The Contract Group: Small Group Approaches to Interpersonal Growth

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The Contract Group:  
Small Group Approaches to Interpersonal Growth

by

Gerard Egan

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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VITA

Gerard Egan was born on June 17, 1930. He attended Loyola Academy (Chicago), Xavier University (Cincinnati), and West Baden College of Loyola University and received an A.B. with a major in classics from Loyola in 1953. He also received a Ph.L. from West Baden College in 1956. Further graduate degrees from Loyola include an M.A. in philosophy in 1959 and an M.A. in psychology in 1963. He attended St. Mary of the Lake Seminary, Mundelein, Illinois, from 1961 to 1965, receiving an S.T.B. in 1963 and an S.T.L. in 1965. He was ordained a priest for the Archdiocese of Chicago in 1965. He has taught modern languages at St. Ignatius High School and philosophy and psychology at Loyola University and Niles College. He was a psychology intern at Galesburg State Research Hospital during the 1966-67 academic year.
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Chapter I

Introduction

**The Burgeoning Phenomenon of Small Group Work**

There is no denying the phenomenon of the growing use of small group methods as the vehicle of learning and growth experiences. Popular articles referring directly or indirectly to "sensitivity training" and "encounter" groups have recently made their appearance in newspapers and national magazines (e.g. Anonymous, 1968; McLuhan, 1967; Williams, 1968), and for years now business leaders have been interested in small group laboratories as means of improving managerial skills, human relations acuity, and productivity in their organizations (Benne, 1964; Blake & Mouton, 1964, 1965; Campbell & Dunnette, 1968; House, 1967). The small group approach to problems in education (Fox & Lippitt, 1964) and in the wider community (Klein, 1965) is also on the rise.

The overly enthusiastic are claiming that all things can be done through groups. Individuals flock to sensitivity-training laboratories or "encounter" groups looking for a variety of self-actualization experiences, from hard-core psychotherapy to fellowship. Morton Lieberman is currently studying the small, self-actualization group phenomenon on the West coast. In one comparatively small city (population 50,000) he has discovered over 200 self-actualization groups of various kinds (private communication). It would also seem that we are witnessing merely the beginning of this phenomenon, for the idea of growth-through-groups has just begun to catch the public imagination. Organizations in the turmoil of change are looking eagerly (or beleaguredly) to sensitivity training for some sort of help, if not salvation. Practitioners
arise all around, many of them with doubtful qualifications, and still the supply does not seem to approach the demand. Indeed, the professional community stands aghast at the number of non-professionals who have taken up the mantle of "trainer." House (1967) expresses his concern over what is taking place in business and industry:

The issue is one of some concern at this moment, because there are training directors, personnel managers, business consultants, and members of business school faculties not trained in psychological practice, who nevertheless engage in T-Group training. Are they perhaps getting beyond the area in which they are trained, and might they not evoke anxieties or problems which they are not capable of recognizing or handling? (pp. 26-27)

The problem may be even more acute outside business settings, for in these cases group experiences have an even greater similarity to group psychotherapy. Yet, despite the lack of qualified trainers, few professionals are engaged in the work of training trainers. This problem is not unlike the problem of "lay" therapists which will be discussed more directly below.

A striking amount of at least informal experimentation with small groups is going on, experimentation which is outside the pale of the group-dynamics sub-division of social psychology and which includes both "normal" and psychiatric populations— from the sensory awareness experiments at the Esalen Institute (Gunther, 1968) and the self-actualization explorations of Herbert Otto and associates (1966) to Mowrer's "Integrity-training" groups (1964, 1968); from the molar experimentation of such psychotherapeutic communities as Daytop Village (Shelly & Bassin, 1965) and Synanon (Casriel, 1963; Maslow, 1967; Yablonsky, 1962, 1965) doing pioneer work with "sociopathic personalities" to the more molecular experimentation with groups in university "laboratories"; from the organization-oriented laboratory approach delineated
in such works as *The Managerial Grid* (Blake & Mouton, 1964) to the human-relations, personal-growth, community-relations, higher-education, and conflict-management laboratories sponsored by the National Training Laboratories (Bradford, Gibb, & Benne, 1964) and the more "self-actualization" exploration of Rogers (Hall, 1967; Rogers, 1967), Bugental (1965), and Thomas (1964, 1967).

**The research and publication gap.** If one looks for it, there is a fairly extensive literature on small group laboratory learning (e.g. Blake & Mouton, 1961, 1964; Bradford, Gibb, & Benne, 1964; Campbell & Dunnette, 1968; Craig & Bittel, 1967; House, 1967; Miles, 1959, 1964; Schein & Bennis, 1965b; Tannenbaum, Weschler, & Massarik, 1961, to mention but a few). At least one journal covers the field more or less directly (*The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*) and some articles are beginning to appear in other journals. But, with few exceptions, what has been published concerning laboratory learning in general and especially what has been written specifically about sensitivity training has not yet made its way into the mainstream of psychological thinking. The practice of sensitivity training has outrun both theoretical formulation and organized research, and the resulting turmoil has made many behavioral scientists look upon the whole field of laboratory learning with suspicion and the sub-specialty of sensitivity training with outright hostility (a colleague of mine in counseling an undergraduate psychology major as to the advisability of counting a laboratory course in sensitivity training as part of his program remarked to the young man: "We don't give credit for love-ins"). Despite the fact that Schein and Bennis (1965b) render "particular thanks to Leland Bradford
and Kenneth Benne whose efforts over the years to nurse the delicate child
of laboratory training have now produced a robust viable adult" (p. viii),
it seems that in many ways that we are still dealing with the problems of an
infant offspring of an adolescent science. Indeed, one of the strongest
motivations underlying the writing of this book is the desire to put some
order into one particularly chaotic area of laboratory learning—the use of
the small group as a vehicle of personal and interpersonal growth, or, if
you wish, a kind of psychotherapy or self-actualization or growth experience
for the relatively normal. This I call "sensitivity training." I do not
think that the term "sensitivity training" is a particularly happy one, for
it has too many negative connotations for some, while for others it means
so many things that it means nothing. But, since the term is with us for
better or for worse, and since it will be used with some frequency in the
pages that follow, it is essential to give it some kind of exact meaning.

Toward a Definition of Sensitivity Training

The distinction between laboratory learning and sensitivity training.
It is not my purpose here to present an extended treatment of laboratory
training, for Bradford, Gibb, and Benne (1964) and Schein and Bennis (1965b)
have already provided us with excellent overviews of this field. However,
since I define laboratory training or learning as a genus of which sensitivity
training is a species, and since it is the purpose of this book to delineate
one particular approach to sensitivity training, it is necessary first briefly
to point out the essentials of laboratory training and secondly to situate
sensitivity training in this context. For it is only against such a back-
ground that it is possible to formulate a specific approach to sensitivity
The genus: laboratory training. Someone once said that it is better to feel compunction than to know how to define it. This sentiment, paraphrased and applied to laboratory learning, might read: it is easier to experience laboratory training than to describe it. Buchanan (1964) provides a rather compact statement describing the nature of laboratory training:

Training approaches meriting the name of laboratory (or T-Group) utilize (1) a face-to-face, largely unstructured group as a primary vehicle for learning, (2) planned activities involving interaction between individuals and/or between groups, (3) systematic and frequent feedback and analysis of information regarding what happened in the here-and-now and what effect it had, (4) dilemmas or problems for which 'old ways' of behaving for most of the participants do not provide effective courses of action (and thus for which innovative or 'search' behavior is required), and (5) generalization, or reformulation of concepts and values based upon the analysis of direct experience (p. ).

Schein and Bennis (1965c) outline some of the difficulties encountered in any attempt to write about it:

Many attempts have been made to characterize the nature of laboratory training, but most of them have not been successful for several reasons: (1) laboratories vary tremendously in goals, training design, delegate population, length, setting, making it difficult to describe this experience in general; (2) laboratories attempt to provide a total and integrated learning experience for the participants, making it difficult to communicate in written words the interdependence of the many separate aspects of the laboratory training design; (3) laboratories intend to provide the opportunity for the participants to explore the interdependence of emotional and intellectual learning. It is difficult without observing the process firsthand to describe and understand the nature of this emotional learning and its meaning to the learner (p. 10).

With this caution, one may proceed to outline the elements which are common to most, if not all, laboratory experiences.

(a) Learning through actual experience in the small group. In most laboratory experiences, the most important learning takes place through
the interactions that take place in the small face-to-face, conversation group itself. Learning may also take place through side-reading, lectures or lecturettes, and various "exercises" which focus in on various aspects of the group experience, but this learning is adjunctive and is important to the degree that it leads to and enhances the quality of interactions in the t-group itself ("t" for "training"). The most important "input" during group sessions is the behavior of the participants themselves. Therefore, all laboratory experiences have a strong "here-and-now" flavor, and experiences outside the laboratory are considered valuable only to the degree that they can make some more or less direct contribution to the interactions taking place in the t-group. The participants are learning how to learn from the behavior that they themselves produce during group sessions.

(b) A climate of experimentation. Theoretically, if the group experience is to have an impact on behavior outside the laboratory, if it is to make a difference in day-to-day living, then it must be different from day-to-day experience. Interactions must in some way dramatize the overlooked dimensions of the kinds of behavior that are the focus of the laboratory, e.g. managerial styles, group decision-making, interpersonal relating, etc. Therefore, participants are encouraged to "experiment" with their behavior during the laboratory, that is, to attempt "new" forms of behavior, kinds of behavior that up to the present have not characterized a person's "style." Another way of putting this is to say that the laboratory possesses a degree of behavioral freedom which is not always found in real life situations outside the laboratory. The laboratory provides the participants a kind of "cultural permission" to engage in (hopefully responsible) forms of
behavior which the construction of their "back-home" environment do not allow. In fact, some of the exercises introduced during the laboratory are designed to shake the participants out of routine ways of acting. Admittedly, all of this can arouse a certain degree of anxiety, but anxiety itself, if kept within limits, becomes a stimulus to new forms of behavior.

(c) Group size. The group has to be small enough to allow each participant the opportunity to contribute to the interaction of the group, but it must be large enough to allow the participants to "space" their contributions, not just according to the demands of the group, but also according to individual needs and capabilities. If the group is too small, each member is constantly "on call"; if the group is too large, then it is too easy for any one individual to hide in the crowd. It seems also that the group must be of a certain size if such factors as heterogeneity of contribution, diversity of opinion, coalition formation and other variables are to become optimally productive (in terms of learning). Another way of viewing group size is to say that the group should be large enough so that the absence of one or two members does not debilitate the group and still small enough so that such absences are felt. In practice groups range in size from about eight to about twelve or fourteen members, but optimal size is determined to a large extent by the nature of the group and its goals.

(d) Feedback. Group members not only engage in certain kinds of behavior, but, at the same time, they, both individually and corporately, try to reflect on the behavior in which they are engaged. The behavior itself (e.g. problem-solving work sessions, group decision-making conferences, managerial planning sessions, discussion of interpersonal problems, etc.) is
part of the "input" of the laboratory experience. Given this behavioral
input, the laboratory provides opportunities for both giving and receiving
feedback with respect to "input" behavior, that is, the group "processes" its
own behavior as a group and the behavior of the individuals in the group.
All behavior is subjected to scrutiny in terms of the group culture and the
group's goals, but "process" variables are subjected to particular scrutiny.
"Process" variables are such factors as: who speaks to whom and in what
manner, the frequency of a person's contributions, what coalitions take place
and how, whether the group atmosphere is one of cooperation, neutrality, or
competition, who are the cooperators, the neutrals, the competitors, and
other such variables.

(e) Leadership. In laboratory experiences the leader is usually called
a "trainer" (though some prefer the term "facilitator") and acts as a resource
person for the group rather than an authoritarian figure who imposes pre-
conceived goals and types of interaction on the group. Seashore (1968) puts
it well when he says that the "staff person's role is to facilitate the
examination and understanding of the experiences in the group. He helps
participants to focus on the way the group is working, the style of the
individual's participation, or the issues that are facing the group" (p. 1).
As a participant-observer, the trainer attempts to reveal to the group its
own dynamics as it moves through various stages of group life. In practice
there is a wide variety of leadership styles; trainers differ quite markedly
with respect to such variables as frequency of intervention, "directive"
tendencies, degree of self-involvement and self-revelation, depth of
confrontation, etc. Finally, one of the reasons he is called a "trainer" is
that he is "training" group members to participate in his role of participant-observer; the participants, in one way or another, learn from him how to observe what is happening in the group.

(f) Communication and emotion. In almost every laboratory, one of the principal emphases is the network of problems centering around intragroup communication processes. It is learned, often painfully, that it is impossible to deal with issues on a purely intellectual level, even though the laboratory might concern itself with a highly "intellectual" area such as problem-solving. As Collins and Guetzkow (1964) note, any attempt to ignore human relations issues is self-defeating:

Meeting interpersonal obstacles contributes as much toward group productivity as meeting problems posed by task-environmental obstacles; in fact, because group members have a tendency to ignore interpersonal issues, interpersonal obstacles may be the major barrier to task effectiveness in many groups (p. 88).

This does not mean that laboratory training is directly psychotherapeutic. Rather personal and interpersonal problems are dealt with insofar as they inhibit free communication within the group and stand in the way of the group's achieving its goals. In laboratory experiences, therefore, while emotional issues are not ordinarily the primary concern of the participants (though they may be), neither are they ignored but rather dealt with to the extend called for by the goals of the group. In the laboratory experience to be outlined in the following chapters, a laboratory experience in which self-actualization and interpersonal growth are the principal goals, emotional issues are one of the principal focuses of the group.

(g) Support. A laboratory is an opportunity for the responsible lowering of defenses which tend to rigidify the personality and distort
reality. But if the laboratory, directly or indirectly, calls for dealing with certain issues, e.g. emotional issues, it must also provide a climate of support conducive to dealing with these issues. This is one area in which many laboratories fail: they demand anxiety-arousing behavior from the participants and yet do not provide adequate security measures. This problem will be dealt with below in the chapter on supportive behavior.

(h) Ambiguity. The average laboratory experience possesses a good deal of built-in ambiguity. The articulated goals of the laboratory are usually so general that one of the major perceptions of the participants is what Benne (1964) calls a "perception of goallessness" (p. 217), and, since the trainer, true to his non-directive approach, does little to clarify either goals or procedure, the participants, amid mounting anxiety, thrash around looking for viable ways of interacting with one another. Schein and Bennis (1965c) picture the situation in these terms: "The goals are unclear, the training staff provides minimal cues....The general absence of expectations creates an unstructured, i.e., ambiguous situation. This serves to upset old routines and behavioral grooves and to open up new possibilities for the delegates" (p. 44). In the opinion of Schein and Bennis, "the ambiguous and unstructured situation creates a need to define and organize the environment" (p. 31). Each laboratory will possess its own degree of ambiguity, which will be marked or minimal in keeping with the nature of the laboratory and its goals. There seems to be a tendency in the literature to consider a rather high degree of ambiguity as essential to laboratory learning. However, in my opinion, excessive ambiguity often works counter to the principal goals of some laboratories and should, therefore, be mitigated or eliminated. Again,
this question will be dealt with separately below.

(i) The general goals of laboratory training. Since there are many different kinds of laboratories, the specific goals of laboratory training will also differ. However, certain general goals which would apply to most laboratory experiences may be outlined, although the literature is slow to speak in any extended way about even the general goals of laboratory learning (e.g. Bradford, Gibb, & Benne, 1964). Schein and Bennis (1965a), however, claim that there "seems to be general agreement about the goals of laboratory training," and suggest the following: "(1) self-insight, or some variation of learning related to increased self-knowledge, (2) understanding the conditions which inhibit or facilitate group functioning, (3) understanding interpersonal operations in groups, and (4) developing skills for diagnosing individual, group, and organizational behavior" (p. 35). Most professionals engaged in laboratory training would probably maintain that all goals, both general and specific, must remain flexible and that it is of the essence of laboratory learning to allow the group to create its own goals and to move in fruitful, though perhaps unexpected, directions.

(j) Exercises. Different kinds of exercises are used in most laboratories to stimulate participation, introduce "missing" elements into the group experience, and highlight different aspects of participant behavior. For instance, individual members might be given a problem to solve. Once they have reached an answer and have indicated the degree of certainty they have with respect to the answer, they are placed in small groups (e.g. in threes) in which members have different answers. They then discuss the problem and must eventually come up with a single answer. Finally, once the
answer has been presented, the members discuss how they worked toward achieving consensus in the group, what emotional problems arose, etc. Exercises may be either verbal or non-verbal. In groups which focus on self-actualization processes and emotional issues there is a tendency to rely more heavily on non-verbal exercises. These will be discussed in greater detail below in Chapter VII.

(k) Laboratory populations. For the most part, participants are drawn from normal rather than psychiatric populations. However, special laboratory techniques have been used with psychiatric populations (Morton, 1965) and with a good deal of success (Johnson, Hanson, Rothaus, Morton, Lyle and Moyer, 1965). Mowrer's (1967, 1968) and Mainord's (1967) approaches to group psychotherapy have laboratory features and undoubtedly further explorations in the use of laboratory methods with psychiatric populations will take place.

(l) Differences in laboratory experiences. Given the unstructured nature of laboratory experiences, it is not strange to note that even among laboratories with the same specific goals there are great differences. It is quite obvious that the focus of learning for a group of executives or managerial personnel from the same organization engaged in a laboratory dealing with managerial styles and their relationship to the interaction between intra-organizational human relations variables and productivity will be quite different from the focus of learning in a university laboratory course in group dynamics in which the participants are interested in learning about the nature and dynamics of small groups by actually becoming a group. What is not quite so obvious is the fact that strikingly different kinds of growth
and learning can take place in similar groups participating in similar laboratories in the same residential center. Exactly what is learned or what kind of growth takes place depends on the style of leadership, the peculiar nature of each group, and the goals that it creates for itself as it moves through the laboratory experience. Investigations of molar activity have always been difficult for the behavioral sciences, but research in the area of laboratory training is even more difficult because of the diversities outlined here.

**Sensitivity training: a species of laboratory learning.** The distinction about to be made is not current or at least not emphasized, to the best of my knowledge, in the literature, but it governs the use of the terms "laboratory learning" and "sensitivity training" throughout this book. I am aware that some will find the definition of "sensitivity-training" used here too restrictive, but I believe that the term must be defined and "restricted" if it is to be used in any technical way. Sensitivity training, as understood here, is a particular kind of laboratory learning in which intrapersonal and interpersonal issues are the direct focus of the group. Other goals, such as learning about group processes and developing skills for diagnosing group and organizational behavior, are not eliminated, but they are incidental and, therefore, subordinated to the goal of dealing with personal and interpersonal deficiencies and potentialities. Frankly, I prefer other terms to describe this kind of laboratory experience—e.g. a self-actualization and interpersonal-growth experience, a laboratory in basic human relations, a laboratory in interpersonal relations. Since these terms are less "loaded," I will frequently use them instead of "sensitivity training."
A sensitivity laboratory provides its members with a unique opportunity for responsible learning about themselves on intrapsychic and interpersonal levels. Admittedly, most laboratory experiences, whatever their specific goals have "sensitivity" dimensions, that is, while the principal focus may be learning about the dynamics of an organization, managerial styles, or group processes, still the climate is such as to sustain and even demand a certain amount of examination of personal and interpersonal issues, especially insofar as such issues are interrelated with other aspects of the laboratory. House (1967) points to this interrelationship as one of the reasons why trainers should be competent in the area of clinical psychology:

Many of the T-Group properties deal with complex psychological and sociological variables. The T-Group is designed to induce anxieties and to stimulate interpersonal feedback, introspection, and self-evaluation. Although some may claim that the T-Group is not therapeutic, within the latitude of T-Group emphasis are methods which closely approximate methods utilized in overtly therapeutic processes. This being the case, I believe it is imperative that T-Group leaders have psychological training equivalent to that required for professional clinical psychology (p. 26).

What Schein and Bennis (1965a) conceptualize as "meta-goals" of laboratory training "rarely articulated by the trainer"—such goals as a spirit of inquiry (especially into oneself and one's interpersonal living), expanded consciousness and choice, authenticity in interpersonal relations, collaboration with other group members, and conflict resolution through rational means—these I see as more direct goals of sensitivity training and see no reason why they should not be suggested or in some way "articulated" by the trainer. One of the purposes of this study is to show how the elements of laboratory learning outlined above apply to sensitivity training in general and particularly to the contract approach to interpersonal growth formulated here.
Psychotherapy for the Normal?

If sensitivity training in the strict sense deals directly with such intrapersonal and interpersonal issues as personal and interpersonal deficiencies and potentialities and only indirectly with group process and organization variables, then how does sensitivity training, so defined, differ from group psychotherapy? This is certainly a valid, although complex question, but some of its complexities must be dealt with in order to provide a meaningful context and rationale for any kind of sensitivity training.

There is a de facto demand among "normals" for sensitivity experiences, and this demand seems to be growing. In order to understand this phenomenon (if it is not just a fad), it is necessary to investigate the whole question of unused human potential.

The "psychopathology of the average." Early in the history of modern psychology William James remarked that few men bring to bear more than about ten percent of their human potential on the problems and challenges of human living. Others since James have in one way or another said substantially the same thing, and, amazingly enough, few if any, have challenged these statements. "Unused human potential" has even become the war cry of "humanistic" psychologists and humanistically oriented behavioral scientists and philosophers (e.g. Allport, 1955; Buber, 1937; Jourard, 1963, 1964, 1968; Laing, 1960; Maslow, 1968; May, 1958, 1960; Moustakes, 1956; Mowrer, 1964; Murphy, 1958; Otto, 1966; Rogers, 1961; Van Kaam, 1960; Wheelis, 1958, 1960, to mention but a few). It is contended here that the problem of unused human potential "outweighs" the problem of emotional disorder, even though elsewhere it has been rightly claimed that in terms of social welfare and national economy
mental illness is our most serious public health problem (Schofield, 1964). The problem of unused human resources is not as dramatic as the problem of emotional disorder and it is not a "public health" problem, but, while it does not have the same visibility as mental health problems, it certainly is one of the major problems of public welfare and moreover it is much more pervasive than the problem of "mental illness." The problem of unused human potential is one that affects every man.

Maslow (1968) remarks that "what we call 'normal' in psychology is really a psychopathology of the average, so undramatic and so widely spread that we don't even notice it ordinarily" (p. 16). Perhaps too much energy has been poured into the task of moving men from a state of "mental illness" to a state of "mental health," while not nearly enough energy has been expended on the task of moving the "mentally healthy" in the direction of self-actualization. Mental health, if it is understood in an analogy with physical health, is like air-conditioning. Air-conditioning does not cause pleasure (except by initial contrast or as a status symbol). It gives relief. It renders a person's environment neutral and thus allows him the opportunity to make better use of his human potentiality, if he so desires.

Traditionally the task of devising ways of developing a "normal" man's potentialities is the province of education in the broadest sense. Despite the theoretical importance of education, however, there is evidence to suggest that formal education has failed to serve the function of unfettering human potentiality (e.g. Jacob, 1957; Miles, 1964; Rogers, 1961, Chapter 13). For example, creativity among students, far from being encouraged, is often seen (or rather felt) as the proverbial thorn (Guilford, 1962; Holland, 1961). In
fact, some advance the thesis that education, at least as it exists on primary and secondary levels in this country, is primarily an instrument of conformity rather than liberation (Friedenburg, 1963).

The problem of the "psychopathology of the average" must be attacked at its roots if there is to be any widespread success in dealing with it. Limbacher (1967a, 1967b) has suggested a training program in mental health for grammar school students. While this program has a preventive-mental-health orientation rather than one of self-actualization, he at least realizes that emotional education simply must accompany intellectual education in the school system itself. Limbacher's program, as it stands now, seems too didactic and overly insight-oriented. Laboratory-learning approaches and sensitivity-like experiences would seem more suited to children of that age. Steinzor (1968) looks forward to the day when "the curriculum of our public and private institutions, from the earliest grades on, will have made the language of honest, warm dialogue a required part of general education" (p. 9). Full interpersonal living depends upon a person's ability to involve himself effectively, even creatively, with others, but this does not "just happen," nor is it a question of some having the "gift" of creativity in human relationships while others are devoid of it. People have to learn how to become present to others in more fully human ways. But strangely enough, until recently at least, people have not thought it worthwhile to teach children (and adults) how to involve themselves with others. Our school system is strange in this regard: children spend an enormous amount of time doing things next to, instead of with, others. Our society teems with this kind of "parallel" learning just as it does with "parallel" living. Therefore, it is
essential to find ways, from the earliest years of education of putting people into more effective human contact with one another. Interpersonal growth experiences such as sensitivity-training laboratories are showing us that people can actually learn how to live with themselves and with others more effectively. Human relations learning is perhaps the most important kind of learning that can take place, but, paradoxically, it is the most neglected. I imagine that it has been presumed that such learning occurs more or less "naturally" outside the more formal classroom situation, whereas most often it does not, or if it does, not to such an extent that we can claim that the majority of persons reaching adulthood can be considered self-actualized on an interpersonal level.

D-needs, M-needs, and B-needs. Maslow (1968) sees the origin of neurosis in a person's "being deprived of certain satisfactions which I called needs in the same sense that water and amino acids and calcium are needs, namely that their absence produces illness" (p. 21). Some of these basic needs are needs for "safety, for belongingness and identification, for close love relationships and for respect and prestige" (p. 21). These are D-needs ("D" for "deficiency"). Such needs, if, unfulfilled, stand in the way of further human growth. Counter to D-needs are the B-needs ("B" for "Being") of the person whose D-needs have been more or less adequately satisfied but who still feels within himself a drive toward further self-actualization. For instance, a person can feel within himself a need for B-love rather than D-love. D-love is "deficiency-love, love need, selfish love" (p. 42); it is possessive and always characterized by a rather marked degree of anxiety-hostility. B-love, on the other hand, is "love for the Being of another person, unneeded love,
unselfish love" (p. 42); it is non-possessive, can never be sated, and
possesses a minimum (almost non-existent) degree of anxiety-hostility. "B-
lovers are more independent of each other, more autonomous, less jealous and
threatened, less needful, more individual, more disinterested, but also
simultaneously more eager to help the other toward self-actualization, more
proud of his triumphs, more altruistic, generous and fostering" (p. 43).

I believe, however, that another category, M-needs ("M" for "mainte-
nance"), might be added to Maslow's schema. While many men might not be
grappling with marked D-problems, they still have not moved on to any
significant pursuit of B-values, at least in certain key areas of life such
as interpersonal relating. Rather most of their energies are poured into
"maintenance" functions. Such men work adequately, but more often than not
it is at uninteresting jobs; their home lives are rather "neutral," neither
hotbeds of neurotic interaction nor centers of interpersonal stimulation;
they profess certain religious values, but these values are ritualistic and
restraining, holding them back for "doing wrong" rather than impelling them
to involve themselves more creatively in their communities. Such men exhaust
their energies in M-functions, and there is relatively nothing left over for
B-functions. Perhaps Phillips (1956) would include those who spend a dispro-
portionate amount of time carrying out "M-functions in the term "normally
unadjusted adults" in whom, as he notes, the avoidance gradient (preoccupation
with defense mechanisms) is not the primary concern, but rather the approach
gradient (the inertia that keeps them from the work of self-actualization).

Sensitivity-training populations versus psychiatric populations. It
would be simple to state that sensitivity training is not group psychotherapy
since the laboratory population is a "normal" rather than a "diseased" one (although, as noted above, laboratory methods are beginning to be applied to group psychotherapy). This, however, would overlook certain important issues. First of all, it is becoming more and more difficult to distinguish with complete accuracy between "normal" and "psychiatric" populations. Burton (1965) points out that studies of the "non-diseased" offer

the possibly novel thesis...that the psychically diseased and the non-diseased are not such polar opposites as we had formerly believed—that the existence of the diseased and non-diseased is fundamentally the same and differs only in the mode of being-in-the-world, i.e., in the expression of their humanness. Both have similar problems of being man, feel despair the same way.... Possibly only the crucial intensity of existence in each differs from time to time, and the historical and contemporaneous way in which the human condition is met (p. 384-385).

Schofield (1964) would certainly sympathize with such a thesis, for he believes that the "psychiatrist has frequently expanded the domain of mental illness to include all degrees and kinds of psychological distress, failing to appreciate that the human suffers some pains not because he is sick but because he is human" (p. 146).

Hendin, Gaylin, and Carr (1965) in a study of the "non-patient" also find difficulty with traditional ways of categorizing the "mentally ill" and the "mentally well";

It is apparent that the distinction between patient and non-patient is not the same as between sick and well. The discrepancy between how these individuals [the subjects of the study] and any textbook description of 'healthy' or 'ideal' adjustment is striking. The interesting question then arises as to what integrative forces permit individuals to function, often with purpose and adaptation, constructively and productively, in spite of underlying difficulties....It is somewhat disconcerting that in the present study the nurse whom the interviewer described as one of the most disturbed girls was also described as 'dramatic and engaging,' while
the 'colorlessness' of one of the most normal of the group led
the interviewer to speculate on how depressing it would be if
this is what constitutes 'normality' (pp. 105-106).

Maslow (1962) and Rogers (1961, 1963) have also been studying "normal" groups
in an effort to establish a baseline for psychotherapeutic treatment.

A total re-evaluation of the fruitfulness of the "medical model" in
dealing with problems of living is taking place (e.g. Ellis, 1967; Kanfer and
As Schofield (1964) notes, "the total case load of those who are mentally and
emotionally diseased is composed primarily of persons who are neither in need
of, nor responsive to, specific medication, surgery, hospitalization, or other
physical regiments" (p. 1). Given such turmoil in the "healing guild," it
would seem unwise to characterize any kind of sensitivity training as a
"psychotherapy" for the "normal," even though there are definite similarities
between the two experiences. Even though many people stand in aware of or
are afraid of the term "psychotherapy," there is nothing mystic about it.
Psychotherapy is a human growth experience that usually takes place in some
kind of relational context (just as a laboratory in interpersonal relations
is a human growth experience that takes place in a relational context). The
therapist variables (e.g. non-possessive warmth, genuineness, accurate empathy,
responsible confrontation, concreteness) and patient variables (e.g. openness,
a willingness to experiment with self-exploration and other forms of growthful
behavior) that characterize good psychotherapy do not differ dramatically from
the trainer and participant variables that characterize a good laboratory in
interpersonal relations. However, the purpose of sensitivity training may
be explained in terms of the D-, M-, and B-needs of relatively "normal"
populations (the application of sensitivity procedures to psychiatric populations defined as such is another question).

Sensitivity training in terms of D-, M-, and B-needs. It is unrealistic to suppose that participants in sensitivity training experiences should be limited to those in whom D-needs are no longer active factors and whose energies are not tied up in M-functions, so that the laboratory might center around B-needs, B-values, and B-functions exclusively. Bugental (1965) attempted to set up such a laboratory, terming it "Advanced Sensitivity Training." Members were chosen because of "functional excellence" in vocation, marriage, and friendship relations, because they manifested an observing and curious ego, because they gave evidence of possessing adequate tolerance for psychic stress arising from ambiguity, intrapsychic conflict, interpersonal conflict and uncertainty and risk, and finally because they were highly motivated for group interaction. But, while everything looked fine on paper, things did not work out as well in practice:

Our hope to select a group freer than usual of the deterrents of psychic disturbance was in vain. The group was a fairly typical selection of twelve functional, reasonably socially effective people who nevertheless were beset by a clear range of emotional interferences with their functioning.

We, as trainers, were severely handicapped in attempting to give primary emphasis to positive forces in the participants' personalities by our own unresolved neurotic components and by our years of training and experience which have been largely in the frame of reference of psychopathology and dealing with deficiency motivations. Time and again we found ourselves most active in the familiar ways of pointing to interferences and distortions and least effective in facilitating growth, venturing, and creativity.

The participants, as faithful products of their culture and personal histories, seemed to be more ready to recognize and deal with that which was negative and pathologic within themselves
and unsure and self-conscious about the positive and creative (p. 112). Sensitivity training purports to deal with the whole man, and every man, it would seem, even those most engaged in B-functions, must grapple to some extent with D-needs and the proportion of his life taken up with M-functions, and this is a lifelong task.

If a sensitivity laboratory were composed principally of participants with unresolved D-needs, then such a group would be much more similar to a traditional outpatient psychotherapy group than to the groups envisioned in this book. Slater (1966) even claims that "members of groups with which I am familiar benefit in inverse proportion to their therapeutic need" (p. 253), though it would be difficult to validate such a statement given the difficulties involved in measuring both "benefit" and "therapeutic need." Be that as it may, sensitivity groups, as dealt with in the literature and here, are usually made up of participants with a mixture of D-problems, various degrees of M-function over-involvement, and B-aspirations and skills. For very few of the participants, however, are D-needs the over-riding interactional concern during group sessions; still, on the other hand, few, if any, of the participants express no D-concerns. Therefore, in almost all sensitivity groups some time is spent in hunting down the sources of intrapersonal and interpersonal "noise-in-the-system." Or, as Bugental (1965) puts it, "much of the typical sensitivity-training program and most of psychotherapy have been concerned with exposing and (hopefully) overcoming those forces within individuals which limit their abilities to fully realize their potentialities" (p. 107).

A more important focus in sensitivity groups is M-involvement, or rather
M-over-involvement. In fact, it is principally the person who is overcommitted to M-operations in his personal and interpersonal living who is the victim of the "psychopathology of the average." In a laboratory in interpersonal relations, the participants can expect to be challenged to move beyond mere M-concerns in their interpersonal living.

And so, the sensitivity-training laboratory concerns itself with the D-, M-, and B-concerns of its participants, but the proportion of time and energy spent on each set of concerns, whether in the case of an individual participant or the group as a whole, depends on the composition of the group and the directions in which the group moves. Also, it must be recognized that D-, M-, and B-concerns are interactive. For instance, over-involvement in M-activity might lead to frustration and D-reactions. Or a participant might discover that experimentation with some kind of B-activity, such as practicing new ways of being responsibly present to the other members of the group, might eliminate some D-symptom such as psychosomatic distress.

The Contract-Interpersonal-Growth-Group

It is against the somewhat confused and ill-defined background of laboratory learning and sensitivity training that this study is written, a study that purports to establish a methodology for a particular kind of sensitivity-training group, called, somewhat ungracefully, a "contract-interpersonal-growth group."

Ways in which the "contract-group" differs from "traditional" sensitivity training. The contract-group has a much higher degree of structure and a much higher degree of "visibility" (the opposite of ambiguity) than do traditional sensitivity-training groups. First of all, prospective partici-
pants realize what kind of experience they are about to undergo, for the major features of the contract-experience are outlined for them, either by lecture or in writing (e.g. a pamphlet explaining the experience more or less fully), before or at the time they enter the group. Once they have an understanding of the principal features of the proposed laboratory, they are free to enter the experience or not, but if they do enter, they realize that the laboratory is going to be conducted as stated in the outline. Another way of putting this is that entry into the group takes place "by contract," the description of the sensitivity experience being the "contract" to which participants subscribe. In practice I have found that if the participants freely choose to participate in a sensitivity-training experience, the contract need not be explicitly chosen but rather may be "imposed" as the defining structure of the experience. For good or ill, this eliminates a good deal of the ambiguity that is usually associated with the initial stages of the laboratory and also eliminates the anxiety that results from this ambiguity. Anxiety, however, is by no means entirely eliminated, rather its source and focus change. Once the participants realize, even in some general way, just what is expected of them, their anxiety centers around their willingness and their ability to fulfill the contract.

Secondly, the contract (chapter 2) provides a certain degree of structure for the laboratory; it establishes definite goals (chapter 3) and definite interactional means to achieve these goals (chapter 6-9); it defines the kind of leadership that is to characterize the group experience (chapter 5) and the general "laboratory" orientation of the group (chapter 4); finally, it points out the principal ways in which participants take flight from
sensitivity experiences and suggests ways in which members might take a stance against such flight (chapter 10). The kinds of interaction that are seen as facilitating growth are self-disclosure (chapter 6), total human expressing, including honest expression of feeling and emotion and the non-cliche use of language to translate oneself to the other members of the group (chapter 7), support (chapter 8), and responsible confrontation (chapter 9). At first glance, it might appear that the contract provides too much structure, but in practice the structure provided by the contract is seen as "facilitating" rather than "regulating" and provides ample opportunity for both individual and group initiative. Therefore, Chapter 2 explains in detail the reasons for sensitivity-training "by contract" and then subsequent chapters both explain the provisions of the contract and provide the rationale for including each provision.

It is not suggested that the contract described here is the only viable sensitivity-training contract. Many different kinds of contract could be set up for laboratories in general and sensitivity training experience in particular. The contract group, therefore, is both a detailed account of a contract approach to one kind of laboratory experience and also a paradigm for a wide variety of group experiences. Contractual provisions for these experiences will differ, obviously, with differing goals.

"High visibility" and the introduction of a good deal of structure (even to the definition of the modes of interaction demanded in the group) are actually rather radical departures from sensitivity-training theory and practice. Their potential value will be one of the principal emphases of this study.
The parentage of the contract-group: therapy and group dynamics. The sources of the kind of group process suggested here are many. Of the three models of man described by Allport (1962)—man-as-reactive, man-as-reactive-in-depth, and man-as-a-being-in-the-process-of-becoming—the last has been the most influential, though the others have not been excluded. The immediate stimulus to formulate a methodology for sensitivity training came from my attempts to puzzle out for myself the difference between "good" and "bad" group process during t-group meetings of staff members and in group psycho-therapy sessions with patients at Galesburg State Research Hospital, Illinois. I have drawn on the theoretical formulations and the research findings of a number of fields: individual and group psychotherapy, laboratory training, social psychology in general and group dynamics in particular. Theory and research in the area of psychotherapy is very helpful in formulating programs for laboratories in interpersonal relations for a very definite reason. The activities that take place in the context of psychotherapy belong there not because they are mysteriously identified with the process of therapy but because they are intense, growthful forms of relating. For instance, the client begins to trust the therapist because the latter is genuine, warm, and accepting. Because the patient trusts the therapist he is willing to disclose himself to him, perhaps at some of the deepest levels of his being. The therapist responds with understanding and support and perhaps even shares himself in terms of self-disclosure with the patient. This kind of relationship is therapeutic because it is fully human, but because it is fully human, it is the kind of relationship that belongs first of all in ordinary human life and only "secondarily," as it were, perhaps in an intensified form, in
Many of us are afraid of intimacy, of deep human relations, and we would gladly relegate them to the province of the therapist. Laboratories in interpersonal relations have come into being in order to reintroduce men to deeper relationships, to challenge the fact that the deepest human relationships may exist only between a client and his therapist. Much of the research, then, being done in the area of psychotherapy tells us a great deal about how to form closer, more growthful relationships with others.

Social psychology, in that it deals with all forms of human relating, has much to tell the clinician. Unfortunately, few clinicians seem to read the social psychology literature. Those who reject a universal medical model in dealing with problems in human living desperately need to know how man relates to man in all areas of living. Clinicians frequently tend to see pathology everywhere because they do not have a sufficient feel for the wide range of human response found in the "normal" man or at least in the man afflicted only with the "psychopathology of the average." Reading in the literature of social psychology can help counteract this tendency. This literature is referred to from time to time in the following pages, but it is just a beginning.

Since this study deals with groups, it seems only natural to refer to the group dynamics literature of social psychology. Even though Lott and Lott (1965) claim that "since applications of so-called group behavior principles are often urged in such fields as group psychotherapy, education, and community relations, it is vital to distinguish between validated and unvalidated hypotheses..." (p. 299, emphasis added), it strikes me that the failure to make adequate use of "group behavior principles" in the practice of
group psychotherapy is one of the foremost problems in this field. Many group psychotherapists do little more than conduct individual therapy in front of an audience, completely failing to place the laws of group interaction at the service of the therapeutic process. Some psychotherapists, principally psychoanalysts, have resisted the application of principles drawn from the study of group dynamics to group psychotherapy on certain theoretical grounds (e.g. Locke, 1961; Lowrey, 1944; Wolf & Schwartz, 1962), while others, also on theoretical grounds, urge such application (Bach, 1954; Goldstein, Heller, & Sechrest, 1966; Hunt, 1964; Lorr, 1963; Schneider, 1955). The literature on small group dynamics and the literature on group psychotherapy are the "twain" that have never really met; the group psychotherapist and the group dynamicist have not been reading each other's literature. In self-actualization and interpersonal-growth laboratories the two fields converge in a most natural way. But the literature on sensitivity-training, even though it has grown out of an education and social psychology oriented background, still does not make sufficient use of group behavioral principles. Again, an attempt is made to do just this in the following pages, but it is only a beginning. One hope is that interpersonal-growth experiences with "normals" which utilize principles drawn from both individual and group psychotherapy, social psychology, and group dynamics will produce research data which will help clear up the spectacularly confused area of psychotherapy with the disturbed.

A "theory of method." Rioch (1951) points out that most theories of psychotherapeutic process are really theories of method, not formulations of the nature of the process. The same could be said about most theories dealing
with the process involved in sensitivity or growth or basic encounter groups. While the present study is admittedly a "theory of method," it would not be untrue to say that throughout it there are glimpses of an underlying formulation of the nature of the "growth" process. Any attempt to provide a rationale for including certain interactional variables such as self-disclosure and confrontation would have to make certain assumptions about the processes involved in interpersonal growth.

**Other contract groups.** The idea of growth-through-contract is hardly a widespread one. In the field of psychotherapy, both Mainord (1968) and Mowrer (1968) exact contracts from prospective patients for the group "growth experiences" that each conducts. Mowrer's contract contains three provisions: the prospective group member must agree (1) to be completely open about himself to the group with respect to both past and current behavior; (2) to take responsibility for himself once he enters the group (not to blame others for his predicament); and (3) to get involved with the other members of the group. Mainord's contract is somewhat similar to Mowrer's. What is most noteworthy is the fact that these are some of the first attempts to introduce a high degree of "visibility" into the psychotherapeutic experience itself. In the area of sensitivity training, Bach (1966) has formulated a kind of contract for a "marathon" group experience. These "Ten Marathon Commandments" form a contract which is designed to make the "marathon" experience, which Bach describes as an "intensification and acceleration of transparency and genuine encounter by a deliberate instigation of group pressure focused on behavioral change" (p. 995), even more intense. Bach's "contract" will be discussed in the chapter on confrontation.
The Question of Training Trainers

The question of training effective trainers for laboratory groups and especially for sensitivity groups parallels a problem in the field of psychotherapy discussed by Schofield (1964). Schofield claims that many of the people flocking to mental health professionals do not suffer from traditional forms of mental disturbance (such as those delineated in the American Psychiatric Association's diagnostic manual), but rather from what he calls "philosophical neuroses" which are characterized not by specifically neurotic complaints but by an "absence of faith, of commitment, of meaning, of the need to search out personal, ultimate values, or of the need to live comfortably and meaningfully each day in the face of final uncertainty" (p. 150). The "philosophically neurotic," frequently because they can afford to, monopolize too much of the time of mental health professionals. Therefore, Schofield calls for a way of increasing "the number of persons who are adequately skilled and appropriately competent to converse therapeutically" (p. 3).

Rioch, Elkes, Flint, Usdansky, Newman, and Silber (1963) took a step in this direction by training housewives as "mental health counselors." The theory is that extensive academic training leading to formal degrees is not necessary to produce effective counselors, especially when these counselors work in settings where they are supervised by professionals. A follow-up note (Anonymous, 1967) indicates that all of Rioch's trainees (except one who dropped out because of illness) are working successfully in individual therapy, counseling, or group therapy. Three have gone on to advanced study in psychology or social work. The same note indicates that other centers (e.g.
Johns Hopkins) are presently training non-professionals for work as therapists.

The whole question of who should be doing therapy (and by implication, conducting laboratories in interpersonal relations) is a thorny one:

[I]n the field of psychotherapy, evidence suggests that the most important determinant of the therapist's effectiveness lies in his personality, his capacity to empathize with the patient and to a much lesser extent his actual experience working directly with patients (Truax & Carkhuff, 1964). It seems that the preclinical experience such as medical school, Ph.D., School of Social Work, and other intensive educational procedures are largely irrelevant in this sphere as currently practiced (Schofield, 1964). What is even more devastating, according to an informal study conducted by Meehl, a significant number of practicing psychotherapists, despite the most intensive of training, are judged by their colleagues as incompetent or ineffectual. Thus, we must assume that in the field of psychotherapy (perhaps excluding behavior therapy), the relevant sphere of knowledge is largely located in the area of common rather than scientific knowledge. This assumption is further buttressed by the fact that various studies suggest that people without the background of mental health professionals can, after a short period of clinical experience, achieve a facility in certain kinds of psychotherapy (taking account of the difficulty of making such evaluations) equals that of someone with as tortuous and expensive an educational background as the psychiatrist (Rioch et al., 1963; Poser, 1966) (Werry, 1968, p. 7).

In my experience it is the socially intelligent person, the person with a "feel" for his fellow human beings, that makes the best trainer.

I would hope to see programs similar to training programs for lay therapists instituted for training trainers for sensitivity work. In fact, sensitivity training groups seem to be excellent fora in which the problems of the "philosophically" neurotic can be worked through, and, if this is the case, this would relieve some of the pressures under which mental health professionals are now working. While few universities have set up programs for training trainers for laboratory work in general and sensitivity training in particular, such university centers would fill a serious lacuna in the
clinical sector of the behavioral science field. Not only could institutes be set up to train and perhaps to certify trainers (many groups looking for competent sensitivity trainers have no way of verifying the credentials of prospective trainers), but desperately needed research programs could also be established in these centers. Entrance into such programs should be controlled so that not just the academically competent but rather those who possess both academic and social competence would be accepted for training. Such programs could become excellent ways of making "increased use of 'peripheral' resources such as teachers, clergy, and others" (Schofield, 1964, p. 169).

The Audience to Which This Study is Addressed

At the time of this writing no book deals directly and exclusively with sensitivity training in the sense in which it has been defined here (a laboratory experience centering around intrapsychic and interpersonal concerns). Although the present study outlines a specific approach to a laboratory in human relations, it deals principally with those variables (self-disclosure, expression of feeling, support, confrontation, and self-exploration as a response to responsible confrontation) which are found in any group experience in which self-actualization and interpersonal growth are goals. This study has been used as a text in a laboratory course in human relations and as an adjunctive text in courses in counseling and psychotherapy. It should be of interest to anyone who has already participated in or is about to participate in a laboratory experience with any kind of direct or indirect "sensitivity" orientation. Finally, anyone interested in interpersonal growth might find food for both reflection and action here, for much of what is discussed can be "experimented" with outside laboratory and group settings.
An Eclectic Approach

The "theory of method" outlined in this book is clearly eclectic. While many of the hypotheses suggested are derived from existing psychotherapeutic approaches, e.g., those of Rogers, London, Schofield, Mowrer, Truax, Berenson, Carkhuff, Laing, Beier, Ellis, and a number of others, still it is not a theory of psychotherapy that is elaborated here, but rather an approach to interpersonal growth designed for populations of normal subjects. Another rich source for hypotheses has been the literature in social psychology which deals with normal human interaction and human behavior in groups. While it is not the intent of the author to criticize psychoanalytic concepts or procedures, still the major psychoanalytic concepts were not considered germane to this specific approach to interpersonal growth. Therefore, such terms as the "unconscious," "libido," "transference," "repression," and the like are not treated here. This book focuses on human communication and the ways in which communication affects other forms of human behavior. While it is assumed that learning plays an important part in the elaboration of behavior patterns, it is not assumed that learning provides an exclusive explanation of behavior. Still, a further assumption is that a great deal of behavioral modification can take place through direct learning and conscious decision.
Chapter II
The Contract

Groups as "Natural" and Groups as "Contractual"

The varieties of groups. The field of group dynamics is very broad. There are many different kinds of groups and many attempts have been made to classify them:

Over the years, many different classificatory schemes have been proposed. A common procedure has been to select a few properties and to define 'types' of groups on the basis of whether these properties are present or absent. Among the properties most often employed are: size (number of members), amount of physical interaction among members, degree of intimacy, level of solidarity, locus of control of group activities, extent of formalization of rules governing relations among members, and tendency of members to react to one another as individual persons or as occupant of roles. Although it would be possible to construct a large number of types of groups by combining these properties in various ways, usually only dichotomies have resulted: formal-informal, primary-secondary, small-large, Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft, autonomous-dependent, temporary-permanent, consensual-symbiotic. Sometimes a rather different procedure has been advocated in which groups are classified according to their objectives or social settings. Accordingly, there are said to be work groups, therapy groups, committees, clubs, gangs, teams, coordinating groups, religious groups, and the like (Cartwright & Zander, 1968, p. 24).

There is an extensive literature dealing with the interactions that take place within groups and between groups, but, as Cartwright and Zander note, "only beginnings have been made" (p. 25).

The conversation group. In many small groups, the participants come together in order to talk with one another, that is, conversation (social interaction) is either the principal goal of the group or it is one of the principal means of achieving some other goal. Conversation groups that meet by design come together for a number of purposes—to negotiate a labor contract, to discuss community problems, to enjoy one another's company,
to engage in group psychotherapy, to engage in a laboratory course in group dynamics, etc. These conversation groups may be highly structured with respect to purpose (for instance, to work out a labor contract) or the purpose might be vague by design (for instance, to learn about small groups by actually being a small group). The goals of the group are achieved principally through face-to-face conversation: it is through conversation (social interaction) that decisions are reached, that people get to know one another, that personal problems are handled, etc. This study deals with one kind of small, face-to-face conversation group.

**Contracts in conversation groups.** In all small, face-to-face conversation groups that come together by design, there is usually some kind of at least vague, implicit, minimal contract operative. That is, there is a series of "rules" which make the group operative and give it direction. The members either explicitly or implicitly agree to follow these "rules" (more or less) in order to achieve the purpose of the group. First of all, the participants agree to come (though their freedom to come might vary quite a bit from group to group). Secondly, they usually agree to engage in or at least listen to the conversation that takes place in the group. Sometimes they agree to talk about something quite specific—for instance, the provisions of a labor contract—while at other times there is a more vague contractual specificity—for instance, those who agree to participate in group psychotherapy sessions realize to a greater or lesser degree that they are agreeing to talk about their "problems" or themselves with some degree of openness. At other times the members of a group contract (vaguely, perhaps) to "unstructured" conversation—for example, in academic labora-
tories in group dynamics and in sensitivity-training laboratories. Ordinarily in laboratory-training situations there is no predetermined topic of conversation. The point is this: if one were to examine different kinds of conversation groups, he would discover that these groups run according to a certain set of "rules." These rules might well change as the group moves forward, but at any stage of the development of the group some set of rules governing what is done and what is not done in the group is operative. This set of rules is the contract which governs the group. Implicit in any group contract are the goals or the purposes of the group and the means the group utilizes in order to achieve these goals.

Leader and member contracts in small groups. If the small group has a leader, there are at least two kinds of contract operative in the group: the leader-contract and the member-contract. The leader may be working under two different but related contracts: a "commercial" contract and a "process" contract. For instance, in a group psychotherapy situation the "commercial" contract stipulates that the leader be paid, either by the patients directly or by some sponsoring agency, to operate as leader, that is, to use his professional skills in order to guide the participants to better levels of adjustment. The "commercial" contract usually assumes his professional competence and allows him to run the group as he sees fit. But the therapist himself usually has a specific way in which he approaches the therapeutic situation—he has goals in mind and some idea of the means that he will employ in order to reach these goals. That is to say, the therapist himself operates within a "therapy process" contract which he has devised. This contract is usually quite flexible and changes as he grows in
experience. However, if the therapist is also involved in a research project, then he might be operating under some kind of "therapy process" contract that is not entirely his own. Such a contract may have been devised by a research team of therapists, and once designed, it is "imposed" on all the therapists working on the same project. Such a contract serves to standardize the therapeutic process for the sake of research.

The provisions of a member-contract specify the ways in which the member should act during the small-group experience. For most small, face-to-face conversations groups the member-contract is usually quite minimal and vague. For instance, when the faculty members of a high school come together to discuss the issues facing the institution, they operate under some kind of minimal contract, but the contract is practically never articulated. It is assumed (no matter how gratuitous an assumption this might be) that they know why they are at the meeting and what they are to do. In most laboratory-training situations, including laboratories in self-actualization and interpersonal relations, the member-contract remains unarticulated. The participants realize that they are a group of "non-patients" (Hendin, Gaylin, & Carr, 1965) or of "non-diseased" (Burton, 1965) individuals pursuing personal or interpersonal growth through the group process. They realize they constitute some kind of "growth" group, but they have only the vaguest idea of how they should act in such a group. A similar statement could be made with respect to patients or clients entering psychotherapy: they realize that they are patients, but they usually have only a vague idea of what is expected of them during the therapy sessions.
The contract-group differs from other kinds of laboratory-training or "growth" groups in that both the leader-contract (the "process" rather than the "commercial" contract) and the member-contract are spelled out in some detail before the group experience begins. Because both contracts are known by all participants from the beginning, the group is said to have "high visibility" or comparatively low ambiguity.

"Natural" interactions versus "contractual" interactions in small groups. A distinction can be made between two kinds of interaction that take place in small groups (a distinction which I have not seen elsewhere, but which is important to the understanding of the nature of contract-groups) --the distinction between N-interactions and C-interactions. N-interactions ("N" for "natural") take place in small, face-to-face groups precisely because they are just that--small, face-to-face groups pursuing some kind of goal principally through group conversation, that is, N-interactions are the kinds of interactions that are characteristic of small, face-to-face groups. In a certain sense group dynamics studies such as that of Hare, Borgatta, and Bales (1962) and Cartwright and Zander (1968) are attempts to get at and summarize the "laws" operative in small groups. These studies deal with such topics as pressures to uniformity in groups, group cohesiveness, power and influence in groups, communication networks, equilibrium in small groups, role differentiation, leadership, motivational processes, and other variables that are operative merely because a number of people have come together for a certain purpose. C-interactions ("C" for "contractual"), on the other hand, take place because of the purpose of the group, that is, they arise from the "contract" to which the group participants have explicitly or
or implicitly "subscribed." A couple of examples will help clarify the difference between N-interactions and C-interactions.

The first example refers to group psychotherapy. A person in group psychotherapy might (a) reveal something about himself, for instance, a personal problem (b) in order to please the therapist and his fellow group members. In this case, engaging in self-disclosure is a C-interaction, because talking about oneself and one's problems is vaguely implied in the member-contract to which the patients subscribe when they enter the group. Self-disclosure is considered one of the means leading to the goal, constructive personality change. The implicit contract includes both the goals of the groups and the means necessary in order to achieve these goals. The contract, then, determines what kind of interactions are appropriate in the group and these interactions are called C-interactions. However, the patient in question engaged in self-disclosure in order to please the therapist and his fellow group members. In small groups there is a tendency for low-status persons to engage in interactions which will please the leader and others who are considered higher in status (Collins & Guetzkow, 1964, pp. 166-187). The patient's interaction, therefore, is both a contractual interaction and a natural (dependency) reaction, that is, he did the "right" thing, but his motivation for doing so was most likely a reflection of his sense of inadequacy rather than his desire to grow. Given the status and power variables that are operative even in small groups, dependency and counter-dependency interactions are going to constitute a part of the group process.

Another example might illustrate the separability of N- and C-
interactions. Let us say that a group of executives have met to air their feelings about a proposed merger with another company. No final decision is to be made at the meeting. The purpose of the meeting is "to clear the air," and the (at least) implicit contract calls for the group members to be as honest as possible in expressing feelings about the merger. The members begin to speak. Mr. X waits until Mr. D, his immediate superior, speaks. Then Mr. X, instead of saying just what he feels, "colors" his own feelings with what he has heard from Mr. D. His N-interaction is a dependency-interaction. But he has violated the member-contract. He has not said what he really thinks. There is no C-interaction in this case; there is only the anti-C-interaction of dependency. If Mr. X had said what he really felt, even though he realized that this differed from what others, including his immediate superior, were saying, then his C-interaction would have been open-expression-of-feeling-to-the-group. However, if he expressed his feelings in reaction to Mr. D, then his C-interaction would also have been an N-interaction, namely, counter-dependency. But if he expressed his feelings because this was called for by the member-contract, and if the contract also warranted responsible confrontation, then his interaction would have been a C-interaction on two counts: (1) honest expression of feeling and (2) confrontation of the opinions of others. But if the implied member-contract calls for open expression of feeling but does not allow a subordinate to confront a superior, then the contract itself is deficient and needs more explicit definition.

Dearth of C-interaction literature. There is an extensive literature dealing with group dynamics. Moreover, a good deal of this literature deals,
Directly or indirectly, with the verbal and emotional interactions that take place in the kind of small, face-to-face conversation groups which are of interest in this study (e.g., Bales, 1950, in press; Bion, 1961; Borgatta & Crowther, 1965; Bradford, Gibb, & Benne, 1964; Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Hare, Borgatta, & Bales, 1962; Homans, 1950; Mann, 1967; Mills, 1964; Stock & Thelen, 1958; Whitaker & Lieberman, 1964). However, since none of this literature deals explicitly with the contracts underlying group membership and group behavior, it consequently has little or nothing to say about C-interactions. As noted above, this literature studies groups principally as "natural" rather than as "contractual." Slater (1966), for instance, with extensive experience in academic laboratories in group dynamics, speaks of such things as the "theme of group murder," the "theme of autonomy," the "theme of cannibalism," and the "theme of the sacred king." He talks about the revolts against the leader that take place "naturally" in groups, but his discussion stops there. He does not, for instance, discuss ways of controlling or avoiding such "revolts" so that the group might be freer to pursue more conscious and explicit goals more effectively. Bion (1961) talks of the "flight-flight group," the "pairing group," and the "dependent group," but he does not discuss ways of relating such group cultures to the overall purposes of the group. The point is this: sometimes N-interactions facilitate the work and progress of the group, while at other times they stand in the way of such progress. If any particular group has a solid understanding (a) of the goals of the group and of the means proportioned to the fulfillment of these goals and (b) of the N-interactions which facilitate and impede the attaining of these goals, then such a group becomes master of its destiny in
a way unknown to groups which fail to differentiate between C-interactions and N-interactions.

An hypothesis concerning C- and N-interactions. The hypothesis is this: the more explicit both the member-contract and the leader-process contract are in any face-to-face group and the deeper the commitment of the participants to these contracts, the less crucial N-interactions become. If the member-contract is vague and implicit, then variables such as pairing, flight-flight, and dependency characteristically multiply and occupy a disproportionate amount of the group's time and energy. However, if the member-contract and the leader-contract are clear, and, furthermore, if they are accepted by the members of the group as a condition of entry, then N-variables become less important. Rather, those N-interactions which are identified with or facilitate C-interactions will multiply, while non-facilitative N-interactions will decrease. Explicit and universally accepted contracts do not eliminate non-facilitative N-interactions (e.g. preoccupation with status within the group), but they do make non-facilitative N-interactions more apparent, they bring them out into the open where they can be dealt with more effectively.

Obviously there has to be a prior decision as to whether the elimination or minimalization of N-interactions in the group is a value or not. If the purpose of the group is precisely to study N-variables through the group process (as it is in academic laboratories in group dynamics), then their prior elimination or minimalization would be self-defeating. However, if increased C-interactions is the goal of the group, and if a condition for their increase is a strong member-contract and a strong leader-process-contract, then the subsequent minimalization of non-facilitative N-phenomena
is a positive value. In many laboratory-training situations one of the precise goals of the group (though it may not be articulated to the participants beforehand) is to discover experientially and become enmeshed in both non-facilitative and facilitative N-interactions in order to get a real feeling for what makes groups move forward and what makes them grind to a halt.

However, since the focus of this study is a contract-approach to sensitivity-training or interpersonal-growth groups, ways of minimizing N-phenomena that impede C-interactions constitute an object of primary concern.

**Operationalizing the Group**

**The goal as defining group process.** The goals of a group give some kind of specificity to the kinds of interaction that take place in the group. Certain kinds of interaction move the group toward its goals while other kinds of interaction stand in the way of goal-fulfillment. The overriding goal of sensitivity-training (or at least of the kind of contract-group which is the focus of this study) is interpersonal growth ("interpersonal growth," an admittedly vague concept, will be defined operationally in the chapter on goals). Therefore, the problem is to provide a group experience which will facilitate interpersonal growth. Other goals, such as "learning how groups work," are not excluded from the total goal-structure of the contract-group, but they are secondary. It is hypothesized here that clear and explicit leader-contracts and member-contracts can help create a group climate which is conducive to interpersonal growth. The provisions of such contracts should be as detailed as is necessary to help achieve the goal of interpersonal growth.

**Operationality.** March and Simon (1958) make a distinction between "operational" and "non-operational" goals in group process. A non-operational
Goal is one that (1) is quite general in itself (e.g. to raise the cultural level of the community) and (2) is not realized by a particular sequence of group activities. Therefore, in the contract-group the function of the member-contract and the leader-process-contract is to break the general group goal—interpersonal growth—down into more specific goals and to provide specific group activities designed to realize these goals.

Cartwright and Zander (1960) classify hypothesized determinants of group effectiveness under one or more of the following headings:

1. the extent to which a clear goal is present
2. the degree to which the group mobilizes energies of group members behind group activities
3. the degree to which there is conflict among members concerning which one of several possible goals should control the activities of the group
4. the degree to which there is conflict among members concerning means that the group should employ in reaching its goals
5. the degree to which the activities of different members are coordinated in a manner required by the group's tasks
6. the availability to the group of needed resources, whether they be economic, material, legal, intellectual, or other (p. 345).

Contracts can do much to provide these determinants of group effectiveness.

(1) The member-contract specifies both the superordinate goal (interpersonal growth) and certain subordinate goals (self-disclosure, expression of feeling, confrontation, self-exploration, support) which, when taken together, constitute an operational definition of interpersonal growth. (2) Participants choose to enter sensitivity-training experiences because they want to grow interpersonally. The contract focuses or "mobilizes" the energies of the group by delineating the kinds of interaction which lead to interpersonal growth. (3) The contract does not eliminate conflict from the group (conflict, too, can be growthful), but it does tend to eliminate useless "contract talk."
Many participants find it much easier to argue about what the group should do than to engage in specific kinds of group interaction. The contract sets up an "experiment" in interpersonal growth and invites the participants to engage in the experiment rather than argue about its merits. (4) The contract also specifies the means to be used in the experiment in order to achieve the superordinate goal of interpersonal growth. For instance, the contract suggests that such activities as responsible, self-involving confrontation lead to interpersonal growth. The participants are asked to engage in or "experiment" with such activities (without prejudging the experience) in order to discover whether such activities do deepen their ability to involve themselves with others. (5) The leader is present in the contract-group as both a coordinator and as a resource person. He both explains and models contractual behavior and encourages the other participants to engage in the experiment. The member-contract stipulates that there will be a leader and it spells out his functions in the group. (6) Most of the resources that are needed for interpersonal growth lie within the members of groups themselves. The leader brings with him such resources as a professional knowledge of group dynamics and experience as a member of groups. He places these resources at the service of the group. Ideally, his skills will become diffused among the members of the group.

Raven and Rietsema (1957) found that group members with a clear picture of the group goal and the paths to that goal had a closer involvement with the group goal, more sympathy with group emotions, and a greater readiness to accept influence from the group than those who were unclear about goals and the paths to the goals. It is assumed, then, that the contract will help
increase the members' involvement, sympathy, and openness to change.

The member-contract is established, then, in order to introduce a high degree of "operationality" in the group from the very beginning. It is an effort to make the group what Bion (1961) calls a "sophisticated" or "work" group from the start.

Eliminating wasteful design. "Wasteful design" is not a stranger in the behavioral sciences. The reduplication of staff effort in arriving at a useless diagnosis and a treatment program that is frequently ignored anyway is all too common in many mental health settings. It is my impression that a good deal of wasteful design is too often associated with sensitivity-training laboratories. For instance, a great deal of time in such laboratories is spent hammering out a viable contract to govern the interactions of the members. Sometimes almost the whole time is spent in formulating and re-working this contract. Undoubtedly the participants learn much about themselves and one another during such an experience and a good deal of interpersonal growth takes place. But often the members of such groups leave with a great deal of frustration, because there is no time to implement the contract which has been hammered out. Both the member-contract and the leader-process-contract eliminate a good deal of wasteful design from the contract-interpersonal-growth experience. The prospective member realizes just what kind of experience it is and what is expected of him if he chooses to enter. The time usually spent in the elaboration of the contract is spent rather in the pursuit of the goals specified by the contract.

Psychological Versus Mere Formal Membership in the Group

Being involved in the group experience. The antecedent acceptance of
the member-contract by those choosing to participate in the group experience goes far in solving the critical problem of differentiating between what Golembiewski (1962) calls "formal membership" and "psychological membership" (p. 67). It is a common experience in sensitivity groups to herald the "coming out" of a member. "John has finally joined the group" is a recognition that he has passed from just formal to psychological membership. Or perhaps it is rather that John has finally given some concrete sign that he is (and has been) a psychological member. Obviously the group operates more effectively if all of its members are "psychological" members from the start. Otherwise, instead of real group process, there is what Golembiewski (1962) calls "the behavior of individuals in an interpersonal situation" (p. 67).

The contract, especially if it is freely chosen by the participants from the beginning, does much to elicit psychological participation from the outset of the group—at least this is the hypothesis. In this study it is assumed that the members engage in the sensitivity-training experience because they want to and that they could stay away without recrimination. The behavior of those who are forced to take part in some kind of laboratory experience (House [1967] discusses the ethics of such an arrangement) is in a category by itself and is not the focus of this study. In the contract-group the ordinary criterion used to determine "psychological" membership is simply fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the contract. Given the nature of the contract as described in this paper, it is assumed that it would be quite difficult, if not impossible, for a participant to "fake" psychological membership. It is not assumed that everyone would be able to fulfill the contract. Those who feel that they could or should not should not enter the experience
Participation in the "common good." Any group which is more than a "group of individuals in a social situation" is so because in some way the group gives birth to a "common good" in which all of the members participate. Each member, as member, achieves his own individual good by participation in the common good. This "common-good" aspect of groups is one of the factors that make a group more than a collection of individuals. Slater (1966), however, claims that a group (in context he seems to be referring directly to academic groups engaged in a laboratory in group dynamics) is also less than a group of individuals, since only a "portion" of each individual is present. In the contract-group, however, the member-contract not only gives greater definition to the "common good" of the group, but entry-by-contract, it is assumed, increased the size of the "portion" of each individual present.

Ambiguity Versus Clarity in Growth Experiences

Ambiguity. Over the years any number of writers have sympathized with the plight of the person who feels that he must seek help in the form of psychotherapy. Curran (1944), for instance, describes such a person's confusion: "A confused person is likely to approach the first interview feeling a minimum of responsibility for himself and a maximum of fear, insecurity and defensiveness" (p. 189). It is not just that the person feels confused as he approaches the psychotherapeutic situation; his confusion often persists because the therapist fails to provide any meaningful structuring: "The patient may at first feel that his task is unorganized and formless and that there are no rules. Then he experiences a strange feeling of helplessness and dissatisfaction. It is as though the therapist did not care what he
talked about or how he spoke of it" (Ingam & Love, 1954, p. 81). The problem of the failure of the therapist to provide constructive structuring still persists, however, or at least it is still being discussed and investigated. Hoehn-Saric and his associates (1965), for example, believe that the problem needs further attention:

Because of the diversity and ambiguities of public conceptions of mental illness and psychotherapy, psychiatric patients reach the psychiatrist's office with a wide variety of attitudes and expectations. Only the most sophisticated are perfectly clear about why they are there and what to expect. Less sophisticated patients may have unrealistic expectations for improvement: they may not understand their role in the therapeutic process and may be bewildered by a procedure that differs not only from usual medical treatment but from customary social interactions" (p. 267).

To add to the confusion, even the "sophisticated" might find it difficult to say why they are sitting in the waiting room of a psychiatrist rather than that of some non-medical therapist.

There is some evidence that indicates that patients and therapists have quite different views of the same therapeutic experience. Truax and Carkhuff (1967) summarize some of this evidence:

Among the plethora of studies concluding, in effect, that therapists prefer 'better' patients, that is, those less sick and more sensitive, intelligent, and willing to talk about themselves and their problems, were a few studies showing the discrepant expectations of therapist and patient, particularly with regard to the length of treatment (Garfield & Wolpin, 1963): the therapist thinks in longer terms and the patient in shorter terms of treatment. Feifel and Eells (1963), using an open-ended questionnaire to get at differential assessments of therapy, found that therapists tended to stress changes in symptomatic relief and improvement in social relationships, whereas patients stressed self-understanding and self-confidence. In addition, the patient focused on the opportunity to talk over problems and emphasized the 'human' characteristics of the therapist, while the therapist focused on therapeutic technique (p. 377).

It is no wonder, then, that failure to structure the therapeutic relationship
leads to deleterious consequences including premature termination. Sherman (1945) found that leaving the client too much on his own resources early in the process of therapy resulted in strong resistance. Levitt (1966) found that patients enter therapy expecting some kind of therapist participation. The failure of the therapist to meet with this preconception reduces the probability that the experience will affect him. Failure to let the client know the rationale underlying therapy and to give him some idea of expected therapist and client behavior tends to make the therapeutic experience more manipulative than it should be. Ambiguity can also be a difficult factor for normals to handle in a task-oriented situation. Mann and Mann (1959) made a study of indefiniteness in a classroom situation. Classroom groups, meeting four times a week for one hour over a three-week period, were organized as task-oriented study groups to discuss assigned reading lists or as free discussion groups. Ratings of the members' desirability as friends increased in the former groups and decreased in the latter where, according to observers, the subjects were frustrated and angered by the indefiniteness of their situation. Goldstein, Heller, and Sechrest (1966) express a certain degree of amazement at the fact that many or most therapists fail to tell their clients much about the therapeutic process:

For whatever reasons, few therapists would seem to be anywhere near as explicit as the behavior therapists, either about the theories they hold or about the techniques they employ. But it is unclear whether patients are kept uninformed because (1) it is not believed that informing them would be of any value, (2) desirable results are obtained only when the learning is by self-discovery, or (3) it is believed that the value of the technique and treatment would be impaired by the knowledge of the patient. We would call into question the second assumption and refer the reader to the cogent arguments given by Ausubel (1963) in refutation of the idea that really meaningful learning
must come through self-discovery (p. 246).

It would be less than honest to imply that no one sees ambiguity as a value in the therapeutic process. Rogers' (1951, 1961) approach to therapy involves a good deal of ambiguity which he must see as facilitative and Frank (1961) suggests that ambiguity or unclarity tends to arouse unpleasant emotions such as anxiety and resentment which heighten the patient's desire for relief, thereby increasing his own influencibility. Goldstein, Heller, and Sechrest (1965), however, comment on Rogers' position:

'[R]eflection of feeling' as a technique in therapy is assuredly manipulative and intended to have some purpose. Even Rogers has admitted that all psychotherapists are in the business of influencing and controlling behavior (Rogers & Skinner, 1956).... If the therapist told them (the patients) truthfully that by reflecting the feelings, rather than the content, of the patients' statements he hoped to have them come to a better understanding of their feelings and themselves, it seems much less likely that any resistance at all would be aroused. Whether such a straightforward statement would decrease the effectiveness of reflection as a technique (assuming that it has some) is an empirical matter. (p. 247).

Frank's statement sounds too baldly manipulative. However, it is doubtful that the Rogers and Frank of 1961 are the Rogers and Frank of 1969. In fact, Frank is one of the co-authors of the Hoehn-Saric (1965) article mentioned above which urges "systematic preparation of patients for psychotherapy."

There is, then, growing dissatisfaction with the kind of ambiguity or secretiveness that characterizes approaches to the growth-experience called psychotherapy. Sensitivity-training experiences or laboratories in interpersonal relationships are also growth experiences. It would be unfair to liken the participants in such experiences to patients or clients entering psychotherapeutic experiences. But, while the ambiguity that characterizes
the goals and processes of most sensitivyt-training laboratories might well stimulate or at least be the occasion for certain kinds of growthful activities on the part of the participants (e.g. setting goals, formulating a contract, etc.), still the evidence dealing with the deleterious effects of ambiguity in the psychotherapeutic process suggests, at the minimum, that ambiguity need not characterize all growth-experiences and that structuring a laboratory in interpersonal relations by means of a contract could well prove quite beneficial. There is no need, however, to become embroiled in meaningless arguments: laboratory experiences high in ambiguity and laboratory experiences high in clarity or "visibility" are different experiences. Each may well have its own positive and negative characteristics, but these remain to be demonstrated.

Clarity. Since the contract-group is characterized by such "high visibility," something should be said about its potential advantages.

Goldstein, Heller, and Sechrest (1966) have reviewed a number of areas of psychological research, for instance, the psychology of learning and a number of areas of social psychology, with a view to applying the fruits of this research in the area of psychotherapy. One of the hypotheses established by them is the following:

Hypothesis 5.4a: Giving patients prior information about the nature of psychotherapy, the theories underlying it, and the techniques to be used will facilitate progress in psychotherapy.

We find it remarkable that psychotherapists have apparently been unwilling to impart to their patients more than a little of the process of psychotherapy. Some writers have made general suggestions about 'structuring' of psychotherapy (e.g. Fromm-Reichmann, 1950; Holland, 1965; Rotter, 1954; Wolberg, 1954), but such suggestions have been rudimentary and sometimes even evasive. Many, perhaps even most, other writers have ignored the
whole question of just what patients should be told about psychotherapy. We believe that in many cases a fuller explication would be quite desirable (p. 245).

In truth, a number of authors have discussed the value of structuring the psychotherapeutic encounter; the problem seems to be (though hard data is lacking) that few therapists have seen fit to introduce formal structuring techniques into their psychotherapeutic approach, especially to the extent that Goldstein, Heller, and Sechrest might deem advisable. As early as 1949 Bixler reviewed the literature on structuring, but did so in terms of "the setting of limits." Ingham and Love (1954), on the other hand, took a more positive attitude toward structuring. They suggest six basic process values (all of them really patient variables) which should be communicated to the client both in structuring remarks and through basic attitudes: (1) that it is good for men to investigate themselves; (2) that it is better to investigate than to blame; (3) that emotion is to be regarded as a real and important thing; (4) that there must be relatively complete freedom of expression in the therapeutic situation; (5) that investigating the past may be useful in understanding the present; and (6) values centering around the client's present view of his world are important for the therapeutic process. More recently, Hoehn-Saric and his associates (1965) have used the Role Induction Interview (RII) "to arouse or strengthen in the patient certain appropriate anticipations of the psychotherapeutic process, particularly with respect to patient and therapist roles" (p. 270). The RII, based on the Anticipatory Socialization Interview of Orne (referred to as "in preparation for publication" by Hoehn-Saric and his associates), consists of four components: "(1) a general exposition of psychotherapy; (2) a description and
explanation of the expected behavior of a patient and of a therapist; (3) a preparation for certain typical phenomena in the course of therapy (e.g. resistance); and (4) the induction of realistic expectation for improvement within four months of treatment" (p. 270). The research conclusion was that "RII had a favorable effect on certain aspects of patients' therapy behavior and improvement and, properly used, could be a valuable tool in psychotherapy" (p. 280).

Truax and Carkhuff (1967) refer to a rather interesting way in which initial structuring in therapy might take place:

[V]icarious therapy pre-training (VTP)...may be employed in either group or individual psychotherapy. It simply involves presentation to prospective patients of a 30-minute tape recording of excerpts of 'good' patient therapy behavior. The tape itself illustrates in a very concrete manner how clients often explore themselves and their feelings: it thus provides cognitive and experiential structuring of 'how to be a good patient.' In short, it allows for a vicarious experiencing of deep psychotherapy prior to the initiation of the psychotherapeutic or counseling relationship. Recent research (Truax & Carkhuff, 1964) completed using VTP in group psychotherapy with both mental hospital and juvenile delinquent patients provides both clinical and research confirmation of its facilitative effect. It was found that early psychotherapy sessions from groups receiving VTP showed significantly higher levels of self-exploration than non-VTP groups having the same number of sessions. Further, VTP resulted in significantly more successful outcomes in time-limited therapy as judged by a variety of objective outcome criteria (p. 373).

The authors mention only patient behavior, but it seems only reasonable to hope that VTP would give the patient some idea of what to expect from a good therapist, too.

The contract as structuring the sensitivity-training experience. Since psychotherapy deals with human growth, it is my conviction that we should search through the literature on psychotherapy and borrow whatever seems to
be beneficial for a sensitivity-training experience. In the contract-group the contract to which the participants subscribe serves to structure the laboratory experience. Since, at least in this study, each of the provisions of the contract is thoroughly explained, the participant knows not only what he should do but also why. The idea of VTP is a most intriguing one. Even in laboratory groups that subscribe to a contract, there is much initial fumbling around trying to get started. Some groups, even late in the laboratory, take flight by claiming that they still do not understand what they are supposed to be doing. I would like to incorporate a videotape version of VTP as part of the structuring process at the beginning of a laboratory in interpersonal relations. The participants would first pre-read the contract and get some idea of what is expected of them (and of the leader) in the actual group situation. Then they would watch one or two videotapes of "good" group sessions, that is sessions in which all of the major elements of contract behavior were illustrated. This would help make the contract much more concrete and eliminate some of the useless "contract talk" of early sessions. Someone might object, saying that viewing a "good" session might frighten some of the participants; they might think that they are not capable of such intensive interaction. On the other hand, however, it might show the participants that intensive interaction can be quite engaging and growthful, and not destructive as some of the participants' fears would imagine it to be.

These remarks deal with the problem of how much one should know about a "growth-experience"—whether it be psychotherapy or a laboratory in interpersonal relationships—before entering that experience. A claim for "high
visibility" in all kinds of growth experiences is made. Or at least it is suggested that "high visibility" approaches are just as valid as "ambiguous" approaches. These remarks, however, do not touch on the question of the therapeutic or non-therapeutic nature of self-knowledge. Is it better for a "sick" or a "normal" man to know himself completely or is such knowledge, at least in certain cases, potentially destructive? This question will be dealt with in the chapter on self-disclosure.

Minimizing Manipulation

A number of authors have discussed the humanistic and ethical problems of deception and manipulation in psychological experimentation (e.g. Aronson & Carlsmith, 1968; Jourard, 1967; Kelman, 1967). Jourard, for instance, sees psychologists as too manipulating in their experimentation. He makes a plea for greater openness on the part of psychologists even in the area of experimentation, where deception and manipulation have been traditionally seen as both acceptable and necessary. "E" and "S," he says, should get to know each other on a more human level. Aronson and Carlsmith (1968), however, while encouraging a more humane treatment of experimental subjects, point out that it is not always possible to avoid subject distress:

[Many questions in social psychology can be answered only by designing experiments which cause subjects some psychological discomfort, such as anxiety, embarrassment, annoyance, insecurity, etc. One simply cannot investigate the effects of anxiety except in situations where people are being caused anxiety (p. 29).

Manipulation and deception are even more suspect as values in therapeutic and other "growth" situations (e.g. sensitivity-training laboratories) in which the enhancing of responsible self-determination is a traditional goal. In the usual approach to sensitivity training, in which ambiguity is a value, the
trainer, whether justly or not, is sometimes seen as manipulative. After all, he has been through many such experiences and at least he knows what is happening and, in a sense, what is going to happen. Even his silence is seen, at times, as manipulative, for he watches as the participants "dance." Even the word "trainer" sounds ominous to some, for in their experience animals have trainers. This is not to say that ambiguity should not be a factor in sensitivity-training experiences. It does mean, however, that trainers should be aware of the impact that ambiguity can have on some participants and that ambiguity should never be used to manipulate. If there is ambiguity in the contract-group, it does not stem from hidden dimensions of the experience itself. Individual participants may not be clear as to how to put the contract to work in their own interactions, but this is akin to the "beneficial uncertainty" which Beier (1966) sees as growthful in therapeutic situations. It is hypothesized that both the member-contract and the leader-contract will serve as safeguards against deception and manipulation.

**Group Participants as "Therapists" to One Another**

Patterson (1966) has discovered that one characteristic that unites therapists of widely differing approaches is commitment to a particular theory or method. The failure or inability of the therapist to commit himself to a definite approach apparently limits his effectiveness. This does not mean that a person has to identify himself definitively with a peculiar "school" of therapy, that is, he does not have to be a Freudian, a Jungian, or a follower of Rogers, but he should have a philosophy of therapy which can be translated into therapeutic interaction. Steinzer (1967), when asked to what school he belongs, inevitably replies "Steinzorian." He explains himself:
I hasten to add that I'm not about to establish still another organization, but that it is my whole being, in all my lived and dreamed-of lives—my 'voices of experience'—which infuses my interpretations, advice, actions, hopes and confrontations. If pressed far enough, I could add that my allegiance is American; my values are to some an amalgam of my working-class background and my present economic level; my idea of progress is affected by the Judaeo-Christian spirit of Western culture; my choice as the most significant person in modern psychotherapy is Freud; the teacher who has inspired me most is Carl Rogers; my latest enthusiasm and applause for authors in my field are directed to Jerome Frank and Thomas Szasz—and so on (pp. 1-2).

Yet, though he eschews specific systems, he does have a very vital philosophy of therapy which he translates into therapeutic interaction. He maintains that therapy takes place when people meet and respond, that healing grows out of trust and affection. However, these are the conditions, not just of therapy, but of human growth itself. It is the purpose of the contract to help put people into growthful contact with one another. Each member becomes, as it were, a "therapist" to the others, that is, one concerned with the being and the growth of the other. The member-contract and the leader-process contract provide the therapist-members a definite theory of method to be used in the helping relationship. Acceptance of the contract is the commitment that makes for such "therapist" efficacy.

Some Objections to Growth-by-Contract

A discussion of objections must deal with two questions: (1) Is the factor objected to really desirable (if it is absent) or undesirable (if it is present)? (2) Does the contract-group de facto either eliminate or foster the factor in question? Obviously the second question cannot be answered aprioristically. Actual experience with contract-groups is necessary in order to determine the presence or absence of factors.
Objection: the contract makes what is usually a "cool" medium "hot."

McLuhan (1964) makes an intriguing distinction between "hot" and "cool" communication media. "Hot" media are characterized by "high definition," a state of being well filled with data. The radio, he claims, is a "high-definition" medium, while communication by telephone is low in definition. Low-definition media are "cool," for the participants have to "fill in the gaps" more and thus become more involved in the communication process. Listening to a tape playback of a group session is "hot," for there is high definition and experience would seem to indicate that involvement is difficult. On the other hand, watching (and listening to) a videotape playback of a group session is quite "cool." The viewers are flooded with a new communication-dimension. They must interpret more (e.g., all the non-verbal communication taking place within the group); there are more "gaps" to be filled in. Involvement runs high.

Small groups are usually quite "cool," that is, they are low in definition and thus deeply involve the participants. Sensitivity-training and other forms of small group process have even been called "seductive." It is objected that a contract would make a group higher in definition and thus render a "cool" experience tepid, if not "hot. First of all, however, if a group is very low in definition, that is, if it is almost completely without structure, it tends to die. The failure of a group to elaborate for itself some kind of viable contract leads to the "death" of the group. The members can no longer tolerate ambiguity and aimlessness. Ennui sets in; involvement disappears. There is nothing more agonizing than sitting through sessions of a group that has already died. The question is not whether the
contract introduces structure or not, it is rather whether the degree of
definition introduced by the contract is too high or not. Obviously this is
a function of the particular kind of contract introduced. The contract must
be facilitating rather than restrictive. The hypothesis in this study is
that the kind of contract to be described in the following chapters is
facilitating, that it introduces an optimal degree of definition, that it
allows plenty of room for "member-movement," that it increases rather than
decreases member participation, that it focuses the group on issues that in
themselves exact participant involvement. It is the group that is filled
with irrelevant interaction that is high in definition and, therefore, clogged
with useless data. Whether these hypotheses are verified or not will depend
upon research that is still to be done.

