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The Diplomatic Mission of Archbishop Flavio Chigi, Apostolic Nuncio to Paris, 1870-71

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THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION OF
ARCHBISHOP FLAVIO CHIGI
APostolic Nuncio to Paris,
1870-71

by

Christopher G. Kinsella

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School of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment
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LIFE

Christopher Gerard Kinsella was born on April 11, 1944 in Anacortes, Washington. He was raised in St. Louis, where he received his primary and secondary education, graduating from St. Louis University High School in June of 1962.

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During the 1970-71 academic year, Mr. Kinsella was assigned to Loyola's Rome Center for Liberal Arts in Roma, Italy, when most of the European research for this dissertation was done at the Vatican Archives. In 1971-72, Mr. Kinsella was the recipient of a grant from the Arthur Schmitt Foundation. During this period, he did further studies in archives in Paris, France.

Mr. Kinsella is single. The dissertation has been done under the supervision of Dr. Walter D. Gray, associate professor of history at Loyola and currently Academic Dean of Loyola's Rome Center.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND

CHIGI'S CAREER TO 1870

The year 1870 was either an année terrible or an annus mirabilis for a good portion of Europe, depending on whether one's country was the recipient of blessing or disaster. The multitude of writing on the events of that year will never cease, nor will the political effects still to be seen in contemporary Europe. Discussion will long endure of the contradictions of a liberal empire, a disputed candidacy, the editing of a dispatch, the mechanized invasion across the Rhine, the violent birth of a republic with a monarchist assembly, the awkward proclaiming of an absolute empire, an infallible pope without a country, and the verve of Roma Capitale.

Few could have been in a better position to be familiar with these events than Flavio Chigi (1810-1885), titular Archbishop of Mira and Apostolic Nuncio to Paris. As a key figure in the Paris diplomatic world, chief spokesman for a worried pope before the pontiff's protector, negotiator with the Iron Chancellor, and a fellow traveler with a lost and uncertain provisional government, Chigi had an excellent locus from which to observe the unfolding of a very
complex and multi-faceted drama. "Observe" is the correct word as Chigi's direct influence in the story of 1870 was minimal. Rather his role was one which put him officially and unofficially into close contact with many elements and which makes him worthy of study.

Archbishop Chigi was assigned to Paris from January of 1862 through May of 1874. The years 1870 and 1871 were the busiest of Chigi's remarkably long tenure. Only brief attention need be paid to Chigi's early career, the decade of the 1860's, or to the post-war years. The main focus of this work will be the crucial twenty months from January, 1870 to the end of August, 1871, that is, from the start of Ollivier's ministry to the resignation of Favre and the affirmation of Thiers as President of the French Republic.

The duties of an apostolic nuncio, reflecting the duality of the nineteenth century papacy, were twofold: the head of the Roman Catholic Church then represented a spiritual domain and a temporal one. The spiritual area was the pope's leadership of a world-wide religion which had a very self-assured opinion of itself and its mission. The temporal sphere, after 1860, was a portion of the middle segment of the Italian peninsula where Pius IX retained sovereignty with the aid of Napoleon III's troops. It was the era of the thorny Roman Question.

The papal diplomatic agents could not escape this duality any more than the popes could. The duties and missions of nuncios
involved both the spiritual life of the Catholic Church within the borders of the country to which they were accredited and the political relations between two sovereignties. On the spiritual side, the main function of a nuncio was to act as official intermediary in the naming of bishops of dioceses within the nation. There were variations among European states on how this was done. Other "spiritual" functions included forwarding letters of citizens to the Holy Father, transmitting petitions of canonization, reporting personnel changes among the important clergy, alerting the Vatican on potentially heretical seminary professors and printed material, advising on the appearance of new cults, and collecting and dispatching the Peter's Pence.

On the temporal or political side, a nuncio's duties corresponded to those of most regular ambassadors: dealing with the foreign minister on mutual matters, conveying news of foreign events gained through diplomatic channels, reporting on internal political developments, handling complaints of citizens, and maintaining a constant attention to the attitude of the host country toward the home government.  

1Vatican diplomatic terminology differs from the civil nomenclature. A "nuncio" is a full-ranked ambassador from the pope to a country with which the Vatican has full diplomatic relations. A nuncio is not to be confused with an "apostolic delegate" which indicates a Vatican representative to the Catholic Church within a country with
In his years at Paris, Flavio Chigi's activities covered all those duties. But his was no ordinary ambassadorial position, complicated as it was by the all-pervasive Roman Question. Because of the overriding importance of the Roman Question, attention is given herein to the "political-diplomatic" aspects of Chigi's term. Little will be said about the "spiritual" side though much could be done in this regard as the Vatican documents are very full.

Since Chigi was at Paris for a full twelve years, any attempt to deal fully with such a complex period as 1862 through 1874 would involve a longer study than a dissertation requires. The historical literature for Franco-Vatican relations during Louis Napoleon's reign is virtually endless. Works of all styles and prejudices can be found in a number of languages. The early 1870's and beyond are less covered than the previous epoch, largely due to the fact that until the time of the Ralliement the story lacks earnestness or substantial changes. Some literature does exist if only in a relatively small quantity.²

²The principle works on Franco-Vatican relations in this period are: Jean Maurain, La Politique Ecclésiatique du Second Em-
It is the turnover period of the war years of 1870 and 1871 which remain the least investigated. In order to show how a diplomatic agent worked in difficult and extraordinary circumstances and to show how Vatican-French relations evolved in a time when the situation was so drastically altered for both governments, the narration will emphasize the critical years 1870 and 1871.

Such a stated purpose does not rule out a glance over Flavio Chigi's early career or the 1862-1869 period. It should be remembered that the following is intended to be a glance and little more. The intent is to show how the Vatican documents reflect the period and how Chigi reacted to important crises. The limited number of French sources cited bring out the official government view of the sometimes troublesome nuncio.

Flavio Chigi was born in Rome on May 31, 1810, a scion of aristocratic Roman stock. His father was Agostino Chigi-Albani,
while his mother was Amelia Carlotta Barberini. With this mixture of Chigi, Albani, and Barberini, more noble blood could hardly be found in Rome. There had been four cardinals in the Chigi line, one of whom was Fabio Chigi (1599-1667) who had served as papal nuncio in France in the seventeenth century to the court of Louis XIV where he struggled with the Sun King, Mazarin, and Jansenism. This Fabio Chigi was elected Pope Alexander VII in 1655. The Albani and the Barberini likewise claimed several cardinals and one pope each, Clement XI and Urban VIII respectively. 3

In 1836, Flavia Chigi entered the Pontifical Nobel Guard, the military unit which served as a ceremonial bodyguard for the pope and was open only to sons of Roman noble families. Several French and Italian sources indicate that during this stage of his life, Chigi followed a very worldly course and was one of the noted revellers of Roman society. 4

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In 1849, Chigi left Rome and went to Gaeta to join his self-exiled pontiff, Pius IX, who had gone there to escape the Garibaldian uprising in the Eternal City. At some point in this sojourn, for reasons unclear, Flavio decided to embrace an ecclesiastical career. An official French report drawn up years later indicated that he expressed this desire to none other than Pius IX himself who urged Chigi along.  

Chigi took up seminary studies in Tivoli, northeast of Rome, and was ordained within a few years at the age of 42. His rise in the Vatican ranks was quick. In 1853, he was named a Canon of St. Peter's. In 1855 he became a domestic prelate with the rank of Secret Chamberlain on Active Duty to the Person of the Holy Father. The following year, at age 46, Chigi was consecrated Titular Archbishop of Mira in partibus and was sent immediately as Nuncio Extraordinary to represent Pius IX at the coronation of Czar Alexander II of Russia. Upon his return from St. Petersburg, Chigi was appointed Apostolic Nuncio to Bavaria. He served at Munich until his appointment to Paris in late 1861.

Archives are hereinafter cited as AMAE. This resume is from a collection drawn up in 1877 on all members of the College of Cardinals in the eventuality of a papal election. Chigi had become a cardinal in 1874 and was living in Rome in 1877.

5 AMAE, loc. cit.
Chigi's assignment to Paris was enshrouded in a controversy unrelated to himself. The previous nuncio, Archbishop Sacconi, had long ceased to be an effective diplomat in the eyes of the French court. As early as 1859, both Rome and Paris had agreed on replacing him, and Pius IX promised to give Sacconi a Red Hat and with it automatic promotion and removal to Rome. The naming of Chigi was suggested by the French ambassador in Munich, Baron de Menneval. The Imperial government found the nomination acceptable, but the arrival of Chigi could not be effected until the next consistory. Not until September of 1861 was Sacconi raised to the cardinalate. Chigi's appointment was formally announced, and he arrived in Paris to assume his post in January of 1862. He was now 51 years old.

The first official dispatch which Chigi sent to Rome was dated January 18, 1862. It simply informed Secretary of State Giacomo Cardinal Antonelli (1806-1876) that the journey from Rome by way of Marseilles and Lyons had been successful and that ecclesiastical receptions had been held at a number of stops. Although Chigi had been in Paris less than a week, he had already met with Cardinal Morlot (Archbishop of Paris), the Foreign Minister Edouard-Antoine Thouvenel, and a number of French politicians. For the next several days, the new nuncio was greeted by other members of the Paris

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6 Maurain, p. 437.
Diplomatic Corps of which he was now dean. 7

These first meetings rendered Chigi great satisfaction. He found from discussion with the Spanish and Austrian ambassadors that they thought that the stability of the Kingdom of Italy was limited, that things could not remain as they were in the peninsula, but that there was room for direct contacts between Victor Emmanuel and Pius IX. The diplomats also felt that there should be some reform in papal government whereby the pope should delegate his civil powers to laymen while leaving himself freer to be a spiritual ruler. 8

The members of the Senate and Legislative Assembly, Chigi wrote to Antonelli, were men "worthy of faith." Many speeches they gave reiterated the necessity of the Temporal Power and how "inadmissible were the pretentions Piedmont on Rome." In every case,

7 Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Inventario della Segretaria di Stato, Rubricella #287 (1862). A rubricella is a day book in which were recorded capsule summaries of all dispatches as they arrived from the various nunciatures. Use of these day books has proved largely sufficient for this first chapter.

The Vatican Archives are cited hereinafter as ASV, the Secretary of State's section as Segr di St.

8 Rapporto #15, Feb. 9, 1862, ASV, Segr di St, Anno 1862, Rubrica 165, fascolo 21, fol. 80. A rapporto is an official dispatch from a nuncio to the secretary of state in Rome. Citation of Chigi's rapporti forms the bulk of Vatican documents used in this work. Chigi wrote a total of 2131 dispatches during his twelve years at Paris.
such sentiments reflected the thinking and polity of the Emperor himself. 9

Thouvenel was more cautious, indicating that although the Emperor had a desire to put an end to the present state of affairs in Italy and as devoted as the Emperor was to the Holy Father, there was a need for reconciliation between the interests of Italy and those of the Holy See. The annexations by Piedmont must be regarded as faits accomplis, and it was useless to think that France would resort to force to regain Papal territory already lost. Chigi drew some hope from Thouvenel's promise, given at the end of the interview, that the French troops would not leave Rome. 10

The first meeting between Chigi and the Emperor was set for January 23 at the Tuileries. The occasion was the presentation of credentials, and it was much played up by Napoleon. The full court was present as well as most of the Diplomatic Corps. The Emperor gave the new nuncio a special guard of honor and the use of a carriage

9 Ibid., fols. 77-78. Important to note here is Chigi's reference to "Piedmont" rather than "Italy." Since the Holy See did not officially recognize the existence of the Kingdom of Italy until 1929, almost all of its official reference during the nineteenth century to the major political state in the Italian peninsula was in terms of "Piedmont" or (until 1870) "the government of Florence." This careful distinction was scrupulously adhered to by Chigi, as is seen throughout this work.

10 Ibid., fols. 78-79.
from the Imperial stables.

In presenting his credentials, Archbishop Chigi alluded to the honor he felt in being named to this "noble and generous nation" which has proven itself to be "very Christian." He hoped that he would employ all his zeal "to maintain the good rapport which happily exists between the Holy See and the French government." In his reply, Napoleon said he had no doubts that Chigi's appointment would improve relations between himself and Rome and "would serve the well-being of Religion and the peace of Christianity."

After this exchange, Chigi was accorded the privilege of being presented to Empress Eugénie who had waited in her own apartments during the official ceremonies. All in all, Chigi wrote to Antonelli, there certainly seemed to be a great deal of support, both official and popular, for the cause of the Holy Father.  

On February 3, 1862, Chigi was a dinner guest of the Emperor. Afterwards, Napoleon and the nuncio had a discussion on matters pertinent to the Roman Question. Napoleon again indicated how grate-

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11 Le Moniteur Universal, January 24, 1862, p. 99, for the description of the presentation ceremony. Chigi's remark about the extent of support in France for the cause of the Holy Father is from ASV, Segr di St, Rubricella #287 (1862).

On the average, Chigi met with Napoleon III about twice a year. These meetings were in addition to the annual formality of the New Year's greetings from the Diplomatic Corps which Chigi delivered in his capacity as dean.
ful he was to the Holy Father for having appointed a nuncio and for thus having normalized relations between Paris and Rome. One day he hoped to see the present disputes in Italy settled. Matters were going in a vicious circle in the peninsula, and such things as the continual rebellion in Naples and Sicily would lead one to think that Italian unity was a "chimera." The activities of both the left-wing Garibaldians and the plots of the deposed conservative King of Naples [then residing in Rome under Pius IX's protection] showed how difficult Napoleon's situation was as he found both solutions inimical. 12

If disorder and violence were to continue in Italy, the Emperor continued, France had a firm intention of searching for a means of aiding the Holy Father, but she would have to be obliged to exclude every project which would have the use of force as a base. Italy must suffer for her own good. "It is not so bad that the Italians undergo this experience in their alleged greatness. Their misfortune displeases me, but I hope that it will be salutary, for such is always the better means to avoid self-deceit. Let us wait a while longer, and events will justify me." Napoleon concluded the conversation with another affirmation that French troops would not retreat from Rome. 13

12 Rapp 15, February 9, 1862, ASV, Segr di St, A 1862, R 165, fols. 81-82.

13 Ibid., fols. 83-84.
Such was to be the style of most of Chigi's reports in the years 1862 to 1869: attention to all nuances of the Roman Question, whether in the Diplomatic Corps, the government and cabinet, the French press and literature, the episcopate, or the Emperor himself. Any embassy or nunciature serves its home government as a listening post to report events and evaluate policies of various nations. The Paris nunciature under Flavio Chigi was to be no exception. Chigi's dispatches from the first seven years were constantly filled with as much information as he could gather on significant diplomatic issues even if they were not of direct interest to the Vatican.

For example, in 1863 Chigi furnished considerable background on the Polish uprising. The Catholic religion of the Poles concerned Rome, and Paris was a major source for data and developments. Chigi continually adjudged the situation and imparted all details of negotiations of the powers over the affair. Discussion of Polish matters entered into many of the conversations Chigi held with Thouvenel that year. Chigi sought to keep the Holy See's views and position known to the powers by direct contact with the various ambassadors. The Vatican displayed this attention, not only because of the Catholicism of the Poles, but also because of an underlying fear that any diplomatic arrangements France might make elsewhere on the continent would undermine the strength of the French commitment.
In 1864 a similar pattern of behavior emerged regarding the Danish War. Once again, Chigi filled the diplomatic pouches to Rome with note after note on the north European conflict. The Vatican's concern here would seem more tenuous than in the Polish case, yet one Catholic power (Austria) was involved and another Catholic power (France) was at close range, wondering whether to intervene. France's foreign policy was almost as important to the Holy See as its own.

The Napoleonic intervention in Mexico also interested Chigi. He reported on the selection of Maximilian of Austria as Emperor, his visit to Paris and departure for Mexico, the difficulty between France and the United States, and the subsequent French disengagement from the area. Church-State relations in Mexico were in a condition of tumult at the time, and Chigi formed his part of the link of information to Rome. The nuncio even met with the Empress Carlota in August of 1866 when she came through Paris on her unsuccessful journey of European capitals. Chigi was of little help to her.

14 ASV, Segr di St, Rubricella # 294 (1863).
15 ASV, Segr di St, Rubricella # 301 (1864).
16 ASV, Segr di St, Rubricella # 287 (1862), # 294 (1863), # 301 (1864), # 308 (1865), and # 315 (1866).
The events of the 1860's which did directly concern the Vatican and its efforts to retain the Temporal Power were the September Convention, the 1866 war between Austria and Prussia, and the 1867 invasion of the Papal States by the Garibaldians.

The September Convention of 1864 appeared as a complete surprise to Chigi, as it did to many. The agreement calling for evacuation of French troops from Rome while supposedly leaving the independence of the Papal States under the protection of the Kingdom of Italy was another aspect of Napoleon III's secret diplomacy. Chigi's first dispatch on the pact did not go to Rome until after the announcement, and there is no indication of any previous knowledge on Chigi's part of the negotiations leading to the pact. From late September to the end of 1864, Chigi met repeatedly with the Foreign Minister Edmond Drouyn de Lhuys and with the Spanish, Austrian, and Prussian ambassadors. His intent was to find the exact French position. He tried to pry information out of the Italian ambassador in Paris, Constantino Nigra, with whom he rarely dealt, all to no avail. The final weapon was a direct appeal to the Emperor. This came in early November, 1864. Chigi met with both Napoleon and the clerical Empress Eugenie, but he described this session as "useless."17

The 1866 war brought out the worst of nightmares to the

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17 ASV, Segr di St, Rubricella # 301 (1864).
Vatican due to the defeat of Catholic Austria, the cession of Venetia to Italy, and the uncertainty as to whether France would enter the conflict. Chigi conducted himself as he had done in the Danish War two years earlier. He kept a close watch on all developments and dutifully reported them to Rome. His main pre-occupation was, as before, to ascertain where the French stood.

Because the September Convention was now in force (it had been agreed on two years earlier and there was no French expeditionary force at Rome while Italy was at war) and because the Vatican was diametrically opposed to the smallest changes in the Italian peninsula, much less at the expense of Austria, the cession of Venetia through French hands was a deeply felt blow. Chigi was upset at the French role despite the fact that Drouyn de Lhuys had made assurances of the "sincere neutrality" of France. The French move was taken as a double act of betrayal—to Austria and to the Papacy.

Chigi was pleased to report that Vienna resisted all suggestions to cede the Trentino.  

The 1867 invasion of the Papal States by Garibaldi brought the Roman Question out into the open more than it had been since the wars of Italian Unification. On his own, Garibaldi led a military force of volunteers from Italian soil across the papal frontier to

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18 ASV, Segr di St, Rubricella # 315 (1866).
liberate Rome but was stopped by a combined French and Papal army at Mentana. Chigi hardly had to furnish Rome with information in this particular event. He did give what advanced knowledge he had on the formation of the Garibaldian forces. Because of fears of action by these radicals, Chigi was prompted as early as April of 1867 to request a renewed guarantee of the Temporal Power from the French. During the actual days of the crisis (October and November, 1867), Chigi held several conferences with Drouyn de Lhuys and two with Napoleon III. The results were much better than what had been obtained after the September Convention and Austro-Prussian War as a French army garrison remained permanently at Rome after the battle of Mentana. 19

The years 1868 and 1869 were relatively quiet ones for Chigi. No great international outbreaks loomed, no qualifications of French policy towards Rome seemed in the offing, the tenor of Europe was largely peaceful. Chigi's attention was for the most part turned toward internal French politics and the preparations for the upcoming ecumenical council.

French archival sources are rather sparse on Flavio Chigi. No current personnel reports exist in the French Foreign Ministry Archives, no year-by-year file or resumés were kept. The archives

19 ASV, Seg dr St, Rubricella # 322 (1867).
of the Ministry of Cults are somewhat more ample but still limited in quantity. The official French view of the nuncio seems to have been one of some forebearance interspersed with periodic irritation as on several significant occasions in the 1860's Chigi acted beyond the limits of his capacity as ambassador in the opinion of the government. These several occasions involved times when Chigi communicated directly with French bishops and diocesan officials much to the distress of the French cabinet.

In the spring of 1864, the bishop of Nice, Monsignor Sola, was entangled in a conflict with his cathedral chapter of canons. Prior to 1861, Nice had been a part of the Kingdom of Piedmont, but after France absorbed the city that year, the diocese was in a state which had a concordat with Rome. Sola wanted to dismiss some members of the chapter who were politically opposed to him, and he did so, claiming that their appointments were illegal according to the Concordat of 1801 because they had not been formally approved by the French government.

Underlying this was the fact that Sola had previously enjoyed good standing with the government of Piedmont which was now the

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20 Maurain, pp. 699-702. This narration is largely taken from Maurain. This author saw some of the same documents Maurain did in the Archives Nationales in Paris and at the AMAE. Certain documents beyond those which Maurain used are cited accordingly.
perfidious state of Italy in the Vatican's eyes. The canons had been thrust upon Sola by an angry Holy See, and he used the pretext of the lack of government sanction to dislodge the obstreperous clerics. The French government supported the bishop while the canons appealed to Rome.

At this juncture, Chigi entered the fray and incurred reproach from the French cabinet. On May 19, 1864, Chigi addressed a letter to the canons saying that the pope had ordered him to inform them that the pontiff had heard their plea. Chigi further said, "His Holiness encourages the capitulatory corps to hold firm in order that the present statute not be changed except with the agreement of the proper authority." Chigi hoped that the canons would find encouragement in hearing these thoughts of the Holy Father.

French ire was aroused because of the definite stand taken by the Holy See and because the nuncio had been the transmitter of the note. According to the government's position, Chigi had erred notoriously and gravely. Paris considered it an uncalled-for intervention in internal affairs by a foreign agent, and the reaction of the

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21 The letter in its entirety is found in a note from Baroche to Drouyn de Lhuys, July 12, 1864, Archives Nationales, Fonds du Ministère des Cults et Justice, F19 1924. The italicization of the words "to hold firm" is in the Baroche note, and there is no indication whether the emphasis was made by Baroche or was in Chigi's original. Portions of the letter are also reproduced in Maurain, p. 700. Archives Nationales hereafter cited as AN.
The cabinet was swift. The Minister of Cults and Justice, Pierre-Jules Baroche, fired a note of protest to the Quai d'Orsay in which he succinctly stated a phrase which would be repeated often, "Le nonce n'est qu'un ambassadeur." Baroche cited earlier instances when previous nuncios had to be reminded of this (notably 1802, 1823, 1852) and both the nuncio and the Holy See had reneged. 22

The French ambassador in Rome, the Comte de Sartiges, carried a note of protest to Cardinal Antonelli. Antonelli replied by defending the right of the pope to use nuncios to communicate with the clergy, otherwise there would be little use to having nuncios at European courts. The normal procedure was for a nuncio to send a copy of such correspondence to the government beforehand. Antonelli merely expressed regret that such an action had not occurred in this particular instance.

