Intuitive Knowledge in the Philosophy of John Duns Scotus

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INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

by
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LIFE

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INTRODUCTION

John Duns Scotus proposes in his philosophy two acts of knowledge: the abstractive and the intuitive. Intuitive knowledge is the knowledge of a thing present and existing, as it is present and existing. Abstractive knowledge, on the other hand, can be had of an object whether it is present or not and whether it is existing or not.

Duns Scotus proves the necessity for adding the act of intuitive knowledge to the act of abstractive knowledge on the basis of the adequacy of being as the proper object of the intellect attainable by intuitive knowledge in an eminent degree, since the proper object of sense knowledge is attainable by intuitive knowledge. This is the argument based on the analogy with sense knowledge. Scotus proves his point also from the knowledge of our interior acts which must be intuitive, from intellective memory which is a recall of the actually existing thing, and from our knowledge of contingent truths which predicate actual existence of a subject. If we are to have the intuitive knowledge that exists in the beatific vision, there must be a natural capacity in man pre-existing this type of knowledge. The capacity is natural, while the gift itself is supernatural and endowed by God.
The intuitive knowledge of a thing as actually present in its concrete existence postulates the individual being as the proper object of the intellect. The concept of being is the product of both abstractive and intuitive knowledge, and is univocal and adequate as to motivation and predication. The individual being as object of the intellect is made up of the formalities of the common nature and individuality or haecceity, formally distinct, but in reality identical. The formal distinction between the individuality and the common nature produces the individual being and serves as the foundation for intuitive knowledge.

With the sensitive power or faculty of the soul formally distinct, but really identical, with the intellective faculty or power—allowing to the acts of these powers a real distinction—the similarity between sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge as being intuitive takes the form of an identity, properly distinguishing intellectual intuitive knowledge to exist in an eminent degree over sensitive intuitive knowledge.

Endeavors will be made to present the doctrine of John Duns Scotus on intuitive knowledge. The doctrine on univocal being and the formal distinction will be presented to give a better understanding of intuitive knowledge. Adequate judgment on the doctrine of John Duns Scotus concerning intuitive knowledge can be given, if his doctrine is considered as a logical development from his own principles of philosophy, namely, the univocity of being and the formal distinction.
CHAPTER I

INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

The philosophical doctrine of a man is passed on to posterity through his writings, a source more certain than oral tradition. However, even into the writings of a man may creep works that are not his, because of the over-zealousness of his followers to give to their master proper credit, or because of inadvertence and ignorance. There are at present two chief sources for the works of John Duns Scotus: the Wadding edition and the Vives edition. These editions include the spurious with the authentic works of Scotus. The Scotistic commission, however, directed at present by Charles Balicç, O.F.M., is now working at Rome meticulously and laboriously on a new critical edition that purports to include the authentic works of Scotus, the best critical readings of those works,—two volumes of which are published,—and what promises to be an unbiased and factual life of Scotus, being written by Ephrem Longpré, O.F.M., the former director of the commission. This purification after a century and a half of oblivion tends to eliminate the contradictions in the works of Scotus, and heralds a new flowering of philosophy, in the place of its decadence.
The results of the criticism to which the work of Duns Scotus has been subjected has thrown a new light on his philosophy. Contradictions disappear, the links with the past are stronger, the constructive value is more evident, and we now see the genius of the Franciscan master in a very different light from that in which it was formerly placed.  

Intuition is a vague and ethereal term, misunderstood very much, when it is understood at all.

M. DeMunnynck, O.P., in his excellent study on intuition, has passed on to us a rather complete division of the kinds of intuition that exist. Most common of all is the "perceptive intuition" where "sensible objects impose themselves on our perception without any intermediary."

The perceptive intuition dominates our whole imaginative life. The "imaginative intuition" reveals, as if in a dream, a wholly imaginative world by means of an internal vision. On the next step up is the "infra-rational intuition", in which "everyone at some time or another gets a new idea, a new image, which is not the fruit of reasoning something which is offered brusquely to the attention of the mind." The intuition of genius, of inventiveness, of individuality is the infra-rational intuition. "Fundamental intellectual intuition" is the immediate grasp of the object common to

3 Ibid., 148.
4 Ibid., 151.
the mind, the intuition—to what degree of clarity it may be—of being as such. "To the unique nature of the intelligence there should correspond a common object. All that we conceive must present a common aspect rendering it intelligible. This common aspect, we soon discover, is nothing other than being, taken in all its fullness."

5 The "post-rational intuition" is the progressive vision on conclusions the mind develops in its thinking. 6 "Supra-rational intuition" is a visioning of things above reason, as for example, the harmonious reasonableness existing between the infinite mercy and the infinite justice of God. 7

The "mystical intuition" of the saints is the pure vision of God. 8

Intuition, as its significance appears in the pages of the philosophy of Duns Scotus is a type of the intellectual intuition. Scotistic intuition is the act of understanding an object both as actually present and actually existing. This act of intuition is distinct from the act of understanding, called abstraction, which is indifferent to the existence or non-existence of the object, as well as to its presence or absence. Why should there be possible such an act of intuitive knowledge in addition

5 Ibid., 154.
6 Ibid., 156, 157.
7 Ibid., 159-161.
8 Ibid., 164, 165.
to abstractive knowledge? Duns Scotus gives the following answer as proof for intuitive knowledge. Every absolute cognitional perfection that inheres in the sensitive faculty of knowledge should eminently inhere in the intellectual faculty of knowledge. Now it is proper to the perfection of actual knowledge to grasp completely its first known object. The object is not completely grasped, when it is not grasped in itself, but in a certain diminished likeness derived from it. The sensitive faculty possesses this perfection in its knowledge, because it can grasp the object in itself, as it is actually existing and actually present. The sensitive faculty does not grasp the object in a diminished resemblance and in a certain diminished perfection. Therefore, this kind of knowledge should inhere in the intellectual faculty, and cannot inhere there, unless that faculty know its object as actually existing and as actually present, or in some intelligible object eminently containing this first known object.9

9 Joannes Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, q. VI, n. 8, Duns Scoti Opera Omnia, ed. Vives, Paris, 1891-1895, XXV, 243, 244: Iste actus intelligendi . . . potest satis propri duci abstractivus, quia abstrahit objectum ab existentia et non existentia, praesentia et absentia. Alius autem actus intelli gendi, quem tamen non ita certitudinaliter experimur in nobis: possibilis tamen est talis, qui, scilicet praeclae sit objecti praesentis ut praesentis, et existentis ut existentis. Hoc pro batur, quia omnis perfectio cognitionis absolute, quae potest competere potentiae cognitivae sensitivae, potest eminenter com petere potentiae cognitivae intellectivae; nunc autem perfectionis est in actu cognoscenti, ut cognitio est, perfecte attingere
While Duns Scotus modifies the theory that says our knowledge is the result of abstraction alone, he admits that the theory of intuitive knowledge supplements the theory of abstraction. In abstractive knowledge the intellect abstracts the object from existence and non-existence, from its presence and absence. There is another kind of knowledge, however, which focuses precisely upon a present object as present, and on an existing object as existing. The evidence for this additional kind of knowledge flows from an analogy with sense knowledge. Any cognitive perfection that belongs to sense knowledge should belong in an eminent degree to intellectual knowledge. We know perfectly, when we know the object in itself, not when we know the object only in some diminished similarity or in some similarity derived from the object. Sense knowledge is perfect knowledge, because sense attains its object as it is in itself, as existing, and as present in its real existence. Perfect knowledge of this kind should also pertain to the intellectual faculty, since the sensi-

primum cognitum; non autem perfecte attingitur, quando non in se attingitur, sed tantummodo in aliqua diminuta, vel derivata similitudine ab ipso; sensitiva autem habet hanc perfectionem in cognitione sua, quia potest objectum attingere in se, ut existens, et ut praesens est in existentia reali, et non tantum diminute attingendo ipsum in quadam perfectione diminuta; ergo ista perfectio competit intellectivae in cognoscendo; sed non posset sibi competere, nisi cognosceret existens, et ut in existentia propria praesens est, vel in aliquo objecto intelligibili eminenter ipsum continente . . . See also Opus Oxoniense, IV, d. 49, q. 12, XXI, 442; Opus Oxoniense, II, d. 3, q. 9, XII, 212, 213.
tive power; conjoined to an intellectual soul and an organ, as
for example, vision, is really identical with the soul, since the
sensitive power is considered as a virtue of the soul itself,
which does not need operation unless united to the organ, and
also because of the adequacy of univocal being as the object of
the intellect. Of univocity and the formal distinction more will
be said in later chapters. Therefore, the intellect can know a
thing as existing and as it is present in its own existence.
This knowledge may be called intuitive knowledge, in the strict
sense of the term, since it is an intuition of the thing as
actually present and existing.

Ephrem Longpré calls the basis of the concept of uni-
vocal being that is the adequate object of the intellect and the
product of the intellect's process of abstractive and intuitive
knowledge the individual Ens. The individual being is an object
of thought, and it is the only reality which exists in fact. The
individual being is constituted of the quiddities or formalities
of individuality and the common nature, both of which are for-
mally distinct, that is to say, really identical. A more com-

10 Maurice J. Grajewski, O.F.M., The Formal Distinc-

11 Cyril L. Shircel, O.F.M., The Univocity of the
Concept of Being in the Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, Wash-
ington, D. C., 1942, 64, 65.
plete explanation of the formal distinction will follow in chapter III. In order to reach the quiddities of individuality, the concrete and actual existence of the individual being, and of the common nature, the ideal quiddity, abstractive and intuitive knowledge must be employed. Abstractive knowledge reaches the object in its ideal quiddity, or in its common nature, through the intelligible species which moves the intellect. Intuitive knowledge reaches the object in its existential reality, or in its individuality, through the thing present in itself which directly moves the intellect. Intuitive knowledge grasps immediately the thing itself present in its concrete existence, and it also grasps the real and objective aspects of the Ens, the first intentions of being, or the nature as nature. By this dual knowledge the mind has a complete and a direct grasp of the individual.

As an object of thought, the individual Ens is also the only reality which exists in fact. In order to reach its concrete and actual existence, and to give us an ideal representation, according to Duns Scotus, two ways present themselves: the abstractive and the intuitive cognition. The former is based on abstraction; it does not reach its object in its existential reality, but in its ideal quiddity; this is the foundation of science in the Aristotelian sense of the word, thanks to the abstract concepts which it elaborates. Intuitive cognition, on the contrary, is a direct view of the object; it touches immediately the thing itself in its concrete existence, as well as the real and objective aspects of the Ens, which the Scholastics call intentiones praeae entis. In abstractive cognition, the intelligible species moves the intellect; in the intuitive cognition, on the contrary, it is the object, res praeens in se.

It is in this double fashion that the mind directly
The Scotistic concept of the individual being, made up of the common nature and the individual difference or haecceity, differs vastly from the Aristotelian-Thomistic composite, constituted of prime matter and substantial form, which are really distinct. Abstractive knowledge reaches as far as the essence or common nature. Intuitive knowledge completes the process by reaching the first intentions of being, the existential presence shining through the individuality. In abstraction the intelligible species motivates the intellect, but the thing present in itself is the motivating object in intuitive knowledge.

To safeguard our certitude about the existence of objects outside the mind Scotus postulates intuitive knowledge in addition to abstractive knowledge. The abstracted species presents to the mind the quiddity of the object devoid of its actual conditions, telling us nothing of its actual existence, since it prescinds from the object's existence or non-existence. Abstraction is an imperfect kind of knowledge, since the object is not present in itself, but is present through the intermediary of a species that represents the object imperfectly. The intellect should have the privilege of a more perfect type of knowledge, as

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given in intuitive knowledge, since the sense faculty, inferior in its cognition to the intellectual faculty, reaches its object perfectly in its actual presence and concrete existence. By this intuitive knowledge the intellect has the impression of life, that is, of things as they are existing and in the concrete.

"Intuitive cognition is in itself a more perfect manner of knowing than abstractive cognition; in intuition, the object is given as present in itself and not by the intermediary of a species which represents it imperfectly; under this heading it is fitting to endow reason with the privilege of intuition, and this, so much the more because sense, which is an inferior cognitive faculty, enjoys it and reaches concretely its object. Without intuition, the intellect would never have the impression of life, of the existing and of the concrete, for the abstract species represents precisely the quiddity of the object outside of all its actual conditions, and teaches us nothing about its existence." "In effect," Scotus continues, "abstractive cognition represents equally, in an ideal manner, a thing that exists or that does not exist, an object present or not; accordingly, it is impossible to obtain by this means, cognition of a thing as far as it is existing and present to the subject which perceives it. It is necessary, then, that the intellect be endowed with intuition, otherwise it would not have any certitude of the existence of any object whatsoever: alioquin intellectus non esset certus de aliquo existentia alicujus objecti."

