Internationalism and the German Revolution, 1918-1919

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INTERNATIONALISM AND THE GERMAN REVOLUTION

1918 - 1919

by

James D. Shand

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

June 1967
PREFACE

The German revolution of November 1918 overthrew the monarchical system of government and established the foundations for a democratic, socialist republic. President Ebert replaced Emperor William as chief executive, and the popularly elected Reichstag assumed greater control over the government, but the overthrow of the Second Reich was far from thoroughgoing. The army, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary remained unpurged and free to wield continuing influence, along with heavy industry and the landed interests, in a fashion not always sympathetic to the new form of government. Within fifteen years the republic sickened and died amidst economic disorder, political intrigue, and constitutional disputes. The ill-fated birth and transitory, crisis-ridden life of the Weimar Republic led many contemporary observers and later writers to question the genuineness or validity of the 1918 revolution. Yet all would admit that the events of 1918-19 reflected the working of many political, economic, and intellectual forces. One of these was the movement referred to as internationalism, namely, the belief that relations between the nations and the peoples could and must be one of friendship, understanding, and trust, subject to international law rather than to power politics. For the German internationalists, the revolution of 1918 promised the opportunity to diffuse and implant their ideals of international reconciliation in a rejuvenated Germany.
This dissertation examines the relationship between German internationalism and the revolutionary events of 1918-1919. By concentrating on this aspect of the revolution, I hope to reveal a neglected facet of modern German history, one which is vital to a total understanding of the German scene not only during the revolutionary months, but throughout the entire era of the Weimar Republic. The internationalist ideals played a major role in forming the context of public debate of German foreign policy in this period. For a brief time internationalism ceased to be the doctrine of a neglected, even vilified, minority, and became, at least partially, the accepted principle of state policy. The description of the organizations and individuals involved in this transformation should cast light on that vital moment of intellectual history which bridges the gap between concept and practice, between principles and politics.

The internationalist individuals and groups studied here could also be described, generally speaking, as pacifist. Clearly not all internationalists need be pacifists, namely principled opponents of all war. Just as clearly, however, the pacifist motivation, that is, the avoidance of war, would logically lead to acceptance of internationalism. It should be noted, however, that the terms "internationalism" and "internationalist" were not frequently used by contemporary Germans to refer to the groups and individuals I have studied. Nevertheless, I have used the term "internationalism" in the title and as the organizing motif, because in English this is the broader term and refers less ambiguously to the general ideas of international cooperation and
organization which constitute the theme of this study. The frequent use of the terms "pacifism" and "pacifist" in the text arises from the fact that pacifist associations formed the core of the internationalist movement and that pacifism and internationalism were so closely intertwined in the period under consideration.

For aid and encouragement in developing this theme, which grew out of a seminar paper in Atlantic Community Studies, I wish to thank Dr. Raymond Schmandt.

In a study of this sort the opportunity to use German libraries and archives was invaluable. For this opportunity I am indebted to a grant from the Fulbright Commission. While in Europe I was able to avail myself of the friendly and scholarly assistance of Dr. Thilo Vogelsang of the Institut fuer Zeitgeschichte, Munich; Dr. Hans Booms, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz; Dr. Klaus Weinandy, Politisches Archiv, Auswaertiges Amt, Bonn; Dr. Heinrich Busley, Bayerisches Staatsarchiv, Munich; Dr. Horst Dreitzel, Institut fuer Europaische Geschichte, Mainz; the staffs of the Munich City Library and the Bavarian State Library, Munich; Mr. Norman S. Field and Miss Hope Reeder, United Nations Library, Geneva; and Dr. Harold J. Gordon Jr., of the University of Massachusetts.

I could not have completed the writing of this dissertation so rapidly without the free time allowed by the grant of an Arthur J. Schmitt Fellowship from the Graduate School of Loyola University.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used in the footnotes to refer to some of the most frequently cited German newspapers and archives.

- BT  Berliner Tageblatt
- FZ  Frankfurter Zeitung
- MNN Muenchner Neueste Nachrichten
- VossZ Vossische Zeitung
- BAK Bundesarchiv, Koblenz
- BGStA Bayerisches Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Munich
- BHptStA Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Munich
- BKrA Bayerisches Kriegsarchiv, Munich
- PA-AA Politisches Archiv, Auswaertiges Amt, Bonn
CHAPTER I

INTERNATIONALISM IN PEACE AND WAR:
THE BACKGROUND TO 1918

The Weimar Republic came into existence burdened with a heavy legacy from the imperial past. From the beginning its diplomacy operated under the disadvantages of a lost war and a governmental overthrow. The foreign policy debates in those turbulent years took many themes from the war-time controversies, while adjusting them to fit a changed world position resulting from the twin constellation of a defeat and revolution. One aspect of this debate, which extended far beyond the precincts of the Wilhelmstrasse, was the contest between two views generally labelled nationalism and internationalism. The hysterical attacks of racist and other right-wing German nationalists have tended to cast not only their own arguments but even the very terms of the controversy itself into disrepute. Many other more sober-minded contemporaries, however, also bore witness to this clash of opinions, this competition for the allegiance of the German people. In the early days of the 1918 revolution, Gustav Stresemann disassociated himself from the democratically-inclined liberals with the reproach that "in their camp the international way of thinking is at war with German sensibilities." And the

1 Letter of Gustav Stresemann to Generalsekretaer Brues, November 25, 1918, in Nachlass des Reichsaussenministers Dr. Gustav Stresemann, 3069/6896/134608. All references to the Stresemann Nachlass are to the microfilm version consulted at the Institut fuer Europaische Geschichte, Mainz, and also available at the National Archives in Washington, D.C.
archivist Erich Volkmann, testifying later before a special Reichstag investigating committee, retrospectively described the war-aims controversy as "a bitter struggle over great ideas. . . , a struggle which continues on today before our very eyes, in which the two opposing sides are represented by adherents of two ideologies, the national power principle and the international ideal of justice."²

The nationalistic currents in twentieth-century Germany have been extensively studied as forerunners of the Third Reich, but the other contender in this "bitter struggle" has received less attention from historians. Yet the victim of this scholarly neglect constituted a not insignificant aspect of the German revolution of 1918, that attempted re-orientation of the German political system. The revolution was a complex series of events, extending from the installation of the cabinet of Prince Max of Baden in October 1918 to the promulgation of the republican constitution in August 1919. During that year reformist, even revolutionary, ideas were abroad in the land. For all its improvisations and imperfections, the German revolution embodied a number of forward-looking movements which sought to bring the structure and spirit of the Reich more into accord with liberal, democratic, and socialist ideals. One such movement was the campaign by cer-

tain groups and individuals to imbue the nascent republic with "a new and more generous spirit in the goals of foreign policy." 3

For these advocates of internationalism, the implementation of a new course in foreign affairs was an important, indeed an integral, part of the German revolution.

1. The Internationalist Position Before 1914

In Germany, as in most of Europe, the half-century before 1914 was a time of increasingly vocal nationalism, finding active expression in competitive militarism and imperialism. The voices in the Hohenzollern Empire sounded perhaps a bit more strident, stimulated as they were by the newness of the Prussian-dominated Reich and by the country's rapid economic growth. On the altar of national unification had been sacrificed not only the liberal hopes of 1848, but also much of the cultural cosmopolitanism which had previously characterized German life. Where prior to 1870 particularism had appeared to be the main obstacle to development, the new nation felt itself more threatened by allegiances which recognized no borders. Among politicians and intellectuals in the decades after 1870 this sentiment crystallized into the stereotypes of several hostile internationals menacing Germany: the red socialist, the black Catholic, and the golden capitalist-Jewish. The socialists were the particular targets of Emperor William II's wrath, and he openly branded them as "those

fellows without a country" and "enemies of the nation."

At the same time, a very considerable international life was growing up in late nineteenth-century Europe. An array of organizations developed, drawing members from many countries and aimed at curing social ills, furthering humanitarian goals, or gathering scientific data. Germany played a substantial role in this story. A 1908 survey showed that Germany was the seat of forty-one such international associations. These were forums where like-minded experts from different nations could meet to discuss and compare common problems and solutions. Harmlessly non-political in character, they in no way posed a threat to the foundations of the European nation-state system, so that their cataloguer, the Austro-German pacifist Alfred Fried, could truthfully claim that "internationalism does not develop at the expense of the nation." The reverse side of the coin, however, was the harsh contrast between these isolated gestures of practical private cooperation on one level and the growing national animosities and rivalries on another. An optimist like Fried might describe this deficiency as a comprehension gap, which education and technological progress would eliminate. Others felt that the situation called for a qualitatively different internationalism, calculated to strike more directly at the root of the problem.

This organizational internationalism is the phenomenon


5Fried, Das Internationale Leben, p. vi of the Forword.
which concerns us in this paper. As was fitting for a movement designed to alleviate national antagonisms, it took shape around a pacifist nucleus, but it also served as the rallying point for such diverse traditions as the international law school, the concept of European unity, and the liberal free-trade doctrine. Those German men and women whom we will denote as internationalists all agreed that they must combat the growing chauvinism by preaching and practicing international friendship and understanding, on the assumption that hostilities arose chiefly out of ignorance and prejudice. This axiom related to their conviction that true national interests could be reconciled and therefore need not lead to armed conflict.

Although not all Germans who subscribed to these general internationalist principles were pacifists, it was inevitable that pacifism would find in internationalism one of its most effective expressions and that pacifists would provide strong support for the internationalist endeavor. In this sense the first organized internationalist group within the Hohenzollern Empire was the German Peace Society (Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft), founded in 1892. Prime mover and first head of the Peace Society was the Austrian journalist Alfred H. Fried (b. 1864), who transplanted to the soil of Wilhelmian Germany the teachings of his friend and fellow Austrian pacifist, Bertha von Suttner. From 1899 on, Fried published the pacifist journal Friedens-Warte, while the Peace Society disseminated its own organ, Voelker-
Within the German Peace Society we find most of the prominent internationalists who will figure in this paper. Of these, the most vigorous activist was Ludwig Quidde (b. 1858), who in 1912 succeeded Fried as President of the Society. Originally devoted to historical research, Quidde made his mark as a polemical democrat and anti-militarist with his brilliant critique of the Hohenzollern autocracy, *Caligula*, published in 1894. In that same year he founded in Munich the first local branch of the Peace Society. For over twenty years he served as a German delegate to the International Peace Office in Bern. Quidde was unique among his pacifist colleagues for his pre-war engagement in the political arena, as he sat in the Bavarian Landtag for the Progressive (left-liberal) Party.

Most of the other outstanding internationalist members of the Peace Society were academicians, and many were specialists in international law. This tended to cement the already natural relationship between pacifism and organizational internationalism and to give German internationalism a strongly legal bent. Walter Schuecking (b. 1875), professor at Marburg, was destined to play a politically active role in the post-war years comparable to that

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of Quidde. Prior to 1914 his fame rested on his insistent advocacy of international legal organizations for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Two other pacifist professors, Georg Nicolai (b. 1874) of Berlin and Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster (b. 1869) of Munich, later provoked violent reactions for their sharp criticisms of German militarism. Other international law scholars who contributed to pacifist projects included Theodor Niemeyer (b. 1857) of Kiel, Leonard Nelson (b. 1882) of Goettingen, Franz von Liszt (b. 1851) of Berlin, and Robert Piloty (b. 1863) and Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy (b. 1874) both of Wuerzburg. A younger student of international law, Hans Wehberg (b. 1885), was already active in the Peace Society before the war. ⁸

These men, mostly educated in the 1880's and 1890's, came to maturity and launched their professional careers at a time when the flourishing German Empire was beginning its fateful course toward achieving the status of a world power. In this atmosphere they represented a dissident element, a countervailing force, as it were, to that Praeceptor Germaniae, Heinrich von Treitschke, and to the nationalism and imperialism which he symbolized and defended. Generally speaking, these internationalists ⁸

⁸For brief synopses of the lives of these internationalists, see Berkeley, Deutsche Friedensbewegung, pp. 138-146, and Wehberg, Fuehre, pp. 54-69, as well as the entries in Wilhelm Kosch, Biographisches Staatshandbuch (Bern and Munich: Francke Verlag, 1963), pp. 335, 776, 840, 909, 921, 983. Specifically on Foerster, see his own memoirs, Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, Erlebte Weltgeschichte 1869-1953 (Nuernberg: Glock and Lutz, 1953), pp. 91-175 and the introduction to the excellent article, Heinrich Lutz, "Deutscher Krieg und Weltgewissen: Friedrich Wilhelm Foersters politische Publizistik und die Zensurstelle des bayerischen Kriegsministeriums 1915-1918," Zeitschrift fuer Bayerische Landesgeschichte, XXV (1962), 470-472.
stood within the earlier, and superseded, German liberal tradition. Outsiders though they might be to the Wilhelmian Reich, they formed part of the continental European and Anglo-American pacifist movement of the late nineteenth-century. As academicians and particularly as international lawyers, they shared a predilection for juridical institutions as the solution to conflict and war. The very terminology of their arguments betrayed this legal cast to their thought. A favorite analogy depicted the task of ending the prevalent state of "international anarchy" in much the same fashion as strong national governments had brought law and order out of feudal disarray. To accomplish their end of imbuing international relations with this same law and order, the internationalists looked to institutional arrangements, such as arbitration courts and mediation panels. In effect, these German internationalists tended to translate into the field of international affairs their domestic legal concepts of a sovereign Rechstaat standing over and above the conflicts of society and endowed with the competence and the organs to settle these conflicts
peacefully.  

The Peace Society was not the only association in imperial Germany devoted to internationalist goals. In order to attract into the internationalist cause persons unwavayed by strict pacifist doctrine, Schuecking and others founded in 1911 the Society for International Understanding (Verband fuer Internationale Verstaendigung). A suitably broad program defined the task of the Society: "to spread an appreciation of the significance of good mutual relations between the various peoples in all spheres of life, in order to prepare the way for a freer international policy among the nations." The roster of Society officers included pacifist academics and a number of politicians from the Center and Progressive parties. With an eye, perhaps, to this wider audience, the Society's chairman, Dr. Friedrich Curtius, warned that "what is important is that we win over not isolated individuals, but the masses, and thereby gain a power with which statesmen, generals, and diplomats must reckon." This far-seeing declaration was ambitious for its day, but it foreshadowed the political turn

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9For this brief analysis of the German scene and the place of the internationalists within it, as well as for their relationship to the world outside Germany, I have relied primarily on three works: Ludwig Dehio, Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie: Betrachtungen uber ein Grundproblem der neueren Staatsgeschichte (Krefeld: Verlag Neuss, 1948); Dieter Dux, "The Germanic Approach to the Problem of International Organization," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Division of Social Sciences, University of Chicago, 1948); and F. W. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States (Cambridge University Press, 1963), especially pp. 92-150 which contain a history of internationalist theories. Also basic here is Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht (Duesseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1962). For Treitschke's anti-pacifist impact see Andreas Dopalen, Heinrich von Treitschke (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), pp. 226-236.
which internationalism would take in 1918. For the time being the Society had to be content to publish brochures expounding its ideals and to arrange two public conventions, one at Heidelberg in 1912 and another at Nuremberg in 1913.  

Two similar associations with a more marked appeal to intellectuals sprang up in Germany just before 1914, but never attained even the modest success of the Society for International Understanding. In Munich Wilhelm Ostwald sought to enroll "the creative spirits of the world" in his organization The Bridge (Die Bruecke), which he intended as a world federation along scientific and cultural lines. Among its German members was the political scientist and philosopher, Ernst Jaeckh (b. 1875), whose internationalist career would begin in earnest in 1918. The Association of Cosmopolitan Clubs, founded in Berlin by Professor Hugo Kuensterberg after his return from the United States, shared the non-political character of The Bridge. It urged German social and academic leaders to correspond and exchange ideas with their counterparts in other nations as a step toward world

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The same idea in reverse patterned the Vacation Courses for Foreigners, which Professor Ludwig Wagner conducted yearly in Kaiserslautern starting in 1908. An integral part of these courses was an international peace seminar, with an impressive list of lecturers, including Bertha von Suttner, Alfred Fried, and Ludwig Gudde. The Boettunger Institute in Berlin attempted to introduce foreign students to German life, language, and culture, while the study-travel program organized by Walter Berendsohn in Kiel encouraged German students to seek educational experience abroad.

A religious facet of internationalism was represented in the universities by the Christian World Student Federation, whose members pledged themselves "to further the knowledge that the principles of Jesus Christ ought to be valid for international
As a practical demonstration of this belief, a group of Lutheran churchmen, headed by the young Berlin pastor Friedrich Siegmund-Schulze, established in 1909 the Church Committee for Promoting Friendly Relations Between Great Britain and Germany. Siegmund-Schulze publicized the work of this group in his journal, Die Eiche, and on speaking tours in England.15

A secular equivalent was the German-British Committee for Understanding, which originated in Germany in 1905 as the counterpart of a similar committee in England. One of its professed purposes was to persuade German commercial and industrial circles that the economic rivalry between the two countries need not degenerate into enmity and armed conflict, but should instead progress in the direction of fraternal cooperation in the midst of competition. Ernst Sieper, a professor of English Literature at the University of Munich, sounded the Committee's optimistic theme: "A strong England on the side of Germany will be the most secure guarantee for the continuing progress of the world-historical mission of these two Germanic peoples."16

Internationalist attempts to win over the German business

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16Fried, Handbuch, pp. 290-291; the quote is from Ernst Sieper, Die wirtschaftliche Rivalitaet zwischen Deutschland und England, a lecture printed as No. 2 of the Pamphlets of the German-English Committee for Understanding (Munich and Berlin: Verlag R. Oldenburg, 1911), pp. 19-20.
community to their credo could hope for little success in view of
the general industrialist support for pan-German military and im-
perial policy. Significantly, the German delegates to the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce congress at Boston in 1912 initially
rejected, and later only grudgingly voted for, a resolution favor-
ing an international governmental conference on arbitration and
the prevention of war. Free-trade advocates like Lujo Brentano
and Georg Gothein might continue to preach the liberal doctrines
of Cobden and Bright, but few German industrial, commercial, or
agrarian figures deserved the title of internationalist. A
brilliant exception was Walther Rathenau, but this eccentric in-
tellectual was not typical of his peers in the Wilhelmian economic
world. His advocacy of several internationalist-oriented schemes
in the pre-war years was as unorthodox as it was unavailing.

Internationalism met no more favorable a response from the
political elite. Wilhelmian foreign policy, swayed as it was by
navalism and militarism, was cool, if not decidedly hostile, to

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17George L. Ridgeway, Merchants of Peace: The History of
the International Chamber of Commerce (Boston: Little, Brown

18On Gothein, see Fried, Handbuch, p. 354 and Kosch,
Biographisches Staatshandbuch, p. 414. On Brentano, see Lujo
Brentano, Mein Leben im Kampf um die soziale Entwicklung Deutsch-
lands (Jena: Eugen Diedrichs Verlag, 1931), pp. 301-306; and
James J. Sheehan, The Career of Lujo Brentano (Chicago, The Uni-

19He proposed an international accounting agency to deter-
mine the extent of permissible national armament expenditures, in
a 1911 article, "Politik, Humor, und Abrüstung," in Walther
Rathenau, Gesammelte Schriften (5 vols.; Berlin: S. Fischer Verlag,
1918), 1, 179-181, and a European customs union, in a 1913 article
"Deutsche Gefahren und Neue Ziele," Rathenau, Schriften, 1, 267-
278.
ideas of disarmament and compulsory arbitration. This became abundantly clear in the course of the two Hague conferences in 1899 and 1907. Although an internationalist-minded law professor, Philip Zorn of Bonn, attended the first Hague conference as an official German representative, neither he nor his fellow-delegates could overcome the bad impression left by Emperor William's insistent and notorious antipathy toward any binding arbitration agreement. Consequently Germany received a perhaps unjustly large share of the blame for the meager results of the much-heralded conferences. Despite some attempts to put the best possible face on events, German internationalists sadly realized that the outcome left Germany with a tarnished reputation abroad and a weakened sense of internationalism at home. The failure of the Hague conferences, in fact, gradually assumed in the minds of the German internationalists the features of a traumatic experience which must never be repeated. Its effects also confirmed pre-war internationalists decisively in their non-political stance. Unable actively to support the imperial foreign policy, but impotent to challenge or condemn effectively, the internationalists took refuge in a non-political attitude and concentrated on the private activities described above.20

This individual and group activity in favor of a peaceful

world order and international understanding did receive some support from certain elements in German political life, chiefly, as might have been expected, from liberals. In 1895 the left-liberal Progressive Party program placed the party on record as "striving for a federation of peace and freedom among nations... and supporting all efforts which further cooperation among nations, the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and the mutual reduction of armaments." From this party also came the demand that the approval of the Reichstag be a requirement for declarations of war and for treaties of peace. This doctrine, rested on the liberal assumption that the conduct of international relations was better off in the hands of the people's representatives. Such a demand also pointed the way to the future politicizing of the internationalist program after 1918.

Another political forum for pro-internationalist sentiment and activity was the Inter-Parliamentary Union, founded in 1889. Although initial German response to this institution was half-hearted, by 1900 many Reichstag deputies belonged, especially Progressives, Centrists, and Social Democrats. Under the auspices of the Union, two special meetings of French and German parliamentarians were held in Switzerland in 1913 and 1914 to

Potentially the most powerful support for internationalist ideals in pre-war Germany was the Social Democratic party together with its working-class affiliates. The German party was, both ideologically and organizationally, the pride of the Second International. What brought the German socialists into agreement with the academic pacifists and the legal internationalists was the party's position on questions of war, peace, and international relations. The Erfurt Program of 1897 called for the settlement of international disputes through arbitration and for a parliamentary veto over war and peace. Despite the clinging to the concept of a militia, the program also espoused international treaties to limit armaments.

If the socialist platform included many pacifist planks, it also contained a distinctive brand of Marxian internationalism. The Erfurt Program was explicit on this point.


24Salomon, Parteiprogramme, pp. 3-5.
The interests of the laboring class are the same in all nations with the capitalist system. Therefore, the freeing of the working class is a task to which workers from all parts of the world must equally contribute. In recognition of this fact, the Socialist Party of Germany feels and declares itself one with the class-conscious workers of all other lands.

This paean to supra-national solidarity remained a matter of rhetoric for the mass following of the German Social Democratic party, which was more interested in solving domestic problems. The party leaders, recognizing the basically national allegiance of the German workers, reacted defensively to charges of lack of patriotism by stressing that proletarian internationalism did not preclude devotion to country. On the party's right-wing this patriotic sentiment even tended to shade over into an openly nationalist "socialist imperialism" as expressed in the journal, Sozialistische Monatshefte.

On the other end of the political spectrum the left-wing socialists voiced doubts as to whether the tools of "bourgeois pacifism," such as arbitration and treaties, were adequate to solve the problems of international relations as understood by

25 Ibid., p. 3.

Marxian analysis. A party pamphlet explained the issue.

The bourgeois philosophers (i.e., the academic internationalists) only complain that they can effect no change. So long as capitalism dominates, it will, by virtue of its inherent conflicts of interest, be at the mercy of militarism. ... Only the working class is the born enemy of war. ..., since it alone strives for the solidarity of all peoples, which, in turn, is only possible on the basis of a socialist economic order.27

Prior to 1914, this attitude of "anti-pacifism" was confined to a small group on the extreme left led by Karl Liebknecht. At the 1912 party congress moderate leftists like Hugo Haase and Karl Kautsky joined middle-of-the-road socialists to defeat a radical proposal which would have condemned all international agreements between capitalist governments as illusory. Instead the congress approved a resolution emphasizing the need to work against war even within the capitalist framework.28

2. The Initial Impact of the War

In view of its pre-war divisions and its ambivalent position on pacifist internationalism, it was not surprising that the German Social Democratic Party was swept along on the wave of patriotic emotion in the August days of 1914. The vote of the Party's Reichstag delegation in favor of war credits symbolized for most Germans the incorporation of "those fellows without a country" into the national body.


For others, however, this action marked the ultimate defection from principle. As the party central committee continued to support the war as defensive and hence justifiable, opposition within the party became more vocal. Leftists began to draw out to their logical conclusions the potentially revolutionary theses of proletarian internationalism.

In June 1915 Hugo Haase, Karl Kautsky, and Eduard Bernstein, the core of the later Independent Socialists, published their manifesto of protest, "The Command of the Hour." Fearful that the German socialists' support of the governmental war policy was proving detrimental to the party's international prestige and credibility, the writers appealed for an open party declaration in favor of an immediate peace with no annexations.29

These German Independent Socialists attended the Zimmerwald conference in Switzerland in September 1915, a meeting summoned by Italian and Swiss socialists who were impatient over the hesitancy of the International Socialist Bureau to call an international party conference. The resulting Zimmerwald conference comprised chiefly the left-wing elements from the various national parties and urged the proletariat to common action for peace. The German proponents of a more vigorous socialist anti-war policy used the forum for their summons to the international working-class "to a struggle for freedom, international fraternity."

At this stage the Independent Socialists diverged from the German Majority Socialists primarily over tactics. The Majority was content to continue support for the imperial government's basic foreign and military policy, thereby maintaining the political truce, or Burgfrieden, obtaining since August 1914. The Independents, on the other hand, believed that the assumptions of the Burgfrieden were now passé, and that the socialists must expound their own positive peace program, if they were to remain true to principle. The content of that proposed program, as envisioned by many leading Independents, included such standard notions as treaties of compulsory arbitration and general disarmament. This internationalism, as described by the Independent theorist Eduard Bernstein, differed little from that of a pacifist and international law scholar like Walter Schuecking.31

Further to the left, the so-called International Group, the later Spartacists, led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, were clamoring for something much more radical than merely re-


31 This is the view of Ludwig Bergstraesser, "Die Entwicklung der politischen Parteien im Weltkrieg und in der Revolution," in Heinrich Waentig (ed.), Die Entwicklungsgeschichte der grossen politischen Parteien in Deutschland (Bonn: Kurt Schroeder, 1922), p. 1142. Bernstein's major works of this period were: Die Internationale der Arbeiterklasse und der europaische Krieg (Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1915) and Sozialdemokratische Voelkerpolitik (Leipzig: Verlag Naturwissenschaften, 1917).
newed allegiance to traditional socialist internationalism as it had prevailed in pre-war Germany. The contrast between the Kautsky-Haase-Berstein position and that of the Liebknecht faction came to the surface at the founding congress of the Independent Socialist Party in April 1917. All speakers expressed disappointment at the breakdown of the International in August 1914, and disapproval of the course pursued by the Majority Socialists. All agreed that the outbreak of the war had revealed the emptiness of traditional power politics and cabinet diplomacy. So far unanimity obtained, but the parting of the ways came over the question of alternative policies and goals. The radicals under Liebknecht rejected any further talk of arbitration treaties, international law, or concepts like the United States of Europe. All of these they regarded as "bourgeois pacifist ideals" and therefore futile and unavailing to avert war. The Spartacists called for a complete break with this pacifist, legalistic internationalism. In its place they proposed "the class-struggle as the weapon against war," by which they meant not only domestic revolution against military autocracies, but also ultimately the elimination of the nation-state itself as the root cause of war. While Independents like Kautsky were prepared to go so far toward revolutionary statements as to suggest that "any United States of Europe can only be realized as a union of republics," the Liebknechtians had given up hope of political reform along the lines of parliamentary democracy. If the working class was the only guarantee of world peace, then it must seize power from the existing governments and constitute itself as the basis of inter-
The split between Independents and Spartacists did not at this time, in early 1917, result in an open break. The party manifesto issued by the April congress reflected the tension.

We demand a peace of international understanding, based on the principle of national self-determination, without annexations and with international limitation of armaments and compulsory arbitration. We do not see in these institutions any magic means to lasting peace, but rather a good starting point for the proletariat's struggle to maintain the peace. We do not place our trust in governments, but only in the might of the proletariat.

As with the socialists, so also with the non-socialist internationalists, the prolongation of the war led in the long run to an increased radicalism among certain elements. More immediately, however, the various internationalist organizations were hard pressed to maintain their existence and activity. Some smaller groups with limited purposes vanished. The Society for International Understanding expressly suspended operations at the outbreak of the war, but it remained formally in existence and

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emerged now and then in later war years. The German Peace Society, both in its central office, now removed to Stuttgart, and in its local branches, especially in Munich under Quidde, was subject to governmental supervision and later censorship, harassment, and restriction. Some freshly founded war-time organizations arose.

The first of these creations was the New Fatherland Club (Bund Neues Vaterland). Many leading German internationalists joined this organization. Its establishment stemmed from the collaboration between the Berlin writer Otto Lehmann-Russbueildt and the aristocratic riding-master Kurt von Tepper-Laski. During a conversation between these two in August 1914, Tepper-Laski let fall a remark which foreshadowed the direction the internationalist movement was to take: "After this war we shall have to have a revolution to make sure that such a war never occurs again." In November 1914 the New Fatherland Club was founded and proclaimed its goals in an aggressively worded program.

The New Fatherland Club is a working committee of Germans united to cooperate in the tasks incumbent upon the German people as a result of the European war. The

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Club intends: (1) directly and indirectly to support all efforts aimed at imbuing the politics and diplomacy of the European nations with the idea of ... supra-national cooperation. ... This is possible only by radically breaking with the existing system in which a certain very few had the power to decide the fate of millions; (2) in so far as this task assumes a causal link between domestic and foreign policy, to work toward bringing these two into accord, for the good of the German people and of the whole world.36

The revolution spoken of by Tepper-Laski and inherent in this policy statement did not necessarily amount to a Spartacist-style mass uprising. The overwhelmingly pacifist and moderate character of the dominant circles in the New Fatherland Club precluded such an interpretation, at least at the beginning. Aside from a few socialists, the leading figures were pacifists like Schmecking, Quidde, Wehberg and Helmut von Gerlach, editor of Die Welt am Montag, with whom were associated a sprinkling of liberal politicians and writers like Friedrich Naumann, Hans Delbruck, and Lujo Brentano.37 What these men had in mind was rather the prospect of anchoring a future outgoing, conciliatory international policy in a liberalized, democratic system at home. "Our goal... is to imbue the aims of German foreign policy with a new and more generous spirit; in this effort it is important that the German people play their part and never again allow themselves to be driven passively into new wars without their

36Lehmann-Russbuekdt, Kampf fuer Weltfrieden, pp. 16-18. This program was also distributed separately as No. 5 of the Flugschriften, Bund Neues Vaterland (1915).

37Lehmann-Russbueldt, Kampf fuer Weltfrieden, p. 16; Jaeckh, Voelkerbundgedanke, p. 71; Berkeley, Deutsche Friedensbewegung, p. 61.
The New Fatherland Club followed internationalist precedent in seeking contacts with similar organizations in other lands, both neutral and belligerent, in a private attempt to re-weave the shattered strands of international trust and cooperation. The Club viewed itself as a sister organization to the Union of Democratic Control in Great Britain and the Dutch Anti-Oorlog-Raad. Under the auspices of this latter body, a meeting of Dutch, English, and German pacifists convened at the Hague in April 1915 and created the Central Organization for a Lasting Peace, a sort of clearing house for projects to end the war and fashion a peace settlement. A short while later, a delegation of German pacifist women, led by the feminist Anita Augspurg of Munich, also travelled to The Hague to help form the International Women's Federation for a Lasting Peace.

Although the German pacifists attending these Hague meet-

38 From a memorandum drawn up by Ernst Reuter, January 1915, printed in Lehmann-Russbuehd, Kampf fuer Weltfrieden, p. 22.


ings had consulted the Foreign Office before their departure, the
Wilhelmstrasse gave a cold shoulder to Schuecking's report on the
developments at the conference. Military censors intervened to
forbid publications describing pacifist contacts with foreign
societies. This consorting with neutrals and the enemy aroused
suspicion in nationalist circles.

The New Fatherland Club is a member of an international
organization which embraces our enemies. ... Even
worse, as a member of this international organization it
is preparing the way for the creation of a supranational institution, which, independently of the chosen
representatives of the individual nations, will influence the shape of the coming peace.\(^1\)

Here, indeed, was the heart of the matter. While military
authorities charged that the Club "was speaking out ... for a
quick peace settlement without annexations or indemnities, often
for a peace at any price," a pacifist like Hans Wehberg praised
the Club "for enlightening the German people as to the dangers of
an annexationist policy."\(^2\) The bitter controversy over German
war aims, over the shape of the future peace and the nature of the
post-war world, came to be the major point of reference for dis-
cussion. Moreover, the central position which this controversy
assumed in the German public mind furnished the internationalists
with their first entree on to the main political stage.

In its first published brochure in 1915, the New Fatherland
Club announced its opposition to the annexationists. Claiming to

\(^{1}\) Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung, September 14, 1915; see
also Lehmann-Russbuehd, Kampf fuer Weltfrieden, pp. 23-25, 27-34.

