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The Teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas on the Participation of Creatures in Good

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THE TEACHING OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS
ON THE PARTICIPATION OF CREATURES
IN GOOD

By

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the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

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LIFE

John J. Kinsella, S.J., was born in Chicago, Illinois, on February 13, 1928.

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In June of 1953 the author received the Licentiate in Philosophy from the College of Philosophy at West Baden. At present he is working for the Master of Arts degree in the Department of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Loyola University.
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A. Summary of Doctrine ........................................... 88
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Among recent trends in Thomistic studies a growing interest in St. Thomas' Platonic and neo-Platonic characteristics is evident. Arthur Little's *The Platonic Heritage of Thomism*\(^1\) is a good example of just such a study. The principal doctrine attributed to St. Thomas' Platonic bent is that of participation. In recent years two second editions of notable works on St. Thomas' theory of participation have appeared. First, there is L.-B Geiger's *La Participation dans la Philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin*\(^2\) and then there is Cornelio Fabro's *La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino*.\(^3\)

The study of this doctrine of participation in the works of St. Thomas leads to the posing of several questions, chief among which might be couched in these terms: was St. Thomas of Aquinas a Platonic Aristotelian or an Aristotelian Platonist? Or in other words: was St. Thomas fundamentally an Aristotelian or a Platonist? Those who would answer with the latter make much of St. Thomas' doctrine of participation.

To attempt an answer to this question within the scope of a Master's thesis would be extremely presumptuous. A definitive

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\(^1\)Dublin, 1949.


answer could be given only after years of careful study and research, and perhaps not even then.

The author of this thesis would like to investigate one section of this larger problem and has endeavored to present St. Thomas' doctrine on the participation of creatures in good. This is certainly a limited subject, but it is felt that an exposition in English of St. Thomas' theory of how creatures participate in good will contribute something toward the study of St. Thomas' doctrine of participation in general and maybe per accidens throw a little light on the historical side of the question. For participation in good is one of the principal types of participation and one of the more Platonic aspects of the doctrine itself.

There have been several studies of St. Thomas' doctrine on good. A rather well worked-out treatment of the Thomistic philosophy of the metaphysical good is contained in Sister Enid's dissertation for the Catholic University of America, *The Goodness of Being in Thomistic Philosophy and Its Contemporary Significance*.4 Another treatment of St. Thomas' philosophy of the good is Elizabeth G. Salmon's *The Good in Existential Metaphysics*.5 Since it is the Aquinas Lecture for 1952 at Marquette University, this work has the limitation of being restricted to a paper of an hour's reading.

Neither the current studies of St. Thomas' metaphysics of the

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5Milwaukee, 1953.
good nor the works on participation go into the subject of participation in good to any length or detail. A wedding of the two doctrines—an exposition of the Thomistic doctrine of participation in good—is the aim of this thesis.

This study is not historical but expository. It does not attempt to state what the heritage of St. Thomas was nor to place him in one philosophical camp or another on the basis of doctrinal leanings. This thesis merely ambitions the presentation of St. Thomas' doctrine of participation in good, of what Thomas said on the subject and not what his sayings on the subject make of him.

This study suffers a notable omission which could be treated quite legitimately within the confines of the subject matter, that is, the epistemological side of the question. Most of the aspects of the question pertaining to the theory of knowledge have been omitted entirely; a few have been touched upon cursorily. Both the omission and the terse treatment of these important aspects of the problem are due to the necessary limitations of a paper of this scope.

The procedure called for by this thesis entails working from those texts of the works of St. Thomas that deal directly with the subject. On the question of the good this is Question 21 of the Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate, the Question de Bono. This section of the De Veritate forms the basis for the treatment of the metaphysics of the good because it is the longest and most developed treatise of St. Thomas on the subject. Furthermore, the De Veritate ranks with the Summa Theologiae and the Summa Contra
Gentiles as one of the major works of St. Thomas. As Etienne Gilson puts it, "the Quaestiones de Veritate ... are no less indispensable to know than the two Summas for the person who would penetrate to the very depths of St. Thomas' thought." Vernon Bourke states, moreover, that "most of the basic principles and conclusions of Thomistic wisdom are thoroughly developed in this earliest and longest group of disputed questions."

It should be noted here that the treatment of St. Thomas' doctrine on the good is limited to the metaphysical good and bypasses or merely touches upon the Thomistic teaching on the moral and psychological goods.

The principal text to be consulted in the matter of participation is from the second chapter or lesson of the In Librum Boetii De Hebdomadibus Expositio. Unlike the question of the good, the subject of participation is not treated at length in the works of St. Thomas. Consequently, the text from the De Hebdomadibus forms the basis of the study, while other texts from the works of St. Thomas will be consulted to interpret, extend, and amplify what is said in the Commentary on Boethius' De Hebdomadibus. Throughout the entire study no text promising to be helpful will be neglected.

The metaphysics of the good will be treated first, and then

7Vernon J. Bourke, "Introduction" to Truth (Chicago, 1952), I, xxvi.
St. Thomas' doctrine on participation in general. Lastly, the
doctrine of the participation of creatures in good will be consid­
ered. This arrangement has been selected because it is felt that
the notions of participation and of good must be clarified before
the doctrine of participation in good can be expounded.

To a large extent, quotations from the works of St. Thomas
that occur in the body of the text of this study are given in Eng­
lish with the original Latin in the footnote. For the most part,
standard translations have been used: for the Quaestiones Dispu­
tatae de Veritate, Truth; for the Summa Contra Gentiles, the Domi­
nican Translation; for most of the Summa Theologiae cited in this
study, Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas; where that was not
possible, the Dominican Translation of that work was used. Where
other translations have been employed, they will be cited in the
proper places. Where a translation is given and no translator is
mentioned, the translation is that of the author of this thesis.

8 Translated from the definitive Leonine text by Robert W.

9 Translated by the English Dominican Fathers, 5 vols. (Lon­
don, 1924-1929).

10 Translated into English; edited and annotated, with an in­

11 Translated by the English Dominican Fathers. First American
edition, 3 vols. (New York, 1947-1948). When a citation from this
work is given, it will be preceded by the initials D.T.
CHAPTER I

THE DOCTRINE OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS
ON THE METAPHYSICAL GOOD

In order to understand St. Thomas' theory on participation in good, it will be necessary first to understand precisely what is contained in the notion of good, in which creatures participate.

In the twenty-first question of the *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*, the *Quaestio de Bono*, there are three topics of special importance and interest: (1) the relation of the notion of good to that of being, (2) the order of the transcendentals, and (3) the question of participation in good. All six of the articles of this question fall under one or other of these topics.\(^1\) Since the last topic of these three, that of participation, will be treated in the final chapter of this study, after the general ideas on participation have been examined, this chapter will be concerned with the relation between good and being and the order of the transcendentals.

As for the first of the two topics to be considered in this chapter, that of the relation of good to being, St. Thomas and

\(^1\)The sixth article introduces an Augustinian question not directly on the point of this study; hence it will not be treated here. The question is: Does the Good of a Creature Consist in Measure, Species, and Order as Augustine Says?
all philosophers are faced with a problem. When a man says that something is good, it would seem that he is adding something to that thing; an addition to being, however, seems impossible because the universal concept of being contains all things within it. "For every reality is essentially a being."²

St. Thomas starts his close metaphysical analysis of the relationship obtaining between being and good by an enumeration of the ways in which one thing can be added to another: "Something can be added to something else in three ways. (1) It adds some reality which is outside the essence of the thing to which it is said to be added. For instance, white adds something to body, since the essence of whiteness is something beyond that of body."³ Of the three modes of addition, the first is realized when one thing is added to another; and the addendum is outside the essence of that to which it is added. This kind of addition takes place when white is added to man, for it is not of the essence of man that he be white.

Another mode of addition is had by contraction or determina-


tion. This happens when the notion of man is added to animal. Previous to the addition of man, animal contains the notion of man implicitly or potentially. Man contracts and determines the notion of animal, giving it the formal qualities of a man.

*Alio modo dicitur aliquid addi super alterum per modum contrahendi et determinandi; sicut homo addit aliquid super animal: non quidem ita quod sit in homine aliqua res quae sit penitus extra essentiam animalis, alias oporteret dicere, quod non totum quod est homo esset animal, sed animal esset pars hominis; sed animal per hominem contrahitur, quia id quod determinate et actualiter continetur in ratione hominis, implicite et quasi potentialiter continetur in ratione animalis. Si­cut est de ratione hominis quod habeat animam rationalem, et de ratione animalis est quod habeat animam, non determinando ad rationalem vel non rationalem; ista ta­men determinatio ratione culus homo super animal addere dicitur, in aliqua re fundatur.*

It should be noted that in this type of addition there is a real foundation for the determination or contraction. Although the genus animal is capable of being rational or irrational, in the actual composite there is an existing reality that makes it the one and not the other.

The third and last type of addition is made in thought alone. What is added by the second notion is only a conceptual note which is not found in the notion of the first. For example, the adjective blind adds something to the notion of man, namely, blindness; but blindness is only a conceptual being and not a natural one, because it is a privation. Nonetheless, blindness contracts the notion of man because not every man is blind. When we speak of a

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blind mole, however, we do not determine our notion of mole in any way, because every mole is blind.

Tertio modo dicitur aliquid addere super alterum secundum rationem tantum; quando scilicet aliquid est de ratione unius quod non est de ratione alterius: quod tamen nihil est in rerum natura, sed in ratione tantum, sive per illud contrahatur id cui dicitur addi, sive non. Caecum enim addit aliquid supra hominem, scilicet caecitatem, quae non est aliquod ens in natura, sed rationis tantum, secundum quod ens est comprehendens privationes; et per hoc homo contrahitur, non enim omnis homo caecus est; sed cum dicitur talpam caecam, non fit per hoc additum aliqua contractio.5

It does not make any difference, then, whether the conceptual addition contracts or determines the being to which it is added. What characterizes this third type of addition is that it is made by thought alone.

After describing these three types of addition, St. Thomas proceeds to see what kind is employed when the note of goodness is added to being. It is clear that good is not added to being in the first way. In fact, nothing can be added to the universal concept of being according to the first manner of addition; for this type of addition requires that the addendum be outside the essence of that to which it is added, and there is nothing that exists or has any reference to existence outside the essence of transcendental being. "It is not possible . . . for something to add anything to being in general in the first way, though in that way there can be an addition to some particular sort of being; for

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5Ibid.
there is no real being which is outside the essence of being in general, though some reality may be outside the essence of this being. "6 As Thomas points out, something can be outside the comprehension of this or that particular being; but nothing can be outside the all-embracing concept of being taken in the transcendental sense. 7

As for the second kind of addition, that of contraction and determination, there are many things which can be added to the transcendental concept of being according to it. All of the ten categories are added in this way; for each of the ten categories or predicaments adds a determined mode of existence to the notion of being: substance adds the mode of being in itself; accident, that of being in another; relation, that of being referred to another; and so forth. Good, however, cannot be added in this way:

Secundo autem modo inveniuntur aliqua addere super ens, quia ens contrahitur per decem genera, quorum unum-quadque addit aliquid super ens; non aliquod accident.

6Ibid.: "Non autem potest esse quod super ens universale aliquid addat aliquid primo modo, quamvis illo modo possit fieri aliqua additio super aliquod ens particulare; nulla enim res naturae est quae sit extra essentiam entis universalis, quamvis aliqua rest sit extra essentiam huius entis." It is clear that in this passage universalis as applied to being means transcendental, a term commonly used by the later scholastics. Universalis could not mean univocal here.

7In 1, 1 c. of the same work, Aquinas says the same thing: "Sed enti non potest addi aliquid quasi extranea natura, per modum quo differentia additur generi, vel accidentis subiecto, quia quae-libet natura essentialiter est ens." Nothing can be added to being as though it were extraneous to being, for every nature is essentially a being.
vel aliquam differentiam quae sit extra essentiam entis, sed determinatum modum essendi, qui fundatur in ipsa essentia rei.

Sic autem bonum non addit aliquid super ens: cum bonum dividatur aequaliter in decem genera, ut patet in I Ethicor.: et ideo oportet quod vel nihil addat super ens, vel si addat, quod sit in ratione tantum. ⁸

As St. Thomas has already indicated, good is a mode that follows upon every being;⁹ and, as Aristotle says,¹⁰ the good is equally divided among the ten categories of being. Therefore, good cannot be a determined mode of being.

By this process of exclusion, it becomes evident that, if good adds anything to being, it must do so according to the third type of addition, which is by concept alone. Now good does add something to being because men do not call a thing good for no reason at all. Therefore, since every conceptual addition is either a negation or a certain kind of relation and good is not a negative but a positive notion, it must be that good adds some kind of a relation to being.

Si enim adderetur aliquid reale, oporteret quod per rationem boni contraheretur ens ad aliquod speciale genus. Cum autem ens sit id quod primo cadit in concept-

⁸ De Ver., 21, 1 c. In the same work, 1, 1 c, the relation of the categories to being is explained: "Sunt enim diversi gradus entitaties, secundum quos accipiuntur diversi modi essendi, et iuxta hos modos accipiuntur diversa rerum genera. Substantia enim non addit supra ens aliquam differentiam, quae significat aliquam naturam superadditam enti, sed nomine substantiae exprimitur quidam specialis modus essendi, scilicet per se ens; et ita est in aliis generibus."

⁹ Ibid., 1, 1 c.

¹⁰ Nicomachean Ethics., I, 5, 1096 a, 19-30.
Of the three proper accidents or properties that are consequent on every being, one or oneness adds a negative note, that of indivisibility. Since true and good are positive notions, they must add a relation which is of the reason alone.

The nature of this merely rational or conceptual relation, which will be referred to as a non-real relation hereafter in this study, remains to be clarified. Something is related to another thing in a non-real sense, says Thomas quoting Aristotle, when it is not really dependent upon that to which it is related; but, on the contrary, that to which it is related is really dependent upon it.12 Such is the relation existing between knowledge and the thing known:

Illa autem relatio . . . dicitur esse rationis tantum, secundum quam dicitur referri id quod non dependet ad id ad quod refertur, sed e converso, cum ipsa relatio quaedam dependentia sit, sicut patet in scientia et scibili, sensu et sensibili. Scientia enim dependet a scibili, sed non e converso: unde relatio qua scientia refertur ad scibile, est realis; relatio vero qua scibile

11 Ibid.
12 Metaphysics, 1, 15, 1021 a, 27.
The thing known is related to knowledge in a non-real sense because in no way is the thing known actually dependent upon knowledge; but knowledge is really dependent upon the thing known, and from this point of view there is a real relation between the two.

St. Thomas goes on to say that in this way the true and the good add the merely rational or conceptual note of that which perfects to the notion of being. "The true and the good must therefore add to the concept of being, a relationship of that which perfects." Elsewhere, speaking of the three major transcendentals, one, true, and good, St. Thomas says, "But none of these adds any difference that limits being, but a quality that follows upon every being; just as the one adds the quality of indivisibility, and the good the quality of finality, and the true the quality of ordination to knowledge." Here Aquinas is careful to point

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13 De Ver., 21, 1 c. For the same doctrine see S.T., I, 13, 7 c; III, 35, 5, ad 3; In I Sent., 30, 1, 1, ad 2; De Fis., 7, 8, ad 1; 7, 11, ad 1. In S.T., I, 13, 7, ad 6. St. Thomas gives this norm for seeing whether the relations are mutually real or not: "Si enim unum in sui intellectu claudat aliud et e converso, tunc sunt simul natura... Si autem unum in sui intellectu claudat aliud, et non e converso, tunc non sunt simul natura. Et hoc modo se habent scientia et scibile."