Following the argument in favor of intuitive knowledge from the analogy with sense knowledge, Scotus proposes the argument from the knowledge of our interior acts. Scotus says that if we would not have an intuitive knowledge of some object, we would not know whether our acts are within us or not with any degree of certitude. It is a fact, however, that we do know that our intrinsic acts of intellection and willing, along with our

13 Ibid., 42.
sense knowledge belong to our Ego. I ponder, I wonder; I want, I need, I desire; I see, I feel. Experience teaches this. It is not a question of "it is thought, it is seen". Therefore, the same reasons that hold good for placing the individual being as the object of intuitive knowledge, hold good for any being whatever, including our interior acts.14

Intuitive knowledge is the knowledge of a concretely present object, insofar as it is actually existing. The soul apprehends itself concretely with no intermediary. In this way also the soul apprehends its acts and its states of consciousness. This is an intuition we experience of our inner acts. Our interior acts are present to ourselves and existing within us, and our knowledge of them is a knowledge of them as present and existing. This is intuitive knowledge of our intrinsic acts, the revelation of our conscious acts, revealing itself with the successive states of our thoughts and volitions. This is the psychological intuition of the Ego. Longpré tells us that psychological intuition is an immediate perception, the act of an interior sense by which the soul apprehends itself without any intermediate agent, as well as its operations and its states of conscience: *Quodam sensu, id est perceptione interiori experimur*. In this apprehension the soul

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14 Scotus, *Opus Oxoniense*, IV, d. 49, q. 8, XXI, 306: "... Si non haberemus de aliquo cognitionem intuitivam, non sciremus de actibus nostris si insunt nobis, vel non certitudinaliter (de actibus dico intranscend), sed hoc est falsum; ergo, etc. ergo eadem ratione qua ponis unum ens posse intuitive cognosci, et quodcumque."
apprehends itself concretely. As an experienced intuition, as conscience, or light of our conscious acts, it renews itself in proportion as our thoughts and our acts of will succeed each other; it reveals the existence of the Ego, its ontological tendencies, and its immanent operations, but nothing beyond their presence and the assurance that they belong to the subject which experiences them . . . . The supernatural escapes the grasp of psychological experience. Likewise, intuition does not give us the knowledge of the nature or even of the essence of the soul.15

Longpré goes on to explain that when we wish to fix the proper object of a faculty, we proceed "from the very nature itself of the immanent act perceived by internal experience, and not precisely from the essence of this faculty, considered abstractly."16 Proceeding from the essence of the intellect considered abstractly, we should say that, since the human composite is constituted of a form in matter, the soul substantially united to the body, human knowledge should proceed along the lines of abstracting the form from matter, because there is a proportion in the modes of existence between the object of knowledge and the faculty of knowledge. This thought will be expanded in the second chapter. Proceeding, however, with Duns Scotus from the very nature itself of the intrinsic act as perceived by internal

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16 Ibid., 29. Scotus, Oxoniense Prolegomenon, q. 1, n. 13, VIII, 23: Excepto actu quem experimur, concludimus potentiæ et naturam, cujus iste actus est, illud respicere pro objecto quod percipimus attingi per actum, ita quod objectum potentiae non concluditur ex cognitione potentiae sed ex cognitione
experience, seen in our introspections, we see several things that lead us to establish the proper object of the intellect. From the very nature of the internal act as perceived by psychological intuition, we experience the incapacity of the intellect to embrace at the same time actually and concretely an infinite number of objects, and that the intellect understands quite indistinctly a large number of objects, taken actually and concretely at the same time, if these objects are understood through a variety of species. Secondly, psychological intuition shows us the imperfection and the limits of human knowledge. Finally, introspection teaches us that our intellectual acts succeed one after the other, having an existence after a non-existence, and are not perpetual. Since the intellect is imperfect, limited, and incapable of grasping a multitude of objects at the same time, but proceeds from one intellectual act to another, it follows

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\text{actus quem experimur.}
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17 Ibid. Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, III, d. 14, q. 3, n. 5, xxiii, 356; Experimur quod intellectus noster non se extendit simul actualiter in infinita nec extendere potest, imo valde indistincte intelligit plura simul actu si illa intelligentur per diversas species.

18 Ibid. Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, II, d. 3, q. 9, n. 2, xii, 216; Opus Oxoniense, III, d. 14, q. 2, n. 20, xiv, 317.

19 Ibid. Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, I, d. 3, q. 7, n. 20, ix, 361: . . . intellectio actualis est aliquid in nobis non perpetuum sed habens esse post non esse sicut experimur.
there must be one proper object of the intellect, the individual being.

Duns Scotus believes that every singular is of itself intelligible, even though the singular may not be as equally intelligible to every intellect. Since the understanding is the faculty that naturally grasps the entire being in its essence and in its existence, and since in the singular there is nothing that stands outside of being, everything within the singular being is intelligible by its very nature. Since the individual in itself possesses unity, the individual being is intelligible in itself and directly. Scotus says

"that every singular, to whatever genus it belongs, is of itself intelligible, although it may not be equally so to every intellect. Consequently, since the understanding is the faculty of the entire Ens, and since in the singular there is nothing which is not positively Ens, all that is in the singular Ens is intelligible by its very nature. Moreover, the individual in itself is endowed with unity; it is then intelligible by itself and directly." 20

If we did not know directly our interior acts, both the intellectual and of the interior senses and sensation, we would have no proof for the existence of our individual soul from the permanency of the Ego through our successive and varied acts. This would lead to the impermanent, ever-flitting "states of consciousness", as the substrate of personality, instead of the Ego or the soul. The ground for the direct knowledge of the self as

20 Ibid., 40. Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, III, d. 14, q. 3, n. 7, xxii, 357.
thinking would wash away. Introspection would disappear, along
with knowledge and science. The internal evidence for the direct
knowledge of our interior acts denied,--how else can we know
them?--common sense is denied, since one denies one's self. The
result could lead anywhere; to a state of doubt at the least.

We now come to the third of the quintet of proofs Duns
scotus offers in favor of intuitive knowledge.

One of our interior acts is the power of remembering
things, on the sensible level, as on the level of intellect.
There is in the intellect the power of recollection in relation
to a universal object, and even in relation to a singular object,
in addition to acts of the will. Were it otherwise, we would
have to deny the sanctions of punishment and reward, for we re-
call the individual deeds that deserve reward and feel happy, or
that deserve punishment and feel guilty. In this way recollec-
tion is proper to the intellect, but there is a certain kind of
recollection common to the intellective and sensitive faculty in
man. There is the recollection on the part of the inferior sen-
sitive powers. Just as the intellect can perceive my act intuiti-
tively or abstractively, in the act of understanding, so the
sense can record whether it be an act proper to the intellect,
or proper to some other faculty.21

21 Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, IV, d. 45, q. 3,
n. 10, XXIV, 574: ... recordari non est partis sensitivae, sed
Intuitive knowledge is not only of the singular, but essentially it is of the existing nature itself, as existing. Intellective memory is also of a past object previously existing, not as singular, but as this singular, as existing, which is not cut off from the universal, although it may be cut off from the abstractive quiddity through the operation of the intellect. A rose existing at the present is not cut off from the universal concept, upon which science is founded, even though the universal has not reached its ultimate grade of abstraction. 22

intellectivae. Recordatio enim non tantum est in intellectu respectu objecti universalis, imo respectu objecti singularis, et actus volendi similiter, alias oportet negare poenas et præmia. . . . Unde dico quod ista recordatio est propria intellectus, quae non est alterius, sed tantum est recordatio actus ipsius intellectus et voluntatis. Sed alia est similiter recordatio, quae est communis sibi et aliis, scilicet parti intellectivae et sensitivae, nam quaedam est recordatio potentiarum inferiorum, scilicet sensitivarum; sicut enim intellectus potest percipere actum meum intuitive vel abstractive, intelligendo, ita posset sensus recordari, sive sit actus proprius intellectus, sive aliarum potentiarum.

22 Ibid., n. 13, XXIV, 575, 576: cognitio intuitiva non est tantum singularis, inquantum est cognitio intuitiva, sed essentialiter est ipsius naturae existentia, ut existens est, quia prius competit esse naturae, quam sit ut haec sive ut singularis, eo quod essentia sit ejusdem rationis in omnibus singularibus, non autem singularitas ipsa est ejusdem rationis in omnibus, sed diversa in quolibet singulari unius essentiae; et quo sequitur quod essentia potest cognosci, non tamen singularitas ejus. Cum igitur ad recordationem non requiritur nisi præteritum prius existens, licet non ut singulare, idcirco esto quod singularis, ut tale, non intelligitur ab intellectu, intelligitur tamen aliquid singularare, non ut singulare, sed ut intelligitur, et tale singulare, ut existens, non recedit ab universalis, licet a quidditate abstractiva per intellectum recedat, quia rosa nunc existens non recedit a rosa universalis, de qua scientia est, licet non sit universale in ultimo gradu abstractionis; et ita dico.
This is the third of the quintet of proofs Scotus proposes for intuitive knowledge. Intellecutive memory is an act we are acquainted with. We recall ideas; a speech is given from memory. The factual internal evidence for this act of memory postulates a faculty of memory, since *operatio sequitur esse*, an act betokens a faculty, just as every effect must have a cause. Of course, the intellecutive memory draws its material from the storehouse of images retained in the phantasy. There is a recall of sensible images, of phantasms. We recall an image of a fulcrum, of a triangle, of the written or spoken word. Upon this recall of sensible images is based the intellecutive recall of ideas. However, to recall an intelligible species as essence completely separated from its actual existence and individual character, is to recall the empty shell of reality, a shadow and a fiction of what is really present in actually existing individual things. As a result we are confronted with the chasm splitting our intellecutive remembrance of individual reality from the material phantasm, and, so to speak, its sensitive memory, the basis for intellecutive memory. This severs memory from its object. As a consequence, we can see a great deal of wealth and an immense

*quod anima separata recordari potest de tali natura existente, licet non ut singularis. See also Parthenius Minges, *Joannis Duns Scoti Doctrina Philosophica et Theologica*, Florentiae, 1930, 1, 193-205.*
depth of thought in Plato's attempt to bind the intellect to reality through the recollection of "Ideas". To recall the objective "forms" Plato intimates the mind's need for an objective basis for the universal concept it forms. There should be a universal in re, a common nature, which in its turn, conjoined to the specific nature, serves as a basis for ideation and recall.

A memory about the past, and an opinion about the future are the two kinds of imperfect intuitive knowledge Scotus proffers; while intuitive knowledge about the nature, or the singular, as it partakes of actual existence, is perfect intuitive knowledge.

Passing over imperfect intuitive knowledge as an opinion about the future, we see that the proof for intuitive knowledge from intellective memory rests upon the proof from our knowledge of contingent truths. This proof introduces the fourth member of the quintet.

Scotus tells us that the human intellect can know the singular as this singular, because this knowledge is not disproportionate; nor is this knowledge contradictory to the created


24 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, III, d. 14, q. 2, XIV, 527.
intellect, as intellect. The human intellect, however, cannot know the singular, as this singular, from the nature of the universal, since this nature, as such, is not contained determinately, that is, as this nature, within the notion of universality. Consequently, if the singular is known as this singular, it is known through a species proper to it. It is improbable that every species of all possible singulars should be created at the same time that the human intellect knows them. These possibilities being infinite in number, there would be an infinite number of actual infinite species, and the individual could know everything.25

But should the human intellect have a notion of the singular, as it is singular, that is not taken from things, still it would be necessary to grasp the notion of the actual existence of the thing, or its non-existence, and also a notion of the accidents required for the existence or non-existence of the thing, from reality. The reason for this is evident, since from the notion of quiddities and universals, which are clearly necessary in nature, there can be no knowledge of the contingent proposition. The existence or non-existence of things, however, are contingent facts. Consequently, it is not adequate to have the

25 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, II, d. 3, q. 11, n. 11, XII, 278.
The truths that can be known by the intuitive knowledge of existing things, as they are existing, that is, contingent truths, cannot be known through the medium of any species whatever. The explanation rests in the fact that from the knowledge of the terms there can be no knowledge of the interlinking and existential truth concerning the two terms of contingent com-

26 Ibid., 278, 279.
27 Ibid., 279.
plexes, that is to say, of propositions joined by the nexus of existence, the copula, "it is", or "est". The existential truth of contingent propositions is not included within the terms, as the necessary existential truth of the scientific proposition is included in the species and in the terms. From this follows the necessity for having some things present in themselves, in order that they may be known and seen in themselves intuitively, to account for the knowledge of contingent truths, which deal with existing things, as they are actually existing. This process of knowing contingent truths cannot be accomplished in the common genus, unless by means of things themselves present in themselves according to their own existence, nor on this account, can actual or habitual intuitive knowledge in the common genus be given the soul (of Christ's humanity) about all things. He makes progress in knowledge like every other soul by knowing one thing after the other, in one way or another. In relation to imperfect intuitive knowledge, which remains, carried about by the intellective memory as habitual intuitive knowledge, as the left-over from our perfect intuitive cognitions, the same may be said that it does not know everything in its common genus. This follows, since many memories are left in the mind from the many singulare known with perfect intuitive knowledge. From these memories are known those objects, relating to the conditions of existence, not as present, but as past, and in those conditions of existence those
objects had in the past. 28

Scotus is a perfectionist, in the sense that, while seeing the lapsed nature of man, he still penetrates beneath this status down to the natural capacities themselves in the intellect of man, and foresees the results these capacities were foreordained to produce. To get a better view of these natural capacities, Scotus analyses the perfect status of knowledge as seen in the Angels and in the humanity of Christ and in the beatific vision. Though hindered and held down to earth by the senses, Scotus will nevertheless maintain that man has these natural capacities, say for intuition, however dulled in their lustre they

28 Scotus, *Opus Oxoniense*, III, d. 14, q. 3, n. 6, XIV, 527, 528; . . . veritates cognoscibiles cognitione intuitiva de existentibus, ut existentia sunt, scilicet veritates contingentes, non possunt cognosci per species quascumque innatas, quia ex cognitione terminorum non potest cognosci veritas complexorum contingentium de illis terminis, quia illorum complexionum veritas non includitur in terminis, sicut in speciebus et terminis earum includitur veritas necessaria complexionalis scientialis. Oportet igitur propter veritates contingentes, quae sunt de existentibus, ut existentia sunt, cognoscendas, habere aliqua objecta in se praeuentia, ut possint in se intuitive cognoscì et videri; et hoc non potest fieri in proprio genere, nisi ipsis rebus in se secundum suam existentiam praesentibus, et ita illa cognitione intuitiva in genere proprio actualis vel habitualis, non potest dari illi animae de omnibus; et quod hoc necessè est dicere quod profecit, sicut et alia anima, quia alia et alia objecta, alio et alio modo cognovit. Similiter quantum ad intuitivam imperfectam, quae relinquitur ex ista perfecta, quia de talibus pluribus perfecte intuitive cognitís derelictæ sunt piures memoriae, quibus cognoscuntur illa objecta quantum ad conditiones existentiae, non ut praeuentia, sed ut praeterita, ad hoc dico, quod etiam sic non novit omnia in genere proprio.
may be as the result of the scorching effects of original sin. Moreover, these capacities for direct knowledge are natural to man, since God created man with these potentialities in His Infinite Wisdom.

