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A Recent Controversy on the Common Good

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A RECENT CONTROVERSY
ON THE COMMON GOOD

by
James Lee Anderson, S.J.

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

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VITA AUCTORIS

James Lee Anderson, S.J., was born in Urbana, Illinois, September 7, 1931.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

At a time when many states and individuals are brazenly violating the common good, it becomes all the more important to possess at least a correct notion of it. Commenting on Professor Charles De Koninck's *De la primauté du bien commun contre les personnalistes*,¹ Yves R. Simon writes, "Of all the philosophical investigations which may throw light on our political, social and moral problems, none is more badly needed and eagerly demanded than a thorough study of the concept of the common good."² In political matters two extremes are to be avoided, rampant individualism and totalitarianism. Today Communist totalitarianism is the world's great threat, and, as the late Walter Farrell, O.P., remarked at the 1945 meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, "In itself, the question of the general relation of the person to the common good is of prime importance in view of

¹Charles De Koninck, *De la primauté du bien commun contre les personnalistes* (Québec, 1943).

the totalitarian trends in political thought and action.\textsuperscript{3}

This thesis will consider a controversy on the common good, which began in 1943 and was concluded in 1946. The two main participants were Professor Charles De Koninck and Father Ignatius T. Eschmann, O.P. Jacques Maritain certainly figured in the controversy; he and his doctrine were often discussed by De Koninck and Eschmann. But his only direct contribution was an essay which added nothing to the arguments already presented, except a restatement of his own position. Professor De Koninck, dean of the faculty of philosophy at Laval University, argued for the primacy of the common good. His position was strongly opposed by Father Eschmann, of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies and the Institut d'études médiévales Albert-le-Grand.

The purpose of this thesis is to present the main positions and arguments advanced by both sides, and then to evaluate the controversy itself. This will involve answering the following questions: What did each man have to say? How did each understand the other? How well did they meet each other's arguments? How did they find the question, and how did they leave it?

In the controversy the personalist notion of the common good is challenged. Some consideration, then, must be given in this thesis to personalism in general and its metaphysical basis, but

\textsuperscript{3}Walter Farrell, O.P., "Person and the Common Good in a Democracy," \textit{PACPA}, XX (1945), 40.
only insofar as it will be helpful toward an understanding of the historical context of the controversy and particularly of De Konink's book, *De la primauté du bien commun contre les personnalistes,*¹ which occasioned the controversy. Moreover this thesis does not propose to attempt a definitive settlement of the question of the primacy of the common good, nor investigate any aspects of the common good not treated in the controversy itself.

The procedure of the thesis will be, after an investigation of the historical context of the controversy in this first chapter, to consider briefly its history and polemic tone in the second chapter. Next, in the third chapter a presentation of the major positions and arguments, and, finally, an evaluation of the controversy in the fourth.

"*Contre les personnalistes.*" The title of Professor De Konink's book tells us that he is not only asserting the primacy of the common good, but vindicating it against the personalists.

What, then, is personalism? Jacques Maritain, its leading Thomistic exponent in this country, describes it as not a doctrine, but a reaction against the two opposite errors of totalitarianism and individualism. This reaction varies greatly. "There are, at least, a dozen personalist doctrines, which, at times, have nothing more in common than the term 'person.' Some of them incline vari-

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¹This book will hereafter be referred to in the text as *Primauté,* and in footnotes as *BC.*
ously to one or the other of the contrary errors between which they take their stand. Some contemporary personalisms are Nietzschean in slant, others Proudhonian; some tend toward dictatorship, while others incline toward anarchy." Maritain's own type of personalism is called into question in the controversy. The basis of it can be briefly stated. "Our whole being is an individual by reason of that in us which derives from matter, and a person by reason of that in us which derives from spirit." This distinction between person and individual and its application to social problems has become the leitmotif of Maritain's political writings.

The personalist movement originated in France and developed around the review *Esprit*. Its most prominent writers there were Emmanuel Mounier, editor of *Esprit*, and Denis de Rougemont. Mounier's *Manifest au Service du Personnalisme* is said to be the most complete statement of the doctrinal aims of French personalism. Due to the influence of Jacques Maritain interest in personalism spread to the United States. This American Catholic variety of personalism starts with the person-individual distinction, and derives from it a whole ethical, social, and political system, which

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6 Ibid., p. 33.


8 Ibid., 231.
is proposed as a defense against totalitarianism and as an argument for all human rights.9

However, neither the distinction nor its application to social problems have been accepted without question. In 1938, Father Pedro Descoqs, S.J., professor of philosophy in the Jesuit scholasticate at Jersey, rejected the system's metaphysical basis, the opposition between person and individual. "The conclusion which seems to us to follow from this short inquiry is that the essential opposition which they want to introduce between individual and person is purely arbitrary and artificial. It has neither an historical nor a metaphysical foundation."10 In 1943, Father John A. Creaveny of Dromintine College denied Maritain's claim that the person-individual distinction as used by the personalists was Thomistic doctrine. In Father Creaveny's opinion, Maritain confused two questions, the problem of individuation and that of individuality.11 And in 1944, Louis J. A. Mercier, Associate Professor of French at Harvard University, also objected to the distinction. "And, from another point of view, the distinction sa-


10 "La conclusion qui nous semble se dégager de cette courte enquête est que l'opposition essentielle que l'on voudrait introduire entre individu et personne, est purement arbitraire et factice. Elle n'a de fondement ni dans l'histoire, ni dans la métaphysique." Pedro Descoqs, S.J., "Individu et Personne," Archives de Philosophie, XIV, Cabier II (1938), 33.

11 Creaveny, p. 247.
vors more of Neo-Platonism than of Thomism. To assign to the individual the material and temporal life and to the person the spiritual and eternal sets up an opposition between body and soul which blurs the fact that they are, in the human individual or person, one compound."

It had been asserted that the application of this distinction to social problems provided an answer to totalitarianism and to all questions of human rights. "[O]ne of the principal duties of 'social thinking' is to distinguish person from individual." Whatever may be the validity of the distinction in itself, its application to social thinking seemed to some not necessary. Speaking at the American Catholic Philosophical Association meeting in 1945, Father Walter Farrell, O.P., said, "Certainly the distinction between individual and person is not necessary for the defense of the traditional Thomistic position on the relation of the person to the common good." Others, such as Father John Creaveny, saw in the distinction an inadequate, and possibly dangerous, refutation of the claims of statism. For by claiming that the individual is for the State and the State for the person, besides overlooking man's social nature, it laid itself open to the retort: "If the individ-

12 Louis J. A. Mercier, "Maritain's Conception of Integral Humanism," Thought, XIX (June 1944), 234.

13 Editorial, "The Primacy of the Person," Blackfriars, XXIII (September 1942), 337.

14 Farrell, p. 38.
ual is for the State, if his temporal life ought even to be sacri-
ficed for the common good, it is reasonable that the State, in the
interests of that common good, should have absolute authority over
the individual body! By this little piece of dialectics, the ta-
bles are neatly turned on the Personalist, and his favourite dis-
tinction serves as the basis of a possible theoretical justifica-
tion of such a Totalitarian practice as sterilization: "15

So much for the metaphysical basis of personalism and the pro-
tests against it. Meanwhile, Professor De Koninck raised a ques-
tion about another aspect of personalism: its notion of the common
good. His remarks were directed against personalism in general.
His failure to state clearly to whom he was attributing the doc-
trines he attacked led to a great deal of acrimony. This will be
discussed in the next chapter of this thesis.

At any rate, we may ask just what the personalists have said
or done to make Professor De Koninck feel it necessary to vindicate
the primacy of the common good against them.

An investigation discloses no particular occasion for Profes-
sor De Koninck's alarm, no one book or event. However, we may be
sure that Primaute did not spring forth fully armed, as it were,
from the mind of Zeus. From some of De Koninck's statements in his
introduction and from one chapter entitled "Personnalisme et total-
itarisme" it is possible to see why he thought such a book neces-

15Greaveny, p. 248.
sary. In reading the remarks which will follow about personalism and totalitarianism, it will be helpful to keep in mind that the book was published April 13, 1943, a time when both Nazism and Communism were very much in men's minds.

Personalism, Professor De Koninck writes in his introduction, has this in common with totalitarianism: both exalt personal dignity and private good at the expense of the common good. Contrary to what one might expect, modern totalitarianism exalts the dignity of the human person. But this is a perverted notion of the dignity of the human person, for it extends even to the rejection of God.

Man's true dignity consists in his proper subordination to the common good, but the distorted notion of human dignity which is shared by personalism and totalitarianism involves the preference of a proper good to the common good. This is why Professor De Koninck states, "It is possible to affirm the dignity of the person and at the same time be in very bad company." 16 This is why he calls personalism a "doctrine péricieuse à l'extrême." 17

In the chapter "Personnalisme et totalitarisme" Professor De Koninck states his main objection to personalism. Here it can be clearly seen why he thinks it necessary to vindicate the primacy of the common good against the personalists. For he believes that the notion of the common good which the personalists have is such that,

16 "On peut à la fois affirmer la dignité de la personne et être en fort mauvaise compagnie." BC, p. 2.
17 Ibid., p. 3.
if they wish to safeguard human rights (and they do), they must prefer the personal good to the common good. Personalism opposes both extreme individualism and totalitarianism, as Maritain has pointed out; but Professor De Koninck claims that it is at bottom in agreement with both. And why?

Personalism, he asserts, makes its own the totalitarian notion of the common good and of the State. In the totalitarian scheme of things, the common good is singularized; it is no longer a good that is really common but a bonum alienum, "and it sets itself up in opposition as a more powerful singular good against other singular goods that are purely and simply subject to it."¹⁸ The State itself, instead of being a moral person, is taken to be a physical person. It becomes a person pour soi, free from all ordination to a higher, common good. There occurs an inevitable conflict between the person that is the State and the persons that are the citizens. No matter what the outcome of the struggle, whether the individual citizens triumph or the State, the underlying, tension-producing concept of the common good and the State is a personalist and totalitarian one. "Society is then openly totalitarian when the State acquires its liberty by victory over individuals; it is openly individualistic when the individuals dominate the State. But in both cases the concept of the state is person-

¹⁸"[E]t il s'oppose en singulier plus puissant à des singuliers purement et simplement assujettis." Ibid., p. 75.
alistic and totalitarian."19

Of course, as Father Jules A. Baisnée of Catholic University cautions, "It would be absurd to see a logical or a psychological connection between the advocacy of Personalism and the extreme claims of Humanism and Totalitarianism."

Nor does Professor De Koninck fall into that error. But he does believe it necessary to vindicate the correct notion of the common good against the totalitarian concept of it which he thinks the personalists have unwittingly employed.

19"La société est alors ouvertement totalitaire quand l'Etat acquiert la liberté par la victoire sur les individus; elle est ouvertement individualiste, tant que les individus dominent l'Etat. Mais, dans un cas comme dans l'autre, la conception de la cité est personnaliste et totalitaire." **Ibid.**, p. 76.

20Baisnée, p. 70.
CHAPTER II

THE HISTORY AND TONE OF THE CONTROVERSY

Beginning with the book which started the whole dispute we will find it helpful to consider the history of the controversy by briefly summarizing the contribution of each book or article in order of appearance. Since the controversy centers around the doctrine advanced in Primauté, this book will receive fuller treatment in this chapter than the other books and articles. This summary will be sufficient to make intelligible Father Eschmann's objections, which will be discussed at length in the third chapter.

HISTORY OF THE CONTROVERSY

De Koninck, Primauté

Primauté was published April 13, 1943. Actually only one seventy-nine page essay in the book is concerned with the common good. The rest of the volume contains another essay, "Le principe de l'ordre nouveau," and several appendices. Over half the essay on the common good deals with objections which might be brought against the doctrine proposed in the positive part, and answers to these objections.

In his preface to the book Cardinal Villeneuve offers a short,
clear summary. But since the summary given by Yves Simon in his
review in the October, 1944, issue of the Review of Politics is
arranged in more clear cut divisions, let us turn to it for a mo-
ment:

Here is a survey of the main doctrinal points treated by De
Koning.

1. If the common good were merely a collection of private
goods, its excellence would be merely material. The genuine
principle of its excellence is its communicability. 'The com-
mon good is greater [than the private good] for every being
which participates in it, inasmuch as it is communicable to
other particular beings' (p. 8).

2. The common good of a multitude is the good of every
member of that multitude. If it were merely the good of the
multitude itself, considered as a kind of individual entity,
it would not really be common. Let us not say, for instance,
that the species seeks its own good against the natural de-
sire of the individual; let us say, rather, that the individ-
ual itself naturally seeks the good of the species more than
its private good. Accordingly, the common good is not by any
means a bonum alienum.

3. Rational creatures, on the ground of their ability to
grasp the all-embracing concept of being, are capable of re-

tating themselves actively, through knowledge and love, to
the common good of the whole universe. Rational natures are
distinguished by the incomparably greater intimacy, as well
as by the loftiness, of their relation to the common good
(pp. 12-16).

4. Loving the common good in order to possess it is not
loving the common good as such. That kind of love for the
common good characterizes tyrants. A society made of people
who all love the common good that way would be a society of
tyrans (p. 17).

5. The subordination of the temporal common good to the
supernatural good should not be mistaken for the subordina-
tion of a good that is common to a good that is private; the
higher good to which all temporal good is subordinated is
itself a common good (p. 19).

\footnote{Simon, pp. 530-531.}
In the remainder of his essay Professor De Koninck applies this general theory of the common good to the extrinsic and intrinsic common goods of the universe, God and the order of the universe respectively. He argues that persons are ordered to God insofar as He is a common good, and that in the universe itself individual persons are willed only for the good of the order of the universe.

Simon, "On the Common Good"

In his October, 1944, review of Primaute, as far as De Koninck's positive doctrine on the common good was concerned, Simon had high praise for the book. "De Koninck has outlined, with unusual profundity and accuracy, the main aspects of a theory of the common good . . . We do find in it a most valuable contribution to the definition of the common good and to the vindication of its primacy.

It calls for many specifications and further developments, but it constitutes a very sound foundation for any further development of the theory of the common good."2

Baisnée, "Two Catholic Critiques"

Three months after Simon's review, Father Jules A. Baisnée of

2Ibid.
Catholic University published "Two Catholic Critiques of Personalism" in Modern Schoolman for January, 1945. He summarized and recommended both Father Pedro Descoq's criticism of the person-individual distinction and Professor De Koninck's vindication of the common good against the personalists. "The reader will find in the essays of Fr. Descoqs and Professor de Koninck an objective statement of the main points of Personalism and a fair discussion of the arguments advanced in support of it. The two essays are complementary since the first author approaches the doctrine from the metaphysical viewpoint and the other is concerned with its moral implications."  

Eschmann, "In Defense of Jacques Maritain"

In the May, 1945, issue of Modern Schoolman Father Ignatius T. Eschmann, O.P., published a vigorous reply to Professor De Koninck's book. He rejected wholly and categorically De Koninck's thesis of the "contradictory and unintelligible position of the absolute superiority of 'the' common good over all and everything." He attacked the application of Professor De Koninck's general notion of the common good to the extrinsic and intrinsic common goods of the universe. He also devoted several pages at the end of his article to a defense of Maritain's doctrine on the per-

3Baïsnée, p. 60.

son and his relation to society.  

De Koninck, "In Defense of St. Thomas"

Professor De Koninck answered Father Eschmann's denunciation of his book with a long rebuttal in *Laval Théologique et Philosophique* entitled "In Defense of Saint Thomas: A Reply to Father Eschmann's Attack on the Primacy of the Common Good." For the most part this rebuttal consists of replies to the objections brought by Father Eschmann against the thesis of Primauté that persons are ordered to God, their objective beatitude, as He is a common good, and that they are subordinated to the intrinsic common good of the universe, its order.

Since the main part of the thesis will be a presentation and evaluation of arguments advanced by Father Eschmann and Professor De Koninck, it will be unnecessary to go into more detail now.

