The Metaphysics of the Passions According to the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas

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THE METAPHYSICS OF THE PASSIONS

ACCORDING TO THE DOCTRINE

OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

by

Kenneth M. Kunert, S.J.

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
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LIFE

Kenneth Michael Kunert, S.J., was born in Detroit, Michigan, March 1, 1926.

He was graduated from University of Detroit High School, Detroit, Michigan, June 1944. He entered the Society of Jesus and in June, 1944 enrolled in Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio. After two years of Novitiate, he spent two years in the Juniorate studying Latin, Greek, and English Literature. In September, 1948, he transferred to West Baden College affiliated with Loyola University. He was graduated in June, 1949 with the degree of Bachelor of Arts.

The author began his graduate studies at Loyola University in February 1950. From September 1951 to June 1954 he taught Latin and Greek at Loyola Academy, Chicago, Illinois. During the summers of these years he returned to West Baden College to continue working for a degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy.
CHAPTER I

LOOKING FORWARD

The purpose of this work will be to evolve the metaphysical nature of the passions from a study of the works of St. Thomas Aquinas. Once the metaphysical nature of the passions has been evolved, it will be a simple matter to come to a conclusion with regard to what the four causes of the passions are, namely, the efficient, final, formal, and material causes proper to the general nature of the passions. The verification of these conclusions will be the ultimate end to be achieved in this thesis.

Before entering into this study, however, it would be well to state what is meant by the word "passion" as used in this thesis, since it differs from the meaning of the word passions as used in modern psychology. As used here the passions will mean the emotions; yet even this must be understood in a little different sense than in modern psychology, since the word passions used by St. Thomas means the same as the word emotions used today and even more than this. This difference between the usages of the words passion and emotion as used by the moderns and the word passions as used by St. Thomas is explained very well by Father Joseph Le Rohellec when he says:

"Les philosophes modernes distinguent entre émotion et passion. L'émotion désignerait un mouvement subit et momentané; la passion désignerait un mouvement affectif prolongé, enraciné par l'habitude"
et devenu une seconde nature. Au dire de plusieurs, les passions seraient des inclinations pervertie. -- Saint Thomas, au contraire, prenant le terme passion dans un sens plus général, parce que plus étymologique et plus métaphysique, lui fait signifier tout acte de l'appétit sensible, qu'il soit violent ou calme, rapide ou prolongé... En tout cas la passion au sens thomiste ne peut jamais designer une habitude, elle signifie essentiellement un acte.  

Father John Lindworsky, S.J. distinguishes the words a little differently. He says:

Strong feelings which are connected with disturbance of the normal course of images, and are accompanied by noticeable bodily changes, we call emotions -- older writers, passions.

Emotions may be contrasted with moods. While we understand by the term emotion a strong but more acute mental state, we mean by mood a more moderate but lasting state of a similar nature...

The passions (Leidenschaften) are no longer to be counted among the feelings or the emotions. We understand by passions, as we ordinarily employ the term, a dominating interest that is strong enough to make conduct more difficult and occasionally also to incite us to less considered action.

Thus a modern philosopher and a modern psychologist point out the difference in meaning between the term emotion and the term passion as used by the moderns. St. Thomas on the contrary, as Le Rohellec mentions, used the word passions in a sense that to some extent includes both the modern meaning of the word emotions and the modern meaning of the word passion; yet he differs in that his word passion always means the act and not the mood.


or habit which the modern word passion implies in its technical sense.

This meaning of passion in St. Thomas as delineated by Father Le Rohellec cannot be accepted at this point as the final definition of the word; however, it may be used as a working definition and therefore a starting point for beginning this exegetical study in St. Thomas. Because this is an exegetical study, it will be necessary to work out from the texts of St. Thomas the real meaning that he attributes to the word passion; and this will form an integral part of the thesis, since the conclusions concerning the causes of the passions or emotions (the two words will be used interchangeably, with both carrying St. Thomas' meaning and connotations of the word) can be based only on a clear and accurate understanding of what Thomas means by the word passio in the context of emotion.

It is necessary to enter into this question because of the wide variety of meanings that may be attributed to the Latin word passio. Basically it has the notion of suffering or having something done to one. Hence it also has the notion of passivity and receptivity. It is used as the correlative of actio and thus is used to signify one of the ten categories. Therefore in its restricted use as meaning passion or emotion it includes something of all of these ideas, and yet differs from all of them. Indeed it may even have the idea of property as being the quality or effect characteristic of the nature of some thing or being.3

Hence to get to the exact meaning of passio in the sense used in this thesis as passion or emotion will require further study and treatment.

However, with the working definition delineated above it is possible to enter into a discussion of the procedure to be employed in discussing the problems of this thesis. Today the discussion of the emotions is relegated chiefly to the field of experimental psychology, where the emotions or passions are studied in so far as they are composed of the physiological or psychic elements. There the discussion is concerned not so much with the causes of the emotions as with their psychological nature, especially the inter-relation of their component parts as experimentally perceived.

In this thesis, however, the discussion will concern itself primarily in studying the metaphysics of the emotions, in analysing the nature of the passions in order that their causes may be revealed by perceiving the external manifestations of their acts, operations, and objects. The findings of psychology will enter into the thesis as a negative guide and as a point of departure from which the metaphysical study will begin.

According to St. Thomas, in order to know the nature of any power or faculty, it is necessary to study its acts and operations. With this as a basic principle, if the four causes of the passions are to be discovered, it will be necessary to begin by analyzing the acts and operations of the passions and the potencies corresponding to these acts and operations in order to arrive at a knowledge of their nature. Once their acts, operations, potencies, and nature have been discovered, then the way will be open for the further discovery of the causes involved in the emotions.

The first question to be determined, therefore, will be the meanings of the word passion (passio) as used by St. Thomas, in order to find out
where the emotions (or "passions" as used in this thesis) fit into the scheme. After this is discovered, the next step will be to find out what is the subject of the emotions, in order to see to what part of the sense nature they belong, whether to the cognitive nature or to the appetitive nature or to both. Next, what the object of the passions is.

Once the subject and object of the passions have been determined and once the relation of the passions to the appetitive and apprehensive faculties of the animal nature has been learned, then it will be possible to draw a conclusion concerning the efficient, final, formal, and material causes of the passions according to that nature common to all the passions in general. Although slight variations may be found according to each individual emotion, yet these will all fall under the causes found proper to the common nature. It is to the discovery of these basic common causes that this thesis will restrict itself.

As this will be an exegetical study using St. Thomas Aquinas as its source, it will be useful to state the main fonts for its thought and development. St. Thomas has two extended treatments of the passions: the first is in the *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate*, questions 25 and 26; and the second is in the *Summa Theologiae*, Pars Prima, questions 80 and 81, and Prima Secundae, questions 22 to 24, which deal particularly with the matter of this thesis, and questions 25 to 48, which treat each individual emotion separately. This thesis, however, will not go into each separate emotion except in passing. From these last questions on the particular emotions, however, some particular applications may be drawn. But the
thesis will not be dependent on them for its subject matter. Sections from other of St. Thomas' works may also be quoted; but if used, they will be used only to clarify and point up the matter found in the extended treatments mentioned above.

Sources other than St. Thomas will be used only in a secondary and auxiliary way, and only when they will help clarify some difficult passage or help summarize briefly some extended treatment or when needed to point out the connection and logic between the various ideas contained in this paper. They will also be used to summarize briefly the modern psychology of the emotions, but the proof of the thesis does not depend on them.

The chapters of the thesis following this one will be divided in the following manner. First a brief summary of the psychology of the passions will be given as the background upon which the matter of this thesis will build. This will be followed by a discussion of the various meanings of the word passion, passio, in St. Thomas in order to find out the exact meaning of passion or passio in the sense of the word emotions as understood in this thesis. After this the subject of the passions will be discussed to find out whether the passions are proper to the body alone, to the soul alone, or to both body and soul together.

After the subject has been determined, the next step will be to

3 See above p. 2.
decide to what part of the animal nature the passions pertain. Are they merely part of the sense apprehension? Merely part of the sense appetite? If the latter, do they depend upon sense cognition in any way? Again, if they belong to the appetitive faculties, how can they be so diversified as they are perceived to be?

This last question leads into the discussion of the object of the sense appetite, namely, the good. Once all this has been seen and established, then all of it will be drawn together finally in order to ferret out the four basic causes of the passions.

In all this matter, the thesis' claim to originality will lie in the last chapter where the conclusions as to the four basic causes of the passions, drawn from the exegesis of the texts of St. Thomas, will be given. Much of what will be treated in the early chapters has been treated before, although from the viewpoint of psychology rather than from the viewpoint of metaphysics.

Therefore the originality of the thesis will lie not in the matter treated, but rather in the end toward which it is directed, namely, a metaphysical study of the emotions to discover their four major causes.
CHAPTER II

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PASSIONS

The question of the passions and the emotions traverses the whole field of psychology. It is discussed in rational psychology, a field left almost entirely to the scholastic philosophers, in experimental psychology, and in clinical psychology. The first two of the fields concern themselves with the nature of the emotions, and hence present the basic facts with which this thesis is concerned. To study the passions or emotions it is necessary to know what they are, what are their component parts, and how they are related to cognition. Their relationship to cognition is the concern of rational psychology. Their component parts and make-up is the primary concern of experimental psychology. These two fields of psychology work together to give the complete picture of the nature of the emotions.

Experimental psychology has discovered that the emotions are a composite of the physical and the psychical. It has shown that every emotion is bound up with bodily changes as faster breathing, increases in pulse beat and blood pressure, stricture of the chest muscles, and other like phenomena. In fact the emotions are so immersed in these phenomena that William James and Carl George Lange in the United States and in Germany simultaneously and independently came out with the same theory that the physiological changes were the cause of the emotion. This theory was a complete reversal of the theory accepted up to that time, namely that the emotion was the cause of the
bodily resonance.

Is the bodily resonance the cause or the effect of the emotion? ... From the days of Aristotle through medieval philosophy down almost to the present, these phenomena of body resonance have been looked upon as the effects of the emotion and not its cause -- as the emotional expression and not its constituent elements. In the nineteenth century two men at approximately the same time put forward the view that the ordinary interpretation of the situation is just the reverse of what it should be, namely that a perception produces the emotion, but that the perception of the bodily resonance is the emotion. According to the traditional view, the perception produces the emotion and the emotion produces the bodily resonance.1

William James himself puts his theory thus:

Our natural way of thinking about these coarser emotions is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My theory, on the contrary, is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion. Common-sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful as the case may be.2

Although many accepted this theory for a time, it was proved erroneous by the work of a number of leading psychologists, chief among whom Charles B. Sherrington and Walter B. Cannon. Concerning Cannon's work,


Thomas V. Moore says:

The work of Cannon and his pupils which has been briefly analysed is the most important contribution that has yet been made to our understanding of the bodily resonance. Cannon himself has pointed out the utility of the bodily changes which are produced by the emotional excitement through the activity of adrenalin ... In the struggle which is likely to follow upon emotional excitement, the energy of the organism will necessarily be called upon. The emotion, therefore, by a definite mechanism sets free the energy that will be required for the struggle.

Looking at the physiological mechanism for the production of visceral changes in emotional experience, it is apparent that these changes must take place after the experience of the emotions, and, therefore, they cannot be the emotion, nor can the subject's perception of these changes, which come after he experiences the emotion, constitute the very essence of the emotion itself.

It seems rational to look upon the realization of the critical situation as causing the emotion, and the emotion as bringing about the stimulation of the splanchnic nerve, which stimulation is responsible for the further sequence of events in the emotional display.

Once the series of processes has been initiated, the emotional resonance is no doubt perceived, and its perception constitutes an important element in the complex series of events constituting the emotional sequence. 3

From the conclusions drawn by Moore in the above passage it seems evident that the true sequence found in the emotions is not the one proposed by James and Lange, but the time-honored sequence which they rejected.

All of this, as is seen in the foregoing quotation, does show that the emotions are rather complex entities involving some cognition, a reaction to that cognition which is psychological, followed by one that is physiological, all of which unite to give the complete emotion.

3 Moore, Driving Forces, 126-127.
Along the lines of rational psychology another question has risen concerning the emotions: whether they are merely sensations, that is, a form of sense cognition as Stumpf has said, or whether they belong to an affective faculty distinct from the faculties of cognition and of appetency. The answers given to these questions by rational psychology completes the table of facts offered this thesis by psychology.

T. V. Moore raises the first part of this question, and then gives the answer to it.

Are the affective mental states sensations? This theory, as we have seen, is maintained by Stumpf for a group of feelings that are at least intimately connected with sensations. Others have gone so far as to maintain that all affective mental states are nothing more than sensations . . . .

Against this view that affective states are a specific form of sensations we may urge the following considerations:

(1) All other known sensations (except the supposed "sensations" of feeling) have their sense organs. There is no sense organ for pleasure and pain . . . .
(2) Not only have pleasure and pain no sense organ, but they may be produced by the stimulation of any sense organ. But sensations are specific . . . .
(3) A sensation is produced directly by the external stimulus. A feeling, however, seems to be more indirectly produced by a conscious state on account of which one is affected in one way or another. It is our reaction to this conscious state or reaction to a sensation and not the sensation itself.

(5) Feelings are subjective; sensations objective. Thus, in knowing we distinguish the subject who knows and the object which is known. In feeling, however, we cannot make such a distinction because there is no object of knowledge. Thus I can say of the sensation that I see the bright blue sky, but I cannot say, "I am the bright blue sky." On the other hand I say, "I am happy; I am angry, or I am sad," etc. 4

Thus by an analysis of the phenomena of sense cognition and of feelings Moore shows that the emotions are not merely sensations. The second part of the questions asks if they belong to a distinct affective faculty of the soul. Cardinal Mercier treats this problem.

Cardinal Mercier's proof of this is achieved by an analysis of the emotions given through pages 165 to 170. Omitting the proof, it is sufficient for this thesis to accept the description of the emotions presented in these pages to arrive at all the facts necessary to begin the study of St. Thomas. Mercier says:

L'émotion est une modification passive, agréable ou désagréable, perçue par la conscience; elle est produite par une représentation d'un bien ou d'un mal, réside dans les facultés appétitives et les détermine à s'attacher au bien ou à répudier le mal que les facultés perceptives leur présentent.

From this description it is clear that an emotion involves an element of cognition; it involves the appetitive faculty as that which reacts to good and evil and as that which is led to produce some corresponding reaction as a result of this perception be it fear and a running away from the object causing this fear or a joy and the embracing of the object causing

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5 D. J. Mercier, Psychologie, ed. 11th Louvain, 1923, II, 164.
6 Ibid., 165.
this joy.