To the objection that a present object leaves only an intelligible species in the intellect and an imaginable species in the sensitive faculty, the power of producing the phantasm, Scotus replies that it leaves a memorative species, along with a sensible species in the phantasy. The sensitive faculty knows the object in itself absolutely, apprehending its quiddity. The memorative faculty grasps the object as it was grasped in the past, so that the past apprehension is the immediate object, and the immediate object of that past apprehension is the mediate object of recollection. Abstractive knowledge abstracts the species of the quiddity, as it is a quiddity, from the species in the phantasm, which represents the object absolutely, not as it exists here and now or then. Intuitive knowledge co-operates with the intellect, grasping its object as present in its actual existence, and from this co-operation there results an habitual intuitive cognition held in the memorative intellect. This habitual intuitive cognition is not of the quiddity absolutely, but of the thing known as existing, when it was perceived in the past, as a once existing past experience.29

29 Ibid., 526: Et si objicitur quod ex re praesente
Along with the proof from sense analogy and conscience, Longpré has in addition admirably summarized the proofs from contingent truths and memory. He goes on to say:

Furthermore, all the judgments of existence that we form and that express truths purely contingent de facto, are conditioned by the direct and intuitive view of terms united or separated by the intellect in the judgment. The abstract or universal concept, since it does not reflect the actual existence of objects, is incapable of signifying to the mind, that the terms—subject and predicate—are united or separated objectively. "It is not," adds Scotus, "in the nature itself of these terms that the understanding finds the reason or the relation which establishes de facto these truths, for then these propositions would not be contingent, but necessary, as all that is taken from the nature of things." The

non relinquitur nisi species intelligibilis in intellectu, et in parte sensitiva species imaginabilis, ut in virtute phantastica, hoc falsum est, quia de re praesente non tantum relinquitur species sensibilis in phantasia, sed aliqua in potentia memorativa, et illae potentiae cognoscent objectum sub alia et alia ratione; nam una cognoscit objectum secundum se absolute, apprehendendo quidditatem ejus; alia apprehendit objectum, ut in praeterito apprehensum, ita quod apprehensio praeterita est immediatum objectum, et objectum immediatum illius apprehensionis praeteritas est objectum mediatum recordationis. Ita etiam praesente aliquo sensibili sensui, potest virtute illius causari in intellectu duplex cognitio, una abstractiva, qua intellectus agens abstrahit speciem quidditatis, ut quidditas est, a specie in phantasmate, quae repraesentat objectum absolute, non ut existit hic et nunc vel tunc; et alia potest esse in intellectu cognitio intuitiva, quae cooperatur intellectui, et ab hac potest derelinqui habitualis cognitio intuitiva importata in memoria intellectiva, quae sit non quidditatis absolute, . . . sed cogniti ut existens, quando in praeterito apprehendebatur, ut praeterit.

An excellent commentary follows q. 3, 529-532.

For the doctrine of Scotus on the agent intellect as the ordered activity of reducing the potential universal or intelligible to the actual universal or intelligible, and of making the potentially understood actually understood, and his doctrine on the possible intellect as memory and intelligence, see Quaestiones Quodlibetales, q. 15, n. 16, XXVI, 146, 147.
attrition of the predicate to a singular subject supposes, then, the intellectual intuition of the concrete and of the existential. "Moreover," adds the Marian Doctor, "without intuition, the intellective memory is lessened, for it would only conserve the intelligible species of universal concepts and not the representation of singular objects perceived in their concrete reality." 30

We come finally to the fifth member of the quintet of proofs in favor of intuitive knowledge. This is the proof from the natural capacity of the human intellect for the beatific vision.

Haunting Duns Scotus throughout his work is the status of the human intellect as it operates united to the body in this life, and its proper status to behold God and the glorified Body of Christ face to face in the beatific vision, in its entitative status. 31 The beatific vision is intuitive, since it would be impossible to have beatitude consist in the knowledge of an object, not actually present and existing, as happens through the phantasm in abstractive knowledge, but it must consist in the actual face to face vision of God in His existential presence. 32 The intellect as an intellect has the capacity to know singulars directly, the immaterial as well as the material, though as it


32 Scotus, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, q. 6, n. 8, xxv, 244.
operates in the present life in conjunction with the body, it grasps singulars in a hazy way, that is, it apprehends vaguely the first intentions of the specific nature, or haecceity.

Dorothea Elizabeth Sharp presents observations on this point worthy of notice:

The intellect in itself . . . has the power to know singulars . . . . Yet in its present life being hindered by body, it can only vaguely apprehend them by grasping certain general first intentiones of the haecceitas such as numerical unity, independent existence, and incommunicability.33

Since the beatific vision is promised man, he must have the capacity for receiving this vision, since the "necessary prerequisite for receiving any perfection, be it natural or supernatural, accidental or substantial, is that the recipient have the capacity to receive it."34 A miracle or supernatural accident or substance cannot fulfill this fundamental need. Christ cannot give sight to a stone, unless he first makes it an eye. God cannot give an angel or a human soul the vision of Himself, without putting into the angelic nature and the human nature at its creation the capacity to receive the beatific vision. Because of the need for a natural capacity in acquiring a perfec-


tion, whether natural or supernatural, "all knowledge, even that of the beatific vision, is natural in the sense that it is in accord with the nature of man." 35

There is no species in intuitive cognition. While the sensible image intervenes in abstractive knowledge, "this collaboration is not an absolute necessity, based on the nature itself of the soul—otherwise, the intellect could never attain God and spiritual substances." 36 The collaboration of sensible image and intellect is not entirely the consequence of original sin, "since, even if it is in the absolute power of the intellect to know without the help of the sensible image, it is none the less natural for the soul, united substantially to the body, to reach also the real by way of the senses and of the imagination." 37 The co-operation of intellect and imagination is partially explained by original sin, and partially by the natural order of the soul set up by divine wisdom for the present state of our life. 38

35 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, II, d. 3, q. 8, n. 13, XII, 195: Hoc non est ex natura nec ista causa est absolute naturalis sed est ex peccato sed etiam ex natura potentiarum pro statu isto, quidquid dicit Augustinus.
The argument from the natural capacity of the human intellect for the beatific vision—to prevent violence being done a natural faculty by changing its nature to receive a supernatural perfection—completes the quintet of arguments in favor of Scotus's position on intuitive knowledge. This is the fifth proof Wolter adds to the quartet of proofs Shircel has discovered:

the Subtle Doctor establishes his theory of intuitive cognition, over and above the abstractive, on the following evidence: firstly, by the fact of intellective memory; secondly, by analogy with sense knowledge which is intuitive; thirdly, by reason of our knowledge of interior acts which cannot be adequately explained by abstractive knowledge; finally, by our knowledge of contingent truths which postulates intuitive knowledge.39

As sense perceives the object directly, so does the intellect eminently. We view our singular interior acts of intellect and will directly. Contingent judgments would be meaningless, unless the mind joins the singular term of the subject directly with the actual existence of the singular term of the predicate by intuitive knowledge. Memory of a species would never reach the actual existing object without intuitive knowledge. With the specific nature joined to the common nature, so that it is only formally distinct from it, since "it is such in essence and in concept that it can be thought of by itself, when it is not another thing, though with that other it may be so closely

united that not even omnipotence can separate it, "40 and with the
soul joined to its faculties in this manner, and the faculties
among themselves, intuitive knowledge of the specific nature of
the individual being reaches the concrete existence of the pro-
per object of the intellect.

It is the concept of being as the adequate and univocal
object of the intellect that will be taken up in the following
chapter.

40 Parthenius Minges, "Duns Scotus," The Catholic
CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPT OF BEING, THE ADEQUATE AND UNIVOCAL OBJECT OF THE INTELLECT, AS THE PRODUCT OF ABSTRACTIVE AND INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE

The formal object of the faculty of the intellect, as also the result of the process of the intellect's acquiring knowledge, indicates something of the nature of the process for acquiring knowledge. Consequently, a study of the adequacy and the univocity of the concept of being as the object of the intellect in the philosophy of Duns Scotus clarifies the process of abstractive and intuitive knowledge. These two processes produce the univocal being of Duns Scotus.

The material object of knowledge is the thing in itself with its concrete existence; singular, material, sensible, with its proper and common sensible qualities, with its individuating differences and characteristic notes. An individual book, a particular person are material objects of knowledge. The substantial material form of the material object, or corporeal substance, is the basic raw material of our knowledge. This is the material object quod. The material object quo of the intellect
is the phantasm or sensible image produced in the process of sensation. It is the intermediary in abstractive knowledge.

The formal object of knowledge may be the proper formal object of the intellect, or the common formal object of the intellect.

For St. Thomas Aquinas the proper formal object of the intellect is the essence of the sensible thing, because, since we are forms in matter, the principle of proportion demands we know "a form existing individually in corporeal matter, but not as existing in this individual matter."1 The common formal object of the intellect as a faculty for St. Thomas is being as such, since of the intellect there is one object which comprises all things known by the intellect, because nature is directed to one thing (otherwise unproductiveness and inactivity would ensue because of the indeterminateness of the faculty to any one definite effect).2 On the other hand, the proper formal object of the intellect is being in so far as it is being in the philosophy of Duns Scotus.3 This adequate object of the intellect corresponds to the common formal object of the intellect for St. Tho-

1 St. Thomas Aquinas, S. T., I, q. 85, a. 1, Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. Anton C. Pegis, New York, 1945, II, 813.


3 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, I, d. 3, q. 3, IX, 89, 90.
mas. While no object but the most general can be adequate to the intellect precisely as a faculty, for the present state of our existence, the state of union of soul and body, the quiddity of a sensible thing is adequate to the intellect as a motive.

The primary, proper, and adequate object of the intellect for Duns Scotus is being. In so far as it is being. Being in so far as it is being is the first, natural, and adequate object of the intellect, because the proportion between the adequate object of the intellect and the faculty is a proportion of natural order. The adequate object of the intellect is of such a nature that it moves the faculty. The faculty is of such a nature that it is moved naturally by this adequate object. When this natural order between faculty and object is present, the natural order between motivum and mobile, the moving and the movable, and consequently, act and potency, then we have an object


5 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, I, d. 3, q. 3, n. 24, IX, 148

6 Scotus, Commentarium in Sententias, I, d. 3, q. 3, n. 14, IX, 98: Objectum adaequatum et potentia sic proportionatur, quod extremum ut est objectum adaequatum naturaliter, potest movere potentiam, causando in ea cognitionem sui, et potentia nata est moveri naturaliter a tali objecto.

7 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, I, d. 3, q. 3.
which is first, natural, and adequate, and pertains to the intellect as a faculty. This natural order or adequation implies a kind of proportion between object and faculty. "For Scotus, an object by its very nature moves such and such an intellect, and an intellect by its very nature is motivated by such and such an object."8

Although this natural order or adequation between faculty and object implies a proportion, it does not imply a similarity in the mode of being. The faculty and the object are dissimilar rather than similar. The faculty and the object are "proportionate to the extent that a proportion requires a dissimilarity of the things that are proportionate."9 This dissimilarity is found in the proportions of matter to form, part to the whole, cause to the thing caused. Duns Scotus modifies the principle of proportion of St. Thomas between the modes of being of faculty and object to determine the objects of the intellect: because we are forms in matter, we know forms in matter; consequently the proper formal object of the intellect is the essence of the material thing.10 The reason Scotus gives for sub-

8 Shircel, Univocity of Being in Duns Scotus, 48.
9 Ibid., 46.
10 St. Thomas Aquinas, S. T., I, q. 85, a. 1, II, 813; q. 84, a. 7, II, 808, 809; q. 12, a. 4, I, 276.
stituting his principle of natural order or adequation for the
principle of proportion of St. Thomas is found in Scotus's denial
of the similarity between the mode of being in the faculty and the
object. The faculty is actually the potency and the movable, and
consequently it is not similar to the object, the act and the mo-
tivating element.\textsuperscript{11}

For Scotus being is the adequate object of the intel-
lect according to motivation, \textit{secundum virtutem}, or virtually,
and according to predication.

