The Attitude and Opinion of the Press Toward Cordell Hull's Latin American Policy 1933-1939

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THE ATTITUDE AND OPINION OF THE PRESS
TOWARD CORDELL HULL'S LATIN
AMERICAN POLICY 1933-1939

by
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of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Latin American policy of the United States goes back to men like Henry Clay and James G. Blaine, those far-seeing visionaries who proposed and developed a Latin American policy when most people were ignorant of, or at least, unmindful of our southern neighbors. There has always been a feeling of sympathetic interest on the part of Americans for those who sought freedom from the mother country or from the crushing heel of any tyrant. In a measure this accounts for the attitude of most North Americans toward our neighbors when they severed themselves from Spain and set up republics.

It is true that until recently little or no effort has been made on our part to understand the difficulties "that have sorely tried her younger and less powerful neighbors or to study their racial characteristics and customs with the friendly application necessary to good relations between the states." 1

Our interest in the emancipation of the Spanish colo-

1 Graham H. Stuart, Latin America and the United States, New York, 1938, 10.
ties was not entirely altruistic; there was always the dangerous possibility of some European intrigue whereby the colony might be a pawn and fall into the hands of a European power stronger than the weakened hand of Spain. That could become a serious threat to our peace and security in this hemisphere. Secondly—there was the matter of trade.

The attitude of the United States in respect to trade with Latin America has varied. From 1815 to 1855 was a period of intense interest. During the next thirty years commerce with Latin America was of little concern. In 1880 there was a revival of interest which lasted until about 1900; from 1900 the interest grew stronger and lasted throughout the period which embraced the First World War. The years following 1930 were the depression years and they were filled with discouragement and later were filled with anxiety because of the Nazi trade and propaganda drives. The success of the Nazi military machine in Europe showed the importance of economic relations with Latin America. 2

The fears of Thomas Jefferson seem logical and real; Spain could be a menace; any power could be a threat to the wobbly United States. Is it any wonder then that Thomas Jefferson forsook some of his cherished ideals and concluded the

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2 J. Fred Rippy, South America and Hemisphere Defense, Baton Rouge, 1941, 44.
Louisiana Purchase? His claims to East and West Florida may seem to have been a bit weak but his concern is understandable—a foreign power on our border was a danger.

Bemis considers the "No-Transfer Resolution" of 1811 which emerged from the great territorial problems of North America as the first significant landmark in the evolution of its Latin American policy. ... In 1939 it became a joint declared policy of all the republics of the New World. It is at once the earliest and the most recent expression of the Latin American policy of the United States.3

The "No-Transfer Resolution" was a stepping stone to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823.

During the period beginning with 1815 our official policy toward the Spanish colonies was one of neutrality, despite the fact that unofficially we were sympathetic to the revolted colonies. The neutrality laws were violated to such an extent that the Spanish Minister protested vehemently in Washington.

Henry Clay4 had long opposed Adams' policy of non-recognition of the republics which had broken with Spain; Clay believed that much was to be gained by recognizing them. Finally


when there seemed to be no possibility of Spain regaining them through the aid of some European country, and when there seemed to be nothing to be lost by recognizing them, the United States under James Monroe recognized the independence of the revolted colonies. Thus we were the first nation outside of Latin America to recognize their independence. This set an example for the other nations of the world to follow.

The Monroe Doctrine, a unilateral statement of policy that bound the United States to no nation, was the next major step in the Latin American policy of the United States. President Monroe issued his famous message on December 2, 1823. While the message was really a summary of American foreign policy, the message is best known for these two statements:

the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.

and

The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we shall consider any attempt on their part to

5 Bemis, Latin American Policy, 99.

6 J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Washington, 1896, II, 209.
extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as
dangerous to our peace and safety.7

The Monroe Doctrine is evidence that the United States
early developed a Latin American policy that combined idealism
and realism. It is true that it did not become an important
document upon its publication but in later years it served as a
cornerstone of Latin American policy.

During the years of expansion and the realization of
our Manifest Destiny, a Latin American policy was always evident
and a definite part of our foreign policy. Naturally, it was not
a selfless policy; a nation must have some self-interest to sur-
vive.

The United States was invited, or invited itself, to
send representatives to the Panama Congress in 1825.8 Henry C.
Clay, always an ardent enthusiast of Latin America, urged ac-
ceptance of the invitation. After much difficulty President John
Quincy Adams acquiesced, but unfortunately our representatives
never reached the Congress. Little or nothing was accomplished,
yet Bailey credited this Congress with beginning the ideals of
Pan Americanism. He said: "None of its recommendations was ever

7 Ibid., II, 218.
8 Bailey, Diplomatic History, 195.
adopted; none of its projected meetings was ever held. Yet the germs of the Pan American ideal, which was to assume considerable significance, were definitely planted.9

Again in 1847-1848 another attempt was made to assemble the peoples of this hemisphere at Lima, Peru for the "Congreso Americano". The failure of this congress, according to White,10 was due to the fact that the United States was engaged in war with Mexico in which we acquired nearly half of what had been Mexican territory. White said:

The most solemn pledges of the Congress had been made against just such acts of "aggression" as this. The American Monroe Doctrine had been aimed at any such gobbling up of Latin-American territory--but only by an aggressive European power.11

The crystallization of Latin American policy comes to the fore in the administration of Benjamin Harrison when he appointed James G. Blaine as Secretary of State. Blaine had definite positive ideas about a Latin American policy. So farseeing was Blaine in matters concerning Latin America that he invited the republics to meet in Washington to consider and discuss the

9 Ibid., 196


11 Ibid., 1.
methods of preventing war between the nations of America. The group met in Washington in 1889 with Blaine giving the address of welcome before the delegates. He said:

Your presence here is no ordinary event. It signifies much to the people of all America today. It may signify more in the days to come. No conference of nations has ever assembled to consider the welfare of territorial possessions so vast and to contemplate the possibilities of a future so great and so inspiring. . . .

We believe that hearty cooperation, based on hearty confidence, will save all American States from the burdens and evils which have long and cruelly afflicted the older nations of the world.

We believe that friendship, avowed with candor and maintained with good faith, will remove from American States the necessity of guarding boundary lines between themselves with fortifications and military force.

We believe that friendship and not force, the spirit of just law and not the violence of the mob, should be the recognized rule of administration between the American nations and in American nations.12

Blaine also developed the idea of the United States acting as arbiter of disputes between the American republics, and the American republics and Europe instead of turning to non-Americans for aid in settling such disputes as might arise. The outstanding feature of Blaine's Latin American policy, however,

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was the meeting in 1889 of the First International American Conference in Washington. Bemis commented on this conference:

The Secretary's ostensible purpose in assembling the Conference seems to have been the promotions of trade and arbitration; but, . . . it was the harbinger of a memorable movement that was to yield richer results in riper times, as Blaine himself prophesied in his closing address to the delegates.13

This Congress failed to accomplish as much as had been hoped for but it did achieve the formation of what came to be known as the Pan American Union. Bailey14 contended that the First International Congress was the wedge for the future gatherings. He feels that the friendly manner shown to the Latin Americans helped to dispel their suspicions. Finally the reciprocal tariff reductions by treaty, which the Conference found to be more practical than a customs union, gained considerable backing.

The advent of imperialism led to a new era in our Latin American policy marked by the Cuban question and numerous others which involved Latin America in our destiny. This era with its imperialistic tendencies, the policy of expediency, nonrecognition, Platt Amendment, intervention, exploitation, "Big Stick" diplomacy, dollar diplomacy and interference did not help to

14 Bailey, *Diplomatic History*, 445.
create any feelings of good will or neighborliness. These policies only helped to arouse further hatred and suspicion of our neighbors toward our motives then and in the years to come.

Hinton\textsuperscript{15} comments on these events in his biography of Hull, saying:

The whole episode of 1898 had awakened apprehensions among the Latin-American republics. These were not allayed by subsequent developments between the United States and Cuba and were fanned to white heat by the revolution which separated Panama from Colombia and made possible the construction of the Panama Canal. There was considerable feeling among our neighbors to the south that the United States had driven Spain out of Cuba only to make the island an American dependency as had been done in Puerto Rico and the Philippines. The imposition of the Platt Amendment, giving the United States the right to intervene in Cuban affairs for the purpose of preserving order, lent color to their suspicion.\textsuperscript{16}

The diplomacy created by the Panama question did not alleviate the suspicions of our neighbors and the "Big Stick" diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt helped to widen the breach. The Roosevelt pronouncement, generally referred to as the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, justified the intervention in Latin America by either the United States or a foreign country, was proclaimed on December 6, 1904, in these words of Roosevelt:

\begin{quote}
15 Harold Hinton is a newspaper man who writes for the \textit{New York Times}. He has also written a biography of Cordell Hull.
\end{quote}
All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. Chronic wrongdoing . . . may in America as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States, however, reluctantly in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. 17

Bailey maintained that public opinion in the United States generally supported the Roosevelt corollary, while in Latin America very little concern was shown. 18 Several years later when Marines were landed in Central American and Caribbean republics to enforce the Roosevelt corollary, Latin America protested strongly.

Taft and his dollar diplomacy hardly added an amicable chapter to Latin American affairs, nor did Wilson's watchful waiting. The Panama Canal project became a realization and with it came an awakened interest in our sister republics. Their orderliness especially, those near the Big Ditch, became more and more important to the Canal. Taft had been anxious to have money invested in Latin America and once the investments were made, it was an easy, logical step for his and the following administrations to protect the investors and their investments under the

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18 Bailey, Diplomatic History, 559.
Roosevelt corollary. It was necessary to justify the intervention by pointing to the benefits secured to Latin America under our protective and profitable guidance, to say nothing of the benefits accrued to the investors of the United States.

Woodrow Wilson's administration marked a beginning of the repudiation of economic imperialism, which was interrupted by World War I. With the repudiation of our former Latin American policy there began a period of more satisfactory relations with our southern neighbors. The sky was not entirely cloudless but it began to point to happier days. Wilson was fundamentally a noninterventionist despite his intervention in Mexico. Bemis19 claimed that Wilson really was the inspiration for the new Latin American policy which came to be known as the Good Neighbor policy under Franklin D. Roosevelt.

It was Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes who made strides toward the liquidation of the policy of intervention which the United States had used in Latin America. He tried to convince the republics to the south that the "Big Stick" did not mean imperialism. His first step in the liquidation process was working out of a plan for the evacuation of the Marines from the Dominican Republic.

The Washington Conference of 1922-1923 was held under

19 Bemis, Latin American Policy, 199.
Hughes's chairmanship. This Conference produced thirteen treaties. According to Bemis these treaties were a miniature experiment in inter-American peace and solidarity worked out in Washington by Hughes and Sumner Welles. "To him Sumner Welles has been ascribed the elaboration if not the inspiration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy." Hughes had taken great care to make it clear that he did not accept the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Thus did Hughes do his part to create more amicable relations between the Americas by his attempts to get rid of intervention and the fostering of good will with our neighbors.

The new Secretary of State, Kellogg directed J. Reuben Clark, Jr., Undersecretary of State, to work out an historical explanation of the Monroe Doctrine to show that the Roosevelt corollary was not a legitimate offspring of the Monroe Doctrine.

The result is a collection of documents giving the background, principles, and instances which might be or have been considered as falling within the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. It is known as the Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine. This memorandum rejects the Roosevelt corollary and the imperialistic principles of our foreign policy.

20 Ibid., 207-208.
21 Ibid., 208.
In the preface Clark made it clear that the Monroe Doctrine does not concern itself with purely inter-American affairs. The author said:

... The Doctrine states a case of the United States vs Europe, and not of the United States vs Latin America. ... So far as Latin America is concerned the Doctrine is now, and always has been, not an instrument of violence and oppression but an unbought, fully bestowed, and wholly effective guaranty of their freedom, independence, and territorial integrity against the imperialistic designs of Europe. 22

Thus this Memorandum backed up the Hughes interpretation. It repudiated the corollary but preserved the right of intervention. 23

Herbert Hoover was another staunch believer in cultivating the friendship and good will of our neighbors. His good will trip to Latin America and his friendly attitude as President-elect did much to foster good feelings. In his inaugural address he stressed the fact that we did not desire any economic or territorial domination of any other people. He declared:

The United States fully accepts the profound truth that our own progress, prosperity and peace are interlocked with the progress, prosperity and peace of all humanity. The whole world is at peace. The dangers to a continuation of this peace today are largely the fear and suspicion which still haunt the world. No suspicion or fear can be rightfully directed toward our country.

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23 Bemis, Latin American Policy, 22.
Those who have a true understanding of America know that we have no desire for territorial expansion, for economic or other domination of other peoples. Such purposes are repugnant to our ideals of human freedom. . . . the American people are engrossed in the building for themselves of a new economic system, a new social system, a new political system—all of which are characterized by aspirations of freedom of opportunity and thereby are the negation of imperialism.\footnote{24}

Hoover proved his policy regarding Latin America and the abandonment of dollar diplomacy, intervention, and imperialism when he withdrew the last troops from Haiti and Nicaragua and again when he failed to exercise treaty rights on several occasions. He was determined to carry out his policy of non-intervention, de facto recognition, and to prove our departure from imperialism.

Franklin D. Roosevelt came to the presidency with rather definite ideas against intervention in the home affairs of our neighbors and the need for joint action in case of distress in one of our neighboring countries. At his inauguration March 4, 1933, he had the good fortune to name the policy which we now call the Good Neighbor policy, by referring to the policy of his administration as that of the good neighbor—\footnote{24} not only meaning Latin America—but the whole world. In the inaugural address he said:

In the field of world policy, I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor—the neighbor who resolutely respects himself, and, because he does so, respects the rights of others—the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of agreements in and with a world of neighbors. We now realize as we have never realized before our interdependence on each other; that we cannot merely take, but must give as well. . . .

Thus these were the major steps which led to the Good Neighbor policy as we know it today. It was founded on the repudiation of imperialism, dollar diplomacy, "Big Stick", and intervention; it was founded on a freer flow of trade, non-intervention in the affairs of our neighbors, consultation, amicable relations, and coequality.

CHAPTER II

HULL AND NONINTERVENTION

For the world and especially for Latin America, Roosevelt's choice of a Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, was an extremely fortunate one. In Cordell Hull was found one devoted to a cause which he put above all else, even the possibility of election to the highest office in our land. He firmly believed that the security of the United States was based on trade and, therefore, it was necessary to have a freer flow of trade; that it was necessary for us to maintain amicable relations with our neighbors; that it was necessary to follow a policy of noninterference and nonintervention. These were the fundamental principles of Hull's Latin American policy. Because Hull was an intellectual idealist, sincere, loyal, patient, yet strong, firm, amiable, shrewd and persistent he was able to realize the policy which he had so carefully planned.

Friends of Hull advised him not to accept the post offered by President Roosevelt. He weighed the matter a long time and very carefully; he came to the decision to accept because he saw in the Department of State an opportunity to
practice some of his fundamental beliefs. For example, Hull felt that the economic situation at this period in our history was caused by restrictive trade barriers.\(^1\) In the office of Secretary of State, Hull thought that he would have a better opportunity to initiate the plans which would help to obliterate some of the restrictive measures. In accepting the office he had a talk with the President in which he made it perfectly clear that the only condition under which he would accept the office was that he was to have a perfectly free hand; it was not to be a post at which he would merely carry on the correspondence of the State Department.\(^2\) With this freedom which he demanded he knew full well the responsibility and accepted the office with hope and courage.

The following quotation from Hull's statement on international policies sums up his policy in his own words:

"This country constantly and consistently advocates maintenance of peace. We advocate national and international self-restraint. We advocate abstinence by all nations from use of force in pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations. We advocate adjustment of problems in international relations by processes of peaceful negotiation and agreement. We advocate faithful observance of international agreements. Upholding the principle of sanctity of

\(^1\) Graham H. Stuart, *The Department of State*, New York, 1949, 310.

treaties we believe in modification of provisions of treaties, when need therefor arises, by orderly processes carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommodations. We believe in respect by all nations for the rights of others and performance by all nations of established obligations. We stand for revitalizing and strengthening of international law. We advocate steps toward promotion of economic security and stability the world over. We advocate lowering or removing of excessive barriers in international trade. We seek effective equality of commercial opportunity and we urge upon all nations application of the principle of equality of treatment. We believe in limitation and reduction of armament. Realizing the necessity for maintaining armed forces adequate for national security, we are prepared to reduce or increase our own armed forces in proportion to reductions or increases made by other countries. We avoid entering into alliances or entangling commitments but we believe in cooperative effort by peaceful and practicable means in support of the principles hereinbefore stated.3

Roosevelt addressed the Pan American Union on April 14, 1933, and in this address he emphasized our policy toward Latin America. Bemis4 said that Roosevelt did not really announce a new policy; the speech reflected the conclusions of Sumner Welles' book, Naboth's Vineyard. In his address Roosevelt said:

Your Americanism and mine must be a structure built of confidence, cemented by a sympathy which recognizes only equality and fraternity. It finds its source in the hearts of men and dwells in the temple of the intellect.

