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Brentano's Empirical Psychology: An English Translation with an Evaluation of Its Influence upon Contemporary Scientific Psychology Volume 1

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Brentano's Empirical Psychology: An English Translation
With an Evaluation of Its Influence Upon
Contemporary Scientific Psychology

Volume I
A Critical Introduction to
Franz Brentano

by
Anton C. Rancurello

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

1966
LIFE

Antos C. Rancurello was born in S. Damiano Macra, Italy, December 18, 1921.

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III
A psychological sophistication which contains no component of historical orientation seems to me to be no sophistication at all. --- E. G. Boring

Anyone who is practically acquainted with scientific work is aware that those who refuse to go beyond fact rarely get as far as fact. --- T. H. Huxley

PREFACE

The suggestion to translate Franz Brentano's *Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt*, with a critical introduction as a companion, was made several years ago by Dr. Frank J. Kobler, Professor of Psychology and Director of the Clinical Training Program at Loyola University (Chicago), in a Seminar on Contemporary Psychological Literature. The very context surrounding this suggestion clearly defined its frame of reference: the undertaking was not meant to be a nostalgic "retrogression" to hypothetical "good old days" in psychology, or a futile, though learned, exercise in erudition; rather, it implied that Brentano's thinking, through its historical influences and its own inner dynamism, was continuous with present-day trends and projected future developments in our science. More in particular, Professor Kobler's own specific academic and professional interest in clinical psychology implied that Brentano's orientation fitted into the mainstream of what broadly may be labeled dynamic psychology, and more narrowly existential-personalistic psychology (as to subject matter of study), and holistic-phenomenological psychology (as to preferred methods of research).
At first, the writer's newly found interest and dedication to sound training in scientific psychology came into rather sharp conflict with his formal background in philosophy, as to his commitment to follow through with the above mentioned suggestion. Indeed, his doubts in the matter still persisted at a distance of two to three years, even after reception of the following personal letter from Professor E. G. Boring, who stated in part: "It would seem to me that a translation of Brentano's *Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt* would be a very useful undertaking and would promote an intelligent understanding of the background of modern psychology by English-speaking graduate students of psychology. They never seem to be able to understand what Brentano was driving at and of course they do not, as a rule, read German very well. If there could be added to this an introduction and commentary of a kind that would make Brentano's meaning clear to American graduate students of psychology, that would put him into perspective in the historical scene, indicating his relation to the scholastic tradition and his other background, and showing further the nature of his influence, if all that could be done the monograph would become very valuable indeed, not only for graduate education but for the other psychologists who are supposed to be already educated." It was only in the wake of continuous keen interest in this project by Dr. Kobler and other psychology professors at Loyola University that the writer's doubts in the matter were resolved—in practice, if not in principle. Therefore, it was a very rewarding experience when, some-
time later on, he received the following endorsement from another leading American psychologist, Professor G. W. Allport, in a personal letter: "It excites me greatly to hear that you have translated Brentano's Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt. Professor Boring was likewise pleased with this news. It should have been translated 50 to 75 years ago. So you are performing a belated service of great magnitude. I shall watch for the publication eagerly."

Unless the writer is mistaken, all indications are that the context and atmosphere in psychology are more receptive of, and show a greater degree of "belonginess" with, the present project and interest now, in comparison with only a decade ago. Witness, for example: (1) the formation within the American Psychological Association of a Division of Philosophical Psychology, and a Division of the History of Psychology; (2) the founding of a Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, and the increased pace at which books and articles are published on the impact and meaning of existentialism, phenomenology, and "humanism" upon psychology, and the even greater demand across the land for seminars, workshops, lectures on practical applications of these theoretical frames of reference, be it in the clinical area, or in counseling, education, teaching, social interaction and communication, etc.; and (3) on a more restricted, though not less significant level, the "second look" which American psychologists are more and more boldly taking at their science and at themselves, as indicated among other things by numerous book reviews on
their unofficial forum, Contemporary Psychology, and by the following articles recently published on their official journal, the American Psychologist: "The mystery-mastery complex in contemporary psychology" (Bakan, 1965), "Will psychologists study human problems?" (Sanford, 1965), and "The teaching of psychology and the psychology we teach" (McLeod, 1965).

In at least one basic common inspiration, the preceding trends and events in psychology seem to go back to the frame of reference and vision of the two captions quoted at the beginning of this writing, and through them, to Brentano's orientation. Brentano, in fact, is perhaps unique among modern thinkers in respect to the breadth and depth of his historical orientation; and he himself went beyond fact, beyond his empirical psychology, not in the sense of renouncing it, but in the sense of incorporating it into a broader, more comprehensive synthesis of fact.

Among other things, this new synthesis involved the clear recognition on his part of the indispensable role of experimentation in all types of psychological researches, and his consequent repeated efforts to obtain an Institute and a Laboratory of psychology at the University of Vienna. Within this context, although these efforts were in vain, one may legitimately wonder what kind of laboratory "Brentano's Laboratory" would have been; what its functional organization would have looked like, what kind of research projects would have filled its rooms, what spirit would have bestirred the ongoing activities and the people involved in them. The answers to these hypo-
theoretical questions, even though hypothetical themselves, may very well be a close approximation to "what might have been." First of all, "Brentano's Laboratory" would not have been in the nature of either a medieval castle or a more recent ivory tower, both removed in their own ways from real life, from the problems confronting people individually and collectively; hence, secondly, it would have then been an Action Research Center, in the best spirit of Lewinian tradition and other contemporary trends in psychology, aiming in principle at investigating all that we now consider essential in psychology; and thirdly, it would have been moved, not by the weight of opposition to Wundt's laboratory, but instead by an independent, essentially holistic and dynamic leitmotiv.

In terms of general organization, this study comprises three closely inter-related chapters. The first chapter offers a portrait, as against a mere composite picture, of Brentano's life, personality, and works, and as such paves the way for a synopsis in the second chapter of his orientation and stand on psychological issues. There logically follows, in the third chapter, a general appraisal of Brentano's significance in contemporary psychology.

An annotated bibliography of Brentano's writings and of works bearing upon his thought is included in the present study both as a supplement to the text proper, and as an independent contribution. As conceived and as they stand, the annotations are much more extensive as to quantity of infor-
mation, and much more comprehensive as to quality of appraisal, than those typically found in the usual annotated bibliographies. In essence, they represent the writer's own way of utilizing E. G. Boring's timely suggestion concerning the value of "a commentary of a kind" in a study of Brentano's thought such as the present one.

But before proceeding with his own "business," there remains an important and pleasant task for the writer. He wishes to express his debt of gratitude to Professor Frank J. Kobler, as the inspiring source and indefatigable advisor of this study; in addition, he also wishes to express his appreciation for the help and encouragement given to him by Professors Vincent Herr, S. J., and Edmund Marx, also of Loyola University. Moreover, his gratitude goes in memory of Walter Roesch, S. M., formerly Head Librarian at the University of Dayton (Dayton, Ohio), for his invaluable and priceless assistance in securing many of the sources for this investigation. For the typing of the manuscripts of both volumes comprising the present work, the writer is deeply indebted to Mrs. Lois Cardwell. Not only her technical skill, but her devotion to a lengthy and exacting task was sincerely appreciated.
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I
Franz Brentano, grandson of Pietro Antonio Brentano, an Italian merchant who had resettled in Frankfurt, was born on January 16, 1838, at Marienberg, near Boppard on the Rhine. His grandfather, a widower with five children, had married in 1774, at age thirty-nine, the seventeen year old daughter of Sophie de Laroche, Maximilienne, whom Goethe had met and admired the previous year during a few days stay with her mother, and subsequently used as a source of inspiration to write his Werther.1 Three of the children born of this marriage, Klemens, Christian, Franz' father, and Isabelle, commonly called Bettina, were destined to leave a characteristic impress upon German cultural trends.

Klemens Brentano (1778-1842), poet and novelist, was a leader of the second movement in German romanticism. Emotionally unstable, he led an erratic and troubled life both before his "conversion"2 to Catholicism in

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1 There seems to be some exaggeration, for the sake of literary contrast, but also a kernel of truth in the following statements (Angelloz, 1958): "This lovely and intelligent girl condemned herself to a life among oil casks and herring barrels at the side of a dull, homely husband. She was delighted when the poet became an attentive friend of the family, but her jealous husband became anxious, doubtless as a result of domestic scenes, and Goethe was invited not to return" (p. 61).

2 Like his younger brother and sister, he had been reared in the Catholic faith, but this religious training was apparently strongly colored by the maternal grandmother's skepticism in the spirit of 18th century Enlightenment.
1817 and after 1824, the year of the death of Anne Catherine Emmerick, a stigmatized nun, whose "revelations" he had laboriously collected over a five year period (1819-1824) and later on published in twenty-four volumes. Showing signs of derangement some years before his death, he was asked by Franz's father to come and live with his family at their home in Aschaffenburg. Four years old when his famous uncle died, Franz must have retained some personal memories of him.

Bettina Brentano (1785-1859) married Count Ludwig Achim von Arnim, an intimate friend of her brother Klemens, and like him a prominent figure of the romantic group of Heidelberg. She herself was a writer of such vivid imagination to be called the "Sibyl of romanticism." Of the eleven volumes comprising her collected writings, probably the best known is Goethes Briefwechsel mit einem Kind, inspired by, and expressing her ideal love with the poet.

Christian Brentano (1784-1851), although less versatile than his sister and brother, achieved more than passing fame in German Catholic circles as a writer of religious treatises. While showing none of his brother's personal eccentricities, his dedication to religion, following in the wake of his early adoption, by age seventeen, of "a system of complete determinism, indeed, materialism" (Kraus, 1919, p. 4), is not entirely free from certain elements of exaggeration. His late marriage at age fifty-one (1835) to Emilie Gegner (1810-1881), then only twenty-five years old, seems to be a psychological expression of this inner condition. In this context, it is of
further interest to notice that Emilie herself was "imbued to the uttermost
with a religious outlook and religious interests" (Stumpf, 1919, p. 97), and
became known as an author of pious books.³

The cultural contributions made by Franz Brentano's uncle and aunt, and
by his father, undoubtedly justify the reference, invariably found in most
biographical sketches of his life, to the fact that he was born into a family
of "historical renown" which belongs to the German "intellectual aristocracy
through its tradition." Needless to say that the task of carrying on this
tradition along still different avenues was fulfilled to a very high degree
both by him, as will be shown, and by his younger brother Lujo (1844-1931),
the recipient of the 1927 Nobel Peace prize, and a well-known thinker in the
history of politico-economic thought.⁴ In addition, at least indirectly,
this tradition may be said to be reflected in the complex achievements of his
pupil and cousin, Count George Frederick Von Hartling (1843-1919), as a promi-

³These reflections do not call into question the sincerity of the re-
ligious outlook and practice "as a characteristic note of the whole Brentano
family" (Hernandez, 1953, p. 14). They merely raise what seems to be a
justifiable doubt concerning their degree of inner harmony and balance. A
clarification of this doubt would appear to be an essential component in
any study in depth of Franz Brentano's religious crises, and might throw
significant, and perhaps unexpected, light upon them.

⁴Within this context, it seems pertinent to mention in passing that
Franz Brentano's only son (born 1888), John C. Brentano, now professor
emeritus at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, has had a success-
ful teaching career in the field of physics.
F. Brentano was a prominent Catholic philosopher, writer, and political figure.\(^5\)

Franz Brentano received his early education from a Catholic priest who had been hired by his parents as a teacher for their children,\(^6\) and completed his secondary education (1855) at the local Gymnasium in Aschaffenburg, where the family had relocated the same year of his birth. During his years at this Institute, not only did he excel in the study of classical languages, but "showed such talent for mathematics that he almost chose this discipline for his life goal" (Pidoll, 1918, p. 443). The increasingly important role that the mathematical concept of probability later on came to play in his theoretical orientation testifies to this latent predilection and to a concomitant natural bent of mind in a way which to some extent parallels the intellectual development of Descartes and Leibniz.

From a psychological point of view, the reason why Brentano did not follow his penchant for mathematics seems to be more complex than Pidoll leads one to believe. His decision to devote himself to philosophy was apparently prompted not by a mere matter-of-fact knowledge that this science ranked higher than mathematics, but instead by the earnest hope and expectation to find in its contemporary systems a satisfactory solution for a serious re-

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\(^5\) He was the grandson of the youngest sister of his father. His varied political role reached the highest point when he became Chancellor of the empire in 1917.

\(^6\) In addition to their two sons, Franz and Lujo, Christian and Emilie Brentano had three daughters: Maria, Sophia and Claudine.
religious crisis he first experienced toward the end of his Gymnasium, at age seventeen.

This attitude and state of mind of Brentano deserve closer psychological scrutiny. First of all, one is struck by the very close parallel with similar experiences on his father's part: in both instances the religious crisis occurred at age seventeen for essentially the same reasons (centering around the problem of determinism in general, and the doctrine of original sin in particular); and in both instances a solution was first sought through philosophy but actually found, at this juncture, in a new and more intense commitment to the practice of religion. In the second place, it seems important to call attention to the fact that Brentano was won over to the Church "basically through the influence of his mother and his Catholic friends," and that "thereupon he dedicated himself to it with enthusiasm, deciding voluntarily to become a priest" (Kraus, 1919, p. 4).

Kraus stresses the voluntary aspect of this decision, apparently viewing it as a decisive factor to be taken into account in any effort made to understand Brentano's subsequent separation from the Church (1874). At best, this is a naive simplification of complex events in our author's life. By contrast, one is likely to gain a better perspective in the matter, if these events are viewed in the light of a cardinal trait of his personality: a certain single-mindedness and intolerance of ambiguities. Translated into motivational terms, this trait enables one to see that both his dedication to, and separation from the Church had to be absolute. In addition, in re-
pect to his decision to become a priest, this same condition suggests that it was first arrived at prematurely without adequate reflection; it is almost as if Brentano could not even tolerate the relativity of the time factor involved in any decision-making process, or at least the uncertainty unavoidably connected with it.

In this will-for-absoluteness one finds again a close parallel between Brentano and his father. But while his father apparently found adequate avenues in a variety of religious undertakings which satisfied his quest, Brentano himself, more gifted and more exacting intellectually, failed, and, one is strongly tempted to say, was bound to fail. Not even life in a Dominical monastery, which he tried for a brief period (summer of 1862), could satisfy his yearning for perfection in practical life. Viewed from this perspective, his relentless pursuit of intellectual excellence in his advanced education in philosophy and theology bears an undeniable resemblance to an effort at compensation. However, lest this critical reflection be taken out of context and misinterpreted as to its actual import, it should be kept in mind that the prime mover of this pursuit was what Windischer himself (1936), one of his sharpest critics, called a "deep love-of-truth and a pure will-for-truth" (p. 9).

In terms of chronology, after a three-semester sojourn at the local Lyceum in Aschaffenburg, the road to intellectual excellence took Brentano in succession to the Universities of Munich (1856-57), Würzburg (1858) and Berlin (1858-59), to the Academy of Münster (1859-60), and to the University
of Tübingen, where in 1862 he was granted his degree in philosophy, in absentia, with his work, *On the Manifold Meaning of Being according to Aristotle*. Continuing on this road, Brentano devoted himself for the next two years to the study of theology, moving from the Dominical monastery in Graz (Austria) first to Munich and then to the Seminary in Würzburg, where he was ordained a priest in 1864.

Although Frederick Trendelenburg (1802-1872), the well-known German philologist and Aristotelian philosopher at the University of Berlin, and Ignaz von Döllinger (1799-1890), famous and controversial historian and theologian at the University of Munich, are usually mentioned as Brentano's foremost teachers, Franz Clemens (1815-1862) and Ernst von Lasaulx (1805-1861) also deserve this title. The former, professor at the Academy of Münster, highly esteemed by the pupils for his method, depth and mastery of doctrine, first made Brentano familiar with scholasticism; the latter, a very complex figure, probably influenced him most directly through his scholarly interests not only in philosophy, but also in classical philology and aesthetics, and through his stimulating and dynamic teaching at the University of Munich.7

7Seiterich (1936) makes reference to Brentano's acquaintanship with Heinrich Denifle (1844-1905), outstanding medieval historian and Dominican priest, during his stay in Graz. It is highly unlikely, however, to say the least, that any significant intellectual exchange took place between them because of differences in their level of studies at that time.
The question of how specific the influence of these distinguished thinkers was upon Brentano would necessitate a comparative study of their views. This study has never been undertaken, and is obviously beyond the scope of the present work. Ultimately, however, such a study would seem likely to reveal that this influence was more general than specific, in the sense that it furnished him with a springboard for subsequent independent intellectual elaboration, as opposed to a well defined platform. What is true of philosophers across the centuries, i.e., that none of them can be considered as his ideal teacher, seems to be even more true of his real teachers in actual life. In support of this view, let it suffice to mention that Brentano was barely halfway through his advanced education when, in the Spring of 1860, he first conceived the idea of the four developmental stages of philosophy - an idea which seems to lie at the basis of his "absolutely doubt-free conviction" that he "was called from within and from above" (Husserl, 1919, p. 160) to be the "pioneer" of a true Philosophia perennis.8

8Brentano himself later on told Stumpf (1919, p. 89-90) that the idea of a satisfactory philosophy of the history of philosophy came to him with all the impact of "an evident and redeeming" illumination, when, otherwise perplexed at the engulfing contradictions existing among philosophers, he was just recovering from a serious illness. The perceptive reader hardly needs to be reminded of the close analogy between Brentano and Descartes with regard to their conversion to philosophy and their concomitant "consciousness of a high mission" toward it. As superbly described by Husserl, with the passing of time, this consciousness became all-encompassing in Brentano, being reflected in "every trait, in every movement, in the innerly and outwardly oriented look of his soulful eyes, in his whole style of expression" (p. 154).
In terms of published writings, Brentano's originality and independence of thinking can already be seen rather clearly in his doctoral dissertation study mentioned above, and stands out even more sharply in his second study The Psychology of Aristotle, especially his Doctrine of Vounίκος, by means of which he habilitated himself as a Dozent at Würzburg during the summer of 1866 - a study which went into the official records of the University as "the best work presented to this philosophical faculty in the course of half a century" (Stumpf, 1919, p. 89).

Brentano received even greater and more specific official recognition for his Habilitation Theses, being commended for the "keenness of his mind... the ease in interpreting uncommon ideas... and the many-sidedness of his knowledge in the field of philosophy and exact research" (Stumpf, 1919, p. 89). Although these theses covered traditional philosophical problems, in many respects they bore the stamp of his personality, as reflected in the "strength of his convictions," and of his Weltanschaung, insofar as the latter was to remain "oriented in two directions - toward the past and toward the future" (Windischer, 1936, p. 8). This proved to be especially true of his stand on scientific method, for which he was also officially commended.

This twofold directionality of thinking was to remain Brentano's bane as well as the major source of his strength throughout his teaching career, spanning across almost three decades, first at Würzburg (1866-1873) and then in Vienna (1874-1894). On the one hand, in fact, it greatly appealed to, and influenced his young students, for youth has been, and will always be, chal-
lenged to the very limit of their resources only when the wisdom of the past and the anticipations of the future are brought to bear upon the present. On the other hand, however, it aroused the antagonism, more or less overt, but typically rather intense, of many of his colleagues who stood for either the uncritical acceptance or the skeptical rejection of the established order.

In general, Brentano's appeal to youth is clearly reflected in the large class attendance to any of the courses he ever offered. Within this context, it may not have been by mere chance that the only non-medical courses taken by Freud at the University of Vienna (1874-1876) were among those taught by Brentano; and, of course, it was not by mere chance that very frequently following his lectures many students joined him in a "common walk" for further philosophical discussions.⁹

More specifically, this appeal is mirrored in the number of outstanding pupils and "grandpupils" who were inspired by him to become scientists in the broad sense of the term, and who subsequently achieved independent stature and renown. Among the former, in addition to George von Hartling, pre-

⁹Combining in one Aristotle's peripatetic style and Socrates' maieutic art, these discussions apparently acquired such a typical character to give rise to the term Brentanieren (Stumpf, 1919, p. 146). Specific reference to the fact that "Brentano was a master in the Socratic maieutics" is made by Husserl (1919, p. 155).
viously mentioned, are Hermann Schell, Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Franz Hillenbrand, Christian von Ehrenfels, Alexius Meinong, and Edmund Husserl; among the latter, Oskar Kraus, Alfred Kastil, and Franziska Mayer-Hillenbrand, well known editors of his works.10

Kraus (1919) is obviously belaboring the issue under consideration when he claims that one can find among Brentano’s students "all shades from the extreme right to the extreme left" (p. 11). However, there is a kernel of truth in this statement that adds a new dimension to the range of his influence. Perhaps, it is in the field of religion that we could find the best approximation to the two extremes mentioned above, respectively in von Hertling’s stand as a staunch Catholic figure and Schell’s role as the leader of German modernism. In the field of philosophy, instead, the opposition between von Hertling’s neo-thomism and Husserl’s transcendental idealism can hardly be conceptualized in these terms. At least from the point of view of Brentano’s own theoretical orientation, these two systems as such would both belong to the extreme right.

In many respects, and in line with the general frame of reference given above, Kraus' statement is more readily applicable to Brentano’s opponents from among his colleagues. Perhaps the most interesting, and undoubtedly surprising, thing in this connection is the fact that the opposition to

10 To be complete, this list should also include the names of important thinkers, such as Theodore Ziehen in Germany, James Ward and George Stout in England, and Francesco DeSarlo in Italy, who openly recognized their indebtedness to Brentano.
Brentano at the University of Vienna followed the very same lines as the opposition to him at Würzburg, in spite of the drastic change in his personal life from his status as a priest to that of a lay professor, and in spite of significant changes in his theoretical outlook.

At Würzburg itself, the "liberal circles" within the University consistently viewed Brentano as a mystic, a scholastic, a one-sided Aristotelian, indeed, as a Jesuit in disguise,\(^{11}\) and successfully fought against his promotion to full professor of philosophy, when the academic Senate recommended him for this position in 1872, because he was a priest. The inconsistency is quite obvious. On the one hand, the opponents of Brentano-the-priest would undoubtedly have fought even harder against the retention of Brentano-turned-layman even in his lower rank of professor Extrarodinarius, if he had not voluntarily resigned this position;\(^{12}\) on the other hand, these same

\(^{11}\) Brentano himself mentioned some of these epithets in a letter to Stumpf dated February 25, 1872 (Stumpf, 1919, p. 124).

\(^{12}\) In this respect, the opposition of Catholic theologians at Würzburg, which was first voiced openly in 1872, would have strengthened the hand of the "liberals." A realistic analysis of this situation must have played a certain role in leading Brentano to give up his teaching position when he left the Church the following year. In taking this step, however, Brentano seems to have been motivated basically by higher considerations - a genuine sense of respect for his old Catholic colleagues and students, and the conviction that he could not ethically hold onto a position which had been given to him as a priest.
opponents very conveniently, it would seem, chose to ignore all evidence which unmistakably ran counter to their too easy and superficial stereotyping. Among other things, such evidence included Brentano's basic revision of traditional logic, his extensive treatment of the English empiricist philosophers in his lectures, his published study on Comte (1869), his open stand against the doctrine of papal infallibility strongly defended by the Jesuits,\textsuperscript{13} and a trip to England (Spring of 1872) to meet in person the outstanding contemporary representatives of a theoretical orientation in which he saw much vitality.\textsuperscript{14} On the face of it, therefore, much of the opposition of Brentano's liberal critics appears to have been actually motivated by deeper underlying conservative leanings on their part. It was not so much the elements in Brentano's orientation which looked toward the past that aroused their mistrust, as instead those elements which were clearly

\textsuperscript{13}Brentano had been asked by Ketteler, bishop of Mainz and an intimate friend of his, to prepare a comprehensive study of this doctrine in 1869. This study was published the following year, before the actual proclamation of the dogma itself by the Vatican Council, with the consent of the German ecclesiastic hierarchy meeting officially at Fulda. Although this study was non-partisan in spirit, in the sense that Brentano based his opposition upon philosophical, theological, and historical arguments, "it contained many errors of information...and interpretation" (Hernandez, 1953, p. 19).

\textsuperscript{14}Brentano was looking forward especially to a meeting with J. S. Mill, but was unable to do so because Mill was then traveling abroad. However, he did meet Spencer, Mivart, and Robertson Smith; in addition, he also visited with Cardinal Newman. His plan to meet with Mill in Avignon the following year was again thwarted, this time by Mill's death (1925 a, p. 62).
setting the stage for a different type of liberalism in respect to both the overall conception of philosophy and its teaching within the University setting.

Unwittingly, Brentano's catalytic personality as a teacher, and the role into which he cast himself as a pioneer of a new perennial trend in philosophy contributed to create and perpetuate this atmosphere of antagonism. The very nature and dominating themes of his two inaugural professorial addresses, respectively, *The Philosophy of Schelling in its Different Phases: Exposition and Critique* at Würzburg, and *On the Causes of Discouragement in the Philosophical Domain* in Vienna, played an important role in this respect. That the first of these two addresses was of such import, as implied here, is sufficiently proved by the fact that he weaved it anew into a lecture delivered to the Philosophical Association of Vienna at a distance of more than two decades (1889). Within the same context, the overall impact of the second address is incisively revealed by the following manifesto laying down which course of action he was going to pursue and why: "The requisite conditions," so went this manifesto, "are given; the method is provided; the path for research is charted" (1929 a, p. 99). Coming toward the very end of the address, and contrasting strongly in its laconic brevity with much of the style of the previous discussion, this pronouncement was obviously timed to convince the audience of the depth of his convictions and personal confidence in the matter.

As if sanctioned by the responsiveness of the students to his teaching,
Brentano's convictions grew even deeper throughout his career at the University of Vienna. By contrast, his confidence seemed to have been put through the crucible not only by the relentless opposition of many colleagues, but also by further crises in his life. The opposition to Brentano at this University was even more caustic and more sharply delineated along a left and a right than at Würzburg, as clearly indicated by the following labels that were pinned on him: "a clerical obscurantist" (Brentano, 1929 a, p. 158, n. 10), "a Scholastic, a Jesuit in disguise, a rhetorician, a monger, a sophist" (Husserl, 1919, p. 154). The further crises in Brentano's life included his marriage in 1880 to a Catholic girl, Ida Lieben, with the concomitant unavoidable resignation from his full professorship, the subsequent keenly felt loss of status in his role as a mere Privatdozent, and finally the death of his wife and the severance of his association with the University (1894), which had provided him with at least a semblance of a home for his intellectual life.

15It seems important to call attention here to the fact that these attitudes toward Brentano were being expressed more than a decade after he went to Vienna, when Husserl was a pupil of his (1884-1886).

16It was through the recommendation of Lotze and the influence of the Austrian minister of Education von Stemayer that Brentano had received a full professorship at the University of Vienna on January 22, 1874, against the initial opposition of both the Emperor and Cardinal Rauscher. He lost this position because, unable to marry in Austria, and in order to be able to do so in Saxony, he had to give up his Austrian citizenship. Following his marriage, he returned to the University of Vienna in the lesser role mentioned here, hoping in vain that he would soon be restored to his previous position.
Although symbolic interpretations are typically quite precarious, one would seem to be justified in finding a common meaning between Brentano's final resignation from teaching and his separation from the Church three decades earlier. In effect, both of these events in his life represented for him the collapse of two official vocations: the religious and the philosophical. As perceptive a man as he was, he could hardly have failed to sense this implication, before he took these two steps; and no thinker of lesser stature than his could have retained as much faith, as he did, in what these two vocations basically stand for, after he arrived at his decisions. The roads to these decisions were both long and at times tortuous, but ultimately Brentano proceeded to their very end with increasing decisiveness and determination.

The acute period of Brentano's final religious crisis lasted three years (1870-1873): the inner break first occurring in the Spring of 1870,17 and the open separation from the Church on April 11, 1873. In essence, the former took place because he was no longer able to see "how the absolute certainty, which befits the act of faith, is compatible with its lack of inner evidence"

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17 Brentano's religious crisis, therefore, preceded the proclamation of the dogma of papal infallibility (July 18, 1870), rather than developing as a result of it, as was the case with Döllinger. That this crisis was not contingent in any significant way, if at all, upon the course of action of his former teacher is shown by the following passage in a letter which he wrote to Stumpf toward the end of the Winter 1870-71: "I have no close connection with the partisans of the anti-infallibility movement. You know how much I disagree with the doctrine of infallibility. However, I have no trust in these men" (Stumpf, 1919, p. 122).
(Seiterich, 1936, p. 19-20), and the latter followed as a matter of course in due time. It is easy to see that Brentano's double course of action at this juncture was already governed by the following basic canon in his outlook formulated later on: "man judging with evidence, i.e., the knower, is the measure of all things, of those which are, that they are, of those which are not, that they are not" (Kraus, 1930 a, p. XV). While this principle is far from being itself evident, it served to justify for him the conclusion that both faith proper and positive religion were among the things "which are not," and hence he rejected them. At the same time, however, the same principle was to be the moving force behind his indefatigable efforts throughout the rest of his life to erect a theistic and optimistic world-view upon a sound basis.

Brentano's separation from the Church was neither preceded nor followed by antagonism on his part. By contrast, he "often spoke with bitterness"

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18 Within the context of his discussion of "The religious development of Franz Brentano" (pp. 17-25), Seiterich touches briefly upon some specific articles of faith which troubled our author. It is hoped that a qualified writer will undertake a detailed study of both of these issues, not only from a theoretico-historical, but also from a psychological, point of view.

19 Brentano left the Church as a symbol of positive religions. It is for this reason that he never joined any other denomination, even though he was urged to do so by his friends, including his brother Lujo.

20 Husserl's testimony in the matter is worth quoting: "About Catholicism," Husserl (1919) states, "I never heard him talk except in a tone of great esteem" (p. 156). It is to be regretted, instead, that in the controversy which developed concerning Brentano's marriage in 1880, some elements of the Catholic Press lowered the discussion to the level of unsupported innuendoes.
against the official attitude and prevailing atmosphere toward him at the University of Vienna, which ultimately led to his resignation.\textsuperscript{21}

The opposition which Brentano met both at Wurzburg and Vienna coupled with his strong, and in many respects compulsive, striving for excellence in his intellectual pursuits, and with his inner travails, exacted a heavy psychological toll from him at times. He himself told Stumpf (1919) that the preparation for some of his lectures at Wurzburg "had strained his nerves in a colossal way" (p. 100), and "frequently complained...about his weak nerves" (Husserl, 1919, p. 161) during the years when Husserl was his student in Vienna. The specific psychological components of these stress periods are not known. There seems to be some indirect evidence, however, that rather deep depressive trends were involved. At any rate, as he himself intimates in his \textit{Last Wishes for Austria}, this was the case at the time of his departure from Vienna.