In summary, then, modern psychology, rational and experimental, teaches that the emotions are composed of psychic and physiological and psychic reactions. They teach that the emotions pertain to the appetitive faculty of a cognitional being and that they have some dependence upon cognition.

Indeed these facts are not the private property of modern psychology alone, for they have been observed through the ages, although former times did not have all the instruments and methods of modern experimental psychology to arrive conclusively at all the physiological facts of the emotions and to know their part in the emotions as easily and state it as definitely as modern psychology has been able to do. Indeed, that there were physical components was known; for St. Thomas gave the emotions the name passiones for the very reason that they involved an undergoing, a physical change in the one experiencing the emotion.

For Thomas, however, the word passio refers not only to the emotions, but it has a variety of meanings or perhaps connotations; so it will be necessary to distinguish exactly the precise meaning of passio so as to distinguish the meaning of emotion from the other meanings of the word. This done, it will be possible for the thesis to proceed in its quest for the causes of the passions or emotions.

This distinction on the word passio, it seems, will be best made if the logic of the various degrees of difference in the meaning is brought out by following it from the more simple beginnings through to its more
exact and elaborate conclusions.

The first distinction that Thomas makes on the word *passio* seems to be based on the etymological and essential meanings of the word. The word *passio* and, therefore, the verb *pati*, which means to bear, support, undergo, suffer, and to endure, Thomas says comes from the Greek verb *pati*, a Latin transliteration of ἔποιεiν the second aorist infinitive of ἔποιεω. The primary meaning given for ἔποιεω first in its more general meaning is "to have something done to one," and then in its more restricted sense is "to suffer." Thomas seems to derive his first twofold distinction of the word *passio* from these two meanings of the Greek verb. More commonly the word *passio* denotes a reception of some sort, a passivity, and this agrees with the general notion "to have something done to one." In its more restricted sense *passio* means to suffer, but to suffer means to undergo something detrimental and painful to oneself. So in this restricted sense something unsuited comes to the one experiencing the passion driving out something suited to that being, as a certain type of disease will replace a certain type of good health.

*Sciendum est igitur, quod nomen passionis dupliciter sumitur: communiter et proprie.*

*Communiter quidem dicitur passio receptio alicujus quocumque modo; et hoo sequendo significacionem vocabuli: nam passio dicitur a pati graece, quod est recipere.*

Proprie vero dicitur passio secundum quod actio et passio in motu consistunt; prout scilicet aliquid recipitur in patiente per viam motus.

Et quia omnis motus est inter contraria, oportet illud quod recipitur in patiente, esse contrarium al cuii quod a patiente abjicitur. 8

The general meaning of passio, then, is any reception of any kind whatever in the one effected by the agent's action, while properly speaking it signifies a change caused by transient action. This change results in the reception of one thing, whose reception requires the expulsion of its contrary. Thus in its more restricted sense passio or passion includes the notions both of motion and of contrariety.

Now to receive something from another being, one must have the capacity for the thing received. The full milk pail is not used to take the milk gotten in stripping the cows after the use of the milking machines, but only a pail that is empty or half full, since this alone has the capacity to take on this added milk, this alone has the potency for this milk. So too in the case of the reception involved in passio in the strict sense of the word there must be an unfulfilled capacity in the patient or recipient.

But if one is to be a patient having a potency and receiving that whereby the potency will be filled, someone else must be the agent giving that wherewith the potency is actuated. The agent in turn must possess that which he is to give, else he would not be able to give it. The foregoing

8 Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, 26, 1, ed. Spiazzi, 1948. (Hereafter referred to as De Ver.)
statements, however, express nothing else but the doctrine of act and potency practically stated. It is to this theory of act and potency that Thomas relates the notion of passion. He states that just as the terms act and potency are not used univocally but analogously, so too is the word pati used analogously accordingly as it fits under the basic principle of act and potency.

In the case of suffering where the patient receives a form ill-suited to itself, there is a sort of corruption, a loss of a form. But the corruption of one thing is the cause of the generation of another and so a new form arises for which there must be a potency. In the case where a being is merely having something done to it, and hence there is a simple reception of some sort, the doctrine also applies; for although a form is not lost in this case, a potency is filled by the coming of a new form. For in order to receive a form, a being must be in potency to that form. The form in turn must take its origin from some agent already possessing it, since a potency can only be informed by what is in act.

Sicut potentia et actus non dicuntur simpliciter, sed multipliciter; ita et pati non uno modo, sed multipliciter. Dicitur enim pati uno modo, secundum quamdam corruptionem, quae fit a contrario. Passio enim proprie dicta, videtur importare quoddam decrementum patientis, inquantum vincitur ab agente; decrementum autem patienti accidit secundum quod aliquid a patiente abjicitur. . . Jujusmodi autem formae abjectio fit a contrario agente. . . Primo igitur modo proprie dicitur passio, secundum quod quaesam corruptio fit a contrario

Alio modo passio communiter dicitur et minus proprie, secundum scilicet quod importat quamdam receptionem. Et quia quod est receptivum alterius, comparatur ad ipsum sicut potentia ad actum: actus autem est perfectio potentiae; et ideo hoc modo dicitur passio, non secundum quod fit quaesam corruptio patientis, sed magis secundum quod fit quaesam salus et perfectio ejus quod est in potentia, ab eo quod est in actu. Quod enim est in potentia, non
On the meaning of passion in the proper sense St. Thomas says that this meaning of the word may be slightly extended so that a being will be said to undergo passion if it is impeded in any way from having its natural movements. The reason for this would seem to be that, although the thing impeded perhaps does not receive a form ill-suited to itself, yet it is forced to act contrary to the nature of its own form; and so in one sense it may be said to lose its form in losing the action of that form.

Quia ergo actio proprius accepta est quam quodam abjectione, prout patientia pristina qualitate transmutatur in contrarium; ampliatur nomen passionis secundum usum loquentium, ut qualiter aliquid impediatur ab eo quod sibi competebat, pati dicitur; sic ut dicamus grave pati ex hoc quod prohibetur ne deorsum moveatur; et hominem pati si prohibatur suam facere voluntatem.

In a later work Thomas unites all these differences into his definition, thus stating it more accurately and clearly.

Respondeo dicendum quod passio dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo proprius: et sic pati dicitur quod a sua naturali dispositione removetur. Passio enim est effectus actionis: in rebus autem naturalibus contraria agunt et patiuntur ad invicem, quorum unum removet alterum a sua naturali dispositione. -- Allo modo, dicitur passio communiter, secundum quamque mutatationem, etiam si pertineat ad perfectionem naturae; sicut intelligere vel sentire


10 De Ver. 26, 1 c.
It should be noted that in this later work Thomas has changed his definition of *passio proprie* so that it is had when a thing or being is altered from its natural disposition, while formerly he said that it was had whenever a thing was subject to the reception of a contrary of something already possessed. This difference will be returned to shortly.

Also to be noticed is the fact that Thomas refers *passio communiter* even to perfections such as intellection and volition. It would be well, then, to find out just how these two different types of passion may be found in a being. This Thomas states in the following words:

*Passio igitur primo modo communiter accepta invenitur in anima, et in qualibet creatura, eo quod omnis creatura habet aliquid potentialitatis admixtum, ratione cujus omnis creatura subsistens est aliquid receptiva.*

*Passio vero secundo modo accepta non invenitur nisi ubi est motus et contrarietas. Matus autem non invenitur nisi in corporibus et contrarietas formarum vel qualitatum in solis generabilibus et corruptibilibus. Unde sola juusmodi proprie hoc modo pati possunt. Unde anima, sum sit incorporea, hocmodo pati non potest; et si etiam aliquid recipiat, non tandem hoc fit per transmutationem a contrario in contrarium, sed per simplicem agentis influxum, sicut aer illuminatur a sole.*

According to this explanation any being having an admixture of potency and act can be a subject of passion or suffering in the more general sense of the word. Thus a chameleon in changing colors, a plant in blossoming, a house in being painted, the intellect in understanding can be said to suffer, to

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11 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, 97, 2 c, ed. Petri Caramello, 1950. (Hereafter referred to as S.T. I, or I-II as the reference may be.)

12 *De Ver.* 26, 1 c.
undergo passion. In fact any change from potency to act can be called passion in this broad sense. In its proper sense, however, passion includes the notions both of motion and of contrariety. Motion is found only in beings having bodies, while contrariety of forms is found only in beings subject to generation and corruption. Hence passion in its strict sense can refer only to bodies and to bodily changes or modifications.

Passion in its general meaning cannot undergo division, since to do so would make it cease to be general and would greatly cut down its extension so that it would not take in all the notions that man has included under it. Hence this thesis need not bother itself further with this meaning. In its strict sense, however, it can undergo further refinement; and indeed, it is within this notion of passion properly speaking that Thomas goes on to make his next distinction. Thus the word is found to bear a threefold division according to the varying degrees of strictness proper to the word's definition. This new distinction goes back to the point made earlier that a being can have passion in the proper sense of the word whenever it is altered from its natural disposition.

Pati dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo, communiter, secundum quod omne recipere est pati, etiam si nihil abjiciatur a re: sicut si dicatur aerem pati, quando illuminatur. Hoc autem magis proprie est perfici quam pati. — Alio modo dicitur pati proprie quando aliquid recipitur cum alterius abjectione. Sed hoc contingit dupliciter. Quandoque enim abjiciitur id quod non est conveniens rei: sicut eum corpus animalis sanatur, dicitur pati, quia recipit sanitatem, aestitudine abjecta. — Alio modo, quando e converso contingit sicut aegrotare dicitur pati, quia recipitur infirmitas, sanitate abjecta. Et hic est propriissimus modus passionis. Nam pati dicitur ex eo quod aliquid trahitur adagentem: quod autem recedit ab eo quod est
sibi conveniens maxime videtur ad alius trahi.\textsuperscript{13}

According to this threefold division, that is most properly called passion which involves the loss of something which is proper to the being receding the action of the agent, since in this the patient is especially drawn to the agent causing the ill effect. And it is \textit{passio} in this sense that the English word "suffer" translates. For the word suffering is used with the idea of undergoing losses; hence it refers to sickness, which is a loss of health; to suffering pain of body and to suffering mental anguish which is usually the result of some great loss either present or imminent.

In like manner, according to this new distinction, that is still passion properly speaking, although in a lesser degree than above, in which the patient loses something not proper to himself in order to gain something truly his own, as when one recovers from a sickness to return to good health. This is also passion properly speaking, since in this case also is had motion causing the reception of one contrary with the expulsion of its opposite. In this case, however, the thing expelled is not proper to the being undergoing the passion, while the being received is proper and fitting to it.

In this last passage Thomas unites the distinctions made in the two passages previously quoted, wherein he made twofold distinctions. In the first\textsuperscript{14}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{13} \textit{S. T.}, I-II, 22, 1 c.
\textsuperscript{14} Above, p. 16.
\end{flushleft}
he had said that that was passion properly speaking which involved motion
and contraries and in which the reception of one contrary involved the
expulsion of the other. In the second he said that that was passion properly
speaking when the patient lost something proper to its natural disposition.
Now in this passage he brings these differences together to present a
complete analysis of the meanings of the word passio.

In the light of this analysis of the word, it is now necessary to
find out just where the notion of passion as meaning emotion fits into the
scheme. This Thomas brings out very clearly in a passage in which he explains
how intellecitum comes under the notion of passio taken in its more general
meaning. Here he gives, although in inverse order, the threefold
distinction of passion just seen. But in this passage Thomas places sadness,
one of the emotions, under the notion of passion according to the most proper

15 Above, p. 18, bottom.

16 S. T., I, 79, 2e. Pati tripliciter dicitur. Uno modo
proprissimr, solloet quando aliquid removetur ab eo quod convenit sibi
secundum naturam, aut secundum propria inclinationem; sicut cum aqua
frigiditatem amittit per calefactionem, et cum homo aegrotat aut tristatur.
-- Secundo modo, minus proprae dicitur aliquis pati ex eo quod aliquid ab
ipso abjiciitur, sive sit ei conveniens, sive non conveniens. Et secundum hoc
dicitur pati non solum qui aegrotat, sed etiam qui sanatur; non solum qui
tristatur, sed etiam qui laetatur; vel quocumque modo aliquis alteretur vel
moveatur. -- Tertio modo dicitur aliquid pati communiter, ex hoo solo quod
id quod est in potentia ad aliquid, recipit illud ad quod erat in potentia,
absque hoc quod aliquid abjiciatur. Secundum quem modum omne quod exit de
potentia in actum, potest dici pati, etiam cum perficiatur. Et sic intelligere
nostrum est pati.
meaning of that word, for sadness is not proper to the nature of a being, and in making itself felt it drives out the more proper state of calmness or joy and leaves the being in a worse condition. On the other hand, he says that joy is less properly called a passion since its coming expels the state of sadness, an emotion that is not proper to the being in question. The reason for this is that joy is more proper to the being than sadness, and hence it draws the patient in a lesser way to the agent than does sadness which is not proper to the patient, as was seen, since joy brings a proper perfection to the patient. Sadness, then, since it does not bring a proper perfection to the patient, must, so it seems to Thomas, necessarily draw the patient closer to the agent, the cause and source of the sadness, than would some emotion which was proper to and a perfection of the patient.

This last distinction of St. Thomas, however, instead of clearing up the problem for the thesis, seems rather to have given rise to a dilemma, as now it is evident that the passions come under distinct significations of the word passion. For the purpose of the thesis it is necessary that there be some common meaning proper to all the passions or emotions, since the end is to discover the four major causes for the passions according to their general and common nature. This dilemma, on the contrary, is easily solved with the help of St. Thomas.

It is obvious that passion in the strictest sense of the word cannot be the meaning used here, since this would exclude all those passions or emotions which are proper to the being, and this would not fit the problem of the thesis. The general meaning cannot apply, for this is much too broad in
its scope since it includes intellection, sensation, and volitions under its
signification. This leaves only the less strict signification of the word
passion as the one that must be used. This, however, fits the needs perfectly;
for as St. Thomas says: "Secundo modo, minus proprie dicitur aliquis pati
ex eo quod aliquid ab ipso abjicitur, sive sit ei conveniens, sive non
conveniens."\[15\] This description fits all the emotions for some are conveniens
(suitable) to the nature and some are not conveniens (not suitable) to the
nature of the being itself.

With the meaning of the word passion discovered which adequately
fits all the emotions, it is now possible to study the passions or emotions
and the metaphysics behind them in order to arrive at a knowledge of their
four basic causes.

Therefore it is now possible to proceed with the next phase in the
study of the emotions to find out what is the proper subject of the
passions.