\(^{2}\) Report No. 101948, Kriegsministerium, Munich, pp. 8-9;
Wehberg, Pazifist im Weltkrieg, p. 57.
follow "the spirit of Emperor William's oft-repeated assertion that Germany seeks neither conquest nor world dominance," the Club declared that "in order to keep the war within limits, Germany must renounce all plans for annexation." At a confidential meeting of Club members in August 1915 this matter received full consideration. A division of opinion emerged. The majority, headed by Schuecking, Quidde, and the socialist Eduard Bernstein, pressed for an outright and unqualified anti-annexationist stand. Others, notably the Progressive Party leaders Friedrich Naumann and Bernhard Dernburg, demurred, arguing that a renunciation of all plans for annexation would weaken the government's bargaining position at the peace conference. In a final decision the assembled members charged Quidde with the task of composing a small anti-annexationist booklet, which the Club would publish under the title The Restoration of Europe.

This projected brochure had not yet appeared, when the Club was dissolved by government order in February 1916. Quidde went ahead on his own and in early 1916 produced a slim volume entitled Real Guarantees for a Lasting Peace. In this clandestinely printed work Quidde pointed out that the annexations sought by some Germans would only array all of Europe against Germany for

43Was will der Bund Neues Vaterland? No. 1, Flugschriften, Bund Neues Vaterland (Berlin: Verlag Neues Vaterland, 1915), pp. 3-4.

44A typed copy of the minutes of this meeting, written up twenty years later from stenographic notes taken at the time by Hans Wehberg, is in the Nachlass Wehberg, BAK, Nr. 14. There is a brief description of the meeting in Wehberg, Pazifist im Weltkrieg, pp. 58-59.
generations. He argued that the only real guarantee for a lasting peace was a European, or a world-wide, organization based on international law.45

In February 1916 the central German government forbade the New Fatherland Club any public activity, and in March similar prohibitions were extended to Quidde's Peace Union in Munich and to the Peace Society headquarters and bookstore in Stuttgart.46 The German internationalists had to cast about for some new form of organization under cover of which they could continue to operate. In September 1916 a public announcement heralded the formation of the International Law Center (Zentralstelle Voelkerrecht) which described itself as an agency for lasting peace and international understanding. The Center took as its basic belief Quidde's statement that a durable peace must safeguard Germany's valid interests by establishing institutions for the peaceful settlement of conflicts and by imparting a new spirit to national and international life. The signers of this opening manifesto

45Ludwig Quidde, Reale Garantien fuer einen dauernden Frieden (Munich: M. Ernst, 1915). The work was forbidden and copies confiscated by the military authorities, see Report Nr. 101948, Kriegsministerium, Munich, pp. 12-14. The incident that sparked these discussions within the New Fatherland Club and occasioned Quidde's book was the pro-annexationist petition of six economic organizations to the Imperial Chancellor in May 1915. Their petition is printed in Lutz, Fall of German Empire, II, 102-103. See also Hans Gatske, Germany's Drive to the West (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1950), pp. 289-294.

included most of the major figures from the New Fatherland Club and the Peace Society. In addition to churchmen, academicians, publicists, lawyers, and Reichstag deputies, the name of a perennial financier of pacifist undertakings appeared on the list, philanthropist and professor Heinrich Roessler of Frankfurt. Perhaps in deference to his financial contributions he was named honorary chairman at the Center's first meeting in Frankfurt in December 1916. The business management of the association, however, remained centered at the Berlin headquarters, presided over by Helmut von Gerlach.47

The highlight of this December meeting was an outstanding speech by Schuecking, who proceeded from a critique of existing German foreign and military policy to a vision of a future world order. Sharply condemning the annexationists, Schuecking cautioned that the official imperial war aims were unrealistic in that they hoped to achieve by military conquest a Germany secure from any future aggression. More feasible would be "a peaceful organization of Europe and of the world in such a way that mutually hostile military alliances never again arise." Schuecking had long favored the notion of developing the seminal ideas of the Hague conferences into a systematized international legal order. He therefore pictured a world peace league in which a permanent court of arbitration would settle legal conflicts between nations, while political clashes of interest would be

47 The public announcement was printed in BT, September 7, 1916, and in Friedens-Warte, XVIII, Nos. 8/9 (August/September, 1916), pp. 274-275. See also Berkeley, Deutsche Friedensbewegung, p. 34.
the province of an office of investigation and mediation. To secure compliance with the findings of these tribunals, Schuecking proposed moral, economic, political, and ultimately military sanctions, whose effectiveness was to be heightened by the almost total elimination of national armies in favor of a world police force. He concluded with an admonition which the German internationalists were to take increasingly to heart. "Whether we are to see such a world League of Nations emerge from this war depends not on legal techniques, but on the moral desires of the peoples of the world." 48

The International Law Center moved to stimulate these "moral desires" by submitting a petition to the Reichstag in September 1916. The signers recommended that any lasting peace should encompass a new system of international law embodied in a supra-national organization for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Such an institution would also end the need for secret diplomacy and power alliances. The benefits of this arrangement would redound not only to the advantage of peace, but also of liberal democracy within Germany. Alluding to a theme which was to grow in importance, the internationalist petitioners voiced

48 Walter Schuecking, Der Weltfriedensbund und die Wiedergeburt des Voelkerrechts (Leipzig: Verlag Naturwissenschaften, 1917), pp. 8-31. This was the first work in a series entitled "Nach dem Weltkrieg: Schriften zur Neuorientierung der auswaertigen Politik." Schuecking in this speech used the term "Weltstaatenbund" where I have translated "world League of Nations," rather than "Voelkerbund," the term commonly used later. In either case, since it will not always be clear whether the German speakers are referring to the general notion or to the specific organization later established, I will always capitalize League of Nations.
the hope that "this new political organization of the world... would also allow a new orientation in our domestic affairs... the creation within Germany of a condition of freedom and peaceful culture, which would, in turn, strengthen the foundations of world peace."49

What seemed like the answer to this appeal came on November 9 in Chancellor Benthmann-Hollweg's speech to the Reichstag. Referring to British and American proposals for a post-war world organization, the Chancellor conceded that "at the end of this war, when the world sees the devastation wrought on lives and property, a cry will arise from all humanity for agreements... to insure that in so far as is humanly possible such a catastrophe never recur."50 That Benthmann-Hollweg, though by no means a pacifist, was sincere in this protestation, was accepted by men like Quidde and Fried.51 The question of the Chancellor's sincerity, however, was largely academic. In the face of the military dictatorship of Field Marshall Hindenburg and General Ludendorff, the civilian government in Berlin acceded to its position of relative impotence,


disappointing the pacifist expectation that "the Chancellor has set German policy on the road which corresponds to the basic ideas of the Hague conferences." The collapse of winter peace discussions, the government's negative position regarding the post-war fate of Belgium, and the bowing to military judgment in the question of submarine warfare further convinced the advocates of a peace of understanding that they could expect no positive support from this civilian cabinet.

At the same time, by the spring of 1917, the pressure from the left and from their own electorate was coming to be felt by the Majority Socialists, the largest single party in the Reichstag. The Ebert-Scheidemann Socialists might with reason fear that the Independents, with their clear-cut opposition to the war effort, would soon capture the allegiance of the working classes, unless the Majority Socialists offered an attractive pacifist alternative. Simultaneously, the Center Party leader, Matthias Erzberger, had become convinced from his contacts and observations that Germany could no longer expect to achieve a military victory in the war. In early June 1917 he set about to form a coalition of his own party with the Majority Socialist and the left-liberal Progressives. This Reichstag majority coalition conceived and carried through a parliamentary initiative, which included the dismissal of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and the proclamation of an indepen-

dent Reichstag statement on German war aims.53

3. The Peace Resolution:
Rallying Point for Internationalists

The resulting Reichstag Peace Resolution of July 19 marked
the adoption of the traditional internationalist credo by the
majority of the German parliament. Although by its explicit word-
ing the Reichstag merely expressed itself in favor of "a peace of
understanding and of lasting reconciliation" and "the creation of
international legal institutions," the speeches during debate left
no doubt that the coalition leaders saw the improvement of inter-
national relations and the achievement of a peace of understanding
as related to the democratization of German political life.54

The very assertion of Reichstag initiative indicated the scope and
direction of the change. The significance of the action did not
escape the attention of pacifist contemporaries, as was evident by
the response from the internationalist camp. In the names of
their respective organizations, Quidde, Roessler, von Gerlach,
Tepper-Laski, and Anita Augapurg congratulated the Reichstag for

53 The best general accounts of the genesis of the Peace
Resolution and the cluster of Bethmann-Hollweg, are Arthur Rosen-
berg, The Birth of the German Republic 1871-1918, trans. Ian
Morrow (New York: Russel and Russel, 1962), pp. 153-177; and
Epstein, Erzberger, pp. 188-190. These can be supplemented by
Berkeley, Deutsche Friedensbewegung, pp. 43-45; Friedrich Stempfer,
Die ersten vierzehn Jahre der Deutschen Republik (Offenbach:
Bollwerk Verlag, 1947), pp. 24-25; and Fischer, Griff nach
Weltmacht, pp. 521-523.

54 The text of the Peace Resolution is in Verhandlungen des
Reichstags, CCCX, 3573. See also speeches ibid., 3637-3641, and
statements by Erzberger in committee session, in Erich Matthes
(ed.), Der Interfraktionelle Ausschuss 1917/18, vols. 1-4 (Duesseldorf:
Droste Verlag, 1959), 1, 6.
having expressed "the most essential principles underlying a peace of understanding and a reconciliation of the nations."55 From his Swiss exile, Alfred Fried sent words of encouragement, "since the transformation of German domestic politics from a junker-aristocratic nature to a democratic one is the sole guarantee for Germany's effective cooperation in a future international organization."56

This conjuncture of Reichstag majority sentiment with the internationalist program foreshadowed things to come in 1918. At the moment, however, the action carried little effective political weight, since the Reichstag continued to be excluded from any decisive voice in foreign policy. The central government, under the domination of the military, pursued its goal of an annexationist peace through armed victory.

Two events in the fall and winter of 1917-1918 demonstrated that the gap between the government and the internationalists loomed as wide as ever, despite the Reichstag Peace Resolution. The German government's reply to the papal peace note of August 1917, although couched in friendly terms and apparently sympathetic to disarmament and international conciliation, turned evasive on particulars, especially on the crucial issue of Belgium. Internationalists and Reichstag majority deputies had hailed the papal message, but it was difficult to defend the German reply as


a manifestation of the spirit of the Peace Resolution.57

More damaging to fragile internationalist hopes was the peace treaty with Russia in early 1918. Here not only the imperial government, but also much of the Reichstag majority coalition, swerved from the principles of the Peace Resolution. When the Reichstag approved the dictated treaty of Brest-Litovsk over the opposition of the Independent Socialists and the abstention of the Majority Socialists, the step seemed to confirm von Gerlach's prediction that the new Reichstag adherents to the internationalist cause would prove unreliable.58 Within the parliament the Independent Socialist Georg Ledebour rose to condemn the treaty as a violation or a disregard of the Peace Resolution by the very men who had proposed it.59 At its April meeting, the executive committee of the Peace Society deplored the tendency of politicians to view the Peace Resolution as having been outdated by the military victories in the east, as if the German desire for a peaceful international order sprang from weakness and not from convic-

57 Letter to Monsignor Pacelli from Quidde, Munich, August 25, 1917, in Voelker-Friede, XVII, No. 9 (October, 1917), pp. 12-13; Matthias, Interfraktionelle Ausschuss, I, 123-124. Fried's comment typified pacifist disillusionment over the German reply: "This makes the whole affair illusory. The reply is as cold as marble." Fried, "Kriegstagebuch," Friedens-Warte, XIX, No. 9 (October, 1917), p. 292. On the other hand, Erzberger professed himself satisfied with the German reply, in a speech to the Wuerttemberg Center Party congress, September 23, 1917, printed as Matthias Erzberger, Der Verstaendigungsfriede (Stuttgart: Verlag Deutsches Volksblatt, 1917), pp. 3-5. This booklet also contains the papal note and the German government reply.

58 Comment made at the December 1917 meeting of the Peace Society and the International Law Center, in Voelker-Friede, XVIII, Nos. 1/2 (January/February, 1918), p. 4.

59 Verhandlungen des Reichstags, CCCXI, 4040.
tion. In an effort to keep the majority parties true to their pledges, the International Law Center dispatched a circular to the Reichstag leaders of the Socialist, Progressive, and Center parties, reminding them that their belief in a peace of understanding as consistent with the well-considered interests of the German people should not falter due to a change in the military situation.

Despite this vacillation on the part of some members of the Reichstag majority coalition, the German internationalists were not forced back into the isolated and passive role typical of the early war years. The events and debates of 1917 so polarized German opinion under the banners "peace of understanding" and "peace of annexation" that the internationalist, anti-annexationist viewpoint with its corollary of domestic political reform now occupied a well-defined and defensible position in the arena of German public debate. This resulted in a broader, if less homogeneous, front in support of the major internationalist goals.

The chief organizational form which this front took after July 1917 was the People's League for Freedom and Fatherland (Volksbund fuer Freiheit und Vaterland), founded in November 1917.

60Voelker-Friede, XVIII, No. 5 (May, 1918), p. 55. See also Fried's comments in "Kriegstagebuch," Friedens-Warte, XX, No. 3 (March, 1918), p. 87.

as a direct reply to the pan-German Fatherland Party of Admiral Tirpitz. The People's League, like its annexationist opponent, enrolled both individual and group members. Its adherents subscribed to one basic principle, support for the Reichstag Peace Resolution. World-renowned intellectuals, such as historian Friedrich Meinecke, political economist Lujo Brentano, and sociologists Ernst Troeltsch and Max Weber, held positions on the executive and advisory committees of the People's League, together with Reichstag deputies and trade union leaders. The League program laid particular emphasis on the connection between an outgoing foreign policy and domestic political reform. In this respect, the League, though not associated directly with the pacifist groups, carried on a line of thought common to most German internationalists.

Only a people in whose political system there is room for the responsible cooperation of all classes and elements can be powerful externally. . . . Only the combination of a wise and realistic foreign policy with a popularly-based free political order can form the foundation of a great power. The incorporation of this new Germany into a community of mutually respecting

62 The proceedings of the founding convention of the People's League on November 14, 1917, were printed under the title UM Freiheit und Vaterland (Gotha: Verlag Andreas Perthes, 1918). See also Koppel S. Pinson, Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization (New York: Macmillan, 1954), pp. 334-335. Annelise Thimme, Hans Delbruck als Kritiker der Wilhelmischen Epoche (Duesseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1955), p. 121 lists the total adherents to the People's League as about four million, compared with somewhat over one million for Tirpitz's Fatherland Party. She adds that these figures are not so important as the fact that the Fatherland Party possessed the greater influence with the government. Fischer, Griff nach Weltmacht, p. 560, describes the Fatherland Party as "the incorporation of that massive protest by the German middle class against any concessions on the war aims question. . .and against any importation of western democracy."
nations is one of our main aims.\(^6\)

This acceptance of certain points paralleling the internationalist program did not commit the League to strict pacifist ideals. Christian trade union leader Anton Stegerwald, a co-chairman of the People's League, made this point clear at a public meeting in January 1918. "We are by no means illusionary pacifists, but we oppose establishing the future world order solely on power or on one-sided German dominance, because we see in that an evil for Germany."\(^6\) This realpolitischer Pazifismus, as editor Hans Delbruck called it, was an ethical, and even more a political, reaction against an annexationist pan-Germanism which these men deemed contradictory to German tradition and destructive of true German national interests. In order to counteract this new imperialism the People's League appealed, as it were, from a nation badly informed to a nation better informed. Despite its greater preoccupation with power politics, this approach did not differ substantially from that taken by Quidde in his Real Guarantees and did not exclude a sincere dedication to liberal internationalist principles, as enunciated by Professor Troeltsch. "It is our conviction that without a basic recognition of the moral element, that is, without the responsible participation of the people in the government and a certain international perspective in all our policy, we will never find our way out of

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\(^{63}\) This program, together with the list of officers and committees was printed in Das Neue Deutschland, VI, No. 7 (January, 1918), pp. 195-196.

\(^{64}\) Anton Stegerwald, "Volk und Frieden," in Von Deutscher Volkskraft (Gotha: Verlag Andreas Perthes, 1918), pp. 32.
The People's League was not the only new bearer of the internationalist standard which came into existence in the period after the Reichstag Peace Resolution. In late 1917 a group of Roman Catholic professors, priests, and publicists, inspired by Pope Benedict's peace initiative in August 1917, formed the Commission for Christian International Law to function as a center for German Catholic contributions to the idea of a League of Nations. Some of these same men, together with a number of Center Party politicians including Erzberger, attended the January 1918 meeting of the International Catholic Union in Zurich. This organization had been founded by Germans and Austrians, and, as it still consisted solely of delegates from the Central Powers, its activities were tolerated by the German government. This Zurich conference passed resolutions calling for a renewed development of international law, the summoning of an international congress of Christian labor unions, and the creation of a standing committee to convene at the seat of future peace negoti-

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The previously existing groups also continued their activity. The continuing ferment of ideas within the socialist camp betokened the vitality which internationalism aroused in that quarter. Another international socialist conference convened shortly after passage of the Reichstag Peace Resolution, this time in Stockholm. Although the non-participation of entente socialists again, as at Zimmerwald, prevented any practical effectiveness, the German Independent Socialists used the occasion to issue a manifesto repeating their program of peace without annexations, general disarmament, and international social legislation. They also defined further their view of the relationship between domestic democratization and international order. "Control of foreign policy through the democracy in each state will prevent aggression. . . . The peace treaty will be secured, only if some international force supervises it; we see this force embodied not in an international governmental body, but in the international socialist proletariat."68 If the Independents did not specify how they meant to practice this formula, the more radical Karl Liebknecht suggested that the international class struggle against war might take the form of mass strikes to para-


The Majority Socialists at their national party congress in October 1917 adhered more closely to traditional internationalist terminology and thought, as in their statement: "The people themselves must be the guarantors of coming international treaties, the ever vigilant custodians of the peace." At the same time they explained their own interpretation of the connection between domestic reform and an internationalist foreign policy in much the same fashion as the People's League. They stressed that Germany's lack of democracy caused, at least partially, the hatred and mistrust which other western nations exhibited toward the Reich. The democratization of the domestic political order would not only provide surety for a peaceful Germany, but would also win friends abroad.70

Throughout the fall and winter of 1917-1918 the pacifist organizations continued operating both within Germany and on an international level. In November 1917 Quidde, Schuecking, Erzberger, Bernstein, and Niemeyer travelled to Bern to attend a


conference called by the Central Organization for a Lasting Peace. The theme of the meeting was the formation of international relations after the war.71

The Peace Society and the International Law Center held a joint convention at Erfurt in December 1917, at which they assessed the year's developments and considered plans for the future. This meeting formulated in clear and precise terms the pacifist vision of the post-war world order which they hoped to see established. The pacifists present adopted a resolution, suggested by Quidde, which demanded that "the bases for developing the Hague conferences be directly incorporated into the peace treaty by writing into it the fundamental elements of an international union of nations, with governmental conferences to be supplemented by a permanent administrative bureau and a world parliament."72

Pacifists also concentrated attention on education as a means of winning over youth, and the people in general, to the internationalist cause. On the university level professors like Schuecking and Niemeyer continued to offer lectures and seminars


on international law and related subjects. The internationalist educational effort met greater resistance on lower levels. At their December 1917 convention the Peace Society and the International Law Center voted to petition the individual state parliaments to reform their school systems along pacifist lines. In the spring of 1918 the German Women's Committee for a Lasting Peace drew up plans and a syllabus for a projected nation-wide lecture series on such subjects as the League of Nations and the democratization of the government.

In the course of early 1918 the internationalist members of these German pacifist organizations began to see the need for

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73 A post-war study showed that twenty-two German universities offered a total of some two hundred such courses during the war years, Moritz Liepmann, Die Pflege des Voelkerrechts an den deutschen Universitaeten (Berlin: Verlag Hans Robert Engelmann, 1919), tables in appendix, no numbered pages. The effect of such lectures on one youth was described in a letter to Walter Schuecking from a former student, Werner Hirsch, April, 1919: "I want to tell you how much you moved one young student. ... As we heard from your mouth the noble, humanitarian concepts of international reconciliation, our hearts grew sick with rage at the thought that the monstrous destructive work of the war stood in such sharp contrast to this ideal." Nachlass Schuecking, BAK, No. 94, Verschiedene Vereinigungen 1918-1920, Vol. 1.

74 "Hauptversammlung der Friedensgesellschaft," Voelker-Friede, XVIII, Nos. 1/2 (January/February, 1918), p. 3. An example of governmental opposition was the 1916 decree to school officials in the Prussian district of Frankfurt on the Oder: "In recent months we have been petitioned to use the schools to combat international enmities and to promote reconciliation between nations. No heed is to be paid to such efforts." Erlass des Regierungspraesidenten, Frankfurt/Oder, February, 1916, an seine Kreisschulinspektoren, in BEptStA, M Inn 66132, Friedensbewegung.

75 Letter from Lida Gustava Heymann, Hamburg, July 1918 and Bericht vom Obermilitaerbefehlshaber, Berlin, August 20, 1918, in BKra, Stellvertretendes I. Armeekommando, Nos. 281 and 283/I.
greater and more direct efforts at winning over the country and, if possible, the government, to their policy of a peace of understanding and reconciliation, before it was too late. A pacifist reader could hardly help but agree with the following words of advice printed in the January 1918 issue of Friedens-Warte.

The most important task for pacifism in the immediate future is to leave the classroom and to go out among the people... Pacifism has so far failed to win over the masses, because it has been based too much on pure ideas which do not enthuse the masses. Now we must try to enlist emotions and the popular conscience on our side. This will be all the easier, since the people are emotionally and conscientiously opposed to the war.76

The growing war-weariness of the German population during the winter of 1917-1918 did not necessarily concern itself with internationalist goals, but it could provide the pacifists with a potentially broad and dynamic support for their struggle against annexationist proponents of a victorious peace through military force, since only a peace of understanding promised an immediate end to the fighting. The left-wing revolutionary socialists were quick to grasp the implications and were already appealing to this reservoir of mass sympathy in their clandestine propaganda. To express the core of the argument they coined the

76Adolf Saager, "Der Pazifismus als Massenbewegung," Friedens-Warte, XX, No. 1 (January, 1918), pp. 15-16. Saager, a chemist and independent journalist from Munich, had helped Ostwald found The Bridge in 1911. During the war he emigrated to Switzerland. Kosch, Biographisches Staatshandbuch, p. 1058. For what it is worth, a mid-1917 poll in Hamburg revealed 367 in favor of a peace with annexations, 55 undecided, and 7,182 in favor of a peace of understanding, though not necessarily precluding minor border rectifications—printed without further identification in Voelker-Friede, XVII, No. 7 (August, 1917), p. 10.
succinct slogan: "No peace without revolution." Despite the Marxist overtones and derivation of this motto, it merely sounded an extreme variation on the traditional internationalist theme that the democratization of Germany was a prerequisite for a lasting peace of reconciliation. By 1918 the pressures of war and the logic of their own beliefs were inclining German pacifists of all persuasions toward similar conclusions. Hans Wehberg was describing a common phenomenon, when he wrote, "By mid-1918 I had lost all hope that the German government would develop in a pacifist direction, and, since the pacifist idea must triumph, let it be through revolution if necessary." 

77 Police reports from late 1917 and early 1918 describing this radical propaganda and its distribution among the populace are contained in RHptStA, M Inn 71700, Akten Betreff Politische Umtriebe, Vol. 3, 1855-1918.

78 Wehberg, Pazifist im Weltkrieg, p. 22.
CHAPTER II

INTERNATIONALISM TAKES THE ROAD TO REVOLUTION

By the summer of 1918 the German internationalists were no closer to achieving their goal of a peace of understanding than they had been a year earlier before the Reichstag Peace Resolution. This Reichstag action, together with the founding of the People's League for Freedom and Fatherland and the popular disaffection with the war, created a favorable atmosphere for pacifist propaganda, but at the centers of power, where the vital decisions were made, the military dictatorship remained the controlling factor. Neither the army High Command nor its political supporters showed any signs of being ready to abandon their hopes for a victorious peace with annexations. On the home front, Chancellors Michaelis and Hertling, the successors to Bethmann-Hollweg, managed to stifle political reforms like the abolition of the three-class suffrage in Prussia.

The fate of Foreign Secretary Richard Kuehlmann indicated how far removed the influential forces in Germany stood from any acceptance of the internationalist credo. Kuehlmann had been the chief German diplomat during the negotiations leading to the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. There he had already incurred the displeasure of the High Command for accepting, even if only in principle, Trotsky's formula of "no annexations." Now, in a speech on June 24, 1918, Kuehlmann made the first open admission from the side of the government that perhaps the war could not be
satisfactorily ended by military means alone. The implications of this statement enraged the High Command, which compelled the resignation of this "defeatist." The aging Center Party Chancellor, Count Hertling of Bavaria, hastened to placate the military leaders by disavowing Kuehmann's remarks. The incident could not help but breed further uneasiness among pacifists and internationalist-minded Reichstag majority politicians over the government's apparent retreat from the principles of the Peace Resolution.¹

The Kuehmann dismissal, however, represented one of the last-ditch victories of the annexationists. The military successes on the Russian front in 1917 had encouraged the High Command to try for one final knock-out blow in France in 1918, but initial small gains in March, April and May were won only at excessively high costs and did not achieve the anticipated strategic success. On July 15, two weeks after the Foreign Secretary's resignation, General Ludendorff launched the fifth and final great offensive on the western front calculated to bring victory before the winter. Within three days the German advances in the area of Rheims were halted, and by the end of July French and American troops had forced the German armies to fall back to defensive positions north of the Marne. The military situation

¹There is an excellent brief account of the Kuehmann affair in Rosenberg, Birth of German Republic, pp. 226-229. For the reactions see Theodor Wolff editorial, M., July 9, 1918 (Abend), unsigned editorials in Internationale Korrespondenz, June 25 and 27, 1918, and the reports of committee sessions of July 7 and 9 in Matthias, Interfraktionelle Ausschuss, II, 421-437 and 450, as well as the editorial in Vorwaerts, July 10, 1918.
deteriorated even further with the British surprise assault near Amiens on August 8. By mid-month the civilian cabinet and the military leadership seriously, but in great secrecy, debated the futility of further resistance. Publicly and officially the German government maintained a silence which could be construed as optimism, but any astute observer could realize that the failure of the vaunted western offensives meant Germany could hope at best for a compromise peace.  

1. The Political Offensive: August-September 1918

Against this background of military stalemate, a number of highly-placed German political figures spoke out for a peace of understanding and for post-war international cooperation and reconciliation along lines urged by the German pacifists. The "political offensive," as one contemporary termed it, began with a lecture by Colonial Secretary Wilhelm Solf in Berlin on August 20. This scholarly, non-political administrator enjoyed the reputation of being a moderate liberal. In his address Solf appealed to "the centers of the European conscience" in all lands, and promised German cooperation for any and all efforts to bring

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about a peace of reconciliation.³

Two days later the liberal Prince Max of Baden, heir apparent to the throne of that south German state, celebrated the anniversary of Baden's constitution with a speech comparing the German legal tradition with the "mob rule and lynch justice" of the western democracies. This harsh and seemingly anti-western remark introduced his comment that the German constitutional model might better serve as a guide for a future international organization than the American or British programs. Despite its polemical tone, the Prince's speech represented an attempt to win German support for the League of Nations by depicting the concept in national terms.⁴

In a speech at Stuttgart on September 12, Progressive Party Vice-Chancellor Friedrich Payer reiterated the historic German sympathy for international projects. "The concept of a League of Nations...has long been a common one for us Germans. Courts of arbitration, even international ones, are no novelty for us." More distinctly than Solf or Prince Max, Payer stressed that no peace was possible, unless all sides gave up their demands for

³Solf's speech was printed in BT, August 21, 1918 (Morgen) and commented on in Vorwaerts, August 23. The term "political offensive" came from an unsigned editorial in Deutsche Korrespondenz, September 6, 1918. Earlier on August 1 Bavarian Minister President von Dandl had spoken favorably to the Landtag concerning Wilson's League of Nations, but as this speech received little publicity, it was not reckoned with the three reported here; it was however quoted partially in BT, August 1 (Abend).

⁴For the speech of Prince Max see the August 23 editions of BT, MNN, and VossZ; for comments see Vorwaerts, August 23, and an article by Paul Rohrbach in Deutsche Politik, XXX (August 30, 1918), pp. 1100-1106.
conquests and agreed to accept a restoration of the pre-war status quo. Like the internationalists, Payer argued that the people themselves would come to exert a greater influence on international relations and would demand a conciliatory peace settlement. 5

These well-publicized speeches indicated that the principles of the Reichstag Peace Resolution and the ideals of the internationalists had won, or regained, favor among personalities high in German political life. The reaction from extremists on both the left and the right demonstrated that these declarations lay squarely in the main stream of German internationalist teaching. Count Ernst Reventlow, speaking for the Pan-Germans, claimed to see in Solf's speech the beginning of a concerted attack upon conservative nationalists. The right-wing Deutsche Zeitung branded Payer "a spokesman for out-and-out pacifists" and termed his speech "a national scandal." 6 On the other hand, left-wing Socialists and Spartacists saw nothing remarkably new or internationalist in the remarks of Solf or Prince Max and expressed shock that the German Peace Society could praise them. 7

Most German pacifists did, in fact, respond enthusiastically to these speeches, gratified to hear their long-cherished dreams ratified by leading government figures. Alfred

5 BT, September 13, 1918 (Morgen); Vorwaerts, September 13.

6 Quoted in BT, August 22, 1918 (Morgen) and September 13 (Abend).

7 Unsigned article in Franz Pfemfert's journal, Die Aktion, VIII, Nos. 37/38 (September 21, 1918), pp. 489-490; also quoted in BT, August 28, 1918 (Morgen).
Fried voiced the sentiment of many of his colleagues, when he wrote that the statesmen and politicians were now espousing ideas which the pacifists had preached for years.\(^8\) This verdict, although true, did not do full justice to the impact which these speeches made on the German public mind. However much they might appear to pacifists as repetitions of their traditional internationalist doctrine, for the general public these outspoken affirmations of German willingness to support the league concept cleared the air for untrammelled discussion of this topic. From this time on the League of Nations became the touchstone for internationalist debate of major foreign policy issues. Moreover, the image of President Wilson now began to become associated closely with the League of Nations in German minds. Books and articles appeared discussing the Wilsonian "fourteen points," especially as they constituted a plan for a world organization.\(^9\)

In the guise of the League of Nations the internationalist ideal caught the imagination of a broad spectrum of German politicians, writers, and thinkers. Specifically German contributions to this theme rapidly appeared.