Being is the adequate object of the intellect according
to motivation, because of itself alone it can motivate the in-
tellect to a knowledge of itself and of other things. "Thus
\textit{being} contains virtually all those things which are \textit{per se} in-
telligible by the intellect, and it is only through this object
that different things are rendered intelligible."\textsuperscript{12} Just as the
divine essence alone and \textit{per se} can motivate the divine intellect

\textsuperscript{11} Scotus, \textit{Opus Oxoniense}, I, d. 3, q. 3, n. 4, IX: Congruentia etiam illa, quae adducitur pro illa opinione, nulla
est. Potentia enim et objectum non oportet assimilari in modo
essendi, se habent enim ut motivum et mobile, et ita se habent ut
dissimilia, quia ut actus, et potentia; sunt tamen proportionata,
quia ista proportio requirit dissimilitudinem proportionatorum,
sicut communiter dicitur in omni proportione, sicut patet de
materia et forma, parte et toto, causa et causato, et caeteris
proportionalibus; igitur ex modo essendi talis potentiae, non
potest concludi similis modus essendi in object.

\textsuperscript{12} Shircel, \textit{University of Being in Duns Scotus}, 70.
to a knowledge of itself, so being *per se* and alone can motivate our intellect to a knowledge of itself and other things. Being is the adequate object of the intellect according to a *per se* or natural motivation.13

The adequate object of a faculty according to motivation may vary according to the distinction Scotus makes between the two types of motivation. There is the motivation that proceeds from the very nature of the faculty, and the motivation that proceeds from our present state of union of soul and body. Being is the adequate object of the intellect according to the motivation that proceeds from the very nature of the faculty. The quiddity of the sensible thing is the adequate object of the intellect according to the motivation that proceeds from our present state.14

Being is the adequate object of the intellect according to predication. Being as such is the proper object of the intel-

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13 Scotus, *De Anima*, q. 21, n. 2, III, 612, 613: Sciendum quod duplex est adaequatio objecti; una secundum virtutem . . . quod per se ipsum solum potest movere intellectum ad notitiam sui, et aliorum, sicut essentia divina est objectum adaequatum primum intellectus divini, quia est sufficienter movens intellectum divinum ad notitiam sui primo, et aliorum ex consequenti, et substantia movet intellectum nostrum ad notitiam sui primo, et ex consequenti, ad notitiam propriae passionis, vel accidentis.

ject. All things are known in virtue of their being. Consequently all things, as the various objects of our intellect, are definitely related to each other in virtue of their being. For this reason being can be said or predicated essentially of all objects that come within the range of our knowledge. Color, for example, is the proper object of the sense of sight. Whiteness and blackness are known because they are colors, and because they come within the range of the proper object of the sense of sight. Consequently, color is essentially predicated of whiteness or blackness.15 Thus being is the adequate object of the intellect according to predication, because it is of its very nature and essentially predicated of all things.16

The adequate object of a faculty according to predication may vary according to the distinction Scotus makes between the two types of predication. In quid predication, quidditative predication, or predication according to a primacy of commonness differs from the predication according to a primacy of implica-

15 Ibid., 71.

16 Scotus, De Anima, q. 21, n. 2, III, 612, 613: Objectum autem adaequatum secundum praedicationem est quod per se et essentialiter praedicatur de omnibus, quae possunt a potentia cognosci, sicut lux, vel color, vel commune utrique praedicatur essentialiter de omnibus visibilibus: utraque autem primitate adaequationis, ens est primum objectum intellectus nostri.
denominative predication, or predication in quale. In quid predication means the predication of the essence of a subject in whole or in part after the manner of an essence, after the manner of subsisting, and not after the manner of merely denominating. The predication of the whole essence of the substance results in species. The predication of part of the essence of the substance results in genus. A subject is predicated quidditatively of its inferiors whenever it is contained in its inferiors. Since being is contained in genera, species, individuals, God and creature, being is essentially or quidditatively predicated of genera, species, individuals, God and creature. This in quid predication is made according to the primacy of commonness, since being is common and applicable to all things knowable, material and immaterial. In quale predication, on the other hand, means the predication of the essence of a subject or of an accident after the manner of denominating. The predication of the essence itself after the manner of denominating is substantial or essential predication and results in the specific difference. The predication of an accident after the manner of denominating is accidental predication and results in property, should the accident be convertible with the essence. If the predication results

in an ultimate universal, it is a common accident. Being is deno-
nominatively predicated of its transcendentals: unity, truth, and
goodness, and of ultimate differences, since being is contained
virtually, not quidditatively, within the transcendentals and ul-
timate difference, that is, within qualitative concepts. Being
is contained virtually within the transcendentals, since being
comes into the definition of the transcendentals as something
added, not as something pertaining to their essence. The tran-
scedentals are passions of being. Being cannot be predicated in
quid of its passions. Therefore being cannot be predicated quid-
ditatively of the transcendentals. A notion predicated essen-

18 Scotus, Super Universalia Porphyrii, q. 12, nn. 5, 6, I, 155: Praedicari enim dividitur in praedicari, in quid, et
in quale, tanquam in per se differentias: quia isti sunt primi
modi praedicandi. Praedicari in quid, est praedicare essentiam
subjecti, per modum essentiae, id est, per modum subsistentis, et
non denominantis: et hoc contingit dupliciter; vel quod praedicet
totam essentiam subjecti, et sic est Species . . . si vero partem
essentiae, sic est Genus. Si enim totam ipsum Genus speciei es-
sentiam diceret, sufficeret ad definitiendum Speciem, et Differentia
superflueret. Praedicari in quae, est praedicari per modum de-
nominantis, quod contingit dupliciter; vel quod praedicet subjecti
essentiam, per modum denominantis; et tunc praedicatur in quae
substantiale, sive essentiale, et sic est Differentia . . . vel
ergo praedicat accidentes convertibiles, egredientia in principiis sub-
jecti, et sic est proprium; vel accidentes commune, et sic est ul-
timum universale.

19 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, I, d. 3, q. 3, n. 6, IX,
103: Passio per se secundo modo praedicatur de subjecto . . .
Ergo subjectum ponitur in definitione passionis sicut additum . . .
sed si ens cadit in ratione earum ut additum, ergo non est per se
primo modo in ratione quidditativa earum.
tially or quidditatively of another is predicated univocally, while a notion predicated in quale or qualitatively of other notions is a univocal predicate. Consequently from the standpoint of predication being is the primary adequate object of the intellect, because in being is found the dual primacy of commonness and virtuality, since every per se intelligible contains within itself the formal ratio of being essentially and virtually.

Scotus distinguishes between the thing and the notion

20 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, III, d. 7, q. 1, n. 5, XIV, 336: Aliud est univocum praedicatum, aliud est univoce praedicari restricte loquendo; univocum praedicatum dicitur cujus conceptus est in se unus; et hoc modo album dictum de ligno et de lapide est praedicatum univocum; univoce autem praedicatur illud cujus ratio est ita una, ut praedicatur, quod ratio ejus includitur in ratione subjecti; et hoc modo denominativum non predicatur univoce.

21 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, I, d. 3, q. 3, n. 8, IX, 108, 109: Dico quod ens est primum objectum intellectus nostri, quia in ipso concurrit duplex primitas, scilicet communitatis et virtualitatis; nam omne per se intelligibile aut includit essentialiter rationem entis, vel continet virtualiter . . . . Omnia enim genera et species et individua, et omnes partes essentiales generum et ens increatum includunt ens quidditative . . . . Omnes passiones entis includuntur in ente, et in suis inferioribus virtualiter . . . . Et ita patet, quod ens habet primitatem communis tatis ad prima intelligibilia, hoc est ad conceptus quidditativos generum, specierum, individuorum, et partium essentialium omnium istorum et entis increati et habet primitatem virtualitatis ad intelligibilia inclusa in primis intelligibilibus, hoc est, ad conceptus qualificativos differentiarum ultimarum et passionum propriarum.
we have of the thing. In reality being and the transcendental are convertible. In reality being is analogous. Conceptually, however, being and the transcendental designate distinct notions: 

"here a simple conversion no longer holds, for being cannot be predicated of its transcendental essentially."22 Being as a concept is univocal in character "on the grounds of its commonness applicable to all things knowable, material or immaterial."23

To better understand the relation to being of the transcendental Scotus distinguishes between "esse de essentia" and "esse item essentialiter." "To be of the essence" presupposes "to be the same essentially", but "to be the same essentially" does not presuppose "to be of the essence", since "esse de essentia" is that which is included per se in the quidditative concept of the essence and consequently is contained in its quidditative ratio, and is not an addition. On the other hand, a thing can "be the same essentially" even though it is outside the concept of essence, as unity and truth for example, which are outside the concept of being which is prior to unity and truth, but is not

22 Shirael, Univocity of Being in Duns Scotus, 74,

23 Ibid., 84.
really different from unity and truth. Consequently, "the transcendental are not of the very concept of being itself but are, nevertheless, identical with it." 25

Not only is being the adequate object of the intellect according to the adequacy of motivation and predication. Being is the univocal object of the intellect.

The concept of being is the univocal object of the intellect, because being is contained essentially or virtually in all things or concepts by right of an in quid or an in quale predication, and because the concept of being is the product of abstraction and intuition. Being, as the object of abstraction and of intuition, is a higher degree of being than the being that is the object of abstraction alone. Consequently, being, as the adequate object of the intellect, and as the product of abstraction and intuition, is predicated only univocally, because being is predicated or known in the same sense that it is apprehended by

24 Scotus, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis, VII, q. 1, n. 2, VII, 351: Non enim idem est esse de essentia A, et esse idem essentialiter vel realiter ipsi A. Primum quidem infert secundum, sed non e converso, quia de essentia A praeceps est illud, quod includitur per se in conceptu quidditativo A, et ideo ponitur in racione ejus quidditativa, non ut additum; potest autem esse realiter ipsi A idem, licet sit extra conceptum ejus, puta unitas, veritas, etc. extra conceptum entis, qui prior est illis, secundum Avicennam 5, non tamen illa dicunt rem aliam ab ente.

the intellect, and because being designates both the nature of the sensible quiddity and the very act of existence, or the very existence of this act. Gilson says that being as the adequate object of the intellect implies the univocity of being, because, if the intellect has being for its proper object, the intellect must be able to grasp being by a unique act, and, consequently, to know it in the same sense in which the species of being is apprehended.

Scotus proves being is the univocal object of the intellect by showing Aristotle's principle of causality presupposes univocal predication. Aristotle says "a thing has a quality in a higher degree than others if in virtue of it a similar quality belongs to the other things as well." A cause that imparts a perfection to some thing enjoys that perfection in a higher degree than the effect receiving the perfection. This is true only if the cause is a univocal cause. Fire is the hottest of all things.


27 Etienne Gilson, "Avicenne et la Point de Départ de Duns Scot," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge*, Paris, 1927, II, 104: Elle implique l'univocité de l'être; car si l'intellect a l'être pour objet, propre, il doit pouvoir le saisir par un acte unique, et par conséquent le connaître dans le même sense quelle que soit l'espèce de l'être appréhendé.

because it is the univocal cause of all heat. If fire were not a univocal cause, but an analogical cause or an equivocal one, then the sun would be the hottest of all things, and not heat. Aristotle continues, "that which causes derivative truths to be true is most true." Unless truth be predicated univocally of both first principles and of other things, it will not follow, as in the case of heat, that first principles must be most true because they are the cause of truth in other things. Aristotle concludes that "as each thing is in respect of being, so it is in respect of truth." That which is the cause of being is the greatest being. This presupposes univocal predication. God is the cause of being; God is the greatest being; therefore being is univocally predicated of God and creature.

