Firmitas Animae: a Study of Fortitude in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas

James William Sanders
Loyola University Chicago

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FIRMITAS ANIMAE: A STUDY OF FORTITUDE
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

by

James W. Sanders, S.J.

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

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LIFE

James William Sanders, S.J., was born in Peru, Illinois, November 16, 1929. He was graduated from St. Bede Academy, Peru, Illinois, June, 1947; attended St. Bede College, Peru, Illinois, 1947-1948, Notre Dame University, 1949, and was graduated from Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio, June, 1953, with the degree of Bachelor of Literature. He began his graduate studies at Loyola University in September, 1953.

From 1956 to 1959 the author taught English at St. Ignatius High School, Chicago, Illinois.
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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis will be to determine the exact nature of the *firmitas animae* or *firmitas mentis* which is necessary for the special virtue of fortitude in the philosophy of St. Thomas. St. Thomas speaks of this quality as a reality necessary for fortitude; yet nowhere does he say explicitly what it is. It will be the purpose of this thesis, then, by examining what St. Thomas does say about fortitude, and by considering that in the light of his psychology of virtue in general, to determine more accurately what he thought this reality of *firmitas animae* to be.

This treatment will necessarily observe certain limitations. First, emphasis will be placed upon the reality which makes the act possible rather than upon its morality. Therefore, the treatment will be primarily from a non-moral point of view.

Second, the consideration will be limited to fortitude as an acquired moral virtue, not as an infused virtue or as a gift. However, since there are times when what is said about the supernatural aspects of fortitude sheds light upon its natural philosophical aspects, such statements fit into the general purpose of the thesis and will be used.

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1St. Thomas uses the terms *firmitas animae* and *firmitas mentis* interchangeably. They will occur in the text of quotations in the thesis. Therefore, no references seem necessary here.
Third, the development of the thesis will be primarily doctrinal and not historical. The treatment of fortitude found in the *Summa Theologica*, II-II, will be used as the basis of the exposition. References to other texts will be made as occasion demands to clarify or expand issues raised. One historical aspect, however, since it leads to certain perplexing difficulties of interpretation, must be kept in mind throughout. This is the fact that in his treatment of fortitude St. Thomas is working within the framework of the traditional Aristotelian militaristic notion of fortitude, while in his own mind he is thinking in terms of a very different Christian fortitude. It is the difference between the soldier and the saint. While trying to save Aristotle's position, St. Thomas frequently turns it into his own. The result often leads to confusion for the student. For this reason, this historical difficulty will be dealt with as it comes up in the development of the thesis.

Fourth, although fortitude is a virtue, and all virtues are habits, the emphasis will not be placed upon the aspect of fortitude as a habit until the very end. The reason for this is that the habit of fortitude is formed through acts. By studying the formation of the act of fortitude first, it will be easier to arrive at an understanding of the nature of the *frrmitas animae* which must go into the formation of the habit.

With these limitations in mind, it is now possible to begin a development of the thesis. The first chapter will be an attempt to arrive at a general definition of fortitude. This will include a thorough discussion of the subjective experience of the brave man in an act of fortitude. It will also include objective constituents of an act of fortitude. The second chapter will deal with the integral parts of fortitude, those auxiliary virtues or qualities
of soul which are necessary for the act of fortitude itself. The third and fourth chapters will bring a general discussion of the psychology of human acts to bear upon the specific situation of fortitude in an attempt to isolate the specific nature of that firmitas animae which makes fortitude what it is.
CHAPTER I

FORTITUDE

To begin with a general discussion of the topic, then, it seems proper to
discuss the notion of fortitude as a virtue. In various places St. Thomas
gives slightly different definitions of virtue, but a good functional definition
which will obviate the necessity of a lengthy and unnecessary explanation might
be this: "Ad virtutem humanam pertinet ut faciat hominem et opus eius secundum
rationem esse."\(^2\)

Now, there are several ways in which a person might be \textit{secundum rationem}.
First, if his intellect is \textit{secundum rationem}, he has the Intellectual virtues.
Second, if his human acts, those acts performed knowingly and freely, are \textit{se-
cundum rationem}, he has moral virtue.

There are several ways, in turn, by which a person's human acts might be in
accord with reason (\textit{secundum rationem}). First, he must know what is good for
him to do in each particular instance. This pertains to the virtue of prudence.
Second, once a person knows what is good for him to do in any particular in-
stance, this good must be accepted and freely chosen by the will. This per-
tains to the virtue of justice, the virtue by which "rectitudo rationis in rebus

\(^2\textit{S.T.}, 11-11, 123, 1 \text{ c.}\)

\(^3\text{The fact that prudence bridges the gap between the intellectual and moral
virtues will not be dealt with here. See \textit{S.T.}, 1-11, 57, 5 \text{ c}; and also \textit{In III
Sent.}, 23, 1, 4 \text{ sol. 2 ad 3.}\)
humanis instituitur."\(^4\)

However, in human activity the situation is never simply a matter of the will's acceptance of the dictates of right reason. Granted that the will, through the general virtue of justice, is to be ordered to choose the good proposed by reason, there are still impediments which tend to hinder this choice of the good. Thus there arises the need for other virtues by which a person might be in accord with reason. As a result of these protective virtues, the impediments to the choice of the rational good are removed: "tolluntur impedimenta huius rectitudinis in rebus humanis ponendae."\(^5\)

In general, these impediments are of two kinds. First, the proper exercise of the will can be impeded by an attraction "ab aliquo delectabili."\(^6\) That is, something pleasing to the senses often tends to pull the will away from doing that which right reason dictates.\(^7\) The virtue which combats this impediment is the virtue of temperance. The second impediment repels the will "ab eo quod est secundum rationem propter aliquod difficile quod incumbit."\(^8\) That is, the will is impeded from following right reason because of some difficulty which stands in the way of following the rational good. The virtue which overcomes this impediment is fortitude: "Ad hoc impedimentum tollendum requiritur

\(^4\) Justice here, \textit{S.T.}, I-II, 123, 1 c, is taken in a very wide sense. This will be explained more fully later.

\(^5\) \textit{S.T.}, I-II, 123, 1 c.

\(^6\) \textit{Ibid}.

\(^7\) Exactly how the sense appetites can influence the will will be discussed later.

\(^8\) \textit{S.T.}, I-II, 123, 1 c.
The situation of fortitude, then, explained in ultra-simplified form, is this: Reason proposes a good to be sought. The will, on the supposition that it is rightly ordered, would ordinarily choose to seek this good. However, it is a good difficult to attain, so difficult that the very aspect of the difficulty tends to impede the will's choice to attain it. It is here that fortitude steps in to meet the difficulty, thus leaving the will free to seek the good, and it is precisely here that the need and place of *firmitas animae* appears.

This general structure of fortitude, as already stated, has been ultra-simplified. It is now necessary to examine its various aspects more in detail.

First, the notion of difficulty should come under closer scrutiny. What is important here is that the subject, the brave man, must perceive the difficult object precisely as difficult. Thus, a man might, from the exterior, seem to be brave in meeting objective difficulties, whereas in actuality he may not be acting bravely at all. He may, for example, be totally or partially ignorant of the danger's gravity. He may have undergone this difficulty so many times before that it no longer seems difficult to him. He may have great confidence in a certain skill which tends to lessen the difficulty as he experiences it. But the truly brave man, in the act of bravery, perceives the difficulty precisely as difficult.

Now then, the perception of difficulty works a definite effect on the human

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10 For this reason fortitude is said to be conservative (*conservativa*) of the good of reason. See *S.T.*., II-II, 123, 12 c.

11 *S.T.*., II-II, 123, 1 ad 2, covers all the cases mentioned.
person. It arouses in him certain feelings, called by St. Thomas passions. It is these passions which immediately influence the will away from the rational good; and, therefore, it is they which must be controlled by firmitas animae. It is, in fact, these passions which actually become the subjects of the virtue of fortitude in the sense that man's rational powers must so govern them that they truly participate in reason itself. It is of the utmost importance, then, to discuss the passions involved in an act of fortitude.

Primarily, the perception of difficulty arouses the passion of fear: "Quod autem aliquis retrahatur ab aliquo difficili, pertinet ad rationem timoris, quia importat recessum quendam a malo difficultatem habente... Et ideo fortitudo principaliter est circa timores difficillum rerum, quae retrahere possunt voluntatem a sequela rationis." That is, the perception of difficulty causes fear to rise in the heart of man. This fear tends to influence the will away from following the dictates of reason. Therefore, it is the job of the firmitas animae of fortitude to control or overcome this fear.

12 St. I., 1-11, 56, 3 & 4 c.
13 Ibid., 123, 3 c.
14 Actually, it is fortitude's job to preserve the mean between too much and too little fear: "Omnis autem virtus moralis ponit modum rationis in materia circa quam est. Unde ad fortitudinem pertinet timor moderatus secundum rationem: ut scilicet homo timet quod oportet, et quando oportet, et similiter de aliis. Nic autem modus rationis corrupit potest, sicut per excessum, ita et per defectum. Unde sicut timiditas opponitur fortitudini per excessum timoris, inquantum scilicet homo timet quod non oportet, vel secundum quod non oportet; ita etiam impaviditas opponitur ei per defectum timoris, inquantum scilicet non timet aliquis quod oportet timere."—Ibid., 126, 2 c. However, ordinarily the problem is to overcome an excess of fear, and so St. Thomas deals almost exclusively with this aspect of fortitude, the control of fear.
However, fear is not the only passion with which fortitude has to deal. "Oportet autem huiusmodi difficillimum impulsum non solum firmiter tolerare cohibendo timorem, sed etiam moderate aggregi; quando scilicet oportet ea exterminare ad securitatem in posterum habendam. Quod videtur pertinere ad rationem audaciae." Therefore, at times the difficulty is such that to overcome it one must not simply conquer his fear, but he must go to the attack in order to exterminate the difficulty. This, says St. Thomas, requires the passion of boldness, the passion which consists in "invadendo id quod est homini contrarium."16

Thus, the two principal passions involved in fortitude are fear and boldness. These are the passions which must be brought under the control of reason and participate in reason if the will is to be free to choose and follow the rational good.17 In the one case fortitude acts on fear to repress it; in the other fortitude acts on boldness to engender it.18

But to understand better the role of fear and boldness in the act of fortitude, and thereby to understand better the act of fortitude itself, a brief

15 S.I., II-II, 123, 3 c.
16 Ibid., 127, 3 ad 2.
17 There are also other passions which have difficulty as an object. St. Thomas's reasons for rejecting these passions in favor of fear and boldness as the principal irascible passions will not be dealt with here since the present object is merely to understand St. Thomas's own view of the dynamics of an act of fortitude.
18 Again, as with fear, it is fortitude's job to preserve the mean between too much and too little boldness. However, in the face of real danger it is seldom difficult to repress an excess of boldness. Therefore, "...fortitudo plus utilitur audacia quam eam reprimat."—S.I., II-II, 161, 3 ad 3.
explanation of the dynamics of these two passions is necessary. Their action
might be explained in the following way: First, each is a reaction to an object
perceived as an evil (malum) for the one perceiving. This evil is apprehended
as still in the future and as possible of being avoided or overcome. Thus far
the objects causing fear and boldness are the same: a threat to the individual,
in the future, not unavoidable.

They differ, however, in this, that fear arises at the perception of this
evil, threatening object in the future under the aspect of its impending danger
to the individual, while boldness arises at the perception of the same object
under the aspect of its avoidableness or of its being able to be overcome.
Thus, fear shrinks from "malum futurum propinquum cui resistit de facili non
potest." On the other hand, boldness attacks "terribilia sub spe alicibus
boni." Nevertheless, despite these opposite tendencies, both are responding
to the same object.

In fact, the two seem to be at opposite ends of a continuum. In so far as
the individual perceives this difficult, future evil as less and less possible
of being avoided, he fears it to a greater and greater degree. If the point
comes where he perceives it as impossible of being avoided, then his fear turns
to sadness; for the evil, as he apprehends it, is already upon him.21

19 S.T., 1-11, 43, 1 c. St. Thomas further explains the object of fear as
difficulty which "excedit potestatem timentis, ut scilicet ei resistit non
possit."—Ibid., 41, 4 c. This object is a "malum imminens quod non de facilli
repelli potest."—Ibid., 42, 5 c.