We all of us have peculiar problems, and, to speak frankly, the interest of our own citizens must, in each instant, come first. But it is equally true that it is of


4 Bemis, Latin American Policy, 259.
vital interest to every Nation of this Continent that the 
American Governments, individually, take, without further 
delay, such action as may be possible to abolish all un-
necessary and artificial barriers and restrictions which 
now hamper the healthy flow of trade between the peoples 
of the American Republic.  

This last sentence is of extreme importance because it 
expresses the philosophy and hope of Secretary of State, Cordell 
Hull. Hull fought for the lowering of trade barriers during his 
long term of office; he felt that trade barriers were partly 
responsible for our economic ills during the depression and defi-
nitely responsible for our unfavorable balance of trade. As 
early as 1914 Hull had formulated this philosophy and felt that 
if we could get rid of economic rivalry it would enable us to 
increase commercial exchanges among nations and remove "unnatural 
obstruction to trade, we would go a long way toward eliminating 
war itself."  

Hull went on to add:

The year 1916 is a milestone in my political thinking. 
Then for the first time openly I enlarged my views on trade 
and tariffs from the national to the international theater. 
Hitherto I had fought hard for lower tariffs, largely 
because of their immediate domestic effect. I believe that 
high tariffs meant a higher cost of living for American 
citizens. They assisted in building up monoplies and trusts 
By cutting down the sales of other countries to us, they 
also cut down the purchases by other countries from us.  

In considering the Latin American policy of Cordell  

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5 Rosenman, Public Papers of Roosevelt, II, (1933), 130-131.
6 Hull, Memoirs, I, 84.
7 Ibid., 81.
Hull, it is necessary to take into consideration the attitude of Latin America toward the "Colossus of the North" and thereby judge the influence which Hull exerted to bring about more amicable relations aided and abetted to some extent by the exigencies of World War II.

The temperament and nature of the Latin American must also be taken into account. His background is essentially European; his culture and heritage are essentially European. He feels a closer tie to Europe than he does to the United States. The Latin American is by nature filled with pride and an intense spirit of nationalism.

Argentina, especially, has felt that her place in Latin America is that of the leader. She has felt an unusually strong antipathy for the United States because she feels that we are trying to usurp her position of leadership in South America and because of our refusal to accept Argentine beef because we are afraid of the spread of hoof and mouth disease into our country. Practically every step of the way Argentina has fought the United States. 8

Cordell Hull's philosophy toward the Good Neighbor Policy of the administration can best be summed up in his own words:

8 The question of Argentina will be discussed in a later chapter.
A decade of steady implementation of the Good Neighbor policy was now to follow. It was not always to be smooth rafting, and we were to encounter towheads in our stream of friendship. Great patience was required, and disappointments were sure to be encountered. But I had long before realized that the achievement of worthwhile aims often called for extreme patience and sometimes serious personal and official embarrassment, and I therefore formed a definite resolution that I would undergo any such experience for the sake of vitally important long-view-accomplishments.9

Throughout his administration Hull did all he could to implement the good will policy toward our neighbors. He was ably assisted by his assistant Sumner Welles, a career diplomat, and also by a well qualified group of experts in the Division of Latin American Affairs. Sumner Welles had general jurisdiction over the Department of Inter-American Affairs10 and formulated many of the plans and policies.

The Latin American world was almost unknown to Hull. His only previous experience with the area had been during the Spanish American War when Hull served with the army in Cuba. Certainly this did not prepare him for the tasks at hand, in fact this was an unsatisfactory background11 for one who was to formulate and direct the affairs of the United States with such a large and complex area as Latin America. However, what Hull


10 Sumner Welles, Time for Decision, New York, 1944, 200.

11 Stuart, Department of State, 310.
lacked in background and experience, he made up for in sincerity and devotion to the job at hand and the willingness to work untiringly for the policy.

Hull carefully checked the character and the fitness of officers in the Department of State and kept most of the seasoned, experienced persons in the key positions which they had held previously. He inaugurated the system of daily press conferences and no matter how busy he was he insisted upon receiving the representatives of the press and radio. In his relations with the diplomatic corps, Hull believed in complete frankness and demanded that his subordinates deal with problems in the same frank manner.

Hull's heritage in Latin America was not a pleasant one. In his Memoirs, he said:

Our inheritance of ill will was grim. It was probated under the name of Intervention; intervention in Panama to separate Panama from Colombia and build the Panama Canal; intervention in Mexico; intervention in Cuba; intervention in Haiti; intervention in Nicaragua.

Hull adds that not only was there this feeling against us but also there was a lack of unity among the republics themselves. The Chaco War was in full swing between Paraguay and Bolivia.

12 Hull, Memoirs, I, 180.
13 Stuart, Department of State, 314.
14 Ibid., 315.
15 Hull, Memoirs, I, 308.
A conflict was smoldering between Colombia and Peru over a border. In Cuba a revolution was brewing. 16

The fundamental policy of Hull was one of nonintervention in the affairs of Latin America. He had resolved that we could be friends only if we abandoned the right to intervene in their internal affairs. He had helped to write the plank in the Democratic platform in 1932 which stated "No interference in the internal affairs of other nations" and also "Cooperation with nations of the Western Hemisphere to maintain the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine." 17

Hull realized that Latin American policy had to be based on "mutually beneficial policies and principles, political, economic and moral." 18 These principles and policies must be backed up by actions and not merely by lip service. These actions, he maintained, must be "delicate and tactful." 19 It is our job to establish trust and confidence thereby creating a new relationship with our neighbors.

When Hull had been in office only two weeks he was asked by the League of Nations to join in settling the Leticia border dispute between Colombia and Peru. Roosevelt and Hull decided

16 Ibid., 309.
17 Ibid., 309-310.
18 Ibid., 310.
19 Ibid.
to cooperate by having a representative take part but without the power to vote. Hull commented on this cooperative move:

Our acceptance signified our willingness to cooperate with other nations in the settlement of Latin American questions. Unilateral action on our part was now in the discard. We began to apply a principle to which we adhered in the years to follow. This was to refrain from acting until after having consulted with all the other interested nations. Only in this way could we work from under the deep-seated resentment engendered in Latin America by previous one-sided actions of our country.

Cordell Hull proved himself in the eyes of the Haitians when he announced that an executive agreement was signed which provided for the withdrawal of United States Marines from Haiti by the end of October, 1934. The Marines had been stationed there since 1915. The executive agreement also provided less stringent financial arrangements for Haiti which would naturally aid her economic recovery. Hull credited the new pact to the fact that Haiti, under the more stable leadership of President Stenio Vincent, had bettered conditions in Haiti to a marked degree.

Comment was made on the fact that an executive agreement had been used rather than a formal treaty. According to the New York Times, Secretary Hull said: "that the executive agreement had merely been found a quicker method of arriving at the settle-

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20 Ibid., 310-311.

ment desired by both countries." 22

The Chicago Daily News ran an editorial entitled "Pulling Out of Haiti" in which they said that the pulling out of Haiti was not receiving the attention that it should because of the Cuban crisis. The editorial commented that the executive agreement "represents a significant modification of this country's Caribbean policy and should contribute much to that improvement of relations with other Latin American nations...." 23 The editorial went on to state that much criticism had been leveled at us because of our policy of intervention which sometimes led to exploitation of "backward people for the profit of American capital." 24 The same editorial pointed out that Haiti has given very little recognition to the preservation of law and order and the improvement in finance, public health and welfare under the benevolent hand of the United States. 25

These early references to Hull's actions on Latin American policy are significant in that they show plainly the desire and intention to carry out the Good Neighbor policy with the active cooperation of the press because the overall coverage was favorable at this time. Much damage can be and is done by

22 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
the press when disparaging remarks are made by hostile writers, as will be pointed out in a later instance.

The next major problem of the Secretary was that of Cuba. The Cuban situation had been growing more difficult since 1925 because of the dictatorship of General Machado. Things had gone from bad to worse under his regime; law and order were practically unknown. The Platt Amendment to the treaty of 1903 gave the United States the right to intervene in Cuba to preserve independence and maintain a government which could guarantee life, property, and individual liberty.26 However, Roosevelt and Hull were determined to carry out their policy of nonintervention and in the interest of that policy, despite the efforts of some quarters to force the issue, they steadfastly refused to send Marines into Cuba.

A United Press dispatch27 appeared in the New York Times stated that the administration was standing on its policy of nonintervention and that Welles was "cooperating with the various political factions in an effort to prevent further bloodshed."28

26 Hull, Memoirs, I, 312-313.

27 The United Press Associations serve 1004 newspapers in the United States and 967 foreign papers. This is a total of 1971 papers. This data was secured from the United Press office in New York in answer to a letter of inquiry to the writer.

The Chicago Daily News in a dispatch from Fred Reed, staff correspondent in Washington, said that a department official maintained that intervention would not be necessary because this official was sure that Welles could persuade Machado that "his time is up." This action on the part of Welles could certainly be interpreted as a type of interference and in opposition to the principles of Hull.

Roosevelt appealed to Cuba to submerge its political differences and to establish a government which could maintain law and order and guarantee life and property. A New York Times article interpreted this as an "appeal as urging Machado to quit if necessary."  

The Chicago Daily News editorial of August 10th accused Machado of spreading propaganda to the effect that the United States was interfering in the affairs of Cuba. The paper stoutly defended the position of Welles and the Roosevelt administration. The editorial said: "Both Welles and the Roosevelt administration have displayed such extreme solicitude for Cuban rights and ... for Machado's prerogatives that there is not the slightest excuse for that sort of propaganda." The editorial

29 Chicago Daily News, August 9, 1933, pt. 1, 2:5.
also commented on the fact that some Latin Americans will make the most of the Cuban situation to spread prejudice against the United States and thus "block President Roosevelt's program for more cordial relations between the American peoples."\(^3\)\(^2\)

The New York Times said that the diplomats of Latin America discussed the possibility of intervention. They agreed that such a step by this country would be an unpopular move throughout Latin America. Such a move would go far to "counteract the good effect of the agreement to evacuate our Marines from Haiti."\(^3\)\(^3\)

An editorial appeared in the Chicago Daily Tribune which credited the government in its actions in the Cuban affair; it stated the American government has been "approaching the situation for several months with as much discretion as possible. The administration . . . desires to avoid extreme action which could be taken under an interpretation of the Platt Amendment."\(^3\)\(^4\)

The days came and went but the Chicago Daily News covered the Cuban crisis watchfully. An editorial accused Machado of hoping for armed intervention in the belief that such intervention would strengthen his cause and keep him in office.

\(^3\)\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\)\(^3\) New York Times, August 10, 1933, pt. 1, \(1:7\).

\(^3\)\(^4\) Chicago Daily Tribune, August 11, 1933, pt. 1, \(12:1\).
However, the Department of State was too astute to fall into that line of reasoning. The editorial pointed out that the administration has attempted to further good will in Cuba by the Roosevelt program of economic assistance and the contemplation of a reciprocal tariff agreement, both of which have been hampered by the political turmoil and strife in Cuba.  

The sugar question loomed ominous in the Cuban situation said the Chicago Daily News. This paper maintained that sugar may have a "decisive influence upon the political as well as the economic future of the island republic and, possibly upon the whole future relationship of the United States to all Latin America."  

Arthur Krock writing from Washington for the New York Times believed that Hull "won his spurs" in the Cuban situation. Krock later awarded the spurs to Hull again for his work at Montevideo. Krock added that the Department of State officials felt that recent events had convinced them that Hull was being undermined in the State Department but his handling of the Cuban crisis has shown that he is determined "slow to action, but when

36 Ibid., August 17, 1933, pt. 1, 16:1.
37 Ibid.
38 New York Times, August 17, 1933, pt. 1, 16:5.
he moves with force, courage and firmness.\textsuperscript{39}

During the Cuban crisis, Mr. Hull was in communication with the ambassadors of Latin America; he consulted with them before any action was taken by the State Department which would be of any interest to them or affect them. This policy was advantageous because it strengthened our hand with the Latin Americans and caused much less resentment than if we had acted alone without consultation with our neighbors.\textsuperscript{40}

On September 6th, the President after conferring with representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico issued a statement regarding the Cuban situation. He clearly stated that information about Cuba would be available to the Latin American countries; he also made it clear that we had no desire to intervene and Cuba should obtain a satisfactory government of its own.\textsuperscript{41}

The \textit{Chicago Daily Tribune} reminded its readers that "Disorders are a reflection on Uncle, but anything done to help out is a cause for reproach."\textsuperscript{42} True to its isolationist policies the editorial added that the lesson of Cuba should teach the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Hull, \textit{Memoirs}, I, 314.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{42} \textit{Chicago Daily Tribune}, November 13, 1933, pt. 1
\end{itemize}
United States something in regard to the Philippines, "principally either to stay in, or, in getting out, get out bag and baggage." 43

Editorial comment in the Chicago Daily News 44 urged a return to the pre-Wilsonian policy of recognition for a foreign government which demonstrates the sovereignty of the government. Since de facto recognition has been a policy of the United States since earliest times, it does not seem that this advice is unsound at this time. The Chicago Daily Tribune concurred in this opinion of recognition of Cuba's government in an editorial criticizing Welles' actions in Cuba and suggested that American diplomats not be allowed to play one faction against the other. 45 Welles denied that he had used any pressure or influence in Cuba which could be construed as interference or intervention. 46

In the latter part of November Roosevelt issued a statement of policy in which he declared Washington stood ready to recognize any government which demonstrates itself representative

43 Ibid.
45 Chicago Daily Tribune, November 25, 1933, pt. 1, 14:1.
46 Sumner Welles, Two Years of the Good Neighbor Policy Department of State, Latin American Series, No. 11, Washington, 1935, 9-10.
of its people and able to secure their support. The *Chicago Daily News*\(^{47}\) said that this policy should command favor throughout Latin America; it should dispel some of the suspicions and prejudices our neighbors have. Here, then, was a return to the principle of de facto recognition by the United States.

As the months progressed conditions were far from satisfactory in Cuba. The *Chicago Daily News*\(^{48}\) suggested that some American business men would like to see the disorder grow in Cuba in order to force the United States to intervene. The paper despaired of such intervention because nothing would be gained from intervention and certainly intervention would not fit the Cubans for self-government any more than intervention had equipped any other country for self-government.

On January 26, 1934 the *Chicago Daily News* ran an editorial in which the paper commented that the Cuban situation had been handled in a sympathetic manner and that if the Cubans failed to "improve the responsibility cannot fairly be placed on the White House."\(^{49}\) The editorial also mentioned that some economic aid was probable for Cuba.

\(^{47}\) *Chicago Daily News* November 25, 1933, pt. 1, 10:1.

\(^{48}\) Ibid., December 21, 1933, pt. 1, 16:2.

\(^{49}\) Ibid., January 26, 1934, pt. 1, 18:1.
Finally a treaty was signed with Cuba May 24, 1934. By this treaty we gave up the right to intervene in Cuba thus completely abrogated the Platt Amendment. This proved that what Hull said he meant—nonintervention in the affairs of our neighbors.

The Detroit Free Press paid tribute to Hull in an editorial which commented: "The patience and restraint he displayed in the face of a difficult situation in Cuba is but one example of a policy of good neighborliness which has regained for the United States the confidence and good will of other American republics." 50

As late as January 24th, 1935, the Chicago Daily Tribune 51 denounced the efforts we made in Cuba. The Tribune maintained that we have tried control, we have tried advice. We abrogated the Platt Amendment. Our only measures of success were in the field of sanitation and health. The Tribune inferred that perhaps American manipulation had contributed to the disorders in Cuba. According to the editorial,"Cuba Heads for the Jungle", is the title of the editorial,"Cuba is sliding back into the semi-barbarism or complete barbarism of jungle society." 52

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52 Ibid.
Regardless of the state of society in Cuba, it does not seem that the Chicago Daily Tribune need have used such terms to discuss the situation. It appears to be a case of bad judgment and a lack of courtesy to use such opprobrious language in discussing one of the very neighbors we hoped to win to our Good Neighbor policy. Such an editorial can only hope to alienate our neighbors!

Prior to all this the Seventh International Conference of American States was held in Montevideo in December of 1933. This Conference is significant because it laid the groundwork for future cooperation between the American republics. The outlook was not too favorable for the Conference because of the failure of the London Economic Conference and the Geneva meeting for military disarmament.⁵³

President Roosevelt regarded the meeting to be one of great importance, an opportunity to further understanding and accord among the Americas. With this in mind he directed Secretary of State Cordell Hull to attend in person.⁵⁴ On the way to the Conference Hull stopped at various ports of call to establish personal contact and relations with the statesmen of the various

⁵³ Hull, Memoirs, I, 317.
⁵⁴ Wilfred Funk, ed., Roosevelt’s Foreign Policy, New York, 1942, Item 19, 28-29.
countries. Both Roosevelt and Hull had the highest hopes for the success of the Conference and Hull did not lose a single opportunity to further the cause of the Good Neighbor policy from the time of his appointment to head the United States delegation until he returned home.

Hull expressed himself on the forthcoming Conference in his addresses and statements saying, that a "more substantial step forward in Pan American unity can and . . . will be taken at Montevideo than all others within two decades." He realized full well that there were impediments to the success of the Conference but he was confident that it could be brought to a successful conclusion.

