1952

The American Attitude Toward the First Moroccan Crisis and the Algeciras Conference

Betty Mullen
Loyola University Chicago

Recommended Citation

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master’s Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1952 Betty Mullen
THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE
FIRST MOROCCAN CRISIS AND THE
ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE

by
Betty Mullen

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

June
1952
LIFE

Betty Mullen was born in Chicago, Illinois, May 11, 1926.

She was graduated from St. Thomas the Apostle High School, Chicago, Illinois, June, 1944, and from Rosary College, River Forest, Illinois, June, 1948, with the degree of Bachelor of Arts.

From 1948 to 1952 the author taught History at Visitation High School, Chicago, Illinois. During this period she took courses in History at Loyola University.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. A BACKGROUND STUDY OF THE MOROCCAN SITUATION.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the United States have a right to participate? — Would we be violating our Monroe Doctrine? — Were our interests commercial or political? — Would our delegates be forced to vote? — The Conference opened — The early work of the Conference.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. AMERICAN PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE FRENCH AND GERMAN CLAIMS TO MOROCCO</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. SECRET HISTORY OF THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE.</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspondence of President Roosevelt, Baron von Sternberg, Jusserand and the Kaiser.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE.</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act of Algeciras — What did France and Germany gain? — The trouble was not ended.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. THE AFTERMATH OF THE CONFERENCE</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More disorders broke out — The Kiderlen-Waechter plan — The</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BIBLIOGRAPHY
CHAPTER I

A BACKGROUND STUDY OF THE MOROCCAN SITUATION

Morocco, or Maghreb-el-Aksa—the Key of the West—is a country in northeastern Africa, across the Mediterranean Sea from Gibraltar. Some historians claim that it is the most desirable of the North African countries, because of its fertility, its natural resources, and its geographical position. In size it is slightly larger than France, and its population in 1904 was about five million. The climate is pleasant, and due to the rich soil of the valleys and plains, agriculture is one of its chief occupations. Every known variety of vegetable and grain can be raised there, and Morocco could easily supply all the markets of Europe with early spring vegetables.¹

The Atlas mountains shelter the country from winds, storms, and the heat of the desert. Because the mountain pastures are among the finest grazing districts of the world, the sheep industry is very important. Not only have the mountains affected the climate and industry of the country, but they have exercised a great influence upon the history and government of Morocco. Since several mountain chains cross the country, the division of the country into numerous provinces has prevented the organization of a well united government. Thus, it is not surprising to find tribal independence,

¹ N. D. Harris, Intervention and Colonization in Africa, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914, 243.
local jealousies and personal rivalries existing in Morocco.

No doubt this disunity is further accentuated by the lack of good roads and of modern means of transportation. Hindered thus by the mountain chains and poor transportation, the central government of Maghzen has been unable to subject the barbarous Berber tribes in the mountains, or the Arabs and Moors in the plains. Actually, only a certain number of tribes were directly subject to the Sultan, while the others were a law unto themselves.

What then was the great attraction held by European countries for Morocco? Was it the agricultural products? Its sheep industry? Its geographical importance?

Whatever the answer may be, it is true that in the early twentieth century several European countries were looking longingly at Morocco. Beginning with the 1870's there was a renewed interest in overseas expansion among the leading countries of Europe. This followed a period from 1840 to 1870 when there was a marked decline of European imperialism. A few exceptions characterize this time, such as Napoleon III's efforts to resurrect a colonial empire for France, and a few additions made by the British in India. But generally speaking, wide-spread colonial expansion was lacking.

A favorite explanation of why European imperialism resumed in the 1870's is an economic one, based on the following statement:

It was advanced originally by publicists and statesmen to win the support of business interests for imperialistic policies. Marxian writers took up the argument and integrated it with their dogma of materialistic determination, reasoning then that, imperialism is an inevitable phase in the evolution of capitalism, a phase in which surplus capital, accumulated by the exploration of domestic labor, is obliged by diminishing returns
at home to find new outlets for investment abroad.  

This new imperialism then would be one of investing as well as one of colonizing. To carry the economic argument further, some claim that the need of raw materials necessitated the acquisition of new colonies.

However, this argument, based solely on economic reasons, would seem to ring false when the following conditions are considered. Russia and Italy participated in the scramble for colonies, although they had no surplus manufactured goods to sell, nor surplus money to invest. Likewise, Germany, who greatly exceeded France in industrial development, was far outdistanced by France in acquiring more territory.

Basically, then, the new imperialism was a nationalist phenomenon. It was a psychological reaction to maintain or recover national prestige. Such seemed to be the case of England, who, isolated in Europe, would enlarge the British Empire; of France who, having suffered losses in Europe, would turn elsewhere for compensation; of Russia who, halted in the Balkans, would again turn to Asia; of Germany and Italy who, having united their countries, wished to extend their prestige overseas. It was then only those countries who wanted to increase their powerful position in the eyes of the world that joined this imperialistic race; the countries without prestige were noticeably absent in the scramble.

England felt the need of increased power during these decades

---


3 Ibid., 220.
(1870-1900's), since she and Russia were at odds over their expansions in the Near East; she and Germany were rivals in naval production; and she and France were traditional enemies, whose animosity had increased over colonial disputes. France, having just lost land as a result of the Franco-Prussian War, wanted to save face in the eyes of the world by acquiring an extensive empire. Russia, facing an interruption of her Balkan campaign, turned not to Africa, as did the other powers, but to Asia. The situation of Germany and Italy differed from that of the other Great Powers in that they were not resuming, but starting the task of building empires. Both entered the colonial field late, because of a delayed unification of their own countries. While the others were vying for colonies many years before, Germany and Italy were struggling to unite their many provinces into strong nationalistic states, and had just succeeded in so doing prior to this period.

Then began a series of diplomatic alliances among these countries to insure successful colonial activity. The first of these agreements came in 1879, when Germany and Austria-Hungary, signed what became the Dual Alliance. This alliance was of short duration, however, for in 1882 Italy joined with Germany and Austria to form the Triple Alliance. Realizing that without the support of some stronger nation, it would be impossible to acquire new possessions, Italy accepted the opportunity to join forces with the signatories of the Dual Alliance. Thus began an alliance which was to exist until 1915. Most of the agreements made during this period claimed to be defensive in character. The two following articles from the Triple Alliance bear this out:

Article 3.
Should one of the signatory parties be drawn into war with a power not
belonging to the alliance, the two others are pledged to observe a benevolent neutrality toward the signatory power.

Article 4.
Should one of the signatory parties be attacked without provocation, for whatever cause, by a power not belonging to the alliance, the two other parties are bound to furnish help and assistance with all their strength to the party attacked.⁴

In the years immediately following this treaty Italy showed considerable interest in Tripoli and Cyrenaica; and Germany, not wishing to lose the support of Italy, or more probably, not wishing to see Italy join with France or England, renewed the Triple Alliance in 1887. This renewal contained a secret clause, protecting Italy against any attempt by France to take over Italy's territory in Africa.⁵ Despite this agreement Italy proceeded to make a treaty with France in 1900, concerning African expansion.⁶ Whether Germany was aware of this treaty is uncertain, but in 1902 the Triple Alliance was again renewed, and it reassured Italy of German support in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, and also contained a declaration from Austria-Hungary that no opposition would be offered to Italian measures in these provinces.⁷

Thus the Triple Alliance, contracted in 1882 and renewed twice before 1902, aligned Germany, Austria-Hungary and a doubtful Italy, each one promising to support the others in their colonial policy.

⁵ Ibid., 212.
⁶ Explained on page 7.
⁷ Pribram, II, 213.
Suffering from her recent defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, France succeeded in adding Tunis and Algeria to her empire, although Italy had entertained the idea of doing the same. However, when France began plans for annexing Morocco, she wisely decided to obtain the consent of the other interested powers. It was at this time that the Italian-French Treaty materialized.

To understand the Italian change of policy it is necessary at this time to review the French relations with Russia and England. Germany feared the possible alliance of France and Russia, which would leave her with an enemy to the west and an enemy to the east. Such an alliance did not appear too probable, due to the seemingly insurmountable difference in government between republican France and monarchial Russia. However, to avoid any such danger, Bismarck joined the League of Three Emperors in 1881. This league composed of Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary, was strengthened by a Reinsurance Treaty shortly afterward, despite the fact that the Triple Alliance had already been formed. In 1890 William II refused to renew this Treaty and as Bismarck had feared France and Russia were drawn closer together.8

On August 27, 1891, Russia and France signed an agreement, pledging to consult one another over any threat to peace.9 This statement was too indefinite to suit the French plans, so in 1893 the following secret treaty was arranged:

---


9 Pribram, Secret Treaties, II, 213.
If France is attacked by Germany or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

If Russia is attacked by Germany or Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

This Dual Alliance between Russia and France was the first step toward the Triple Entente, formed as a balance of power against the Triple Alliance.

If an alliance between England and France was inconceivable before the Dual Alliance, it was even more remote now that Russia had joined with France, her traditional enemy. Russia and England had also been having difficulty in the Near East, but the diplomatic problem was further complicated by the fact that England did not wish to weaken Russia too much, because then Germany would be given a free hand.

Consequently England, isolated by her troubles with France, Germany, and Russia, was desperately trying to align herself with some other power, so as not to be left alone against them all. One of these disputes between England and France developed over the Fashoda affair. Finally, in 1899 an Anglo-French Agreement settled the trouble in Fashoda, and both countries marked out their spheres of interest in the Sudan.

It is now possible to return to the treaty made between Italy and France, since it came about directly as a result of the Anglo-French agreement. Italy, learning of this agreement, asked France if this would interfere with the Turkish provinces of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, which the Italians wanted for themselves. In order to gain the good will of Italy, France told the Italian

10 Ibid., 215.
foreign minister that they had no designs on Tripoli or Cyrenaica.\textsuperscript{11}

Now, although Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance, a further arrangement was made on December 16, 1900, when Italy promised not to oppose France in

\begin{quote}
the exercise and the safeguarding of the rights which are the result for her of the proximity of her territory (Algeria) with that (Moroccan) Empire... it being understood that, if a modification of the political or territorial status of Morocco should result therefrom, Italy could reserve to herself, as a measure of reciprocity, the right eventually to develop her influence with regard to Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

This was of great importance to France, because until now Italy had been prepared to fight rather than let France take any more of North Africa.

Having obtained the consent of Italy to go ahead in Morocco, France was now prepared to deal with England and Spain.

M. Delcassè, the French foreign minister, next approached Spain, and promised her the northern coast of Morocco, including Tangier and Fez, and a part of the South, if France could take the rest.\textsuperscript{13} The Spanish Cabinet refused to sign the agreement, because they feared the reaction of England.

To approach the English was a very difficult thing to do, even though a successful agreement had been made in 1899 concerning the Fashoda affair. Delcassè, however, selected a very opportune time to consult with England,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} W. H. Cooke and E. P. Stickney (ed.), \textit{Readings in European International Relations Since 1879}, New York, Harper \& Bros., 1931, 81-82.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Pribram, \textit{Secret Treaties}, II, 245.
\item \textsuperscript{13} G. P. Gooch, \textit{History of Modern Europe}, New York, Henry Holt \& Co., 1922, 341.
\end{itemize}
because England was having trouble with Germany over the following points: 1) German press reports against Britain's conduct in South Africa were very unfavorable; 2) German naval power was increasing steadily, and 3) Germany's Bagdad Railway Scheme was not in keeping with the British plans in the Near East.