The first German treatment of a post-war association of nations came from the pen of Walter Schuecking. With his legal


\(^9\)Wilson enunciated his fourteen points in his message to Congress, January 8, 1918. Probably the first German book to appear on the subject was Moritz J. Bonn, \textit{Was will Wilson?} (Munich: Verlag Georg Mueller, 1918), which came out in late summer 1918. A number of articles on the league idea by the Bavarian aristocrat and pacifist, Count Max Montgelas, were printed in \textit{BT}, September 1, 1918 (Morgen) and September 29 (Morgen).
background and his long-time interest in international organization, the Marburg professor was ideally suited to summarize two decades of German pacifist thought in an important analysis of the league concept. The book, entitled *International Legal Guarantees*, expanded Schuecking's favorite notion of a continuation of the Hague conferences. He now proposed regular conferences among the nations, to be supplemented by a standing court of arbitration and a permanent bureau of mediation. The purpose of this association, as envisioned by Schuecking, included much more than the peaceable settlement of international grievances. In order to avert frictions that might lead to war, the member states were to practice certain basic principles, such as freedom of the seas, abolition of traditional alliance systems, and the parliamentary control of foreign policy. To these standard liberal and pacifist demands Schuecking added the proviso that each state must discourage, and possibly prohibit, all printed and spoken insults against other nations.10

This wide-ranging book projected the thinking of a generation of German pacifists into the post-war world, but its immediate reception in September 1918 was overshadowed by the almost simultaneous appearance of a treatise by Matthias Erzberger, *The

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10Walter Schuecking, *Internationale Rechtsgarantien: Ausbau und Sicherung der zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen* (Hamburg: Verlag Broschik, 1918). The only contemporary reviews I found were a sharply critical leftist attack in *Die Aktion*, VIII, Nos. 37/38 (September 21, 1918), p. 486, and a favorable commentary in *BT*, September 5, 1918 (Morgen). There was also an advertisement for Schuecking's book on the back cover of O. P. Trautmann, *Der Voelkerbund* (Berlin: Verlag der Grenzboten, 1918).
League of Nations: The Path to World Peace. A book written by this controversial public figure so closely associated with the Reichstag Peace Resolution was bound to attract considerable attention. Erzberger's study, although more urgently polemical, agreed substantially with Schuecking's work in emphasizing the necessity for establishing a world organization which could impose disarmament and compulsory arbitration. Aware of imperial Germany's hostility to these and similar international arrangements, Erzberger drew upon the research of his friend August Hommerich to demonstrate that the principle of arbitration enjoyed a venerable Germanic tradition. Like Schuecking, the Center Party leader urged freedom of the seas as one prerequisite for the success of a League of Nations. He also condemned, more specifically than had the pacifist academician, the competing notion of a restricted European League of Nations. Erzberger became the first prominent German politician to write unequivocally and in detail in favor of a League of Nations along Wilsonian lines.11

Both Erzberger's and Schuecking's proposals aimed at creating a comprehensive legal and political organization of nations in accord with traditional pacifist thinking. In addition they both raised the economic questions involved in a peaceful post-war settlement. Internationalist thought, in so far as it had

11Matthias Erzberger, Der Voelkerbund: Der Weg zum Weltfrieden (Berlin: Verlag Reimar Hobbing, 1918). See also Hommerich, Deutschum und Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, and Epstein, Erzberger, pp. 250-255. Erzberger's book was reviewed in Vorwaerts, September 22, 1918; in BT, October 10 (Morgen); in Deutsche Korrespondenz, October 11; and in Voelker-Friede, XVIII, No. 12 (December, 1918), pp. 117-118.
ever concerned itself with this topic, had usually drawn on the free-trade doctrine of the nineteenth-century liberals. Now both Schuecking and Erzberger feared that even a free-trade reform might not do away with all possibilities of economic warfare, and they ventured a bit farther to argue that the League of Nations should intervene directly, for example by arranging a systematic world-wide distribution of all raw materials needed by the industrial nations.12

Lujo Brentano, the perennial advocate of free trade, also saw in the League of Nations a means for eliminating the economic causes of war through its adoption and enforcement of an anti-tariff policy. The Munich professor also broached new territory with his suggestion of agreements among the great powers for the joint exploitation and development of the backward regions of the world. This type of international cooperation, he felt, would sublimate colonial rivalries and thereby banish another irritant from the diplomatic scene.13

Already in the fall of 1918 other proposals appeared which pushed the social and economic interpretation of a League of


13 Lujo Brentano, Der geplante Volkerfriedensbund als Mittel zum Ausgleich wirtschaftlicher Gegensatze (Berlin: Liebheit and Tiesen, 1918). Walther Rathenau agreed with Brentano on the harmfulness of protective tariffs for good international relations, letter of Rathenau to Professor Dr. Lujo Brentano, October 11, 1918, in Walther Rathenau, Briefe (2 vols.; Dresden: Carl Reissner Verlag, 1926), II, 66. Socialists tended to play down the importance of free trade as a factor for world peace, see the review of Brentano's brochure Ist das System Brentano Zusammengebrochen? in Vorwaerts, August 25, 1918.
Nations even more into the foreground. Professor Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy of Wuerzburg put forward one such plan. Expanding on Brentano's vision of cooperative international efforts, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy sought to convert the League from a purely political or legal alliance into a "community of labor" (Arbeitsgemeinschaft), in which the countries would vie with one another only in employing their national talents in works benefitting all humanity. His essay revealed an acute mistrust of politicians and governmental bureaucrats, whom he wished to replace with professional experts and technicians as more suited to wield power and make decisions in a cooperative international society.14

The economic aspect of international organization also fascinated the industrialist and thinker Walther Rathenau. He criticized the "wide-spread opinion that a future comprehensive policy will be possible through courts of arbitration or other such institutions," adding, "It is not the activity of judges that we need, but the functioning of economic syndicates." In a pamphlet addressed To Germany's Youth, Rathenau called for "an economic federation, a common economy Ein Wirtschaftsbund, eine Gemeinwirtschaft" for the world. A central administration would handle international financing and the allocation of both raw

14Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Der Voelkerbund als Arbeitsgemeinschaft (Leipzig: Der Neue Geist Verlag, 1918). The book was a reprint of a speech by the Professor in Munich, October 28, 1918.
materials and finished industrial products.\textsuperscript{15}

Although a man like Rathenau stressed economic institutions more than the legal structures of the proposed League of Nations, he agreed with most German internationalists in seeing this League as a world-wide organization. But even at this early date, when the league idea still seemed far from realization, a number of publicists began to champion the cause of a continental association in preference to the international organization suggested by Wilson and most German pacifists. The two organs which most vigorously propagated this viewpoint were the \textit{Sozialistische Monatshefte}, journal of the right-wing Majority Socialists, and the \textit{Vossische Zeitung}, a liberal Berlin newspaper. Ostensibly these writers felt that it was impractical to proceed at once to a world association of nations without first unifying the separate regions of the globe. With allusions to the existing Pan-American Union and to the British Empire, they argued for a United States of Europe as a step to overcome the Franco-German antagonism. Their writings, however, left no doubt that the motive animating this suggestion included the fear of a threatened Anglo-American economic hegemony over Europe as well as cultural resent-

\textsuperscript{15}Letter of Rathenau to Professor Dr. Victor Riecke, November 6, 1918 in Rathenau, \textit{Briefe}, II, 74; Walther Rathenau, \textit{An Deutschlands Jugend} (Berlin: S. Fischer Verlag, 1918), pp. 86-87. See also Count Harry Kessler, \textit{Walther Rathenau: His Life and Work}, trans. W. B. Robson Scott and Lawrence Hyde (London: Gerald Howe Ltd., 1929), pp. 221, 253-255.
ment against the "anglo-saxon" world. 16

This continentalist alternative to a world-wide League of Nations would reappear after the November revolution and remain alive for years, eventually merging into movements for European unity. From the beginning it encountered considerable opposition from German pacifists and from most internationalist-minded politicians. To the pacifists the scheme appeared reprehensible for raising the specter of future power-bloc rivalries, which might lead to major wars between the various regional leagues. Others found the anti-British and anti-American tone displeasing. Realists pointed out that the continentalists ignored the very real involvement of the United States and Great Britain in European affairs, as well as the rising importance of America for post-war European economic recovery. Perhaps most important, the pacifists believed that the war, at least as a world war, had sprung essentially from Anglo-German misunderstandings and jealousies, and that therefore this wound must be healed, if a lasting peace was to prevail. The main stream of internationalist thought remained true to the concept of a world-wide League of Nations, and, though not rejecting out of hand all efforts for more restricted cooperation among European nations, it continued to see in the project

of the continental league at best a will-of-the-wisp and at worst a reversion to the very power diplomacy which the pacifists were trying to eliminate.\textsuperscript{17}

By September 1918, then, the German internationalists had delineated many of the principle outlines of a League of Nations and had faced up to its economic ramifications, even though the legal aspects continued to attract most of their attention. Creation of the League, however, depended on the achievement of a peace of understanding and reconciliation, and this in turn, so the pacifists claimed, required the installation in Berlin of a responsible parliamentary ministry dedicated to the principles of the 1917 Peace Resolution. There were those in the extreme left-wing socialist camp who regarded revolution as the only means to this end, and, as we have seen, certain pacifists were by this time inclined to accept such a conclusion as inevitable. Suddenly, however, at the end of September 1918, they found this condition fulfilled, not through popular revolution or as a result of parliamentary initiative, but as a gift bestowed by a panicky army High Command finally despairing of armed victory.

2. The Interregnum: October 1918

On September 29 the Emperor and his military commanders met in special council at the imperial war headquarters in Spa. Chancellor Hartling arrived from Berlin to hear both Ludendorff and Hindenburg declare that a German defeat was now inevitable and only a matter of time. The collapse of the Bulgarian front and the impending capitulation of Austria-Hungary exposed the Reich to invasion from the south-east, even if the western front should hold firm. Ludendorff demanded an immediate request for an armistice. Furthermore, in order to ease the shock which German public opinion would suffer at hearing of imminent defeat, he insisted on constitutional reforms to modify the semi-autocratic regime and to introduce parliamentary control of the government. Hartling resigned, and on October 1 the Emperor entrusted the chancellorship to Prince Max of Baden, known for his liberal and internationalist beliefs. On October 4 the new Chancellor made known the composition of his new government, which included members of the parties supporting the Reichstag Peace Resolution, namely, the Center, the Progressives, and the Majority Socialists.18

Since the new government was charged with the task of arranging an immediate armistice through the mediation of President Wilson, its loyalty to the internationalist program would now more than ever determine its effectiveness. The platform which

18Halperin, Germany Tried, pp. 53-61.
the majority coalition drew up as the basis for their policy included firm adherence to the Reichstag Peace Resolution, an open declaration of willingness to join a league of free and equal nations, and the determination to eliminate all military influence over the civilian government.19 The Chancellor declared his unswerving allegiance to internationalist principles in his opening speech to the Reichstag on October 5. "What I seek is a lasting, honorable peace for all mankind. I believe that such a peace will also safeguard the future well-being of our own fatherland. In this respect I see no distinction between the imperatives of national and international duty."20

As an indication that these statements were not mere facades, the cabinet refused to admit the annexationist National Liberal party into the government, although that party had recently proclaimed its support, somewhat belatedly, for domestic political reform and for a League of Nations.21 Another sign of the new course came with the appointment of Colonial Secretary Wilhelm

19 "Das Program der Mehrheitsparteien," BT, October 5, 1918 (Morgen).

20 Printed in BT, October 6, 1918 (Morgen). For background on this speech see Prinz Max von Baden, Erinnerungen und Dokumente (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1927), pp. 364-369, and Halperin, Germany Tried, p. 62.

21 Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey (eds.), Die Regierung des Prinzen Max von Baden (Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1962), p. 56. The new program of the National Liberals, adopted September 28, was printed in BT, September 29 (Morgen).
Self as new foreign minister. More positively, the new ministry proceeded to translate into reality the internationalist program, according to which parliamentary control of foreign policy would help obtain a favorable peace and win the confidence of the entente democracies. So little disguised was the connection between constitutional reform and the pre-armistice negotiations that the Chancellor and his supporters at times had to defend themselves against the charge that Wilson was dictating the shape of the new Germany. In reality, both the abolition of the three-class Prussian suffrage and the constitutional amendment making the Reichstag's consent necessary for declarations of war had long been demands of the Progressive and Socialist parties. Now the cabinet of Prince Max used these constitutional reforms as proof to President Wilson that the power over war and peace had been transferred from a militaristic oligarchy to the elected representatives of the German people.

On the domestic scene the new government sought to demonstrate its break with the nationalistic and militaristic past by adopting a new attitude toward pacifist organizations. A series of incidents in this connection aroused public opinion and pro-

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22 The majority parties demanded that the Foreign Minister be "a diplomat who by reason of his war-time activity does not stand in the way of peace" and "who had not already declared himself against the Peace Resolution." Matthias and Morsey, Regierung des Prinzen Max, pp. 17, 26, 58, 76, 80; Max von Baden, Erinnerungen, p. 255; "Die Situation," BT, October 5 (Morgen).

23 Theodor Wolff editorial, BT, October 25, 1918 (Morgen).

24 Halperin, Germany Tried, p. 63; Matthias and Morsey, Regierung des Prinzen Max, pp. 50-55; Theodor Wolff editorial, BT, October 16 (Morgen); speech by Maximilian Harden, printed in BT, October 21 (Morgen).
vided the government of Prince Max with opportunities to prove the internationalism which it claimed to profess.

The first such episode, actually a holdover from the final days of the Hertling regime, concerned a war Ministry decree of July 1918. This confidential order, which in September fell by chance into the hands of the German Peace Society, authorized military commanders to prohibit speeches and assemblies in favor of a peace of understanding, describing these activities as "undesirable propaganda for international pacifism." The cabinet of Prince Max, when it became aware of this document, agreed with the Peace Society that the Chancellor must take steps to counter military machinations against the stated policy of the government.²⁵

The publicity attending the October 5 request for an armistice diverted attention from this contretemps, but a few days later the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung stirred up pacifist suspicion anew by publishing a letter written by Prince Max in January 1918. In this private communication to Alexander von Hohenlohe, a German aristocratic pacifist residing in Switzerland, Prince Max had criticized the pacifists and spoken scornfully of that very Reichstag Peace Resolution which now served as the program for his ministry. While conservatives and Pan-Germans rejoiced at the ensuing embarrassment, socialists were

²⁵Letter of German Peace Society and International Law Center to Chancellor Hertling, September 17, 1918, in Taetigkeit Qudde, BAk, pp. 11-13. Matthias and Morsey, Regierung des Prinzen Max, p. 9. The decree was printed in BT, September 26, 1918 (Abend).
shocked into demanding the Chancellor's resignation. Cooler heads soon prevailed with the argument that another change of governments would likely prove more ruinous to pre-armistice negotiations than a ten-month old letter. 26

Pacifist good-will toward the Prince Max government soon endured an even more severe test. On October 23, the Berlin police, acting under the terms of the above-mentioned War Ministry decree, forcibly dissolved a Peace Society meeting. The anger and scepticism of the pacifist participants in the face of this inexplicable government action expressed themselves in protesting shouts of "So this is the new course!" and "The days for violence are over." The following morning in the cabinet meeting Erzberger raised sharp objections to this arbitrary and damaging action. In an official apology to the Reichstag, Interior Minister Karl Trimborn announced the lifting of the offending military decree and proclaimed explicit governmental approval of future Peace Society gatherings. On October 28 the government annulled all prohibitions against individual or group pacifist activity. 27

In view of the new government's evident sympathy for the goals of internationalism, it seemed obvious to most German paci-

26 Fz, October 9 (Abend), October 14 (Abend), and October 15 (Morgen); Theodor Wolff editorial, BT, October 14 (Morgen); Matthias and Morsey, Regierung des Prinzen Max, pp. 136-137, 171-174; Prince Max, Erinnerungen, p. 398.

27 Fz, October 24 (Abend); Matthias and Morsey, Regierung des Prinzen Max, pp. 320-324; Verhandlungen des Reichstags, CCCXIV, 6219. The dispatches lifting pacifist prohibitions can be found in BHptStA, M Inn 66132, Friedensbewegung.
fists that the Prince Max cabinet ought to formulate a clear German proposal for a League of Nations. Already in September, in the final month of the Hertling chancellorship, the major pacifist organizations and certain internationalist-minded members of the Reichstag majority parties had pressed the Berlin government for an official statement. In October the new cabinet learned that the Foreign Office had actually been working on such a project for months. Under the general supervision of Dr. Johannes Kriege, head of the Legal Section, a memorandum had been drawn up as early as the spring of 1918, which detailed most of the components of an international organization.28

Since this Foreign Office draft was not published and therefore had no value as a sign of German intentions, other private associations and individuals saw themselves compelled to step in and make up for the government's inactivity. One group which decided to take the initiative was the German Society for International Law, founded in mid-1917 by Professor Theodor Niemeyer of Kiel. At the Society's meeting on September 19, 1918 the members voted to set up a study commission for the purpose of examining the league of nations idea. Two days later this group agreed to expand into a general study commission which would include both professors and politicians, such as Erzberger, whose

28Matthias and Morsey, Regierung des Prinzen Max, pp. 87, 92, 99; BT, October 8, 1918 (Morgen). Ernst Jasekh tells us that in early 1918 he pressed the Foreign Office for greater efforts to draft a model League charter, whereupon Kriege showed him a secret file containing the completed work, Ernst Jasekh, Der Goldene Pflug: Lebensernte eines Weltbuergers (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1954), pp. 349-350.
book on the League had just appeared. The installation of Prince Max as Chancellor and the request for a Wilsonian armistice induced the commission to speed up its work on a draft league charter. It divided up the subject matter into ten separate topics, which it distributed among ten committees: organization and competence of the League; compulsory arbitration and mediation; limitation of armaments; freedom of commerce and other economic questions; colonies; powers of the executive against refractory members; relationships among the states within the League; national self-determination and the rights of national minorities; international social policy; and laws to curb nationalistic hate campaigns in the press. Staffing these committees were internationalist-minded educators (Niemeyer, Schuecking, Quidde, Wehberg) and majority party politicians (Gothein, Erzberger, Suedekum). In January 1919 the Society approved and printed the final draft charter for a League of Nations, which it then submitted to the government for use as Germany's contribution to the Paris peace conference.  

Meanwhile, on October 8 another group, one with more direct connections to the government, gathered under the sponsorship of Majority Socialist Gustav Bauer, Minister of Labor in the Prince

\[29\] Accounts of the September meeting may be found in *BT*, September 20, 1918 (Morgen); *Voelker-Friede*, XVIII, No. 11 (November, 1918), p. 105; and Theodor Niemeyer, Der Voelkerbundsentwurf der Deutschen Gesellschaft fuer Voelkerrecht (Berlin: Verlag Hans Robert Engelmann, 1919), pp. 114-15. For the later developments, see *BT*, October 28, 1918 (Morgen); *Voelker-Friede*, XVIII, No. 12 (December, 1918), pp. 118-119; Niemeyer, *Voelkerbundsentwurf*, pp. 15-16; and Jaseckh, *Voelkerbundgedanke*, pp. 44-45.
Max cabinet. In addition to Progressive and Socialist Reichstag deputies, those in attendance included trade-union figures and a scattering of internationalist intellectuals. Unlike the Society for International Law, this informal group did not propose to draw up its own plan for a League. Instead it made its chief aim the attempt "to spread the idea of the League of Nations as widely as possible among the masses by persistent and comprehensive propaganda in speeches and writing.\textsuperscript{30}

A small "scientific committee" was appointed by the group to carry out this work. Under the chairmanship of Professor Hugo Preuss of Berlin, this committee, which included Progressive deputy Georg Goethein and Walter Schuecking, assumed the job of composing and publishing pamphlets on questions concerning the League. Preuss' committee also cooperated with the People's League for Freedom and Fatherland in staging a public rally on October 27 in Berlin under the motto "The League of Nations and the Peace." An overflow crowd filled the halls of the Berlin Handelshochschule to hear Progressive politician and former Colonial Minister Bernhard Dernburg emphasize the need for anchoring the proposed international community of nations in the consciousness of free, responsible, democratic institutions at home. Following his address four other speakers from the Reichstag joined in sponsoring a resolution.

The People's League, with its four million members...\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{30}Letter to Walter Schuecking from Professor Dr. Hugo Preuss, October 11, 1918 in Nachlass Schuecking, BAK, Schriftwechsel und Berichte, Vol. 1, Vorarbeiten und Entwuerfe, 1917-1918.
renews its allegiance to the principle of incorporating a new Germany into a community of mutually respecting nations. It sees the way to this goal in the creation of a League of Nations such as the imperial government and the Reichstag majority have suggested in line with the recommendations of President Wilson. . . . An absolute prerequisite for this League of Nations is the conclusion of the war with a just peace which will grant Germany and all other states their national honor and the right of free development. 31

Even at this stage in the development of the league idea, with the outlook for the post-war period still most uncertain, a general optimism pervaded most of the speeches and articles by league supporters. Some of this optimism reflected a belief in the apparently inevitable triumph of their cause, as when Progressive leader Friedrich Naumann wrote, "We must somehow come to terms with the League of Nations, since it is undoubtedly an idea on the march and will come either with us or against us." 32 Dernburg, speaking at the October 27 rally of the People's League, put it this way: "The league movement cannot now simply vanish, because in it morality and expediency are joined." 33 On the other hand, Naumann himself cautioned against excessive optimism. More aware, perhaps, of the irrational forces that guided policy in Germany and in all countries, he warned that "there exist many other things besides utility in the hearts and minds of men,

31 Letter of Preuss to Schuecking, October 14, 1918, BAK. A detailed report of the meeting appeared in BE, October 28, 1918 (Morgen). The proceedings were also printed and published by the People's League in booklet form as Voelkerbund und Frieden (Gotha: Verlag Andres Perthes, 1919).

32 Friedrich Naumann, "Voelkerbund," Hilfe, October 17, 1918. See also Naumann's speech in the Reichstag, October 25, in Verhandlungen des Reichstags, CCCXIV, 6172.

33 In Voelkerbund und Frieden, p. 12.
namely subterranean tendencies, latent hatreds, deep natural urges."34

Reactionary symptoms within Germany gave strength to Naumann's admonition. The government of Prince Max, it is true, stood officially on the side of the internationalists, but this did not guarantee that the nation as a whole backed the government and its new foreign and domestic policies one hundred percent. The democratization of Germany, the negotiations with Wilson, and the plans for a League of Nations, enjoyed by no means unanimous support. On October 6 the Agrarian League issued its own verdict on recent events. "Instead of concentrating on strengthening the German people, our democracy has used this period of national emergency to pursue its own goals and has thereby weakened Germany at home and on the front lines."35 The central committee of the Free Conservative party published a declaration lashing out at its domestic opponents and calling for "the mailed fist" against the entente.36 Clearly these conservative nationalists were either ignorant or contemptuous of the desperate military situation which had led the High Command and the government to seek an armistice and to undertake the so-called "revolution from above."

Already by October 12 these right-wing statements had aroused socialist fears of a conservative coup against the govern-

34Naumann, "Voelkerbund," Hilfe, October 17, 1918.
35Quoted in BT, October 6, 1918 (Morgen).
36Quoted in BT, October 7 (Morgen); see also "Vaterlandspartei und Reichskanzler," BT, October 15 (Morgen).
ment. The Majority Socialist newspaper Vorwaerts hinted at a conspiracy to establish a dictatorship pledged to continue the war. A socialist appeal to the country on October 18 spoke ominously of "the dark forces of counter-revolution." Scattered incidents, in which schools spread propaganda against the new policy of international understanding, provided further evidence of nationalist efforts to sabotage the government's policy. Internationalists urged greater concentration on disseminating public information, and especially on the proper education of youth as a prerequisite for a pacifist and democratic Germany. 37

The government recognized this conflict of opinions within the country, and in an address to the Reichstag on October 22 the Chancellor attempted to combat some of the prevalent misunderstandings over the course the government had taken since October 5. Referring to the clash between advocates of a peace of reconciliation and supporters of a peace through conquest, Prince Max conceded that this ideological conflict still divided Germans, although the government had definitely chosen the path of international justice and cooperation.

The German people have the right to know what the acceptance of a Wilsonian peace will mean for them. Many charge that it will mean Germany's subjection before an enemy tribunal, but the heart of Wilson's program is the League of Nations, which can only come into existence, if all nations rise above them-

37Vorwaerts, October 12, 1918; "Aufruf des Vorstandes der Sozialdemokratischen Partei an Deutschlands Maenner und Frauen," Vorwaerts, October 18; "Reaktionaere Klagen," BT, October 13 (Morgen); "Die Vergiftung der Jugendseele," Vorwaerts, August 17, 1918; additional shorter notices in BT, October 14 (Abend), and Vorwaerts, October 27.
selves. The realization of this legal community demands the surrender of a portion of our absolute self-sufficiency. It is of decisive importance for the future of Germany in what spirit we pursue this necessary development. . . . But of this there can be no doubt, we shall measure up to the tasks of war and peace, only by fulfillment of the new governmental program and by a decisive break with the old system. 38

3. The Road to Revolution

Ironically it was not the advocates of continued war or the nationalistic supporters of the old system who really threatened and in the end overturned the moderate government of Prince Max of Baden. The November revolutions in Germany stemmed rather from those elements who found the new parliamentary-supported cabinet not radical or decisive enough. They comprised both those who suspected the sincerity of the new government's adherence to democracy and internationalism, and those whose aims went much farther than mere political reform or legal pacifism.

In the first group were some of the German pacifists. Alfred Fried, for example, accurately prophesied in early October the course which events were to take a month later, and also voiced some of the sentiment animating the changes. "I do not consider this democracy [I.e. Prince Max's government] as genuine. . . . In a few weeks a new ministry will come, a guaranteed and real democracy, which will govern Germany on completely new principles. . . and be strong enough to speak the truth and bring

38 Verhandlungen des Reichstags, CCXIV, 6156-6157.
Examples of other efforts by the government to enlighten the public concerning the new foreign policy may be found in BIIptStA, M Inn 66332, Akten Betreff Krieg 1914/18: Stimmung in der Armee und in der Heimat.
The increased radicalism also showed up in the New Fatherland Club, when that organization reconstituted itself in October 1918. Kurt von Tepper-Laski sounded the new militancy in a speech entitled "Militarism, Capitalism, and Monarchy: The Three Powers which we Oppose." The attraction which these pacifists now found in socialism echoed in the Club's call for a national constituent assembly and for a "democratic socialism" as the necessary foundation for a peaceful world order. "Only a socialist society can save mankind from a relapse into barbarism. . . . Through democracy to socialism! Long live the democratic international of the world!"\(^{40}\)

The pacifists were, of course, neither numerous nor well-organized enough to lead a popular revolution, even had they been so inclined. In fact, the majority of them did not feel so inclined. Most still hoped to be able to realize their internationalist goals under the aegis of the Prince Max government, and if their dissatisfaction prompted talk of radical aims or of socialism, this remained talk.

Others, however, were preparing to take action. The Independent Socialists and the followers of Karl Liebknecht, the Spartacists, found in the confusion and uncertainties of the October days a perfect opportunity to press forward with their


\(^{40}\)Lehmann-Russbueldt, Kampf fuer Weltfrieden, pp. 79-80; BT, October 22, 1918 (Abend); Mitteilungen, Bund Neues Vaterland, new series, No. 1, Revolutionsnummer (November, 1918), pp. 3-6.
own particular domestic and foreign policy ideas. The Spartacists flatly rejected the League of Nations as "an organization of global bourgeois dominance for the purpose of dividing up profits." In its place they preferred a solid proletarian front, in which a German soviet republic would ally itself with Lenin's Russian regime.⁴¹

The Independent Socialists, on the other hand, offered alternative proposals to the government's policy and confined their criticism to specifics. In more measured terms they demanded that the government set up courts to try those Germans guilty of starting and prolonging the war. They also sought more vigorous measures against "capitalist profiteers" who reaped personal advantage from the war. In their statement of the internationalist ideal the Independents were also more moderate than the Spartacists, for they did not reject a League of Nations altogether, but rather urged an extension of the Wilsonian plan into a true League of peoples, not just of governments. Where the Independents agreed with the Spartacists was in their accusation that the Prince Max government, despite the participation of Majority Socialists, was more interested in preserving German society intact and in defending German military honor than in securing social democracy, world peace, and international understanding. In the eyes of the Independents, the government lacked the insight, the imagination, and the determination to be success-

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In early November, with the further collapse of the military situation, these accusations of the Independents turned to threats. The trend came to a head first in Bavaria. On November 3 the Austrian empire surrendered unconditionally, leaving the Reich, and especially Bavaria, exposed to invasion. This was an ideal situation for the Independents to capitalize on their slogan "No Peace Without Revolution." Leadership of the Independent Socialists in Munich was in the hands of Kurt Eisner, a visionary intellectual and publicist, originally from Berlin. Eisner had been associated with the New Fatherland Club in 1914. In November 1918 he had just been released from a prison term imposed for anti-war activities.

On November 4, 1918 a mass demonstration crowded onto the Theresienwiese in Munich. Eisner and his pacifist friend, Professor Edgar Jaffe, harangued the crowd with calls for immediate peace under any circumstances. The meeting concluded with the resolution: "Should the central government not find the courage for this step, then the people should set up a new government, which in the name of all of Germany shall conclude peace between the nations." 43

The mood of crisis deepened in the following days, and

42 "Aufruf der Parteileitung und Reichstagsfraktion der U. S. P. D., 5. Oktober 1918," BT, October 10 (Abend); Reichstag speeches of the Independents Ledebour, Cohn, and Bernstein later in October, in Verhandlungen des Reichstags, CCCXIV, 6234-6236, 6268-6269, 6294-6295.

43 Reported in BT, November 5, 1918 (Morgen).
tensions increased as Emperor William delayed a decision on the
abdication question. On November 7, in mid-afternoon, another
demonstration gathered in the Bavarian capital with an even more
urgent appeal expressed in markedly internationalist terms.

The German people acknowledges its oneness with all the
peoples of Europe and joins them in the desire to se­
cure the peace of the world through a general federation
based on justice and freedom. The German people awaits
with confidence the fulfillment of President Wilson's
world peace plan.44

That same night a group of insurgents led by the Indepen­
dent Socialists overthrew the Wittelsbach dynasty and declared
Bavaria a Free State. The new socialist government was to be a
Council of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants, headed by Kurt Eisner
as Premier and Foreign Minister. From the beginning Eisner made
it clear that his domestic revolution had distinct international
implications. In his first message to the Bavarian people he ex­
plained the reasons for overthrowing the old government and pro­
mised that the new Free State of Bavaria would enjoy great world
significance. "Bavaria will prepare Germany for the League of
Nations. The democratic social republic of Bavaria possesses the
moral energy to gain for Germany a peace which will spare us much
evil."45

Eisner's hope was that a Bavarian government, led by a
notorious opponent of Prussian militarism, would be able to win
the confidence of President Wilson and of other western statesmen.

44Printed in NNN, November 8 (Abend).

45"Aufruf aus der Nacht zum 8. November 1918," in Kurt
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and persuade them to grant Germany more lenient peace terms. As a believer in the benevolent intervention of the socialist International, Eisner also appealed to sympathetic party comrades in all the entente and neutral countries to regard the creation of a socialist Bavarian republic as a warrant of Germany's change of heart.46

The Bavarian revolution opened the floodgate of revolution which within three days brought down the imperial government in Berlin and the local monarchies everywhere in Germany. Of more importance for this paper, Eisner was also carrying out one thesis of internationalist doctrine to its historically logical conclusion. In August 1914 Kurt von Tepper-Laski of the New Fatherland Club had warned: "After this war we shall have to have a revolution to make sure that such a war never again occurs." Four years and two months later these words found fulfillment in Eisner's boast that his Bavarian revolution was the first step toward the creation of a peaceful post-war world. It had long been a tenet of internationalism that foreign policy was rooted in domestic politics and that a responsible parliamentary democracy in Germany was a prerequisite for world peace. Under the stress of the war, German pacifists and socialists came to see the implications of this belief, namely that the democratiza-

tion of Germany must eliminate from power the militarists and imperialists and thereby regain for Germany the international confidence on which alone a post-war League of Nations could be built. Eisner simply translated this theoretical belief into action in the form of revolution. The academic and legal internationalists might themselves never have resorted to force against the government of Prince Max, but as of November 8, German internationalism found itself allied, for better or for worse, with the cause of the socialist revolution.
CHAPTER III

A TIME OF EXPERIMENT AND ADJUSTMENT:
NOVEMBER 1918–JANUARY 1919

The second weekend of November 1918 brought Germany both the conclusion of the World War and the collapse of the monarchical system. On November 3, a naval mutiny in the imperial fleet at Kiel led to the creation of a workers' and soldiers' council in that port city. From there the revolution spread through north Germany. The deposition of the Wittelsbachs by Kurt Eisner, and Emperor William's refusal to abdicate heightened the revolutionary tensions in Berlin, where the Independent Socialists and the Spartacists controlled a considerable following among the working classes. On November 9, Prince Max of Baden, acting on his own initiative, announced the abdication of the Emperor and yielded his office as Imperial Chancellor to the Majority Socialist leader, Friedrich Ebert. That afternoon, in an effort to head off a Spartacist coup by Karl Liebknecht, Ebert's assistant, Philip Scheidemann, stepped to the outer balcony of the Reichstag building and proclaimed the German republic. This change of regimes in Berlin complicated the work of the German armistice team in France, but on the morning of November 11, in the forest of Compiegne, Matthias Erzberger, acting on instructions from the Ebert government, signed the terms of surrender.¹

These two events, the revolution and the military defeat,

¹Halperin, Germany Tried, pp. 79-104; Rosenberg, Birth of Republic, pp. 270-274.
determined the fate of German internationalism for the following ten months. The victory of the Entente, the overthrow of the Prince Max government, and the destruction of the monarchy had not been among traditional internationalist demands or expectations. On the other hand, the failure of Prussian militarism and the removal of Hohenzollern rule did clear away obstacles to the realization of internationalist hopes. Moreover, the accession to power of the socialists and the triumph of a western alliance at least nominally under President Wilson's leadership promised to place decisive control in the hands of sympathetic friends.

This ten-week period after the socialist revolution was for the internationalists a time of considerable confusion, in which they had to cope with new situations and new forces. The Majority and Independent Socialists who exercised governmental power in Berlin and in the local state capitals held internationalist views, even if with a slightly different character than that of the academic pacifists. The German internationalists could, therefore, be justifiably optimistic, since the new republic seemed definitely aligned on their side. Moreover, the massive yearning for peace which had provided much of the revolutionary dynamic might well prove susceptible of an internationalist interpretation.

1. The Uses of Internationalism

Both the provisional government in Berlin under Friedrich Ebert and the local socialist regimes, notably Kurt Eisner's in Munich, took similar paths in adopting internationalist terminolo-
In order to dramatize the condition in which Germany found itself after the revolution and the armistice. In Berlin, the Spartacists, at the very outset, even sought to outbid the new Ebert government with a summons to a soviet republic based solely on the workers' and soldiers' councils and allied with Lenin's Russia. Karl Liebknecht orated enthusiastically for a world revolution, as he appealed to the vision of "proletarian internationalism." But the Berlin Workers' and Soldiers' Council, the controlling factor in the revolutionary capital, supported not Liebknecht, but the Council of People's Representatives, which included both Majority and Independent Socialists. Against the Spartacist vision of a soviet republic the Council of People's Representatives contented itself with proclaiming a socialist republic seeking world peace. Against right-wing opponents of the revolution, the Ebert government argued that peace could come only with the aid of international socialism, and the socialist seizure of power was the best means of obtaining this assistance.

