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American Historians' Opinion of the Reasons for the Pearl Harbor Attack

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AMERICAN HISTORIANS' OPINION OF THE REASONS FOR THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

by

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DEDICATION

To Mary Immaculate,
Queen of the Holy Rosary,
who has promised us peace,
and the conversion of Russia,
if, with firm faith,
we ask her to intercede for us,
with her Divine Son,
this book is lovingly dedicated.
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CHAPTER I

JAPAN ENVISIONS A WORLD EMPIRE IN THE FAR EAST

Responsibility for the war between Japan and the United States has been a topic much discussed since the day that Pearl Harbor received the shattering blows of the Japanese. The attack was one of the most humiliating and devastating catastrophes ever endured by our proud and mighty nation. In making an analysis of the responsibility for this war, one finds a great divergence of opinion among writers. Some claim that Japan, ambitious for "world empire," was responsible for the conflict, while others place the blame on President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the statesmen who were directing our nation. The defeat at Hawaii was, at the outset, blamed upon Japan, because she had launched the attack at the moment that our American Government was trying to find a road to peace. In a special message to the New York Times, Bertram D. Hulen said that Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, accused Japan of making a "treacherous and utterly unprovoked attack" upon


4 Ibid.
the United States and of having been "infamously false and fraudulent" by getting ready for the invasion, while her diplomats were conducting negotiations to maintain peace.

That the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was a treacherous surprise, was the story given out for several years by Washington. Americans had not yet learned that members of our Armed Forces had cracked the secret code, months before Pearl Harbor, and that the Congressmen who read the code knew nearly as much about Japanese plans as the Tokyo war council. But the President, and the Washington officials wished to give the public the idea that a Japanese attack was not expected.

Writing in Thought, Charles Callan Tansill expressed the opinion that we could not make a compromise with dictators, who disregarded all the rules of civilized nations. It was futile to hope that Japan would maintain peace with us, if we considered her conduct since 1931. The attack on Pearl Harbor had been dramatized by the Japanese many times in her war against China. Japan had pursued a policy of cruel and heartless destruction, and the bombing of Pearl Harbor was only one item in a long list of useless slaughter and crime.

5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Morgenstern, 310-312.
8 Ibid.
9 Charles Callan Tansill, "The United States and Japan, Thought, New York, XVII, No. 64, March, 1942, 104.
On the other hand, Walter Millis thinks that the question, "Who was responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster?", can never have a final answer. So many factors, both good and bad, enter into the question, so many motives are inextricably mingled, that the moral issue of responsibility must depend on the standard which a particular person applies to it. Millis finds it difficult not to blame Admiral Kimmel and General Short because, being the commanding officers at Hawaii, they should have been prepared for a military surprise. They were like captains of a ship being navigated over a rough course. Even though their equipment was not complete and their charts undependable, yet they were responsible for bringing the ship into port despite the dangers they encountered.  

In writing this thesis, no attempt will be made to determine who was responsible for the great tragedy of Pearl Harbor, for writers in general hold so many divergent opinions that the question may never have a correct answer. Nevertheless, an effort will be put forth to present the views of the more reputable American historians who have written about these tragic events. Japan's rise to power, American foreign policy in the Far East, President Roosevelt's search for the road to peace, and finally, the revisionist theories concerning Pearl Harbor, which developed after the Pearl Harbor Investigation, will be discussed in the various chapters.

For more than a century, Japan had been making encroachments on the mainland of China, and on the islands near her shores, until at length, she

10 Walter Millis, THIS IS PEARL, New York, 1947, 112.
held a great maritime empire with representatives sitting at the council
tables of the nations. As far back as 1875, the Japanese took control of
the Ryu Kyu Islands south of Kyushu. The kings of these islands had, for se-
veral hundred years, paid tribute, at one time to China, at another to Japan.
However, the Japanese summarily put an end to this custom by making the king-
dom a Japanese prefecture, and its king, a member of the Japanese nobility.
At this time, by a treaty of amity with Korea, Japan gained control of three
important ports. But it was not long before trouble arose between the Ko-
reans and the Japanese, culminating in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. The fol-
lowing year, Japan took Formosa, and declared her purpose of controlling parts
of China.

The issues involving the United States and Japan will be better un-
derstood, if some mention of America's early dealings with Japan is made. At
the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States initiated its 'Open
Door' policy, and two years later the Anglo-Japanese alliance was formed. Not
long after this, Japan started on her career of empire building. Public opin-
ion favored Japan in those days. It was fitting that she should free North
China from Russia's grasp, so when Japan made a surprise attack on Port Arthur
the American press praised the Japanese.

12 Ibid., 24.
13 U.S. Dep't., Pearl Harbor, 1.
14 Charles Callan Tansill, Back Door to War, New York, 1945, 3.
(Later references will be given: Tansill, Back Door.)
Emerging victorious at Port Arthur, Japan secured, by the Treaty of Portsmouth, the Liaotung peninsula, and the southern half of Sakhalin, as well as a lease of Kwantung, and possession of the South Manchurian Railway, which was shortly linked to Korea by a Japanese branch line, via Antung. The Chinese Eastern Railway remained under Russian control.

Edwin O. Reischauer believes that no one could question Japan's seizure of Sakhalin and the Kwantung Leased Territory. Justice seemed to be on her side, for she had won this territory from China in 1895, only to have to surrender it a few months later to Germany, France, and Russia who unscrupulously divided it among themselves, three years later, Russia taking the Kwantung Territory for herself.

America had briefly pursued a policy of empire building when she took the Philippines in 1898, but a few years later, she returned to her belief in the right of a nation to determine its own status, and began to oppose imperialism in Asia, professing her belief in the territorial integrity of China and the "Open Door" policy, demanding equal economic opportunity for all foreign business concerns operating there.

15 "It was at Yalta that Roosevelt and Churchill conceded Stalin's demands in the Far East, including the recovery of Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands and the acquisition of a position in Manchuria, that was tantamount to full control of that ancient Chinese province." Sumner Welles, Two Decisions: One Debit, One Credit, 191.

16 T. A. Bisson, America's Far Eastern Policy, New York, 1945, 17.


18 Bisson, 17.
President Theodore Roosevelt, who acted as mediator in the peace settlement at Portsmouth (1905) had made prior arrangements with Japan concerning Manchuria. Japan and Russia were obligated by the treaty "not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries, which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria." 19

Even though Japan became the dominant power in the Far East by this treaty, still she was not satisfied, because she had received no indemnity. Since Roosevelt had helped to arrange the terms, the Japanese blamed the American people, and as a result riots broke out in Japanese cities, which endangered American life and property. It was not until Russia and Japan, on July 30, 1907, concluded public and secret treaties, which marked off their respective spheres of influence in Manchuria and Mongolia, that the President realized his scheme for "balanced antagonisms" had failed. 20 The following year, on November 30, Roosevelt concluded the Root-Takahira Agreement, which "gave Japan a free hand in Manchuria," in return for a promise of non-aggression in the Philippines. 21 The President was, no doubt, glad to make this pact, as it was a means of conciliating the Japanese, who were causing him serious concern over the immigration question, at that time. 22 He was particularly disturbed over the dispute with Japan, in regard to immigration into California. After Taft had become President, Roosevelt wrote to him stating "that the Adminis-

19 Tansill, Back Door, 5.
20 Ibid., 4.
21 Ibid., 5.
22 Ibid.
tration should take no steps that would make Japan feel that we are 'a menace to their interests' in North China.

Looking at the Japanese side of the question, Reischauer expresses the idea that there seems to be no excuse for the English-speaking peoples claiming as their right most of the parts of the world which have a desirable climate, and at the same time excluding the Japanese from the uninhabited or sparsely settled lands of the tropics, simply because the latter began migrating at a later period. The Japanese, because of insufficient territory on the Island, dream of a new home in the great unexplored regions south of them, particularly, in New Guinea and Borneo.

Colonel House believed that the United States should not thwart Japan's expansion into Asiatic territory near her homeland, otherwise we might have to fight with her at a later date.

By 1910, Japan had annexed Korea, regardless of the fact that she had previously guaranteed to the Koreans, freedom, and the right to property. Besides this, during World War I, taking advantage of the widespread disorder in the world, she presented her well-known Twenty-one Demands to China.

When America entered the conflict in 1917, Japan became our ally.

23 Ibid.
25 Tansill, Back Door, 53.
26 U.S. Dep't., Pearl Harbor, 1.
27 Ibid.
The following year, she was asked to participate in an inter-Allied plan to aid in the evacuation of Czechoslovakian forces from Siberia, and to guard the military supplies there. Fifty thousand Czech soldiers, who had deserted the Austrian armies to fight for the Allies, were caught by the revolution while being transported across Siberia to Vladivostok. The United States sent 7,000 troops, and Japan, which was more than happy to be recognized as an ally of the Great Powers, sent an equal number. Moreover, seizing the opportunity to take Eastern Siberia, at this time, she sent 70,000 troops into the area, but her attempt at conquest was unsuccessful. The American force under General William S. Graves stayed in Siberia nearly two years. Its sole accomplishment was the prevention of the ruthless rule of Red Russia in the maritime provinces of Siberia. 29

At the Peace Conference at Versailles, (1919), Japan paid little attention to European affairs, devoting herself to those of the Far East. 30 President Woodrow Wilson, nevertheless, strongly opposed Japan's position in Shantung, disclaiming any knowledge of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement. Tansill severely criticizes the President's action in these words: "Wilson's action therefore, and his subsequent denial of any knowledge of the secret treaties must have convinced Japanese statesmen that he was implementing the maxims of Machiavelli." 31

28 Ibid.
29 Tansill, Back Door, 53.
30 Ibid., 52.
31 Ibid.
The Lansing-Ishii Agreement specifically stated that "territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." 32 These "special interests" are explained by A. Whitney Griswold in the following words:

Established diplomatic usage has endowed the phrase "special interests" with political as well as economic connotations. ... The situation in world politics at the time the agreement was being negotiated was such as to suggest that Lansing realized the political character of his concession and concealed it. The fact is, Lansing knew of the existence of the secret treaties, with which his phrase was pale in comparison and which rendered fantastic the expectations implicit in the rest of the agreement. ... Given Lansing's knowledge of the Allied commitments to Japan, even the phrase "special interests" implied at least tentative recognition of them. 33

During the decade following the Treaty of Versailles, the American people generously contributed to the economic restoration of Europe. Public opinion was enthusiastic over the conclusion of the Kellogg-Briand Pact which condemned recourse to war for the settling of world problems, believing only too gladly that this would end war. It praised the work of the government in furthering the plans for disarmament instituted at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922. 34

32 Ibid.


To settle the Far Eastern Question, the United States, the British Commonwealth of Nations, Japan and France promised to respect the rights of one another in the island possessions of the Pacific, and to consult one another in case any other nation attempted aggression there. The Nine-Power Treaty signed by all the major nations who had interests in China, was also a result of the Conference. The signatories promised to maintain the Open Door policy in China, to refrain from interfering with her administration of government and to recognize her territorial integrity.

These two treaties represent a desire on the part of the United States Government to protect China from being forcibly deprived of her territory and to ensure peace in that country. They were also designed to take care of the special interests of the United States under the system of unequal treaties. As they were applied, the second design Cancelled the first.

In a letter to Senator Borah, February 23, 1932, Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State, discusses the Nine Power Treaty, explaining its connection with the Open Door policy. He wrote:

This treaty, as you of course know, forms the legal basis upon which now rests the 'open door' policy toward China. That policy,

35 Tansill, Back Door, 459.


37 Helen Mears, Mirror for Americans: Japan, Boston, 1948, 217.

38 Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis, 166-167.
enunciated by John Hay in 1899, brought to an end the struggle among various powers for so-called spheres of interest in China which was threatening the dismemberment of that empire. To accomplish this Mr. Hay invoked two principles (1) equality of commercial opportunity among all nations in dealing with China, and (2) as necessary to that equality the preservation of China's territorial and administrative integrity. These principles were not new in the foreign policy of America. They had been the principles upon which it rested in its dealings with other nations for many years. In the case of China they were invoked to save a situation, which not only threatened the future development and sovereignty of that great Asiatic people, but also threatened to create dangerous and increasing rivalries between other nations of the world. War had already taken place between Japan and China. At the close of that war three other nations intervened to prevent Japan from obtaining some of the results of that war claimed by her.39

In another part of the letter, Stimson says:

This treaty represented a carefully developed and matured international policy intended, on the one hand, to assure all the contracting parties their rights and interests in and with regard to China and on the other hand, to assure to the people of China the fullest opportunity to develop without molestation, their sovereignty and independence according to the modern and enlightened standards believed to obtain among the peoples of the earth.40

The "Open Door" policy was not formally stated until 1922, when the representatives of the nations who had interests in the Pacific held a conference at which the "Open Door" policy was crystallized into the Nine Power Treaty which defined the principles upon which the treaty rested.41

Notwithstanding the fact that Japan had signed the Nine Power Treaty and had accepted the agreements made at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, we find her meddling in Chinese affairs soon after General Tanaka's cabinet

39 Ibid., 168.
40 Ibid., 167.
41 Ibid.
came into power in 1927. In open violation of her promises at the Washington Conference, Japan took over Manchuria and set up the puppet regime of Manchukuo. This action was also a disregard of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which renounced war as an instrument of national policy.

A clash between Japanese and Chinese soldiers in the South Manchurian Railway zone, was the occasion of the Manchurian Incident. The Chinese Nanking Government called the incident "aggression." The Japanese soldiers, on the other hand, replied that they were only defending their own property, just as any other nationals would do in similar circumstances, terming it police action to prevent disorder, and explaining that the action was purely local, and that the Powers were not involved in any way. They claimed that the Chinese forces, thought to be those of young Marshal Chang Hsueh, governor of Manchuria, had attempted to destroy part of the railroad, which belonged to Japan.

The intervention of Japan in Manchuria on September 18, 1931, was the beginning of the destruction of world security. The agreements of the Nine Power Treaty were first ignored and then broken, as Japanese military forces went deeper and deeper into China, subjecting that country to political and

42 U.S. Dept., Pearl Harbor, 2.

43 Ibid.

44 "Her [China's] richest province, Manchuria, which contains seventy per cent of her industrial strength was controlled by Japanese from 1932 to 1945, and is now in large part controlled by the Soviet Union and the Chinese Soviet Army. Her might lies in the intelligence, endurance and numbers of her people. She may recover Manchuria and she may become a great industrial nation. She is not now." Bullitt, 110.

45 Mears, 213.
economic controls which gave Japan the advantage in every instance. In the opinion of Mears, the Western Powers must accept part of the blame for the Manchurian incident, which resulted from a very complex set of conditions in China. Western penetration was the cause of many revolutions in China, and as time elapsed the situation became more chaotic, thus furnishing the Japanese with a pretext to protect their property.

Under-Secretary Welles notes the long range vision of his superior officer in the State Department in regard to Japan's invasion of China. These are his words:

Secretary of State Stimson was the one figure in the Hoover Cabinet who saw clearly what effect the Japanese invasion would inevitably have upon the peace of the rest of the world. In February, 1932, he urged the British government to join with the United States in view of the failure of the League to cope with the situation in invoking the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922. He felt that concerted pressure upon Japan by all the signatories of that treaty was the one possible means of achieving any practical results. As is well known, the British government through Sir John Simon, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, tacitly made it clear that it was not disposed to take the action suggested. The British government permitted it to be understood, that in as much as she was a member of the Council of the League, and the League was already attempting to deal with the situation, she would weaken the effectiveness and prestige of the League if she were to join with this government by invoking either the Nine-Power Treaty or the Kellogg-Briand Pact. This attitude did much to create in this country hostility toward British policy, and many otherwise objective persons placed the blame for the almost unlimited evils arising out of Japan’s successful aggression in Manchuria squarely upon the doorstep of the British Government.

46 U.S. Dep’t., Pearl Harbor, 2.
47 Mears, 207-208.
48 Summer Welles, Time for Decision, New York, 1944, 280.
China, who was not able to resist the Manchurian attack, appealed to the League of Nations on September 21, 1931. The Chinese claimed that the Japanese, anxious to conquer and annex Manchuria, had themselves blown up the railroad. The United States press sided with the Chinese. The European governments, however, were reluctant to decide the issue until all the facts concerning the incident were thoroughly investigated. The League discussed the question, and in December, 1931, appointed a commission to study the matter. Sir Henry Lytton, a British Earl, headed the investigation. The United States opposed the Manchurian Incident, condemning it as an act of aggression on the part of the Japanese, and on January 7, 1932, the Secretary of State issued the Stimson Doctrine, stating America's official position concerning Japanese aggression. It contained no new principle in foreign policy, but simply repeated the statements made to both China and Japan after the latter had presented her Twenty-one Demands, in 1915.

Lord Lytton declared the Japanese Government in Manchukuo to be a puppet regime, and thought it ought to be replaced by a Chinese autonomous government. When the Lytton Commission's report of the Manchurian situation

50 Mears, 213 - 215.
51 Bain, 147.
52 Mears, 215
53 Sumner Welles, Time for Decision, New York, 1944, 280.
was adopted by the League of Nations, the Japanese delegate walked out of the Assembly on February 21, 1933, and the following month notified the League that she was withdrawing from membership. It was at this time that Sadao Araki, who believed in excluding foreigners from the homeland, and in an imperial policy abroad, announced over the radio:

Frivolous thinking is due to foreign thought. . . . Japan must no longer let the impudence of the white peoples go unpunished. It is the duty of Japan . . . to cause China to respect the Japanese, to expel Chinese influence from Manchuria, and to follow the way of imperial destiny.

The League of Nations achieved one practical result through the Lytton Commission, namely, it made clear to all the world the true circumstances concerning the Manchurian Incident. Likewise, President Hoover and Secretary of State, Stimson, in refusing to recognize Japan's puppet state served a useful purpose, at a time when public morale was extremely low.

Concerning the withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations, Mr. Koki Hirota, His Majesty's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs said in a speech delivered in the House of Peers, and also in the House of Representatives of the Imperial Diet, on January 23, 1934:

The Japanese Government were obliged to serve notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations on the 27th of March, 1933, because the Manchurian Incident and the questions regarding the State of Manchukuo

54 U.S. Dep't., Pearl Harbor, 2.

55 Frank P. Chambers, Christina Phelps Harris and Charles C. Bayley, This Age of Conflict, Revised, New York, 1950, 430-434.