Objection: the contract eliminates spontaneity, induces rigidity. In
the contract-group, group life is not as unprogrammed as in other forms of
training- or growth-groups. The plaintive "what-are-we-supposed-to-be-
doing?" is not heard or at least not with the same intensity and frequency.
Slater (1966) claims that it is this being-unprogrammed that makes the
members of the group face "questions dealing with the central dilemma of
life itself." However, even the detailed contract to be presented below
leaves the group unprogrammed to a great extent. The leader, while he does
try to see to it that the contract is fulfilled, does not tell the members
how they are to fulfill it. He does not tell them in what "modalities"
(see below) they must engage. If the members of the group confront one
another when they engage in "flight" activity, this could be looked upon as
"induced rigidity," but then the term "rigidity" begins to take on a rather
equivocal cast. The contract still leaves very many choices to be made by the participants, but the point is that these choices, because of the contract, are focused on much more central issues. It is contended that the contract-group is much more likely to deal with the key issues of life than is the group which must first hammer out its own contract. The contract provides structure or clarity or definition, but with plasticity. Definition with-plasticity seems to be an ideal condition for a group.

Objection: the contract antecedently limits the freedom of group members. Perhaps "guilty" is the best answer to this charge, but then it is necessary to ask whether such "limitation" is a value or not. Maritain (1951), in discussing world states, objects to the concept of "sovereignty." The body politic, he says, has a right to autonomy, both internal and external. But sovereignty adds another note to autonomy: the transcendentally supreme character of independence and power. If nations are to work together for the common good of the world, he claims, they must, while retaining their autonomy, surrender their sovereignty. The member-contract in the growth-group may be looked upon, analogously, as a surrender-of-sovereignty. Effective interpersonal involvement demands a surrender of sovereignty, at least in the negative sense outlined by Maritain. Freedom is curtailed, if such a word should be used, in the name of an experience which is designed to make the group participants more "free" in their interpersonal living.

Objection: entry by-contract introduces a limiting "selectivity-factor" in the group experience. Some kind of "selectivity-factor" is always at work in both therapeutic laboratory-training situations. Therapists often limit themselves to those who are considered "good candidates" (Truax & Carkhuff,
Candidates for therapy select themselves according to a number of criteria: e.g., the ability to afford time off work, the desire to change, financial considerations, degree of psychic pain, the desire to please others, etc. Analogous self-selection criteria are considered to be operative to all groups. The objection here is that the contract introduces an added selectivity-factor, so that, for example, a person who might be interested in sensitivity-training would not attempt a contract-experience. The contract might attract an elite. On the other hand, it might attract those who are desperately trying to improve the quality of their interpersonal living.

In order to discuss this question reasonably, it would be necessary to have the kind of "hard data" that simply are not available. It will certainly be interesting to see what kind of clientele the contract-group draws. Anecdotal evidence seems to indicate the contract group populations do not differ significantly from populations engaged in more "traditional" sensitivity-training experiences. However, a desire for interpersonal growth seems to characterize both the interpersonal "haves" and the interpersonal "have-nots." It is hypothesized that those interested in "sensitivity-training" would also be interested in a contract-group experience. In my own experience over the past two-and-a half years, no one has refused to enter a sensitivity-training laboratory because of the contract. It is also hypothesized that those who actually engage in some kind of sensitivity-training experience and find it valuable would like to move on to a contract-group-growth-experience.

Bugental and Tannenbaum (1965) describe the experience of a group of
people who, having found an initial sensitivity-training experience so fruitful, wanted to engage in a more high-powered "festival of growth."

The participants chosen for the experience were an "elite," that is, a number of people who were considered to have moved beyond stagnated involvement with D-needs and M needs. However, they found the experience somewhat disappointing. They either could not recapture the spirit of their previous experience or the second experience was too much like the first. One view of their plight (though it is not suggested by the authors) might be this: they were eager, they were open, but they were without a feasible contract. New contractual provisions had not been built into the second experience, and therefore it resembled the first too closely. Those who sponsored the second experience could have designed a laboratory with different or more intensive features and then these features could have become the provisions of a structuring contract. It is difficult to say whether such an approach would have worked, but it seems that a high powered contract-experience would have been ideal for such a group.

Objection: a contract makes the risk of failure greater. This might well be true, but greater risk of failure is not seen as a negative factor. "Failure" is an analogous, if not an equivocal, term when used to describe both physical and psychic healing. If a physical agent is used to try to stem the spread of gangrene, failure means something quite specific. The battle is lost and the foot or leg must be amputated. "Failure" in psychotherapy is much more nebulous, because the criteria for success and failure are not clear. In one sense, psychotherapy does not "fail," rather it is "terminated." One of the reasons that therapy cannot be said to "fail"
is the low "operationality" of the goals of therapy. But, while low operationality prevents clearly defined failure experiences, especially in the mind of the patient, it also seems to stand in the way of effective therapy. The contract introduces a much higher degree of operationality than is usually found in either therapy or in other kinds of growth-experiences. In a contract group it is difficult for a person to say to himself or to the group that he is "getting something out of it," if he is not. He is not getting out of it what he should if he is not fulfilling the contract. And it is quite evident whether he is fulfilling the contract or not. If he tries to rationalize away his failure, his attempts ("These contract things don't work," "It was too contrived to get anything done," "We really didn't have the freedom to move," etc.) should be more transparent and hollow because of the contract. Ordinarily, then, such a person will have to take responsibility for the failure himself, for it was he who did not engage in the "modalities" contracted for, it was he who fled group process. Because the contract was clear, he can see exactly how he fled the group experience. Even his failure is "diagnostic." The contract-group, because it more clearly defines success and outlines the activities of a "successful" experience, also heightens the risk of failure ("success" being defined here as contract-fulfillment). This is good, for it is good to know that one has failed and why one has failed.

Objection: the contract reduces "productive" anxiety. There are those who are concerned about the anxiety factor in laboratory experiences:

3. Can the candidate tolerate the anxiety involved in the T-Group process? Most T-Group participants are adults, already settled in their ways, who have gone through adjustment processes involved in
adolescence and early adulthood. They have well-established behavior patterns, habits, responses, values, emotional reactions and defense mechanisms—all of which have now become meaningful to them, and which allow them to operate in their own environment.

The T-Group is a very soul-searching process. It requires the individual to introspect, to look at his own values and his own emotions, to ask himself whether and why he likes them, and whether he wishes to live the way he has. After a person is established in his way of life, two things must be considered: a) Does he have the general ability to tolerate the anxiety involved in this kind of soul-searching? and b) Is he at this time going through some other stress experience such as adjusting to the change of life on the part of himself or other members of his family, or meeting difficult financial obligations?

To prevent avoidable emotional disturbances, admission to T-Groups should be based on a careful screening process designed to ensure that participants are able to withstand and profit from the anxiety induced in the T-Group process (House, 1967, pp. 25-26).

These concerns are very real, especially in the context in which House reviews the literature on laboratory training. He is talking about the application of T-Group methods in business and other organizational settings. Sometimes entire organizations or entire departments are subjected to laboratory training without being asked and without being given the freedom to attend or not attend. But in the present study it is assumed that the individual freely chooses to engage in the laboratory experience and in some way reflects upon his ability to profit from it. Indeed, in a contract-situation the prospective participant can make a more intelligent decision whether to attend or not attend in that the contract clearly delineates the nature of the experience.

Participation in growth-group experiences is an approach-avoidance situation. Group process is both seductive and anxiety-arousing. It offers a fresh source of relatedness, but it demands a certain degree of self-
immolation. There is the lure of fusion and the terror of it, the hope of greater individuation and the despair of it. Usually, the anxiety aroused as one approaches or begins a group experience is considered to be "anxiety at the service of the ego" (Kris, 1952). It is intimately associated with the pursuit of self-identity which implies both separateness and relatedness. Schofield (1964) claims that our society has tended to over-dramatize anxiety:

If this is the Age of Anxiety it is not so simply as a function of absolute increase in the things which man is fearful. Rather it is because we have taught man to be anxious about his anxiety. We have created a distorted image of anxiety. We have attributed to anxiety and to the efforts to escape anxiety all of man's neurotic ills. We have sensitized ourselves to recognize the signs of anxiety, and we have been encouraged to the fallacious value of a total avoidance of anxiety as a goal of life; we have been led to believe that a complete freedom from anxiety would be the distinguishing characteristic of an adjusted life (p. 152).

Anxiety is a part of life. It is up to man to control and use it. Schachter (1959) showed that a state of anxiety leads to the arousal of affiliative tendencies. Man seeks out his fellow man when he is afraid. Need the resultant contact be any less growthful because it was sought in order to reduce anxiety?

The Yerkes-Dodson Law (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908) states that the relationship between fear or anxiety and learning is curvilinear. The level of anxiety or drive which stimulates optimal performance lies somewhere in the middle: it must be neither too high nor too low. There has been some confirmation of this "law" from more recent studies (e.g., Matarazzo, Ulett, & Saslow, 1955; Stennett, 1957). It is assumed that this "law" is also operative in growth or therapeutic experiences. The ambiguous group situation that initiates sensitivity-training experiences produces relatively
high levels of drive. The laboratory is designed to produce anxiety-drive.

It is also assumed that there are "optimal" levels of anxiety for effective group process in contract-interpersonal-growth-groups. The member-contract does not eliminate anxiety; it is rather one of the sources of it. However, since the contract gives a fairly clear picture of the kind of group experience into which the members are entering, ambiguity and the "unknown" in general are not the primary sources of anxiety (it is assumed in the major writings on sensitivity-training [e.g., Bradford, Gibb, & Benne, 1964] that ambiguity in terms of "goallessness" and "planned ambiguity" is a primary source of anxiety in laboratory groups). While it is true that contract-group participants may never have been engaged in a sensitivity-training experience before, they still have some idea of the meaning of the contract variables (self-disclosure and the like). Anxiety arises from the provisions of the contract and one's ability to fulfill the contract. The contract calls for self-disclosure, confrontation, and a willingness to express human feeling. These seem to be more authentic sources of anxiety than ambiguity; they are more related to real life concerns. Or rather the ambiguity that arises in a person when he views the contract is related to real life concerns: how open can I be? what will I do when challenged? how can I start expressing my feelings now?

Anxiety in the contract group does not "just happen." It is part of the contract. It is explained to prospective participants that in accepting the contract, they are subscribing to a certain amount of anxiety. It is explained that anxiety can be debilitating or that it can be an "energizer." This more rational approach does not eliminate anxiety. But it does prepare
the participant to expect anxiety, to recognize it for what it is, and to
use it to "energize" group activity.

If there is such a thing as an optimal level or range of anxiety for
participation in laboratory experiences, then a problem arises. There are
relatively great individual differences in both state (situational, transient)
and trait (part of the personality make-up, relatively permanent) anxiety
(see Levitt 1966). Participants come to sensitivity-training laboratories,
then, with varying degrees of anxiety. It is very important for the trainer
or leader to be aware of this. For instance, while some exercises might not
stir one participant, they might tend to immobilize another. The function
of the laboratory is not directly to make people anxious, but to utilize
anxiety that does arise as a drive. Sometimes, however, it is quite difficult
to determine which participants are relatively calm, which are quite anxious,
and which are even too anxious. The contract calls for openness on the part
of the participants, and disclosure of one's state of anxiety (especially
if the participant feels that it is excessive or debilitating) should take
place relatively early in the group. Therefore, while the contract itself
might well be a potent source of anxiety, it also demands the kind of
openness that allows anxiety to surface and to be dealt with in the inter-
action of the group. The contract, then, viewed in different ways, can both
elicit and help to control anxiety. The contract both provides a structure
which increases the psychological safety of the experience (e.g. by building
support into the experience, by demanding growthful rather than punitive
confrontation, etc.) and acts as a stimulus to taking growthful risks (e.g.
self disclosure, expression of feeling, etc.) in the group.
A Variety of Contracts

This study will delineate one general kind of contract-experience. But there can be an almost endless variety of such experiences. Once the goals of a group are determined, then the means that are assumed to lead up to these goals can be elaborated. Finally, both goals and means can be made part of the contract. The use of a variety of contract-groups in various kinds of experimentation seems to be one of their most promising features. The variables of the group experience can be spelled out in detail, and fulfillment or non-fulfillment of contract is relatively easy to determine.

Any contract can be purposefully rigid or flexible. In experimental situations it seems that a certain "rigidity" of contract is called for. The purpose of the experiment is to see what effects this contract has. So the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of this contract is important. However, in "growth" experiences it is possible to allow for the re-working or re-formulation of the contract. In such groups the goals are more important than the contract itself. If the contract has to be changed in order to provide a more profitable group experience, then it should be changed. However, the reformulation of the contract is a relatively drastic step. Blaming the contract for group or personal failure can be a type of flight from group process. Responsible contract reformulation can be undertaken only after responsible efforts have been made to fulfill the provisions of the contract.

In both contract-experiences and in laboratories characterized by "planned ambiguity" and "goallessness" it is possible to introduce "focused" contracts in the form of exercises. In a sense all exercises introduced to
the group are contractual, that is, the exercise is generally imposed on the group and the participants are usually expected to follow the rules laid down for the exercise. For instance, in a contract-group in which self disclosure is one of the contractual variables it is possible to define the topic of disclosure by means of a "focused" contract. It is assumed that there would be some reason for specifying the topic of area of disclosure and that the participants are more or less willing to have such a sub-contract imposed on them.

A Sample Contract for a Laboratory in Interpersonal Relations

Lest the notion "contract" remain too abstract, a sample contract for a laboratory in interpersonal relations is given below. However concise or extended a contract might be, it should provide prospective members to get some kind of "feel" for the group experience they are about to enter. This means that all the major variables that will ultimately given definition to the kinds of interaction expected in the group should be spelled out adequately. The provisions for the contract below have been chosen because it is believed that these are the major variables in and de facto do take place in sensitivity-training laboratories in which self-actualization and interpersonal growth are the superordinate goals.

A CONTRACT FOR A LABORATORY IN INTERPERSONAL GROWTH

This laboratory in interpersonal relations will be conducted according
to a contract. The purpose of the contract is to provide a facilitating structure for the group experience and to let you know the nature of the experience you are about to enter. Please read the following contract carefully and then decide whether you would like to participate or not in the kind of experience described in the contract. If you want to participate in the group, you must subscribe to the contract.

1. **The Goals of the Group.** The overriding goal of the group is, of course, interpersonal growth. Interpersonal growth involves discovering "new ways of being present to others. Personal growth, too, is a goal of the group, but it is assumed that all that is good in personal growth (e.g. reduction of anxiety, enhanced feelings of self-worth, a keen sense of self-identity) must be placed at the service of interpersonal relationships. Man is a relational being and the height of his growth lies in his relationships with others.

2. **Leadership in the Group.** The group will have a leader, but since he is not a leader in the traditional sense of that term, he is sometimes referred to by different titles, such as "trainer" or "facilitator." The name is not important, but his function is. He is skilled in group dynamics and has had a good deal of experience participating in and working with groups. However, he is in the group because he, too, is interested in growing interpersonally. Therefore, he subscribes to the same contract that you do, that is, he is a leader-member. As leader, his function is to put his knowledge of groups and his experience in groups at the service of your group. He is a resource person, not a super-member. He is someone like you, interested in increasing his interpersonal effectiveness by involving himself
with you. If certain provisions of the contract are not clear, he will explain them to you, but he is not in the group as teacher, at least in the traditional sense. In fact, a good teacher is one who likes to get together with others in order to learn.

The ideal is that the leadership qualities he demonstrates become diffused among the members of the group so that, in a sense, the group might act as its own leader. He will work for that diffusion. What are some of the specific things he will do. He will tell you about some of the difficulties that face most beginning laboratory groups. For instance, some groups spend a good deal of time "dealing with the leader," that is, they make him a father-figure" and try to work out authority problems with him. However, in this group the leader is not meant to be an authority figure. It is not that the participants may not work through authority problems, but there are other ways of doing this besides focusing on the group leader. If too much time is spent "dealing with the leader," this can prove detrimental to the over-riding goal of the group. In this group "interpersonal growth" means that the members are to spend a good deal of time involving themselves with one another (including the leader-member).

From the beginning the leader-member will "model" the kinds of behavior called for by the contract. Again, he does so not because he is completely self-actualized in the area of interpersonal relating but because the sooner the group begins to engage in contractual behavior the better.

3. The Laboratory Nature of the Group Experience. The experience you are about to enter is called a "laboratory" for a number of reasons. Part of the contract is to accept the experience as a laboratory. This is what a
laboratory entails:

(a) Learning by doing. You will learn how to relate to others more effectively by actually relating. You will see yourself in action, as it were, and you will talk about the ways in which you relate to the other members of the group.

(b) A climate of experimentation. The term laboratory implies experimentation. You will experiment with your own behavior, attempting to relate to others in "new ways." This does not mean that the group will invent new ways of acting. Rather you will try to deal with others in ways that you do not ordinarily use in your day-to-day contacts. For instance, if you are usually quiet and reserved, you may experiment with "speaking up" in the group. For you, this is a "new way" of being present to others.

(c) No prejudging the experiment. The person who comes to the laboratory convinced that the "experiment" will not work usually leaves it feeling quite self-satisfied. His prophecy has been self-fulfilling. You are asked not to prejudge the experience but rather to reserve your judgment. The only way you will ever know whether the experiment "works" or not is to give yourself as completely as possible to it.

(d) Feedback. Your own behavior is the major "input" in the laboratory. But trying "new ways" of behaving is somewhat useless unless it is possible to determine how this behavior strikes others. Therefore, you are asked not only to react to others but to tell others how their behavior strikes you. You, too, will receive feedback from the other participants. By means of such feedback you should come to a better understanding of your own interpersonal abilities and limitations.
Try to get a feeling for your ability to involve yourself to make contact with others. All of us have strong points and all of us have areas of deficit in our interpersonal living. Use the group in order to get a feeling for both.

4. **Rules of Immediacy.** If the laboratory experience is to be intensive, it must be as immediate as possible. Certain "rules" facilitate a climate of immediacy in the group.

   (a) **The here-and-now.** Deal with the here-and-now rather than the there-and-then. Your interactions with one another are the most important part of the laboratory. When you do talk about things that have happened or are happening outside the group, do so in such a way so to make them relevant to what is happening in the group. If you keep talking about things outside the group, people and situations unfamiliar to the other participants, you will lose their interest. Make the outside and the past somehow "present" to your fellow group members. Talking about people and things outside the group is sometimes a way of fleeing from more intensive group interaction.

   (b) **Cooperation.** Your goals can be reached only if you cooperate with one another. This does not mean at all that there will not be disagreements, but interpersonal growth is much more likely to take place in an atmosphere of cooperation rather than one of competition or conspiracy. This does not mean that you have to be "nice" for the sake of being nice: a cooperative group structure does not exclude strong feeling and confrontation. But there is little immediacy unless you move toward the other person in an effort to involve yourself with him. The contract provides a structure for cooperation. If you are fulfilling the provisions of the contract, you can be sure that
you are cooperating with the other participants.

(c) Avoid generalities. When you speak, try to be concrete and specific. For instance, when speaking about yourself, use "I." Do not use "you" when you mean "I." In fact, try to avoid using general words to refer to people such as "you," "one," "people," "men," "they," "we," and the like. Do not say: "There are some people in the group with whom I get along better, but rather: "I seem to get along better with John and Mary than with any of the other members of the group." Finally, do not make speeches to the whole group: even if you want to address the whole group, try to address the group through another member. For instance, say: "John, you were not really listening to me this morning; in fact, this seems to be a group problem: we don't really listen to one another." If you address yourself always to the whole group, the other members will often sit there and listen respectfully to you, but no one will respond to you. Speeches addressed to everybody tend to be addressed to nobody. In summary, use "I" when you mean "I"; be concrete, avoiding vagueness and generalities; try to address individuals in the group, even when you are addressing the entire group (in a way, you are always addressing the entire group whenever you speak).

(d) Do not "siphon off" issues of concern to the group. Sometimes group members get together in twos and threes outside the group and work through issues that have arisen within the group. There is nothing wrong with this providing you summarize to the group what has taken place outside the group. If the issues come up within the group, then, in some sense, they belong to the group. If these issues, then, are settled outside the group, some of the life of the group is "siphoned off," and the group becomes
somewhat anemic because of it, that is, it loses a degree of immediacy.

5. The elements of dialogue: emotion, language, and the fusion of the two. You will contact one another principally by talking to one another. Language, then, and the expression of feeling are crucial factors for this experiment.

(a) Emotion. Try to let reality have an emotional impact on you, especially the reality of the other members of the group. Let yourself feel various emotions; feel what it feels like to experience these emotions. Secondly, let yourself react as constructively as possible to what you experience. Do not try to hide the emotional dimensions of yourself. Do not be overly intellectual: ideas are certainly important, but in laboratories in interpersonal relations, emotions are equally as important. Tell others, then, not just how you think about things, but how you feel about them. Sometimes our ideas and our emotions do not coincide. It is good to be able to recognize this division within yourself.

(b) Human language. Get a new feeling for the power of human language. How do you translate yourself into language? Find out whether your language gives expression to the deep you or only to the superficial you. If you tend to use an exsanguinated language in your day-to-day contacts, experiment with a more forceful use of language in the group. Try to avoid cliches; use words that have more "power" than the words you ordinarily use. Language can be a form of contact or it can be a barrier between you and the other; try to make your language as "contactive" as possible. If you speak in cliches and generalities, this might well reflect an unwillingness on your part to make deeper contacts with others.

(c) Poetry: welding feeling to language and language to feeling. Try
to let your feelings find expression in language and let your language be colored by feeling. Some of us experience things deeply, but we cannot translate our experiencing into language. The laboratory is an opportunity to make attempts to do just that. When you succeed, your language will be, in one of the deepest senses, "poetry," for it will be an integrated expression of the person you are.

6. The Core Interactions

The heart of this contract and therefore of the group experience itself are the kinds of interaction in which you will engage. You are asked to experiment with the kinds of interaction listed below. They are ways of contacting others, of involving yourself with others, and therefore offer possibilities of growing with others. You are asked, then, to engage in the following kinds of activity in the group:

(a) **Self-disclosure.** You are asked to be open about yourself. This means that you are to talk about yourself in such a way as to get the "real-you" (rather than a facade) across to others. In one sense, facts about yourself are not important in themselves; the fact that through them you "translate" yourself to others in the group is important. You are not asked to reveal your past life or your darkest secrets. **You** are important, not your secrets. What you say about yourself should encourage others to "come in," that is, self-disclosure should constitute a kind of invitation to others to involve themselves with you.

It is up to you to determine how you will talk about yourself and what you will say. This sounds very abstract right now, and it will be easier to determine in the give-and-take of the group interaction. There are various
"levels" of self-disclosure: the more personal something is the deeper it is. The general "level" of self-revelation is generally determined by the group itself and depends on a number of factors—for instance, the willingness of individuals to take risks and the level of trust in the group. The point is that the group members and not the contract determine the level at which they will work. You will undoubtedly reveal yourself at a level at which you feel comfortable, or perhaps a little beyond (that is, you will "risk" talking about yourself). A moderate degree of anxiety in the group is generally a sign that you are working at least a little beyond the "level of comfort," and such anxiety, if controlled, can be a help rather than a hindrance. Self-disclosure, if it is authentic, if it is really a "translation" of yourself, tends to create intimacy. If you have difficulty talking about yourself, if you become too anxious, it might well be that you fear rejection but it is also possible that you are afraid of the intimacy to which self-revelation leads.

Self-disclosure must be in keeping with the "here-and-now" rule. If you talk about your past, you should do so because it tells something about the kind of person you are here and now in this group. If you talk about how you are outside the group, this, too, should be made relevant to the "you" that is in the group. That is, self-disclosure should stimulate interaction with others. Never just talk on about yourself to a passive audience. In keeping with the "here-and-now" rule, one area of self-disclosure is most important: You should talk about what is happening to you in the group. For instance, if you are anxious, let others know that you are anxious: others want to deal with you as you are, but this is impossible if you hide your feelings.
If you are bored, let others know immediately. It is deadly to wait an hour and then tell others that you have been bored. In a sense, you are responsible for your own boredom if you do not speak up.

Finally, although it was said above that you do not have to talk about your deepest secrets, you may speak as deeply about yourself as you wish. The point is that you will not be forced to do so. Sometimes if someone else speaks rather personally about himself, you will find it easier to talk about yourself (but you should remember that this works the other way around also).

(b) **The manner of expressing feeling.** Above you were encouraged to let emotion be part of the group experience. Too often we either swallow our feelings (for instance, our anger) only to let them filter out in rather unproductive ways (we become cold or uncooperative, we make snide remarks or remain silent, etc.). There is another possibility however: speak frankly to one another about your emotion-laden contacts with one another. For instance, if you are angry, instead of just "blowing up" or "swallowing" your anger, let the other know that you are angry and would like to work it through: "John, I'm really angry with what you said, but I'd like to tell you why and get some response from you. If possible, I want to work this out with you here." Perhaps such frankness coupled with a desire to work things through would constitute for you a "new way" of being present to another.

(c) **Listening.** It is amazing to discover how poorly we tend to listen to others. The contract asks you to examine your ability to listen. Listening does not mean just hearing words and sentences and understanding their meaning, rather it means "reaching out" for what another has to say, it means listening to persons rather than just ideas. Learning to pick up all
the cues that others emit, including both verbal and nonverbal cues, is part of listening. Facial expressions, gestures, a shrug of the shoulders, bodily positions—all of these are sources of communication. Often, too, when we communicate with one another, we embed "surplus-messages" in our overt communications by the way we say things. You are asked to become sensitive to the "surplus-message" aspects of communication also.

(d) Support. It is difficult for people to "put themselves on the line," that is, to engage in meaningful self-disclosure and to express feelings responsibly. When you and the other members of the group do make sincere attempts to fulfill the contract, then you need support. It is assumed that you are basically supportive, that is, that you have some kind of basic acceptance of others simply because they are; otherwise you would not want to engage in an experience the goal of which is interpersonal growth. Still, you can accept others, and sincerely so, without always approving of everything they do. It may be, for instance, that you may reveal things about yourself which you yourself do not approve. Obviously, then, though you would expect others to support you in your self-disclosure, you would hardly expect them to approve of the things that you disapprove of in yourself.

Support has two phases. The antecedent phase consists in encouraging others to fulfill the contract. For instance, one of the best ways of encouraging others to fulfill the contract is to fulfill it yourself. The leader-member will try to do just this by "modeling" the behavior called for by the contract. The second phase refers to your support of those who do engage in contractual interaction. Others will reveal themselves, they
will express their feelings. Support then means giving some kind of recognition that the other has fulfilled the contract, that he has "done a good thing." Support means being responsive to the behavior of others. Again, engaging in contractual behavior is an excellent way of giving phase-two support. For instance, if one of the members engages in responsible self-disclosure, you may give him a good deal of support by revealing something about yourself in the same area, something that responds to his concern.

Although support is absolutely necessary for effective group operation, it is also perhaps one of the most difficult of the contractual provisions. When someone "invites you in" by being open about himself, you may feel gauche and find it difficult to respond to him. When someone speaks feelingly about himself, it is too easy to ignore his feelings (for this may be an uncomfortable aspect of his communication) and to try to deal with him on an intellectual level, for instance, by asking him a lot of questions. Because of our discomfort we try to intellectualize the whole process. However, if you are made uncomfortable by what another says, if you are unable to respond in what you think would be a meaningful way, do not pretend that you can. Counterfeit support, expressed in such cliches as "I understand," and "I know how you feel," deadens group process. Perhaps your best response is to admit that you are uncomfortable, that you are at a loss for a response. This can be supportive in itself, because it is honest. Do not try to show "conventional" sympathy to others merely because you think that you should say something. Support is the gift of one's person and not the fulfillment of a convention. Learning to be present to others in meaningful support is one of the most important tasks of the group experience.
(e) Confronting others. Sometimes you will find it impossible to agree with what another person is saying or doing. If this is true, tell him so as honestly as you can, and tell him why. This is confrontation. Confrontation is basically an invitation to another to examine or reflect upon his behavior "in community," that is, in the context of the group. For instance, perhaps another person in the group is simply not fulfilling the provisions of the contract at all (if he is silent all the time, he could not be). If you tell him this and ask him to examine his behavior, then you are confronting him. The way you confront, however, is very important: the cardinal rule is that you should confront another because you are concerned about him and want to involve yourself with him. Confrontation is not just irresponsible "telling a person off." Responsible confrontation is an invitation to self-examination, not an act of punishment. If you are merely punishing another, you might find some relief (for instance, from your anger), but you are doing little to set up interpersonal contact between yourself and the other. Undeniably confrontation will almost always have some kind of punitive side effects (none of us like to be challenged because of allegedly negative forms of behavior), but punishment cannot constitute the rationale of confrontation. Sometimes it is not easy to confront without making punishment the primary purpose of the act. Confrontation, then, is something you must experiment with in the group.

(f) Responding to confrontation. If confrontation is responsible, that is, if it really is an invitation to self-examination, then obviously the best response is self-examination. However, when we are confronted, even when it is done by someone who is concerned for us and wants to involve
himself with us, our instinctive response is often twofold: to defend ourselves and to attack the confronter. That is, we respond to the punitive side effects of confrontation instead of to the confrontation itself. Therefore, try to listen to what the one confronting is saying and not just to the feelings he is evoking in you. If what he says is true and if, in addition, he wants to involve himself with you, then it is to your advantage to listen, to examine yourself, and to respond to him. This is difficult, but frequently rewarding.

Self-disclosure, expression of feeling, listening, support, confrontation, and response to confrontation--these, then, are the forms of interpersonal behavior with which you are asked to experiment. The ability to engage freely and responsibly in such behaviors is interpersonal growth.

7. A Stance against Flight. Engaging in the kinds of interactions described above is not easy, and therefore we find ways of running away from group process. We tend to run away because we get anxious, because we prefer not to know the truth about ourselves, because it is painful, perhaps, to be the object of another's concern. You are asked, then, to take a stance against all the different forms of flight from intimate group interaction: e.g. calling upon humor whenever things get "too" serious, keeping one's feelings to oneself, spending a good deal of time on intellectualized interpretations of the behavior of others. You must become sensitive to the ways you flee group process and to the different ways in which the group as a whole tends to flee (e.g. by "tacitly" deciding not to talk about certain subjects). Confronting modes of flight in yourself and in the group is essential to the life of the group. One mode of flight is extremely
destructive: cynicism about the experience even before one enters into it. The person who comes to the group believing that he will get nothing from it will leave having fulfilled his own prophecy. Try not to flee from your anxiety by employing all sorts of defenses. Rather handle your anxiety by dealing with it in the group. It is obvious by now that the contract demands that you be active in the group. Silence and withdrawal are types of flight. Perhaps in other groups the non-active member profits even though he adds little more than his presence. This cannot be the case in the contract-group.

8. Freedom. This contract is not meant to put you in constraints; it is meant to help you channel your freedom. It says, for instance, that self-disclosure is a value in this group, but it does not say what you must talk about nor does it dictate the level of disclosure. This is something that you must work out yourself in the give-and-take of group interaction. You must choose the kinds of interaction that are most meaningful to you. Some of the experiments you engage in in the group will be successes and some failures, but this is a reflection of life itself. Try not to expect too much from the group nor too little. The only way you can really learn about the possibilities of the group experience is by giving yourself to it.

The contract, then, is a certain attempt to use cognitive input at the beginning of the group experience in order, hopefully, to promise interpersonal-affective learning. If the cognitive input, to a greater or lesser extent becomes a reality of interpersonal function, then the group experience has been 'successful.'

The elements in the above contract are the elements found in any
sensitivity-training group the goal of which is interpersonal growth. The contract provides a certain degree of what Boy and Pine (1963) call "structured permissiveness"; the contract is both a stimulus and a safeguard: it moves the participants toward intensive interaction, but it lays down certain ground rules to insure that this interaction will be growthful. It facilitates the formation of a "cultural island" in which the participants are given a good deal of "cultural permission" to investigate the possibilities of intimacy with one another; risk-taking is not eliminated but it is controlled.

The term "contract group" will be used frequently in the pages that follow. However, when it is said that something happens or should happen in the contract group, this means that this "something" is part of the contractual experience and not that it does not or could not happen in other kinds of sensitivity-training experiences. For instance, it is stated explicitly in the contract that constructive confrontation is an expressed value in the contract group, it must be remembered that confrontation constitutes an essential element in any kind of laboratory experience in which personal and interpersonal growth are overriding concerns.

The Focused Contract

Contracts can be comprehensive—-they may cover all the major facets of the group experience—or they can be "focused"—-they may refer specific facets of the training experience. The "focused" contract, for instance, can be introduced as an exercise in the group. It may be that the participants have made a "tacit decision" not to talk about sex, even though it is an issue of major concern and the failure to deal with it in any way is
"muddying" the interaction. The trainer under the circumstances might introduce a focused contract which will enable the participants to deal with the issue under relatively low-risk conditions. A sample contract might read something like this:

1. The general topic of the next meeting will be sex.
2. The purpose of the meeting is not to have individual participants disclose their sex lives but to examine the reasons why this group has completely avoided the topic of sex.
3. What are some of the fears you personally would have in discussing sexual issues here?
4. What are some of the advantages that would accrue to you personally from a more open discussion of sexual issues?
5. If you do talk about yourself, feel free to "bracket" any areas you find too uncomfortable to discuss.

Such a focused contract gives the participants a certain degree of cultural permission to deal with sexual issues. It stimulates but does not force. It is admittedly contrived, but so is the entire laboratory experience. Its advantage lies in the fact that it uses structure to rescind a possibly non-growthful "tacit decision"; it gives the group the freedom to face an issue or to decide openly to "bracket" an area in future discussions. The variety of such focused contracts is limited only by the imaginative resources of the group.

The Impressed Versus the Freely Chosen Contract

It has been suggested above that the contract be given to prospective participants before the training experience begins so that they may decide whether or not they want to participate in such a laboratory. If this is the case, then the contract can be pursued with a good deal of vehemence (see Bach, 1966), but even then it should be remembered that the contract exists for the sake of the participants and not vice versa and intensive
pursuit of a contract should exclude mechanical rigidity and inflexibility. However, the more usual case is that the participants enter a laboratory experience with only general ideas about the nature of the experience. The question is: Can a contract be imposed on such participants? The answer, I believe, is yes. The participants come expecting some kind of experiment in interpersonal intimacy. The contract merely gives form to the experience. It does not exist in order to manipulate the participants in some kind of inhuman way; it is there to channel their energies. I have "imposed" both general and focused contracts on groups with good effect. On occasion there has been too much talk about the contract and its provisions during the interaction, but this relatively mild form of flight is easily handled. It would be another question were a leader to impose a sensitivity-training contract on a discussion group. Since the participants had not opted for such an experience even in a general way, to impose such a contract would be to impose on their freedom. Finally, if imposition-of-contract rather than entry-by-contract characterizes a laboratory-training group, the interaction will tend to be somewhat less intense.

Cautions in Contractual Approaches

The myths of the ideal contract. The contract delineated in this chapter, while it does not include many of the factors that are relevant to all interpersonal-growth-oriented laboratory experiences, is not necessarily an ideal that should be imitated. As noted above, contracts should be fitted to the needs and the goals of the participants: it is not a goal in itself. Furthermore, while the contract may both stimulate and channel the energies of the group, it has no magic in itself nor is it a substitute
for work. Dozens of different contracts, both comprehensive and focused, could be elaborated, but they are valuable only if they serve the needs of the group. If they do not, they should be discarded. However, they should not be discarded before they are given a fair trial, for this would merely condone the flight tendencies of the group.

The myth of the ideal participant. The contract is an ideal in at least two senses. First of all, it is an abstraction that becomes concrete only in the lives of the participants. However, if it is to be meaningful, it must be adapted to the needs of the individual participant. Since individual participants differ greatly from one another, the contract is not to be rigidly applied to all participants in a univocal way. The contract (for instance, the contract outlined in this chapter) calls for experimentation with certain kinds of behavior (self-disclosure, confrontation, etc.), but the individual himself in the context of the give-and-take of the group interaction must determine what behaviors are most meaningful to him and the degree to which he thinks that he should engage in them. He may be asked to experiment with self-disclosure, but he is not asked to engage in as much self-disclosure as participant A nor as little as participant B, nor does he have to discuss the same areas that participant C does. In order to become more deeply himself, the participant has to make choices, but his choices should be based on his own interpersonal-growth needs rather than arbitrary "ideals," whether these ideals are set forth in a contract or elaborated by the group itself. While the individual participant should become as aware as possible of his own resistance to growth and come to realize that this resistance can manifest itself in his inventing reasons
why he should not engage in contractual behavior, still he should retain his autonomy throughout the group experience and not allow it merely to carry him along. The hypothesis is that if he both fails to take risks and fails to make choices, the group experience will not benefit him.

The contract is an ideal in a second sense. The contractual behaviors outlined in the contract above and explained in the following chapters are not easy to engage in, and success is not measured by the participants ability to engage in every one of them perfectly. The contract is primarily a stimulus and a guide for behavior, not some absolute measure of growth or a device by which one participant may be compared with another. The contract is an ideal in the sense that it sets goals, but it does not (and cannot) delineate idiosyncratic pursuit and possession of such goals.

Growth is direction: in some sense of the term it means "moving forward," but it also encompasses such notions as "regressions," "plateaus," and "limits." The contract-group participant is expected to "move forward" with the contract as a stimulus and a guide, but since different participants have different interpersonal potentialities and since there are a variety of starting points, "success" in contract-fulfillment must be defined idiosyncratically. As Bunker (1965) puts it, there is "no standard learning outcome and no stereotyped ideal toward which conformity is induced" (p. 42). Boyd and Elliss (1962), too, argue that no particular pattern can be regarded as typical training outcome. The entire laboratory experience, including the contract, is at the service of the individual.

Fulfilling the contract. There is, then, no "perfect" way of fulfilling the contract. One person's approach might be global, that is, he gets some
idea of the spirit underlying the provisions of the contract and tries to experiment in some global way with contractual behaviors that seem meaningful to him. Another person's approach might-be more studied, that is, he might carefully consider each contractual provision and try to see what each means for his interpersonal behavior. Neither of these extremes or anything in between is the way of implementing the contract. It is certainly assumed that every participant will "violate" the contract in one way or another from time to time, but he can learn as much about himself through recognized violations as through strict observance.

The contract as contrived. Some might say that contracts are too rational, that life runs on as a mixture of the rational and the irrational, and that people cannot be expected to do violence to their life style in order to follow the provisions of a contract. A training laboratory is a place where people come in order to examine their life styles. If a person's life is governed too closely by reason, the contract gives him an opportunity to experiment with the affective dimensions of life; if a person's emotional life is too labile, the contract gives him an opportunity to experiment with growthful controls. The question is not whether the laboratory is contrived or not but whether it has a growthful impact on the participant's real life or not. The laboratory is not real life nor is it a substitute for it, but it can enrich it.

The Contract and Research Possibilities

Research with training laboratories, especially laboratories in interpersonal relations, is minimal. The purpose of this short section is not to indicate what research should be done (Campbell and Dunnette [1968,
pp. 99-101] do point out major areas of needed research) but to suggest what contributions contract approaches might make to research in this area. They seem to be principally two: control and provocation.

Control. Golembiewski (1962) divides small groups into three "designations" for the purpose of research. "Designation I" means that the group:

1. Consists of a small number of individuals in more or less interdependent status and role relations who

2. Have an indigenous set of values or norms which regulate the behavior of members at least in matters of concern to the group (p. 35).

He quotes Bales (1950) in defining "Designation II": "any number of persons engaged in a single face-to-face meeting or series of meetings in which each member receives some impression of the others as a distinct person even though it was only to recall that the other was present" (Bales, 1950, p. 33). "Designation III" refers to groups in a simple aggregative sense: "Thus one study dealt with a 'relatively stable group of college students.' 'Stable' was defined as lack of newcomers or dropouts. The group was a formal one of forty-two girls taking the same course of study" (Golembiewski, 1962, p. 36). Golembiewski complains that it is difficult to determine whether the experimental collectivities in any "laboratory" situation are really small groups in the sense of "Designation I." And yet, he says, this question becomes crucial in the analysis of experimental results with such groups. The contract-group offers a possible answer to the problem of membership (psychological rather than just formal). It is certainly a group in the sense of "Designation I." Research with contract-groups seems to be quite feasible, for the contract not only gives greater assurance of the kind of membership involved, but through its provisions it also eliminates a number
of uncontrolled variables (e.g., it reduces the number of goals in the minds of group members) and provides a definite set of variables amenable to statistical analysis.

Truax and Carkhuff (1967) recommend as a research model for psychotherapy the general linear equation. The outcome desired is constructive personality change (CPC). The variables which lead to this outcome and which are to be placed in the linear equation are therapist variables (e.g. non-possessive warmth), patient variables (e.g. self-exploration), situational or contextual variables (e.g. vicarious therapy pre-training), and interaction or process variables (e.g. the therapist's approach to hostile responses on the part of the client). The same linear model is applicable to laboratory-training situations also. The contract controls the variables which go into the training situation: leader variables, participant variables, situational variables, and interaction variables. Since the researcher can also determine whether the contract had been fulfilled or not, he can more easily relate training variables to outcomes.

Provocation. Weick (1968) defines the observational method in research as "the selection, provocation, recording, and encoding of that set of behaviors and settings concerning organisms 'in situ' which is consistent with empirical aims" (p. 360). With respect to provocation he says:

For the moment it is sufficient to note that settings and behaviors are robust and that interventions do not necessarily affect the ways in which they unfold. As was pointed out, it is 'provocation' which tends, more than any other term, to blur the distinction between experimental and naturalistic methodology. We contend that such blurring is beneficial (p. 361).

He talks of "the use of directed settings" and of "evoking a behavior":

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"Careful choice and/or modification of a situation can enable observers to evoke behaviors that are of interest" (p. 377). The contract, then, is used to provoke or stimulate behaviors "of interest." It is assumed here that training situations are "robust," that is, that the addition of the contract does not radically alter the nature of the training group. The laboratory itself is contrived and it would seem that the contrived nature of the contract is not antithetical to the nature or purposes of the laboratory.

Scoring systems. There are many different ways in which interactions in face-to-face groups can be scored (see Holsti, 1968 and Weick, 1968). They go from the relatively simple to that of Katz (1964) which has 56 categories. In the contract-group the contract itself provides the scoring categories. For instance, I have used a rather simple scoring system in some informal research. The scoring unit used was the "remark" (Snoek, 1962): a series of phrases or sentences, uttered without interruption, about a single topic. "Remarks" were scored (+) if they were contractual, (-) if they were non-contractual, and (x) if they were questions or remarks which merely sustained the interaction without adding to it in a contractual way. The (+)'s and the (-)'s were also rated on a three-point scale to give some indication of how "good" or how "poor" the "remark" was. Participant profiles began to emerge. For instance, one young man's profile consisted almost entirely of (x)'s, that is, he had become a kind of leader in his own right, but not a leader-member, for he contributed little in the way of contractual behavior. "Remarks" can also be broken down into other categories. For instance, (+)'s can be scored according to the kind of contractual behavior engaged in (self-disclosure, responsible confrontation, self-exploration as a
response to confrontation, etc.). In the same way, (-)'s can be scored in such a way as to indicate the kind of flight involved (defensiveness, counterattack, actuarial self-disclosure, punitive confrontation, etc.). Such scoring leads to more elaborate and more useful profiles.

Concluding Remarks

How detailed a contract? How detailed a contract should be given to participants in a contract training laboratory? Only research can answer such a question. One hypothesis would be that the relationship between the definition (detailed nature) of the contract and group productivity is curvilinear: contracts both too high and too low in definition will result in low productivity, while a contract of moderate definition indicating clear goals and flexible means will result in high productivity. In high-definition conditions the participants become too embroiled in the technicalities of the contract itself; in low-definition conditions ambiguity is high and many energies remain unchanneled.

Maintenance versus effective synergy. Cattell (1951) calls the sum total of the energy which any group can command and expend "synergy." "Maintenance synergy" is the energy used up in the machinery which keeps the group in existence and "effective synergy" is the residual energy available to carry out the purposes for which the group explicitly exists. One of the primary functions of the contract is to cut down on maintenance synergy and maximize effective synergy. If the group has pre-established goals, then the contract can do just that. For groups whose primary goal is to create their goals it is another question.

The chapters which follow. The rest of the book is a study in some
depth of the provisions of the contract outlined in this chapter. Since the contract variables suggested here are those associated with any sensitivity-training experience designed to stimulate interpersonal growth, the following chapters probe the anatomy of such experiences.
Chapter III

Group Goals

Introduction

Campbell and Dunnette (1968) in a review article summarize some of the goals of laboratory training:

1. Increased self-insight or self-awareness concerning one's own behavior and its meaning in a social context.
2. Increased sensitivity to the behavior of others. It refers first, to the development of an increased awareness of the full range of communicative stimuli emitted by other persons and second, to the development of the ability to infer accurately the emotional or noncognitive bases for interpersonal communications.
3. Increased awareness and understanding of the types of processes that facilitate or inhibit group functioning and the interactions between different groups—specifically, why do some members participate actively while others retire to the background? Why do sub-groups form and wage war against each other?
4. Heightened diagnostic skill in social, interpersonal, and intergroup situations.
5. Increased action skill. It refers to a person's ability to intervene successfully so as to increase member satisfactions, effectiveness, or output. The goal of increased action skill is toward intervention at the interpersonal rather than simply the technological level.
6. Learning how to learn. This does not refer to an individual's cognitive approach to the world, but rather his ability to analyze continually his own interpersonal behavior for the purpose of helping himself and others achieve more effective and satisfying interpersonal relationships.

Differential emphasis among the above objectives constitutes one of the most important dimensions for distinguishing among variations in T groups (p. 75).

The overall emphasis depends principally on the unit of society which is the focus of the laboratory. Laboratories may focus on individuals, groups, or organizations or on any combination of the three. A key question in any laboratory is whether the participants at the beginning of the laboratory have a clear idea of the purpose of the laboratory or not.
Developmental sequence in training groups. Another way of getting a feeling for the general goals of training groups is to see what actually takes place over time in such groups. Tuckman (1965), in reviewing developmental sequence in small groups in general, distinguishes between the interpersonal stages of group development and task behaviors manifested in the group. He calls the pattern of interpersonal relationships the "group structure," while the content of interaction as related to the task at hand is called the "task activity." This distinction is somewhat difficult to maintain in therapy and training groups, however, since the task is a personal and interpersonal one: "the group exists to help the individuals deal with themselves and others" (p. 385). The proposed developmental sequence in training groups is as follows:

Stage 1. Group structure: testing and dependence. In this initial stage there is a good deal of testing and dependency behavior, the latter being predominant. Participants express, in one way or another, strong dependency needs toward the trainer. There is a tendency toward quick acceptance of structure and arbitrary norms.

Stage 1. Task activity: orientation. There is a good deal of talk about what is to be accomplished (goals) and how (means).

Stage 2. Group structure: intragroup conflict. Polarization takes place in the group. For instance, those who favor a more active, less defensive approach vie with those who remain defensive and try to find safety in structure. Anxiety, threat, and resistance characterize this stage. There are also struggles for leadership.

Stage 2: Task activity: emotional response to task demands. Members
express themselves freely and engage in experimental aggressiveness and hostility. The task is to remove blocks to learning about themselves, to reduce anxiety, and to express real reactions to one another.

Stage 3. Group structure: development of group cohesion. "All the relevant T-group development studies see the stage of conflict and polarization as being followed by a stage characterized by the reduction of conflict resolution of the polarized issues, and establishment of group harmony in the place of disruption. It is a 'patching-up' phase in which group norms and values emerge" (Tuckman, p. 392).

Stage 3. Task activity: discussing oneself and others. "While the social function of the third stage is to cause a unique and cohesive group structure to emerge, the task function is to attempt to use this new structure as a vehicle for discovering personal relations and emotions by communicating heretofore private feelings" (p. 392).

Stage 4. Group structure: functional role-relatedness. The members coalesce into a work organization which has strong but flexible norms; members provide one another support and mutual acceptance.

Stage 4. Task activity: insight. The participants discover things about themselves and provide one another with growthful feedback.

If, then, the development sequence of a training group gives any indication of the sequence of desirable goals, the following goal-pattern emerges: (1) The expression of dependency needs and the need for structure; (2) discussion of goals and means; (3) experimentation with aggressiveness and hostility; (4) declaring where one stands with respect to proposed goals; (5) attempts to reduce defensiveness and anxiety; (6) reduction of conflict.
increased cohesion; (7) open discussion of self and others; (8) working to maintain an organization of support and mutual acceptance; (9) deepening of communication, intimacy, responsible feedback.

Ambiguity Versus Clarity of Goals in Laboratory Training

Confusion in face-to-face groups. In most small, face-to-face groups—whatever their nature: laboratories in group dynamics, T-Groups, psychotherapy groups—the members undergo a good deal of at least initial confusion, anxiety, and discomfort because they have no clear knowledge of group goals. Obviously their knowledge of the means to achieve nebulous goals is even less distinct. For instance, the patient in a group psychotherapy setting realizes that he is in the group "to get better," and he either has a vague idea himself or he is told that "getting better" is contingent upon his talking about his problems in the group. But the patient often wonders why he is being "cured" in a group. Many patients see the group—and often this is a true perception of what is actually happening—as a place where a number of individual therapy sessions are conducted at the same time.

The novice T-Group member is traditionally "at sea" during the early sessions of the group. He may be told of the general "contract" that exists between trainer and group, but both the contract and the goals are implied in it, if remembered at all, remain vague. Benne (1964), for example, tells his groups that he is a resource person who is there to help them learn about groups and membership in groups. He indicates that there are two sources of data for learning about groups: (1) the knowledge that members already have about groups because of membership in other groups, and (2) the observation and clarification of behavioral events and the relationships
that emerge in the T-Group itself, as the members interact with one another.

Bennis (1964) spells out the goals of a human relations laboratory:

There are two major goals of the T-Group which can be indivisible in operation: (1) that group members become more aware of the enabling and disabling factors in decision-making in groups and of their own behavior and feelings in groups; (2) that group members utilize the group as a crucible for increasing their own repertoire of skills in managing group processes and their own behavior in groups (p. 272).

But, despite these adumbrations of some kind of operational goals, early-session confusion is almost universal:

If we were to interview members of a T-Group during its early sessions concerning the then current goal of the group, we would find two modal perceptions. One is the perception of goallessness—... The other is that the group goal is what "I" (that is, the group leader) and a few other members have stated it should be and that most of the other members are aimlessly (or willfully) wandering from this goal (Benne, 1964, p. 217).

Such ambiguity, goallessness, and division are beneficial in laboratories in which the participants are to learn "group formative processes" (Benne, 1964) by immersing themselves in group process. Bennis (1964) sees this initial groping for goals, not primarily as a search for a viable goal-structure, but rather as dependency plea: "The group's pretense of a fruitless search for goals is a plea for him (the leader) to tell the group what to do" (p. 254). The leader is presumed to know what the goals are or ought to be. But, according to Bennis, initial dependency gives way to something more solid: "Without any particular structure or clear-cut goals to begin with, the group must develop its own muscles and structure; and this demands sophistication about the group formative processes, as well as sensitivity to the self as a result of this maturation process" (pp. 274-275). The group
must start goalless because one of the principal goals or functions of the
group is to create its own goals. The interactions involved in this creative
process contribute also to the personal and interpersonal growth of the
participants. Gibb (1964) distinguishes between "natural" groups and
T-Groups precisely in terms of goals; T-Groups are forced by the very nature
of the "social contract" to both create and scrutinize goals.

In groups in which the participants must create their own goals there
is bound to be a good deal of frustration and division. French (1941)
showed that the attractiveness of a group is lessened when the members
disagree over the way to solve a group problem (e.g., the establishment of
goals). He notes that withdrawal is most likely to occur when the members
are disagreeing over the method they should use in solving the problem.
Indeed, in a residential laboratory there is usually a good deal of talk
about "getting out of here" because of the disorder, confusion, and hostility
that characterize the goal-setting phase of the laboratory. However, since
it is a laboratory and since goal-setting is part of the experiment, few if
any participants actually do leave (many more would probably leave if this
were a "real life" situation). Undoubtedly there is must to be learned from
such a process. The group both feels and later reflects on the frustrations
and divisions that go into a group decision-making process. The individual,
because of the behavior he emits and the feedback he gets, learns a great
deal about himself on an interpersonal level. There are undoubtedly other
advantages to engaging in such goal-creating activity. For instance, Lorge
and his associates (1958) note increased productivity on the part of groups
which have had a hand in setting goals for themselves.
In the typical T-Group, the members come with such a variety of personal goals that the trainer must be oriented toward a "meta-goal," namely, "establishing the group conditions which are necessary for maximally meeting the needs of the various members who enter with discrepant individual goals" (Horwitz, 1964, pp. 365-366). Therefore, in the early sessions at least, even though group leaders or trainers have a more panoramic view of the group process and where it is going, the members remain confused. But, again, this is understandable if one of the principal reasons for their being there is the "creation" of their own goals. One problem is that group members sense that the leader has some idea of what goals will be formulated and of the developmental sequence that will take place. A plausible hypothesis would be that such differential knowledge the so-called authority- or leader-problem on the part of the members.

In academic laboratories in which students get together with a leader-teacher to study the formation and processes of small groups, the goals again are purposely vague. The members are "supposed" to experience periods of ennui and drifting, to have "hang-ups" with the leader and to rise up against him in revolt, to experience group inertia with respect to the formulation and execution of goals--for this is one of the most effective ways to study the "nature" of small groups (Slater, 1966).

Not all of the confusion concerning goals, however, stems from the practical necessity of creating goals for the group. Much of the "goal-disturbance" (intolerance of "goal-ambiguity") is both a manifestation of and a defense against anxiety. The implication of goal-confusion is: "If I knew the goals of this group, if the leader would not insist on hiding them, then
would pursue them." Actually such statements as "I don't know what the
goods are" can often be translated: "I am afraid," "I don't want to move too
fast," "I want in, but I am not sure that I can pay the price," or "I have
decided not to invest myself yet; it is too early for me."

**Goallessness as a value.** The danger is to assume that the "purposeful
goallessness" that characterizes so many different kinds of groups—whether
by design or by accident—is a value in itself, a value that must characterize
all kinds of laboratory-training groups, a value so central that other group
values must be subordinated to it. It is undeniable that group participants
learn much about group dynamics as they participate in the often agonizing
process of "working out" a viable contract for the group. Too often, however,
grinding out the contract becomes a goal in itself, an absolute value,
because it engenders a kind and degree of learning about group process
impossible to duplicate in a didactic classroom situation. The formulation
of the contract becomes the absolute value, or rather learning about group
process is the absolute value and this is achieved by working out a contract.
This absolute value is surrounded by satellite values such as the members'
"working through" their feelings about one another and becoming more aware
of their own interpersonal strengths and limitations. If it is undeniable,
however, that there are groups in which the creation of goals and/or the
formulation of an operational contract are the prime values, it is also true
that such groups often end with just that, a formulated contract which cannot
be implemented because time has run out. In such groups frustration often
runs high, no matter how much has been learned about "group formative
processes."
Goals in the contract group. Although "goallessness" and "planned ambiguity" characterize most of the sensitivity-training paradigms to be found in the literature and in the one followed by Tuckman (1965) in elaborating his developmental-sequence model for training groups, this need not be the case. In fact, there has been an almost unwarranted acceptance of goallessness as a value, for there is no empirical evidence demonstrating the superiority of goallessness in all training groups. While the value of goallessness and planned ambiguity in many training situations is not denied, it is suggested here that clear-cut goals and "high visibility" may also be values in certain training situations. Ambiguity and goallessness are of special value in situations in which learning about group formative processes is a primary goal. This is not the case in the contract group. The primary goal of the contract group is interpersonal growth. The contract, then, provides structures which enable the participants to make intimate contact with one another as quickly as possible. The contract delineates specific goals in order to make the group more operational from the beginning. Goallessness, ambiguity concerning goals, differential knowledge concerning goals in leader (panoramic vision of developmental sequence) and in group members (goal confusion), creation of principal goals, contract-talk, formulation of contract, goal-disturbance, and similar factors are not values in the contract group. While the benefits of "working through" goal conflicts may be lost, other benefits take their place—for instance, there is more time for intimate interpersonal contact. Contact fulfillment takes the place of contract formulation. This does not mean that such factors as goal conflict and ambiguity do not occur in contract groups, for the group remains
"natural" even while it is contractual. These variables, however, are
inhibited. When a member, despite the contract, is uncertain about group
goals, this is "diagnostic" and must be worked through in the group. This
is far cry, however, from "developmental" goallessness and ambiguity.
Finally, even though interpersonal growth is the overriding goal of the
contract groups described in these pages, this is not to say that little is
learned about group process in such groups. Indeed, much is learned about
group process, even though such learning is secondary.

Varieties of Goals in Group Process

Research has shown that goals become "operational" to the degree that
they are clear and to the degree that the steps or means leading to goal-
achievement are made clear (March & Simon, 1958; Raven & Rietsema, 1957).
In one kind of laboratory experience, then, one of the first objectives is
to establish and clarify goals and goal-facilitating structures. The members
of a contract group, however, should have a clear understanding of goals
from the start so that energy can be channeled into pursuing instead of
clarifying goals.

An example. Let us say that a group member makes the following
statement: "You know, at home my wife and I don't really talk to each other
very much any more, that is, there is little or no serious talk. And lately
I have been finding excuses to stay late at work so that when I come home
the kids are already in bed. I am withdrawing from them. It seems that I
have a need not to be with people, at least in any very close way. And I
know that it has been affecting my participation here. I speak only when
it's safe. I haven't really put myself on the line with you. I feel alone
right here in the group, as if I were not a part of the whole operation."

This example illustrates different kinds of goals found in the contract group:

(1) **Contract goals.** This is a generic term and refers to all of the provisions of the contract. In the kind of contract group under discussion interpersonal growth is the superordinate or overriding goal. This is the key contract goal and hypothetically all other contract goals are subordinate to and subserve this goal. For instance, in the example cited above, the participant is engaging in self-disclosure. Self-disclosure is a contract goal, for it is seen as one of the ways of establishing the kind of intimacy that is at the heart of interpersonal growth. By engaging in responsible self-disclosure (a "means"), the participant is by that very fact pursuing the superordinate goal of interpersonal growth. He reveals the kind of person he is both within and outside the group and through this revelation makes contact with his fellow participants. All the provisions of the contract are contract goals.

(2) **Interaction goals.** The contract specifies certain kinds of interaction, specifically, self-disclosure, expression of feeling, support, responsible confrontation, and self-exploration as a response to responsible confrontation. In the example above, self-disclosure is the predominant interaction. The contract also "forbids" certain kinds of interaction, for instance, long-winded, intellectualized interpretations of the behavior of others and defensive, self-excusing behavior. In the example above, the participant reveals an area of deficit factually without trying to rationalize or excuse it. This refusal to involve himself in defensive behavior is, in
negative sense, also an interaction goal. Interaction goals are the heart of the contract experience.

(3) Process goals. Since it is a question of group process, one set of goals indicates the kinds of activities that are necessary in order to establish effective group process. These goals are essential to any group desiring to handle its business as a group rather than as a collection of individuals in a social setting. One of the process goals illustrated in the example above is dealing with the "here-and-now." Whatever a group member talks about must be made relevant to these people (his fellow group members) in this situation (the give-and-take of group interaction). The participant quoted above does just that: while he talks about an interpersonal problem that he has at home, he realizes that this problem in some way defines an aspect of his personality make-up and influences the quality of his participation in the group experience. He deals with the here-and-now relevance of a there-and-then problem. In doing so, he makes contact with or "engages" the group. Process goals are species of contract goals. Their purpose is to make the group run more efficiently and with greater immediacy.

(4) Content goals. Content refers to the specific subjects or topics discussed by group members. A contract may or may not specify the topics to be discussed by group members (although the contract described in these pages does not). If the contract does specify areas of discussion, then content goals become contract goals. This may be the case with "focused" contracts that take place within the laboratory experience. For instance, the leader may suggest an exercise which involves discussing a specific topic (for example, one's relationship to authority). In the example above,
participant talks about his tendency to withdraw from people. However, it is, not the contract, specifies the area of self-revelation. While authentic self-disclosure is specified by the contract, talking about alienation is not. The participant himself chooses the subject matter of his act of self-disclosure.

(5) Need goals. Each participant enters the group with a variety of personal needs and a tendency to use the group in order to achieve these needs. Horwitz (1964) indicates possible conflicts between personal needs and group goals:

Although certainly there are unstructured features of a T Group, the T Group does generate a group goal which, however, will ordinarily differ from the individual goals with which trainees enter the group. Frustration arises from the goal's being difficult to define and exceedingly difficult to attain.

The trainee may be oriented toward reaching a more or less specific goal--X', e.g., to deal more effectively with persons in authority. A second trainee may be oriented toward reaching a specific goal--X'', e.g., to work better with subordinates. By contract, the trainer is oriented toward what might be called the meta-goal--X, namely, establishing the group conditions which are necessary for maximally meeting the needs of the various members who enter the group with discrepant individual goals. This goal is enforced upon members by the particular characteristics of T-Group interaction.

The underlying task of the T Group is to develop a social system which enables maximal satisfaction for each of its members (pp. 365-366).

In the contract group, too, need goals must be integrated with contract goals. Certain needs may be antithetical to the goals of the group, e.g., the need to withdraw, the need to dominate others, the need to monopolize conversation, while other needs, e.g. the need for affiliation, may be more readily integrated with contract goals. In a sense, it is not whether individual need goals are satisfied or not, but rather how they are satisfied. In the example
above, the participant is acting counter to his need to withdraw; if he finds affiliation safe, growthful, and rewarding, this may reduce or eliminate his need to flee. At any rate, his first attempt to deal with this need is to reveal it, to get it "into community" where it can be dealt with more effectively.

If the group is to run smoothly, there must be some kind of goal-harmony. Since goal-harmony and goal-clarity are considered so important in the contract group, each kind of goal will now be taken up separately.

**Contract Goals**

Contract goals include not only the overriding goal of the group, interpersonal growth, but also those interaction, process, and sometimes content goals that are seen as means of achieving interpersonal growth. Interaction, process, and content goals will be dealt with separately. In this section the emphasis is on the superordinate goal of the contract group--interpersonal growth.

**Interpersonal growth as the overriding or superordinate goal.** "Interpersonal growth" as a superordinate goal is too general and must be defined operationally. Interpersonal growth is defined operationally as the sum of both process and interaction goals. More concretely, one who engages in authentic self-disclosure, responsible expression of feeling, concerned confrontation, non-defensive self-exploration, and realistic support (all of these are described in the chapters that follow) and does so by effectively contributing to and utilizing group resources (process goals) is, by hypothesis, growing interpersonally. Operationally, these activities constitute interpersonal growth.
Growth in interpersonal effectiveness is considered to take place through practice in establishing a responsible and viable dialogue of word and feeling among the members of the group. The participant is expected to learn and put into practice new ways of being-present-to-the-other and new ways of allowing the other to be present to himself. If a participant is "shy," and this keeps him from interacting with others, he is considered to be irresponsibly out-of-community. He must try new ways of getting into community; he must risk embarrassment, discomfort, and anxiety in involving himself with the other participants. If, on the other hand, a participant is a "manipulator," then he is considered to be irresponsibly in-community. He, too, has to learn new ways of being present to the other members of the group. The "interactional" provisions of the contract—that is, interactions such as self-disclosure, confronting others responsibly, accepting confrontation, giving effective support, etc., all of which are called for by the contract—present general guidelines for formulating "new ways" of being present to others. If a participant usually never talks about himself, if he never lets others know what he is like "inside" in any way, the kind of person he is—then self-disclosure will be a "new way" of being present to others.

Interpersonal rather than personal growth. While it would be fruitless to introduce here a meaningless dichotomy between personal and interpersonal growth, still the goal of the group is stated as interpersonal rather than personal growth. Ego-centered and other-centered goals are conceived of as a dynamically interrelated system. A healthy egocentricity (loving oneself) even has a kind of existential priority over involvement with others (loving
Fromm-Reichmann (1950) believed that any display of lack of self-respect was inevitably accompanied by a reduction of one's respect for others. Sullivan (1940), too, found that one respects others only to the extent that one respects himself. Erikson (1959) sees true engagement with others as both the result and the test of firm self-delineation. According to Erikson, when a person who has not achieved a sense of self-identity attempts to engage in interpersonal relations, he experiences a "tense inner reservation, a caution in commitment" (1959, p. 125). Such a person engages in only stereotyped interpersonal relations. He does not really encounter the other, but deals in desperate attempts at clarifying what Erikson calls the "fuzzy outlines" of his own identity. The other is not the "other," but a kind of narcissistic mirror. His relationships with others, then, involve "fusion" rather than growthful involvement and result in a loss of identity.

Lynd (1958) emphasizes the relatedness of personal and interpersonal growth:

Openness to relatedness with other persons and the search for self-identity are not two problems but one dialectical process; as one finds more relatedness to other persons one discovers more of oneself; as the sense of one's own identity becomes clearer and more firmly rooted one can more completely go out to others. It is not a loss of oneself, an 'impoverishment,' but a way of finding more of oneself when one means most to others whom one has chosen. Nor must complete finding of oneself, as Fromm and others sometimes seem to imply, precede finding oneself in and through other persons. Identity is never wholly realized. Love is never perfect. Strength to apprehend love that is beyond anxiety, beyond the need to use other persons for one's own security, beyond desire for power over others is never complete, but may grow throughout life. Like identity and mutuality with others it is a lifetime process of discovery (p. 241, emphasis added).

While this is true and some kind of understanding of it is cardinal to psychological growth, it is nevertheless also true that interpersonal effectiveness
is a pre-eminent goal of human living, and, as such, superordinate to
individualistic or ego-centered goals, e.g., personal psychic comfort. While
self-identity has its "antecedent" priority in human living, responsible
interpersonal involvement has a "subsequent" or ultimate priority. That is,
ultimate self-actualization can take place only through effective in-
community involvement, and self-actualization-in-community becomes the
composite goal of human living. These, at any rate, are the assumptions
underlying the present delineation of group goals.

The contract group is to serve as a means of getting its members more
effectively into community. This means both dyadic community, the community
of the small group, and the wider community. If Buber (1937) is right and
a person does not effectively become an authentic "I" until he has worked
at transforming another from object to "Thou," then it is also true that a
person is not fully a social or societal or community "I" until the community
or the communities to which he belongs becomes "Thous" in his life. Studies
(Jacob, 1957; Allport, 1961) describe the average American college student
as quite conformist and quite disinterested in wider community concerns.
Jacob's study showed the average student to be "gloriously contented" and
"unabashedly self-centered." Though they discharge the obligations demanded
of them by the government, they will not voluntarily contribute to public
welfare. Nor do they particularly desire an influential voice in public
policy. They vote, but otherwise they abdicate the citizen's role in the
political process. Though they predict another war, international problems
are the least of their concerns. Although pouring one's energies into
various forms of concern for the wider community may be a way of avoiding
intimacy on a more personal level, still disinterest in the larger community can also reflect a general disinterest in others.

The reason for making something of the distinction between personal and interpersonal growth is this. It is amazing how many people come to group experiences--and this seems to be especially (if obviously) true of psychotherapy groups--"to get something out of it for myself." The contention here is that many people enter groups intending to grow in some way, but without any special realization that the condition of growing is the coming-together. Too few fail to realize that the experience is taking place in a group, not just because others have something to contribute to one's own personal growth, but because the culmination of personal growth lies in the ability to involve oneself responsibly with others. In the contract group, the members come together in order to grow together.

Berne (1966) doubts that authentic intimacy, as described here, can take place in groups. At least in psychotherapy groups, all that can be expected is a kind of "pseudo-intimacy." "Affective expression is encouraged without careful assessment of its authenticity....The affective expression is largely socially (externally) programmed, and it is usually part of a game in which the patient compliantly participates" (pp. 231-232). I disagree. The "game" structure that is evident in Berne's psychotherapeutic method, seems, at least partially, to be imposed upon the psychotherapeutic situation rather than to grow out of it. As Coles (1967) points out, "the cynicism, the cult of self, the lack of any philosophical, historical or religious perspective found in Berne are "thoroughly contemporary, thoroughly American, and awful" (p. 17). The contract group is anti-game," even while admitting
that many do engage in games in order to avoid intimacy.

Interaction Goals

Little more will be said here about interaction goals because these are studied in some depth in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and IX. They constitute, however, the heart of the contract. The participant agrees to experiment with:

1. the elements of dialogue:
   a. freer experiencing and responsible expression of feelings and emotions;
   b. the value of language as a means of translating oneself to others;
   c. the recognition and use of non-verbal channels of communication;

2. self-disclosure: revealing to the other members, in some way, the person inside;

3. support: listening effectively to others; encouraging others to fulfill the provisions of the contract; giving others recognition and help when they do engage in contractual behavior; reacting responsibly when others present themselves emotionally in the group;

4. confrontation: inviting others to fulfill the contract, if they are not doing so; inviting others to examine aspects of their behavior which, it seems, they have not sufficiently examined;

5. accepting confrontation: responding to responsible confrontation, not by defensiveness and attack, but by engaging in self-exploration;

6. taking a stance against flight: refusing to engage in interactions antithetical to the interactions listed above; refusing to withdraw
from the interaction; trying to minimize flight in oneself and in others.

**Process Goals**

Process goals refer to the way in which any goal in the group is pursued. Their purpose is to regulate and give definition to the interactional process itself. They provide cautions and structures which make the group a more efficient and effective organization. In the contract group these pragmatic rules are also contract goals.

The distinction between self-oriented and altruistic goals. The entire discussion of goals might become a bit clearer if some attention is first paid to a distinction that Cartwright and Zander (1960) draw between "selfish" and "altruistic" goals in group process. In the following schematization, process goals, that is, the ways in which the group is utilized in the pursuit of other goals, have a kind of primacy over other goals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process goals: The ways in which any other goal is pursued in the group</th>
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<td>selfishly</td>
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Other Goals: contract, content, need

Examples of interactions illustrating each quadrant of the diagram will
help make the distinction between goals, especially the distinction between process goals and other goals, clearer:

**Quadrant A:** "Selfish" goals (contract, content, need) pursued "selfishly." This means that a group member pursues a contract, content, or need goal that redounds to his own benefit ("selfish" or "self-oriented") in a way that is inimical to the interests of the group. That is, the way in which he pursues his goal tends to destroy the efficiency and the cohesiveness of the group. Mr. A finds that his anxiety is running very high in the group. He has learned from experience that he can reduce his anxiety by monopolizing the conversation (this might not be a completely conscious realization). This keeps him occupied and it also keeps disturbing stimuli at bay. He proceeds to do this, and his anxiety is lowered. He has pursued a "selfish" goal (the need-goal of reducing personal anxiety), but he has done so in a "selfish" way (by monopolizing the conversation in the group, by keeping the group from being an interacting group).

**Quadrant B:** "Selfish" goals pursued "altruistically." This means that a group participant pursues a goal (need, contract, content) that redounds to his own personal benefit, but he does so in a way that is designed to promote inter-member "engagement" and group cohesiveness. For instance, Mr. B, too, is quite anxious, and he feels the same need that Mr. A felt, namely, to reduce his anxiety. But, instead of dodging the issue, he confesses to the group that he is anxious and that this is affecting the quality of his participation. He wonders if other participants are anxious, too. He tells the group that he would like to know what it is about the group and about himself-in-the-group that causes such anxiety. He has pursued an ego-
centered goal (the reduction of personal anxiety) in an "altruistic" way (by bringing his concern before the group, by eliciting the feelings of other members, by "engaging" the other members of the group). He has also fulfilled a contract goal—self-disclosure.

Quadrant C: "Altruistic" goals pursued "selfishly." This means that a participant pursues a goal that is intended to benefit some other member of the group itself, but he does so in such a way as to hinder desirable group-process variables. For instance, Mr. C decides that the group should talk about sex. He realizes that this will make him quite uncomfortable, but he thinks that it is an issue that this particular group should handle for its own good. He brings the subject up a few times and even gets the group to discuss the fact that it has been avoiding this area of discussion. However, the group as a whole is not ready to pursue the subject; sex is not yet a viable topic for the group. Still, Mr. C, at every opportunity, brings up the subject and tries to get the group to engage in a serious, perhaps self-revealing, discussion of it. He is pursuing an "altruistic" content-goal (though it is hardly denied that other, more basic, need goals are operative), that is, he sincerely believes that a comparatively open discussion of sex will benefit everyone, but he pursues the goal in a way designed to disrupt group process. He wants what well might be good, but he wants to get it his way. He cannot trust the group to handle the problem.

Quadrant D: "Altruistic" goals pursued "altruistically." This means that a participant pursues a goal (contract, content, need) that is of benefit either to another member or to the group as a whole, and he does so through the group process, by "engaging" the other members of the group. For
instance, Miss D says: "I don't want to hurt or embarrass you, Mr. Y, but you have been rather quiet in the group. It just seems to me that you have been reneging on our contract, and I don't think that that is fair to the group or to you. I think we have been remiss in not trying to involve ourselves with you sooner." She pursues an altruistic goal (it is a contract goal, for she confronts another to "join" the group for his own sake and for the sake of the group, and she confronts the group--including herself--for being remiss), and she does so in a way designed not to alienate either Mr. Y or the other members. Her confrontation is not an act of punishment, it is not primarily an expression of her own frustration, rather it is an attempt to get the group members--including herself--to involve themselves more completely with one another.

Given these distinctions, it is clear that a certain degree of group "altruism" is essential if the group itself is to become the vehicle of problem-solving and growth.

Some key group-process-goals. Group-process goals are also contract-goals, that is, the participants agree to use these goals as standards with respect to their manner of participation. These goals or standards set the interactional tone of the group. The following group-process goals are considered essential to the effective running of the group:

(1) All concerns must be made group concerns. Another way of stating this is: whatever is done is to be done through group process. The examples above make it clear that it is not important to multiply contract-goals nor is it important that the content and need goals being pursued be "altruistic." What is important is that all goals--contract, content, need--
be pursued through the group process. The members of the contract group not only agree to pursue interpersonal growth as the superordinate contract-goal, but they contract to pursue both personalistic and altruistic sub-goals in such a way as to involve themselves more deeply with the other members of the group. This is the cardinal group-process goal: to submit everything to the group. The group should never become just a group of on-lookers, while two of the members interact. It is not against the better interests of the group for two members to discuss their relationship, whether it be one of concern or of antagonism, but they should do so in such a way as not to exclude the other group members (although, in one sense, it is impossible to "exclude" other group members since they are "there"). If Mr. A and Mrs. Q show a great deal of antagonism toward each other and finally discuss it in the group, the other group members are not only free to comment on the relationship and how it affects them and the entire group, but they should be encouraged to do so. This is often difficult. Other group members do not want to "butt in." It is "none of their business." Often it is a question of the other members being afraid of the emotions that are involved in the interchange. They are afraid to engage themselves.

One of the violations of the everything-through-the-group standard, at least in residential sensitivity training laboratories, is "siphoning." Two or more members get together outside the group in order to work out their relationships. They return to the group changed, and this interrupts the rhythm of the group. Or worse, one member will pair with another member outside the group in order to discuss and work out feelings toward a third member. This dilutes group process and manifests negative feelings toward
and mistrust of the group. It is only natural that a certain amount of pairing take place outside the group, but whatever significant interactions this involves should be made public to the group. Pairing may even be encouraged or planned if it helps make the group sessions more meaningful. For instance, one of the group members might find it quite difficult to engage in self-disclosure. So, outside the group, he tells what he thinks is important to another group member. This "breaks the ice" for him and enables him to be open in the group. Mowrer (1963) will interview a patient before he enters the "integrity" group. The patient unburdens himself here first and then usually it is easier for him to "tell his story" to the entire group.

Participants in various kinds of face-to-face groups often fail to participate, it is true, because they are selfishly preoccupied with their own concerns. They neither engage other members, nor do they want to be engaged by others. When they speak, they do so in a rather solipsistic manner, or they look to the leader for a "solution" to their "problem." But there are also participants in these groups who realize that a group has been assembled precisely because some problems are handled more effectively through group interaction. Cattell (1953) even defines the entity "group" of the inter-reliance of the members:

The definition which seems most essential is that a group is a collection of organisms in which the existence of all (in their given relationships) is necessary to the satisfaction of certain individual needs in each. That is to say, the group is an instrument toward the satisfaction of needs in the individual. Individuals belong to the group only because they achieve certain satisfactions made possible by its organization which would not be so readily possible (or which did not happen to occur) for them through any other device (p. 20).
No one or two individuals should be allowed to act as if the other members of the group did not exist. Many participants are too "polite" or too timid to "interrupt" non-involving group action (or dyadic action, as the case might be), to "intrude" themselves. Everyone should feel free to speak to every issue and actually take advantage of this freedom.

Fouriezos, Hutt, and Guetzkow (1950) showed that groups primarily concerned with "self-oriented" needs are relatively ineffective. After observation of 72 decision-making conferences, they concluded that groups with the highest scores on self-oriented needs rated themselves lowest on satisfaction measures. They were less satisfied with the meeting in general, with the decisions reached, with the manner in which the group reached its decisions, and with the chairing of the meeting. Groups with high scores on "selfish" or self-oriented behavior completed fewer items on the agenda, but they held longer meetings. The contract for the interpersonal-growth contract-group calls for "altruistic" process goals, not just because they seem to be more fully human, but also because they are more "economic." Such goals assure that further contract goals will be pursued more quickly and more efficiently.

(2) Acceptance of the "laboratory" nature of the group experience. The laboratory nature of the group experience is explained in some detail in Chapters I and IV. The contract-group participant is asked to assume a "laboratory" set. The experience he is entering is, in a sense, contrived; it is different from day-to-day experience. It focuses on many of the molecular aspects of human interaction. It demands that the participants experiment with "new forms" of behavior, that is, potentially growthful ways
of involving themselves with one another, but ways which are not presently part of their interpersonal life style. Since the laboratory is an experiment, the participant is asked to reserve judgment; he is asked not to prejudge the experience, to determine beforehand that it is going to be completely successful or unsuccessful.

(3) Cooperation. Isreal (1956) found that groups which establish a "cooperative goal structure" are more effective than groups which establish a "competitive goal structure." In the contract group the assumption is that cooperation is essential to the work of the group and therefore the participants are asked to adopt a cooperative "set." Since cooperation is considered so important, it will be considered here at some length.

(a) Cooperation and personality. In disturbed relationships "working against" tends to take the place of "working with." Horney (1945) describes the interpersonally disturbed as "moving toward" people, that is, in a compliant way which is both an expression of helplessness and a call for support, (2) "moving against" people, that is, in an aggressive way, competing with others in order to surpass and defeat them, with the ultimate purpose of becoming strong enough to disregard the possible counter hostility of others, and (3) "moving away" from people, avoiding all the threats and risks involved in any kind of close interpersonal relating. These needs tend to give rise to N-interactions that can hamper the efficient running of the group. They certainly stand in the way of establishing a cooperative goal structure and working pattern in the group.

On the other hand Dreikurs (1967) insists that effective human relationships are characterized by cooperation. Cooperation, according to Dreikurs,
demands four attitudes together with a stance against their antitheses: (1) social interest versus hostility; (2) confidence in others versus distrust and suspicion; (3) self-confidence versus inferiority feelings, and (4) courage versus fear. Interest, trust, a feeling of self worth and courage are all essential to optimal performance in the training group.

(b) Cooperation in therapeutic situations. Individual therapy is being seen more and more as a cooperative venture in which both therapist and client become involved with each other (Schofield, 1964; Steinzor, 1967); it is a route taken by both therapist and client (Stern, 1966). In a study by Fiedler (1950), the good therapeutic relationship was described by a variety of therapists as one in which the therapist saw the patient as co-worker on a common problem. In my own experience, group therapy progresses most steadily when the members come to the realization that they are not just recipients of help but that their involvement with one another is the condition for growth. When patients cease being patients in therapy and become agents instead, then there is cause for hope. In the contract group neither leader nor members are "finished products" in the area of interpersonal maturity. All the members have much to offer one another if they are willing to drop some of their defensiveness and become involved with one another.

(c) Cooperation as a process goal in training groups. In the "natural" developmental sequence suggested by Tuckman (1965) for training groups, a period of initial dependency and confusion is followed by a period of antagonism and turmoil in which personal differences and differences in goal orientation are worked through. This is followed by a period of cohesion and
cooperation. Such a sequence seems "natural" to a group situation characterized by initial goallessness and planned ambiguity. However, whatever value may accrue to group participants from working through the problems associated with the first two stages, still a group experience in which the first two stages, if not eliminated, are at least shortened and in other respects attenuated has its own peculiar value. Even though group members may learn a good deal about the value of cooperation by both engaging in and becoming the victims of non-cooperation, there is also a value in forestalling and minimizing non-cooperation. Cooperation, after all, must be some kind of ultimate goal in all training groups, for productivity, no matter how productivity is defined, is impossible without cooperation.

Cooperation, then, is one of the process goals to which the members of the contract group subscribe. The empirical evidence supports the value of cooperation with respect to smoother performance and increased productivity in a variety of group situations (e.g. Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Deutsch, 1949; Grossack, 1954). There is also a good deal of evidence that cohesiveness in groups is enhanced if members work together for common rather than mutually exclusive and individual ends (see Lott & Lott, 1965 for a review of the evidence). Cooperation in the kind of enterprise called for by the contract is not an easy thing. As Goffman (1967) notes, "Joint involvement appears to be a fragile thing, with standard points of weakness and decay, a precarious unsteady state that is likely at any time to lead the individual into some form of alienation" (p. 117). The hypothesis in the contract group is that if the participants enter the group with a set toward cooperation, "decay" is a good deal less likely. Deutsch (1958) found that prior
cooperative orientation and Oskamp and Periman (1965) found that public commitment to cooperation increased cooperation on a task which ordinarily evoked relatively low levels of cooperation. Making cooperation one of the process goals of the contract group is similar to Deutsch's "cooperative orientation," and the participant who agrees to the contract makes a form of "public commitment" to cooperation.

(d) The nature of cooperation in the contract group. In the contract group cooperation means getting "into community" as quickly as possible. It means that members have come together, not to compete with one another, but to grow with one another. A cooperative style of group interaction will produce a distinctive type of "interpersonal movement" in the group. Three types of interpersonal movement may be indicated as follows:

Type A. self ←------------------- other
Type B. self -------------> other
Type C. self -------> ←-------- other

In Type A, one member remains entrenched in himself and makes the other "capitulate" or move out toward him. In Type B, which is the counter of Type A, one "leaves" himself in a movement that entails "giving in" to the other. In Type C, which is characteristic of cooperative group movement, both participants venture out of themselves and both encourage the other to venture forth. In the contract group the participants subscribe to Type C movement. This does not mean that types A and B will not occur. For instance, if a group member remains silent long enough, other group members will finally remark on his silence and make efforts to get him to move out into the group. The silent person is engaging in Type A movement (or lack of movement),
while those who finally pursue him are engaged in Type B movement. The silent member should be confronted. However, were he engaged in pursuing the provisions of the contract with others who were doing the same, then all would be engaged in Type C movement. Type C is the ideal, though this hardly lessens the value of necessity of Type B.

