Palestine in German Thought and Action 1871-1914

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PALESTINE IN GERMAN THOUGHT AND ACTION 1871-1914

A Dissertation
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requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by
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PALESTINE IN GERMAN THOUGHT AND ACTION 1871-1914

A Dissertation Abstract

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This dissertation is a study of German interests in Palestine, both in thought and action, before 1914. It is based primarily on the German Foreign Ministry archives, which were captured and microfilmed before their return to Germany, and on contemporary periodical literature.

The study begins with the German participation in the "peaceful crusade" which began after the opening of Syria and Palestine to Western penetration in the 1840's. Special attention given to the formation of the Temple Society whose aim it was to colonize the Holy Land. The fact that German religious, educational and philanthropic institutions, as well as colonies, were established in Palestine even before the founding of the German Empire in 1871, had important later consequences.

The presence of a relatively large number of German nationals in the Holy Land, for instance, forced Chancellor von Bismarck to pay much greater attention to events in Palestine than he would have otherwise done. Furthermore, the fact that German settlements were flourishing in Palestine, at the very time the colonial agitation of the 1880's began in Germany, gained the enterprise support from various colonial interests. Germany's position in Palestine raised fears and suspicions in Europe over the German Governments's political intentions. At no time were these suspicions greater than during Emperor William II's journey to the East in
1898. Although all speculations that Germany intended to dominate Palestine proved baseless, the visit of the Emperor further stimulated the growth of "Deutschum" in the Holy Land. The German Foreign Ministry in the era of "Weltpolitik" was, however, careful not to sacrifice Germany's growing political and economic ties with Turkey merely to gain advantages in Palestine. Such considerations were most consistently followed by the Foreign Ministry in its dealings with the Zionist movement.

The German involvement in Palestine generally received much coverage in the German press. For those interested in comprehensive reports there were several German journals that were exclusively devoted to the Holy Land. Moreover, items concerning the German colonies in Palestine were often featured in the colonial papers.

How far Germany would have gone to protect her interests in Palestine can not definitely be stated since no severe international crisis involving these interests arose. But even if it is assumed that the German Government would not have fought to maintain its position in Palestine before 1914, this land clearly commanded much greater attention in Germany than historians have hitherto indicated.
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INTRODUCTION

This study demonstrates how Palestine\(^1\) from the time it was opened to Western penetration in the middle of the nineteenth century, attracted attention in Germany. The material presented deals not only with Germany's official policy, it also concerns the interests of German Protestants, Catholics, and Jews in the Holy Land. German involvement in the affairs of Palestine was reflected in books, pamphlets, and journals as well as in direct action, both official and unofficial.

The importance of Palestine to Germany, as well as to other nations, has been relatively much greater than either the size of that land or its natural resources warranted. The reason for this to a large extent lay in the fact that Palestine was a spiritual center and a holy land to rival religions championed by contending powers. However, more than religion was involved. Located in the Near East - an area of great strategic significance\(^2\) - Palestine formed the land bridge that connected Asia with

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1 Until the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 there was no geopolitical entity called Palestine. The term Palestine was first used by the Romans in the second century A.D. It referred to the southern portion of the Roman province of Syria. "Palestine" for many centuries remained in popular use as a general term connoting a region that extended from the Mediterranean on the west to the Arabian desert on the east, and from the Litani river in the north to the Gaza valley in the south. See "Palestine," Encyclopedia Britanica, 14th ed., vol. XVII.

2 The strategic significance of the Near East is best explained by what Ernst Jackh, one of the most insistent pre-war advocates of a German Turkish orientation, has termed its "three
Africa and Mesopotamia with the Mediterranean Sea.

The significance of the Near East, in modern times, increased following Napoleon's campaigns in Egypt and Palestine in 1798-1799. Ideas regarding the possible German colonization and domination of this region were first voiced in the 1840's and were repeated in the 1880's. Although Palestine became the only land in the Near East in which German colonists really settled, Germany's economic, cultural, and political positions in the Turkish Empire beginning in the late 1880's were constantly strengthened.

The activities of the Great Powers in Palestine, as manifested by the recent publications of professors A. L. Tibawi, and Derek Hopwood, have only lately become of interest to historians. No study concerning German activities in Palestine has yet been made. The works of Fritz Fischer, Ulrich Trumpner, and of the Marxist historians Wilhelm Gotlieb and Lothar Rathmann have almost exclusively been devoted to the Era of the First World War. These studies as well as those concerned with continental and three oceanic status. Not only do Europe, Asia and Africa merge there, but the Mediterranean Sea, along whose shores this phenomenon occurs, opens and locks the exit to three oceans. See Ernst Jackh, Background of the Middle East (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 12.


the Berlin Bagdad Railway made little reference, if any, to the subject here under consideration. The fact that there were German societies specifically concerned with Palestine and German colonists living in that land has for some reason not received the attention of historians. Likewise the German diplomatic relations with the Zionist movement prior to 1914 have failed to attract due attention.

Some of the source material used in this study, especially the periodical literature, has always been available. On the other hand the documents of the German Foreign Ministry used here have become available only in recent years. The availability of these official documents not only makes the story more complete, but they also give a clear expression to the extent to which various German officials, including some of the Chancellors and the Emperors, had Palestine on their mind.

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For the latest study of the Berlin Bagdad Railway see Lothar Rathmann, _Berlin Bagdad_ (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1962). The best accounts among the older works continue to be those of Edward Mead Earle, _Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway_ (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935), and John Wolf, _The Diplomatic History of the Bagdad Railway_ (Columbia: The University of Missouri, 1936).

The German documents used for this study are from the collection of the German Foreign Ministry Archives, 1867-1920 (Microfilm Collections). This collection of records will henceforth be cited as A. A. ("Auswärtiges Amt.")
CHAPTER I
GERMANY AND PALESTINE BEFORE 1871

Early Relations

The first German contacts with Palestine were religious.¹ The earliest German visitor to the Holy Land was Willibald, Bishop of Eichstadt, who made his pilgrimage in the early eighth century. This pilgrimage, however, was not immediately followed by others. The growth of Moslem power in and around the Mediterranean Sea temporarily halted similar ventures until the tenth century. Among the more prominent Germans who came to Palestine in that century were Hilda, Countess of Swabia, and Judith, Dutchess of Bavaria. In spite of the fact that these early pilgrimages were usually not undertaken out of curiosity and a spirit of adventurism, many of the returning pilgrims wrote full and vivid accounts of their journey. Such accounts,

¹The subject of German pilgrimages to Palestine was carefully researched in Germany during the nineteenth century. One of the earliest bibliographies published on this subject was Titus Tobler's Bibliographia geographia Palestinæ. Zunächst kritische Uebersicht gedruckter und ungedruckter beschreibungen der reisen in Heiligen Land (Leipzig: S. Hirzl, 1867). The most authoritative work on German pilgrimages to Palestine was the study of Reinhold Röhrich and Heinrich Meisner, Deutsche Pilgerreisen nach dem Heiligen Lande (Berlin: Weidmann Verlag, 1880). A shorter edition of this work was published by Reinhold Röhrich in 1900. The names of German pilgrims listed in this work alone covered over 200 pages. Das Heilige Land in its first issue published in 1857 declared that one of its purposes was to publish historic items of interest that concerned pilgrimages. Likewise Die Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina Vereins in its first publication in 1878 made it known that it was soliciting articles on the subject.
once they were transcribed and made public, effectively stimu-
lated interest in the Holy Land. Consequently, beginning in the
eleventh century individual pilgrimages began to be supplemented
by large pilgrim caravans. The greatest German enterprise of
this kind was organized in the autumn of the year 1064. The
participants, numbering at least seven thousand, were led by
Archbishop Sigfried of Mainz, Bishop Gunther of Bamberg, Bishop
William of Utrecht and Otto of Ratisbon.

A new relationship between Germany and Palestine, one
that did not remain exclusively religious in character, was
inaugurated during the Era of the Crusades. Among the most
important German participants in the various crusades were King
Conrad III, Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, his son Henry VI and
his successor Emperor Frederick II. Germany's political involve-
ment in Palestine, during this period, reached its height when
Emperor Frederick II, as King of Jerusalem, entered the holy
city on March 17, 1233. However, already by the end of that
century no Germans were left in Palestine. Acre, the last im-
portant Christian stronghold in the Holy Land, fell to the Mos-
lems in 1291. Among its defenders were the Teutonic Knights.2
This German Order, having failed to secure its position in Pales-
tine, consequently diverted its energies to create a German

2 The Teutonic Knights were organized from among German
knights who had arrived in Palestine in 1197 and chose not to
return to Germany. They were incorporated in 1198 and received
recognition from the Pope as a Military Order. The Order soon
received many gifts in Germany and began to acquire castles in
Syria and Palestine. Among its most important possessions was
the castle of Confort which dominated the city of Acre. The
castle while under German domination was named Starkenberg.
colonial empire on the shores of the Baltic.

Even though pilgrimages from Germany to Palestine were resumed within ten years of the fall of Acre, all German attempts, before the nineteenth century, to establish any meaningful political or economic relations with the East failed. The first serious attempt to establish commercial relations with the Near East was undertaken by the Augsburg house of Manlich in 1526. Although the enterprise at the height of its operations had as many as seven ships in the Mediterranean, its success was short lived. A later attempt, which saw the establishment of the "Levantinische Compagnie" by Philip Clement, with the blessing of King Frederick the Great, was even less successful. Among the most important commercial and political concessions gained by any German state in the Near East before the nineteenth century was the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce of March 23, 1761 by which Prussia obtained capitulatory privileges in the Ottoman Empire.\(^3\) The inherent benefits of this treaty for Prussia, however, became apparent only in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The German "Rediscovery" of the Near East

The internal disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the parallel ascendancy of Prussia in the nineteenth century tended to awake renewed interest in Germany for the affairs of the Near East.

Only Prussia of all the Great Powers of Europe had at

\(^3\) The treaty was patterned after the famous French capitulation Treaty of February, 1535. It was reconfirmed on March 20, 1862.
the beginning of the nineteenth century no economic or political interests in the domains of the Sultan. Thus it was not surprising that the Prussian Ambassador in Constantinople immediately after the battle of Navarre in 1827 was accorded a privileged diplomatic position over his European colleagues. The outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war in 1828 accorded Prussia her first opportunity to take advantage of this privileged position. Hoping to mediate the dispute, General Friedrich von Muffling, the Prussian Chief of Staff, arrived in Constantinople on August 4, 1829. His efforts to persuade Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) to enter into negotiations with the Russians proved successful and resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Adrianople. Consequently, before he returned to Prussia, General Muffling was granted an audience by the Sultan, "a privilege which," according to Heinrich von Trietschke, "no Frank had enjoyed within the memory of man."4

A further opportunity for Prussia to pay greater attention to the affairs of the Near East arose during Muhammad Ali's revolt against the Sultan. Muhammad Ali, the Pasha of Egypt, having modernized his army with French help, began his campaign against the Sultan by seizing control of Palestine and Syria. The campaign begun in late 1831 was so successful that by December of the following year the Egyptian forces were already threatening Constantinople. With France actively supporting the Egyptians and the British undecided over what course of

action to follow, the Sultan turned to Russia for protection. The Russian intervention that followed saved the Sultan, but at a cost that was very disturbing to Britain. The Treaty of Unkia-Skelessi, signed between Russia and Turkey on July 8, 1833 seemed to Palmerston to have laid the ground work for possible unilateral Russian intervention in Turkey. Palmerston, who until then had not been enthusiastic over the Sultan's attempts to reform his own army, suddenly decided to offer Turkey instructors and aid. Consequently, a British military mission headed by Lieutenant Colonel Considine arrived in Turkey. The British gesture, however, was not enthusiastically welcomed by the Turks. Not only were they unwilling to give Considine the command of the army; they had found an alternative - Prussian military advisors.

The first Prussian military advisor employed by the Sultan was Captain Helmuth von Moltke who arrived in Constantinople on a private visit in 1835. His mission, and that of other Prussian officers who followed him, inaugurated a tradition that

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5 Henry Temple Viscount Palmerston (1784-1865). British Foreign Secretary from 1830-1834, 1835-1841, 1846-1851.


7 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 80. Mahmud II is sometimes referred to as the Turkish Peter the Great, because of his attempt to westernize Turkey.

8 Webster, vol. II, p. 546.

9 Later Field-Marshall, chief of the German General Staff 1857-1888. For Moltke's mission in Turkey see his Gesammelte Schriften und Denkwürdigkeiten (8 vols.; Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1892), especially volumes I and II.
was to last into the twentieth century. Having somewhat strengthened his army Sultan Mahmud II finally resolved to end the Egyptian occupation of Syria and Palestine by force. The Turkish army commanded by Hafiz Pasha crossed the Euphrates in April, 1839. However, for two months thereafter it undertook no action. Von Moltke, fearing a surprise Egyptian attack, suggested to the Turkish command either to attack or, as a precautionary move, to withdraw to the fortress of Birejik. When he was rebuffed on both his suggestions von Moltke resigned. On the day after, the Turkish army was decisively defeated by the Egyptians at Nizib. Two other developments, the sudden death of the Sultan and the defection of the Turkish navy to the Egyptians, suddenly seemed to make the disintegration of the Turkish state inevitable.

The deteriorating situation in the Near East once again became a matter of concern to all the Powers. Palmerston, determined to preserve the territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire, mobilized the Powers of Europe, save France, against the Egyptians. A convention between Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, on the one hand, and the Sultan, on the other, for joint action against Muhammad Ali, was signed on July 15, 1840 in London. On September 7, 1840, two days after Muhammad Ali's rejection of the terms offered to him, an allied fleet (British and Austrian) bombarded Beirut. Acre was bombarded and captured on November 3. Next, the allied fleet commanded by Admiral Napier moved on Alexandria. Consequently a treaty restoring Syria and Palestine to the Sultan was signed at Alexandria on

Prussia gave only moral, not military, support to the concert.
November 27, 1840 and was confirmed by the Treaty of London for the Pacification of the Levant, signed on July 18, 1841.

Thus, thanks to the intervention of Europe, the Egyptian occupation of Syria and Palestine which had lasted for almost a decade came to an end. The consequence of the occupation and the restoration were very far reaching. A new era had begun in which these lands, for the first time since the Crusades, were opened to European penetration. This process already began under the Egyptian regime. The Egyptian authorities had exhibited surprising toleration toward the Christian population. Christians were granted equal rights; they were exempt from military duty; missionary activity was permitted and most important, the European Powers for the first time were allowed to set up consulates in Jerusalem and in Damascus.11 In spite of the restoration of Turkish rule, this process could no longer be reversed.

The first Prussian Consul in Jerusalem, Dr. Ernst Gustav Schultz, arrived in Palestine in 1843. This appointment was quite in line with a current within Germany which saw a reawakening of interest in the Orient in general and Palestine in particular, a trend best illustrated by the various publications that appeared during these years. Carsten Niebuhr's Reisen durch

11 Henry Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931), pp. 163-165. Under the capitulatory system European consuls in the Ottoman Empire claimed more privileges and exemptions than consuls in any other country. Among the more important privileges thus enjoyed were personal privileges like freedom of worship, economic privileges that included exemption from direct taxation and juridical privileges that accorded the right to be tried in consular courts. Such exemptions were even extended to the employees of the consuls, the employees' families and servants and to what ever nationals the consuls cared to recognize.
Syrien und Palästina nach Cypern was posthumously published in 1837. Moltke’s letters from Turkey, full of fascinating observations and comments were published, with an introduction by Carl Ritter, in 1841. Carl Ritter, the greatest geographer of modern times, was already at work on the Palästina volumes of his Erdkunde. Another well known German geographer’s work, Heinrich Kiepert’s Atlas in fünf Blätter Zu Robinson’s Palästina appeared in 1840-1841. Two years later this map was followed by another map of Palestine that included an original map of the land east of the Jordan river. Dr. Ernst Gustav Schultz’s Jerusalem was published in 1845. W. Kraft’s Die Topographie Jerusalem’s in 1846, and Friedrich Adolf Strauss Sinai und Golgotha in 1847. The first German scientific society devoted exclusively to the affairs of the Orient “Die Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft” was established on October 2, 1845. The purpose of the society was to further German knowledge of Asia. Among its first activities the society published a periodical

12 Carsten Niebuhr, Reisen durch Syrien und Palästina nach Cypern (Hamburg, 1837).


16 See Ernst Gustav Schultz, Jerusalem (Berlin: S. Schropp, 1845), W. Kraft, Die Topographie Jerusalem’s (Bonn: M. B. König, 1846) and Friedrich Adolf Strauss, Sinai und Golgotha (Berlin: Jonas Verlag, 1847).
and founded a library. *Die Zeitschrift der Morgenländische Gesellschaft* during its first years of publication regularly featured articles that dealt with Palestine. 17

Even though these works were primarily scientifically oriented, political speculations and suggestions concerning these "newly discovered" lands did not lag behind. Already Moltke in his letters from Turkey, written between 1835 and 1839, made repeated references to possible German opportunities in the areas he visited. His ideas concerning German colonization in the Near East, as recently pointed out by a renowned historian, were not dissimilar to those of the German imperialists of the 1900's. 18

Commenting in the *Augsburger Algemeine Zeitung* in 1841 concerning the events that led to the restoration of Syria and Palestine to the Sultan, Moltke emphasized the point that these lands were in reality handed over to the Turks, by the European Powers, as a present. 19 He had no confidence in the newly imposed Turkish administration and feared that new uprisings were inevitable. He ventured to predict that a new war that could lead to European intervention would break out in less than two years. Such a threat to the peace of Europe, Moltke declared, could be avoided were Palestine turned into a Christ-


19 Moltke's articles in the *Augsburger Algemeine Zeitung* were later compiled into one chapter entitled "Deutschland und Palästina" in his *Gesamelte Schriften und Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. II, pp. 279-288.
ian principality headed by a German Prince. Public opinion in Europe, he believed, would favor this development. 20

Being a military man and a political realist Moltke well understood that what was involved was not merely a religious problem. More than just the city of Jerusalem and the fate of the Christians in Palestine was at stake. A Christian principality in Palestine consisting of Jerusalem and the Holy Places could have no future. It would be isolated, surrounded by enemies from all sides and torn apart by internal strife. Consequently the state to be created would need access to the strategic sea coast. It would have to be strong enough to repel both Egyptian and Turkish attacks. In fact what Moltke envisioned was a buffer state to separate Egypt from Syria. 21

Palestine, Moltke realized, could not be overburdened though by military expenses. Hence its army would consist of several battalions of well trained troops staffed with European soldiers and officers, and of a militia similar to the one that existed on the Austro-Turkish borders. This system, he believed, was particularly well suited for Palestine because of the need for colonization. He foresaw that the "rich soil" and "the fortunate skies" of that land would attract a great number of immigrants. Economically the state would prosper because of its geographical location and its harbors. The rights of the individual, of property and of religious freedom, according to Moltke, were to be guaranteed. The form of government best suited for this state was enlightened absolutism. The "half barbaric" conditions of Palestine required a righteous, wise

20 Ibid. 21 Ibid.
and energetic ruler. In order for colonization to succeed an honest, upright and diligent administration was required.\textsuperscript{22}

Needless to say Moltke had little doubt that the people best qualified for these tasks were German. Other considerations also favored Germany. "Germany," as he stated, "has the negative advantage of not being a sea power, but has commercial trade outlets to the Orient through the navigation of the Danube and the Austrian ports of the Adriatic."\textsuperscript{23}

The consequences and the influence of such an exemplary state in the Orient were "unmeasurable." England, Moltke charged, had already apportioned to herself much of the world. France had acquired Algiers. Why should not Germany, when the opportunity presents itself, spread her own culture, industriousness and honesty, he asked.\textsuperscript{24} The idea that Palestine should become an outpost of German civilization was to be repeated, as will be seen, also in later years.

Moltke's conviction that Germany's natural routes to the Orient lay along the Danube was shared by Friedrich List. List claimed that the "lands of the lower Danube and the Black Sea, all of Turkey, the entire southeast beyong Hungary is our hinterland."\textsuperscript{25} It was, according to List, the duty of the "German race" to lead the world, "to civilize wild and barbaric lands" and to settle unpopulated areas.\textsuperscript{26} "Standing still" meant for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{23}Ibid., p. 284.
\item \textsuperscript{24}Ibid., p. 288.
\item \textsuperscript{26}Ibid., p. 445.
\end{itemize}
him nothing else but retreat.  

Asia-Minor and Egypt contained the most fertile areas in the world. A civilized government there, List believed, would be able to direct the flow of European emigration to those lands.  

To prove his contention, List pointed to the fact that England had already raised her exports to Turkey, Egypt and Syria, in the decade between 1834-1844, by 130 percent.  

List regarded the emigration from southern Germany to the United States as basically unnatural, and wished it to be redirected towards the areas of the Danube and beyond. Other political economists in Germany voiced similar views. Claiming that Germans who emigrate to America, Russia or Australia are lost to their Fatherland, William Rescher upheld List's ideas of emigration "towards those parts of Turkey, which God willing, shall yet constitute the inheritance of the German people."  

Louder and more aggressive calls for German colonization in the Turkish domains followed. The archeologist Ludwig Ross writing in the Allgemeine Zeitung in 1845 called for channeling German emigration to the lands of the Mediterranean, especially to Asia-Minor. Ross reminded his readers that the first attempts to colonize these areas were undertaken by the Crusaders. These, he insisted, were German enterprises, since  

27 Ibid., p. 447.  
29 Ibid., p. 450.  
31 These articles were published in book form in 1850. See Ludwig Ross' Kleinasien und Deutschland. Reisebriefe und Aufsätze mit Bezugnahme auf die Möglichkeit Deutscher Niederlassungen in Kleinasien (Halle: E. Pfeiffer Verlag, 1850).
The most important Crusades were led by Germans. The rights of Europeans to these lands were the same as those of the Phoenicians, the Greeks, the Romans and the Turks. This was the right of might. German colonization must therefore begin without bothering to ask how. He suggested looking to history; "when our ancestors wanted to occupy Jerusalem or Kurland they did not ask how, they simply went and occupied it." Writing after the Revolution of 1848, Ross indicated that his views had hardened. He now called upon Germany to conquer Asia Minor by force, insisting that what was needed was boldness rather than a German naval squadron in the Mediterranean.

German scientific investigations directed by such well known scholars as the geographer Heinrich Barth, the anthropologist Rudolf Virchow, and the archeologists Heinrich Schlemann and Ernst Curtius, continued to increase German knowledge and enthusiasm for the Near East. Politically oriented publications, for instance Kuhlmann's *Palästina als Ziel und Boden Germanischer Auswanderung und Kolonization mit Rücksicht auf eine Germanische Kolonisation des Orients im Allgemeinen* (Palestine as the Goal and Ground of German Emigration and Colonization with Consideration regarding the General Colonization of the Orient) also continued. More important, however,

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32 Ibid., pp. 180-181. 33 Ibid., p. 188.
34 Ibid., p. XX
for later developments, were some of the concrete steps that were taken to reestablish German influence in Palestine.

The First Projects

The roots of Germanism ("Deutschtum") were successfully planted in Palestine through a combination of projects that included: the establishment of the Bishopric of Jerusalem, the establishment of German charitable and educational institutions in the Holy Land, and the establishment of the Temple Society.

The opening of Syria and Palestine to European penetration coincided with a change in Prussia which was of great consequence for Germany's activity in the Holy Land. Frederick William IV who succeeded his father to the throne on June 7, 1840 was a man very much influenced by religion. The living conditions of the Christians in the Holy Land had interested him from his early youth. The events in the Near East, according to Trietschke, seemed to him like "the renewal of the Crusades, like a victory of the Cross over the Crescent." He believed that conditions in Palestine presented Prussia with an irretrievable opportunity not only to restore Christian influence to the Holy Land, but also to have the Protestant Church represented equally with the Latins and the Greeks. A memorial written by Joseph Maria von Radowitz suggested that three residents, chosen for the Latins by France and Austria, for the Greeks by

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39 Bunsen, Vol. I, p. 595. Radowitz (1797-1853) was a Prussian general and a politician who advised the Prussian monarch.
Russia and for the Protestants by Britain and Prussia, should be appointed to represent the European Powers in Jerusalem. These residents were to be protected by a European garrison stationed in the city. The European residents, it was further suggested, were to receive judicial jurisdiction over the local Christian population. Moreover, the Holy Sites at Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Nazareth, as well as certain fortifications, were to be turned over to the Christians. These proposals were presented by Prussia to the Great Powers on March 30, 1841 but not adopted.

Frederick William IV, having resolved not to let his opportunity in Palestine slip by, decided to take a different approach. Baron von Bunsen, one of the King's Privy Councillors, who was serving in Bern, was summoned to Berlin. Bunsen was appointed Envoy Extraordinary to the Court of St. James and sent to London with special and confidential instructions. According to R. W. Graves, Bunsen's instructions consisted of three proposals. Two were contained in a memorandum from Bunsen to Palmerston dated July 15, 1841. The first of these two, according to Graves, is said to have suggested that Turkey's land laws be amended so as to allow Christian (especially Protestant) settlers to buy and own land in the Turkish Empire. The second proposal envisioned a joint Protestant corporation to be set up

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40 Ibid. The Prussian plan was one of several plans advanced at that particular juncture of the Eastern Question. Since each power was suspicious of the other, none of the proposals was realized.

41 R. W. Graves, "The Jerusalem Bishopric," The English Historical Review, LXIV (July, 1949), 328-352. Graves, using the records of the British Foreign Office, concluded that the Prussian aims were political rather than religious.
by Britain and Prussia. This memorandum, according to Graves, not only emphasized the material advantages that could be gained in the Near East, it also urged the British Government to act quickly in order to counter the activities of the other European powers. \(^{42}\) The third proposal brought by Bunsen to England concerned the creation of a joint Jerusalem bishopric. Of the three proposals this was the only one to gain acceptance.

The Anglo-Prussian agreement of 1841 concerning the Jerusalem Bishopric stipulated that the nomination of the bishops of Jerusalem would alternate. The first was to be nominated by Britain. The next by the King of Prussia, and although a Prussian subject, he was to be ordained by the Archbishop of Canterbury. Half of the endowment was to come from the King of Prussia, the other half from the British crown.

Even though theologically and politically this agreement favored Britain, \(^{43}\) it did accord Prussia her first opportunity to set foot in Palestine and participate in the "Peaceful Crusade." \(^{44}\) The venture lasted forty years. Ecclesiastically it was of no great significance. It was abrogated by Prussia upon the death of Bishop Joseph Barclay in October, 1881. The German Government at that time decided to forgo its right of nomination and renounced the arrangement on the grounds that it favored Britain. However, by then Germany's influence in Pales-

\(^{42}\) Ibid.

\(^{43}\) Trietschke characterized the political aspects of the agreement as a "monstrosity" (Vol. VI, p. 443).

\(^{44}\) The term is used to characterize the missionary work of the rival powers in Palestine during this period.
The first German missionaries arrived in Palestine in 1846. They came from St. Chrischona near Basel, in Switzerland, upon the request of Bishop Samuel Gobat who himself had been nominated that year by Frederick William IV to serve as Bishop of Jerusalem. The mission, as far as Prussia was concerned, ended in failure. The Swiss missionaries were unable to support themselves and joined the British mission already in Palestine.

Of much greater significance, for the future of German influence in Palestine, was the arrival of Pastor Fliedner from Kaiserwerth on the Rhine. Accompanied by four Deaconesses he arrived in Palestine, again on the request of Bishop Gobat, in 1851. Unlike his predecessors Pastor Fliedner had obtained financial and moral support for his project from the Prussian monarch. Frederick Wilhelm IV in order to guarantee the success of this mission, and the future of other German missions to Palestine, founded the "Berlin Jerusalem Verein" on December 2, 1852. The function of this society, according to Article one of its statutes, was: to assist the German Evangelical Church in the Holy Land, to establish schools, hospitals and hospices, and to render assistance to members of the Church who either travel to Palestine or choose to settle there. The society published a newsletter called Neueste Nachrichten aus dem Morgenlande.

Bishop Gobat served in Jerusalem from 1846-1879. He was the most successful of the bishops appointed under the joint agreement.

The first institution established by the Deaconesses in Jerusalem was a hospital with eight to ten beds, open to all nationals and denominations. The success of the hospital was immediately apparent. After additions made in 1852 proved inadequate, the hospital, four years later, moved into new quarters. The new structure, and an additional plot of land, were purchased by the "Berlin Jerusalem Verein." The land was soon utilized for establishing a new German institution, the Tolitakumi school for girls, which opened in 1868.

Besides these two so-called Kaiserwerther institutions the "Jerusalem Verein" supported the "Syrian Orphanage" in Jerusalem. This German institution was a direct outgrowth of the Christian massacres in the Lebanon in 1860. Pastor Ludwig Schneller had left Jerusalem for the Lebanon to recruit candidates for his planned missionary work, and although he returned with only nine boys, the orphanage was established. It eventually grew to encompass a complex of ten different institutions with an enrollment of over two thousand children.

The "Jerusalem Verein" began to enter the field of missionary work on its own in the 1860's. Its first school and church were established at Bethlehem in 1865. An asylum for leprosy patients, "Jesus Hilfe," was founded in Jerusalem in 1867. Other projects sponsored by this society followed in the years after the founding of the German Empire.


48 Altneuland-Monatsschrift für die Wirtschaftliche Erschliessung Palästinas, IV (1907), 218.
German Catholic activity in Palestine first centered on promoting Catholic rather than German interests. The first German Catholic society for Palestine was established under the auspices of King Ludwig of Bavaria in 1838. The purpose of the "Ludwigsmissionsverein" was limited to supporting Catholic work in Palestine.49 Similarly the "Verein Von Heiligen Grabe," established in Cologne in 1855, contributed its collections to the Latin Patriarch in Jerusalem.50 Even so, this society especially through its organ Das Heilige Land (a bi-monthly first published in 1857) did much to arouse the interest of the German public in Palestine. The purpose of the publication, as outlined in its first issue, was to awaken interest in the Catholic affairs of Palestine by featuring historical, descriptive, archeological and topographical articles about the Holy Land.51

Of still greater significance than either the work of the Evangelical Church or the German Catholics, for the development of Germanism in Palestine, was the establishment of the "Tempelgesellschaft" (Temple Society) in Württemberg. The plan of the Temple Society was to promote emigration to Palestine of persons ready to share a common religious and social viewpoint envisioning the second coming of the Messiah.

The founder, and for many years the driving force behind this organization, was Christoph Hoffmann (1815-1885). His

49 "Der Bayernkonig Ludwig I und das Heilige Land," Die Katholischen Missionen, XXXII (1903), 30-32.

50 "Das goldne Jubilaum des deutschen Vereins vom Heiligen Lande" Das Heilige Land, XLIX (1905), 129-135.

51 Ibid., I (1906), 1-5.
father, Gotlieb Wilhelm Hoffmann, was the spiritual leader of a small Swabian pietistic community at Korntal which he founded in 1818. Having been brought up in the religious atmosphere of Korntal, the younger Hoffmann was deeply influenced by the pietistic teachings of the eighteenth century south German divine, John Bengel. Quite naturally he chose the study of theology. His studies at the University of Tübingen did much, so Hoffman tells in his biography, to stimulate his interest in the Orient. He was also greatly influenced by Leopold von Ranke. It was through his works that Hoffmann came to appreciate the power of the individual in shaping the course of history.

The founding of the Süddeutsche Warte in 1845 by Hoffmann and two associates accorded him one of his first opportunities to voice his conservative religious and political viewpoint in public. It is interesting to note that already in his first article entitled "Past and Future," while making no reference to Palestine, Hoffman declared that the political future of Germany lay in the East. The Revolution of 1848 accompanied by the failure of the Frankfurt Parliament, to which Hoffmann was elected, caused him to reevaluate his religious and political views. The conclusion which he reached was that the future of Germany, and for that matter of the whole world, depended on a new socio-religious orientation that must be based on the teachings of the

53 Ibid., p. 680.
54 Ibid., vol. II, pp. 154-159. A reprint of the article is found here.
prophets of the Old Testament. It was this realization which placed Hoffmann on "the road to Jerusalem." According to the editorial if that were to happen only the "people of God," though admittedly not assembled as yet, should be given the liberated land. Consequently one year later the same paper carried an invitation to the public to attend an open meeting at Ludwigsburg to discuss the idea. At the meeting, held on August 24, 1854, 439 signatures (365 represented heads of households) of so-called Friends of Jerusalem were collected for a petition to be addressed to the Diet of the Germanic Confederation at Frankfurt. The petition, carried by Hoffmann to the President of the Confederation, called for efforts to be under-

58 Ibid., pp. 343-344. The article was entitled "Die Morgenländische Frage."
taken to intercede with the Sultan, to induce him to open Palestine to German colonization. The political aspects of the petition stressed the point that while German emigrants to America and Australia were lost to Germany, the settlers intending to emigrate to Palestine would remain German and would continue to contribute to the welfare of their motherland.

The fact that the response of the Germanic Confederation was negative did not deter Hoffmann. In order to demonstrate their serious intentions the Friends of Jerusalem decided in 1856 to create their own community in Germany. They settled at Kirchenhardthof, a hamlet near the city of Waiblingen, to prepare for the eventual emigration to Palestine. One year later Hoffmann, while in Berlin, was granted an audience by Frederick William IV. The King was given a detailed account about the aims and aspirations of the Friends of Jerusalem and was requested to approve the sending of a commission to Palestine to examine the feasibility of the plan. Frederick William gave his approval but insisted that the commission include a physician and a scientist. By the time the proposed commission was formed the Prussian monarch had fallen ill, and in his absence the attitude in Berlin towards Hoffmann changed. The official protection and services of the Prussian consulates in the Orient was all

59 Ibid., p. 366.
60 Friedrich Lange, Geschichte des Tempels (Jerusalem: Verlag von Christoph Hoffmann, 1899), p. 53. The author was a teacher at the Temple colony of Haifa.
61 Ibid., p. 167.
62 Christoph Hoffmann, vol. II, p. 422.
that the commission was promised.