56 Welles, 200.
showed that there was no agreement between Japan and the League on the fundamental principles of preserving peace in the Far East. 57

In the same address, Hirota reminded the members of the Imperial Diet of the words which the Emperor used in his rescript which was issued to the Japanese people. These are Hirota's words:

Now that Manchukuo has been founded, Our Empire deems it essential to respect the independence of the new State and to encourage its healthy development in order that the sources of evil in the Far East may be eradicated and an enduring peace thereby established. . . . However, the advancement of international peace is what, as evermore, we desire, and our attitude toward enterprises of peace shall sustain no change. By quitting the League and embarking on a course of its own, Our Empire does not mean that it will stand aloof in the Extreme Orient, nor that it will isolate itself thereby from the fraternity of nations. It is our desire to promote mutual confidence between Our Empire and all the other powers and to make known the justice of its cause throughout the world. 58

The resignation of their nation from the League, caused worry and disturbance to the common people of Japan, who had gloried in the fact that their country was regarded as a Western Power. The business community feared that the League would impose a blockade, or a boycott to force Japanese armies out of Manchuria. By propaganda, the Emperor had tried to give his people a feeling that a state of crisis existed. In 1933, he had warned them that there would be trouble because they had withdrawn from the League, and they were made to believe that a cordon was being drawn around Japan by the western nations in order to prevent the Japanese from freeing Asians from exploitation by the Western Powers. 59

58 Ibid.
59 Kears, 230-231.
There were two schools of political thought in Japan in regard to the manner in which Manchuria was to be ruled. One group wanted constitutional and popular government, the other believed in military control. The former method was known as the "friendship" policy, the latter as the "positive" policy toward China. Baron Shidehara, Japan's great Foreign Minister, advocated the "friendship policy" which was founded on good will and neighborliness toward China. General Baron Tanaka, on the other hand, believed in a "positive policy", one which uses military force to attain its ends. He was of the opinion that Japan should defend its holdings against all who menace them. 60

The fact that the great powers were unwilling to act when Japan ruthlessly took over Manchuria, demonstrated to all the world the impotence of the League of Nations. Japan's attempts at aggression had been so easy, so swift, and so successful that she did not know enough to stop before the whole world was involved in a great conflagration. Her withdrawal from the League revealed its ineffectiveness to preserve peace. The United States declared her disapproval of Japanese aggression in Manchuria, but did nothing more. Its failure to act, gave Japan the opportunity to rush forward to catastrophe. 61 The Italian Government, seeing that Japan was not hindered in her aggression, undertook the conquest of Ethiopia. The League's impotence also emboldened Hitler to enter on a course of violence in the hope of creating a "greater Germany." 62

60 Stimson, 27.
61 Reischauer, 21-25.
62 Welles, 280.
The decision to acquire a solid footing in Asia was made by the Hirota Cabinet, at a Five Ministers Conference, August 11, 1936. They planned to move southward slowly and quietly, so as not to arouse suspicion concerning their aims. A complete offensive on China began on July 7, 1937, occasioned by an incident at Peiping, which had been started by the Japanese army. The Congressional Committee describes it thus:

Seizing upon the negligible Marco Polo Bridge incident between Japanese and Chinese forces near Peiping, Japan, in July of 1937, began wholesale invasion of China. The lawless acts of the Japanese military in carrying forward the invasion was a disgusting and degrading episode of rape, theft, and murder. In the outrages attending the occupation of Nanking, on December 13, 1937, the Japanese military wrote a particularly ignoble page in history. Yet, on July 27, 1937, the Japanese Premier, Prince Konoye, stated, "In sending troops to North China, of course, the Government has no other purpose, as was explained in its recent statement, than to preserve the peace of East Asia." Again, on October 28, 1937, the Japanese Foreign Office said: "Japan never looks upon the Chinese people as an enemy." As observed by Secretary Hull: "Japan showed its friendly feeling for China by bombing Chinese civilian populations, by burning Chinese cities, by making millions of Chinese homeless and destitute, by mistreating and killing civilians, and by acts of horror and cruelty." 64

Mr. Hoshi, a Japanese business man, in speaking of Japanese aggression gives us an idea of what the Japanese were intending to do. He says:

We will not annex China, oh no, we will not do that. We will only arrange China so we can do business with China. ... The world is three parts, Europe for the Europeans, America for the United States, Asia for Japan. 65

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63 U.S. Dep't., Pearl Harbor, 2.

64 Ibid.

The rise of ultranationalism in Japan, as a result of their victory in Manchuria, caused a feeling of insecurity in Moscow. The comintern intensified its efforts to prevent war. Nozaka, Japanese expert in foreign affairs, was called upon to report on conditions in China. He said that the war in Manchuria marked the commencement of a new imperialistic campaign against the Chinese revolution and the U.S.S.R. and that the United States wished to subject all China to the American Dollar, and therefore wanted to prevent the seizure of Manchuria by Japan, and that the dollar diplomats were endeavoring to have Japan get into war with the U. S. S. R. Nozaka ended his report to his superiors in Moscow in a tone of warlike confidence:

Should the imperialists of the whole world hurl their challenge at our fatherland, the USSR, we will show them that the world proletariat will arise in arms against them. We will show them that nothing awaits them but the grave.

Down with Japanese imperialism!

Down with the international counterrevolutionary conspirators!

Long live the Red Army of the Soviet Union and the Red Army of Soviet China!

Strengthen the revolutionary struggle of the world proletariat against war and war machinations!

Long live the Comintern!

The Communists considered the China Incident as the beginning of a Japanese offensive against Russia. The conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the agreement reached at Osaka, in the winter of 1937, seemed to confirm this idea.


67 Ibid., 69.
Shortly after the fight at Peiping, July 7, 1937, Prince Konoye, the Japanese Prime Minister, made known to the Diet the Government's plan for establishing a new order in East Asia. An attempt to form a military alliance with Germany proved unsuccessful because the Navy and some of the politicians opposed giving "Germany military aid in a war against the Western Powers." Japan wanted an alliance with Germany chiefly as a protection against the Soviet Union, but Germany wanted better trade relations than Japan wished to give, and she also wanted a promise of military assistance in case she was attacked by another country. Hiranuma, who had recently been appointed Prime Minister, in Konoye's place, made another attempt in May, 1939, to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact, but he was unsuccessful, because Japan was unable to promise Germany military aid in case war should break out. Hiranuma continued negotiations in an effort to have the Japanese ambassadors at Berlin and Rome form an agreement. When on August 23, 1939, the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was signed, Japan received a severe blow.

While Germany was still at war with Europe, Japan saw her opportunity to begin an offensive in the Far East. Stalmar, the German emissary,

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came to Tokyo to confer with Foreign Minister Matsuoka in order to persuade Japan to restrain the United States from entering the European war. Matsuoka was assured that Germany would not interfere with Japan’s plans for a Greater East Asia, and that Germany was interested only in the economic field in that part of the world. Stalmar said that a struggle between the whole Anglo-Saxon world and Asiatics was bound to develop. He considered the German-Japanese Alliance to be a long term pact for co-operation during the coming struggle, and therefore, he was anxious to make a treaty before the European war ended. Ribbentrop was likewise anxious to make an alliance with Japan against Britain and France. He tried to have General Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador, ally Tokyo with the Nazi-Soviet bloc. In a telegram to Tokyo, Ribbentrop said that it was important for Japan to quickly extend her power in East Asia toward the South before the conflict between England and Germany comes to a close. 74

As is well known, Stalmar succeeded in inducing Japan to sign the Tripartite Pact. Joseph W. Ballantine tells us that

Stalmar and Matsuoka drew up a draft of a treaty, which was laid before the Privy Council on September 16, 1940. The Navy held back its approval until some days later. The cabinet still had to obtain the sanction of the Emperor, who strongly relied upon the advice of Prince Saionji, the last surviving elder statesman, and a bitter opponent of the alliance. Kido, who, as Lord Privy Seal, was charged with keeping the aged and ailing Saionji informed, failed to do so, and the old statesman was left completely in the dark on what was going on. In this way the Emperor’s sanction was obtained and the Tripartite Alliance was signed on September 27, 1940. Saionji, upon

73 Ibid.
74 Langer and Gleason, 293.
learning what had been done was sorely aggrieved because he felt that the Emperor had been betrayed. 74

When the European war broke out in September 1939, Japan saw an opportunity to settle her differences with China, without fear of interference from the Western world, but Chiang Kai-shek, would not come to an agreement. Wang Ching-wei, who had turned traitor to the Chinese Nationalist Government in 1938, was made President of a "National Government of China" in 1940 by Japan. He promised support of the Co-prosperity Sphere in East Asia, and the Japanese Government officially recognized its freakish creation. 76/

In "Mukden to Pearl Harbor" we find an account of the plans for the establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Early in October, the Cabinet approved of the plans drawn up by the Foreign Office. They called for:

1, the early successful settlement of the China affair; 2, the negotiation of a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union; 3, the incorporation of the countries of Southeast Asia and the islands of the Malay Archipelago in the so-called "Co-Prosperity Sphere" (i.e. the establishment of domination or control there). At a Four Ministers' Conference held on September 4, even India, Australia and New Zealand had been marked for inclusion in Japan's sphere of influence. 77/

The chance for a settlement with Chiang Kai-shek was lost because a treaty with the puppet regime of Wang Ching-wei was concluded in December and a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union was entered into, in April of the following year. 78

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76 Chambers, 677.


78 Ibid.
Even before the Pact with Germany and Russia had been concluded, Ambassador Grew had informed the authorities at Washington of the trend of affairs. He was later to call this message his "green light" telegram. The Ambassador realized that Japanese aggression could not be stopped by mere words of disapproval. Americans as a whole knew little of the real strength of the Japanese war machine, or of the stubborn determination of its war lords to conquer the Far East. Grew felt that an embargo on essential war materials would precipitate rather than stop her race for military and economic independence. He realized that the maintaining of the status quo in the Western Pacific was necessary for the survival of the British Empire, and for ourselves as well, since American economic security was dependent on Britain. Japan needed something stronger than a polite expression of American disapproval to turn her from her path. After serious thought, the State Department began to take vigorous action. In September, iron and steel scrap were put under embargo. On October 8, Ambassador Horinouchi called at the State Department to protest. Secretary of State, Hull, after claiming that the United States Government had been very patient with the Japanese, continued:

It is clear now, however, that those who are dominating the external policies of Japan are . . . bent on the conquest by force of all worthwhile territory in the Pacific Ocean area without limit as to extent in the South . . . and that we and all other nations are expected, as stated, to sit perfectly quiet and be cheerful and agreeable, but static, while most of Asia is Manchuria-ized. . . . I added that, of course, if any one country is sufficiently desirous of trouble, it can always find any one of innumerable occasions to start such trouble.

79 Walter Millis, This Is Pearl, New York, 1947, 19.
80 Ibid., 20.
The United States Government continued to exert economic pressure. American aircraft sales to Japan amounted to very little at the end of 1938, because manufacturers had been advised by the State Department to stop sales. The American-Japanese commercial treaty of 1911 was not renewed in 1939, but trade with Japan was placed on a day-to-day basis. The Export Control Act which passed Congress in 1940 gave Franklin Delano Roosevelt authority to control the export of goods essential for defense. Gradually, machine tools, chemicals, and strategic metals could not be shipped without a license. Next aviation gasoline was banned. Japan resented this measure and said that future trade between the United States and Japan would be very uncertain, if such measures continue. 81 In the conversations which Secretary Hull held with Admiral Nomura and Mr. Kurusu, Japan threatened to aid Germany, if we did not recognize her political, military and economic interests in China and in Greater East Asia. 82 If Japan could get what she wanted by diplomacy; if, without going to war, she could gain her ambitions in the Far East, then she would interpret her obligation to Germany and Italy defensively. In other words, if the United States entered the war against Germany, in the Atlantic, Japan would not feel bound by the Tripartite Pact, to aid Germany by attacking the United States in the Pacific. 83 If Japan's attempts at diplomacy failed, she would make a surprise attack on us in the Pacific, using force to achieve her ambitious schemes for conquest. During the early part

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81 U.S. Dept't., Pearl Harbor, 7.
83 Ibid.
of 1941, Japan was making ready for the attack. Shortly after these economic restrictions had been imposed, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. The Pact provided that Germany, Italy and Japan would assist one another with all political, economic and military means, when one of the powers was attacked by a power not then involved in the European war, or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.

The three Powers declared that the Pact was not made against the Soviet, from which it follows that the Power referred to must be the United States, toward whom it was a veiled threat. The following April, Japan entered into an agreement with Russia. Roosevelt retaliated by freezing Japanese assets in the United States, and Britain did likewise. France had agreed after her fall in June, 1940, to close the ports and railroads of Indo-China to war materials being shipped to Free China, and Britain closed the Burma Road for three months, in an effort to appease Japan. Decoux, the French General of Indo-China was powerless to prevent Japan from establishing air bases there, presumably to be used to bomb Chiang Kai-shek's defenses, newly established at Chungking. During 1941, Japan hurriedly prepared for war. The National Mobilization Law was put into effect. The Premier, Prince Konoye, was trying to make a settlement with the United States, but the militarists did not want a settlement. Already, the Japanese were studying the maps of Pearl Harbor, and ascertaining the number and strength of our battleships and airplanes. Tojo, Minister of War, warned Konoye that "to carry on negotiations, for which there is no possibility of fruition, and in the end to let slip the time for fighting would be a matter of the greatest consequence." Konoye finally

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84 Ibid.
85 U.S. Department, Pearl Harbor, 3.
resigned in October, and Tojo, "the Razor Brain" succeeded him as head of the war cabinet.

Japan continued to extend her military position in the southwest Pacific until the Philippines were almost entirely encircled, and its armed forces were near enough to strike important trade routes. Roosevelt realized that Japan was occupying these positions as a preparation for a great offensive. In order to avoid war, strong economic pressure was very necessary.

A Japanese officer, who took part in the attack on Pearl Harbor reported to the Joint Committee, the following information:

On October 5, 1941, a meeting was called of all officer pilots of the carriers aboard the Akagi in Shibushii Bay, by the chief of staff of the carriers, Rear Admiral Rynosuke Kosaka. About 100 attended. They were told very secretly that on December 1, 1941 (Japan Time) a Japanese naval air force would strike the American fleet at Hawaii. Grand Admiral of the Japanese Navy, Isoruku Yamamoto, also addressed the group saying that "Although Japan never wanted to fight the United States, they were forced to, because they would be defeated regardless, if the United States continued its aid to China. . . . The United States Fleet," he said, "was Japan's strongest enemy, so if they could strike it unexpectedly at Hawaii, it would be 2 or 3 months before it could maneuver. By that time occupation of Borneo, the Philippines, Singapore, Java and Sumatra would be complete." 88

Even the Marquis Koichi Kido, the Lord Privy Seal, advised the Emperor that it was necessary to fight the United States.

Tojo was appointed Premier in October of 1941. He was given plenipotentiary powers to carry on war. On November 15, he sent Kurusu to Washington to help Nomura, and to bring the Japanese demands to Washington. The

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86 U.S. Dep't., Pearl Harbor, 14-17.
88 Ibid., 126-127.
message demanded that "the United States and Great Britain abandon China to
Japan, and provide Japan with the materials for a Japanese advance into
American, British and Dutch territories in the Far East." 89

At the Atlantic Conference in August, 1941, Britain and the United
States warned Japan not to encroach any farther in the South Western Pacific,
for if she did, the United States and Britain would take counter measures,
which might lead to war with Japan, and if she attacked a third power, the
United States would seek to aid that Power. This was really a war ultima-
tum. 90

Preparations for the attack on Pearl Harbor, Singapore, and other
American, British and Dutch possessions in the Far East were completed by
November 1st. If the United States did not accept the Japanese terms by
November 29, 1941, diplomacy would be abandoned and Japan would notify its
allies that it intended to open hostilities with Great Britain and the Uni-
ted States. 91 Japan's generals, with their supply of oil diminishing rapidly,
and with the chance to acquire a vast empire slowly fading, would not
waste any more time arbitrating. 92

The following quotation reveals some of the difficulties with which
the high authorities in Washington were faced, at this time.

89 Bisson, ix.
90 Be mis, 868.
91 Ballantine, "Mukden to Pearl Harbor, The Foreign Policy of Japan,"
*Foreign Affairs*, XXVII, July, 1949, 664.
The Japanese were not offering to negotiate a reasonable settlement by processes of agreement; they were presenting demands, to be accepted or rejected. The United States had only two choices: either to yield to the Japanese demands and sacrifice principles and security, or to decline to yield, and to take the consequences. 93

Secretary of State Hull replied on November 26, 1941 to the Japanese demands with the following counter demands. These were: 1) a non-aggression pact between China and Japan was to be made; 2) the Japanese were to withdraw their forces from China and Indo-China; 3) China was to be given a guarantee of territorial integrity; 4) Japan was to recognize the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek.

On December 1, 1941, the New York Times carried the account of the Japanese rejection of American proposals.


Tokyo, Monday, December 1. In the first official statement on the American proposals for a settlement of the issues in the Pacific submitted to Japan, Foreign Minister Shigenori Tojo today rejected the principles underlying them as "fantastic" and characterized the American attitude as unrealistic and regrettable. He reiterated Japan's determination to proceed with the construction of a "New Order in East Asia." 94

Following the lines of a strong message from Premier General Hidaki Tojo, the reading of which was the highlight of yesterday's mass meetings, the Foreign Minister declared:

(93 Ibid.

94 New York Times, December 1, 1941, pt. 1, sec. 1.)
The world is confronted with unprecedented disturbances. In Greater East Asia, however, close relations of Japan, Manchukuo, and China must go forward toward the construction of a new order in East Asia on the basis of their co-existence and co-prosperity. 95

In our negotiations with the United States, we have consistently upheld this principle. However, the United States does not understand the real situation in East Asia. It is trying forcibly to apply to East Asiatic countries fantastic principles and rules not adapted to the actual situation in the world and thereby tending to obstruct the Construction of the New Order. This is extremely regrettable.

Opposing the slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics under Japan's leadership" to the American principle of the "Open Door," Japan, Manchukuo and the Nanking puppet regime, yesterday celebrated the first anniversary of their joint declaration of co-operation with mass meetings in their principal cities organized by their governments. Semi-official organs reiterated the firm determination of these countries to "liberate" the one thousand million people of East Asia from the "exploitation" of Europe and America by the construction of the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere," as a guiding torch for mankind to crush all outside powers' obstruction of this "holy and historic mission." 95

A week after this news article appeared, on December 7, 1941, the Japanese had made their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, following which they made attacks on the Philippines, HongKong, Malaya, Burma, the Netherlands East Indies and the British islands northeast of Australia. The next day (December 8) Japan declared war on the United States and Great Britain. 96 The ease with which the attack on Hawaii was made, enabled Japan to continue her work of destruction. American forces, greatly depleted, withdrew to the Bataan peninsula for a last stand. 96

95 Ibid.
The report of the Congressional Committee investigating Pearl Harbor tells, in a brief sentence, of the retaliation visited on the Japanese for their brazen and dastardly attack.

The Pyrrhic victory of having executed the attack with surprise, cunning, and deceit belongs to the war lords of Japan whose dreams of conquest were buried in the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. History will properly place responsibility for Pearl Harbor upon the military clique dominating the people of Japan at the time. 97
CHAPTER II

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD JAPAN

One of the questions which arose to trouble American statesmen, in the early years of the twentieth century was immigration. In 1890, there were only about 2000 Japanese emigrants in the United States. By 1900, they had increased to 24,000 and by 1910 to 72,000. Although this was a very small per cent of the total population of our country, nevertheless, the Japanese came into serious competition with white labor, because of his superior industry and his low standard of living. The San Francisco Board of Education brought about a crisis between Japan and the United States when they decided that Chinese, Japanese and Korean children would not be permitted to attend the public schools, but would have to go to the Oriental school in Chinatown. The Japanese government immediately issued a protest. Since her victory over Russia at Port Arthur, Japan had felt a new self-confidence, and was anxious to maintain her national honor. One of the Tokyo papers, Mainichi, on October 21, 1906, declared angrily that the Japanese should send their navy to punish the Americans for their discrimination.¹ The European press likewise criticized the United States for willfully provoking a proud and sensitive nation. Germany went so far as to say that a war between America and Japan was imminent.²

¹ Chitoshi Yanaga, Japan Since Perry, New York, 1949, 434-435.
² Ibid.
The United States, anxious to avoid trouble, sought to have friendly relations with Japan by settling the immigration question to the latter's satisfaction. The "gentlemen's agreement" of 1907, in which the Japanese government promised not to give passports to skilled and unskilled laborers, who wished to go to the United States, eased the situation, somewhat. The following year, on September 29, diplomatic negotiations were begun by Foreign Minister Komura and Ambassador Takahira in Washington, culminating in the Root-Takahira Agreement by which both the United States and Japan promised to refrain from interfering with each other's possessions in the Pacific, to guarantee Chinese freedom, and to support the "Open Door" policy. President Theodore Roosevelt, who had been seriously concerned over our dispute with Japan in regard to immigration into California, was no doubt glad to give "Japan a free hand in Manchuria, in return for a disavowal of aggressive intentions toward the Philippines." After William Howard Taft had become President, Roosevelt wrote to him, stating "that the Administration should take no steps that would make Japan feel that we are 'a menace to their interests' in North China."4

After World War I had closed, the United States, fearful that the war-impoverished countries of Europe would send waves of immigration to find homes and employment in our country, began to tighten her immigration laws. At first, only three percent of the number of people of each nationality,

3 Tansill, Back Door, 5.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 32.
who resided in the United States in 1910, were permitted to immigrate to America. Later, the number was reduced to two per cent, and still later in 1923, Congress introduced a bill excluding aliens ineligible for citizenship. The Japanese Ambassador Hanihara protested this bill strongly. He wanted to know "whether Japan as a nation is or is not entitled to the proper respect and consideration of other nations?"