20 S.T., 11-11, 144, 3 c. Also S.T., 1-11, 45, 1 c.

21 S.T., 1-11, 42, 2 c & 3 ad 2.
On the other hand, if the individual perceives this same difficult future evil as more and more possible of being overcome, the threat decreases, and his boldness grows greater and greater. The reason for this is that the possibility of success engenders hope, and hope engenders boldness: "Provocatur spes causans audaciam, per ea quae faciunt nos aestimare quod possibilis sit adipisci victoriam." 22

Hope works in this way: if one considers the same difficult, threatening object in the future, it is obvious that this object can also be apprehended simultaneously, but under another aspect, as a good. That is, as in the case of fortitude, this difficult object is a means to a further good, and as such it naturally participates to a degree in the goodness of the end toward which it serves as a means. Likewise, when the difficult object appears as one which can really be overcome, the object itself takes on a certain aspect of goodness. Viewed in either of these two ways, the same object becomes not a possible, difficult, evil object in the future, but a possible, difficult, good object in the future. In other words, the same object can at the same time, though under different aspects, appear as both an evil and a good. It is this difficult object in the future under the aspect of its goodness which causes hope: "Spes est motus appetitivae virtutis consequens apprehensionem boni futuri ardul

22 Ibid., 45, 3 c.
possibilis adiplsci." 23

Now, as the apprehension of this object under the aspect of its goodness increases, hope increases. And as hope increases, fear correspondingly decreases. 24 Likewise, as hope increases boldness increases: "Ex hoc enim quod aliquis sperat superare terrible inminens, ex hoc audacter inequitur ipsum." 25 The converse is also true. As fear increases, hope decreases, until fear turns into sadness and hope vanishes completely.

Everything depends, then, on the aspect under which this difficult object in the future is apprehended. If looked upon as an evil, it causes fear. If looked upon as a good, it engenders hope, which in turn engenders boldness.

23 S.T., I-II, 40, 2 c. It would be well to mention at this point that the movement of the appetitive potency spoken of here need not be restricted to the sense appetites alone. This applies not only to hope but to all the appetites. St. Thomas makes this quite clear: "Sunt in appetitu superiori aliqae operationes consimiles passionibus inferioris appetitus."—DeVer., 26, 9 ad 5. By higher appetite St. Thomas means the will. Cf. De Nat., II, 1 c; S.T., I-I, 82, 5 c. This point is stressed by Noble: "Il faut bien se persuader que dans son long traité des passions (I-II, q. XXII — XLVIII) S. Thomas ne décrit pas les passions uniquement sensibles, mais tous les mouvements affectifs de l'âme. Cajetan le dit très nettement dans son commentaire, q. XLVIII, art. 4: Universalis passiones tractatae sunt tam pro passionibus quam pro actibus voluntatis similibus passionibus."—H.D. Noble, O.P., "Comment la passion enjôle la volonté," Divus Thomas (Placentia), III (January 1926), 643 note 14. While in treating the virtue of fortitude St. Thomas is speaking primarily of sense appetites, it should be born in mind that this does not exclude a corresponding act of the will following intellectual apprehension. This will become clearer as the thesis progresses.

24 S.T., I-II, 42, 5 ad 1.

25 Ibid., 45, 2 c. This can also be stated in another way: "Quaecumque nata sunt causae spem, vel excludere timorem, sunt causae audaciae." Ibid., 45, 3 c. Cf. also S.T., I-I, 125, 2 ad 3.
To summarize, now, the situation of fortitude as thus far described, suppose that a man is faced with a difficulty which stands in the way of a good proposed by reason. This difficulty looms as a threat to his own personal welfare. If he apprehends it more as a difficulty from which it is not likely he can escape, and which it is not likely he can overcome, then fear plays the dominant role, though some hope remains because he still at least realizes the possibility of escape or victory. On the other hand, if he apprehends this difficulty rather in the light of the possibility of overcoming it, or in the light of the good which meeting it will help him attain, then hope springs into his heart, and as a result of hope boldness also, a spontaneous, spirited movement to overcome this difficulty. Yet, some fear, too, remains, since there is still the possibility that the difficulty may not be overcome.

The above, then, constitutes the picture of the internal experience on the level of the passions prior to the actual act of fortitude. The picture, however, is admittedly a general one, and will have to be expanded somewhat. Before proceeding along this line, however, it is first necessary to define more clearly the exact context of that act which is most specifically one of fortitude.

This can be done by concentrating once more on the aspect of difficulty which is basic to the act of fortitude, that is, on the peculiar type of difficulty the act of fortitude is meant to meet. For the fact is that the practice of all virtue involves some difficulty, and in this sense fortitude is required and is used in all virtue. "Cullibet enim virtuti morali, ex hoc quod est
It is obviously also true that as the difficulty grows the fortitude required must be greater. It follows, then, that the ultimate, the specific, act of fortitude as such will be that in which the difficulty is greatest. It is this specific act in which we are interested here, the act in which fear grows most terrible and in which boldness is the most difficult to muster. To meet such a situation requires the ultimate in *firmitas animae*. In a general way St. Thomas states that this ultimate act consists "in sustinendis et re-pellendis his in quibus maxime difficile est firmitatem habere, scilicet in aliquibus periculis gravibus."²⁷

Now then, there is no doubt in the mind of St. Thomas as to exactly what these few grave dangers are. There is, in fact, only one which stands out above all others. This is the danger of death.²⁸ The danger of death strikes the greatest, most unavoidable, most irreducible fear into the heart of man.

The reason is simple enough: "Omnis timor ex amore nascitur."²⁹ A man fears to lose only that which he first loves. "Ex hoc enim quod aliquis amat

²⁶ S.T., I-II, 61, 4 c. See also De Virtut., 1, 12 ad 23.

²⁷ S.T., I-II, 123, 2 c.

²⁸ S.T., I-II, 123, 4 c. St. Thomas insists on this fact in various passages: S.T., I-II, 61, 3 c.; I-II, 123, 11 c.; 124, 3 c & 4 c; De Virtut., 1, 12 ad 23.

²⁹ S.T., I-II, 123, 4 ad 2. Love, in fact is the basic cause of all the passions: S.T., I-II, 41, 2 ad 1.
aliquid bonum, sequitur quod privatium talis boni sit el malum, et per consequens quod timeat ipsum tamquam malum.\textsuperscript{30} Now, no man loves anything with as natural and indestructible a love as that with which he loves his own life.\textsuperscript{31}

To lose his life means to lose his very self and all he has in the world. St. Thomas sums up this position very neatly when commenting on Aristotle:

\textit{Aliquis dicitur simpliciter fortis ex eo quod est intrepidus circa ea quae sunt maxime terribilia. Virtus enim determinatur secundum ultimum in potentia, ut dicitur in primo de Caelo; ideo oportet quod virtus fortitudinis sit circa ea quae sunt maxime terribilia, ita quod nullus magis sustineat pericula quam fortis. Inter omnia autem maxime terribile est mors. Et huius ratio est, quia mors est minus totius praesentis vitae, et nihil post mortem videtur esse huiusmodi bonum aut malum, de his quae pertinent ad praesentem vitam, quae nobis inferunt mortem. Ea enim quae pertinent ad statum animarum post mortem, non sunt visibilia nobis. Valde autem terribile est id per quod homo perdit omnia bona. Unde videtur quod fortitudo proprie sit circa timorem periculorum mortis.}\textsuperscript{32}

While in the above passage St. Thomas is admittedly commenting on

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{S.T.}, I-II, 43, 1 c.

\textsuperscript{31} One might ask, then, how it would ever be possible for anyone to commit suicide. One might also contend that people do love other realities, reputation for example, more than life itself. An adequate answer to these objections would involve a lengthy discussion which would not be particularly relevant to the purpose of the thesis. By way of answer here it can simply be stated that, while St. Thomas admits that subjectively a person might love something else more than life, as in suicide, yet objectively this is impossible, the reason being that these other loves should be controlled by other virtues. For example, if a person commits suicide because he loves his reputation too much, he has done so because he lacks the humility which would normally control this love of reputation. But no other virtue can control the love of life. This is irreducible. Further, St. Thomas is speaking here primarily of love as felt on the sense level, and on this level it is difficult to see what could be loved more than life itself. St. Thomas has in mind fear in the sense appetite which has as its object the physical evil of death. Cf. \textit{S.T.}, II-I, 123, 4 ad 2; 125, 2 c.

\textsuperscript{32} In \textit{III Ethic.}, lect., 14, n. 536.
Aristotle, who did not share the Christian faith in life after death, nevertheless, from the wording of his commentary it is plain that he agrees with Aristotle that death is the most terrible of physical evils. While a man may have faith and hope in life after death, it is none the less true that the end of life on earth is, psychologically at least, the end of everything. What lies beyond is not clear; and, even if it were, to get to the beyond involves an end of life as it is known in this world. While it may be and should be true that in a higher sense there is no fear of death for the man who has faith in God, still, on the level of sense appetite this fear cannot be avoided. And it is on this level that the act of fortitude primarily works. It fights the fear of a corporal, physical evil: "Fortitudo ordinatur ad mala corporalia." And no physical evil can be greater than bodily death. "Maxime autem terrible inter omnia corporalia mala est mors, qua tollit omnia corporalia bona." Thus, even a martyr, who has all the confidence in the world that he will enjoy eternal life, is literally scared stiff of death itself.

Once death has been established as the greatest difficulty the brave man must meet, St. Thomas goes on to determine which type of danger of death offers the greatest grounds for fortitude. Following the lead of Aristotle, he con-

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33 S.T., II-11, 123, 11 ad 2.
34 S.T., II-11, 123, 4 c.
35 Ibid., 8 c. This passage, however, explains an exception to this rule which sometimes comes about by special grace.
cludes that to face the danger of death in war would be the ultimate in fortitude. "Fortitudo proprie est circa pericula mortis quae est in bello." 36

This, however, seems to be a case where St. Thomas is trying to save the Aristotelian notion of a militaristic fortitude where heroism in war is the ultimate. 37 Actually, working within this framework, he twists the meaning to fit his own purposes. He does this by expanding the notion of war to include undergoing the danger of death, a painful one, for a good cause. What he certainly has in mind are the various types of Christian martyrdom. Thus, he distinguishes between "bellum generale," which pertains to soldiers fighting on the battle line, and "bellum particulare," 38 which pertains to an individual undergoing danger of death in a variety of ways.

In conclusion, then, it was certainly St. Thomas’s mind that to undergo the danger of death was the ultimate in fortitude, though not necessarily a soldier’s death in war.

It has been shown that the act of fortitude has to do both with repressing

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36 Ibid., 5 c.

37 Aristotle makes bravery in war the greatest because in war a man faces "...pericula maxima et optima."—In III Ethic., lect. 14. The dangers are maxima because nowhere else is danger of death as great. They are optima because undergone for the highest end, the common good. Obviously, St. Thomas could not fully agree with either of these reasons because his notion of Christian martyrdom introduces new and more important factors.

38 S.T., 11-11, 123, 5 c. Cajetan, commenting on this passage, explains St. Thomas’s position as a departure from the Aristotelian militaristic idea of fortitude. See Thomas de Vio Cajetanus, Commentary on Summa Theologica, contained in Opera Omnia S. Thomas, Leonine ed. (Rome, 1882), X, 15.
fear and engendering boldness. It has also been shown that the situation in which fear is repressed or boldness engendered, to constitute an act of fortitude in the ultimate sense, must be the situation in which the difficulty which constitutes the object of both fear and boldness is the difficulty of undergoing the danger of death. It is now necessary to show more precisely how fear and boldness operate in meeting the danger of death.

On the basis of the separate functions of fear and boldness in facing difficulties, St. Thomas divides fortitude into two separate acts. One, that of attack, deals with the passion of boldness. The other, that of endurance, deals with the passion of fear.39 It will now be necessary to examine the structure of these two acts.

The first is the act of attack. St. Thomas conceives its structure in this way: A person perceives a difficulty, a threat to his own life, which stands in the way of the good and he seeks. This danger is not immediately upon him but further in the future.40 Likewise, though a real danger, it appears that he can overcome it, that it is weaker than he.41 As a result, hope rises that he will triumph over the danger. This leads to a spirited movement of boldness which helps him go out to the attack and confront the danger.

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39 S.T., 11-11, 123, 6 c.
40 S.T., 11-11, 123, 6 ad 1.
41 Ibid.
He may even summon the passion of anger to his aid if the danger is such that it
roused anger in him. "Ad iram pertinat insilire in rem contristantem, et sic
directe cooperatur fortitudini in aggradiendo." 42

The picture here is one of a spirited, hopeful, confident, almost triumphant
decision to meet a threat to one's life, a threat which still laid in the future, a
threat which, though real, appears as definitely able to be overcome.