14 De Ver., 21, 1 c (III, 6): "Oportet igitur quod verum et bonum super intellectum entis addant respectum perfectivi."

15 In I Sent., 19, 5, ad 3: "Nullum tamen eorum addit
out that the three transcendentals do not determine being in any way but add, each of them, a formality: indivisibility by the one, finality by the good, and ordination to cognition by the true.

Although both the true and the good add a note of that which perfects to being according to their respective formalities, there is a distinction not only between the kind of perfection added but also in the mode in which each one adds to being. In every being there is a specific character and there is existence. Accordingly, one being can perfect another in two ways.

In quolibet autem ente est duo considerare: scilicet ipsam rationem speciei, et esse ipsum quo aliquid aliud subsistit in specie illa; et sic aliquod ens postest esse perfectivum dupliciter.

Uno modo secundum rationem speciei tantum. Et sic ab ente perficitur intellectus, qui perficitur per rationem entis. Nec tamen ens est in eo secundum esse natural; et ideo hunc modum perficiendi addit verum super ens. Verum enim est in mente . . . ; et unumquodque ens in tantum dicitur verum, in quantum conformatum est vel conformabile intellectui.16

The first way, then, that one being can perfect another is in the line of the specific character of the perfecting being, as happens when the intellect is perfected by an object outside itself. For, in cognition, the being known does not exist in the intellect according to its natural existence; but its species or specific character exists there intentionally.

quam differentiam contrahentem ens, sed rationem quae consequitur come ens; sicut unum addit rationem indiisionis, et bonum ratione finis, et verum rationem ordinis ad cognitionem

16 De Ver., 21, 1 c.
The second mode of perfecting another is that which is accomplished in both the specific character and the existence. It is in this way that the good perfects being. "A being is perfective of another not only according to its specific character but also according to the existence which it has in reality. In this fashion the good is perfective; for the good is in things, as the Philosopher says." Thus the good perfects another being not only according to the specific character of good but also according to its own existence; and, for this reason, the good is said to be present in things.

It is noteworthy that St. Thomas refers to the addition the good makes to being as a ratio and not a natura. "Bonum, verum et unum addunt super ens, non quidem naturam aliquam, sed rationem." Natura here is taken in the sense of an essence existing in reality; ratio, as a formal aspect or formality of something also existing in reality. The point that Thomas wants to make is that the good does not add another entity to being; indeed, as Aquinas has already said, this would be impossible. What the concept of good does is to point to some aspect or facet of being that is not

\[17\text{Ibid., (III, 7): "Alio modo ens est perfectivum alterius non solum secundum rationem speciali, sed etiam secundum esse quod habet in rerum natura. Et per hunc modum est perfectivum bonum. Bonum enim in rebus est, ut Philosophus dicit in VI Metaphys." The exact place in The Metaphysics is E, 4, 1027 b, 25-26.}\]

\[18\text{In I Sent., 8, 1, 3 c.}\]

\[19\text{See De Ver., 1, 1 c and 21, 1 c; for a discussion of this same point see pp. 4 and 5 above.}\]
understood specifically by the concept being taken in itself.

What, then, is the content of the concept good? St. Thomas answers that since the good thing completes and perfects another thing, it takes on an aspect of finality toward that which it perfects. "Inasmuch as one being by reason of its act of existing is such as to perfect and complete another, it stands to that other as an end. And hence it is that all who rightly define good put in its notion something about its status as an end. The Philosopher accordingly says that they excellently defined good who said that it is 'that which all things desire.'" The concept of good, then, inasmuch as it perfects and completes the being which tends toward it, is a final cause or end for that being.

In this first article of the twenty-first question of the De Veritate, St. Thomas distinguishes two types of good. The first type, holding the highest position on the scale of goods, is that which perfects another as an end. Another type of good, called useful by the Angelic Doctor, is that which leads to an end or na-

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20 De Ver., 21, 1 c (III, 7): "In quantum autem unum ens est secundum esse suum perfectivum alterius et conservativum, habet rationem finis respectu illius quod ab eo perficitur; et inde est quod omnes recte definiientes bonum ponunt in ratione eius aliquid quod pertineat ad habitudinem finis; unde Philosophus dicit in I Ethicorum, quod bonum optime definiunt dicentes, quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt." As given in the text above, Truth, which is a translation of the Leonine Manuscript, translates the phrase "In quantum autem unum ens est secundum esse suum perfectivum alterius et conservativum" (emphasis added) by "Inasmuch as one being by reason of its act of existing is such as to perfect and complete another," which would indicate that the Leonine Text reads something other than conservativum here, possibly completivum or, better, consummavivum. In any case, it will be taken to mean complete in the English sense.
naturally follows upon an end; this type of being is called good in either a causal or significative sense. "First of all and principally . . . a being capable of perfecting another after the manner of an end is called good; but secondarily something is called good which leads to an end (as the useful is said to be good), or which naturally follows upon an end (as not only that which has health is called healthy, but also anything which causes, preserves, or signifies health)." To these two categories of good, St. Thomas adds a third type, the pleasurable. He defines the pleasurable good as that which quiets or brings rest to a desire.

What is the relation of these three types of good among themselves? St. Thomas tells us that the honorable good and the pleasurable good are goods in themselves inasmuch as they contain the aspect of true finality or end in itself and are not subordinated to some other end as the useful good is. "The useful good is ordained to the pleasurable and to the honorable as to an end; and thus there are two principal goods, the honorable, namely, and

21Ibid.: "Sic ergo primo et principaliter dicitur ens bonum perfectivum alterius per modum finis; sed secundario dicitur aliquid bonum, quod est ductivum in finem: prout utile dicitur bonum, vel natum est consequi finem."

22See De Ver., 22, 15 c; 24, 1, ad 11; and 24, 6 c for places where Thomas mentions all three types of good.

23In the Summa Theologiae, I, 5, 6 c, St. Thomas defines the pleasurable good thus: "Id autem quod terminat motum appetitus ut quies in re desiderata, est delectatio"; and in the same work, II-II, 145, 3 c, he says, "Delectabile autem dicitur inquantum quietat appetitum." This note of satisfaction of a desire seems to characterize the pleasurable good.
The honorable good and the pleasurable seem to be good in the proper sense, while the useful is called good as though by an analogy of attribution.

A more precise alignment of the three goods places the pleasurable good beneath the honorable because the pleasurable good is not always in accord with reason and consequently is not always a moral good, whereas the honorable good and the useful good are always in accord with reason and therefore morally good. For this reason the pleasurable good is subordinated to the honorable.

"Goodness is not divided into these three as something univocal which is predicated equally of them all, but as something analogical which is predicated of them according to priority and posteriority. For it is predicated chiefly of the honorable, then of the pleasant, and lastly of the useful." The good, then, is predicated first of all of the honorable good, secondly of the pleasurable, and lastly of the useful.

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24 De Malo, I, 4, ad 12; Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo, Marietti ed. (Rome, 1942), II, 18. See De Ver., 24, 6 c for the same doctrine.

25 S.T., I-II, 34, 2, ad 1; see also I, 5, 6, ad 2.

26 Ibid., I, 5, 6, ad 3: "Bonum non dividitur in ista tria sicut univocum aequaliter de his praedicatum; sed sicut analogum, quod praedicatur secundum prius et posterius. Per prius enim praedicatur de honesto; et secundario de delectabili; tertio de utili." (Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Summae Theologiae, with Leonine text, e. P. Caramello [Turin, 1950], I, 29 b.) The translation is from The Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas (a revision of the English Dominican translation), e. Anton C. Pegis (New York, 1945), I, 50.
In the second article of Question 21 of the *De Veritate* St. Thomas takes up the question of whether good and being are interchangeable in their real subjects. Aquinas' teaching on the good requires that good and being be identical in real, existing, concrete beings, or, as they are called, supposites.

St. Thomas argues in the following way. Since the nature of good consists in the ability of one thing to perfect another thing as an end, everything that has the notion of end has the notion of good. There are, moreover, two aspects of the notion of end; (1) it is desired by those things which do not as yet possess it; and (2) it is relished and delighted in by those things which are already in possession of it. As Thomas puts it: "Two things are essential to an end: it must be sought or desired by things which have not yet attained the end, and it must be loved by the things which share the end, and be, as it were, enjoyable to them. For it is essentially the same to tend to an end and in some sense to repose in that end." With this point established, the next

27 *De Verit.* 21, 2 c: "Utrum ens et bonum convertantur secundum supposita."

28 See *S.T.*, I, 19, 1, ad 1; 49, 1 c; I-II, 72, 1, ad 1; 94, 2 c; II-II, 44, 1 c; where Thomas says that an end has the formal aspect of good. In *De Verit.*, 21, 2 c he says, "Cum ratio boni in hoc consistat quod aliquid sit perfectivum alterius per modum finis, omne id quod inventur habere rationem finis, habet et rationem boni."

29 *De Verit.*, 21, 2 c (III, 10): "Duo ... sunt de ratione finis; ut scilicet sit appetitum vel desideratum ab his quae finem nondum attingunt, aut sit dilectum, et quasi delectabile, ab his quae finem participant: cum eiusdem rationis sit tendere in finem et in fine quodammodo quiescere."
question is: are these two formalities found in being?

That these two aspects of goodness are verified in being is proved in the following way: (1) those things which do not have existence, tend to it as prime matter tends toward form; and (2) all things which have existence naturally love their existence and conserve it with all their strength. Therefore, all things are good, either by tending toward existence which they do not have or by enjoying the existence they already have. "For whatever does not yet participate in the act of being tends toward it by a certain natural appetite. In this way matter tends to form, according to the Philosopher. But everything which already has being naturally loves its being and with all its strength preserves it."\(^{30}\)

It is in the sense of the good's being applied to prime matter that the good is said to have a larger extension than being. "Accordingly matter cannot be called a being absolutely, because it is a potential being, whereby it is shown to have an order towards being: and yet this suffices for it to be called a good absolutely, on account of this very order. This shows that the good, in a sense, extends further than being."\(^{31}\) In the De Veritate,

\(^{30}\)Ibid. (III, 11): "Quae enim nondum esse participant, in esse quodam naturali appetitu tendunt; unde et materia appetit formam, secundum Philosophum in I. Phys. Omnia autem quae iam esse habent, illud esse suum naturaliter amant, et ipsum tota virtute conservant." The reference to The Physics of Aristotle is I, 9, 192 a, 22.

\(^{31}\)C.G., III, 20: "Materia ergo non potest simpliciter dici ens ex hoc quod est potentia ens, in quo importatur ordo ad esse:
however, St. Thomas is careful to point out that good is extended to prime matter in a causal, and not in a real or predicative, sense. "Good extends to non-beings not attributively but causally, inasmuch as non-beings tend to good."32 The prime matter cannot be said to be good in a real sense because prime matter of itself really does not exist; but it can be said to be good in this that it tends toward good through the final causality of goodness.

"For even non-existent things, namely matter considered as subject to privation, seek a good, namely to exist. Hence it follows that matter also is good; for nothing but the good seeks the good."33

After stating that every existing being has one of the two features of an end, either it tends toward being or enjoys and conserves its own actual existence, and accordingly has the nature of good (inasmuch as every good perfects another being as an end),34 Aquinas concludes that every existence has the formality of good.


32De Ver., 21, 2, ad 2 (III, 11): "Bonum non se extendit ad non entia per praedicationem, sed per causalitatem, inquantum non entia appetunt bonum."

33C.G., III, 20 (III, 1, 40): "Nam et ipsa non existentia, scilicet materia secundum quod intelligitur privationi subjecta, appetit bonum, scilicet esse. Ex quo patet quod etiam sit bona: nihil enim appetit bonum nisi bonum."

34See above, pp. 14 and 15 in the text; also De Veritate, 21, 2 c, where St. Thomas treats this point.
"Existence, therefore, has the essential note of goodness."  

He goes on to say, "Just as it is impossible, then, for anything to be a being which does not have existence, so too it is necessary that every being be good by the very fact of its having existence, even though in many beings many other aspects of goodness are added over and above the act of existing by which they subsist."  

Accordingly, just as it would be impossible to have a being that would not have existence, so would it be necessary to say that every being by the very fact that it has existence is also good.

St. Thomas then argues for the converse of this proposition. "Since ... good includes the note of being, ... it is impossible for anything to be good which is not a being. Thus we are left with the conclusion that good and being are interchangeable."

Since good includes the formality of being, there cannot be a good that does not have being; and thus the proposition that good and being are interchangeable is true.

In the *Summa Theologiae* St. Thomas has a neat proof for the statement that every being is good. He argues that, since every

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35 De Ver., 21, 2 c (III, 11): "Ipsum igitur esse habet rationem boni."

36 Ibid.: "Unde sicut impossibile est quod sit aliquod ens quod non habeat esse, ita necesse est quod omne ens sit bonum ex hoc ipso quod esse habet; quamvis et in quibusdam entibus multae rationes bonitatis superadduntur supra suum esse quo subsistunt." This last point will be taken up in a later chapter.

37 Ibid.: "Cum autem bonum rationem entis includat, ... impossibile est aliquid esse bonum quod non sit ens; et ita relinquitur quod bonum et ens convertuntur."
existing being as such has some act, it is therefore perfect to some extent, because all act indicates perfection. He further argues that, since perfection has the formal aspect of being desirable in itself and of good, every being is good. "Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being, has actuality and is in some way perfect, since every act is some sort of perfection, and perfection implies desirability and goodness. . . . Hence it follows that every being as such is good."38 Consequently, every being, inasmuch as it is a being, is good.

Although every good is a being and every being is good, St. Thomas notes that the interchangeableness of these two concepts is had according to the substantial goodness and substantial being of every suppositive and not according to the goodness or existence that might be accidental to the suppositive. In fact, St. Thomas lists accidental good as a division of being. "A thing can be called good both from its act of existing and from some added property or state. Thus a man is said to be good both as existing and as being just and chaste or destined for beatitude. By reason of the first goodness being is interchanged with good, and conversely. But by reason of the second, good is a division of being."39 It is by reason of a being's substantial goodness and not

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38I, 5, 3 c (I, 45): "Omne enim ens, inquantum est ens, est in actu, et quodammodo perfectum: quia omnis actus perfectio quaedam est. Perfectum vero habet rationem appetibilis et boni. . . . Unde sequitur omne ens, inquantum huiusmodi, bonum esse."

39De Ver., 21, 2, ad 6 (III, 12): "Aliquid potest dici bonum
its accidental goodness that being and good are interchangeable.