Secretary Hughes wrote a letter to Representative Albert Johnson, Chairman of the House Committee on Immigration, stating that he considered the proposed legislation at variance with the treaty of 1911, and that it would largely undo the work of the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament, which so greatly improved our relations with Japan. He was certain that it was not "worth while thus to affront a friendly nation with whom we have established the most cordial relations."

Later, Secretary Hughes and Ambassador Hanihara exchanged notes about immigration. Hanihara said that Japan was not "Questioning the sovereign rights of any country to regulate immigration to its own territories," but he failed to see the logic of a measure which would "not only seriously offend the just pride of a friendly nation . . . but would also involve the question of the good faith and therefore of the honor of their government." The measure might lead to "grave consequences" which he hoped might be avoided.

Meanwhile, the U. S. Supreme Court in the case of Ozawa v. U. S.

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6 Ibid.

7 Secretary Hughes to the chairman of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization of the House of Representatives, February 8, 1924.

8 Ambassador Hanihara to Secretary Hughes, April 19, 1924.
(260 U.S. 178) handed down a decision on November 13, 1922, to the effect that the Japanese were ineligible for citizenship by naturalization. The bill was adopted on April 12, by an immense majority of 373 to 71. On May 31, 1924, a formal protest was lodged by the Japanese against the exclusion law. Tokyo papers were loud in their denunciation of it. 

In 1931, the Immigration Committee of the United States Chamber of Commerce favored the restoration of a quota system. The California Council on Oriental Relations organized in 1931, was active in aiding the Immigration Committee. Business men and educational leaders were confident of restoring the quota system. But when the destruction of the railroad track at Mukden on September 18, brought about the Manchurian Incident, all hope of repealing the exclusion law was lost, and the faint rumblings of war became audible.

Reischauer seems to take the part of the Japanese when he says:

As seen from the Japanese point of view, there is no reason why the English-speaking peoples, who have actually multiplied during the last century and a half at a far less rapid rate than the Japanese, should have the right to appropriate for themselves most of the lightly populated parts of the world which enjoyed a desirable climate, while the Japanese are excluded not only from these areas, but also from the less desirable and still empty lands of the tropics, simply because they became candidates for emigration a century or two later than the English speaking peoples. They naturally look toward the great unexplored islands south of them, such as New Guinea and Borneo, and dream of a new Japan which will redress the unhappy balance of the old.

But the difficulties concerning immigration, in no way compared with the problems which arose on account of Japanese aggression, Japan had annexed

9 Yanaga, 142.
10 Ibid., 141.
Korea in 1910. Then because she had been one of the Allies in World War I, she was permitted to take over the German interests in the Far East. President Taft had challenged Japan's position in China by dollar diplomacy. Wilson had applied diplomatic pressure, when Japan had presented her Twenty-one Demands to China, refusing to recognize Japan's action.\(^{12}\) By 1919, Japan had risen to the status of a great power in the Far East, and China was in danger of being dismembered, while very little notice was given to the "Open Door" policy.

One method which the United States used to give financial aid to China was the establishment of a consortium in which British, French, Chinese and Americans held interests. During Taft's administration, certain American banks had been high-pressured into joining a four-power banking consortium to aid China in building the Chinese Hukuang Railways; later it became a six-power organization when Russia and Japan became members. In 1913, American bankers, realizing that they were deriving very little profit from their membership, applied to President Wilson to give them security by asking them to stay in the consortium at the request of the United States Government. The President, however, favored abstention from membership for the reason that the consortium might exert undue pressure, which would interfere with the financial and political affairs of China.\(^{13}\) Germany and Russia were eliminated from the consortium by the outbreak of World War I; Britain and

\(^{12}\) Tansill, 51-52.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., 54.
France could not pay their loans to China, but Japan came forward with an offer of 320,000,000 yen. The other members of the consortium could not but realize the implications which might follow because of Japan's contribution, and suggested that it would be wise for the United States to re-enter the consortium. After considering the matter and discussing it with the President, Secretary Lansing advised that instead of the old one, a new four-power consortium should be formed. Britain, France and Japan were given a detailed proposal concerning it. The Japanese press opposed this re-arrangement, stating that this would cause Japan to lose "the fruits she had amassed in the last few years." The Japanese government had their financial representative, Mr. Odagiri confer with the American financial representative Mr. Lamont, and inform him that "all rights and options held by Japan in the region of Manchuria and Mongolia, where Japan held special interests should be excluded from the arrangement. Mr. Thomas W. Lamont said that Japan's exclusion of Manchuria and Mongolia would be inadmissible. The Japanese representative took pains to explain that the safety of Japan was at stake because of the Russian menace. Matters in Siberia might change over night. The Japanese wanted Manchuria and Mongolia to serve as buffer states against Russian encroachments. Since Japan seemed unwilling to agree to the plan proposed, the United States suggested another plan for a Three Power Consortium, but Britain and France would not hear to it. They feared such a course might

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14 Ibid., 55-56.
15 Ibid., 55.
16 Ibid.
lead Japan to form an alliance with Germany. Finally, the Chinese government was notified that a new Four Power Consortium had been formed, but China made no answer to the notification, then or later, probably because of the concessions demanded by Japan. Hence, the consortium accomplished nothing. Nationalist China scorned it, not wishing to give up any of her power to international bankers. 17

Japan was left in a paramount position of military and naval power in the Far East after the Washington treaties of 1922 were signed, but she was expected to abstain from further conquests in China, to recognize the territorial integrity of China, to maintain the "Open Door" policy, and to leave unmolested the islands of the Pacific. 18 But she did not keep her promises. In September, 1931, the Japanese occupied the principal cities of Southern Manchuria. This was a violation of the Pact of Paris, so the United States sent a warning note to Japan saying that she would not recognize any treaty or agreement made in violation of the Pact. 19 The Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact (Pact of Paris) initiated by the men after whom it was named, was a solemn agreement by fifteen nations of the world to solve their difficulties by pacific means. Fifteen nations signed the pact on August 27, 1928. At the invitation of the United States, the other nations of the world were asked to join. Sixty-three nations


19 Bemis, 810-814.
had become members by 1949, leaving eight not holding membership.  

Ambassador Grew tells us that he was sent to Tokyo to keep peace in the East, and to guard American interests in Asia. He had been chosen by president Hoover, who lacked the ability or the power to prevent the Japanese from taking Manchuria in 1931-1933, an aggression which could have been prevented by the use of economic and financial sanctions. When Franklin Delano Roosevelt succeeded Hoover, in 1933, Grew was retained in Tokyo. Roosevelt followed a policy of appeasement toward Japan, while America was being hurriedly prepared for war. Grew realized the power which the militarists wielded, and knew that Arita and Konoye were dominated by them. The militarist clique in Japan, who were responsible for instigating and executing the Manchurian incident of September, 1931, will, no doubt, live in history as the persons who were responsible for World War II. That gigantic world struggle, which struck us at Pearl Harbor, was simply the consequence of a chain of events which began in Manchuria. We can now see clearly the road over which the Japanese travelled from Mukden to Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The policy which the United States adopted in 1934, had a direct effect on World War II. In government records one can find evidence about Japan and the effects of Japanese policies upon our dealings with China. The main idea in the whole Far Eastern situation is stressed by Ambassador Grew. It

20 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
is that Japan considers herself responsible for the peace and order of Greater East Asia. She thinks that she should be consulted on any question of importance affecting China. 23

When Secretary of State, Stimson, learned of Japan's military conquests in Manchuria, he restated the principle which the United States has followed throughout the years since the days of Perry; this was that China's integrity must be preserved, and equal opportunity must be granted to all nations trading with China. This "Stimson Doctrine" as it is now known, was not a new principle. Even the statement that the United States would not recognize territory taken in violation of treaty promises was not new. It simply reaffirmed the declaration presented to both China and Japan in 1915, after Japan had made her Twenty-one Demands. The United States has consistently followed this policy for the past hundred years. 24

Stimson sent notes to Japan and China on January 7, 1932, telling their respective governments that the United States refuses to recognize the legality of any treaty forced upon China, contrary to the Pact of 1928. He waged a disheartening campaign, as disclosed by the documents following the note of January 7, 1932. Particularly important are the trans-Atlantic conversations which Secretary Stimson held with the British Prime Minister,


Ramsay Mac Donald, and the British Foreign Minister, Sir John Simon, in February, 1932, for it was in that month that the Japanese army and navy were moving toward Shanghai. At the same time, the military clique in Tokyo, which had seized control of the Japanese government, was misleading both the American and British governments by dual diplomacy. 25

Neither the United States nor Britain imposed military or economic sanctions on Japan, because of this deceit, but both Stimson and Simon urged a strong diplomatic front against the obstreperous state. Stimson was still under the illusion that peace could be obtained through the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, although the United States still held herself aloof from the League of Nations. 26

After the appointment of Joseph C. Grew to Japan, June, 1932, reports from that state were more adequate and complete. Information regarding the collapse of parliamentary government and the promotion of a popular war psychology by means of propaganda reached the State Department regularly. But regardless of Grew's tireless efforts, Japanese relations grew worse. The Japanese considered the United States policy of conciliation to be a sign of weakness. 28 The United States failed to approve a government loan


26 Ibid., 148.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.
to China, because Japan opposed it. Russia, on the other hand, increased her aggressions toward Japan. During 1934, many persons felt that war would break out between Japan and Russia. The United States failed to influence Japanese policy but Russia did, for we find her (Japan) in 1935, changing her policy because Russia had built up a military power in Asia, and had expressed her readiness to use it if necessary. A Japanese statesman remarked that the greatest means for preventing war between Russia and Japan had been "the marked increase of Soviet military strength in the Far East." There is a lesson for us here. Japan felt that Russia would resist expansion to the north, while it was not possible for the United States to prevent Japanese expansion to the south, west or east. If the United States in 1930, had built up a superior navy as Stanley Hornbeck had advocated, future events in the Far East might have been vastly different than they are. The Manchurian crisis taught the world that there was no magic power in existence which was able to stop or control ruthless aggression.

Secretary of State, Hull, tells us that from the time of the Marco Polo Bridge incident in 1937 until July, 1941, the United States had pursued a policy of self-control and patience, notwithstanding the continual violation of American rights by the Japanese, and their continued aggressions which endangered our country. Nevertheless, the American Government had sought to work out a plan for continued friendly relations with Japan, and to

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give the Japanese every opportunity to develop peaceful policies.

The change in European conditions after Munich gave the Japanese many opportunities for future conquests. Now Japan was in a position to cut off supplies coming to China from the United States and Europe, supplies sustaining China against the encroachments of her ambitious neighbor. China had been getting her arms and war supplies through British HongKong, and French Indo-China, and by way of the Burma Road. Almost before the ink was dry at Munich, Japan laid hold of Canton and brought an army of occupation to South China, thus preventing China from getting supplies through Hong Kong.

When Czechoslovakia was taken by Hitler in 1939, Japan jumped at the chance to occupy the large Chinese island of Hainan, controlling the Gulf of Tonkin. Then, in 1940, she made an agreement with Thailand (Siam) to protect their common interests, and for the exchange of information. By September, 1940, France had fallen, so Japan occupied Indo-China, thus sealing up that source of supplies for China. No sooner had the United States passed the Lend-Lease Act, than Japan stirred up trouble between Thailand and the French forces in Indo-China; then, acting as mediator, she secured a better hold on Thailand in March, 1941, from which Burma could be reached.

In a cablegram to the State Department, September 12, 1940, Ambassador Grew told how Japan was making use of her opportunity to pursue her policy of aggression. It reads in part:

Whatever may be the intentions of the present Japanese Government, there can be no doubt that the army and other elements in the country see in the present world situation a golden opportunity to carry into effect their dreams of expansion; the German victories have gone to their heads like strong wine; until recently they have believed implicitly in the defeat of Great Britain; they have argued that the war will probably (a) in a quick German victory and that it is well to consolidate Japan’s position in greater East Asia while Germany is still acquiescent and before the eventual hypothetical strengthening of German naval power might rob Japan of far-flung control in the Far East; they have discounted effective opposition on the part of the United States although carefully watching our attitude. The ability of the saner heads in and out of the Government to control these elements has been and is doubtful. . . .

Diplomacy may occasionally retard but cannot effectively stem the tide. Force or the display of force can alone prevent these powers from attaining their objectives. Japan today is one of the predatory powers; she has submerged all moral and ethical sense and has become frankly and unashamedly opportunist, seeking at every turn to profit by the weakness of others. Her policy of southward expansion is a definite threat to American interests in the Pacific and is a thrust at the British Empire in the east. 31

During the Congressional Investigation of Pearl Harbor, it was revealed that a telegram from Tokyo to Berlin had been intercepted on July 2, 1941, by a United States Communications Division. It gave the information that the militarists of Japan were attempting to bring Chiang’s government under the control of the Japanese by applying pressure at various places in the South. They planned to take over concessions by propaganda, and if that failed, by fighting. At the same time, they planned to continue diplomatic relations, and to make every possible effort to prevent the United States from entering the war. 32

31 Joseph C. Grew, committee exhibit No. 1, p. 9, cited in Investigation of Pearl Harbor, 16.

In 1941, Admiral Toyoda was appointed Foreign Minister to replace Mr. Matsuoka. Frequent expressions of the wish for peace were made by the new Minister, as well as by the Prime Minister and Ambassador Nomura to the United States representatives. Nevertheless, their actions belied their words, for mobilization was continued, not only in Japan, but increasing numbers of the armed forces were sent to Manchuria, Indo-China and south China.  

From another intercepted message from Japan to Germany, July 19, 1941, our government learned that Japan was not making any change in her foreign policy, and that she would remain faithful to the agreements of the Tripartite Pact. This information led American diplomats to doubt the sincerity of Japanese desires for peace.

Finding that after several months of diplomatic discussions, Japan was still intent on aggression, President Roosevelt, on July 26, 1941, froze Japanese assets in the United States. The effect of this order was to bring trade between Japan and the United States to a halt. At the time of the freezing order, large Japanese forces were already concentrated in Manchuria, Indo-China, and south China. American property in China, and even the American Embassy and the U. S. S. Tutuila at Chungking had already been damaged with bursts.

We have seen that Japan's ambition for control of the Far East was not to be hindered by either diplomacy or economic pressure. We have watched

34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
her as the number and boldness of her aggressions increased. Our statesmen, and the leaders of other nations tried to stop her in her ruthless campaigns, until finally, the attack on Pearl Harbor, led to her ignominious defeat and deep humiliation.

In the next chapter, the Roosevelt foreign policy will be discussed. As he assumed the office of President of the United States, the Briand-Kellogg Peace Pact had already proved itself powerless to prevent war. The League of Nations had shown its impotence by permitting Japan to retain Manchuria, and to continue her ruthless aggression. All the major powers of the world were rearming. As the prospects for world peace dimmed, America began to prepare for the fateful hour.
CHAPTER III

SEARCH FOR THE ROAD TO PEACE

When Franklin Delano Roosevelt was inaugurated on March 4, 1933, the economic life of our nation was at a low ebb. During 1932, over 1,400 banks had failed, and in the last two weeks before Roosevelt took the oath of office, twenty-one states and the District of Columbia were either permitting their banks to run under special orders, or had declared a banking holiday. The new President at once assumed the leadership of the Nation, urging confidence and courage. He told the people that the only thing they had to fear was fear itself, and that his most important task at the moment was to find work for the unemployed. On the day after his inauguration, a nationwide bank moratorium was declared, and an embargo was placed on the withdrawal of currency from the banks. This act was the inauguration of the New Deal, and an effort to restore prosperity to the Nation. In its effect, it was a step in the direction of a planned economy. For the next four years, Roosevelt and the leaders of our nation struggled with the problems of unemployment, insecurity and poverty. More than a score of legislative acts were passed, giving the government control of, or supervision of economic life. Much criticism against the President’s policy was made by those who believed in the laissez faire method of business. The majority of the people, however, were in favor of the new experiments, and felt that the New Deal would lead the
country to economic stability.

Roosevelt had many friends and many enemies. In *This Age of Conflict*, we learn that the character of Roosevelt was a mixture of political insight and enduring high principles. His truthfulness was taken for granted, even by those who disliked him. He was a great orator, possessing a better understanding of foreign affairs than any of the high authorities with whom he worked. No one could deny his sureness of vision. His death, April 12, 1945, "at the moment of triumph and indispensability in world politics, was a great loss to his generation." 1

The above portrayal contrasts greatly with John T. Flynn's analysis of Roosevelt in his book, *The Roosevelt Myth*. He tells us that the President exerted continuous pressure to change the structure of government, in order to gain more power for himself. By one plan after another, he increased the powers of the President, and lessened those of Congress and the Courts. 2 The NRA provided the President with $3,300,000,000 to use for relief and recovery. The purse strings, which had formerly been held by Congress were now in his hands. In the whole ten years previous to 1933, the government had not expended such an enormous sum. 3 Senators and representatives instead of go-

1 Chambers, 611.


3 Ibid.
ing to Congress for appropriations, now went to the President. They had to bow to his wishes, if they desired to get money for their districts. The wielding of this new power by the President was in its results an attack on the structure of government, which endeavors to keep its three branches independent of each other. During the Roosevelt administration, over a hundred bureaus were organized, such as the NYA, the CCC, the NRA and the FWA. Many bureaus were never given power to function in a legitimate way, by act of Congress, but held their power directly from Roosevelt. By means of blank-check donations and government rulings, the powers of the nation can be seized, and if this plan is continued, our free government will be changed without a vote of the people and our Constitutions will be destroyed.

In a recent book, Professor Thomas A. Bailey states that

Roosevelt repeatedly deceived the American people during the period before Pearl Harbor... He was faced with a terrible dilemma. If he came out unequivocally for intervention, he would be defeated in 1940.

In a radio broadcast, January 12, 1941, Senator Burton K. Wheeler, Democratic Senator from Montana, criticized the Land-Lease Bill at length. He said in part, that never before, in the history of the United States has the chief executive of the nation asked Congress to act contrary to international law. Never before, in the history of this nation has duplicity been evident

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Thomas A. Bailey, The Man in the Street, New York, 1948, 297
in its dealing with other nations. At no other period has the United States
given to one man so great a power, a power which could undermine the frame-
work of our Government. At no other time has Congress been asked to surrender
its rightful powers to the Chief Executive. ... "The lend-lease-give pro-
gram is the New Deal's triple A foreign policy; it will plow under every
fourth American boy. ... Approval of lend-lease means war, open and complete
warfare."³

According to Eliot Janeway, America's economic reorganization be-
tween the years 1939 and 1945 was little short of miraculous. A new standard
of living was given to the nation; labor, both in the city and in the country
assumed a new dignity and importance. There was a tremendous improvement in
both the living and working conditions of the Negro. Complete mobilization
of industry permitted the United States to conquer the Axis and become the
leader in the struggle against Soviet domination. Roosevelt deserves the
credit for this stupendous accomplishment. He took a chance on the speed with
which the economy developed to initiate further production, as needs for the
war effort became greater.⁹

Some historians, viewing the New Deal from the standpoint of the

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³ Charles A. Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War,
1941, a Study in Appearances and Realities, New Haven, 1948, 108, quoting
Congressional Record, 77th Congress, First Session, Vol. 87, Part 10, (Appendix)
3, A 178-179.