Having bidden farewell to Austria, Brentano sojourned for a short while in Switzerland and Rome, and then took up residence in Florence in 1896. For two decades, in striking similarity to the length of time he spent in Vienna,

\textsuperscript{21}Among other things, Brentano complained about the fact that, as \textit{Privatdozent}, he was no longer able to direct doctoral dissertations. Had he not been handicapped in this respect, it seems likely that a number of young promising students would have wanted to work under his guidance and perhaps follow him in his orientation or at least use it as a starting point for their own independent thinking. Perhaps even Husserl himself might have been among them. The fact that he dedicated his doctoral dissertation to Brentano, referring to him as "my one and only teacher of philosophy," lends some plausibility to this conjecture.
this city, famous not only for its rich cultural tradition but also for the exquisite hospitality of its people, gave him a home and a homeland.22 Perhaps even more than when he went to Austria, Brentano must have felt that he had come to Italy "with inherited warm sympathy for this land and its people," and that he had "found the most friendly reception" not only in its intellectual capital, but across the peninsula.23 This pleasant circumstance was undoubtedly a welcomed psychological experience for him, at a time when he needed it so much; perhaps even Italy's proverbial "sunny" climate helped a little, in view of his declining physical health throughout this time. But again all this came to a sudden end in 1915 when Italy entered World War I. Because of strong feelings in the matter, on account of his open pacifist stand, he again felt compelled to leave his home and homeland and moved to Zurich, Switzerland. He died there two years later, on March 17, 1917, at age 80. Uttered during his very last hours of life, the following words sum-

22 During these years, Brentano maintained a summer home at Schönburg on the Danube, which he used to call affectionately his "New Aschaffenburg." Both this home and his residence in Florence soon became the meeting place for numerous former students and friends. Among others, Husserl visited with him once at Schönburg, and was a guest of his in Florence in 1908.

23 The quotations are taken from Brentano's Last Wishes for Austria (1895, p. 9) and, of course, express his feelings toward this country in general and Vienna in particular. That Brentano came to feel equally at home in Florence and Italy is indicated by his regular active contacts with many contemporary Italian thinkers, and by the very sympathetic interest that some of these thinkers showed toward his views. Among other things, this interest led to the Italian edition of his Classification of Psychic Phenomena (1911) which in turn, as Brentano himself indicates (1911 a, Preface), led to the German edition of the same work.
marize vividly his clear grasp of the drama of his human existence in the light of his deep sense of the divine: "It is so difficult to overcome the senses;" "What God ordains, we must welcome. Only at times it reaches beyond our weak strength" (Kastil, 1951, p. 18).

It was Brentano's good luck that throughout his periods of stress and crises, just as during the undoubtedly numerous moments of inner peace and harmony, he remained surrounded by a loyal, though relatively small, group of friends among his colleagues and acquaintances, and enjoyed his student's genuine and warm admiration. In addition, he was perhaps even more fortunate to find an affectionate and sensitive companion not only in his first, but also in his second wife, Emília Ruprecht, whom he married in 1897. The stabilizing influence of these factors was probably great, though

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24 Among Brentano's friends at Würzburg, who achieved fame in their own fields of scientific endeavors, were Adolph Fick (physiology), Johann Wislicenus (chemistry), and Frederick Prym (mathematics); among those in Vienna, Marsxow von Fleischl (physiology), Theodore Meynert (psychiatry), Franz Miklosich (philology) and Karl F. Claus (zoology), and among those who came to know him during his later years in Italy, Ludwig Baltzmann (physics and mathematics) and Cosmo Guastella (philosophy). Breuer was not only Brentano's friend, but his family physician in Vienna, and his correspondent in "long written discussions on the Darwinian hypothesis and related problems" (Kraus, 1919, p. 82).

25 Husserl (1919) expressed this admiration most eloquently, stating: "he himself felt that my gratitude for what he had become to me through his personality and the living force of his doctrines was indelible" (p. 166).

26 Both Stumpf and Husserl offer vivid recollections of this harmonious relationship. Their testimony adds strength to Kraus' dismissal, as unfounded, of a lone dissenter's opinion concerning the unhappiness of Brentano's first wife in her married life (1919, p. 13).
not measurable according to standard parameters. Basically, however, the answer for his resiliency is to be found in the "strength of his personality" (Husserl), his "good heart" (Kraus), and his keen gifts of mind.

Brentano's strong personality manifested itself even in his early childhood, according to the testimony of his sister Claudine, and was undoubtedly the basic motivating force which led him to charter his life, as much as he did, according to his intellectual convictions. In his everyday life, however, both his strong will and his equally strong convictions were greatly tempered and counterbalanced by the simplicity of the man who frequently interrupted the logic-tight train of thought in his lectures or learned con-

27 Kraus (1919) makes reference to "the role of friendship in Brentano's life" (p. X) in the index of his study, but then fails to develop this theme as such in the text proper. Yet an investigation of this topic would likely be very enlightening and very interesting. To be complete such an investigation should include an analysis of available scientific letters which Brentano exchanged with such important thinkers as Ernst Mach, Federico Enriques, Vincent Lutoslawski, Eugene Rolles, Gustav Schneider. In addition, it should be extended to encompass a detailed study of his "strong family sense" (Kraus, 1919, p. 80).

28 "Of his early childhood," Claudine writes (1918), "I remember his strong will, which he once imposed in a very categorical fashion" (p. 469).

29 A lesser, but not insignificant, expression of this characteristic thought-action sequence in Brentano is found in his open and learned challenge to the views of the Rector himself of the University of Vienna (1893 c). That this feature of Brentano's life style had its inherent "weaknesses" has been suggested above in the present study, and is recognized by Stumpf himself (1919, p. 1143). In view of this, Kraus' tireless efforts to underscore always and only Brentano's positive traits, invariably raising them to the superlative level, while undoubtedly well-intentioned, do not reflect scientific accuracy.
versations with a spontaneous joke or witticism; who found himself equally at home in his library, pondering over the deepest problems confronting humanity, as in his garden, tending the soil and watching nature unfold its latent potentialities; who conversed with equal interest and zest with his learned friends and with the laborers working around his house, even to the point of actually sharing the latter's toil; who himself never paid any attention to life's comforts, but at the same time was ever mindful of the convenience of others. In terms of a broad generalization, one is tempted to say that Brentano epitomized in his own life his conception of ethical "orthonomy" (as opposed to heteronomy and autonomy). Certainly, this ideal was a source of personal strength in coping with life stresses and a guiding rule in all his scientific pursuits.

In terms of published works during his life time, Brentano does not rank high, at least not according to present day criteria of mass intellectual productions. Yet the little that he put into print shows clearly his originality and individuality as a thinker, and the unity, within differentiation and progression, of his thought itself. In addition, even the worshippers of Bacon's proverbial idola tribus have to reckon with the fact that, under the editorship of Oskar Kraus, Alfred Kastil and Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand, the methodical and well planned publication of some previously printed works and

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30 Both Stumpf and Husserl (1919) give vivid descriptions and examples of the simplicity and good-natured side of Brentano's personality.
many posthumous manuscripts, since 1924, has already produced fifteen solid volumes.\textsuperscript{31} Even if duplications in several manuscripts were to be eliminated, we would still be left with an imposing monument of scientific achievement.

With the exception of his four studies on Aristotle (1862, 1867, 1882, 1911 b, 1911 c), the only complete unitary work which Brentano published was his \textit{Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint} (in the original 1874 edition, and in the 1911 edition of part of it, with the addition of an important appendix, under the title of \textit{Classification of Psychic Phenomena}). The other writings are either short single studies (1869, 1874 b, 1876, 1883, 1889, 1892 a, b, and c, 1893 a, b, and c, 1895 a, 1897, 1901, 1908), most typically in the original form of lectures, or a composite of several such studies, such as his \textit{My Last Wishes for Austria} (1895 b) and \textit{Researches in Sensory Psychology}.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{31}The motivation behind Brentano's "reluctance" to publish has not been explored with any degree of accuracy. To claim, as it is generally done, that the major, if not exclusive, reason for this reluctance was his total lack of interest in fame is at best a simplification. Among other things, this view hardly agrees with the simple fact that he always expressed such undisguised, though unpresumptuous, satisfaction whenever his views were given recognition in a work by another author. By contrast, it would seem that perfectionistic trends in his personality most likely played a very important role in this context. Of course, this hypothesis would have to be investigated in detail along with other possible contributing factors.

\textsuperscript{32}Except for further introductory comments upon Brentano's psychological writings which are necessary in view of the basic orientation of the present study, no effort is made at this point to identify in greater detail his other works. Sufficient information in this respect is contained in the annotated references.
Brentano wrote his *Psychology* "in the span of a few months" (Kastil, 1951, p. 13) toward the end of 1873 and the beginning of 1874. The Preface itself bears the date, March 7, 1874. Wundt had just published the first half of his *Principles of Physiological Psychology* in 1873, and Brentano took it into account in his work, in effect offering a conception of psychology radically different from the one advocated by the founder of this science in its experimental orientation. Yet, in order to fully understand the meaning and originality of Brentano's point of view, it is important to keep in mind that he would have written his book even without Wundt, and that in writing it he was not motivated to any significant degree, if at all, by mere opposition to this author. The real reason behind his work was that he had something worth saying in its own right and said it when the time was ripe for him.

Several factors played a direct, though variable, role in this connection. Perhaps, very important among them, but most easily overlooked, are factors in his own personality, his life experience, and his bent of mind. Suffice it to mention here his inclination to "meditation," his restless searching for an overall stable course of action, and his basic conviction that the fulcrum of the whole edifice of knowledge can only be found in man's immediate experience which is "characterized as right."

The above conviction, in effect, sanctioned the marriage between rationalism and empiricism, with the latter playing the most immediate role in leading Brentano to lay the foundation for as lasting and harmonious a re-
relationship as possible between them in a science of psychology which was to be empirical without being empiricistic, and rational without being rationalistic. His effort to establish the autonomy of such a science in the face of the reductionistic spirit of either physiologically or sociologically oriented authors, such as Maudsley and Comte, seems particularly significant in this respect. In view of this, his extended personal study of 18th and 19th century English thinkers must be considered as another important factor accounting for his 1874 Psychology. His trip to England in 1872, in all probability, served to crystallize his motivation to write this volume.

Still another factor is to be found in the fact that Brentano had twice (summer 1871, and winter 1872-1873) taught a course in psychology at Würzburg in which several basic themes, as found in his subsequent work, were already clearly stated and discussed (Stumpf, 1919, p. 135). This factor, together with his freedom from any other activity, following a trip to Paris during the Spring and early Summer of 1873, account sufficiently for the short period of time it took him to complete this work, in spite of difficulties he met in finding original sources needed for immediate reference.³³

As conceived in 1874, Brentano's Psychology would have comprised six "books." Two of these books, dealing respectively with "psychology as a science" and "psychic phenomena in general," make up the first volume which

³³His short trip in November, 1873, to Leipzig, where he called on Weber, Fechner and Drobisch (Stumpf, 1919, p. 130), with whom he takes issue in his Psychology, was probably prompted mainly by his search for some of these sources.
was published then. The other books, which would have investigated "the properties and laws" of imagination (third), of judgment (fourth), and of "affective and volitional states" (fifth), and "the relationship between mind and body," including "the question of whether it is conceivable that psychic life endures after the disintegration of the body" (sixth), were never published as such. The important issue concerning the motives or reasons why Brentano did not carry this plan to completion apparently never came up for specific discussion in his many Socratic dialogues with his favorite and most brilliant students, and he himself never expressed a direct view on the matter in his subsequent writings. The closest he ever came to give us an indirect cue in this respect was in his volume, The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong (1889), where, after presenting this study, as "a fragment of a Descriptive Psychology" (1902, p. VIII), he in turn presents the latter "if not as a continuation" (1902, p. 52), yet still as "an essential stage in the further development of some of the views advocated in (his) Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint" (1902, p. VIII).

The above statements are significant because they show that the basic idea, if not the basic hope, embodied in the original plan of his Psychology remained in the foreground of his thinking. What this idea was, can be inferred rather easily from the following central theme of his 1889 study mentioned above: "In order to gain an insight into the true origin of ethical knowledge it (is) necessary to take some account of the results of...researches in the sphere of descriptive psychology" (1902, p. 10). Brentano
could have added that he was referring to a descriptive psychology of "affective and volitional states." But this was more than obvious from the context of his whole discussion. Equally obvious for us is the overall import of his stand. In essence, Brentano was convinced that as a whole descriptive psychology was necessary "to gain an insight into the true origin" of every, and all types of human knowledge, be it in the realm of metaphysics, logic, natural sciences, or Geisteswissenschaften. In particular, as it pertains to the present discussion, he was convinced that not only the specific problems of aesthetics, logic, epistemology, and ethics, but the problem itself of human existence as such, could not be adequately solved without first investigating their psychological foundation. It was this conviction which prompted the original plan of his Psychology.

True enough, in 1874, Brentano had not made explicit the distinction between "sensory" and "noetic" (intellective) consciousness on the one hand, and between "descriptive" or "phenomenological" and "genetic" or "explanatory" psychology on the other (1929 a, pp. XIX-XX). His analysis then cut across these boundaries so that the lines of demarcation, specifying the relative roles of the two types of consciousness and psychological investigations remain at times hazy. Yet he was very much aware that these lines existed, and let us foresee the blueprint for their further delimitation. It will be sufficient at this point to state that important as the analysis of sensory consciousness was originally, and was to remain subsequently, for
Brentano, the major task which he saw lying ahead of him in his *Psychology* was the vindication of the inalienable rights and indispensable role of noetic consciousness. In the same vein, as useful as he perceived "genetic" psychology to be "for the progress of humanity," he made its very existence as a natural science dependent upon prior descriptive psychological inquiries; this aspect of his thinking, too, can hardly be missed by the attentive reader of his 1874 work. To repeat, in order to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, in 1874, Brentano did not explicitly use the above terms; however, the important fact is that he was already aware then of the basic underlying issues.

Furthermore, in announcing four more "books" as an integral part of his *Psychology* in 1874, Brentano did not state that his ideas in the matter had already crystallized, nor did he commit himself unalterably to model his discussion of them after the fashion of the first two books. In view of this, Kraus is not justified in asserting, without any qualification, that Brentano did not carry his original plan to completion because "it had become unworkable" (1928 b, p. XIX). It would seem more correct to say that, had he not been reluctant to publish, he would have completed the original plan within the frame of reference of his later explicit distinctions mentioned above. This view is sufficiently justified by the simple fact that throughout the rest of his life Brentano retained an active interest in the problems outlined, but left unsolved, in his *Psychology*. 
Brentano's efforts to solve the problem of the psychological foundation of ethics is revealed not only by his published study on *The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, but also by his posthumous work, *Foundation and Development of Ethics* (1952). The content of another posthumous volume, *The Doctrine of Right Judgment* (1956), shows likewise that he kept alive his original intent to investigate the "properties" of judgment in a special book of his *Psychology*. While this volume is broader in scope than such a projected book, in the sense that philosophical problems are definitely kept in the foreground, the fact that psychological issues are also taken into account makes it relevant within the context of the present discussion.

The appendix which Brentano himself added to his *Classification of Psychic Phenomena* (1911) contains further evidence of his interrupted endeavor in defining ever more accurately the properties of judgment and of "feeling and will," as a means to establish with corresponding certainty the psychological bases of epistemology, logic and ethics. In view of this, such an appendix may be viewed as another "fragment" of that "Descriptive Psychology" which he had hoped to "be enabled in the near future to publish in its complete form" (1902, p. VIII), but which in effect was never published as such. Even more than in the case of his analysis of the above mentioned fundamental classes of psychic phenomena, this hypothesis seems applicable to his further important studies on "imagination" contained both in the appendix under discussion, and in a second appendix added by Kraus in the so-called second
volume of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1925 a). Certainly, Brentano's keener and more conscious interest in working out a descriptive psychology of this most fundamental (in his system) psychic "faculty" is clearly shown by the "Essentials of a descriptive Psychology of the Intellect" which he had obviously developed with sufficient clarity and details no later than the years 1884-1886, since he was then presenting them to his students in some of his lectures (Husserl, 1919, p. 153). In terms of a comparable descriptive psychology of the senses, the same interest is reflected in his four articles on optical illusions (1892-1893) and in the studies which make up his volume *Researches in Sensory Psychology* (1907). Last, but not least, his interest in a complete descriptive psychology, encompassing both the "intellect" and the "senses" finds at the same time its fullest confirmation and most mature expression in his posthumous volume, *On Sensory and Noetic Consciousness* (*Psychology*, vol. 3, 1928 a). Particularly significant in this respect is the fact that Kraus himself entitled the second section of Part One of this volume "Phenomenognosy (phenomenological psychology) of sensory and noetic consciousness," and had planned to re-edit in Part Two Brentano's 1907 volume mentioned above along with new essays on the psychology of colors and sounds.

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34 Husserl also mentions that, in the course of his discussion on the descriptive psychology of the intellect, Brentano touched upon "parallel applications in the sphere of emotions." It seems quite possible, indeed very likely, that Brentano incorporated his views on this matter in his study *The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong* (1889).
While Brentano's analyses of sensory and intellective consciousness delve more deeply and more specifically into philosophical issues than was the case with his *Psychology*, insofar as they present his views on a descriptive psychology of these two types of consciousness, they must be interpreted as a fulfillment of that part of his original plan which envisioned a detailed study of the "properties" of psychic phenomena, especially as it pertains to the phenomena of "imagination." His other posthumous volume, *Principles of Aesthetics* (1959), lends further support to this view. In addition, one of the studies contained in this volume, but previously published by Brentano himself, *The Genius* (1892 a), as well as the discussion of the distinction between descriptive and genetic psychology, in the context of their relationship to aesthetics, show that he also kept alive his interest in the other part of his original plan - the investigation of the "laws" of psychic phenomena ("genetic" psychology). This interest is also reflected in three articles he published on optical illusions (1892 c, 1893 a, 1893 b). An even more clear-cut and convincing proof of this, however, is offered by his repeated, though unrewarded, efforts to secure for himself an Institute and a Laboratory at the University of Vienna (1895, pp. 5-6). These efforts were motivated by his desire to conduct more specific and more extended researches in "genetic" psychology, and by his conviction in the high practical value of these researches; in addition, they were also motivated by a desire to put his
ideas on "descriptive" psychology to experimental test. 35

The preceding discussion, it is hoped, has shown that by and large Brentano carried through the original plan of his Psychology, and at the same time has defined both the sense and the limits of this accomplishment. Although the latter does not constitute a complete system of psychology, it adds sufficient closure to the original work to justify the claim that "Brentano's claim to notice to posterity rests largely on his Psychology" (Eaton, 1930, p. 24).

35 Brentano's direct statements on this matter are substantiated by Eisenmeyer. On the basis of personal acquaintanship and conversations with our author, Eisenmeyer states that he would have liked to have "the necessary staff of assistants who would have investigated factual material in line with his leading ideas" (1918, p. 493).
II

OVERVIEW OF BRENTANO'S STANDPOINT IN PSYCHOLOGY

1. Introduction: Scientific methodology and the scope of human knowledge. -- In 1866 at the University of Würzburg, in open challenge to Schelling's epigoni, but to the great satisfaction of their exasperated students, Brentano formulated and defended his most famous habilitation thesis: \textit{Vera philosophiae methodus nulla alia nisi scientiae naturalis est}.\textsuperscript{1}

A quarter of a century later (1892), within the context of his conference \textit{On the Future of Philosophy}, after recalling the "very striking impression" made by this thesis, and how it became the "main target" of his examiner's "attacks," he pointed out that recently Dilthey himself had "risen polemically against it in a characteristically new fashion" in his \textit{Introduction to the Sciences of the Mind} (1929 a, p. 9). Dilthey's viewpoint, he added, was apparently shared by Exner, his intellectual opponent in this conference. All this, Brentano implied, was a proof of the value of his conception. In support of this implication, he even shared with his audience the content of a personal letter received from Stumpf, in which his renowned pupil pointed out "how (his thesis) had been evermore confirmed" (1929 a, p. 30) since the time

\textsuperscript{1}Stumpf gives a vivid recollection of the impact which this thesis made upon him and his choice of vocation, as well as upon the other students (1919, p. 88). Brentano himself depicts (1929 a, pp. 14-15) with obvious pride the contrast between the "bold student" who scribbled the words "Factory of Sulphur" across the door of Franz Hoffmann's "deserted" philosophy classroom, and the "eager audience" which he, "an immature beginner," found "immediately" upon starting his teaching career.
of its enunciation.

Pointed as some of the expressions in the preceding paragraph might seem to be, they actually do not come near to dramatize fully Brentano's own empathy with his conception that the method of natural science was the method of philosophy. Indeed, Brentano felt equally strongly that it was also the method of all Geisteswissenschaften.2

The two basic issues which must be closely analyzed in order to arrive at a correct understanding of his position are obvious. Briefly formulated, they read: (1) What is the general nature and logical foundation of the method of natural science? and (2) Is its application to philosophy and to the "sciences of the mind" univocal or analogous?

Even though Brentano's stand on the second of these two issues is quite unequivocal, it has often been misunderstood. Paradoxically, the basic reason for this misunderstanding lies in the unfortunate use of the expression "method of natural science" which, taken literally, tends to suggest a univocal application of this method to philosophy and to the sciences of the mind. Nothing is actually farther from Brentano's true conception. In fact,

2According to Brentano, philosophy is the highest among the "sciences of the mind." His reference (1929 a, p. 128) to other Geisteswissenschaften, such as sociology, political science and psychology, as "philosophical disciplines" calls attention to the important and basic philosophical issues involved in these areas of knowledge. In no way, however, it can be construed to imply that, in other respects, these disciplines are not independent sciences, distinct from philosophy. It is for this reason that L. Gilson's effort to use as synonymous the terms philosophy and Geisteswissenschaft (1955 a, pp. 59-64) fails so noticeably to convince the reader.
according to him, not even in the realm of the natural sciences, can the scientific method be applied univocally. Brentano is very explicit on this point, stating that, far from demanding that we "always proceed uniformly," natural science basically "teaches and disciplines us to change our method in conformance with the specific nature of the objects" of research (1929 a, p. 35). That the same principle also applies to philosophy and to the other sciences of the mind is clearly shown by his advocacy of "an essentially nature-conforming method" for the former, and "a method bearing an analogy" to that of natural science for the latter (1929 a, p. 45).

In an appendix to his published conference On the Future of Philosophy (1929 a, pp. 75-81), Brentano took great pains in differentiating his stand on scientific methodology from certain contemporary trends and attitudes which he considered especially harmful to the advancement of the sciences of the mind. As expressed then, his views were quite modern, and remain instructive even for us, in their effective portrayal of the negative consequences stemming from (1) a superficial adherence to the canons of scientific methodology which only masks an inner lack of "all earnestness" in the actual conduct of research, (2) "the dilettante encroachment" upon the domain of the sciences of the mind by experts in natural science, (3) the vain effort to

3 As a result of this encroachment, Brentano points out, these experts tend to "bend the facts to their theory, instead of reverently subordinating the latter to the former." Psychologically, the failure of these scientists outside the area of their specialty is due to factors such as their inability to become really ego-involved in the study of issues in the realm of the mental sciences, their unawareness of the particular "uncertainties and dangers" inherent in these sciences, and their lack of the required special aptitudes and specific research habits.
give substance to the sciences of the mind by merely bringing to bear upon them "excerpts" from natural science, (4) the failure to recognize that "the boundaries between formal learning and scientific and artistic tact" cannot be ignored, (5) "the logical unknowledge" of the true nature and foundation of the inductive process, typically found even in those scientists who otherwise strive to follow faithfully the scientific method.

4Humorously, Brentano compares mental sciences constructed in this fashion to "the lean hen (which) with the stuffing appears to have become a considerably fatter roaster." This comparison, however, is but a faint metaphor of the claim, made in all earnestness, that the natural sciences are not "enriched with even a single discovery" through such an approach. The further claim that "this is what happened in psychology through repetition of data taken from handbook of physiology" is significant not only as a historical illustration of the point under discussion, but as another proof of Brentano's continued interest in this science.

5Applying this idea to the field of psychology, Brentano wrote with keen insight: "One may learn as much as he wants about psychology, but will not thereby become an expert knower of people...if he cannot at the same time acquire this wonderfully trustworthy psychological tact. He who believes that the scientific method eliminates those boundaries which, according to Pascal, are crossed only by the 'esprit fin'; that the 'esprit geometrique' reigns supreme, is heir to a folly which will degrade him, and perhaps also his scientific method, in the eyes of other people."

6Turning again to psychology, Brentano called attention to two very unfortunate "errors," indeed "perversions," connected with the lack of knowledge underdiscussion which had not only marred its image, but had also hindered its progress: (1) the attempt to construct this science on the exclusive basis of researches on sensory processes, disregarding the "phenomena of the so-called inner perception, such as judgments (and) preferences," and (2) the attempt to investigate "the genesis of psychic phenomena...without having first studied and described them in an orderly fashion." The latter, Brentano added, is just as much of an impossibility as would be the attempt "to cultivate physiology without intensive anatomical studies."
Brentano reacted most vigorously against this "logical unknowledge." Within this context, he reiterated his strong opposition to any "vague, universal conception of scientific-empirical methodology," and singled out as especially unfortunate the fact that many contemporary scientists "never sought explicitly to take cognizance of the theory of inductive research." In view of this, it is not surprising that he himself devoted so much attention to these two issues, in an effort to arrive at a coherent and intrinsically consistent conception of induction.

The essential elements of this conception are actually quite simple, both in themselves and in their mutual relationships. Brentano begins with the view that "induction in the strict sense of the term" is a reasoning process whereby we try to "establish general laws starting from the observation of particular facts" (1929 a, p. 96; Cf. 1925 b, p. 81-82). While this is its most common goal, at times induction only leads to the prediction of a-

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7 A methodical effort to follow in detail Brentano's several lines of reasoning on this issue was made by L. Gilson (1955 a, pp. 111-196). While highly commendable in terms of objectivity and accuracy, her analysis is somewhat deficient in didactic clearness. Bergman's study (1944), by contrast, is of easy reading, but fails to bring out some important aspects of Brentano's thought.

8 Throughout most of his life, Brentano held that the observation of particular facts found its expression in particular perceptions, that is, according to his terminology, particular knowledges or judgments. During his last years, however, his epistemological orientation led him to conclude that no knowledge is entirely particular. In terms of this orientation, therefore, induction would consist in a transition from the less general (more particular) to the more general.
nother particular fact. In both instances, however, the observation of the facts which forms its starting point must be methodical painstaking and detailed (1929 a, pp. 131-132). Moreover, "induction shows the way to deduction and gives direction to it," and in turn both the "understanding" and the "certainty" of its laws are strengthened by deduction (1874 a, Book I, ch. 3). There is thus mutual complementary interaction between induction and deduction: "it makes no difference whether we verify (a law) by induction, after deducing it, or whether we discover it by induction and then explain it with respect to more general laws" (Ibid.).

By and large, Brentano's conception so far would seem to be acceptable to the great majority of scientists. It is only when they became first aware of its further essential component that basic doubts and reservations are likely to arise in their mind. The component under discussion pertains to the further role attributed by Brentano to deduction in the inductive process, in agreement with the logical primacy which, according to him, the former possesses over the latter. Because of this primacy, Brentano held out the position that induction is justified and has value only to the extent that it partakes in some way of the nature of deduction (apodictic analytical reasoning).

It should be obvious, therefore, that the problem of the logical justification of induction had a much broader scope and deeper implications for Brentano than for most scientists. He was not merely, or even mainly, interested in showing how the deductive method, wisely and timely pursued, con-
stitutes an important link in the overall processes of inductive research, strengthening and unifying the results attained by it. Basically, he wanted, and needed, to establish the character of rationality or intelligibility of inductive reasoning, so as to bridge the gap between the "assertorical" ("truths of fact") and the "apodictic" ("truths of reason").

Clarifying the "assertorical" (the factual) by means of the apodictic (the rational), and in the process giving substance to the latter by means of the former—that was his goal.

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9 Within a historical context, Brentano's defense of the rationality and intelligibility of the inductive process, and of the conclusions to which it leads, represents his answer to, and criticism of, the position of thinkers, such as Hume and Mach and Avenarius, who consider inductive laws as a mere irrational by-product of habit, or as a simple pragmatic device which facilitates the exercise of memory. "The human mind," according to Brentano, "aspires to general laws, not on account of their convenience, but because of their luminosity. And this luminosity is inseparable from its fruitfulness; even the laws established on the basis of a single case throw light upon an infinite number of cases" (L. Gilson, 1955 a, p. 141). More in general, Brentano is arguing against any form of empiricism "incapable of safeguarding the authentic demands of reason," and in favor of "the only valid empirical orientation, that which starts from experience but with the conviction that experience is fraught with intelligibility, and ponders over the facts in the light of this conviction" (Ibid., p. 142).

10 It may be useful to recall that hovering over his pursuit of this goal was "the spirit of Bacon and Descartes," and that throughout such an undertaking his own orientation in psychology remained his constant lighthouse. The attentive reader will also readily see reflected in this undertaking Brentano's desire to insert himself in the tradition of the ascending phase of philosophy.
Brentano's path to this goal was that of modern mathematics. Specifically, what characterizes most distinctly his point of view on the issue under consideration is his effort to justify induction through the calculus of probability, in the spirit of Laplace's well known probability principles and Bernouille's law of great numbers. It is because their probability is established through this deductive procedure that inductive laws share in the character of apodictic propositions, and as such deserve our confidence. The degree of this confidence, needless to say, is proportionate to the degree of probability that the connection of two or more concepts, as expressed in an inductive law, is a necessary connection, and not merely an accidental or fortuitous one. And of course, probability itself can never become certainty, because, by its very nature, the necessity of the conceptual nexus expressed in synthetic (inductive) laws is never absolute as in the case of analytical principles. Yet, Brentano goes on to say, infinite or extremely high probability, for example in the order of 1 billion or 1 trillion to 1, is "practically equivalent to absolute certainty" (1929 b, p. 106) in all domains—in the domain of action as well as in the domain of knowledge. Therefore,

11 In this context, it may be of interest to mention that, according to Brentano, Hume would have not been ensnared by his extreme skepticism concerning induction, if he had studied Bernouille's *ars cogitandi*.

12 Brentano calls absolute, apodictic certainty, "mathematical certainty," and speaks of "physical certainty" in reference to infinitely or very highly probable propositions (1929 b, p. 136). In the strict sense of the term, only the former deserves to be called certainty; the latter is so only in analogy with it. Theoretically, these two types of certainties remain distinct.
not only the suspension of action, but also the suspension of assent remains unjustified once we arrive at scientific conclusions which enjoy such a level of probability. We can use these conclusions as a guide in everyday life and as a frame of reference in our Weltanschauung, just as the mathematician uses his axioms in his field of endeavor.