With this interpretation of the interchangeability of goodness and being in mind, another facet of the Thomistic metaphysics of the good can be approached, namely, the statement that "Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea." By this Thomas means that in the actually existing being the substantial goodness and the substantial being are one and the same; the one cannot be had without the other; for, as has been proved, every being is good and every good thing is a being. The human intellect regarding a being, however, discerns two formalities, the existence and the goodness of the being. The being of the thing can be considered without any reference to its goodness, but the converse of this is not true, for the good presupposes and includes the notion of being. The good is said to add in concept alone the formal aspect of that which perfects to the concept of being. As Thomas says, "goodness and being are the same really. But goodness expresses the aspect of desirableness, which being does not express." Good expresses something about a thing that

et ex suo esse, et ex sua proprietate, vel habitudine superaddita; sicut dicitur aliquis homo bonus et in quantum est iustus et castus, vel ordinatus ad beatitudinem. Ratione igitur primae bonitatis ens convertitur cum bono, et e converso; sed ratione secundae bonum dividit."

40S. T., I, 5, 1 c (I, 42): "bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem: different secundum rationem tantum."

41In I Sent., 8, 1, 3 c.

42S. T., I, 5, 1 c (I, 42): "bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem: sed bonum addit rationem appetibilis, quam non dicit ens."
being does not express, even though both attributes are one and the same in the thing of which they are predicated.

This discussion of the relationship of good to being opens the way for the second topic to be investigated in this chapter, namely, the order or rank of the transcendentalis among themselves.

The first thing to be noted is that, since they are interchangeable according to the supposite, there can be no order of priority among the four transcendental notions of being, one, true, and good from a consideration of the supposite. Any priority of one of these to the other must belong to the order of concepts; and, according to this type of consideration, there can be a priority. "If we compare them to each other, we can do this in two ways: either as to their real subject and in this way they are interchangeable with one another and are the same in the real subject and never are separated; or according to their intellectual expression, and in this way being is essentially and logically prior to other things. The reason for this is that being is included in the notion of these things, whereas the opposite is not true. For the first thing that enters the representation of the intellects is being, and without this nothing can be grasped by the intellect."43 That which precedes all the others is being be-

43In I Sent., 8, 1, 3 c: "Si autem comparemus ea ad invicem, hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel secundum suppositum; et sic convertuntur ad invicem, et sunt idem in supposito, nec unquam dera-linquunt se; vel secundum intentiones eorum; et sic simpliciter et absolute ens est prius aliis. Cujus ratio est, quia ens includitur in intellectu eorum, et non e converso. Primum enim quod cadit in imaginatione intellectus est ens, sine quod sic nihil potest ap-
cause this concept is included in the understanding of all the others, whereas the converse of this proposition is not true. St. Thomas says, furthermore, that, since the one adds only a negation, it is the closest to being. The question of priority, then, will be concerned with the good and the true.

Aquinas starts his discussion of the priority of truth to goodness in the De Veritate by alluding to a double order that can obtain among perfections. The order may be considered from the aspect of the things perfected or from the aspect of the perfections themselves.

Considered from the aspect of the things perfected, the order existing between the true and the good yields the priority to the good.

Si autem attendatur ordo inter verum et bonum ex parte perfectibilium, sic bonum est naturaliter prius quam verum, duplici ratione.

a) Primo, quia perfectio boni ad plura se extendit quam perfectio veri.

A vero enim non sunt nata perfici nisi illa quae possunt aliquid ens perciere in seipsis vel in seipsis habere secundum suam rationem, et non secundum illud esse quod ens habet in seipso: et huiusmodi sunt solum ea quae immaterialiter aliquid recipiunt, et sunt cognoscitiva; species enim lapidis est in anima non autem secundum esse quod habet in lapide.

prehendi ab intellectu." Thus Mandonnet has it; Parma reads (correctly) sine quo (Vol. VI, 69 a).

44 Ibid.: "Unum addit rationem indivisionis; et propter hoc est propinquissimum ad ens, quid addit tantum negationem."

45 De Ver., 21, 3 c: "Ordo autem inter perfectiones potest attendi dupliciter: uno modo ex parte ipsarum perfectionum: alicio modo ex parte perfectibilium."
Thomas alleges two reasons for placing the good prior to the true when considered from the viewpoint of the things perfected. The first reason is that the perfection of goodness is extended to more things than the perfection of truth. For the true can perfect only those beings that are endowed with an immaterial cognitive faculty, since conformity with an intellect is the nature of truth. All that is necessary to be perfected by the good is existence. The second reason for putting the good before the true in this lineup is that things which are perfected by both the good and the true are first perfected by the good. Goodness comes from existence while cognition always follows upon existence. Thus, when these two transcendental concepts are considered from the point of view of the things perfected, the good takes precedence over the true.

An absolute consideration of the true and the good, that is, a consideration of them in their own intelligibility and in them-
selves without reference to anything else, places the true before
the good.

Considerando ergo verum et bonum secundum se, sic
verum est prius bono secundum rationem, cum sit perfec-
tivum alicuius secundum rationem speciei; bonum autem
non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed secundum esse
quod habet in re. Et ita plura includit in se ratio
boni quam ratio veri, et se habet quodammodo per addi-
tionem ad illa; et sic bonum praesupponit verum, verum
autem praesupponit unum, cum veri ratio ex apprehensione
intellectus perficiatur; unumquodque autem intelligibile
est in quantum est unum; qui enim non intelligit unum,
nihil intelligit, ut dicit Philosophus in IV Metaph.

Unde istorum nominum transcendentium talis est ordo,
si secundum se considerentur, quod post ens est unum,
deinde verum, deinde post verum bonum.47

The reason Thomas advances, then, in the Question De Bono for the
priority of truth over goodness in the absolute order is that the
true perfects according to the essence of the perfecting being
whereas the good perfects things according to both its essence and
its existence. Moreover, the good presupposes the true, which in
its turn presupposes the one.

This same question is treated in the Summa Theologiae.48 Here
the good and the true are considered only as they are conceived by
the intellect, or in the absolute order. The same doctrine is
held as in the De Veritate, but different reasons are proffered.

47Ibid. The exact reference to Aristotle’s Metaphysics is
Γ, 2, 1003 b, 23-32.

48I, 16, 4 c. It is interesting to note that this comparison
is made not in the section on good, but in that on the true.
some way perfect; for thus it is desirable." The first of the two reasons Thomas gives in this work is that the true is more proximate to being that the good. The true regards being immediately, while the good in its perfective capacity is appetible and follows upon being. Thus, in the absolute order the true is prior to the good.

The second reason given in the Summa Theologiae for the absolute priority of truth to goodness is the following: "Secondly, it is evident from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true is related to knowledge, and the good to the appetite, the true must be prior in nature to the good. Since the true is concerned with cognition and the good with appetency, the true is prior to the good because cognition always precedes appetite.

St. Thomas has more to say about the relationship between the true and the good in his Commentarium In Epistolam S. Pauli ad Hebraeos. In this work he says: "Although the true and the good, when considered absolutely, are interchangeable in their real subjects, they are none the less related to each other in a different way inasmuch as they differ logically. For the true is in a cer-

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49Ibid. (I, 173): "Verum propinquius se habet ad ens, quod est prius, quam bonum. Nam verum respicit ipsum esse simpliciter et immediate: ratio autem boni consequitur esse, secundum quod est aliquo modo perfectum; sic enim appetibile est."

50Ibid. "Secundo apparet ex hoc, quod cognitio naturaliter praecedet appetitum. Unde cum verum respiciat cognitionem, bonum autem appetitum, prius erit verum quam bonum secundum rationem."
tain sense good, and the good is in a certain sense true. It is the same way with the intellect and will, which are distinguished according to the distinction between the true and the good. This terse opinion of St. Thomas on the subject seems to be the best: the two transcendentals in question have different orders of priority according to the different viewpoints taken of them.

Now that the Thomistic metaphysics of the good has been reviewed, this study can turn toward the Thomistic doctrine on participation in general to understand better the position of St. Thomas on participation in good.

51 In Heb., c. 11, lect. 1 (Parma XIII, 756 b): "Verum, autem, et bonum, etsi in se considerata convertantur quantum ad supposita, tamen inquantum differunt ratione, diverso ordine se habent ad invicem: quia et verum est quoddam bonum, et bonum est quoddam verum. Et similiter intellectus et voluntas, quae distinguuntur penes distinctionem veri et boni."
CHAPTER II

THE DOCTRINE OF PARTICIPATION
AS GIVEN IN THE WORKS OF
SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

Before an adequate treatment of Saint Thomas' doctrine on participation in good can be given, an inquiry must be made into the Thomistic position on participation in general. Moreover, since this study is concerned with the transcendental notion of good and participation therein, the aspect of participation to be treated in this chapter will be transcendental participation. The other types of participation will be treated inasmuch as they are related to transcendental participation.

The notion of participation was part and parcel of the thinking of most of St. Thomas Aquinas' philosophical forebears as well as contemporaries. It should not be surprising then, if it is difficult to find a precise and exact meaning of the term participa-

It should not be surprising that the much-used and tossed about term participate should have different meanings in different contexts. L.-B. Geiger, O.P., in his book on Thomistic participation, assigns various non-technical meanings to the terms participare and participatio in the works of St. Thomas. Father Geiger says that in certain passages participare could be as well rendered by habere or recipere; but, in the main, St. Thomas used the terms participatio and participare in their technical sense.

What, then, was the technical meaning of participare for St. Thomas? In his Commentary on the De Hebdomadibus of Boethius, the Angelic Doctor gives the etymological definition of participare. "To participate," he says, "is to receive as it were a part." Today, certain terms applied to the physical sciences, almost defy definition precisely because they are used so much and are so familiar. For example, Ernest H. Hutten, writing for The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (May, 1955), says: "We only slowly work out the meaning, or meanings, of a technical term. In physics, for example, we employ 'electron' in many different ways, according to the theories in which the term occurs; but I do not think there is a single textbook where we could find a definition for it." "The Methodology of Psycho-Analysis," p. 81.


Ibid., pp. 11 & ff.

In the text, "Omne quod est participatum in aliquo est in eo per modum participantis: quia nihil potest recipere ultra mensuram suam" (In I Sent., 8, 1, 2, Contra 2), Geiger says that participare is a synonym for recipere; and he seems justified in making this statement. See his work for further examples; pp. 11-12, note 3; and pp. 145-146, notes 2 & 3.

St. Thomas Aquinas, In Librum Boetii De Hebdomadibus Exposi-
Taking too etymological a view of participation presents the danger of misunderstanding the true meaning of metaphysical participation. To receive, accept, take, or have a part of anything denotes the idea of a division of a whole among several recipients, like dividing a pie among four or six people. In the metaphysical order, however, such a division is not possible; for act and quality are simple things. They either are or they are not. "If, then, participation is applied to them, this cannot mean to have a part, since there are no parts, but to have in a particular, limited, imperfect way an act and a formality which are found elsewhere in a universal, unlimited, and perfect manner."

Lest his reader get the idea that metaphysical participation might be quantitative, St. Thomas, immediately after the above-quoted phrase from the Commentary on Boethius, adds, "when anything receives in a particular manner that which belongs to another in a total manner, it is said to participate it." Another

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7 Fabro, Cornelio, La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino, 2nd ed. (Turin, 1950), p. 316. "Se quindi ad essi si applica il 'partecipare' ciò potrà significare non l'avevare una parte, poiché non vi sono parti, ma l'avere in modo 'particolare', 'limitato', 'imperfetto' un atto ed una formalità che altrove si trovano in modo totale illimitato e perfetto."

8 In de Hebd., lect. 2; ed. Calcaterra, p. 376: "quando aliquid particulariter recipit id quod ad alterum pertinet universaliiter dicitur participare illud."
description of metaphysical participation is to be found in St. Thomas' Commentary on the Heavens of Aristotle, in which he says, "for to participate is nothing else than to accept from another in a partial manner." 9

In order to illustrate his doctrine on participation, St. Thomas, in the key passage cited from the Commentary on the De Hebdomadibus of Boethius, offers some clear examples of participation.

[H]omo dicitur participare animal, quia non habet rationem animalis secundum totam communitatem; et eadem ratione Socrates participat hominem; similiter etiam subjectum participat accidens, et materia formam, quia forma substantialis vel accidentalis, quae de sui ratione communis est, determinatur ad hoc vel illud subjectum; et similiter effectus dicitur participare suam causam, et praecipue quando non adaequat virtutem suae causae; puta, si dicamus quod aer participat lucem solis, quia non recipit eam in ea claritate qua est in sole. 10

Participation, then, seems to mean a being's partial reception and determination of a perfection that belongs to the participated being in a perfect or complete way. 11

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10 In de Hebdomadibus, lect. 2.

11 In many other texts from the writings of St. Thomas these fundamental notions of participation are repeated. See In ad Coloss., c.1, lect. 4 (Parma, XIII, 536 b): "Participative aliquid convenit alio quod excedit suam naturam sed tamen aliquid de illo participat, sed imperfecte: sicut intellectualem hominem quod est supra rationale, et est essentiale Angelorum, et idem aliquid participat homo"; also In I Met., 10, n. 154 (ed. Spiazzi, 1950, 45 b): "Quod enim totaliter est aliquid, non participat illud, sed est
The main passage on Thomistic participation, that is, the text from the second chapter of Thomas' Commentary on the De Hebdomadibus, gives the three modes or types of participation. These are the logical, the predicamental, and the transcendental. Although St. Thomas does not call these kinds of participation by these names, he does conceive of them as different modes of participation; and, as will be seen, the names suggested here and used by modern authors, do fit the different modes to which they are applied.

Further down from the selection already cited, Aquinas says, "Though we pass over this third type of participation for the moment, it is impossible for existence itself to partake of anything according to the first two types." What should be noted in this quotation is not the doctrine of participation as regards subsistent existence but the fact that Thomas conceived of per essentiam idem illi. Quod vero non totaliter est aliquid, habens aliquid aliud adiunctum propriie participare dicitur"; C.G., I, 32: "Omne quod participatur determinatur ad modum participati, et sic partialiter habetur et non secundum omnem perfectionis modum"; and finally, C.G., II, 52: "Quod autem competit alicui secundum propriam naturam suam, non convenit aliis nisi per modum participationis: sicut calor aliis corporibus ab igne. Ipsum igitur esse competit omnibus aliis a primo agente per participationem quandam. Quod autem competit alicui per participationem, non est substantia eius."

12 In de Hebd., lect. 2; as given above on page 29 of this thesis.

13 Ibid. "Praetermissio autem hoc tertio modo participandi, impossibile est quod secundum duos primos modos ipsum esse participet aliquid." The underscoring is not in the original text.
three modes, types, or kinds of participation.

The three types of participation are found in the three sets of examples given in the main text of Thomistic participation quoted above. The first pair of examples are given thus: "Man is said to participate in animal because he does not have the nature of animal in its full extension, and in the same way Socrates participates in man." Man's participation of animal and the individual's participation of man are examples of a type of participation which may be called "logical" because these examples of participation occur in the order of logical intentions.

