1954

The Austro-Slovenian Frontier Question at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919

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THE AUSTRO-SLOVENIAN FRONTIER QUESTION

AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE,

1919

by

Bogdan Cyril Novak

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

June

1954
PREFACE

The purpose of this thesis is to indicate the difficulty involved in drawing a frontier between German Austria and Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. This difficulty derives mainly from the fact that the Slovenian nation, the most northerly of the Yugoslav nations, was never united under the Austrian Monarchy, but rather was divided into historical Crownlands of the Empire.

The author of this thesis uses the term "Austro-Slovenian" rather than "Austro-Yugoslav" with reference to the frontier question, since it was in reality an Austro-Slovenian problem, having its roots deep in the past. The problem had existed long before the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918, and would inevitably have been raised even without regard to the formation of the new state, involving as it did two neighboring nations, rather than two separate states.

This thesis is divided into four main parts. The first part presents a short history of Slovenia, showing the difficult struggle of the small nation for survival and for territorial unification. Here also the problem of "Germanisation" is explained by way of demonstrating the difficulty involved in drawing the Austro-Slovenian frontier. Secondly, the structure of the Peace Conference is considered, along with the work of the various committees.
appointed to deal with the problem. Thirdly, the frontier question as presented to the Peace Conference is discussed with reference to the various stages in the drafting of the Treaty. Here are included the Slovenian claims, the Austrian counter-proposals, and the decisions of the Conference, along with concomitant problems. Finally, the plebiscite in Carinthia is considered in the light of the reasons why the Slovenian representatives, who based their arguments for the liberation of Slovenia from the Austrian Monarchy on the right of self-determination, were also strongly opposed to a plebiscite in Carinthia and Styria.

Because Slovenia was at this time under German rule, all geographical locations mentioned in the text have both German and Slovenian names. Appendix I provides a complete listing of all place names used in this thesis along with corresponding names in other languages. Several maps have also been included by way of clarifying the frontier question at various stages of its development. These maps, eight in number, are interpolated into the text of the thesis at the stage to which they most nearly refer.

The author of this thesis wishes to express his deep-felt gratitude to the Slovenian Franciscan Fathers of St. Mary's Seminary at Lemont, Illinois, for the use of their excellent library in which much important source material for this thesis was found. Special thanks are hereby extended to Father Kazimir Zakrjasek, O. F. M., retired founder of St. Mary's Seminary, for his encouragement, and to Father Kalist Langerholc, O. F. M., for his kind assistance in the preparation of this thesis.
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CHAPTER I

A SHORT HISTORY OF SLOVENIA

In this chapter, a short outline of Slovenian history is presented, with special regard to the problem of "Germanisation." This is necessary to a better understanding of the Austro-Slovenian frontier question.

The Slovenians were the only Slavic people who settled in the eastern Alps. After the migration of nations, the ancestors of the Slovenians settled down in a territory which was about two-thirds larger than the territory presently occupied by them. On the north they reached the Danube from the River Traun to Wienerwald. Their neighbors to the north were the Czechs and Moravians, to the northwest the Bavarians, to the southwest the Langobards, to the south the Croatians, and to the east the Avars. They occupied about 60,000 square km., whereas present-day Slovenian territory measures only about 24,000 square km.

In the first half of the seventh century, sources state that the Slovenians had their own state, with a duke at its head. The duke was elected

1 See Map 1, p. 2.

MAP 1

ALPINE SLAVS AFTER THE MIGRATIONS

*Source: Grafenauer et al., Zgodovina, Appendix: Maps.

Legend:

1 Slovenian territory in the ninth century.

2 Present-day Slovenian ethnic territory.
by the people. For about one hundred years, the dukes of Carinthia were independent—that is, from the time of Valuk, about 630, to the time of Borut in 745. The capital was Karnburg on Zollfeld, north of Klagenfurt. After the name of its capital the whole nation was called Carantani. The whole structure of the state was based on tribal organization, and it is in this sense of a tribal organization that the term "state" should be understood. The oldest man of every tribe was at the same time the representative of the tribe as a princeps. At the head of this organization was the duke, elected by all the freemen. Later the office of duke became hereditary in a family, but he was still formally elected by the princeps of the tribes. The whole ceremony of his election and confirmation was distinctive and has no comparison in history.3

In 745 the Duke Borut asked the Bavarians for help against an invasion of the Avars. The Bavarians helped in the fight against the Avars and Borut in consequence had to acknowledge Bavarian supremacy.4 The Carinthians retained their Slovenian dukes, who were still elected by the princeps; but before the installation they had to be confirmed by the Bavarian duke, and later by the king of the Franks. During this period the Slovenians were slowly developing from a tribal organization into a feudal state organization.5

With the recognition of Bavarian supremacy, the Slovenians also came into contact with Christianity. During the time of Duke Gorazd (749-751) and


4 Matko Potočnik, Vojvodina Koroska, Ljubljana, 1910, II, 19; Gruden, Zgodovina, 65; Grafenauer et al., Zgodovina, 143.

5 Moravski, Slovenski Korotan, Celovec, 1919, 17.
his successor Notimir (751-769), the first Slovenians accepted the Christian religion. At the same time the first missionary bishop was sent into Carinthia, and with him came many Irish missionaries. After the death of Notimir a pagan rebellion broke out and Duke Valtunk found it necessary to again call upon the Bavarians for help. After the rebellion the Slovenians of central Carinthia for the most part accepted the new religion.

The "Germanization" of the Slovenians started with this acceptance of the Christian religion. The missionaries came usually from Salzburg, and with them came German influence. The Archbishopric of Salzburg acquired new lands in the valley of the Danube, where the first German settlements were founded. In 811, the River Drava was established as a line of division between the Archbishopric of Salzburg and the Patriarchy of Aquilea. Thus, both seats of the church organization were situated outside Slovenian territory.

In 820 Carinthia lost its Slovenian dukes. In that year the Slovenians came to the aid of the Croatians, who were engaged in a war against the Franks. The Slavs lost the war, and most of the Slovenian nobility was killed in battle. All the lands of the nobility were confiscated, and fell to the Emperor, Louis the Pious. Louis distributed these lands among his Bavarian and Frankish vallals; at the same time he appointed a German duke for the whole of Carinthia, who held office for life. With the loss of their nobility, the

6 Gruden, Zgodovina, 63-65; Grafenauer et al., Zgodovina, 113-114.
7 Gruden, Zgodovina, 70; Grafenauer et al., Zgodovina, 116; Potočnik, Vojvodina Koroska, II, 23.
8 Gruden, Zgodovina, 74-76; Grafenauer et al., Zgodovina, 117-118; Potočnik, Vojvodina Koroska, II, 25.
the Slovenians lost the leading element of their medieval society. The German nobility now decided the future destiny of Slovenian lands. With the new nobility came new families, knights, and servants, who changed the whole national structure of Slovenia. The greater part of the Slovenian inhabitants came under the feudal rule of these new lords, as their bondmen. Only a few freemen escaped serfdom.

Since the Capitularia of Charlemagne had stipulated that everyone should be judged according to his "lex originis", the Slovenians were allowed their own courts, which were conducted in the Slovenian language until the middle of the thirteenth century. There are many indications that the installation of a new duke still took place in the Slovenian language until the beginning of the fifteenth century. The rite of installation is described in an insert in the Schwabenspiegel; it is also mentioned by many chroniclers. Otokar out der Geul, writing at the beginning of the fourteenth century, describes the rite of installation in a chronicle some hundred thousand verses in length, and known today as Österreichische Heimchronik:

Die herren sullen füeren in
für den gebüren hin,
der da sitzet üf dem stein
derselbe sol ein bein

9 Gruden, Zgodovina, 77-80; Grafenauer, et al., Zgodovina, 118-150.

10 Moravski, Slovenski Korotan, 17-18; Grafenauer et al., Zgodovina, 158-159.

11 "A. B.", Ustoličenje koroških vojvod, Ljubljana, 1908, 16, 20-22, 24, 26; Potočnik, Vojvodina Koroška, 45; Moravski, Slovenski Korotan, 18-19; Grafenauer et al., Zgodovina, 141; Mirko Rupel ed., Valvasorjevo berilo, Ljubljana, 1951, 162-163.
\[\text{6}\]

"If duz ander legen windisicher rede sol er phlegen." 12

In the second half of the fourteenth century the chronicler Johannes von ViciRING in his \textit{Liber certarum historiarum} wrote as follows: "Rusticus autem super lapidem sedens \textit{Sclavice} proclamabit: Quis est iste, qui progreditur sic incendens?" 13 In the latter part of the fifteenth century the chronicler Jakob Unrest wrote in his \textit{Chronicon Carinthiacum}:

From olden times the dukes of Carinthia had the right, when they were accused before the Roman Emperor or King, or when they were addressed by him, to defend themselves in the \textit{Windish} language; therefore Carinthia is indeed a \textit{Windish land}. 14

In 1227, the German poet-knight Ulrich von Lichtenstein arrived in Carinthia attired in the costume of a Venus, and wrote that the duke of Carinthia, Bernard Sponcheim, greeted him in \textit{Slovenian}: "buge was prini gralva Venus." 15 This would indicate that until the fifteenth century the Slovenian language was regarded as the language of the land, being spoken not only by the peasants, but

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12 Moravski, \textit{Slovenski Korotan}, 16. The English translation would read: "The nobles should lead him [the duke] before a freeman, who, sitting on the stone [the duke's stone], should cross his legs and should speak in the \textit{Windish tongue}." The italics in foreign quotations throughout are inserted by the author of this thesis, unless otherwise indicated.


14 Ibid: "Von alIter haben all hertzogn von Kerndten die Freiheit gehabt, wann sy vor einen römischen khayser oder kunig verklagt sind wordn, oder angesprochen, so haben sy sich in windischer sprach verantwurt; darumb das Kerndtn ein rechts windisch land ist."

by the German nobility as well. Secondly, it would indicate that the word Hindish is equivalent in meaning to Slovenian—a fact that was later denied by Austrian politicians at the Peace Conference in 1919 for political reasons.

In the middle of the ninth century the Slovenians on the east side of the River Mura enjoyed independence for a short while under the rule of Duke Pribina (840-861), and his son Kocelj (861-874). During the reign of Kocelj, the Slavic apostles Cyril and Methodius visited the land. They translated the Missal into Slovenian, and obtained permission from the Pope to say Mass in the Slovenian language. The Archbishops of Salzburg, however, feared the loss of their influence over this land, and imprisoned Bishop Methodius. Only after decisive intervention by the Holy See was he released. After the death of Methodius his disciples had to leave the country by order of the Archbishop of Salzburg. They journeyed into Dalmatia, and also into Serbia and Bulgaria.

Toward the middle of the tenth century the Hungarians occupied the vast Danube valley. At that time the Roman Emperor established Great Carinthia as a border province against invasion by the Hungarians. Great Carinthia combined all the territories once occupied by the Slovenians and the Furlania. The duke of Great Carinthia was appointed for life by the Emperor. Each of his successors belonged to a different noble family; in this way the Emperor tried


17 Dragotin Lončar, The Slovenes: A Social History, Anthony J. Klančar, trans., Cleveland, Ohio, 1939, 6-7; Gruden, Zgodovina, 81-88; Grafenauer et al., Zgodovina, 150-153.

18 Gruden, Zgodovina, 89-94; Grafenauer et al., Zgodovina, 153-154.
to prevent the title from becoming hereditary. At the same time, however, large parts of Great Carinthia were hereditary possessions of the feudal nobility. These great fiefs were held directly under the Emperor; hence the authority of the dukes of Carinthia was not great. These fiefs slowly developed into the Austrian Crownlands of Styria, Lower Austria, Carniola, the County of Gorizia, the District of Trieste, Istria, and Furlania. Carinthia itself finally became hereditary. After a long struggle between the noble families, the Hapsburg family incorporated into its possessions all of these lands, one after the other. In 1282 the Hapsburgs absorbed Lower Austria and Styria; in 1335 they inherited Carniola and Carinthia, in 1371 they inherited the County of Gorizia, and in 1382 the city of Trieste requested Hapsburg protection against Venice.

Thus, from the end of the fourteenth century to November 11, 1918, the Hapsburgs were hereditary rulers over all the Slovenian territory.

From the later middle ages to comparatively recent times, the word "Slovenian" meant at the same time a peasant. The Slovenian national boundary was established by the end of the fifteenth century, and it did not change until about seventy years before World War I, when systematic "Germanization" commenced.

The second period of "Germanization" took place when Maria Theresa and Joseph II initiated a program of new reforms to centralize the hereditary lands of Hapsburg. The whole administration was transformed from a feudal system to a centralized state administration in which the German language became

19 Gruden, Zgodovina, 91-99; Grafenauer et al., Zgodovina, 154-156.
20 Grafenauer et al., Zgodovina, 699-700; Gruden, Zgodovina, 214, 227, 232, 276.
the official language in the place of Latin. The Patent of 1782, which gave personal liberty to the peasants, was very important for the Slovenians.21 The land which the peasant worked was still not his own property, and he was still required to perform the feudal duties. He was, however, personally free. This meant that he could leave the lord and choose another job, without the lord’s permission. As a consequence, he could also send his children to higher schools. With this a Slovenian intelligentsia started to develop, and in the cities the Slovenian element became stronger. A new class, namely the Slovenian middle class, evolved. This evolution pointed ahead to the struggle of the Slovenian people for recognition as a nation in the nineteenth century.

With the Napoleonic wars German national feeling was intensified, and after the Congress of Vienna, the idea of a united Germany gained a firm hold. It was developed in all its aspects and ramifications by the German philosophers, statesmen and by the intelligentsia. The idea enlisted enthusiastic supporters in the cities and towns and, toward the end of the nineteenth century, among the peasants and workers. With this German national renaissance the last great fight for the Slovenian lands started, a fight which was to continue up to recent times.

While, in 1848, the Germans were demanding a united Germany, the Slovenians also asserted for the first time their claims for a united Slovenian administration. All the lands where the Slovenian language was spoken should be united, they argued, in a separate administrative unit with Slovenian as the official language for the schools, the courts, and for the whole administra-

21 Gruden, Zgodovina, 992.
The major problem here was that the territory occupied by the Slovenians at that time did not extend to the boundaries of the historical Crownlands of the Hapsburg Monarchy. In Carinthia only the southern part was Slovenian—up to the so-called "historical line" established in the fifteenth century. The same was also true of Styria where only the southern part was Slovenian. Only the County of Gorizia and Carniola were wholly Slovenian. A part of Slovenian land was included in Istria and another part fell within the district of Trieste. Prekmurje was a part of Hungary. Any unification of these lands would mean breaking up the historical Crownlands and forming a new administrative unit. Against the claims for a united Slovenia, the Germans insisted that the historical division into Crownlands should be maintained in the future. A strong regional feeling developed, especially in Carinthia and in Styria, that the inhabitants were first and foremost Carinthians or Styrians without regard to the language that they spoke. In 1848 the Emperor and the Germans, while they were willing to concede some of the claims of the different nationalities, were not prepared either to consider or to discuss Slovenian claims for a united Slovenia.

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23 See Map 2, p. 11.
24 Prekmurje means literally "the land on the other side of the River Mura". It is the only Slovenian land on the north-eastern bank of the Mura.
25 See Map 3, p. 12.
26 Apih, Slovenci, 86, 242, 261; Mal, Zgodovina, 786-787.
In 1865, an attempt was made by Belcredi to reorganize the Austrian Monarchy on a federal basis, taking national structure into account. At this time the Slovenians reasserted their claims for the unification of all their lands in one administrative unit, in which a National Council should be the supreme representative of all the Slovenian countries. The reorganization program was interrupted by the Austro-Prussian war. After the war the Monarchy was divided between the Germans and the Hungarians, and hence there were two state organizations under the personal union of the Hapsburg Monarch. Prekmurje was the only Slovenian land that fell to Hungary, all the other lands being retained under the central government in Vienna.

The "Great German Idea" contemplated the unification of all the Austrian Crownlands with German territory. Accordingly, in 1867 the Austrian central government in Vienna embarked on a vigorous program of "Germanization" of the Slovenian lands, since Slovenia was the only territory separating the Germans from the Adriatic Sea. Carinthia being the most proximate Slovenian land, it was there that the "Germanization" started and remained always the strongest. When, after 1871, German nationalism became transfused with German imperialism, a systematic "Germanization" of Carinthia and Styria was instituted.

In pursuing this program the Germans of Carinthia and Styria had the support of the local governments and the schools, as well as of the private en-

27 Mal, Zgodovina, 974; Dragotin Lončar, Politično življenje Slovencev, Ljubljana, 1921, 26-29; Franc Erjavec, Slovenci, Ljubljana, 1923, 43-44; Lončar, The Slovenes, 60-61.

28 Mal, Zgodovina, 976, 1002-1009; Franc Erjavec, Zgodovina katoliškega gibanja na Slovenskem, 5-6.
terprises. The whole economic system, as the whole commerce, was in German hands. The Slovenians, as has already been explained, were in large part peasants. The intelligentsia at this time numbered but a few.

Throughout this period the greatest factor in "Germanization" was the school. In 1861 there were still twenty-eight Slovenian schools and fifty-six German-Slovenian schools in Carinthia. By 1913 only three Slovenian schools remained, and of these, one was private.29

In Carinthia there were three types of elementary schools: the Slovenian school, a mixed school, and the German school. The mixed schools (Utraquistische Schule) were entirely in the hands of the Germans, and in these schools Slovenian children learned the German language.30 In the first year of instruction the teacher addressed his pupils in Slovenian, after that only in German. Slovenian parents were encouraged to send their children to the mixed schools. The argument advanced for this was that the children would not require their native language to secure better positions, but they would require German. Along with the German language these schools inculcated a German viewpoint. They taught that to be German meant to be the ruler of Europe, whereas only peasants and poor people spoke the Slovenian tongue. The result of this indoctrination was that the children were ashamed to speak Slovenian; when they grew up they became Germans and hated all that was Slovenian. In the future they


would become even greater enemies of the Slovenians than the Germans themselves. The Slovenians contemptuously styled them "Nemčurji".31

It was precisely in this way that many Slovenian students were lost to the Slovenian nation. As students in German gymnasias and universities, they frequently forgot their mother tongue and proclaimed themselves "Germans". Ashamed of their Slovenian parentage, they were among the strongest supporters of "Germanization". The few Slovenian intelligentsia who were not ashamed to proclaim their nationality and who joined Slovenian organizations were sent by the Austrian administrative authorities to posts far from Slovenia.

Another tool of "Germanization" was the railroad. All railroad clerks were Germans. With their families they created strong new German settlements along the railroad lines or reinforced older settlements within Slovenian territory.32 Also, the police stations were usually in the hands of Germans or German-minded Slovenians.33

With regard to the courts, the Constitution of 1867 stated that the language of the parties before the court should be the language spoken by these parties in litigation. This right was confirmed by the Ministerial Order of 1882. The courts in Carinthia, however, paid no regard either to the Constitution or to the Ministerial Order. They proceeded on the assumption that,  

31 In Slovenian Nemec means German, Nemčur means German-minded Slovenian.


33 Grafenauer, "Germanizacija", Koroški Zbornik, 252.
since everyone in Carinthia knew German, it was not necessary to apply the Constitution. Even when both parties were Slovenian the German language was used. In Southern Styria the situation was somewhat better than in Carinthia.

The post office system in Carinthia was entirely in German hands. Letters were not delivered if the address was written in Slovenian, and in many cases people were punished because they used Slovenian rather than German place names.