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15 S. T., I, 79, 2c.
CHAPTER III

THE SUBJECT OF THE PASSIONS

The emotions, it has been seen, are all placed under the second and stricter signification of the word passion, that is, as any change in which one form is received into a subject its contrary or opposite being driven out. This alteration always requires a material subject, since it involves both motion and contrariety in the transit necessarily implied in the predicaments of action and passion.

On the other hand, experience teaches man, and experimental psychology has confirmed it, that his emotions or passions are accompanied by or contain in their very nature bodily changes such as stricture of the chest muscles, difficulty in breathing, sudden changes of hot and cold over the surfaces of the body, faster heart beat, and other visceral changes pouring adrenalin and other stimulants into the blood stream. Therefore it seems evident that the body has a dominant part in every emotion. But what about the soul? Does it play a part? Are the passions a modification of the composite?

It would seem that the passions are proper to both body and soul since they are found only in cognitive beings, as will be seen, and they depend upon the cognition of some object which arouses the determined emotional reaction proper to the particular situation. If both soul and body enter into
the emotion, what then is the influence played by each in the emotional state? The answer to this question is the work of the present chapter, at least in the respect that one of the two will probably be found to be the subject of the emotions and therefore the material cause of the emotions.

On turning to St. Thomas it is now found that within the second meaning of passion which he gives, a meaning which, although it is proper to the term, is not the most proper meaning of the term, he makes a distinction. He distinguishes the bodily passions and the psychical passions. With an understanding of the distinctions already made on the word passion, the first conjecture would be that the bodily passions are the passions under consideration here, while the psychical passions would refer in some way to acts of intellection, volition, and sensation. These latter, however, have already been placed under passion in its most general meaning; yet both of these distinctions in this present situation refer to passion in its less general or more strict interpretation; thus it does not seem likely that this is what Thomas means by these distinctions. It will be necessary, therefore, to take up these new distinctions and discover what St. Thomas means by them. This then is the first problem of this chapter.

This new distinction is proposed by St. Thomas in the *De Veritate*. He is speaking about passion in its proper sense when he brings in this new sub-classification:

_Alio modo dicitur passio proprie, quae consistit in abjectione unius contrarii et alterius receptione per viam transmutationis; et hic modus passionis animae convenire non potest nisi ex corpore: et hoc dupliciter._
Uno modo secundum quod unitur corpori ut forma; et sic compatitur corpori patienti passione corporali.

Alio modo prout unitur ei ut motor; et sic ex operatione animae transmutatio fit in corpore, quae quidem passio dicitur animalis.¹

In this distinction Thomas is speaking of the two ways in which passion properly speaking can pertain to the soul. In both of these ways the passion pertains to the soul not directly but through and because of its union with the body.

In the first manner, the passion pertains to the soul in so far as it is united to the body as its substantial form, thus as forming one composite with the body. Because of this union the soul suffers with the body, that is, compatitur - it undergoes the same things that the body undergoes since it, together with the body, forms the unus per se, the substantial being that lives and acts in this world. This manner of "compassion" is called the a passio corporalis, a bodily passion.

In the second manner the soul is looked upon as being united with the body as its mover, as the source of the body's motion, as the principle of the body's action. In this case the soul is considered not only as the form of the body determining the essence of the composite, but it is also looked upon as the form giving to the composite the agere, the power to act. Here then the soul is conceived as performing its second function as the substantial act of the being endowed with the faculties of knowing. In this mode the soul through its operations is the cause of the transmutation, the

¹ De Ver., 26, 3 prin.
change undergone in the body. Hence this type of passion or change is called
the passio animalis, the psychical passion.

As is clear from common experience, every change undergone by the
body is not a change which involves the emotions or passions in that meaning
of the word. Since this is so, it is necessary to investigate the matter of
these new distinctions on the passions in order to see what changes come under
which distinction. Once this is cleared up, then the emotions can be classi-
fied as to their place among the various classifications of the passions.

In this case the names themselves are not of much help in answering
the question, since both fall under passion in the stricter sense of the word;
therefore both imply a bodily change. Otherwise it would seem that the passio
animalis should refer to the acts of intellection and of volition, the acts
that are passions only in the more general meaning of the word, and the emo-
tions would automatically find their place under the passio corporalis.
Since, however, this division may not be applied, it is necessary to turn to
St. Thomas to find out exactly what he means by these new subdivisions of the
word passion.

First of all, he states that the bodily passions pertain to the
various potencies or powers of the body in so far as they are rooted in the
soul which is, according to its essential nature, the form of the body. The
bodily passions therefore will have an effect on the soul because they are a
suffering experienced by powers that are rooted in the soul. The discovery of
how these passions pertain to these powers will lead to the further discovery
of the ways in which they can have reference to the soul.
Passio igitur corporalis praedicta pertingit ad potentias, secundum quod in essentia animae radicantur, eo quod anima secundum essentiam suam est forma corporis, et sic ad essentiam animae pertinent; potest tamen haec passio attribui aliqui potentiae tripliciter.

Uno modo secundum quod in essentia animae radicatur: et sic, cum omnes potentiae radicentur in essentia animae, ad omnes potentias pertinent praedicta passio.

Alio modo secundum quod ex laesione corporis potentiarum actus impeduntur: et sic praedicta passio pertinent ad omnes potentias utentes organis corporalibus, quarum omium actus impeduntur lassis organis, sed indirecte. Et hoc modo pertinent etiam ad potentias organis corporalibus non utentes, scilicet intellectivas, in quantum accipiunt potentiis organis utentibus: unde contingit quod laesso organo virtutis imagina tivae, intellectus operatio impeditur, propter hoc quod intellectus indiget phantasmaticus in sua operations.

Tertio modo pertinent ad aliquam potentiam ut apprehendentem ipsum: et sic propre pertinent ad sensum tactus; nam tactus est sensus eorum ex quibus componitur anima, et simpliciter eorum quae animal corrupitur.

As stated here, the bodily passions may be attributed to a potency or power of the soul in three ways. First of all, they pertain to a power in so far as that power is rooted in the essential nature of the soul, that is, in the soul as the substantial form of the body. This, however, applies to all the powers of the body, since all of them have their well-spring in the soul; for all acts of the body are acts of the composite which involve both body and soul. This classification, then, is of no aid to the thesis, since it does not sufficiently distinguish an emotion from any other act that involves a bodily change or transformation.

Secondly, the bodily passion can be attributed to a potency of the body in so far as the act of the power is hindered because of some injury to it. But if the power may not perform the act, then neither can the soul.

2 Ibid.
since it depends on the body to have an act of the composite. Hence in this case the bodily passion refers to all powers using bodily organs whose acts may be impeded by an injury to the organ necessary for the performance of the act in question. An example of this may be taken from a daily occurrence at the dentist's office. A person comes in to have a tooth extracted. Now all around that tooth are the sensory nerves whose function it is to carry nerve impulses to the brain for the perception of pain in that area of the mouth. The sensation of the pain is an act of the composite depending upon the nerves to carry the impulse to the brain, and the nerves require the soul's presence for the carrying out of their act since it is the act of a living being, a living composite of body and soul. Psychology for its part tells that all sensory acts of a being are acts of the composite. The doctor, realizing the pain that would be undergone in the extraction of the tooth, deadens the nerves with novocain in the area about the tooth to be extracted. Because of this drug the nerves undergo a change, they suffer this violence which does not permit them to carry out their act of carrying nerve impulses to the brain, and thus the sensation of pain is not had. The soul also because of this injury to the nerves, this hindrance placed in the way of the performance of this act, undergoes this passion, for it is not able to unite with the nerves in performing the normal act that would be had were it not for the novocain. The soul cannot have sensation of pain without the aid of the nerves carrying the impulse; therefore the soul too is impeded from the act and is said to suffer along with the body.
Certainly the second mode of bodily-passion does not appear to have any connection with the emotions since in them there is not had an impeding of a power of the soul due to some injury to the organ used by that power.

The third manner in which this passion is attributed to a power rooted in the soul is based upon that power's apprehension of the bodily passion, as happens in the case of the sense of touch. This does not seem to have any reference to the emotions.

It is rather obvious that in none of the various ways in which the bodily passion may be attributed to the different potencies rooted in the soul is there had what is commonly understood as an emotion. Indeed, did St. Thomas intend to place the emotions under this type of passion, he would have foreshadowed by six centuries the James-Lange theory of recent times which was rejected after the turn of the twentieth century as the result of much experimentation in the laboratories of psychology. According to the James-Lange theory the emotions are the bodily resonance, or at least caused by it. They began with this bodily resonance and then passed over into the soul. According to St. Thomas the bodily passions do just that, they begin in the body and because of the union of body and soul they pass over into the soul from the body. Thomas, however, does not mean by such passion the emotions. The quotation just given seems to point this out clearly enough to prove the fact. Thomas' position is made clearer by what follows in this same passage.
Since the passio corporalis does not contain the emotions under its signification, that leaves only the second classification under passio minus proprie to contain them. This it does, as will be seen in the following quotation:

Passio vero animalis, cum per eam ex operatione animae transmutetur corpus, in illa potentia esse debet quae organo corporali adjungitur, et cujus est corpus transmutatur.

Et ideo hujusmodi passio non est in parte intellectiva, quae non est aliquid organis corporalis actus; nec iterum est in apprehensiva sensitiva, quia ex apprehensione sensus non sequitur motus in corpore nisi mediante appetitiva, quae est immeditatum movens. Unde secundum modum operationis ejus statim disponitur organum corporale, scilicet cor, unde est principium motus, tali dispositione quae competat ad exequendum hoc in quod appetitus sensibilis inclinatur, Unde in ira fervet et in timore quodammodo frigescit et constringitur.  

The passion of the soul, on the other hand, causes a change in the body as the result of the operation (and activity) of the soul. Since this type of passion of the soul results in a bodily change, it must be rooted in a potency of the soul which is conjoined with some bodily organ and whose function it is to cause such a change in the body. In this present situation the soul is not only present in the body as its form giving it its essence and existence, but more than that it is present as the principle of its operations, acting as mover, as the source of motion of the body.

What power of the soul is conjoined with the body and able to produce the movement of the body? Is mere cognition or the faculty of cognition able to perform this function? No, for the end of cognition is to know the

3 Ibid.
object either as a concrete individual, as is the case with sense cognition, or in its universal nature, as happens in the case of intellection. Now merely to know an object, to have within one's self the intentional species of the object, is not sufficient of itself to cause a change in the body such as happens in the case of the emotions. The knowledge is an end in itself. It does not intend a further action, but it rests satisfied in itself.

Therefore mere apprehension is not sufficient to be the cause that exerts the causality of mover on the body.

Motivation is the work of the appetites. The appetite disposes the body to condition itself to move after a desired object, or it disposes the body to move away from an object which is perceived to be harmful to the being perceiving it. Indeed, it is the appetite which considers objects in so far as they are good for the one tending to them, or evil for it. If the object is seen to be good, the appetite naturally tends toward it, thus arousing a bodily resonance which prepares the body to move to acquire it since it is a desired good. The same is true of the object perceived to be evil, save that the appetite tending away from them sets up a bodily resonance which prepares the body for flight in order to gain the good that consists in avoiding this injurious thing or what follows from it. Therefore the appetite is the power that can exert the causality of a mover upon the body.

Now, since the emotions must belong to these psychical passions, the emotion must begin in the soul, and through the soul it moves out to prepare the body, as St. Thomas says, to follow and attain that toward which the sense appetite is inclined. This sequence of apprehension, appetite, and body
resonance is in accord with the findings of modern experimental psychology. As was seen in the second chapter of this thesis, Walter Cannon and others, in examining into the James-Lange theory, disproved that theory and proved that the true sequence of the complex of the emotion is that outlined above. This is the more logical order, for in this order the act of the sense appetite has some meaning, some purpose which otherwise it would not have. This sequence is the opinion of common sense, as James admitted, for thus the perception of the object as good or evil for the one perceiving it moves the appetites to seek it. The appetency in turn prepares the body resonance which will best fit the body to carry out the desired act that will best attain the end of the appetite. It is precisely for this reason that experimental psychologists came to this conclusion concerning the proper sequence of the emotional act. Thus St. Thomas was right when he said:

[2] x apprehensione sensu non sequitur motus in corpore nisi mediante appetitiva, quae est immediatum movens. Unde secundum modum operationis ejus statim dispositur organum corporale, acicet cor, unde est principium motus, tali dispositione quae competat ad exequendum hoc in quod appetitus sensibilis inclinatur.

The physiology of this statement may not be in complete accord with what the physiologists and psychologists have learned in their laboratories, but the order of nature is correct.

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4 See above, p. 8.
5 De Ver., 26, 3 c.
With the above distinctions of the passions of the body and of the soul taken care of, the meaning of the passions as used in this thesis, meaning the emotions in the sense previously defined in the first chapter, is finally sufficiently elucidated by St. Thomas to distinguish this use of the word from all other uses that he makes of the word passion. In brief, the passions (emotions) come under the classification of passion in the proper though less strict signification of the word. Within this classification they come under the sub-class of the *passiones animales*, the psychical passions.

The emotions as passion in the proper sense of the word must always include some physical bodily change. As passions of the soul, they will always have their inception in the soul, and through its power they will move into the body, causing the body resonance which is the physical change mentioned above. So much then for the distinctions of the word passion.

With the meaning of the word passions achieved it is now possible to attend to the problem concerning the subject of the passions. It would seem that the passions have their beginning in the soul that the soul would be the proper subject which contains them and which is informed by them. First they belong to the soul, and from the soul they pass over into the body. But the soul itself cannot suffer the passion in the proper sense of the word, since that includes contrariety and motion, which demand a material subject, a body. Therefore the passions must belong primarily to the body since this is one of the requisite elements of the passions in the strict sense of the word. Therefore they cannot be proper to the soul.
Passio vero secundo modo accepta non inventur nisi ubi est
motus et contrarietas. Motus autem non inventur nisi in corporibus,
et contrarietas formarum vel qualitatum in solis generabilibus et
corruptibilibus. Unde sola hujusmodi proprie hoc modo pati possunt.
Unde anima cum sit incorporea, hoc modo pati non potest: et si etiam
aliquid recipiat, non tamen hoc fit per transmutationem a contrario
in contrarium, sed per simplicem agentis influxu, sicut aer illumin-
inatur a sole.

From the above passage it is obvious that the passions are not pro-
per to the soul, and yet they have their beginnings in the soul. How, then,
can both principles, body and soul, be accounted for in the passions? St.

Thomas answers this question thus:

Passio autem cum abjectione non est nisi secundum transmutationem
corporalem: unde passio proprie dicta non potest compoteri animae
nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet compositum patitur.