At first it would seem that confrontation, one of the interaction goals of the contract, would automatically and necessarily involve a combination of movements A and B. However, if the group is characterized by cooperative effort, this will not be the case at all. At least in an ideal confrontational situation, Mr. X, the object of confrontation, first gives the group some cues that he is open to confrontation. By his verbal exchanges he moves "into the group" in various ways. When he is confronted, then, he is already "out in the group" in some sense. There are a variety of ways in which a participant can move into the group, and once he does so, he becomes "available" for a variety of interactions.

(e) Cooperation and complementarity of contractual roles. The members of the group enter the group by accepting the stipulations of the group contract, that is, they say that they want the kind of experience described by the contract. One way of interpreting this is that the participants willingly assume, or try to assume, certain roles in the group. The contract is so set up as to induce within the group a certain "complementarity of roles." This means that, because of the contract and the role complementarity that it induces, fewer decisions are required about certain aspects of group activity, energy is conserved for more important activities, and the group process proceeds more smoothly. For instance, the contract calls for
responsible confrontation, but it also calls for self-examination rather than defensiveness or attack or other forms of counter-behavior, as the response to such confrontation. The role of the confronter and the role of the self-examining confrontee are complementary. If the contractual roles are learned and accepted, group process moves along vigorously, meaningfully, and comparatively smoothly.

Spiegel (1957) points out various causes for failures in role complementarity. Such failures are deleterious to group cooperation and disruptive of effective group process. Some of the causes for complementarity failures are relevant to the discussion on cooperation. First of all, cognitive discrepancy takes place when one or more parties are not familiar with the roles they are expected to assume and therefore miss their "cues." However, if the participants in the contract group understand the provisions of the contract and are willing to take a "cooperative stance," the possibility of cognitive discrepancy is lessened. In the group "missing cues" usually has some other meaning than failure to understand the contract. Allocative discrepancy refers to non-acceptance of roles. If the participants really subscribe to the provisions of the contract, allocative discrepancy should also be minimized. The problem arises when a group member, after agreeing to the contract, reneges on his agreement. In situations in which the contract is "imposed," allocative discrepancy arises from the fact that some members do not really accept the contract or some of its provisions. Complementarity also suffers when one or more members simply do not possess the roles called for by the contract. For instance, a particular member might always see even the most responsible confrontation as attack. He cannot assume the
role of one-who-explores-himself-upon-confrontation, because his self-identity is too weak to sustain confrontation. He might be almost completely lacking in the capacity to lay aside his defenses and engage in the self-examination called for by confrontation.

(f) Cooperation, dependency, and conformity. One might object that this demand for a cooperative goal structure is an unrealistic attempt to banish difference of opinion and disagreement, which are part of the warp and woof of interpersonal relating, from the group interaction. Nothing of the kind is meant. The kind of cooperative effort suggested here is not meant to eliminate difference of opinion and disagreement, but to have them take place as growthfully as possible. The contract states that the members are present, not to compete, but to become involved with one another. Becoming involved with one another will obviously entail conflict and difference of opinion. For instance, when A confronts B on B's mode of acting, ideally B will respond, if A's confrontation has been responsible, by exploring his behavior. After B, in the give-and-take of the group interaction has examined himself and his behavior, he may well reply to A that he disagrees with him. A comes to realize that there are modes of living that differ from his own, but by involving himself, within the structure of the group, with others who live and think and feel differently from the way he does, he can broaden the base of his experience. A certain degree of heterogeneity in the make-up of the group would seem to be in order precisely for this reason.

Nor can the cooperation called for by the contract be identified with conformity or dependency. Tuckman (1965) says that initially there is a
period of dependency in the training group. The members look to the trainer for goals and direction. Cooperation, however, means that the members assume corporate responsibility for the group from the start rather than assigning this function to the leader. The early sessions of groups are always filled with anxiety, and anxious people tend to surrender blindly to the security of authority (Fromm, 1955; Getzels, 1957; Maslow, 1959; Riesman, 1950). But this tendency to polarize into leader and members must be counteracted by leader and members alike, for it militates against cooperative effort and involves working through problems which are not the focus of the group. Darley (1966) found that fear causes increased conformity and that this increase is greatest if the conformity pressures come from people toward whom the subject feels affiliative. Anxiety in the contract group should be handled as openly as possible so that dependency and conformity can be minimized. The only "conformity" looked for in the contract group is fulfillment of contract, and the purpose of the contract is to facilitate the development of responsible autonomy and relatedness.

(g) Cooperation and the deviant member. Since failures in cooperation and role complementarity involve the notion of deviancy, a word might be said about the deviant member. The problem of deviancy is minimal in groups in which entry-by-contract is the norm, but it is a more serious problem for imposition-of-contract groups. If the deviant person only reneges on certain provisions of the contract while fulfilling others and if his deviancy does not become one of the prime concerns of the group, then the group can still function adequately. The problems with the deviate are many: for a period of time his deviancy becomes the focus of group interaction and then he is
finally usually rejected, and strongly so if the group is a highly cohesive one (Schachter, 1951). Once he is rejected, he hangs albatross-like around the neck of the group. If the deviate (one who simply refuses to engage in contractual behavior) does not leave the group, then the group members should deal briefly with how such a member should be handled. If the deviate actually disrupts group interaction, then it would seem better to expel him. Groups are very reluctant to do this because the members are usually concerned about the deviate and expulsion is tantamount to admitting failure on their part.

(4) The here-and-now. This is one of the most important process goals in both contract groups and other kinds of training experiences. It involves what might be called the "space-time" dimension of the group. The group is only a group when the members are actually together. Therefore, the principal focus of the group is the present, the here-and-now. The content of the interactions that take place in the group must in some way lose their space-time "distance." A participant's search for identity may be complicated by the fact that his father made him an appendage, denied him the freedom to grow as an individual. What is important to the group, however, is the members present being-in-the-world-as-appendage, his present feelings of identity diffusion, and how this mode of being influences his action in this group. The member may well talk about the past, but the past has to be made present. He may well talk about what has happened or is happening outside the group, but the "there" must also be made "here." For instance, a participant's mode of being present to his co-workers at his place of employment can be "transported" by comparing it to his mode of being present
to the other members of the group. "At work I'm a mouse. Here it's still the same. I'm still a mouse." Or--"At work and at home I can hardly contain my hostility, but I don't feel hostile here at all, even when I'm confronted. Maybe you have accepted me. Or maybe I have accepted you more than the others. Anyway, there's a big difference." If a past or future concern can be made relevant to the activity within the group, then it loses its space-time distance.

The problem with the then-and-there is that it (coupled with other factors associated with it that will be discussed below, e.g. the quality of a person's self-disclosure) engenders ennui. This is just a fact. If group members spend a good deal of time discussing problems outside the group, the group members "lose contact" with one another. There is, as noted above, such a thing as healthy egocentricity. A person must be a person first, before he can involve this "person" in various activities. There is also such a thing as healthy group-egocentricity. It cannot survive, much less operate effectively, unless certain of its needs are fulfilled. Prolonged dealing with concerns that are too "distant" is like cutting off the oxygen supply of the group. A kind of suffocation takes place. Therefore, group members have to search out ways of rendering their then-and-there concerns present to the group. These concerns, if they are real concerns and not just dodges which insulate the participant from interacting meaningfully with the other members of the group, in some way "define" him. They color him and his activity, including his activity in the group. The group leader can be very helpful here, by "modeling" ways of transporting then-and-there concerns so that they become relevant to this group. It seems to me that
one of the principal defects of psychotherapy groups is this inability to deal with the here-and-now. Members keep talking about the problems that they have at home and outside the group in general. They fail to see that these various problems are defining their manner of participation in the group. The group is not seen as a laboratory for the examination of these problems. The inept group psychotherapist falls back on the expedient of using the group as a locus for multiple individual therapy.

If a member finds it difficult to overcome the space-time dimensions of his concerns, then this very fact should become a concern for him and for the group. His inability to overcome "distance" partially defines his mode of presence in the group. This is "diagnostic" in the best sense of the word. His discussion of the then-and-there might be a flight from group process. Or the concerns that he verbalizes might not be his real concerns but diversions, ways of keeping him from thinking about issues that are really pertinent to his style of interpersonal living.

This concern for the here-and-now is also rooted in a theory concerning the usefulness (or uselessness?) of investigating past behavior in order to change the present.

This is not to deny the significance of the past in indirectly affecting behavior. However, even though the past can create a certain condition which carries over into the present, it is, nevertheless, the present condition that is influential in the present. Strictly considered, linking behavior with a past event is an extremely difficult undertaking; it presupposes that one knows sufficiently how the past event affected the psychological field at that time, and whether or not in the meantime other events have again modified the field (Deutsch, 1954, p. 186).

Rogers (1951) applies such thinking to the therapeutic situation:
It should also be mentioned that in this concept of motivation all the effective elements exist in the present. Behavior is not 'caused' by something which occurred in the past. Present tensions and present needs are the only ones which the organism endeavors to reduce or satisfy. While it is true that past experience has certainly served to modify the meaning which will be perceived in present experiences, yet there is no behavior except to meet a present need (p. 492).

Too often in training-group situations participants become preoccupied with there-and-then concerns, not because they are more meaningful, but because they are safer. If they are really meaningful, they should be translated into here-and-now concerns and become vehicles of involvement rather than modes of flight.

5) The rules of immediacy. It is difficult to listen to conversations filled with vagueness and generalities. It is difficult because it is boring. Truax and Carkhuff (1964) have suggested that "concreteness" in therapeutic conversation might well be a variable worth exploring. They define concreteness as follows:

A low level of concreteness of specificity is when there is a discussion of anonymous generalities; when the discussion is on an abstract intellectual level. This includes discussions of 'real' feelings that are expressed on an abstract level. A high level of concreteness of specificity is when specific feelings and experiences are expressed--'I hated my mother!' or... then he would blow up and start throwing things'; when expressions deal with specific situations, events, or feelings, regardless of emotional content (p. 266).

Such concreteness is definitely a value to the contract group and forms part of the "rules of immediacy"--ways of making the interaction more immediate and personal. The "rules" are:

(a) The use of "I." When the participant is speaking of himself he must use "I" and not some substitute such as "we," "one," "you," "people,"
or some inpersonal expression such as "it happens," etc. Any substitute for "I" entails a loss of immediacy, puts some kind of distance between the speaker and the state or action he is discussing.

(b) Concreteness. The speaker should avoid vagueness, abstractions, and generalities. If he does talk about something abstract such as a principle, he should illustrate what he means by a concrete example, preferably from his own experience. In general, he should talk about his own experience. If he talks about the experience of others, he should talk about the impact that the other's experience has on him.

(c) Speak to someone. The participant should in general address specific people in the group rather than the entire group. The participant who is always speaking to everyone is very often speaking to no one. It is more immediate to address the whole group through a specific member of the group. For instance, someone might say: "I think that there is a lot of flight behavior in the group. John, you tend to talk about the there-and-then all the time. Bill, when confronted, you are always very defensive. You seldom open up and examine the issue at all. In the morning session I said nothing at all." The person who tends to address the whole group tends to talk about generalities and to give speeches. Both are deadly as far as the group interacting goes.

(d) Questions. The participants should not ask too many questions, especially the question "why?" Pointed questions that demand concrete answers help keep the interaction concrete. The question "why?" usually demands an interpretation on the part of the respondent and interpretations tend to become vague, highly intellectualized, and hypothetical and as such
are antithetical to the immediacy desired in the interaction. "Did you hit him?" gets at the facts of the respondent's behavior. "Why did you hit him?" can lead anywhere and thus nowhere.

Content Goals

In most kinds of group interaction in which personal and interpersonal growth are the overriding goals, the content of the interaction is ordinarily not predetermined. It is believed that this would unnecessarily limit the scope of group interaction (Grinker, MacGregor, Selan, Klein, & Kohrman, 1961). Goals, they say (and I would add, specifically content goals), depend on and develop from the transactional experience of the group. Any human concern is grist for the mill. If the growth experience is taken seriously, the content of the interaction will be pitched at a more or less deep personal level, that is, group members will tend to treat of subjects that "touch" their persons.

Although content freedom is also the goal in the contract group, still, as was indicated above, it is possible to include certain "focused" contracts in which the content of the discussion is specified. This is especially true if the participants are trying to avoid certain areas of human concern. "Focused" content-contracts may also be used to stimulate interaction.

An example of a focused content-contract. A group might contract to discuss "non-growthful conformism" in day to day living. If the members are to discuss such a subject concretely and intelligently, they should be prepared to do so in some way. Some topics need little preparation, but the participants could be given the following remarks on conformism by way of preparation or stimulation.
By "conformism" is meant the tendency to follow fixed patterns, to conform to certain standards, in situations in which conformity is not a value at all and to do so from motives which are non-growthful such as fear, laziness, or lack of motivation. Munroe (1955) contends that the "triviality and the magnificance of human devotion to social goals represent the folly and the grandeur of our species" (p. 116). Doubtless all of us are wedded to certain social conventions that are meaningless and perhaps even detrimental to interpersonal living, but they usually go unchallenged in our lives. Henry (1963), for instance, denounces our conformity in the area of advertising in America. Advertising, he says, preys upon unhealthy conformist tendencies. He sees it as a means used by an irrational economy to imbue the subjects of such an economy with "pecuniary logic." If Americans could wrest themselves from their conformist tendencies and pursue a more realistic logic, such an economy, he claims, could not survive. This is the paradox: if Americans are to exist economically as they are, they must work at remaining stupid. Although Erikson (1964) sees no reason to insist that a technological world as such need weaken man's inner resources of adaptation and produce a "nation of sheep," still subscribing without reflection to the values of a technocratic society, one's creative potential untapped because it entails socially unacceptable "divergent" thinking, submitting without criticism to the host of unexamined conventions imposed by the societies and organizations to which one belongs, accepting the common rituals that govern interpersonal living because they provide an escape from intimacy (Berne, 1957, 1964, 1966), submitting to personal suppression built into the American system of education (Friedenberg, 1963; Keniston, 1965)--all of these
forms of conformism are prevalent and some of them affect us. Such conformism undoubtedly, either directly or indirectly, gives a certain definition to our persons and affects the quality of our human relationships. We may welcome conformism because it saves us from the agonies of decision and intimacy. Convention and ritual undoubtedly have their value in human living, but when do they obstruct and deaden human relating instead of channeling it.

Residential sensitivity training laboratories seem to stimulate the non-conformist tendencies of its participants. Whitman (1964) seems to be a bit wary of the kind of "regression" or adolescent culture that springs up in these situations, although he calls it a "healthy and understandable thing" (p. 314). He claims that some regression is necessary for learning, but sees problems with those who regress either too little or too much in laboratory settings. However, it seems possible to interpret the "adolescent-culture" phenomenon in terms other than regression. During adolescence a certain number of quite engaging qualities are in evidence: the adolescent is often quite spontaneous, clever, humorous, adventuresome; there is a pleasing unpredictability about him, for he is striving to get a feel for himself as an independent being, a person in his own right rather than an appendage of home, school, church, or society. His speech is often quite refreshing, because there are few "filters" between what he thinks and what he says. He is open, honest, candid, frank. The qualities of the creative person—fluency or the ability to put out a large number of responses to a situation rather than focusing in on just one correct one, flexibility or the ability to change one's thinking and to change the meaning, interpretation or use of something, and originality or a flair for the unusual, the
novel, the far-fetched, the remote, the clever (Guilford, 1962)—these qualities are often much more in evidence in the "immature" adolescent than in the "mature" adult. "Maturing" is often a process of controlling such "adolescent" behavior in the face of the conventions of society and its organizations. In the residential sensitivity laboratory, the need to conform is minimized, conventional "conformism" disappears, and many of the more admirable qualities of adolescence reappear. This is hardly regression. It is progress.

The purpose of the above discussion of conformism is not to induce an intellectual discussion of this phenomenon but to serve as a basis for self-exploration on the part of the members of the group. The discussion should be a concrete, personal one: the conformism of these people and the way it affects their relationships to one another here and now. If the participants adhere to the process and interaction goals of the contract, the conversation will not become intellectualized, abstract, and a-personal.

Need Goals

The group is not only a contractual group, but it is a "natural" group. Each member has his own psychological make-up and his own constellation of needs. One of the reasons a member joins the group is that he feels some kind of need for a more effective interpersonal life. The group itself helps to fulfill this need. In one sense all needs are ego-centered, yet it is not logical nonsense to divide needs into ego-centered needs (e.g. a need to reduce personal anxiety) and altruistic needs (e.g. a need to improve one's neighborhood). Most needs, however, are not pure; they are multi-determined. A person's altruistic need to serve his community also satisfies ego-centered
needs for recognition and belongingness.

Within the context of the contract group, conflicts will arise between need-goals and contract goals. A need to dominate will obviously conflict with the kind of cooperation called for by the contract. Therefore, the contract group experience should prove quite diagnostic with respect to the strength of certain needs. Often it is only within the context of a group experience that a person begins to realize how strong is his "need" to withdraw. The group experience also gives its participants an opportunity to test their ability to control their needs, that is, those needs that conflict with the contract. Again, conflict will not be eliminated and contract violations will occur, but because of the contract conflicts should be highlighted in such a way as to render them more manageable.

The Overriding Goal--Interpersonal Growth--Revisited

Interpersonal growth is defined operationally as the sum of the interaction goals (pursued according to process goals), that is, the person who experiments with and engages in responsible forms of self-disclosure, expression of feeling, support, confrontation, and self-exploration as a response to confrontation is, at least by assumption, growing interpersonally. This admittedly introduces a certain kind of circularity in the training process. As Campbell and Dunnette (1968) note: "It appears that some of the interpersonal skills most important for accomplishing the T-group's objectives are also the very skills constituting the major learning goals of the method" (p. 77). The assumption, however, is that the participants have the basic ability to engage in these behaviors, but because of personal, group, and cultural circumstances, they have had inadequate practice in them. The group
as a "cultural island" allows the members to actualize these behaviors rather quickly. The participants "learn" principally in the sense of reducing to act what already exists in potency.

The sensitivity-training experience does not provide a major personality "overhaul." The person who leaves the group with the intention of going "back home" to demonstrate how different he is to family co-workers, and friends is a horror to behold. The average participant, upon leaving the laboratory, finds that growthful behaviors that became relatively easy to engage in in the laboratory situation are difficult to manage in his real-life situation. He realizes that he experienced something quite valuable in the laboratory, but now he is faced with the very difficult task of integrating the laboratory experience with life. A certain modesty with respect to the ultimate goal of the laboratory is in order. I would say this: if the interactions which take place in the laboratory induce in the participant a healthy form of diagnosis which leads to attitude change which, ultimately, leads to growthful behavioral change, then the training experience is a success. A word about "healthy" diagnosis and attitude change is in order.

Dynamic diagnosis: the cybernetic function of the group. Experimentation with the kinds of behavior described in the contract should serve a diagnostic function. It is an opportunity to challenge what Frank (1961) calls one's "assumptive world" (see pp. 18-34), especially in the area of interpersonal relations. Some people say that it would be a waste of time for them to participate in a sensitivity-training experience: they are adjusted both personally and interpersonally, they experience deep relationships with others, they are productive. They see the group experience as a
refuge for those who cannot "make it" interpersonally, a kind of substitute for real interpersonal living. However, the assumption is not that a person enters such a group because there is something radically wrong with the quality of his interpersonal life. It is rather that all human relationships can be improved; the group offers opportunities to experiment with "new ways" of being present to others. The group is not meant to be a flight from real life or a substitute for it. Those who come to it thinking that it is usually suffer quite a bit.

For some diagnosis has become a dirty word in psychology. It is assumed that as a process separate from treatment, it is relatively useless or at least "uneconomic," that is, the fruits of a separated diagnosis are not sufficient to warrant pretreatment expenditure of time and energy, which in many mental health systems is reduplicated time and energy. Erikson even sees the diagnostic process as potentially dangerous (1964):

Hospitalized patients, having been committed, are often ready to commit themselves. They expect 'to go to work,' both on themselves and on whatever task they may be asked to do. But too often they are met with a laborious process of diagnosis and initiation which emphasizes the absolute distance of patienthood from active life. Thus literally 'insult is added to injury' in that the uprooted one, already considered expendable or abnormal by his previous group of affiliation, finds himself categorized and judged by those who were expected to show him the way through a meaningful moratorium. Many a man acquires the irreversible identity of being a lifelong patient and client not on the basis of what he 'is,' but on the basis of what is first done about him (p. 97).

However, diagnosis, freed from its pejorative connotations (and perhaps from a too strict association with the medical model of emotional disorder), is a human value. Plato in the Apology claims that the unexamined life is not worth living. The fact is that we tend to drift to "maintenance" levels of
interpersonal relating. In the contract group, the member gets a sense of or feeling for his own "areas of competence," his own "areas of promise," and his own "areas of deficit" in interpersonal relating. In the matrix of the group experience, disturbances in human communication (Ruesch, 1957) come to the surface. The participant develops a feel for his present interpersonal limits (and this is usually quite painful) and perhaps even for his absolute interpersonal limits (and this is even more painful). He comes to a realization of failed-potentialities in interpersonal living, but this implies that he gets a deeper insight into these potentialities themselves. This makes the diagnostic aspect of the group experience a starting point—dynamic, hormic, motivational.

Diagnosis here is contextual and cybernetic. It is contextual in that it develops out of the context of actual interrelating. It is cybernetic in this sense. The participant "emits" certain interpersonal behavior in the group. He receives "feedback" concerning that behavior from the other members. Finally he uses this feedback as a corrective device or as a stimulus to try different modes of behavior in the group. For instance, Miss G constantly introduces new topics of discussion in the group, often in the middle of on-going discussions. The other members confront her with the fact, first by a not too warm reception for the new topics and then by more direct forms of confrontation. Miss G begins to realize that she never really listens to what others have to say. Or she realizes that there are areas or topics discussed that arouse too much anxiety in her. Or she begins to realize that she is not happy in the group unless she is the center of attention. Because of the feedback she receives, she can try new forms of
of behavior in the group. "I always change the subject when you discuss sex, because it makes me afraid."

The group is not miraculous. It does not create capacity when none exists. But if Maslow (1964) and a host of others are right, none of us comes close to using a very significant amount of his human potentialities, interpersonal capacities included. Diagnosed patterns of unsatisfactory interpersonal behavior may be amenable to modification, to learning and re-learning. Finally, diagnosis, in the sense explained here is not easy, especially for those with high levels of anxiety. Studies show that the highly anxious do not show a great deal of interest in exploring new areas and having new experiences (McReynolds, Acker, & Pietila, 1961; Penney & McCann, 1965).

Attitude change. It is suggested that effective diagnosis in the training group will lead to attitude change (that is, if such change is warranted). Although attitude change seems to be a "natural" goal of laboratory learning, it is not mentioned with any frequency in either the theory or research literature: "Turning to another type of internal criterion, the authors were surprised to find relatively few studies relating T-group experiences to attitude changes....[T]he scarcity of research relating laboratory education to attitude change is disappointing and rather hard to understand" (Campbell & Dunnette, 1968, pp. 92, 95). Attitude change is a modest and realistic goal. For instance, a participant who has difficulty responding to even responsible confrontation by self-examination finally realizes that he is very defensive, that he usually sees even helpful and well-ment confrontation as attack. Gradually his attitude toward confrontation
changes. Although even responsible confrontation has punitive side-effects, still it is possible to ignore or endure these for the sake of the benefit to be obtained. After the laboratory is over, the participant may still react adversely to honest criticism (he has not changed overnight), but his attitude has changed and this is the seed of behavioral change. If this is true, then research should show attitude changes by the end of the laboratory experience and behavioral changes in follow-up studies.

**Behavioral change.** The ultimate goal of the laboratory is behavioral change. Experimentation with behavior in the laboratory is the first step in this process. The laboratory offers no magic and works no miracles. Behavioral change demands work, both during the laboratory and especially after it. The person who sees little value in working at bettering his interpersonal relationships is ill-advised to enter a sensitivity-training experience.
Chapter IV

The Laboratory Method

Introduction

The "laboratory" character of the interpersonal-growth experience is part of the contract. Although a summary of the fundamental aspects of the laboratory method is given in the first chapter, an indication of how these factors apply to interpersonal-growth experiences in general and to the contract group in particular is in order.

Diversities in laboratory experiences. It would be unrealistic to try to catalog here all the differences that exist among the various kinds of laboratory experiences. It is much more feasible to discuss some of the sources of the differences that do exist. Two factors that account for a great deal of the differences are the size of the social unit in focus in the laboratory and the purpose of the laboratory. For instance a laboratory might be oriented primarily toward (1) the community, (2) the organization, (3) the group, or (4) the individual. In each instance, a variety of goals might be contemplated.

(1) The community. Klein (1965) describes the use of laboratory experiences in community development programs. The purposes of such programs are quite broad:

For the purposes of the program which this chapter describes, community development has been considered to encompass work with community groups and entire communities for the purpose of assisting in the development of leadership skills, of fostering effective citizen participation in meeting economic, social, and civic needs, and of enabling optimal utilization of state and national resources from both government and voluntary bodies while strengthening local community initiative and autonomy (Klein, 1965, p. 185).
Laboratories are run in which goals such as the following are set for the participants:

1. Increasing their sense of community, by which [is] meant the readiness to view community events in terms of interacting forces and processes within a coherent whole.

2. Enlarging their definition of citizenship... an increased ability to identify and respond to opportunities for effective participation in community events.

3. Enhancing their sensitivities and skills as citizen participants within groups and organizations.

4. Developing more sophistication and objectivity in their attempts to diagnose the forces and processes contributing to community problems.

5. Helping them to function more effectively as agents of change in situations where collaborative planning and effort is needed (Klein, 1965, pp. 185-186).

In some cases community teams composed of a number of workers from the same community agency or representatives from a variety of community agencies came as units to the laboratory. Teams of trainers or community consultants also go into the community itself and work toward a variety of goals with community leaders in situ.

(2) The organization. An example of a laboratory experience which focuses on a single organization is found in The Managerial Grid (Blake & Mouton, 1964; see also Blake & Mouton, 1965). The "grid" deals with managerial styles and emphasizes the two major dimensions of managerial skill: human relations and productivity. The grid itself is depicted in Figure 1. An entire laboratory program with a large organization may require from three to five years to complete. A six-phase approach to organization improvement is suggested (Blake & Mouton, 1965):
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**High Concern for People**
- Country Club Management—(1, 9)
  - Production is incidental to lack of conflict and good fellowship.

**Low Concern for People**
- Impoverished Management—(1, 1)
  - Effective production is unobtainable because people are lazy, apathetic, and indifferent.
  - Sound and mature relationships are difficult to achieve because, human nature being what it is, conflict is inevitable.

**High Concern for Production**
- Team Management—(9, 9)
  - Production is from integration of task and human requirements into a unified system of interplay toward organizational goals.

**Middle of the Road**—(5, 5)
- Push for production but don't go all out. Give some, but not all. Be fair but firm.

**Task Management**—(9, 1)
- Men are a commodity just like machines. A manager's responsibility is to plan, direct, and control the work of those subordinate to him.
Phase 1: learning to apply behavioral science theory of solving problems of work in a human laboratory. "The aim is for managers to study and to understand behavioral science theory and research findings sufficiently well, and in such a concrete and personal way, that intuitive assumptions underlying habitual behavior can be replaced by sound managerial approaches for getting work done in a manner that arouses mutual confidence and respect" (p. 172). The laboratory is so structured that line personnel rather than academic behavioral scientists serve as the faculty for each of the laboratory sessions. This makes them better teachers (and one assumption is that a good manager is an effective teacher) and makes them also feel more responsible for the implementation of what is taught. The participants engage in various exercises designed to reveal to themselves their own managerial styles and to improve managerial skills with respect to both human relations and productivity. The ideal, of course, according to the grid is a 9,9 style of management (see Figure 1). The other phases of the program involve team training, interteam cooperation, setting organization improvement goals, implementing planned change, and stabilizing and replanning. Even though the managerial-grid laboratory is a highly structured, organization-oriented experience, the participant learns much about himself personally and interpersonally in the give-and-take of group interaction.

(3) The group. "Group" here means the small, face-to-face group. Obviously small, face-to-face groups are used in both community and organization laboratories, but there are also training experiences in which the principal focus is on the small group itself. For instance, some courses in group dynamics are taught in a laboratory fashion. The participants (the
students) learn about the small group by actually being one (or becoming one) for the duration of the course. The leader (usually the teacher) establishes his position as leader (usually by merely being the teacher), but otherwise offers little direction, much to the frustration of the participants. The members of such a group, in an even more basic way that the members of a "goalless" sensitivity-training group, must determine the goals of the group and work out viable ways of dealing with one another. This is often a tortuous process during which they tend to take out their frustrations on the leader by symbolically expelling, "killing," or usurping the position of the leader (Slater, 1966). From time to time the members use the sessions to explore themselves and one another, so that the meetings sound like group psychotherapy sessions. Therefore, though the direct goal is to learn about small groups by becoming one, the participants engage in a good deal of behavior similar to that found in "growth" experiences of various kinds.

Laboratories are also designed to study the potentialities of small groups, e.g., group versus individual ability in problem-solving and decision-making situations. For instance, small groups are given different types of problems to work out or are asked to make managerial decisions. With the help of a trainer such groups reflect upon themselves and the processes they engage in order to solve problems and come to decisions. The participants become more aware, not only of group problem-solving and decision-making processes, but also of the human relations problems involved in group processes. According to Collins and Guetzkow (1964), inability to handle the interpersonal dimensions of task situations is one of the greatest sources of task failure.
Meeting interpersonal obstacles contributes as much toward group productivity as meeting problems posed by task-environmental obstacles; in fact, because group members have a tendency to ignore interpersonal issues, interpersonal obstacles may be the major barrier to task effectiveness in many groups (p. 88).

The principal focus of a laboratory, then, may be the small group itself—e.g., how they are formed, how a group of unrelated individuals becomes a cohesive unit, problem-solving processes in groups, group decision-making, certain group characteristics such as group norms, group climate, group structure, and power factors in groups.

(4) The individual. The contract group is a laboratory in which intrapsychic and especially interpersonal issues are the direct focus of the group experience. A small group provides a unique opportunity for handling such issues: the participant can experiment with a wide variety of interpersonal behaviors and can benefit from the comparatively wide spectrum of feedback he receives from his fellow participants. Stoller (1968) refers to such experimentation as "stretching accustomed modes of behavior." The group forms a kind of culture-in-miniature within which new constructs may be tried not just in an intellectual but in a behavioral way. Hampden-Turner (1966), in formulating an "existential" learning theory applicable to training situations, suggests that part of the growth cycle involves a person's periodically "letting go" and risking a portion of his "experienced competence" in order to "bridge the distance" between himself and the other. The participant ventures out into the group, experiences with "new" behavior, receives feedback, and ends with a new synthesis, including broadened knowledge and a clearer sense of his identity.
In all laboratories, and this includes the contract laboratory, theory is subordinated and emphasis is placed on impact-through-involvement. The whole purpose of a laboratory is to translate theory into action. Very often the participants are not ready for this kind of learning; the emphases are unaccustomed ones: "The learning of concepts, the setting of goals, the clarification of values, and even the achievement of insight into self, are sometimes far ahead of the development of the performance skills necessary to expression in actual social transactions" (Berne, Bradford, & Lippitt, 1964, p. 17). One of the principal modes of flight employed by groups is to regress to an abstract discussion of concepts and values. But the group demands interpersonal performance rather than discussion: "Laboratory method starts with a different over-all view of learning as a transaction between learner and environment in which neither learner nor environment is regarded as fixed and in which both undergo modification" (Benne, Bradford, & Lippitt, 1964, p. 24). Even if the laboratory is an academic course, books are absent or secondary. If there are lectures they are very short. The participants are not asked to repeat what they have learned and the general authoritarian structure associated with learning is laid aside. In fact, almost all the cues that traditionally enable a learner to identify a learning situation are absent. This disturbs some people. Some think that no learning or an inferior kind of learning is taking place. After the experience is over, the participant finds it difficult to categorize what he has "learned" in traditional terms. This at times embarrasses him and confuses those with whom he discusses his experience.

George Kelly (1955a, 1955b) is interested in man-in-evolution. He
claims that man is best understood in the perspective of history and that by reflecting on himself he can discover ways of restucturing his life. The pattern man uses to view or construe the world he is in are called "constructs." Whether these constructs are "right" or "wrong," they still exist: "What he perceives may not exist, but his perception does" (1955a, p. 8). Even though a person tries to improve his constructs by increasing his repertory of experience, his general construct system is resistant to change. Thus, two factors hinder him from bettering his construct system: (a) fear and the resultant need to hang on to the old and (b) the lack of a "laboratory" in which he could experiment with new constructs in a relatively controlled and safe way. The training laboratory is precisely the place where the search for new "constructs" is secure. It is much easier to let go of the old, for it is both permitted and encouraged by the group culture. Possibly new constructs are there spread out among the heterogeneous group comprising the laboratory. Perhaps one of the reasons for the almost phenomenal growth of sensitivity-training laboratories and encounter groups is the need to have a relatively safe place in which to re-do one's construct system.

Cultural permission. Residential laboratories are sometimes referred to as "cultural islands" both because they are cut off or insulated from the highly routinized culture in the "back-home" situation and because they develop their own culture in miniature. But whether the laboratory be residential or not, it affords the participants "cultural permission" to engage in certain activities that is not found in the back-there situation. "Cultural permission" is one of the keys to the success of laboratory
training; it allows the laboratory situation to be different from day-to-day living so that it might make a difference in such living. "Laboratory," then, means the establishment of a climate of freedom. If it is to succeed, there must exist in it a kind of freedom that is lacking outside the group. The contract is not just a structure; it is a stimulus to a certain behavioral freedom. It serves as a guideline to the kinds of experimentation that are encouraged and even demanded. Even contract laboratories, then, are freer than ordinary life, for they declare a moratorium on certain inhibitory conventions.

What are some of the cultural permissions afforded by the laboratory? It "allows" comparative strangers to talk with one another at comparatively deep levels: the cultural prerequisites for friendship and intimacy are laid aside and the participants deal with one another at some depth, not because they are long time acquaintances, but merely because they are fellow human beings. Confrontation is another important area of cultural permission. We seldom tell one another what impact we have on one another. In our culture it seems much more permissible to tell a third party impressions about another that I would not dare tell the other. Such conversations abound, and while they may satisfy some need to ventilate one's frustrations in interpersonal living, there is little in them that could be called growthful. The contract, in a sense, is a list of the cultural permissions given the participants in their interactions with one another: they may disclose themselves, express their feelings, tell others what they like about them, challenge the behavior or attitudes, lay aside those forms of politeness which are really no more than interpersonal constrictions, and anything else
that appears to be both interpersonally responsible and growthful. There is some complaint that some laboratories go too far, that they "permit" or even encourage too much, so that the cultural and even ethical sensibilities of the participants are offended. In view of the sensitivity-training explosion taking place on the American scene, this may well be true. However, the contract group encourages responsible cultural permissiveness without subscribing to cultural (or ethical) license. The person who participates in a contract group learns not only the operational provisions of the contract but he also learns why the contractual variables have been chosen. In the contract wide cultural permissions are extended, but it is the participant who must determine what he is going to allow himself.

The Assumptions of Training Technology

Campbell and Dunnette (1968) outline the implicit and explicit assumptions of T-group methodology. These assumptions will be listed here together with some indication as to how they apply to the contract group.

**Feedback.** "A substantial number of group members, when confronted with others' behaviors and feelings in an atmosphere of psychological safety, can produce articulate and constructive feedback" (p. 77). The entire contract is designed to facilitate just this kind of feedback. Neither the inactive nor the irresponsibly confronting participant is fulfilling the contract and become themselves the object of group confrontation. Perhaps few of us feel comfortable revealing to another the impact his behavior has on us, but the contract provides a stimulus to do just that.

**Agreement on feedback.** "A significant number of the group members can agree on the major aspects of a particular individual's behavior exhibited"
in the group situation. Certainly a complete consensus is not to be exacted, but neither must the feedback go off in all directions" (p. 77). If the participant is a person who goes off "in all directions," then the feedback should reflect precisely this, that is, the contradictions in his behavior should become apparent. Secondly, a person must reveal enough about himself if he expects any kind of consistency of feedback from the group. If he gives little of himself, then the feedback will be scattered, for it will be a question of each other member interpreting the participants behavior in his own way. There is no guarantee that there will be consistency of interpretation. In a word, if the participant wants to get some consistent picture of himself from the other members in the group, he must assume an active role in the group, he must generate sufficient "data" as the raw material for feedback. If the participant is active, then the feedback will be consistent: this certainly is the assumption in the contract group, though it still awaits empirical verification.

Completeness of feedback. "Feedback is relatively complete and deals with significant aspects of the individual's behavior" (p. 77). If the members are actively pursuing the contract, then feedback will be as complete as the participant receiving the feedback will allow. A participant will not receive feedback on those dimensions of his person which he chooses not to reveal. But even if the participant is quite defensive in certain areas, feedback will be complete in the sense that others will tell him how defensive he appears. Again, this assumption depends upon whether the members of the group assume an active role in the group, especially with respect to the "significant aspects" of one another's behavior. The contract, in that
it encourages both self-disclosure and responsible confrontation, is a stimulus to deal with the significant.

Representative behavior. "The behavior emitted in the group is sufficiently representative of behavior outside the group so that learning occurring within the group will carry over or transfer" (p. 77). There are really two assumptions here: (1) that the behavior in the group is a sample of behavior outside the group and (2) that changes in the sample behavior will transfer to behavior outside the group. The second assumption is really dealt with separately below. If a group not only permits but demands that its participants be themselves, then behavior in the group will be representative of behavior outside the group. A case comes to mind. A young lady in a week-end laboratory experience was all sweetness, light, and cliches. She was immediately supportive of everyone and thus ingratiated herself with everyone. However, I did not believe that her behavior in the group was "sufficiently representative of behavior outside the group," she seemed less than real. I confronted her with my misgivings several times. She finally got quite angry and manifested a completely different side of her personality. After that incident her feedback to others became more realistic. A group has a way of dealing with facades; facades prevent person to person contact, and this inhibits the growth of the group. It is not that there is any particular sense of accomplishment in stripping away the facade of another, it is rather that in the give-and-take of the group it is too frustrating to try to communicate with a facade. The contract demands a variety of "significant" behaviors. If a person does not engage in a particular kind of contractual behavior, this in itself is revealing.
For instance, if a person simply never confronts anyone else in the group, this can mean several things. It may mean that he is afraid of others or overly sensitive. It may mean that if he were to confront people would see a side of him that he does not want to reveal. In any case, he should be faced with his refusal to confront; he should be faced with the fact that his behavior in the group does not seem to be "representative."

**Psychological safety.** "Psychological safety can be achieved relatively quickly in the group (in the matter of a few hours) among either complete strangers or among associates who have had varying types and degrees of interpersonal interaction" (p. 77). The contract increases psychological safety in a number of ways: it adds "high visibility" to the training experience and is thus anti-manipulative; it helps create a common group culture, so that the "risks" taken by the participant take place against the background of a shared culture; it demands growthful forms of behavior, e.g., concerned rather than punitive confrontation; the leader "models" contractual behavior and serves as a kind of "guardian" of the contract. Some would probably object that the contract makes the training situation too safe. I would rather hope that the participants would see in the contract a pledge of response and support no matter what they risked.

**Interpersonal incompetence.** "Almost everyone initially lack interpersonal competence; that is, individuals tend to have distorted self-images, faulty perceptions, and poor communication skills" (p. 77). This assumption is overstated. Most men have areas of competence, areas of promise, and areas of deficit in the interpersonal dimensions of their lives. The laboratory, however, should never be considered just as remedial. The laboratory gives
its participants an opportunity to examine their interpersonal styles, including their areas of promise. A person, even though he feels that he is adequate in relating to others, might discover that he is even more comfortable or stimulated when he approaches others in ways different from those he is used to. The participant, then, is asked to share his areas of competence, explore and experiment with his areas of promise, and discover and experiment with changes in his areas of deficit.

**Anxiety and learning.** "Anxiety facilitates new learning" (p. 77). The place of anxiety in the training situation was dealt with above.

**Transfer learning.** "Finally, transfer of training occurs between the cultural island and the 'back home' situation" (p. 77). While there is much anecdotal evidence that such transfer does take place, there has been relatively little empirical corroboration. Burker and Knowles (1967), using questionnaires sent to those who knew the laboratory participants in the back-home situation, found evidence indicating that transfer of training does take place. As suggested above, perhaps the immediate fruit of training experiences lies in the area of attitude change, which may subsequently underlie behavioral change.

Most experimental findings are useless unless they have some degree of generalizability. Interpersonal growth laboratories are failures if the participants do not transfer their learning to other social groups. Another way of conceptualizing the process is for each participant to consider his wider social environment as part of the laboratory. I have been in groups in which college students, once having experimented with openness with their peers, widened the scope of their experimentation to include parents
and siblings. A number of them reported rather dramatic improvement of relationships, while a few said that people outside the group thought that they were "putting them on." However successful or unsuccessful these experiments outside the group might be, they enhance the group experience itself, especially to the degree that what takes place outside the group is transformed into the here-and-now. "I talked to my dad, and I tried to be open, but I don't think that he had the slightest idea what I was talking about. I'm not sure whether it's him or me. Do I talk and say nothing here? I just wonder whether I am as vague as he makes me think I am." It is not just a question of trying out laboratory "gimmicks" on one's friends. Such childish manipulation would merely reflect the immaturity of the participant. But if the laboratory experience generalizes to include some of the "significant others" in the lives of at least some of the participants, then it is having the impact that it is meant to have, and this dialogue-with-others-outside-the-group can add a new dimension to the total group experience itself.

"Experimental Controls"

The laboratory as such is not an experiment in the strict sense (unless, of course, it is also the object of research, but then such research "stands apart" from the actual laboratory, at least in some sense of the term). Still, the notions of laboratory and experimentation, even in their widest sense, imply some concept of experimental controls. The contract adds a degree of "control" to the laboratory. Goals are clearly defined and an attempt is made to eliminate other than contractual variables. Even when non-contractual behavior arises, e.g., the intrusion of need-goal behavior
that is antithetical to contract goals, such behavior is rather readily identified and "controlled" in this sense. The contract also offers a structural schema which facilitates the elaboration of different training "designs."

Suspension of Judgment

On the one hand, the laboratory offers the participant a climate of interpersonal freedom that is available in few other social contexts; on the other, it demands of him a kind of suspension of judgment with respect to the design of the laboratory. In the contract group this design is quite visible and might seem, at least at first glance, to involve a number of artificialities (these are discussed below). There is the natural tendency to pre-judge the entire experience or at least various aspects of it. The participants, however, contract to suspend judgment as much as possible, to experience the laboratory and its exercises before evaluating them. Both more traditional sensitivity training laboratories and contract experiences involve a certain amount of psychological risk. In the former the participants are not sure what lies ahead; in the latter, the members know what lies ahead and are apprehensive about it. In both experiences the participant might find out that he is not as interpersonally effective as he thinks he is. Risk engenders anxiety, and anxiety engenders defensiveness. This defensiveness can well take the form of attacking as meaningless an experience that well might highlight interpersonal inadequacies both to oneself and others. If the participants are forewarned with respect to the elements of risk and anxiety and to the tendency to attack what might prove to be painful, it is hypothesized here that they will approach the laboratory
experience with a greater sense of openness. An ideal attitude would be something like this: "In general I want the kind of experience described in the contract. I realize that it involves a certain amount of risk and anxiety. I also realize that I am not entirely convinced as to the meaningfulness of all provisions of the contract, and I will probably have some reservations concerning the communication exercises that will be proposed. Still, I prefer not to pre-judge any particular aspects of the laboratory, in so far as this is possible. I am going to try to enter into everything with an open mind." If antecedent suspension of judgment is a value, so is consequent evaluation of laboratory and exercise. Again, if the laboratory itself or some particular aspect of it reveals certain areas of deficit in interpersonal capability, there will be a natural tendency to attack the source of this knowledge. Still, laboratory designs will grow in effectiveness only if the laboratory experience is realistically criticized by the participants.

What a Laboratory in Interpersonal Relations is Not.

The laboratory is not an assemblage of guinea pigs who are being manipulated either by the leader from within or by researchers from without. Jourard (1967) strongly questions the kind of research in which the human person becomes an object to be manipulated:

A humanistic psychologist, like his less humanistic colleague, is concerned to identify the factors that affect man's experience and action, but his aim is not to render man predictable to, and controlled by, someone else. Rather, his aim is to understand how determining variables function, in order that man might be liberated from their impact as he pursues his own free projects (p. 109). Jourard goes on to suggest that the experimenter-subject relationship be one
of dialogue rather than manipulation. Rome and Rome (1967), who have been developing a unique method of studying the organization and government of large social organizations, report successful research in which subjects are seen as collaborators in the enterprise rather than as objects of manipulation. Milgram (1963) conducted a study in which "obedience" to the experimenter meant that the subject (insofar as he knew the situation) had to administer painful shocks to another subject. Twenty-six out of forty subjects "administered" the highest shocks on the "generator" (the other subject was a stooge and was not receiving any shocks at all). It is chilling to think what a subject will do for a man of science. Milgram's subjects were given a kind of "scientific permission" to do what they would ordinarily consider inhuman. It would be ironical if the leader were to engage in any kind of large scale manipulation, for one of the purposes of the laboratory is to have the participants learn to involve themselves with one another in non-manipulative ways.

Artificiality-Reality Dimensions of Laboratory Life.

The sources of artificiality. At first glance it would seem that a laboratory in interpersonal relations labor under a relatively high degree of artificiality. In a sense this is true; laboratories are contrived, and their artificiality would make little sense unless it somehow had an impact on day-to-day living. The sources of artificiality in the contract group, for instance, are at least three.

(a) Laboratory artificiality. The laboratory itself is artificial. The people who comprise the various groups in the laboratory situation do not come together "naturally," that is, they do not choose to be with other
members of the group because they are attracted to them for one reason or another. In most instances the participants find themselves in "stranger" groups, that is, most of the participants are, at least relatively, unknown to one another. Or, if they do know one another, it is not along the dimensions emphasized by the laboratory. And yet they are expected quickly to achieve a certain degree of intimacy with one another in the give-and-take of group interaction. The artificiality of being with the members of this group is often emphasized if the laboratory is composed of a number of groups. After a while certain members begin to feel the "distant-fields" urge, and they begin saying to themselves "I wish I were in that group."

(b) **Contract artificiality.** The second source of artificiality is the contract itself. The participants are not only expected to achieve a certain degree of intimacy with one another, but the contract (at least the one described here) specifies to a great extent the nature of this intimacy. For instance, the participant is expected to reveal to others the kind of person he is, at least in some degree. He is expected to confront others, and be confronted by them. Not only are strangers thrown together in a kind of intimacy, but even the dimensions of this intimacy are imposed.

(c) **Exercise artificiality.** The laboratory usually entails certain stimuli to communication in the form of laboratory exercises. These will be considered in greater detail elsewhere, but at least one example must be treated here, because exercises do constitute a third source of artificiality. For instance, there is the "snake" exercise, a somewhat ominous term, arising innocently enough, however, from the physical arrangement of the participants. The members of the laboratory divide into two groups, arranging themselves
in two lines a couple of feet apart so that each member is directly opposite another member. Then each member merely looks silently into the eyes of the person standing opposite him for fifteen or twenty seconds. Each row circles around (the "snake" undulates) until every member has gazed into the eyes of every other member. This part of the exercise is entirely non-verbal.

Then the members of the group sit down and discuss how they felt, what emotions or reactions arose, during the exercise. There are other both verbal and non-verbal exercises, most of which are designed to stimulate different modes of communication among members or to dissolve communication "blocks" that arise in the group. Whatever their purpose, however, they are still artificial; they are ways of interpersonal acting which are not current in even the relatively intimate associations of ordinary life.

The reality of laboratory life. One of the assumptions underlying the laboratory experience is that it must be different from day-to-day living if it is to make a difference, if it is to have an impact on such living. But the laboratory experience is not designed just to be different, it is not a question of courting a "games" artificially. "Artificial" experiences are countenanced only to the degree that they are considered useful in changing interpersonal attitudes and behaviors in the direction of fuller interpersonal living. Perhaps a better way of putting it is this: the artificialities of the human relations laboratory are valuable to the degree that they highlight "overlooked realities" in day-to-day interpersonal living. Much of what takes place in a laboratory is artificial only in the sense that it is not what is usually done in interpersonal relationships, not in the sense that it is false or inauthentic. Training groups, then are something more and
something less than real life. They are certainly more than most of the ritualistic and cliche interrelating that goes on in everyday life, but they are less than the natural, spontaneous growthful contacts that take place between those who choose one another as friends at the deepest levels.

(a) Laboratory reality. The members come together because they want to grow interpersonally. The participant is expected to involve himself with this group of "strangers" precisely because they are human beings. They involve themselves with one another; the work out their likes and dislikes, and they do so in the context of this group. The laboratory sets up a demand that each member face this set of interpersonal relationships.

One of the realities of ordinary human living is that people are "locked" into relationships with certain other individuals or sets of individuals. In the laboratory, interpersonal problems cannot be solved by ignoring them, by moving to a different set of persons, or by utilizing other modes of interpersonal flight. The pressure for involvement with this particular set of people, while artificial in one sense, highlights the unreality of unproductive modes of involvement or non-involvement with the "real" people in the participant's normal life situation. Moreover, dealing with the stranger in the laboratory group can bring home to the participant, in a dramatic way, his failure to deal with the "stranger element" in those with whom he is intimate in real life. The laboratory does not allow the opportunities of flight from intimacy that day-to-day living often does. Therefore, part of its artificiality is that it is more rather than less real than ordinary interpersonal living.

(b) Contractual reality. The laboratory itself makes it impossible for
the participant to take flight from these people, this set of interpersonal relationships. The contract, insofar as it defines the general ways that each is to involve himself with the others, prevents group members from avoiding certain important modalities of interpersonal relating. The member is forced to engage in interpersonal activities that may not be part of his interpersonal life style. He is not only engaged with these particular people, but he cannot avoid the qualitative realities of this engagement that are called for by the contract. A member, in his ordinary life, might manage to avoid letting others know something about the "person within," he may court "any-price" peace and thus avoid confrontation and the self-examination it involves, but in the group the pressures of the contract tend to force him to face, at least to some degree, these realities of interpersonal living. Therefore, the contract, too, for all its artificiality, exacts an engagement with interpersonal realities which are too often avoided in real life.

(c) Exercise reality. Exercises usually focus in on smaller elements of the communication experience. The "snake" exercise, for instance: When two people communicate, they usually look at each other from time to time, and they are aware that they are present to each other. The "snake" exercise isolates this aspect of communication. It is artificial in its isolation of certain elements of communication, in its protractedness, and in its completely non-verbal character. But eye-contact and mutual non-verbal presence are human realities, realities that usually go generally unnoticed in human interrelating. Exercises focus on molecular aspects of relating in order to make them more real in molar living. Some artists exaggerate
various forms in their painting in order to make the observer look at a form that has never really "lived" in the observer's eye or to revive a feeling for something that may have once lived but is now dead. Exercises are the "zoom lens" of the laboratory experience. If they are used judiciously, they can make certain aspects of interpersonal relating come alive in dramatically new ways.

Aronson and Carlsmith (1968), in discussing experimentation in social psychology, refer to both "experimental" and "mundane" realism.

In one sense, an experiment is realistic if the situation is realistic to the subject, if it involves him, if he is forced to take it seriously, if it has impact on him. This kind of realism we call experimental realism. The term 'realism' can also be used to refer to the extent to which events occurring in the laboratory setting are likely to occur in the 'real world.' We call this type of realism mundane realism (p. 22).

If this terminology is adapted to laboratories in interpersonal relations, it may be said that such laboratories are high in both experiment and mundane realism. The participant can become as "engaged" as he desires in the interaction of the group, and, if the intimacy that develops within the group does not reflect the intimacy of the participant's "real world," in some way it should and therefore becomes diagnostic, if not motivational.

Conclusion

Laboratories as centers for study of the normal. The interpersonal-growth laboratory provides an opportunity to study some of the deepest reactions of man in an atmosphere of relative security. The environment has its realism and yet it is controlled. There is no reason why growthful training experiences and research cannot take place at the same time.

Laboratories as centers for the "therapy" of the normal. Schofield
expresses concern about the number of people with "philosophical neuroses" who take up the time of clinical professionals who have more important or pressing work to do. According to him, the "philosophically diseased:

suffer a freedom of complaint. The absence of conflicts, frustrations, and symptoms brings a painful awareness of absence— the absence of faith, of commitment, of meaning, of the need to search out personal ultimate values, or the need to live comfortably and meaningfully in the face of final uncertainty. For increasing number of rational, educated, and thoughtful men the central struggle becomes one of finding and keeping an emotional and psychological balance between the pain of doubt and the luxury of faith. A distaste for this struggle, or an insistence on its resolution as a necessary condition for continued existence is at the heart of the philosophical Neurosis (p. 150).

Encounter groups, led by those with drastically less formal training than professional therapists, seem almost ideal in handling such problems. The participants are suffering and therefore the group is serious business to them. But one of their chief complaints is that, in one way or another, they are out-of-meaningful-community. The small group is a meaningful community, but it is also a center where the participants learn to involve themselves more effectively with others, with the wider community, and with the problems which face the country in general.

Schofield is also concerned with the need of trained people to work with the emotionally disturbed. He favors steps that have been taken to recruit and utilize non-professionals as mental health counselors (see Rioch, Blkes, Flint, Usdansky, Newman, & Silber, 1963). Contract group, under the direction of professionals, could be used quite effectively to train such mental health counselors.
The present culture. Growth-through-groups has caught on in America. It is hardly surprising. There have been diatribes against sensitivity-training, encounter groups, residential laboratories, and other facets of human relations training, but any wholesale affirmation or condemnation of these phenomena is meaningless. Sensitivity-training is simply not a unitary phenomenon. There are good laboratory experiences, poor ones, and even dangerous ones. We should now see to it that a wholesome laboratory culture takes roots in our social system. It seems that there is even a humanistic laboratory-orientation to life. If I am laboratory-oriented, this means that I am always somewhat aware of my areas of deficit and promise and that I can experiment ways of reducing dissonance in my life and actualizing interpersonal possibilities. It means that I am willing to take risks in order to grow. In means that I realize that others have resources even for my own growth which I do not possess myself but which I can tap in a very human and growthful way.
The question of leadership in general is a complex one. Gibb (1950) studied two sets of ten-man leaderless groups (one group of college students and one of army officer candidates). He had outside observers rate the group members on leadership qualities and the members of the groups themselves rated one another on three sociometric questions. The group members were to choose (1) those with whom they would like to spend leisure time, (2) those with whom they would like to work, and (3) the person whose removal from the group would bring about the largest group change. The results showed that sociometric choice on the third criterion (removal and group change) had, by far, the highest correlation with observer ratings of leadership. It is difficult, then, to point out in any general way what makes a good leader, for leadership criteria can change from situation to situation. As Lindzey and Byrne (1968) point out, "it appears that the nature of the relationship between sociometric status and leadership is dependent on the demands of the situation and the characteristics of the individuals composing the group" (p. 485).

Mann (1959) summarizes some of the problems associated with evaluating leadership.

Viewed historically, the study of leadership has stimulated more than its share of controversy. The trait approach to leadership, the view that leadership is an attribute of the individual, has received the harshest treatment throughout the years. To have spoken of an individual as possessing a measurable quantity of leadership was perhaps an unfortunate choice of words. The clear implication of such a statement is that since leadership is specific
to the individual, it will remain constant for the individual regardless of the situation in which he finds himself. Investigations of the actual consistency with which an individual maintains leadership status in different groups and under varying conditions have yielded results sufficiently equivocal to permit a new bifurcation of the field. On the one hand, the trait approach has been modified to imply that an individual's achieved leadership status is a function of his personality. On the other hand, sufficient evidence has been accumulated to give impetus to the situational approach to leadership, which maintains that leadership is an emergent phenomenon, created through the interaction of individuals (leaders and followers), and that selection and stability of any leadership pattern is a function of the task, composition, and culture of the group. From all this work has emerged some such summary formulation as that an individual's leadership status in groups is a joint function of his personality and the particular group setting (pp. 246-247).

Given these cautions, Mann goes on to indicate those personality qualities which the empirical literature shows as associated with effective leadership in small groups.

The positive relationships of intelligence, adjustment, and extroversion to leadership are highly significant. In addition, dominance, masculinity, and interpersonal sensitivity are found to be positively related, while conservatism is found to be negatively related to leadership (p. 252).

It is difficult to specify leadership qualities in as restricted an area as laboratory training, for little or no research has been done on leadership in such groups and de facto leadership styles vary greatly from leader to leader and from situation to situation. According to Whitman (1964), the trainer in a T-group should have experience in two areas: (1) his own inner life, and (2) group dynamics. Both of these qualities seem essential for a trainer in a contract group.

The Trainer as Leader-Member

Leader-member. In the contract group the leader is also a member, that
is, he subscribes to the same member contract that the other participants do. In most sensitivity-training groups part of the "planned ambiguity" revolves around the role of the trainer in the group. For a while he seems to be neither leader nor member, for he gives the group little direction and in general interacts little with the individual members. But again, it is difficult to talk about what trainers do or do not do in groups in general because of the great variability in trainer styles. However, in the contract group the function of the leader is explicit. What he should do as member is spelled out in the member contract. What he should do as leader is spelled out in this chapter. What follows, then, constitutes a kind of leader contract.

The leader-member and interpersonal effectiveness. Mann (1959) indicated that an effective leader is an adjusted one. Rogers (1967) has found that the "congruent" therapist is more effective and describes such a person as one who "responds as the real person he actually is," who "employs no artificial front and does not have to hide or fear his real reactions" (p. 10). The trainer in the contract group should also be adjusted and "congruent," but this does not place him in a separate category in the group. It is not essential that he be the "most adjusted" or the "most congruent." The leader-member is in the group because he is interested in interpersonal growth, his own included. He is not there because he had "made it" in the area of interpersonal relations, but because he thinks that interpersonal growth is important. Because of his experience he may be more aware of his own interpersonal strengths and his areas of deficit, and it is this being in touch with his own experiencing which enables him to make
Contact with others. Ideally, the leader-member is a person of high social intelligence, that is, he has a feeling for people and knows how to get in contact with them without manipulating them. His social intelligence is seen partially in his ability to become a member of the group sincerely, even though he is the leader or trainer. If the leader-member is not congruent and in other respects socially intelligent, then his presence in the group will be disturbing rather than growthful and the participants will have to spend a good deal of energy in learning how to deal with him.

The Functions of the Leader-Member

Initial structuring. It goes without saying that the leader should be familiar, both theoretically and experientially, with the contract under which the group will be working. If the contract is given to prospective members before entering the group, then the leader need say little about the contract once the group begins. However, if the contract is "imposed," there may be more "contract-disturbance" during the first few meetings and some minimal discussion of the contract as contract will be in order. Under no condition, however, should the leader allow the contract to become the continual object of discussion; one of the reasons for the contract is precisely to avoid such "contract talk." The leader should avoid answering a multiplicity of abstract questions about the contract, even when the contract is brief and therefore open to some misinterpretation. The best time to answer a question concerning the contract is when the particular contract problem arises during the group interaction itself. Many areas within the contract can be cleared up effectively only within the context of group action.
Whitman (1964) sees the initial remarks made by the trainer in a T-group as extremely important in defining the subsequent character of the group (see Redl, 1942). The situation in the contract group, however, is quite different in that the contract itself bears a good deal of the weight of the initial structuring. What is important in the contract group is the immediate affective impact that the leader has on the group. There is no reason why he should not be warm and accepting from the very beginning rather than aloof and ambiguous. If the emotional attitudes he expresses arouses the resistance of the participants, then the group will have to spend time dealing with this rather than proceeding to the immediate concerns of the contract. Working through such resistance may well be a fruitful experience in itself, but it is not part of the explicit design of the contract group experience. In the contract group a poor beginning due to a clumsy leader is simply "uneconomic," for it is a time-consuming undertaking to try to right "wrongs" in group process once they have been made.

Putting his knowledge and experience at the service of the group. According to Whitaker and Lieberman (1964), one of the sources of the group therapist's "power" comes from the unique position from which he sees the group "focal conflict," which consists of two elements: a disturbing motive, that is, a wish on the part of one or more participants and a reactive motive, that is, the fear or fears aroused by the disturbing motive. The therapist, because of his experience and training and because he in some way "stands apart" from the group, has a vision of the group which none of the participants has. This is at least one of the factors which makes him a powerful figure. In training laboratories any leader who has a high degree
of social intelligence, who has a solid knowledge of group dynamics, and who has had experience in groups in a powerful figure indeed. However, the way in which the trainer in the contract group uses his power differs from the way in which a therapist traditionally uses his in group psychotherapy and from the way in which another trainer would use his in a more traditional sensitivity-training group. This is to be expected since the goals (or at least the means!) differ in these three different situations. The primary function of the leader in the contract group is to place all of his resources at the service of the group as directly and as unambiguously as possible. He is there both to fulfill the contract and to help the other members to fulfill it too. He is a kind of "social engineer," who in interested in the development of the conditions of the interpersonal setting. The statement of the conditions of the interpersonal setting is taken care of by the contract, but it is up to the trainer to see to it that these conditions develop in such a way as to lead to the fulfillment of the goals of the contract. His leadership does not place him "outside" the group nor does his leadership in the group give him any special position in the group with respect to the member contract. He is not even different from the other members in that he is to serve the group, since it is the function of all the participants to serve the group. However, because of his knowledge, experience, and skills, he is in a special position to serve the group.

Because of his knowledge of group dynamics (groups as "natural") and because of his experience (including his experience with groups as "contractual"), he knows, even before the group begins, the kinds of problems that will most likely arise "naturally" and impede the progress of the group.
the therefore uses this knowledge of groups—"natural" to forestall the kinds of group process that do not contribute to the goals of the group, no matter how profitable such activity would be in another context. For instance he prevents the participants from entering into a long, intellectualized discussion of the merits of the contract or of sensitivity training in general. Such discussions, no matter how intellectually profitable they may be, do not contribute to the goals of the contract and therefore are considered by definition (or rather "by contract") forms of flight behavior. If the group wants to pursue goals other than those outlined in the contract, they should come to a consensus, abandon the contract, and subscribe to a different process.

Dealing with the major characteristic problems of groups. N-interactions (see chapter 2) can be disruptive, neutral, or facilitative with respect to the goals set by the contract. The contract trainer ignores the neutral, confronts the disruptive, and encourages the facilitative. For instance, Lott and Lott (1965), in a review of the literature on group cohesiveness, found that increased contact or interaction on the part of group members heightens the cohesiveness of the group. The trainer, then, encourages the members of the group to interact with one another as much as possible and he discourages or confronts behavior that limits interaction (e.g. speeches, monologues, psychological withdrawal, excessive silence, etc.). There are certain usually avoidable "natural" problems in groups that are so important that, at least in the contract group, they should be explained in some way from the very beginning. If these problems which are productive of disruptive N-interactions are explained in the contract itself, then the leader need
not do so but merely comment on them (and confront when necessary) when they do arise. However they are explained and handled, it should be before they interfere with an "economic" pursuit of group goals. In other kinds of group experiences these same problems arise, but they are handled often only after they disrupt the group, and purposely so. For instance, a group might become entangled in long, intellectualized discussions of psychodynamics. During the course of these discussions, many members become bored and withdraw psychologically from the group. Finally, after the participants have experienced the deadening effect of the particular kind of non-growthful N-interaction, the trainer may ask the group to reflect on what is happening. The participants learn painfully, but profitably, that they have really been avoiding more intimate contact with one another. However, learning the anatomy of disruptive or non-growthful N-interactions by actually living with them is not one of the primary goals of the contract group.

Perhaps the central characteristic problems that will face the group should be included in the contract and/or discussed by the leader from the very beginning. Later, as less crucial problems arise, the leader can interpret them in the context of the group interaction. Some N-interactions are more disruptive than others and it is also possible that different kinds of N-interactions will prove disruptive (or facilitative) to groups with different kinds of contracts. The problems discussed below are considered important enough for the contract group to warrant attention before the group begins:

(1) The handling-the-leader problem. Almost everyone who discusses the question of leadership in small groups deals with the problems that
arise because of the polarization that takes place between leader and members (e.g. Bennis, 1956, 1964; Bion, 1961; Tuckman, 1965; Whitman, 1964). Tuckman (1965) suggests that the initial stage of training groups is marked by a degree of member-leader disturbance. Bennis (1964) divides participants into three categories during this initial stage: the "dependents," those who look to the trainer for cues, the "counterdependents," those who solve their dependency needs by opposing the leader, and the "independents," those who are "not threatened by the prospect of intimacy" (p. 264). Nor is it certain that such polarization is confined to the initial stage of the group, for although Bennis (1956) hypothesized that the group would deal first with the problem of authority (evidenced by power struggles and by preoccupation with relationships with the trainer) and then go on to deal with the problem of intimacy (evidenced by concerns about how much self-revelation there could be, etc.), the results showed a continuous dealing with both these issues. Perhaps Slater (1966) deals most intensively with such group-characteristic phenomena as dependency, counterdependency, revolt, exclusion-of-the-leader, etc. Mann (1967) has developed a rather extensive member-leader analysis system in which all feelings of member toward leader are scored. The system includes such categories as "moving against," "resisting," "withdrawing," "guilt inducing" (e.g., blaming, accusing, feeling misunderstood, etc.), "identifying," "moving toward," "showing dependency," "showing self-esteem" (e.g., showing leader ability of being open and honest), etc.

As intriguing as such variables are and as focal as they are in a variety of group experiences, in the contract group an attempt is made to render them relatively inconsequential. The overriding goal of the contract group...
demands that the participants become as deeply involved as possible with one another. However, if the group spends an initial stage dealing primarily with member-leader phenomena (Tuckman, 1965) or deals continuously with such problems (Bennis, 1956), time and energy are diverted from what are considered to be more important goals. Therefore, the leader "blows his cover," as if were, he tells the group about these phenomena, he indicates the kinds of N-interactions (e.g. dependency, counterdependency behavior) that arise in face-to-face groups because of member-leader polarization. He abdicates his "fatherhood" and his "divinity" from the beginning. If members are to have difficulty with him, he wants it to be because he is another group member and not because he is leader. However, this does not mean that dependency and counterdependency phenomena will not arise in the group, but it is hypothesized that they will not arise with the same frequency and with the same intensity as they would in groups not made aware of such phenomena from the beginning. The fact that a particular member refuses to allow the leader to abdicate his fatherhood or his omnipotence is quite significant. But authority problems do exist and they will be stronger in some participants than in others. Member-leader polarization "stages" or "cultures" are to be avoided, not individual N-interactions that arise from very deep needs in individual cases. No contract can legislate authority or dependency problems out of existence. In fact individual problems in these areas will be highlighted in the contract group because they will not appear merely as a part of a "stage" or a "culture."

According to Whitaker and Lieberman (1964), part of the therapist's "power" in group therapy comes "from the frequency with which the patients
impute to the therapist the power of gratification, threat, and magical solutions. On this basis, the therapist becomes an object of impulses involved in the group focal conflict and a source of solutions" (pp. 197-198). It is precisely this power which the leader, insofar as this is possible, abdicates. The contract-group leader differs from both therapist (at least as traditionally conceived) and trainer in that he makes himself quite "visible." He tries to avoid rather than utilize ambiguity. Unlike the trainer as Whitman (1964) conceives him, he is not concerned with a middle-road between "absence of visibility" and "complete visibility" (p. 312). His cards are on the table. He does not feel constrained to withhold information from the group because they cannot "tolerate" it. Both member contract and leader contract are group property. It is hypothesized that such openness will facilitate communication within the group and make the leader less of a "problem."

Finally, the trainer in the contract group does not conceive of the members' relationships to him and his to theirs in terms of "transference" and "countertransference." While there is no special need to look upon transference as "a devil conjured up only to be sent back to his usual habitat with much expenditure of time and energy" (Eysenck, 1959, p. 74), still it is considered a non-crucial issue in the contract group. Those who conceive of resistance to growth in such terms as transference (e.g. Bernstein, 1965) might argue that an attempt to eliminate the problems centering around member-leader polarization by increasing the visibility of the phenomenon merely makes the problem of transference more acute by making it less visible. On the other hand, many therapists work without the concept of transference or
at least conceive of it in other than psychoanalytic terms. For instance, May (1958) suggests that "the neurotic is one who in certain areas never developed beyond the limited and restricted forms of experience characteristic of the infant. Hence in later years he perceives wife or therapist through the same restricted, distorted 'spectacles' as he perceived father or mother" (p. 79). It is not a question of "transferring" feelings but of persistently perceiving relationships in maladaptive ways.

Preventing "tacit understandings." Whitman (1964) refers to the different "levels" on which a group operates simultaneously. He says that "for practical purposes, two levels is a useful division. Overt and covert, or manifest and latent, are ways of describing these levels" (p. 318). Both Bennis and his associates (1957) and Lieberman (1958) found that norms about member behavior were established early in the group and tended to persist throughout the life of the group. Groups "naturally" make decisions, that is, they make N-interaction decisions, and not just C-interaction decisions, about all sorts of things: procedure, topics to be discussed, limits to be set, etc. Some of these decisions are overt, some are covert. For instance, sex might come up in the course of the group discussion, but somehow or other it is sidetracked. It comes up again later, but again it is sidetracked. Finally, even though it is not openly discussed, group members realize that "we do not talk about sex in this group." This is what Slater (1966) calls a "tacit understanding." A covert decision has been reached in the group. The group of tacit understandings which is currently operative, gives direction to the group, and sets limits for group interactions, may be called the "group mentality" or the group "culture." Bion
(1959), Slater (1966), and Whitaker and Lieberman (1964) all deal with this phenomenon.

"Facit understandings" can subvert the expressed purposes of the group. The trouble with covert decisions is that once they are made, they are very difficult to change.

The group forms its own history and constructs its own standards and modes of behavior and, once fixed, they are extremely difficult to alter....They have almost the binding effect of laws; for the social punishment when they are broken (such as disapproval, ostracism, and hostility) is as severe as its equivalent prison sentence in Western society (Whitman, 1964, p. 315).

Groups can die from stumbling over their "tacit culture."

Since covert decisions are considered to impede rather than facilitate group process in the contract-group, the leader discusses the notions or "tacit understandings" and "group culture" with the participants. He not only "blows his own cover," but he also "blows the cover" of the group. The ideal is that decisions in the group be made overtly and not covertly. Explaining the concept of "tacit understanding" at the beginning of group process certainly does not eliminate the "natural" tendency of the group to operate this way. The leader must confront the group in the process of coming to a "tacit understanding." For instance, if the leader witnesses the sidetracking of the sex issue mentioned above, he would confront the group: "The sex issue has been brought up a number of times and each time it has been sidetracked. It seems that we are on the verge of entering into a 'tacit understanding' not to talk about sex. If we really want to avoid the sex issue, let's first talk about it and then make a decision above board." Crucial (and thus anxiety-provoking) issues are often sidetracked through this covert decision-making process.
Any kind of "hidden agenda" in the group muddies communication and should be avoided insofar as possible. Both individuals and groups as such develop a hidden agenda. For example, A might be attracted to B and would like to see the relationship a mutual one. Therefore, A in any number of indirect ways places acts designed to elicit B's attention and favor: for instance, he might "pair" with B in a variety of ways, show B that they think and feel alike. Or a group may conspire, indirectly, to "get" a punitive trainer. The participants become apathetic and bored or sabotage exercises suggested by the trainer and in general see to it that the trainer fails in his task. Since pursuit of a hidden agenda ultimately works counter to the declared goals of the contract group, it should be dealt with in the same way as tacit understandings.

(3) Lowest-common-denominatorism. When even one person in a group displays indifference toward the goals of the group, the efficacy of the group is lowered. Whitman (1964) claims that the T-group can move along only as rapidly as the slowest member. The problem of the lagging or delinquent or deviate member is one that arises "naturally" in groups. Although an effective contract can help control deviancy by eliminating the unmotivated (especially if the contract is freely chosen and not just "imposed") and by eliminating the kind of vagueness and ambiguity in group process that often engender the indifference or apathy of the deviant member, there is no ultimate way of ensuring the interest and cooperation of all members. The problem of lack of motivation is one of the most difficult to handle in all kinds of growth experiences. Rogers (1966) believes that it is more difficult to deal with than psychosis:
From our own experience in working with unmotivated schizophrenic individuals and a small matched group of unmotivated normal individuals I have come to a conclusion which you may regard as startling. It is my present conviction that working with a lack of conscious motivation in the individual is more difficult than working with the problem of psychosis. This is of course a subjective opinion, based in part on our general lack of success in trying to form a facilitative relationship with unmotivated 'normals' of low socioeducational status. Insofar as the two elements are separable, I believe the absence of conscious desire for help presents a greater challenge to the therapist than the presence of psychosis (p. 8).

The leader, then, should discuss the possibility of the group's ultimately having to deal with an unmotivated or deviant member. If this is done, it is hypothesized that the delinquent member will not have as much of a retarding effect on the group. Whether such a member should be expelled or encouraged to remove himself from the group is a moot question. The natural tendency of groups which lose a member for one reason or another is to spend a good deal of time dealing with their own feelings of guilt and loss. Whatever is done, the contract group should not allow a deviant member to absorb its energies.

The Leader as Guardian of the Contract

Stock (1964) suggests that a trainer may be sensitive to "missing functions" in the group and may either deliberately try or unconsciously tend to supply the missing element. In the contract group the "elements" of the group experience are more clearly delineated and it is therefore much easier for the leader (and the other members) to see what is "missing." The trainer, then, should consciously try to stimulate the group to add what is missing. In a sense, therefore, the leader-member is, at least initially, the guardian of the contract. He is in the service of the group members principally to see to it that the contract is fulfilled. The individual participants
benefit to the degree that they share in the "common good" of the group, and it is the function of the leader to see to it that this common good, as defined by the superordinate, interaction, and process goals of the group, is pursued. He fulfills this function by encouraging and modeling contract behavior and by confronting those who do not engage in such behavior or who engage in anti-contractual behavior. He has every right to encourage and confront quite directly, for his being a "stimulus" is part of the contract to which the members agree. He does not have to apologize for upholding the contract. However, the way in which he fulfills his function as "guardian" is quite important. If he is a watch dog, an authoritarian figure, who confronts in alienating ways, then he will induce a non-growthful polarization between himself and the other participants. An important way of encouraging contractual behavior is to have the participants reflect on their own behavior. He has them stand back and evaluate or "process" the ways in which they are pursuing (or avoiding) the goals of the contract. Such self-criticism is less ego-deflating and often more direct and incisive than that of an observer. There is perhaps a curvilinear relationship between the degree of "guardian" behavior and productivity in the group. Productivity will be low if the leader-member is either too cautious or too eager to confront a delinquent group. Optimal productivity will be correlated with forceful but tempered confrontation. This is a difficult task, so, again, there is no substitute for social competency in the leader.

The Leader as Model

There are various ways in which the leader can promote the contract: he can encourage, stimulate, confront, "process," and in general act from the
"outside." But since in the contract group he is a leader-member, he promotes the contract perhaps principally by modeling the behavior called for by the contract: he accepts, he encourages, he engages in self-disclosure, he invites others to self-examination, he responds to confrontation by examining his own activity, he expresses his feelings, cooperates with others, sticks to the here-and-now, tries to involve himself with others and encourages others to involve themselves with him, and generally searches for new ways of being present to others. Campbell and Dunnette (1968) suggest that such modeling characterizes trainer behavior in all kinds of sensitivity-training experiences:

The role of the trainer also constitutes a dominant technological element bearing on the group's effectiveness for giving feedback and promoting psychological support. The trainer serves as a model for the participants to imitate; that is, he absorbs feelings of hostility and frustration without becoming defensive, provides feedback for others, expresses his own feelings openly and honestly, and is strongly supportive of the expression of feelings of others. In short, he exhibits for consideration the very process deemed necessary for maximum learning to occur (pp. 76-77).

Modeling, however, demands a good deal of tact. For instance, if the trainer engages in self-disclosure, he does not rush in with a degree of self-revelation which would shock and inhibit rather than challenge and encourage. Dramatic self-disclosure would then be the leader's way of deciding for the group at what level of disclosure they should operate. To set this level is a function of the group as a whole and should not be usurped by any single individual. Similar cautions apply to the other interaction goals such as confrontation.

The Diffusion of Leadership

Whatever might be the most current thinking on leadership in training
and/or therapy groups, the function of the leader in the contract group is to become less and less a leader and more and more a member. That is, all of the functions which have been listed as leader-functions above should become dispersed among the members of the group. Leadership, according to Collins and Guetzkow (1964), "is a scattered activity--one member being influential at one time because of a particular combination of environmental demands and personal characteristics, and another being influential at another time because of a different congruence of demand and trait" (pp. 214-215). As Cattell (1951) suggests, leadership is measured by impact-on-group. If an appointed leader has no real impact on the work of the group, then his leadership is merely nominal. Leadership, then, is really a shared function, it is something fluid in the group. Having a leader-member in the contract group is a contrived state of affairs in the same sense that the entire laboratory is contrived. He is the leader in the beginning because of his experience, knowledge, and skills. But the whole function of the group is to have the participants grow in precisely the same skills. As the members begin to engage in contractual behavior, there is less and less need for the leader-member to stimulate such behavior. Whenever any participant engage in contractual behavior, at that moment he becomes a "leader" in the sense that he promotes the "work" of the group. "Status" in the contract group, if such a term is applicable, is identified with contract-fulfillment.

If leadership is to be diffused in the group, then the leader must be willing to relinquish his "favored" position. If he is over-invested in being a "parent," it will be difficult for him to recognize and reinforce through support the increasing skills of the participants. If he hangs on
tightly, not only his level or depth of intervention, but even his
inner of intervention is likely to become the standard of the group (Blake, 1964). Such behavior, however, runs completely counter to the purposes of
the group.

There are analogues to the above conception of leadership in certain
therapy groups. Bach (1966) describes a Marathon group in which "every
member is a co-therapist responsible for the relative success or failure of
any given Marathon meeting" (p. 997). The professional co-therapists in the
group, "if and when they feel like it," participate as "patients" rather
than consultants. Structure is provided by the "Ten Commandments" of the
Marathon which provide a kind of contractual foundation for the group
experience. The staff in Mowrer's (1968) integrity groups are there as
participants rather than "therapists" or observers. They are leaders in the
sense that they "go ahead" and fulfill the contract.

If the trainer in the contract group models effectively and monitors the
contract judiciously, trying to see to it that C-interactions increase while
disruptive N-interactions decrease, if he teachers the group to confront
itself according to the provisions of the contract, then his skills will be
disseminated throughout the group and the group will be "leaderless" by
paradoxically being full of "leaders."

Leaderless Groups

Research is currently being carried on with unled training and psycho-
therapy groups. Leaderless groups are not new, for Gibb (1964) and others
have been experimenting with them for a number of years:
Our many years of experience with 'leaderless' groups in various settings lead us to feel that maximum participative behavior is attained more readily in training groups without trainers than with trainers. The groups are perhaps more aptly described as 'leaderful,' in that what occurs is not an abolition of leadership but a distribution of leadership roles in the group. It is perhaps even more accurate to describe the participative groups as 'trainerless.' Members learn to observe and experiment upon their own behavior in increasingly creative ways. They learn that it is less adaptive to take a 'trainer stance,' that is, advise, 'help,' teach, change, or persuade others (pp. 298-299).

Harrow and his associates (1967) found that unled groups tended to be warmer and more supportive. Salzbert (1966), in studying the verbal behavior of therapy groups, found that unled groups produced fewer problem-relevant responses, but were more spontaneous. Berzon and Solomon (1966) not only found leaderless group therapy to be feasible, but one kind of interaction, confrontation, increased in unled groups. The authors do not say, but I presume that the confrontation was considered therapeutic. In experimenting with unled sessions in group marital counseling (I observed the interaction through a one-way mirror), I found that not only were the groups more spontaneous (that is, there was much more self-initiated interaction), but there was also a high degree of problem-relevant interaction. The latter (although contrary to Salzberg's findings) was most likely due to the fact that the group was working under a contract. Once they had learned the contractual process ("how therapy goes"), they could have profitable sessions without me. At least this was my clinical observation. Not all the evidence in this area is completely positive. Truax and Carkhuff (1964) found that although some of the deepest levels of therapeutic process took place with juvenile delinquent groups during unled sessions (sessions were alternately led and unled), the alternately unled groups showed no greater
In unled groups, then, there is the possibility of greater patient process without greater outcome. However, the saving of manpower powers seems significant in itself, nor is there any reason to suppose that the cautions suggested by Truax and Carkhuff need apply in any way to laboratory training groups with non-psychiatric populations.

"Instrumented laboratories." The National Training Laboratories have been experimenting for some years now with "instrumented" training laboratories (Blake & Mouton, 1962; also see Benne, 1964). There is no trainer in the "instrumented" group; whatever staff there is usually works outside the group. In the place of the trainer, a series of self-administered evaluation forms or "instruments" are introduced. These "instruments" are used throughout the laboratory to provide its participants with feedback. Group action is interrupted from time to time, and, through feedback, the participants learn to see themselves better. In a trainer-directed group, feedback takes place through his "interventions." In the instrumented group, wall charts and graphs indicate the characteristics of both group and personal action during each meeting. In "instrumented" laboratories, the staff engages in a variety of activities: they provide the instruments of action research, train members to use the data gathered, give general sessions in modeling and in setting standards for giving and receiving feedback, arrange for intergroup competition and collaboration among development groups, etc. Although their activity may provide a good deal of structure for the laboratory, still they do not sit in and control the groups. The information that is fed back into the groups from the data collected is used as the
members see fit.

The "instrumented" laboratory has been used in industrial, university, and hospital settings, with both "normals" and with psychiatric patients. Johnson and his associates (1965), in a follow-up study of an "instrumented" laboratory with psychiatric patients, found that the improvement-cure record of the "instrumented" groups equalled or surpassed that of the regular therapy groups.

The contract group begins with a leader in order that it may become effectively leaderless in as short a time as possible. If the leader is warm and skillful in engaging in contractual behavior, then "behavioral contagion" (Lippitt, Polansky, Redl, & Rosen, 1952) will take place and the group will be quickly on its way to a creative interpersonal experience.

Semi-led training groups. Although, as indicated above, it is not uncommon for psychotherapists to experiment with alternate led and unled group therapy sessions and although completely unled training groups are common (Gibb, 1964), there is no mention of training groups with alternate led and unled sessions. I have experimented with such a procedure in a laboratory course in interpersonal relations. When I was in the group, I was there as leader-member, but obviously it was much more difficult to become a full member. One member even commented: "Since you were on the outside of the group, we did not have to work through the whole problem of your leadership." Even though such part-time leadership-membership is hardly ideal, it is workable especially if it is made clear from the beginning that this part of the contract.
Conclusion

The style of the contract-group trainer differs, at least theoretically, from that of the trainer in more "traditional" T-groups. Campbell and Dunnette (1968) says that in a traditional training experience, "a trainer is usually present, but he does not accept, in fact he overtly rejects any leadership role" (p. 75). He may overtly reject leadership in some sense of the term, but he is still present in the group as leader in some sense. If, as Campbell and Dunnette suggest, his modeling of growthful behavior does give direction to the group, then he is a leader. In the contract group, the leader overtly accepts his role as leader, but he makes it clear that one of his primary goals is the diffusion of leadership among the participants. There is evidence (Fleishman & Harris, 1962; Halpin, 1957; Oaklander & Fleishman, 1964; Rush, 1957) that suggests that high-consideration, high-structure behavior is frequently associated with effective and successful leadership for widely different populations. If this is true, then a warm and accepting trainer working within the structure of a viable contract should be successful, even though success is ultimately defined as the diffusion of his leadership qualities. It is not structure per se which is offensive, but constricting, controlling, non-facilitative structure.