The Nice affair was basically centered in this exchange of notes and other actions from May to August of 1864, capped by Antonelli's half-apology and admission of irregularity. The Quai d'Orsay and the Ministry of Cults continued for the next several months to keep a close eye on events at Nice and on Chigi. The confrontation did not set an ideal mood for the coming of the September

22 Baroche to Drouyn de Lhuys, AN, loc. cit.
Convention that same year. 23

Only a few more months elapsed when Chigi committed another error of judgment in the matter of corresponding with the French Episcopat. In the wake of the encyclical Quanta Cura of December 8, 1864 and the famous appended Syllabus Errorum, the reaction of the French clergy produced some forthright statements. Two of the more renowned ones were issued by the bishop of Poitiers, Louis Pie, who defended the encyclical in a widely-publicized sermon, and the bishop of Orleans, Felix Dupanloup, who skillfully interpreted the Syllabus in a manner which toned down the conservative views of Pius IX. Chigi created strife similar to the Nice affair by writing letters of congratulation to both of these prelates early in 1865. These letters were published by Le Monde in early February, probably through no fault of Chigi's.

In his letter to Pie (January 12, 1865), Chigi indicated that he had received "with joy" Pie's pulpit statement. He further wrote, "The veritable glory of the Church of France would be resplendent without shadow on this occasion.... It would be such a consolation

23 AMAE, Mémoires et Documents, Rome, Vol. 117, subtitled "Immixtion des nonces dans les affaires ecclesiastiques de France, 1864," contains over 200 pages of notes and documents on the Nice controversy. A complete analysis of these papers is unnecessary here because of space limitations and because of the adequate treatment to be found in Maurain.
to the Holy Father how this Catholic Nation would be inspired in its courage and firmness from which, despite diverse opinions which may appear, it does not waver."

Writing to Dupanloup on January 26, Chigi was hardly less complimentary. In referring to Dupanloup's pamphlet as a "magnificent work," Chigi wrote, "I cannot finish without expressing to you all my recognition for this new testimony in which you have given the Church and the Holy See of your zeal and devotion and for the powerful backing which you bring forth again, so helpful to the cause of the Holy Father." 24

The text and tone of these letters, supporting as they did two bishops who had been so outspoken in an area of controversy of acute embarrassment to the civil power, represented for the French government another instance in which the nuncio interfered in France's internal affairs. Baroche noted, as he had earlier in the Nice case, that the published letters "constituted an infraction of the rules of international law and the public right of France." 25

Sartiges was ordered to lodge another protest. Antonelli had little choice in the matter other than to order a full apology by Chigi. Chigi was given an audience by Napoleon III on February 14, 1865 at

24 Undated memo from Baroche quoting the letters, AN, F 19 1924.

25 Ibid.
which he expressed atonement for the publicity and assured the Emperor that "penetrated with the duties of his diplomatic standing, he never had any intention of straying from the rules of international law." The Moniteur simply noted that the Emperor accepted the apology "with benevolence."

An undated memo emanating from the Ministry of Cults about this time stated much of the French position on the place and bounds of a nuncio. The memo largely refers to Chigi's practice of writing to bishops notifying them of transfer. Beyond scorning this particular device as being contrary to the principles of international law, the memo further stated, "... the Emperor and his Government have never admitted and cannot admit that the Nuncio of the Holy

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In light of the fact of the existence of these and presumably other letters of Chigi to French bishops, the irritation by the French government in 1864 and 1865 is difficult to understand. Evidently, it was the publicity which prompted the outrage of the cabinet.

At the Vatican Archives, the author was informed that the whereabouts of Chigi's personal papers (other than the official correspondence with Antonelli) is unknown.
Father may correspond directly with bishops. This principle has ... been explicitly recognized by the court of Rome on numerous occasions, some of them very recent." The note went on to say that in writing to bishops, the nuncio committed acts of ecclesiastical jurisdiction which had always been forbidden for a nuncio to do in France. "It is here again that the Government of the Emperor is obliged to put forth an absolute protest at this pretension."

Further along, referring again to the "pretensions of the Nunciature," the memo said that Rome and the Nuncio should remember a decree from an earlier pope (Urban VIII) that in cases of transferred bishops, only the Roman Curia or "some other means" should be used to send such a notice. The French government had historically been "the other means" by which all papal correspondence had been transmitted. The memo concluded that the government should declare again that it would no longer tolerate direct correspondence between the Nuncio and the bishops. 27

There were to be several more instances of Chigi's conduct before 1870 which would compromise him in front of the cabinet. In 1866, he wrote to the cathedral chapters of Marseilles and Vannes, instructing them to proceed with a canonical election upon the resig-

27 AN, F 1947. The memo is in a subsection of this carton entitled: "Rapports de la France avec Rome sous le Second Empire et la Troisième République."
nation of the previous ordinary. In 1863 and 1867, the Minister of Cults turned down requests by provincial bishops that Chigi be allowed to participate in local religious observances. Baroche denied the requests, indicating that the nuncio could not be allowed to attend such functions where his mere presence and seniority would allow him to preside over the services. 28

In early 1869, the French government took exception to letters of some Ultramontane clergy in France on the upcoming council which were published in Rome in the Jesuit organ, Civiltà Cattolica. The government thought the publication improper since the letters had passed through the Paris nunciature. The French were further disturbed by the pro-infallibility nature of the letters. Chigi castigated the government for itself interfering in the Holy See's matters. 29

Drouyn de Lhuys was prompted at one point to remark to Baroche that although Rome was always disposed to admit "in principle" that the nuncio accredited in France "was only an ambassador," the Vatican always evaded the issue when a question of a violation came up. 30

28 AN, F191924, and F191947.
29 Maurain, pp. 896-899.
All this did little to make relations between the Second Empire and the Holy See harmonious. It is well-established that such things as the September Convention, the Syllabus, the mistrust between Pius IX and Napoleon III, the Emperor's chameleon views on the Roman Question, and the Ultramontane-Liberal split in the ranks of French Catholics were definite signs of Franco-Vatican discord. It is safe to say that the conduct of the papal nuncio in Paris during the same period was of no help and probably did more harm than good.

As the decade of the 1860's closed, the Vatican Council opened. In France, some of the Emperor's "liberal" reforms were imminent. The immediate prospects for understanding between Paris and Rome were dim. Only a few more months remained in which to re-establish cordiality before the skies would collapse in the summer of 1870.
CHAPTER II

IN THE LAST DAYS OF THE SECOND EMPIRE

JANUARY TO JULY, 1870

The last six months of the life of the Second Empire are often described as its last spring. Internal economic growth was never greater, the social issues were dormant, the liberal reforms began to take hold, the foreign scene boded peace. The Papacy was enjoying similar strength despite the discord often seen in the sessions of the ecumenical council. Pius IX was popular as never before, there was an overwhelming infallibilist majority in the council, the Temporal Power was secure with the continued presence of French troops and the seeming weakness of Italy, and the rush toward the proclamation of infallibility was itself a sign of ultimate triumph. The issues and duties which faced Flavio Chigi from January to July of 1870 reflected this optimistic outlook, as he shared in the successes experienced by Paris and Rome. With the exception of an abortive French attempt to intervene in the council, the situation was encouraging.

The year 1870 opened with the annual New Year's reception at the Tuileries in which the Diplomatic Corps took part. Chigi, as
Dean of the Corps, delivered the official greeting to Napoleon III as he had done each January 1 since 1863. In his remarks, Chigi gave the traditional New Year's message of the assembled corps, making particular reference to the ambassadors' hopes for the health of the Emperor, Empress, and Prince Imperial and for the prosperity of France. Napoleon's formal response indicated his hope for good relations between his government and foreign powers in the new year.  

The Emperor made a personal aside to Chigi, entrusting him to pass on to the Holy Father his profound homage. Napoleon regretted that his own state of ill-health and the work of the council facing the Pope had prevented the two from maintaining better contact. The Prince Imperial likewise approached Chigi at the reception and requested that the nuncio lay before the Holy Father his peaceful wishes and devotion.  

The next day saw the announcement of the new Ollivier Ministry, the so-called cabinet of the 2nd of January. The new ministry

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1 *Journal Officiel*, January 2, 1870, p. 5.

2 Rapp 1527, January 4, 1870, ASV, Segr di St. Archivio di Nunziatura di Parigi (hereafter ANP). This report was found in the archives of the nunciature now on file at the Vatican. The files of the various nunciatures are systematically recalled to Rome. Unfortunately, these particular bundles of documents are not paginated as the Rubricare. Reports not found in the Secretary of State's file can usually be found in rough draft in the nunciature archives.
was to embody the latest step of Napoleon III's continuing liberalization as it was intended to be a true, functioning cabinet. Chigi saw in the formation of this new ministry the intent and hope of the Emperor to establish a "vital" government, one balanced between Center and Center-Right which would enhance the imperial authority and one which would create a counterbalance against the Orleanists and other elements. Chigi thought that all political elements which could prevail against such a combination as the Ollivier cabinet were all in motion but that such a design of opposition would not have any probability of succeeding.

The men to be found in the ministry were very acceptable to Chigi. Louis Buffet at Finances, Louvet in Agriculture and Commerce, the Marquis de Thalouet at Public Works, and the new President of the Conseil d'Etat, Marie-Louis Parieu, all had reputations as fervent and practicing Catholics. The Comte Daru, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Emile Segris, Minister of Public Instruction, were "decisively infused for the cause of the Church." Two other members of the ministry, Emile Ollivier, Keeper of the Seals, and Maurice Richard, Minister of Fine Arts, were Protestants but Chigi thought them well-disposed toward the Catholic religion. "It is false to assume," Chigi wrote to Antonelli, "that Ollivier is so ravished with errors concerning the two most important points, the
Temporal Power and the rapport between Church and State."

Antonelli's reaction was that Chigi's report, along with other information about these men he had received from France and elsewhere, "had given hope that the interests of the Church and of the Temporal Power of the Holy Father will find in the new ministry a new means of support and . . . perhaps an effective defense."

Antonelli also told Chigi that the nuncio's communication conformed to his own judgment of the men in power. Rome evidently felt reassured that Napoleon III's continued liberalization and appointing of non-Catholics to important positions did not appear to threaten French policy toward Rome.

Chigi quickly learned to adapt himself to dealing with the new liberal system. Antonelli had ordered him to seek an interview with Daru to obtain the Emperor's final agreement to some nominees to vacant sees. Chigi's first impulse was to request an audience with both Daru and Napoleon, thinking that the Emperor would wish to be directly consulted. Chigi found out very quickly that this procedure was now mistaken. He was quickly informed that he need meet only with the Foreign Minister as under the liberal reforms the new ministers had far more authority than previously. "Such diligence,"

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3 Ibid.
4 Antonelli to Chigi, #57565, January 10, 1870, loc. cit.
he wrote, "I have believed to be more opportune, indeed even necessary, because I know positively that in all deliberations which concern public affairs, the minister deals with them categorically. According to the new system, the operation of parliamentary rule, . . . all the participants [in a cabinet meeting] deal with the Emperor ministerially and His Majesty seems merely to preside."5

An early test for the Ollivier Ministry was the shooting of the republican Victor Noir by the infamous Pierre Bonaparte, a disgraced cousin of the Emperor. The possibility of turning Noir's funeral into an anti-government demonstration was thwarted by Ollivier's famous quotation on threatening to use force to break up any such demonstration yet affirming that his government was one of peace and order. Chigi wrote in glowing terms to Antonelli on January 18 of his admiration for the government and how it handled the situation. The government's action showed it possessed "all the conditions of a great vitality and a splendid success." The ministry was now viewed by public opinion on all sides as having "dignity, force, capacity undiminished." All factions were now rallied around Ollivier's leadership.6

5 Rapp 1530, January 11, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 248, f 2, fol. 5.

6 Rapp 1535, January 18, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 248, f 1, fol. 9.
In early February, a strike by workers at the Le Creusot steelworks in Paris was broken up by use of troops, the first such instance in France since the 1850's. Chigi made reference to how the workers were tightly organized and how there were revolutionary elements among them. He praised the troops for the restraint shown, how they reacted only when acted upon, and the fact that there were no deaths and only minimal wounds. However, he thought that the Ollivier ministry was setting a dangerous precedent for itself, that it could perhaps reap what it has sown. An important lesson for Rome was that Olliver had indicated that he could well follow the same course of action if the papal government was threatened by similar revolutionary outbreaks. 7

The sessions of the Vatican Council had been underway since December 8, 1869, but the proceedings at Rome had little occupied Chigi's attention during the first part of 1870. The French government had likewise given little heed to the sessions. Upon taking office, Daru had in a Senate speech disclaimed any interest on the part of the Foreign Ministry and had thus re-affirmed the hands-off policy enunciated by his predecessor La Tour d'Aubergne the previous September. Until late February, Chigi's correspondence mentioned little about

7Rapp 1549, February 11, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 243, f 3, fols. 54-55.
the council debates, the issues under discussion, or the heated arguments on voting procedure then underway.

A succinct change in this situation began to appear after the text of the scheme de Ecclesia was furtively published by the Augsburger Zeitung in late January, 1870. The schema contained the controversial statement on papal infallibility. It further contained a number of sections pertaining to relations between Church and State, one of which read, "If anyone says that the Church is not a perfect society . . . or that, in the civil society or in the state, it is subject to secular control, let him be anathema." There were other portions asserting the Church's right to own property, control education, and to decide whether the civil power was acting correctly in a moral sense. It was this section which aroused the fears of several European civil governments, France in particular, and which produced a mild attempt by Daru to effect some sort of intervention in the council sessions.

Other European states, Austria and Prussia especially, were to be brought into the affair with the French and through their own representatives in Rome. The diplomatic involutions seen in this study need not occupy us here. As it turned out, the French action

8 Lillian Parker Wallace, The Papacy and European Diplomacy, 1869-78 (Chapel Hill, 1948), pp. 72-73 and 76-79.
was largely unilateral due to the deference shown France by the other powers and because of the lack of substance in Daru's maneuvers. Chigi naturally became a part of the exchanges between Paris and Rome. He managed to present the Vatican's case in a very determined way, but the eventual failure of the French efforts cannot be attributed to Chigi alone.

Daru's first move came on February 20 when he sent a dispatch for Antonelli to the Marquis de Banneville, French ambassador in Rome, expressing strong objection to the wording of the schema on Church-State relations. Daru focused his arguments on this portion of *de Ecclesia* only, offering no comment on the dogma of infallibility, which he said was entirely a religious matter. In a cabinet meeting on February 21, Daru came face to face with strenuous opposition from other ministers for his action, and he was forced to telegraph Benneville to hold back the dispatch from Antonelli until the wording could be toned down. 9 On February 22, Chigi sent word to Antonelli that he had caught wind of a "new impression" in the government concerning what was happening at Rome. There was a great worry as to what would happen to civil society if conciliar

9Wallace, pp. 83-84. The full text of Daru's note can be found in *Acta et Decreta Sacrorum Conciliorum Recentiorum, Collectio Lacensis* (Rome and Fribourg, 1890), Vol. VII, pp. 1553-1555. The note is in a section devoted to documents between Rome and the various governments of Europe on matters related to the council.
sanction of the schema was forthcoming, and the government, as far as Chigi was able to determine, was definitely going to make some move. Chigi was further aware of the difficulty Daru was having with the cabinet, but the main fear was that the troops would be withdrawn from Rome if the schema were adopted. 10

Chigi was able to see Daru about the matter on March 6. Daru was rather cooperative. He admitted that messages had been sent to Banneville about French objections to the council, and he showed Chigi some of the letters and papers involved. He expressed his conviction that the ideas contained in the schema would amount to tearing up the Concordat. As far as removing the French garrison was concerned, Daru said he realized how such an action would only strengthen the cause of the Left in France and he would rather turn in his resignation than have any part of withdrawing from Rome. Daru then brought up the matter of whether the pope would admit a French ambassador to the council sessions. The dispatch of February 20 had not mentioned this idea as it had contained only the protests against de Ecclesia, but Daru had made the suggestion of an ambassador in notes to other civil powers. Only by the time of this conference with Chigi was the matter brought before a papal repre-

10 Rapp 1554, February 22, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 165, f 3, fols. 88-89.
sentative. Chigi and Daru simply went over possible candidates for the position (namely Banneville, Parieu, and the Duc de Broglie), but nothing was said on the legitimacy of admitting an ambassador of a civil power to a church council. In his report, Chigi made no comment on Daru's request or on the candidates suggested.  

Antonelli's response to Chigi's report was couched in no uncertain terms. He spoke of what he called "the strange interpretations attached to this document [de Ecclesia]" saying that they were none other than the product of unjust ideas on the nature of the Church. He considered it a false concept to say that the rights of the Church impinged upon the civil power. He promised that his upcoming statement would set things clear as to the meaning of the articles in the schema and would "serve to undeceive the honorable Comte Daru in his ill-conceived convictions that the schema would tend to tear up the Concordat. . . . The conclusions of the council . . . will never have as an effect the abolition of the Concordat." Antonelli refrained from making any direct reference to the Daru note of February 20 or to the ambassador's proposal. 

11 Rapp 1566, March 8, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, ANP, 1869-70.

12 Antonelli to Chigi, #58260, March 18, 1870, loc. cit. There is difficulty experienced in analyzing diplomatic documents and trying to maintain proper chronology because of the time lag involved in transmitting notes between emissary and foreign minis-
In mid-March, Baron Karl de Werther, Prussian ambassador in Paris, told Chigi that Count Otto von Bismarck was thinking of responding in a positive way to the French proposal for common action against the council. Chigi told Antonelli about this but countered the development by saying that talk in the Diplomatic Corps at Paris was that religious questions should be kept apart from political ones. There was hesitation by both Catholic and Protestant powers to interfere in any way in the council, and, despite what Werther had said, the mood Chigi read was that deference was going to be given to France's initiatives. Antonelli wrote back that the proposal of which Werther had spoken had been definitely refused. He further

try. By the time an ambassador, or in this case a nuncio has sent something to his chief and received a response, several days have elapsed. Important other events may have occurred in the meantime.

In the Chigi-Antonelli correspondence, there was a variance of four to nine days from the date of a Chigi rapporto to the date of a direct response by Antonelli. Then it would be several more days until Secretary of State's answer would be delivered to Chigi. Telegraph was, of course, used in emergency situations, and these are so noted. There is no way of telling how often Antonelli was able to answer the same day he received something from Chigi. Since the focus of this paper is Chigi and his view of things in Paris rather than Antonelli and how things looked from Rome, the emphasis is laid upon how all this transmission appeared in Paris. The reader is advised not to pay much attention to the dates of some of Antonelli's statements, no matter how late they may seem.

13 Rapp 1575, March 21, 1870, loc. cit.
enjoined Chigi to discourage the talk of concerted action and of the more frequently heard proposal of a French ambassador to the council.

Antonelli's most forthright statement on the French note of February 20 came on March 19 and was presented to Daru on March 26. Antonelli opened by assuring that the Holy Father was as appreciative as ever for the protection afforded by France for the freedom of the council. The Holy See further understood that Daru's interest was prompted by sincere and devoted sentiments on his part. Antonelli said he could not see how de Ecclesia had caused such a change of viewpoint in the French cabinet. He took special pains to declare that the objectionable section of the schema did not give the Church or the Roman Pontiff absolute power over the civil authority, although there was certainly something to be said of the superiority of the spiritual over the temporal on all levels. The Church is a perfect society, said Antonelli, and it is the one to decide what shall be rendered unto Caesar and what shall be rendered unto God.

The principles as enunciated in de Ecclesia, Antonelli continued, had been taught by the Catholic Church for centuries. The essential purpose in debating and proclaiming them in the council was mainly "to recall to modern society the divine precepts of jus-

14 Antonelli to Chigi, #58358, March 30, 1870, loc. cit.
tice and honesty and to bring again to the world that peace and prosperity which only can be attained by the observance of the divine law." The French government, he said, had no reason to intervene in the deliberations of the council. Despite Daru's contention, there was no provision in the Concordat of 1801 allowing the French government to have a representative at any Church council. The adoption of de Ecclesia would not in any manner alter the relations between France and the Holy See and any other civil government. Antonelli said he hoped that the French would not continue to insist on having an ambassador at the council or on having any say on any council matters.

As stated above, Chigi presented this note to Daru on March 26. Because the meeting was rather short and was part of the weekly reception given by the Foreign Minister to the Diplomatic Corps, Chigi requested a later appointment with Daru to sound him out more thoroughly. Daru would have more time to sample the sentiments of other members of the cabinet. Accordingly, the two did not meet again until March 31. Daru said that the response of Antonelli was benevolent and deferential in tone but severe and regretful in content.

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because of the rejection of the ambassador request. The Foreign
Minister was inclined to modify his position on the ambassador ques-
tion, but he thought some way remained for the French to continue
pressure and eventually get their ideas before the council. 16

On April 2, Chigi sent notice to Rome of an impending devel-
opment which would effectively end the current maneuvers of Daru.
A project which had long been talked about in French political circles
was about to come to fruition: the idea of holding a plebiscite to sub-
mit to national approval all Napoleon III's recent liberal reforms.
Chigi saw two motives in the decision to go for the plebiscite. First,
the government wanted to see the Imperial dynasty receive a renewed
stamp of approval which a favorable plebiscite would indicate. The
second motive was that the Imperialist party would be able by such
an act of power and energy to destroy the opinion that it was defunct
and lifeless. Chigi thought the Imperialists were aiming at the forces
of the Left, especially the Republicans and Orleanists. 16

The question of whether to hold a plebiscite had now reached
cabinet-level discussion. Although the decision to hold a plebiscite
was likely to be made, there was a split in the cabinet. The two
obstinate ministers were Buffet at Finances and Daru. Chigi under-

16 Rapp 1586, April 2, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 248,
f 1, fols. 108-109.
understood these two to be opposed to holding a plebiscite because they were more inclined toward Orleanism, and plebiscites did not enter into a liberal monarchy scheme of government. Chigi thought it very likely that a ministerial crisis would result because of the disagreement and that Daru stood to lose because of his position. 17

Several days later, on April 8, Chigi reported that the government had definitely changed plans from sending an ambassador to the council to the idea of submitting a memorandum. This memorandum would be placed directly before the council thereby insuring that the French point of view would be communicated to the council participants. 18 On April 12, when the cabinet decided to go ahead with the plebiscite, Daru promptly resigned along with Buffet. Chigi was elated that his prediction of several days earlier had come true. He told Antonelli that the departure of Daru did not surprise too many observers, for many had doubted all along that he could remain much longer as Foreign Minister. Daru's successor was not immediately named, and Ollivier temporarily assumed the portfolio. 19

17 Rapp 1587, April 3, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 248, f 3, fols. 56-57.
18 Rapp 1590, April 8, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, ANP, 1869-70.
19 Rapp 1591, April 12, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 248, f 3, fols. 60-61.

