The Views of David Urquhart on the Crimean War

Joseph Anton Biesinger
Loyola University Chicago

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THE VIEWS OF DAVID URQUHART ON
THE CRIMSON WAR

by

Joseph Anton Biesinger

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
February
1961
LIFE

Joseph Anton Bissinger was born in Chicago, Illinois, February 25, 1934.

He was graduated from St. George High School, Evanston, Illinois, June, 1952, and from Loyola University, June, 1956, with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Humanities.

From September, 1956 to February, 1958 the author took graduate courses in History at Loyola University. During March of that year he began his six month tour of active duty in the United States Army as a commissioned officer. From 1958 to 1960 the author taught History at Nazareth College, Louisville, Kentucky.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

David Urquhart was one of the most vociferous and despised radicals of mid-Victorian England. For two decades before the Crimean War he had been a leading advocate in England of taking a favorable attitude toward Turkey, and a persistent advocate of opposing the ever-increasing menace of Russia to that country. Urquhart, little written about in modern history or briefly dismissed as a monomaniac or fanatic, was gifted with rare enthusiasm and persistence. He was a prominent English personality, the leader of a vociferous minority, and certainly one of the few contemporary English experts on the Near East. The publication in the thirties of two of his most influential works, *Turkey and Her Resources* and *The Spirit of the East*, gave him a reputation as an authority on the Near East. And the former was later to become a source for Karl Marx's writings on the Eastern Question.

Not only did Urquhart see Turkey in a favorable light and Russian expansion as a menace to Europe and Western Civilization, but he also despised free trade, industrialism, the Whigs, the Church of England, and above all

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2 David Urquhart, *Turkey and Her Resources* (London, 1833).
Lord Palmerston. For him, Palmerston was nothing more than a hired agent of the Czar, helping to bring about the collapse of the moral order in Europe in the Czar's interest. 4 Not even Palmerston's attitude during the Crimean War changed his mind. The Crimean campaign, Urquhart thought, was deliberately sabotaged in an attempt to prevent the Turks from defeating the Russians. 5 Lord Palmerston had for a long time also been interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. Such actions were contrary to the law of nations, a principle which Urquhart found increasingly violated in the nineteenth century. Interestingly enough, he became associated with Karl Marx in his opposition to Palmerston and the government's policies in the Crimean War, and Urquhart's influence is unmistakable in Marx's writings on Palmerston and the Eastern Question. 6 Not only did Urquhart play an important role in arousing the English public against Russia through many speeches, newspaper articles, pamphlets, and books, but he indirectly influenced public opinion through other writers and speakers who accepted his principles and facts either in whole or in part. His views were read directly or indirectly on the continent and even as far away as the United States, through the pen of Karl Marx in The New York Tribune. 7

5 Ibid., p. 190.
7 Charles A. Dana, the foreign editor of The Tribune, had asked Marx to write some articles on the Eastern Question. The Tribune at the time was somewhat radical, being founded by a group of American followers of Fourier. The paper had a circulation of two hundred thousand copies, probably the greatest of any newspaper in the world.
Despite a century of historiography on the Crimean War there still is much controversy concerning the origins and conduct of the war. Urquhart's ideas on these subjects are of importance not only because they give us a better understanding of the radical opposition to the government's of Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, but also because they give us another interpretation of the events. His opinions reveal another framework in which to judge the war. Most historians have not considered this framework, or for that matter his views, as respectable or supportable. On the other hand the principles on which he believed society should be founded remind us of ideals more widely held in former ages. For him justice and law were extremely important, and the evils of his day he largely attributed to their violation. And when he spoke of diplomacy and public opinion people must have shuddered to hear their popularly held conceptions besieged by the power of his keen intellect.

Just prior to the Crimean War public opinion greatly reflected his views. In 1851 he published a pamphlet, The Mystery of the Danube, followed in 1853 by a book, The Progress of Russia in the West, North, and South. Besides constantly writing for periodicals and newspapers, he greeted the outbreak of the war with the pamphlet, The War of Ignorance and

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10 David Urquhart, The Progress of Russia in the West, North, and South (London, 1953).
Collusion. The ideas that were stirring English public opinion into excitement on the Eastern Question and conditioned them for their reception of the news of the massacre at Sinope were good evidence of the efficacy of his articles. 12

Urquhart was also influential in developing among English workingmen a large number of investigating committees of foreign affairs. In understanding the views of David Urquhart and his coterie we will get a clearer conception of the ideas of these opposition groups who, with Cobden and Bright, were so vociferous in denouncing the purpose and conduct of the Crimean War. And even though Urquhart's explanations may not be true in the final analysis, we will at least have a more accurate and comprehensive understanding of the contemporary English scene.

It will then be the purpose of this paper to study the views of David Urquhart concerning England's foreign policy during, and her conduct of the Crimean War. Even though his extensive activities and writings and the groups he inspired were not very successful in undermining the popularity of Palmerston in England among the respectable classes, or in convincing the English people of the corruption of England or her collusion with Russia for the destruction of Turkey, they certainly were as unique and as significant as they were vociferous.

Two books directly and indirectly concerned with Urquhart are Gertrude


Neither of these treat extensively, or for that matter adequately, his views on English policy, Palmerston, and Russia during the Crimean War. Robinson's work is mainly concerned with a general analysis of his views throughout life, the events of his earlier life, the formation and direction of the foreign affairs committees, and his interest in the Vatican Council. Bishop, on the other hand, gives us some close and sympathetic glimpses of Mrs. Urquhart's husband, and a good survey of their actions during the war. No authoritative biography has been published on David Urquhart. However, the information contained in Robinson and Bishop and other sources does give us a decent account of his actions during the period of the war.