Note that the picture of the act of attack painted here goes well beyond
what was indicated earlier when it was explained that the brave man must
sometimes use boldness to attack a difficulty in order to preserve the good of
reason. 43 Here the situation or the circumstances in which this aggression
takes place is limited to a very definite area, namely, the situation in which
the attacker makes the decision to attack a difficulty which is not yet actually
upon him, and which he definitely feels superior to. 44

The picture of the act of endurance, however, is quite different. In en-

42 Ibid., 10 ad 3.
43 Ibid., 3 c. See page 8.
44 One might ask why the scope of an act of attack should be so limited.
Is it not possible, for example, that at times the good of reason might demand
that a person attack a stronger foe? This certainly happens in real life.
Likewise, should the act of attack be limited to a decision to fight a future
difficulty? Is there not a time in the actual attack when the difficulty is
immediately present? A solution to this problem is not called for here, since
the main object is to understand St. Thomas's own thought. However, one pos-
ible interpretation of St. Thomas's mind might be this: When the danger appears
stronger, and when it is no longer in the future but immediately present, then
the act of attack turns into an act of endurance, even though physically
speaking it continues to be an act of attack. Thus, a soldier actually at-
tacking a foe whom he realizes to be stronger would really be psychologically
enduring and not attacking.
durance the threat to one's life is much greater. It appears as the stronger, the overpowering threat. The danger is immediately present, so immediate, in fact, that its futurity turns into actual physical suffering. As this happens the hope of deliverance vanishes and fear turns into sadness. The act of endurance becomes the actual endurance of pain, and that over a period of time.

In this act there can be no help from the passions, no sense of hope or joy, no spirited enthusiasm for victory, because the pain of sense blots all these out. There is only the firm rational determination to abide by one's decision to hold on, to endure for the sake of some higher good proposed by reason. In this sense, "hunc actum sola ratio per se facit."

Note that this picture of the act of endurance also goes well beyond what

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45 S.T., 11-11, 123, 6 ad 1.
46 ibid.
47 ibid., in III Ethic., lect. 18, n. 584; and S.T., 11-11, 123, 8 c.
48 S.T., 11-11, 123, 6 ad 1.
49 See S.T., 11-11, 123, 8 on this point. St. Thomas argues that in the act of endurance a person suffers tristitiae from the apprehension of the immediate danger to his life. He also suffers dolor sensus from the actual physical pain being undergone. At the same time he enjoys a delectatio which "...proprie consequitur opera virtutum." This delectatio cancels out the tristitiae, but the dolor sensus in turn cancels out the delectatio. The net result, then, of the total experience is the overwhelming consciousness of pain. "A magnitudine corporalis doloris quasi evanescit delectatio spiritualis...quia dolor corporalis est sensibilior... at apprehensio sensitive magis est homini in manifesto."--123, 8 ad 3.
50 S.T., 11-11, 123, 10 ad 3.
was indicated earlier when it was simply stated that the brave man must be able
to stand firm and control his fear of the danger of death. There have been two
specifically new elements introduced here. The first is the notion that the act
of endurance involves not only the passion of fear, but also that of sadness;
and, even beyond this, it includes actual physical suffering. St. Thomas is
most explicit on this point: "Ad fortem autem pertinet non solum stare contra
timores futurorum periculorum, sed etiam in ipsis periculis persistere, sicut
prius dictum est. Et ideo dicit quod praecipue dicuntur fortes ex eo quod bene
sustinent tristitia, idest praesentialiter imminentia, puta percussiones et
vulnera. Et inde est quod fortitudo habet tristitiam adjunctam."\(^{51}\) The second
new element is the notion of a length of time being involved in the endurance.\(^{52}\)

Therefore, it becomes clear that there is a basic and clearly marked differ-
ence between the two acts of the same virtue. The act of attack is a spirited
movement against a weaker opponent who looms as a danger in the future. The act
of endurance is a determined resolution despite the contrary movements of the
passions and of actual sense pain to stand firm against a stronger opponent who
(or which) is actually present and inflicting pain, and that over a period of
time.

\(^{51}\) In III Ethic., lect. 18, n. 584. The problem here is that whereas St.
Thomas originally stated that fortitude has to do with fear, he now brings
sadness, tristitia, into the picture. Sadness is a reaction of the sense appe-
tite to a physical evil which is immediately present.---S.T., 1-11, 42, 3 ad 2.
Further, the passion of sadness should properly be governed by the virtue of
patience. This problem will be taken up in the next chapter.

\(^{52}\) S.T., 11-11, 123, 6 ad 1. Again, a problem arises, for the virtue of
perseverance should properly govern endurance which lasts over a period of time.
This problem will also be taken up in the next chapter.
These differences are most striking. It seems difficult, in fact, to class the act of attack with that of endurance as an act requiring the ultimate in firmitas animae. And, in fact, in the mind of St. Thomas the two do not rate equal importance. He maintains that the act of endurance is the principal act of fortitude: "Principaliior actus fortitudinis est sustinere, id est immobiliter sistere in periculis, quam aggrehi."\(^53\) No further proof of this fact seems necessary. The circumstances themselves of the two acts tell the story. Clearly, the firmitas animae necessary for fortitude need not be as great in the act of attack as in that of endurance. Basically, the difference seems to be this: "Audacia autem consurgit ex hoc quod aliquis aestimat eum quem invadit, suam non excedere potestatem . . . . Difficillius autem est stare contra fortiorem, quam insurgere in aequalem vel minorem."\(^54\)

Therefore, the discussion will henceforth center more on the act of endurance as the ultimate in firmitas animae, though not to the exclusion of the act of attack, which also employs the same firmitas animae though to a lesser degree.

To understand further the situation in which the acts of fortitude take place, it will now be necessary to go on to discuss the integral parts of fortitude, those other virtues which St. Thomas conceives as necessary for fortitude itself. Only after seeing how these integral parts enter into an act of fortitude can the exact nature of firmitas animae be determined.

\(^53\) S.T., 11-11, 123, 6 c.

\(^54\) In III Ethic., lect. 18.
CHAPTER II

THE INTEGRAL PARTS OF FORTITUDE

The virtues allied to fortitude as integral parts\(^1\) are absolutely necessary for the specific act of fortitude itself, "sine quibus fortitudo non potest esse."\(^2\) They have, therefore, a direct relation to \textit{firmitas animae} itself, and must be understood in order to arrive at an understanding of \textit{firmitas animae}.

St. Thomas apparently lists four qualities as integral parts of fortitude, two for each of the separate acts.\(^3\)

For the act of attack he names two: confidence (\textit{fiducia}), which pertains to the soul's preparation: "ut scilicet alquis promptum animum habeat ad aggrediendum";\(^4\) and magnificence (\textit{magnificentia}), which pertains to the execu-

\(^1\) The integral parts may also be potential parts, that is, virtues allied to fortitude but which do not have the difficulty of meeting the danger of death as their specific object. Thus, as will be seen, patience has to do with controlling sadness, and as such is a potential part of fortitude, but only when the sadness comes from meeting the danger of death does patience become an integral part of fortitude. Therefore, the potential parts are not important in this treatment.

\(^2\) \textit{S. I.}, II-11, 128, 1 c.

\(^3\) \textit{Ibid.}, But it will be shown that this classification is merely an attempt to preserve the classic treatment of fortitude, while actually, with regard to two of these parts, St. Thomas means something quite different.

\(^4\) \textit{Ibid.}
tion of the act: "ne scilicet aliquid deficiat in executione illorum quae fiducialiter inchoavit."\(^5\) Thus, the one prepares the soul to attack by giving it confidence, and the other sees to the actual execution of the act. In performing these functions they are essential for the act of attack itself: "Haec ergo duo, si coarctantur ad propriam materiam fortitudinis, scilicet ad pericula mortis, erunt quasi partes integrales ipsius, sine quibus esse non potest."\(^6\)

To examine these two parts of the act of attack more closely now, they must be fitted into the act of attack in its actual context. First, in the matter of confidence there might be the specific difficulty of a threat to one's life which is a real threat and yet one that can or may be overcome. This gives rise to conflicting passions of fear, in so far as the possibility of losing life is really present, and hope in so far as the possibility of emerging victorious is also present. In order to generate the boldness necessary for the act of attack, the fear must somehow be repressed and the hope strengthened. "Spes autem firma esse non potest nisi amoveatur contrarium. Quandoque enim aliquid, quantum ex seipso est, speraret aliquid, sed spes tollitur propter impedimentum timoris; timor enim quodammodo spei contrariatur."\(^7\) Now, when fear goes, security (securitas), which "laudatur ex hoc quod non timeat,"\(^8\) takes its place. Therefore, the fear which impedes hope must itself be impeded by this security. When this happens hope actually becomes confirmed, and confirmed hope is nothing

\(^5\) Ibid.
\(^6\) Ibid.
\(^7\) Ibid., I ad 6.
\(^8\) Ibid.
more or less than confidence itself. "Est enim fiducia spes roborata ex aliqua firma opinione."9 These two, then, security and confidence, are correlative notions. "Securitas enim a malo aliquo infert quandam fiduciam de bono opposito, et e contra."10 One must have security from fear to have confidence, but he must also have confidence to have security from fear.

In the act of attack, however, the emphasis is placed on confidence because the act of attack is a positive act, and confidence is the more positive aspect of the confidence-security correlation. In this sense, then, confidence is an integral part, a necessary condition, for the act of attack. "Et ideo fiducia ... potest nominare conditionem virtutis, et propter hoc numeratur inter partes fortitudinis, non quasi virtus adjuncta, sed sicut pars integralis."11

By way of brief summary, then, confidence is necessary for the act of attack because it makes firm the hope that is necessary to generate the boldness used in the act of attack.

The second integral part of the act of attack, magnificence, as the name

9 S.T., 11-11, 129, 6 ad 3. Actually, fiducia seems to go just one step beyond hope itself, since hope is hardly hope unless it is based on some firm opinion. Gauthier says that fiducia is a participation of the appetite in the certitude of the cognitive faculty.--R.A. Gauthier, O.P., Magnanimity, (Paris, 1951), p. 357. Also cf. S.T., 1-11, 40, 2 ad 2. Further, it must be born in mind that the hope, and therefore the confidence, spoken of here, is primarily hope of actual success in meeting the difficulty, not hope in a good which may come as a result.

10 Cajetan, X, 69, commenting on 11-11, 129, 7 c. Also cf. Gauthier, p. 358, on this point.

11 S.T., 11-11, 129, 6 ad 3.
implies, has to do with doing great things, with activity. "(A)d magnificentiam pertinet facere aliquid magnum."¹² Now, obviously, in the act of attack the brave man must be a doer, a man of action. There must be something which carries him to the attack. Magnificence is such a virtue. It moves to action. It carries hope over from a movement within the soul to an actual movement toward the object hoped for. Further, it carries a man into great and difficult undertakings. In this sense it is allied to and necessary for fortitude. "Magnificentia autem convenit cum fortitudini in hoc quod, sicut fortitudo tendit in aliquid arduum et difficile, ita etiam et magnificentia."¹³

Now that the nature and operation of *fiducia* and *magnificentia* have been explained, however, a slight digression is in order to show that actually St. Thomas meant to subsume both of these under the greater virtue of magnanimity.¹⁴ That is, what both confidence and magnificence have to offer as necessary for the act of attack is already contained in the virtue of magnanimity. Therefore, it is magnanimity which is really necessary for the act of attack. This statement needs explanation.

First, as should be clear from what has gone before, confidence is not really a virtue at all. It was explained as a participation of the appetite in the certitude of the cognitive faculty.¹⁵ As such it is merely a state of soul or a condition for virtue. Put in another way, in the situation of the

¹² *Ibid.*, 2 c.


¹⁴ This position is confirmed by Gauthier, who shows its historical background: pp. 311-313, 358-360.

¹⁵ See above, p. 24, note 9.
act of attack there would be no reason why a person should not lose confidence rather than strengthen it. There is adequate cause for both hope and fear. What makes the balance swing in favor of hope over fear? It would be begging the question to say that confidence does this, since it is precisely the strengthened hope which constitutes the confidence. In other words, there must be some reality behind hope which strengthens it into confidence. Confidence cannot stand by itself.

Second, magnificence, though treated as a virtue in the proper sense, has as its proper object the doing of great things in a monetary way. "(A)d magnificientiam pertinet magnos sumptus facere ad hoc quod opus magnum convenienter fiat."16 Moreover, the magnificent man spends his money in a particular way: "... operari aliquid in exteriori materia: sicut facere domum vel aliquid huiusmodi."17 Thus, the magnificent man is the one who builds libraries, amusement centers, etc. for the public at his own expense. Now, while this is certainly concerned with doing great things, it seems far from the act of attack in fortitude.

Of course, St. Thomas does explain that, taken in a broader sense, magnificence does include other activities: "... facere pro quacunque actione sive transeat in exteriorum materiam ... sive maneat in ipso agente, sicut intelligere et velie."18 But taken in this sense, as will now be shown, it seems to be assumed into the virtue of magnanimity.