The elections were so organized as to prevent the Slovenians from securing a majority in districts which were entirely Slovenian. Before 1907 the German majority was secured by means of an election law which restricted the right to vote to those who paid a certain amount in taxes. In this way Slovenian workers and peasants were excluded. The vote was divided between the great landowners and the people living in cities and large villages. The great landowners required only a small number to elect their representative, and since the landowners were Germans only, their representatives also were Germans. In the cities and towns a larger number of votes was required, but less than for rural districts. As most Slovenians lived in rural districts, a still larger number of votes was required to elect their representatives, who were never equal in number to the representatives of the cities and towns. After 1907 the right to vote was extended to include the entire population. Now the German administration divided Slovenian territory in such a way that a small part of Slovenian territory became an appendage of a larger German part.

34 Ibid., 262-263.
35 Ibid.
In this way the Germans retained their majority. Only in a few sections where it was impossible to parcel Slovenian with German territory did the Slovenians have an opportunity to elect their own deputies.36 Official statistics for 1921 show 21.2% of the population of Carinthia to have been Slovenian, yet they had only 4.6% of the mandates in local government and 11.1% of the mandates in the central government in Vienna.37 This was a consequence of the peculiar form of "voting geometry" practiced by the German administration.

The centers of "Germanization" were the larger villages. These were situated along the more important roads, later along the railroads, and were usually to be found in the valleys. The larger villages were centers of the "Commune" administration and also the parish, each with its church and rectory. There was at least one school, usually more, several stores and inns, a police station, a post office, and a finance office, which was an executive organ of the Customs Office. In short, each large village was the center of the smallest administrative unit.

Railroad and postal clerks, the heads of the "Commune" administration, the teachers, the police, and the internal revenue officials—all were Germans. They lived with their families in the villages. Some store owners, proprietors of inns, and butchers were Slovenian; however, they had to speak German in order to conduct their business. Frequently they were invited to participate in German society and to become members of German organizations. All too often

36 Moravski, Slovenski Korotan, 14.
37 Grafenauer, "Germanizacija", Koroški Zbornik, 264; Grafenauer, National Development, 75.
these people came to regard themselves as Germans. Their children were educated as Germans and were to become most virulent in their German feeling. Peasants in the neighborhood sold their agricultural produce to the Germans. These latter were ever ready to loan them money, but always on the condition that in some future election or census they declare themselves Germans. If the Germans found out that such a peasant had become a member of some Slovenian organization, he was forced to return the borrowed money immediately. In the event that he could not return the money, his land was put up for sale. The Germans had a special organization for purchasing Slovenian land that was sold, and in this way more and more Slovenian land fell into German hands. Farmers' societies were formed along with singing clubs, gymnastic clubs, peoples' theaters, and other types of organizations, whose members were educated in German sentiment. Although these large villages were only enclaves within Slovenian territory, they were an important socio-economic factor in the "Germanization" of Slovenia.

Only the church was solidly on the side of the people. The priests, mostly sons of Slovenian farmers, frequently resided with their parents or relatives. They were at the same time the cultural and political leaders of the Slovenian people. They organized social and cultural organizations, and built cultural homes which became the centers of the Slovenian national renaissance. They organized cooperatives to enable the Slovenian farmers to purchase the articles they needed more cheaply. They also organized cooperative bank institutions. Largely through these efforts the Slovenian rural districts became more economically independent and were no longer completely subject to German pressure.
Before the outbreak of World War I, Slovenia could claim two outstanding leaders. Both were priests. The first, Janez Evangelist Krek, was the organizer of cultural centers, economic cooperatives, and workers' organizations. The other was Anton Korošec, the political leader of the Slovenian people. Through these two men the work of Slovenian liberation was prepared. The Slovenian intelligentsia supported this work with all the means in its power.

In May 1917 the so-called "May Declaration" was issued in which the Slovenians demanded the unification of all lands in which the Slovenian language was still spoken, and demanded further that Slovenia should be allowed to join with the Croatians and Serbs of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in forming one political unit.38 The Austrian government was prepared to recognize a Yugoslav federation under the Hapsburg dynasty, but up to the last moment was unwilling to concede to Slovenia the right to join such a federation.39 When, in October of 1918, Emperor Karl declared to Father Korošec that Slovenia would be allowed to join a South Slav federation under the Hapsburg Monarchy, Korošec replied that it was already too late. The Slovenians now demanded more; they demanded an independent state of all the South Slavs.40

On October 29, 1918, an independent state comprising the Slovenians, Croats, and Serbs of the former Hapsburg Monarchy was proclaimed, with Zagreb

38 Mal, Zgodovina, 1113-1116; Ferdo Šišić, ed., Dokumenti o postanku kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1914-1919, Zagreb, 1920, 94.
39 Mal, Zgodovina, 1117-1118.
40 Erjavec, Zgodovina, 236.
as its capital.\textsuperscript{41} On December 1, the incorporation of the Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro into the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians was announced.\textsuperscript{42}

The Armistice of November 3 did not define a boundary line between the new state of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians, and Austria, but merely between the Slovenians and Germans in Styria and Carinthia.\textsuperscript{43} A line was defined, however, between Hungary and the new state. Since the Germans had never before agreed to a united Slovenia and had systematically cultivated regional feeling in Styria and Carinthia, the national frontier between the Slovenians and the Germans was never recognized and was the source of considerable difficulty even before the Peace Conference.

It was appreciably easier to define a frontier line for Styria than for Carinthia. Styria was divided into Northern Styria with Leoben as its capital, Central Styria with its capital at Graz, and Southern Styria with Maribor as its capital. Since Southern Styria was generally regarded as Slovenian land, though there was a German majority in Maribor, this frontier question was not difficult. In Carinthia the problem was complicated by the fact that there was no separate administration which could be taken as the basis for a new division. As a consequence of the systematic "Germanization", the histori-

\textsuperscript{41} Silvo Kranjec, Kako smo se zedinili, Celje, 1928, 126; \textit{\v{S}i\v{s}i\v{c}}, Dokumenti, 189-213; Lon\textsuperscript{c}ar, \textit{Politijo \v{c}ivljenje}, 119.

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{\v{S}i\v{s}i\v{c}}, Dokumenti, 264-283.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 121-124; Kranjec, Kako smo se zedinili, 128; Allied and Associated Powers, Army, Terms of the Armistices Concluded between the Allied Governments and the Governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey, London, 1919, 16-23.
cal frontier had been removed progressively southward in the seventy years before World War I. Approximately half of the Klagenfurt Basin was thus lost to Slovenia. Owing to the circumstances under which it was lost, however, the Slovenians now renewed their claims to this territory. This would serve to indicate the difficulty in finding a workable solution to the Carinthian frontier question, when the problem was brought before the Peace Conference in 1919.
CHAPTER II

THE COMPOSITION OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

It is important, before proceeding to a consideration of the Austro-Slovenian frontier question, to have a clear picture of the composition of the Peace Conference of 1919 and of its operating procedure. This is to say, it is important to understand how and by whom proposals were initiated and by whom, in the final instance, they were accepted or rejected. This chapter will deal only with the committees which were directly concerned with the question discussed in the present thesis.

The Supreme Council of the Peace Conference was the ultimate authority which accepted or refused all proposals, and was the dominating force of the entire Conference. Originally, this authority had been vested in the Council of Ten, which was an extension of the Supreme War Council. In March the Council of Ten was divided into the Council of Four and the Council of Foreign Ministers. With the signing of the Peace Treaty with Germany on June 28, the Council of Four and the Council of Foreign Ministers completed their work; thereafter the Council of the Heads of Delegations functioned as the Supreme Council. On January 10, 1920, the Council of the Heads of Delegations ended its work and its function was assumed by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs which figured as the Supreme Council until January 21, 1920, when the work of the Supreme Council was completed.
The Council of Ten was composed of the heads of governments and the foreign ministers of the five Great Powers, namely the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. The heads of governments were President Wilson for the United States, Lloyd George for Britain, M. Clemenceau for France, Signor Orlando for Italy, and Marquis Saionji for Japan. The foreign secretaries of the great powers were Mr. Lansing for the United States, Mr. Balfour for Britain, M. Pichon for France, Baron Sonnino for Italy, and Baron Makino for Japan. The aforementioned comprised the Council of Ten. At such times as M. Clemenceau was absent his place was taken by M. Tardieu; Lord Milner substituted for Mr. Lloyd George, and Colonel House took over in the place of President Wilson when he was absent. The Council of Ten usually met in M. Pichon's suite at Quai d'Orsay. M. Clemenceau served as president of the Council of Ten and at the same time as the president of the whole peace conference.

The Council of Ten acted as the Supreme Council from January 12, when the Peace Conference began, until the middle of March, when the Council of Ten was divided into the Council of Four and the Council of Foreign Ministers. After that time the Council of Four acted as the Supreme Council, but from time to time both Councils met jointly and at such times they represented the Supreme Council. It was, however, essential that the Council of Four be present when all decisions were made. Without the Council of Four, or better without the heads of governments, there was no Supreme Council.

The Council of Four comprised the heads of governments of the four Great Powers: the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy, represented respectively by President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau, and M. Orlando or M. Sonnino. The Council of Four acted as the Supreme Council from the middle of March until June 28. The Council of Four generally met at President Wilson's residence in the Place des Etats-Unis, or at Mr. Lloyd George's apartment, or in M. Clemenceau's office. These meetings were informal in the sense that there was no presiding officer. M. Paul Mantoux was the interpreter, since M. Orlando spoke no English. After the first few meetings, Sir Maurice Hankey served as secretary of the Council of Four. Count Aldrovandi attended later meetings as the Italian secretary. The first draft of the Treaty with Austria of June 2 was prepared under the direct supervision of the Council of Four.

The Council of Foreign Ministers was formed in the middle of March and was composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. Accordingly its members were Mr. Lansing, Mr. Balfour, M. Pichon, Baron Sonnino, and Baron Makino. The work of the Council of Foreign Ministers, like that of the Council of Four, was completed on June 28. The Council of Foreign Ministers represented a secondary stage in the deliberations in that it tried to resolve those questions on which the various territorial committees could not agree. The reason for this rests in the fact that


every question was to come before the Supreme Council in the form of a final proposition. In this way as few unresolved questions as possible might come before the Supreme Council, which in turn either accepted or rejected the proposals. The meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers were usually presided over by M. Pichon, and were held in his rooms at Quai d'Orsay. At these meetings each delegation retained its own secretary; present also were a joint secretariat and an interpreter.

After the signing of the Treaty with Germany on June 28, 1919, the Council of Four, the Council of Foreign Ministers, and the Council of Ten had completed their work. They were superseded as the Supreme Council by the Council of the Heads of Delegations, representing the five Great Powers.4 M. Clemenceau attended the meetings of this council as president of the Peace Conference. M. Pichon was the French representative, and Mr. Lansing represented the United States until he was succeeded in July by Mr. Polk. Mr. Balfour was the representative of Great Britain until Sir Eyre Crowe succeeded him in September. M. Tittoni was the Italian representative until, in December, M. Scialoja took his place. In December, Mr. Polk left for America and the United States was not represented by a plenipotentiary. The membership of the Japanese delegation also underwent changes. The Council of Heads of Delegations prepared the final draft of the Treaty with Austria, which was signed by the Austrian representatives on September 10, 1919.

On January 10, 1920, the Council of the Heads of Delegations was replaced by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. It held three meetings

at Quai d'Orsay between January 10 and January 21, 1920, at which time M. Clemenceau resigned and the Supreme Council as such came to an end.

The Supreme Council was succeeded by the Council of Ambassadors consisting of the American, British, Italian, and Japanese Ambassadors at Paris and a French representative. Its function was to execute the conditions of the Treaties of Peace. The execution of the Klagenfurt Plebiscite was one of the duties which fell to this Council. Since the United States was not a party to the Austrian Treaty, the American ambassador in Paris was only an observer in the Council.5

The Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions Relating to Rumania and Yugoslavia, herinafter referred to as the Territorial Committee, was established for the purpose of studying the problem of the frontier between Austria and Yugoslavia. Each of the four Great Powers nominated two members to this Committee. Mr. Clive Day and Mr. Charles Seymour were the American representatives; M. Tardieu and M. Laroche represented France; Mr. Crowe and Mr. Leeper were the English representatives; and M. De Martino and M. Vannutelli-Ray represented Italy. M. Tardieu was appointed chairman of the Committee.6

All the proposals concerning the Yugoslav-Austrian frontier presented to the Supreme Council were prepared by this Committee. The Committee was not authorized to make final decisions but merely to draw up proposals. In the


6 Almond and Lutz, Treaty of St. Germain, 368, 505. It should be noted here for purposes of accuracy that this Committee was one of several like committees established to consider specific territorial questions. However, since this Committee was the only one whose work comes within the purview of
event that the representatives could not agree on a concrete proposal, the Committee was instructed to submit its report in two parts, one representing the opinion of the majority, the other that of the minority. All proposals were normally referred to the Central Territorial Committee, where they were coordinated with the overall work of the Peace Conference. In the event of a disagreement among the members of the Territorial Committee, the matter was referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers which attempted to reach a compromise solution before the question was submitted to the Supreme Council for a decision. This procedure was followed until June 28. After this date the intermediary Council of Foreign Ministers was eliminated and only the Territorial Committee and the Supreme Council continued to function prominently in the settlement of territorial questions. The Central Territorial Committee, of which M. Tardieu was also president, continued in its coordinating function, but seldom interfered and never in important questions.

The Yugoslav Delegation to the Peace Conference was composed of four members: Dr. Nikola Pašić as president of the Delegation, and Milenko Vesnić, Dr. Ante Trumbić, and Dr. Ivan Zolger as members. For the discussion of internal problems the Yugoslav government later added three more members: Mato Bošković, Dr. Otokar Rybar, and Josip Smolčaka. Of these, Zolger and Rybar were the Slovenian representatives, Trumbić and Smolčaka were Croatian, and Pašić, Vesnić, and Bošković were the Serbian representatives. Experts appointed to advise the Delegation on the Slovenian frontier question were Dr. Lambert this thesis, its name will herinafter be shortened to Territorial Committee.
Ehrlich for Carinthia, Dr. Kovačić for Styria, and Dr. Slavič for Prekmurje. 7

The Austrian Delegation arrived in Paris in the middle of May, 1919, but not until the first draft of the Treaty was formally presented on June 2 was the Delegation allowed the right to express its opinion and to present counter proposals, and even then only in written form. Thus, the Austrian Delegation had no voice in the preparation of the first draft. Dr. Renner was the president of the Austrian Delegation; Dr. Wutte was the expert for Carinthia and Dr. Schumy served the Delegation as expert on both questions. 8

The primary source material concerning the question discussed in this thesis is to be found in the minutes and other documents of the abovementioned councils, committees, and delegations. The minutes of meetings of the Council of Ten were carefully prepared, but were not transcribed stenographically. Minutes of British origin bear the designation "I. C.", meaning International Conference. All minutes of American origin carry a "B. C." designation, signifying Bureau Conference; "B. C." minutes cover the period of January 12 through July 5, 1919. 9 No official minutes of meetings of the Council of Four were prepared. When Sir Maurice Hankey was present, he took private notes; M. Paul Mantoux, who was present as interpreter, took private notes also. These unofficial records of the meetings of the Council of Four are designated "I. C. 'A'" for the preliminary period and later "C. F." I. C. for the period


8 Martin Wutte, Kaerntens Freiheitskampf, Zweite umgearbeitete und vermehrte Auflage, Weimar, 1943, 251.


In addition there are the Minutes of the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, with the designation "C. M." running from C. M. 1, January 10, to C. M. 3, January 21, 1920. The American set of Minutes of the Council of Ambassadors begins with C. A. 1, January 26, 1920, and ends with C. A. 101 on January 12, 1921, this being the date of the withdrawal of the American Ambassador from the Council. The minutes of all the aforementioned Councils were made available periodically in condensed form in the so-called S-H Bulletin and the E. S. H. Bulletin. The former was compiled by the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, and contained digests, not always completely accurate, of the minutes of the various committees, along with miscellaneous documents relating to their work and deliberations. The S-H Bulletin ran through 1,428 numbers covering the period from February 2 to December 7, 1919. The E. S. H. Bulletin was compiled by the staff of the American Embassy in Paris, and, in a similar to that of the S-H Bulletin, covers in its 1,358 numbers the meetings of December 12, 1919 through January 3, 1921. Additional source material includes the resolutions of the councils, the reports of the Territorial Commit-
tee and Central Territorial Committee, the correspondence, resolutions, memora-
danda, and propaganda material of the Yugoslav and Austrian Delegations.10

CHAPTER III

THE DRAWING OF THE FIRST DRAFT

The present chapter will analyze the events from February 18 to June 2, 1919, at which time the first decisions of the Peace Conference concerning the Austro-Slovenian frontier, as expressed in the first draft of the Treaty, were delivered to the Austrian Delegation.

On February 18 the Yugoslav Delegation was called before the Supreme Council to present its claims with regard to future boundaries of the new state. For this occasion the Delegation formulated a set of twelve memoranda. The fourth memorandum was devoted to the question of the northern frontiers of Yugoslavia, including the Austro-Slovenian frontier. Before the Council of Ten the Yugoslav Delegates presented the proposed claims. M. Vesnić explained the Serbian frontier question, Dr. Trumbić the Croatian, and Dr. Žolger presented arguments to justify the Slovenian claims regarding Prekmurje, Styria, and Carinthia.¹

Dr. Žolger prefaced his statement with a brief history of the "Germanization" policy pursued by the Austrian government. He then stated that the future Slovenian frontier in Prekmurje, Styria, and Carinthia should be drawn

in such a way as to include all Slovenians and all territory in which Slovenians had constituted a majority fifty years before. That the territory now claimed by the Slovenians was fifty years earlier purely Slovenian could be proved, Zolger argued, by the Census of 1849-1851 and by ecclesiastical parish records. After 1870 the Pan-German idea had become the official policy of the Austrian government and every possible means had been utilized to "Germanize" the Slovenian populations of Carinthia and Styria. As a result, some of the northern territory had been lost. With regard to later censuses, Zolger alleged that they could not be trusted, since they had been prepared by representatives of the Great German Idea. Approximately one hundred villages were designated in the latest census as German, but they could be proved by parish records to speak Slovenian. Zolger argued:

It was therefore fair to say that the reduction of the Slovene element was not the result of natural evolution, but the work of a deliberate and forcible policy, carried out in contempt of all morality and law.2

Therefore, Zolger submitted, the Peace Conference should accept the following principle in fixing the frontier between Slovenia and Austria: that wherever the Slovenian people constituted a majority, the land should be considered a part of Slovenia, notwithstanding the fact that the larger villages and towns had been centers of "Germanization" and were only enclaves within Slovenian territory.

By way of conclusion, Zolger submitted that the future Slovenian frontier3 should include all of Prekmurje, all Southern Styria with the Maribor Ba-

2 Ibid., 264.

3 See Map 4, p. 33; see Map 5, p. 34.
MAP 4 *

PROPOSALS FOR THE AUSTRO-SLOVENIAN BOUNDARY ON

FEBRUARY 18 AND MARCH 2, 1919

*Source: Grafenauer et al., Koroški zbornik, 390.