The commission, reduced to Hoffmann and two colleagues, arrived in Palestine on March 14, 1858. Neither Dr. Netzstein, the Prussian Consul, nor the German Evangelists working in Jerusalem shared Hoffmann's enthusiasm. The trip was a disappointment. Hoffmann became convinced that much work still lay ahead before his project could be realized. Writing in the Süddeutsche Warte upon his return from Palestine, Hoffmann reemphasized his determination not to give up. Declaring that for the first time since the Crusades conditions could be changed in Palestine, Hoffmann called on Germany "to recognize its national duty." Hoffmann's idea of Germany's future political role in the Near East was clarified by a memorial submitted to the Diet of the Germanic Confederation in April, 1859. Envisioning a partition of the Turkish Empire, the document conceded Constantinople to Greece and Egypt to England. Syria and Palestine, it demanded, must be placed under Germanic protection.

The "Tempelgesellschaft" (Temple Society) was officially founded as a religious society, independent of the German Evangelical state church, in June, 1861. The Süddeutsche Warte became the official publication of the society. The official goals of the Temple Society well reflected the fact that its religious aims were intimately connected to political ones. The

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63 Ibid., p. 436.
64 Friedrich Lange, pp. 182-192.
65 Ibid., p. 213.
66 The title was changed to Warte des Tempels in 1877. The place of publication was Stuttgart.
program of the society called for the rebuilding of the Temple in Jerusalem and the occupation of Palestine. A synod held by the society in Stuttgart in April, 1862 further clarified this point. The first paragraph of the first resolution adopted by this synod declared:

The spiritual and material interests of the German people find their satisfaction through the transformation and occupation of the Orient.

According to Hoffmann the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, which resulted in "the spilling of German blood and the parallel rise of Frehcn power," convinced the members of the Temple Society that their planned emigration to Palestine must be hastened. Hoffmann had hoped that the planned emigration would not be a matter of small groups leaving here and there, but that an organized people of 40,000 to 50,000 would colonize Palestine in an organized effort. The impatience of the membership, though, convinced him to change plans. An official decision to begin colonization could not be delayed, as some individuals were already beginning to leave without due authorization. Under these circumstances the Temple Society at a special assembly in Kirchenhardthof on March 25, 1868 decided that emigration to Palestine must begin at once.

The first emigrants, headed by Hoffmann and his family, left Germany in August, 1868. On reaching Constantinople Hoffmann petitioned the Turkish Government for a firman to allow the

67 Friedrich Lange, p. 240. 68 Ibid., p. 256.
71 Lange, pp. 328-329. 72 Ibid., p. 342.
Temple Society to lease a three square mile area at Mount Carmel in Palestine. In its petition the society also demanded the right to purchase the land, to be exempt from military service and taxation, as well as the right of self government. Before leaving Constantinople Hoffmann received the encouraging news that the King of Prussia was taking a personal interest in the project, and that he had ordered his representatives to promote the matter. 73 Indeed the idea to apply for a firman had originally come from T. Weber, the Consul in Beirut, who in May had suggested that the German settlers should not become Turkish subjects. 74 The Turkish reply reached Hoffmann several weeks after his arrival in Palestine. The Turkish Government advised that before the petition could even be considered, the settlers would be required to declare their intention to become Turkish subjects. Consul Weber, reaffirming his earlier advice, again suggested that the settlers not renounce their European protection. 75

The legal aspects concerning the purchase of land were considerably eased when in the following year Prussia and Turkey signed an agreement whereby German nationals could possess title to land just like Turkish nationals. 76 The efforts of the Temple Society to colonize Palestine could now begin in earnest. Purchase of land in Jaffa and near Haifa began in 1869, and the

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73 Ibid., p. 351. 74 Ibid., p. 342. 75 Ibid., p. 361.
76 The treaty became possible under Article I and V of a Turkish Imperial Decree dated January 18, 1867. The text of this document is available in Nasir Sousa, The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1933), pp. 321-323.
first sizable groups of Templers began arriving.

Another important development which tended to increase German influence in Palestine occurred in 1869. Prince Frederick, the Crown Prince of Prussia, visited Palestine on his way to the opening ceremonies of the Suez Canal. He arrived on the morning of November 3, 1869 and landed at Jaffa accompanied by about thirty Prussian soldiers. At the climax of the visit "a large piece of land" near the Church of the Holy Sepulchre was officially transferred to Prussia - a gift from the Sultan. The act of transfer was finalized by a ceremony in which Frederick placed

77U. S., Department of State, Diplomatic and Consular Correspondence (Record Group 59) Jerusalem, 1856-1906, (nine volumes). See vol. II (March 13, 1864-March 13, 1870), despatch of John B. Hay to Hamilton Fish, November 13, 1869. This collection of documents will hereafter be cited as Consular Correspondence Jerusalem. It is used because it reflects the observations of more or less neutral observers. It must be noted that the German Foreign Ministry Archives 1867-1920, archival reference Deutschland I. A. A. a 36 ("Acten betref. die Reise Sr. Kgl. Hoheit des Kronprinzen nach dem Orient und zur Eröffnung des Suez-Canals"), contains no information concerning the visit of the Crown Prince to Palestine.

78Ibid. The property referred to was the eastern half of the enclosure that was known as the Muristan. It had originally belonged to the Knights of St. John. When Saladin occupied Jerusalem he turned the cloister from which the nuns had fled into an asylum, called in Arabic "Muristan," by which name the whole area has since been known. See H. Frutz, "Die Besitzungen des Johanniterordens in Palastina und Syrien," Zeitschrift des Palästina Vereins, IV (1881). Also C. Schick, "The Ancient Churches in the Muristan," Quarterly Statement of the Palestine Exploration Fund, 1901. The Reformation had divided the Order of St. John. The Knights of Malta remained Roman Catholic. The Protestant elements of the Order went to Prussia but their estates were seized by the Prussian Government during the Napoleonic Wars. The Order in Prussia was restored by Frederick William IV in 1859, and he immediately hoped to acquire the site of the Hospital of St. John in Jerusalem. He was not able to acquire the property without the consent of the Sultan as it was "wakuf", i.e., inalienable ecclesiastical property, only obtainable by the order of the Sultan. It was on this site that the Church of the Redeemer, for which consecration William II came to Jerusalem, was built.
the arms of the North German Confederation over the gate of the
grounds acquired. 79

The acquisition of this "valuable concession," 80 which
was lost to Christianity since the thirteenth century, was also
of symbolic significance. It well symbolized the fact that
among the European Powers who for the first time since the Cru­
sades were reasserting themselves in Palestine, Prussia was
playing no minor role.

79 Ibid. 80 Ibid.
The First Temple Colonies

Of the various German projects started in Palestine before the founding of the German Empire the enterprise of the Temple Society seemed unquestionably the most significant and potentially the most valuable. 1

The colonization of Palestine by the Temple Society began, as already mentioned, with the establishment of two urban colonies at Haifa and at Jaffa. The first lands obtained by the Germans at Haifa consisted of an area of merely fifteen acres located on the slope between the feet of Mount Carmel and the Mediterranean Sea, about one mile to the west of the Arab town of Haifa. Regarding this land as only an initial purchase the colony almost immediately undertook plans for the purchase of additional land. The settlement of two hundred families was envisioned. Negotiations to this effect began in 1870 with the Turkish Government through the mediation of Consul Weber in Beirut. 2

1 In the view of the American Consul in Jerusalem of "the various foreign elements in Palestine, of political and moral significance" none deserved more attention than the "German colonization society known as the Temple at Jerusalem." U. S., Department of State, Consular Correspondance, Jerusalem, vol. III (April 30, 1870-October 31, 1873), despatch of J. Beardsley dated August 8, 1871.

2 Friedrich Lange, Geschichte des Tempels, p. 395.
The initial Turkish reaction seemed favorable as Rashid Pasha, the Governor of Syria, was much impressed with the achievements of the settlers. The purchase, though, did not materialize as the Turkish attitude suddenly hardened. Despite this setback, the colony gradually continued to expand through the purchase of other tracts of land at Haifa and its vicinity. The favorable commercial and strategic location of this colony eventually made it the most valuable and beautiful German colony in Palestine.

The appearance of the colony has often been described by contemporary visitors as follows:

Leaving the town (Arab Haifa), we suddenly find ourselves apparently transported into the heart of Europe. Running straight back from the beach for about half a mile, and sloping upward for about a hundred feet in that distance, to the base of the rocky sides of Carmel, runs the village street. On each side of it is a pathway with a double row of shade trees, and behind them a series of white stone houses, of one and two stories generally with tiled roofs, each surrounded with its garden, and each with a text in German engraved over the doorway.

The German colony at Jaffa was established almost simultaneously with that of Haifa. The task of the Germans here was made easier by the failure and dissolution of a colony initiated by American Adventists. Much of the Adventists' property, in-

3Consul Beardsley's report that the Prussian Ambassador at Constantinople concluded a contract with the Porte according to which the Temple Society received one thousand acres of government land at Haifa was premature. In the Consul's opinion only Germany was in a position to gain such a concession. See U. S., Department of State, Consular Correspondence, Jerusalem, vol. III, despatch of Aug. 8, 1871.

4Laurence Oliphant, Haifa (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1887), pp. 23-24

5The organizer of this American colony was a Mr. Adams, the founder of a religious sect, the Church of the Messiah, who had come with one hundred seventy people to settle in Jaffa in 1886.
cluding a hospital, several apartment houses, a hotel and a saw mill, were purchased and put to use by the Germans in 1869.

In August, 1871 Hoffmann with the approval of the Colony's Council of Elders bought the grounds of an old Greek monastery located about four miles northeast of Jaffa. The new land was divided into eighteen lots and prepared for settlement. Two lots were given to families already at Jaffa, twelve were allotted to expected new immigrants from Germany, and the remaining four were set aside for special purposes. The new colony named Sarona, after the valley of Sharon where it was located, was dedicated on August 27, 1871. In his dedication address to the assembled members and guests Hoffmann publically thanked the German emperor for the assistance and the protection accorded the settlers. 6 In September the Directory of the Temple Society in Stuttgart, after hearing an optimistic report about the possibility of restoring the soil of Palestine to its former fertility by the application of scientific agricultural methods, decided to make Sarona an agricultural colony. 7 By the end of 1872 over ten homes and a community hall were already constructed. In its appearance the colony resembled that of Haifa. In the 1880's it was described as follows:

There is a wide central street with neat stone and tilled roofed houses, and two rows of shade trees, with a short cross street, church and schoolhouse, and that general air of cleanliness and comfort which Germans understand so well how to import to their settlements. 8

A fourth German colony named Rephaim was established in

6Lange, pp. 425-426. 7Ibid., p. 427.
8Oliphant, p. 285.
1873 about one mile outside the walls of the old city of Jerusalem. A fifth colony was being planned at et-Tireh in the vicinity of Haifa. Even though colonization was progressing quite rapidly, various external and internal difficulties facing the settlers prompted Hoffmann in 1875 to proceed with greater caution. Consequently, the plans for the colony at et-Tireh were canceled.9

The earliest threat to the lives and morale of the settlers was malaria. In 1872 as many as twenty-six out of 125 settlers succumbed to malarial fever at Sarona alone. Although malarial conditions continued for many years, improved sanitation, drainage, planting of Eucaliptus trees and proper medical care eventually reduced the death rate to an acceptable ratio. The problems of malaria were further compounded by the many difficulties encountered by the settlers in choosing and purchasing fertile land in areas not infested with the disease.

Much of the land in Palestine was unavailable to the settlers as it was owned by the Turkish Government (Miri) and it was reluctant to sell it to foreigners. Free-hold property (Hulk) was either held by villages in communal ownership, or in small patches with multiple owners. Thus, of the land available, either the whole village had to be purchased, or the property owners of the small patches had to agree on a common price. Furthermore only a transaction that resulted in an official registered title (Hedchi) could make the purchase secure. An agreement concluded between the German and Ottoman Empires in 1871, supplementing the earlier agreement with Prussia, entitled German

9Lange, pp. 605-606.
nationals to obtain titles to lands in the Ottoman domains. 10

But having secured the right to hold real estate in their own
name, the Germans, by virtue of the agreement, became subject to
all local taxes levied upon landed property. This naturally ex­
posed them to the arbitrary assessments of the corrupt native
tax collectors, a condition which raised new difficulties. 11 Not
before the 1890's were problems concerning title to land and tax­
atation settled to the satisfaction of the Germans. 12

The first internal split to shake the Temple Society oc­
curred in 1874. From the time colonization began, the adminis­
tration of the society in Palestine was divided between G. A.
Hardegg and Christoph Hoffmann. The former was in charge of col­
onization, the latter with over-all missionary activity. This
administrative division, aimed at separating the secular func­
tions of the society from its religious ones, proved unpractical.
The system had originally been devised in Germany where it was
not realized that the distances and the lack of communication in
Palestine would tend to encourage each colony to develop indepen­
dently. The resulting dispute led to the resignation of Hardegg
from the society in 1874. The fact that he was also the presi­
dent of the Haifa colony motivated eleven families of that col­
ony also to leave the society. They remained in Haifa, but

10 See above p. 25.

11 According to the Imperial Decree of January 18, 1867
foreigners in the Ottoman Empire who became real estate holders
could not enjoy consular immunities in regard to matters con­
cerning that property.

12 Umtsrichter Götel, "Eine deutsche kolonie in Syrien,"
Freussische Jahrbucher, XCVI (April-June, 1899), 237.
joined the Evangelical church. The reorganization of the society which followed saw Hoffmann, together with an elected directory, assume full leadership of all the colonies. The idea that secular and spiritual affairs ought to be separated persisted. In 1879 it was decided that the colonies would transform themselves into civic communities not bound by religious beliefs. These autonomous communities it was hoped would officially be recognized by the German Empire. But the idea was rejected by the German Government as it could not recognize autonomous German bodies on Turkish soil. 13 In place of this plan, a different scheme was substituted. On December 15, 1883, following a suggestion of the "Kolonial Verein" in Germany, 14 the settlers in Palestine formed the "Association for Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture" with headquarters in Jerusalem. This was an ordinary commercial company in which all the settlers could enroll as members. The company, which could also be joined by non-Templers, was placed under the jurisdiction of the German Consulate in Jerusalem. 15 Organized in this way, the Germans hoped to be able to avoid the jurisdiction of the Turkish authorities and also to attract German investors for much needed capital.

Hoffmann had insisted that each emigrating family must have enough capital to live without any income for at least two years. 16 This regulation was strictly enforced so that all immigrants were of some means. Still, especially during the

13 Christoph Paulus, "Die Tempelkolonien," Zeitschrift des Palästina Vereins, VI (1883), 36.
14 See below, p. 63.
15 Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, I (1884), 65.
16 Lange, p. 426.
first years, the success of the enterprise depended to a certain degree on gifts and contributions collected in Germany. In order to increase such contributions, Hoffmann in September, 1875 travelled to Germany. On September 24 a mass meeting attended by about one thousand persons was held at Stuttgart. Hoffmann, addressing the assembled, declared that England was already engaged in rebuilding Palestine and that an English financial association had been formed to promote trade and agriculture in the Near East. He was not only interested in funds but also in investments which he promised would return dividends. The public was invited to comment, but the response was poor. The invitation to speak was accepted, though, by a certain professor Frass who hailed the colonization of Palestine from a German national point of view. Colonial sentiments in Germany in 1875 were not yet ripe. Hoffmann's attempt to arouse interest in the Templers' colonies by comparing them to the colonies of the Puritans in America did not succeed. Indeed, from a financial point of view, the trip to Germany was no success. The financial difficulties continued. Though they were never sufficiently severe to threaten the existence of the colonies, they did stifle economic expansion.

Despite all the difficulties the achievements of the German settlers, especially in the 1870's, were very impressive. Not only were they setting an example of what an industrious and hard working people could do in Palestine; they actually successfully introduced the country into the modern age. One of their most important contributions for the future development of

17 Ibid., pp. 614-615.
Palestine concerned local transportation and commerce. They were the first to introduce wheeled vehicles (carts and wagons) and paved roads and to establish regular inter-city transportation. All this in a land till then dependent on camels, donkeys, and mules.

The road between Haifa and Nazareth, a distance of twenty-two miles, was the first constructed by the Templers. The first section to Samunieh was completed in 1872, the next to Kejdel in 1874, and Nazareth was reached in 1875. The expenses amounting to about one thousand dollars were defrayed by the Franciscan Monastery in Nazareth. Another road constructed by the Haifa colonists led up to the top of Mount Carmel, where in later years a German resort hotel was built. German enterprise also inaugurated transportation between Haifa and Acre and between Jaffa and Jerusalem. The road from Haifa to Acre was paved to accommodate wagons. A German transport company owning thirty wagons and carts began operating regular service between Jaffa and Jerusalem, beginning in 1875. At least one wagon a day left one way, and another the other.

Early German contributions were also made in industry and agriculture. The colony of Haifa after one decade supported four hundred souls. Here Germans owned and operated an oliveoil soap factory, a wind grist, and a factory manufacturing olive wood artifacts. Other businesses belonging to the Haifa colonists included three retail stores, one wholesale store, and a hotel. Individual German residents worked as wagon builders,

18 Ibid., p. 608. 19 Ibid., p. 608.
drivers, silver smiths, shoe makers, tailors, etc. Jaffa's colony by 1880 consisted of an estimated 150 German colonists. German businesses in Jaffa included the firms of Breisch and Friedel, three mills, a hotel, and a hospital. Here Germans were employed as gardeners, craftsmen, mechanics, and other professions. The colony of Rephaim (Jerusalem) with a total population in 1880 of 257 Germans consisted of artisans and craftsmen. The only worthwhile commercial establishment in Jerusalem, Duisberg & Company, with branches at Haifa and Jaffa, was German.

Before the arrival of the German colonists, land cultivation in Palestine was more primitive than it had been in ancient times. Sarona, an exclusively agricultural colony with a population of close to two hundred in 1880, consisted of about six hundred acres of cultivated farm land, one hundred and seventeen acres of vineyards and thirty acres of land cultivated for vegetables. The lands here were very fertile but were often inundated by water coming from wadi Musrara. As mentioned, this

20 Christoph Paulus, p. 36. These statistics were also related in a report submitted to the Foreign Ministry by Von Hacke, the Captain of the German war ship "Gazelle" which visited Palestine in April, 1877. A. A. "Türkei I. A. B. q. 126" (Den Schutz der Christen in Palästina), Von Hacke's report to the Admiralty forwarded to the Foreign Ministry No. A3279, May 24, 1877.

21 Ibid. 22 Ibid.

23 The American Consul in Jerusalem described it as "a large establishment," and reported that Mr. Duisberg had attempted to import some goods from the United States. U. S., Department of State, Consular Correspondence, Jerusalem, vol. IV (December 3, 1873—December 20, 1879), despatch of Joseph G. Wilson, May 10, 1879.

24 Paulus, p. 36.
colony for a time severely suffered from malaria.

The Templar colonists also made contributions in the educational sphere. Convinced of the great importance of education, for both Germans and natives, the Temple Society made it one of its most important tasks to establish schools in all its colonies. The first schools, patterned after the schools in Germany, were established at Jaffa and Haifa, and were opened to everyone who wished to attend. 25 A lyceum, or grammar school for boys, originally established at Jaffa, was moved to Jerusalem in 1873. 26 A boarding school for girls was opened by the society at Haifa in October, 1879. 27 An additional school, The Theological Academy of the Temple Society, with a curriculum of three years, was opened in Jerusalem in October, 1881. 28

These projects were the first to be supported by the German Government. Upon the order of the German Emperor, the schools of the Temple Society in Palestine beginning in 1879 were subsidized by the German Empire. The lyceum in Jerusalem received a yearly subsidy of 1,500 Marks, the school at Haifa 1,100 Marks and the schools at Jaffa and Sarona 625 Marks respectively. 29

The emigration of the Templers to Palestine had by the end of the first decade resulted in the establishment of four colonies representing an investment of about three million Marks. The German population of Palestine had risen to about one thousand, and their achievements were being admired by natives and foreigners alike. This was a significant development. But the

25 Lange, p. 434. 26 Ibid., pp. 737-738.
27 Ibid., p. 760. 28 Ibid., p. 851. 29 Ibid., p. 761.
emigration slowed down in the 1880's. The original enthusiasts for the idea of "assembling the people of God in Palestine" had emigrated and only few new adherents were joining. Palestine, in spite of the achievements of the Templers, offered little inducement to German emigrants who wished to find a better and more comfortable life. Even the establishment of two small additional colonies, named Walhalla and Neuhardhof, in 1892, did not alter the situation. Indeed, not before the beginning of the twentieth century were any important new German colonies established in Palestine.

Bismarckian Diplomacy and Palestine

Bismarck's diplomacy in regard to Palestine generally conformed to the accepted historical view that the Chancellor's diplomacy in the Near East was essentially a disinterested one. Yet, an examination of this subject reveals that it cannot simply be dismissed, as historians have tended to do, merely by quoting Bismarck's famous statement that the Ottoman Empire was not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.  

Bismarck's overall diplomacy was essentially motivated by one primary goal: The preservation of the German Empire founded in 1871. The Chancellor's policies therefore were primarily aimed at maintaining the "status quo" in Europe and preventing the creation of anti-German coalitions. The coalition that Bismarck feared the most was one that could ally France and Russia and thereby threaten Germany with a two-front war. All of Germany's diplomatic moves were subordinated to this one overriding fear.

Bismarck's attitude towards Palestine was complicated by the presence of German nationals in the land and by the fact that the two powers with which he was concerned the most - France and Russia - were themselves intriguing to win predominance there. As early as 1868 Bismarck had been informed by a report from Aleppo that France was making preparations to bring Palestine under French domination. These French ambitions were sure to clash with Russia's own ambitions aimed at Jerusalem, the center of the Orthodox East. The prospects of revived traditional

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31 This view continues to dominate historical thinking on the subject of Bismarckian diplomacy. Langer's *European Alliances and Alignments 1871-1890*, continues to be one of the most thorough diplomatic works that advocates this point of view.


34 For Russia's aims in Palestine see Derek Hopwood's *The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine 1843-1914*. 
Franco-Russian tensions in Palestine, which in the past had already once contributed to the outbreak of war, could not be overlooked by Bismarck. Such a situation could indeed be viewed by Bismarck with some comfort, for as long as France and Russia were at odds, there was little for Germany to fear. Russia’s sensitivity over her position in Palestine, however, rather than leading to tensions with France, first gave rise to a dispute with Germany.

The channel through which Russia hoped to advance her cause in Palestine and Syria was the Patriarch of Jerusalem. The Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem from the seventeenth century had been under the control of the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople. But as a result of Russian pressure Jerusalem’s subordination to Constantinople ceased in the mid-nineteenth century. This occurred when Cyril, Bishop of Lydda, was, with Russian backing, elected patriarch of Jerusalem. The election of Cyril, though, did not make Russia’s domination of the patriarchate absolute. The patriarch could still be deposed by his synod since it was controlled by the Greeks. A crisis between Cyril and the synod came to a climax in 1872 and Germany, because of actions of its consul in Jerusalem, was dragged into the affair.

The Greeks, having been alienated by Cyril, were demanding his immediate deposition. The Russians, not surprisingly, did their best to avoid such a development. Kozhevnikov, the Russian consul at Jerusalem, was advised by Ignatiev, the ambas-


36 At a conference held in 1872 at Constantinople, Cyril, with Russian support, opposed a move to declare the Bulgarian church schismatic.
sador at Constantinople, to back Cyril and gain the support of the Orthodox Arab population of Palestine.\(^{37}\) Consequent Russian attempts to stir up the Arab population in favor of Cyril resulted in mass demonstrations and acts of sabotage.\(^{38}\) These acts, according to von Alten, the German Consul at Jerusalem, indicated that Russian agents in Palestine were bent on instigating a revolt against Turkey. Furthermore, according to von Alten, property rights in Palestine, including those of the Germans, were also threatened by the Russian agitation.\(^{39}\)

Nazif Pasha, the Turkish Governor of Jerusalem, having become apprehensive over the situation, decided to consult the foreign consuls residing in Jerusalem. Consequently, at the end of November Nazif Pasha held at least one meeting with von Alten. The German Consul regarded the Governor as a "responsible and moderate man" who deserved the support of Germany.\(^{40}\) Believing that German property in Palestine was indirectly threatened by the crisis, von Alten advised the Governor to preserve law and order in the land.\(^{41}\)

In spite of the Russian agitation the Synod at the end of November decided to depose Cyril. This was a blow to Ignatiev but he still hoped to reverse the decision before it could be

\(^{37}\) Hopwood, p. 182.


\(^{39}\) Ibid., von Alten's letter dated Jerusalem, December 8, 1872.

\(^{40}\) Ibid., November 30, 1872.

\(^{41}\) Ibid., December 8, 1872.
approved by the Porte. To accomplish this Ignatiev needed the support of Nazif Pasha. On December 1 Ignatiev telegraphed the Russian Consul in Jerusalem to: "Keep the Pasha well disposed to us promising him rewards and my protection..."\(^{42}\)

Nazif Pasha, regarding von Alten as "the most disinterested person,"\(^{43}\) decided to follow his advice rather than be influenced by the Russians. Not only did he support the action of the synod, on November 27 he even ordered the arrest and deportation of Cyril to Constantinople.\(^{44}\) The shocked Ignatiev immediately blamed the German and British Consuls for encouraging the Governor.\(^{45}\)

The official reaction of the Russian Government was very sharp. The first indications of a developing crisis came in a despatch dated December 6, 1872 from St. Petersburg to Bismarck, warning that Tsar Alexander was very much perturbed at Germany. The charges against von Alten began with an accusation that the German Consul had insulted Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich during his visit to Jerusalem in October, 1872. According to the despatch, von Alten had failed to accord the Russian his due respects. He did not display the German flag in honor of the visitor and did not respond politely to an invitation to attend a reception. The Tsar was hurt and indicated that the incident would affect the intimate relations between Russia and Germany.\(^{46}\)

\(^{42}\) Quoted in Hopwood, p. 184.

\(^{43}\) A. A., Türkei 105, No. A15, Pera, December 25, 1872. According to this despatch Ignatiev charged that the Governor was bribed by the synod.

\(^{44}\) Ibid. \(^{45}\) Hopwood, p. 184.

Later despatches from St. Petersburg informed Bismarck that the Russian Government was also charging the Germans with interference in church affairs in Palestine. This interference, the Russians complained, must have been interpreted in the Near East as reflecting a German desire to undermine Russia there.47

These incidents, as far as Bismarck was concerned, could not have come at a worse time. Russia's benevolent attitude towards Prussia during the Franco-Prussian War was greatly appreciated by Bismarck. With France defeated, but seeking revenge, the Chancellor above all things was anxious to solidify Russo-German relations.48 A step in this direction had been taken in September when the Emperors of Germany, Austria, and Russia, accompanied by their foreign ministers, met at Berlin.49 These efforts now seemed threatened.

Von Alten insisted that he was innocent. He advised Bismarck that the invitation which he had received from the Russian Consul was not an invitation in the European sense of the word. Instead, he had been merely invited to ride out of Jerusalem to welcome the Grand Duke. This he did not do because he was ill. The letter in which he explained his disposition, and which the Russians had charged was impertinent, was a rough translation from German into French - a language in which he was not fluent. He had conveyed his good wishes to the Grand Duke and advised him that he would be at his disposal should the latter wish to see him. No official request to display the German flag had

48 Langer, p. 11.
49 Ibid., p. 21.
been circulated; furthermore, the time of the arrival of the Russian in the city had not been conveyed to him. Von Alten insisted that all the allegations leveled against him only reflected the bitterness of the Russians at the deposition of Cyril. 50

Von Alten's appraisal of the Russian motives was correct. The alleged insults to Duke Nikolai were readily forgotten. 51 On the other hand, the accusation that there had been German interference was not allowed to rest. Only after repeated German assurance to Russia that her consuls in the Orient received strict orders not to express opinions counter to Russian interests 52 did the Russians relent. The same promise was once again repeated by Bismarck in conversations with the Russian Privy-Councillor Streoukhov in April, 1873. 53

Bismarck's assurances were well received by the Russian Government, especially since its demand that von Alten be removed was complied with. The German Consul's request for a vacation and a transfer were approved by the Foreign Ministry in April, 1873. 54

Von Alten's position that his diplomatic intervention was motivated by alleged threats to German property and lives, regardless of its validity, clearly reflected the fact that Bismarck's aloofness could be maintained only as long as conditions


52 Ibid. 53 Hopwood, p. 184.

in Palestine remained calm and uneventful. Indeed, the growing involvement of the German settlers in Palestine in the 1870's tended to increase Germany's commitment to the preservation of peace, since any disturbances were bound to threaten German lives and property.

The shocks and the vibrations that shook the Ottoman Empire following the outbreak of the insurrection against Turkish rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina in August, 1875, the Bulgarian massacres of 1876, the Russo-Turkish War that followed in 1877, and the diplomatic activity that accompanied that phase of the Eastern Question did not spare Palestine. The Moslem population of Palestine was in a state of excitement and the Christians living among them were panic stricken.

According to E. Hardegg, the American Vice-Consul in Jaffa, himself a German national, the first threats of a massacre occurred in June, 1876. Cries of "why should we not kill our enemies here" began as soon as the levy of Turkish reserve troops in Palestine began. The hostility of the Moslems was intensified even further once the wounded and crippled Turkish soldiers began returning home in November. The hostility felt by the Moslems against the German Templers was especially bitter due to the fact that as foreign nationals they were exempt from serving in the Turkish army. The Templers, afraid for their lives, decided to protect themselves against possible attacks. Buildings in the colonies were reinforced, fire arms were purchased, and a local

55 U. S., Department of State, Consular Correspondence, Jerusalem, vol. IV, despatch of E. Hardegg, January 1, 1877.
56 Ibid.
German militia was organized and trained for battle.  

Hoffmann, realizing that his men could not resist any major onslaught, also appealed to Germany for help. Bismarck's immediate reaction cannot be ascertained. The appeal was carried directly to the Emperor, apparently by Kögel, the Court Chaplain. Upon hearing of the distress of the Germans in Palestine, the Emperor issued an Imperial Order for a German warship to be despatched there.

The corvette "Gazelle" commanded by Count von Hacke, the first German warship to visit Palestine, anchored off Jaffa on Easter morning, 1877. The Commander spent several days visiting the colonies of Jaffa, Jerusalem and Sarona, and conferred with Hoffmann. The colonists were allowed on board ship, and the ship's crew was welcomed in the colonies. From Jaffa the "Gazelle" went to Haifa. In all the "Gazelle" spent four weeks off the Syrian coast.

A thorough report on the conditions of the Germans in Palestine was submitted by von Hacke to the Admiralty in Berlin. It in turn forwarded the report to the Foreign Ministry with the comment that the visit of the warship served to advance the interests of Germany in Palestine.

The report began with a statistical analysis of the num-

57 Lange, pp. 672-673.

58 Ibid. No documentation on either Hoffmann's appeal or Bismarck's reaction is available from the A. A. records.

59 Ibid.

ber of German settlers in each colony, their occupations and their achievements. A general outline of political conditions in Syria and Palestine, describing the mood of the Moslem population and the attitude of the Turkish officials, followed. Von Macke pointed to the various legal difficulties that faced the settlers and attributed this situation to the fact that the Germans were regarded by the Turkish officials as intruders. A review of the economic conditions of the colonies, including a statistical breakdown of their assets, their commercial enterprises, and their trade, came next. The report indicated that in exports to Syria and Palestine Germany ranked third, behind England and France. In the export of manufactured goods, Germany actually ranked a close second behind France. The volume of industrial goods exported from Germany to Syria was put at six to seven million Marks. Among the major products exported the report listed textiles that came from the Rhine, Silesia and Saxony; silken products from Eberfeld; wools from Alsace; steel products from Solingen; pharmacetics from Berlin; and other items. An assessment of the dangers that were faced by the settlers concluded the report. Von Macke had witnessed no major incidents, but he did not doubt that the Germans could face "extreme danger" should Turkey be defeated. Before signing the report he added that it was in the interest of Germany to initiate similar visits at regular intervals.

Although the visit of the "Gazelle" impressed the Moslem population and made the fanatic elements realize that the German Empire would assist its nationals, the situation remained very

\[61\text{ibid.} \quad 62\text{ibid.}\]
hazardous. No sooner had the "Gazelle" left than it became evident that further intervention would be required. A report dated May 30, 1877 from Münchhausen, who had succeeded von Alten as German Consul in Jerusalem, indicated that all Turkish soldiers stationed in Palestine were being withdrawn to the war theatre. Security matters were accordingly to be left to the local garrison. The implied danger was obvious, as the Bulgarian massacres had originated under similar circumstances. The German Consul indicated that he was leaving it up to the Foreign Ministry to decide whether Germany's material interests in Palestine deserved that some "extraordinary measures" be taken. The Porte upon the inquiry of the German Ambassador at Constantinople gave assurances that some troops would be kept in Jerusalem, but the ambassador remained convinced that this was not the case.