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5These seem to be directed against Father Descoqs's and Father Baisnés's articles, which attacked this doctrine. "It seems to me -- salvo meliore judicio -- that the bare essence of this doctrine might be summed up in the following ant hymena: St. Thomas says: Ad rationem personae exigitur quod sit totum completum; or again: Ratio partis contrariatur personae. Hence, Jacques Maritain concludes, the person, qua person, is not a part of society: and if a person is such a part, this 'being part' will not be based upon the metaphysical formality and precision of 'being person.'" *Ibid.*, p. 205.

6Charles De Koninck, "In Defense of Saint Thomas. A Reply to Father Eschmann's Attack on the Primacy of the Common Good," *Laval Théologique et Philosophique*, I, Numéro 2 (1945), 9-109. This article will be referred to in the footnotes as DT.
The last article of the controversy appeared in the October, 1946, issue of The Review of Politics. A restatement by Jacques Maritain of his own position, it was entitled "The Person and the Common Good." This article was later published, with the addition of one chapter, as a book, The Person and the Common Good.

In the book's second chapter, "The Positions of St. Thomas on the Ordination of the Person to Its Ultimate End," are contained some arguments against De Koninck's position. But since, surprisingly, they only echo the objections voiced by Father Eschmann in his article in the Modern Schoolman, Maritain makes no real contribution to the controversy.

In the following chapters of the book Maritain reaffirms the distinction between person and individual, applies this distinction to the relation between person and society, and then considers some contemporary social problems. It will be seen in a later chapter of this thesis that Maritain is not so sharply opposed to De Koninck's doctrine on the primacy of the common good as is Father Eschmann. For the present it will suffice to state, in brief, Maritain's opinion on the person and the common good. Several short statements include the core of his doctrine:

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8 Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good (New York, 1947). References will be made to the book rather than the article.
Here lie both the difficulty and the solution of the problem. Anarchical individualism denies that man, by reason of certain things which are in him, is engaged in his entirety as a part of political society. Totalitarianism asserts that man is a part of political society by reason of himself as a whole and by reason of all that is in him. . . . The truth is that man is engaged in his entirety—but not by reason of his whole self—as a part of political society, a part ordained to the good of the society.

Man is a part of and inferior to the political community by reason of the things in and of him which, due as they are to the deficiencies of material individuality, depend in their very essence upon political society and which in turn may be used as means to promote the temporal good of the society. . . . On the other hand, by reason of the things in and of man, which are derived from the ordination of personality as such to the absolute and which thus depend in their essence on something higher than the political community and so concern properly the supra-temporal accomplishment of the person as person, man excels the political community.9

TONIC OF THE CONTROVERSY

The highly personal, polemic tone of the controversy rose for the most part out of a belief by some of the writers that Professor De Koninck had treated Jacques Maritain unfairly.

We have seen that Simon approved of the positive doctrine of Primauté. But turning to the polemical side, insofar as De Koninck was writing contre les personnalistes, he has several complaints. He inquires: What are the characteristics of personalism in De Koninck's judgment, and who are the personalists against whom he is vindicating the primacy of the common good? The answer to both questions is distressingly vague.

9 Ibid., pp. 61-64.
As for the personalist doctrine itself, "He gives us only piece-meal information about his own conception of the philosophy which he fights with such ardent conviction."¹⁰

But this is not Simon's primary objection. For he fears that most readers will assume that the personalist against whom De Koninck's book is directed and to whom the personalist errors mentioned are attributable, is Jacques Maritain.

To my knowledge, everybody has believed, and still believes that Maritain is the real target of De Koninck's vindication of the primacy of the common good, against the personalists.

Now, re-read the collection of personalistic stupidities and monstrosities that we abstracted from De Koninck's essay: insofar as he trusts the writer, and believes that his criticism is aimed at Maritain, the reader cannot help taking for granted that those stupidities and monstrosities are really found in Maritain's work. The net effect of the essay, insofar as Maritain is concerned, resembles that which could have been brought about--perhaps not so successfully--by plain calumny. A charitable guess is that De Koninck was so unaware of the situation as not to foresee what the reaction of his readers would be.¹¹

Thus, although Yves Simon believed that for Professor De Koninck to allow the reader to get the impression that Maritain was guilty of some of the personalist errors attacked in *Primaute* would be virtually calumny, he chose to interpret De Koninck's procedure as a failure in foresight rather than in charity.

Even Father Baïsnié, who is quite sympathetic toward Professor De Koninck's book, complains mildly of the vagueness of Professor

¹⁰Simon, p. 531.
¹¹Ibid., p. 533.
De Koninck's references to personalism and personalists. "But unlike Fr. Descoqs who gives liberal references to the authors he criticizes, Professor De Koninck seems to deal with the Personalists as it were impersonally, being content with introducing their arguments with such formula as 'on prétend' or 'on a voulu conclure.' Thus the task of ascertaining the sources of the arguments and the correctness of their interpretation is made very difficult if not impossible."\(^{12}\)

Father Eschmann's reaction was stronger. He felt obliged to write "In Defense of Jacques Maritain." He accused Professor De Koninck of attacking Maritain under the cloak of anonymity, "an all too convenient anonymity which permits every attack, and leaves every avenue of retreat wide open."\(^{13}\) As for Professor De Koninck's own doctrine and arguments, "If they were true, then the Personalists, and with them, all the Christian Fathers and theologians and philosophers, should close their shops, go home and do penance, in cinere et cilio, for having grossly erred and misled the Christian world throughout almost two thousand years."\(^{14}\) Discussing De Koninck's doctrine on the relation of the person to the order of the universe he writes, "Is it necessary to remind Thomists that they should not, in any way whatever, revive the old pagan blasph-
my of a divine cosmos?"15

Father Eschmann also frequently criticizes what he considers Professor De Koninck's deviation from the pure doctrine of Saint Thomas. "The reader is avid to get good Thomistic bread, but he must content himself with Ersatz."16

It is of statements such as these that De Koninck complains when he speaks of the "uninhibited violence"17 and "sneering and irony"18 of Father Eschmann's article.

However he gives at least as well as he receives. The peak—or the depth—of ad hominem arguments is reached when he states, "Indeed I recognize the distinct though unenvied polemical advantage of his faulty Latin, his shallow acquaintance with philosophy and theology when allied to such unclouded confidence."19

Even Jacques Maritain managed to slip some quiet back-handed remarks into the midst of the haymakers swung by Father Eschmann and Professor De Koninck. "[G]ertain minds, despite their metaphysical inclination, prefer confusion to distinction. This holds especially true when they are engaged in polemics and find it expedient to fabricate monsters which for the lack of anything bet-

15Ibid., p. 192.
16Ibid., p. 199.
17DT, p. 10.
18Ibid.
19Ibid., p. 52.
ter, in particular for the lack of references, are indiscriminately attributed to a host of anonymous adversaries."

The bitter polemic tone of the controversy as exemplified by these few samples of the vitriolic remarks exchanged between the participants may be a partial explanation why the results of the controversy were rather disappointing. The notion of the common good did not receive a clarification proportionate to the furor raised. And such is usually the case when friction arises: much heat and no light. "Parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus."21

The reader might wonder whether De Koninck really meant to attack Maritain in Primaute. Simon said that he did not, and that the doctrines attacked were not Maritain's.22 Father Eschmann said De Koninck did mean Maritain, and that Maritain's doctrine was the object of the attack by Primaute.

It seems that Professor De Koninck did intend to attack Maritain. And why? Perhaps he meant to stir Maritain to reconsider and clarify his position on the person and the common good. At least that is what may be concluded from some statements in "In Defense of Saint Thomas." De Koninck asks, "Who is to blame for these contradictory judgments, that Father Eschmann should think Maritain is, and Simon should think he is not the object of De la

20Maritain, p. 4.

21Horace. Ars Poetica, l. 139.

22Simon, p. 530.
And again: "But let us suppose that Jacques Maritain has spoken clearly and consistently on this subject (a supposition hardly reconcilable with the contradictory judgments of Father Eschmann and of Professor Simon), that he has treated it in philosophical fashion and that he really is the main target of my essay against the personalists. Could I have no justifiable reason for that failure to name my adversary which Father Eschmann calls 'anonymity'?"\(^{24}\)

But enough of the cross currents of the controversy. Let us turn now to the main stream of its major positions and arguments.

\(^{23}\)DT, p. 11.

\(^{24}\)Ibid., p. 12.
CHAPTER III

PRESENTATION OF THE MAJOR POSITIONS AND ARGUMENTS

The arguments of this controversy are long and involved. They proceed along a winding path which frequently twists back upon itself. The nature of a controversy is such; for to meet an opponent's arguments directly, it is often difficult to follow the perfectly straight road which the nature of the matter might demand. The reader who does try to follow such a course may easily find himself lost.¹

For the sake of clarity, then, subtitles have been generously employed in this chapter as road markers for each step in the debate. Each of Father Eschmann's arguments against the doctrine of Primaúte is followed immediately by Professor De Koninck's reply.

In the last chapter the main doctrinal points of Primaúte were briefly considered. It was seen that after speaking of the primacy of the common good in general, Professor De Koninck went on to consider the primacy of two common goods in particular, the

¹"The reader is warned that he may find this paper difficult to follow because of its apparent lack of plan. In order to write a true rebuttal of my Opponent's attack I have felt obliged to forsake an order more in accordance with the nature of the subject and intend merely to follow him step by step through the pages of his own work." DT, p. 14, n. 2.
intrinsic and extrinsic common goods of the universe.

Here he stated, first, that persons are ordered to God insofar as He is a common good, and, second, that in the universe itself individual persons are willed only for the good of the order of the universe.

THE NATURE OF THE COMMON GOOD

Father Eschmann directs his attack exclusively against these two points. He rejects Professor De Koninck's basic position, the "contradictory and unintelligible position of the absolute superiority of 'the' common good over all and everything."2 The closest Father Eschmann comes to dealing directly and explicitly with Professor De Koninck's notion of the nature of the common good is once at the beginning of his article and again near the end. In these places he states that one of De Koninck's basic errors was to make absolute the relative primacy of the common good. But Professor De Koninck sees implied in many other of Father Eschmann's statements and arguments a notion of the common good which is altogether different from the one he holds. "The notion of common good which he has in mind throughout his attack is very distinctly the one I had emphatically and repeatedly denounced as totalitarian."3 Professor De Koninck had repeated frequently in his first essay that

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2Eschmann, pp. 184-185.
the common good is not the singularized bonum alienum that the totalitarian regime makes of it, that "the common good is not a good which will not be the good of particulars and which will be only the good of the collectivity envisaged as a sort of singular."\(^4\)

Now he calls attention to the passage from Mystical Corporis Christi which Father Eschmann cites as an affirmation of personalism against the primacy of the common good. It will be necessary to quote this passage in order to see the point of De Koninck's inference from the use which Father Eschmann makes of the passage.

For while in a natural body the principle of unity so joins the parts that the single parts wholly lack their own, as it is called, subsistence; on the other hand in the Mystical Body the power of mutual union so joins the members that, although the union is intimate, the single members totally retain their own personality. If we consider the mutual relation of the whole and its single parts, we see that in every physical living body all the single members are finally and uniquely destined to the benefit of the whole composite, while every social union of men, if only we regard the last end of its usefulness, is ordered eventually to the benefit of all and every member, as they are persons.\(^5\)

From the use of this citation (Father Eschmann quoted it without

\(\text{"Le bien commun n'est pas un bien qui ne sera le bien des particulières et qui ne sera que le bien de la collectivité envisagée comme une espèce de singulier." }\) BC, p. 9.

\(\text{"Dum enim in naturali corpore unitatis principium ita partes jungit, ut propria, quam vocant, subsistentia singulae prorsus careant; contra in mystico Corpore mutuae conjunctionis vis, etiam si intima, membra ita inter se copulat, ut singula omnino fruantur persona propria. Accedit quod, si totius et singulorum mutua [sic] inter se rationem consideramus, in physico quolibet viventi corpore totius conceptionis emolumento membra singula universa postremum unice destinantur, dum socialis quaelibet hominum compages, si modo ultimum utilitatis finem inspicimus, ad omnium et uniusculiusque membri profectum, utpote personae sunt, postremum ordinantur." }\) Eschmann, p. 186.
explanatory comment) Professor De Koninck concludes, "Since he has quoted against me a passage from the Encyclical Mystici Corporis Christi (DM, 183, 186) with particular emphasis on the words '... utposito personae sunt', it must be that, in his mind ..., the common good whose primacy I defend is not attained by the persons, that this common good, indeed, is as the good of a natural body which so unites the parts that each lacks its own individual subsistence, so that the different members are destined solely to their good through the whole."6

The other citation which Father Eschmann quotes against Professor De Koninck (again without comment) is a passage from Divini Redemptoris. The line most relevant to the issue is, "The State exists for man, not man for the State."7 Professor De Koninck concludes that by this quotation Father Eschmann means to add papal authority to his negation of the primacy of the common good. He comments that insofar as Father Eschmann is using this quotation against him, he must think that De Koninck makes the political common good the supreme common good, to which all else must be subordinate. He answers the difficulty by merely reproducing an almost identical objection which he had met in Primaute. The main answers to this objection are that the State exists for its members as their common good, and that it is subordinated to man insofar as he

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6 pt., p. 20.

7 "Civitas homini, non homo Civitati existit." Eschmann, p. 186.
is ordered to even higher common goods.

10. 'The state exists for man, man does not exist for the state'.

To convert this text into an objection against our position, it must be translated: 'The common good of the state exists for the private good of man'. We could then cite what follows immediately in this same text: 'This does not at all mean to say, as individualistic liberalism understands it, that society is subordinated to the egotistic utility of the individual'.

The state exists for man. That should be understood in two ways. First, the state, when we envisage it as an organization in view of the common good, should be entirely subordinate to this good insofar as it is common. Considered under this aspect, its only reason for being is the common good. Now this common good itself is for the members of society; not for their private good as such; it is for the members as a common good . . . The state is not, nor can it be, for itself, fixed and complete within itself, opposed as an individual to other individuals: its good should be the same as the good of its members . . . Second, the state, as the common good of the state, is for man insofar as he contains formalities which order him to superior common goods, formalities which are, in man, superior to that which orders him to the common good of the state.8

810. 'La cité existe pour l'homme, l'homme n'existe pas pour la cité'.

Pour convertir ce texte en objection contre notre position, il faudrait le traduire: 'Le bien commun de la cité existe pour le bien privé de l'homme'. Nous pourrions, alors, citer la suite immédiate de ce même texte: 'Ce qui ne veut point dire, comme le comprend le libéralisme individualiste, que la société est subordonnée à l'utilité égoïste de l'individu'.

La cité existe pour l'homme. Cela doit s'entendre de deux manières. Premièrement, la cité, quand nous l'envisageons comme organisation en vue du bien commun, doit être entièrement soumise à ce bien en tant qu'il est commun. Envisagée sous ce rapport, elle n'a d'autre raison d'être que le bien commun. Or, ce bien commun lui-même est pour les membres de la société; non pas pour leur bien privé comme tel; il est pour les membres en tant que bien commun . . . La cité n'est pas, ou ne peut pas être, un 'pour soi' figé et refermé sur soi, opposé comme un singulier à d'autres singuliers: son bien doit être identiquement le bien de ses membres . . . Deuxièmement, la cité, comme le bien commun de la
THE RELATION OF PERSONS TO THE ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE

After quoting against Professor De Koninck passages from Divini Redemptoris and Mystici Corporis Christi, Father Eschmann sets to work refuting the two main parts of De Koninck's doctrine to which he takes exception. They are, first, "that individual persons are subordinated to that ultimate separate and extrinsic good of the universe which is God . . . that this subordination is formally motivated by the fact that God is the common good"; second, "that persons are subordinated to the intrinsic common good of the universe, i.e. its order."9

Father Eschmann first directs his attack against the second part, the intrinsic common good of the universe and its relation to persons. Professor De Koninck had asserted that "within the universe itself, persons are willed only for the good of the order of the universe, its intrinsic common good, which is greater than the individual persons who materially constitute it."10 Against this position Father Eschmann levels three charges: First, that it is absurd to consider principal parts of the universe as materially

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9Eschmann, p. 187.

10"Dans l'univers même, les personnes ne sont voulues que pour le bien de l'ordre de l'univers, bien commun intrinsèque meilleur que les personnes singulières qui le constituent matériellement." BC, p. 27.
constituting it. Second, that Professor De Koninck argues from the wrong group of Thomistic texts. Third, that St. Thomas has already explicitly stated and solved the problem.