Legend:

1 Austro-Hungarian state boundary before 1918.
2 The frontier of the Crownlands before 1918.
3 The Italian proposal of March 2, 1919.
4 The English proposal of March 2, 1919.
5 The American proposal of March 2, 1919.
6 Yugoslav proposal of February 18, 1919; French proposal of March 2, 1919.
**MAP 5**

**PROPOSED LINES OF DIVISION FOR CARINTHIA**

*Source: Grafenauer et al., Koroški zbornik, 396.*

**Legend:**

1. Yugoslav proposal of February 18, 1919—the historical boundary.
2. Ethnic boundary in the fourteenth century.
3. Present-day ethnic boundary in the Villach District.
4. First delimitation of the plebiscite area by the Territorial Committee on April 6, 1919.
5. Second delimitation of the plebiscite area on May 10, 1919.
6. Delimitation of plebiscite area in the first draft of June 2, 1919 (Correction of the western line of the plebiscite area).
7. Delimitation of the plebiscite area in the Treaty of St. Germain (Correction of the western line).
8. Territory not claimed by Austria (Commune Jezersko).
9. Compromise line which the Austrians were prepared to accept in the negotiations with the Slovenian representatives.
sin and the valley of the River Mura, and all of Slovenian Carinthia as included within the historical frontier of 1850: namely, the Klagenfurt Basin, the District of Villach, the Valley of the River Gail, the Valley of Kanal, and the Valley of Gailits.4

After this explanation the Yugoslav Delegation withdrew, and the Council of Ten decided that the Yugoslav frontier question should be submitted for further study to a special committee "without power to decide on solutions but with a Commission to report on facts."5 Baron Sonnino insisted that this committee should not be allowed to study the frontier between Yugoslavia and Italy. All decisions concerning this boundary and the whole preparation and study of the problem must be reserved for the Supreme Council, he argued. He had no objection, however, if a commission were established to study the other frontiers of Yugoslavia. Accordingly, a Territorial Committee was created for the study of the eastern and northern frontiers of Yugoslavia with the exception of the Yugoslav-Italian frontier. The Yugoslav Delegation was instructed to prepare precise proposals by March 8 for the Territorial Committee.

The Slovenian expert, Dr. Ehrlich, reported in a short article in 1921 that it had seemed that the Slovenian frontier as proposed by the Yugoslav Delegation would be accepted by the Peace Conference, and that the majority of the experts of the Territorial Committee were favorably disposed toward the

4 Ehrlich, "Mirovna konferenca", Koledar 1922, 32.

Slovenian claims. But suddenly it became evident that there were new forces at work in opposition to the Slovenian proposals. It was the report of Colonel Miles, sent by Professor Coolidge from Vienna to the American Delegation at the Peace Conference, and later the arrival of Miles himself in Paris, which changed the Allies' attitude toward Slovenian claims.6

To understand Colonel Miles' mission, it becomes necessary here to consider the situation in the border lands after the Armistice. As the Armistice of November 3, 1918, did not define a line between the Germans and the Slovenians, the latter attempted to secure control of the administration in the Slovenian territory claimed by them.

The question was an easy one in Southern Styria, since it had previously constituted a separate administrative unit. The Slovenians took over the administration of the whole of Southern Styria and the administration line between Southern Styria and Central Styria was, in general, regarded as the temporary frontier between Austria and Slovenia. The Slovenian National Guard under the command of General Rudolf Maister took up positions along this line.7

Quite different, however, was the situation in Carinthia. Here there was no administrative division corresponding to the national frontier. Since the Slovenian intelligentsia was not as strong in Carinthia as in Styria, the Slovenian National Guard occupied the rural districts, but was unable to secure possession of the cities of Klagenfurt and Villach. By the beginning of December, 1918, the National Guard had occupied the District of Villach outside the

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6 Ehrlich, "Mirovna konferenca", Koledar 1922, 32.
7 Matija Slavič, "Dravni prevrat v Mariborski oblasti", Slovenci v desetletju 1918-1928, 219-228.
city, and the Klagenfurt Basin south of the River Drava, the Districts of Ferlach, Eberndorf, and Völkermarkt in the eastern part of the Klagenfurt Basin, the Jezersko Commune, and the Mežica Valley.  

Immediately after the war, the Germans of Carinthia had feared Serbian hegemony in that section. They were soon assured, however, that no Entente troops would occupy Carinthia, and began to prepare themselves to repulse the Slovenian National Guard and occupy the whole of Carinthia. The president of the Slovenian National Government at Ljubljana, Dr. Janko Brejc, was well aware of this situation. In the early days of December when he was at Beograd, he urgently requested Yugoslav Regent Alexander to send Serbian troops into Carinthia. Alexander promised Brejc that troops would be dispatched before Christmas.

At about the same time, Dr. Korošec returned from Switzerland and addressed a meeting of the Slovenian government at Ljubljana. He informed the Slovenian representatives that the Peace Conference would accept the northern frontier claimed by the Slovenians. He had received assurances from the Allied representatives to this effect. That some such assurance might have been given is confirmed by a telegram from Colonel House to President Wilson on December 11, 1918, in which House said:

If you decide to recognize the National Council of Zagreb as a representative of the Serbo-Slovene Nation [sic] in territories formerly belonging to Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, it would be well to assure the Yugo-Slavs in a very guarded way that the question of

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8 Viktor Andrejka, "Razvoj vojaštva in vojaški dogodki od prevrata do danes", Slovenci v desetletju 1918-1928, Ljubljana, 1928, 278-282.
their territorial aspirations is a matter to be decided by the Peace Conference....

It is entirely possible, of course, that Korosec interpreted some "very guarded" assurance as a genuine promise that the matter would be settled to his satisfaction.

On December 9, 1918, a delegation of German representatives arrived in Ljubljana to determine a provisional frontier in Carinthia. They were prepared to cede the judicial districts of Bleiburg, Eberndorf, Eisenkappel, and possibly also Ferlach. The Slovenian government insisted on the cession of all Slovenian territory which it had already claimed. No agreement was reached, and the Germans returned home. Almost immediately the Germans initiated an offensive, and early in January, 1919, they occupied all of Carinthia except the territory they had been prepared to cede in the unsuccessful negotiations at Ljubljana. After the offensive was completed, the Germans requested an armistice conference, which met in mid-January in Graz. At this time all of western Carinthia as far as the Karavanke Mountains was in German hands; only the territory in the southeast of Carinthia remained in Slovenian possession.

It was in this situation that Professor Coolidge sent Colonel Sherman Miles and Lieutenant Leroy King to Ljubljana to investigate the Slovenian question. On or about January 16, they arrived in Ljubljana and were enthusiastically received as the representatives of an Allied nation whose president pro-

11 See Map 5, p. 34.
claimed the right of self-determination—a principle which brought people liberation and at the same time secured the recognition of their territorial claims. Colonel Miles asked to be informed about the Slovenian claims with regard to the future frontier. Slovenian experts undertook to explain the problem and the Americans listened attentively without saying a word. The following day, to the complete surprise of the Slovenian representatives, they left Ljubljana without notice. This surprise turned to bewilderment when, on the next day, the Americans made their appearance at the armistice negotiations in Graz. Here Miles and King listened to the proceedings for a while, and afterwards offered themselves as arbitrators in the matter at hand. The Slovenian Delegation was surprised, but its members were hardly in a position to refuse this offer from the American representatives, whom they had no reason to mistrust. It was quite reasonable to assume that they were acting pursuant to a commission from the American Peace Delegation, which presumably favored the Slovenian claims. After both parties had agreed to accept the Americans as arbiters, a written agreement covering all details was prepared for signature by both parties. Fr. Grafenauer was the only Slovenian delegate present at this time, and he signed the agreement, which stated that the demarcation line to be proposed would consider the ethnic question in its "broad aspect." After a more careful study of the text, however, the Slovenian delegates became suspicious that the whole agreement had been prepared by the Germans. The wording of the document was very carefully prepared:

12 Letter, Miles to Coolidge, January 16, 1919, in Foreign Relations, XII, 468-475.
As far as this agreement is concerned, it is understood that this line will not represent the definitive boundary, but only a line of division between the two jurisdictions for the present time; so it is clear that, with its establishment, it is not necessary to try to adjust it in all details with regard to this difficult national question, but that, on the other hand, this line must take into consideration this question in its broad aspect, and primarily it should be so clearly defined by the natural geographic conditions of the land that there will be no possibility of a mistake.\textsuperscript{13}

Dr. Brejc, president of the Slovenian government, later recalled that after he had scrutinized this document he at once suspected that the Germans were behind it, and that the Americans Miles and King were consciously or unconsciously working with them.\textsuperscript{14}

In his letter from Vienna on January 20 to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace in Paris, Professor Coolidge informed the American Delegation about Colonel Miles' mission. He apologized for the fact that neither he nor Miles had requested proper authorization for such action, and acknowledged that he was well aware that he had exceeded his authority. Coolidge went on to justify his action on the grounds that it was necessary to take action in order to save the lives of the people in this territory. With this in mind he had authorized Colonel Miles and Lieutenant King to arbitrate the armistice line. He

\textsuperscript{13} Brejc, "Od prevrata do ustave", Slovenci, 173. The following is the original German text:

Insoferne als Uebersinnung darüber besteht, dass diese Linie nicht die endgültige Grenze darstellt, sondern nur die Trennungslinie zweier Verwaltungen für die gegenwärtige Zeit, so ist es klar, dass bei deren Festlegung kein Versuch gemacht zu werden braucht, sie allen Details der schwierigen Nationalitätenfrage anzupassen, dass aber anderseits diese Linie die Frage in grossen Zügen berücksichtigen muss, und vor allem, dass sie durch die natürlichen geografischen Bedingungen des Terrains so klar definiert ist, dass kein Irrtum sich darüber ergaben könnte.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 172-173.
added that he would also send Major Lawrence Martin and Professor Robert J. Kerner to join Miles and King. In this letter, Coolidge requested telegraphic approval and further instructions. It should be noted here that Coolidge received no reply to this request for at least ten days, and in the meantime Miles, still without proper authorization, continued to act as arbitrator of the boundary dispute.

Colonel Miles and his Field Commission traveled in two automobiles across the Klagenfurt Basin in the second half of January, 1919. Being winter, the country was covered with high snow and they could travel only in those valleys where the roads were in reasonably good condition. At the same time they could visit only towns and large villages, which, as has already been noted, were the centers of "Germanization." Furthermore, it was directly after the victorious German offensive, which had caused many Slovenian families to withdraw along with the Slovenian Guard. Those Slovenians who remained behind were afraid to speak their true mind when asked by Miles whether they preferred German or Slovenian rule. The German authorities were well informed as to the day on which the Commission would visit a particular village or town and organ-


16 Telegram, American Mission in Paris to Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) for Coolidge, January 30, 1919, in Foreign Relations, XII, 500; telegram, Coolidge to American Mission in Paris, February 27, 1919, in Foreign Relations, XII, 522.

ized mass demonstrations of the German population in these places. Colonel Miles did not inquire as to the nationality of those with whom he spoke, German or Slovenian, but rather asked them whether they preferred Yugoslav or Austrian rule. In this way he tried to draw a political rather than an ethnic line. It should be remembered that his original mission had contemplated the drawing of neither a political nor an ethnic line, but had a purely military character in that its purpose was to determine upon an armistice line between two fighting units. To the Miles mission were assigned one Austrian and one Slovenian representative. The Slovenian representative was Dr. Lambert Ehrlich, later the Slovenian expert for Carinthia at the Peace Conference. When he requested Colonel Miles to visit other villages where the Slovenians were in the majority, Miles refused, saying that it was not important.\(^\text{18}\)

On February 9, three of the four members of the American Field Commission sent a majority report to Professor Coolidge in Vienna. Colonel Miles, Lieutenant King, and Major Martin proposed that an armistice line should be drawn along the crest of the Karavanke Mountains.\(^\text{19}\) This would mean that all the territory occupied by the Germans after their most recent offensive would be retained by them, while the Slovenians would retain only the southeastern part of the territory which was still under their occupation. The majority report, while it did not deny that the territory left to the Germans included a strong Slovenian population, stated categorically that the Slovenians of Carinthia preferred to remain under Austrian rule. The report went on to propose to

\(^\text{18}\) Ehrlich, "Mirovna konferenca", Koledar 1922, 33.

\(^\text{19}\) Report No. 9, Miles and King to Coolidge, February 9, 1919, in Foreign Relations, XIII, 504-510.
the Peace Conference that the best solution, so far as the Klagenfurt Basin was concerned, would be to give the entire Basin to Austria.\footnote{Report No. 13, Miles, Martin, and King to Coolidge, February 12, 1919, in Foreign Relations, XII, 515-520.} For such a recommendation, they had received no express authorization from either the Austrians or the Slovenians. This proposal, if accepted by the Peace Conference, would mean that the Slovenians would have to evacuate the entire eastern part of the Basin, which had been confirmed in their possession by the proposed armistice line.

At the same time, Professor Kerner, dissenting from the views of the other three members, submitted a minority report. It is significant that Kerner was the only one of the four who knew the Slovenian language and was able to converse with the people in their own tongue. He stated in his minority report that the Slovenians were preponderantly pro-Yugoslav, and pointed out that there was substantial evidence that the Slovenians did not feel free to express this preference when interviewed by members of the Miles Commission.\footnote{Robert J. Kerner, ed., Yugoslavia, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 1949, 101-102.} Professor Coolidge received both the majority and the minority reports on the same day, and he in turn submitted on February 10 both reports to the Peace Conference in Paris, endorsing the views and findings expressed in the majority report.\footnote{Letter, Coolidge to American Mission in Paris, February 10, 1919, in Foreign Relations, XII, 500-501; Letter, Coolidge to American Mission in Paris, February 12, 1919, in Foreign Relations, XII, 511-513; also in Coolidge and Lord, Archibald Cary Coolidge, 205.}
On February 9, Dr. Ehrlich, the Slovenian advisor to the American Field Commission, sent a report to President Brejc at Ljubljana, in which he advised the latter that the Miles Commission had visited only villages and towns where the Germans were in the majority, but had refused to visit Slovenian rural districts. Ehrlich advised his government to be prepared for an unfavorable decision in the matter. 23

The Slovenian government notified the Central government in Beograd about the present status of the situation. The Central government replied that the Slovenian government had no right to deal with international affairs, which were reserved to the Central government. Hence, they would not recognize the validity of the signature of the Slovenian representative, Grafenauer, in Graz. Furthermore, the Colonel Miles Commission could not be regarded as an inter-allied commission, and only such a commission would have the right to decide on an armistice line. The Beograd government expressed its doubts that the field commission had any authorization from the Peace Conference or from the American Delegation in Paris, and at the same time questioned whether the Coolidge Commission in Vienna had been duly authorized. This same opinion was expressed in a note sent by the Yugoslav government to the Peace Conference in Paris on February 13, and also in a note sent to Coolidge himself in Vienna on February 12. 24

Precisely how the Germans tried to influence the Peace Conference through the Miles Commission was demonstrated by the so-called Maribor and Rada...

kersburg "incidents". While Colonel Miles was on his tour through Carinthia, the Germans invited him to visit Maribor, which had been under undisputed Slovenian administration ever since the collapse of the Monarchy. There the Germans, aided by the Socialist Party, organized a mass demonstration to be staged on the arrival of the American Field Commission. About ten thousand people gathered with Austrian national flags raised in their hands and demonstrated for German administration. The mob massed before the City Hall and attempted to take possession of it. They fired upon the Slovenian National Guard, which returned the fire and dispersed the mob. Seven persons were killed in this exchange, and twenty-four were wounded. Thus, under the protection of Colonel Miles' Commission, the Germans tried to overthrow the Slovenian administration in Maribor. Austrian newspapers "exposed" the Slovenian "persecutions" to which Germans in Maribor were subjected, and in this they enjoyed some success. On January 30, Professor Coolidge dispatched a telegram to the American Delegation calling for the immediate occupation of Maribor by Allied troops.

Realizing the full possibility of influencing the American Commission in Vienna by means of these staged "incidents" the Germans now incited peasants in the neighborhood of Radkersburg to attack the Slovenian National Guard in the town. As before, all the Austrian newspapers loudly protested the Slovenian "persecutions" of Germans on the Styria frontier, demanding that the Commission of Colonel Miles be charged also with deciding an armistice line for

26 Coolidge and Lord, Archibald Cary Coolidge, 205-206.
Styria. General Maister, the commander of the Slovenian National Guard, realizing the extent and influence of the German propaganda, immediately informed the French Military Mission in Zagreb about the "incident" and requested that an Allied military mission be sent to protect the Styrian frontier. A mission was dispatched and arrived in Maribor under the command of a Frenchman, Major Montegu. At about this same time, a German Delegation from Graz arrived in Maribor with Dr. Kaan at its head. An armistice line was agreed upon, whereby the railway line from Spielfeld to Radkersburg came under Slovenian administration. German propaganda later accused the governor of German Styria, Dr. Kaan, of "selling out" the city of Maribor to the Slovenians. After this, however, the Styrian frontier remained relatively calm and free from disturbing "incidents."

When the Yugoslav protest of February 13 arrived in Paris, the American Delegation was placed in a rather uncomfortable position, since it now appeared that the Americans were trying to settle a question without the knowledge and consent of the other Great Powers. To relieve the embarrassment, Mr. Lansing proposed at the meeting of the Council of Ten on February 22, that the question of an armistice line in Carinthia should be referred to the Military Committee of the Supreme War Council. This proposal was accepted but no commission was subsequently sent into Carinthia. On February 24, Mr. Lansing instructed Professor Coolidge not to publicize any of the conclusions proposed

27 Slavič, "Državni prevrat", Slovenci, 245-246; Andrejka, "Razvoj vojaštva", Slovenci, 284.

28 Minutes BC-37, February 22, 1919, in Foreign Relations, IV, 98.
in the report of the American Field Commission. He was further instructed to inform both parties to the question that the whole problem had been taken under consideration by the Supreme War Council, and that therefore the problem was entirely beyond the competence of any single person or of the American Commission to decide.\textsuperscript{29}

Now for the first time the Slovenians were satisfied that they were not bound by the Miles solution. On the other hand, it was a question of tactics; the protest of February 13 could make an unfavorable impression on the American Delegation, especially since the Slovenian delegate had signed for the proposed arbitration of Colonel Miles. Later, when the Slovenians realized that it would prejudice their claims, they recalled their agreement. The embarrassing position in which the American Delegation had been placed as a result of this could turn the sympathies of the Delegation against Slovenian claims. This, actually, is what happened.

On February 20, Colonel Miles arrived in Paris to explain his report on Carinthia to the American Delegation and the American experts.\textsuperscript{30} Miles' recommendation that the Karavanke Mountains be adopted as the future frontier for Carinthia was accepted by the delegates and the experts. Although the armistice line proposed in his majority report was not formally accepted, the report itself became the basis for subsequent decisions regarding Carinthia.

\textsuperscript{29} Coolidge and Lord, Archibald Cary Coolidge, 206–207; telegram, American Mission in Paris to Acting State Secretary, February 26, 1919, in Foreign Relations, XII, 521–522.