29 Shircel, *Univocity of Being in Duns Scotus*, 81.
31 Shircel, *Univocity of Being in Duns Scotus*, 81.
33 Scotus, *De Anima*, q. 21, n. 7, III, 615: Ostendo per intentionem Philosophi 2, Metaphysicae, text. 4 dicentis, quod unumquodque est maxime tale, quod est causa, quod alia sunt univoce talia, ut ignis est calidissimus, quia est causa univoca caloris in alio, non autem hoc est verum de causa analogica, vel aequivoca, quia tunc sequeretur, quod Sol esset calidissimus, et subdit quod *prima principia esse verissima*, quia sunt causa veritatis in aliis, quod non sequeretur, ut dictum est, nisi veritas diceretur in utrisque univoce; sed subdit, sicut se habent ad esse, sic ad veritatem: igitur quod est causa entitatis aliis, est maxime ens; si tamen ens dicitur de eis univoce, non aliter, cum igitur Deus sit causa entitatis aliis, et dicitur maxime ens, oportet quod ens dicitur de Deo, et creaturis univoce.
The second proof Scotus gives for being as the univocal object of the intellect follows from the denial that being is predicated of other things on the basis that the concept of being corresponds to God essentially and to creatures by participation. The concept of being does not correspond essentially to God, because, if the intellect has a concept proper to some one object, then the intellect can distinguish that object from every other object through the concept. This is true because a concept that is proper to one object does not correspond to other objects. If the concept of being is not univocally common to God and to creature, then that concept will be proper to God alone: it will correspond to God essentially and principally, and to other things only by participation. Therefore, through the concept of being alone we could distinguish God from creature. This is false, since through the concept of being we know God only in a confused manner, in so far as we know God through a concept common to Him and to creature. Consequently, since a proper concept of God is impossible, there must be a common or univocal concept, predicated univocally of God and creature, not analogically nor equivocally.34

34 Ibid., 615, 616: Non diceres ens analogice, vel aequivoce praedicari de aliis, nisi quia conceptus entis convenit Deo per essentiam, aliis autem per participationem. Sed quod non conveniat Deo per essentiam, probatio; intellectus enim habens conceptum proprium alicujus objecti, potest illud per illum conceptum distinguere ab omni alio, quia ille conceptus, qui est uni
The final proof Scotus gives for the univocal predication of being states that no real concept is caused in the intellect of man naturally unless it be by those things which naturally motivate our intellect. But the things which naturally motivate our intellect are the phantasm, or the object shining in the phantasm, and the active intellect. Therefore no simple concept enters the intellect naturally, except in virtue of the phantasm and the agent intellect. But a concept that would not be univocal to the object as it shines in the phantasm, the only other possibility, would be different from the object and prior to the object. This concept would be analogous. An analogous concept of this nature, however, cannot be caused by the phantasm and the active intellect, because any object shining in the phantasm or the intelligible species, by means of the active or the passive intellect, according to the ultimate of its power, as an effect adequate to itself in the intellect, forms a concept proper to itself, and a concept of all things included in it essentially or virtually. The assumed analogous concept is neither

proprius, est incompossibilis aliis: sed si conceptus entis non est communis univoce Deo, et creaturae, ille erit proprius Dei, et convenit Deo per essentiam, et principaliter, et aliis per participationem, ut supponitur; igitur intellectus noster per conceptum entis potest distinguere Deum a creatura, quod falsum est: per conceptum enim entis cognoescimus Deum confuse tantum, prout habet cum aliis unum conceptum communem.
the proper concept, nor is it included in that proper concept essentially or virtually. For this reason a proper concept cannot be an analogous concept. To rely upon an analogous concept to know God would mean that we would never actually come to know God. Since this is false, the assumption of an analogous concept must be false. Therefore, being must be univocal in its predication of God and creature.35

The same argument that God cannot be known by the human intellect naturally, unless the concept of being is univocally predicated of the Creator and the creature, holds good on the same basis for substance and accident. A univocal concept and univocal predication is as necessary to know God as it is to know substance. A substance does not immediately motivate our intel-

35 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, I, d. 3, q. 3, n. 8, IX, 19: Nullus conceptus realis causatur in intellectu viatoris naturaliter, nisi ab his quae sunt naturaliter motiva intellectus nostrī, sed illa sunt phantasma vel objectum relucens in phantasmate, et intellectus agens; ergo nullus conceptus simplex fit modo naturaliter in intellectu nostro, nisi qui potest fieri virtute istorum. Sed conceptus, qui non esset univocus aliqui objecto relucenti in phantasmate, sed omnino alius et prior, ad quem iste haberet analogiam, non posset fieri virtute intellectus agentis et phantasmatis, ut probabo; ergo talis conceptus alius analogus, qui ponitur naturaliter in intellectu viatoris numquam erit, et ita non poterit naturaliter haberii aliquis conceptus de Deo, quod est falsum. Probatio assumpti, objectum quodcumque, sive relucens in phantasmate, sive in specie intelligibili cum intellectu agenti vel possibili cooperante, secundum ultimum suae virtutis facit in intellectu, sicut effectum sibi adaequantum, conceptum suum proprium, et conceptum omnium essentialiter vel virtualiter inclusorum in isto, nec est iste; ergo ille non fier ab aliquo tale movente.
lect to a knowledge of itself, but only mediately through a sensi­
able accident. Consequently there is no quidditative concept of sub­stance, unless it be the concept abstracted from the concept of accident. Since no quidditative concept can be abstracted from the concept of accident except the concept of being, it follows that, since being is univocal, it must be predicated univocally of substance and accident.36

St. Thomas distinguishes two objects of the human intel­lect. Because of the union of soul and body, the human intellect knows the essence of material or sensible things through the abstractive process of the active intellect. This object is prop­ortionate to the human faculty of knowledge: since we are forms in matter, we know forms in matter, or the quiddities of material things. The essence of the sensible thing is the proper object or the proper formal object of the intellect. By reason of the faculty considered as a faculty, the human intellect knows being as such, the common ratio of all things abstracted from reality.

36 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, I, d. 3, q. 3, n. 9, IX, 109: Sicut est argutum, quod Deus non est a nobis cognoscibilis naturaliter, nisi ens sit univocum creato et increato, ita potest argui de substantia et accidente; cum enim substantia non immutet immediate intellectum nostrum ad aliquam intellectionem sui, sed tantum accidenta sensibile, sequitur, quod nullum conceptum quiddi­tativum habere poterimus de ea nisi sit aliquis talis, qui possit abstrahii a conceptu accidentis; sed nullus talis quidditativus, abstrahibilis est a conceptu accidentis nisi conceptus entis, ergo, etc.
Being as such is the adequate or common object of the human intellect. Being is the first intelligible and the proper object of the human intellect, because "we can conceive nothing otherwise than as a being." Duns Scotus likewise distinguishes two objects of the human intellect. Scotus substitutes for the principle of proportion the principle of natural order, a modified principle of proportion. The primary object of the intellect is that which is common to all intelligibles. This is being as such. Therefore, being as such is the primary, proper, and adequate object of the intellect. Because of the present state of union of soul and body, the quiddity of the sensible thing is also an object of the intellect. The quiddity of the sensible thing is the proper or adequate object by reason of the present state.

From the viewpoint of the objects of the intellect the doctrines of Duns Scotus and St. Thomas seem similar. From the viewpoint of being they seem radically different.

37 Shirael, Univocity of Being in Duns Scotus, 84, 85.
38 Ibid., 68.
39 Ibid., 85.
40 R. P. Phillips, Modern Thomistic Philosophy, London, 1939, II, 171: "... it is by no means clear that Scotus's own assertion that being is univocal with respect to the ten categories and to God and creatures, is really in contradiction with the view of St. Thomas that it is not. This may seem rash to suggest after centuries of heated controversy, but the question is
The being of St. Thomas is the object of abstraction alone. Being for St. Thomas is that to which corresponds existence. It is the result of the process of abstraction of the active intellect which separates the essence of the material thing from its material trappings, which hinder intelligibility, to present the common ratio of all things as abstracted from concretely existing things. Since this being is abstracted from reality which is sensible, it will naturally follow that it is predicated of a pure intelligible such as God in a sense partly the same and partly different,—the same by reason of existence, but different in essence,—that is to say, analogously, "and becomes available only when corrected by all the necessary negations." Being, considered in relation to its inferiors, falls under the analogy of proper proportionality and of attribution. "Formally, being is analogous by an analogy of proportionality, for its unity consists in the unity of the relation or proportion of every being to its existence. Virtually, however, being is

whether the being of which Scotus asserts and S. Thomas denies that it is univocal are really the same "being". Both agree that being is not a genus, and this admission on Scotus's part would make his assertion that it is univocal unintelligible, if he attaches the same meaning to "being" that St. Thomas does. In fact, it seems that the "being" which Scotus is speaking of is not that being in general arrived at by abstracting the essence of sensible things, which, according to St. Thomas, is the proper object of the human intellect, but merely the very act of existing apart from any further determination."

41 Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, New York, 1940, 263, 264.
analogous by an analogy of attribution, inasmuch as being is found in a more perfect mode in substance than in accident." 42 For St. Thomas the analogy of proper or metaphysical proportionality is an analogy according to intention and according to esse, that is, in concept and in reality, "since the things to which the terms are applied are not identical or exactly the same either in intention or in esse. Thus being is predicated of substance and accident. Here the common nature, being, is justified in its reference to substance and accident since both are necessarily being. 43 Substance and accident, however, are being according to an order of greater or less perfection. In this is found their diversity. 44 The analogy of attribution is an analogy according to intention alone and not according to esse, that is, an analogy in concept alone. This analogy is present when one intention refers to many things according to an order of priority and posteriority, although this intention is found to exist actually only in one of the references. Health, for example, exists intrinsically and formally and after an order of priority in the principal analogue, animal, but by an order of extrinsic denomination and after an order of posteriority in the minor ana-

42 Shirael, Univocity of Being in Duns Scotus, 13.

43 Ibid., 11, 12.

44 St. Thomas Aquinas, In Sententias, I, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1: (Analogia) secundum intentionem et secundum esse, et
logues, food and pulse.45

The being of Duns Scotus, on the other hand, is the object of abstraction and intuition. Abstractive knowledge reaches the ideal quiddity of being. In abstractive knowledge the intelligible species moves the intellect. Intuitive knowledge views being directly in itself. In intuitive knowledge the object itself as present moves the intellect. Duns Scotus believes intuitive knowledge is necessary to grasp the individual being in its entirety. Intuitive knowledge is a more perfect kind of knowledge than abstractive knowledge, since it grasps quiddity and existential presence. "Being as the product of both abstraction and intuition is decidedly broader and of a more general character than the being of St. Thomas. Viewing being in this light, it was but logical for Scotus to postulate the univocity of being."46 The being of Duns Scotus reminds you of the pure indetermination of Plotinus, so that

When Duns Scotus says that what first falls under the intellect is being he no longer therefore understands with St. Thomas the nature of the sensible being as such, but existence in itself, without any determination whatsoever, and taken in its pure intelligibility.47

45 Ibid.: (Analogia) secundum intentionem tantum et non secundum esse, et hoc est quando una intentio refertur ad plura per prius et posterius quae tamen non habet esse nisi in uno.

46 Shircl, Univocity of Being in Dune Scotus, 85.

47 Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, 263, 264.
Duns Scotus makes a distinction between two acts of the intellect on the level of simple apprehension, or the intellect of a simple object. The abstractive act of the intellect can be indifferent to an object as existing, and as not existing, and can also be indifferent to an object not really present, as well as to an object really present. We frequently experience this act within us, since we understand universals or the quiddities of things equally as well, whether they naturally possess an objective existence in some substance, or not, and whether they be present or absent to the intellect. There is an a posteriori proof for this kind of abstractive knowledge. The knowledge of a conclusion, or the understanding of a principle persists in the intellect equally as well, the thing existing, the thing not existing; the thing present, the thing absent. Since the one way or the other there is produced the act of knowing a conclusion or understanding a principle equally as well, consequently there is produced equally as well the intellect of that extreme—whether the minor proposition of the syllogism or the predicate of the judgment—on which depends the understanding of the nexus of the conclusion, or of the principle. On the other hand, the intuitive act of the intellect, not as certainly experienced within us as the abstractive act, centers upon an object present and existing, as present and existing, because the intellect should possess in an eminent degree the perfection of the sensitive fac-
ulty. Just as the proper object of the sense faculty is the sensible thing, as present and existing, so the proper object of the intellect is being, adequate and univocal, as present and existing.48

Duns Scotus appreciates the dichotomy of intellect and singular reality, and the abyss between creature and Creator. He endeavors to maintain by principle the unity that shines through the evident fact of reality.49 To accomplish his project, Scotus

48 Scotus, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, VI, 8, XXV, 243, 244: . . . distinguitor de duplici actus intellectus, et hoc loquendo de simplici apprehensione, sive intellectione objecti simplicis, unus indifferenter potest esse respectu objecti existentis, et non existentis, et indifferenter etiam respectu objecti, non realiter praesentis, sicut et realiter praesentis: istum actum frequenter experimur in nomis: quia universalia, sive quidditates rerum intelligimus aeques, sive habeant ex natura rei esse extra in aliquo supposito, sive non: et ita de praesentia et absentia. Et etiam hoc probatur a posteriori: quia scientia conclusionis, vel intellectus principii aeques in intellectu manet, re existente, et non existente, praesente, vel absente: et aequae potest haberi actus sciendi conclusionem, et intelligendi principium: ergo aequae potest haberi intellectio extemli illius, a quo iste actus intelligendi, qui scientificus dicit potest, quia praevius, et requisitus ad scire conclusionis, et ad intelligere principii, potest satis proprii dicit abstractus, quia abstrahit objectum ab existentia, et non existentia: praesentia, et absentia.

Alius autem actus intelligendi est: quem tamen non ita certitudinaliter experimur in nobis: possibilis tamen est talis: qui, silecit praesae fit objecti praesentis, ut praesentis: et existentis, ut existentis. Hoc probatur; quia, omnis perfectio cognitionis absolute, quae potest competere potentiae cognitivae sensitivae, potest eminenter competere potentiae cognitivae intellectivae . . .