The leader as "anti-entropic." Entropy has been described by Rosenblith (1967) as the "tendency of a closed system to deteriorate and run downhill by going from a highly differentiated, and less probable state to the more probable, undifferentiated, and chaotic state." (p. 274) The group can be considered analogous to such a system. Left to its own devices, the group tends "naturally" to run downhill. The leader is an anti-entropic
force in the system. He keeps the communication system "open." The group system "closes" when the individual members seal themselves off from one another. When the members are fulfilling the contract, they are engaging in "non-probable" interpersonal behavior that is assumed to lead to growth. The system, then, is open. The leader helps keep the communication system open by his knowledge of groups "as nature" and by fulfilling his function as "monitor" of the contract. When members close in upon themselves, they become undifferentiated, that is, the group resembles, analogously, the "rundown" state of the system in entropy (see Wiener, 1954). The ideal is that each member become an anti-entropic agent in the group.

Leadership and individual style. Leadership demands in the contract group still allow the leader to be himself, to possess his own style. Any particular leader may be more effective in or stress one set of contract variables rather than another. The leader should be himself just as he allows (or encourages) others to be themselves. The contract-group leader will also become a member of the group in his own individual way. Perhaps he will always remain differentiated from the group in some way (Slater [1966] claims that the image of the leader as differentiated from the group serves as a point of orientation in turmoil), but he should "stand off" from the group as little as possible. The contract itself is a "point of orientation." At times he may be the victim of what Goffman (1967) calls "interaction-consciousness," that is he becomes preoccupied with his special responsibility to see to it that the interaction "goes well." The leader who becomes too preoccupied both fails to "give himself to his own party" and forgets that responsibility for effective interaction is a corporate one. Finally,
although the leader should be a fairly well integrated person, there is no reason why he must be the "best" group member. Different participants will excel in different interpersonal skills, with each learning in some way from all the others.
Chapter VI

Total Human Expression: the elements of human dialogue; pathos, logos, poiesis

Introduction

Needless to say, the members of a face-to-face sensitivity-training group are there in order to communicate with one another. Since, in the contract group, the members agree to experiment with their interpersonal behavior, this means experimenting with the process of communication. Communication, however, is both an ambiguous word and a complex task. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to consider the elements of communication insofar as they relate to a laboratory in interpersonal relations.

Total human expressions refers to a man's ability to communicate himself fully, that is, both on an intellective and an emotional level. This ability will be examined in terms of three dimensions of dialogue: pathos, logos, and poiesis. Pathos refers to all the elements, passive and active, that constitute the experience of feeling and emotion. Logos is a large concept: it refers to man's ability to communicate himself to others both in words and through non-verbal behavior. Logos also refers to the ability to utilize all channels of interpersonal communication in the "translation" of oneself, intellectually and emotionally, to the other. These "channels," according to Wiener (1968), include (a) language in its most straightforward sense, that is, "verbal content, e.g., word meaning and syntax," (b) the way in which the verbal message is delivered, that is, the "extra-linguistic phenomena of communication (Mahl & Schultz, 1964), e.g., variations in tonal qualities, patterns of stress, pitch, and pauses which are not dictated by
the required linguistic form, and (c) all the forms of non-verbal behavior that enter into the communication process, that is, "motoric or bodily phenomena..., e.g., facial expressions, gestures, postures, and proxemics" (p. 51). Poiesis refers to the ability of man to be "poetic" in his communication, that is, the ability to integrate verbal, non-verbal, and emotional expression in dialogue. Negatively, it is the refusal to strip words of their human feeling together with a refusal to allow emotions to become irrational.

The logic of the following discussion of these three elements is not the logic of human living, that is, elements discussed separately (and therefore somewhat abstractly) are actually woven into idiosyncratic patterns in the transactions of any particular individual. However, if this dissection leads to the kind of awareness that underlies behavioral change, then it is justified. It is obvious that these elements of dialogue are important in everyday life. It is just as obvious, then, that they are important in any kind of sensitivity-training experience. The contract group, however, is explicit in its requiring its participants to focus their attention on their emotions, especially those that arise from the interaction within the group, on their ability (or inability) to translate themselves into language, on their non-verbal communications, and on the difficulties involved in allowing emotion to give color and character to one's verbalizations.

Men, either by their inability or their unwillingness to communicate deeply with one another, seem to foist upon themselves a state analogous to social deprivation. It would seem that such self-inflicted deprivation might
well have effects analogous to those observed in studies on social deprivation. Studies by Mullin (1960), Nardini (1962), and Rohrer (1961) indicate that variables such as monotony of environment and absence of sources of emotional gratification can cause intellectual inertia, impaired memory and concentration, insomnia, headaches, low-grade depression, and greatly increased appetite (with resultant weight gain). An interesting hypothesis is that similar symptoms found among relatively normal populations of our society reflect self-imposed estrangement from others, although such a macro-hypothesis would be difficult to verify. The contract group is a laboratory in which the participants come together to determine whether or not they themselves are victims of any form of self-inflicted social deprivation, and, if this is the case, to find ways of remedying such a situation by in-community activity.

**PATHOS: MAN AS THE SUBJECT OF FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS**

**The Flight From Emotion**

There is growing concern—and perhaps it may also be said that there is growing evidence, though it is the fruit of observation rather than experimentation—over the inability of some to engage in a free and constructive expression of emotion. The hypothesis might be stated: many men in our society, especially those in the middle and upper classes, are constricted in their ability to experience and to give expression to their emotions; for one reason or another, they have not faced up to their "possibilities" in these areas. Even in sensitivity laboratories where it is expected that a certain selectivity factor would engage a population somewhat more free than the average in the area of emotional experiencing and expression, parti-
Participants have to be reminded again and again to give expression, not just to what they think, but to what they feel.

Formal education is overloaded in the area of intellect, impoverishment in the area of emotion. As Neill (1968) notes:

Today our schools educate the head and leave the emotions to the crowd-compellers—the press, the radio, the TV, the churches, the commercial exploiters with their lying advertisements. Our pop heroes and film stars have become our leading schoolmasters dealing with real emotions.... The danger today is underdeveloped emotion, perverted emotion, infantile emotion (p. 37).

Paperback novels, movies, and the ubiquitous television set all constitute a two-edged sword in the emotional life of man. If used with imagination and discretion, they can complement a person's emotional life, enhance and enrich it by broadening his emotional experience and provide the beginnings of some kind of insight or vision into a wide variety of human experiences. But too many misuse these media with the result that they are not complements to emotional living but rather substitutes for it, and for many this vicarious emotional living is sufficient.

Fromm (1941) decries the general tendency of society to discourage emotion and the resulting "cheap and insincere sentimentality with which movies and popular songs feed millions of emotion-starved customers" (p. 271). He sees the child developing a "pseudo character," not because he has to learn to control his feelings, but because he must deny that he even experiences them. Lynd (1958) notes the same trends: "In our society 'emotional' is frequently used as a derogatory term. Developing emotional maturity is more often conceived in terms of training a child in what he should not feel and in controlling the expression of his feelings than in extending the range..."
and depth of his emotions and their expression" (p. 236). Fromm goes so far as to suggest that bad dreams result from the fact that people force their true feelings out of consciousness because these feelings do not fit in with the social self.

In a recent book, Schutz (1967) describes the joy that he experienced watching his new-born son being totally absorbed in the experience, both happy and unhappy, of growing. He describes what he sees as unbounded joy, but also begins to wonder: "But will something happen to Ethan as it does to us all? Where will his joy go? In most of us it becomes depleted, distorted, contorted. Guilt and fear begin to defile it. Somehow the joy of Ethan goes, never to fully return" (p. 10). The rest of the book is an engaging essay on some ways and means of winning back the joy that too many men forfeit as the price of security, socialization, and productivity.

Keniston's Hypothesis. One way of looking at the emotional parasitism of society—men become parasites to television, movies, and the rest mentioned above—is that it is an essential or at least unavoidable phenomenon in a technocratic society such as ours. Keniston (1965) suggests that two phenomena of our society converge to create an emotional dilemma for the working man. First of all, many men find little emotional satisfaction in the work they do in order to earn a living. Work instead of satisfying certain emotional needs, intensifies them. Breadwinners come home, then, hungering for emotional satisfaction and expecting to find it with their families. But today's family—and this is the second phenomenon—is a smaller unit than yesterday's. Family today no longer means a complex of grandparents, aunts, uncles, and children living in the same at least
relatively circumscribed geographical area. Family today means wife and two or three children too geographically or psychologically separated from close relatives to constitute an interactional unit with any direct emotional meaning or impact. Keniston claims that, given the emotional constriction or frustration of the breadwinner at work, the family, especially so small a family, cannot satisfy his intensified or exaggerated emotional needs at home. Obviously the wife, too, faces analogous emotional frustrations, and then both husband’s and wife’s intensified emotional needs become interactive.

There are no ready made solutions for these emotional binds. Ideally, husband and wife, without abandoning their obligations to work and children, will move out into the community, e.g., in church and civic activities, thus broadening the bases of emotional fulfillment. However, other less, responsible "solutions" tend to destroy the equilibrium of the family: tension and fighting in the home, extramarital adventures, emotional constriction and insulation, and the vicarious emotional living mentioned above, made easy, for instance, by the proliferation of "engaging," undemanding, sports events on television.

Man's struggle for freedom has been the theme of much of his literature from the very beginning of recorded history. While this freedom if conceived of in more or less political terms, this does not mean that there has not been a concomitant or parallel struggle for more interior forms of freedom such as emotional freedom. Today if men have been freed from the emotion-constricting slavery of Jansenism, Puritanism, and Victorianism (and certainly not all have), many have managed to shackle themselves with new bonds. While the prior slavery was enjoined in the name of morality and religion, the new
slavery is imposed in the name of technocracy, progress, and production. Many have been duped into thinking that they are emotionally free, when all that has happened has been a change in the facade of their bondage. It is as if men were afraid to allow men to experience either themselves or their environment in an unfettered way and to institute communication with one another based on this experiencing. Rather this is the unknown, the unknown is dangerous, the dangerous is to be feared, and the feared is to be resisted.

Some men are relieved when they are told that "feelings get in the way," for it justifies an already determined mode of interpersonal acting. Men who are guarded in their feelings toward others do not particularly want to become aware of their feelings toward others. They would also prefer that others not feel strongly about them. It is thought uncivil, rude, unconventional, unwarranted, and even obscene to express feelings toward others. Emotional insulation parades under such euphemisms as "respect for others" and the "dignity of privacy." Sometimes the mentally ill are feared, not because they express too little but because they express too much. Men who are afraid of feelings and emotions to begin with are utterly terrified when these are expressed without restraint. Perhaps the best symbol man-as-emotional today is the polyethylene bad. Nothing gets in. Nothing gets out. He remains enshrined in interpersonal asepsis.

"Normal Alienation from Experience." Laing (1967) conceptualizes what is assumed here to be a fairly widespread flight from fuller emotional living as man's "normal alienation from experience":
As adults, we have forgotten most of our childhood, not only its contents but its flavor; as men of the world, we hardly know of the existence of the inner world:...as for our bodies, we retain just sufficient proprioceptive sensations to coordinate our movements and to ensure the minimal requirements of biosocial survival--to register fatigue, signals for food, sex, defecation, sleep; beyond that, little or nothing....our capacity even to see, hear, touch, taste and smell is so shrouded in veils of mystification that before one can begin to experience the world afresh, with innocence, truth and love (pp. 10-11).

For Laing, psychotherapy is the process of getting back into contract with one's experiencing through affective contact with another:

The psychotherapeutic relationship is therefore a re-search. A search, constantly reasserted and reconstituted, for what we have all lost and whose loss some can perhaps endure a little more easily than others, as some people can stand lack of oxygen better than others, and this re-search is validated by the shared experience of experience regained in and through the therapeutic relationship in the here and now (p. 34).

The contract group or any growth-experience for "normals" is also an emotional "re-search" project. Emotional alienation might be more easily "endured" by the normal, but if it is true that the "psychopathology of the average" or man's "normal alienation from experience" is as serious a problem for society as it is assumed to be here, then, while the individual might be able to "endure" his emotional constriction, society cannot.

The evidence is in. It would be a simple, but rather useless, task to go on cataloging the evidence of man's sins against the emotional dimensions of his humanity. However "clinical" and anecdotal such evidence is, it is still compelling, and one need not prove what is self-evident. The growing popularity of organizations such as the Esalen Institute, the National Training Laboratories, the Western Behavioral Sciences Institute, and of sensitivity laboratories in general dramatizes the plight of a people seeking
deliverance from emotional bondage. Whether this deliverance take place in responsible ways depends, at least partly, on the willingness of behavioral scientists to channel some of their talents into creative thinking and experimentation in this area. The growing laboratory-learning culture in our society offers any number of possibilities for such work. Perhaps a new era is dawning in the field of mental health, an era in which concern with prevention is absorbed into larger concerns such as self-actualization and community potentialities for human growth.

**Emotional life and the function of the contract-group.** Sensitivity groups possess the potentiality of developing an intense intragroup emotional life. Since one of the process-goals of the group as a whole and of members individually is "diagnosis," the group provides ample opportunity for the participants not only to deal with one another on an emotional level but to examine the quality of their emotional living. The members should experiment with all phases of the pathos experiences outlined below; they should try to feel and give expression to emotions and nuances of emotion that do not constitute their ordinary patterns of emotional living. This does not mean that the participants should "manufacture" emotions, for most of them already probably spend too much time expressing emotions that they do not really feel. Rather they should try to interact as intimately as possible with one another and allow themselves to feel the whole range of emotions that arises from such interaction. Only then will they be able to evaluate, both within themselves and in dialogue with one another, their emotional successes and failures. The members of the contract-group are told explicitly that the group is to serve as a laboratory in which the quality of one's emotional
living can be evaluated and, hopefully, enriched. The participants contract (1) to examine their ability to face up to the emotional realities of personal and interpersonal living, and (2) to experiment with different aspects of emotional living. The analysis of the pathos experience below will help operationalize these provisions of the contract and serve as a guide as to what to look for in both individual emotional experiences and in the corporate emotional life of the group.

The Phases of Emotional Experiencing

The pathos experience, dealt with at a level of abstraction that is meaningful for sensitivity experiences, is constituted by four phases: (1) awareness, (b) impact, (c) reaction, and (d) expression. It is possible to short-circuit pathos at any one of these phases, the result being a truncated emotional experience.

(a) Awareness. As Arnold (1960) notes, emotion is preceded by a cognitive element in which the individual first evaluates the situation in which he finds himself. If he evaluates the situation confronting himself as immediately dangerous, fear arises. This means that the quality of a person's emotional life is dependent on the quality of his awareness. If, either by nature or nurture, a person's ability to be aware of what is happening around him is constricted, then his emotional life will be constricted. On the other hand, if a person wants to grow emotionally, he must improve the quality of his awareness of himself and of his environment, especially his interpersonal environment.

This refusal or inability to be aware of self and others is characteristic of the emotionally disturbed. In fact, it may be hypothesized
that the more disturbed a person is the greater his tendency to cut off the
pathos process or experience of an earlier stage. The most severely
disturbed, then, would sabotage emotional experience at the level of
awareness. I have been in group therapy experiences in which the most
severely disturbed have been challenged merely to repeat the gist of what
another had revealed in an emotionally-charged disclosure. An "I-didn't-
hear-what-he-said" typified the poverty of awareness that characterized
these patients. This inner numbness or preoccupation with self effectively
fended off any kind of affective contract with others.

In a parallel way, this lack of awareness of self and others
characterizes the more severe forms of the psychopathology of the average.
In the contract group it is assumed that the unfettered ability to exper-
ience oneself and one's environment is a relatively rare phenomenon. Aware-
ness can be cut off in a variety of ways: men can be "too busy" to notice
emotion-generating stimuli in themselves or coming from without; emotional
involvement "gets in the way" and cuts down on productivity, and this is
treason in a technocratic society. Recently, however, industry itself has
realized that closing one's eyes to the emotional realities of life is
literally unprofitable. Programs have been set up for alcoholics because
merely dismissing them meant a loss of valuable personnel and decreased
morale. Men in managerial positions have been sent to human relations
laboratories in order to become more aware of the emotional realities of
interpersonal relating on the job. Ignored emotion leads to ineffective
communication; ineffective communication leads to decreased productivity.
Managerial involvement in human relations laboratories is growing because
is profitable in terms of dollars and cents. It would be a sad commentary on the human condition if industry's new-found interest in the emotional climate of the work situation because it is financially profitable were not paralleled by a renewed interest in emotional variables on the part of private individuals merely because it is profitable in terms of human growth.

Denial is not the only mechanism used to fend off emotion-provoking stimuli. Festinger (1957) suggests that men distort their perception, that is, the quality of their awareness, so that reality may seem to be concordant with pre-formed attitudes or pre-chosen forms of behavior. For instance, A might be angry with B and express his anger in a variety of ways, and yet B, because he does not want to deal with the emotional realities of the situation distorts the cues emitted by A. He sees A's anger as A's "not feeling well," because "not-feeling-well" is not a factor that would force B to become involved with A on an emotional level. Or a person might not want to be in contact even with himself because it would force him to come to grips with his emotions. For instance, a person might somatize his anxiety: his colon is in an uproar, but he tries to ignore the painful stimuli or if he does advert to them, he interprets them as signaling "poor eating habits" rather than anxiety. He cannot experience himself reflexively as anxious, for this would have behavioral consequences that he prefers not to face.

The contract calls for a willingness to become aware of one's self and one's environment. The first step, then, in the pathos process is, broadly speaking, a cognitive one. Awareness is not merely passive, however; a person has to make himself aware, he has to reach out into his environment, instead of defending oneself from input, especially input that will start the
emotional process. One has to court such input. Schutz (1967) makes much of what he calls the "creative process." The first aspect of this process is called "freeing, or acquisition": "Before one is able to use his experience in unusual, productive, and satisfying...ways, he must acquire a repertoire of experience. He must be open to experience, able to perceive and sense his environment, and be aware of his own internal feelings" (p. 55). In developing one's emotional potentiality the element of perception or awareness seems to have at least a logical priority.

Ambiguity of emotional stimuli. Another reason why awareness must be a dynamic, active process is that fact that emotionally tinged or charged emotional stimuli in interpersonal transactions are often ambiguous: Fiedler (1960) sees distortions in interpersonal perception as so common as to provide a means of measurement of attitudes:

It has become a psychological truism that a person's behavior is influenced not by some objectively definable reality but rather by the individual's perception of reality. Ambiguous stimuli increase the likelihood that perceptual distortions will occur, and we assume that these distortions reflect in part the inner needs, emotional states and attitudes of the perceiver. Among the most ambiguous of our everyday stimuli, as Festinger (1957) and others have pointed out, are the feelings and attitudes of others. Moreover, it is frequently difficult, and often socially taboo, to discuss one's feelings towards others openly with them. As a result, distortions in interpersonal perception are frequent, and they provide an important avenue for the measurement of attitudes, and hence also, of the individual's interpersonal relations with these others (p. 587).

Sensitivity laboratories do not operate under the social taboos to which Fiedler refers. In the contract group, the participants are not only encouraged to scrutinize the quality of their own awareness, ferreting out tendencies to misinterpret and distort stimuli received from others, but
to be active in having others clarify the ambiguous stimuli which they emit.

(b) Impact. Even if a person does not short-circuit the pathos experience at its very roots, that is, at the level of awareness, he can do so at the level of "impact." It is true that at times feelings and emotions take us by storm; willy-nilly, we are flooded with fear, anger, sexual desire, or some other emotion. But even though a person remains more or less open to emotional stimuli at the level of awareness, he can still learn how to cut off the affective impact of that of which he is aware. While he realizes in a rather detached, intellectual way that he is encountering an emotionally evocative stimulus and can even correctly identify the emotion or emotions that the stimulus is geared to evoke, he has learned how to neutralize the affect-evoking dimension of the stimulus. He has learned not to allow himself to react at all or to react in such an attenuated way that there is no proportion between the stimulus and the strength (or weakness) of the reaction.

Laing (1960) describes a number of syndromes in which the 'logical' defense is to strip one's environment, especially one's interpersonal environment, of its emotional impact. First of all, there are those with such a poor sense of self-possession or identity that they see interpersonal encounter as potentially "engulfing." The best defense in the face of the engulfing presence of another is isolation. Since it is impossible always to manage absolute physical isolation, the next best thing is to preserve emotional isolation. The other is allowed to be present physically, but not emotionally. Secondly, there are those who feel som empty that they fear the "implosion" of reality. If reality, especially affective reality,
were to rush in upon them, this would mean their destruction, for they are their emptiness. In order to get away from the "impingement" of reality, the sufferer learns how to cut off the affective dimensions of his "contacts."

In a third syndrome, the sufferer, rightly or wrongly, perceives himself as being treated as an it by others rather than as a person with feelings; he feels that he is being "petrified." In order to counteract this process of depersonalization, he "petrifies" others first, he refuses to run the risk of experiencing the others as free agents. Interpersonal transactions, therefore when they do take place, become stereotyped "business contacts" with no emotional overtones.

Laing depicts extremes, but perhaps most of us at one time or another are victims of milder forms of the syndromes described. He observes with respect to "implosion" that all of us are literally just a few degrees Fahrenheit away from such an experience, for when we are suffering from even a slight fever, the world can become quite threatening and "impinging."

Whatever the reasons underlying the tendency to eliminate or minimalize the emotional impact of reality and whatever different idiosyncratic patterns or syndromes this process might take, the participants in the contract group contract to determine the extent to which they are victims of such a process. To put things more positive, the group is a laboratory in which the participants try to allow affective reality to have as full and as constructive an impact as possible.

Rogers (1967), in dealing with a psychiatric population, discovered that with respect to the client's in-therapy behavior, the major variable was "the degree of immediacy of the client's experiencing--the degree to
which he is 'in' his experiences or remote from it" (p. 74). This refers to the degree to which the client is open to his feelings, able to "own" them, and to explore them in search of their personal meaning. Rogers goes on to suggest that the neurotic may be one who "looks away" from the felt process of experiencing as it goes on within him. The degree to which a person can be present to his own experiencing indicates the degree to which he is disturbed or self-actualized:

At one end the individual's psychological functioning is rigid, static, undifferentiated, impersonal. Constructs are fixed. He exhibits feelings but does not own them. He is remote from the experiencing going on within him. He is unable to relate. He is unable to communicate himself. He sees himself either as having no problems, or being in no way responsible for the problems which do exist. At the other end of the continuum the individual is functioning in a fluid, changing way, responsive to the ever-changing experiencing which is going on within himself, and responsive to the events going on outside himself. Feelings are experienced with immediacy, are owned, may be expressed when appropriate. The individual is close to his experiencing and refers to it in guiding his behavior. Experience is construed tentatively, and new meanings are drawn from new experience (Rogers, 1966, p. 5).

Hobbs (1962) sees the neurotic as one who cannot be intimate even with himself; he is unable to let himself feel how he actually feels about himself and others. Others (McReynolds, Aker, and Pietila, 1961; Penny, 1965; Zucherman, Kolin, Price, and Zoob, 1964) have found that the anxious tend to avoid sensation-seeking. They restrict interest in the sensual, in excitement, in the new, in the strange, in the unpredictable. If this is the case, then the neurotic has problems with both the awareness and the impact levels of the pathos experience.

Contract-group members are asked to check tendencies to "look away" from their experience or to flee the "intimacy-with-self" that develops from
full emotional openness. Yet, if McReynolds and the rest are right, the laboratory should not be so anxiety-provoking as to cause or encourage the very process of constriction that it is supposed to combat.

Increasing the range of emotional impact: the "subtle" emotions. Most of us are readily aware of the impact of the "heavy" emotions such as anger, fear, sexual desire, depression, and others, especially when they are strong and "make" us aware of their existence, but we are not as aware and as open to their more attenuated or subtle forms or to more subtly nuanced emotions such as wonder, surprise, curiosity, ennui, and caution, to name just a few. The English language is filled with words referring directly or indirectly to these more subtle forms of feeling and emotion, but, though this might give some witness to the reality of such emotions, still it is a reality that does not seem to play the role it should in our interpersonal lives. For instance, when one person meets another for the first few times, he might "like" the other, but "like" merely summarizes a whole group of emotionally-laden variables. Part of this "liking" is a rather wholesome and pleasing curiosity. He is attracted to the other and finds a certain delight in "exploring" the other or in engaging in mutual "exploration." Again, the contract group is a laboratory for learning how to become aware of, experience, and enjoy the whole range of these more subtle emotions. If this is the case, then the laboratory must provide an atmosphere in which such subtle emotions are viable. Too often sensitivity laboratories are rather heavy-footed, providing opportunities only for the more dramatic emotions.

The use of exercises to stimulate emotional awareness. Many laboratories use various exercises to stimulate awareness of some of the emotional
Dimensions of life. Participants are asked to relax, to be quiet and become aware of themselves as body (to become conscious of their own breathing, to listen to the beating of their hearts), to experiment with the "forgotten" senses of taste, touch, and smell. Gunther (1968) considers the process of socialization as one, at least in part, of "desensitization" in a pejorative sense:

Children by nature are sensitive, involved in sense play and exploration... Social and formal education stress the cognitive and motor functions of the organism without regard for sensory development. We teach them non-sense. This lack of sensitivity creates desensitization: an imbalance in being; a loss of feeling; senseless: inhibition-alienation-depression-anxiety-deadness (p. 20).

He has devised any number of exercises or games to enable people to regain contact with the physical realities within and around them. One group exercise in tasting, the "bread ceremony," seems even to reach back deeply into the religious history of man:

Sit in a circle surrounding a loaf of unsliced bread. After sitting quietly, looking at the bread, pass it around the circle. Allow each person to feel its eight and smell its flavor. As the loaf is passed from one person to another, look into each other's eyes. One person slowly (just a fraction of an inch at a time) breaks the bread open. The group watches. The two halves are passed around the circle, each person looking at the inner exposed half and breaking off a piece no bigger than he can chew comfortably. After each person has taken his piece of bread, he closes his eyes. He puts the bread in his mouth and slowly chews, not swallowing until the bread is completely liquefied. Afterward open your eyes and see all of the group (p. 179).

Such exercises may or may not form part of the contract-group culture. However, if exercises and games are to be used emotional awareness and contact, then the participants should know this from the beginning.

(c) Non-verbal reaction: the "passive" element. There are those who,
although they are quite aware of the emotion-provoking stimuli in their environment and even allow these stimuli to have their impact, still short-circuit the pathos experience at the level of expression, even non-verbal expression, if possible. They have learned to control the emission of non-verbal cues which would give others some insight into their interior lives. They seem "unemotional," but this does not really mean that they are devoid of emotion--frequently it is just the opposite--but rather that they have learned to control its expression. Actually they are over-controlled. All of us, at one time or another and for one reason or another, engage in such "control," but over-control becomes problematic only when it is resorted to with some frequency or becomes part of person's life style. Again, the contract-laboratory provides an opportunity for its participants to examine the positive and negative aspects of the "emotional control" they exercise from day to day.

Emotional congruence. Rogers (e.g. 1961, 1967) has long insisted on what he calls "congruence" in the therapeutic relationship:

....each of us knows individuals whom we somehow trust because we sense that they are being what they are, that we are dealing with the person himself, not with a polite or professional front. It is this quality of congruence which we sense which research has found to be associated with successful therapy. The more genuine and congruent the therapist in the relationship, the more probability there is that change in personality in the client will occur (1961, pp. 61-62).

At least part of this congruence is emotional congruence. If the therapist hides his emotions from the client behind a professional facade, then he lacks emotional congruence and is not as effective as he might be. It would seem, however, that lack of congruence is non-therapeutic for the same reason that most kinds of behavior are termed non-therapeutic: it is non-
Some men choose to be emotionally incongruent; they look upon natural, non-verbal emotional reactions as too dangerous, too self-revealing, too intrusive, or too disruptive. And so they opt for a rather drab, expressionless, "archaic-smile" emotional style (for rather lack of style) in appearance and gesture as being both "proper" and safe. The problem is that such emotional asepsis is less than human. When Rogers says that such incongruence is "non-therapeutic," this does not mean that it is non-therapeutic because it falls short of some kind of medical or professional standard, it is non-therapeutic because it falls short of being fully human behavior.

(d) Non-verbal emotional expression: the "active" element. The term "expression" here does not refer to using language to give expression to what one feels. This interpenetration of feeling and language will be considered below under poiesis. "Expression" here refers to the active use of non-verbal forms of emotional expression as part of one's communication style.

As Murphy (1964) notes, non-verbal communication of emotions has not been sufficiently tapped as a source of knowledge of man:

If communication theory is conceived of only in terms of bits of verbal information received, it can miss its most fundamental role; for the world of blushing, blanching, sighing, hinting, and averting the eyes leads into a rich communication world that can be treated as communications and which we can teach our recorders, and magnetic tapes, and our computers to understand and use. We need to understand the whole communication process. The inner structure of man will then be seen more fully in its relation both to the social environment he encounters and the social environment which he is forever creating (p. 101).

Smith (1966) acknowledges this argument and explains that speech is only a small part of the communication process:
people interact not only through words but also through spatial relations...through temporal relations...and people interact through gesture and touch and many other media. They not only send and receive information in these many different ways; they use each of these ways for participating in a communal dialogue, for reciprocating and mediating one another's meanings. Communication is far more comprehensive than language (p. 3).

However, some people—even though they are aware of emotional stimuli, allow these stimuli to have their impact, and react in the sense that they allow their emotions to appear "in public" in their facial expressions, gestures, etc.—still truncate the pathos experience to a certain degree by failing to make active use of these non-verbal forms of affective communication. It is the difference between merely allowing oneself to react and being involved in one's reactions, even taking delight in them, to the extent that they become part of one's active communication style. One can become "active," communication-wise, even in such involuntary reactions as blushing if, sensing one's reaction, one puts oneself "in" one's reaction in such a way as to say, non-verbally: "You have 'caught' me, you have hit upon a vulnerable area, a point of shame."

All laboratory training and especially all sensitivity training laboratories deal with the problems and potentialities of feeling and expressing emotion. The contract laboratory is a place where one can not only experience all the dimensions of the pathos experience including authentic emotional response from others but where the feedback potential of the group provides a unique opportunity for the objective appraisal of the role of emotion in human life.

The Sensitivity Laboratory as Stimulator of Feelings and Emotions.

Lieberman, Lakin, and Whittaker (1968) have found that an important
The capacity of a therapy group is to "induce and release powerful feelings."

In a group

Individuals may be carried away, may experience feelings which they later believe are uncharacteristic of themselves, and may act on feelings without displaying their typical controls.... An individual may experience previously-denied feelings not with enduring terror but with growth--the corrective emotional experience of finding that the feelings are not overwhelming or that the feared consequences do not occur.

In group therapy, participation in group-generated affect may allow the patient to by-pass defenses so that the feared affect may be experienced first, thus rendering the resistance less necessary.

The patient in individual therapy who intimates his innermost feelings to a benign professional person undoubtedly risks far less than the group therapy patient, who may undergo feelings of extreme exhilaration or fear as he reveals himself "in public."

The managing of group affect becomes one of the essential skills of the therapist. This skill involves tamping down contagion where necessary, protecting individuals who need to be exempted from participation in group affect, breaking up group resistance in order for affect to emerge, sensing when to let the affect run on and develop and when to introduce cognitive reflection about the affect (p. 32).

Sensitivity groups, too, generate a good deal of emotion and perhaps experimentation with emotional expression can be more intense than in therapy groups because of the greater initial psychological integration of the participants. The cautions which Lieberman notes, while they should be taken into consideration, refer more specifically to psychiatric populations. Moreover, the safeguards built into the contract-experience, e.g., the emphasis on supportive behavior, go far in making experimentation with emotion as safe an experiment as possible.

Emotion-evoking exercises. In sensitivity groups, emotions are not only allowed to arise naturally from the verbal interaction of the participants, but occasionally at the discretion of the trainer certain "exercises"
are introduced to further stimulate the arousal and expression of emotions. These exercises may be verbal or non-verbal and they may or may not involve physical contact. Exercises involving some form of touch are usually powerful emotional stimulants both in themselves and because we as a people generally refrain from touch as a mode of communication. Tactile communication, according to Frank (1957), is one of the more important forms of non-verbal communication. "Tactile experiences considered as messages and responses are exceedingly diverse and capable of an amazing variety of transformations in human communication, where, as in language, we must recognize both the cultural patterning and the idiosyncratic deviations and elaborations" (p. 209). Perhaps tactile contact is too immediately related to sexuality in our society and therefore we are afraid to explore its communication potential. Be that as it may, it is not suggested here that the kind of contact that takes place during certain laboratory exercises become a way of life. But such contact insofar as it stimulates a variety of feelings and emotions can be "diagnostic" in the very best sense. Frequently it reveals—sometimes dramatically—to a person how hesitant he is to make human contact, how far away from others he really is, or how little or how ineffectual he makes use of emotion in his attempts to relate to others.

"Manufacturing" emotion. It may be objected that the participants in sensitivity laboratories are called to "manufacture" feelings and emotions ("feelings-by-contract"). Rather they are asked not to suppress at any "stage" the feelings and emotions that arise naturally in the group and to give themselves to exercises designed to stimulate emotion. Berne (1966) claims that expression of real feeling rarely takes place in therapy groups
and that the feelings that are expressed are actually "socialized" feelings.

Whether this is true or not of therapy groups (and even if it is true de facto, I do not believe that it need be true, it is my experience that there is a good deal of authentic emotion in sensitivity groups enough to dramatize to most participants their areas of strength and areas of deficit in the area of emotional living.

Emotion as a dimension of laboratory interaction. Emotion has been discussed here somewhat abstractively, but in the laboratory the participants do not express emotions abstractly. They do so in the context of the interactions of the meeting. This can be done in several ways. First of all, and this is the usual case, emotion is expressed as a dimension of the variety of interactions in which the participant engages. For instance, when someone engages in self-disclosure, he does so with some (and perhaps a good deal of) emotion. Likewise emotion can be (and in some sense should be) a dimension of other kinds of interaction, e.g. support, confrontation, self-exploration. Secondly, a person might talk about his emotions directly. He might say, for instance, that he is very angry. However, if a person merely talks about his emotions without giving expression to them in some way, he usually appears too cold and controlled, and the others wonder whether he really "owns" his emotions or not. Finally, emotion can be expressed non-verbally. A person may cry or throw his arms around another person or stalk off from the group. The laboratory encourages the expression of emotion if emotion is really felt, but does not demand emotion for the sake of emotion.

LOGOS: MAN'S TRANSLATION OF HIMSELF INTO LANGUAGE
Introduction
The contract group contracts to *logos*, effective interpersonal communication through human language. It has been assumed above that an unspecified number of men suffer from emasculation in their emotional life. Now it is also assumed that many men also suffer a concomitant emasculation in the quality of their verbal communication, in their ability to use language as a mode of interpersonal contact.

*Logos*, when used as a generic term, refers to man's interaction with man in terms of human language, the way a man translates himself into language. While it is true (1) that both philosophers and behavioral scientists have theorized about the phenomenon of language as a form of what Lorenz (1955) calls "expressive behavior," that is, as a reflection of the structure of personality (e.g. Buhler, 1934; Cassirer, 1953; Hodges, 1952; Honingfeld, Platz, & Gillis, 1964; Moscovici, 1967; Piaget, 1952; Stout, 1902; Von Hartmann, 1884; Wittgenstein, 1922), and that (2) there have always been those who have been interested in the language differences existing between psychiatric and normal populations (e.g. Forrest, 1965; Glauber, 1944; Gottschalk, 1961; Johnson, 1944; Lorenz, 1955; Newman, 1938; Sanford, 1942; Sherman, 1938; Spiegel, 1959; Wender, 1967) and that (3) more or less molecular psychological studies are increasing man's understanding of the phenomenon of language and verbal behavior (e.g. Cofer & Musgrave, 1963; Dixon & Horton, 1968; Kansler, 1966; Mehrabian, 1966; Salzinger, 1967; Wiener & Mehrabian, 1968), still little of this theorizing and research has been translated in such a way as to become useful in dealing with people, either normal or abnormal, on a "clinical" or applied level. More attention must be given to such molar dimensions of language as the quality of man's
verbal expression in his interpersonal contacts. As Wiener and Mehrabian (1968) note, it is too fruitful an area of interpersonal discovery to ignore:

Anyone who listens carefully to the way people say things quickly learns that the particular words a speaker uses to describe an event or experience can be a rich source of information about his feelings and attitudes. The bases for making these kinds of inferences are not usually explicit, although members of a communication group appear to respond regularly to these subtle variations in word usage (p. 1).

Laboratory learning situations seem to provide excellent opportunities for such research and for the application of research findings. What follows is a brief indication of the aspects of language that might be profitably considered and experimented with in a sensitivity laboratory. The laboratory experience is an opportunity for the participants to examine man-as-one-who-speaks by subjecting their own verbal interactions to the scrutiny of the group.

The Problems and Potentialities of Language

Problems. There are various ways in which people underuse or abuse language in interpersonal situations and many reasons why they do so. Some language problems stem directly from and reflect varying degrees of psychopathology. Bettelheim (1967) discusses children who have surrendered the use of language because of parental disapproval, their mutism being an indication that they have given up any hope of influencing the world. This surrender of speech closes a vicious circle:

Once the child has even stopped communicating with others, his self becomes impoverished, the more so the longer his mutism lasts, and the more so the longer his personality remains underdeveloped at the time of the onset of withdrawal (p. 56).

If this [mutism] happens before he has fully learned to manipulate
symbolic forms, before the age of three or four, then the child also fails to develop the higher intellectual processes (p. 57).

Erikson (1954) discovered that one of the outcomes of traumatic war experiences was a distrust and devaluation of language. Meerloo (1952) found neurosis manifested in language-use disturbances: "The insecure neurotic shrinks from free word-play; he tries to manipulate words mechanically, like machinery. He fears the adventure of communication" (p. 87). Ruesch (1957) sees the origin of communication problems in parents' inability to adapt themselves to the maturation level of their children. According to Ruesch, three types of language are learned in succession: somatic, action, and verbal. If parents do not adapt their language to the developmental stage of their children, while at the same time offering encouragement to improve verbal language proficiency, then communication disturbances may arise in their children.

Language problems arise out of and reflect not only psychopathology in the strict sense; they also reflect the psychopathology of the average. Many "normal" men fear the communication process because of more or less normal fears of involving themselves deeply with others. They neither pour themselves into their language in interpersonal situations nor do they expect others to do so. Language must remain on a "safe" level. They habitually put "filters" between what they really think and feel and what they say. This results in exanguinated or muddied, but "safe," communication. Some men engage in language that is overly precise—they ask too much of language—while others engage in language that is too vague—that is, they ask too little of language, both both extremes are usually defensive measures,
ays of keeping interpersonal contacts at "acceptable" levels of intensity. Men are victims of poor education in language. They have lived in families or in societies that have been afraid of open communication with the result that patterns of language are not available to them to express what they would like to express. This conversation or language anemia is recognized by the novel writer:

Even in modern-novel dialogue the most real is not the most conformable to actual current speech. One has only to read a transcribed tape of actual conversation to realize that it is, in the literary context, not very real. Novel dialogue is a form of shorthand, an impression of what people actually say; and besides that, it has to perform other function--to keep the narrative moving (which real conversation rarely does), to reveal character (real conversation often hides it), and so on (Fowles, 1968, p. 89).

Men read novels not only for vicarious pathos but also for vicarious logos, the meaningful talk that is missing from their lives.

In societies which subtly discourage or limit conversational freedom and deeper interpersonal contact through language, some men abandon (at least in a relative sense) language either because it is useless as an instrument of deep human communication or because the patterns of language "allowed" are seen as identified with the "establishment" that is being rejected. In the case of the present "hippy" culture, this flight-from-language involves both (1) the creation of an argot that reflects a break from the values of society that are seen as useless or oppressive while emphasizing the values of the sub-culture and (2) an often irresponsible immersion in the pathos dimensions of living. A counter language evolves and a counter pathos-society is established parallel to or outside the confines of the society being rejected.

Potentialities. Despite the problems involved in exsanguinated
language and communication, language is still one of the most dramatic ways in which man differs from other animals. Stout (1902) sees language as an instrument by means of which man examines the world around him. If he is afraid of this world, his language will be anemic and feeble, but if he loves the world and is challenged by it, his language will be strong and searching. To adapt a phrase from Wittgenstein (1922), the limits of a person's language are the limits of his world. Cioran (1968) sees silence as unbearable and would find it easier to renounce bread than speech. He claims that one cannot withdraw one's confidence from words "without setting one's foot in the abyss." Language exposes, reveals both individuals and societies: "Words, at least in traditional societies, often express far more than feelings or ideas. The way words are used—in tales, riddles, proverbs, and typical modes of address and conversation—can reveal a great deal about the structure and values of a society" (Abrahams, 1968, p. 62).

Novelists and writers frequently have, if not deeper, at least more striking, distinctive, and challenging insights into the nature and force of human language than do behavioral scientists. Writers continually try to enlarge the possibilities of language. D.H. Lawrence, Virginia Woolf, and James Joyce never hesitated to experiment with verbal symbols that would most fully convey what they experienced. As Burgess (1968) notes: "Language, of its very nature, resists tautology; it wants to launch out, risk lies, say the thing which is not."

Brian Friel's entire play Philadelphia Here I Come is based on the distinction between what the leading character really thinks and feels and would like to say and what he actually says. In the play there are two
levels of conversation—the vague, hesitant, compliant, failed bravado of the
man who is about to leave his father in Ireland to seek a new way of life in
the United States and the vigorous speech of the son’s "inner core" (played
by a separate character). The pity of it all is that, although the audience
is electrified by what the "inner man" says, yet it knows that his speech
really dies (and in a sense the son dies with it) because it is never spoken.
The man who chains up his language chains up himself.

The contract group is a laboratory in which the participants can
experiment with the potentialities of language. The purpose of what is said
here is not to apotheosize language, for as Lynd (1958) notes, language is
sometimes a sensitive instrument and sometimes a clumsy tool of communication.
But when a man enlarges the possibilities of his language, he enlarges his own
possibilities. The laboratory gives him the opportunity to extend the range
of language in order to contact himself and others at deeper levels. In the
safety of the laboratory he can run risks in his use of language that he could
cannot outside. The following discussion of language might serve as a basis for
this experimentation.

Different kinds of language

In keeping with the consideration of language from a molar, interactional
point of view, perhaps the following distinction—again, despite the fact that
they are somewhat abstractive—might give direction to the discussion that
follows.

1) Logos. Logos, in the strict or restricted sense, refers to man's
ability to translate his real self into language. Logos is language filled
with the person who is speaking and therefore refers to his ability to use
Speech in order to express his identity. It also refers to the use man makes of speech in order to establish some kind of growthful interpersonal contact. Negatively, it is the refusal to use speech merely to fill interactional space and time or as a smokescreen or shield behind which to hide.

Just as there are different kinds of truly human contact and various degrees or levels of such contact, so there are different kinds of logos. If a man talks meaningfully about his political or religious beliefs, this is logos. Logos need not be self-disclosure in the sense discussed in chapter VII, but, in that it is meaningful speech, it will always provide some insight into the identity of the speaker. Meaningful speech with an intimate friend will be on a different level from meaningful speech with one's fellow workers. The special ability to allow one's language to express not only one's thoughts but also the feelings and the emotions that surround these thoughts is a special kind of logos called poiesis. Poiesis will be treated separately below.

Logos must be clearly differentiated from the ability to speak fluently and elegantly, for both fluency and elegance are at times used to camouflage rather than reveal one's identity. It would also seem necessary to distinguish logos from the ability to speak "insightfully" about oneself, a quality which as traditionally been seen as a favorable condition, if not a pre-requisite, for effective participation in psychotherapy, an hypothesis that is being seriously challenged today (Carkhuff and Berenson, 1967; London, 1964). Logos here means translating or handing oneself over to others through the medium of speech, whatever the esthetic value of the language used.
Logos implies a respect for language as a form of communication and contact. It implies dialogue, and, as Matson and Montagu (1967) point out, for certain contemporary existentialist thinkers, authentic existence is communication, life is dialogue. Dialogue is certainly the life of the contract group. That is why the group member, by contract, is expected to examine his use of speech. If he is to develop "new ways" of being present to the members of the group, he must discover "new ways" of speaking and perhaps develop a new respect for language.

Dialogue in the sense in which it is being used here is opposed to "game" communication. Dialogue is "game-free" or at least an attempt to make communication "game-free." Rapoport (1964) and Wiener (1950), both of whom have made significant contributions to the mathematical theory of games, caution against the use of game-theory as a basis for human communication. Rapoport finds dialogue with the "strategist" impossible, for the basic question in the strategist's mind is: in a conflict how can I gain an advantage over my opponent? Rapoport thinks that the much more basically human question is: If I can gain an advantage over another, what sort of person will I become? The "cybernetic" man is basically monological, not dialogical, and for him communication is intimately wedded to control, the control of the other. Berne (1966) uses "game" in a somewhat different sense. The "games people play" are ways of avoiding intimacy in human relationships. The "game" prevents dialogue. Berne goes so far as to say that the most that one can expect in a psychotherapeutic group is the discovery and analysis of the "games" played there. Real intimacy, he says, is almost never found in such group situations. It is the contention of this paper that the members
If a contract interpersonal growth group can establish dialogue, can free themselves to great extent from a "game" approach to one another, and can establish not just the social imitation of intimacy that Berne speaks of, but real human intimacy.

(9) Commercial-speech. "Commercial-speech" refers to the language of the "market-place," the use of language in the "commercial" transactions of men. Such language is lean, utilitarian, pragmatic; it deals with objects rather than persons, for it is a medium of exchange rather than of interpersonal contact. Much of such language today is left to computers. It would be of no interest to us here were it not for the fact that there are people who use commercial-speech as their principal mode of speech in interpersonal transactions. They see people as objects to be manipulated rather than persons to be contacted and this is reflected in the quality of their speech.

If speech is principally "commercial," then, as McLuhan (1964) suggests, it can be dispensed with: "Electric technology does not need words any more than the digital computer needs numbers" (p. 80). However, the utopia he envisions which is characterized by a "speechlessness that could confer a perpetuity of collective harmony and peace" arising out of a "collective awareness that may have been the preverbal condition of man" (p. 80) is antithetical to man himself. Speech defines man. It is just strange that he makes such poor use of it in his effort to humanize himself.

(3) Cliche-talk. "Cliche-talk" refers to "anemic," language, speech in the sense of talk-for-the-sake-of-talk, conversation-without-depth, language that neither makes contact with the other or reveals the identity of the
speaker (except negatively in the sense that he is revealed as one who does not want to make contact or does not want to be known). Cliche-talk fosters ritualistic rather than fully human contact ("Do you think that it is really going to rain?"--"The way they're playing, they'll be in first place by the first of September!"). Cliche-talk fills interactional space-and-time without adding meaning, for it is superficial and comes without reflection. Perhaps it is the person who is over-committed to maintenance-functions (see Introduction), a person who is either unaware (because he lacks the requisite social intelligence) or afraid of possibilities, for further interpersonal growth, whose speech will be predominantly cliche-talk.

People usually listen politely to cliche-talk, especially when it is pseudo-logos, that is, dressed up or doctored to sound important:

When a conversation fails to capture the spontaneous involvement of an individual who is obliged to participate in it, he is likely to contrive an appearance of being involved. This he must do to save the feelings of the other participants and their good opinion of him, regardless of his motives for wanting to effect this saving (Goffman, 1967, p. 126).

If the needs of the listener are such that he is willing to put up with the boredom of cliche-talk in order to enjoy the safety that is found in ritual, then the circle is complete and the field is wide open for such conversation.

One of the most common forms of cliche-talk in our culture (and perhaps this is a transcultural phenomenon) is "griping," a more or less superficial communication of dissatisfaction with persons, institutions, or things outside oneself. It is one of the few verbal expressions of feeling allowed in public, and it is probably allowed because it is a ritual and most rituals safe. The trouble with chronic griping is that it is a fixative. As Ellis (1962) points out, a person's verbalizations to himself and others...
stand in the way of change; "forces outside of me control me;" "I can do nothing to change."

Cliche-talk is just words, while logos always connotes human contact. Some people speak endlessly about themselves and say nothing (if they were really disclosing themselves, others would not find it boring). They say nothing about themselves because they have no real feeling for themselves—they are deficient in the pathos dimension of life—and could hardly be expected to relate what they do not experience. Such people simply are not using speech as a mode of contact. For them speech is solipsistic, self-centered, centripetal. It is monologue rather than dialogue.

(4) Anti-logos. When language is actually used to destroy growthful interpersonal contact rather than foster it, then it is anti-logos. There are a number of forms of speech that are really violations rather than uses of language. For instance, in the heat of anger language can be used as a weapon, a tool of destruction rather than an instrument of growthful encounter. When a married couple stand shouting at each other (often saying things they do not really mean), language becomes completely swallowed up in emotion; it loses its identity as language. At such times it actually has more in common with a sledge-hammer than speech. Lying, too, can be a form of anti-logos, for deception cannot be the basis of growthful interpersonal contact. The speech of the psychopath, for example, is frequently, if not continually, anti-logos, for he uses speech to create situations that do not exist, to manipulate others rather than to engage in growthful encounters with them. Finally, the language of the psychotic, while it might have its own peculiar logic (and without discounting the possibility that a psychosis
may be a desperate form of revolt against a "sick" family or society—see 
Tang, 1967), is frequently anti-logos. The psychotic, at least at times, 
appears to use language to drive others away. He fears human contact so 
deply that he reverses the function of language, making it a barrier instead 
of a bridge.

Another way of conceptualizing anti-logos is to see it as the kind of 
expression proportioned to high deficiency-functioning (see Introduction). 
The stronger the influence of deficiency-needs in a person's life, the more 
likely he is to engage in some form of anti-logos.

Most men engage in all four kinds of speech at one time or another. 
They use commercial-speech not only in strictly commercial transactions, but 
allow it to slip occasionally into interpersonal encounters. Indeed, life 
without some cliche-talk would be intolerably intense for most men. It is a 
question, however, of proportion and most men need to find ways of increasing 
the amount of logos (in the restricted sense) in their lives. The sensitivity 
laboratory affords an opportunity of discovering ways how to do just that.

Language: Content, Invitation, and Self-Expression

That Buhler's (1934) analysis of the functions of language strikes at a 
phenomenological core is evidenced by the number of writers who use his 
analysis as a basis for a further discussion of the nature and use of 
language. Language, according to Buhler, (1) has content, (2) is an 
invitation, and (3) involves self-disclosure or self-expression. First of 
all, language has content, that is, it signifies or represents something; 
the speaker communicates, explains, or verifies something. Insofar as speech 
merely imparts information, it is functioning at its lowest, impersonal level.
And yet many people have difficulties even at this point, that is, they have difficulties in making language a clear conveyer of their ideas. It is extremely important, however, for a person to know whether what he says comes across with the requisite degree of clarity. If the manifest content of a person's language during group sessions is not clear, it does not help if others are "polite" and pretend to understand a muddled message. It happens that some people in affective situations defend themselves by dealing in unclear content. If this is the case, it takes courage but it is also a sign of interest in the other if a listener says: "I don't know about the others, but I really didn't understand what you just said." It is amazing how often group members allow muddled or unintelligible communications to go by without any kind of responsible challenge. On the other hand, there are those who habitually strip language of other than utilitarian content functions. They take pains to see to it that the content of their communications are clear, but for them speech is defined as nothing more than commercial-speech. But even this attempt at restricting the function of language is itself a disclosure of the personality of the speaker.

Secondly, speech is always some kind of invitation, challenge, or summons. It is at the very least a request to be heard, even when it is being used as a means of driving others away. When a person speaks, he does so in order to be heard, his speech is a call for a response. The response is expected to be proportioned to the nature of the invitation or challenge: a command requires obedience, a petition hopes for a concession, a promise expects trust, an explanation demands attention, testimony looks for faith, and so forth. Therefore, speech not only has explicit content, but it also
contains implicit "messages" for the listener: it tells him to come close or
away, to take a particular stance, to become active or remain passive,
and so forth. It is not just the ability to understand the explicit content
of language that makes a person a good listener but rather a sensitivity to
the other "messages" embedded in language. In the contract group the
participants are asked to reflect on their use of language in terms of the
invitations or challenges that it implies. A participant's language might
be an invitation to affective contact or it might be a command to stand clear.
It is important for participants to come to some understanding of the
habitual invitations, summonses, and challenges characterizing their speech.

Finally, speech always involves some degree of self-revelation, even
when the speaker uses it as a means of hiding himself ("Even thy speech
betrays thee"), for he then reveals himself as one who is afraid of the
intimacy of dialogue. But speech for the non-defensive person or for the
person who is attempting a responsible relaxing of his defenses becomes self-
expression in a most positive way, even though he is not speaking directly
about himself. When a person becomes less defensive, two things happen with
respect to his use of language: he puts more of himself into his speech and
he initiates a truer communication with the other by aiming at the other
directly in himself as a person. If the other responds in a non-defensive
way, then dialogue becomes a reciprocal opening up, a mutual revelation. But,
if this is to happen, both the speaker and the one addressed must respect
one another in the mysteriousness of their personalities and there must be
both mutual trust and mutual availability. Only under these conditions does
language lose its fetters and take on the strength and color of the person-
ilities of those who use it. Much will be said about self-disclosure in the contract-group; the participants are encouraged to examine their use of language in order to discover how much of themselves they really do disclose through their use of language. It may well be that by the way they express themselves they are disclosing precisely what they think that they must hide.

The Function of Language in Organizing Reality

Sapir (Mandelbaum, 1949) and Whorf (Carroll, 1956) suggested one more function for language in a proposition that has been called the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which states that language functions not simply as a means of reporting and communicating experience but also as a way of defining experience (see Wiener & Mehrabian, 1968, pp. 5-10). Language is an instrument that actually shapes perception to some degree. Lynd (1958) also recognizes the ability of language to influence perception:

In his study of "Memory and Childhood Amnesia" Schachtel (1947) gives a particularly illuminating account of the way in which language inevitably reflects the dominant preoccupations and the limitations of a society. By such reflection it restricts perception and experience unless refreshed by innovation. Certain kinds of experience may be buried or lost because the culture provides no language through which they can be expressed (p. 247).

Schachtel (1947) sees the ability of socialized language to turn experience into a cliche: "The capacity to see and feel what is there gives way to the tendency to see and feel what one expects to see and feel, which, in turn, is what one is expected to see and feel because everybody does. Experience increasingly assumes the form of the cliche..." (pp. 12-13). But Lynd does admit that language is a two-edge sword, that although acquiring a language frequently means a dulling and conventionalizing of perception, it is also
possible "for the use of words to quicken, not to deaden, awareness" (p. 171).

Though language hardly creates reality, it is one of the organizers of perceived reality and as such can perhaps reveal a good deal about the inner organization of the speaker. If this is the case, then the participant who is aware of his use of language has found another "diagnostic" tool by which to gauge his personal and interpersonal life.

Translation "Messages" into Logos

When two or more people are talking, there are usually at least two levels of communication: (1) what is de facto conveyed by the verbal interchange (the "content" mentioned above) and (2) a variety of other "messages" that are transmitted in a number of different ways, e.g., the qualities of the verbal exchange itself such as speed, tone, inflection, intensity, and emotional "color" and nonverbal cues such as eye contact, bodily stance, facial expressions, and gestures. These "messages" are similar to what Ruesch (1963; see also Ruesch and Bateson, 1951) refers to as "meta-communicative processes," the purpose of which is to interpret or classify the content of the verbal message or to send a parallel message more or less unrelated to verbal content. These meta-communications can even negate or deny the explicit meaning of the verbal message (for instance, it is a rather common occurrence to hear "no" on an explicit verbal level and at the same time to experience "yes" on a metacommunicative level, the latter being the "real" message). As Berne (1966) notes, the metacommunicative "message" might even substitute for some kind of tactile stimulus:

Game analysis is grounded on the principle that the human organism can accept, up to a point, visual, auditory, and symbolic recognition signals as a substitute for direct tactile stimulation of
received (that is, people would "read" one another, if asked to do so, on a meta-communicative level even though they might seldom verbalize the fact that they have either sent or received such messages), still people would differ in their sensitivity to meta-communicative messages and in the number and kinds of messages sent out over non-verbal rather than verbal routes.

One of the functions of the contract group is to become aware of the metacommunicative dimensions of language and then, as opportunities arise in the give-and-take of group interaction, to attempt to translate meta-communications into logos. This means first of all becoming aware of oneself as transmitter of such messages and translating them into verbal language and secondly becoming aware of the "messages" of others and confronting them with "translations." Obvious, this does not mean that one should be on the watch for and attempt to translate all meta-communications, for this would be to err in the opposite direction and make the communication process intolerable. The meta-communication process is a kind of communication shorthand and, if used correctly, facilitates the communication process. However, both vague and never-translated meta-communicative messages can clog or muddy interpersonal contact. Excessive reliance on meta-communication might also manifest an implicit distrust of language. At any rate, all interpersonal communications problems are fair game for the contract group.

Language and Self-Identity

One of the messages of G. B. Shaw's Pygmalion is that in some fashion language makes the person. Differences in the use of language not only reflect class differences in society but language actually helps create and maintain the differences in values that separate one class from another.
For instance, a person from a lower class might speak quite freely about sexual matters and do so in public, while a member of an upper class might not feel free to speak about sexuality at all. Language, then, is an instrument of reinforcement regarding the different approaches to sexuality that exist in the two classes. What is true with respect to social identity is also true in the area of self-identity. Self-identity is one of those heuristic "impact-concepts" that is just beginning to be translated into operational terms and subjected to controlled investigation (e.g. Bronson, 1959; Hess, 1963). Language not only reveals a person's identity, "who he is," but in some way it makes him the person he is. The literary dictum, Le style c'est l'homme même, can also be applied to a person's style of speaking: La parole c'est l'homme même. If a person's language is weak, insipid, cliche-ridden, and consistently ritualistic in social situations, this says much about the person's ability and willingness to relate both to himself and to others. Language not only reflects his encapsulation but becomes one of the instruments of his self-imprisonment.

Erikson (1956) sees the relationship between language and self-identity as developing early during the maturational process:

...[A] child...learning to speak...is acquiring one of the prime functions supporting a sense of individual autonomy and one of the prime techniques for expanding the radius of give-and-take...Speech...defines him as one responded to by those around him with changed diction and attention...[A] spoken word is a pact: there is an irrevocably committing aspect to an utterance remembered by others....[The child may come to develop, in use of voice and word, a particular combination of whining or singing, judging or arguing, as part of a new element of the future identity, namely, the element 'one who speaks and is spoken to in such-and-such a way'... (p. 115).
Erikson (1963) also discusses the case of a man who wanted to bury his past, to break with certain aspects of his self-identity. One of the things he did was to pursue graduate studies in a foreign language. Erikson suggests that this new language, both in terms of a new career, a new medium of expression, and a new culture, may well have offered his client an opportunity to establish a different self-picture.

It is hypothesized, then, that language reveals certain dimensions of a person's life style and also creates and serves to maintain certain patterns of living and interacting. Ryle (1952), for instance, suggests that personality differences exist between those who use dispositional verbs such as believe, wonder, suppose, and aspire, which signify ability, tendency, and proneness-to, and those who deal principally in modal verbs such as does, can, and must. The person who constantly believes, wonders, and supposes is seen to be differently oriented toward reality from the person who disposes of reality in terms of what does, can, or must happen.

Identity crises (Erikson, 1956, 1963, 1964), too, are reflected in the use of language. The adolescent who, according to Erikson, goes through a kind of natural period of identity diffusion and a moratorium in which society allows him to experiment with a number of different roles, speaks the specialized language of his sub-culture. Language becomes one of the ways in which he declares that he is not just an appendage of parents, church, school, and society in general, but a person in his own right.

The contract group, then, is a laboratory in which the participants have the opportunity to reflect on the implications of the propositions: "My language is me," and "In some way I use language to make myself what
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It is an opportunity to examine the ways in which they use logos, commercial-speech, cliche-talk, and anti-logos to fashion a communication life-style.

**Logos in the Contract Group**

The contract group obviously calls for logos rather than any form of commercial-speech, cliche-talk, or anti-logos. Moreover the contract specifies the kind of logos that is acceptable during group sessions. Therefore, with respect to the contract group, logos can be divided into both contractual and a-contractual logos. For instance, if a participant begins seriously to spell out his views on the current political situation but in no way relates what he is doing to contractual goals (e.g. rendering the there-and-then here-and-now), given the ordinary sensitivity contract, he would probably be engaging in a-contractual logos. Engaging in a-contractual logos is frequently a fairly sophisticated form of flight from group process, for while a-contractual logos might well be meaningful in itself, it is not so in the context of the contract group. It is one thing if a member speaks about values, another if he speaks meaningfully and feelingly about his values. The latter is contractual, while the former is a-contractual logos. Group members often hesitate to challenge the member engaged in a-contractual logos because they feel that they would be keeping him from doing something that is good in itself.

The general rule is that logos in the group stimulates logos. If a person uses language powerfully in the group, others will tend to follow his lead. Therefore, one of the functions of the leader-member is to model logos. However, he must do so intelligently, that is, he must proportion his
manner of speaking to the ability of others to listen. His language must be
spur rather than a club. Goffman (1967) suggests that this might well mean,
least in the first sessions of the group, "scaling down" one's expression
in the service of dialogue:

These two tendencies, that of the speaker to scale down his
expressions and that of the listeners to scale up their
interests, each in the light of the other's capacities and
demands, form the bridge that people build to one another,
allowing them to meet for a moment of talk in a communion
of reciprocally sustained involvement (pp. 116-117).

However, this line of reasoning should not be used as an excuse to keep talk
at a "safe" level.

In my own experience I have seen ill-timed and ill-controlled logos
(which then really becomes anti-logos) inhibit and even destroy group process.
Once one group member, tried of the anemic communication that characterized
the first couple of meetings, spoke with such dramatic force about himself-as-
problematic and the group-as-anemic that he frightened the other members into
shutting off communication rather than upgrading it. Instead of challenging
the group from the start, he allowed his frustration to build up until it
burst forth in language that could not be handled by the group. On the
other hand, I frequently (but not frequently enough) find myself stimulated
by the "strong talk" of a number of my friends. Their logos awakens logos
within me and I find myself both thinking thoughts, feeling emotions, and
giving expression to both with a depth that surprises me. It is as if the
third thing, dialogue, is greater than its parts, which are my thoughts and
feelings and those of my friend taken separately. This kind of mutual
stimulation is the goal of the contract group.
The Extra-Linguistic Dimensions of Speech

Much can be learned about a person, not only from the verbal content of his communications (the content can be strong, cliché-ridden, ambiguous, weak, etc.), but also from the quality of the voice in delivery, or as Wiener and Mahraphian (1968) put it, from "variations in tonal qualities, patterns of stress, pitch, and pauses which are not dictated by the required linguistic form" (p. 51). For example, a person may claim that he is not anxious but betray his anxiety quite openly in the tone, pitch, and timbre of his voice: "An insecure person...may speak in complex, involved or even unfinished sentences, with poor pitch and volume control, and with frequent nervous mannerisms" (Mahl & Schulze, 1964, p. 51). Voice quality, rhythm, continuity, speech rate, and verbal output all communicate something to the listener, or, from a more active point of view, the speaker has all of these extra-linguistic factors at his disposal, to use, as he sees fit, to increase the effectiveness of his communication. In a sense, there are two kinds of extra-linguistic phenomena: (a) those related to speech itself (e.g. pitch, tone, etc.), and (b) those forms of behavior which, although they "communicate," are more or less separable from speech in the strict sense. Such non-verbal behavior, as it is called, is a subject of intense interest and debate in sensitivity-training laboratories and, as such, deserves separate consideration.

LOGOS: NON-VERBAL COMMUNICATION IN THE LABORATORY

The scientific study of non-verbal communication. Although it is a truism that non-verbal behavior plays an extremely important part in the entire communication process, some have suggested that its scientific study
La Barre (1964) takes strong exception to such a suggestion:

It is easy to ridicule kinesiology as an abstruse, pedantic, and unimportant study by pure scientists. But I believe that kinesiology is, on the contrary, one of the most important avenues for better understanding internationally. Consider, as one small example, how Chinese hate to be touched, slapped on the back, or even to shake hands; how easily an American could avoid offense by merely omitting these intended gestures of friendliness! Misunderstanding of nonverbal communication of an unconscious kind is one of the most vexing, and unnecessary sources of international friction. (Consider, for example, the hands-over-the-head self-handshake of Khrushchev which Americans interpreted as an arrogant gesture of triumph, as of a victorious prize-fighter, whereas Krushchev seems to have intended it as a friendly gesture of international brotherhood.) (p. 218).

Birdwhistell (1952, 1961, 1963a, 1963b) and Hall (1959, 1963a, 1963b, 1964, 1966) have both elaborated categories which relate body movements, including gestures and facial expressions, to the process of communication. Davitz (1964) has reviewed the literature on the interpretation of emotions from facial expressions and researchers such as Ekman (1965) and Ekman and Friesen (1967) continue to do research in this area. Dittman (1963) is another who studies the relation of bodily movement to communication. La Barre (1964) discusses (not without humor) a wide variety of non-verbal communicative behavior--greetings, kissing, sticking out the tongue (in China "a quick, minimal tongue-protrusion and retraction signifies embarrassment and self-castigation" [p. 200]), gestures of contempt (Neapolitans click the right thumbnail off the right canine in a downward arc" [p. 201]), gestures of politeness ("a Shan may bend over and snuff the sleeve of the benefactor's coat" [p. 202]), conventionalized motor acts (e.g., in both Oriental and Occidental acting), and conversational gestures (e.g., "the shaken right
forefinger of accusation, sharp criticism, and threat" [p. 203])—on a cross-cultural basis. On the other hand, while there is a good deal of talk about the non-verbal dimensions of sensitivity-training and even though many laboratories use non-verbal exercises in group interaction, I know of no systematic study of this phenomenon. Perhaps many of the studies mentioned above could begin to lay a theoretical foundation for their use.

Non-verbal communication is always present in the sensitivity-training group, but in different ways. The following division might help conceptualize the presence of such behavior in training groups:

(1) Inadvertent non-verbal communications. First of all, since the participants are physically present in the group, they are continually giving off communication cues by their facial expressions and bodily posture both as a complement to their verbalizations and when they are silent. They grimace, sit on the edge of their chairs, yawn, cough, bury their hands in their faces, cast their eyes down, wring their hands, scratch their heads, cry, and engage in a whole host of communicative non-verbal acts. Very often such acts give some evidence about how they are feeling at the moment, but at other times these acts seem ambiguous, out of place, or even contradict the verbal portion of the participant's message. For instance, I once videotaped the last session of a laboratory course in interpersonal relations. One of the participants engaged in a fairly lengthy remark on how much he had liked the experience, how interesting and worthwhile it was, etc. However, his voice was flat, without affect, he could hardly be heard by the other members, he was slouched down in his chair, and he made no eye contact with any of the other members. In a word, his entire tone and posture belied
that he was saying, a fact that was not lost on him during the replay of the tape.

(2) **Advertent non-verbal communication without physical contact.** A participant may intentionally emit some form of non-verbal behavior in order to make psychological contact with another participant or the group as a whole. He may groan, wink, smile and engage in a variety of other non-contactive acts in order to transmit some message. The person who scratches his head might unwittingly be saying something about his perplexity and/or anxiety, while the participant who winks at another is actively using a non-verbal channel in order to communicate (e.g. he may be flirting or he may be engaging in a form of non-verbal support).

(3) **Advertent non-verbal communication with physical contact.** A third category, and this is the kind of non-verbal behavior that is the object of most of the controversy and/or discussion, involves actual physical contact—e.g., touching, holding, hugging, kissing, pushing, swinging, "passing," etc. Sometimes such non-verbal behavior takes place "naturally" within the group, e.g., one participant, after disclosing himself at a rather deep level, begins to cry, and a second participant puts his arm around him to give him support. Other forms of physical contact can take place through exercises designed to have the participant feel the effects of physical contact. Some exercises involve dyads. For instance Gunther (1968) suggests an exercise called "back talk":

[T]he couple stands back to back with eyes closed, and through movement get to know each other's backs. Have a non-verbal conversation with your backs. (One person rubs; the other listens; take turns.) Have a back argument. Make up. Be very gentle, playful. Move up and down at various speeds.
Eventually stand quietly back to back and slowly separate. Experience your back—how you feel. Turn around, open your eyes and see your partner (p. 118).

Other exercises may involve the whole group, e.g., "under the sheets":

Each person goes under a sheet and stays quiet for 5 minutes. They are allowed to do anything they want to, except to move around the room. The move about the room, contact/encounter other people or groups as long as each stays under his own sheet. Be open to your desires and let whatever action-reaction that wants to happen occur. No talking during the experience. When it is over, experience how you feel; come out from under the sheet (Gunther, 1968, pp. 174-175).

Such exercises are frequently quite diagnostic: they quickly reveal areas of emotional constriction. For example, during a "processing" session which took place immediately after a few simple non-verbal exercises involving physical contact, one of the participants, who had been obviously rigid during the exercises, made a statement something like this: "I really feel somewhat disturbed, not by the exercises but by my reaction to them. Over the past couple of years I have become much more at home with myself and with others. I felt that I was more or less in possession of myself both on the personal and interpersonal level. These exercises this morning disturbed me because I did experience my rigidity, I did see dramatically that not everything has been worked out, I did see that I am still afraid of intimacy with perhaps both myself and others." Insofar as these exercises are diagnostic, they aid the process of communication in the sense that they put the participant in more effective (though sometimes painful) contact with himself. Such communication—within-self serves as a basis for more effective communication with others.

The anxiety and the value inherent in physical contact. Physical
Contact in our society is anxiety-arousing. First of all, it is an expression of intimacy and many of us are afraid of intimacy. Secondly, physical contact in our society seems to be over-identified with sexuality; it is not seen as a universal mode of contact and communication. Anxiety runs very high when the exercise is so structured that the dyads are of the same sex, especially if both are male. "I would feel a lot better if my partner were a girl" says a number of things: "I live in a culture in which physical contact of male with male is more or less taboo"; "physical contact, is, of its very nature, sexual"; "I consider intimacy as something intersexual."

However, the laboratory is a "cultural island," that is, it attempts to develop its own human culture apart from the cultural rigidities that exist outside the laboratory. In the case of exercises involving physical contact, the laboratory culture says this: "Physical contact is another channel of human communication. It can be so restricted as to communicate only certain dimensions of interpersonal living such as hostility (in acts such as shoving, striking, etc.) and sexuality (in any physical act showing interest or concern). Here we experiment with physical contact as a channel of communication. Our purpose is to see how many different human realities we can express through physical contact or through a combination of physical contact, non-verbal behavior which does not involve physical contact, and verbal behavior. Our purpose here is to grow interpersonally by involving ourselves with one another. Physical contact is one of the modes of human involvement. Here in the laboratory there is cultural permission to deal with it more freely than we could in day-to-day living. It is hoped that we can take advantage of this permission."
Some of the problems associated with physical contact in the laboratory. Physical contact can arouse strong emotion, especially strong anxiety. In my own experience I have found that the way in which exercises are introduced to the group is of paramount importance. An example, in the first residential laboratory I attended, we had generally avoided exercises, especially non-verbal exercises involving physical contact during the first half of the laboratory. Around the midpoint we were involved in a session in which communication had noticeably bogged down. It seems that we just could not get in contact with one another. We were sitting outside on a kind of patio, when suddenly the trainer said: "I'd like to do something. Let's go inside." The anxiety level in the group shot skyward. My imagination ran wild: we were going inside because we were going to do something that should not be seen by others. Once inside, we sat around for a while, saying nothing. The trainer remained in a very serious, brooding mood. Our anxiety continued to mount. Finally he said: "I would like a volunteer." Again my imagination ran riot: volunteers are called for (especially under the "battle" conditions under which we were operating) only when the mission is dangerous. We remained silent and frozen in our seats. The trainer made another plea for a volunteer. Finally, with obvious trepidation, one of the men in the group (certainly not me) said that he was tentatively willing to try to cooperate. The trainer said: "Hold out your palms, I'd like to feel your strength and let you feel mine." They pushed against each other for a while, but the volunteer's willingness faded and he withdrew from the exercise.

The exercise the trainer proposed was really a simple, fairly non-threatening exercise, but the way in which he introduced it created such
anxiety that it practically immobilized the group. Communication had floundered. The trainer's purpose, then, was to offer an exercise or two to stimulate contact and communication, but he completely defeated his own purpose. The leader can control the degree of anxiety (at least the general anxiety level of the group) by the way he introduces the group to such exercises. In the contract group both the experimental nature of the laboratory experience and the reason for using non-verbal exercises are explained before the laboratory begins. Furthermore, if non-verbal exercises are first introduced as experimental games, they will arouse much less anxiety than if used as "serious" dynamite to get rid of communication blocks in the middle of group sessions. I often begin a laboratory with a "micro-lab," a kind of festival of communication games which involves many different kinds of exercises—verbal, non-verbal without physical contact, and non-verbal with physical contact, and mixtures. This tends to make the participants less wary and thus more ready to experiment with communication-through-physical-contact later on in the laboratory.

In the contract laboratory the participants should not be forced or bullied into more serious exercises or exercises that take place at more serious times during the life of the group. Again, the way the exercise is proposed will often determine whether the participants will engage in it or not. For instance, if two people seem to be avoiding each other or if they have not been able to make contact on a verbal level, the trainer might reflect on this and then say: "I wonder whether the two of you would like to engage in a little non-verbal experiment which may or may not facilitate communication between you. These exercises work no magic, there's nothing
mystic about them, but they may help." Individuals differ quite a bit in their willingness to explore the non-verbal dimensions of communication. But if this dimension of laboratory life is made relatively non-threatening (it will almost always arouse some anxiety), most of the participants will make use of it and it can become a fruitful area of experimentation, complementing the verbal interaction of the group.

Choosing the right exercise. Exercises should not be used indiscriminately in laboratories, but should rather be integrated with the task at hand. If the overriding purpose of the laboratory is to become more aware of oneself and of others as body and as sensing, then the laboratory might be highly exercise-oriented and many of the exercises suggested by Gunther (1968) might be used. If the purpose of the laboratory is interpersonal growth, many of the exercises suggested by Schutz (1967) could be integrated into the experience. But the choice and timing of an exercise are important. If the participants are already anxious and the exercise is seen principally as an instrument which will arouse more anxiety, there is a strong probability that it will not have a beneficial effect, for the participants will not be able to give themselves to it properly. In the contract laboratory the exercise is not an end in itself. Even when it constitutes a form of communication in its own right, it is still there to complement and help stimulate verbal involvement. Some trainers mechanically substitute exercises for the give-and-take of verbal interaction, but this often merely reflects their own anxiety and need to see to it that the interaction keeps moving. There are certainly plenty of exercises of all kinds available. Besides those listed by Gunther, Schutz, and Malamud and Machover (1965), there is an
endless supply in the fertile imagination of those who conduct laboratories.

An exercise created or modified to fit a specific situation that arises in a group will fare better than a borrowed exercise, which, although "interesting," does not fit.

Exercises and life. Exercises, like the laboratory itself, are contrived. They are not meant to be a way of life. If they make a participant pause and reflect on some dimension of his interpersonal life, if they show him some of his unused potentialities, if they enlarge his area of freedom with himself and others, then they have served their purpose well. However, even though a participant might not make a contrived exercise-culture part of his day-to-day living, he may find that because of his laboratory experiences he interacts in somewhat different ways. For instance, he may show affection more readily in physical ways. The only caution is that he not inflict himself in his new-found freedom on others.

POIESIS: WORDS-MADE-FLESH

When pathos finds expression in human language, when logos is suffused with human feeling and emotion, a new term is needed to describe the communication that takes place. The term used here is poiesis which comes from the Greek verb meaning "to do, to make." The English word "poetry" comes from the same stem. When meaning and feeling become artfully one in language, the result is poetry. In human dialogue, when words are meaningfully filled with human emotion, when feelings and emotions find creative expression in human language, the result is poiesis. Forrest (1965) uses the same term with somewhat negative connotations. For him poiesis is a "making" almost in the sense of "making up" or "contriving." The schizophrenic, for instance,
uses languages not just to describe or communicate something, but to "make" something. In the schizophrenic's language, wishes are not merely uttered but fulfilled. In fact, fulfillment of wishes occurs only in the world of words. Be that as it may, in the present context poiesis has only positive connotations. It is too rich a term to be wasted on pathology. Poiesis is word-made-flesh in human dialogue.

Men seem to feel safer when they compartmentalize their experiences. Feelings are all right, and language is all right, but they are to be kept apart, if possible. Lynch (1967) recognizes in movies a similar movement, that is, a movement toward immediate, private, and wordless experience. He deplores such a movement: "[W]ords and ideas have been given a hard time; they have been pushed into a polarized state, devoid of contact with images and things. They need to be allowed to re-enter the world and re-establish their relation to things and their own power as a human art" (p. 79).

Meaningless words and unverbalized feelings both sin against human communication. Lynch suggests that even brutal language is better than either emasculated words or silences that hide hate and bitterness:

...[T] words in Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf are, on the surface, ordinary human words that say something. On the second level they turn out to be words describing games being played at, unrealities, fictions. On the third and final take they have inflexibly human rules behind them and are the only forms of salvation and contact, cruel though they might be, between George and Martha (p. 83, emphasis added).

Language, then, can be strong medicine, if it is "made" strong by becoming the vehicle of the speaker's experience.

The members of the contract group are asked to experiment with poiesis.
This does not mean that their language must be continually filled with emotion. First of all, there are degrees of poiesis, and secondly, we could not keep up the process of communication if all words were afire. What is demanded in the contract group is feeling proportioned to meaning and expressed with simplicity in human language.

**Experiencing, expressing, communicating.** Men first experience something, then they express it, and, if their expression is successful, that is, if they actually contact another, they communicate their experience. Gendlin (1962) suggests that psychotherapy deals primarily with the first variable, experiencing: "Psychotherapy generally...seems to involve not only verbalization, but more fundamentally, the client's inward reference to and struggle with his directly felt experiencing. The individual's inward data, concretely felt, seem to be actual stuff of psychotherapy, not the words... (p. ). In sensitivity groups, however, it is rather a question of getting participants to verbalize the more or less integral pathos experiences they do have and are in contact with. But even in therapy, the impact of the therapist is determined, according to Patterson (1966), by the client's perception of the therapist. It is not sufficient for the therapist to have positive feelings toward his client, nor is it sufficient merely to express these feelings. Rather he must express them in such a way that they are actually picked up by the client, that is, he must communicate these feelings. Therefore, although helping a patient to get into contact with his own experience seems to be the first step in the therapeutic process, still, since integral functioning is ultimately defined by the quality of a person's interpersonal relationships, the ability to express and communicate
themselves integrally are also essential goals of therapy. Patterson thus highlights one of the frequently forgotten dimensions of poiesis, that is, that feelings must be expressed through language in such a way that others actually do pick them up. This is work, hard work. This is why integral communication is called poiesis, a "doing, a making." Therefore, when Salter (1949) recommends "feeling-talk"—"we must forego premeditated utterances and say what we feel when we feel it" (p. 99)—it must be remembered that mere "feeling-talk" may not be sufficient. The expression of feeling must be suffused with logos so that it becomes an invitation to dialogue.

Failed poiesis: action divorced from language. While perhaps the primary failure to achieve poiesis consists in an inability or a refusal to include emotion in verbal expression, there is also another, even more dramatic, form of failed poiesis. It involves what Bloch (1968) calls "an inability to substitute and utilize language for action and activity" (p. 178). When a married couple stand screaming at each other, a kind of communication-through-action is taking place, but the use of language is really incidental to the whole process. This dumping of raw emotion on each other is an "action" or an "activity" devoid of both logos and poiesis. But if a marriage begins primarily on the level of pathos so that, although each "experiences" the other, still neither is capable of translating that experience into language, and if the marriage continues principally on the level of pathos, with commercial-speech alone handling the necessary transactions between partners, then trouble is almost unavoidable. The couple turns up in some marital counseling situation and it is discovered that their problem is "a lack of communication." From the beginning their feelings
toward each other have been strong and turbulent, but strength and turbulencen
t not imply depth. They have never really questioned their feelings. They
eschew logos: they never speak meaningfully about their core, their values,
their goals, the interlaced meanings of all the phases of their lives.
Pathos is not modified, stimulated, and matured by effective logos. There
has never been any "need" for words. When ephemeral feeling dies away,
however, and the inevitable problematic of living together arises, communi-
cation fails because it has never really been a part of the relationship. The
pathos level on which the relationship has been based is not sufficient to
handle the problematic. When undisputed problems mount too high, irrespon-
sible pathos runs wild, with words becoming the lackeys of feeling. Then
the conversation that does exist is nothing but a caricature of communication.
The sooner a couple realizes the potentialities of human language and makes
mature verbal interactional systems part of their relationship, the better
prepared will they be to handle problems that arise, and, what is more
important, the greater will be their potentiality for interpersonal growth.
The Expression of Emotion

In human affairs there seem to be two highly prevalent, though doubt-
fully growthful, ways of handling strong feeling, both positive and negative.
Actually both are ways of avoiding rather than handling emotion in trans-
actional situations.

(1) The suppression of feeling. The "safest" way of handling strong
feeling is to suppress it. Perhaps "conceal" is a more accurate word than
"suppress," for hidden emotion does make itself felt under a number of
disguises. For instance, if a person suppresses or conceals his anger, it
frequently comes out in a number of deceitful ways, e.g., in coolness, unavailability, snide remarks, obstructionism, and other subtle forms of revenge. Feeling has not really been suppressed, rather it has been translated into a number of non-growthful activities which are difficult to deal with precisely because of their "underground" character.

Riecken (1952) describes a work camp in which, because of the philosophy and religious convictions of the members, the prevailing atmosphere was one of friendly and gentle interactions. Since the members disapproved of all kinds of aggression, both physical and verbal, a problem arose with respect to the handling of the minor antagonisms that arose daily and tended to interfere with the work to be done. Meetings were held, but problems were discussed in a most abstract and intellectualized way. Because of the failure to institute real emotional communication, the antagonisms persisted much to the dissatisfaction of everyone. But an intellectual approach to a non-intellective situation was bound to fail.