⁹ Paul Farmer, U. of Wisconsin reviews Eliot Janeway's The Struggle
for Survival: A Chronicle of Economic Mobilization, in World War II, (Chron-
icles of America Series, LIII'), New Haven, 1951. Cited in A.H. R., Apr. 1952,
WII, 758-759, No.3.
present (1950) say it appears to be a compromise. A completely controlled and directed economy was offensive to the American way of life, with its inclination for personal freedom in business. Expanded governmental control of business was considered a weapon to fight the depression, but not as a remedy for all national ills. In labor legislation, and in social, likewise, the Roosevelt administration accomplished more benefit in a few years than Britain did in fifty. The United States sought a compromise between unrestricted competition and regimented economy. The recognition of the Soviet Union was considered by some writers, to be the most important diplomatic act of the Roosevelt regime during 1933. It is said that Maxim Litvinov, Soviet delegate to the World Economic Conference in London (1933) stated that his government was ready to buy $1,000,000,000 worth of goods abroad. The American opinion concerning the Russians was anything but cordial. During the Bolshevik Revolution $140,000,000 worth of American property had been confiscated. Besides this, the Kerensky government had borrowed $332,000,000, a debt which the Soviets refused to honor. But since the rise of Japan was a threat to both Russia and America, Roosevelt decided to overlook past differences and sent word to President Kalinin, that the United States would welcome a Soviet representative to discuss questions relating to the two countries. Litvinov came as representative of the Soviet. After eight days of discussion, formal diplomatic relations were established between Russia and the United States. The Soviet Union pledged protection to American citizens in Russia, and cancelled all claims for damages done during the Siberian expedition. It promised also, to refrain from Communist propaganda in the United States. The Uni-
tated States refused to lend the Soviet any more money, being deterred by the Johnson Act of 1934, which forbids loans to governments in default.

The successful attack of Japan upon Manchuria in 1931, and the steady progress of Japanese control in North China during 1933 to 1937, made it clear to the United States, as well as to the other great powers, that Japan aimed at making the entire Chinese Republic a Japanese protectorate. Their plan, stated Ambassador Grew from Tokyo to Secretary Hull in December, 1934,

is to obtain trade control and eventually predominant political influence in China, the Philippines, the Straits Settlements, Siam, and the Dutch East Indies, the Maritime Provinces and Vladivostok, one step at a time, as in Korea and Manchuria, pausing intermittently to consolidate and then continuing as soon as the intervening obstacles can be overcome by diplomacy or force. . . . We would be reprehensibly sonorous if we were to trust to the security of treaty restraints or international comity to safeguard our interests or, indeed, our own property. 10

In informal discussions with one of America's representatives in Tokyo, Saburo Kurusu of the Japanese Foreign Office said that

Japan, who was destined to be the leader of the Oriental civilization would in course of time be the "boss of a group comprising China, India, the Netherlands East Indies, etc. . . . He proceeded to say that the United States will lead the Americas both North and South. Great Britain is leading the European countries, but Great Britain is degenerating, while the rest of Europe is decadent. Therefore, it will end by the United States leading the Occidental civilization, while Japan leads the Oriental civilization." 11


11 Chambers, 601.
In a report to the Secretary of State, William E. Dodd, Ambassador to Germany, said that the Dutch Minister talked to him and told him that the Dutch authorities had become concerned about a movement known as "an Asiatic League of Nations." Two generals had been appointed to travel about in China, and to organize in Manchukuo, Mongolia, the Shanghai district, Indo-China and Siam, groups whose purpose it is to bring about a close co-ordination with Japan, and ultimately give Japan control of the Far East. This activity has been rather intense since the American recognition of Russia. Dodd explained that Japan has changed her plans in regard to Russia. Instead of challenging her at once, she will delay, in order to establish a stronger hold on the regions named. The Dutch minister also described a changing Japanese tariff policy destined to ease the relations of Japan with all the countries concerned, but he was quite positive in asserting that the European countries at the Hague held the opinion that the Japanese military clique intends to annex the Philippines and the Dutch possessions. The Minister sincerely hoped that the United States would assist in bringing about better economic and political relations in the Far East. 12

With this information at hand, the United States began to take counter measures in the Far East. Through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,

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A loan of $50,000,000 was made to the Chinese Government in May, 1934. The United States had already recognized the Soviet Union, in November, 1933, which action was considered by Japan as a move by Washington to oppose Tokyo's ambitions in the Pacific. When Japan denounced the Washington naval agreement of 1922, a race for naval supremacy in the Pacific began. International relations further deteriorated, when Japan withdrew from the London Naval Conference (December, 1935 to March, 1936) because America stood firmly against full naval parity with the United States and Britain.\(^\text{13}\)

In the opinion of Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, American policy was ersatz during the period from the Munich crisis until the summer of 1939. It was the best the President could provide for the country, since the American public were insisting on isolation. By April, there was no chance of appeasement. England and France were trying to get allies against Germany. America was in a position to help Europe. A repeal of the embargo on munitions might have stayed Germany. During the spring of 1939, in talks to Senators and Congressmen, the President used to end his conversations with the idea that he regarded the repeal of the embargo as the greatest step that could be taken to guard the country's interests, both to secure peace and to protect us in case war should come.\(^\text{14}\)

On February 11, 1939, Stanley K. Hornbeck, advisor on Political Rel-

\(^{13}\) Chambers, 604.

ations, prepared a memorandum concerning an economic offensive against Japan, which the Department of State was planning. The record states that until 1900, the Japanese were considered as a

"comparatively amiable, artistic, art-loving and peaceful people, who needed to be taught and could be patronized." But Japan's character was "not what it was thought before 1895 to be," and her "strength is not what it has been thought since 1905 to be." 15

Since 1905, the world, through fear of Japan, has permitted her to ruthlessly steal territory from her neighbors. 16

There are three ways by which nations may offer resistance to such injustice: first by opposing it as an immoral act, second by economic opposition, and third by armed intervention. America has long tried economic opposition; hence the only measure left to her is armed intervention. The conclusion is that military force will have to be used sooner or later. 17

Rauch contends that President Roosevelt could and did hope that the series of measures which he adopted during pre-Pearl Harbor years might have averted hostilities. He is exonerated from the charge of planning war or of having violated in any way the promises of peaceful intention he made during the 1940 campaign. 18

15 Tansill, Back Door, 502, quoting a memorandum by Stanley K. Hornbeck, Adviser on Political Relations, February 11, 1939, 793 / 14671, Confidential file, HS, Department of State.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Basil Rauch, Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor: A Study in the Creation of a Foreign Policy, New York, 1950, reviewed by Charles C. Griffin, A.H. R., LVI, October 1950, 368.
Herbert Feis, adviser on International Economic Affairs, recommended increased economic pressure by France, Britain and the United States, if denunciation of our existing commercial treaty failed to be effective. Ambassador Grew disagreed with this policy of economic pressure. He was of the opinion that Japan had vast resources which she could use; that she had been storing up raw materials for military supplies, and that economic pressure might not be effective. 19

Secretary of State, Hull had no more optimistic outlook than Grew. He told the members of Congress that the conflict to come would affect the whole world. It would be an attack by "powerful nations armed to the teeth, preaching the doctrine of naked force and practicing a philosophy of barbarism." 20 He declared that

Hitler intends to make himself the colossus of Europe, while Japan places her heel on Asia. If they succeed, we will have to transact our business with the rest of the world through Tokyo and Berlin. We know all this, and yet we retain this embargo, which directly encourages Hitler, makes war more likely, and threatens our own peace and safety. 21

China, at this time, (1939), asked France and Britain to join with her in some plan against Japanese aggression in the Far East, in case of war in Europe. She asked that France and Britain supply air and naval forces to defeat Japan, while China would supply the army. Britain refused, saying that she would have to fight the war in Europe before she could do anything

19 Tansill, 502.
20 Alsop and Kintner, 39-42.
21 Ibid., 43.
in the Far East, and expressed the hope that the presence of the United States Fleet in the Pacific might deter Japan from attacking Britain's possessions there. While China was seeking aid against Japan, the latter was trying to find some plan to preserve the peace of Europe. Japan feared an accord between Germany and Russia, as that would undermine Japanese safety. Failing to get allies in Europe, Japan turned for help to the United States.

During an unofficial conversation with the United States Ambassador, May 16, 1939, by a Japanese who had friends among the high officials of the Court of Japan, the following information was conveyed to Ambassador Grew: pressure was being put upon Japan by Germany and Italy toward entering an alliance with them. Japan was anxious to avoid becoming involved in European affairs yet it could not ignore the fact that "Russia straddled Europe and Asia, and that whether Japan liked it or not, its policies and actions form a bridge by which events in the Far East and in Europe act and react on each other." On May 23, diplomatic conversations were resumed between the Prime Minister of Japan, Baron Hiranuma, and the American charge d'affairs, Eugene H. Doo- man. Baron Hiranuma expressed his horror over the fact that there might be a second world war. He suggested an alliance with the United States, which would have a "moderating influence in Europe."

22 Tansill, 502.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., 507-508.
25 Ibid., 506.
Domun said that the principal difficulty in the way of making such an alliance was Japan's aggressions in China. Hiranuma responded by saying that Japan was only endeavoring to protect its rights in North China. If Secretary Hull thought a settlement of the China conflict was necessary to the making of an alliance, then Japan could not form one, as she had hoped to do, although she thought an American-Japanese alliance would bring about peace in Europe. Secretary Hull gave a cold and discouraging answer to this proposal. It would be better, he thought, for Japan to work singly with the European nations with whom she had "special relations." If the Japanese really wanted world peace, it was proper for them to put an end to hostilities in the Far East. The following July, without waiting for a reply to this conversation of Hiranuma and Hull, President Roosevelt gave notice to the Japanese that the treaty of 1911 would terminate on January 26, 1940. Tansill is of the opinion that this note was not sincere. Our government gave the reason for the termination of the treaty as "changes may need to be made toward better serving the purposes for which such treaties are concluded."

The real reason for its termination was that Japan refused to stop her advance into China, and Americans were protesting the sending of war materials to Japan. This action was the beginning of a strong economic offensive on Japan. 27

It was at the suggestion of Herbert Feis, the adviser on Internation-

26 Ibid., 507-508.

27 Ibid., 508.
al Economic Affairs, that Secretary Hull sent a note to the Japanese Ambassador, Horinouchi, telling him that the trade treaty would be terminated.28

Previous to this termination, several events happened which made the relations between Japan and the United States more strained. The first of these incidents was the bombing of Chungking. Ambassador Johnson, American charge d'affaires in Tokyo called on the Minister of Foreign Affairs on July 10, 1939, and protested against the danger to which American representatives were subjected on account of the bombing of Chungking. The Japanese Minister expressed distress that American lives had been endangered, but said he could not promise that the bombings would cease. Air attack was a necessity in that region. On the same day, July 10, 1939, Roosevelt demanded from the Japanese Government, a statement in reference to the bombings and to the danger to Americans.29 Hull delivered Roosevelt's message, and stated that something very serious would happen if the bombings continued. In response, the Japanese Ambassador expressed the hope that the United States Government would keep its nationals away from the danger zone, but Hull replied sharply that the United States Government did not "concede the right of any other outside country to a monopoly of highways or streets or other localities in China."30

28 U.S. Dep't., Pearl Harbor, 7.

29 Secretary Hull to American Embassy in Tokyo, July 10, 1939. 793.94/15201A, MS, Department of State, cited by Tansill, 616.

30 Memorandum of conversation between Secretary Hull and the Japanese Ambassador, July 20, 1939. 793.94 / k5253, MS, Department of State, cited by Tansill, 617.
That the Department of State was being more aggressive toward Japan than Britain was, is shown by the Tientsin Affair. During World War I, China liquidated Austrian and German concessions in Tientsin, and in 1920, she confiscated the Russian concessions. The British had 46 million invested in Tientsin and the French, a large amount, although less than the British had. Besides this, 50 million of British silver was in the Tientsin banks in the name of the Chinese Nationalist Government. Japan demanded that this silver be turned over to the Japanese Government. When the Chinese refused, barricades and wire entanglements were erected around the British and French concessions.

After the sinking of the United States gunboat Panay, and the bombing of civilian populations in China, the Washington authorities imposed a moral embargo on aircraft going to Japan. The victories of Germany and Japan presented difficult problems in foreign policy, and the United States faced economic losses in some regions. Public opinion was confused and indefinite. The Washington authorities disagreed as to what policy was best for the United States as a whole. The people at large opposed war and believed in isolationism, yet Secretary Hull, in 1935, had made known to the country, that isolationism had been given a trial, but it had failed and had destroyed 22,000,000 billion dollars' worth of foreign trade. After due consideration, the United States Government on July 1, 1938, restricted the sale of airplanes

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31 Tansill, 506.
32 U. S. Gov't., Pearl Harbor, 3, 7.
nd aeronautical equipment to countries whose pilots were using them to attack
the civilian population.33

As a result of the Tientsin Affair, Sir Robert Craigie, the British
Ambassador to Japan, signed the Craigie-Arita Agreement on July 21, 1939.
By the terms of this far-reaching formula, Great Britain consented to the
plan that Japanese forces be allowed to keep order and protect property in
the Chinese territory where Japan was carrying on military operations, and
Britain permitted Japan to suppress any actions that would interfere with the
success of these military operations. Britain wanted to protect her conces-
sions, so followed a path of appeasement in signing this agreement. This
action was in reality a desertion of the National Government of China.
Great Britain showed her vulnerability by giving way to Japan not only here
at Tientsin, but also when under pressure by Japan she closed the Burma Road.
By this latter act, the United States was hindered from sending supplies and
war materials to China. Likewise, France closed the route through French
Indo-China, when pressure was applied to her by Japan. This was a further
hindrance to the United States, who found it to her interest to continue aid
to China.34

When World War II broke out, neither France nor Britain could give
any assistance to the United States in the Far East. A report from the Amer-
ican Embassy expressed the belief that there would be a greater demand for

33 U. S. Dept., Pearl Harbor, 7.
34 Tansill, 617.
American goods, cotton, wool, pulp, machinery, industrial equipment, nonferrous metals, iron, steel and chemicals. 35

In 1939, Ambassador Grew had warned President Roosevelt that sanctions on Japan might lead to war. If an embargo were put upon American oil, Japan might reciprocate by taking control of the rich petroleum resources of the Netherlands East Indies. Grew wished to prevent war with Japan. Tansill believes that Roosevelt had a deep-seated dislike for Japan, and appeared unwilling to recognize any gesture of Japan for an agreement. Grew did not like this attitude. The Japanese Foreign Minister had given him to understand that Japan would take measures to facilitate American commerce, and that they would not drive out American interests in China.

When the Japanese demanded the recognition of a new Central Government for China, headed by Wang Ching-wei, Secretary Hull answered:

The Government of the United States has ample reason for believing that the Government (of Chiang Kai-shek) with capital now at Chungking, has the allegiance and support of the great majority of the Chinese people. The Government of the United States of course continues to recognize that Government as the Government of China.

The British Ambassador to Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, expressed conciliation toward Japan's new Central Government in China. He stated that both Britain and Japan were

striving for the same objective, namely, a lasting peace and the preservation of our institutions from extraneous, subversive influences. This friendly gesture toward Japan was favorably

35 Ibid., 621.

36 Ibid., 620.
regarded by the London Times which spoke of the proposed establishment of the Wang regime as "an offer of peace to the Chinese people." 37

Britain, however, looked at Japanese aggression in a different light, when Japan announced that she was deeply concerned over any development accompanying the aggravation of war in Europe that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands Indies. 38

Dr. Loudon, Netherlands Minister to Washington, immediately informed Japan that his government would not tolerate any "preventive protection" of its colonial possessions. 3

Secretary Hull was also very prompt in letting Japan know that the United States would not tolerate any intervention in the Dutch East Indies, and the entire Pacific area. He then reminded Japan of the Root-Takahira treaty of 1908, and of the Four Power Treaty of 1921. 40

Apparently, the British were ready to take action against Japan after the Tientsin Affair, for Lord Lothian of the British Foreign Office, inquired about Anglo-American fleet movements in the Atlantic and Pacific, and asked Secretary Hull "whether Japan should be opposed or appeased." 41 Lothian suggested a strong economic embargo be placed on Japan, and that

37 London Times, March 29, 1940, cited by Tansill, 621.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
battleships could be sent to Singapore to demonstrate a united policy on the part of Britain and the United States. \(^{42}\) Hull thought we ought to let the situation stand as it was for the present, but when Japan succeeded in persuading Britain to close the Burma Road for three months, thus cutting off war materials from China, Hull made it known that the United States wished the main lines of trade and commerce in every part of the world to be kept open. \(^{43}\)

At a dinner party, attended by Morgenthau, Stimson and Knox, Lord Lothian and the Australian minister, the plan of cutting off oil supplies from Japan was discussed. Lord Lothian suggested destroying the oil wells in the Dutch East Indies, but when Sumner Welles heard of it, he said that this procedure would cause Japan to attack British and Dutch colonial possessions. However, the opinion of the three American representatives prevailed. \(^{44}\)

These men realized that Japan was not to be coerced by threats. Some other procedure must be followed. Finally, Morgenthau drew up an order, that placed all kinds of oil and scrap metals under control. The President signed it, and sent it to Under-Secretary Welles for counter signature. Welles refused to sign it, and wrote a new order, which only cut off aviation

\(^{42}\) Tansill, 624.

\(^{43}\) Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor, The Coming of the War Between the United States and Japan, Princeton, 1950, 89-91.

\(^{44}\) Tansill, 624.
motor fuel and lubricants, and No. 1 heavy melting iron and steel scrap.\textsuperscript{45}

A member of the Japanese embassy saw the newspaper accounts of the total embargo, and immediately made inquiries at Washington. Welles calmed the Japanese representative by saying the order was not aimed at any particular country, and that it was only motor oil, lubricants and heavy melting iron which was to be cut off. The Japanese Government protested by three long notes to Welles.\textsuperscript{46} Both British and Dutch representatives counselled prudence, but Grew, who had heretofor opposed sanctions against Japan, suddenly reversed his policy, for he believed that the time had come to impose strong economic pressure, and that if we wanted to support Britain, "we must preserve the status quo in the Pacific, at least until the war in Europe had been won or lost.\textsuperscript{47} "A show of force, and the resolve to use it, was necessary to keep Japan in her place.\textsuperscript{48}

During 1940, the United States continued her policy of aiding China, by exerting pressure on Japan. Diplomatic pressure was employed by offering objections to Japan's seizure of Chinese territory, and to Japan's disregard of Americans living in China. Economic pressure was exerted by loaning to China sums of money totaling $200,000,000 which enabled her to continue her manufactures and to get needed materials for both civilian and military uses.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Ibid., citing Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 2, 637.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 625, citing Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 2, 637.
\end{itemize}
Besides this, America also sent munitions to be used against Japan.\textsuperscript{49}

Hull realized, as early as the winter of 1940, that the Japanese military men were planning the conquest of the Pacific as far east as India and to the South Seas, and as far west as Hawaii.\textsuperscript{50}

By the end of 1939, Japan had 55 million barrels of oil in reserve. But after that date, it had been more difficult to procure. Only 50,000,000 barrels were in reserve by September, 1941. Fuel oil stocks were only 22,000,000, but the aviation gasoline supply had increased from one to four million barrels. Japan could no longer draw supplies of oil from the United States or India. Japan felt that the sooner she attacked, the better chance she had of winning. Delay meant a diminishing oil supply.\textsuperscript{51}

President Roosevelt sought to have Congress amend the Neutrality Act, so that we could provide Britain and France with arms against Germany, in the event that war should break out, but the Senate Committee, on July 11, 1939, voted to defer decision until January, 1940. Hull considered this decision as a "Neutrality Disaster." He resorted to a measure to offset the failure of Congress to amend the Neutrality Act. He ended the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{49} U.S. Dept., Pearl Harbor, 8

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{51} Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor, New Jersey, 1950, 21.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
After Japan had signed the Tripartite Pact, September 27, 1940, the United States began to impose stronger economic sanctions on Japan. The Pact was made public, the three signatories avowing their intention to bring about a new order in Europe and Asia. A few days before this, Hitler had attacked Russia. This left Japan free to move into South Indo-China. She made use of her opportunity, taking Tankin Province. Here she could outflank Singapore, and occupy the Malay peninsula, thus endangering strategic Singapore, which was the key to Asia, Malaysia, and Australasia.\(^{53}\) Roosevelt retaliated by placing a total embargo on iron and steel to Japan. This did not affect Japan too seriously, as she had built up a large stock pile of materials for her immediate needs.\(^{54}\)

The Japanese were aiming at building a new "world empire" aided by Hitler. Together they planned to make the Eastern hemisphere their own and they thought they would be able to control and subjugate all other nations.\(^{55}\)

Japan felt that Russia would resist expansion to the north, while it was not possible for the United States to prevent Japanese expansion to the south, west or east. If the United States, in 1930, had built up a superior navy as Stanley Hornbeck had advocated, future events in the Far East might have been vastly different. Our policy toward China was influenced

\(^{53}\) U.S. Dept., Pearl Harbor, 18.