England, therefore, did not hesitate to accept the French offer of an alliance at this time, and the Entente Cordiale was signed in 1904. A few years later, the Triple Entente was formed, composed of Russia, France, and England; but first the Anglo-Russian difficulties had to be smoothed out.

The declaration of April 8, 1904, as it was made known to the general public, contained the following agreements:

2. The Government of the French Republic declares that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco.
3. His Britannic Majesty's Government recognizes that it appertains to France... to bring about the administrative, economical, financial and military reform of which it stands in need (in Morocco).
4. In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortifications.
5. In regard to these interests the French Government will come to an understanding with the Spanish Government.14

However, that was not the complete arrangement made between these two powers, because in 1911 the following secret articles became known:

1. Whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it (Morocco), the northern part should come within the sphere of influence of Spain, and the remaining part be left to France.

2. If Spain... should think proper to decline the arrangement between France and Great Britain would be none the less applicable. 15

Naturally, Spain signed the agreement, and France was now free to proceed with her plans in Morocco.

On December 10, 1904 Delcasse addressed the French Chamber of Deputies with these words:

The time has come to convince Morocco that for the sake of tranquility, we should aid it in establishing internal security and order; for our prosperity we should furnish capital to profit by the resources in which Morocco abounds; so that continuing to live its own life, its customs, laws and chiefs being safeguarded, under a Sultan whose authority will be strengthened and extended, Morocco will know our power only through the benefits which will accompany it. 16

France was making use of the article in the Anglo-French Treaty which had given them the right to protect their own territories against attacks by the Moroccans. Since Morocco bordered directly on Algeria, there were certain to be raids across the border. International attention was focused on the Moroccan disorder at this time, when Ion Perdicaris, a naturalized American citizen, was kidnapped by a Moroccan bandit, Raisuli. The American Secretary of State, John Hay, dispatched a naval squadron to Morocco and issued a demand for "Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead." 17 Perdicaris was soon released, although some credit a French diplomat for securing his release. 18

15 Ibid., 394.


18 Moon, 201.
course, brought a favorable light to the French plan of bringing order into Morocco.

Extensive French loans made to the Sultan of Morocco also added to the French claim that they were entitled to enter Morocco at this time. In 1900 Abd-el-Aziz, just sixteen, came to the throne and was encouraged to spend his money freely on various European luxuries. Unable to collect higher taxes from his people, he accepted a French loan of sixty-two million francs at a five per cent interest on the security of sixty per cent of his customs revenue. After making such a generous loan, France assumed the privilege of straightening out the internal chaos of the Moroccan state. Shortly after the loan was made, M. Saint-Rene Talliandier was sent to Fez by Delcassé to institute a program of reforms. These reforms included the organization of the military police under French officers, the establishment of a state bank to bring about financial order, and the undertaking of various public works with French capital. 19

No word of disapproval was forthcoming from England, Spain, or Italy, since they had been silenced by earlier treaties promising them compensations. Russia also remained quiet because of the Dual Alliance made in 1893. Only Germany objected, since she had not been assured of colonial gains if France made any.

Germany's objection took the form of a visit by the Kaiser to Tangier, after an unsuccessful appeal to President Roosevelt to call for a

19 Ibid., 202.
conference. While in Tangier, the Kaiser delivered a forceful speech in which he declared that "the Sultan was sovereign and independent and should be cautious about adopting the French program of reforms." He further claimed that "Morocco should remain open to the commerce of all nations on equal terms." The Sultan was greatly impressed by the speech and refused to sign the plans, unless they were first discussed by an international conference.

Meanwhile, Delcassé met with the French Cabinet in June and demanded that France uphold its honor, even if war was necessary. He added that England had promised to support the French. The French Cabinet was doubtful of English support, and felt they could count only on Russia as a sure ally. Russia at this time, however, was suffering from the Russo-Japanese War, so she, too, was of little help. After some discussion, the Cabinet voted in favor of a conference and Delcassé resigned to be succeeded by M. Rouvier.

Thus we have the setting for the famous Algeciras Conference held from January 16 to April 7, 1906. The United States helped sponsor this conference because of her earlier participation in the Madrid Conference of 1880, which had agreed to the "open door" of Morocco. It was on this point that Germany felt the right to demand another conference, since she too had been a signatory.

21 Ibid., 254.
22 Moon, 204.
CHAPTER II

AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE PARTICIPATION OF THE
UNITED STATES IN THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE

With the opening of the Algeciras Conference public opinion in the
United States was divided along three lines. The first and most controversial
topic concerned whether or not the United States had the right to take an
active part in the problem. Both Republican and Democratic Senators voiced
their opinions publicly, and newspaper and magazine editors quickly lined up
for or against our participation.

One of the first objections to President Roosevelt's whole-hearted
backing of the conference was based on the argument that such an action would
be contrary to our Monroe Doctrine. As might be expected most of the objections
came from the Democrats, who followed the leadership of Senator Augustus
Bacon of the Democrats. Senator Bacon pointed out in his argument that:

Our commercial interests are not involved in the proceedings of the
conference, since they are safeguarded by the Madrid Conference, and the
Algeciras Conference disavows the intention of revising them.1

If then our commercial interests were not involved, the United
States would not be justified in entering the conference, since that was one

1 "U. S. and the Moroccan Conference," Harper's Weekly, New York,
January 27, 1906, 112.

13
of the main reasons for our interest in it. Senator Bacon then proceeded to explain that the real problems to be discussed were political, because:

Germany was asking for permission to exercise the temporary control of the crown domains, which were given as security for the loan of two million dollars, made by German bankers to the Sultan of Morocco. This is political because so often this temporary control becomes permanent. Another question to be handled involves the problem of whether or not the maintenance of order in the Sultan's dominions should be entrusted to France or to international interests.2

These above mentioned problems, claimed Senator Bacon, could only be judged as political questions and it would then be contrary to the Monroe Doctrine for the United States to become involved in such an affair. He further added that the only possible excuse for United States representation would be some incident similar to the Perdicaris affair; and since no such event had occurred we should not become involved, because, "It is the unvarying policy of our government to cross such bridges when we come to them."

Such arguments coming from a Democratic Senator might not have carried much weight, but much to the surprise of all, Senator Eugene Hale, the leader of the Republican majority, agreed with him. Senator Hale stated that he "was afraid the President would lead us into an entangling alliance and would set a precedent in our foreign policy."3 He further claimed, however, "that our delegates would be recalled in case a vote was demanded against one country or the other."4

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
From the Republican group came an immediate answer through its spokesman, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. As a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, he attempted to refute the Democrats' arguments that if the United States representatives attended this conference it would be a disregard of the principles laid down by the Monroe Doctrine. He went still further to explain away any objections which might arise concerning Washington's warning against "entangling alliances."

In refuting the first argument he said:

The Monroe Doctrine is not being violated, since we are not seeking territory or entering into alliances which might involve us in war. France and Germany are both our friends, we are merely trying to avoid war between them.5

Then since some objections had been voiced concerning the possibility of the United States becoming involved in "an entangling alliance" with one or more European countries, Senator Lodge went on to discuss this.

Would it be absolutely wise to adhere to Washington's warning which was expressed immediately after our disagreement with France concerning the treaty of alliance? Furthermore, this warning does not in the least exclude, and never has been held to exclude, the United States from agreements with one or more European powers as to matters affecting trade and commerce, or from international conventions, which are entered into from the promotion of the world's peace.6

As is quite evident from the foregoing statements one of the main difficulties was to determine whether or not the United States was primarily concerned over this conference because of its commercial or political interests.


6 Ibid., 335.
If commercial interests were endangered, many felt we would not be violating the principles of the Monroe Doctrine; while on the other hand, if our main concern was for the political situation in Morocco, then we would be breaking a principle for which we had fought for over seventy-five years.

As an example of the American attitude concerning this question, Outlook stated that "our interests are, commercial not political." This statement was based on the Treaty of Madrid made in 1880 which provided for an "open-door" in Morocco for all powers signing this treaty, and which we now saw as being endangered due to the French-German controversy over Morocco. This opinion was agreed to by most of the Republicans and was upheld as we have seen by Senator Lodge.

However popular this argument was in our country, the official trade figures of Morocco in 1904 show that total United States trade with Morocco amounted to only $400,000, compared with $2,500,000 for Germany, $4,000,000 for France and $8,500,000 for England. These figures alone would seem to deny the fact that the United States would feel very seriously the threat of the possible loss of Morocco's trade.  

To counteract the Republican statement, the Democrats pointed to the statement made by England which definitely attempted to put the United States on the spot as violating the Monroe Doctrine by her political intervention in Morocco. Sydney Brooks attacked Senator Lodge for declaring the interest of

7 "U. S. and the Moroccan Conference," Outlook, LXXXII, January 27, 1906, 144-145.

the United States to be commercial by saying that, "it [United States] is sitting at and voting at a conference on a question that is predominantly, if not exclusively, a European question." To substantiate his opinion that the United States was inconsistent in upholding the Monroe Doctrine, Brooks referred to the prevailing situations in Venezuela and Morocco with these words:

Against Venezuela France has complaints which the world is at one in regarding as well founded. A valuable concession granted to her citizens has been frivolously cancelled. Her minister has been treated with studied and contemptuous indignity. But before exacting reparations for these and other injuries France must seek the sanction of the United States. She is informed that under no circumstances will she be permitted to occupy permanently a single inch of Venezuelan territory. Even a temporary occupation exposes her at once to the animosity and suspicion of American opinion.10

After thus showing how the United States interpreted and applied the Monroe Doctrine to matters relating to the Western Hemisphere, he then stated that "the contrast between the liberty the United States enjoys in Morocco and Europe and the restrictions she obliges Europe to conform to in South America, makes something of an international anomaly." He further added "the United States has neither a commercial nor political interest in Morocco."11

Several other important questions were brought forth by Brooks in this article, which strongly condemned the American position and strengthened the Democratic argument to withdraw our representatives. He asserted that:


10 Ibid., 403.

11 Ibid.
1) Roosevelt had raised the question of better treatment for the Jews in Morocco, which England feels would certainly not be discussed except for Roosevelt's initiative.

2) Roosevelt raised a question of an international system of policy which England claims is a commitment of America's aiding with Germany.

3) America will probably not assume the slightest responsibility for carrying out the recommendations of the conference and admits us liable for the results of whatever decision is reached. Therefore, the conferences cannot affect her politically or commercially.12

In dealing with the first of these statements it is necessary to review the conditions existing among the Jews in Morocco. For many years the Jews had been treated badly in Morocco being forced to wear the gabardine and to go barefoot in the streets. The law even restricted them from living in two-story houses. However, little heed was paid to this situation until international attention was focused on it due to an incident which occurred in the early twentieth century. There are two versions to the incident; the first was that of the French government, which read, "A respectable Jew, aged seventy, who was a French citizen from Algiers, was attacked by a mob at Fez, drenched with kerosene and burned alive."13

Naturally the French newspapers played up the story dramatically, using it in the hope of arousing the world's attention to the need of some organized force (namely French) which would bring law and order to Morocco. The Moroccan government immediately presented its side of the story by stating that "the Jew was not aged, respectable nor a French citizen. He was justifiably shot for insulting a Moorish woman on the street."14

12 Ibid.

13 "How we got into it," Independent, LX, January 11, 1906, 118.