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia protested that the time was not ripe for the Conference. Argentina was particularly adamant and until the very end could not make up her mind to send a delegate to attend the Conference.

Hull was anxious to present to the Conference an economic resolution for lower tariffs and the abolition of trade restrictions. Fundamentally the program provided for a tariff

56 Hull, Memoirs, I, 317.
57 Ibid., 320.
truce: the initiation of bilateral or plurilateral negotiations for the removal of restrictions on commerce and reductions of tariff rates. Governments were to try to eliminate restrictions and duties which clearly lacked economic justification. The governments were also to agree to incorporate in these "trade agreements the most-favored-nation principle in its unconditional and unrestricted form, this to be applied to all forms and methods of control of imports and not only to import duties."58 In preparing the resolution Hull says he hoped the whole world could be included in the idea; it was not to be confined to the New World alone. "Measures like my economic resolution could have been applied as logically to the Eastern Hemisphere as to our own."59

Regarding this economic resolution the New York Times60 in an editorial stated the fact that although Hull may not be forbidden to pursue his work on trade agreements, he cannot hope to bring it to function unless there is a change of attitude on the part of the President. And change the President's attitude he did.

The delegation arrived at Montevideo on November 26,

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58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., 321.
60 New York Times, November 11, 1933, pt. 1, 14:3.
to find "the atmosphere or 'ambiente' as the local press described it, was excited and not too promising." Hinton contended that the "Chaco War, North American efforts to collect defaulted bonds, the threat of intervention in Cuba, and the presence of the United States Marines in Nicaragua would combine to throw a chill over the gathering." Hull hastily took counsel with his political self and decided positive action was needed.

The attitude toward Hull upon his arrival at Montevideo was not a warm one. He was treated with suspicion and distrust. The newspapers of Montevideo and Buenos Aires "rawhided our country and our delegation, called us names, and threw out the idea that we were down there as usual, for purely selfish narrow purposes." The Brazilian press hailed Hull as the first representative of President Roosevelt's New Deal to visit Latin America. They expressed the hope that Hull's visit would bring about an understanding between the United States and Brazil and some solution of the economic problems of the two countries.

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61 Hinton, Cordell Hull, 245.

62 Hinton is misinformed on the fact of the Marines being in Nicaragua. The Marines were withdrawn after the 1932 elections and the last were evacuated on January 2, 1933. See World Almanac, 1933, New York, (no publication date), 689. Also see The New International Year Book, 1933.

63 Hull, Memoirs, I, 324.

Hull called on the delegations in Montevideo without making an appointment. These informal calls usually lasted thirty to forty minutes and created a better feeling and paved the way for closer cooperation. Hull always tried to impress the delegations with the fact that we were there with the firm intent to carry out the doctrine of the good neighbor. We simply wanted to cooperate fully with all Latin American countries in promoting the political and economic ideals in which we are all alike and mutually interested.65 These informal calls created a feeling of friendliness and warmth that a more formal approach could not have created.

Argentina presented a problem. Even before the meeting began the New York Times predicted that Argentina would "assume leadership of South American affairs and organize a regional South American bloc, opposed to the United States."66 It is a fact that Argentina opposed our actions for some time and hastened to organize her sister republics against us whenever she could possibly do so. Hull had set his heart on unity of action at the Conference,67 so, undaunted he called on the Argentine delegation headed by Saavedra Lamas. He received Hull nervously

65 Hull, Memoirs, I, 326.
67 Hull, Memoirs, I, 327.
but Hull outlined his plans and thereby appealed to the vanity of Saavedra Lamas and asked his counsel as the head of the Argentine delegation. Hull told Saavedra Lamas of his plan on two resolutions, one pertaining to an economic program for business recovery and the other pertaining to the peace treaties. Hull then proposed that Saavedra Lamas should present the resolution to the Conference which pertained to the peace treaties and that Hull would present the economic resolution. He told Lamas that if he did not care to propose the peace resolution that he would have to find the next best man to do it. After due consideration Saavedra Lamas accepted Hull's idea and consented to propose the resolution backed by the support of the United States delegation. This cooperation between Hull and Saavedra Lamas was "unexpected" and "in sharp contrast to Argentina's antagonistic attitude toward the United States in previous conferences." 

In the following quotation, the reader can readily understand the reason for Cordell Hull's triumph with Saavedra Lamas and also the reason for the success of his Latin American policy in general. He wrote:

But I firmly believe in the principle that "there are no real triumphs in diplomacy". I felt that true success

68 Ibid., 327-329.
70 Ibid., December 10, 1933, 37:1.
could come only by inducing our opponents to become our allies through convincing them that basically our ideas were their ideas. . . . I could have introduced into the Conference the peace resolution I had prepared rather than give it to Saavedra Lamas and perhaps I could have secured a majority in its favor. But, had I done so, Argentina doubtless would have fought it on some technical grounds and the unanimity it needed would have vanished. I believed it wiser in the circumstances for the head of the Argentine delegation to offer it. 71

Commenting on Hull's mission to Latin America the Chicago Daily Tribune called it a "commendable official enterprise and we are confident will result in improvement in our relations with our South American neighbors." 72 In the same editorial the Tribune noted the ability of Hull as well as his integrity and the sincere manner with which he attacked whatever he undertook.

Again commenting on the Conference and the report of an economic proposal, the Chicago Daily Tribune pointed out that the decline in trade between the United States and Argentina is a considerable amount in dollars and cents. It is pointed out by the Tribune that bonds are defaulted by Latin American countries 73 which injures not only American investors but also the Latin Americans themselves; their credit will undoubtedly be restricted as a result of these defaults. The Tribune hastened to conclude: "If Mr. Hull has a plan for reviving trade and can

71 Hull, Memoirs, I, 331.
73 Ibid., December 8, 1933, pt. 1, 6:1.
put his plan into successful operation, he will rate a monument in every Latin American capital as well as in Washington, D. C. \(^74\)

Saavedra Lamas introduced his peace resolution and in accordance with their agreement, Hull seconded the resolution. In his speech, he pointed out that they were writing a chapter in the peace efforts of the Americas which would go down in history. He also mentioned the policies of the New Deal and assured that these policies would be strictly adhered to by the Roosevelt administration. \(^75\)

On December 12th, Hull made his economic proposal on trade revival and the reduction of tariff barriers through "the negotiation of comprehensive bilateral reciprocity treaties based upon mutual concession." \(^76\) Saavedra Lamas supported Hull's proposal declaring that Cordell Hull had put his finger on the world's sore spot." \(^77\) This proposal of Hull's is rated by Wertenbaker as the "first positive United States contribution in history to the doctrine of Pan Americanism." \(^78\)

Harold Hinton in commenting on the work of Hull de-

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74 Ibid.
75 Hull, Memoirs, I, 332-333.
78 Charles Wertenbaker, A New Doctrine for the Americans, New York, 1941, 102.
clared that the United States and Argentina had made a trade with the proposals, as the United States had agreed to support the Antiwar Pact of Saavedra Lamas in return for Argentine support of United States economic leadership at the Conference. If Hinton made this statement as a criticism of Hull's work, it hardly seems to be a justifiable one in the light of diplomatic relations.

An editorial in the New York Times titled "American Tariff Policy" said the Hull program looked to the future and must await a change in American tariff policy. The editorial pointed out the fact that the United States is attempting to raise prices at home and any legislation dealing with tariffs will depend on the success of the price-raising program or the inadequacies of such a program. However, the editorial concluded that the tariff policy of the United States is changing.

The resolution was adopted. In an Associated Press release it was viewed as representing a change in the tariff

80 Ibid., December 14, 1933, pt. 1, 24:2.
81 Ibid.
policies of this country. Since no adverse criticism accompanied the article it can be assumed that the change was acceptable.

On December 19th a special cable from Montevideo sent by Harold Hinton told of the assurances made by Hull that the United States was definitely committed to a policy of nonintervention in the affairs of the Americas. The editorial concluded thus: "The declaration of a Chaco armistice and discussion of a nonintervention resolution called up expressions of amity and mutual respect such as no previous Pan American gathering has seen." 84

Hull along with others was credited with the Chaco armistice. 85 In another article of the same date, the New York Times pointed out that Hull came to Montevideo with a definite plan of action for well-defined organized peace. Like a good executive or a good Tennessee politician, he has quietly suggested all his plans to others and let them introduce the projects and take the credit. 86

The Chicago Daily News credited Hull with a diplomatic victory at the Pan American Conference that "not only constituted

84 Ibid., December 20, 1933, pt. 1, 1:3.
85 Ibid., 15:3.
86 Ibid., 15:1.
a personal triumph but greatly improved United States relations and prestige in Latin America." In its editorial column the same paper commented on the success of Hull’s policies at the Conference but added a note of warning that perhaps Hull’s philosophy on tariffs may be met with some misconceptions on the part of our neighbors. It reminded its readers of the fact that the Congress of the United States shapes American tariff policies and not the Secretary of State. The editorial concluded:

The United States deserves better esteem from its Latin American sisters for its more liberal policies of the last few years. It has done much to allay suspicion by withdrawing from Nicaragua and Haiti and other countries where it had intervened on less provocation. By redefining its position on intervention and its interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, it has indicated a disposition to respect the sovereignty of other countries. Such considerations should weigh against any disillusionment which may arise from misconception of the tariff policies.

Arthur Krock wrote from Washington for the New York Times maintaining that "Hull won his spurs" at Montevideo making the President, Tennessee, and the Department of State proud of him. He went on to say that Hull has become the number one figure in the cabinet and a true exponent of the Wilson policy.

87 Chicago Daily News, December 27, 1933, pt. 1, 2:5.
88 Ibid., December 28, 1933, pt. 1, 14:1.
89 Ibid.
As the Secretary journeyed home he was warmly praised by many of the delegations from Latin America as a real peacemaker and as the hero of Montevideo Conference. A news item in the New York Times from Panama City said: "Hailed by the local press as the 'standard bearer of peace', Secretary of State Cordell Hull of the United States, who arrived here this morning, ... justified that designation." 91

The New York Times quoted Dr. L. S. Rowe, director general of the Pan American Union in an article in February. Dr. Rowe said the work of Hull particularly as a peacemaker, is a very important contribution to Pan America. He maintains that Hull's efforts at the Conference ushered in a new era in our relations with the countries of Latin America. Dr. Rowe said:

I had occasion to visit these countries two weeks after Secretary Hull's visits. Hull visited Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama and was deeply impressed with the new attitude of friendliness, confidence, and cooperation characteristic not only of the government but also of the people.

This feeling is that our relations with them are being approached from a new and more liberal angle and that the United States is determined that those elements of our policy which in the past have given rise to criticism are either to be eliminated or fundamentally modified. The situation is one fraught with deep significance for the future of Pan Americanism. 92

91 Ibid., January 8, 1934, pt. 1, 10:1.
92 Ibid., February 7, 1934, pt. 1, 6:5.
In his Memoirs Hull points that the eyes of Latin America were turned toward us to see if we meant to carry out the agreement we had signed at Montevideo as well as the policy of the Good Neighbor. "We had reached a climax of cooperation at Montevideo. Any faltering on our part now would revive old suspicions and antagonisms as acutely as before, if not more so."93

An Associated Press dispatch gives us some light on the press in Lima, Peru. The release is entitled "Press Lauds Foreign Policy of Roosevelt". It points out that the newspaper El Comercio94 said Roosevelt's recent speech on foreign policy closes an irritating period in relations between the United States and other republics. It will lend toward "development of sincere and useful understanding and postponement of suspicions originated by certain methods previously employed in American international relations".95 The use of the word postponement is interesting; apparently there seemed little hope to postpone suspicion definitely.

Upon his return to Washington Hull conferred with the President, then issued a statement emphasizing our disavowal of

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93 Hull, Memoirs, I, 342.
95 Ibid.
"all the old themes of conquest or armed intervention"; it became evident that solidarity of purpose of all the Americas could be attained. For the first time, there was no bloc working against us. Of course, there was not complete harmony at the Conference but on all major issues there was a unity not found in the Americas previously.

Bemis, an authority on diplomatic history, hailed the Conference at Montevideo as a great advance in Pan Americanism, "particularly in regard to the organization of peace in the presentation of which the nations of the New World had a common vital interest." He also mentioned the resolution on the removal of trade barriers, the treaties defining the nationality of women, the requirements of naturalization in general, and the convention defining the rights and duties of states as further accomplishments of the Conference.

Bailey said that this Conference gave the Roosevelt administration the opportunity to "breathe greater reality into its Good Neighbor policy." He concluded his remarks with the

96 Hull, Memoirs, I, 342.
98 Ibid.
99 Bailey, Diplomatic History, 737.
observation that the Conference adjourned with "greater cordiality toward the United States than had been evidenced at any of the six previous gatherings."100

An interesting note came from a Latin American, Luis Quintanilla who said: "Hull . . . proceeded with utmost tact and kindness. He succeeded first in dispelling suspicion and secondly in securing cooperation."101 Quintanilla went on to credit Hull and the Roosevelt administration, feeling quite confident of their policies as long as the Roosevelt regime continued in office but then brought up the question of what will happen with a change of administration. Quintanilla concluded: "The answer implies a faith in the United States, a faith which only time can justify. At any rate, that Conference at Montevideo was I repeat, a turning point in Pan Americanism."102

Another view is expressed by Van Alstyne who commented that the Roosevelt administration was determined to make a reality out of Pan Americanism. Pan American was to be the "chief instrument of hemisphere defense."103 We could not get anywhere with

100 Ibid.
101 Luis Quintanilla, A Latin American Speaks, New York, 1943, 159-160.
102 Ibid., 229.
police action, a continued intervention might lead to intrigue and cooperation in Europe, the only alternative was friendship. In 1933 the Roosevelt administration began realistically to forecast the future and to appraise the practical need for Latin American collaboration in the face of possible foreign dangers. 104

The Montevideo Conference brought prestige to Hull and praise from Graham Stuart. He claims this Conference was successful because Roosevelt and Hull were agreed upon the Good Neighbor policy and that the Department of State worked hand in hand with Mr. Hull to accomplish the objectives of the Good Neighbor policy. The Department of State had prepared Mr. Roosevelt's Pan American Day speech of April 12, 1933 wherein Roosevelt defined his Good Neighbor policy "as possessing the essential qualities of a true Pan Americanism, and defined the Monroe Doctrine as a Pan American doctrine of continental defense." 105 Hull had helped draft the plank in the Democratic platform of 1932 which advocated no interference in the internal affairs of nations. Hull also had been able to secure some support from Roosevelt on the resolution on lower tariffs and abolition of trade restrictions. Not only did Hull accomplished these things but Stuart credits him with person-

104 Ibid., 229.
105 Stuart, Department of State, 323.
al endeavors to win over the delegations and especially the proud arrogant Argentine delegates. Stuart praises the astute manner in which Hull won the cooperation of the head of the Argentine delegation, Saavedra Lamas.

Stuart does not feel that Hull was well qualified for the office of Secretary of State yet he concedes Hull's accomplishments thus: "By submerging himself and the American delegation in order to obtain wholehearted cooperative action for the welfare of all, instead of personal prestige and praise, Secretary Hull made the Good Neighbor Policy a vital force for better understanding." 107

According to Wertenbaker, Montevideo tore down our interventionist policy of a hundred ten years' standing. He commends Roosevelt's backing of Hull's stand on nonintervention and tariff reductions by negotiating with the other nations. "This stone in the policy structure enhances the Secretary's prestige in Latin America at the expense of a good deal of criticism from high-tariff advocated at home." 108

Another reliable comment is made by Arthur Whitaker who said:

106 Ibid., 310.
107 Ibid., 324.
the first important stage in the emergence of the new inter-American cordiality came at the Seventh International Conference of American States at Montevideo in 1933, when the United States surrendered the right of intervention, and the meeting ended in an atmosphere of friendliness.

On December 28, 1933, the President addressed the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and acclaimed Hull. In this Item 26, "Peace by Peoples Instead of War by Governments," he praised the work done at Montevideo and ended on a note of praise for the Secretary of State whom Roosevelt credits with bringing about a friendlier atmosphere between the United States and our neighbors to the south. Roosevelt said: "For participation in the bringing about of that result we can feel proud that so much credit belongs to the Secretary of State of the United States, Cordell Hull." 109

Hull was satisfied with the backing he received from Congress upon his return from Montevideo. He was extremely pleased with the rapidity with which legislation was passed in Congress on the Chaco embargo, the Cuban treaty, Haiti, and the Argentine Antiwar Pact. Hull said that these concrete evidences of Congress showed they were convinced of the "validity of the Good Neighbor Policy and the need to implement it with acts." 110


110 Funk, Roosevelt's Foreign Policy, Item 26, 47.

111 Hull, Memoirs, I, 346.
What did Cordell Hull himself feel had been accomplished at Montevideo? In an address before the National Press Club in Washington, he discussed this very point. First of all he praised the people of Latin America for their love of law, justice, and equality, for their courtesy, loyalty and kindness. He mentioned the inauspicious beginning of the Conference and the pessimistic outlook held by many before the Conference began, chiding the press somewhat by saying: "... some of my friends of the press who were utterly pessimistic as to the outcome." Hull pointed out the suspicions, prejudices and aloofness, and lack of concrete cooperation between the United States and Latin America in previous years. Hull claimed that the Conference marked the "beginning of a new era--a new epoch--in this hemisphere." A new spirit inspired by the policy of the good neighbor was born at Montevideo. International cooperation was demonstrated. A peace revival was conducted through the entire proceedings. The trade and tariff steps were mentioned.