A more theatrical exercise in internationalism occurred in Munich on November 17 with a revolutionary festival in the state opera house. After the playing of the "Leonore Overture,"

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2Speech of Karl Liebknecht on November 9, 1918, in VossZ, November 10; program of the Spartacists in the November 10 issue of their newspaper Rote Fahne, printed in Eberhard Buchner (ed.), Revolutionsdokumente: Die deutsche Revolution in der Darstellung der zeitgenössischen Presse (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1921), pp. 142-143.

3Proclamation of Berlin Workers' and Soldiers' Council on November 10, 1918, in BT, November 11 (Abend).
the curtain rose to reveal Kurt Eisner, who delivered an address on the meaning of the Bavarian revolution. The internationalist accent sounded strongly.

We cry out from this place to all the people who yesterday were our enemies. We acknowledge our guilt, and in this way we clear the path to a true understanding and reconciliation. We send greetings to the French, the Italians, the British, and the Americans. We wish to cooperate with all of them in creating a new era.

The new German socialist governments realized that their internationalist message would be acceptable at home only if it proved effective abroad in ameliorating the terms of the armistice and of the final peace settlement. Consequently, they urged the statesmen and socialists in the western nations to pursue a more benevolent policy toward the revolutionized Germany. In one of its first messages after November 9, the German Foreign Office pointed out to the American Secretary of State how overly strict armistice terms might engender in Germany a spirit hostile to the formation of a peaceful international community.

Two days after seizing power in Munich, Kurt Eisner dispatched a note to all the victorious governments, warning them that they should not punish the newly democratic Germany, but should instead "practice far-seeing generosity, which may bring about international recon-

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5BT, November 11, 1918 (Abend).
The leaders of both the Majority and the Independent Socialists joined in a request to the central office of the socialist International, calling for a world-wide public socialist protest over the western treatment of Germany. A few days later the Independents alone, alluding to their consistent opposition during the war, pleaded with the foreign socialists to speak and act against "entente attempts to hinder the success of the German socialist revolution."7

These exhortations to international solidarity echoed a real, if fleeting, popular sentiment of fraternity kindled by the cessation of hostilities. On November 17 a local socialist leader in Kiel arranged an assembly for Russian, French, and British prisoners of war. He asked them to return home and describe to their compatriots the extent and significance of the German revolution. Representatives of the three nationalities then rose to acknowledge the new German socialist regime as a milestone on the road to world peace and brotherhood. The gathering broke up with the singing of the "Marseillaise." At a similar meeting of the Frankfurt Workers' and Soldiers' Council on November 20 a French doctor Linval and an Englishman named Turnbull appeared to bear socialist greetings to their German

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6Telegram of Kurt Eisner to the Bundesarat in Bern, Switzerland, to be transmitted to President Wilson and the governments of France, Great Britain, and Italy, November 10, 1918, in BGStA, MA I 1076, Bayern: Beziehungen zum Ausland, No. 4.

7BT, November 12, 1918 (Morgen) and November 14 (Morgen). For similar appeals by Wurttemberg and Hessian socialists, see BT, November 11 (Morgen) and November 12 (Morgen).
These socialist appeals reflected a belief in the internationalist view on the relationship between domestic and foreign policy. In accord with this view one might argue that with the German government not only democratic but even socialist, the world no longer needed to fear German military aggression. The removal of the old military ruling caste gave free rein to the latent yearnings of a basically peace-loving Germany, which desired nothing more than to cooperate with its neighbors. So ran the argument in the background of these socialist declarations.

The news of the armistice terms added a novel and somber variation to this traditional internationalist theme, and showed that the reciprocal interaction between foreign affairs and domestic developments might also operate in reverse, and to the detriment of the latter. Internationalists had previously insisted that only the democratization of Germany could change its foreign policy in favor of a League of Nations. Now they realized and stressed that the preservation of freedom and democracy within Germany required in turn Germany's admission on honorable terms to the family of nations.

During the weeks after the revolution not only the German governments and the socialist parties, but also other internationalist individuals and groups voiced this note of concern. In early December 1918, the economist and philosopher Walther Rathenau published in Vorwaerts an open letter to Colonel House,
Wilson's advisor, reminding him of the responsibility which the whole world, and the United States in particular, bore for the fate of Germany, a fate which was bound to be catastrophic, if a vindictive peace terminated the war. Later that month, addressing himself "to all who are not blinded by hate," Rathenau expressed his fear that the German belief in justice and reconciliation might be destroyed by the heedless actions of the western powers.\(^9\)

The German intellectuals also turned to their academic and artistic colleagues abroad, and appealed to them as fellow representatives of the international cultural community. In the wake of the German revolution, professors and artists in several cities imitated the actions of the workers and the soldiers and formed Councils of Intellectual workers. The Berlin Council of Intellectual Workers (Rat Geistiger Arbeiter) declared in its manifesto of November 13, "We desire a free fatherland and a free world. We extend our hand to our brothers in all nations." Its program, announced on the following day, included abolition of military service, support for a League of Nations and a world parliament, and the elimination from the press of all "nationalistic corruption."\(^{10}\)

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\(^9\) Vorwaerts, December 6, 1918; "An Alle die der Hass nicht blendet," Die Zukunft, XXVII, Nos. 11/12 (December, 1918), pp. 318-322.

\(^{10}\) Printed in Buchner, Revolutionsdokumente, pp. 192-193. For two inside views of the Munich Rat Geistiger Arbeiter, see Brentano, Mein Leben, pp. 354-362 (Brentano was chairman of the Council for a time), and Franz Schoenbener, Confessions of a European Intellectual (paperback edition; New York: Collier Books, 1965), pp. III-113.
A more radical Political Council of Intellectual Workers (Politischer Rat Geistiger Arbeiter) in Munich issued a statement on November 14, asserting that the idea of freedom which had prevailed with the revolution was nothing uniquely German, but rather a part of the common European heritage. Therefore, it was "the duty of each intellectual to exert himself internationally." Wilhelm Herzog, a pacifist and left-wing socialist writer, in his newly-founded journal Die Republik, condensed these sentiments into an appeal to "the intellectual international." Directed specifically at the French novelist and pacifist, Romain Rolland, this open letter of December 3, 1918 sought to enlist the aid of French pacifist intellectuals and socialists like Rolland and Henri Barbusse in the task of destroying those prejudices and hatreds which stood in the way of international reconciliation. This literary and artistic internationalism represented an outgrowth of the war-time effort by Frenchmen and Germans to maintain cultural contacts across the borders even in a period of war hysteria. Much of this activity centered in neutral Switzerland, where men like Romain Rolland, Stefan Zweig, Hermann Hesse, and Alfred Fried could freely meet and exchange thoughts. This style of internationalism, however, moved on a different, almost totally non-political plane, from that which primarily concerns us in this

11MNN, November 15, 1918 (Morgen). The head of this Political Council was Heinrich Mann, the brother of Thomas Mann.
Organized German pacifism soon followed the example of the socialists and the intellectuals in launching its own appeals to the conscience of the world. In so doing, it too shifted away from the former internationalist argument that a political change within Germany was the essential pre-condition for world peace. Pacifists did not deny the truth of this axiom, but now that the revolution had brought the desired political change, the needs of the time dictated that emphasis should now fall on showing that "domestic policy is determined by foreign policy." The close connection between the two, always a central tenet of internationalist thought, admitted of this reverse conclusion also, as the Peace Society explained.

Every pacifist was and is convinced that only the development of an international system of justice can free us from the bonds of militarism. . . . We have always recognized that free social development within Germany was hindered by the dominance of a foreign policy based on force. . . . Therefore the hope for progress, social reform, and freedom. . . is dependent on whether international relations shall now be guided by the standards of justice.13

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13Pazifismus und Revolution, a one-page fly-sheet issued by the Secretariat of the German Peace Society, undated, but apparently sometime in November, 1918.
In an attempt to elaborate and broadcast these views, the New Fatherland Club, assisted by the Peace Society and the International Law Center, organized a public lecture for the evening of December 8 on the subject: "Onward to a Peace of Justice: An Appeal to the World's Conscience." A sizeable crowd attended the event held in the Berlin Opera House. Walter Schuecking spoke first on the topic of a League of Nations. He vividly depicted how the realization and development of this ideal would be threatened, if the principles of power politics, rather than those of international justice, prevailed in the peace settlement.

There followed two lengthy speeches by leading women pacifists, Helene Stoecker and Elizabeth Rotten. Both stressed that the entente should profit from Germany's past mistakes, and should realize that a peace based purely on momentary military superiority might prove illusory. The self-interest of the western democracies demanded a peace of reconciliation with a socialist and democratic Germany. The alternative was a world revolution instigated by the Bolsheviks. Most important of all, a harsh and vengeful peace enforced by an entente-dominated League of Nations would render impossible any further pacifist progress within Germany and would open the door for the return of a nationalistic system. "We can hold back reaction and counter-revolution, only if we can show our people that their belief in the possibility of a higher organization of humanity is justified." The reading of an open letter from the New Fatherland Club to the French intellectuals led to a concluding resolution addressed to pacifist leagues in all neutral and enemy lands.
Today mankind stands at the crossroads of history. A new age of international peace should follow this most terrible of wars, but Germany faces enslavement and exploitation, which make the League of Nations only an instrument to keep Germany down. Therefore we, who even at the zenith of German power fought for the idea of a just peace, we demand the honorable fulfillment of Wilson's conditions, which have been accepted by all sides. We demand this...in the name of the conscience of the world.

2. The Intervention of Kurt Eisner

This concern with a just or unjust peace settlement and its possible evil influence on Germany's domestic development did not blind all internationalists to the other, older, facet of their argument, namely that the political situation within the Reich might decisively affect the shape of the coming peace. This traditional internationalist belief animated the brief spectacle of Kurt Eisner's Bavarian foreign policy, which also provided the first occasion for the actual involvement of a German pacifist in diplomatic affairs.

Two days after the installation of the socialist government in Munich, the philosophy professor and pacifist, Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, then residing in Zurich, telegraphed his congratulations to Kurt Eisner. The revolutionary leader, knowing Foerster from his writings, his war-time pacifist controversies, and some slight personal contacts, saw in him a potential ally in his attempted moral rehabilitation of Germany's international prestige. Eisner cabled a request that the professor continue in

Switzerland as provisional Bavarian ambassador. "Under the circumstances, it is of decisive importance that the unique form of our Bavarian revolution exert its moral influence." On November 13 Foerster accepted, "since in questions of international affairs, I feel particularly close to you."15

Eisner hoped that he could employ his Swiss ambassador as a channel to reach the French, British, and American rulers directly. Foerster claimed to possess contacts with agents close to important western governmental leaders, but these claims soon turned out to be mostly the product of Foerster's wishful thinking, and this aspect of the ambassador's mission proved abortive. The contact with Foerster in Switzerland, however, proved of importance to the Bavarian leader in quite another respect. Eisner was an independent Independent Socialist, and his idealistic, often naive, view of foreign relations now led him to react differently than most German socialists and pacifists to the entente's treatment of Germany. Eisner believed that Germany bore the decisive responsibility for the World War and therefore also for the ill-repute and distrust she suffered everywhere. Mere rhetorical appeals to cultural or proletarian solidarity were valueless, he felt, unless Germany convinced a doubting world

15 Telegram of Professor Foerster to Eisner, November 10, 1918; Telegram of Eisner to Foerster, November 12; Report of Foerster to Eisner, November 16; in BGStA, MA I 1076, Beziehungen zum Ausland, Nos. 2, 7, 21. See also Friedrich W. Foerster, Mein Kampf gegen das militaristische und nationalistische Deutschland (Stuttgart: Friede Durch Recht, 1920), p. 20.

16 Telegram of Foerster to Eisner, November 13, 1918; Telegram of Eisner to the Swiss Bundesrat in Bern, November 10; Reply of Bundesrat to Eisner, November 11; BGStA, MA I 1076, Nos. 1-5, 8
that the November revolution was not an act of desperation but a fundamental change of heart.

The dispatches of Foerster helped prod Eisner into independent action. Foerster's telegram of acceptance must have seemed the confirmation of Eisner's worst fears, when it asserted "Germany's four years of bluff politics have created such mistrust against us that people fear the present revolution is only a show and that in a short while the reaction will come." A few days later Foerster referred once again to "a fear that the German people will repudiate the revolution, because they do not know the truth about the past." These words, coming from Foerster and directed to Eisner, could only point to one conclusion for the Bavarian statesman. Germans must acknowledge and renounce the folly and falsity of the Prussian, Hohenzollern foreign policy and the whole spirit that animated it. Such a radical about-face, with its historical and moral implications, could not ignore consideration of the concrete issue of German war guilt.17

Within a few weeks of the revolution Eisner found the opportunity for giving these suggestions striking expression in a two-pronged attack against the central government in Berlin. As the leaders of all the new state governments gathered in the German capital on November 25, Eisner published excerpts from the

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diplomatic documents in the Bavarian Foreign Office archives, purporting to prove a crucial German responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities in 1914. Far from calming the ensuing storm, Eisner defied the request of Foreign Minister Solf during the conference that negotiations and diplomatic moves be left in the hands of the Berlin government. He would never leave the cause of peace, Eisner swore, in the hands of such "compromised men" as Solf and Erzberger. Returning to Munich, Eisner indulged in the further dramatic stroke of severing diplomatic relations with Berlin. 18

The shock of these theatrics soon wore off, but the question of war guilt remained to poison and cloud the atmosphere of public debate and to spread dissensions even within the ranks of the internationalists. They all agreed on the evils of the old system and some had called for a German trial of those leaders responsible for the war, but not all agreed that Germany alone had been instrumental in inciting the conflict. Nor did they all feel that a unilateral German confession of guilt served the cause of either truth or peace.19 Most pacifists tended to sym-

18 BT, November 25, 1918 (Morgen); FZ, November 26 (Morgen); MNN, November 29 (Abend). Eisner gave a highly colorful account of the conference in a speech of November 29 to the Munich Council, printed in Eisner, Neue Zeit, pp. 46-48. For a favorable pacifist view of Eisner's actions, see Fried, "Kriegstagebuch," Friedens-Warte, XX, Nos. 11/12 (November/December, 1918), pp. 289-291.

19 Quiddle, "Schuldfragen ohne Ende," MNN, November 28, 1918 (Abend) and December 3 (Abend). Also his speech to the provisional Bavarian Council on December 17, 1918 printed separately as Ludwig Quiddle, Rede gegen Eisner (Munich: Verlagsabteilung der deutschen Volkspartei, n.d.).
pathize more with the views of the Berlin government, as expressed in the diplomatic note of November 29 to the entente.

To bring about world peace, to create lasting guarantees against future wars, and to restore international confidence, it seems urgent that an investigation shed light on the circumstances leading to the war in all nations. . . . The German government suggests that a neutral commission be established to consider the question of war guilt, consisting of men whose character and political experience promise a fair judgment.20

This note encountered no willingness on the part of the western powers, so Germany, like the other states, proceeded to its own editing and interpretation of the diplomatic documents. Eisner's dramatic revelations, therefore, served no real purpose and, perhaps unwittingly, did a disservice to the pacifist cause. By emphasizing Germany's diplomatic blunders in 1914, Eisner focused attention on this narrower question of mobilization dates and declarations of war. This had the effect of overshadowing those ethical and pedagogical questions which Foerster and other internationalists, including Eisner himself, regarded as the crux of Germany's past failures and the locus of needed reform.21

In contrast to the war-guilt question, the issue of "compromised men" as raised by Eisner culminated abruptly in December 1918. His charge that the Foreign Office in general and Solf in particular bore the taint of the past and were therefore bound to be liabilities in the coming peace negotiations took hold all the

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20 Printed in BT, November 29, 1918 (Abend).

21 Friedrich W. Foerster, "Die Bedeutung der Schuldfrage," MNN, December 20, 1918 (Abend); see also Foerster's later comments in his Mein Kampf, p. 35 and his Erlebte Weltgeschichte, pp. 211-212; Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, pp. 38-39, 137.
more easily in that demands for a purge of the German diplomatic service had arisen even before the revolution. Although Ebert spoke out in defense of his Foreign Minister, the pressure for personnel changes continued to build up. On November 28 the Executive Committee of the Berlin Workers' and Soldiers' Council petitioned the Council of People's Representatives to dismiss Solf and to set up a commission, drawn partly from this very Executive Committee, to gather and study the relevant documents on the outbreak of the war. The following day a meeting of the Berlin Worker's Council erupted into accusations against the Foreign Office. A resolution was passed demanding that this ministry employ "new and more suitable men in its work." The presence of the Independent Socialist Karl Kautsky as a sort of watchdog on the Wilhelmstrasse did not suffice to quell the uproar, as it rapidly became apparent what little decision-making authority he possessed. Finally on December 12 Solf resigned. His successor, Count Ulrich Brockdorff-Rantzau, had a satisfactory war-time diplomatic background as ambassador to Denmark, which recommended him as an "uncompromised" minister.

22Examples were the editorial "Die Neugestaltung des Auslanddienstes," BT, August 24, 1918 (Morgen); Arthur Holitscher, "Kenntnis fremder Völker," BT, September 4 (Abend); and the editorial, "Der offiziose Augiastatt," BT, October 22 (Abend).

23Buchner, Revolutionsdokumente, pp. 337, 343; Vorwaerts, November 28; BT, November 28 (Morgen) and November 30 (Morgen) and December 12 (Morgen). On Brockdorff-Rantzau's background and appointment, see Voss, December 23 (Morgen); Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente (Charlottenburg: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fuer Politik und Geschichte, 1920), pp. 3-9; and Edgar Stern-Rubarth, Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau, Wanderer zwischen zwei Welten (Berlin: Verlag Reimar Hobbing, 1929), pp. 53-73.
3. The Bolshevik Variant

These controversies occasioned by the Bavarian foreign policy of Kurt Eisner, intense though they sometimes were, did not burst the bonds of traditional internationalism. Despite these internal variances, the main stream of German internationalism continued to coincide roughly with the beliefs and actions of the ruling socialist government in Berlin. Taking their stand on the revolutionary overthrow of the militaristic imperial system, both the Majority Socialists and the academic internationalists concurred in the desire to integrate the newly democratic Germany into the western family of nations.

A rival internationalism, however, characterized the extreme left-wing socialist opposition to the new republic. The Spartacists, as the followers of Karl Liebknecht styled themselves, pursued after November 1918 the same lines of thought and action as they had maintained in earlier socialist disputes. In foreign affairs they still basically opposed any world order, League of Nations, or peace union between capitalist nations, since in their eyes capitalism itself was the source of wars. International conflicts would only cease with the universal triumph of proletarian socialism. What had seemed mere fanciful theorizing before 1914 was now a realizable, if dubious, prospect, since the Spartacists professed to see the embodiment of their ideal state in Lenin's Russia. On the international level, the world revolution of communism as preached by Lenin was to replace the "bourgeois League of Nations" as depicted by Wilson. For Germany, the adoption of this Spartacist line would mean a
break with the West and a turning to the East. Domestically, it
signified a rejection of the parliamentary democracy foreshadowed
in the provisional government's promise of free general elections,
for the Spartacists demanded instead the retention and strengthen-
ing of the Council or Soviet System (Raetesystem).24

In this debate over the form of government, the German
pacifists stood almost unanimously on the side of parliamentary
democracy, and they felt compelled to oppose a governmental sys-
tem which they viewed as a form of dictatorship or minority rule.
The general German verdict against the Council System was not, of
course, based solely on internationalist considerations, but one
of the most frequently used and most telling arguments against
the Council idea insisted that the victorious western powers
would never conclude a peace treaty with a bolshevized Germany.
This contention played a large role in the heated sessions of the
December 1918 meeting of the Central Council in Berlin, where the
fate of the Council form of government was sealed.25 In the

24 Buchner, Revolutionsdokumente, pp. 142-143; Liebknecht's
speech of December 7, 1918 in Bf, December 8 (Morgen); report on
the National Spartacist Conference in Berlin at the end of Decem-
ber, 1918, when they formally adopted the name Communist, in Bf,
December 30, 1918 (Abend) and January 1, 1919 (Morgen); also in
Die Republik, December 31, 1918 and January 1, 1919. Report of
meeting of Munich Spartacists, MNN, December 20, 1918 (Morgen).
Count Harry Kessler described the hectic January days in Berlin
in 1919 as involving "a question of world-historical significance,
not only for the continued existence of the German Reich or of
the democratic-republican state, but for the decision between
East and West." Graf Harry Kessler, Tagebücher 1918-1937
(paperback edition; Frankfurt/Main: Insel Verlag, 1961), p. 95,
entry for January 6, 1919.

25 For the debates at this Congress of Councils see Bf,
December 19, 1918 (Abend) and Die Republik, December 17 and 20,
1918.
course of this decisive conference the Majority Socialist newspaper, Vorwaerts, felt it worthwhile to print an article by Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster describing the abhorrence which the Council System aroused in France, England, and America. The convening of a constituent assembly and the normalization of German political life along parliamentary lines, he argued, were prerequisites for a favorable peace treaty and for the re-establishment of contacts with the democratic nations of the west.

The decision of the Central Council in December to support the provisional government's call for national elections to a constituent assembly marked the defeat of the Council System. A major Spartacist uprising followed in Berlin in January 1919. Freikorps units under the supervision of Army Minister Gustav Noske suppressed the rebellion with a bloodthirsty ferocity that shocked pacifists. The murdering of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg later in January effectively ended Spartacist internationalism as a viable force in the German capital.

4. Internationalism and the Democratic Party

With some type of parliamentary government now certain to prevail as the political form of the German republic, the question arose as to what attitude the pacifist organizations and their members should take in politics, and, more immediately, in the January elections for the National Assembly. Participation in war-time controversies and observation of the forces at work

26 Vorwaerts, December 17, 1918; an editorial in the December 18 issue of Vorwaerts endorsed Foerster's position.
within Germany had convinced most pacifists that their previous stance of non-involvement in politics was no longer tenable or necessary. Quidde set the new standard with his comment that pacifism, while refraining from purely partisan squabbles, must take a clearly democratic stand, if it hoped to anchor its internationalist ideals in the national constitution. In this spirit the German Peace Society at its first Berlin meeting after the revolution listed as its number one goal "an organic and total reformation of the German constitution and administration along the lines of free social democracy."27

A number of possibilities presented themselves as political paths which the pacifists might take. One was an attempt by the Peace Society to maintain a supra-party position as a sort of endorsing agency for internationalist-oriented candidates. In early January 1919 the Society sent out a questionnaire to each party headquarters and to each individual seeking election to the National Assembly. The inquiry asked whether, if elected, the candidate would support German entry into a league of equal nations based on arbitration, general disarmament, protection of national minorities, freedom of the seas, and international social legislation. Unfortunately, only a handful of replies came in from candidates of the Majority Socialist and Democratic parties, but those few did affirm an allegiance to internationalist

27 Ludwig Quidde, "Der deutsche Pazifismus vor und nach dem Weltkriege," Voelker-Friede, XVIII, Nos. 11/12 (November/December, 1918), pp. 96-99, 109-113; report of Peace Society meeting, November 18, 1918 in Voelker-Friede, XVIII, No. 12 (December, 1918), p. 120.
Another possible field of activity open to the pacifists entailed their working as individuals directly within the existing political parties. Most pacifists rejected as an impractical aberration the founding of a specific Peace Party, such as the one which would garner a few thousand votes in Wuerttemberg in January 1919. In a choice among the major political parties, non-socialist and non-Catholic internationalists inevitably tended to cluster around the Democratic Party, the lineal successor to the Progressive Party of pre-war days.

This new party owed its birth to the exertions of a number of intellectuals and publicists, headed by the sociologist Alfred Weber and by the editor of the Berliner Tageblatt, Theodor Wolff. On November 16, 1918 they issued "an open appeal for the founding of a great democratic party." Although the manifesto laid the greatest stress on a firm loyalty to the republican form of government, the character and interests of the signers committed the new organization to take at least a mildly

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28 The January questionnaire was printed in Voelker-Friede, XIX, Nos. 2/3 (February/March, 1919), p. 17; the replies were discussed at a Munich meeting on January 27, 1919, described in ibid., XIX, Nos. 4/5 (April/May, 1919), pp. 33-34.

29 Discussion at Peace Society meeting on January 21 at Stuttgart, Voelker-Friede, XIX, Nos. 2/3 (February/March, 1919), p. 23. For the Wuerttemberg election returns, see Staatsanzeiger fuer Wuerttemberg, January 13 and 20, 1919. This topic is discussed at greater length in Chapter V.

30 BT, November 16, 1918 (Morgen); FZ, November 16 (Abend); for an account by a participant see Theodor Wolff, Der Marsch durch Zwei Jahrzehnte (Amsterdam: Albert de Lange, 1935), pp. 207-208.
internationalist stand. This became more evident at the founding session on November 18, when National Liberal and Progressive party leaders met with the Democratic spokesmen to discuss the formation of an all-inclusive liberal, democratic party for the new republic. Alfred Weber, and his more famous brother, Max Weber, successfully opposed the admission of "compromised" right-wing members of the old National Liberal Party into the new party's central committee. This rebuke was specifically aimed at Gustav Stresemann, who then formed his more nationalistic and conservative followers into the German People's Party, having failed in his attempt "to work within the Democratic Party against its cosmopolitan tendencies." 31

The internationalist character of the Democratic Party took on more precise form in its programs. The Frankfurt local numbered among its guiding principles the advocacy of general disarmament, the right of national self-determination, and Germany's entry into a League of Nations. Under the chairmanship of Ludwig Quidde, the Bavarian branch of the Democratic Party (confusingly labelled the German People's Party, but not to be confused with Stresemann's followers) proclaimed that "once again the German people will rise...and regain its place in the world, but only as a member of the community of nations, with a

31 Wolff, Marsch, pp. 208-209; FZ, November 19 (Morgen), and November 21 (Abend); Henry A. Turner, Stresemann and the Politics of the Weimar Republic (paperback edition; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 13-26; Stresemann's own remarks are contained in a typed copy of a planned article, Stresemann Nachlass, 3069/6895/H134 402, and in a letter to Dr. Hugo, November 18, 1918, Nachlass 3069/6896/134 573.
new spirit and with honorable intentions." The national Democratic Party program for the January 1919 election outlined the scope of its internationalism.

We demand a foreign policy imbued with the spirit of lasting peace and suited to secure Germany's place in the world. We are in favor of a league of equal nations, international courts of arbitration, and simultaneous reduction of armaments.... We demand freedom of the seas and the free development of trade and commerce.32

The personalities which the Democratic Party attracted also testified to its internationalist leanings. Ludwig Quidde was one of the founding members and guiding spirits of the Bavarian branch of the party, and in this capacity he played a considerable role in the party politics of the Eisner regime. Quidde and Walter Schuecking were the only pacifists singled out to be candidates for the National Assembly, and both won seats in that body, Quidde for Upper Bavaria, Schuecking for Hesse-Nassau. Another acknowledged pacifist who associated himself with the Democrats was the outspoken editor of Die Welt am Montag, Helmut von Gerlach, who served for a short time after the revolution as an assistant State Secretary in the Prussian government. In addition to these pacifists, a number of public figures and intellectuals, who had earlier been associated with internationalist organizations, now adhered to the standard of the Democratic Party, such

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32FZ, November 15, 1918 (Morgen); "Aufruf der Deutschen Volkspartei in Bayern," MNN, December 23 (Morgen); FZ, December 14 (Morgen). The national program is also in Salomon, Neue Parteilinprogramme, pp. 42-45.
This association of the Democratic party with internationalism brought down upon its head the condemnation of right-wing German nationalists. Stresemann's followers branded it "the golden International... whose members represent international capitalism and who desire a money-grubbing republic inspired by the international spirit." A local conservative group in Wuerttemberg voiced its intention "to defend our Christian political and moral conceptions, our national German culture, from the threatening democratic, international, materialist curse."

On the eve of the January 1919 election to the National Assembly, the monarchist National People's Party (the DNVP, as it was commonly abbreviated) published a pronouncement signed by a number of German academicians. The signers, seven of whom were history professors, urged the voters to rally behind this national party "in contrast to the internationally-minded parties." Among the latter they reckoned not only the Socialists, but also "the Democrats, who, following the French example, would set mammon on the throne under the rule of demagogues."

33 For lack of a standard monograph on the Democratic Party and its members, see MNN, November 22, 1918 (Morgen); BT, December 2 (Morgen); PZ, January 18, 1919 (Morgen); Stampfer, Vierzehn Jahre Republik, p. 69; and von Gerlach, Von Rechts nach Links, pp. 242-244.

34 Reprinted in BT, December 21, 1918 (Morgen); Staatsanzeiger fuer Wuerttemberg, January 7, 1919.

These and similar accusations stung Democratic spokesmen into sharp replies. In Berlin, Professor Meinecke castigated his fellow professors for making statements unworthy of their calling. Rejecting their contention that only the DNVP contained true German patriots, he especially bemoaned the tendency to accuse one's opponents of a lack of national feeling. At an election eve rally in Frankfurt, the local Democratic chairman, Dr. Gehrke, scornfully dismissed the right-wing charge that the Democratic Party lacked national sentiment. "Our party is conscious of the national honor, but it does not feel compelled to go around mouthing the word 'national' constantly."36

As these rejoinders showed, some Democrats were aware that there was no incompatibility between the party's advocacy of a Wilsonian League of Nations and a due regard for valid German national interests. Indeed, this was the whole message of German pacifism as preached by men like Fried, Schuecking, and Quidde, namely that Germany could not lose, but could only gain, by incorporating itself into a world community of law and equal rights. The People's League for Freedom and Fatherland, many of whose organizers were now prominent in the Democratic Party, had likewise argued that German national interests, properly conceived, were best served not by pan-German annexationism, but by a mutually acceptable peace of understanding. The Democratic Party now tried to follow this tradition. Nevertheless, the insinu-

36Friedrich Meinecke, "Hochschullehrer und politische Parteien," VossZ, January 18, 1919 (Morgen); PZ, January 18, (Morgen).
ations leveled by the right-wing critics reflected a prevalent
German suspicion of any overt internationalism, and this put the
Democratic Party on the defensive.

From within the ranks of the party itself criticism arose
over this issue, particularly from among the women, who seemed
especially sensitive to any rumored deficiency of national feel-
ing. On December 9, 1918 a meeting of the business committee of
the Democratic Party took up a complaint from representatives of
its women's organizations "that in its publicity the Democratic
Party does not sufficiently emphasize the national idea." The
committee denied the allegation, but the women continued to work
on their own to insure that the party not bear any stigma of in-
ternationalism. The National Women's Committee distributed model
campaign speeches, which included a section entitled: "National
self-assertion...in contrast to the International." 37 One of
the most active Democratic women, Elly Heuss-Knapp, wife of
politician and publicist Theodor Heuss, summed up the women's
sentiments in a post-election article.

The German Democratic Party does not bear this name
for no reason. It seeks to unfurl above its ranks
the banner of a pure, confident, unshakeable
national sentiment. It does not dream about the
International, from which the armistice has separ-
at ed us far more than did the four war years. A
loyal and sturdy love of fatherland is the firm

37 Meeting on December 9, 1918, minutes, in BAK, Sitzungen
des geschaeftsfulhrenden Ausschusses der Deutschen Demokratischen
Partei (Protokolle) 1918-1919, R 45 III/9, p. 13. The model
speech was No. 17 in a series issued under the title Musterreden
fuer Redner und Rednerinnen, Frauen-Flugschriften der Deutschen
Demokratischen Partei (Berlin-Zehlendorf: Demokratische Verlag,
1918), pp. 17-18.
ground in which the Democratic Party is rooted. 38

In themselves these defensive qualifying statements showed only that some members of the Democratic Party were as anxious to draw the line separating it from the left, from the Social Democrats, as from the conservative nationalists on the right. In foreign affairs as in domestic policy, the Democratic Party sought to remain a party of the middle. The party did not swerve from its support for such basic internationalist goals as the League of Nations. Because of these differences of opinion within the Democratic Party, it served as a mirror for the German scene as a whole as regards "that bitter struggle. . . between the national power principle and the international ideal of justice." The Democratic Party furnished a meeting ground, where pacifists and internationalists could engage in debate with politicians and intellectuals whose prior nationalism was now considerably tempered by a realistic criticism of the German past. Such men found that within the framework of the Democratic Party they were largely able to agree on reconciling these two supposed opposites, nationalism and internationalism, into a balanced synthesis. The tension between these two poles of thought, however, remained a problem for the party, as we shall see in a later chapter.

5. The Internationalist Organizations
The existence of the Democratic Party with its pacifist

membership and its moderately internationalist program could not supersede the work of the specifically internationalist organizations. In the months after the November revolution these continued their own specialized activities and tentatively mapped out for themselves areas of work and development within the emerging republic.