(2) Acting-out. The second way of handling strong feeling is to foist it on the other. Pent up anger is allowed to "explode" or pent up affection is allowed to overwhelm the other. Such "solutions" are rationalized as forms of honesty, but, strangely enough, such "honesty" seldom results in growthful encounter. Acting-out does satisfy immediate instinctual needs, but seldom serves the process of communication. Some people pride themselves on "blowing up" and getting it "out of their systems," claiming that this is more honest than concealment and the subtle "leakage" of negative feeling that ensues. This may well be true, but such pride should be tempered by the fact that there is still a more human way.
Poiesis in responsible encounter. Let us suppose that once George has been angered by John, he says something like this: "John, I am really angry with you. I could try to swallow my anger or I could blow up, but I don't think that either of these would solve anything, because I think that in a way my anger is really our problem, yours and mine, and I'd like to talk it out with you. How about it?" Such a tack (especially if the stylized way in which it is presented here is overlooked for the moment) is rarely employed, for it demands too much honesty and runs the risk either of refusal or of disquieting discoveries about oneself. It also demands dealing with feelings instead of relinquishing them in one way or another. George remains angry, but now his anger becomes a point of possible contact instead of just an abrasive force. Sometimes a person has to choose between the pain of talking out another's hostility toward him and the discomfort of being the victim of a dozen covert expressions of hostility so rationalized that it is impossible to get at them.

The Prevalence of Hostility

One of the first emotions that members of sensitivity groups tend to experiment with is hostility. For a number of people hostility is a relatively "inexpensive" emotion (though there are those who find it almost unbearable either to express or to be the object of hostility), more or less readily available for use. Because it is readily available, some use it recklessly, and this serves to perpetuate the caricature of the sensitivity laboratory as a place where people "tell one another off."

The responsible expression of hostility as a form of poiesis. Contract-group members are in no way discouraged from expressing anger or hostility,
but they are asked to do so in as constructive a way as possible. Mann (1959), in reviewing the literature, discovered that the expression of positive feelings in group situations is positively correlated with intelligence and adjustment, while the expression of negative feelings such as anger, hostility, disagreement, tension, and antagonism is negatively correlated with these variables. But it seems that the mere expression of negative feelings is not the issue; it is rather how they are expressed. Negative feelings, too, are part of the human condition and are experienced by the intelligent and well-adjusted. The hypothesis here is that the intelligent and well-adjusted, when they do express negative feelings, would tend to do so in a positive way, that is, through some form of poiesis. The positive expression of negative feelings can be growthful. Therefore, the airing of negative feelings can be quite beneficial to contract-group interaction if it is done responsibly, but it should hardly be the major emotional preoccupation of the group.

Hostility that is expressed by some form of anti-logos rather than poiesis merely elicits more hostility. A study by Bandura, Lipsher, and Miller (1960) showed that hostile therapists encourage patient hostility. The study also indicated that therapists tend to avoid patients who direct hostility toward them. Finally, patients suppress or redirect hostility following avoidance reactions on the part of therapists. Thus, when hostility is a more or less "buried" variable in a transactional setting, it tends to evoke a manipulative, "game" culture that is hardly growthful. In the contract group, if anyone tries to engage in this "attack-immunity" game of Bandura's therapists, he should be challenged immediately.
The meanings of hostility. Hostility frequently expresses more than raw "againstness." Especially in group interaction it can mean many things. (1) It may be a way of expressing one's individuality or showing strength in the group. This use of hostility, however, is relatively immature and usually characterizes only the earlier sessions of the life of the group. Real strength and individuality can be displayed in contractual ways. (2) For the person who feels threatened by the interaction of the group hostility may be a defensive maneuver rather than a form of attack. (3) "Planned" hostility may be used as a "dynamite technique" to stimulate action during a boring session. (4) Hostility can also have a more subtle and constructive meaning: it may be an attempt to achieve some kind of interpersonal contact or intimacy. A number of authors (e.g. Burton & Whiting, 1961; Mills, 1964; Ogilvie, 1961; Slater, 1966) have suggested (and some have conducted research that supports the hypothesis) that identification tends to follow aggression. For instance, Slater states: "It is for this reason that aggression leads to identification: in fantasy the attack is a freeing of the desirable attributes from the hateful shell that prevents their acquisition" (p. 146). It would take rather ingenious empirical investigation to determine whether this is the case or not, but it does seem to be a fact that sometimes after two people storm at each other, they tend to draw closer together. Perhaps the direct route to intimacy is too difficult and the turmoil of the indirect route is all that is available.

Perhaps one of the best ways available to a participant in a sensitivity group to discover the meaning of hostility in his interpersonal relations is to express the hostility that wells up within during group sessions.
The Problems and Potentialities of Poiesis

One of the problems of poiesis is that it is an anti-manipulative and anti-"game" form of communication in a manipulative and game-prone culture. Even therapy does not escape verbal manipulation, for, as Krasner (1963) has observed, the communication of therapeutic influence is a function of the therapist's verbal behavior. His studies indicate that the patient learns the role that the therapist expects of him through verbal conditioning. And yet the hypothesis under which this book is being written is that the less manipulation in human interaction the more growthful will it be.

A second problem is that it is doubtful that our present culture is ready for a sharp rise in the amount of poiesis in interpersonal relating. The character Jerry in Albee's The Zoo Story is somewhat disconcerting to the average reader, for people are not accustomed to dealing verbally with reality on the level that he deals with it. Jerry is resented both because he feels too much and because he translates what he feels into language. Therefore, even those who are responsibly and intelligently "poetic" in their encounters must expect to experience a certain amount of rejection from those who cannot tolerate intimacy.

And yet, as Lynd (1958) would have it, men have a moral obligation to become artists in communication. This is difficult, for schisms within man, according to Maslow (1967)--for instance, splits within the personality due to the inward battle between impulse and control--cause splits in his communication: "To the extent that we are split, our expression and communications are split, partial, onesided," but, on the other hand, to the extent that we are integrated and whole, our communications are "complete, unique,
idiosyncratic, alive, and creative" (p. 197). The split between feeling and verbal language reflects the schizoid nature of the "average" man. His task is to overcome this split, because, if Lynd (1958) is right, too much is to be lost if he does not:

It may be asked why, since the language of intimacy will always be to a large extent a language of gesture, facial expression, and touch, it should be important to enlarge the possibilities of verbal language for such communication. For at least three reasons: 1. Lack of a verbal means of communication of certain experiences may sometimes lead to atrophy or lack of awareness of the experiences themselves. 2. Ranges of mutual exploration may be cut off and unnecessary misunderstandings may arise if there is a feeling that words should not be used or an unwillingness to search for words to use as one medium of communication. 3. The creation of symbols in language is a characteristically human ability that can bring unconscious creative forces into relation with conscious effort, subject into relation with object, can give form to hitherto unknown things and hence make possible the apprehension of new truth (pp. 249-250).

Such integration of words and feeling is perhaps both a cause and a reflection of the general integration of the individual. If the participants of a contract laboratory come away with a deeper respect for honest emotion, honest language, and honest attempts to integrate the two, then the laboratory has been successful.
Chapter VII

Self-Disclosure

Introduction

One of the principal interaction goals in the contract group (and all sensitivity-training groups) is self-disclosure. Since self-disclosure of some degree constitutes an integral part of almost any kind of laboratory experience and does so in a special way in laboratories in interpersonal relations, it needs special attention, especially in view of the fact that most of us fear self-revelation to a greater or lesser extent and therefore find it difficult to estimate its value in interpersonal living.

Since this chapter is comparatively long, a preview is in order: the following topics are dealt with: (1) Dangers associated with concealment. There is a growing literature pointing toward the potential pathogenic nature of concealment. The works of such people as Mowrer and Jourard are considered from this point of view. (2) Our culture and self-disclosure. The relationship between our culture and self-disclosure is placed in focus, for there seem to be a number of cultural bans against self-disclosure. This same society seems to extol privacy as an absolute value. Therefore the value of privacy and its relationship to interpersonal involvement are considered. (3) Truth and honesty. At least in practice, truth and honesty are not the precious commodities that they are made out to be. Some of the factors militating against greater spirit of truth and openness in society and how this affects self-revelation among men are discussed.

(4) Intra-individual resistance to disclosure. Resistance to self-disclo-
Sure is not just a function of certain factors in society. There are also intra-individual factors which prevent a greater spirit of openness among men—e.g., flight from self-knowledge, fear of intimacy, and a refusal to bear responsibility. (5) Guilt and disclosure. Guilt is an everyday human commodity which often is instrumental in keeping a person out-of-community in some way. It has many faces, and some of these are probed. (6) The value of shame in human life. Shame, too, is a common experience. Depending upon how it is approached, it can either enhance or prove detrimental to both personal and interpersonal living. How it differs from guilt and how it relates to communication with self and others are considered. (7) Honesty in the group experience. Possible areas of self-disclosure during the group experience itself are discussed. Of especial importance is the here-and-now honesty of what is happening to oneself and how one stands in relationship to the other participants during the group interaction.

(8) Self-disclosure: "story" and "history." It is argued that humanistic self-disclosure is not a mere recital of actuarial data, no matter how intimate they might be. (9) The degree of disclosure in the group. Different groups achieve different levels of self-disclosure. Some of the factors determining the depth of disclosure are reviewed. (10) Labeling as a form of behavioral control. It is hypothesized that self-disclosure can be used as an effective behavioral control device. It is then called "labeling," a term borrowed from Dollard and Miller (1950) to describe a process somewhat different from theirs. (11) The dangers of self-disclosure. Finally, some of the dangers of self-revelation, especially self-revelation in a group situation, are reviewed. However, it is suggested that these dangers can be minimized or even eliminated,
so that the potential advantages of self-disclosure will outweigh its potential disadvantages. This is not to deny, however, that self-disclosure always entails a certain degree of risk.

Interaction Goals

In contrast to the T-group in which there is an "absence of any prearranged or externally assigned task" (Benne, 1964a, p. 217), the contract group imposes certain tasks on its members. The impact-value of the traditional T-group lies in its members search for viable goals and effective modes of interrelating. The impact of the contract group, on the other hand, lies in the specific kinds of interactions to which its members subscribe. The provisions of the contract dealt with so far—the concept of the contract itself, group goals, the laboratory nature of the group experience, leadership, and the elements of dialogue—have, to a large extent, specified attitudes that group members are expected to adopt and the structures of group process. Interaction goals, however, deal more specifically with the kinds of interaction that are expected to take place in the group. These interactions flow from the attitudes and the structures which have already been dealt with. The participants, then, are expected to engage in self-disclosure, for this is one of the provisions of the contract. But the self-disclosure engaged in must be made relevant to the here-and-now, and it must be done in cooperation with (rather than opposition to) other members. That is, all the interactions to be discussed in this and the following chapters must reflect the attitudinal and structural aspects of the contract which have already been discussed. Self-disclosure, then, is one of the interactional means of "operationalizing" (March & Simon, 1958) the overriding goal
of the group. If self-disclosure, as outlined in this chapter, is effectively engaged in, then this is, in part, interpersonal growth.

SELF-DISCLOSURE: A BASIC STEP TOWARD GROWTH

All the participants in the contract group must agree to engage in some degree of self-disclosure; they must make some efforts to reveal the "person within" to the other members of the group. Self-disclosure is cardinal in growth groups, pivotal in the sense that many of the "good things" that happen in such groups happen because of self-disclosure. In non-contract groups in which interpersonal or personal psychological growth is at least an implicit goal, a good deal of the group's activity, especially in earlier sessions, deals with formulating policy with respect to self-disclosure. "I'm not so sure how far I can go," "I am beginning to wonder whether we are starting a therapy group here," "Boy that (some disclosure made by one of the participants) was a bomb; how are we going to handle that?" -- these and similar statements are "contract talk" referring principally to self-disclosure. The prospect of revealing oneself is unsettling and must be approached gradually in such groups. The group must first decide whether self-disclosure is a value or not, at least for this group in these circumstances. Or, while many of the members of such groups might realize that it has a value in human living and even in this group, they need time to get used to this idea, or time to decide how to approach such a dangerous undertaking, or time, perhaps, to screw up the courage needed to talk about oneself. In the contract group the person must make most of these decisions before he enters the group or at least at the time that the contract is imposed. Self-disclosure in the contract group is a value. The rest of this
is an attempt to explain why it is a value and how it may be approached
to the group. Lynd (1958) says that "a person who cannot love cannot reveal
himself" (p. 241). The contrary also seems to be true: the person who cannot
reveal himself cannot love. If this is true, then the question of self-disclo-
sure is intimately associated with interpersonal growth. The assumption in this
statement is that responsible self-disclosure is a kind of royal road of commun-
ity. This sharing of the human condition—in its sublimity, banality, and de-
Portly—pulls people together.

13 Deception and Concealment as Pathogenic or Growth-Stifling

Mowrer's position. In a series of publications (e.g. 1950a, 1950b, 1952a,
Mowrer has elaborated a theory concerning the etiology of emotional disturbance.
Mowrer is constantly re-thinking his position, so that what started out to be a
theory of psychopathology is being modified, complemented, and expanded to such
an extent that a coherent interpersonal theory of man is beginning to emerge.
Each of what Mowrer says deals directly or indirectly with the problem of self-
closure.

Mowrer (1968a) places himself in the camp of "third-force" psychology.
He is both free and responsible. To a large extent he can fashion his own
destiny, and need not be just a simple product of his heredity (force I) and
his environment (force II). Or, from a different viewpoint, neither Freudian
psychoanalytic theory (force I) nor Watsonian and Pavlovian behaviorism (force
II), separately or in combination, provide an adequate working model of man.
Adler (Adler, 1964; Ansbacher, 1967; Dreikurs, 1950) as having "antici-
ated both aspects of contemporary Third-Force psychology: the emphasis on vol-
ution, individual choice and responsibility, and the emphasis upon man's irrev-
cable need for community, that is, deep communion and identification with one's
fellows" (Mowrer, 1968a, p. 9).

Mowrer turns to Pratt and Tooley (1964, 1966) for a conceptual or struc-
tural model of man-in-community, man's interactions with himself and his fel-
lovs. For Pratt and Tooley, all social relations represent "contractual trans-
ctions." All of life is a patterning of contractual arrangements which men
take with themselves and with others, so that contracts become the "instrumental-
ties" for both the creation and the exchange of values among men. "These
contracts may be explicit or implicit, conscious or unconscious, unilateral or
multilateral, voluntary or coercive. They constitute the warp and woof of per-
sonal and social life. Men are their contracts" (Pratt & Tooley, 1966, p. 882).

Much of psychopathology, then, can be conceptualized in contractual terms:
"Psychological and psychosocial disorders are conceptualized as personal-social,
contract-system disorders, contract crises, contract conflicts, distorted or
anti-social contracts, contract deficity, contract stress-and-strain, inade-
quate or immature contract system development" (p. 882). Self-actualization is
also depicted as a contract function: "The ideal is authentic competence in the
major contract spheres of living" (1966, p. 882).

The first step on the road to emotional disturbance, then, is some kind of
mismanagement of contractual life. A man may overcommit himself, he may
undercommit himself, and he may "cheat" on the commitments that he has made
(Mowrer, 1968a). The selfish person is someone who is overcommitted to himself
and undercommitted to others. He is either irresponsibly out-of-community
e.g., the miserly recluse) or he is irresponsibly in-community (e.g., the person who must always have "his way" when he is with others). A person may mismanage his contractual life in a seemingly endless variety of ways, and no man's life is entirely free of contractual failure. Emotional disturbance may be defined in terms of contractual failure itself. Thus the sociopath, either in a specific area of life or more generally, disregards the contractual structure of interpersonal living. He makes his own rules.

Contract mismanagement, then, is man's first mistake. The second mistake is in a sense worse than the first. If a man fails to fulfill a contract, but admits that he has failed, and tries to make restitution, he can usually avoid emotional trouble. This, however, is not the course which all men follow. Some men fail to live up to their contractual obligations and then try to conceal their failures both from themselves and from others. Deception, then, becomes a way of life. Mowrer sees this refusal to face up to the "what-is" as pathogenic. It is a break with reality, and breaking with reality is the warp and woof of emotional disorder.

In his writings Mowrer contends that this refusal to "confess" one's misbehavior, at least to the "significant others" in one's life, often leads to emotional disorder. He tentatively divides the usual symptoms associated with emotional disturbance into two types (Mowrer, 1967) Type I symptoms are the agonies usually associated with emotional disturbances of one kind or another: e.g., tension, anxiety, depression, loss of appetite, fatigue, loneliness, phobias, scrupulosity, sense of unreality, hypochondriasis, etc. He sees these symptoms as discomforts arising from deviant behavior, contractual failures. These symptoms are usually involuntary, mediated by the autonomic nervous sys-
tem. Yet they are potentially useful in that they aim at motivating the sufferer to change his life-style, to get at and do something about the contract disorders underlying them. Type II symptoms are the means, usually ineffectual, that the sufferer uses to try to handle Type I symptoms. They are attempts to escape the pain rather than attempts to get at its roots: withdrawal, suicide, rationalization, blaming others, self-pity, busy-ness, overeating, abuse of sex day-dreaming, intoxicants, tranquilizers, etc. Type II symptoms are disabling, because they prevent the sufferer from moving in the right direction. They are "home remedies" of various types either chosen by oneself or suggested by others. Though they may bring temporary relief, they do not get at the root of the problem. Since they are delaying tactics, they ultimately make things worse. Both Type I and Type II symptoms are "muted confessions," they are signs of a person's inability or refusal to involve himself responsibly in his contractual obligations. Mowrer is not the first to recognize the potentially pathogenic nature of secrecy. In his writings (e.g., 1964, 1968b) he uses examples drawn from literature of the therapeutic value of "confession." Harper (1959) notes that "the personal privacy, the hidden subjectivity, of various aspects of neurosis can be removed by talk alone (even if the talk is devoid of insight into causation and does nothing other than expose the problem to objective discussion), and sometimes the emotional disturbance loses its power with its privacy." Mowrer probes further into the "why" of the pathogenic nature of such privacy.

In his earlier writings, Mowrer refers to the process he instituted to help those with emotional problems as "integrity therapy." Recently he has tended to drop the term "therapy" and substitute "training" for various reasons.
First of all, the term "therapy" implies illness, but, generally, Mowrer does not.

the emotionally disturbed as "sick" in the usual sense of the word. He does

: reject biochemical approaches to psychopathology, but he is wary of their

: extension:

We are not here holding that organic or biochemical anomalies do not

reflect themselves in the sphere of human functioning; and in this

sense and to this extent, the so-called medical model is highly adq­

quate and relevant. The danger lies in possible over-extension of

the model... To the extent that mental and emotional suffering have a

biochemical basis, their elimination or amelioration is a merciful

boon to all humanity. But where suffering is the consequence of

behavioral malfunctioning, it has motivational, educational work to

do, and its chemical counteraction is clearly not indicated. We have

yet to determine the dividing line between the organic and the func­
tional, and the argument advanced in this paper is offered primarily

as a means of conceptualizing emotional problems with a behavioral

and interpersonal, rather than a strictly organic, biochemical basis

(1968a, pp. 37-38).

Secondly, Mowrer's groups are actual "training-grounds" for more effective in­

terpersonal living. I had experience with these groups in Galesburg, Illinois--

th at Galesburg State Research Hospital with Mowrer himself and in the communi­

ty. These groups were run according to a simple contract which was the basis

for entry. The prospective participant was to agree (1) to "tell his story,"

that is, to reveal the "unconfessed" deviant behavior that could possibly be at

the root of his disturbance and to remain "confessionally current" as the group

moved along; (2) to assume responsibility for himself, that is, to stop blaming

others for his problems and to assume the direction of his own life; and (3) to

become interested in and involved with the other members of the group. The

group formed a small community which became the vehicle of the redintegration of

its members into the other communities from which they had come, e.g., family,

neighborhood, church, job, etc. Self-disclosure, however, was not the only or
ven the most important group variable. Once a person revealed himself, he was

text expected to discuss with the group what kind of "restitution" he was to

take and how to go about it. He was asked to review his contractual relation-
ships with himself and with others, especially with the "significant others" in
his life and to start on a process of contractual re-adjustment, first within
the group and then in the other groups to which he belonged.

The group produced some dramatic successes (as far as "success" could be
measured by clinical observation), but there were also the failures. One of the
sources of the failures, I believe, was a "violation" of the "laws of the groups"
spelled on in this paper. Too often the groups became places where individual
"therapy" or "training" took place in the presence of others. The members were
not sufficiently encouraged to interact with one another. It was seldom that
they dealt with their feelings towards one another. It was seldom that they
dealt with their feelings towards one another. Too much of what was revealed
dealt with the then-and-there, no attempts being made to make it relevant to
these people in this group. All in all, the theory of the source of emotional
disturbance became so central that other conditions for effective interpersonal
involvement were overlooked. While Mowrer's natural "feel" for what kind of in-
teraction should take place within a group made him an excellent group leader,
I believe that he has underestimated the necessity of "teaching" effective group
process in the training sessions. I also have some difficulty with a certain
narrowness in Mowrer's initial formulations concerning the etiology of emotional
disturbance, but this problem will be dealt with below.

Other approaches to the relationship between openness and growth. Mowrer
is not alone in advocating complete openness in the therapeutic situation.
Psychological honesty or openness is a goal of almost every therapeutic approach, but there is something distinctive about the "confessional" honesty demanded from the beginning by Mowrer. Mainord (1968) describes what he calls "Therapy #52--The Truth." The prospective client must agree to a group contract which is much like Mowrer's: (1) the patient must agree to be completely open with the group. (2) He must agree to accept total responsibility for all of his behavior all the time, twenty-four hours a day. Responsibility here means acting according to one's own ethical code. (3) Each patient must accept responsibility for every other patient in the program. Mainord says that the first two conditions are usually accepted, but with a lack of undertaking of the behavioral demands that these conditions will entail. The third condition, he says, is usually bewildering to the patient. In Mainord's groups are much more "behaviorally" oriented than Mowrer's:

The group meetings are to be sources of new information, and an avenue for feedback, for manipulation of consequences, and even a place to learn skills in new modes of interaction, but the truly important social environment will never be some group sharing a similar plight with reinforcements manipulated for the patient's benefit. The appropriate social skills can never be completely demonstrated in the therapeutic group, and only a rigid adherence to the use of an external criterion makes it possible to expect much generalization.

The group meeting should result in extracting new behaviors, but the crucial reinforcements can come only from the environment (p. 33).

Mowrer, too, was beginning to talk about a totally controlled hospital environment in which group work would be only a part of a total program.

Jourard on concealment. Jourard (1964, 1968) has been investigating the implications of concealment and self-disclosure in a context which is much wider and perhaps more positive than Mowrer's. He, like Mowrer, believes that con-
sicken." The person who finds his behavior unacceptable, in one way or another, both to himself and to others must conceal his own identity. The person who finds his behavior unacceptable, in one way or another, both to himself and to others must conceal his own identity. The energy that he pours into concealment adds to his stress and dulls his awareness of his own inner experience. Whatever contact he makes with others is through a facade; a kind of rigidity or stereotype permeates his relationships with others. Loneliness and depression are inevitable as part of the price for concealment, for the concealer is separate, apart, out-of-community. The concealer thus increases the stress factors in his life and thus becomes susceptible to all sorts of sickness, both physical and psychological. But when Jourard talks like this, he is not describing just the neurotic or the emotionally disturbed in general. He sees this as the affliction of most men, at least in our own society. This lack of transparency is a major element in the "psychopathology of the average" that afflicts the so-called "normal" personality of our time. The more desperate the need to conceal, the greater the stress, and the more likely the occurrence of physical and psychological decompensation.

The pathogenic secret. Ellenberger (1966) discusses the concept of the "pathogenic secret." Like Mowrer, he believes that the content of this secret may be deviant behavior, but it is not limited to deviancy. For instance, the secret may deal with thwarted love, jealousy, or some physical infirmity. It does not always deal with guilt and shame, but it always has hopelessness connected with it, a "no-exit" aspect. Ellenberger claims that Moritz Benedikt (1835-1920), a Viennese physician, was the first to deal systematically with the pathogenic secret. Benedikt cites instances of hysterical women who were
ured of their neurosis by confessing their pathogenic secrets and working out
related problems.

None of these men "prove" that concealment in itself causes emotional dis-
turbance and that self-revelation, even accompanied with restitution-behavior
in the case of deviancy, effects a cure. But it is undoubtedly true that in
many well-documented cases deception and concealment have at least aggravated,
if not caused, emotional anguish and that "confession" of self-revelation,
openly coupled with restitution-behavior, has led to dramatic improvement. Self-
disclosure of guilt and failure is certainly one of the principal patient vari-
ables in the psychotherapeutic process, just as concealment, as Jourard notes,
is an undeniable facet of "normal" living. It is essentail, then, to review
the factors within society and within the individual which mitigate against
greater openness. Evidence concerning the deleterious effects of concealment
has always been with us; it is only recently that men have begun to point a
scientific finger at this evidence. But why is self-disclosure in such
disrepute?

Self-disclosure and Cultural Taboo.

There seem to be at least two forces in society that militate against
greater self-disclosure among its members: (1) a kind of cultural ban against
intimate self-disclosure, and (2) a society-wide cultivation of the "lie" as
a way of life.

Self-disclosure as weakness. The person who exhibits strength by "suffer-
ing in silence" has become a cultural stereotype in our society. "Little boys
don't cry" is an early version of the masculine ideal, and the woman who, in
fiction of radio, TV, or the novel, confesses that "I simply have to talk
to someone" is really confessing, not a deep human need, but her own weakness,
even though such weakness might be understandable and even excused in a woman.

If self-disclosure is not weakness, then it is "exhibitionism," and, as such, a
sign of illness rather than a desire for human communication. Very often, the
adolescent, in his discovery of himself and "the other," engages in a good deal
of self-disclosure. But this drive to exchange intimacies, even though it might
have overtones, at times, of exhibitionism and other kinds of problematic beha-

ior, is usually not looked upon as the beginning of something that could be
quite good--being at home in discussing oneself with significant others at an
intimate level (see White, 1964). It is rather just that, adolescent behavior,
aive and immature. Such behavior will pass, just as the "natural neurosis" of
adolescence passes. When the adult finds it necessary to communicate himself
to a friend, he often feels that he needs an excuse for such action. "The
person with a painful and perplexing personal problem is loath to ask a friend
to share the knowledge of it, and his friend is loath to encourage him to talk
it out" (Schofield, 1964, p. 160). It is difficult for both of them, for there
is little cultural support for what they are doing. Lynd (1958) goes further
and maintains that the ban refers not only to "revelations of the inmost self"
but to the revelation of the "central dynamics of society" itself (p. 231). A
racist community is loath to have that aspect of its culture discussed. Non-
finally non-racist communities sometimes engage in rather ludicrous startle and
denial behavior when the unpondered and unconfessed racist elements of this
culture are exposed and openly discussed.
Mowrer has received a good deal of criticism for his views on the therapeutic value of "confession." While much of what he has written and especially the tone of his writing are not above criticism, it is still interesting to listen to the "tone" of his critics as they focus in on the "confessional" aspects of his theories. It is difficult not to see an element of "Thou-does-protest-too-much" in this spontaneous "this-is-nonsense" style of criticism. Much of this criticism, it seems, stems from unexamined cultural taboos against self-disclosure. The critic is speaking out, ritually as it were, the fears of his society, the "central dynamics" of which have been challenged.

The medical model and cultural permission. Even a society that is somewhat afraid of honesty cannot ban self-disclosure completely. One person's communicating himself intimately to another, especially in times of special stress, is such a basic need that even a relatively closed society must find ways of channeling such disclosure, must find cultural justification for it. Freud was a courageous man. He took a bold step forward when he declared that the revealing of intimacies about oneself was a medical act and, as such, was perfectly justified in any society. Society could hardly be accused of greeting Freud's thesis with wholehearted approval. Still, over the years, it has become quite acceptable to reveal oneself to a doctor or to a psychologist or counselor. Intimate self-disclosure became justifiable as a medical act, or at least as a para-medical act. Society's way of allowing self-revelation was also its way of containing it: it should take place between a client and a professional. Seeking therapy or counselling gives a person the cultural excuse he needs to establish a relationship in which he is free to tell anything
about himself. But "therapy" implies illness and even counseling implies "problems," so that, to a large extent, self-disclosure is still associated with weakness, if not illness or emotional disturbance.

The professional has become the traditional one to listen to and deal with the intimate details of one's life because he is considered capable of understanding "what is behind" disturbing or uncontrolled behavior. At least he is the one who can become the catalyst for understanding or insight, and insight has long been considered the key to the control of behavior. The problem is that we live in a day when both the medical model of emotional disturbance (Szasz, 1961; Werry, 1968; Sarbin, 1967) and the primacy of insight (London, 1964; Carkhuff & Berenson, 1967) are being challenged more and more. One of the problems is the work "problem" or at least the work "solution." It is true that men refer to disturbances in interpersonal living as "problems," and when they come to mental health professionals, they are looking for "solutions." Behavioral scientists have more or less followed this "problem-solution" paradigm in their approach to psychopathology. But, while this paradigm is obviously well suited to mathematics, it is not clear that it is generally applicable to human relationships. Too many people think that they have the "problem" and that the professional has the "solution." But impasses in interpersonal relationships are more properly "transcended" than solved; that is, when two people change their attitudes and their ways of acting toward each other, when they communicate more freely with each other, areas of conflict dissipate or are transcended.

The problem-solution paradigm is too neat and pat to fit the complexities of human interaction, especially the complexities of disturbed communication. The person suffering communication disturbances does not need a professional "solutions-
tion." He needs experiments in communication, not someone to give him an answer. The professional is a professional, not because he has answers, but because he is creative, because he can set up and evaluate these experiments in communication.

Group therapy widened the scope of the cultural permission to reveal oneself. One was now allowed to reveal himself to peers, provided that some professional presided over the group interaction. The present popularity of all kinds of "sensitivity training" is a further breach in the wall. People do not want to have to declare themselves ill in order to involve themselves in communication experiences analogous to those in group therapy, so they turn to sensitivity training as a kind of "therapy for normals." It is quite true that the latest National Training Laboratories brochure asks prospective participants not to look upon the various laboratories as psychotherapy or a substitute for psychotherapy, and yet, for many, sensitivity training seems to afford a cultural permission to speak freely about themselves not unlike the permission granted in group psychotherapy. It seems that there are several different "brands" of sensitivity training and the question of "therapy for normals" in a laboratory setting is not an issue that has been settled even within the National Training Laboratories (e.g., Weschler, Massarik, and Tannenbaum, 1962; Benne, 1964b; Frank, 1964). The contract group seems to take up a position somewhere to the right of group psychotherapy and to the left of "traditional" sensitivity training.

Privacy: the pros, but especially the cons. Much has been written on the value of and the individual's right to privacy (e.g., The Panel on Privacy and Behavioral Research, 1967). Much heat has been generated in discussions con-
tending the tendency of the behavioral scientist to overstep his bounds in this area. But the coin has two sides and Bennett (1967) takes a rather refreshing look at the obverse side:

Privacy...is a graceful amenity, generally to be fostered, but with discriminating restraint and with due recognition of obligations as well as privilege. It is the writer's contention that the moral imperative is more often allied with the surrender of privacy than with its protection...Secrecy within the community is incompatible with cooperation, inimical to the welfare and progress of the ingroup...Strictly speaking, of course, sex is not ordinarily a private experience, but a peculiarly delicate and intimate transaction between at least two people. I submit that even in this sensitive area, more serious problems stem from mismanaged communication about sex—partners who cannot discuss it, children who must not be told, and alienation of the deviate—than from mere breaches of privacy...The confessional is also respected as a confidential relationship. It should be noted that this, too, is a communication; a revelation, in fact, of the most private secrets to at least one other person...The reference, in many religions, is to public confession. The Protestant sinner must bear witness "before men" to achieve absolution. Indeed, it is recognized in Catholic circles that the traditional confessional, intent on making peace with God, leaves unresolved the problem of making peace with the community...The readiness of people to discuss their personal problems with neighbors, and even strangers, makes one wonder, in fact, whether confidentiality is so necessary to the privacy of the patient as the comfort of the therapist. There are therapists who believe that the therapeutic process is facilitated in the presence of an audience. The popularity of group therapy reflects a similar assumption that patients find help in sharing personal problems—that confession is good for the psyche as well as the soul...The contemporary concern over privacy parallels a pervasive need to communicate...Our dilemma will not be resolved by hiding away from each other in separate caves, but through more and more interpersonal communication, better managed...The critical problem we face is not how to keep secrets from each other but how to facilitate this readiness to communicate. The overriding question is how to maintain an atmosphere of trust and confidence which will enable us to talk about personal affairs...freely....It is the writer's conviction that the importance of honest communication in our interdependent relationships outweighs the sanctity of privacy as a social value...Anyone who undertakes to influence the lives of other people must accept an obligation to let them know where he stands, to reveal his motives, to share his purposes (pp. 371-376).

This entire article is worth reading. Undoubtedly, many would take exception to much of what Bennett has to say. It is a kind of confrontation that
might find difficult to respond to with honest self-examination and honest examination of the "dynamics" of society.

Jourard (1967) has already been mentioned as championing more openness, less secrecy, by means of a more honest experimenter-subject dialogue in behavioral research. Sidowski (1966, p. 22) discusses the "mutual distrust" between experimenter and subject that characterizes a good deal of behavioral research. Wiener (1954) approaches the problem of secrecy in the context of a different kind of research, but perhaps he, too, has hit on a principle that has wider application to the human enterprise than one might first suspect. Wiener has strong reservations regarding the secrecy that surrounds research projects, specifically government research. It is his contention that in the long run such secrecy is uneconomic. Lack of communication leads to reduplication of effort. Thus, if the purpose of secrecy is, let us say, to gain time on an enemy in an area of research which will eventually yield its secrets anyway, then the price of secrecy is usually too high: the loss of progress that greater communication would lead to. It seems that Mowrer, Mainord, Jourard, Bennett, and Wiener are all saying, though from different points of view, that there is a tendency in society to look upon secrecy and privacy as values in themselves, even though in the long run they may be self-defeating. In many areas of life, the loss imagined to stem from revelation is imaginary. The amount of energy expended in keeping the secret and "encoding" it -- the neurotic may be considered to "encode" his secrets in his symptoms -- is too costly and ill spent. It is much more costly than revelation. Just as secrecy is often considered a value in itself, so revelation is considered as an evil in itself. We have learned to fear self-disclosure as self-destructive, so that few of us are
ready to examine the possibility of its having constructive consequences.

Society and Truth

In a study by Kohn (1959) in which middle-class and working-class parents were asked to select the three characteristics most desirable in a ten- or eleven-year-old child, the top-rated choice was honesty. This may or may not point to some fundamental drive for truth and honesty, at least in these segments of the population, but whether it does or not, there is some question as to both the availability and the social desirability of truth.

**Psychoanalysis on the availability of truth.** The widespread impact of psychoanalysis on society, or at least on some segments of society, is undeniable. Every educated man has some knowledge, however distorted, of psychoanalytic theory. Psychoanalysis has opened up (at least some would say so) whole new vistas in the domains of history (e.g., Erikson's *Young man Luther*, 1958) and literature. Comedians find in it an almost limitless source of humor, their wit sometimes adding to already distorted conceptions, and sometimes, though more rarely, laying bare the very marrow of some Freudian insight.

There is no intention here to mount an attack against psychoanalysis, but it does not seem out of place to suggest a hypothesis pertinent to the question of self-disclosure. One of the perhaps not too subtle messages of psychoanalysis—whether this be the "fault" of the theory or those who exercise the right of private interpretation in variegated exposures to the theory—is that truth is not a commodity that is readily available. Things, especially human things, are not what they seem to be. Much of the "really real," to borrow a phase from Plato, is a below-the-surface phenomenon; it is a source which is not easily
apped, however good the intentions of the searcher might be. The analyst demands free association rather that or at least in addition to the revelation of the intimate details of the patient's life, for the latter is not as significantly revealing as the former (Munroe, 1955, p. 38). Therefore, it would seem that psychoanalysis is one of the forces contributing to a kind of "tacit understanding" in society that man is relatively incapable of telling the truth about himself, of revealing the deepest sources within himself.

Nor is such a view restricted to psychoanalysis. Thorne (1955) claims that the individual is never able or willing to reveal what is really important about himself. "Nothing should be taken at face value in eliciting facts concerning the life record" (p. 116). It seems to be something other than strong addiction to empiricism that leads him to say: "Actually, no statement or behavior pattern should be taken at face value, whether the person is normal or abnormal, except with confirmatory evidence from external sources" (Thorne, 1950, p. 134). Mowrer has been heavily criticized for his sharp attacks on psychoanalytic theory. However, I would suggest that at least part of Mowrer's intuitive distaste for psychoanalysis arises from the more or less philosophical position of that theory that man is unable to tell the truth about himself. It is a definition of man that Mowrer finds intolerable. It is a philosophical position that affects man's appraisal of himself and his communication with others.

The cultivation of the lie. While it may be assumed that many men in society have become more or less convinced that the deepest truths about themselves are unavailable, many others find a need to distort the truths that are available. The fact that most men lie now and again is such a truism that, on a widely used personality inventory, a confession to this effect is part of a
validity scale built in to the test (Hathaway & McKinley, 1942; Hathaway & Whel, 1951). Perhaps a less evaluative way of looking at validity scales is to say that they attempt to measure the defensiveness of the individual taking the test. The fact that most men lie now and then, however, is not the point here. It is rather that we seem to live in a society that actually cultivates the lie, and does so in ways unavailable to the generations that have preceded us. Perhaps Alexander the Great and Caesar lied about their campaigns to their subjects at home. This is a question that classicists and historians must settle. But it seems undeniable that a good deal of the uneasiness felt in the United States today stems from the suspicion that "they" are not really telling us the truth in many areas of national living. Some critics are quite outspoken in their condemnation of what they see as a lying generation.

...This new generation of the Left hated the authority because the authority lied. It lied through the teeth of corporation executives and Cabinet officials and police enforcement officers and newspaper editors and advertising agencies, and in its mass magazines, where the subtlest apologies for the disasters of authority (and the neatest deformations of the news) were grafted in the best possible style into the ever-open mind of the walking American lobotomy: the corporation office worker and his high-school son (Mailer, 1968, pp. 83-84).

Lying in diplomatic circles is frequent enough, well documented enough, and publicized enough to be considered axiomatic. It could be the cause of a good deal of hilarity were one not sober enough to interpret it in terms of devastating mistrust among individuals and communities. Henry's (1963) comments on the passion for truth in our culture are certainly apropos: "Most people are not obsessive truth-seekers; they do not yearn to get to the bottom of things; they are willing to let absurd or merely ambiguous statements pass" (p. 49). One of the principal objects of his attack is the phenomenon of advertising:
The relaxed attitude toward veracity (or mendacity, depending on the point of view) and its complement, pecuniary philosophy, are important to the American economy, for they make possible an enormous amount of selling that could not take place otherwise (p. 49).

One of the discoveries of the 20th century is the enormous variety of ways of compelling language to lie.... We pay intellectual talents high price to amplify ambiguities, distort thought, and bury reality (p. 91).

How many men in our society are "outer-directed" (Riesman, 1950), their antennas high in the air in an attempt to pick up cues from society as to what they may and may not say? Fromm sees men as considering themselves, their personalities, as a commodity to be "marketed" in society, and one wonders how much deceit, falsification, and facade are indigenous to this marketing process.

The point of these remarks is not that psychoanalytic theory is without value (this would be absurd) or that twentieth-century western culture is necessarily more addicted to both the blatant and the subtle lie than other cultures, past and present. However, given the assumption that the kind of self-disclosure required in the contract group has some interpersonal-growth value, it is essential to face the fact that there are subtle and not-too-subtle forces within society that militate against this kind of self-disclosure. A deeper awareness of these forces, it is hoped, will help facilitate the fulfillment of the self-disclosure provision of the contract.

Intra-Individual Sources of Resistance to Self-Disclosure

The flight from self-knowledge. The problem-solution model of psychotherapy which sees self-disclosure as a transmission of necessary information to the therapist so that he can work out a solution is so obviously inadequate that it could be easily ignored, were it not for the fact that a certain percentage of
clients, at least initially, subscribe to such a conception. Stockpiling information about oneself with another simply does not necessarily or automatically lead to more effective emotional adjustment. Unless the client begins to listen to himself in such a way that he begins to get into better contact with his own experiencing (Gendlin, 1962), then he speaks on in vain. Self-disclosure is one of the principal ways, not only of communicating with others, but of communicating with oneself. Perhaps the latter is even logically prior. It is assumed here that many men flee self-revelation because they fear this closer contact with themselves. "The human organism seems capable of enduring anything in the universe except a clear, complete, fully conscious view of one's self as he actually is" (Sherrill, 1945). Self-disclosure both crystalizes and in a sense reifies aspects of the self that a person would rather live with silently--however painful the living--than face. At least in this one aspect, then, a group is only as threatening to a participant as he is to himself. Inevitable it is the individual participant who is his own severest judge. Jourard (1964) speaks out very strongly to this very poing.

...When a man does not acknowledge to himself who, what, and how he is, he is out of touch with reality, and he will sicken and die; and no one can help him without access to the facts. And it seems to be another empirical fact that no man can come to know himself except as an outcome of disclosing himself to another person. This is the lesson we have learned in the field of psychotherapy. When a person has been able to disclose himself utterly to another person, he learns how to increase his contact with his real self, and he may then be better able to direct his destiny on the basis of knowledge of his real self (p. 5).

When I say that self-disclosure is a symptom of personality health, what I really mean is that a person who displays many of the other characteristics that betoken healthy personality... will also display the ability to make himself fully known to at least one other significant human being... Neurotic and psychotic symptoms might be viewed as smoke screens interposed between the
patient's real self and the gaze of the onlooker. We might call the symptoms 'devices to avoid becoming known.'

A self-alienated person—one who does not disclose himself truthfully and fully—can never love another person nor can he be loved by the other person (p. 25).

Much is being written about alienation and identity conflicts, with attempts being made to establish both the social conditions and the interpersonal dynamics of these problems. Man's flight from himself is, in large part, a flight from communication with himself. Self-alienation is frightening, but any kind of intimate contact with the "problem-self" is seen as even more frightening. Self-alienation, then, becomes self-reinforcing, its "reward" lying in its being, supposedly, less painful than its alternative. Even when a person gets out of contact with himself and with others to the degree that he flees to a mental hospital, this is still no guarantee that he is ready to face himself. Time and again in mental hospitals, when a patient is faced with the choice between the pain of alienation and the pain of therapy, he chooses the former, unable to find the courage to be. Since a similar dynamic is seen as operative in the "psychopathology of the average," self-disclosure is stressed in the interpersonal-growth contract.

Fear of intimacy. In dealing with patients in both individual and group psychotherapy, I discovered another block to self-disclosure. It is difficult to reveal oneself on a deep level to another without creating, by the very act of self-revelation, some degree of intimacy. In a group situation, for some reason or another, this intimacy has a special intensity. The participants in group psychotherapy and in other kinds of group growth-experiences are aware of this, and even though they might have the courage to let others see the "mystery
of iniquity" or even the "mystery of goodness" that they are, they cannot tolerate the intimacy that this act would create. They do not flee self-revelation as such. They flee intimacy. Meerloo (1956) believes that for many persons fear of human relations is greater than the fear of death. Berne's (1964) thesis seems more apropos in our present culture. The all too real possibility of intimacy frightens many people. They prefer to skirt real self-revelation and to avoid real intimacy. They engage in sporadic acts of pseudo-self-revelation leading to pseudo-intimacy in a "games" approach to human relationships. Others merely eschew self-revelation. If it takes place by accident, they try to neutralize its effect. "Am I frightened? I suppose so. Most men are from time to time. It's quite normal." The obvious "message" here is "Don't probe." Failed intimacy is another major dimension of the "psychopathology of the average."

**Flight from responsibility.** In some cases flight from self-disclosure is a flight from responsibility, a flight from the anxiety and work involved in constructive personal change. Self-disclosure leads to the revelation of "areas of deficit" and "areas of aspiration" in human living. It is relatively easy to avoid both these areas in day-to-day living. However, once these areas are "reified," once a person declares what he finds unacceptable in himself and what goals he thinks that he should be pursuing, he commits himself to change, and avoidance behavior becomes more painful. Self-disclosure commits one to "conversion," to the process of re-structuring one's life; it demands that a person leave the security of his own house and journey into a foreign land, and most men balk at that. If one senses that "conversion" is impossible, then self-disclosure must be avoided. So it is assumed that some men fear or even
preciate self-disclosure because of the behavioral consequences it entails. If the self-revelation takes place in a group, then the pressure to change is even greater than in a one-to-one-situation, for there is the necessity of facing the pressures and demands of a "community."

In the mental hospital it is common enough to run into patients who would like to be better adjusted, if adjustment could be effected through some kind of magic. Popular forms of magic are: just being in the hospital, drugs, getting other people to change, getting the "answer" from the professionals, the hope for spontaneous remission, etc. In this sense, it seems not unfair to say that a certain percentage of mental patients actually choose their illness. Some will argue that it is the function of the therapist to motivate the patient, that if the patient does not want to participate in some therapeutic program, he should be taught to appreciate the program and its potential benefits. So much of psychotherapeutic theory and technique is predicated on the assumption that the patient wants to be cured. In the academic setting, it can be all theory, method, technique. In the mental hospital, it is often a question of motivation. If a person "chooses" to be "mentally ill," how much money and energy should society pour into convincing him that he really wants to be well and that he should decide to undertake an arduous program of psychotherapy?

This problem is not as serious in private practice. First of all, the patient most likely is actively seeking therapy. Secondly, there is the selection factor: the "best candidates" for therapy are often chosen, and part of the definition of "best" is "well-motivated." Psychotherapy and growth-experiences in general can be proffered, in many different ways and repeatedly. Part of the "proffering" may even be a hospital ward behavioral reinforcement program.
e.g., Ayllon & Ayllon, 1959; Ayllon & Haughton, 1962; Ayllon & Azrin, 1964),
designed to help the regressed patient achieve, if possible, a state of inte-
gration and "contact" sufficient to elicit from the patient some kind of cues
indicating that he "wants" to be cured. Beyond a certain point, however, the
patient must himself opt for health and the work involved in striving for it.

Mowrer's (1968b) contract intimates that self-disclosure is part of the
psychotherapeutic "work," but that it is not enough. Self-disclosure is the
prelude to behavioral change, especially self-initiated behavioral change s.
Mainord's (1968) contract implicitly demands a great deal of behavioral change,
though he admits that the patient is somewhat unsuspecting when he agrees to
contractual terms that do not appear to be excessively difficult. The contract
group also demands behavioral change. The change directly contracted for is
greater openness. But it is only fair to warn the person who intends to be open
about himself that this has behavioral consequences beyond the group.

Anderson (1964) proposes the thesis that at least some of men's emotional
problems have their root, not in guilt, but in "grandiosity." Men, she says,
are filled with feelings of "entitlement." When they are frustrated, they give
way to resentment. This grandiosity also underlies feelings of helplessness.
The "helpless" person is one who cannot reach a preconceived degree of perfec-
tion in some area or who cannot get others to behave as they should. This
pride is subtle and insinuates itself into all areas of life. This thesis is
interesting and perhaps pertinent to flight from self-disclosure. There is in
most men a rather deeply embedded desire to change first, if they think that
they must change at all, and then present themselves as changed to others—in
the case at point, to the group. Anderson would recognize this as false inde-
Perhaps there are some changes that demand a group, a community of some kind. There are some things that either cannot be done outside of community or are done much more effectively in community. It takes humility, and not just a surrender to dependence, to admit this. Group experience is not an abdication of autonomy, but it is a potent vehicle of change. However, a man will reveal himself to the group only to the extent that he wants to change.

The reverse halo-effect. Another source of fear in self-revelation could be termed the "reverse halo-effect." The halo-effect refers to the fact that a person, judged to be competent or outstanding in a particular area, will also likely to be judged to have a similar degree of competence in other areas. If A is an expert in psychology, this aura of expertise tends to spread to other areas and either he or others begin to look upon his pronouncements in theology or political science with the same awe. The reverse process sometimes stifles self-disclosure in growth groups. The group member fears self-disclosure because he usually thinks first in terms of disclosing the worst in himself. If he tells the other members about incompetence in one area of living, he feels that they will assume similar incompetence or irresponsibility in related or even unrelated areas. If a person admits problems in his private life, he fears that others will assume incompetence in his professional life. This is especially true if the person's profession is closely related to human living, e.g., psychology. There are several ways of handling this in the group. The participant can try to give a balanced view of himself, speaking alternately of strengths and weaknesses. Or the group can take up the problem of the "reverse halo-effect" and discuss it directly. The reverse halo-effect brings up the
problem of stereotyping and categorizing. No one likes to be dealt with as "problem," but there is a tendency in groups to identify the participants with their problems in living, for it is easier to deal with problems than with persons. Self-disclosure in the contract group should be in dialogue-disclosure, that is, the participants should reveal themselves gradually in dialogue with one another and not allow themselves to fix on one person, even those his problems differ from those of the rest of the group.

These, then, are some of the reasons why people tend to avoid self-disclosure. As Shaffer and Shoben (1956) note: "One of the hindrances to successful counseling is that it depends on discussing the very things that the client is least inclined to discuss..." (p. 529). And yet, willingness to engage in self-exploration, which certainly involves self-revelation, is central to the growth process. Truax and Carkhuff (1967) review the evidence for such a statement:

A number of studies have explored what it is that successful patients do in therapy. There is a great deal of convergence upon the patient's intrapersonal or self-exploratory experiences. Using a variety of indices of constructive behavioral and personality change, Truax (1961) found significantly more depth of self-exploration... in successful than in unsuccessful cases of hospitalized schizophrenics. Truax and Carkhuff (1963) reviewed results indicating relatively clear-cut findings that the greater the degree of patient engagement in the deep intrapersonal or self-exploratory process, the greater the degree of constructive personality changes in the patient. Further analysis indicated that even during initial stages of psychotherapy (the second interview), the level of patient self-exploration was significantly predictive of final outcome... Wagstaff, Rice, and Butler (1960) report similar findings in a study of client-centered counseling. Their data indicated that patients with successful outcome tended to explore themselves more in the course of psychotherapy, whereas patients who could be classified as therapeutic failures showed little self-exploration and emotional involvement. In a more specific study of client-centered counseling, Braaten (1961) found that measures of self-reference and 'private self' differentiated
successful from unsuccessful counseling cases (pp. 372-373).

It is hypothesized here that such openness will be of equal benefit to non-psychiatric populations.

Guilt and Self-Disclosure

In a study by Talland and Clark (1954), clients judged the therapeutic value of fifteen topics discussed during counseling. There was general agreement as to the relative value of the topics. Ratings showed a high correlation between the perceived helpfulness of a topic and its "disturbing" qualities. The topic called "shame and guilt" was experienced as extremely upsetting, but the discussion of this area of life during counseling sessions was considered to be very helpful. A group of psychologists also rated the same fifteen topics for their "intimacy," that is, the degree of personal significance for the clients. There was a high correlation between what the psychologists deemed "intimate" and what the clients judged to be helpful. Guilt and shame are household items in human living. It would be impossible to deal adequately with self-disclosure without treating of them. They will be treated separately guilt in this section, shame in the next.

The many faces of guilt. The psychological literature, especially the literature dealing with theoretical formulations, is filled with references to guilt and guilt feelings (e.g., Cameron, 1963; Erikson, 1963; London & Rosenthal, 1968; Lynd, 1958; May, 1958). Guilt and anxiety are often related. For instance, Lowe's (1964) work with a guilt scale compiled from MMPI items indicates that anxiety and guilt are highly related phenomena. Levitt (1967) suggests that individuals with high anxiety-proneness are given to stronger guilt
feelings or ot more easily provoked guilt feelings. He suggests that anxiety and guilt are really not separate constructs, but that guilt is simply another form of anxiety. Mowrer (1968b) suggests that poorly handled guilt leads inevitably to increased anxiety. The problem is that guilt seems to be a genus with a number of species. Guilt as a genus implies violation-of-standard, whether the standard be real or imagined, and some kind of perception of this violation on the part of the violator, whether this perception be "clear and distinct," vague, or even "unconscious." The species of guilt differ depending on the kind of standard violated and/or the kind of perception involved. The species of guilt that seem relevant to the discussion may be termed: moral, existential, pseudo- (or conventional). It is the contention of the writer that hidden guilt, of any kind, is a potential source of psychological trouble and that one of the most effective ways of handling guilt is self-disclosure. Self-disclosure is related, though in different ways, to the "therapy" of all species of guilt.

(a) Moral guilt. Moral guilt refers to a willful violation of some moral or ethical or contractual standard that a person holds, either implicitly or explicitly. If A, realizing that it is a violation of his norms of conduct, steals money from B, then he becomes the subject of moral guilt. Ethical value systems differ from culture to culture, and even from individual to individual; that is, both individual and cultural subjectivity enter somewhat into the determination of a particular value system. Almost everyone, however, has some kind of value system or, from the viewpoint of Pratt and Tooley (1964, 1966), a network of contracts with self, others, and society at large. If the network itself is either non-existent or deficient, one is considered "ill" in whatever
sense the psychopathic or antisocial personality may be considered ill. It is not necessary for a person to reflect explicitly on the contractual nature of his relationships. By merely existing as a human being, by entering into relationships with others, and by living in society, one assumes contractual responsibilities. When a person, more or less knowingly and willfully, violates one or more of these contracts, he becomes the subject of moral guilt.

It is of course Mowrer's (1964, 1968a, 1968b) thesis that the complexus--contract-violation-behavior, followed by concealment and failure in restitution--behavior--is pathogenic. "Confession," especially when coupled with restitution, seems, at least generally, to deprive contract violations of their potentially pathogenic power. Since value systems usually deal with social relationships, a violated value usually implies a break in human relationships. The guilty person is who, by his behavior, has gotten "out-of-community." Recognition and revelation of this behavior is a step toward getting back into community. Many people would say that this is good common sense: at least it seems to be a very good working hypothesis. However, attempts should be made to test this hypothesis in various ways, though it is evident that experimentation in this area would be quite difficult. There are apparent exceptions to this hypothesis. For instance, some people brag about exploits that others would consider to be contract violations. In defense of the hypothesis, however, such behavior might not be the exception that if first seems to be, for (1) the deviant behavior is "confessed," that is, it is externalized in the community, and (2) those who engage in such behavior might not see it as a violation of any contract. Different contractual systems exist at different levels of society. It is enough to know this fact without entering into the
question of the relative merits of each contractual system. Therefore, what seems to be "contractual unawareness" might merely reflect cultural and individual variations, ignorance, or, if the deviation is significant, the "illness" of the anti-social personality.

Tournier (1962) calls moral guilt "value" guilt. It arises, he says, from a decision of the self against the self. Becker (1966) calls it "realistic, objective, or social" guilt. It is a falling short of the requirements of life with-others. He, too, admits that cultural differences are important in the determination of such guilt. Others see the whole question of moral guilt as an unfortunate mixing of theology with psychology. Terms like "guilt," "self-disclosure," "confession," "restitution," "contract," and the like are considered too "moralistic" to be dealt with in a behavioral science. If this is the case, I would have to disagree with them. Secrets concerning past moral failure may well be contemporary determinants of behavior if they divert energy into the task of putting up a facade and keeping it in good repair. Undoubtedly, some of Mowrer's critics are disturbed by the fact that he refers to man's moral life at all. However, one criticism of Mowrer does seem justified. It is disturbing that Mowrer, at least in his writings published to date, deals almost exclusively with moral guilt. At least this is often the tone of his writings. His position is reductionistic in that he tends to reduce most, if not all, neurotic guilt to moral guilt, and in the process ignores both existential and pharisaical guilt. Perhaps it is not that Mowrer says too much, but rather too little.

(b) Existential guilt. It is also assumed here that self-revelation gets at another kind of guilt that is just as pervasive as moral guilt. Existential
ontological guilt deals with "failed-potentialities." From the very fact that we are human, there stand before us any number of "possibilities" in the organic process that we call human-life and growth. It is quite obvious that a man cannot choose and fulfill all the "possibilities" or "potentialities" in his life. But the fact that he allows too many possibilities to slip by, that he chooses poorly among the possibilities that are at hand—this is the source of existential guilt. May (1958) follows Medard Boss (1957) in his treatment of this species of guilt:

If, as Boss puts it, we 'forget being' —by failing to bring ourselves to our entire being, by failing to be authentic, by slipping into the conformist anonymity of das Man—then we have in fact missed our being and are to that extent failures.

'If you lock up potentialities, you are guilty against...what is given you in your origin, in your "core"' (p. 53).

Failed-potentiality can take a number of forms, both intrapersonal and interpersonal:

...We can be as guilty by refusing to accept the anal, genital, or any other corporeal aspects of life as the intellectual or spiritual aspects.

We have cited only one form of ontological guilt, namely, that arising from forfeiting one's own potentialities. There are other forms as well. Another, for example, is ontological guilt against one's fellows, arising from the fact that since each of us is an individual, he necessarily perceives his fellow man through his own limited and biased eyes. This means that he always to some extent does violence to the true picture of his fellow man and always to some extent fails fully to understand and meet the other's needs. This is not a question of moral failure or slackness—though it can indeed by greatly increased by lack of moral sensitivity. It is an inescapable result of the fact that each of us is a separate individuality and has no choice but to look at the world through his own eyes. This guilt, rooted in our existential structure, is one of the most potent sources of a sound humility and an unsentimental attitude of forgiveness toward one's fellow men (p. 54).

This lack of interpersonal sensitivity can be considered as "forfeiting one's
potentialities," for it is a question of failed-potentiality in the area of interpersonal living.

Clark (1967) makes a distinction between existential guilt and existential shame, but the notion of failed-potentiality underlies both:

Buber has shown (1965, pp. 121-148) that existential guilt is the guilt of not having affirmed another, of not having answered another's plea for community, of not having entered an I-Thou relationship. Existential guilt, then, is clearly an important determinant in one's coming to value and create relation, for such guilt can often be expiated only by the establishment of relation in the here and now.

Existential shame, on the other hand, is the shame of not experiencing oneself as an actor, as a creator, as—to use Bugenwald's term (1965, pp. 203-208)—an 'I-process.' We experience existential shame as we are aware of having reated ourselves only as recipients of power and not also as expressors of it (p. 256).

Dealing with existential shame and guilt seems to be a function of a growth-experience or "therapy for normals." If this is the case, then Clark sees sensitivity training as precisely this kind of experience: "This kind of experience people in sensitivity training groups have is one which is designed better than any other I know of to allow for the experiencing of both existential guilt and existential shame, and both are manifestly important for man to experience" (p. 256).

What are the "standards" violated in existential guilt? They cannot be contractual standards, for violation of contract leads to moral guilt. In many of the contracts that define a person's life, there is what "must" be done or not done, if the contract is to remain integral. Beyond that, however, lies the fullness of the contract. Scholastic philosophers make a distinction between esse (to be), the bare existence of something, and its bene esse (to be well or fully), the perfection of its being. In marriage, for instance, the
parties must not commit adultery, the husband usually must support his wife, etc. These contractual provisions belong to the esse of marriage. When the partners move beyond mere contract fulfillment, when the relationship deepens, putting them into more intimate contact with each other, with themselves, and with others (children, friends, etc.), then it is a question of the bene esse of marriage. Living out this potential seems to be related to a kind of quasi-contract that a person has with himself, to what he demands of himself with respect to the bene esse of the marriage. It is no longer a question of fulfillment or non-fulfillment, it is rather a question of degree. Existential guilt refers to the bene esse of living.

Men do experience existential guilt. Everyone carries the burden of failed-potentiality, in the pursuit of a career, in interpersonal relationships, even in play and creative enjoyment. But few men discuss failed-potentialities. The contract group and growth groups in general afford an excellent opportunity to reveal and discuss areas of failed-potentiality. However, entering a sensitivity group, or especially a contract group, may increase the risk of adding to one's store of existential guilt. Once it becomes clear that the provisions of the contract, such as self-disclosure and expression of feeling, are "possibilities" for growth, then a refusal to participate in these experiences will only add to one's existential guilt. The group experience becomes just one more failed-potentiality. Such failure can produce a real sense of diminishment.

(c) Pseudo- or neurotic guilt. This guilt, which Tournier (1962) calls "functional", and which Becker (1966) refers to as "fantastic," is usually considered to be the domain of professionals dealing with emotional disturbances.
This kind of guilt has a number of subspecies or at least it can be expressed in quite different ways. Some psychotics think or feel that they have committed the "unforgiveable sin," when they have not done anything very reprehensible. Some neurotics think they are "rotten," though they do not speak of or even know of any particularly egregious contract-violations in their lives. I prefer to refer to this kind of guilt as "pseudo-guilt" rather than "neurotic," for (1) its analog is also found in psychotic patients, and (2) "pseudo-" implies that (a) there has been no real violation of standard, there has been no relevant instance of contract-violation, although the "guilty" party insists that there has been or at least "feels" that there has been, or (b) there has been some kind of contract violation, but the individual's reaction is out of proportion. Stern (1954) recounts a case in which a woman, after the death of her rather brutal husband, talked about having committed the "unforgiveable" sin. It was finally learned that her guilt revolved around the fact that a friend of her husband's had made a "pass" at her some thirty years previously. She had not cooperated with the man, so that no real contract-violation had occurred. Her reaction was simply not proportioned to the incident.

Stern summarizes the differences between moral and neurotic guilt (which, in Stern's sense, is a narrower concept than pseudo-guilt): moral guilt has the quality of proportion, can be assuaged by realistic restitution or atonement, does not necessarily depend on emotion, and refers to realized acts only; pseudo-guilt lacks proportion, cannot be "undone," is so inextricably interwoven with anxiety that that which is experienced subjectively is at times only the anxiety without conscious feelings of guilt, and refers to repressed drives rather than realized acts.
Sometimes pseudo-guilt takes the form of an exaggeration of existential guilt. A person feels, without "reason," that his whole life has been meaningless, that his life, rather he himself, is defined by failed-potentiality.

Some draw a distinction between "guilt" and "guilt feelings." If it is a question of contract-violations and/or failed-potentialities, then the individual "feels guilty" (and should). If, however, a person invents, exaggerates, or otherwise distorts normal guilt, either moral or existential, then he "has guilt feelings." This terminology is abandoned here as being too ambiguous.

Another problem, more complex than that of classification and terminology, is the source of abnormal guilt. As indicated above, Mowrer (1964, 1968a, 1968b) has tended to think that "neurotic" guilt is the result of concealed and otherwise mismanaged moral guilt. There has been little room for "pseudo-guilt" in his system, though I have the feeling that he is moving away from what I consider to be an overly reductionistic position. Psychoanalytic theories, on the other hand, tend to see the origin of pseudo-guilt in such processes as repressed libidinal drives. A drive exists. The individual learns in some way that, at least for him here and now, it is prohibited. The drive is repressed. Since this process, in the main, takes place on the level of the unconscious, it remains "unlabeled" (Dollard & Miller, 1950). Even though the individual has never actually violated the standard in question, he feels as if he did, and because of repression he does not know why he feels guilty. This "developmental guilt" is explained somewhat differently by others. For instance, the significant adults in a child's life reject him for one reason or another (e.g., he was not wanted in the first place, he is not attractive, they are too busy with other interests, etc.). The rejection may be open or subtle,
the point is that the child forms his self-image from the cues he receives. 

Erikson (1964) puts it:

Hardly has one learned to recognize the familiar face (the original harbor of basic trust) when he becomes also frightfully aware of the unfamiliar, the strange face, the unresponsive, the averted, the darkened and the frowning face. And here begins ... that inexplicable tendency on man's part to feel that he has caused the face to turn away which happened to turn elsewhere (p. 102).

In the extreme case, the child learns to look upon himself as worthless. Guilt learned in this fashion becomes a mode of being. I have dealt with cases in which the patient who "learned" his worthlessness as a child and youth later acted out his worthlessness. "'They' treated me rottenly, so now I will act rottenly," is the logic of such behavior. This renouncement of responsibility, even though it is triggered by adverse developmental circumstance, seems to be a contract violation situation, however mitigated the person's guilt might be. These are cases of "mixed" guilt.

The point of this hurried, incomplete, and somewhat over-simplified consideration of the possible etiology of pseudo-guilt is to suggest that it, too, can be, and is, treated, at least in part, by one form or another of self-disclosure. The concealed is laid open, the repressed is "labeled." If therapy is considered not just a question of insight but a "corrective emotional experience" (Alexander, 1963), this, too, demands self-revelation. The paradigm, perhaps over-simplified, is something like this: Patient: "I am worthless." Therapist: "Tell me about yourself, reveal to me the 'person inside.'" Then, perhaps slowly and painfully, the patient reveals himself. Therapist: "I have to be honest with you. I find the person you have revealed worthwhile. If you have really been listening to yourself, I think that you might have the
same reaction."

But enough about pseudo-guilt. Perhaps the pseudo-guilt "of everyday life" can be handled in the contract-group. However, the consideration of the etiology, nature, and treatment of its more serious manifestations belongs in works on psychopathology and psychotherapy. The contract group is, by definition, made up of "normals."

(d) **Pharisaical guilt.** Some of the standards of conduct established in society refer to the more superficial, conventional, and ritualistic aspects of interpersonal relating and living in community. It is not that ritual is not necessary. On the contrary, ritual is an essential part of human living, whether the ritual be religious or secular in character. Ritual is a deep human need and finds expression in any number of ways: in liturgical services, in guru-style meditation, in the stylized activities of fraternal organizations, in some stereotyped family activities (e.g., Sunday visiting of relatives can be deeply ritualistic), etc. Indeed, this area of human behavior would be a fruitful area of more intensive sociological and psychological research. The "sick" rituals of the obsessive-compulsive and of the psychotic are dealt with in detail in works on psychopathology, while normal ritual remains comparatively ignored. Berne (1964) sees much of ordinary human living as ritualistic, but his viewpoint is somewhat cynical (though often realistic), and he ignores the deeper rituals that bind men together. Why do people keep going to movies and watching television programs that are cast in the same mold, that follow the same pattern? Why do people read certain genres of literature such as spy, detective, and love stories? At least part of this behavior seems to be ritualistic, a search for same ness. Ritual, whether it centers on the deepest
more of human living or on its more superficial aspects, connotes security, control, rhythm of living, a sense of well-being from knowing what is going to happen, a kind of securely encompassing knowledge. Ritual excludes the intrusive and the unexpected.

Convention might be considered as part of the ritualistic dimension of living. It seems to connote, however, defined aspects of interpersonal living that are, at least relatively, more superficial. Ritual taps something deeper in man than does convention. The latter refers to the more superficial aspects and even to the more humorous aspects of the "what-is-done" and the "what-is-not-done" in social intercourse. For instance, it is said that Mrs. Vanderbilt once asked Fritz Kreisler to play at a dinner party which she was giving for her exclusive set of friends. She asked him what he would charge. The violinist replied: "Thirteen thousand dollars." She agreed, but added: "Of course, you will not mingle with my guests." "In that case, Madame," Kreisler is said to have replied, "my fee is five hundred dollars." Day-to-day living is filled with conventions. The conventions of society usually call for a certain degree of conformity and men readily respond. Technological societies are particularly demanding. Keniston (1965) suggests that, since so many of the positions offered by the corporations and organizations of our society demand on-the-job training, the primary value of a diploma and a degree is to give witness to the fact that one has been able to endure sixteen years of "education." This is the proof that a technocracy requires to be assured that a prospective employee will become an obedient cog in an efficient organizational machine.

Allport (1962) suggests that the concept of "social influence," as usually understood, does not explain the phenomenon of "conformity" noted in groups.
The group is rather a "theater of operations" for the satisfaction of individual needs, it is a medium of self-expression. "Norms" arise from a kind of cyclic action within the group. It is this—rather than a "one-way agency of the group acting upon the individual." The group or the "grouping" is constituted by the give-and-take of behaviors of seeking and recognition. The relationship, then, between the conduct prescribed by group norms and the cooperative activities of the group members is close and facilitating. The forces that Allport sees as operative in a group or "grouping," then, seem to arise out of a kind of benign, security-motivated utilitarianism.

Collins and Guetzkow (1964) see both advantages and disadvantages in the "conformity" behavior noted in groups. In general "the social weighting given to the majority opinion (i.e., conformity) frequently causes the better alternatives to be chosen" (p. 41). But there are circumstances under which "social influence" is more likely to lower the quality of a group product:

(1) An expert may continue to receive the respect of an authority even though the topic is outside his own area of specialization.
(2) A group member may conform merely for social approval. (3) Conformity and agreement can set in so soon that all opinions are not considered. (4) Finally, group members can become so much in the habit of depending on other persons for knowledge and information that they cannot make contributions on their own.

Useful as social knowledge may be, it must be used intelligently. It may be that we place too much emphasis on getting along with others and not enough on the content of communication in our culture (pp. 41-42).

In general they take a more moderate approach to the question of the "pressure to conform" in our society than does someone like Whyte (1956) in The Organization Man.

Ritual and convention do have a place in human living and in this sense a certain degree of conformity and/or utilitarian "patterning of behaviors" is
part of the social cement that binds men together. To reject ritual in personal and interpersonal living and to defy convention as conformism would obviously have a devastating effect on both the individual and society. To the extent that ritual and convention are necessary for the necessary relationships between the individual and society, they belong to the sphere of contract obligations. However, ritual can become outmoded and convention can prove stifling. Pharisaical or conventional guilt is the guilt that arises from violation of standards or ritual and convention that have lost their function. Personal growth and necessary change within society demand the ability to go beyond ritual and convention. Both the individual and society should feel free to experiment with bypassing certain conventions. The over-ritualized and the over-conventionalized balk at this for such pruning and experimentation make them feel guilty. The flexible person knows when ritual and convention may and should be set aside. He feels, not guilty, but free.

The contract group is a place where one might well explore his relationship to ritual and convention. Mutually shared self-revelation in this area has the potentiality to free the rigid and inhibited and to confront the insensitive.

An example illustrating the four species of guilt. Perhaps an example in the area of sexuality might draw together some of the principal notions concerning guilt. (1) An outright misuse of sex such as adultery is a contract violation and leads to moral guilt. (2) If a couple have failed to integrate sexuality into their married life so that it becomes a means of deepening their love for one another, at once a symbol of their love and an expression of it—this can lead to a sense of failed-potentiality and existential guilt. (3)
expressing one's sexuality, learning to fear this drive as dangerous and/or dirty, may well lead to pseudo-guilt. (4) If a married couple were to eschew perfectly acceptable forms of experimentation with sexual technique in order to remain within the bounds of what they perceive to be a conventional approach to sexual expression, they would most likely do so in order to avoid pharisaical or conventional guilt.

A summary word on guilt. The topic of guilt is not a popular one. It makes too many people wince inside. It is unpopular enough to make some scoff when even an attempt is made to deal with it in some kind of scientific context. But guilt is part of the human condition; it is unavoidable in human living. It is a two-edged sword. If mismanaged or not managed at all, it tends to become psychological deadweight; if faced and handled, it can become an important growth factor. Concealment of guilt from self and others, which initially appears to be the least painful, if not the only, solution, eventually exacts its price in terms of human growth. Self-revelation, on the other hand, is almost always initially painful. But once guilt "has to be hidden" from oneself and from others, it is liable to psychological translation or transformation. A sense of failure, for instance, becomes fatigue, boredom, depression, or touchiness in interpersonal relationships. It is the assumption here that a certain degree of self-revelation in a sensitivity-training group can open up new perspectives with respect to the effective handling of guilt, whether the guilt be moral, existential, pharisaical, or even pseudo- or neurotic. These different types of guilt are usually not found in the "pure" state. They are intermingled and confused in the ordinary man's life, and only when a man dares let others see his life for what it is, is there hope that the
complexities of guilt may not make him less than he really is.

**Shame and Self-Disclosure**

Even though Talland and Clark (1964) treated "shame and guilt" as a single topic in their study, there are reasons for separating the two here. Erikson (1963, 1968) rightly calls shame an "emotion insufficiently studied" (1968, p. 110). While it is true that the discussion of failures that have led to guilt may evoke shame, the experience of guilt and the experience of shame are simply not the same thing. Shame experiences can arise completely outside the context of guilt. Just as guilt experiences, if mishandled, can become psychological deadweight and stand in the way of growth or, if well managed, can have an opposite effect, so shame, too, can be either a destructive experience or a stimulus to growth. It, too, is intimately related to self-disclosure, but in a way different from guilt.

**Erikson on shame.** Erikson (1963, 1968) deals with shame briefly in considering the various "stages of man." The crisis of "autonomy versus shame" comes early in the life of the child. The child suddenly wants to have a choice. This tendency must be encouraged, and yet he must be protected from anarchy; he must be trained to "hold on" and "let go" with discretion. He must be encouraged to "stand on his own two feet," and also be protected from meaningless experiences of shame and doubt. Shame, as Erikson sees it, implies that a person is completely exposed, conscious of being looked at, self-conscious, visible—yet not ready to be visible. The person who is ashamed would like to avert the eyes of those looking at him, but he cannot, and so he turns his rage in upon himself. Erikson, therefore, spells out the dangers inherent in shame.
If a person is shamed too much, this leads to his trying to get away with things unseen. If a child or an adult is constantly forced to consider self, body, and wishes as dirty and evil, he will either revolt, sometimes even to the point of defiant shamelessness, or he will succumb to a lasting sense of shame and doubt. Erikson believes that many adults, otherwise mature and free of neurotic symptoms, display this sensitivity, or perhaps over-sensitivity, to a possible shameful "loss of face."

Shame, then, is a powerful emotion and must be evoked with some caution. Shame in a group experience is even more powerful. I have participated in group experiences in which shame was evoked recklessly, causing a great deal of pain but very little "healing." Evoking shame without providing adequate human support may be as dangerous and destructive of growth in adult life as it is in childhood. As Fromm (1956) notes, shame involves a deep awareness of human separation, and without reunion by love, shame is sterile. Erikson's cautions, then, are well taken. But this does not mean that shame experiences are merely negative; they can be a powerful force for growth.

Lynd on shame. Helen Merrill Lynd (1958) has written a most remarkable analysis of shame and its relationship to identity. The root meaning of the word is to uncover, to expose, to wound. But shame is not just being pain-fully exposed to another; it is primarily an exposure of self to oneself. In shame experiences particularly sensitive and vulnerable aspects of the self are exposed, especially to one's own eyes. It is a sudden experience. In a flash one sees his unrecognized inadequacies without being "ready" for this revelation of self to self; much less is he ready for exposure to the eyes of others.
Shame, according to Lynd, in some way pre-exists the specific shaming event:

...I think that this public exposure of even a very private part of one's physical or mental character could not in itself have brought about shame unless one had already felt within oneself, not only dislike, but shame for these traits (p. 29).

The feeling of unexpectedness marks one of the central contrasts between shame and guilt. This unexpectedness is more than suddenness in time; it is also an astonishment at seeing different parts of ourselves, conscious and unconscious, acknowledged and unacknowledged, suddenly coming together, and coming together with aspects of the world we have not recognized (p. 34).

The external event, then, that precipitates a shame experience might be quite trivial. A casual remark or a joke might trigger a profound feeling of shame in another, while the person who made the remark often remains oblivious to what is happening inside the person who was the object of his remark. But shame could not arise, could not be touched off by "insignificant" incidents unless, deep down, one was already ashamed.

The difference between shame and guilt. Shame and guilt differ. Alexander (1963) believes that shame generates feelings of "weakness" or "inadequacy," while guilt gives rise to an "I-am-no-good" or perhaps rather an "I-am-not-good" feeling. He contends that inferiority feelings in shame are rooted in a deeper conflict in the personality than the sense of wrongdoing in guilt. Piers and Singer (1953) believe that guilt accompanies transgression, while shame follows upon failure. So guilt is generated whenever a boundary is transgressed or a standard is violated, while shame occurs when a goal is not being reached. Shame thus indicates a real "shortcoming." Lynd (1958) says that shame lacks the inherent legal reference of guilt. It is not a question of failing to pay a debt or of violating a prescribed code. Rather shame is
Much more intimately associated with failed-potentiality and as such related to existential rather than moral guilt: "...The Ego-Ideal is in continuous inter-function with the unconscious and conscious awareness of the Ego's potentialities...Shame... occurs whenever goals and images presented by the Ego-Ideal are not reached" (Piers and Singer, 1953, pp. 14, 16). Because shame represents a failure to be, it gets into one's guts in a way that differs from guilt: "It is pervasive as anxiety is pervasive; its focus is not a separate act, but revelation of the whole self. The thing that has been exposed is what I am" (Lynd, 1958, p. 50).

A shame experience might even be defined as an acute emotional awareness of a failure to be in some way. It differs from existential guilt in that it is an acute emotional experience and in that it is not just a realization of failed potentiality but a painful awareness of what one is not. For instance, one can be ashamed of one's own body (it lacks grace, beauty; it has grown old; it is crippled, deformed, etc.), but one's physical make-up is hardly a source of existential guilt.

As Lynd well notes, both shame and guilt might arise from the same situation: "...Shame and guilt may sometimes alternate with and reinforce each other...a particular situation may be experienced by an individual as shame or guilt or both according to the nature of the person..." (pp. 22-23). Murder may be experienced as both a violation of a standard and as a deep personal failure. It is an act that may suddenly reveal to a person his deepest personal inadequacies and his most tragic interpersonal failures. Less dramatic acts may do the same. A burst of uncontrolled anger may be experienced as some kind of contract failure, but it might also be a source of deep shame insofar
it reveals a person to himself and forces him to gaze at the nakedness of his own inadequacy. Both failures to be and over-stepped boundaries are potentially destructive to personality integration. When these two strains meet in the same human experience, the danger is heightened markedly.

When an acute shame experience strikes, there is no defense. It rinses one's being. But few recognize the fact that such an experience has potentialities for growth. The icy clarity of self-knowledge that is part and parcel of the shame experience is usually too painful. One has to escape and forget. The sound is allowed to heal and any situation that might possibly re-open the sound is quietly avoided. This not only constricts one's "life-space," but it makes one vulnerable to further shame experiences: "Not knowing what should be done with shame, one's first impulse is to conceal it, and this may produce further shame, for this involves the demanding process of examining or re-examining one's "assumptive world" (Frank, 1961): "Part of the difficulty in admitting shame to oneself arises from reluctance to recognize that one has built on false assumptions about what the world one lives in is and about the way others will respond to oneself" (Lynd, 1958, p. 43). But, as with guilt, concealment is no answer: "Protection against isolation and the difficulty of communicating such experiences as shame may take the form of impersonalization and dehumanization....I will deny the possibility of openness; I will protect myself against it" (Lynd, 1958, p. 70).

Erikson (1963, 1968) emphasizes the dangers in shame, or perhaps rather in "shaming" and "being shamed," while Lynd (1958) emphasizes the potential value of dealing with shame through self-disclosure:

If, however, one can sufficiently risk uncovering oneself and
sufficiently trust another person, to seek means of communicating shame, the risking of exposure can be in itself an experience of release, expansion, self-revelation, a coming forward of belief in oneself, and entering into the mind and feeling of another person (p. 249).

If, as Fromm (1956) says, shame is a feeling separateness without reunion by love, then self-disclosure can be the beginning of this reunion. And just as a refusal to deal with the roots of shame can lead to personality constriction, so faced or transcended shame can enhance personal identity:

Shame interrupts any unquestioning, unaware sense of oneself. But it is possible that experiences of shame if confronted full in the face may throw an unexpected light on who one is and point the way toward who one may become. Fully faced, shame may become not primarily something to be covered, but a positive experience of revelation (Lynd, 1958, p. 20).

Experiences of shame are a painful uncovering of hitherto unrecognized aspects of one's personality as well as of unrecognized aspects of one's society and of the world. If it is possible to face the, instead of seeking protection from what they reveal, they may throw light on who one is, and hence point the way toward who and what one may become (p. 183).

Shame, then, is a way of discovery.

Shame, revelation of both self and society. Just above, Lynd refers to "unrecognized aspects of one's society and of the world." She says that some of the most acute shame experiences arise when one is ashamed of the "failure to be" of those closely related to oneself. Identification with significant others seems to be the mechanism that mediates such shame. If, then, a person is identified with the society that surrounds him, he can feel deep shame for this society when its "failures to be" are recognized. A young man came to me once for counseling. He had been playing basketball; a game was organized with "skins" against "shirts," and he had been asked to remove his T-shirt. When he manifested some reluctance to do so, one of the other players remarked that
was reluctant because he had a scrawny build. Even though his antagonist and the other players did not realize it, he was flooded with shame. The incident was trivial, but in an instant he did realize with painful clarity that he was ashamed of his body. In the counseling session it came out that his shame went further than that. He also realized that he lived in a society that excessively extols physical grace, charm, or beauty, often to the extent that it becomes a condition for acceptance. He realized that he had more or less concurred with society in this, so that he was ashamed of himself for having been ashamed of his body and he was ashamed of his society for its hierarchy of values. Now he wanted to talk about his feelings about his own body and the way that he swallowed whole the values of society. His shame could have led to constriction or growth. He chose to have it lead to growth.

A summary note on shame. An attempt has been made to indicate the growth potentialities of facing shame. This means not only discussing the sources of shame within oneself but also facing the actual shame experience that often arises both from the disclosure made in the group. This does not mean that in some pollyannish fashion self-disclosure and facing guilt and shame will constitute some kind of panacea for the ills of the human condition. Sharing shame, for instance, does not mean that it will be dissipated: "It is also true that if one discovered that one was not alone in having these traits, shame would in one sense be alleviated by being shared; but if one still felt these characteristics as mean and ugly no matter how may people had them, shame would in another sense be extended" (Lynd, 1958, p. 29). This points up the fact that mutual self-disclosure is not designed just to relieve anxiety. It is designed to put people in more effective contact with the what-is. It is true that often a
person needs a good deal of support in order to face the what-is, but this is far more conducive to growth than giving support to another in order that he may endure the more or less self-inflicted agonies that arise from not facing the what-is.

Risk and trust. Most people hesitate to disclose themselves to a group. They balance on the edge of self-disclosure as they would on the edge of a diving board. But just as the shock and pain of entering the water are short-lived and inevitably outweighed by the benefits of mutual sharing. Refusing to "enter the water" in the group because the shock and pain of self-revelation are seen as protracted in a defensive maneuver, a kind of psychological metonymy. Still the pain of self-disclosure and the possibility of rejection lurk around the corner, so group members bide their time.

Behind the feeling of shame stands not the fear of hatred, but the fear of contempt which ... spells fear of abandonment...the deeper rooted shame anxiety is based on the fear of the parent who walks away 'in disgust,' and ... this anxiety in turn draws its terror from the earlier established and probably ubiquital separation anxiety (Piers & Singer, 1953, pp. 11, 16).

Risk is an essential feature of growth groups. But before one takes this risk he asks himself searching questions: "Can one have faith that with certain other persons greater openness can increase understanding, respect, love? That with them increasing intimacy can be, not a corroding, but a deepening and enriching process?" (Lynd, 1958, pp. 238-239). Perhaps the "nothing ventured, nothing gained" truism has a special applicability to communication in growth groups:

Confronting, instead of quickly covering, an experience of shame as revelation of oneself and of society -- facing 'actual life' -- requires an ability to risk, if necessary to endure, disappointment, frustration, and ridicule...Engagement with life and with history--self-discovery and further discovery of the world--has always involved
such risks (Lynd, p. 232).

Still, even initial risk demands some kind of climate or trust. But to demand trust from others, one must first show that he himself is trustworthy. And one of the principal ways of doing this is by risking self-revelation. Mowrer (1966d, 1968b) solves this "chicken-and-egg" dilemma by having the participants of his "integrity" groups contract to absolute self-disclosure before even meeting the other members of the group. Very often this works. It is true that the initial interviewer usually "models" for the prospective group member and shows that at least he is trustworthy. But, since there is no such initial commitment in the contract group, the problem of mutual trust must be worked out perhaps the notion of "kairos," the "right moment," has some value in the contract group. The participants all contract to self-disclosure, but each puts himself "on the line" at the moment that is "right" for himself. Obviously such a concept could be used to rationalize away complete failure to fulfill the self-disclosure provision of the contract, but this need not detract from its possible utility. The problem of trust will be taken up more thoroughly in the chapter on support.