\(^{54}\) Tansill, 625.

\(^{55}\) U.S. Dept., Pearl Harbor, 8.
greatly by Japan's wishes.56

Japan had signed the Tripartite Pact as a defense measure, for Hitler's triumphs might lead him to the Far East, and to the Dutch East Indies, which was the richest archipelago in the world. The Pact confirmed a German "new order" in Europe, which meant a German conquest of the continent of Europe, in return for a Japanese "new order" in the East, which meant a Japanese conquest of the Far East, and the expulsion of occidental power from "Greater East Asia." 57 The alliance also resolved that if one party were attacked by a country not already participating in the war, that the other two members of the pact would come to the aid of the third. Article 3 pointed straight at the United States. It stated:

Japan, Germany and Italy . . . undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict. 58

Herbert Feis has pointed out to us every bend and turn of the Road to Pearl Harbor. He says that in 1937, the Western Powers had their last chance to stop Japan short of a major war, but that this chance was lost when "the only concurrent action taken was to do nothing." 59 He thinks that Hull's policy of appeasement, was better than Morgenthau's, who wanted more


57 Bemis, 861-865.

58 Tansill, 626.
stringent action which might have had the effect of bringing about a Japanese attack in 1940, when we were in a greater state of unreadiness, than in 1941, and when Japan would have had a better chance to defeat us. 59 He also thinks that Crew and Doorman were too hopeful about the Konoye-Roosevelt meeting. 60 We are told that oil was crucial to Japan at this time and that the embargo on it was a real weapon in the hands of the Western Powers. We are not informed why Japan attempted so great a conquest, nor what caused the deep divisions in the Japanese government. 61

Japan had a secret oral understanding with Stalmar, representative from Berlin, reserving for herself the right to decide whether a cause for war existed in any particular case. There is evidence that Japan signed the Tripartite Pact to hinder the United States from entering into the war. Admiral Nomura received instructions from the Japanese Foreign Office, October 8, 1941, stating that Japan had signed the Tripartite Pact in order to preserve "amicable relations with America." 62

While President Roosevelt was making plans for a stronger economic offensive against Japan, Japan was trying to effect peace and was willing to sacrifice her position in China to attain peace. In November, 1940, Matsunaka asked Bishop James E. Walsh, Superior General of the Catholic Foreign Mis-

59 Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor, 107.
60 Ibid., 274.
61 Ibid.
62 Tansill, 625-626.
sion Society of Maryknoll, New York, and Reverend James H. Drought of the
same order to bring a message to the President from Japan, telling him that
the Japanese would be willing to withdraw from the Asia, and that they would
restore China's geographical and political integrity and remove her military
forces from China. General Hito and the Japanese Army also wished to make
peace. Bishop Walsh and Father Drought, during a two hour conference, placed
the plan before the President and Secretary Hull, January 23, 1941. At the
conclusion of the visit, the Bishop and his companion were told that the
matter would "be taken under advisement."

Just before Bishop Walsh and Father Drought had presented the Ja-
pinese peace proposals, Mr. Hashimoto had held lengthy conversations with
Mr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine. If America would assure Japan
"an open door to trade in the colonial possessions of various countries
throughout the world," Prince Hirose would be willing to carry out the pro-
mise of non-aggression and removal of military forces from China. Mr. Horn-
beck's answer was a "gruff negative."

It is Japan, not the United States that has been the aggressor; Ja-
pan, not the United States, has disregarded law, violated treaties,
killed and injured persons, created fear, destroyed property, dis-
criminated, necessitated evacuations, piled up armaments, seized
territory and threatened to seize more, et cetera . . . . It is Ja-
pan, not the United States, that has made threats and talked of

63 Ibid., 629.
65 Ibid.
Bemis is of the opinion that the Secretary of State had made many attempts to come to a peaceful agreement with Japan in regard to the settlement of the Far Eastern Question. He states that the White House even hinted at a "separate Monroe Doctrine for Europe, Asia and the American World." He goes on to explain:

a general Japanese-American diplomatic settlement became extremely difficult when, by signing the Triple Alliance, Japan stepped from the backyard of American diplomacy to take a place in the front yard too.

By this act, Japan put herself into the affairs in the Atlantic, where with all its might, the United States was struggling to keep Britain from being submerged, and at the same time endeavoring to unite the Americas into a solid block against the Axis.

In How War Came, we read that Nomura requested a meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye as a means of bringing about peace. Roosevelt was at the moment having a meeting with Churchill at which the famous Atlantic Charter was drawn up. Roosevelt answered the Japanese request by sending a message stating that certain principles should be agreed upon before a meeting could be arranged. He said that the following four points should be adhered to by both nations: 1) Territorial integrity for all nations, 2) Non-interference in the affairs of other countries, 3) Equality

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67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.
of commercial opportunity, 4) Maintenance of the status quo in the Pacific.

Six months previous to the Atlantic Conference, the American Ambassador at Tokyo, telegraphed to the State Department saying that he had received information from the Peruvian Minister that in the event of trouble between the United States and Japan, that Japan intended to make a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, using all the equipment that was available. Neither the Peruvian Minister, nor our Division of Naval Intelligence put any credence in this report.  

While Japanese ambassadors were trying to effect a peace, Japan continued her activity in the Far East. By October, 1940, she had shown her power by settling a boundary dispute between Thailand and Indo-China. By awarding several thousand square miles of territory to Thailand, Japan weakened French influence in southeastern Asia, and made Japan's position at Bangkok stronger. Tokyo next sought a ten year neutrality pact with Russia, which was signed on April 13, 1941. Saburu Kurusu, Japanese Ambassador to Germany, signed the document. It was he who was talking peace with the United States at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack.

Russia thought that the British and French would be conquered before many months had elapsed. She therefore feared that Germany would attack her from the west, while Japan would attack on the east. For this reason,

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69 Forrest Davis and Ernest Lindley, How War Came, New York, 1942, 288.
70 U.S. Dept., Pearl Harbor, 77.
71 Demis, 366.
the Soviet Government entered into the non-aggression pact with Japan. A little over a month later, Germany attacked the Soviet Union, which used defensive strategy and exerted great effort to gain the help of the United States. To show its sincerity, it abolished the American Communist Party, and the Communist International, the Comintern, which latter organization Stalin considered to be the Holy of Holies of the working class.  

As Japan continued her advance through Indo-China getting closer to Singapore and Burma, she became a threat to the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines. The President and the Secretary of State watched Japan's program with uneasiness, and sought to stop her advance, first by warnings, then by extensive loans to China. When to appease Japan, the Burma Road was closed by order of Great Britain, the United States uttered a dissenting note. During the next few months, American oil, scrap iron, gasoline and in the end, petroleum were placed under embargo, not against Japan alone, but against all countries. We were reserving them for our own needs. By


73 Bemis, 867, quoting Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 1940, 595, says: "March 7, 1940, the Export-Import Bank authorized a loan of $20,000,000 to be repaid in tin; on September 25, 1940, a loan of $25,000,000 guaranteed by the Bank of China; and in addition a $30,000,000 purchase of tungsten by the Metal Reserve Corporation, a subsidiary of the United States Reconstruction Finance Corporation. A further loan of $60,000,000 was announced November 30, 1940, in connection with a plan of the Metal Reserve Company to purchase a stock of wolframite, antimony, and tin from the National Resources Commission of China."

74 Ibid., 867. See statement made by Secretary Hull to the Press, July 16, 1940. Documents on American Foreign Relations, III (1940-1941), 269.
July, 1941, all American credits in the United States were frozen, and American credits in like manner, in Japan. On July 24, 1941, President Roosevelt told the Japanese Ambassador that he assumed the occupation "was being undertaken by Japan for the purpose of further offense." He also told him that the United States Government had been allowing exports of oil to Japan "primarily for the purpose of doing its utmost to... preserve peace in the Pacific region," despite the "bitter criticism that had been leveled against the administration. 75 The next month, August, 1941, an American lend-lease mission was sent to China, and supplies needed by that country were beginning to move by way of Rangoon, and along the Burma road. Soon after this, Japanese pilots attempted to destroy the Burma Road by bombing it. 76

Churchill, Prime Minister of England, says that the attack by Japan should have been expected. 77 There were many reasons why Japan would attack the United States. We should have realized this, and been prepared for it. In a communication to Stalin, Churchill wrote that if the United States should be attacked by Japan, Great Britain would immediately come to our aid. 78 Germany did not want the United States to enter the war. She wished Japan would attack the British and Dutch possessions in the Far East,

76 Bemis, 867.
78 Ibid., 476.
but not any of the American possessions. However, Japan thought it too
great a risk to attack the Far East, until she had crippled the American
Fleet in Pearl Harbor.79 In April, 1941, Matsuoka received a message from
Churchill, in which the latter told him that Japan would incur serious dan-
ger by entering the war.80 Churchill was happy, however, when Japan final-
ly attacked Pearl Harbor, not because of the damage done there, but for the
reason that he knew that America's entrance into the war meant victory for
the Allies. The fate of the three members of the Axis was sealed by that
attack. Britain and the United States together could conquer the world.81
Through diplomacy, Churchill held the friendship and good will of America.
He knew he was dependent on her for both men and munitions.82

Tansill claims that the Soviet Union was responsible for both the
war in Europe, and in the Far East.83 He thinks that Stalin instigated war
so that he would be able to spread Communism more easily and rapidly.84 Ja-
pan was a barrier to Communism in Asia. The United States should not have
opposed Japan: to do so was a great mistake. The democracies also made a
fatal error in defending Poland against Hitler. Tansill says that Roosevelt

79 Ibid., 181.
80 Ibid., 189-190.
81 Ibid., 607.
82 Ibid.
83 Tansill, 456.
84 Ibid., 458.
was not only guilty of maneuvering Japan into war against the United States, he was also responsible for influencing Chamberlain to oppose Hitler in Poland, thereby bringing about war in Europe. Hitler, if not interfered with, would have turned Eastward after his conquest of Poland, for he wanted the Ukraine and would have preferred to fight with Russia over it, than with England and France. Tansill also blames Woodrow Wilson for intervening in World War I. Had Wilson not interfered, a balance of power would have been created in Europe, and the mistakes of Versailles would have been avoided.

No one can disprove charges made against what might have been. We have no proof however, that had we not entered World War I, that beneficial results would have followed. If America had not intervened, Germany might have had a complete victory in Europe, and it might have been a very stern master toward the conquered.

Julius W. Pratt asks, "Can we be sure that the United States would be secure in such a situation?" Would it have been more secure than it is today? Tansill blames the Chinese for resisting Japan in Eastern Asia, and the United States for helping China. His reason is that Japan was a

85 Ibid., 509.
86 Ibid., 514.
87 Ibid.
88 Julius W. Pratt, University of Buffalo, reviews Tansill's Back Door to War, A.H.R., LIXII, October, 1952, 150-158.
89 Ibid.
bulwark against Communism. In 1941, it was not apparent that Communism would gain control, if the Japanese didn't. It may be that Japan was expressing alarm over Communism as an excuse for pursuing her aggressions in China. There is no real proof that Japan would have been satisfied with anything less than the whole of China, and a China completely subject to her. 90

Pratt agrees with Tansill that the Pacific was the "back door" to the European war, but he will not agree that Roosevelt deliberately sought war. He believes that our tenacious insistence on the traditional American policy, in view of the fact that Japan was determined to conquer and control China produced a situation, which could not be overcome save by war. When war appeared inevitable, "how we should maneuver them [the Japs] into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much damage to ours selves" was a normal and natural question. 91

In a letter to important and influential Japanese, written at the American Embassy in Tokyo, September 1, 1941, Ambassador Grew speaks of the China affair: he says that about two weeks after war had begun, in July, 1937, Chiang Kai-shek sent a message to Japan, offering to withdraw all Chinese troops if Japan would do likewise, and declare an armistice until peace could be negotiated. The message was sent through the British Embassy and delivered to Mr. Horinouchi, Vice Foreign Minister. But nothing came of it. It appears that the Japanese did not want an armistice or peace. They had

90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
been fighting for four years, and Chiang Kai-shek was still the legitimate
ruler of the Chinese. He was still fighting bravely for his country. Wang
Ching-wei had to be protected by Japanese soldiers in order to preserve his
life. How could he be considered as the real ruler of China? He was simply
a puppet. Japan's difficulties with China could have been smoothed out by
peaceful means. 92

In Turbulent Era, Ambassador Grew tells of his attempts to inform
the State Department of Japan's attitude toward the United States, sending
cable after cable to Secretary of State, Hull, only to discover years later
that Hull had never read the messages. Our State Department is shown to be
inept by the picture here drawn. The Japanese had hoped to avoid a conflict
with America. Grew foresaw two great tragedies during his lifetime, the spread
of Bolshevism over Europe, and the "surprise attack" on Pearl Harbor. Had
our diplomats been more experienced and conscientious, Pearl Harbor might
have been avoided. 93

Mr. Feis, in The Road to Pearl Harbor, shows how the United States
was being goaded into war. When Japanese warships and troop transports be­
gan to move south in December, 1941, General Marshall advised President
Roosevelt to set up a geographical limit beyond which Japan could not tres­

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92 Joseph C. Grew, Report from Tokyo: A Message to the American
People, New York, 1942, xvii-xvill.

pass, and to tell Japan that we would fight if she overstepped these limits. This line might have become the boundary between war and peace, had the attack on Pearl Harbor not occurred. December, 1941, was too late a date to draw such lines. We wonder if the line had been drawn ten or even four years earlier, perhaps we could have made the Japanese understand that they could gain their ends without war, and thus by our straightforward declaration have altered the course of history.\textsuperscript{94} From The Road to Pearl Harbor, we learn how futile it is to attempt to compromise with aggression. Each concession made by the Allies stirred the Japanese to bolder advances. Cordell Hull toned down proposals to deal firmly with the Japanese, because he did not receive public support and lacked adequate military power. Mr. Feis lets the facts speak for themselves, in order to prove that "far from goading Japan into war, we gave the Japanese twice as much rope as they needed to hang themselves." The Hull note, that killed the peace, did not really kill it, for the note was too late to have had any effect. "The Japanese combined fleet had already left Hitokappu Bay days before the Hull note reached Tokyo, with sealed orders to attack Pearl Harbor." \textsuperscript{95}

In This Is Pearl, we are informed that Admiral Stark and his associates did not wish to enter the War. Neither did the Japanese naval officers. Although the Japanese leaders are represented as resisting war, the


\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Ibid.}
reason why they finally attacked us is left unstated. Nor does the book make clear why Admiral Yamanoto opposed the Tripartite Pact, and the war with the United States. 96

By November, 1941, the Japanese Government had come to the decision to make one more offer to the United States, and if an agreement could not be reached, to use force to get what they demanded. They planned a surprise attack over extensive territory, and the attack was to be made as soon as the forces could be gotten ready. If America refused the Japanese demands, Japan would attack us at all points simultaneously.97

Moore considered Nomura the best representative that Japan had had in Washington in the past quarter of a century. It was Nomura who wanted Kuru su to assist him to attain a peaceful settlement of affairs with the United States.98 Kuru su had been an American consul, and Nomura knew him to be a diplomatist, and a negotiator of ability. He did not regard him as a militarist. Nomura, while Foreign Minister to Japan, had sent Kuru su to Berlin to sign the Tripartite Pact.99 He believed that Kuru su had signed it without believing it to be the best plan for his country. However, he had acted under orders from the Japanese Government. Since his visit to Berlin,

96 James A. Field, Jr., A.E.E., R., 54, 1943-1949, Reviewer of This Is Pearl, The United States and Japan, by Walter Millis, New York, 1941.
97 Frederick Moore, With Japan's Leaders, New York, 1942, 257.
98 Ibid., 257-264.
99 Ibid.
Kurusu’s view had altered radically. Besides, he came with definite orders from his government, different than the instructions, which former Japanese officials bore. 100

Moore was under the mistaken idea that the Japanese would not dare to make war, and the United States Government felt that Japan would not be so bold as to attack us. The British, likewise, were of the same mind, even though Japan had given repeated warnings. 101

Japan was ready for war. Kurusu presented his government’s final demand on November 20, 1941. In substance it stated:

The Japanese Government offered to remove its armed forces from Southern Indo-China, transferring them to the North of that French possession, thereby relieving Thailand and the Dutch East Indies of threat. In return, the Japanese asked, in effect, that the American Government promptly lift the cordon, resume trade relations with Japan and supply her especially with oil. This implied that the Japanese Government would not agree to the withdrawal of troops from Northern Indo-China or from anywhere in China, as the American Government had been asking in return for lifting the cordon. 102

The Japanese proposals, if accepted, would leave China a helpless victim of Japan. But America could not accept such demands. It would be a betrayal of “Free China” and a desertion of General Chiang Kai-shek’s Government. By ceasing to help Chiang Kai-shek, we would permit Japan to defeat him. 103

100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
That the State Department regarded Kurusu's proposals with gravity can be gathered from the actions of Mr. Hull, and President Roosevelt following the presentation of the Japanese demands. Hull immediately called a conference of representatives of the British, Australian, Dutch and Chinese Governments which met November 22, 1941. During the succeeding few days, the representatives also conferred with the President.104

By November 26, the State Department delivered a formal rejection to the Japanese demands, in the form of counter-proposals. One of the articles stated that "The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indo-China."105 Professor Tansill says that Franklin D. Roosevelt "gave his ultimatum to Japan, November 26, 1941, with a complete understanding of the fact that it was a battle cry." He is likewise critical of American efforts to hinder Japanese aggression, especially for the reason that Japan was opposing Russia.106

Moore says that Winston Churchill did not believe that Japan would attack in 1941, since she had not done so the previous year, when she would have had a better chance of success. Likewise, the Armed Forces would have been on the all out alert at Pearl Harbor, if they believed an attack there to be imminent.107

104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Fred Harvey Harrington, "Mid-Century Meering", A.H.R., No. 56, 717, quoting Charles Callan Tansill.
107 Moore, 257-264.
At Cheltenham, Maryland, on the morning of December 4, the Navy radio receiving station caught a Japanese broadcast from JAP in Tokyo, in which there was inserted a false weather report, "east wind rain." United States communications officers were able to interpret this message as "imminence of war." This information alerted American Armed Forces radio stations to watch for the "east wind rain" message. As soon as they received it, the message was decoded and handed to Commander Safford, who forwarded it without delay, to Rear Admiral Noyes, who telephoned it to the President's naval aid.\(^{108}\) Safford and Lieutenant Commander Kramer, tried for three days to arouse Admiral Stark to the realization that "... the Japanese were going to start war on Saturday, December 6, or Sunday, December 7, 1941.\(^{109}\)

On December 2, Tokyo ordered the Japanese to destroy all copies of codes, save one copy of two specified codes, and all files and secret documents at the Washington Embassy. On the same day an important meeting was held at the White House, at which only Roosevelt, Stimson, Knox and Welles were present.\(^{110}\) The President discussed each phase of the Japanese situation. Welles had already asked the Japanese for what purpose they had sent their forces into Indo-China, and had insisted upon a quick answer. The President considered sending a message to the Emperor, and one to Congress also.