The New Fatherland Club openly clothed its post-revolutionary statements in a socialist array, that is, in the garb of "spiritual socialism" commonly assumed by the intellectuals during the November days. At a public demonstration in Berlin on the day after the socialist revolution, the leaders of the New Fatherland Club called for "the founding of a new socialist world order."39 One Club figure, Captain von Beerfelde, even sat for a short while on the Berlin Workers' and Soldiers' Council. Eduard Bernstein, Helmut von Gerlach, and Kurt Eisner, all of whom had at one time or another been associated with the New Fatherland Club, now held positions of power or influence in the revolutionary governments.40

The new program which the New Fatherland Club adopted in December 1918 delineated four sectors of proposed activity: the realization of socialism "after the model of the British Fabians"; abolition of the rule of force and of class dominance; development of the individual personality; and reconciliation of the nations. Only the second and fourth of these points would earlier

39Reported in BT, November 10, 1918 (Morgen).
40Mitteilungen, Bund Neues Vaterland, New Series, No. 1, Revolutionnummer, November, 1918, pp. 9-10.
have been classified as strictly internationalist demands, but the New Fatherland Club was adapting its original views on the relationship between foreign and domestic affairs to fit the new revolutionary situation. It envisioned its future function as that of an intellectual dynamo for the revolution.

The League of Nations and the International offer no assurance of world peace, if that peace is not firmly anchored in the minds and hearts of all men. Therefore we also need a spiritual revolution, in order that the accomplishments of the political revolution may be preserved and extended.41

The German Peace Society, in accord with its own longer traditions, viewed its domestic task in less openly socialist terms. The Society continued to see its chief domestic mission as the creation within Germany of a pacifist atmosphere. Some initial steps toward this end included the wider distribution of the Society's journal, Voelker-Friede, and the increased sale of pacifist literature through the Society's bookstore in Stuttgart.42

The Society's staff also discussed plans to extend its influence over a wider field by working through pacifist-inclined educators and clergymen. In view of the war-time use of the schools to implant chauvinism, the development of pacifist attitudes and beliefs in the youth became a matter of special concern. Reform of the press was another Peace Society goal. Pacifists regarded the

41Printed in Captain G. von Beersfeld, Michel, wach auf!, No. 1, Flugschriften, Bund Neues Vaterland (Berlin: Verlag Neues Vaterland, 1919), p. 32.

nationalistic poisoning of these two streams, the schools and the newspapers, as major factors contributing to Germany's moral and political decline. They resolved to use the favorable conditions after the revolution to set a new course for Germany in all these matters.\textsuperscript{43}

Such projects, even if undertaken on only a small scale, demanded money, but the financial resources of the Peace Society had sunk to almost nothing, and the low membership numbers, depleted by the war, promised no dramatic increase in revenues. In January 1919 the Peace Society, which still had its headquarters in Stuttgart, turned to the Wuerttemberg government with a plea for aid. Arguing that "the political revolution has confronted the Society with many tasks, the solution of which is of supreme importance for all Germans," the petitioners made three requests: permission to use rural churches for Peace Society meetings; assignment to Society use of a few offices in government buildings; and a financial subsidy for pacifist propaganda.\textsuperscript{44}

This appeal does not seem to have met a favorable response. The central government in Berlin, however, proved will-


\textsuperscript{44}Note from Wuerttemberg ambassador to the Bavarian Foreign Ministry, January 20, 1919, BGStA, MA 97553, Akten des Staatsministeriums des Aussern, Friedensbewegung. Bavaria replied that it offered no such assistance to its pacifists, and the absence of any further comments by the Peace Society seems to indicate that Wuerttemberg also refused to provide the requested aid.
The origins of the German Association for a League of Nations (Deutsche Liga fuer Volkerbund, hereafter DLFV) stretched back into pre-armistice days, for in a sense it represented an outgrowth of that small "scientific committee" on the league idea chaired by Professor Hugo Preuss in October 1918. Even before the revolution this committee had received the assignment of "spreading the idea of a League of Nations as widely as possible among the masses." The committee weighed the possibility of organizing an association for this purpose. As a preparation, it drew up a questionnaire on the topic of international organizations and circulated it among Reichstag deputies, government officials, professors, military specialists, business and labor leaders, jurists, and editors. The results of this informal poll showed a general agreement that Germany should speak out openly with its own opinions on the League of Nations, and that since the notion of a League was still relatively unknown and unpopular within Germany, an intensive propaganda effort among the people themselves should accompany this government action. The execution of such an undertaking would require an organization of specialists able to devote almost full time to the project. The report also indicated that the necessary financial backing for this work would be forthcoming, but did not pinpoint these poten-

45Letter of Hugo Preuss to Walter Schuecking, October 14, 1918, BAK, Nachlass Schuecking. This committee has been described in Chapter II.
tial sources of assistance.\^6

Shortly after the November revolution no less prominent a
governmental leader than Friedrich Ebert picked up the threads of
this earlier project and decided upon Ernst Jaeckh as the man to
organize the association. A left-wing liberal intellectual, in-
terested in social and international causes, Jaeckh had engaged
briefly in diplomacy during the war as a member of the German
mission in Turkey. As he himself admitted, he preferred a less
confining bureaucratic position with more outlet for personal
initiative. Inspired by the humanitarian sentiments of the
Silesian philosopher Karl Joel, Jaeckh also shared Alfred Fried's
optimistic belief in technology as the uniter of the world. His
talents and his interests combined to fit Jaeckh for the role of
initiator of the DLFV, and he readily accepted Ebert's invita-
tion of November 20 to come to Berlin for discussions.\^7

In the capital Jaeckh met not only with Ebert, but also
with Solf, Ersberger, and Preuss. Since Preuss was now occupied
with drawing up the German constitution, the government commis-

\^6 Bericht ueber die Umfrage wegen Errichtung einer
Deutschen Voelkerbund-Liga, BAK, Nachlass Schuecking, Deutsche
Liga fuer Voelkerbund, Vol. 1. This memorandum is undated, but
the contents clearly mark it as dating from before the revolution
and the armistice.

\^7 The Ebert-Jaeckh correspondence of November 1918 is in
Jaeckh, Goldene Pflug, pp. 351-352, 463; more details are in the
letter of Ernst Jaeckh to Hans Wehberg, December 5, 1918, BAK,
Nachlass Wehberg, No. 46. On Jaeckh's earlier background see
H. C. Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action 1815-1945
(The Hague: Martin Nyhoff, 1955), pp. 294-295; for the influence
of Karl Joel, see Ernst Jaeckh and Wolfgang Schwarz, Die
Politik Deutschlands im Voelkerbund (Geneva: Libraire Kundig,
sioned Jaechh to form a German Association for a League of Nations by uniting behind this one goal the efforts of all sympathetic individuals and groups. The Berlin government promised financial backing to the tune of several hundred thousand marks.48

By mid-December Jaechh had completed the necessary preliminaries, and on December 17 the DLFV was officially founded at a public meeting in Berlin. The major speaker at the evening gathering was State Secretary Erzberger, who lent the prestige of his name and position by taking over the chairmanship of the Association. Walter Schuecking served as Erzberger's deputy. Hans Simons, the son of Walter Simons, chief of the Central Chancellery, acted as secretary, while Jaechh, the business manager, retained control over most of the day-to-day affairs.49

As with the People's League for Freedom and Fatherland, membership in the DLFV could be either individual or organizational. Jaechh was able to associate the major national trade unions with the DLFV, as well as the Civil Service League, the Society of Commercial Apprentices, the Women's Clubs, and the German Democratic Youth Associations, thereby allowing him to claim a group membership of about nine million. More valuable and significant was the solid support extended to the DLFV by all the major internationalist organizations: the Peace Society, the New Fatherland Club, the International Law Center, the

48 Letter of Jaechh to Wehberg, December 5, 1918, BAK, Nachlass Wehberg.
49 FFZ, December 20, 1918 (Morgen) and December 22 (Morgen); Jaechh, Goldene Pflug, p. 352.
Society for International Understanding, the German Society for International Law, and the Women's Organization for a Lasting Peace. This support also included the willingness of individual pacifists like Schuecking, Wehberg, Rotten, Niemeyer, Quidde, and Stoecker to assume posts on the Association's central committee and to staff the six subsidiary departments which actually carried out the main work of the DLFV.

The function of the DLFV was implicit in the history of its genesis. Its constitution pithily stated the Association's goals: "Preparing for securing a League of Nations; filling the German people with favorable attitudes toward the League; cooperating with like-minded organizations at home and abroad." In practice the DLFV concentrated its activity at first mainly on the home front, where it sought to influence public opinion through brochures and monographs. Among its short pamphlets it printed a speech by Erzberger on the League of Nations and interviews with a number of German government officials on the same topic.

The first full-length monograph published by the DLFV


52 Satzung der Deutschen Liga fuer Voelkerbund (E.V.) (Berlin: Verlag Hans Heinemann, 1919), p. 3.

53 Ruehlmann, Voelkerbundsgedanke, pp. 224-225 lists the first monographs issued by the DLFV; see also Jaeckh, Goldene Pflug, p. 354.
exemplified its cooperation with other internationalist groups. The German Society for International Law had begun work on a model League of Nations charter in September 1918. When the project was completed in mid-January 1919, the Society presented a copy of their draft charter to the central government in Berlin. The DLFV then offered to print, at its own expense, a booklet containing this document together with a history of its origin and an explanation of its provisions, as prepared by the Society's chairman, Professor Theodor Niemeyer of Kiel. This booklet served not only to enlighten those Germans who cared to read it, but also to demonstrate to the world the active German interest in the League of Nations, both prime goals of the German Association for a League of Nations.54

The ten-week period from the November revolutions to the elections for the National Assembly marked the era of rule by the provisional government. As the name implied, it was a time of tentative decisions, when practical actions, often deriving from improvisation or sheer necessity, shaped much of the future outline of the Weimar Republic, even before that form of government was legally established. So also during this period the relationship between the revolution and German internationalism became experimentally adjusted. Both the revolutionary leadership and the internationalist organizations enunciated the basic principle

of German adherence to the main stream of internationalist thought, rejecting on the one hand the chauvinism of the pan-Germans, and on the other, the Spartacist agitation for a bolshevik world revolution, in favor of a Wilsonian League of Nations. This intertwining of internationalism with the German revolution found its most vivid expression in the Berlin government's sponsorship and subsidizing of the German Association for a League of Nations, and in the internationalist stands adopted by the Majority Socialist, Center, and Democratic parties. This latter point was especially significant, for these three parties emerged from the January elections with an overwhelming majority, and, as the Weimar coalition, were to dominate in the National Assembly.

With the summoning of the National Assembly to Weimar and the convening of the peace conference in Paris, the German internationalist effort entered a new phase. It now became mandatory for Germans to restore the international bonds uniting them to friendly forces in the west and thereby gain a place in the emerging community of nations. At home pacifists must work to insure that the spirit of non-violence and of international reconciliation diffuse itself among the masses and be embodied in the new republican constitution.
CHAPTER IV

GERMAN INTERNATIONALISM LOOKS ABROAD:
FEBRUARY-AUGUST 1919

1. The International Conferences

In its pre-war days European internationalism had regarded it as axiomatic that its gospel of solidarity should seek expression in international organizations. The internationalists from different countries, pacifists, socialists, churchmen, parliamentarians, and intellectuals, had come together into more or less formally organized associations. This tendency toward international organization suffered a setback with the outbreak of war in 1914. Some bodies vanished entirely. Others, however, such as the socialist International and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, maintained their existence and continued to function, at least spasmodically. In the course of the war, German and neutral pacifists created two new international agencies, the Central Organization for a Lasting Peace and the International Women's Federation for a Lasting Peace.

After the November armistice, as we have seen, both the Majority and the Independent Socialists in Germany appealed to the International for support. Socialists in other countries too, notably in Great Britain, desired an international party conference, and by late December 1918 the socialist International began making preparations and issuing invitations. The conference was to be held at Bern, and a date was finally set for late January
1919, after the German elections to the National Assembly. To this meeting, the first confrontation between comrades from the belligerent countries, the two German socialist parties each sent a number of delegates, the most notable Independent being Kurt Eisner of Bavaria. Twenty-four other national sections were represented at Bern, including Great Britain (by the British Labor Party), France, Austria, Holland, and Hungary. The Belgians, Swiss, and Americans were conspicuous by their absence.¹

Even in the informal pre-conference sessions at Bern it became evident that two topics would dominate the discussions, the League of Nations and the question of war guilt. On the first of these there was much talk, but little real disagreement during the conference itself, which lasted from February 3 to 10. The critical problem was to find a formula which would express, in principle, socialist support for a League of Nations, but which would, at the same time, differentiate the Marxist socialist conception of a League from the system of international security being worked out in Paris. The conference resolution of February 5 largely succeeded in this aim. The statement on the League of Nations read:

The uniting of the peoples into a closely-knit community has always figured among the ideals of the socialist International. This ideal arises from the solidarity of the proletariat in all lands and from the ultimate socialist goal, which cannot be realized nationally, but only internationally. The World War has turned this socialist ideal... into an urgent

task also for non-socialist parliamentarians. . . .
But the society of nations can develop favorably and
live up to its duties, only if the international pro-
letariat stands behind it with all of its power. 2

Despite this self-conscious socialist wording, the Bern
conferees did not aim at setting up an alternative to the Wilsonian
League of Nations, for they went on to describe their ideal
socialist League in the following familiar terms: disarmament;
compulsory arbitration; equal rights and duties for all members;
self-determination of nations. 3 So closely did this socialist
manifesto parallel the traditional doctrines of pacifist inter-
nationalism that Alfred Fried, who was in Bern observing the con-
ference, felt justified in reporting that "unlike earlier confer-
ences, where the socialists merely adopted a few pacifist ideas
as window dressing, here they are devoting a major part of their
work to the league idea, and they are demanding a democratic
League." 4

More serious differences of opinion arose over the question
of war guilt, in part because this issue was so confused. Given
the atmosphere of the time, however, some discussion of this sen-
sitive question was unavoidable. If this socialist conference in-
tended to furnish European opinion with an example of inter-
national solidarity, it would have to show itself capable of
bridging the abyss between war-time enemies, an abyss which the

2Printed in VossZ, February 6, 1919 (Morgen).
3Ibid.
4Fried, "Kriegstagebuch." Friedens-Warte, XXI, Nos. 1/2
statesmen in Paris were either unwilling or unable to cross. Any attempt to restore international solidarity, on either the working-class or the governmental level, could only succeed on the basis of mutual trust. But, as the French socialist Albert Thomas pointed out in the opening day's session, it was precisely this element of confidence that was lacking, and this deficiency, he asserted, was rooted in a general doubt among the non-German party comrades over the war-time position of the German Majority Socialists. On the next day, Otto Wels, speaking for these Majority Socialists, countered by blaming the outbreak of the war on capitalism and imperialism in all countries. Wels justified the German socialist party's stand in August 1914 by pointing to its belief in Russia's aggressive intentions and to its conviction that the party was powerless to avert war.\(^5\)

The conference threatened to degenerate into endless quibbling between the Germans and the French, or even to break up completely, until on February 4 Kurt Eisner rose to present another German view. Believing that the impasse was largely psychological, Eisner decided to put an end to this mistrust by a frank, if extreme, acknowledgement of German socialist mistakes. For him the western European socialists were not so much concerned with finding the evil diplomatic genius to blame for the tragedy of 1914, since socialism was quite prepared to write off imperialist wars as outgrowths of capitalism. What was bothering them, he

\(^5\)FZ, February 4 (Morgen), February 5 (Morgen), and February 5 (Abend). The Frankfurter Zeitung carried particularly full coverage of the Bern conference.
felt, was the unwillingness of the presently ruling German socialists to define their earlier stand vis-a-vis German war aims, and this reluctance cast doubt on the meaning of the German revolution itself. In a lengthy and not always coherent speech, Eisner confessed that the German socialists should have seen the impossibility of justifying and supporting the imperial war effort by early 1915, and they should then at once have worked to oppose or overthrow the government. Since they had failed to act, they had no course now but to join in a full investigation of German war guilt, no matter how embarrassing or detrimental this might prove to the Berlin regime. "The truth must out, even if it means our ruin." Eisner concluded with a plea to all other socialist comrades for understanding and assistance.6

Eisner's speech achieved the desired effect and led to a speedy resolution of this vexing problem. The assembled socialists voted to postpone debate on the question of German war guilt until a future meeting. For the time being the conference agreed to accept the revolutionary spirit of the new Germany as evidence of a break with the old militarist system and as sufficient grounds for renewed attempts at international proletarian cooperation.7

In Germany the reaction to Eisner's speech and to the work of the socialist conference was mixed. The liberal internationalist Frankfurter Zeitung and the Majority Socialist Vorwaerts

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6Eisner's speech was later reprinted as a brochure by the New Fatherland Club, Kurt Eisner, Schuld und Suehne, No. 12, Flugschriften, Bund Neues Vaterland (Berlin: Verlag Neues Vaterland, 1919).

7EZ, February 6, 1919 (Abend).
stressed the spirit of reconciliation that had pervaded the conference. In his native Bavaria the Muenchner Neueste Nachrichten described Eisner as a fanatic who had left his country morally defenseless in the face of implacable enemies. The Frankfurt paper, on the other hand, though disagreeing with some of Eisner's assertions, felt that the Bavarian leader had done Germany credit by showing that a confession of past error need not be degrading. The assassination of Eisner a week after his return to Munich eliminated his controversial personality from the political scene. The war guilt controversy continued to plague Germany, especially after the terms of the peace treaty became known. Nevertheless, thanks largely to the intervention of Eisner, international socialism could now cease to debate the past and work instead toward the future.

A forward-looking attitude also characterized the international Trade Union Conference, which convened in Bern simultaneously with the socialists. Germany, which considered this particular field of internationalism one of its strong points, sent four delegates. These joined representatives from fourteen other countries, including France, Great Britain, Austria, Italy, Hungary, Holland, and Switzerland. At this meeting the main topic on the agenda was the League of Nations. The delegates hoped to see incorporated into the League Covenant a section giving effec-

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8 PZ, February 11, 1919 (Abend); "Die Wiederauferstehung der Arbeiterinternationale," Vorwaerts, February 11 (Abend).

19 MNN, February 12 (Abend), February 13 (Morgen and Abend); PZ, February 13 (Abend); Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, pp. 254-257.
tive international protection to the rights of labor. The chief conference resolution of February 8 addressed several requests to the Big Four in Paris.

The administration and distribution of production should be placed in the hands of the producing masses. The Trade Union International demands the national and international organization of labor. . . . It feels that the continuing effectiveness of international labor legislation can only be insured through the creation of an international labor office as a part of the League of Nations. This office is to be based on an international labor parliament in which there will sit delegates from all nations and all occupations.

Before disbanding the labor conference set up a permanent commission to keep a watchful eye on diplomatic actions in Paris effecting international labor.10

The net effect of these two conferences was to re-unite the non-communist European socialists and trade unionists into revivified international organizations, to group this newly united force behind the ideal of the Wilsonian League of Nations, and to accept Germany as an equal partner in this venture. In themselves these were no mean accomplishments. Bern, however, was not Paris, and it remained problematic what lessons the victorious statesmen would draw from the open deliberations of the socialists and trade unionists.

Meanwhile international pacifism was moving to re-bind its broken ties. It too wished to state in a world forum its own proposals for the shaping of the post-war world. Like the socialists,

10FZ, February 8 (Morgen); ET, February 10 (Morgen); FZ, February 11 (Morgen); Van Der Slice, International Labor, pp. 328-342.
the pacifists were thereby resuming efforts already undertaken
during the war, as at the April 1915 meeting in The Hague and the
September 1917 gathering in Switzerland. In January 1919 the
Dutch pacifist, Jan von Beek en Donk, chairman of the Central Or-
ganization for a Lasting Peace, began to arrange an international
conference of interested scholars and public figures to discuss
the whole topic of a League of Nations. The conference, scheduled
for early March, was also to take place in Bern.11

In view of the German government's role in creating the
German Association for a League of Nations (DLFV), it was not sur-
prising that the Berlin Foreign Office took an active role in
assuring the success of this conference and German participation
in it. When Adolph Mueller, the German ambassador to Switzerland,
cabled Berlin in early February 1919 asking permission to support
von Beek's undertaking, the Wilhelmstrasse authorized him to
spend up to ten thousand francs. Later in the month the DLFV sub-
mitted to the Wilhelmstrasse a lengthy list of possible German
delegates, which Berlin passed on to Mueller in Bern. The ambas-
sador now urged caution and restraint. Too overt a German par-
ticipation or too overwhelmingly numerous a German delegation
might frustrate the aims of the conference by creating the impres-
sion that it was nothing but a German contrivance. Mueller
specifically and sharply inveighed against sending Ernst Jaeckh of
the DLFV, who, he said, was suspected by non-German pacifists. On
this matter he was overruled, and Jaeckh accompanied Schuecking.
Montgelaas, Simons, and Wehberg as DLFV delegates. Nor does Berlin seem to have paid much heed to Mueller's warning regarding the number of delegates. Other German internationalist groups sent equally large delegations, including such prominent figures as Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Helene Stoecker, Leonard Nelson, Albert Einstein, Helmut von Gerlach, and Eduard Bernstein.12

When the conference opened on March 9, representatives of pacifist groups from Great Britain, Italy, the United States, Germany, Sweden, Holland, and Austria were present, but no delegates had yet arrived from France, Belgium, or Luxemburg. At the very beginning of the conference the war-guilt question was raised briefly. Count Max Montgelaas, the German member of the presiding committee, was able to avert a showdown by suggesting that debate on this topic be postponed until all delegates were present. He gracefully expressed the special German regret that no representatives from Belgium or Luxemburg were on hand, since he had hoped to be able to convey to them "the German sorrow over violation of their neutrality." The next day, in closed session, by a vote of thirty-six to eight, the German group approved a statement calling...
for the surrender of all German diplomatic documents on the war to a special German tribunal, but admitting in advance that "the crucial decisions for war had been acts of the Central Powers." As with Eisner's speech to the socialists, this German concession satisfied what little desire there was among the pacifists for a full-blown debate on war-guilt.\textsuperscript{13}

For the most part the conference sessions were devoted to more positive questions, such as standards for membership in the League of Nations, economic powers and functions of the world organization, and the validity of the Council System as a model for international association. Two topics which provoked considerable discussion were press censorship and the nature of the future world assembly.\textsuperscript{14}

Pacifist concern over nationalistic agitation in the press, a relatively new phenomenon, had been stimulated by war-time experiences. There was general agreement at Bern that the newspapers on both sides had exhibited chauvinistic tendencies during and after the war. To eliminate this evil certain German radical pacifists suggested state intervention and control, but others, such as Hans Wehberg, voiced the fear that such control, even in


\textsuperscript{14}FZ, March 12, 1919 (Morgen); Vorwaerts, March 12 (Morgen and Abend).
international hands and for a good cause, was incompatible with freedom of expression. Helmut von Gerlach supported this liberal position with the argument that "intellectual movements must be countered with intellectual methods, not with codes of law." The supporters of this viewpoint contended that education of public opinion could satisfactorily immunize readers against nationalistic agitation in the newspapers. The radical resolution on press censorship was defeated.15

A more legalistic dispute centered around the composition of the central representative organ of the projected League. As a long-time authority on international organization, Walter Schuecking proposed a two-chamber system, the nations as units being represented in one house by their diplomatic missions, but with a People's Parliament (Voelkerparlament) to act as a balance. Schuecking personally felt that this People's Parliament should hold the greater power and importance, since this would develop international law "from being the representation of the interests of the states to the representation of the interests of the peoples; the true cosmopolitan spirit will be lacking, if only states as such are represented." Other speakers, including von Gerlach, seconded this motion for a two-house assembly, but the conference adopted instead a resolution by Mendelssohn-Bartholdy

15FZ, March 12 (Morgen) and March 14 (Abend); Vorwaerts, March 16. Two of the radical German pacifists involved here were Richard Grelling and Professor Georg Friedrich Nicolai. The latter had fled from Germany to Denmark during the war to avoid difficulties arising from his anti-militarist writings.
calling for a popularly elected single chamber.16

The initiators of this Bern League of Nations conference not only intended to engage in academic discussion, but also hoped to stir the consciences of the diplomats working in Paris. This part of the task had taken on an even greater urgency, since in mid-February the allied statesmen had published the first draft of the proposed League Covenant. The pacifist conference was sharply critical of this document, and in its final session on March 18 the conference addressed a message to the Paris peace conference. This dispatch began tactfully by praising the proposed establishment of a League of Nations as constituting an improvement over the previously existing state of international anarchy. The pacifists, however, went on to state their dissatisfaction with the Paris Covenant and offered six suggestions for its improvement. Instead of an assembly of delegates from the national governments, a true People's Parliament, chosen by direct popular vote, should form the central organ of the League. The League must from the beginning include all independent nations willing and able to carry out its decisions. Therefore the entente must not exclude Germany. In addition to the peace-keeping machinery provided for in the Paris Covenant, the League should comprise an international court and an office of mediation. In conjunction with the creation of the League, total disarmament must prevail, together with the abolition of compulsory military service. Finally, the administration of all colonies should be subject to

16PC, March 12 (Abend).
the supervision of the League, and free trade ought to be the universal economic rule.17

These statements represented the sum of general internationalist thought on the subject of a League of Nations, as formulated at the only international pacifist gathering held in 1919. Since Germans predominated by sheer numbers and force of talent, the meeting also served as a forum for the vanquished to tell their conquerors and the neutrals their views on the future international community.

A fourth international conference met in Switzerland in May 1919, this one summoned by the International Women's Committee for a Lasting Peace. American, British, French, and German women pacifists of varying political persuasions met in Zurich from May 12 to 14. They assembled just as the Versailles treaty was being published and the revelation of its terms was arousing a fever of anger within Germany. The end result of this feminist conference, however, was a display of reconciliation between representatives of the former belligerents. This sentiment resulted in a protest resolution, drafted by the American and British women and sent to the Big Four in Paris, sharply attacking the treaty conditions as ruinous not only to Germany but to Europe as a whole.18


18VossZ, May 19, 1919 (Morgen). This article also reported that when the first French delegate arrived at the conference, the German, Lida Gustava Heymann, stood and presented her with a bouquet of roses as a symbolic gesture of Franco-German reconciliation.
The tone of this conference was more radical than that of the March pacifist gathering in Bern. Leadership of the German delegation fell into the hands of the radical socialist feminists, Anita Augspurg and Lida Gustava Heymann. Fraulein Augspurg was chiefly instrumental in securing the rejection of a resolution which expressed mild gratitude to the entente statesmen for establishing a League of Nations. In its place she successfully backed a severe condemnation of the Paris Covenant. Her argument held that any pacifist support for such a defective organization as the Paris League of Nations would only serve to perpetuate its existence. So better there be no League at all, than an imperfect one. Sooner or later, she contended, the world would demand and receive a truly socialist-oriented League of Nations, and such an institution would then merit the support of the Women's Committee.19

These four international conferences marked important stages on Germany's path to world rehabilitation. Here, the German internationalists might now say, was visible proof that Germany ranked again as an equal and honored partner, at least among socialists, trade unionists, pacifists, and feminists. On these levels the German plea for re-admission into the world community met a sympathetic answer.

19A thorough account of this women's conference is contained in a Report from the German Consulate General in Zurich to the Foreign Office, May 19, 1919, in PA-AA, Akten über Pazifistische Kongresse in der Schweiz, Vol. 2. The main body of the report consists of press accounts of the conference from the Neue Züricher Zeitung interspersed with commentaries by a Dr. R. Lasswitz, apparently on the Consulate staff.
2. Germany Seeks the Initiative

Valuable as these conferences were, the German internationalists knew as well as their fellow-countrymen that the effect of these meetings could only be demonstrative in nature. Even the potentially strongest groups involved, the socialists and the trade unions, had little or no voice in the councils of power at Paris. The ultimate and decisive confrontation between the new Germany and the western victors would come over the peace conference table. In preparation for that eventuality the German government must prepare its own case for a more favorable peace. The German internationalists played a considerable role in this effort, particularly in the work of fashioning a German alternative to the League as it was being devised in Paris.

Fundamental to the German position on a League of Nations was the complete commitment of the three ruling parties, their internationalist supporters, and their governmental agents to the two basic beliefs of German internationalism: that a world-wide democratic League of Nations must be created, and that a democratic, socialist Germany should be a full-fledged member of this society of nations. The January election programs of the Democratic, Center, and Majority Socialist parties had all explicitly endorsed the league concept. The active cooperation of the Ebert regime in creating and subsidizing the DLFV bore witness to the government's adherence to the league idea.

Declarations of high government officials removed any lingering ambiguity on this point. The new Foreign Minister,
Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, speaking to representatives of the German press on January 15, 1919, reminded them that "the idea of the League was received by the German people with all their characteristic enthusiasm. . . . and that with all of that same enthusiasm we stand behind the idea today." He stressed this determination from a somewhat different aspect in an address to the foreign press on January 24.

The German people through its revolution has exchanged its former place in the world for a new one. . . . Its task is one of reconstruction. But this can be accomplished fruitfully, only if the German people is allowed to proceed side by side with the other peoples, in that solidarity of democracy which alone can guarantee the peace, prosperity, and happiness of the world.20

Walter Simons, the new director of the legal section of the Foreign Office, also stated in an interview that Germany was genuinely eager to contribute actively to the realization of the league ideal.21

Formal government enunciation of these policy positions came in mid-February during the opening sessions of the National Assembly. The new Minister President, socialist Philip Scheidemann, in his official policy statement, listed among his chief goals: equal German participation in a League of Nations; mutual disarmament; compulsory arbitration of international disputes; and the abolition of secret diplomacy. Speaking for the


21Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, January 23, 1919.
Center Party, Adolf Groeber also urged the creation of an all-embracing League. The most eloquent speech came from the Democratic leader, Friedrich Naumann, who subtly alluded to his earlier Mitteleuropa concerns.

As Alexander I came from the east in 1815, so now Wilson comes from the west, with an American model, the holy alliance of the League of Nations. It is absolutely essential that we incorporate ourselves into this world plan. We should have done so earlier of our own accord. . . . We now want to join the League, and if anyone can remove from the Germans their world-historical burden of being confined and exposed in the heart of Europe, there will be no better friend of the League than Germany.

Count Brockdorff-Rantzau concluded the session by restating his own affirmative position on the League. 22

There were signs in early 1919 that the Germans generally assumed that a League of Nations would come into existence and that Germany would become a member. The initial draft of the future German constitution, published on January 21, 1919, contained an explicit reference to the League of Nations in the paragraph dealing with Reichstag confirmation of treaties. 23

Efforts to spread popular support for, and knowledge of, the

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22 Verhandlungen des Reichstags, CCCXXVI, 44-49, 57-58, 66-71. For a contemporary comment on the Foreign Minister's speech, see Georg Bernhard, "Graf Brockdorff's Rede," VossZ, February 15, 1919 (Morgen); and also Stern-Rubarth, Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau, p. 75.

23 As printed in FZ, January 21, 1919 (Morgen), Article 59 of the proposed constitution read: "Declarations of wars and treaties of peace are to be treated as national laws. Treaties with foreign states which involve matters of national legislation need the approval of the Reichstag. As soon as a League of Nations is formed with the goal of eliminating all secret treaties, then all treaties with other League states will need the approval of the Reichstag."
league idea presupposed that German requests for membership in the League would overcome entente objections. Two public demonstrations in late January and early February, sponsored by the German Peace Society and the DLPV, exemplified both the hopes and the fears of the internationalists in this regard. All speakers praised the ideal of a peaceful world order in which Germany should play its role. At both meetings, however, the counter-theme of fear also emerged, as, for example, in a resolution warning that "this war can have a conciliatory conclusion, only if the rights of all nations are respected, if the peace treaty is just to all sides, and if no nation is politically oppressed or economically enslaved."24

On February 16 the German newspapers published the long-awaited draft League Covenant issued in Paris. Now the German pacifists and the general German public could see in detail how well the reality of the League measured up to the internationalist hopes or confirmed internationalist fears. The first impressions were disheartening, and the immediate German reaction was almost totally negative. The most commonly expressed view condemned the Covenant as a compromise, in which Wilsonian idealism had lost out to Clemenceau's anti-German demands. The apparent refusal of the Paris diplomats to consider the suggestions of the Bern conferences,

24 For the Munich demonstration, see MNN, January 25, 1919 (Morgen), and FZ, January 25 (Morgen); for the Stuttgart gathering, see Staatsanzeiger fuer Wuerttemberg, February 10, 1919, and Voelker-Friede, XIX, Nos. 4/5 (April/May, 1919), p. 33. Perhaps another sign of public interest in the League was the film "Pax Aeterna: Das Erwachen des Voelkerbundes," which played in Berlin from February 9 through 16.
and the inability or refusal of these diplomats to lift the peacekeeping machinery out of the realm of power politics constituted two of the most frequently mentioned criticisms. In view of these defects the evident intention of the victors to exclude Germany from the proposed League did not occasion the surprise or anger one might have expected. True, some saw this as a betrayal of German trust, while others accepted it as an inevitable, if sad, reality. Spokesmen from the Vossische Zeitung and the Sozialistische Monatshefte, on the other hand, took malicious delight in pointing out how they were not surprised by this aspect of the Paris Covenant. It only confirmed their predictions of an Anglo-American attempt at world hegemony, which Germany could thwart only by helping to forge a continental European union.25

The opinions of the German pacifists concerning the handiwork of the entente were scarcely less critical. Fried, although conceding that the German internationalists had not expected miracles, still felt that the Paris Covenant had severely disappointed even their modest hope for limited progress. The charter was deficient in its treatment of disarmament, in its neglect of the problem of national minorities, in its clinging to "outdated power politics," and in its refusal to build on the work of

the Hague conferences. Hans Wehberg coined for the proposed League the ironic title "the Unholy Alliance." Walter Schuecking more optimistically admitted the presence of many good features in the Paris Covenant, although he regretted its excessively political character, which represented a step backward from the legal concepts of the Hague. Both Schuecking and Wehberg agreed, however, that Germany must not reject the league idea altogether, but must rather seek to join the League in order to improve it from within.26

This was also the opinion of Count Harry Kessler, a cosmopolitan, radically-inclined aristocrat with artistic pretensions, who immediately after the November revolution had served for a time as the first German ambassador to Poland. Back in Berlin by the beginning of 1919, Kessler noted in his diary his reaction to the news of the Paris League Covenant.