Urquhart, as Robinson points out, fits into a school of historical interpretation diametrically opposed to the traditional English one. There still are two diametrically opposed views concerning the period of the Congresses, the period of reaction following the Congress of Vienna. English writers have commonly accepted Metternich as the soul of a system of reaction. The rival theory makes Russia the inaugurator and motivator of intervention in order that she might create distrust and conflict among the Western nations and profit by the ensuing confusion. The writers of the latter school are prepared to prove that Russian agents helped foment the revolutions in Spain and Italy. Sorel, one of this school's more prominent exponents, states that the idealistic Alexander was both the hidden god of

14 Maria C. Bishop, Memoir of Mrs. Urquhart (London, 1897).
the revolutionaries and the public god of the conservatives. This is essentially what David Urquhart said of Russian policy throughout his life. 15

But even after a hundred years of research on the policies and diplomacy of Russia, England, and France the origins of the Crimean War are not yet fully clear. Certainly that tangled web of diplomatic events which preceded it has not been entirely unravelled. Gavin B. Henderson summed it up and explained away this viper's tangle by stating that "The Crimean War was the result of diplomatic drift and ministerial incompetence." 16 As B. Kingsley Martin describes the drift toward war the actual villain appears to be public opinion. 17 For roughly two decades after the Treaty of Unkias Skellesi of 1833, a flood of anti-Russian literature—partially, if not mainly, inspired by David Urquhart and Lord Ponsonby—had been steadily mounting 18 until it carried, as Aberdeen described it, a drifting cabinet into the war. 19 Henderson is convinced that the events and results of the war were more shrewdly and impartially analyzed by contemporaries than by later historians. 20 Such a maxim, then, makes the views of Urquhart of primary importance. Although Henderson does an excellent job of analyzing the diplomacy and character of leading figures during the war in his Crimean

15 Robinson, pp. 5-7.
16 Gavin B. Henderson, Crimean War Diplomacy (Glasgow, 1947), p. 199.
17 Martin, pp. 215-224.
19 Martin, p. 217.
20 Henderson, p. 243.
War Diplomacy, he does not mention Urquhart. On the other hand he does not take such a favorable view of Lord Palmerston as does Seton-Watson and Temperley. He thoroughly analyzes Palmerston's character, calling him little less than a fanatic in his attempts to enhance Britain's prestige. If Urquhart can be accused of being addicted to Russophobia, perhaps Palmerston, his arch enemy, can be accused of Anglophobia.

In discussing commentaries on the views of David Urquhart, there is a strong temptation to include material not directly concerned with the subject under scrutiny. This would lead to a discussion as extensive as is Erison D. Gooch's article, "A Century of Historiography on the Crimean War." It is interesting to note that the closest he ever comes to David Urquhart (and Urquhart had decided views on all phases of the war) is in his discussion of the views of Karl Marx and Vernon L. Puryear. Marx, he states, viewed the Crimean War as an attempt on the part of Russia to restrict English commercial competition in the Near East. "In his day, Marx was virtually alone;" Gooch tells us, and "No voice added documented support to his analysis;" until Vernon L. Puryear published in 1931 the first documented proof in his book, England, Russia, and the Straits Question, 1844-56. Such a statement ignores the writings of Urquhart in general, and especially his book-length work which preceded the war, The Progress of Russia, in the West, North, and South.

21 Ibid., p. 203.
22 Gooch, pp. 33-58.
23 Ibid., p. 49.
Vernon L. Puryear, whose work E. L. Woodward and A. J. P. Taylor consider controversial, in addition to the above mentioned book has made a comprehensive analysis of the relation of economics to diplomacy in his *International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East*. The former, which includes a lengthy treatment of the diplomacy of the Crimean War, gives little information on Urquhart's views of the war. The latter treats quite well his influence and activities in the thirties, and is excusable for lack of comment concerning the war, because it is not within the scope of the book.

Paul W. Blackstock and Bert F. Hoselitz in their commendable resurrection of Marx's writings on the Eastern Question which according to them are practically unavailable, have in their book *The Russian Menace to Europe* given quite a fair appraisal of the importance of the writings of Karl Marx on the Eastern Question. Marx was shown to fit the description of the group that Gavin B. Henderson described as dependable observers who "gave very satisfactory judgments on the causes of the war and the respective responsibilities of the states concerned." Although it is true that Marx recognized the vital necessity for modern reforms in Turkey, he did not adopt the extreme pro-Turkish position of such "propagandists" as David Urquhart.

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24Gooch refers to A. J. P. Taylor who found these ideas "novel, if unreliable," and E. L. Woodward who thought them "interesting material, though the conclusions drawn are often controversial," p. 51; Vernon L. Puryear, *International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East* (Stanford, 1935).


26Henderson, p. 243.

27Blackstock and Hoselitz, p. 262.
However, the authors fail to see that many of the other views of Marx on Palmerston and the Eastern Question express the views that David Urquhart held and propagated. Even though Marx ridiculed him at certain times this does not give a comprehensive picture of the nature of their relations, let alone Marx's indebtedness to him.

Somewhat permissively and certainly apologetically Seton-Watson analyzes Urquhart's position on the mid-Victorian international scene. Britain in Europe contains several pages informing the reader of the influence of Urquhart. In doing so Seton-Watson apologizes, asking for the reader's indulgence in discussing what some might not consider serious history, but which to him seemed "of some value, as revealing the levity with which unproved charges could be bandied about in the Victorian era, despite our strict law of libel." Concerning Urquhart's charges that Palmerston had been bribed in 1825 Seton-Watson states that "It seems almost incredible that a man of Urquhart's high character, knowledge, and experience should have believed such rubbish; it certainly helps to explain why he made no mark in politics, despite his remarkable achievement in rousing the interest of working-class clubs in foreign policy." It seems that Seton-Watson accepts the allegations that Urquhart's opinions and attitudes were not founded on facts, and that his attacks on Lord Palmerston were really the

29 Ibid., p. 257.
30 Ibid., p. 256.
manifestations of a feud which began in the thirties over some Russian documents printed in Urquhart's Portfolio, the Vixen affair, and finally his removal from the embassy in Constantinople. Urquhart, however, denies that this opposition was due to his disappointment in being dismissed from the foreign service. The contributions of Seton-Watson to our general knowledge of Urquhart are small; he makes no contribution concerning Urquhart during the Crimean War.

David Urquhart's view of history was quite interesting; it certainly sheds some light on why he was unsuspicious of writers who saw no wrong in England's actions. Histories composed especially for schools, and the memoirs of statesmen he believed to be quite perverted. Lies, he thought, were more the rule than the exception in these compositions. School books were not supposed to clash with national self-love. The editors of memoirs of course had to maintain the credit of a grandfather, a father, or a brother. In these multifarious ways new generations inherited the "imbecility and perversion" of the old, and children were encouraged to continue the errors of their fathers. This probably was quite true in mid-

31 In 1836 a London merchant named Bell fitted out the sloop, Vixen, with a cargo of salt and ran the Russian blockade to the coast of Circassia. The Russians alleged that the vessel contained gunpowder as well as salt, and confiscated her. It was alleged that Urquhart and Ponsonby encouraged Bell and wished to embroil the English government in the matter.