In his answer to these objections of Father Eschmann, Professor De Koninck tries to clarify the main issue involved. He puts the question in this way: "Is it in the very being of the individual persons taken separately that we find most perfectly realized the good which God produces, that is, the good that is in the universe itself? or is it rather the total order of the universe which most perfectly represents and is closer to, the ultimate separated and extrinsic good which is God?"\textsuperscript{11} As the question was raised in \textit{Primauté} it was in face of the contention that "the individual persons are themselves goods willed first for themselves and in themselves superior to the good of the accidental whole which they constitute by way of consequence and of completion."\textsuperscript{12}

Persons as Principal Parts of the Universe

Now for the first of Father Eschmann's objections against this doctrine. Professor De Koninck had said that persons are principal parts materially constituting the universe. Father Eschmann speaks as if De Koninck had said that they were \textit{material} parts materially

\textsuperscript{11}DT, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{12}"[L]es personnes individuelles sont elles-mêmes des biens voulus d'abord pour soi et en soi supérieurs au bien du tout accidentel qu'elles constituent par voie de conséquence et de complé-ment." BC, p. 27.
constituting the cosmos, considered as merely the material universe. And he objects, "For, being material parts of the cosmos and subordinated, as material parts, to the stars and the spheres, they will have just as much responsibility, just as much choice, as the pistons in a steam engine."\(^\text{13}\) De Koninck protests that this is not at all what he said or meant. He had not said persons were material parts materially composing the universe, but simply parts materially composing it.

Next Father Eschmann shifts his grounds and grants that Professor De Koninck considers persons as the principal parts materially constituting the universe. However, this notion seems to him as fatuous as the definition of St. Joseph's paternity as a real causality, but negative by abstention.\(^\text{14}\) With this he dismisses the point. "Let us be charitable and forget that such a statement ('Les parties principales constituant matériellement l'univers . . .') has ever been made in a work which pretends to exhibit the pure wisdom of St. Thomas Aquinas."\(^\text{15}\)

In answer Professor De Koninck asks, "However, does not a part as part, whether principal or secondary, material or formal, corporeal or spiritual, belong to the genus of material cause? Is not

\(^{13}\)Eschmann, p. 189.

\(^{14}\)Ibid.

\(^{15}\)Ibid.
any and every part 'id ex quo'? In confirmation he cites Saint Thomas: "Third, all parts exist because of the perfection of the whole, like matter because of form; for parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole."17

Use of Thomistic Texts

In support of his opinion that, of all created goods, the perfection of the universe is the greatest, Professor De Koninck had cited six texts from St. Thomas. Father Eschmann objects that none of these is acceptable evidence because they do not properly and immediately belong to the doctrine Professor De Koninck attempts to prove. Rather, he should have consulted another group of texts which deal directly with the position and rank of persons within the universe.

Against Greco-Arabian necessitarianism St. Thomas states that there exists an intelligent and loving Creator, i.e. a personal God and a divine and all-embracing Providence. In this group of texts . . . St. Thomas frequently . . . avails himself of two quotations from Aristotle, viz., (a) bonum commune est divinus . . . and, (b) quod est optimum in rebus existentes est bonum universi. By these citations no proper doctrine on the common good is taught; and still less is anything said about the relations between the common good and the proper good of the intellectual substances. Their impact is clearly to show, against a Greek heresy, that, even in the Greek thinkers themselves, and above all in Aristotle . . . there were principles upon which one may proceed to prove the

16DT, p. 16.

fact of divine Providence.

This is the group of texts Professor De K. argues from. He should not have done so, because they do not properly and immediately belong to the question he undertook to treat.18

Professor De Koninck's reply is that all this makes no difference. Granted that St. Thomas is arguing against a Greek heresy. What of it? What matters is that he has stated quite explicitly that the order of the universe is the highest created good. He answers:

In other words, according to Father Eschmann, when St. Thomas says that God governs the order of the universe and bestows upon it His greatest care (maxime quarat) because it is the maxime bonum in rebus causatis, the praeclupe volitum et causatum, and because the good of the order of the universe is the propinquissimum in rebus creatis to His own goodness, omne ad ipsum ordinetur, sicut ad finem, omne particularis bonum hujus vel illius rei, sicut minus perfectum ad id quod est perfectum, he does not really mean the reasons he gives to be taken as the true reasons.19

A Thomistic Distinction

Father Eschmann's third objection against Professor De Koninck's doctrine of the ordination of the person to the intrinsic common good of the universe is that a distinction made by St. Thomas settles the question in his (Father Eschmann's) favor. The argumentum in contrarium and response which Father Eschmann cites are from S.T., I, 93, 2, where Thomas asks whether the image of God is

18 Eschmann, pp. 191-192.
19 Dr., p. 29. The underlined phrases are mostly from C.G., III, c. 64.
found in irrational creatures.

3. Moreover, something is more similar to God insofar as it is more perfect in goodness. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness than man: for although they are single goods, nevertheless all taken together are said to be very good, Gen. 1. Therefore the whole universe is in the image of God, and not only man.

In answer to the third objection it must be said that the universe is more perfect in goodness than the intellectual creatures extensively and diffusively. But intensively and collectively the likeness of divine perfection is found more in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for the highest good. It must also be said that part is not divided against the whole, but against another part. Hence when it is said that only the intellectual nature is in the image of God, the whole universe, according to some part, is not excluded from being in the image of God; but other parts of the universe are excluded.20

Father Eschmann interprets St. Thomas's response to mean that not the total order of the universe, but individual persons taken separately more perfectly represent God. He explains St. Thomas's extensive-intensive distinction in this way:

The whole universe is more like God 'extensively and diffusively.' That is, if you consider God as the cause and fountain-head of the whole universe and of every creature

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Ad tertium dicendum quod universum est perfectius in bonitate quam intellectualis creaturae extensive et diffusive. Sed intensive et collective similitudo divinae perfectionis magis invenitur in intellectuali creatura, quae est capax summi boni.—Vel dicendum quod pars non dividitur contra totum, sed contra aliam partem. Unde cum dicitur quod sola natura intellectualis est ad imaginem Dei, non excluditur quin universum, secundum aliquam sui partem, sit ad imaginem Dei; sed excluduntur aliae partes universi." S.T., I, 93, 2.
pertaining to it, you will judge that there is quantitatively more likeness in the whole than in the parts. But . . . 'intensively' . . . and 'collectively,' i.e., considering the fact that the essentially most perfect likeness is gathered together in one single point, an intellectual substance by far surpasses everything that might, in a certain sense, be said to be like God. The intellectual substance is, indeed, the only proper image of God.21

Professor De Koninck introduces his rebuttal of Father Eschmann's interpretation of this distinction by recalling God's purpose in making things many. Since no one creature can sufficiently represent the perfection which exists in God simpliciter et unite, God in creation must accomplish this by representing Himself in many creatures, composite et multipliciter.

"For He produced things in being that His goodness be communicated to creatures, and represented by them. And because it can not be sufficiently represented by one creature, He produced many different creatures, so that what one lacks to represent the divine goodness may be supplied by another: for the goodness which is in God simply and uniformly is in creatures multiplied and divided. Hence the whole universe more perfectly participates in the divine goodness and represents it than any other creature."22

21Eschmann, pp. 190-191.

22Produxit enim res in esse propter suam bonitatem communicandam creaturis, et per eas reprezentandam. Et quia per unam creaturam sufficienter reprezentari non potest, produxit multas creaturas et diversas, ut quod deest uni ad reprezentandum divinam bonitatem, suppleatur ex alia; nam bonitas quae in Deo est simpliciter et uniformiter, in creaturis est multipliciter et divisim. Unde perfectius participat divinam bonitatem, et reprezentat eam, totum universum, quam alia quaecumque creatura." S.T., I, 47, 1 c.
ness of the perfection existing in God simpliciter is more perfectly expressed, then, by what exists in creation multipliciter.

"Just as God is one, so He also produced one, not only because everything in itself is one, but also because all things somehow are one perfect thing, and this unity requires diversity of parts, as has been shown."23 It is clear then that the extensive perfection of the universe, its unity of order, is not a mere quantitative addition, but is intended per se as the only way in which that which is in God simpliciter et unum can be more fully represented.

As for intensive imitation of the divine perfection, any single member is more perfect than the whole manifold of creation, but it is not absolutely more perfect.

"Hence, with respect to what is in God simpliciter et divisim, if intensive imitation by the creature were absolutely better than that which is achieved through extension, the universe could not possibly be the praeципue intentum."24

After considering what the praeципue intentum in creation is, Professor De Koninck seeks to determine in what way St. Thomas understood the problem. According to him the point of St. Thomas's objection and response is this: The whole universe is more perfect

23"[S]icut Deus est unus, ita et unum produxit, non solum quia unumquodque in se est unum, sed etiam quia omnia quodammodo sunt unum perfectum, quae quidem unitas diversitatem partium requirit, ut ostensum est." De Pot., 3, 16, ad 1.

24DT, p. 36. Cf. G.G., III, c. 64; S.T., 1, 50, 3 c; 15, 2 c.
than man, its highest part. But in order to be better absolutely than any of its parts the whole universe must possess intensively the perfection of all its parts. Therefore the image of God is properly found in irrational creatures as well as in intellectual creatures. But this objection, St. Thomas goes on to say, is not true. It would be like saying that if an animal could not be better absolutely than its eye except by being better intensively, the whole animal would have to be an eye. Absolutely speaking the manifold of the universe represents God more perfectly extensively. Only the intellectual creature, in precision from other creatures, is in the proper image of God. And the universe is in the image of God because of the intellectual creatures.

Professor De Koninck's direct answer to Father Eschmann's explanation of this text is:

Just what does my Opponent mean by: 'there is quantitatively more likeness in the whole than in its parts'? Does he mean that whether God makes one image of Himself, or many, the difference is merely quantitative? That, absolutely speaking, there is no better expression of Himself when He produces images many and varied, than when He produces a single one? By his superficial understanding of the term 'extensive' Father Eschmann destroys the Thomistic doctrine of the reason why God made the intellectual creatures many and varied.25

THE RELATION OF PERSONS TO GOD AS A COMMON GOOD

The first part of the thesis of Primauté was that "the single persons are ordered to the ultimate separated good [God] insofar

25Ibid., p. 39.
as it is a common good." Father Eschmann rejects this, bringing two basic criticisms to bear against it, that De Koninck confuses the notions of universal good and common good, and that he misunderstands the nature of beatitude.

Meaning of a Text from De Caritate

In support of his thesis that God as the object of beatitude is the common good of persons, Professor De Koninck had quoted from De Car., 2 c, the statement that "there is required love for the good common to the whole society, which is the divine good as the object of beatitude." Father Eschmann accuses Professor De Koninck of quoting St. Thomas out of context, and cites more of the text in order to bring out its proper meaning.

Inasmuch as a man is admitted to share in the good of some state and is made a citizen of that state, certain virtues belong to him for doing those things which are proper to citizens, and for loving the good of that state; so when man by divine grace is admitted to a participation of heavenly beatitude, which consists in the vision and enjoyment of God, he becomes as it were a citizen and companion of that blessed society which is called the Heavenly Jerusalem, according to the words of Eph. 2:19: 'You are fellow citizens of the saints and domestics of God.' Hence to man, thus associated with heavenly things, there belong certain gratuitous virtues, which are infused virtues, for whose due operation there is required love for the good common to the whole society, which is the divine good as the object of beatitude.

26"[L]es personnes singulières sont ordonnées au bien ultime séparé en tant que celui-ci a raison de bien commun." BC, p. 27.

27"Si autem homo, inquantum ad partecipandum bonum alicuius civitatis et efficientur civis illius civitatis: Competunt ei virtutes quaedam ad operandum ea quae sunt civium, et amandum bonum illius civitatis, ita, cum homo per divinam
Arguing from this text Father Eschmann says that Professor De Koninck's interpretation is false. St. Thomas does not here teach that the object of our beatitude is the divine good insofar as this good is a common good. St. Thomas is merely comparing two goods, highest in their own orders, but not two common goods properly speaking. The earthly city is referred to only as an example. St. Thomas takes care that we do not over extend the example by using the words "quasi civis," to which corresponds in the parallel text, S.T., I, 60, 5, ad 5, "quoddam bonum commune." Thus God is not a common good in the proper sense, but only in a certain sense. That God is not a common good in the proper sense is proved in a later passage of De Caritate: "The object of charity is not a common good, but the highest good."28

Let us paraphrase the passage in question, in order to set its true significance in relief: Prerequisite to the exercise of infused virtues in the Heavenly City is the love of the highest good which is the divine good, the object of beatitude. In like manner, the love of the earthly city's highest good, i.e. its common good, is prerequisite to the exercise of natural virtues. In a certain sense, the divine good might also be called a common good (quoddam bonum commune). But the object of charity is, of course, not a common good; rather it is

gratiam admittatur in participationem caelestis beatitudinis, quae in visione et fruitione Dei consistit, fit quasi civis et socius illius beatae societatis, quae vocatur Caelstis Jerusalem, secundum illud Eph. 2, 19: 'Estis cives sanctorum et domestici Dei.' Unde homini sic ad caelestia adscripto competunt quaedam virtutes gratuitae, quae sunt virtutes infusae, ad quorum debitam operationem praeexigitur amor boni communis toti societati, quod est bonum divinum, prout est beatitudinis objectum." Eschmann, p. 194.

28"[B]onum commune non est objectum caritatis, sed summum bonum." De Car., 5, ad 4.
the divine good ("Bonum commune non est objectum caritatis, sed summum bonum," Q. D. De Caritate, 5 ad 4).\textsuperscript{29}

Professor De Koninok answers that not he, but Father Eschmann misinterprets the text, and that Father Eschmann also misconstrues the other citations employed in his paraphrase, namely, "quoddam bonum commune" and "bonum commune non est objectum caritatis." To the text as cited by Father Eschmann Professor De Koninok adds several more lines which say that in order to love the divine good it is not enough to love it in order to possess it, for this is the way tyrants love the common good; it must be loved for itself, that it endure and be diffused. According to Professor De Koninok, what St. Thomas means to say here is this: A virtue requires the love of the good which is its object. But the supernatural divine good cannot be attained by a natural virtue. Hence the necessity of the infused virtues, for whose due operation there is required the love of the good common to the whole society, that is, the divine good as the object of beatitude. This is the good which is the proper object of the virtue of charity. Furthermore, since this divine good, as it is the object of beatitude, is a common good, it is not to be loved merely to be possessed; for even the evil desire it in this way. And this desire is not charity.

Thus, against Father Eschmann, Professor De Koninok states that the comparison between the earthly and heavenly cities, in order to strengthen the proof, must be based on something common to

\textsuperscript{29}Eschmann, p. 195.
both. "In a word, what St. Thomas establishes here is that the divine good, prout est beatitudinis objectum, must be loved as the good citizen loves the good of the earthly city; and this means that it must be loved 'ut permaneat et diffundatur', and not, like the tyrant, 'ut habeatur et possideatur'.”30 According to Professor De Koninck, the kind of love advocated by Father Eschmann is the love which the tyrants and wicked have.

So much for the text itself. Professor De Koninck now turns to Father Eschmann's assertion that God is a common good only in a certain sense, quoddam bonum commune. Referring to Bradley's Arnold he points out that "quoddam" may mean "a certain one" or "a" or it may be taken as "as it were" or "in a certain sense." Professor De Koninck cites the text from which the phrase is taken and argues that "quoddam" cannot here mean "in a certain sense."