At the session of the Territorial Committee on March 2, 1919, each of the delegations expressed its own opinion with regard to the Slovenian-Austrian border question. Dr. Seymour expressed the American point of view when he said that he would not object if Prekmurje was retained by Yugoslavia or if the actual administration line in Styria should be accepted as the future frontier. He was of the opinion, however, that Carinthia constituted a separate geographical entity and should be given to Austria. The English Delegation was, in general, of the same opinion as the American, except that it was prepared to give Radkersburg and the Valley of Mežica in Carinthia to Austria. The Italian Delegation favored giving Prekmurje to Hungary and the Maribor Basin, the Valley of Mura, and the whole of Carinthia to Austria. As for southwestern Carinthia, the Italian Delegation contended that this should be reserved to the Supreme Council for decision, since this territory was of special interest to Italy by virtue of the railway connection between Vienna and Trieste. The French Delegation gave its unqualified support to the Yugoslav claims. The American Delegation had initially concurred in the French viewpoint, but at this session the American position underwent a radical change, indicating that the American experts had changed their minds in the matter. This was doubtless owing to the influence of Colonel Miles and his report.

The Yugoslav Delegation was poorly informed about this most recent development. On March 7, M. Haumant informed Dr. Zolger that there was considerable danger that the River Drava would be designated as the frontier in Carin-

32 See Map 4, p. 33.
this. On the basis of this information the Yugoslav Delegation, assuming that the southern part would go to Yugoslavia, began to argue for the territory north of the Drava. In a number of publications it was asserted that the territory south of the Drava could not subsist without Klagenfurt, and that the Klagenfurt Basin should be regarded as a territorial unit. In this way, the Slovenian experts turned to their own use the very arguments which had been used against them by the Territorial Committee. This strategy stands as one of the most serious mistakes made by the Yugoslav Delegation. Rather should they have prepared a sound memorandum based on ethnic and economic statistics, than merely to adopt the position that the Klagenfurt Basin was an entity, and as such, incapable of division.

On April 6, the Territorial Commission completed its report regarding the Austro-Slovenian frontier. This report represented a compromise between the American, British, and French positions, with the Italian Delegation dissenting. The Slovenian proposal concerning Styria was accepted; Carinthia, however, was to go to Austria, with the exception of the Valley of Mëzica and the Jezerisko Commune. The French Delegation succeeded in pressing its demands regarding the Klagenfurt area, with the result that the population was given the right to protest against union with Austria and to request union with Yugoslavia. The Committee proposed the frontiers of the Klagenfurt Basin, but on the north this frontier included a vast territory never claimed by the Yugoslav

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33 Ehrlich, "Mirovna konferenca", Koledar 1922, 34.

Delegation—so vast that it would virtually impossible to secure a majority vote in favor of union with Yugoslavia. The future was to be decided by a total vote, and in this way Carinthia was practically lost for Slovenia. No western frontier for Carinthia was proposed in this report because of Italian insistence that the question be reserved for decision to the Supreme Council. The opinion of the Italian Delegation was that both the Mura and Maribor Basins should go to Austria; at the same time the Italians strongly opposed any plebiscite in Carinthia.35

On the last day of April, open fighting resumed in Carinthia, and by May 8 the Germans were in possession of the whole territory. Negotiations were shortly arranged and were held in Klagenfurt. There the Germans repeated their previous offer: they were prepared to cede the eastern part of Carinthia south of the River Drava and east of the Freibach Creek. The Slovenian representatives once again refused this proposal, and the armistice negotiations came to an abrupt conclusion on May 17.36

Because of the fighting in Carinthia, the Supreme Council determined to begin discussion of the Austro-Slovenian border question as soon as discussion on the German Treaty was completed. The question was taken up by the Council of Foreign Ministers on May 9.37 The Territorial Commission was delegated the responsibility of preparing an extension of the already proposed frontier.

35 See Map 4, p. 33 and Map 5, p. 34.
37 Minutes FM-13, May 9, 1919, in Foreign Relations, IV, 679-684.
from the Ljubelj Pass to the Italian border. Meanwhile, Baron Sonnino tried to secure the Maribor Basin for Austria, and further proposed that the western part of the frontier between Slovenia and Austria should be drawn in such a way as to insure that the territory of the upper Sava River would also belong to Austria. He explained the Italian position on the ground that it was designed to prevent the Trieste-Vienna Railway, running through Gorizia, Jesenice, and Klagenfurt, from passing through the territory of a third state. The territory affected by the proposed Ljubelj Pass frontier was generally referred to as the Jesenice "Triangle".38

After the May 9 meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Territorial Committee discussed the Jesenice Triangle problem in three sessions on May 9 and 10.39 The Italian representatives demanded that the "triangle" be given to Austria. The Committee finally proposed, over Italian opposition, the Karavanke Mountains as the whole southern frontier of Carinthia. At the same time the Territorial Committee drew a new line for the delimitation of the Klagenfurt Basin. On the north this new line was identical with that which had been suggested by the Slovenians on February 18, with the result that about sixty thousand Germans were no longer included in the Klagenfurt area. At the same time, the Mežica Valley and the Jezersko Commune were excluded from the plebiscite area and were confirmed in Slovenian possession. The whole Villach District and the Valleys of Gail and Kanal were also excluded from the plebis-

38 See Map 4, p. 33, Map 5, p. 34, and Map 8, p. 109.

39 Minutes FM-114, Annexure "A": Report Submitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers by the Committee on Yugoslav Affairs, May 10, 1919, in Foreign Relations, IV, 701-703.
cite area because of Italian opposition.40

On the same day, May 10, M. Tardieu reported the proposals of the Territorial Committee to the Council of Foreign Ministers.41 After Tardieu's report, Baron Sonnino tried once again to secure the Jesenice Triangle for Austria. He pointed out that yet another alternative was open—namely, to attribute it to Italy. This solution, Sonnino indicated, was not desired by Italy, which "wished to avoid the inclusion of non-Italian populations, except in the case of territories required for Italian safety."42 Mr. Balfour replied that the Italian solution would separate about fifty thousand Slovenians from the bulk of their nation and that this proposal violated both ethnographical and geographical considerations. Baron Sonnino pointed out that in Poland and Rumania many thousands of people had been separated from their country so as not to interfere with important railroad connections. Mr. Lansing replied that in these cases, the territory had been taken from an enemy nation and given to a friendly nation, to which Sonnino retorted that the Slovenians were less his friends than were the Austrians. Yugoslavia, of which Slovenia is a part, is a new state, Sonnino argued, as is German Austria. New states should be regarded neither as friends nor as enemies, he concluded. In this statement of Baron Sonnino, it is possible to detect the underlying influence of Austrian diplomacy. The proposals of the Territorial Committee were accepted by the Council of Foreign Ministers along with the Italian reservation regarding the

40 See Map 5, p. 34, and Map 6, p. 53.


42 Ibid., 697.
MAP 6*

PLEBISCITE AREA IN CARINTHIA

*Source: Grafenauer et al., Koroški zbornik, 408.

Legend:

1 Austro-Hungarian boundary before 1918.
2 Crownland boundaries before 1918.
3 New State boundary after 1920.
4 Slovenian historical boundary claimed by the Yugoslav Delegation on February 18, 1919.
5 The "Green Line", a compromise proposal of the Yugoslav Delegation on May 16 and 20, 1919; also northern frontier of Plebiscite Zone "A".
6 Northern frontier of Plebiscite Zone "B".
7 Austrian proposals for the division of the Plebiscite Area, Zone "A" to be divided into three districts: I, II, III. The part of Zone "A" marked K CONI "B" was to be attached to Zone "B".
On May 12, the question came before the Council of Ten for a final decision. The Council accepted the propositions of the Territorial Committee. Baron Somnino tried once more to get the "triangle" for Austria, but it was finally decided to leave the question open for future decision. At the same time Somnino, anticipating that the matter would never be resolved favorably for Italian interests, attempted to secure a plebiscite for the Maribor Basin. This proposal, however, was foredoomed to failure.

Thus, the Austro-Slovenian frontier question had passed from the Territorial Committee to the final stage, the Supreme Council. The frontier of Styria was acceptable to the Slovenians. The question of Prekmurje remained open, since the River Mura had been designated as the starting point of the Styrian frontier. In Carinthia, the Nezica Valley and the Jesersko Commune had been given to Yugoslavia. The Klagenfurt Basin had been given to Austria, with the provision that a plebiscite should be held to determine whether the population preferred union with Yugoslavia within the limits decided by the Conference. The total vote should decide the future of the whole Basin. Excluded from the plebiscite area were the District of Villach, the Valleys of the Rivers Gail, Gailitz, and Kanal, and the so-called Jesenice Triangle.

The Yugoslav Delegation was dissatisfied with the proposed solution of the Carinthia problem and instituted a campaign for revision of the decision. This campaign began on or about May 12 with the announcement of the Council's
final decision before the second draft was completed.

On the same day that the Supreme Council announced its final decision concerning Carinthia, the Yugoslav Delegation sent a memorandum to President Wilson and Lloyd George, protesting against the decision to give the whole of Carinthia to Austria, and requesting a plebiscite for all the frontiers of Slovenia. The memorandum further stated that, because of the Treaty of London, about four hundred thousand Slovenians were placed under Italian occupation and now, with the assignment of Carinthia to Austria, another one hundred thousand Slovenians would fall under Austrian rule. In this way, a full one-third of the Slovenian population would remain divided from the rest of the Slovenian nation. It would be unjust, the memorandum submitted, to sacrifice so large a proportion of the total Slovenian population for the principle of geographical borders.\[44\]

On May 16, the Yugoslav Delegation submitted to the Peace Conference a new compromise proposal according to which the whole Klagenfurt Basin could be divided along the line following the Wörthersee Lake and the Rivers Glanfurt, Glan, and Gurk, as far as the northern boundary of the Klagenfurt area. The southern part would go to Yugoslavia without any plebiscite and the northern part to Austria. This new line of division was called "Green Line", and was explained to the Territorial Committee on May 20 by Dr. Zolger.\[45\] Zolger pointed out that the Yugoslav Delegation had initially claimed the whole Klagenfurt Basin, because some fifty years before, there had been a Slovenian major

\[44\] Wutte, Kaerntens Freiheitskampf, 210-211.

\[45\] See Map 6, p. 53.
ity there. At the present time, however, there was no longer a Slovenian ma-
Jority in the whole basin because of an unnatural and unjust "Germanization." The Peace Conference had accepted a plebiscite for the whole basin which would mean the loss of the whole of Carinthia for the Slovenians, since the plebiscite would be determined by the present-day majority. At no time did the Yugoslav Delegation affirm that the present-day majority was Slovenian. It was, however, the opinion of the Yugoslavs that to accept a plebiscite implied the recognition of the consequences of Austrian "Germanization," and in this way the Yugoslav Delegation maintained that its initial claims had been just. Since the Peace Conference was not willing to accept this point of view, the Yugoslav Delegation had proposed the new compromise solution, the "Green Line" division of the basin, which could be regarded as a national or ethnic frontier. Dr. Zolger's argument convinced the French, British, and Italian representatives, but of the American representatives only Professor Johnson concurred in his explanation. The first three delegations and Dr. Johnson drew up a note to the Supreme Council recommending the Yugoslav compromise solution, with the rest of the American Delegation dissenting. With this the Carinthia question was reopened and President Wilson once again began to collect new material about Carinthia.46

On May 22, Colonel Miles prepared for President Wilson a special memorandum in which he argued that the only solution for the Klagenfurt question would be a frontier drawn along the crest of the Karavanke Mountains. This, Miles maintained, was not only his present opinion in the matter, but repres-

46 Wutte, Kaaerntens Freiheitskampf, 241-242; Ehrlich, "Mirovna konfer-
encia", Koledar 1922, 35.
presented the substance of all decisions made up until that time.\textsuperscript{47} Dr. Johnson took action to refute the claims made in the Miles memorandum. He succeeded in pursuing the American experts, Dr. Seymour, Dr. Day, and even Colonel Miles himself, to prepare a joint memorandum for President Wilson and the other American Commissioners. In this memorandum it was stated that the opinions of the American Delegation, as also with the opinions of the Peace Conference, had at no time been unanimous, and indicated also that the proposals of the Territorial Committee accepted on April 6, and on May 9 and 10, represented a compromise of the various opinions concerning the whole Austro-Slovenian frontier question and not merely of the Klagenfurt problem considered alone. These proposals of the Territorial Committee had not been discussed with special reference to the Klagenfurt question either by the Council of Foreign Ministers or by the Supreme Council, but were accepted \textit{in toto}. The question of dividing Klagenfurt along ethnographic lines had not been discussed. On the basis of Colonel Miles' report of February 9, Dr. Seymour and Dr. Day agreed with Miles that a majority of the Slovenian population preferred not to be separated from the rest of German Carinthia, which constituted an economic and geographic entity. Accordingly, these three opposed the new Yugoslav proposal.

At the end of the joint memorandum was presented the opinion of Dr. Johnson, who argued that because of the abnormal conditions under which the Miles inquiry had taken place, the resulting report was without value as a basis for the future disposal of the Slovenian population of the Klagenfurt Basin.

\textsuperscript{47} David Hunter Miller, \textit{My Diary at the Conference of Paris}, New York, 1924, IX, 471.
especially since the results of this inquiry had been formulated in two contradictory reports. He pointed out that the basin was, to be sure, a geographical unit; but since the basin was a typical agricultural region, the economic ties were less strong and less important than they would be in an industrial region. According to Johnson, all ethnographic, strategic, and political considerations favored the assignment of the area to Yugoslavia, and he therefore agreed with the French, British, and Italian Delegations that the Slovenian territory of the basin should be assigned to Yugoslavia on the theory that the Slovenian majority had Slovenian sentiments, and that the region should be assigned to an Allied rather than to an enemy Power. 48

Thus, the question of Klagenfurt came once again before the Supreme Council on May 21. Before the Council of Four, President Wilson pointed out that there were two principles to be considered regarding the future frontier of Carinthia. One was the principle of a natural or geographical frontier. On the basis of this principle, a large part of Slovenian territory should be given to Italy, and by the same token the Karavanke Mountains should be accepted as the future frontier of Carinthia. The other would be the national or ethnographic principle, according to which the "Green Line" proposed by the Yugoslav Delegation would become the future frontier of Carinthia. This would mean at the same time that a large part of Slovenian territory claimed by Italy on the basis of the geographical principle would have to be given to Yugoslavia. Thus, the Supreme Council would have to decide which principle should here be applied.

Wilson stated that he would prefer not to apply one principle for one frontier, and another principle for the other frontier.\[49\]

It is clear that by this strategy President Wilson tried to influence the Italian Delegation to change its recommendation on the Yugoslav proposal. Otherwise, why did he not accept as a solution the application of the geographical principle in determining both frontiers, and agree that the whole Klagenfurt Basin should then go to Yugoslavia as was first proposed by the Yugoslav Delegation?

The Carinthia question was now postponed until May 29, at which time no final decision could be reached because President Wilson opposed any changes.\[50\] On May 29 it was decided that a plebiscite should determine who would get the whole basin, the outcome to be based on the total vote. With regard to the Tarvisio–Jesenice–Villach "Triangle", it was decided that Tarvisio should go to Italy, Villach to Austria, and Jesenice to Yugoslavia.\[51\]

On May 30, a group of Slovenian representatives was received by Colonel House, President Wilson's "right hand" at the Peace Conference. There were two somewhat conflicting reports about this visit. Colonel House wrote in his diary:

May 30, 1919. The Archbishop of Carinthia with several delegates from that country came to expound the cause of the Slovenes. They were delighted to have the news that their wishes have been met. I told them

\[49\] Minutes CF-37, May 27, 1919, in Foreign Relations, VI, 72; also in Aldrovandi Marescotti, Guerra Diplomatica, 429-430.

\[50\] Minutes CF-40, May 29, 1919, in Foreign Relations, VI, 102; Minutes CF-41, May 29, 1919, in Foreign Relations, VI, 105-106.

\[51\] Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, Boston and New York, 1933, 351-352; also in Wutte, Kaerntens Freiheitskampf, 245.
that their demands had exceeded their prudence, with the result that more territory had been allotted to them than they could probably hold by a plebiscite. They did not deny this.52

Concerning this same visit, a report of the Slovenian Delegation was prepared by the Yugoslav Consul General in Paris, who had served as interpreter for the group on the visit. Dr. Brejc cites this report in his memoirs.53 The Slovenian Delegation which came from Ljubljana included Bishop Jeglić, Dr. Brejc, Dr. Triller, and Dr. Ravnikar. Dr. Brejc explained to Colonel House that they had come at the last moment to appeal to the Peace Conference to abandon the proposed division of the Slovenian nation. Colonel House assured them that he had studied the Slovenian problem and that he was in agreement with Dr. Johnson on his proposals favoring the Yugoslav claims. House then called in Johnson and they discussed the Carinthia frontier. Both House and Johnson agreed that the decision to choose the Karavanke Mountains as the future frontier was based on the report of Colonel Miles. House declared that the Klagenfurt Basin seemed to him so large that he doubted if the Slovenians would win the plebiscite. This, he contended, was the fault of the Yugoslav Delegation, because they had asked for too much territory. Dr. Brejc replied with the same argument that Dr. Volger had presented to the Territorial Committee on May 20: that is to say, that he believed that the Slovenians had a rightful claim to the whole territory. If the Great Powers were aware that this territory was too large for a plebiscite, why then did they not change the frontiers of the plebiscite area? Since they had left out the territory claimed by the Yugoslav Delegation

52 Seymour, ed., Intimate Papers of Colonel House, IV, 471.

on the west, which had an unquestioned Slovenian majority, they could in the same way eliminate the northern German part. Brejc recalled that the Austrians had initiated an offensive which resulted in the occupation of the whole of Carinthia. The Slovenians had not countered with an offensive only because they had trusted Allied promises that their claims would be upheld. Now, Brejc submitted, all the Slovenians were convinced that Carinthia was lost to them because it was not in their possession. For this reason, they were preparing themselves, with Yugoslav help, to occupy the whole of Carinthia.54

It would be dangerous and misleading to attach any special significance to the fact that House received the Slovenian Delegation from Ljubljana, and that his remarks during the course of the interview seemed to indicate a sympathy for their position, since House received many such delegations every day. On the other hand, the Slovenian Delegation held it as a great honor to be received by a personal friend of the President of the United States, so that their report might possibly be more accurate. In point of fact, Dr. Jeglič was not "the Archbishop of Carinthia", as he is identified in House's entry, but was rather the Bishop of Ljubljana, which is in Carniola. Also, there is no indication in the report of the Slovenian Delegation that "they were delighted to have the news that their wishes have been met," as House claims.55 It is patently clear that their demands had not been met. The rest of the content of the House entry is correct but for the fact that it gives a somewhat mistaken impression. The Slovenians did not admit that with a plebiscite they would fail

54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
to secure the territory claimed by them on February 18, but rather they asserted their belief that they still had a right to the whole territory. They opposed a plebiscite because a plebiscite implied the *de facto* recognition and confirmation by the Peace Conference of the fundamental injustice done to the Slovenian nation as a result of "Germanization".