Victorian England, and certainly adds weight to S. Macoby's dictum that the serious students of history had of necessity to delve well past the "standard history" written for their consumption.\(^{35}\) Sounding much like Urquhart, Macoby warns that the "standard history" was too often confined in its sources to The Times editorial office and Downing Street. Such histories are no more than a mere "fable convenus."\(^{36}\) Realizing this, it is quite surprising that in his excellent study, English Radicalism, 1853-86, he adds little to our knowledge of Urquhart's views and actions concerning and during the Crimean War.

So Urquhart was to a great degree responsible for the knowledge that many Englishmen had of the Near East.\(^{37}\) Disraeli himself owed to him all his knowledge on the subject. At one time he had been instructed daily by Urquhart. Disraeli was one of the few men who accused the government of "connivance."\(^{38}\) Furthermore, the view he expressed of history was rather similar to that of Urquhart. He once wrote about the "standard history" of his day as being that in which "generally speaking all the great events have been distorted, most of the important causes concealed, some of the principal characters never appear, and all who figure are so misunderstood and misrepresented that the result is a complete mystification."\(^{39}\) Urquhart may

\(^{35}\) S. Macoby, English Radicalism, 1853-1886 (London, 1938), II, 7.
\(^{36}\) Ibid.
\(^{37}\) Robinson, pp. 44-47; Bolsover, pp. 444-457.
\(^{38}\) Bishop, pp. 128-129.
\(^{39}\) S. Macoby, p. 7.
certainly be seen as one of those principal characters who seldom appear, and Lord Palmerston as one of those who appear, but are misunderstood.

Professor Harold Temperley in his detailed and scholarly work, *England and the Near East: The Crimea*, describes David Urquhart as one of those professional agitators who was "strange, brilliant and restless. . . .," and who "had spread the doctrine that Russia was an able, treacherous, corrupt, ambitious, and extraordinarily dangerous power. . . ." The British public after all liked sensations and certainly enjoyed dramatic episodes replete with villains and heroes. So Temperley explains away their acceptance of Urquhart's ideas on Russia as a "diplomatic fable" with Russia as the wolf, and Turkey as the lamb. Lord Palmerston is not found to be a man of principle and system, nor a traitor as Urquhart saw him, but only a "superb opportunist." Generally, Lord Palmerston gets off rather well under the pen of Temperley, and David Urquhart rather poorly. In any event, Temperley also ends his book with the beginning of the war, and therefore does not cover the period with which this paper is concerned.

The treatment of Urquhart at the hands of this respected English histo-

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41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., p. 60.

43 Temperley states that "All that can be said in defence of Urquhart (and a good deal more than I can personally endorse) is in Puryear, *England, Russia and the Straits Question*, chapter II. Urquhart's most elaborate defense and arraignment of Palmerston is in a privately printed work, *The Foreign Affairs of Great Britain as Administered by Lord Palmerston* (1841)." Temperley feels certain that Urquhart is the author. p. 409.
torian makes it quite evident that more must be known about his methods of speaking and writing, what he said, and how and why he impressed people the way he did. Urquhart for a long time before the war had aroused a swarm of official and unofficial enemies. He offended many people by telling them what they did not like to hear or want to believe. It was therefore inevitable that some would seek relief in calling him an eccentric, and insinuate that he suffered from delusions. If his allegations were true, in whole or in part, it certainly would have been in the interest of those accused to seek to discredit him. What made matters worse was that in trying to impress people he would exaggerate what was essentially a fact. His wrath against the crimes of unjust and illegal warfare did not seriously move most of his countrymen. Many times it seemed that his belief in the power of men to be right made him intolerant of wrong, and angry at the doer. Sometimes he purposely acted as though he was fiercely angry at a person in order to provoke antagonism so that indifference would be shattered. At other times he would speak in paradoxes to arouse interest. Urquhart said, "There is no art I have practised so assiduously as the faculty of

44 Bishop, pp. 47-48.
47 Robinson, pp. 172-173.
48 Ibid., p. 175; Bishop, pp. 40-41.
49 Bishop, p. 133.
making men hate me. That removes apathy. You can get them into speech." 50

However, Robinson believes that at times he was naturally passionate and intolerant, and destructive of all that opposed him. This may have been brought about by the intense pain he suffered more than occasionally, for which he found relief only in his Turkish bath. On the other hand he was also able to act with gentleness, patience, and self-restraint. 51 He had good reason to act the way he did, because he believed that the age in which he lived was corrupt. Not only was its speech insincere, but its reason was perverted by self-love. Urquhart attempted to lift a man out of his age, his insincerity, and his self-love. He would show a man that he did not possess real knowledge, but was blindly following public opinion. He would also show him that his theories were based on falsehood, that suffrage was but a mirage, and that the road to the promised land was up the rocky paths of self-discipline and knowledge. 52

B. Kingsley Martin in The Triumph of Lord Palmerston 53 gives evidence of an outstanding piece of research which has profoundly enlightened us on the relation of public opinion to English policy. He concludes that the English entrance into the Crimean War was mainly due to the influence of public opinion. Urquhart made significant contributions to that public excitement which crescendoed after Sinope into England's entrance into the

50 Robinson, p. 133.

51 Ibid., pp. 175-176.

52 Ibid., pp. 127, 129.

war. If this be true, then the proper and extensive understanding of Urquhart's views becomes quite important; they must not be relegated to the fringes of history, even though most historians would disagree with his interpretation of the war and of the personalities involved. Martin, more than any other author, properly discusses the views of Urquhart on the eve of the war. But this book ends at the beginning of the war, and certainly does not focus its attention on Urquhart's opinions and influence.

One does not get a clear picture of David Urquhart during the Crimean War unless he is seen in the context of the rampant radicalism and vociferous public opinion that so stirred England at this time. A. J. P. Taylor places him in this setting in his short history of English radicalism entitled, *The Trouble Makers*. His treatment is brief, concise, not really derogatory, but adding nothing new nor really critically worthwhile. Urquhart was the leading advocate of taking a favorable attitude toward Turkey, and "the strangest dissenter of the nineteenth century." Though Urquhart was a radical, Taylor does not think that he started that way. Others apparently started with general radical principles and extended them to foreign affairs. But Urquhart, so Taylor would have it, devised a foreign policy of his own and later found that only radicals supported it. Taylor must have used his imagination a little too much in this description of Urquhart's

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mental processes. It is an oversimplification; it seems that he developed his views from principles of law, a deep understanding of society, and an intimate association with Turkish life, and the manifestations of Russian diplomacy in the Near East. It is true by 1853 that mainly the radicals accepted his views, but then he had already become convinced in the late thirties and early forties that the future of England lay with the oppressed working man. He took responsibility for having diverted the Chartist leaders from violent revolution, and therefore checked the movement which he thought was being influenced by foreign agents.