14 Ibid., 119.
Despite the refutation of the French story by the Moroccon government, the United States Consul at Tangier protested and demanded punishment for those guilty. He further warned the Sultan:

It is undeniably requisite that the Israelites of Morocco should be protected by the local authorities, otherwise, it will not be long before they will be protected by foreign nations. 15

This incident, no doubt, was what Sidney Brooks was referring to in his article, when he claimed that Roosevelt had raised the Jewish problem which would otherwise not have been raised if Roosevelt had not done so.

The second accusation made by Brooks, claiming that the United States by her suggestions of an international system of policy made a commitment of America, siding with Germany, will be discussed later in a more detailed manner, although it did not seem to be strongly substantiated by the American public.

When Brooks stated that America would probably not assume the slightest responsibility for carrying out the recommendations of the conference and admitted no liability for the results of whatever decision was reached, he raised a question which had been voiced many times by the people of America. The United States in entering this conference could in the eyes of many be placing itself in a difficult position, because if it came to a decision, the United States might be forced to side either with Germany or France. In such a case we would have lost a friend since we were presumably entering the conference as a friend of both countries.

This question was brought to the attention of the public in an

15 Ibid.
article attempting to explain away arguments made by Senator Bacon.16 The problem was stated as follows: "How can the United States assist except by voting for one side or the other in which event they are sure to offend a nation with which the American government is on friendly terms?" The answer given by this writer followed the opinion of most of the men close to the President, for he said, "If our delegates are called on to vote in a way to griev e either France or Germany, the Secretary of State can instruct them to withdraw from the conference." As we have seen, Senator Hale agreed with this theory, although he had sided with Senator Bacon on the other issues.

Senator Spooner also entered into this debate by strongly objecting to the stand taken by Senator Bacon. In answering the Republican Senator, he said that "the men (delegates) were not to vote, but merely listen, and discuss, if they desired."17 But his chief difference with Senator Bacon arose concerning whether or not discussion should be carried on in open or closed session. He was in favor of a closed session, while Senator Bacon claimed, "no foreign government should be offended, nor was any slight intended to the President."18 However, the Senate voted not to have an open discussion of the problem. The following day Senator Bacon repeated a request made previously "that the President present a report on whatever instructions were given to our delegates since the President's entire policy


18 Ibid.
both in Europe and South and Central America, has seriously alarmed Senators on both sides.¹⁹

An editorial on the same day reinforced Senator Spooner's statement that our representatives were to listen and discuss, but not vote, unless they first contacted their home government.

The question then arose as to why the United States should become involved in the conference at all, if they intended to withdraw should their decision prove embarrassing to the United States. Several theories were presented along this line, most important of which was that there seemed to be a definite threat of war existing between Germany and France, if some solution was not reached concerning their interests in Morocco. The United States, having showed their power as arbitrator recently in Venezuela and in the Russo-Japanese War, may have felt the call to offer their services again. As Senator Lodge saw it, France and Germany were both our friends, we were merely trying to avoid war between them.

Although the question was debatable whether a war might develop because of this trouble, Mr. Root claimed that "there are strained relations between France and Germany, and it is supposed that a casus belli may be found there."²⁰ This opinion was contradictory to the optimistic statement made by the New York Times a week earlier that neither London nor the United States expected war,²¹ despite the fact that their newspaper had said on the

¹⁹ Ibid., January 9, 1906.
²⁰ Ibid., January 19, 1906.
²¹ Ibid., January 7, 1906.
previous day, that:

Ambassador White and Minister Gummere have gone to the conference with two objects—the maintenance of the open-door in Morocco, and the exercise of good offices by this country in the conference to smooth away asperities and prevent the development of friction that jeopardizes world peace. 22

Since it is impossible to know whether war would have resulted had the United States failed to join the conference, we can merely conclude that there was a difference of opinion on the subject. That many of the American people felt confident in the judgment of President Roosevelt is evident from the following statement:

With Senator Spooner, most Americans, we think, believe that the President of the United States, who hit upon the psychological moment to intervene and bring to an end the deplorable war between Russia and Japan, can be trusted to determine the psychological moment when our ambassadors must withdraw from the Moroccan Conference in order to save this country from all danger of unfortunate European entanglements, should such a moment come to pass. 23

Another view on the importance of the United States' participation was presented in the same article, when the author continued, "Furthermore, though it is not generally known, two of the Great Powers declined to be represented unless all the signatories to the existing Moroccan Treaty took part." If such was the case, the conference might not have been held without the presence of the United States' representatives.

It is quite evident that as a result of the secret treaties negotiated by the European countries during the years preceding the conference,

22 Ibid., January 6, 1906.
23 "U. S. and the Moroccan Conference," Outlook, LXXXII, February 3, 1906, 244.
all the Big Powers had lined up, even before the conference convened, either for France or Germany. The United States could then perform a valuable service to such a meeting by arriving as an impartial member. This position, of course, was claimed by the United States on several occasions.

On January 4, 1906 the New York Times said,

Messrs. White and Gummere, the American delegates will go into the conference absolutely uncommitted to either the French or the German contentions. The government's view is that America has by virtue of her ancient interest in Morocco, rights even superior to those of any European state in deciding the critical questions which will come before the conference... America stands uncommitted either to the German proposition, the creation of an international police force, or the French plan of employing Algerian police for the purpose. 24

Three days later the editor of the New York Times again repeated that the United States would remain impartial.

The ancient rights of America referred to in the previous article were explained by the author in this way:

The basis of this view is that America, singlehanded, made war upon the Barbary States, wiped out piracy in the Mediterranean waters, and concluded the first treaty between any civilized nation and those States, a treaty which has formed the basis of the demand of every other nation for favored nation treatment at the hands of Morocco... The United States feels it has the right and duty to participate in this conference. 25

The United States was then claiming rights to participate in the Algeciras Conference, because one hundred and nineteen years ago they had made their first treaty with Morocco. They followed this treaty with another one in 1863, and then in 1868, America with eleven other countries had met at


25 Ibid.
Madrid, where a third treaty was signed. This latter treaty had remained as the standard for dealing with Morocco, until the recent clash between French and German interests.

Not all Americans felt, however, that this was a sound reason for the United States to intervene in the affairs of Morocco. One opponent stated:

The fantastic explanation from Washington, that our historic bombardment of the Barbary pirates entitles us to a place in the conference, can hardly be received with gravity by European diplomats, however, good their control of their facial muscles.26

Taking into account then the many reasons advanced by the United States for their active participation in the matter, it can be assumed that recognition might have been given to her ancient rights in Morocco and to her commercial interests. Furthermore, some consideration might be forthcoming because of Roosevelt's successful role as arbitrator in several incidents just prior to this crisis in Morocco; but undoubtedly, the strongest claim held by the United States was the urgent request by Germany and the seeming desire of France to have the United States help them settle their problems without recourse to war. This last reason will be emphasized in a later chapter, dealing with the official correspondence between the French and German ministers and President Roosevelt.

As to the American assertion that they were attending the conference uncommitted to either the French or German interests, and were viewing the

situation from a completely impartial position—that is open to criticism. Certainly, our official papers, which were not made public at the time, but which later presented us with the true picture of American interests, leaves a question in our minds as to just how impartial the United States was.

With so many arguments being debated during the months preceding the Conference, it might be expected that American interest might lag; however, with the departure of the American delegates to Algeciras the interest of the American public was re-awakened to the approaching Conference. Spain, who was to act as host to the representatives of the participating countries also recognized the importance of the Conference and the following description reached the American newspapers from Algeciras:

This quaint old town is gradually awakening as the day for the opening of the Conference on Moroccan reform approaches, and the usual Spanish lethargy has given place to a burst of animation and excitement. All public buildings and bridges are resplendent with crimson decorations and tapestries... the gathering of many warships adds a touch of picturesqueness and significance to the scene.27

Although there was a general optimistic feeling that a satisfactory arrangement could be made concerning the problem in Morocco, Senator Hale, who had earlier expressed his disapproval of sending American delegates to the Conference, again emphasized this by saying:

The danger is not from the President or the Secretary of State, but from the ascendance and promise of the war spirit in the country... It would be much better if we could keep our hands off. But we shall get out of this without being entangled.28

28 Ibid., January 17, 1906.
It was a distinguished group of delegates who assembled on January 16, 1906 to open the Conference. The senior delegates from the various countries were: M. Revoil of France, who was the ex-governor of Algiers; Herr von Radowitz of Germany; Henry White of the United States; Marquis Visconti Venosta of Italy; Count Cassini of Russia, who was the Ambassador to Spain; Sir Arthur Nicolson, who was the Ambassador to Russia; Mohammed el Torres of Morocco; and the Duke of Almodovar of Spain, who was chosen President of the Conference.29

An interesting episode occurred just prior to the opening of the Conference, which involved Mohammed el Torres. The Moroccan delegate no doubt was annoyed by the repeated statements claiming that foreign help was needed to put down disorder in Morocco, and so he responded to one such remark, "Why don't they hold a Conference upon Russia and establish order there?"30

As the minor questions were settled first by the delegates, the Americans began to show less interest in the Conference, but when the important questions of control of the bank and police were brought before the delegates the public again eagerly followed the news from Algeciras.

One interesting item of news came to the attention of the American public, shortly after the arrival of the delegates from the United States. While both Henry White and Samuel Gummere told of the great wealth in Morocco, Mr. Gummere went on the explain, "Investors there [Morocco] think they are

29 Ibid., April 1, 1906.
30 Ibid., January 18, 1906.
losing money if they do not make from 30 to 40 per cent, while 80 to 100 per cent is not rare. 31

As the questions of greater importance arose during the Conference the United States became aware of its powerful position at the Conference. Before analyzing the official communications which made this Conference possible, we will consider some of the public opinions, expressed in America, during the Conference, concerning the major problems to be discussed.

31 Ibid., January 22, 1906.
CHAPTER III

AMERICAN PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE FRENCH
AND GERMAN CLAIMS TO MOROCCO

As was stated in the preceding chapter, the United States repeatedly claimed, that they were impartial in their attitude toward the trouble in Morocco, but felt that since they did not intend to gain materially from the conference, they could render a valuable service by their presence. However, Allan Nevins probably worded it more correctly when he said, "The United States is not wholly impartial, but certainly disinterested and unselfish."1

France was basing her claim to interference in Morocco on her predominant interest in northern Africa. This interest was developed by the fact that France controlled Algeria, which adjoined Morocco. Since there was a danger of raids over the border of these two countries, France felt the need of some strong power which would bring order into this region. Because France was geographically closer than any other interested country, she was suggesting police control by the French. Spain, who possibly might also claim a special interest in Morocco, because she faces Morocco across the Mediterranean Sea

on the North, had agreed with France in a secret treaty to allow France to penetrate into most of Morocco, receiving only a small section for herself.