Wallace states that when Daru resigned, "The news was telegraphed to Rome, 'Daru resigns. Ollivier takes his place. Council
The business of the proposed memorandum remained at hand despite Daru's departure. It had by now been drawn up, approved by the cabinet, and sent on to Banneville who was trying to obtain an audience with Pius IX to make the formal presentation. Chigi suspected that Daru still had had collective action by the powers in mind because he had sent copies of the memorandum to the other governments. The Austrians had responded by stating approval of what it contained but no more, and Chigi thought that the remaining cabinets had made similar answers. Sentiment for concerted action did not seem to be building. 20

With Daru's resignation, the main support for French intervention was gone. The oral backing of the other powers was still to be had, but within the French cabinet there was no one who would continue to push the issue. Consequently, Banneville was left to present the memorandum without firm advocacy from Paris. He was not able to see Antonelli until April 15, and he did not see Pius IX until a week later. In this audience, the Pope refused to lay the memorandum before the council. 21

free. ' " op. cit., p. 98. She does not say who sent this note, and there is no indication at the Vatican Archives that Chigi sent such a telegram.

20 Rapp 1591, loc. cit.

21 Wallace, pp. 99-100.
During this same period, Chigi’s reports to Antonelli indicate that the memorandum proposal had ceased to occupy the center of attention. Of six reports sent to Rome between April 12 and April 22, not one mentioned anything about the council or the memorandum. Only by April 21 did Chigi have an opportunity to see Ollivier after he took over as acting Foreign Minister. In their conversation, Chigi and Ollivier centered on renewed felicitations between the Holy See and France, an understanding that there would be no change in the status of French troops at Rome, and a pledge by Ollivier to get to the business of naming bishops once the plebiscite was completed. There was no talk of the council.

In the papal correspondence, Antonelli wrote the last word on the French intervention move in a note to Chigi dated May 7. Chigi had written him a week earlier saying that members of the Diplomatic Corps had been asking him what had happened to the French memorandum. The word was out that Banveville had made the presentation, but a response had not been made public. Antonelli told Chigi that the Pope did not find it suitable to give any response as the memorandum did not contain anything substantially different from the first French note of February 20. The answer Antonelli gave on

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22 Rapp 1597, April 22, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 248, f 3, fols. 62-63.
March 19 was sufficient. Antonelli said he was quite content that Ollivier had indicated that the memorandum be allowed to lapse without an answer. The whole démarche instigated by Daru, tenuous from the start, evaporated into oblivion.

In the early part of May, newspaper accounts circulated concerning alleged plots against the Emperor's life; the Journal Officiel noted, for example, the arrest of a number of conspirators on May 1, but played down any danger. Chigi thought that the publicity would discourage "the friends of the revolution" from their determination to take any action. Ollivier did tell Chigi that the danger was more real than the newspaper accounts had indicated, but so far, all conspiracy rings had been uncovered. Chigi thought the government release of the information was designed to shake some of the indifference off the electorate before the plebiscite. The ministry was now more secure than ever in its expectation of the outcome, and it regarded the disclosure of the intrigue as providential.

The long-awaited plebiscite was held on May 8. Chigi was pleased with the favorable result—a nationwide majority of 7 to 1 in

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23 Rapp 1599, April 29, 1870 and Antonelli to Chigi, May 7, 1870; both in ASV, Segr di St, ANP, 1869-70.

favor of the Empire. He wrote to Rome that the government's ex-
pectations were "splendidly justified." One could easily determine
that considerable content and satisfaction had taken hold of the Em-
peror and the cabinet. Reports of disorder in Paris and in the other
great cities of France on the day of voting were unconfirmed, but the
fact of the rumors was an indication to Chigi that revolutionary de-
signs did continue to exist along with the fears that these designs
created.25

With the end of the Daru council intervention move, the break-
ing up of the assassination ring, and the finishing of the plebiscite,
Chigi thought it an opportune moment to have an audience with the
Emperor. He saw both Napoleon and Eugénie on May 13 at the
Tuileries. Chigi opened by telling Napoleon of the relief Pius IX felt
because of the uncovering of the plots against the Emperor's life. A
discussion on infallibility then followed. Despite all that had been
done and said during the Daru démarche, Napoleon III was still evi-
dently concerned about the effects adoption of de Ecclesia with its
assertion of Church rights would have on Franco-Vatican relations.

The Empress was likewise concerned about infallibility. She
spoke in a pronounced manner of her fears that the definition would
bring about the alienization even defection from the faith by many

25Rapp 1604, May 10, 1870, loc. cit., fols. 74-75.
Catholics. Chigi strove to point out that these fears were exaggerated and were rooted in Gallicanism, for which Their Majesties certainly had no sympathy. The great Concordat of Napoleon I was the most eloquent and peremptory condemnation of Gallicanism. Chigi thought the points he raised went a long way towards quelling the fears of the Imperial couple and that Eugénie especially was moved to having second thoughts about her qualms regarding infallibility.  

Since the resignation of Daru on April 12, Ollivier had carried the portfolio of the Foreign Ministry, but in mid-May the new minister was appointed, Antoine-Alfred Duc de Gramont, who had been serving as ambassador in Vienna. Gramont, of course, was to play out his unenviable and controversial role later in the Ems Dispatch Crisis and the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War. The Duc was not unknown in Vatican circles as he had been assigned to Rome previously. Chigi reported that Gramont's religious principles were so manifest that he did not have to inform Rome on that matter. Two other ministers were appointed at the same time, Charles Plichon at Public Works and Jacques Mege at Cults. Chigi spoke very highly of these two in terms of their religious devotion and their loyalty to

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26 Rapp 1607, May 14, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 243, f 2, fols. 72-75.
Chigi's first conference with Gramont came May 19. Gramont was quite effusive in telling Chigi how highly he regarded the Pope, and Chigi thus thought that Gramont would prove very dependable to Rome. Gramont also said that interpolations and "violent motions" could be expected soon in the Legislative Corps soon regarding the council. He told Chigi not to worry, that the government could handle the situation should it arise.

On May 21, 1870, Chigi and the rest of the Diplomatic Corps participated in the ceremony at the Tuileries marking the official proclamation of the results of the plebiscite. The occasion was the last triumph of the Second Empire and the last great ceremony of its life. Talk and publicity had earlier been in diplomatic circles that Chigi was leading a movement to use the gathering to address a collective note of congratulation from the Diplomatic Corps to the Emperor because of his success. Chigi denied in a report to Antonelli that such a move was underway. He said that as far as he knew the English ambassador, Lord Lyons, and the Austrian ambassador, Prince Richard von Metternich, were going to offer the individual

27 Rapp 1610, May 17, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 248, f 3, fols. 78-79.

greetings of their sovereigns to Napoleon because of the uncovering of the assassination plots earlier in the month. Chigi had done this for Pius IX in the audience of May 13, but he felt a collective congratulations by diplomatic representatives would have been interfering in French politics.

On June 3, Chigi met again with Gramont, and the points they dealt with were the council, the sojourn of French troops in Rome, and the finances of the Papal States. On the council, Gramont said that action could still be expected in the chambers but that the Holy See should neither take offense nor be upset. He said that he had not spoken of nor given the least thought to bringing out the troops, and in regard to papal finances, Gramont indicated that the time was not ripe at the moment, but perhaps in the immediate future some measures could be taken to bring relief to the Holy See's treasury.

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29 Rapp 1602, May 6, 1870, loc. cit., fol. 70-72. References to this rumored action were made in Mémorial Diplomatique, May 5, 1870, p. 339 and May 10, 1870, p. 353.

Lord Lyons thought that Metternich was the main catalyst behind the move to present the collective congratulations and that Chigi merely made some inquiries among other diplomats and found them generally cool on the suggestion. Lord Newton, Lord Lyons, A Record of British Diplomacy (London, 1913), Vol. 1, pp. 287-288.

In Henry Salomon, L'ambassade de Richard Metternich a Paris (Paris, 1931), p. 245, reference is made only to the fact that Metternich directed a personal congratulatory note on the plebiscite from Franz Joseph to Napoleon III.

30 Rapp 1620, June 3, 1870, ASV, loc. cit., fol. 97-98. This
After this all-inclusive conference and its amiable results, Chigi found time to leave Paris for the baths at Marienbad to get some long-needed treatment. The month of June spelt the beginning of the summer hiatus in Paris, and the time was as good as any for a respite. Chigi was gone from Paris from approximately June 5 through June 15. The fortnight spent at the resort did not bring complete rest and diversion to the nuncio, as the ingredients for another "publication of letters" controversy were put together during Chigi's absence.

A letter addressed to Chigi from Monsignor Francesco Mercurelli, one of Pius IX's private secretaries, was published in L'Univers, Le Monde, and the Mémoiral Diplomatique on June 21. The letter said that the Pope was quite satisfied with the many letters and messages of support for infallibility which had been received in the past few months from the French clergy, and since so large a number of such messages had come to Rome, he found it impossible to answer them all individually. Mercurelli asked Chigi to make individual answers and to make a general statement of the Pope's appreciation. As on the previous occasions during the 1860's, the

is one of the few references to papal finances that this paper will make. However, the Chigi rapporti say much about papal finances because the Vatican made several loans with French banks including the Rothschilds. Also, the Peter's Pence Collection was taken up monthly in France and was forwarded to Rome through the nunciature.
French government took exception to the publication and was upset that the nuncio had been enjoined to communicate with the clergy. The old phrase, "Le nonce n'est qu'un ambassadeur," re-appeared in a memo from the Minister of Cults to Ollivier.  

This particular incident did not grow to the proportions of the earlier ones. Chigi quickly pointed out to the Quai d'Orsay that he had been away from Paris when the note arrived and that a lower official in the nunciature had taken receipt of it. Thinking the letter was of interest to the French clergy, the official judged that newspaper publication was the best way of handling the situation. Chigi verbally told Gramont how the error came about, and the whole matter was quietly and quickly dropped. A repetition of the Nice affair and the Syllabus letters was not to be had.  

Towards the end of June and the beginning of July, Chigi found himself pre-occupied with some rather routine matters. Antonelli wanted him to inquire as to the status of the recruiting station of the Roman Legion which Antonelli understood was about to be

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31 Information on Chigi's absence from Paris is in Antonelli to Chigi, #59041, May 30, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, ANP, 1869-70 and Rubricella 343 (1870). The Mercurelli letter is in ANP, 1869-70 and Mémorial Diplomatique, June 21, 1870, p. 495. The French memo is Mége to Ollivier, June 20, 1870, AN, F 19 1924.

transferred from Altkirch in eastern France to Limoges, west of Paris. Antonelli wanted Chigi to find out if the rumors of the transfer were true and what such a change would mean to the status of the legion. Another matter of interest was the continuing threat of an interpellation in the chambers on the government's attitude toward the council. On July 1, Chigi wrote that Gramont had told him that Daru might spearhead such an attack but that the cabinet was prepared. A few days later, Chigi devoted much attention in a dispatch to a request by the Orleanist Princes to have the decree of exile against them repealed. 33

Chigi's pursuit of the status of the Roman Legion recruiting station was to be fruitless. The expected interpellation led by Daru would never come. In the same dispatch in which Chigi devoted so much space to the relatively innocuous petition of the Orleanists, he made his first mention of the Hohenzollern Candidacy to the Spanish throne.

At this point, some assessment can be made of Chigi's per-

33 Discussion of Roman Legion recruiting station in Antonelli to Chigi, June 10, 1870, ASV, ANP, Segr di St, ANP, 1869-70 and in Rapp 1623, June 17, 1870 and Rapp 1623, June 28, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 190, f 2, fols. 119-120 and 113-114.
Gramont remarks about Daru quoted in Rapp 1626, July 1, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 248, f 3, fols. 162-163 and Chigi remarks about Orleanist in Rapp 1628, July 8, 1870, loc. cit., fols. 165-166.
formance as an ambassador, leaving aside the particular issues he faced in these first six months of 1870 such as the council intervention move and the plebiscite. Such an estimation is better placed here because things were to be so different after the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War. Certain trends and patterns emerge which indicate some of Chigi's outlook and his manner of handling situations.

A striking but not altogether unexpected aspect of Chigi's reports is his way of evaluating members of the French government rather solely in terms of their personal devotion and their support of the Temporal Power. That this kind of subject matter appears in the writing of a Roman clergyman in the service of an about-to-be infallible pope perhaps should not surprise anyone, and, given the official nature of Catholicism in the Second Empire, this kind of appraisal might seem somewhat appropriate. Yet one would think that a nuncio should be telling Rome more about a cabinet member: such things as his family and political background, his ability to handle his new post, and some of the projects or programs the new minister might have in mind. The Vatican and its nuncio should have been concerned about these other factors surrounding members of the government. Chigi should have furnished much great information on the key cabinet positions of Minister of Cults and the Foreign Minister, who activities and outlooks would affect the status of
the Catholic Church in France and the survival of the Temporal Power regardless of the number of prayers they said or the endless pledges of support for the Temporal Power. That Chigi's vision was so limited was one of his major shortcomings.

Another side of Chigi is his almost paranoid concern for keeping the French troops in Rome and his constant inquiry as to whether they were about to be removed. Instances of this appeared in Chigi's meetings with Daru and later with Ollivier and Gramont, when the nuncio was the one who was always asking if the troops were about to be pulled out. When Chigi first heard of Daru's council intervention plan, his first impulse was to link any such scheme to the threat of pulling out the garrison. There is no evidence that Daru had any such project in mind. Chigi's fears of French abandonment of Rome was consistent throughout the 1860's as well. Often the words "ritiro delle truppe" appear in dispatches during that period even though the government in Paris had given no hint of such an action.

Chigi's rare comments on French politics seem somewhat untenable, at times naive. For example, he mentions Orleanism numerous times, apparently regarding it as a potent force on the French political scene. At one point he classified Orleanism as a force of the Left. The evidence elsewhere is that Orleanism was barely organized at this point in the Second Empire and its adherents were few; an Orleanist party hardly existed in the chambers. Chigi
gives some attention to the republican elements in France but always lops them with extreme revolutionary groups. Such a mistaken generalization would be expected from a nineteenth-century churchman whose education and exposure were so severely restricted. Chigi's reaction to the Le Creusot strike and the conspiracies in early May were more vertiginous than the government's.

What is lacking in the Chigi reports is a continuing and pointed analysis of French politics. His references to parties and opposition groups are in the vaguest of terms, and there is little talk of chamber debates. Chigi's political comments are prompted only by specific events such as civil strife or ministerial changes. The state of French politics was critical to the Vatican's interests, and Chigi would better have served those interests by a greater awareness of the whole picture.

Chigi's place and standing within the Diplomatic Corps is hazardous to assess because the evidence for forming such a judgment is extremely sketchy. It has already been pointed out that the French Foreign Ministry Archives are scant in resumés on Chigi. Standard secondary monographs on other important diplomats in Paris such as Lord Lyons and Metternich make little reference to Chigi. Chigi himself writes only obliquely of other ambassadors, seldom mentioning any by name. Chigi's role as Dean of the Corps came into play only on ceremonial occasions. There is little to
indicate that he displayed much leadership among his fellow ambassadors.\textsuperscript{34}

This consideration has thus far elicited a view of Archbishop Flavio Chigi at Paris as an ambassador \textit{qua} ambassador. The sum total is that he was something less than competent and was crucially short-sighted. It has been observed how Chigi acted under "normal" circumstances. After mid-July of 1870, the predicament in which Chigi found himself was anything but normal.

\textsuperscript{34} The references cited in n. 29 above are about all that is said in Lord Newton's work on Lord Lyons and Salomon's monograph on Metternich concerning Chigi. In the case of one other important member of the Paris Diplomatic Corps, namely the American minister Elihu Washburne, that situation was quite different as will be seen in later chapters.
The Hohenzollern Candidacy to the Spanish throne came into Flavio Chigi's life with the same unexpected suddenness that it entered the general European scene. Foreign ministries everywhere commented on how no serious problems loomed on the horizon. It was summer, and everyone was on holiday. There had been no hint of a direct confrontation between France and Prussia since 1866. Powers such as England and Russia remained on the outside looking in, offering little chance to upset the equilibrium. States such as Austria and Italy had too many internal problems to indicate that they would cause any trouble that would disturb the peace. Finally, in far-off Spain, Carlist wars, pronunciamentos, and civil strife had been the order of the day for so long that no one seemed to take notice. The Spanish had turned out their dissolute Queen Isabella II in 1868 and had been looking for an occupant of the throne ever since. Few had any idea that this search would produce the bombshell it did when the Cortes under the leadership of the dictator General Juan Prim
offered the throne to a member of the Catholic branch of the Prussian royal family, Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen.

Chigi's activities in June and July of 1870 had not risen above the level of the routine. He had shown very little interest in Spanish affairs, and the only thing remotely connected with Spanish events which came to his attention was some correspondence which he handled for the exiled Isabella, then residing in Paris. This correspondence was superficial and consisted of Chigi forwarding notes from Isabella to Rome. The notes and letters were of a formal nature and contained nothing in the way of political deals between Isabella and the Holy See.¹

There is no need to say that after the Hohenzollern Candidacy became public knowledge on July 3, the whole situation was drastically changed for Chigi. He abruptly found himself handling several issues of the most vital and paramount nature. He had to follow the intricacies of the unfolding Candidacy crisis and the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War. There was then the war itself to be dealt

¹Most of these notes consisted of formal greetings from Isabella to Pius IX on religious feasts and so on. Chigi did not meet with the Queen, he merely acted as a post man. If Isabella wanted to follow protocol in sending things to Rome, she had to use the Apostolic Nuncio in Paris as she could use neither the Spanish Embassy nor the French Foreign Ministry.

Several biographies consulted on Isabella and other works on Spanish political history of the time indicate nothing on Chigi.
with, the disaster of Sedan, and the sudden appearance of the republic. More importantly, Chigi was faced with the task of protecting the Temporal Power and keeping the French troops in Rome, but he would see Rome fall nearly as fast as the Second Empire. In the end, Chigi was to find himself in a besieged city wondering how to insure his own safety and that of the other diplomats.

The world first heard of the Spanish offer to Leopold on July 3, 1870. On July 6, the Foreign Minister of France, the Duc de Gramont, gave his famous chamber speech firmly denouncing the prospect of a Hohenzollern on the Spanish throne and affirming France's total opposition. It was not until two days later that Chigi sent anything about these developments to Cardinal Antonelli. Throughout the days of the Candidacy Crisis, Chigi was remarkably silent about the events unfolding around him on all sides, and he later confessed that things moved so quickly he could barely keep up with them and that Rome could get as much information from the newspapers as from him. Thus he had little to say directly about the original announcement of the Candidacy, Leopold's renunciation, or the Ems dispatch. His comments and actions were more general as he evidently did not feel that he had to act as a news bureau. It will be seen that the Vatican's long-feared specter of France going to war and abandoning Rome was immediately before Chigi's
What Chigi had to say in his rapporto of July 8 was important, however, even though his remarks came five days after the crisis broke and were contained in an almost afterthought fashion at the end of a dispatch primarily devoted to the unimportant petition of the Orleanist princes. Chigi spoke of how the "stagings" of General Prim had provoked such a disagreeable sensation in the French government, but, more importantly, he said that experts on Spanish affairs whom he had consulted thought the Candidacy was not serious or durable and "they think that the emotion felt in the French government is exaggerated and without foundation." These words were the quotation of the opinion of others and not Chigi's. The fact that he would send the dispatch to Rome meant perhaps that he leaned in the direction of those who felt that France was over-vexed concerning the issue.

Later the same day, Chigi sent word to Rome of the mood France was in now that the crisis was full-blown. Chigi felt he did not have to tell Antonelli how excited and repulsed everyone in France was because of the news of the offer to Leopold. He thought that the

\[2\] Rapp 1634, July 17, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, Anno 1871, R 242, f 1, fol. 13 for Chigi's later comment about his not being able to keep up with events.

\[3\] Rapp 1628, July 8, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R248, f 3, fol. 165.
words which Gramont had spoken in the Legislative Assembly two
days earlier were the exact expression of the sentiments of the
nation, as the speech had been thunderously applauded. But if Gra-
mont's words had received so much favorable support and reaction,
there were still many in Paris who thought the speech would have
the opposite effect than desired, namely that Prussia would be un-
daunted and that the Cortes would be goaded into electing Leopold
because of the harshness of the French stand. All the talk of Leopold
needing King William's approval was nonsense, as several years
earlier another Hohenzollern, Prince Charles, had accepted the
crown of Rumania without William's consent. Chigi was confident
that the Candidacy would not be confirmed in Madrid and that the dan-
ger of war would be averted. Even now, Werther, the Prussian en-
voy at Paris, had gone to confer with William at Ems, and Chigi
thought that only a "happy and peaceful result would emerge." 4

Chigi's optimism of July 8 was largely justified. Not all of
France, either in the nation-at-large or in the government, was
completely bent on war. The same was true on the Prussian side,
given the well-known pacific leanings of King William versus the
belligerent hopes of his chancellor Bismarck. Four days later came

4 Rapp 1631, July 8, 1870, ASV, Segr di St., A 1871, R 242,
f 1, fols. 3-4.
the renunciation by Leopold, the event which seemed to many to end
the whole affair. Everyone breathed a sigh of relief. Then came
in rapid succession the famous series of events: the Benedetti inter-
view with William at Ems, the edited dispatch released by Bismarck,
and the violent French reaction which did lead to war.

Unfortunately, some of these particulars went unnoticed by
Chigi, for his next statement did not come until July 14 in a cipher-
ed telegram to Rome:

The responses of Prussia carried by Werther
are evasive. The renunciation of Prince Leopold
is personal. The sovereign's guarantee that the
candidacy will not be reproduced is lacking. This
was formally requested.