16 St. I., II-II, 134, 3 c.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
For magnanimity is the virtue which, put in the briefest possible terms, desires and does those things which are most worthy of honor. "(D)icendum est quod propria materia magnanimitatis est magnus honor: et ad ea tendit magnanimus quae sunt maximo honore digna."\(^{19}\) The magnanimous man does these things, not from desire of esteem, but simply because they are honorable and worthy of human endeavor. "(H)oc modo magnanimitas est circa honorem: ut videlicet studeat magnanimus facere ea quae sunt honore digna, non tamen sic ut pro magnae aestimet humanum honorem."\(^{20}\) Therefore, the magnanimous man is the one who desires and does great things. Now, since no one undertakes such an enterprise without hope because "prosecutio boni pertinet ad spem,"\(^{21}\) magnanimity above all pertains to the virtue of hope.\(^{22}\) It is the virtue whose peculiar function it is to strengthen hope and carry it into action: "(A)d magnanimitatem pertinet non solum tendere in magnum, sed etiam in omnibus virtutibus magnum operari, vel faciendo vel qualitiercumque agendo."\(^{23}\) Clearly then, when the object of magna-

\(^{19}\) S. I., II-II, 129, 2 c.

\(^{20}\) S. I., II-II, 129, 1 ad 3. Cf. 129, 1; 2; 3, for a fuller treatment, especially of the difficulty involved in the virtue.

\(^{21}\) S. I., I-II, 45, 2 c. Cf. 40, 8 c.

\(^{22}\) Gauthier summarizes St. Thomas's notion of the virtue of magnanimity thus: "La magnanimité est la vertu de l'espérance humaine."--Gauthier, p. 362. This means hope as in the act of attack, where one hopes for actual success in the difficult enterprise undertaken. However, it also means a magnanimous hope of another kind, as in the act of endurance where hope does not have as its object the possibility of success in overcoming the difficulty, but some other good which will result from enduring the difficulty. Again, however, the hope spoken of in the present context is not this latter type.

\(^{23}\) S. I., II-II, 134, 2 ad 2.
nimity, the great but difficult good which is most worthy of human endeavor, happens to be the danger of death, then the object of magnanimity is the same as the object of the act of attack. In this case magnanimity becomes an integral or necessary part of fortitude.

It is necessary because it strengthens the hope necessary for the confidence to attack, and it moves to actual activity. Perhaps St. Thomas himself has best summarized the role of magnanimity in this regard: "(D)ictum est cum de passionibus ageretur, bonum arduum habet aliquid unde attrahit appetitum, si liceat ipsum rationem boni, et habet aliquid retrahens, scilicet ipsum difficultatem adipiscendi: secundum quorum primum insurget motus spei, et secundum alhid motus desperationis . . . . Circa illos motus appetitivos qui se habent per modum retractionis oportet esse virtutem moventem moderantem firmantem et impellentem . . . quae firmat animam contra desperationem, et impellit ipsum ad prosecutionem magnorum secundum rationem rectam: et haec est magnanimitas."24

The final conclusion, then, would seem to be that it is the virtue of magnanimity, understood as the ability to make one strong in hope and to carry hope into action, which, when directing hope toward the possibility of successfully overcoming the danger of death, is the real integral part of the act of attack in fortitude.25

24  S.I., 11-11, 161, 1 c.

25 It would seem that in the act of attack fortitude as such moves against the difficulty under its evil aspect and magnanimity moves under its good. Therefore, we have two virtues convening on the same object in one act, the act of attack. cf. S.I., 11-11, 129, 5 c, and also Cajetan's commentary on 129, 4 c.—Cajetan, X, 65.
This however, it must be carefully noted, does not in any way change the basic problem of the thesis; for magnanimity itself uses the same *firma\*ta\*\* animae to confirm hope and make it operative. As stated in the above quotation, when there is a situation involving a difficult good which both attracts and repels the appetites, a virtue is called for which will strengthen the soul to resist the repelling aspect and follow the attractive one. However, the question still remains: Where does this strengthening power come from and what is its nature? In other words, it is now clear that magnanimity, as a strengthenener of hope, enters into the act of attack; but it is not at all clear what makes magnanimity a strengthenener of hope, what gives magnanimity this firmness, this *firma\*ta\*\* animae. What is the nature of this reality which makes it possible to hope rather than to despair when there is reason for both? This question must wait until the concluding chapters for an answer.

Now it is time to discuss the other two virtues necessary for fortitude, the two used in the act of endurance, patience and perseverance. Patience is that virtue which provides "ne difficultate imminentium malorum animus frangatur per tristitiam, et decidat a sua magnitudine."\(^\text{26}\) Perseverance is the virtue which provides "ut ex diuturna difficillimum passione homo non fatigetur usque ad hoc quod desistat."\(^\text{27}\) Thus, the one guards against giving way to sadness, while the other guards against giving way to the weariness involved in meeting continued difficulty. In performing these two functions they can be essential

\(^{26}\) SS. I., II-11, 128, 1 c.

\(^{27}\) Ibid.
to the act of endurance in fortitude: "Haec etiam duo, si coarctantur ad propriae materiam fortitudinis, erunt partes quasi integrales Ipsius." 28

More fully, patience enables a man to bear adversities, and, therefore, primarily to bear sadness, which is the primary effect of suffering. It enables him to possess his soul in peace despite the onslaught of sadness and actual physical suffering. "(P)er patientiam dicitur homo suam animam possidere, inquantum radicitus evellet passiones adversitatum, quibus anima inquietatur." 29 "(P)atientia dicitur habere opus perfectum in adversis tolerandis: ex quibus primo procedit tristitia, quam moderatur patientia." 30

On the other hand, perseverance insures firmness: "contra difficultatem diuturnitatis." 31 It moderates some of the passions: "scilicet timorem fatigationis aut defectus propter diuturnitatem." 32

From what was said in Chapter I about the nature of the act of endurance, it can easily be seen how the virtues of patience and perseverance fit into the structure of enduring. 33

First, it was pointed out that St. Thomas conceived the act of endurance

28 Ibid.
29 S.T., II-II, 136, 2 ad 2.
30 Ibid., 2 ad 1.
31 S.T., II-II, 137, 2 ad 1.
32 Ibid., 2 ad 2.
33 See above, p. 20.
as not only the endurance of fear, but of actual sadness and even physical suffering. Since the endurance of sadness pertains to the virtue of patience, it follows that patience is necessary for the act of endurance. "Actus fortitudinis non solum consistit in hoc quod aliquis in bono sistat contra timores futurorum periculorum, sed etiam ut non deficiat propter praesentium tristitiam sive dolorem: et ex hac parte habet affinitatem cum fortitudine patientia."  

Further, it not only has an affinity with fortitude, but it is an integral and a necessary part of fortitude: "Patientia potest, quantum ad aliquid su, poni pars integralis fortitudinis . . . prout scilicet aliquid patienter sustinet mala quae pertinent ad pericula mortis."  

Second, it was also pointed out that endurance implies a length of time. Since enduring for a length of time pertains to the virtue of perseverance, it follows that perseverance is also necessary for the act of endurance in fortitude.  

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34. 3. 1. 11-11, 136, 4 c.  

35. 3. 1. 11-11, 136, 4 ad 3. Cajetan explains St. Thomas's mind on the importance of patience in the act of endurance thus: "Dicendum est quod fortitudo habet pro actu suo principali immobiliiter sistere et contra timores et contra tristitias quae in periculis mortis intervenerunt, ita quod actus elus est et superatis timoribus et tristitiliis totium malorum, immobiliiter persisteret: quod est plus quam superare timores, et plus quam superare tristitias."--Cajetan, X, 105.  

36. See above, p. 20.  

37. At this point it might be noted how thoroughly St. Thomas's notion of the act of endurance in fortitude is imbued with the Christian view of life. By the inclusion of patience and perseverance in the act, and, in fact, by making them a very essential part of the act, St. Thomas includes under fortitude not only the supreme act of Christian existence, martyrdom, but, in a lesser yet no less real degree, the whole notion of suffering the trials of this life in a patient and persevering resignation.
It is also clear, however, that the inclusion of patience and perseverance in the act of endurance does not in any way help to solve the problem of this thesis, namely, the nature of *firmitas animae*. It only serves to enlarge the notion of the act of endurance, pointing out more clearly how it includes being firm against the sadness which comes from actual pain endured for a length of time. But the question of where that firmness comes from remains to be solved.

Thus, while in the first chapter fortitude was delineated as the virtue which controls the passions of fear and boldness which are involved in meeting the danger of death, this second chapter, in dealing with the integral parts of fortitude, has laid stress on the control of hope and sadness in meeting the same danger. Cajetan summarizes very clearly what has thus far been said: "Unde fortitudo, licet sit in irascibili, im qua sunt timor et audacia, exigat tamen modificatam spem et tristitiam ad actuum suorum perfectionem. Et prop-terea vocantur modificantia haec partes Integrales. Et per haec patet quod non superflue, sed necessario multiplicantur huiusmodi Morales dispositiones et habitus: ut scilicet in qualibet materia propria virtue cum conditionibus requisitis inveniatur, quasi totum cum suis partibus heterogenels."\(^{38}\)

However, the point to be made here is that, although these integral parts may be necessary parts of the virtue of fortitude, they are only necessary in the sense that fortitude involves not only the control of fear and boldness, but also of hope and sadness. That is, the integral parts do not make the control of fear and boldness possible. Therefore, they do not constitute the *firmitas animae* of fortitude. They merely reemphasize the fact that there must be a

\(^{38}\) Cajetan, X, 56.
power within the soul which not only has the firmness to repress fear and en-
gender boldness, but also to repress sadness and strengthen hope. What this
power consists in will have to be determined later.

By way of summary, now, however, of all that has been discussed in the last
two chapters, it would be well to draw out as concretely as possible the es-

tential content of both the act of attack and the act of endurance.

The act of attack might be termed the typical soldier's virtue, though not
necessarily strictly confined to soldiers. By way of example, suppose the case
of a soldier on D Day facing the prospect of making a landing on the Normandy
coasts. He is still on the English coast. Suppose that he is given the
choice of remaining safely in England or of going with the landing forces.

He is acutely aware of the situation. He knows full well that thousands
will die on that beachhead, and that he may be one of them. This thought
strikes fear into his heart, for he naturally does not want to die. On the
other hand, he also knows full well that many thousands will not die. Whether
or not the battle is won, many will escape death; and he can easily be one of
them. This gives a real basis for hope. Further, he also realizes that he
has much to be confident in. The air force will heavily bomb enemy coastal
installations, and the navy will shell them. The entire plan has been well
laid. He himself will be well armed. There is much to be confident in.
There is a very real possibility that he may emerge victorious.

But still, there is the real possibility that he may not, that his army
may be defeated and that he may die. Nevertheless, he secures himself against
this fear. Fastening upon the hope of success, he chooses to rely upon the
confidence he has in the army, navy, and air force, \(^3\) and in his own competence as a soldier.

He chooses to step down into the landing barge and sets out across the Channel. As he does so, he feels a certain spirit of boldness come over him, together with certain feelings of anger at the enemy. \(^4\) In this frame of mind he sets out for the battle.

This is the act of attack as St. Thomas conceived it. \(^4\) But the question, again, is: Why did this soldier choose to do what he did? Another soldier under exactly the same circumstances might have chosen the opposite.

The act of endurance, though, is a quite different matter. It is the martyr's virtue. Suppose now, again by way of example, an early Christian, say during the reign of Nero. \(^4\) He sits in his prison cell. In a few minutes he will be called before the state officials and asked to abjure his religion. He knows full well that by the simple act of offering some incense to an idol he can save his own life. He also knows that, if he refuses, his living body will be

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\(^3\) The confidence one possesses in the act of attack need not be totally a confidence in self. It can also be founded on other exterior grounds. On this point see S.T., 11-11, 129, 6 ad 1; and also 1-11, 40, 5 c.

\(^4\) Anger, too, depends on hope: "Nullus irascitur nisi sperans vindictum."—S.T., 1-11, 48, 1 c.

\(^4\) However, certain other elements of this act will appear in the next chapters. The present is meant as a summary of what has already been said.

\(^4\) Though martyrdom involves the supernatural, the act is treated here from a philosophical point of view.
used as a human torch to light the Emperor's garden party tonight.

In this case, on his own decision rests the certainty of life and death. If he abjures, he lives; if he remains true to the Faith, he dies. There is a sound basis of hope for his life and of fear for its loss, and he feels the surge of both these movements. As the jailer approaches, he realizes the decision must be made; and it is. He chooses to remain true to the Faith.

At that moment his fear turns into sadness; for the pain of his fiery martyrdom, though still hours away, is in a very real psychological sense actually upon him in all its terrible long-drawn-out reality. From that moment, since all hope of deliverance is gone, his martyrdom is no longer future but present.

This act, carried into execution, of course, in actual death, is the act of endurance in its fullest sense. But the question arises again: Exactly why did this man choose to die rather than to live? Another man in exactly the same circumstances might have chosen the opposite.