All of the remaining examples in the passage cited from the Commentary on the De Hebdomadibus concern beings in the real order as opposed to the order of logical intentions. The participation of a subject in an accident and the participation of matter in form are examples of participation in the predicamental division of the real order. "Likewise subject participates in accident and matter in form because the form (whether substantial or accidental), which of itself is common, is determined to this or that subject." This type can be called "predicamental participation" because subject and accident and matter and form are to be found

\[\text{Ibid. } "[\text{H}]omo dicitur participare animal, quia non habet rationem animalis secundum totam communitatem; et eadem ratione Socrates participat hominem."

\[\text{Ibid. } "Similiter etiam subiectum participat accidentem, et materia formam, quia forma substantialis vel accidentalis, quae de sua ratione communis est, determinatur ad hoc vel illud subiectum."\]
in the nine categories or predicaments of accidental being.

The next division of the real order and of metaphysical participation refers to transcendental participation and can be called "Transcendental participation." "In the same way an effect is said to participate in its cause, especially when it does not measure up to the power of its cause. Suppose, for instance, that we should say that the air participates in the light of the sun, because it does not receive the light with the same brilliance that it has in the sun."16

It should be noted that St. Thomas does not mean that all causality is an instance of transcendental participation. For instance, when a dog generates an offspring, there is no question of transcendental causality because both beings are of the same species. In order to avoid giving the impression that all causality is transcendental, Aquinas says that an effect is said to participate in its cause "especially when it does not measure up to the power of its cause."17 This is the case, for example, when air is said to share the sun's light. The air has the same kind of light that the sun has, but the air does not possess the light with the same degree of brilliance that it is present in the sun.

If the cause and the effect are of the same species, as is

16*Ibid.* "Similiter effectus dicitur participare suam causam, et praecipue quando non adaequat virtutem suae causae; puta, si dicamus quod aer participat lucem solis, quia non recipit eam in ea claritate qua est in sole."

true in the case of generation within a species, the participation is univocal or "predicamental" because both beings participate in the same kind of form. When the cause and the effect are from different grades of being, however, as is the case in the causality exercised by the Creator toward the creature, the participation had by the creature is said to be analogous or transcendental.

Since this study is concerned with the participation of one of the transcendental notions, that of the good, it will be necessary to examine closely the nature of transcendental participation. Before a treatment of this third mode of participation is presented, however, a brief look into logical and predicamental participation will be in order.

As has been seen, S. Thomas' first example of participation comes from the field of logic: "man is said to participate in animal because he does not have the nature of animal in its full extension, and in the same way Socrates participates in man."18 What should be noted here is that, even though a thing can be predicated by participation, still, if it actually belongs to the essence of the participant, it is also predicated of it substantially. It was Plato's opinion that something could not be predicated through participation and substantially at the same time; Thomas, however, says, "According to the opinion of Aristotle, who held that man truly is what animal is (as though the essence of

18Ibid. The original Latin is given in note 14 on page 29 of the text above.
animal did not exist apart from the specific difference of man), nothing stands in the way of the substantial predication of something that is had through participation."  

Aristotle, then, did not share Plato's belief that what was predicated substantially could not be predicated participatively also.

Plato's doctrine of subsistent ideas called for actually existing universal ideas that maintained themselves apart from the concrete singulars, the objects of sense knowledge. These latter were merely imitations of the universal ideas, which were more real than the objects of sense knowledge.  

Such a doctrine would exclude the possibility of substantial and participative predication at one and the same time; for what is predicated by participation is predicated of the concrete singular, and this cannot be but an imitation of the universal idea of which the essence in question is predicated substantially. Aristotle, on the other hand, held that in the predication of a genus or species the attribute had to be possessed substantially by that being of which it is predicated if the predication were to be valid. When man is said to be an animal, man substantially possesses the notes of the concept animal.

19Ibid., lect. 3: "Sed secundum sententiam Aristotelis, qui posuit quod homo vere est id quod est animal, quasi essentia animalis non existente praeter differentiam hominis; nihil prohibit, id quod per participationem dicitur, substantialiter praedicari."

20See Plato's Republic, Bk. VI, 507 b; also Aristotle's Metaphysics, A, 6, 987 b.
Aristotle could maintain this doctrine because he held that the universal idea did not exist apart from the singulars of which it is predicated except in the mind. Consequently, the concrete singular could possess the attribute essentially; man could be said to be truly that which is contained in the concept of animal and at the same time man could be said to participate in the universal idea of animal. The idea of animal, then, exists formally in the mind, while the foundation for the valid content of the idea exists only in those beings that are the inferiors of the genus animal.

Later on, it will be seen that participation of a perfection and possession of that perfection in a substantial sense or by essence cannot be had in the transcendental or predicamental type of participation. That Thomas, however, is speaking in this passage of logical and not real participation is abundantly clear from the text, in which immediately before the passage cited above he says he is referring to "another type of participation, in which namely species participates genus." Therefore, it is seen that predication of a perfection by participation and in a substantial sense is possible in the logical order; but such simultaneous predication cannot be had in the real order.

In his Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, St. Thomas in effect corroborates what has been said above, namely, that in

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21 In de Heb., lect. 3, as quoted on p. 33 of this study.
22 Ibid.
logical participation, essential and participative predication can
be had at once and the same time; he also gives a clear example of
what he means.

Ea de quibus genus praedicatur secundum participationem
non possunt definiri per illud genus, nisi sit de essentia illius definiti. Sicut ferrum ignitum, de quo ignis per participacionem praedicatur, non definitur per ignem sicut per genus; quia ferrum non est per essentiam suam ignis, sed participat aliquid eius. Genus autem non praedicatur de speciebus per participationem, sed per essentiam. Homo enim est animal essentialiter, non solum aliquid animalis participans. Homo enim est quod verum est animal. 23

When iron is said to be red-hot or fiery, it is not meant that fire is of the essence of iron, but that the iron participates in some of the perfection of fire. When a man is said to be an animal, however, it means that man is by his own nature (that is, essentially) an animal and that what is truly said of an animal pertains to man. In the case of man and animal it is not meant that man merely participates in some of the perfections that are found in the notion of animal; for man has all the perfections of animal, even though these perfections are specified or determined by man's rationality. Man is said to have all of the notes of animal because genus is not predicated of its species by participation but essentially. 24

23 In VII Met., 3, n. 1328.

24 St. Thomas' statement here about genus being predicated essentially and not through participation seems to contradict what has been said above about simultaneous essential and participative predication. In the light of the following text from the *Summa Contra Gentiles* (see note 25) it would seem that Thomas meant that an attribute could be predicated essentially of something that
Another interesting text on logical participation is the following taken from the Summa Contra Gentiles. "Whatever is predicated univocally of several things belongs by participation to each of the things of which it is predicated: for the species is said to participate the genus, and the individual the species. But nothing is said of God by participation, since whatever is participated is confined to the mode of a participated thing, and thus is possessed partially and not according to every mode of perfection." This text highlights the participation of species in genus and of the individual in the species that is had in univocal predication. Although it omits the aspect of substantial participation on the part of the participant, it does bring out the fact of limitation on the part of the participating subject by the statement that whatever possesses something by participation does not possess the thing in question in its totality of perfection. The reason for the omission of the point on substantial participation, no doubt, is that Thomas is here talking of the difference between univocal or predicamental predication and transcendental predication. Bringing in the matter of substantial possession in logical participation would only confuse the issue.

possesses the quality by participation and in this sense the attribute is predicated not participatively but essentially.

The next consideration will be that of the participation had in the predicamental order, which is concerned with substance and its attributes. It will be seen how substance participates in the perfection of certain accidents and how matter participates in form. In treating predicamental participation here, the order of St. Thomas is being followed; for Thomas mentions examples of predicamental participation in his Commentary on the De Hebdomadibus of Boethius after the examples of logical participation.26

Predicamental or categorical participation deals directly with the real order and not directly with logical intentions, as is the case with logical participation. The substance, for example, man, actually participates in the perfection of the accident under consideration, white for example.

Predicamental participation is, therefore, real participation and as such it constitutes with transcendental participation a division or mode of participation that is opposed to the logical type.

In his Commentary on the Book of the Sentences, St. Thomas gives a description of predicamental participation that is clearly exemplified. "Some things happen to be called 'alike' . . . because they participate in the same form, as two white things participate in whiteness."27 In this type of participation both be-

26See page 29 of this thesis.

27In I Sent., 48, 1, 1 sol.: "Contingit autem aliqua dici similia . . . ex eo quod participant unam formam, sicut duo albi albedinem."
ings, or any number of beings for that matter, participate in the same form; hence this type of participation has been called univocal participation by some (although it will continue to be referred to in this paper as predicamental). Of course, it should be remembered that by the same form here is meant the same type of form, not the same numerical form. This is an example of two substances participating in the perfection of an accident, as described in the Commentary on the de Hebdomadibus of Boethius. 28

After describing this univocal or predicamental participation in the above-cited passage from the Commentary on the Sentences, St. Thomas goes on to say, "thus all similar things must be composite beings." 29 It is important to note that predicamental participation takes place between beings that are composites, composed of matter and form, and substance and accidents. It will be seen that this is not true in transcendental participation, where the participated being is not composite but simple and the participating being may be simple in essence, as in an angel.

What is the nature of the form that is participated in by the composite participating being? Thomas says that it is a participated form. 30 The form is participated inasmuch as it is a com-

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28 Lect. 2. This type of conformity is also described in the De Veritate, 23, 7, ad 10: "Creatura non dicitur conformari Deo quasi participanti eamdem formam quam ipsa participat."

29 In I Sent., 48, 1, 1 sol.: "et sic omne simile oportet esse compositum."

30 S.T., I, 3, 8 c: "Forma . . . quae est pars compositi, est forma participata."
stituent element of the essence or something added thereto.

St. Thomas also tells us that the participating subject, either the substance or the matter, is compared to the accident or form as potency is to act.31

In predicamental participation, then, several beings can share the same attribute or form (1) fully, (2) equally, (3) and as a part.32 Another feature of this second type of participation is the actual existence of the participated quality only in the participating subject. According to St. Thomas, who follows Aristotle in this particular, there is no substantial humanity or subsistent whiteness, as Plato would have it. These qualities exist only in the concrete singulars from which they are abstracted.

Therefore, as is the case with logical participation, the participated form in predicamental participation (although it has an intentional existence in the intellect) exists in the real order only in those singulars which participate in it and of which it is predicated.

31C.G., II, 53, Item: "Omne participans aliquid comparatur ad ipsum quod participatur ut potentia ad actum." St. Thomas says the same thing in S.T., I, 75, 5, ad 4: "Omne participatum comparatur ad participans ut actus eius."

32These qualities are suggested by Fabro in his La Nozione Metafisica (p. 319). Fabro's schema, which purports to provide a summary of all the expressions used by St. Thomas regarding participation, adds a fourth note about predicamental participators, possession of the quality as something existing of the essence of the thing ("sicut aliquid existens de essentia rei"). This last characteristic would not be true of a subject's participation in accident or of matter's participation in form. Fabro's schema, then, seems to attribute too much to predicamental participation.
In the text quoted from the Commentary on the de Hebdomadibus of Boethius, St. Thomas describes the third and last kind of participation: "in like manner an effect is said to participate its cause, and especially when it does not equal the power of its cause, as, if we should say that the air participates the light of the sun because it does not receive it in that brilliance which it is in the sun." That Thomas says, "especially when it the effect does not equal the power of its cause" seems to indicate that he is referring here not to univocal causality, that of generation within a species for example, but of analogous causality, not of secondary causes but principally of the first cause. As has been seen, this third type of participation has been called transcendental or analogous participation by modern writers on the subject.

Thomas describes the difference between predicamental and transcendental participation in this way: "Agreement can be had in two ways: (1) either between two things participating in some one thing, and such agreement cannot be had between Creator and creature . . . , (2) or according as one thing exists of itself and absolutely and the other being participates in it as much as it can in a likeness of it. This would be the case, for instance, if we supposed that heat existed without matter and fire agreed

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33 In de Hebdi., lect. 2.

34 This third type of participation will continue to be called transcendental in this study.
with it by participating in some of the heat. Such agreement can be had between a creature and God, for God is called a being because He is His very own existence. A creature, however, is not its very own existence, but is called a being as something participating in existence." Logical or predicamental participation is had when two participants share the same kind of nature or quality. Transcendental participation, however, is different in this respect. Transcendental participation concerns two beings: one which possesses an attribute by virtue of its own essence and according to all of the perfections of the attribute and the other being participates in the perfection of this higher being by virtue of a likeness of the perfection possessed essentially by the higher being.

From the text just cited two things are apparent about transcendental participation: one, that it is had ultimately between creature and Creator; the other, that it concerns likenesses or similarities. The relation between creature and Creator will be treated elsewhere; similitude or likeness will be considered here.

The creature is said to participate in a likeness (similitudo

35In II Sent., 16, 1, 1, ad 3: "Convenientia potest esse dupliciter: aut duorum participantium aliquod unum: et talis convenientia non potest esse Creatoris et creaturae...; aut secundum quod unum per se est simpliciter, et alterum participat de similitudine eius quantum potest: ut si poneremus calorem esse sine materia, et ignem conveniri cum eo ex hoc quod aliquid caloris participaret: et talis convenientia esse potest creaturae ad Deum: quia Deus dicitur ens hoc modo quod est ipsum suum esse: creatura vero non est ipsum suum esse, sed dicitur ens quasi esse participans."
of God. This calls to mind the Platonic doctrine of participation, wherein the concrete, existing, sensible object is said to be an imitation (eikon or mimesis) of the separately subsisting reality.

An important fact to be noted about St. Thomas' doctrine on similitudo is that there can be similarity or likeness only among those beings which are different in some respects. "There cannot be likeness where there is no diversity." If there were no diversity between the two beings that are said to be alike, there could be no similarity because there would only be identity.

The next thing to be noted about similarity is that it is a sort of relation; the relation exists between the two beings that are said to be similar. The exact nature of this relation will be investigated elsewhere.

In the Summa Theologicae St. Thomas distinguishes three types of likeness:

\[\text{Quaedam enim dicuntur similia, quae communicant in eadem forma secundum eandem rationem, et secundum eundem modum: et haec non solum dicuntur similia, sed aequalia in sua similitudine; sicut duo aequaliter alba, dicuntur similia in albedine. Et haec est perfectissima similitudo.--Alio modo dicuntur similia quae communicant in forma secundum eandem rationem, et non secundum eundem modum, sed secundum magis et minus; ut minus album dicuntur simile magis albo. Et haec est similitudo imperfecta.--Tertio modo dicuntur aliqua similia, quae communicant in eadem forma, sed non secundum eandem rationem;}\]

\[\text{36 In IV Sent., 40, 1, 2, ad 4: "Similitudo non potest esse ubi non est aliqua diversitas." See also S.T., III, 5, 1, ad 3; 22, 1, ad 2; 46, 4, ad 1; where Thomas quotes St. John Damascene in this regard.}\]

\[\text{37 "Relatio quaedam," C.G., II, 11, Adhuc.}\]
The three kinds of similarity, then, are: (1) **perfect**, which is had among beings possessing the same attribute according to the same nature and in the same measure; (2) **imperfect**, or that which is had among beings sharing the same attribute according to the same nature but not in the same measure; and (3) **non-univocal**, or that which is had among beings only analogously agreeing, which share the same attribute but not according to the same nature.