Typical of the United States' attitude toward this claim of Morocco was this statement:

The fact that there is a long boundary line between Algeria, a French possession, and Morocco, naturally gives to France under any circumstances a special interest in whatever takes place across the frontier. 2

Another article confirmed this by saying, "Beyond all question France has predominant interests in Morocco, due to her adjoining Algerian possession." 3

Germany refused to accept this claim by France, logically stating:

Just because one nation has predominant interests does not follow that she has predominant rights of interference. . . If predominant interests allow for predominant rights of interference, why shouldn't Germany take the Netherlands? 4

It would not be sufficient reason for France to take over Morocco just because it bordered on Algeria, but the grave danger came from attacks by Moroccan rebels across the border. As the Sultan's money began to decline, rebellion soon broke out in Morocco and quickly spread to the border. France took advantage of the trouble to point out that the Sultan was unable to keep order in his country, and that some other nation, namely France, should undertake control of the police.

4 Ibid., 582.
At least one American writer objected strongly to such a plan as suggested by France. Arthur Schneider, who had spent some time in Morocco, described this situation. Most of the big European countries had obtained special privileges for themselves by encouraging young Mula Abd-el-Aziz to buy their manufactured goods. When his money began to dwindle, they would loan him money and in this way increase their privileges. However, word soon reached the natives that the Sultan was overly extravagant and uprisings occurred. Most generous with its loans was France, who far exceeded the other countries in their investments, and obviously in its privileges. Mr. Schneider unfolded more of the story when he stated, "the rebellion began, and could have been put down easily, if it had not been fostered by the French, who immediately negotiated another loan with the Sultan."5

That France was taking advantage of the rebellion to increase her special position in Morocco, and to draw attention to the disorder in the country is quite obvious from another observation made by Mr. Schneider. "While this rebellion was going on the European papers made a terrific news of it." Nevertheless, the author, who was at the scene of the disorder, said, "Actually I, as an eyewitness, saw nothing but slight skirmishes."6

Even giving France the benefit of the doubt, that great disorder did exist in Morocco, and that danger was probable to Algeria, Germany still felt that it was not the task of France to undertake police control. In the opinion


6 Ibid., 188.
of the Germans it was up to all the countries to control a troublesome nation, not just France.

America did not agree with the solution of Germany, nor did they wholeheartedly accept the French plan, although they definitely considered the French proposal more acceptable than the German. An article published by Mr. Tallichet, the Editor-in-Chief of the Swiss Review and a recognized authority in Europe, was highly commended by American reviews as containing a possible solution. Mr. Tallichet wrote:

If any country is to intervene in order to put down rebellion in Morocco, it should be only one country, the one nearest and most interested in the maintenance of order, since sacrifices will be necessary for the purpose. France is clearly the power that fulfills all the conditions. Germany is too far; does not have proper equipment to carry out the job; and would be placed in too close a contact with Algeria.  

Although these comments seemed to assure the French of getting control of the police force, since they fulfilled the necessary requirements, the United States and several other big powers withheld their approval. The strongest objection to such a plan was based on the suspicion that perhaps French control of Morocco would not necessarily mean better conditions for the inhabitants. This question, raised by a few far-sighted individuals in the United States, was also mentioned by Mr. Tallichet. Despite the fact that he favored having the French in control of the police, rather than a force of all the interested nations, he said of France:

Her former treatment of other colonies has been uncomplimentary except in Algeria and Tunis, where many improvements have been made. But outside

---

of Algeria and Tunis, her exploitation of the natives, is admitted even by France, herself.\(^8\)

This latter reference no doubt concerns her colonial policy in Indo-China, French Congo and Madagascar. It could be expected then that objection to the French proposal would be forthcoming from Germany, but such was not the case. Mr. Tallichet explains that the other countries have not used this argument, because they, including Germany, have been doing the same thing.

Of course not everybody felt that the French treatment of her colonies was unfavorable, for another writer stated, "In her colonies, France is to be congratulated upon her great work for civilization."\(^9\)

But whether the United States was rejecting the French plan for the above reason, or for some other reason, it can be assumed that the former French attitude to her colonies was not an argument in their favor at this time.

In addition to requesting control of the police force in Morocco, France was also maintaining that it would be her right to assume control of the Bank of Morocco, since she had invested more money than any other country in Morocco to keep the Sultan from becoming bankrupt. Furthermore, they claimed that French trade with Morocco was greater than that of any other nation.

Germany objected to this French trade with Morocco strongly, stating that although their commercial interests at this time were not comparable to

---

8 Ibid., 728.
9 "France and Her Foreign Relations," Review of Reviews, XXXIII, 270.
those of France; they were nevertheless growing. It was Germany's suggestion, then, that an international control be established in Morocco, which would assure all the interested powers of a fair treatment. Again Mr. Tallichet in his article of March, 1906, commented on the situation by saying, "No country has less interest in Morocco than Germany. Its commercial interests are of little importance, although Germany is aiming at increasing them."10

Germany was not claiming that she had the greatest commercial interest in Morocco as was France; but she was claiming the right to increase her trade, if possible, and this she believed could be done only if the Bank of Morocco was controlled by an international force. It is only natural that Germany's dealings with Morocco would be much less than those of France, since Germany had not entered the imperialistic field until much later than France and Great Britain, because the unification of her country was not completed until late in the nineteenth century.

As to the French claim that their commercial interests exceeded those of any other country, we can only refer again to the official trade figures of 1904, which show that England's trade with Morocco more than doubled that of France.11 However, France may have been including in her estimates her heavy loans to the Sultan.

When the Germans approached President Roosevelt with the suggestion of calling a conference to settle the problem of Morocco, they presented their trump card in basing their right to such a conference on a previous agreement...

10 Tallichet, "Morocco Situation," Independent, LX, 816.
11 "France and Her Foreign Relations," Review of Reviews, XXXIII,
reached at the Madrid Convention in 1880. Throughout the trying months preceding the conference and in the early days of the conference, Germany insisted over and over, that her only interest in calling this meeting was to uphold the agreements made at Madrid over twenty years ago. According to the Germans the international principles involved were far more important than the recognition of any country's predominant interests.

Germany pointed out that one of the clauses of the Madrid Convention guaranteed to each of the signatories the treatment of the "most-favored nation." In explaining the Emperor's aims, Baron von Sternburg, the German minister to the United States said:

Germany's policy has been and is to preserve the status quo. This marks the different lines which France and Germany are following at Algeciras, the one tending to guard the signatory powers of the Treaty of Madrid and the open door in trade, the other to turn Morocco into a French protectorate. . . France claims a preferential position because of the length of her Algerian frontier and because of her preponderant interest in Morocco's previous loans; but Germany claims that peace should not be bought at the sacrifice of an international principle. . . Therefore, Germany is merely working to place the two vital questions--police and bank--under international control.12

In insisting that France was attempting to establish a French protectorate in Morocco, Germany was directly attacking the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, in which Great Britain recognized that France should preserve order and provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms in Morocco. As far as Great Britain was concerned, France was to have a free hand in Morocco and in return, France was

12 "Baron von Sternburg on Morocco," Outlook, LXXXII, March 17, 1906, 588.
willing to let Great Britain have a free hand in Egypt.

The opinion of the United States relative to this situation was not too widely publicized, although Harper's Weekly did voice its opinion on the Anglo-French treaty in these words: "The Anglo-French Agreement is inconsistent with this treaty [Madrid], because it would undoubtedly lead to a French protectorate."13 Evidently, then, others besides Germany were recognizing the possible danger. Although not too much publicity was given to the United States' attitude, behind the scenes at the conference their delegates were working to uphold the international principles of the Madrid Treaty. In the words of Baron von Sternburg:

The Conference as a whole recognized, this week, the special interests of France, but by insisting on the open door prevents her from repeating the commercial policy she pursued in Tunis and Madagascar.14

France presented another argument which she felt would secure any attempt she might make to gain control of Morocco. This new statement said that the Moroccan government and the natives liked the French and would not oppose an intervention by them. Germany did not hesitate to deny the statement, and went further to declare that the Moroccans would prefer German intervention. The American press agreed with Germany by saying:

The Moors at present dislike the French most, since the French by the Anglo-French agreement are free to carry out their plan of pacific penetration. This policy can be carried out only with the consent of the


14 "Baron von Sternburg on Morocco," Outlook, LXXXII, 585.
Moors, and they are determined to do everything in their power to resist it. 15

This belief is further substantiated in another article which refers to the famous Tangier incident to prove the argument that the Germans and not the French are considered to be the friends of the Moors. This article explains:

Another impression which seems to prevail in America, and is constantly exploited in the newspapers, is that the Moors take kindly to the French. Nothing could be farther from the truth. In fact they favor the Germans. When pushed to the wall by France, he [the Sultan] implored help of Germany.

The Kaiser then paid his visit at Tangier. The visit created the most intense excitement I have ever witnessed in Morocco. Walls and buildings were newly whitewashed, triumphal arches were built and the Kaiser advanced in great pomp and ceremony to the deep wall of the Royal Moorish band. 16

This eyewitness account would seem to deny any statements made by the French that the Germans were not liked by the Moroccans; but France continued in its propaganda, hoping that the rest of the world would agree with her.

Referring once again to the statement made that "The United States is not wholly impartial, but certainly disinterested and unselfish," it has been proven that we did not show partiality to either the French or German arguments on all points. Public opinion varied toward the two interested powers as each claim was presented. The Americans were almost unanimous in

---


agreeing that France had predominant rights in Morocco, because of its nearness to Tunis and Algeria, but they were equally willing to admit the German rights to upholding the international principles established by the Madrid Treaty in 1880. Again they were divided in their sympathy toward France and Germany on such important matters as, whether France be given control of the Moroccan bank, because of the great commercial interest, or should the growing commerce between Germany and Morocco be permitted to grow? Should France control the police force in order to protect the border districts of her own colonies, or should Germany's plan of an international police force be recognized?

But while we were not wholly willing to give our support to either France or Germany where these matters were concerned, the public and official opinion was almost unanimous in its backing of France when the diplomatic situation was reviewed. It was not just a question of losing one of these countries as our friend; but Great Britain, another very interested power, was anxiously watching to see what the United States was going to do. Would the United States then risk its present diplomatic status in order to uphold its statement that they were disinterested and unselfish, or would they become just a little interested and a little selfish, in order to obtain a few powerful allies?