David Urquhart spent much of his life reminding his countrymen that Russia was gradually undermining the legal and moral order of Europe. These observations reflected a conception of history that seemed incredible to most of his contemporaries. A majority of them saw his concept of Russia as the manifestations of a distorted mind. Urquhart perceived the effects of the deliberate imperial policy of Russia where most respectable Englishmen thought they saw the manifestations of popular insurrections, of nationalism or of mere chance. He saw Russia as a gigantic country that was essentially weak; but through the intelligence of her ministers, the rejection of scruple, and the use of diplomacy, revolution, and war, she had been able to follow a policy of uninterrupted conquest as designated by Peter the Great. His knowledge of the political testament of Peter the Great further strength-

58 Robinson, p. 82.
59 Ibid., pp. 84-89.
60 Ibid., p. 2.
ened his view that Russia was dedicated to a mission of imperial expansion. Even though that testament is most probably a forgery intended to bias European opinion against Russia, the fact remains that most of what it stated had been and was being accomplished in the eyes of David Urquhart.

In his thinking Urquhart closely associated principle and fact. He felt that during his lifetime great moral issues were at stake. Russia was attempting to exclude international affairs from the domain of moral law. Before this colossus of the north became important on the international scene, other countries and sovereigns had acted unjustly, but Russia had acted by the principle of injustice. To attain its ends Russia worked behind the scenes influencing individual statesmen and newspapers, and fomenting revolutions. Many times it had made use of men and movements intentionally opposed to it. But the defenders of the principle of justice in public policy were hesitant because of uncertain aims, and ineffective because they did not understand the nature of national justice. Furthermore, they used, as did most other Englishmen, such phrases as democratic government, ministerial responsibility and nationality without understanding them. This led Urquhart to conclude that the opposition that England had given to

61 Laurence Lockhart, "The 'Political Testament' of Peter the Great," SEER, XIV (1936).

62 Since the time of Peter the Great, Russia had acquired Estonia, Ingria, Livonia, St. Petersburg, Revel, Cronstadt, part of Poland, the Sea of Azoff, part of Turkey, Oldenburg, the Crimea, Odessa, Courland, Georgia, Mingrelia, part of Persia, the Caspian Sea, and the fortresses of Ismail, Anapa, Immeretia, and Pote on the eastern coast of the Black Sea.

63 Robinson, pp. 2-3.
Russian pretensions was most ineffectual.

Although every European state was threatened, Russia's main victim in the nineteenth century was the Turkish empire. When in control of this strategically situated empire he felt that Russia could control Southeastern Europe and the Near East, approach the West through the Mediterranean, and threaten England's Indian empire. Opposed to Russia's plans were the Turks, a people with great military characteristics and a sense of righteousness in public action. Urquhart was sure that the West had forgotten about the relation between religion and politics, but the Turks had not. He saw Turkey as an able opponent to the systematic injustice of Russia, an opponent who, if left to herself would have been able to stave off any Russian attack or attempts at subversion. But Turkey was not being left to herself. Too many powers were interfering with her government, society, and military forces. Could it not be that through diplomacy Russia was securing the help of the powers in subverting Turkish strength? Urquhart constantly maintained that the Western Powers had frequently helped Russia in this way while making overtures of friendship to Turkey. 64

Russia was inherently weak; of this Urquhart was convinced. In the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29, Russia maneuvered herself into a position to attack Turkey by getting the supposed allies of Turkey, England and France, to join her in destroying the Turkish fleet at Navarino. England and France had not even bothered to declare war. Even with this advantage the Russian forces under Diebitsch might have been defeated had not the Sultan been

64 Ibid.
persuaded by his ministers and the representatives of England and France to sign, in a panic, the Peace of Adrianople. If the Sultan had waited, Deibitch's army would inevitably have been destroyed. Similarly, in 1830 the Polish armies were able to withstand the Czar's armies for ten months. In fact, a Turkish victory the year before might have meant the emancipation of Poland. 65 But the danger from Russia was not decreasing, it was becoming more seriously menacing. Urquhart saw Russia's statesmen use the rise of Mehemet Ali in Egypt to secure in 1833 what was equal to a protectorate of Turkey. When the Western Powers grew hostile to what they saw happening, Russia, through diplomacy, sought in 1840 to break up with the help of Lord Palmerston the Anglo-French Entente of 1830. This crisis passed without war between England and France. Mehemet Ali was then made an hereditary Pasha of Egypt through the help of the Western Powers. The establishment of a dynasty in Egypt was a step toward the permanent loss of that empire, and seriously weakened the Turkish Empire. 66

By the middle of the nineteenth century the relations between Russia and England had been almost permanently amicable for three hundred years. England had been at war and peace with other countries throughout those centuries, but with Russia, which was her arch enemy, England had never really been at war. It therefore seemed to Urquhart that Russia had been helped in one way or another, either intentionally or unintentionally by

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65 Ibid., p. 9.

66 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
English policies. Lord Ponsonby, who was Urquhart's superior while secretary at Constantinople, briefly summed up in 1854 England's role in Russia's aggrandisement during the nineteenth century in a short work entitled Lord Ponsonby's Testament. Lord Ponsonby in the thirties had already worked closely with Urquhart. Around 1834 it seems both had developed fixed views on the Eastern Question. Together they launched a press campaign which was favorable to Turkey and against Russia. Ponsonby even corrected and subsidized Urquhart's famous pamphlet, England, France, Russia, and Turkey, and informed him of events at the Porte while Urquhart was in England. Nevertheless, Urquhart was aware that English ministers had helped Russia to expand to the west and south. In discussing Russia's expansion to the south he confined himself to commercial expansion in the Ottoman Empire, the Buxine, the Caspian, and the Caucasus. He exhibited in his book, Progress of Russia in the West, North, and South, the steps which Russia had successively made in stopping up the water-ways and suppressing the production of the adjoining countries. His knowledge of these countries was derived from visiting them and working and talking with the men involved. In his observations he saw a practical connection between the welfare of kingdoms and the observance of the moral law. This connection alone was

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67 Urquhart, Progress, p. lxxv.
69 David Urquhart, England, France, Russia, and Turkey (London, 1834).
permanent. Men might change and so would the circumstances of their actions, but the position of a nation with reference to others was fixed by its acts; these acts would also determine its character. Urquhart knew that he was dealing with history in the making, and describes his position in society as the chorus of a Greek stage which announces the actors and foretells the events, but laments in vain. 71