But how may the soul as part of the composite suffer per accidens,
that is, by reason of something not itself? Thomas answers this question and
summarizes all this matter thus:

Si ergo passio proprie dicta aliquo modo ad animam pertinet, hoc
non est nisi secundum quod unitur corpori, et ita per accidens.
Unitur autem corpori dupliciter: uno modo ut forma, inquantum
dat esse corpori, vivificans ipsum; alio modo ut motor, in quantum
per corpus suas operationes exercet.
Et utroque modo anima patitur per accidens, sed diversimodo.
Non id quod est compositum ex materia et forma, sicut agit
ratione formae, ita patitur ratione materiae: et ideo passio incipit
a materia, et quodammodo per accidens pertinet ad formam; sed passio
patiens derivatur ab agenti, eo quod passio est effectus actionis.
Dupliciter ergo passio corporis attribuitur animae per accidens.
Uno modo ita quod passio incipiat a corpore et terminetur in
anima, secundum quod unitur corpori ut forma; et haec est quaedam
passio corporalis: sicut cum laeditur corpus, debilitatur unio corporis cum anima et sic per accidens ipsa anima patitur, quae secundum suum esse corpori unitur. 

Allo modo ita quod incipiat ab anima, in quantum est corporis motor, et terminetur in corpus; et haec dicitur passio animalis; sicut patet in ira et timore, et alia hujusmodi: nam hujusmodi per apprehensionem et appetitum animae peraguntur, ad quae sequitur corporis transmutatio. Sicut transmutatio mobilis sequitur ex operatione motoris secundum omnes modum quo mobile dispositur ad obedientium motioni motoris. Et sic corpore transmutato per alterationem aliquam, ipsa anima pati dicitur per accidens.

So, according to Thomas, the soul is united to the body as form and mover. A composite of matter and form, in so far as it acts, it acts by reason of the form, and in so far as it undergoes change, bodily transmutation, it does so by reason of the matter. In the case of the bodily passions the act of the soul is impeded by the passion of the body; and so the soul suffers undergoes this passion per accidens, that is, not because this passion affects the soul directly, but because it affects the soul through the body of which the soul is the form. It is because of the body that in this case the soul may not act. Thus the soul is said to undergo this passion per accidens, by reason of something other than itself.

In the case of the passions of the soul, the emotions, the action begins in the soul because of some perception; the soul in turn through the appetite causes the proper physical change in the body so that the composite can give the proper response to the situation, either the response of pursuit or the response of flight. The change is in the body, not in the soul, but it is an act of the composite in which both the soul and the body act as one.

8 De Ver., 26, 2 c.
principle. **Per se**, of its own nature, the passion or change is undergone in
the body, but the soul as a principle of the composite act also undergoes this
passion, not, however, by reason of itself, or its own undergoing of the pas-
sion, but because of the body which undergoes the passion and with which it is
substantially united.

Thus the soul in both types of passion, the bodily passion and the
psychical passion, undergoes the passion **per accidens**, that is on account of
the body with which it is united as form in the one case and as mover in the
other. The passions are, therefore, **per se**, of their very nature, in the body
and only secondarily in the soul.

To sum up, the passions or emotions fall under the second and
stricter meaning of the word passion, namely, as that in which there is the
reception of one contrary, be it proper to the being or not, with the expul-
sion of its opposite. Within this classification the emotions are sub-classi-
fied as a passion of the soul with the soul acting as mover, as the cause of
the physical change undergone by the body. Nevertheless the passions or emo-
tions are of their very nature proper to the body, yet on the other hand they
are proper to the soul only by reason of the body and the relationship result-
ing from the operational union of the body and the soul.

With the above understood, it is now possible to determine the sub-
ject or material cause of the passions. First, however, it is necessary to
know what a material cause is.
According to this explanation the material cause is the subject receiving the effect of the agent's action. The first effect received by matter is the substantial form as in the union of body and soul, for the soul is received into the body as its substantial form. After this first reception the matter is in potency to receive various accidental forms. "Materiam secundum quod est sub una forma substantiali, remanet in potentia ad multas formas accidentales."¹⁰

Passion, as was seen earlier,¹¹ properly speaking is always a correlative of action, both of which come under the ten predicaments as general types of accidents. They are both received into a being already existing with its substantial form; and therefore they must be accidental forms, for they are received into second matter. The same is true of the matter that will undergo the passion or emotion, since this matter already exists with its substantial form and hence can receive only accidental forms which will give it a second esse. The passions are received into the body, are experienced by the body which already exists with the soul as its substantial form. The body therefore stands to the passions as second matter to an accidental form. It is the potency into which the accident that is the passion is received.

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¹⁰ Ibid., 7, 2 c.
¹¹ Above, p. 13, p. 11.
In the case of the emotions the passion requires of its very nature a change in the body as the effect of the action of the soul, as this chapter has shown. Therefore according to the definition of the material cause, this would make the change in the body the material cause of the passions, the subject of the passions. Thus the body, itself informed by the substantial form of the soul, receives the accident of the emotion; the bodily change receives the accidental form of the emotions or passions from the soul, and this bodily change becomes the material cause of the passions or emotions. Of this St. Thomas says:

Est autem attendendum in omnibus passionibus, quod transmutatio corporalis, quae est in eis materialis, est conformis et proportionata motui appetitus, qui est formalis: sicut in omnibus materia proportionata formas.\(^{12}\)

The bodily change is the material part which receives the form from the appetite, and this form received is the appetitive tendency causing this certain emotion. Therefore the bodily change receives the form and becomes the subject or material cause of the passions.

Now that the notion of the emotions has been sufficiently classified, now that the subject and first cause of the emotions has been discovered, it will be possible in the next chapter to delve further into the nature of the passions in order to discover the three remaining basic causes yet hidden in the passions and proper to them according to their general and common nature.

\(^{12}\) S.T., I-II, 37, 4 c.
CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE OF THE PASSIONS

From the discussion of the last chapter the conclusion may be drawn that the passions or emotions are proper to the sensitive nature of cognitive beings and not to the rational nature. The basis for this conclusion lies in the nature of the sensitive and of the rational acts, and in the nature of the passions themselves. The acts of the sensitive nature are always the result of the operational union of body and soul. In this union each plays an intrinsic part and has a causal relationship to the act resulting from the operation; for the two together form one principle of operation. In the case of the acts of the rational nature as such the act is placed by the soul alone. In these acts the body merely presents a necessary condition as long as the two are substantially united. In the passions, however, the body places more than a condition; it plays an essential part since of their very nature the passions involve physical bodily changes. The soul in turn functions as the motivating force of the act, thus making the act the result of the operational union of body and soul. Hence the act depends upon the composite of body and soul substantially and operationally united.

Because of the difference in the natures of the rational and sense acts, and because of the nature of the passions, it is plain that the passions can be proper only to the sensitive nature of man.
Within the sensitive nature of man or animal there exist two classes of potencies, namely, the apprehensive powers and the appetitive powers. The problem that presents itself at this juncture of the thesis is to discover to what power or faculty the passions properly belong. The next question is why do they belong to this power or faculty.

Some hint concerning the conclusion that will be given to this question has already been indicated in some of the quotations discussed in the earlier chapters of this thesis. In these quotations Fr. Le Rohellec and Cardinal Mercier stated that the passions are to be attributed to the appetitive nature.\footnote{Page 1 (quotation from Le Rohellec); pp. 11-12 (definition of emotions by Mercier); pp. 34, 37.} with the use of this material from modern psychology as a negative guide, it is possible to follow Thomas down the pathway of his texts to find what conclusions reason has led him to attain. In doing this it is best to follow Thomas' own method, beginning with the acts of these faculties or powers in order to discover the nature of the apprehensive and appetitive faculties respectively. The disclosure of the nature of these will present the data necessary for answering why the passions should be attributed to the one power rather than to the other. Whence this study will arrive at a clearer understanding of the metaphysics behind the passions.

To begin at the beginning, Thomas distinguishes five different classes of powers in the soul. These are the powers of sense, the appetitive powers, the vegetative powers, the powers of local motion, and the intellective
or rational powers. Of these five it is possible immediately to eliminate two
which have already been rejected, the one implicitly, the other explicitly.
First, it has been stated explicitly that the passions are proper to cognitive
beings. But if they are proper to cognitive beings, they are proper to higher
powers than the vegetative. Therefore the vegetative powers have been implicit-
ly ruled out. The intellective powers on the other hand cannot contain them
for the acts of the intellect (as has been already pointed out) are immaterial,
while the passions contain material components since they include in their
essential make-up the notes of bodily resonance, a material phenomenon.

Hence the passions must find their place somewhere among the three
remaining powers, either in the power of apprehension or in the power of appe-
tite, or in the power of local motion.

But first it is necessary to see how Thomas distinguishes the powers
with which this chapter is primarily concerned. He says:

Omn autem operans oporteat aliquo modo conjungi sui objecto circa quod
operatur, necesse est extrinsecan rem, quae est objectum operationis
animae, secundum duplícem rationem ad animam comparari. Uno modo se-
cundum quod nata est animae conjungi et in anima esse per suam simi-
litudinem. Et quantum ad hoc sunt duo genera potentiarum: scilicet
sensitivum, respectu objecti minus communis, quod est corpus sensibile;
et intellectivum, respectu objecti communissimi, quod est ens univer-
sale. — Alio vero modo, secundum quod ipsa anima inclinatur et ten-
dit in rem exteriorem. Et secundum hanc stiam comparationem, sunt
duo genera potentiarum animae; unus quidem, scilicet appetitivum, se-
cundum quod anima comparatur ad rem extrinsecam ut ad finem, qui est
primum in intentione; aliud autem motivum secundum locum, prout anima
comparatur ad rem exteriorem sicut ad terminum operationis et motus;
ad consequendum enim aliquod desideratum et intentum, omne animal
movetur.²

² S.T., I, 78, 1 c.
These powers, then, are distinguished one from the other according to the operational relationship that they have with beings existing apart from and outside of themselves. The very notion of operation implies two things, the operator and the object of the operation. Hence the soul, too, in the performance of its operations must have some object or thing upon which it can work. It follows from this that the object of the act must also be essentially related to the act causing it to be of one nature rather than another. The relationship between the operator and the object of the operation is of a twofold nature; and according as each of the correlative terms is considered in the light of the other, it may be either active or passive depending upon the point of emphasis.

The thing operating is active in so far as it is eliciting the act, but it is passive in so far as its act is determined by the thing that is the object of its act. The thing in turn is passive in so far as it is the object of the operation, and active in the sense that it determines the operation or act to be of this type. As object of the operation the thing outside is intended in its concrete reality as the object of the soul's action. In its active aspect the object causes the intentional species in the soul. It is according to this twofold relationship of the object of the operation with the soul that the various faculties or powers of the soul are distinguished by Thomas. When the being that is the object of the operation is taken in its active sense as being united with the soul in the intentional species, then the operation had is that of cognition, and the faculties involved are the senses and intellect. When the being is taken as passive and in its concrete reality as the end to which the soul is inclined and that to which it tends,
then the operation is that of appetency and the faculties involved are the appetitive faculties of sense and intellect. Finally, when the soul moves the body to attain and seize this object, then the power distinguished is that of local motion.

With regard to the passions, the power of local motion will not directly enter the discussion since it rather follows the emotion and is that for which the emotions prepare the bodily resonance. Therefore the powers of interest here are the powers or faculties of sense apprehension and of sense appetite. Hence the next step will be to see to which of these two the passion will belong more properly. This can be discovered only by understanding the nature of the appetitive and apprehensive powers of sense. That is accordingly the study to be taken up at this point.

The faculties, as is stated by Thomas in the last passage quoted, are distinguished by their relationship to some extrinsic object or thing. The object must be perceived before it can be sought. Since it is the work of sense apprehension to perceive the extrinsic thing before the appetite can seek it, the inquiry into the nature of these faculties will begin with the study of sense apprehension. This understood, the study of sense appetite may be taken up.

All the questions of concern in this thesis with regard to the relationship of sense apprehension to the emotions can be sufficiently answered by an understanding of the general doctrine of sense cognition. Since the point of interest rests in a knowledge of the general nature of sense
apprehension, it will not be necessary to take up individually each of the different exterior and interior senses.

In working out the general nature of cognition, Thomas begins by pointing out what it is that makes one being capable of cognition while another is incapable of achieving it. Cognition results when a being capable of apprehension comes in contact with another being and is able to receive that second being into its senses. Obviously it cannot receive the being physically within its senses, since this would only result in doing injury to the organ; so it must receive it within itself intentionally. In receiving this being intentionally in its senses it comes to possess within itself over and above its own substantial form the form of the thing known. It is this ability to possess within oneself the form of another that distinguishes the being capable of cognition from that incapable of it.

[Cognoscentia a non cognoscentibus in hoc distinguuntur, quia non cognoscentia nihil habent nisi formam suam tantum; sed cognoscens naturam est habere formam etiam rei alterius, nam species cogniti est in cognoscentis. . . Immaterialitas alicujus rei est ratio quod sit cognoscitiva; et secundum modum immaterialitatis est modus cognitionis. Unde in II de Anima dicitur quod plantae non cognoscunt, propter suam materialitatem. Sensus autem cognoscitivus est, quia receptivus est specierum aequa materia; et intellectus adhuc magis cognoscitivus quia magis separatus est a materia et immixtus.]

Two things are required for cognition, one on the part of the knower, namely, that he have the faculty or power of knowing, and the other on the part of the thing to be known, namely, that it be united with the knower.

3 S. T., I, 14, 1 c.
Material things, however, cannot be in the knower according to their essence, according to their materiality, but through an intentional likeness existing in the knower:

Ad visionem, tam sensibilem quam intellectuallem, duo requiruntur, scilicet virtus visiva, et unio rei visae cum visu: non enim fit visio in actu, nisi per hoc quod res visa quodammodo est in videntes. Et in rebus quidem corporalibus, apparat quod res visa non potest esse in videntes per suam essentiam, sed solum per suam similitudinem: sicut similitudo lapidis est in oculo, per quam fit visio in actu, non autem substantia lapidis.\(^4\)

Although the thing known is said to exist within the knower, this existence is that of the intentional order and in no way does it affect or change the thing as it exists outside the knower in its concrete reality. The being exists in the mind with an intentional existence, and it exists in the world outside with a concrete physical existence. The thing outside is known because of the agreement between the intentional form caused in the knower by the concrete being and the concrete being existing outside the knower. The representation within the mind is equated to the thing represented.

\[\text{In omni enim cognitione quae est per similitudinem, modus cognitionis est secundum convenientiam similitudinis ad illud cujus est similitudo; et dico convenientiam secundum representationem, sicut species in anima convenit cum re quae est extra animam, non secundum esse naturale.}\(^5\)

In other passages Thomas speaks of this form or likeness having a twofold aspect. The first is the aspect of the \textit{esse} or existence that it has in the knower, and the second is its aspect of relationship to the thing which

\(^4\) \textit{S. T.}, I, 12, 2 c.
\(^5\) \textit{De Ver.}, 8, 1 c (med.).
it represents. Through its act of existence in informing the potency of the
cognitive faculty it causes the knower to perform the operation of knowing.
Through its aspect of relationship this form limits and determines that knowl-
edge to the one definite thing outside that evokes this form and causes it to
exist within the knower.