This third type may rightly be called transcendental or analogous similarity.

Since transcendental similarity is the type most to the purpose of this study, a further investigation of its nature is in order. Moreover, a treatment of this particular type follows immediately upon the passage just quoted above; for in this article of the *Summa Theologiae* St. Thomas is speaking of a creature's similarity to God.

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38 *S.T.*, I, 4, 3 c.
The first example of likeness given here is between univocal beings, such as sire and offspring of the same species. The other two examples are of likenesses between non-univocal or analogous beings, both of them representing cause and effect; but in the first of these second two examples the effect is outside the species but not outside the genus of the cause, while in the second example the effect has for its cause a being which cannot be contained within a genus. As will be seen, it is this type of likeness that is had between God and creatures. It is the most remote of all the types of similitude, but it is a likeness nonetheless. For, although the similarity that creatures bear toward their Creator is imperfect, still, inasmuch as each creature possesses a perfection, it bears some resemblance to God.

St. Thomas tells us that creatures are like God according to the third type of likeness, that of analogous likeness. Every creature represents Him and is like Him so far as it possesses some perfection: yet not so far as to represent Him as something of the same species or genus, but as the superabounding source of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind

39 Ibid.
40 S.T., I, 13, 5, ad 2.
41 Ibid., corpus.
of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the power of the sun."42 The creature, inasmuch as it has any perfection, is a likeness of God; but it does not represent God as though it were of the same species or genus of God but as something falling far short of the divine model in regard to form, manner, and measure of existence. Fabro calls this likeness a "similitudine degradata," a likeness on a lower level of being.43

Aquinas tells us, furthermore, that in the non-univocal or analogous cause the likeness of the effect is to be found in a higher manner, while in the effect the likeness of the cause is present in a lesser degree.44

But where is the likeness of the effect found in the higher analogous cause? In the divine intellect, according to St. Thomas: "Although creatures are not so perfect as to be specifically like God in nature, after the manner in which a man begotten is like to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him, according to the representation in the examplar known by God; just as a material house is like the house in the architect's

42 Ibid., article 2, c: "Quaelibet creatura intantum eum Deum repraesentat, et est ei similis, inquantum perfectionem aliquid habet: non tamen ita quod repraesentet eum sicut aliquid eiusdem speciei vel generis, sed sicut excellens principium, a cuius tamen aliqualem similitudinem effectus consequuntur; sicut formae corporum inferiorum repraesentant virtutem solarem."

43 La Nozione Metafisica, p. 318.

44 C.G., II, 98, Dicunt: "In causis autem non univocis similitudo effectus est in causa eminentius, causae autem in effectu inferiori modo."
mind." The creature is said to be like God inasmuch as it is like an idea of itself which is in the divine intellect, just as the house which has been built is like the idea of itself that was conceived in the mind of the architect long before the house was constructed.

What is the content of the idea in the divine mind? St. Thomas says that this idea contains the natures of things. There is in the divine mind an idea of everything that exists in reality: "The essences of things as existing in the knowledge of God are called ideas." This participation in God according to the creature's likeness to God is had on the part of the creature according to its form. "Since it is from the form that a thing has its being; and since a thing, inasmuch as it has being, approaches to a likeness of God, Who is His own simple being: it follows of necessity that the form is nothing else than a participation of the divine similitude in things. Wherefore Aristotle, speaking of the form, rightly says (I Phys. ix.) that it is something godlike and desirable."

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45 *S.T.*, I, 44, 3, ad 1 (I, 430): "Licet creaturae non pertinent ad hoc quod sint similes Deo secundum suam naturam, similitudine speciei, ut homo genitus homini generanti; attingunt tamen ad eius similitudinem secundum repraesentationem rationis intellectae a Deo, ut domus quae est in materia, domui quae est in mente artificis."


47 *C.G.*, III, 97 (IV, 47): "Cum enim forma sit secundum quam res habet esse; res autem quaelibet secundum quod habet esse, accedat ad similitudinem Dei, qui est ipsum esse simplex; necesse
For the creature, its form is the divine likeness participated. That Thomas equivalates the form of a being with the likeness of God in which the creature participates, should be clear from this passage.

The notion of likeness is definitely at home in the realm of formal causality and its subdivision of exemplary causality. A creature is like God, made unto His image and likeness, because by virtue of God's power and providence it possesses a form and the exemplary cause of this is contained in the divine mind. This notion of similitude or likeness belongs to the static or essential side of participation, that is, to the province of formal and exemplary causality; formal on the part of the creature, exemplary on the part of the Creator.

As a kind of summary of St. Thomas' main ideas on similitudo and an introduction to the existential or dynamic element in participation, the following passage from the Summa Contra Gentiles is apt.

Effectus enim a suis causis deficientes non convenient cum eis in nomine et ratione, necesse est tamen aliquam inter ea similitudinem inveniri: de natura enim actionis est ut agens sibi simile agat, cum unumquodque agat secundum quod actu est. Unde forma effectus in causa excedente invenitur quidem aliqualiter, sed secundum alium modum et aliam rationem, ratione cuius causa aequivoqa dicitur. Sol enim in corporibus inferioribus calorem causat agendo secundum quod actu est; unde

est quod forma nihil sit aliud quam divina similitudo participata in rebus; unde convenienter Aristoteles, in I Physic., de forma loquens, dicit quod est divinum quoddam et appetibile." The exact reference to the Physics is I, 9, 192 a, 18.
oportet quod calor a sole generatus aliqualem similitudinem obtineat ad virtutem activam solis, per quam calor in istis inferioribus causatur, ratione culus sol calidus dicitur, quamvis non una ratione. Et sic sol omnibus illis similis aliquam iter dicitur in quibus suos effectus efficaciter inducit: a quibus tamen rursus omnibus dissimilis est, inquantum huiusmodi effectus non eodem modo possident calorem et huiusmodo quo in sole inventur. Ita etiam et Deus omnes perfectiones rebus tribuit, ac per hoc cum omnibus similitudinem habet et dissimilitudinem simul.

... Simile enim alicui dicitur quod eius posidet qualitatem vel formam. Quia igitur id quod in Deo perfecte est, in rebus allis per quandam deficientem participationem inventur, illud secundum quod similitudo attenditur, Dei quidem simpliciter est, non autem creaturae. Et sic creatura habet quod Dei est: unde et Deo recte similis dicitur.48

All beings tend to produce things that are like themselves. For this reason, creatures bear some resemblance to God, their Creator. From the point of view of the creatures, they are said to be like God because they participate in the divine essence through a likeness of God. The likeness is the similitude of one or more of the perfections of God. These perfections are present in their highest degree in God but in a lesser degree in creatures.

The other main aspect of participation to be considered is the dynamic or existential, which involves the creature's receiving and actualizing a form by virtue of the divine operations of creation, conservation, and providence. The last of these three operations pertains to final causality; the first two belong principally to efficient causality.

Nowhere does Thomas explicitly state that participation in-

48 C.G., I, 29.
volves efficient causality, but the close connection between the two concepts is implied in many places. For example, in the opusculem *De Ente et Essentia*, there is the statement: "Now, whatever belongs to a being is either caused by the principles of its nature, as the capability of laughter in man, or it comes from some extrinsic principle, as light in the air from the sun's influence. But it is impossible that the act of existing be caused by a thing's form or its quiddity, (I say caused as by an efficient cause); for then something would be the cause of itself and would bring itself into existence—which is impossible. Everything, then, which is such that its act of existing is other than its nature must needs have its act of existing from something else."^49

Although there is no explicit mention of participation here, several of its elements are in evidence: (1) causality, and then two results of causality, (2) the reception of a perfection from an extrinsic being, and (3) existence from another being. Thomas, however, does explicitly state here that the being that does not possess existence in its own essence must have it from another as

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from an efficient cause. It would seem, therefore, that St. Thom-
as considered efficient causality as closely related to participa-
tion, if not essential to the doctrine.

Another text which implies the close relation between the no-
tion of participation and efficient causality is the following:

"Whatever is found in anything by participation must be caused in
it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes heated
by fire." ⁵⁰ Although there is no explicit mention made of effici-
ent causality here, it may be reasonably inferred, because the
production of red-hot iron (as in the example above) would neces-
sitate, besides the form of fire, an agent causing its actual exis-
tence.

As is evident from the passage just quoted from the Summa
Theologiae, causality with its concomitant notion of dependence of
effect on cause is a topic closely connected with participation. ⁵¹
The reason for this close connection is that participation by its
very notion connotes reception and passivity, and demands an agent
to fulfill its act of participating.

Also closely connected with the idea of participation is the
fact that the perfection caused in the participant must belong
substantially or essentially to the ultimate cause. St. Thomas

⁵⁰S.T., I, 44, l c (I, 427): "aliquid invenitur in
aliquo per participationem, necesse est quod causetur in ipso ab eo
cui essentialiter convenit; sicut ferrum fit ignitum ab igne."

⁵¹Cf. also S.T., I, 44, arg. 1; 49, 3, arg. 4; 61, l c; 65,
4, arg. 2; 96, l c; and C.G., I, 98.
does not mention ultimate cause in his treatment of these matters; but it may be legitimately supposed that he means this here because in the passages in which he speaks of participation in the transcendental sense he is speaking of the operations of God toward creatures.

The first of the operations of God as efficient cause that will be considered is creation. This act of the Divinity is defined by the Angelic Doctor as the production of a thing in its entire substance, with nothing being presupposed either created or uncreated. St. Thomas further describes creation as the emanation of all being from non-being which is nothing. It is the production of the complete being with nothing presupposed as regards matter or the like. Man is created, says Thomas, from that which is not man; and whiteness is created from that which is not white.

Thomas also holds that a necessary part of creation is the creation of prime matter and passive potency. It is necessary to say that even prime matter is created by the universal cause of

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52 See any of the texts cited in the preceding note or S.T., I, 44, 1 c, as given in note 50.

53 S.T., I, 65, 3 c: "Creatio . . . est productio alicuius Rei secundum suam totam substantiam, nullo praesupposito quod sit vel increatum vel ab aliquo creatum."

54 Ibid., 45, 1 c: "emanatio totius esse . . . ex non ente quod est nihil."

55 Ibid.: "homo fit ex non-homine, et album ex non-albo." Thomas has a fuller treatment of these points in his In II Sent., 1,1, 2.
things." 56 The reason is that, if the entire supposite is a created being, everything pertaining to the being must be created, even if it be prime matter or passive potency. Otherwise, a part of the created being would be uncreated, which would be a contradiction. "[I] t is necessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if all that belongs to its being is created." 57

Not only are all creatures created by God; 58 but it is only God—the first cause, the prime mover, the absolute being, existence itself—Who can create anything. God, according to Thomas' natural theology, cannot even delegate the act of creation to any creature. "[I] t is impossible for any creature to create, either by its own power, or instrumentally—that is, ministerially." 59

This total and complete production of the creature by the Creator indicates a relation of total dependence of creature on God. "[C] reation in the creature is only a relation of a certain kind to the Creator as to the principle of its being." 60 This

56Ibid., 44, 2 c (I, 429): "oportet ponere etiam materiam primam creatam ab universali causa entium."

57Ibid., ad 3 (I, 429): "oportet quod etiam illud quod se habet ex parte potentiae, sit creatum, si totum quod ad esse ipsius pertinet, creatum est."

58Ibid., 45, 2 c; 44, 1 c.

59Ibid., 45, 5 c (I, 440): "impossibile est quod alicui creaturae conveniat creare, neque virtute propria, neque instrumentali sive per ministerium." The same is said in 65, 3 c.

60Ibid., 45, 3 c (I, 437): "creatio in creatura non sit nisi relatio quaedam ad Creatorem, ut ad principium sui esse; sicut in passione quae est cum motu, importatur relatio ad principium motus."
"relation of a certain kind" is a real relation in the creature but not in God; in God the relation is merely rational inasmuch as the creatures are referred to Him. "[C]reatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are related to Him."61

Another aspect of God's efficient causality with respect to creatures is His conservation of creatures in the state of being. In the Summa Theologiae Thomas states that the being of each and every creature so depends upon God that not for a moment could the creature exist if it were not kept in being by the operation of the divine power. "For the being of every creature depends on God, so that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into nothingness, were it not kept in being by the operation of the divine power."62 In the same article Thomas illustrates this teaching with one of his crystal-clear examples.

Sic autem se habet omnis creatura ad Deum, sicut aer ad solem illuminantem. Sicut enim sol est lucens per suam naturam, aer autem fit luminosus participando lumen a sole, non tamen participando naturam solis; ita solus Deus est ens per essentiam suam, quia eius essentia est

61Ibid., 13, 7 c (I, 124): "creaturae realiter referuntur ad ipsum Deum; sed in Deo non est aliqua realis relatio eius ad creaturas, sed secundum rationem tantum, inquantum creaturae referuntur ad ipsum." Also see 6, 2, ad 1; 13, 7, ad 2, 4, & 5; 32, 2 c; 45, 3, ad 1; and III, 2, 7 c.

62Ibid., I, 104, 1 c (I, 963): "Dependet enim esse cuiuslibet creaturae a Deo, ita quod nec ad momentum subsistere possent, sed in nihilum redigerentur, nisi operatione divinae virtutis conserverentur in esse."
suum esse; omnis autem creatura est ens participative, non quod sua essentia sit eius esse. Et ideo, ut Augustinus dicit IV super Gen. ad litt., virtus Dei ab eis quae creatae sunt regendis si cessaret aliquando, simul et illorum cessaret species, omnisque natura concideret. 63

Just as the air would have no light if the sun would cease to shine, so every creature, which participates in the existence of God, Who is His own existence, would cease to exist if the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His creatures.

The last phase of existential participation to be considered is God's providence over creatures. This aspect of the question is concerned with God as the greatest good and last end of all creatures. Hence it presents the notion of God as the final cause of all created being.

The Angelic Doctor states that the plan of all things as directed toward their final end is providence. 64 He also divides the notion of providence into two divisions: (1) first there is the order of things that are ordained beforehand to their end; and, then, (2) there is the execution of this order, which is called government. 65 It would seem that both the plan of creatures directed toward their end and the execution of this plan by God refer to His final causality.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid., 3 c: "Ratio autem ordinandorum in finem, proprie providentia est."

65 Ibid. "Ad providentiam duo pertinent: scilicet ratio ordinis rerum provisarum in finem; et executio huius ordinis, quae gubernatio dicitur." Thomas also describes providence as the chief part of prudence, "principalis pars prudentiae" (Ibid., 1 c).
The reason why God is said to direct everything in nature toward an end is that God is the Creator of every good in nature, both the good that a creature has in his substantial being and the good possessed by the creature by virtue of his relation to other creatures and to his final end, the divine essence. Since God, then, is an intellectual being, His act of creation must have followed a predetermined plan (at least logically prior by nature). This plan or ordination of all creatures toward their last end is what is called providence.