Under the pressure of these circumstances, Bismarck "advised" the Emperor to authorize the despatch of additional war ships to Palestine. According to the orders issued, no military steps were to be taken without specific instructions, but since German property and life were at stake, it was realized that in case of an emergency, the commanders of the ships would have to make a decision on their own responsibility. The first war ship to arrive at Jaffa, the "Victoria," came on June 14, 1877 and after several days left for Haifa and Beirut. The most


64 Ibid. No. A3856. 65 Ibid. No. A3418.

66 Ibid., No. A3356. This is an unsigned and undated memorandum. 67 Ibid.
impressive show of German force came when a squadron consisting of the frigates "Kaiser," "Deutschland," "Friedrich Karl," "Preussen," and a smaller vessel "Falke," arrived at Jaffa on July 5. The show of force continued in August with the return of the "Gazelle" for five days to Jaffa.

The German naval demonstration in Palestine did not hurt Bismarck diplomatically. His fears since the outbreak of the Bosnian insurrection had been that the tension between Austria and Russia would lead to war - a war in which Germany, due to public sentiment, would gravitate towards Austria, and Russia would be drawn to France. The solution to this dilemma, Bismarck believed, lay in a partition of Turkey that would satisfy both Russia and Austria. Such a partition, he realized, would necessitate the acquiescence of England. This Bismarck hoped to achieve by encouraging the English to unilaterally seize Egypt. Bismarck's first serious advance to England regarding this matter was made in January, 1876. The possibility that England might annex Egypt was much discussed in the major European capitals in April, 1877, for the subject was raised by Rubar Pasha, the Khedive's former Foreign Minister, who at that time was touring Europe. The plan gained Bismarck's full support.

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68Lange, p. 674.


70Despatch of Lord Odo Russell, English Ambassador at Berlin, January 2, 1876. Published in David Harris' "Bismarck's Advance to England, January, 1876," Journal of Modern History, III (Sept., 1931), 446.

71G. P., II, No. 227, p. 29. 72See Harris' article above.

73Rubar Pasha was granted an interview by Count Münster,
quences of a possible partition of the Ottoman Empire was still on Bismarck's mind in June, when the naval squadron was leaving for Palestine. His ideas were outlined in a communiqué to Count Georg von Münster, the German Ambassador at London, on June 15, 1877 as follows: If England possessed Egypt and Russia controlled the Black Sea, both powers would have an interest in maintaining the "status-quo." At the same time these powers could be expected to remain antagonistic to one another, over some of their other vital interests. Such an arrangement, he believed, would hinder the ability of these powers to join anti-German coalitions. Furthermore, such a development could also have consequences in respect to France, as it would tend to promote Anglo-French rivalry in the Mediterranean.74

If Egypt, in Bismarck's diplomatic calculations, was assigned to England in 1877, and Constantinople to Russia, what was to become of Syria and Palestine? Even though Bismarck's speculations as outlined to Münster made no specific reference to these lands, there can be little doubt that he was ready, under the right circumstances, to concede this whole area to France. Historians have often pointed to the fact that Bismarck was eager to encourage French colonial activity in order to divert her

the German Ambassador in London. The interview took place on April 24, 1877, the very day that Russia declared war on Turkey. Nubar Pasha voiced the opinion that the war could not be localized and that he was convinced of the imminent disintegration of the Turkish Empire. His visit to London, he told the German Ambassador, was to induce the English to establish a protectorate over Egypt. For this see G. F., II, No. 289, pp. 147-148. Bismarck's marginal comment to this despatch read: "most understandable." He immediately instructed State Secretary von Bülow not to oppose the idea. G. F., II, No. 290, p. 150.  

attention away from Alsace and Lorraine. But Franco-German relations since the war scare crisis of January, 1877 were strained, and remained so till the end of the year.

Bismarck under these circumstances was not obliged to consider French interests in Syria and Palestine. Indeed, Germany's independent action and manifestation of interest in her nationals settled there could possibly indicate to France that Germany had something positive to offer her, if she were ready for a deal.

Once the decision to send a German naval squadron to Palestine had been made, Bismarck was quick to point out that other powers with interests in the region should join Germany in pressuring Turkey not to withdraw any additional troops from Palestine. Such a development Bismarck knew would minimize the risk of a German military intervention should disturbances break out. While no European power could show complete indifference to the fate of the Christians in Palestine, their reaction to the German proposal was not uniform.

The French were the first to respond. Duc Decazes, the French Foreign Minister, was no more eager than Bismarck to see a German military intervention in Palestine. He assured Prince Hohenlohe, the German Ambassador at Paris, that he too believed that it was most important to convince the Porte to leave regular

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76 Ibid., pp. 109-110.

Turkish troops in Palestine. Since Decazes needed no prodding, Hohenlohe even decided not to invoke Bismarck's reminder that Germany was aware of France's traditional role as protector of the Christians in the Levant. 78

The English response was most positive. Münster assured Lord Derby, the English Foreign Minister, that Germany had no political aims in Palestine, and that she was acting only to protect her nationals. Derby, replying to Münster, advised him that England had been promised by Turkey that the Christians would be protected. England in fact did not mind Germany's action. The time had passed, according to Derby, for England to worry over the growth and activities of the German navy. On the contrary, he assured Münster, England would welcome it if the two navies were to cooperate in protecting their trade and nationals in the Mediterranean. 79

The Italian Foreign Ministry, though it voiced readiness to demand of the Porte that it keep troops in Palestine, insisted that according to its information the local Moslem population posed no threat to the Christians. 80

The coolest reaction, however, came from Austria. Count Andrassy, the Foreign Minister, believed that Turkey could not be forced to use her troops in Palestine when they were needed elsewhere. 81 The Austrian attitude was not limited to words. Viola-

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78 Ibid., No. A3685. Hohenlohe to Bülow, June 7, 1877.
79 Ibid., No. A3751. Münster to Bülow, June 11, 1877.
81 Ibid., No. A3950. Dispatch from Vienna, June 18, 1877.
ting her declared neutrality during the Russo-Turkish War, Austria actually permitted a chartered Lloyd steamship flying her flag to pick up the last two remaining Turkish battalions in Palestine.

In spite of the fears that had prompted the German intervention in Palestine, the country for the next few years remained quiet and untouched by diplomatic developments. The Congress of Berlin which met in June, 1878 to settle the Eastern Question did not, due to French pressure, consider any problem related to Egypt, Syria, or Palestine.

Bismarck's diplomacy after the conclusion of the Congress continued to be directed to preventing the formation of anti-German alliances. His disinterest in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire continued. To be sure, the Egyptian Question could not be completely neglected by Germany, but even it was manipulated by Bismarck to fit his needs for alliances.

Not until 1882 did Palestine once again figure in Bismarck's diplomacy.

The political crisis that engulfed Egypt, and the anti-European outbursts that accompanied it, effected both the Moslem and the Christian population of Palestine. German lives and

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84 The best studies on Bismarck's Egyptian diplomacy are Mathilde Kleine's Deutschland und die ägyptische Frage 1875-1880 (Greifswald, 1927), and Wolfgang Windelband's "Bismarck's Egyptien Politik," The Bulletin of the International Committee of Historical Sciences, January, 1943.

85 The Khedive's decision in 1875 to sell his shares in the stock of the Suez Canal Company to the British Government in-
property were again being threatened, but the German reaction, as will be seen, was much less than in 1877. Reitz, the German Consul in Jerusalem, in a report to Bismarck on July 4, 1882 related the view that the friction between the European Powers and the Moslems in Egypt was being interpreted by Moslems in Palestine as a direct attack upon Islam. Rumors of a pending massacre of Christians at Bethlehem were already spreading, and signs of agitation were evident at Jaffa. There the muezzin had raised a flag on top of a mosque which supposedly was aimed at arousing the Moslems. Refugees, especially Catholic priests, were beginning to arrive from Egypt with tales of horror. The Consul assured Bismarck that in spite of the rising tensions, conditions were still generally calm and that the Governor was instituting measures to protect the Christians. In a later report to Bismarck, dated July 24, the German Consul advised that the bombardment at Alexandria had impressed the local Moslems, and that only minor outbreaks had taken place. Still, the Germans in Palestine once again felt threatened and once again they began

Augurated an era under which Egypt increasingly came under foreign tutelage. Consequently, an anti-European national movement with the slogan "Egypt for the Egyptians" revolted against the Khedive. The intervention of the European Powers in the domestic affairs of Egypt led to anti-European riots which climaxed in the death of about fifty Europeans at Alexandria on June 12, 1882.


87 Alexandria, the stronghold of the Egyptian national movement, was bombarded by the British on July 11, 1882.

preparing their defences.

Similar reports of unrest in Palestine were reaching other European capitals. Bismarck, taking notice of a report from Vienna to the effect that Giers, the Russian Foreign Minister, had shown deep concern over the situation in Syria, requested the Foreign Ministry to address an inquiry to the French Government asking what information it had received about the situation.

With conditions that had precipitated the German naval demonstration in 1877 resurfacing, a decision as to what action, if any, Germany should take could not be postponed for long. Bismarck had several options to choose from. Two German gunboats, the "löwe" and the"Habicht," were already on station in Egypt, and a third, the "Cyclop," could leave for the Mediterranean as soon as such an order were issued. Furthermore, a naval squadron on training exercises in the North Sea could, with little extra cost, be diverted to the Mediterranean.

Bismarck was determined in 1882 not to run any political risks in the Mediterranean. He immediately saw to it, therefore, that the Emperor was advised that the despatch of the whole squadron would arouse political conjectures over Germany's intentions. Only the two smallest vessels on training in the North

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90 Ibid., No. A4726. To Bismarck at Gastein, July 25, 1882.


92 Ibid., Report No. 14 from the Foreign Ministry to Bismarck, August 2, 1882.
Sea, Bismarck suggested, should be considered. The deteriorating situation in Egypt convinced Bismarck that Germany's interests would be served best by not getting involved in the crisis. His persisting fear of becoming somehow confronted by a Franco-Russian alliance made him determined not to antagonize any power, especially not England or Russia, when German interests were not directly involved. A German show of force in Palestine could only upset these considerations.

Moreover, Franco-German relations in 1882 were considerably warmer than they had been in 1877. There was no advantage to be gained by antagonizing France, especially not where Bismarck hoped to encourage French colonial aspirations.

Emperor William's reaction to the news from Palestine was much less cautious than Bismarck's, and he immediately, without consulting his Chancellor, ordered the warship "Nymphe" to Beirut. Afraid that the appearance of the "Nymphe" in Syria and Palestine might upset his diplomatic plans, Bismarck, when he learned of this development from Admiral Stesch, ordered the ship to change course. Should it be too late for that, he added in a telegram the following day, then once at Beirut, the "Nymphe" should leave for a less conspicuous port like Fort-Said.

94 G. F., IV, No. 727, p. 32.
95 Ibid., p. 33
97 Ibid., No. A5087. Stosch, Chief of Amiralty, to Hatzfeldt, August 11, 1882.
and await instructions there. Bismarck's apprehensions were somewhat alleviated by a despatch he received on August 8, reporting that a French warship had arrived at Beirut on August 5. Satisfied that the "Nymphé" would not be the first foreign warship at Beirut, other precautionary steps were ordered. Acting on the assumption that the Emperor would not allow his orders to be overridden, Bismarck ordered the Captain of the "Nymphé" to avoid creating any impression that he came to Beirut to observe the movements of his French counterpart. Moreover, the French Government, Bismarck insisted, was to be assured that the Captain of the "Nymphé" had orders to cooperate with the French and that Germany was well aware of France's traditional involvement in the region.

Duclerc, the French premier, was not overwhelmed by Bismarck's overture. He thanked the German Chancellor for his willingness to cooperate with France, but he did not react to the German declaration that Syria and Palestine could be regarded as a French sphere. Hohenlohe was puzzled. He assured Bismarck that he had read to Duclerc the appropriate text "slowly and clearly." However, he could not tell whether Duclerc was holding

98 Ibid., No. A5121. Telegram No. 145, August 12, from Bismarck at Varzin.
100 Ibid., No. A5149. Bismarck to Hatzfeldt, August 15, 1882.
102 Ibid., No. A5445. Hohenlohe to Bismarck, August 24,
back or simply did not understand the importance of the statement. Bismarck interpreted his ambassador's observations as indicating that the French actually mistrusted his intentions. Terming such alleged mistrust "unfounded and unwelcomed" he assured Hohenlohe once more that the despatch of the warship was not politically motivated and, as if to prove it, promised that the visit would be very brief.

When the "Nymphé" arrived at Beirut on August 25, the French frigate "Thetis" and the Italian "Formidabile" were already there. Finding conditions at Beirut calm the vessel proceeded to Jaffa. The arrival of the "Nymphé" in Palestine on September 4 had already been preceded by the visits of the Italian warship "Marc Antoni," the French "Bisson," and the English "Ready." After establishing that conditions at Jaffa and Jerusalem were also undisturbed, the "Nymphé" on September 6 left for Haifa. The visit there lasted for only one day. Upon her return to Beirut, the ship was ordered to continue to Suda Bay.

Bismarck's wishes had been fulfilled. The Germans were not the first at the Syrian coast, and the visit as he had pro-

103 Ibid., No. A5445.
mised the French was brief.

The news of the fall of Cairo to the British and the capitulation of Arabi, the leader of the Egyptian nationalists, once again aroused the Moslem population of Palestine. The storm, though, was over and no significant incidents followed.

Bismarck's attitude towards Palestine during the crisis of 1882 quite embittered the German settlers. The events of 1877 had led them to expect that the Imperial Government would not let them down. Their feelings were expressed in an article entitled "Our Colonies" published in the Marte des Tempels in 1883. Referring to the French Moniteur, which in a recent issue had expressed concern over the exemplary German achievements in Palestine, the article castigated Germany for neglecting its citizens in the land. It went on to stress the patriotism of the settlers and the value of Palestine for necessary future German exploits in the Near East and concluded by calling on the German Government not to underestimate the advantages offered by the German enterprises in Palestine.

The article was in tune with the rising colonial sentiments in Germany. Indeed the colonial agitation begun in Germany in the 1880's accorded the Templers an opportunity to find much greater sympathy for their efforts than before.

Furthermore, and as far as Bismarck's diplomacy was con-

108 Arabi was defeated at the battle of Tel-el-Kebir on September 13, 1882. General Sir Garnet Wolseley entered Cairo on September 15, 1882.


110 The article is quoted in Lange, Geschichte des Tempels, pp. 388-390.
cerned probably more decisive, Germany's relations with France after a period of detente once again, in the middle of the decade, began to deteriorate. The heightened Franco-German tensions which became apparent in 1886 not coincidently also affected Bismarck's diplomacy towards Palestine. His recent hesitation to despatch warships to the Syrian coast now vanished. Beginning in 1836 German warships began arriving in Palestine on a much more regular basis.

This new policy was inaugurated by the visit of the "Lorelei" to Jaffa on May 1, 1886. During the four day visit, Captain Dreger, the Commander, inspected the colonies of Jaffa, Sarona, and Jerusalem. The visit at Haifa also lasted several days. The official explanation given for these visits was that they were undertaken to determine the eligibility of settlers of military age for service in the German armed forces. The length of the visit and its political implications, though, could hardly have been lost on the French.

The next visit of the "Lorelei" to Palestine exposed the political considerations behind the changed policy even further. This visit took place in 1887 - the year of the rise of Boulang er in France and of Bismarck's anti-French inspired Mediterranean Agreements. The purpose of the visit as stated by Captain Lymcker, the Commander of the "Lorelei" was twofold:

111 Franco-German relations deteriorated after the fall of the Ferry Ministry in the fall of 1885.
112 Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, III (1886), 364.
113 The multiple crisis that faced Bismarck in 1887 is discussed by Langer in his chapter "The Crisis of 1887."
to conduct medical examinations for draftees and to strengthen
the German elements in Palestine by showing the flag. 114

Captain Lyncker's report to the Admiralty about his visit
to the colonies reflected open admiration. The report, which re­
lated some of the problems that faced the settlers in their rela­
tions with the French monks on Mount Carmel and with the native
Arab population at Jaffa, was consequently forwarded to Bismarck.
Obviously interested in the information, the Chancellor suggested
that the German Ambassador at Constantinople might submit a fuller
report.

These later manifestations of a somewhat greater German
interest in Palestine must be related to the domestic and foreign
political atmosphere of the years after 1885. As this examina­
tion of Bismarck's diplomacy has demonstrated, the significance
attached by Bismarck to the German enterprise in Palestine was
very secondary and always subordinated to more important diplo­
matic considerations.

Palestine and the Colonial Agitation
of the 1880's

The idea of Moltke, Friedrich List, Ludwig Ross, and
others, 116 that Germans should emigrate and colonize the Near
East had no visible effect on the trend of German emigration.

114 A. A., Türkei 140 ("Die Streitigkeiten zwischen Chris­
ten und Muhammedern in Haifa"); N.A. T-120; serial No. K690;
ople, May 23, 1887.

115 Ibid., No. A7155. Bismarck to Constantinople, June 9,
1887.

While the number of Germans emigrating still rose, they all continued to sail across the seas, especially to North and South America.

German colonization in the Near East was limited to that of the Templers in Palestine. They, as an article in the Freussische Jahrbücher pointed out in 1883, were the only Germans in Asia who had maintained their national identity and character. The article, after describing the achievements of the Templers, lamented the fact that Germany's commercial relations with Syria and Palestine were allowed to decline. Accordingly the German woolen monopoly was broken, and French products were beginning to replace traditional German exports like soap and steel products. Germany's ability to compete with England and France, the article maintained, was hampered by the lack of direct German commercial communications with the Levant.

The concern shown by this article for German trade and commercial interests overseas was symptomatic of the increasing importance attached to this subject in Germany. This concern, as only recently demonstrated by historians, was directly related to the economic depression of the years 1873-1896.

Various societies for the promotion of overseas expansion were established, but not before 1882 was there any central

117 "Die deutsche Ansiedlung in aussereneuropäischen Ländern," Freussische Jahrbücher, LII (1883), 66-68.
118 Ibid., p. 68.
organization to coordinate such efforts. 120 This organization was the "Kolonial Verein" founded on December 6, 1882 at Frankfurt. Its immediate success and growth reflected the need for such a society. Its official organ, the Kolonialzeitung (Deutsche Kolonial-Zeitung) was first published in January, 1884. A somewhat different society, "Die Gesellschaft fur Deutsche Kolonization," was founded by Karl Peters on April 3, 1884 at Berlin. The objectives of the two societies differed. Peter's society was chiefly interested in the colonization of East-Africa and advocated therefore a policy of annexation. The "Kolonial Verein," on the other hand, was more interested in supporting already existing overseas projects. 121

One of the projects which immediately engaged the attention of the "Kolonial Verein" between 1883-1887 was the colonization of Palestine. 122 Shortly after its founding, the society received a request from the Temple Society for advice and assistance. Replying to this appeal the "Kolonial Verein" suggested that the settlers, in order to create needed capital for expansion, should form a commercial corporation, legally recognized by the German Empire. 123 Following up this advice, the Templers on December 15, 1883 founded the "Verein fur Handel, Gewerbe und Ackerbau" (Association for Commerce, Industry and Agriculture) at


121 Ibid., pp. 83-84.

122 The "Kolonial Verein" in 1887 was absorbed by "Die Deutsche Kolonial Gesellschaft." See below, p. 70.

123 Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, I (1884), 65-66.
Jerusalem. With relations between the Germans in Palestine and the colonial society established, the Templers were accorded the important support of the *Kolonialzeitung*.

Already in its first issue the *Kolonialzeitung* carried an article entitled "The Economic Development of the Temple Colonies in the Orient." The article depicted the settlers in Palestine as true German pioneers who deserved the full and unquestioned support of their Fatherland. They deserved this support not merely for patriotic and idealistic purposes but also from a national economic point of view. The organ advised its readers that the Germans in Palestine had already created four "wonderful" colonies and that they had realized the importance of commerce and industry. Of the three most important factors needed for successful colonization, diligence, intelligence, and capital, the settlers lacked only the last. Capital was needed to purchase additional land; improve transportation; construct roads; undertake irrigation; and to build industrial and commercial enterprises. The first step in this direction was taken with the formation of a commercial association. Any German who wished to join this enterprise could become a "silent partner" by simply making a deposit of five hundred Marks.

The achievements of the Germans in Palestine were again outlined in a later article headlined "With the 'Gazelle' on Visit in the German colonies Jaffa and Haifa." The writer, telling of the visit of the "Gazelle" in 1877, carefully contrasted

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the miserable living conditions of the native population with the much higher standard of the Germans in Palestine. The sight of the "clean white houses lying symmetrically divided among the fields," to quote the writer, "makes the heart of the visiting German beat faster." The article indicated that the settlers were careful to preserve their separate identity, as evidenced by the fact that there had not been one single mixed marriage.\textsuperscript{126}

An additional article in the \textit{Kolonialzeitung} during its first year of publication dealt with the rather successful German grape growing industry in Palestine. The writer, himself a German settler, assured his readers that with comparative little work the produce in Palestine is plentiful.\textsuperscript{127}

The support and the publicity given the Templers encouraged them to send a deputation to Germany to discuss some of their difficulties with the leaders of the "Kolonial Verein." The deputation from Palestine, arriving in Germany in the summer of 1884, presented the "Kolonial Verein" with a list of grievances which it in turn took up with the Foreign Ministry. Among the grievances presented were matters that concerned citizenship, judicial rights, financial support for the settlers, German import regulations, Turkish taxes, military service in the German army and other matters of concern to the Templers.\textsuperscript{128}

In regard to the citizenship rights of the Templers the Foreign Ministry advised that any German subject who did not re-


\textsuperscript{127}"Der Weinbau auf dem Gebirge Juda," \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 428-430.

\textsuperscript{128}\textit{Ibid.}, II (1885), 438.
side in Germany for a period that exceeded ten years automatically lost his citizenship. Yet as long as such a subject did not renounce the German citizenship it could be renewed. The difficulty of the settlers in regard to land titles, according to the Foreign Ministry, would ease as soon as such titles were registered under the name of the German consulate in Jerusalem. The matter of financial assistance, the "Kolonial Verein" was promised, would be carefully studied. The request that goods exported by the Germans in Palestine to the motherland (oils, oranges, wine and other goods) should be exempt from import duties, was rejected. Only goods coming from German territories could be exempt. Concerning Turkish levies, specifically those on wine, the Foreign Ministry indicated willingness to intervene. This the German Government, as a bond holder, could legally do. 129

The question of obtaining deferments from the German army was especially dear to the Templers. They did not conscientiously object to military service but regarded compliance with the law as too great an economic burden.

Christoph Hoffmann in 1881 had already petitioned Bismarck to exempt the colonists in Palestine from military service and to consider their work in Palestine as an equivalent. Bismarck refused. 130 The "Kolonial Verein" supported the argument that the law as it applied to the Templers was unfair. As argued in the Kolonialzeitung the law was making it impossible for any family with children ranging in age from thirteen to nineteen to

129 Ibid., p. 442.
130 Lange, Geschichte des Tempels, p. 857.
settle in Palestine and maintain their German nationality. Hardships did not result only from the fact that affected families lost needed working hands; the cost of the trip to and from Germany was not paid by the government. Worse yet, some families made the sacrifice only to be informed that their sons did not pass the physical examinations.\(^{131}\) The Foreign Ministry insisted that the military law of September 23, 1875 could not be amended to accommodate the Germans in Palestine. However, a concession was forthcoming. The Templers soon after were informed that their military status could legally be determined by a physical examination administered on board German warships. Thereafter they could possibly take advantage of German warships visiting Palestine or they could travel to Constantinople where such service was always available.\(^{132}\)

The efforts undertaken by the "Kolonial Verein" on behalf of the German settlers in Palestine were outlined in the Kolonialzeitung under the headline "The Prosperity of the German-Syrian Colonies - A National Task."\(^{133}\) Carrying an item according to which the Haifa colony had received a gift of 30,000 Marks from Mrs. Von Bannmarth for the construction of a resort hotel on Mount Carmel, the "Kolonial Verein" once again called upon all Germans to invest in Palestine.\(^{134}\)

Any potential emigrant was naturally concerned over the

\(^{131}\)Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, II (1885), 441.

\(^{132}\)Ibid., p. 442.


\(^{134}\)Ibid.
c climatic conditions in the land he planned to make his home. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Kolonialzeitung, hoping to boost the German efforts in Palestine, published the results of a scientific study entitled "The Acclimatization of the Germans in Palestine." This study, conducted by Franz Paulus, M.D., with the assistance of Drs. T. Schmidt in Haifa, R. Lorch in Jaffa and G. Hoffmann in Jerusalem, concluded that the German in Palestine could well adjust to the climatic conditions of such a sub-tropical land. The findings of the study indicated that the only adverse affects suffered by the Germans were traceable to excessive heat. A comparison between temperatures in Jerusalem and Stuttgart in 1884 revealed that temperatures in Jerusalem were higher by 3.4° in May; 9.4° in June; 3.0° in July; 6.2° in August and 6.0° in September. The lingering heavy summer heat tended to induce, at the very end of the summer season, a certain laziness and exhaustion. Such symptoms disappeared, however, as soon as the rainy season began. Furthermore, the mild winter in Palestine was not only comfortable, but healthy.

The "Kolonial Verein" besides supporting the colonization of Palestine also publicized plans for the development and colonization of other areas of Turkish-Asia.

Wilhelm von Pressel, the eminent German railway engineer, in a memorial written in April, 1880 made the first serious pro-

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136 _Ibid._

137 Wilhelm von Pressel was the technical director of the Trans-Balkan lines of the Oriental Railway Company.
posal that envisioned the reconstruction of Anatolia. His plan was given publicity in the Kolonialzeitung in 1885. Another project envisioned by the famous German orientalist, Professor A. Sprenger, was given its first publicity in the Kolonialzeitung. Sprenger's plan envisioned three different areas of colonization. The first around Balbek with a contemporary population of 30,000 persons, could in the professor's estimation support one and one half million people. Another area located along the caravan route between Hama and Aleppo could, once reacclimated by irrigation, support one million souls. The third area extending from Aleppo to the Euphrates was especially suited, according to Sprenger, for the raising of corn and cattle. This area alone could supply the whole German army with horses, and all of Germany with meat. An estimated ten to fifteen million colonists could be settled there. If the plan were to be executed a "New Germany" with a population of about twenty-five million would arise in the Orient.

One of the most prolific writers agitating for German colonization in the Near East was the economic journalist and later Pan-German Paul Dehn. Commenting on the above plans in the Kolonialzeitung in 1885, Dehn urged the German Government to seriously consider these ideas. The most valuable parts of the world were already under the control of the European Powers. Turkey, according to Dehn, was an exception, but even here there were already areas into which the European Powers have extended

138 Paul Dehn, "Deutsche Kolonialprojekte im Orient," Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, II (1885), 598-602.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
their "avaricious" hands.\textsuperscript{141}

The "Kolonial Verein," encouraged by German achievements in Palestine and by the possibility of opening Turkish-Asia to German colonization, believed that the whole region could be rejuvenated through the introduction of the railroad.\textsuperscript{142} The opportunity for German control of a railway running from Damascus to Haifa and Acca, declared the Kolonialzeitung in 1884, should not be passed up by Germany. \textsuperscript{142} M. Schumacher, a German engineer from Haifa, explaining the virtues of the proposed line in the Kolonialzeitung, hailed the choice of Haifa as the proposed terminal. Nowhere along the entire Syrian coast, he explained, was there a better location and a more suitable spot for a deep water port.\textsuperscript{143} However, the efforts of the "Kolonial Verein" to raise the necessary capital for this project in Germany were not successful.

A merger between the "Kolonial Verein" and "Die Gesellschaft fur Deutsche Kolonisation," which took place in 1887, resulted in the formation of the "Deutsche Kolonial Gesellschaft." The attitude and aims of this newly formed, but powerful society, were not akin to the now defunct "Kolonial Verein." This fact was immediately reflected in the Kolonialzeitung which became the official organ of the new society. Consequently, the publicity that had been given to the Templers in Palestine was considerably reduced. As far as the "Deutsche Kolonial Gesellschaft"

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{142} "Die Eisenbahnunternehmungen in Syrien-Palästina," Ibid., I (1884), 231-286.

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
was concerned, the future of German colonialism lay in Africa and not in the Near East.

The "Kolonial Verein" was not the only organization in the 1830's interested in Palestine. A society exclusively devoted to the exploration of Palestine, the "Deutsche Verein Zur Erforschung Palastina" was founded on September 28, 1877. The idea for such a society grew out of the meeting of the "Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft,"144 and the German philologists in 1877. The society was supported and was joined by various noted Germans. These included the former Consul to Jerusalem von Alten, the Consul at Beirut Bruning, professors De-Lagarde and Kiepert, von Moltke, Consul Münchhausen at Jerusalem, the Grand Duke von Mecklenburg-Schwerin, the Imperial Chaplain Strauss and others.145

The official publication of the society, Die Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina Vereins, was first published in 1878. The material published included descriptive reports from Palestine, unedited reports of pilgrims, bibliographical notes, articles concerned with the topography, ethnography, statistics, coins and inscriptions of Palestine. The function and aims of the society emulated "The Palestine Exploration Fund" established in England in 1865.

Another German society specifically devoted to Palestine was the "Palästina Vereins der Katholiken Deutschlands" founded in Aachen in 1879. Its organ was the Palästinablatt.

Catholic missionary activity was, it will be remembered,

144See above, p. 8.

145Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina Vereins, I (1878), 1-9. See also the membership list at the end of the volume.
already supported by "Der Verein Von Heiligen Grabe" established in 1855. Its views were publicized by its own organ Das Heilige Land. 146 This German Catholic society originally founded to help the Catholic cause in Palestine regardless of nationality was coming under increasing criticism for not being more German minded. After the founding of the German Empire, the rising nationalistic and colonial sentiments in Germany eventually led to an open rift within the society. The chief advocate of a more nationalistic Catholic orientation in Palestine was the Franciscan, Father Ladislaus Schneider. 147

"Der Verein Von Heiligen Grabe" defended its activity in Palestine and mobilized the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem to come to its defense.

The inflexible opposition of the society to assuming a more nationalistic and colonial character led to the establishment of the rival Catholic society "Palästina Vereins der Katholiken Deutschlands," better known as "Der Deutsche Palästina Verein." The purpose of this society, as stipulated in its statutes was:

1. To support the religious and social interests of German Catholics in Palestine.

2. To establish in Jerusalem a German hospice, a church, a school and a hospital to serve German visitors and residents. Those institutions were also to serve as information centers for Germans wishing to settle in Palestine.

146 See above, p. 19.

147 "Das Katholische Deutschland und der Orient," Die Katholischen Missionen, XXXII (1903-1904), 76-82.
3. To proselytize the Catholic faith and the Christian culture in Palestine.

The quarrel between these two societies was carried on both in their respective organs and during the yearly Catholic general conventions. The 1887 Catholic Convention at Breslau witnessed the president of the "Palästina Verein" declare:

"...The French and Italians have already built schools and churches. Can Germans not utilize these institutions? Can we not support these institutions and thus avoid obligations? I say: No! and a thousand times no! Our obligations concerning the Holy Land go infinitely farther.

These words were not mere rhetoric. The "Palästina Verein" already numbering 20,000 members in 1887 was actively engaged in Palestine. One of its first acquisitions was a piece of land located at the northern end of the Sea of Galilee (Tabgha) in 1886. The land valued at 5,000 Marks was, according to the Kolonialzeitung, to be colonized by German Catholic settlers. The German hospice was completed in 1897. It was located outside the old city of Jerusalem. The household duties of the hospice and an adjacent school were taken over by the sisters of the Order of Barromeus. The administration of the hospice was assumed by the German Lazarists. Biblical Emmaus located about fifteen miles from Jerusalem, a site of strategic importance for it is there that the mountains meet the plain, was also purchased by the society. In the spring of 1888 the Order of Barromeus established a hospital and a school at Mount Carmel. An additional school was established in 1893 in Jerusalem. The "Palästina Verein" already numbering 20,000 members in 1887 was actively engaged in Palestine.

143 Ibid. 149 Ibid., p. 20. 150 Ibid.
151 Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, V (1887), 747.
tina Verein" also encouraged and organized pilgrimages to Palestine. These started on a large scale in the 1880's. The German government, appreciative of the work of the society, extended to it corporate rights in 1891. 152

There was little question about which of the two rival Catholic societies was gaining greater sympathy in Germany. Consequently, a merger of the two was agreed upon. A new organization, the "Verein Von Heiligen Lande," embodying the philosophy of the "Palästina Verein," was formed in August, 1895. Das Heilige Land was kept as the publication of the new society.

Nowhere in the Near East were the cultural rivalries of the European Powers more pronounced than in Palestine. Since missionary activity often went hand in hand with colonialism it is not surprising that German missionary activity in Palestine, especially after the mid 1880's, was supported by the German government.

German Catholic enterprises in Palestine were long preceded by the work of the German Evangelical Church in the Holy Land. The Jerusalem Bishopric, it will be remembered, was renounced by the German Government for favoring Britain. Refusing to invoke its right of nomination in 1881, the arrangement was allowed to lapse. 153 The defunct venture was consequently replaced by the "Evangelical Jerusalem Foundation" founded by Emperor William II on June 22, 1889.

The purpose of the foundation was: "To support and main-

152Die Katholischen Missionen, p. 32.
153See above, p. 16.
tain existing Evangelical institutions; to establish new institutions in Jerusalem and to support the Evangelical community in Palestine. The capital of the foundation consisted of: 430,000 Marks representing interest of the endowment of the Jerusalem Bishopric; 220,000 Marks collected for the "Jerusalem Fund" in the Evangelical State Church; and an estimated 500,000 Marks collected between 1869 and 1888 for the purpose of building churches in Palestine. The five directors of the foundation were directly appointed by the Emperor.