This question of why will be answered in the following chapters, both for the act of attack and for that of endurance. Before going on, however, it should be pointed out more clearly what seems to be the fundamental difference between these two acts of the same virtue. Though in both there is a very real danger of death, in the act of attack there is a very real possibility of life even after the choice of attack is made, and this choice is made with the realization that this is so. But in the act of endurance, once the choice has been made there is no longer any possibility of life as long as the choice remains operative. There is only endurance of suffering. And the choice to endure
was made with the full realization that this was so.

From this basic difference in the structure of the two acts, it can readily be seen why the act of endurance must be considered the principal act of fortitude. However, it can also be seen that even in the act of attack a heroic degree of *firmitas animae* is needed.
CHAPTER III

REASON AND PASSIONS IN FORTITUDE

From what has been said in the last two chapters it is obvious that the *firmitas animae* of the two acts of fortitude will differ in some respects at least, and therefore each act must be considered separately. However, though operating in a different manner in these two acts, the *firmitas animae* of both is essentially the same, as will be shown.

Now that the actual structure of the two acts has been drawn out, it is necessary to attempt a solution to the basic problem of the thesis: What makes fortitude possible? The groundwork will be laid in this chapter, and the final solution made in the next.

More specifically, in the act of attack, what makes it possible for a man to deliberately choose not only to face but actively to go out to meet the danger of losing his life? Likewise, in the act of endurance, what is it that enables a man to choose to endure a painful death without going to pieces before the fear, sadness, and actual physical pain involved?

It will be well to begin an answer by pointing out what does not constitute this *firmitas animae*. This involves a consideration of the role of the passions; for, particularly in the act of attack, it might seem that *firmitas animae* consists in nothing more than the movements of hope and audacity which carry a person forward to the attack. This, however, cannot be.

First, to say this would be to deny the entire Thomistic concept of moral
virtue in which virtue is a strictly moral or human activity consisting in human acts. And human acts are acts which are not placed by passion but by reason and free will: "Iliae solae actiones vocantur proprie humanae, quorum homo est dominus. Est autem homo dominus suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem. Unde et liberum arbitrium esse dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis. Iliae ergo actiones proprie humanae dicuntur, quae ex voluntate deliberata procedunt."¹

This is also true, therefore, of fortitude. And this is exactly what St. Thomas means to say when he states: "Hoc autem ad fortitudinem mentis pertinet, quod infirmitatem curris fortiter ferat."² By mens here is to be understood the principle of a human act: "Mens nominat illud genus potentiae, quae est principium illorum actuum, quorum homo est dominus, qui proprie dicuntur humanae."³ Therefore, it follows that whatever role the passions might play in the act of fortitude, they must play a subordinate role in which they are controlled by reason and will. For reason must be the principle of every human act.

These ideas will be applied now to the two acts of fortitude. First, in the act of attack, though passion does admittedly play an important role, it cannot be the essential constituent of the act, the reason being that it is not a virtue if it proceeds "propter impetum passionis."⁴ Its role, rather, must be explained as one in which it is used as an instrument of man's higher facult-

¹S.T., 1-11, 1, 1 c.
²S.T., 1-11, 123, 1 ad 1.
³S.T., 1-11, 55, 4 c.
⁴S.T., 1-11, 123, 1 ad 2.
ties, reason and will; for as St. Thomas says: "natae sunt passiones rationi
obedire." 5

For this reason St. Thomas maintains that, should the passion of boldness
actually cause an act of attack, the act would not be an act of fortitude at all.
This could, indeed, happen if for some reason boldness were so strong before the
decision to attack that it influenced the will to attack without sufficient
deliberation. The idea here is that in such a case reason would be deprived of
its proper function. 6 In the formation of an act of attack the mind must be
free to consider with tranquility what is to be done. Thus, though the passions
of hope, boldness, and fear are being experienced before the decision to attack,
they cannot influence the actual choice one way or another. 7 That is, for a
full act of attack in its highest sense, reason must be able to view this danger
together with its possibility of death and of victory, and, in the light of some
considerations other than the passions involved, choose either to attack or not
to attack. But the passions themselves cannot be the powers which influence
this choice. St. Thomas states this very clearly in speaking of the difference
between the truly brave man who attacks and the man who acts simply on the

5 S.I., I-11, 56, 4 c.

6 The supposition here is that the act does not proceed from habit. It is
a question of forming a single act.

7 However, the passions may and often do influence the will to the extent
that they influence it to decide to deliberate about the situation. In this
sense St. Thomas says that "(T)Imor conciliatîvos facti."—S.I., I-11, 44, 2 c.
The passions often incite a person to consider what he should do, and this is
good.
impulse of passion: "Sed ratio est discursiva omnium quae afferent difficultatem negotio. Et ideo fortes, qui ex iudicio rationis aggrediuntur pericula, in principio videntur remissi: quia non passi, sed cum deliberatione debita aggrediuntur . . . . Audaces autem, propter solam aestimationem facientem spem et excludentem timorem."8

On the other hand, once the choice to attack has been made, then passion does play a very important role. The passion of fear, of course, must somehow be reduced to a minimum; and this can be done for the following reason: "(s)ublacet autem voluntati, inquantum appetitus inferior obedit rationi: unde homopoetest timorem repellere."9 Further, the passions of hope and boldness must be further engendered and used. This is necessary because the will's choice flows over into activity only through the medium of the passions, which are the actual movers of human activity: "Sicut in nobis ratio universalis movet medianteratione particulari . . . . ita appetitus, qui dicitur voluntas, movet in nobis mediante appetitu sensitivo; unde proximum motivum corporis in nobis est appetitus sensitivus."10

Thus, the choice to attack flows into actual corporal activity only through the passions of hope and boldness. Noble, explaining this, states: "Cette part consiste dans un renforcement de l'énergie volontaire, à l'instance de la décision morale, quand, en face des difficultés de l'action et surtout de l'action

8 S.I., 1-11, 45, 4 c. The word audaces refers to those who act from passion and not from deliberate choice.

9 S.I., 1-11, 42, 4 c.

10 S.I., 1-11, 20, 1 ad 1. See also 1-11, 127, 1 ad 2, for a statement of how boldness precipitates quick action.
qui veut être aussi grande et aussi parfaite que possible, il faut déployer un surcroît d'ardeur, de tenacité violente et d'indomptable espoirance."

Further, other passions, primarily anger, can also be used to help carry out the decision to attack. "Quia appetitus sensitivus movetur per imperium rationis ad hoc quod cooperatur ad promptius agendum, idcirco ponebant et iram et alias passiones animae assumendas esse virtuosis moderatas secundum imperium rationis."¹²

In summary, then, in the act of attack there are two general ideas to be noted about the interaction of reason and the passions: First, there must be a control over the passions of fear, hope, and boldness (also anger, etc.) while deliberation goes on, a control which prevents these passions from influencing the outcome of this deliberation. Second, once the choice to attack has been made, these same passions must be controlled in such a way that fear is repressed and hope and boldness are made operative as reinforcers of the act. This is summarized by St. Thomas himself: "(p)assio praeveniens judicium rationis, si in animo praevaleat ut el consentiatur, impedit consilium et judicium rationis. Si vero sequatur, quasi ex ratione imperata, adjuvat ad exequendum imperium rationis."¹³

In the act of endurance, however, the situation is somewhat different from that in the act of attack. Here, before the choice to endure, the passions of

¹² S.I., 11-11, 123, 10 c.
¹³ S.I., 1-11, 59, 2 ad 3.
fear and sadness must be repressed to the extent that deliberation can go on with equilibrium. In this respect the acts of endurance and attack are the same, except that to preserve this equilibrium in deliberating about an act of endurance would be much more difficult because the passions pull in only one direction. In attack the passion of fear is more than balanced by the passions of hope and boldness. In endurance this is not so. Fear and sadness are not balanced by the hope of success. Further, fear and sadness are experienced as more imminent, and therefore the more terrible.

Once the choice to endure has been made, the differences between attack and endurance become even more marked. For in the act of endurance no passion can be enlisted to aid, because from that moment the only experiences present would be the passion of sadness and actual physical pain, and these move contrary to the choice itself.

Of course, a passion that would carry the will act into external activity, as hope and boldness in the act of attack, is not needed in endurance because no exterior activity is called for. The act of endurance in itself is one of suffering, consisting in an interior adherence, a negative refusal to go to pieces under suffering. It is not a positive decision to do something, except in so far as the end for which it is done is positive. In this sense St. Thomas states: "Multa enim volumus et operamur absque passione, per solam electionem: ut maxime patet in his in quibus ratio renititur passioni."\textsuperscript{14} In other words, when reason is opposed by passion, as in the act of endurance, it is possible for the will alone to place the act. This last statement in no way

\textsuperscript{14}S. I., 1-11, 10, 3 ad 3.
contradicts what was stated before about passion being necessary to carry the will's act into execution. The reason is that in the passage quoted above there is no question of exterior activity but simply of a decision, as in the act of endurance, to remain firm and unmoved. Passion is needed only when there is a question of bodily activity.

This decision to remain firm and unmoved, though it does not involve bodily activity flowing from the passions, nevertheless does demand intense interior activity of another kind. Obviously, this refusal to give way to the pain and suffering involved, especially when there is no pleasure to counteract that suffering, while it does imply a passivity, also implies an intense activity of the soul "fortissime inhaerentis bono." 15

But the point to be made here is that, after the choice to endure, passion cannot be used in any positive way. It was in this sense that St. Thomas said: "(h)unc actum sola ratio per se facit." 16

Thus, the obvious general conclusion with regard to the passions in an act of fortitude is that at most they can positively participate, as in the act of attack, while in the act of endurance they do not even positively participate in

15 Noble explicitly interprets the passage quoted in this same way, as referred to an interior act of the will to struggle (renititur) against passion. -- H.D. Noble, O.P., "Comment la passion enjôle la volonté," Divus Thomas Placenza, III (1926) 646.

16 S.T., II-II, 123, 6 ad 2. Cajetan develops this notion fully in his commentary on the same passage, and concludes: "Ita quod firmiter et immobile late in corpore erit ex firmiter et immobile late agere ipsius animae. Et propterea sustinere ex parte animae consistit in agere, licet ex parte corporis dicat pati." -- Cajetan, X, 16.

17 S.T., II-II, 123, 10 ad 3.
the act. The essential constituents of *firmitas animae*, then, are necessarily contained in the rational part of man. 18

However, since this *firmitas animae* which must come from the rational part of man is so intimately bound up with the passions, either controlling them or using them, since, in fact, the essential function of *firmitas animae* is to impose reason's rule upon the passions, and since it is the passions which tend to impede this *firmitas animae*, it is necessary to discuss now St. Thomas's theory of the exact way in which the passions and the rational part of man interact. Specifically, since ultimately the choice of an act of fortitude rests in the will, it is necessary to know how the passions can influence the will and how the will can influence the passions.

First, the passions can influence the will in an act of fortitude. The passions can get at the will only through the intellect. Therefore, any influence must first be on the intellect itself. More specifically, when there is question of a practical judgment or decision to be made, passion can influence the will through its influence on the practical intellect, or the practical judgment itself: "Passio appetitus sensitivus movet voluntatem ex ea parte qua voluntas movetur ab obiecto: inquantum silicet homo alqualiter dispositus per passionem, ludicat aliquid esse convenientem et bonum quod extra passionem existens

To further explain this experience St. Thomas appeals to Aristotle's dictum, "(Q)ualis unusquisque est, tallis finis videtur ei." In other words, if a person is moved by the passion of fear, for example, he will be so influenced by that passion that he will tend to judge that to flee is a good thing. On the other hand, if he is moved by the passion of boldness, he will tend to judge that to attack is a good thing. Obviously, then, the truly brave man must be able to keep this passional element out of his practical judgments.

More particularly, passion tends to influence practical judgments in two ways. First, it tends to distract the attention away from other considerations and to itself. Man is one, and though he has these two specifically different powers, reason and passion, both are rooted in the same soul. Further, his experience is one. He cannot at the same time be attending to both passion and rational considerations. "Passio appetitus sensitivi non potest directe trahere aut movere voluntatem, sed indirecte potest. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, secundum quamdam abstractionem. Cum enim omnes potentiae animae in una essentiae animae radicantur, necesse est quod quando una potentia intenditur in suo actu, altera in suo actu remittatur, vel etiam totaliter impediatur."  

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19 S.T., 1-11, 10, 3 c.
20 S.T., 1-11, 9, 2 c; and also 58, 3 c.
21 S.T., 1-11, 77, 1 c. Only in exceptional cases does passion completely carry away the attention, and therefore the power to deliberate; but that this sometimes happens is beyond dispute: "Contingit etiam quandoque quod motus appetitus sensitivi subito concitatur ad apprehensionem imaginacionis vel sensus. Et tunc ille motus est praeter imperium rationis."—S.T., 17, 7 c. However, St. Thomas goes on to say: "(Q)uamvis potuisse impediri a ratione si praevidisset."
Clearly, then, another function of *firmitas animae* would be to prevent this tendency of passion from becoming too intense.