We can reject it only if we have a better plan, which considers and decisively solves the whole question more broadly and deeply, in a human way. One obvious mistake is that the Paris League is based on nations, which are in a natural state of opposition, instead of on the great economic and human interests and associations, which of their very nature tend toward internationalism. These international associations...must be given means of power and compulsion against national governments.27

Kessler hinted that this notion had first germinated in his mind, after he had observed the crippling effects of a general


27Kessler, Tagebuecher, for February 16, 1919, p. 128.
strike in Berlin in January 1919. Doubtless he was also influenced by the vaguely developed ideas of Walther Rathenau, whom he greatly admired and whose biography he would later write. 28 Whatever the exact sources of its inspiration, Kessler's plan amounted to an extension of the Council System of government into international affairs. As such, it offered an intellectually intriguing, radical alternative to the Wilsonian League of Nations.

Kessler proceeded at once to attempt to muster both private and public backing for his league idea. He did not encounter in Walther Rathenau the sympathetic enthusiasm he had expected, but certain minor officials in the Berlin Foreign Office displayed some interest, especially the members of an informal study committee on foreign policy which Kessler himself had been instrumental in founding. 29 Kessler spoke several times in February and March 1919 with Foreign Minister Brockdorff-Rantzau, as well as with Walter Simons of the legal department of the Foreign Office. Both men expressed a fascination with the project, but Simons told Kessler that the Foreign Office felt it would be best, if Kessler published his proposals for a League of Nations privately. Coming from a former German ambassador, his league sketch would attract public attention and carry considerable weight, without however

28 Ibid., for January 22, 1919, p. 111. In his biography of Rathenau Kessler noted the similarity between his own and Rathenau's ideas, but did not assert a causal connection, Kessler, Walther Rathenau, p. 221.

29Kessler, Tagebuecher, for February 19, 20, and 21, 1919, pp. 130-134. Rathenau, however, still entertained similar ideas for a League, as is evident from his remarks in a letter of December 30, 1919 to an unidentified C. H., in Rathenau, Briefe, pp. 211-212.
officially committing the government. 30

Kessler also found two potential journalistic supporters for his idea, Joseph Bloch of the Sozialistische Monatshefte and Georg Bernhard of the Vossische Zeitung. Both publications, as we have already noted, opposed the Paris League Covenant as an Anglo-American tool for domination of the world. Bloch and Bernhard encouraged Kessler to develop his projected League, sensing in its radical departure from traditional pacifist and Wilsonian conceptions a certain anti-western or anti-anglo-saxon element that appealed to their own goal of a continental union. Both men offered to print Kessler's version of a league constitution, when he had prepared it. 31

30 Kessler, Tagebuecher, for February 22, March 5 and 11, 1919, pp. 135-136, 146-147, 153-154. Kessler also talked with Stresemann on February 27. Stresemann promised to provide him with pertinent materials in support of his league idea, ibid., for February 27, 1919, pp. 140-141. This would explain Stresemann's speech to the National Assembly on March 4, in which he said: "This [the Paris League] is no League of peoples, but a League of states. . . . Whoever holds that we can create a new era of reconciliation among the nations by means of a League must strive to insure that the bearers of this League are not the states but the international organizations. In these international organizations. . . . the idea of internationalism was anchored even before the war." Verhandlungen des Reichstags, CCCXVI, 495.

31 Kessler, Tagebuecher, for April 5, 9, and 19, 1919, pp. 168-169, 172, 176-177. This brief allusion does not do full justice to Joseph Bloch, whose idea of a united Europe, based on Franco-German reconciliation, appealed to pacifists like Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster and socialists like Kurt Eisner, see Anna Siemsen (ed.), Ein Leben fuer Europa: In Memoriam Joseph Bloch (Frankfurt/Main: Europaische Verlaganstalt, 1956), and the booklet, Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster: das Gewissen einer Generation (Recklinghausen: Paulus Verlag, 1953), especially the essay by Felix Stoessinger, pp. 38-39. The fact remains, however, that at this time, the anti-British and anti-American aspects of this continentalism overshadowed the more positive side of their arguments.
Meanwhile the publication of the Paris draft League Covenant on February 16 had also led the Berlin government to conclude that a full-length German version of a league charter would possibly prove more effective than merely listing their separate criticisms of the Paris document. Impetus for this government decision came from many sides, partly from the study made by the German Society for International Law, partly arising out of the government's connection with the DLFV. A suggestion to act along these lines was also contained in a dispatch sent to the Foreign Office from Alfons Weiner, German ambassador to the Netherlands. "We might redirect our policy by publicizing our own more pure and less selfish conception of a League, ... and thereby force the socialists and liberals in all nations to make a comparison between what ought to be and what actually is occurring in Paris." 32

Foreign Minister Brockdorff-Rantzau indicated in February that his government had some alternative suggestions and amendments to propose to the entente League Covenant. In an interview with George Young of the London Daily News he singled out one of his basic objections to the Paris Covenant. "We would have preferred to give the League a more democratic basis, for example, a world parliament instead of an assembly of delegates, a responsible cabinet instead of a Council." 33 Against this backdrop of dissatisfaction with the Paris League Brockdorff-Rantzau spoke with


33 Interview of February 17, 1919 in Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente, pp. 64-65.
Count Harry Kessler about his radical suggestions for revision. More in line, however, with the Foreign Minister's traditional democratic standpoint was the message sent him on March 23 by Walter Schuecking. The pacifist professor had just returned from the Bern League of Nations conference and wrote to Brockdorff-Rantzau, partly to thank him for his appointment to the German peace delegation, but also to report his impressions gleaned at the conference.

Certain astute pacifists in Bern felt that we Germans should take up the fight against the anglo-saxon imperialist tendencies in the Paris draft charter, and should win for ourselves the sympathy of leftists in the enemy countries by pressing, in so far as possible, for a democratic constitution for the League, for a world parliament.34

The Cabinet in Berlin did not take the firm decision to proceed energetically with the project of a separate German draft League Covenant until April 16. The summons by Clemenceau to send delegates to Paris to consider and sign the peace treaty spurred them to this resolution. Erzberger moved the immediate publication of German proposals for a League of Nations, and the Cabinet agreed. Within the remarkably short time of six days, Walter Schuecking was able to present to the Cabinet a draft Covenant, which he and Walter Simons had worked out. In their undertaking they had drawn on Schuecking's own writings, on Erzberger's book of the previous September, and on the model charter submitted in

34Letter of Walter Schuecking to Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, March 23, 1919, in BAK, Nachlass Schuecking, No. 72, Briefwechsel 1919.
January 1919 by the German Society for International Law.35

The matter now became entangled with Kessler’s project, since Schuecking himself entertained a similar notion of basing a League of Nations, at least in part, on international social, economic, and cultural organizations. On Good Friday, April 18, Schuecking visited Kessler and told him about the decisions taken in the recent Cabinet sessions. Kessler was ecstatic at the surprising news that Schuecking intended to incorporate Kessler’s basic notions into the official German government draft, while giving full credit to the Count for originating the ideas. "Good Friday spell!" Kessler wrote enthusiastically in his diary.36 In fact, Schuecking did write a close approximation of Kessler’s conception into his first draft of the proposed League charter. As originally worded the article on a world parliament called for a body "composed of the representatives of those international organizations in which the common cultural or material interests of

35 Protokolle ueber Sitzungen des Reichsministeriums, April 16 and 22, 1919, in BAK, R431/1348, Sitzungen des Reichsministeriums: Protokolle, Alte Reichskanzlei, Vol. 1, pp. 468-469, 570-571. Hereafter these minutes will be cited merely by title, date, volume, and page numbers. For an earlier inconclusive discussion of this topic by the Cabinet, see Protokolle ueber Sitzung des Reichskabinetts, March 22, 1919, Vol. 1, p. 229. As mentioned in Chapter III, the legal department of the Foreign Office had prepared a draft League charter in early 1918, but this draft apparently was not even consulted in preparing the April 1919 version, according to Gottfried Knoll, Der Deutsche Regierungsentwurf zu eine Voelkerbundssatzung vom April 1919 (Leipzig: Theodor Weiher Verlag, 1931), p. 3, and Jaeckh, Voelkerbundgedanken, pp. 45-46.

36 Kessler, Tagebuecher, for April 18, 1919, p. 176.
the members are furthered."^[37]

As Kessler now proceeded to develop his original thoughts on a League of Nations, he began to feel less enthusiastic over the Cabinet's adoption of his particular formulation. Vague rumors and reports reached him that this supposed triumph of his ideas was actually the work of Erzberger, who planned to claim parentage for the Schuecking draft Covenant and thereby steal the credit from Kessler. On April 22 Kessler and Georg Bernhard made arrangements to outwit Erzberger. Kessler would deliver a major speech the next evening, and the Vossische Zeitung would publish it in the morning edition of April 24 as Kessler's contribution to debate over the League. Walter Simons of the Foreign Office also assured the Count that the government draft charter would not be made public until after Kessler's speech.^[38]

Kessler might have worried less about rival claims to his idea, had he known what occurred after the Cabinet session of April 22. Far from appropriating the genesis of the notion to himself, Erzberger had reworked the whole original draft with Schuecking, Goethein, and Bernstorff. As now presented to the Cabinet on April 23, the sketch contained no mention at all of a world parliament. At Dernburg's suggestion that such a promising idea not be omitted altogether, a compromise clause was added, to the effect that "a world parliament will be composed of ten dele-


38Kessler, Tagebuecher, for April 19, 22, and 23, 1919, pp. 176-179.
gates elected from the parliament of every country." Later that evening this official German government draft for a League Covenant was released to the press and appeared in the morning editions of most papers on April 24. Kessler's speech on the evening of April 23 also appeared in the press the next morning, on the front page of the Vossische Zeitung under the title "German Suggestions for a League of Nations." Despite a clearly worded editorial introduction to the transcript of Kessler's speech, some confusion resulted, especially abroad, as to the actual identity of the official German plan for a League. This momentary confusion may have given Kessler's plan more importance than it deserved as a viable project with any hope of enactment. As an intellectual contribution, however, and as a non-political alternative to the traditional internationalist formulations, Kessler's guidelines for a proposed League possessed an imaginative audacity, which even such an experienced legal pacifist as Walter Schuecking found appealing.

The open incorporation of the controversial Council System


40 BT, April 24 (Morgen); FZ, April 24 (Morgen).

41 "Deutsche Vorschlaege zum Voelkerbund," VossZ, April 24, 1919 (Morgen). The paper continued to push Kessler's plan, as in Georg Bernhard, "Welt-Raetesystem," VossZ, April 25, 1919 (Morgen). Kessler blamed the confusion also on Erzberger, Tagebuecher for April 24, 1919, p. 179.

42 Schuecking attended the April 23 speech by Kessler and in the ensuing discussion he declared himself in overall agreement with the Count's suggestions, VossZ, April 24 (Morgen), and Kessler, Tagebuecher for April 23, p. 178.
and the consequent rejection of formal democracy, however, militated against the acceptance of Kessler's plan. Whatever following his idea might have obtained was considerably reduced by its association with the Vossische Zeitung, for the journal's continentalist stand riled most socialists and liberal internationalists. To aggravate matters, at this very time, in mid-April 1919, representatives of this newspaper and of the like-minded Sozialistische Monatshefte were working in the second National Congress of Councils to secure a vote in favor of such a continental alliance against "Anglo-American imperialism."\(^4\) Kessler's league proposal, though not explicitly favoring this foreign policy, suffered from guilt by association.

This German government draft for a League Covenant was only one part of Germany's response to the situation in which it found itself. Military defeat and diplomatic isolation had created this situation, and by early 1919 it became increasingly evident that a magnanimous peace settlement was not likely to emerge from the Paris conference, unless Germany acted. Rhetorical appeals to world solidarity could not in themselves effect changes in diplomatic and political circles. Therefore the German government must create for itself a position of prestige and respectability from which it might, with reasonable hope of success, strive

\(^4\)Reports on this Congress of Councils are in Die Republik, April 9 through 15, 1919. For discussions pro and con, see Julius Kaliski, "Rede vor dem Raete-Kongress," VossZ, April 9 (Morgen); "Raetekongress ueber auswaertige Politik," VossZ, April 15 (Morgen); editorial, FZ, April 16 (Morgen). On April 16 the special committee on peace problems of the National Assembly discussed the suggestions made in the Congress of Councils, FZ, April 23 (Morgen).
to obtain favorable peace terms.

The campaign took place on several fronts. One such tactical move was German advocacy of a League of Nations as described above. Ambassador Wiener had alluded to this motive in his January dispatch. "At the peace negotiations the league idea offers us the best chance to look good; in this way we can out-trump our enemies in idealism and sternness, but at no real cost to ourselves." 44

Another part of this calculated effort to win moral prestige and a voice in the peace negotiations at Paris involved German advocacy of the demands made by the International Trade Union Conference at Bern in February 1919. Concurrently with its League proposal the German government published its sketch for an international code of labor legislation covering such topics as the eight-hour day, social insurance, working conditions, and an international labor commission. 45 Both this and the League proposal represented attempts to appeal over the heads of the statesmen in Paris to the people, especially to the working classes, of the western democracies. Germany sought to gain a more advantageous bargaining position by appealing to world public opinion with its adoption of programs favored by international socialism and democracy. In the one instance it intended to capitalize on general

44 Brief von Wiener an das Auswartige Amt, January 31, 1919, in PA-AA.

45 BT, April 24, 1919 (Morgen). This document was also printed in a brochure issued by the Foreign Office, "Voelkerbund" oder Voelkerbund: Wie Paris ihn uns aufwingen will und wie Deutschland ihn for dern wird (Charlottenburg: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fuer Politik und Geschichte, 1919), pp. 14-20.
disappointment with the Paris Covenant, in the other, with the dissatisfaction over the entente's relative neglect of international labor problems. In both cases the German initiative followed lines laid down at the Bern socialist and pacifist conferences in February and March.

The German government also sought to firm up its position in advance of peace negotiations by staffing its peace delegation and subordinate committees with acknowledged internationalists. On March 12 the Cabinet decided on a list of six primary delegates, among whom was Walter Schuecking. Word of these appointments quickly leaked to the press, and complaints arose from two sides. The government ignored the rightist charge that an internationalist like Schuecking would not defend German national interests. On the other hand, liberals, socialists, and pacifists were indignant that only one professed pacifist was on the peace delegation. They suggested adding an Independent Socialist, preferably Karl Kautsky. The government would not yield on this point, and Schuecking remained the sole pacifist on the official delegation. On March 18, however, the Cabinet voted to establish a list of delegation advisors, including "certain persons of international reputation, such as Professor Lujo Brentano, Professor Max Weber, Professor Moritz Bonn, Eduart Bernstein" and representatives of the various religions. In so doing it acted on "the principle of finding personalities of world renown who would facilitate the

restoration of international relations in various fields.\textsuperscript{47}

In addition to these direct efforts to compensate for Germany's weak diplomatic position there was discussion of another ploy to overcome the legacy of defeat and isolation, namely the trump card of Bolshevism. It was, of course, one thing actually to seek the bolshevization of Germany and quite another to warn the entente that a vindictive peace settlement might drive Germany into the arms of the Bolsheviks. As we have seen, only the Spartacists actively fought for a Soviet Germany allied with Lenin's Russia. A last flicker of such agitation came in Bavaria in April 1919. A coup in Munich overthrew the uneasy coalition government which had ruled since Eisner's assassination and installed a Council System of government. This self-styled Soviet uprising considered itself one link in the chain of revolutions starting in Russia and extending recently into Hungary, where Bela Kun's Communists had just seized power. The Bavarian revolutionary spokesmen made no secret of their goal. "In union with revolutionary Russia and Hungary the new Bavaria will form the revolutionary International and help pave the way for the world revolution." After this short-lived Soviet Republic was crushed, one of the communist leaders, Eugen Levine, explained the revolutionary internationalist utopia which had animated the hopeless venture. "I believed that Germany could be saved from its international situation only by the intervention of the proletariat. .

\textsuperscript{47} BT, March 13 and 14, 1919 (Abend); Vorwaerts, April 4 (Morgen); "Eingabe der Deutschen Friedensgesellschaft an die Nationalversammlung," BT, April 1 (Abend); Protokoll ueber Sitzung des Reichsministeriums, March 18, 1919, Vol. 1, p. 167.
Our Soviet Republic was an attempt to save Germany from its impending tragic fate."

For most Germany, however, the path to Moscow was not a preferable alternative to the path toward Paris. Radical intellectuals might debate the desirability of an eastern orientation as compared with the prospects of resuming relations with the west. The policy of the Foreign Ministry was to avoid having to confront such uncomfortable options. "A one-sided alliance with the west against Russia or a union with Russia in order to frustrate an undesirable peace settlement—either of these would amount to a continuation of the war." Brockdorff-Rantzau desired to shut no doors prematurely, but he saw that tactical considerations recommended a more realistic course. "We should recall that the fight against Bolshevism forms one of the few common denominators re-uniting us with the western powers."

Officially and privately the Germans continued to use the

48 Erich Muehsam, "Proletarier aller Laender, vereinigt Euch!," MNN, April 8, 1919 (Abend); "An das Volk Bayern, von dem revolutionaren Zentralrat," MNN, April 7 (Morgen); "Der Gruss der ungarischen revolutionaren Rasteredestruktion," MNN, April 9 (Abend); "Levine vor Gericht," MNN, June 3, 1919 (Abend).

Specter of Bolshevism as a psychological weapon in an otherwise uneven struggle against an entente-dictated peace. The main thrust of their argument was that unless the victorious powers offered Germany favorable peace terms and membership in the League of Nations, Germany would be forced to find salvation elsewhere.

Considering the future variegated history of this argument in the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich, and the Adenauer era, it is interesting to find the pacifist Walter Schuecking writing to Foreign Minister Brockdorff-Rantzau in 1919 concerning the tactics of this maneuver.

On all sides [at the Bern conference] I heard the suggestion that Germany should refuse to sign any peace treaty which contains excessively harsh conditions. . . . Bolshevism is feared in England, France, and Italy. We could, therefore, according to the opinion of my friends there, threaten the entente that, if the peace failed to materialize owing to their lack of justice, then they would be ruined along with us. 50

The success of Bela Kun in Hungary in March 1919 provided more ammunition for those Germans anxious to sound a warning to their western victors. "Unless the entente finally decides to negotiate honorably with its former enemies, whose only goal is to shape a lasting peace according to the principles of Wilson and of international social democracy, we do not see how such a fate [as Hungary's] is to be averted." 51 No was the government above in-


51 Editorial, Vorwaerts, March 22, 1919 (Abend); also "Das Menetekel von Budapest," and "Die Entente und der Bolschevismus," MNN, March 26 and March 29/30. A more critical view was contained in Hjalmar Schacht, "Bolschewistische Auflösung oder internationale Zusammenarbeit," Bf, April 2 (Morgen).
dulging in such intrigues. When French and British observers came to Berlin in March to investigate Germany's domestic stability, an official from the Ministry of Justice was reputed to impress upon them "the conviction that the danger of Bolshevism is an urgent one for all of western Europe...and that Germany is the strongest and last bulwark against this threat."52 This motif was to run through much of subsequent German politics.

3. Versailles and After

Underlying all the tactics and stratagems described above was the internationalist assumption that the new democratic and socialist Germany deserved better treatment from the victors than the imperial autocracy which it had superseded. The events of May and June 1919 proved these expectations illusory, and in so doing, they presented to the German nationalists the propaganda weapon of a Diktatfrieden, which they used with telling effect in their campaign against the internationalists. The German peace delegation came to Paris in May prepared to negotiate, but no opportunity for real negotiation was granted. The specific written objections which they were allowed to submit led to only slight modifications in the original treaty terms. The Entente, through the mouth of Clemenceau, politely but firmly rejected the two positive German contributions to the concept of international organization, namely the sketch for a League of Nations and the

code of international labor legislation. On top of all this, Germany was not admitted into the entente-dominated League.

The reaction of the German internationalists to these setbacks took several forms. Initially, as in the past, they appealed to pacifists and other like-minded colleagues abroad, but now with an even greater urgency. The Majority Socialists warned their western comrades that the Versailles peace treaty did not represent so much a national triumph over the German empire, as a capitalist device to crush the nascent German socialist republic. In similar fashion the women of Germany urged their sisters in western Europe and America to protest this peace "which will only kindle hatred and a new world conflict." The German Peace Society wrote to Wilson of the impact the treaty would have on their work within Germany. "It will stir up all nationalistic instincts... It will shake our young democracy and further the machinations of the reactionaries... In this way it will endanger the whole work of a peaceful reorganization of the world, of which you are the prophet."53

At home, many German pacifists, notably Quidde and Schuecking, joined other politicians in denouncing the Versailles treaty as unacceptable and impossible of fulfillment. The opposition of such men reflected their horror at the treaty's violation of their internationalist hopes. These pacifists were quick to assert that only they, and not the reactionary nationalists, might

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53Vorwaerts, May 10, 1919 (Morgen); FZ, May 21 (Morgen) and May 25 (Morgen). Also pertinent is the appeal "An die Geistigen Arbeiter aller Laender vom Reichsbund geistiger Arbeiter, Ortgruppe Muenchen," MNN, June 7/8, 1919.
justifiably protest the entente peace terms, since only they had stood for internationalist principles when Germany had still hoped to win the war. The fact was, however, that these specifically pacifist motives for opposing the Versailles treaty could not always emerge clearly in the emotional atmosphere of the time, and the similarity of the protests themselves tended to blur the line between the nationalists and the internationalists. Thus both Quidde and the nationalists argued for German rejection of the peace treaty on the assumption that the entente would yield in the face of united German defiance and would ameliorate the terms. Both Quidde and the nationalists insisted that the attribution of sole war guilt to Germany and her allies was false and unjust. In view of the potential confusion which these similar views might cause, Hans Wehberg felt compelled to point out the narrow, but decisive, line separating pacifism from the nationalist reaction.

Our chief aim must be to achieve a modification of the Versailles treaty, but not, of course, through a war. We must oppose those nationalist circles who harbor such ideas. . . . We attack the treaty with weapons of the spirit, by proving to the world that it does not correspond to Wilson's Fourteen Points. In our criticism of the treaty we must take care not to offend or injure other peoples. Our only true reason for opposing Clemenceau's handiwork is our love of justice. 54

If the pacifists had done no more to differentiate their

54Speech by Hans Wehberg at the June Pacifist Congress, printed in Achter Deutscher Pazifistenkongress einberufen von der Deutschen Friedensgesellschaft und der Zentralstelle Volkerrecht, Berlin, 13-15 Juni 1919 (Charlottenburg: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fuer Politik und Geschichte, 1919), pp. 50-51. For Quidde's speech in the National Assembly in May, Verhandlungen des Reichstags, GCXXVII, 1107-1110. For other similar pacifist statements on this issue, see articles in FZ, June 5 (Abend) and June 19 (Morgen), and in MNN, May 17/18.
protests from those of the nationalists than by staking out this somewhat theoretical position, then the accusation levelled against them might have some validity, namely that "while the nationalists spoke, the pacifists furnished them with arguments."55 But the German internationalists, unlike the right-wing, did not content themselves with denunciations and hand-wringing. Once it became evident that both the peace treaty and the League Covenant were to become realities, the internationalists searched for ways to come to terms with these unpleasant facts of international life.

Despite discouragements, the pacifists and other like-minded Germans looked for a positive side in the events of the summer of 1919. They realized that the signing of the peace treaty meant not only the end of the war, but also the beginning of a new age. Though inaugurated under less than auspicious circumstances, they insisted that this new age must not begin with German abandonment of the internationalist principles as the guiding stars of its foreign policy.

Chief among these internationalist principles was attachment to the idea of a League of Nations. Several reasons existed why Germany must not lose faith in the league concept, but must instead do all it could to gain admission to the world body and then to work from within at converting it into a more perfect international instrument for peace. The League offered the best, indeed the only, peaceful and legal means for effecting revision of the Versailles treaty. Moreover, given the technological and

55Berkeley, Deutsche Friedensbewegung, p. 59.
economic trends toward world inter-dependence, some form of international association was inevitable. To these practical considerations some writers added a moral argument. Should Germany now abandon its earlier enthusiastic endorsement of the League, the world might with reason accuse the new republican government of pursuing the discredited imperial two-faced politics of supporting the League only as long as that seemed to favor immediate German national interests. Such blatant hypocrisy would bring Germany once more into disrepute. It would amount to "beginning the peace with the same kind of lie as we began the war."56

German internationalism therefore sought to keep alive the will to incorporate the Reich into the family of nations, even after the debacle of Versailles. If official admission into the League appeared temporarily impossible, then private efforts must make up for this deficiency. In July 1919 German intellectuals joined colleagues from France, Italy, Belgium, Sweden, and the United States in subscribing to Romain Rolland's appeal "For the Independence of the Spirit." This manifesto, printed in several leading German newspapers, pledged its adherents to believe in and work for supra-national cultural solidarity. "We rejoice in humanity and love it. . . . We acknowledge no nation. We know only one people, the people of humanity." Along similar lines

56Ludwig Quidde, "Voelkerbund trotz alledemi!," Mitteilungen der Deutschen Liga fuer Voelkerbund, No. 11 (May 14, 1919); Walter Schuecking, "Deutschlands Mission," ET, July 13 (Morgen); Johann Heinrich Bernstorff, "Das zukunftige Verhaeltnis Deutschlands zu den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika," Das Demokratische Deutschland, I, No. 31 (July 13, 1919), pp. 717-723.
certain German pacifists took steps to join the Swiss-based Central Committee for the Restoration of International Relations.57

New international socialist and pacifist conferences in Switzerland in August and September 1919 provided occasions to demonstrate a continuing cooperation between the Germans and their western colleagues. Coming as they did in the wake of the Versailles treaty, these conferences reflected a general disillusionment by both socialists and pacifists over the frustration of their earlier hopes. The chief tone was one of limited expectation as compared with the Bern conferences of February and March. The comment of Friedrich Stampfer on the Lucerne Socialist conference perhaps best summed up the spirit which animated German internationalism in the post-Versailles months. "Let us learn from the past, and, instead of an International of resolutions and illusions, let us set up a new International of sober self-criticism and of practical work."58

For most German internationalists self-criticism meant a renewed interest in the moral question of German guilt. As dis-

57This appeal and the list of signers was printed in Vorwaerts, July 26, 1919 (Morgen), PZ, July 27 (Abend), and VossZ, July 28 (Abend). The new Minister-President, Gustav Bauer, referred to the appeal in a speech to the National Assembly on July 23, Verhandlungen des Reichstags, GGGXXVIII, 1852. On German membership in the Swiss Committee, see letter of Count Max Montgelas to Walter Schuecking together with enclosures, July 9, 1919, in BAK, Nachlass Schuecking, Verschiedene Vereinigungen, Vol. 1.

tinguished from the controversy over diplomatic responsibility for
the war, this moral view emphasized that a Prussianized Germany,
the embodiment of autocracy and militarism, had brought down on
its own head the enmity of the liberal democracies of the world.
It took considerable courage for Eduard Bernstein to conclude from
this well-grounded foreign distrust of Germany that "eighty or
ninety percent of the Versailles treaty was just and necessary."59
Another eloquent voice of self-criticism was Friedrich Wilhelm
Foerster, who had long fought against the dominance of Treitschke
and Prussianism within Germany. Foerster, like Quidde, had op­
posed signing the Versailles treaty on the ground that it was in­
compatible with pacifist ideals, but he admitted that in view of
Germany's international reputation the treaty was "psychologically
very understandable." He cautioned his fellow-countrymen not to
vent their bitterness so much against foreign countries as against
those at home who had been responsible for Germany's moral inferi­
ority. Germany must cleanse itself by acknowledging its past
aberrations, and it must be the first country to do so, since it
had most consistently and excessively sinned.60 With a similar
sense of a new German moral mission Mayor Konrad Adenauer spoke at

59Eduard Bernstein, "Die nächsten Aufgaben in der
Friedensfrage," Vorwaerts, July 4 and 5, 1919 (Abend). Bernstein
had first made this remark at the June Socialist Party Congress,
Protokoll ueber die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozial-
demokratischen Partei Deutschlands, Weimar, 10-15 Juni 1919

60Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, "Nach Friedensschluss," BT,
July 15 and 17 (Morgen). Viktor Schiff, "Wilsons Versagen, unsere
Schuld," Vorwaerts, July 18 (Morgen) attacked these articles and
criticized Foerster for his "unlimited confidence in the western
democracies."
the dedication of the recently founded Cologne University in June 1919.

Here on the Rhine German culture and the democratic culture of the west confront each other more clearly than elsewhere. If we do not succeed in bringing these two elements together into some sort of a cultural synthesis, then it is good-bye to Europe's hegemony in the world. This university must and will cooperate in this lofty work of lasting international reconciliation.61

Within the realm of practical work one widely discussed suggestion emerged by which Germany might concretely illustrate her commitment to reconciliation with the west and at the same time exemplify her readiness to make amends for war-time destruction. This was the project to help reconstruct the devastated areas in occupied Belgium and northern France. Internationalists had considered action in this field of endeavor from the first days after the November revolution. German assistance for rebuilding these devastated areas had been one of Kurt Eisner's proposals during the November days of his independent Bavarian foreign policy.62 A letter of Walther Rathenau to Finance Minister Erzberger in July 1919 expounded the sweeping ramifications involved in this undertaking.

In our present desperate position we must try to find the fulcrum point for controlling the whole situation. That point lies in Belgium and northern France, in the problem of reconstruction. On this basis we can (1) arrange our relationship to France; (2) revise the peace treaty; (3) refashion and improve the reparations agreement; (4) influence domestic conditions; (5) regain for Germany her moral

61 Telegram, June 13, 1919 (Morgen).

62 Telegram of Eisner to Foerster, November 18, 1919, BGStA, MA I 1016, Beziehungen zum Ausland, No. 26.
position. The main prerequisite is that we must not undertake the reconstruction as a reluctantly assumed duty, but should rather elevate it to the status of a major world issue, an accomplishment of such perfection that, measured against the war, it will stand out for centuries as Germany's greatest positive achievement. 63

Discussion soon bogged down in the morass of reparations controversies. Difficulties also arose over whether German prisoners of war should be employed, or only volunteers. Eventually some private German groups and individuals did attempt on a small scale to carry out this initial internationalist inspiration. 64

Another example of Germany's practical willingness to pursue a pro-League, internationalist policy despite the diplomatic rebuffs of 1919 resulted from an initiative taken by the German Association for a League of Nations. In the late summer of 1919 Ernst Jaseckh, as business manager of the DLFV, conceived the plan of establishing a semi-official German representative at the Geneva headquarters of the League of Nations, under the auspices of the DLFV. He considered for this appointment the new Frankfurter Zeitung correspondent to Switzerland, Bernhard Guttmann, and invited the journalist to Berlin for conversations with the new Foreign Minister Hermann Mueller, with Erzberger,


64References to government interest in the project may be found in PA-AA, Akten vom Auswaertigen Amt Weimar, 10, Wiederaufbau der zerstoerten Gebiete. Also see Johannes Bartschut, "Der Aufbau der zerstoerten Gebiete," VossZ, July 10, 1919 (Morgen) and "Der Wiederaufbau und die USPD," VossZ, August 7 (Abend). The only indications I found of actual attempts were references to the work of Florens Rang and of a Catholic group, mentioned in F. W. Foerster, Erlebte Weltgeschichte, p. 343.
and with other interested parties in the Foreign Office. After assurances that the position would not interfere with his continued work for his newspaper, Guttmann accepted the position and a DLFV remuneration of two thousand Swiss francs for his future services. "I will constantly keep the Association for a League of Nations informed on the general political situation and especially on everything concerning the League of Nations and the concept of international reconciliation." Jaeckh, for his part, promised to pass on this information to the Wilhelmstrasse and to coordinate the efforts of his private ambassador with the activities of the Foreign Office.65

From this it is clear that the shock of Versailles and the disappointment over the Paris League Covenant did not paralyze the outward-directed activities of the German internationalists. On the domestic front, too, these diplomatic setbacks proved to be serious obstacles to effective work, but here too the internationalists continued to strive to translate their ideals into reality. A consideration of these activities will round out our study of internationalism and the German revolution.