The "Jerusalem Verein" founded in 1852 also continued its missionary work in Palestine. This society, originally established in Prussia, beginning in the 1880's branched out all over Germany. The "Jerusalem Verein" supported a hospital established by the Order of St. John in Jerusalem, the children's hospital "Marienstift" founded in Jerusalem by the Grand Duke von Mecklenberg-Schwerin in 1874, the "Syrian Orphanage" in Jerusalem, the girls' orphanage and school "Tolitakumi" and the hospital of the Deaconesses, which in 1894 moved into a new structure constructed at a cost of over 300,000 Marks, as well as the only leper hospital in Palestine, and the Armenian Orphanage established near Bethlehem in 1898. In addition to its missionary station at Bethlehem, the "Jerusalem Verein" also established stations and institutions at Betdjala (1878), Hebron (1884), Haifa (1891) and Jaffa (1892).

155 Die Katholischen Missionen, p. 79.
156 For the "Jerusalem Verein" see above, pp. 17-18.
This "vast charitable and educational work"\textsuperscript{157} undertaken by Germany in Palestine, when taken together with the German settlers, whose number was greater than all foreign nationals in Palestine combined,\textsuperscript{158} accorded Germany a foothold in the land which could not be overlooked once Germany entered the era of "Weltpolitik."

\textsuperscript{157} U. S., Department of State, Consular Correspondence, Jerusalem, vol. IX (January 31, 1898-August 20, 1900), despatch of Selah Merril, Nov., 12, 1898.

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
CHAPTER III

PALESTINE AND "WELTPOLITIK:"

THE VISIT OF WILLIAM II

The World Reaction

The visit of Emperor William II and Empress Auguste-Victoria to Palestine in 1898 once again reflected the complex religious-political character of Germany's relations to Palestine.

The decision to go to Palestine, from the moment it was officially relayed to Sultan Abdul Hamid II, was unceasingly characterized by the German Government as one motivated by strict religious considerations. The official explanation advanced by the government was William II's desire to be present in Jerusalem at the dedication of the Lutheran Church of the Redeemer (the Church of St. John of Jerusalem), which was built on the site of the ancient hospice of St. John, acquired by his father on his visit to Palestine in 1869.

1G. F., XII, No. 3338, p. 557. This occurred during Marschall von Bieberstein, the newly appointed ambassador's first audience with the Sultan on November 20, 1897. The idea of visiting Palestine may have been decided already in March, 1896. At that time, William II, on a visit to Mount Vesuvius, according to William Treloar, is said to have discussed the idea with John M. Cook, of Cook's Tourist Agency. See Sir William Treloar, With the Kaiser in the East. Notes of the Imperial Tour in Palestine and Syria, and first published in October and November 1898 (London: Horace Marschall and Sons, 1915), p. 21.

2See above, pp. 26-27.
The mere fact that a German Emperor would be present in Jerusalem on October 31, the day that Luther had nailed his theses on the church door at Württemberg, was unquestionably of great historic and religious significance. The historic meaning of the pending occasion was articulated by The Times as follows:

The German Emperor, the representative and heir of the Hohenzollerns and their traditions, the head of the evangelical Protestantism of Germany, the home of the Reformation, standing at Jerusalem surrounded by the representatives of other Protestant peoples, as the guest of the Sultan, and guarded by the flower of the Sultan's army, and dedicating in the cradle of Christianity a new church on the site of one of the oldest Western churches and one of the most famous confraternities in the city - a spectacle such as this, so rich in its memories and its associations, its astounding contrasts, and its infinitely pregnant suggestions, is little less than an epitome of the whole history of Christendom.3

When viewed in this light few in Europe could wish the Emperor ill. After all, William II had already gained a reputation for his romantic temperament, and his love for travel had earned him the nickname "Reise Kaiser" (travel Kaiser). Furthermore, as expressed by the Morning Post "who does not dream of a sojourn by the classic waters of the Bosphorous, of the solitudes of Mount Carmel and of the road from Jericho to Jerusalem..."4 Yet, not surprisingly, neither the international historic character of the projected pilgrimage nor its touristic aspect excited Europe.

3 The Times (London), October 8, 1898, p. 11. This excerpt, and many others reflecting the reaction of the European press to the forthcoming visit, were forwarded by the German Embassy in London to the German Foreign Ministry. This particular excerpt from The Times was designated in the archives as Preussen 1 no. 1 no. 4 ("Reise Seiner Majestat des Kaisers nach Athen und Konstantinople, Palästina, Ägypten pp."); reel No. UC I 334; document No. A11857.

What concerned some of the European governments and the press were the political implications of the journey and Germany's ever increasing penetration of Palestine. 5

The fact that German colonies and institutions had been established in Palestine was beginning to be viewed in Europe with increasing suspicion. The era of "Weltpolitik" had begun. No longer did Germany think in terms of the bones of the Pomeranian grenadier. The new policy, though evident before, was officially announced by the Emperor during the festivities for the German Empire's jubilee in 1896. At the grand banquet, in the afternoon, on January 18, 6 Emperor William II declared:

......The German Empire has become a world power. Everywhere, in the farthest corners of the globe, dwell thousands of our countrymen. German wares, German science, German diligence cross the oceans. In thousands of millions we may reckon the values which Germany has floating on the seas.

It is your part, gentlemen, to help me in the task of linking firmly this greater German Empire with the smaller home. The vow I made to-day in the presence of you all can only be wholly fulfilled if you, stirred by the spirit of the holy, undivided patriotism, lend me your fullest most untiring support. With this wish, therefore, that you will help me with all your might in doing my duty not alone to my countrymen living at home, but also to those many thousands of your countrymen living abroad - that is to enable me to protect them when it is my duty to do so......The German Empire - may it prosper and live! Hoch! Again, hoch! And a third time, hoch! 7

5 Despite William Langer's judgment that "the whole business need not have been taken so seriously," The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890-1902 (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1951), p. 637, the fact remains that it was taken seriously, and must therefore be considered.

6 The occasion being the 25th year jubilee of the German Empire's proclamation at the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles.

Germany's policy in respect to South Africa and China clearly manifested the seriousness of the above spoken words. Germany, it was evident, was engaged in search of new spheres of influence abroad. Was she eyeing any of the Turkish domains? Only speculative answers could be provided. But such speculation was supported by the fact that Germany's relations with the Ottoman Empire, in contrast to all the other European powers in 1898, were most friendly. Adding to the uncertainty was the great popularity with which the new philosophy was greeted by the German people. The mood of "Weltpolitik" in Germany was reflected by the founding of the Pan-German League ("Alledeutscher Verband") in 1894. The League, joined by professionals, especially professors and teachers, and by businessmen and state officials, advocated a world policy in which the racial and cultural kinship among Germans would be exploited for colonial ends.


9. The German acquisition of Kiaochow, following the murder of two German Catholic missionaries in southern Shantung in November, 1897.

10. Germany and Turkey were cooperating especially in the economic and military fields. Furthermore, of the Big Powers only Germany in 1893 refused to join in pressuring the Sultan to evacuate Crete.

11. The popularity of the idea of "Weltpolitik" and "Weltpolitik" was widespread. For a discussion of the subject see Fritz Fischer, Krieg der Illusionen, pp. 62-77, and Ludwig Dehio, Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1959). The Pan-German League was originally formed in consequence of the indignation felt at the Zanzibar Treaty with England. It was reorganized in 1894, and given the name Pan-German League.

The ideas of the Pan-German League in respect to the Ottoman Empire were expressed in a pamphlet called *Germany's Claims on the Turkish Inheritance*, published in 1896. According to this pamphlet Germany's interests in Asia Minor and Syria extended beyond construction of railways and other commercial interests. Repeating the now familiar view that these areas at one time had been very fertile, the Pan-German League called for their colonization by German immigrants. "Among all the lands of the earth there is none so inviting for colonization as Syria and Assyria," the pamphlet declared. If the flow of German emigrants were directed towards these regions, and a commercial and political alliance were concluded with Turkey, then, the Pan-Germans believed, "the whole economic and political future of Germany would be placed upon an incomparably broader and surer foundation." The position of the Pan-German League in regard to Palestine was thus made clear. The fact that the League's ideas were extended to Palestine was also reflected in the Pan-German Atlas which proudly featured the German colonies of Haifa, Jaffa, Sarona, and Rephaim. Not surprisingly the League was welcomed in Palestine. Pan-German branches were established almost immediately at Jaffa and Jerusalem, and their delegates, some time prior to the Emperor's visit, attended a Pan-German conference at Munich. These facts were not lost upon Europe.

Among the European powers France and Russia were the most

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13Pan-German League, *Deutschlands Ansprüche an das Türkische Erbe* (Munich, 1896).
16The *Times* (London), October 6, 1898, p. 8.
sensitive to the German penetration of Palestine. Even though France, since the conclusion of her alliance with Russia in 1894, allowed the latter an almost free hand in Palestine and Syria, 17 she did resist the German penetration. The means employed by France to achieve her aims hinged upon her special relations with the Vatican and her claims of Protectorate over the Catholics in the East.

Already in the fall of 1897, France, exercising her influence at the Vatican, attempted to remove Msgr. Piavi, the Latin Patriarch in Jerusalem, whom she considered too friendly to the German cause in Palestine. 18 The French apprehensions were apparently not baseless as is evident from the fact that von Tischendorf, the German Consul-General at Jerusalem, as well as the president of the "Verein von Heiligen Lande" were strongly convinced that it was in the interest of Germany to maintain Msgr. Piavi in Jerusalem. 19 These wishes soon after gained the full support of William II, who as "secular head" 20 of the German Catholics felt himself duty bound to act in this matter. 21 Relaying the German point of view to Otto von Bülow, the Prussian Minister at the Vatican, the Foreign Ministry requested that this matter be brought to the attention of the Pope with clear indications that

17 G. P., XII, No. 3359, p. 600. Also Langer, p. 637.
18 Ibid., No. 3351, p. 589. State Secretary von Bülow to von Marschall, January 10, 1898.
19 Ibid.
20 Literal translation would be "political head."
a positive response was expected. The German diplomatic inter-cession succeeded, and Msgr. Piavi was consequently retained.

William II, as evidenced by the handling of the above matter, did not recognize the French claims of Protectorate in the East. The French traditional claims based on the so-called "Letters Patentes" of May 30, 1740 had in fact never been recognized by Germany. This position had been reiterated by Bismarck in an official declaration on May 5, 1875, according to which Germany reserved to itself the right to protect all German subjects in the East, irrespective of their religion. Still, the era of "Weltpolitik" manifested an innovation in respect to Germany's stand towards the French Protectorate. Now, for the first time, one of Germany's most important tasks in the Near East was to oppose actively the French claims and bring about their collapse. As explained by Marschall von Bieberstein, the German Ambassador at Constantinople, in a communiqué to Chancellor Hohenlohe on February 25, 1898, the French Protectorate had an obviously indirect bearing on political questions; therefore, he believed, its successful elimination would raise Germany's own prestige in the East.

The approaching visit of William II to Palestine did not incorrectly give rise to suspicions that Germany was actually
aiming to substitute for the French Protectorate a German one. Thus, though strictly by coincidence, on the very day the first practical consultations concerning the arrangements of the trip to Palestine took place at the Royal palace at Homburg, in France Cardinal Langenieux advanced the idea that a "National Committee for the Preservation and Defense of the French Protectorate" should be established. Writing to Pope Leo XIII about his idea, the French Cardinal claimed that the collapse of the French Protectorate "would be assuredly a misfortune and humiliation for our country." The Pope replying to the Cardinal's letter on August 20, 1898 indicated that his response could be made public as soon as the Cardinal saw fit. The story and the content of the Pope's reply appeared in an anonymous article in the Revue de deux Mondes at the beginning of September. The Pope to the great satisfaction of France and to the dismay of Germany, with great emphasis reaffirmed the exclusive right of France to protect all Catholics in the East. Such a direct statement concerning this subject, the article added, was the first ever made by a Pope so personally and publically.

The diplomatic clarifications offered by the Vatican to Germany following the disclosure of the Pope's letter to Cardinal Langenieux centered on the argument that the Vatican was only in-

27 The Times (London), July 21, 1898, p. 5.
29 Ibid.
30 The Times (London), October 15, 1898, p. 11.
31 G. P., XII, No. 3370, p. 613.
interested in maintaining the "status quo." 32 The German reaction was conciliatory. There had already been indications that the Vatican, apprehensive over Russia's increasing influence in Palestine, was silently welcoming Germany's involvement there. The Papal decision not to replace Msgr. Piavi was one encouraging sign. Another was the confidential information received by von Marschall from Msgr. Bonetti, the Papal Delegate in Constantinople. According to Bonetti the effects of the projected visit of William II to Palestine were already benefiting the Catholic Church in as much as the Russian Orthodox in Jerusalem were becoming more flexible. 33 Despite this though, the Pope's declaration worried Marschall. Writing to the Foreign Ministry on September 11, 1898 the Ambassador questioned if, for example, the German hospital in Haifa, run by the sisters of the Order of Barromeus, could continue to display the German flag, or whether the Vatican would now insist that a French flag be raised. 34 The Ambassador suggested that Germany stand up for her rights and that she be completely inflexible on this issue. Reading this assessment, the Emperor fully agreed. 35 Thereupon it was officially decided to accept the invitation of several German Catholic institutions in Palestine to be visited by the Emperor. 36 As will be

32 Ibid., No. 3371, p. 614.
33 A. A., Freussen 1 No. 1 No. 4, document No. A1078, telegraph No. 370, Therapia, September 3, 1898.
34 A. P., XII, No. 3372, p. 616.
36 Ibid., No. 3375, pp. 618-619. Von Bülow to the Foreign Ministry, Sept. 18, 1898. For the invitation itself, see A. A., Türkei 175 ("Das Coenaculum und die Dormition de la sainte
seen the German stand was well demonstrated by William II once he arrived in Palestine. But, the conflict with the Vatican over the issue was not over yet. To the great astonishment of the German Government Pope Leo XIII, in an allocution to certain French pilgrims on Saturday October 8, 1898, once again publically declared himself in full accord with the French interpretation of the Protectorate. 37 This latest incident coming so close to the date of the Emperor's departure, was taken very seriously in Germany and was regarded by William II as a personal affront. 38 A crisis which for a time seemed to be leading to a diplomatic break between Prussia and the Vatican followed. Otto von Bülow, at the time on vacation in Germany, did not return to his post. The appointment of the new Minister was delayed for maximum effect, and he did not take up his position until after the completion of William II's journey. 39 Responding to this sharp German reaction the Papal State Secretary, Cardinal Rampolla, again invoked the argument that the Vatican was not acting against Germany. 40 Negotiations between the Prussian charge d'Affairs in Rome, von Below-Rutza and the Papal Secretary finally yielded a hint that the Vatican would not interfere in "practical natural

Vierge"); reel No. UC I 404-4-5; document No. A10140, dated Aachen, August 31, 1898.

37 The Times (London), October 15, 1898, p. 11.

38 G. P. XII, No. 3379, p. 621. State Secretary von Bülow to von Below-Rutza at the Vatican.

39 The Vatican was informed of the new appointment on October 16, 1898. See Ibid., No. 3384, p. 625.

40 Ibid., No. 3382, Note 2, p. 623.
developments in Asia-Minor."\textsuperscript{41} The situation, thereafter, as far as Germany was concerned, clearly called for a wait and see attitude.

The topic of the German Emperor's journey to Palestine, complicated by the crisis over the Protectorate rights of France, produced a sharp triangular duel among the German, Russian and French press. The German press, including the clerical, generally supported their government on this issue. Repudiating the French claims the semi-official Kölnische Zeitung in an apparently inspired article on September 20 declared that Germany would oppose any attempt on the part of France to exercise its claims. The paper reminded France that by the Treaty of Berlin the right of protection over the subjects of the different powers was recognized as being vested with the diplomatic and consular representatives of the powers in the East.\textsuperscript{42} Concluding its article the Kölnische Zeitung warned: "If France interferes in the affairs of Turkey, that is patent encroachment upon German sovereignty which will doubtless be repelled by the German Empire with the utmost determination."\textsuperscript{43} Responding to the Pope's allocution to the French pilgrims, the same organ, after declaring that Germany's dignity forbade this development from passing without notice, called upon German Catholics "to do their duty..."\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{41}Ibid., No. 3386, p. 627. Von Below-Putzau to the Foreign Ministry, October 21, 1893.
\textsuperscript{42}This argument was also raised by von Merschall. In a despatch to the Foreign Ministry the Ambassador pointed to Article 62 of the treaty to repudiate the French claims. See G. F., XII, No. 3373, p. 617.
\textsuperscript{43}Quoted in The Times (London), September 21, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{44}Ibid., October 12, p. 3.
The reaction of the *Germania*, the organ of the Center party, was immediate. It declared that Catholics in Germany were "quite aware of what they have to do and leave undone," and reminded the *Kölnische Zeitung* that it was only in accordance with their own convictions that German Catholics were acknowledging German protection over their institutions in the East. The German Catholics had indeed done their national duty and were being accused by the French press of letting their chauvinism prevail over their religious convictions.

Several leading German papers, while welcoming the journey of their Emperor, voiced anxiety over the timing and the length of the planned pilgrimage. Commenting on this subject the liberal *Frankfurter Zeitung* remarked that the absence of William II from Germany coincided with the up-coming elections for the Prussian Diet and the sessions of the Prussian and Imperial parliaments. Echoing this concern the *National Zeitung* added that the absence of von Bülow, the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, might represent too great a burden for the aged Chancellor von Hohenlohe. But expressing the philosophy of the National Liberals, the paper hailed the journey from the point of view that it would encourage the German settlers in Palestine and would promote civilization in that region of the world. The paper conceded that France might have some grounds for political

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Jealousy, for the Emperor's presence in the East would promote the prestige of Germany and would strengthen the German elements, the agents of civilization in Asia-Minor, Syria and Palestine.\(^50\) In a similar vein the influential Vossische Zeitung, denying that Germany had any territorial ambitions in Turkey, stressed the point that the journey "represents a German moral victory." It too hoped that the occasion would encourage the German settlers in Palestine and would promote Germany's prestige.\(^51\) The conservative Kreuz Zeitung, like its liberal counterparts, also voiced some concern over the timing of the journey. Confessing some uneasiness over the world situation the paper voiced the hope that those responsible for the journey "have convinced themselves of the impossibility of surprises...."\(^52\) Even though there were some isolated attempts to engage in political speculation, for instance that questions connected with Syria would split the Franco-Russian alliance,\(^53\) the German press, quite obviously with official blessing, refrained from attributing to the pilgrimage great political significance.

The official and unofficial restraint of the German press was in sharp contrast to that of Russia and France. The St. Petersburg Novosti already on July 13 accused William II of trying to acquaint himself with Asia-Minor as a possible field

\(^{50}\) Ibid., October 3, 1898, p. 3.
\(^{51}\) Ibid., October 13, 1898, p. 3.
\(^{52}\) Ibid., October 6, 1898, p. 3.
\(^{53}\) Ibid., September 23, 1898, p. 3. This was also discussed in the Austrian press by the Politische Korrespondenz. See A. A., Freussen 1 No. 1 No. 4, document No. A12357, von Eülenburg to von Hohenlohe, October 27, 1898.
for German colonization. Furthermore, as the paper interpreted the situation, Germany through the Roman Curia hoped to obtain a protectorate over the Turkish Catholics similar to the one acquired in China at the expense of France. Repeating a similar view, the same paper on September 20 declared that both France and Russia must cooperate to support their respective protectorates and not permit any German schemes to take them by surprise.\(^{55}\) Again recalling Germany's policy in China the Novosti on October 2 declared that it would not be surprising if in return for the military and the political assistance extended to Turkey Germany would demand a part of the Syrian coast. If that were to happen, the paper declared, France and Russia would not remain indifferent.\(^{56}\) A similar claim was carried in the Novoe Vremya according to which "the splendid port of Haifa will shortly be given over by treaty to Germany."\(^{57}\)

This Russian anti-German press campaign was clearly disturbing to the German Government. William II, trying to calm Russian suspicions, wrote personally to Tsar Nicholas II on August 18, 1898 trying to assure him of the religious character of the journey. The letter read as follows:

I am most astonished at the amount of bash and blarney that is being ventilated in the newspapers of Europe about my visit to Jerusalem. It is most discouraging to note that the sentiment of real faith which propels a Christian to

\(^{54}\) The Times (London), July 14, 1898, p. 5.

\(^{55}\) Ibid., September 21, 1898, p. 3.

\(^{56}\) Ibid., October 3, 1898, p. 3.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., September 21, 1898, p. 3.
seek the country in which our saviour lived and suffered, is nearly quite extinct in the so-called better classes of the 19th Century, so that they must explain the pilgrimage forcibly by political motives! What is right for thousands even of your lowest peasants is right for me too! 58

The letter had little effect. The campaign in the Russian press continued, and so did German efforts to have it stopped. But according to Tschirschky, the German Ambassador to St. Petersburg, even the chief censor was unable to curb the attacks, since they were inspired by the powerful procurator of the Holy Synod, M. Pobedonostsev. 59

The news item concerning Germany's alleged intentions at Haifa was originally carried by the French paper Le Matin on October 17, in an article entitled "William II and Haifa." According to the report Germany was seeking a port in the Mediterranean in order to shorten her lines of communication with Kiaochow in the Far East. Haifa, the paper maintained, had a great future and the German settlers, not unlike the Puritans who had settled in New England, were preparing the ground for German occupation. 60 Other articles appearing in the French press told of similar German designs. An article in Le Soleil on August 24, declaring that William II was trying to follow in the footsteps of Frederick Barbarossa and rule over Palestine, 61 was quite characteristic of the trend.

58 Quoted in G. P., XII, No. 3338, Note 2, p. 558.
60 Ibid., No. A11975. The article was forwarded by von Münster, the German Ambassador, to Hohenlohe.
61 Ibid., No. A9948.
England's reaction to William II's projected journey, if judged by the attention accorded to it by the English press in its handling of the issue, seems to have been of special importance to the German Foreign Ministry. Indeed, it must be noted that Anglo-German relations in 1898 were exceptionally cordial. A rapprochement between the two Powers was attempted in the spring of that year. Though no alliance resulted, an agreement concerning the Portuguese colonies was signed on August 30, 1898. Furthermore, the improved Anglo-German relations coincided with the Fashoda crisis which by October threatened to escalate into open warfare between England and France. Under these circumstances it was not surprising that the English press was generally not unfriendly towards the Emperor's trip to Palestine, and to its political implications. Germany's right of protection over her Catholic subjects and institutions in the East was not challenged. Referring to the French claims The Times on October 8 declared: "It has its root...in political aspirations...which have little to do with religion." The Daily Telegraph, maintaining the same view, pointed to the fact that even the Franciscans in Palestine, claiming the traditional right of guarding the Holy Places, were no longer French, but Italians or Spaniards. The English press generally agreed that the influence of France

63 The crisis subsided only after France on November 3 decided to unconditionally evacuate Fashoda.
64 A. A., Freussen 1 No. 1 No. 4, document No. Al1557.
65 Ibid., Al1820.
in the Near East was declining while that of Germany was rapidly rising. "France has always posed as protector," declared the Globe on October 17, "but it is already apparent that her part in that capacity is played out" the paper concluded. That Germany had real interests in Palestine was obvious. "There are German interests in Turkey and German interests in Palestine," wrote the Morning Post. Germany's increasing interest in the East was also very real to The Times. Analyzing Germany's commercial achievements in the region the paper on October 21, with a note of regret, castigated "British statesmanship" for missing the opportunities seized by Germany. Returning to the same subject on October 28 The Times presented statistical evidence to show how German competition, at least in Palestine, was gaining the upper hand. Accordingly, in 1894 England had 15.6 percent of all the imports into Palestine. Three years later her share had shrunk to 10.8 percent, while Germany's share, on the other hand, rose in 1896 to 8.9 percent from 7.3 percent in 1894. These and other manifestations of Germany's increasing penetration of the East did not worry The Times. "In this country," the paper on October 28 editorialized, "we can have nothing but good wishes for the success of the Emperor's journey and for any plans of German commercial expansion...we can honestly say

68 *Ibid.*, A12124. The parts of the article that dealt with Germany's commercial and industrial infiltration of Turkey so impressed von Bülow that he on November 3 telegraphed from Jerusalem to have this part of the article reproduced in the German press. See *A.A.*, No. 44, ("Telegramme an und von Herrn von Holstein, St. S. von Bülow aus Jerusalem," 3.11.1898); *N.A.* T-120; serial No. KI828; document No. A12688.
that if we were not to have these good things for ourselves, there are no hands we would rather see them in than in German hands." The Daily Telegraph seemingly was even less concerned. An article by the paper's correspondent in Palestine, featured on the day of the dedication of the Lutheran Church in Jerusalem, concluded that "...a common religion and a common love of peace link silently and indissolubly the destinies of the Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon peoples."71

The political uproar that greeted William II's decision to visit the East did not deter the Emperor from executing his plans. Still, due to the excited atmosphere and the political uncertainties of the time, a brief excursion to Egypt which had originally been planned was cancelled.72

The Visit

A special Imperial train consisting of twenty carriages, bearing their Majesties the Emperor and Empress, the chiefs of the Emperor's civil, military, and naval cabinets,73 the Emperor's private physician, the court chaplain, the painter profes-

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70 Ibid., October 28, 1898, p. 7.
71 A. A., Preussen 1 No. 1 No. 4, Archival No. A12602.
72 Ibid., AS2806 and AS2796, both dated October 7, 1898.
73 William II even refused to give permission to have the military despatches first reviewed by the General Staff, before sending them off to the Orient. The argument of the Foreign Ministry that too much time might be lost if important documents and charts were first duplicated and sent to Palestine was rejected by the Emperor. See A. A., Deutschland 149 No. 2 ("Behandlung der beim Auswärtigen Amt eingehenden Militär-und Marineberichte"); serial No. ACF 371; document No. A11768, von Richthofen to William II, October 12, 1898. Also William II's response dated October 13, 1898.

Alone, thirty-seven different invitations were extended to the evangelical State Churches in Germany.

The Times (London), October 13, 1893, p. 3. The descriptive material that follows was taken from the daily reports about the journey that appeared in The Times.

It should be noted that Francis Joseph also bore the title King of Jerusalem and could therefore be regarded as the legitimate protector of German speaking Catholics in Palestine. The Empress was in mourning in consequence of the assassination of her husband, the Emperor Francis Joseph I.
ial party across the sea, was boarded at 4 p.m. Accompanied by the German warship "Herta" it sailed for Constantinople.

On October 17, the "Hohenzollern" convoyed by the warships "Herta" and "Hela" entered the Dardanelles. Arriving at Constantinople on the following morning, the German Emperor and Empress were warmly greeted by Sultan Abdul Hamid II as well as many Turkish and German officials. The security arrangements were extraordinary. The visit to Constantinople lasted five days. The time was spent mostly in consultations and excursions, of which the visit to the Anatolian Railway was the most noted. The Russian embassy at Constantinople, it was noticed, hoisted no flag, and the Russian vessels in the harbor did not dress ship. Neither did the French.

Having departed from Constantinople on October 23, the "Hohenzollern" and her accompanying warships arrived in Haifa on October 25, in the afternoon.

The preparations undertaken for the visit by the Turkish authorities in Palestine were very extensive. A cleanup campaign throughout the land had been ordered. Roads were widened and repaired, buildings were painted and decorated with German and Tur-

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78 The Times (London), October 19, 1898, p. 5. Among the Germans present were several military officers attached to the Turkish army. Also present was Dr. Siemens, the director of the Deutsche Bank.

79 An Anarchist plot to assassinate William II had been discovered at Alexandria, Egypt. The plan had to be altered due to the cancellation of the Emperor's itinerary. The plot was discovered when the plotters attempted to transport the bombs to Jaffa.

80 See accounts in The Times (London), October 20, 1898, p. 3, and October 22, p. 7.
kish flags, and special security arrangements were evident all over. Six hundred cavalry of the Imperial Ottoman body guard and the Ertoghrul cavalry regiment had arrived at Haifa on October 16. Another three battalions of Turkish infantry landed at Jaffa on October 24. The traveling camp, arranged for the Imperial party under the supervision of John M. Cook of Cook's Tourist Agency, included seventy-five sleeping tents, six saloon tents, and six kitchen tents. Another ninety-seven tents were pitched in an olive grove on ground belonging to the German colony at Jerusalem. It was to serve as the Emperor's headquarters. Each tent was well furnished with iron bedstead, chairs and tables. Some could accommodate as many as thirty people for dinner. Some of the tents had come from Germany, others were furnished by the Turkish Government. The encampment, about twenty minutes walk outside Jerusalem, was constantly guarded. A better, more scenic site could have apparently been selected but William II is said to have insisted upon living on German ground.

Their Majesties, after their arrival at Haifa, disembarked at 4 p.m. and were greeted at the landing stage, built within the German colony, by various officials and cheering German settlers. The colony was beautifully decorated with flags and festoons. The visit on shore was brief, consisting only of a ride to the monastery on Mount Carmel. The night was again

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81 Treloar, With the Kaiser in the East, pp. 11-13.
82 The landing stage was constructed under the supervision of a German engineer summoned from Constantinople. According to the Frankfurter Zeitung the project cost 50,000 Marks. When the first stone was laid, in August, 1898, the whole consular body, and all the local notables were invited. See The Times (London), August 9, 1898, p. 3.
spent on board the "Hohenzollern." Next morning amid salvos of artillery from the German warships the Imperial party came to shore at about 7 o'clock. The Emperor wore his new tropical uniform with the Order of St. John of Jerusalem and carried a walking stick. At a reception held at the German consulate the Emperor was officially greeted by a delegation of colonists. Mr. Friedrich Lange, the school master of the German school at Haifa, voiced the hope that the Empire would continue to support his school in order to maintain close connections with the Father-land. Replying to the greetings, William II expressed his satisfaction that the colonists had remained German and assured them that their interests would not be neglected by the German Empire.

Father Biever, the director of the German Catholic settlement at Tabgha, speaking at the same reception on behalf of the "Verein Von Heiligen Lande," and the German Catholic settlers in Palestine, thanked the Emperor for his protection and expressed the hope that it would continue in the future. In view of the dispute over the rights of protection, William II's reply could have been anticipated. He said:

Your patriotic address has greatly pleased me, and I thank you much for it. In reply I gladly take the opportunity to declare once and for all that my Catholic subjects can always depend on my Imperial protection whenever and wherever they may require it.

The Munich Allgemeine Zeitung featuring the text of the

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83 The Times (London), October 28, 1898, p. 3.
84 See above, Chapter II, p. 73.
85 Münchner Allgemeine Zeitung, October 29, 1898, p. 5.

The report of the paper was incorrect in as much as it placed the time of the reception in the afternoon of the previous day.
Emperor's reply commented that the announcement was clear enough for the whole world to hear. Satisfied with the turn of events the paper declared that the day had been turned into an "epoch making event for the development of German national consciousness." 86

The reception at the consulate was followed by a brief inspection of the German hospital which was decorated for the occasion with German flags. 87

A long day still lay ahead for the Imperial party. The journey from Haifa to Jerusalem, it had been decided, would be made on horseback and carriage. As later explained by von Bülow, "a railway, with its cars, guards, and puffing locomotive, really did not suit the scene, nor yet the mood of those who had feelings for this country...." 88 At 8 o'clock that morning, amid the strains of the German national anthem and hearty cries of "Hoch!" the Imperial party began leaving Haifa. An estimated number of 1,200 horses and mules were assembled for the trip. Count Wedel, the Imperial Master of the Horse, was in charge of the Imperial horses and carriages. The attendants of the Emperor numbered one hundred and twenty-four. The baggage train was attended by eight hundred muleteers. The Turkish commission that accompanied the Emperor consisted of twenty-seven high officials and one hundred eleven lesser ones. All told the procession numbered about 2,000 persons. Security was provided by a detachment of lancers riding in front and another in the rear. Other soldiers

scouted the fields along the route. Travel in the hot and sandy terrain along the coast of Palestine was slow and difficult. "Up hills and down hills we laboured over places where the scrub and wild thyme were thick, but there was always the same dreadful dust!" recorded one participant. Still, only a few non-fatal casualties caused by sun strokes and scorpion bites were reported.

The procession reached Jaffa in the late afternoon of the following day. At the German colony of Sarona, in the outskirts of the city, William II, replying to another welcoming address by the German settlers, remarked that he was pleased to see that his friendly relations with the Sultan benefited the German subjects in the East. The more the Germans were held on to their Germanism, the Emperor declared, the more would they constitute a civilizing and beneficial element for Turkey.

After spending the night at Jaffa, the Imperial party early the next morning set out on the road to Jerusalem. Additional time for the reception of deputations had to be set aside. Another Templar delegation presented the Emperor with water color pictures of their colonies, and a Zionist deputation headed by Dr. Theodor Herzl was briefly seen at Mikveh-Israel on the Jaffa to Jerusalem road. The Imperial party reached its encampment at Jerusalem on Saturday at noon.

The clean up campaign that had been ordered by the Tur-
kish Government was specifically aimed at the Holy City. The buildings in Jerusalem were whitewashed, a new road to the Mount of Olives was paved, other roads in and around the city were repaired, and the Jaffa Gate, hitherto carefully locked each night, was widened to allow for the entry of the Imperial carriages.

The entry of the German Emperor into Jerusalem on Saturday, October 29, was a brilliant event. The Imperial cavalcade was led by six mounted equerries followed by a carriage occupied by the foreign consuls. Then came the Emperor, preceded by trumpeters. He was riding on horseback wearing his service uniform fully decorated. In addition William II wore a white silk dust dress which resembled a pilgrim's cowl. The Emperor was followed by his Imperial staff who were similarly clad. The Empress and her ladies followed. The trumpets sounded and Germans cried "Hoch! Hoch!"