\(^{109}\) Ibid. The testimony of Captain Safford is given in detail.

The War Council had met on November 28, the President presiding. When the meeting adjourned, it was thought that the President would send a warning to Japan. But the President delayed sending the message until December 5, at which time the Japanese Armed Forces were already on their way to attack us. Hull advised the delay. Feis has found no convincing record, giving reasons why the President delayed. Hull had been reading and rereading the message to Congress, which had been drafted at the War Council meeting. He, too, decided to wait until some action by Japan would indicate that it was time to notify Congress.

Count Ciano of Italy wrote in his diary, December 3, 1941, that Roosevelt had been successful in forcing the Japanese to attack the United States, since he (Roosevelt) was prohibited from entering the war directly. On the same day, General Miles, with the consent of General Marshall, sent word to the American embassy at Tokyo to destroy our code machine there. Two days later, Australia was preparing for war, but feared a blockade in the near future. Mr. Stimson did not like the fact that the Chicago Tribune (December, 1941) revealed a secret plan of the high authorities at

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111 Ibid.
112 Feis, 335.
113 Ibid.
114 Frederick R. Sanborn, Design for War, New York, 1951, 521.
115 Ibid., 525.
Washington, to raise an army of 10,000,000 men, 5,000,000 of whom were to be sent to Europe in 1943. 117

In the meantime a member of the Armed Forces was vainly trying to warn his superiors of grave danger. Blake Clark describes it thus:

Private Joseph L. Lockard was listening in on one of the detector units which the Army had recently installed -- an instrument so marvelously sensitive that it picks up the whir of an airplane motor more than a hundred miles away. Officially, the detector was closed at seven A.M. but in order to instruct another soldier who was learning how to operate the unit, Private Lockard kept the instrument tuned in.

At exactly two minutes past seven o'clock, Lockard sensed that the detector had picked up something. His heart beat fast as he interpreted the signal: "Planes -- lots of them -- a hundred and thirty-two miles distant." The excited private re-checked the distance. He re-checked the azimuth. Then he called the Army Information Center.

"Flash -- planes -- a hundred and thirty-two miles -- approaching from an unusual direction." 118

Unperceived by the United States military men, a Japanese task force was coming upon Hawaii. Over the flagship Akagi flew the flag, which had been displayed on the battleship Mikasa, when the Japanese attacked Port Arthur in 1905. 119 At Tusushima Straights, "the planes were leaving the decks of the carriers. Their errand, each crew had been told, was to destroy the power of the United States to cheat Japan out of its deserved place on the earth." 120 In a well-planned and skillfully executed attack, 300 Japanese

117 Ibid.
118 Feis, 335.
119 Ibid., 341.
120 U. S. Dep't., Pearl Harbor Attack, xi.
planes, from six aircraft carriers bombed the island of Oahu, striking the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Before 9 o'clock 188 planes were either lost or so badly damaged that they could not be reconditioned. Eight American battleships, three light cruisers, and four other vessels were destroyed. Our casualties amounted to 3,435 men. The Japanese pilots returned to their carriers with small losses; less than one hundred in personal, twenty-nine planes and five midget submarines.

About an hour after the attack, Japanese ambassadors delivered to the Secretary of State, an answer to the recent American note, but it contained no hint of Japan's attack. It stated, that Japan was trying to bring peace to the world, and stability to China and the islands of the Pacific. Hull told them that the whole thing was a lie and a deception. They did not answer, but left the White House unescorted, enemies of the United States.

That the high naval officials failed to transmit a warning to Honolulu seems unaccountable. On the evening of December 6, the Japanese reply to the United States note of November 26, was intercepted. The President read the message to Nomura, then immediately exclaimed, "This means war!" But the President did not call a conference of the Army and Navy officials.

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121 U. S. Dep't., Pearl Harbor, xi.
122 Ibid., 65.
123 Ibid.
124 Feis, 341.
125 Tansill, 652.
as would have been expected. He seemed unperturbed by the news. On December 7, at 9:00 A.M., Lieutenant Commander Kramer brought the last part of the Japanese orders to Nomura, to Admiral Stark. Its meaning was so clear that Stark cried out: "My God! This means war! I must get word to Kimmel at once." 126 However, he did not notify him; instead he tried to get General Marshall, who could not be reached immediately because he was off horseback riding. His absence prevented an alert from reaching Pearl Harbor in time to save the American fleet from destruction, and the lives of over three thousand members of the Navy and Air Corps. 127

General Marshall reached his office at 11:25 that morning. There was still time to warn Honolulu by scrambler telephone, by radio, or by FBI radio, but instead he sent the message RCA, and failed to mark it "priority".

Tansill inquires:

Was the General under Presidential orders to break military regulations with regard to important military information? Did he think that the President’s political objectives outweighed considerations of national safety? Was the preservation of the British Empire worth the blood, sweat and tears not only of the men who would die in the agony of Pearl Harbor, but also of the long roll of heroes, who perished in the epic encounters in the Pacific, . . . . 128

President Roosevelt was sitting in the oval study of the White House, enjoying a quiet Sunday afternoon, when "Death stood in the doorway.

126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
The Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor. America had suddenly been thrust into war... "129
CHAPTER IV

CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF PEARL HARBOR

A concurrent resolution calling for an investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster was submitted on September 6, 1945, by the Senate majority leader, Alben W. Barkley. Section 2, of the resolution, describes the purpose:

The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the attack made by the Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and shall report to the Senate and the House of Representatives not later than January 3, 1946, the results of its investigation together with such recommendations as it may deem advisable. 1

The spirit and intentions supposed to animate the inquiry were described by Senator Barkley in his address. He said that reports of previous investigations "are confusing and conflicting, when compared to one another, and to some extent contain contradictions and inconsistencies within themselves." He referred to the "widespread confusion and suspicion" that prevailed "among the American people and among the members of Congress." 2

Senator Barkley said that the Congressional investigation should fix responsibility "upon an individual, or a group of individuals" or upon a system under which they operated or co-operated or failed to do either, "and that it should determine what corrective action might tend to prevent a recurrence of the disaster." 3

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3 Ibid.
The inquiry, Barkley said, should be conducted without partisanship or favoritism toward any responsible official, military, naval, or civilian, high or low, living or dead. ... Congress itself should make its own thorough, impartial, and fearless inquiry into the facts and circumstances and conditions prevailing prior to and at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, no matter how far back it may be necessary to go in order to appraise the situation which existed prior to and at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. 4

The resolution passed both Houses of Congress on September 11. By assigning six out of ten places on the committee to Democrats, and by appointing Alben M. Barkley, Senate majority leader, chairman, the administration demonstrated the partisan nature of the project. President Harry S. Truman's executive order thus denied minority committee members the power to examine the government files. But neither Senator Ferguson, nor Senator Brewster were to be deterred by these attempts to hinder justice from taking its course. When the committee finally made its report on July 20, 1946, three divergent opinions were submitted. 5

Throughout the period during which the investigations were being made, continuous and persistent efforts were made to silence minority members. If they were honest in describing President Roosevelt's methods and motives, they would be declared defenders of Hitler and Tojo. If they criticized American officials, they would be represented as blaming their own country for starting the war. 6

4 Ibid., citing Congressional Record, p. 8490, Sept. 6, 1945

5 Morgenstern, x.

6 Ibid.
In the weeks and months following Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt and the high authorities at Washington, attempted to determine the cause of the catastrophe. The defeat at Hawaii was, at the outset, blamed on Japan. The Japanese had not only fired the first shot, but they had kept on dropping bombs until our battleships and aircraft were demolished, and over two thousand men of our Armed Forces lay dead. When it was found that Japan was not wholly at fault, Roosevelt and the high command pointed the finger of guilt at Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Secretary Knox blamed them for not being watchful; for not sighting the enemy in time. The President, although he had called no witnesses, found Kimmel and Short guilty, and dismissed them from their commands. Roosevelt then appointed a commission headed by Justice Roberts, to investigate the matter. The commission found Kimmel and Short guilty of dereliction of duty. They were told that they would be subject to court martial at some future date. Under the circumstances, both men had to keep silence. The threat of unjust punishment hung over their heads for the next four years.

The Roberts Report, which was given to Roosevelt on January 24, 1942, made many errors in important matters. It is very much to be regretted that the Roberts Report was made so hurriedly, and that it was so inaccurate and incomplete. The Roberts Commission knew about the intercepted messages

7 Ibid., 311.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
and the cracked code, but it did not inquire about the messages, or find out if Kimmel and Short had been informed about them. General Marshall, after advising Short not to resign, "took steps in secret to get rid of him." Admiral Stark hoped that Kimmel would resign also. Feeling that their higher officials wanted it, both men resigned, but they knew they had been treated unfairly. Kimmel felt that he was singled out as the scapegoat for the tragedy of Pearl Harbor. President Roosevelt, and his war cabinet and council concealed their own failure to inform Kimmel and Short. Thus the Pearl Harbor commanders were deprived of their posts. Disgraced in the eyes of the public, who thought they were to blame for Pearl Harbor, they could do nothing in their own defense, because the threat of court-martial hung over them. The President and the War Cabinet advised postponement of a trial, in order to prevent certain military secrets from being known.

Finally, in 1944, there was a strong demand for an investigation of Pearl Harbor. The President, seeing that Congress was determined to make a thorough examination, decided to have the administration control the work. Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson arranged for a Navy Court, and an Army Board. Kimmel was declared not guilty. The report read in part:

"Based upon the facts established, the court is of the opinion that no offenses have been committed, nor serious blame incurred on the part of any

10 Ibid., 47.
11 Ibid., 45.
12 Ibid., 47.
13 Ibid., 48.
person or persons in the naval service." 14

Kimmel testified that it was more than two years after the Roberts Commission had given its report before he (Kimmel) was allowed to know what accusation the Commission had brought against him. The Navy Court was the only one in which the rights of an American citizen were granted him, 15 although Kimmel had requested a report of his trial, the Secretary of the Navy refused to grant his request. Six months later, on August 28, 1945, the findings of the Naval Court appeared in the press, and Kimmel learned for the first time that he had been judged "not guilty of any dereliction of duty or error of judgment." 16

The report of the Army Board was no more pleasing to the Administration than that of the Navy Court. The Army findings named members of the President's cabinet, and of the high command guilty. These were Secretary of State, Hull, Chief of Staff, Marshall, and Chief of War Plans Gerow, in addition to General Short. President Truman and Secretary Stimson tried to overrule the Army board. Stimson said that the criticism of Hull was "uncalled for" and that that of Marshall was unfair, and "unjustified," 17 "Truman endeavored to court martial the American people.

"The country," he said, "was not ready for preparedness. . . .

14 Ibid., 312.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
I think the country is as much to blame as any individual in this final situation, that developed in Pearl Harbor." 18 Admiral King, Commander-in-chief of the Fleet, and Secretary of the Navy, Forrestal, didn't think it would look just right before the public to free Kimmel of all guilt, so he said that the Admiral would not be allowed, in future, to occupy any position in the Navy "which requires the exercise of superior judgment." 19 That their ruling might not appear too prejudiced, they gave the same order to Admiral Stark as well. 20 Judge Advocate General Cramer made efforts to have further investigation, and he suggested that the work be put into the hands of a "selected" individual. 21 Colonel Clausen was given the task. Two days after his report was submitted, Cramer brought up the verdict of "not guilty." 22

The general question which the Joint Committee took upon itself to solve was:

Did all the civil, military, and naval authorities of the United States charged with responsibility for the conduct of diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese Government and for preparedness and defense at Pearl Harbor competently, efficiently and with proper regard for the trust imposed in them fulfill the duties of their respective offices under the Constitution and laws of the United States? 23

18 Ibid., 311.
19 Ibid., 312.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 U. S. Dep't., Pearl Harbor, 496.
The subsidiary and specific questions were:

1. Did the high civil, military, and naval authorities in Washington secure in advance of 10 o'clock a.m. (e.s.t.) December 7, 1941, information respecting Japanese designs and intentions sufficient to convince them beyond all reasonable doubt that war with Japan was immediately imminent?

2. If so, did they give to General Walter C. Short and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, the commanders at Pearl Harbor, clear and definite orders, immediately prior to the Japanese attack, instructing them to be fully alert for defense against such an attack?

3. Was Hawaii adequately equipped for its defense against a Japanese attack in accordance with the known circumstances?

4. Did the commanders at Pearl Harbor take the appropriate measures required by the orders issued to them from Washington, by the duties of their respective offices, and by the information in their possession and the resources at their disposal, to maintain the security of the possessions of the United States as far as that responsibility was invested in them? 24

The Committee did not investigate the wisdom of the foreign policy of the United States Government. This question was omitted from the instructions given to the committee. Such a question would require the study of history extending back fifty years or more. However we can get some clues to the truth, by studying our dealings with Japan, and the negotiations leading up to December 7, 1941. 25

After all the testimony was presented, the Joint Committee found the record of Pearl Harbor incomplete. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary Knox were dead. Harry Hopkins, an intimate and official assistant of the President died shortly after the investigation began. Ill health kept Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and Secretary of War, Stimson from giving

24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
information which would have been valuable.\(^{26}\)

The Congressional Investigating Committee found the Roberts Report unsatisfactory. It was made hastily, and was proved to be inadequate and incomplete. It did not investigate the intercepted "winds messages" sent early in December, 1941, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Neither did it find out who accepted the messages and to whom they were sent.\(^{27}\)

The fact that Washington failed to transmit the "winds messages" to the commanders at Hawaii became an important piece of evidence during the Congressional Investigation of Pearl Harbor. If General Short and Admiral Kimmel had not received the vital intelligence transmitted by the "winds message", they could not have been expected to act upon it. Mr. Justice Roberts testified that he would not have read it (the winds message) even if it had been shown to him. The Investigating Commission says:

It should be noted, however, that Justice Roberts had sufficient legal experience to know the proper method of collecting and preserving evidence which in this case involved the highest interests of the Nation. The facts were then fresh in the minds of key witnesses in Washington. They could not then have been ignorant of their whereabouts at important times or have forgotten the details of events and operations. No files would have been "lost" and no information would have been distorted by the passage of time. The failure to observe these obvious necessities is almost as tragic to the cause of truth as the attack on Pearl Harbor itself was for the nation.

These difficulties were supplemented by even greater ones stemming from Presidential restraints of the Committee and from the partisan character of the Committee itself.\(^{28}\)

\(^{26}\) Ibid., 497.

\(^{27}\) Ibid.

\(^{28}\) Ibid.
President Harry S. Truman issued an order to the Joint Committee on August 28, 1945, curtailing their power to gain full access to official documents from which they could learn the facts. It is true that the President relaxed the order of August 28, by a new one less stringent, on October 23, 1945, but individual members of the Committee were not permitted to search the records. The majority party members continued to hold control over papers, records and other information. Some of the majority members of the Committee tried to have the restrictions removed, however, when by a majority vote of the Committee, the minority members were forbidden access to government files and other records, the minority inferred that there was a deliberate attempt being made by the majority to hide the truth.

These restrictions were opposed to the usual practice as evidenced by the testimony of Mr. Burton K. Wheeler, the Senator from Montana. He had assisted in the investigation of the Teapot Dome Scandal, being a minority member of the committee. He testified that no one member of the committee had ever been hindered from searching the files in any department of government. During the Coolidge administration, Attorney General Daugherty was asked to resign because he refused to give the files from his department.

President Truman was well versed in the rights of committee members, having been head of the Truman Committee (later the Mead Committee). During the four years of its existence, no member of the committee, whether

29 Ibid., 498.
30 Ibid., 497.
31 Ibid.
of the majority or minority was ever refused access to any information that a member thought relevant or useful. At the time the Committee was formed, the methods which had proved very successful in the Truman Committee were banned to the Senate investigators of Pearl Harbor. When Stimson declined to appear before the Committee, he offered the excuse of ill-health. He did not answer the 176 questions submitted by Senator Ferguson, on March 6, 1946, but he did submit written answers to 61 submitted to him later by the same Senator.

Secretary Hull testified before the Committee three times, nevertheless the Republican members of the Committee were not allowed to cross-examine him. They had no way of securing information from him, when the questions sent to him remained unanswered.

Ambassador Grew's diary had been given to persons who were preparing it for commercial publication, but it was denied examination by the Committee. Excerpts of the diaries were printed in the record, and the rest of the documents were withheld. American law demands that the court have access to the whole document, in cases where a part of the document is used by a person in his own defense. Miss Grace Tully, President Roosevelt's secretary was allowed to select the official letters of the late president, pertaining to Pearl Harbor. The Committee and the country had be satisfied that her se-

32 Ibid., 499.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., 500.
35 Ibid.
lection was correct, but it was hardly a satisfactory one for those who were responsible for learning the truth and producing the evidence. 36

The delays in building up defenses, such as air fields and radar installations at Hawaii, was an important question before the Committee, but they were not permitted to question Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. 37

Navy and War authorities strongly advised a modus vivendi for three months beginning in November, 1941, in order to give our armed forces time to prepare for war. Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox examined the document and told Secretary Hull that this procedure would be a safe one. 38 Nevertheless, shortly after this, the modus vivendi was suddenly dropped from the agenda, and there was substituted the Hull message which was followed shortly by the attack on Pearl Harbor. 39 General George Marshall testified that Japan might have decided not to attack us, had we succeeded in delaying her attack until Moscow had defeated the Germans in December, 1941. 40

Because the Committee was unable to get all the facts regarding the Pearl Harbor attack, it worked under a handicap; however, it succeeded in collecting a vast amount of information in a short time, enough to point

36 Ibid. 501.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid. 501-502.
39 Ibid. 502.
40 Ibid.
out those who were responsible for the destruction of Pearl Harbor. A study
of the material collected makes this clear.\textsuperscript{41}

The following conclusions were drawn from the evidence which was
collected by the Committee:

In the months before Pearl Harbor attack, there was a growing ten-
sion with Japan, and after November 26, war seemed imminent. By November 7,
1941, the threat of war had become so strong that Roosevelt and his cabinet
felt that one of three courses would have to be pursued: either America's
leaders would maneuver the Japanese into firing the first shot, or the Pres-
ident could order an attack upon Japan, or he could ask Congress to decide
between war and peace.\textsuperscript{42} But the President of the United States did none
of these things. He waited for Japan to fire the first shot.\textsuperscript{43}

The Washington high authorities, especially the War Council, and
the War Cabinet, had a very good chance to send identical and precise in-
structions to the commanders at Hawaii, but they did nothing. The War Coun-
cil numbered five members, namely, the Secretaries of State, War and Navy,
and the Chiefs of Staff and of Naval Operations, while the War Cabinet was
composed of these same men, together with the President, and sometimes the
commanding general of the Air Force, General Arnold.\textsuperscript{44} It seems strange

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 502.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 513.
that the names "War Council" and "War Cabinet" were given to Roosevelt and his colleagues during peace time; it indicates that the leaders were thinking in terms of war rather than of peace. In this case they should have notified those in charge of our defenses at Hawaii, and given them orders to reconnoiter. The "War Cabinet" and the "War Council" discussed their policies together so that all might have the necessary information to make proper decisions in each one's own sphere. They met weekly or more frequently, and it was the President's work to coordinate the civil and military branches.

Many intercepted messages were decoded by the Army signal Corps or by the Navy Office of Communications, and sent directly to the "War Council" and the "War Cabinet."