Omnis cognitio est secundum aliquam formam, quae est in cognoscente
principium cognitionis. Forma autem hujusmodi potest considerari
dupliciter: uno modo secundum esse quod habet in cognoscenset; alio
modo secundum respectum quem habet ad rem cujus est similitudo.

Secundum quidem primum respectum facit cognoscensem actu cognos-
cere; sed secundum secundum respectum determinat cognitionem ad
aliqhood cognoscibile determinatum.6

The thing outside does not have to exist according to the manner in
which it is known in the knower, or in which its form exists within the
knower. The reason for this is rather obvious. First of all the existing
thing will contain more than is perceived by the senses. If one sees a car
and forms in his senses the image of that car, he knows that car according to
its color, its design, and so forth; but he does not perceive the motor, the
interior design, etc. in this one operation. Also perhaps his image is
slightly distorted because of some injury to his sense organs; yet what he
knows does to some extent represent the car, and the representation is caused
by the car existing right there before him. Nor does the thing outside exist
according to the esse had by the form in the knower; for this act of existence
in the knower is intentional and according to the manner of being of the
knower. But the thing outside has a concrete real existence that remains the

6 De Ver., 10, loc.
same whether the knower considers the being or not. Nevertheless the form in the knower brings knowledge of the thing outside, since this form is aroused in the knower by the presence and causality of the thing existing outside. Hence this is true knowledge resulting from the representation caused by the concrete existing thing existing outside the knower.

Et ideo modus cognoscendi rem aliquam est secundum conditionem cognoscentis, in quo forma recipitur secundum modum ejus. Non autem oportet quod res cognita sit secundum modum cognoscentis, vel secundum modum illum quo formas, quae est cognoscendi principium, esse habet in cognoscente; unde nihil prohibet, per formas quae in mente immaterialiter existunt, res materiales cognosci. 7

To sum up, to have cognition a being must be able to receive the form of another within itself while it retains and maintains its own proper form. This other form is received in an immaterial way and is representative of the being outside that is to be known. This form received not only represents the thing outside, but it causes the knower to know actively, to perform the operation of knowing by informing this cognitive potency and bringing it into act. The apprehensive faculties have to become the thing known, although in an intentional manner, if they are to know this particular thing. Once they have apprehended the thing to be known, their act is completed and they rest in this act of knowing. Thus the end of the faculty and the end of the act are attained. "Operatio virtutis apprehensivae perfectur in hoc, quod res apprehensae sunt in apprehendente." 8

7 Ibid.
8 3. T., I, 81, 1 c.
The foregoing summary completes the first half of the inquiry into the nature of the faculties of apprehension and appetency; for in it is delineated the general outline of the act of knowing; and from the knowledge of this act is derived the knowledge of the nature and of the end of the faculty. Now it is necessary to take up the second half of the inquiry to find out the nature and end of the appetitive powers of the sense nature. Once this is completed, the conclusion can be drawn as to which of these two powers the passions more properly belong.

To begin with, the word appetite is derived from the Latin word *appetere*, which means to seek out or to seek after. Etymologically, then, the appetite signifies a power that seeks out some object, a power that tends toward an object which is perceived and sought as being good for the nature of the one perceiving it. "Appetere autem nihil aliud est quam aliquid petere quasi tendere in aliquid ad ipsum ordinatum." The act of the appetitive faculty may, therefore, be described as an inclination towards an end fitting and proper to the being seeking it.

There are three different genera of appetites distinguished by St. Thomas. First there is the natural appetite which is found in all beings. This is not, properly speaking, a power or faculty, but an inclination that the form is naturally endowed with so that it can achieve its own end, as the inclination of heavy objects to fall to earth. "Nihil enim est aliud appetitus

9 De Ver., 22, 1 c (fin.).
naturalis quam quaedam inclinatio rei, et ordo ad aliquam rem sibi convenien-
tem sicut lapidem ferri ad locum deorsum.10 Secondly, there is the sense
appetite which is found in all beings endowed with sense cognition. Thirdly,
there is the rational appetite or will which is found in beings endowed with
an intellect. This last appetite, the rational appetite, will receive only
passing mention, as it is proper to the higher nature in man, and the passions
have been shown to be proper to the lower or sense nature in man.

Since it is preferable to take the appetites according to the asc-
cending order of importance, the first type to be discussed will be the
natural appetite. Every creature that exists is directed and related to some
end proper to itself, for otherwise it could not act. The natural end of each
being is the end proper to each one's nature. Hence the natural appetite of
each being will be determined by the form informing and determining this being
to be what it is. This form provides this being with an inclination, a tend-
ency toward the end that is proper to the being. This inclination is natural
because the principle inclining it thus is the very nature or form of the
being itself.

It is according to the principle proper to each being and forming it
to be as it is that all inanimate beings and all powers are directed and deter-
mined in regard to the one definite end intended by their nature. These
beings, however, cannot determine their own end, since only a being with an
intellect can know an end as such and relate an action to an end. Hence their

10 Ibid., 25, 1 c (prin.).
end must be determined for them by the being or person creating or producing them. Once he has determined the end, then he must make them so that they can achieve this end by their own natural operations. He must make their nature such that it will work towards the end for which it was made. For example, the end of the watch is to tell the time, and so the watchmaker constructs its whole mechanical structure so that it will attain this end.

The end for all creatures is determined for them by God their creator. The only fitting end, however, for which God can create a being is His own infinite goodness. Therefore all creatures must be directed toward this good by means of an end that participates in some way in the infinite goodness of God. Thus the end of each being is some good, and thus the end of the natural appetite is this same good which participates somehow in the goodness of God. For this natural appetite is nothing else but an inclination or tendency towards the end proper to each particular being or creature.

11 Ibid., 22, 1 c.
Deus autem, cum non habeat alium suae voluntatis finem nisi seipsum, et ipse sit ipsa essentia bonitatis: Oportet quod omnia alia sint inclinata naturaliter in bonum, ...

Unde cum omnia sint ordinata et directa in bonum a Deo, et hoc modo quod unicumque insit principium per quod insum tendit in bonum, quasi petens suum bonum; oportet dicere, quod omnia naturaliter bonum appetant.

Quod autem dirigitur vel inclinatur in aliquid ab aliquo, in id inclinatur quod est intentum ab eo qui inclinat vel dirigat. ...

Unde, cum omnia naturalia naturali quaedam inclinatione sint inclinata in fines suos a primo motore, qui est Deus, oportet quod illud in quod unumquodque naturaliter inclinatur, sit id quod est volitum vel intentum a Deo.

In so far as this natural appetite refers to all beings and to all faculties determined to one specific end, it refers also to the apprehensive powers whose inclination and tendency are toward the species or forms of their proper objects. Once this form is possessed, the act of cognition is accomplished, and thus the apprehensive power attains its end, the act of cognition, and rests in this act.

The natural appetite, since it refers to an inclination that is proper to any being which is determined by nature to one definite end without possibility of divergence, cannot be the appetitive power sought in this thesis. The power sought here is that proper to the sense nature alone. The natural appetite, since it refers to all natures and all powers, is, therefore, much too broad in its scope to find application in this question.

The other two types of appetite distinguished by Thomas were the sense appetite and the rational appetite, called the will. These differ from natural appetite in that they depend upon the perception of the appetibility

12. Ibid.
of the thing sought. In these a thing may be appetible because it brings
pleasure or because it is useful or for some other similar reason. The nat-
ural appetite, however, does not consider this, since it has only one inclina-
tion and that toward only one determined good.

Hic autem appetitus sensibilis medius est inter appetitum natura-
lem, et appetitum superiorem rationalem, qui voluntas nominatur.
Quod quidem ex hoc inspecti potest, quod in qualibet appetibili
duo possunt considerari: scilicet ipsa res quae appetitur, et ratio
appetibilitatis, ut delectatio vel utilitas, vel aliquid hujusmodi.
Appetitus ergo naturalis tendit in ipsam rem appetibilem sine
aliaqua apprehensione rationis appetibilitatis; nihil enim est aliquid
appetitus naturalis quae quaedam inclinatio rei, et ordo ad aliquam
rem sibi convenientem, sicut lapidem ferri ad locum deorsum.
Quia vero res naturalis in suo esse naturali determinata est;
et una est ejus inclination ad aliquam rem determinatam: unde non
exigitur aliqua apprehensio, per quam secundum rationem appetibilita-
tis distinguatur res appetibilis a non appetibili.13

As is said here, the sense appetite falls between the natural appe-
tite and the rational appetite or will. The sense appetite and the rational
appetite are so named because of the type of cognition that they follow:
sense appetite, that of sense cognition; rational appetite, the cognition of
the intellect.

The will, since it follows the intellect, which knows the universal
natures of things, seeks first the universal good, the good in general. There-
fore its object is the essence of goodness, and it is all inclusive. Any par-
ticular good sought by the will, therefore, is sought only secondarily and
because it is perceived to participate in some way in the universal good, in
the ratio boni.

13 Ibid., 25, 1 c.
Appetitus autem superior, qui est voluntas, tendit directe in rationem appetibilitatis absolute; sicut voluntas ipsam bonitatem appetit primo et principaliter, vel utilitatem, aut aliquid hujusmodi; hanc vero rem vel illam appetit secundario, in quantum est praedictae rationis particeps. Et hoc ideo quia natura rationalis est tanta capacitas quod non sufficeret ei inclinatio ad unam rem determinatam, sed indiget rebus pluribus et diversis: et ideo inclinatio ejus est in aliquid commune, quod in pluribus inventur, et sic per apprehensionem illius communis tendit in rem appetibilem in qua hujusmodi rationem appetendas esse cognoscit.\(^\text{14}\)

The sense appetite on the other hand, since it follows sense cognition, which perceives only the individual, particular, and material, seeks only particular goods, only particular appetible or useful good things. It does not tend to the essence of appetibility or usefulness, the ratio boni vel utilitatis, as such but to some particular pleasing or useful thing. For this reason it is below the rational appetite, for it considers only the individual thing here and now pleasing and useful; and it is above the natural appetite in that its tendency is not to one thing only but to all things which the sense appetite perceives through the senses that are here and now pleasing or useful to itself or to some part of the animal nature. The natural appetite is restricted to one particular power or nature. The sense appetite is not so limited; but it has as its object the goods of all the powers and faculties of the animal as well as the goods of the whole animal as such. Hence it merits the title of animal appetite, for it seeks the good of the whole and of all of its parts.

Appetitus vero inferior sensitivae partis, qui sensualitas dicitur, tendit in ipsam rem appetibilem prout inventur in ea id quod est ratio appetibilitatis: non enim tendit in ipsam rationem

\(^{14}\) Ibid.
It is with this last appetite, the sense appetite, that this second part of this inquiry is chiefly concerned. What has been learned thus far about this appetite may be put briefly as follows. The sense appetite, as the natural and rational appetites, is a tendentia in bonum, an inclination toward good. It gets its name from the fact that it follows upon sense cognition. Thus it seeks the appetible good in so far as the ratio boni, the essence of the good, is found within this particular thing. It does not, however, seek the good as such; but being dependent on sense cognition, it seeks the particular things perceived in sense cognition in so far as those particular things are perceived here and now as good or useful to it.

At this point, however, a problem seems to arise as to whether this appetitive faculty is really distinct from the apprehensive faculty. For the appetite seeks the good that is in things, but the senses already possess this good in their apprehension of the thing since they possess the form of the thing so desired. Therefore, since the form of the thing desired and therefore the good of the thing desired is already had in the apprehension, the appetite should rest satisfied.

15 Ibid.
The difficulty, however, is more a case of confusion of terms than 
anything else. First it must be remembered that the sense appetite seeks the 
good of the whole being and not just the good of some part of it. The good 
possessed in the senses, however, is merely the good of the senses, and were 
the appetite to rest in this the animal would quickly perish since neither 
animal nor man can live on sense cognition alone. Man and animal must sus-
tain the body, and because of this need he has been endowed with a liking for 
food. If he is hungry and he sees a sizzling steak, he desires that steak. 
If the desire were satisfied with the mere apprehension of the steak, his body 
would not receive its nourishment and he would soon die of starvation; for the 
steak must be taken, eaten, and digested to nourish the body. Hence the sense 
appetite must seek more than the mere good of apprehension. It must seek the 
steak itself and prepare the body for the action of taking and eating it. In 
this lies the reason and the necessity for having two distinct faculties, one 
of apprehension, and the other one of appetency. True, they both look to an 
extrinsic thing; but one seeks to possess the thing in its physical reality, 
while the other seeks to possess merely a similitude of the thing.\(^{16}\) The 
extrinsic thing is related to the sense apprehension as the cause informing 
the senses with its intentional representation; it is related to the appetite 
as an end to be attained and possessed in its physical reality.

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16 Pp. 41-42.
Appetitus animalis consequitur formam apprehensionis. Et ad hujusmodi appetitus requiritur specialis potentia animae, et non sufficit sola apprehensio. Nemin enim appetitur prout est in sua natura: non est autem secundum suam naturam in virtute apprehensiva, sed secundum suam similitudinem. Unde patet quod visus appetit naturaliter visibile solum ad suum actum, scilicet ad videndum; animal autem appetit rem visam per vim appetitivam, non solum ad videndum, sed etiam ad alios usus. Si autem non idigit anima rebus perceptis a sensu, nisi propter actiones sensuum, scilicet ut eas sentiret; non oporteret appetitivum ponere speciale genus inter potentias animae, quia sufficeret appetitus naturalis potentiarum. 17

Another point of confusion causing this problem is that the animal or sense appetite is confused with the natural appetite. The natural appetite of the senses seeks the good of the extrinsic being as informing the senses through its intentional similitude, and it rests satisfied in this. This natural appetite is not distinct from the senses, but it is the natural inclination founded in their form which causes them to move from the state of potency to act once the proper object presents itself. This natural inclination answers only this one need, and it is limited to one power or faculty in which it is found. The animal appetite on the other hand seeks the objects of all of the powers in order to answer their needs and to see that the whole being is well-ordered and achieving its end.