A number of triumphal arches were erected to welcome the German Emperor. The first such arch outside the Jaffa Gate was that of the Jewish community of Jerusalem. The Emperor upon reaching this arch was welcomed by two elderly rabbis who handed him a gift and addressed him in Hebrew. Consul von Tischendorf, having familiarized himself with the text, provided the Emperor with the translation. He was quite embarrassed, though, when the Emperor, under the impression that his consul had learned Hebrew, expected him to translate his response to the rabbi's add-

92 Ephraim Cohn-Reis, Mesichronot Ish Yerushalyim (Jerusalem, Rueben Mas, 1934), p. 239.

93 The Jewish population of Jerusalem was slightly over 30,000 and represented a majority.
Entering the city by the Jaffa Gate the Imperial party was greeted by the roar of guns from the citadel and the playing of "Deutschland Deutschland über alles" by a Turkish band stationed at the Tower of David. Once inside the old city their Majesties proceeded on foot to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. There they were met by the Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox and Armenian clergy, headed by Msgr. Piavi, the Latin Patriarch. Welcoming addresses and polite responses followed. From there the Imperial party continued to the recently completed Lutheran Church of the Redeemer. Here the Prussian Minister of Public Worship, Dr. Bosse, formally thanked William II for coming to celebrate the dedication of the church.

At a reception held that evening in the German consulate William II personally and formally informed Father Schmidt, the director of the German hospice in Jerusalem, of his intention to hand over to the "Verein Von Heiligen Lande" the recently acquired property in Jerusalem known as the "Dormition de la sainte Vierge." Official notifications were thereupon despatched to the president of the society in Achen, and to Pope Leo XIII. The Pope "was moved" by this gesture and it was promptly applauded by the German press. The Germania voicing the thanks of the Ger-

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94 Cohn-Reis, p. 247.

95 The arrival of the Imperial party in Jerusalem was naturally reported in all German newspapers, but as the correspondent of The Times in Berlin noted, the comments in the press lacked any kind of enthusiasm or traces of sentiment. The Times (London), November 1, 1898, p. 5.

96 It was here according to tradition that Mary dwelt.

97 A. A., Türkei 175g, No. A12542, Pope Leo XIII to William II, October 30, 1898.
man Catholics referred to the gift as an unforgettable memorial of the Palestine journey. More concerned with the political implications of the gesture, the Hamburger Correspondent and the Kölnische Zeitung saw significance in the fact that it was the protestant protector of the German Empire who acquired a site so revered by the whole Catholic world. Pointing to the universal importance of the event the semi-official Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung claimed that the action proved that the German Emperor's presence in the East actually represented all Christians. Similarly the Munich Allgemeine Zeitung interpreted the event as one additional proof that the Emperor indeed cared for the welfare of all his subjects regardless of their creed. 98

The next morning, Sunday October 30, the Emperor and Empress attended Divine service at the Evangelical church in Bethlehem. Addressing the assembled, William II voiced his deep disappointment at what he had witnessed so far in Jerusalem. Conceding that the "extreme difficult and unpicturesque approaches to Jerusalem" may have contributed to his unfavorable impression, the Emperor pointedly added that "seeing the actual conditions at the sacred places is enough to make one's heart bleed." Then calling on the people to avoid religious disputes he urged them "to present henceforth a solid phalanx in the Orient with our Evangelical Church and creed...." Skillfully mixing politics and religion, William II, referring to the feuds among the Christian sects and to the fact "that one shred after the other, on one

98 These and other views of the German press were forwarded by the Foreign Ministry to Bülow in Jerusalem. Ibid., No. A12570, telegram No. 74, von Richthofen to Bülow, November 1, 1898.
pretext or other, is torn from Mohammedan sovereignty...," insisted that no one could blame the Moslems for not exhibiting greater respect towards the Christians. Concluding his admonition the German Emperor declared: "Now our turn has come...it is for us at present to demonstrate what is really the essence of Christianity..." Possibly to emphasize her husband's speech the Empress, later that morning, took part in the formal opening of a new German institution in Palestine - the German orphanage near Bethlehem. The Emperor after his return to Jerusalem escaped the eastern environment by visiting the German colony. In the afternoon their Majesties ascended the Mount of Olives to attend service at the Russian church on the summit.

The following day, Monday October 31, was the day on which the consecration of the Church of the Redeemer was celebrated. The road leading to the church was already crowded in the early hours of the day. The Imperial party left camp at about half past nine that morning. The Emperor riding on horseback was wearing the white mantle of the Teutonic Knights and was attended by a cavalcade of knights wearing similar mantles. The Empress and her attendants were riding in the state carriage. Having arrived, their Majesties entered the church to the tune of Handel's "See the Conquering Hero Comes." After the conclusion of the service William II quite unexpectedly went up to the altar's steps and knelt in deep devotion. After a few silent moments he turned to the congregation to deliver an allocution.

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The Empress, so von Bülow tells, taken by surprise, turned pale. Though the Emperor's words were non political, his call for "peace on earth" clearly echoed Tsar Nicholas II's recent Peace Manifesto. To the strains of Handel's "He Shall Feed His Flock" the Emperor and Empress left the church. Escorted by a detachment of German sailors the party returned to camp.

Another important ceremony was scheduled for that afternoon. The ground of the "Dormition" on Mount Zion was to be officially handed over to the "Verein Von Heiligen Lande." A guard of honor formed by two companies of German marines from the warship "Hertha" faced a flag staff which was placed in the center of the property. Also present was the band of the "Hohenzollern." At the time of the Emperor's arrival the band was playing a march but upon receiving a signal it immediately switched to "Deutschland Deutschland über alles." After the hoisting of the German flag, William II decorated the guard of honor and exhorted his soldiers to defend the honor of their Fatherland. The playing of another march concluded the ceremony. Commenting on the event, the Kölnische Zeitung on November 1, wrote that the construction of a German cathedral in Jerusalem, in addition to the German Church of the Redeemer, would remind the world of the differences that divided Germany but at the same time would also serve to demonstrate that such differences could not disintegrate the

100 Von Bülow, Memoirs, p. 297.

101 The text is quoted in Schierband, pp. 315-319.

102 The account of these events, as presented here, was provided by The Times (London), November 2, 1898, p. 5, and the Münchner Allgemeine Zeitung, November 2, pp. 1-3.
united German Fatherland. Concluding its assessment the paper declared:

Over these two towers the Imperial eagle will henceforth extend its mighty pinions. These towers will bear witness that they owe their foundation to a common origin - the initiative and the fostering care of the Hohenzollerns.103

The events of October 31. in Jerusalem were also welcomed by the Munich Allgemeine Zeitung. Under the headline "The Peace Festival at Jerusalem" the paper for the first time featured the news concerning the journey on its front page. It voiced the wish that the events of the day would finally silence all political suspicions that were being raised in Paris, St. Petersburg, Rome, and even in Germany.104

The official purpose of the visit to Palestine had been accomplished. The remaining days, according to the schedule, were to be devoted to further sightseeing. According to the original plan the Imperial party was to undertake excursions to the Dead Sea, Jericho, Nazareth, Mount Tabor, and Tiberias. This schedule, however, was drastically altered and all excursions outside Jerusalem cancelled. Officially, the weather was blamed. The real reason behind the sudden change was the news from Fashoda. The deepening Anglo-French crisis, William II believed, might necessitate his presence nearer to home.105 There was still much to see in Jerusalem. Although careful not to sound too political, William II spared no words to demonstrate his

103 Ibid.
104 Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung, November 2, 1898, p. 1.
105 A. A., Preussen 1 No. 1 No. 4, document No. A3422, von Bülow to von Mürbach, March 26, 1899.
determination to protect all Germans living in Palestine. The revised schedule, though it limited the Emperor to Jerusalem, did not prevent this theme from being further exploited.

On Tuesday, November 1, passing through the German colony of Rephaim (Jerusalem) the Emperor thanked the colonists for their cordial reception and seized the opportunity to praise the work of his Swabian subjects in Palestine. Sounding rather personal, he told the Templers:

If any one of you should require my protection, you know that I am available; let him apply to me, no matter what his creed, and I am glad to say ("erfreulicherweise") the German Empire is in the position to extend proper protection to its members outside Germany.106

Further visits to German institutions were conducted on the following day. Especially impressive for the Emperor was a visit to the German girls' orphanage Tolita Kumi.107 Also visited that day was the Catholic hospice which was conspicuously decorated with German flags. The director, Father Schmidt, welcomed the Emperor by telling him that "the shadow of the Emperor had fallen with cool and refreshing influence on dry and parched land...." Not to be outdone by this oriental rhetoric William II replied:

First of all I thank you for your patriotic address. Your institution stands, as you said, under my shadow. That shadow proceeds from the same black and white shield which I have also stretched over your brethren...in the Far East.....To protect them my brother is now out there with the mailed might of my ships whose flag here also

106 Münchner Allgemeine Zeitung, November 2, 1898, p. 3.
107 A. A., Preussen 1 No. 1 No. 4, document No. A12673, Jerusalem, November 3, 1898.
waves its protecting fold above you.

The visit to Palestine was nearing conclusion. Their Majesties spent their last day in the Holy City rather quietly. They left the city for Jaffa on board a special train on Friday, November 4. Arriving in Jaffa that afternoon the Emperor and Empress boarded the "Hohenzollern" amid salutes by her escorts, and left for Syria.

The visit to Palestine had come to a successful end. Those who had expected any dramatic announcements were disappointed. Other more pressing international and domestic matters had already overshadowed much of the journey, and the whole subject was quickly dropped by the European press.

After an impressive visit to Syria, the climax of which featured William II's speech at the tomb of Saladin, the Imperial party on November 26, 1898 returned to Potsdam.

The Religious and Political Consequences of the Visit

Bernhard von Bülow, the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, after his return from Palestine, in a speech to the Reichstag on December 12, 1898 briefly and in general terms outlined Germany's position in the Orient in view of the recent journey of William II. The journey, according to von Bülow's interpretation, demonstrated Germany's peaceful policy. Germany, he contended, did not have and did not want any special influence in

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108 Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung, November 5, 1898, pp. 7-8, also The Times (London), November 5, p. 7.

109 In his speech on November 8, the Emperor expressed his friendship to the Sultan and the 300 million Moslem people.
Constantinople. Its commercial enterprises in the Levant were primarily aimed at improving the welfare of the Ottoman Empire, all political speculations notwithstanding. He conceded that Germany had gained sympathy in Turkey but credited it to Germany's unselfish policies. Referring to the speculations that had preceded the Emperor's journey to Palestine, von Bülow claimed they were intended to damage Germany's friendly relations with Turkey. But the Sultan, the State Secretary added, was too clever a man to suspect for even one moment that William II would attempt to follow the steps of Bohemond and Tankred and try to somehow seize "Syria, Palestine, or God knows what." His words were received by the Reichstag with serenity. 110 Concerning the subject of the Protectorate, von Bülow denied any intention on the part of Germany to claim the right of protection over all Christians living in the Orient. The right of protection over German subjects and institutions, on the other hand, he insisted was strictly reserved to the German Emperor. That this point had been amply demonstrated was well realized, and a warm applause by the Reichstag followed. 111

While von Bulow's declamation could hardly serve as a guideline for Germany's true motivations and intentions, his explanation concerning the Empire's relations to Palestine was basically correct. The German Empire's official policy indeed excluded any plan to annex Palestine, or for that fact any other Turkish territory. But one must remember that the struggle among

111Ibid.
the competing Powers in Palestine, at the time, centered on cultural rather than on territorial predominance. In this sphere the Emperor's visit and the German acquisition of the "Dormition de la sainte Vierge" clearly enhanced Germany's position in Palestine.

The acquisition of the "Dormition," and the concession granted for future construction on the ground, represented a much greater achievement and was of greater consequence than the account of William Langer, for instance, indicates. Like so much else in Palestine this transaction was motivated and complicated by religious as well as political considerations. The political aspects of the deal were quite apparent to von Bülow and played a definite role in his decision to see the acquisition approved and carried out. As he assessed it in a report on the subject submitted to William II on June 4, 1898, German control of the holy places in Jerusalem known as the Cenacle (the room of the Last Supper), and the "Dormition" would serve to diminish France's traditional claims in the East.

The first German attempt to acquire these holy places occurred as early as 1890 under the initiative of the "Palastina Verein." Von Radowitz, the then German Ambassador to Constant-

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112 According to Langer "the Sultan had hurriedly bought from the Arab owner a holy place... which was only a cabbage patch worth a few hundred francs, but for which the Germans paid 120,000 francs in order that the Emperor might present it to the German Catholics." The Diplomacy of Imperialism, p. 639.

113 A. A., Türkei 175 g, No. AS1592. Also G. P., XII, No. 3368, p. 610.

114 Known later as the "Verein Von Heiligen Lande," see above, chapter II, p. 72.
tinople, in a despatch on December 26, 1890 voiced the opinion that the acquisition of the Cenacle was out of the question but that the "Dormition" through the intervention of the German Government could possibly be purchased. 115 Local Moslem opposition in Jerusalem, though, frustrated the plan, and the matter was not raised again until the Emperor's projected visit to Palestine became known. Baron von Marschall, the Ambassador at Constantinople, when requested to report whether von Radovitz's views were still valid, replied that according to his own evaluation of the situation, the Sultan could under no circumstances be expected to transfer such a holy Moslem shrine as the Cenacle to any Christian. Such an act, the Ambassador believed, would arouse the whole Moslem world against the Sultan, and against Germany. On the other hand, the purchase of the "Dormition," von Marschall reported, "might be possible but difficult." Should negotiations regarding this matter be attempted, he suggested that they be pursued directly through the Sultan in order not to raise any suspicions that Germany was behind the offer. 116 Reviewing von Marschall's assessment, von Bülow, with the approval of the Emperor, concluded that the matter of the Cenacle would not be raised at all since it could hurt Germany more than France. However, the "Dormition," von Bülow suggested, should, if it proved possible, be acquired. His decision was supported by the

115 A. A., Türkei 175 g, No. AS1592. Also G. P., XII, No. 3366, p. 607.


117 A. A., Türkei 175 g, No. AS1592. Also G. P., XII, No. 3368, p. 610.
argument that, on the one hand, the acquisition would hurt the prestige of France in the Levant, and, on the other hand, it would keep up the newly aroused antagonism of the German Catholics towards their French co-religionists. The scheme gained William II's approval, but only on the condition that it would not alienate the Moslems.

Having received a pledge from the "Verein Von Heiligen Lande" to raise the required 120,000 M. for the purchase, the German Government on July 23, 1898 related its wishes on this subject to Tewfik Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador at Berlin. The response of the Turkish Government was slow in coming. The long delay in fact prompted the German Foreign Ministry on September 12 to remind Constantinople of its desire to have the matter settled. But arduous negotiations still lay ahead. Two weeks after, reporting that some progress had been made, von Marschall indicated that the Sultan's acquiescence had been obtained. The next step was for Constantinople to inform the Governor of Jerusalem of its desire to purchase the property in question, without providing the reason why.

The negotiations regarding the "Dormition," though held in secret, became known to France. This development, and von

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118 Ibid., the Emperor's marginal comment.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid., No. A10140, letter to von Bülow, Achen, August 31, 1898.
121 G. P., XII, No. 3369, p. 611.
122 A. A., Turkei 175 g, No. AS2313. Also G. P., XII, No. 3374, p. 617.
Bulow's reaction to it, further intensified the political significance of the project. The State Secretary, exhibiting concern and anxiety over the possibility that French pressure might block the proposed transaction, quickly moved to counter any such threat by applying his own pressure. Employing unusually blunt language he directed von Marschall to advise the Sultan that Emperor William II was personally interested in the successful conclusion of the proposed plan and that he would appreciate a positive response. A rejection of these wishes, von Bülow maintained, could only be traced to French pressure which, if successful, in view of Germany's warm relations with Turkey, would hurt the Emperor's feelings very deeply. 124 The Turkish Government, unwilling to alienate William II on the eve of his visit, moved to satisfy him. On October 13, two days after the Emperor's departure for the East, the Foreign Ministry finally received the information it was waiting for. The Sultan, von Marschall telegraphed, had ordered the purchase of the "Dormition" for transfer to Germany. 125

The question as far as Germany was concerned, except for some legal complications regarding on whose name the title of the property was to be registered,126 seemed settled. However,

124 Ibid., No. 3377, p. 620, von Bülow to von Marschall, October 5, 1893.

125 Ibid., No. 3380, p. 621. The content was forwarded to von Bülow on October 14. A. A., 175 g, No. A52858.

126 The title was originally signed by von Tischendorff, but William II insisted that the property be registered in his own name. This was done. See A. A., Türkei 175 g, No. A13574, telegram No. 481, November 23, 1898, and No. A13694, telegram No. 491, November 29, 1898.
it soon became apparent that some opposition, especially from Russia, was still forthcoming.

The first indications that Russia was not apathetic to Germany's latest gain in Palestine came when Zinoviev, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, told von Marschall on December 6 that he had received a report from Jerusalem to the effect that some of the stones located at the "Dormition" are holy to the Orthodox faith. Von Marschall, realizing the political implication of the Russian contention, immediately requested clarification from Jerusalem and instructions from Berlin. The telegraphic response of the Foreign Ministry to von Marschall read: "Refuse any comment which might limit the acquired rights of the Emperor in regard to the 'Dormition.'" Von Tischendorff's first reaction, when approached by his Russian colleague in Jerusalem on the subject, was to order the larger stones that were on the ground of the "Dormition" assembled and placed in the inner area, and to have the property encircled by a wall. Von Tischendorff's instructions were similar to von Marschall's: "In case there is any attempt from any quarter to infringe on the rights...you are to declare that your instructions forbid you from discussing such matters." The Foreign Ministry's instructions to St. Petersburg were almost identical.

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127 Ibid., Al4220, telegram No. 500, December 7, 1898. The telegram was shown to Chancellor von Hohenlohe.
128 Ibid., Al4220, telegram No. 308.
129 Ibid., Al4219, telegram No. 502.
130 Ibid., Al4220, telegram No. 21.
131 Ibid., Al4220, telegram No. 869.
sequently all Russian attempts to raise the issue were rebuffed by the argument that the property belonged to William II personally (the title was registered in his name), and that therefore any inquiries should be directed to Berlin. Germany's obstinate refusal to discuss the matter discouraged the Russians from pressing the political aspect of the issue. They eventually settled for a religious face saving compromise by which the stones in question were to be placed in the western wall of the Church of the Dormition so that they could be revered from the outside.

This rather uncharacteristic Russian flexibility, it must be noted, coincided with a much more important, but related, Russian diplomatic offensive aimed at Germany. The Russian Government greatly concerned over William II's successful journey to the East, and Germany's increasing influence in the Turkish domains, concluded that a political clash between the ambitions of the two powers in the Near East was becoming inevit-

132 Ibid., AS1429, telegram No. 507, Pera, December 10, 1898, and A3572, telegram No. 114, Pera, March 26, 1899.

133 The compromise was suggested by Father Schmidt, the director of the German hospice in Jerusalem. See Ibid., No. A14305, telegram No. 510, Pera, December 10, 1898. Zinoviev on March 26, 1899 once again approached von Marschall about this matter, and was again rebuffed. See Ibid., No. A3572, March 26, 1899. The Porte in September 1900, before giving its approval for the construction of the Church of the Dormition to begin, imposed the condition that the stones on the western wall be placed in a position so that they would be visible from the outside. See Ibid., No. A13237, September 19, 1900.

134 The most recent indication was the concession granted Germany in January, 1899 for the construction of a harbor at Haidar Pasha, the terminal of the Anatolian railway line. In consequence of the Emperor's visit to Constantinople, Germany was also granted a concession for a cable to run from Constance to Constantinople.
A Russian diplomatic campaign aimed at reaching an accommodation with Germany in the Near East was therefore inaugurated. The first conversation that centered on Germany's new posture in the East was held between Count Osten von Sacken, Russia's Ambassador in Berlin, and von Bülow on March 24, 1899. In their discussions, begun in Berlin but also carried on in St. Petersburg, the Russian diplomats showed readiness to approve Germany's achievements and even welcome further German advances in Asiatic Turkey, provided that Germany "unambiguously recognized Russia's traditional claims in the Bosphorus." These Russian advances to Germany, as pointed out by professor Langer, really touched upon Germany's basic foreign policy principles. Their acceptance by Germany, as was argued by von Holstein, could only have meant the ruin of the Triple Alliance and the alienation of England. This Germany refused to accept.

Another attempt to frustrate Germany's plans concerning the "Dormition" was, according to von Bülow, inspired by France. The "Verein Von Heiligen Lande" having taken possession of the

135 A. A., Deutschland 131 No. 3 Secr. ("Gehime Acten betreffend Deutsche Russische Verständigung über den Türkischen Orient"); reel No. UC I 298; document No. A1395, von Radolin to von Hohenlohe, June 29, 1899. This topic is also covered by the G.P., XIV, Nos. 4015-4025.


137 Ibid., No. A1395, von Radolin to von Hohenlohe, June 29, 1899. This report totaled seventeen pages alone.

138 For instance, see Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, pp. 640-641.

139 A. A., Deutschland 131 No. 3 Secr., No. AS814. A promemoria by von Holstein, dated April 17, 1899.
"Dormition" was suddenly presented with an attractive offer by the Franciscan Order in Jerusalem. The Franciscans, claiming ownership over the so-called American cemetery that bordered on the "Dormition," agreed that the title of their property would be added to that of the "Dormition" if in exchange their Order would be rewarded with the administration of the Church of the Dormition scheduled to be built on the property. The "Verein Von Heiligen Lande" anxious to increase and round off its property on Mount Zion, agreed to the proposition on the condition that only German nationals belonging to the German chapter of the Order be entrusted with the administration of the church. This demand the Franciscans in Jerusalem and in Rome rejected.\(^{140}\)

Von Bulow, who was kept informed on all these developments, now became suspicious. Reporting this turn of events to the Emperor, he suggested that Germany should continue to insist on its original demand "in order not to open the door to French and Russian intrigues."\(^{141}\) A German investigation of the offer followed, revealing that the Franciscan Order was in fact not the legal owner of the property altogether. The property in question had been bought from the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions in New York. But since the price had not been fully paid, the title possessed by the Franciscan Order was not the legal one. Under the existing circumstances, not only did the Order have no legal right to transfer the property, under Turkish law no buildings

\(^{140}\) A. A., Türkei 175 g, No. A1728, memorandum from von Bülow to William II, February 16, 1899.

\(^{141}\) Ibid., William II's marginal comment was: "Why does the General Consul not notice anything?"
could be erected on a cemetery. 142 Von Bülow, reporting to Emperor William II on this "French trap," concluded that:

...the Franciscan order in Jerusalem, standing under French protection, had planned a move on the chessboard which, if successful, would rid them of insecure, almost worthless property, but would have made them masters, and given them authority over the new house of God. But since for us everything depends on the new project becoming a starting point ("Ausgangspunkt") for German endeavors, I suggest...to break off negotiations with the Franciscans. 143

The Emperor's response was: "Yes, immediately." 144 Furthermore, concerned over additional complications, William II instructed von Bülow to be on guard against any Franciscan attempt to persuade the Turkish authorities to add the cemetery's title to that of the "Dormition." 145 The administration of the Church of the Dormition, it was consequently decided, should be entrusted to the Benedictines of Beuron. 146

The de facto establishment of Germany's right to protect all its subjects and institutions in Palestine, and the acquisition of the "Dormition," as was demonstrated, must be regarded as tangible German gains in Palestine. Though no other such gains, in consequence of the Emperor's visit, were immediately evident, 147 public interest in Palestine and the Germans living

143 Ibid. 144 Ibid. Marginal comment of William II.
146 Ibid., No. A8643, July 15, 1899.
147 Von Bülow in his speech to the Reichstag on December 12, 1898, in respect to Palestine, mentioned only the matter of
there was greatly intensified. Characteristic of this development, for instance, was the _Kolonialzeitung_. This paper, as noted above, from the time it had become the organ of the "Deutsche Kolonial Gesellschaft" had shown very little interest in either the German enterprises in Palestine or in the possibility of colonizing the Turkish domains. The visit of Emperor William II to the East, the paper admitted, reflected a trend that could not be ignored. The paper suddenly discovered that Germany possessed plantation colonies in Africa and in the South Seas; a trade colony in Kaio-chow; a sort of an emigrant's colony in South West Africa, but no agricultural colony where German farmers could migrate and prosper. The time to establish such colonies might be ripe, the _Kolonialzeitung_ admitted. But taking issue with the Pan-German League, and in fact keeping in line with Germany's official foreign policy towards Turkey, the paper declared that it was not necessary for such colonies to be under German sovereignty. 149 Telling its readers of the many difficulties that had faced the German settlers in Palestine, the paper concluded that several more colonies could be established protection, and the acquisition of the Dormition. Count von Mirbach (he had accompanied William II to Palestine) writing to the Emperor on March 22, 1899, requested information for a book which he was planning to publish (I have been unable to locate this work). Even though von Mirbach requested special information concerning the motives of the journey, and Germany's future plans in the East, he was given only the standard answers. See A. A., Preussen I No. 1 No. 4, Archival No. A3442, letter from von Mirbach to William II, dated March 22, 1899, and the reply, dated March 26, 1899.

148 See Chapter II, p. 70.

149 "Der deutsche Kaiser im Orient," _Kolonialzeitung_, vol XV (1898), 348.
there, but added that no mass emigration from Germany to Palestine was possible.\textsuperscript{150} Attempting to present a balanced account, the \textit{KoloniaJzeitung} admitted that the subject was being widely discussed in Germany and that more optimistic views should also be considered. A long and optimistic excerpt from an article in the \textit{Geographischen Zeitschrift} followed. The author, Theobald Fischer, insisted that Palestine, without undergoing industrialization, could support a population of three million souls. The land west of the Jordan, he declared, was ideal for the cultivation of oranges, cotton, sugar-cane, tobacco, bananas, and various vegetables while the land east of the Jordan was famous for its cereals and grains.\textsuperscript{151} Even though not committing itself on the subject, the \textit{KoloniaJzeitung} henceforth accorded the subject greater coverage.

The influential \textit{Preussische Jahrbücher}, not unlike the \textit{KoloniaJzeitung}, in consequence of William II's journey, called attention to the fact that the German colonization of Asiatic Turkey would not necessarily mean that the Sultan must lose sovereignty over his domains. Reminding its readers that in India there still existed large, almost autonomous states that belonged to the British colonial Empire, the \textit{Preussische Jahrbücher} declared: "that is also what we need."\textsuperscript{152}

Considering Germany's warm relations with Turkey, this

\textsuperscript{150}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 362.

\textsuperscript{151}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 362-363. It can be noted that the present population of the State of Israel is three million.

\textsuperscript{152}\textit{Preussische Jahrbücher}, vol.XCIV (October-December, 1898), pp. 371-2.
brand of colonialism seemed much more appropriate and was definitely more welcome to the German Government than the doctrine of annexation advocated by the more reactionary Pan-German League.

The *Preussische Jahrbücher*, apparently intending to demonstrate the practical implications of its declared stand, soon after featured a long and important article entitled "A German Colony in Syria." The article was divided into three sections. The first, dealing with the enterprises of the Templers in Palestine, pointed to the fact that despite their initial great hardships the settlers have accomplished much. So much, according to the article, that the value of their immovables already reached nine million Francs. The second section of the article considered the future opportunities for developing the land. Haifa, the writer believed, would be of special importance as a gate to Mesopotamia for the "peaceful colonizers entering from the Mediterranean." Regarding the productivity of the land, the article pointed out that the Jordan valley was well suited for the cultivation of cotton. The cultivation of wheat, vegetables, fruits and other agricultural products was also considered. Claiming that the difficult climatic conditions in Palestine can be overcome, as proved by the experience of Sarona, the article concluded "that the existing conditions for colonization, with the exception of a few climatic detriments..., can be re-

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153 See above, p. 80.


garded as extraordinarily advantageous for Europeans." The article's third section discussed Germany's future task in this region. It suggested that the existing German colonies in Palestine serve as a base for the gradual penetration of the hinterland, as far as the Persian borders. This penetration, it was pointed out, must be achieved through the introduction of German capital and the settling of German colonists.

The motives for this policy were admittedly purely colonial. Germany, the writer of the article maintained, must profit "so that we can assert ourselves vis-a-vis England and America." Having already pointed to the possible cultivation of cotton in Palestine, the writer even envisioned Germany's possible emancipation from American dependency on cotton. Furthermore, believing that Palestine and Syria would eventually become staging points for East Africa and East Asia, it was suggested that Palestine should be considered as a practical school for the colonization of tropical and subtropical lands.

The article closed by voicing the hope that the present generation would fulfill the long forgotten legacy of Henry VI, and culturally conquer the Orient.

Such ideas were not limited to thought only. In the immediate years that followed the Emperor's visit, Germany's position in Palestine was both consolidated and extended.

CHAPTER IV

THE JEWISH QUESTION AND

EMPEROR WILLIAM II'S JOURNEY TO PALESTINE

The Idea of a Jewish State in German Thought

Until the Era of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution the Jews in Europe were generally considered a separate ethnic and cultural entity, and were therefore allowed their separate laws and autonomous institutions. However, the men of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution who advocated the emancipation of the Jews insisted on an end to that medieval status of the Jews. The condition under which emancipation was granted was best reflected by Clermont Tonnerre's oft quoted declaration:

One must refuse everything to the Jews as a nation, but one must give them everything as individuals; they must become citizens.  

This spirit of the emancipation of the Jews, which in fact severed the religious and national elements of Judaism, was introduced into Germany by Napoleon. It was eventually incorporated into the constitution of the North German Federation in 1869, and confirmed by the constitution of the German Empire in 1871.

The German Jews already prepared by Moses Mendelssohn for the

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2 Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) urged the Jews to accommodate themselves to the modern age by adopting the language, culture and customs of the states in which they dwelt.
modern age, readily accepted the idea of emancipation with all its implications.

By the middle of the nineteenth century the process of Germanization among the Jews was already so advanced that a new Jewish doctrine to cope with the situation was deemed necessary. This doctrine which came to be known as Reform Judaism was formulated in Germany in three rabbinical conferences held between 1846 and 1848. Among its more important revisions was one that directly affected the sensitive traditional myth of Exile and Restoration. Fearing that their attachment to the land of their ancestors might cast a shadow over the Jews' undivided loyalty to the German states, the rabbis at their first conference decided to eliminate from the liturgy any reference to the ideal of the Restoration of the people to Palestine.3

Not surprisingly not all German Jews favored this rabbinical interpretation. Strongly affected by tradition and the nineteenth century currents of nationalism some individual German Jews were unwilling to accept the fact that their emancipation could not be reconciled with their continued adherence to the concept of a Jewish nationality. Heinrich Graetz, for example, having come under the influence of the Hegelian school of historiography during his university days at Jena, strongly believed that the concept of a Jewish nationality was not a political issue, but rather a manifestation of the uniqueness of his faith. It was with this theme in mind that Graetz between 1853

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and 1876 published his eleven volume History of the Jews. This work and its author, though unrepresentative of the thinking of the German Jews, raised considerable excitement. Graetz's fellow historian Heinrich von Treitschke was especially antagonized. During the anti-semitic wave that began in 1879 Treitschke used this issue to publicize his views. In an article entitled "Graetz and his Judaism," representing the first of three articles on the Jewish question in the Preussische Jahrbücher, Treitschke analyzed the age old question of Jewish persecution. Postulating the complex question as to why over the centuries it was the Jews who were always singled out for persecution, he advanced the familiar argument that the Jews suffered due to their stubborn unwillingness to forgo their identity. The same thing, he believed, was happening in Germany. The German Empire, Treitschke advised his readers, had already the largest number of Jews in western Europe. Berlin alone, accordingly, had as many Jews as the whole of France. Not only were the Jews in Germany more numerous, they also were more powerful than anywhere else. One only had to look around to realize that fact, he maintained. The

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4 Heinrich Graetz, History of the Jews from the Oldest Times to the Present, Eng. trans. 1891, became a standard work on the subject. Graetz (1817-1891) was a professor at the University of Breslau.


relatively higher standard of living enjoyed by the Jews accorded their children the opportunity to gain a better education than Christian children could. Jewish influence in the press, and on all levels of society was very strong, as was their influence on the stock-exchanges and on the directory of the German Imperial Bank. Furthermore, the most beautiful house of God in the German capital was a synagogue. Could a person who thought and wrote as Graetz did, Treitschke asked, be considered a German? His answer, since Graetz was "an Oriental who neither understands our nation nor wants to understand it," and "has nothing in common with us besides that he possesses our citizenship and uses our mother tongue...", was obviously negative. There was no room in Germany for any other nation, Treitschke insisted. Those Jews who believed in their nationality had one course open: to emigrate and found their own Jewish state. Those Jews who chose to remain in Germany must fully assimilate. Assimilation, he concluded, was not easy since "a complete amalgamation" between the Jews and the Europeans could "never fully be achieved." However, despite the severe contradictions between these two elements, Treitschke believed that the German civilization was sufficiently flexible and tolerant to withstand the differences.

Similar views were voiced by the historian Johan Scherr. Requested to respond to a question of whether he believed that the Jews should convert to Christianity, Scherr in 1884 responded by stressing the national aspect of the problem. He declared:

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7 Ibid., p. 662.  
8 Ibid., p. 668.  
9 Ibid., p. 663.  
10 Ibid., p. 669.
If the Jews regard themselves as a separate nation, they have the right, and other nations have the right, to tell them: A Jewish nation, create yourself, a national state in Palestine, or in any other place that you want.  