Urquhart first became aware of Russia's secret interests and subversive work after he had arrived at Constantinople from Greece, just in time to be present at a celebration in commemoration of the Peace of Adrianople. Having been singled out by a Russian diplomat who had recently been on a mission to Greece, he was given some information concerning Russo-Greek relations. Being perplexed, he asked one of the Prussian secretaries of legation the meaning of the comments he had heard, and if Russia had any object in injuring Greece. He was told that Russia had fomented the Spanish revolt, and that this was an example of her work everywhere. 72

The close connection of Russia with the Greek revolt is of primary importance in David Urquhart's life. Not only did it convince him of the ignorance that prevailed in the West about Eastern affairs, but presented him with his first great lesson in the power of diplomacy. Fighting with the Greeks, he came to know their hatred for Russia. While living with the Turks he realized that they had great military abilities. Beginning an inquiry into the diplomatic methods of Russia after the destruction of the

71 Urquhart, Progress, pp. lxi-lxiii.
72 Free Press, August 2, 1865, pp. 68-69.
Turkish fleet at Navarino and the peace of Adrianople, he was aided by the facts revealed in diplomatic documents found in Warsaw during the Polish rebellion of 1830. These secret despatches were sent to England, received and studied by Urquhart, and printed in the Portfolio with, as Urquhart claimed, the consent of the English government. To the casual reader, the despatches did not contain great revelations. Certain phrases were, however, significant to a person like Urquhart, who was conscious of the facts pertinent to the despatches. Nevertheless, they confirmed his judgments on Russian policies.

Russia's diplomatic methods also aroused his suspicions. Pozzo di Borgo had for some time been one of the ablest of Russian foreign representatives, and, strange as it may seem, was seriously nominated at one time for the position of French minister of war. In London Countess Lieven, the wife of the Russian ambassador, was at different times quite intimate with the Duke of Wellington, Lord Grey, Lord Palmerston, and other prominent men. The Lievens were linked with the change in the British policy of isolation concerning the Greek question. Commenting on the failure of the Russian forces to defeat the Turks in the winter of 1828 she wrote to her brother: "Defeat the Turks, for love of God! Europe is growing insubordinate since it thinks we cannot do so."

73 The Portfolio was a short-lived periodical devoted to diplomatic affairs published by Urquhart and his friends. It was first published in 1835 and discontinued in 1836 when Urquhart went to the East; but was revived from 1843 to 1845.

74 Robinson, p. 8.

75 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
Urquhart went so far as to believe that whoever held the key to the secret of Russian power, could not only destroy her, but also employ her. This secret did not lie only in the knowledge of historical and statistical details. It involved the study of the means by which Russia conquered and extended her influence in each province or country over which she held sway. Possession of this knowledge would have enabled governments to understand how Russia could be counteracted. Such knowledge was difficult to acquire, because of the self-love of every minister, people, and sovereign, and by their own misconduct which frustrated their perception of the truth. Sir James Graham appropriately expressed the thinking of every European who was asked to investigate his colleagues: "You wish me to examine a case wherein I am to find that I have been a dupe all my life, and this is the most favourable construction to be put. I will not do it."76

Urquhart felt that England had been dissipating itself since 1827 by constantly intervening in the affairs of other countries. Most people thought that it was England's popular constitution, and the presence of pre-eminent men in positions of leadership that preserved England and made her great. To Urquhart, however, these were only illusions. In his mind the actions of the so-called great men did not bear out the expectations of the English people. Since the death of the Duke of Wellington, Englishmen had not seen any man of extraordinary ability in the position of foreign minister. The other ministers, no matter how great, could not exercise independent judgment and action in foreign matters. Besides, their days were laden

76 *Free Press*, June 6, 1860, p. 55.
with too many other cares to permit of laborious investigations into a world that was beyond the sphere of a debate or division in the House of Commons. A large portion of English affairs had then been relegated by common consent to mediocre men. Lord Palmerston, he thought, was one of these mediocre men who had risen to power with the help of Russia. He more than any other minister was guilty of collusion with Russia; a fact apparent in most of his actions and certainly in the way that he brought on the Afghan War and later engineered the Crimean War. On the other hand Urquhart saw Russia, England's opponent, as a country that trained and disciplined its leaders. He thought that they were intellectually superior; had a system of operation, and permanency of purpose; and had a sense of confidence in themselves, and contempt for the rest of mankind. This contrast places in relief Urquhart's views on the relative position of England and Russia on the eve of the Crimean War.

77 Urquhart, Progress, pp. lxiv-lxv.
Urquhart believed that Russia's commercial policy was one of the most important phases of her diplomacy. Her success in carrying out this policy was in his opinion contributing to the fulfillment of her plan to dominate Europe. Although commerce was one of the most important elements of diplomacy, it certainly could not be practiced or understood by itself. It was intricately involved in every other element. Russia had long been successful in advancing her ends, because she possessed the "knowledge and talents" to do so. English merchants on the other hand really knew very little about the nature of international trade. This made Russia's progress easier. Her phenomenal development was all the more astounding, because she had made herself into a commercial nation while handicapped by a dearth of commercial resources. What was responsible for her rapid growth in commercial importance was, as Urquhart thought, her "capacity for management."¹

Turkish trade had continually increased in the forties due to administrative changes in England and Turkey, such as the abrogation of the Corn Laws, and the freedom of export of Turkish grain from Moldavia and Walla-

¹David Urquhart, Limitation of the Supply of Grain (London, 1855), pp. 16-17.
The effects of the first were stated in the Banker’s Circular of January 1854 in these words: “Since we have opened our ports for the free importation of foreign grains, our trade with Russia has gradually declined, but from the same period that of Turkey has gradually increased; and while the former has diminished nearly fifty percent, the latter has risen to the same extent.” This directly affected the prosperity of the Russian landlords who were mainly dependent on England for sale of wheat and other products. They also strongly influenced the actions of the government. The effects of the second were seen in the competition that appeared after the treaty of Adrianople had freed Moldavia and Wallachia from a compulsory fixed-price system favorable to the Turks. By 1840 the Principalities were exporting wheat on Austrian and British carriers to nations that previously had purchased Russian grain exclusively. By 1851 the exports of grain from Moldavia and Wallachia had equalled the export of that product from Russia. The decline of Russia’s exports by 50 per cent between the years 1843 and 1853 was seen by Urquhart as quite an important factor which affected the condition and prompted the movements of Russia. Russia had to do something to save herself; not only did the income of the landlords decrease, but that of the government also, due to the 15 per cent tax on exports.

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3 Ibid.


5 Ibid.

fore, because of the decline in Russian trade and the consequent increase in the trade of the Principalities the emperor of Russia decided to invade those provinces.