I am not without fear that something has been
promised to Italy for the evacuation of Civitavecchia.
Gramont has not yet commented. 5

Chigi's confidence was now shattered. He knew that France
at war could mean withdrawal from the Papal States, and he was al-
ready doing his best to learn what the French government would do.
He must have been trying desperately to see Gramont during the days
of July 12 through 14, but all he could say by the time of this tele-

5ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 165, f 7, fol. 17. Most of
Chigi's telegrams were sent in cipher but decoded, handwritten
copies are on file at the Vatican Archives. The author did not have
to do any deciphering, only translating from Italian. Decoded tele-
grams are so marked on the manuscripts and are pieces of papers
much smaller than the rapporti.
gram was that no comment could be obtained.

On July 15, Chigi sent another telegram:

Today in the Chambers there came what amounted to a declaration of war. Werther is gone. Minister of Foreign Affairs has told me that for now there will be no change for the troops occupying the Pontifical State. Piedmont will declare its wish to remain neutral.

Actually, Chigi had not seen Gramont by this time but had received the assurances through Ollivier. Whether Chigi firmly believed what French officials were telling him is doubtful because he doggedly pursued the matter and also attempted to find out the attitude of Italy regarding the war. 6

The fact that Chigi was not able to see Gramont during these days is readily understandable given the days-long activities in which the cabinet was immersed. Gramont had enough on his mind without having to see the papal nuncio on business which was growing less important by the hour. The floor was occupied by the nations involved: France, Prussia, and Spain; even the powers of England, Austria, and Italy had to take a back seat. There was not much room for a nuncio to be seen or heard. Chigi had not built enough confidence in the French government or the Diplomatic Corps to be called upon or consulted. He represented a sovereign whose stand-

6 ASV, Segr di St, A 1871, R 242, f 1, fol. 11.
ing had diminished a long way since the days of Innocent III. Chigi's repeated ruffling of feathers of French officials through the 1860's had left him with no confidantes in important government posts. The nuncio had not established a firm and trustworthy relationship with Napoleon III. The French position in Rome became inconsequential in the whole picture. Chigi had no role in shaping the events of July, 1870.

Chigi's supreme task was to keep the French in Rome, and beyond that was the question whether Italy would stay neutral. Chigi was able to tell Rome that the French had found out that Italy had opted for neutrality, much to the chagrin of the French. Nigra, the Italian ambassador in Paris, was spreading the word in the Diplomatic Corps that Italy wanted to stay neutral "at all costs." Chigi was worried that the Italian king, Victor Emmanuel II, might carry the day in Florence despite his own ministers' wishes. Chigi had information that Victor Emmanuel was personally determined to take up arms along side the French and had written to Napoleon III to that effect, suggesting common tactics that the Italian and French armies might follow. Though he realized what such an alliance would mean to the independence of the Papal States, Chigi did not think that Italy would come in so quickly or that the French were
realistically depending on the Italians to do so.\footnote{Rapp 1636, July 19, 1870, \textit{loc. cit.}, fol. 30. At this junction in time in 1870, Chigi had nothing to say about the great event at Rome, the proclamation on infallibility. Chigi, of course, had more important business to attend to. Beyond that, the likelihood is that he refrained from any doctrinal comments because his job was that of a diplomat.}

Antonelli said he appreciated all of Chigi's reports and efforts when he wrote to Paris on July 22. Naturally he was pleased to hear the French pledge from Ollivier that the garrison would remain in Rome, but such a pledge was not enough for the Secretary of State. Rumors were rampant throughout Italy, said Antonelli, that a deal had been concocted between France and Italy which called for the recall of the French troops. Chigi was ordered to continue to find out all he could and to keep Rome fully informed.\footnote{Antonelli to Chigi, \#59660, July 22, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, ANP, 1869-71.}

The next day, July 23, Antonelli sent further instructions to Chigi to deliver without delay a note from Pius IX to Napoleon III. The note was addressed personally to the Emperor and consisted of a last-minute appeal for peace. The Pope indicated that though he was sovereign over a small territory, his spiritual and moral authority was immense. He hoped that Napoleon would put an end to the war, and specifically offered mediation, adding that he had sent the same note to William of Prussia. Chigi was told to present this
note if and when he saw the Emperor. 9

Chigi's long-sought audience with the Emperor came on July 25 at the suburban palace of St. Cloud. It had taken almost three weeks while the crisis raged on and the war broke out before Chigi was able to meet with Napoleon. The audience started in the manner all the previous ones had. Chigi opened with a statement replete with the usual felicitations: the Pope was the great spiritual leader, the Pope blessed Napoleon III and his family, Pius IX was ever grateful for the French protection. This last point was especially crucial at this date, and Chigi enlarged upon it, calling it the glory of France and the Emperor. The Holy See was even more grateful now because Napoleon had maintained the garrison despite the needs of war. Chigi limited himself to these remarks, not at any point asking the Emperor directly how much longer, if at all, French troops would stay in Rome.

Napoleon III did not mince words. He seized upon Chigi's last point by saying without any hesitation that "the needs of war" had rendered it indispensable to recall the garrison from Rome. This was all Napoleon said, offering no further explanations or apologies.

Whether Chigi was completely stunned by this announcement

9 Antonelli to Chigi, #59680, July 23, 1870, loc. cit.
or had some forewarning, one can only surmise, but he launched into furious argument on the portent of the French withdrawal. It was fraught with dangers and evil consequences. The security of the Papal States was at stake. Italian troops stood poised on the border ready to seize Rome. If that was not enough, Chigi said, Rome was always faced with the threat of the Garibaldian revolutionaries within the city itself. Pontifical sovereignty needed the French presence.

Napoleon stood firm despite the nuncio’s pleas. He said that he could control the Florentine government, that Italy had learned a lesson at Mentana several years earlier which it had not forgotten.

Chigi countered this by asserting that Italy had shown itself to be completely irresponsible on a number of occasions in spite of treaties solemnly agreed to such as the September Convention.

Gramont, who had apparently joined the audience along with the Empress Eugénie, tried to justify the Emperor’s decision as a military necessity. The French garrison amounted to only five thousand men and was not much more than a police force, the Foreign Minister said. France further wished to avoid making the same mistake that Austria had in the 1866 struggle of having to fight both Prussia and Italy. The main theater of the war was to be the borderlands with Prussia, and France could not risk having to open a second front so far to the south. Gramont went on to say that France was
not acting from fear, that the decision had been made unilaterally, and that the Emperor had written personally to Victor Emmanuel appealing to the honor of Italy and reminding him of the provisions of the September Convention.

The discussion continued a while longer as Gramont brought out some evidence from French diplomatic agents that Italy would behave and would not violate papal territory. Chigi continued to stress how essential it was for the French to stay and how the Pope's own resources were not enough. His arguments did not go much deeper than this, and it was apparent that the French would not yield. Chigi finally gave up hope of dissuading the Emperor and asked for a later audience, which he never received. Napoleon left for the front several days later himself, never to return to Paris. July 25 was the last time Nuncio and Emperor were to meet. It was their thirty-second and final conference.

Chigi had no opportunity to offer the personal note from Pius IX with its offer of mediation. He wrote to Antonelli that the announcement of the troop withdrawal had precluded discussion of any other items. Furthermore, Chigi thought, the Pope's offer was too

\[10\] Chigi's description of his audience with Napoleon III is spread over two rapporti, 1640 and 1641, dated July 26 and July 27, 1870, respectively, both found in ASV, loc. cit. There is no reference to this audience in the French National Archives or the Foreign Ministry Archives.
little and too late, as France was already so enthusiastically and deeply at war. 11

The reaction from Rome was rather muted. Antonelli told Chigi that he understood fully how hard the nuncio had tried to change the Emperor’s mind on the decision to recall. He took no comfort in Gramont’s contention that Italy could be trusted, emphasizing his own belief, similar to Chigi’s that Italy did not have a reputation for abiding by conventions or agreements. 12

An appointment which Chigi had a week later with Gramont produced no further results. Gramont offered declarations from the ministry in Florence that they would abide by the September Convention and not intervene in papal territory, and he informed Chigi of other intelligence which indicated that Italy would hold off. Chigi remained unconvinced as did Antonelli, who told Chigi later that Italian intervention would come after contrived plots had been hatched. Antonelli thought that even though France had departed from Rome, perhaps it would pledge to return to protect the Pope should Italy try to move in. 13

11 Ibid.
12 Antonelli to Chigi, #59809, August 3, 1980, loc. cit.
13 Rapp 1644, August 2, 1870, and Antonelli to Chigi, #59876, August 10, 1870, ASV, loc. cit.
For the rest of the month of August, the question of French protection at Rome seems to have fled Chigi's mind. His reports and other papers indicate that he was deeply engrossed in the progress of the war, following its every turn and sending almost daily accounts to Rome. The expected hand-wringing, knocking at the Foreign Minister's door, attempts to see the Emperor, frantic messages to the Vatican, stern instructions from Antonelli, efforts at gaining the support of prominent French politicians (or even the Empress) were all missing, indicating that the French withdrawal was not totally unexpected and the Vatican was not caught completely off-guard. Chigi had often in the past come to the conclusion that the French were about to pull out. When they finally did as a major war began, he could not have been totally surprised. Through August, then, Chigi studied a nation at war, and his testimony during that month reads almost as a history of the war as seen from Paris.

Chigi was quite aware of the preparations underway once the French had made the declaration. He marvelled at the numbers of men and quantities of material moving through Paris on the way to the front. He noted now the enthusiasm for war was so great in the chambers, how the Emperor's government was stronger, and how public fervor grew day by day. He followed closely the various maneuverings of the French army, how it was divided into several corps, and the campaigns it followed. Every indication is that Chigi
was supporting France quite apart from his official position which would also wish for a French triumph. The optimistic temper which reigned in Paris in the summer of 1870 caught hold of Chigi along with so many others. All believed that France would win. Even after Chigi reported that the French would leave Rome, he spoke of the courage of the French troops and "the hope of final victory which would confirm the superiority of the French Army." ¹⁴

Everything changed on August 4-5 as the French met early minor defeats at Forsbach and Wissemberg on the French-Prussian frontier. These two battles were relatively minor scrapes in which the French received small setbacks. Politically the effect was devastating as the general public began to realize the sorry shape of the Army. Militarily, the effect was equally as devastating in the next several days as the French forces could not adequately re-group and they began their haphazard retreat which would allow them to be trapped at Sedan.

Chigi's communication to Rome was abruptly punctuated with a telegram on August 7 telling of the defeats and how they made the situation grave. Paris was readying itself for seige, a government crisis ensued as the Chambers had been convoked, an appeal would

¹⁴Chigi's war information contained in Rapp 1634, July 17, 1870 and Rapp 1636, July 19, 1870, both in ASV, Segr di St, A 1871, R 242, f 1, fols. 13-17 and 32-33.
be made to all the defensive forces of the nation, and the government and the populace were resolved to defend themselves at all costs.

In a full dispatch two days later, Chigi spoke of Forsbach and Wissenberg as "un disastro generale" and of the feverish preparations already in progress for the defense of Paris. 15

As August wore on, Chigi noted a great air of resentment had grown in the city despite the appearance of public calm. Dissatisfaction appeared everywhere because of the erroneous government announcements on the number of troops in the Army, the falsified accounts from the front, and the generally inept way mobilization was handled. He complained, along with a great many French citizens, that the only way to learn what was happening in the war zone was to read the English newspapers which were uncensored and circulated daily in the French capital. Chigi felt strongly that trouble was brewing, and several times he mentioned revolution as a distinct possibility. The Emperor had better find himself a victory in the field or be faced with problems back home with which he could not cope. As the French armies under MacMahon, Bazaine, and the Emperor regrouped themselves, the feeling at Paris improved. As late as August 22, Chigi said that the French expected a "decisive

15 Telegram, August 7, 1870 and Rapp 1648, August 9, 1870, both in ASV, loc. cit., fols. 90 and 129-130.
victory" soon.

On August 24, Chigi held his last conference with a Foreign Minister of the Second Empire. Prince La Tour d'Auvergne was now Foreign Minister, as Gramont had resigned along with the rest of the Ollivier ministry after Forsbach and Wissemberg. La Tour d'Auvergne repeated much of what Gramont had said earlier. He had proof and assurance from Florence that the government would observe the September Convention and guarantee the integrity and independence of the present pontifical territory. Nigra had continually given such reports to the Quai d'Orsay. At one point, the Italian ambassador had shown La Tour d'Auvergne confidential instructions for General Cadorna, the Italian commander of troops now drawn up along the papal frontier, that the General was to observe a line running from Orvieto to Rieti (both towns are about sixty miles north of Rome) and proceed no further. Chigi did not give his reaction to this meeting, but most likely he remained unimpressed.  

Even though Chigi could talk at such a late date with the For-

16 Rapp 1650, August 11, 1870; Rapp 1652, August 18, 1870; and Rapp 1654, August 22, 1870; all contained in ASV, loc. cit., fols. 133-34, 137-38, and 151-53.

17 Rapp 1655, August 24, 1870, ASV, Segr di St A 1870, R 165, f 3, fols. 96-97. In this report, Chigi does not say what he himself said in the interview nor does there exist any response by Antonelli.
eign Minister about the security of the Papal States, the situation in Paris was worsening. The Prussian armies were getting closer. The great fear was the Crown Prince Frederick's Southern Army would bypass the French forces (then raggedly backing off to the Belgian frontier) and directly invest Paris without opposition. No matter how it was to be done, an attack on Paris was a definite possibility, and in that case, Chigi's greatest responsibility would be to maintain contact with Rome. It was a nervous prospect which faced all the members of the Diplomatic Corps. Towards the end of the month, Chigi was beginning to take steps aimed at collective action by all the ambassadors to keep the diplomatic channels open. His position as dean came into full play in this episode. 18

On August 31, Chigi hosted a meeting of diplomats at the nunciature where they discussed their difficulties. Evidently the ambassadors did not realize the lateness of the hour as two days later came the French defeat at Sedan. The news did not arrive in Paris until September 3, and sometime during that day, Chigi telegraphed to Rome:

The Emperor has voluntarily gone from Sedan to offer himself to the King of Prussia. MacMahon not wishing to subscribe to the surrender has with-

18 Rapp 1657, August 30, 1870 and Rapp 1658, September 2, 1870, both in ASV, Segr di St, A 1871, R 242, f 1, fols. 169-71 and 184-85.
drawn forty thousand men along with Wimspffen.
... His Majesty has been conducted safely, going
to Belgium.

On September 4, Chigi wired:

The Republic is proclaimed. Provisional
government installed without any opposition. All
is quiet. Prussians march unhindered toward Paris.
Diplomatic Corps undecided on whether to leave or
stay. As for myself, I await the orders of Your
Eminence. 19

The rapidity with which event followed event in those early
days of September of 1870 is one of the most chronicled episodes in
French history. The above telegrams, reproduced in their entirety,
are Chigi's only testimony as a witness to the tumultuous changes.
There is no other way to detect where he was each day, with whom
he conferred, how and when he heard about Sedan, whether he saw
any government officials, or if he personally saw such things as the
frenzied Chamber meetings or the various street scenes. This lack
of detail is in marked contrast left by such individuals as Metternich,
Nigra, Lord Lyons, and the American minister Washburne. 20

19 All three telegrams in ASV, loc. cit., fols. 180, 176, and
182.

20 Metternich and Nigra were with Empress Eugénie in her
last desperate hours at the Tuileries and aided her in her escape.
Lord Lyons had just returned from the front where he had unsuccess-
fully tried to see the Emperor. Washburne gives vivid eye-witness
accounts of the Chamber meetings, the proclamation of the Republic
at the Hotel de Ville, and the street demonstrations in Volume I of
his Recollections of a Minister to France (New York, 1887).
Only on September 6, at a time when he had more opportunity to assess the situation, did Chigi pen a report to Antonelli. He referred to the developments of the last several days as a "military and civil catastrophe." He expressed surprise and some sorrow at the humiliating manner in which Napoleon III had surrendered to the Prussians, as this action had played the major role in bringing down the Empire. Chigi also wondered how it was possible that such a small group of politicians in the Chambers could proclaim a republic. Even though a republic was the new order of the day, it did not inspire much confidence or sympathy. Talk was already heard of either an Orleanist or a Bourbon being offered the throne. For the moment, the new government was to defer important questions of internal political matters and foreign relations, concentrating instead on the menace of the Prussians. The government was determined to resist Prussia to the last, but competent individuals doubted that this resistance would be worthwhile or victorious, given the sad condition of the Army.

By mentioning deferred action on constitutional questions, the resolve to continue the war, the overwhelming Prussian threat,

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Rapp 1660, September 6, 1870, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 198-200. The description of the immediate dilemma of the new Republic represents one of Chigi's better, if rarely correct, assessments of French politics.
and the immediate appearance of monarchist solutions, Chigi des-
cribed in a nutshell the essential problems of the Third Republic which
were to plague its entire life.
CHAPTER IV

THE FALL OF THE TEMPORAL POWER AND THE
PROBLEMS OF THE SIEGE OF
PARIS

The disappearance of the Second Empire did not spell an end of troubles for Flavio Chigi. Rather, it served to open a Pandora's box of agitation, a lost cause, and eight months of exile. Trouble enough it was for Chigi to have to face difficulties in Paris, but he also had to do what was possible to stave off the threat besetting far-away Rome.

Towards the end of August, Chigi had become quite aware that the Prussians were pouring into France at a rapid pace. When French inability to stop the invasion became apparent long before Sedan, all Paris expected an attack or siege on the city. The Diplomatic Corps knew that it could not escape any of the dangers incumbent with such an eventuality, so they began to make preparations.

The various ambassadors were split on what course to follow. Some suggested that they should all go to French Army headquarters so as to be near the Emperor and avoid being shut up in Paris. Lord Lyons was the particular proponent of this action, but Chigi thought
it impractical as the French were not about to allow foreign agents into their precincts. Lord Lyons himself found this out when he tried to visit Napoleon III at the front.

An alternative was being pushed by Prince Metternich. He suggested continual contact among the various diplomats and ministers so that collective action could be pursued. A series of meetings toward that goal was begun at the end of August. In the meantime, the diplomats decided to stay in Paris. La Tour d'Auvergne told Chigi on August 29 that the Empress was firmly determined to maintain residence at the Tuileries, come what may. The Diplomatic Corps thus decided to remain close to the Regent government.

As Chigi wrote all this information to Rome, he reminded Antonelli of the "immense difficulty" which could lie ahead if Paris were besieged. With an interruption of communication with Rome so likely, Chigi pledged to use every means of contact possible, whether telegraph or railway if necessary. Nonetheless, Chigi begged Antonelli to send explicit instructions.

Before these instructions arrived, Chigi went ahead with conferring with the other foreign representatives. The first meeting was held at the nunciature on the afternoon of Wednesday, August

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1 Rapp 1657, August 30, 1870, ASV, Seg di St, A 1871, R 242, f 1, fols. 169-71 and Rapp 1655, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 165, f 3, fols. 96-97.
31. It was previously agreed that the meeting would be of the most casual and informal nature so as to allow free discussion and to avoid any public image of panic. Only full-ranked ambassadors were present.

Those attending were unanimous in thinking that freedom of action was of the utmost necessity, yet this freedom was dependent upon what the French government would do in case of siege. Much discussion went into what the diplomatic community would do if the French civil government should largely transfer itself out of Paris and leave the city in the control of a military tribunal. The official status of the Diplomatic Corps would be very uncertain if it were left under the authority of the Army. Finding out the government's plans was the urgent task of the moment, and each ambassador pledged to ascertain this information from the Foreign Minister.²

The battle of Sedan and the collapse of the Second Empire rendered such inquiries academic. The fate of Paris became as obvious as the rising of the sun. Full-scale flight from the city by

²Rapp 1658, September 2, 1870, ASV Segr di St, Anno 1871, R 242, f 1, fols. 184-185.

Chigi does not name those who took part in the meeting, but it can safely be assumed that Lyons, Metternich, and the Spanish and Russian ambassadors were in attendance. Nigra was likely not present as he would have been persona non grata at a papal nunciature.
many citizens and officials began immediately. Chigi found it vital to see the Foreign Minister, but he was not able to get to the Quai d'Orsay until September 8, six days after Sedan and four days after the proclamation of the Republic. There was yet another Foreign Minister by now, Jules Favre (1809-1880), with whom Chigi would have many negotiations in the days and months ahead. Despite the fact that France had practically lost the war and the Prussians were knocking at the gates of Paris, Favre found the time to receive the nuncio just as he had been able to grant interviews to Lyons and Metternich earlier.

Chigi told Favre that he came in what was really an unofficial capacity because the Holy See had not extended recognition to the new Republic. The nuncio was concerned mostly about the fate of the personnel and archives of the nunciature now that the Prussians were on their way. Favre gave his best assurances that the Government of National Defense (the official title the provisional government had given itself) would do its best to protect all foreigners and their property.

Chigi then asked if the foreign representatives in Paris would be able to maintain contact with their home governments. Favre said it was his desire to see the entire Diplomatic Corps kept together outside the capital since Paris would be surrounded in a few days. The advantage would be to make use of the ambassadors in
possible peace negotiations. Favre painted a horrifying picture of a bombarded city in which many innocent victims would suffer. Surely such a spectacle would make the ambassadors do what they could to work for a settlement of the war.

Then the conversation turned to the inevitable topic of the safety of the Temporal Power. With acute embarrassment, Favre showed Chigi a dispatch he had received from Florence. The Italian government had decided to invade the Papal States and take Rome. Without allowing the nuncio to say anything, Favre tried to impress on Chigi the improbability of France coming to the aid of the Holy See in repelling the invasion. There was simply nothing that could be done. Favre then became quite emotional and personable at this point. He hoped to convince Chigi that although his personal convictions were in favor of the Sovereign Pontiff and France fully understood what the Holy See was suffering, the Eldest Daughter of the Church was powerless. Chigi had no response to this.

Favre asked Chigi if he knew whether the Pope would leave Rome should Victor Emmanuel's troops enter the city. Chigi said he had no way of knowing what Pius IX's intentions were and that he hesitated to speak on this question for fear of misquoting his superior or giving mistaken impressions. 3

3 The description of the conference with Favre is entirely
Chigi had ceased to make overt efforts to secure French aid for Rome since his interview with Napoleon III on July 25. His conduct was little different in this meeting with Favre. He did not pound the table, he did not remind France of her sacred duty, he did not threaten ecclesiastical punishment; the hour was past for all of that. He merely acquiesced. Now that Italy had crossed the Papal frontier, the handwriting was on the wall. Chigi evidently agreed with Favre that France could do nothing. Chigi would not see Favre or any other French official until after the 20th of September, the day the Italian army captured Rome. The end of the Temporal Power was in sight, and Chigi apparently accepted that fate.