Omne enim bonum quod est in rebus, a Deo creatum est, . .. In rebus autem invenitur bonum, non solum quantum ad substantiam rerum, sed etiam quantum ad ordinem earum in finem, et praecipue in finem ultimum, qui est bonitas divina, . .. Hoc igitur bonum ordinis in rebus creatis existens, a Deo creatum est. Cum autem Deus sit causa rerum per suum intellectum, et sic cuiuslibet sui effectus oportet rationem in ipso praexistere, . .. necesse est quod ratio ordinis rerum in finem in mente divina praexistat. Ratio autem ordinandorum in finem, proprie providentia est.

This universal ordination of all creatures to God, as to their last end, by attraction to the highest good is called providence and represents the aspect of finality to be found in transcendental participation.

Thus it has been seen that in the essential or static order, that is, in the order of likeness, transcendental participation involves formal causality in God inasmuch as the exemplary form of

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66 Ibid., 6, 4 c.
67 Ibid., 21, 4 c.
68 Ibid., 22, 1 c.
every created object is contained in the divine mind. In the creation this involves formal causality inasmuch as it deals with the form to be received. In the existential or dynamic order, participation involves efficient and final causality on the part of God. In the creature existential participation is concerned with the actual reception of the form in the predisposed matter; and it is this matter and form that are preserved in existence and directed toward their final end by God's final and efficient causality.
CHAPTER III

THE POSITION OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

ON THE PARTICIPATION OF

CREATURES IN GOOD

After the investigation of the nature of the addition made by the concept of good to that of being has been made and an examination of the Thomistic doctrine of participation in general and transcendental participation in particular has been completed, a study can now be undertaken of St. Thomas' doctrine on participation in good.

In the De Veritate St. Thomas inaugurates his treatment of participation in good by posing the question: Is everything good by the first goodness? After refuting the arguments of some of the adversaries who had weird opinions about the type of causality exercised by God in the creation of the world, Thomas proceeds to treat Plato's position. Plato and the Platonists, following

1David of Dinant and others held that God is the same as prime matter. Thomas denies this on the score of Aristotle's teaching that an efficient cause cannot contain within it a material cause because these two causes have contrary characters. Others, such as the followers of Amalric of Bène, held that God is the form of all things. About this position Thomas says, "efficiens vero et forma effecti idem sunt specie, in quantum omne agens agit sibi simile, sed non idem numero, quia non potest idem esse faciens et factum" (De Ver., 21, 4 c).
the Academic's doctrine of subsistent ideas and participation of creatures therein, taught that all things are called good by virtue of their participation in the first goodness, which is God.\(^2\)

Thomas rejects this opinion and one similar to it that was held by the Porretans\(^3\) because, with Aristotle, Thomas held that there were no subsistent ideas but that the forms of things were in things themselves and not separated from them. Thomas invokes another Aristotelian argument: even granting that there were subsistent ideas, Plato's position would not apply to good because good is not predicated univocally; and in cases in which the predication was not univocal, Plato did not assign a single idea.\(^4\)

St. Thomas finds one fault with the thinking of the Platonist school on this point. It seems to forget that "every agent is found to effect something like itself."\(^5\) Hence, the first goodness, which is understood as the effective cause of all good things, imprints a likeness of itself upon the things it effects. Therefore, every good thing is good by reason of an inherent form which is a likeness of the divine goodness. The formal causality

\(^2\) Thomas used the term Platonici to refer especially to the Neoplatonists; these would include, for example, Plotinus, Proclus, and Pseudo-Dionysius.

\(^3\) The followers of Gilbert of La Porrée (died in 1205); some of the more famous Porretans were Simon de Tournai, Alain de Lille, Nicolas d'Amiens, and Raoul Ardent.

\(^4\) De Ver., 21, 4 c.

\(^5\) Ibid., (III, 20): "omne agens invenitur sibi simile agere."
on the part of God, which Plato taught, is saved inasmuch as God is the exemplary cause of all good things. St. Thomas' opinion, then, is a modification of Plato's.

St. Thomas went along with Plato in saying that all things were good by the first goodness, but Thomas held that the likeness of the divine goodness that the creature possessed was had as an inherent form and in this way the created good is good by the first goodness which is the efficient and exemplary cause of all good things. The form of goodness which the creature has is the same formality as the goodness of God but it is not possessed according to the same nature (that is, substantially or essentially) or in the same degree of limitless perfection. Nonetheless, the goodness of the creature is a true, if a lesser, likeness of the divine goodness.

This same doctrine seems to be treated a little more succinctly by St. Thomas in the Summa Contra Gentiles. As is customary in this work, several proofs are offered for one proposition. The

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6Ibid. See also ad 1, where Thomas says that the goodness of a creature is drawn out of the divine goodness: "Bonitas creaturas extrahitur a divina bonitate."
statement that God is the good of every good is proved by arguments based on God's being all-perfect, and His exemplary and final causality.

The first proof is based upon the fact that God, Who contains all the perfections of creatures, must also possess all the goodness that creatures have, because the goodness of each thing is its perfection and act. 7 "For the goodness of a thing is its perfection. . . . Now, since God is simply perfect, He contains in His perfection the perfections of all things. . . . Therefore His goodness contains all goodnesses; and consequently He is the good of every good."8 God, Who is all-perfect, accordingly possesses the perfection of every goodness and thus is the good of every good.

The second proof that Thomas gives for the same proposition is based on exemplary causality. "A thing is not said to have a quality by participation, except in so far as it bears some resemblance to that which is said to have that quality essentially: thus iron is said to be fiery in so far as it partakes of a resemblance to fire. Now, God is good essentially, while all else is good by participation. . . . Therefore nothing is said to be

7C.G., I, 37, Amplius: "Bonum uniuscuiusque est actus et perfectio eius."

8Ibid., I, 40 (I, 87): "Bonitas enim uniuscuiusque est perfectio ipsius. . . . Deus, autem, cum sit simpliciter perfectus, sua perfectione omnes rerum perfectiones comprehendit. . . . Sua igitur bonitas omnes bonitates comprehendit. Et ita est omnis boni bonum."
good except in so far as it bears some resemblance to the divine goodness. Therefore He is the good of every good."9 Unless there is a regress into infinity, which would be repugnant to the notion of finality,10 there must be a being which is goodness itself and which does not possess goodness from another through participation but has it by its own essence. This being, known to the human intellect by various names—such as the first cause, the prime mover, or the greatest good—is the cause of all created goods, among which are included logically all goods other than the supreme good. According to the Thomistic theory of participation, then, any being possessing some quality through participation, possesses it through a likeness of an attribute of the same kind had by a being that possesses it by virtue of its essence. And if a creature possesses goodness, it does so through a likeness of the divine goodness. "Nothing is said to be good except in so far as it bears some resemblance to the divine goodness."11 Thus does God exercise the function of exemplary causality toward the creature that participates in His goodness.

9Ibid.: "Quod per participationem dicitur aliquale, non dicitur tale nisi inquantum habet quandam similitudinem eius quod per essentiam dicitur: sicut ferrum dicitur ignitum inquantum quandam similitudinem ignis participat. Sed Deus est bonus per essentiam, omnis vero alia per participationem. . . . Igitur nihil dicitur bonum nisi inquantum habet aliquam similitudinem divinae bonitatis. Est igitur ipse bonum omnis boni."

10Ibid., I, 37.

11Ibid., I, 40: "Igitur nihil dicitur bonum nisi inquantum habet aliquam similitudinem divinae bonitatis."
The third and last proof given in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* that God is the good of every good is taken from God's finality and the nature of goodness itself. "Since a thing is desirable for the sake of an end, and the aspect of good consists in its being desirable; it follows that a thing is said to be good, either because it is an end, or because it is directed to an end. Therefore the last end is that from which all things take the aspect of good. Now this is God. ... Therefore God is the good of every good."  

Since good is that toward which there is an appetititive tendency and every end toward which a being tends is a real or an apparent good or something leading to such a good, the notions of good and end are inseparable. The ultimate end of all creatures is that to which all beings are ordained and from which all intermediate ends receive the notion of finality. That God is the final end of all creatures is proved in the third book of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*.  

All creatures, then, participating in God's goodness through a likeness of the divine goodness, participate also in the notion of finality, which is found in its highest and ultimate perfection.

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13 This was discussed in Chapter I, pp. 14-16; see also *De Ver.*, 21, 2 c; and *S.T.*, 5, 3 c.

in God's goodness. Moreover, any being seeking a creature as its end, seeks it only inasmuch as it participates in the notion of finality found in God and inasmuch as the creature is ordained to the divine goodness. For St. Thomas says: "In all mutually subordinate ends the last must needs be the end of each preceding end: thus if a potion be mixed to be given to a sick man; and is given to him that he may be purged; and he be purged that he may be lowered, and lowered that he may be healed, it follows that health is the end of the lowering, and of the purging, and of those that precede. Now all things are subordinate in various degrees of goodness to the one supreme good, that is the cause of all goodness: and so, since good has the aspect of an end, all things are subordinate to God as preceding ends under the last end. Therefore God must be the end of all." Thus, just as in curing a patient the doctor uses several remedies to obtain the desired end, which is the health of the patient, so in creation the various degrees in the hierarchy of goods are all directed toward the greatest good, which is the cause of every good.

There is this difference, however, between the example just

15C.G., III, 17 (III, 34): "In omnibus finibus ordinatis oportet quod ultimus finis sit finis omnium praecedentium finium: sicut, si potio conficitur ut detur aegroto, datur autem ut purgetur, purgatur autem ut extenuetur, extenuatur autem ut sanetur; oportet quod sanitas sit finis et extenuationis et purgationis et allorum praecedentium. Sed omnia inveniuntur in diversis gradibus bonitatis ordinata sub uno summo bono, quod est causa omnis bonitatis: ac per hoc, cum bonum habeat rationem finis, omnia ordinantur sub Deo sicut fines praecedentes sub fine ultimo." This passage also shows the quaint medical practices of the thirteenth century.
given from the Contra Gentiles and the doctrine intended. The means the doctor uses are not goods in themselves, except useful goods; while many goods in the transcendental hierarchy of good could be real goods. The castor oil which the doctor might use to cure a patient is not an end in itself, and thus it is neither an honorable good nor by any stretch of the imagination is it a pleasurable good; but it is a useful good. But a servant of God could take a vacation in order to serve God better. The vacation would be a pleasurable good, something desired in itself and thus having the true idea of an end; but it would be directed at the same time to a greater good, the service of God. In this way all the genuine goods are ordained to the divine goodness, the cause of every good.

It has been seen, then, that God is the cause of every good in creatures; for all creatures share or participate in the goodness of God through a likeness of the divine goodness which the creatures receive as inherent forms and constituent principles. It is the form of goodness which gives the creature the notion of finality and makes of it a true end. The actualization of this form is accomplished by God's efficient causality in His operations of creation and conservation. "Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary, effective and final principle of all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the likeness of the divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own goodness, whereby
it is denominated good."\textsuperscript{16} This passage from the \textit{Summa Theologiae} gives the same position about a creature's possession of good that is found in the \textit{De Veritate}:\textsuperscript{17} although the divine goodness is the exemplary, efficient, and final cause of all goodness in creatures, the creature still possesses its likeness of the divine goodness as a form that inheres in the creature's essential constitution.

A further point to be noted about good is that it is perfective according to its act of existence as well as its specific character.\textsuperscript{18} A creature's act of existence is provided for by God's efficient causality; the specific character, by God's exemplary causality; but the species or nature is actuated by efficient causality, and both the specific character and its existence are directed to God by His final causality. "Air is said to be bright from the sun, not because the very fact that the air is referred to the sun is the brightness of the air, but because the placing of the air directly before the sun is the cause of its being bright. It is in this way that the creature is called good with reference to God."\textsuperscript{19} Just as the light of the sun causes light in

\textsuperscript{16}\textit{S. T.}, I, 6, 4 c (I, 55): "Sic ergo unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate divina, sicut primo principio exemplari, effectivo et finali totius bonitatis. Nihilominus tamen unumquodque dicitur bonum similitudine divinae bonitatis sibi inhaerente, quae est formaliter sua bonitas denominans ipsum."

\textsuperscript{17} 2:1, 4 c.

\textsuperscript{18}\textit{De Ver.}, 22, 1, ad 1.

\textsuperscript{19}\textit{Ibid.}, 21, 4, ad 2 (III, 20-21): "aer dicatur lucens a so-
the air, so does the divine goodness cause goodness in the creature, giving it the formality of goodness, the actual existence of the formality of goodness; and in its formality the creature receives the direction of its goodness to the greatest good through God's efficient causality.

This causal relation between creature and Creator indicates the dependence of the creature on the Creator for the constituent principles of its make-up, not only for its being called into being but also for its preservation in existence. As was indicated above,²⁰ St. Thomas seems to mention participation explicitly only in connection with God's exemplary causality, inasmuch as creatures participate in the divine essence by a likeness of that essence which is their form. This exemplary causality, however, at the least presupposes efficient and final causality; for the form would be of no avail if it were not actuated in some matter, nor would the agent act if it did not have some reason or end in mind. Therefore, the actualization and ordering of the exemplary causality involved in the part played by God in participation depends upon His efficient and final causality.

Moreover, in certain passages from the writings of St. Thomas,

le: non quod ipsum referri aerem ad solem sit lucere aeris, sed quia directa oppositio aeris ad solem est causa quod luceat. Et hoc modo creatura dicitur bona per respectum ad bonum.²¹ The context here, where Thomas is explaining how creatures can have goodness from God, makes it clear that bonum in this passage refers to God, the Summum Bonum.

²⁰Chapter II, pp. 49-51.
he almost says that efficient and exemplary causality are a part of the role played by God in the participation of creatures in His goodness. In the De Veritate Thomas says that the likeness by which the creature shares in the goodness of God is imprinted on the creature by God's efficient causality. "If . . . the first goodness is the effective cause of all goods, it must imprint its likeness upon the things produced."21 From the context here it is seen that St. Thomas held that the first good was the cause of all other goods, and he states that this comes about by impressing a likeness of the first goodness upon the creature, which seems to denote the operation of efficient causality.

In the passage from the Summa Theologiae where Thomas proves that the first goodness is the cause of all other goodness, efficient causality is put on a par with exemplary and final causality. "Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary, effective and final principle of all goodness."22 Here Thomas mentions all three causes in the same breath.

It is true that causality is not participation. Participation by its very nature connotes limitation, passivity, and reception of something from some extrinsic source. The causality of

21De Ver., 21, 4 c (III, 20): "Si prima bonitas sit effectiva omnium bonorum, oportet quod similitudinem imprimat in rebus effectis."

22S.T., I, 6, 4 c (I, 55): "Unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate divina, sicut primo principio exemplari, effectivo et finali totius bonitatis."
God, however, is what makes participation possible.\(^{23}\) The divine causality is the role that God plays in participation. All of the causes are needed to make participation work. Why restrict participation to exemplary causality?

But in spite of the arguments for making efficient and final causality a part of the system of participation, there seems to be no text of St. Thomas' writings that explicitly states this doctrine. In a characteristic statement of Aquinas on participation it is likeness or similitude that is highlighted. The following is one such typical passage: "A thing is not said to have a quality by participation, except in so far as it bears some resemblance to that which is said to have that quality essentially."\(^{24}\) The likeness of the divine goodness that the creature possesses is what entitles the creature to be called good.