This extensive growth of the grain trade between England and the Principalities was not, however, characteristic of the rest of Turkey. The other Turkish provinces in Europe, Asia, and Africa were able to produce four times the amount of grain as the Principalities, but they were restricted by the Anglo-Turkish commercial treaty of 1841 which imposed a prohibitory duty on Turkish exports. The difference between the Principalities and these provinces was that the duty was not applied on the Danube, because Austria would not submit to it. In 1851 the Porte in reforming the system of taxation had reorganized the collection of internal taxes, and Urquhart claimed that in the beginning of 1853 he "received a pressing invitation to go to Constantinople for the purpose of obtaining the abrogation of the export duty which had been restricting Turkish commerce. Russia was fully aware of these plans, he concluded and recognized their effect on her export trade when Prince Menschikoff's note was presented.

It was evident to Urquhart that by stopping the export of grain from the Principalities, England was being made dependent on Russia. She would

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7 David Urquhart, Progress of Russia, in the West, North, and South, 2nd ed. (London, 1853), p. xli.
9 Ibid., p. 12.
10 Free Press, August 25, 1855, supplement, p. 2.
then have a monopoly over England's grain supply. This dependence would become more serious as England became increasingly dependent on foreign supplies. Poland was the great supplier of Europe, but was already under Russian control\(^\text{11}\) largely through Palmerson's negative attitude. It was Urquhart's opinion that Russia now had her eye on the Danube, and in 1853 threatened the very existence of England and Turkey.

The basin of the Danube produced the same articles as Russia. Ships were essential for the transport of these raw materials and the heavy produce. The Danube was the only means of water communication and the only way by which the metallic ores, rocksalt, timber, hides, wool, tallow, sheep, goatskins, grain and hemp could get to England. Besides, the Principalities were even attempting to rival Egypt in the production of cotton\(^\text{12}\). For England it was extremely important to have numerous sources for the same raw materials, so that the loss of one source would not jeopardize her industries. Consequently, every ton of goods exported from the Danube was a ton less exported from Odessa or St. Petersburg. The competition which resulted also affected the price of goods and reduced Russia's income. A reduction of one shilling on the cwt. of tallow or the quarter of grain was enough to net Russia the loss of from £50,000 to £100,000. Urquhart merely states that a document published at an earlier date at Odessa by the authority of Count Woronzow conclusively proves these points\(^\text{13}\).

\(^{11}\) Urquhart, *Limitation*, p. 12.

\(^{12}\) Urquhart, *Progress*, pp. 300-301.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., p. 301.
The navigation of the Danube river till 1853 had been interrupted, Urquhart thought, in three ways: by the interference of Russia with the internal regulations of the Turkish provinces of the Danube; by the obstruction of the river itself; and by direct interference of the Russian government's enactments. The first was based on rights which Russia mistakenly derived from the treaty of Adrianople, a treaty, however, which bound Russia with England and France not to seek, and not to acquire any privileges, possessions, or advantages of any kind in Turkey. In the second Russia obtained control of the Delta at the mouth of the Danube through the treaty of Adrianople, but she did not fulfill her obligations in this regard and allowed sand to accumulate which blocked the river. Third was the ukase of February, 1836 which commanded all vessels trading on the Danube to go to the port of Odessa, one hundred and fifty miles away in Russian territory, to perform quarantine. This, he realized, was an obvious violation of the law of nations which had roused English indignation. Numerous petitions were presented to the House of Commons on the subject and a motion was made by Patrick Stewart equivalent to pledging the government to resist aggression. The government, however, secured the withdrawal of the motion by declaring itself ready to do what it thought necessary. Nothing was done and the whole thing was soon forgotten. The ukase remained in force. The Russian consulate charged as much as £ 80 for vessels of one hundred and fifty tons leaving Liverpool and London for the Danube and desiring to pass without undergoing the quarantine at Odessa. Charges were increased to diminish the size of the ships; the difficulties of navigation were increased; even insurance became more costly. Urquhart thought that it should
have been obvious to any intelligent and interested observer that England was becoming entirely dependent on the illegal acts of Russia, which actually were directed against England and not against Turkey. 14

There was no attempt by the English government to resist these encroachments of Russia. On the contrary the English government took the position of Russia in enforcing the submission of Turkey and Austria to the interference resulting from the ukase. The vice-consulate at the mouth of the Danube was removed from its dependence on the Ottoman government, and by moving it to Odessa was made dependent on the Russian government. 15

When the Russian troops invaded the Principalities in 1853, they not only cut off the grain supply, but ate the grain intended for export to England. These actions simply ruined the grain trade in these provinces. The center of trade then moved to Odessa where, Urquhart notes, the streets had practically been deserted the day before. 16 In this way Russia deprived the English people of grain except through her sufferance, and made certain that they paid a high price for it. 17 Every step, he felt, had been completed. The production and the productive power of the Principalities were under Russia's control.

In July of 1853 Russia had ostensibly entered the Principalities to

14 Urquhart, *Limitation*, pp. 5-7. See also the government's published Blue Book, *Correspondence in Reference to the Navigation of the Danube*.
secure the demands of Prince Menshikov for the equality of treatment for
Greek and Latin Christians, and to secure a virtual Russian protectorate of
all Orthodox Christians. This stemmed from the generally accepted allega-
tion that the Christian subjects of the Porte were persecuted, and from the
antagonism between the Latin and Orthodox churches. Urquhart was convinced
that the Christian subjects of the Porte, contrary to popular belief, did
not wish to be "protected" by the Czar. In fact, most of these Christians
were known by the title of "Old Believers," or in Russian, Starovirtzi, and
numbered as high as twelve or thirteen million subjects. These people actu-
ally were bitterly persecuted for not conforming to the Russian Church after
its break with Constantinople. They even called the Czar "Antichrist." 13
The movements to independence by the Malo-Russians who numbered about ten
million Urquhart attributed to this schism and persecution. In fact, if
Russia had been free to extend her hegemony to the Ionian Sea, she would
have been involved in a religious war with about twenty million people. The
Christians of Turkey actually called upon the Turks for the protection of
their faith, and they feared Russian political control. 19

If this was the true relation between the Christians of Turkey and
Russia, then Russian intentions in a joint intervention of the Powers be-
comes evident. There had to be some other reasons for her intervention in
Turkey, Urquhart thought, because the Christians certainly never would have
invited her to intervene in their behalf. In 1826 the Greeks had declared

18 Urquhart, Progress, p. x.
19 Ibid., pp. xi-xii.
against Russian interference, but she threatened to act anyway, and alone. The Western Powers, being utterly terrified, scrambled to yield Russia their support with the pretext of restraining her. Therefore, by calling Turkey a "sick man," Russia sought to establish her supremacy over the Oriental Church, and by crying "persecution" she used the Oriental Church to break down the authority of the Sultan. Russian intervention had always been the greatest danger, and Europe cooperated with its effectiveness by always sanctioning it.