Since the decision of the Supreme Council on May 29 was to accept a plebiscite for the whole Klagenfurt Basin, this was virtually the same as to assign Carinthia to Austria. With regard to this, the Yugoslav Delegation sent a memorandum to the President of the Peace Conference, M. Clemenceau, on May 31. In this memorandum they stated that the Peace Conference did not take into account either the original Slovenian claims or their minimum demands, and that the Conference had not considered the Slovenian claims even within the limits that the Germans themselves were prepared to concede.56 The sacrifices of Slovenians on the Adriatic would be aggravated by the loss of Slovenian Carinthia: "The soul of the Slovenian people will never recover from this blow."57 One final appeal was made to the Peace Conference to assign the territory south of the "Green Line" to Yugoslavia. The memorandum further pointed out that, in one part of the draft Radkersburg was assigned to Yugoslavia, while in another part it was assigned to Austria. Prekmurje was still regarded as belonging to Hungary since the frontier of Styria started at the Mura River.58

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jection was expressed by Dr. Trumbić at the Plenary Session of the Peace Conference, on which occasion M. Tardieu replied that the Radkersburg provision was only a mistake, and that Radkersburg would belong to Yugoslavia, while the Prekmurje question would be decided in the treaty with Hungary. Tardieu said nothing about Carinthia.59

Since the Yugoslav Delegation could not reopen the Carinthia question with this memorandum, it was decided that, in protest, the Delegation should absent itself from the Plenary Session of the Peace Conference at which the draft was to be handed over to the Austrian Delegation. President Wilson informed the Yugoslavs that he would take this as an insult to the Entente-Powers. The Yugoslav Delegation then decided to send a note to the Conference stating that Yugoslavia could not accept its decisions concerning Carinthia. At the same time several members of the British Delegation succeeded in persuading Lloyd George and Clemenceau that voting in the plebiscite should be by communes or at least that the area should be divided into two parts—that is, the voting should not be for the whole basin at once. Since President Wilson would not agree to this, M. Clemenceau tore out that page of the draft which contained the provisions concerning Klagenfurt before the draft was handed over to the Austrian Delegation.60

At noon on June 2, the first draft of the Treaty was formally presented to the Austrian Delegation, with the provision that remarks concerning the

60 Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, 355-357; Ehrlich, "Mirovna konferenca", Koledar 1922, 36.
Treaty should be returned in writing within fifteen days.61

Thus, the Styria question was resolved in favor of the Slovenians; the Prekmurje and Carinthia problems remained open; the territory of western Carinthia was lost to the Slovenians since the Valley of Gail and the Villach District were assigned to Austria; the Valley of Gailitz and of Kanal with Tarvisio went to Italy.

61 Wutte, Kaerntens Freiheitskampf, 251; Aldrovandi Marescotti, Guerra Diplomatica, 459-460.
CHAPTER IV

THE DRAWING OF THE SECOND DRAFT

It has already been seen that the Austrian armed forces in Carinthia succeeded in expelling the Slovenian National Guard from Carinthia in the first half of May, 1919. Armistice negotiations between the German and Slovenian representatives were un成功ously terminated at Klagenfurt on May 17.

The failure of these negotiations caused the Yugoslav government at Beograd to take a more direct and immediate interest in this question. The first step consisted of the reorganization of all armed forces in Yugoslavia. All of the regular units of the Yugoslav Dravska Division, comprising the Slovenian National Guard, Slovenian draftees born between 1890 and 1894, and the Yugoslav Voluntary Legion, were mobilized. General Krsta Smiljanic was appointed supreme commander of the Dravska Division which contained some twenty-two battalions, four squadrons, and twenty batteries, and had approximately 10,200 rifles and eighty cannon. On May 28, several units of the Dravska Division occupied Dravograd and Rosenbach, while others were crossing the Karavanke Mountains through the Rosenbach and Jezersko Passes.

On May 29, the Division occupied the land between Dravograd and Bleiburg. On May 30 they occupied Lavamuent and Ferlach. On June 2 St. Paul, and

1 The Division took its name from the River Drava.

on June 3, Völkermarkt. By June 6 the Yugoslav armed forces had reached Bruckel, west of Klagenfurt, and Zollfeld, and had the city of Klagenfurt blocked from the north and the south. At this same time the Italian XXII Army Corps occupied Feldkirchen, St. Veit, and Tarvisio, with eighteen battalions and full artillery. This Italian Army Corps thus blocked the path of the Yugoslav forces and supported Austrian claims under the pretense of protecting the railroad connections between Vienna and Trieste.3

As soon as the offensive began, the Austrians asked for an armistice. Negotiations were conducted in the city of Kranj from June 4 to June 7. Because the Austrians refused to accept the Yugoslav proposal that the "Green Line" should be the dividing line between Austrian and Yugoslav troops, and that the area north of Klagenfurt should be proclaimed neutral, the Yugoslav forces on June 6 occupied the city of Klagenfurt. The Austrians now feared the loss of the city of Villach and signed the armistice on June 7. Later the same day an Italian captain, Reusel by name, arrived from Vienna with instructions to the Austrian Delegation not to sign the armistice since the Supreme Council would order the Yugoslav forces to evacuate the Klagenfurt Basin. The following day, June 8, the Austrian Delegation recalled its signature of the armistice.

During the course of the offensive, the Italians tried in every way possible to help the Austrians. They supplied the Austrians with intelligence about the strength and movements of the Yugoslav forces; one such intelligence report was intercepted by the Yugoslav army in Klagenfurt on June 8. The XXII

3 Tamperley, History of the Peace Conference, IV, 124-125.
Italian Army Corps occupied Slovenian land in southwestern Carinthia, the valley around Tarvisio, the Gail Valley, the territory southwest of Villach, and the District of Villach itself, in order to prevent the occupation of this territory by the Yugoslav army. Finally, on June 10, 1919, an Inter-allied Commission, which was under Italian influence, came to Klagenfurt and demanded the evacuation of the Yugoslav army from the whole Klagenfurt Basin. On the same day the French ambassador in Belgrad protested in the name of the Supreme Council against the Yugoslav occupation of southern Carinthia. The Yugoslav government ignored all protests and made no effort to comply with the demand to evacuate southern Carinthia. It merely countered with a question: why had not the Supreme Council protested any of the earlier Austrian offensives? In other words, why had it not ordered the Austrians back in the beginning of May when they occupied the whole of Carinthia? As will be seen, this question was later discussed many times by the Peace Conference in various stages of its deliberations.

On June 2, the first draft of the Treaty was presented to the Austrian Delegation. As early as May 31, however, President Wilson had asked Professor Johnson to prepare his findings on Carinthia.

Professor Johnson submitted a memorandum on the Carinthia question on June 2. In the first part of this memorandum Johnson presented a short history of the solutions proposed for the question of Klagenfurt. He criticized the

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5 Wutte, Kaerntens Freiheitskampf, 251.
May 22 memorandum of Colonel Miles and devoted special attention to the joint memorandum of May 27. He asserted that the question of the Klagenfurt Basin had always been a very difficult one and that the opinions of the experts were in no way unanimous. In the second part of his memorandum, Johnson explained in somewhat more detail his point of view which, in general, was similar to that expressed in the joint memorandum. By way of conclusion he laid down several principles regarding the Klagenfurt question for the American Delegation. Firstly, the presumption that the Slovenian population south of the "Green Line" proposed by the Yugoslav Delegation preferred a Yugoslav administration to an Austrian one, should be accepted. Secondly, a set of articles should be prepared which would guarantee the liberty of local commerce within the Basin. Finally, if necessary, a rule could be accepted which would give the Slovenians the right, after a certain specified period of time, to protest against the inclusion into Yugoslavia. This solution would make it possible for the Slovenian population to determine its own future irrespective of the influence of German votes.6

Thus, the Carinthia question came once again before the Council of Four, sitting as the Supreme Council, on June 4. At this time, M. Vesnić defended before the Council the second Yugoslav proposal, the "Green Line". His arguments, in general, were the same as those of Dr. Zolger when he introduced this same proposal to the Territorial Committee on May 20. After Vesnić's presentation, President Wilson explained his projected solution. He disclosed a map of the Klagenfurt Basin divided by a purple line. This line was virtually

6 Miller, My Diary, IX, 471-474.
the same as the Yugoslav "Green Line". The southern part, claimed by Yugoslavia, was marked "A"; the northern part, which the Yugoslav Delegation was prepared to cede to Austria, was marked "B". Wilson now suggested that the inhabitants of the "A" Zone should vote at an early date after the signing of the peace treaty, in a plebiscite to determine whether they should be united to Yugoslavia or to Austria. Should they vote for Austria, both Zones "A" and "B" would go to Austria. On the other hand, should they vote for Yugoslavia, Zone "B" would then also vote in a plebiscite to choose between Yugoslavia and Austria. M. Vesnić replied that he had already supplied numerous reasons to indicate why the Yugoslav Delegation opposed a plebiscite. According to Austrian statistics of the year 1910, there were in the territory comprising Zone "A", some 73,488 inhabitants. Of these, 50,837 were Slovenian, and the remaining 22,651, German-Speaking. These figures, although they indicated clearly that the Slovenians were in the majority, failed to take into account the fact that the Slovenians had been subjected for many years to German influence and German propaganda against the Serbs, and as a result might not be sympathetic to Balkan unity. Vesnić argued that if it was necessary to accept a plebiscite for the area, he would propose that the vote be taken by communes rather than for the whole of Zone "A". President Wilson and Lloyd George refused this proposal on the ground that they could not understand why the Slovenian population should not vote for Yugoslavia. Vesnić explained that they would vote for Yugoslavia only if they had been left for a period of years without German pressure and influence. Notwithstanding the Yugoslav objections the Council of Four agreed to the plebiscite for Carinthia as proposed by President Wilson. The whole area was to be administered by a local government un-
til the plebiscite took place. The plebiscite itself would take place under the supervision of the League of Nations. The Territorial Committee was to prepare these propositions for the Treaty, and the Yugoslav Delegation was to set the date on which the plebiscite would be held.7

On June 5, a group of Slovenian representatives including President Brejc, Bishop Joglič, Dr. Triller, Dr. Ravnikar, and the Deputies Prepeluh and Golouh, were received by President Wilson. The Yugoslav Consul General at Paris, Dr. Švegelj, served as interpreter and he wrote a report of the audience which Dr. Brejc later published in his memoirs. Dr. Brejc saluted President Wilson with the words: "Ave Wilson, Sloveni morituri Te salutant." He pointed out that under the former Monarchy, Slovenians possessed no political rights, but they were at least united under one state. Now, after the war, they were to be divided among four states. Wilson replied that he had tried to help the Slovenians, but that in his opinion the Klagenfurt Basin was a geographical unit and it seemed to him that it should remain undivided.

The Slovenian Delegation tried to win over President Wilson to the "Green Line" proposal. Wilson answered that he could not understand why the Slovenians were afraid of a plebiscite since they would now have an opportunity to gain more territory than they had claimed with their "Green Line". He had given the Slovenians the benefit of the right of self-determination. Why, if they were Slovenian, should they not vote for Yugoslavia? By way of answering this objection, the Slovenian representatives proceeded to outline for the

7 Minutes CF-45, June 4, 1919, in Foreign Relations, VI, 173-180; Luigi Aldrovandi Marescotti, Nuovi Ricordi e frammenti di diario per far seguito a Guerra Diplomatica (1914-1919), Milano, 1938, 23-32.
President the history of the "Germanization" of Slovenia. They argued that the imposed and enforced social structure which resulted from Slovenian domination by a "master race" could not be removed overnight, and that only after this influence was removed by time would there exist the proper atmosphere in which a new Slovenian intelligentsia could arise to defend Slovenian culture in Carinthia. Until all this would be accomplished, the Slovenian representatives were reluctant to accept the responsibility for a plebiscite. As the situation then stood, with a social structure based on one hundred years of subjection, a large part of the Slovenian population would be afraid to vote for Yugoslavia. They would vote for Austria not because they preferred Austria to Yugoslavia, but rather out of fear that the Germans would return and would revenge themselves. Twice before Austrian troops had occupied Carinthia without protest from the Peace Conference. In their last occupation, the Germans had plundered and burned down farms, and had murdered many peasants. What assurance was there that they would not return a third time?

These, in substance, were the reasons why the Slovenian Delegation was opposed to a plebiscite for Carinthia. The Delegation then introduced the question of the Slovenian coastland, where the situation was much different. Here there were Slovenian schools and a Slovenian intelligentsia; here also many Slovenians were engaged in commercial enterprises. The Slovenian Delegation inquired of President Wilson as to the reasons why the Allied Powers had denied a plebiscite to the Slovenians in these regions while at the same time forcing them to a plebiscite in Carinthia. President Wilson gave no answer to this question. At the conclusion of the interview, Bishop Jeglič thanked Wilson for his interest and offered to pray for the President and his family.
Wilson was delighted, and expressed his thanks. In his report on the interview, Dr. Svegelj later remarked that he had the impression that President Wilson did not fully understand the question of "Germanization" in Carinthia and its consequences.8

On June 6, the problem of the administration of the plebiscite area was taken under discussion by the Territorial Committee. M. Tardieu remarked that it would be virtually impossible to find clerks sufficiently conversant with both the Slovenian and German languages as to be able to carry out the work impartially. If German clerks were appointed, they would almost certainly continue their "Germanization" policy. It was finally accepted as the only possible solution that Zone "B" should have a German administration and Zone "A" a Yugoslav (Slovenian) administration until the plebiscite took place. The Italian Delegation proposed an alternative division of the plebiscite area which opposed Yugoslav administration in Zone "A".9

After the decision of the Supreme Council on June 4 and the interview with President Wilson, the Yugoslav Delegation saw that its "Green Line" proposal would not be accepted by the Peace Conference. Consequently, the Delegation prepared a new proposal, which was outlined in a letter to the Peace Conference on June 6. In this latter they requested that Zone "A" be placed under Yugoslav administration and Zone "B" under Austrian administration. After a certain time

8 Brejc, "Od prevrata do ustave", Slovenci, 184-187; mentioned also in Minutes CF-49A, June 6, 1919, in Foreign Relations, VI, 211.

the population of Zone "A" would have the right to protest against union with Yugoslavia and request union with Austria. In the event that a majority would not favor union with Austria, the population of Zone "B" should be given the right to protest against union with Austria and to request union with Yugoslavia. On the following day the Yugoslav Delegation sent a second letter in which it explained who, under its new proposal, would have the right to vote. This right should be given to any person twenty years of age or older who was born in the plebiscite area and had maintained permanent residence in the plebiscite area from January 1, 1919, and to any person who, although not born in the plebiscite area, had maintained permanent residence from January 1, 1905. It was suggested that the plebiscite commission be composed of five members, three to be nominated by the Allied forces, the fourth by Yugoslavia, and the fifth by Austria. The plebiscite should be held within three to six months after the present treaty had been placed in effect, and should be held first in Zone "A", and three weeks later in Zone "B". The frontiers of the "A" Zone, according to the Yugoslav proposal, should be the same as those proposed in the "Green Line" division.10

The question once again came before the Supreme Council on June 7, at which time the Council rejected both the proposals submitted by the Territorial Committee and those submitted by the Yugoslav Delegation. Instead, it was decided that the administration of the whole plebiscite area should be placed under the direct supervision of an international commission. The Yugoslav Dele-

10 Ehrlich, "Mirovna konference", Koladar 1922, 37; Wutte, Kärntens Freiheitskampf, 466.
gation replied in a note on June 9, that it could not accept this decision. The entire administration, it was allowed, would be placed in German hands and the policy of "Germanization" would receive a semblance of international protection.11

At about the same time the Italian Delegation tried to secure a decision that the Yugoslav forces should be ordered to leave the territory which they had occupied in Carinthia from May 28 to June 7. This question was vital for Yugoslavia in the sense that if Yugoslav troops remained in Zone "A" of Carinthia, German influence over the Slovenian peasants would be diminished and they would no longer be afraid to declare themselves in favor of union with Yugoslavia. This same problem was known also to the Austrian Delegation, which attempted by every means possible to remove the Yugoslav forces from Carinthia. On June 17 Baron Sonnino proposed that the Council of Four take a definite position with regard to the evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin. The Council of Four decided that the whole question should be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers and that the Territorial Committee should propose a line behind which both forces should remove.12

At its session on June 18 the Territorial Committee discussed the question of evacuation. At the same time a proposal made by Dr. Zolger which called for the incorporation of the Mežica Valley into Zone "A" was also discussed. The Committee recommended that Zone "A" be attached to Yugoslavia,

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12 Minutes CF-34, June 17, 1919, in Foreign Relations, VI, 534; Wutte, Kaerntens Freiheitskampf, 293.
Zone "B" to Austria, and that the administration of both zones be placed under the control of an international commission. Each of the five Great Powers would nominate one member to the commission; Austria and Yugoslavia would also nominate one member each. The right to vote in the plebiscite was allowed to every person twenty years of age who was born in the area and had been a permanent resident at the time that the treaty came into force. The limits of the territory were as they had previously been decided, except that the Mešica Valley was to be excluded from Zone "A".

The Italian Delegation dissented from this decision of the Territorial Committee, insisting that the area should be evacuated of troops and that the right to vote in the plebiscite should be extended to include all persons twenty years of age or older who had been resident in the area as of August, 1914. The Council of Foreign Ministers discussed the question again on June 18 and 19, after which it accepted the proposals of the Territorial Committee. In addition to the provisions already stated, it was decided that the Yugoslav forces should withdraw to the south of the "purple" or "green" line, and the Austrians to the north of this line. This simply meant that the Yugoslavs would occupy Zone "A" and the Austrians Zone "B". Again the Italians, in the person of Baron Sonnino, dissented.

13 Note from Territorial Committee to Council of Foreign Ministers, June 18, 1919, Appendix "C" to Minutes FM-25, June 18, 1919, in Foreign Relations IV, 830-841; Note from Territorial Committee to Supreme Council, June 18, 1919, Annex "A" to Minutes FM-26, June 19, 1919, in Foreign Relations IV, 845-846.

14 Minutes FM-25, June 18, 1919, in Foreign Relations IV, 834-837; Minutes FM-26, June 19, 1919, in Foreign Relations IV, 842-845.
The matter was finally resolved by the Council of Four on June 21. The Council, in general, approved the proposals of the Territorial Committee. The Yugoslav and Austrian forces were to be reduced to minimum necessary to maintain public order, and in the near future they were to be replaced by a local recruited police force. The plebiscite in Zone "A" was to be held three months after the coming into force of the treaty, and three weeks later in Zone "B". The International Plebiscite Commission would consist of four permanent members, representing the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy. When dealing with matters affecting Zone "B" an Austrian representative would be added, and when dealing with the matters affecting Zone "A" a Yugoslav representative would be added. All persons twenty years old or older who had resided in the zone since January 1, 1912, were qualified to vote. Thus, the voting provision represented a compromise between the Yugoslav proposal for January 1, 1905, and the Italian proposal for August, 1914.15

On June 23 the Supreme Council ordered that Yugoslav and Austrian armed forces were to withdraw respectively south and north of the "purple" or "green" line which divided Zones "A" and "B".16

On June 25 the Territorial Committee completed the articles of the Austrian Treaty. These articles were the same in the second draft of July 20, and in the final Treaty.

Another aspect of the frontier question to be considered here is that

16 Temperley, History of the Peace Conference, IV, 371; also Almond and Lutz, Treaty of St. Germain, 520.
of Prekmurje, the territory on the northeast side of the River Mura, which was under Hungarian administration. The Slovenian expert for the Prekmurje question at the Peace Conference was Professor Matija Slavič. Because the available Hungarian statistics failed to indicate where Slovenians were living in the Prekmurje area, Dr. Slavič had to prepare all the statistical data and maps. On June 21, 1919, the Slovenian representatives from Prekmurje, Jožef Klekl, Sr., Josip Godina, and Ivan Jerič, prepared and signed a memorandum to the Peace Conference in which they requested the union of Prekmurje with the rest of Slovenia in Yugoslavia, and calling for Yugoslav occupation and Slovenian administration of the territory. Here they indicated their desire for the unification of Slovenians around the River Raab with those living in Prekmurje. On June 28, when the treaty with Germany was signed, the Yugoslav Delegation sent this memorandum in French and English translations to the forty-five representatives at the Peace Conference. On July 8 the Yugoslav Delegation addressed a note to M. Tardieu, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Leeper in which they asked that the twelve Slovenian villages along the River Raab be assigned to Yugoslavia together with Prekmurje.17

The Prekmurje question was discussed by the Supreme Council on July 9. The Supreme Council accepted the proposals of the Territorial Committee, prepared for the most part by Dr. Johnson, according to which Prekmurje was assigned to Yugoslavia, although the question of the Slovenian villages along the

River Raab was left open. With the acceptance of this decision by the Supreme Council, the last part of the frontier between Slovenia and Austria was determined for inclusion in the second draft of July 20. This part of the frontier remained unchanged in the final draft of the treaty.