"For unless 'bonum universale' is a 'bonum commune' in the strict sense ('cum in Deo sit unum et idem ejus substantia et bonum commune'), the whole proof of this article 5 is sophistical."31

The text which Father Eschmann cites in his paraphrase (that the object of charity is not a common good, but the highest good) seems to contradict directly Professor De Koninck's thesis that God is properly a common good for any created person. In answer Professor De Koninck refers to the context. The problem is whether char-

30 Ibid., p. 51.

31 Ibid., p. 45. Reference is to S.T., I, 60, 5, ad 5.
ity is a special virtue. The fourth argumentum in contrarium is:

4. Moreover, good is the general object of all virtues: for it is virtue which makes its possessor good, and renders his action good. But good is the object of charity. Therefore charity has a general object; and thus it is a general virtue."32 So, according to the objection, the object of charity would be the general good (bonum commune in praedicando) which is the object of all the virtues. St. Thomas answers: "In reply to the fourth objection: the object of charity is not the common good, but the highest good; and therefore it does not follow that charity is a general virtue, but that it is the sum of virtues."33 Thus, Professor De Koninck points out, the "bonum commune" used in the response is not bonum commune in causando, but bonum commune in praedicando. "For, the 'common good' of this text is to be taken, not as the common good of persons, but as the good common to the different virtues nor is it a commune in causando, but in praedicando and in essendo. If the 'bonum commune' of this text were to be understood as a commune secundum virtutem or in causando (the objection shows that it is not), we should then conclude that charity is a general virtue."34


33"Ad quartum dicendum, quod bonum commune non est objectum caritatis, sed summum bonum; et ideo non sequitur quod caritas sit generalis virtus, sed quod sit summa virtutum." Ibid.

34DT, p. 43.
Universal Good and Common Good

Father Eschmann says that Professor De Koninck's "root mistake, in his whole treatise on the primacy of the common good, is that he rashly assumed an absolute identification between God and 'the' common good."35 The reason for this mistake, according to Father Eschmann, is that in the mind of Professor De Koninck the two notions of universal good and common good are erroneously identified; and the reason for this error is that De Koninck confuses bonum universale in essendo and bonum universale in causando. The cornerstone of Christian ethics for Father Eschmann is that we are ordered to God as He is in Himself, bonum universale in essendo.

Professor De K. has confused bonum universale in essendo and bonum universale in causando. "The creature," St. Thomas says (Summa, I, 103, 4), "is assimilated to God in two respects: first, with regard to this that God is good; and thus the creature becomes like Him by being good; and, secondly, with regard to this that God is the cause of goodness in others; and thus the creature becomes like God by causing others to be good."--The common good, and every common good, is formally bonum universale in causando; it is not, formally, bonum universale in essendo.

The very first and essential element of our ordination to God is not the fact that God is the first bonum universale in causando, the fountain of all communications, but that He is the bonum universale in essendo.36

Professor De Koninck's reply is that Father Eschmann himself is in confusion about the bonum universale in essendo and the bonum universale in causando. Bonum universale in essendo can have more

35Eschmann, p. 203.
36Ibid., p. 196.
than one meaning, Professor De Koninck says.

Let us now consider the expressions bonum universale in essendo and bonum universale in causando. The former may bear three distinct meanings: first, it may be taken to mean bonum universale in praedicando which is common to all things insofar as they are good in any way; secondly, it may mean the perfection of divine being considered in itself without formal reference to will; thirdly, it may mean bonum universale per essentiam, where the good is understood in the rigorous sense of 'perfectivum alterius per modum finis', and this is the divine good, for God is good simpliciter by His very essence, 'in quantum ejusta essentia est suum esse'.

As for bonum universale in causando, it can mean the divine good either as a final cause or as the efficient and exemplary cause of all created goodness. In the first sense the divine good is considered as "perfectivum alterius per modum finis." Of course, with respect to the divine will, the divine good is a final cause only according to the manner of signification, since in God will and the thing willed are distinguished only by reason. But with respect to any created will, the divine good is a final cause in the strict sense. The second sense of bonum universale in causando—as the universal efficient and exemplary cause of all goodness—is the sense in which Father Eschmann seems to employ the term in the argument cited on page forty-two. And here, according to Professor De Koninck, is where Father Eschmann makes his mistake.

When he has distinguished the various meanings of the two terms, Professor De Koninck points out that bonum universale in...
essendo in its third sense and bonum universale in causando in its first sense are the same, "the only difference being that the former expresses the identity of divine goodness and divine being; the latter brings out the proper formality of the divine good as final cause."38

Once he has clarified his position on these notions, Professor De Koninck examines the objection raised by Father Eschmann. "In forma, it amounts to this: The term of our ordination to God is bonum universale in essendo. But bonum universale in essendo is not bonum universale in causando. Therefore, the term of our ordination to God is not bonum universale in causando."39 Against Father Eschmann's argument so expressed Professor De Koninck answers that if bonum universale in essendo means bonum per essentiam, and bonum universale in causando means bonum universale per modum finis, the major is true and the minor false. But if bonum universale in essendo is taken in the second sense, as the perfection of divine being considered absolutely, in precision from the formality "perfectivum alterius per modum finis", the minor is true, the major false. In either case the conclusion is not true.

Professor De Koninck counters the quotation cited by Father Eschmann from S.T., I, 103, 4 c, with another from De Ver., 21, 4 c. Father Eschmann's text considers God as the universal effi-

38 Ibid., p. 57.
39 Ibid.
cient and exemplary cause; Professor De Koninck's text, as the universal final cause: "Since God is the beginning and end of all things, He has a two-fold relation to creatures: one according as all things proceed from God in existence; another according as they are ordered to Him as to an end." 40

Immediately after Father Eschmann's argument about bonum universale in essendo et causando, he adds that only if a multitude of blessed share in the divine good, can God be properly called a common good. If only one creature enjoyed God, there would be a "certain common good," common to God and the creature.

From this it follows that our own (personal) good is a participated good. Through this participation a 'certain common good' ('quoddam bonum commune') emerges, i.e. a good which, in a certain way, is common to God and the creature. Considering the supernaturally elevated creature, this common good is constitutive for a community or 'society' between God and the supernaturally elevated creature, a society which is called, by St. Thomas, societas suae (i.e., Dei) fruitionis. It is the divine friendship to whose essential constitution no multitude of creatures is required. The fact that there is such a multitude of creatures does not yet formally come into consideration.

This fact becomes only now, i.e. in the third place, relevant. For if there are several creatures sharing in the same participated good they will have something in common. Here, then, there will be a common good properly speaking, i.e. a good pertaining to a multitude of beings in such manner that each and everyone communicates in it. God is, as St. Thomas says, the last common good among men, i.e. that good in which they finally must or should unite: 'Hominem non uniuntur inter se nisi in eo quod est commune inter

40"Cum Deus sit principium omnium rerum et finis; duplex habitudo ipsius ad creaturas inventur: una secundum quam omnia a Deo procedunt in esse; alia secundum quam ad eum ordinantur ut in finem." Ibid., p. 58.
First Professor De Koninck examines Father Eschmann's "certain common good." He asks just what Father Eschmann means when he says that "our own (personal) good is a participated good." He must mean either formal beatitude—a personal, proper good of the person—or objective beatitude (which could be called "participated" only by extrinsic denomination). If formal beatitude, then the "certain common good" which emerges from it, a good common, in a certain way, to God and the creature, could only be a bonum commune in praedicando; but this "is not a good in the proper sense and it most certainly is not the good of the societas sue (i.e., Dei) fruitionis." If the "participated" good is objective beatitude, it is most properly a common good, for it is the object communicated to the created intellect. But because objective beatitude is only imperfectly attained in the creature's formal beatitude, it can be a good common to God and to the creature only as a bonum commune in praedicando. Therefore, concludes Professor De Koninck, no matter how Father Eschmann takes "our own (personal) good," the "good which, in a certain way, is common to God and the creature" can at best be only a bonum commune in praedicando.

Next Professor De Koninck weighs the proper common good admitted by Father Eschmann, i.e., God as actually enjoyed by a mul-

\[41\] Eschmann, pp. 196-197.

\[42\] DT, p. 60.
titude of blessed. Thus it would seem that for Father Eschmann, for a good to be called common it must be actually communicated to many. "In other words," says Professor De Koninck, "the denomination 'common good' is founded, not on the superabundance and in-commensurability of the divine good (which for that very reason can never be the proper good of any person) but on the fact of a manifold of persons who actually share this good." The conclusion which Professor De Koninck draws from this position is this: God is a common good only per accidens with respect to the objective beatitude of any single person, for the existence of a multitude which also shares in the divine good is not essential to beatitude. Hence "common good properly speaking" as applied to God in Father Eschmann's sense is a purely extrinsic denomination.

After describing in what sense God can be called a common good, Father Eschmann continues his argument about bonum universale in essendo et causando. He cites a text from In I Eth., 2, n. 30, which he interprets to mean that the common good is "divinius" only as a bonum in causando, which is more like God as the universal cause of all goods. But with respect to likeness to God in ordine essendi, the speculative intellect is superior to anything like God in ordine causandi.

Professor De K. has, throughout his treatise, neglected these fundamental considerations. On the very first page of the treatise proper (p. 8) he has omitted to pay due attention to St. Thomas' words: 'Dicitur autem hoc [scilicet bonum com-

43Ibid., p. 62.
mune] esse 'divinius' eo quod magis pertinet ad similitudinem Dei, qui est ultima causa omnium bonorum.' Obviously the words 'qui est ultima causa omnium bonorum' are, in St. Thomas' mind, restrictive . . . Let us paraphrase: Aristotle gives to the common good the attribute 'divine', because this good, being the cause of the particular goods contained in its order and sphere, is in this respect more like God insofar as God is the cause of any and every good. There is, however, another respect to which the above text gives no consideration. This is the likeness to God in linea essendi. And in this respect the speculative intellect being, in the beatific vision, informed by God and most intimately united with Him, is by far superior to anything which is like God in ordine causandi. 44

Professor De Koninck answers these arguments of Father Eschmann by calling attention to the fact that in the context from which Father Eschmann quotes, St. Thomas is speaking of the common good as a final cause, not as an efficient cause. "Hence the good, which has the nature of final cause, is greater insofar as it extends to more things." 45 And so he denies Father Eschmann's interpretation of the text and ironically adds: "In other words, when St. Thomas, in this very text, speaks of the good 'quod habet rationem causae finalis', he actually means . . . something quite different, namely the good as an 'effective' cause of other goods!" 46

As for the respect of likeness to God in ordine essendi which Father Eschmann proposes in the same passage, Professor De Koninck

44 Eschmann, p. 197.
45 "Unde et bonum, quod habet rationem causae finalis, tanto potius est quarto ad plura se extendit." In I Eth., lect. 2, n. 30.
46 DT, p. 67.
claims that no matter how it is interpreted, it makes no sense.
For if Father Eschmann means that the personal good of formal beatitude is greater than any created good considered as the cause of another good, Professor De Koninck agrees; but he says that this only proves that some created proper good can be better than some created common good. "The good which we maintain is greater than the personal good of the Blessed is not a common good of an inferior order but the common good of objective beatitude." Or, if this is not Father Eschmann's argument, says Professor De Koninck, he can only be trying to infer that because formal beatitude is strictly a proper good of the created person, so is objective beatitude. "This would be a wretched sophism begging a real identity of our formal and objective beatitude; their distinction would be one of reason only."48

The Nature of Beatitude

Leaving the doctrinal chapter of Professor De Koninck's essay "La bien commun et sa primauté," Father Eschmann proceeds to criticize one of the objections raised by De Koninck against the thesis of Primauté, along with De Koninck's answer to it. The objection is concerned with beatitude and the superiority of the speculative order to the practical. Professor De Koninck's response includes

47 Ibid., p. 68
48 Ibid.
the statements (a) that the practical happiness of the community is ordered to the speculative happiness of the person insofar as he is a member of the community; and (b) that the sovereign beatitude which consists in the vision of God is essentially a common good. 49

Father Eschmann objects that the response given by Professor De Koninck is based not on St. Thomas, but on Peter of Auvergne. 50 The quality of his Thomism is, according to Father Eschmann, open to the suspicion of the Averroistic atmosphere of the late thirteenth century Paris. While he is at it, Father Eschmann also complains of the use Professor De Koninck makes of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas. "As long as the notion of a doctrinal source retains any proper and intelligible meaning, it is surely impossible to use Peter of Auvergne unqualifiedly as a Thomistic source; and, let it be noted, the same applies, of course, to Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, etc., commentators whom Professor De K. puts, without any distinction, on equal footing with St. Thomas himself."

In particular Father Eschmann objects to the notion of "speculatio totius civitatis" expressed by Peter of Auvergne. "[W]hat in the world can speculatio totius civitatis be?" 52 He takes it

49ECC, pp. 61-62.
50In VIII Pol., lect. 2.
51Eschmann, p. 199.
52Ibid.
to mean a social, group action of contemplation, rejects it, and cites St. Thomas to prove that such an action is impossible. "But anyone, by the fact that he is engaged in speculation, is directed alone to the end of speculation." 53

Then Father Eschmann returns to Professor De Koninck's own response. Two statements in particular he finds must be rejected. "In the light of St. Thomas' explicit teaching, the view (a) that 'le bonheur pratique de la communauté . . . [est ordonné] au bonheur spéculatif de la personne en tant que membre de la communauté' must be rejected." 54 The very notion of the "speculative felicity of the person qua member of the community" is contradictory. For to be a member of a community means to be imperfect and still in via; to have reached speculative felicity means to be perfect and in termino. In proof of this Father Eschmann cites S.T., II-II, 188, 8: "Just as that which is already perfect excels that which is exercised for the sake of perfection, so the life of solitaries [i.e. in contemplation] . . . excels the social life." 55

The second statement which Father Eschmann rejects is that which says the sovereign beatitude which consists in the vision of

53"Sed aliquis ex hoc, quod speculatur, ipse solus dirigitur in speculationis finem." In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 1, qa 3, sol 3.

54Eschmann, p. 201

55"Si quia ergo id quod iam perfectum est praeeminet ei quod ad perfectionem exercetur, ita vita solitarioorum [i.e. contemplantium] . . . praeeminet vitae sociali." Ibid.
God is essentially a common good. In proof of this Father Eschmann simply refers in general to the "littera Sancti Thomae." By way of summing up, he adds that beatitude is not a common good, either objectively or formally. Not objectively, because objective beatitude is God as the bonum universale in essendo. Not formally, because formal beatitude is a personal act of the created intellect. However, extrinsically, "in virtue of the fact that there is a multitude of the Blessed sharing, as it were, in the same good, the vision might be called a certain common good which, then, is the constitutive of a certain 'society.'"

To these objections of Father Eschmann Professor De Koninck has much to say, three chapters in fact. He begins by reproducing the original objection and response from Primaúte, as quoted by Father Eschmann, and states just what he intended it to mean.

The practical order is all together ordained to the speculative order. Now perfect happiness consists in the speculative life. But the speculative life is solitary. Therefore the practical happiness of the society is ordered to the speculative happiness of the single person.

Professor De K.'s answer to this 'objection' is as follows:

We answer that the practical happiness of the community is not, of itself, ordered to the speculative happiness of the single person, but to the speculative happiness of the person insofar as a member of the community. [Here is quoted Petrus de Alvernia, In VII Pol., lect. 2.] It would be, indeed, contradictory for a common good of itself to be ordered to the single person as such. It is very true that the speculative life is solitary, but it remains true also that even the sovereign beatitude which consists in the vision of God

is essentially a common good. This apparent opposition between the solitary life and the common good which is the object of this life is explained by the fact that this felicity can be considered either from the viewpoint of those who enjoy it or from the viewpoint of the object itself of this felicity. Now this object is of itself communicable to many. Under this aspect it is the speculative good of the community.

The practical common good should be ordered to this speculative good which extends as common good to persons. The independence of persons from each other in the vision itself does not exclude from the object this universality which means, for every created intelligence, essential communicability to many. Far from excluding it or abstracting from it, the independence presupposes this communicability.

In this passage, Professor De Koninck states, he wishes to say that the speculative good of the community is the object of beat-

57 "L'ordre pratique est tout entier ordonné à l'ordre spéculatif. Or, le bonheur parfait consiste dans la vie spéculative. Mais, la vie spéculative est solitaire. Donc, le bonheur pratique de la société est ordonné au bonheur spéculatif de la personne singulière.