So far, Brentano has succeeded in clarifying the assertorical by means of the apodictic, by showing that inductive laws, properly discovered and justified, are "practically equivalent" to axiomatic principles. There remains for him the task of demonstrating that these laws are actually operating in the world of reality. The principle of contradiction which governs mathematical (deductive) reasoning is of no help to him here. Since this principle applies only to that which is simultaneous, we cannot establish on its basis the necessity of the hypothesis of a given succession of events. To do so we need another principle: the principle of causality. Brentano is thus confronted with the new task of ascertaining the validity and universality of this principle. After discarding all purely a-priori and all purely empirical approaches to this problem, he derives such a principle from an analysis of the concepts of "coming-into-being" and "contingent" with the help of the probability calculus.13

13"The truth of the principle of causality manifests itself to us by means of the concept of coming-into-being which includes the concept of time and consequently that of continuity, as well as by means of the law of great numbers..." (1929 b, p. 149). According to Brentano, contingent, non-caused becoming is not contradictory, but infinitely improbable. Hence his appeal to Bernouille's law. It will be sufficient to mention in passing that, according to Brentano, the universality of the principle of causality implies
The ascertainment of the principle of causality opens the way for Brentano to conclude to the transcendent. The hypotheses of the existence of God and of an outer world, in the broadest sense of the term, present themselves to him as "infinitely probable," and as such possessing "physical certainty." And, of course, further specific hypotheses concerning the outer world advanced by natural science and by the sciences of the mind, when properly arrived at inductively and duly justified deductively, as previously mentioned, enjoy a comparable status.

It should be obvious that, in their most essential aspects, the two basic hypotheses mentioned above bear upon philosophical issues. This brings up the problem of the relationship between philosophy and the other sciences. With respect to the natural sciences, Brentano's thought seems to have evolved gradually from an initial position (1869, 1874 a) in which he considered physics (as the most highly developed natural science) capable of providing us with truly general and infinitely probable laws, to a final position (1915)\(^\text{14}\) in which he attributed this capability only to metaphysics.

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the principle of absolute determinism. This conclusion will undoubtedly take aback many a reader. Even more surprising, however, is his further claim that only the latter principle can fully guarantee and justify freedom of the will. Rogge's work, The Problem of Causality in Franz Brentano (1936) remains the most comprehensive study of this issue available today. Less extensive, but still very adequate treatments are found in L. Gilson (1955 a) and Seiterich (1936).

According to this position, therefore, metaphysics becomes propaedeutic to the natural sciences, paving the way for their specific researches, and shedding light upon their findings.¹⁵

Brentano's stand on the relationship between philosophy and the sciences of the mind, by contrast, remained the same throughout his life. He has always emphasized that the ultimate solution of the problems confronting these sciences is dependent upon broad guidelines laid down in philosophy. This also applies to descriptive or phenomenological psychology in his system. This science, however, enjoys a privileged status because it constitutes the starting point of all scientific endeavors, including philosophy. According to Brentano, science would be a vain, objectless effort without sound psychological foundations; and, of course, it would be respectively an irrational undertaking and a solipsistic game without the extension of these foundations

¹⁵ The import of metaphysics on natural science is both theoretical and methodological. On a theoretical level, metaphysics is presupposed by natural science because it investigates and explains the existence of the characteristics (such as spatial continuity and time dimensions) which are found in material substances, and the existence itself of these substances. Methodologically, metaphysics is superior to natural science not only because its basic concepts are derived from inner experience which alone yields "truths of fact," but also because frequently it can rely upon the internal analysis of these concepts to solve some of its problems. Pertinent references to the existential character of Brentano's metaphysics are found in Werner (1931) and in L. Gilson (1955 a). The latter author's "reflections" on the evolution of Brentano's methodological approach to metaphysics are also very valuable.
through mathematical (logical)\textsuperscript{16} justification and inductive verification.

Did Brentano succeed in extending scientific knowledge beyond the realm of the psychologically given and the mathematically evident? Hugo Bergmann himself, a "grandpupil" of his, does not think so: "The calculus of probability is an instrument to build a rationalized, objective world. It cannot be used to demonstrate the impossibility of an irrational world of pure contingency. Thus Brentano's attempt to prove the law of causality with the aid of the probability calculus fails" (1944, p. 291). And with it fails his extension of knowledge beyond the confines mentioned above.

For the sake of argument, however, one may grant that such an extension was successful. What are, in this case, its actual limits? The answer to this question is obvious from the preceding analysis. But let us listen to Brentano once more: "The most important questions of life," he states, quoting Laplace, "are mostly problems of probability" (1956, p. 242). The full scope of human knowledge seems to reach beyond these limits.

2. **Psychology from the empirical standpoint.**--Brentano himself seems to have felt keenly the constraints of the upper boundary of knowledge in his system. Within this context, his statement that "even if all our knowledge is piecemeal, nevertheless there is an element of grandeur about this patchwork" (1926, p. 128), sounds more like a wish-fulfilling rationalization than

\begin{footnote}{16}{Brentano considers mathematics as "a part of logic." Cf. his critique of modern "Attempts to mathematize logic" (1911 a, Appendix).}
a factual expression of a deep intellectual conviction.

Brentano would have been more correct if he had made this statement in reference to the segment of "truths of fact" contained within the lower boundary of knowledge, as conceived by him. Certainly, he himself was convinced that "there (was) an element of grandeur" in his overall psychological standpoint; and the student of his thought will easily agree that his contributions in this area are, if not grandiose, historically important and significant in their own right.

The foundations of Brentano's orientation in psychology were laid down in his volume, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874 a). It will be sufficient here to identify briefly the spirit in which Brentano wrote this work, and the main trends of thought contained in it. 17

After defining the full scope of his complete *Psychology*, in 1874, Brentano emphasized that it was not his intention "to write a compendium of this science" (p. 1). In line with his conviction that "psychological laws possess the character of permanent and important truths" (p. 44), his goal was more restricted, but by the same token deeper and more scholarly: to secure for psychology what other sciences had already attained, that is, "a core of generally accepted truths capable of attracting to it contributions from all other fields of scientific endeavor" (p. 2). In other words, he was not concerned with "the quantity and the universality of the tenets, but rather (with) the unity of the doctrine" (p. 2); his aim, to phrase this issue in

17 Specific references to this volume in the present and following sections are taken from the English translation.
still different terms, was to write a psychology in place of psychologies, not merely another psychology to be catalogued among the many that had already been developed.

With confidence, but without arrogance, Brentano cast himself in the multiple role of defense lawyer, public prosecutor, juror, and judge. He criticized effectively "the opinions of others wherever they seemed to be erroneous," but recognized his great indebtedness to them, and told his audience that he would "readily and gratefully welcome any correction of (his) views which might be suggested" to him (p. 2). Rather than trying to hide the past sterility of psychology, he emphasized it, advanced a plausible theory to explain it, and, displaying at once forensic skill and scientific ingenuity, found in it the best "confirmation" of our high "expectations" concerning the role of this science as "the science of the future" (pp. 38-44). In a genuine conciliatory spirit, he recognized both the dependence of psychology upon all the other sciences, and its indisputable status as "their crowning pinnacle" and most enduring foundation, in terms of both its "theoretical significance" and "practical task." (pp. 6-7, pp. 35-38, p. 411). In the same spirit, he recognized both the empirical and non-empirical character of psychology: "My point of view is empirical: experience alone is my teacher. However, I share with other thinkers the conviction that a certain ideal conception is entirely compatible with such a standpoint" (p. 1).18 Style not-

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18 The expression "ideal conception" in this passage can only be taken to mean a conception of psychology as a rational, i.e., a-priori, science, in the sense given by Brentano to the latter term. Trying to find in it a concealed leaning toward idealism, as Brightman (1932) did, is not even a good exercise in paralogism.
withstanding, Brentano moves in and out of the several roles mentioned above with grace, timeliness and precision.

As already mentioned, Brentano's Psychology of 1874 represents the fulfillment of only one third of his complete plan. The reader, therefore, should not be surprised to find that, as it stands, this work deals exclusively with the two most basic problems which we find at the threshold of any science: the problems of the nature of its method, and of its subject matter. The second, third, and fourth chapter of Book I define Brentano's stand on the first of these two problems; the second problem is introduced in the first chapter of Book I, and treated systematically in the nine chapters making up Book II.

Brentano was fully convinced that "the progress of science" depends upon the "progressive increase in the true understanding of its method" (p. 46). Accordingly, having justified the conception of psychology as "the science of psychic phenomena (pp. 18-33), he set out to explore in detail the nature of its method, or rather methods, defining at the same time the various "areas" from which "the psychologist gathers the experiences upon which he bases his investigation of psychic laws" (p. 67). The "primary source" or basic method of psychology is "the inner perception of our psychic phenomena" (p. 46), at the time of their occurrence; its next important tool is "the observation of past psychic states in memory" (p. 54). This second method is important because it introduces into psychology observation, without which no
science is possible. Yet, Brentano readily admits, if psychology were to confine itself to the use of these two tools and the exploration of the corresponding two areas of research, its "experimental foundations...would always remain insufficient and unreliable" (p. 59). In order to remedy this condition, therefore, psychology has to investigate "the externalization of the psychic life of other persons" (pp. 59-67) in verbal communication, autobiographical accounts, "human achievements and voluntary acts," and "involuntary modifications which accompany or follow naturally certain psychic states" briefly, psychology needs, and can rely upon, "objective" observation. This observation, Brentano adds, should also be extended to include the study of the behavior of infants, adults in primitive societies, the mentally ill, and animals, and of social and cultural phenomena. Last, but not least, objective observation must be focused upon the physiological antecedents of our psychic states and outer behavior.

Brentano takes great pains (pp. 46-54) in differentiating "inner perception" from "inner observation" or introspection, showing that the former alone is possible with respect to on-going psychic processes. Humorously, he empathizes with the plight of some bright "young people" who had only reaped "a tumult of confused ideas and numerous headaches" from their useless efforts at self-observation, and as a result "had come to believe that they lacked aptitude for psychological investigation." In a serious vein, while praising some of his contemporaries (Comte, Maudsley, Lange) for recognizing that "inner observation really does not exist," he criticizes their vain efforts to erect psychology on the exclusive basis of objective observation. They would not have fallen victim of this "error," he states, if they had recognized the distinction proposed by him.
Brentano paid special attention to the nature and role of this last type of objective observation (pp. 69-104). He was prompted to do this both by historical circumstances and by personal conviction. Historically, he found himself confronted with various reductionistic efforts, i.e., efforts "to base psychology upon physiology." Through a critical analysis of the various arguments advanced by three outstanding representatives (Comte, Horwicz, Maudsley) of this point of view, he reached the following two conclusions: (1) these thinkers have "exaggerated the services which physiology can render to psychology," and (2) psychology, in order to be an independent science, must rely upon "the psychological method" proper. Yet he himself shared the opinion of his opponents concerning an inherent "weakness of all non-physiological psychology," insofar as this brand of psychology ignores the fact that physiological conditions in general, and in particular "processes in the brain exert an essential influence upon psychic phenomena and constitute one of their conditions" (p. 99). In more positive terms, Brentano was convinced of the "bi-partite psychophysical character of psychology in its greatest part, if not in its entirety" (p. 75). In this sense, therefore, psychology itself, but not its method, is physiological. Even when investigating the role of underlying physiological conditions affecting behavior and experience, the psychologist cannot use the identical methodology of the physiologist. His method rather, to use Brentano's own later terminology, is only "a method bearing an analogy" to that of the physiologist.
Having solved to his satisfaction this important theoretical and methodological issue, Brentano turns his attention to the problem of measurement in psychology (pp. 105-114). He pays tribute to Herbart for having "first emphasized the necessity of mathematical measurement" in our science, while noticing "the complete failure of his attempt to discover actual measurements" (p. 107). Likewise, while recognizing the great merit inherent in Weber and Fechner's attempt to measure "psychic intensities," he points out certain basic limitations to the usefulness of their method; furthermore, he suggests a revision of their "so-called" psychophysical law. Aside from this specific issue, he justified the possibility and need of mathematical measurement "for the exact treatment of all sciences," including psychology, on the ground that "we actually find magnitudes in every scientific field" or at least find in them "some object which can be numbered" (p. 106). In the latter case, if nothing else, statistical procedures can be used (p. 114).

The actual magnitude measured by the Weber-Fechner method, according to Brentano, is not the intensity of a color as seen or of a sound as heard, etc. but the intensity of the inner act of seeing or hearing. It is this distinction between the psychic act and its object or content which was basic to his thinking at the time he wrote his *Psychology*, providing him with the only acceptable basis for defining the subject matter of psychology and the

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20. In this context, Brentano offers a brief criticism of Wundt's point of view (pp. 105-107, 113-114).
natural science. "As the proper object of psychology," Brentano asserts, "we must consider only psychic phenomena in the sense of real states," acts or processes (p. 153). By contrast, the natural science studies physical phenomena, such as "color, tone and warmth," that is, the "content" or "object" of a particular class of psychic acts—"external perception" or sensation. As such these phenomena "have only a phenomenal...existence" (p. 141).

The originality of Brentano's point of view concerning psychic acts made it necessary for him to treat this problem extensively in some of its

21 "We could express the scientific task of the natural sciences," Brentano writes, "by saying that they are those sciences which seek to explain the succession of physical phenomena connected with normal and pure sensations (that is sensations which are not influenced by special psychic conditions and processes) on the basis of the assumption of the influence on our sense organs of a world which is extended in three dimensions in space and flows in one direction in time. Without explaining the absolute nature of this world, these sciences would limit themselves to ascribe to it forces capable of producing sensations and of exerting a reciprocal influence upon their action, and to determine for these forces the laws of co-existence and succession. Through these laws they would then establish indirectly the laws of succession of the physical phenomena of sensations, if, through scientific abstraction from the concomitant psychic conditions, we admit that they manifest themselves in a pure state and without alteration of sensibility." Commenting upon this conception of natural science in a footnote, Brentano adds: "This explanation does not coincide entirely with Kant's premises, but it approaches as far as possible his explanation. In a certain sense it comes nearer to J. S. Mill's views in his book against Hamilton (ch. 11), without however, agreeing with it in all the essential aspects. What Mill calls 'the permanent possibilities of sensation,' is closely related to what we have called forces" (pp. 150-151).—These rather lengthy passages were quoted not only because they summarize well Brentano's conception of the nature of natural sciences, but also because they throw light upon the basic difference in standpoint between these sciences on the one hand, and physiological and sensory psychology on the other.
most essential aspects: basic characteristics of psychic phenomena which distin-

guish them from physical phenomena (Book II, ch. I), their conscious nature
(ch. II), their unity within diversification and active interaction (chs. III-

IV), and their classification into the three fundamental classes of "imagi-
nation, judgment, and feeling and will" (chs. V-IX).

Brentano's overall conception of the structure of the psychic act will be discussed in some detail later on in this study. At this point it will be sufficient to comment briefly upon his overall methodological approach to the solution of the various issues mentioned above, and to give an equally brief factual account of the basic characteristics of psychic phenomena, as viewed by him.

At the end of his discussion of psychological methodology, in his Psychology, Brentano wrote (p. 119):

Before closing our discussions concerning the method of psychology let us add a last, and more general remark concerning a methodological procedure which often prepares and facilitates our investigations in other fields, but does so especially in the psychological field. I have in mind a procedure which Aristotle tended to use so readily, that is, the classification of the "Aporiae." This classification shows all the different possible hypotheses, indicates for each of them the characteristic difficulties, and in particular gives a dialectical and critical aperçu of all the contradictory opinions formulated by eminent men or held by the masses. Likewise, in his last essay about Grotes' Aristotle, which he published a few months before his death in the Fortnightly Review, J. St. Mill also evaluated with acute understanding the advantages of this preliminary investigation. I believe that it is evident why psychologists in particular can derive even greater profit from divergent opinions than investigators in any other field. Each of these opinions, even though it is perhaps considered only under one aspect or interpreted erroneously, is based upon some elements of truth and upon some experience. Moreover, when we
are dealing with psychic phenomena, each individual has his particular perceptions which are not accessible in the same form to anyone else.

It is upon this method that by and large Brentano relies throughout Book II of his Psychology to develop his theory of the psychic act. Some philosophers might view his effort to relate a given author's opinion to facets of psychological experiencing as a prostitution in the direction of "psychologism" of an otherwise good procedure. Psychologists, by contrast, are likely to be overwhelmed by the undeniable subtleties of his argumentations, and as a result to underrate the actual range of empirical data which constitute an integral part of the methodological approach under consideration, as used by him. This critical comment and especially closer study of Brentano's work itself, should ensure a more objective outlook on this matter.

Empirical data utilized by Brentano in this context fall into three groups: historical, linguistic, and psychological. He explicitly categorizes them as such in connection with his effort to identify the main reasons underlying "the misunderstanding of the true relation between feeling and volition" (pp. 393-406); and, without too much difficulty, they can be seen reflected in the other related investigations.

Reasoning from these data, in the limelight of "the immediately evident inner perception," Brentano rejects (pp. 131-135, 144-147) as doomed to failure all previous attempts to base the distinction of psychic phenomena from physical phenomena upon the premise that psychic phenomena "appear without
extension and spatial localization," and "manifest themselves successively" as a simple one-dimensional flow of events. The reasons for such a failure, he insists, are obvious: on the one hand "certain psychic phenomena also appear extended," and on the other "very often many psychic phenomena are present in consciousness simultaneously."

On the positive side, the same methodological approach yields for Brentano a set of characteristics which, in his opinion, truly differentiate psychic phenomena from physical phenomena. Two of these characteristics have already been mentioned incidentally in the preceding paragraphs: psychic phenomena alone "are perceived in inner consciousness" with evidence, and "possess a real existence" (pp. 140-144). Another characteristic can also be inferred from what was stated above: "the psychic phenomena which we perceive, in spite of their multiplicity, always appear to us as a unity" (p. 150, pp. 148-149). There remains one further characteristic. According to Brentano's standpoint in 1874, the "feature which best characterizes psychic phenomena is...their intentional in-existence" (p. 150, pp. 136-140):

Every psychic phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called intentional (also perhaps mental) in-existence of an object. In spite of some ambiguity, we call it a relation to a content, a direction toward an object (which is not to be interpreted as reality), or an immanent objectivity. Every psychic phenomenon contains something as an object within itself, even though not in the same way. In imagination something is represented; in judgment something is acknowledged or rejected; in love something is loved; in hate something is hated; in desire something is desired.

Brentano used the adverb "undoubtedly" to underline the full extent of his
confidence in this early doctrinal point. Yet, it is on this very issue that he subsequently became his own sharpest critic. He was led to this self-critique both by inner developments of his own thinking, and by a felt duty to refute the "erroneous" extensions of his original theory of intentionality in the direction of Meinong's "theory of the object" and Husserl's brand of phenomenology.

Briefly stated, Brentano self-critique led him to assert that the expression "mentally existing object" is merely a "systematic" or "co-signifying" expression to which nothing corresponds in reality. In other words, the so-called "mentally existing object" constitutes only a dependent moment of psychic activity, or better, of the psychically active subject, it coincides in reality with the subject, and consequently cannot be the term to which the latter refers himself.22

Implied in the preceding self-critique is a sharper distinction between object consciousness, that is consciousness as given in the fundamental act of pure "imagining" (representing something, having something as object), and cognitive consciousness, as given in acts of judgment. Object conscious-

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22 Cf. Katkov (1930) and Kraus (1924, pp. 244-40) for a detailed exposition of this new conception and other doctrines connected with it. The Appendix added by Brentano to the second partial edition of his Psychology in 1911, and included in the present translation, contains his direct views on the matter (pp. 412-431, 439-455, 462-465). Further statements of, and elaborations upon, these views are found in some of his posthumous volumes (1928, 1930, 1956).
ness is pure experiencing. Through it, for example, we experience ourselves as hearing a tone. We do not experience this tone as an immanently existing object, in the sense of a copy of a sound existing extramentially; nor, of course, do we experience the latter as such. The existence of that which is represented eludes the analysis of our acts of imagination; it is first ascertained in the acts of evident judgments, either in truth or probability. It is to be noticed that in these judgments the intentional tendency of the knower is directed toward the thing itself (a real sound, for example), and not toward a mental copy of it, for "otherwise the intending could never become a transcending" (Kraus, 1924, p. 34).

Other specific doctrinal developments subsequent to Brentano's Psychology are his theories of primary and secondary consciousness, of the modes of "imagination" (temporal modalities, imagination in recto and in obliquo), and of sensory and noetic consciousness. To some extent, these developments represent "corrections" of his early stand; by and large, however, they bring forth and make explicit the seminal thought contained in it.

A broader theoretical development in the latter sense, which is of special significance to the basic purpose of the present study, is Brentano's distinction between "descriptive" or "phenomenological" psychology and "genetic" or "explanatory" psychology. This distinction is not found as such in his Psychology of 1874. However, the content and general frame of reference of this volume clearly imply it. In terms of its content, the entire Book II and a good portion of Book I deals with matters of descriptive psy-
chology. From the point of view of its general frame of reference, the distinction under consideration harmonizes statements which, at first sight, may appear incongruous or at least not thought out with sufficient clarity or thoroughness. Thus, even if the reader succeeded in sharing Brentano's enthusiasm, while perusing the highlights of his work given above, he probably wondered how and to what extent the empirical and rational character of psychology could coexist together in any way other than by mere extrinsic juxtaposition; perhaps, he was even more startled in learning that psychology was to be simultaneously the very foundation of all the other sciences and their "crowning pinnacle." In this context, Brentano's brief reference to Comte's own admission "that an earlier science (is) in many ways supported and elevated by a subsequent one" (p. 411) was hardly sufficient to allay all doubts. These and other uncertainties, however, are removed as soon as one realizes that Brentano was in effect talking about not one, but two coordinated types of psychological inquiries—the descriptive and the explanatory. It is the former which constitute the theoretical foundation of all sciences, including genetic psychology, and as such incorporates in itself both empirical and rational or a-priori (in Brentano's sense) elements. The latter instead is exclusively inductive, empirico-experimental, and represents the "crowning pinnacle" of the scientific edifice both in a retrospective and prospective sense: retrospectively, all the other sciences appear as the "substructures" which had to be carefully worked out in order for it to be
born and take shape; prospectively, in terms of "the practical task" lying ahead of it, "once it reaches maturity and is capable of effective action," it will be its indisputable role to shed light not only upon the other sciences, but also upon all "practical aspects of life" (p. 42).

As mentioned previously (ch. I, p. 28), Brentano lectured on descriptive psychology at least as early as the biennium 1884-1886, and made reference to it in print a few years later, in 1889. He again lectured upon it during the winter semester of the following academic year under the title of "Psychognosy" (Kraus, 1924, p. XVII). Without so naming it, he argued on its behalf when he published his conference On the Future of Philosophy a year later. In this context, he criticized the "error" of those who fail to undertake a serious, methodical "analysis of psychic phenomena" as a necessary preparatory groundwork for their researches in "genetic psychology" (1929 a, p. 79).

Although Brentano had used the expression "genetic psychology" at least once before in his writings (1893, p. 67), the above reference to it and the implicit defense of "descriptive psychology" constitute his first joint formulation of his standpoint concerning the nature and role of both of these.

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23 These dates are based upon Husserl's testimony. Kraus was obviously not acquainted with this testimony when he tentatively set the date of Brentano's first lecture on descriptive psychology during the winter semester, 1887-1888 (1924, p. XVII).
two types of psychology. The official **manifesto** proclaiming this state of affairs, however, appeared two years later in his volume, *My Last Wishes for Austria* (1895, pp. 34-35). It is worth reading in its entirety:

My school distinguishes a psychognosy and a genetic psychology (in distant analogy to geognosy and geology). The former shows all the ultimate psychic elements which, in combination, account for the totality of psychic phenomena, just as the various letters account for the totality of words. Its fulfillment could serve as the foundation of a *characteristica universalis*, as conceived by Leibniz and before him by Descartes. The latter informs us about the laws governing the succession of phenomena. Since, on account of the undeniable dependence of psychic functions upon processes in the nervous system, these laws are by and large physiological, it is easy to see how in this respect psychological researches must entwine with physiological researches. One could perhaps suppose that psychognosy can prescind entirely from physiological discoveries and correspondingly also dispense with all instrumental devices. However, it is only through the ingenuous and imaginative use of instruments that we can attain essential findings in our analysis of sensations, whether we are dealing with hearing, or sight, or the lower senses; and this work pertains to psychognosy.

This passage is important because it brings forth clearly Brentano's general conception of the nature and role of descriptive and genetic psychology. Particularly significant for the present study is the reference to the experimental foundation of both of these psychological disciplines. In effect this stand represents a further important refinement of our author's views concerning the empirical character of psychology, as he expressed them in his original volume, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*.

3. **Genetic or explanatory psychology.**\(\text{24}\) -- Repeatedly frustrated in his

\(\text{24}\) The term "explanatory" was used by Brentano in place of "genetic" in
efforts to found an Institute of Psychology equipped with a laboratory at the University of Vienna, Brentano was not able to undertake any experimental research in either genetic or descriptive psychology. From a historical point of view at least, it would have been very instructive if he had been in a position to do so. Titchner was technically right when he stated that "Brentano, even with a laboratory, would not have been in Wundt's sense an 'experimental' psychologist" (1921 a, p. 119). However, the conclusion to be drawn from this is not that he lacked the temper of the experimentalism would have been different, both methodologically and content wise, from Wundt's prototype. It is this difference that could have been historically instructive.

Brentano's full awareness of the central role of experimentation in genetic or explanatory psychology, and correspondingly of the inadequacy of purely empirical studies, is probably the major reason why he did not pursue to any great extent this second avenue of research that was open to him. As mentioned previously (Ch. I, p. 30), however, the few empirical essays he wrote testify to his continuous interest in this science beyond his Psychology.

Although interesting reading, these essays do not represent a sufficiently important contribution to warrant additional comments besides those offered in the annotated bibliography. By contrast, Brentano's overall conception of

his posthumous volume, Principles of Aesthetics (1959, p. 36). Kraus added to it the adjective "causal," obtaining "causal-explanatory" which brings out its full meaning, as will be indicated below (1929 b, p. XIX).
the nature and fields of application of genetic or explanatory psychology is theoretically significant and as such deserves closer consideration.

Brentano's genetic or explanatory psychology corresponds to the traditional model of this science. As used by our author, the term "genetic" indicates that this fundamental branch of psychological inquiry investigates the "laws" governing the "genesis" of psychological processes or states and their "externalization" in behavior; the term "explanatory" adds the important connotation that the discovery of these laws satisfies all the requirements of a true explanation, i.e., an explanation through understanding, of man's experience and behavior.\textsuperscript{25} Such an understanding is not all-encompassing, but nevertheless authentic within its own boundaries, and highly dynamic in terms of the light it sheds upon all areas of human living.

Some effort will be made in the next chapter to explore the theoretical significance of this conception of scientific psychology in comparison not only with Dilthey's views, but also with purely classificatory or symbolic theories of science. At this point, it will be sufficient to call attention to its modern spirit, in the best sense of this term. Equally modern was Brentano's standpoint concerning the fields of application of scientific psychology. None of his contemporaries identified with as much precision, sense

\textsuperscript{25}To be properly understood, this statement must be viewed within the context of Brentano's doctrine of the rationality or intelligibility of all inductive knowledge, as highlighted above in the present chapter.
of balance, and foresight, as he did, so many future developments in this science.

In addition to "general psychology," Brentano recognized "a special psychology" and an "individual psychology" (pp. 101-102), corresponding respectively to the now thriving field of differential psychology, and to promising developments in the direction of an "idiographic" or "morphogenetic" psychology of personality, as visualized by G. W. Allport (1961). Moreover, he seemed to have foreseen subsequent developments in constitutional psychology when he stated that psychological laws established without taking into account "differences in physical conditions," and resulting "differences in the psychic life of different persons," are "proportionately lacking in precision" (p. 101).

The need for an "attentive study of morbid psychic states" (abnormal psychology) was justified by Brentano on the basis of both theoretical and practical considerations. Theoretically, our author stressed the value of abnormal psychology for general psychology. At the same time, however, he called attention to the primacy of the latter, stating that it "would be a mistake...to pay equal or greater attention to...morbid states than to those of normal psychic life" (p. 64).

Brentano adopted a similar attitude of critical discrimination toward the broad field of social-cultural psychology. While recognizing the need for, and value of, specific psychological investigations of primitive socie-
ties, advanced societies, and "the outstanding phenomena of art, science and religion" (p. 66), he again concluded (p. 67):

The observation of psychic phenomena in human society undoubtedly sheds light upon the psychic phenomena of the individual. The opposite, however, is even more true. Indeed, in general it is a more natural procedure to try to understand society and its development on the basis of what has been found in the individual than trying to throw light on the problems of individual psychology by means of the observation of society.

The specific contribution to general psychology from animal psychology, child psychology, and a psychology of the "exceptional" individual (the handicapped or the gifted) were also singled out by Brentano (pp. 62-64, 65). In this context, for example, he suggested that the study of the congenitally blind could shed light on two important problems which have since generated numerous researches: (1) do the congenitally blind have "the same knowledge of spatial relations as we do"?, and (2) what is "the nature of their first sensory impressions" following a successful operation? (p. 63). In addition, he stressed the importance of gaining adequate "insight...into (the) motives and preparatory conditions" (p. 66) underlying the achievements of the gifted, in clear anticipation of what was to become dynamic psychology.26

4. Descriptive or phenomenological psychology.-- According to Brentano, the relationship between descriptive or phenomenological psychology and

26Brentano discussed some of these motives and conditions in The Genius (1892 a). For a brief summary of his views on this topic the reader is referred to the annotation to this essay in the bibliography.
genetic or explanatory psychology is analogous to the relationship between anatomy and physiology (1959, p. 36). Although this comparison is inadequate in several respects, it serves to illustrate the general goal of descriptive psychology. Like anatomy, this branch of psychology aims at describing its object of study—the psychic act, or, more correctly expressed, "the psychically active subject."

As conceived by Brentano, descriptive psychology is partly an empirical and partly an a-priori science. In the former role, it yields "truths of fact" based ideally upon both inner experience and experiment; in the latter role, like mathematics, it arrives at "truths of reason," general knowledges, by means of conceptual analyses. It is unfortunate that our author made no effort to distinguish these two aspects of his descriptive psychological inquiries. Indeed, it is unfortunate that he did not restrict the expression "descriptive psychology" or "descriptive phenomenology" to the empirical portion of it, labeling its a-priori half more appropriately epistemology or

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27 Brentano formally used this expression as a subtitle of his course on "Descriptive Psychology" taught in 1888-1889. It was not until 1901 that Husserl first made extended and specific use of the term phenomenology in the second volume of his Logical Researches, and not until around 1910 that this term became identified with his philosophical approach; in the meantime, Stumpf had advanced his own formal conception of phenomenology in his treatise On the Classification of Sciences (1905). Chronologically, therefore, Brentano has priority over both of these authors not only on terminological grounds, but also theoretically, with respect to his use of the term phenomenology.
theory of knowledge. If he had done so, his influence upon scientific psychology would undoubtedly have been more extended and more specific.

The task of sifting critically the empirical from the a-priori in Brentano's descriptive psychology would require a much more detailed and more extensive analysis than is possible in a short introductory study such as the present one. For this reason, although challenging in itself, this task is forsaken in favor of a more factual exposition of some of his leading ideas, as expressed in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and other pertinent subsequent works.