113 Ibid., 3.
114 Ibid., 4.
115 Ibid., 6.
with their possibility of international trade on a much wider scope. This sentence of the speech summed up the attitude of the Conference toward these trade problems:

... The Conference was not content with a mere expression of disapproval, but it proceeded unanimously to propose a definite, concrete, and comprehensive program for economic rehabilitation which would combine a policy of mutually profitable international trade with such domestic economic policies and programs as each nation may desire to maintain.

Our press commented favorably and in agreement with the personalities of those involved and in agreement with the writers of the period of the Conference. There was no serious lack of unity among the reports of the press. Hull himself commented on the favorable press which the Conference had received. Referring to the accomplishments of the Conference in relation to the press he said: "the press of the United States and that of our neighbors have extensively taken note of this changed outlook, ...

Our next concern is with the problem of Mexico. The situation is fraught with a number of misunderstandings on our part as well as on the part of our neighbor. One has only to look back through the years to see evidences of intervention of one

116 Ibid., 7.
117 Ibid., 10.
118 Hull, Addresses and Statements, 83.
kind or another which would naturally arouse suspicions of us. At times our choice of representatives in Mexico had left much to be desired and undoubtedly these representatives have been the cause of some of the discord.

General Lazaro Cárdenas was elected in 1934. According to *Time*, Mexico prepared to inaugurate Cárdenas and suffered "a momentous change of heart, was thanking its stars for President Roosevelt and Ambassador Josephus Daniels. 119 Previous to the Cárdenas inauguration there had been some criticism of the appointment of Daniels to the post in Mexico because he had been Secretary of the Navy at the time when the Navy bombarded Vera Cruz in 1914. *Time* said the change of heart on the part of Mexico was due to the fact that:

... In Ambassador Daniels they have found the weightiest approver of Mexico's radical and anti-clerical Six-Year Plan. He had called it roundly "a new deal and a square deal!" Roosevelt raised the price of silver. He has also recognized the Soviet Union, considered by Mexicans the spearhead of all that is Godless.120

The storm clouds began to gather over Mexico shortly after the inauguration of Cárdenas. *Commonweal*121 said the reports of an American newspaper man, who risked his life to bring out documentary evidence, indicated a new revolution was going on

120 Ibid.
in Mexico. Bridges were blown up, trains delayed, tracks torn apart—tangible evidences of the strife and turmoil in Mexico. Commonweal urged its readers:

... Everything that can properly be done by American public opinion should be exerted promptly and powerfully to avert the outbreak of another civil war in Mexico—but if those efforts fail, let it be remembered that no share of the blame for such a tragedy may be justly laid upon the church. 122

The problem of recognition of the new Cardenas government was discussed in America under the title, "No Intervention in Mexico". Representative Higgins of Massachusetts asked for withdrawal of recognition of Mexico. America said:

Secretary of State Hull shows that he is not yet properly informed concerning the real burden of our complaint: It is true Mr. Higgins asked for withdrawal of recognition, but even there Mr. Hull is not on firm ground, for one of the conditions of our recognition of Russia is a promise to respect the religion of Americans in Russia, a thing which is not being done in Mexico. 123

America pointed out that what American Catholics wanted is a cessation of intervention, even if recognition cannot or will not be withdrawn. The editorial pointed to the interventionist tactics of Josephus Daniels as listed by the Brooklyn Tablet:

Daniels is guilty of recognizing Calles as boss; of praising the National Revolutionary party which party was anxious to expel all Bishops and priests; of entertaining the Governor

122 Ibid., 272.

123 "No Intervention in Mexico", America, LMI, January 19, 1935, 342.
of Puebla who had closed the churches in Puebla; of calling on Garrido Canabal, leader of the Red Shirts who are murdering Catholics, and praising Canabal.124

America concluded:

Now all this obviously constitutes intervention of the most efficacious kind. Mexico is not united behind the new President and the country is aflame with revolt. Every time Mr. Daniels comes out with one of his praises of the Calles crowd, he is shouting to the world that he and his Government are supporting them. Every Mexican on both sides recognizes this instantly. And they are right. We call for a stop to this intervention.125

Since the United States had pledged herself to the policy of non-intervention, America felt that we were entitled to demand that intervention such as practiced by Daniels be stopped at once.

Our Sunday Visitor carried an article in which the resolution presented by Senator Wagner to the Senate is discussed. The resolution demanded "that the United States suspend trade relations with Mexico and urge tourists not to visit that country because of 'atrocities' against Catholics."126 This resolution was framed by the Knights of Columbus of New York who charged "the Mexican Government is substituting atheism and communism for Christianity and slavery for freedom."127 The Knights of Columbus objected to Daniels' actions in supporting the National Revo-
In an article in *The New World*, a report was made of the denunciation of the persecutions in Mexico by members of Congress. It stated that precedents for intercession had been inserted in the *Congressional Record* as well as a bill directing the Secretary not to enter into any reciprocal trade agreements or understandings with any nation engaged in religious or racial persecutions.  

Senator Borah proposed a resolution that an inquiry be made by the United States Senate regarding the state and Church situation in Mexico. This was said to be an intrusion by some Mexican officials. According to the *Chicago Daily Tribune* these officials felt that the Borah proposal was unworthy of consideration. The officials of Mexico pointed out that such an inquiry would mean interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation; such an interference could lead to serious international consequences. Despite the fact that Borah represented the sentiments of a large number of United States citizens it "does not diminish the resentment here [Mexico] that United States..."
authorities be requested even to take consideration of any action regarding Mexican sovereignty." 130

America objected to the agitation of the New York Times and the World-Telegram over the proposed Borah resolution. America maintained the reporting on the Mexican situation had been the poorest in modern times 131 and, therefore, the full facts in the case were not known to the public. America felt that objections to looking into the Mexican situation need not be based on a "mere legalistic point of international comity which forbids any peering into what goes on in another country." 132 America said:

The truth is that this Mexican question is an American question, an American question of the most domestic kind. . . . As a matter of fact, we think that Senator Borah . . . has proposed a signal service to amicable relations with Mexico, and all of Latin America, whose irritations against us is growing faster than is American irritation against Mexico. A hush-hush policy will simply not work. The thing has gone too far. 133

Our Sunday Visitor reported on the reply received by Representative Higgins of Massachusetts when he again urged the recall of Daniels and that the United States withdraw recognition

130 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
of Mexico. Secretary Hull said: "... it is not within the province of this Government to intervene in the situation in Mexico." No comment was made by this paper as to the need for intervention nor was any comment made that the United States should intervene. Arguments were given by the Knights of Columbus to Mr. Hull that a warning should be given to Mexico that diplomatic relations would be severed unless persecution of Catholics in Mexico was stopped. To this Hull again answered that he would adhere to a policy of nonintervention.

During this period there was a demand for investigation, interference, inquiry and intervention on the part of many people in the United States, Catholics as well as Protestants. Archbishop Curley condemned the "ignoble silence of the United States, with regard to the events in Mexico." According to Archbishop Curley, it was estimated that over a million resolutions and letters had been sent to Roosevelt and Hull protesting the events in Mexico. Archbishop Curley accused Hull of creating a new departure in American diplomatic practice when he refused to express a protest to the Mexican Foreign Office. The Archbishop

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134 Our Sunday Visitor, February 3, 1935, pt. 1, 2:3.
135 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
said Mexico is "not carrying out the part of the 'good neighbor' relationship," as long as it adopts a course counter to the American principles of fundamental rights of conscience and freedom of religion.

The Knights of Columbus wrote to Roosevelt and Hull about the religious persecutions in Mexico. In Roosevelt's original letter sent to the Knights of Columbus he said: "In respect to the rights enjoyed by Mexican citizens living in Mexico it has been the policy of this government to refrain from intervening in such direct concerns of the Mexican Government. That policy of non-intervention I shall continue to pursue." The Knights of Columbus answered sharply and reminded Roosevelt of his responsibilities and denied that they sought intervention. Instead they maintained they asked that the Government of the United States remonstrate on behalf of those persecuted.

On the same point, the Catholic Daily Tribune reported the reply made by Roosevelt and stated: Mr. Roosevelt made it clear that his stand was not to be interpreted as evidence of indifference and reiterated his abhorrence of religious intolerance.

139 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
whether here or abroad. The Commonweal commented that Roosevelt's policy of non-intervention will comfort any nation which denies or minimizes religious liberty.

The Brooklyn Tablet said that Roosevelt's stand on religious persecution in Mexico will "probably result in increased vengeance," and the government there will "probably now feel free to go ahead and slaughter everyone seeking to worship Almighty God." Hubert Herring writing for the Chronicle of World Affairs maintained:

In the meantime, let the United States keep its hands off. I would even express the hope that American groups would deny themselves the rather dubious pleasure of protesting. It will do them no good, and it only serves to complicate a situation which, I am convinced, will mend if Mexico is permitted to order her affairs in her own way.

The New York Times reported in April 1937 that a possible obstacle to complete relations of a friendly nature be-

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144 The Brooklyn Tablet, cited in Ibid.
between the United States and Mexico was removed when Secretary of State Hull and Dr. Najera signed a treaty providing for the termination of Article VIII of the Gadsden Treaty of 1853. This article provided for the building of a plank and railroad across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Mexico considered this article an abridgment of her sovereignty. In pursuance of the Good Neighbor policy which strove to eliminate trouble spots, the termination of this article pointed to better and more amicable relations.

In January 1938, Hull protested the fact Mexico had felt obliged to raise international trade barriers just when other nations were finding it possible to lower them. However, because of Hull's policy of noninterference and amicable relations no representation of any kind would be made to the Mexican Government until a complete analysis of the decree had been made by experts.

An interesting article appeared in the Saturday Evening Post called "Revolution on a Silver Platter". Commenting on Cárdenas and his relations with Washington the article said:

Washington, embarking upon a still undefined policy of being a "good neighbor", looked on social reconstruction with a friendly eye; and this was of primary importance. It is axiomatic in Mexico that no chief executive can long hold

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147 Ibid., January 22, 1938, pt. 1, 2:8.
148 Ibid.
office unless the White House approves. This has been proved time and time again; in recent days during the terms of Venustiano Carranza, Alvaro Obregon and Calles. All these men received White House support when they were in danger, and all survived. The New Deal was not merely friendly to Mexico; it went farther than simply keeping hands off Mexican affairs. It embargoed arms for would-be enemies. Later a new innovation, it bought Mexican silver at well over the market price and Mexican metal generally, permitting pegging of the peso, giving Mexico added purchasing power, and the government 13 per cent of its total income. 149

In commenting on the land grab which had taken place in Mexico, the Post writer said:

Nevertheless, it may be that our State Department was wise in adopting the attitude that the land program should be encouraged and no immediate payment demanded for the United States citizens' lands seized. In this connection, Washington accepts the Mexican view that American landowners acquired their Mexican holdings on a shoestring and made big profits for years... 149

On the other hand, Washington could have slowed somewhat the agrarian program, or held it in safer bounds, by protecting United States landowners who have had vast holdings in Mexico. 150

It must be remembered in dealing with this problem of expropriations of oil and farm lands that the United States agreed to the right of Mexico to expropriate and that Mexico agreed to our demand for compensation for properties seized. Despite the impatience of those affected there was an amicable attempt on the part of the State Department to obtain justice for those whose

149 Frank L. Kluckhohn, "Revolution on a Silver Platter", Saturday Evening Post, CX, February 5, 1938, 17.
150 Ibid., 71.
lands and properties had been seized.

The Post writer added this comment on our diplomatic policy:

Where Washington appears to have fallen down completely; however, particularly from the viewpoint of being a "good neighbor" to Mexico, has been in countenancing, and even encouraging, an intensified campaign against foreign industry. For many extreme steps that President Cárdenas took in this direction were followed by general laudatory speeches by Ambassador Josephus Daniels... His friendly speeches might have had a useful effect had they been followed by an occasional bit of common-sense advice. They were not, however, probably because of diplomatic policy set at home.151

The Post noted the demands of Mexico that the oil companies would be forced to pay royalties on all their properties which upset the Morrow-Calles agreement guaranteeing the oil companies rights in Mexico.152

The next step was the oil expropriations!

Cárdenas signed a decree in November, 1936, which provided for the expropriation of private property of public utility to satisfy collective necessities in case of war or interior upheaval. Actually the program to drive out the petroleum interests took the shape of most burdensome labor legislation. Tacitly the Cárdenas Government encouraged the labor unions to strike against

151 Ibid., 71, 73.
152 Ibid., 73.
the foreign owned companies for heavy increases in pay, shorter hours, double pay for overtime, . . . ." 153 The labor courts upheld the unions on every demand and the foreign companies, although costs had been driven to prohibitive levels, agreed to the demands except those which dealt with the control of books and management. Because the companies refused to accept the complete demands, Cárdenas decreed March 18, 1938, the expropriation of their properties. 154

The Chicago Daily News, in discussing the oil expropriations, said the Secretary of State declared, forcibly that the "United States intends to defend its citizens and their legitimate interests, in any part of the world, to the full extent allowed by the limits of reason." 155 In concluding the editorial the News said: "The 'good neighbor' policy is undoubtedly admirable. It presupposes, however, that we have good neighbors." 156

The Chicago Daily Tribune featured an article written by Arthur Sears Henning. He said the oil seizures have strained the relations between the United States and Mexico. Henning pointed out the United States did not dispute the authority of the

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153 Bemis, Latin American Policy, 347.
154 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
Mexican Government to expropriate any properties within her boundaries, but we did demand just compensation. Mr. Henning said the crisis

... is not due entirely to the expropriations of the American oil wells and refineries or to the previous action of the Mexican government in raising the Mexican tax to a prohibitive degree on products imported chiefly or exclusively from the United States. The expropriations of the oil properties presented the United States with a cumulative grievance, coming on top of the expropriations in the last decade of hundreds of farms, ranches, and other agricultural properties owned by Americans, few of them ever have been fully compensated by the Mexican government.157

Mr. Henning noted that the administration had done nothing but make representations to Mexico on account of the "good neighbor" policy until this expropriation of oil interests. In other words the farmers and ranchers were not really supported in their claims although Mexico agreed to compensation; very few claims were ever satisfied.158

The Chicago Daily News reported there was hope of settling this oil situation amicably because of the neighborliness which Cárdenas showed in his message to the United States. The Latin American branch of the diplomatic corps was confident of a satisfactory adjustment according to the News.160

158 Ibid.
160 Ibid.
The Chicago Daily Tribune said editorially that "Mexico has no reason to anticipate an unsympathetic response in Washington to the seizure of the foreign owned oil properties."  

161 The Tribune said the government here sanctions such actions and practices as for example in the case of TVA.  

162 The Tribune also reported to its readers from its Washington bureau that the oil case will test the Good Neighbor policy. The Tribune was able to point to the New Deal philosophy saying: "From motives not only of good neighborliness but of sympathy with the economic and social new deal that President Cárdenas is giving Mexico, Mr. Roosevelt declined to take the British course. . . . He conceded the right of Mexico to expropriate the properties and early requested just compensation. The article concluded that unless the Mexican Congress made a more impressive provision to compensate the oil companies than it did to indemnify the owners of expropriated farm lands, the "good neighbor policy will be badly bent. And if Mexico gives Japan a foothold in that country. . . , the question will arise whether Franklin Roosevelt's good neighbor policy is as efficacious as

162 Ibid.  
Theodore Roosevelt's big stick policy.\textsuperscript{164}

Several weeks passed and Hull decided to prod Mexico on its plans for compensation for the oil properties.\textsuperscript{165} The \textit{New York Times} said that there was a stiffening of attitude on the part of the State Department.\textsuperscript{165} The \textit{Times} added this change of attitude may be due to the fact that Mexico had had time to formulate a plan of compensation and that "easy acquiescence might encourage a spread of the virus of expropriation throughout Latin America."\textsuperscript{166} The \textit{Times} also noted that the policy of Hull included respect for the plighted word of governments and included in this policy are financial pledges, too. The \textit{Times} concluded:

Notwithstanding the importance of issues and the apparently slow progress being made toward an accommodation, the negotiations are proceeding in a friendly atmosphere and the relations between the United States and Mexico remain unimpaired. There is every desire here to preserve the Good Neighbor policy in its original force and vigor, and there is the sincerest hope of continuing relations with Mexico on the most cordial terms. Nothing could give the administration greater concern than to have a misunderstanding develop.\textsuperscript{167}

\textit{Newsweek} said that Cardenas bids Latin America to expropriate alien property since the program has been successful in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{165} \textit{New York Times}, July 10, 1938, pt. 4, 5:3.
\item \textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{167} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
Mexico and that he has sent "skilled propagandists to canvass Central and South America." According to Newsweek the oil firms and others with large holdings were alarmed and insisted the "State Department has invited this development by failing to demand restoration of oil properties as Britain has done." The New York Times writer, Bertram D. Hulen, believed Hull was proceeding wisely in suggesting arbitration of the oil properties rather than using economic and diplomatic pressure to force compensation. Since arbitration is a fundamental principle of our foreign policy it was a wise move on Hull's part despite the pressure that must have been put upon him by the affected groups. Hulen felt that the Good Neighbor policy was being tested very severely in this situation of the oil expropriations. He ended his article: "However, should misunderstandings arise that would lead to modification or virtual abandonment of the policy, that would be considered a regrettable but unavoidable consequence of the protection of legitimate American interests abroad."