Professeur De K.'s answer to this 'objection' is as follows: Nous répondons que le bonheur pratique de la communauté n'est pas, par soi, ordonné au bonheur spéculatif de la personne singulière, mais au bonheur spéculatif de la personne en tant que membre de la communauté. [Here is quoted Petrus de Alvernia, In VII Pol., lect. 2.] Il serait, en effet, contradictoire qu'un bien commun fut, de soi, ordonné à la personne singulière comme telle. Il est très vrai que la vie spéculative est solitaire, mais il reste vrai aussi que, même la béatitude souveraine qui consiste dans la vision de Dieu, est essentiellement bien commun. Cette apparente opposition entre la vie solitaire et le bien commun qui est l'objet de cette vie s'explique du fait que cette félicité peut être considérée, soit de la part de ceux qui en jouissent, soit de la part de l'objet même de cette félicité. Or, cet objet est, de soi, communicable à plusieurs. Sous ce rapport, il est le bien spéculatif de la communauté. Le bien commun pratique doit être ordonné à ce bien spéculatif qui s'étend comme bien commun aux personnes. L'indépendance des personnes les unes des autres dans la vision même n'exclut pas de l'objet cette universalité qui veut dire, pour toute intelligence créée, essentielle communicabilité à plusieurs. Loin de l'exclure, ou d'en faire abstraction, l'indépendance présuppose cette communicabilité." Ibid., p. 198.
tude, and that there is no opposition between the solitude of the speculative life and the community of its object; such an opposition would appear only to those who fail to distinguish formal from objective beatitude. The question here, says Professor De Koninck, is whether the person must order himself to objective felicity, or objective felicity to himself. But to say that persons must order themselves to God as to a common good does not mean that there must be a mass movement by the community as a whole. "[T]he assecutio of this common good is [not] an assecutio communis as opposed to the assecutio singularis of the speculative intellect."58

After explaining the precise meaning of his response in Primauté, Professor De Koninck turns directly to Father Eschmann's criticism of the passage. He believes it necessary to clear up three possible misconceptions. First, since Father Eschmann in this section is writing in defense of solitude and contemplation, the reader must not infer that De Koninck is in any way slighting the speculative. Rather, apart from frequent assertions of the primacy of the speculative in the essay which Father Eschmann attacks, the second essay of Professor De Koninck's book "is entirely devoted to showing the disastrous consequences of La négation de la primauté du spéculatif."59 Second, it might be believed from

58DT, p. 77.
59Ibid., p. 74.
Father Eschmann's bracketed insertion in the text he cites from Primaúté that Professor De Koninck quotes Peter of Auvergne in the body of his writing. That is not the case. De Koninck quotes Peter of Auvergne in a footnote; he denies that the response is in any way dependent on Peter of Auvergne. "To give the proper argument for a doctrine, and to refer to an author as confirming it, are not quite the same thing." Third, in defense of his use of Peter of Auvergne, Professor De Koninck cites Ptolemy de Luca, who calls Peter, with reference to this very commentary on the Politicis, "fidelissimus discipulus ejus [Sancti Thomae]." As for his dependence on Cajetan and John of St. Thomas, "a scrutiny of the essay which Father Eschmann attacks will reveal that it contains a single quotation from Cajetan (a mere paraphrase), and five quotations from John of St. Thomas. Of the latter, only two actually appear in my own text: the first being a passage which notes the obvious distinction between common good and alien good; the second to show even the temporal common good must be publicly ordained to God."

But why, Professor De Koninck feels it necessary to explain, does he cite Peter of Auvergne at all? The reason is that Aristotle, in chapters two and three of the eighth book of the Politicis,

\[60\text{Ibid.}, p. 78.\]
\[61\text{Ibid.}, p. 79.\]
\[62\text{Ibid.}\]
refers to contemplative happiness of the community. He does not say how this can be. Since, then, there exists a Thomistic commentary on this text, it is natural to turn to it. The authority of Peter of Auvergne does not matter; the passage involved can be weighed on its own merits.

The notion of the citation from Peter of Auvergne with which Father Eschmann takes vigorous issue, and upon which as a cornerstone he claims that Professor De Koninck founds his response, is \textit{speculatio totius civitatis}. If this means anything, he says, perhaps it means a social action, group contemplation. But this is impossible. Professor De Koninck argues that \textit{speculatio totius civitatis} does have a definite meaning, and that it is not the \textit{assecutio communis} or social action which Father Eschmann would make it to be. Of course contemplation is altogether an individual act. The contribution of Peter of Auvergne is to call attention to the importance of the object in his consideration of beatitude. God, the object of contemplation, is a common good, superabundantly communicable to many intellects. God produced a manifold of intellects because He wished to communicate Himself more abundantly than would be possible if He were to communicate Himself only to a single created intellect.

Finally, because he believes that Professor De Koninck (and Peter of Auvergne, too) is advocating a "genuine social or common act" of contemplation, Father Eschmann cites two texts from the commentary on the \textit{Sentences}, in which St. Thomas states that the
assecutio communis of contemplation as a social act is impossible.

"The words IPSE SOLUS DIRIGITUR IN SPECULATIONIS FINEM and the subsequent statement of the absolute pre-eminence of the SINGULARIS ASSECUTIO of the common good--deserve to be written as a motto at the head of a treatise of Thomistic social philosophy."63

Professor De Koninck says that these texts are in no way opposed to his thesis. In fact, he uses them to confirm his own position, that God as objective beatitude is a common good.

Father Eschmann's first citation is taken from In III Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1, ad 2. Professor De Koninck supplies the whole objection and response. It will suffice here to reproduce only the major of the objection: "Bonum gentis divinius est quam bonum unius." The important thing about St. Thomas's reply, says Professor De Koninck, is that he does not distinguish the major. He could have conceded that it is true of the practical good and denied it of the speculative, but he does not.

The second citation is from In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 1, qa 3, sol. 3.

It seems that beatitude consists more in an act of the practical intellect than of the speculative intellect. For a good is more divine inasmuch as it is more common, as is evident in I Ethic., q. 1. But the good of the speculative intellect is proper to him who is engaged in speculation; the good of the practical intellect can be common to many. Therefore beatitude consists more in the practical intellect than in the speculative intellect.

In answer to the first objection: The good to which

63Eschmann, p. 200.
the speculative intellect is joined by knowledge is more common than the good to which the practical intellect is joined, insofar as the speculative intellect is separated more from the particular than the practical intellect, whose knowledge is perfected in action, which consists in singulars. But it is true that the attainment of the end to which the speculative intellect as such arrives, is proper to the one who attains this end; but the attainment of the end which the practical intellect intends can be proper and common inasmuch as someone through the practical intellect directs himself and others to the end, as is evident in the case of a ruler of many others; but anyone, by the fact that he is engaged in speculation, is directed solely to the end of speculation. The end of the speculative intellect excels the good of the practical intellect insofar as its singular attainment excels the common attainment of the good of the practical intellect; and thus the most perfect beatitude is found in the speculative intellect.64

Here, too, St. Thomas does not distinguish the major. In fact, he shows that it applies even better to the good of the speculative intellect than to the good of the practical intellect.

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64 Videtur quod beatitudo magis consistat in actu intellectus practici quam speculativi. Quanto enim aliud bonum est communius tanto est divinius, ut patet in I Ethic., cap. 1. Sed bonum intellectus speculativi est singulariter ejus qui speculatur; bonum autem intellectus practici potest esse commune multorum. Ergo magis consistit beatitudo in intellectu practico quam speculativo.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod bonum cui intellectus speculativus conjungitur per cognitionem, est communius bono cui conjungitur intellectus practicus, inquantum intellectus speculativus magis separatur a particulari quam intellectus practicus cuius cognitio in operatione perfectur, quae in singularibus consistit. Sed hoc est verum quod assecutio finis, ad quem pervenit intellectus speculativus, inquantum hujusmodi, est propria assequenti; sed assecutio finis quem intellectus practicus intendit, potest esse propria et communis, inquantum per intellectum practicum aliquis se et alios dirigit in finem, ut patet in rectore multitudinis; sed aliquis ex hoc quod speculatur, ipse singulariter dirigitur in speculationis finem. Ipse autem finis intellectus speculativus tantum praeeminet boni [sic] intellectus practici quantum singularis assecutio ejus excedit communem assecutionem boni intellectus practici; et ideo perfectissima beatitudo in intellectu speculativo consistit." DT, p. 88.
"And we must note carefully that St. Thomas calls 'communius', not the good which consists in the act of the speculative intellect, but the 'bonum qui intellectus speculativus conjungitur per cognitionem', and this is objective beatitude."65 The other thing to note about this citation is that both the assecutio communis of the practical intellect, and the singularis assecutio of the speculative intellect, which excels it, have to do with formal felicity. They are acts of the speculative and practical intellects. By failing to note the difference between the assecutio of the common good and the assecutio communis of the practical intellect Father Eschmann erroneously states that the good attained by the assecutio singularis of the speculative intellect cannot be a common good.

Professor De Koninck, at this stage of his rebuttal, does not answer directly and explicitly Father Eschmann's rejection of two main points of his response in Primaute. However, the answer is perhaps contained in his other arguments. That this is so in the case of the second point ("The sovereign beatitude which consists in the vision of God is essentially a common good") is readily apparent. As for the first point, ("The practical happiness of the community . . . [is ordered] to the speculative happiness of the person as a member of the community") this seems to be what Professor De Koninck is stressing when he says that because of its incommensurable communicability to many creatures, the divine good

65Ibid.
can be compared to the intellectual creature only as the good of the whole manifold of intellectual creatures is compared to a part. He does not answer Father Eschmann's argument that the speculative felicity of the person qua member of the community is a contradictory notion because it would involve the person's being both *in via* and *in termino*.

So much for the exposition of the major arguments of the controversy. Some of the arguments which treat more of personalism in itself than of the common good have been omitted. But all the important points scored by either side in the contest itself have been recorded here.
CHAPTER IV

CRITICISM OF THE MAJOR POSITIONS AND ARGUMENTS

We have seen what arguments Father Eschmann and Professor De Koninck have to offer in support of their positions on the common good. Now we must examine the worth of these arguments and the basic positions which they support.

THE RELATION OF THE POLITICAL COMMON GOOD TO THE EXTRINSIC AND INTRINSIC COMMON GOODS OF THE UNIVERSE

However, before evaluating the more general positions and the controversy as a whole let us consider one problem, puzzling in itself, which will help to make clear the controversy's main issues.

We recall that Professor De Koninck begins Primaute by considering the political common good. But soon, after a discussion of the general notion of the common good, there follows a series of arguments that God as our objective beatitude is a common good, and that persons are ordered to the good of the order of the universe. Father Eschmann ignores all that Professor De Koninck says about the common good in general and attacks him solely on these two issues.

The question which immediately rises in the reader's mind is
this: Why, instead of the political good, does Professor De Koninck discuss the extrinsic and intrinsic common goods of the universe, God and the order of the universe respectively? Why does Father Eschmann attack him exclusively on these issues? What is the relation between these common goods and the political common good?

Professor De Koninck says in his "In Defense of St. Thomas" that in Primaúté he wanted to use a new approach, the better to bring out the basic questions. "Instead of discussing the problem in terms of 'person' and 'society,' I approach it in the fundamental terms of 'proper good' and 'common good.'"¹

Given this knowledge of Professor De Koninck's wish to approach the problem in terms of proper good and common good, we might naturally expect that he would develop fully the notion of common good, discussing a hierarchy of common goods in order to clarify the concept. And so he does.

But more directly, it must be remembered that Professor De Koninck was writing "contre les personalistes." In his illuminating summary and commentary on Primaúté Father Baisnée mentions the personalists' insistence that the person stands even above the universe. He quotes a personalist writer on this very point.

It is not only with regard to society but also regarding the whole universe that the Personalists affirm the primacy of the person; or rather they view the order of the universe as a superstructure of persons who, in the mind of God, are

¹DT, p. 93.
not mere parts but radically independent wholes. In the words of M. Violatoux:

If it is true that in the universe, the individuals exist as parts subject to a whole and that the universe necessarily unrolls its forms through the individual actions and experiences, it is not right to say that the persons are to the universe in the relation of parts to a whole. For, if it were so, they would exist for the sake of the universe, and being turned into means they would lose their personality. If the individual exists for the sake of the universe, it is for the sake of the person that the universe exists.²

In his vindication of the primacy of the common good "contre les personnalistes" Professor De Koninck would then quite naturally be expected to treat of the common good that is the order of the universe.

Professor De Koninck is drawn to a consideration of the divine common good, among other reasons, by the necessity of an ordination to God for the preservation of even the political common good. "The common good of political society is not purely and simply the universal good, and it cannot be preserved when it is not ordered to the sovereign good."³ Even more, he believes that the totalitarian notion of the state involves a denial of God. For, as we have seen, in totalitarianism the common good is singularized; it becomes a bonum alienum. The State becomes a person pour soi, free from all subordination to a higher, common good. "The

²Baisnée, p. 72.

³"Le bien commun de la société politique n'est pas le bien purement et simplement universel, et il ne peut être conservé quand on ne l'ordonne pas au bien souverain." BC, p. 84.
totalitarian State, founded on the negation of the common good and erected into a person for itself, . . . cannot be ordered to God. The negation of the very concept of common good and of its primacy is a negation of God."  

Father Eschmann, too, believes that every investigation of the political common good demands a consideration of the soul's relation to God. "Any serious Thomistic consideration of the Problem of Person and Society must needs lead to, and terminate in, the mystery . . . of the soul, and every soul, in the face of God, and God alone."

The relation between the political common good and the common goods that are God and the order of the universe can be seen in Professor De Koninck's doctrine that in any sphere or order the person's common good is superior to his proper good. It is better not only in itself but for him. In any case, where the common good seems to be subordinated to an individual good, this is because of the individual's ordination to a common good in a higher order.

Besides, if the rational creature cannot be circumscribed altogether to a subordinate common good, to the good of the family, for example, or to the good of the political society, that is not because its individual good, taken as such, is greater; it is because of its ordination to a superior common good to which it is principally ordered. In this case, the common good is not sacrificed to the good of the individual

4"L'Etat totalitaire, fondé sur la négation du bien commun et érigé en personne pour soi, . . . ne peut pas être referé à Dieu. La négation de la raison même de bien commun et de sa primauté est une négation de Dieu." Ibid., p. 77.

5Eschmann, p. 203.
insofar as individual, but to the good of the individual in-
sofar as he is ordered to a more universal common good. The
individuality alone cannot be the reason per se. In every
sphere the common good is superior. 6

An address by Father John F. McCormich, S.J. to the American
Catholic Philosophical Association in 1939, though not from the
viewpoint of the person's common good and proper good, does show
this hierarchy of the various goods of man. Since all authority
is from God, man does not lose his dignity by being a subject.

The created thing is by its nature dependent. It holds in
the universe the place and the rank that correspond to the na-
ture its Creator has endowed it with . . . . All this speaks of
subordination and subjection. It is subject to its Cre-
tor as the source and as the end of its existence; it is sub-
ject to creatures in so far as in the constitution of nature
some creatures are necessary means to the attainment of its
end. Now in the constitution of nature it is discoverable
that the social organization which we call the political com-
unity or the state is necessary for man, for without it he
would not be entirely human. 7

As for a conflict between the political common good and the good of
the individual, it would seem to Father McCormick that the true
political common good cannot be opposed to the good of the indi-
vidual. Referring to S.T. II-II, 104, 5, he says:

6 "Par ailleurs, si la créature raisonnable ne peut se borner
entièrement à un bien commun subordonné, au bien de la famille,
par exemple, ou au bien de la société politique, ce n'est pas parce
que son bien singulier, pris comme tel, est plus grand: c'est à
cause de son ordination à un bien commun supérieur auquel elle est
principalement ordonnée. Dans ce cas, le bien commun n'est pas
sacrifié au bien de l'individu en tant qu'individu, mais au bien de
l'individu en tant que celui-ci est ordonné à un bien commun plus
universal. La seule singularité ne peut en être la raison per se.

7 John F. McCormick, S.J., "The Individual and the State,"
ACPA, XV (December 1939), 15.
In two instances the subject will not be bound to obey: first, when a higher superior intervenes with a command, and secondly, when the subject is not under the authority of the superior in regard to the matter commanded. But of course, every individual is under the authority of the community in what pertains to the command [sic] good, and it is hardly conceivable that a higher superior—God, in this instance—would countermand what is for the common good, which after all is his own ordinance. The freedom of the subject from the authority of the community, then, would seem to be limited to the case in which this authority commands something that is not for the common good. Otherwise it seems that, as far as the common good is concerned, the individual is simply subordinate to the authority of the community. And after all, if we reflect that the common good is the provision of nature—and therefore ultimately of God—for the good of the individual, would it not be monstrous to suppose that the individual had the freedom to pursue his own ends regardless of the common good?\(^8\)

Man's absolutely ultimate end is God, the supreme common good. Man attains this end by assimilation, by becoming like to God insofar as he can. Since man is a social being, his very perfection is social. His proximate end is to perfect himself through social cooperation. This proximate end is further ordered to the intrinsic common good of the universe.