On July 10 the Yugoslav Delegation sent a note to M. Clemenceau, as president of the Peace Conference, requesting permission to occupy Prekmurje, which had already been assigned to Yugoslavia by the Conference, and at the same time requesting once again that the Slovenian villages along the River Raab be assigned to Yugoslavia. This question was resolved definitively on August 1, when the Supreme Council decided that the frontier would not be improved, from the geographical point of view, if the Slovenian villages in question were assigned to Yugoslavia. The Council did, however, accede to the Yugoslav request for permission to occupy Prekmurje. The Yugoslav army occupied Prekmurje on August 12, 1919.

As had already been suggested, the Austrian Delegation had no direct influence over the proposals contained in the first draft of the treaty. Their claims, however, were supported, as has been seen, by Professor Coolidge in Vienna and by Colonel Miles, and also by the Italian Delegation. On June 3

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18 Minutes HD-3, July 9, 1919, in Foreign Relations, VII, 62; Recommendations of the Territorial Committee, Appendix D to Minutes HD-3, July 9, 1919, in Foreign Relations, VII, 75-76.

19 Minutes HD-21, August 1, 1919, in Foreign Relations, VII, 454-455; Note, Territorial Committee to Supreme Council, July 22, 1919, Appendix F to Minutes HD-21, August 1, 1919, in Foreign Relations, VII, 468-469; Note, Territorial Committee to Supreme Council, July 26, 1919, Appendix H to Minutes HD-21, August 1, 1919, in Foreign Relations, VII, 473-474.
Professor Wutte and M. Schumy sent to the German government in Carinthia a message to the effect that the Italian Delegation could be counted upon to support Austrian claims regarding Carinthia and indicating that a plebiscite would be accepted for Carinthia, and further that the plebiscite area should not be too small. They suggested that the Carinthia government request Segre and the Italian Commissioner to explain this question to Baron Sonnino and M. Orlando.20

This message of Wutte provides a striking illustration of Italian and Austrian collaboration against the Slovenian claims. In this way the Austrian Delegation was kept informed about the decisions of the Peace Conference at various stages of its deliberations, and was well prepared to submit its remarks on the first draft.

The Austrian Delegation had arrived in Paris on May 13, and on June 2 it received the first draft of the treaty. On June 10 it prepared and sent an introduction to its memorandum of June 16.21 On June 25, M. Renner, president of the Austrian Delegation, sent a letter to the Peace Conference introducing the Austrian counter-proposals of July 10.22 In the aforementioned notes and memoranda, the Austrian Delegation disclosed its position along the following lines: first, that German Austria should be regarded as a new state like the

20 Wutte, Kaerntens Freiheitskampf, 466.


other states formed from the territory of the former Monarchy, and secondly, that the German population of the new Austrian state could in no way be considered responsible for the crimes perpetrated by regimes of the former state.

Regarding Slovenian territory, it was indicated that the linguistic frontier was not clearly drawn since the races were mixed and numerous German minorities lived in Carniola and in the Slovenian Coastland region. The Austrian Delegation indicated that Austria would voluntarily abandon any and all claim to these minorities and, by way of compensation would require only natural or geographical frontiers. In this way she would get some insignificant rural districts in Carinthia and Styria in order to secure the great lines of communication which were of primary importance to her economic life. This, it was reasoned, would cause no harm or injustice to the Slovenians, since the minorities had declared their wish to be united with German Austria. The Austrian Delegation would support the claims of these people for a plebiscite on the ground "of the fundamental right of nations to self-determination, a humanitarian right which the Powers have extolled to the nations exhausted by the war."23

The Austrian Delegation demanded that the area of the plebiscite be evacuated by Yugoslav and Austrian troops and occupied by the troops of a third state and also that the plebiscite decide the future boundary by communes rather than for the whole area. The Delegation from German Carinthia consistently opposed this decision of the Austrian Delegation.24


24 Wutte, Kaerntens Freiheitskampf, 297.
Regarding Carinthia, the Austrian Delegation was of the opinion that it represented a geographical and economical entity and that this entity should not be destroyed. Accordingly they demanded the whole of Slovenian Carinthia except for the Jezersko Commune. They also requested that the plebiscite area be enlarged to include the Villach District, the Valleys of Gail, Gaillitz, and Kanal, along with the District of Tarvisio.

More elaborate were the Austrian claims regarding Styria. From the ethnic point of view, it was argued that it was impossible to draw a clear line since the territory had a mixed population. The entire population of this territory was united with the northern Styrians "by the special character of their customs, manners, economic interests, and their agricultural and industrial undertakings, as well as by their spirit of solidarity and their provincial patriotism." In this mixed territory the German language indisputably played the predominant role. The city of Maribor was an "historical bulwark of German civilization." The frontiers proposed by the Peace Conference, it was asserted, would destroy the economic and commercial unity of Central Styria. All the real estate of the cities and the commerce and industry of the Maribor Basin were almost entirely in the hands of German-speaking Styrians. All the establishments of the Maribor Basin and the Drave Valley had been created, in the German view, by "the zeal and spirit of organization of our people." The railway "triangle" from Bruck to Villach to Maribor would

26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., 386.
be blocked by the proposed frontier and the Austrian Republic would lose its direct connection with Italy and the port of Trieste. Furthermore, many Germans employed by the Southern Railways would lose their work:

The Southern Railway Companies employ at the present time more than 4,000 workmen and employees of German race, who, together with their families, represent 15,000 people. Most of these families of workingmen have permanently settled in Marburg for the last ten years.28

With the proposed new frontier the exploitation of hydraulic power on the Drava River would be rendered impossible for Austria, and this in turn, it was contended, was the only hope of securing electricity for northern Styria. These were the considerations in view of which the Austrian Delegation proposed a plebiscite for the whole Maribor Basin, including the Mura Valley and Radkersburg.29

It should be noted that these contentions of the Austrian Delegation were based exclusively on economic claims. They did not deny that the population was not German, nor that the German enclaves within Styria and Carinthia were merely a consequence of "Germanization". This fact is clearly demonstrated by the statement concerning the German railway workmen who had settled down within the last ten years. The language of Styria was German because the whole administration was German. In return for all the German enclaves in Carinthia and in the Slovenian Coastland the Austrians were now requesting Slovenian land in Carinthia and Styria.

28 Ibid.

29 See Map 6, p. 53 and Map 7, p. 83.
MAP 7*

PROPOSALS FOR THE FRONTIER IN STYRIA

*Source: Grafenauer et al., Koroški zbornik, 415.

Legend:

1 Styria's boundary.
2 Boundary of judicial districts.
3 Proposal of the Territorial Committee accepted by the Supreme Council on May 12, 1919.
4 Slovenian ethnic frontier of 1870, roughly the northern frontier of the plebiscite area.
5 Yugoslav proposal of February 18, 1919.
6 Southern frontier of the plebiscite area proposed by the American and Italian Delegations; also frontier proposed by the Miles Field Commission on February 12, 1919.
7 Southern frontier of the plebiscite area proposed by the French and English Delegations; also frontier line claimed by the Austrian Delegation in its first reply on June 10, 1919.
8 Southern frontier of the plebiscite area as proposed by the Austrian Delegation on August 6 and 9, 1919.
9 Austrian claims in their counter-proposals to the first draft, June 16, 1919.
Also worthy of note is the fact that these Austrian counter-proposals had no influence on the second draft of the treaty, which was delivered to the Austrian Delegation on July 20, 1919. The Austro-Slovenian frontier as proposed in the second draft of the treaty was as follows: Prekmurje would go to Yugoslavia; the Styria frontier was the same as proposed in the first draft—which is to say that the whole of Southern Styria together with the Drave Valley, the Maribor Basin, the Mura Valley, and the city of Radkersburg, should go to Yugoslavia. Carinthia was divided into two zones for purposes of the forthcoming plebiscite which would determine the future of the whole Klagenfurt Basin. The Mežica Valley and the Jezersko Commune were given to Yugoslavia without plebiscite. The western part of Slovenian Carinthia was not included in the plebiscite area, but was divided between Yugoslavia, Austria, and Italy, as proposed in the first draft.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
CHAPTER V

THE DRAWING OF THE FINAL DRAFT

The present chapter will concern itself with the Yugoslav and Austrian remarks about the second draft of the treaty, and with the efforts of the Yugoslav Delegation to prevent a plebiscite for Southern Styria, all culminating in the signing of the final draft of the treaty.

On July 25 the Yugoslav Delegation submitted a memorandum to the Peace Conference in which it was pointed out that according to the second draft of the treaty the territories of Western Carinthia claimed by the Slovenians had been given either to Italy or to Austria. Only the District of Tarvisio had been reserved for later decision. The memorandum requested that these territories, the Valleys of Kanal and Gailitz, on the one hand, and the Gail Valley and the District of Villach on the other, should either be assigned to Yugoslavia or at least that they should be included in Zone "A" of the plebiscite area.¹

On August 6 the Austrian Delegation sent a covering letter to its "Observations" on the frontiers of Austria, and on August 9, it sent the "Observations" themselves and counter-proposals, plus an "Annex C" devoted to the

question of Styria. The Austrian Delegation pointed out once again that Austria should be regarded as a new state, and that she was not responsible for the crimes of the war.

Regarding the Carinthia question, the Austrian Delegation protested that the Kanal Valley along with the District of Tarvisio had been given to Italy. Because of the railway connection, the northern part of the Valley of Mežica, it argued, should be attached to Zone "A" of Carinthia. The whole plebiscite area should be evacuated and occupied by a neutral power. The Delegation also requested that the plebiscite be taken by communes or at least that the Zones should be subdivided—Zone "A" into three parts, and Zone "B" into two parts. The plebiscite should be held on the same day in all Zones.

The principal attention of the Austrian Delegation was directed to the Styria question. To this question the whole "Annex C" of the "Observations" was dedicated. Here it was stated that conditions in the Klagenfurt and Maribor Basins were the same. The railroad line connecting these two basins was also the main connection of Klagenfurt with the rest of the world. As before, they argued that the Maribor Basin formed a geographical unit with Central Styria, and that it had strong economic ties with Northern Styria.

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3 See Map 7, p. 83.
The hydraulic forces of the River Drava were of the greatest importance to Austria. A special chapter of "Annex C" was devoted to the Valley of the River Mura and especially to the Districts of Apac and Radkersburg; here it was argued that this territory had always belonged to the integral German territory. The railway connecting Spielfeld with Radkersburg was indispensable to the Austrian economy and commerce, and for this reason the territory should be included in the plebiscite area of Styria.

All of the Austrian arguments had an economic or geographical basis. The Austrian Delegation could produce no valid ethnic argument to justify its demand for this territory. It did, however, invent such an argument—it stated that the Styrians were not Slovenians but Wends. It was argued that throughout the history of Slovenia the word *Wenden* was frequently used as a synonym for Slovenian in the German language. So far as this statement that the natives of Southern Styria were not Slovenians but Wends was concerned, Dr. Slavič, the Slovenian expert for Styria at the Peace Conference, was of the opinion that this theory had been fabricated by the former assistant mayor of Radkersburg, Dr. Kamniker, who came to Paris as the Austrian expert for Styria. Dr. Kamniker, of Slovenian origin but of German sentiment, was himself a typical product of the "Germanization", as well as being its most outspoken apologist. Kamniker's theory as put forth by the Austrian Delegation was expressed as follows:

> From the ethnic point of view the inhabitants are Germans and native Wends, the same as in Carinthia. It is a country of mixed tongues. In the cities and villages belonging to them, the Germans form a majority as high as 90%; in the country, the Germans and Wends live side by side. The Wends differ essentially from the Slo-

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4 Slavič, "Državni prevrat", *Slovenči*, 261.
venes of Carniola. According to their own sentiments, they are before all other things Styrians. Their habits and customs, as well as their national costumes, resemble those of the northern parts of Styria. Their language is based in many respects on words borrowed from the German, for example: Gemeindeamt - gmaisen, Pflug - plug, Schere-Skarja, Sessel - Zessely, Gewehr - gvir, putzen - putzati, etc. The Wends of the Valley of Drave have nothing in common with the Slovenes of Carniola; on the contrary, in many regions the name "Krac", Carniolian, is considered to be an insult. 5

The above statement is open to two radically different interpretations. An analysis of both alternatives leaves little room for doubt that this double meaning was the conscious and deliberate intention of those who formulated the argument. Thus, to the Allied experts the members of the Austrian Delegation interpreted the argument as follows: the inhabitants of Styria are Wends. Their habits, customs, and national costumes are mostly the same as those of the Germans in Northern Styria. Their language is a mixture and is very near to the German language, as they "borrowed" many words from the German. The Wends are not Slovenians and they are not Slavs. They are a separate race, a mixture, very near to the Germans. Because of their Styrian sentiment they should be united with the rest of German Styria.

At the same time, however, the argument was capable of another convenient interpretation. In the event that the Yugoslav Delegation should challenge the argument as a falsification of historical facts, the Austrian Delegation could simply reply in effect: You misunderstand. We simply meant that the Wends, or, if you prefer, the Slovenians of Styria, differ regarding their

5 Memorandum on Styria, Annex C to Observations, SH-Bulletin No. 668, in Almond and Lutz, Treaty of St. Germain, 391; the English equivalents of the six words cited in this statement are as follows: commune office, plow, scissors, chair, rifle, and 'to clean or polish'.
customs, habits, national costumes, and some words, from the Slovenians of Carniola. We merely pointed out that they are proud to be Styrians just as the Carniolans are proud to be Carniolans. This is only to say that there is a strong regional feeling in Styria. This merely makes the Germans and Slovenians first Styrians, just as in Carinthia.

The statement was prepared, of course, only for the first interpretation, and it was this interpretation which exerted a strong influence on some Allied experts. The reference to the "90% German majority" could and did create the impression that the whole Maribor Basin had a German majority. The wording of this statement was, to be sure, very cautious; it stated "belonging to them". In reality, the Germans had a majority in the city of Maribor and in several large villages along the railroad and some main roads. This was a consequence of the "Germanization" which has already been explained in this thesis. The fact of the matter was that all of these places were merely artificial German enclaves within Slovenian territory.

It might be noted here that the habits, customs, and national costumes of all the inhabitants of the Alps have something in common. This fact does not prove, however, that all the inhabitants are Germans or close to the German nation. This region is a meeting-place of three main groups: the German, the Roman (Italians and French), and the Slavic. Southern Styria is much closer to Northern Styria with respect to habits, customs, and national costumes, than to the other Alpine lands since all of Styria was settled by Slovenians. However, the Slovenians of Northern Styria were "Germanized" before a national consciousness developed among them, and hence they regarded themselves as Germans. It is an established fact that a race or nation can assimilate or
take over the language of another nation and can even regard itself as part of that nation, but its customs, habits, and national costumes will remain the same, or if altered, they will continue to show some traces of their origin. Hence, these arguments of the Austrian Delegation were more a proof that the whole of Styria was once Slovenian, than a proof that the inhabitants of Southern Styria were Wends, bearing a close ethnic relationship to the Germans. Similarly, it is impossible to prove from six words that the language of one nation is based on the language of another nation. At the same time, however, it is inevitable that a nation held in subjugation for centuries by another nation will incorporate some words from that nation into its own language. This is only natural, and cannot be interpreted to mean that the "slave" nation has lost its individuality.

By the same token, a regional antagonism does not prove that the Styrians and Carniolans are not one and the same nation, since this regional feeling was officially cultivated and supported by the "Germanization" policy.

The ethnic question has here been discussed by way of indicating the means employed by German diplomacy to secure these territories. For persons who were unfamiliar with the basic questions involved, the Austrian arguments could prove, as they must have proved, most convincing.

The "Observations" further stated that the Klagenfurt and Maribor Basins had strong economic and commercial connections so that the one could not subsist without the other. This, it will be recalled, was the same argument advanced by the Yugoslav Delegation and supported by Dr. Johnson in opposition to Colonel Miles' contention that the Klagenfurt Basin was a geographical and economic entity connected only with Austria and with no important connections
with Yugoslavia. Now that the Austrian Delegation was assured that the Carinthia question had been resolved in its favor, it sought to revise its previous arguments and was content to allow the true facts to appear. On the basis of these strong economic ties between the Klagenfurt and Maribor Basins, the Austrian Delegation now requested a plebiscite for the Maribor Basin also. Thus, ironically, the identical argument which had been used to oppose the Slovenian claims to Carinthia was now used to support Austrian claims to Styria.

To what lengths Austrian diplomacy went to justify its claims to Styria is evident in another statement in the "Observations": "In October 1918, the city of Marburg declared itself in favor of the German Austrian Republic."6 The true facts in the case are most revealing. In October of 1918 the delegation from Maribor had declared its support of the Austrian Monarchy and its opposition to the acceptance of an armistice which would destroy the Monarchy. In October, however, the Monarchy was still in existence. The armistice was signed on November 3, 1918, and the Emperor, Charles, abdicated on November 11, 1918. The Austrian Republic was not proclaimed by the Austrian Parliament until November 12, 1918.

The "Observations" also bear out the suspicion of a rather immediate connection between Colonel Miles and the Austrian authorities. It is stated that when Colonel Miles arrived in Maribor on January 27, 1919, he suggested that the Germans of the city complain against Slovenian terrorism to the Peace Conference. "Moreover, a memorandum was submitted to the Peace Conference, drafted on the advice of Colonel Miles, by the mandatories of the German popula-

6 Ibid., 392.
To all the aforementioned Austrian claims the Yugoslav Delegation replied in a note sent to the president of the Peace Conference on August 11. In this note they rejected the Austrian theory that Styria was inhabited by Wends rather than Slovenians as historical untruth. The word Wenden had been used traditionally to mean Slovenian. Previous Austrian legislation and all official statistics had recognized only Germans and Slovenians as inhabitants of Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola. The territory of the Maribor and Mura Basins had always comprised a single ethnic, geographic and administrative unit, and belonged to Southern Styria, of which Maribor was the center. It is true, they said, that Vienna had economic interests in Southern Styria, but Vienna was the capital of the old Empire and, as such, it had economic interests in every land of the Empire. This certainly did not mean that all lands should be attributed to Austria simply because Vienna had formerly maintained interests in them. The Yugoslav note alleged that these claims were merely a restatement, in new dress, of the old Pan-German policy: "my interest is my right." 8

The same note rejected the Austrian proposal that the Klagenfurt Basin should be divided into smaller units and at the same time rejected the proposal that the voting be done by communes. The Yugoslav Delegation flatly refused a plebiscite for Styria, stating that the plebiscite in Carinthia had been forced upon them and that every plebiscite merely gave the Germans "The formal right and possibility of stabilizing the results of their Germanizing

7 Ibid.
system of violence."9

On August 25, the Council of the Heads of Delegations, sitting as the Supreme Council, accepted the claims of the Austrian Delegation and approved a plebiscite for Styria on the intervention of the Italian representative, M. Tittoni. The Territorial Committee was to prepare the articles regarding the plebiscite.10

The Yugoslav Delegation formally protested this decision in a note on August 26.11 The note reaffirmed the previous Yugoslav position and went on as follows:

It would, moreover, be incomprehensible if precisely concerning the Austrian frontier account were taken of every enclave created artificially by the well known system of Germanization in the heart of Slovene territory, and if it were desired to sacrifice the vital interests of territory entirely Slovene to the enclaves which are encircled by it.12

On August 26, the question was discussed by the Territorial Committee. The French and British Delegations submitted that the proposed frontiers of the plebiscite area were artificial, and that the whole basin was a unit, and that this unit had been broken up for political purposes so that the Austrians might secure a majority. If a plebiscite was to be accepted, the British and French

9 Ibid., 396.


12 Ibid., 402.
reasoned, it should be for the entire basin. Therefore the Districts of Ptuj and Ljutomer should be included. Because of the railway connection between Klagenfurt and Maribor, the District of Dravograd and the Mëžica Valley should be incorporated into Zone "A" of Carinthia. The Italian Delegation supported the Austrian proposal. The American Delegation was at first undecided but later concurred in the Italian opinion.