49 Zacharias Van deWoestyne, O.F.M., Cursus Philosophicus, I, 284-286.
sees the necessity for postulating a type of being as adequate object to the intellect, that is common to the material and the immaterial, by the commonness of univocity, that is the product of abstraction and intuition, in a word, univocal being. Being, as object of the intellect, enjoys the primacy of motivation and of predication. Being, from the aspect of motivation, is that object which motivates the intellect per se and naturally, extending to things material and immaterial, and not to abstractions from the material alone. Being as the primary object of the intellect from the point of view of predication, "is that object which can be predicated of all things without exception, but not in the identical way. Of simpliciter simple concepts, of ultimate differences and transcendental, being is predicated in quale; of all other things it is predicated in quid or quidditatively." 50 In quid predication is univocal predication. In quale predication results in the univocal predicate, since being and simpliciter simple concepts are contained within others which justify a univocal predication, they are called univocal predicates in virtue of this essential predication. 51 Consequently, for Scotus there is rigorous unity: the mind, indeed does

50 Shirsel, Univocity of Being in Duns Scotus, 86.
51 Ibid.
not only attain the "exclusive intelligible," but it grasps also by intuition, and in a direct manner, the matter itself of the judgments, namely, the singular and material object, and all that is the object of experience and sensibility. Thus, thanks to an intuition of the concrete and existential Ens, all the order of concepts is solidly anchored to the real and brought back to unity.52

Just as univocal being is the product of abstraction and intuition, so also is this individual being knowable by intuition and abstraction. This univocal "being as the primary, natural and adequate object of the intellect is more common in its character than the sensible, . . . it is an object which is essentially included in every per se intelligible, whether material or immaterial, . . . it is not limited but unlimited, and hence all-inclusive."53 The univocal and adequate object of the intellect is common to every material and immaterial individual.

We have also seen that Duns Scotus emphasizes the active factor belonging to the nature of an object of reality, as the principle of activity, as opposed to its more or less static essence. The object acts as a motivating agent to co-operate with the agent intellect to effectively and terminatively produce the concept. Between object and mind there stands the real relation of the motivating factor of reality to the movable in-


53 ShirceI, Univocity of Being in Duns Scotus, 67, 68.
intellect, as also the real relation of the measurable intellect to the thing measuring the intellect. The foundation of these two terms is found in the adequacy and univocity of being to the intellect. The nexus between the mind and the object is discovered in the abstractive and intuitive knowledge of the individual Being.

These principles of Duns Scotus to the mind of Longpré resolve the Kantian antinomies that propose the paradoxical dichotomy between the creature and the Creator, and between sensation and intellection. On the basis of univocal being as the adequate and proper object of the intellect, and on the basis of its predication in quid or essentially of genera, species, individuals, God and creature and of its predication in quale or virtually of transcendentals and of ultimate differences, resulting in the univocal predicate, Scotus has brought together the extremes of uncreated being and created being. Secondly, on the basis of the intuitive knowledge of the singular, Scotus has provided the binding link or nexus between the processes of sensation and intellection.

By placing in the Ens the proper object of the intellect and attributing to the transcendental concepts a representative value and a common intelligibility or of univocal content,

54 Scotus, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, q. 13, XXV, 507-539.
whatever may be the objects to which they are applied, Scotus has brought together the two extremes of being—the world and God—and at the same time by direct and univocal application of these transcendental notions, surpassed Kantian agnosticism. The solution of the second antinomy is offered not less surely by the Scotistic psychology of intuition, and of direct knowledge of the singular. 55

For an idea of the unity Scotus believes to exist in being and between the faculties of the soul before the operation of the intellect we will consider in the next chapter his theory of the formal distinction.

CHAPTER III

THE FORMAL DISTINCTION, FINDING INSEPARABLE THE INDIVIDUALITY FROM THE COMMON NATURE, AS WELL AS THE SENSITIVE FACULTY FROM THE INTELLECTUAL FACULTY, AS THE BASIS FOR INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE

To understand intuitive knowledge better it is helpful to understand the constitutive elements of the object of intuitive knowledge, the individual being, and of the faculty of knowledge, the sensitive and intellectual powers. The individual being is composed of its individuality of haecceity and of the common nature, both formally distinct. The sensitive power of the soul is also formally distinct from the intellectual power. As the real distinction between the constitutive elements of Thomistic being, essence and existence, lends itself to abstractive knowledge, since the really distinct essence can be separated from the existence by the power of the agent intellect, so an identity between the individuality and the common nature lends itself to intuitive knowledge, since the individual being is actually present to the intellect in its concrete existence. With the sensitive faculty really distinct from the intellective faculty, the agent intellect will naturally abstract its species
from the sense phantasm. With the sensitive power identical with the intellective power, the intellect will partake to an eminent degree of the senses' power of intuition, since the proper object of the intellect is the individual being, just as the proper object of the sense is the singular material thing.

For a better understanding of the formal distinction and its relation to intuitive knowledge a few words on the nature of a formality are in order.

Allan Wolter, O.F.M., says that a fairly accurate and intelligible notion of a "formality" is "to consider it as the objective basis of a concept which, though real, does not represent the whole intelligible content of the physical entity, but a part only."\(^1\) A formality, while it is not a distinct physical thing, is a positive something somehow less than a thing, the ratio objective of a distinct formal concept, its objective basis. It has its own quiddity or entity. The formality exists by the existence of the thing, and even God cannot separate the formality from the existence of the thing. Just as there is a real distinction between the whole and its parts, so there is a formal distinction between the thing as a whole and the single formalities. This formal distinction is inadequate, since, in the dis-

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tinction between "animality" and "sensitivity", "animality" in­
cludes "sensitivity". However, there is a modal distinction be­
tween a formality and its intrinsic mode, as for example, between
intelligence and its mode of finiteness in man.2

According to the investigations of Maurice Grajewski,
O.F.M., into the formal distinction of Duns Scotus, a formality
is "a positive entity which, antecedently to the operation of the
intellect, is inseparably and really conjoined with the being or
essence within which it is found."3 Correspondingly, a formal
distinction is "a distinction from the nature of the thing occur­
ing between two or more really identical formalities, of which
one, before the operation of the intellect, is conceivable with­
out the others though inseparable from them even by divine pow­
er."4 The formal distinction is a secundum quid or restricted
real distinction in that the things distinguished do not have a
simple identity, but only a secundum quid non-identity. A secun­
dum quid distinction exists when, the identity intact, there ex­
ists a diversity in these three conditions:5 from the nature of

2 Ibid., 22-24.

3 Maurice J. Grajewski, O.F.M., The Formal Distinction
of Duns Scotus, Washington, D.C., 1944, 76.

4 Ibid., 93.

5 Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, I, d. 33, q. 2, n. 10,
XXII, 403.
the thing, before the operation of the intellect, one formality is conceivable without the others, though metaphysically inseparable.

Parthenius Minges, O.F.M., states that each individual being contains two formalities, the common quidditative nature and its individuality or haecceity. These realities in essence and in concept can be considered by themselves, but the one is in no way the other, even though they are metaphysically united so closely that even the power of God cannot separate them. Minges uses this statement from the course Scotus taught at Oxford to prove his point:

Quodlibet commune et tamen determinabile adhuc potest distinguui, quantumque sit una res, in plures realitates formaliter distinctas, quarum haec formaliter non est illa. Sed haec est formaliter entitas singularis, et illa est entitas naturae formaliter, nec possunt istae duae realitates esse res et res, sicut possunt esse realitas, unde accipitur genus, et realitas, unde accipitur differentia, ex quibus realitatum specifica accipitur, sed semper in eodem, sive parte sive toto, sunt realitates eiusdem rei formaliter distinctae.7

Anything common and yet determinable, in so far as it is a singular thing, can be divided into several realities formally distinct, of which one is not formally the other. The one is formally the singular entity, and the other is formally the entity of the nature. These two realities cannot be taken as thing and thing, as the reality from which genus is taken, and the reality from which difference is taken, making the reality specific. The singular entity and the entity of nature are realities of the same thing formally distinct.8

To the contrary, Grajewski points out that in the Reportata Parisiensia Scotus names six formalities that constitute "each composite having unitive identity," namely, "universal and individual matter, universal and individual form, the universal and individual composite."9 This seems to be a more specific

7 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, II, d. 3, q. 6, n. 15, XII, 144.
8 Ibid.
9 Grajewski, The Formal Distinction, 95.
division of the general division Minges makes of each individual being into the common nature and its individuality.

Duns Scotus places a formal distinction between the natura communis, to use his words, and individuality. To better understand this distinction it is necessary to examine Scotus's position on the doctrine of the universals which is closely connected with the natura communis, and his position on the doctrine of "haecceity", or the principle of individuation.10

Scotus says that the universal is from the intellect. It is not a figment, because nothing in reality outside the mind corresponds to a figment. To the universal there corresponds something outside the mind, by which the intellect is moved to cause an intention of this sort. Therefore, the universal is from the intellect effectively, but materially or genetically or occasionally the universal proceeds from a property in the thing.11

Duns Scotus distinguishes between two types of universals. The subjective universal is a product of the mind, a second intention, the formal ratio of the thing considered as a purely mental construct. The objective universal is the absolute quiddity of the thing, a first intention, the nature considered

10 Ibid., 140.

11 Scotus, Super Universalia Porphyrii, q. 4, n. 4, I, 97.
as nature," and the object of the second intention. The absolute
quiddity is per se neither singular nor universal but indif-
ferent. This objective universal as such is the object of the
intellect.12

"The universal is sometimes taken for a second intention
which follows the first operation of the intellect by which
a quiddity is understood absolutely ... at other times,
however, the universal is taken for the thing subject to the
second intention, i.e., for the absolute quiddity of the
thing which is of itself neither universal nor singular, but
indifferent. Such is the direct object of the intellect
which is not in the intellect subjectively but only objec-
tively."13

Minges calls these universals the universal in essendo or the
metaphysical universal, and the universal in predication or the
logical universal.14

The actual universal exists only in the intellect, but
the potential universal, the same as the specific nature of
things, exists only in things.15 The potential universal posses-

ses a specific unity.16 This unity is not merely subjective,

12 Grajewski, The Formal Distinction, 142.
13 Scotus, De Anima, q. 17, n. 14, III, 581. Ibid.
14 Parthenius Minges, O.F.M., Joannis Duns Scoti Doc-
trina Philosophica et Theologica, Quaracchi, 1950, I, 69.
16 Ibid., d. 12, q. 5, n. 11, XXIII, 30. Ibid., 143.
but, because of its real existence, this unity is objective. It is not logical nor numerical, and though it is less than a numerical unity, it is a real unity. We understand the nature of the potential universal by understanding the doctrine of the nature communis.

In the world outside the mind only individuals exist actually. Scotus follows Avicenna in saying that the composite individual shares a common or universal nature, which in reality is not common, nor universal, nor particular, but indifferent, a nature only. The common nature is the same as the universal in the thing, the specific nature in the thing, universale in re, and differs from the universal in the intellect, the second intention, the universale in intellectu. The common nature exists in the individual in so far as it is conceived as common by the intellect, but it does not exist in the individual as a common nature. If the common nature did exist in the individual as a common nature, "then we would be forced to admit the existence of Platonic ideas or the really existent universals." The common

17 Ibid., n. 12, XXIII, 31. Ibid.

18 Scotus, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis, VII, q. 18, n. 8, VII, 458. Ibid.

19 Grajewski, The Formal Distinction, 144. Scotus, Super Perihermenias, I, q. 8, n. 4, I, 551, 552.
nature is not a simple logical being, since it is not a pure fig-ment of the mind. If the common nature were a pure figment of the mind, "we would know nothing about reality, but only about our concepts, and our opinion would not change from the true to the false with the change in the existence of a thing." 20

The universal or common nature can exist only in individuals. The common nature is indifferent to the actual existence or non-existence of things. 21 The common nature in itself, however, is non-existent, but exists in the individual which represents it. 22 The universal as an actual or logical universal cannot exist as a being, since to be existing as existing is contradictory to the notion of the universal in actu, that is, the purely mental construct. 23 Therefore the existence of the common or universal nature is more singular than universal, since it is not universal unless in the singular. 24 The intrinsic re-


21 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, II, d. 3, q. 11, n. 11, XII, 278. Ibid.

22 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, I, d. 3, q. 6, n. 8, IX, 243. Ibid.

23 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, IV, d. 43, q. 1, n. 11, XX, 41. Ibid.

24 Scotus, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis, VII, q. 13, n. 23, VII, 424: Quod cum extra sensum diant (scilicet universalia), immanifestum est utrum sunt, vel non. Respondeo, hoc
lation between the individuality and the common nature is so in-
timate that with the corruption of the individual or composite
goes the destruction of the universal nature contained within
it.25 God restores the common nature by creating new individuals
with this nature,26 or by producing anew this same species in
another individual.27

The species specialissima, or prerogative species, is
"the common nature of a thing which in itself is neither singu-
lar nor universal--it is the nature as nature; that is what the
natural causes in the process of knowing first produce in our
intellect."28

Singulars and individuals are the only really existing
things. These are beings, and not "being as such", and as beings
they are known intuitively. The ens communissimum or "being as

25 Ibid. Ibid., 145.

26 Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, II, d. 3, q. 1,
n. 5, XX, 561. Ibid.

27 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, II, d. 3, q. 7, n. 4, XII,
161. Ibid.

28 Basil Heiser, O.F.M., Conv., "The Primum Cognitum
according to Duns Scotus," Franciscan Studies, II, 1942, 197,
201-204.
such" is the most general concept drawn from and prescinding from individual beings with their formalities of common nature and haecceity, and from the intrinsic modes of finity and infinity. "Being as such" is not a reality, but only a predicate, though much broader in predication than any universal, being called a transcendental for this reason. Since it is a predicate and no reality, it cannot become the object of intuitive knowledge. Thus, the ena communissimum is a concept that is as transcendental as possible.\textsuperscript{29} Intuitive knowledge on the part of the intellect has the individual being as its object.