The instructions which Chigi had requested earlier arrived on September 11. Antonelli said that Chigi should follow the example of the British ambassador in deciding whether to remain in Paris or leave. This suggestion was given in good faith, Chigi wrote back the next day, but most of the diplomats had decided by now that they would act in the best manner they saw fit regardless of instructions from home governments. For himself, Chigi thought that it was best to stay on at Paris for as long as possible. The interest of the Vatican would be better served by his presence in the

contained in one dispatch, Rapp 1661, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 204-205.
capital. Also, Chigi thought he might have a hand in mediating peace between France and Prussia. 4

On the matter of what could be done to save the Temporal Power, Chigi could only formulate theories. If France yet succeeded in stopping the Prussians, then she would come to the Pope's aid. Perhaps the French would be persuaded that the September Convention, being an international treaty, its validity continued under the new regime. Chigi could not imagine that the Catholic and Imperialist sentiments of some members of the new government could not favorably be appealed to. All these factors were ridiculously tenuous, Chigi knew, and he told Antonelli on September 15 that he could not put into words the desolation and sorrow that the news of the continued invasion of the Papal States caused in him. There was no hope now for any comfort or consolation for the oppression of the Holy See. 5

4 Antonelli to Chigi, #56166, September 6, 1870, ASV, ANP, 1869-70 and Rapp 1662, September 12, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1871, R 242, f 1, fols. 206-207.

5 Rapp 1662, September 12, 1870 and Rapp 1663, September 15, 1870, ASV, loc. cit., fols 201-202.

In Rapp 1663, Chigi made a number of other comments worth mentioning. He saw "no possibility of success for the mission of Signore Thiers." Chigi described an incident of a mob attack on the Jesuit seminary in Rue Vaugirard in Paris and told of Interior Minister Jules Simon's warning to Archbishop Darboy of Paris of the difficulty the government might have in protecting Church properties -- a foretaste of the Commune. Finally, Chigi expressed
On September 20, 1870, forces of the Italian government under General Cadorna entered the city of Rome after token resistance and put an end to the Temporal Power of the Roman Catholic pontiffs. The last dramatic act of the Risorgimento was played out, and Italy now had her historic capital. Pius IX remained in the halls of the Vatican Palace in unshakeable defiance of the new order and began the long, self-imposed seclusion of himself and subsequent popes whereby the Catholic pontiffs became known as "The Prisoner of the Vatican."

Chigi was given this grave news by Favre who presented him with a telegram received at the Foreign Ministry which read:

After several volleys of cannon and a treaty of capitulation, the Italians have occupied Rome. The Holy Father has not left the city.

The same day Antonelli sent his own notification to Chigi and asked him to round up support for the cause of the Holy See. Chigi did this and said he talked with General Trochu (the military governor of Paris and nominal head of the Government of National Defense), Favre, Lord Lyons, and Prince Metternich. All said they deplored the action of Italy but were powerless to do anything. 6

For himself, Chigi could only say that he was very sorry and make some references to the "iniquity and the stealth of the horrible government of Italy." He renewed his pledge of loyalty to the Holy Father and told Antonelli that he would continue to follow all his orders. There was little else to be done. Action on the Roman Question would have to be put off. Chigi now devoted his full attention to the question of what the Diplomatic Corps was to do in a city under siege.7

After Sedan, the Prussians advanced virtually unhindered to Paris and began the siege on September 19. Large numbers of French government officials had previously gone to Tours to establish some sort of center of authority which could keep in touch with the rest of the country. Important officials such as Favre and Trochu remained in Paris. The ambassadors of England, Russia, Austria, Italy, and Turkey left the city soon after the siege began. Chigi was the only full ambassador left in the capital. There also remained the American minister Elihu Washburne (1816-1887), who was handling Prussian affairs in France, and an assortment of other ministers, chargés d'affaires, and consuls from smaller European and Latin American nations. The difficulty was at hand of being able to com-

7Personal letter to Antonelli in Chigh's hand, September 26, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1871, R 242, f 1, Fols. 208-211.
municate with home governments, and under Chigi's leadership as dean of the corps, the emissaries took steps to alleviate their situation.

A second meeting of diplomatic agents took place at the nunciature on Friday, September 23. With the siege now in full force, Chigi told his guests that perhaps their position was useless since they could not send out dispatches. General discontent was expressed that Lyons, Metternich and the others had left without informing anyone and in violation of the agreement to hang together. The problems as Chigi saw them were: when would be the proper time to leave Paris, should the diplomats act separately or together, and what steps might be taken to establish lines of communication. Several ministers spoke their minds. The Swiss minister Kern thought that the Corps should not leave until an official notice of bombardment had been given, as was the usual procedure according to international law. Kern suggested that Chigi should be entrusted to go to Favre in the name of all the diplomats and request from him what information he had. Favre was to submit to the Prussian military headquarters two points: (1) that the Diplomatic Corps be allowed a weekly courier service to leave Paris, and (2) that the Prussians would serve adequate notice beforehand of shelling of the city. Hopeless as it might seem to obtain these conditions, Chigi assented to the mission and promised to reconvene the gathering.
when he had achieved any results. 8

Chigi got in touch with Favre immediately who promised to forward the message to Bismarck when he would see the Chancellor at Ferrières. Favre also said that France was very grateful that the various envoys had decided to stay on at Paris despite the cruel circumstances in which they all had found themselves.

Bismarck's reply, which came on September 26, was hardly comforting. He said he regretted that military considerations would not allow him to divulge any plans or projects concerning attacks to be made against the city. He was, however, disposed to allow the weekly courier service provided that all correspondence was left unsealed and contained nothing pertaining to military affairs.

Chigi received this message through Favre on October 3 and called a third meeting at the nunciature the next day. In regard to Bismarck's answer on the request for a bombardment notice, Chigi said it was evasive. The conditions Bismarck attached to the sending of dispatches rendered it impossible for the Diplomatic Corps


9 Favre to Chigi, September 24, 1870; Bismarck to Favre, September 26, 1870, and Favre to Chigi, October 3, 1870, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 19, 23, and 25.
to avail themselves to the Chancellor's offer. All the envoys present agreed. Some discussion ensued on whether diplomats actually had the right to be notified of bombardment (Kern assured them they did) and to the outrage felt at having to send dispatches unsealed subject to the inspection of a foreign power. Kern again took the initiative and suggested that the diplomats themselves correspond directly with Bismarck and tell him they rejected his statement. Their cause might be better presented than Favre had been able to do. A committee of Chigi, Washburne, Kern, and the Dutch minister Baron de Nyeveldt was appointed to draw up the letter.  

The letter to Bismarck was composed and signed on October 6. Fifteen names were affixed to it, the first being Chigi's. The letter made reference to the message previously sent by Bismarck indicating that dispatches would have to be left open. The diplomats said they wanted to live up to their duties as foreign agents in a capital under siege, but as diplomatic agents they could not fulfill their roles under a condition of open dispatches. If this restriction was imposed they could not act as representatives of neutral powers

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10 Rapp 1667, October 23, 1870, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 15-18 and Washburne, 1, pp. 159-62. Rapp 1667, written several weeks after all this happened, was the first dispatch Chigi wrote to Rome after his arrival in Tours.
and report to their governments properly.\textsuperscript{11}

An uncompromising reply came from Bismarck on October 10. Since the Prussian Foreign Minister Baron von Thiele had given official notice to foreign governments on September 26 that Paris was in a state of siege and that the freedom of movement of diplomatic agents therein was subject to the military situation, Bismarck could only comply with this ruling. The military situation controlled everything, and Bismarck thought that international law was on his side in demanding that all correspondence be left open. The French government had itself decided to hold Paris, and their decision had made Paris a fortress under siege. The diplomats who had chosen to remain with the government to which they were accredited would have to suffer the inconvenience of being in a sieged fortress, and the Prussian government could not be responsible for any consequences.

\textsuperscript{11}Diplomatic Corps in Paris to Count von Bismarck, ASV, loc. cit., fol. 10 and Washburne, I, pp. 161-162.

The diplomats who signed the letter were the following: Chigi, Kern, Washburne, Baron de Nyeveldt, Baron Adelswaerd --minister of Sweden and Norway, Count de Moltke-Huitfeldt--minister of Denmark, Baron Beyens--minister of Belgium, Lopez de Arosemena--secretary of legations for Honduras and Salvador, Ratton--chargé d'affaires of Brazil, Viscount de Las-castre--chargé d'affaires for Portugal, Duke d'Acquaviva--chargé d'affaires of Monaco and San Marino, Martin--chargé d'affaires of Hawaii, Thirion--chargé d'affairs from the Dominican Republic, de Ballivian y Roxas--Bolivian minister, and Galvez--minister of Peru.
This was entirely a new situation, Bismarck continued. A national government at war with a power with which it had severed diplomatic relations had shut itself up in its capital and foreign diplomats with it. Such a set of circumstances was without parallel in modern times, and it was rather difficult to determine what international law said. Bismarck closed by saying that the envoys were still able to communicate with him and King William, but in the end, the diplomats had only the Government of National Defense to blame for their problems.

The persistent obstinacy shown by the Prussian Chancellor seems to have been the last straw for Chigi. He decided the time had come to leave Paris. He made this decision feeling that it was necessary to be in touch with Rome and with the rest of France as well. To leave Paris would provide him the liberty to receive instructions from Antonelli and to be able to carry them out. Also there was the need to counter any influence Nigra, the Italian ambassador, might have at Tours. The needs of Rome could be better pleaded at Tours.

Accordingly, Chigi petitioned Favre to obtain a pass from

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13 Rapp 1667, October 23, 1870, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 15-18.
Bismarck through the Prussian lines, which Favre did with no trouble. Chigi hoisted the papal flag over the nunciature, sealed and hid the nunciature files, and left the building and papal citizens under the protection of one M. Haugel. The nuncio left Paris on October 10 by way of the Porte de Sèvres, the western gateway out of the city.

Instead of heading directly for Tours, some 145 miles to the west, as one might expect, Chigi made a surprising two-day stop at Versailles, which was now the military headquarters of the Prussian forces. There he asked for and received an astounding audience with the full array of the denizens of Prussian power: King William, Crown Prince Frederick, Count von Bismarck, and General von Moltke. Chigi's motive was predictable. He told the Prussian rulers that he wished "to call their attention to the sacrilegious invasion of Rome and to call upon the support of their offices so that justice would be done to the rights of the Holy Father."

Though Prussia was now pre-occupied with the war, perhaps a time and a place could be established in which a declaration of Prussian support would come forth.

After this statement, Chigi got principle responses from

\[14\] Ibid. Attempts to identify this M. Haugel were unsuccessful.
Prince Frederick and Bismarck. The Crown Prince spoke of compromise, saying that the possibility existed of finding a middle ground between the privileges of the Holy See and the action of the Italian government. He expounded a number of reasons and answers for demonstrating that the fall of the Temporal Power of the Holy See and the establishment of another sovereignty in Rome would not weaken the independence and liberty of exercise of the Pope's spiritual power. Therefore the opposition emanating from Rome to the idea of dealing directly with Victor Emmanuel's government had no reason to exist.

Not wanting to hear this kind of advice, Chigi pointed out to the Crown Prince the fragile nature of his suggestions, saying further that they did not take into account in any manner the expectations and inalienable rights of the Holy Father in this matter now called the Roman Question. Chigi's response was typical of any Vatican representative: staunch opposition to any suggestion of a solution which fell short of recognizing the Temporal Power.

Bismarck spoke next, giving a statement which tended to reflect more official Prussian policy than Frederick's informal remarks. The government of Berlin regretted what had happened to the Temporal Power but simply was not in the same position as the Catholic states. Prussia could not take the same interest as Austria, for example, which was situated geographically closer to the Italian
peninsula and was of necessity more concerned than Prussia could be. Prussia would pursue a policy unhampered by the other powers.

At the conclusion of the interview, the Prussian officials begged Chigi to lay their respects before the Holy Father and to convey their respects to Cardinal Antonelli. 15

With his mission in Versailles an evident failure, Chigi saw

15 Rapp 1670, October 27, 1870, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 110-

113.

This rapporto contains the only reference the author could find to this interview. Dr. Mortiz Busch's Le Comte de Bismarck et Sa Suite pendant la guerre de France (Paris, 1879), p. 176 indicates that Chigi was in Versailles on or about October 16, and had an interview with Bismarck, but does not describe the interview proper.

Bismarck's own published writings and memoirs likewise contain little or nothing about this meeting. His The Memoirs (New York, reprinted 1966), II, Ch. XXIII, titled "Versailles", says nothing. Ch. XXIV, titled "Culturcampf", describes negotiations in mid-October, 1870 with Archbishop Ledochowski of Posen and Bonnechose, Cardinal Archbishop of Rouen, in which the two prelates tried (as Chigi had) to get Prussian support for the plight of the Holy See. Bismarck's Lettres à sa femme pendant la guerre de 1870-71 (Paris, 1903) makes no reference to the meeting.

The French Foreign Ministry Archives contain no mention of the meeting. The Vatican Archives contain only Chigi's Rapp 1670 and a follow-up note from Antonelli thanking him for his efforts, indicating that Chigi acted on his own in seeing the Prussians.

The only other place where this meeting could be further explored would be Prussian and German archives. Given the infinitesimal significance of this meeting in the whole picture of the Franco-Prussian war, the conduct of German foreign policy later, the career of Bismarck, etc., plus the fact that the author does not read German, renders any further pursuit of documentation on Chigi's confrontation with the Prussians meaningless.
little reason to stay on any longer. He left and arrived in Tours on October 21, 1870 to begin an exile with a wandering government which would last into the following spring.

July through October of 1870 had been a turbulent four months for Archbishop Flavio Chigi. In a sense, his entire world had collapsed: an emperor he had respected was deposed, a government he favored vanished, a pope he served had been humiliated, a comfortable diplomatic existence he had known was abruptly rent from him. A bad time it was, though Chigi cannot be faulted for bringing all these things about. If it is not a question of Chigi causing all his own troubles, what should be examined are his reactions to these events.

Chigi could easily have become maudlin and sullen once the Second Empire evaporated. The evidence is that he was undaunted. A new government was in, and it did not matter that the form of that government was of questionable acceptability to the Vatican. Thus Chigi immediately began to deal with Favre even though Favre was a Protestant and the government was a republic. Chigi was a diplomat and was in no position to attempt to mold French politics, at least not when the war was going so badly.

If the Second Empire was to disappear without so much as a shrug from Chigi, the loss of the Temporal Power was another matter. Chigi did feel the papal tragedy in a deeply personal way and
admitted as much to Antonelli with many references to sorrow, pain, disgust, desolation, and so on. Such expressions are not often found in diplomatic correspondence.

Chigi's interior feelings notwithstanding, the foremost question is, can it be said that the nuncio failed? Looking solely at the evidence, such as the withdrawal of the French garrison in late July, the delinquency of Chigi in not working night and day to get the French to return to Rome, and the entry of Italian troops into the Eternal City on September 20, the answer to this question would have to be a resounding "yes." Yet because Chigi cannot be blamed personally for all these things, the ineffectiveness of his mission lies elsewhere.

In examining Chigi's role over the long run, that is, going back to 1862, it is clear that the nuncio had not labored enough to better relations between Paris and Rome. He had held the Paris nunciature at critical junctions in Vatican-French relations (the September Convention, Mentana, the Vatican Council), but he lacked either the courage or the finesse to use these and other opportunities to shore up relations between Paris and Rome. For Chigi to be assigned to the court of Napoleon III for eight years and still suffer the ignominy of being told ex post facto about the troop removal indicates an immense shortcoming in Chigi in not establishing himself in diplomatic circles or gaining the trust of officials of the Second Empire.
Chigi's continual squabbles with Napoleon III over such matters as writing letters to bishops and other violations of diplomatic courtesy did not better relations and should have been cause for his recall.

When the end of the Temporal Power came in sight, Chigi had no one to turn to in France, neither the Empress, conservative lay Catholics, or the French episcopate. Chigi could argue vociferously with Napoleon III and Gramont in the audience of July 25, but that was the end of it. It is small wonder that for the next two months Chigi did almost nothing to protect the safety of Rome and the Pope.

Flavio Chigi was the product of a thoroughly traditional Roman Catholic indoctrination. This put him into several traps from which he could not emerge. One was that he represented the usual seen in most Vatican officials at the time: hard-headedness and lack of imagination. The pope was right, those who had other opinions were wrong. France must protect the pope, it was her sacred duty. France's diplomatic services to help the pope in other ways could not be utilized. The pope must have the Temporal Power, no doubts about this could be entertained. Chigi refused to listen to talk of compromise as voiced by Gramont in late July and by Crown Prince Frederick in October.

Chigi was little different from his masters in Rome when it
came to the Temporal Power. If Pius IX and Antonelli were to be given over to their classic intransigence on the question of Papal Sovereignty, the nuncio in Paris could act in no other way. The difference for Chigi was that he was out in the field and had opportunity to maneuver and improve things. He could talk with persons of other viewpoints and possibly get a different perspective on the viability of the Temporal Power. He was in a position to see how inconsequential the question of the independence of the Papal States was in the total European picture. He fell short of doing this and thus helped make things all the worse for both France and the Holy See.

Despite Chigi's omitting to build himself a solid base throughout the 1860's which he could have put to use in 1870, one feature running through the background does offer some defense for him. The fact cannot be ignored that while Chigi himself seems to have accepted the fate of the Italian takeover of Rome, the Holy See itself acted little differently. Inasmuch as Chigi did not rant and rave and give off thunderous protests in Paris, Antonelli himself did not toss up a storm when the French said they were pulling out. Antonelli did not tell Chigi to knock on all doors or have Napoleon III excommunicated. Only towards the end, as September 20 came closer, did the Secretary of State begin to send out a few frantic messages. Once again, this conduct would indicate a certain fore-
taste that Rome would one day be lost and the Vatican would not be able to do much to prevent it.

Chigi can be charged with failure though such a statement is not intended to heap the blame of September 20 on his shoulders alone. In his own surroundings, he could have alleviated the predicament to an extent that French influence could have been put to better use or compromise over the Roman Question could have been worked toward.

In regard to Chigi's handling of the problems of the Diplomatic Corps in Paris, Chigi met again with failure. Here his lack of success can bring no censure, as his actions in trying to deal with awkward conditions were the best that could be hoped for. It would have been a Herculean task to wrangle concessions out of one such as Otto von Bismarck, especially when he was about to put the stranglehold on the prize of Paris. Hardly anyone could have persuaded the Iron Chancellor to allow sealed documents to come out of the capital or to announce his tactics in bombarding the city.

Chigi did his utmost to preserve the unity of the Diplomatic Corps. His pride was not so great that he could not work together with consuls and secretaries from such places as Haiti, Peru, and Hawaii. When Bismarck answered negatively the first time, Chigi had no hesitation in going along with the other diplomats in appealing directly to the Prussian chancellor.
Chigi can be further commended on acting pragmatically by staying in Paris as long as he did rather than follow Antonelli's instructions or depart right away as Lyons, Metternich, and the others did. Finally, it was to Chigi's credit that, even though he represented the Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic world, it was not below him to co-operate with fellow envoys who themselves were not Catholic or who represented non-Catholic states.

Chigi's last venture before arriving in Tours, the audience with the Prussian leaders, stands out as something of a pretentious puzzlement. Here was a nuncio accredited to France holding negotiations with Prussia. Here was a nuncio who had recently completed a turgid exchange with Bismarck and was now trying to curry his favor. Chigi revealed a considerable naïveté by stating that he wished that the time and place could be named when Prussia would come to the Pope's aid. How Chigi hoped to gain such a pledge by making an appeal at a Prussian military headquarters in time of war is incomprehensible. Chigi's abject dismissal of Frederick's conciliatory suggestions indicates how narrow-minded a Vatican diplomat could be. The whole scene was another example of inept Vatican forays into the world of realpolitik.
CHAPTER V

THE MONTHS AT TOURS AND BOURDEAUX

Flavio Chigi took up his own exile with the French government in Tours on October 21, 1870. Tours, with a population of 60,000 at the time, was a medium-sized industrial city some 145 miles southwest of Paris. By autumn of 1870, it had become the center of activity of the French resistance with the government now situated there. Refugees crowded into the city along with remnants of the French army and throngs of government bureaucrats. The diplomatic corps had trickled into the city as well. Despite Tours' new stature as a temporary national capital, things would not be the same as they had in glittering Paris before the war. Chigi did not fit very well in this scene as the Diplomatic Corps could not function as it had before and because the government was so disorganized and preoccupied with the war. Chigi's unwanted sojourn in Tours and later Bourdeaux could normally be dismissed as a dull parenthesis had it not been for the ticklish problem of the Roman Question.

Regardless of a dispossessed pope in Rome and a frenetic French government fighting a quixotic crusade, Chigi plugged on at keeping
the papal needs before French eyes. 1

Chigi's main contact in the Tours government was Jean-Baptiste comte de Chaudordy (1826-1889). A career diplomat who was serving as first secretary of the French embassy in Madrid when the Hohenzollern candidacy crisis broke, Chaudordy was appointed délégué for foreign affairs since Jules Favre had remained in Paris. Chaudordy was a loyal Catholic and monarchist, and his sympathies undoubtedly lay with the plight of Pius IX. Chigi saw fit to appeal to these sentiments but was to meet with little success, a failure due more to France's debilitation rather than a weakness of will on Chaudordy's part.

The nuncio and the acting foreign minister held their first meeting on November 7, 1870, in circumstances far less formal than had been during the peaceful days back in Paris. The substance of the exchange was Chigi presenting a circular protest from Antonelli which referred to France's responsibility of supporting Pius IX under terms of the September Convention. Chaudordy's answer was curt and to the point. France had a new government, and it

1 According to one source, Chigi was lodged in Tours at the home of the Marquis de Mondragon. Leonce DuPont, Tours et Bordeaux, souvenirs de la République à outrance (Paris, Dentu, 1877), p. 58. DuPont further describes Chigi as being "the best lodged and provided for" among the diplomats in Tours, some of whom had to search hard for adequate shelter.
could not be responsible for acts and agreements made by previous men who were either dead or out of office. 2

The brief exchange was typical of several which Chigi would have with Chaudory. The frigid atmosphere and the brevity of Chigi's descriptions resulted from the exigencies of the war-time state of affairs and the consequent dispensation with ceremonials. Specific appointments were hard to get. Formal statements of greeting from the Pope were forgotten. Pledges of support of the Holy Father were completely unheard. The length of conferences was severely curtailed, even to the point that some appear to have been chance meetings in corridors. Ultimately, Chigi was competing with the Franco-Prussian War for the attention of the acting foreign minister.