Existence and nature of "the psychically active" subject. -- As previously mentioned, in his Psychology, Brentano subscribed to the "modern" definition of this science as the "science of psychic phenomena" in preference to the "old" definition of it as the "science of the soul." However, he took pains in pointing out that his preference in the matter was based upon the fact

28 While epistemological questions constitute the very core of the a-priori side of Brentano's descriptive psychology, metaphysical problems also find a prominent place in it. This is especially true of his posthumous volume, Doctrine of Categories (1933).-- Kastil's introduction to this volume contains a unified exposition of Brentano's thought on this issue. Other good presentations of this thought are found in L. Gilson (1955 b) and Hernandez (1953). For some comments on Vanni-Rovighi's (1938) short, but valuable critical study, the reader is referred to the annotated bibliography.
that "the new definition (was not) connected with the new metaphysical doctrine" (phenomenalism), did not contain anything "which would not be acceptable to the followers of the old school" (p. 32).

Brentano's life-long intellectual battle against phenomenalistic systems shows that he himself never intended to write a psychology "without a soul," i.e. a psychology as the science of psychic phenomena, or psychic acts, without a "psychically active" subject. According to him, "the problem of the soul bears properly only upon the question of what the subject of consciousness is, not upon whether in general there must be such a subject" (Kraus, 1919, p. XCII).

Brentano's learned discussion of "the unity of consciousness" in his Psychology (pp. 242-275) contains his empirically derived evidence that a subject, the self, underlies "the totality of our psychic life" at any given moment. It is the "common belongingness of our psychic acts to one real thing," he asserts, "which constitutes the unity of which we are speaking" (p. 251). So conceived, he concludes, the unity of consciousness is "one of the most important tenets of psychology" (p. 253). The denial of this tenet, according to him, would defeat all further efforts on behalf of this science, indeed, of science as such, because it would plunge us into absolute skepticism.29

29Brentano's line of reasoning on this issue is as follows: "...immediate factual knowledge requires not only that the object of the knower be identical with the knower, but also that the identity of the knower and the known be recognized... One sees, therefore, the implication of Lichtenberg's attempt to
While the reference of "our present psychic phenomena" to the subject or self is "immediately evident" and as such beyond the reach of doubt, the reference of "our past psychic activity" to the same reality is not. In other words, the problem of "whether the persistence of the self is the continuance of one and the same unitary reality or simply a succession of different realities linked together in such a way that, so to speak, each subsequent reality takes the place of the reality which preceded it" (pp. 261) could be answered either way. The problem of the nature of the subject of our psychic acts, present and past, is also a problem which has to be solved in its own right.

In his Psychology, Brentano admitted as plausible a biological conception of the self, with the only provision that it be organismic and not "atomistic." Both the importance of this issue in psychology, and the clearness with which Brentano expressed himself on it, justify the following rather long quotation (p. 262):

...the belief that the self is a corporeal organ which forms the substrate of continuous substantial changes would not contradict our previous statements, (on the unity of consciousness), provided that whoever might hold such a belief admit that the impressions experienced by such an organ exert an influence upon degrade Descartes' tenet: 'cogito, ergo sum.' This author was of the opinion that, instead of saying 'I think,' we should limit ourselves to saying 'it thinks.' This conception implies that, in the act of judgment, the relation of identity between the knower and the known remains unknown. If this were the case, the possibility of an immediate evidence would vanish" (1928, p. 6), and with it would vanish all hope to justify science.
the way in which it renews itself. Thus, just as a wound leaves a scar, the past psychic phenomenon would leave as an after-effect a trace of itself and with it the possibility of a remembrance. The unity of the self in its past and present existence, therefore, would be the same as the unity of a river in which one wave follows another and initiates its movement. The only hypothesis that would have to be excluded by those who might consider an organ as the substrate of consciousness would be the atomistic hypothesis which considers each organ as an aggregate of different realities. At best, as DuBois-Reymond did in his communication to the convention of natural scientists in Leipzig, the only value that they could ascribe to this hypothesis would be to consider it as some kind of methodological principle in the field of natural sciences.

While admitting the plausibility of a biological conception of the self, Brentano in no way subscribed to it. In terms of personal preference, his criticism of purely physiological psychologies and his defense of the conscious nature of psychic acts clearly show that he not only favored, but considered as correct only a psychological conception of the self: "the psychic subject is a spiritual, i.e. a non-dimensional substance."

Brentano did not explicitly state this position in his Psychology of 1874. According to the overall plan of this work, the mind-body problem was to be discussed in a later section (Book VI). Although this section was never written, some essays published posthumously in the volume, Religion and Philosophy (1959, pp. 188-249), contain his essential views in the matter. For the purpose of the present study it will be sufficient to add the following direct passage (pp. 231-232) in clarification of the short statement quoted in the preceding paragraph:

Only the hypothesis of spirituality accords with the facts. These allow us to consider the brain only as the organ of consciousness,
but not as its subject. The continuance of psychic life obviously requires that it be affected anew at every moment. If the brain fails, the soul does not think and feel; however, how could it perform its complicated task except through its complicated structure? The brain, therefore, must interact in all its parts with a unitary subject. Only in this way is its action understandable, but not on the basis of the materialistic hypothesis, according to which this complication should already be present in each single point of the brain.30

Translating the preceding views into as neutral a psychological frame of reference as possible, one could compare Brentano's doctrine to Calkins conception of the "conscious self which has a body" (1908, p. 16). If nothing else, this comparison brings out the important fact that, according to our author, psychology is essentially the science of "the psychically active" subject, and not merely the science of "psychic phenomena" or "psychic acts."

As stated above, Brentano's painstaking defense of the unity of consciousness in his Psychology shows that this was his true position from the very start. Subsequent developments in his thinking merely confirmed it more explicitly. In terms of these developments, in fact, Brentano came to consider words such as "consciousness," "to represent," "to judge," as mere grammatical abstractions, without independent meaning. They become meaningful only when they are understood in the context of expressions such as:

30 Brentano's critical reflections on several theories bearing upon the relationship between body and mind are at times quite original and still worth reading today. Along with the spirituality of the soul, Brentano also defended its immortality and creation by God. These aspects of his theory, however, are not treated in detail in the above-mentioned essays.
someone-who-is-conscious of something, represents something, makes a judgment about something. In other words, according to Brentano, it is impossible for us to conceptualize psychic phenomena, acts or processes without a subject of which they are accidents or "modes." It follows that what truly exists is the "psychically active" subject. "Psychic phenomena" or "acts" are real "events" only in the sense that they express "modalities" of functioning, i.e. "attitudes," of the subject.

Thus Brentano's doctrine of "psychic phenomena" or "psychic acts" is in essence a doctrine of the "psychic subject" or "self." It is only because of "linguistic convenience" that we prefer to speak of "psychic acts" rather than "the psychically active" subject. The latter expression would compel us to resort to such cumbersome statements as: "the psychic subject insofar as it represents something," whenever we have to specify the particular type of activity taking place at a given time. Direct reference to, and specification of, the activity itself in everyday communication as in writing is perfectly admissible, provided only that we keep in mind that the activity itself refers to the subject, is but an "attitude of the subject."

General structure of the psychic act (consciousness).--According to Brentano, the "common feature of everything psychical consists in what has been called by a very unfortunate and ambiguous term, consciousness, i.e. in a subject-attitude, in what has been termed intentional relation to some-
thing..." (1902, p. 12). It follows that the various "modes of consciousness" or "fundamental classes of psychic phenomena" are simply particular manifestations of such an "attitude." The basic task of descriptive psychology, therefore, consists in ascertaining the various possible "attitudes of the subject to the object," or "modes of relation to the object," describing them, and showing their dynamic interrelationships.

As is well known, Brentano distinguished three fundamental classes of psychic phenomena or psychic acts, i.e. three fundamental types of "subject-attitudes" or "modes of relations: imagination, judgment, and affectivity" (p. 418). Under the concept of imagination, he included all psychic acts in which we merely become aware of something, i.e. all acts of pure experiencing, whether it be sensing, or imagining (taken in the usual sense of the term), or thinking: "We speak of imagination whenever something appears to us" (p. 310). The term judgment was employed by him in the usual meaning of acts bearing upon "the acceptance of something as true or the rejection of something as false," with the added important qualification that "such an acceptance or rejection occurs also in many cases in which the term judgment is not used, for example, in the perception of psychic acts and in memory" (p. 311). Finally, he delimited the realm of affectivity by including in it "all the psychic phenomena which are not contained in the first two classes," referring to them variously as "phenomena of love and hate," "emotions," "feel-
The following passage (pp. 240-241) which Brentano himself presented as a "review" designed to summarize the investigations of two entire chapters of his *Psychology*, when properly clarified by a statement of subsequent "corrections" and "additions," expressed well his thought concerning the interrelationships of the various "psychic phenomena" described in the preceding paragraph:

Every psychic act is conscious; it implies the consciousness of itself. Every psychic act, no matter how simple, has a double object, a primary and a secondary object. The simplest act, for example, the act of hearing, has for primary object sound, and for secondary object itself as a psychic phenomenon in which sound is heard. This secondary object is present in consciousness in a threefold way: it is represented, it is known, and it is felt. Consequently, every psychic act, even the simplest, may be considered under four different aspects. It may be considered as an image of its primary object, such as the act in which we perceive a sound is considered as an act of hearing; however, it may also be considered as an image of itself, as a cognition of itself, and as a feeling of itself. In addition, in the totality of these four relations, it is object not only of its self-image, but also of its self-cognition and, if one may so speak, of its self-feeling. Thus, without any further complication and multiplication, the self-image is represented, the self-cognition represented as well as known, and the self-feeling represented as well as known and felt.

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31The dynamic sense in which Brentano used the term "interest" is well reflected in the following statements: "The term interest is used only to designate certain acts of our third class, i.e., acts which arouse our desire of knowledge or curiosity. Yet it cannot be denied that every pleasure or displeasure can be described not altogether inappropriately as interest, and that every desire, every hope, and every voluntary decision is an act of the interest which we take in something." (pp. 311-312).
In his *Psychology*, having considered "the immanent in-existence of an object in psychic phenomena" as their essential distinguishing characteristic, Brentano made their principal class differences dependent upon "the fundamental differences in the modes of immanent objectivity" (p. 309). In the same context, he also spoke of "fundamental differences in their mode of relation to the object." These two expressions were then used as synonymous. Therefore, when he discarded "immanent objectivity" from his system, in order to be able to retain the principle that the "characteristic property of every psychic activity consists...in its relation to an object" (p. 412), he had to re-define the concept of psychic relation. The following passage expresses well Brentano's views on the difference between such a relation and all other classes of relations (pp. 412-413): 32

While in the other relations both the fundament and the term is real, in the psychic relation only the former is real... If we think of something, the thinking subject must exist, but not necessarily the object of our thought; indeed, if we deny something, the existence of this thing is necessarily excluded in all cases in which our denial is correct. The thinking subject is the only thing postulated by the psychic relation; the term of the so-called relation need not exist."

In view of this difference, psychic activity should be looked up as a "quasi-relation," i.e. "something...similar to a relation."

"The similarity consists in the fact that whether we think of a relation properly called or of a psychic activity, in a certain manner we think of two objects at the

32 Unless otherwise indicated, Brentano's "corrections" of, or "additions" to previously held views, are taken from the original Appendix to his volume, On the Classification of Psychic Phenomena (1911 a). Page reference is to the English translation.
same time" (p. 413) - a "primary" and a "secondary" object. Correspondingly, psychic activity involves a primary and a secondary relation, a primary and a secondary consciousness.

The attentive reader will undoubtedly notice that the difference between this conception and Brentano's earlier conception in his Psychology bears upon epistemological, rather than psychological issues. In other words, it is a different epistemology that we find reflected in his new outlook, not a basically different psychology. In the matter of details, however, we also find some changes in psychological views.

The most conspicuous change bears upon Brentano's departure from his previously held view that the relation of affectivity accompanies all psychic acts. For our purpose it will be sufficient to quote the following passage (pp. 418-419) which brings out very clearly the nature and scope of this change:

...a very large number of psychologists believe that every psychic activity implies a so-called "feeling tone," which is the same as saying that every psychic activity, just as it is the object of an image and of an evident affirmative judgment, it is also the object of an inner affective relation. I myself have concurred with

Brentano's new epistemological standpoint does not deny the primary object of consciousness; on the contrary, it even emphasizes it, by insisting that only "the real" can be object of such consciousness. What it denies is that primary consciousness can raise and solve the problem of the existence of this object. This problem, according to him, is first posited by secondary consciousness in judgment, and can only be solved at this level.
this opinion in my Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Since then, however, I have changed my mind and believe now that there are many sensations which lack this affective relation, and consequently are not in themselves either pleasant or unpleasant. Indeed, I think that the whole broad class of visual and auditory sensations does not possess any affective characteristic, which does not exclude that they are usually accompanied by varied and very vivid affective states of pleasure and displeasure.

Another change in the same direction is reflected in Brentano's subsequent critical reappraisal of the limits within which intensity may be considered a characteristic of psychic phenomena, and as such be utilized to distinguish one class of phenomena from another. It seems pertinent to quote him directly also on this issue (pp. 431-433):

When I set out to prove in my Psychology that imagination and judgment are two distinct fundamental classes of the psychic relation to the object, I referred myself to the incomparability of the degrees of intensity of these two modes of relation, following thereby the traditional opinion according to which the degrees of conviction should be conceived as differences of intensity. Subsequently, I have recognized that this opinion is false. On this point I refer the reader to my Researches on Sensory Psychology. In this work I have also shown that the degrees of preference and the degrees of decision of the will are not analogous with the degrees of intensity of a sensation, and especially that it was necessary to discard the opinion that every psychic relation implies intensity in the proper sense of the term, since we have images (such as that of the number "three" in general) which are without intensity. In contradistinction to someone who asserts something with the exclusion of any doubt, another person may believe that it is only probable. The latter does not make a judgment which is the same as the judgment of the former, differing from it only in intensity; on the contrary, he makes a judgment, indeed several judgments, contentually different from the judgment of the former...It is entirely different for intensity as a characteristic of sensation. A person who hears distinctly
is superior, with regard to the reality of hearing, to the person whose hearing is weak, just as he who not only hears, but also has touch, smell and taste sensations, all other things being equal, is superior, with regard to the reality of sensation, to the one who merely hears. For this same reason, a loud sound which existed not only in the phenomenological order, but also in reality, would have a greater degree of reality than a faint sound under the same conditions.34

These and other "corrections" of past "errors" are actually of secondary importance with respect to Brentano's overall original orientation. They neither weaken it, nor strengthen it. More significant instead are some of the "additions" to, or further refinements of it subsequent to his Psychology.

Perhaps the two most striking general features underlying the evolution of Brentano's thought, as pertains to matters under consideration, are (1) his increasing specific emphasis upon the psychic subject or self as the true referent point in all psychological inquiries, and (2) his keener awareness of subtler nuances in psychic life. The first trend, already detectable in

34Brentano had already rejected his previous view that "the so-called degree of conviction consists in a degree of intensity of the judgment" in his work, The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong. The argument he advanced at that time contains a vein of humor, directed not only against his opponent, but also against himself, which makes it worth reproducing: "If the degrees of conviction of my belief that 2 + 1 = 3 were one of intensity, how powerful would this be! And if the said belief were to be identified, as by Windelband (p. 186), with feeling, not merely regarded as analogous to feeling, how destructive to our nervous system would the violence of such a shock to the feelings prove! Every physician would be compelled to warn the public against the study of mathematics as calculated to destroy health" (1902, p. 53).
the Appendix to the volume, *On the Classification of Psychic Phenomena*, stands out very sharply in his posthumous work, *On Sensory and Noetic Consciousness* (1928). The second trend is reflected in the important distinction, within the sphere of primary consciousness, between sensory and noetic objects, and in the recognition, within the sphere of secondary consciousness of "modalities" of imagination, "apperceptive" processes (observation, attention), and abstraction processes (distinguishing and comparing).

**Modalities of imagination: consciousness of time.** — When he wrote his *Psychology*, Brentano described at some length various modalities of experiencing present in the realms of judgment and affectivity. Indeed, he utilized the existence in judgment of the polarity affirmation-negation, in analogy with the polarity love-hate in affectivity, as a proof that judgment was fundamentally different from imagination (pp. 343-348). By contrast, he then stated categorically: "Among images, we do not find any contraries, except those of the objects which are enclosed in them...There is absolutely no other type of opposition in the entire domain of these psychic activities" (P. 344).

35 The following statement taken from the former work illustrates this trend: "the secondary object (of psychic activity) is the activity itself, or, to be more exact, the psychic agent which encompasses simultaneously both the primary and the secondary relation" (p. 418). In the latter volume, there is hardly a page without a reference to the "psychically active" subject.
Subsequently, however, Brentano came to recognize that imagination can also "be differentiated into special modes... in spite of the identity of the object." Imagination, for example, may take on a direct and an indirect form (p. 425):

The first is always present when we exercise our faculty of imagination; the second, however, is present along with it every time that we think of a psychic relation, or even of a relation in the proper sense of the term. Besides the psychic agent, which I think in recto, I always think in obliquo his objects; likewise, besides the fundament of the relation, which I think in recto, I always think in obliquo its term. The modus obliquus itself, moreover, is really not simple; on the contrary, it has several different forms. It is different depending on whether we are dealing with a relation of size, or a relation of causality, or a psychic relation with the object; indeed, it is different depending on whether this psychic relation is a simple image or a judgment, and in the latter case, if it is an affirmative or negative judgment, etc.

These modalities of imagination, according to Brentano, "are important not only in themselves, but also for judgments and emotions" (p. 428); and not only because they help clarify epistemological issues, but also because they represent a true dynamic enrichment of our psychic life. From the latter point of view, for example, they make it possible for us to have a unified, yet differentiated and highly dynamic, representation (percept, thought) of a complex object (pp. 425-426):

Whenever we represent (complex objects) clearly to some extent, the relation which is involved in this image is multiple and, in spite of this multiplicity, clear in the cartesian sense of the term. This relation applies not only to the whole, but also separately to the parts which together appear to determine this whole; this is so, for example, when I distinguish a red spot as colored, red, extended, situated here, triangular, etc.
and think of it as being characterized by all these properties. Each of these properties appears then to be connected with the others as a determining element. Every relation of imagination to one of these characteristics has a special object which, due to the reciprocal determination of all the characteristics, explains together with other objects the clear image that we have of the whole.

The particular example offered by Brentano in the above passage is an illustration of "an objective whole which possesses... intuitive unity." The same thing, however, is true in cases in which "the whole" possesses only "attributive unity"; for example, when one thinks of "a round square" (p. 1426). In other words, according to our author, a "complex image" involves always a true "synthesis of images"; it is never a mere sum of "parts." The "parts," of course, are there, but not in the fashion in which the separate pieces are found in a mosaic. To use an expression cherished by many, and well-known to all contemporary psychologists, we could say that these parts exist, as if in a "field." Correspondingly, "the whole" itself is not a static entity, but essentially a relational, highly dynamic reality. It seems pertinent to mention here that analogous considerations apply to Brentano's conception of complex judgments and complex affective-motivational-volitional states.

The unified and dynamic character of imagination, in its direct and indirect modalities, is further reflected in acts of judgments made possible by it. Thus, Brentano asserts, "a careful investigation would probably show that in every distinct image we make in some way a negative judgment, since we
recognize that the psychic relation to one of the parts is different from the psychic relation to the other part" (p. 424). Another illustration of the diversification of our "cognitive" life consequent upon the modalities of imagination under consideration is brought out in the following passage (p. 429):

If I represent or assert the existence of someone who denies something, I myself do not deny this thing in obliquus, any more than, if I think that a cause produces an effect, I do not produce this effect myself, even though the indirect object and the particular modus obliquus by means of which my thinking is related to it are not indifferent with regard to the content of my judgment; in fact, it is on account of this consideration that my judgment is directed toward another object.

With proper changes in wording and frame of reference, the preceding passage could be used also as an illustration of the influence of the same modalities of imagination upon emotions. To this end, it would be sufficient to say: "If I represent or assert the existence of someone who loves something, I myself do not love this thing in obliquus..." etc.

Brentano did not investigate in detail the full range of modifications of judgments and emotions by means of the direct and indirect modalities of imagination. A phenomenological analysis would undoubtedly reveal other instances of such modifications, perhaps even more pertinent than the examples he gave us. The latter, however, were found valuable because they

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36 His posthumous volume, The Doctrine of Right Judgment (1956), contains a brief analysis of the classification of concepts according to differences in the modes of imagination (pp. 62-65).
illustrate the holistic and field direction of his orientation, just as his stand concerning the psychic subject or self, as previously described, illustrates its existentialistic vein.

Besides the two modalities just described, Brentano asserted the existence in imagination of "temporal modes." Like the former, these modes also produce modifications in judgments and emotions. At the risk of some repetition, it seems worthy to quote in sequence two passages showing Brentano's thinking on this issue (p. 428):

The differences of the modes of images, just as the differences of their objects, are important not only in themselves, but also for judgments and emotions which are based upon these images.

This is obviously true of the temporal modes. When I judge that there is or there has been a tree, in both cases I assert this tree, but with a different mode of judgment. The temporal mode of the image, just like the object of the image "tree," modifies not only the image, but also the judgment, by introducing into it a temporal differentiation. The same thing applies when I desire something in the present or in the future. Both acts are acts of love, but differ as to time, just as the images upon which they are based.

In addition to their role in "cognitive" and affective life, the temporal modes of imagination play a very important independent role in our consciousness or awareness of time. Brentano could not have expressed himself more clearly and with greater conviction on this issue than he did when he asserted: "Just as a qualitative mode must be present in every judgment... a temporal mode is also absolutely required for every image... This principle possesses the same degree of certainty as the principle that there is no image without an object" (pp. 423-424).
In view of this, one is not surprised to find that, with the exception of
the problem of God, no other single problem took so much of Brentano's time
as the problem of time: how time is given in experience; in what way or ways
our experience of present time differs from the experience of past and future
time phenomena; what is the ultimate nature of temporal differences. The
essentials of his final answer to these questions are contained in the fol-
lowing passage (pp. 422-423):

...temporal differences must be considered as different modes of
imagination. To consider the present, past and future as objec-
tive differences would imply the same error as regarding exis-
tence and non-existence as real attributes. When, in a speech
or melody, we hear a sequence of sounds, or when we see a body
in movement or in the process of changing color, the same indi-
vidual sound, the same colored body, individually determined as
to place and quality, appears to us first as present, then more
and more as past; at the same time, other things which subse-
quently will undergo the same modal change of imagination be-
come present. If we considered these differences as objective
differences, as undoubtedly spatial differences or when we repre-
sent something more to the right or more to the left in the
visual field, we could not justify the essential differences ex-
sting between space and time.

This passage shows that, according to Brentano, we experience time in
imagination, rather than in judgment; that temporal differences lie in the
way in which events are represented, and not in the way in which they are
judged; and that these differences are not to be construed as objective dif-
ferences. Also implied in it is Brentano's conception that, while present
time is experienced directly, the past and the future are given to us only
indirectly. To be properly understood, the latter claim must be viewed with-
in the context of the following tenets in his subsequent doctrine: (1) we per-
ceive the past and the future in the representations that we have of ourselves as experiencing a given past or future event, and (2) non-present events are nothing real by themselves and are always dependent upon present events. It will be sufficient to add here that the latter tenet is but an application of his final epistemological standpoint according to which only "the real," in the sense of a concrete existing being ("thing"), can be the object of thought.

It should be obvious from the preceding analysis that Brentano's interest in the problem of time centered around the nature of time and the

37 Along with a more detailed discussion of other aspects of the doctrine under consideration, these tenets are discussed in an essay entitled "On Time" which Kraus dated around 1914, as he edited it in the volume, On Sensory and Noetic Consciousness (1928, pp. 45-52). In this essay, Brentano professed his deepest conviction concerning his view that temporal differences are "differences of imagination": "The more one probes into this question, the more convinced he becomes of this truth" (p. 49). Psychologically, this realization must have been all the more satisfying to him, coming, as it did, at the end of a long intellectual searching which had led him in succession to consider time differences as characteristics of the physical phenomena themselves, and as modal differences of the act of judgment. The first of these two views was expressed by Brentano both in his study, August Comte and Positive Philosophy (1926, p. 114), and in his Psychology. (Cf., for example, p. 209: "...the sounds...appear to us in their different temporal characteristics"); the second view was made known by Kraus (1930 b).-- In spite of his professed self-assurance, however, doubts concerning the problem of time and the related problem of space seem to have lingered on in Brentano's mind past 1914. His very involvement with these problems just slightly over two weeks before his death, and especially the lack of closure in his views at this time, lend support to this impression. (On this issue, see his posthumous study, Zur Lehre von Raum und Zeit, 1920).
characteristic modality of our consciousness of it. As shown by the following passage, however, he fully recognized the value and timeliness of psychological researches bearing upon the measurement of time (pp. 424-425):

There is no need to point out explicitly that the problem of the nature of time in no way coincides with the problem of the process whereby we measure temporal dimensions and intervals, be it by means of intellectual judgment, or by means of habit or by means of an originally instinctive evaluation. Although this last problem is of considerable psychological interest and leads the investigator to teleological considerations concerning, for example, our blind faith in memory, our habitual expectations and many natural inclinations and aversions, we do not have to deal with it here.

In addition to underlining Brentano's overall openness and sensitivity to strictly psychological problems, this passage also shows which characteristic approach he would have followed, had he been able to undertake specific experimental researches. In this passage, in fact, Brentano identifies the problem of time measurement as "the problem of the process whereby we measure temporal dimensions," and finds it of "considerable, psychological interest... (because it) leads the investigator to teleological," or, as many psychologists prefer saying, purposive and dynamic, "considerations." There seems to be little doubt concerning the generalization to be derived from his stand on this particular problem: be it empirical or experimental, according to Brentano, psychology is to be conceived as the science of psychic processes or acts themselves, in both their static and dynamic aspects, rather than as the science of their content or "objects." Indeed, since the former never exist apart from the subject or self, psychology, is ultimately the science of the
person himself, and in this sense the science of truly human problems, as they are given in man's concrete existence.

It does not follow from the above that, according to Brentano's orientation, the psychologist cannot and should not investigate the content or "objects" of psychic processes or acts. On the contrary, it is easy to see that he must perform do so, since "the relation to something as object" is one of their essential characteristics. Indeed, in many instances, "the study of the psychic act in respect to the primary object (enjoys) a very privileged status," as compared to the study of it insofar as it is related to itself as secondary object (Kraus, 1924, p. LXXXIX). The only thing that Brentano's orientation denies is the possibility of a psychological investigation of contents or "objects" without reference to processes or acts, or, more correctly expressed, without reference to the subject himself; for example, that it is possible to investigate a thought, a sensory quality, that-which-is-loved, apart from the subject who thinks, sees, and loves. One could even venture to say that, had Brentano granted this possibility to his opponent for the sake of argument, he would have subsequently brought forward elaborate and convincing arguments to show the lack of value of such a type of psychological investigation.

Doctrine of sensation. — The preceding statements concerning the limits within which the "primary objects" of psychic experience can and must be investigated, according to Brentano's orientation, should not be understood to mean that the ever-present reference of these objects to the psychic act, and
ultimately to the psychic subject, must correspondingly be kept always in the foreground of the discussion, in terms of linguistic expressions. Brentano was well aware that the "economy of language" speaks against such an attitude. What is actually required is the simple, yet basic, realization by the psychologist that it is quite impossible to study the objects of inner experience in their supposedly pure "existential" condition, apart from their imbeddedness in the functioning subject. From this point of view, Titchner's effort to give status to "content" psychology by labeling it "existential psychology" or "existentialism" was obviously doomed to failure from the outset. Gestalt psychology had little difficulty in showing that far from being pure existential givens, the "elementary processes" (contents, objects) recognized by him were in reality the distilled products of elaborate abstractions. In effect, Brentano had emphasized this very same point several decades before the term "gestalt" was formally "adopted" by psychology.

Guided by the above-mentioned realization or frame of reference, the "act" psychologist or "existentialist," in the spirit of Brentano's orientation, can proceed to investigate the objects or contents of experience using readily available and pragmatic linguistic short circuits, much in the same way as a "content" psychologist might do. Again, Brentano himself had done so long before Gestalt psychology projected itself on the horizon of psychology with all the semblance of an entirely novel phenomenon, as will be apparent from the following synopsis of his views on "sensory psychology" or "sensory consciousness."
The very basic question of sensory psychology: What is the nature of sensation? sets Brentano’s orientation apart from the orientation of practically all of his contemporaries, and a large majority of psychologists during the next several decades. Many psychologists, in fact, hold that sensations are the last elements of psychic life which are not capable of further division and analysis. Brentano agrees that sensations are our first and original experience, and that the richness and diversification of "imagination" stems from the fullness of sensory impressions; according to him, however, this does not mean that they are the "simplest psychic processes." On the contrary, he claims, they are strikingly complex experiences, encompassing always manifold relations or acts of "imagination" and "judgment," and often also acts of "interest."

Sensations are "images," i.e. involve "acts of imagination," insofar as something is represented in them; they are at the same time "judgments," insofar as we naturally and irresistibly believe in the existence of the sensed object; and often they are accompanied by an instinctive pleasure or displeasure. All these various "relations of consciousness" in sensation, however, are indissolubly linked together, in such a way that sensation is and always remains a unified process. It is only through careful analysis that the several "part-relations" involved in it are first laid bare.\(^{38}\)

\(^{38}\) I have often said that children instinctively and according to an inborn impulse hold as true (believe) what appears to them. Upon closer scrutiny, it becomes evident that this instinctive belief is clearly inseparable from sensation. This sensory belief, if I may so express myself, which is also at the basis of our immediate belief in the external world, can be sus-
As revealed by analysis, the two basic "moments" or dimensions of any sensation are its quality its spatial determination. In respect to the latter characteristic Brentano is decidedly a nativist, in that he defends the view that all our sensations, without exception, are originally spatially determined. Furthermore, sensory (perceived) space is conceived by him as a "continuum" which may be either uninterrupted or show more or less empty spaces. Indeed, since it determines its own characteristics, and since sensory quality derives its characteristics of extension, density and continuity from it, sensory space is a "primary continuum."

It goes without saying that, according to Brentano, perceived quality and perceived space are completely inseparable parts in every sensation: where no space is sensed, there is also no quality, and vice versa. It follows that every sensation, indeed, every sensory element, is individuated through the simultaneous presence of space and quality. This universal principle of individuation of sensory experience is the consequence of a "law of

Pended, so to speak, through higher knowing (judgment), but it can never be eradicated. It is not a superimposed act... On the contrary, sensation is a unified act, which encompasses two simultaneous inseparable parts, namely, the intuition of physical phenomena and the assertorical affirmation (judgment) of these phenomena" (in Kraus, 1930, p. 16).

39 Brentano's thought on this point evolved from an initial neutral position in the battle between empiricism and nativism (1907, pp. 54-57) to a final position in his posthumous works, as described here.
sensation" which our author called the "law of impenetrability": "Just as in the spatial world a substance is impenetrable to another substance, so in the sensory (perceived) space a quality is impenetrable to another quality" (1907, p. 57).