Perhaps it could be said that participation is had principally through exemplary causality and secondarily through final and efficient causality. It cannot be said, however, that St. Thomas taught such a hierarchy of causality in the matter of participation, because there is no text that would bear out such an opinion.

After realizing that God is the total cause of goodness in creatures, one might ask, "Why did God wish to share His goodness

\(^{23}\)See pages 50-51 and note 51 for texts and references to texts showing connection between participation and causality.

\(^{24}\)\textit{C.G.}, I, 40 (I, 86): "Quod per participationem dicitur aliquid, non dicitur tale nisi inquantum habet quandam similitudinem eius quod per essentiam dicitur."
with others?" "Because He is so good," St. Thomas answers. "God is infinitely good: for which reason He admits His creatures to a participation of good things." It is God's infinite goodness that prompts Him to share His goodness with creatures. His complete goodness needs nothing else, but it motivates Him to share it with creatures.

Many texts testify to the fact that Aquinas believed that God poured forth His goodness upon creatures freely. In the De Veritate he quotes Pseudo-Dionysius as saying, "the divine goodness communicates itself to us like the sun, which, without previous choice or knowledge, pours out its rays upon all bodies." In another place Aquinas says that it is in the communication of good in general that God does no picking or choosing, but in the communication of this or that good there is some question of choice. "If

25S.T., III, 23, 1 c (D.T., II, 2147 a): "Deus . . . est infinitae bonitatis: ex qua contingit quod ad participationem bonorum suas creaturas admitit." In another place St. Thomas says the same thing: "Ad productionem creaturarum nihil aliud movet Deum nisi sua bonitas, quam rebus aliiis communicare voluit secundum modum assimilationis ad ipsum." This last citation is from the Contra Gentiles, II, 46.

26Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, c. 4; PG 3, 694; as quoted by St. Thomas, De Veritate, 5, 2, arg. 1 (I, 207): "divina bonitas se creaturis communicat sicut noster sol, non praecogniens neque praecognoscens, radio suos in corpora diffundit." St. Thomas explains this dictum of Dionysius in the same article, ad 1: "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod similitudo Dionysii quantum ad hoc attenditur, quod sicut sol nullum corpus excludit, quantum in se est, a sui luminis communicatione; ita etiam nec divina bonitas aliquid creaturam a sui participatione." In S.T., I, 19, 4, ad 1 and De Ver., 23, 1, ad 1 Thomas makes the same comment on the same passage of Dionysius; this doctrine is also set forth in S.T., I, 23, 4, ad 1, while in I, 21, 4 c and C.G., II, 28 Thomas says that God is more generous than the situation demands.
the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election, inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness. . . . But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others." So it is that the divine goodness is manifested in creatures, by God's giving one what the other does not receive and sharing with another some aspect of the divine essence not imparted to the first. Every creature, however, gets something and in this respect God refuses no creature His goodness.

The communication of the divine goodness through a diversity of creatures is admirably explained in the Summa Contra Gentiles.

Deus per suam providentiam omnia ordinat in divinam bonitatem sicut in finem: non autem hoc modo quod suae bonitati aliquid per ea quae fiunt accrescat, sed ut similitudo suae bonitatis, quantum possibile est, imprimatur in rebus. Quia vero omnem creatam substantiam a perfectione divinae bonitatis deficere necesse est, ut perfectionis divinae bonitatis similitudo rebus communicaretur, oportuit esse diversitatem in rebus, ut quod perfecte ab uno repraesentari non potest, per diversa diversimode perfectiori modo repraesentaretur: nam et homo, cum mentis conceptum uno vocali verbo videt sufficienter exprimi non posse, verba diversimode multiplicat ad exprimendam per diversa suae mentis conceptionem. Et in hoc etiam divinae perfectionis eminentia considerari potest, quod perfecta bonitas, quae in Deo est unice et simpliciter, in creaturis esse non potest nisi secundum modum

27S.T., I, 23, 4, ad 1 (I, 244): "Si consideratur communicatio bonitatis divinae in communi, absque electione bonitatem suam communicat; inquantum scilicet nihil est, quod non participet aliquid de bonitate eius. . . . Sed si consideretur communicatio istius vel illius boni, non absque electione tribuit: quia quae- dam bona dat aliquibus, quae non dat aliis."
Diversity among creatures is had, then, so that the various aspects of the divine goodness may be portrayed better. Since no one of the participants in the divine essence can manifest all of its perfections, the divine goodness is better known through the diversity of creatures found in creation.

Although St. Thomas says, "The divine goodness keeps no creature from participating in itself," in other places he affirms that creatures can limit the amount of the divine essence they are capable of receiving. "Good communicates itself. It belongs to the highest good, therefore, to communicate itself in the highest possible degree, that is, as much as each and everything is capable of receiving it. Consequently, if it does not communicate itself to something, this is because that thing is not capable of

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28 C.G., III, 97. In De Ver., 5, 8, arg. 9, Thomas quotes Pseudo-Dionysius (according to Spiazzi, Quaestiones Disputatae, I, 102 a; but no further reference is given) on the same subject: "Magis autem manifestatur divina bonitas, ut dicit Dionysius, in diversitate naturarum quam in numerositate eorum quae eandem naturam habent; et propter hoc etiam non facit omnes creaturas rationales vel per se existentes, sed quasdam rationales, et quasdam per se existentes, et alias existentes in alio, sicut accidentia." The Leonine edition, as translated into English, attributes the saying to St. Augustine of Hippo (Truth, I, p. 230); and this idea is found in three places in the writings of Augustine: Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum, I, 4, PL 42, 606-607; De genesis contra Manicheos, I, 21, PL 34, 188-189; and Octoginta Trium Quaestionum, XLI, PL 40, 27.

29 De Ver., 5, 2, ad 1 (I, 210): "nec divina bonitas aliquam creaturam a sui participatione excludit."
receiving it." Thomas, however, gives an answer to this difficulty of how the divine goodness can communicate itself freely and at the same time give more to one than to the other. "It belongs to the divine goodness as infinite to give from its perfections whatever the nature of each thing requires and is capable of receiving." The key to the problem here is nature. A certain nature or essence can take only a limited amount of perfection. Therefore, although God communicates to this nature as freely as He does to others, still this being will receive less of the divine perfection because it is so limited by its nature, which includes the limiting principle as well as the specific or characteristic perfection. Because of other circumstances, free will, for example, in human beings, the amount of perfection one individual will receive is different from what another will participate.

Aquinas says that good (and God is the greatest good) is even extended to non-beings. "Good extends to non-beings . . . causally, inasmuch as non-beings tend to good. And so we can call non-beings things which are in potency and not in act." Inasmuch as non-

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30 Ibd., 6, 2, arg. 6 (I, 261): "Bonum est communicativum sui ipsius. Ergo summi boni est summe se communicare, secundum quod unumquodque est capax. Si ergo alicui non se communicat, hoc est quia non est capax ejus."

31 Ibd., ad 6 (I, 266): "Quod ad bonitatem divinam pertinet, in quantum est infinita, ut de perfectionibus quas unaquaeque res secundum suam naturam requirit, unicumque largiatur, secundum quod est ejus capax." The underscoring is in neither text.

32 De Ver., 21, 2, ad 2 (III, 11): "Bonum . . . se extendit ad non entia . . . per causalitatem, inquantum non entia appetunt bonum: ut dicamus non entia ea quae sunt in potentia, et non in
beings tend toward good, the goodness of God extends toward them by final causality. Elsewhere St. Thomas says that in this respect the notion of good is more extensive than that of being; for, when non-beings tend toward being, they tend toward it as a good, and only good things seek good. 33

After the consideration of the part God plays in participation, that is, His role as the First Cause according to the efficient, final, and exemplary modes of causality, there remains to be seen the manner in which creatures participate in the greatest good, which is the divine goodness.

As has been seen, Aquinas tells us that creatures participate in the divine goodness by a likeness of that goodness. Inasmuch as a creature possesses the nature of goodness, to that extent is it like the divine goodness. 34 The goodness which the creature has is a likeness of the goodness of God—not an exact image of the divine essence because such cannot be except in God, but a likeness of some facet of the divine goodness. 35

To this doctrine of a creature's goodness through participation in the divine goodness St. Thomas adds a logical corollary: the more closely a created substance resembles the divine goodness,

33 C.G., III, 20.

34 C.G., III, 64: "Res autem participant divinam bonitatem per modum similitudinis, inquantum ipsae sunt bonae."

35 Thomas says the same thing in S.T., I, 44, 4, ad 3; 105, 5 c; II-II, 23, 2, ad 1; C.G., I, 96; III, 24.
the more it participates in goodness. As a reason for this Thomas says that the closer a being approximates its cause the more it shares in the effect of that cause. It is necessary to understand cause in the sense of exemplary cause. The more a creature is like the divine goodness the more it shares in that goodness.

Aquinas tells us, moreover, that it is the intellectual creatures who most approximate God; for they come closest to God, Who is a knowing and willing being. "Now, among the superior creatures, the closest to God are those rational ones that exist, live, and understand in the likeness of God. Consequently, God in His goodness gives them the power not only of pouring out upon other things but also of having the same manner of outpouring that He Himself has—that is, according to their will, and not according to any necessity of their nature." Man, because he is endowed with free choice and understanding, more closely approximates the divine essence than any other creature having matter in its essential make-up; for no other creature on earth has these divine qualities. In the Summa Contra Gentiles Thomas says the same

36 De Ver., 29, 5 c: "Unaquaeque autem substantia tanto a Deo plenius bonitatem ejus participat, quanto ad ejus bonitatem appropinquat."

37 C.G., III, 64, Item 2: "Quanto aliquid propinquius est causae, tanto plus participat de effectu ipsius."

38 De Ver., 5, 8 c: "Inter superiores autem creaturas maxime propinquae sunt Deo creaturae rationales, quae ad Dei similitudinem sunt, vivunt, et intelligunt; unde eis non solum a divina bonitate confertur ut super alia influant, sed etiam ut eundem modum influendi retineant quo influit Deus; scilicet per voluntatem, et non per necessitatem naturae." (I, 233.)
thing in substance but not quite so explicitly, for he is talking
of why it is fitting that there should be intellectual creatures.

Similitudo autem unius invenitur in altero dupliciter: uno modo, quantum ad esse naturae, sicut similitudo cal-
loris ignei est in re calefacta per ignem; alio modo, secundum cognitionem, sicut similitudo ignis est in vi-
su vel tactu. Ad hoc igitur quod similitudo Dei per-
flecte esset in rebus modis possibilibus, oportuit quod
divina bonitas rebus per similitudinem communicaretur
non solum in essendo, sed cognoscendo. Cognoscere autem
divinam bonitatem solus intellectus potest. Oportuit
igitur esse creaturas intellectuales.39

The superiority of intellectual creatures is shown here by the fact
that these can possess a likeness of God not only in their act of
existence according to their nature but also in knowing and under-
standing the goodness of the divinity according to their nature.

God also employs the higher creatures to communicate His good-
ness to the creatures that participate the least in the divine
goodness by allowing the higher creatures to exercise a certain
amount of causality toward the lower beings. "Similarly, in the
ordering of the universe, as a result of the outpouring of God's
goodness, superior creatures have not only that by which they are
good in themselves, but also that by which they are the cause of
goodness for other things which participate the least in God's
goodness."40 Elsewhere in the De Veritate St. Thomas affirms that

39C. G., II, 46, Item.

40De Ver., 5, 8 c (I, 233): "Unde et in ordine universi cre-
aturaee superiores ex influentia divinae bonitatis habent non solum
quod in seipsis bona sint; sed etiam quod sint causae bonitatis
allorum, quae extremum modum participationis divinae bonitatis
habent."
this communication of good to other creatures is the most noble imitation of the divine goodness.\textsuperscript{41} A creature's imitation of God is most noble, then, when the creature imitates God's way of sharing His goodness with others.

Now, after the consideration of the degrees of participation in the divine goodness, an investigation can be made into the ways in which a creature participates in the divine goodness. St. Thomas tells us that two aspects of a creature can be considered in this regard: (1) the species taken absolutely, and (2) the relation of the creature to its end.\textsuperscript{42} Thomas states, furthermore, that good is present in things according to both their substance and their ordination toward their end.\textsuperscript{43} In this study the creature's participation in good according to its substance will be considered first.

This brings up a problem proposed to Boethius (A.D. 470-526) that he endeavored to answer in a work often referred to as De Hebdomadibus but more correctly entitled Quomodo Substantiae Bonae Sint. The problem is proposed in the form of a dilemma consider-

\textsuperscript{41} 9, 2 c: "Ex bonitate divina procedit quod ipse de perfectione sua creaturis communicet secundum earum proportionem; et ideo non solum intantum communicat eis de sua bonitate, quod in se sint bona et perfecta, sed etiam ut aliiis perfectionem largiantur, Deo quoddammodo cooperante; et hic est nobilissimus modus divinae imitationis."

\textsuperscript{42} De Ver., 5, 1, ad 1: "In re creata cuo possunt considerari: scilicet species ejus absolute, et ordo ejus ad finem."

\textsuperscript{43} S.T., I, 22, 1 c: "In rebus autem inventur bonum, non solum quantum ad substantiam rerum, sed etiam quantum ad ordinem earum in finem, et praecipue finem ultimum."
In the third Lectio of the Commentary on the De Hebdomadibus St. Thomas wrested with the problem, and this would lead to pantheism; if creatures are good by participation, it would seem that goodness is a mere accident consequent upon substance. Boethius explained Boethius' solution in his In Librum Boetii De Hebdomadibus. Expositio. 44 How well Thomas interpreted Boethius will not be considered here; only the doctrine presented in the commentary is to the purpose.

St. Thomas gets down to the problem itself. First he states it in its simplest terms: Are beings good by their essences or by participation? 45 Thomas then points out that in this question it is presupposed that to be by one's own substance and to be through participation are direct opposites.

Next it is granted by Thomas that according to one of the types of participation, that by which a subject participates in an accident or matter participates in a form, this possession of a perfection by essence and through participation would be directly opposed. Because the form of the participation is considered here; only the doctrine presented in the commentary is to the purpose.
accident is not contained within the nature, and the perfection of a substantial form is not present in the uninformed matter, these perfections cannot be predicated of their subjects in an essential sense. 47

St. Thomas goes on to say, however, that in that type of participation in which species participates genus, there is true participation and at the same time the predication is substantial. "But in the second mode of participation, namely that by which species participates in genus, it is true that the species participates in the genus. This is also true in the opinion of Plato, who held that the idea of animal was distinct from the idea of a two-footed man. But in the opinion of Aristotle, who held that man actually is that which animal is (on the grounds that the essence of animal does not exist without the specific difference of man), nothing stands in the way of the substantial predication of something that is said to exist through participation." 48 If good were predicated of creatures in this way, they would participate

47 Ibid., "Et in uno quidem supradictorum participationis modorum manifeste verum est: scilicet secundum illum modum quo subjectum dicitur participare accidentis, vel materia formam. Est enim accidentis praeter naturam subjecti, et forma praeter ipsam substantiam materiae."