This diplomatic correspondence hinted at the answer, when Mr. Reid wrote in a message to President Roosevelt:

The truth seems to me that our relations with England are of far greater importance to us than those with Germany. . . I cannot personally see anything to be gained from unusually good relations with Germany which
compensate us for the least jar in our relations with Great Britain.\textsuperscript{17}

Clara Schieber contends that the United States actually was pro-French in her attitude, chiefly because France was an enemy of Germany. It is her belief that America's attitude was definitely anti-German because:

Since 1885 when we had trouble with Germany over the Samoan question, the United States has drifted steadily into disapproval of German manners and methods. We disapproved of her behavior in China, almost came to blows with her in the Philippines, feared her in the Caribbean and in South America. At the same time our relations with France improved, since France was Germany's neighbor and rival. To emphasize our disapproval of German militarism and imperialism, we showed approval of French policy, especially in foreign affairs. If France had been disputing with England or Italy in Morocco, it is conceivable that American sympathy might have been pro-British or pro-Italian and we might have accused France of militaristic ambitions; but since it was with Germany, our sympathies were whole-heartedly French.\textsuperscript{18}

That the United States was aware of what might happen to her diplomatic relations with Britain was quite obvious from the foregoing statements; but there was also an economic condition to consider in view of a possible German triumph. This was presented to President Roosevelt in a letter from Henry Cabot Lodge in which he stated:

I am very anxious that we should do all that is possible to encourage amity with the French. France should be with us and England—in our zone and our combination. Such an alignment would be sound economically and politically. . . . It would be an evil day for us if Germany were to crush France.\textsuperscript{19}

Another author expressed our interested attitude toward France by


\textsuperscript{18} Clara E. Schieber, Transformation of American Sentiment Toward Germany, Reprinted from The Journal of International Relations, XII, No. 1, July, 1921, 65.

saying, "America owes so much to France that there is not a request France is ever likely to make that America would not deem it her duty to meet." 20

Could the United States still declare that they were uninterested in what would happen at the Algeciras Conference, when our diplomatic relations with Great Britain were at stake and when our debt to France must be repayed? It is true that the United States sympathized with Germany for being isolated from the European diplomacy in Africa, or at least one writer claimed it; 21 but was that sympathy so strong that she would endanger her own relations and possibly isolate herself from the good will of England and France?

This was not probable, and as the conference convened one American magazine stated, "With all the Mediterranean powers, including Great Britain and the United States, approving her position, France has little to fear from an international conference." 22 This opinion was confirmed by the official letters of President Roosevelt, which will be dealt with in the following chapter.

22 Elizabeth White, 261.
CHAPTER IV

SECRET HISTORY OF THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE

Although it is well known that President Roosevelt supported the Algeciras Conference in an attempt to avoid any serious threat of war between France and Germany over the Moroccan question, the actual inside story of his powerful position was not publicly made known until after the conference.

Joseph Bucklin Bishop, who had been in President Roosevelt's close confidence during most of his public career, received a request from the President to write the history of the period which covered his public career.1 As a result, all his personal and official correspondence was turned over exclusively to Mr. Bishop. Roosevelt added to these documents, suggestions, incidents, and anecdotes which make this work of great historical value.

Of primary importance to this paper are the secret letters exchanged between Roosevelt and the French Ambassador, Jusserand, and the German Ambassador, Sternburg, whom he refers to as Speck, and the Kaiser himself. These letters, which were not even published in the Blue Book, show step by step the prominent part played by Roosevelt in arranging the conference, and suggesting compromises between the French and German governments. Mr. Bishop


40
states, "His service as peacemaker in this controversy was equaled only by that which at the same time he was rendering to the world in bringing to an end the war between Russia and Japan."

However, Secretary Root told Mr. Bishop, "I consider it of far greater importance to the world then the Portsmouth settlement."

The source of Bishop's information concerning the Algeciras Conference is in the form of a letter, addressed on April 28, 1906 to Whitelaw Reid, the American Ambassador in London. This letter contains all the confidential correspondence dealing with this matter.

To supplement Mr. Bishop's study of the Moroccan situation, another work, edited by Etling E. Morison, adds further light to this problem. Despite these two excellent works a complete investigation of President Roosevelt's writings is impossible because three important collections are not available, namely, the Leonard Wood, the Henry Cabot Lodge and the George B. Cortelyon Collections. Most of the material available for research work can be found in the Theodore Roosevelt Collection the Library of Congress.

The story all began on March 6, 1905 when Sternberg came to the President with a message from the Kaiser, asking him to join with the Kaiser in telling the Sultan of Morocco:

That he ought to reform his government, and that if he would do so, the

---

2 Ibid., 467.
3 Ibid., 468.
United States and Germany would stand behind him for the open door and would support him in any oppositions he might make to any particular nation (meaning France, of course) which sought to obtain exclusive control of Morocco.5

This message was followed up the next day by another note stating "the Emperor regarded France and Spain as a 'political unity' who wished to divide up Morocco between themselves and debar her markets to the rest of the world."6 The President answered the above note by stating, "I do not see my way clear to interfere in this matter, for I do not think that our interests are sufficiently great."7 He then went on to express his friendliness to Germany and to say that he believed her policy was one for peace.

The first mention of a conference came on April 5, when in a correspondence with the German Ambassador, Sternberg mentioned that England and France were allies; and that Germany would like a conference to settle the fate of Morocco. He went on to say in the words of the Kaiser, "Germany asks for no gains in Morocco; she simply defends her interests and stands for equal rights to all nations there. Besides this she is bound to think of her national dignity."8 Here we have the old unwritten imperialistic rule, "when one Great Power seizes an important colony, its rivals may justly feel aggrieved if they be ignored; they should be consulted in advance, and permitted to seize

5 Ibid., Letter from William II to Roosevelt via Sternberg.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., Letter from Roosevelt to William II via Sternberg.
8 Ibid., 469.
something for themselves by way of compensation."

Another suggestion came from the Kaiser on April 15, when stating that, "he believed the attitude of England would depend upon the attitude of the United States." Therefore, he urged the United States to tell England that we thought there should be a conference. Again on April 25 and May 13 word came from the Kaiser, through Sternberg urging the United States to approach England in the matter of a conference, and insisting that England was the one who was opposing this conference. The Kaiser also mentioned in this memorandum that France had made an offer to come to terms but he expressed his views in these words:

The Emperor states that his policy is absolutely clear and simple. In spite of special advantages offered to him he stands by the treaty rights granted to all. Only if he should discover that he should receive no support from the interested treaty powers in connection with the open door and the conference, he would be forced to think of Germany alone. Only then - and not before - he would have to choose between the possibility of a war with France and the examining of those conditions which France may have to propose, so as to avoid a war.  

Following the Kaiser's letter on May 13, President Roosevelt expressed his view in the following way, "...I very sincerely wish I could get England and Germany into friendly relations."  

On May 29, the Kaiser claimed both England and France had offered

9 Moon, 202.
10 Bishop, 469, Letter from William II to Roosevelt via Sternberg.
11 Ibid., 470.
Germany a sphere of interest in Morocco if she would accept it and let the question remain quiet; but he had refused this offer by saying he was for the maintenance "of the status quo and for the open door and for equal treatment of all nations whose rights were established by treaties."13

Roosevelt's own attitude toward all this trouble was set forth in two letters which he wrote at this time. The first was sent to his acting Secretary of State, William Taft, and contained the following message:

... The Kaiser's pipe-dream this week takes the form of Morocco. Speck (Sternberg) has written me an urgent appeal to sound the British Government and find out whether they intend to back up France in gobbling Morocco. ... I do not feel that as a Government we should interfere in the Morocco matter. We have other fish to fry and we have no real interest in Morocco. I do not care to take sides between France and Germany in the matter.

At the same time if I can find out what Germany wants I shall be glad to oblige her if possible, and I am sincerely anxious to bring about a better state of feeling between England and Germany. ... I do not wish to suggest anything whatever as to England's attitude in Morocco, but if we can find out that attitude with propriety and inform the Kaiser of it, I shall be glad to do so ... but we must not make the English suspicious or make them think we are acting as decoy ducks for Germany ... or, we shall have to drop the business.

In his second letter to Sternberg, he reminded him that "at the present moment I dislike taking a position in any matter unless I fully intend to back it up, and our interests in Morocco are not sufficiently great to make me feel justified in entangling our Government in the matter."15 He

13 Bishop, 471, Letter from William II to Roosevelt via Sternberg.

14 Morison, 1161, Letter from Roosevelt to Taft.

15 Ibid., 1162.
then explained that the other fish we had to fry—China, the Russo-Japanese War, Santo Domingo, Venezuela and Panama were taking up a great deal of his time. Assuring the German Ambassador, however, of the interest of the United States to help avoid war between France and Morocco, he had instructed Taft to find out from Sir Mortimer what the British Government's views were in the matter. He continued, "I do not think I should go any further than this at present."

These two letters had been written by Roosevelt while he was away from Washington on a hunting trip, and when he returned at the end of May, he met with both Jusserand and Sternberg. His reaction to conferences was that a definite threat of war did exist between Germany and France; but he also sensed that both men felt that a compromise should be made. Roosevelt believed completely in the truthfulness of both ambassadors, and took them into his confidence. This was not a mistake on his part, for the events which followed proved that without the entire cooperation of the three, the successful agreement could not have been reached.

In speaking with Sternberg he discovered that the Ambassador did not approve of the action his Government was taking, but had to back up its position through loyalty. The French Ambassador, on the other hand, upheld France's attitude that Germany was asking for too much, but he did say that in order to avoid war, it might be better to yield to Germany, as far as the conference was concerned.

Now the question of dealing with the British was quite different. Roosevelt could not get close to Sir Mortimer, and a conference with him revealed no more than he already knew, that England was bitter toward Germany,
and was anxious to see Germany humiliated by a refusal from France to hold a conference. Roosevelt went on to say:

I did not think this showed much valor on their part, although from their point of view it was sagacious, as of course in such a war, where the British and French fleets would be united, the German fleets could have done absolutely nothing; while on land, where Germany was so powerful, it would be France alone that would stand, and would have to stand, the brunt of the battle. 16

It is little wonder then that Roosevelt decided shortly after this to ignore Germany's appeal for him to approach England on the question of a conference, and to concentrate his attention on negotiating directly with France. Since England had very little to lose and everything to gain by a war between France and Germany, he felt it was useless to attempt further dealings with Sir Mortimer. He added at this time, "I desired to do anything I legitimately could for France; because I like France, and I thought her in this instance to be in the right; but I did not intend to take any position which I would not be willing at all costs to maintain." 17

Roosevelt had these decisions in mind when he received another appeal from the Kaiser on June 11, urging him again to approach England on the question of a conference. His new appeal was based on the facts that Mr. Rouvier, who had replaced Mr. Delcasse, had shown a more friendly attitude to Germany, and had indirectly informed the German Charge d'Affaires in Paris, that England had made a formal offer to France to enter into an

16 Ibid., 475, Letter from Roosevelt to Whitelaw Reid.
17 Ibid.
offensive and defensive alliance with England which would be directed against
Germany. But despite this new threat of war the Kaiser felt that there was
still hope, since, "At present the leading statesmen of France are opposed to
such an alliance, because the majority of the members of the French Government
still hope to come to a satisfactory agreement with Germany." So he
strongly urged Roosevelt to do something immediately, or else France might
take this offer made by England. Attempting to rule out Roosevelt's earlier
argument that the United States did not wish to interfere because of her other
numerous foreign problems, he added,

I feel that if you could give a hint in London and in Paris that you
would consider a conference as the most satisfactory means to bring the
Morocco question to a peaceful solution, you would render the peace of
the world another great service, without encountering any risk.