According to Brentano, the "law of impenetrability" accounts not only for the individuation of sensory experiences, but also for their intensity. He arrived at this conclusion through a comparative analysis of several possible ways in which the sensory field may present itself in experience and the corresponding laws governing our observation of it. With regard to the sensory field several alternatives are possible. A given sensory field may be (1) completely devoid of sensation (such as in the case of absolute stillness), (2) filled uninterruptedly with a quality (such as a homogeneous red surface), (3) partly filled with a quality and partly empty (such as a sequence of sounds and pauses), and (4) filled with mixed qualities. In terms of laws of observation, these several alternatives in the sensory field suggest that (1) in some instances we somehow sense weak impressions, but do not observe them, (2) in other instances we cannot sense separately the smallest parts of our sensory field, even though each makes an impression upon us, and (3) in still other instances we can observe the total sensory field only in a confused, unclear fashion. The latter case, for example, is given in our observation of a violet surface: here, the red and the blue are given in the global impression that we have of the sensory field, but only in a confused, unclear manner. When considered in relation to differences in degrees of qualitative
"fullness" or "emptiness" of the sensory field, these laws of observation account for the changing intensity of our sensations, as suggested by the following generalization: the intensity of a sensation is simply the waxing and waning of the "density" or the "qualitative fullness" of the sensory field which we observe in our sensory experiences. This generalization applies to all sensory fields.

It follows, according to Brentano, that the sensory acts themselves must partake of the intensity of the sense objects, in such a way that the richness of all the "relations of consciousness" involved in them is entirely dependent upon the "quantum of sensation," i.e. the "density" of sensory objects: the greater this quantum or density is, the more "bulky" and "intensive" they themselves are. In comparison with these acts, Brentano adds, conceptual acts appear weak and empty, since they lack intensity and complexity. 40 It is easy to see how wide the cleavage is between our author and those sensory psychologists who consider sensation as the most simple and most empty psychic process.

For the purpose of the present synopsis, it will be sufficient to add that Brentano also devoted close attention to two other "moments" or dimensions of sensory experience: saturation and brightness, in an effort not only

40 According to Brentano final orientation, it is only in "noetic consciousness" that we can attain "pure" images, judgments, and "interests." It is only on this level, for example, that we attain "images" which are not enmeshed with judgments and affective processes.
to define their nature, but also to show that they were general properties of the whole sensory field, i.e. common characteristics of all sensations. In the historical context in which he was writing, this position was, if not novel, certainly progressive. Perhaps even more so, was his use of the term "field" in reference to other sensory domains besides vision.

Brentano's stand on the problem of the fundamental classes of sensory qualities and the senses is worth mentioning at least in passing, because of its striking departure from the commonly accepted view. Our author recognized only three such classes: sight, hearing, and a third class encompassing all other sensations and sensory qualities. While recognizing that many qualities of this third class coalesce together to form a variety of subclasses or subgroups (taste qualities, olfactory qualities, etc.), he claimed that the difference between them is not sufficiently great to place each of them into a new "species of quality." He was led to these views by his assumptions that the basis for the classification of sensory qualities and senses into fundamentally different species ought to be sought not in anatomical considerations, but in a psychological analysis of their intensity, saturation, and brightness. It is because the intensity, saturation, and brightness of sounds and hearing bear only an analogy to the corresponding dimensions of colors and sight that we are entitled to consider them as fundamentally different from one another; by contrast, all other sensory qualities and correlative senses must be classified together into a single fundamental class because,
supposedly, the above mentioned dimensions have a univocal meaning for all of them. 41

Human "interests." -- Eisenmeier (1918) himself recognized the weakness of several aspects of Brentano's doctrine of sensation. In spite of this, he concluded: "in his doctrine of sensation Brentano has dug more deeply than most of his contemporaries" (p. 493). This conclusion would seem to be more justified in respect to his views concerning the nature of affective-motivational-volitional states and their role in the economy of human existence. Of course, even in this area such a conclusion would only bear upon the quality of his doctrinal tenets, rather than upon the quantity of the evidence which he brought to bear upon them. 42 Writing in an era in which on the one hand scant attention was paid in official psychological circles to affective and conative processes, and on the other hand several concerted efforts were made in philosophy to divorce these aspects of human experience from cognition and correspondingly to build a complete Weltanschauung upon them, he came forward with a point of view which simultaneously safeguarded their importance, complexity, intra-relationships and intelligibility.

41 For a slightly different view, see his posthumous volume Principles of Aesthetics (1959, pp. 199-206).

42 The essentials of Brentano's views on the topic under consideration are found in his Psychology (1874). Some important new developments and some minor corrections of these views are found in his study, The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong (1889), and in the Appendix of his volume, Classification of Psychic Phenomena (1911). By contrast, his posthumous work, Foundation and Development of Ethics (1952) contains basically only a restatement of his position, as expressed in the other works mentioned here.
In general, the importance attributed by Brentano to affective and conative experiences in human life is well reflected in his common reference to them as "interests." No matter how primitive and undifferentiated a pleasure is, and no matter how lofty and complex a desire is, they are both an expression, and in this sense an "externalization," of "the interest which we take in something." In line with a modern expression, one could say that they are manifestations of "ego-involvement." The only danger in using the latter term is that, in its commonly accepted meaning, it is too narrow to describe the full scope of experiencing which Brentano had in mind. For, according to our author, the generalized state of excitement or contentment of the new-born, no less than the achievements of the genius, implies ego-involvement.

This facet of Brentano's doctrine is likely to be overlooked because of his conception in descriptive psychology that "imagination" is the simplest "relation of consciousness" lying at the basis of all other "psychic phenomena." A superficial interpretation of this conception might lead one to conclude that, according to him, pure cognitive experiencing (awareness) is also time-wise, developmentally, the first and most fundamental type of psychic functioning. What was said above concerning his doctrine of the nature of sensation clearly shows that he was convinced of the opposite: "genetically," i.e. developmentally, psychic life begins with the most complex acts. It will be sufficient to add here that "emotions of pleasure and displeasure," even more than the instinctive or "inborn impulse to hold as true what ap-
pears to them," play a dominant motivating role in the life of infants and children. It is only with progressive growth and maturation that cognitive experiences (imagination, judgment) come to assert themselves; and, as mentioned previously, it is only in the higher conceptual life of the mature individual, i.e. in "noetic consciousness," that they first appear in their purest forms.43

The upward development of cognitive life, in turn, is accompanied by a parallel development within the realm of affective-conative experiences, culminating in acts of "right love" and free acts of will. This general aspect of Brentano's thought contains several leading ideas which deserve closer analysis.

In asserting the "unity of the fundamental class of feeling and will," Brentano did not imply that feeling and will, and the countless phenomena

43 The character of "ego involvement" of all affective-conative experiences is well reflected in the following passages (pp. 385-386): "without a specific experience of volition, we could not represent adequately to ourselves this phenomenon in its proper nature by the simple statement of the characteristics attributed to it...No definition of hope or fear could give a full understanding of their intrinsic distinctive characteristics to an individual who would only have experienced feelings of joy or sadness. This observation applies as well to the case of different kinds of joy: the joy of a good conscience and the pleasure of agreeable warmth, the joy produced by the sight of a beautiful painting and the pleasure of eating a palatable food differ in quality as well as in quantity, so that without a specific experience the simple definition of the special object could not give us a perfectly adequate knowledge of it."
which cover the distance between them, were alike in all respects, but merely
that their fundamental "mode of relation of consciousness to the object (was)
essentially kindred" (p. 367). He expressed himself very clearly concerning
the nature of this kinship (p. 370).

"...just as in judgments we deal with the truth or falsity of
objects, in an analogous manner in the phenomena of this
class we deal with their goodness or badness, their positive
or negative value. It is this characteristic relation to
the object which, in my opinion, is revealed by inner percep-
tion in desire and will, as well as in all that we call feel-
ing or emotion, in a manner that is both immediate and evi-
dent."

At the same time, however, he singled out equally clearly the undeniable
"qualitative differences between the special modes of (the phenomena of)
love." While not "fundamental," these differences must be taken into account
in a more refined classification of these phenomena into special classes.
Within this context, far from being opposed to a distinction between emotion
and motivation, Brentano readily recognized it. According to him, in this
domain of consciousness, just like in the domain of "consciousness in general,"
unity does not imply elementistic simplicity, but holistic complexity and
dynamic interaction. Such a stand is altogether consistent with recent de-
velopments in psychology which recognize simultaneously the distinction and
close interrelationship between motives and emotions. \( \text{\textsuperscript{44}} \)

\( \text{\textsuperscript{44}} \) This general historical perspective, along with further specifications
of it, in the next few paragraphs, is offered at this point rather than in
the following chapter because it enhances the meaning of Brentano's views.
Particularly significant in this respect is the increasing interest shown by many contemporary psychologists concerning the role of emotions as motivational factors, and a growing trend toward a pluralistic conception of motives. The leitmotiv underlying both of these developments can easily be found in Brentano's orientation. Indeed, in respect to the latter, one could say that our author's conception of motives is as extremely pluralistic as Lewin's. His very broad conception of affective-conative processes as human "interests" certainly matches this author's all-encompassing use of the term "need."

Carrying one step further this comparison, it would seem that Brentano's concept of "interest" is even better suited to a genuine "field" orientation than Lewin's concept of "need," because it brings out more clearly both the character of active participation on the part of the subject and the character of value of the field objects, consequent upon such a participation. In this respect, Murray's vector-value scheme of motivation (1951) and Koffka's conception (1935) of the "ego" as an integral part of a person's "behavioral environment" may be said to come closer to Brentano's standpoint.

The nature of the subject's participation in "phenomena of love" or "interest," as conceived by Brentano, is of interest in its own right. In essence, such a participation involves an act of "valuation." Consequent upon, and in line with underlying cognitive processes, this act of "valuation" is either "blind" or "insightful." In analogy with evident judgments, the latter yields a knowledge that something is truly and really good, and, as such
constitutes the foundation for true human behavior—ethical behavior, on both the individual and social level.  

Implied in the preceding doctrine is Brentano's recognition of two broad levels of affective-conative processes: "lower" or "sensory" and "higher" or "rational" feeling, emotions, desires, and motives. As already mentioned, according to him, free volition represents the highest and most complete form of psychological functioning in this realm of experience. In terms of historical comparison, free volition in his system corresponds closely to the concept of ego autonomy which has found its way into contemporary psychology in a variety of ways: the creative self (Adler), functional autonomy (Allport), primary ego autonomy (Hartmann), responsibility (existential psychology). Although advanced by outstanding authors of divergent orientations and from the vantage point of varied theoretical as well as practical interests, this concept's right to existence in psychology have been, and still are, challenged. In addition to system-inspired arguments brought to bear against it, a common source of misapprehension in this matter seems to lie in the mistaken notion that free volition or ego autonomy is a monolithic and hence unanalyzable quantum in human behavior which, if accepted, would forever foreclose the road to two of psychology's main goals as a science—prediction and control. The attentive study of Brentano's thought

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Both Sanz (1948) and Most (1931) give a good exposition and critical appraisal of the epistemological basis and metaphysical implications of Brentano's theory of "right love."
could be of value in clarifying these uncertainties. In fact, our author has emphasized both the rich "nuances" and imperceptible merging of the realm of volition with all the other facets of psychological functioning, and its inherent "lawfulness."

According to Brentano, "volition consists in a particular relation of the psychic activity to an object insofar as it is good or bad" (p. 371): "It is not simply a desire for something to happen, it is a desire for something to be produced as a consequence of the desire itself" (p. 396). This is not equivalent to saying that all volitions enjoy "full freedom," undisputed autonomy, and that this freedom or autonomy is not found anywhere else in the domain of "affectivity" or "interests." On the contrary, as shown by the following passage (pp. 391-392), volitions come in different "nuances" and are continuous with other "affective" phenomena:

"...Let us admit the actual existence in the domain of the will of this full freedom which, in each case, makes it appear possible for us to have an act of willing, non-willing, and willing the contrary. It is certain that this full freedom does not extend to the whole area of volition, but perhaps only to those instances in which either different kinds of action or at least acting or non-acting, each in its own way, are considered good. The most eminent defenders of the freedom of the will have always expressly recognized this. There is another point, however, on which they have perhaps been less categorical, but which nevertheless unmistakably reflects their convictions: I am referring to the fact that there are also free acts among psychic activities which cannot be characterized as volitional, and which are included among feelings. Thus the grief engendered by remorse for a past act, malicious delight, and many other phenomena of joy or sadness are considered acts which are as free as the resolution to change one's life and the intention to do harm to someone. Many thinkers, while reserving the terms of merit and demerit to free activity, go so far as to put the contemplative love of God above services volum-
tarily given to the neighbor. If, in spite of this, they speak only in general of the freedom of the will, it is because of the following reasons: ancient philosophers, as we have seen, have broadened the meaning of the term will and applied it identically to feeling and volition in the strict sense of the term; modern philosophers, instead, have often added other equivocal terms which have interfered with their investigations. Locke, for example, has never clearly distinguished between the faculty of executing or refusing an action according to whether we want or do not want it, and the possibility of wanting or not wanting it under the same circumstances. It is consequently certain on the one hand that, if freedom exists in the domain of love and hate, it does not extend only to voluntary acts, but also to certain affective manifestations, and on the other hand that not every voluntary act, any more than every affective act, can be called free. This is enough to show us that the affirmation of freedom does not widen the gap between feeling and will, ...

In terms of its broadest implication for the purpose of the present study, the preceding passage indicates that "volitions" or other "interests" are free or autonomous to the extent that they stem directly from the subject's own "attitudes" (or "relations to the object") rather than from the numberless and, frequently, nameless factors which "genetically" lie at the basis of these attitudes. Therefore, far from being uncaused and unmotivated, they bear the imprint of what could be called par excellence cause and motive: the subject himself (efficient cause) acting on the basis of his "attitudes" (final cause).

It follows that an adequate knowledge of the subject and his "attitudes" would enable one to "predict" his choices and the behavior consequent upon them; within the limits of this prediction, "control" would also be possible." Of Course, this presupposes that the "genesis" itself of these attitudes is
"lawful" in its own right. Brentano has not failed to bring this out, as reflected in the following passage (pp. 390) bearing upon "the laws which govern the succession of (the) phenomena" under consideration:

These phenomena are not independent either from the laws of imagination or from those relative to the origin and succession of judgments; but, with regard to their succession and evolution, they also present special underviable laws which form the psychological basis of ethics.

Brentano has not investigated exhaustively and in detail the special laws governing our "interests"; and one may very well question some of the laws which he did establish and/or the theoretical considerations leading him to establish them. These facts do not lessen his great merit of having not only defined an essential area of psychological research, but also provided psychology with a valuable frame of reference within which to pursue such research.

The passage just quoted above called attention once more to an important positive aspect of Brentano's orientation: the dependence of all human "interests" (affective-conative phenomena) upon cognitive processes. The contrast between this conception and McDougall's and Freud's parallel conceptions is obvious. It will be sufficient to add that, however, our author was not unaware of facts in human experience and behavior which led these two thinkers to their respective viewpoints. This is partially reflected in the following passage (pp. 438-439):

"...there are cases in which we prefer a certain action, which is judged beautiful, above all others and nevertheless, under the sway of passion, we want and do the opposite. Perhaps these cases can best be interpreted according to Aristotle's conception that
passion does not allow the higher love and higher judgment to express themselves properly, that it prevents them from developing to their full extent, since it completely dominates them. Although the quest for sensuous pleasure is not consonant with the dictates of reason, nevertheless rational deliberations come to the assistance of passion and suggest the means that will help us to secure pleasure; thus the love and pleasure which are connected with preference become mere means and lead to action, while the opposite noble preference remains without influence. If we consider this situation from this point of view, we find ourselves in the presence of a complex set of relations. The affective phenomenon is connected with images and judgments, as well as with other acts of love in which we desire something as a means, and finally with the external act..."

In general, as suggested by this passage, Brentano fully recognized (1) the independent role of impulsive ("instinctual," "hormic") affective-conative processes in human life, at times directly, and at other times indirectly, insofar as they do not allow the "higher" processes "to express themselves properly" or prevent them "from developing to their full extent," and (2) their added power of action on account of the "assistance" given to them by "rational deliberations." While on the one hand we are in no way justified to conclude from these statements that he was referring to such specific dynamic processes as repression, regression or primitivization, rationalization, etc., on the other we cannot fail to see that there is adequate room in his system for them.

The preceding paragraph also calls attention to the fact that, according to Brentano, the impulsive and the rational, the cognitive and the conative, may unite together in such an intimate fashion as to form "a complex set of relations" (or "subject's attitude") ultimately leading to the "external act"--
behavior. The holistic character of this view is unmistakable. In addition, as a highly dynamic attitude of the subject, Brentano's "complex set of relations" strongly resembles McDougall's "sentiment."

**Creative imagination and noetic consciousness.**—When he wrote his Psychology in 1874, Brentano included in the domain of imagination all instances of simple awareness: at the level of sensing, imagination proper, and thinking. However, he talked mostly about sensing and thinking, rather than imagining (in the usual sense of the term). To all appearances, he was then satisfied with the view that the "images of imagination" did occupy a well-defined position, half-way between, if not entirely equidistant from, sensing and thinking, and that the term "imagination" could be applied equally well to these three realms of experiencing. Accordingly, he found in this unified, though multivalent, "subject's attitude" (faculty) the basis for the experience of the beautiful⁴⁶ and for the doctrine of aesthetics.

Although Brentano never wrote the third Book of his Psychology which

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⁴⁶"Each fundamental class of psychic phenomena has a type of perfection proper to it which manifests itself in the inner feeling that accompanies, as we have seen, every act. In addition, there is a corresponding noble joy inherent in the most perfect acts of each fundamental class. The highest perfection of imagination is the contemplation of the beautiful; it is of little importance that this contemplation be sustained by the object or that it be independent of it. It is this contemplation which affords the highest enjoyment which we can find in imagination" (p. 402).
would have investigated all the problems relative to "imagination," a decade later (1885-1886), in his lectures on "Selected questions from psychology and aesthetics" he turned his attention to its role in our experience of the beautiful and in our scientific efforts to develop a doctrine of aesthetics. By this time he was convinced that imagination proper or "phantasy" constituted the cornerstone of such a doctrine (1959, p. 36). Correspondingly, he attempted to delimit more accurately the domain of phenomena belonging to it. In so doing, he also redefined his stand on the problem of "imagination" as a whole.

His overall position can be briefly summarized as follows: (1) only perceptual or intuitive images, i.e. images "which form the foundation of perception" are images in the proper sense of the term, (2) non-perceptual images or concepts are images only in the improper sense of the term, and (3) images of imagination proper are non-perceptual images which approach perceptions, insofar as they have "a perceptual core." It follows that the boundaries of the latter are undefined and fluid. Indeed, Brentano concludes (1959, p. 87):

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47 Published in his posthumous volume, Principles of Aesthetics (1959).

48 Brentano's "brief historical overview" (1959, pp. 46-68) of the most important opinions concerning the nature of imagination, from Aristotle to Wundt, is excellent in many respects and as such worth reading.
From our research it follows that there is no specific doctrine of the images of imagination. According to our definition, they fall sometimes in the domain of perceptions, and sometimes in the domain of concepts. Accordingly, for both of these domains we must first of all describe as accurately as possible the phenomena (descriptive study), and subsequently investigate their genesis and course of development (genetic study).

This new viewpoint of Brentano must be understood correctly. It is easy to see that negatively this viewpoint implies the rejection of the conception (which he himself had previously held) of imagination proper as a halfway house with its own distinct domain of phenomena; by contrast, it is not apparent at first sight what, if any, is its positive import. Closer analysis of this issue indicates that in effect our author was (1) advocating the existence in our experience of complex phenomena involving the synthesis of both sensory-perceptual and conceptual-abstract processes, and (2) arguing in favor of an accurate study of these phenomena at both levels, and from both a "descriptive" and "genetic" (explanatory) standpoint.

Thus delimited, Brentano's domain of imagination proper or phantasy corresponds, or is closely allied, to the important domain investigated by contemporary psychology under the various rubrics of "creative imagination," "productive thinking (Wertheimer), and (tested) "intelligence."\(^4^9\) The similarity between Brentano's conceptions and these contemporary viewpoints is reflected not only in the general nature of the phenomena investigated and of

\(^4^9\) Psychologists who may have been wondering about the epistemological issues underlying the use of these terms could find an answer in his theoretical orientation.
the methods of investigation themselves, but also in the importance attributed to research findings in this area. Our author's stand on the latter issue is quite modern and as such undoubtedly acceptable to modern psychologists. Speaking of the import of researches in the domain of (creative) imagination, he stated (1959, p. 36):

"All that pertains to this (domain) is not only of the greatest importance for aesthetics, but is of far-reaching significance for the life of the artist as well as of the scientist (including the mathematician), indeed, for the life of every man. Accordingly, the investigation of the life of imagination ranks amongst the most important tasks of psychology. Of course, we are not dealing here with only one problem; rather, we are confronted with many and varied problems."

In still another respect, Brentano's thought finds echoes in scientific psychology. During the period when he was trying to clarify the problem of imagination proper, he was also working toward a solution of the problem of noetic consciousness. Apparently, it was his desire to secure for this type of consciousness a specific and permanent domain of phenomena which prompted him to de-emphasize the experiential origin of concepts and correspondingly to emphasize their abstract character. This seems to be the meaning of his position mentioned above that non-perceptual images or concepts are images only in the improper sense of the term.

This position came very near to a nominalistic conception of concepts similar to the standpoint, subsequently adopted by many psychologists, according to which concepts are mere "mental constructs." Brentano, however, was never satisfied with such a position. In his final stand, as expressed in the posthumous volume, On Sensory and Noetic Consciousness (1928), he re-
emphasized again the foundation in experience of abstract concepts or ideas. It was probably on account of this concern that he retained for them the more general term "image" (Vorstellung) in preference to the term "idea."

Critique of language.-- Brentano's life-long interest in several linguistic problems (structural aspects of language, semantics, language as an expression of psychic phenomena) is closely connected with his effort to ascertain ever more accurately the experimental basis of the tools - concepts, hypothesis, laws - used by science in its efforts to develop an authentic Weltanschauung. The historical significance of this aspect of his thought was expressed with unusual clearness by the editor of his posthumous volume, The Doctrine of Right Judgment (pp. VI-VII), Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand:

Long before the neo-positivists and logisticians showed the need for a logical analysis of language, it was Brentano who took into his hand this analysis...In many respects he went even further than the neo-positivists, but without ever giving up the conviction that we can arrive at necessary and general knowledges.

Even after discarding those aspects of this analysis that were inspired by some of his specific philosophical doctrines, one is left with a number of important reflections and a general standpoint which can be of value to contemporary psychologists.

50 His Psychology and his Appendix to the volume, Classification of Psychic Phenomena (1911 a), contain several specific illustrations of this interest. Further evidence of it may be found in most of his posthumous works, and especially in his volume, The Doctrine of Right Judgment which contains a rather extensive discussion of the linguistic problems mentioned here.
It was the conviction that Brentano's standpoint in psychology contained important perennial "truths" for this science which motivated the present study and the translation of his volume, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. Such a conviction, however, in no way involved, as a premise, the major contention of this study—that Brentano's actual accomplishments for which he deserves posterity's permanent acclaim, and which will secure for him a truly prominent place in the history of scientific endeavors, do not lie in the field of philosophy, but in psychology.

The "validity" of this overall appraisal of Brentano as a thinker, of course, will ultimately rest upon the nature itself of his psychological doctrines. As given in the preceding chapter, the overview of these doctrines is sufficiently comprehensive to enable the reader to form an independent personal judgment in this matter. To this end, however, it seems essential that Brentano's views be cast into proper historical perspective; for, without such a frame of reference, the full import of his overall standpoint might not be apparent. It was on account of this fact that in a few instances as previously indicated, the direct presentation of some aspects of his thought was complemented with the formulation of a partial historical context. In the remaining pages of this study, an effort will be made to further extend this approach. The lines of discourse that are going to be pur-
sued will serve to delineate such an approach in some of its important dimensions. As such, they are illustrative rather than comprehensive.

1. Brentano, structuralism, and the "Third Force" in psychology.--

In this writer's opinion, Brentano's thought deserves consideration in any study of contemporary philosophical trends because of his existentialist metaphysics and his critical realistic epistemology. The former, however, would only constitute a relatively minor chapter in an overall detailed treatment of existentialism; and the latter should appear in any comparable study of epistemological trends in the contemporary world not because it is attuned to the general spirit which permeates these trends, but rather on account of the valuable counteracting weight that it could exert upon them. Furthermore, there is no sign on the philosophical horizon that existentialism will turn its clock back to where Brentano set it, or that present day epistemologists will avail themselves of his insights to regain a better perspective on the value and actual limits of "scientific" knowledge. In view of this, one could say that our author is a guest, and not always a welcomed one, among contemporary philosophers, rather than a chartered member; or, if one prefers, a spectator of, rather than an active participant in, the on-going philosophical dialogue (no matter how discordant it may appear at times).

The situation looks quite different when one turns his attention to Brentano's standpoint in psychology. Here, upon closer scrutiny, one finds that principles and ideas paralleling closely those characterizing such a stand-
point have subsequently been championed by eminent psychologists of varied interests, and that within the last three decades a theoretical re-orientation incorporating several of these principles and ideas has been gaining increasing momentum in American psychology. The fact that this re-orientation has taken place in this country enhances its value. If it had developed in Europe, without direct involvement of American psychologists, the latter would have undoubtedly looked upon it as but a resurgence of continental leanings toward abstract problems. By contrast, European psychologists can hardly attribute this American movement to diminished concern with scientific cogency and practical issues. On the contrary, it was the will for greater fidelity and adherence to "fact" in both pure and applied research fields of psychology which inspired it.¹

Extending Allport's (1961) characterization of his conception of personality, one could describe the movement under consideration as a trend toward an "empirical" and "humanistic" psychology: empirical, in the sense that it reaches beyond experimental methodology to utilize all other "valid" sources of psychological knowledge (of which phenomenology is but one example), while working evermore assiduously to expand both the range and the quality of experimentation itself; humanistic, because its starting, as well as its final, referent point is the human personality, taken in its bio-psycho-social indi-

¹Allport's volume, Personality: a Psychological Interpretation (1937), may be viewed as the first official landmark of this movement. Explorations in Personality (1938) by Murray and his collaborators, and Lewin's A Dynamic Theory of Personality (1935) should also be mentioned in this context.
viduality and existential context. Perhaps, some misunderstandings will be avoided by making explicit these and other features of the above-mentioned trend, and correspondingly portraying it as an empirico-experimental, holistic-analytic, understanding-explanatory, phenomenological-existentialist, structural-dynamic, and humanistic-personalistic psychology. Of course, it is important to keep in mind that these features to some extent overlap with one another, and that not all of them appear in the thinking of authors who could be mentioned as representative of the trend in question.

In retrospect, to use Maslow's well-known characterization, this trend may be viewed as the "Third Force" in psychology which developed in opposition to psychoanalysis and behaviorism, even though it benefited from both of these earlier "revolutions," assimilating their positive conquests. Such a trend has found and is still finding impetus for growth and development in contemporary events; at the same time, however, it is also ideally and dynamically connected with antecedent movements and orientations.

It may be worthwhile to mention in passing, as illustrations, that psychoanalysis and behaviorism (indeed, psychology in general, according to Ebbinghaus' famous dictum) have "a short history, but a long past." In the case of behaviorism, Boring (1950) has given a vivid picture of antecedent trends leading back to Descartes' conception of animals as mere automata; as to psychoanalysis, in his volume, *The Unconscious before Freud*, Whyte (1960), has traced skillfully the history of basic ideas underlying Freud's psychoanalysis back 200 years to 1680, that is, to a point removed by only three
decades from the death of Descartes, who had given conscious mind its most comprehensive "bill of rights."

A similar situation holds true with regard to the movement which is under consideration here. Thus, for example, contemporary interest among psychologists in phenomenology and existentialism reaches back to similar interests on the part of earlier phenomenologists and existentialists; in turn, the latter shared the interests of earlier thinkers.

Whyte's introductory critical reflections (1960, p. VIII) on the nature of the relationship between Freud and his "predecessors" are worth being quoted here, because they can easily be extended to define the historical connection in which we are interested:

...the early thinkers are not "predecessors" who "anticipated" Freud. They, and Freud, and countless others are participants in a tradition which is being slowly enriched. They did not "lead to Freud," for some of them knew much that Freud, rightly for his own purposes, preferred not to emphasize. Hence one way of improving current ideas is to recall what was thought and said in earlier times. The aim is not to project our ideas into the past, or to dazzle ourselves with the prescience of early thinkers as wise as we are, but to recognize where they knew more...Freud is not final; he is the most influential figure in a succession of thinkers, all recognizing aspects of the truth. And Freud himself may be the anticipator of a more balanced doctrine that still lies out of sight.2

Like the thinkers who came before Freud, Brentano is not a "predecessor" who "anticipated" the re-orientation that has taken place in psychology during

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2 It may be of interest to notice that, six years earlier, Stern had visualised the "movement toward personalism" as an expression of "a more balanced doctrine" referred to here by Whyte.
the last few decades, or leading ideas advanced by other thinkers (such as Clarkins, W. Stern, Wertheimer, Koffka and Kohler, Spearman, etc.). But he has been a participant in the Zeitgeist underlying the origin and varied fortunes of these ideas and re-orientation. Although silent at first, and always unobtrusive, his role in this "spirit of the time" has been increasingly felt, especially since Boring took pains several decades ago to bring it to the attention of the other participants, delineating incisively its major features.

Without slight to these other participants, one could say that Brentano "knew much that (they)...preferred not to emphasize"; and correspondingly that the latter have come to know much that he never emphasized in detail. But perhaps the details are less important than the general frame of reference, in the sense that they would be meaningless without it. In this respect, it is certainly to Brentano's credit to have formulated as broad and meaningful a frame of reference as he did.

Brentano expressed himself very clearly upon the empirico-experimental character of all psychological investigations, whether phenomenological (descriptive) or "causal-explanatory." If Titchner had taken the trouble to read all of his works published before 1921, he probably would not have written his article on "Brentano and Wundt: empirical and experimental psychology" (1921 a), or at least would not have written it in the same vein as he did.  

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3This article shows that Titchner was acquainted with Brentano's Psycho-
Ultimately, if he admitted that "experimental psychology is in the broad sense empirical, and a psychology which is in the narrow sense empirical may still have recourse to experiment" (p. 111), it was because he wanted to enhance the status of Wundt's psychology which he characterized as "essentially a matter of description" (p. 111). By contrast, he stated, "Brentano's psychology is essentially a matter of argument" (p. 111), i.e. "a rationalization of mind in use" (1928, p. 176).

According to Titchner the "empirical" psychologists of Brentano's temper, who studies "mind in use" (acts, processes) is not a scientist because in so doing, "like the rest of the world, who are not psychologists," he merely takes "mind as he finds it...actively at work in man's intercourse with nature and his fellow-man, as well as in his discourse with himself" (1921, p. 119). Furthermore, such a psychologist cannot be a true scientist in Wundt's sense. Supposedly, the latter is a true scientist because his "primary aim is to describe the phenomena of mind as the physiologist describes the phenomena of the living body" (1921, p. 118), and because he "falls back on 'genetic explanation' only when some phases of the traditional subject-matter of psychology proves to be indescribable" (1921, p. 116).