Johannes Messner has succinctly stated the relation of the political common good, the order of the universe, and the divine common good:

Indeed, like every other actuality of order, society in effecting its common good becomes part of the order of the universe as intended by the Creator and designed in His creation, to be completed in coöperation by men. In the realization of its order of the common good, society becomes, as St. Augustine points out, part of the beauty of the universe, since the idea of beauty is inseparable from that of order. Social

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\(^8\)Ibid., p. 19.
reality even outlasts temporal existence since men's association in the pursuit of their ends is reflected in their consummation of these ends in the life to come. Of that life the fundamental constituent of all human communal life, that is, love, . . . will form an integral part and thus a lasting reality and will enter into the union of all with the communi et immutabili bono (St. Augustine). Thus that life will essentially be community life. 9

THE PROBLEM OF THE CONTROVERSY

In the light of the third chapter and of the immediately preceding section it becomes evident that the main question is less a problem of the person and society than of the person and his common good. Now we must consider how Professor De Koninck and Father Eschmann understood the problem and how this affected the thesis.

In his rebuttal article Professor De Koninck states explicitly just what the problem is that he was trying to solve in Primauté. Although he wished to discuss the relations between the person and society, he found it more convenient to approach his subject along the more basic concepts of proper good and common good. Simply to compare the importance of the person with that of society, to judge what each is rather than what its good is, would be to confuse the issue. For it is immediately evident that any society is only an accidental being with moral unity; it has no substantial existence. It is of course real, but has only acci-

dental unity. The person is a substance; and in the order of beings, substance is higher.

Instead of discussing the problem in terms of 'person' and 'society', I approach it in the fundamental terms of 'proper good' and 'common good'. Ultimately, person and society are not to be judged by what they are absolutely, but by what is their perfection, i.e. by what is their good; that is the only way in which Aristotle and St. Thomas ever discussed this problem. To look upon the absolute comparison of person and society as the most basic consideration is distinctly modern. From such a point of view, the problem of person and society quite naturally becomes the question: is the person better than society? instead of: is the proper good of the person better than his common good? When the problem itself has been so distorted, what can be expected in the solution?10

So the problem which Professor De Koninck faces is not: Which is greater, the good of society and of the universe or the good of the person? Rather it is: Which is greater, the common good of the person or the proper good of the person?

When the problem is put improperly, Professor De Koninck says, in terms merely of person and society, the answer tends to be either totalitarian or egoistic and individualistic.

The totalitarian solution is that the individual person is ordered and subjected to society. We are inclined, in rejecting this doctrine, to swing to the opposite extreme; but if we prescind from the common good of the persons which is the final, and therefore first cause of society, we are left with a mere aggregate of individuals. Now, in this formal consideration, each and every one of that group could never be more than an alter ego, and the group itself could never be more than an aggregate, a mere unum coagertionem of alter ego's.11

10DT, pp. 92-93.
11Ibid., pp. 93-94.
It should be added here, however, that although Professor De Koninck's approach to the problem is sound and does avoid much confusion, nevertheless in any consideration of person and society their natures as well as their ends must be taken into account. A certain minimum knowledge of their natures must be had if their ends are to be known.

Father Eschmann makes no such explicit statement of the basic problem as he sees it. This must then be determined from his general approach. His article is written in defense of the Christian personalist doctrine of person and society; and it is in terms of person and society that he seems to approach the problem raised by Professor De Koninck. It is for this reason that Father Eschmann considers Professor De Koninck's position "contradictory and unintelligible" and a danger to the integrity and independence of the person. He does not seem to be aware of the exact problem of Primaúte. Consequently, he brings up objections which indicate that he believes Professor De Koninck's position to be that man exists for the State. This is why Professor De Koninck complains, "Father Eschmann will speak as if I held the supreme common good, to which all else must be subordinated, was none other than the common good of mere political society." Given Father Eschmann's understanding of the problem, such a reaction to Professor De Koninck's doctrine might be expected. "When we state the fundamental problem

\[12\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 92.}\]
in terms of person and society, it is quite natural that the sub-
ordination of the personal good to the common good should be in-
terpreted as the collectivist and totalitarian subjection of the
individual to the mass."13

We might, however, ask whether this is fair to Father Esch-
mann. The context of Primaauté (especially as set by the Foreword)
is about the social and political common good. In his rebuttal
article Professor De Koninck indicates precisely what his problem
is. He was not so clear in Primaauté. Father Eschmann is hardly
at fault, then, for considering the problem in terms of person and
society.

BASIC POSITIONS

Now that we have considered the basic problem of the contro-
versy, we must turn to the answers to this problem, that is, to
the basic positions taken by Professor De Koninck and Father Esch-
mann. We will try to note especially the fundamental differences
between these answers, and the degree of clash or meeting of minds
between these two authors.

At the same time we will be able to include some indications
of Jacques Maritain's opinion on these positions. It was mentioned
in Chapter II that, although Maritain repeats most of Father Esch-
mann's arguments against Professor De Koninck, he is not so opposed

13Ibid., pp. 94-95.
to De Koninck's doctrine as is Father Eschmann. This may be because he grasps Professor De Koninck's meaning better than does Father Eschmann. At any rate, since Maritain does have some part in this controversy, it may be well to mention some of the fundamental points on which he and Professor De Koninck are in agreement.14

The three main answers to Professor De Koninck's problem are concerned with the nature of the common good, the relation of persons to the universe, and their relation to God.

The Nature of the Common Good

As will appear, many of the differences between Professor De Koninck and Father Eschmann are the result of Father Eschmann's failure to understand his opponent's position. It is true that behind their words, they must and do agree on many important points regarding man's ordination to God and to the order of the universe. Nevertheless the whole controversy cannot be reduced to a lis verbórum. There are several fundamental differences between Professor De Koninck's and Father Eschmann's understanding of the nature of the common good which influence their positions on the order of man to God and to the order of the universe. It would not be accurate to say that these latter two positions follow entirely from their notions of the common good, however.

14 Curiously, Maritain gives no sign of having read De Koninck's article, "In Defense of Saint Thomas."
Before comparing Professor De Koninck's and Father Eschmann's positions on the nature of the common good, let us discuss briefly some notes of the common good which are generally agreed upon by Catholic writers. A good is common if it is communicable to many, as the music of a dance band, the peace and prosperity of a community, or sunlight. A good is proper if it cannot be communicated to others, as my health or my responsibility. The same good may be common under one aspect and proper under another. Thus an idea, as subjective and perfecting me, is proper to me. The same idea, however, as representative and communicable to others, is a common good. Just as the concept of good is analogous, so also the concept of common good is analogous.

Again, before comparing the two authors' positions on the nature of the common good, there are several points of Professor De Koninck's doctrine, given little attention in the controversy, which yet do deserve mention.

First, can there be a conflict between the proper good and the true common good? According to Professor De Koninck, "The proper good is not opposed to the common good."\footnote{Le bien propre ne s'oppose pas au bien commun.} This is developed and confirmed as De Koninck goes on to show that the common good can not be a bonum alienum. If it were a bonum alienum, as he thinks the personalists take it, there would be a real conflict between the proper and common good. Heinrich Rommen explains this
relation lucidly when he treats of the sacrifice of one's life for the common good.

The sacrifice of one's life can have meaning only if by it man serves his own good, too. That would mean that in reality there is no conflict between the common good and the rightly understood private good. The sacrifice is only obedience to a law that is even higher again than the common good, to God's law. Thus we can truly say that in the ultimate sense common good and individual good coincide though they do not absorb each other. The actual good order is the best guaranty of the private good of the individual, and the righteous realization of the private good by the citizen is to the advantage of the common good. To such a degree is this so, that any grave violation of the private good of an individual by another is a violation of the common good with the reaction of punishment on the part of authority, the aim of which is the protection of the common good. Though man's social nature reaches its perfection in his becoming a citizen, man does not become a mere part of the state, but as a member retains his inalienable personal independence, his substance. Similarly the qualitative difference and the prevalence of the common good do not do away with the private good. The common good is to be conceived like the health and the vitality of the organism, which are different from the members but are of benefit to each of them as something animating them, connecting them so that each participates in it, and still no member has it wholly and separately.16

Can a common good be also a proper good? This question is like the first. For Professor De Koninck the same good can be common under one aspect and proper under another, as we have noted in reviewing some of the commonly agreed upon marks of the common good. The common good is not a bonum alienum. It is the good of every member of a multitude.

There is the proper good to which every being tends, its perfection. There are also the goods to which beings tend insofar as

16 Heinrich A. Rommen, The State in Catholic Thought (St. Louis, 1945), pp. 326-327.
they tend to their perfection. In some of these goods many beings may find their perfection; they are common goods. The participation in them by each being is a proper good. "The good is that which all things desire insofar as they desire their perfection. This perfection is for each of them its own good—bonum suum—and, in this sense, its good is a proper good. But then the proper good is not opposed to the common good. Indeed, the proper good to which a being naturally tends, the bonum suum, can be understood in different ways, according to the different goods in which it finds its perfection." 17 Here De Koninck cites C. G., III, c. 24, showing how a good can be proper by reason of the individual, of the species, of the genus, or of the similitude of principiates to a principle. From this he concludes, "Hence the common good does not have the character of an alien good—bonum alienum—as in the case of the good of others taken as such." 18

Another question developed by Professor De Koninck but not taken up by Father Eichmann concerns the order of the universe and man’s knowledge of it. Here Professor De Koninck is still trying

17 "Le bien est ce que toutes choses désirent en tant qu'elles désirent leur perfection. Cette perfection est pour chacune d'elles son bien—bonum suum—et, en ce sens, son bien est un bien propre. Mais alors, le bien propre ne s'oppose pas au bien commun. En effet, le bien propre auquel tend naturellement un être, le 'bonum suum', peut s'entendre de diverses manières, selon les divers biens dans lesquels il trouve sa perfection." BG, pp. 9-10.

18 "Des lors, le bien commun n'a pas raison de bien étranger—bonum alienum—comme dans le cas du bien d'autrui pris comme tel." Ibid., p. 11.
to show that a common good is not a *bonum alienum* but a better good for the person than a mere private good. He proceeds according to the hierarchy of knowledge, noting that the knowledge of brutes is limited to the sensible and hence they can have an appetite only for the singular, sensible, private good. Man's knowledge on the other hand is universal. He can know the whole universe and its order, which is the intrinsic common good of the universe. Man's proper good, then, inasmuch as his knowledge is intellectual and universal, is the good of the order of the universe. Thus the proper good of man as an intellectual substance is the common good that is the order of the universe as possessed in knowledge. For a common good as communicated is a proper good, and the whole order of the universe is, as it were, summed up in man by knowledge.

Beings are more perfect in proportion as their appetite extends to a good that is more remote than their merely individual good. The knowledge of brutes being bound by the sensible individual, their appetite cannot extend beyond the sensible, private, individual good: explicit action for a common good supposes a universal knowledge. Since the intellectual substance is *comprehensiva totius entis*, and since it is one part of the universe in which the perfection of the whole universe can exist by knowledge, its most proper good insofar as it is an intellectual substance is the good of the universe, a good essentially common. The intellectual substance is not this good in the way it is the universe by knowledge. . . . If the good were in the one loving it as the thing known is in the knower, we would be ourselves the good of the universe.

Consequently inferior beings differ from superior beings in this, that their most perfect known good is identified with their individual good, and that the good which they can
diffuse is restricted to the good of the individual.\textsuperscript{19}

From these considerations it would seem, though Professor De Koninck does not draw this conclusion explicitly, that he considers the order of the universe to be greater formally, that is, as known by man, than materially.

Concretely, what would seem to be the supreme proper and common goods according to Professor De Koninck? God, the extrinsic common good of the universe, is the supreme common good, and possession of God by knowledge and love in the beatific vision is the supreme proper good.

Another question that will help to a better understanding of Professor DeKoninck's doctrine on the common good is this: Why does he not answer totalitarianism by saying that man has a proper good that is greater than any common good of society? Certainly he holds that this is true. He does not state that every common

\textsuperscript{19}"Les êtres seront plus parfaits à proportion que leur appétit s'étendra à un bien plus éloigné de leur seul bien singulier. La connaissance des brutes étant liée au singulier sensible, leur appétit ne pourra s'étendre qu'au bien singulier sensible et privé: l'action explicite pour un bien commun suppose une connaissance universelle. La substance intellectuelle étant 'comprehensiva totius entis', étant une partie de l'univers dans laquelle peut exister, selon la connaissance, la perfection de l'univers tout entier, son bien le plus propre en tant qu'elle est une substance intellectuelle sera le bien de l'univers, bien essentiellement commun. La substance intellectuelle n'est pas ce bien comme elle est l'univers selon la connaissance. . . . Si, comme le connu, le bien était dans l'aimant, nous serions à nous-mêmes le bien de l'univers.

Par conséquent, les êtres inférieurs diffèrent des supérieurs en ce que leur bien connu le plus parfait s'identifie à leur bien singulier, et en ce que le bien qu'ils peuvent répandre est restreint au bien de l'individu."

\textit{Ibid.}, p. 12.
good is greater than every proper good, but merely that every com-
mon good is greater in its own sphere. It is true though that this
is not the answer to totalitarianism which seems most important to
him. He is, as has been seen, trying to restore the true notion
of the common good which totalitarianism has distorted. There is
nothing to fear in the primacy of the common good as correctly un-
derstood, for it is not a bonum alienum. It is a good communica-
table to every individual. Moreover, behind all this, though he does
not put it in so many words, seems to be Professor De Koninck's re-
alization that man is a social being. Even in heaven he remains a
social being. Men are joined to God by caritas. They are joined
to each other by caritas. Caritas is the basis of contemplation,
which is the proper good of this social being which is man. This
contemplation supposes a communicable object, God, and an actual
communication in that object. As Messner puts it, "Of that life
the fundamental constituent of all human communal life, that is,
love, . . . will form an integral part and thus a lasting reality
and will enter into the union of all with the commun et immutabili-
bone (St. Augustine). Thus that life will essentially be commu-

20 Messner, p. 143.
would say. For a subjective good, since it is not truly communicable, is not really common. It is logically common in that it can be predicated of many subjects, as thought and health can be predicated of many men. But it is not a good which is numerically one and really common. It is, according to Professor De Koninck, commune in praedicando only.

The following notions characterize the nature of the common good according to Professor De Koninck: A good is really (not merely logically) common if it is communicable to many, whether it is actually communicated or not; communicability is the principle of its excellence. The common good is not a mere collection of private goods, nor is it the good of the multitude considered as a single entity; it is not a bonum alienum. Numerically one, it is really common and communicable to every member of a multitude.

In any sphere the common good is superior to the proper or private good. This is of course not to say that every common good is superior to every proper good.

Every end is a good and every good can be an end; the type of causality exercised by the common good is final causality. It is by knowing and loving the common good that rational creatures order themselves to it.

Since one common good, e.g., the political, is a finis efficacendus or a finis perficiendus, and another, e.g., God as objective beatitude, is only a finis consequendus, a common good can be the object of either the practical or the speculative intellect.
Such is Professor De Koninck's notion of the common good. It should be pointed out that even though he explicitly disavows considering the problem in terms of person and society, his omission of any positive doctrine on the political common good is disappointing, to say the least. His consideration of the political common good merely tells us what it is not.

Father Eschmann says nothing directly about the nature of the common good. Yet, from the third chapter, it would appear that he bases many of his arguments on the assumption that the common good defended by Professor De Koninck is a bonum alienum. It is doubtful that Father Eschmann would want to hold such a doctrine, that the common good is a bonum alienum. Yet some of his objections do seem to take this as at least an implicit assumption.