169 Ibid.
171 Ibid.
Editorially the New York Times commented that Hull's vigorous note to Mexico on the expropriations should dispose of the charge that the State Department had been remiss in protecting American property rights in Mexico. However, the Times did not feel that the Good Neighbor policy demanded that we abandon our interests abroad to whatever measures other countries saw fit to use.

Delbert Clark, who wrote for the New York Times, said that Hull's note to Mexico showed a firm attitude on the part of the administration on the matter of expropriations and despite the Good Neighbor policy it was necessary to forestall a wave of expropriations throughout Latin America. Hull had chosen to stress the agrarian issues rather than the oil seizures because the "issues of seizure of relatively small farm properties strikes a chord in the American breast." Clark noted also that "foreign policy at all times must have domestic support or it inevitably falls."

Ecuador backed Hull's stand and commented on his note to Mexico in the newspaper Telegrafo. "It is the duty of all

174 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
governments to pay the full value of the property expropriated. To act otherwise is an arbitrary abuse of power."\textsuperscript{176}

The \textit{Chicago Daily Tribune} noted that Costa Rica was imitating Mexican expropriations and, like \textit{Newsweek}, the Tribune accused Cárdenas of promoting the idea of expropriations in other Latin American countries.\textsuperscript{177} It regretted the fact that the investors who have had their holdings taken cannot use the promises of compensation as cash. In conclusion the \textit{Tribune} added that Mexico could say that "the New Deal taught it how to deal with investments."\textsuperscript{178}

On August 26, 1938, Hull sent another note to Mexico demanding that Mexico stop seizing American owned farmlands without proper compensation. This note was said to be the strongest this government had sent in recent years according to the Associated Press dispatch.\textsuperscript{179}

The \textit{New York Times} commented on the note in an editorial saying the note left Mexico "without legal or moral support."\textsuperscript{180}

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\item \textsuperscript{176} \textit{Telegrafo}, cited in \textit{Ibid.}, July 31, 1938, pt. 1, 31:5.
\item \textsuperscript{177} \textit{Chicago Daily Tribune}, August 15, 1938, pt. 1, 10:2.
\item \textsuperscript{178} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{179} \textit{Chicago Daily News}, August 26, 1938, pt. 1, 7:4.
\item \textsuperscript{180} \textit{New York Times}, August 27, 1938, pt. 1, 12:2.
\end{itemize}
The paper discussed Hull's failure to mention the oil property which had been seized because he feared accusations of dollar diplomacy and imperialism. The Times felt that Hull should have demanded the return of the oil property because it was quite evident that Mexico was in no position to make compensation to the oil companies for the properties seized.\textsuperscript{181}

The Chicago Daily News stated in an editorial, "A Warning to Cárdenas", that if he continued his policies we would be forced to abandon the easy tolerance of the Good Neighbor policy.\textsuperscript{182}

Hull sent another note of 5000 words to Mexico late in August regarding the expropriations. The New York Times maintained there was not a word in the note which could be taken as a threat nor could Uncle Sam be accused of bullying. The Times felt that Hull was condemning the Mexican attitude only in an effort to save fundamental principles of Latin American policy, which included the principles of nonintervention and co-equality based on an assumption "that each of the score of Latin American republics would guard the welfare of foreigners within their boundaries as the United States preserves that protection."\textsuperscript{183}

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{182} Chicago Daily News, August 27, 1938, pt. 1, 10:1.
\textsuperscript{183} New York Times, August 28, 1938, pt. 4, 6:1.
The efforts to settle the expropriations dragged on into August of 1939 when the negotiations broke down. The New York Times said that there were three horns to the dilemma which confronted Hull on the Mexican situation. They were:

1. The Good Neighbor policy must not be allowed to be vitiated by conflicts of commercial interest.

2. Latin American must not be encouraged to think the United States will be unconcerned about expropriations.

3. European nations must not be convinced that they have an unwilling and feeble champion in the United States.\textsuperscript{184}

The Times felt that the administration would continue to follow its present policy of trying to reach an amicable solution because the New World could not afford to be divided in the light of the trend of world affairs at that time.\textsuperscript{185}

It was not until 1942 that a solution was found. While the compensation was not adequate, nor was its payment prompt, the two countries were glad to settle the controversy because of the threat to hemisphere solidarity from without. In reality the United States practically paid for the expropriated lands through the purchase of silver and stabilization of the peso and other concessions. The New York Times said: "This is a dangerous pre-

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., August 13, 1939, pt. 1, 13:1

\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.
cedent. The best that can be said for it is that it terminates a troublesome controversy with a neighboring country at a time when it is of vital importance to maintain and strengthen relations with Latin America."\(^{186}\)

\(^{186}\) Ibid., April 22, 1942, pt. 1, 22:3.
CHAPTER III

THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM

Following Hull's return from Montevideo he became busy with his trade agreements. President Roosevelt was not too kindly disposed toward Hull's trade proposals and philosophy but as time went on Hull sensed that the President was beginning to show more interest in his trade philosophy.

As early as 1916 Hull formulated the philosophy of trade which he carried through his twelve years as Secretary of State. He said in his autobiography:

But toward 1916 I embraced the philosophy I carried throughout my twelve years as Secretary of State, into the Trade Agreements, into numerous speeches and statements addressed to this country and to the world. From then on, to me, unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic competitions with war. Though realizing that many other factors were involved, I reasoned that, if we could get a freer flow of trade--freer in the sense of fewer discriminations and obstructions--so that one country would not be deadly jealous of another and the living standards of all countries might rise, thereby eliminating the economic dissatisfaction that breeds war, we might have a reasonable chance for lasting peace.  

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1 Hull, Memoirs, I, 353; also Stuart, Department of State, 322; also Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940, New Haven, 1946, 103.

2 Hull, Memoirs, I, 81.
No one can deny that Hull devoted much of his time and energy to the study of trade; always he adhered to the same idea—prosperity depends on stable nations as well as individuals. He contended "any policy tending to disrupt trade relations impairs national security, leads to international misunderstanding and finally to war." Hull condemned high tariffs as a means of interference—a policy in direct opposition to his idea of nonintervention.

Bertram D. Hulen, writing for the New York Times, discussed Hull and his political views on tariff and trade. He pointed out that Hull holds that "reciprocal commercial treaties based on mutual tariff concessions and, as nearly as possible, the unconditional favored-nation policy, if other governments will agree, would greatly supplement the usual legislative method of tariff readjustment."

The Chicago Daily News contained a well-written intelligent editorial in which was discussed Hull's trade policies. The editorial said that the blame for the tariff situation must be shared by both parties because they both joined in the log-rolling. It pointed out that the United States is not the only


country guilty of economic nationalism; nearly all are guilty of this same economic nationalism. The only hope for complete recovery lies in the resumption of trade according to this editorial. Every nation must give and take regardless of the selfish interests of some producers. "The problem", said the News, "is to discover the true national interest, and agree to admit such foreign goods as will not cause unemployment in this country, while creating employment in important export industries through sales in foreign markets." All citizens, regardless of party, would certainly be glad to support such a policy as this one.

On April 30th the New York Times carried a report on an address by Hull before the American Society of International Law. The subject was related to international economic rehabilitation. The report in the Times did not speak adversely of Hull's remarks that the economic plight of the world was due to "economic war."6

Before the Conference at Montevideo he had proposed to seek a trade pact with Brazil. An Associated Press dispatch quoted the reaction of the newspapers La Nación and La Prensa on the proposal. The dispatch said: "The newspaper Nación called agreement on monetary and tariff problems a decisive influence

5 Chicago Daily News, April 11, 1933, pt. 1, 16:2.
6 New York Times, April 30, 1933, pt. 1, 12:1
upon Pan American economic unity.7 "The newspaper Prensa conceded that 'President Roosevelt sees clearly that such unity cannot be borne without tightening commercial ties."8

At the Montevideo Conference Hull proposed that the excessive trade barriers be leveled to a reasonable degree. He urged that this be done by the adoption of bilateral reciprocity treaties based on mutual concessions to be entered into by nations of this hemisphere among themselves and others as well, and the second, by a proposed understanding with other important countries that we and they proceed simultaneously to bring down these trade barriers to a level dictated by a moderate tariff policy.9

On June 12, 1934, President Roosevelt signed the bill known as the Trade Agreements Act,10 which was really an amendment to the Smoot-Hawley Act. The President was authorized to enter into trade agreements with other countries without the need of Senate approval or Congressional action. Under this act the President could "increase or decrease any of the Smoot-Hawley rates by as much as 50 per cent in return for adequate trade concessions from another country."11 Reductions applied to coun-

8 Prensa, cited in Ibid.
9 Hull, Addresses and Statements, 28-29.
10 Hull, Memoirs, I, 358-359.
11 Ibid., 359.
tries that did not discriminate against us.

Naturally Hull was overjoyed at the success of his long, bitter fight for lower tariffs and trade. He firmly and sincerely believed that the "basic approach of peace is the ordering of the world's economic life so that the masses of people can work and live in reasonable comfort." 12

The Department of State did a good job in explaining the program to the American people according to Graham Stuart. 13 The members of the department gave addresses explaining every phase of the program and this publicity was helpful when the program came up for renewal. The success of the reciprocal trade program was "a great personal victory for Secretary Hull over the resolute opposition of isolationists, protectionists and New Dealers, and in spite of the wavering support of an opportunist President." 14 Others called the trade program financially and economically unsound because it would turn the favorable balance of trade to competing countries.

The first trade agreement was signed with Cuba in August of 1934. Our trade with Cuba increased noticeably—"exports to Cuba increased 129 per cent compared with the last four months.

12 Ibid., 364.
13 Stuart, Department of State, 318.
14 Ibid.
of 1933 and our imports from Cuba increased 155 per cent.15 The favorable balance of trade going to Cuba.

In a special article by Harold Hinton from Washington for the New York Times, Hull is heaped with praise for his economic efforts. Hinton wrote:

... The present attempt at negotiating reciprocal tariff agreements, undertaken for the betterment of domestic business conditions, is perhaps the only orthodox and conservative plan which has taken place in the recovery program.

... Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, whose quiet insistence on the possibility of outliving economic nationalism finally overcame the resistance of Raymond Moley and other advisors of President Roosevelt, speaks of the project as a "step back toward economic unity." The economic sanity to which Mr. Hull refers is the revival of foreign trade, which in 1929 enabled this country to sell $5,000,000,000 worth of goods abroad. Mr. Hull believes 2,500,000 families could be taken off the relief rolls and put to gainful employment if that slice of business were obtainable today.16

An interesting editorial appeared in the New York Times entitled "Slow Progress". It discussed the slow progress made in negotiating the trade agreements. By December 1934, twelve countries had been added to the list of those seeking to conclude trade agreements with the United States. They included Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Brazil, Colombia, and several Central American countries. The editorial caustically remarked: "It is pleasant to see the list expand. But it would be more reassuring

15 Hull, Memoirs, I, 344; also Stuart, Latin America and the United States, 14.
to have the announcement of an agreement actually concluded."\(^{17}\)
The editorial bemoaned the fact that by this date only one agree-
ment had actually been concluded, namely Cuba.

No reflection is cast upon Mr. Hull by the New York
Times, whom they grant, has worked untiringly and unwaveringly to
secure the passage of the trade agreements but rather place the
blame on the manufacturers who protest the lowering of any tar-
iff.\(^{18}\) However, the New York Times did not feel that it was the
time to abandon the plan and advocate a horizontal reduction of
all duties. This same paper concluded: "But it must be con-
fessed that the results achieved thus far have been disappoint-
ingly meager particularly when it is remembered how long a time
has passed since the advocates of reciprocity first described the
necessity of tariff reform as 'urgent' and 'imperative'."\(^{19}\)

On December 23, the New York Times featured another
editorial discussing Hull and his philosophy. The editorial said
that Hull's ideas "would fall upon unwilling ears in the Con-
gress."\(^{20}\) Concluding with this statement, the Times left no
doubt as to its regard for Mr. Hull and his tariff program:

\(^{17}\) Ibid., December 14, 1934, pt. 1, 22:1

\(^{18}\) Ibid.

\(^{19}\) Ibid.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., December 23, 1934, pt. 4, 4:1.
Above all, the Secretary deserves praise for singling out the intimate connection between commercial freedom and the abolition of dread of war. He would apparently agree with the description of the word of Richard Cobden years ago aiming at "Retrenchment, Free Trade and Peace". This is not a worn-out shibboleth, but an aim and an effort worthy of the best endeavors of the ablest statesmen today.\(^\text{21}\)

During this period there was little or no press coverage on Cordell Hull's activities regarding Latin America and the trade program. The trend seemed to be toward editorial comment, favorable and unfavorable. The New York Times especially followed the progress or rather lack of progress on the trade agreements program.

It ran an editorial on "Tariff Bargaining" again berating the powers that were for their do-nothing attitude and tactics because of the pressure of powerful lobbies who sought to keep tariffs protective in nature. Included in this editorial was a discussion of whether business recovery was slow because of trade restrictions or that business must recover before trade restrictions were to be lowered. "To suggest that lower tariffs must wait upon recovery of business certainly seems to be the very reverse of the theory that the way to revive business is to lower tariffs."\(^\text{22}\)

In February of 1935, there appeared a brief notice of

\(^{21}\) Ibid.

the signing of the trade pact with Brazil. The report was that Brazil hailed "with satisfaction and relief ... the news of the conclusion of the American Brazil trade treaty." 23

The Chicago Daily Tribune also took note of the Brazil trade agreement. In a special article by Arthur Sears Henning, writing from Washington, he contended that the Roosevelt tariff policy was being put to the test because Hull was "aggressively pushing negotiations of reciprocal foreign trade agreements and American manufacturers are protesting in increasing numbers against the withdrawal of protection." 24 Henning added that the conclusion of the Brazilian pact had seemed "to reveal in bold relief the methods by which Mr. Hull aims to impel other nations to remove barriers to foreign trade." 25 Mr. Hull had refused to reveal nations on the so-called black list and, therefore, would not benefit from the new pact.

The New York Times defended the Brazilian pact as even the "most stalwart protectionist need not take alarm" 26 at the new pact because the articles included are not ones in competition with our own products. The editorial raised the point of the

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23 Ibid., February 4, 1935, pt. 1, 6:3.
25 Ibid.
most-favored-nation principle maintaining this principle cramped our opportunity for tariff bargaining. The New York Times said the treaty is extremely limited in range but hoped with Hull, who described the pact as "the first break in the log-jam of international trade," that it will be the forerunner of other pacts. 27

The Chicago Daily News also commented on the Brazilian pact bringing out the fact that in the days after World War I, markets were not a problem. It was easy to sell our products. But the depression days were hard on our producers and, therefore, hard on all the people. Markets were sought after in a most diligent manner. The editorial said the reciprocity route was the logical one. The News felt that this pact was more significant than the Cuban pact because it did not involve political consideration and the products to be admitted did not seriously compete with our own products. The conclusion was noteworthy: "... the Brazilian pact deserves the publicity it has received. But the reciprocity process is regrettably slow, and the middle west, which has a large stake in the revival of foreign trade, hopes it may be accelerated." 28

There was some criticism of the Brazilian pact because of the manganese ore included in the tariff concessions. Some

27 Ibid.

critics objected to Hull's policy on account of these concessions to Brazil and particularly the one pertaining to the ore. The New York Times wrote an editorial commending Hull's reply to his critics. They maintained reducing a tariff would bring about a storm of protest from those manufacturers of the article and hastened to add:

It is, then, time for the officials responsible for the tariff-reduction policy to stop talking generalities and to point out as Secretary Hull has now done, exactly how the specific duty on the specific article has been at the expense of all the rest of us as consumers, and by the retaliation it has caused. It is also a good time to point out how those in the protected industry itself are taxed as consumers for every other tariff, and even injured as producers by the general disorganization which an extravagantly high tariff policy brings.29

The Louisville-Courier Journal commented on the reciprocal trade policies of Cordell Hull as the most logical step toward harmonious international relations.30 They agreed with Hull's thesis that the promotion of normal trade was the natural way in which to promote peace.31

The Chicago Daily Tribune was cited in the New York Times for its kind remarks about Mr. Hull's policies. According to the editorial Mr. Hull was "one of the few men in Washington

31 Ibid.
whose activities are calculated to produce an economic recovery."32

The Cleveland Plain Dealer said that Hull had worked consistently to overcome the harm done by the previous administrations. The Reciprocal Trade Act made it possible to lay the foundation for increased trade with several smaller nations but the restrictions of the Smoot-Hawley policy hampered trade with the leading nations to which our exports were heaviest and from which we must expect our heaviest imports.33

On the anniversary of the Reciprocal Tariff Act, the New York Times editorial staff contended that the program was still in the experimental stage. They maintained the only treaty of consequence was the one concluded with Brazil but which had not been put into operation because of opposition in South America and also because the Brazilian Congress had failed to approve the measure thus far. The Times maintained the failure was due to the most-favored-nation principle and also to the "unyielding opposition of most groups of American producers to any increase in imports."34 Despite the efforts of Hull to sell the people the

33 Cleveland Plain Dealer, cited in Ibid., April 26, 1935, pt. 4, 8:3.
34 Ibid.
idea that we must buy abroad if we hope to sell abroad, there was this opposition on the part of the producers to reduce tariffs on any item mentioned. As soon as the tariff on any product was specifically mentioned as the one to be reduced there was a storm of protest and a wild scramble to lobby against such reduction. Such opposition was partly responsible for the limited number of treaties which have been concluded; those which have been concluded had faced just such opposition.