Shame and fantasy. Daydreaming is a little discussed activity. Full-length studies on daydreaming are few and literally far between (Green, 1923; Singer, 1966; Varendonck, 1921). Daydreaming or directed fantasy (rather than just mind-wandering) is considered an adolescent activity that is outgrown with the responsibilities of adulthood. In adulthood, fantasy is encouraged if it is "creative," if it is a source of growth rather than a substitute for it. If not encouraged, it is at least countenanced when it is used sparingly— with respect to both quantity and quality — to take the edge off a depressing day
or a dreary life-situation. In this sense, Singer (1966) calls daydreaming or directed fantasy "a neutral skill available for adaptive enrichment of the life of otherwise ordinary persons" (p. 187). But this is not the place to review theoretical considerations and empirical findings concerning daydreaming. Singer's work is both adequate and interesting.

The point here is that many men engage in some kind of fantasy in varying degrees. Only to the degree that this fantasy distorts the what-is and the what-should-be (contract standards) of life in a non-creative way does it become problematic. The revelation of such fantasy can be the source of intense shame, but it can also get at some of the deepest roots of unfaced failure in a person's life. For instance, if a man, when he is having sexual relations with his wife, imagines that he is with someone else, either real or imaginary, then it seems that he has failed to integrate sexual experience with love. If he reveals his fantasy, he might feel deeply ashamed, but the revelation seems essential to his getting to the source of his interpersonal failure. Examination of fantasy, then, while often painful and productive of shame, can, at least for some, be an important factor in a growth experience.

Other Approaches to Self-Disclosure in the Training Group

Areas of guilt and shame, as important as they might be, are by no means the only topics for self-disclosure. Perhaps they may even be more accurately considered as dimensions which are sometimes involved in the process of self-disclosure. If a person talks about the what-is of his life, he will inevitably talk about areas of living which are touched or even suffused with guilt and/or shame. The discussion above indicates the importance of not avoiding
An area of living because of the guilt or shame associated with it. But some other approaches to self-disclosure might be indicated here:

(a) **Values.** In talking about themselves, people often shy away from two most important areas, the "best-in-me" and the "worst-in-me." The "worst-in-me" is the area of shame and guilt and has already been discussed. But people also avoid talking about the good they do, the values they hold, the aspirations they have. In face, when given a choice, that is when asked simply to engage in some form of self-disclosure, most people immediately think of areas of shame and guilt. Perhaps one of the principle reasons why the area of values and aspirations is overlooked is the fact that the good men do is often not unadulterated good. We have goals, but we fall short of them; we have certain values, but there are times when we ignore these values; we do good, but even the good we do is not pure, unmixed, stainless, without blemish. This is, it is very difficult to talk about the "best-in-me" without also talking about the "worst-in-me."

It is also dangerous to talk about values in a group, because one soon discovers that it is impossible, even intolerable, to do so without arousing oneself from one's value-lethargy and doing something about it. Uncommunicated values remain uncertain, ambiguous, inoperative in life; communicated values place demands on the communicator. Just as self-disclosure concerning the guilt-shame dimensions of life demands "conversion," so self-disclosure in the area of values demands action. Some find the price of such self-disclosure too high. Finally, a person is sometimes loath to communicate his values because he lacks the courage of his convictions; he is afraid that his values will appear too naive or outmoded to others. He is afraid to say "I believe" to a
that has lost faith even with itself. He is afraid to admit values that seem inconsonant with a materialistic world. On the other hand, there may be childish elements in the values he does hold. Then subjecting one's values to the scrutiny of a community will entail a process of purification and refinement. This, too, can be demanding and painful.

(b) Contract system. Talking about contract-failures (moral guilt) presupposes a contract system. A group experience can be an excellent opportunity for its participants to examine the expressed and implied contracts that provide the guidelines for interpersonal living. For instance, a college student living at home and commuting to school might examine some of the contractual relationships that exist between himself and his parent. Is there, for example, a contract of mutual non-interference or mutual non-involvement? Is the contract a utilitarian one: "I'll obey your rules since you are paying for my education, even though I see these rules as your way of keeping me an adolescent"? Contracts, of course, can be much more positive and open-ended. An example of such a positive, though in this case unilateral, contract might be: "I contract myself to show concern for my parents, to be open with them, even though they do not reciprocate."

(c) How I stand in the group. The kind of self-disclosure that is absolutely essential to the life of the group is the revelation of what is happening inside each member with respect to the process of the group. If a participant is afraid to disclose himself, he should at least disclose that. If he is bored because what is happening in the group is actually flight from real group process, he should say so. Very often, when a member who has been silent for a long time is confronted concerning his silence, he will say: "I've been quiet
"Because nothing has been going on. What you have been doing is very boring."

Actually, he has been violating the contract, for the contract demands that he take the initiative and present his views about what is happening when it is happening. If group process is boring, then his silence is part of that boredom and not, as he might view it, a legitimate commentary on it.

The modality of self-disclosure, properly used, is one of the most effective ways of handling the "hidden" variables in the group. A person that is honest about himself and his feelings in the group does much to minimize the effect of the "underground" group culture—that complexus of "tacit understandings" that often leads to group atagination—which was discussed in the chapter on leadership. High "visibility" is an essential part of this experiment in interpersonal growth. Self-disclosure with respect to the here-and-now adds a dimension of "control" to the experiment which is often lacking in other kinds of growth experiences.

In day-to-day living we seldom take the time to clear up communication problems that disrupt our interpersonal living. For instance, research has shown that there is a powerful tendency to assume that one's positive or negative feelings toward another are reciprocated (Newcomb, 1956, 1958, 1960; Tagiuri, 1958; Tagiuri, Blake, & Bruner, 1953; Tagiuri, Bruner, & Blake, 1958) and people tend to act on such assumptions, whether they are true or not. Since the contract group is an experimental situation, the participants have "cultural permission" to find out where they stand in relationship to one another. If the group culture supports a healthy feedback system, communication channels remain open and the participants can related to one another realistically.

In a human relations laboratory which I attended, the trainer of the group
To which a friend of mine belonged called an extra session. He told the participants that a good deal was happening between different members of the group both in and outside group sessions that was not being discussed and that this failure in openness was suffocating group process. For several hours they discussed hitherto undisclosed love relationships, animosities and the way that the members had been "pairing" either with members of this group or other groups and working out binds and hang-ups outside the group. The trainer's demand for intra-group honesty seemed to work. The siphoning process stopped and the group was reborn. In the contract group, the members should demand this kind of intra-group honesty of themselves; this is the responsibility of the group and not just of the leader-member.

"Processing" as a way of keeping the group honest. Every once in a while a group should stop and "process" what it is doing. For instance, after the group has been discussing for a while, the leader-member (this is one of his legitimate functions especially in the beginning sessions of the group) might interrupt the discussion and ask: "All right, what have we been doing here? What's going on; what's been happening?" The response is usually refreshing. The group stands outside itself, as it were, as its own critic. A new-found freedom of speech, a freedom that belongs to the legitimate critic, often springs up in the group during these "processing" sessions and stands in vivid contrast to "hedging" and "fencing" that was going on before.

The "fish-bowl" technique may also be used as a processing device. In this case, the group splits in two -- either in a random fashion or perhaps into the quiet members and the talkative members -- and half engage in discussion in an inner circle while the other half listen in an outer circle.
After a predetermined length of time, the discussion is halted and, while the members of the inner circle remain silent, the members of the outer circle "process" the discussion. This "processing" usually focuses, not so much on the content of the discussion, but on "process" variables: was the group open and honest? were there any "tacit understandings" that subverted the discussion? did the members engage in contract behavior? who failed to engage in the contract and how? what N-interactions obstructed contract behavior? These and similar questions deal with process behavior.

The Mode or Quality of Self-Disclosure: "Story" Versus "History"

The way in which a person reveals himself in the group is very important. In a sense it is even more important than the content of the revelation, for content, no matter how intimate in itself, can lose its intimacy and its meaning in the telling. I propose two styles or modes of self-disclosure: "story," the mode of involvement, and "history," the mode of non-involvement.

History. A recent television documentary showed excerpts from a "marathon" group experience conducted at Daytop Village, a rehabilitation center for addicts. During the early hours of the marathon a young addict began talking about himself and his past life. His self-revelation was almost totally "history." I was disturbed to think that what he was doing was considered acceptable group process, that is, I was disturbed until one of the group leaders finally spoke up and confronted the speaker. In effect he said: "You have been engaging in 'history' rather than 'story,' and mere 'history' in this group experience is meaningless."

"History" is pseudo-self-disclosure. It is actuarial and analytic, and
usually has a strong "there-and-then" flavor. It clicks off the facts of ex-
perience and even interpretations of this experience but leaves the "person"
of the revealer relatively untouched; he is accounted for and analyzed, but unrevealed. The person retails many facts about himself, but the "person with-
in" still remains unknown. "History" is often a long account. It is long and often steady because it fears interruption. Interruption might mean involve-
ment, and a person engages in "history" to avoid rather than invite involve-
ment. "History" has a way of saying "Be quiet" or "Don't interrupt," but these are dodges to keep others at bay. The steady clicking off of facts keeps the group focused on the revealer, but does not allow the members to deal with him.

In "history" the manner of self-revelation is usually somewhat detached. There is little ego-involvement and thus little risk. The speaker deals with himself as object rather than as subject. Intimate life details might be re-
vealed, but their intimacy has no particular meaning. They are just more facts. On the other hand, "history" might be a concatenation of generalities, generalities poorly disguised by the first personal pronoun. But whether it is a question of intimate details or generalities, the message is always the same: "Keep your distance." It is as if the revealer were trying to inti-
mate to others that he is rather invulnerable: "This is not really affecting me; I don't see why it should affect you." Sometimes sheer quantity of in-
timate information about self is divulged because the "historian" implicitly realizes that if he retails enough, quickly enough, the others will not be able to react effectively to any particular part of it. "History" is also self-centered. The leader in the Daytop Village marathon took the young ad-
dict to task for his ego-centricity. He told him that he had been talking a
long time and had not even mentioned that he had a wife who had feelings.

"Historical" information does not unite speaker and listeners. Rather, the information sits there as an obstacle between them. It is a barrier rather than a bridge. It sometimes even has an "I-dare-you-to-do-anything-about-this" aura about it. Even when the information disclosed is intimate, it is usually boring. The "historian" exudes and "I-don't-really-care" attitude that is readily picked up by the other members of the group. The information is boring because it is divorced from the person. It is flat, there is no human drama about it. To use Matson and Mantagú's (1967) paradigm, "history" is "computorial," and, as such, calls for "feedback" rather than human response. Or in McLuhan's (1964) terms, "history" is a "hot" modality, high in definition and low in involvement. Its high definition refers not just to sheer quantity, but to its "there-it-is-and-there-is-really-nothing-to-be-done-about-it" quality.

"Story." "Story" lies at the other end of the continuum. It is authentic self-disclosure, for it is an attempt to reveal the "person within," and more than that: it is an attempt to get him involved with his listeners. "Story" is an invitation for others to "come in;" it is an opening of the door. In group growth experiences, as in the rest of life, others often stand around waiting to "come in." "Story" is a signal for others to move into one's presence.

"Story" is not actuarial; it is rather selective in detail, for the revealer intuits the fact that it is not the transmission of fact that is important but the transmission of self. It does not avoid detail, but the choice of detail is secondary to the act of communication. "Story" usually
avoids interpretation, too; it allows experience to remain unintellectualized and thus speak for itself. The "story-teller," even if he leaves out detail, is still graphic and specific; he does not hide behind generalities disguised by the first personal pronoun. Facts are selected for their impact-value, for their ability to reveal the person as what-he-is-now-through-what-he-has-experienced.

The "story-teller" is taking as risk and he knows it. Therefore, "story" is always an implicit request for human support. The revealer has come to trust the group to a certain degree, but he still feels his vulnerability; his act of self-revelation is akin to Kierkegaard's "leap of faith" which is always a leap of trust. But he takes this leap because he wants to relate to the other members of the group and relate more fully to himself. He realizes that "story" is the way of involvement and the way of discovery, and he wants both. And so he comes to the point. He does not wander around in the there-and-then, but manages to make the past and the "there" and even the future define him as he is in the here-and-now. "Story," then, is not analytical and discrete. It is synthetic; it attempts to present a totality, the complex totality that is the person himself, who takes shape out of the complexity of his experience.

The one who tells his "story," in that "story" is not computorial and therefore not a request for "feedback," in a dehumanized sense, is looking for human response. "Story" of its very nature is dialogue and merits such response. Because "story" is not computorial and monologic, it is inevitably engaging, even when someone who is usually a bore adopts it. Some people are constantly talking about themselves, and most men find this terribly boring. Such people are
ring because they are usually engaging in "history" rather than "story."

First of all, they are really saying nothing about themselves, and secondly, they care little for the objects of their monologue and would find real response such as self-disclosure and confrontation frightening. Bores do speak in generalities poorly disguised under the pronoun "I." But "story," on the other hand is always engaging, for it means that the speaker has to "blow his cover" and drop his defenses and stand somewhat naked in his own eyes and in the eyes of others. Men are seldom, if ever, bored with a sincere confession, because they intuitively realize its importance for the one revealing himself and respect him for what he is doing. The person who engages in "story" is one who stops complaining about how much he hurts and begins admitting who he is.

This is most refreshing in human affairs. I think perhaps that it might be impossible to dislike someone who engages in "story," for it is an act of humility, a manifestation of a need to move "into community," and a surrender of egocentricity (or at least a beginning of surrender).

In McLuhan's terminology, "story" is a "cool" modality, low in definition and high in involvement. It is low in definition not just because it is selective of detail and thus allows others to "fill in the gaps" in an information sense, but the information transmitted is seen as a medium, a bridge instead of a barrier. "Story" has high impact-value; it tends to change both speaker and listener; it draws the listener out of himself and towards the speaker. It changes the speaker in that it calls forth emotions that are more authentic and therefore perhaps less familiar to the revealer. "Story," then is not maudlin, but it is shot through with emotion; it is not sensational, but it has drama in the same way that a life fully lived has drama.
The kind of self-disclosure wanted in the contract-group is that in which a person gives testimony to himself, gives witness to his own mysteriousness, the mystery of goodness and the mystery of evil that he is. When a person gives testimony, he asks others to trust him and he binds himself to telling the truth. Testimony, then, engages not only the mind, but the will: it involves love. Testimony is "involving": it involves the witness because he binds himself to his listeners, and it involves the listeners because it demands that they believe. Men have access to a person's innermost being only through testimony, and persons give testimony to themselves only under the influence of love (see Latourelle, 1962).

"History" and "story" in the contract-group. It may be useful to imagine "history" and "story" as anchoring opposite ends of a continuum. The members of the interpersonal-growth group contract to "story," that is, "story" is a goal toward which the participants are working. In the same way, the elimination of the modality "history" is also a goal. "History" is thus an object of confrontation in the group.

Levels of Self-Disclosure.

Different kinds of face-to-face groups could be placed in a more or less rough order according to the degree or level of self-disclosure that de facto takes place in the context of the group meeting. From least to most, the order might read something like this:

1. "Business" meetings, e.g., managerial meetings, faculty and teachers' meetings, community council meetings, etc.
2. Discussion groups, e.g., formal or informal academic or
seminar-type groups, discussion clubs, etc.

3. Groups investigating the phenomenon of "group dynamics," e.g., academic groups that learn about group dynamics by being a group, unstructured groups that come together to see what human value there might be in coming together, etc.

4. "Sensitivity training" groups, e.g., human relations laboratories, personal growth laboratories, etc.

5. Psychotherapy groups.

6. "Integrity training" groups (Mowrer, 1968b).

This does not mean that no self-disclosure takes place during a "business" meeting. For instance, if the members of a managerial training have gone through a sensitivity training laboratory, they may work out their feelings toward one another before tackling an important managerial decision. Also, the above order is not rigid. For instance, a great deal of intimate self-disclosure might take place during a laboratory course in "group dynamics," depending on the kind of group culture that develops. A particular sensitivity training group, too, might engage in a degree of self-disclosure usually found in psychotherapy or integrity groups. The position of the contract group in the list will vary according to the nature of the contract. The contract being explicitated here would probably place the contract group between sensitivity-training and psychotherapy groups. We have been speaking of groups in general. However, within groups a good deal of individual differences with respect to self-disclosure will be manifested by the participants.

The contract group differs from the other groups (and is like the integrity group) in that self-disclosure is explicitly established as a group value.
However, unlike the integrity group the "level" of self-disclosure is not determined by contract. In the integrity group the prospective participant must agree to disclose all his past contract failures and do so sometime during the early part of the group experience. He also contracts to remain "confessionally current" throughout the rest of the experience. Therefore, the integrity group establishes a certain "level" of self-disclosure at least in one area, the area of contract failure.

"Level" is a term difficult to define operationally. It seems to be an operational term in the integrity group, for there it means all those actions which the "trainee" believes to have been contract failures in his life. Since the scope of self-disclosure is wider in the contract group, "level" is not as easy to define. Still, group members have a kind of instinctive awareness of different "levels" of self-disclosure. To move to a "deeper" level of self-disclosure means to reveal that which is more painful to reveal, that which one is more reluctant to reveal. The "deeper" one goes, the closer one gets to his "core," to the "person within," to the person he really is. "Deep" self-disclosure gets at a person's identity. It gets at the repressed, the unrecognized, the ignored, the unseen, the unannounced in a person; it gets at the "best" in a person and the "worst" in him. The deeper the self-disclosure, the more does it reveal the "mystery" of one's person. "Level," then, is not a certain set of statements about a certain area of living. What member A discusses freely might be a most painful area for member B; the same area of discussion represents different "levels" for them. "I am bored with this group" is often an honest statement that reveals something about the person who so speaks his mind. But, "My mother is an alcoholic and I find it difficult to be
"With her" would usually be a more painful kind of revelation, tapping areas of guilt and shame, and therefore getting closer to the "core" of the revealer. "I get deep satisfaction from being a Christian" or "I have deep religious convictions, but I have always been afraid to share them with anyone because I don't always live up to them" are statements about values that might tap even deeper levels in some persons.

This more or less metaphorical approach to the concept of "level" is quite obviously not entirely satisfactory, but perhaps it is sufficient for the purpose intended here. A more clinical and empirical approach to the concept "level" is discussed by Truax and Carkhuff (1967) in terms of a self-exploration scale ranging from no self-exploration to a very high degree of self-exploration.

In the first stage no personally relevant material is communicated by the client or does he respond to attempts on the part of the therapist to reveal himself. In stage two, the therapist must coax material from the client, while in stage three the client may actually make brief comments on material introduced by the therapist. In stage four, the client discusses personally relevant material, but in a mechanical fashion: he does not "own" what he is talking about. Spontaneous discussions and reactions on the part of the client begin with stage five. In stage six the client reacts spontaneously and with feeling, while in stage seven he makes tentative gestures toward discovering new material. Active interpersonal exploration is characteristic of stage eight, and stage nine is a highly developed phase of stage eight. The contract more or less demands that the participant begin at least with stage five, though many participants "regress" at one time or another to a lower stage. In a certain sense, the scale defines the manner of self-exploration but does not define content areas.
The members of the contract group contract to self-disclosure, but not to any particular level of self-disclosure. The group has to work through the problem of the level of self-disclosure and in this respect the variability among groups can be great. The level of disclosure in the group will depend on a number of factors: the courage of individual members, the atmosphere of support and trust developed by the group, the ability of individual members to see the value of self-disclosure for themselves, and the spirit of cooperation in the group. It is assumed that the level of disclosure in the group will gradually deepen. The process will not be an even one: members will retreat during crises of trust; there will be plateaus of apparent stagnation and indifference when members are "feeling their way;" there will be sudden surges of honesty and intimacy which most members will find deeply rewarding. The contract serves as a means of keeping the group under a certain degree of pressure with respect to self-revelation. If it is true that the level of self-disclosure in the group will usually not go beyond the limits set by the atmosphere of trust and support that exists in the group, then the contract should exert pressure on the group to create the kind of atmosphere in which disclosure is possible and profitable.

Self-Disclosure at the Service of Behavior Control: "Labeling"

Dollard and Miller (1950) emphasize the greater behavioral effectiveness of articulated over non-articulated thoughts. As the child grows up, he undergoes a great variety of emotional experiences, but he does not have the ability to verbalize these experiences. Anxiety-ridden emotional experiences retain behavioral consequences which are more or less outside rational control because
they have not been subjected to "higher mental processes." The lack of verbal
responses to drives such as fear, sex, and aggression increases the likelihood
of maladaptive behavior or symptoms. Learned verbal cues can prevent the gen-
eralization of anxiety from the past to the present. When previously repressed
material is verbalized, the result is not uninhibited behavior but rather be-
behavior that is under better social control.

Dollard and Miller deal with labeling in the context of psychotherapy in
which the labeling process refers principally to past experience. But such
labeling or a process similar to labeling, with an orientation toward the future,
be used as a form of behavior-control. For instance, the group members may
discuss the seeds of irresponsibility or the seeds of failed potentiality with-
themsehves, that is, they "label" unporductive forms of behavior to which
they feel drawn. Usually when a person is tempted to do something that he
thinks that he should not or to fail to do something that he thinks that he
should, he tries not to think about it. He puts it out of mind, refuses to sub-
mit it to "higher mental processes," allows the behavior to run off principally
on the level of emotion. The man who knows vaguely (or not so vaguely) that if
he goes to this tavern he will get drunk and irresponsibly involved with some
of the women there will often put such considerations out of mind. On the sup-
position that he does not want to engage in such behavior, he might try to re-
verse the process. That is, he forces himself to think about what he is tempted
to do; he forces himself to "label" the entire sequence of undesirable behavior
prior to initiating the sequence. The assumption here is that if he labels this
behavior, submitting it to "higher mental processes," he will be in better con-
trol of this behavior. And if he does initiate the undesirable behavior se-
ence, he will do so with increased responsibility (and culpability).

The contention here is that such a process is most effective when carried out "in-community," whether the community is a natural one (e.g., marriage partner, family) or some conventional group (e.g., the contract group). It takes a certain degree of courage to discuss one's "temptations" to violate one's contracts or one's tendencies to "fail-to-be" in various ways, but if one does so, he enlists the resources of the community in his program of behavior control.

"Labeling," to be effective, should be specific. "I feel that I won't live up to my expectations during the next semester" is too general and sound more like a cry of despair than an attempt to control behavior. "If I go home with this chip on my shoulder, I'll have a fight with my wife, go out and get drunk, and end up in a mess" is a much more appropriate example of effective labeling. Since the over-riding goal of the contract group is interpersonal growth, labeling of specific "temptations" to maladaptive interpersonal relating belongs in the group. Effective labeling is a way of transporting the there-and-then of the future into the here-and-now of group process in that it reveals seeds of action or inaction that are growing and maturing right here and right now.

Labeling need not be restricted to avoiding unwanted behavior, but it can also be used to stimulate desired behavior. The individual rehearses something that he wants to do, noting what he will do when certain difficulties arise, but also noting the rewards associated with the desired behavior. The hypothesis is that the more concrete the labeling process is, dealing with specific behaviors in specific situations, the more effective will it be.
ssible Dangers Associated with Self-Disclosure

Self-disclosure is a powerful behavioral instrument and must be used with discretion. Under certain conditions, then, self-revelation will be either dangerous or useless.

(a) If it is exhibitionism. Self-disclosure may be nothing more than verbal exhibitionism, a verbal exposure of self in a exhibitionism-voyeurism context (see Glatzer, 1967). Exhibitionism is a manifestation of lack of control and a symptom therefore of pathology. The exhibitionist is merely using his listeners to satisfy his own distorted needs. He is neither attempting to involve himself responsibly with others nor is he asking them to respond by involving themselves responsibly with himself. The "drama" of the disclosure assumes a disproportionate significance in exhibitionism; its "shock" value is often its most important feature. Jourard (1964) believes that either too much or too little self-disclosure is a sign of disturbance. I would tend to think that the context in which it is done and the way in which it is done is more important than its quantity.

(b) If the person receives no support for his openness. Even in an atmosphere of relative trust, self-disclosure entails risk. If a person puts himself on the line and then fails to receive support, self-disclosure can be quite traumatic. Self-revelation is a way of involving oneself with others. If they fail to respond, this is usually experienced as rejection no matter what the real or objective state of affairs might be. Sometimes, after engaging in self-disclosure, a person will feel diminished—perhaps the next day or during the week between meetings. This seems to happen when the participant discloses
himself in the wrong way (e.g., with a strain of exhibitionism) or when he fails to receive proper support. It is as if he had emptied himself and now there is nothing to fill the vacuum. Support is so essential a variable in growth groups that it will be treated separately (chapter VIII).

(c) If a person contracts to engage in self-disclosure and then reneges. This is usually a case of failed-potentiality. It is one of those existential failures that can confirm a person in a negativistic self-image.

(d) If a person engages in "history" rather than "story." In this case, self-disclosure is useless, for "history" puts something between the "historian" and his listeners and cuts off interpersonal involvement, the supposed purpose of the group.

(e) If self-disclosure is incomplete in a situation that calls for complete openness. If a participant in Mowrer's integrity group tells only a part of his story of contract-failure or refuses to stay "confessionally current," then he is more or less living a lie, pursuing a course of action in the very group that is designed to eliminate such behavior. It is difficult to see how this would not take its toll in terms of guilt and anxiety.

Self-disclosure is not as dangerous as some make it out to be. It is not a medical act; it is first of all a human act. Nor need it be a sign of immaturity, of "adolescent" behavior. If done responsibly, it is a continuation of valuable human behavior that often does begin, however imperfectly, during adolescence.

Epilog.

The Johari Window. Luft and Ingham (1955) and Luft (1963) have presented
A model of awareness in interpersonal relationships called "The Johari Window." It is depicted below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Known to Self</th>
<th>Not Known to Self</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. III.</td>
<td>II. IV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Known to others</td>
<td>Not Known to others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of free activity</td>
<td>Avoided or hidden area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blind area</td>
<td>Area of unknown activity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1: The Johari Window**

I have used this model as a basis for an exercise in a course in abnormal psychology. The figure is put on the board and the quadrants are explained. The class members are then given blank three-by-five cards. They are asked to move some bit of information about themselves from Quadrant III to Quadrant I by writing it on the card. The cards are collected and a few minutes are spent eliciting their reactions to the exercise. Meanwhile, the person conducting
the exercise shuffles the cards so that the exercise can be carried out with complete anonymity. Next he reads all the cards, without comment, one after another. Finally, he elicits the reactions of members of the class to what they have heard.

There is usually a wide variety of responses, from "I have a hole in my sock" to "I am a practicing homosexual" of "I have felt like committing suicide." The modal response usually deals with alienation, difficulty in human relations, operating under a facade, and identity problems. The effect on the members of the class is often quite striking. Some, for the first time, realize that there are others, many others, who have problems similar to theirs. One student once said: "Things just couldn't be the same in that class anymore."

The problem is that things can be just the same. There is a moment of openness, and its possibilities are seen, often in a dramatic way; then people return to their "normal" patterns of living. People really dislike being shut off from others, but few want to pay the price of venturing out of themselves.

**The value of self-disclosure: a new kind of communication.** Mowrer deals with self-disclosure principally as a way of handling the deleterious effects of mismanaged guilt. However important this might be, it is not the focus of the contract group. Self-disclosure in the contract group is seen as leading to a new kind of communication or at least to a new freedom of communication. Dealing with one another is something like showing one another the "houses" we live in, houses in which one or more rooms must remain locked because of what is behind the doors. In the contract group the participants learn the skill of opening some of these doors and the air that sweeps through the house is refreshing. To use another metaphor, communication which is characterized by a
fear of self-disclosure is like trying to talk to someone across a room filled with pillars. In the contract group the participants learn how to remove some of these pillars and to their amazement the house remains standing. The contract is a training group in which the participants learn the value of self-disclosure. If they learn well, then they return to the "significant others" in their lives with the potentiality for a new kind of communication.

Self-disclosure is not the only value in life, but it is a dimension of the interpersonally fruitful life. Only the individual can determine what part it is to play in his own interpersonal life.
Chapter VIII
Supportive Behavior in Sensitivity Groups

If a sensitivity-group contract calls for such variables as self-disclosure in a rather demanding sense ("story" rather than "history") and total human expression in terms of pathos, logos, and poiesis, then the contract must also provide an atmosphere which will not only sustain but also actively encourage such variables. In a word, the contract must provide a climate of support. However, the problem is that attempts to give solid, non-cliche support—whether these attempts are made in the context of group therapy, sensitivity training, or real life—are often clumsy and ineffective. When faced with the more dramatic dimensions of others such as their pain, their anxieties, their peak and nadir experiences, their strong emotions, whether positive or negative, their successes and their failures, we fumble around, babble inanities, or take refuge in silence. The contract-group, then, is a laboratory in human living in which the participants learn how to react to the more dramatic dimensions of others. In the give-and-take of the group meetings, they learn to remedy their deficiencies in both giving and receiving support.

The need for a supportive climate in sensitivity-training laboratories is generally recognized:

The second element necessary for assuring effective feedback is what Schein and Bennis (1965) referred to as a climate of 'psychological safety' and Bradford et al. (1964) called 'permissiveness.' That is, no matter what an individual does in a group or what he reveals about himself, the group must act in a supportive and nonevaluative way. Each individual must feel that it is safe to expose his feelings, drop his defenses, and try out new ways of interacting. Such an atmosphere has its obvious
counterpart in any constructive clinical or therapeutic relationship (Campbell & Dunnette, 1968, p. 76).

Not only must a climate of psychological safety exist, but it must be communicated to the participants if it is to have any kind of "unfreezing" affect with respect to their behavior:

People must certainly differ greatly in their ability to accept the guarantee of psychological safety. To the extent that the feeling of safety cannot be achieved—and quickly—the prime basic ingredient for this form of learning is absent. Its importance cannot be overemphasized, nor can the difficulty of its being accomplished (Campbell & Dunnette, 1968, p. 78).

It is not difficult to find support for such suggestions in the literature dealing with interactions in small, face-to-face groups. For instance a series of studies (Gibb, 1960; Lott, Schopler, & Gibb, 1954, 1955) indicated that feeling-oriented, positive feedback resulted in the greatest efficiency, least defensiveness, and greatest spread in participation in such groups. Supportive behavior, then, is a value in all kinds of sensitivity-training laboratories. Campbell and Dunnette (1968) suggest that support is not only essential but that it must be felt as quickly as possible. The hypothesis here is that the contract will facilitate the speedy establishment of a climate of support.

This chapter has three sections: one on listening, one on giving support, and a short section on receiving support. First of all the participants must learn how to listen to one another; this is an absolute prerequisite for supportive behavior. But listening is much more demanding than is ordinarily supposed, since it involves much more than just hearing and registering words, sentences, and ideas.
LISTENING: THE SINE-QUA-NON OF SUPPORTIVE BEHAVIOR

**Total Listening**

For our purposes listening means becoming aware of all the cues that the other emits, and this implies an openness to the totality of the communication of the other. In the sensitivity group, this requires being aware not only of individuals but also of the mood of the group as a whole. Perhaps listening to the group is even more difficult than listening to individuals because it demands an awareness of subtle interactional patterns. Ideally the leader-member is already sensitive to these patterns and one of his functions is to point them out to the other members. Listening, then, demands work, and the work involved is difficult enough so that the effort involved will not be readily expended unless the listener has a deep respect for the total communication process.

One does not listen with just his ears: he listens with his eyes and with his sense of touch, he listens by becoming aware of the feelings and emotions that arise within himself because of his contact with others (that is, his own emotional resonance is another "ear"), he listens with his mind, his heart, and his imagination. He listens to the words of others, but he also listends to the "messages" that are buried in the words or encoded in all the cues that surround the words. As Berne (1961) suggests, he listens to the voice, the demeanor, the vocabulary, and the gestures of the other, or, as Haley (1959) would have it, to the context, the verbal messages, the linguistic patterns, and the bodily movements of the other. He listens to the sounds and to the silence. He listens not only to the message but to the context also, or, in Gestalt terms, he listens to both the figure and
the ground and to the way these two interact. He is aware of what Murphy (1964) calls the "world of blushing, blanching, sighing, hinting, and averting the eyes"; like Smith (1966) he is aware that "people interact not only through words but also through spatial relations...through temporal relations...and...through gestures and touch and many other media" (p. 3).

The contract group is a laboratory in which the participants are to learn to become more fully aware of every possible channel of communication, both verbal and non-verbal. Weick (1968) thinks that non-verbal aspects of communication are generally overlooked, much to the detriment of the communication process:

Observers who are accustomed to analyzing speech behavior in naturalistic settings may regard nonverbal actions as a redundant source of information. This point of view neglects the fact that humans spend a very small portion of their interactional time vocalizing...(p. 381).

Although nonverbal behavior holds promise for observational research because of its visibility, naturalness, and discriminability, it can also be too subtle to record unless the observer has been trained to be sensitive to it. That persons are often unaware of the rich nonverbal language is not surprising, since much of it occurs unconsciously (Scheflen, 1965, p. 34). Jecker et al. (1964) found that teachers who were untrained in the analysis of nonverbal behavior could not predict, from filmed facial cues, whether a student had comprehended a lesson in algebra (p. 382).

We are perhaps too ideationally oriented and have a set to bypass non-ideational cues. Tomkins (1962) has suggested that the face is the "primary site of affect": "The centrality of the face in affective experience may also be seen in the relationship between the hand and the face. The hand acts as if the face is the site of feeling" (p. 210). The relationship of hand to face, then, is an important source of information concerning the feeling
states of the other: "It is our argument that human beings slap, hide, stimulate, support, caress, inhibit, or reassure their faces with their hands because they correctly localize the face as the primary site of their concern" (p. 212). Others have studied the face as a rich source of communication (e.g. Ekman, 1965; Haggard & Isaacs, 1966; Leventhal & Sharp, 1965; Levitt, 1964). Exline and various associates (Exline, 1963; Exline, Gray, & Schuette, 1965; Exline & Winters, 1965) have examined the phenomenon of eye contact and exchanged glances, finding them important channels for communicating such affective information as liking and various forms of interpersonal discomfort. The communication potential of both posture (Scheflen, 1964) and body movements (e.g. Katz, 1964; Mahl, Danet, & Norton, 1959; Spiegel & Machotka, 1965; Werner & Wapner, 1953) is also an area of serious study. In the laboratory setting of the training group it is feasible to focus more attention on nonverbal aspects of communication than one would ordinarily do outside a laboratory setting for the purpose of enhancing one's total interpersonal listening skills.

The non-selective character of total listening. Total listening is, in a sense, non-selective: it encompasses all the cues emitted by the other, even those that the other would rather conceal and those the listener would rather not "hear." For instance, the weight of an obviously over-weight person is a cue to be reckoned with, for through it the other is "saying" something to those with whom he interacts. The message may be "I am frustrated" or "I don't care about others" or merely "I have poor self-control," but it is a message that should not be overlooked. In a group therapy session in which I was an observer the therapist asked the wife of
one of the in-patients (the patient himself refused to attend the sessions) what she thought she was trying to tell others by her obvious overweight. The therapist "listened to" a cue, confronted the woman in a firm, kindly, responsible way, and succeeded in instituting a dialogue that proved quite useful. Therefore, good listening demands both "subjectivity," that is, engagement with the other, and "objectivity," that is, disengagement from the other, in order to pick up both positively and negatively valenced cues. The good listener is sensitive to the what-is and not just to the what-should-be or to the how-I-would-like-things-to-be.

**Active listening.** It becomes quite apparent that the good listener is an active listener, one truly engaged in the communication process, one who goes out of himself, as it were, in search of significant cues emitted by others. Listening, then, is facilitated if the listener is actively interested in others. Newcomb's (1953) "strain toward symmetry" principle leads to the prediction: the more intense one person's concern for another, the greater is the likelihood that he will be sensitive toward the other's orientations toward objects in the environment. Certain studies do show that liking another increases sensitivity toward him. Eisman and Levy (1960) showed that lip-reading was more accurate the more the reader liked the communicator. Suchman (1956) discovered that people who were more favorable toward others were more accurate in estimating the feelings of these others. In a study by Fiedler (1950), it was discovered that all therapists described the good therapeutic relationship as one in which the therapist participates completely in the patient's communication, and, as Rogers (1961) has noted, this is impossible unless a mutual respect and liking arise in
the therapeutic encounter.

The person who is an active listener is much less likely to stereotype others and becomes guilty of "univocal" listening. Perhaps an analogy would make this a bit clearer. Everytime Brahm's Second Symphony is played, the untrained ear hears only the Second Symphony; it is quite a univocal experience. The individuality of different orchestras and different conductors and the nuances of different tempos and accents are all missed. Thus, while there is only one Second Symphony, it can be played with quite different--and distinguishable--nuances. Similarly, John Doe is only John Doe, but John Doe, too, has different nuances of orchestration at different times, and these nuances will be missed by the untrained, "passive" listener who finds it more comfortable to deal with him as a stereotype in univocal terms. The active, searching listener, who is open to all the nuances of John Doe, will more likely pick up many of these cues. This openness to nuance, however, does not imply that the good listener is skilled in "analyzing" the other, for analysis often means reducing the other to a whole series of stereotypes, and sometimes this mistake is worst than the first.

All of Rogers' works (e.g. 1942, 1951, 1961, 1967) form a magnificent treatise on total listening:

I also find the relationship is significant to the extent that I feel a continuing desire to understand--a sensitive empathy with each of the client's feelings and communications as they seem to him at that moment. Acceptance does not mean much until it involves understanding. It is only as I understand the feelings and thoughts which seem so horrible to you, or so weak, or so sentimental, or so bizarre--it is only as I see them as you see them, and accept them and you, that you feel really free to explore all the hidden nooks and frightening crannies of your inner and often buried experience (1961, p. 34).
Perhaps Rogers' emphasis on total listening explains in part the impact that he has had on the field of psychotherapy. He has seemed to prove that total listening is in itself therapeutic. Up to the time of Rogers' studies total listening had been a too little explored aspect of the therapeutic encounter.

Social intelligence and listening. There is no doubt that this ability to become totally aware of others demands intelligence: "...[S]ensitivity to the subtle aspects of the wordless communications in psychotherapy is a most important dimension of therapeutic skill. This skill is not too readily learned but rather reflects native or early acquired aptitudes that are highly correlated with general intelligence" (Schofield, 1964, p. 105).

However, the intelligence required seems to be more closely related to what may be termed "social" intelligence, a "feel" for people and an ability to involve oneself creatively and responsibly with them, rather than academic intellectual interest. The socially intelligent person is capable of becoming aware of the wide range of cues emitted by others, of evaluating them, and of responding to them.

Obstacles to Effective Listening

Alienation from communication. Against the background of what it means to be a good listener, it will be helpful to review some of the obstacles that arise to prevent effective listening in the group. Goffman (1957) discusses three kinds of preoccupation that disturb the communication process. The kinds of alienation he describes actually interfere with a person's ability to listen to others in the fullest sense of that term, although what he says must be modified somewhat in order to apply it to a sensitivity-training group. (a) External preoccupation is the first kind of alienation:
the individual neglects the prescribed focus of attention, giving his main concern to something unconnected with the other group members in their capacity as fellow-participants. He is "listening" to something that is "outside" the group in some way. According to Goffman, the topic of conversation is the prescribed focus of attention, but in a sensitivity-training group the focus of attention is wider than just the topic being discussed. For instance, in the contract group the topic actually being discussed might well be irrelevant to contractual goals and should be challenged rather than attended to. The daydreamer is alienated in any group, but in the contract group the person who is actively listening to the total interaction might become more preoccupied with the atmosphere surrounding the discussion rather than the topic itself, perhaps because the atmosphere is "speaking louder" than what the participants are saying about a specific topic. The atmosphere is not external to the topic of conversation, for it is having an effect on the entire conversation. In the case described, the good listener will interrupt the conversation, bringing up the problem of the non-facilitative atmosphere of the group.

(b) Self-consciousness is a second cause of alienation. Self-consciousness results from one's preoccupation with himself as an interactant and this prevents him from giving himself entirely to the topic of conversation. Whitman (1964) discusses this phenomenon in terms of perceptual defense:

The extreme type of perceptual defense is autistic perception. Here there is really no perception at all. Very often you see somebody in the group who has a dreamy look in his eyes or perhaps even listens interestedly, but a few minutes later will say, 'Well, I've been thinking what was said to me (ten minutes ago!) and I have thought of this point....' This is the person who most often is responsible for contributing a thud
or due to the group discussion, because his remark is connected to his own ruminations but not to the thread of group discussion (p. 321).

In the sensitivity group, however, a certain degree of self-consciousness is expected of the participants, for they are evaluating themselves precisely as interactants. There seem to be two kinds of self-consciousness: one which draws the participant away from the interaction into himself and one which makes the participant more acutely aware of his part in the interactional process and therefore more acutely aware of all the cues generated during group meetings. (c) The third kind of alienation, according to Goffman, is interaction-consciousness. The participant is so worried about how the interaction itself is progressing that he constricts his ability to follow the topic of conversation. Again, in the sensitivity-group there is a constructive form of interaction-consciousness just as there is a destructive form. Perhaps the difference is between being interaction-conscious (Goffman also calls it being "other-conscious") and being interaction or other-involved. In human relationships "the medium is the message" to a large extent, that is, the manner in which the interactional process is conducted also communicates. Therefore, members of sensitivity-training groups are asked to become aware of interactional styles. The victim of interaction-consciousness is really so deeply involved with his personal concerns that his awareness of what others are saying and of what is happening in the group is constricted, while the interaction-involved participant is "hearing" more than just the conversation, for he is picking up communication cues from a variety of sources.

Listening, then, in sensitivity groups is different from listening in
ordinary conversation groups, for in sensitivity groups listening itself is a focus of study. But even in ordinary conversation groups there is more to communication than just the topic of conversation. An awareness of all the factors involved in communicating increases one's ability to follow and evaluate a topic of conversation.

"Message anxiety" as an obstacle to listening. Research indicates that the comprehensibility of a message is unfavorably influenced when the content itself is anxiety-arousing. Nunnally (1961) calls this "message anxiety." Gynther (1957) found that "message anxiety" lowered the "communicative efficiency" of the speaker. Kasl and Mahl (1965) discovered that it led to speaker anxiety and flustered speech, while Geer (1966) found that it produced speaker anxiety, slowed speech, and silences.

"Message anxiety," then, is an obstacle to effective listening in two ways: (1) it makes the speaker himself less comprehensible so that the listener has to fill in the "gaps," and (2) it is hypothesized that the speaker communicates his own anxiety plus the anxiety of the message to the listener and the resultant "listener anxiety" further distorts the message. Since in sensitivity groups there is likely to be a good deal of "message anxiety," the participants should be prepared to handle the communication difficulties that arise from it. This means that both the speaker and the listener must be aware of possible communication distortions and make efforts at minimizing them. High visibility would be very helpful here, that is, if the speaker were to admit that he finds the content of the message quite disturbing, this would be a cue for the listener to listen more intently and become more aware of the anxieties that are possibly being generated within himself.
Campbell: human error in the communication process. Campbell (1958), in studying the communication process, discovered certain sources of systematic error, an understanding of which is extremely useful to anyone interested in human interaction. Both speaker and listener can profit from Campbell's findings, for these findings can be cast in terms of principles for improving the process of speaking (output) and the process of listening (input).

(a) Length of the speaker's remarks. If the only "recorder" present to take down a speaker's remarks is the listener himself, then both the speaker and the listener should realize that a communications "leakage" takes place between output and input. There is a good chance, according to Campbell, that the average listener will tend to shorten, simplify, and eliminate detail from the actual output of the speaker. The longer the speaker's remarks, the greater the leakage. Thus, if the speaker really wants to get his remarks across, he will take into account the natural leakage of the listening process and not be unnecessarily long. There is an important lesson here for sensitivity groups. In such groups there is usually little reason for anyone to speak at considerable length. Extended speeches are out of place both because they cut down on interaction and involvement and because they entail too much leakage. Extended "history," for example, has less impact than compact "story." An active, concerned listener will interrupt longer discourses precisely because he does want to listen, assimilate, and interact. On the relatively rare occasions on which a participant does speak at some length in the group, he must realize that his listeners are not assimilating all the facts that he is retailing but
are rather receiving a total impact from his remarks. If he speaks at length, it must be because "total impact" is more important than individual facts.

(b) **The middle of the message.** "...[T]he middle of the message will be least well retained" (p. 343). The concerned listener must take greater efforts to retain what is said as remarks lengthen, but the concerned speaker, realizing this, will try to "eliminate" the middle, that is, by keeping his remarks short enough so that they have, as it were, only a beginning and an end.

(c) "Rounding off" the message. The listener tends to "round off" what he hears, "dividing the content into clear-cut 'entities,' reducing gradations both by exaggerating some differences and losing others" (p. 344). This seems to be a function, at least in part, of a kind of egocentricity with which every listener is afflicted: he tailors messages to fit his own needs. The good listener, then, has to take pains not to ignore subtle differences in what is said, even though these differences go contrary to opinions that he himself holds. Also the good speaker will speak frankly, honestly, and plainly, making shadings of meanings as clear as possible. When a speaker becomes too subtle, when shadings of meaning begin to proliferate, this may mean that the speaker is unsure of himself or afraid of those to whom he is speaking. If either is the case, he should be honest enough to say so and let his message be interpreted in the light of his own misgivings.

(d) **The past haunting imperfectly transmitted messages.** "An imperfectly transmitted message will be distorted in the direction of important past
messages, both rewarding and punishing past messages" (p. 350). Perhaps another way of putting this is that a listener is influenced in his listening by the way he has been reinforced by communications in the past. If a participant in a sensitivity group hears a confused, abstruse, or poorly delivered message, there will be a natural tendency for him to interpret it in the light of past messages that have had either positive or negative (rather than merely factual) meaning for him, that is, messages that he himself has found important. Obviously, the good listener, being active, will try to minimize this source of error by having the speaker clarify the message. But it is surprising how many participants, for one reason or another, allow imperfectly transmitted messages to go without challenge. Secondly, a good listener will try to be aware of what the speaker is actually saying in light of previous emotional experiences with the speaker. If the participant is honest enough to keep his relationship with the other members out in the open, there should be less tendency for him to distort messages because of emotional reasons.

(e) The reductive nature of listening. The "most pervasive of the systematic biases" (p. 346) is the tendency for the listener to modify a new message so that it becomes more like previous messages. Obviously, if the speakers were never to say anything new, the listener would not be burdened with and have to cope with anything new. Therefore, the speaker who rarely says something new is contributing to this bias. But the good listener is one who can consistently break away from this bias. To do so, however, he must be in affective contact with the speaker and he must allow the speaker the freedom to change. Time and again in sensitivity groups member A, after listening to member Z, will say something like: "We've
really heard that story before: in fact, we have heard it over and over again," only to have member B, who possibly has been listening more creatively, say: "That's not true. There is something new here. He is now saying, even though in a confused way: 'I do want to change.' Anyway, that's what I'm hearing." Unfortunately poor listeners are a most formidable obstacle to change in group members.

(f) Hearing what one expects to hear. In general, according to Campbell's findings, listeners will modify messages so that they conform to the meaning expected by them. The poor listener, then, either does not listen or stops listening half way through a message, and he does so because he "knows" what the speaker is going to say. This is "creative listening" at its worst. Again, it is a question of casting the speaker into a univocal mold, thus stripping him of his freedom. Too much listening is "Kantian" listening or "computer" listening. The listener has present categories and whatever is heard must fit into these molds or handled by these "banks." Whatever cannot be received into his computer banks must be shunted off and excluded. And yet, Collins and Guetzkow (1964), in reviewing the literature on group decision-making processes, find that "the most important part of conference communication may occur when another member says something that we do not expect and thus offers us a perspective or possible solution which should not have occurred to us while working alone (p. 184). Poor listening is poor business practice besides being poor human relations. The intelligent speaker, realizing this human tendency to stereotype, truncate, and not to allow for the possibility of change, will emphasize the fact that what he is saying is different from what he had said before, that he has
changed or moved away from a previously held position (if this is the case), in order to break through his listeners' natural stereotyping process.

Finally, I would hypothesize that those who are uncomfortable with their own freedom or with the freedom of others tend to constrict the messages of others.

(g) "You agree with me." The listener tends to modify messages so that they are in better agreement with his own opinions and attitudes. Although such a tendency is nothing more than a concrete specification of the ancient scholastic principle "whatever is received is received according to the state, condition, or bias of the receiver" and as such is in no way new, empirical data are being amassed which manifest just how pervasive such a principle is in man's practical life. Thus, to a large extent we hear what we want to hear. The sensitive listener, however, addicted as he is to the what-is, constantly fights this natural tendency in order to hear what is actually being said. This means that to be a good listener one must drop or at least relax his defenses a bit in order to be willing to explore the new.

(h) Black-or-white listening. "There is a tendency to distort coding assignments in the direction of an affective or evaluative coding. The most natural coding of any input by the human operator seems to be the general nature of 'like' versus 'dislike,' 'approach' versus 'avoid,' 'good' versus 'bad,' 'beautiful' versus 'ugly,' etc. The general finding of psychologists is that whatever assignment is given tends to be distorted in this direction of this evaluative assignment. This is shown repeatedly as a 'halo' effect, or general factor in rating assignments' (p. 357). This is a reflection of the either-black-or-what tendency in man. Not only is everything a subject of evaluation, but things tend to end up in just two categories, "good" or
It seems almost natural for man to listen to messages in evaluative terms and it is much simpler to hear a communication as "bad" or "good" in its entirety rather than to expend the effort that differential evaluation of a message would demand. This basic tendency to listen to communications in evaluative terms prevents the listener from assimilating other aspects of the message; creative aspects of the message are lost in its "badness" or deficiencies are swallowed up in its "goodness." If the speaker realizes that his message might strike others as immediately "good" or "bad," then a caution against this should be built into the message itself urging listeners to suspend, if possible, this evaluative propensity.

(i) The pressures of the group and "filtered" listening. "When a group of persons are exposed to a message stimulus and asked to state its meaning (size, degree of movement, amount of prejudice, etc.), they will distort their individual interpretations in the direction of their fellows" (p. 361). The average listener tends to listen, at least to some extent, "through" the group, that is, he filters what is said through the more or less complex interactional and attitudinal patterns that comprise one aspect of the culture of the group. Although such a process can be advantageous at times—for instance, in group decision-making situations: "The social weighting given to the majority opinion (i.e., conformity) frequently causes the better alternatives to be chosen" (Collins & Guetzkow, 1964, p. 55)—this is not the case in sensitivity groups. The good listener listens, or makes every effort to listen, directly to the other without sifting what is said through the attitudinal filters of the group. It would seem that there is greater possibility for success in this area in the contract-group
because of the high-visibility nature of the group culture and because of the built-in cautions against "tacit understandings" and "covert decisions" in the group. But even under such contract conditions nature will out to a certain degree and members will tend to modify what they hear so that it might fit more neatly into the group culture. For instance, if there is a tacit understanding in the group not to discuss sexuality, when a member does bring the subject up, others will tend to ignore what he has to say or "hear" it as a digression. This presents another challenge to the good listener, for he must see the individual as primary and the group as serving the needs of the individuals who constitute the group.

It is hardly necessary for sensitivity-training participants to memorize the communications obstacles described by Campbell. It is sufficient to realize that it has been demonstrated that just in the ordinary course of events it is difficult to be an unbiased listener. The pitfalls that he describes cannot be avoided entirely; they can only be minimized.

The Impact of the Speaker on Listening

Whenever a member speaks and really says nothing or, in the contract-group, whenever he engages in various forms of flight behavior, he must realize that the quality of listening will go down in the group. As a general rule, the speaker gets the kind of attention he deserves. Some participants speak vaguely and evasively because they do not want to be "read" by their listeners; they thrive on the haphazard listening they receive. Such tendencies should become the object of confrontation in the group.

The "Compleat" Listener

It has been suggested that the good listener is the active listener,
one who readies himself to be as receptive as possible to all cues generated in the group and one who is aware of and tries to combat the variety of obstacles, stemming from within himself and from the matrix of the group, standing in the way of effective listening. The "compleat" listener, however, goes further than this, for he realizes that the proof of the pudding always lies in the eating. Therefore, once he has listened in the sense described here, he must in some way manifest to the speaker that he has listened fully, intelligently, and sympathetically (that is, he has not prejudged the speaker's remarks.) In fact, this is the basic source of support in the group: the knowledge that one has been listened to actively and intelligently. Secondly (and this is the ultimate proof on one's listening skills), he translates what he has heard into effective contractual interaction. That is, the good listener is hardly just one who amasses information, however conscientiously, and communicates to the speaker that he has been an effective tool of enregistration; rather, the variety of ways in which the individuals and the group itself have spoken have served as stimuli, and because he has listened well, there is a much better chance that his responses will be proportioned to the stimulus. In the contract group his response will generally take the form of one or more of the contractual modalities, namely, direct supportive behavior, self-disclosure, expression of feeling and emotion, or some form of confrontation. All of these modalities, if carried out responsibly, are supportive.

Listening as Diagnostic

The quality of one's listening is "diagnostic" with respect to the quality of one's human relations. Rotter (1962) claims that it is not lack
of insight into self that characterizes the person in emotional trouble but rather a lack of insight into others. He is so poorly aware of others that his interactions with them are awkward and self-defeating. The contract-group, then, is a laboratory in which the participants are to experiment with active listening. Part of the process of being an active listener, one who searches out communications cues, will include challenging participants who speak vaguely or evasively. The participant who finds out that he does not listen carefully or that he is unable or unwilling to venture out into the group in search of clarity of communication will profit diagnostically. On the other hand, the participant who succeeds will find himself much better prepared to provide active support in the group.

SUPPORT: CREATING A CLIMATE FOR GROWTH

The universal need for interpersonal warmth. There is almost universal recognition of the fact that a degree of warmth in interpersonal relationships is absolutely essential for psychosocial growth. This need begins at birth and, although it might undergo certain transformations throughout the maturational process, it would seem that it is a still strongly felt need during old age. Watson (1959), in reviewing the literature on the deleterious effects of maternal deprivation, found the evidence confirmatory despite the fact that there were experimental inadequacies in many of the studies (for the specific kinds of design inadequacy varied from study to study). Lehrman (1960), in his clinical work, found that this need for warmth does not stop with childhood:

The incisive work of Ackerman (1958) and others on intra-family interactions,...Ferenczi's (1926) demonstration that the analyst's warmth is a necessary condition for cure, and Fromm-Reichmann's
(1950) brilliant sensitivity with schizophrenics all encourage the hope that precise knowledge of the effects of inter-personal warmth at the breast, in the home and role-appropriate warmth in the office can help us fulfill our task of preventing and curing mental illness (p. 1102).

The work of Rogers (1961, 1967) and others (e.g. Schofield, 1964; Truax, 1961, 1963; Truax & Carkhuff, 1964) not only supports this conclusion but leads one to believe that warmth is not necessary just for psychotherapeutic situations, but that it is universally needed for personal and interpersonal growth.

Frank (1961) claims that "the greatest potential drawback of therapy groups is the tendency not to supply sufficient support, especially in early meetings, to enable members to cope with the stresses they generate" (p. 190). Whether this is the greatest potential drawback of sensitivity groups or not (some would certainly think so) is still to be determined, but the fear of non-support is certainly one of the greatest fears of those who are considering the possibility of engaging in sensitivity training and of sensitivity-group members who are considering taking certain risks in the group (e.g. disclosing themselves, dealing openly with emotional issues, etc.). Prospective participants realize in one way or another that they are to engage in some kind of self-disclosure, that they are going to be confronted or challenged by the leader or other participants, and that such interaction is more than likely going to arouse strong emotion. They see the possibility of some kind of shame experience and they rightfully fear it, for, as Erikson (1959) says, "Shame supposes that one is completely exposed and conscious of being looked at....One is visible and ready to be visible ....Shame is early expressed in an impulse to bury one's face, or to sink,
right then and there, into the ground. But this, I think, is essentially rage turned against the self" (pp. 142-143). Prospective participants foresee quite easily the potential pain of the sensitivity experience, but what they do not or cannot foresee is a climate of support that will render what is foreseen as painful interaction not only tolerable but even stimulating and deeply satisfying.

Psychological safety, then, is a legitimate concern of any kind of growth group, any kind of group in which intrapsychic and interpersonal concerns constitute the principal focus of attention, and it is a seeming lack of concern for such safety in some quarters that disturbs many professionals. However, support has always been a concern for those seriously committed to laboratory training, e.g. the personnel of the National Training Laboratories (NTL):

A first purpose of the T Group is to help individuals to learn from their continuing experience in the areas of self-awareness, sensitivity to phenomena of interpersonal behavior, and understanding of the consequences of behavior—one's own and others'. Learning in these areas requires willingness to explore openly one's motivations and one's feelings; to utilize the reactions of others as feedback about the consequences of one's behavior; and to experiment with new ways of behaving. Since each of these steps requires emotional support, the T Group faces the dual task of creating a supportive climate and of developing situations in which members can learn through examining their own experience (Bradford, 1964, p. 191).

Yet, while most practitioners agree that a supportive climate in human relations laboratories is absolutely essential (and actually see to it that such a climate does develop in the group or in the community of which the group is a part), still few have taken the pains to discuss either the nature of support or the ways in which a supportive climate is created in a group.
Needless to say, there is little if any published research in this area.

**Antecedent and Consequent Support**

In the contract group support can be discussed in terms of the kinds of interaction specified by the contract. There are basically, then, two kinds of support: antecedent and consequent. Encouragement of any kind, whether direct or indirect, given to participants to engage in contractual behavior is antecedent support, that is, it comes before contractual behavior and is directed toward eliciting it. For example, if the leader-member models some form of contractual behavior, let us say that he engages in self-disclosure of some kind, and if he does so skillfully and sincerely, his behavior is a form of antecedent support, for it is designed to encourage members to engage in the same kind of behavior. On the other hand, reinforcement given to participants for actually engaging in contractual interaction is consequent support. Reinforcement, of course, can take place in many different ways, but it always "says" to the participant who has engaged in contractual behavior: "You have done a good thing in the group." During the early sessions, the trainer primarily (but also as many of the other participants as possible) should engage in forms of antecedent support, for it is amazing how many "normal" people have fears and feelings of inferiority floating immediately below the surface or lurking behind carefree facades. These feelings inhibit group process and people need encouragement to overcome them. In the contract group, the contract itself provides one of the main sources of antecedent support in that it takes into consideration the natural fears of the participants and serves as a stimulus to participation. The contract establishes a rather large "cultural island"
around which the participant may wander freely and with relative safety. If
the participant chooses to remain on one small part of that island and remain
a spectator of instead of a participant in the life of the island, this is
not the fault of the island culture but rather of his exaggerated fears.

The Forms of Antecedent Support

"I accept you because you ARE": Acceptance or unconditional positive
regard as antecedent support. The contract-group recognizes the fact that
the basic attitudes its participants have toward one another merely or
simply as fellow human beings are crucial to the climate of interpersonal
growth. Therefore, insofar as possible (though obviously one cannot change
deep-seated attitudes and habitual behavioral patterns by contract or edict),
the contract calls first of all for the basic kind of acceptance which
Rogers (1961, 1967), following Standal (1954), calls "unconditional positive
regard"; this attitude, considered essential for the therapeutic process,
is described by Rogers and Truax (1967):

A second condition which is hypothesized as essential for
therapeutic movement and change is the experiencing by the
therapist of an unconditional positive regard for the client.
This means that the therapist communicates to his client a
deep and genuine caring for him as a person with human
potentialities, a caring uncontaminated by evaluations of
his thoughts, feelings, or behaviors. The therapist
experiences a warm acceptance of the client's experience
as being a part of the client as a person, and places no
conditions on his acceptance and warmth. He prides the
client in a total rather than a conditional way. He does not
accept certain feelings in the client and disapprove others.
He feels an unconditional positive regard or warmth for this
person. This is an outgoing, positive feeling without
reservations and without evaluations. It means not making
judgments. It involves as much feeling of acceptance for the
client's expression of painful, hostile, defensive, or
abnormal feelings as for his expression of good, positive,
mature feelings. For us as therapists it may even be that it
is easier to accept painful and negative feelings than the positive and self-confident feelings which sometimes come through. These latter we almost automatically regard as defensive. But unconditional positive regard involves a willingness to share equally the patient's confidence and joy, or his depression and failure. It is a non-possessive caring for the client as a separate person. The client is thus freely allowed to have his own feelings and his own experiencing. One client describes the therapist as 'fostering my possession of my own experience and that I am actually having it; thinking what I think, feeling what I feel, wanting what I want, fearing what I fear; no "ifs," "buts," or "not reallys."' This is the type of acceptance which is expected to lead to a relationship which facilitates the engagement of the patient in the process of therapy and leads to constructive personality change.

Thus, when the therapist prizes his client, and is searching for the meaning or value of his client's thoughts or behaviors within the client, he does not tend to feel a response of approval or disapproval. He feels an acceptance of what is.

Unconditional positive regard, when communicated by the therapist, functions to provide the non-threatening context in which it is possible for the client to explore and experience the most deeply shrouded elements of his inner self. The therapist is not paternalistic, or sentimental, or superficially social and agreeable. But his deep caring is a necessary ingredient in providing a 'safe' context in which the client can come to explore himself and share deeply with another human being (pp. 102-104).

To a great extent what Rogers and Truax describe here is the kind of acceptance ideally owed to another simply because he is a human being. It is a willingness to let the other be who he is and what he is, but it is an active, concerned letting-the-other-to-be rather than a detached "not-giving-a-dam" what the other is like or what he does. It means allowing the other to have the psychosocial lifespace that he needs in order to be himself as fully as possible. Negatively it means a refusal to exercise various sorts of control over the other, demanding that his life-style conform generally or in specific aspects to one's own, e.g. with respect to style or modes of interpersonal interaction and to value-system. Acceptance implies an active
allowing the other to be different from oneself, "active" here meaning that
A's interaction with B should actually foster B's otherness, his differences,
his unique way of being. In a sensitivity group it is as if each member of
the group were to say to every other member: "You have a value that neither
I nor we collectively either determine or can abrogate. We recognize you
as being this value."

At the very minimum acceptance demands that one allow the other to
express the ways in which he is different, different from the other members
of the group and perhaps different from the images of man that are currently
"acceptable" in our society. But if such acceptance is to be active, the
members must be willing to say to one another: "Your actions cannot be so
different or bizarre as to open an unbridgeable gap between you and me."
Insofar as acceptance is active, it approaches what Fromm (1956) calls
"brotherly love," the most fundamental kind of love. This love means such
things as care, respect, and the desire to further the life of the other.
Such acceptance or love tends to disregard status, for it is a love between
equals.

Schofield (1964) says that "this quality of 'acceptance' in our culture
at this time is peculiarly stricted to the psychotherapeutic contract, but
it is common to all such contracts. In this sense, psychotherapy provides
a very special, perhaps ideal, form of friendship" (p. 109). There is no
absolute reason, however, why such attitudes of acceptance cannot become
more pervasive in our culture at this time. Perhaps one of the reasons for
the proliferation of sensitivity-training laboratories in our culture at
this time is to disseminate among the general population "growth-variables"
that up to now have been common only in therapeutic enterprises. Sensitivity laboratories—and certainly contract-group laboratories—are designed to stimulate the cultivation of such attitudes of acceptance among people not engaged in any strictly therapeutic situation. These laboratories encourage participants to become aware of their basic attitudes of acceptance and rejection of others and to grow in their active concern for others to be who and what they are. This is essential to the kind of support-in-depth that creates a climate in which participants can engage freely in the modalities called for by the contract: self-disclosure, expression of feeling and emotion, and mutual confrontation. As Latourelle (1962) says, for communication and dialogue to become a reciprocal opening up, that is, a mutual revelation, both the speaker and the hearer must respect each other in the mysteriousness of their personalities: there must be mutual trust and availability. One of the principal tasks of the laboratory is to find ways—direct and indirect—of communicating this basic attitude of acceptance of one another to one another. The laboratory is also diagnostic in this regard. If a person finds himself lacking in this basic acceptance of others, then he should explore the interactional consequences of his lack. If he decides that he should do something about it, then, for him, the laboratory will be principally remedial. If he decides that he is unwilling to change, then he must learn to live with the behavioral consequences of his decision.

Stern (1966), in discussing psychotherapy, makes a distinction that might well bridge the gap between Rogers and Truax's views of unconditional positive regard and the following section on acceptance versus approval.
According to Stern, there are two approaches to experience: (1) the instrumental which aims at mastery, and (2) the sacramental which aims at appreciation. The therapist using the instrumental approach will see the patient's past as something to be overcome (either by emotional insight, behavioral modification, learning ways of adjusting to reality, or a combination of all these methods). On the other hand, the therapist following the sacramental approach looks upon the patient's past with respect, even though (in the eyes of the therapist or of society in general or of the patient himself) it may need to be transcended, and he looks upon the patient's present as an experience which can be transformed, at least in part, through concerned and appreciative confrontation. In the sacramental approach the patient's task becomes that of learning how to recognize himself as a unique and total being, while the therapist must enter into the relationship as an interacting-with-another self instead of a mirror in whose clear surface the patient can come to appreciate his deepest feelings and how he is distorting reality. I sincerely believe that the core of what Rogers calls unconditional positive regard is compatible with the kind of respectful confrontation suggested by Stern.

Acceptance versus approval. Acceptance, whether it is described in terms of Rogers and Truax's unconditional positive regard or in terms of giving the other respect, concern, understanding, the freedom to be, and the opportunity to make and be responsible for his own decisions, is not synonymous with approval (Rogers and Truax explicitly place it outside the pale of either approval or disapproval). But acceptance in the finest sense does not, it is contended here, exclude the kind of confrontation to be
described in the next chapter. I do not believe that A, if he is sincerely interested in growth, wants or expects B to accept him in the sense that B must accept, overlook, discount or even approve of modes of acting with which A himself is dissatisfied and which remain for him a source of concern if not of some kind of contract or existential guilt. A does not (or should not) expect B to consider his own (B's) value system so cavalierly and narrowly as not to be concerned about these values among men in general and even with respect to A. Therefore, B can really accept A in a way that is consonant with such concepts as unconditional positive regard and non-posessive warmth (and certainly this kind of acceptance does have some kind of priority in human relationships) and still (at least eventually, if not immediately) suggest to A the hypothesis that some aspects of A's behavior might be proving deleterious to A himself, if not also to others. B can do this without in any way refusing to "respect" the experience of A, no matter how different from his own such experience might be. Once a person has declared effectively--perhaps by word but especially by his actions--that he is antecedently "for" another, that he is open to him and his experience--his miseries, his joys, his triumphs, his failures, his problems--then, and perhaps only then, does he had the freedom to make careful confrontational interventions in the life of the other.

Rogers and Truax (1967) and Schofield (1964), in discussing acceptance as a therapist variable, do not discuss the relationship between acceptance and confrontation nor do they discuss approval at any length. But if, as Patterson (1966) suggests, one person manifests certain ideal qualities in his relationship to another--empathy, genuine concern, a desire to help, a
belief in the ability of the other to change, an expectation or a hope that the other will change in directions indicating growth, self-congruence, and sincerity—then it would seem to follow that approval simply could not be tied to the coattails of acceptance, for this would demand a certain dishonesty on the part of one desiring to give himself to the other and thus vitiate the concept of acceptance itself. In a word, at least at a certain stage of a relationship between two people, confrontation can be a manifestation of positive regard, a regard that still remains unconditional in that the confronter does not make his friendship depend on a change of life in the confrontee. His positive regard is also still unconditional in that he is not trying to rob the person he is confronting of his freedom (indeed, he wants him, if possible, to be even freer than he is now).

On the other hand, wholesale approval of another implies either radical non-involvement with him or non-concern or it implies unlimited rather than unconditioned love. If A really does not care for B, then he can be lavish with his approval, because it costs him nothing. Or if A's unlimited "love" for B is really an unlimited need for B and B's affection and approval, then A might well be ready to do whatever is necessary to maintain this relationship. But there is no evidence that such unlimited approval or "love" is therapeutic or otherwise growthful. On the contrary, developmental studies have demonstrated that setting limits for a child as he is growing up, if done responsibly with the child's growth rather than just the adult's comfort in mind, is an obvious act of care and concern. On the other hand, there is evidence that unlimited approval is deleterious to growth. Strickland and Crowne (1963) found that patients with high need for approval
terminated therapy significantly earlier than patients with low need for approval. It is true that these patients might have terminated the relationship for a number of reasons (poor therapist, "spontaneous remission," failure to receive unconditional positive regard, misunderstanding of the nature of therapy, financial concerns, etc.), but it also is possible that the early-terminators were, on the whole, immature people who expected to receive unlimited approval or love from the therapist. Truax and Carkhuff (1967) suggest that the need for approval (as opposed to a need for respect, concern) is an indication of disturbance rather than a remedy for it. In somewhat the same vein, Frank (1961) maintains that in group therapy support need not be expressed in terms of increased "liking" (one of the forms of approval) but in terms of respect for the "new" self that emerges from the therapeutic process. I am in no way suggesting that Rogers and Truax's concept of unconditional positive regard suffers from the inadequacies outlined here; rather it is a question of trying to demonstrate that there is no conflict between the concept of non-possessive warmth and responsible confrontation, even though the latter has not been a part of the armamentarium of non-directive or client-centered approaches to therapy and other growth experiences.

Antecedent acceptance as an expressed sense of solidarity in the human condition. An acute awareness of the fact that man, for all his splendid accomplishments, often not only chooses unwisely but doggedly adheres to self-destructive choices—this awareness expressed by sensitivity-group members in such a way as to make it evident that no one is exempt from human folly is a form of antecedent acceptance. The sooner a member gives
sufficient cues to indicate that he is open to both the heights and the depths of the human condition, the sooner will he find himself "in-community" in a spirit of mutual trust. It is the person who in one way or another can say: "We are a micro-community of men participating in both the wisdom and folly of man--it is this person who expresses a kind of solidarity with others in the human condition that is both a statement of acceptance of others and a plea to be accepted by others.

Fromm-Reichmann (1950) says that the respect that the therapist has for his patient is valid only if the therapist realizes that his client's difficulties in living are not too different from his own. She also maintains that such a statement is not just a humanitarian or charitable hypothesis but that it is a scientific conviction. Another way of putting this is that in order to create a climate of trust, acceptance, and support, the participants in a sensitivity group must in some way denude themselves of status-roles and appear in the group simply as human beings, subject to both the sublimities and follies of the human condition. Stern (1966) suggests that this should also take place in therapeutic encounters. The therapist, he says, should let his clients see some of his own problems in living, for therapy is someplace where two or more people go together.

If this is to be accomplished, then the participants must lay aside not only formal status roles (e.g. psychiatrist, psychologist, clergyman, manager, teacher, etc.) but also any role that would interfere with free contact among group participants. For instance, if someone assumes a quasi-role based on the supposition that "problems put people in categories, problems divide," and if he translates this role into interaction in the
group, saying implicitly or explicitly: "I've listened, but my hang-ups are not yours nor are yours mine; we're playing this game in different ballparks," he is assuming a role that demands that he reject others and that others reject him. This kind of psychological or interactional distancing, no matter how subtle or covert, inhibits mutual acceptance and therefore limits or interferes with the kind of trust that is absolutely essential in the group if all the participants are to "contact" one another freely. This distancing works in two directions. The one who says, at least by implication: "My problems are not yours: they make me less than you, they set me apart from you" sets himself apart from others, making it very difficult for them to provide him with any kind of support. Though he does this in order to make himself less vulnerable to rejection, he defeats his purpose because he creates an atmosphere in which support is not viable. If he also adds a poor-me element, he complicates matters further, for he both refuses support and at the same time tries to extort it. This makes the rest of the participants ambivalent toward him, if not angry. On the other hand, if a participant takes the attitude toward another: "Your problems are not mine: your problems set you apart from me," then his "support," if he gives it at all, will smell of condescension, and the one being "supported" will resent being patronized.

Support is most effectively given by one who has a feeling of involvement, of being with others, whatever the human experiences of these others might be. He has a strong feeling for the what-is of human living instead of the what-should-be. He so gives himself to others that the ways he is like others and the ways in which he differs from them do not determine his
involvement. The one who isolates himself from the experiences of others in the group is less human for doing so, no matter how he rationalizes his isolation.

**Availability as antecedent support.** Friendship, and this includes the beginnings of friendship in sensitivity or contract-groups, may be defined in terms of availability. Friends are mutually available and the degree of availability defines the strength or the depth of the relationship. Some distinction, however, must be made between physical and psychological availability. Physical availability refers to the spatio-temporal dimensions of the relationship. There is a high degree of physical availability if one person spends a good deal of time with another, if he remains geographically close, if physical presence of some sort (e.g. even contact by telephone) can be easily achieved, or if more intimate kinds of actual physical contact are a dimension of the encounter. But, as important as physical availability is for friendship, psychological availability is even more important. Physical and psychological availability are separable, and the latter is the more difficult to define. First of all, any kind of availability, whether physical or psychological, can be either active or passive. For example, A might invite B to spend some time with him or, on the other hand, he might merely allow B to be with him. These would be examples of active and passive availability. A person is actively available in a psychological way if he takes the initiative in sharing himself—his deeper thoughts, concerns, feelings, and aspirations—with another. If he merely allows the other to share such things with him, that is, if he is a more or less willing listener to the confidences of another, then he is also psychologically available, but
passively so.

It is evident that there are all sorts of combinations and degrees of availability, both active and passive, physical and psychological. For instance, a prostitute might be actively available on a physical level, but not psychologically available at all. Perhaps the ideal marriage, in terms of availability, is one in which the partners are utterly psychologically available to each other and in which mutual physical availability is worked out according to the individual needs and responsibilities. Marriage partners come together with a frequency and an intimacy of contact which are not available to others, and their physical intimacy symbolizes, promotes, and enriches their mutual psychological availability. Both their physical and psychological intimacy reveal how deeply they are "for" each other, how deeply each wants to support the very being of the other. In like manner, failures in marriage, and in friendship in general, can be conceptualized in terms of failures in physical and psychological availability, both active and passive.

Since I had always been an at least "implicit "believer" in the dictum that one could have very few close friends, I was taken aback once by a trainer in a sensitivity group in which I was participating when he said that he neither believed in that dictum nor lived by it. He claimed that he had many deep friends. It is true that he did not see many of them very often (physical availability was relatively low in many cases), but when he did see them, he did not need time to "work his way" back into the relationship. Rather he and his friends started communicating immediately at a deep level (psychological availability was very high). It may be that our sub-
scribing to the few-friends dictum (don't spread yourself too thin," "don't become a psychological glutton," etc.) is a way of rationalizing our fears of getting too close to others.

In the contract group, then, members are supportive to the degree that they become available to one another. At first glance, it would seem that they are always, as long as the group is in session, physically available to one another, but even in the group itself there are degrees of physical availability. For instance, there are certain physical cues--e.g., looking at the other, modulations of voice, etc.--that indicate psychological availability or the beginnings of it, and these cues may or may not be present. One of the main purposes, in my opinion, for using nonverbal, "contact" exercises in the group is to allow the participants an opportunity to use physical contact both to stimulate and symbolize their psychological availability to one another. Such exercises, however antecedently anxiety-arousing or "silly" they may seem to be (see Kaplan, 1968), are actually serious and fear-reductive, for they usually reveal others as more psychologically available than one had realized. The sooner the participants become available to one another and the more deft they become in finding ways in which to reveal or give evidence of this availability, the sooner will they create a climate of trust that will support more than superficial manifestations of the modalities of self-disclosure, expression of feeling, and confrontation.

Participant "congruence" as antecedent support. Rogers (1961), Rogers and Truax (1967), and others (e.g. Truax & Carkhuff, 1967) have studied the value of therapist authenticity or "congruence" in the therapeutic relation-
ship, and they have come to the conclusion that it, together with unconditional positive regard and accurate empathy, is one of the most important therapist variables:

We readily sense this quality of congruence in everyday life. Each of us could name persons who always seem to be operating from behind a front, who are playing a role, who tend to say things that they do not feel. They are exhibiting incongruence. We tend not to reveal ourselves too deeply to such people. On the other hand, each of us knows individuals whom we somehow trust because we sense that they are being what they are in an open and transparent way and that we are dealing with the person himself, not with a polite or professional facade. This is the quality of congruence.

In relation to therapy it means that the therapist is what he is, during the encounter with the client. He is without front or facade, openly being the feelings and attitudes which at the moment are flowing in him. It involves the element of self-awareness, meaning that the feelings the therapist is experiencing are available to him, available to his awareness, and also that he is able to live these feelings, to be them in the relationship, and able to communicate them if appropriate. It means that he comes into a direct personal encounter with his client, meeting him on a person-to-person basis. It means that he is being himself, not denying himself.

It is not a simple thing to achieve such reality. Being real involves the difficult task of being acquainted with the flow of experiencing going on within oneself, a flow marked especially by complexity and continuous change....

It is not an easy thing for the client, or for any human being, to trust his most deeply shrouded feelings to another person. It is even more difficult for a disturbed person to share his deepest and most troubling feelings with a therapist. The genuineness, or congruence, of the therapist is one of the elements in the relationship which makes this risk of sharing easier and less fraught with dangers.

....At a very low level of congruence the therapist may be clearly defensive in the interaction, as evidenced by the contradiction between the content of the message and his voice qualities or the nonverbal cues which he presents. Or the therapist may respond appropriately but in so professional a manner that he gives the impression that his responses are formulated to sound good rather than being what he really feels and
means. Thus incongruence may involve a contrived or rehearsed quality or a professional front.

At the upper ranges of therapist genuineness, his openness to all types of feelings and experiences, both pleasant and hurtful, without trace of defensiveness or retreat into professionalism, is usually most evident from the quality of his voice and the manner of his expression (Rogers & Truax, 1967, pp. 100-102).

It is hypothesized here that this quality of congruence is essential not only for a therapist in a therapeutic relationship but for anyone who wants to live a fully human life. Again, it is a question of a variable that is perhaps too closey identified with the therapeutic relationship. It is therapeutic because it is deeply human. Therefore, participants in a contract group are to examine or rather experience their ability or inability to be congruent in the interaction of the group and attempt modes of behavior designed to develop congruence. It is evident that a group of congruent participants will be supportive provided that they effectively handle the confrontation that arises naturally from their being congruent. This problem will be dealt with in the next chapter.

**Trust formation as antecedent support.** One way of conceptualizing antecedent support is as trust formation. Erikson (1959, 1963, 1968) sees trust-versus-mistrust in existence itself as the first crisis faced by the child:

What we here call trust coincides with what Therese Benedek has called confidence. If I prefer the word 'trust,' it is because there is more naivete and more mutuality in it: an infant can be said to be trusting where it would go too far to say that he has confidence. The general state of trust, furthermore, implies not only that one has learned to rely on the sameness and continuity of outer providers, but also that one may trust oneself and the capacity of one's own organs to cope with urges; and that one is able to consider oneself trustworthy enough so that the providers will not need to be on guard lest they be nipped.
But let it be said here that the amount of trust derived from earliest infantile experience does not seem to depend on absolute quantities of food or demonstrations of love, but rather on the quality of the maternal relationship. Mothers create a sense of trust in their children by that kind of administration which in its quality combines sensitive care of the baby's individual needs and a firm sense of personal trustworthiness within the trusted framework of their culture's life style. This forms the basis in the child for a sense of identity which will later combine a sense of being 'all right,' of being oneself, and of becoming what other people trust one will become (1963, pp. 247-249).

Thus trust-mistrust crisis is, of course, resolved differentially so that even the "normal" participants in a sensitivity laboratory will differ in their ability to trust themselves and others. It is important for the participants to realize this as they attempt to create a climate of trust in the group.

Gibb (1964) claims that trust is absolutely essential for growth; he links defensiveness to the trust-mistrust crisis:

A person learns to grow through his increasing acceptance of himself and others. Serving as the primary block to such acceptance are the defensive feelings of fear and distrust that arise from the prevailing defensive climates in most cultures. In order to participate consciously in his own growth a person must learn to create for himself, in his dyadic and group relationships, defense-reductive climates that will continue to reduce his own fears and distrusts (p. 279).

Gibb sees the participants' unresolved feelings of fear and distrust, even though these may be buried and denied, as formidable obstacles to growth through group interaction. Acceptance must precede what he calls "data-flow," that is, the free interaction of group members: "Data-flow is possible only within the limits of trust formation. A free flow of data is possible only with antecedent or concurrent reduction of distrusts and fears" (p. 283). It is evident that this is an area in which careful research is needed, but
there is some evidence to back up Gibb's clinical observations. Mellinger (1956), for instance, found that scientists in a research organization tended to conceal their attitudes about a particular issue when communicating with persons in whom they lacked trust. Read (1962) found that among executives the less trust they held for their immediate superiors the greater the tendency toward "inaccurate communication" (p. 10) with these superiors. As Collins and Guetzkow (1964) note: "Communication behavior is a function of ...the nature of the milieu" (p. 167). If distrust colors the environment, we can expect distortions in communication.

Some of the symptoms of distrust in the group are:

...persistent defense of one's public image, attempts to change attitudes and beliefs of others, attempts to make decisions for others, avoidance of feeling, avoidance of conflict, advice giving, flattery, cynicism about the powers of the group, derogation of the group's abilities, lack of confidence in the product of the group, and denial of membership (Gibb, 1964, p. 284).

Gibb (1968) suggests other symptoms of lack of trust in groups: "strategy" behavior, differences between what is said inside and outside the group, and impersonal talk:

[Early in groups, people are pretty closed and they operate with a certain kind of strategy. They program their communications, they plan what to say. They plan what to say on the basis of the effect it will have....The more I fear someone, the more I ration my communications, the more I restrain my behavior, the more controlled I am....

[An] operational test we use in research is: Do people say the same things about each other in the group that they do in clusters going home? To their wives after they get there...? If they say the same things about each other outside as they do to each inside, that is a good feedback system. It is very rare in my experience.

[People tend, when they are fearful to be impersonal. They tend to escalate the cognitive level, to say: "Isn't it interesting that
people are this way—people need people," rather than to say "I need you," "I hurt," "I love you," "Sit by me".... (pp. 3-4).

Therefore, since little happens in a group until the participants learn to trust one another, one of the most important tasks of early group sessions is the formation of a climate of trust. It is far better to try to forestall the mistrust behavior described by Gibb than to try to remedy it. In the contract group, the process of building a climate of trust is aided by the contract itself. If one knows that all the other participants have subscribed to the same contract, then it is easier to trust them, for one can, at least to some degree, predict their behavior and reactions. However, if the contract is imposed on the group instead of being freely chosen (imposition-of-contract instead of entry-by-contract), then it is necessary to determine to what degree the participants are actually "buying" the contract before one could use the contract as a source of trust. The leader-member should be familiar with the signs of distrust within the group and bring the entire trust issue out into the open. If he does not do this, the participants themselves will do it eventually (and sometimes repeatedly), therefore his early confrontation of the trust issue might be more "economic" in the long run.