After this assurance that the United States need not fear any risk
for herself, he again claimed that he had been offered "a sphere of influence"
by the French; but since Germany was pledged by honor to stand by the Sultan,
he could not in conscience accept this offer. In his own words the Kaiser
said, "Here is a curious case:—We may be forced into war not because we have
been grabbing after people's land, but because we refuse to take it." Despite the Kaiser's continual warning that war was inevitable,
Roosevelt did not feel that things were quite that bad; but nevertheless, he
proceeded with his plan to suggest the matter of a conference to the French

18 Ibid., 476, Letter from William II to Roosevelt via Sternberg.
19 Ibid.
instead of the English. This he did in a series of communications with the French Government through Jusserand.

Roosevelt assured the French that he was proposing this conference, because he had a real sentiment for French; and he would no more advise her to do anything humiliating or disgraceful for France, then he would if it were his own country. Furthermore, he warned France not to place too much confidence in the promises made by England, because in case of a war, it would be France not England that would have to stand the danger of invasion by land. Now, if a peaceful agreement was to be reached some arrangement would have to be made to help Germany save its self-respect, because although Germany might be willing to drop the matter of Morocco at this time, she could not do so gracefully, due to all the publicity that had been given to this question in recent months. He then recommended that France submit to the conference, as a means of helping the Kaiser save his face. He further assured the French that if there was a conference of the Great Powers

France would have every reason to believe that the conference would not sanction any unjust attack by Germany upon French interests, and that if all the Powers, or practically all the Powers, in the conference took an attitude favorable to France on such a point it would be well-nigh impossible for Germany to assail her.20

Then he concluded his suggestion with a promise, which no doubt convinced France that her interests in Morocco were not in danger; for Roosevelt said,

I would not accept the invitation of the conference unless France was willing, and that if I went in I would treat both sides with absolute justice, and would, if necessary, take very strong grounds against any attitude of Germany which seemed to me unjust and unfair.

---

20 Ibid., 478.
Following this communication to the French Government, came a reply on June 23 from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which he said that the French Government had agreed to the conference because "his Roosevelt's ideas and advice inspired it." However, he presented these new problems. First, the German Ambassador refused to discuss what matters would be presented at the conference, and claimed that Germany was merely calling for a conference as a question of form and of etiquette in order to test the right of the signatory powers to the Convention of Madrid. He assured the French that he wanted only to insure the open-door policy, and that otherwise France could take up the realization of her program. France believed otherwise, and was anxious to have a definite program mapped out before the conference convened. Secondly, the Kaiser had taken steps to inform the French in Paris that all the forces of Germany were behind the Sultan of Morocco, and, "he uses the most menacing language towards us at Washington, at Rome, and at Madrid."

That the French were taking seriously Roosevelt's promise to "take very strong grounds against any attitude of Germany which seemed to me unjust and unfair," was quite evident in the following message delivered through Jusserand from the French Government.

Tell him that the exceptional authority which attaches to his counsel, not only because of his office, but also because of his character, his sense of right and justice, and his clear perception of what are the highest interests, qualify him in supreme degrees to intervene in favor of the maintenance of peace. The insistence with which the Emperor has appealed to him, has left the way open for the President to take the initiative that we expect from his friendship.

21 Ibid., 480. Letter from French Minister of Foreign Affairs to Roosevelt via Jusserand.
Following this letter Jusserand and Roosevelt held a conference in which they discussed the next move to make toward Germany, since certain disagreements had to be straightened out. Roosevelt informed Jusserand that he would talk with Baron Sternberg immediately. Sternberg brought with him a letter from the Kaiser, stating that he greatly appreciated the change which was noticed in the policy of France since the action taken by Roosevelt as regards the Morocco question. He added, "Your diplomatic activity with regard to France has been the greatest blessing to the peace of the world."22 Roosevelt then wrote three letters to Sternberg which were to be forwarded to the Kaiser, but before doing so he showed them to Jusserand in order not to arouse any suspicion of double dealing on his part.

The letters contained the following statements:

. . . The French Government informs me unofficially through the Ambassador that it has ceased in its opposition to a conference of the powers in Morocco. It seems as a matter of course that a program of the conference would be needed in advance in accordance with the usual custom in such cases. I suggest that be arranged between Germany and France.23

This suggestion, if followed by Germany, would solve the first problem presented by the French, but now came the difficult part of warning Germany not to push the French too far. In his most diplomatic manner, he began by building up the ego of the Kaiser in these words,

Let me congratulate the Emperor most warmly on his diplomatic success in securing the assent of the French Government to the holding of this conference. . . I need not say to you that I consider such peaceful

22 Morison, 1251, Letter from Roosevelt to Sternberg.
23 Bishop, 482, Letter from Roosevelt to Sternberg.
solutions as vitally necessary to the welfare of the world at this time, and in view of its having been secured by the Emperor's success in obtaining this conference, I wish again to express my hearty congratulations. It is a diplomatic triumph of the first magnitude.24

Roosevelt then explained why he had approached France and not England on the question of the conference, stating that England had nothing to lose and would probably profit greatly by the loss of Germany's colonies and fleet. He assured the Kaiser, as he had previously assured the French, that he would advise Germany to do nothing which would humiliate and disgrace her in the eyes of the world. In fact he would not have offered his suggestions to Germany unless Germany had urged him to work for the conference in the first place. But since he had spoken to France and since the conference was agreed upon, he felt it his obligation to make a further statement of his views. With this introductory message of congratulations and explanation of his reasons for stating his opinion at this time, Roosevelt proceeded with the important part of his letter:

... I feel that now, having obtained what he [the Kaiser] asks, it would be most unfortunate even to seem to raise questions about minor details, for if under such circumstances the dreadful calamity of war should happen, I fear that his high and honorable fame might be clouded. He has won a great triumph; he has obtained what his opponents in England and France said he never would obtain, and what I myself did not believe he could obtain. The result is a striking tribute to him personally no less than to his nation, and I earnestly hope that he can see his way clear to accept it as the triumph it is.25

For several days following this message to Germany there was a

24 Ibid., Letter from Roosevelt to William II.
25 Morison, 1257, Letter from Roosevelt to Sternberg.
great deal of bickering between the French and Germans over the progress of the conference, and it looked doubtful whether such a meeting would take place after all. Once again Sternberg and Jusserand came to Roosevelt for a solution, and he advised them both to send the following message to their Governments: "The two Governments consent to go to the conference with no program, and to discuss there all questions in regard to Morocco, save of course where either is in honor bound by a previous agreement with another power."26 He then stated that he did not want any publicity to be given to him for his work on the conference, since he would rather it be thought that France and Germany came to the agreement on their own.

Both governments agreed to this suggestion and Germany added, "that in case during the conference differences of opinion should arise between France and Germany, he [the Kaiser] in every case will be ready to back up the decision which you [Roosevelt] should consider to be the most fair and the most practical."27

This decision was reached on June 28, and as the conference was not to begin until January 6, of course a new problem arose in the meantime. The Kaiser became worried about where the conference would be held, and who the French were sending as a delegate. He wanted the meeting to be at Morocco and he did not want the French to send Revoil as a delegate. The

26 Bishop, 485, Letter from Roosevelt to Sternberg and Jusserand.
27 Ibid., 487, Letter from Sternberg to Roosevelt.
matter was cleared up quickly and then Roosevelt informed Jusserand that since the conference had been arranged to save face for the Kaiser, he would suggest that "the French Government should not let their people boast or be disagreeable and try to humiliate the Kaiser in connection with the conference, because the important point was for them to get the kernel of the nut, and they did not have to consider the shell." 28

Although Roosevelt's trust in Germany concerning the conference was shaky, he put complete confidence in Sternberg, whom he strongly suspected was not himself in favor of Germany's policy; but at this time he also became unsure of France, and it was only his faith in Jusserand that enabled him to negotiate with confidence. Germany seemed most anxious at this time to assure the United States that all the Powers except England were backing her at the conference, although both Russia and Italy pleaded with us to do something to keep Germany from gaining a sphere of influence in Morocco. Of course we knew Austria was in favor of Germany, but Roosevelt knew that Austria was a mere cat's-paw for Germany.

It soon became clear that Germany was departing from her original plea for the open-door policy in Morocco, since she began demanding a port for herself, and then a seaport for Holland or Switzerland, adjacent to her own, which would in the eyes of the other diplomats, eventually become Germany's. The French refused to give in on these points and the United States' view was announced as "The interests of France and Spain in Morocco

28 Ibid., Ch. XXXVII. 488, Letter from Roosevelt to Jusserand.
are far greater than those of other powers."

On January 29 Germany suggested and asked the United States to propose "to entrust the Sultan of Morocco with the organization of the police forces within his domains and to allow him certain funds, and to establish an international control with regard to the management of these funds, and the carrying out of the whole plan." The United States of course did not favor such a plan because French interests were far more important in this region and if the Sultan were given such powers, it was quite likely that he would favor the Germans, whose interests were not so long standing nor as predominate as those of the French.

Therefore on February 19, Roosevelt instructed Elihu Root to send the following plan to the Kaiser, which he called a modification of Germany's suggestion:

1. That the organization and maintenance of police forces in all the ports be entrusted to the Sultan, the men and officers to be Moors.

2. That the money to maintain the forces be furnished by the proposed international bank, the stock of which shall be allotted to all the powers in equal shares (except for some small preferences claimed by France, which he considers immaterial).

3. That duties of instruction, discipline, pay and assisting in management and control be entrusted to French and Spanish officers and non-commissioned officers, to be appointed by the Sultan on presentation of names by their Legations.

That the Senior French and Spanish instructing officers report annually to the government of Morocco, and to the government of Italy, the Mediterranean Power, which shall have the right of inspection and

29 Ibid., 489.
30 Ibid., 490.
verification, and to demand further reports in behalf of and for the
information of the Powers. The expense of such inspection, etc., to be
deemed a part of the cost of the police maintenance.

4. That full assurance be given by France and Spain, and made obligatory
upon all their officers who shall be appointed by the Sultan, for the
open door, both as to trade, equal treatment and opportunity in
competition for public works and concessions.

Roosevelt then concluded by saying that in such an agreement
Germany would be conserving her principle of the open door, and France would
be making concessions which it would be entirely possible for her to make.
Therefore, "I think it is fair, and earnestly hope that it may receive the
Emperor's approval."

Germany's reply to the foregoing program was not, however, satisfac-
tory. As to points 1, 2 and 4 they were given approval with the condition
that the second point, the question of granting France a slight preference,
be discussed. But in regard to the third point Germany was strongly opposed.
They stated that this was in fact the main gist of the latest French proposal,
and that Germany was objecting to it on the grounds that such a set-up would
place the police forces entirely in the hands of France and Spain. To remedy
this situation the Emperor suggested,

... that the Sultan should have a free choice among the other nations
... and in case France should fear that under the present conditions
the Sultan might favor German officers, that at least four different
nationalities should be taken into consideration in an equal manner.
Ultimately, so as to acknowledge the special rights of France in
Morocco, the Sultan might place the police control in Tangiers, and
perhaps in some other port, entirely in the hands of French officers.

31 Ibid., 490-1.
In all the other ports officers of various nations would cooperate. 32 The Kaiser then added that he hoped the President would broaden his proposal for mediation according to the above plan.