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logy, his The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong, and his Researches in Sensory Psychology, but had either never read his Last Wishes for Austria, or forgotten about the clear statement which he made in this volume about the need for experimentation not only in "genetic" but also in "descriptive" psychology. For a follow-up discussion of the general issue of empirical and experimental psychology, see Titchner (1925), Carmichael (1926), and Boring (1928).
As is well known, "the phenomena of mind" or "traditional subject-matter of psychology" of which Titchner speaks are the "contents" of psychic acts and processes. Just like the physiologist studies samples of tissues taken from the "living" body with the help of the microscope, the psychologist should study "contents" apart from the "living" mind ("mind in use") with the help of what Titchner came to call "trained introspection" (a "device" roughly comparable to the microscope, in that it is intended to sharpen the "eye" of the mind).

At first sight, such a conception seems to have a certain aura of plausibility, and most definitely has "the air of simplicity," in that it "simplifies so greatly the problems that lie before the student of psychology." Upon closer analysis, however, one soon realizes that by the time the psychologist gets to them, the "contents" or "phenomena of mind" are twice "dead," having "died" the first time when they were divorced from the acts or processes to which they refer, and the second time when they were put under the highly filtered and artificial light of "trained introspection." Certainly, Titchner is technically correct when he describes this type of introspection

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1 These statements are taken from The Battle of Behaviorism: An Exposition and an Exposure (1929, p. 41). That they are applicable in our case is shown by the fact that McDougall always viewed Wundt and Titchner's variety of introspective psychology as but another type of "mechanical psychology," just like behaviorism, and invariably directed his critique simultaneously against both types of conceptions.
as an "observation of an Is" (1899, p. 291), but has no right to label his "structural" psychology "existential," since the "Is," as a mere distillate of analysis, is lifeless. The Gestaltists emphasized this very point when they described it as a "brick-and-mortar" type of psychology.

It also follows that, as conceived by Wundt and Titchner, structuralism yields neither explanation nor understanding. Like the architect, the traditional structural psychologist can only inform us about the number and type of the various component elements making up the "structure" he conceived, and the particular "position" which each of them occupies in such a structure. Furthermore, in the strict sense of the term, such a psychologist cannot speak of the "role" or "roles" of either the separate elements or the resulting "aggregate." Correspondingly, his psychology cannot be in any way a "dynamic" psychology. Even when, out of sheer despair, he "falls back upon 'genetic explanation'" (taken not in Brentano's broad sense of the term, but in the restricted sense of an appeal to physiological processes), such a psychologist does not offer us anything dynamic, explanatory, or of an understanding nature because the proposed solution lies outside his reference system.

A few words will suffice to bring out the marked contrast between such a conception and Brentano's standpoint. Some of the most essential characteristics of a genuine psychology, which are so manifestly absent in the former, stand out in high relief in the latter.

"Mind in use" is certainly an existential given. As such it has not
only a characteristic structure but a lawful mode of functioning. Through accurate phenomenological description, by means of empirical analysis and experimentation, the former can be "understood"; and the latter, when properly investigated, can be "explained." "Understanding" and "explanation," however, are not mutually exclusive modes of knowing in Brentano's system: insofar as they contribute to the "intelligibility" of that which they study, they imply one another, in such a way that to understand something is equivalent to explain it, and vice versa. Furthermore, as a "relational" given, "mind" is eminently dynamic not only in its functions, but also in its structure.

The terms "mind" was employed here in order to retain the continuity of discourse with regard to Titchner's critique of Brentano. Actually, we know that the true referent point according to our author's orientation is the "psychically active subject." This is so in the case of "experience" or psychic acts proper; in the case of "behavior" instead, the referent point is man in his existential condition of a self-which-has-a-body.5 Such a holistic and humanistic-personalistic frame of reference, by contrast, is absent

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5 The extent to which the latter view might not be reconcilable with his metaphysical doctrine of the mind-body relationship needs not be investigated in the present study. For our purpose, the important thing is that, according to our author, behavior reflects the unitary functioning of the whole man, and is the proper object of psychological study. Titchner, instead, relegates the science of behavior to the province of biology.
in classical structuralism. The humanistic-personalistic aspect of Brentano's standpoint is further enhanced by the fact that he used to cherish the vision of man as the "carrier of history" (1892, 1959). The existentialist overtones of this vision are also obvious.

It is not necessary to re-emphasize at this point the similarity between Brentano's standpoint, as briefly summarized above, and the overall frame of reference which instigated, and is presently sustaining, the "Third Force" in psychology. The similarity between such a standpoint and some other independent thinkers or orientations will be brought out in the ensuing discussion. In view of this, it would seem that Titchner was unwittingly a prophet against himself when he stated: "Psychology...may gladly confess her debt to both (Brentano and Wundt). Yet one must choose either one: there is no middle way between Brentano and Wundt" (1921, p. 108). It almost looks as if Titchner saw "the handwriting on the wall," and tried in vain to erase what was being written. For, as we have seen, many contemporary psychologists have "chosen" Brentano over Wundt; by contrast, while revered as the founder of psychology, Wundt is no longer a source of inspiration and influence.

6. Brentano's stand concerning the variety of specific methods to be used in psychology and his views on the several fields of psychological investigation constitute other areas of agreement.
2. Brentano and some of his contemporaries.—During his lifetime, Brentano did not have the advantage of an active school with active students working toward expanding, refining, and putting to experimental test his ideas in psychology. Furthermore, a few students of his (Stumpf, Meinong, Ehrenfels) who achieved renown in this science soon developed their own frame of reference and correspondingly pursued independent theoretical and research interests.

In spite of this, the revolt which he started against associationism gained impetus, influencing "most of the important writers of textbooks or systematic treatises in the last twenty years of the nineteenth century" (Flügge, 1951). Chief among these writers were Lipps, Ward, Stoudt, and James. In all instances Brentano's influence was selective, rather than "totalitarian."

Lipps' insistence upon the essentially active character of the "mind" and the importance of the self, his interest in space perception and esthe-

7 The "school" to which, as mentioned in the first chapter, Brentano himself refers never grew beyond the germinal stage of a certain ideal classroom atmosphere.

8 Ehrenfels will be mentioned again briefly in the following pages. By contrast, no further reference will be made to Stumpf and Meinong, since an exposition and comparison of their views with those of Brentano is not essential to the historical context which is being delineated here. The interested reader who might wish to follow this line of study is referred to Boring's classical work (1950), to Stumpf's own studies (1919, 1930), and to Spiegelberg's (1960) and Eaton's (1930) investigations.
tics, and even his doctrine of empathy all bear the imprint of Brentano's views and theoretical interests. On a theoretical level, the latter doctrine seems to be an extension of his conception that sensory experiences are complex unitary act in which "imagination" is inextricably blended with, and enriched by, an immediate belief (blind judgment) and an equally immediate "interest" in the sensed object--"a feeling into" (Einfühlung, empathy) such an object, according to Lipps' terminology. On the research level, Lipps arrived at this doctrine through his studies of optical illusions in which, as we know, Brentano himself had been interested (1892, 1893 a, 1893 b).

Ward also assimilated from Brentano two of the basic concepts in his own system, the concepts of the activity and unity of the self, and transmitted them to Stout. From here they filtered down to McDougall. As present in Stout's system, the concepts under discussion were mingled with elements derived from associationism. While Stout personally seemed to have considered such a mixed marriage a success, McDougall obviously thought otherwise. As a hypothesis, it seems probable that the latter author was first motivated to develop his purposive psychology by the inherent conflict which he saw in Stout's hybrid orientation—a conflict which, in terms of contrast effects, must have simultaneously convinced him of the basic inadequacies of associationism and the noble virtues of an activistic type of psychology.

James, of course, had preceded McDougall, with his sharp critique of associationistic ("domino") psychology and a corresponding emphasis upon the
unity and personal character of consciousness. While his views in the matter were largely the product of independent thinking, he did not fail to pay tribute when he first published his *Principles of Psychology* in 1890 to Brentano for having championed a similar orientation. Specifically, he stated: "Altogether...Brentano's (chapter) on the Unity of Consciousness is as good as anything with which I am acquainted" (1907, I, 240, n.).

Theodore Ziehen, who also recognized his indebtedness to Brentano (along with Helmholtz, Hering, Fechner, Spencer, and Mach), is worth mentioning in the present context. As described in his "Autobiography" (1930), the general plan of his psychology includes many tenets reflecting the influence of Brentano's views. It seems worth listing some of them because they bring out our author's standpoint: (1) introspection and objective observation must work together; (2) an essential, indeed, indispensable element in the development of the science of psychology is the experiment, although it is not the only method; (3) "psychic" and "conscious" are identical in psy-

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9 The reason, for discussing this author is partially due to the fact that he was a protege of a kind ofBinswanger who has recently (1963) made his appearance on the American scene with all indications that his presence will be increasingly felt among both psychologists and psychiatrists--Ziehen was himself a psychiatrist who turned into a self-made psychologist and philosopher.

10 That Ziehen in several respects differs basically from Brentano should be obvious from the mere listing of the authors who influenced him. One basic difference lies in his ostracism of the "subject" from psychology.
chology; (4) without the least detriment to applied psychology, we might remember the relation of psychology to the theory of understanding in the sense of a prima philosophia; (5) the phenomenological principle is of paramount importance for the entire psychology. The meaning and import of this last tenet is brought out clearly in the following passage (p. 488):

In every psychological investigation, determine first of all the facts pure and simple, i.e. add nothing to them and think nothing of them, and consider those facts as the foundation upon which you are to build and construct. We admit that it is often difficult to follow these directions in full measure. That does not impair the practical significance: the formula indicates the directions we are to follow. Self-evident as this phenomenological procedure seems, still even today it is rarely carried out properly; generally the phenomenologists as such are slighted and their description is already filled with all kinds of theoretical suggestions or imaginings.\(^\text{11}\)

Ziehen's extensive investigations of problems in logic and epistemology bearing, among other things, upon the indispensability of a psychological foundation of these two disciplines, also fall in line with two of Brentano's major interests. And one is tempted to view the author's studies of native abilities in music and mathematics as examples of studies that Brentano himself might have wanted to carry out, if he had been provided with the proper means.\(^\text{12}\)

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\(^{11}\) In this context, Ziehen specifically states that he is not referring to phenomenology as understood by Husserl and Stumpf.

\(^{12}\) Brentano's own giftedness for mathematics and his theoretical utilization of it have been mentioned previously in the present study. For a partial exposition of some of his views on music, see his volume, *Principles of Aesthetics* (1959, pp. 216-224).
Alfred Binet is being mentioned in this section of our historical perspective mainly, if not exclusively, because Soucek (1924) took the trouble of comparing his views to those of Brentano. For the purpose of the present study, it will be sufficient to mention that the similarity between these two thinkers' standpoint does not seem to be any greater than a *flatus vocis*: they both speak of "acts of knowledge" and "objects of knowledge," "psychic" and "physical" phenomena. How far Binet's views actually are from those of Brentano is clearly illustrated by the following two propositions which he upholds: (1) "psychic" and "physical" are not opposed, are not two different classes of phenomena, but rather exemplify merely the duality of mind and matter found in all psychic phenomena; (2) it is necessary to suppress from consciousness the notion of the subject, for such a notion would "denature" the psychic event. The so-called subject is nothing but a bundle of "sensations" (as stated by Taine, Ribot, Mach and Titchner). Even prescending from this second proposition, it is easy to see that the "relational" character of the act itself, which is cardinal in Brentano's thinking, is entirely missing in Binet's conception.

3. Brentano and Freud. — As mentioned in the first chapter, Freud was a student of Brentano. The question as to whether or not his thinking was in any way influenced by his only non-medical teacher, was briefly investigated by Merlan (1945, 1949) who gave an affirmative answer to it. Since that time, it has become customary for most writers of history of psychology textbooks
to make reference to it. By and large, whether affirmative or negative, their attitude in the matter has been largely perfunctory.

Basically, such an attitude seems to be entirely justified, for to approach the solution of such a question at any level of depth would involve at least a small independent treatise dealing with the by-no-means simple problem of whether or not Freud's psychoanalysis presupposes an underlying philosophy, and if so what type of philosophy. Certainly, the answer given to this problem will affect drastically the way in which the question under consideration is approached and solved.

Even aside from this issue, such a question would be more pertinent in a study of Freud's thinking than in one dealing with Brentano's viewpoint. With regard to the latter, the only relevant issue, which could and should be raised, is whether or not our author's strong stand against unconscious acts or processes implies the absolute denial of the existence of any unconscious factors underlying human behavior and experience. This issue is not difficult to solve. For, if on the one hand Brentano has always asserted that psychic acts or processes by their very nature are conscious, on the other he has also consistently recognised that the "dispositions" underlying these acts are most typically "unconscious." It will be sufficient to add that,

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11 Brentano distinguished between "innate" dispositions (man's basic "attitudes" or modes of functioning) and "acquired" dispositions. The former are by nature unconscious; the latter, by contrast, may be conscious or unconscious, depending upon the situation confronting a given individual.
according to his thinking, "dispositions" are the equivalent of the modern concept of "set."

4. **Brentano and functionalism.** -- In two lengthy articles, Titchner dealt in detail with the problem of the relationship between functional psychology (1921 a), as found in Ladd, Angell, and Judd, and act psychology (1922), as expounded by Stumpf, Lipps, Husserl, Messer, and Witasek. In the latter context, Brentano came up for discussion mainly in reference to a brief summary of Munsterberg's and Husserl's criticisms of some of his doctrines. Obviously, having previously (1921 a) written a specific article comparing our author's orientation with that of Wundt, Titchner felt that he could by-pass him in the present general discussion of act psychology.

Titchner's exposition of the views of the separate authors whom he investigated is quite comprehensive and still worth reading today. By contrast, his "integration" or general synopsis of the two trends and his critical evaluation of them are highly subjective. As may easily be expected, he does not see much, if any, worth in these trends: "They represent what we may call an art of mental life,--a general 'applied' psychology' that is logically prior to the special 'applied psychologies' of education, vocation, law, medicine, industry" (p. 82). Relatively speaking, however, he saw more value in the act variety of "empirical" psychology than in its functional counterpart: "There is no seed of life in functionalism compared with the power of perennial self-renewal that inheres in intentionalism" (p. 79).
Pursuing further this kind of logic, Titchner found it easy to dispose of functionalism as "the parasite of an organism doomed to extinction." He proceeded somewhat more diplomatically in the case of intentionalism, but in the end the verdict was the same, as shown by the following passage (p. 81):

The one complete and positive reply to intentionalism is the existential system, the system that is partially and confusedly set forth...in the works of Wundt and Kulpe and Ebbinghaus... If we can build psychology upon a definition that is scientific as the word "science" is to be understood in the chapter of the whole history of human thought; and if we can follow methods and achieve results that are not unique and apart but, on the contrary, of the same order as the methods and results of physics and biology; then, by sheer shock of difference, the act-systems will appear as exercises in applied logic, stamped with the personalities of their authors. They will not, on that account, languish and die, because "mind in use" will always have its fascination, but they will no longer venture to offer themselves as science.

These value judgments seem to be a further illustration of the hypothesis advanced above that Titchner was in effect foreseeing the end of an era in psychology and tried in vain to fight back the tide of history in psychology. The fact that he saw behaviorism primarily, if not exclusively, as a system which got "its motivation...from dissatisfaction with the psychology of function" strengthens such a hypothesis. From a historical point of view, in fact, it is well known that Watson directed his open critique especially against Wundt and Titchner's type of "psychology of consciousness."

With regard to act psychology, Titchner's views mentioned here should enhance the contrast between Brentano's conception and classical structuralism, as portrayed in the preceding pages. With regard to functionalism, his
blunt condemnation seemed to have challenged H. Carr, the last chartered member of functionalism, into action. In fact, in his vigorous defense of this system (1925) he was apparently bent to prove that Titchener was wrong when he opposed functionalism and act psychology. The latter, he seemed to argue, was but one "first conception" of functional psychology as "the psychology of mental operation." As such, he continued, it was "an essential propaedeutic" to two other truer conceptions: functional psychology as "the psychology of the fundamental utilities of consciousness," and as "psychophysical psychology." His justification of the premise in this line of reasoning, and the conclusions to which he arrived, are worth quoting (p. 454):

It remains...to point out in what manner the conception of functionalism as concerned with the basal operations of mind is correlated with the other conceptions...Certainly if we are intent upon discerning the exact manner in which mental process contributes to accommodation efficiency, it is natural to begin our undertaking by determining what are the primordial forms of expression peculiar to mind...Again like the biological accommodatory view, the psychophysical view of functional psychology involves as a rational presupposition some acquaintance with mental processes as these appear to reflect consciousness. The intelligent correlation in a practical way of physiological and mental operations evidently involves a preliminary knowledge of the conscious differentiations both on the side of conscious functions and on the side of physiological functions...In view of the considerations of the last few paragraphs it does not seem fanciful to urge that these various theories of the problem of functional psychology really converge upon one another, however, divergent may be the introductory investigations peculiar to each of the several ideals. Possibly the conception that the fundamental problem of the functionalist is one of determining just how mind participates in accommodatory reactions, is more nearly inclusive that either of the others, and so may be chosen to stand for the group. But if this vicarious
duty is assigned to it, it must be on clear terms of remem-
brance that the other phases of the problem are equally real
and equally necessary. Indeed the three things hang together
as integral parts of a common program.

Except for the emphasis upon the second conception of functional psy-
chology as being "more nearly inclusive than either of the other," Brentano
would not have found much to object against in these views: the first and
third conceptions of functional psychology, as defined by Carr, are actually
found in his system, and the second is entirely consistent with it, even
though he himself did not advance it explicitly. Brentano's psychology,
however, involves further specifications of the "functional" program beyond
those recognized by classical functionalism.

5. Brentano and the Würzburg School. — In following the preceding brief
synopsis of Titchner's articles on "Functional psychology and the psychology
of act," the reader may have noticed that Külp, the reputed founder of the
Würzburg School, was presented as an advocate of structural psychology. This
again creates the impression that Titchner was trying to stop the "handwriting
on the wall," this time by conveniently overlooking the fact that Külp had
progressed beyond his pre-Würzburg structuralist stand, coming to recognize
the distinction between acts and contents, and the existence of "imageless
thought," and more in general to reject two of the cardinal tenets of
Wundtian-Titchnerian psychology: sensationalism and associationism.

No explanation is needed to show that these main features of the Würzburg
School are found in Brentano's orientation. Brentano's direct influence upon
the development of this school, however, does not seem to be as great as it might appear at first sight. First of all, acts and contents were not conceived by members of this school in quite the same manner as Brentano did: the acts appear to have been viewed in a less dynamic and "relational" context, and the contents seem to resemble more the "objects" of the structuralists than the "objects" of Brentano. In the second place, the concept of "imageless thought" was not derived from Brentano's concept of "noetic consciousness" because his views on this issue were not publicly known at that time. Perhaps it is the anti-associationistic bent in our author's orientation that exerted the most direct influence upon Kulpe and his pupils.

In terms of immediate historical derivation, the Würzburg School took its concept of act as distinct from content from Husserl (Ronco, 1962) rather than from Brentano. On the one hand, however, this School basically added acts to contents, and new contents to the traditional contents, as "elements" of psychological study, rather than integrating them in a unified synthesis. In view of this, one could say that the resulting system is oriented more toward "content psychology" than "act psychology" proper: it is almost as if the lineaments of Brentano's orientation (through Husserl) have been superimposed upon the still clearly discernible background of Wundt's viewpoint. 15

15 Both Humphrey (1951) and Ronco (1962, 1963) have called attention to the intermixture of the old and the new in the Würzburg School. From the point of view of general information for the reader, it seems worth mentioning that Ronco's study is the best available exposition and critical appraisal of this School. The fruit of a one year research project at the Institute of
According to Ronco (1963, pp. 30-39), the term "imageless" (unanschauliches) underwent a gradual transformation away from Wundt's sensationalism in the Würzburg School. Ach and Watts, for example, used this term in the sense of "active, but unconscious images." The existence of "imageless thought" proper was first recognized by Schultze and Bühler. However, even for Bühler, the "'thought' or 'concept' of a given object is (merely) the sum of the relations linking this object with other objects which belong to the same order." The obvious difference between this conception of "imageless thought" and Brentano's concept of "noetic consciousness" further underscores the fact that the former was developed independently from the latter. Of course, this fact far from lessening the historical significance of Brentano's standpoint, it enhances it. Our author, in effect, "anticipated" by almost three decades the Zeitgeist which animated the Würzburg School.  

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Psychology of the University of Bonn, made possible by a grant from the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung Foundation, this study takes into account Humphrey's investigation (1951), correcting and supplementing it in several respects.

It seems important to mention that this early Zeitgeist, through the works of Sels, Ach, Spearmann, Lindworski, and Duncker, has extended its influence to our time. More recently it has found expression in Bruner, Goodnow and Austin's volume, A study of thinking (1957)—the outcome of half a decade of researches identified as "the Harvard Cognition Project." It is not within the scope of the present study to pass judgment on the experimental "techniques" used in this study. By contrast, it is worth noticing that theoretically the authors' conception of "a concept as a (mere) network of significant inferences" (p. 244) is even more inadequate than Bühler's conception in safeguarding the true nature of thinking. Were the authors themselves aware of this implication when they described themselves as "empiricists"? (p. 246).
The Würzburg School was more successful in, and brought to a more complete closure, its anti-associationistic stand than its anti-sensationalistic intent. However, even in this respect there occurred an evolution of thinking (Ronco, 1963, pp. 25-30). Thus, for example, "associationism was not definitely overcome" by Ach and Watts; and Messer went only a step further when he "placed at the center of the critique of associationism the factor of 'volition'." Bühler, although convinced of the existence of the thinking subject as such, did not dwell specifically upon this theoretical position; it was only with Külpe, in his systematic, post-Würzburg development, that such a position was consciously and unequivocally formulated in a way which echoes very closely Brentano's thought. Külpe specifically raised the issue of the "legitimacy of a psychology 'in which sensations, images, with their affective fringes, are the only contents of consciousness...'; a psychology in which 'it would be more exact to say: it thinks (es denkt), rather than: I think...' -- In (his) opinion, such a psychology would be an imaginary construct which contradicts the results of recent researches, according to which activity has become the most important thing, and reactivity and the mechanism of images have become of secondary concern. The activity in question is the activity of the thinking subject: the tasks, Külpe states, are not presented to sensations, to feelings or to images, but to a subject, whose spiritual nature, and whose spontaneity alone can assimilate and execute the instructions" (Ronco, 1963, p. 29). In view of the virtual identity of this stand with Brentano's conception, Külpe's accusation of positivism
leveled against our author is all the more surprising. By the same token, however, this fact shows once more that, while Brentano did not influence the Wurzburg thinkers directly, he preceded them in their main conclusions by several decades.

6. Brentano, the Austrian School, and Gestalt psychology. -- Ehrenfels and Meinong, both pupils of Brentano, were undoubtedly the most articulate theoreticians of the Austrian School. It was not through them, however, that Brentano's orientation entered into psychology. The credit for having achieved this factually, if not intentionally, goes to two students of Meinong, Witasek and Benussi. In effect, their experimental work showed that "most of the data of perception can be expressed in terms of acts" (Boring, 1950, p. 448).

By contrast, Ehrenfels' "form-qualities," although apparently borrowed from some of Brentano's views, are less consistent with the spirit of his overall system than Wertheimer, Koffka, and Köhler's Gestalten, which were not so borrowed. The "relational" and unitary character of psychological processes, as conceived by Brentano, also seems to be better preserved in Gestalt psychology proper, than in Ehrenfels' system. Again, however, it was "the spirit of the time" and their own inventiveness which led the founders of this school to their characteristic point of view, rather than Brentano's direct influence. This seems to be true not only of their early doctrines, but also of subsequent developments, such as Wertheimer's concept of "pro-

There seems to be undeniable similarities between Brentano's views on the "psychophysical character" of psychology and the Gestaltists' conception of the "psychological field" as a "psychophysical field." Certainly Brentano's standpoint allows for the various types of "forces" or "dynamic relationships" recognized by this conception, be they intra-object, object-object, object-Ego, or pure Ego-forces. The similarities in question are not limited to a certain general agreement in principle; frequently they are reflected in a harmony of opinion on specific issues. The following views expressed by Koffka (1935) are presented as illustrations of this point:

(1) "the persistence of the Ego is...not a matter of memory, but of a direct persistence through time"; (2) "the Ego...is complex, consists of a variety of...sub-systems" which "do not simply exist side by side," but "are organized in various ways"; (3) "the original Ego-environment relation (is) not...a purely cognitive one, in which the Ego merely takes cognizance of objects, but...a conative one, in which the Ego adapts its behavior to the environment"; (4) "the closer the dynamic relationship between the Ego and the object...the more likely...will recognition be...Thus whatever has interested us, attracted our attention, is relatively easily recognized"; (5) "remembering appears to be more decisively an affair of construction rather than one of mere reproduction" (after Barlett); (6) "the problem of personality is one of the intrinsically greatest problems of all psychology." In addition, a
comparative study would show that the Gestaltists' evaluation of the status and role of psychology (Koffka, 1935), and their critique of empiricistic associationism (Kohler, 1929) echo many themes found in Brentano's comparable analyses.

The simultaneous presence of basic differences between our author's orientation and Gestalt psychology are also obvious. It will be sufficient here to mention that, even in Koffka's synthesis, Gestalt psychology does not safeguard some of the essential personalistic and existentialist aspects of psychology, such as may be found in Brentano's conception.

Postscript. -- Just like the portrait of Brentano's personality, life and work, and the overview of his standpoint in psychology, which were presented in the first and second chapter of the present study, the historical perspective on his significance in psychology delineated in this chapter could be supplemented with other considerations or finer details. In particular, this could be done with benefit in respect to important similarities which seem to exist between Brentano's overall standpoint in psychology and the orientation of Spearman on the one hand, and that of early personalistically oriented psychologists on the other.

Relative to Brentano's psychological ideas the greatest single merit of Spearman, along with the representatives of the Wurzburg School, the Austrian School, and Gestalt Psychology, may be said to lie in the fact that through
them such ideas penetrated into the mainstream of experimental psychology. Furthermore, in addition to providing experimental verification for specific aspects of his thinking, these authors came to share with him, and correspondingly to further in psychology, a personalistic outlook. This orientation developed most slowly and remained most incomplete in Gestalt Psychology\(^{17}\); by contrast, it was achieved more rapidly and more consciously within the context of the Würzburg School. Spearman who spent three months at the University of Würzburg in 1906, coming to respect Külpe and to admire Bühler,\(^{18}\) followed in their footsteps. Although less outspoken on this issue than Külpe, on account of his scientific stature, he undoubtedly exerted a greater influence upon psychologists. Certainly, his claim that "the general tide of psychology seems to have arrived at conceiving the principle of mind, the 'psyche,' as an Individual who Feels, Knows, and Acts" (1937, II, 287) did not go unnoticed when it was first made and since that time.

The specific merit for having emphasized a personalistic conception of psychology, however, goes to Mary Calkins (1900, 1901, 1909, 1930), W. Stern

\(^{17}\) As late as 1930, Calkins rightly reproached Gestalt Psychology for its failure to take into account the "supreme illustration of the Gestalt" - the self. It was only five years later that Koffka first made an attempt to integrate the Ego or self into the Gestalt system; and, as mentioned above, such an attempt remains defective in several respects.

\(^{18}\) He called Bühler "one of the living psychologists to whom I feel most in debt" (1930 b, p. 305)
(1930), W. McDougall (1923 a, 1923 b, 1924, 1930 a, 1930 b), T. V. Moore (1924, 1939), and A. Gemelli (1924, 1942). Of course, one need not agree with the particular brand of personalism advanced by these thinkers to pay them this tribute. Likewise, dissimilarities in details between their standpoint and that of Brentano do not lessen the significance of the conviction they all shared with him that "the study of psychic functions leads to the very heart of personality" (Gemelli, 1924, p. 271).

In retrospect, these personalistically oriented psychologists may be said to have carried Brentano's standpoint to the threshold of the "Third Force" movement in psychology. In turn, as previously stated, the latter has extended it to our generation. This uninterrupted continuity of thinking further enhances the significance of our author's contribution to this science.

The term "contribution" was purposefully used in preference to "contributions." In fact, Brentano's great merit essentially lies in the "general point of view" which he bequeathed to psychology -- a point of view aptly characterized by Maslow (1954, p. 27) as "holistic rather than atomistic, functional rather than taxonomic, dynamic rather than static...purposive rather than simple-mechanical."

The experience of studying as complex a thinker as Brentano is enriching, in spite of the fact that strong disagreements and agreements are likely to be aroused in rather quick succession. Ultimately, however, a reasonable
balance is established. The writer hopes that the present study will be of assistance to the reader also in this respect.
ANOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY


Pictures Brentano as a "true intellectual aristocrat" and "a great founder of a school," who has exerted a profound influence upon both philosophy and psychology. Mention is made of Brentano's early role in "shaking the yoke of associationism," and of the essential difference between his descriptive psychology and Husserl's phenomenology.

While on the one hand these annotations are clarified and made more meaningful by the text proper of the present study, on the other they themselves supplement it (by way of bringing out contextual or contextual details, or peripheral value judgments, which, if expressed there, would have made the work cumbersome and fragmented). Indeed, in many respects they may be said to represent an independent contribution, with a value and right to existence of its own. They were purposively cast into this role, so as to enhance their usefulness as a sounding-board. It is hoped that in this respect they will spare future students of Brentano's thought duplication of efforts (where the expenditure of energy and time would far outweigh the returns), or by contrast encourage them to even greater endeavor (when securing and carefully studying a given work might easily spell the difference between a mediocre and an excellent investigation). These reflections, together with the nature itself of the several studies under consideration, help explain why at times a minor or incidental study, which might be out of print or out of easy reach, or a study which was only mentioned in passing in the present work, is discussed at greater length than a more important and/or more pertinent work. That there is a certain risk involved here, it's quite obvious. The writer is the first to recognize that his evaluations, whether factual or judgmental, carry with them a greater or lesser degree of subjective selectivity. This risk cannot be eliminated altogether. A tacit compromise between the writer and any given reader, therefore, seems to be the best that can be hoped for: just as the former does not strive to present his "findings" dogmatically, the latter should not accept them blindly. They are merely broad guidelines, and will best serve their purpose when they are so considered and used.

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Placed Brentano's orientation at the beginning of "the history of ideas leading up to Gestalt psychology."


In addition to being quoted several times on specific topics, Brentano's views are briefly considered and evaluated as a whole (pp. 310-316). Among other things, the author praises Brentano's critique of associationism, and his successful effort to relate the study of psychological issues with that of logical and metaphysical problems. On the negative side, he takes issue with Brentano's doctrine of the psychic relation as a distinguishing characteristic of psychic phenomena.


Discusses in sequence (1) Brentano's methodological approach to psychology (as of 1874), (2) his views on five basic distinguishing characteristics of psychic phenomena (listed and briefly described separately), (3) his conception of judgments and emotions, and (4) his theory of truth, values and consciousness. Philosophers reading this article will be disappointed at not finding the promised "philosophical overtones," at least not to the extent of their rightful expectations. Psychologists, instead, not being primarily concerned with this issue, will find such an article instructive.