For some time there seemed to be no interest in the trade program on the part of the press, as no articles, or editorials appeared in the papers. The interest was resumed by the papers with the opening of the 1936 Presidential campaign. During this campaign the tariff program became a very vital issue.

The Raleigh News and Observer reminded its subscribers that the Republicans had proposed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act as a cure-all for the depression. As a remedy for this unhappy failure Cordell Hull's reciprocal treaties came into being despite the rumblings of the protectionists. The News and Observer said: "Trade has been set free, men have been put back to work. A substantial beginning has been made in recovering that international trade which was all but destroyed behind tariffs which more effectively strangled industry than protected it."35

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The Chicago Daily Tribune slapped the administration tariff policies in an editorial, "Tariff by Dictators". The occasion was a speech by Dr. Robert Lincoln O'Brien, a Republican from Massachusetts, who expressed approval of the reciprocal trade treaties. He went so far as to say he was going to urge the Republican convention to adopt a plank to perpetuate the new tariff making policies which Mr. O'Brien happened to discover "vastly preferable to the old log-rolling method." The Tribune disagreed with the findings of Mr. O'Brien. It reminded him that the tariffs were not arrived at by impartial, expert study, rather the very opposite is true.

The fact is, of course, that they are made by politicians in the executive branch of the government instead of politicians in the legislative branch. . . . Mr. Roosevelt, like others with dictatorial aspirations, has no use for scientific detachment. He wants what he wants and he means to have it. To him the great virtue of the reciprocal tariff arrangements is that he can make them. He can accept the recommendations of his experts if he wants to, but he is under no necessity in the matter. He can use his control of tariff[s] to reward the faithful and punish his opponents. If the tariff[s] commission will not approve of his plan he may seek means of winning them over but if he fails he still can ignore the recommendation and go ahead.

37 Ibid.
38 Mr. O'Brien was the chairman of the United States Tariff Commission.
The writer has found no evidence to support this thesis of the Chicago Daily Tribune. Hull does not mention this dictatorship on matters of tariff policies in his Memoirs nor do any of the other writers which were consulted. Since Hull does mention other disagreements with Roosevelt's policies, and since the tariff situation was one of Hull's chief interests, it seems logical that Hull would have mentioned such dictatorship had it existed.

In the New York Times an article was found in which Chester Davis, Agricultural Adjustment Administrator, said the farmers had benefited from the reciprocal trade program because the "income from agricultural exports to eight of the thirteen nations which we have such agreements increased 15 per cent over that of the corresponding period of last year, as against 5 per cent for nations not having agreements." Since the farm group opposed the agreements, this statement is important as it was uttered by the Agricultural Adjustment Administrator.

The New York Times again defended Hull's treaties. This time they defended the treaties on the grounds that, despite the cries that imports were flooding the markets, the fact remains that fourteen treaties have now been concluded yet, "our imports for the latest month reported are less than half those

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for the comparable month of 1929, when the Republicans themselves were in power. At the same time our exports were increasing which was exactly what Hull had hoped for in his plan.

The *Cincinnati Enquirer* saw in Mr. Hull's defense of his treaties the opening gun in the 1936 campaign as far as tariffs were concerned. The *Enquirer* felt that Hull had conducted his reciprocal trade program "not as a Democrat but as a public servant. There had been no hint of partisan bias or favoritism in making of these admirable treaties."  

The *Chicago Daily Tribune* was happy to print a report by Arthur Evans on the attack upon Mr. Hull and his trade treaties by Congressman Francis D. Culkin of New York. Culkin accused the State Department by saying "they have placed the northern farmer on the 'good neighbor auction block'." Culkin added to this that all the proceedings of the treaties were carried on with the greatest secrecy and maintained the "whole procedure was a clear violation of the principles of popular government." It was not difficult to understand why this article appeared while others of praise were left out of the pages of the *Tribune*.

41 Ibid., July 20, 1936, pt. 1, 14:1.


43 *Chicago Daily Tribune*, October 8, 1936, pt. 1, 10:2.

44 Ibid.
During the 1936 campaign, Governor Alfred Landon assailed the trade program and in an Associated Press Dispatch Hull answered the criticisms made by Landon. Hull asserted there had been a rise in exports since the trade treaty program began and thereby justified his faith in the program. Hull was glad to quote: "From a level of slightly over $1,600,000,000 in 1932 and 1933 our exports rose to over $2,280,000,000 and continue this year on the upward trend." 45

The Chicago Daily News denounced the Roosevelt administration because the dollar had been devalued and, therefore, our dollar bought less than it did before. The conclusion was pointed: "Foreign trade is a swap. If we do not buy, we cannot sell. No wonder our foreign trade under the New Deal, has reached a new low!" 46

William L. Clayton, said to be the world's largest cotton merchant, in an expression to the Chattanooga Times, said that Secretary Hull "has patiently and unswervingly stuck to his principles. A vote for President Roosevelt is a vote to keep Secretary Hull in office, where his work, just beginning to bear fruit,

46 Ibid.
may go forward with infinite benefit to the nation and to the world. 

Mr. Pfeiffer, the head of Importers and Traders, defended Hull's policies on trade. Pfeiffer said:

The Roosevelt administration through the efforts of that far-sighted statesman, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, has taken the lead in a determined attempt to prove that many supposedly necessary trade restrictions can be safely reduced, if not entirely eliminated, by carefully prepared and intelligent cooperation between nations, and that few if any, legitimate interests need suffer in the process.

The New York Times again came to the front with an editorial agreeing completely with the stand of the Foreign Policy Association who maintained the gradual removal of tariff barriers could not be resisted by those who objected to Government intervention in business. The Foreign Policy Association described as inconsistent those critics of the administration who denounced regimentation and at the same time denounced Hull's policies on trade. The Times approved this attitude of the Foreign Policy Association and concluded with: "The surest road to 'regimentation' is to propose a policy of extreme economic isolation. The best antidote is the one urged by Mr. Hull: the development of foreign markets to absorb the domestic surpluses."

49 Ibid., October 22, 1936, pt. 1, 24:1.
Harold Hinton\textsuperscript{50} in a special cable from Buenos Aires said the Hull trade policies met obstacles since Argentina's foreign trade was greater than all of the rest of South America, not including Brazil. Argentina's example had great influence according to Hinton and her slogan was "Buy from those who buy from us." Naturally such resistance to the Hull program was trying when he was meeting resistance here at home at the same time and especially in the light of his efforts to secure the friendship of the countries to the south.

The year 1937 brought a problem to the front because the Trade Agreements Act was to expire in June. Hull was reluctant to see his pet project thrown into the discard pile and so he promptly began to plan his fight for the survival of his beloved program for another three year period at least. He was well aware of the fact that the program had been one of the controversial issues of the 1936 campaign and that the fight for extension would be an out and out struggle to save the program. He felt that the program was worthwhile and the records showed a marked increase in the trade of our country. Hull appeared before the House Committee and prepared a statement for the Senate Finance Committee in which he defended the treaties and urged their extension. The opposition from the cattle, wool and copper states

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Ibid.}, December 20, 1936, pt. 4, 6:6.
was exceedingly bitter.\textsuperscript{51} The \textit{Congressional Record} shows the bitter struggle which took place during the hearings for there are countless pages of argument and debate on the matter. The extension was passed by a considerable majority for another three year period.

In 1938 the trade program of Hull was adopted by the Americas at the Pan American Conference held in that year but John Whitaker, \textit{Chicago Daily News} correspondent, warned that: "This forward step has the weakness, like everything else done at a conference of being a mere resolution of words and paper but Hull means to give it concrete reality by vigorous persecution of bilateral trade treaties."\textsuperscript{52}

Nothing of consequence appeared in the newspapers until late in 1939 and early 1940 when the battle began again for a renewal of the Trade Agreements Act for another three year period. The fight was a long and hard one and again the opposition came from the cattle, wool and copper interests. The matter was discussed at great length in the House and the Senate. Many of the editorials and opinions which will be quoted appeared in the \textit{Congressional Record} as the newspapers the writer was able to consult did not feature any too much material as by this period a much

\textsuperscript{51} Hull, \textit{Memoirs}, I, 519.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Chicago Daily News}, December 16, 1939, pt. 1, 1:1.
more interesting struggle was being reported in the news because of the European situation.

The *Knickerbocker News*, an independent Republican paper, said the American farmer and manufacturer cannot be displaced in the world market despite the cheap labor of some of our competitors because we can deliver the goods needed in the world market. This newspaper reminded its subscribers that the trade across international borders as well as the trade within a country provided more business, more wealth, more jobs and more prosperity.53

The *Register*, independent paper of Des Moines, Iowa, warned the farmer to look back into the early 1930's before deserting the trade agreement program.54 The *Register*, independent Democratic paper of Mobile, said the nation must resist the opposition to the trade program because "the country's national welfare must not be subjugated to selfish private interests."55

The *Chicago Daily Times* exhorted its readers to support the trade program because it was very elementary economics--one


must buy from foreign countries if we expected them to buy from us. The editorial berated the selfish interests of manufacturers and producers who were fighting the program, as well as the Senators and Representatives who put the interests of their constituents above the interest of the nation. The editorial concluded: "Secretary Hull has patiently been obliterating the traces of the tariff mess of the 20's. For the first time the tariff problems are being handled honestly and scientifically. . . . It would be a political and economic crime to go back to the scandalous methods of Smoot-Hawley days."56

The Cincinnati Enquirer said the trade agreements have had faults but they have been a big step forward from the logrolling tactics of former days. They represented "a most important contribution to world order."57

Hull made a speech before the American Farm Bureau Federation in which he maintained "prosperity can be achieved only in a world which is at peace. Hope of enduring peace among nations is an illusion unless there is a solid foundation of economic well-being for all nations."58

In its usual hysterical fashion the Chicago Herald

58 Chicago Herald American, December 8, 1939, pt. 1, 10:1.
American cited that part of the address and hurried to protest vehemently. The comment was to the effect that Hull's free trade policies had not spread contentment. "They have succeeded, in fact, ONLY in impairing the prosperity of farmers and business men and working men and women IN THIS COUNTRY."\(^{59}\) Along with this diatribe they added the reminder that Congress should resume the treaty-making power where it rightfully belongs and concluded: "We will NOT regain American prosperity through any indirect and fatuous attempt to make all the REST of the world prosperous first. We can do it ONLY by thinking of AMERICA FIRST AND ALWAYS."\(^{60}\) There were several other editorials and comments in the Chicago Herald American written in the same vein. They represented such poor opinion and attitude that it seemed foolish to reproduce them here.

The Times of Bayonne, New Jersey, maintained those who were endeavoring to destroy the trade program were the very ones who had guaranteed prosperity under the Smoot-Hawley program. They backed up their contention by pointing out the 50 per cent rise in our export trade of farm products to trade-agreement countries while the farm exports to other countries which did not have

\(^{59}\) Ibid.

\(^{60}\) Ibid.
trade agreements with us declined slightly. 61

The New York Times said to abandon the trade agreement policy would be a blow at peace and international cooperation, but to renew the program would "reassert our faith that nations are not mere competitors in a ruthless struggle for markets, but mutual customers dependent on each other. ..." 62

The Oregon Journal, an independent Republican paper, suggested a worthwhile consideration to their readers. "Facts, not emotional prejudices, the whole rather than the partial effect of the Hull agreements should determine their fate." 63

Time had a few comments to make on the situation of Hull's trade agreements. They mentioned the selfless devotion of Hull to his program and his refusal to consider himself a candidate for the Presidency. 64 Time carefully stacked up for Mr. Hull's program in a favorable manner despite the opposition's charges that farm imports had risen in the year 1937. [1935 and 1936 were the years of the drought and this accounts for the increase in farm imports.] The article closed

61 The Times, Bayonne, New Jersey, December 5, 1939, cited in the Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1940, 1637.


63 Oregon Journal, January 8, 1940, cited in the Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1940, 1639.

64 "Hull", Time, XXXV, January 3, 1940, 15.
with this interesting observation: "But over the years Cordell Hull showed staying power, and gradually Franklin Roosevelt became a Hull man, carrying out Hull doctrines whereas nowhere was there any evidence that Mr. Hull was a New Dealer." 65

Newsweek wrote of the trade program in much the same manner as Time. It, too mentioned the fact that Hull had sacrificed the possibility of being nominated to the office of President but preferred to stay with his trade program. It also cited figures and facts to back up the program. 66

These editorials and comments give some idea of the thoughts expressed by the press in the campaign for the renewal of the Trade Agreements Act. The Act was renewed for three years but only by a small margin of five votes.

From this period the trade agreements program died from the news. The big news in all the papers was the progress of World War II, and once we had entered the conflict, the war news was of major importance to the press.

By January 1, 1943, twenty-five reciprocal trade agreements had been negotiated, sixteen of those were with those of countries of the New World.

Bailey in commenting on the Trade Agreements Act, said:

65 Ibid., 17.
"... it is difficult to determine the economic consequences of the program but it has unquestionably done much to improve international good will, especially with the Latin American countries."

Bemis said the Hull program on trade became known as the New Reciprocity and also the cornerstone of American foreign policy when the United States became a full belligerent in World War II.

Sumner Welles, in his latest book, Seven Decisions That Shaped History, said Mr. Hull failed to realize that even his trade agreements could not turn the tide against the dictators and bring peace to the world. Welles presented this thesis on the matter: "But no matter how beneficial a liberal economic regime might have been in more normal times, after 1936 no economic remedy could have dissipated the military threats that confronted all the democracies."

It is difficult to evaluate the Trade Agreements Act because of the abnormality of the times during World War II and in the period of unrest which followed in the world after the war and which persists even today. Regardless of the impossibility of evaluation, the Trade Agreements Act was extended for another three

67 Bailey, Diplomatic History, 736.
68 Bemis, Diplomatic History, 734.
year period in 1945. Needless to say the action greatly pleased Mr. Hull who had resigned from the Cabinet. Even though no longer active in the work of the government, he continued to write and watch his pet dream continue in its work of fostering economic good will. 70

70 Hull, Memoirs, II, 1721.
CHAPTER IV

ARGENTINA

Argentina has presented a difficult problem in attempts to secure hemisphere solidarity. This problem arose from several factors which need to be taken into consideration in discussing that country.

Argentina is a country more like the United States than any of the other Latin American countries. Its climate is similar to our own; its products are similar to ours. Because of a favorable climate she, like the United States, has developed to a marked degree in comparison with her sister republics. Argentina is a proud nationalistic country. She feels she is the logical leader of South America. She is jealous of any help which is given to Brazil. Argentina's population is mostly of European origin and she still looks to Spain and Europe culturally, and her economic life is tied in very closely with that of Great Britain.


2 White, Argentina, 62.
and Europe. This economic relationship with Great Britain and Europe is due to the similarity of products of the United States and Argentina. It is due, too, to our past tariff policies which have kept Argentine products out of the United States in the name of protection, protection of American products.

There has been a feeling of dislike and distrust toward the United States on the part of Argentina. This feeling dates back to the year 1824 when Argentina was the first South American country to recognize the Monroe Doctrine; she sought to base her foreign policy on collaboration with the United States and the Monroe principles. Since the United States did not encourage this move on Argentina's part, ill-feeling was created. Along with this fact was the Falkland Islands situation. The United States failed to uphold Argentina's claim to the Falkland Islands when they were occupied by Great Britain and again ill-feeling was created by our failure to recognize her claims during the century of dispute with the British.

And there was beef! Under an act of 1890 the United States Government had full authority to prevent the importation of infected cattle and sheep into the United States and in 1903 the authority was extended to include meats, hides and other ani-

3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., 257.
mal products. The reason for these restrictions was that hoof and mouth disease was prevalent in many countries and especially in Argentina.

Argentina has always held this restriction on meat and meat products against us. She has felt that the hoof and mouth disease was used as an excuse to keep her meat out of the United States when the truth of the matter has been, in her eyes at least, that we just did not want her meat and meat products in competition with our own. There is some justification for this contention since there are parts of Argentina where hoof and mouth disease is unknown and since the canned meats were also refused admittance to the United States it does appear to be hard to explain the situation.