Unaquaeque potentia animae est quaedam forma seu natura, et habet naturalem inclinationem in aliquid. Unde unaquaeque appetit obiectum sibi conveniens naturali appetitu. Supra quae est appetitus animalis consequens apprehensionem, quo appetitur aliquid non ea ratione quae est conveniens ad actum hujus vel illius potentiae, ut potest visio ad videndum et auditio ad audiendum; sed quia est conveniens simpliciter animali. 18

17 S.T., I, 76, 1 ad 3.
18 Ibid., 80, 1 ad 3.
Although the animal or sense appetite is a power distinct from the powers of apprehension, yet it depends on those powers for the presentation of its object, since its object is not one and determined as is the object of the natural appetite. Because of this determination the natural appetite must necessarily and blindly tend to its object. But the sense appetite, since its object is as many and varied as the needs of the whole being, cannot be determined necessarily to any one of its objects until that object is perceived by the senses and presented to the appetite. Therefore, before a being can desire any object through its appetite, it must first know the thing and know it as desirable for itself. This knowledge of the object can only come from the apprehensive powers. Thus it is seen that the appetitive powers depend on the cognitive faculties to present them with their fitting objects. The objects presented, the appetitive powers are then determined by them to perform their operation.

Notus enim appetitivae partis ex apprehensione quodammodo oritur, quia omnis operatio passivi ab activo originem sumit. Appetitus autem potentia passiva est, quia movetur ab appetibili, quod est movens non motum... Appetibile vero non movet appetitum nisi apprehensum. 19

Here cognition of the object, however, does not suffice to move the appetite; for the appetite seeks the being only in so far as it is seen to be good or useful to it. Therefore the object must be known as being proper and fitting to the one seeking it, as giving joy or being useful to this one.

19 De Ver., 25, 1 c, (prin.).
Appetitus naturalis habet necessitatem respectu ipsius rei in quam tendit, sicut grave necessario appetit locum deorsum. Appetitus autem sensitivus non habet necessitatem in rem aliquam, antequam apprehendatur sub ratione delectabilis vel utilis; sed apprehenso quod est delectabile, de necessitate fertur in illud. Non potest brutum animal inspiciens delectabile, non appetere illud. 20

In the sense appetite there is no inclination till the good sought is known as appetible; but once this is known, the appetitive powers are necessarily drawn to that good. It is, therefore, clear that the sense apprehension and the sense appetite work together in eliciting the appetitive act. "Potentiae appetitivae concomitantur apprehensivas." 21

With the problem as to whether the appetitive power is distinct from the apprehensive power solved, the inquiry into the nature of the apprehensive and appetitive powers of sense is completed. In the light of this knowledge it is possible to find out to which power the passions or emotions properly belong. Indeed it was for this purpose that this study was undertaken.

The passions are passive. They belong properly to the body, since they possess as one of their essential notes the qualities of physical change. As passive the emotions must be dependent on the movement of a passive power. Both sense cognition and sense appetite are such passive powers. As participating in physical change they must be dependent upon a power united with a bodily organ which can undergo change. But both the appetitive and the apprehensive powers of sense are so united with bodily organs, but with this

20 Ibid. (med.).

21 S.T., I, 83, 3 ad 1.
difference. The change undergone by the apprehensive power is primarily
spiritual and only accidentally physical, that is, the physical change under-
gone does not form an essential part of the apprehension. The appetitive
power on the other hand requires of its very nature that there be a physical
change in the make-up of the bodily organs with which it is united. Indeed
it is the purpose of the appetitive power to condition the body so that it is
prepared to pursue, take, and possess the object that is desired.

The purpose of the passions is similar to that of the appetitive
power; for they condition the body so that it is best fitted to execute the
act proper to a given situation. Hence the emotions belong to the appetitive
rather than to the apprehensive powers of sense.

Passio proprie inventur ubi est transmutatio corporalis. Quae
quidem inventur in actibus appetitus sensitivi; et non solum
spiritualis, sicut est in apprehensione sensitiva, sed etiam
naturalis.\(^\text{22}\)

Again the passions properly speaking include character of motion,
since taken in their strictest sense they are a result of contrariety and
motion. Motion, however, is more properly a product of the appetitive power
than of the apprehensive power. The apprehensive power seeks to rest in its
object once it is known and once its intentional form is possessed in the
faculty, evoking its operation. But the act of the appetitive power is to
tend toward that object, and this tendency can be satisfied only when the
object is possessed in its physical reality. Therefore the appetitive power,

\(^\text{22}\) Ibid., I-II, 22, 3 c.
once aroused to its own act of tending to the object, prepares the body for
the execution that will satisfy this tendency, with the consequence that the
movement necessary for attaining the execution results. Thus the motion is
more proper to the appetitive power and is a result of its operation, while
there is no result of the operation of the apprehensive power other than the
operation itself which is a sort of rest and repose in the thing intentionally
possessed.

Motus autem sensualis est appetitus apprehensionem sensitivam consequens. Actus enim apprehendivae virtutis non ita proprius dicitur
motus, sicut actio appetitus: nam operatio virtutis apprehensivae
perficitur in hoc, quod res apprehensae sunt in apprehendente; oper-
ativo autem virtutis appetitivae perficitur in hoc, quod appetens
inclinatur in rem appetibiliam. Et ideo operatio apprehensivae vir-
tutis assimilatur quieta: operatio autem virtutis appetitivae magis
assimilatur motui.\textsuperscript{23}

Hence from the note of motion the passions are seen to belong to the
appetitive power rather than to the apprehensive power.

The notion of passion has as its correlative term that of action;
for action and passion, agent and patient, participate in the same motion
which results in the modification of the patient. In this motion the patient
is attracted to the agent. Thus the next note of passion to be tested by the
notes of the powers of apprehension and appetency is that of attraction.

Now there is much more attraction toward a being that is sought in
its existing physical reality than there is attraction toward one that is
sought merely through its intentional form. For example, the newly wedded

\textsuperscript{23} S.T., I, 81, 1 c.
husband would much rather have his wife in his arms than have her present by an image in his mind. The same is true here. The apprehensive power is attracted to its object by means of the intentional form in the faculty through which the thing is known. Once this form is present and the thing is known, the apprehensive faculty rests. It undergoes passion in the broad etymological sense of the word. The appetitive power, however, is drawn to the thing itself, so that it must induce the proper physical changes in the body in order that the person or animal will be able to move and attain the end desired. The appetite is attracted to the thing and its act is not satisfied until that thing is actually possessed.

Thus the emotions, as a movement of the soul preparing the body to execute the bidding of the appetite, belong more properly to the appetitive power than to the apprehensive power of the animal or sentient being.

In nomine passionis importatur quod patiens trahatur ad id quod est agentis. Magis autem trahitur anima ad rem per vim appetitivam quam per vim apprehensivam. Nam per vim appetitivam anima habet ordinem ad ipsas res, prout in seipso sunt: unde Philosophus dicit, in VI Metaphys., quod bonum et malum, que sunt objecta appetitivae potentiæ, sunt in ipsis rebus. Vis autem apprehensiva non trahitur ad rem secundum quod in seipso est; sed cognoscit eam secundum intentionem rei, quam in se habet vel recipit secundum proprium modum. Unde et ibidem dicitur quod verum et falsum, quae ad cognitionem pertinent, non sunt in rebus sed in mente.24

Vis appetitiva dicitur esse magis activa, quia magis principiorum exterioris actus. Et hoc habet ex hoc ipsa ex quo habet quod sit magis passiva, scilicet ex hoc quod habet ordinem ad rem ut est in seipso; per actionem enim exteriorum pervenimus ad consequendas res.25


25 Ibid., ad 2.
Thus from these three notes of union with bodily organs, motion, and attraction the passions or emotions are seen to belong to the appetitive nature; for although both the appetitive power and the apprehensive power seek the same objects, yet they seek them under different aspects. The apprehensive power seeks the object in so far as it is knowable; the appetitive power seeks it in so far as it is proper and pleasing to it.

Id quod apprehenditur et appetitur, est idem subjecto, sed differt ratione: apprehenditur enim ut est ens sensibile vel intelligibile; appetitur vero ut est conveniens aut bonum.26

This then concludes the inquiry as to which of the sense faculties, the apprehensive or the appetitive, the emotions belong. For it is clear that, although they depend to some extent on both, they are more proper to the appetitive power. This fact and the other results of the inquiry thus far now make it possible to resolve the question as to the basic causes of the passions. The study of these facts and the consequent conclusions concerning the causes of the passions will, then, be the subject matter taken up in the next chapter.

26 S.T., I, 80, 1 ad 2.
CHAPTER V

THE CAUSES OF THE PASSIONS

The emotions fall under the notion of passion in its proper though less strict sense. Thus they involve in their make-up the notions of change and motion. They involve change in the sense that a new form comes to the subject of the passions and drives out the form present at the time of its coming. This new form may be proper to the person involved as is the case with joy, or injurious to the person as in the case of sadness. The passions involve motion in the sense that this change is the result of the agent's action. Motion and change as applying to passion in its proper sense can be experienced only by a material being, and so the passions are seen to be proper to a body. Thus only secondarily do they affect the soul. The passions also depend upon the cognition of their object. Since they depend on cognition and apply more properly to the body, they must be limited to the sentient nature as such. Through the passions is felt the attraction of the person or animal involved for the physical being present before it; thus they belong to the appetitive rather than to the apprehensive powers of sense. From these indications the nature of the passions is established.

With the nature of the passions understood it is now possible to begin the inquiry into the basic causes of the emotions or passions. The material cause, the subject of the passions, has already been determined in
Chapter III. Hence this study will be limited to determining what the final, formal, and efficient causes are that will be found proper to the nature common to all the emotions.

Before it is possible to find causes common to the general nature of the emotions, however, it is necessary to show that there is such a common nature. Generally the emotions are divided into two groups, the concupiscible and the irascible. In the first group are contained the emotions of love, desire, joy, and their contraries of hate, aversion, and sadness. These emotions are placed under this species, since they have as their end either a good thing to be attained or an evil thing to be avoided. The second group contains the emotions of hope and its contrary of despair, audacity and its contrary of fear, and anger which has no contrary. This second group differs from the first in that these second groups arise only when some obstacle stands in the way of the first groups' attaining the good or shunning the evil. Thus this second group of emotions might be called the shock troops of the passions which enter the bulge created by some extrinsic cause which stands in the way and prevents the concupiscible passions from completing their operation.

[P]assiones quae sunt in irascibili et in concupiscibili, different specie. . . .

[O]bjectum potentiae concupiscibilis est bonum vel malum sensibile simpliciter acceptum, quod est delectabile vel dolorosum. Sed quia necessae est quod interdum anima difficultatem vel pugnam patiatur in adipiscendo aliquod hujusmodi bonum, vel fugiendo aliquod hujusmodi malum, inquantum hoc est quoad modum elevatum supra facilem
potestatum animalis; ideo ipsum bonum vel malum, secundum quod habet rationem ardui vel difficiles, est objectum irascibilis.¹

Ad hoc vis irascibilis data est animalibus, ut tollantur impedimenta quibus concupiscibilis in suum objectum tendere prohibetur, vel prop- ter difficultatem boni adipiscendi, vel proppter difficultatem mali superandi. Et ideo passiones irascibilis omnes terminantur ad passiones concupiscibilis.²

Immediately two questions arise: the first is, why should there be two different sets of emotions, and the second is whether the two sets of emotions which are of different species can participate in one nature common to both. These questions will be taken up in order. First, why should there be two different species of emotions?

There are two species of emotion because there is a natural necessity requiring them. This need for two different sets of emotions for sentient beings can be verified by the fact that there are similar needs for all types of beings, even for inanimate beings endowed only with natural appetite. In every being there are two necessary inclinations. The first is to attain the end intended by the natural appetite, and the second is the tendency to resist those things which cause the destruction of the being or which hinder it from attaining its necessary end. Both of these tendencies are really aspects of the same need, namely, self-preservation and the perfection of the being; yet each has a different function to perform.

In rebus naturalibus corruptibilius, non solum oportet esse inclinationem ad consequendum convenientia et refugium nociva; sed etiam ad resistendum corruptentibus et contrariis, quae convenientibus

¹ In loc., I-II, 23, 1 c.
² Ibid., ad 1.
impedimentum praeaeent et ingerunt nocuaenta. Sicut ignis habet naturalem inclinationem non solum ut recedat ab inferiori loco, qui sibi non convenit, et tendat in locum superiorem sibi convenientem; sed etiam quod resistat corrupmentibus et impedimentibus.\(^3\)

In attaining the end of its natural appetite a passive being is merely receptive with regard to the good necessary for it; but in resisting a potential cause of its destruction the being must be more than merely receptive. It must do more than merely undergo its immanent operation, otherwise this destructive cause will bring about the destruction of this passive being. Thus in the being there must be two types of powers, one purely passive and one dependent on this which will act against the hostile agent.

Sic ergo appetitus naturalis ad duo tendit: scilicet ad consequendum id quod est congruum et amicum naturae, et ad habendum quaedam victoriam super illud quod est ei adversum; et primum est quasi per modum receptionis, secundum vero est per modum actionis; unde ad diversa principia reducuntur. Recipere enim et agere non sunt ab eodem principio; ut ignis, qui per levitatem furtur sursum, per calorem contraria corrumpit.\(^4\)

The first power is merely passive. It performs its operation as long as nothing hinders it from doing so. When, however, something does hinder it, then, since it is only passive, it cannot remove this hindrance, and so it must suffer this evil. It is at this time that the second power, dependent on the first, is aroused. This power is active and can attack and destroy this obstacle so that the original operation can continue unimpeded. Once the obstacle is removed the operation of the second power ceases and the operation of the first power then continues to its completion.

\(^3\) S.T., I, 81, 2 c.
\(^4\) De Ver., 25, 2 c.
An example of this can be taken from the sense of sight and its organ, whose natural appetite is to see things. As long as the eye and the lids function correctly and the person is awake, the act of vision goes on unimpeded. If a cinder, however, gets stuck in the eye, or some infection comes to it, to carry on trying to see as before could result in the impairment or destruction of the organ. Hence some remedy must be applied. In this case the lids close, the eye ducts pour out tears to flush the eye out and rid it of whatever is impairing its operation. Normally the eye should be open to see, and this may be termed its natural appetite during the waking hours of man and animal; but when something comes that would injure the eye, then it must, momentarily at least, close. Its natural appetite is modified in this abnormal situation by a corrective measure, and other powers normally not operating are brought into action which will eventually result in the eye's being able to carry on its normal work.