He is opposed to the "absolute" primacy of the common good which he accuses Professor De Koninck of advocating. By arguing from the case of one proper good (beatitude) which is superior to the political common good, he uses what Professor De Koninck calls a transgression of genera, comparing a common good of one sphere with a proper good of a higher sphere.

His use of bonum universale in essendo and bonum universale in causando indicates that he considers the causality exercised by the common good to be efficient causality. His objections to speculatio totius civitatis include the assumption that the common good is the object of the practical intellect only. His proposal of the proper sense in which God can be called a common good seems to
suppose that a good to be common must be actually communicated to the members of the multitude.

These differences on the nature of the common good are real and fundamental. Professor De Koninck's notion of the common good is the premise on which he builds the rest of his doctrine. Father Eschmann does not explicitly formulate the theory of the nature of the common good which we have just attributed to him. But he does found his objections against the rest of Professor De Koninck's doctrine on these notes of the common good which, he seems to suppose, Professor De Koninck shares with him.

The following chart will set off sharply the fundamental differences between Professor De Koninck and Father Eschmann on the nature of the common good:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>De Koninck</th>
<th>-- Common Good --</th>
<th>Eschmann</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Supreme in each genus.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Vs. &quot;absolute&quot; primacy;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>transgression of genera.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Final causality.</td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Efficient causality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Object of practical or</td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Object of practical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>speculative intellect.</td>
<td></td>
<td>intellect only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Communicable.</td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Must be actually communicated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers one to three underlie De Koninck's and Eschmann's positions on the relation of persons to the order of the universe; numbers three to five, the question of objective beatitude as a common good. When we consider these questions, we will see how Professor De Koninck's and Father Eschmann's positions were influenced by their notions of the nature of the common good.
Jacques Maritain sees more clearly than Father Eschmann the main points of Primaúte. He understands the nature of the common good in much the same way as does Professor De Koninck. Regarding the general notion of the common good, then, he agrees that the common good is superior to the private good if both are considered in the same sphere or genus. "No one more than St. Thomas has emphasized the primacy of the common good in the practical or political order of the life of the city, as in every order, where, in relation to a same category of good, the distinction between the private and common good is found." 21

The Relation of Persons to the Order of the Universe

Regarding the relation of persons to the common good that is the order of the universe, Professor De Koninck's position is this: The total order of the universe most perfectly represents God's perfection. The greatest perfection within the universe is not the individual persons taken separately, but the perfection of the total order of the universe. To say that "within the universe itself, the persons are willed only for the good of the order of the universe" is not to make of the universe a kind of super individual to whom God wills the enjoyment of all things. Rather, the good that is the universe is the most perfect final cause God has made. Therefore every part of the universe, whether or not it is a per-

21Maritain, pp. 18-19.
son, is ordered to this good of the universe insofar as "each creature exists for the perfection of the whole universe."\textsuperscript{22}

In this brief statement of Professor De Koninck's position appear several indications of the influence of his doctrine of the nature of the common good. The intrinsic common good of the universe that is its order is really common; it is not a \textit{bonum alienum}, a "kind of super individual to whom God wills the enjoyment of all things." The intrinsic common good of the universe is supreme within its own sphere, that is, "within the universe itself"; it is not supreme when another higher sphere is considered, such as the relation of the person to God. The causality of a common good is final causality; the order of the universe is the most perfect final cause God has made.

The doctrine which Professor De Koninck attacks in \textit{Primauté} is that which makes the greatest perfection within the universe consist primarily and absolutely in the individual persons taken as separate wholes; thus the perfection of the order of the universe would be secondary. "They would have it rather that the order of the universe was only a superstructure of persons which God wills, not as parts, but as radically independent wholes; and it would be only in the second place that these wholes would be parts."\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{22}\textit{[S]ingulae creaturae sunt propter perfectionem totius universi.} \textit{S.T., I, 65, 2o.}

\textsuperscript{23}On voudrait plutôt que l'ordre de l'univers ne fut qu'une
It would seem at first glance that Father Eschmann directly answers this position of Professor De Koninck when he writes of persons, "They are, first, through a personal relation, ordained to God as He is in Himself. Only then, and second—since God is also the Creator of a universe—they are parts, i.e. formal, constitutive parts of that whole to which these substances, each one in its own proper way, will bring the divinely appointed order." But Father Eschmann does not approach this problem in the same way as does Professor De Koninck. Professor De Koninck is considering the relation of persons within the universe to the intrinsic common good of the universe which is its order. Father Eschmann goes beyond the limits of this consideration and compares persons to their ultimate end. When he does this, he is guilty of a "transgression of genera." He has moved his comparison from the sphere in which the order of the universe is supreme to a higher order. From the paragraph which concludes his section on the relation of the person to the order of the universe, it seems that Father Eschmann assumes that Professor De Koninck approaches the problem from the same point of view. It also indicates that Father Eschmann takes "cosmos" as the material universe rather than as the whole universe of which man is a part. As used by Professor De Koninck, however,

supérstructure de personnes que Dieu veut, non pas commes parties, mais comme toute radicalement indépendants: et ce ne serait qu'en second que ces toute seraient des parties." BC, p. 27.

24 Eschmann, p. 192.
the order of the universe includes not only the physical order, but the order of all things, including man's political actions, to God. Father Eschmann's charge that Professor De Koninck may be reviving "the old pagan blasphemy of a divine cosmos" seems to take the order of the universe as a bonum alienum.

The most essential and the dearest aim of Thomism is to make sure that the personal contact of all intellectual creatures with God, as well as their personal subordination to God, be in no way interrupted. Everything else—the whole universe and every social institution—must ultimately minister to this purpose; everything must foster and strengthen and protect the conversation of the soul, every soul, with God. It is characteristically Greek and pagan to interpose the universe between God and intellectual creatures. Is it necessary to remind Thomists that they should not, in any way whatever, revive the old pagan blasphemy of a divine cosmos?25

Professor De Koninck states that the problem in this second part of his thesis is whether the good that is the universe is the most perfect final cause that God has made. Father Eschmann's whole approach confirms De Koninck's charge that "he confuses the good of the persons that is the universe, with the good that is the persons; he confuses the persons as contributing to the essential perfection of the universe (which perfection is, within this order, their finis oujus gratia) with the persons considered as 'for whom' (finis qui) is the perfection of the universe."26

Professor De Koninck's distinction focuses the problem clearly: The persons as contributing to the essential perfection of the

25Ibid.
26DT, p. 41.
universe must be distinguished from the persons considered as the finis cui of the perfection of the universe. In this latter respect persons differ from irrational creation. Each creature exists for the perfection of the whole universe. But persons are superior to irrational creatures in this, that they can attain their end, God, explicitly by knowing and loving him. "It can be seen by that, that the more perfect a being is, the more it is related to the common good and the more it acts principally for this good, which is better not only in itself but also for it. Rational creatures, persons, are distinguished from irrational beings in this, that they are more ordered to the common good and that they can act expressly for it."

Professor De Koninck might have mentioned here, as he does elsewhere, that persons have a different relation to the order of the universe than do irrational creatures, because persons give that order a formal existence in their knowledge of it.

St. Thomas similarly distinguishes the different ordinations of persons in a beautiful passage in the Summa Theologiae. There, after stating that the creatures lower than man exist for man, that

27"Singulae creaturae sunt propter perfectionem totius universi." S.T., I, 65, 2 q.

28"On voit par la que, plus un être est parfait, plus il dit rapport au bien commun, et plus il agit principalement pour ce bien qui est, non seulement en soi, mais pour lui, le meilleur. Les créatures raisonnables, les personnes, se distinguent des êtres irraisonnables, en ce qu'elles sont davantage ordonnées au bien commun et qu'elles peuvent agir expressément pour lui." BC, p. 14.
every creature, man included, exists for the perfection of the whole universe, and that the whole universe is ordered to God's glory as an imitation of the divine goodness, he adds that rational creatures have God as their end in a very special way; they can attain Him by their own operation, by knowing and loving Him.29

And Jacques Maritain agrees with both St. Thomas and Professor De Koninck when he writes that "absolutely speaking, the intellectual substance is loved and willed for the order of the universe of creation before being loved and willed for itself. This in no wise hinders it, in contrast to irrational beings, from being really for itself and referred directly to God."30

The Relation of Persons to God as a Common Good

Professor De Koninck's position on the order of persons to God is that individual persons are ordered to the ultimate separated good insofar as it is a common good. To fill out his basic position on God as our common good, it will be helpful to consider some other statements which he makes in the same section of Pri-

29"Secundo autem creaturae ignobiliiores sunt propter nobilior-es, sicut creaturae quae sunt infra hominem, sunt propter hominem. Ulterius autem, singulae creaturae sunt propter perfectionem totius universi. Ulterius autem, totum universum, cum singulis suis par-tibus, ordinatur in Deum sicut in finem, inquantum in eis per quandam imitationem divina bonitas repraesentatur ad gloriam Dei; quam-vis creaturae rationales speciali quodam modo supra hoc habeant finem Deum, quam attingere possunt sua operatione, cognoscendo et amando." S.T., I, 65, 2 c.

30Maritain, pp. 7-8, n. 7.
God is the most universal common good and should be loved for Himself. God cannot be the particular, private good of the individual person because the person is himself the principal object of the love of his individual good. "A man has a proper good insofar as he is an individual person; and as for the love regarding this good, each man is for himself the principal object of love."  

By reason of the universality and superabundant communicability of God's goodness we, as parts of the whole manifold of intellectual substances, are ordered to Him as to a common good. "It is then as a part of a whole that we are ordered to the greatest of all goods which can be most ours only in its communicability to others. If the divine good were formally 'a proper good of man as he is an individual person', we would be ourselves the measure of this good, which is very properly an abomination."  

In this question, whether God as our objective beatitude is a common good, it is the communicability of the common good which most influences Professor De Koninck's position. A good is common if it is communicable to many. God's infinite goodness is super-

31"Est autem quoddam bonum proprium alicujus hominis in quantum est singularis persona; et quantum ad dilectionem respicientem hoc bonum, unusquisque est sibi principale objectum dilectionis." Q.D. de Car., 4 ad 2.  
32"C'est donc bien en tant que partie d'un tout que nous sommes ordonnés au plus grand de tous les biens qui ne peut être le plus notre que dans sa communicabilité aux autres. Si le bien divin était formellement 'un bien propre de l'homme en tant qu'il est une personne singulière', nous serions nous-mêmes la mesure de ce bien, ce qui est très proprement une abomination." BC, p. 25.
abundantly communicable to a multitude of persons. It is on this very point, as we shall see, that Maritain agrees with De Koninck.

We have already seen in the third chapter Professor De Koninck's dependence on the other marks of the common good, that its causality is final and that it can be the object of the speculative as well as of the practical intellect.33

Fundamentally, Father Eschmann opposes this part of Professor De Koninck's thesis because he understands De Koninck to deny that our ordination to God is based upon the fact that God is the bonum universale. Father Eschmann is perfectly correct in pointing out that "our ordination to God is based upon the fact that God is the most perfect and supreme good, the bonum per se."34 But again, he is fighting phantoms. For Professor De Koninck agrees with this, though he would add that we are ordered to God, the bonum per se, because it is the essential communicability of the sumnum bonum which makes us and all creation possible.

In fairness to Father Eschmann we should add that the most obvious meaning of bonum universale would be an intrinsic goodness had by all. In this case it would be universale in praedicando. Since this is not De Koninck's meaning, it is not entirely Father Eschmann's fault that he misses his target.

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33 See pp. 42-45, 47-48 for the final causality of the common good; pp. 57-60 for the common good as object of the practical or speculative intellect.

34 Eschmann, p. 193.
Father Eschmann's approach to the whole question is influenced, Professor De Koninck thinks, by the assumption that common good as applied to God means God as the efficient and exemplary cause of all things. Although it remains possible that Father Eschmann included final causality in his bonum commune in causando, nevertheless, from the way he employs the term in his arguments, and because he makes no explicit mention of final causality, Professor De Koninck's interpretation seems correct. Father Eschmann's other main arguments against Professor De Koninck's position are based on his own doctrine of the nature of the common good, that its causality is efficient and exemplary, that it must be actually communicated to be common, and that it is the object of the practical intellect only. Also, it must be mentioned that, whereas Professor De Koninck is talking mostly about objective beatitude, Father Eschmann considers almost exclusively formal beatitude (and not without reason, since this controversy started as a question of the political common good and therefore of human activity.

Again we see that Maritain agrees with Professor De Koninck on an important point. For although he says that in beatitude the

37 Pp. 45-46.
38 Pp. 49-60.
law of the primacy of the common good over the personal good comes to an end in a certain sense, he adds, "In another sense, this law always holds; in the sense that the infinite communicability of the incomprehensible Essence forever transcends the communication which, through its vision, the creature receives of it." 39

At this stage the main work of the thesis is accomplished. The stated purpose was not to solve, but rather to sharpen the points of difference. The opponents differ from the very start, on the nature of the common good. In Primauté Professor De Koninck stated his position on the common good (which later received needed clarification in his "In Defense of Saint Thomas") and then proceeded to apply this doctrine to the relation of persons to the intrinsic and extrinsic common goods of the universe. In Father Eschmann's mind the nature of the common good is radically different. He attributed his own notion of the common good to Professor De Koninck. Understanding Professor De Koninck's positions on the relation of persons to God and the order of the universe in the light of his own concept of the common good, it was not surprising that he should find the doctrines objectionable. Nearly all of Father Eschmann's difficulties stem from this initial assumption, that Professor De Koninck's understanding of the nature of the common good was the same as his own. This was the main point of difference, and the cause of the others.

39 Maritain, p. 79, n. 48.
It now remains to consider the arguments used to bolster the opposing positions. Here too will appear the influence of the opposing theories of the nature of the common good, and of Father Eschmann's erroneous assumption.

PARTICULAR ARGUMENTS

The following questions may be asked at every stage of each author's reasoning: If he bases his proof on a Thomistic text, does he correctly interpret St. Thomas's words? And if he does understand the text, does he apply it correctly? What, if any, are his implicit presuppositions? How does he understand the terms? Does Father Eschmann understand Professor De Koninck? If so, are his arguments against him valid? Does Professor De Koninck understand Father Eschmann's objections? Are his replies to these objections valid?

Therefore, the first of Father Eschmann's arguments to be considered critically, along with Professor De Koninck's response to it, is the passage cited from Divini Redemptoris. Father Eschmann neglects to say just how he intends that this passage be taken, unless he means nothing more specific than that "the language at least of recent papal utterances favours the personalist ideas as expounded by Maritain." He does not say how he means to use this against Professor De Koninck. Consequently, although this is

40 Eschmann, p. 186.
no guarantee of Father Eschmann's meaning, Professor De Koninck seems perfectly justified in stating just how the text could be used against his position, and then making his response along that line.41

Persons as Principal Parts of the Universe

Against Father Eschmann's objection that the notion of principal parts materially constituting the universe is absurd, Professor De Koninck argues that a principal part or a formal part is still a part.42 If it is not id ex quo, why call it a part? Perhaps Father Eschmann understands by "materiellement" something different from what appears in his or Professor De Koninck's text, but he fails to show that the notion of principal parts materially constituting some whole is absurd. He seems to take the notion too narrowly and to assume that only a purely material being can be a material part.

Use of Thomistic Texts

Father Eschmann's next objection is that Professor De Koninck used the wrong texts to prove his doctrine on the relation of persons to the order of the universe.43 Regarding Father Eschmann's

41 Pp. 25-27.
42 Pp. 29-31.
43 Pp. 31-32.
criticism on the methodology of exegesis, it is true that when there are explicit or ex professo statements on a question, these should not be neglected while only oblique and incidental remarks are taken into account. It is not that incidental remarks cannot be used in any way to understand the author's meaning, but that they can very easily be misinterpreted according to the interpreter's preconceived notions since they provide little doctrinal context from which the point in question can be understood.

Nevertheless, Professor De Koninck's reply is true, that St. Thomas says quite clearly in these texts that the order of the universe is the highest created good. Father Eschmann speaks as if the truth of St. Thomas's premises were irrelevant to the conclusions. St. Thomas's words could hardly be more clear. Father Eschmann says that in these texts no proper doctrine on the common good is taught; but what does bonum mean, and what is the good to which omne particulare bonum is ordered as to a common good? Father Eschmann seems to assume that the whole article must be concerned with the position and rank of persons within the universe in order for it to yield any light on that point.