The way the preposition "behind" is used in the English language casts some light on the question of support and trust. If someone is "behind" someone else, this is usually either a heartening or a threatening situation. "We are behind you all the way," is a positive and supportive situation, but if a person is merely "behind" another in the sense that he is in the shadows, as it were, undeclared and unknown, then his presence is experienced
as threatening. If a person does not in some way declare himself "for" me--especially if my contract with him is fairly extensive--then it is not paranoid for me to wonder whether he is "against" me in some way or not. He need not declare himself "for" me directly; it is sufficient if he indicates that he is the kind of person who is "for" others generally. Another way of saying this is that the "he who is not for me is against me" dictum has some general applicability to human relationships. Most men would prefer to have those who are not "behind" them in a positive sense to stand out in the open, "in front of" them, in honest opposition, if necessary, rather than remain in the shadows unknown. This kind of honesty in the sensitivity group goes far in establishing a facilitative climate of trust.

Misplaced trust can, as Lynd (1959) points out, lead to deep, even incapacitating, experiences of shame:

Even more than the uncovering of weakness or ineptness, exposures of misplaced confidence can be shameful--happiness, love, anticipation of a response that is not there, something personally momentous received as inconsequential. The greater the expectation, the more acute the shame; the greater the discrepancy between one's image of oneself and the image others have of one, the more one has to put on a 'brave face' (pp. 43-44).

Creating a climate of trust, then, involves having others "declare" themselves in the group, that is, declare their attitudes (or lack of them) toward others. Still one cannot wait to share oneself until he is absolutely sure that he will be accepted by others. There is always the chance that one's gift of oneself will be spurned or go unnoticed, at least to a degree. However, the risk of laboratory training reflects the risk of life; too many of us fail to grow because we prefer a climate of absolute or excessive safety. The laboratory, because it is life in miniature (though it is also
life under a magnifying glass), has supportive resources more ready at hand for those who take risks and fail or are failed than do macro-life situations.

Someone once called belief "prophetic of reality," that is, if a person believes deeply enough in something, his faith will enable him to muster the forces needed to create that in which he believes. Trust, in the sense of entrusting oneself to others, can also be prophetic of reality: the person who dares to entrust himself to others goes far in creating a climate of trust in the group.

Consequent Support in Terms of Reinforcement

Collins and Guetzkow (1964), in reviewing the literature on communication and interaction, come to the conclusion that "communication behavior is a function of...the kinds of reward particularly valued by the individual (his motives and needs). A communicator initiates communication when he expects a reward on the basis of his own past experience with this or similar task environments and fellow group members" (p. 167). Therefore, if the various forms of antecedent support are instrumental in getting effective group interaction started and in contributing to the formation of a viable "interactional climate," it is consequent support in terms of reinforcement that keeps the interaction going and brings it to term.

Recognition and appropriate response as reinforcement. In the contract group, reinforcement means, in general, that once a member has participated in some form of contractual behavior (e.g. self-disclosure, expression of feeling), the other members should both (1) recognize (actively, behaviorally) the fact that he has acted contractually, that he has done "something good" in the group, and (2) respond appropriately to his contractual behavior.
Ideally, recognition and response emerge into a single act. For instance, if a person engages in meaningful self-disclosure ("story"), it is not enough for the group simply to recognize verbally the fact that he has acted contractually: "You have engaged in 'story' and this is a 'good thing' in this group"—but they should react or respond to what he has said (if it is "story" the assumption is that it is meaningful), that is, they should react personally to the disclosure. "Appropriate" response means response proportioned to the modality in which the other is speaking. For example, if A, perhaps only after screwing up his courage to take a responsible risk in the group, confronts B, then B's best response to A would be to examine himself on the issues suggested by A. Such a response would both recognize and reinforce A's contractual behavior. Again, if A reveals himself significantly to the group, then B might respond by revealing himself along similar or relevant dimensions. B's act would indicate to A not only that he has listened carefully to him but also that he has felt a certain solidarity with him. Such an act would provide A with a good deal of reinforcement. On the other hand, if B were to reply to A's self-disclosure irresponsibly—for instance, by trying to "upstage" A with his own disclosure—then, obviously, his "response" would have the opposite effect.

The trouble with simple direct recognition of contractual behavior—"We recognize the fact that you have engaged in 'story'"—as opposed to full contractual response which includes recognition is that recognition that stands by itself can carry overtones of "separateness" from the other. If A merely recognizes the fact that B has acted contractually, he "stands off" from B to a certain extent, at least by not really involving himself with B.
Mere recognition of the plight of another is closer to pity than empathy, and a person who pities another separates himself or stands off from the other. Sometimes, however—and this is especially true of earlier sessions in the life of the group—the only response a person is honestly capable of is to recognize the fact that another member has acted contractually. For instance, if someone reveals himself to a degree that was unexpected in the group, he might catch the other members off guard, as it were. Perhaps all they can say at the moment (if they say anything) is something like this: "This is the deepest level of self-disclosure that we have experienced in this group. But, although we appreciate the fact that someone has moved us forward by his contractual behavior, we are still at a loss for appropriate modes of response." I have participated in groups in which "premature" and ill-prepared-for self-revelation has, unfortunately, merely angered the group. In one group, the participants kept referring to such a disclosure as "the bomb," and the group finally ended without their really being able to handle this disclosure. Such a situation could have been avoided if the group had first discussed its goals and worked out some sort of contract to deal realistically with possible group interactions.

Jourard (1967) discusses some research that seems to support the general position taken here, that is, that more than mere recognition of contractual behavior is necessary for adequate reinforcement:

Another student, W.J. Powell, Jr. (1964), did a doctoral dissertation which was more carefully controlled than Rivenbark's exploratory study. He conducted interviews with college students, asking them to make themselves as fully known to him, the interviewer, as they cared to. He carefully controlled all extraneous variables and compared the increase in self-disclosure (using an operant-conditioning design) that occurred when, on the one hand,
he responded with authentic disclosures of his own (in contrast to 'reflecting' the feeling or content of their disclosures) and when, on the other hand, he responded with expressions of approval and support. He found that 'approving, supporting' responses did not increase the students' disclosures at all. Reflection and restatement of their disclosures resulted in an increase in disclosures of negative self-statements, but did not affect positive, self-enhancing expressions. Self-disclosure from the researcher was associated with significant increases in the subjects' disclosures of both positive and negative self-references (p. 114).

This research tends to confirm what has been said here about approval and the value of responding by self-involvement. The implications not only for sensitivity training but for therapy in general are evident, even though it means a departure from more comfortable therapeutic approaches to which we have become accustomed.

The necessity of "immediacy" of reinforcement. Collins and Guetzkow (1964), in extending the experimental data on the timing of rewards (see Hilgard & Bower, 1966), suggest that temporal immediacy has its place in social reward situations also:

The experimental data on the timing of rewards suggest that they are most effective when they follow behavior within a few seconds. Although the ability of humans to verbalize and plan for the future increases the effectiveness of an environmental reward, many social systems would be impossible if events in the task environment were the sole source of reward. It may take a goodly time for the group to realize its goals, but social rewards may be applied immediately by verbal and gestural behaviors in the face-to-face group (p. 77).

For instance, what is suggested here may well refer to the situation in which a sensitivity-training participant puts himself "on the line" in some way or other, and, once he is finished, there follows a comparatively long silence. We should find out whether such temporal "gaps" are deleterious to the social reinforcement system operative in the group, and the hypothesis
here is that they well might be. I remember one group in which a young man "put himself on the line" and, after he had finished, called for some feedback from the others. Luckily enough, this particular segment of the group experience was recorded on videotape. He received practically no immediate response from the others. In fact, when he called for response, most of the participants tried to "leave the scene" by bowing their heads or by looking off in a different direction. When I replayed the tape, I told them to watch what they did with their heads when they were asked to give some feedback. Then I asked the one who had put himself "on the line" how he felt at that moment. He said that he had felt alone, very much alone.

I would hypothesize that the more "immediacy" there is in reinforcement behavior in the sensitivity group the greater the effect. This refers to temporal immediacy, certainly, for temporal immediacy of reinforcement means at least that the listener has picked up the cue "I-am-finished" or the cue "I-would-like-some-response." But it also refers to "qualitative immediacy," that is, the degree to which the respondent really puts himself "into" the response. Indeed, such qualitative immediacy seems to be more important than mere temporal immediacy. One way of conceptualizing this qualitative immediacy of response is in terms of a therapist variable currently receiving a good deal of attention—accurate empathy (Rogers, 1961, 1967; Truax, 1961, 1963; Truax & Carkhuff, 1967).

Immediacy of supportive reinforcement in terms of accurate empathy.

Rogers and Truax (1967) describe accurate empathic understanding:

The ability of the therapist accurately and sensitively to understand experiences and feelings and their meaning to the client during the moment-to-moment encounter of psychotherapy consti-
tutes what perhaps can be described as the 'work' of the therapist after he has first provided the contextual basis for the relationship by his congruence...and his unconditional positive regard.

Accurate empathic understanding means that the therapist is completely at home in the universe of patient. It is a moment-to-moment sensitivity that is in the 'here and now,' the immediate present....[I]t is of limited use to the individual if the therapist only arrives at this insightful and empathic understanding...as he drives home at night. Such a delayed empathy or insight may be of value if the therapist has a later chance to respond to the same theme, but its value would lie in formulating his empathic response to the patient's immediate living of the relationship.

The ability and sensitivity required to communicate these inner meanings back to the client in a way that allows these experiences to be 'his' is the major part of empathic understanding.

...To communicate this perception in a language attuned to the patient that allows him more clearly to sense and formulate his confusion, his fear, his rage or anger is the essence of the communicative aspect of accurate empathy.

...The communication is not only by the use of words that the patient might well have used, but also by the sensitive play of voice qualities which reflect the seriousness, the intentness, and the depth of feeling.

...This empathic understanding when it is accurately and sensitively communicated seems crucially important in making it possible for a person to get close to himself, to experience his most inward feelings, to maintain contact with his inner self-experiences, thus allowing for the recognition and resolution of incongruencies. It is this self-exploration and consequent recognition and resolution of incongruities that we believe allows the client to change and to develop his potentialities.

The common element in a low level of empathy involves the therapist's doing something other than 'listening' or 'understanding'; he may be evaluating the client, giving advice, offering intellectual interpretations, or reflecting upon his own feelings of experiences. Indeed, a therapist may be accurately describing psychodynamics to the patient, but in a language not that of the client, or at a time when these dynamics are far removed from the current feelings of the client, so that there is a flavor of teacher-pupil interactions (pp. 104-106).

Truax and Carkhuff (1967) note that "accurate empathy which stressed..."
tic accuracy or sensitivity to feeling or experience from a slightly analytic point of view proved much more highly related to the criterion indices than did the better known variable which grew out of the client-centered tradition" (p. 365). However this statement may be reconciled with what Rogers and Truax have said above, it is hypothesized here that the accurate empathy that is effective in sensitivity groups (and indeed in human relationships generally) includes both the ability to get "within" the other and the willingness and ability to convey this to the other in terms that are intelligible to him. Perhaps this would make a therapist more active than a Rogerian therapist is generally thought to be, but if this is a development in client-centered theory, it seems to be in the right direction.

Reinforcement of the individual rather than the group. Research indicates that individuals involved in some group task, rather than the group as a whole, should receive reinforcement. Rosenberg (1960) demonstrated that an individual will not learn new modes of behavior if the group as a whole is rewarded in such a way that the task-environmental rewards and punishments are not specifically coordinated to his behavior. Zajonc (1962) has reported that the performance of seven-man teams was inhibited when individuals received knowledge only of group success and failure and did not receive feedback on individual performances. This contains an important lesson for sensitivity groups. Group members frequently tend to address the group as a whole instead of one another when more individualized responses would be more appropriate. While this might be safer (because it is less involving), it is also self-defeating, because the participants as individuals are not rewarded for taking risks in communication. Furthermore, communica-
tions addressed to the group as a whole tend to become general and abstractive, less immediate, less personal. Certainly some communications must be addressed to the group as a whole, and all communications are directed toward the group in some way. If A reveals himself, he usually reveals himself to the group as a whole directly (unless his self-revelation is in response to a communication from another member, in which case it is made directly to the other member and indirectly to the entire group). But if B responds to what A has said by addressing the group in general, even in rewarding terms—"Now we are getting somewhere!"—his response is less effective than if he had addressed A directly. In this case the group is best reinforced by A's being reinforced.

Failures in Support

Group members can fail to support one another in a variety of ways. Some of them are listed here.

Cliché or ritualistic support. Our language is filled with socially appropriate cliches expressive of support—"I know how you feel," "Is there anything I can do," "You must feel awful," "I just didn't know," etc.—and they usually abound in sensitivity groups. One of the more disturbing cliches is the "I know just how you feel" followed immediately by "because I..." It is disturbing because the implication is that the authenticity of another's feelings in some way depends upon whether it can be verified in the experience of the one listening to him. This situation at its worst is represented by the person who merely uses the cliche "I know how you feel" in order to divert attention to his own experience. The problem with such ritualistic or "socialized" support is that it simply is not supportive.
We find non-cliche support difficult because it involves emotion—the other's and our own—and we simply are not comfortable with emotion. We find non-cliche support difficult because it involves going out of ourselves to the other. It demands that we lay aside our egocentricity and many of us are not ready to do that. Frequently when we try to express positive emotions in support of one another, we sound phony because we do not trade in these emotions from day to day and we are simply gauche with the unfamiliar. In a sensitivity group it may be more supportive (because it is more honest) if a member were to admit that he is faced by one of the lessons of the Book of Job, that is, that it is fruitless and even inhuman to try to engage in logical and highly "socialized" dialogue with someone who is suffering. If a participant frankly admits his inability to go beyond the cliche for the moment, even this can be refreshingly supportive. In fact, this honest "clearing of the decks" might make attempts at more authentic kinds of support somewhat easier.

Cheap empathy. Some sensitivity-training participants never miss an opportunity to give support, especially to the sufferer. They resemble professional wake-goers, their motto seeming to be: "I am always at your side (in times of disaster)." Such support is ritualistic, triggered by any sign of pain in the other, and seems to be directed toward fulfilling the needs of the one "giving support" rather than the one in need. Actually the one supported is seen as a stereotype, "one-in-pain," "one-needing-my-support," and to the degree that this is true support is not authentic interaction with this person. On the other hand, over-support might be a person's way of manifesting his own need for support or mothering. Support should not
be "mush," even though it may be tender; it should not be sentimental, even though it involves feelings and emotions. It should arise out of the strength of the one who gives support and not out of his weakness. The one who gives authentic support will give support in both adversity and joy, success and failure because support does not mean "propping the other up," it means being "with" him especially when the other reveals or is trying to come to grips with some of the more dramatic dimensions of his life, positive or negative. Lynd (1959) suggests that we overemphasize support-in-adversity: "Scheler points out that the term 'sympathy' is often wrongly confined to pity or compassion. Sympathy with suffering (Mitleid) and sympathy with joy (Mitfreude) are two different things, often confused, and the second is frequently neglected in the study of the first" (p. 236). It takes both strength and skill to support the other because he is the other and not because he is either victim or hero. Only those who are not afraid of universal contact with the other can provide a wide range of support.

The St. Sebastian Syndrome. St. Sebastian was a Christian martyr who was killed, it is reported, by being shot full of arrows. This frequently happens in an analogous way in sensitivity groups. A person tells his "story" and, although it is vaguely sensed by others that support would be an appropriate response, no one knows how to go about such a task. Being unskilled in the art of support, they tend to substitute a caricature: they begin to ask questions to show their "interest," "How do you feel?--When did it happen?--How are things now?--How long has it been going on?"--etc., etc. This keeps the victim in the center of attention of course and does away with the need for real involvement or response. At first (at least this is
zy experience) the victim does not recognize the game: he thinks that the others are actually asking serious questions and he tries to answer them. Then he begins to feel that what is taking place is either out of place, missing the point, or downright ludicrous, but being polite, he still answers the questions for a while (though with less and less enthusiasm). His interlocutors keeping pumping him with arrows (by this time even they are tiring of the game) until he and the interaction die. This caricature of support can also be called the "Is-it-bigger-than-a-breadbox" syndrome both because of the Twenty Questions nature of the game and because such a question frequently seems as "meaningful" as the others being asked. This does not mean that an occasional question cannot be both extremely insightful and deeply supportive, but it must be appropriate, non-ritualistic, sincere, pithy, forceful, and a prelude to a deeper involvement with the other. A question in this vein which is actually quite confronting can be more supportive than all the cliches and vapid questions put together.

Support versus "red-crossing." "Red crossing" is a term that originated, I believe, at Synanon and means "rushing to the aid of a group member like a Red Cross worker." Its connotations are obviously pejorative. Some people cannot stand seeing another in any kind of pain, physical or psychological, even in cases in which the pain is beneficial. For instance, if someone is being confronted in the group in a responsible way and therefore necessarily undergoing the pain associated with the process of confrontation, it is the "red-crosser" who comes to the aid of the confrontee in an effort to "get him off the hook." He does so in a number of different ways: he gives approval to the confrontee's behavior (whether the confrontee approves of his
own behavior or not), he tries to rationalize away the other's guilt or responsibility, gives speeches the burden of which is that "all of us are likewise sinners," and in general tries to show that the person being confronted is an innocent victim needlessly suffering. The "red-croasser" is not at all like the person who intervenes when he believes that the confrontational process has become irresponsible, negative, and profitless in a particular case. This kind of intervention is often needed in sensitivity-groups (less often, I believe, in contract-groups). Needless to say, in the contract-group the "red-croasser" fulfills no useful function.

Silence as failure in support. "They also fail who only sit and wait"—to misuse a line from Milton. A group member once talked about the "hurt" that she felt from the silent members. She did not sense that they were hostile, but she found it difficult to engage in self-disclosure in front of people who willed to remain strangers. Even silence that is perceived as sympathetic is harmful if it is protracted. In the contract-group there should be no silent members; in fact, there cannot be if the contract is being fulfilled.

THE PROBLEMS IN RECEIVING SUPPORT

Even when support is given responsibly and sincerely, there is no guarantee that it is going to be received as it is given. The people who attend sensitivity laboratories come with a wide range of normal problems of living a number of which militate against their being open to even very really human supportive behavior. Some arrive with dependency problems against which they have been struggling. They see themselves as tending to be overly dependent and the resent any kind of behavior in others which can
be interpreted as playing to their dependency needs. Evidently such
counterdependent behavior interferes with their effective involvement with
others. Therefore, if it becomes clear during the interaction of the group
that a participant has been fending off attempts on the part of others to
support him, his behavior should become the object of confrontation. If he
is struggling with dependency, then, if possible, he is to share this problem
with the group, he is to bring it "into community" where it can be handled.
On the other hand, there are those who thrive on attention and uncreative
forms of "support." They are constantly looking for subtle forms of approval.
Ideally, support, at least in the contract-group, should elicit further
contractual behavior from the one who seeks support or to whom support is
actually given. If it does not, if supportive behavior constantly goes "sour"
in the case of any particular participant, the group should take this as
diagnostic and try to get the problem out into the open. Furthermore, if
the members of a group are giving one another support and still find that
little or no progress is being made in effecting a viable climate of trust
(even though there is a generally "pleasant" atmosphere in the group), then
it is time to investigate whether support putatively given is also "support
received." Unfortunately, groups can run a long time on social "pleasantness
and other counterfeits of support. Support-counterfeits are seen for what
they really are by their effects: (1) the tend to make the group comfortable
and the participants tend to lose that edge of anxiety that frequently stirs
up meaningful interaction; (2) contractual behavior diminishes, becomes
emasculated, or disappears entirely.
CONCLUSION

No one and no contract can program the development of a climate of trust and support in a sensitivity-training group. As Gibb (1968) notes, the group, no matter how long it remains in existence, continually discovers new levels of trust and support. The initial reaction of many participants is one of hopelessness: "I could never really entrust myself to you." However, as the group moves forward, even the most timid, encouraged by the risks the other members take, begin to move out into the group. If the contract helps the participants, including the most fearful, to move "into community" more quickly and with a greater degree of psychological safety, that it serves its purpose well.
Chapter IX

Confrontation in Laboratory Training

Introduction

Confrontation is an important "growth" variable both in the laboratory and in life, but it is one that merits careful explanation for a number of reasons. First of all, confrontation-in-caricature is popularly taken as the symbol of laboratory training in general and sensitivity training in particular: "I don't have to attend a laboratory to tell people off and to give them their chance at me." It is true that some laboratory experiences are characterized by irresponsible confrontation, but this is certainly not generally true nor is there any reason why it has to be the case in any given laboratory experience. Laboratories are designed to be growth-experiences, not places where the psyche is laid open to possible destruction. And yet time and again people approach me asking me whether a particular individual should take part in a laboratory experience or whether a laboratory should be allowed to operate at all lest an individual or a group be exposed to psychic harm. Well-run laboratory experiences are no more "dangerous" than group therapy experiences, and I assume that the latter are run for the benefit of the participants. Laboratories have been designed in which all the participants are drawn from a psychiatric population (Morton, 1965) and with apparently excellent results (Johnson, Hanson, Rothaus, Morton, Lyle, & Moyer, 1965). Other laboratories prefer to exclude those with more severe problems in living (the NTL literature specifically states that its laboratories are not designed as therapy sessions). If confrontation is responsible, that is, proportioned to both the laboratory design and popula-
tion, then it will be a powerful force for growth.

Secondly, confrontation as a therapy-variable or as a modality of mature human interaction has received practically no theoretical attention in the literature (Douds, Berenson, Carkhuff, & Pierce, 1967), and controlled research in this area has just begun (e.g., Berenson & Mitchell, 1968; Berenson, Mitchell, & Lailey, 1968; Berenson, Mitchell, & Moravec, 1968; Boyd & Sisney, 1968; Truax, Fine, Moravec, & Millis, 1968). Confrontation is another one of those "therapy-variables" that is therapeutic because it is a fully human and growthful kind of interaction; it receives no mystic baptism because it is associated with therapy. Douds, Berenson, Carkhuff, & Pierce (1967) suggest that life itself "without confrontation is directionless, passive, and impotent" (p. 172). One of the reasons why confrontation seems necessary for full human living is what might be called the "bias" nature of man: man, when unchallenged, tends to drift towards extremes, he becomes either too much "for" himself (Anderson, 1964) or too much "against" himself (Reik, 1949). Or he merely drifts into the "psychopathology of the average," which, given his potentialities, is also an extreme. The mature man is one who has learned to challenge himself and his own behavior; is always looking for more productive ways to be and interact with others. But, since he is really mature, when he fails to challenge himself, he is grateful when his friends (and perhaps even his enemies) are concerned enough to confront him.

Confrontation, then, has its place first of all in all mature human interaction, and, because it is a modality of mature living, it also belongs both in interactions which attempt to explore human potentialities and deal
with the "psychopathology of the average" (training laboratories) and in interactions designed to come to grips with more serious problems in living (psychotherapy). It is not strange to find confrontation in therapy and other interpersonal-growth experiences, rather it is strange that "normal" men make such limited and ineffectual use of such a powerful growth variable.

Confrontation, psychoanalysis, and client-centered counseling. Douds, Berenson, Carkhuff, & Pierce (1967) note the general failure of the "psychotherapies" to deal with the issue of confrontation: "Confrontation, as life, continues independently of all therapeutic models. With the possible exception of the existentialists, none of the major systems leaves room for the concept of confrontation: the existentialists alone approach confrontation by their concept of 'encounter'" (p. 170). Many of the therapies in existence today have been directly or indirectly, but still deeply, influenced by both the psychoanalytic tradition and, at least in the United States, the non-directive approach. Non-directive approaches, by definition, eliminate direct confrontation and the therapies that have been influenced by the psychoanalytic tradition have stressed insight rather than action (see London, 1964). Douds and his associates (1967) believe that the absence of confrontation in therapy has produced a rather exsanguinated therapeutic culture; they refer to the "middle-class" therapy "which hopes to seduce the illness away" (p. 171). With regard to the non-directive tradition, however, perhaps we have come full circle in a spiral of growth. In Hegelian terms, the thesis would be therapy as advice-giving, therapy in which the therapist took over the direction of the other's life, therapy that was too heavy-handed, robbing the client of his freedom to grow. In the main the non-directive approach
became the antithesis to such a tradition and stressed total acceptance and empathy, the ability to get into the "world" of the client. The synthesis, the beginnings of which are being felt today, finds a place in therapy for responsible confrontation, but in an atmosphere of unconditional positive regard and empathy.

Confrontation and other therapies. Although theoretically few writings deal directly and separately with confrontation as a therapy variable, this does not mean that therapies in which confrontation plays a key if not central role do not exist. Synanon and Daytop Village (Casriel, 1962; Maslow, 1967; Patton, 1967; Shelly & Bassin, 1965; Yablonsky, 1965) have been using confrontational "encounters" as an important part of their total institutional program; and it is with some frequency that those participating in the program are called to task because they are "talking the talk but not walking the walk," that is, their behavior is lagging behind Daytop & Synanon expectations. Alcoholics Anonymous groups have long been confronting what they call the "stinkin' thinkin" of members who try to rationalize and excuse their behavior. Mainord (1968a, 1968b) and Mowrer (Mowrer, 1967; Drakeford, 1967) have for years now been using contractual approaches to therapy in which contract-oriented confrontation plays a major role. For instance, Mainord suggests the following dialogue to indicate how his patients are held to the contract:

Patient A: How did you get along sexually?
Patient B: Not very well.
Patient A: What do you mean?
Patient B: I'd rather not talk about that--it gives me this terrible feeling just to think about it.
Therapist: Your agreement was to be completely honest, and that withholding information was to be considered dishonest.
You didn't agree to be honest only when it felt good, if you'll remember (1968b, p. 1).

Ellis (1962) uses logic, reasoning, suggestions, persuasion, and prescription of activities in his rational-emotive psychotherapy, all of which contain a large element of confrontation:

TH: Let's get back to changing John. Would it be so terrible if you got refused, even by a girl you didn't know that there was a good chance beforehand she was going to refuse you, and you didn't know at all what was going to be? Or would it be so terrible if you gradiosely didn't get exactly what you wanted without any effect and without their selecting you?
PT: No, it, uh, it wouldn't be bad. This I, you know, I, this I can logically believe this.
TH: At times.
PT: Yeah, at times.
TH: But most of the time, more strongly, you still believe the other things... (Patterson, 1966, pp. 128-129).

Bach (1966) conducts "Marathon" groups according to rules which demand a kind of total confrontation or what he calls "constructive aggression" (p. 998). The ordinary rules of tact are suspended for the duration of the Marathon. Stoller (1968b) also outlines a kind of marathon therapy in which confrontation plays an important part. Beier (1966) has written on the use of the "asocial" response as a means used by the therapist to free himself from the "games" of his client and to confront the client with what he is really saying or implying. Corsini's (1968) "immediate therapy" is a form of group therapy in which both self-confrontation in community and confrontation by others play a central role. The existentialists (e.g., Frankel, 1962; May, 1958, 1961; May & van Kaam, 1963; van Kaam, 1962) place such emphasis on the client's "possibilities" and on his freedom and responsibility that confrontational encounters between patient and therapist are inevitable.
The list of those who use confrontation as one of their therapeutic tools could, I am sure, be lengthened considerably, but the point here is that confrontation is not new to therapy just as it is not new to life (Plato long ago said that the unexamined life is not worth living, and the unchallenged life tends to be the unexamined life). Moreover, there is a good deal of informal experimentation with confrontation taking place both in therapy and in laboratory-training situations. As a powerful element of human interaction, it can both stimulate personal and interpersonal growth and it can cause extensive harm. In inept hands it becomes the tool of the user's own deficits and pathology. On the other hand, when used responsibly, it becomes another avenue of involvement with and concern for the other. What follows is an attempt to describe confrontation and its caricatures and to indicate some of its uses in a variety of growth-group experiences.

Toward a Description of Confrontation. Berne (1966) defines confrontation in terms of his transactional system:

In confrontation the therapist uses information previously elicited and specified, in order to disconcert the patient's Parent, Child, or contaminated Adult by pointing out an inconsistency. The patient is stirred up and his psyche is thrown out of balance, and this tends to cause a redistribution of cathexis.

To the patient's Child, a confrontation may represent a Parental move in a game that stimulates defensive operations learned early in life. To his Adult it may represent an intellectual challenge for which he is grateful ("I never noticed that before"). To his Parent it may represent an incursion on Parental authority. (p. 235).

Confrontation, therefore, has the purpose of ending a "game" type of interaction, but if it is not reacted to properly, it becomes a stimulus for further game-involvement. Douds and his associates (1967) describe confron-
tation in a way that is more adaptable to the needs of a sensitivity-group:

Direct confrontation is an act, not a reaction. It is initiated by the therapist, based on his core understanding of the client. It brings the client into more direct contact with himself, his strengths and resources, as well as his self-destructive behavior. The purpose of confrontation is to reduce the ambiguity and incongruities in the client's experiencing and communication. In effect, it is a challenge to the client to become integrated; that is, one with his own experience. It is directed at discrepancies within the client (his ideal versus real self); between what the client says and does (insight and action); and between illusion and reality (the therapist's experience of the client versus the client's expression of his experience of himself and the therapist). The therapeutic goal is nondestructive and emerging unity within the client. It implies a constructive attack upon an unhealthy confederation of miscellaneous illusions, fantasies, and life avoidance techniques in order to create a reintegration at a higher level of health (p. 171).

This is the kind of confrontation that people engage in who are concerned about one another.

The measurement of confrontation in research. Berenson and his associates (Berenson, Mitchell, & Laney, 1968; Berenson, Mitchell, & Moravec, 1968) have distinguished five "major" types of confrontation for the purpose of research:

Five major types of confrontation were employed: Experiential, Didactic, Strength, Weakness and Encouragement to Action.... Experiential confrontation was defined as the therapist's specific response to any discrepancy between patient and therapist's experiencing of the patient, or to any discrepancy between patient statement about himself and patient's inner experience of himself, or to say discrepancy between patient and therapist's experience of the therapist. A didactic confrontation was defined as the therapist's direct clarification of the patient's misinformation or lack of information. This type of confrontation may include the therapist's efforts to offer the patient information based on test data, behavior, or data about some aspect of the world as well as details about the therapist or the structure and function of the therapy process. Confrontation of Strength referred to an experiential confrontation which focused on the patient's resources. Weakness referred to an experiential confrontation which focused on the patient's
liabilities or pathology. Finally, Encouragement to Action involved the therapist pressing the patient to act on his world in some constructive manner and discouraging a passive stance toward life. Frequency and type of confrontation were accepted only when the two independent judges agreed upon both presence and type of confrontation (Berenson, Mitchell, & Laney, 1968, pp. 111-112).

In a sense, then, there are only three types, for Strength and Weakness are both subdivisions of Experiential confrontation. Results seem to indicate that "high-level" therapists use "experiential" confrontation more frequently, while "low-level" therapists tend to confront the client's weaknesses (however, confrontation of weakness is defined in the article as a kind of "experiential" confrontation). Whether these are the categories which will eventually prove most helpful in research remains to be seen, but certainly a much clearer theoretical discussion of the bases for classification is needed at the present time.

Truax and his associates (Truax, Fine, Moravec, and Millis, 1968) have studied the effects of therapist persuasive potency in individual psychotherapy. A therapist is high in persuasive potency if during an interview he "is the kind of person that communicates a socially influential or potent person" (p. 360--again, a clearer operational definition of "persuasive potency" would have made this article more meaningful). The results suggested that therapist persuasiveness operates to effect patient improvement somewhat independently of other personal qualities of the therapist (specifically his level of accurate empathy and nonpossessive warmth for the patient) (p. 362). I would hypothesize that there is some positive relationship between therapist "persuasive potency" and his ability to engage in growthful confrontation. Indeed the relationship between persuasion (see Frank, 1961)
and confrontation in therapy and other growth experiences is an intriguing one, but little can be said until more effective operational definitions for and measurement of both persuasion and confrontation have been devised and research has been carried out. I would now like to dissect the act of confrontation and suggest ways in which it can become an effective variable in interpersonal growth experiences.

THE ANATOMY OF CONFRONTATION

Generally confrontation takes place (1) when one person (the confronter) either deliberately or inadvertently places some act (2) which causes or directs another person (the confrontee) to advert to, reflect upon, examine, question, or change some particular aspect of his behavior. In other words, some act on the part of the confronter—whether he is aware of it or not—acts as a stimulus to the confrontee and this stimulus-act has a specific effect on the confrontee: it challenges him, "pulls him up short," directs him to reflect upon or change some aspect of his behavior (behavior, that is, in wide sense: overt acts, inaction, attitudes, moods, etc.). I believe that confrontation must be described or defined as generally as this if it is to include all behavior that is referred to in the literature as confrontational. Moreover, if it is defined this generally, it becomes quite easy to see that there are many different forms (both growthful and destructive) and many different degrees of confrontation. It is extremely important for sensitivity-training participants to understand the nature of confrontation and to become acquainted with the different forms it can take, for it can be one of the most potent forms of interpersonal behavior and its power should be respected.
At first glance confrontation is a simple process, but it can become extremely complicated because of the variables involved:

(1) the nature of the stimulus act;
(2) the natural "bias" of the confronter;
(3) the relationship between the confronter and the confrontee;
(4) the motivation of the confronter;
(5) the manner in which the confrontation takes place;
(6) the effect which the stimulus act has on the confrontee;
(7) the manner in which the confrontee responds to the confrontation.

Each of these elements of the confrontational process merits separate consideration.

(1) The nature of the stimulus act: the forms of confrontation.

A wide variety of act, both verbal and nonverbal, may have a confrontational effect upon any particular person. If the confronter realizes or suspects that some act that he places will have a confrontational effect on someone else, then he is deliberately engaging in the modality of confrontation. However, if he merely places an act which \textit{de facto} has some confrontational effect which he neither foresaw or intended, then the confrontation is not deliberate. It is evident that group members should become as aware as possible of the effects of the acts they place, for \textit{indeliberate} (and thus uncontrolled) confrontation can be destructive. A review of some of the kinds of stimulus-acts that can have confrontational effects is a starting point for making confrontation a more rational process.

Confrontation can take place through a variety of stimulus acts. The following are the confrontational stimuli dealt with in this chapter:
(a) giving the confrontee information he does not possess or is considered to possess in an adequate way;
(b) interpretation of the confrontee's behavior;
(c) directly challenging the other's behavior;
(d) self-involvement of confronter with confrontee as a mode of confrontation;
(e) group situational variables which are considered confrontational, e.g., group exercises, the contract itself in a contract group, being with strangers, etc.;
(f) "processing," that is, group self-criticism;
(g) withdrawal of reinforcement;
(h) the use of videotape.

Each of these will be taken up in order.

(a) **Confrontation through information.** One of the basic forms of confrontation is to transmit to another some information concerning his person. Again such information transmission may or may not be deliberate and it may not be foreseen that it will have a confrontational effect. One way of illustrating this process is by means of the "Johari Window" (Luft & Ingham, 1955), which we have already seen in Chapter VII. (See Figure 1). Each quadrant of the "window" is defined by its coordinates. Therefore, Quadrant II (blind area) involves those things which a person does not know (at least in some sense of "know") about himself but which are known by at least some others. In confrontation through information the confronter moves some kind of information that has some relationship to the confrontee from Quadrant II into Quadrant I. By the very fact that one man
Figure I

**SELF**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Known to self</th>
<th>Not known to self</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.</strong></td>
<td><strong>II.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of free activity</td>
<td>Blind area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III.</strong></td>
<td><strong>IV.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoided or hidden area</td>
<td>Area of unknown activity</td>
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Figure IX:1. The Johari Window.
"outside" another he has a view of the other of which the other is meta-
physically incapable. In this sense, those that surround us are, at least
potentially, valuable sources of information about our own persons, for they
have sources of evidence that are not directly available to us.

If confrontation were merely a question of the transmission of correct
and meaningful information by a concerned observer to a willing listener in
order that the latter might engage in and grow through self-examination and
subsequent behavioral change, then everything would be simple indeed. In
reality, however, such simplicity has to be learned: it is a goal rather
than a starting point. In confrontation-through-information, there are a
number of important variables: the nature of the information transmitted
(its veridical status and/or hypothetical character), the person (confronter,
confrontee, or other) to whom it principally refers, the fact as to whether
or not the seriousness of the information, and the differential meaning the
information has for confronter, confrontee, and the other members of the
group. Since these factors influence the quality of the confrontation, they
must be taken into consideration.

A third set of statements deals with the interpretations of behavioral
cues emitted by the confrontee. These will be dealt with below under
"interpretations."

Does the confrontee already possess this information or not? If the
confrontee suspects or knows that what he has to say is already known by
the confrontee, then he should weigh the consequences of telling someone
what he already knows. For instance, if he says to another participant:
"You have not said a word here this evening," undoubtedly the other already
realizes this. If the information is already known, then the confronter should manifest his intent in repeating it; for instance, he should explain how he feels about the other's silence and why he has interrupted it.

Usually the confronter assumes that what he has to say is "unknown" to the other in some sense of the word "unknown." For instance, the confronter may think that the information, though known, bears repeating, that it should be brought "into community," that repeating it here and now would have a specific effect, that it needs to be dramatized, etc. In this case he assumes that the confrontee does not "know" the information well enough to act upon it, that is, the information is "unknown" in the sense that it has either made little impression on the confrontee or has not had any behavioral consequences. On the other hand, if the confronter realizes that it is most likely that the confrontee simply does not possess the information that he is about to transmit, then he should first weigh the consequences of his act, its surprise or "shock" value, the impact it will have on the group, etc. In other words, the confronter should have a healthy respect for the power of knowledge and use it reasonably.

The importance of the information and its differential meaning to confronter and confrontee. "Your tie is crooked" is a relatively unimportant piece of information, while "You have bad breath" or "I notice that John never sits close to you" might be relatively more important. The seriousness or the objective importance of a piece of information will usually determine its impact on the group as a whole, including the confrontee, but still at times the subjective meaning of any particular bit of information might differ greatly with respect to confronter, confrontee, or any other member of the
group. For instance, if the confronter says, "Your tie is crooked," this might be accepted by the confrontee and the group as a whole with a certain amount of indifference, but the point is that a crooked tie on this particular person might bother the confronter quite a bit. On the other hand, the confrontee might be particularly sensitive to information that is relatively meaningless to confronter and the group as a whole. The intelligent and considerate confronter is one who can judge not only the absolute importance of any piece of information but its relative importance to the confrontee and to the others. If there is a good deal of discrepancy between the objective importance of what the confronter has to say and its subjective meaning to him, it might be best if he were to lay the entire problem before the group: "You know, your tie is crooked and that has been bothering me. I tend to be compulsive, I know, but I really think it bothers me because it is your tie that is crooked. I think that I have something to work out with you." This keeps the real issue before the group. Furthermore, if the confronter suspects that there is a good deal of discrepancy between the objective importance of the information and the subjective meaning it has for the confrontee, he will have to decide what constructive use may be made of the information.

(b) Interpretation as a stimulus-act. Interpretation of the behavior of another as a mode of confrontation is a two-edged sword: it can either be a powerful stimulus to fruitful self-examination or it can lead to irrelevant and meaningless speculation and be utilized as a means of flight by an individual and by an entire group. If interpretations are nothing more than detached intellectualized exercises on the part of the confronter, then he is playing "psychiatrist" in a game of "psychiatry," the purpose of the game
being to avoid intimacy. Interpretation as a game is at best an exercise in
logic; at worst it is a destructive form of manipulation of the other. On
the other hand, interpretation, if carried out with skill, integrity, and
empathy, can be a powerful stimulus to growth.

Theoretically interpretation leads to insight and insight is supposed
to be some kind of key to better psychological living. This point of view,
however, is currently being strongly challenged:

As for goals of therapy, the actionists allege that Insight
therapists delude themselves and at their worst, defraud
society, by claiming to sell self-knowledge, for this is what
practically nobody comes to them to buy. Even knowing that
their clients seek relief, not information, they stock their
bazaars with certificates their license dispensation of a
balm they do not have. Face to face with customers, they then
produce a diagram of illness and a blueprint for repair, both
always the same—they say he suffers from illusions that must
dissipate when once he knows himself. Chief among them, and
most illusory of all—he thinks that what he thinks is his
trouble really is his trouble. Almost by sleight of mind,
the sufferer's surface troubles are made secondary, and the
rationalization with which the therapist diverted his attention
from them to begin with, launches him on his introspective
voyage, and perhaps keeps him there forever—for when does a

London goes on to maintain that the Action therapists, too, have their
problems and suggests a combination of the best of both action and insight
might be the road that therapy must travel. Douds, Berenson, Carkhuff, and
Pierce (1967) also have problems with insight as a vehicle of growth and
suggest that too often it leads to psychological paralysis:

In his helplessness and confusion [the client] seeks therapy.
More often than not, he receives insight in the form of a
conceptual integration of himself. He may choose insight as a
way of life, a culturally higher, secondary goal. Insight may,
seemingly, reduce confusion by subsuming the conceptualizations
he has about himself in a neater package, allowing him the
illusory belief of being "on the top of his problems,"—he can
now explain his anxiousness on high level terms. Victimized by a wishful need for a magic solution, he accumulates insights based on his reactions to different people and situations, hoping for THE ULTIMATE INSIGHT which will be an answer to everything. Still paralyzed to act, he remains dependent and passive, noticeably lacking action and directionality in his existence (pp. 172-173).

Insight gives the client an "out," a way to not-deal with his behavior. Insight in the sense in which it is under attack here deals principally with cognitive systems and the relationships between cognitive systems. The problem is that in the client cognitive systems and behavior are in separate compartments. The critics of insight might well paraphrase Kierkegaard's criticism of Hegel and say to the client: "Your insights are beautiful castles; too bad you do not live in them."

However, this does not mean that insight and the interpretations which "produce" insight are useless in and of themselves. Interpretations as therapeutic variables are certainly prone to certain defects: they are too often presented as facts instead of hypotheses and they frequently come as packaged answers to questions instead of stimuli designed to goad the confrontee into finding his own answers. Moreover the focus of interpretation has been the dynamics underlying behavior, the hypothetical sources of behavior, rather than behavior itself. But, in the final analysis, both interpretation and insight are valuable to the degree that they lead to constructive behavioral modification:

A comprehensive psychotherapy of the kind implied by this argument would be one that uses both insight and action to attack complex psychological problems. But insight, within this system, would no longer focus so much on motives as on those behaviors, present and historical, that produced disorder by violating one's relationship with the functional context that lends meaning to one's life. And its primary
purpose, once achieved, would be to steer the development of a new action system, one which channels the individual's behavior in ways intended to restore his functioning within that context. And the context, the referent that makes the action system meaningful, would be neither the painful symptom, nor the wounded selfhood that may lie beneath it, but something external to the individual. For most such therapies, a social system, real or hypothesized, must provide that context (London, 1964, p. 133).

Effective interpersonal living is the ultimate goal of therapy or any other kind of growth experience and the value of any therapy variable must be judged according to this criterion. Interpretations, then, are valuable to the degree that they are points of departure for growthful action, whether "insight" intervenes or not. An interpretation is "valid" and an "insight" is "meaningful" if the action which follows from it on the part of the confrontee is "growthful," that is, if it leads him to more effective interpersonal relating.

What then can we say about interpretation as the stimulus in an act of confrontation? What antecedent "validity" must it have before it is proffered? Slater (1966) suggests that we need not worry much about the "validity" of an interpretation, because, in a sense, all interpretations are valid:

...[I]n psychotherapy, an interpretation can never be incorrect, unless it is stated comparatively or quantitatively, since human beings are so complex and ambivalent that any statement will be accurate at some level. (This follows from the psychological law that every motive has an equal and opposite contramotive.) From a theoretical viewpoint, the issue is whether it is salient or not; from the practical one it is whether or not it is well timed (p. 162, fn 57).

I cannot agree with his epistemological views concerning interpretation (and I will say why presently), but I am in complete accord that the saliency (which I consider a practical issue) of the interpretation and other variables
associated with the conditions under which it is presented to the confrontee are extremely important. The "goodness" of an interpretation is measured by its positive or growthful impact-value: it must cause the confrontee to examine his concrete behavior, some aspect of his life style, in such a way that he is moved to modify this behavior in ways which improve his ability to involve himself with others. It is only the empathic confronter that can come up with salient interpretations, for he alone is both outside and "inside" the confrontee enough to put his finger on issues that are central to the confrontee's behavior and life-style. Timing, too, is important: the good confronter knows when the confrontee has opened at least enough to receive the full impact of an interpretation. Furthermore, confrontation must be related to the ongoing process of the group and not just appear from nowhere; it should flow from the group experience and be integrated into it. Finally, it should be pithy, the starting point for interaction between the confronter and the confrontee (and the rest of the group) and not a long-winded statement with an air of finality. In general, long-winded speeches in groups, no matter what their "pith and moment" tend to "lose the name of action."

The epistemology of interpretation. Interpretations transmit "information" that is hypothetical, conjectural, inferential: "You know, Bill, I think that you have real sexual hang-ups with women and that maybe you are even latently homosexual." Such a statement is a hypothesis and as such is the conclusion of an inferential process. Since it is a conclusion, it has premises: certain behavioral "cues" emitted by the confrontee and a subjective element, the feelings or "clinical" judgment or insight of the confronter.
For instance, the premises of the hypothesis stated above might have been: "When you talk with the males in the group you are usually animated and interested, but your conversations with the females are guarded, short, and sometimes clip" and other such behavioral observations together with the feelings and "insights" that lead to the confronter's interpretation of the behavioral cues. That is, such hypotheses are inferences based on both fact (the behavior of the confrontee) and feeling (the feelings of the confronter which arise from the impact the confrontee has on him).

Since hypothetical statements arise from the process of clinical inference, it should be remembered that such judgments suffer from all the problems with which the inferential process is plagued. O'Neill (1968) points out the bases of clinical inference and the problems to which each kind of inference is subject: no matter whether one reasons from definitions and categories ("She is obviously schizophrenic"), uses empirical tools of varying accuracy and sophistication ("She has an elevated Pd score. " "There is a poverty of M responses"), engages in interpretation of symbols ("She shows a preference for asparagus"), deals in "causal" explanations of behavior ("He probably has some minimum brain damage," "It is a question of an excessively strong superego"), or uses his own emotional reactions, whatever their integrity or sensitivity, as the basis of his inferences ("I can tell you are ripped up inside," "I feel a tremendous warmth when you talk to me")--whatever the bases of one's inferences, when it is a question of confrontation, it is essential to communicate to the confrontee that one is dealing in inferences and not in self-evident facts. Moreover, the confronter should convey to the confrontee some indication of the degree of certitude he believes
to underlie his hypothesis. The certitude underlying a statement like "You are anxious" will probably differ from the certitude underlying "You are dishonest." Every hypothesis, by definition, falls short of certitude in some way. The "high visibility" of the contract group demands that the confronter give some indication of just how hypothetical his statement is.

The point is this: in the group, facts should be presented as facts, feelings as feelings, and hypotheses as hypotheses. The problem is that too often in sensitivity groups the confronter presents his feelings and his hypotheses abruptly and apodictically as facts concerning the person of the confrontee. As a rule this simply should not take place in the contract group. The contract calls for "high visibility." In this case this means that the confronter should share with the confrontee the bases of his feelings and the premises of his inferences and not wait until they erupt abruptly as "facts" (for they they are really accusations). If the more apodictic "You are arrogant" is preceded by the less apodictic "I feel that you are more or less patronizing me" and "Your tone then was pretty harsh" and "At times you don't seem to give the rest of us much credit," it is likely that there will be more mutual honesty and involvement and less need for destructive sledgehammer-confrontation. If I bring my feelings and my premises "into community" as quickly as possible, then the other person can share in the inferential process and is more likely to accept a reasonable hypothesis concerning his behavior, especially if it contains a realistic suggestion for growth. If the participants are willing to be this open, then at least facts will sound like facts, feelings will sound like feelings, and hypotheses will sound like hypotheses, and failed epistemology will not muddy
the waters of the group experience.

(c) The direct challenge. Although there is an element of challenge in any kind of deliberate confrontation, still the explicit verbal challenge can stand as a specific kind of stimulus-act. In its simplest form the challenge is a suggestion, request, or demand that the confrontee change his behavior in some way: "I don't deny that it might be painful, but maybe it would be more growthful if you were to try to involve yourself with us more," "Do you think that you could honestly answer a few direct questions about our relationship, yours and mine?," "Stop monopolizing the conversation."

Evidently these are examples of bald challenges, whereas most challenges are situated in a much wider context of information, explanation, etc.

The direct challenge as such is neutral, that is, its growth value for the confrontee (and for the group) depends on a number of confronter, confrontee, and situation variables. For instance, the confronter may act for a number of reasons: annoyance, concern for the confrontee, concern for the group or others influenced by the behavior of the confrontee, a feeling that he "should" say something, etc.; he may challenge the confrontee to do something that is growthful or nongrowthful, relevant to the confrontee's needs or irrelevant, possible or impossible; the confrontee may or may not be prepared for the challenge: he may be hurt and not ready to listen, he may be very anxious, etc.; there may or may not be a climate of trust and support strong enough to sustain the kind of challenge made. If the confronter fails to take these variables into consideration, he may end up blowing in the wind, much to his own frustration.

It is usually a mistake if the confronter deals in demands rather than
suggestions and requests when he challenges the behavior of others. Even if he does not intend to play God or omnipotent father, he may give the impression that he is doing so, and this tends to destroy any value that the confrontation might otherwise have. Since no one can predict with absolute certainty whether a change in another's behavior will benefit the other or not, there is always an element of hypothesis in every challenge. Therefore, as in confrontation-through-information, the degree of certitude associated with the hypothesis should dictate the manner in which the challenge is made. If the confrontee's behavior is obviously self-destructive or destructive of those around him, then the challenge can be put quite directly and forcefully. If, on the other hand, the confronter only suspects that a change in behavior will benefit the confrontee or others, the force or the "demand-element" in the challenge must be proportioned to the certitude of the hypothesis underlying the challenge. For instance, whenever a confronter says to a confrontee: "You talk too much here," there are certain hypotheses and attitudes underlying such a challenge, e.g., that the confrontee talks but says nothing, that he monopolizes the time of the group, that he is exhibitionistic, that he prevents other members who want to interact from interacting, etc. Perhaps it would be more realistic to say that no matter how forcefully the confronter challenges the behavior of the confrontee, honesty demands that he deal openly with whatever is implicit in his challenge. If the confronter is willing to do this, he will soon learn whether he tends to challenge others because of his concern for them or because of his own needs.

Calling the other's game. A special and quite effective form of direct challenge consists in "calling the other's game." According to Beier (1966--
a book well worth reading in its entirety), many patients in therapy attempt to "engage" the therapist either by their verbalizations or other communications, that is, they try to get the therapist to play their "game." The patient tries to hide his game under the guise of certain conventions, his real intent lying in subtle cues rather than in the overt message:

Subtle cues are actually the means by which a sender constricts the response outcome. He uses these subtle cues to influence and control another person's responses to his own ends with only a minimal risk of being exposed for his attempts....

In addition to constructing the respondent's possible recognition of his intentions, an individual can, as stated earlier, also hide the meaning of his manipulation from his own awareness. With his subtle hidden cues he can influence the respondent and bid for and provoke certain responses, yet maintain that he is quite innocent, that he really had no share in triggering these response activities....

The mechanism described here allows the sender to 'engage' the respondent and at the same time reduce the possibility of exposing his own intentions. The concept of engagement leads to new observations helpful in the analysis of the communicative process, particularly with reference to understanding certain practices in the psychotherapeutic process (pp. 280-281).

The purpose of "engagement" is to keep the environment as safe as possible:

Vulnerability, then, gives rise to certain preferred behaviors in interaction, which are ways of engaging and involving another person. When carefully analyzed, these messages seem to yield the ideas that made the individual vulnerable in the first place. An individual's preferred modes of interaction are not merely defenses; they are also behaviors that seek out certain responses in the environment. They trigger responses that are safe (as the sender has created an emotional climate in the respondent by which the response activity has been constricted) and apparently are also rewarding. They give the patient the experience that he is still dealing, still 'alive' in the area of his vulnerability (p. 281).

The effective therapist "disengages" himself from the patient's game, affording the latter an opportunity to grow:
The therapist is most effective when he provides disengaged responses that do not reinforce the patient's present behavior. The therapist's responses not only interrupt the patient's expectancies (and in this manner extinguish association) but, being disengaged, are actually designed to give the patient the experience of 'beneficial uncertainty.' This experience provides a challenge to explore new choices in a nonthreatening situation. The patient should experience with the therapist, message by message, that he can tolerate the uncertainty and even utilize if for the discovery of territory previously prohibited to him. He will experience that in this 'sanctuary' he can forgo the dangers and pleasures of being misunderstood, and so his messages will become less discordant.

Through the disengaged response, the therapist trains the patient to give more freedom to the people he encounters (p. 283).

This is one example where withdrawal of reinforcement is an effective mode of confrontation.

The general instrument of "disengagement" is what Beier calls the "asocial" response, a response which indicates a refusal on the part of the therapist to give "conventional" replies to the conventions the patient uses to restrict the therapist's interaction. It is a response that fails to reinforce the patient's expectations. A few samples of such responses will illustrate what is meant:

Patient: I hate you.
Therapist: Go on (p. 51).

Patient: You are sure a quack. I don't think I should come to see you again.
Therapist: To seek help from an ignorant man like myself, this is crazy (p. 53).

A patient who claims she has been raped says: I like you very much, I even dream of you.
Therapist: You want to lie with me on the couch? (p. 61).

Member 1: Nice weather today.
Member 2: Oh, yes, I love a blue sky.
Therapist: And the clouds are just beautiful. And the wind is blowing so sweetly. And the sun is sparkling, bright and
handsome.

Member 1: Let's get going (p. 149).

Patient: You only see me for the money.
Therapist: Why would anyone want to see a fellow like you for anything but money? (p. 60).

The "asocial" response "disengages" the patient, thus placing him in a state of "beneficial uncertainty," but it is a type of growthful uncertainty especially in view of the fact that it takes place in an atmosphere of acceptance and support.

Others suggest a variety of approaches to "catch" patients in their attempts to keep growth at a distance and to ward off constructive interpersonal contacts. Dreikurs (1967) suggests that patients in psychotherapy use their symptoms to cover up their real intentions and he considers one of the goals of the therapeutic process the revelation of the "game": "As Adler pointed out, one of the most effective therapeutic means is 'spitting in the patient's soup.' He can continue what he is doing, but it no longer 'tastes as good'" (p. 230). Ellis (1962) challenges the "illogicalities" to which the patient is addicted and which he (the patient) perpetuates by his verbalizations. Beier claims that although what he proposes may sound like Ellis' rational-emotive therapy, it is really different: "Ellis argues the patient into behaving rationally, while we propose to provide the patient with responses that give him the experience of beneficial uncertainty about his previous expectations. We propose that with the proper, disengaged response by a therapist, the patient is placed in a position where he can make more adequate choices" (p. 55). That is, Beier jolts the client into experiencing his own freedom, while Ellis is much more interested (or more
exclusively interested) in the client's behavioral changes.

What Beier proposes pertains, I would suggest, not just to therapy but to sensitivity training, other growth experiences, and life itself. We would be better off if others were to respond to us "asocially" more often, catch us in our games, pull us up short. Beier (1966, in discussing family group therapy, offers three guidelines for effective confrontation: he suggests that the therapist should intervene (1) when a member says or implies that someone else must change to solve his (the speaker's) problem ("If John would only stop drinking..."), (2) when any member makes a statement which is designed to maintain the past ("Well, this is the way my father was and his before him," "My wife wants me to be more aggressive, but I am what I am, and I can't help it"), and (3) when a member constricts communication by asking "loaded" questions or by giving connotations of which he may not be aware ("We always talk things over, don't we, dear?," "Isn't that the way you have always treated me?"). These kinds of communications always crop up in sensitivity-training groups and they should be challenged, but not just by the leader; in the contract-group all the members agree to challenge such response-restricting communications.

(d) Involvement of self as a stimulus-act. Not every kind of confrontation is an explicit and direct form of confrontation. If a person tries to live up to the implicit contract of any sensitivity-training group or the explicit one of the contract-group, he will take an active role in "contacting" others in various ways, especially through the modalities of the contract, e.g. self-disclosure, expression of feeling, and support. In short, he will reach out to others in attempts to establish varying degrees of intimacy.
Such contact is confronting because intimacy itself is confronting. The person being contacted, the "confrontee," feels himself being reached out to, he feels himself as the object of unconditional positive regard and empathy, he feels the impact of the other's congruence, he experiences the other as a locus of deep feelings and emotions. But in many ways he is probably not used to such behavior, especially such focused behavior, and it "pulls him up short," it makes him take stock of himself, it makes him reach for responses that are not usually at hand. Intimacy in our culture is almost bound to have a confrontational effect, especially when it is set in sharp focus through the experiences of the laboratory. Since these indirect forms of confrontation can be as strong or even stronger than more direct forms such as challenges of the other's behavior, the participants should be as aware as possible of the impact their behavior is having on the other. Some of the conflicts which arise in the laboratory stem from the fact that a participant's whole mode of behavior has been confrontational without his realizing it. For instance, the way a participant interacts with another may place the other under extreme emotional pressure. If this is the case and it is not sensed by the confronter, then the confrontee or someone else should advert to what is happening: "John, you are making tremendous emotional demands on me right now, and I do not think that I can reply to them at this time or under these conditions." Indirect forms of confrontation have the same effects, generally speaking, as more direct forms and should be pursued in the same way.

(e) **Group situation variables as confrontational.** Certain aspects of the laboratory experience itself are designed to have a confrontational
effect on the participant. In the contract group the contract itself is an instrument of confrontation: it outlines a rather demanding set of interpersonal behaviors and usually sends the prospective participant searching into himself to see if he has the resources necessary to engage in such behaviors. The fact that a certain degree of intimacy is demanded in any sensitivity-training group is confronting enough, but this is compounded by the fact that the participant finds himself in a "stranger-group": he does not choose his bedfellows. As he looks around the group, it is as if each of the other participants were saying: "Here I am; you have to deal with me."

It is not that any of the participants verbalizes or even conceptualizes such a challenge, rather each is the challenge by his very being. The verbal and nonverbal exercises used to stimulate communication in the group constitute another source of confrontation. The participant finds himself touching others or looking at others without using words, and such focusing in on relatively molecular aspects of the interactional process is foreign to him and as such places its own set of demands on him. One commonly used exercise, called prescription, is directly confrontational. If this exercise is used, then somewhere towards the middle of the "life" of the group each member takes his turn leaving the group while the others work out a "prescription" for him, that is a set of suggestions for improving the quality of his interpersonal living. When he returns to the group, the prescription is presented to him and he can use it, if he wants, as a basis for further experimentation in the group. These are just a few of the group variables that can have a confrontational effect; whether they do not depend on how they are perceived by the individual participant.
(f) Processing as a group mode of self-confrontation. "Processing" is a very useful form of group interaction. After the participants have been interacting for a while, the interaction is stopped and the members "process" what has been taking place, that is, they try to examine the nature of the interaction and answer such questions as: "What have we been doing here? How have we been interacting with one another? Who has been interacting with whom? What have been our communication blocks? Who has been active? Who has been silent? Which participants have assumed leadership roles? Who has been bored? Processing gives the group an opportunity to be its own critic. The members receive a kind of "cultural permission," as it were, to stand outside themselves and act as critics of their own behavior. Remarks made during this period are not taken as "critical" in a negative sense, because responsible criticism is the very meaning of this processing interlude. Very often because of this cultural permission participants will find themselves saying things that they simply had not been able to say during the group interaction itself: "We have really been beating the air," "John, I think you wanted to get us going, but you really monopolized the situation," "Bill, I am not so sure now that I was really honest with you," "I think we showed how really afraid of self-disclosure we are," "I was just too anxious to say anything." In the early stages of the group life, processing is something that stands "outside" the regular interaction of the group. This gives the members an opportunity to realize that self-criticism can be quite constructive. Gradually, however, the members learn to incorporate processing into the regular group interaction itself. Until this is possible, processing periods provide excellent opportunities for groups to confront themselves,
to admit and frankly examine the modes of flight which individuals and the
group as a whole have been utilizing, and to do so without arousing
intolerable anxiety.

(g) Withdrawal of reinforcement as confrontational. As seen above,
Beier's "asocial" response is one that fails to reinforce certain behaviors
that are seen as nongrowthful. Other such withdrawals of reinforcement in
sensitivity groups can also serve as stimuli with confrontational effects.
For instance, the person who uses humor to flee intimacy or interrupt inter­
actions which are uncomfortable for him is reinforced in such behavior when
others laugh. Tension dissipates and uncomfortable issues are sidetracked.
A refusal to reinforce such behavior, that is, a refusal to laugh and/or
abandon an uncomfortable issue, is confrontational. Another example is the
non-involving monologue: if group participants tend to deliver monologues
which prevent mutual interaction, then passive attentiveness will be an
effective reinforcer. Confrontation in this case means interrupting and
engaging the speaker. Part of the "processing" of group interaction should
consist in pointing out the ways in which unproductive forms of behavior in
the group are reinforced and in determining effective ways of withdrawing
such reinforcement. If the participants fail to support a- or anti-contractual
behavior, the group will become less diffuse and more productive.

(h) Videotape as a vehicle of confrontation. Since about 1960 an
increasing amount of research has taken place in which attempts have been
made to alter the behavior of psychiatric patients by confronting them with
photographs, movies, or videotape recordings of their appearance and behavior
(e.g. Boyd & Sisney, 1967; Cornelison & Arsenian, 1960; Kagan, Krathwohl, &
This technique has also been used with cardiac patients (Verwoerd, Nowlin, & Agnello, 1965) and in the training of counselors and psychotherapists (Schiff & Reivich, 1964; Walz & Johnston, 1963). Boyd and Sisney (1967), using videotape playbacks, found that "interpersonal concepts of the self, the ideal self, and the public self became less pathological and less discrepant with one another following the self-image confrontation" (p. 291). One of the primary advantages of feedback by videotape is its objectivity, its "cleanness." The confrontee is confronted by himself, and, since he cannot charge bias, rationalizations are relatively useless. Furthermore, the confrontee sees his behavior in context, he gets a view of the molar realities of his interaction which ordinarily escape him. He can more readily see those aspects of his behavior which elicit what Stoller (1968) calls "discrepant" feedback, that is, response to his behavior other than what he believed he would receive. I find that immediate playback of the tape tends to have the greatest impact value, for, as Rogers (1968) notes, "the closeness in time to the behavior that has just happened makes it difficult to disown what has occurred" (p. 38). In time, videotape feedback should become one of the most potent sources of confrontation in both individual and group therapy and in laboratory-training experiences.

(2) The natural "bias" of the confronter.

A second factor to be noted in the confrontation process is the possible "bias" of the confronter. If the confronter merely by the fact that he is not the other, by the fact that he stands "outside" the other, is in a metaphysical position to know the others in ways that are not available to the
latter, it is also true that his "separateness" is a source of bias. The information which he feeds to the other is processed through the subjective filtering systems (e.g. the philosophical, value, and natural psychological systems) of the confronter and takes on the latter's "color." Though this bias can be minimized (and this depends in large part on how close the confronter is to his own experiencing), it cannot be avoided altogether. Therefore, both confronter and confrontee should be aware of this phenomenon, for it is another source of possible error in the confrontational process. Even when the stimulus-act does not consist of information, interpretations, or direct challenges on the part of the confronter but rather in the emotional impact which he has on the confrontee, the confrontation may still be quite biased. The confronter's emotions are real, but they are not necessarily realistic. He may "confront" by expressing anger toward someone who really did nothing to provoke it (that is, he may be projecting the anger he feels toward himself). In such cases his emotions are "biased" (in some sense of the word) and thus the confrontee cannot be expected to respond as if he had actively provoked these emotions. In general, confronter bias should be controlled by group members other than the confrontee, for the latter should be as open as possible to constructive confrontation. But this very openness makes him less sensitive to sources of confrontational "error." The others, therefore, are in a better position to pick up elements of bias and deal with them openly.

(3) The relationship between the confronter and the confrontee.

Both the long-range and the ad hoc aspects of this relationship affect the quality of the confrontational process. Confronter and confrontee might
love, hate, or be indifferent or neutral toward each other, or the relationship might be a confused or muddied one, marked by an admixture of feelings, conscious and semi-conscious, strong and weak, positive and negative. Moreover, such feelings may be mutual or one-sided. But even though the confroner loves the confrontee, at the moment of confrontation he might be acting from some lesser motive such as pique, jealousy, momentary irritation, etc. On the other hand, a confroner who generally dislikes another might rise above his feelings and engage in an act of concerned, growthful confrontation. In the contract group the participants are asked to be as aware as possible of their relationship to those they confront including the quality of the relationship at the moment of confrontation. If the confroner has really done nothing to establish a relationship between himself and the confrontee or if he has even rejected overtures of friendship on the part of the confrontee, this is evidently going to affect the dynamics of confrontation. There is some research evidence that corroborates what seems to be a "common sense" observation: the behavior of liked persons is seen in a more favorable light than the behavior of disliked persons even when this perception is not accurate (Berkowitz, 1956, 1957; Horowitz, Lyons, & Perlmutter, 1951; Sherif, White, & Harvey, 1955). The responsible participant will first of all be aware of the quality of his relationships and then try to rectify whatever bias might exist in his perceptions. An ideal atmosphere for confrontation is one in which the quality of the relationships is "highly visible." This means a group culture in which members know where they stand in relationship to one another because these relationships have been dealt with "in community." It is evident, then, that confrontations that take place early in the group will often center
around clarifying relationships ("We have really never spoken to each other, so I'm not sure where I stand"). The more "real" relationships within the group are, that is the more frank, open, and motivated by concern they are, the greater the chance of eliminating some of the natural "bias" factors mentioned above.

(4) **The motivation of the confrontee.**

An analysis of the motivation underlying confrontation has two distinct dimensions: (a) the purpose or function of an act of confrontation in itself and (b) the motivation of the confronter. Ideally a high degree of correlation will exist between these two dimensions, that is, the confronter will choose to confront because of the growth-functions he sees inherent in an act of responsible confrontation. These two dimensions, however, are separable, and the confronter can choose to confront out of motives that are less than ideal.

(a) **The purpose of an act of confrontation.** In general, confrontation is just one more modality of interpersonal contact and as such stems, ideally, from a desire on the part of the confronter to involve himself more deeply with the confrontee. The term confrontation when used in the context of international politics connotes a stand-off, a refusal to yield, an impasse, an irreducible separateness on the part of the nations involved. However, confrontation, as used in the context of growth experiences, has the opposite connotation: an act of constructive confrontation is an attempt on the part of one person to involve himself with another, it is a way of expressing his concern, a way of showing the confrontee that he is "for" him. Confrontation is a way of "being with" rather than "being against" the other, even though
the confrontee might disagree strongly with the confrontee. In the contract group, then, the rule is simple: do not confront if you do not intend to involve yourself with the other. The person who confronts in such a way that he either does not want or fails to exhibit concern or a willingness to become involved with the confrontee is actually an intruder. Since the intruder merely wants to get "inside" the other for some reason or another without fostering any kind of mutuality, it is hypothesized here that such intrusive presence is inimical to interpersonal growth and is to be avoided in sensitivity groups.

The direct purpose of an act of confrontation is not to change the behavior of the other but to create a situation in which it becomes possible for him to change his behavior. Confrontation is an invitation to the other to engage in self-examination. The confrontee, then, invites the confrontee "into community" to reflect on his behavior—whether the "community" be a dyad or a larger group. The purpose of confrontation is not to restrict the other but to free him. The confrontee, then, is given an opportunity—in an atmosphere of trust and security—to step back from his behavior in order to see it in a different light and from a different viewpoint, that is, as it strikes others. It is possible, then, that he will be challenged to consider perhaps more fruitful or at least less destructive modes of behavior or to take a longer look at the human "possibilities" that are in and around him, but he will grow only if he chooses from these possibilities. Another way of saying this is that one of the purposes of confrontation is to bring the confrontee into more direct contact with his own experiencing. Gendlin (1962) suggests that a person need not be forced to live with the "introjected" values.
of alienated man. Rather, through therapy or some other growth experience, he can become psychologically "open," that is, he can learn to trust his own experience and use it as a direct referent and source of wisdom. Rogers (1964) develops the same theme:

Most importantly [in therapy], he can begin with much difficulty at first, to sense and to feel what is going on within him, what he is feeling, what he is experiencing, how he is reacting. He uses his experiencing as a direct referent to which he can turn in forming accurate conceptualizations and as a guide to his behavior.... As his experiencing becomes more and more open to him, as he is able to live more freely in the process of his feelings, then significant changes begin to occur in his approach to values (p. 20).

Confrontation, then, becomes a way of inviting the other to become himself more fully.

Another way of looking at confrontation is to see it as an instrument which might help the other reduce the amount of "cognitive dissonance" (Festinger, 1957) in his life. One way of reducing such dissonance is to tailor reality to one's own inner needs, and there is an extensive (though hardly unchallenged) literature suggesting that such "tailoring" is quite common among men. Confrontation offers the possibility of realistic resolution to dissonant cognitions. For instance, as Newcomb (1963) points out, there is a very strong tendency to assume that one's highest ranked associates on a scale of preference return the compliment, however unwarranted such an assumption might be. Furthermore, the ability to judge the attraction of others toward oneself does not become more accurate with increasing acquaintance. Now, if I think that another has more interest in me than he really has, I may try to ignore whatever cues he emits which would indicate disinterest. On the other hand, I could try to make sure where I really stand with
him, realizing that positive regard is not always reciprocated. Concerned mutual confrontation, then, though it sometimes risks being painful, is a powerful tool for the reduction of dissonance. In the contract group the participants are asked to share this kind of openness with one another, establishing a group culture that is as dissonance-free as possible. Responsible confrontation goes far in making reality the measure of one's thinking instead of one's thinking the measure of reality.

(b) The motives of the confronter. Ideally the confronter engages in confrontation for the reasons listed above: he involves himself with the confrontee so that they might grow together. However, he may engage in confrontation for more idiosyncratic and less growthful reasons: to relieve his boredom, to ward off confrontation from himself ("the best defense is a good offense"), to punish the confrontee or the entire group, to take flight by engaging the group in "game" behavior, to relieve his own frustration and anxiety, to fulfill a need to dominate, etc. Moreover, his motivation might be mixed, that is, he might confront for a variety of reasons, both good and bad. Although it would be an exercise in futility if the confronter himself or the group as a whole were to try to unravel the confronter's entire motivational skein, still it is useful for the participants to realize that confrontational behavior, like most human behavior, is multi-determined, multi-motivated. However, if, as far as the confronter is able to determine, his personal motives are in general agreement with the purpose of confrontation in the group, then he need not worry about ancillary motives. However, if he or the group suspects that ancillary motives are quite important or even predominate, then "high visibility" demands that he qualify his confrontation
"I may well be biased in my remarks because John and I have never gotten along") or, if he fails to do so, that his remarks be challenged by the other participants.

(5) The manner of confrontation.

Confrontation implies some kind of separateness, some kind of "gap" between confronter and confrontee which the former, for one reason or another, desires or feels impelled to close. His reasons for doing so, as we have seen, can either enhance or vitiate the act of confrontation. However, good motivation is not enough, for even the well-motivated confronter may do so in such a way as to thwart the desirable effects of confrontation.

Punishment as a dimension of confrontation. This question is a thorny one, one that does not yield to ready answers. But it must be dealt with in some way for a number of reasons: every act of confrontation, however responsible, seems to have a punitive dimension; some people confront in order to punish and succeed in doing so, but, on the other hand, an act of confrontation not intended to be punitive might have quite punitive effects. This is problematic because research has not yet given us clear-cut answers with respect to the growth-value of punishment in human interactional situations. Research so far has shown that punishment, depending on the conditions under which it is administered, can have both positive and negative effects (see Bandura, 1962; Church, 1963; Hilgard & Bower, 1966: pp. 83-85; 113-114; 133-139; 488-490; Solomon, 1964). Studies indicate that punishment might be ineffective if it is delayed too long (thus losing its association with the "punishable" act), that it can serve as a cue for selecting an appropriate response (provided that the subject is aware of alternative responses), that
mild punishment might merely suppress a response temporarily rather than eliminating it (though during the time of suppression the subject has an opportunity to learn alternative responses), that punishment that produces only emotional excitement tends to fixate the punished response, and that it is important that punishment be given in the presence of the discriminative cues for the response. If the evidence on punishment is not all in, and if what we have leads to different conclusions, it is quite difficult to map out an intelligent plan for the use of punishment in psychotherapy and other growth experiences. To my knowledge, there has been no systematic attempt to do so.

Most of the research on punishment so far has been carried out on animals or on molecular aspects of human behavior, so that the problem of application to more molar aspects of human behavior is necessarily an unresolved one: "This series of experiments by Estes, with their interpretations, show how, within the experimental and theoretical framework of Skinner's system, it is possible to experiment upon problems genuinely relevant to the practical control of learning situations. The challenging difficulty is finding appropriate ways to test the implications in a social context" (Hilgard and Bower, 1966, p. 139, emphasis added). Perhaps sensitivity-training groups and other forms of laboratory experience will provide a realistic "social context" for such research, but the fact is that this has not yet happened. French and Raven (1960) touch on the question of punishment in social behavior:

At times, there is some difficulty in distinguishing between reward power and coercive power. Is the withholding of a reward really equivalent to a punishment? Is the withdrawal of punishment equivalent to a reward? The answer must be a psychological one--it depends upon the situation as it exists for P [a person].
But ordinarily we would answer these questions in the affirmative; for P, receiving a reward is a positive valence as is the relief of suffering. There is some evidence (Dittes & Kelley, 1956) that conformity to group norms in order to gain acceptance (reward power) should be distinguished from conformity as a means of forestalling rejection (coercive power).

The distinction between these two types of power is important because the dynamics are different. The concept of sanctions sometimes lumps the two together despite their opposite effects. While reward power may eventually result in independent systems, the effects of coercive power will continue to be dependent. Reward power will tend to increase the attraction of P to O [some social agent]; coercive power will decrease this attraction (Raven & French, 1958). The valence of the region of behavior will become more negative, acquiring some negative valence from the threatened punishment. The negative valence of punishment would also spread to other regions of the life space. Lewin (1935) has pointed out this distinction between the effects of rewards and punishments. In the case of threatened punishment, there will be a resultant force on P to leave the field entirely. Thus, to achieve conformity, O must not only place a strong negative valence in certain regions through threat of punishment, but O must also introduce restraining forces, or other strong valences, so as to prevent P from withdrawing completely from O's range of coercive power. Otherwise, the probability of receiving the punishment, if P does not conform, will be too low to be effective (pp. 614-615).

While much of what is said here is thought-provoking and in some way applicable not only to sensitivity-groups in general but specifically to the act of confrontation in the context of such groups, still it is quite theoretical and in need of confirmation by research.

In view of the shaky research foundation upon which the social value of punishment rests, one might imagine that it would be excluded from such interactions as confrontations in growth groups. Not only has this not been the case, but there is a rather interesting body of evidence which would indicate that punitive—and sometimes extremely punitive—confrontation has quite a salubrious effect on the confrontee. Grinker and his associates (1957)
attempted to evoke anxiety in hospitalized patients by means of a stressful interview, but, to their chagrin, the patients tended to look upon the interview as helpful no matter how threatening the interpretations made to him (Hawthorne effects?). Heller, Davis, and Myers (1966) studied the activity-passivity and the friendliness-hostility dimensions of interviewing patients. The most noteworthy point of the experiment was that the only clear advantage of interviewer friendliness was that this condition was overwhelmingly preferred by the subjects. Despite this preference, however, there was no indication that verbal behavior during the interview changed in any way as a result of friendliness. In fact, there was some evidence that the subjects may have felt more pressure to discuss some possibly threatening topics (e.g. sex) with hostile interviewers. Kushner and Sanalu (1966) found that punishment therapy may be best used when there are other factors, such as social pressure, working on the patient to reduce undesirable behavior. They suggest that in aversion therapy the level of punishment should be clearly noxious, but not so intense so as to immobilize the organism. These considerations, it would seem, could well apply to confrontation.

More striking than these considerations, however, is the apparent success of groups in which rather punitive confrontation forms the central core of the therapeutic or growth process. Bach (1966) works in the context of the group Marathon in which group-pressure "is a major vehicle which can move people effectively and quickly from impression making and manipulative behavior toward honest, responsible, spontaneous levelling with one another" (p. 995). The Marathon situation may be called totally confrontational: "It takes devotion mixed with CONSTRUCTIVE AGGRESSION to get people to take
off image-masks and put on honest faces. It takes patience and energy to break down resistances against change which all well-entrenched behavioral patterns...will put up as part of a person's phoney 'self-esteem.'...Tired people tend to be truthful! They do not have the energy to play 'games''(p. 998). Bach admits that, at times, the confrontation can be quite brutal: "In the 'feedback' reactions to the expression, no holds are barred! Candid 'levelling' is expected from everyone, which means participants explicitly share and do not hide or mask their here-and-now, on the spot reactions to one another' Tact is 'out' and brutal frankness is 'in'"(p. 1001). An even more brutal approach is taken at Daytop Village; Drakeford (1967) describes an "encounter" at Daytop:

Three nights a week the whole population of Daytop musters for a ninety-minute session of encounter. This unique even, described as 'the principal formal medium for effecting value and behavioral changes,' commences with a gathering in the assembly room. The leader stands to read the names of the participants in each group and designates their meeting places. It is the prerogative of any member of the community to fill out a slip indicating his desire to be in a group with a certain other individual. There may have been some difficulty of relationship and he wants to tell this other person what is 'on his chest.'

I tried to look nonchalant and unconcerned as I sat in the dining room with my assigned group. A man led off with a blast of abuse...his superior who had offended him by his attitude in a work relationship. To say that the statements of the offended one were candid would be a gross understatement. In a couple of minutes the protestor was pouring out a torrent of abuse...(p. 72).

Maslow (1967) was pulled up short by what he witnessed at Daytop Village. He found himself re-evaluating his position on the value of confrontation and asking himself questions he had not asked before:

I have a lot of impressions and thoughts rushing in on me... Let me say it this way: Do you think that this straight honesty, this bluntness that even sounds cruel at times, provides a basis
for safety, affection, and respect? It hurts, it must hurt.... It seems possible that this brutal honesty, rather than being an insult, implies a kind of respect. You can take it as you find it, as it really is. And this can be a basis for respect and friendship (p. 30).

A similar type of therapeutic process called the Synanon Game is played at Synanon three times a week. Patton (1967) describes the game:

The Synanon game has been described as 'intense group interaction'--which it is. It has also been called 'attack therapy,' which tells nothing at all about the actual game experience. One sociologist describe the game as 'verbal street fighting,' a threatening analogy, though not an entirely inaccurate one, in spite of the limited backgrounds of most Synanon residents in streetfighting, verbal or other. For Synanon people the game is a group situation where one can spill out his fears and hostility, where he can expect to hear the kinds of truths he cannot see in himself, where he can tell others what he really thinks of them without retribution, where he can solve the confusions and conflicts of his working day and his inter-personal relationships, where he can be as spontaneous, creative, rigid, angry, loud or passive as he chooses with no authority or rules save one, the proscription against physical violence or the threat of it....Its weapons are the language of truth and accuracy, which always hit a moving target; both have no place in the Synanon game--itself ever changing and becoming (p. 5).

No attempt is made here to imply that the populations of such centers as Daytop Village and Synanon are comparable to those which engage in sensitivity-training laboratories nor is it suggested that "brutality therapy" become a way of life in such laboratories. Rather the point is this: severely punishing, even brutal, confrontation in each of the contexts described above apparently "works," and somehow this fact must be integrated into a theory of confrontation. The point is this: the use of punishment in the control of behavior is a very complex question. One simply cannot say: "I am going to punish John by this act of confrontation, but it is for his own good," unless one has some basic understanding of both the effects of punishment in general
and of the "how" of the inflicting of punishment in particular: As Solomon (1964) notes:

[T]he effects of punishment are partly determined by those events that directly precede it and those that directly follow it. A punishment is not just a punishment. It is an event in a temporal and spatial flow of stimulation and behavior, and its effects will be produced by its temporal and spatial point of insertion in that flow (p. 242).

Thus, to predict in even the grossest way the action of punishment on a response, one has to know how that particular response was originally inserted in the subject's response repertoire (p. 243).

Campbell and Dunnette (1968) apply some of Solomon's theorizing to laboratory training:

Based on his and others' research, Solomon theorized that learning as a consequence of punishment occurs in a two-stage process: First, a conditioned emotional reaction must be established to temporarily suppress the unwanted behavior. Second, and most important, responses incompatible with the punished response must then be reinforced and established; only in this way can one guard against the rapid extinction of the conditioned emotional reaction and the corresponding reappearance of the unwanted behavior. In the context of the T group, this means that punishment in the form of anxiety arousal must be accompanied by the reinforcement and shaping of responses incompatible with those responsible for originally inducing the anxiety. In a sense this is what the T group tries to do; however, it seems reasonable to ask whether or not the usual T group is sufficiently structured to assure the sophisticated control of stimuli and reinforcement configurations necessary in the two-stage process suggested by Solomon. Given the variability of contingencies that this lack of structure probably produces, some possible alternative outcomes might be either that simply no learning occurs or that some of the negative side effects are incurred (p. 78).

It is hypothesized here that a contract, especially one which deals specifically with confrontation as a possibly punitive stimulus, might help to control some of the contingencies of which Campbell and Dunnette speak.

Finally, all of this is said not to discourage the use of confrontation even though it almost inevitably has punitive side effects but to make the
confronter realize that he can expect at times quite negative responses to what he might consider most "benevolent" acts of necessarily punitive confrontation.

Confrontation and domination. If confrontation can be used to punish, it can also be used to control and dominate. If A confronts B because A thinks that he is right and B is wrong, he should be careful of his motivation. As Gibb (1968) notes, when people are fearful, they tend to control. If there is an atmosphere of trust in the group, tendencies to confront in order to control should diminish. However, if such confrontation continues to be a part of any participant's interactional style, this should become a matter for group reflection.

Confrontation in the context of acceptance and empathy. Research is beginning to show that therapists who supply ample amounts of empathy, positive regard, and genuineness are more likely to occasion deeper levels of self-exploration in their clients than therapists lacking in these qualities (Berenson, Mitchell, & Moravec, 1968; Holder, Carkhuff, & Berenson, 1967; Piaget, Berenson, & Carkhuff, 1967; Rogers, 1967; Truax, 1966; Truax & Carkhuff, 1965). Therefore, if one of the most important functions of confrontation is to invite the other to responsible self-examination "in-community," then it seems that confrontation would be most effective if carried out under the conditions mentioned above, that is, under conditions of empathy and positive regard. Good therapists confront more than poor therapists (Berenson, Mitchell, & Laney, 1968), but they also provide the conditions that sustain confrontation. The results of this research are in keeping with the theory underlying Stern's (1966) "sacramental" approach to
psychotherapy: he sees a person's present as an experience which was to be transformed and if necessary transcended through concerned and appreciative confrontation. A study by Torrance (1966) suggests that confrontation will be more effective if it is positive and constructive rather than negative or merely evaluative. Somehow, these facts, too, must contribute to a total theory of confrontation.

The manner of confrontation: reconciling diverse elements. My own experience with confrontation in different kinds of growth groups has been mixed. I have seen confrontations which fulfilled the caricature of sensitivity-training ("a place where people tell one another off") do a good deal of harm (e.g. apparently push someone into a short-lived psychotic episode—though some claimed that it was a beneficial episode) and yet I have also seen bitter confrontations produce not only realistic self-exploration and growthful behavioral changes but even increased intimacy between confronter and confrontee. On the other hand, I have witnessed non-punitive, "high regard" confrontations both succeed and fail. It seems that we must say that confrontation is a growth-experience variable with great potential although it is not entirely clear under what conditions this potential is released.