The second, and closely related, way that passion tends to influence the practical judgement is as follows: Passion, of its nature, strongly moves and controls the imagination. But the *vis aestimativa* judges on the basis of the data furnished by the imagination. The practical intellect, in turn, judges on the basis of the data furnished by the *vis aestimativa*. Therefore, ultimately, the data on which the practical intellect judges has been influenced by the passions working through the medium of imagination. "Impeditur enim judicium et apprehensio rationis propter vehementem et inordinatam apprehensionem imaginationis, et judicium virtutis aestimativae: ut patet in amentibus. Manifestum est autem quod passionem appetitus sensitivi sequitur imaginationis apprehensio, et judicium aestimativae: sicut etiam dispositionem linguae sequitur judicium gustus. Unde videmus quod homines in aliqua passione existentis, non facile imaginationem avertunt ab his circa quae afficiuntur. Unde per consequens judicium rationis plerumque sequitur passionem appetitus sensitivi; et per consequens motus voluntatis, qui natus est sequi judicium rationis." 22

This does not, of course, mean to say that passion working through the imagination so binds up and impedes the practical intellect that deliberation becomes impossible. Rather, what happens is something like this: There are practical syllogisms formed. Each has a universal proposal stating a different good. One states the good of reason, the other the good of passion.

22 *S.T.*, 1-11, 77, 1 c.
Thus, in fortitude, one might state, "Difficulty should be met." The other might state, "Difficulty should be fled." For each there would be the proposition, "But this is a difficulty." Then, two different conclusions would be formed. Under the rational proposition that difficulties should be met, the conclusion formed might be, "This difficulty should be met." Under the passional proposition that difficulties should be fled, the conclusion formed might be, "This difficulty should be fled." Now, if passion is strong enough, if it so colors the imagination, it could impede the rational conclusion, "This difficulty should be met." Passion would tend to make the second practical judgment the ultimate practical judgment. The will would accept the conclusion, "This difficulty should be fled."23

Thus, in fortitude, the passions could so captivate the attention and so control the imagination that a person might judge that it is better for him to flee than either to attack or to endure. Or, on the other hand, other passions, boldness for example, might work in the same way to move him to attack when the rational good demands that he do not attack. It is the function of firmitas animae to prevent these aberrations. Clearly, it must do so by control over the attention and over the passional influence on the imagination.24

23 St. Thomas illustrates this process very clearly when speaking of another type of act: "Philosophus dicit in VII Ethic, quod syllogismus incontinentis habet quaeratur propositiones, duas universales: quarum una est rationis, puta nulam fornicationem esse commitendam; alia est passionis, puta delectationem esse sectandam. Passio igitur ligat rationem ne assumat et concludat sub primas unde ea durante, assumit et concludit sub secundas."—S.I., I-II, 77, 2 ad 4.

24 It would seem that attention also is bound up with the imagination, so that control of the imagination tends also to control attention.
The need now arises to study the ways in which the will can influence the passions. Since it is necessary to control the influence of the passions on the will, it is obvious that, did the will not have some power over the passions, fortitude would be impossible. But the will does have power over the passions. "Posito quod ratio sit ligata per passionem, necesse est quod sequatur perversa electio; sed in potestate voluntatis est hoc ligamen rationis expellere."25

How, then, is this control exercised? There are various ways, depending on the particular relationship of a particular passion with a particular act of the will.

Thus, it sometimes happens that the movement of passion naturally corresponds to that of the will. "(l)n idem tendat bonum quandoque uterque appetitus; sed differunt penes diversum modum appetendi."26 Thus, in the act of attack there is a natural movement of hope and boldness in the same direction as the will's choice to attack. In this case there is no problem of control over the passions.

However, when both passion and will are not already tending toward the same object, the situation is changed. Sometimes in this case it is possible for the will to simply choose to use a passion. It commands the activity of the passion "per modum electionis: quando scilicet homo ex ludicio rationis eligat aliqua passione, ut promptius operetur, cooperante appetitu sensitivo."27

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25De Maio, 3, 10.
26De Ver., 22, 4 ad 4.
27S.I., I-II, 24, 3 ad 1.
Of course, the situation is not so simple. It is not merely a question of deciding to use a passion. The reason is that the will can never exercise complete control over the passions. The basic reason for this is that a passion has two constitutive principles, the soul and the body. To have perfect control over the passions, then, the will would need complete control over both aspects of passion. This it does not have. 

"(A)d intelligendum qualiter actus appetitus sensitivi subjatur imperio rationis, oportet considerare qualiter sit in potestate nostra. Est autem sciem quod appetitus sensitivus in hoc differt ab appetitu intellectivo, qui dicitur voluntas, quod appetitus sensitivus est virtus organi corporalis, non autem voluntas. Omnis autem actus virtutis utentis organo corporali, dependet non solum ex potentia animae, sed etiam ex corporali organi dispositione . . . . Unde et actus appetitus sensitivi non solum dependet ex vi appetitiva, sed etiam ex dispositione corporis."  

Thus, the will, a spiritual power, cannot exercise direct control over the bodily part of passion, and therefore does not have complete control over the movements of passion.  

There are, however, indirect ways by which the will can control the bodily component of passion, for example, by removing the cause of the sensation which causes passion. Applied to the passion of boldness, St. Thomas says that the

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28 S.I., 1-11, 17, 7 c.  
29 Qualitas autem et disposition corporis non subjacet imperio rationis. Et ideo ex hac parte impeditur quin motus sensitivi appetitus totaliter subjatur imperio rationis."—S.I., 1-11, 17, 7 c. St. Thomas explains the control thus: "(R)atio praeeest irascibili et concupiscibili non principatu despotico, qui est domini ad servum, sed principatu politico aut regali, qui est ad liberos, qui non totaliter subjuntur imperio."—Ibid.
will can influence the bodily component of boldness by making use of these things which cause "caliditatem circa cor." And he mentions that drinking wine might provide the necessary warmth around the heart.

However, this indirect control of the body seems to be a minor aspect of the will's power to choose the use of a passion. The major aspect lies in the will's power to influence the aspect of passion said to be in the soul. However, even here there does not seem to be direct control. The will seems to control this aspect of passion by a process the reverse of that by which passion tends to control the will. That is, the will by controlling the operations of the mind can control the use of the imagination, and, through the imagination, of the passions themselves. "Apprehensio autem imaginationis cum sit particularis, regulatur ab apprehensione rationis quae est universalis, sicut virtus activa particularis a virtute activa universalis. Et ideō ex ista parte, actus appetitus sensitivi subjacet imperio rationis."}

Thus, by exercising control over the thought process the will can exercise control over the imagination, and therefore also over the passions. St. Thomas explains in detail how this takes place in the act of attack, where it is especially necessary to be able to command the use of the passions:

30\[S.I., I-II, 45, 3 c.\]

31\[S.I., I-II, 17, 7 c. Cf. also I-II, 30, 3 ad 3. Note that the imagination plays an extremely vital role in the interplay of the will and the passions. The imagination, in fact, seems in large measure to be the battleground of the war which goes on between the two. Whichever gains control of the imagination tends to win.\]
(A)udacia consequitur spem, et contrariatur timori: unde quaecumque nata sunt causare spem, vel excludere timorem, sunt causa audaciae. Ex parte quidem appetitivi motus, qui sequitur apprehensionem, provocat spes causans audaciam, per ea quae faciunt nos aestimare quod possibile sit adipsici victoriam; vel secundum propriam potentiam sicut fortitudo corporis, experientia in periculis, multitudo pecuniarum, et alia hulusmodi; sive per potentiam aliorum, sicut multitudo amicorum vel quorumcumque auxiliarum, et praecipue si homo confidat de auxilio divino; unde illi qui se bene habent ad divina, audacios sunt . . . Timor autem excluditur, secundum istum modum, per remotionem terribilium appropinquantium: putat quia homo non habet inimicos, quia nulli nocuit, quia non videt alicui periculum imminere."32

In other words, hope is generated by the will's choice to make the intellect think about the hopeful aspect of the situation, and fear is simultaneously excluded by the will's choice to make the intellect think about those things which lessen fear. "Hoc etiam quilibet experiri potest in seipso; applicando enim aliquas universales considerationes, mitigatur ira aut timor aut alicui hulusmodi, vel etiam instigatur."33

It would seem, then, that in choosing to attack the will simultaneously calls forth the necessary boldness by concentrating the mind's attention on the hopeful side of the situation. The mind's thinking about those things which cause hope fills the imagination with hopeful images; and thereby the passion of hope itself is aroused, and through hope boldness also. Passion might be further aroused by conditioning the body with a little wine.

Obviously, however, this cannot be the case with the act of endurance. First, nothing can be done about the bodily component of the passion involved.

32 L.I., 1-11, 45, 3 c.
33 L.I., 1-1, 81, 3 c.
because to remove the body from the cause of pain would be to destroy the situation of the act of endurance itself. Second, the will cannot elect to use passion because it is essential to the act of endurance that no passion be used to help the act. Rather, because of the nature of the act, it is not possible to elicit the help of passion. It would seem that the imagination is completely swept away by passion, especially by the pain of sense. The question presents itself, then, of how it is possible to prevent the will from being completely swept away.

Before this question can be answered it is necessary to explain one final way in which the will can influence the passions. This is by redundancy: "per modum redundantiae quia scilicet, cum superior pars animae intense movetur in aliquid, sequitur motum eius etiam pars inferior. Et sic passio existens consequenter in appetitu sensitivo, est signum intentionis voluntatis." Thus, the will, by the intensity of its act, seems to overflow into the sense powers and cause the same movement in them.

Applied to the act of attack, this would mean that if for some reason a person intensely willed to attack, this desire in the will would elicit a corresponding desire on the sense level. Applied to the act of endurance,

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33a See page 19, footnote 49, for Thomas's reasoning on this point.

34 S.T., 1-11, 24, 3 ad 1. By the intensity of a will act is meant to be included the higher emotions consequent on a will act. Cf. De Ver., 26, 9 ad 5 De Mal., 8, 3.

35 Redundance also seems to work through the imagination. The vehemence of a will act causes changes in the imagination. This is Noble's opinion—H.D. Noble, O.P., "Comment la Volonte Excite Ou Refraine la Passion," Revue Des Sciences Philosophique et Theologique, XVII (1928), 388.
however, the picture is again quite different. For regardless of the intensity of the will's act, the passion of fear and the sadness, plus the sense pain, are so great that no positive redundance can take place. Reason alone can place the act of endurance. The question comes back again, then, of how it is possible for the will to prevent itself from being swept away by the passions.

The answer does seem to lie in a second aspect of the notion of redundance which might be termed negative redundance. In another passage St. Thomas explains redundance thus: "(E)x viribus superioribus fit redundantia in inferiores; cum ad motum voluntatis intensum sequitur passio in sensuali appetitu, et ex intensa contemplatione retrahantur vel impeduntur vires animales a suis actibus." The important words here are the last: "retrahantur vel impeduntur vires animales a suis actibus." This is what might be called negative redundance. The passage indicates that what happens is not that positive passions are elicited as in the act of attack, nor even that the passions of fear and sadness cease, but merely that they are retracted and impeded from flowing over into action. This is put in another way: "Sicut enim in exercitu progressio ad bellum pendet ex imperio duclis, ita in nobis vis motiva non movet membra nisi ad imperium eius quod in nobis principatur, id est rationis, qualiscumque motus fiat in inferioribus viribus. Unde ratio irascibilibum et concispilibum reprimit, ne in actum exteriorem procedant." Here the point is

36 De Ver., 26, 10.

37 De Ver., 25, 4. See also Cajetan. Speaking of the spiritual delight that would ordinarily be consequent upon the will's choice of an act of fortitude, he admits that this delight is not felt in the act of endurance, but goes on to say: "Fundamentum autem eius, scilicet ex ratione et electione fortiter persistere, non absorbetur nec evanescit: sed quod hoc superat omnes dolores sensibiles." -Cajetan, Commentary on S.T., 11-11, 123, 8 c.
again that, despite the fact that the passions positively continue to pull the other way, still the will is able to repress them to the extent that they do not flow into bodily activity. And this is done by the intensity with which the act of the will is made.

This seems to be precisely what happens in the act of endurance. Despite the impetus of contrary passion, the will, by the intensity of its act, refuses to act upon this impetus. It is simply an interior refusal to go to pieces in the face of this frontal attack by the passions. And the refusal to do so depends upon a certain intense contemplation of universal considerations, the nature of which will be discussed later.