We will now look into the relation of the common nature to the individual, their distinction, and the part played by the individual properties in relation to the common nature. In his doctrine on the universals and the common nature Scotus differs slightly or only apparently with the traditional school. In his doctrine on the principle of individuation and "haecceity" Scotus differs radically with the traditional school.\textsuperscript{30}

The common nature in the quiddity of things is the same as their generic and specific natures. These natures do not ex-
haust integrally the complete nature of the individual similar to
the way that the genus does not exhaust the species. 31 There is
in the individual an individual property that perfects the com-
plete nature of the individual. In the individual there are two
entities or realities or formalities formally distinct: the uni-
versal and the particular. The universal formality is the com-
mon element, the essence, the natura communis, which is common to
every individual within the same species. The particular for-
mality is the individuality, the haecceity, or singular entity,
which constitutes the individual as such. 32 Duns Scotus tells
us that the intention of nature is fulfilled in the species, as
if in something more perfect than the genus, and it is fulfilled
in the individual, in a more perfect and a more real entity than
the entity of the species. 33 This gives the individual more per-
fection and a new position in the domain of metaphysics and sci-
ence. 34 St. Thomas, however, says that the ultimate tendency in

31 Scotus, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis, VII, q. 13,

32 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, II, d. 3, q. 6, n. 15, XII,
144, Ibid.

33 Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, I, d. 36, q. 4,
n. 25, XXII, 457. Ibid., 146.

34 Scotus, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis, VII, q. 13,
n. 17, VII, 417: Individuum est verissime ens et unum . . .
Longpré, "The Psychology of Duns Scotus and Its Modernity," 63,
Ibid.
nature is toward the species, and not toward the individual nor the genus. The individual finds its place with the universal as the object of the intellect and of knowledge in the individual being of Duns Scotus.

The individual entity from which is taken the individual difference is not the matter, nor the form, nor the composite. It is the ultimate reality of being of the matter, the form, and the composite. Duns Scotus tells us that every quidditative entity, whether the part of some genus or the whole genus, is of itself indifferent, as a quidditative entity, to this or that entity. Consequently, as a quidditative entity is naturally prior to that entity as it is this, and as it is prior naturally, just as it does not correspond to it to be this, so from its own formal nature its opposite—to be this—is not contradictory to it. The composite in so far as it is a nature does not include its own entity by which it is this, nor does matter in so far as it is a nature include its entity by which it is this matter, nor does form include its own entity in so far as form is a nature. Therefore, this entity is not matter, form, or the composite, in so far as any of these is a nature, but it is the ultimate reality of the being that is matter, or that is form, or that is the

35 St. Thomas Aquinas, S. T., I, q. 85, a. 3, ad 4, II, 821.
Since matter, form, and the composite can all be conceived as universal, they cannot be the principle of individuality as such. Duns Scotus distinguishes between the nature of matter and its individuality as "this matter," that is, between the common nature and the haecceity.

The individual, as such, exists because of something positive that makes it exactly what it is and nothing else. This positive entity is the "ultima realitas entis," or the "haecceitas".

The formality that makes up the individual is not matter, since the same singularity found in the corrupted being is not found in the generated being, nor is it quantified matter, since a change in the quantity of an object does not mean a change in its individuality, nor is it an accident, since accidents presuppose something prior in nature which is substance.

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36 Scotus, *Opus Oxoniense*, II, d. 3, q. 6, n. 15, XII, 144.


38 Scotus, *Opus Oxoniense*, II, d. 3, q. 6, n. 15, XII, 144.


and for this reason cannot individuate the substance. Existence is not the cause of individuation, because what is not distinct of itself cannot distinguish another. Existence is determined to different genera and species by the determination of essences of which it is the existence. If existence were not so determined by essences, existence would have proper genera, species and differences besides the determination of its essence. The composite does not cause individuation, that is, material substances are not individuated per se, so that what gives them reality gives them also individuality, as the Nominalists say. Scotus believes that the nature of itself is indifferent to singularity and to universality. The nature becomes singular by contraction by the thinness of the thing, and it becomes universal by means of the intellect. Sharp tells us that "if a nature ex se is a this, the intellect, when understanding it as a universal, understands it under a character opposed to its nature, just as if it were to understand Socrates as a universal." The Nominalists' theory that the nature of itself is a

42 Grajewski, The Formal Distinction, 149.
44 Grajewski, The Formal Distinction, 147.
45 Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century, 299.
this means that the nature de se haec becomes the entire sub-
stance of diverse individuals, thus identifying the species with
the whole nature of the individual.46

Consequently, the entity that makes up the individual
is the ultima realitas entis of matter, and of form, and of the
composite. "The individual is, therefore, not made up merely of
matter and form, but of this matter and this form, forming this
composite or individual."47 Haecceity adds nothing to the quali-
tative determinations of the individual and is in no sense a uni-
versal.48 The haecceity is the element that "contracts and com-
pletes the specific form by impressing upon it its definitive
seal."49 It is the ultimate reality of being, contracting the
species, to make it one in number, incommunicable, and existing
by itself, or subsistent.50

In every created thing a distinction is made between
the common nature, corresponding to the genus and the species,
and the individual property or haecceity, as humanity and Socra-

46 Ibid.
47 Grajewski, The Formal Distinction, 152.
48 Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, II, d. 12, q. 5,
49 Grajewski, The Formal Distinction, 152.
50 Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, II, d. 12, q. 8,
ticity. The common nature is universal, but not purely a logical
universal, nor a figment of the mind, but a nature as nature, in-
different to universality and singularity.51 The common nature
is also a metaphysical universal. Consequently, both logical
being and metaphysical being are the object of the intellect.
Ens inquantum ens in both orders is the object of the intellect.
Thus being is understood in two ways: as restricted to the real
order of things and of the concepts of first intentions, or as
taken in the widest possible connotation that embraces both the
real and the logical orders. It is in this latter sense that
being is the object of the intellect. "Inquantum" in the phrase
ens inquantum ens has a dual interpretation. Metaphysical ens
inquantum ens is understood specifically, or in so far as
inquantum specifies being to its proper and formal notion, that
is, real being. Ens inquantum ens in reference to the object of
the intellect is understood reduplicatively, not specified to the
formal and proper notion of being per se, but as that which is
also a secundum quid formal notion of being. In this reduplica-
tive sense logical being is considered as contained virtually in
real being which per se enjoys this formal notion of being.52
In this sense logical and real being is the object of the intel-

51 Scotus, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis, VII, d. 18,
n. 10, VII, 459. Ibid., 152, 153.

52 Scotus, Commentarium in Quaestiones Quodlibetales.
There is a formal distinction between the common nature and the haecceity, since they both are formalities. These two formalities possess all the necessary characteristics of the formal distinction. The common nature exists actually ex natura rei before the operation of the intellect. The common nature is not separated nor can be separated from the individual or singular even by the power of God. Since these two realities cannot be included in the same concept, although they are separable, the positive reality, haecceity, is formally distinct from the nature communis or the specific nature. Because these two realities cannot be included in the same concept, their definitions must be different. With the corruption of the individual

q. 3, nn. 4-7, XXV, 117-119. Shircel, The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, 103.


54 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, II, d. 3, q. 6, n. 9, XII, 132. Ibid.

55 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, II, d. 3, q. 1, nn. 2-5, XII, 7-10. Ibid.

56 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, I, d. 35, q. unica, n. 12, X, 554. Ibid.

57 Scotus, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis, VII, q. 13, n. 15, VII, 414, 415. Ibid.

follows the destruction of the universal or common nature. This destruction is similar to the destruction of any other formality that inheres in a subject and undergoes corruption.59

The principle of individuation of Duns Scotus becomes intelligible through the application of the formal distinction, and is closely connected with the formal distinction. Scotus's teaching on the individual being and the formal distinction brings out the richness of the individual. Today stress is laid on the universal as the medium of science.60

The common nature really existing in things is the objective basis for our universals, preventing their being fictions of the mind: "c'est qu'il existe, pour chaque universel, un substrat qui soit réellement identique à cet universel."61 "Or, bien que cet intelligible en acte soit un objet intelligible singulier, c'est déjà l'universel au sens de 'nature commune et indéterminée', donc universalisable."62 Thus, the being of Duns Scotus is contained within each individual, as the common and undetermined nature of Avicenna, and in a sense, of Plotinus.

59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 153, 154.
62 Ibid., 16.
How then can this position avoid nominalism: how can we obviate making of our universal ideas mere words, a flatus vocis, the sound of air, with no objective basis or true signification? The answer is to be found in leaving what is singular in the first object of thought, and in understanding the nature of the object. To do this we must seek for the principle of individuation, not in matter, nor in matter quantitate signata, but in the intrinsic formality of the object known as haecceity. This principle individualizes the singular. The singular is the first object of the intelligence. However, the singular is known indistinctly, and it becomes known distinctly when the intellect, after having elaborated these principles of the common nature and the haecceity, applies them to the singular. Consequently, the indistinct singular is what we come to know at first, but if there is question of distinct intellectio, it is not the singular, but the universal which is known in the first place.63

This primary object of thought is a complex object. Because it is complex, the intellect has the right to make a distinction, considering one part as the object, while prescinding from the other. What it grasps for consideration separately is then the "nature," that is to say, "the common and indeterminate nature" of Avicenna. This is a basic part of scotistic thought.

63 Ibid., 13.
Taken in itself, the nature is nothing else than the essence in its strict sense. Considering it inasmuch as it is a universal, predicable of many, is the business of the logician. Considering it in so far as it is singular, individualized by its haecceity, in its ultimate complete form, is the business of the natural philosopher, or the physicist. However, in its indetermination itself, as being itself, neither universal, nor singular, such is in a word the consideration of the metaphysician.

The nature of the horse, "equinity", is neither that which makes this nature capable of being predicated of several individuals, nor that which makes it the this of a particular individual, but it is the nature of the horse. Scotus is fond of the phrase Avicenna uses: "equinity is nothing more than equinity."

Consequently, to fortify our concepts with an objective basis Scotus sees the necessity for seeing in the individual thing a common nature, formally distinct from the individuating difference or haecceity. This common nature plays the role of the foundation in reality for the universal concept. Scotus modifies the Aristotelian motto: *Intellecutus est universalium, sensus singularium.*  


ward to the beatific vision of God face to face, he qualifies it substantially to read: Intellectus est universalium et singularium, sensus singularium tantum. The intellect can know the universal and the singular, while the senses are restricted to knowledge of the singular alone. Singularity as singularity is not intelligible to our intellect in its present state, as united to the body. Singularity is intelligible as such to the intellect taken as a faculty separate from the body, and will be known by our intellect at the beatific vision. Knowing singular natures in this life, and knowing that they are singular, is no guarantee to our perceiving the exact formal reason why they are singulars. Thus our clear and distinct concepts, defining the essence of reality, are partial and incomplete concepts, since they exclude the concrete individual in its full intelligibility. These concepts and definitions represent the common elements only--those rationes held in common actually or possibly with other individuals. Scotus postulates the natura communis to protect the objectivity of these notions, the definitions at the root of all scientific knowledge. The natura communis is for-


mally distinct from its principle of individuation, "endowed with its own proper unity, which is somehow less than numerical unity, . . . (and) as actualized in concrete individual things, forms the immediate and proper object of the conceptus realis." 68

The Scotistic concept of the individual being, made up of the common nature and the individual difference of haecceity, both formally distinct, is the object of the intellect and its dual process of knowledge: abstraction and intuition. Abstractive knowledge reaches as far as the essence or common nature, the ideal quiddity. Intuitive knowledge completes the process by reaching the first intentions of being, the existential presence shining through the individual difference. In abstraction the intelligible species motivates the intellect, but the thing present in itself is the motivating object in intuitive knowledge. Only by placing a formal distinction between the common nature and the individuality to produce the really identical individual being, can the individual being be the object of the dual process of the intellect's act of understanding: the abstractive and the intuitive.

The intuitive knowledge of an actually existing and

present object has a structure built upon the synthesis of the univocity of the concept of being—there is an analogy among really existing beings—from the formalities of the common nature and the individuating difference or haecceity, both formally distinct. Here is the continuity of formal distinction or real identity to be found in univocal being. To be understood is the formal distinction or real identity existing between the sensitive and intellectual powers of the soul, though not between their operations, giving them their continuity. The link of intuitive knowledge seems to supply the continuity between univocal being and unified soul.

We come now to the formal distinction as it applies to the sensitive and intellective powers of the soul, serving as the basis for intuitive knowledge.

Scotus bases his strongest argument in favor of a formal distinction between the sensitive and intellective powers of the soul on the principle of contradiction. Before the operation of the intellect contradictories are predicated of animality and rationality in man. Since these contradictories cannot possibly belong to one and the same indistinct subject, these contradictories must be formally distinct. Contradictories are predicated of animality and rationality in man before the operation of the intellect, because the principle of similarity with brutes belongs to animality in man, but rationality lacks this agreement.
The principle of agreement and the principle of disagreement are contradictory predicates. These contradictory predicates, however, inhere in one subject, the soul. Therefore rationality and animality are formally distinct.69

Before the operation of the intellect takes place in man there pre-exist the formalities of animality and rationality, since "animality in man is the sentient principle and the source of all sensitive powers, while rationality is not, otherwise there would be a two-fold adequate cause in man for the same effects," and since "animality has a true aptitude to be communicated to many beings specifically distinct, which is not proper to rationality."70 This may sound like formalism, but we should remember that "form" and "formality" do not mean the same thing. "Form is really distinct from its subject, while formality is really identical with its subject. Different forms bespeak a diversity of beings; different formalities do not imply a plurality of beings but simply a plurality of realities within a single entity."71 Formality is not a thing, it is a rea rei.72 On this score, with the formality a reality of the thing, and with the formal dis-

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70 Ibid. Ibid., 97, 98.