On November 13, Chigi had another conversation with Chaudory. Chigi found that Chaudory actually did lean toward supporting the papal cause, and, more importantly, Chaudory gave forth with a complete report on talks he had been having with the Italian ambassador, Constantino Nigra. Basically Chaudory had

2 Rapp 1676, November 7, 1870, ASV, A 1870, R 165, f 1, fols. 128-129.

Chaudory's correspondence is at the Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Papiers des Agents du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Inventaire No. 52. There are fourteen volumes which cover the years 1864-1890. These volumes contain no letters exchanged with Archbishop Chigi.
told Nigra of his own personal belief that what was going on in Rome was against the rights of the sacred person of the Holy Father. Nigra attributed these disturbances to the actions of returning Roman emigrants who had taken advantage of the situation. Surely the Italian government was not to blame. Chigi thought it was easy to see the vanity of this argument as the authors of disorder were to be found in the Florentine government.

The substance of this conversation may not appear to be very great, but a precedent was being established. Obviously, there was a willingness by Chaudordy to divulge this information. Chigi was much more eager to hear what Nigra had to say than was Nigra's desire to know the papal nuncio's thoughts. A small but necessary diplomatic chain was being linked up between Rome and Florence by way of Chigi, Chaudordy, and Nigra. Cumbersome as this roundabout path was and short-lived as it was to be, it did prove useful to Vatican-Italian ties in that at least some exchanges were made even if they were of an unfriendly nature.

Chigi learned from Chaudordy on November 29 that Nigra carried a response from Florence to the papal protest against the seizure of the Quirinale Palace. The note was to be forwarded to Antonelli. Chigi took particular exception to the Italian contention

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3 Rapp 1686, November 24, 1870, loc. cit., fols. 151-152.
that the seizure of the Quirinale was not an act of theft because the palace was not a pontifical one and was therefore no different from the many other palaces in the city of Rome. Chigi wondered what Florence could be thinking in view of the popes who had lived in the Quirinale, the conclaves held there, the sacred congregations which had used it, and the various palatine cardinals who resided within its walls. Chaudordy further added that he had spoken to Nigra about Chigi's concern for the Italian government's position on allowing the Vatican to keep collecting the Peter's Pence and the Holy See's right to maintain consulates. Nigra promised he would inquire with Florence on these matters. 4

Chigi welcomed this approach by Chaudordy and his readiness to help the Holy See by presenting Rome's case to Nigra. Chigi saw that Chaudordy's original aloofness of November 7 indicated not a lack of understanding but rather the need to make the firm impression that France was utterly helpless to render direct aid to Rome. Aside from this, other means were definitely available, and the presentation of remonstrances to Nigra was one such way. On December 1, Chaudordy requested Chigi to keep him fully supplied with documentation of acts of violence in Rome and other attempts at hampering the freedom and dignity of the Holy Father. Chaudordy

4Rapp 1688, November 29, 1870, loc. cit., fols. 167-69.
pledged that he would submit such papers directly to Nigra and would support the Vatican protests. 5

These brief encounters between Chigi and Chaudory represented a major change in Vatican tactics. After Sedan and the 20th of September, the time had ended for Vatican hopes of French military aid to oust the Italians from Rome. For the moment, the best path lay in the strictly diplomatic way: get French statements of support, have the French make protests of their own, urge the Government of National Defense to lead the way among Catholic powers to abet the Pope's distress.

Chigi did not see Chaudory again until near the end of 1870 because on December 10, the Government of National Defense was forced to make an abrupt departure from Tours since Prussian forces were reaching out from Paris and could not be stopped. The government quickly ran off for the safety of Bourdeaux and the Atlantic coast. The departure from Tours was more sudden than the gradual withdrawal from Paris in September. Chigi had no hesitations about accompanying the government on this move, and he joined in with the continued exile. 6

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5 Rapp 1689, December 1, 1870, loc. cit., fols. 161-62.

6 A special train was outfitted by the Government of National Defense to carry the diplomatic corps to Bourdeaux on December 10, 1870. Some of the distinguished envoys were forced to double
In an interview on December 20, Chaudordy explained to Chigi that the French ambassador to Florence had been recalled. The ostensible reason was to prevent his presence in Florence from interfering with the mission of Adolphe Thiers who had arrived there on his journey of European capitals begging for help for France. Chaudordy did not connect the recall to any dissatisfaction from Rome or that the recall was a sign of French support for the Holy See. Chaudordy did mention to Chigi the problem the French eventually would have when Italy officially transferred the capital to Rome and the French embassy would have to follow. The hypothesis of whether this would represent an official French sanction of September 20th would turn into an actual crisis the following summer. 7

Another conference with Chaudordy on January 11, 1871 produced further warm support. Chigi and Chaudordy discussed possible action the Catholic powers might take to aid the Pope. The time for protest from the Vatican was nearing an end as the world up in space because facilities were in short supply. Accordingly, Chigi had to endure the unpleasantness (undoubtedly for him) of sharing a compartment with Mohammed-Pasha, the Turkish ambassador. Dupont, p. 246. In Bourdeaux, Chigi stayed at the new archiepiscopal palace recently completed by Cardinal Donnet. Dupont, p. 226.

7Rapp 1693, December 20, 1870, ASV, A 1870, R 165, f 1, fols. 190-191.
seemed to understand well enough by now the nature of Pius' plight, thought Chaudordy. The délégué expressed his inclination to begin talks with Rome and other friendly powers on working together. To shore up his pledge, Chaudordy mentioned that he had spoken to Nigra of his discontent with the recently passed Law of Guarantees. Taking note of recent attempts by Beust, the Austrian foreign minister, to try to bring Italy and the Holy See to the conference table, Chaudordy said he wanted to take part in these moves, but added that he would do so only with the full knowledge and cooperation of the Holy See.\(^8\)

Through these various maneuvers and exchanges, Chigi seems to have achieved a strong advantage. He had managed to bend the ear of a hastily-formed, distressed, and critically truncated provisional government. An early abandonment and abnegation of the papal cause had been slowly waxed into mild compassion. A France brought to her knees still had her sentiments as eldest daughter of the Church. Fiery protests would still emanate from Rome, Italy would continue it's sacrilege, France was still thinking more of Prussians than of priests, but a new turn in an old direction had been accomplished.

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\(^8\) Rapp 1702, January 12, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 165, f 8, fols. 23-24.
By January of 1871, Chaudordy's attitude was not the only thing that was changing in France. The Franco-Prussian War had run much of its course, though the protracted peace negotiations and their consequences still lay ahead. Post-Second Empire France was definitely emerging, and Chigi was keeping his ear tuned to the new shape, so vital to Vatican interests. With this new France were coming new leaders, and Chigi was soon to find that the chief person to reckon with in the French government was no longer to be the Comte de Chaudordy but Adolphe Thiers.

The profound changes which swept France in 1870 and 1871 did not escape the observant eye of Archbishop Flavio Chigi. On the one hand was the military holocaust which came over the land, the defeat of French arms, the humiliation in the field, a third of the nation under occupation, the capital laid to siege. Then there were the political changes in both form and members: the loss of the imperial system, new but old leaders, the uncertain republic. Beyond all of this, there was a change in character and outlook which Chigi watched constantly. Old arguments and issues such as plebiscites and the power of the emperor were now moribund. The Prussian threat looming across the Rhine so hotly debated for years was not an omnipresent reality. The issues now were such things as what had gone wrong, why had glorious France been swamped with such ignominy, who was responsible, and what could be done
to bring France out of this horror. As Frenchmen of every type and stamp grappled with these profundities, Chigi was ever attentive because how soon and how well the Papal phoenix might rise out of the ashes depended so much on the manner in which the new France would emerge.

As early as October of 1870, Chigi sensed a certain direction that the French mode of thought was drifting toward. Already the hope was high that the upcoming elections for the constitutional assembly would retain a majority in favor of the cause of "order and the Church." In every part of France, the result of the defeats and all the tears was an impression among Frenchmen that a sensible return to God was the only path of hope. A return to religion was a way to expiate the disasters. There was no mistake in noting that the announcement of the withdrawal of the French troops from the Papal States coincided with the first defeats suffered by French forces. The slap in the face of the Pope had precipitated the wrath of God on France.

Chigi said he had received such sentiments from laymen of every opinion, not to mention ecclesiastics and members of the hierarchy. A principal spokesman for this point of view had been none other than General Louis-Jules Trochu (1815-1896), nominal head of the Government of National Defense. Trochu had expressed such beliefs to Chigi in a manner "so elevated, moving, and decisive,"
as would befit a person of "such political intelligence" and one so "profoundly Catholic." The General had begged to be placed before the feet of the Holy Father to implore the apostolic benediction, pledging his hope of a resurgence of France to its ancient strength and splendor to the point where France would not fail to do its duty to the Holy Father. 9

Chigi's typically boundless optimism about the extent of favoritism toward Rome existent in France was soon tempered by a closer look into the state of French politics. Where once he had seen devoted angels of French conservatism everywhere, he now saw the satanic agents of socialism and revolution lurking behind every tree. Writing in December, Chigi said that there existed in all French cities groups of men of the most subversive tendencies. These men were going to take advantage of the preoccupation of the Government of National Defense "to bring about the triumph of their domination." Events in cities throughout France where riots had occurred and religious orders had been forced to close their schools indicated that these "acts of barbarism" were meant to stabilize

9 Rapp 1668, October 24, 1870, ASV, A 1870, R 165, f 1, fols. 103-06. Chigi's reference to Trochu's "political intelligence" represents one of the nuncio's most exemplary off-the-mark judgments about French politics.

An ironic note creeps in here in that when Chigi referred to France's "resurgence", he used the Italian word "risorgimento", a fact which probably made him cringe.
"the terrorism of the Socialist and Republican movement." It was a comfort to see that the majority of the nation was not involved in this movement and that this portended the "probability of a turn of events in France favorable to order and the tradition of honor."\(^{10}\)

As late as February, 1871, when France was heading toward internal peace with the impending election of its constitutional assembly, Chigi was still sending reports to Rome on democratic and socialist plots to keep up the terror in the street, to seize control of the assembly, move the capital to Marseilles, give the dictatorship to Gambetta, and wage war against Prussia a outrance. Chigi said he had no difficulty in seeing how these schemes were related to the activities of similar factions working outside of France.\(^{11}\)

Somewhere between the Scylla of the clericals and the Charybdis of the revolutionaries, the reality of French politics emerged in the outcome of the elections for the Constitutional Assembly held on February 8, 1871. With a two-thirds majority of the Assembly rendered to trustworthy monarchists and conservatives, Chigi deemed it safe to say that the Assembly was composed of men "ardent for peace and order."

\(^{10}\) Rapp 1697, December 29, 1870, ASV, A 1871, R 165, f 9, fols. 79-81.

\(^{11}\) Rapp 1710, February 2, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 242, f 2, fols. 74-77.
Right now, the task facing the new Assembly concerned matters of peace and war; after that would come the crucial debates on what the form of government of France would be. Chigi was surprised at the vitality and numbers that the Legitimatists had shown, a strength in their ranks which had previously gone unnoticed. Chigi was anxious to see how this group would work with the bloc of Orleanists and other conservatives. Of the 100 or so deputies who "leaned toward revolution," Chigi discounted them saying they had neither the strength nor numbers or internal unity to put their machinations into action.

Chigi saw the line of conduct of the Assembly following three main points. First, those who stood for order would have to preserve their unity, whatever the diversity of their opinions might be, to combat the party of disorder. Secondly, the Assembly must put aside for the moment any question of the form of government and must itself act as the government of France without becoming too attached to the principles of republicanism. Finally, the peace with Prussia, whether in terms of territorial cession or an indemnity, must not be allowed to bring on the ruination of France, either to

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12 Rapp 1714, February 13, 1871, loc. cit., fols. 79-82. Chigi further noted to Antonelli that Archbishop Dupanloup had been elected to the Assembly, adding (perhaps facetiously) that he hoped Dupanloup's influence could be used to the advantage of the Church.
her military defense capabilities or to the strength of the public treasury. 13

The first order of business the Assembly took up was the erection of an executive administration. Chigi recognized from the beginning election results that the formidable veteran of French politics, Adolphe Thiers, was to be the most powerful figure in the group. The Assembly had barely held its first session when Chigi wrote that Thiers "would give the movement and the direction to the Assembly." Thiers' dedication to public affairs would make it easier to seek solutions to the important questions at hand. Already, Chigi thought, Thiers was acting in the manner of a head of state before the power was given him officially. 14

The Constitutional Assembly did exactly this on February 16, 1871, after strenuous debate on the nature of Thiers' power and title. Chigi saw the actions as a temporary fusion of the monarchist factions for the sake of convenient peace. Thiers, Chigi

13 Rapp 1715, February 17, 1871, loc. cit., fols. 84-86.
In this same dispatch, Chigi relayed the good news that Giuseppe Garibaldi, the fanatic leader of the Risorgimento, had decided not to take his seat in the new Assembly. Garibaldi had come to France to fight on the French side in the Franco-Prussian War. He had gained the status of a national hero when his unit captured a Prussian battle standard during a minor skirmish. This notoriety gained him enough prominence to win a seat, but, as indicated, he declined the honor.

14 Rapp 1714, February 13, 1871, loc. cit.
said, wanted the full title and prerogative of President of the Republic, but was denied this because in the view of so many Legitimatists republicanism was tantamount to socialism.

The news of the Thiers election was warmly greeted in Rome. Antonelli wrote that the influence of Thiers in the current papal plight seemed "indubitable." He urged Chigi to get Thiers to turn his attention toward the cause of the Holy Father, so that "the authority of his voice and his eloquence . . . would lead his country on that path . . . in the glorious tradition of its history." France's whole volte face in electing the conservative Assembly was viewed very well in Rome. Antonelli enjoined his nuncio to use "every appropriate circumstance to explain the fate of the Sovereign Pontiff to the Chief of the Executive Power."16

As regards Thiers' attitude toward the all important Roman Question, Chigi found from Chaudordy that the new chief executive had taken great care in his first days in office to investigate the state of relations between France and all other powers. In particular concerning Rome, Thiers' had shown himself to Chaudordy to be satisfactory to the interests and rights of the Holy See. This was a

15 Rapp 1715, February 17, 1871, loc. cit.

16 Antonelli to Chigi, #1065, February 26, 1871, loc. cit., fol. 83.
good beginning for the papal cause, but the details would be long in working themselves out. 17

A further sign of French stability began to appear during the month of February as various European powers began to accord diplomatic recognition to the nascent Republic. This recognition had never been extended to the Government of National Defense despite the continued presence in Bourdeaux of the diplomats accredited to the defunct Second Empire. Britain, Spain, Austria, and Russia were among the first to have their representatives present credentials to Thiers, followed by Italy toward the end of the month. 18

The Holy See was rather slow in taking this definitive step. One reason for this was the government of the Holy Father had all the doubts in the world about recognizing a republic, although this factor is negligible in Chigi's correspondence. More important was whether France on its part would name an ambassador to the Holy See. The previous ambassador, the Marquis de Banneville, had resigned in September of 1870 upon the abdication of Napoleon III, in accordance with diplomatic courtesy which requires such action when a head of state leaves office for whatever reason. From

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17 Rapp 1715, February 17, 1871, loc. cit.
18 Rapp 1716, February 22, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 165, f 8, fols. 39-42.
September on, the French embassy in Rome was under the direction of the chargé d'affaires.

The situation for foreign powers to have diplomatic relations with the Holy See was made very delicate since the seizure of Rome by the Florentine government. Foreseeing the inevitability of transfer of the Italian capital to Rome, European governments pondered if they should have one representative in Rome for both Victor Emmanuel and Pius IX or if the old system would continue. The naming of a French representative to Pius IX with the full rank of ambassador would be a victory for the Vatican.

France herself began to name ambassadors to the major courts of Europe as these other states sent their recognitions to Bordeaux. By late February, French diplomats had been dispatched to London, Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Madrid. Chigi telegraphed this information to Rome, noting that what was missing was the appointment to the Holy See. Disturbed by this, Chigi pressured Chaudory as to the reason. Chaudory gave assurances of the firm intention of the French government to make such an appointment, but that the delay was caused by an inability to find the right person for the part. At the present, the Duc de Corcelles was the prime candidate. Chigi asked Rome what it thought about having de Corcelles named, and Antonelli replied that "so distinguished and
Chigi had been anxious for some time to see the new Chief of the Executive Power. This had been denied him although other diplomats in Bordeaux had conferred with Thiers. Chigi seemed to think that his inability to get an appointment was due largely to Thiers' repeated absences from Bordeaux in connection with the peace negotiations. 20 Chigi finally visited with Thiers on March 10, 1871.

The audience was formal in nature and was reminiscent of the meetings Chigi had held with Napoleon III. Chigi opened the discussion with official salutations from Pius IX on the occasion of Thiers' election. Then he set out to press three main points. First he wanted to call Thiers' attention to the "indignant and intolerable" state to which the Holy Father had been reduced by the Italian government. Second, Chigi touched on the urgency of France appointing to the Holy See a person who would be "the symbol of the Catholic intentions of France" and one who would represent the majority found in the Assembly. In the third place, Chigi spoke to Thiers of his hope to regulate the life of the Church in France, say-

19 Rapp 1716, February 22, 1871, loc. cit. and Antonelli to Chigi, #1103, March 4, 1871, loc. cit., fol. 43.

20 Rapp 1718, March 2, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 165, f 9, fol. 91.
Thiers replied very cautiously to Chigi's talk of the gravity of the Holy See's troubles. Chigi seemed to think that Thiers was somewhat indifferent and simply did not comprehend the enormous dangers facing the pope. Thiers merely made some references to the limits of power of his office which prevented him from any great enthusiasm for supporting a foreign monarch.

On the matter of appointing an ambassador to Rome, Thiers said he was indeed at work on this business, but the greatest consideration was that he hoped to find an individual who was agreeable to the pope. Thiers thus reaffirmed what Chigi had heard earlier that the delay in naming someone to Rome was caused by the inability to pick the right man.

In closing his description of this meeting, Chigi confided to Antonelli his personal impression of Thiers saying that in all his speeches and writings, Thiers worked with the intention of avoiding any definite opinion and of avoiding solutions of all questions, leaving them hanging for the future."

21 Rapp 1721, March 10, 1871, loc. cit., fols. 84-87.

Chigi and Thiers did discuss Chigi's third point about naming bishops to vacant sees in a vague and inconclusive manner. The particulars mulled over by the two men will be treated later.

The private papers of Adolphe Thiers are scattered in several locations in Paris: at the Bibliothèque Nationale, at the Foreign Ministry Archives, and at the Bibliothèque Thiers. The documents
For its part, the Holy See slowly got around to sending the credentials for its nuncio to France although Chigi had requested them in mid-February. By mid-March, Chigi wrote to Rome that inasmuch as the other powers had afforded their recognition to the new regime, any further delay might offend Thiers. Antonelli yielded to this request although the French had still not settled on who the ambassador to Rome would be. Chigi received the proper credential papers on March 25 and immediately requested an audience with Thiers which was granted him for March 30.  

By this time, another sign of France's increasing stability had appeared on March 10 with the removal of the government from its provincial stopping place in Bourdeaux back to the more permanent location of Versailles. Thus, the presentation of credentials took place there.

The mood was very different from the time Chigi had presented his credentials to Napoleon III more than nine years earlier.

Consulted by this author in the AMAE proved to be useless. The Bibliothèque Thiers was closed for unexplained reasons during the author's stay in Paris in the fall of 1971. Given the previously noted paucity of documents in French Archives on Chigi, it was deemed that gaining entrance to the Bibliothèque Thiers would probably have been futile.

\[\text{22} \text{ Rapp 1723, March 12, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 242, f 2, fols. 133-134 and Rapp 1727, March 25, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 162, f 8, fols. 60-61.}\]
France was depleted. There was no ride in a state coach for Chigi. There was no full court assembled. Chigi himself remarked later that the form was one of complete privacy. Thiers attempted to express his "extensive loyalty" to the Holy Father but hastened to add that the notorious state of affairs in France rendered her powerless to respond to the expectations of His Holiness. Thiers then gave some information that Chigi was elated to hear. The new ambassador to the Holy See had been named, and he was Bernard-Hippolyte-Marie, Comte d'Harcourt (1821-1912). Although this was good news to the nuncio, there was a catch. France had also named an ambassador to Italy, Eugene-Antoine-Horace, Comte de Choiseul (1837-1915). Thiers explained that this was necessary to do as France had every reason to maintain good relations with Italy as well. Realizing the sensitivity of Rome on this matter, Thiers explained that as much thought and effort had gone in naming Choiseul as naming Harcourt, with the hope that both men, found to be extremely capable for the delicate missions entrusted to them, would be acceptable to the Vatican.

Chigi then stated that if there were insuperable roadblocks to France giving the Pope a complete remedy, what would France think or do if some of the other powers of Europe, viz. Bavaria, Austria, and possibly Prussia would resort to concerted action to protect the Pope? Thiers answered that he was totally unaware of
any such plans being in the wind and that at any rate France would not surrender to those other powers the right of protecting the Holy Father which she had traditionally held.

For a closing remark, Thiers expressed the opinion that it was his wish that Pius IX should stay on in the precinct of the Vatican as long as possible until better times had come.  

23 Rapp 1728, March 31, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 165, f 9, fols. 98-100.

Comte d'Harcourt had served earlier in French diplomatic posts in the German states under the July Monarchy and the Second Republic. He resigned his post at Stuttgart after the Coup of December 2, 1851, and remained in private life until the 1871 appointment to Rome. His father, Francois-Eugene-Gabriel, duc d'Harcourt (1786-65) had been French ambassador to Rome during the troubles there in 1849-51. The Harcourt family archives were destroyed by fire in 1944. The Due de Corcelles had previously been a member of the Corps Legislatif in the Second Empire. The appointment to Italy was his first diplomatic post. Later, he became an active Republican.