In this same section Father Eschmann adds that persons are first ordered to God and then to the order of the universe. He cites here a sentence from the Contra Gentiles in which St. Thomas says that intellectual substances have a further ordination to God and to the order of the universe. If Father Eschmann intends to use this passage against Professor De Koninck's thesis, to prove
that it is not true that persons are willed only for the good of the order of the universe, he seems to go beyond what St. Thomas says: "However, when we say that intellectual substances are ordered for their own sake by divine providence, we do not mean that they are not further referred to God and to the perfection of the universe."44 Perhaps Father Eschmann overlooks that Professor De Koninck says that within the universe, persons are ordered to the perfection of the universe. He does not say that this ordination is ultimately to the order of the universe, but Father Eschmann paraphrases him in just this way: "For, is not the ultimate reason why God has created the intellectual beings or persons none other than exactly the order and common good of the universe?"45

A Thomistic Distinction

The next controverted point is the extensive-intensive distinction from St. Thomas which Father Eschmann quotes against Professor De Koninck, and which was presented thoroughly in the third chapter of this thesis.46 After recalling the reasons why God made things many and varied, Professor De Koninck demonstrates that Father Eschmann misinterprets the Thomistic distinction. The fact

44"Per hoc autem quod dicimus substantias intellectuales propter se a divina providentia ordinari, non intelligimus quod ipsa ulterior non referuntur in Deum et ad perfectionem universi." C.Q., III, 112.
45Eschmann, p. 187.
46Pp. 32-36.
that Father Eschmann misunderstands this text is, we think, apparent from the exposition of this section in the third chapter. We might consider, however, why Father Eschmann misunderstands it.

He fails to understand St. Thomas's answer because he fails to understand the question. According to Father Eschmann, the problem raised by St. Thomas is this: "Which is more like God, i.e. more to the image of God, the whole universe, or one single intellectual creature?" But the question which St. Thomas faces is stated in the title of the article: "Whether the image of God is found in irrational creatures." As St. Thomas uses "image," the question can be put, "Whether the image of God is found properly in irrational creatures." In the Marietti edition, footnotes six and seven, referring to I, 45, 7 c, explain that effects which represent only the causality of the cause are said to be improperly the image of the cause; effects which represent the cause according to the likeness of its form are said to be properly the image of the cause. It might be added that in I, 93, 2 ad 1, St. Thomas says that wherever there is similitude, there is aliquid de ratione imaginis. But this is not necessarily a proper image.

Father Eschmann makes the mistake which St. Thomas warns against in the last half of his response to the third objection; he puts the opposition between intellectual creatures and the uni-

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47 Eschmann, p. 190.
48 S.T., I, 93, 2.
verse, whereas it should be between intellectual creatures and irrational creatures. Because of this mistake he paraphrases St. Thomas as saying that "the universe in one of its parts, and precisely in its first and foremost constitutive parts, is ad imaginem Dei." But St. Thomas does not say in one of its parts; he says that the universe in accordance with (secundum) one of its parts is in the image of God. "It must be added that part is not divided against the whole, but against another part. Hence when it is said that only an intellectual nature is in the image of God, the universe in accordance with one of its parts is not excluded from being in the image of God; but the other parts of the universe are excluded."50

A possible explanation for Father Eschmann's confusion may be that he understands "universe" in this context as meaning "cosmos," the material universe, excluding man. It is certain that he takes it in this meaning in other sections of his article.51

Meaning of a Text from De Caritate

The next argument concerns Father Eschmann's objection to Pro-

49Eschmann, p. 191.

50"Vel dicendum, quod pars non dividitur contra totum, sed contra aliam partem. Unde cum dicitur quod sola natura intellectualis est ad imaginem Dei, non excluditur quin universum secundum aliquam sui partem sit ad imaginem Dei; sed excluduntur aliae partes universi." S.T., I, 93, 2 ad 3.

51Pp. 29-30.
Professor De Koninok's use of a quotation from *De Caritate*, in confirmation of his thesis that God is the common good of persons. Each charges the other with failing to understand the context from which the quotation is taken. However, it does seem that Professor De Koninok more ably defends his interpretation. In addition to the reasons which Professor De Koninok gives in his rebuttal article, there are other considerations which lead one to conclude that Father Eschmann misinterprets the text. The argument centers about the words "there is required love for the good common to the whole society, which is the divine good as the object of beatitude." This statement is near the conclusion of a long argument, for which St. Thomas first lays down the principle, "For virtue therefore there is required love of the good for which the virtue operates," and then lists various kinds of goods in progression up to the divine good, the object of the virtue of charity.

This is the way in which the article is developed. Professor De Koninok has somewhat of an advantage in that he argues from what the text actually says. It says that God is a common good as the object of our beatitude. Taken this way, the words fit in with the argument of the article. Father Eschmann attempts to show that *bonum commune* in this context does not properly mean *bonum commune*. To prove this he goes out of the context for two other citations, meant to show that God as the object of beatitude is at most a com-
mon good "in a certain sense."53

Briefly, as was seen in Chapter III, Father Eschmann's use of these citations is this: Because "bonum commune non est objectum caritatis," the meaning of "bonum commune" in the disputed text of De Caritate, article 2, must be only "quoddam bonum commune." Professor De Koninck is correct in pointing out that the "bonum commune" which is not the object of charity must be, in its context, a bonum commune in praedicando. Moreover, apart from the fact that St. Thomas says nothing in this article about "quoddam bonum commune," the phrase can mean "a" common good just as well as "in a certain sense." Let us reproduce the text from which Father Eschmann borrowed the notion of a "certain common good." We will see that each time St. Thomas uses "common good," whether the Latin is "quoddam bonum commune" or simply "bonum commune," he is speaking of a proper common good, a good that is really common.

In answer to the fifth objection: Since in God His substance and common good are one and the same, all who see the very essence of God are by the same motion of love moved to the essence of God as it is distinct from others and as it is a common good. And because, insofar as He is the common good, He is naturally loved by all, it is impossible for whoever sees Him through His essence not to love Him. But those who do not see His essence know Him through some particular effects which are some times contrary to their wills. And thus in this way they are said to hold God in hate, although, insofar as He is the common good of all, everyone naturally loves God more than himself.54


54"Ad quintum. Dicendum quod cum in Deo sit unum et idem eius substantia et bonum commune, omnes qui vident ipsam Dei essentiam, eodem motu dilectionis moventur in ipsam Dei essentiam prout est ab
Universal Good and Common Good

Against Father Eschmann's assertion that he falsely identifies bonum universale in essendo and bonum universale in causando, Professor De Koninck simply states that in the commonly accepted sense in which he uses them, the terms are identical. Father Eschmann's error is to assume that bonum universale in causando must be God as the universal efficient and exemplary cause. He seems to suppose that a good can be common only insofar as it produces a multiplicity of other goods with the causality proper to an efficient cause, and not as the end of this multitude.

Against Father Eschmann's proposal of what it means for God to be called a common good in the proper and in the improper sense, Professor De Koninck's criticism seems valid. But this is a small point, and hardly worth further comment.

In another objection about bonum universale in essendo et causando, Father Eschmann in citing a text from In I Eth., 2, n. 30, again assumes that bonum in causando must refer to efficient

aliis distincta, et secundum quod est quoddam bonum communes. Et quia inquantum est bonum commune, naturaliter amatur ab omnibus; quicumque videt eum per essentiam, impossibile est quin diligat ipsum. Sed illi qui non vident essentiam eius, cognoscent eum per aliquos particulares effectus, qui interdum eorum voluntati contrariantur. Et sic hoc modo discuntur odio habere Deum, cum tamen inquantum est bonum commune omnium, unumquodque naturaliter dili-

gat plus Deum quam seipsum." S.T., I, 60, 5 ad 5.

55 Pp. 42-44.
56 Pp. 45-47.
causality. His error is more obvious this time, since in the very passage from which he quotes, St. Thomas speaks explicitly of final causality.

To the second part of Father Eschmann's objections, in which he argues that the personal good of beatitude is greater than any created common good, Professor De Koninck's answer is correct. He applies the principle of non-transgression of genera, which he mentions frequently in Primaute: "Within every genus the common good is superior. The comparison by transgression of genera, far from weakening this principle, supposes and confirms it." As for the "wretched sophism" which Professor De Koninck holds over Father Eschmann's head, that is hardly necessary. He may, in his zeal, have misinterpreted some texts, but he is hardly so precipitous as to conclude that because formal beatitude is a personal good, so is objective beatitude.

The Nature of Beatitude

Peter of Auvergne's "speculatio totius civitatis" is taken by Father Eschmann as a group action of contemplation. Professor De Koninck says this is a misinterpretation; Peter could not have in-

57 Pp. 47-49.

58 "Dans tout genre le bien commun est superieur. La comparaison par transgression des genres, loin d'infirmer ce principe, le suppose et le confirme." 80, p. 15.
tended such an impossible meaning.\textsuperscript{59} As was seen, the meaning of this phrase according to Professor De Koninck is that, although contemplation remains a personal act, the object of contemplation is God, the supreme common good, communicable to a whole manifold of created intellects. Certainly, only in Professor De Koninck's interpretation does Peter's phrase make sense; if he meant what Father Eschmann thinks he meant, he was wrong. It is, of course, possible that Professor De Koninck reads his own meaning into Peter's text. Yet, although Peter does not make his meaning so clear as Professor De Koninck makes it for him, it is likely he really understood the phrase in this way; for he does call some attention to the importance of the object. "The essential note of perfection is taken from the object."\textsuperscript{60} In any event, whether Peter of Auvergne meant it this way or whether Professor De Koninck's is a benign interpretation, he does not base his argument on this text, but uses it only in confirmation.

Father Eschmann's basic objection to the "Nous répondons" which he quotes from \textit{Primauté} seems to stem from two assumptions.\textsuperscript{61} He supposes, it would seem, that by "bonheur spéculatif de la personne en tant que membre de la communauté," Professor De Koninck is speaking of \textit{assecutio communis}, a mass movement. He also seems

\textsuperscript{59}\textit{Pp. 50-51, 56.}

\textsuperscript{60}\textit{"[R]atio perfectionis sumitur ex objecto." In VII Pol., lect. 2. Petrus de Alvernia complevit.}

\textsuperscript{61}\textit{Pp. 49-54.}
to suppose that Professor De Koninck argues against the primacy of the speculative.

Father Eschmann's first specific objection against the "Nous répondons" is that the very notion of the "speculative felicity of the person qua member of the community" is contradictory. Professor De Koninck does not explicitly answer this objection. But it seems to be satisfactorily met in the section in which he states the meaning in general of the whole "Nous répondons." There he explains that there is no conflict between the solitude of contemplation and the community of its object. As member of the whole manifold of intellectual creatures, the person's good is the good communicable to the whole manifold or community.

Again, considering now the political community, let us recall the place of the civil common good in society: Man's temporal felicity and perfection consist essentially in a virtuous and religious life. For the development of such a life he needs various goods of soul and body, such as health, food, clothing, shelter, tools, external freedom, instruction, etc. These goods constitute a man's private prosperity. But that all men may attain their private prosperity there are required certain public conditions. These are the public prosperity of citizens and the civil common good: peace and protection of the juridical order; public roads,

62 Pp. 51, 60.
63 Pp. 53-54.
a monetary system, transportation, communication, schools, hospitals, libraries, etc; and the communication of citizens in each other's labors and products. This public prosperity, this civil common good is ordered to individuals as members of the community that they may attain their ultimate eternal end as well as their proximate temporal end. In other words, as Professor De Koninck said, the practical happiness of the community is ordered to the speculative happiness of the individual person as a member of the community. The common good of the community is ordered to its members.

We are here speaking, of course, of the civil common good. The civil common good is effected by its citizens and is ordered to them. But the divine common good is neither effected by nor ordered to its creatures. Rather, they are effected by and ordered to it.

As for Father Eschmann's objection about the contradiction involved in the very notion, even though Professor De Koninck neglects this point altogether, it presents no great difficulty. For to be a member of a community that is the manifold of intellectual creatures who participate in God's superabundant communicability does not necessarily mean to be imperfect and still in via.

Father Eschmann's second objection to this text is the statement that the sovereign beatitude which consists in the vision of God is essentially a common good. Insofar as Professor De Ko-
ninok proves in general that God as our objective beatitude is a common good, he has already answered Father Eschmann’s difficulties with this statement. It must be added, however, that Professor De Koninok’s manner of expressing himself in the statement in question is prone to misinterpretation. It is evident from the context that he is talking about God as objective beatitude. But to speak of "the vision of God" as he does is apt to give the reader the impression that he means formal beatitude. Father Eschmann’s difficulties, then, with this particular text of De Koninok, would seem to result from a misleading vagueness on the part of Professor De Koninok.

Father Eschmann’s last argument is based on another misunderstanding of Professor De Koninok’s text. Because he believes that Professor De Koninok argues for an assecutio communis, he cites two passages from St. Thomas to prove that this is impossible. Professor De Koninok, however, agrees with him.

CONCLUSIONS

In this thesis we have considered the arguments advanced in support of their positions by Father Eschmann and Professor De Koninok, and we have critically evaluated these arguments and the basic positions. We have seen that Professor De Koninok answers each of Father Eschmann’s objections against his thesis of the

65PP. 56-59.
primacy of the common good. In general it appears that Father Eschmann does not clearly understand Professor De Koninck’s basic thesis. However, as we have noted on pages 70 and 104, this is sometimes due to the vagueness of Primaúte.

Before formulating our final judgment, we must recall the purpose of this thesis. It was to sharpen, not solve the differences between Professor De Koninck and Father Eschmann; and to pass judgment on the outcome of the controversy, but not to go beyond it. In the section of this chapter entitled "Basic Positions," we have sharpened the points of difference. Now, in order to pass judgment within the controversy itself, we must begin with Primaúte as the starting point. Given the problem and the solution of Professor De Koninck in Primaúte, we must consider how successfully Father Eschmann attacks Professor De Koninck’s doctrine and how well Professor De Koninck defends it.

In summary, then, Professor De Koninck has come out with a doctrine on the primacy of the common good. Even one of the personalists against whom it was directed, Jacques Maritain, agreed with some of its fundamental points. Yves Simon approved it and considered it "a most valuable contribution to the definition of the common good and to the vindication of its primacy."66 Father Eschmann attacked this doctrine as a "contradictory and unintelligible position." Many of his arguments, however, were directed

66 Simon, p. 530.
against a doctrine that Professor De Koninck did not hold. Professor De Koninck answered each one of Father Eschmann's arguments which actually touched his position. It is regrettable that Father Eschmann did not reply to "In Defense of St. Thomas." This would have afforded a better check on the correctness of Professor De Koninck's interpretations of Father Eschmann's objections. Perhaps the fact that he did not write a second article indicates that Father Eschmann conceded the truth of De Koninck's reply. Or it may have been merely that he no longer wished to prolong a controversy that had become too personal and too bitter. At any rate, it must be conceded that, within the controversy, Professor De Koninck stands victorious. Perhaps other objections could be raised against his thesis of the primacy of the common good, but that is beyond our consideration.

However, it might be added that if Professor De Koninck's book would have been a more valuable contribution if, instead of attacking the personalist views on the intrinsic and extrinsic common goods of the universe, he had developed his basic notion on the common good, as Yves Simon suggested when he wrote that it "calls for many specifications and further developments, but it constitutes a very sound foundation for any further development of the common good."67

It might have been expected that a challenge to Professor De

67Ibid., p. 531.
Koninck's book would have just this effect of stimulating specifications and further developments. Unfortunately however, when the last pen ran dry, the state of the question and its answer were found to be little more developed. Yet the controversy at least had this effect, that it led Professor De Koninck to clarify and further substantiate his doctrine. That it did no more may be partly laid to its acrimonious polemic tone and to Father Eschmann's misunderstanding of several basic points of Professor De Koninck's doctrine, particularly of the nature of the common good.
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The thesis submitted by Mr. James Lee Anderson, S.J., has been read and approved by three members of the Department of Philosophy.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

April 27, 1957

Signature of Adviser