It was the President's duty to see that his cabinet and council transmitted important information to the commanders of Hawaii and elsewhere. The two groups, "War Cabinet' and War Council" could, without difficulty or inconvenience, have sent necessary and exact instructions to the Hawaiian commanders concerning the danger of a sudden attack. Nevertheless this was not done. These groups knew that the Japanese were going to attack very soon, especially after November 26, 1941. They had learned this through decoded secret messages which had been intercepted.

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45 Ibid., 514.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
The high officials in Washington, including the President, expected a Japanese attack "perhaps next Monday" that is the Monday following November 25, 1941. The intercepted Japanese messages gave them this advance information, and the War Cabinet knew that November 29, was the time-limit fixed by Japan for a diplomatic agreement with the United States. One of the decoded messages read: "The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days; we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die." Japan considered our diplomatic note of November 26, 1941, a "humiliating proposal" as revealed by an intercepted message.

On September 24, 1941, the Japanese consul at Hawaii received detailed instructions from the Japanese Government in regard to the way he was to report about United States vessels in and around Pearl Harbor. The Japanese Government wanted to know where the craft were located, how many were in each place, and what kind of vessels. For more exact placement, the harbor was divided into five areas, A, B, C, D, and E. On September 29, 1941, the Japanese consul in Hawaii, in answer to the "bomb plot" message, sent a system of symbols which could be used to show the position of United States vessels. This dispatch was decoded and translated in Washington on October 10, 1941. Several other messages were sent from Japan

49 Ibid., 515.
50 Ibid., 517.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., 518.
requesting the position, number and movements of ships in Pearl Harbor. These messages were intercepted and decoded. All indications pointed to an attack on Pearl Harbor.

On November 15, 1941, the Japanese consul in Honolulu was asked to give his "ships in harbor report" about twice a week. During the fortnight from November 15 to 29, four messages asking for the location of ships in Pearl Harbor were sent to the Japanese consul, who forwarded the information to Tokyo on November 18, telling the number of ships, where located, designating the subareas of Pearl Harbor, and reporting the movements of destroyers. These messages were intercepted, sent to Washington by the Communications department before December 6, 1941, and were decoded and translated there.

Japan had never sought information about location of vessels in any other area than Pearl Harbor, although she had endeavored at different times to learn the position of the United States Fleet. The "bomb plot" message and the requests for information about Pearl Harbor indicated that Japan was going to attack there.

Lieutenant Commander Kramer of the Naval Intelligence in Washington sent to the President, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, the Director of Naval Communications, the Director

53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
of Naval Communications, the Director of War Plans, and the Director of Naval Intelligence the Pearl Harbor "bomb plot" intercepted message. These men discussed the "bomb plot" several times, speaking of it as a plan for an air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor. They thought it was a waste of time for the Japanese to get all this "meticulous" information. If they had thought carefully about the Japanese activities, they should have discovered that if Japan simply wanted to keep in touch with the movements of the fleet, such detail would not have been necessary. Furthermore, the answers to messages from Tokyo were always sent back there, indicating that the "bomb plot" was developing there, and would be put into execution from there. The purpose of the knowledge about ship-movements in the harbor was that the ships might be bombed, or could be attacked by submarines or by direct invasion. Had Washington determined the importance of these Japanese messages and warned the Hawaiian Commanders, Pearl Harbor might have been saved, or at least, less damage would have been done.

Admiral Kimmel was at this time commander of the fleet and concerned with its safety. General Short, commander of the naval base, was responsible for the fleet while at his base. Therefore any information evidencing danger to the fleet was basic and should have been given. The President, his War

57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., 519.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
Cabinet and his War Council had received vital information, the "bomb plot" messages, long before the Pearl Harbor attack. These messages intercepted by the Army Signal Corps and the Navy Office of Naval Communications concerned the fleet and the protection of the naval base at Hawaii. Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not have access to this information. It was therefore the obligation of the President and his colleagues to see that these men received this vital information which directly concerned the fleet and the naval base. The Washington authorities were guilty of neglecting an important duty toward Kimmel and Short.

The "Pilot message" from Japan to her ambassadors in Washington announced the coming of the Japanese reply to the United States note of November 26. It was to be in fourteen parts, the last of which was to be handed to the Secretary of State on December 7, 1941. Long before December 7, a great mass of information had been collected and delivered to the Washington authorities. They should have been able to judge the intentions of the Japanese from this information, and the commanders at Hawaii should have been informed, but the Washington high authorities did not inform them, although the information was very necessary for the defense of Pearl Harbor.

62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., 520.
65 Ibid.
The men at Washington responsible for preparedness, received messages showing the United States was facing great danger. These men were the President, the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, and the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations. The "magic," that is the reports from the cryptanalysis of Japanese code messages was not sent to General Short or to Admiral Kimmel, and much general information from other sources was also withheld.

If a review of the history of Japan be made, it becomes evident that Japan has on more than one occasion used the strategy of surprise. The United States should have been ready for a sneak attack, because the high authorities at Washington had plenty of information concerning the imminence of war. Secretary Hull, at a meeting with these authorities on November 25, and again on November 28, expressed the opinion that the Japanese would make a surprise attack, perhaps at several points at once. Ambassador Grew also felt that the Japanese would attack suddenly and without warning.

President Roosevelt was in all probability expecting an attack by Japanese forces. Therefore, he and his War Council were not warranted in keeping this knowledge from the commanders at Hawaii. A message from Ambassador Winant in London at 10:40 A.M. December 6, 1941 (Washington time) informed Roosevelt that two large Japanese forces were sailing toward the Kra Peninsula. Still the President took no steps to alert Hawaii.

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66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., 521.
68 Ibid.
Admiral Kimmel received a message on November 24, 1941, stating that the Japanese might make a surprise attack in any direction including the Philippines or Guam. He was told to inform the senior officers, but that utmost secrecy was necessary, so as not to arouse the Japanese. The next message announced that negotiations with Japan were ended, and to expect an aggressive move against the Philippines, Thai or Kra, and that the number of the Japanese forces was large. The high authorities in Washington failed to estimate the danger in regard to Japanese plans, and to notify Hawaiian commanders of perils they might meet. In this respect the high authorities were negligent. They did not act promptly in evaluating information they had received, nor did they send appropriate directions.

Five months prior to this, in a memorandum dated May 26, 1941, Admiral Kimmel requested that he be furnished with information, as soon as it would become available, bearing on Japanese movements which might affect the base at Hawaii. He said that his was a difficult position. Located far from Washington, he is not informed as to changing policies of government. Hence, he cannot determine what course of action is best, and sometimes does not know what force he will be permitted to use. The uncertainty created by lack of necessary information interferes with the proper execution of naval operations.

69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., 90.
72 Ibid., 341.
memorandum to the President, in which they informed him that Japan's fleet was superior to that of the United States and that our Armed Forces would not be able to undertake an offensive without withdrawing all naval vessels from the European theatre. Besides this, a great quantity of merchant tonnage would be required which would have to be withdrawn from the Atlantic, leaving Britain without the necessary aid in her fight against Germany. The Pearl Harbor commanders thought that by the middle of December, 1941, enough air and submarine strength could be accumulated to deter the Japanese against any action south or west of the Philippines. 73

An attack on Pearl Harbor was a necessary part of Japanese strategic planning, and there is evidence that the President was considering that probability. Roosevelt had stationed the fleet at Pearl Harbor, to deter the Japanese from making an attack during the diplomatic conferences, and to make a show of power, which might make the Japanese yield to to the wishes of the United States. 74 Admiral Richardson, then Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, advised against stationing the fleet there, and was "removed because of protest on that issue." 75 Admiral William D. Leahy, former Chief of Naval Operations was of the same opinion as Admiral Richardson, in this regard. The fleet would be effective only if it moved to strike Japanese forces, which might be too near American, Dutch or British territory.

73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., 522.
The Japanese had moved far southward and were bound to be conscious of the United States fleet at their left, and to destroy it, if possible, otherwise they could not hope to be successful in their conquest of East Asia. 76

Prime Minister Churchill foresaw that the United States Fleet would be attacked for he reasoned that Japan would not attack the Malay Peninsula, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies with the American Fleet at its rear. 77

Colonel Otis Sadtler testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board that a Japanese message had been caught by the United States service men which told that an important message was coming, which would announce war with a certain country. A false weather report would give the message. The Army Pearl Harbor board intercepted this second message which gave the information "east wind rain" which meant that Japan would go to war with the United States, but that it would preserve peace with Russia. 78 This original message has disappeared from the Navy files. It was taken from the files and sent with other papers to the Roberts Commission. Copies of it were in various places. They have all disappeared. 79

The Joint Congressional Committee, after conducting investigations for over two months, rendered a report of the majority party. The following were the conclusions with regard to responsibilities:

1. The Empire of Japan attacked Pearl Harbor without being provoked

76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., 526.
79 Ibid.
to perform this act of aggression. The treacherousness of the attack is shown by the fact that Japanese ambassadors were kept at Washington, conferring with the government officials and pretending to seek peace, while actually their military forces were already moving across the Pacific to attack Pearl Harbor.

2. Japan is responsible for the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese used a striking force of great power and executed their attack from a great distance. They were much more powerful than our commanders suspected.

3. The foreign relations of the United States with Japan were such that there was no just reason for them to attack us. The Secretary of State had made known to the War and Navy Departments the critical conditions that were developing, and that diplomatic relations had ceased; it was therefore time for the military to take control.

4. No evidence was found to prove that the President and his secretaries coerced or tricked Japan into war.

5. The President and the high authorities at Washington tried in every way possible, to avert war with Japan.

6. The Army and Navy failed to avert the disaster at Pearl Harbor, because they did not establish reconnaissance parties to watch the movements of the Japanese. If they had had a force reconnoitering, they would have discovered the hostile forces approaching and could have fought them.

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80 Ibid., 251.
off, and thus saved Pearl Harbor.

7. That the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor was a surprise to everyone. Yet the Washington high authorities knew that there was danger of an attack by air. The Hawaiian officers knew of the imminence of war.

8. The Commanders at Pearl Harbor failed:
   a) To perform their duty; they had been warned of the imminence of war; they had other information; the Army and Navy should have coordinated their war defense plans.
   b) To alert their men, after receiving warnings from the Washington high authorities between November 27 and December 7, 1941.
   c) To exchange all war information, and to plan their defence together.
   d) To keep a reconnaissance force on the alert for Japanese aircraft.
   e) To see that the Army and Navy had their equipment ready.
   f) To use the forces and supplies under their control to repel the Japanese raiders.
   g) To properly interpret the messages sent to them.

9. The mistakes made by the commanders at Hawaii were mistakes of judgment concerning the information they possessed.

10. The War Plans Division of the War Department, failed to inform the Hawaiian Command, that they had not alerted their department sufficiently.

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81 Ibid.
The Intelligence and War Plans Divisions of the War and Navy Department failed:

a) To consider carefully the intercepted messages from Tokyo to Honolulu of September 24, November 15, and November 20, (the bomb plot plan). The Hawaiian Commanders should have been informed of these intercepted messages, as they directly concerned the Pearl Harbor base.

b) To be properly on the alert to take the "one o'clock message." If this message had been correctly interpreted, the command would have been able to alert all the outposts of the Pacific as General Marshall tried to do as soon as he received the information. 82

The Committee is of the opinion that the Army and Navy Departments did not receive sufficient information to put them on the alert for war.

Based on the Committee's investigation, the following recommendations were presented to the Senate:

1. Unity of command should be established immediately at all United States military and naval stations.

2. Army and Navy intelligence agencies should work very closely together. Officers who have an aptitude for this work should be carefully chosen and kept in the position for a long time in order that they may know their field thoroughly and become competent in interpreting information received. Those appointed should be eligible for promotions, just as any other

82 Ibid.
person in the service. Efficient intelligence service is important in
peace-time as well as in war.

3. The Committee wished the activities of Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
district engineer in the Hawaiian Department, investigated. 83

Senators Ferguson and Bruster of the minority would not accept
the majority report, calling it "illogical and unsupported by the preponder-
ance of evidence." 84 They gave a separate report. It stated that the
President of the United States failed to secure cooperation among the War
Cabinet in determining what course to follow. The President should have
insisted that clear and exact directions be sent to Kimmel and Short at
Hawaii. The Constitution and laws of the United States grant the president
power to enforce cooperation. 85 The Commander-in-chief of the armed forces
of the United States appoints the chief officers and final responsibility
rests on him. Therefore Kimmel and Short could not be blamed. The Presi-
dent's decision to await the Japanese attack made it a more urgent duty for
him to inform the Hawaiian Commanders, and order them to fully alert their
forces for defense against a Japanese attack. 86 President Roosevelt and
the high authorities failed to do their duty. They neglected to inform
Admiral Kimmel and General Short of the imminence of war, and they failed
to give them the information obtained by "magic." A few men were attempt-

83 Ibid., 251-253.
84 Morgenstern, 318.
85 Ibid., 318-325.
86 Ibid.
ing to prepare for war by the conference method. They were trying to do the work which should have been assigned to the leaders of the armed forces. To neglect to make the proper preparations for war was the greatest failure of the President and his War Cabinet. Some powerful individuals were making decisions independently of the rest of the Cabinet, and even of Congress. 87

President Truman's claim that the country as a whole was to blame as much as any single individual cannot be accepted because the American people had not been informed of the imminence of war, or of the messages learned through the communications department. 88

The minority committee of the Congressional Investigating Committee believed that the tragedy at Pearl Harbor was due to the failure of the high officials in our government. Using the evidence that had been collected, they drew up twenty-one conclusions stating who was responsible for the Pearl Harbor tragedy. The twentieth conclusion states:

In the final instance of crucial significance for alerting American outpost commanders, on Saturday night, December 6, and Sunday morning, December 7, the President of the United States failed to take that quick and instant executive action which was required by the occasion and by the responsibility for watchfulness and guardianship rightly associated in law and practice with his high office from the establishment of the Republic to our own times. 89

It is the fixed policy of the government of the United States to preserve our country and its possessions from attack. This policy is a permanent one which has been reaffirmed by Congress many times, when war loomed

87 Ibid., 325
88 Ibid., 413.
large in Europe or Asia. The execution of that fixed policy is the duty of
the President, for he is Commander-in-chief of the armed forces. It is he
who is bound to decide what is best for the country. The responsibility of
making plans for its defense rests with him. It is true, that he is ably
assisted by competent advisers, but in the end, it is the President who
makes the final decision. 90

Having made an analysis of the responsibility for the war between
the United States and Japan, by stating the opinions of the more reputable
historians on the subject, the author of this thesis finds that writers do
not agree. Some put the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster on
President Roosevelt, and his War Cabinet, while others blame the War Lords
of Japan.

It is the writer’s opinion, that both the United States and Japan
bear a share of the guilt. The Japanese, by their open acts of aggression
and injustice, performed in complete violation of treaties and internation-
al agreements are responsible. Washington officials bear their share of the
blame also. They foresaw that war was inevitable, yet they failed to assume
their responsibilities, when the country was in grave danger. It is true,
that they tried to delay the war by a three-fold pressure, first diplomatic
then economic, and finally by actively aiding Britain and China by sending
supplies, and munitions in large quantities, and at the same time, hindering
Japan by a total embargo on essential war materials. In this way the United

90 Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-
1940, New Haven, 1947, 567.
States hoped to delay the Japanese long enough to enable the country to prepare for war. In the final months, when Roosevelt and his War Cabinet knew of the imminence of war, they failed to take the steps needed for the safety of our navy and air force. The high authorities at Washington made decisions which should have been made by officers trained in naval, air and military affairs. In the crucial hours, when "magic" informed the War Cabinet of the certainty of attack, they failed to alert Admiral Kimmel and General Short, the two men who could have prevented disaster had they received the information, from the high authorities, to which they were entitled.

In future, we must secure our country's safety, by electing men, who will accept the high responsibilities entrusted to them by the people of the United States, and who will be mindful of their duty and will serve America with unquestionable loyalty.
CRITICAL ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES

I. PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIAL

A. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS


B. DIARIES, MEMOIRS AND PRIVATE PAPERS

William E Dodd, Jr., and Martha Dodd, ed., Ambassador Dodd's Diary, New York, 1941. Mr. Dodd was appointed ambassador to Germany by President Roosevelt in 1933. Charles A. Beard wrote a preface to this book in which he says: "As a dossier of evidence bearing on policies, methods, and labors, Mr. Dodd has left this journal covering affairs from the beginning to the end of his mission. But it is more than that. To use a metaphor, it casts a flood of light into the dark passages of the time now past in which Adolf Hitler was solidifying and expanding his dominion in Germany, from July, 1933, to the close of 1937. . . . the training and experience in historical study and writing which Mr. Dodd brought to bear upon his journal are clearly revealed in it and distinguish it from whole libraries of diplomatic memoirs compiled by professional gossips." (p. xv-xvi)
Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years In Japan, New York, 1944, is a contemporary record drawn from his diaries, and private and official papers. In writing this book the author "sought to promote not only the drive for the unconditional surrender of Japan, but also the reconstruction of peace at the end of hostilities. Toward the ultimate end, one of the purposes of the book, in the words of Ambassador Grew was to tell the Americans that 'there are many Japanese today, who did not want war, who realized the stupidity of attacking the United States, Great Britain, and the other United Nations, who did everything in their power to restrain the military extremists from their headlong and suicidal aggression!'" cited by Kenneth Colgrove, A.H. R., II, 1945-1946, 316. Joseph C. Grew, Report from Tokyo, New York, 1942, was written "to assist the war effort in the United States by impressing the American people with the formidable character, the brutality, and the fanatical determination of the Japanese military machine." (Forward x.) Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era, New York, 1952, tells some of the reasons why Pearl Harbor was attacked. Neglect and unconscientiousness of our State Department officials are shown by the author to be partly responsible for the "surprise attack." Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 vol., New York, 1948, contains extensive quotations from memoranda of conversations which Hull had with representatives of other governments. He gives the main points of the conversations rather than the exact words. The book is not desirable for research, on this account but it contains interesting historical material. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, Boston, 1952, is an absorbing book. It is a political biography, being a ten-year narrative of Vandenberg, and a portion of the American people of his time. In January, 1950, he wrote to a constituent: "To me 'Bipartisan foreign policy' means a mutual effort, under our indispensable two-Party system, to unite our official voice at the water's edge, so that America speaks with maximum authority against those who would divide and conquer us and the free world. It does not involve the remotest surrender of free debate in determining our position." (p.552) His son and editor states: "It was his dedication to bipartisanship that dominated the last years of his life, and brought into sharp focus a generally unrecognized spiritual side of his nature." (p. xix)