Now, however, it might be well to summarize what has been said about the interaction of passion and will. First, passion can influence the will only by influencing judgment; and it can do this in two closely related ways: first, by attracting the mind's attention; second, by coloring the imagination, and through the imagination the data on which the practical intellect judges. On the other hand, will can also influence passion in several ways: First, when will and passion both tend in the same direction, one helps the other. Second, if there is no movement of passion, or if passion moves contrary to will, the will can control passion by an act of choice. This is done, on the one hand, by controlling the soul's aspect of passion through choosing to think about those things which will so color the imagination that they will call forth the desired passion or decrease the undesired one; and on the other hand, by controlling the body's component of passion through choosing to remove the object causing passion, or vice versa. Third, the will can influence passion through redundancy from the intensity of its own act. It can, in this way, either call
forth a passion corresponding to its own act, or at least prevent a contrary passion from flowing into action.

This theory of the interaction applied to the acts of attack and endurance would seem to work in the following way: In both acts the will would be influenced by passion in the same way, that is, by attention and by coloring the data on which judgment is made. However, only in the act of attack can the will influence passion by eliciting its positive help through a control of the thought processes which influence the imagination, by a control of the bodily component of sensation, and by a positive redundancy from the intensity of its own act. In the act of endurance the will does not seem to have any positive control over the passions in the sense that it can elicit their use. Its only control is a negative one in preventing the contrary passions from flowing into activity. This would seem to be accomplished through a type of negative redundancy from the intensity of the will's act.

In an attempt to make these statements clearer, they will now be applied to the concrete examples used at the end of Chapter II.

First, in the case of the soldier prior to the landing at Normandy, the experience would be something like this: As he sat trying to decide whether to go with the invasion army or not, he would feel strong movements of both hope and fear. The hope would lead to imaginary pictures of marching triumphantly across France and into Germany, of receiving a medal for bravery, of returning home a hero, etc. The fear would lead to imaginary pictures of himself lying mutilated and dead on the beach at Normandy. However, if he is to place a true act of fortitude, his will must somehow choose to fix the mind's attention upon neither of these two movements, but on the more universal considerations of
reason itself. After doing this, and seeing that reason tells him that he should attack, he makes the decision. Now he is no longer indifferent to the feelings he had before the choice was made. He chooses now to think only about the hopeful aspects of the situation, of the possibility of victory and of honor of the strength of his army, of his own fighting fitness, etc. At the same time he finds reasons why fear should be cast out. These considerations tend to fill the mind with hopeful images. The hope he had before the decision thereby increases in intensity, and with it the boldness also. He might also call up reasons why he is angry at the enemy, and, as this anger grows, it increases the desire to attack. He could also take care of the bodily component by having a drink or two. Further, he thinks more about the rational considerations which led him to decide to attack: love for his country, etc.; and these thoughts tend to increase the intensity of his act of the will to attack, and this intensity also redounds into the passions to move them even more strongly.

Thus, when he goes into battle, he goes as a truly brave man; for he has made a choice uninfluenced by passion, but he also goes as a bold man, filled with a desire for battle which is not just a rational desire but an animal one as well.\(^{38}\)

\(^{38}\) It is important to note here that to act with passion is in no way contrary to virtue, provided that the act is in accord with reason. Thus, in another context, speaking of the sexual act, St. Thomas states quite positively that it is not against virtue to be completely blinded by passion in the act itself, provided that the act was entered into in accord with reason.—\textit{S.I.}, II-II, 153, 2 ad 2. Thus, applied to the act of attack, the brave man could lose himself in boldness and even anger, provided that he had entered the act with deliberate choice. Cf. \textit{S.I.}, II-II, 158, 1 ad 2.
On the other hand, the Christian awaiting his trial experiences something quite different. He experiences only fear of what will happen if he chooses to remain true to the Faith. He pictures himself enveloped in flames, almost feeling the terrible agony as he does so. But despite this fear, his will somehow chooses to focus attention on other considerations. Somehow he resists being carried away by these wild and terrible imaginations, and in the light of rational considerations he judges that he should choose to endure. He makes the decision. Now, once the decision is made, there is no passion to call to his aid. The realization that a painful death awaits him grows yet stronger. Yet, he can to a degree control the workings of his mind and force himself to think of why he is doing this. As the choice is carried out, and he actually begins to undergo martyrdom, actual physical pain takes over. Most certainly at this time the battle for control becomes greatest. The imagination is now swept away by the pain. Yet, though everything within goes contrary, somehow he clings to the will to endure, and by the intensity of this act he refuses to give way. The passions cry out in pain for flight or an attempt at escape, or for complete despair. But by concentration on the firm decision to endure, the passions are hindered from having their way. 39

These, then, are the situations of the acts of attack and endurance. It has been shown in this chapter how it is that the will is able to exercise control over the passions in these acts. That is, it has been shown by what

39 The ultimate explanation of how it can be that the will can so control the passions seems to be forever bound up in the mystery of the mind's power over the body.
process this control comes about. But it has not been shown why this control
does occur. The solution has been hinted at in a general way by stating that
the control is exercised through attention to rational considerations and through
the intensity of the will's act. It would seem to follow, then, that the ultimate reason for this control, and therefore the ultimate nature of firmitas
animae, will depend upon the nature of these rational considerations and the
nature of this intense act of the will itself. This will be the subject of the
next and final chapter.
CHAPTER IV

FIRMITAS ANIMAE

The last chapter dealt with the interaction of the passions with reason and will in man. It ended with the conclusion that the will can control the passions, either inciting or repressing them, by choosing to think about certain universal considerations and also by redundance from the intensity of its own act.

It will be the purpose of this chapter to consider what these universal considerations and what the intensity of the will's act might be. Since these are absolutely necessary for an act of fortitude, they have a direct bearing on the reality of firmitas animae. From a consideration of these factors it will be possible to deduce the true nature of firmitas animae, and thus to conclude the thesis.

First, when St. Thomas talks about the will's choice to think about universal considerations, he seems to be speaking of the end for which an act of fortitude is to be performed. That is, when a man is faced with a difficulty involving a threat to his life, he naturally turns his mind to think upon the reasons why he should or should not face the difficulty. His passions, working through imagination, conjure up numerous reasons why he should not. However, if he gives himself a chance, he also thinks of the good that might be achieved by meeting the difficulty. This would be the ultimate end intended in the act.

If he is willing to think about the end, if he is thoroughly convinced that
It is a good end, then it would seem that this conviction, plus the intensity of desire for the end, would command him to face the difficulty involved in attaining it.

In this connection St. Thomas speaks of several higher virtues, higher in the sense, at least, that they act as ends with regard to other virtues. They have the power to command the other virtues. For the sake of more concrete illustration, these commanding virtues will now be enumerated and explained, especially with regard to their function in acting as ends for the other virtues.

Gauthier contends that St. Thomas thought in terms of three great commanding virtues:

Les fins les plus hautes qui, dans l'ordre naturel, puissent solliciter le coeur humain, sont au nombre de trois: la grandeur de l'homme, le bien de la communauté, l'honneur de Dieu, et il y a, dans l'ordre naturel, trois grandes vertus générales, trois lignes de force de la vie morale, la magnanimité, la justice sociale, la religion. Ainsi la magnanimité embrasse toutes les vertus et les ordonne à la grandeur de l'homme, la justice sociale embrasse toutes les vertus et les ordonne au bien de la cité, la religion reprend une troisième fois toutes les vertus et les ordonne à l'honneur de Dieu. Entre toutes ces aspirations, il n'y a pas conflit, mais harmonie, car la personne humaine ne trouve sa grandeur que dans le service de la communauté et dans le culte de Dieu.

First, magnanimity is the virtue which provides the motive of human nobility. Thus, a man might be moved to an act of virtue by considering the

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2 Magnanimity here is taken in a slightly different sense from that of Chapter II where it was shown to be necessary for the act of attack. There magnanimity was necessary to generate hope of actual success in overcoming the difficulty. Here magnanimity is used as a virtue which calls forth an act of fortitude by offering hope of a different kind. Here it would be hope in a wider sense, hope of conducting oneself in a manner worthy of a human being regardless of whether or not there is any real hope of overcoming the actual physical difficulty. In this sense magnanimity could apply to the act of endurance as well as the act of attack. It simply provides the motive of acting nobly, which can be used in the act of any virtue.
nobility of the act, and in this sense magnanimity can call forth the act of any virtue. "(M)agnanimitas . . . operatur magna in omnibus virtutibus . . . quasi noventis per imperium." Therefore, a man might be moved to perform an act of fortitude by considering simply the rational good of acting in a manner worthy of human dignity.

Second, justice, taken in a wider sense here than the usual sense of rendering another what is his due, is the virtue which orders all of human activity toward the common good. "(B)onum ciuslibet virtutis, sive ordinantis aliquem nominem ad se ipsum sive ordinantis ipsum ad alivas alias personas singulares, est referibile ad bonum commune, ad quod ordinat justitia. Et secundum hoc actus omnium virtutem possunt ad justitiam pertinere, secundum quod ordinat nominem ad bonum commune." Thus, the motive of doing something for the common good can move a person to perform any one of the other virtues. St. Thomas does not mean to say simply that the other virtues pertain to justice, but that justice actually moves them into activity: "Justitia . . . dicetur esse virtus generalis inquantum scilicet ordinat actus aliarum virtutem ad suum finem, quod est movere per imperium omnes alivas virtutes." Third, the virtue of religion can also be a motive power for the other virtues: "(D)icendum quod religio habet duplices actus. Quosdam quidem prop-

3 In III Sent., 9, 1, 2. A like statement of magnanimity's power to command the other virtues is not found in the Summa, but it is Gauthier's contention that St. Thomas still meant this when he wrote the Summa.—Gauthier, p. 368, note 5.

4 S.T., 11-11, 58, 5 c.

5 ibid., 7 c.
rios et immediatos, quos elicit, per quos homo ordinatur ad solum Deum: sicut sacrificare, adorare et alia huiusmodi. Alios autem actus habet quos producit mediantibus virtutibus quibus imperat, ordinans eos in divinam reverentiam: quia scilicet virtus ad quam pertinet finis, imperat virtutibus ad quas pertinet ea quae sunt ad finem.\textsuperscript{6} This passage brings out very clearly how it is that religion, as well as the other virtues spoken of here, moves another virtue into operation. It does so because it is thought of as an end to be attained. Thus, the universal considerations spoken of previously by which a man can control his imagination and his passions, are nothing more than thoughts of the ends proposed by these commanding virtues together with the desire to attain these ends.

Finally, it might be mentioned here also that in the supernatural order charity would be the counterpart of the natural virtue of religion. Indeed, in Christian life it is the great commanding virtue which ought to provide the motivation for all the other virtues. "Et hinc etiam apparet, quomodo caritas sit motor omnium virtutum: inquantum scilicet imperat actus omnium aliarum virtutum. Omnis enim virtus vel potentia superior dicitur movere per imperium inferiorem, ex eo quod actus inferior ordinatur ad finem superioris."\textsuperscript{7}

These above are the general virtues which have the power to act as ends for all the others. However, this does not exclude the possibility that some

\textsuperscript{6}ibid., 81, 1 ad 1.

\textsuperscript{7}De Car., 3 c. Cf. George P. Klubertanz, S.J., "The Unity of Human Activity," The Modern Schoolman, XXVII (January 1950), 75-103. This explains in detail how charity informs the other virtues.
particular virtue might command the act of another. In this connection St. Thomas speaks of an example in which the virtue of temperance commands an act of fortitude. The example used is that of a woman martyr who chooses to lose her life rather than to have her chastity violated. It was her love for purity which demanded that she die in its defense. Thus it was the virtue of temperance which became the end for which the act of fortitude was placed. Cajetan explains such a situation: "(I)deo oportet ad hoc ut temperantia sit ita perfecta ut sit sufficiens salvere seipsam, quod sit etiam perfecta imperative, hoc est ut habet actum imperii ad alios actus exclusivos extraneorum contrariorum, puta ad imperandum actui fortitudinis ne propter timorem mortis perdatur temperantia."  

It might seem from what has been said about these commanding virtues that the firmitas animae of fortitude consists in nothing more than the firm conviction of one or more of these other virtues coupled with the will's ardent desire to practice it. But such an interpretation cannot be maintained. First, this would rule out the necessity of having a separate virtue of fortitude. To face death for the love of God, for example, would be simply an act of charity. Now, to be sure, it is an act of charity; but St. Thomas maintains that it is also much more. It is an act of fortitude. The reason is that a single act can at the same time be an act of more than one virtue. "Nihil autem prohibet unum actum a diversis habitibus informari, et secundum hoc ad diversas species

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8S.T., 11-11, 124, 4 ad 2.
9Cajetan, Commentary on the Summa, 11-11, 124, 2, p. 30.
reductio ordine quodam."—10

This is not merely a question of rational distinctions. St. Thomas clearly means that to face death for the love of God, or for any other good reason, a man must not only have the virtue of charity, or some other commanding virtue, but also a separate reality which constitutes the virtue of fortitude. There must be something in the soul beyond the conviction that God exists and the consequent love and desire for him.