It is quite clear from Roosevelt's reply that he was no longer going to treat Germany in a gentle manner. He stated that he did not feel that he could ask France to make any further concessions, and that he would like to drop the entire matter, but felt that since he had suggested the conference he would like to do all he could to avoid a war. Reminding the Kaiser again that he had suggested the conference only because of Germany's urgings, he emphasized the Kaiser's willingness to cooperate by quoting the following passage from a letter of June 28, 1905:

The Emperor has requested me Sternberg to tell you that in case, during the coming conference, differences of opinion should arise between France and Germany, he, in every case, will be ready to back up the decision which you should consider to be the most fair and the most practical. 33

He continued,

Under the circumstances, I feel bound to state to Your Majesty that I think the arrangement indicated in my letter of February 19th is a reasonable one, and most earnestly urge Your Majesty to accept it. I do not know whether France would accept it or not. I think she ought to do so. I do not think that she ought to be expected to go further. 34

He pointed out that if France agreed to such an arrangement, she

32 Ibid., 492, Letter from William II to Roosevelt via Sternberg.
33 Ibid., 493.
34 Ibid., 493-4, Letter from Roosevelt to William II.
would be giving in to the extent that she would have joint responsibility with Spain, and would be answerable to all the other Powers for the maintenance of these rights. In addition Germany would have fulfilled her purpose in calling the conference, namely, the principle of open-door. As an additional warning, Roosevelt said,

... I see grave reasons to apprehend that if the conference should fail because of Germany's insisting upon pressing France beyond the measure of concession described in this proposed arrangement, the general opinion of Europe and America would be unfavorable, and Germany would lose that increase of credit and moral power that the making of this arrangement would secure to her, and might be held responsible probably far beyond the limits of reason, for all the evils that may come in the train of a disturbed condition of affairs in Europe... throw upon France the responsibility for rejecting, if it is to be rejected, the suggested arrangement.35

The Kaiser replied by again thanking Roosevelt for his hard work in trying to solve the problem, but added that after giving considerable thought to the matter, he still felt that some alteration should be made to meet the international side of the question, since France would be obtaining a certain monopoly in Morocco which would not result in economic equality for the other nations. He then said that Austria-Hungary had submitted a plan which he felt would be agreeable to Roosevelt and the other Powers. This plan contained the suggestions that instead of entrusting the Moroccan ports to control by the Spanish and French jointly, all eight ports should be distributed. Accordingly, the plan of distribution should work as follows: the police in four ports should be organized by the French, in three the police should be

35 Ibid., 494-5.
organized by the Spanish, and the last either the Swiss or the Dutch should organize the police.

The United States objected seriously to this suggestion because they felt it was contrary to the very principle for which the conference was held, namely, providing for the open door. It would make little difference according to the original principle whether France were given control of all the ports or whether they were distributed according to the Austrian plan.

Germany then assured the United States that they were sorry that their attitude had resulted in certain misunderstandings, but that they were certain these misunderstandings would be removed easily.

By this time President Roosevelt was becoming weary of the bickering employed by Germany over the control of the police in the ports and he sent the following message to the Kaiser, which he had formerly given verbally to Sternberg.

... if the Emperor persevered in rejecting our proposals and a break-up ensued, I should feel obliged to publish the entire correspondence, and that I believed that our people would feel a grave suspicion of Germany's justice and good faith, but if the Emperor would yield to what seemed to me our very fair proposals, I should not publish any of the correspondence, and would endeavor in every way to give Germany full credit for what was done. 37

This evidently was exactly what the Kaiser did not want the world to know, for the publication of these documents would throw a very unfavorable light, upon Germany's action. They had demanded a conference with the

36 Ibid., 498.
37 Ibid., 600, Letter from Roosevelt to William II.
declaration that their sole intent was to uphold the principle of the open door in Morocco. The correspondence of this period revealed, however, that Germany was actually seeking something for herself. In addition to hoping to acquire some territory, Germany also wished to make the other European countries realize that Germany was now one of the Great Powers, and must, therefore, be consulted in matters of international importance. By agreeing to the plan of President Roosevelt they would be given credit for the success of the conference, and thereby, receive the public acclaim for which they sought.

A few days after receiving the President's proposal, Germany yielded to his plan. True to his word, President Roosevelt gave Germany the credit he had promised them. On April 12, 1906 while addressing a group of German veterans he stated,

... It is not out of place in closing for me to say a word of congratulations both to the German people and the German Emperor, upon the work that has been accomplished in the Algeciras Conference which has just closed, a Conference held chiefly because of the initiative of Germany.\textsuperscript{38}

Later, when speaking of this incident President Roosevelt said, "In this Algeciras matter, you will notice that while I was suave and pleasant with the Emperor, yet when it became necessary at the end I stood him on his head with great decision."\textsuperscript{39}

These letters which were addressed to Whitelaw Reed, and copies of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 501-2.
  \item \textsuperscript{39} Moon, 205.
\end{itemize}
which were to be sent to Meyer and White, were requested by the President, "to be considered as of the most strictly confidential character." Fortunately for us these letters did become public and shed an entirely different light on the situation. Without them it would have been difficult to realize Germany's true purpose in demanding the Conference, and would have left the official American attitude toward the trouble in Morocco uncertain in the eyes of the world.

40 Bishop, 503.
CHAPTER V

AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE RESULTS
OF THE CONFERENCE

Before investigating the American attitude toward the results of
the Algeciras Conference, the following were the provisions of the General
Act:

1. The independence of Morocco was recognized in the preamble.
2. Government finances were to be entrusted to a State Bank at Tangier,
   managed by four censors appointed, respectively, by the Deutsche Bank,
   The capital was to be subscribed in equal parts by the signatory
   powers, excepting that France should have the larger share.
3. Customs duties were placed under international supervision.
4. Concessions or contracts for public works were to be granted upon
   impartial adjudication, which would accept the most favorable bids
   regardless of the nationality of the bidder.
5. A force of 2,000 to 25,000 armed Moroccan police was to be organized,
   under 16 to 20 French and Spanish officers, and 30 to 40 French and
   Spanish subalterns.

   The officers would be Spanish at certain ports, French at others,
   and mixed at the rest.

   However, the whole police administration was to be supervised by a
   Swiss officer, as Inspector General.¹

   It would appear, on the surface, that Germany was victorious in

¹ American Journal of International Law (Supplement), New York,
Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1907, 1, 47-55.
obtaining their demands, since international control of Morocco was substituted for Delcasse's plan of establishing a French protectorate over Morocco. However, France had succeeded in assuring herself of the support of England, the neutrality of Italy and the friendliness of the United States. So, while France was unable to achieve her immediate object, she no doubt felt stronger, now that she could number so many great powers among her friends. That President Roosevelt sided with the French is quite evident after viewing the secret letters of this period; and that most of the American public agreed with the outcome of the conference can be seen from the observations made by the press, although they were not exclusively pro-French.

Some of the less observing comments concerning the results of the conference, summarized the outcome as a gain for both Germany and France, and also a loss for both countries. These conclusions were based on the facts that France gained an international acknowledgment of her claims to special rights in territorial, administrative, and financial interests; that she gained control of the police in four important ports and control with Spain of two others; and that the French claim to a greater share in the Moroccan State Bank than the other powers was agreed to by the conference. On the other hand, France was not allowed to establish a French protectorate of Morocco. Germany at the same time gained by forcing France to place the entire police of Morocco under an inspector; and to compel the French to

2 "Decisive Action," Outlook, LXXXII, April 7, 1906, 782.
admit Spain as a dual control of the Moroccan police. As to what was lost
by Germany, it was claimed by the German Colonial Society and the Pan-Germanic
League, although not officially approved by the Kaiser, that the chief hope
of Germany was to get control of one of the Moroccan ports and also of
important commercial concessions. In this, of course, they failed. 3

Reading between the lines, another study pointed out that "both the
ideas of Germany and the policy of France have been preserved by the
decision." 4 The author went on to explain that the French policy of penetra-
tion into Morocco was still possible, through their almost unquestioned control
of the police and bank; but that the French had modified Delcasse's plans.
Germany's ideas were preserved in that she must be consulted in Mediterranean
matters. However, it is doubtful whether this really was a gain for Germany,
since the virtual isolation of Germany was apparent at the time of the
conference. As was stated previously France was assured of England's support,
the neutrality of Italy and the friendliness of America. Add to this the
probable support of Russia, once they recovered from their war with Japan, and
it leaves only Austria-Hungary as an ally for Germany.

In discussing the combined Spanish and French control of the police
in Morocco, still another conclusion seems logical. France actually did not
lose anything in agreeing to this joint control because in an earlier
agreement made with Spain, before attempting to push into Morocco, France had

3 Ibid., 783.
4 "Outcome," Nation, LXXXII, April 5, 1906, 276.
recognized certain rights of Spain to this territory and thus, had hinted at allowing Spain to help them in policing the territory, should they succeed in annexing it. 5 So when France agreed to this demand of the delegate at the conference, they were probably putting into operation the very plan they, themselves had entertained for many years.

While France, then could view with pride the concrete gains they had made as a result of the conference, Germany felt that they had saved face in the eyes of the world. It was this argument that President Roosevelt had used to convince the Kaiser to come to terms at the assembly, when war threatened. It may have been an empty honor that Germany had maintained, in their right to be consulted in Mediterranean affairs, but in the diplomatic relations of the European countries, it was an all important honor, especially to Germany, who was without strong allies.

If the statement made by the Pan-Germanic League and the German Colonial Society had not been made known to the rest of the world, concerning the German plan to gain control of a Moroccan port and important commercial concessions, the German position at the conference may have been received in a very favorable light. Evidence of this can be seen from a popular American attitude expressed just a few days prior to the release of the statement made by the above societies. This particular article was quoted by an American periodical, after it had first appeared in England, and it backed Germany in its demand for a conference by admitting that, "Germany was

morally and legally justified in declining to accept the Anglo-French agreement in respect to Morocco, because it, too, was a signatory of the Madrid Conference in 1880. Thus, if Germany were merely upholding this international principle of the open door in Morocco, many Americans would no doubt have sided with Germany against France, but once their own selfish interests became evident, their supporters became fewer.

Certainly the official results of the conference agreement did not tell the entire story of the gains and losses of the two most interested powers. One author went so far as to claim that the official results mattered to no one, and that the main question was, "Is Kaiser Wilhelm to be treated as the Overlord of Europe, without whose authorization no treaties or conventions are binding." He continued by interpreting the decision with these words, "No... he is not yet the King of Kings and Lord of Lords." It was with great pleasure that this author saw Germany's plans of gaining ground in Morocco halted, for he added, "Prince Bulow without any repentance admitted after the conference, that Germany's alleged commercial interest was just a scheme."