Highlights the central features of Brentano's theory, and places it into historical perspective in respect to the "epistemological issue" which was first raised by Hume's denial of the validity of (incomplete) induction, but which "surprisingly did not disquiet most of the logicians of the 19th century." While concluding that "Brentano's attempt to prove the law of causality with the aid of the probability-calculus fails," the author asserts that both his idea of connecting the theory of induction with the calculus of probability, and the foundation given by him to the application of induction to problems of mathematics are of "lasting interest and value."


A clarifying commentary on the issue of experimental versus empirical psychology first raised by Titchner (1921, 1925) in regard to Brentano's and Wundt's orientations, and subsequently restated by Car-michael (1925). Considering "'empirical psychology' as something broader than experimental psychology, something which includes 'experimental psychology'," the author concludes that, strictly speaking, "in such a sense it cannot be opposed to 'experimental psychology'," while granting a relative value to the opposition between these two types of psychological approaches, as defined by Titchner. It is of interest to notice that, while in his subsequent stand (1928) on the matter under discussion Titchner seems to have taken into account the clarification offered by his most illustrious pupil, he does not make any direct mention of it.


The author seems to be too kind to his old teacher when he states: "Titchner has done more than any other writer to introduce Brentano to Americans" (p. 380). This is especially so if we consider the case of knowledge which is interest-arousing. Titchnerian Brentano, in fact, would never have caught the attention of the American public. By contrast, Boring's Brentano has done so to a very large extent. Since the volume under consideration is a standard classic not only of American graduate students in psychology, but also for any educated psychologist, no attempt is made here to give a brief synopsis of his portrait of Brentano. Suffice it to say that by and large his portrait of our author has been copied, with only minor changes, by most other subsequent American writers of history of psychology textbooks.

The author makes brief reference to Brentano's "act" or "intentional" psychology (adding to the dismay of future historians, "perceiving" to Brentano's sacred trilogy of fundamental classes of psychic phenomena; and seemingly over-emphasizing the similarity between his conception of intentionality and that of scholastic thinkers). The opposition of Brentano's conception to Wundt's "content" psychology, and its influence upon Stumpf, Husserl and the Austrian School (which in turn influenced Gestalt psychology) are called to the reader's attention. In addition, the author asserts, but does not prove, that both American functionalism and Spranger's "understanding" psychology are analogous or closely related to Brentano's act psychology, and that the dynamic approach in psychology stemmed from Brentano's orientation.


Contains some inkling of Brentano's brilliant mind, "good heart," and "strong" personality.


Dedicated to Trendelenburg, this first work of Brentano clearly shows his outstanding ability for detailed analysis and keen synthesis, portraying his underlying proclivity to use the forum of history to re-think in an original fashion or revitalize theoretical issues. Specifically, Brentano's concern with the status and future of metaphysics may be detected in this work.

Brentano, F. Ad Disputationem qua theses...pro impetranda venia docendi...defendet et ad praelectionem inauguralem publicam...invitat Franciscus Brentano. Aschaffenburg: Schipper, 1866.

In sequence, these theses deal with methodological questions (1-4), ontological and metaphysical problems (5-11), issues in philosophical psychology (12-15), logical and linguistic inquiries (16-21), ethical investigations (22-23), and esthetics (24-25). The most important of these theses, the one that became Brentano's theoretical slogan, is the fourth one: Vera philosophiae methodus nulla alia nisi scientiae naturalis est. -- The title of these theses, followed by a commentary and critical note for each one of them, was published by Kraus (1929 a).
Brentano, F. *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom *

This work, through which Brentano "habilitated" himself to the faculty of philosophy at the University of Wurzburg, is his second one. Following in the wake of his first study of Aristotle, and showing the beginnings of his life-long goal to assure philosophy a sound and undisputed scientific footing, it presages the future central role assigned by him to psychology in this respect. In terms of its actual content, one could single out again the thoroughness with which Brentano attempts to establish the validity of his interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of the "active intellect." A final judgment on this matter, however, must be left to the historian of philosophy.

Brentano, F. *August Comte und die positive Philosophie. *Chilianeum, 1869, 2.

Brentano's first published work following his 1867 study of Aristotle's psychological doctrines. It was basically written for the purpose of convincing a Catholic intellectual audience that the spirit of positivism was not incompatible with theism and metaphysics. In this article, Brentano also attempts to harmonize Comte's philosophical view of history, and this author's conception of the hierarchical organization of sciences, with his philosophical interpretation of the history of philosophy.—Re-edited by Kraus (1926).

Brentano, F. *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. *Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1874. (a)

Brentano's first, but by no means his last word in psychology. See the present translation.

Brentano, F. *Über die Gründe der Bemutigung auf philosophischem Gebiete. *Wien: Braumüller, 1874. (b)

Originally Brentano's inaugural professorial address delivered at the University of Vienna on April 22, 1874 (only slightly over a month after the publication of his Psychology). It contains an analysis of the main objections of positivism against philosophy, followed by "a proof of its strength and rightful claim" for a place and future among the various sciences. Surprisingly enough, however, Brentano here rests his case on behalf of philosophy upon Comte's positivistic conception of a hierarchy of sciences. Disregarding this inconsistency, later recognized by Brentano himself, his views on the dependence of "Sociology and all other branches of philosophy" upon psychology remain in the mainstream of his thinking.—Re-edited by Kraus (1929 a).
Brentano, F. *Was für ein Philosoph manchmal Epoche macht.* Wien: Hartleben, 1876.

Originally an address to a student's club at the University of Vienna. It contains an exposition and critique of Plotinus' philosophy, with the specific purpose of showing its striking similarities to certain modern philosophical conceptions (especially Schelling's conception), all being presented as concrete illustrations of that phase of decline in philosophy which Brentano called mysticism.—Re-printed by Kraus (1926).


An exposition and defense of his interpretation of Aristotle, according to which this philosopher would have asserted beyond the shred of a doubt the divine origin of man's soul, and hence its spirituality and immortality.


Reprinted by Brentano himself, first in his *Von Ursprung Sittlichler Erkenntnis* (1889), and then in his *Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene* (1911), and as such included in the present translation.


Originally an address delivered before the Vienna Law Society on January 23, 1889, bearing the title: Of the Natural Sanction for Law and Morality. In printing it, Brentano changed this title "in order to bring its general purport more clearly into prominence," added a preface and seventy two references or explanatory notes (in effect doubling the entire study), and appended his previously published essay on Miklosich's Subjectless Propositions. Content wise, this essay deals with three basic issues: (1) the nature of value judgments as determiners of rules of conduct, (2) the ultimate rightness of these rules, and (3) the recognition of the rightness of these rules. It seems important to mention that Brentano himself considered this work "the ripest product" of all that he had "hitherto published," and more specifically as "a fragment" of his "Descriptive Psychology."—Subsequent editions (1911, 1922, 1934, 1955).
Brentano, F. *Das Genie*. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1892. (a)

Originally an address delivered to the Vienna Society of Engineers and Architects. Its central and recurring theme is that "genial activity differs from the non-genial always in degree, but never in kind." Proceeding methodologically "from simple to more complex cases," and casting the whole discussion into a fairly adequate historical perspective, Brentano develops this theme as it applies to "geniuses" in the field of "games," the scientific field, and the field of fine arts. Discounting as "at the very least premature" any attempt to explain "genial phenomena" on the basis of "a special physiological constitution of the brain," he advances instead a psychological explanation, viewing them as the "fruit of habit, of practice...according to common psychological laws" (such as the laws of "interest," "participation" - including both feeling and will--and "imprinting"). With a genial touch of his own, Brentano concludes: "What was divine in (geniuses) lives also in us, even though it does not burn with such a bright flame, and this is exactly what makes us like them." In essence, this small treatise may be viewed as a chapter in his "genetic" psychology. Re-printed in Grundzüge der Ästhetik (1959).

Brentano, F. *Das Schlechte als Gegenstand dichterischer Darstellung*. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1892. (b)

Originally an address delivered to the Vienna Society of the Friends of literature, and recently reprinted in Grundzüge der Ästhetik (1959). Basically, in this essay, Brentano challenges and intrigues his audience to reconcile "the fact" that "the representation of evil predominates in poetry" with "the law" that "the representation of that which is better has more value than the representation of a lesser good, or of evil." Presenting comedy as "the thesis," and tragedy as "the arsis of the soul" (in opposition to Aristotle's conception of the latter as "catharsis"), he develops the theme that "the special value of a representation is not dependent exclusively on the goodness of that which is represented," but also upon the extent to which it portrays man--this "highest carrier of history"--in its actual existential condition with its light and dark sides.--In terms of minor details, the student of personality theories might be interested in appraising critically Brentano's claim that Moliere "gives only a static picture, and not the dynamics of human characters"; and the student of Brentano's personality, more likely than not, will detect a biographical ring in the following statement: "There may be tragedies without sad outcome, but there cannot be any tragedy without sharp tragical conflicts, producing such a shock which still smudgers the soul at the end."
Delightfully intrigued, almost as a child would under similar circumstances, when a friend physiologist first acquainted him with the now classical Muller-Lyer illusion, Brentano undertook to prove in this article the explanation which he had offered on the spur of the moment. As against his friend, who was inclined to attribute this illusion to kinesthetic sensations from eye movements or to some form of "associative" processes (whereby the end strokes of the center line are considered as belonging with it in one case, and as its extension in the other), Brentano viewed it "as the consequence of the law of the overestimation of smaller, and underestimation of bigger angles." He illustrates his interpretation through several interesting simplifications and variations of the stimulus pattern in the illusion under discussion, and a few other stimulus combinations (including the Zöllner figure).

This second article of Brentano on optical illusions was prompted by the attention that Theodore Lipps had given to his first one on the very next issue of the same journal (of which he was an editorial consultant). Deeply pleased (as he always was when his views were publicly recognized) that his first article, though quite extemporaneous, had already followed in the footsteps of habent sua fata libelli, Brentano seems to have no difficulty in disposing of both Lipps' objections against his interpretation of the Muller-Lyer illusion, and the solution he had offered in its place. As a by-product of this further discussion, however, he realizes that the "law" he had invoked to explain this illusion was actually but an application of a broader law of "genetic psychology"—which accounted for the fact that such illusion varies depending upon changes in the stimulus pattern, as well as upon psychological or physiological factors in the observer.

Brentano's continued involvement with this problem was motivated by the fact that not only had his first article aroused the interest of German students (through Lipps), but it had already produced echoes in French-speaking countries through a summary and critical discussion of it by J. Delboeuf (Revue scientifique, 1953, 52, 237 ff.). Needless to say that Brentano was immesurably pleased about the summary, and found no
difficulty in answering Delboeuf's criticisms and suggested explanation. Ultimately, while agreeing that "many causes may be involved in producing the one and the same optical illusion," he insists that nevertheless "the factor invoked by him is the most important."

Brentano, F. Über die Zukunft der Philosophie. Wien: Holder, 1893. (c)

Originally a lecture delivered to the Philosophical Association of Vienna on March 22, 1892 in refutation of the position taken by A. Exner, Rector of the University of that city, in his inaugural address the previous year that (1) "philosophy has forfeited its sovereignty without any hope of ever regaining it," and (2) the method of the natural sciences is inapplicable to the Geisteswissenschaften. In its printed form, the lecture itself is supplemented with an introduction and an appendix by Brentano himself.—Re-edited by Kraus, along with other studies, in a single volume bearing the same title (1929 a).

Brentano, F. Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr augenblicklicher Stand. Stuttgart: Gotta, 1895. (a)

Originally an address delivered by Brentano to the Literary Association of Vienna on November 28, 1894. It contains the most complete single expression of his philosophical interpretation of the history of philosophy. The essential ideas of this interpretation, however, are quite simple. According to Brentano, in the three great periods of its history—the Greek, the Mediaeval and the Modern—philosophy has followed a similar evolution, running through four successive stages: a stage of ascendance, and three stages of progressive decline. It will be sufficient here to point out that Brentano's ultimate goal in this context was to show that this history needed not repeat itself forever, i.e. that philosophy, if properly conceived and based upon sound foundations, could attain the same state of progressive development that can be observed in all other sciences. Not only by implication, but by direct statements, he perceived himself as just the man that would start philosophy on its road to success.

Brentano, F. Meine letzten Wünsche für Österreich. Stuttgart: Gotta, 1895. (b)

Reprint of articles published in the Vien Neue Freie Presse (December 2, 5, 8, 1894), with a preface and two "supplements" (containing the critique of the stand he had taken in those articles by "einer regierungsfreundlicher Presse," and his replies to it). The articles themselves contain Brentano's critical assessment of (1) Austrian laws on marriage (with special reference to his own case), and (2) the intellectual
atmosphere and certain specific policies of the University of Vienna (in general, and in particular as they related to his efforts to ensure freedom of thinking and teaching, rejuvenate philosophy, and furnish the young psychology the proper media for growth and development -- an Institute, and a Laboratory). "Accusations," Brentano tells us, were directed against him on both counts, especially the first; and he did not hesitate to "defend" himself. Ultimately, the claim of this booklet for scientific status seems to rest mainly, if not exclusively, upon Brentano's views on the value and need for experimentation in psychology, and his distinction between "descriptive" and "genetic psychology." In terms of historical context, Brentano wrote his Last Wishes upon resigning his post at the University of Vienna. The reasons leading him to take this step, together with the deep pathos and nostalgia connected with it, are well reflected in the following statements: "It has been twenty years since I came to Austria, to Vienna and its University. I have come with inherited warm sympathy for this land and its people; I have found the most friendly reception; and as one of the noblest daughters of Vienna extended her hand to me as wife, I felt even more closely united in brotherhood with my new people. Now fate has it that this is the very reason why, failing in health, overwhelmed (with sorrow) and fettered in my best views for the common good, today I am thinking of leaving Austria."

Brentano, F. "Über Individuation, multiple Qualität und Intensität sinnlicher Erscheinungen." Munchen: Lehman, 1897.

Originally a paper read at the third International Congress of Psychology (Munich, August 4-7, 1896), this study "on the doctrine of sensation" was subsequently reprinted by Brentano (1907).


Reprinted by Kraus in his 1926 edition of Brentano's Die vier Phasen. For a brief comment upon it, see the annotation to this volume.


As of now the only work of Brentano translated into English. The translator seven-page long Biographical note actually refers primarily to the biography of Brentano's intellectual development, as expressed in his published works.

Reprinted by Brentano in his *Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie* (1907).


Contains two papers read by Brentano respectively at third and fifth International Congress of Psychology (1897, 1906), as mentioned in the present reference list. Several explanatory notes were added by Brentano to their publication in the present volume. Also included in this work is an address Über das phänomenale Grün, delivered by Brentano before the Vienna Philosophical Society on January 29, 1893. The appendix Zur Frage vom Phänomenalen Grün is in effect a "rewrite" of the essential parts of this address, yielding "a more concise, yet at the same time more comprehensive conception, due to the addition of new considerations." For some reference to the content of the studies comprising the present volume, see the text of this introduction.

Brentano, F. Thomas von Aquin. *Neuen Freien Presse* (Vienna), April 18, 1908.

Written on the anniversary of St. Thomas' death for the benefit of the general public, this article is largely descriptive in nature and simple in presentation, and as such of no special scientific interest. As a whole it presents St. Thomas as occupying a similar position in Mediaeval thinking as Aristotle did in Greek Philosophy. This is obviously the reason why Kraus reprinted it in his 1926 edition of Brentano's *Die vier Phasen*.

Brentano, F. *Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene*. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1911. (a)

In effect the second edition of Brentano's *Psychology*, as authorised and prepared by Brentano himself. It contains the last five chapters of Book II, dealing with the broad problem of the classification of psychic phenomena, and an important Appendix (included in the present translation).

Brentano, F. *Aristoteles' Lehre vom Ursprung des menschlichen Geistes*. Leipzig: Viet & Comp, 1911. (b)

Reprint, with some changes, of his study Über den Grecianismus des
Aristoteles (1882), and of his Offener Brief an Herrn Professor Eduard Zeller (1883), which contains Brentano's reply to the critique of his interpretation of Aristotle by this famous scholar of the history of Greek philosophy. This controversy between Brentano and Zeller is well known to the historian of philosophy.

Brentano, F. Aristoteles und seine Weltanschauung. Leipzig: Quelle & Mayer, 1911. (c)

Contains Brentano's overall interpretation of Aristotle, bringing together and in part correcting the presentations of his previous studies on this author. Gives a detailed treatment and appraisal especially of Aristotle's doctrine of God. It seems appropriate to mention here in passing that Brentano must be recognized as one of the best students of Aristotle in modern times, though not necessarily the most unprejudiced writer on the matter.


Dictated on February 29, 1917, just slightly over two weeks before his death, this essay is a clear testimony to Brentano's continued interest throughout most of his life in this problem, and at the same time a sign of residual dissatisfaction on his part concerning his successive efforts to find a completely satisfactory answer to it. The general makeup of the present effort (sixteen pages devoted mainly to a critique of several doctrines on this problem from Aristotle to Einstein; one page to a summary of "positive" findings; and the remaining five pages to a preventive rebuttal of anticipated objections) and its lack of closure seem to lend support to this impression.

Brentano, F. Die Lehre Jesu und ihre bleibende Bedeutung. Leipzig: Meiner, 1922. (a)

The preface to this work throws some light upon Brentano's inner religious crisis. As a whole, this little volume shows that Brentano retained throughout his life, after his separation from the Catholic Church, a simple Christian faith.


In addition to Brentano's original (1889) study (less some of its footnotes, subsequently published by the editor in Wahrheit und Evidenz), this volume contains a few other brief "treatises" dealing with ethical-epistemological theory and problems in "Practical Philosophy." Subsequent editions (1934, 1955).

Contains Book I and the first four chapters of Book II of Brentano's original Psychology.—Available also in a subsequent unchanged edition (Hamburg: Meiner, 1955).


Besides Brentano's 1911 Classification of Psychic Phenomena, this volume contains a second appendix, added by the editor, under the general title of Über Anschauungen, Begriffe und Verstandesdinge. It may be of some interest to note that one of the four "essays" comprising this appendix was dictated by Brentano on March 7, 1917, only eight days before his death.—Available also in a subsequent unchanged edition (Hamburg: Meiner, 1959).

Brentano, F. Versuch über die Erkenntnis. Edited, with a Commentary, by A. Kastil. Leipzig: Meiner, 1925. (b)

Contains several studies (mostly in the nature of "dictations") extending roughly over the last twenty years of Brentano's life. The title may have been chosen by the editor with the conscious intent to put this volume in direct line of descent from Locke's and Leibniz's epoch-making Essays, and from Laplace's less well known, but equally important, Philosophical essay on probabilities. In essence, this volume is a theory of epistemology, and more specifically a theory of induction, with definite "psychological overtones." Its longest single essay (dated 1903) is entitled: "Down with Prejudices: a word of exhortation to the present world to free itself, in the spirit of Bacon and Descartes, of all blind a-priori." Supplemented with additional studies, this essay forms the core of a four-part treatise, touching upon: (1) scientific philosophy and philosophy of prejudice, (2) the logical character of mathematics, (3) the problem of induction, and (4) the universal principle of causality and the impossibility of absolute chance occurrence for anything which is or was or will be. A twenty-page long essay on probability (dated 1916) completes the text of this volume.


In addition to the study Die vier Phasen (1895) proper, and the studies on Comte (1869), Plotinus (1876), and Thomas Von Aquin (1908), appraised
separately in the present reference list, this volume contains three more studies: Über Kants Kritik der Gottesbeweise (1911-1912), Schopenhauer (1911-1912), and Über voraussetzungslose Forschung (1910). Of all these studies, the last one, at best, bears only an indirect relationship to the central theme of the volume as a whole, and far less theoretical value than its title would lead one to believe.


As conceived by Kraus, the third volume of Brentano's Psychology would have included two parts. The second part, to be entitled Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie, and consisting essentially of a new edition of Brentano's 1907 volume bearing this title, together with new "essays" dealing more specifically with the psychology of colors and sounds, was actually never published. The present volume includes only the first part, bearing the subtitle: Wahrnehmung, Empfindung, Begriff. It is in turn divided into two sections, dealing respectively with (1) basic issues underlying specific problems in the psychology of sensation (inner perception in the sense of secondary consciousness, inner perception in the sense of secondary consciousness, inner perception in the strict and broad sense, possibility of sensory deception, distinction between perception, observation and comparison, perception and apperception, perception in modo recto and modo obliquo, time perception), and (2) phenomenological psychology of sensory and noetic consciousness (analysis of sensory and noetic objects of inner perception, the process of abstraction and the universal character of all perceptions and sensations, especially time and space perceptions, consciousness of absolute time and of its concrete manifestations). The philosopher will undoubtedly recognize this landscape as familiar territory; but let him not forget that the psychologist, too, has a right to move within its boundaries and pass his own value judgment upon it. - For a comment on a projected fourth volume of Brentano's Psychology, see the annotation to his Religion und Philosophy (1954).

Brentano, F. Über die Zukunft der Philosophie. Edited, with an Introduction and Commentary, by O. Kraus, (2nd ed.) Leipzig: 1929. (a)

In addition to the original study bearing the same title, this volume includes the reprinting of Über die Gründe der Entmutigung auf Philosophischen Gebiet (1874), and of Brentano's 25 Habilitation Theses (1866), and the first printing of a lecture Über Schelling Philosophie. Delivered by Brentano to the Philosophical Association of Vienna in 1889, this lecture incorporated part of the text of his "habilitation" address at the University of Wurzburg in 1866 under the title of Über...
Schelling Philosophie in ihren verschiedenen Phasen: Darstellung und Kritik. The critique of Schelling's philosophy, omitted in his 1889 lecture, was reproduced by Kraus in the present volume. It is worth mentioning that Brentano's choice of a topic for his "habilitation" address was probably motivated also by the fact that Schelling himself had taught at Wurzburg from 1803 to 1806, and had left behind considerable influence. The reason for bringing together into a single volume these disparate writings is the fact that they all throw light upon Brentano's views upon "scientific" methodology.

Brentano, F. Vom Dasein Gottes. Edited, with a Preface and Commentary, by A. Kastil. Leipzig: Meiner, 1929. (b)

Although not labeled in this manner, the volume may be said to include two main sections, reflecting respectively Brentano's "earlier" and "later" views on the problem of the existence of God. The first and main section (445 pages out of 490), bearing the title of the book itself in the table of contents, presents his thought on this problem, as developed in his lectures both at the University of Wurzburg and at the University of Vienna (1868-1891), but basically as found in a manuscript of the year 1891. These lectures express his "earlier" views. His "later" views on the problem under consideration are contained in a short study bearing the title "Progress of thought in the demonstration of the existence of God," dictated by Brentano in 1915, and printed for the first time in the present volume. To clarify the labels "earlier" and "later," as used here, it will be sufficient to point out that the evolution of Brentano's thought on the problem under discussion does not imply discontinuity, and still less opposition, in his basic underlying philosophical attitude. Content wise, after an introduction which underlines the theoretical and practical interest of the problem of existence of God, Brentano's "lectures" are divided into two main parts: (1) Preliminary researches (establishing the need for, and possibility of, demonstrating the existence of God, as against the stand of both those who assume that the existence of God is self-evident, and those who assume as equally self-evident that it is undemonstrable), and (2) Proofs of the existence of God (containing a very extensive, detailed exposition of the teleological argument, from the vantage point of the critique advanced against it by several modern thinkers, and a brief analysis of other traditional arguments). In terms of the several "steps" in the demonstration of the existence of God outlined in the study mentioned above, it is of interest to notice that the point of departure of Brentano's analysis of "temporal continuity" (on which he bases himself to justify the principle of sufficient reason, and through it the principle of causality) is derived from one of the theories of his descriptive psychology: the theory of the "temporal modes" of imagination.
Brentano, F. Briefe on A. Marty, und Kraus gegen entia rationis. Edited by Kraus. Philos. Heft, 1929, 2. (c)

Reprinted in Wahrheit und Evidenz (pp. 87-113). For a general statement of their meaning, within the context of Brentano's intellectual evolution, see the annotation to this work in the present reference list.


As indicated by the editor himself, the several "treatises" comprising this volume "do not constitute the systematic exposition of one and the same theory, but instead present Brentano's thought in its existential evolution." This is reflected in the nature and sequence of the four parts into which the present work is divided: Early doctrine, Transition to the new doctrine, Exposition of the new doctrine in letters, Exposition of the new doctrine in treatises. Of the six treatises making up the first part, six are mere reprints of footnotes found in the first edition of Brentano's Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis in 1889 (nn. 21, 22, 23 and 27); of the remaining two, one ("On the concept of truth") is the text of a lecture delivered by Brentano to the Philosophical Association of Vienna (March 3, 1889), and the other ("Being in the sense of the True") a "fragment," dating around 1902.

The common theme underlying these treatises is Brentano's modification of the Aristotelian concept of truth (truth does not consist in an adequantio rei et intellectus, but in an adequantio of our judgment with the being or non-being of something, i.e. with the existence or non-existence of its object), and his consequent adoption of the theory of so-called "being of reason," subsequently rejected by him. This rejection is ushered in by Brentano's critical studies of linguistic expressions, though which he tries to show that all "abstracts" nouns (such as being, non-being, possibility, impossibility, etc.) are mere denominations extrinsicae i.e. mere "co-signifying" (mitbedeutende) words. A letter to his pupil A. Marty dated March 1901 ("Grammatical abstract nouns as fictions") and two other short treatises (1904, 1905), making up the second part of this volume, are illustrative of these studies and of Brentano's orientation during his period of "transition to the new doctrine." The last two parts present this "new doctrine," as found respectively in a series of nine letters written by Brentano to A. Marty, O. Kraus, and F. Hillebrand over a ten year period (1906-1916), and in six treatises dated 1914-1915. In essence, this new doctrine represents but a logical step beyond the previous two phases, reflecting his absolute conviction, now, that so-called "ideal objects" were mere "fictions," and his equally absolute confidence in the correctness of his doctrine of "evident" judgments or judgments "charac-
terized as right." Two letters of Brentano to Husserl (dated January 9, and April 30, 1905), added in an appendix to this volume, retain a value of their own, above and beyond the relationship of their content to the basic issues debated in it.


In comparison with modern subjectivistic conception of the categories as mere modes of knowing, Brentano's stand that "the doctrine of categories (is) one of the most important parts of ontology" represents an obvious "return to Aristotle." This fact alone is sufficient to alert the reader to the underlying thread connecting the various treatises comprising this volume (most of them written during the period 1907-1916) with his first work *Von der mannifachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* published more than forty years earlier (1862). That Brentano's Aristotle in the last decade of his life differs significantly from the Aristotle of his early adulthood is indicated by a special section in the second part of the present volume "Concerning the understanding and critique of the Aristotelian doctrine of categories," and by a constant effort throughout the other essays to reinterpret the views of this thinker in the light, and in function, of his own intellectual evolution. Elements of "linguistic clarifications" and epistemological considerations (prominent in the first part of this volume, but again present throughout its contents) assist Brentano in both his historical and theoretical task. The latter is perhaps best expressed in the third part entitled "The last three outlines of the doctrine of categories." An appendix bearing upon "The nature of the corporeal world in the light of the doctrine of categories" completes the volume's work.


Presents Brentano's ideas on Ethics as found in annotations and outlines used by him in his lectures on "Practical Philosophy" at the University of Vienna (1876-1894). In its present form, the text is supplemented with statements taken from O. Kraus' works and other works of
Brentano. This painstaking editorical work was originally undertaken by A. Kastil, and subsequently, after his death in 1950, was brought to completion by the present editor, one of his pupils. Content wise, following a brief introduction (covering some general topics to be expected at the beginning of my course in Ethics), this volume is divided into six parts, touching upon the following broad issues: principles of ethical knowledge, the highest practical good, freedom of the will, morality in general, ethical principles, actualization of ethical principles. The theme underlying all of these issues, and throwing light upon Brentano's own answers to them, is his basic conception that ethics is neither "heteronomous" (dependent upon extrinsic norms), nor "autonomous" (in the sense of Protagoras' famous dictum "man is the measure of all things"), but "orthonomous" (in the sense that the true "measure of all things" is not "man as such," but "man, the knower, insofar as he judges with evidence" (einsichtig).


The goal of this volume is to present Brentano's overall views on "the relationship between philosophy and religion, and their common tasks." As can easily be inferred from the commentary, an almost herculean and extremely assiduous effort (first by A. Kastil and then by the present editor herself) went into "assembling" this volume from very disparate sources (notes, outlines, lecture excerpts, letters, summaries from previous printed works). In spite of this, as indicated by the editor herself, Brentano's views remain fragmentary in a number of instances. In terms of content, the volume contains four major sections (each subdivided into several parts), dealing respectively with the following topics: (1) philosophical essay on religion (concept and tasks of religion and philosophy, religion and typical forms of religion, the philosopher's attitude toward "popular" forms of religion), (2) existence and nature of God, and his relation to the world, (3) problems in theodicy (origin of evil and its compatibility with the "ordinances" of an all-powerful and all-good God, optimism versus pessimism), and (4) spirituality and immortality of man's soul. The last part was edited by A. Kastil over a ten year period (1933-1943), and was originally intended by him to form the core of a fourth volume on Brentano's Psychology (in addition to the three volumes edited by Kraus). The present editor justifies its inclusion in this volume because, according to Brentano, the most important task of both philosophy and religion is directed to prove the spirituality and immortality of man's soul. As it presently stands, this part contains an exposition and critique of the most important "mind-body" theories, followed by a detailed statement of proofs designed to show that "the psychic subject,"
i.e. "the subject of our psychic activities," is a spiritual, non-dimensional, non-spatial substance," and as such immortal. Among other things, within this context, Brentano debates the issue of whether any one part of the brain or the brain as a whole could be the substrate of psychic activities. In view of his repeated insistence in previous studies upon the spirituality of Aristotle's "active intellect," it is of interest to notice in passing that in the present volume he argues against the "semimaterialism" of this author.


Based upon Brentano's lectures on logic (1878-1879, 1884-1885, 1887) and other manuscripts on the theory of knowledge, the volume attempts to present Brentano's conception of "right" ("characterized as right," "evident") judgment as a unified whole. In essence, it gives us Brentano's own theory of knowledge. As it stands, this volume contains an introduction (which introduces the reader to the vision of logic as the doctrine, or better the art, of right judgment), and four parts, each of which are further divided into numerous subparts. It will be sufficient here to list the main areas of discussion with a few broad illustrations of its actual content: (1) "Ideas and their linguistic fictions, selbstdbedeutende and mitbedeutende terms, classifications of concepts, judgment and propositions,(types of judgment); (2) "On immediate knowledge" (a-priori and a-posteriori truths, proofs of a-posteriori sources of knowledge, proof of the sources of a-priori knowledge); (3) "On mediate knowledge" (concept of mediate knowledge, deductive or "evident" reasoning, defense of the value of syllogism, problem of induction); (4) "On probability" (concept of probability, Laplace's principles of probability, Bernouille's theorem, formation of hypotheses and induction, the principle of causality). The importance of this volume, within the context of Brentano's thinking, needs hardly be emphasised, in view of the fact that Brentano, like Descartes (and many other thinkers since them), was convinced that without satisfactory answers to the questions discussed in it (theory of knowledge) progress in philosophy, indeed in any scientific discipline, was impossible.