It is in this sense that St. Thomas makes the distinction between the virtue which commands the act and that which elicits it. In the above quotations the notion of the virtue which commands has been brought out clearly. As a concrete example here, St. Thomas says of the act of martyrdom that charity is the "primum et principale motivum, per modum virtutis imperantis."—11 But he also says that fortitude is the "motivum proprium, per modum virtutis elicentis."—12 Cajetan explains this passage: "Et licet martyrium sit semper harum trium virtutum actus ratione dictarum eius conditionum, caritatis tamen et fidel non nisi imperativa, fortitudinis autem elicitive... Actus namque a pluribus procedens virtutibus est elicitive ultimae, cui directe respondet actus ille: sicut actus emanens a pluribus potentissimis spectat elicitive ad

10S.T., II-I, 4, 9 ad 1. Cajetan further explains this notion: Stat quod unus numero secundum substantiam actus sit in pluribus virtutum generibus... Nullum inconvenienti est eundem actum ratione unius circumstantiae spectare ad unum genus virtutis, et ratione alterius spectare ad aliud genus."—Cajetan, Commentary on S.T., II-I, 124, p. 30.

11S.T., II-I, 124, 2 ad 2.

12Ibid.
Infimam illarum potentiarum.  

From these passages it is clear that fortitude is a separate reality in itself. It must be concluded, then, that while the commanding virtue does somehow flow into the act, it is not the only cause of the act. Cajetan puts this well in a commentary on the case of the woman martyr who performs an act of fortitude to preserve her chastity: "[(D)icendum quod temperantiae actus, in casu posito, imperative coadjuvat ad productionem fortitudinis.] 14 Here the important word is coadjuvat. The commanding virtue helps, but it does not do everything.

This can perhaps be made clearer by a more or less formalized narrative of what occurs in the soul during the formation of an act of fortitude. The example of an act of martyrdom, treated philosophically, will be used. The process would be something like this: First, there is a very deep conviction within the soul of God's existence and of the other truths of the Faith. Second, there is an intense desire to serve God in all things and to remain true to the Faith. This is charity. Now, all goes well in the practice of faith and charity until finally persecution comes along and the picture changes considerably. Now the practice of faith and charity involves a threat to life itself. In fact, to preserve faith and charity means certain death. Here fear rears its ugly head. This makes the person think again and re-examine the situation: "Timor conciliatios facit." 15 If the fear is strong enough and gains complete

13 Cajetan, Commentary on S.T., 11-11, 124, 2, p. 30.
14 Cajetan, Commentary on S.T., 11-11, 123, 5, p. 14.
15 S.T., 1-11, 44, 2 c.
control over the imagination and the practical judgment, the will may choose not
to have the intellect think about the ends proposed by faith and charity; and
they are abandoned in favor of the end proposed by passion.

However, if the will chooses to have the intellect think about the ends
proposed by faith and charity, to reconsider faith and charity in the light of
this new circumstance of a difficulty which stands in the way, then a step to-
wards the formation of an act of fortitude has been taken. This step probably
will be taken if faith and charity have already been grasped in a thorough con-
viction of their value.

Now then, if on consideration the person finds that he really is deeply con-
vinced of the truths of his Faith and that he really does want to love God, then
he is led through a practical syllogism of some sort which would seem to end with
the practical conclusion that difficulties are to be met for the sake of a good
end.16 Perhaps more particularly, the conclusion would be that difficulties
are to be met for the sake of faith and charity. Even more particularly, the
conclusion would be that this difficulty should be met here and now for the sake
of faith and charity. The will accepts this judgment, and thereby elicits an
act of fortitude, making it possible for the judgment to flow into activity.

There seem to be two very important points involved here. First, the end
intended, the ultimate reason for the act, the motive, is of the utmost impor-

16 A discussion of prudence has been avoided in this thesis. However, it is
important to realize that prudence is essential to the formation of all these
virtues. "(E)x ea omnes alias virtutes morales rectitudinem electionis parti-
cipant, et sic elus actus immiscetur actibus omnium allarum virtutum."--In III
Sent., 9, 1, 1, 2. Again, "(P)rudentia adiuat omnes virtutes, et in omnibus
operetur . . . sicut sol allqualiter influit in omnia corpora."--S.I., II-II,
47, 6 ad 3.
ance in forming an act of fortitude. The judgment that difficulty should be met for a good end could never have been reached, in the case given; were it not for the previous interiorly grasped conviction that God does exist and should be served. In other words, this conclusion which leads directly to the act of fortitude is subsumed under a more universal judgment. "(S)ic et ratio speculativa procedit ad conclusionem ex principiis per se notis, ita ratio prudentiae procedit ad electionem et consilium de his quae sunt ad finem ex fine; et ideo dicuntur fines aliarum virtutum esse principia prudentiae." This brings out very clearly the importance of motivation in St. Thomas's theory of moral virtue. The power to place an act of fortitude depends upon the possibility of rational conviction.

The second important point is this, that, although the act of fortitude does ultimately depend upon some higher motivation, still, it does have its own distinctive reality. In the illustration given the act of fortitude could not have been placed were it not for the formation of a specific practical judgment that difficulty must be faced for the sake of a good end. This judgment had to be accepted by the will as good before the act of fortitude could become a reality. That is, the specific aspect of meeting difficulty, the difficulty of meeting the danger of death itself, had to come into focus and be grasped and accepted as good.

In this sense fortitude is a reality in itself, has a motive peculiar to itself, has an end of its own, though admittedly only a proximate end. And the precise end of fortitude is to expose the self to the danger of death. "(A)ctus

17 In III Sent., 33, 2, 5 ad 6.
humani praecipue dijudicantur ex fine . . . . Ad fortem autem pertinet ut se exponat periculis mortis propter bonum.18 That is, the very end of fortitude itself is to expose oneself to the danger of death for a good reason. That is why the point has been made here that somehow the practical reason, through the virtue of prudence, must arrive at a conclusion which states that difficulty must be faced for the sake of a good end. It is this principle which is responsible for the act of fortitude itself, which elicits the act. It is this principle which gives fortitude its own end and makes it a virtue in its own right.

Thus, while the strength to perform an act of fortitude, the firmitas animae, may depend upon higher motivation, firmitas animae itself would seem to consist rather in a practical conclusion grasped and accepted by the will that to meet the danger of death for a good end is a good in itself. It would seem that fortitude as such is formed only when this principle becomes operative.19

This, of course, leads the discussion naturally into the question of habit. Thus far the thesis has concentrated on the formation of a single act of fortitude, the reason being that habits of moral virtues are formed only through acts, and therefore the act must first be understood in order to understand the habit.

Now that it has become clear what firmitas animae is in a single act, it can more easily be seen what it would be in a habit. It would seem that as more acts of fortitude are placed less attention need be placed on the ultimate motivation, that is, on the virtue commanding the act. Fortitude as its own motive

18 2.I., 11-11, 125, 2 ad 2.

19 Cf. ibid., 123, 7, for a statement of how fortitude can have its own end and still be placed as an act ordered to a further end. It is a question of the difference between proximate and ultimate ends.
comes more to the fore, and a simple reference to the principle that it is good
to meet the danger of death for a good and becomes more and more sufficient to
elicit the act of fortitude.

In this sense Cajetan maintains that when the habit has been formed it is possible to say that a man can act with fortitude as the primary end while another virtue merely provides the matter for the act. Speaking, again, of an act of fortitude placed to preserve the virtue of temperance, he says: "Si utraque virtus inest secundum exercitium proprium habitus temperantia non imperat, ut dictum est, actum fortitudinis, sed solum materiam dat fortitudini, ex hoc ipso quod reddit tale periculum mortis optimum, ac per hoc materiam circa quam fortis fortiter se habet sustinendo. Ita . . . . non est actus temperantiae nec elicitive nec imperative, proprie loquendo, nisi forte ex parte materiae circa quam est fortitudo, quasi imperare dicatur quia excitat fortitudinem constituendo materiam circa quam versari debet."\textsuperscript{20}

Thus, as the habit is formed, the motivation of fortitude itself seems to become more and more dissociated from the motivation of some higher commanding virtue, at least in the sense that this commanding virtue no longer primarily

\textsuperscript{20}Cajetan, Commentary on \textit{S.T.}, II-II, 123, 5, p. 15.
moves the act. 21

In fact, the notion of habit would seem to go even beyond the mere notion of fortitude becoming more and more an end in itself, and less and less dependent for its force on other virtues. For it would seem that a person who really had the habit in its fullest sense would have achieved such a control over his passions that they would now respond spontaneously in the correct way. That is, they would have achieved such participation in the motivation spoken of that they would now respond spontaneously to the apprehension of a difficulty to be met for a good end. This would mean that when the situation is seen as one where reason dictates that it is good to meet the danger of death, the passions spontaneously fall into line. If reason calls for attack, boldness spontaneously comes into play, and in the proper proportion. In fact, even before the decision to attack, the passions of hope and fear were properly balanced, thus making the decision easier. If the situation calls for endurance, the passions

Perhaps it is in this sense that St. Thomas speaks of the convertibility of the virtue of fortitude: "Quis enim potest firmiter stare in his quae sunt difficillima ad sustinendum, consequens est quod sit idoneus ad resistendum allis quae sunt minus difficillina."—S.T., II-II, 123, 2 ad 2. In other words, if a person has enough firmitas animae to face the danger of death, he can turn this same firmness against any lesser danger. However, this would seem to imply a dissociation of the firmitas animae from any particular motivation coming either from some particular commanding virtue or from some particular type of difficulty. Thus the determination to face a difficulty would have to be dissociated from the motivation furnished by charity, justice, temperance, etc., and would have to concentrate simply on the goodness of facing a difficulty for any good end. Likewise, the determination would have to be dissociated from the difficulty of meeting the danger of death, and would have to concentrate simply on the goodness of meeting any kind of difficulty for any good end. But if this motivation remains particularized the transfer will not occur.
spontaneously refuse to precipitate flight or interior despair. This would be a description of the truly brave man, the man who has so fully integrated himself that his entire organism responds properly in a situation calling for bravery.

However, in the case of fortitude St. Thomas seems to be truly dubious that the habit would ever develop to this degree. This would seem to be particularly so in the act of endurance where reason alone performs the act. The fact is that, since the specific act of fortitude is that of facing the danger of death, in the act of endurance in its fullest sense as described in this thesis it would be impossible to develop the habit because the opportunity to practice could come but once. Even in the act of attack St. Thomas would seem to hesitate in placing too much faith in the habit.

Thus, when speaking of whether or not the truly brave man should be able to respond to the danger of death at a moment's notice, he states that, to be sure, to respond in such a situation would be sure proof that a man has the habit of fortitude. However, he goes on to say that this is not essential to the brave man, since prudence dictates that even if he seems to have the habit he should reinforce it by premeditation whenever possible. "Eliget enim fortis praemeditati pericula quae possunt immine, ut eis resistere possit, aut facilius ferre.

In other words, since the ultimate act of fortitude is such a serious affair, prudence dictates that a man ought not to trust that he has the habit to

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22 S.T., II-II, 123, 9 c.
23 S.T., II-II, 123, 9 c.
a sufficient degree. Therefore, from this statement it would seem that the
\textit{firmitas animae} would ordinarily come, not simply through the spontaneous move-
ments of the passions habitually participating in reason, but from firm rational
conviction and determination gained as a result of meditation.

From all this perhaps a final conclusion as to the nature of \textit{firmitas
animae} can now be drawn. This conclusion will be stated in the form of a
series of propositions: (1) It depends for its original formation upon the
higher motivation of other virtues, and ultimately upon the convictions of the
speculative intellect. (2) In itself it is an ultimate practical judgment of
the practical intellect, firmly grasped by the will, to the effect that it is
good to meet the danger of death for a good end. (3) As a practical conviction
firmly grasped by the will it tends to control the imagination, and thus influ-
ences the movements of the passions. (4) Through being repeatedly carried in-
to operation it tends to so educate the passions that they spontaneously parti-
cipate in this principle.

Finally, from these propositions it can be seen that the all important
factor in the act of fortitude is that practical judgment of the practical
intellect, firmly grasped and adhered to by the will: It is good to meet the
danger of death for a good end. This is \textit{firmitas animae}.

It is true that this judgment has been formed under the influence of higher
motivation and that it has been accepted as good under the influence of higher
motivation. But it is a reality in itself, a reality eliciting the specific
act of fortitude.

It is also true that in some cases the passions may aid in an act of fortit-
tude, but it is always the adherence to this practical judgment which makes the act possible.

Thus, both the soldier who went to the attack at Normandy and the martyr who died for the Faith did so because each had grasped and adhered to the same judgment of the practical intellect: It is good to meet the danger of death for a good end.
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II. SECONDARY SOURCES

A. BOOKS


B. ARTICLES


The thesis submitted by James W. Sanders, S.J., has been read and approved by three members of the Department of Philosophy.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Oct. 2, 1959

Date

Signature of Adviser