A more pessimistic reflection on the resulting control of Morocco by Europeans, written shortly after the conference convened, expressed the


8 Ibid., 754.
belief that the Sultan would merely continue to play one foreign country against another, as he had done in the past. Even should one nation be awarded the right to intervene, great obstacles would make this difficult to carry out. Foremost among these difficulties would be that of religion, since the Sultan is not only the temporal head of the country, but also the religious head. Any interference by France or any other country with their religious leader might result in serious riots on the part of the natives. Geographic conditions were also considered unfavorable, due to the lack of railroads, good roads, telegraph lines, and bridges. Furthermore, in visualizing France at the head of the administrative department in Morocco, another problem arises, namely that of enforcing the laws which they make. Should France gain control of the customs houses, she would still find it necessary to seek additional taxes, elsewhere. Here, the trouble would certainly begin, since the Sultan had always been forced to ask for much more than he needed in order to assure himself of getting the necessary money, and then he often got it only after sending his forces out to collect it. With these in mind it is little wonder why any European country would want to control Morocco.

The American representative, Henry White, expressed his opinion of the French and German delegates to the conference by saying:

Neither France nor Germany sent men of first rate ability. M. Paul


10 Ibid., 257.
Revoll, the Frenchman was ingenious, subtle and wordy in his arguments, but since his government had little confidence in him, he was constantly acting under direct orders from Paris. The Germans sent Herr von Radowits and an assistant Count Tattenbach. Tattenbach soon took charge and was downright, ill-tempered and unable to see any point of view but his own. 11

To add to the trying conditions of the conference, Henry White related that the newspaper men were very annoying to the delegates, "especially the French, who were constantly pouncing on them with questions." 12 This was contradictory to another observation made here in America which lauded the French for "attempting to avoid war talk against Germany during the conference, thereby making Germany and not France look like the aggressor." 13

When the final decision was reached by the representatives of the Great Powers, the treaty was presented to the United States' Senate for ratification. This treaty was ratified and to it was added an explanation that the participation of the United States in the conference was due to the fact that she had signed the treaty of Madrid in 1880. 14 America was still claiming, then, that they were impartial and uninterested in who won favor in Morocco, but was only interested in upholding the international principles of the Madrid Treaty. However, the author is somewhat skeptical, believing we had a definite intention of helping France. In summarizing President

11 Allan Nevins, 264.
12 Ibid., 273.
13 "Outcome," Nation, LXXXII, April 5, 1906, 277.
14 Alfred L. P. Dennis, 510.
Roosevelt's policy, he states, "Most people thought that Roosevelt was hand in glove with the Kaiser, yet his final stand was unquestionably in support of France."

It is interesting to note at this time, that France who hesitated in agreeing to the conference, fared much better than Germany, who had urged President Roosevelt to obtain the consent of France to the conference. Not only did France gain actual privileges, but also the support of many friends, among these the Americans. One author attributed this success to "the moderation and justice of the French contention at the Algeciras Conference, which have been gradually but surely appealing to the good sense of the rest of the world, and it may be said that the French case is considerably bettered since the conference opened."15

The *New York Times* in summarizing the opinion of our delegate, Henry White, stated:

Mr. White, the American delegate, is of the opinion that the result of the conference is a satisfactory one, not only because the immediate future of Morocco is secured, but because the manner of the settlement is satisfactory both to France and Germany, removes the causes for friction, and restores international relations to a normal condition. The principles for which Germany insisted, the integrity of Morocco and equal commercial and economic rights there, were recognized, while the special position, claimed by France, also was recognized.16

Little realizing that the trouble was not over in Morocco between


the French and Germans, but was to continue on until 1911, many optimistically observed at the close of the conference that the peace of Europe had been preserved.
CHAPTER VI

THE AFTERMATH OF THE CONFERENCE

Since the Algeciras Conference did not permanently settle the trouble in Morocco, this study would not be complete without a brief summary of how France was able to successfully carry out her plan of making a protectorate of Morocco.

Shortly after the conclusion of the conference, disorders broke out in Morocco which France felt called for intervention. The first of these outbreaks occurred when Sir Henry MacLean, a British subject, was captured by Raisuli, the bandit, and held for a ransom of £20,000.1 This, of course, brought international attention again to the Moroccan situation. The second disturbance came about because the Sultan had been conferring with the Europeans in order to concede certain privileges and rights to them. Mulay Hafid, a brother of the Sultan, organized several warlike tribes to rebel against the Sultan.2 Still another cause for intervention resulted when at Casablanca, the Shawiya tribesmen heard that the French and Spanish were planning to build a railroad through a Moslem cemetery. They immediately invaded the town and killed several Europeans, among whom were some Frenchmen.3

---

1 Moon, 207.
3 Cooke and Stickney, 172.
The French retaliated by sending an army of three thousand men to occupy Casablanca and the surrounding territory. Strangely enough, the German did not raise a serious objection to the occupation of Casablanca by the French; but serious dissatisfaction was shown by the natives, who again joined with Mulay Hafid to overthrow the Sultan in 1908. It was little time, however, before the new Sultan also turned to the Europeans with terms of concessions, and again the natives rebelled. When he tried to raise more money by taxing the natives to pay an indemnity to France for the trouble at Casablanca, the capitol was attacked and the Sultan asked the French for military help. The French responded by dispatching ten thousand men to occupy the capitol city of Fez. In explaining their latest action, the French declared that such action was necessary to safeguard the lives of Europeans in Fez against attacks by the natives.

In the meanwhile, the passive attitude exhibited by the Germans took on a different character. Deserters from the French foreign legion were being encouraged and helped out of Casablanca by a German organization with the knowledge of the German consul. The plan was not successful, though, and the deserters, along with some of the Germans, were arrested. For a while it looked as if war might develop from this incident, because the Germans demanded an apology, the release of the deserters and compensation for the rough

5 Cooke and Stickney, 174.
6 *New York Times*, September 27, 1908.
treatment given to their captured countrymen. In their words, it was "an insult to the German flag." The French, supported by England and Russia, refused to meet those demands. The whole problem was solved by presenting it to the Hague Tribunal, which found the Germans guilty of aiding deserters and the French guilty in not respecting the de facto protection exercised by the German consulate.  

This latter crisis occurred in 1909 and no further trouble developed until the French occupied the city of Fes in 1911. Again the Germans protested, stating, "... should France overstep the limits of the specified programme... we should again claim our full freedom of action."  

Three months later the French and Spanish occupied the city and the Germans announced that France had acted against the Act of Algeciras. Since no recognition was given to this declaration, Germany began to formulate a new plan, which she presented through the German foreign minister, Kiderlen-Waechter. The plan consisted of three steps. The first was to ask the French how long they intended to stay in Fes. The second was to demand compensation for Germany, if they were going to stay, because this was a violation of the Algeciras Act. Lastly, Germany would send a warship to Agadir until the compensation was forthcoming.  

7 Chicago Tribune, May 23, 1909.  
8 Cooke and Stickney, 174.  
On July 1, 1911 the German gunboat, Panther, stationed itself at Agadir and suggested that the French Congo, from the Sanya River to the seacoast, be given to Germany. France refused the plan, adding that they would not consider the proposal even if Germany threw in her colony of Togoland and part of the Cameroons. 10

Germany had not reckoned with the possible action of England, which came almost immediately. England feared that their naval plans would be hindered by the presence of German boats in these waters; so they warned Germany that such methods would be embarrassing to her, if they continued, and that such embarrassment would not be tolerated. 11

Kiderlen-Waechter finally withdrew his original plan in October, and on November 4th, 1911 the following agreement was reached. France was to be allowed to intervene in Morocco, on condition that all nations should enjoy equality as regards customs, tariffs, transportation charges and mining. The iron resources of Morocco were to be settled by stating that no tax would be laid on the export of iron ore. Germany was to receive 100,000 square miles of French Congo. 12

Germany was not at all satisfied, but as the Kaiser had said earlier in secret documents,

The wretched Morocco affair must be brought to a close, quickly and

---

10 Gooch, 479.

11 Cooke and Stickney, 186.

finally, nothing can be done, Morocco will become French. So get out of the affair gracefully, in order that we may at last end the friction with France, now, when great questions are at stake. 13

Having removed the German opposition at last, France next considered the Franco-Spanish Treaty on November 27, 1912. This treaty included the following provisions:

1. The northern coast, about 200 miles long and 60 miles deep, was set apart as a "Spanish zone," by a lieutenant of the Sultan, under the supervision of a Spanish High Commissioner.
2. Spain was to receive two pieces of territory in the South, making a total of about 16,000 square miles or about one-twelfth of the Moroccan area, and one-tenth of the Moroccan population.
3. Tangier and 140 square miles of surrounding territory was to be internationalised.
4. The rest of the territory was to be the French zone. 14

One final step remained in the French plan for Morocco, and that consisted of making a treaty with the Sultan. This was successfully accomplished on March 30, 1912 when the Sultan agreed to a French protectorate on the condition that he be retained as the nominal ruler. 15 Another rebellion followed when the Moroccan police mutinied and killed eighty Frenchmen in Fez. This was put down after some trouble and the French offered the Sultan a pension to resign, which he accepted, and his brother Mulay Yusef succeeded to the Throne. 16 The French from previous experience thought it best to keep a native ruler at the head of the government in hopes of pacifying the natives in that way.

13 Moon, 210.
15 American Journal of International Law, VI, 207.
16 New York Times, August 12, 1912.
The final renouncement of any German claims to Morocco came in the Versailles Treaty, when the German colonies were taken away from her.

Thus is concluded a story of rival imperialism, which is credited by many historians as a cause for the Great War, which involved most of the European countries in struggle for world domination in the early twentieth century. It was not just a conflict between France and Germany for control of a north African country, but an international crisis, resulting from several earlier alliances and secret promises of compensations to those who were not directly involved.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. PRIMARY SOURCES

A. BOOKS

American Journal of International Law, I, VI and VII, New York, 1907-1913.

Cooke, William Henry, and Edith P. Stockney, Readings in European International Relations Since 1879, New York, 1931.


B. NEWSPAPERS


II. SECONDARY SOURCES

A. BOOKS


Schieber, Clara E., *Transformation of American Sentiment Toward Germany*, reprint from the *Journal of International Relations*, XII, 1921.


B. ARTICLES


"Decisive Action," Outlook, LXXXII, April 7, 1906, 782-783.


"Light that Europe Saw at Algeciras," Review of Reviews, XXXIII, May, 1906, 609-610.


Low, A. M., "Will France Claim Morocco?" Forum, XXXIX, October, 1907, 170-173.

Maxey, E., "Morocco Moriturus," Forum, XXXIX, April, 1908, 568-574.


"Morocco Affair," Nation, LXX, June 29, 1905, 517-518.

"Morocco Affair," Outlook, LXXXV, January 5, 1907, 6-7.


"Morocco and the Powers," Outlook, XC, September 12, 1908, 59-60.


"Morocco Conference at Algeciras," Outlook, LXXXII, January 20, 1906, 103-104.


"Outcome," Living Age, CCXLIX, April 28, 1906, 242-244.

"Outcome," Nation, LXXXII, April 5, 1906, 278-277.

"People of Morocco Against All Europe," Current Literature, XLIII, September, 1907, 257-262.


"Success of Moroccan Conference," Independent, LX, April 5, 1906, 815-816.


"U.S. and the Moroccan Conference," Outlook, LXXXII, February 3, 1906, 244-245.


APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Betty Mullen has been read and approved by three members of the Department of Psychology.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

Date: July 1952

Signature of Adviser: [Signature]