Thomas uses the example of fire to explain this same thing. The natural tendency of fire is to rise into the air. If water, an agent which tends to destroy fire, is poured on the fire, the first must react against it to prevent it from quenching the fire. The fire must not passively give in to its inclination, but it must fight against the water lest it succumb under it. Hence the fire must introduce its form of heat into the water to cause it to evaporate into steam unless the fire is to suffer the deleterious effects of the water. Thus by acting according to its form the fire causes the water to evaporate. Thus the fire, using its heat prevents the water from stifling it.
Inventur autem appetitus naturalis ad duo tendere secundum duplicem operationem rei naturalis.

Una quorum est per quam res naturalis nititur acquirere id quod est conservativum suae naturae, sicut grave movetur deorsum, ut ibi conservetur.

Alia est per quam res naturalis sua contraria destructur per qualitatem activum: et hoc quidem necessarium est corruptibili: quia, nisi haberet virtutem, qua suum contrarium vinceret, ab eo corruptur.

Sic ergo appetitus naturalis ad duo tendit; scilicet ad consequendum id quod est congruum et amicum naturae, et ad habendum quandam victoriam super illud quod est ei adversum; et primum est quasi per modum receptionis, secundum vero est per modum actionis; unde ad diversa principia reducuntur. Recipere enim et agere non sunt ab eodem principio; ut ignis, qui per lovatatem fortur sursum, per calorem contraria corrumpit.

This same sort of action must take place also on the level of the sense appetite; for although it differs from the natural appetite in that it depends on cognition, yet it agrees with it in this, that both seek the good of the being. Therefore the sense appetite must also have these different operations, the one receiving its good object, the other resisting and destroying whatever stands in the way of the first operation. The first set of passions are called the concupiscible, the second the irascible. The concupiscible passions seek to gain that which is desired and to avoid that which is perceived to be harmful. The irascible passions seek to resist and destroy any attacking agents which would prevent the concupiscible passions from attaining their end and the end of the being.

Quia igitur appetitus sensitivus est inclinatio, consequens apprehensionem sensitivam, sicut appetitus naturalis est inclinatio consequens formas naturalem; necessae est quod in parte sensitiva sint.

5 De Ver., 25, 2 c (prin.).
duae appetitivae potentiae. Una, per quam anima simpliciter inclinatur ad prosequendum ea quae sunt convenientia secundum sensum, et ad refugiendum nociva: et haec dicitur concupiscibilis. Alia vero, per quam animal resistit impugnantibus, quae convenientia impugnant, et nocentia inferunt: et haec vis vocatur irascibilis. Unde dicetur quod ejus objectum est ardum: quis scilicet tendit ad hoc quod superest contraria, et superemineat eis.6

Thus it is seen that there is a need for two different sets of emotions, and it may be said that the irascible passions are the shock troops, as it were, of the concupiscible passions.

The second question to be answered is whether these two sets of emotions have a common nature. The answer to this lies in the relationship of the two sets to each other and to a common end. The irascible passions have their beginning and end in the concupiscible; for they are called into action when the concupiscible passions are hindered from attaining their end, and their work is completed when the concupiscible passions can carry on their operation unimpeded.

Irascibilis quodammodo ad concupiscibilem ordinatur, sicut propugnatrix ipsius.

Ad hoc enim necessarium fuit animali per irascibilem victoriam de contrariis consequi, ut concupiscibilis sine impedimento suo delectabili potiretur: cujus sigillum est quod propter delectabilia pugna est inter animalia, scilicet propter coitum et cibum.7

Et inde est quod omnes passiones irascibilis habent et principium et finem in concupiscibili: nam ira incipit ex aliqua tristitia illata, quae est in concupiscibili, et terminatur post vindictam adeptam ad gaudium, quod iterum est in concupiscibili: et simul iter spes incipit a desiderio vel amore, et terminatur in delectatione.

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6 3 T., 1, 81, 2 c.
7 De Ver., 25, 2 c.
The concupiscible passions have as their object both good and evil but under different aspects. The good is their object in so far as it is the end toward which they are ordained. The evil is their object in so far as it is the end from which they must flee. The irascible passions in turn have as their purpose to help the concupiscible passions attain their end by overcoming any impediment that comes in their way. All of the passions or emotions are, therefore, related to both good and evil as ends; the concupiscible for the purpose of attaining the good and avoiding the evil; the irascible for the purpose of attaining the good by overcoming the evil. Thus it is evident that all the passions refer in some way or other to the good to be obtained.

Objectum concupiscibilis . . . est bonum vel malum sensibile absolute. Bonum autem, inquantum bonum, non potest esse terminis ut a quo, sed solum ut ad quem: quia nihil refugit bonum inquantum bonum, sed omnia appetunt ipsum. Similiter nihil appetit malum inquantum hujusmodi, sed omnia fugiunt ipsum: et propter hoc, malum non habet rationem termini ad quem, sed solum termini a quo. Sic igitur omnis passio concupiscibilis respectu boni, est ut in ipsum, sicut amor, desiderium, et gaudium: omnis vero passio ejus respectu mali, est ut ab ipso, sicut odium, fuga seu abominatio, et tristitia. . . .

Sed objectum irascibilis est sensibile bonum vel malum, non quidem absolute, sed sub ratione difficultatis vel arduitatis. . . . Bonum autem arduum sive difficile habet rationem ut in ipsum tendatur, inquantum est bonum, quod pertinet ad passionem spei; et ab ipso recedatur, inquantum est arduum vel difficile, quod pertinet ad passionem desperationis. Similiter malum arduum habet rationem ut vitetur, inquantum est malum, et hoc pertinet ad passionem timoris: habet etiam rationem ut in ipsum tendatur, sicut in quoddam arduum, per quod scilicet aliquid evadit subjectionem mali, et sic tendit in ipsum audacia.6

Causatur enim ira ex malo difficili jam injacente. Ad cujus presentiam, necesse est quod aut appetitus succumbat et sic non exit terminos...
tristitiae, quae est passio concupiscibilis: aut habet motum ad invadendum malum laesivum, quod pertinet ad iram. 9

Since, however, the passions all work for one common end, and since they are all proper to the same appetitive faculty, they must have a nature which is common to them all and of which each individual emotion will form a slightly different aspect. This is seen to be true, for all the passions are ordained toward either the joy in the good thing possessed or sadness in an evil thing possessed, and hence are merely different avenues along the way to its attainment. "Gaudium et tristitia, principales dicuntur, quia sunt completivae et finales simpliciter respectu omnium passuum." 10

Therefore, since it can be said that all the passions have one common nature, it should be possible to find causes which are basic to all of them and which will differ only in the aspect in which they are applied to each individual emotion. It is to the discovery of these causes that this study now directs itself.

The object of the appetitive power is the goodness of the physically existing thing. Since the passions belong to the appetitive power and may be termed as the various ways in which the appetite seeks its object, their object will also be the same, namely, the object perceived as good for the being in which they are found. This good thing, therefore, will be first in the order of intention and last in the order of execution, since it must first be

9 Ibid., 3 c.

10 Ibid., 25, 4 c.
known before it can be sought, and once known and sought the appetite will not rest till it has this good thing in its possession. The end, however, which is first in the order of intention and last in the order of execution, is none other than the final causes that puts the operation in motion. For the end must be known before it can be attained. To attain this good the other causes must enter into the scene, since the final cause supposes an efficient cause which it can move toward attaining the end. The efficient cause in turn supposes a formal cause which it can impose upon the matter acted upon so that the end intended as final cause may ultimately be attained in the existential order as well as in the intentional order.

Bomum autem, cum habeat rationem appetibilis, importat habitudinem causee finalis: cujus causalitas prima est, quia agens non agit nisi propter finem, et ab agente materia movetur ad formam: unde dicitur quod finis est causa causarum.11

Cum bomum sit quod omnis appetunt, hoc autem habet rationem finis: manifestum est quod bomum rationem finis importat. Sed tamen ratio boni prae supponit rationem causee efficientis, et rationem causee formalis, . . In causando autem, primum inventur bomum et finis, qui movet efficientem: secundo, actio efficientis, movens ad formam; tertio adventit forma.12

It is of the very nature of goodness that it be the final cause which puts all the other causes in motion. This good thing, however, must be perceived as good for the being seeking it, or else it will not move this being in the least. So it is the good thing perceived as such that will be the final cause in any given situation where either the sense or rational

11 S.T., I, 5, 2 ad 1.
12 Ibid., b c.
appetite are involved. Therefore the final cause of the passions, as the various ways in which the appetite is referred to its object as present and possessed, or present and not possessed, and so forth, will be that object which is apprehended as the good for the one seeking it through its appetite and passions. Thus it is this particular thing perceived as being either good or useful to the percipient that is the end intended and the final cause of the operation. It is first in the order of intention, starting the process, and last in the order of execution, thus ending the process.

It has already been seen that the change had in the body during an emotion is the material cause of the passions. The material cause as such demands a formal cause that will specify its nature, that will determine it to be this rather than that, to be the emotion of love rather than the motion of hate, the emotion of sadness rather than the emotion of joy. The material cause must remain unspecified until it is informed by the form which will give the resulting composite its essential nature, either accidental or substantial; for matter is mere potency.

\[ \text{Materiæ est id quod est in potentia.} \]

\[ \text{[M]ateriæ est id quod est in potentia. . .} \]

\[ \text{[Q]ue compositum ex materiæ et forma est perfectum et bonum per suam formam: unde oportet quod sit bonum per participationem, secundum quod materia participat formam.} \]

The matter involved in the passions, however, is not prime matter but second matter, since the passions are modifications experienced by an
already existing being. The being must first exist according to its substantial nature and existence before it can undergo an emotion. Therefore, since the passions are accidents of this being, the form to be received will have to be an accidental form which will bring the potency into act and will give an increase in second or accidental existence. In the case of the passions this being already formed and in potency to this second existence and accidental modification is the body. "Forma autem accidentalis non facit esse simpliciter; sed esse tale, aut tantum, aut aliquo modo se habens: subjectum enim ejus est ens in actu." \(^{15}\)

But what is this form which makes the emotions to be what they are, and whence does it come? The emotions, as has been seen, are an operation of the composite embodying both body and soul. The body is moved toward its change by the action of the sense appetite, a power that exists in the souls of both the brute animal and of man.

Unde proximum motivum corporis in nobis est appetitus sensitivus. Unde semper actum appetitus sensitivi concomitatur aliqua transmutationes corporis; et maxime circa cor, quod est primum principium motus in animali. Sic igitur actus appetitus sensitivi, inquantum habent transmutationem corporalem annexam, passiones dicuntur. \(^{16}\)

In fact, not only is the body moved, but the changes of the body and the motion of the sense appetite are concomitant with each other and mutually

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15 S.T., I, 77, 6 c.
16 Ibid., 20, 1 ad 1.
proportionate. "Corporalis transmutatio, quae est in passionibus animae, proportionatur motui appetitus." 17

Thus it is seen that the appetite causes the body to undergo whatever modifications will best prepare it to meet the situation confronting the being. The passivity of the bodily change is proportionate to the activity of the appetite. The bodily change, however, as the material cause of the passions cannot be determined to one type rather than to another unless it is activated by the form which will determine it to meet this particular situation. The bodily change is actuated in the proper way by the operation of the sense appetite. Therefore this motion or operation of the sense appetite is the formal cause of the composite that forms this particular emotion.

St. Thomas states this clearly.

Est autem attendendum in omnibus animae passionibus, quod transmutatio corporalis, quae est in eis materialis, est conformis et proportionata motui appetitus, qui est formalis: sicut in omnibus materia proportionatur formae. 18

But in a passage seen earlier, 19 Thomas says that the passions apply only accidentally to the soul, in which the sense appetite exists and of which it is the faculty. But if the passions are proper to the soul only by reason of the body, how can the soul possibly provide the form of the emotion through

17 Ibid., I-II, 48, 2 c.

18 Ibid., 37, 4c. Also I, 20, 1 ad 2: "In passionibus sensitivi appetitus, est considerare aliquid quasi materiale, scilicet corporalem transmutationem; et aliquid quasi formale, quod est ex parte appetitus. Sicut in ira... materiale est accensio sanguinis circa cor, vel aliquid hujusmodi; formale vero, appetitus vindictae."

19 Pp. 33-35
its faculty of the sense appetite? For the form of the emotion belongs to the emotion of its very nature and not accidentally, that is, by reason of something else; for the form is what makes the emotion to be this particular emotion and not some other.

This difficulty is easily solved if it is remembered that in this place Thomas is speaking of the passions as referring primarily and more properly to the bodily change, that is, according to the strict meaning of the word. The soul as an immaterial or spiritual being cannot undergo bodily change; and therefore, if it suffers the passions, it can do so only because of the body with which it is conjoined. The act of the passion, however, is a composite act of the body and soul as are all acts of the sense nature; therefore there is nothing that prevents the soul from being able to provide the form for the passion. Indeed Thomas says that the form is had more properly in the soul than in the body.

In passionibus animae est sicut formale ipse motus appetitivae potentiæ, sicut autem materiae transmutatio corporalis: quorum unum alteri proportionatur. Unde secundum similitudinem et rationem appetitivi motus, sequitur corporalis transmutatio. 20

This motion, which is had in the soul, unites with the bodily change in the body, with which the sense appetite is conjoined for the carrying out of its operations, to form the composite which is this particular emotion. The bodily change follows the likeness and nature of the motion of the appetitive faculty and is proportionate to it. Thus it is evident that the motion of

20 S.T., I-II, 44, 1 c.
the sense appetite is the formal cause of the emotions specifying and determining them to be this emotion rather than some other.

Now that the formal, material, and final causes of the emotions are determined, there remains only the efficient cause to be delineated to bring to a conclusion the quest of this thesis. From its very name it is evident that the efficient cause is a cause that produces an effect. In the case of the emotions, the effect to be produced is the emotion or passion which will best prepare the animal or man to meet the situation confronting it. This situation, however, is determined according to the relationship that is had between the good sought and the appetite seeking it, namely, whether the good is to be attained, whether it is possessed but to be enjoyed, whether it is an evil thing possessed but to be shunned, and so on. This good or destructive thing perceived as such by the being in question is the final cause, the end to be attained or avoided. The final cause in turn, once perceived, determines the effect that is to be produced by the efficient cause, and it determines the operation of the efficient cause which is to produce this effect.

Cum bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, hoc autem habet rationem finis; manifestum est quod bonum rationem finis importat. Sed tamen ratio boni praesupponit rationem causa efficientis, et rationem causae formalis. Videamus enim quod id quod est primum in causando, ultimum est in causato: . . . In causando autem, primum inventur bonum et finis, qui movet efficientem; secundo actio efficientis, movens ad formam; tertio advenit forma. 21

But every agent that is to produce an effect must first have within itself the form of the effect to be produced, since all agents produce some-

21 S. T., I, 5, 4 c.
thing similar to themselves, and since no one can give or produce in another what he does not possess first within himself.