CHAPTER V
SECURING THE HOME FRONT

1. Constitutional Reform

The November revolution created for the German pacifists an opportunity to translate their internationalist principles into practice. The forces of militarism and autocracy had, temporarily at least, lost their grip on the reins of power, at the very time that a revulsion against the war was inclining popular sentiment in favor of the pacifist cause. The socialist governments which came to power in Berlin, Munich, and other state capitals looked with favor on the internationalist movement, of which their own party formed a section. In the January 1919 elections to the National Assembly the three parties of the Reichstag Peace Resolution scored a large majority. High-ranking members of the ruling Center, Democratic, and Majority Socialist parties were active in internationalist associations.

These ideological and personal ties between pacifism and the leaders of the new German republic guaranteed that internationalism would have a voice in shaping the future German constitution. The preparation of this document was one of the chief tasks of the National Assembly, and the internationalists were resolved that the new constitution should mirror their teachings, in so far as that was relevant. Writing in Friedens-Warte Georg Grosch recommended that the authors of the constitution should include in it "definite changes so as to render impossible for all
time to come that attitude of scorn toward international ethics and international law which obtained during the war."¹ The Berlin branch of the Peace Society sent a petition to the National Assembly with similar demands.

We request that the National Assembly, in its drafting of the new constitution, make a clear break with the traditions of the past German Empire. . . . An understanding with our former enemies is dependent on whether the German people abandons its old ways based on the glorification of military success and on power politics. . . . The National Assembly should assent to the idea of a League of Nations. . . .not as a way out of present difficulties, but as the realization of the ideal of justice and of general cultural progress.²

One basic constitutional position shared by almost all German internationalists, pacifists, socialists, and liberals, was that parliamentary control of foreign policy would ensure peace by taking diplomatic decision-making out of the hands of an allegedly irresponsible elite and vesting it in the people’s representatives. The German Society for International Law had addressed itself to this issue in its work on a league charter in the fall of 1918. A sub-committee headed by Walter Schuecking considered the arguments and recommended an effective Reichstag voice in foreign policy

¹Georg Grosch, "Die voelkerrechtlichen Bestimmungen im Verfassungs-Entwurf fuer das kuenftige Deutsche Reich," Friedens-Warte, XXI, No. 3 (April, 1919), pp. 64-66.

²"Antrag der Deutschen Friedensgesellschaft, Ortsgruppe Berlin, an die Nationalversammlung," (undated) in Voelker-Friede, XIX, No. 6 (June, 1919), pp. 45-46.
The proposed constitution, as presented to the National Assembly contained three articles aimed at accomplishing this internationalist goal. We have already noted that one such article stipulated that "declarations of war and treaties of peace must come into effect through the process of national legislation," that is, they would require the consent of the Reichstag. This paragraph went on to provide that "upon the creation of a League of Nations with a prohibition on secret diplomacy, all international treaties will require parliamentary approval."  

This article came up for debate on February 10, 1919 and encountered its first opposition from the left. The Independent Socialist, Hugo Haase, felt that the provisions were too limited, and he demanded an immediate and unconditional end to secret treaties and diplomacy. Germany should not wait for a League of Nations to act, but should set a good example, and incidentally create a favorable impression abroad, by pioneering in this direction. Hugo Preuss, the architect of the constitution, warned that Germany should not commit itself in advance to a potentially unilateral, and therefore disadvantageous, concession, while Foreign


4This was article 59 of the draft constitution, printed in FZ, January 21, 1919 (Morgen).
Minister Brockdorff-Rantzau assured the National Assembly that he had no intention of concluding any secret treaties. Unimpressed, Haase submitted a resolution to amend this article so as to ban all secret treaties and secret diplomacy from the outset. The motion lost, although the two pacifists present, Quidde and Schuecking, broke ranks from the Democratic Party to vote for it.\(^5\)

The next discussion of this article occurred during the final reading of the constitution in July 1919. The atmosphere was now highly unfavorable to any internationalist sentiments, what with the reaction to the peace treaty and the disenchantment over the Paris League Covenant. Nationalist opponents successfully eliminated from the article the direct reference to a League of Nations and to secret diplomacy "as being unworthy of Germany." The pleas of Independent and Majority Socialists availed only to save the essential clauses of Article 45 which in its final form read: "Declarations of war and treaties of peace must come into effect through the process of national legislation. Alliances and treaties with foreign states which concern areas of national legislation need the consent of the Reichstag."\(^6\)

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\(^5\) Verhandlungen des Reichstags, CCCXXVI, 14, 29-35. For the stand taken by Quidde and Schuecking see the letters of Quidde to his wife, February 11 and 14, 1919, in Handschriftenabteilung der Muenchner Stadtbibliothek, Nachlass Ludwig Quidde—hereafter cited merely as Nachlass Quidde.

Meanwhile in early March the National Assembly took up for consideration a related article which stated rather loosely that "the generally acknowledged rules of international law shall be binding components of German national law." This provision got off to a bad start in the National Assembly owing to the vagueness of Walter Schuecking's explanatory opening speech. On March 7 the Committee on the Constitution began detailed study of the article. The committee members from Stresemann's German People's Party unanimously opposed including such a statement in the constitution. There were no "generally acknowledged rules of international law," they averred, and even if there were, this unilateral admission by Germany constituted a humiliating condescension to world public opinion.

The defenders of the article, remonstrated that Germany must make some reference in its constitution to internationalist principles, lest it fall again into the bad repute it had enjoyed immediately after the Hague conferences. Obviously, the traumatic memory of this event still rankled in internationalist breasts. Against the conservative contention that this provision would single out Germany as an exceptional case, Hugo Preuss pointed out that in the United States international treaties formed the law of the land. The Majority Socialists, in an attempt to clarify the situation, moved to reword the article so that it would read,

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7 Verhandlungen des Reichstages, CCCXXVI, 475-477. Stresemann criticized Schuecking's speech for not explaining what was meant by "the generally acknowledged rules of international law." Ibid., p. 495.

8 Verz. March 7, 1919 (Abend).
"The treaties concluded by Germany, the generally acknowledged rules of international law, and, when Germany enters a League of Nations, the decisions of the League, shall constitute binding elements of German national law." The Foreign Office and the Justice Ministry, however, let it be known that they preferred the original wording, and in that form Article 4 entered with Weimar Constitution without further debate.9

One other related article in the proposed constitution called for the creation of a Reichstag committee on foreign affairs. On July 4 the National Assembly debated this provision. Appropriately, Walter Schuecking took the floor to defend the creation of this parliamentary organ, which he had also favored in his report to the German Society for International Law. He presented the case briefly. "Foreign policy has long been the cause of grief for the German people. One reason has been the failure of the Reichstag to act. . . . It will be a good reform, if a committee of foreign policy experts from all parties is set up to work with the government." Hugo Haase, the opponent of secret diplomacy, also spoke in favor of the proposed article, which passed and became Article 35 of the Weimar Constitution.10

The internationalists had therefore succeeded in writing


10Verhandlungen des Reichstags, CCCXXVII, 1291-1299. The pertinent part of Article 35 read: "Der Reichstag bestellt einen ständigen Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten," Kakies, Deutsche Verfassungen, p. 83.
all three of their desired innovations into the Weimar Constitution. In this way internationalism, as a part of the revolutionary situation, became embedded in the charter of the new republic. This internationalist victory, so potentially significant for German development, did not escape the notice of contemporary politicians. The remarks of speakers in the National Assembly testified to the controversial nature of these internationalist reforms.

Rudolf Heinze of the German People's Party, in opposing the creation of the Reichstag foreign affairs committee, condemned "this outpouring of distrust...which is nowhere less called for than in foreign policy." In so doing he hit upon the very attitude which, to the dismay of nationalistic conservatives, characterized the internationalist backers of these constitutional reforms. Their pre-war and war-time experiences had bred in them an aversion to the spirit, the personnel, and the results of traditional German diplomacy. They saw in their ideal League of Nations one escape from these evils, but they were also determined to shape the national constitution in such a way as to limit the independence of the Foreign Office. Over and above the prescribed parliamentary supervision, they hoped that the Wilhelmstrasse would purge itself of the traditions and personalities left over from the days of the Wilhelmian Empire. Brockdorff-Rantzau, however, insisted on a free hand within the Foreign Office, as he explained to the Cabinet. "An actual parliamentarianization of the foreign service is not possible, since a successful

11Verhandlungen des Reichstags, CCCXXVII, 1291.
foreign policy presupposes a relationship of confidence between the ambassadors and the Foreign Minister." ¹²

During the final general discussion on the constitution in late July 1919 other speeches in the National Assembly alluded to the internationalist spirit of the document. A Majority Socialist deputy praised the constitution for "erecting bridges to the international community by acknowledging the creative power of international law." Center and Democratic spokesmen voiced regret over the deletion of the passage mentioning the League of Nations. ¹³ Critical remarks came from both extremes. The Independent Socialists announced their intention to vote against ratification, since in their eyes the constitution was neither democratic nor internationalist enough. Nationalist speakers, however, found all too many traces of internationalism in the constitution, which they branded as "full of illusions, especially the illusion of a world revolution." ¹⁴

This tension between nationalism and internationalism appeared in other National Assembly debates also. A constitutional article describing the new German flag sparked a brief flurry of controversy, largely because the Independent Socialists


¹³Verhandlungen des Reichstags, CCCXXVIII, 2077-2081.

¹⁴Ibid., CCCXXVIII, 1955, 2090-2091, 2100.
tried to make the red flag the official state emblem, while conservatives clung to the black-white-red of the Hohenzollern monarchy. The adoption of black-red-gold pleased all democratic forces with its memories of 1848. This decision could also be seen as a compromise between nationalistic attachment to the imperial past and an unbending Marxian internationalism.\(^\text{15}\)

Another incident, not properly a constitutional matter, also revolved around socialist internationalism. On April 7, 1919 the Scheidemann Cabinet decided to make May 1 a general national holiday dedicated to world peace. The wording of the government proclamation left no doubt, if any could have existed, that international socialist connotations dictated the choice of May Day as the first holiday of the new republic.\(^\text{16}\)

A resolution in support of the Cabinet's decision was placed before the National Assembly later in April. In his introductory speech, the socialist presiding officer, Eduard David, emphasized the two-fold inspiration behind the festival. "With this measure we seek to establish a general holiday dedicated to the high ideals of the international protection of labor and of a lasting and secure world peace." Of the three coalition parties only a representative of the Center objected, on the ground that May Day derived from an ideology with which a major part of the

\(^{15}\text{Ibid., CCCXXVII, 1225-1234. Article 5 read: "Die Reichsfarben sind schwarz-rot-gold. Die Handelsflagge ist schwarz-weiss-rot mit den Reichsfarben in der oberen inneren Ecke," Kakies, Deutsche Verfassungen, p. 77. The second sentence was a concession to the nationalists.}\)

\(^{16}\text{Protokoll ueber die Sitzung des Reichsministeriums, April 7, 1919, Vol. 1, pp. 394-398.}\)
population disagreed. Just how violently this disagreement might exhibit itself became evident in the reply of the DNVP spokesman, Dr. Koeltsch, who seized the occasion to launch an impassioned attack.

We have had only the most painful experience with the international or cosmopolitan idea. . . . That was how it was after 1813, 1815, 1848, 1870 and now again today. Gentlemen! Have we not had enough of internationalism? How we have placed our hopes in it, you on the left especially! But we remain incorrigible dreamers and gullible believers, . . . There is nothing to recommend such a holiday as this. 17

In the face of opposition the government had to be content with a bill proclaiming May 1 a national holiday just for 1919. Almost coincidentally the socialist International issued a manifesto dedicating the day on a world-wide basis to the ideal of a league of peoples. 18 For a time the German Democratic Party considered formal participation in the celebration along with the socialists in order to demonstrate its own internationalist sentiments, but at the last minute the party's central committee rejected the notion. 19 The holiday passed in Germany without any disturbances or any general enthusiasm, though Vorwaerts printed a "Chorus of Reconciliation" expressing the theme for the day.

Brothers, we were tools in the hands of evil men. . . .

17Verhandlungen des Reichstags, CCCXXVII, 1049-1060.
18Vorwaerts, April 24, 1919 (Abend).
19Sitzung des Geschäftsleitung Ausschusses der Deutschen Demokratischen Partei, April 12, 1919, BAK R45III/9, Protokolle der Sitzungen des Geschäftsleitung Ausschusses der DDP, pp. 94-98. The party left the decision to the locals, and the Frankfurt Democrats staged a May Day celebration, FZ, May 1 (Morgen) and May 2 (Morgen).
Brothers, we want to extend our hands to all sides; Brothers, draw nearer to us; we must all be of one mind.
In Germany, France, and Russia, Beyond the Alps, beyond the Rhine,
All laborers must stand united as one.

2. Education and Internationalism
These parliamentary and diplomatic reforms, important though they were to the internationalist cause, largely represented the victory of basic and long-accepted liberal beliefs. A more dramatic sign of the internationalist character of the new constitution appeared in the section on education and the schools. Here the willingness to break with the chauvinist past found striking expression in a sentence on the content of instruction, which prescribed that "all schools are to strive to inculcate moral training, a sense of citizenship and of personal and professional excellence in the spirit of Germanic national character and of international reconciliation /Im Geiste des deutschen Volksstums und der Volkerversoehnung/".

Overshadowed as it was by the more vigorous controversy concerning confessional versus free schools, this short clause first received consideration on the floor of the National Assembly in July. Again, German revulsion against the recently ratified Versailles treaty created an unfavorable atmosphere for talk of international reconciliation. A Nationalist (DNVP) deputy spoke out in favor of "a German school, with no place in it for any-

20 Vorwaerts, May 1, 1919.
21 FZ. January 21, 1919 (Morgen).
thing un-German or anti-German." 22

Dramatic confrontations between socialists and nationalists interrupted the proceedings and highlighted the nature of the dispute. A delegate of Stresemann's party pointed out how foolish it was for Germans at precisely this time to insert the term "International Reconciliation" into their constitution as a desirable goal of education. "We should instead teach our youth about the peace treaty, and then they will develop the courage and the strength for action." At this a socialist shouted, "Do you want to bring down new misfortune upon us?" A short while later as a DNVP delegate was also condemning the article as particularly inappropriate at this moment, the cry "All the more important now!" arose from the socialist benches. To this the Nationalist speaker heatedly, but perhaps correctly, retorted, "There lies the difference in our points of view!" A final effort by the conservative side to eliminate the objectionable phrase as "being a gesture of servitude to world opinion" failed, and the article became a part of the Weimar Constitution. 23

The topic which ignited this flurry of debate was one on which both nationalists and internationalists had very strong feelings. In contrast to the conservative attacks in the National Assembly, Frau Blos of the Majority Socialists and Rheinlaender of

22 Verhandlungen des Reichstags, CCCXVIII, 1689.

the Center Party spoke warmly concerning the importance of educating youth in the spirit of reconciliation. The place which education held in the internationalist plan for the new republic was at least as important a one as that assigned to the constitutional reforms in the area of foreign policy. In fact, the internationalists regarded the two as complementary. The German Society for International Law, while calling for parliamentary control over foreign affairs, also cautioned that "the education of the people themselves in the spirit of peace and of international understanding would be even more effective... if case] chauvinists or jingoists should enter the parliament or its committees."

The various German pacifist organizations were assiduous in taking up the cause of an internationalist-oriented education. The New Fatherland Club presented at the Bern League of Nations Conference in March a program for educational reform on a pacifist basis. Such an education must be ethical in nature. The reforms were not to be confined merely to formal schooling, but were to extend to all media which catered to or influenced young people, such as literature, the theater, and films. In all of these forms of communication "the overwhelming significance of international cooperation must be depicted." To further this plan on a worldwide scale the New Fatherland Club suggested the creation of an international education office under the auspices of the League of

24 Verhandlungen des Reichstags, CCCXXVIII, 1706-1708.

25 Entwurf von Bestimmungen ueber die Frage der parlamentarischen Kontrolle der auswaertigen Politik... von der Studienkommission der Deutschen Gesellschaft fuer Voelkerrecht, November 9, 1918, BAK, Nachlass Schuecking.
The female pacifist groups in Germany also campaigned vigorously for new educational goals and methods, under the motto that "education for peace has always been the concern of the women." The most vocal and active association here was the German branch of the International Women's League for Peace and Freedom. At its national gathering in Frankfurt in the summer of 1919, one of the officers, Dr. Olga Knochewsky, formulated the educational demands of the Women's League: instruction in the spirit of pacifism; the banning of nationalism from the schools; all education to be conducted in an atmosphere of love and understanding, respecting the moral and social imperatives of the new era. The group petitioned the National Assembly to create a Ministry of Peace (Friedensministerium) charged, among other things, with the obligation "to organize the instructional programs of all schools on the basis of international understanding." 27

Like the New Fatherland Club these women pacifists included under the rubric "education" everything which might influ-


27 Fritz and Anni Roettcher, Die Frau und der Volkerbund (Ebingen: Genossenschaftsdruckerei, 1919), p. 14; report of women's meeting in Frankfurt, June 11-12, 1919, FZ, June 12 (Morgen) and June 14 (Morgen), and an article by Gertrud Baer, "Zur Konstituierung der Internationalen Frauenliga fuer Frieden und Freiheit, Deutscher Zweig," Die Frau im Staat, I, No. 7 (July, 1919), p. 9; see also Volkerverzeichnende Frauenarbeit: November 1918-Dezember 1920, herausgegeben von der Internationalen Frauenliga fuer Frieden und Freiheit (Stuttgart: Verlag Friede Durch Recht, 1921), p. 21.
since the young. Accordingly the German Women's League for Peace and Freedom set up numerous committees to coordinate a broad range of tasks. These self-imposed activities included efforts to discover and purge school books contrary to Article 148 of the new constitution and even propaganda drives against selling or buying warlike toys for children. 28 The women's section of the Peace Society contributed a booklet entitled A Pacifist Children's World: On the Moral Education of our Little Ones. This anthology of pacifist poems, nursery tales, and songs was meant "to provide parents with the possibility of driving warlike thoughts from their children's minds and of developing in them the desire for a truly peaceful culture." 29

The Peace Society itself also took cognizance of this problem. At its national convention in June, Hans Wehberg proposed that one pacifist goal should be "to prepare the way in all schools and universities for an atmosphere conducive to the League of Nations." Two representatives of student organizations, Ernst Lindemann and Walter Friedlaender, impressed on the pacifist convention the urgency of inculcating an internationalist spirit in the youth of Germany. The present time was favorable for such a pacifist initiative, they argued, since the student youth were now open to pacifist ideas and were themselves crying out, "We wish to be educated not as citizens of a nation, but as men."


As a result of these pleas, the convention in its concluding resolutions charged its members "to petition their respective education or cultural ministries to undertake a thorough-going educational reform of school books, eliminating all sentiments favorable to war and introducing a spirit of international reconciliation."\(^{30}\)

Other individual pacifists also concerned themselves with internationalism in education. Ludwig Wagner, who had pioneered in teacher exchange programs before the war, wrote of his hopes to see the League of Nations supervise an international program of education, which would include regular conferences of teachers from all countries.\(^{31}\) Leonard Nelson, professor of philosophy at the University of Goettingen, was instrumental in organizing branches of the International Youth Federation at six German universities. In its appeal "to the free youth of all classes and nations," this student organization proclaimed its belief in "The validity of the rule of law not only within the nation but between the nations."\(^{32}\)

Most of these individual or group pacifist activities remained of limited effectiveness. In contrast, the German Association for a League of Nations was able to take advantage of its

\(^{30}\)Achter Deutscher Pazifistenkongress, pp. 54, 61, 68.

\(^{31}\)Ludwig Wagner, "Voelkerbund und Erziehung," \(FZ\), April 12, 1919 (Morgen).

\(^{32}\)"An die freie Jugend aller Staende und Voelker!", printed in \(D\)ie \(R\)epublik, February 8, 1919, and in \(F\)riedens-\(W\)arte, XXI, No. 3 (April, 1919), pp. 74-75. Among the Friends of the International Youth Federation listed at the end of this appeal were Walter Schuecking, Friedrich Siegmund-Schulze, Elizabeth Rotten, and Albert Einstein.
special relationship with the government in its parallel efforts to imbue German education with internationalist ideals. The DLFV carried out its work in this field through three committees, on education, on the schools, and on international law.

The education section under pacifist Elizabeth Rotten sought primarily to support and further the work of other pacifist organizations by endorsing their pedagogical suggestions. Paul Ruehlmann's school committee aimed at influencing the schools mainly by working through teachers' organizations and through state ministries of education. Its first success came in June 1919, when at its request the Prussian Ministry of Education circulated the following memorandum to all district school officials.

The Association for a League of Nations is prepared to popularize the idea of a League of Nations. For this it deserves our full recognition. To this end it desires to hold appropriate... lectures in the schools. I direct the attention of all school principals to the necessity of spreading such ideas, and I ask them to make certain that these lectures take place in the class rooms and that the students attend them.33

The international law committee of the DLFV, headed by Walter Schuecking and Hans Wehberg, concentrated its educational efforts chiefly on cultivating international law studies in the universities. At its first meeting in March 1919 this committee discussed the feasibility of setting up seminar facilities in other German universities similar to Professor Niemeyer's international law institute at Kiel. Schuecking suggested the Univer-

sity of Frankfurt as an ideal place to start, "since there we could receive a great deal of money for our scientific purposes from private persons." Further discussion led to the decision that the DLFV should prepare a petition and present it to all the state governments. The general feeling of the committee, as was perhaps to be expected from a group of academicians, was that the universities must offer more lectures on international law, that study of the subject should be encouraged by placing it on the list of required courses, and that more graduate students ought to be induced to write dissertations in this field.\textsuperscript{34}

At the committee's next meeting in June, Wehberg was able to announce that Professor Moritz Liepmann of Kiel had completed a memorandum on the encouragement of international law studies in the universities. This would serve as the DLFV petition to the Prussian Minister of Education and could also be circulated to the other state governments.\textsuperscript{35} Liepmann incorporated into his work most of the suggestions made by the committee in March. Himself a professor of international law, he regarded it as one of the saddest facts in Germany that "our academicians, the historians, philosophers, mathematicians, and teachers have no idea of the efforts and accomplishments made in the field of natural law, but rather laugh at it as a specialty for naive intellectuals or

\textsuperscript{34} Protokoll der ersten Sitzung des Volkerrechtlichen Ausschusses am 27. Maerz 1919, in Raeumen der Deutschen Liga fuer Volkerbund, in BAK, Nachlass Wehberg, No. 31, pp. 2-6.

sentimentalists." In a brief historical sketch Liepmann indicated the roots and the results of this German disregard for internationalist values.

The neglect of international law has been a symptomatic trait of German life ever since 1870. In all areas of cultural and economic life mighty forces were stirring, but in the last analysis their goal was always the attainment of economic and military power. We lost sight of the knowledge that ideas rule the world more decisively than trade, industry, or armed might. In our battle against the world this system collapsed. Now and for a long time to come Germany must develop its cultural history.36

The prescription which Liepmann and the DLFV recommended to the state education ministries was an intensified promotion of international law studies in the universities. This reflected the predominantly legal viewpoint taken by most German internationalists.

In September 1919 the international law committee met for a third time, to hear from Schuecking how their petitions had fared. Only two state governments had responded, Prussia and Hesse-Darmstadt. The latter voiced considerable enthusiasm for the DLFV suggestions and promised to encourage university lectures on international law. The Prussian government expressed the same feelings of friendly sympathy, but deplored its inability to collaborate with the DLFV on this project owing to a serious lack of

Both of these state governments followed up these informal provisional replies with official public statements expounding clearly their views on internationalism in education. A report from the Hessian Office of Education in December 1919 referred explicitly to Article 148 of the new national constitution.

Education for international reconciliation presupposes the ideal of a just and reasonable arrangement of the relations between nations. We Germans have special reason to affirm this ideal, since it found its deepest spiritual expression in the philosophy of our greatest thinker. This is not a matter of servility to foreigners nor an unworthy subjection to unjust demands. On the contrary, this principle of international reconciliation furnishes us with the very platform from which we shall make claims for our own people. The national constitution seeks only to reject a blind and furious chauvinism, which would be injurious to us and unworthy of our educational institutions.

Not until February 1920 did Konrad Haenisch of the Prussian Education Ministry respond officially to the DLPV petition. He noted his "agreement with the author of the memorandum, that the more energetic dissemination of knowledge and understanding concerning international law is a necessary task." He promised to take the committee's suggestions into account in his

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37Protokoll der dritten Sitzung des Volkerrechtlichen Ausschusses am 8. September 1919 im Sitzungssaal der Deutschen Liga fuer Volkerbund, BAK, Nachlass Wehberg, No. 31, pp. 3-4. The replies mentioned here from the Hessian and Prussian governments must have been private communications to the DLFV, since the official government declarations described in the following paragraphs came after this September meeting of the committee.

projected reform of the university law faculties, especially the request to include international law as an integral part of the general course of studies. Unfortunately, financial considerations made it impossible at this moment for him to appoint new professors of international law, but he wanted the DLFV to know that it enjoyed his approval "for its idea of introducing international law also into the curricula of the newly founded adult evening schools /der neubegründeten Volkshochschulen/."39

For the internationalists, educational reform on a pacifist basis had to go beyond the universities. "It is also necessary to awaken a realization for the new problems of our times... through the adult evening schools and thereby convince the people that a new era of understanding among nations has begun."40

Some German internationalists considered a broader view not only of the audience but even of the content and goal of a pacifist education. In an essay on "The League of Nations as a pedagogical problem" Paul Ruehlmann indicated how the topic of internationalism in education fitted into a wider general perspective. "Revolution and democracy bring with them the politicizing of the school, and a politicized popular education must


come to terms with the fundamental reality of the new world order, the League of Nations. Education for international responsibility, therefore, must become a part of the general political education of the German people. Implicit in this argument lay the liberal assumption on the relationship between education and political democracy. In the eyes of the pacifists the political backwardness of the German people stemmed from a defective political education, and these twin deficiencies formed major obstacles to the triumph of internationalism. Walther Rathenau had this causal nexus in mind when he wrote, "If we can speak of a German guilt for the war, it consisted in this, that the people let themselves be treated as immature." A conviction of the necessity for political education led after 1918 to an increase in public lectures on political themes and to the founding of political schools. By working through these new educational media, the German internationalists hoped to create the domestic foundation for a foreign policy of peace and international order.

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42Letter of Walther Rathenau to Fraulein Amanda Sonnenfels, September 25, 1919, in Rathenau, Briefe, p. 190.

43The most prominent such school was Friedrich Naumann's Staatsbuergerschule begun in late 1918, see Theodor Heuss, Friedrich Naumann: Der Mann, Das Werk, Die Zeit (2nd ed.; Stuttgart: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag, 1949), pp. 410-411. For an internationalist connection with this school see letter of Ludwig Quidde to his wife, July 16, 1919 in Nachlass Quidde; Quidde was engaged to offer a lecture series on the fall of 1919. For another such school see Ernst Jaseck and Otto Suhr, Geschichte der Deutschen Hochschule fuer Politik (Berlin: Gebrueder Weiss Verlag, 1952), especially the introduction.
The pacifist groups and the DLFV centered their attention primarily, of course, on the young Germans and above all on the university students. Internationalists hoped that these young men would also become active participants in the crusade for a peaceful world order. In the first twelve months after the revolution, however, it was still impossible to determine whether these future leaders would swing predominantly to the nationalist or the internationalist side of the scales. The question posed by international law professor Franz von Liszt in December 1918, "Where do the German students stand?", remained still without a definite answer one year later.\(^{44}\)

On the credit side of the internationalist ledger might be placed the activities of the German Democratic Youth Club, an arm of the Democratic Party. At the Democratic Youth Days held in Berlin April 25 through 27, 1919, the internationalist trend within the Club took shape. The official Club statement on foreign affairs in its policy guide lines included "an acknowledgement of the League of Nations."\(^{45}\)

Two manifestoes drawn up by local chapters of the Democratic Youth Club and submitted to the national party organization sounded even more explicitly internationalist tones. A petition from Berlin read in part:

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\(^{44}\)Franz von Liszt, "Wo bleiben die deutschen Studenten?", BT, December 12, 1918 (Abend).

\(^{45}\)Printed in Das Demokratische Deutschland, I, No. 22 (May 10, 1919), p. 513. At the opening session, a student, Erwin Grau, read his rhapsodic poem hailing "a league of all democrats. . . from man to man, from land to land," also printed ibid., I, No. 21 (May 21, 1919), pp. 574-575.
The relations among nations must be free from oppression and force. In place of war, legal methods must be used to settle conflicts of interest. . . . The Democratic Party is in favor of a democratically organized league of equal peoples. . . . The Party regards it as the common duty of all peoples to develop true internationalism on the foundation of separate nationhood.46

A program submitted by the Breslau branch urged similar sentiments and also dealt with internationalism in education. "In order to bring about a truly international understanding, all schools must further the knowledge of foreign countries. . . . and the national government should intensively promote the systematic study of other nations."47

Other signs also indicated that internationalism was making some headway within the student body of the German universities, even if not in the academic form propagated by the DLFV. In February 1919, a few days after the murder of Kurt Eisner, a group at the University of Munich published an appeal to their fellow students: "Free yourselves from inbred nationalistic-egocentric prejudices. . . . When will the time come for all students of all nations to unite in a selfless striving for truth?"48

In June the student socialists at the University of Berlin called for "creation of a popular school system open to everyone, and based, of course, on the international nature of


48"Studentenschaft," MNN, February 27, 1919 (Abend).
knowledge; the independence of education and of the professors from the demoralizing and falsifying influence of capitalism and chauvinism.\textsuperscript{49}

Students and student organizations showed a willingness to respond generously to conciliatory gestures from beyond the borders. In Early February 1919 the French socialist writer Henri Barbusse issued a call for the creation of "the cultural International." He directed his voice also toward Germany. Student groups at Heidelberg and Berlin replied warmly to his expression of solidarity.\textsuperscript{50} Later in February a similar appeal from French socialist students to their German comrades elicited equally favorable reactions from student associations at Kiel, Breslau, Goettingen. The wording of the reply from the Kiel University student socialist club typified both the enthusiasm and the high-flown vagueness which characterized these exchanges.

Deeply shaken and rudely aroused by the experiences of the war, but filled with the certain conviction that despite everything man can again raise himself up, we wish to employ all our strength for the rapid recovery of the cultural and spiritual International. We pledge ourselves to a policy of absolute truthfulness, the sole basis for understanding and reconciliation. In this spirit we hope to cooperate in the rebirth of humanity and of the conscience of


\textsuperscript{50}Henri Barbusse, "Fuer die Geistige Internationale," \textit{Die Republik}, February 2, 1919; student replies, \textit{ibid.}, February 4 and 23, 1919.
The other, the nationalistic, side of university sentiment also appeared in connection with these Franco-German communications. The socialist student society at the University of Jena reported that their chairman had prepared a similar reply to the French, but the rector had refused permission to post it on the student bulletin board, so they were unable to collect signatures. The students concluded that "this university represents class interests, and belongs not to the people, but to the capitalists and the German nationalists." The reported harassment of foreign students at the University of Berlin led Die Republik to brand that institution "a center of pan-German agitation." Members of the DLFV found the students at the University of Halle not only apathetic, but actually hostile to their message concerning the League of Nations.