The question of whether the Jewish community in Germany was to be regarded as a separate nation, or as a religious community, was not left to the individual Jew to decide. Thus, for example, Eduard von Hartmann, one of the most conspicuous philosophers of the time and a founder of modern psychology, in his book Das Judentum in Gegenwart und Zukunft\(^{12}\) ("Judaism at Present and Future") declared that the Jewish question could not be regarded as purely religious. Claiming that all existing nationalities were a product of race mixture, von Hartmann insisted that the Jews only lacked a Jewish state to be regarded as a nationality in the sense of the Italians and the French. Preferring to use the term tribe rather than nation von Hartmann demanded that the Jews suppress their tribal feelings ("Stammesgefühl"), reminding them that the German nation ("Volk") instinctively regarded its territory as national wealth whose fruit only belonged to that nation. Developing his argument to its logical conclusion von Hartmann believed that should the Jews be dispossessed of their property in Germany this would be regarded as an act of moral restitution. Though hastening to add that he himself did not advocate such a step, he warned the Jews not to

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\(^{11}\) Quoted in Simon Dubnov, Divre Yeme Israel (10 vols; Tel-Aviv: Dvir Co. Ltd., 1948), X, 25. Johan Scherr's answer was included in J. Singer, Briefe berühmter Christlicher Zeitgenossen über die Judenfrage (Vienna, 1865).

\(^{12}\) Eduard von Hartmann, Das Judentum in Gegenwart und Zukunft (Leipzig und Berlin: Verlag von Wilhelm Freidrich, 1885).
"close their eyes...to this national psychologically founded instinctive feeling of justice." 13

Even more convinced that the Jews were indeed a nation was the theologian, and later Nazi apostle, Paul de Lagarde. For him "the Jews were a nation not a religious community, in any case they are the latter only because they are the former." 14 Lagarde's basic political and religious ideas were first proclaimed by him in private in 1853. They were made public in 1874, and later appeared in the form of an article entitled "Concerning the Actual Tasks of Germany's Policy." The article, which embodied all of Lagarde's future ideas, was included in his Deutsche Schriften, first published in 1886. Lacking von Treitschke's relative tolerance and von Hartmann's self imposed patience, 15 Lagarde urged a quick solution to the Jewish question. Stressing the urgency of the matter by resorting to the organic concept of a foreign body which if not eliminated may lead to decomposition, he demanded of the Jews to either convert or leave Germany. As expressed in a speech delivered to the Conservative party of Prussia on October 3, 1884 Germany had to be filled with German people and German ideals "like an egg; then there could be no room for Palestine in it." 16

The Jews, as far as Lagarde was concerned, were an obsta-

13 Ibid., p. 127.
15 Von Hartmann, p. 190.
icle for Germany's future not only inside Germany. Germany's first political task, he maintained, was to unite with Austria in order to form a Greater Germany. Since the new Germany also needed straight and natural boundaries, German hegemony was also to be extended over Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and parts of Rumania. The Magyars, Czechs, and Poles could possibly, he believed, be Germanized, while some Rumanians might have to be deported. The two million Jews who dwelt in these lands presented Lagarde with a special problem. Fearing that they could eventually become stronger than their German masters, he stipulated that they should be settled in Palestine. Indeed, according to Lagarde "if Israel were to exist on its own, and create its own state, Germany and Austria would treat that state with friendship.""17

The views of von Treitschke, Scherr, von Hartmann and Lagarde were by no means unrepresentative of the thinking of the German intellectuals of the time. Such attitudes, when taken in conjunction with the agitation of Wilhelm Marr, Adolf Stöecker, Eugene Duhring, Theodore Fritsch, and others by no means unrepresentative of the thinking of the German intellectuals of the time. Such attitudes, when taken in conjunction with the agitation of Wilhelm Marr, Adolf Stöecker, Eugene Duhring, Theodore Fritsch, Liebermann, and other

17 Ibid., "Über die gegenwartigen Aufgaben der deutschen Politik," Deutsche Schriften, pp. 35-37.


19 Wilhelm Marr, Der Sieg des Judentums über das Germanentum (Bern, 1879). For a detailed discussion of this pamphlet see Massing, pp. 6-9.

20 Eugene Duhring, Die Judenfrage als Rassen-Sitten und Kulturfrage (Karlsruhe, 1861).

21 Theodore Fritsch was the editor of the Antisemitischen Correspondentz, first published in 1835.
early German anti-Semites\textsuperscript{23} who sought to prohibit the integration of the individual Jew into his surrounding environment, made a solution that envisioned the creation of a Jewish state much more urgent than the Jews in Germany cared to admit. However, if any German truly believed that the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine was a simple matter of immigration to that land, he could discover the reality of the matter by simply consulting the \textit{Kolonialzeitung} in 1886.

The first agricultural colonies established in Palestine by European Jews came into being in consequence of the Russian pogroms that followed the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881. The first such colony was founded by Jews from Russia in 1882. Two additional colonies by Jews from Rumania followed the same year. A fourth colony started by Jews from Poland was established in 1883. This rapid pace of Jewish colonization, coupled with the fear that the pogroms would lead to a mass influx of Jews into Palestine, prompted the Turkish Government to impose a quick ban on Jewish immigration. The sight of Jewish refugees arriving by boat at the shore, but being forced to turn back by Turkish officials was described in the \textit{Kolonialzeitung} as follows:

\begin{quote}
It was heartbreaking to often witness when seasick women and children hoping to end their unpleasant trip...were told they could not disembark....All their pleas, their weeping and cries always remained unanswered since the local authorities had strict orders from
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{22}Liebermann von Sonnenberg in 1889 founded the "Deutsch-Soziale Antisemitische Partei."

\textsuperscript{23}A most interesting and useful account of all anti-Semitic activities in Germany between 1833 and 1894 is to be found in \textit{Deutsche Antisemitenchronik 1838 bis 1894} (Zurich: Verlag Magazin, 1894).
According to the paper, those Jews who prior to the enforcement of the Turkish regulations successfully established their colony (the reference was to the colony of Samarin established in 1882), suddenly faced severe Turkish harassment. Their titles to the land were challenged and their building permits revoked. The prospects for the Jewish colonization of Palestine accordingly looked very bleak.

The first two Zionist (implying a political theory of return to Zion) literary works appeared in Germany in 1862. The first, rabbi Zvi Hirsch Kalischer's Drishat Zion ("In Quest of Zion"), attempted to prove that the prophetic promises of the Old Testament actually meant the establishment of a national Jewish state in Palestine. The second work, written in Cologne by Moses Hess, the editor of the socialist Rheinische Zeitung, was entitled Rome and Jerusalem. Strongly affected by the Damascus blood libel of 1840, Hess came to the conclusion that the Jews if they could not reconcile their emancipation with their Jewish nationality, should give up the former and establish a Jewish state in Palestine with the aid of France. Both these works were of no immediate consequence and were soon forgotten.

The next important Zionist work appeared in 1882. It was


Ibid.

The Damascus blood libel of 1840 in which Jews in Damascus stood accused of the ritual murder of a monk, shocked the Jews around the world. The fact that the French Consul in the city, the representative of liberal France, supported the allegations, heightened the frustration.
a pamphlet in German entitled *Auto-Emancipation*, written in response to the events in Russia by Leon Pinsker of Odessa. Considering anti-Semitism a modern phenomenon that could not be overcome by emancipation, Pinsker called on his readers to emancipate themselves by creating their own national state. His call, due to the circumstances of the time, found an immediate response. Secret Jewish societies known as "Hoveve Zion" ("Lovers of Zion"), determined to pursue the practical aspects of Pinsker's idea, sprung up all over Russia. The new movement soon spread to Poland, Galicia, Rumania, England, France the United States, Austria and to Germany. In Germany, a small Jewish society named "Ezra" (help) which aimed to support the Jewish colonization of Palestine was founded in Berlin in 1883. In 1882 a group of Jewish students at the University of Vienna founded their own student association and called it "Kadima" (forwards). A sister society, known by the same name, was established at the University of Berlin in 1889. Similar Jewish student organizations followed at the universities of Heidelberg, Munich, Leipzig, Breslau and Königsberg. The ideology of the Berlin "Kadima" society was well reflected in a signed memorandum submitted in 1891 to the London based International Committee for the Assistance of the Russian Jews. Echoing some earlier familiar arguments the memorandum called upon the committee to divert the flow of Jewish emigration from America to Palestine. Obviously

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28 It should be noted that most of these students were of Russian birth. Two members of this group, of later fame, were Dr. Chaim Weizmann and Professor Martin Buber.
influenced by available German literature on the Near East, the students emphasized the fact that the lands of Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia were not only fertile, but also depopulated. Their suggestion was however rejected.

The idea to create a Jewish national state did not appeal to the Jews of Germany. Yet the increasing anti-Semitic attacks to which they were subjected, coupled with the plight of the Russian Jews, could not completely be overlooked. To deal with these problems a new organization called the "Central Verein deutscher Staatsbürger Jüdischen Glaubens" ("The Association of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith") was established in Berlin in 1893. As implied by its name, the association categorically rejected the notion of a Jewish nationality, and insisted that the sympathy exhibited by it towards other Jews was to be compared with Protestant and Catholic manifestations of concern towards their own coreligionists in foreign countries. The anti-Semitic trend in Germany, the association decided, should be fought through litigations in the courts, and the publication of a monthly journal called In deutschem Reich.

The few individuals in Germany who at that time already believed in the Zionist ideal were organized in small and insignificant groups. The prime movers of the Zionist movement in Germany were Max Bodenheimer and David Wolffsohn, both of Cologne.

29Sokolow, II, p. 325.
31Dubnov, X, p. 32.
Their acquaintance in 1892 led to the establishment of the Cologne Jewish National Association, which strove to back Jewish colonization in Syria and Palestine. A similar society known as Young Israel was somewhat later established in Berlin. Its organ Zion: Monatschrift für die nationalen Interessen des Jüdischen Volkes was the first Zionist monthly published in Germany. The Zionist movement of Germany did not however come into being before 1897. The first step aimed at some unity among the scattered groups was taken in June, 1897 at Bingen. There members of the above mentioned societies along with some other individuals from Frankfurt, Mainz and Bingen, decided to adopt the collective name "Zionistische Vereinigung für Deutschland" (Zionist Federation of Germany). The movement was officially constituted later in the year at Frankfurt on the Main, but was immediately ostracized by the Jewish community in Germany. 32

Zionism as a political movement was born with Theodor Herzl's Der Judenstaat: Versuch einer modernen Lösung der Judenfrage published in 1896. Theodor Herzl, for several years the Paris correspondent of the influential Viennese Neue Freie Presse, had paid little attention to the fate of the Jewish people prior to his assignment to France. Though Eugen Duhring's anti-Semitic publications in the early 1880's aroused his concern, 34 it was


34Raphael Patai (ed.), The Complete Diaries of Theodor
not before covering the Dreyfus Trial that Herzl's Jewish conscience really awakened. In Der Judenstaat he wrote:

The Jewish question exists wherever Jews live in perceptible numbers. Where it does not exist, it is carried by Jews in the course of their migrations....This is the case in every country, and will remain so....till the Jewish question finds a solution on a political basis....it is a national question, which can only be solved by making it a political world question to be discussed and settled by the civilized nations of the world in council.35

What Herzl demanded of the Powers was that the Jewish people be granted sovereignty "over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation; the rest," he insisted, "we shall manage for ourselves."36

Herzl's proposition that a European congress should consider the creation of a Jewish state was not utopian. It originated from the fact that the partition of the Turkish Empire was a distant possibility.37 Moreover, the idea of creating a Jewish state in Palestine had in the past already intrigued several leading British statesmen who believed that the overland route to India could thus be protected. Lords Palmerston, Beaconsfield, and Salisbury, all at one time or another had voiced interest in such a project.38 However, although he eventually turned to England, the first power Herzl tried to interest in his project was Germany. Indeed even before he outlined his thoughts in writing, the first European statesman whose opinion he tried to gauge was

Herzl, trans., Harry Zohn, (5 vols; New York and London: Herzl Press and ThomasYoseloff, 1960), I, 4. This work will henceforth be referred to as Diaries.

35Herzl, pp. 14-15. 36Ibid.
37Diaries, I, 269. 38Sokolow, I, 125-176.
the aging Bismarck. To him Hertzl wrote:

Only the man who has stitched a torn Germany together with his iron needle in such a wonderful way.... only he is big enough to tell me whether my plan is a truly saving idea or an ingenious fantasy.39

Even though Bismarck did not reply,40 he was not discouraged. On the contrary, as recorded in his Diaries, the thought articulated in his letter encouraged him to start his book.41

Theodor Herzl's Search for
Emperor William II's Support

Theodor Herzl, believing that the realization of his political aims could, on the one hand alleviate Germany's domestic problems and, on the other hand, serve the Empire's aims in the

39Diaries, I, 120.

40Bismarck's view regarding the establishment of a Jewish state is obscure. According to an article by a certain South German politician in the Weiner Neue Frein Presse in January, 1898, Bismarck was of the opinion that the expulsion of the Jews from Germany would hurt the national welfare of the country. See Heinrich von Foschinger, (ed.), Conversations with Prince Bismarck (New York and London: Harper Brothers Publishers, 1900), p. 164. An intriguing article concerning this subject was published by the English correspondent Arnold White in 1893. According to Mr. White, Bismarck masterminded all the anti-Semitic outbreaks of the 1830's in Germany and in Russia. The reason accordingly was that Bismarck hoped that the Jews through their oppression would awake to the need for a state of their own. His plan, according to Mr. White, envisioned the meeting of a European Conference which would agree to banish the Jews from Europe within five years. The plan did not materialize, it was claimed, because of Bismarck's premature retirement from office. See Arnold White, "Bismarck as Philosemite; or, Why Bismarck cried Rep," The Newberry House Magazine, III (January-June, 1893), 641-649. Since this strange article was not documented it must be assumed that the whole story was purely fictitious. I have not been able to find any supporting evidence. It seems possible, however, that Herzl somehow heard the story and thereupon decided to write to Bismarck.

41Diaries, I, 187.
East, was convinced that given the opportunity to personally present his ideas to Emperor William II, Germany's support would be won. The idea to enlist Germany's support occurred to Herzl already in 1895, \(^{42}\) but the opportunity to confront important German personalities, including the Emperor, presented itself only after the publication of Der Judenstaat, in February, 1896.

Herzl's solution for the Jewish question, as outlined in his book, was received in Germany with mixed emotions. Though editorially welcomed by the influential Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, it was sharply criticized by all the liberal papers, and other German papers such as the Münchner Allgemeine Zeitung.\(^{43}\) The reaction of the press was of no political consequence. However, of great significance was the fact that the book caught the attention of a certain Reverend William Hechler, the chaplain of the English Embassy in Vienna and a former tutor to the children of the Grand Duke Frederick of Baden. Himself the author of a book entitled The Restoration of the Jews to Palestine according to the Prophets, Reverend Hechler rushed to tell Herzl that according to his own interpretation of the Bible the restoration of the Jews was scheduled for 1897-1898. Returning the visit, Herzl on March 16, 1896 enlisted the Reverend's help in establishing contacts with influential persons in Germany.\(^{44}\)

Acting upon Herzl's request, Hechler on March 26, wrote the Grand Duke of Baden a long letter in which he reminded his

\(^{42}\)Herzl in June, 1895 had already prepared a memorandum about the Jewish question which he hoped to present to William II. See his letter to Albert Rothschild dated June 28, 1895, in Diaries I, 189-190.

\(^{43}\)Ibid., I, 309, 314.  \(^{44}\)Ibid., I, 312.
former employer of a conversation which they had on the subject of Restoration. Characterizing Herzl's book as representing a serious and practical idea, Hechler enclosed three copies of _Der Judenstaat_ with his letter. Furthermore, having received information concerning William II's scheduled visit to Vienna, Hechler in his letter implied that one of the enclosed copies was intended for the Emperor.  

Emperor William II arrived in Vienna on April 14, 1896. Although unable to meet the Emperor personally, Hechler succeeded in raising the subject in a long conversation with Drayn der, the Imperial court preacher. This conversation having yielded the information that William II was headed to visit the Grand Duke of Baden, Herzl requested Hechler to go there too. Carrying out his instructions Hechler proceeded to Karlsruhe. Using the enticing argument that the Grand Duke could play a major role in the founding of a Jewish state, just as he had participated in the founding of the German Empire at Versailles, Hechler succeeded in interesting the Duke in Herzl.  

Telegraphing his accomplishment to Herzl, he urged him to come immediately to Karlsruhe for an audience with the Duke.

The audience between Herzl and the Grand Duke Frederick of Baden took place on April 23, 1896. The meeting was conducted in a friendly atmosphere, and lasted for two and one half hours.

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45 Herzl, Hechler, the Grand Duke of Baden and the German Emperor 1896-1904. Documents found by Hermann and Bessi Eltern. Reproduced in Facsimile (Tel-Aviv: Eltern's Bank Ltd, 1961), document No. 1, p. 1. This collection of documents will hereafter be referred to as Documents in Facsimile.

46 Diaries, I, 329.
The Duke, Herzl later recorded, took his proposals quite seriously, but was reluctant publically to endorse the plan in Germany for fear of being branded an anti-Semite. He did, however, agree to have his name discreetly mentioned outside Germany. Some of the points raised by Herzl, and reemphasized in a letter of acknowledgment three days later, revealed Herzl's basic argument as to why Germany should favor the Zionist idea. Emphasizing the fact that only those Jews who did not want, or were not able, to assimilate in Europe would emigrate to Palestine, Herzl stressed the point that the departure of the discontented Jewish element could benefit both Europe and the Near East. On one hand, Herzl maintained, the emigration of this element would tend to weaken the revolutionary parties in Europe. On the other hand, Herzl argued, the influx of the Jews into Palestine would further the westernization of the Orient.47

Herzl's main objective was really to gain a hearing from William II. Though this did not materialize at Karlsruhe, the contact established with the Grand Duke had to be maintained. Consequently some time after his first audience, having in the meantime visited Constantinople, London and Paris, Herzl requested an additional meeting with the Duke.48 Asked to report in writing rather than in person, Herzl on August 1, 1896 outlined his progress as follows: His conversations in Constantinople 49 were in-


49 Herzl was in Constantinople from June 18, to June 29.
decisive, although he still hoped that a "proper formula" could be found. His talks in London with Jewish financiers centered on the idea, raised in the Turkish capital, whereby a Jewish vassal state in Palestine, paying the Sultan an annual tribute, could possibly be established. His contacts with Edmond de Rothschild in Paris, he reported, were negative. Then summoning up his courage, Herzl ventured to do what he had hesitated to do before: he requested the Duke "point blank to induce his Majesty, the German Kaiser, to give me a hearing." 50

Even before he received a reply, but with this very desire uppermost in his mind, Herzl at the beginning of September went to Breslau. Any success in contacting William II who was then on army manoeuvres, depended on Reverend Hechler's contacts. The Reverend's first step was to inform the Grand Duke of Herzl's whereabouts. 51 Then hoping to transmit a letter of recommendation to the Emperor through Prince Henry of Prussia, Hechler himself came to Breslau. Having arrived too late to meet the Prince, Hechler tried to enlist the help of Gunther of Schleswig-Holstein, a brother of the German Empress. The latter talked to Hechler but refused to transmit any messages. Realizing their failure Herzl and Hechler left Breslau. 52

Despite this failure, and the fact that he received no encouragement from the Grand Duke, Herzl did not relent. Writing to the Duke on November 17, 1896 Herzl introduced a new element which he hoped would induce the Duke to contact William II. Re-

51 Ibid., No. VI, p. 22. 52 Diaries, II, pp. 460-464.
ferring to a planned Franco-Russian financial scheme for Turkey, which he realized must have been very unwelcome in Germany, Herzl hinted that a Jewish financial arrangement for Turkey in return for concessions in Palestine, could possibly be arranged. A secret meeting with William II in Berlin, Herzl proposed, could further explore this topic. Though not doubting the sincerity of the offer, the Grand Duke of Baden once again refused to play the role of a mediator and in a reply on November 30, suggested that Herzl contact the Emperor on his own. For such a bold step Herzl was as yet not ready.

The year 1897 saw the Zionist movement grow in importance. On June 4, the first issue of Die Welt, the weekly organ of the movement, was published by Herzl in Vienna. A much greater achievement that year was the meeting of the first Zionist Congress, which assembled in Basel from August 29 to August 31.

The growth of the movement, reflected by these two events, was not lost upon the German Foreign Ministry. Among the first reports received on Zionism was a despatch by Consul von Tischendorf in Jerusalem, dated June 19, 1897, and another despatch concerned with the proceedings of the first Zionist Congress, dated September 24, 1897. The importance attached by the European press to the upcoming congress, von Tischendorf reported, was quite exaggerated, since the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine was still somewhat a utopian idea. Reviewing the achievements of the secular Jews in Palestine, the Consul-General admitted that they could be of social benefit to the Turkish Govern-

ment. Because of this he tended to support Jewish demands that the regulations concerning Jewish immigration and acquisition of land should be relaxed. On the other hand, von Tischendorf quickly added, the Jewish enterprises in Palestine carried with them a definite political risk. As he saw it, the Jews who entered Palestine preferred to maintain their foreign nationality rather than become Turkish subjects. Such a development, he insisted, actually tended to strengthen foreign influence in Palestine. Therefore, von Tischendorf concluded, it was not in Germany's best interest to support the Zionist movement. 54

The report concerning the Zionist meeting in Basel was less opinionated. It began with an analysis of the ideas expounded in Der Judenstaat; it mentioned the vocal opposition of the Executive of the German rabbis to political Zionism - a fact that caused the Congress to meet in Basel rather than in Munich; it gave a statistical breakdown of all the delegations in attendance; it reviewed the speeches of the main speakers; and concluded with a presentation of the official political program of the Zionist movement. That program was reported as follows:

Zionism seeks to create for the Jewish people a publically and legally recognized secure home (öffentlich rechtlich gesicherten heimstatte) in Palestine. To achieve these goals the Congress decided upon the following program:

1. The systematic encouragement of the colonization of Palestine with Jewish agriculturalists, laborers and artisans;
2. The organization and unification of all Jewery into local and general organizations in line with the laws of their respective lands;
3. The strengthening of Jewish national

54 A. A., "Türkei 195" (Die Juden in der Türkei); N.A. T-120; serial No. K692; document No. A8600.
feelings and national consciousness.

4. The taking of steps for gaining the consent of the various governments to fulfill the aims of Zionism. 55

This report submitted to the Imperial Chancellor also caught the attention of Emperor William II. His reaction was summed up by a marginal comment that read:

I am much for it that the Jews [he used the derogatory term 'Mauschels'] go to Palestine; the sooner they depart the better. I will place no difficulties in their way. 56

Herzl's major political aim after the conclusion of the first Zionist Congress was still to secure his desired audience with the German Emperor. Feeling that his political position had been strengthened by the congress, he decided to act in accordance with the Grand Duke's suggestion. A letter addressed to William II, requesting an audience, was sent to the Grand Duke for transmission to the German Emperor on October 22, 1897. 57

The Emperor's reply was received by Herzl on December 1. The answer concerning the desired audience was negative. However, the Emperor voiced the wish to receive Herzl's account of the Basel congress as outlined in his pamphlet Der Bassler Congress. A copy was consequently despatched that very day to von Lucanus, the Head of William II's Privy Council. 58 The first penetration of the inner circle of the German Government was thus achieved.

Another instrument through which Herzl hoped to make his


56 Ibid., No. A11445. Marginal comment of William II.

57 Documents in Facsimile, No. IX, p. 28, and No. X, p. 2.

58 Ibid., No. XI, p. 31.
views known in certain important quarters was Die Welt. Even though the planned journey of Emperor William II to Palestine was known to Herzl for some time, it was not before the news was officially released by the German Government that he took advantage of Die Welt to discuss the matter. In his first editorial on the subject on March 11, 1898, Herzl declared that anti-Semitism was a destructive force which needed a solution. The German Emperor on his visit to Palestine would, the editorial hoped, see the Jewish colonies already established and would realize for humanitarian as well as political reasons that the victims of anti-Semitism must find a new home. Admitting that the Emperor's attitude towards Zionism was unknown the editorial concluded by voicing full confidence in William II's "trustfulness, nobleness, humanity and cleverness." Appendix:60 60 It was during his stay at Breslau that Herzl had observed William II's defective arm, and realized that "his pathological predilection for all things military may stem from this." (Diaries, II, 463).
German Ambassador in Vienna. The latter, the Duke suggested, should be told that the Zionist movement could prove important for Germany's future policy in the Orient.61

Herzl who until then had not taken this kind of approach was immediately ready to exploit it. His thoughts on the subject were formulated in two letters impulsively drafted but apparently never sent.62 The first draft intended for the Grand Duke included a reference to the fact that a "neutral national element" strategically located on the route to Asia, could be of value to Germany.63 In the second draft, intended for William II, the same idea, though more sharply defined, reoccurred. Here making reference to "the route to Ophir (Africa) as well as Kaio-Chow" Herzl suggested that Europe would not permit any other "cultural element" but the Jews to take root in strategically located Palestine.64

Though no immediate effort was made on the part of Herzl to contact Count Eulenburg, his efforts to gain access to Emperor William II suddenly received their overdue backing. The Grand Duke of Baden, continually impressed by the Zionist movement, suddenly decided to act on Herzl's long standing request. Writing to his nephew on July 28, 1898 the Grand Duke advised William II that he had not taken up Herzl's request before because he did

62The first letter was not approved by Meckler. In regard to the second, Herzl indicated that it would be sent in case Count Eulenburg were to encourage him to contact William II. Neither letter was found in the German archives and is therefore not in Documents in Facsimile.
63Diaries, II, pp. 639-640.
not believe that "the subject had sufficiently matured." This was no longer the case, and he therefore concluded that "it deserved some attention..."65 Thereupon calling the Emperor's attention to Herzl, to the Reverend Hechler (who he stressed was German), to the Zionist efforts in England, and to a secret scholarly possibility to relocate the Ark of the Covenant in Palestine,66 the Grand Duke suggested that all these points should be reviewed by Count Eulenburg.67

If any additional evidence of the vitality of the Zionist movement was needed, it was provided at the close of the following month when six hundred Zionist delegates from all over the world assembled once again at Basel for the second Zionist Congress. Among the first observations concerning this congress reported to the German Foreign Ministry was the fact that the attendance of the second Congress greatly exceeded that of the first. Even more noteworthy was the fact that the Zionist movement was beginning to embark upon a serious program for the East. The first step taken in this direction was the decision to establish a Jewish colonial bank. The purpose of the bank, the report to the Foreign Ministry advised, was as follows:

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66Emperor William II was extremely interested in Near Eastern archeology. He was the president of the German Orient Society (Die Deutsche Orient Gesellschaft), and devoted himself to study its work. In his memoirs William II admitted having often personally influenced the Turkish Government concerning such matters. See The Kaiser's Memoirs, trans. Thomas R. Ybarra, (New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1922), p. 203.

67Documents in Facsimile, No. XII, p. 32.
1. To create individual concerns, as well as insurance and shipping companies in the Orient especially in Syria and Palestine, through the attraction of Jewish labor.

2. To support the Jewish agricultural colonies... through the purchase of land...

3. To organize import and export trade in Syria and Palestine by supporting commercial enterprises.

4. To win concessions for railways, port facilities, mining concessions and trade monopolies in the Orient.

5. To establish banks for the above purposes. 68

Another audience between Herzl and the Grand Duke of Baden took place immediately after the close of the second Zionist Congress on September 2, 1898. The conversation was later described by Herzl as having been "highly political." The Grand Duke came out in favor of a Jewish state in Palestine and suggested that a formula whereby the Sultan could keep his overlordship should be found. Ambassador von Marschall in Constantinople, the Duke suggested, had already advised the Foreign Ministry that the Sultan seemed inclined to regard the Zionist movement favorably. Encouraged by these confidential indications Herzl proposed that Germany assume the role of a protectorate power over Palestine. Advancing an argument which would later be often repeated, Herzl declared that the settlement of Palestine by Jews would advance the German cause in the East because with the Jews a German cultural element would be introduced into the Orient. After all, he stressed, the leaders of the Zionist movement were German, the language of the congresses was German, and the majority of the Jews in Europe were part of the German culture. Well aware of

the political implications of their conversation, the Grand Duke suggested that due to the political storm which already surrounded the Emperor's scheduled journey to Palestine, it might be best for Herzl not to present his case to William II before his departure. This assessment, however, was rejected by Herzl. 69

Acting on information related to him by the Grand Duke to the effect that Count Eulenburg had been instructed to report to the Emperor about the Zionist movement, Herzl, upon his return to Austria, decided immediately to contact the Ambassador. Writing to the Count on September 8, he voiced his willingness to come to Vienna if the Ambassador so desired. 70 This move proved well taken. An audience with Count Eulenburg was scheduled for September 16. The Ambassador's first question upon meeting Herzl was what exactly he wanted William II to achieve in Constantinople. Did he want the Sultan to give the Zionists land and autonomy? Herzl replied that his aim was to enter into negotiations with the Sultan in order to obtain Palestine on the basis of autonomy. The German Emperor, he hoped, would recommend the idea. Count Eulenburg did not believe that Herzl could meet William II during his forthcoming visit to Vienna, 71 but apparently concerned that Herzl might turn to England, he suggested instead an audience with State Secretary von Bülow. 72

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69 For the audience itself see Diaries, II, pp. 655-660. Also see letter by Herzl to the Grand Duke, dated September 8, 1898, in Documents in Facsimile, No. XIV, p. 37.


71 William II was scheduled to arrive in Vienna on September 17, to attend the funeral of Empress Elizabeth.

72 Diaries, II, pp. 662-665.
The meeting with von Bülow took place on the following day. The audience, Herzl immediately realized, did not go well: "...it was more a chat, than a tightly organized political conversation."\(^73\) Von Bülow proved quite well informed. He had read Herzl's writings and knew of the second Zionist Congress. He wanted Herzl to explain why for example the Neue Freie Presse did not mention the subject, and why the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung was so bitterly opposed to Zionism. Did this not suggest that the Jews from central and western Germany were not inclined to emigrate to Palestine? The conversation lasted for three quarters of an hour and came to an abrupt end before Herzl had "a chance to unfold the entire matter."\(^74\)

Disappointed with the encounter with the State Secretary and the fact that once again he had failed to meet Emperor William II, Herzl left Vienna for Paris. Disappointed but not discouraged he soon made one additional attempt to achieve his goal. Writing to Count Eulenburg on September 21,\(^75\) Herzl once more pressed the Ambassador to arrange an audience with the Emperor. The letter advanced the following points: German culture would be introduced into the eastern Mediterranean; the domestic, social, and political tensions in various European nations would be eased; Turkey would be strengthened by the influx of an energetic national element, as well as the payment of cash; and introducing a new element, Herzl added that the Jews would build a railroad

\(^73\)Ibid., p. 666.  \(^74\)Ibid., pp. 665-669.  

\(^75\)The letter was written in France, but for fear that the French censor might read it, Herzl mailed it from Cologne. See Diaries, II, p. 672.
from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. 76

Herzl's unyielding persistence now suddenly paid off. Count Eulenburg's reply was handed to him at the German Consulate in Amsterdam on October 1. It contained the long awaited news. Emperor William II, Count Eulenburg advised, would be "disappointed" if he were not to meet Herzl and a Zionist delegation while in Jerusalem. 77

From Great Expectations to Deep Disillusionment

Having received the news of the German Emperor's willingness to grant him an audience in Jerusalem, Herzl wired Count Eulenburg that he would soon come to Berlin. Matters concerning the planned Jewish Colonial Bank required his attention in London but on October 6 he arrived in the German capital. On the following day Herzl visited the Count on his estate at Liebenberg. His conversation there was most gratifying and encouraging. Herzl was told that Emperor William II "was warmly inclined towards the project..." and that he was getting "quite used to the idea of a protectorate." Von Bülow, too, Count Eulenburg reassured Herzl, "had been won over." But realistically he was given to understand that as much as Germany "desired" such a protectorate, it would not go to war to get it. 78

Herzl well realized that he could not expect all his Zionist colleagues to concur in his decision to place the proposed future Jewish state under German protection. However, as

76 Ibid., II, pp. 669-672. 77 Ibid., p. 675.
78 Ibid., pp. 686-692.
far as he personally was concerned the arrangement with Germany, besides its obvious political advantages, could also be of benefit in some other respects. Thus, on the day after his visit to Liebenberg, while reflecting over his far reaching achievement Herzl concluded that:

> to live under the protection of this strong, great, moral, splendidly governed, tightly organized Germany, can only have the most salutary effect on the Jewish national character.\(^79\)

On October 9, 1898 Herzl was invited to visit the Potsdam Palace. His first conversations on that day were with the Grand Duke of Baden. Like Count Eulenburg, the Duke's assessment of the Emperor's position was most positive. "The Kaiser," Herzl was told, "...is full of enthusiasm."\(^80\) Concerning the audience in Jerusalem, the Grand Duke related the Emperor's wish to have it first take place in Constantinople because the Emperor had decided to "mediate" the matter and "to go through with it."\(^81\) Germany's decision to support the Zionist movement having apparently become a matter of fact, the conversation could move on to consider the consequences of that decision. Russia, Herzl suggested, could prove most obstinate. Yet, he hoped to overcome that opposition by agreeing to the extraterritorialization of the holy places. England's stand on the other hand, he believed, would prove much more favorable, since the Anglican Church was apparently in favor of the Restoration of the Jews. France, Herzl assured the Duke, should not be feared, for the domestic upheaval that country was undergoing made her much too weak to

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\(^79\)Ibid., p. 693. Notation dated Berlin, October 8, 1898.