Thus the efficient cause by reason of its form produces in another an effect which is similar in form to the form of the cause. To find the efficient cause of the passions, it is necessary to find something having a form like the form to be produced in the passion and which enters into the act of producing the passion.

Taken in its strictest sense, the passion per prius or more properly is in the body and only accidentally in the soul. The changes produced in the body, however, are caused by the motion of the sense appetite. Hence the proximate efficient cause of the passion as being more proper to the body is the motion of the sense appetite. "Proximum motivum corporis in nobis est
appetitus sensitivus." It is possible for the appetite to be an efficient cause; for although it is a passive power and thus moved, yet it also, once moved by the object, moves the other powers whose action is necessary for the acquiring of the object. "Potentia enim appetitiva est potentia passiva, quae nata est moveri ab apprehenso: unde appetibile apprehensum est movens non motum, appetitus autem movens motum."26

The appetite, then, suffices as the efficient cause that explains the passion in its strictest sense as being proper to the body. When, however, the passion or emotion is considered in its complete reality, it belongs to both body and soul; for while the passion in the sense of a bodily change is only accidentally in the soul, yet when it is considered in its totality, it includes the affective state as well, and this is had more properly in the soul than in the body, as has been seen.27 Thus any particular emotion includes both the bodily change and the affective state of soul, both of which form the composite that is the emotion. Hence to find the complete efficient cause of the emotions will require further investigation.

The formal cause of the emotion is the operation of the sense appetite moved to enjoy the thing possessed, to desire the good not yet possessed, and so forth. What is there, then, which possesses this form and which can produce it in the appetite? What moves the appetite? Ultimately the thing

25 S.T., I, 20, 1 ad 1.
26 S.T., I, 80, 2 a.
27 P. 32.
causing this effect is the final cause through the action of the efficient cause. The final cause, however, is the appetible good. The appetite will never seek this appetible good unless this good is presented to the appetite by the apprehensive power. Hence the apprehensive power must exert some causal effect upon the emotions.

Motus enim appetitivae partis ex apprehensione quodammodo oritur, quia omnis operatio passiva ab active originem sumit. Appetitus autem potentia passiva est, quia movetur ab appetibili, quod est movens non motum....Appetibile vero non movet appetitum nisi apprehensionem. In quantum ergo ex appetitibili apprehenso per sensum movetur vis appetitiva inferior, ejus motus sensualis dicitur.\textsuperscript{28}

A brief examination of this activity of the apprehensive power in presenting the appetible good to the appetite and of the nature of the efficient cause will show that the apprehensive power acts as an efficient cause in producing the effect that is the emotion.

First of all, the efficient cause is one that produces an effect. But in the case of the emotions the sense appetite is unable to act until the appetible good is perceived, and hence its motion cannot cause the bodily resonance proper to the emotion. After the appetible good is presented to the appetite by the apprehensive faculties as proper and good for the being, then the sense appetite must of necessity tend toward it. It must move with the consequence that the bodily resonance arises and the complete emotion is produced. Therefore the apprehensive power by its apprehension of the sensible good and by its presentation of this good to the appetite produces the effect that is the emotion.

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{De Ver.}, 25, 1 c, (prin.).
Appetitus autem sensitivus non habet necessitatem in rem aliquam, antequam apprehendatur sub ratione delectabilis vel utilis; sed apprehenso quod est delectabile, de necessitate fertur in illud; non enim poteat brutum animal inspiciens delectabile, non appetere illud. 29

The efficient cause which produces an effect in another cannot produce that effect unless it first has that form within itself in some manner. Now the various emotions have reference to the appetible good in so far as it is present and possessed, distant and to be acquired, present and to be shunned, or distant and to be avoided. But the good could be present and yet not caused the emotion; for if one is asleep or unaware of the good, the appetite will not and cannot be moved by it. Therefore, before the appetite can desire a good not had or take delight in a good possessed, it must first be made aware of that good's presence through the apprehension of the senses. Now the senses tell the appetite not only that the good is present but also how it is present, namely, in the possession of the one seeking it or at a distance from it, and so on; for this is all a part of the apprehension. To reveal this fact to the appetite, however, the apprehensive faculties must first possess the intentional form of that knowledge within themselves; otherwise they would not know the appetible good and hence would not be able to move the appetite.

One cannot, for example, take any joy in eating a cool, sweet, well-ripened piece of watermelon on a hot day unless the sense of touch and the sense of taste tell him that he is in contact with the melon and that the taste is sweet and that the melon is refreshing and delicious. Once the appetite realizes through the aid of the apprehension that it is in contact with

29 Ibid., (med.).
this delicious and refreshing piece of melon, then the appetite is moved to the affection of joy and satisfaction in possessing this particular good. Later, if a red and ripe piece of watermelon is seen in the showcase of a cafeteria, the memory and imagination recall and bring up the sweet taste of melon and the delight taken previously in eating a similar piece, with the result that the memory of this former experience plus the apprehension that this piece of melon is not in hand arouses the desire to possess it. Thus the apprehension of this good and of its relationship to the subject produces a different emotion, this time the emotion of desire and love of this good.

Thus it is seen that the apprehension of the appetible good and of its relationship to the one apprehending it produces the emotion as an efficient cause. This is possible since the form of the emotion is had virtually in this act of cognition.

Is this cognition, however, the complete efficient cause? The answer to this question must be given in the negative, since the apprehension alone is not sufficient to move the appetite. The apprehension contains merely an intentional form of the object, but the appetite seeks the object itself. Hence the ultimate efficient cause must be the appetible good acting on the appetite through the apprehensive powers. The apprehensive powers are necessary; for unless they perceive the object and perceive its relationship to the appetite, the appetible good can never move the appetite. But once the appetible object and the apprehension unite, then the appetite is reached and the proper effect is produced.
St. Thomas states this in the following passages:

Motus enim appetitivae partis ex apprehensione quodammodo oritur, quia omnis operatio passiva ab activo originem sumit.\textsuperscript{30}

Potentia enim appetitiva est potentia passiva quae nata est moveri ab apprehensio; unde appetibile apprehensum est movens non motu, appetitus autem movens motum.\textsuperscript{31}

Let it be noted that it is the apprehensum, the apprehended good, that moves the appetite, not just the appetible good or just the apprehension of this good, but the two united together.

A suasive proof also may be had for this position from another statement of St. Thomas which refers rather to the distinction of the rational appetite from the sense appetite. He says:

Appetibili non accidit esse apprehensum per sensum vel intellectu, sed per se ei convenit: nam appetibile non movet appetitum nisi inquantum est apprehensum. Unde differentiae apprehensi sunt per se differentiae appetibilis.\textsuperscript{32}

Since the difference of the apprehensions of the appetible good is sufficient to determine a difference in the kind of appetitive power, it should be, or so it seems, sufficient to decide and determine a difference in degree as is had in the case of the different passions. The concupiscible and irascible passions which belong to the same potency differ in species because of the way they consider the good. This consideration, however, can only come from the sense apprehension and the estimative or cogitative sense. Therefore

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 25, 1 c.

\textsuperscript{31} S.T., I, 80, 2 c.

\textsuperscript{32} S.T., I, 80, 2 ad 1. (Italics added.)
it would seem that within each group of passions the sense apprehension would also supply the note of relationship of the object of the appetite to the form produced by the efficient cause, and thus would at least have some part along with the object in constituting the complete efficient cause.

That the object is the efficient cause stands in Thomas' doctrine whenever the potency to be actuated is a passive potency. He says:

Omnis enim actio vel est potentiae activae, vel passivae. Objectum autem comparatur ad actum potentiae passivae, sicut principium et causa movens: color enim inquantum movet visum, est principium visionis. 33

The appetite is definitely a passive power, as has been stated so often in the quotations from Thomas used throughout this chapter. The passions take their name from the fact of their passivity or receptivity. Hence their objects must stand in their regard as their efficient causes.

But if the object is an efficient cause, then two difficulties arise to which some answer should be given. First, as efficient cause, can the object have the form, at least virtually, which is to be produced in the emotion? The answer to this is yes; for the object of its very nature is a good for the being and therefore is desirable and a source of joy, or it is hostile of its very nature and therefore to be avoided and feared, and so on.

33 S. T., I, 77, 3 c. Also in In II De An. 6 n. 305. "Species enim actuum et operationum sumuntur secundum ordinem ad objecta. Omnis enim animae operatio, vel est actus potentiae activae, vel passivae. Objecta quidem potentiarum passivarum comparantur ad operationes earum ut activa, quia reducunt potentias in actum, sicut visibile visum, et omne sensibile sensum."
Thus in general it has this form, and this form is specified even more accordingly as the object is related to the one potentially seeking it as possessed, distant, and so forth.

Secondly, can the efficient cause be identified with the final cause? In this case they are identified in that the are in the same being, but they differ in their relationship to the one seeking them. As final cause, the object is referred to as the end desired and to be attained. It is that toward which the appetite tends. As the desired end, it also has sufficient force to act as efficient cause, since the objects of passive powers are active in their regard. In the one case the object is merely considered as the end intended; in the other it is considered as actively moving the appetite to seek of necessity this end perceived as its good. In the one case the object is a good for the appetite whether it is perceived or not; in the other it must be perceived if it is to move the appetite; and although it is in this perception that the object's goodness is perceived, yet this very goodness once perceived is so strong that it necessitates the appetite to seek it.

This, then, completes the discussion of the causes and of the metaphysical nature of the passions. The study and development of the latter has led to the establishment of the former at least according to the doctrine of St. Thomas with which this study was concerned.

To sum up this last part of the inquiry, it can be said that the body is the subject or potency into which the accidents of the passions are received. The material cause of the passion itself is the physical change
undergone by the body. The formal cause is the motion of the sense appetite inducing this change in the body. The complete emotion, then, is a composite of the affective state in the soul and the physical change in the body. The appetible good, as the end sought, is the final cause of the passions which starts the causes moving to produce any particular emotion. The efficient cause is a combination of the object and its relationship to the one seeking it plus the apprehension of itself and its relationship. These four causes comprise the intrinsic and extrinsic causes needed for the production of any effect, and so with these discovered the inquiry is at an end.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

To the Greeks the perfect figure was the circle for it seemed continuous without beginning and end. Although the purpose of this chapter is to close the circle begun with a description of the matter to be taken, yet here the end differs greatly from the beginning, because what was then conjecture and the germ of the thesis has now blossomed forth into fact and the flower of the conclusion. It will, therefore, be the purpose of these last few pages to bring all the facts together to give a brief but definite picture of what has been discovered, of the flower that has blossomed forth from the seed of conjecture.

The first problem was to find out where the emotions fit into Thomas' scheme of the word passio. This word passio was found to participate in a threefold division of meaning according to its etymological and essential meanings. According to its etymological meaning the word signifies any change from potency to act; thus its extension is very broad, covering change in its strict sense, where the facts of motion and contrariety are verified, and in its broad sense, where it means rather to perfect the being or faculty than to change it; and according to this latter meaning it is applicable also to the immaterial powers or faculties. In its essential meaning the word refers to
change only in its strict sense, which is applicable only to material beings.
In this strict and therefore proper sense of the word two divisions are given.
More properly the word means a change for the worse where a being loses some-
thing proper to itself to gain something ill-suited to itself. Less properly
it includes any change involving a material being whether that change is for
the better or for the worse. In the more proper sense the word can only refer
for example to a change from health to sickness or from joy to sadness; but in
the less proper sense it can refer to either a change from health to sickness
or from sickness back to health, from joy to sadness or from sadness to joy.
Hence the emotions according to Thomas' meaning of the word passio or passion
come under the essential though less proper meaning of the word.

The meaning of passio as applied to the emotions reveals the subject
in which they inhere and their material cause. Since of their very nature the
emotions or passions involve physical change, as accidents, they inhere in the
body. The material cause of the accident itself, however, is not the body,
the potency that receives the accident, but the change undergone by the body
in the emotion. The reason for this difference between subjects lies in the
fact that the material cause of the accident itself must form a part of that
accident. Thus the body, although it receives the accident into itself, is
not a part of it; but the change undergone by the body in the emotion is def-
initely a part of that emotion.

The object of the emotions is some physical existing thing which can
satisfy some need either of the whole being or of some part of it. The emo-
tions cannot be aroused by this object unless the object is presented to them
by the apprehension. Therefore the emotions are dependent upon cognition. The purpose of the emotions is to attain the good thing which could benefit the one in whom they reside and to avoid the evil thing which would bring harm or destruction to the being in whom they reside. They refer not only to the good of a particular power as does the natural appetite, but they refer also to the good of the whole being. Their object then is the good thing to be attained or the evil thing to be avoided. Thus it is seen that the passions are proper to the appetitive faculties of all sentient beings; for their object is the good; they depend upon cognition; and they are proper to the body.

What, then, are the causes of emotions? The emotions have as their end either a good thing to be attained or an evil thing to be avoided. In both cases the passions tend to the good of their subject. The passions belong to the appetitive power and this power's object is the good. Goodness, however, has the nature of final cause. Therefore the appetible good thing that is the end and object of the emotions is also their final cause.

The emotions are an act of the composite, thus they pertain, as does every act of the composite, to both body and soul. Through the change undergone in the passions the body constitutes the material cause of the emotions. Through the motion of the sense appetite preparing the body for the proper reaction to the given situation, the soul constitutes their formal cause. Hence the composite being that is the emotion has as its material cause the bodily change and as its formal cause the motion of the sense appetite.
To find an adequate efficient cause of the emotions a distinction must be made in the meaning of the word. Taken in its strict sense as a passion the word emotion refers more properly to the body and only accidentally to the soul. In this sense as meaning the change undergone by the body, the efficient cause is the sense appetite. The word emotion, however, in its complete sense involves both this change in the body and an affective state which is more proper to the soul. What then is the efficient cause of this composite? The emotions are dependent on sense apprehension which presents them with their object and shows how this object is related to the one seeking it. The emotions are also dependent upon the object itself. Both sense apprehension and the object unite to determine the operation of the passions. Hence these two, since they determine the operation of the emotion, are seen to be the complete efficient cause of the emotions.

In conclusion, then, it can be said that the emotions are a composite act embodying both body and soul, the body in its physical change supplying the material cause, and the soul in the motion of the sense appetite supplying the formal cause. The final cause of the emotions is the appetible good which attracts them, while the efficient cause is the appetible good together with the apprehension of its relation to the one having the emotion by the senses.

Thus the circle—if a Greek figure may be borrowed—which began in conjecture is closed with the end of fact.
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The thesis submitted by Kenneth M. Kunert, S.J., has been read and approved by three members of the Department of Philosophy.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

May 28, 1954
Date

[Signature]
Signature of Adviser