48 Ibid., n. 45: "Sed in alio participationis modo, quo scilicet species participat genus, hoc verum est quod species participat genus. Hoc etiam verum est secundum sententiam Platonis, qui posuit aliam esse ideam animalis, et bipedinis hominis. Sed secundum sententiam Aristotelis, qui posuit quod homo vere est id quod est animal, quasi essentia animalis non existente praeter differentiam hominis; nihil prohibit, id quod per participationem dicitur, substantialiter praedicari."
in goodness and at the same time possess it substantially, just as
man possesses the perfections of the notion of animal substantial­ly.

But Boethius takes participation to mean possess as an acci­
dent in the sense that man would participate in the accident of
whiteness. Therefore, it would necessarily follow that if crea­
tures are good by participation, they would not be good in them­selves. 49 If it were true, then, that things are not good substan­
tially, it would follow that they would not tend toward good; but
Boethius has already granted that creatures tend toward good. 50

The other horn of the dilemma leads to the conclusion that if
creatures were substantial goods they would also be substantial
existences and thus they would be the first good, which is God. 51

Thomas gives the solution to this problem by saying that God,
the first good, has goodness of His own proper nature, which is
goodness itself. Creatures do not have goodness by their nature
or essence, which is that of humanity or some such thing; but they
are good by virtue of the relationship of causality they have to

49 Ibid., n. 47: "Sicut igitur Boetius hic accipit participa­
tionem, prout subiectum participat accidens; per se autem quod po­
nitur in definitione subiecti. Et sic ex necessitate sequitur quod si res sint bonae per participationem, quod non sint bonae
per se."

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid., nn. 48-51; in paragraph # 52 St. Thomas says: "Si
ergo omnia sunt ipsum primum bonum; cum ipsum primum bonum nihil
aliud sit quam Deus, sequitur quod omnia entia sunt Deus: quod
nefas est."
the first good, their first principle and last end.

Esse primi boni est secundum propriam rationem bonum, quia natura et essentia primi boni nihil aliud est quam bonitas; esse autem secundi boni est quidem bonum, non secundum rationem propriae essentiae, quia essentia eius non est ipsa bonitas, sed vel humanitas, vel ali­quid aliud huiusmodi; sed esse eius habet quod sit bonum ex habitudine ad primum bonum, quod est eius causa: ad quod quidem comparatur sicut ad primum principium et ult­timum finem; per modum quo aliquid dicitur sanum, quo­ aliquid ordinatur ad finem sanitatis; ut dicitur medi­cinale secundum quod est a principio effectivo artis me­dicinae. 52

The participation which creatures enjoy in the divine goodness, then, is the third type enumerated by St. Thomas in a preceding lectio of the In Boetii De Hebdomadibus. 53 This is the participation of effect in its cause. As God is the cause of goodness in creatures, so the creature participates through this causality in the divine goodness.

It still remains to examine just how this goodness is present in creatures. St. Thomas tells us that it is present in the form or essence, in the existence, and in the accidents of creatures. Goodness in a creature according to form and existence is called the substantial goodness of the creature or goodness in a quali­fied sense, while the goodness present by virtue of the accidents is known as absolute goodness. "A creature is from God not only in its essence but also in its act of existing, which constitutes

52Ibid., lect. 4, n. 62.

53Lect. 2. The original Latin text is given above on page 29 of this study. This third type of participation, of course, is the transcendental, cited above on page 32 and discussed on pages 41 and following.
the chief characteristic of substantial goodness; and also in its additional perfections, which constitute its absolute goodness. These are not the 'essence of the thing. And furthermore, even the relation by which the essence of the thing is referred to God as its source is distinct from the essence.'  

It seems rather surprising that the absolute goodness of a creature is due to its accidental goodness. As Thomas himself remarks, it is the other way around with existence; and one would expect it to be the same with goodness.  

As will be seen, the reason for man's principal good being from his accidents is that good is relative.

First of all, as has been said, goodness is present in the creature according to form. As already has been seen above, goodness is present in the creature in the inherent form which is a likeness, the exemplary idea of which is contained in the divine intellect as a possible participation in the divine goodness.

Secondly, goodness is present in the creature according to

54 De Ver., 21, 5, ad 5 (III, 27): "Creatura non solum est a Deo secundum essentiam suam, sed secundum esse suum, in quo praecipue consistit ratio bonitatis substantialis; et secundum perfectiones superadditas, in quibus consistit bonitas absoluta; et haec non sunt essentia rei. Et praeterea ipse respectus quo essentia rei refertur ad Deum ut ad principium, est alius quam essentia."

55 Ibid., 5 c: "De bono autem est e converso. Nam secundum substantialem bonitatem dicitur aliquid bonum secundum quid; secundum vero accidentale dicitur aliquid bonum simpliciter."

56 Pp. 59, 60, & 65.

57 De Ver., 21, 4 c; S.T., I, 6, 4 c.
its act of existence. As has already been pointed out, St. Thomas held that in the act of existence a creature's substantial goodness is chiefly had. "A creature is from God . . . in its act of existing, which constitutes the chief characteristic of substantial goodness." This is most reasonable, for being and good are interchangeable, and accordingly the act of being must be good in itself. Moreover, the act of being is a likeness of the divine goodness, which is being itself.

This substantial goodness, however, is called qualified goodness, or goodness in a certain sense. The unqualified goodness or absolute goodness that a creature has is his accidental goodness. "From the point of view of its substantial goodness a thing is said to be good in a certain sense, but from that of its accidental goodness it is said to be good without qualification. Thus we do not call an unjust man good simply, but only in a certain sense, inasmuch as he is a man. But a just man we call good without further restriction." This brings up the subject of accidental

58 It should be noted that in the Thomistic metaphysics, form is distinct from existence. As Thomas puts it in the Compendium Theologiae, "Forma consequitur esse, etsi etiam non sit ipsum esse," I, III; ed. Verardo, S. Thomae Aquinatis Opuscula Theologica, I, 54.

59 De Ver., 21, 5, ad 5 (III, 27): "Creatura . . . est a Deo . . . secundum esse suum in quo praecipue consistit ratio bonitatis substantialis."

60 Ibid., c (III, 25): "Nam secundum substantialalem bonitatem dicitur aliquid bonum secundum quid, secundum vero accidentalem dicitur aliquid bonum simpliciter; unde hominem injustum non dicimus bonum simpliciter, sed secundum quid, in quantum est homo; hominem vero justum dicimus simpliciter bonum."
good in man and his ordination to God the Creator.

The reason why a creature is not called good in an absolute sense except by virtue of his accidental perfections is that goodness is had with respect to others and a creature is in perfect harmony with other things through accidents. For the creature's operations are had by means of powers distinct from the essence.\textsuperscript{61} A creature's perfection, then, is attained through the operation of its powers by which accidental perfections accrue to the individual. The absolute perfection of the creature is had through the accidents and not the essence or nature.\textsuperscript{62}

The creature in both its constituent and accidental principles is directed to God as to its last end. "Now things are directed to the ultimate end intended by God, the divine goodness to wit, not only in that they operate, but also in the very fact that they exist: because inasmuch as they exist they bear a likeness to the divine goodness, which is the end of all things."\textsuperscript{63} All

\textsuperscript{61}Ibid., "Nam unumquodque dicitur esse ens in quantum absolute consideratur; bonum vero . . . secundum respectum ad alia. In seipso autem aliquid perficitur ut subsistat per essentialia principia; sed ut debito modo se habeat ad omnia quae sunt extra ipsum, non perficitur nisi mediantibus accidentibus superadditis essentiae quia operationes quibus unum alteri conjungitur ab essentia mediantibus virtutibus essentiae superadditis progrediuntur."

\textsuperscript{62}Ibid., ad 5.

\textsuperscript{63}\textsc{C.G.}, III, 65 (III, 155): "In finem autem ultimum quem Deus intendit, scilicet bonitatem divinam, ordinantur res non solum per hoc quod operantur, sed etiam per hoc quod sunt; quia inquantum sunt, divinae bonitatis similitudinem gerunt, quod est finis rerum." This citation is from the beginning of this rather lengthy article; in the Leonine manual edition it is found on page 297b.
creatures, both inasmuch as they are and inasmuch as they operate through powers distinct from their substantial existences, tend to become like or to be assimilated to the divine goodness. Two passages from the *Summa Contra Gentiles* illustrate this point.


Adhuc. *Omnis res per suum motum vel actionem tendit in aliquod bonum sicut in finem. . . . In tantum autem aliquid de bono participat, in quantum assimilatur primae bonitati, quae Deus est. Omnia igitur per motus suos et actionem tendunt in divinam similitudinem sicut in finem ultimum.*

Thus, it is not only proper to a creature to be a likeness of the divine goodness, but also, inasmuch as it is possible, to become more like God, the infinite good.

This attraction of all things to the divine goodness extends even to prime matter, according to Aquinas. Good that is predicated of prime matter is not to be called merely potential good; but inasmuch as it is ordained to good can the matter be called good (by the very fact of that ordination). Another reason for saying that prime matter can be called good is that prime matter has a tendency toward being and therefore toward good. Because only like things seek like things, the prime matter must be good.

*Et licet unumquodque sit bonum inquantum est ens, non tamen oportet quod materia, quae est ens solum in poten-

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64III, 19.
tia, sit bonum in potentia. Ens enim absolute dicitur, bonum autem etiam in ordine consistit: non enim solum aliquid bonum dicitur quia est finis, vel quia est obti­nens finem; sed, etiam si nondum ad finem pervenerit, dummodo sit ordinatum in finem ex hoc ipso dicitur bonum. Materia ergo non potest simpliciter dici ens ex hoc quod est potentia ens, in quo importatur ordo ad esse: potest autem ex hoc simpliciter dici bona, propter ordinem ipsum.

Nam et ipsa non existentia, scilicet materia sec­cundum quod intelligitur privationi subiecta, appetit bonum, scilicet esse. Ex quo patet quod etiam sit bona: nihil enim appetit bonum nisi bonum.\(^{65}\)

The goodness of God, then, reaches to the lowliest on the Thomistic ladder of being, to prime matter.

A final consideration of the Thomistic theory of the participation of creatures in good is Aquinas' interpretation of the saying of Dionysius, "Bonum est diffusivum sui et esse."\(^{66}\) This dictum has been translated thus: "Good tends to pour out itself and existence."\(^{67}\) Thomas says that, although the word to pour out generally indicates the operation of an efficient cause, it can still be taken in a broad sense to mean to influence, to make, and the like, and thus indicate the operation of any cause. In the saying, "Good tends to pour out itself and existence," Thomas would have the diffusive quality of pouring out indicate the operation of a final cause, because a being is dependent upon its final cause in its whole existence whereas the efficient cause is not the measure of the thing but only its beginning and also the

\(^{65}\)C.G., III, 20.

\(^{66}\)De Ver., 21, 1, ad 4.

\(^{67}\)Truth, III, pp. 3-4.
effect shares or participates in the efficient cause only as in an assimilation of its form.

[D]iffundere, licet secundum proprietatem vocabuli videatur importare operationem causae efficientis, tamen largo modo potest importare habitudinem cujuscumque causae sicut influere et facere, et alia hujusmodi. Cum autem dicitur quod bonum est diffusivum secundum sui rationem, non est intelligenda effusio secundum quod importat operationem causae efficientis, sed secundum quod importat habitudinem causae finalis; et talis diffusio non est mediante aliqua virtute superaddita.

Dicit autem bonum diffusionem causae finalis, et non causae agentis: tum quia efficiens, in quantum hujusmodi, non est rei mensura et perfectio, sed magis initium; tum quia effectus participat causam efficientem secundum assimilationem formae tantum; sed finem consequitur res secundum totum esse suum, et in hoc consistebat ratio boni. 68

Therefore, since the act of being of the creature is influenced in its constitution and operations by its ultimate end, which is the greatest good or the divine goodness, and the creature is ever imitating this goodness in the essential and accidental perfections of the creature, goodness is to be understood as pouring itself out according to the operations of final causality.

Thus is it seen that all creatures in their entirety—matter, form, accidents, and existence—are dependent upon the divine goodness and participate in its perfections through its exemplary, efficient, and final causality.

68 De Ver., 21, 1, ad 4.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

When something is said to be good, it is meant that the thing has something which is desireable not only to others but also to itself. The gazelle roaming the jungles and plains of Africa offers a great attraction to the appetite of the hungry lion, it is true; but the gazelle's own existence is a good to itself, so much so that it will make use of every means possible to take flight from the lion and preserve its own existence.

The good thing, then, is that which creates a tendency toward itself in others and in itself. Thus the notion of good always conveys the idea of end. This concept of good and its concomitant concept of end is interchangeable with the concept of being inasmuch as every being has some reference to existence which in itself is desireable and consequently a good.

But where does the good thing get that by which it can be called good? What is the source of the goodness of any being? St. Thomas' fourth proof for the existence of God tells us that God, in Whom are all the perfections of creation in their greatest perfection, is the cause of all the goodness which is to be found in creatures.¹

There is something about the idea of good, however, which,

¹S.T., I, 2, 3 c, quarta via
psychologically speaking, makes it more attractive than any of the other divine perfections. A man is more interested in a thing if he knows that the thing is good than if he knows that it exists, or that it is one, or even true. The goodness of his home means more to him than its existence, oneness, or its truth. And the goodness of his house, like the goodness of any creature, is due ultimately to the goodness of God, the source of all goodness; for the ultimate reason why anything can be said to be good is that it participates in the goodness of God through the causality of God, which constitutes the creature in goodness and preserves it in the same.

This participation is always had through a likeness of the divine goodness. For every good thing is a model of the divine goodness, not an exact model because such would be the divine goodness and consequently there would be two supreme beings, which is impossible. But each being portrays some facet of the divine essence and its goodness is a likeness of some aspect of the divine goodness.

Of all the creatures on the face of the earth, man is the highest because he possesses the divine qualities of intellection and free choice. And man by the proper use of these qualities can most nearly imitate the goodness of God by communicating goodness to the lower creatures on earth.

Thus there is a hierarchy of goods that extends from the low-entity on the Thomistic scale of being--prime matter--up through all the grades to man and the angels and finally to the highest,
which is the divine goodness itself; and all of these beings receive their goodness from God by imitating some aspect of His divine essence.

What deserves stress in this doctrine of participation of creatures in goodness is the active or dynamic side of the metaphysical reality. Participation of creatures in good should not be conceived of as so many creatures holding on to some good thing, as forty children in a classroom holding on to lollipops received for good recitations. Participation in good should be thought of as a continual receiving of a stream of gifts from the author of all goodness.

Not the least part of the dynamic side of participation in good is the attraction of all creatures to the goodness of God as to their last end. God is the gigantic loadstone attracting all beings to Himself, because every being that seeks another and tends to it as a good, does so because the real or supposed good appears as a likeness of some aspect of the divine goodness. This special attraction of man to God has been enshrined most beautifully in the language of man by St. Augustine, who says to God, "For Thou hast made us for Thyself and our hearts are restless until they rest in Thee."²

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APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by John J. Kinsella, S.J., has been read and approved by three members of the Department of Philosophy.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

December 27, 1956

Date

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