Proportion as a key to growthful encounter. The question here is: how can one strip confrontation of its tendencies to attack and destroy without stripping it of its impact? At attempt will be made here to formulate certain hypotheses about the manner in which confrontation must take place if it is to be a growthful rather than a neutral or even destructive experience. These remarks take on the nature of hypotheses because they are based on evidence that is principally observational and have not been confirmed by experimenta-
tion. The evidence so far suggests that the "proportional" nature of confrontation is most important, that is, confrontation, if it is to be effective, must be proportioned to a number of confronter, confrontee, and situational variables. Another way of saying this is that the interaction of confrontation variables is as important as the variables themselves. It is assumed here that it is the socially intelligent person who can perceive the importance of these interactions and act upon them. In fact, this is one definition of social intelligence.

The strength of any confrontation arises principally from two variables: the sensitivity or closeness-to-core of the subject matter of the confrontation (e.g., under ordinary circumstances the area of sex would be a more sensitive one, closer to the core of the confrontee, than, say, personal neatness) and the vehemence with which the confrontation is delivered (e.g. the Daytop Village approach would score very high on a scale of vehemence). These variables are additive, so that vehement confrontation in a highly sensitive area would represent the strongest kind of confrontation. If confrontation is to be responsible, its strength must be proportioned to a number of variables among which are (a) the quality of the relationship between confronter and confrontee, (b) the current psychological state of the confrontee, (c) the possible disorganization which the confrontee will undergo as a result of the confrontation, (d) the limits of the confrontee's capabilities, (e) certain group conditions, and (f) the contract, either implicit or expressed, which governs the group experience.

(a) The quality of the relationship between confronter and confrontee. The confronter must ask himself: "What can the relationship between the
other and me bear?" To use metaphorical language, the more "solid," the "healthier," the more "substantial" the relationship is, the more powerful the confrontation may be (other conditions being equal). If the confronter has done little to build a solid relationship between himself and the confrontee, then he cannot expect to engage in strong confrontational encounters, for it has nothing on which to stand. However, if a participant has tried to build a relationship and has received no response, then he would be justified in engaging in comparatively strong confrontation, especially with respect to the lack of communication on the part of the confrontee, for mutual involvement is one of the expressed goals of the group. In general, then, the confronter must realistically assess the quality of the relationship between himself and the other—his degree of acceptance and concern for the other, the degree of support of which he is capable and which he is willing to provide the other, etc.—and then proportion his confrontation to these variables.

(b) The current psychological state of the confrontee. The strength of the confrontation must be proportioned to the current ability of the confrontee to support and act upon the confrontation. This means a number of things. If, for instance, the confrontee is already laboring under a good deal of anxiety, his immediate need might be for encouragement and support, and the confronter should ask himself whether it would be fruitful to confront him at this time (timing is always an important concern) or in this area of sensitivity or with this degree of vehemence. No participant is expected to be free of anxiety, but the level of anxiety should stimulate rather than paralyze. Confrontation should also be proportioned to the other's ability
to change, and, to some extent, his desire to change. One of the purposes of confrontation is to try to show the other than he does have the personal and/or community resources necessary to change an unproductive or destructive style of life. But if the confrontee is relatively eager to change, then he can ordinarily tolerate much stronger confrontation than a person who is not convinced that he can or should change. If the confronter is interested in the other, he will not mount a strong frontal attack when he knows that it has little or no chance of being effective. The confronter who, knowing that the confrontee has little or no interest in change, still hits him with an extremely strong confrontation, is dealing in a form of "shock" therapy ("kick the TV and see what happens"). I have seen such tactics "work," but it seems to be a last resort and effective only in the hands of the extremely socially intelligent.

Some people, without being masochistic, are looking for "strong medicine" in terms of confrontation and are quite ready to respond favorably to it. I would hypothesize that this is especially true for those who voluntarily attend sensitivity-training laboratories (especially if they have a basic idea of what such a laboratory entails). It should be true to an even greater extent of those who join a contract group. Others, again without being masochistic, welcome even the punitive aspect of confrontational process, for, if I may use an analogy from religious experience, they see in it an element of cleansing or expiation. They "pay the price," as it were, of re-integrating themselves more fully "into community." On the other hand, it is possible that a person might seek confrontation precisely to prove to himself his own lack of self worth. But such a situation in sensitivity
groups is relatively rare and usually easy to discover, for then, for that person, confrontation becomes an end in itself and is divorced from subsequent behavioral change.

(c) **The risk of disorganization.** Effective confrontation will usually induce some degree of "disorganization in the other:

The therapeutic risk will...depend upon the amount of disorganization both the therapist and the client can handle.... The closer the decision affects the inner core of a person, the greater the fear of the life and death choice. A constructive therapeutic confrontation frequently does result in death of a sort: the death of illusion, hence, an illusory death....After an initial experience of death to the illusory self, the void which is temporarily created has a chance to fill up with the person's real being....The therapist, by active confrontation, precipitates an awareness of crisis; he did not precipitate the crisis (Douds, Berenson, Carkhuff, & Pierce, 1967, pp. 171, 173, 195).

Confrontation is usually in some way directed toward the defense mechanisms of the confrontee. This questioning of defenses, although ultimately growthful, does entail disorganization.

Almost every individual has an established self-image protected by a number of defense mechanisms. Such mechanisms have become resistant to change because of their repeated association with the reinforcing properties of anxiety reduction; that is, they protect the self-image from threat. Thus, in the T group when an individual's usual mode of interacting is thwarted and his defense mechanisms are made a direct topic of conversation, considerable anxiety results. Such anxiety then constitutes a force for new learning because, if the group experience is a successful one, new methods of anxiety reduction will be learned. If the T group is successful, these methods will be more in line with the goals of the training and will have more utility for the individual in coping with his environment than his old methods which may indeed have been dysfunctional. Thus, anxiety serves the purpose of shaking up or jarring loose the participant from his preconceived notions and habitual forms of interacting so that feedback may have its maximum effect. Without such "unfreezing," feedback may be ineffectual...(Campbell & Dunnette, 1968, p. 76).
The strength of the confrontation must be proportioned to the degree of disorganization foreseen and the ability of the confrontee in the context of the group to handle this disorganization. Confrontation means in some way challenging the unrealities of the "world" of the other, which, though unreal, feels "solid" to him. Maslow (1967), however, after his experience at Daytop Village, suggested or hypothesized that in therapy in general we have looked upon the client as too delicate, too fragile, too incapable of handling strong confrontation and its disorganizing effects, and so we have been afraid to use this tool. Douds and his associates (1967) suggest that we fail to confront because we are afraid of the consequences for ourselves, for he who confronts opens himself to confrontation: "Much of the time it is the fear of exposure that is at the base of the therapist's avoidance" (p. 176). The "disorganization" that Douds and his associates speak of sounds a good deal like Beier's (1966) "beneficial uncertainty" which is a step toward growth rather than toward dissolution.

(d) The limits of the confrontee's capabilities. The contract group should be "diagnostic" in the best sense of the word, that is, the participants should get a "feel" for one another's areas of potentiality and of deficit. While the participants should allow one another a wide latitude for growth, they should also come to a realistic understanding of one another's limits. Confrontation should be proportioned to these limits. Certainly the object of confrontation is to help the confrontee to move beyond his present limits, but even concerned confrontation cannot create potentiality where it does not exist. It may well be that the confrontee is not capable of interpersonal styles that are the preferred styles of the confronter, and it is a mistake
to use confrontation in an attempt to get the confrontee to assume a style of relating that is not consonant with his capabilities. I have seen individuals and even groups spend unreasonable amounts of time trying to get the confrontee to assume an interpersonal style more similar to their own. This is a waste of time and also a way of avoiding one's own problems.

(e) **Group conditions.** Confrontation must be proportioned to certain group variables, that is, the group must create a climate in which confrontation is viable. For instance, if the participants have achieved a certain degree of mutual trust and support, then relatively strong confrontation can be handled even if the confronter himself fails to provide proportional support, for the other members will supply for his deficiency. Confrontation is also much more possible in a group which has developed an "open" culture, that is, a group that has refused to tolerate the "tacit understandings" which tend to constrict or eliminate effective communication. In a group in which the participants show that they are willing both to confront and to be confronted, confrontation soon becomes a constructive dimension of the group culture. In a word, confrontation must be proportioned to the culture of the group.

(f) **Contract, implicit or expressed.** It was suggested earlier that every group operates on some contract, whether expressed or implied. The trouble with implicit contracts in sensitivity-training situations is that they may or may not effectively provide for confrontation, and, even if they do, the conditions that regulate its use always remain vague. It seems only reasonable to assume that making confrontation one of the specific provisions of an overt group contract goes far in preparing the group for this variable.
One way of conceptualizing this is to say that through the contract (and other variables) receive a high degree of "legitimacy." French and Raven (1960), in discussing coercive power (and there is an element of "coercion" in confrontation), suggest that "the more legitimate the coercion the less it will produce resistance and decreased attraction" (p. 622). The hypothesis is that contractual "legitimation" of confrontation will increase its frequency, responsibility, acceptability, and effectiveness. It will also allow stronger degrees of confrontation to be used. The group, then, becomes a laboratory in which the participants, through their successes and failures, learn how to make responsible confrontation part of their interpersonal styles of life.

The success of such therapeutic communities as Daytop Village and Synanon and of Bach's Marathon groups rests, in part, on the fact that the participants contract more or less explicitly to confrontation. They know what they are getting into but their desire for change outweighs the pain they foresee. At one time I was tempted to call such experiences "supportless" groups, but this, I believe, is inaccurate. They ban from the beginning more "effete" or unsubstantial kinds of support and even, to a large extent, the approaches to support outlined in the previous chapter. Support arises rather from the fact that severe confrontation takes place in a total institutional setting (even Bach's groups are "in residence" for the entire time of the Marathon), that there are no observers but just participants (leaders and clients together), that everyone realizes that there is work to be done and gets down to doing it "in community," that everyone present is striving for interpersonal growth. Motivation, too, is quite high in such groups. Bach,
for instance, chooses only those who can demonstrate a sincere willingness to change. It cannot be assumed that the rank and file of those who participate in sensitivity-training laboratories or even contract-group programs possess the same degree of motivation as Synanists or Marathon participants.

(6) The effect confrontation has on the confrontee.

There is no absolute way to predict the precise effect that any particular act of confrontation will have on the confrontee. His immediate emotional response might be one of elation, depression, or indifference regardless of whether the confrontation is responsible or irresponsible. The "high visibility" of the contract group would suggest that the confrontee reveal to the confronter and the group in general what impact, positive or negative, that the confrontation has had upon him ("I guess for the moment I really do not know what to say, because frankly you really took me by surprise," "My immediate reaction is elation over the fact that you are concerned enough about me to confront me," "You've made me so angry that I have to get my wits about me before I could possibly make a rational response"). If someone says to John, "John, your contributions here have been both marginal and minimal and I really feel your absence in our interaction," John may be relieved, appreciative, anxious, shocked, or angry, but if he reveals his emotional response, he will go far in preventing unproductive ambiguity, confusion, uncertainty, or "stickiness" from arising in the group. Once the confrontee has gotten his emotional reaction "into community" so that it can be dealt with productively there, then he will be much freer to channel his energies into the open and constructive reaction to confrontation called for by the contract. Precisely how a person "should" react or rather respond to confrontation is a
subject that concerns us next.

GROWTHFUL RESPONSE TO CONFRONTATION.

Up to now we have been dealing with what the confronter should do in order to make confrontation a responsible interactional process. We now turn to the confrontee and what he should do in response to objectively growthful confrontation. Most of us naturally tend to react to confrontation, automatically, as it were, and emotionally, but few of us develop the art of responding to confrontation. The contract group is a laboratory in which this art is to be learned. The most common reactions to confrontation are various forms of defensiveness ("My family has always been this way," "But I'm like this only in this group") and counterattack ("You haven't put out much in the group yourself"). Pilisuk (1962) showed that subjects tended to retain favorable estimates of their own performance in the face of adverse criticism, and it made little difference whether the criticism came from a friend or a stranger. However, if the subject thought that the criticism came from a friend, he used different forms of rationalization to explain away the friend's behavior. Harvey, Kelley, and Shapiro (1957) found that criticisms were distorted by confrontees when they were thought to come from friends; confrontees also tended to devalue friends who engaged in such criticism. In a word, it is not easy to respond nondefensively to confrontation. However, it is assumed here that awareness of just this fact is a step toward taking on a more positive attitude toward confrontation. Kirtner (1955) found that the client who sees his problems as involving his relationships with others and who feels that he has contributed to these problems and wants to change is likely to be successful in a therapeutic encounter, while the client who
externalizes his problems, feeling little self-responsibility, is much more likely to be a failure. Motivation, then, is crucial to the confrontational process. If the participant wants to change, he will want to be confronted and be willing to endure its unpleasant dimensions. The ideal is that the confrontee enter actively into the confrontational process, that he become an agent in a dialogic process rather than just a "patient" suffering through something that is "for his own good." Now to a clarification of such confrontee "agency."

Accepting the invitation to self-examination. If growth-provoking confrontation is, in one sense, an invitation to self-examination as a prelude to possible behavioral change, then actual self-examination on the issues in question is the "proper" response to confrontation. Research in psychotherapy is beginning to show that that successful outcome is related to the client's ability or willingness to explore his behavior. Wagstaff, Rice, and Butler (1960) found that successful patients tended to explore themselves more, while those who failed engaged in little self-exploration and in general manifested little emotional involvement. Braaten (1961) found that therapeutic success was related to exploration of the "private self." Truax (1961) found significantly more depth of experiencing in therapeutic successes than in therapeutic failures from a schizophrenic population. Similar results have been reported by Truax and Carkhuff (1963), Holder, Carkhuff, and Berenson (1967), Piaget, Berenson, and Carkhuff (1967), and Tomlinson and Hart (1962) among others. Pratt (1966) calls this striving on the part of individuals or groups to understand themselves and their conditions and to take part in changing themselves and their contractual surroundings their "reflexivity
quotient." As Pratt implies, the kind of self-exploration desired is one geared to the examination of behavior and focused on behavioral change. Too many people equate self-examination with a kind of amateur psychoanalytic self-exploration. The person who sees himself only through a maze (or haze) of "interpretations" can too easily become convinced that responsibility for himself lies either outside himself or in hidden layers of his personality which are relatively impossible to fathom.

Getting a "feel" for how one is experienced by others. The participant cannot respond to confrontation unless he is willing to venture outside himself. One of the most effective ways for him to learn is to drop his defensiveness, at least partially and temporarily, and try to understand the way in which he is experienced by the others in the group. Ideally, the confrontee—admittedly under somewhat adverse conditions—tries to become as "accurately empathetic" as he can during the confrontational encounter, that is, he tries to get inside the "world" of the confronter and actually "feel" how he is being experienced by the other.

Self-confrontation. The contract calls for self-exploration-in-community as the response to confrontation, but such self-exploration may be either self-initiated or undertaken in response to a challenge by another. If the question is looked at a bit abstractedly, a certain gradation appears: it is "good" for a participant to respond appropriately to unsolicited confrontation, but it may even be "better" if he actively seeks it out, that is, if he manifests to the other members that he is open to meaningful hypotheses about himself and his behavior. It might even be "best" if the participant were to confront himself ("It strikes me that I have been coming across rather punitively in
our interactions here; I'm dissatisfied with my behavior and would like to
deal with it"), for such self-confrontation-in-community indicates a very
high degree of responsibility or "agency" on his part. The self-confronter
takes the initiative, but he realizes that he needs the "community" both
for support and for a corrective "outside" view of himself. The person who
does nothing more than respond appropriately to confrontation seems to imply
that motivation for change must come principally from others; it is they who
make him want what is essential to his own growth. Learning how to confront
oneself, then, is one of the goals of the group. There are, however,
counter-feits of self-confrontation: some participants "get" themselves first
so that the other members will not "get" them in areas more sensitive and more
in need of attention. They want to avoid certain issues, so they take the
initiative in less sensitive areas. Since many groups fall for this ploy, it
would seem that a healthy confrontation culture would call for a combination
of self-initiated and other initiated confrontations.

**Differential response to different modes of confrontation.** There is
absolutely no reason why group participants should respond univocally to
different kinds of confrontation. It may well be that any given participant
will respond quite differentially to the various forms of confrontation that
arise in the group. For instance, a person's ability to respond to highly
intellectualized or rational verbal confrontation might differ drastically from
his ability to the confrontation implicit in the others' emotional approaches
to him. Such a person might be quite frightened by manifestations of affection.
The contract asks such a person to try to respond to such a confrontation as
he would to more intellectualized or strictly verbal forms of confrontation:
I feel your concern and your warmth and frankly they frighten me, they make me want to turn you off and run away, but that's precisely why I think I would take a good look at what's going on inside me and between you and me."

Since it is usually much more difficult to deal with a "feeling" rather than a "rational" confrontation, the confrontee has to take greater pains to be honest with himself and others, the group participants have to provide the support necessary to sustain such confrontation. Very often it is only the confrontee who knows what kind of stimulus—acts "pull him up short," and the responsibility is his to reveal this to the group so that he may reap the benefits of confrontation.

An openness to temporary disorganization. The confrontee should be ready to accept (in some sense of the term) the disorganization induced by effective confrontation. Confrontation almost always demands some kind of reorganization of perceptions, attitudes, and feelings, and such reorganization is impossible without some kind of uprooting. However, if the participant is prepared for this disorganization, then his chances of responding rather than merely reacting to confrontation are greatly increased. If, in addition to this, the group culture itself and the participants individually provide support proportioned to the degree of organization, the possibility of successful confrontational interaction is further enhanced. Confrontation without support is disastrous; support without confrontation is anemic.

Over-response. A person is not supposed to soak up confrontation like a sponge. This might be as bad or even worse than being closed to confrontation, for it implies a lack of agency and of contact with one's own experiencing which are essential to change: "Other people can give us feedback,
and we can sense when their reporting is accurate, if their view resonates with an organismic sensing within us of what we have been doing, and consequently we can change our course of action" (A. I. Rogers, 1968, p. 37).

While it is true that those who are relatively socially adjusted do not count on continual social reinforcement in order to operate effectively on an interpersonal level, it is also true that passive absorption or any and every confrontation cannot be termed responsible openness to confrontation. If this takes place in a group, a getting at the roots of such masochism (psychoanalytically defined or not) would not be out of place. In a word, over-response to confrontation should be challenged and if possible unmasked.

**Confrontation and conflict.** Even though the "correct" response to confrontation is self-examination in view of possible behavioral change, this does not eliminate conflict and differences of opinion. Once the confrontee has assimilated the point of view of the confronter and has examined himself on the issues proposed, then together they might examine both areas of agreement and areas of conflict. Conflict differs from defensiveness, attack, hostility, and aggression. It may be intense, but it is constructive rather than argumentative. It is a challenge for those who participate in it to accept one another's "otherness." Hoffman, Harburg, and Maier (1962) offer some evidence suggesting that conflict can increase the number of alternatives which group members generate. It is quite likely that the same can be said of interpersonal contacts. When conflict is merely a front for a defensive refusal to examine oneself or just a disguise for counter-attack, it is usually unproductive. The group participants themselves—and this is especially true during confrontational interactions—should monitor the conflicts that arise
in order to keep them honest.

Responding to irresponsible confrontation. There are those who take advantage of the relative non-defensive climate of the group in order to ride roughshod over the other participants. If the confrontation is irresponsible—if it is nothing more than attack, if its primary aim is punishment rather than involvement—then the leader and the group as a whole should intervene and confront the confronter. Little is gained if the confrontee merely becomes angry and fights it out with his aggressor. However, if the confrontee can ignore the irresponsibilities of the other, he can often sift out elements of truth that otherwise might never have come up: "I really thought that John's primary purpose was to attack and punish me and that he exaggerated quite a bit, but as I look at myself I am beginning to realize that his basic point is true: I am fundamentally a very selfish person and I do try to disguise this at times by 'do-good' tactics." Honesty, whenever and wherever it can be found, is a valuable commodity.

AREAS OF CONFRONTATION

Behavior rather than motivation. The direct object of confrontation should be a person's overt behavior rather than its conjectural foundations, that is, what-is should be the primary object of confrontation rather than what-may-be. The closer confrontation comes to motivation the more hypothetical it becomes and thus the more abstract. For instance, one way of conceptualizing neurosis is in terms of "central strategies":

A conceptualization of the problem of neurosis in terms of information storage and retrieval is based on the fundamental idea that what is learned in a neurosis is a set of central strategies (or a program) which guide the individual's adaptation to his environment. Neuroses are not symptoms
(responses) but are strategies of a particular kind which lead to certain observable (tics, compulsive acts, etc.) and certain less observable, phenomena (fears, feelings of depression, etc.). The whole problem of symptom substitution is thus seen as an instance of response substitution or response equipotentiality, concepts which are supported by abundant laboratory evidence (Breger & McGaugh, 1965, p. 355).

A person might emit all sorts of behavioral cues which reveal his "program," but the fact still remains that his behavior is quite real while the "program" is a construct. If the construct is the object of confrontation, it should be confronted as construct and primarily through the behavioral cues through which it is revealed.

**Strength as well as weakness.** Since the purpose of the contract group is not unmasking but rather interpersonal growth, it would be meaningless if the participants were to confront one another only in areas of interpersonal deficit without touching on one another's constructive resources. To do so would be to fall into the error of the "low-functioning" therapists studied by Berenson, Mitchell, and Laney (1968) and by Berenson, Mitchell, and Moravec (1968): "low-functioning" therapist tend to confront weaknesses rather than resources. "You say little in the group" differs quite a bit from "You don't say much, but when you do speak you always contact someone and without cliches." It is still a question of confrontation, but now it is directed toward unused or little-used potential. If a participant always deals with deficits rather than the resources of others, this is "diagnostic" in itself and should become a subject of discussion in the group.

**Self-underestimation.** Self-underestimation is possibly a form of flight and as such should be confronted. Some informal research which Dr. Barbara Powell and I did with sensitivity groups while we were at
Galesburg State Research Hospital indicated that there is a rather high correlation between self-estimate measures on group process variables (administered before regular group sessions began) and actual performance in the group. In other words, participants seem to place a limit on their own desire or ability to participate and their performance becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Therefore, if participants are to move beyond their own self-estimated limits, they must be confronted with the fact that they tend to underestimate their ability to participate in the give-and-take of group interaction. This is a specific form of "confrontation of strength."

**Behavior in the group: confrontation and contract.** It is relatively easy to delineate what kind of behavior should be confronted in the contract-group: (1) any behavior that violates any of the provisions of the contract and (2) the different forms of flight from contract-fulfillment (these will be considered separately in the next chapter). In groups in which there is only an implicit contract, areas of confrontation cannot be as clearly delineated. Also the "high visibility" demanded in the contract group points to certain areas of confrontation, that is, the "hidden" aspects of the group culture: "tacit understandings," hidden agenda, hidden goals, etc.

**Differential intragroup relationships.** The contract does not demand that the participants involve themselves with one another in any univocal way. Each participant becomes in different ways and to different degrees with his fellows. However, much can be learned by confronting the participants with these differences in involvement. For instance, if A involves himself deeply with B but only superficially with C, this says something about A, B, and C.
Behavior outside the group. Behavior outside the group is relevant only to the degree that it can be made a here-and-now concern for the participants in general. As a rule "story" is relevant, while "history" is not. Once a person reveals extra-group behavior, it, too, can become an object of confrontation. However, the group should not deal exclusively with the "out-there" behavior of the participants. This leads to loss of immediacy, loss of interest, and eventually to the stagnation or the death of the group. The way a person behaves "out there," however, affects his "in-here" relationships, but the "out there" and the "in here" should be dealt with concomitantly.

SUMMARY: SUGGESTED "RULES" FOR CONFRONTATION

In summary, the following rules may help to make confrontation in the group a constructive process:

(1) Confront in order to manifest your concern for the other.
(2) Make confrontation a way of becoming involved with the other.
(3) Before confronting, become aware of your bias either for or against the confrontee. Do not refrain from confrontation because you are for him or use confrontation as a means of punishment, revenge, or domination because you are against him.
(4) Before confronting the other, try to understand the relationship that exists between you and him and try to proportion your confrontation to what the relationship will bear.
(5) Before confronting, try to take into consideration the possible punitive side effects of your confrontation.
(6) The strength or vehemence of your confrontation and the areas of
sensitivity you deal with should be proportioned to the needs, sensitivities, and capabilities of the confrontee.

(7) Confront behavior primarily; be slow to confront motivation.

(8) Confront clearly: indicate what is fact, what is feeling, and what is hypothesis. Do not state interpretations as facts. Do not engage in constant and/or long-winded interpretations of the behavior of the others.

(9) Remember that much of your behavior in the group can have confrontational effects (e.g., not talking to others, your emotional attitudes, etc.).

(10) Be willing to confront yourself honestly in the group.

No set of rules will provide assurance that the confrontation will always be a growthful process in the sensitivity-training group. But groups can learn much from both the use and abuse of confrontation.
Chapter X
A Stance Against Flight

Introduction

It is not easy to engage in the kinds of interaction outlined in the previous chapters. Thus, human nature being what it is, there is a natural tendency for group participants to find ways either to resist or to flee the work at hand. Even though participants engage in sensitivity-training experiences because they want to, it can still be expected that they will resist the process, because it is anxiety-arousing and demanding. Not only are the common defense mechanisms such as projection, rationalization, reaction formation, insulation, etc. used, but they are used in ways which are peculiar to the group situation. The group situation threatens the participants with both self-knowledge and intimacy, and the defenses of the participants rise to the challenge.

Flight tendencies seem to appear whenever the human organism is threatened by the often painful processes associated with intrapsychic and interpersonal growth. It is not surprising, then, to find flight a constant problem in both psychotherapy and other kinds of growth situations. Gibb (1964), for instance, notes that "a person may...engage in frenetic off-target work in an effort to find himself or to keep from finding himself (p. 282). Whitman (1964) suggests that group participants defend themselves against involvement by overintellectualization, overaffective behavior, and selected inattention. In Grinker's transactional therapy, the patient is not permitted to become anonymous, to intellectualize, or to talk persistently about others. Mowrer (1950), Dollard and Miller (1950), and Rotter (1954) all
see the maladjusted person as one who fails to learn adaptive or growthful behavior automatically because he persistently engages in avoidance behavior which keeps him from situations in which he could learn more adaptive and growthful behavior. Although such avoidance behavior is not really satisfying (flight never really is) and is punished in the long run, it is immediately satisfying and, therefore, persists. Whitaker and Lieberman (1964) define failure in therapy in terms of various forms of flight: "Failure to benefit from therapy occurs (1) when a patient succeeds consistently in maintaining a habitual maladaptive solution in the group, thus remaining uncomfortable but affectively untouched by the situation; (2) when a patient resorts to physical or psychological flight, thus insulating himself from the affective forces of the group; or (3) when a patient reacts to threat with the breakdown of previously established solutions and the substitution of disorganized, inadequate behavior" (p. 180). Whatever the immediate rewards of flight behavior, it is ultimately self-destructive.

Flight can be conceptualized in various ways—for instance, along overt-covert and mild-severe dimensions.

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A          B
Overt
I          II
Mild       Severe
III        IV
C          D
Covert
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Figure 10.1. Flight behavior.
At point A (mild-overt) in quadrant I we might find some such remark as "We don't have to overdo it here," or "It's better to let this thing develop gradually," at point B (severe-overt) in quadrant II actual physical flight, at point C (mild-covert) in quadrant III a passing joke that breaks the tension of the interaction, and at point D (severe-covert) in quadrant IV disruptive aggressive and punitive behavior on the part of some group member.

Flight from growth is easily conceptualized in the contract group: it refers to failures to engage in the contractual behaviors outlined and in substituting a- or anti-contractual behavior. Therefore, we have already dealt with a number of different kinds of flight--for instance, engaging in "history" rather than "story" in the modality of self-disclosure. It is our purpose here, not to repeat what has been said above, but briefly to classify and clarify the major modes of flight used in groups in the hope that such exposure of flight modalities will reduce flight behavior in actual group interaction. Nor are all possible flight modalities detailed here, for, given the ingeniousness of the human spirit in both devising modes of flight and disguising them, this would be an endless task.

This chapter, then, is an attempt to "spit in the soup" of the group member in flight. The members of the contract group are asked to become aware of the principal kinds of flight behavior and to take a stance against flight by confronting themselves and one another when it arises. This refusal to withdraw from the enterprise is extremely important, for flight in the group only mirrors the flight behavior in the participant's day-to-day life.

Since not only individuals but also entire groups may engage in flight, the following is divided into two sections: the individual in flight and
the group in flight.

The Individual in Flight

Cynicism, initial and otherwise. The participant who comes to the group experience with a closed mind and whose principal defense is a cynical attitude toward what is happening in the group will find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to engage in the group interaction. Watson and his associates (1961) found that those who come to a laboratory experience ready to give themselves to it showed positive and results afterwards, while those who expected the laboratory to be irrelevant found it irrelevant. Perhaps the most incapacitating failure of the cynic is that he refuses to initiate anything in the group. To initiate is to show interest and he cannot be caught showing interest in an enterprise that is in some way below him. He waits until someone else initiates something and then he sits in judgment on what is happening. In fact, his usual posture is one of silent judgment on the proceedings of the group. This makes him all but unvulnerable, for he can maintain the same posture even when he becomes the object of confrontation. At times he may be swept along by the action of the group, and when the group situation calls for sincerity, he is sincere. But he returns almost immediately to his former posture and hangs albatross-like around the neck of the group.

Silence. It seems logical to begin with silence. Some have tried to rationalize silence by claiming that there is no evidence that the silent person is not benefiting from the group experience; others say that the silent member is a "point of rest" in the group or that he is "dynamic" in the sense that the group must deal with him. There are a number of errors here. The silent person may well be learning something in the group, but he certainly is
not growing if growth means interpersonal growth, for it is ludicrous to assume that interpersonal growth takes place without interpersonal exchange. Growth means, in part, that the person become an "agent" instead of a "patient" in his interpersonal contacts. If the silent member is considere "dynamic" in that he contributes to the dynamics of the group—his silence is a felt "force" or he mobilizes the energies of the group, for they must deal with him—then his silence is implicitly or explicitly manipulative and deleterious to interpersonal growth. The silent member frequently arouses the concern of the group ("Why is he silent?", "What is happening inside?"), creates feelings of guilt ("We have been neglecting him"), or provokes anger ("Why does he choose to remain an outsider?", "Why does he sit there in judgment of the rest of us?"). That is, silence does manipulate, whether this is the intention of the silent member or not. Furthermore, in the contract group, silence and contract-fulfillment are simply antithetical. By definition the silent member is not growing in the contract-group insofar as contract fulfillment can be considered a sign of growth. It has already been mentioned how one sensitivity-group member felt "hurt" by the silent members: she did not know where they stood in the group and this constricted her ability to interact with them. Smith (1957) found that group productivity was negatively affected by the presence of two silent members in five-person groups, for the silent members were perceived as unpredictable.

Slavson (1966) sees silence in group psychotherapy as a form of communication even though it is also a form of resistance. The reasons for silence, he says, are either characterological (e.g., the person never says much, he has developed habits of silence) or neurotic (e.g., the result of anxiety
and/or guilt). An individual may also be "selectively" silent, that is, he might be silent because he is not interested in the topic of discussion in that it has no relevance to his current needs or preoccupations or the topic might constitute an area of threat for him. In the contract group, however, such selective silences violate certain provisions of the contract, for the participants are asked to deal openly with their boredom and, at least in a general way, with their areas of threat. Slavson calls an attempt on the part of a member to impose silence on the group because the interaction threatens him "endogenic" silence; if, on the other hand, the members of a group "turn off" an overassertive member, this is "imposed" silence. In the contract-group, however, anxiety arising from threat should be handled as openly as possible, and the overassertive member should be confronted and not merely silenced. In a word, imposing silence on another or others usually indicates some sort of flight. Finally, Slavson talks about "iatrogenic" silence, that is, silence that ensues in the group when the leader is abrupt or becomes angry. In the contract group, the leader is a leader-member and his behavior, too, is open to confrontation. The group that responds to leader-behavior by falling silent is in flight.

Sometimes the entire group becomes silent, but naturally so. The meaning of such silence varies, but by no means is it always a sign of flight. If such silences occur with any frequency or if they occur at dramatic moments in the life of the group, their practical meaning for the group should be investigated.

Silence-as-flight, although it admits of degrees, tends to limit growth. What Whitaker and Lieberman (1964) say of the silent patient also refers to
the participant in any kind of interpersonal growth experience:

Therapeutic benefit is limited for the consistently silent patient. He can experience affect associated with crucial personal conflicts in the group, can observe the consequences of others' yielding maladaptive solutions similar to his own, and can achieve insight through being exposed to relevant group information. Direct interpretations and feedback are less available to him and less likely to be accurate and usable. He cannot directly experience the actual testing of the reality of his fears or the necessity for maintaining habitual maladaptive solutions (p. 180).

Although quality of participation is, absolutely speaking, more important than quantity, there comes a point where lack of quantity is deleterious to the overall quality of an individual's participation. This marriage of quantity and quality of participation is something that must be learned in the actual give-and-take of group interaction.

**Interpretation and the pursuit of insight.** Interpretation and insight go together, for supposedly the former leads to the latter. The value of both interpretation and insight in therapeutic practice is currently being challenged from a number of quarters. Whatever the outcome of the struggle between "insight" and "action" therapists (London, 1964), the point is that in all growth experiences, including sensitivity-training situations, the use of interpretation and the pursuit of insight too often constitute flight behavior. Our culture tends to make us think that the only kind of real knowing is "scientific" knowing. In growth-groups, then, the participants think that they are doing the "scientific" thing when they attempt to tease out the conjectural foundations of their own behavior and that of their fellows. The person in the group who makes interpretation one of the principal components of his style of interaction is either misled or in flight. It is not just that the "understanding" of behavior becomes an end in itself, but
there even comes a point where interpretation and insight no longer refer to actual behavior and become merely internally consistent logical systems with their own axioms and postulates.

Rogers and Truax (1967) maintain that accurate empathy is a far cry from the interpretation-insight dyad under attack here:

An accurate empathic grasp of the patient's conflicts and problems is perhaps most sharply contrasted with the more usual diagnostic formulation of the patient's experiences. This diagnostic understanding which is so different but so common involves the "I understand what is wrong with you" or "I understand the dynamics which make you act that way" approach. These evaluative understandings are external and even impersonal. While they may at times be very useful in developing external understanding, they are in sharp contrast to an accurate and sensitive grasp of events and experiences and their personal meaning to the client. The external and evaluative understanding tends to focus the client's being on externals or upon intellectualizations which remove him from an ongoing contact with the deeper elements of his self (p. 105).

Insight cultures are often flight cultures because they keep the group from coming to grips with the affective behavioral dimensions of interpersonal living. Frank (1961) reflects on the problems inherent in an overintellectualized approach to therapy. At least in American psychotherapy

[1]he scientific ideal reinforces the democratic one by valuing lack of dogmatism. It also values objectivity and intellectual comprehension and these features may not be entirely advantageous for psychotherapy. They tend to result in an overevaluation of its cognitive aspects. From the patient's standpoint, 'insight' in the sense of the ability to verbalize self-understanding may be mistaken for genuine attitude change. From the therapist's standpoint, the scientific attitude may lead to undue stress on the niceties of interpretation and avoidance of frankly emotion-arousing techniques such as group rituals and dramatic activities, even though there is universal agreement that in order to succeed psychotherapy must involve the patient's emotions (pp. 219-220).

It is not that insight is considered meaningless. Rather it may be that insight-through-action might be more interesting and ultimately more productive
than a more intellectualized and abstractive form of insight. As Goroff (1967) notes, "the development of 'insight' comes not from interpretations, but from experiencing...changes in...behavior" (p. 432). The participants in the contract group are asked to do just that: change their behavior, attempt to be with one another in different, non-cliche ways. The sharing of resulting emotional reactions and insights is a far cry from the sterile insight-searching that goes on too frequently both in and out of therapy. Douds and associates (1967), too, severely criticize the insight-game:

At best, insight inundates affect with ideas and drowns it in a whirlpool of words. At worst, the person is left with the feeling of being splintered into a thousand pieces, in contact with the fact that he has no identity of his own, only fitting in relation to specific people and situations. Feeling alone, without action, leads to no change. Thus, the alienated person who seeks only insight slowly decays while having the illusion of making progress (p. 177).

Our fear of feelings and emotions moves us to try to substitute logic for them. It is a poor substitute. There are two ways in which the interpretation-insight game may be played. First, a participant may play the role of interpreter: he feels free to discuss the dynamics underlying his own behavior and that of others. Another way of playing the game, however, is to demand that the other come up with "proper" interpretations of and insights into his own behavior. The favorite ploy of the person who plays the game is the question "why." His immediate response to disclosure is not support but "why." If the respondent plays his game, he usually has to venture into intellectualized conjecture which is usually quite boring and does not lead either to fruitful insight or behavioral change. However, it does prevent group members from interacting affectively with one another, and this might
just well be the whole purpose of the game.

Although the pursuit of interpretation and insight might be the problem of only a member or two, it can become a group problem, that is, a "culture" of interpretation and insight can develop within the group. If intellectualized interpretation and insight go unchallenged early in the life of the group, the participants tend to enter into a "tacit understanding" to encourage or at least to tolerate such activities. Once the "decision" has been made, it is difficult to unmake. The leader-member should challenge such "tacit understandings" from the beginning.

This is not to say that every interpretation and that all pursuit of insight constitute flight behavior. Interpretation is valuable to the degree that it has some impact on the person whose behavior is being analyzed. Interpretation must produce some kind of "focus" that leads to behavioral change. Wiener (1967) suggests that "it is not the quantity of information that is important for action, but the quantity of information which can penetrate into a communication and storage apparatus sufficiently to serve as a trigger for action" (p. 127). The pithy, conjectural, "impact" interpretation usually produces intensive interaction in the group, while the extended interpretation almost inevitably ends in monologue and lecture. As May (1958) notes, the more detailed we become in our analysis of forces and drives, the more abstract we become and the more removed from living human beings. An "interpretation culture" contributes vastly to the entropy of group process. Such a culture is overly intellectual and analytic, living together in dialogue, on the other hand, is emotional and synthetic.

Humor. Humor is a two-edged sword. For instance, it can be used to
ease the punitive side effects of confrontation and thus facilitate interaction, but it can also be used as a weapon to destroy attempts to deepen the level of the interaction or to broach sensitive topics. When humor is used to dissipate tension, it does just that, but it does so without getting at the issues underlying the tension. Whenever either an individual or a group adopts humor as a consistent component of interactional style (e.g. the group spends five or ten minutes in banter at the beginning of a session, or a member becomes humorous whenever a particularly sensitive issue is brought up), such behavior should be challenged.

The questioner. It is amazing how many participants seem to handle emotional interactions by means of questions. For instance, participant A reveals himself at a fairly deep level and expresses a good deal of emotion in doing so. Participant B, unable to handle either the revelation or the emotion, begins to ask A questions instead of supporting him or engaging in counter self-sharing. Questions can be effective if they get at the guts of the interaction and also reveal something about the questioner in the process (e.g. that he is concerned, anxious, etc.). Berne (1966) uses interrogation primarily to help document points that promise to be clinically decisive ("Did you really steal the money?"). Questions put to the patient's Adult, Berne says, are thought provoking and in this respect resemble confrontations. But, on the negative side, questions can be an attempt to intellectualize emotions expressed in the group or even an expression of hostility, a way of "picking at" the other. Some people ask questions because they think that they should say something or interact in some way, and questions constitute the safest way of doing this. Whenever questions,
especially "why" questions, become the instruments of an ineffective interpretation-insight culture, they indicate flight and the question-culture should be challenged.

**Rationalizations.** Rationalization is part of the warp and woof of every defense mechanism. In sensitivity groups an almost infinite variety of rationalizations are available to the participant who finds that he is not giving himself to the group experience. As the proverb goes, he who cannot dance says that the yard is stony. It is possible to mention here only a few of the more commonly used rationalizations. One is the "distant fields" syndrome: the participant says to himself if not to others that he would be doing well if he were only in "that other" group. It is the peculiar combination of personalities in this group that prevents him from getting on with the work. Once that he has convinced himself that the obstacle is his environment (including the trainer) rather than himself, he proportions is participation to his "discovery." Sometimes it takes the form: "Even I cannot cope with this group."

Others project their own inadequacies on the laboratory experience itself: "This is a contrived situation, quite unreal; it does not facilitate real interpersonal contact." The fact is that no one claimed that the group situation was not contrived; the laboratory is both real and unreal, but the person who becomes preoccupied with its unrealities is in flight. It is too easy to blame these unrealities for one's own failures, just as it is so easy for the person who is either afraid of failure or who feels he has failed to become cynical about the powers of the group.

A rather silent member of a group once suggested a rather interesting
he should not punish but apologize, for he has violated his contractual obligations in a number of ways. In the contract group, the participant who does nothing about his boredom deserves it.

**Over-involvement.** Some people flee centrifugally, away from the interaction, while others (probably fewer in number) flee centripetally, into the action. The latter over-involve themselves with the group and cannot tolerate what seems to be under-involvement on the part of others. Being-in-the-group becomes their identity (perhaps because they have little sense of identity outside the group) and what they experience inside the group is more real for them than what they experience outside the group. But the group is a means of enhancing one's interpersonal living: not a substitute for it. Perhaps the over-involvement of some can be explained by the construct of reaction-formation: those who feel most uncomfortable and alienated from the group (or from others in general) must seem to be its most ardent supporters. Those who make a cult of growth-group experiences both inside and outside the group do much to alienate both fellow participants and the general population. Over-involvement, however, is not the usual participant problem, and those who tend to flee centrifugally should be slow to accuse their fellow participants of too much involvement.

**Dealing in generalities.** One of the most common failings of participants is a "generality" approach to the interaction. When speaking, they use "you" and "one" and "people" instead of "I," they state and restate general principals without applying them to themselves, or to others and they address themselves to the group at large instead of contacting individual participants. But being specific does make a difference in the sense of immediacy in the
group. There is a world of difference between the statement: "You get scared to bring up what is really bothering you," and "I am really afraid to talk about the things that bother me here." It does make a difference when participants talk about specific incidents and people inside the group instead of speaking generally about the group culture. It does make a difference when a participant directs a high percentage of his remarks to individuals in the group instead of speaking generally to the whole group. When a participant addresses the whole group through the immediacy of his contact with another individual, the entire interaction becomes less abstractive and more engaging. In experimenting with groups, I have arbitrarily banned the use of "people" and of "you" and "one," refused to let others make general statements, and demanded that the participants address themselves to particular individuals instead of the entire group. The resulting culture, while somewhat artificial, at least initially, dramatizes the lack of immediacy that preceded it. Rid the group of the generalities that plague it and you rid it of one of the most common sources of boredom.

Low tolerance for conflict and emotion. Inevitably there are some participants who have a low tolerance for conflict and/or strong emotion. When conflict and emotion run high, these participants react in one of two ways (or both ways at different times): they either withdraw from the interaction or they try to stop what is taking place. In conflict or confrontational situations they may become mediators, saviors, or "red-crossers." They defend the confrontee, chide the confronter, and in general pour oil on the waters of conflict. Nor is it just negative emotion which they find intolerable. Often strong positive emotions are just as threatening
and these, too, must be tempered by humor, changing the subject, and other ploys. This does not mean that no one should ever intervene in conflict situations; some conflict situations are unprofitable and forms of flight in themselves and deserve to be challenged. It does mean, however, that one should try to be aware of and perhaps declare his motivation when he does intervene in conflictual or other emotional situations ("intervene" is used here in distinction from "participate"). The participant who can declare his discomfort during even responsible conflict without trying to sabotage the interaction has taken the first step toward handling his low tolerance for emotion.

No space to move. One of the functions of growth experiences is to reveal to the participant the possibilities for growthful change. He can resist this revelation in a variety of ways. He may deny that any change or at least the changes proposed would be beneficial or even possible. That is, he may present himself as having no "room" in which to "move." He sees himself as hemmed in by his heredity, environment, and history. Too often his response to confrontation is: "I can't do anything about it; that's the way I am." The problem here is not that the participant refuses to move in the directions suggested by others but that he refuses even to entertain the possibility. He might refuse to do so in the name of personal freedom and integrity or out of a sense of being the victim of forces outside his control, but responsible confrontation is not an attack upon a person's integrity nor a call to do the impossible. The person comes to the group not to be re-made but to entertain possibilities for change. If he resists this, he is resisting the very raison d'etre of the group. If a participant finds that
his interactional style is heavily loaded with statements of defense and/or attack, he might well entertain the hypothesis that he is unwilling to examine even the possibility of change.

The Group in Flight

Obviously some of the resistances and flight modalities outlined above could apply not only to individuals but to the group as a whole. This is especially true if the group establishes a "culture" in which one or another flight modality, e.g., intellectualized interpretation, is either tolerated or even encouraged. Certain other behaviors, however, pertain more to the resistance or the flight of the group as such, though here again any particular behavior might characterize an individual rather than the group. Some of these behaviors are outlined below.

Extended contract talk. In contract-group experiences it is essential that participants have a solid understanding of the principal provisions of the contract. In other kinds of growth-group experiences, especially experiences characterized by goallessness or "planned ambiguity," it is necessary for the participants to work out some kind of contract among themselves. In both groups, then, early meetings are characterized by "contract talk" which includes a discussion of goals and the group structures necessary to achieve these goals. However, when the group persists in "contract talk," when it keeps formulating and reformulating its goals, when it keeps restructuring the contract, then it is quite likely that the group is allowing talk about the contract to take the place of fulfilling the contract. It is much easier to discuss a contract (expressed or implied) than to engage in it.

This does not mean that a group should not discuss the contract or reformulate
its goals from time to time. This reformulation, however, should be quite concrete, that is, goals should not be discussed in themselves but in terms of the individuals, interactions, and incidents of the group itself. If this is done, occasional "contract talk" will become just another modality through which the participants contact one another.

**Analysis of past interactions.** Detailed analysis of past interactions in the group is both a caricature of "processing" and a seemingly popular form of flight. For instance, the group in an afternoon meeting discusses in detail the dynamics of the morning meeting. This takes place under the guise of "working things out" and "getting things straight," but the hidden purpose is frequently to gain a respite from intimate interaction. The group analyzes not to put things in perspective but to put the interaction at a distance. Sometimes these "historical" analyses take place during the same meeting, that is, the participants interact for a while and then the interchange degenerates into a "This happened and then that happened: or a "No, B got angry and then A got angry" situation in which the here-and-now is abandoned for a safer there-and-then. In worthwhile "processing," the participants become critics of the group culture and of their own interactions with a view to improving both. "Historical" analyses, on the other hand, usually become ends in themselves; the group treads water, as it were, in order to avoid involvement. It is interacting to see what happens after the group concludes an "historical" analysis of its interaction: frequently it merely drops silent for a while, which is some indication of the relevance of the analysis.

**Serious a-contractual conversations.** Sometimes groups flee the expressed
or implied contract by engaging in "worthwhile discussions" which really have no relation to the goals of the group. I sat in on a sensitivity group once and listened for a while to a rather high-level discussion of some of the most important social issues of the day. Had a total stranger come into the group without knowing its general purpose, I am sure that he would have thought that it was a social-action group that was taking itself seriously. Such conversation would have been most appropriate at another time in another place, but in the training group it was merely an expression of discomfort and anxiety and a flight from the real purpose of the group. Usually, such serious discussions take place early in the life the the group, for most people assume that when they are talking intellectually about serious issues, they are in close contact with their fellow discussants. Such conversations are difficult to challenge, too, for it seems ignoble to interrupt something that is so worthwhile in itself. I tend to interrupt the conversation and have the group "process" what it is doing. Soon the participants realize that they are avoiding the real issues at hand. The point is that such conversations should be interrupted immediately so that "serious intellectual discussions" do not become part of the group culture.

Turn-taking and dependence on exercises. Some of the exercises which are commonly introduced into human relations laboratories involve "turn-taking" or "going around." For instance, early in the life the the group, each member might be asked to give his first impressions of every other member. Turn-taking provides a structure which both forces each member to participate and provides a certain amount of "institutionalized" safety. As the group moves forward, however, there should be less and less reliance on
is the case, then these members are in flight. No structure which significantly reduces the involvement of a number of members (or serves as an excuse for their non-involvement) should be tolerated; if "dealing with one" has this effect, then it is not being handled properly. It is possible to "deal with one" in a way which does not cut down on the involvement of the participants. First of all, no participant should be allowed to excuse himself from the interaction simply because another participant is to a greater or lesser extent the focal point of the discussion. Secondly, "dealing with one" does not exclude interactions between participants other than the focal participant. Too often it is assumed that if the group is "dealing with one," the only permissible interactions are those between the focal participant and someone else. This is artificial and stultifying. Thirdly, the focal participant, himself realizing that there is a tendency on the part of some to withdraw from the interaction in a "dealing with one" situation, should take the initiative in bringing silent members back into the discussion. The problem is that most focal participants become somewhat passive and merely allow themselves to be dealt with. Another danger inherent in a "dealing with one" situation is the tendency to focus on there-and-then incidents and concerns rather than the here-and-now. This of itself serves the cause of alienation. The responsibility for maintaining a here-and-now culture in a "dealing with one" situation falls to a great degree on the shoulders of the focal participant. He cannot escape talking about there-and-then concerns, but it is his responsibility to make these concerns relevant to the here-and-now. For instance, it may be that the there-and-then limits his ability to involve himself with the other participants, that is, his past history affects his
sharing yourself with me, it gives me the courage to share myself with you."
It is also unwarranted to assume that the group can work completely through
any participant's self-revelation at any one time. Such gradiosity covers a
multitude of uncertainties and anxieties in groups. The group should feel
free to return again and again to anything that has been said in the group
and to look at new facets of self-disclosure in the light of subsequent
group interaction.

Interruptions and moods. If the group culture is too "polite," it will
not allow one participant to interrupt another nor will it allow anyone to
interrupt a group procedure such as "dealing with one." Perhaps a distinction
should be made between relevant and irrelevant interruptions or interventions.
To interrupt in order to change the topic is one thing, to intervene because
one has something important and relevant to say is another. On the one hand,
the group culture should not encourage boorishness, but, on the other, it
should promote a freer atmosphere than that found in polite conversations.
With good purpose one should be able to break into a conversation without
being made feel that he is an intruder or a bull in a china shop. Although
it has been thought that the number of interruptions that would occur when
members of families of schizophrenics interacted would be significantly
higher than the number of interruptions during the conversations carried on
by the families of normals. Mishler and Waxler (1966) found that the
opposite was true. The data suggest that the families of acute schizophrenic
patients have the fewest interruptions and families of normal children have
the most. Such data may indicate that "interruptions" are even an essential
part of good conversational interaction. If the interaction is so fragile that
any interruption can destroy it, then perhaps the participants should work at making it more robust rather than pouring energies into protecting it. Sometimes participants claim that through interruptions the "magic of the moment" is lost: "We never got back to it." This statement, however, may mean: "We did not want to get back to it"—relief being disguised as altruistic annoyance. The group does not have its moods and mood can be a facilitating factor, but the group should not be too dependent on mood in order to get its work done. It is not that there are not "right times" for dealing with certain issues, but it is up to the group to create these "right times" rather than waiting for them to happen.

Problem-solution cultures. No matter how applicable a problem-solution model might to be such sciences as mathematics and physics, it leaves much to be desired when applied to intrapsychic and interpersonal living. As soon as a group participant mentions that he has certain "problems," this evokes certain predictable reactions in the other participants: they want to "solve" his problems, have him "solve" them himself, or help him "solve" them. In fact, the group usually welcomes talk of problems, because it is much easier to deal with problems than to involve oneself with persons. If certain of his behaviors can be separated from him and labeled as problematic, then one's approach to him can be relatively simple and "clean."

This seems to be more than just a question of semantics. "Problems" and implied "solutions" simply are not persons but ways of setting persons at a distance. In fact, people are beginning to substitute other terms for the word "problem." For instance, they talk about their "hang-ups." It may be that the term "hang-up" is just a current substitution for the cliche
"problem," but the former term implies that the person who is "hung up" is in some way responsible for this behavior and that behavioral change in within his power. At least "hang-ups" do not seem to have "solutions."

Life is not the compartmentalized or atomistic entity that the problem-solution paradigm envisions. Life is principally interpersonal living, but to cast interpersonal living in terms of "problems" and "solutions" tends to make objects out of people. Even though most interpersonal-growth groups, at least in the beginning, identify depth of involvement in the group process with the revelation of "problems," depth of involvement entails their sharing themselves rather than their problems. If the participants insist upon sharing problems, this might be because they cannot share themselves. When two people find it difficult to involve themselves with each other, they seldom sit down and "solve" this "problem" they have with each other. Rather, through dialogue they begin to transcend attitudes and behaviors that keep them apart. Once they become more available to each other, a new synthesis (rather than a "solution") takes place in their relationship. They grow in relationship to each other, and growth does not fit in well with a problem-solution paradigm.

If a person always talks about himself in terms of his problems, he tends to maintain the false hope that if he solves his problems, then things will be all right: Utopia is the land of solved problems. Perhaps the use of such terms as "problem" and "solution" appears unhealthy or inappropriate because such language is symptomatic of overly "mechanistic" attitudes toward oneself and one's relationship with others.

Tacit decisions. The tendency of the group to make "tacit decisions"
or come to "tacit understandings" has been mentioned above, but it bears repeating here in that it is one of the principal ways in which groups as such take flight. As Whitaker and Lieberman (1964) note, unchallenged modes of behavior tend to pass into the group culture as "laws," and once these "laws" are made, they become very difficult to change or abrogate. "Tacit understandings" can affect almost any aspect of group life: the content of discussions ("We do not talk about sex here"), procedure ("When one person is talking, no one should interrupt him and he should be given all the time he wants"), depth of interaction ("We really don't want to wash our dirty linen here" or "There are some things that we should just keep to ourselves"), rules ("Coming late or absenting oneself from this group is not an offense"), style ("Humor is allowed almost anytime during the interaction"), goals ("Our purpose is to decrease the discomfort that we feel in being together with one another" or "Cooperation with one another is not a group value in this situation"). Since flight-by-tacit-decision can take place very early in the life of the group, it is up to the leader-member to explain both the process involved and the consequences of such "understandings" and to challenge them as soon as he sees them being formulated in the group.

"Tacit decisions" can begin with clearly expressed statements which go unchallenged in the group. For instance, in a group which was slated to meet once a week for twelve weeks in three-and-a-half hour sessions, one of the participants said during the first meeting: "This set-up really doesn't allow us much time to get involved with one another; the time is short and we don't see one another between sessions." One hypothesis might be that he was afraid of getting involved with the others and that he really feared
that there was too much time. His statement, however, went unchallenged in the group and kept coming up like a refrain in subsequent meetings. The participants tacitly accepted his analysis of the limitation of the possibilities of the group and spent the following weeks trying to live with the frustration that this entailed. There are always tendencies to blame the group structure (time, length of meeting, lack of specific things to say and do, etc.) for group inaction, but to allow these tendencies to become concretized in the group culture can mean the suffocation of the group.

**Ritual behavior.** Alexander (1963) warns against what he calls "standardizing the treatment" in psychotherapy, that is, allowing it to degenerate into an interaction ritual between therapist and client. The interpersonal-growth group, too, can easily take on a ritualistic atmosphere devoid of eruptions of any kind in which sameness soothes. Although the participants become quite comfortable in such a ritual, there is still the illusion that something serious and worthwhile is really taking place. In a ritualistic group culture, not only do the same issues come up over and over again, but they are handled in the same way. For instance, participant X's silence and general lack of involvement is dealt with from time to time, but little is done between ritualistic confrontations to bring X into the interaction. It is almost as if the participants were to say to themselves from time to time: "Since nothing in particular is taking place right now, we might as well make a group assault on X again." One way to dramatize the ritualization of the group is to replay a videotape of, let us say, session three together with a tape of session eight. If the same issues are being dealt
with in the same way, that is, if it would be impossible for a stranger to determine which was the earlier and which the later session, then it may well be that the group has ritualized itself as a form of resistance or flight. A ritualized group culture is a sterile thing of which boredom and resistance to attending (reluctance to come, coming late, actual absences) are the inevitable signs.

Exceeding contractual limits and the question of "loyalty." The following situation comes up again and again in groups. The meeting is scheduled to last from seven until 10 o'clock. Little happens until about nine-thirty so that by ten o'clock the group is "in the middle of things." Most members take it as a sign of involvement in and loyalty to the group to extend the group session until ten-thirty or eleven o'clock. Not only that, but they implicitly or explicitly accuse anyone who wants to leave at the contracted time of "disloyalty." Frequently this mode of proceeding is established early in the life of the group by means of a "tacit understanding" and becomes an important factor in the group culture. The group attempts to take flight by substituting sheer quantity of participation (time spent together) for quality. In my opinion, meetings should, in general, start and stop in time. "Loyalty" should be demonstrated not by a willingness to give oneself to endless discussions (quite often such discussions entail "dealing with one" in a way which precludes the involvement of the majority of the members) but by a willingness to get down to work from the start. The person who "opens up" five minutes before the scheduled end of the meeting should continue in the following meeting. If in the following meeting he finds that the "golden moment" has passed, it is more than likely that he was
only teasing the group in the first place. Or if mood is so important for him, then the interactions that take place when the mood is upon him might well have little learning value. His moods are perhaps analogous to drugged states in which real learning either does not take place or does not transfer to non-drugged conditions.

Concluding Remarks

Flight as non-growthful avoidance learning. Avoidance learning has been used with varying degrees in treating such problems as alcoholism and sexually deviant behavior (Kalish, 1965). The client must learn to stay away from a certain situation, avoid a certain stimulus, or place a certain act in order to prevent some unwanted consequences. For instance, an alcoholic treated with Antabuse might learn that nausea and violent retching are too high a price to pay for drinking, so he avoids the stimulus that results in such a noxious response. In groups the participants soon learn that, at least initially, a certain degree of pain and discomfort is associated with involving themselves affectively with one another. They also learn that there are certain behaviors (see flight behaviors outlined above) which put off, circumvent, or in other ways avoid painful self-actualizing interaction. Each time a participant engages in some sort of flight and not only avoids painful interaction but even receives some kind of positive response from his fellow participants, the flight behavior in question is reinforced and the group is on its way toward a flight culture.

Participation versus involvement. Some members participate quite a bit in the group interaction but involve themselves minimally. In reviewing videotape of a group session recently, I began scoring the interactions,
using (X) to indicate a contractual interaction, (O) a non-contractual interaction, and (N) a kind of neutral interaction designed to "keep things moving" though not constituting a real contribution in itself. Participation "styles" began to emerge. For instance, one participant ended up with a long string of (N's). He had participated quite a bit in the interaction but had contributed little of himself. He had really assumed the role of "facilitator" without even realizing what he was doing (for he was quite surprised later when his fellow participants told him that he was playing the role of leader). The participants who have long strings of (O's) and (N's) are certainly participating, but they are not involving themselves. It would be better if these members were to cut down on their participation and increase their involvement.

**Fight versus maintaining adequate defenses.** Sensitivity-training experiences, if carried out responsibly, give the participants a relatively safe opportunity to lower some of their defenses in the name of growth. No growth experience, however, should demand that the participant divest himself of his defenses entirely. But maintaining adequate defenses (even in the process of lowering them) and resistance-flight are two different processes. The more common danger is that the participant will not drop his defenses enough to allow the experience to have its impact on him. The person with crumbling defenses either refuses to participate in such experiences because he senses the danger or he reveals his tenuous defense-system behaviorally early in the life of the group. Selection procedures should screen out those with crumbling defenses so that the group culture can bring to bear fairly strong pressures on those with more than adequate
defenses.

**Flight as entropic.** Group interaction tends to entropy unless it is fed "information" from "outside" the system, that is, outside the systems of defense and convention that enclose the participants. Cliches are entropic, a cause and a sign of the decline of the system. Long-winded, intellectualized interpretation-insight systems are entropic. "Story," on the other hand, has high "message" or "information" value, for it keeps the system "open," reverses the entropic process, and leads to an enclave of anti-entropic "organization" (see Wiener, 1967, and Rosenblith, 1967). Flight is always identifiable by its entropic effect. No matter how engaging or entertaining it might be at the moment, it has no sustaining effect and the "system" that is constituted by the interrelationships between members "runs down." If nothing is done, it dies. Again, no contract, implicit or explicit, can ban the various forms of flight that take place during sensitivity-training laboratories, but if the participants are willing to examine the modes of flight in which they do engage, they can learn much about themselves.
Chapter XI
Epilog

The Problem of Agency

An assumption throughout this book has been that it is the relatively active participant who will benefit most from the training experience. The group has no miraculous powers: it cannot serve the personal and interpersonal growth of the participant who actively resists the experience or who remains a passive spectator of the group interaction. However, as Bion (1961) notes, it is impossible to do nothing in a group, not even by doing nothing. A refusal to accept the challenge of agency in a group is a refusal to face one's potential. The assumption here is that such refusals are deleterious to personal and interpersonal growth. Erikson (1964) speaks generally about the agency-passivity dimension of psychic life:

*Patiens, then, would denote a state of being exposed from within or from without to superior forces which cannot be overcome without prolonged patience or energetic redeeming help; while *agens* connotes an inner state of being unbroken in initiative and in acting in the service of a cause which sanctions this initiative. You will see immediately that the state of *agens* is what all clients, or patients, in groups or alone, are groping for and need our help to achieve (p. 87).*

Indeed, one of the common marks of emotional disturbance is the surrender of agency, especially the refusal to be an agent in interpersonal situations. Perhaps one of the most important goals of laboratory training in interpersonal relations is experimenting with one's power-of-agency in interpersonal living. In order to do this, the individual participant must take responsibility for what is happening in the group: "The group (including the trainers) is responsible for itself, each of us must exercise his personal
and joint responsibility if any degree of 'self-actualization' is to be achieved" (Bugental & Tannenbaum, 1965, p. 110). The group will be as good as I make it--this seems to be the cold, hard logic of sensitivity-training groups.

Agency, like independence, cannot be conferred; it must be seized:

In the last analysis independence cannot be conferred; it can only be seized....[W]e can only say that it has become manifest in an individual or group when it no longer occurs to that group or individual to seek the solution of its problems by an agent outside itself. To 'demand one's independence'...is of course a contradiction in terms (Slater, 1966, p. 150).

"Initiative," therefore, is an important concept in training groups. In the contract group this is made abundantly clear: the member, for all practical purposes, contracts to be an initiator, to move out of himself and "contact" the group and its individual participants. It is unlikely that the group will transform a passive person into a high-initiator, but an increased sense of agency is an important goal for every participant. If a person participates only by responding when he is contacted in some way, then his participation, rated in terms of seconds spent talking, might well be high, but if his participation is rated in terms of number of acts initiated (see Mann, 1959, p. 244), then his participation will be low. The contract calls for participation by initiation--at least this is an ideal to be pursued.

It is not suggested here that universal active participation is characteristic of face-to-face groups. The evidence indicates that ordinarily "interaction is unevenly distributed among group members" (Collins & Guetzkow, 1964, p. 170). There is a characteristic tendency for a few people to dominate group interaction and this tendency increases with the size of the
group. In training groups, however, tendencies to domination and passivity are to be resisted. This is essential if the participants are to work toward cohesiveness. The group dynamics literature indicates that cohesiveness, defined in terms of inter-member attraction or liking, increases with increased interaction (for a summary see Lott & Lott, 1965). Collins and Guetzkow (1964) also cite evidence indicating that the "more interactions initiated by a group member, the more interactions will be directed to him by other group members" (p. 170). In other words, group cohesiveness depends on intermember activity and intermember activity depends, at least in part, on the willingness of the individual participant to assume a certain degree of agency in the interpersonal life of the group. Mann (1959) indicates that initiators in groups are usually more intelligent, better adjusted, and more extroverted than non-initiators. Since group members usually possess different amounts of intelligence, adjustment, and "extroversion," this means that the group as a whole will have to strive to keep the interaction distributed in such a way as to benefit all members. This is not to say that all members must participate equally (nor is mere quantity rather than quality of participation being urged), but it does mean that care should be taken to give all members an opportunity to become initiators and that the relatively passive should be encouraged to initiate interaction. It is hypothesized here that a certain quantity of participation (and initiation) is essential to overall quality of participation. Every group session starts with an emptiness which can be filled only by the initiative of the participants. Filling this emptiness must be a cooperative effort.

Bunker (1965), in studying the effects of laboratory training in the
participants' day-to-day lives subsequent to the training sessions found no differences between participants and controls in effective initiation of action, assertiveness, and self-confidence—all factors in the "agency" dimension of living. However, what we do not know is how much initiative, assertiveness, and self-confidence are displayed by the experimental group in the laboratory itself. Nor do we know whether increasing initiative, assertiveness, and self-confidence were explicit goals of the laboratory experience or not. A laboratory will not magically increase these qualities unless it is designed to do so and unless the participants experiment with and exercise their power-of-agency within the group. In the contract group the exercise-of-agency is an explicit goal. I would like to see Bunker's experiment replicated with an experimental group which has been explicitly encouraged to responsible agency by the laboratory experience itself.

Research: Issues and Applications

A number of reviews have covered the research literature on laboratory learning from a variety of points of view (Buchanan, 1965; Campbell & Dunnette, 1968; House, 1967; Stock, 1964). While most of the research has had a direct or indirect managerial or organizational orientation, still it raises issues and suggests application to laboratory experiences the goals of which are self-actualization and interpersonal growth. Unfortunately, despite the phenomenal growth and spread of these latter experiences, there is little research which deals directly with them. In fact, the research that seems most relevant to such groups is that certainly to psychotherapy and to a number of areas of social psychology. However, no one has yet synthesized the pertinent aspects of this literature and used it as a
starting point for research into interpersonal-growth oriented sensitivity-training groups. Yet it is only fitting to comment on some of the research findings in the general area of laboratory training and discuss their relevance to the kind of experience outlined in the past ten chapters. Since these comments will not be exhaustive, the reader interested in a more comprehensive review of research problems and findings is referred to the reviews listed above.

The lack of a unitary phenomenon. The consensus of those who have reviewed the literature is that the evidence concerning the value of laboratory-training experiences is contradictory, confusing, and inconclusive. Since most of the research deals with the use of laboratory training for the purpose of increasing managerial skills and organizational effectiveness, the above statement may be put as follows: "Examination of the research literature leads to the conclusion that while T-group training seems to produce observable changes in behavior, the utility of these changes for the performance of individuals in their organizational roles remains to be demonstrated" (Campbell & Dunnette, 1968, p. 73). As such, this conclusion does not deal with the use of laboratory techniques as means of increasing self-actualization processes and interpersonal growth. One of the principal causes of the confusing and contradictory evidence obtained so far is undoubtedly the fact that "sensitivity-training," the "T-group," and "laboratory-training" are very often broad terms which do not indicate any kind of unitary phenomenon. Laboratories use a variety of techniques, e.g., lectures or lecturettes, exercises, both verbal and nonverbal, and face-to-face conversation of various kinds; trainers use a variety of
styles, some being quite passive while others are quite active; laboratories take place in a variety of settings with different kinds of populations, e.g. volunteers who attend a residential laboratory, students in courses, non-volunteers who represent a cross-section of a particular organization, volunteers in weekly local groups conducted by non-professionals, etc. Perhaps it is the phenomenon itself which is confusing and not the evidence. As Campbell and Dunnette (1968) put it:

Research concerning the relative contributions of specific technological features of the T group is also sparse. For example, there are no systematic studies examining the influence of differences in trainer personality and/or style on the outcome achieved by participants. Case reports and anecdotal evidence are all that exist (p. 97).

It is practically impossible at times to replicate studies, for the descriptions of what took place in the training situations are either non-existent or too sparse to be meaningful. The variables of the laboratory situation must be described carefully if replication is to become possible.

In that the contract-group approach delineates goals, leadership style, and the kinds of interaction expected of the members, it offers a kind of unitary phenomenon for study. If, in addition, a log is kept indicating the sequence of such events as exercises, greater control is possible in replication studies. This does not mean that research with laboratories characterized by goallessness and "planned ambiguity" is impossible (though it is probably more difficult). However, the essential communalities of such experiences should be carefully described so that research efforts center around the same phenomena. A contract approach to self-actualization through the small group experience may standardize the experience in a way which does not appeal to some, but if such standardization is impossible,
then so is impossible, then so is research and all that an interested party can do is listen to the "witness," both positive and negative, given by those who engage in laboratory training.

**Methodological problems and the question of outcome.** It is a truism to say that enormous methodological problems face the researcher interested in macro-aspects of human behavior. Furthermore, once one has read to extent research literature dealing with laboratory training, it is easy to criticize the efforts which have been made to measure this phenomenon. For instance, one glaring defect in these studies (among many in the design of research) has been the failure to use control groups (Gassner, Gold, & Snadowsky, 1964). One of the serious problems facing the researcher is how to measure outcome. In this respect, a kind of dilemma exists: on the one hand, traditional psychological tests are not sensitive to the changes which take place in training groups, and yet, on the other, ad hoc scales and tests are unvalidated. For instance, Dunnette (1962) reports a study in which the California Psychological Inventory was used to assess change in 70 business students who has engaged in 48 hours of laboratory training. Although the results were termed negative, perhaps it would have been more exact to say that they were irrelevant, for there is no reason why the GPI should measure the outcome of laboratory training. Haiman (1963) found significant shifts in attitude as measured by a composite open-mindedness scale, and indeed, as Campbell and Dunnette (1968) suggest, the whole area of attitude change as one of the principal outcomes of laboratory experiences is one which has been little studied even though it is an area of great promise. Some of the tests which have been used to measure outcome have been
used to measure outcome have been of limited use because of ceiling effects: laboratory participants score high on the pretest and thus have little "room to move." Better tests in the area of the self-actualization of the relatively normal person are needed. After a laboratory experience, a participant might feel better and be more satisfied with the quality of his interpersonal interaction, but many are wary of such subjective measures.

In summary it seems relatively well established that the way in which an individual sees himself may indeed change during the courses of a T group. However, there is no firm evidence indicating that such changes are produced by the T-group training as compared with other types of training, merely by the passage of time, or even by the simple expedient of retaking a self-descriptive inventory after a period of thinking about one's previous responses to the same inventory (Campbell & Dunnette, 1968, p. 91).

Furthermore, while it is possible to ask the associates of a person who has participated in a laboratory whether he has changed for the better or not (Bunker, 1965), such measurement is awkward and of unknown accuracy. Moreover even the positive changes might be unrelated to both the kinds of interactions and the goals which characterize the laboratory experience. It might even be that the participant merely used the laboratory experience as an occasion to engage in some kind of "conversion" experience which is relatively unrelated to the goals, operations, interactions, and exercises of the laboratory. But if this is the case, are we to say that the laboratory has been successful or not?

Most outcome studies deal with group scores. The problem with group scores, however, is that individual differences are lost and ceiling effectives are frequently operative. During the same laboratory experience, some participants improve their interpersonal skills while others seem to
S far research focused on the 'average' effects of T-group or laboratory training has been considered. That is, the crucial question has been whether or not training makes a difference for the group as a whole. Such a generalized interpretation might cover up important interactions between individual differences and training methods. Given a particular kind of outcome, certain kinds of people might benefit from T-group training while others may actually be harmed. The same reasoning may be applied to the interaction of differences in situational and organizational variables with the training experience. However, very few studies have investigated interactive effects (Campbell & Dunnette, 1968, p. 96).

What is it that causes some to succeed and some to fail? What does the successful person do that the unsuccessful person does not?

Finally, the question of "baseline" measurements seem to be important in outcome studies. In a study by Zand, Steele, and Zalkind (1967) it was found that individuals rated as most "involved" in the laboratory experience also tended to be rated as the most involved in follow-up activities. At first glance, this evidence would seem to bear on the question of "agency" discussed above. But since no baseline with respect to involvement has been determined, it is not clear whether it was or increased agency or merely of consistency of behavior. There was no baseline against which to measure improvement in "involvement" or "agency."

Perhaps it is time to review the criteria we use to judge the success or failure of sensitivity-training experience. If measurement is to have any meaning at all, it is necessary clearly to delineate the specific goals of any given laboratory experience, to determine what means are associated with achieving these goals, and to devise measures to determine whether these goals have been reached or not. Perhaps the criteria which we have used to measure success or failure have been too gross or have not
reflected the real goals of the experience. For instance, managerial-training laboratories aside, can success be indicated by the very fact that the participant believes that he has benefited by the training experience and somehow feels enriched for having involved himself rather intimately with this set of people at this time? Does the criterion of success always have to be (or at least exclusively be) what constructive changes take place in the home situation subsequent to the laboratory experience? Perhaps at this stage of laboratory-training development we should be more modest in looking for results. But we can be neither modest nor exact unless we get a clearer picture of what takes place within the laboratory and of the component parts of the goals set for training experiences.

Research and the goals of laboratory learning. To say that "interpersonal sensitivity" is the goal of laboratory learning is to say almost nothing. Campbell and Dunnette (1968) discuss the vagueness of such a goal:

The major purpose here is simply to emphasize that interpersonal sensitivity is not only an elusive, but also a high complex phenomenon. Persons involved in a T-group training program may indeed become more "sensitive," but the nature and underlying strategies of the sensitivities developed may differ widely from person to person and from program to program. Unless the various components and strategies involved in interpersonal sensitivity are taken into account during the design of measuring instruments and during the design and implementation of research investigations, little new knowledge concerning T-group training effects or the likelihood of transferring skills back to the work setting will accrue. So far...most investigations have not attempted to cope with the serious measurement and design problems in this area (p. 80).

Later in the same article the authors run up against the very complexity they speak of. They suppose that one of the goals of laboratory learning should be accurate empathy and they tend to define such empathy in terms of the
ability of an individual to predict the values and attitudes of others. Then they conclude on this negative note: "In sum, the studies incorporating a measure of how well an individual can predict the attitudes and values of others before and after T-group training have yielded largely negative results" (p. 91). Yet it is doubtful that such predictive ability is the goal of interpersonal-growth oriented laboratory training. Accurate empathy refers to the ability to get some kind of feeling for what is going on inside another here and now and is not necessarily related to conceptual accuracy or predictive ability. Sensitivity training should produce more openness to the attributes, attitudes, opinions, feelings, and reactions of others. Accuracy, however, is something that depends upon both the one who emits the communication and the one who receives it. A person perceives another more accurately both if he gets rid of his own barriers to perceiving and if the other emits communications more directly and accurately. Accuracy depends both on the ability to perceive and the clarity of cues emitted. The central point is this: it is difficult to measure attainment of goals unless there is agreement on the part of the participant, trainer, and researcher that the particular laboratory experience is designed to achieve a certain goal and that the participants see it as a goal worth achieving.

Perhaps it would be better to set more modest goals for laboratory experiences. Perhaps the laboratory is a success for any participant who experiments with his behavior sufficiently to get some kind of feel for his interpersonal potentialities and deficiencies. The laboratory, then, would be an instrument of exploration rather than a vehicle of immediate change. It would be much easier to determine whether a participant experi-
ments with certain kinds of behavior than to determine whether his life styles has changed. It might well be that it is participant who explores his possibilities who ultimately changes. If this is the case, then it is not surprising that Harrison (1966) and Schultz and Allen (1966) have found that some of the principal effects of laboratory training in terms of behavioral change did not take place until months after the training experience. Perhaps there is a period of fermentation or incubation characterized by subtle behavioral changes (e.g. changes in interpersonal attitudes).

The psychotherapy research paradigm. Research in laboratory learning could well take some cues from some of the more effective research taking place in psychotherapy. First of all, the goals of any particular kind of laboratory training should be quite clear and operationalized in terms of specific behaviors. In the contract group, engaging in self-disclosure, expression of feeling, support, confrontation, and self-exploration as a response to confrontation are the specific interactional behaviors that define the group goal of interpersonal growth. The immediate goal of the contract group is experimentation with these behaviors on the part of the participants. The laboratory is a "success" in one sense if the participants actually do (increasingly) engage in such behaviors, for it is hypothesized that through these behaviors they come in more effective contact with themselves and with other. The laboratory becomes "diagnostic" in a good sense of that term: the participants come face to face with their interpersonal deficits and potentialities. It is hypothesized that if the participants do experiment constructively with such behavior in the context of the group, then possibilities for growthful behavior change arise in rea
life situations.

The laboratory must provide a climate in which the kind of experimentation described above becomes possible. Certain participant, trainer, relationship, and situation variables facilitate such a climate. It is the function of research to determine precisely what these variables are.

(a) Participant behaviors. Friedman (1963) found that a patient who enters a therapeutic relationship expecting to be helped in that relationship usually does find help in the form of symptom reduction, that is, patient-expectancy is related to symptom reduction. Similarly, it seems that the person who enters a laboratory experience expecting to benefit from it will tend to profit from the experience. The person who enters a laboratory close-minded and cynical is likely to leave the experience the same way (and then perhaps blame the experience itself for being ineffective). Truax and Carkhuff (1964) have suggested that concreteness or specificity of expression is a highly desirable patient variable, that is, they find some evidence that it is related to successful outcome. Concreteness also seems to be a participant variable which adds to the effectiveness of training sessions. The question is: what participant variables are related to positive and negative outcomes?

(b) Trainer variables. Rogers and his associates (1967) discuss the differences between "high-functioning" and "low-functioning" therapists, outlining the qualities that make for high-functioning, e.g. acceptance and warmth, genuineness, accurate empathy, etc. Others (e.g., Berenson & Mitchell, 1968; Berenson, Mitchell, & Laney, 1968; Berenson, Mitchell, & Moravec, 1968; Doude, Berenson, Carkhuff, & Pierce, 1967) have added
confrontation to the repertory of high-functioning therapists. Patients in therapy with high-functioning therapists tend to make progress, while those in therapy with low-functioning therapists tend to stay the same or deteriorate. Now, given the wide variety of trainer styles in laboratory experiences, there are probably certain kinds of behavior that help create a climate of growth for participants and other kinds of behavior which inhibit such growth. It is the function of research to determine precisely what trainers should and should not do in order to facilitate growth in the laboratory. In the contract group the function of the trainer is spelled out with a good deal of clarity: he is to manifest the growth-facilitating behaviors suggested by Rogers (1967), he clarifies the contract, he suggests problems that might arise because of his role as leader or leader-member, and he models the kind of interactional behavior called for by the contract. It is hypothesized that if he does these things well, he will help provide a climate in which interpersonal growth (defined by the participants' fulfilling the contract by experimenting with the kinds of behavior it calls for) is facilitated.

Situation and relationship variables, too, should be studied in laboratory settings, especially with respect to the impact they have on outcome.

Outcomes: success, indifference, disappointment, and damage. Though Bunker (1965), Boyd and Elliss (1962), and Valiquet (1964) in more or less objective studies have showed that laboratory experiences caused increased sensitivity, more open communication, and increased flexibility in role behavior, still most of the evidence that exists concerning the outcome of laboratory training exists in the form of personal testimonials. Most
volunteers believe that they have been helped in some way (although at times they have difficulty in specifying in just what ways), though it is also true that while the participant might believe that he has changed greatly, his associates do not perceive the changes. This may mean that the laboratory participant is inept in externalizing the change, that his associates are inept in recognizing change, or that change simply has not taken place. On the other hand, a certain percentage of participants leave the laboratory experience feeling indifferent, disappointed, or even disturbed. Klaw (1965) for instance, found one in ten liking themselves less after a training period and not knowing what to do about it. It is not uncommon that people change after laboratory experiences, but the changes are not always in the expected or "right" direction. A study by the Foundation for Research on Human Behavior (1960) showed that participants believed that they had changed in seven or eight areas, but it also showed that they thought that half of these changes were negative. Boyd and Elliss (1962) studied three groups: one laboratory-trained, the second conventionally trained, and the third not trained at all. Of 22 reported changes judged to be unfavorable (e.g., increase in irritability or loss of tolerance) 20 were attributed to members of laboratory-trained groups. Underwood (1965) showed that laboratory training produced more observable changes in participants than in controls with respect to job behavior, but it also produced a higher percentage of unfavorable changes. Even if the participant changes "for the good" during the laboratory experience, this does not mean that his life will proceed more smoothly than before, for his friends and the organizations to which he belongs might not be ready for these changes. For example, Schein and
and Bennis (1965) report three incidents of participants who suffered more tension after they returned to the job. It may well be that these participants changed "for the better" but the laboratory did not help them handle the problem of re-entry into a society that had not changed. In fact, some of the unfavorable changes reported above might merely reflect resistance to growth on the part of the back-home associates who rated the trainees' behavior subsequent to the training experience. In sum, the whole problem of the transfer of training effects to real-life situations is an unsolved one.

As to the question of whether laboratory experiences are actually psychologically harmful or not, House (1967) in a review of the literature states: "Instances of reported collapse as a result of participation in T-Group training are rare and completely undocumented..." (p. 29). Seashore (1968) corroborates this: "The incident of serious stress and mental disturbance during training is difficult to measure, but it is estimated to be less than one percent of participants and in almost all cases occurs in persons with a history of prior disturbances" (p. 2). Such assurances are important because it seems that in the whole mythology of sensitivity training almost everyone knows a "person who" has suffered tragic emotional upset because of some laboratory experience. This does not mean that laboratory experiences do not have risks, but then again it is somewhat dangerous to fly, to drive, get married, and to set one's goals high, that is, there is a certain danger associated with living, especially with living a full human life, but men usually do not become preoccupied with these dangers. Safeguards should certainly be built into laboratory experiences,
but people should not become obsessed by potential dangers.

The power of the laboratory experience. The evidence we have indicates that the laboratory is a powerful force for behavioral change, but it also indicates that we have an imperfect understanding of the sources if its power and of ways to channel it into constructive change. An enlightened and integrated process-outcome research program is essential if laboratory programs are to become growthful vehicles of personal and cultural change.

The Ending of the Group

While most sensitivity-training laboratories are relatively short (a two-week residential laboratory, a semester course, a week-end marathon, etc.), this is not always the case. Some people are beginning to integrate a group experience into the pattern of their lives. Even in the short-lived laboratory, many of the participants get to know one another quite intimately and, in a sense, do not want to see the group experience come to an end. There is often a certain nostalgia associated with the last meeting, but usually there is no choice: because of real-life needs, the group must end. Perhaps Mills (1964) describes the feeling tone of the last meeting most poignantly: "Yearning for a benediction from some source, the group dies" (p. 79). Those who belong to groups that do not die probably do so for a number of reasons, e.g., security, companionship, stimulation, intimacy, interpersonal growth, etc. Little can be said about these variables, however, since little or no published research refers to such ongoing groups. Some, I imagine, would feel uneasy about such groups, seeing them as fostering dependency needs, substituting for real interpersonal living, or as a means of fleeing the larger social issues of life and the action which these issues
demand. Certainly encounter groups could be misused in these and other ways, but there is nothing in the structure of these groups which would necessitate such misuses. If I were to risk a prediction, I would say that the ongoing-group phenomenon will increase and that at its best it will both contribute significantly to interpersonal growth and stimulate its members to become more effective agents of constructive social change within the communities and organizations to which they belong.
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APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by Gerald Egan has been read and approved by members of the Department of Psychology.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Date 6/13/69
Signature of Advisor