That the Christians of Turkey were Greeks and united against Mussulman rule Urquhart saw as another one of these illusions entertained by most Europeans. Actually, the Greeks amounted to little more than one million out of thirteen million Christians in Turkey. Half of the Greeks were nomadic, and well dispersed throughout the cities of the Ottoman Empire. The Turks liked them, and even made one of them ambassador to London. On the other hand most other races hated them. A minority, the Greeks in European Turkey, had only that importance given to them by the Turks. One-third of the Mussulmans were "allied in blood to the Russians." And Urquhart goes on to say that even three-fourths of the Christians south of the Danube were related to the Turks by blood. All of these populations accepted the Turks as their masters. In fact, none would accept the supremacy of any

20 Ibid., p. xii.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. xiii. Urquhart gave no proof for his statement concerning the blood relationship.
other people. And so he concluded that if the Turks did not exist they would of necessity have to be invented (as others later were to think of Austria). If Turkey did not exist the vacuum would create chaos and the Near East soon would come under the domination of Russia.  

Statements from the Greek press confirmed Urquhart's views regarding the Greek and Russian Churches. Their "Smyrna organ" warned Russia not to indulge in illusions. The "organ of Hellenism" explained that the Czar's object in extorting the protectorate of the Oriental Church was to convert it into an instrument of his Pan-Slavic schemes. It further denied that the protection which the Powers gave to the Sultan was, as the journals of Russia pretended, the protection of Mohammedanism against Christianity. It was nothing less than the defense of the political inheritance of the Hellenes against Russian incorporation, in which "every Hellenic spirit wished them success."  

In reality the native Turks were the oppressed people of Turkey. They exclusively bore the burden of conscription, and were therefore the socially depressed. Wealth and industry were consequently entirely hampered to the advantage of the Christians who were rapidly increasing in numbers, in wealth, and in territorial possessions. He thought it therefore quite absurd for the allies during the war to extort from the Sultan the "privilege" for Christians to serve in the army, and to own property which already

23 Ibid., p. xiv.

24 Ibid.
was chiefly in their hands. 25

In 1867 a significant episode of the Crimean War was brought to light which showed that the Christian subjects of the Porte were not too dissatisfied with their rulers. In the autumn of 1853 all the military forces of Turkey were assembled at Shumla and on the Danube. No soldiers had been stationed in Thessaly and Epirus, because of their tranquillity. But suddenly thirty to forty thousand Greeks invaded this Turkish territory. When they could not induce, they forced the Christian population to join them. The Turkish villagers who did not have time to retreat into the towns were massacred, whether they were men, women or children. However, not one of the towns was taken by the Greeks. When intelligence reached Constantinople Fuad Effendi was sent as Commissioner-General with three steamers and three battalions. With the help of people who came from everywhere expressing their loyalty and devotion, and even with the Christians forming volunteer bands, the country was soon cleared of a greatly superior invading force in approximately six weeks. 26

In 1853 Urquhart feared the continual Western interference which long had been weakening the legal structure of Turkey. He envisioned the end of Turkish submissiveness, and the contentment of the Christians. He believed that English troops would soon have to put down insurrections all over Turkey and that Russia would then come to support the Christians and Mussul-


England had long interfered in Turkey with intentions of reforming its government. Although Stratford Canning had been hopeful for the gradual reform of the Turkish Empire, in 1852 he left Constantinople believing that the dissolution of the Empire was not far off. 28 Urquhart, however, did not share this opinion that the Empire was irremediably corrupt and would eventually naturally dissolve. He was firmly convinced that no Englishman was able to know the truth about the strength or weakness of Turkey until he had comprehended England's relations to her. 29 Most Englishmen believed that Turkey's existence depended upon the violent means employed by the British government to preserve it. Englishmen interpreted in this manner such events as the attempt to bombard Constantinople in 1807, the deprivation of Bessarabia by the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812, the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Navarino in 1827, the permission granted to Russia in 1829 to resume belligerent rights in the Mediterranean which she had renounced, and the occupation of Constantinople in 1833. 30 So it appeared to Urquhart that England had employed violence for some time against Turkey. In refusing to fall and be shattered by the violent acts of England and the rest of Europe, Turkey actually displayed great strength, tenacity, and resilience.

27 Urquhart, Christianity, p. 15.
29 Free Press, June 1, 1864, p. 52.
30 Ibid.
Russia was so conscious of her own vulnerability in the Black Sea that she felt compelled continually to take measures for her own protection. The year 1827 had seen her combine with England and France to destroy the Turkish fleet at Navarino. Feeling safe then, she went to war with Turkey. In obtaining the Treaty of Unkiah Skelessi she further protected herself from England's and France's naval power by getting all foreign ships of war excluded from the Black Sea.  

Urquhart already demonstrated in 1834 in *Turkey and Its Resources* that most of the common ideas on the subject of Turkey were false. Russia had been able to act upon the decisions of many governments through her unduly great influence in the press. In this way she was able to urge the destruction of Turkey, and then even protect those governments from popular indignation. Russia therefore used the press to misinform Western nations of the Near East.

Although many observers thought that the Turkish military organization was too weak to win a war without aid from the Powers, Urquhart was thoroughly convinced that the Turkish military organization, if left alone and not interfered with by the supposed friends of Turkey, was excellent. Its economical local organization was the source of its excellent and also

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 See Urquhart's articles evaluating the military strength of Turkey, written in 1852 and reprinted in *The Diplomatic Review* from September 4, 1867 to January 6, 1869.

34 Urquhart, *Progress*, p. xl.
the source of its superiority in any engagement with the Russians. Furthermore, the soldiers of the Turkish army were not as passively obedient as were the Russian. The Turkish army was disciplined, as was the Russian army, but it also had judgment, valour, and patriotism—characteristics not universally found in the Russian army. Furthermore, the Turks were irresistible in an attack; not to be held down with impunity; and certainly sufficient for the protection of Europe against Russia, if only she were left alone.

In 1853 the Turks under arms amounted to nearly four hundred thousand men; one hundred thousand more were in the process of being assembled. Nearly two hundred and fifty thousand were regulars; the rest were volunteers: all were animated by a common devotion and enthusiasm, and were drawn from and congregated close to the area of operations. The Russian army on the other hand was drawn from all over Russia, and was employed to protect hostile frontiers, or to repress hostile populations. The Russian soldiers were not overly enthusiastic and certainly did not compare with the Turks.