Concerning the advisability of a plebiscite for Styria, the French and British Delegations pointed out that the Yugoslav Delegation was also requesting plebiscites in the Banat, Bačka, Baranja, Prekmurje, Styria, Carinthia, Dalmatia, in the Slovenian Coastland, and in Istria. Statistics indicated the presence of approximately seventy-five thousand Slovenians and only about seventeen thousand Germans in the territory claimed by Austria. Also, current Austrian publications recognized that the frontier line previously adopted for Styria was in conformity with the ethnic line. The city of Maribor, the capital of Southern Styria, was also the hub of the Yugoslav railway network, whereas the whole traffic toward the north was artificially supported. The administration of this territory had for nine months been in Slovenian hands with the authorization of the Allied Powers and no objection was raised by the Peace Conference to this fact. Both the French and British Delegations affirmed that the Yugoslav Delegation was correct when it stated that it had regarded the previously proposed frontier in Styria as the final one. Up to this point the frontier of Styria had been regarded as indisputable by all stages of the Peace

Conference. For these reasons the French and British Delegations opposed a plebiscite in Styria.

The Italian and American Delegations, on the other hand, were in favor of such a plebiscite. They contended that other plebiscites demanded by the Yugoslav Delegation had nothing to do with the present treaty with Austria but that they should be discussed in connection with the other treaties. While they would not deny the presence of a Slovenian majority in the rural districts of the Maribor Basin, they asserted that:

...there is nevertheless sufficient basis for believing that many of these Slav peasants prefer to be again attached to Austria because of the economic interests which closely tie these regions to those of Klagenfurt and Graz.14

They stated further:

The fact that the Slovene nation is scattered over various geographic regions and even regions with contrary interests (Valleys of the Isonzo, the Save, Drave, etc.,) does not justify the necessity of its unity against which three very strong geographic and economic interests are opposed.15

The American expert, Dr. Johnson, who had been on vacation, returned at a critical moment. He strongly supported the position of the French and British Delegations, and succeeded in changing the point of view of the American Delegation. Thus, the American, French, and British Delegations agreed that a plebiscite should be held for the whole Maribor Basin. When the Austrian Delegation was informed that the plebiscite would be held for the whole basin, it withdrew its demand for a plebiscite for Styria. Accordingly, on August 29,

14 Report, Territorial Committee to Supreme Council, Appendix D to Minutes HD-40, August 27, 1919, in Foreign Relations, VII, 954.
15 Ibid., 955.
the Supreme Council declared that there would be no plebiscite in Styria. On
the intervention of M. Tittoni it was decided to give the city of Radkersburg
to Austria without a plebiscite. The Yugoslav Delegation protested this deci-
sion to no avail. Thus, the frontier of Styria remained the same as had previ-
ously been decided, except that the commune and city of Radkersburg went to
Austria.16

It is interesting to note that, at the time of the fight for Styria, Professor Coolidge was a member of the American Delegation in Paris where he
consistently supported the Austrian claims. The editors of Coolidge's life and
letters comment concerning the cession of Radkersburg with the words: "This
created a salient in the new Austro-Jugoslav frontier, but it saved at least
one German town."17 Thus, the principle of the geographic frontier so strongly
urged against the Slovenian claims now was broken in favor of the national or
ethnic principle in order to save "one German town." This town, which had been
made "German" only within the preceding fifty years, was an enclave in a Slo-
venian commune. Dr. Slavič remarked: "We did not get a single commune that
did not belong to us one hundred per cent, and for the land that was clearly
ours, we had to fight for every single village."18

M. Clemenceau replied to the Austrian "Observations" and all other
notes in his note accompanying the Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers on

16 Minutes HD-42, August 29, 1919, in Foreign Relations, VIII, 2-3; Slavič, "Državni prevrat", Slovenci, 263.
17 Coolidge and Lord, Archibald Cary Coolidge, 224-225.
18 Slavič, "Državni prevrat", Slovenci, 263.
September 2, 1919. He pointed out that the new Austrian Republic was not a new state in precisely the same sense as the other states of the former Monarchy since the Austrian people, together with the Hungarian people, were responsible for causing the war, which they continued to support up until the time of their defeat at the front, at which time they did nothing to divorce themselves from the former government. The whole policy of the Hapsburgs in administering their Empire had been a policy of the supremacy of the German people over the other nationalities of the Empire, which supremacy had been supported by the German people since it assured them political and economic domination over their compatriots. This system of domination over other nations had produced a progressive dependence of the Austrian Empire on Germany, the consequence of which was the subordination of Austrian politics to Pan-German plans of domination which brought on the war. This policy of supremacy and domination had been, according to Clemenceau, the cause of one of the cruellest tragedies of the later war:

...one has seen millions of men belonging to the peoples subject to Austria-Hungary forced, under the penalty of death, to fight against their will in the ranks of an army which served at the same time to perpetuate their own servitude.  

M. Clemenceau further pointed out that Vienna had formerly been the political and economic center of this policy but that it had since lost most of the nations over which it had once dominated. This, Clemenceau alleged, was the source of Vienna's present-day problems. It would be manifestly unjust,

20 Ibid., 227.
he concluded, to aid Vienna in overcoming her economic problems by ceding to her the lands which she had exploited in the past.

Clemenceau had carefully analyzed the situation and had confronted the Austrian Delegation with the bitter truth. Many Slovenian lands were claimed for Austria for no other reason than economic interest. The Peace Conference had already decided many times in favor of these economic interests, based on the past policy of supremacy and domination of the Germans, against Slovenian claims. This was the case with regard to Carinthia, and at a recent point in the negotiations it seemed that Slovenian Styria would fall a victim to these interests also.

After the receipt of the Allied Reply, the Austrian Delegation signed the Treaty of Peace on September 10, 1919. On September 15, Italy signed the Treaty and at the same time renounced its claim to the Jesenice "Triangle". The Yugoslav Delegation signed the Treaty on December 5, 1919. 21

The new frontiers of Slovenia on the north were now fixed. Slovenia had lost Western Carinthia, which was divided between Italy and Austria. The Valley of Kanal with the District of Tarvisio and Ziljica went to Italy. The Valley of Gall with the District of Villach went to Austria. The future of the Klagenfurt Basin remained to be decided by the forthcoming plebiscite. Slovenian Styria and Prekmurje were united with the rest of Slovenia in Yugoslavia. Slovenia lost, however, the railway connection between Spielfeld and Radkersburg and the villages along the River Raab; the former territory was given to

Austria, and the latter to Hungary.22 Thus, only the future of the plebiscite area of Klagenfurt remained undecided. This question will be taken up in the following chapter.

22 See Map 5, p. 34 and Map 7, p. 83.
CHAPTER VI

THE PLEBISCITE IN CARINTHIA

The Peace Treaty with Austria provided, in clauses 49 and 50, that the future of Carinthia should be determined by a plebiscite to be carried out under the supervision of an Interallied Commission composed of four members, one nominated by each of the Four Great Powers.1 Since the United States failed to nominate its member, it was decided that a Yugoslav and an Austrian representative should be nominated also, but without granting them the right to vote. The Austrian representative was to be further restricted in that he was only to be allowed to attend those Commission meetings which involved Zone "B" of the plebiscite area. In reality, however, he was not only present at Zone "A" discussions, but was also consulted on the matter.2

By April 21, 1920, the above-designated Powers had nominated their representatives as follows: Great Britain, Colonel Capel S. Peck; France, Comte Charles de Chambrun; Italy, Principe Livio Borghese; Yugoslavia, Professor S. Cvijić; Austria, Captain Peter-Pirkham. Colonel Peck was to act as president of the Commission. Professor Cvijić, although an outstanding scien-


2 Ivan Zolger, "Quo vadimus", Slovenski Narod, Ljubljana, June 2, 1921.
tist, was apparently no diplomat; he resigned after two months, after which time he was replaced by the former Yugoslav ambassador to London and Vienna, M. Jovan Jovanović. Each commissioner retained a secretary and a staff of experts. A Slovenian, Bruno Hugo Stare, served as secretary to the Yugoslav representative.³

The headquarters of the Commission was established at Klagenfurt, where its first meeting was held on July 21, 1921. The Commission proceeded to set up the administrative machinery for its work, which resulted in the appointing of an Interallied Secretariat General, an Advisory Administrative Council, District Councils, and Commune Councils. The Interallied Secretariat was to be responsible for compiling the minutes of the Plebiscite Commission meetings and was to perform all other secretarial work for the Commission. Roland L'Éstrange Bryce served as Secretary General, and the remainder of the Secretariat was composed of three secretaries representing France, Britain, and Italy. The Advisory Administrative Council consisted of three members, French, British, and Italian, with the British member serving as chairman of the council. Its function was to supervise the administration of the plebiscite area.

Zone "A" was divided for administrative purposes into four districts: Völkermarkt, Bleiburg, Ferlach, and St. Jakob, each with its own District Council. As in the case of the Advisory Council, each District Council was composed of three members—British, French, and Italian. Later one Yugoslav and one Austrian delegate were added, but again without the power to vote. The

³ Bruno Hugo Stare, "Ob desetletnici Koroškega plebiscita", Koledar 1931, Celje, 1931, 74-82.
District Councils in turn organized the Commune Councils, appointed the chairmen and secretaries of these councils, established polling centers, and ruled on appeals concerning the compilation of the voting registers. Officers of the District Councils were directly responsible to the Plebiscite Commission.

There were fifty-one Commune Councils formed in Zone "A", each of which was in charge of the polling places in its area. One polling place was designated for each 588 voters in the area; the total number of polling places was eighty. Each Commune Council was composed of three members nominated by the Yugoslav district representative, and three nominated by the Austrian district representative. Chairmen and secretaries were appointed by the District Councils in such a way that half of the total number should be pro-Austrian and half should be pro-Yugoslav.

According to the provisions of Article 50 of the Peace Treaty, the right to vote was extended to every individual twenty years of age who had been born in Zone "A" of the plebiscite area and who had maintained "habitual residence" in one of the communes of Zone "A" for six months, or if not born in the zone, had made his permanent residence there for a period of seven years prior to January 1, 1912. But the Plebiscite Commission chose to interpret this somewhat differently: the term "zone" was used to designate the whole of the plebiscite area. Consequently, the right to vote was extended to anyone twenty years of age who had been born in the plebiscite area and had habitually resided in Zone "A" for six months, or if not born in the area, had had "habitual residence" there for the seven year period. The meaning of "habitual residence" was extended to include anyone who on or before January 1, 1919, had settled in the plebiscite area either with the obvious intention or under circumstances
which indicated an intention to make his permanent residence in the area. Through this broad interpretation a large number of German employees who according to the terms of the Peace Treaty would not have been permitted to vote, were granted the privilege.

The next step of the Plebiscite Commission was to remove traffic restrictions between Zones "A" and "B", thus permitting free exchange between the two zones. This resulted in large-scale movement by automobile of Germans from the "B" zone into the "A" zone. This migration was organized and carried out under the direct supervision of the Office for German Minorities in Berlin. This office took pains to locate all Germans born in Carinthia, and undertook to pay the expenses of their transportation to Zone "A". In this way about 3,500 Germans of Carinthian birth were returned to Zone "A" to participate in the plebiscite. A large majority of these people had never resided in Carinthia since their birth, much less had they maintained "habitual residence" in Zone "A".

This practice of importing German voters to participate in the plebiscite was rendered possible only by the liberal interpretations of the designated provisions of the Peace Treaty, which interpretations were suggested by the Austrian delegate and supported by the Italian delegate to the Plebiscite Commission.

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6 Ivan Tomšič, "Plebiscit na Koroškem s pravne strani", Koroški Zbornik, Ljubljana, 1946, 433.
Commission, Principe Livio Borghese. 7 In these activities of the Germans the Slovenian residents of Carinthia now sensed clearly a return to German domination. 8

An intensive propaganda campaign was undertaken by the Germans in Carinthia, also under the supervision of the Minorities Office in Berlin. Such slogans as "We are Carinthians", "Carinthia to the Carinthians", "For a Free and Undivided Carinthia", and "What are You—a Carinthian or a Serb?" received currency at this time. All of these slogans stressed the fact that Carinthia was an historical, geographic, and economic unit, and hence it was the duty of every Carinthian to preserve this unity. Another fact which was exploited in the German propaganda was that in Austria at this time there was no compulsory military service, while Yugoslavia was known to be a police state. The people of Carinthia were told that, should the plebiscite favor Yugoslavia, they would be forced by the militaristic Serbs to serve in one war after another. Underlying all this German propaganda disseminated in Carinthia, expressed by the German Carinthian military leader, Dr. Steinacher, in these words:

It was to me an irrefutable matter of course to conduct the plebiscite, not toward a union with Austria, but in favor of the Great German future. The votes for Austria must preserve the prospect of a home return into the German Empire. As we were not able to cry "Germany" because the Interallied Powers, especially the French, were watching for any German machination, and since we did not want to cry "Austria", our fighting word became "Carinthia". And we saw in Carinthia the old duchy of the German Empire. 9

9 Steinacher, Sieg in deutscher Nacht, 317. The following is the original German text: "Es war mir stets eine umumstoessliche Selbstverstaend-
Still another drastic decision on the part of the Commission returned to the German landowners those lands and industrial enterprises which had been taken from them and placed under Slovenian administration after the Peace Treaty. The police force also came under the direct supervision of the Plebiscite Commission. Meanwhile, the Germans had formed special groups known as "Prügelbanden" which terrorized many individuals known to have pro-Yugoslav sentiments. These Germans, if taken into custody by the Slovenians, were freed by the Commission. The combination of the "German return" and the unfavorable actions of the Commission introduced a strong element of fear into the plebiscite proceedings.

At this point it would have been most helpful if the Central Yugoslav government in Beograd had supported the Slovenian government in its protests regarding Plebiscite Commission interpretations of the Peace Treaty. However, when in September, 1920, Dr. Brejc advised the Central government of the new decisions and pointed out the disastrous effect they would have on the voting in Carinthia, the Central government failed to act. The Slovenian government resigned in protest on September 13, 1920, but its resignation was not accepted. Since the Slovenian government at Ljubljana had no right to deal direct-

10 Stare, "Ob desetletnici Koroškega plebiscita", Koledar 1931, 76; Brejc, "Od prevrata do ustave", Slovenci, 205.
ly with the Plebiscite Commission, it was powerless to act against Italian-supported Austrian propositions.

During this time, the fifty-one Commune Councils had prepared voting registers and had issued to each qualified voter a ticket bearing his name and his register number. Until September 28, 1920, anyone who was not given such a ticket had the right to protest to his Commune Council. These protests were submitted on a special form, and, accompanied by all documents, were given directly to the Commune Council, which then sent them to the District Council for final decision. This was the method used by the imported Germans to have their names placed on the registers.

The Austrian representatives were given the right to appeal in these cases until October 3. During this period the Austrians presented to the District Councils not individual cases, but whole groups en bloc. The District Councils then granted the right to vote, also en bloc, without any consultation with the Yugoslav representatives, who were thus not permitted to have a voice in the decisions. In this way a large number of persons who had never made habitual residence in Zone "A" were placed on the voting registers. From September 28 until October 1 the voting registers were submitted to public inspection at the Commune headquarters, and anyone had the right to question the appearance of any name on the register. Any protests which resulted from this inspection were presented to the District Councils, which had until October 8 to decide upon the cases and prepare the final form of the registers. The following day the frontiers of Zone "A" were closed, and on October 10, 1920,

12 Dragotin Lončar, Politika in zgodovina, Ljubljana, 1923, 131-136.
the voting in the area took place.

The formal vote was handled in this manner: each voter presented his voting ticket to the chairman of the polling place, who checked the register to verify the name and number on the ticket. He then handed the voter an envelope and two ballots, one of which was green and bore the word "Austria" on it, and one of white paper bearing the word "Yugoslavia". The voter proceeded to a small booth, where he tore in half the ballot of the state for which he was not voting and then inserted both the torn and untorn ballots into the envelope and sealed it. He left the booth and handed the envelope to the chairman, who immediately placed it in a ballot box.

The voting lasted from seven o'clock in the morning until six o'clock in the evening. The ballot boxes were then closed and sealed. Originally the boxes were to have been sealed with the Commune seals, but a last minute decision by the Commission ordered that special seals be prepared expressly for this purpose. They were procured in Klagenfurt, where it was easily possible for the Austrians to obtain them for their own uses. After the boxes were sealed they were sent directly to the District Councils, where the envelopes were examined and the ballots counted. It had been decided by the Commission that a vote would be valid only if both ballots were in the envelope. During the two days which it took to carry out the examination of the envelopes, it was relatively easy for the Austrians to gain access to them, since there was no control over the process by the Slovenians. Reverend G. M. Trunk, a member of the Yugoslav Delegation in Carinthia, suggests that such manipulations were quite possible.13

After three days the voting count was completed, and on October 14, 1920, Colonel Peck announced the results of the plebiscite: Austria, 22,025 votes, Yugoslavia, 15,278 votes. In percentages this was: Austria, 59%, Yugoslavia, 41%. In accordance with the terms of the Peace Treaty, Zone "A" was given to Austria, and no plebiscite was held in Zone "B".14

After this announcement, Dr. Brejc again appealed to the Central government not to accept the results of the plebiscite, on the basis of those decisions of the Plebiscite Commission which had balanced the scales in favor of the Austrians; if this was not possible, he proposed that the Central government should demand the occupation of the territory south of the River Drava, where the plebiscite indicated a Slovenian majority vote.15 The Yugoslav government acted upon the latter proposition and appealed to the Council of Ambassadors in Paris that this territory be annexed to Yugoslavia. The appeal was rejected.16

A leading role in the pro-Austrian decisions of the Plebiscite Commission was played by the Italian delegate, Principe Livio Borghese. In recognition of his services, the Austrian government after the plebiscite conferred upon him a large villa on the Woerthersee, "Cap Woerth".17 Borghese visited his villa each year, and in 1926 he confided to Matevž Rajner, the mayor of


15 See Map 8, p. 109.

16 Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War, I, 201.

17 Jurij Felacher, "Ob 25letnici koroškega plebiscita", Slovenski poročelavec, Ljubljana, October 10, 1945,
MAP 8*

THE PLEBISCITE IN CARINTHIA

*Source: Mal, Zgodovina, 1134.