Sumner Welles claims our record in this regard is not as black as it is painted, yet he says we cannot justify our attitude on canned meats because our tariffs were uniformly high; nor can our attitude on tariffs on agricultural products be justified.5

John White, the leading authority on Argentina feels meat is the crux of the situation as far as the United States and Argentina is concerned.6 He says the United States has used the hoof and mouth disease as "merely a subterfuge to keep high-quali-

5 Welles, Time for Decision, 238.
6 White, Argentina, 195.
ty but low-priced Argentine meat out of the American market, where the American product could not compete with it." This fact is apparent to Argentina. On the other hand White pointed out that since Britain put a quota on meat imports, there was no reason why Argentina should expect us to buy the surplus. However, White thought for reasons of international policy we should admit small quantities of Argentine beef. He maintained this would not upset our meat prices yet would greatly increase Argentina's annual income and promote a more amicable feeling between the two countries.

During the Conference at Montevideo Hull was able to win Dr. Carlos Saavedra Lamas to a certain degree as has been mentioned in Chapter II. Upon his arrival at Buenos Aires in December 1933, Hull tried to secure the friendship of Argentina, pointing out that Argentina had worked "shoulder to shoulder, particularly in promoting peace and a system of economic order." He hoped that Argentina would try to learn more about us and through friendship and friendly intercourse the two countries would become a "powerful force for good in the world." Wertenbaker

7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 197.
9 Hull, Addresses and Statements, 53.
10 Ibid.
credited Hull with a profound influence in Argentine attitude following the Montevideo Conference. He felt that Hull's cooperation with Saavedra Lamas was an important factor in bettering the two countries.

In February 1936, Sumner Welles addressed the Bar Association of Baltimore on the Trade Agreements Program. In this speech he mentioned the ill-feeling which had existed between Argentina and the United States noting this fact:

The Argentine press and economic publications were filled with denunciations of the commercial policy pursued by this Government and with pleas to the Argentine people that they buy from those who bought from them, and that purchases from the United States be restricted if not eliminated. . . . Today, not withstanding the practical difficulties which we both recognize, both Governments are cooperating in the closest manner to improve the flow of commerce between them, to remove such barriers to trade as can be removed without injury to the interests of either one, and the two Governments have further cooperated in a most cordial and effective manner for some time past in the great peace work undertaken by the Chaco Conference.

An attempt was made to ratify the Sanitary Convention of 1935 between the United States and Argentina which would have alleviated the bitter feelings of Argentina over the beef question. Failure of the Senate to ratify the Convention lessened

11 Wertenbaker, A New Doctrine for the Americas, 104-105.

Hull's prestige and opened an old wound in the Argentine. The ratification of the Convention was prevented by the Senators of the Farm Bloc who were "protecting" the interests of the western cattlemen.

Very little notice was given in the newspapers to Hull's activities in regard to Argentina during this period. Not until the plans for the Conference at Buenos Aires were well under way did the press make note of the situation.

When the Department of State suggested calling an Inter-American Conference to be devoted entirely to the maintaining of peace in the Western Hemisphere, President Roosevelt signified his approval. After consultation with the republics it was decided to go ahead with the plans. Roosevelt wrote directly to the heads of the republics of Latin America through the State Department. The meeting place suggested was Buenos Aires in the hope of securing Argentine cooperation. The agenda was prepared by our State Department and emphasized the need for consultation in case of the threat of war. Argentina showed willingness to cooperate provided the meeting place would be in Buenos Aires as had been suggested. Plans, therefore, went ahead for the Conference.

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13 White, Argentina, 258.
14 Felix J. Weil, Argentine Riddle, New York, 1944, 15.
15 Stuart, Department of State, 324.
In a special cable to the New York Times, John W. White, writing from Buenos Aires, said: "The South American nations have never awaited any other international conference with so much hope and enthusiastic optimism as they display in awaiting President Roosevelt's Pan-American peace conference at Buenos Aires." He also said that they are planning to bring to the Conference projects and proposals which will solve virtually all the problems of the Americas. Not only that, he felt that the Latin Americans were confident of the success of the Conference.

Mr. White contended that this attitude grew out of the success of the Montevideo Conference where Cordell Hull put forth every effort to insure just such an attitude. White wrote:

It is only fair to say that their present enthusiastic attitude toward the forthcoming conference is a compliment to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, to whom South Americans unanimously give credit for the success at the Montevideo Conference, and it is significant that the enthusiasm for the forthcoming Buenos Aires conference dates from the announcement that Mr. Hull would head the United States delegation.

Upon their unprecedented experiences at Montevideo the South Americans base their present confidence that the forthcoming conference will accomplish results in the way of solving inter-American problems. This very attitude is the most promising feature of the preparation for the Buenos Aires conference, because it is promising of a successful outcome. The South Americans are going to Buenos Aires confident of success and prepared to cooperate for the common welfare.17

17 Ibid.
In August of 1936 an editorial appeared in the New York Times entitled "The President on Peace" in which it told of President Roosevelt's reference to our cordial relations and conciliations with South America brought about by his administration. The editorial said: "Mr. Roosevelt is strongly of the opinion that the forthcoming Pan-American Congress in December at Buenos Aires will round out and solidify this work of friendship, so as to make it certain that war shall be banished from this entire hemisphere." The editorial also commented on the praise which Mr. Roosevelt gave to Hull for his part in breaking down the "senseless barriers to international trade." Again in September the New York Times contained an article written by Bertram D. Hulen in which the accomplishments of the administration's Latin American policy were reviewed, noting that several reciprocal trade agreements had been negotiated with Latin American countries; the demonstration of good faith by the withdrawal of Marines from Haiti and the Dominican Republic so that none of our armed forces remained on foreign soil in the Western Hemisphere; the abrogation of the Platt Amendment and the renunciation of our right to military intervention in Panama; the

18 Ibid., August 15, 1936, pt. 1, 14:1.
19 Ibid.
success of our delegation at the Montevideo Conference. Mr. Hulen looked forward to the Conference with hope and optimism because of the increased good will which had been created by the policies of Cordell Hull.

In November the Chicago Daily Tribune had an editorial on "New Friends for the Monroe Doctrine" based on a dispatch from Norman Ingrey, Tribune correspondent. Mr. Ingrey reported a change of attitude toward the Monroe Doctrine had begun to appear in South America. The editorial quoted La Nación which said: "South America has now only the Monroe Doctrine to fall back upon." Ingrey said Mussolini was the reason for this change of attitude because of his imperialistic tendencies in Ethiopia. The Tribune concluded its discussion of this change of feeling toward the Monroe Doctrine by pointing to the coming Buenos Aires Conference. "... perhaps we shall find its atmosphere more friendly than hitherto."

Roosevelt traveled to Buenos Aires to open the Conference. According to the New York Times Roosevelt was welcomed as

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no one else had been welcomed. Roosevelt declared that non-American states who sought to commit acts of aggression would find the Western Hemisphere "prepared to consult together for our mutual safety and our mutual good." 

Cordell Hull sought to win the Argentine delegation and in a sense did secure some cooperation from Saavedra Lamas but the former cool, distant feeling was apparent once more. Hull was deeply grieved at this coolness and a new Argentine bloc. Saavedra Lamas, Hull felt, had been unduly impressed with the League and was bound to oppose anything which was opposed to the League.

Sumner Welles maintained it was at this Conference in Buenos Aires that Hull developed such an antipathy to Argentina. Welles said that at the Conference he was forced to act as interpreter for Hull and Saavedra Lamas and he had to Hull's remarks because he feared an open brawl. He attributed Hull's ill-feeling to Lamas's opposition to the leadership of the United States, and his failure to see Hull off at the end of the

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26 Welles, *Seven Decisions*, 104.
Conference, despite the fact that Hull had unofficially suggested Saavedra Lamas receive the Nobel Peace Prize. 27

The Conference was presented with Hull’s program to: coordinate the five existing peace treaties into one common agreement; to secure a definite agreement to consult together in case of a threat from without or of trouble from within; to set up a common neutrality policy in the event of war or other form of conflict between the American republics. As usual Argentina blocked the attempts of Hull, remembering her old grievances of corn, wheat and beef and remembering, too, the failure of the United States Senate to ratify the Sanitary Convention of 1935.

Hull was disappointed in the outcome of the Buenos Aires Conference because of the obstructionist attitude of Argentina. 28 However some good was accomplished and Hull outlines these three main points agreed upon by all at the conference:

The first was that the American hemisphere has a distinct and peculiar contribution to make because no nation in it is driven by any compulsion or professes any right to threaten the peace of its neighbors. The second was that the only safety for all nations is loyal acceptance of a rule of law under which the integrity of every country, large or small, will be assured. The third was that renunciation of war and other similar declarations must be implemented by a method of action which can set into operation almost instantaneously the cooperative effort of

27 Ibid., 105.

28 Hull, Memoirs, I, 501; also Welles, Time for Decision, 206-207.
the hemisphere in the direction of pacific settlements. 29

The Conference at Buenos Aires, said Welles, was "intrinsically the most important inter-American gathering that has ever taken place." 30 Welles maintained there were two issues at Buenos Aires:

The first was whether the American republics would agree to create some workable machinery to operate promptly whenever intercontinental disputes threatened a breach of the peace or whenever the security of the hemisphere was menaced from abroad. The second was whether they would jointly recognize that a threat to the safety of anyone of them involved the security of the remainder. Unless these two principles could be established, no regional system could be developed, and no hemispheric unity could be achieved which could be depended upon as a protection in time of imminent danger. 31

While Roosevelt was in Buenos Aires, he learned that much of the antipathy of Argentina for the United States was due to the beef question. Before he left Argentina, he promised to bring his influence to bear upon the Senate in order to try and get the Sanitary Convention of 1935 ratified. This promise encouraged the people of Argentina, but they were to be disappointed as Roosevelt was unable to override the powerful cattle bloc.

29 Hull, Memoirs, I, 503.
30 Welles, The Time for Decision, 206; also Seven Decisions, 104.
31 Welles, The Time for Decision, 206.
of the Western states.  

Time on January 4, 1937, printed a quote from Leland Stowe, who cabled his paper the Republican New York Herald Tribune from Buenos Aires: "It is agreed that the prestige of the United States has never been so high among its twenty sister American republics as at present, and the good will dividends of the President's Good Neighbor policy should be a great asset in the next few years, especially if Europe goes to the brink of war."  

At Buenos Aires the republics agreed to consult with each other in case of a threat to peace within the Western Hemisphere, but the idea of a permanent Inter-American Consultative Committee was dropped. A common neutrality policy was kept as a general objective but each country was free to act in accordance with its treaty obligations.  

Another convention adopted was more important than the one above because it dealt with action in case of a threat to peace from the outside. Under this convention they agreed to consult and collaborate in the event of a menace to their peace

34 Hull, Memoirs, I, 499.
from any source.

Thus, for the first time, the American Republics sought to lay the groundwork for meeting the threat to their peace which might come at any time as war clouds lowered over Europe. The Monroe Doctrine protected them from dangers overseas, but that doctrine had come to assume in the minds of many of their leaders a connotation of domination of the Western Hemisphere by the United States. Under the new convention the American Republics took one step in the direction of a hemispheric Monroe Doctrine.35

On April 15, 1937, the New York Times contained an editorial on "Pan American Day" in which was discussed the Latin American relations. The President had given an address on Pan American Day in which he told his listeners of the notable improvement in inter-American relations since 1933. The editorial said:

... until recently Pan-America was little more than a phrase expressing lofty aspirations, has within the last four years been given substantial content by President Roosevelt's good neighbor policy. Secretary Hull, by inspiring confidence in the United States among Latin American countries and by his persistent advocacy of free trade relations, has steadily advanced the President's objective. But the progress was in turn facilitated by Assistant Secretary Sumner Welles and his colleagues in the Latin American Division of the State Department, who labored so intelligently to prepare the necessary technical projects and to clear away the accumulated encumbrances of years. Without this preparatory work the Buenos Aires Conference and its large promise for the future might indeed have been impossible.36

The eight agreements reached at Buenos Aires were submitted to the President who in turn submitted them to the Senate.

35 Ibid., 55.
for ratification. In commenting on this fact Harold Hinton wrote from Washington: "The submission to the Senate this week of the most important of the agreements reached at Buenos Aires . . . marks another step in the development of the 'good neighbor' policy which President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull have been patiently evolving for four years." 37

Hinton was careful to point out the opposition of Argentina to the neutrality legislation proposed, attributing it to the obligations of Argentina to the League of Nations and her commercial relations with Europe. 38 Hinton felt that the Buenos Aires Conference showed a remarkable advance in the name of peace because none of the countries showed any inclination to break the peace.

Another valuable step was achieved, according to Hinton, when we were willing to sign Mexico's protocol thus binding not only the Roosevelt regime, but future regimes as well, to a policy of non-intervention. 39 Hinton justified Mexico's concern over intervention because of our previous policies with Mexico dating back to a war and intervention in other matters from the "Colossus of the North." 40

38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
The interest in the Buenos Aires Conference was not so widespread as it had been in the Conference held at Montevideo. The New York Times was one paper which did follow the Conference. Most of the papers did report the warm reception given to Roosevelt but they did not follow the Conference as had been done previously. After the Conference interest died down in the events which concerned Hull and his Latin American policies. Little or nothing appeared in the press because there was little which was startling or new to be presented to the people. However, there was one short article on Hull's defense of the Sanitary Convention.

As has been pointed out, Roosevelt realized that the ratification of the Sanitary Convention would go a long way toward implementing the good neighbor policy in Argentina, as the failure to remove the prohibitions on beef had long been an open sore to the Argentines. He, therefore, tried to exert his influence to have it ratified. Hull tried to secure its ratification in order to encourage further better relations with Argentina.

The New York Times carried the article in which Hull appealed for the ratification of the Sanitary Convention and attempted to assuage Argentina's sensitivity over beef. The Convention provided for sanitary embargoes on a regional basis rather than a national basis. This would allow beef from Patagonia
to be admitted since this area showed no evidences of hoof and mouth disease. To Hull this was a fairer way to treat the situation. He asserted the pending treaty would contribute to "a healthy expansion of our markets for our farm products through aiding the recovery of our foreign trade." 41

Thus beef continued to be the sore spot between the United States and Argentina because the failure to ratify the Sanitary Convention showed the hopelessness of the situation despite Hull's efforts at neighborliness and good will. It was more important to protect the men of the cattle industry, not from the hoof and mouth disease which did not exist in Patagonia, but from the importation of beef by the United States which would have strengthened the ties and induced Argentina to buy from us because we bought from them, thereby increasing the flow of trade between the two countries.

In defense of our position, White pointed out that in 1937, we bought 102,000,000 pesos of linseed from Argentina and Great Britain bought 180,000,000 pesos of chilled beef but that no mention was made by Argentina of this purchase on our part. Other countries restricted or prohibited the importation of meat from Argentina without the action ever being made a political issue, as was the case in our action. 42

41 Ibid., May 7, 1937, pt. 1, 11:1.
42 White, Argentina, 218.
Another offense on our part which irritated Argentina was the refusal to allow Argentina to serve her own meat at her pavilion at the New York and San Francisco Fairs. Yet these Fairs were supposed to increase neighborliness in the world.

President Ortiz was elected to the presidency in 1937 and the New York Times expected him to continue the policy of friendly cooperation with the United States. After the election the Ortiz government announced a step which was hailed by our press. There was to be an end to the secrecy and censorship which had existed in Argentina for some time. The New York Times commented: "This is a complete reversal of the retiring government's policy of handling the news."

The infiltration of Axis agents into Latin America seemed to go unnoticed by our press. Our diplomatic representatives, however, continued to report case after case of Nazi penetration and the buildup of propaganda against the United States. We were accused of intervention, monopoly of trade, and favoritism.

Prior to the opening of the Lima Conference in 1938,

the New York Times featured an article by Harold Hinton under the title "Hull Again Takes Up the Pan American Torch". Mr. Hinton reminded us that the Secretary of State was the one who has really given meaning to Pan Americanism. He said: "... much of, the impetus that he has given to closer inter-American relations has been the result of his own reasoning; he has not coasted with events, letting them shape his course for him." 46 Hinton reiterated some of Hull's accomplishments and his very human approach to the problems of the Americas, where, he realized, "problems may differ, but men remain men." 47 According to Hinton, this accounts for Mr. Hull's popularity in Latin America and for the "good press" he received in Latin America. 48

As Hull left for Lima where the Eighth Pan American Conference was to be held, he questioned whether the rest of the republics would realize the serious threat which existed for the New World. 49 He wondered about Argentine cooperation; Saavedra Lamas was no longer Foreign Minister; he had been replaced by José Maria Cantilo. Cantilo had urged the postponement of the Lima Conference informing our representative in Buenos Aires that

47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Hull, Memoirs, I, 602.
Argentina believed in a policy of continental solidarity and collaboration but could not be expected to turn her back on Europe.  

On December 5, 1938, just a few days before the opening of the Conference, John White sent a special cable to the New York Times from Lima, Peru. According to him the Latin American countries were:

preparing to push hard at the forthcoming Pan American Conference to force the United States to put the Good Neighbor policy into a concrete form that will insure its continuance after the termination of President Roosevelt's administration.