\(^80\)Ibid., p. 697.

\(^81\)Ibid., p. 697.
oppose such a "fait accompli" as was being prepared for her in Palestine. Herzl's arguments impressed the Grand Duke, and he suggested that while at Potsdam Herzl should also consult von Bülow. The State Secretary was to be presented with the fact that "with the consent of the Sultan, the Kaiser would take the migration of the Jews under his protection." 82

Herzl was received by von Bülow at one o'clock that afternoon. To his surprise the State Secretary was accompanied by von Hohenlohe, the Imperial Chancellor. The latter's inquiries were extremely direct: what size territory did Herzl want? Herzl's reply that the amount of land required was relative to the number of immigrants, was followed by a further question as to who were the owners of the land. This point having been explained, von Hohenlohe inquired whether the Zionist movement intended to found a state. Replying that his aim was to gain "autonomy and self protection," von Hohenlohe demanded to know Turkey's attitude. Basing his answer on information gathered from the Grand Duke, Herzl advised that he had been told that von Marschall had indicated that Constantinople was positively inclined towards Zionism. Von Bülow who until then refrained from interrupting the cross examination, interjected a remark to the effect that he did not see any such assessment from Constantinople. Resuming his inquiry, von Hohenlohe wanted to know the number of Jews that could be expected to immigrate to Palestine, and the funds available for the project. The figure of money mentioned impressed von Bülow, but von Hohenlohe kept silent.

82Ibid., p. 700. For the conversation between Herzl and the Grand Duke see pp. 696-700. Notation dated October 9, 1898.
The meeting ended rather abruptly with the German statesmen rushing off to dinner. Their behavior, Herzl noted, had been "depressingly cool."\(^{83}\)

Herzl's previous optimism was now dampened by greater caution. His thoughts first turned to Bismarck who three years earlier had not even seen fit to answer his letter. The obvious contradictions regarding von Marschall's report, and von Bülow's general negative attitude, seemed to foretell unexpected difficulties. What was Emperor William's real attitude in light of the above? This he could only guess.\(^{84}\)

The Grand Duke's optimistic report concerning the Emperor's view was, however, not exaggerated. His assessment was based on a letter written to him by William II in late September. From the content of the letter it becomes clear that Emperor William II was indeed positively impressed by Herzl's arguments in favor of German support. Declaring himself in sympathy with the Zionist idea the German Emperor revealed to his uncle that he believed that "the colonization of the Holy Land by the well-financed ("Kapitalkraftig") and diligent people of Israel" would quickly bring prosperity not only to Palestine but also to Asia Minor. Indeed he tended to believe that Turkey's entire financial problem might be solved, and that consequently the whole Eastern Question could gradually be settled. Europe, William II seemed to agree with Herzl, would also greatly benefit. Accordingly "the tribe of Shem's energy, creativity, and productiveness would be redirected to better goals than the exploitation of

\(^{83}\)Ibid., pp. 701-704. Notation dated October 9.

\(^{84}\)Diaries, II, p. 704.
Christians." As for Germany, she would particularly benefit, the Emperor declared, by the emigration of those "Semites" who either joined or encouraged the Social Democrats. Furthermore, speaking from what he termed was "a secular realpolitik point of view," William II added that "considering the tremendous power of international Jewish capital with all its dangers, it would surely be a tremendous achievement for Germany if the Jews of the world would be grateful...." Having thus justified his stand the Emperor concluded by assuring the Grand Duke that "those who return to the Holy Land will enjoy protection and security, and I shall intervene with the Sultan on their behalf...."^85

Emperor William II and his entourage left Potsdam for their journey to Palestine on October 13, 1898. On the following day Herzl accompanied by Max Bodenheimer and David Wolffsohn arrived in Constantinople to prepare for the audience with the Emperor. Von Marschall's ambiguous attitude, and for that matter the attitude of the Turkish Government towards Zionism, was soon to be clarified in an unpleasant way. The German Ambassador in Constantinople when asked by Herzl for an audience pretended not to have ever heard of him. Furthermore, the fact that an audience with the Emperor had been arranged for the Zionist deputation apparently surprised him. Having encountered von Marschall's rebuff, Herzl decided to waste no time and to address himself directly to William II. A letter dated October 17, 1898, making reference to the Grand Duke's promises and to the Zionist wish to

^86Diaries, II, pp. 712-713.
be granted permission to establish a "Jewish Land Company for Syria and Palestine,"\(^{87}\) under German protection, was transmitted to the Emperor on October 18.\(^{38}\) A second letter, addressed to State Secretary von Bülow, requesting information as to when and where the whole deputation would be received, was relayed on the same day.

Herzl's audience with William II, for which he had labored so long, took place that same afternoon. Von Bülow, to Herzl's annoyance, was also present, but still the one hour audience with the Emperor deeply impressed him. Herzl was invited to speak first. He unfolded his entire plan and repeated all his arguments in support of a Jewish state under German protection. The conversation centered on anti-Semitism, on developments in France, the treatment of Jews in Russia, the overland route to Asia, the importance of the Persian Gulf, and other related issues. Before departing the Emperor requested to be told in one sentence what he should ask of the Sultan: "A chartered Company, under German protection," Herzl replied.\(^{89}\)

The Zionist deputation, led by Herzl, arrived in Palestine on October 26, 1898. Herzl's first opportunity to greet Emperor William II in the Holy Land presented itself on Friday, October 29, outside the Jewish agricultural school Mikveh Israel on the Jaffa to Jerusalem road. William II having left Jaffa

\(^{87}\)The idea of a Jewish chartered land company was originally envisioned by Herzl in The Jewish State. He decided to return to this idea on October 15, in Constantinople. See Diaries, II, p. 714.

\(^{88}\)Documents in Facsimile, No. XVII, p. 54. Also, Diaries, II, pp. 716-717.

\(^{89}\)Diaries, II, pp. 726-737. Notation dated October 19.
that morning on horseback approached Herzl and greeted him by shaking his hand. Exclaiming that what Palestine needed most was water, the Emperor assured Herzl that he believed that the country had a future. Then saluting the school children who were assembled at the spot to sing "Heil dir im Siegerkranz" (Hail to thee with Victor's Wreath), William II rode off. 90

Despite this apparent manifestation of friendship on the part of the Emperor, several anxious days passed before the Zionist deputation received any word about its pending audience in Jerusalem. Rumors had already spread to the effect that the Emperor was planning to return immediately to Germany, when on November 1, the word finally came that Herzl should report to Legation Councillor Kemeth at the Imperial camp. When Herzl arrived he was handed back the manuscript of an address which he planned to deliver at the time of the audience and which had been submitted to von Bülow for review. Some of the most significant passages, especially those referring to a Jewish chartered land company under German protection, were crossed out. A revised address needed to be drafted. At the time it was resubmitted, a new restriction bearing on the audience was imposed: for the time being the audience could not be given any publicity. 91

The meeting between the Zionist deputation and the German Emperor took place within the Imperial tent, on November 2. William II, after listening to the watered down version of Herzl's address, thanked the deputation for coming but immediately made it clear that the whole project "still requires thorough study

90 Ibid., p. 743. 91 Ibid., pp. 751-752.
and further discussions." The conversation, in which State Secretary von Bülow also participated, centered mainly on problems of irrigation. Nothing of political significance was said.

In spite of the fact that the audience in Jerusalem had not assumed the importance Herzl had been led to expect, he still believed that it could have historic consequences. Only after seeing the official German communiqué revealing the audience did the extent of his failure become apparent. The official communiqué released on November 2 read as follows:

Today the German Emperor received the French Consul, and afterwards a Jewish delegation. The latter presented him with an album containing views of Israelitish colonies which have been set up in Palestine. In reply to the speech delivered by the leader of the deputation, in presenting the album, His Majesty said that all such endeavours to improve the agriculture of Palestine in the best interests of the Turkish Empire, in full recognition of the Sultan's sovereign rights, might be made in complete reliance upon the Kaiser's benevolent interest. This afternoon His Majesty paid a visit to the Latin and Greek Patriarchs.

Herzl realized that a critical change in the German Government's attitude occurred sometime between his first and second audiences with Emperor William II. However, what exactly transpired, he wrote to the Grand Duke of Baden on November 18, 1898, he did not know. Despite this setback, Herzl advised the Duke, he was still hopeful that further discussions with the German

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92 Ibid., p. 755. Notation dated November 2, 1898.
93 Ibid., p. 754.
94 The Times (London), November 3, 1898, p. 3.
95 State Secretary von Bülow in his memoirs claimed that the Turkish Ambassador in Berlin accompanied William II on his journey and made it clear to him that the Sultan was opposed to Zionism. See von Bülow, Memoirs, I, p. 296.
The Grand Duke's reply stressed two points which seemingly caused the difficulty. The first concerned the bad impression the Jews of Jerusalem had made on the Emperor, an observation probably aggravated by the Emperor's general disappointment with the city. The second point, stressed by the Duke, reflected an earlier observation which had been made by von Tischendorf. It concerned the allegation that the Jews in Palestine, due to their unwillingness to renounce the protection of the countries from which they came, were actually increasing the influence of Germany's rivals in Palestine. In an attempt to overcome these objections Herzl on December 15, 1898 once again addressed himself to the Grand Duke of Baden. He was not at all surprised that the Jewish population of Jerusalem impressed William II in a negative way. After all the goal of the Zionist movement was to change exactly this image of the Jew. Had the Emperor seen the Jewish agricultural colonies, Herzl suggested, he would have been convinced to the contrary. In respect to the second objection, Herzl advised the Duke, that if Germany were to assume the role of a protectorate power these problems would be solved. He still believed that an agreement between Germany and the Zionist movement centered around the idea of a Jewish land company under German protection was politically feasible, especially since part of the arrangement could be kept secret.

96 Herzl to the Grand Duke of Baden, November 18, 1898, in Documents in Facsimile, No. XVIII, p.58. Also, in Diaries, II, pp. 765-767.
97 See above, Chapter III, p.103.
98 Diaries, II, p. 774. The Grand Duke's letter to Herzl, dated December 5, is preserved in the Zionist Archives in Jerusalem. See Documents in Facsimile, p. XVIII.
All that the Turkish Government would be asked to do by Germany, he stressed, was to abolish its prohibition on the immigration of Jews to Palestine. Then applying some pressure Herzl advised that regardless of Germany's attitude a Jewish land company would soon be created. He himself, Herzl reiterated, leaned towards obtaining German protection; however, others within the movement preferred English protection. A definite decision in one direction or the other, he suggested, could not much longer be delayed. The Emperor during the audience in Jerusalem had made reference to the fact that further discussions were required. If that was his intention, Herzl would await instructions.

Similar arguments were advanced by Herzl several days later during a conversation on the subject with Count Eulenburg in Vienna. Taking note of Herzl's reference that the proposed chartered land company might be placed under English auspices, the German Ambassador immediately voiced himself in favor of establishing the proposed company in Berlin.

Quite different, however, was the attitude in Berlin. Herzl's letter of December 15 to the Grand Duke had been forwarded by the latter to the Foreign Ministry, but it did not receive any particular notice. Calling this fact to the attention of the Grand Duke, Herzl on January 11, 1899 once again wrote him a letter. Consequently another audience with the Grand Duke


100Diaries, II, p. 777. The conversation took place at the German Embassy on December 19, 1898.

101Documents in Facsimile, No. XX, p. 65.
was arranged for February 27. Although the meeting was again very cordial, Herzl, on this occasion, was given to understand that before the German Government would commit itself to the Zionists, it expected the movement first to acquire land in Palestine on its own, as well as gain Turkish consent for immigration. Despite the obvious conclusion that if the Zionist movement had the power to gain these concessions it would hardly need Germany's good will, Herzl did accept this new proposition as a basis for further negotiations with Emperor William II. Telegrams requesting an audience with the Emperor for the next day were thereupon dispatched by both Herzl and the Grand Duke to von Lucanus, the Head of the Privy Council. Yet, in spite of these new efforts, the Emperor's response remained negative. Rather than see him, William II suggested that Herzl should consult von Bülow.

Once again officially rebuffed, Herzl decided to make one last attempt. Making reference to an altered plan previously discussed with the Grand Duke, under which the Grand Duke of Baden rather than the German Emperor would assume the protection of the proposed land company, Herzl on March 1, 1899 explained the new scheme to William II. The execution of this new idea, he suggested in a letter to the Emperor, could well circumvent any opposition from either the Sultan or any other power. Indeed, no intervention by the German Imperial Government would be at all


103Telegram from von Lucanus to von Babo, Head of the Privy Council of the Duke of Baden, February 27, 1899, in Documents in Facsimile, No. XXII, p. 66.
necessary. Thus, he argued, while undertaking no open obligations the German Empire would still gain predominant influence in Palestine and would even establish for itself a lucrative industrial market there. Concluding his letter Herzl requested William II to grant him one additional audience. A refusal, he added, would be taken by him as a "de facto" sign to break off any further negotiations. 104 The Emperor's negative reply reached Herzl on March 9, 1899. 105

All efforts to induce Germany's cooperation, as far as Herzl was concerned, had reached an impasse. As expressed in a letter to the Grand Duke, Herzl concluded "we shall not attain our goal under a German protectorate." 106 A sharply worded letter addressed to von Bülow accusing him of open antagonism towards Zionism, 107 ended the negotiations that centered around the Emperor's journey to Palestine. Although contacts between the Zionist movement and the German Government, as will be shown below, continued into World War I, the Foreign Ministry, fearing to alienate Turkey, persistently rejected further Zionist advances.

104 _Diaries_, II, pp. 792-795.
105 _Ibid._, p. 797. Notation dated March 10, 1899.
107 Herzl to von Bülow, March 18, 1899, in _Diaries_, II, pp. 797-801.
CHAPTER V

GERMANY AND PALESTINE 1899-1914

The Commercial Aspects

Emperor William II's journey to the East vividly demonstrated to the German people their nation's growing influence in the Ottoman Empire. The wide realization that there were German societies active in Palestine and German colonists already farming the land, not surprisingly stimulated an immediate new German interest for the Holy Land.

Among the first tangible commercial developments that followed the Emperor's visit was the founding of the "Deutsche Palästina Bank." This bank, which was in fact the first German bank in the Orient, began its operations on January 1, 1899. Its founders included Christian Kraft, Prince zu Hohenlohe-Oehringen, Karl von der Heydt, Dr. Bumiller, Max von Hiller and Dr. Max Schoeller.¹ The most important of these seemed to have been the two financiers Karl von der Heydt, who was the president of the banking firm "Heydt und Company" in Berlin, and Prince Hohenlohe-Oehringen. The interest of the latter in the new enterprise was anchored in his financial connections with the "Deutsche Levante Linie" which was already serving the Mediterranean ports.² The

¹ Altneuland, IV (1907), 290-291.

² The "Deutsche Levante Linie" was established in 1889. It was based in Hamburg and served North Africa, the Balkans,
bank, headquartered in Berlin, established its Jerusalem branch in 1899 in the offices of the "Deutsche Palastina und Orient Gesellschaft," a small trading firm of which the new institution was the immediate heir. A second branch office was established by the "Deutsche Palastina Bank" in Jaffa somewhat later that same year.

The "Deutschland Palästina Bank" was specifically established to further Germany's trade with Palestine. However, it was also obviously part of Germany's over-all increasing economic thrust into the Near East which was most directly exemplified by the building of the Berlin-Bagdad Railway. The significance of such an enterprise for Germany's position as a world power ("Welt-politische Machtstellung") was expressed by Georg von Siemens, the Managing Director of the "Deutsche Bank," as follows:

> Each bank or railway established in a foreign land, whose shares remain in the homeland, is at the same time a pioneer for the employment of the home industry and the establishment of lasting relations between the two economic spheres. It is on such proprieties that much of England's influence outside Europe rests.⁴

Another development which signified an intensified German interest in Palestine at this time was the establishment of the "Gesellschaft zur Förderung der deutschen Unsiedlungen in Palästina" (Society for the Advancement of the German Settlements in Greece, Asia Minor, Syria and Palestine.

³The concession to build a railway from Konia to Bagdad was awarded to the "Deutsche Bank" by the Sultan on November 27, 1899.

⁴Quoted in Richard Rosendorff, "Die deutschen Banken im überseisichen Verkehr," Schmoller Jahrbuch, XXVIII (1904), 121.
Palestine). This society began to be organized in the fall of 1899 by Freiherr Joseph von Ellrichshausen. Ellrichshausen had participated in Emperor William II's journey to Palestine and became interested in the future of the land. Realizing that the colonization of Palestine by German farmers could not progress unless they could be financially assisted, Ellrichshausen decided to form a company that would provide interested colonies with low interest loans. The company that was consequently formed accepted members that were willing to invest a minimum of 500 Marks with a yearly return of \(3\frac{1}{2}\) percent. The company based at Stuttgart was headed by Prince Karl von Urach and was also supported by the "Deutsche Kolonial Gesellschaft." 6

Germany's increasing involvement in Palestine had some immediate local repercussions. The German settlers who naturally welcomed the above developments became apprehensive over the Zionist competition in Palestine which they regarded as a threat. Consequently in a letter submitted to the German Foreign Ministry in November, 1899 a professor Niemeyer from Kiel made reference to a letter which he had received from Haifa to the effect that the Zionists were illegally purchasing lands in Palestine and that "if we do not act there will remain little for us." 7 A similar concern it must be noted was voiced in an article that was

5 Relevant material concerning the activities of this society is available in the Deutsche Zentralarchiv, Potsdam, to which I had no access.

6 "Die deutschen Siedelungen in Palastina," Deutsche Kolonialpost, VI (Jan. 1911), 3.

published in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* in 1899. Taking notice
of this apparent growing conflict between the German settlers and
the Zionists the *Vossische Zeitung* already on July 14, 1899 de-
clared that the Zionist enterprises in Palestine would actually
have the effect of increasing the value of land in German hands.
Furthermore, the paper argued, since the Jews spoke German their
immigration to Palestine would benefit Germany's and Austria's
trade relations with that land. It was for that reason the
paper concluded that both France and Russia opposed the Jewish
colonization of Palestine.9

More serious than their opposition to the Zionists was
the long standing Arab opposition to the German colonists them-
selves. The first signs of renewed Arab "fanaticism," reported
the German Vice Consul in Haifa, broke out shortly after the
Emperor's visit. His protests to the Turkish local authorities,
the Vice Consul continued, were disregarded.10 Incidents in
which colonists were hurt reached a climax when an estimated
sixty armed men attacked a Turkish outpost that guarded the Ger-
man colony at Haifa. Reporting about this incident to the German
Foreign Ministry, von Marschall on September 4 and 5, 1900 implied
that the attackers may have received the support of the French

8 Götel, "Eine deutsche Kolonie in Syrien," *Preussische
Jahrbücher*, XCVI (April-June, 1899), 230-257.
9 *Vossische Zeitung*, July 14, 1899. A copy of the article
can be found in A. A., Europa Generalia 84.
10 A. A., Türkei 134 ("Acten betreffend allgemeine Ange-
legenheiten der Türkei"); reel No. K639; document No. A12406,
telegram No. 280, September 5, 1900.
and Russian representatives in the city. Hoping to stop the escalating violence von Marschall brought the matter to the attention of the Sultan. The latter, unable to trust local Arab officials, ordered the Governor of Syria to go immediately to Haifa. Von Marschall who characterized the Governor as an official "who thinks well of Germans" was quite satisfied. A few days later after receiving the Sultan's personal word that "the security of the German colony would be assured," the Ambassador advised the Foreign Ministry that the affair was settled "to our satisfaction."

In the meantime German attention was drawn to the financial success of the "Deutsche Palästina Bank" which in its first two years of operations in Palestine raised its capital from 450,000 Marks to 800,000 Marks enabling it to pay a yearly dividend of 5 percent. Featuring an article headlined "German Enterprises in Palestine" the Deutsche Kolonialzeitung on January 9, 1902 called attention to the importance of the trade of Palestine, and noted with satisfaction that Germany's part in it was "not insignificant."

The economy of Palestine, the paper declared,

11 Ibid., A12393, September 4, 1900, and A12406, September 5, 1900.

12 Ibid., A12743, September 11, 1900.

13 Ibid., A12992, telegram No. 290, September 15, 1900, and A13173, telegram No. 293, September 18, 1900.

14 German imports into Palestine through the port of Jaffa in 1902 were valued at about 420,000 Marks. The comparable figure for Great Britain and her colonies was 1,300,000 M. That of France was 1,000,000 and of Russia 600,000 Marks. Exports through Jaffa destined for Germany amounted to 300,000 Marks. Exports to Great Britain and her colonies in 1902 through Jaffa were valued 1,400,000 M; those to France at 560,000 M and to
should not be underestimated especially since its future would be affected by the Berlin Bagdad Railway. The "Deutsche Palästina Bank," the Kolonialzeitung noted, had already gained a secure financial position in the land, a position which it hoped could soon be expanded into Syria. Germany, the article concluded, must prepare itself for the day when due to the completion of the Bagdad Railway project the economy of that whole area would be revived.  

A further article that pointed to Germany's already established financial interests in Palestine was featured in the Kolonialzeitung on March 27, 1902. The article discussed the establishment of the German Templer colonies in Palestine, and stressed their economic significance. All the colonies, the article pointed out, were located at important commercial junctures. Rephaim was located at the railway station in Jerusalem. The colony in Haifa was not only located at the sea, but also at the railway juncture to Damascus. Also in Jaffa, the port entry to Jerusalem, the Germans were financially well established. The colony of Sarona, the article stressed, could boast of a successful wine industry, a brewery and a steam mill. The German colonists there possessed seventy-two horses, twenty-two donkeys, nine mules, two hundred and sixty cattle and ninety-six hogs. Among the exportable commodities raised at Sarona the article mentioned wheat, barley, sesame, olives, oranges and wines. Concluding the report the organ of the Deutsche Kolonialzeitung mentioned that Russia at 120,000 M. For these statistics see Davis Trietsch, Palästina Handbuch (Berlin-Schmargendorf: Orient Verlag, 1910), pp. 176-177.

15 "Deutsche Unternehmen in Palästina," Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, XIX (January 9, 1902), 9-10.
Gessellschaft” declared that all these colonies deserved the full support of all of Germany's colonial friends.16

Such support was indeed forthcoming that very year. A new German agricultural colony almost twice the size of Sarona (2,000 acres) was established in 1902 about fifteen miles east of Jaffa. This colony named Wilhelma-Hamidije (in honor of Emperor William II) was the first project undertaken by the "Gesellschaft zur förderung der deutschen Unsiedlungen in Palästina." The colony proved very successful, and became known in the land for its dairy products.

Another tract of land in Palestine totaling about 1750 acres was purchased through the help of the same society in 1906. Commenting on the latest acquisition the Kolonialzeitung told its readers that the Templers aided by a 50,000 Mark loan, successfully settled the abandoned Arab village of Bethlehem in the Gelilee. Though they kept the name of the village, the settlers built new houses, dug new wells, and installed a motor driven water pump. The "Deutsche Kolonial Gesellschaft," the paper continued, fully supported the Hamburger Nachrichten's declaration that the Turkish Government should assist and welcome these German efforts for it itself had much to gain from such successful enterprises.17

No sooner was this German colony established than an additional 1800 acres were purchased, once again through the "Gesellschaft zur förderung der deutschen Unsiedlungen in Palästina."
The new settlement named Waldheim was directly adjacent to that

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16Ibid., XIX (March 27, 1902), 124.
17Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, XXIV (August, 1907), 346.
of Bethlehem. Its settlers, many of whom came from Germany, belonged to the Evangelical church.

Land for still another German agricultural settlement in Palestine was acquired in 1906 at Magdala. This land, located at the western shore of the Sea of Galilee next to the German Catholic settlement of Tabgha, was purchased through the efforts of a German resident of Nazareth. Having heard about the land owner's desire to sell the property, this German succeeded in interesting several important persons in the project. Among those who lent him support were Prince Leopold von Hohenzollern, Count Ballestrem, who at one time was the president of the Reichstag, Prince Carl von Urach, and the "Deutschland Palästina Bank." The project was welcomed by the conservative south German Grenzbote as new evidence that "Deutschum" was strengthened to counter the penetration of Russia and England into Palestine. Magdala was settled in April, 1908 but was already abandoned during the following year.

The German Catholic settlement of Tabgha, on the other hand, continued to prosper. Additional land purchased over the years increased the cultivated area of the settlement to 200 acres on which a variety of vegetables and fruits were raised. This German Catholic enterprise reflected the belief of the "Ver ein von Heiligen Lande" that the colonization of Palestine was also an important Catholic task. Featuring an article that was

18See above, Chapter II, p. 73.
20Ibid.
originally published in the Kölnische Volkszeitung the "Verein von Heiligen Lande" in its own organ called attention to several factors that made the colonization of the Holy Land feasible. Pointing to the successful experience of the Templers and to the desirability of cultivating in Palestine of cereals, fruits, vegetables and other commodities, Das Heilige Land in 1907 called upon its readers to undertake a new "tactic" and to purchase in Palestine as much land as possible. 21 A similar call to the German Catholics was raised at the convention of the society at Paderborn on November 22, 1908. Outlining the goals of the "Verein von Heiligen Lande," Dr. Lauberg of Cologne reminded his listeners of Germany's colonial enterprises in Africa and East Asia and raised the question whether the colonization of the Holy Land did not deserve as much sympathy and sacrifices as the former did. 22

In spite of the general success registered by the existing German colonies in Palestine, and the continued calls to further such enterprises, only an insignificant number of Germans could be motivated to emigrate to that rather harsh and underdeveloped land. Indeed since the new settlements had provided an outlet for the natural growth of the Germans in Palestine no further expansion for the near future was foreseen. Furthermore, from a purely financial point of view, Palestine was of little interest to Germany's major financial and industrial institutions. In spite of the fact that Germany's trade with Palestine significant-

21 Grundbesitzverhältnisse und Kolonization in Palästina," Das Heilige Land, LI (November, 1907), 202-204.

22 Ibid., LIII (November, 1909), 204.
ly increased over the years, and the fact that almost all important trade companies such as Aberle & Co., Friedrich Vester & Co., Jauss & Co., Albert Singer, Wilhelm Gross, Dr. J. Benzinger & G. Behrens, Kaiser, and Karl Gollner were German, commercial opportunities in the neighboring lands proved much more attractive.

Even the pioneering "Deutschland Palästina Bank," in spite of its financial success and ability to expand to Haifa, Nazareth, Nablus, Beirut, Damascus, and Alexandretta, was overshadowed before 1914 by a much more powerful German institution operating in the Orient. The "Deutschland Palästina Bank" first encountered competition from a German institution in 1904 with the establishment of the "Banque d'Orient" in Athens. The new bank founded by the German "National Bank" established branch offices in Hamburg, Constantinople, Smyrna, Saloniki, Alexandria and Cairo. Though an agreement was signed between the two banks in 1904, according to which neither would interfere with the other in places where either one had a branch, future developments favored the "Banque d'Orient." In order to overcome the competition of other older banks in the Near East, especially that of the "Banque Imperiale Ottomane" and the "Credit Lyonnais," the "Banque d'Orient" with the cooperation of the important "Dresd-

23 German imports to Palestine through the port of Jaffa rose from 420,000 M. in 1902 to 1,120,000 M. in 1908. Exports from Palestine to Germany which passed through Jaffa, increased from 300,000 M. in 1902 to 920,000 M. in 1908.

24 See "Palästina als Absatzgebiet," Altheuland, I (1904), 144-145.

25 Karl Strasser, Die Deutschen Banken im Ausland (Munich: Verlag von Ernst Reinhardt, 1925), p. 95.
ner Bank" and the "A. Schaafhausen Bank" was transformed on January 3, 1906 into the "Deutsche Orient Bank." The "Deutschland Palästina Bank" however was not immediately affected. A more decisive turn for its future occurred in 1908 when the banking firm of "Heydt und Company" withdrew from the enterprise and a new concern, the "Handels Vereinigung A.G." took its place. The connection between the "Deutschland Palästina Bank" and the "Handels Vereinigung" can be traced to the financial interests of the Hohenlohe-Oehringen family. Indeed as the Frankfurter Zeitung in an article devoted to the "Handels Vereinigung" pointed out the shares acquired by this institution in 1908 were in fact the private property of the Hohenlohes. The Hohenlohes, as was mentioned before, had certain financial interests in both the "Deutschland Palästina Bank" and in the "Deutsche Levante Linie." Until 1908 they did not apparently interfere in the management of the bank. However, the transaction which involved the "Handels Vereinigung" was seemingly aimed at furthering cooperation between the bank and the German shipping line in the Orient. While the bank's business thereafter expanded significantly, its transactions were increasingly centered within Germany. Consequently, the bank had very little to do with Palestine. The "Handels Vereinigung" collapsed in July, 1913. During the following year the branches of the "Deutschland Palästina Bank" in Palestine and Syria were taken over by the "Deutsche Orient Bank."

No significant major industrial projects were undertaken in Palestine by any European power during the period under con-

26 Frankfurter Zeitung, May 15, 1910, p. 4. 27 Ibid.
Several projects for the development of Palestine, however, came up for consideration. Among the more important projects envisioned were the building of a dam on the Jordan River to provide for irrigation and electricity, the establishment of plants to extract natural chemicals from the Dead Sea, and the construction of harbors and other facilities. The one major German concern already operating in the Turkish Empire and able to finance and execute any such project was the "Deutsche Bank." But as Dr. Karl Helfferich, the Director of the bank, admitted in 1913 every time such a proposal had come up for discussion it was rejected.28

A so-called "Palästina Projekt,"29 which among other things envisioned the acquisition of the French owned Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway, was submitted in 1913 by Gottlob Paulus30 to Dr. Karl Helfferich. The latter's response to this plan was negative. Indicating in his reply that the "Deutsche Bank" was trying to utilize its resources to support its existing projects in Turkey "in order to keep what we have," Dr. Helfferich volunteered the information that similar proposals had been repeatedly examined "during better times" but were always deemed too risky.31 Even though Dr. Helfferich had financial considerations in mind, Gottlob Paulus' motives, by his own admission, were primarily politi-


29 Ibid., A18538.

30 Gottlob Paulus was related to both Christoph Hoffmann and Christoph Paulus the founders of the Temple Society.

31 A. A., Turkei 197, No. A18538. Letter by Dr. Helfferich to Paulus dated July 29, 1913.
cal. He advised the Director of the "Deutsche Bank" as well as the German Foreign Ministry that his "Palästina-Projekt" was a financial ploy which, if executed, would give Germany a political hold over Palestine. Palestine, Paulus believed, was the only place in Asiatic Turkey that Germany in 1913 could still politically dominate. 32

Another important German company which was doing business in the Ottoman Empire and might have invested in Palestine was the "Deutsche-Levantinische Baumwollbau Gesellschaft." In a "most confidential" report submitted to the German Foreign Ministry in May, 1910, the company pointed to certain areas in Palestine which could be regarded favorably for the raising of cotton. 33 Among the favorable districts singled out by the company was the coastal stretch from Jaffa to El-Arish (Gaza), the hinterland of Jaffa (the German colonies there), and the hinterland of Haifa. The valley of Jeesrael and the upper Jordan valley were described as most suitable for the purpose. Yet, in spite of these positive indications, the "Deutsche-Levantinische Baumwollbau Gesellschaft" decided not to extend its operations to Palestine. The reason cited in the report was that the company believed that its future depended on intensive rather than on extensive cultivation of cotton. Since conditions in Palestine demanded extensive cultivation, the company advised the German Foreign Ministry of its preference for an area that stretched

32 Ibid., A18538. Letter by Paulus to von Jagow, September 11, 1913.

33 Ibid., A9294. Report by Franz Gunther on the possibilities of cotton cultivation in the Orient.
from Adena through upper Mesopotamia to Mosul. 34

Of the important German companies, only the Hamburg America Line seems to have invested capital in Palestine. The line even though it had no direct service to Palestine operated a chain of hotels at Nablus, Jenin, Nazareth and Tiberias. 35 These hotels together with others owned by Germans in Jaffa, Jerusalem and Haifa, made it possible for the Germans in Palestine to dominate much of the tourist trade of the Holy Land.

Religious and Cultural Activities

Germany's position in Palestine before 1914 was considerably strengthened by the establishment of new German religious and cultural institutions, especially in Jerusalem.

The most important German Catholic enterprise in the Holy Land following Emperor William II's visit was the construction of the church "Maria Heimgang" on Mount Zion and the building of a new hospice in front of the Damascus Gate in Jerusalem. The ground for the church on Mount Zion, it will be remembered, was acquired by Emperor William II and was transferred by him to the "Verein von Heiligen Lande" on October 31, 1898. 36 The land for the new hospice was purchased by the same society in 1899. The purchase involved two separate transactions. The first was completed in April, 1899 at a cost of 66,000 F. Having decided to construct in conjunction with the hospice also a trade school and a teachers' seminar, the society on August 6, 1899 purchased some

34 Ibid. 35 Altneuland, II (1905), 319-320.
36 See above, Chapter III, pp. 102, 105.
additional land at a cost of 50,000 F. The cost of the complete project was estimated by the "Verein von Heiligen Lande" at about 500,000 M. An old building that was located at the northern edge of the newly acquired property was already in May, 1900 converted into a boys' school. It was the first German Catholic school for boys established in Jerusalem. 37

The inauguration of the erection of the church on Mount Zion was delayed until October 7, 1900. It was only after receiving formal German guarantees concerning the ban on the construction of an eastern gate, and the fate of the stones that were found to be holy to the Greek Orthodox that the necessary Turkish firman was issued. 38 The first excavations on the site, directed by the architect Heinrich Renard, 39 began in the second half of the following year. The rocky terrain, the need to arrange an adequate water supply, the poor system of transportation compounded by difficult approaches to the site itself, and other related problems made the work slow and extremely costly. Consequently, it was not before 1904 that all the subterranean construction at this site was completed. 40

37 "Das neue deutsche Hospitz auf dem St. Paulusplatz zu Jerusalem," Das Heilige Land, XLVIII (1904), 65-70.