Legend:

1 The northern frontier of Zone "A".
2 The northern frontier of Zone "B".
3 The northern frontier of the territory in which the majority vote favored Yugoslavia.
4 The boundary of the Crownland of Carinthia before 1918.
5 The state boundary between Austria and Yugoslavia after 1920.
6 Present-day German territory.
Loga ves, that it was owing to his efforts that the Germans had won the plebiscite in Zone "A".18

Furthermore, there is some question as to whether Italy qualified for membership on the commission, since there is an international principle which states that the members of a plebiscite commission must represent non-partisan states. Italy most certainly did not qualify as non-partisan since she had received certain Slovenian coastal regions which would have been endangered by a strong Slovenia. In addition, many Slovenian Carinthians were held as prisoners of war until after the plebiscite and an Italian military unit was stationed in Western Carinthia throughout the duration of the plebiscite. The presence of the latter added considerable weight to German propaganda which made use of the fact to assert that if Yugoslavia won the plebiscite, Italian troops would remain in occupation of the territory. On these grounds Italy should not have qualified for membership on the Plebiscite Commission.19

The basis of decision for Slovenian Carinthians in the plebiscite had an entirely different aspect from that of the German Carinthians. The Germans had actually no problem, since their economic and nationalistic interests were the same. However, the Slovenians had to choose between their economic interests, which lay with the Austrians, and their nationalistic interests, which were with the Slovenians of Yugoslavia. This fact was recognized by the Allies.

18 Tomšič, "Plebiscit na Koroškem", Koroški Zbornik, I, 188. Tomšič states that Felacher gave him photostatic copies of entries from real estate records certified by the District Court of Rožek which indicate that "Cap Woerth" was purchased by the Carinthian government and donated to Livio Borgese.

as is indicated in a note of September 2, 1919, to the Austrian Delegation:

In these conditions they [Allied Powers] have decided to grant to the population all latitude for conforming and according their economic interests with their national aspirations and to decide if they will, or will not, maintain their regional unity, and in this case remain united to Austria, or join the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. 20

The Slovenian position was further weakened by the fact that certain strong Slovenian areas, particularly the Valleys of Kanal, Gailitz, Gail, and Mežica, the Jezersko Commune, and a part of the Villach District were not included in Zone "A".

The outcome of the plebiscite was taken as a substantiation of Colonel Miles' report, as is indicated in a statement by Mr. Bryce: "One thing alone is certain, the conclusion of Colonel Miles in his report was abundantly justified." 21 In reality, however, the plebiscite proved nothing of the sort. Miles had proposed the Karavanke Mountains as the boundary between Austria and Yugoslavia. The north line of the territory in which there was a Slovenian majority vote runs approximately along the line of the River Drava. The Slovenian majority vote territory, then, was that area between the River Drava and the Karavanke Mountains. 22 Thus, the plebiscite resulted only in a loss of precisely that territory which was proved unquestionably by majority vote to be Slovenian. It was, as Dr. Brejc stated, a natural conclusion of an unnatural historical policy. 23

21 Temperley, History of the Peace Conference, IV, 380; Coolidge and Lord, Archibald Cary Coolidge, 208.
22 See Map 8, p. 109.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

By way of conclusion, it might be appropriate to analyze here the attitude and disposition of the representatives of the Four Great Powers toward the Austro-Slovenian frontier question, and the general principles on which these representatives based their decisions in regard to the question.

Throughout the entire Peace Conference, the French representatives were in favor of the Slovenian claims as interpreted by the Yugoslav Delegation. They fully understood the problem of "Germanization", and consequently supported the first Slovenian claim for the recognition of an historical frontier, as well as the subsequent Slovenian "Green Line" proposal for the Carinthia problem. However, they finally accepted the compromise solutions since they had no support from the other delegations, and, further, because they feared that too great a dismemberment of Austria would make her union with Germany inevitable. This latter reason explains why the French favored certain compromise solutions toward the end of the Conference, especially the allocation of Radkersburg to Austria.

The English representatives were not especially concerned with the outcome of the problem. In general, they favored an ethnic line of division to a geographic one, since in their opinion it did not seem proper for one of their allies to sacrifice ethnic territory to a former enemy. Since the French
Delegation supported Slovenian claims and the Italian Delegation opposed them; the English favored compromise.

The Italian Delegation was determined that Slovenia get as little territory as possible, since a weak Slovenia would be unable to organize an irredentia in the Slovenian coastal regions claimed by Italy on the basis of the Pact of London. The Italian Delegation also opposed Slovenian claims because of the Trieste-Vienna-railway connection, which, if the Jesenice "Triangle" remained in Slovenian hands, would result in Italian and Austrian goods being subjected to Yugoslav tolls and customs inspections.

Up until the time of the Miles report, the American Delegation concurred with the French Delegation in supporting Slovenian claims for an ethnic line along the River Drava in Carinthia, after which time there was a radical change to support of Austrian claims. Although the American expert, Dr. Johnson, had some success in convincing the American Delegation of the unjustness of Austrian claims, he could not overcome the influence of the Miles report on the Delegation. Since President Wilson could not fully grasp the meaning of "Germanization" and could see only one meaning in the principle of self-determination, he supported the acceptance of a plebiscite for the Klagenfurt Basin as the best solution of the problem.

President Wilson, and later the Allied Powers also, asserted that the nations which comprised the Austrian Monarchy should have the right of self-determination, which meant simply that they would have the right to dissolve the Monarchy and form new states along national lines. This principle was then extended to cover questions which arose when the national or ethnic boundary between two nations was not clear, in which case the right of self-determination
devolved upon the individuals comprising the disputed area. The right of the nation to choose either union with Austria, full independence, or union under a new federation of nations, can be called the objective right of self-determination; the right of the individual in a disputed area to choose the state to which he preferred to belong, can be called the subjective right of self-determination.

Provided that the definition of the word "nation" were agreed upon, there is no reason why the objective and the subjective rights should have been in contradiction to one another. However, the Peace Conference had never attempted to define "nation", since it was assumed that the meaning was the same throughout Europe. This, unfortunately, was not the case. In Western Europe "nation" meant a group of people united by language and fully awakened to their national unity. For example, the results of a plebiscite held in French-German territory would agree with the national statistics of that territory; each Frenchman would vote for France, each German for Germany. In a case such as this, the objective and subjective rights of self-determination would be in conformity with one another.

In Central or Eastern Europe, on the other hand, the situation would be quite different, as was proved by the plebiscite held in Zone "A" of Carinthia. National statistics showed that the population of Zone "A" was 69% Slovenian and 31% German. Yet the plebiscite held in that area resulted in a 41% vote for Yugoslavia and a 59% vote for Austria. That is to say, 28% of the Slovenians in the zone voted for union with Austria. This would indicate that, although united by language, the Slovenians in Carinthia were not as yet awakened to their national unity.
It was precisely this lack of national consciousness, and the advantageous use of that fact by Austria which lost so much ethnically Slovenian territory for the Slovenians. Had the representatives to the Peace Conference applied only the objective right of self-determination to the Carinthia question, there would have been no need for a plebiscite. The Conference had only to choose between an historical frontier or the actual ethnic frontier, both clearly proved by Austrian statistics. The decision to hold a plebiscite, based upon the subjective right of self-determination, was then only a compromise among the varying opinions of the delegates to the Conference.

That the Austrian Delegation did take advantage of its knowledge of the retarded nature of Central and East European nationalism is fairly obvious. The objective right of self-determination was granted to the nations of the Austrian Monarchy in order to remove Austrian-German domination over non-German nations. And yet, by use of the subjective right of self-determination, the Austrians were applying the pressure of one hundred years of "Germanisation" to these nations. In Carinthia in particular, the German influence had been brought to bear upon the Slovenian people as far back as the latter half of the eighth century. Under this kind of domination, it was only natural that in deciding for themselves whether to join the newly-formed federation of Yugoslavia or the state of Austria, they should revert to that which was most familiar and which had proved most secure for them in the past. In this way the plebiscite in Carinthia resulted in precisely the reverse decision from that which the Peace Conference had intended in extending to the Carinthians the right of self-determination.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. PRIMARY SOURCES

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"A. B.", Ustoličenje koroških vojvod, Ljubljana, 1908.

Contains numerous quotations from the original sources concerning the ceremonies of installation of the dukes of Carinthia.


As interpreter to Signor Orlando at the Peace Conference, Marescotti was present at the meetings of the Council of Four. For this reason, his memoirs are valuable primary sources.

Aldrovandi Marescotti, Luigi, Nuovi ricordi e frammenti di diario per far seguito a Guerra diplomatica, 1914-1919, Milano, 1938.

A continuation of the earlier work, this volume contains a chapter about the last meetings of the Council of Four.


An official compilation of the Armistice terms and clauses.


An excellent work containing a selection of the major source documents. Included are all three drafts of the Treaty, along with the territorial articles. This book was prepared as Publication No. 5 of the Hoover War Library.
A biography of Professor Coolidge who, as a member of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, was sent to Austria to observe political conditions in the territory of the former Austrian Empire. Based on Coolidge's letters and other papers, this work is important because it takes up the matter of the intervention in Carinthia and the mission of Colonel Miles. This is one of the few available sources which mention the Miles Mission.


A pocket edition atlas with maps of the world before World War I. Maps 2 and 3 of this thesis are taken from this atlas.


This is the American edition of Lloyd George's memoirs of the Peace Conference, and is identical with the British edition under the title, The Truth about the Peace Treaty (London, 1938). Lloyd George was the prime minister of Great Britain and a member of the Council of Four.


This work is the most complete documentation of the proceedings of the Peace Conference. The author was a member of the staff of the American Delegation to Negotiate Peace in Paris, and collected virtually complete material on the Conference.

Moravski, Dr., Slovenski Korotan, Celovec, 1919.

This book is a compilation of data of all types to sustain the claim that Southern Carinthia is ethnically and historically a Slovenian land. It contains documents bearing on Slovenian losses as a result of the "Germanization" program.


Nicolson served as an expert to the American Delegation to the Peace Conference. This volume is divided into two sections; the first contains enlightening criticisms of the members of the Conference and their work, and the second contains a chronological listing of remarks from his diary of the Conference.
Rupel, Mirko, ed., Valv8orjevo berilo, Ljubljana, 1951.

For this volume, Rupel collected some of the more important passages of the first published volume of Slovenian history written by Janez Vajkard Valvasor (1641-1693) under the title, Die Ehre des Herzogthums Carnin (1689). Among the most significant of the passages is the history of the duchy of Carniola, in which is given a description of the installation ceremonies for Carinthian dukes.


Seymour wove the papers of House into narrative form, adding interpretive comment wherever necessary. These documents are valuable since Colonel House was a member of the American Delegation to the Peace Conference, and a personal friend of President Wilson. For the purposes of the present thesis, volume four was particularly helpful.


A collection of official documents concerning the formation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians, written, for the most part, in the Croatian language.


Steinacher was the German military leader in the Carinthia fight after World War I, and is a product of the "Great German Idea." The book has value particularly because it is an attestation to the part played by the German propaganda machine in the plebiscite in Carinthia.


Temperley's work is one of the best histories of the Paris Peace Conference obtainable in the English language, and includes references to many valuable sources. Volume four treats the Treaty of St. Germain and the plebiscite in Carinthia; its chapters are written by distinguished British and American scholars. Chapter six of this volume is the work of Roland L'E. Bryce, and is concerned with the Klagenfurt Basin.


Official publication of all documents relating to the Paris Peace Conference, 1919.

The first volume is a scientific study of each of the plebiscites held after World War I, chapter five of which treats the Klagenfurt Basin Plebiscite. The second volume contains documents relating to each plebiscite, including State Department Papers Nos. 54-63 on the Klagenfurt Plebiscite. This is a sincere attempt at impartiality, but it leans rather heavily on Austrian sources, particularly the works of Dr. Wutte.

Wutte, Martin, Kärntens Freiheitskampf, Zweite umgearbeitete und vermehrte Auflage, Weimar, 1943.

This is the second edition of Wutte's work, the first of which was published at Klagenfurt in 1922. It is a most scholarly and at the same time most biased work; Dr. Wutte served as an Austrian expert at the Peace Conference, and in this volume he approaches the Klagenfurt plebiscite from a purely Austrian viewpoint. He presents only those Slovenian arguments against which he can offer a strong Austrian case to disprove them. Since the work is fortified with a great many statistics, documents, etc., it has served as the basis for almost all research done by scholars working in the English, German, and French languages. It is unfortunate that no Slovenian counterpart exists to Wutte's presentation; since there is none, it is difficult for the scholar to remain unbiased about the Klagenfurt problem.

B. ARTICLES


Colonel Viktor Andrejka was a member of the Slovenian National Guard at the time of the fighting in Carinthia after World War I. In this article he recounts specific data concerning the actual fighting as well as the formation and strength of the Slovenian National Guard.


Brejc, as President of the Slovenian National Government, gives firsthand information in this article of the work of the Slovenian Government on the Klagenfurt plebiscite, and cites in particular the visit of the Government to President Wilson and Colonel House. He also furnishes a significant number of documents relating to the plebiscite.

Bryce acted as Secretary General of the Interallied Secretariat of the Plebiscite Commission. In this article he discusses the Klagenfurt question as it existed before the Peace Conference, and then proceeds to relate the subsequent plebiscite. He quotes from official documents, and is, in general, accurate and objective.


Ehrlich presents a short account of his relation to the Peace Conference, covering such points as his presence on the Miles mission as Slovenian delegate, and his position as Slovenian expert on the Carinthia question at the Peace Conference in Paris.


In some respects, this is a restatement of what Kerner expressed in his minority report as a member of the Miles Field Commission. He once more points out his conviction that the Slovenians were afraid to express to Miles their preference for Yugoslavia.

Martin, Lawrence, "The Perfect Day of an Itinerant Peacemaker", Essays Offered to Herbert Putnam by his Colleagues and Friends on his Thirtieth Anniversary as Librarian of Congress 5 April 1921, New Haven, 1929, 333-350.

Martin was a member of the Miles Field Commission, and a supporter of the majority report. Here he reaffirms the argument of geographic unity as a basis for preserving the Klagenfurt Basin as a whole.


Here is presented an account of Slavič's work as Slovenian expert for Prekmurje, and as assistant to Dr. Kovačič, the Slovenian expert for Styria, during the time of the Peace Conference. A description is also given of the events leading to and the actual drawing up of a national frontier between German and Slovenian Styria.


Stare, who acted as secretary to the Yugoslav Delegation on the Klagenfurt plebiscite, herein describes the organization of the plebiscite and analyzes some of the causes of the Slovenian defeat.

Reverend Trunk was a member of one of the Commune Councils for the Klag-enfurf plebiscite; shortly after that time he left Carinthia to come to the United States. Here he presents his memoirs from the opening of World War I up to and including his voyage to the United States. In the section most pertinent to the subject of this thesis, he chronicles the irregularities of the organization and handling of the plebiscite in the districts of Ferlach and Bleiburg. The Ave Maria is a Catholic monthly review in the Slovenian language, published by the Slovenian Franciscan Fathers.

Zolger, Ivan, "Quo vadimus, Slovenski Narod, Ljubljana, June 2, 1921.

Zolger explains how he acted, as Slovenian representative to the Peace Conference, in an attempt to clarify Slovenian claims to the other experts at the Conference. He sheds considerable light on the reasons behind the radical change in fundamental principles made by the Peace Conference during the course of the Conference.

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A revised edition of Erjavec's Slovenci (1923).

Erjavec, Franc, Slovenci, Ljubljana, 1923.

A geographical, historical, political, cultural, economic, and social review of Slovenian life.

Fauchille, Paul, Traite de droit international public, Paris, 1925.

The author is an outstanding French authority on international public law.

One of the best scientific works on Carinthia in the Slovenian language, containing numerous tables, statistics, maps, and documentary materials. It contains works by Slovenian authorities on geography, history, statistics, and law. With the exception of the last few chapters dealing with partisan activities during World War II, which are slightly colored with communist propaganda, this work is quite impartial and scholarly.


A short, condensed history of the Carinthian Slovenians from the migration up to the present.

Grafenauer, Bogo, Dušan Perović, and Jaroslav Šidak, eds., Zgodovina narodov Jugoslavije, I, Ljubljana, 1953.

The most recent history of Yugoslavia, only the first of the projected three volumes has been issued to date. Three chapters of the present volume are devoted to the history of Slovenia: chapter three, which describes the migration of the Slovenians, chapter five, Slovenia from the seventh to the eleventh centuries, and chapter fourteen, Slovenia from the twelfth through the fifteenth centuries. The book contains an appendix of historical maps, and each chapter is thoroughly documented. It should be pointed out, however, that the work is permeated by the communist doctrine of class development and is conceived in line with the economic interpretation of history.

Gruden, Josip, Zgodovina slovenskega naroda, Celovec, 1912-1916.

A collection under one binding of the six volumes edited by the Association of St. Hermagoras, being a history of the Slovenians from the migrations up to the French Revolution.

Hoover War Library, A Catalogue of Paris Peace Conference Delegation Propaganda, Stanford University, California, 1926.

A bibliography of all documents handed to the Paris Peace Conference by the various delegations. Also catalogues propaganda pieces prepared by the delegations.


An excellent work. Chapter nine of the first volume is devoted to the national development of the Slovenian nation from 1848 up to the First World War. It should be noted here that Doctor Kopitar did not have the strong political influence on the Slovenian renaissance which the author of this work attributes to him.
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A Slovenian work in the German language, dealing particularly with the problem of Slovenian schools in Carinthia.

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A History of the Yugoslavs in the sixth century, the report of the museum’s Association for Carniola, Ljubljana (annual report).


The Slovenian Jurist was a monthly publication of the Department of Law at the University of Ljubljana. Tomšič here discusses various points of view concerning the legal organization of the Carinthia plebiscite.

Tomšič, Ivan, "Plebiscit na Koroškem s pravne strani", *Koroški Zbornik*, 1946,
A discussion of the Carinthia plebiscite presented from a juridical point of view.
APPENDIX I

LIST OF GEOGRAPHICAL PLACE NAMES

Since the maps furnished for this thesis were collected from various foreign sources, it was considered necessary by the author to supply the reader with a language cross-index of place names used in this thesis. English (E.), German (G.), Slovenian (S.), Italian (It.), Latin (L.), and French (F.) equivalents have been provided wherever such cross-reference was deemed necessary for complete identification of geographical location.

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*Oglej (S.)*: Aquilea (L., It.)

*Ormož (S.)*: Freidau (G.)

Pettau (G.)

Pliberk (S.)

Podklošter (S.)

Podrožica (S.)

Pohorje (S.)

Pontablašj (S.)

Pontafel (G.)

Pontebba (It.)

Pragerhof (G.)

Pragersko (S.)

Predil (S.)

Predilpass (G.)

Primorska (S.)

Ptuj (S.)

Raab (G.)

Raba (S.)

Radgona (S.)

Radkersburg (G.)

Radmannsdorf (G.)

Radovljica (S.)

Rosenbach (G.)

Rosal (G.)

Rož (S.)

Rožek (S.)

Sava (S.)

Save (G.)

Šcreland (G.)

Skofja Loka (S.)

Slovenia (E.)

Slovenija (S.)

Slovenien (G.)
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APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Bogdan Cyril Novak has been read and approved by three members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

October 28, 1954
Signature of Adviser