At present the Good Neighbor policy is merely a declaration of policy contained in President Roosevelt's inaugural address. The Latin Americans have come to Lima determined to implement that declaration by means of international agreements that would have the force of treaties.  

White added that the good neighbor policy will continue to work one way from "north to south at the expense of American investors." He granted relations between the United States and the Americas to be friendlier than at any other time, but, he continued "the United States has lost much prestige throughout Latin America as a result of its failure to take a stronger stand on the confiscation of American oil fields by Bolivia and Mex-


52 Ibid.
On December 6, 1938, a United Press dispatch from Lima, Peru warned that "a group of South American nations led by Argentina laid the groundwork today for a diplomatic battle at the Eighth Pan American Conference against President Roosevelt's program for the defense of the Western Hemisphere." The dispatch went on to stress the importance of the Conference because of the developments in Europe and the Far East and also because of Roosevelt's declaration that preparation must be made for the defense of the Americas.

The New York Times was doubtful of the outcome of the Conference. This paper wondered about Argentina and her usual opposition to proposals of cooperation and help. Would Argentina oppose the delegations at Lima as was her usual manner?

The United Press dispatch from Lima on December 7, 1938, said Roosevelt was winning the Latin American states to the solidarity plan as approval seemed certain. Despite this optimistic report, the United States was reluctant to seek written accords because of Argentine opposition to any proposals from the

53 Ibid.
United States. José Maria Cantilo, the Argentine Foreign Minister, declared formal pacts to be unnecessary because it was understood the Americas would stand together in the event of invasion. The dispatch from the United Press pointed out that the issues were vast. "They may mean success or failure for men and nations far removed from the Western World."58

The United Press dispatch of the next day said the delegates had begun to fall in line with a program calling for continental solidarity against foreign aggression.59 No mention was made of Argentine opposition in this release.

John Whitaker, writing from Lima for the Chicago Daily News made several interesting observations from there. He told how "whispering in the ears of representatives of the other twenty American republics whom he buttonholed in smoke-filled hotel rooms, Secretary of State Cordell Hull has envisaged this hemisphere's defenses as military and political as well as economic."60 To Whitaker, Hull had triumphed over Cantilo's propaganda against Yankee imperialism and dollar diplomacy and had won prestige and honor in the eyes of the Latin Americans because of the

59 Ibid., December 8, 1938, pt. 1, 4:1.
60 Ibid., December 9, 1938, pt. 1, 1:6.
manner in which Hull handled the Mexican relations over the seizure of oil fields and properties. This handling of the Mexican situation, according to the cable, "has brought good will in South America, even if it has scandalized some North American business interests." 61

Hull was anxious to get a resolution adopted which was strong yet acceptable to the delegates. His proposal bound the republics to resist any threat, either direct or indirect, to their peace, safety, or territorial integrity on the part of any non-American country. In case the peace of anyone of them were disturbed by direct or indirect interference on the part of one or more non-American governments in a matter pertaining to national sovereignty, the Republics proclaimed their common concern and their purpose to make their solidarity effective to resist such threats. The Republics agreed to hold meetings of their Foreign Ministers every two years, and a special consultation of these Ministers could be called by any American Government if the occasion for it arose. 62

This proposal was strong, but Hull felt that these were extremely serious times and, therefore, needed an extremely strong resolution which would insure the safety and cooperation of all the Latin American republics. He felt this was not the time for half-measures; the republics must be united, firm, and strong.

An interesting editorial appeared in the Chicago Daily Tribune which poked fun at the idea of trying to unite the repub-

61 Ibid.
62 Hull, Memoirs, I, 603.
lics against the dictators, since most of the Latin American countries are dictatorships themselves and have been for years. The Tribune mentioned the little democracy which existed in Central and South American countries; Europe was in the same position with few exceptions and these exceptions were weak from a military point of view. 63 The conclusion drawn by the paper was:

A realistic foreign policy would recognize these facts as facts, there are no allies upon whom we can count. We cannot rescue Europe from itself, but if we are wise and maintain our army and navy in a reasonable state of preparation we can prevent Europe from imposing its barbarism upon us and our neighbors. The rest is applesauce. 64

On the eve of the Conference, in Time's viewpoint, Hull and his Chief's good neighbor policy had notably softened Latin American distrust of the United States, but by no means removed it entirely. 65

Hull and Cantilo addressed the opening session of the Conference and there was a similarity between the speeches which seemed to indicate a unanimity of ideas. 66 Hull made his point clear: He was condemning outworn philosophies that "for centuries held men in bodily slavery and spiritual degradation" and

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63 Chicago Daily Tribune, December 9, 1938, pt. 1, 16:2.
64 Ibid.
65 "Hull, 1938," Time, XXXII, December 12, 1938, 12.
66 Ibid.
he hoped for the adherence of "all other nations or groups within nations which, at times against great odds, and in the face of heartbreaking difficulties, are working for a better world."\(^67\)

According to Hinton who cabled this article, Hull's speech was a personal victory. His speech was greeted with roaring applause throughout and after its conclusion. At the ending of the speech Cantilo rushed forward to greet Secretary Hull and escorted him to his place.\(^68\)

Hull considered the next ten days the most difficult of his career.\(^69\) The apparent warm friendly attitude of Cantilo and his cohorts had vanished into thin air. Cantilo left his delegation and disappeared into the Chilean lakes area after the opening session. This showed how lightly he had taken the situation and how much cooperation could be expected for the rest of the sessions since he instructed the Argentine delegates to do little or nothing without first consulting with him. These instructions brought about delay and ill-feeling. Hull felt that Cantilo had run out on the Conference in order to kill it.\(^70\)

An article appeared in the *New York Times* discussing

\(^{67}\) Ibid.

\(^{68}\) Ibid.


\(^{70}\) Ibid.
Argentine opposition. The writer said:

The Argentine republic has long been a hotbed of hostility to us. Suspicion of our motives has never died here. When the delegates left here for the Conference, emphasis was carefully laid on the fact that it would stick close to the traditional Argentine policy—a prominent ingredient of which is opposition to anything even remotely North American.\textsuperscript{71}

The press in Berlin had comments to make on Hull's speech in Lima. They dubbed the speech as "Dollar Imperialism". This dispatch copywritten by the New York Times was sent from Berlin. It read:

The German press commenting on Secretary of State Cordell Hull's speech in Lima Peru, emphasizes "dollar imperialism", of which the United States is accused here in its relations with Latin American countries. The press ridiculed as "laughable" the possibility of a "threatened invasion".\textsuperscript{72}

The Berliner Lokalanzeiger said:

Hull brought forward everything with which to attempt to excuse Washington's hegemonic wishes before the South Americans. The latter will, on their part, supposedly be thankful for this, for they have experienced the fact that his majesty, the dollar, is one of the most inhuman dictatorships in all world history.\textsuperscript{73}

The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung called the speech "professional" and said it was to be expected in view of the recent statements of President Roosevelt and his government, "without

\textsuperscript{71} New York Times, December 12, 1938, pt. 1, 12:2.


\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
leaving much impression behind". The same paper also commented that the Latin American countries were none too eager "to sail in North American waterways without a rudder." 74

In a scathing editorial the Chicago Daily Tribune accused President Roosevelt and Hull of warmongering in South America at the Lima meeting for reasons purely political. 75 The Tribune saw no evidences that the dictators Hitler and Mussolini were about to invade the Americas but it does see a serious danger of Latin America meddling in the affairs of Europe because of a resolution being prepared by Argentina and Mexico regarding mediation in the Spanish war. 76 However, the Tribune admitted some basis for fear of a commercial aggression. The editorial concluded with this statement: "If the dictators of Europe are seeking to monopolize Latin-American trade we may have to take some steps to counteract their tactics. Promoting a war scare will not help us think about the commercial problem more clearly." 77

Argentine opposition continued and there was some feeling against Hull according to John Whitaker. Whitaker maintained

74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., December 14, pt. 1, 16:2.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
that some of the delegates "are fed up with Secretary Hull's insistence there must be no quarrels in public and that conference measures must be brought forward only upon unanimous consent." Whitaker said that Hull took a middle of the road course but he felt confident "the conference will end with a unanimous chorus singing a tune pitched just about where Marse Cordell likes it." Alfred Landon was one of the delegates to Lima who spoke at the Conference. This pleased the Chicago Daily News. This paper wished the delegates at the Conference would speak out as Landon had. They accused the State Department of going "to almost any lengths to spare the supposedly hypersensitive feelings of our Spanish-American neighbors." The News said:

the one-way traffic in our so-called good neighbor policy. We want to be good neighbors, certainly but we would like to see a little more reciprocity than we are finding right now at our southwestern frontier, or, for that matter, among some of the neighbors assembled at Lima. The Conference went on and after much debate and personal effort on Hull's part the Argentine Foreign Minister sent a draft of a new declaration which seemed acceptable and in accord with the draft that Hull had prepared. However, it did not pro-

79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., December 21, 1938, pt. 1, 16:1.
81 Ibid.
vide for regular meetings of Foreign Ministers but such meetings were to be held whenever any republic took the initiative. On Christmas Eve the declaration was unanimously adopted. Persistent effort on Hull's part had brought forth a document which was acceptable to every one thereby assuring the world of the unity of the American Republics.

For Hull the steps taken at Lima were a great advance over what had been accomplished at other conferences. It was an agreement which affirmed that the American Republics would help one another in case of foreign attack. It provided for joint action against military action and also against infiltration methods. Accordingly the responsibility to defend the hemisphere was not the job of the United States alone but of all the Republics of the hemisphere.

The reason Hull strove so hard for solidarity was that he did not want the outside world to have an opportunity to say we were divided in matters of Latin American policy. In giving the closing address at the Conference, Hull said: "And so in this Declaration of Lima lies the future of the solidarity of the American Republics."

\[82\] Hull, Memoirs, I, 607.
\[83\] Ibid., 608.
\[84\] Ibid., 611.
Hull maintained the Declaration of Lima was not a victory for any one country but for the New World. It was drafted by Dr. Cantilo but followed closely Hull’s original draft. According to the New York Times it went much farther than Argentina had intended. 85

Whitaker wrote from Lima and said the Conference ended on a note of confidence in the United States due to the “kindliness, patience and sincerity of Hull. Should it become necessary to negotiate for naval or air bases the necessary good will will have been achieved.” 86

The Chicago Daily News ended its comments on Lima in an editorial which complimented our delegation on its tact and accomplishments at the Conference in face of the real truth that these Republics are really not homogeneous but are separate entities, each with its own balance of power, nationalism, economic problems, jealousies, quarrels and, "yet out of this came a unanimous declaration which if loyally carried out, should take care pretty well of the propaganda danger.” 87

The Chicago Daily Tribune, in closing its discussion on Lima, objected. We have not been as victorious as we should have

87 Ibid., January 4, 1939, pt. 1, 18:1.
been; Peru was not the perfect host; we must keep a smiling front among the good neighbors because of the possibility that some Latin American dictator might make an alliance with some Fascist state. 88 Nothing complimentary was said of the Conference by the Tribune. From its viewpoint we had "been taken".

Sumner Welles said the Lima Conference accomplished little beyond "implementing the basic principles adopted at Buenos Aires." 89

Stuart said the Declaration of Lima was vitally important because it promised to defend continental solidarity against foreign intervention and provided the machinery to make it effective. 90

According to Tomlinson, Hull was called the "Father of American Solidarity". His success in uniting the Republics was credited by every delegate of the Conference. 91

The next step which drew the attention of the press to Latin American affairs was Roosevelt's approval of an order to buy 48,000 pounds of corned beef from Argentina for the use of

89 Welles, Time for Decision, 208.
90 Stuart, Department of State, 338.
the Navy. Roosevelt based his approval on three conditions: it was cheaper than any of the bids submitted by packers of the United States; it was the best corned beef available; it was good neighborliness. 92

Naturally this order aroused a storm of protest in the Senate as once again the cattle interests were being "put upon". The Chicago Daily Tribune was calm in its editorial. The editorial mentioned the reasons which Roosevelt had given in approving the purchase and the protests of the Senators representing the cattle interests. 93 Later another editorial in the Tribune said that Roosevelt was attempting to reduce the American farmers to peasants because of the support given to the Argentine people by buying their product. 94 No one denied the report that Argentine corned beef was superior to the American product. 95

The St. Louis Post Dispatch reviewed the corned beef situation in an editorial, brought on no doubt by the fact that Congress had passed legislation which would forbid the buying of corned beef from Argentina. The editorial, "The Corned-Beef Fi-

92 Rosenman, Public Papers of Roosevelt, VIII, 1939, 192-193.
94 Ibid., May 19, 1939, pt. 1, 6:1.
I asked just what were the facts in the case and promptly answered by saying the beef was superior to our own product; the money paid to Argentina would find its way back here in the form of purchases of American goods. The action showed, said the editorial, that sectional interests triumphed over the interests of the Nation as a whole in question of foreign trade. . . . The incident throws dramatic lights on Secretary Hull's reciprocal trade policy by which, against tremendous obstacles, the Secretary is trying to introduce against common sense and sound business principles into our trade relations with the world.

Shortly after the "beef fiasco" the war in Europe began. Naturally the press concentrated on the latest war news and comments on Hull's Latin American policies faded into nothing. War news was of first importance.

Immediately after the outbreak of war the Latin American countries felt the need for a consultation and plans were laid for the meeting in Panama. The result of this meeting in September, 1939, was the Declaration of Panama which proclaimed neutrality and a zone around the Americas south of Canada in which belligerents were to refrain from naval action in this area. This declaration secured without too much opposition showed

96 St. Louis Post Dispatch, June 2, 1939, cited in Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., Appendix, 2365.

97 Ibid.
the value of the previous conferences at which the groundwork had been laid for such cooperative action.

Bailey said that the Declaration of Panama is of importance "as a spectacular example of collective Pan-American action, as a step in the further 'multilateralization' of the Monroe Doctrine, and as an attempt to restrict belligerent action on the high seas in the interests of regional security." The failure of the declaration to function was laid to the fact that the American Republics were unwilling to use force to enforce its provisions.

Up to this point Hull had shown the world that the Republics could be united and pursue a course of action which was of vital concern not only to our hemisphere but as it developed to the concern of the whole world.

98 Bailey, Diplomatic History, 762.

99 Ibid.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

In the closing chapter of his Memoirs, Cordell Hull said:

In the past, until 1934, perhaps our most flagrant violation of our duty to the world was economic isolationism. Ages of civilization have taught us that international commerce promotes material welfare, peace, and advancement. Intellectual and social progress in the Ancient World, the Middle Ages, and the Modern Era was the result in large part of the reciprocal influence of nations on one another. But we Americans have not fully learned this lesson. We showed the world a true example of the right way from 1934 until the end of the war by embracing a policy of liberal commerce, tariff reduction, and nondiscrimination, but since the end of the war there has been evidence of tendencies to return the United States to the disastrous course of the twenties and early thirties. High tariffs do not bring us prosperity. They do bring us unsalable surpluses at home and the resentment of other nations abroad. . . .

Thus Hull again states his philosophy on trade. He believed firmly and sincerely in this—that the security of the nation was based on trade and nonintervention and noninterference in the affairs of our neighbors, whether they be to the south of our United States or in the Eastern Hemisphere. His whole program was based on an intelligent trade program. These policies

1 Hull, Memoirs, II, 1735.
of good will, trade, nonintervention and noninterference were a return to the earliest principles of our foreign policy. Our policies, if carried out by all, seriously and earnestly, would make each nation a Good Neighbor.

Hull warns us, not only of the need for freer trade but also that we must

practice moderation in our expressions of opinion concerning other nations. As a people we are too prone to condemn other nations and rulers, to apply epithets, to caricature, to ridicule. We forget that our sharp words are not buried in newspaper columns or lost on the rostrum or radio. They come to the knowledge of the governments and peoples they anathematize; they are reproduced and commented upon by the press and radio of those countries, which may not understand our freedom of criticism; and they hamper the conduct of our foreign relations.

This paragraph seems of paramount importance to the writer. The research for this thesis has shown without a doubt the need for an intelligent and unbiased press at all costs. Undoubtedly much damage has been done and ill-will created by the failure of some members of the press, at times, to consider the good of the whole rather than the good of the few; the good of the nation rather than the selfish interests of one section our own country. It is hard for those beyond our boundaries to evaluate and understand correctly our freedom of expression; a freedom which must be safeguarded at all costs but it must be remembered by our press.

2 Ibid., 1737-1738.
that there is an attendant responsibility for every freedom which we enjoy. Our press, then, has a responsibility to safeguard the good will of our neighbors just as Cordell Hull was willing to do.

Sumner Welles' description of Hull seems to sum up completely the man who has had such a profound influence on world policy as Secretary of State for twelve years and who deserves to rank as a foremost proponent of the Latin American policy of the United States. Welles said:

He is a persuader rather than a leader. He relies on the ultimate triumph of reason to solve all human problems. He could not, if he would, coerce anyone into an intellectually repugnant course. His life, public and private, has exemplified that kind of democracy, governmental, intellectual, and spiritual, in which lies the future hope of the human race.  

3 Welles, in the forward to Hinton, Cordell Hull, viii.
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APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Mildred C. Rogers has been read and approved by three members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

[Signature]

[Date]