C POLICIES

Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940, New Haven, 1947, is a study in responsibilities. He chose the thesis that the United States was to blame for World War II. He said that the country wanted the President and the State Department to pursue a policy of isolation during the years 1933 to 1940. The world would have remained at peace, if the high authorities at Washington had been permitted to pursue a different policy. The isolationists would not allow a preparedness program, and so must take the blame for allowing aggression in Europe and Asia, which finally
resulted in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Beard says that in order to test the truth concerning the people's responsibility for foreign policy, we should determine who influenced the people toward isolationism, peace and neutrality during the years 1933 to 1940. Did Roosevelt and Hull continuously oppose the isolationists? When and where and in what speeches and radio broadcasts was this done? Beard says that Roosevelt adhered to an isolationist policy from 1933 to 1937. In his quarantine speech in October, of that year, he broke away from isolationism, and in its place put the idea of collective security. (p. 117, 156 and 164) Charles A. Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities, New Haven, 1948. This volume is a sequel to American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940. It is based upon the documentation provided by the Joint Committee on the Investigation of Pearl Harbor Attack. "The argument of this book is epitomized in the words taken from its concluding chapter," declares C.C. Griffin, who reviewed the book in A.H.R., January, 1949, 382-386. He quotes Beard's words: "If the precedents set by President Roosevelt in conducting foreign affairs, as reported in the records of the Congressional Committee on Pearl Harbor, and other documents, are to stand unimpeached and be accepted henceforth as valid in law and morals, then... the President of the United States... may, after publicly announcing one foreign policy, secretly pursue the opposite and so conduct foreign and military affairs as to maneuver a designated foreign power into firing the first shot in an attack on the United States and thus avoid the necessity of calling on Congress in advance to exercise its constitutional power to deliberate upon a declaration of war." (p. 582-583) Griffin continues: "Everyone who knew the opinions of the late distinguished historian on foreign policy expected this book to be hostile to the Roosevelt administration, but many would have welcomed a treatment in a vein as relatively sober as that of Beard's earlier volume, American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940, which avoided sweeping conclusions unwarranted by the record. It is regrettable therefore that his last work should have been so largely an example of partisanship on a subject so deeply a part of the emotional experience of the author, as the events which preceded the recent world war." (Charles C. Griffin, A.H.R., vol. LIV, January, 1949, 382-386. Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming of the War Between the United States and Japan, Princeton, 1950. In this volume, Feis has shown us every twist and turn of the road which led the United States into war with Japan in 1941. "The decade since this road was traveled has laid bare most of its secrets. Mr. Feis had access to the State Department archives, the Stimson, Morgenthau, and Grew diaries, and selections from the Roosevelt papers, and had the opportunity to talk at length with many of the Americans involved in the negotiations which preceded the outbreak of the war with Japan. On the Japanese side, he had the records of the International Military Tribunal at Tokyo, the records of the similar tribunals at Nuremberg, and the very revealing Kido and Saionji-Harada diaries, as well as other documents and studies." (Edwin C. Reischauer makes these comments in his review of The Road to Pearl Harbor, A.H.R., LVI, October, 1950 to July, 1951, 617-618.)
William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, New York, 1950, is a study of American foreign policy during the years 1937 to 1940. Langer and Gleason were invited by the Council of Foreign Relations to undertake the task of writing a history of American foreign policy of the period prior to the Second World War, and continuing through 1940. The project was financed by a substantial fund from the Rockefeller Foundation. The book naturally supports Roosevelt and the high authorities in Washington, since the authors have had personal contact and counsel from these men. Charles Austin Beard criticized the Rockefeller Foundation saying that it did not "want journalists or any other persons to examine too closely and criticize the official propaganda and official statements relative to our basic aims and activities, during World War II . . . . Instead of promoting the liberty of research and writing that winnow facts from fictions, subsidized histories of this kind prepared to serve a purpose fixed in advance, are more likely to perpetuate errors than eliminate them . . . . Official archives must be open to all citizens on equal terms, with special privileges for none." Walter Millis, This Is Pearl: The United States and Japan, 1911, New York, 1947. The author treats of the year preceding Pearl Harbor, giving an account of the Japanese preparations for war, and our own preparations. He tells of the meetings of ambassadors of the two countries, in an effort to seek a solution of their difficulties. Mr. Millis draws on the government records, particularly the Pearl Harbor investigation for his information. He sides with the Roosevelt administration, taking the standpoint that war was unavoidable, that there was no other way, even though U.S. policies brought war to our country. This Is Pearl is important as it tells of the series of mistakes which led to the tragedy of Pearl Harbor. It leads up to one of the greatest military feats of history, the victory that lost the war for the Axis powers. (James A. Field, Jr. reviewed the above book in The American H.R., LIV, Oct., 1919 to May, 1949, 173-175.) Basil Rauch, Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor: A Study in the Creation of a Foreign Policy, New York, 1950. Rauch claims that Franklin D. Roosevelt was an internationalist, and he endeavors to prove it in this book. After the surrender of the Western Powers at Munich, Roosevelt turned from preoccupation with domestic problems to the task of changing American foreign policy from "isolationism" to "internationalism," accomplishing this bit by bit as his speeches and acts educated the American people.

Charles C. Griffin, reviewing this book in The American H.R., LVI, Oct., 1950, 370, says that "Rauch admits Roosevelt's involvement of the United States a 'limited undeclared war' in the Atlantic Ocean, during the autumn of 1941. He argues strongly that the President did not seek an all out conflict there, and took only minimum measures to bolster the flow of lend-lease to Britain. He cannot, however, concludes Rauch, conceal the fact that these steps were accompanied by a great deal of presidential verbal legereur in order to grasp one horn of the lend-lease dilemma (all out support for Britain, short of war), and at the same time grasp the other horn (lend-lease was a peace measure)."

Griffin continues: "In dealing with the Japanese problem, Rauch forcefully . . . and successfully demolishes the Beard Morgenstern thesis, though he does not explain why the imposition of embargoes, so long resisted by the administration, as likely to bring war, unless limited to non-essentials was resorted to in the summer of 1941, without full recognition of its almost inevitable consequences . . . Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan, Cambridge, 1950, is reviewed by Claude A. Buss in A.H.R., LVII, October, 1951 to July, 1952, 169-172. He tells us that historical writing at its best is found in this book. Mr. Reischauer speaks from experience. He studies the problems of Japan, as well as our own, and points out the economic aspects of each. He says that we do not know the Japanese culture well enough to understand the Japanese character; hence some things, which seem to be contradictions in Japanese character, are not really so at all. "The awakening of Japan preceded that of other countries of Asia. The struggle between democracy and totalitarianism was not a passing phase of Japanese history." (p.203) It has continued until this time under Japanese occupation. Our objectives are to "readjust the balance so that in the future, peaceful and democratic forces within Japanese society will gradually win out over the militarist and authoritarian forces." (287) Mr. Reischauer draws this sage conclusion: "upon the fate of Japan hangs the fate of the world. Japan is merely one element, in the world order as a whole. By helping Japan to become a free democratic nation, we are helping to create a democratic, peace-loving world." Edward R. Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference, Garden City, New York, 1949. According to Stettinius, President Roosevelt could have made no other agreements than he did make at Yalta. Stettinius does not say whether the President's action was right or wrong. The President believed that we should build the peace on a firm unity between our country, Russia and Great Britain. This idea influenced and pre-determined the agreement that was made at Yalta. Charles Gallan Tansill, Back Door to War, The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933-1941. Writing in A.H.R., Oct., 1952, LVIII, No. 1, 150, Julius W. Pratt, University of Buffalo says: "To the work of World War II 'revisionists' such as the late Charles A. Beard, George Morgenstern, William H. Chamberlin, Frederic R. Sanborn, and Harry Elmer Barnes, Professor Tansill now adds a much more weighty documented volume. In addition to the printed sources, he has made abundant use of numerous collections of personal papers and a wealth of material from State Department archives.

The basic thesis of the book can be stated in a few sentences. The Soviet Union, in order to promote its own program was the instigator of war in both the Far East and Europe. . . . Japan was the natural barrier to the spread of Communism in Asia; Germany in Europe. The United States was guilty of a fatal error in opposing Japan; the democracies similarly erred in backing Poland against Hitler. Roosevelt bears the main guilt, for he not only 'maneuvered' Japan into war in the Pacific, thus entering the European war through the 'back door'; he had already 'needled' Chamberlain into taking a firm stand against Hitler in Poland, thereby playing a key role in
precipitating war in Europe. Had Hitler been permitted peacefully to have his way in Poland, he would have turned east for he 'would have preferred conflict with Russia over the Ukraine' to war with England and France over Poland." William L. Neumann, Making the Peace, 1941-1945: The Diplomacy of the Wartime Conferences, Washington, 1950. Neumann describes the course of negotiations between Britain, the United States and Russia during the interval between August, 1941, (The Atlantic Conference), and February 1945 (Yalta). His summary is objective and shows good judgment. He says that the peacemakers have succeeded no better than those who tried to plan a lasting peace at the end of World War I. (See reviews by Leland M. Goodrich in A.H.R., LVI, Oct. 1950, to July, 1951, p. 168.)

D. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Winston Churchill, The Grand Alliance: The Second World War, Vol. III, Boston, 1950, has been reviewed by Preston Slosson in A.H.R., LV, Oct., 1949 to July 1950, 876-878. He says that Churchill carries the story of World War II from the beginning of 1941, to the Japanese attack on American and British possessions, at the end of that year. American policy is discussed and many tributes are paid to President Roosevelt and his advisers.

Churchill tells us that the British intervened in Greece in order to delay the German offensive against Russia, and to interfere with the plans for the Russian campaign. (p.29) The first air-borne attack by the Germans was made against Crete. (p. 261) This used up valuable men that might have been placed to greater advantage somewhere else. "The forces of Goring expended there might easily have given him Cyprus, Iraq, Syria, and even perhaps Persia." (302) Russia, although repeatedly warned by Britain, thought Germany would not attack her for a long time. The best summary of the work in the opinion of Preston Slosson is what Churchill said in an address to Parliament in 1941: "Let us not forget that the enemy has difficulties of his own... and that the struggles of history have been won by superior will power wresting victory in the teeth of odds or upon the narrowest of margins." (p. 155). Samuel E. Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, July, 1942 to May, 1944, Boston, 1949. The A.H.R., Oct. 1950 to July, 1951, LVI, 930, carried a review of Morison's book by Gordon W. Prange. The Bismarcks Barrier was a combination land-sea-air roadblock of strong Japanese bases centered around the powerful and pivotal fortress of Rabaul at the northern tip of New Britain Island. "The history of the eighteen months of bitter land, sea, and air fighting which he so expertly describes presented no great fleets moving into tremendous and epoch-making battle such as Midway or Leyte Gulf... Morison was forced to deal with a series of relatively small and isolated actions." George B. Sanson, The Western World and Japan: A Study in the Interaction of European and Asiatic Cultures, New York, 1953. Sanson, an eminent historian of Japan, has made a study of the effect of the Western world on Japan before 1900. Japan adopted Western culture more quickly than did
other countries. She formed a strong centralized state, a national conscript army, a system of universal education, and a centralized banking structure. Sanson says: "To over-estimate the part played by Western influence is to misunderstand modern Japanese history, and in consequence to form an unbalanced if not mistaken view of the relation between East and West." (p. 223) This book points out the way Japan has continuously resisted the introduction of Western ideas. In all probability, it will take years to develop a democratic way of life in Japan. George B. Sanson, Japan in World History, New York, 1951. This book contains two series of lectures delivered in Japan to the Japanese by its author, George B. Sanson. The specialist in Japanese history will read this small volume with profit and interest. Chitoshi Yanaga, Japan Since Perry, New York, 1949. The author describes Japan's emergence from feudalism, through the efforts of her leaders, who followed a very definite plan. He pictures the rise and fall of Japan as a world power and ends with the Japanese being trained by the United States. Yanaga does not comment or attempt to justify Japan's foreign policy, but lets the reader draw his own conclusions. He says: "Japan was gradually working herself toward the attainment of hegemony in East Asia," (p. 369), but he also writes: "Dual diplomacy . . . gave rise to inconsistencies, contradictions. . . The right hand did not always know what the left hand was doing." (See review by Harold S. Quigley, A.H. R., LV, April, 1950, No. 3, E. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY

Aaron Daniel, ed., America in Crisis: Fourteen Crucial Episodes in American History, New York, 1952. In this volume several recent crises are treated: "When the Banks Closed" by Walton H. Hamilton; Paul B. Sears, "The Black Blizzards"; Morris Janowitz, "Black Legions on the March;" Norman Holmes Pearson, "The Nazi-Soviet Pact and the End of a Dream". In these essays the authors have told of the issues at stake and the effects of the crises on the people of our United States. They have frequently responded with courage and have shown a willingness to work together when public need demanded it. Eliot Janeway, A Chronicle of Economic Mobilization in World War II, Chronicles of America Series, Vol. 53, New Haven, 1951, is reviewed by Paul Farmer in A.H. R., LVII, No. 3, April, 1952, 758. These are Mr. Farmer's words: "America's economic mobilization between 1939 and 1945 constituted a veritable miracle as Eliot Janeway believes, which raised the standard of living of the nation, gave labor - both urban and rural - a new sense of dignity, and importance, and tremendously improved the position of the Negro, while simultaneously permitting the United States to vanquish the Axis and assume a position of leadership in the post-war struggle against Soviet totalitarianism." Henry L. Stimson, Prelude to Invasion, An Account Based upon Official Reports, Washington,
D.C., 1944. Stimson tells us of the success of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and how that attack assured further successes in the Philippines.

With the balance of naval power in the Pacific now in their favor, the Japanese were relatively free to send mass reinforcements to their invasion troops in the Philippines, while the problem of strengthening our outnumbered garrison there was under the circumstances, an insoluble one. Philippine and American forces hopelessly outnumbered, were forced to withdraw to the Bataan peninsula, (a mountainous region north of the entrance to Manila Bay), for a last ditch stand.

Nicholas Murray Butler, America Faces the Future, Boston, 1932. The author believes that we must have some kind of a planned economy. He says: "What I ask for, gentlemen, is a plan, a plan of international cooperation to solve the problems that have become international -- not to sit and wait -- not to stand and wait -- not merely to abuse the people with a plan: but to present a better plan and to testify for our time and for the time that shall come after us that all the sacrifices that have been made for three hundred years all over this world to build institutions of liberty, of freedom, of political and economic opportunity, to build them into governments and social systems -- that all that has not been wasted. We have not been on a false track, but we simply have been inconsequent in appreciating and in meeting the gravest situation with which our system of liberty has ever been faced. Let the world wake up. Let it demand of its men in public office that they either take constructive lead or make way for those who can -- and will!" George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor, The Story of the Secret War, New York, 1947. Charles A. Beard says: "The catastrophe at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, its significance and its issue, is now and undoubtedly will long continue to be an ineradicable center of intellectual and moral interest. Having scrutinized the more than ten thousand pages of sworn testimony and official papers bearing on this disaster before I read the proof sheets of Mr. Morgenstern's book, I can say out of some knowledge of the subject that his volume is a powerful work based on primary and irreducible facts in the case, carefully gathered and buttressed by exact citations of the sources. For his own inferences and conclusions, he gives documentary contexts." What the War Cabinet and the War Council did in their frequent meetings before Pearl Harbor is described in Morgenstern's book. The secret plans of the Japanese government are disclosed by the intercepted code which the Communications Department decoded shortly before the attack. United States Department of State, Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941, Washington, 1942. This book presents a record of policies and acts by which the United States sought to promote conditions of peace and world order.
ADDITIONAL BOOKS CONSULTED


Chambers, Frank P., Christina P. Grant, Charles C. Bayley, This Age of Conflict, New York, 1950.

Davis, Forrest, and Ernest Lindley, How War Came, New York, 1942.


Hull, Cordell, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan: 1931-1941, v. I, Department of State publication, Washington, D.C.

Mears, Helen, Mirror for Americans: Japan, Boston, 1948.

Moore, Frederick, With Japan's Leaders, New York, 1942.

Morrison, Our Japanese Foe, New York, 1943.

Sanborn, Frederick R., Design for War, New York, 1951.


**ARTICLES AND BOOK REVIEWS**


**NEWSPAPERS**

Chicago Daily Tribune, July 1, 1952.

London Times, March 29, 1940.


APPENDIX
Pearl Harbor, showing berthing of the Pacific Fleet when the Japanese attacked on December 7, 1941. Warships indicated in black were sunk; those in black and white damaged but afloat.

This map was copied from George Morgenstern's *The Story of the Secret War* New York, 1947, with the permission of the Devin-Adair Company.
The island of Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, showing objectives of the Japanese attack of December 7, 1941, which brought the United States into World War II. This drawing was taken from Pearl Harbor, The Story of the Secret War, by George Morgenstern, with permission of The Devin-Adair Company, New York, 1947.
This world map is on Denoyer's Semi-Elliptical Projection. The elements of scale, area, and shape are adjusted to combine useful and instructive features in the greatest possible degree. This map emphasizes earth phenomena. The equator line is twice the earth's circumference and the central meridian is the earth's equator. The globe presents a unified picture of the world. There are no interruptions, which divide some countries into regions and produce mistaken ideas as to relationships between countries, continents, and locations. The equator line is the mid-line of the earth. All countries are placed above and below the equator in the same proportion as on the globe. Areas and distances are shown accurately on the map; except at high latitudes. The Polar maps correct exaggeration in the high latitudes. Water areas are on the same scale as land areas. Natural and political features are shown in comparable proportions. Parallels of latitude are straight lines and show true east-west direction. All points on the earth's surface are shown from the equator on the map, as they are on the globe. The meridians of longitude are true north and south lines. They are adaptable to corresponding directions, and for exploration.
The most important single fact in geography is the fact that the earth is a rotating sphere. The Denoyer Semi-Elliptical projection used for this map, suggests the spherical shape of the earth, due to the proportions of the map and the increasing curvature of the meridian lines as you go either way from the center of the map. Land masses near the sides of the map have to a surprising degree the appearance you observe as you rotate a globe and view the curved-away areas in perspective.

As a world map is chiefly valuable for showing world relations, it is important that neither land nor water areas be penalized with respect to the other. In this map the same scale is used for land and water areas. This has been insured by beginning the complete network of meridians and parallels on which the map is plotted. All area on the earth's surface is accounted for on a 64 inch map, since the 25,000 mile equator then need not be divided into 62 1/2 inches.

Note how the map vividly contrasts the much narrower Indian Ocean with the huge expanse of the Pacific. Check it on this map. If a world map fails to show this, and relations between Alaska and Siberia, and between Labrador and northern Europe, it fails in showing important relations a world map should bring out.

Clearness in this way has been heightened by omitting elements deemed non-essential in a simple political map of the world. Relative importance is shown by the size, style and type of names. Continents are in a bold type of great dominance and country names are in capital letters. Cities are named in small type. Names of oceans, rivers and lakes are in italics.

Unity in the Map Project

Since the equator is a full circumference of the earth, the distance from pole to pole is approximately half as long as the equator line. Twice the length of its central meridian lines are essentially correct. In any type of projection the meridians that are further from the equator must bend toward the pole, unless the map is "interrupted" to keep the continents up-and-down position. That sacrifices unity in the map, relations obscure; for example, Siberia may be pulled away from Alaska, although it is actually very close. Unity is a virtue in a world map.

Land Masses

Denoyer-Geppert offers a variety of world maps, in some of which the Americas are centered throwing the Atlantic and Pacific into sharp contrast. In other maps, as in the one on this page, the projection is centered on the prime meridian, keeping the great land masses undivided. This arrangement is preferred by many for use in the lower grades. The continents are identified and learned. The old world may be considered in the right half of the map, while the new world appears in the left half. The political units making up each of the great land masses are clearly colored and distinctly named.

POLITICAL

SCALE: 400 Miles to Inch

Polar insets in the lower corners of the map add measurably to its usefulness. These are on the equatorial scale of the main map and show these polar areas in their true size. Truly a world map for education in this air age.
This world map has a complete network of meridians and parallels. These are the indispensable lines of reference that you have in a good school globe, and they tell you how the map maker about transferring the surface of the world sphere to a flat surface. This network does not merely identify the position of any point; it also provides a means of plotting a world map, locating all data, especially in determining the true position and the relation of one place to another. With this network we can really understand and interpret the world map, with the globe itself.

These lines are 15° apart, so that intervals between these parallels represent one twenty-fourth of the earth's circumference, or 15° of time.

The school globe and any map is determined by the meridians and parallels, and should be so taught. North is toward the north pole of the earth. East and west are along meridians. Other reason it is vitally important that a world map have a network. Children should practice reading direction from the projection of this map, check it on a globe, and also in the polar insets at the bottom of the map. In this way, they will gain a real understanding of direction in maps they are led upon to use.

A synopsis of the principal features of the map is contained in the legend, insuring a maximum of use by both student and teacher. An explanation of various abbreviations used on the map is included. Distinct city symbols are graded according to size.
The thesis submitted by Sister Mary Antonetta, B.V.M.
has been read and approved by three members of the Department
of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of
the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the
fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that
the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content,
form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

Date: June 1, 1954

Signature of Adviser