The concerted action proposal about which Chigi and Thiers talked was one of many which came up during the months after September 20, 1870. These are all discussed in their entirety through the many pages of the prestigious work by S. William Halperin, Italy and the Vatican at War: A Study of Their Relations from the Outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War to the Death of Pius IX (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1939). Halperin's is the premier guide for studying the European outlook on the Roman Question during these years. Unfortunately he makes only three references to Chigi.

Halperin refers to disclaimers by Thiers of participation in joint action with the other powers, disclaimers which were made prior to the March 30 conference with Chigi, pp. 188-90.

The remark by Thiers about Pius IX staying on at the Vatican is the only reference found by all of Chigi's correspondence about Pius IX being rumored to be leaving Rome or about France offering him a refuge.
On the following day, March 31, Chigi held a conference with Jules Favre whom he had not seen since the negotiations with Bismarck in the previous September and October. Favre explained to Chigi that he had given Harcourt two general guidelines for the conduct of his mission to Rome. First he was to maintain an attitude of reserve on all that touched upon the question of the Temporal Power. Secondly, he was to be constantly alert that the person of the Holy Father was respected. The new ambassador to Italy had been instructed in the same manner, and Favre assured Chigi that Choiseul was the very man for that position.

Chigi said he hoped that the French government would carry out its policy and that the government of Florence would not throw itself in the way. Chigi then asked Favre, as he had asked Thiers, what he thought of the reported plans of Bavaria, Austria, and Prussia. Favre responded that the only thing he had heard along those lines was that those powers had discussed what they would do when the Italian government moved to Rome. Each seemed inclined to name one emissary to both Pius IX and Victor Emmanuel and that an ecclesiastic would be named as a sort of assistant ambassador who would handle strictly religious affairs. Favre said he understood that Antonelli had already heard this proposal and had broadly
rejected it. 24

With the conclusion of this conference, a semblance of normalcy appeared to have emerged. Chigi had presented his credentials, regular contact with the foreign minister had been established, and the French government had been set up in a central capital. Things might have been normal for Flavio Chigi, and he might have been able to work unhindered toward his intended goal of getting the French to come to the papal rescue had not the storm of the Commune then brewing in Paris presented another drastic interruption.

24 Rapp 1730, April 1, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 165, f 8, fols. 63-64.

A large bulk of twenty-two volumes of Jules Favre's papers is stored in the AMAE, Papiers des Agents du MAE, Inventaire No. 55. The exchanges between Favre and Chigi concerning the evacuation of the diplomatic corps from Paris (discussed in Chapter IV) are all that these twenty-two volumes yielded pertinent to this dissertation.

Favre's Rome et La République Française (Paris, 1871), his personal testimony on Papal-Franco relations during the period and his disapproval of France rushing to the pope's aid, likewise contains virtually nothing regarding Chigi.
CHAPTER VI

THE COMMUNE AND THE FADING HOPE IN THE SUMMER OF 1871

The disjointed state of political affairs in France to which Flavio Chigi had given such vexatious attention during his days in Tours and Bourdeaux attained its fiery climax with the outbreak of the Commune of Paris in March of 1871. All of Chigi's fears of diabolical revolutionaries and agitating socialists materialized when the National Guard of Paris raised its standard of opposition to the Versailles government. A whole new set of problems and troubles confronted the Apostolic Nuncio, all of which he could have done without. A government upon which Chigi and Rome depended for aid in the long run was now severely threatened from within and would be distracted for an indefinite period while facing the Commune. France had been battered enough by the Prussians to suffer protracted internal discord.

Within the city of Paris itself, the difficulties were enormous. The Commune regime had proclaimed separation of Church and state, freedom of education, equality of man, and other dangerous doctrines. The regime was closing churches and convents.
and was arresting priests. Chief among these was the archbishop, Georges Darboy (1813-1871). The situation of being an outside witness might have been Chigi's fate during the days of the Commune. The normal expectation would have been for him to send a narration of events to Rome and a description of the efforts of the Versailles government against the Commune. Such a mere stand-by role was to be denied Chigi as he expended strenuous energy to secure Archbishop Darboy's release.

Darboy had remained in Paris throughout the entire siege and had won much acclaim for his efforts on behalf of the plight of the citizens. This esteem was not enough to prevent his arrest by the Commune government. Chigi was first informed of the arrest while on a stop at Poitiers on the journey from Bordeaux to Versailles. After arriving in Versailles, Chigi tried fervently to grasp the situation and ascertain the conditions under which Darboy was being detained. Despite Versailles being only twenty miles from the city of Paris proper, communication was virtually impossible given the siege of the city now being maintained by the troops of the Versailles government.

The hands-tied dilemma was changed when, in early April, the Vicar-General of Paris, Abbé Lagarde, arrived in Versailles bearing news and messages from Darboy. Lagarde explained to Chigi some of Darboy's motivation in submitting to arrest, namely
that Darboy and the other clerics imprisoned did not see fit to abandon their posts in the face of the new enemy. Their love for the Church had prompted them to resist.

Lagarde had come to Versailles for reasons other than to pay a courtesy call on the papal nuncio. He was the intermediary in the scheme of proposing to Thiers an exchange of prisoners held by the Versailles government (notably Louis Blanqui) for Darboy and other prominent hostages being held by the Commune. Lagarde informed Chigi of this mission, and Chigi took a hand in the matter by making his own appeal to Thiers several days later. In this interview, Thiers attempted to brush off Chigi's pleas by explaining as much as he admired the hostages and sympathized with their plight, he could in no way have any dealings of this nature with the insurrectionists. Undaunted, Chigi tried to point out the risk to the life of the prisoners because of the character of their captors and the possibility of an attack by the Parisian populace. Thiers countered by saying that the situation in the city was one of public calm, and one did not have to fear a mob attack. Nonetheless, Thiers said he would discuss the matter with his cabinet.

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1 Rapp 1736, n.d., ASV, Segr di St, A 1871, R 165, f 8, fols. 81-82.

2 Ibid., fol. 82-84.
Chigi was not to be put off by Thiers' rebuff but decided to push on and call on other persons who might be able to help Darboy. Accordingly, Chigi established contact with the American minister, Washburne, who had helped Chigi so much the previous autumn during the negotiations with Bismarck. During the intervening months, Washburne had conducted himself admirably by acting as liaison between the Prussians and the French. Washburne had likewise endeared himself to the citizens of Paris because he had stayed on in the city throughout the siege. Perhaps Washburne's influence with all parties—the Versailles group, the Communards, and the Prussians who were never very far away at any time—would enable him to be of some help.

On April 22, Washburne arrived in Versailles and called on Chigi. Washburne expressed his outrage that Archbishop Darboy had been confined, saying that he fully sympathized with Chigi's feeling and how Darboy's arrest had caused a stir throughout the Catholic world. Washburne pledged that he would do everything in his power to secure Darboy's release, though his action would be entirely unofficial and would be restricted by the neutral policy of his home government. The American minister then gave Chigi a report on Darboy's condition which Chigi forwarded to Rome. For the next several weeks, Washburne worked feverishly for Darboy's freedom. He made a number of visits to Darboy in his cell at the
LaRoquette prison, being one of the few persons allowed to do so. Washburne made a number of direct overtures to Darboy's captor, General Cluseret, all of which efforts were to prove futile.  

The direct and indirect entreaties to Thiers were proving fruitless. Chigi's efforts to use Washburne's connections likewise were meeting without success, although Washburne displayed much greater cooperation. As the troops of the Versailles government were moving in on the city, Chigi explored one more method that might lead to Darboy's release. On May 19 Chigi sought the aid of the Prussians. He went, on the suggestion of Lord Lyons, to the Prince of Saxony, who was the commandant of the Prussian occupation forces headquartered at Soisy-sous-Montmorency. Chigi was told by General Fabrice, the Prince's adjutant, that both the Prince and the general himself had been negotiating for some time with the leaders of the Commune, in particular with Cluseret, for the release of the prominent hostages. Fabrice said that the Prussian efforts had been undertaken by the direct orders of Bismarck. Nonetheless, the Prussians were  

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3 Rapp (no number), April 26, 1871, loc. cit., fols. 85-86, and Washburne, Recollections, II, p. 166. Chigi and Washburne met face to face only on this one occasion and maintained little correspondence during Commune.
making no headway either. 4

Five days later, on May 24, Archbishop Darboy was shot at La Roquette along with several others. The act was among the last carried out by the Commune which was suffering its own death in those very hours. In the next several days, Chigi interviewed various witnesses of the shooting or persons who had seen Darboy in his last days. Several gave rather impressive reports on the Archbishop's strength and firmness, and Chigi was able to write to Rome that Darboy had "gone towards death with calm and courage." 5

In early June, Chigi returned to Paris for the first time in eight months. Of major concern to him was the condition of Church properties in the city, which he found to be not too severe. In a certain sense he took interim control of the affairs of the archdiocese of Paris by holding meetings with the metropolitan chapter, visiting damaged churches, distributing a papal relief donation of 50,000 francs, and making moves to choose Darboy's successor. On June 7, Chigi presided at the solemn funeral service in Notre Dame at which he gave the absolution. The funeral was held on a


5 Rapp 1748, May 29, 1871, ASV, Segr di St, A 1871, R 165, f 8, fols. 93-94.
grand scale at public expense to show that the Commune had been completely overcome. Chigi thought that the huge multitude which turned out indicated that the sentiments of the Parisians was definitely in favor of the Church rather than the Commune.

The troubles in Paris, while causing Chigi much anguish and sleepless nights, did not keep him completely distracted from his major duty, obtaining help for the Holy See and keeping alive in the mind of the French government the plight of the imprisoned Pius IX. Even through the days of the Commune, Chigi found time to devote himself to this most sacred part of his mission. As the violence and disruption continued at Paris, the nuncio found himself pursuing some old familiar paths and utilizing new approaches as incidents and movements within French politics presented much hope.

On April 8, 1871, Chigi held another conference with Favre. The Foreign Minister was quite eager to know if indeed Pius IX was under lock and key in the Vatican and was not allowed to leave. Chigi assured him that the pope was indeed a prisoner and took

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6 Rapp 1750, June 6, 1871, loc. cit., fols. 115-117 and Rapp 1752, June 8, 1871, loc. cit., fols. 103-105; Foulon, pp. 566-567; and Washburne, II, pp. 185-186.

In his L'Église de Paris sous la Commune, Persecution et Martyrs (Paris, 1871), Alfred Rastoul makes no mention that any damage was done by the Communards to the Nunciature building. The same is true of other books on the Commune.
heart that Favre was slowly becoming convinced of the difficulty facing the Holy Father. Going on from this point, Chigi said that the Holy Father's position was intolerable and that the Powers and especially France could no longer stand idly by and thus by their silence be a party to the reprobate action of the government of Florence. Chigi repeated he was fully aware of the miserable circumstances facing France but that surely, it seemed to him, France in concert with the other Powers could offer moderate yet definitive remonstrances to the government of Florence on such things as the Italian plan to transfer the capital to Rome and the continuing seizure of religious buildings in Rome by the invaders.

Favre said he did not see the international importance of the Italian government expropriating four or five convents. Chigi reiterated that such actions should be of concern to the Powers because they were theft from the Holy Father. Favre asked how Chigi thought the Powers could stop the transfer of the capital. Chigi admitted the difficulty of actually stopping the Italians, but, he said, this should not hinder any concerted appeals. Favre ended the discussion by asserting his earlier premise that any concerted action could not be attempted by the Powers without a previous consultation with the Holy Father. Although Favre did not explicitly say so, he evidently felt that such an arrangement was the only feasible one, and he was chastising Pius IX indirectly
for employing the tact of constant condemnation and intransigence. 7

If Favre was proving to be as stubborn and unsympathetic as ever about the Roman Question, other elements in the French government were stirring up their enthusiasm about helping the pope. Plans were afoot in the Monarchist Assembly by early April of 1871 for an interpellation of the government on its views. Chigi was ecstatic over these developments, and he wrote to Rome on April 12 that the deputies were pursuing a very practical means of action. The plan, as he understood it, was for the Assembly to make a declaration of its belief of the necessity of the Temporal Sovereignty of the Holy Father in order for him to have liberty and independence for the exercise of his apostolic ministry. Then the Assembly would call upon the new government to take part with other states to restore the rights of the Holy See. 8

Another bright ray of hope appeared on the horizon when the French episcopate began sending petitions to the Assembly demanding action on the part of the French government. On May 3, Chigi received Cardinal Henri Bonnechose, Archbishop of Rouen, as a guest at Versailles. In this rare conference with a member of the

7 Rapp 1733, April 8, 1871, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 68-69.

8 Rapp 1735, April 12, 1871, loc. cit., fols. 78-79 and Rapp 1744, May 31, 1871, loc. cit., fols. 113-114.
French hierarchy, Chigi found out many details of how a collective address from the bishops would be made to the Assembly, that a circular was to be sent to all French bishops, and how he (Cardinal Bonnechose) was leading the movement. It was hoped that the petitions of the bishops would be accompanied by demonstrations and other expressions of sentiment on the part of the laity.9

Finally, the most brilliant champion of all Catholic and papal causes came on the scene in the person of the Comte de Chambord (1820-1883). On May 8, 1871, Chambord issued one of his famous letters, this one going to Joseph de Carayon-Latour, a Legitimatist leader in the Assembly. Chambord spoke very heavily of his religious feelings, making reference to such feelings as "I only bring back peace, religion, and concord," and "If France is to be saved, God must reign there as master and then I can reign as king." The phrases which struck home for the French clericals, for Chigi, and for Rome were: "The freedom of the Church is the prime condition of peace of spirit and order in the world. To protect the Holy See was ever the honor of our country and the most incontestible cause of its grandeur among nations. Only in periods of the greatest misfortune has France abandoned this glorious pat-

9Rapp 1742, May 3, 1871, ASV, Segr di St, A 1871, R 242, f 2, fols. 159-160.
Laying bare his feelings, Chigi described this letter as "one of the most important political events for France." The appeal, replete with its rejection of strife and violence, has been received with universal favor by the French people and had won the admiration of Chambord's adversaries everywhere. Already the Orleanists were ready to rally around Chambord's leadership. Despite Chigi's obvious and overwhelming partiality towards the Legitimist cause and his overestimation of the success of Chambord's letter, he did not in any way specifically indicate how he felt what Chambord's coming to the throne would affect the Roman Question. 11

As the summer of 1871 opened, the state of affairs in the Roman Question had taken several critical turns. Victor Emmanuel had already made one visit to Rome. The Italian parliament had debated long and hard and had after great difficulty passed the Law of Guarantees on May 13. The Italian government had taken control of a number of public buildings in Rome for housing ministers.

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11 Rapp 1754, May 17, 1871, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 169-172. In early July of 1871, Chambord made a brief, incognito visit to Paris, but there is no indication in Chigi's reports or in Brown, pp. 89-90, that the nuncio met with the Pretender.
tries, buildings which had previously been papal property. These takeovers had been regarded as theft and sacrilege by the Vatican, and official protests were issued on each occasion. As has been seen, Chigi had often brought up these protests in conversations with Favre. The last step remaining was for the Italian government to officially move from Florence to Rome. The date for this was set for July 1, 1871.

An important aspect of the transfer would be whether the diplomatic corps in Florence would accompany the government, thus signalling international sanction of the seizure of Rome. The Holy See would of course rather not see this happen, though there was little it was able to do to prevent it. Nonetheless, Chigi would talk to Favre about having the French ambassador Choiseul either stay behind in Florence or come home in protest. The transfer of the Italian capital would coincide with some of the debates in the French Assembly on the Roman Question and the discussion of France's form of government. The monarchists and other conservatives were beginning to flex their muscles vis-à-vis Thiers on these matters, and it was clear that a showdown was pending.

On June 21, Chigi held what was to prove to be his last conference with Favre. The main topic of conversation was the impending Italian move to Rome. Favre indicated that the official notice had been communicated to the Florence diplomatic corps and
that the date had been announced. Choiseul had already telegraphed to Versailles asking for instructions. Favre said in a subdued manner that no decision had been taken and that he was waiting for further developments. France was interested in what the other Powers were thinking, and Favre was going to consult with the Austrian ambassador Metternich shortly.

Chigi forcefully emphasized that the French ambassador in Florence should not follow the government to Rome. Whatever the other Powers would do should not impede France in her decision. France must do what it could to head off the scandal of tacit approval of the invasion of Rome which would be the result in the eyes of Europe of the presence in Rome of the diplomatic corps accredited to Victor Emmanuel.

Favre thought that one of two things might happen: one, that the Foreign Ministry might be going by itself to Rome without the King, the other that Victor Emmanuel and his entire government were going to permanently move. If it were a case of only the Italian Foreign Ministry making the change, no problems would emerge if Choiseul did not accompany it. But if the second eventuality proved to be true, which was more likely, then the gravest difficulties would arise, and Favre wanted utmost to avoid rupturing relations with Italy. Chigi ended the discussion by repeating that even in this case he still saw no reason for the French ambas-
sador to go to Rome.

On June 27, Chigi gained an audience with Thiers to try his luck with the Chief Executive. On being questioned as to whether Choiseul would be instructed to go to Rome, Thiers indicated that he had been in contact with the cabinets of Austria and Prussia and that they were inclined to instruct their representatives to move with the Italian government. While France had indeed considered telling Choiseul to remain behind, she found it very tedious to follow such a course as so doing would put France in complete isolation from the other European states.

As the appointed day for the transfer of the capital to Rome approached, Chigi grew more desperate. Uncertainty existed in diplomatic circles as to how many of its bureaucratic offices the Italian government would move to Rome or whether Victor Emmanuel would simply make a symbolic, ceremonial entrance into the city. Undaunted, Chigi made an eleventh-hour appeal to Favre on June 30 by sending a strongly worded note (the two men did not meet personally) that Choiseul not be permitted to go to Rome.

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12 Rapp 1755, June 21, 1871, ASV, Segr di St, A 1871, R 165, f 8, fols. 120-123. According to Halperin, pp. 150-152, Favre was hoping that the Italians would merely make Rome an "honorary capital." In this Rapp 1755, Chigi further quotes Favre as hinting that he did not think the transfer would take place.

13 Rapp 1756, June 27, 1871, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 125-128.
Chigi pointed out once again how the presence of the French ambassador in Rome would be a French sanction of the Italian invasion and that such a move would mean an abandonment of France's traditional policy toward the Holy See. If Choiseul was actually to make the trip to Rome along with Victor Emmanuel, then the Versailles government should issue a declaration that this action implied little or no significance.  

Favre sent a speedy reply the next day. He said that he had shown Chigi's letter to Thiers but that Thiers insisted that France must still maintain its good relations with the Kingdom of Italy and that a line of conduct would be followed which would be for the benefit of all. Choiseul had been given permission to return to France in order to take part in the Assembly where he still held a seat. Choiseul was to retain his position as ambassador but would not have to face up to the task of accompanying Victor Emmanuel to Rome. Instead, the French chargé d'affaires was to go to Rome no earlier than July 5, pay his respects, and then return immediately to Florence until the situation had improved.  

This is approximately what occurred. Most of the officials

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14 Rapp 17, July 2, 1871, ASV, Segr di St, R 165, f 9, fols. 106-109.  
15 Favre to Chigi, July 1, 1871, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 110-111.
of the Italian government arrived in Rome on July 1 when the official proclamation of Rome as the capital of Italy was made. Victor Emmanuel entered the next day and took possession of the Quirinale as his residence. Across the city, at the Vatican, an uneasy quiet prevailed, but no stern condemnations were issued. Late appeals to Pius IX to leave the city in protest were ignored. A conspicuous part of the scene was the absence not only of Choiseul, but also of the Austrian, Belgian, and Prussian ministers to Italy, all of whose governments had instructed them to stay away for the time being so as to retain some gesture of respect for the claims of Pius IX of sovereignty over Rome.

Despite the deference shown by the Versailles government in instructing Choiseul to stay away from Rome for a while, Chigi had found that Favre was in fact as unhelpful as ever and Thiers continued to be even more adamant in his refusal to take up the papal cause. There remained one more arena where hope still flickered---the Assembly where the long-awaited debates and interpellations on the Roman Question were about to take place. The petitions of the bishops were flowing in daily to Versailles. Similar declarations from Catholic lay groups were also pouring in. Distinguished politicians of some of France's oldest and most

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16 Halperin, pp. 163-165.
Catholic families were organizing their forces.

Although Chigi made a number of quick trips to Versailles to be close to the scene and met occasionally with some of the conservative leaders, he seems to have remained in the background, keeping in mind his position as a diplomat and undoubtedly remembering the slaps on the wrist he had suffered earlier from Napoleon III when he had intervened in French domestic affairs. Chigi reported, for example, what such persons as Joinville, the duc d'Aumale, Kolb, Pojot, Cardinal Bonnechose, and Bishop Dupanloup were doing and how they were working with one another. But such reports were done evidently only as a part of Chigi's function as the pope's chief observer. Chigi's dispatches, the biographies of some of these individuals, and the histories of this phase of French politics indicate that no active role was taken by the nuncio. 17

By July of 1871, the two separate movements were now fusing into one: the petitions of the bishops and laity and the activity of the conservative deputies. The deputies decided to use the petitions as a base for their debates and move for a vote that these petitions be handed over to the Foreign Ministry for action. As

17 Rapp 17__, July 2, 1871, loc. cit. and Rapp 1763, July 19, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 165, f 8, fols. 133-135.
the entire matter was technically an internal political affair for the moment, Favre as Foreign Minister was not directly involved. He seems to have faded from the picture as far as Chigi is concerned since he did not see Favre during the interpellation proceedings. The central figure, it was quite clear to Chigi, was still Adolphe Thiers.

On July 2, secondary elections were held for about one hundred members of the Assembly. The republican elements gained significantly much to the joy of Thiers who still mistrusted both the Bourbons and the Orleanists. Chigi's opinion of the outcome was that although the Thiers forces were quite satisfied, the monarchists were by no means desolated. Chigi felt that the augmentation of the republican party in the Assembly would not present any serious obstacle in the course of the upcoming interpellation.  