Based upon Brentano's lectures (1885-1886) on "Selected problems from psychology and esthetics," other unpublished material, and some previously published studies by Brentano himself (1892 a, 1892 b), both
annotated separately in the present reference list) or by his editors. In essence, it presents all that Brentano ever said on the matter (and he never said it in complete form, at least not as complete as his pronouncements on ethics and logic). Found between covers are three parts, dealing respectively with (1) "Selected problems in psychology and esthetics" (concept of psychology and esthetics, including a rather comprehensive "longitudinal" historical perspective, which in turn includes a detailed exposition and sharp critique of the various theories discussed; relationship between psychology and esthetics, with an analysis of "descriptive" and "genetic" psychology; investigations on imagination—a forty-five page long "treatise"; Das Genie), (2) "On the beautiful" (the concept of the beautiful; value relationships of our representations; Das Schliechtes als Gegenstand dichterischer Darstellung), and (3) "Classification and Assessment of art" (some general considerations and principles, followed with some essays "on music").


Based upon Brentano's lectures on the history of philosophy (Würzburg-Vienna). Even in their available broad outline forms, these lectures show how well Brentano set the stage for his "saga," and how well he knew the part which each actor was playing or which he asked him to play. Of course, the hero in this narrative is Aristotle, taking up, as he does, one-third of Part I, "the ascending phase" (beginning with the Ionian philosophers) and sitting majestically at its apex. As might be expected, Part II, "the phase of decline," is much shorter: only eighty-seven pages, in comparison with three-hundred-and-nine pages, making up Part I.


Less than one page is devoted to Brentano in this study, but it's worth reading, identifying well, as it does, the nature and extent of the basic difference between his orientation and that of empiristic associationism.


Contains a general summary of the content of Brentano's Psychology. In terms of overall appraisal, the author makes reference to the
label of "neo-scholastic" sometimes pinned on Brentano, adding that while on the one hand "the emphasis must be laid on the word 'scholastic'," on the other his "modifications of the old in the face of the new, and the new in the face of the old, are so far fundamental that the work is never in danger of being regarded as a futile resurrection of dogmas." In addition, the author makes a passing reference to the progress away from physiological and experimental psychology," supposedly to be found in Brentano's orientation.


"By way of an experiment in testing the validity of the idealistic view of the finite self," the author analyzes (pp. 183-192) "some of the main features of the account of the self" given by Brentano, whom he considers, together with Lotze and Dilthey, as one of "the chief names in modern psychology." Needless to say that, while recognizing that Brentano as "an Aristotelian...is out of sympathy with modern idealism," the author ultimately finds in his views "a certain relation to idealism." This prejudiced position, however, does not prevent him from making some keen observations on Brentano's holistic conception of the "mind."


A descriptive, analytical comparison of "the philosophy of Husserl with that of Brentano," based upon ample, and generally well selected references to their main works. The several topics discussed are arranged in a logical, meaningful sequence: general comparison between Brentano's descriptive psychology and Husserl's phenomenology; analysis of fundamental differences in their theories of consciousness, and of equally fundamental concomitant differences concerning the nature of psychic processes, especially the so-called "evident perception"; hence, an analysis of their opposite doctrines of evidence, leading to a discussion of their stand as to the doctrine of the object of knowledge, and to a concluding appraisal of the reproach of psychologism directed, or at least inferred, by Husserl against Brentano. Useful as an introduction to a more critical study in depth of the relationship between these two thinkers, or as a terminal point for those who, for lack of formal philosophical background or other reasons, do not wish to delve into the finer nuances of their views.


Carmichael, L. *What is empirical psychology?* Amer. J. Psychol., 1926, 37, 521-527.


Three out of fourteen chapters in this volume (pp. 15-83) are devoted to an analysis of the content of Brentano's *Psychology* and *The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, with pertinent critical comments, and, of course, a delineation of the relationship between his orientation and the orientation of the Austrian School. The most comprehensive and, in many respects, the best single study on Brentano in English.


An exceptionally good exposition of Brentano's doctrine of sensation, supplemented with pertinent critical comments. Being based not only upon relevant works of our author (1892 a, 1893 a, 1893 b, 1907), but also upon "conversations" with him and "handwritten outlines" of manuscripts which were subsequently published, this study retains its full value even today.


Considers Brentano as "the first important" representative of "syste-
matic psychology," whose "originality...consisted in uniting an insistence upon activity with a strict empiricism." Some of the main influences of his orientation upon subsequent trends in psychology (the Austrian School, the Wurzburg School, Gestalt Psychology) are briefly stated. "The revolt started by Brentano against the associationistic outlook," instead, is analyzed in greater detail, and in an original manner, insofar as it is viewed within the context of its influence upon "most of the important writers of textbooks on systematic treatises in the last twenty years of the nineteenth century" (Ward, Stout, Lipps, Hoffding, Kulpe, and James). Equally original is his statement concerning the influence of "the work of Brentano and other members of the 'Austrian School'...as a directing element in Spearman's ambitious attempt to formulate the 'principles of cognition'."


In an effort to clarify and define the object of psychology, the author evaluates the point of view of several psychological schools and/or individual psychologists. Brentano's stand on the distinction between "act" and "content," is briefly discussed within this context. In general, Gemelli rates Brentano very high for his effort "to avoid the danger on the one hand of tautological definitions, and on the other of giving a definition of psychology which presupposes a philosophical system." In terms of details, he argues against him on the grounds that the character of intentionality of psychic phenomena, while important, is not sufficient to distinguish them from physical phenomena; and criticizes him for his failure supposedly to include in his definition of psychic phenomena the fact that these phenomena "present themselves as related to an I, to a subject." The article also contains a comparison between Brentano and Binet.


As an outstanding contemporary philosopher and one of the first and foremost scholars of the history of mediaeval thought, Gilson delineates skillfully the origin and nature of Brentano's philosophical interpretation of the history of philosophy in general and mediaeval philosophy in particular, showing that it was "a perfectly sound and legitimate reaction against philosophical despair" in Brentano, on the psychological level, and "quite in keeping with the central inspira-
tion of (his) own philosophy," on the theoretical level. His central thesis is that, while Brentano's doctrine contains "a nucleus of truth" (the basic problem posited by the ebb and flow of philosophical systems is "nothing less than the nature of philosophical knowledge itself"), at the same time it contains "some fundamental mistakes concerning the very nature of that truth" (insofar as Brentano "never explicitly resorted to more than psychological explanations of the philosophical evolution").


Contains (pp. 248-285) a pertinent critique of Brentano's theory of existential judgment, and a brilliant exposition of an alternate viewpoint.


An exhaustive study, both expository and evaluative, of how Brentano conceives the application in metaphysics of "the great methodological principle stated by him in 1866," and how his thinking in the matter "evolved," while "remaining faithful to some of its deep (original) requisites." A discussion of Brentano's philosophical conception of the history of philosophy is found appropriately at the beginning of this study, because it conditions Brentano's original conception that "the true method of philosophy is no other than that of the natural science." There follows an analysis of his conception of the method of mathematical sciences, of the inductive method, and of the bearing of induction upon the principle of causality in its basic philosophical import, which paves the way for the more specific discussion of the method in metaphysics. This study is more than worthy of consideration i.e.: any investigation touching upon the content and/or theoretical premises of his metaphysical doctrines.


An imposing study of Brentano's descriptive psychology in its philosophical premises and implications, i.e. insofar as it is viewed by him as "the central philosophical science." A good portion of it is appropriately devoted to an analysis of strictly philosophical issues (the concept of reality, the ideas of substance and accident, and being in the improper sense). The author's philosophical frame of reference is also reflected in the treatment of the other topic discussed (psychology from an empirical standpoint; Brentano's analysis
of psychic life in 1874; autonomy and development of descriptive psychology).


An analytical presentation of Brentano's views on the issues under consideration, basically designed to call into question the interpretation of the views as advanced by Kraus, Kastil and Katkov. The author also criticizes the critique offered by Geiser (a Thomist) of Brentano's theory of evidence. Ultimately, therefore, it is not quite clear what kind of moderate realist Brentano is, now how his realist conception bears upon the "relative and provisional criterion of truth" presented by the author as a way out of theoretical difficulties.


Next to Kastil's book, the only existing comprehensive presentation of all facets of Brentano's thought. The author himself recognizes that the publication of Kastil's work, following completion of his own study (1950), would have required some important changes both as to detail and overall appraisal. Yet one is glad that this study was published in its original form. As such, it may be helpful to temper Kastil's "orthodox" account. Showing good familiarity with, and discriminative judgment over, the import of the major philosophical trends, both ancient and modern, the author succeeds in blending his analytical presentation of Brentano's thought with pertinent evaluative views of its position within the context of a historical-theoretical perspective. Of more than incidental interest may be the fact that the author attempts a positive reconstruction of Brentano's theories within his own frame of reference as a Catholic thinker, while remaining alert to basic residual differences between Brentano's point of view and a Catholic Weltanschauung.


Outlines with broad strokes Brentano's philosophical interpretation of the history of philosophy, singling out its "polemic relation with the Hegelian and positivistic conceptions," its "close parallelism with the conception of Dilthey," and also its close similarity with Spengler's philosophy of history.
Without forcing history into a procrustean frame of reference, Husserl's Recollections may be compared to Plato's Apology and Xenophon's Recollections of Socrates - on a similar scale, of course, but as such more objective and more apropos. With the breadth of perspective of the philosopher in him, the author delineates vividly the intellectual portrait of Brentano, and with the empathy of the human side of his own personality he sets in high relief many interesting and meaningful details of his personality in everyday life.


Contains only two incidental references to Brentano. In the first, simple mention is made of Brentano's courses taken by Freud, with the implicit emphasis that "attendance at a three year course in philosophy had been obligatory for medical students in Vienna since 1804" (even though Freud enrolled in one more course than required, which might be taken to indicate that he liked either philosophy, or Brentano, or both). In the second, the author plays down the implication that Brentano's recommendation to Gomperz of Freud, as a translator of the twelfth volume of Mill's collected works, meant that he "remembered him from his seminars."


Edited posthumously by Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand who paid the author the following compliment: "His absorption in (Brentano's) works made him feel that a certain diction similar to Brentano's style was the only correct and proper one. No other member of Brentano's school, at least none of the 'grand-students' still living, has had such an inclination and capacity for this mode of expression, which in a way involves an assimilation of one's own personality to that of the Master." Upon being informed that this book is listed in a bibliography of Brentano's works (Psychology, 1955), the reader will undoubtedly conclude that we are dealing here with an exceptionally good study on Brentano, combining originality of presentation with faithful reflection of his thinking. His admiration, however, is likely to change into its opposite, when he is told that this work is basi-
cally a reproduction of selected statements from Brentano's books (sentences, paragraphs, even whole pages, being reprinted verbatim, or with only minor changes in diction here and there). Only the actual reading of this volume will dispel this possible negative attitude. In so doing, one will soon discover that Kastil's work is no plagiarism, and still less an undergraduate term paper. His undertaking, rather, may best be described as "reminiscing with Brentano," in the best spirit of a "Socratic dialogue." In essence, this study is a well integrated and dynamic exposition of Brentano's thinking. As such it will always remain of great scientific value. The fact that it is classifiable among Brentano's books does not deny it the character of an original production.


Even though in no way as significant as O. Kraus seems to imply in a prefactory comment, this study deserves at least a cursory reading. Perhaps its most valuable contribution consists in a number of introductory considerations comprising most of the first chapter (pp. 465-486), some of which are mentioned here: (1) nature and epistemological value of descriptive psychological analyses, (2) lack of scientific foundations of a phenomenology developed independently from descriptive psychology, (3) Suarez's concept of consciousness, (4) nature of "the immanence or content theory of consciousness and its significance for transcendentalism and phenomenalism." In the remaining portion of this chapter (pp. 487-493), the author merely restates Brentano's concept of consciousness as a quasi-relation, in opposition to N. Losskij's conception of it as a true relation of two coexisting terms, and in opposition to J. Remke's denial that anything relative or quasi-relative is involved in self-consciousness. The third chapter, too, is basically a restatement of Brentano's critique of "linguistic fictions" in theories of judgment, with an effort to bring out the theoretical reasons lying at their basis. By contrast, in the second chapter, the author shows more independence of thinking in that he tries to develop "an apriori psychological proof of the inseparability of primary and secondary consciousness" by reducing "the so-called differentiation of consciousness according to its object to a differentiation through inner perception."


In view of rather prominent consideration given by the author to Husserl's ideas in this study, a better title for it would have
been: "Descartes, Brentano und Husserl," etc. Of course, this state-
ment is not made in criticism, but merely in recognition of a fact.
As it stands, this study recommends itself not only because it is
the only existing monographic treatment on the subject, but, and
especially, because of its intrinsic value in sifting in a discrimi-
native critical manner undeniable similarities, but also basic differ-
ences existing between Descartes and Brentano's epistemological ori-en-
tations and other theoretical interests. While one may well take
issue with the author in matters of details, his overall appraisal
will probably meet few objections.


Kraus, O. Franz Brentano: zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre. With

The best compliment one must pay to Kraus for this study is to say
that he spent most of his subsequent scientific endeavors, both in
his Introductions and Commentaries to Brentano's works edited by him,
and in independent studies, to prove and work out in detail the essen-
tial ideas outlined in it. And he did a good job of it—which, of
course, does not preclude that his overall presentation of Brentano's
theories is slanted in the direction of maximizing to the limits the
inner consistency, the originality, and the significance of these
theories, as well as the monolithic look of his teacher's personality.
This study remains a good, in some respects perhaps even an essential,
introduction in any study in depth of Brentano's thinking; indeed, as
implied above, it remains a good introduction to Kraus' many invalu-
able "introductions" to our author.

Kraus, O. Brentano's Stellung zur Phänomenologie und Gegenstandstheorie.
Leipzig: Meiner, 1924.

Reproduction of the author's Introduction to his 1924 edition of Bren-
tano's Psychology (pp. XVII-XCIII). In this introduction, however, the
title of the volume appears only in connection with the first of
several aspects of Brentano's thought which Kraus discusses: "Brenta-
no's distinction of descriptive and genetic psychology and its re-
lation to phenomenology and theory of object." That the extension of
part of this subtitle to the study as a whole is justified, is indi-
cated by the fact that the comparison of Brentano's views with
Husserl's and Meinong's orientations runs the gamut of the other
topics discussed: Franz Brentano's doctrine of psychic relation in its historical development; doctrine of real (being) as the exclusive object of our consciousness; Brentano's position in respect to psychologism; doctrine of external perception; the expressions "psychic" and "physical phenomena" in Brentano; the method of descriptive or phenomenological psychology, inner perception and inner observations. The very nature of these topics and the authority of Kraus easily concur in making this writing an essential work to read in any study of Brentano's thought.

Kraus, O. Franz Brentano's Stellung im philosophischen Leben der Gegenwart. Philos. Weltanzeiger, 1928, 2, 9-10. (a)

Brentano's position, as specified in the title of this article, is defined in terms of (1) the contributions and/or role of his pupils (G. v. Hertling, H. Schell, C. Stumpf, A. Marty, E. Husserl, A. Meinong, C. v. Ehrenfeis, T. O. Masaryk), (2) its influence upon "thought psychology" Gestalt psychology, and new trends of interests or orientations in aesthetics, ethics (Scheler, N. Hartmann), and metaphysics, (3) relationship to other thinkers (Dilthey, Bolzano), (4) translation of two of his books into foreign languages, and (5) the respect, shown by foreign thinkers, of his ideas (mentioning Titchner, as a good example!).

Kraus, O. Die "Kopernikanische Wendung" in Brentano's Erkenntnis-und Wertlehre. Philos. Hefte, 1929, 3, 133-142. (a)

Originally a lecture delivered to the Kantian Society of Berlin and Halle (November 3 and 6, 1928). Contains a statement and critique of the "ontological standpoint" in philosophy, as exemplified by Plato's doctrine of Ideas, the Aristotelian-scholastic "adequatio theory" of judgment, and the tenets of various forms of contemporary "neoplatonism" or "ontological fictionalism" (in thinkers such as Stumpf, Husserl, Meinong, Scheler, N. Hartmann, etc.) Kant himself is criticized for not carrying his "Copernican revolution" (adoption of the "epistemological standpoint") far enough, as Brentano did. The concluding slogan "durch Kant über Kant," summarizes well the author's own overall appraisal of Brentano's position in the history of philosophy.


Based upon an exchange of letters between Brentano and A. Marty, and a fragment of a lecture dated 1895. A brief introduction and a more ex-
tended commentary by Kraus trace the development of Brentano's views on the problem of time.


Proposes to present Brentano's "new" ethical theory as against the theory he held during the "middle phase of his intellectual development." Surprisingly enough, however, the author pays only scant attention to a correlation of chronology and theories. This limits the value of his study. In addition, one might also wish to take issue with his "revised conception" of Brentano's later views in the field of Ethics.


McDougall, W. Outline of psychology. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923. (a)

McDougall, W. Purposive or mechanical psychology. Psychol. Rev., 1923, 30, pp. 273-278. (b)


Taking issue with Maria Doren's claim (Historische Grundlagen der Psychoanalyse) that the existence of direct relations between Freud and Brentano cannot be proved, unless they were purely personal in character, the author points out that (1) Freud's consistent opposition "to the more or less materialistic medicine of his time," very likely, was inspired by Brentano's uncompromising insistence
upon the distinction between physical and psychic phenomena, and
(2) Freud, quite possibly, first became acquainted with the problem
of the unconscious through Brentano's extensive and detailed analysis
of it in his lectures and Psychology.


To support the stand taken in his first article, the author gives the
title of courses taught by Brentano at the University of Vienna in
which Freud was enrolled, pointing out that these were the only non-
medical courses he took during his whole course of studies there.


Includes a highly prejudiced analysis and critique of Brentano's
thought from an idealistic point of view. (pp. 83-173).

Miziak, H., and Staudt, Virginia M. Catholics in psychology. A Historical

Brentano is discussed along with "Catholics in early German psychology"
(Ch. 2). After justifying his inclusion in their book, the authors
write at some length about his life and some of his writings, and de-
vote the remaining pages to his "act psychology," his role in the
history of psychology, and his relationship to Stumpf, Messer and
Marbe. In addition, several other brief references to Brentano are
found in this volume.

Miziak, H. The philosophical roots of scientific psychology. New York:

In line with its general tone, this booklet contains several pertinent
references to Brentano, calling attention to his position within the
Leibnitzian heritage in philosophy and science, his role as one of the
critics of associationism, his merit in making "the influence of
Aristotle felt in the new psychology," and the inspiration exerted
by him upon a large group of antwundtian psychologists. By contrast,
the author asserts, "there is no specific evidence...to indicate that
Freud was influenced" by Brentano.


The most comprehensive monographic treatment, as yet available, of this facet of Brentano's thinking. Almost exactly half of this work is devoted to a holistic, well balanced presentation of Brentano's ideas, viewed in themselves and in their historical perspective; the other half presents an equally well integrated and keen appraisal of these ideas. The author has succeeded in his goals of (1) contributing to the understanding of Brentano, and (2) showing which trains of thought of ancient and medieval philosophy have re-entered into contemporary speculation through him. While unable to accept some of the most central aspects of Brentano's views, he shows how this "does not detract from the high methodical value and inner richness" of his conception.


This classical work in the history of psychology, as yet unsurpassed in several respects, brings out the fact that Brentano was but one of several "empirical" psychologists who, in the '70's and '80's, were opposed to "sensory associationism" and "Wundt's apperceptionism," insofar as they "did not try to reduce the multiplicity of mental phenomena to the least possible number of elements, but emphasized more sharply the interplay of single phenomena." In addition, this volume contains valuable references to historical and theoretical relationships linking Brentano with the Würzburg School, the Austrian School, phenomenology, and Gestalt psychology.


One of the first "modern" textbooks of "modern" psychology, this volume devotes only the equivalent of a single page to Brentano, defining the meaning of his famous distinction between "acts" and "contents" and placing it into historical perspective (in reference to Leibniz, Kant and Herbart). However, it's no exaggeration to say that this single page is actually worth a whole chapter, showing, as it does, that Brentano's distinction "between the experience as a structure and the experience as a way of acting," or more broadly "as a way of behaving," is quite "radical," and hence modern, and of far-reaching significance.


Contains (1) pertinent biographical data, (2) a largely eulogistic portrait of Brentano’s personality (referring to him as a "universal mind," "a genius," "a master of the historical conception of philosophy," "the greatest knower of Aristotle since Theophrastus," "a friend of nature," "a master of German language"; as a man of "towering character" and "manisided endowment," whose life was dominated by a single "leitmotiv—the striving after the knowledge of truth connected with the decision to act in accordance with...truth," and whose exceptional "power...of abstraction" went hand in hand with an "artistic-like intuition of...the most fundamental sense and original character of phenomena," etc.), and (3) a brief synopsis of leading themes in Brentano’s thought. The latter, too, is decidedly slanted in the direction of a positive appraisal. In spite of this, however, it contains some keen observations.


In addition to biographical data, this article also contains a bibliography of Brentano’s writing, as given by Kraus.


Having laid down for himself the same program of inquiry as Husserl’s, the author criticizes (pp. 32-34) Brentano’s "existential logic" for leading to a position of "forced intellectualism" (all psychological facts are logical) on the one hand, and of downright "empiricism" (identification of logic with psychology) on the other. Limited knowledge of Brentano’s ideas, and the author’s own theoretical preoccupations concur in making his analysis dogmatic rather than factual. Without being aware of it, the author himself takes away much of the strength from his critique when he characterizes Brentano’s logic as "a logic of quality" (i.e. a logic geared to "attain, in the primitive judgment, the real qualitative content which pragmatic necessities have obscured in every day grammatical forms").
The treatment of Brentano's views on psychology is inserted, almost as an after-thought, in a catchall chapter at the very end of the work itself. This is not surprising in view of the author's associationistic and positivistic leanings. In essence, Brentano is considered as the chief representative of "the ideological or logical" trend within the "new" psychology, in opposition to the "physiological" trend (which is analyzed in detail in this book). As such, he is viewed "as a disciple of J. S. Mill," since both show "no physiological leanings." In terms of historical perspective, it may be of some interest to notice that Ribot, while asserting that the method of the ideological or logical school "leads into serious mistakes," grants that this school "may show more delicacy and aptitude in analysis than the physiological school," and devote itself "more closely to what is strictly psychological."


Contains a clear, and fairly comprehensive analysis of all facets of Brentano's theory of causality, showing that such a theory is but "the application of his psycholinguistic-psychognostic method to an essential metaphysical problem." A comparison of Brentano's thought with several contemporary philosophical trends, although slanted in favor of the former, adds value to this study.


Criticizes (pp. 14-22) Brentano's theory of intentionality (erroneously identifying it with Meinong's point of view) on two counts: (1) "the act seems unnecessary and fictitious," as but "the ghost of the subject or what once was the full-blooded soul," and especially (2) the reference to outside objects is "derivative, and consists largely in beliefs." In the latter context, it is of interest to notice that while Russell claims that "Brentano's view of knowledge is incapable of maintaining itself either against an analytic scrutiny or against a host of facts in psycho-analysis and animal psychology, on the other he really rests his case against it on the assumption that, except for the field of sensation (where "realism" is demanded), one must be an idealist.


An analytical exposition and a critical appraisal of three basic aspects of Brentano's thought on the problem under consideration: knowledge of the good, the concept of value, nature of our "preferences." In general, this study could be read most profitably as an introduction to the more comprehensive monographic investigation of Brentano's ethical doctrines by O. Most.


A well documented exposition of both the foundations of the proofs of God's existence and the nature of these proofs according to Brentano, followed by a brief but pertinent historical and contentual critical appraisal. Pertinent and valuable is also the introduction to this study bearing upon the life, significance, and religious development of Brentano.


Binet's theory (as expounded in his book L' Amé et le Corps) of the fundamental distinction between the acts and the object of knowledge (consciousness) is (1) contrasted with the opinions of philosophers and psychologists who either deny this duality of consciousness or base it upon the broader and more basic relation between subject and object, and (2) compared to the corresponding stand on this issue of Brentano, Hofler, Witasek and Stumpf. In addition to pointing out differences and similarities between the views of Binet and those of the "School of Brentano," the author singles out the "absolute independence" of Binet's thinking with respect to this School.


While praiseworthy in respect to many details, this study lacks integration and depth of understanding for scholastic thought. The author's intent to show that Husserl is the true father of the "modern" concept of "intention" and "intentionality" is perhaps the most important single factor responsible for this basic shortcoming. As a whole, however, this study is worth reading by anyone interested in sounding the topic under consideration.

Contains an exposition of basic aspects of Brentano's thought with a critical appraisal of its relationship to phenomenology. The paucity of the author's findings relative to "specific elements of (Brentano's) philosophy which have influenced and permeated the full-fledged phenomenology of Husserl and his successors" clearly shows that he was quite justified in asking the important question: "How far is it legitimate to begin the history of the Phenomenological Movement with Franz Brentano."

Represent the most complete source of information on Brentano's life, personality, and endeavors during the years 1866-1873. Valuable are also the author's "recollections" of his contacts with Brentano between 1873 and 1913, the relationship between Brentano and his pupils, and the appraisal he gives of several aspects of his thought.

Touches briefly upon Brentano's influence on his intellectual vocation, and upon the general tenor of the "agreements" and "deviations" of his views in comparison with those of his teacher.

Titchner, E. B. Brentano and Wundt: empirical and experimental psychology. Amer. J. Psychol., 1921, 32, 108-120. (a)

Discusses points of resemblance, differences of emphasis, and essential differences between Brentano's Psychology and Wundt's Psychological Psychology. In the last analysis, the author opines, "psychology... may gladly confess her debt" to both thinkers; yet one must choose either one: "there is no middle way between Brentano and Wundt."


Contains an initial general comparison between the two Schools, followed by an analysis of "features common to all functional systems" (Ladd's Angell's and Judd's system being singled out as illustrations).


Contains (1) an "analysis" of the views of several "act psychologists" (Brentano, Stumpf, Lipps, Husserl, Messer and Witasek), and (2) an "integration," directed at showing, against Brentano's claim or hope, that "there is no psychology of act, there are only psychologies"; that "in the concrete, we have to do with...differentiation rather than consolidation"; that "the differences among the act-systems are in fact fundamental and inevitable, not superficial and accidental"; that "the diversity of opinion among the psychologists of act is due precisely to their effort toward a consistent systematisation," i.e. to their lack of true scientific (experimental) temper.

Titchner, E. B. Experimental Psychol: A retrospect, Amer. J. Psychol., 1925, 36, 313-323. (a)

After reassuring himself that "experimental psychology had an extraordinary fortunate birth," the author discusses the "major influences that wrought against the establishment" of this science. As can easily be guessed, one of these influences is to be found in the tenacious persistence throughout the history of Western thought of empirical psychology, expressed in its "exemplary form" in Brentano's Psychology. Within this context, the author re-asserts again some of the basic differences between Brentano's and Wundt's orientations, on the premise that in essence "the effect of empiricism upon experi-
mentalism...has been wholly bad."


While not denying "Brentano's a priorism in the late eighties," the author asserts that "there is no conscious trace of it in the *Psychology*," and doubts that the student of this work is prepared by it for the part played by the *a-priori* in Brentano's later thinking.


 Basically a reply to L. Carmichael's identification (1926) of "empirical" with "rational" psychology. The author reiterates a theme developed more fully elsewhere (1921 a, 1925) that no a-prioristic elements have slipped into Brentano's *Psychologie*, and considers both "empirical" psychology (in the strict sense of the term) and experimental psychology *a-posteriori*, i.e. empirical (in the broadest sense of the term) psychologies. In comparison with his previous stand, he seems to adopt a softer, less critical, attitude toward "empirical" psychology proper, insofar as he now grants that it "may, and does, employ the experimental method."


An overview of Brentano's thinking. Contains keen observations on how much, and what kind, of Aristotle is found in Brentano; his conception of method in science and philosophy; the *leitmotiv* and content of his "psychology from an empirical standpoint" (as found not only in the homonymous work, but also in other writings); the relationship between psychology and other sciences; the distinction between "genetic" and "descriptive" psychology, and the central position of the latter within the gamut of the scientific edifice. The author defends Brentano against the accusation of "psychologism," considering him a "critical realist and an unswerving theist." This study is worth reading by anyone who wants a concise synopsis of Brentano's basic ideas.


Brentano's position with respect to the problem of categories is viewed as a valiant, though unsuccessful, effort to overcome the subjectivism (the conception of categories as mere modes of knowing) of the greatest part of modern philosophy. The extent to which Brentano is a genuine
Aristotelian; how he avoids falling victim to a pure empiricistic, nominalistic and psychologicist conception only at the price of some inconsistency in his thinking; and the basic reason for his steadfast opposition to admitting "ideal objects" (an encroachment of logical and metaphysical considerations) are woven meaningfully into the discussion.


In terms of space allotted to him in this work, Brentano does not seem to rate among the greatest of "the great psychologists," as chosen by the author. He shares a chapter along with Ebbinghaus, G. E. Muller, Kulpe and the Wurzburg School, and has a claim only to six pages (two of which present his biography); by contrast, Wundt enjoys at least a modestly long chapter (17 pages, devoted almost entirely to a presentation of his thinking or scientific activity). Perusal of the author's presentation, in fact, is limited to casting it into a brief historical perspective, and to an elementary analysis of only a few of its essential lineaments: distinction between "acts" and "contents" intentionality, classification of psychic phenomena.


A well documented, methodical exposition of Brentano's thought on the two issues under discussion. Its value may be enhanced when read in conjunction with L. Gilson's work, Methode et metaphysique selon Franz Brentano (1955 a).


The author shows good familiarity with the theories of Brentano and the tenets of scholastic philosophy, but unfortunately his study is a "file cabinet" type of investigation, opposing or merely placing one next to the other the "errors" of the former and the "truths" of the latter. Needless to say neither Brentano nor Scholastic philosophy is enlivened by this operation. If anything the latter actually appears quite static and stultified. Yet, paradoxically enough, one may be able to find much residual meaning and life in the end product of this study.


Contains a brief analysis (pp. 86-87) of the relationship between Brentano and Gestalt psychology, and between Brentano and Freud.


Places Brentano's orientation into sharp theoretical and historical perspective by contrasting it with the standpoint of Wundt and of positivism. While for Wundt the distinction between psychic and physical phenomena is merely relative to the observer's point of view, for Brentano it is essential; while for Wundt there is but "one psychic phenomenon—the act, susceptible of various complications," for Brentano there is a plurality of irreducible psychic phenomena. Within the broader context of positivism, Brentano asserts the legitimacy and necessity of investigating what the phenomena are in themselves, "in their phenomenal purity," and is convinced that such an investigation will reveal many more data than positivism is ready to admit. In addition, Brentano paves the way for such decidedly anti-positivistic conceptions as Husserl's pure logic and Scheler's objective theory of values.