This sentiment of apathy and hostility on the part of the students constituted a part of the general German reaction to the Versailles peace treaty and the Paris League Covenant. This turn of affections offered an opportunity to those who desired a more nationalistic goal for education. A member of the German People's

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51 The French socialist student appeal was printed in Die Republik, February 23, 1919; the reply from Kiel, ibid., March 15; those from Breslau and Goettingen, ibid., April 14.
52 Ibid., March 30, 1919.
53 Ibid., March 31, 1919.
54 Deutsche Liga fuer Voelkerbund, Bericht ueber die Tagung der Bezirksleiter, July 29, 1919, BAK, Nachlass Wehberg, No. 31, pp. 4, 8.
Party wrote in Stresemann's *Deutsche Stimmen* in June 1919, "Our youth stands today at the grave of the international idea, at the birthplace of a new national concept."\(^55\) The German right-wing was ready and eager to take advantage of events in order to press for a nationalistic upsurge among the students. The National Youth Federation took upon itself the task of warning students against pacifist influences. "An evil worm is gnawing away at our very existence: internationalism! Rise up, German youth, and destroy all the confused phrases which now deluge our people!"\(^56\)

In view of the over-all German reaction against the Versailles treaty, this nationalistic trend among the students was a natural and anticipated phenomenon. What seemed to the DLFV more curious were indications of opposition to internationalist reforms from the radical left-wing students. In July 1919 the students at the University of Wuerzburg voted that the study of international law should be limited to two hours a week. While this might have been merely a natural desire to reduce their required study obligations, the members of the DLFV international law committee were inclined to ascribe it to the presence of "an active Spartacist group" which considered the study of international law meaningless as compared to the imminent world revolution which would

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\(^{56}\) An Deutschlands Nationale Jugend, Berlin, October 6, 1919, in BHptStA, MK 14915, Parteipolitische Tätigkeit in den Schulen, Vol. 1. This folder also contains material from late 1919 on nationalistic, anti-semitic activity in Augsburg schools.
sweep away the nation-states and all traditional diplomacy. Too much should not be made of this one reported incident, but the student attitude was probably not so much a resistance to internationalism in itself as it was a typical student refusal to confine their idealism within the academic formalities dictated by the DLFV. Indeed, the wording of the student replies to the French appeals, referred to above, also bore little resemblance to the sober programs of the DLFV or the Peace Society. The internationalism of the students took a different, more humanistic, perhaps more radical, form than the internationalism of the established pacifist organizations. Count Harry Kessler observed accurately, when he wrote in February 1919, "I believe that in reality the young people are swayed to both extremes: radicalism and reaction; internationalism and chauvinism. Between these extremes the coming years will see an unbelievably sharp struggle here among us." 

3. The Internationalist Organizations

As crucial as the allegiance of the educated youth might be for the eventual triumph or failure of the internationalist

57 Protokoll der dritten Sitzung des Voelkerrechtlichen Ausschusses der DLFV, BAK, Nachlass Wehberg, No. 31, p. 5. The advice which the exiled German writer and pacifist Hermann Hesse directed at German youth was likewise moral and personal in tone, completely non-political and divorced from, almost hostile to, ideas such as the League of Nations, see his essays of 1919 "Zarathustras Wiederkehr: Ein Wort an die deutsche Jugend," and "Brief an einen jungen Deutschen," in Hesse, Krieg und Frieden, pp. 93-106.

58 Kessler, Tagebuecher, for February 25, 1919, pp. 138-139.
ideal, the universities and schools formed only one of the arenas in which pacifism and internationalism vied with militarism and conservative nationalism for dominance. The work of securing the home front for internationalism involved constitutional and educational reforms, but it also meant transmitting the internationalist principles to all elements of society. This demanded an ideological and personal contact between the avowedly pacifist or internationalist associations and the other areas of German social and political life. Success in this endeavor depended to a large extent on the strength and vitality of those internationalist organizations themselves.

During 1919 the most active internationalist groups were the German Association for a League of Nations (DLFV), and the German Peace Society. The more radical New Fatherland Club and the German Women's League for Peace and Freedom also continued to work within their own chosen spheres. The pre-war Society for International Understanding maintained at best a nominal existence and considered merging officially with the Peace Society. Both this Society for International Understanding and the war-time People's League for Freedom and Fatherland now found their programs and their membership absorbed by the DLFV and, in early 1919,
by yet another new organization. 

On February 3, 1919 Prince Max of Baden addressed a select group of intellectuals and public figures in Heidelberg on the subject "A League of Nations and a just peace." The main body of the speech castigated the western statesmen for failing to live up to the pledges contained in Wilson's Fourteen Points, but toward the end the ex-chancellor reaffirmed his belief in the idea of an international organization to safeguard the peace. Those present at the meeting subscribed to a resolution which consciously linked their efforts to the war-time German resistance against annexationism.

At the high-point of German military success, we opposed a policy which disregarded the rights of other nations. . . . The German people must now actively work together with its government in laying the foundation upon which it can strive to fulfill . . . its international responsibilities.

The signers of this resolution then formed the Working Committee for a Policy of Justice (Arbeitagemeinschaft fuer eine Politik des Rechts), more generally referred to as the Heidelberg Association (Heidelberger Vereinigung). The roster of its founding members included many prominent personages from the People's

59 On May 15, 1919 the People's League staged a protest against the Versailles peace treaty, BT, May 16 (Morgen); at the June 1919 Peace Society national convention Qidde hinted that the Society for International Understanding was considering a merger with the Peace Society, Achter Deutscher Pazifistenkongress, pp. 10, 27. This merger had still not taken place by mid-July, however, as witness the letter from Walter Schuecking to Hermann Maier of the Society, July 15, 1919, BAK, Nachlass Schuecking, Deutsche Nationalversammlung in Weimar, 1919, No. 51.

League and from other internationalist bodies: Moritz Bonn, Lujo Brentano, Hans Delbruck, Friedrich Meinecke, Ernst Troeltsch, Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Hans Wehberg, and Walter Schuecking. Under the chairmanship of Count Max Montgelas, the Heidelberg Association participated in the Bern League of Nations conference in March 1919. In the summer of 1919 it announced that it was affiliating itself with the Swiss-based Central Committee for the Restoration of International Relations. It also tried to organize protest demonstrations against the Versailles treaty both inside and outside Germany, but these plans did not materialize. Wehberg's later comment, that "the Heidelberg Association was never of great significance," may have been true as regards its practical impact on affairs. In its membership and its program, however, it represented one more attempt to unite the democratically inclined intellectuals behind a non-partisan internationalist drive to invigorate German political life.

Much more active was the German Association for a League of Nations with its subsidiary committees. As already noted, three of these committees devoted time and effort to education reforms, with some measurable show of success. The committee on social policy had the advantage of useful personal connections,


which helped to make its work effective. The committee chairman was Karl Legien, head of the German Federation of Trade Unions, while the vice-chairman, Johannes Giesberts, served in the national government in the Labor and Postal Ministries. As a result of these contacts, the DLFV was able to help persuade the Berlin government and the German trade unions to accept the invitation to the International Labor Conference in Washington in the fall of 1919 despite earlier socialist objections. The social policy committee also hosted visitors from other countries, making contact, for example, with representatives of cooperative organizations from the United States. The committee saw fit to describe itself as "a useful and necessary link between the diverse organizations...which pursue the same goal, namely the internationalizing of social policy." Another valuable feature of its service lay in its ability to attract into League of Nations work those Germans who frowned on the institutional League itself as a tool of the western powers, but who were so eager to further international social reform that they overcame this repugnance and worked with the DLFV.63

Throughout 1919 the DLFV continued to grow and prosper under the management of Ernst Jaeschk. The Association did not enroll individual members in the usual sense. All of its individual adherents had to be active participants in the work of the Association or of its committees. These numbered some seven hundred by

the end of 1919. The organizations which affiliated themselves with the DLFV counted over nine million members. In addition to the Association's central office in Berlin, local branches were set up in ten cities during 1919 and plans were underway to expand into eight more. Financially the DLFV partially supported itself through a high individual membership fee of twenty marks per year. It also continued to receive government subsidies through the Foreign Office. In late 1919 Jaeckh was also able to divert into the Association's treasury a sum of five hundred thousand marks from a fund which he had collected earlier for a German-Turkish friendship organization.64

The other and older major German internationalist organization, the Peace Society, presented quite a different picture, faced as it was with financial difficulties, personal and philosophical divisions, and a search for a sense of direction. With no direct government subsidies at its disposal, the Peace Society had only two regular sources of income, membership dues and proceeds from its bookstore in Stuttgart. Neither of these was sufficient to provide the needed funds for expanding the Society's activity, and an occasional monetary grant from the DLFV helped only for specific purposes. The Peace Society depended heavily on the generosity of private contributors and philanthropic sympathizers. The Dresden banker, Georg Arnhold, contributed fifty

thousand marks to help defray the costs of the national pacifist convention in June 1919.65

These financial difficulties reflected an inability to enlarge the Society's membership rolls substantially. Although secretary Fritz Roettcher claimed at the June convention that the Society had gained one thousand new members since the end of the war and now maintained seventy local chapters, even he had to admit that "we have encountered little understanding among the masses."66 The decision of Foreign Minister Brockdorff-Rantzau to become a member conferred prestige, but did not compensate for the lag in recruitment. The June convention took another step to alleviate both the organizational and financial problems by voting to merge the International Law Center with the Peace Society. This move was long overdue, for not only did the two groups share the same goals and to a large extent the same members, but the International Law Center had originated solely as a war-time improvisation to replace the harassed Peace Society.67

At the June convention a controversy arose within the Peace Society over the question of German war guilt. Here the dispute centered around one of the leading officers, Ludwig Quidde.


66Achter Pazifistenkongress, p. 40.

67On the merger, ibid., pp. 32-33, 43; Quidde mentioned the Foreign Minister's joining the Peace Society in two letters to his wife, June 12 and 14, 1919, in Nachlass Quidde.
Differences of opinion over the war guilt theme stretched back at least to the November 1918 days. The compromise accepted by the German pacifist delegates at the Bern League of Nations conference in March 1919 had seemed to settle the dispute for the internationalists. What reignited the controversy was the Versailles treaty with its so-called "war guilt clause" and more precisely Quidde's speech before the National Assembly on May 12. In the most quoted passage of that address, Quidde solemnly declared to the German people that "if someone were to demand of me a confession of sole German guilt, that would be for me a lie." 68

Nationalists attempted to distort this sentence into a complete disavowal of any German guilt by a noted pacifist. From some of Quidde's fellow internationalists it brought charges of nationalism and of compromise. At the June convention some critics tried to charge Quidde with being a false pacifist, alleging that his 1915 booklet *Reale Garantien* had been a militaristic, pro-annexationist work. 69 Despite a clear refutation of this charge by Quidde, his opponents were able to muster a majority for a resolution reproving those "pacifists who during the war fell victim to a power psychosis," an intended slap at Quidde. 70

On the war guilt issue, too, Quidde was not able to prevail. The majority of the convention stood with von Gerlach and Fried in

68 *Verhandlungen des Reichstages*, CCCXXVII, 1107-1110.
69 Quidde reported pacifist dissatisfaction with his National Assembly speech in letters to his wife, May 19 and 21, 1919, Nachlass Quidde; *Achter Pazifistenkongress*, pp. 44-46.
expressing a belief that Germany must bear an overwhelming share
of the responsibility for the outbreak of the war. Quidde pri-
vately castigated such men as "flagellants" and their viewpoint
as one of "shabby penitence." Both he and Schuecking deplored
these tendencies within the Peace Society and ascribed them to the
radicalism of the Berlin pacifists, who apparently dominated the
June congress. Another indication was a resolution espousing
"activity in the spirit of a truly radical pacifism uninfluenced
by considerations of expediency." The decision to move the
Society's headquarters back from Stuttgart to Berlin seemed likely
to increase the chances for radical influence.71

The financial difficulties and internal disputes could
not, however, obscure the truth that German pacifism found itself
by mid-1919 in the most favorable general situation it had ever
witnessed. In his speech on the opening night of the congress,
the young writer Carl von Ossietzky could confidently state that
"pacifism is now a power with which every realistic politician
knows he must reckon." Quidde bemusedly remarked that "this is a
time when the idea of a League of Nations is in very great demand-
everyone is now competing for it."72 An open sign of the new

71Quidde described the congress and the war guilt debate
in letters to his wife, June 14, 16, and 21, 1919, Nachlass Qidde.
For Schuecking's judgment of the congress, see his letter to
Pastor Dr. Julius Gmelin, July 18, 1919, in BAK, Nachlass
Schuecking, Verschiedene Vereinigungen, Vol. 1. The congress
resolution acknowledging "the direct co-responsibility of the
German government for the outbreak of the war," is printed in
Achter Pazifistenkongress, p. 177; see also Berkeley, Deutsche
Friedensbewegung, pp. 53-55.

72Achter Pazifistenkongress, pp. 3, 28.
pacificist reputation was the friendly attitude of the national government, as, for example, when Foreign Minister Count Brockdorff-Rantzau applied for membership in the Peace Society. Although government business kept the Cabinet in Weimar, gracious telegrams from Erzberger and others manifested the new relationship between internationalism and the ruling powers in Germany. 73

This very popularity which internationalist doctrine now seemed to be enjoying led to a certain uneasiness among some delegates to the June convention. This disquietude reflected an anxiety over the question of whether it would be possible to preserve a separate pacifist identity at a time when pacifism was no longer the distinct preserve of a few outsiders, no longer the intellectual gadfly to society and government. Immediate focus of this concern was the DLFV, which not only overshadowed the Peace Society by reason of its governmental connections and subsidies, but which, in the eyes of some pacifists, threatened to dilute the ideological purity of internationalism by admitting into its ranks both opportunists and unrepentant nationalists. Quidde admitted that "many take up the cry for a League who do not sincerely believe in it, and join the Association [DLFV] and try to exert influence there." He believed this danger to be minimal, since confirmed pacifists like Schuecking, Wehberg and he himself held commanding positions within the DLFV. Moreover the Association had always shown great respect and consideration

for genuinely pacifist views. Nevertheless many speakers at the
convention continued to voice fear that popular opinion might con-
fuse true pacifism with the statements of the DLFV.74

Whereas these purists objected to the undifferentiated
broadening of pacifist doctrine, others were concerned lest the
ideological basis of pacifism become too narrow by correlating
pacifism and socialism. These internationalists raised the ques-
tion of how to distinguish the two. The Berlin ethical philoso-
pher, Magnus Schwantje, warned the congress not to incorporate
into the Peace Society program sections to which only socialists
could assent. "The German Peace Society has many tasks in no way
related to socialism and in which men can cooperate who do not ac-
cept the necessity of the socialist economic order." Some female
speakers disputed Schwantje's statements. They insisted that the
socialist analysis of war could provide a more realistic basis
for Peace Society work, and that pacifists should associate them-
selves more fully with the Independent Socialists. Helmut von
Gerlach sided with Schwantje and retorted that "those who wish to
join pacifism and a radical domestic policy should enter the New
Fatherland Club."75

This discussion of pacifist identity led to the proposal
for establishing a separate Peace Party, such as had existed for
a short time in Wuerttemberg in January. Several delegates from

74Achter Pasifistenkongress, pp. 26-29, 38, 44.
75Ibid., pp. 45, 57, 66, 76-77. Two related articles were
Helmut Franke, "Warum muss der Pasifismus das Raetsystem
ablehnen?" and Agnes Pockels, "Dinge die nicht zusammengehen,"
Voelker-Friede, XIX, No. 7 (July, 1919), pp. 51-52.
Wuerttemberg arose at the June convention to defend that action. They argued that pacifism represented not merely a critique of international relations, but also a universal Weltanschauung with unique stands on all matters of domestic and foreign policy. Therefore a distinctly pacifist political party was both a possibility and a necessity. Quidde led the attack against this proposal. His speech also revealed his own conception as to the nature and function of the Peace Society in post-revolutionary Germany.

We cannot found our own political party, because pacifism represents too narrow a base. We wish to have members of diverse parties and viewpoints among us. . . . Our goal should be to ensure through our work the triumph of democracy and pacifism within Germany. A democratic constitution here is a prerequisite for a League of Nations. . . . The application of these principles we can leave to the political parties. Our task is to be the standard-bearer of those principles.76

4. The Democratic Party

In rejecting the notion of a distinctly pacifist party, the Peace Society yielded to Quidde's argument that the proper political role for pacifists was to work for their goals in and through the established political parties. His linking of pacifism and democracy indicated his own preference for the German Democratic Party. In fact, both Schuecking and Quidde sat in the National Assembly as Democratic deputies.

Any pacifist who surveyed the German parties in 1919 would likely have opted for the same choice. On the right wing neither

76 Achter Pazifistenkongress, pp. 55-56.
the monarchist National People's Party nor Stresemann's party could attract a convinced internationalist, despite their lip service to the league idea and their apparent repudiation of pan-German imperialism. On the other end of the political spectrum, both the Communists and the Independent Socialists stood for internationalism, but also for positions on Russia, the Council System, and parliamentary democracy which many pacifists found repugnant. All three parties of the Weimar coalition had long supported a policy in accord with internationalist teachings, and all were therefore potentially attractive. But the internationalism of the Social Democrats and of the Center was colored by an admixture of Marxism and of Roman Catholicism respectively. A pacifist who strongly differed with Marxist or Catholic beliefs would be unlikely to work effectively within either of these two parties. So the choice narrowed down to the German Democratic Party.

At the time of its birth in November 1918 the Democratic Party had been anxious to disassociate itself from the blatantly nationalistic elements within the older middle-class parties. These elements, the right-wing members of the National Liberal Party, had formed the German People's Party under Gustav Stresemann. During the winter election campaigns the Democrats openly espoused the creation of a League of Nations and defended themselves against right-wing charges of un-German behavior. Already in January 1919, though, voices within the party, particularly from the women, were calling for a stronger emphasis on the word "German" in the party's title. Schuecking, on the other hand, suggested to the party central committee in February that "the
party turn its interests more to international affairs."

These two viewpoints did not necessarily represent two diametrically opposed positions between which the Democratic Party would have to choose. They remained compatible, however, only so long as an internationalist policy, such as Schuecking favored, did not seriously undermine the Democratic Party's credibility as a spokesman for German national interests. That there could be no real conflict between a proper regard for national interests and a policy of peace and international understanding was, of course, a long-standing belief of internationalists. The draft of the party's program, unveiled on May 4, seemed to show that most Democrats agreed with this assessment, for it marked no basic change from the Democratic election program for January. The article on foreign policy rejected territorial settlements based on violence in favor of a world order of law and justice. "It is the common task of all people to serve the peace and the cultural progress of humanity. The Democratic Party therefore supports a league of equal nations, the abolition of secret treaties, the creation of international courts of arbitration, a general limitation on armaments, and freedom of the seas."78

Behind the scenes, however, a debate was simmering, as the subtler shades of the nationalist-internationalist confrontation emerged in articles in the unofficial party journal, Das


78 Printed in FZ, May 4, 1919 (Morgen).
Demokratische Deutschland. In the April 19 issue, the Berlin
journalist and economist, Paul Rohrbach, not a party member, ad-
dressed an open letter to the Democrats. His main point was a
cautions warning that "Above all else, the German Democratic
Party must pay greater and more undivided allegiance to the
national concept [zum nationalen Gedanken]." It was, he said, all
very well for the socialists to pursue a policy based on the be-
lief in the supposed world-wide solidarity of proletarian inter-
ests, but for Democrats to desert the national principle for a
similar illusion would be disastrous. This national principle was
still the motivating factor for the majority of people and would
continue to determine the course of events for a long time to
come. Rohrbach suggested that the Democratic Party might take up
the mission of finding a synthesis between the socialist and the
conservative extremes.79

The editor of the journal, Martin Wenck, formerly active
in the People's League for Freedom and Fatherland, replied by
agreeing with Rohrbach's final point. He felt that it would be
possible for the party "to initiate a foreign policy aimed at re-
gaining Germany's lost prestige, while avoiding the old nation-
listic and imperialist ambitions." Wenck argued that the party
should be flexible enough to take a hard line on foreign policy
matters, without in any way abandoning its conviction that Germany

must join a democratic League of Nations. 80

Another Democratic writer was less sure that Rohrbach's views were compatible with the spirit of the party. Paul Otto George of Braunschweig maintained that the rejection of internationalism, which Rohrbach seemed to urge, would not lead to a middle-of-the-road position, as Wenck felt, but would instead constitute a surrender to nationalism. Semantic confusion hindered a clear view of the problem. Naturally a German political party must be national in the sense that it sought the welfare of the nation. The real question, insisted George, was what constituted the national welfare. The German Democratic Party, representing the free citizenry of Germany, saw this welfare as furthered by joining an international democratic brotherhood. The socialist error lay not in their beliefs, as Rohrbach assumed, but in their one sided appeal to the working class. The German Democrats must establish a parallel international fraternity among the middle-classes of the world. George concluded by quoting Max Hirsch, co-founder of the Independent Liberal Trade Unions: "The serious world situation today demands that the German Democratic Party be active nationally and also internationally." 81

The publication of the Versailles treaty in May diverted the party's attention from these theoretical debates and presented it with a practical problem which tested its foreign policy principles. Already in early spring 1919 Democratic


spokesmen had begun to delineate the party's position on the coming peace settlement. A Democratic rally in Frankfurt on April 14 backed a resolution urging "that the German government decisively counter all attempts to impose on Germany a peace of violence /einen Gewaltfrieden/".82

When the terms of the peace treaty became known in early May, storms of protest arose from within the party central committee, from the Democratic delegation in the National Assembly, and from the party's local branches. The central committee voted to support the party's National Assembly delegates in their decision not to sign the treaty, "since a refusal /to sign/ can not bring down on us anything worse than would the acceptance /of the treaty/."83 At the final decisive meeting of the Democratic Assembly delegates on June 19, the vote was thirty-five to eight to reject the treaty and therefore to leave the government coalition. Schuecking and Quidde stood with the majority, while Count Bernstorff, Baron von Richthofen, and Friedrich von Payer led the small minority.84

Although this vote was crucial for both domestic and foreign affairs, it did not provide an unambiguous measure of the internationalist sentiment within the Democratic Party. The presence of Quidde and Schuecking on the side of the majority

82泽, April 15, 1919 (Morgen).
83Protokoll ueber die Sitzung des Hauptvorstandes der Deutschen Demokratischen Partei, Berlin, May 18, 1919, in BAK, R45III/15, pp. 149-158.
84Letter of Quidde to his wife, June 19, 1919, in Nachlass Quidde.
suggested a prima facie correlation between internationalism and rejection of the treaty, but in fact the arguments involved moved on several different levels. Quido, for example, opposed signing, because some terms of the treaty (such as the refusal to allow plebiscites in territory being taken from Germany) affronted his internationalist principles, but also because he, together with many of his party colleagues, believed that a firm German refusal to sign would extract further concessions from the entente, and might result in a more equitable settlement. In these circles there was even talk of suspending the German government altogether and of forcing the entente to assume the stigma of administering its own peace terms directly. 85 Bernstorff, speaking for the minority, protested that a refusal to sign would be ruinous, since the entente would simply occupy Germany and impose even harsher terms. 86 The rejection argument, then, appeared to contain a more internationalist tinge, since it did assume, whether sincerely or not, that world public opinion, particularly from fellow democrats in the west, would compel the Paris statesmen to modify their unjust peace conditions. The argument for signing the treaty cast doubt on this belief in the effectiveness of an international democratic solidarity. 87 Unlike socialism,

85 Letters of Quido to his wife, June 1 and 7, 1919, in Nachlass Quido; Theodor Heuss, Erinnerungen 1905-1933 (paperback; Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1965), pp. 169-170.


however, German democracy had no viable tradition of international solidarity to which it could appeal, and this argument remained solely in the atmosphere of theory.

A more compelling motive in the minds of many Democrats who opposed signing the peace treaty was the fear that a Democratic vote for this passionately condemned treaty would damage the party's reputation within Germany and decrease its national effectiveness. Such an argument betrayed little principled loyalty to internationalism. An exchange of opinions at the party's national convention in July 1919 illustrated this aspect of the debate.

Baron von Richthofen, during some brief remarks on foreign affairs, added, almost parenthetically, "If Germany had not signed the peace treaty, there would not be any Germany left today to conduct a foreign policy." Friedrich Naumann, who had voted to reject the treaty and to leave the coalition, retorted, "If we [that is, the Democrats] had voted to sign the treaty, the future of the national concept would have passed completely into the hands of the right-wing."88 A special meeting of local and national Democratic leaders in September 1919 gave weight to Naumann's reasoning. Called specifically to consider "the alarming swing of popular opinion to the right," this party conclave concluded that the Democratic Party could preserve its strength, only if it more actively propagandized its stand against the peace treaty. In order to survive the general nationalistic upsurge, the party must nourish a more openly nationalistic attitude and disassociate

88 BT, July 21, 1919 (Morgen).
itself clearly from internationalism in any form.89

As is clear, the arguments over accepting or rejecting the Versailles treaty provided at best a confused and shifting indication of the relative strength of the nationalist and internationalist forces within the Democratic Party, for the issues did not always divide neatly along these lines. A better key to the presence and power of internationalism in the party as of mid-1919 lay in the question of continued support for such principles as the League of Nations even after and despite the Versailles treaty. On this matter Quidde and Bernstorff stood together, regardless of their tactical differences over signing the treaty. Quidde told a Munich party gathering in July, "Now the peace is signed... and we must place our German policy in the service of the idea of international understanding, of the League of Nations."90

Bernstorff, who had acquired diplomatic experience before 1918, including a stay in the United States, was selected to deliver the major foreign policy speech at the Democratic convention in July. He began by counselling "a certain attitude of resignation in foreign affairs, since we can no longer pursue a world policy Weltpolitik as before the war." He went on to urge unconditional German entry into the League of Nations, since Germany's admission would constitute a reform of the League.

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89 Protokoll ueber die Sitzung des Parteiausschusses der Deutschen Demokratischen Partei, September 28, 1919, in BAK, Rh5III/10, pp. 24-27.

90 MNM, July 12, 1919 (Morgen).
conclusion, he pressed for good relations with France and Great Britain, as well as with the United States, "upon whose help the development, improvement, and protection of the League depend." 91

These views did not enjoy unanimous support within the Democratic Party, and Bernstorff's speech provoked a mixed response. Some Democrats felt that Germany should stay out of the League, until that organization came begging for German membership. Others disputed Bernstorff's optimism on the League as an instrument for revision of the peace treaty. They feared that an unconditional German entry into the League would only tend to perpetuate the Versailles settlement. 92 Other speakers openly scorned the belief in international democratic solidarity as self-deception. The concluding convention resolution, while not enthusiastically internationalist, did express the party's confidence that the conscience of the world would eventually condemn the Versailles peace treaty. 93 The picture of the Democratic Party that emerged in the late summer of 1919 was one of continued official commitment to fundamental internationalist beliefs, but swayed by a considerable undertow of opposition to any measures which might tarnish the party's national image.

Some of the ambivalence which characterized the Demo-

91PT, July 21, 1919 (Morgen); "Die grosse Aussprache bei den Demokraten," VossZ, July 21 (Morgen).


93PT, July 21, 1919 (Abend) and July 23 (Morgen).
ocratic Party was revealed in its subsequent treatment of its two most illustrious pacifist members. The academic international lawyer, Walter Schuecking, continued to sit in the Reichstag as a Democratic deputy until 1927, but the party dropped the polemical Quidde from its list of candidates in the very next election of 1920.94

The fate suffered by Quidde in the Democratic Party was both symbolic and ironic, since it had been Quidde who so eloquently preached to the Peace Society on the need to work within the existing political parties for pacifist goals. Quidde gave his own analysis of the situation in an address to the Frankfurt Young Democratic Club in October 1919. With an eye, doubtless, on the wavering members of his own party, he spoke of the need to conduct a German foreign policy of international understanding based on an honorable loyalty to the idea of the League of Nations. "Some do so out of a deep conviction grounded on political principles; others, because they see no other possibility in view of Germany's present weakness." Against this latter expediency Quidde directed his wrath, for it was from this source, as much as from outright nationalististic propaganda, that he saw

the threat arising to his version of pacifist internationalism. Quidde and his fellow pacifists were loath to see the League of Nations change from an internationalist ideal to being just one more variable in the game of diplomacy. Yet perhaps this was the price which internationalism had to pay for the accuracy of its predictions and for its modest success. If the internationalist ideas, as their champions insisted, represented not only the most noble, but also the most realistic, goals of German foreign policy, then the German internationalists need not have been unduly dismayed at the transformation their principles underwent in passing from the ideal to the real world.

CONCLUSION

Looking back from our perspective of almost fifty years we might be tempted to see the German internationalists of 1918 not as the fathers of present-day European unification or of German foreign policy, but rather as the last heirs of nineteenth-century organizational internationalism. Their concern with arbitration and mediation procedures, their legalistic disputes over the composition of the League assembly, even their optimism that popular or parliamentary control of foreign affairs could avert wars, all these seem strangely antiquated notions.

Any of these earlier pacifists who might have survived the Third Reich and World War II could observe how differently internationalism manifested itself in Germany and in Europe after the Second World War. Gone almost entirely was the legal approach which they had stressed so heavily. An all-encompassing world juridical organization did exist in the shape of the United Nations, but neither German state was a member. Far from suffering from this non-participation, both German states seemed to support a far more flourishing internationalism than had the Weimar Republic, and in forms almost completely neglected by the earlier internationalists. Each German state was integrated into supra-national, almost exclusively European, military and economic organizations, and only twenty years after the war discussion centered increasingly on a united European community envisioned as
a third force in world affairs.

Nevertheless, some similarities existed between the two post-war periods. The Basic Law of 1949 establishing the West German Federal Republic as well as the Constitution of the East German Democratic Republic promulgated in the same year both contained clauses with internationalist tones. The Bonn document provided that "the federal government can legally confer its sovereign powers on international institutions. . . which create and maintain a lasting peaceful order in Europe and among the peoples of the world." The Communist charter was not so specific, but it did define one duty of "the state power . . . the maintenance of friendly relations with all nations," and branded "the propagation of religious, racial, or national hatreds as a punishable crime."

Not surprisingly, after a second, more costly and more horrifying war, the German reaction away from nationalism was greater than for the era described in this paper. Whereas in 1918 the nationalists of all varieties resumed their clamor shortly after the armistice, today, even in the open society of the Federal Republic, politicians and parties must preface even mildly nationalist sentiments with affirmations of loyalty to the democratic system. Although outright pacifism commands at best a grudging tolerance in either German state, it is nationalism, and not internationalism, which still stands on the defensive. To the extent that these two existing German states mark the fulfillment of the revolution of 1918, so also internationalism, as an aspect of that revolution, has acquired today a state of accept-
ance and an embodiment in governmental and educational institutions.

By contrast, the immediate accomplishments of the internationalists of 1918 were both meager and fragile. The German internationalists misjudged the willingness of the western governments and peoples to forgive and forget. More seriously, they mistook a transitory anti-war feeling within Germany for a deep-seated pacifist conviction. On the other hand, they correctly estimated the chauvinist potential latent in the German mood of resentment. Right-wing nationalist parties polled an ever increasing percentage of the vote during the Weimar Republic, and, thanks to the support of the army, heavy industry, finance, and agrarian interests, they exerted an influence out of proportion to their numerical strength. The more radical among these elements waged an incessant hate campaign against pacifism and internationalism, which they sought to associate with communists and Jews. Other critics mocked the idealism of the internationalists as the anemic outgrowth of an outdated academic rationalism, a trait satirized in the person of Settembrini in Thomas Mann's *The Magic Mountain*.

Only on the diplomatic scene could the internationalists point to any tangible signs of success. The policy of fulfillment, the settlement of the reparations dispute, the Locarno pacts, and, above all, Germany's admission to the League of Nations in 1926, seemed like victories for the cause of internationalism. But they were at best short-lived triumphs, and even in the days of rejoicing, the internationalists sensed that what
they viewed as steps toward Germany's incorporation into the world community, the diplomats like Stresemann, and even more the right-wing German nationalists, regarded as successive dismantlings of the restrictions imposed by the Versailles treaty.

The inauguration of the Third Reich in 1933 spelled the end of German internationalist hopes. A National Socialist regime bent on remilitarization and on German autarchy condemned pacifists and internationalists as major enemies of the state. The withdrawal from the League of Nations in October 1933 and Hitler's refusal to allow the pacifist writer, Carl von Ossietzky, to accept the Nobel Peace Prize symbolized the new government's attitude.

After the Nazi seizure of power, many leading internationalist figures, such as Quidde, Wehberg, Foerster, Jaeschk, and Lehmann-Russbueidt, were forced to find refuge in flight. In Switzerland and in the United States they continued writing and lecturing, in the hope that a post-Hitlerian Germany would take up the threads of internationalist development broken in 1933. Few of the survivors returned to Germany after 1945, however, and none resumed public activity on a major scale.

Yet no artificial break in historical continuity really divides the Germans of today from the men of 1918 and 1919. Whether or not these earlier German internationalists were fully aware of all the implications flowing from the World War, the Russian revolution, and the American entry into European politics, they consciously and conscientiously strove to adapt their traditional beliefs and methods to fit the aftermath of a conflict,
which they well realized as surpassing all previous wars in scope and effect. Their efforts sometimes seemed to fall captive to nineteenth-century preconceptions, but their basic belief in the relationship between internationalism and the revolution was forward looking and had significance for times and places beyond the Germany of 1918. More fundamentally, their message to their fellow-countrymen has lost none of its cogency and has today achieved the status of a truism: that Germany must renounce all attempts at political and military hegemony and can only play a role in world affairs as a member of the European community. If one of the duties of intellectuals is to define the goals and standards by which a nation should guide itself, then the contribution of the German internationalists of 1918 has survived the collapse of their short-term expectations and guarantees their place in the German intellectual tradition.
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APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by James D. Shand has been read and approved by members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

[Signature]
[Date: June 1, 1967]

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