71 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, IV, d. 46, q. 3, n. 5, XX, 448. Ibid., 74.

72 Ibid. Ibid.
tinction a division of the real distinction, perhaps the accusation of exaggerated realism is also an alleged one.

The second class of arguments in favor of the formal distinction, say between animality and rationality, is based on the terms of the distinction. There are many entities really identical which have different definitions. Since a definition expresses the nature of the thing as it exists a parte rei or in reality and not as it is found in our concepts, a difference in definitions indicates a formal distinction between really identified entities. Reference is here made to definitions that express the nature or the formal and quidditative esse of the entity, the nature that the entity has prior to the operation of the intellect, that is, ex natura rei, and not to accidental or descriptive definitions.73

With the logical distinction insufficient to explain how contradictories are united within a single entity,74 and with the real distinction considered as too broad and drastic, Duns Scotus proposes the formal distinction between the soul and its faculties and between the faculties.75

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73 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, I, d. 8, q. 4, n. 18, IX, 665. Ibid., 99.

74 Grajewski, The Formal Distinction, 98.

75 Ibid., 169.
In reality the soul is identical with its powers. When we consider the powers of the soul formally or quidditatively according to the strict notion or formal reason of the powers, they are not identical with the soul, nor among themselves. The powers of the soul can be considered as different entities, realities or formalities of the same subject, that is to say, they are unitively contained within the essence of the soul. In this sense the powers of the soul are really identical but formally distinct.76

In speaking of the identity of the sensitive and intellectual powers of the soul among themselves and with the soul, Scotus presents some subtle metaphysical considerations about unity and the "continentia unitiva." Entities completely identical are not unitively contained, because they are not united. Beings that have the same distinction between themselves that they had previous to the union are not unitively contained. Entities, however, that are really identical but formally distinct are unitively contained. These entities are unitively contained in two ways. In the first way the entities are of the nature of the container, as entities superior to the container, as for example the formal ratio of whiteness, color, sensible quality and quality is received by the same subject, and all these formal reasons are

76 Ibid.
superior to this whiteness and consequently are of its essence. In the second way entities are unitively contained in a subject, as if subsequent to the subject, because they are properties of the container, and for this reason they are not distinct from the container itself. In this way many passions or properties are contained within being, and are nothing other than being itself. These transcendental properties, however, such as unity, truth and goodness are quidditatively and formally distinct from each other and from being itself. By safeguarding these properties as real, metaphysics is safeguarded as a real science. There is a perfect parallel, since in the same way that being contains unitively the formal ratio of unity, truth and goodness, the soul contains unitively the formal ratio of sensitivity and intellectuality, though they are formally distinct. 77

Duns Scotus makes use of the proposition that if things have a real distinction when they are really separated, they retain that distinction conceptually or formally when they are not really distinct. 78 If there is a certain order or relation between things when they are really distinct, they will retain this order or relation when they are in a unitive content. Consequen-


78 Ibid., n. 18, XIII, 43. Ibid., 172.
tly, the intellect is not an essential part of the soul, but is only unitively contained in the soul as a property through which the soul acts. This property or power, the intellect, is not formally the soul's essence, but it is formally distinct, although it retains its real identity and unity. We must imagine therefore that the soul has such a nature in the first instant, as it were, of its existence. In the second instant of its existence, so to speak, the soul is operative or capable of operation according to this or that power. The faculties or powers which are the sources of those operations are contained unitively in the essence of the soul.79

These powers are properties that spring from the soul as from a subject. They are identical with the essence of the soul, and are called parts of the soul, in the sense that no one power is identical with the entire perfection of the essence of the soul as container, but is only a partial perfection of the soul. If no one power is identical with the entire perfection of the essence of the soul as container, then the power does not contain the perfection of the soul itself, nor the perfections of all the other powers, even though the power and the soul are the same because of the formal distinction. Since the perfections of the container are not contained mutually in themselves, because they

79 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, II, d. 16, q. unica, XIII, 43, 44. Ibid., 172, 173.
are formally distinct from the container, but are really identical in respect to a third, the powers of the soul also are not mutually contained in themselves, because they are formally distinct from the soul, being really identical in respect to a third power.\textsuperscript{80}

Francis Lychetus in his commentary on this passage carries the doctrine of the formal distinction between the intellectual faculties of the soul to the point where it includes also the sensitive faculty. The real identity and formal distinction between the sensitive power and the intellectual faculty of the soul seems contradictory, since the sensitive faculty is composed of the intellectual soul and the sense organ, as for example, vision or touch. Since the soul separated from the body is no longer a sensitive power, it seems that the sensitive power is really distinct from the soul. There is no contradiction in saying that the sensitive faculty is really identical with the soul, if the sensitive power is considered as a virtue of the soul itself, needing no operation unless united to the sense organ. The separated soul is incapable of seeing, because the power of the separated soul necessarily needs a determined organ to have this act of seeing.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Ibid.}, n. 19, XIII, 44. \textit{Ibid.}, 173.

"Are the senses superfluous," a critic may ask? The soul is united to the body to achieve its own perfection from this union. This union would not be useless, if this perfection could be achieved in some other way also. We achieve health no less by using an unguent, than by using a medicine. If both will give health, the medicine is not rendered futile by the use of the unguent. Consequently, knowledge acquired by the use of the senses, and by another method in the separated soul, does not render useless the union of body and soul, making it convenient to acquire knowledge by means of the sensible image. More to the point is the fact that the union of soul and body intends the perfection of the whole consisting of those parts. In spite of the fact that no perfection can accrue to this part or to that part, without such a union, nevertheless, the union would not be useless, should the perfection of the whole person, principally intended by nature, be achieved by means of intuitive knowledge.82

82 Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, IV, d. 45, q. 2, XX, 305, 306: ... non sequitur frustra animam uniri corpori. Est enim quod propter perfectionem animae fieret ista unio, ut scilicet acquireret perfectionem suam ex tali unione, non sequitur quod frustra uniatur, si per aliam viam posset eam acquirere; si enim aliquid ordinatur ad finem, non frustra fit, si alio modo possit finis acquiri, sicut si sanitas possit acquiri per lotionem et potionem, non frustra fit latio, et si per potionem possit sanitas haberis; ita etsi cognitio possit acquiri per usum sensuum, et per alium modum ab anima separata, non frustra fit unio, ex quo ipsa conveniens uno modo acquirendi cognitionem.

Aliter, et magis ad rem, quod unio animae ad corpus non est finaliter propter perfectionem corporis, nec solam perfectionem animae, sed propter perfectionem totius consistentis ex istis
To predicate the intellective faculty of the sensitive faculty a distinction is in order. Since the soul and its powers are really identical but formally distinct, a mutual predication in the concrete is admitted, but not in the abstract. The reason for this is that the powers of the soul are unitively contained in its essence but not quidditatively. Although in the abstract animality belongs to the quidditative notion of man, it is wrong to say by abstractive predication that "humanity is animality." It is right to predicate in the concrete, however, that "man is an animal." We cannot predicate the powers of the soul of each other in the abstract, as to say that "the intellect is the will," or "the intellect is the sense faculty," but we can predicate in the concrete, "intellectivum est volitivum," or "the intellective is the sensitive."^83

The formal distinction of the soul and its faculties is not the same as Descartes' real identity between the soul and its thought. Between the soul and its intellections and sensations Descartes places only a logical distinction. Scotus, however,

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partibus; et ideo licet nulla perfectio possit accrescere huic parti vel illi, quae non posset haberi sine tali unione, tamen non fit frustra unio, quia perfectio totius, quod principaliter intenditur a natura, non posset haberi nisi illo modo.

^83 Scotus, *Opus Oxoniense*, II, d. 16, q. unica, n. 21, XIII, 46.
denies the identity of the soul with its operations, and only admits its identity with its powers or faculties.84

To say that the real identity between the soul and its powers makes the soul act through its essence, thus making the soul similar to God, leads to pantheism. The falsity of this statement is brought out by making the proper distinctions between the soul and God. God is pure act, while the soul is subject to the transition from potency to act. God is Ens a se, a subsistent essence. The soul is an ens ab alio, a created, finite and participated being. Consequently, if the soul acts through its essence, "it acts through a communicated essence, that is created, contingent and participated. Between the essence and operation of God, and the essence and the operation of the soul, there is an infinite abyss."85

The formal distinction between the sensitive faculty and the intellective faculty, that is to say, their real identity lends itself to the intuitive knowledge of the individual being, which is both "Naturentität und Natureinheit,"86 made up of the entitative nature and the individual nature. Thus we see that the argument in favor of intuitive knowledge based on the similarity

84 Grajewski, The Formal Distinction, 177.
85 Ibid., 177, 178.
86 Minges, Der Ansebliche Excessive Realismus des Duns Scotus, 41.
of intellectual knowledge, though in an eminent degree, with sense knowledge, stems from the real identity of the intellective and sensitive powers or faculties of the soul, admitting, however, a real distinction between the intellective operation and the sensitive operation. In a word, while the powers are identical, the operations are really distinct.

The formal distinction finds before the operation of the intellect the common nature inseparable from the individuality, and the sensitive faculty inseparable from the intellective faculty. The identity of common nature and individuality gives us the individual being, as the object of the intellect, and its dual process of knowledge, abstraction and intuition. The identity of the sensitive power of the soul with the intellective power of the soul gives us a faculty of knowledge that is unique, furnishing us grounds to say that as the sensitive faculty has the power of intuitive knowledge of its object, so the intellective faculty possesses this power, but in an eminent degree. It is in this way that the formal distinction bears a relation to intuitive knowledge.
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

A moderate conclusion drawn from the previous discussion is the dual character of our knowledge. Our knowledge is abstractive, but to be adequate must also be intuitive. Our knowledge relies on the sensible image of the phantasm. The intellect may know a thing not present in its actual existence by means of the likeness of the object retained in the sensible image. The immaterial quiddity drawn from the material of the phantasm, as a universal concept, does not adequately represent the actually existing concrete individual from which it was taken. Consequently, the mind demands another kind of knowledge, distinct from abstractive knowledge in specie, to fulfill the unity of intellect and singular material things. This specific kind of knowledge is the direct grasp of the individual nature, found identified with the objective common nature, in the actually existing concrete thing. It is the immediate knowledge of a thing present and existing, as present, and in its actual existence. Intuitive knowledge complements abstractive knowledge. Abstractive knowledge supplies us with the essence of material things; intuitive knowledge presents to the mind the actual existence and individuality of the
singular material thing.

There is no doubt that in the composition of the human body there is an undeniable link between the material faculty of the sense organ and its act, sensation, and the immaterial faculty of the intellect and its product, the concept. To deny any connection between sensation and intellection would make of thought a concretion of material particles flowing from the grey matter of the brain cells. To equate intellection with sensation would be to stop with sense knowledge in following the course of the process of forming the idea. Between the formalities of "sensitivity", the part, and "animality", the whole, and "rationality", there is a formal distinction, an inseparable and real union in reality. Thus, the emanations of sensation overflow, in a sense, into the operations of the intellect. The operations of the intellect, on the other hand, have a bond of continuity with the operations of the sense faculties. There seems to exist a directness of interaction between the faculties and the act of sensation and intellection, as in fact there is an immediacy between the sensitive faculty and the object existentially present to the sense organ. The concept of continuity between object and intellect—between sensation and intellection merely pushes it back to a more remote level of materiality—demands a universal term of signification for expression. The term best suited to express this concept seems to be "intuitive cognition".
Nature is the formal principle of activity. Everything human, organic, or inorganic has a nature from which flows the capability of performing various actions proper to that nature. These are the potentialities of nature. Man has a natural desire for happiness. Only perfect happiness is the end which will satisfy him sufficiently. Perfect happiness is the vision of God by the intellect and union with Him in will. This vision of God face to face is an intuition. To avoid doing violence to the nature of man, there must be a natural capacity within the intellect for the vision of God. The capacity for this vision is natural; the gift itself and its agency in the hands of God is supernatural.

Certain elements of our knowledge are beneath the level of awareness. The formation of the sensible expressed species is not a conscious operation. The operation of the agent intellect eludes our consciousness. The simple, instantaneous flashes of thought leave us bewildered as to their explanation, though in experience they are a fact. Again we know little of the ultimate constitutive elements of reality. There are few essences we know by the complete definition of genus and specific difference. One instance confronts us: "Man is a rational animal." The continuity between the essence and existence of being, between the constitutive elements of corporeal substance, as between the substance and its accidents, is a thing of profound mystery to the
human intellect in its present state of union with body in this world.

To say that being is univocal, predicated in the same way of God and creature, but distinguishing God from creature by the intrinsic determining modes of "infinity" and "finity", is, perhaps, what the penetrating insight of few men could vision. The being of analogy and participation may in its sphere also be the true being. Both are systems of contingency. Duns Scotus, however, presents a system of philosophy that "restores completely to the individual, and even to the material singular, its intelligible value."  

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The thesis submitted by Daniel Wendelin Primac has been read and approved by three members of the Department of Philosophy.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

Date: May 21, 1958

Signature of Adviser: [Signature]