Thiers remained the man of the hour. On July 9, Chigi wrote to Rome that the Chief of the Executive power was refraining for the moment from any decisive act which would indicate that he favored the Temporal Sovereignty or from taking any action which would compromise the relations between France and the government of Victor Emmanuel. Thiers wanted to stay away from any declaration of the necessity of the Temporal Power. Peace with

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18 Rapp 17__, July 2, 1871, loc. cit.
Italy was uppermost in his mind. Above all, Thiers did not want a pronouncement from the Assembly which would commit France to action. Chigi's overall opinion was that Thiers was essentially recognizing the powerlessness of France, but that to look beyond Thiers' " veil of ambition," one could still see that in his heart Thiers still favored the rights and privileges of the Church. 19

The culminating debate on the Roman Question took place in the Assembly on July 22, 1871. Thiers rendered a long and famous speech in which he reiterated his personal devotion to the Holy Father and his essential belief in the necessity of the independence of the Holy See but rejected any action by France because of her own weakness and because of the international scene which called for peace and not war. Italy was a respected member of the European community with many friends (particularly the new German Empire), and France did not wish to upset the present equilibrium. If the pope were ever threatened, France would protect his person or always offer him a place of refuge. An expedition to Rome was out of the question.

After the speech, the Assembly went through prolonged debate and finally voted an order of the day (not a statute or official act of government) which assigned the episcopal petitions to

19 Rapp 1759, July 9, ASV, loc. cit., 101-103.
the Foreign Office for study and consultation. The Assembly in effect showed how it felt emotionally but had delivered the matter into the manifestly unwilling hands of Jules Favre. 20

Despite all the drama that seemed to be building up and all the hopes of the clericals, the outcome was a languid statement and a technical evasion. It now seemed that everyone in France (except perhaps for Chambord): Thiers, Favre, the conservatives and monarchists, the cardinals and bishops in the Assembly, were all singing the same chorus--Holy Mother the Church had been raped, the independence of the Holy Father was necessary for the functioning of his office, Pius IX was a prisoner, but there is nothing we can do about it.

Chigi was under no illusion about the hollow victory that had been achieved in the Assembly vote. Writing to Rome four days later, he described the outcome as being insignificant when compared to the sufferings and indignities endured by the Holy Father. Chigi expressed his disappointment at the vote even though what had happened was entirely expected. Chigi realized how the Roman Question was intricately involved with the multi-faceted political structure of France and the changing international scene: a stronger Italy, a weak France, the new Germany, and so on. The anti-

papal press in France had declared that the July 22 vote was the last that shall be seen or heard from the French government regarding the Roman Question, but Chigi discounted such statements as attempts to mislead public opinion. The major result of the vote was that the majority of the Assembly had not given up their support of the Holy See but had deferred the question for the time being. They had not excluded decisive action but had merely postponed it.

Now that the petitions had been sent to the Quai d'Orsay, the door was still left open for another interpellation despite the fact that the Foreign Minister's principles were contrary to the idea of the Temporal Power. When the next interpellation could arise, Chigi felt, depended on how long Favre remained in office and how well the majority held together. Since Favre had voted against the proposal, demands were being raised for his resignation.

More than Favre, Chigi understood that Thiers was still the great hindrance. Chigi repeated how so much of Thier's speech had referred to the relationship between the Roman Question and the general European situation. It was impossible to alter present conditions to the point where the Roman Question might be fortuitously brought up again. Chigi simply hoped that "an irresistible germ might remain alive in his [Thiers'] breast" to some
day go ahead with his conviction. 21

Favre resigned soon after the vote because of his total disapproval of France taking any steps whatever towards active support of Pius IX's claims. He was succeeded by Claude Remusat (1797-1875), an old friend of Thiers and a life-long republican. Remusat was to prove to be as courteous yet as evasive as Favre or most other French officials. The petitions which had gone to the Foreign Ministry were buried there not to surface again. The affirmation of Thiers as President of the Republic at the end of August, 1871, and the continued drift towards the entrenchment of the Third Republic in later years insured that the Eldest Daughter of the Church was not going to rescue the Supreme Pontiff from his prison cell.

Thus, by the end of the summer of 1871, Archbishop Flavio Chigi had lived through a harrowing eighteen months of political intrigue, international crises, the death of an empire, and the collapse of the 1000-year-old Temporal Power. He had dealt with three mercurial and difficult heads of state: Napoleon III, Trochu,

21 Rapp 1764, July 26, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 165, f 8, fols. 146-148. Halperin indicates that even Antonelli was not carried away by the vote of July 22. Antonelli told the Austrian ambassador to the Holy See, "In the present situation of France, if I had to speak before a French chamber, I would have spoken no differently." Pp. 218-219.
and Thiers. He had worked with six different foreign ministers, none of which had brought him much satisfaction. Chigi had endured eight months of exile in dreary provincial cities. The city of his birth and of his Holy Father was in the hands of an excommunicated despoiler, while the Paris to which he had so long been assigned was ravaged by siege, bombardment, and Commune. It is little wonder that by July of 1871, Chigi spoke of controlling within himself "un sentimento di profonda tristezza."\(^{22}\)

\(^{22}\)Rapp, 1764, July 26, 1871, loc. cit., fol. 146v.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The tenure of Archbishop Flabio Chigi as Apostolic Nuncio to Paris lasted approximately three years after 1871. This period proved far less momentous than the first nine years. Whereas the Sixties had been replete with a continuous round of international crises, Napoleonic intrigues, and embarrassing faux pas by the nuncio; and whereas 1870 and 1871 represented an unending series of failure, disappointment, exile, and frustration, the time from the Assembly vote in July of 1871 and Chigi's departure from France in May of 1874 was virtually laggard. France was internally peaceful, the Republic gained strength, the international scene was dormant, and the Roman Question garnered so little interest as to become a dead letter.

Chigi's influence in diplomatic circles in Paris and his appearances at the Quai d'Orsay diminished significantly. Before the dawn of the Third Republic, Chigi had very ready access to both sovereigns and foreign ministers. Hardly a month went by without an appointment with a foreign minister. During the months of the Franco-Prussian War and the Government of National Defense, his
meetings with Caudordy, Favre, and Thiers were regular and frequent.

From the summer of 1871 on, Chigi was far less welcome in government offices than he had been before. Throughout all of 1872, Chigi had one meeting with Thiers and only three with the foreign minister, mostly to discuss the plight of persecuted Armenian Catholics in the Turkish Empire. The same held true for 1873. Chigi had one conference with Thiers before the President's resignation in May of that year, and he had the opportunity to meet with Thiers' successor, Marshall MacMahon, only to present his credentials to the new Chief of State. There were but two appointments with foreign ministers.

In one important area, Chigi did make a crucial contribution by bringing about a subtle change in the nomination procedure of bishops. The portfolio of the Minister of Cults was held by the notorious anti-clerical Jules Simon. During the 1870's a remarkable number of staunchly pro-papal and conservative candidates for French sees were approved by the Republican government. Chigi had a direct hand in this as he was the one who proposed the names to Simon who seemed all too eager to grant approvals.

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1 ASV, Segr di St, Rubricelle, #351 (1871), #358 (1872), #365 (1873), and #372 (1874).
Chigi seized the initiative as early as March of 1871 when in an early audience with Thiers, Chigi found the Chief Executive somewhat disinterested in the business of naming bishops. Chigi later had little difficulty in securing the nomination of Archbishop Gustave Guibert of Tours as Archbishop of Paris shortly after Darboy's death. Thereafter, government confirmation of episcopal candidates was virtually automatic. The episode led to Bishop Dupanloup's famous remark that Simon would get a Red Hat sooner than he would.  

On December 22, 1873, Flavio Chigi was among those named cardinal in the first consistory announced by Pius IX after

2Rapp 1721, ASV, Segr di St, March 10, 1871, ASV, Segr di St, A 1871, R 165, f 9, fols. 84-87.

Jacques Gadille, in his La Pensée et l'action politique des évêques Français au début de la IIIe République, I, pp. 286-288, explores more fully this aspect of Chigi's accomplishment. Gadille also tells how a number of French prelates were elated to see Chigi leave as then their own influence in naming bishops would rise, I, pp. 19 and 293.

Some of Simon's correspondence on this matter is found in AMAE, Mémoires et Documents, Rome, Vol. 117, fols. 218-307 in which he complains that Chigi was making a "présentation" or a "nomination" (Simon's original French words, thus the italicization.)

The author consulted the following works by Simon which contained nothing about Chigi: Le Gouvernement de M. Thiers (2 vols., Paris, 1878); Souvenirs du 4 Septembre; Le Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale (Paris, 1876); and Souvenirs du 4 Septembre, Origine et chute de l'Empire (Paris, 1874). Permission could not be secured to use the file of Simon's private papers at the Archives Nationales.
the loss of the Temporal Power. Others included in the group of new cardinals were Guibert and Archbishop Regnier of Lille, who were the first French cardinals elevated in over a decade. In view of Chigi's troublesome conduct under the Second Empire, his ineffectiveness during 1870 and 1871, and his falling-out with the Republic, it would hardly seem that he was a worthy candidate for being a Prince of the Church. An inescapable precedent was being followed in elevating him to the purple, for the standing order was well set that papal nuncios to certain important Catholic states such as France, Austria, and Spain were automatically created cardinal upon the completion of their appointments as nuncios. This practice, followed to the present time, is deemed as the Holy See's way of honoring the state to which the nuncio had been accredited.\

Upon being named cardinal, Chigi assumed the title of Pro-nuncio until the arrival of his successor. Chigi received his Red Hat directly from President MacMahon in the chapel of the Palace of Versailles. That the head of the French state conferred a cardinal's insignia on a departing nuncio was another tradition which was scrupulously followed. Chigi stayed on at Paris until

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3 Most of this biographical information is obtained from the Chigi obituary in La Civiltà Cattolica, February 23, 1885, Vol. IX della serie duodecima (Vol. 141 in total series), pp. 613-614.
May of 1874 when his replacement, Archbishop Meglia, reached the city to commence his duties. Meglia was a notorious ultra-montane who had once been Pius IX's nuncio to Maximilian of Mexico where he offered little comfort and support to that ill-fated monarch.  

Cardinal Chigi spent the rest of his days at Rome, falling victim to an old Vatican cliché: Promoveatur ut amoveatur, that is, "Let him be promoted that he may be removed." He served on a number of councils of congregations of the Holy See, but these functions were largely honorific. His fate was that of many a lonely cardinal in Rome: many titles but no power. Thus he held such grant sounding posts as Grand Prior of the Knights of Malta and Jerusalem, Archpriest of St. John Lateran Basilica, Secretary of Apostolic Briefs, and Cardinal-Protector of the St. Vincent de Paul Society.  

In the 1878 consistory which elected Leo XIII, Chigi was not considered a serious candidate for the papal throne. In the French Foreign Ministry Archives, there is a collection of dossiers on

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4 Ibid., and ASV, Segr di St, Rubricella #372 (1874). Details on Meglia's mission in Mexico can be found in Joan Haslip, The Crown of Mexico; Maximilian and His Empress Carlota (New York, 1971).

5 La Civiltà Cattolica, loc. cit.
cardinals at the time of the conclave, a series put together to inform the Quai d'Orsay of the prospects to be faced as to the kind of pope any cardinal would make. In the report on Chigi, he is described as "a man of the world, ... a man of little talent and mediocre elevation of ideas, ... and a fanatic infallibist." The report concluded that Chigi's only hope of becoming pope was the reputation of his family name and the fact that there had previously been a Chigi pope, Alexander VII.

On February 16, 1885, Flavio Cardinal Chigi died after a long illness at the age of 74. At the time of his death, he was the last cardinal from the Roman nobility. He was buried in the Chigi family tomb in his titular church of Santa Maria del Popolo.

So lengthy a span as Chigi's twelve years in an important diplomatic post is difficult to appraise briefly. There seems no doubt that, taken as a whole, Chigi was an incompetent ambassador. The repeated mistakes and interferences of the 1860's, the numerous conflicts with various French ministries, the arguments with members of the hierarchy, and the embarrassing episode of the public apology to the Emperor were all affairs which add up to

6 AMAE, Mémoires et Documents, Rome, Vol. 109, fols. 16-17 and 82.

7 La Civiltà Cattolica, loc. cit.
a very sorry record of accomplishment. That the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps should have behaved in a far more restrained demeanor hardly needs be stated.

When the writings and biographies of the other members of the Diplomatic Corps present in Paris are considered (persons such as Lyons, Metternich, Nigra, even Washburne), very little is to be found in reference to the Apostolic Nuncio. Chigi's prominence both social and political among his fellow ambassadors was virtually nil. This should not have been the case in view of such factors as: Chigi's position as Dean, France's being a Catholic state, the importance of Napoleon III's Roman policy, and the immense measure of public standing enjoyed by the Paris Diplomatic Corps during the Second Empire.

One of the more astonishing facts about Chigi was his lack of influence or contacts with the full-blooded clerical Empress Eugénie. Here supposedly was an eminent champion of the Papal Cause. Here was the woman who allegedly said, "Better the Prussians on the Seine than the Italians on the Tiber." Yet the chief representative of the Holy Father accredited to the Second Empire met the Empress only on the highest of ceremonial occasions and in the most formal manner. The intimacy which grew up between Eugénie and other members of the Diplomatic Corps, especially Metternich and his fashionable wife Pauline, was not to
be the case with the Nuncio. In the last troubled hours of the Second
Empire, Eugénie was helped in her escape from the Tuileries by
Metternich and Nigra. Chigi's whereabouts are patently unknown.
Chigi was stringently negligent in not trying to establish better
liaison.

As regards other important personages in the French govern-
ment, Chigi's ascendancy was equally low. No cabinet member
or chamber deputy was his confidante. There were no important
contacts at the Quai d'Orsay. All the foreign ministers he dealt
with received him very politely yet usually managed to be impec-
cably evasive. Ambassadors are not supposed to have spies and
friends working for them, but they always do. Here again, the
Apostolic Nuncio was woefully lacking.

In operating in such seclusion and isolation from the proper

8 The author made extensive searches into numerous bio-
ographies of Empress Eugénie, memoirs of members of the court
of Napoleon III, and descriptions of social life in Paris during
the 1860's. Only one work yielded even a morsel: Harold Kurtz,
The Empress Eugénie, 1826-1920 (Boston, 1964), pp. 173-174
wherein Eugénie is quoted as stating some opinions about Mexican
affairs to the nuncio. Kurtz does not footnote this quotation.
See the bibliography for the other works on Eugénie looked
into by the author, too numerous to mention here.
This judgment on Chigi's lack of favor with Eugénie is
also deduced from the primary sources consulted at the Vatican
Archives and in Paris where the Empress is rarely mentioned.
circles in Paris, Chigi was usually mistaken in his rather superficial reports to Rome on the state of French politics. New ministers were rated only in terms of the level of their Catholic piety and their devotion to the Temporal Power. Chigi did not indicate that he had any conviction that the Second Empire was on shaky grounds or that Napoleon III could not be trusted, nor did he advise Rome of these conditions.

In the long run, the shortcomings of Flavio Chigi as a nuncio created his share of the blame for the failure of papal policies in September of 1870. While Chigi (or anyone else) could not have prevented the loss of the Temporal Power, certainly he held a very flexible position in which to operate and in which to mollify circumstances with his official relations to both Paris and Rome. His associations in France were so minimal or negative by the time of the Italian invasion of the Papal States that he was useless.

After the double-debacle of Sedan and the 20th of September and through the months at Tours and Bourdeaux, Chigi made something of an about-face in his modus operandi. Hidden talents and capabilities emerged under stress as exemplified by the courage shown during the dilemma of the Diplomatic Corps in the face of the siege and the change to a more pragmatic stand concerning the Roman Question. Despite the trouble of following a government-in-exile, Chigi kept apace of political changes. Chigi remained
considerably erroneous in some of his political judgment, such as his description of Trochu as politically astute and the consistent equation of republicans with revolutionaries. Chigi is to be commended for shifting tactics in these days from asking for an expeditionary force to trying to coerce the French into using what diplomatic means were available to work against the Italians.

When the forces of Thiers and Favre were back in command, Chigi met his match. True, he was alert at all the crucial moments: the naming of an ambassador to the Holy See, the transfer of the capital to Rome, and the Assembly vote. In each case, Chigi gave his all of pleading and cajoling, of begging and imploring. Both Thiers and Favre were perpetually one step ahead of Chigi on all issues. They were both extremely shrewd (as Chigi himself confessed), and there can be little doubt that they knew full well in advance what kind of interview they would have with the nuncio.

The Executive Chief and the Foreign Minister of the New Republic saw the true picture: France was defeated, the Prussians were still in occupation, no other European state acted in protest to the seizure of Rome, France needed peaceful relations with all its neighbors including Italy, and the unsettled political storm of republicans versus three camps of monarchists would not allow any foreign involvement. These overly obvious facts were continually presented to the nuncio, who rejected them all with relentless
repetition of his unyielding view of the necessity of the Temporal Power for the liberty and independence of the Holy Father.

Herein was the crux of Chigi's problem. While the French could deal with facts and reality, Chigi's only base was religious, quasi-theological, and definitely emotional. He could offer France no distinct advantage in trying to re-establish the Temporal Power nor could he offer any reprisals if the French did not cooperate. He could only stubbornly speak of the involatility of the Temporal Power and of France's historic mission to protect the Holy See.

The evidence is strong that Chigi was not conscious of the difference between the passionate nature of his stance and the actual conditions which governed French policy. This lack of perception molded so much of Chigi's conduct and was his own greatest deficiency which contributed to all his other failures.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. PRIMARY SOURCES

A. ARCHIVAL SOURCES

1. The Vatican Archives

The Vatican Archives contain documents going back to medi­eval times, documents which cover a wide spectrum of topics such as theology, literature, finances, politics, education, Church government and discipline, personnel, the government of the Papal States, and so on. The section belonging to the Secretary of State is by no means the only important portion of these documents.

Because of the immense bulk and scope of the Vatican Ar­chives, undoubtedly the largest in the world, the ordering of parti­cular papers must be done by the use of very precise code numbers. For this reason, this author has decided to give below a full cita­tion of the groups of documents which he consulted along with their full titles. It is hoped that this full citation will be of help to other scholars and will give something of a clearer understanding of the reference method used in the footnotes.

ARCHIVIO DELLA SEGRETARIA DI STATO

Rubricelle (Day Books), 1862-1874
- "Parigi Nunzio" volume for each year

Consultation of the Rubricelle, which are on the open shelves in a reference-catalogue room in the Vatican Archives, is the first step anyone should take in researching papal diplomacy.

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Rubrice e Buste

This is the main file-location for Chigi's reports and some of Antonelli's replies. The largest number of Chigi papers came from this section. Rubrica means "Index", Busta means "envelope", fascolo means "bundle." All information given below plus the year number (Anno) must be used in order to secure the desired documents.

1862
Rubrica 165
"Parigi Nunzio"
Busta 365
fascolo 21

1870
Rubrica 165
"Parigi Nunzio"
Busta 383
fascoli 1 and 7

Rubrica 190
"Providenza Generali Truppa
Busta 383
anni 1857-70, #58820, Partenza
fascoli 1-3
dei Francesi, arrolamento Pontificio, Nomina del Courten a
Generale--Austria, Bavaria, etc."

Rubrica 248
"Parigi Nunzio (#59047, Elezione di Franci... Colloqui coll'
Busta 384
Imperatore a varii oggetti... attentato all vita dell'Imperatore,
fascoli 1-3
Plebiscito--Vescovi Nomine)"

Rubrica 261
"Francia Ministro (anni 1846-
Busta 386
1870, n. 600046, Invito per la
fascolo 1
Festa di San Luigi)"

1871
Rubrica 165
"Parigi Nunzio"
Busta 393
fascoli 8-9

Rubrica 242
"Guerra fi Francia, Anno 1870;
Busta 394
Lettera di Principe di Bismarck
fascoli 1-2
al Nunzio di Parigi relative alla
corrispondenza del Corpo Diplo-
matico coi rispetti governi
durante l'assedio di Parigi"
FONS DU MINISTÈRE DES CULTES

F191924 "Rapports entre la France et Rome: Nonciature (An X-1899)--Légats et ablégats (1802-1856); Primats (1784-1874)"

--subsection: "Nonciature: Communication irrégulière avec l'Episcopat ou le clergé"

F191939 "Concile de 1869-70; mandements et Lettres pastorale--Reunion des Evêques."

F191940 "Concile de 1869-70. Précédents diplomatiques (1855-70); discussion au Corps Legislatifs et au Senat; controverses et actes du concile; journaux, note, et correspondance."

F191941 "Départ des évêques; incidents divers au concile."

F191942 "Journaux."
"Rapports de la France avec Rome sous le Second Empire et la 3e République--Congrégations Romains (Index, Rites); Concile; Evêques et reguliers (1952-1883); relations de Rome avec Allemagne (journaux) (1887); politique romain (1904), nonces."

ARCHIVES PRIVÉES

160 A P  Letters of Cardinal Donnet
Archbishop of Bourdeaux

AB XIX 526  Letters of Bishop Dupanloup
Bishop of Orleans

3. The Archives of the French Foreign Ministry


A small guidebook on the open shelf of the reading room of the Archives. The necessary first step in ordering documents.

MÉMOIRES ET DOCUMENTS, ROME

The Mémoires et Documents are random collections of memos, notes, dossiers, evaluations, and so on which describe conditions and persons in a foreign state which would be of interest to the Quai d'Orsay. They represent what could be described as "background material."

The author used the following volumes:

107 "Sur le Concile."

108 et 109 "Conclaves--Notes et reseignements sue les Cardinaux--Liste des Cardinaux."
"Mode de Correspondance suivi par le clergé de divers pays catholiques dans ses relations avec le Saint-Siège."

"Immixtion des nonces dans les affaires ecclésiastique de France, 1864."

"Légats a latere, nonces, et internonces, 1873."

"1702-1887. Rapports sur écclésiastiques personnes à Rome."

"Plaintes du nonce contre le Piemont-1864."

"Note du nonce sur les violations du territoire pontifical"

CORRESPONDANCE POLITIQUE

This section of the French Foreign Ministry Archives contains the well-organized files of the usual correspondence between the foreign minister and the various French ambassadors in the field.

The author perused the volumes noted below pertinent to relations with Rome but found them of little use because of few direct references to Chigi. Furthermore, the contents of these documents are thoroughly covered by such authors as Halperin and Wallace.

The author also wished to keep the focus of this work as much as possible on Chigi alone. Any attempt to incorporate the material of the Correspondance Politique would have allowed the dissertation to stray from its purpose.

PAPIERS DES AGENTS DU MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES

Chaudordy No. 52 (14 vols.) 1864-1890
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B. PUBLISHED COLLECTIONS OF DOCUMENTS AND CONTEMPORARY PERIODICALS


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Le Mémorial Diplomatique. 1870.

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The dissertation submitted by Christopher G. Kinsella has been read and approved by members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Date

Signature of Advisor