38 A. A., Türkei 175 g ("Das Coenaculum und die Dormition de la sainte vierge"), document No. A13237, dated September 19, 1900. Also see documents No. A13237, September 21, 1900 and A13349, September 21, 1900.

39 A suggestion by the "Verein von Heiligen Lande" made in December, 1898 to place bids for the design of the church was vetoed by Emperor William II. He demanded that one architect be assigned, and that he should report directly to him. (A. A., Türkei 175 g No. A14380, December 14, 1898).

40 For a full discussion of this stage of the construction
In the meantime construction at the Damascus Gate was also begun. The planned hospice, which was to be called the hospice of St. Paul, and the school were to be housed in a two-winged building. The right wing was to be large enough to accommodate the administrative staff and 150-200 pilgrims. The left wing was to be spacious enough for 100 students. Construction at this site proved much less difficult than on Mount Zion, and proceeded much faster.

Addressing the Fiftieth Convention of the German Catholics in Cologne, a spokesman for the "Verein von Heiligen Lande" on August 25, 1903 called upon the delegates to support the projects of the society in Palestine and to promote pilgrimages to the Holy Land. Drawing loud applause the speaker told his listeners that the "Verein von Heiligen Lande" was not only doing its Catholic, but also its patriotic duty. The initiative that was begun by Emperor William II had boosted "Deutschtum" in Palestine; however, he continued, if German influence in Palestine was to grow, greater support for the society would have to be forthcoming. "Each German Catholic," the speaker amidst stormy applause declared, "must for the honor of God and the honor of the German name partake in this crusade."

The progress of the buildings in Jerusalem soon provided the "Verein von Heiligen Lande" with several opportunities to increase the number of organized pilgrimages to Palestine. Two see the several articles by Heinrich Renard in Das Heilige Land beginning on April 1, 1903. Also useful is the article by Jakob Marchand in Das Heilige Land, XLVIII (1904), 101-109.

\[\text{41Ibid.}, \text{XLVII (1903), 149.}\]
celebrations in March, 1904, one commemorating the inauguration of the crypt of the church "Maria Heimgang" and the other the inauguration of the foundation of the left wing of the St. Paul hospice, attracted a German pilgrim caravan of 150 persons. Another celebration for which 130 pilgrims came took place in March, 1906. The first event, celebrated on March 20, saw the completed right wing housing the hospice of St. Paul transferred to Father P. Wilhelm Schmidt, the former director of the German hospice at the Jaffa Gate. The second event, celebrated on the following day, witnessed the transfer of the church "Maria Heimgang" to the Benedictines of Beuron. Among the pilgrims who came for the occasion were Freiherr von Stotzingen, the Abbot of Maria Lach, and Dr. Klein, the Vice President of the "Verein von Heiligen Lande." Both men, while on their way to Palestine, were presented to the Sultan by von Marschall.

In the meantime another large German institution known as the "Auguste Victoria Stiftung" was being built at the northern edge of the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem. The building, erected on a twenty-five acre site which was purchased through the efforts of the German Empress in 1903, was designed by Robert Leibnitz, the Imperial architect. It was a square-like two story structure with a tower that rose to a height of 200 feet. The

42 According to an agreement that was signed between the "Verein von Heiligen Lande" and the Benedictines on February 15, 1905, the former agreed to: 1. Bear all the costs arising from repairs, and upkeep of the buildings. 2. To pay 7000 Francs each year for the administration of the church. 3. To arrange for cost free vacations at Emmaus (Kubebe). This contract expired on February 15, 1910. It was then renewed only orally. See A.A., Turkei 175 g, No. A33545, November 19, 1915.

43 Ibid., No. A4316, March 2, 1906.
new institution, in accordance with the wishes of the Empress, was to provide a double function: it was to serve as a sanatorium and convalescent home for German residents of Palestine, and also as a national center where all Germans could celebrate their national holidays. The inauguration of the new building on March 31, 1907 provided the occasion for another great celebration. Among the more eminent guests who came to Palestine for this event were Dr. Dryander, the Imperial Court Preacher, and Freiherr von Mirbach.

The completion of the "Auguste Victoria Stiftung" was celebrated along with that of the church "Maria Heimgang" in the spring of 1910. The structure that was erected on the site of the "Dormition" was specifically designed to have "something of a monumental appearance" for it was to serve more than mere "practical needs." Its imposing appearance however elicited mixed reactions. As expressed by an Italian the building represented nothing but "barbaria Teutonica." Regardless of its architectural merits, however, no one in Jerusalem was going to be deprived of a constant reminder of Germany's new symbolic presence in the city. For if not all could be made to view the church, at least, it was hoped, all would hear its bells chime.

44 Altneuland, III (1906), 103.
45 Das Heilige Land, XLVIII (1904), p.
47 The following arrangement was installed:
   I. c major weighing 5060 Lb.
   II. e major weighing 3125 Lb.
   III. f major weighing 2116 Lb.
   IV. g major weighing 1496 Lb.
See Ibid., LIII (1909), 25. Also "Die Glocken für die Sions-
Germans who came to Palestine to celebrate the completion of these two institutions totaled 704 persons.

Among the more eminent Germans who came to Palestine for this celebration were the Prince and Princess Eitel Friedrich and the Princes Konrad and George of Bavaria. His Majesty Prince Eitel Friedrich, accompanied by Ambassador von Marschall, arrived in Jaffa on April 6, 1910. Besides visiting Jerusalem the Prince and the Princess also paid visits to the German colonies of Sarona, Jaffa, and Haifa. Prince Eitel Friedrich on his visit brought with him a present from his father the Emperor. The present consisted of two bronze statues of the German Emperor and Empress in more than actual life size. The statue of the Emperor represented him as a knight of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. The second statue represented the Empress holding a model of the new institution bearing her name and wearing the "Cross of the Mount of Olives." This emblem consisting of a red Jerusalem cross, with four small crosses placed between the four arms and a white eight-pointed cross of St. John in the center, was created to commemorate the founding of the "Auguste Victoria Stiftung." The two large statues were created by the famous German sculptor Albert Moritz Wolff, and were placed within the court of the institution in Jerusalem.

Not unlike the visit of his father in 1898, Prince Eitel kirche in Jerusalem," Das Heilige Land, XLVIII (1904), 9-13.

48 A. A., Preussen 1 No. 3 No. 7 ("Prinz Eitel-Friedrich"); reel No. ACP 338; No. A6574, dated Jaffa, April 7, 1910. For the visit of the Princess to Haifa see ibid., document No. A7027, April 15, 1910.

Friedrich's presence in Palestine served to suddenly once again raise suspicions over Germany's intentions in Palestine. "Nothing is more remarkable in the recent history of the Holy Land than the growth of German interests and German institutions..." declared The Illustrated London News on March 26, 1910.50 Picking up the same story, and commenting on the new German institutions and the two statues that were brought to Jerusalem, the French L'Illustration remarked that the latest developments were "enough to call the attention of Europe to the Germanization of Palestine..." To emphasize its contention the paper alarmingly called attention to the extremely heavy construction of the German institutions and concluded that since they have all been erected on strategic sites, these structures should really be referred to as German fortresses. A series of illustrations which accompanied the story left little doubt that the structures were indeed massive.52 Germany's growing presence in Palestine also drew the attention of certain French language papers in Constantinople. The reaction of the Moniteur Oriental even drew the attention of Emperor William II. Commenting on an article in that paper which criticized France for not following a more aggressive posture in Palestine, the Emperor in the margin of the report wrote: "Impudent."53

The Lutheran church of the Redeemer, the church "Maria Heimgang," the new St. Paul hospice, and the "Auguste Victoria

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50 Ibid.
52 Ibid., pp. 354-356.
as the above mentioned journals correctly pointed out, represented only part of Germany's religious and cultural work in Palestine. Both the German Protestants and the German Catholics, it will be remembered, supported various smaller projects long before Emperor William II's visit. Following the visit such activity too was both maintained and expanded. Among the more important new German Evangelical undertakings in Palestine was the creation of the "Deutsch Evangelische Institute fur Altenkumsforschung des Heiligen Landes" (The German Evangelical Institute for the Research of the Antiquities of the Holy Land), which was opened in Jerusalem in November, 1903. The readiness of the Evangelical Church to establish an institute was taken on June 19, 1900 at the German Evangelical Church Conference at Eisenach. The directory of the institute, it was decided, would be headquartered in Berlin, and the director of the center in Jerusalem would be named by the Emperor. The purpose of the center in Jerusalem was to conduct excavations, do research, offer biblical studies and teach oriental languages. The costs of excavations and research were to be born by the "Deutsche Verein Zur Erforschung Palästina," administrative expenses by the German Evangelical Church. The institute was officially opened in Jerusalem on November 15, 1903. In a speech delivered during the opening ceremony the German Consul-General in Jerusalem declared that the new center of learning gives concrete evidence of Germany's growing scientific influence in Palestine. The first director named

54 For the founding of this society see above, p. 71.
55 Altneuland, I (1904), 379.
56 Das Heilige Land, XLVIII (1904), 50-51.
by the Emperor to head the institute was Dr. Gustav Dalman of
the University of Leipzig. Under his direction the institute
established a curriculum which attracted visiting professors
from German universities, a library, a museum, and a scholarly
publication called the *Palästina Jahrbuch*.

The largest German Evangelical charitable and educational
complex operating in Palestine was the Syrian Orphanage headed
by Pastor Schneller. It consisted of a large orphanage for
boys in Jerusalem, a girls' orphanage, the Armenian orphanage in
Bethlehem, a large trade school, a grammar school attended by
400 students, a seminar for teachers and preachers, an institu-
tion for the blind, and an agricultural school and orphanage at
Bir Salem. Also continuing its missionary and educational work
was the "Jerusalem Verein." Through its efforts a new Evangel-
ical church was founded in 1905 at Jaffa. The chimes for this
church were donated by the Emperor and Empress, and the clock by
the King of Württemberg. Also a new school and missionary house
were established by the "Jerusalem Verein" at the village of
Beth-Sahur, west of Bethlehem.

German Catholic enterprises outside Jerusalem were also
expanded. Emmaus, purchased in the late 1880's, was made over
the years into a summer resort which served the German Catholic
community of Jerusalem. A similar establishment called "Eliasruh"
was established in 1902 on Mount Carmel to serve the German Cath-

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57 For the founding of the institution see above, Chapter I, p. 18.
58 Altneuland, II (1906), 359.
olic community in Haifa. The sisters of the Order of Barromeus who administered this institution also continued to administer the German hospital in Haifa, the German hospice, and the school for girls that was established in the city in 1888. The center for German Catholic missionary activity in the Galilee was the settlement of Tabgha. It was from there that the various schools supported by the "Verein von Heiligen Lande" in northern Palestine were supervised. Among these schools was a boys' school attended by 60 to 80 students at the village of Moghar, a school attended by 60 to 70 students at Rameh, a school attended by 40 to 50 boys and 15 girls at Bar'aschit, another school attended by 18 boys and girls at Safed el Batic, two schools, one for 40 boys and the other for 35 girls at Tibnin, a school for 25 students at En Kafachije, a similar school at Deir Dugheija, and another two schools, one for 60 to 70 students, the other for 30 to 35 girls, at Qana.

Of growing importance for Germany's position in Palestine was also the educational work of the German Jewish society that was known as "Der Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden." This society established in April, 1901 for philanthropic purposes also turned its attention to the field of education. Believing in the principle that the need of the Jews in the Orient to learn the German language was relative to Germany's growing financial and technical influence in the Near East, the society by

60"Zum silber-jubileeum der deutschen Borromaeinnen in Jerusalem," Das Heilige Land, LVI (1912), 104-109.

1914 was already supporting forty-four institutions in the area. Of these, twenty-eight institutions with over 3000 students were located in Palestine. Half of these were located in Jerusalem, the rest were divided between Jaffa, Haifa, Safed, Tiberias, Hebron and the Jewish agricultural colonies of Rechovot and Katrah. The oldest and largest school administered by the "Hilfsverein" was the Lamel school in Jerusalem. Among the various institutions supported by the society were kindergartens, elementary schools, secondary schools, a teachers' seminar and a technical institute. 62

Another German Jewish institution established in Palestine was the "Bezalel" school for arts and crafts which was founded by professor Boris Schatz of Berlin in 1905. 63 This institution as was clearly indicated, for instance, by The Illustrated London News, 64 was regarded before 1914 as purely a German enterprise.

Jewish Rivalry over German Influence

The activity of the "Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden" in the Near East rivaled that of the French supported "Alliance israélite universelle" and therefore naturally gained the support of the German Government. The idea that a German Jewish School Association should be formed in order to operate in a sphere that was being exclusively exploited by the French was first raised


64 The Illustrated London News, March 26, 1910, p. 456.
Writing to the German Foreign Ministry about his idea Simon coupled it with a suggestion that in case of an emergency the institutions envisioned would receive the protection of the German Empire. The proposal to create a society that would compete with the "Alliance" was supported by both von Rosen, the German Consul-General in Jerusalem, and Ambassador von Marschall in Constantinople. Von Marschall, submitting his views over the project to Chancellor von Hohenlohe, stressed the commercial rather than the political advantages for Germany inherent in the proposal. However, at the same time he also admitted that the proposed society would "to a certain degree block French influence" in the Near East.

Taking due notice of the establishment of the "Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden" in 1901, and its friendly connections to the German Foreign Ministry, the Zionist leadership too once again attempted to interest the German Government in its own political aims. In a long memorandum submitted to State Secretary von Richthofen on February 23, 1902, Max Bodenheimer called on the German Government to lend its support to the Zionist movement rather than to the "Hilfsverein." German support for the latter organization, he suggested, raised the danger that France, Russia, and England might conclude that this Jewish society was

66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., No. A12334, Therapia, August 30, 1900.
68 Ibid.
69 Max Bodenheimer was the president of the Zionist Federation of Germany until 1910.
a mere tool of Germany. German support for the Zionist movement, on the other hand, Bodenheimer suggested, would raise no suspicions, since the aims of the movement, unlike those of the "Hilfsverein" were not concentrated first and foremost on furthering one specific European language or culture. Germany's interest would best be served, Bodenheimer continued, if the German Foreign Ministry were to indicate to the influential German Jews who support the "Hilfsverein" that it was positively inclined towards Zionism. Developing his argument the Zionist leader reminded von Richthofen that there were close to eight million Jews concentrated in eastern Europe who spoke a German national dialect - the so-called German Jewish jargon. The Jewish masses in the East represented one united but propertyless element that lacked a European education. Once these people could reach a land where they would be free to direct their own destiny they would quite naturally due to their language affinity be apt to adopt the German culture. The fact that all the important Zionist leaders were themselves German could be expected to stimulate this process. However, in order to ensure the German character of the future Zionist leaders, it would be important to gain the support of the influential German Jews who founded the "Hilfsverein."70

The fulfillment of the Zionist goal, Bodenheimer's memorandum to von Richthofen declared, could have important consequences for Germany's interests in the Near East. German nationals, Jews and non Jews, would take up teaching positions in

70 A. A., Türkei 195, No. A3120.
new institutions, German engineers, technicians, doctors, scholars and other professionals would find new employment opportunities. Indeed a completely new relationship between Germany and the Near East would come about. At the same time, the Jews due to their ties with the west and their racial affinity to the east would form a "live bridge" that would connect Europe's culture with Asia. Consequently, according to Bodenheimer, "the German language and the German culture would dominate all of hither Asia." 71

Turning to some of the antagonism that was being voiced by some of the German colonists in Palestine and their supporters, Bodenheimer tried to assure the German Secretary of State that the work of the Zionists in Palestine would also be of benefit to the existing German colonies. The Jewish farmers, he suggested, should be regarded as natural allies of the German settlers in their struggle to overcome "barbarism and an inferior culture." The development of Palestine could be of equal benefit to Jews and Germans. By cooperating with the Zionist movement Germany could utilize these colonies as a bridge that would connect the German nation with the new Jewish nation. The opposition of the German settlers in Palestine to the work of the Zionists made sense only if Germany herself intended to colonize Palestine. Such a policy, Bodenheimer ventured to suggest, would draw severe opposition from other interested European Powers. Therefore, only by supporting the aim of the Zionist movement to achieve an internationally based agreement with the Turkish Government, he concluded, would it be possible for Germany to "turn Syria and

71 Ibid.
Palestine into a German sphere of influence" ("ein deutsches
interessen Gebite").

Despite the thrust of the above memorandum and Theodor
Herzl's renewed effort to gain another audience with Emperor
William II through the good offices of the Duke of Baden,
the attitude of the German Foreign Ministry towards the Zionist
movement remained negative. Its position as was outlined in an
unsigned Aide Memoire dated January 26, 1904 was summed up in
the sentence: "Zionism has shown that no specific German inter-
est is involved here." To support this unambiguous declaration
the document pointed out that Theodor Herzl was not a German
citizen and that the Zionist movement had little success in re-
cruiting members in Germany. More important, however, from a
political point of view, was the document's assertion that Ger-
man support for the Zionist aims "would bring on irreparable
damage on all our other interests in Turkey." The same nega-
tive attitude towards Zionism was repeated by the German Foreign
Ministry three years later. Thus in response to an inquiry by
Freiherr von Mirbach about Germany's policy towards Zionism,
the Foreign Ministry in 1907 once again unequivocally stated that

72 Ibid.
73 Documents in Facsimile, No. 46, p. 98. Theodor Herzl
to the Grand Duke Frederick of Baden, January 25, 1904.
75 Ibid.
76 Von Mirbach had accompanied Emperor William II to Pales-
tine in 1898. He again went to Palestine in 1907 in order to be
present at the inauguration ceremony of the "Auguste Victoria
Stiftung."
the "wishes of the Zionists cannot be supported by us because of our relations to Turkey." 77

The German Foreign Ministry's inability to establish any common interests with the Zionist movement sharply contrasted with its friendly attitude towards the "Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden." Satisfied that the activities of this society could serve German interests, the Foreign Ministry exhibited special interest in the projected construction of the "Jewish Institute for Technical Education in Palestine," in which the "Hilfsverein" along with other Jewish interests was actively involved. 78

The value of such a project for Germany was outlined by James Simon, the president of the "Hilfsverein" in a letter written to Under State Secretary von Zimmerman on September 21, 1909. Stressing the German character of the project James Simon advised von Zimmermann that not only would the German language be used for teaching purposes, but that admission to the institute would not be limited to Jewish students. The land on which the institute was to be erected, Simon advised, had already been purchased, and was registered in his own name. However, the important Turkish permit to begin construction was still needed. It, along


78 According to information related to the German Foreign Ministry the main contributors to the project were: 1. The "Hilfsverein" (contribution of $300,000 by Cohn-Oppenheim, and $100,000 by James Simon). 2. The American Jacob Schiff of Frankfurt (contribution of $100,000). 3. "The German educated Russian family" Wizotzky (contribution of 200,000 Rubels). 4. The Zionist National Fund (contribution of 100,000 Francs). See A. A., Türkei 195, No. A16933. Consul Hardegg to Bethmann Hollweg, Haifa, August 8, 1913.
with some other concessions, the "Hilfsverein" hoped to obtain through the intercession of the German Foreign Ministry.  

Responding to this letter and to a verbal explanation of the project by Ephraim Cohn, the Director of the Lamel school in Jerusalem, the Foreign Ministry on September 26, 1909 instructed Ambassador von Marschall to act on behalf of the "Hilfsverein" in Constantinople. The Ambassador, even though he personally supported the project, advised that he had been unable to gain the requested concessions. Since that was the case, von Marschall suggested that the work on the institution should be started even without any official permit and that negotiations with the authorities should be taken up at a later time.

Acting upon this suggestion, and von Marschall's further assurance to Paul Nathan, the General Manager of the "Hilfsverein" to "build and I will protect you," the actual construction was begun. At first no interference on the part of the Turkish authorities in Haifa was encountered. But on January 12, 1911 the authorities suddenly halted the activity. Since the intervention of the German Consulate in Haifa was of no avail, the "Hilfsverein" once again turned to the German Foreign Ministry for "direction and help." Demanding that he take appropriate steps, the Foreign Ministry forwarded the appeal to von Marschall. The Am-

79 Ibid., No. A15623.  
81 Ibid., No. A19345. Von Marschall to Bethmann Hollweg, November 18, 1909.  
82 Ibid., No. A1692, January 25, 1911.  
83 Ibid.
bassador's intervention had the desired results. Reporting on his efforts von Marschall on February 8, 1911 replied that the Turkish Government had issued instructions to its officials in Haifa not to interfere. The official Turkish building permit which was consequently issued was, as the Ambassador's report did not fail to stress, granted only thanks to Germany's diplomatic intervention.

The inauguration ceremony for the foundation of the technical institute in Haifa took place on April 11, 1912. Participating in the ceremony was Dr. Loytved Hardegg, the German Vice Consul in Haifa, who on this occasion extended the German Government's good wishes for the success of the enterprise. Reporting about these festivities to the Foreign Ministry the Consul took special notice of the fact that not all of the speeches delivered that day were in German. The introduction of Zionist speakers delivering their speeches in Hebrew, according to the report, reflected "symptoms of great Zionist influence in the project." Seizing the opportunity to voice his own views about the steadily increasing Jewish activity in Palestine Consul Hardegg urged the Foreign Ministry to pay greater attention to the Zionist movement. That movement, he added, would eventually be of greater importance in Palestine than the "Hilfsverein."

To back up his views Consul Hardegg offered a statistical analysis

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84 Ibid., No. A2835, Marschall to Bethmann Hollweg.

85 Ibid., No. A383, telegram No. 26, von Marschall to Bethmann Hollweg, January 2, 1912.

86 Ibid., No. A7588, Hardegg to Bethmann Hollweg, April 18, 1912.
of all the "German speaking Jews" scattered around the world, and reminded the Foreign Ministry of the close cultural relation that existed between Judaism, the German culture, and the Zionist movement. The "Wilsverein," he conceded, through its many schools in Palestine was spreading the German language; however, he stressed, the trend among the Jews in Palestine was definitely towards a greater national orientation. 87

Returning to the same subject one year later, Dr. Loytved Hardegg once again called the attention of the Foreign Ministry to the work of the Zionists in Palestine. Repeating his previous observation Consul Hardegg advised that among the Jews in Palestine (he mistakenly placed their number at 200,000 when in fact the correct number was 90,000) spoken Hebrew was slowly replacing the German language. This being an unwelcomed development from the German point of view, Consul Hardegg suggested that the German Government before granting the Technical Institute its much coveted protection should make it a condition that German be instituted as an obligatory first language. Reading this report Emperor William II enthusiastically gave his approval to the Consul's suggestion. His marginal comment read: "Good! Yes!" 88

A further call to the German Foreign Ministry not to neglect the increasing importance of the Jewish community in Palestine came in 1913 from Baron Hans von Wangenheim, the new German Ambassador at Constantinople. 89 Referring to a report

87Ibid.

88Ibid., No. A10279, Hardegg to Bethmann Hollweg, May 9, 1913.

89Von Wangenheim replaced von Marschall in Constantinople in 1912.
from Jerusalem, according to which the Hebrew secondary school in the city was placed under French protection, and another report that indicated that France was extending her protection to Jews who came to Palestine from Morocco, the Ambassador voiced suspicion that France intended to expand her Syrian sphere of influence also over Palestine. He therefore suggested that Germany should increase her own influence by placing all the institutions of the "Hilfsverein" in Palestine under German protection. 90

The pending decision regarding the official language to be adopted by the technical institute in Haifa was anxiously anticipated by the German officials concerned with this matter. Suggesting that the German members on the board of directors of the institute be pressured to insist upon the acceptance of the German language, Consul Hardegg reminded the Foreign Ministry of the importance of the project for Germany's position in the Near East. Should the German language become a prerequisite for entering the institution, the Consul stressed, then all the lower schools not only in Palestine but also in Syria would have to offer German in order for their students to enter this institution. On the other hand, as Consul Hardegg saw it, the introduction of Hebrew into subjects other than ethics, religion, and history, would limit the institution to Jews only. 91

The vote regarding the official language of the institute

90 Ibid., No. A13408, von Wangenheim to Bethmann Hollweg, June 30, 1913. Also No. A13409, June 30, 1913.

91 Ibid., No. A16933, Hardegg to Bethmann Hollweg, August 8, 1913.
was taken in Berlin on October 26, 1913. Although it was decided not to institute any obligatory official language, a majority on the board of directors voted for Dr. Paul Nathan's formulation that all scientific and technical courses be taught in German. The decision was hailed by Consul Hardegg as being of "utmost importance for the German language in Turkey."\(^{92}\) The decision, however, so outraged the three Zionist members of the board (the directory was made up of twenty-five members) that they decided to resign.\(^{93}\)

The decision of the Zionists to resign from the board of directors resulted in a sharp dispute that involved the Zionist movement and the "Hilfsverein." The dispute, carried in Palestine into the school system of the "Hilfsverein," was named "the war of the languages." Reporting on the outbreaks that accompanied the "war," Dr. Brode, the German Vice Consul in Jaffa, accused the Zionists of using "terror tactics." And fearing that these might ultimately hurt Germanism in Palestine he suggested that the separatist tendencies of the Zionists should, possibly with Russian help, be brought to the attention of the Turkish Government.\(^{94}\) The dispute was officially settled on February 22, 1914 when the board of directors under the pressure of its American and Russian members decided to satisfy the Zionist demand and to gradually increase the subjects taught in Hebrew.

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\(^{92}\) _Ibid._, No. A23900, November 10, 1913.

\(^{93}\) _Ibid._. For the Zionist monetary contribution to the project see footnote No. 77 above.

\(^{94}\) _Ibid._, No. A23894, Dr. Brode to Bethmann Hollweg, November 24, 1913.
The effects of the "war of the languages" strengthened the Zionist position in Palestine, especially within the Jewish educational system. However, at the same time, the Zionist position within Germany was severely damaged. The movement which from its start was not very popular in Germany was now represented there even more. The relations of the movement with the German Foreign Ministry, never too cordial, remained frozen. Only after the outbreak of the First World War were the necessary conditions for a new dialogue created.
CONCLUSION

This study has demonstrated that Palestine for many years commanded much greater and wider attention in Germany than historians have hitherto indicated.

The impetus for Germany's involvement in Palestine was at first, both in the Middle Ages and in the nineteenth century, primarily religious. However, the relationship that developed between these two distant lands was not merely emotional. Although the German Government throughout the period covered by this study never followed a policy that was aimed to either politically or commercially dominate the Holy Land, the thought of such a possibility was not entirely absent in Germany. Any such thoughts were quite naturally reenforced by the seemingly pending dissolution of the Turkish Empire in the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century and the belief of many that Germany must participate in this eventual partition. The first wave of ideas that envisioned the German colonization of the Near East surfaced in the 1840's immediately after the opening of Syria and Palestine to Western penetration. Of the various projects that were advanced at that time the only one to actually materialize was the German colonization of Palestine. Although the Temple Society was primarily a religious organization, it did, as was demonstrated, also embody certain political notions.

The work of the Temple Society in Palestine has not re-
ceived due historical recognition. As this study has shown the early contributions of the German settlers to the agricultural and commercial development of Palestine in the nineteenth century were quite significant. Moreover, the mere presence of a relatively large number of German nationals in the Holy Land forced the German Government, at least on certain occasions, to pay much greater attention to events in Palestine than it would have otherwise done. This, as was seen, was particularly the case during Prince Bismarck's chancellorship.

The efforts of the Temple Society to colonize Palestine were supported throughout the years before 1914 by various German colonial interests. A review of the German press has shown that Palestine received considerable coverage by the colonial press as well as by other journals that were specifically interested in the Holy Land. The efforts to advance the German colonization of Palestine were only partially successful. However, by 1914 there were a total of eight German colonies flourishing in the Holy Land. The most important of these was the colony of Haifa, which together with those of Bethlehem (Galilee) and Waldheim, consisted of about 600 German inhabitants. Next in importance was the complex of German colonies that were established in and around the port city of Jaffa. The urban colony of Jaffa together with the agricultural colonies of Sarona, Walhala, Neuhardthof and Wilhelma were inhabited by about 800 Germans. Another estimated 400 German nationals lived in the colony of Keaphain in Jerusalem, while still others resided in cities like Ramalah, Nablus and Nazareth. These Germans were financially the most secure element of the population. As shown here, at least
until 1914, they owned the most important trading firms, hotels and other commercial establishments, and were therefore of much greater influence in Palestine than their relatively low number may indicate.¹

No other European power was similarly represented in Palestine. The advantage that Germany enjoyed in the Holy Land came into sharp focus during Emperor William II's journey to the East. This advantage, however, despite the many fears and suspicions that the trip raised in Europe, was not, politically speaking, fully exploited by the German Government. The importance of Palestine to Germany during the era of "Weltpolitik" had to be weighed against other, more over-riding, German interests in the Ottoman Empire. It was not surprising, therefore, that the German Foreign Ministry was careful not to sacrifice its growing warm political and economic ties with Turkey merely to gain advantages in Palestine. Such considerations were most consistently followed by the German Foreign Ministry in its dealings with the Zionist movement. The idea that the emigration of Jews to Palestine would politically and socially benefit Germany was shared by both Zionists and anti-Semites. The idea, as was seen, also appealed to Emperor William II. However, his enth-

¹The exact number of Germans in Palestine before 1914 is not known. The numbers given here are based on figures quoted in a series of articles which appeared in the Deutsche Kolonial-post in 1911. See "Die deutschen Siedlungen in Palästina," in the January, February, March, April and May issues of this Journal. It is of interest to note that while the German population of Palestine before 1914 approximated 2000 souls, the number of Germans who lived in 1908 in Togo was 213, in the Cameroons 965, in German East Africa 1954, in Southwest Africa 5295 and in the German possessions in the South Seas 994. See Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, XXVI (October, 1909).
siasm was dispelled by the opposition of the Turkish Government to Zionism. In fact, the same considerations governed all future contacts between the German Foreign Ministry and the Zionist movement at least until 1914.

Wilhelmian Germany, while not inclined to press her influence in Palestine at the expense of her ties with Turkey, could not, however, disregard the ambitions of other European powers in the Holy Land. The competition among the Great Powers for influence in Palestine was primarily cultural. The German participation in this rivalry was given expression by the building of churches, hospitals, clinics and a variety of educational institutions in which the teaching of German values and the German language was stressed. The significance attached by the German Foreign Ministry to such projects was demonstrated in the handling of issues like the acquisition of the "Dormition" and the so-called "war of the languages." No major German industrial enterprises were established in Palestine. The reason for this, however, as was seen, was not a lack of interest but rather the fact that other more attractive economic opportunities represented themselves to German capitalists in other areas of the Near East.

Germany's overall position in Palestine before 1914 was believed in Germany to be sufficiently advanced not to let any foreign power gain predominance over that land. Especially outspoken on this point was the Deutsche kolonialpost which was published in Stuttgart from 1906 to 1914. Thus, for instance, commenting in its December, 1912 issue on a declaration by Raymond Poincare, the President of France, concerning that country's role in the Near East, the paper called attention to Germany's own
interests in Turkey and particularly in Palestine. Now was the
time, the Deutsche Kolonialpost declared, for the German nation
to do everything to prevent any foreign power from making uni-
lateral claims over Palestine.\(^2\) Repeatedly returning to the
same theme in later issues, the paper in May, 1913 declared that
Germany, in Turkey and in Palestine, had not only economic but
also moral interests. The mighty German Empire with its 70 mil-
lion inhabitants, the paper insisted, could not let another
"Morocco" happen again.\(^3\)

The German Government's position on this very subject
was, at least in 1913, not less assertive. Thus, acting on a
hint received from the British Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne re-
garding a possible French move in Syria, the German Foreign Min-
istry in April, 1913 decided to display the German might in the
area.\(^4\) Consequently the most powerful German warship ever to
visit Palestine arrived in Haifa on May 17, 1913. The ship, the
famous dreadnought "Goeben," stayed at Haifa until May 19 and
then continued for a visit to Jaffa. Germany's position in Pal-
estine, which this naval demonstration intended to protect, was,
in the opinion of the ship's commander, indeed sufficiently ad-
vanced so that there could be no talk of only French interests
in the Holy Land.\(^5\)

\(^2\)Deutsche Kolonialpost, VII (December, 1912), 135.
\(^3\)Ibid., VIII (May, 1913), 64.
\(^4\)A. A. Türkei 177 ("Acten betreffend den Libanon"); reel
No. UC I 405; document No. A7077. Report by Admiral Trummel,
submitted to Bethmann Hollweg. Also No. A6923, telegram No. 16,
April 5, 1913.
\(^5\)Ibid., No. A12334/13. "Most confidential" report from
aboard the "Goeben" May 31, 1913.
How far Germany would have gone to protect her interests in Palestine one year before the outbreak of the First World War cannot be definitely stated. But even if it is assumed that in case of a real crisis Germany would have backed down, the despatch of the "Goeben" to Syria and Palestine forcefully demonstrated the German Foreign Ministry's more than casual concern over the future of Germany's interests in this whole area.
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APPRAVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by Gad J. Bensinger has been read and approved by members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

May 24, 1971
Date

Thomae A. Knapp
Signature of Advisor