Urquhart estimated that the force that the Russians could bring against the Turks in 1853 was not more than one hundred and eighty thousand men.

36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., p. 10.
38 Ibid., p. 11.
But this was not a realistic estimate of the forces that Russia could actually engage against the Turks, because probably close to one-half of the Russian troops would become sick or die due to the climate prevalent in the sector of operations.\textsuperscript{39} For these reasons the Turks, he predicted, would obviously outnumber the Russians. In any event with equality of numbers the Turks were certainly not inferior opponents. Lacking the coercion of a British squadron and the dictation of a British ambassador Turkey could win any war with Russia. Not even a single battle was necessary to determine the results of a contest. All the Turks had to do was maintain their strong position south of the Danube and watch the Russian armies disintegrate due to sickness, disease, and death.\textsuperscript{40}

Because of Russia's deficiency in military power in 1853, Urquhart was certain that she could not attack Turkey. Since 1828 Turkey's military forces had tremendously increased, and Russia's had actually diminished. In 1828 when Turkey had no regular army in the Provinces and made no systematic defense of the Principalities, Russia had been forced to retreat.\textsuperscript{41} Russia had been preparing for two years for that campaign, and employed approximately two hundred thousand men.\textsuperscript{42} However, 1853 saw Turkey with an army to defend the Principalities, and the ability to muster on the theater of

\textsuperscript{39}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{40}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{41} Urquhart, \textit{Progress}, p. xlvi.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., pp. xlvi-xlvii.
operations twice the Russian force. Even if Turkey only had the irregulars who in 1828 defeated twice their number of Russian regulars at Kurtèpe, the Principalities certainly were still in competent hands. As to their quality the opinion that General Aupic expressed to the Sultan earlier in 1849, tallied with that of the Turkish General Sem: "Your majesty's troops are able to give a good account of any enemies that will be opposed to them." Urquhart further supposed that even if the army had to retreat it would leave the Provinces devastated and then intrench itself on the Danube. To equal her relative position of 1828 the Russian troops had to have about four hundred thousand men. There was in 1853, however, a serious question whether she could support that force even if she had it. The Russians, in any event, would encounter a serious problem of logistically supporting any force. The conclusion logically following from these facts was that Russia would and could occupy the Principalities only if she were allowed to do so. On no other grounds could she invade them.

On July 7, 1853 the Russian armies crossed the Pruth into Moldavia. The Principalities were again being occupied by the Czar's forces after months of negotiations ostensibly over the issue of guarantees for the privileges of the Porte's Christian subjects. Turkey, not declaring war

43 Ibid., pp. xlvii-xlvi.
44 Ibid., p. xlviii.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., p. 1.
Immediately, negotiated with Russia through the Western Powers for some months over the Vienna Note in attempting a compromise. Less than two weeks after Turkey's ultimatum to Russia to evacuate the Principalities, the countries found themselves at war on the Danube. As Urquhart expected, the Turks were able to take the offensive, and on October 23, Omer Pasha drove back the Russian troops in two engagements near Isaccea and Oltenita. On November 30 the Russian fleet attacked a small Turkish squadron at Sinope which brought about the famous "massacre" which so aroused the English public for war. From this time till March 16, 1854 there was a lull in the hostilities with attempts at peace amid the drift to war.

Urquhart writing on January 6, 1854 saw that the Turks, unless hampered by the Western Powers, would be able to continue their offensive when spring arrived. They certainly would have the upper hand, he thought, because of the earlier thaw and their consequent ability to move troops into the area sooner. It was impossible for Russia to send troops to the Pruth before May. In February or March, however, the Turks already could have three hundred thousand men in Wallachia, and outflank the Russian forces there. Besides, the peasantry would have been able and willing to rise against the Russians. The Russian forces, approximating less than forty to fifty thousand with only hope for reinforcements of twenty thousand men from Bessarabia would have been utterly overwhelmed.

48Ibid., p. 312.
49Woodward, p. 252.
What further restricted the availability of Russian troops in the South was that fifty thousand men were occupied in the area of Georgia keeping the Circassian tribes in check and attempting to subdue them. This native opposition and resistance to Russia made these territories vulnerable to Turkish invasion, the consequences of which could only be imagined by one like Urquhart who knew the spirit which fermented among the Malo-Russians, and who had studied the revolt at Pugatcheff. 52

It is obvious that a war between Russia and Turkey in the spring without English interference would have been disastrous to Russian interests. It would have restored to the Porte all of those territories which had been wrested from it by the Czars of Russia. It certainly would have brought about the defeat of Russia in the Principalities. But as the intentions of the Western Powers were not to change boundaries, Urquhart concluded that they were not intent on restoring to Turkey her former territories. In his mind the Eastern crisis in January of 1854 was a decisive contest through which either Russia or Turkey would crumble. 53

It was Lord Clarendon's opinion that the Russian evacuation of the Principalities was a sine qua non preliminary to a settlement of the crisis. 54 This may have been true, but alone it would not bring about a complete settlement of the basic issues of the conflict. Urquhart did not

52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Urquhart, Progress, p. xv. Lord Clarendon was Foreign Secretary during the Crimean War.
think that a settlement would be forthcoming unless the evacuation would be unconditional on the part of Russia. Furthermore, some provision had to be made for the injury that occurred and against future aggression. Urquhart formulated seven requisites for the settlement of the crisis that threatened the peace of Europe in 1853. In this enumeration can be seen his belief that any good settlement meant a comprehensive adjustment of past injustices which violated the law of nations. Of the seven points two were essential to the immediate settlement: the admission of English vessels to the Black Sea, and the exportation of Turkish grain. Urquhart saw great importance in stressing these terms, because it was precisely on the selection of terms that Russia had affected her conquests, and not by the advance of her armies. Even if they would have been obtainable, he was convinced that as long as the Russian ambassador still resided in London, England would not obtain them. 55

55 Ibid., pp. xv-xvi.
CHAPTER III

THE DARDANELLES, SINOP, AND LORD STRATFORD

The independence and well-being of the nations of Europe in the nineteenth century depended on the freedom of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. The Straits were linked by the Black Sea to the Danube, which was joined by railroad to the Rhine. This system of communication and means of transport, Urquhart realized, could easily be used by a great power to gain hegemony over Europe. To the west, Russia had been restrained for centuries behind the Dnieper; to the east she had been deprived of the Caucasus. For centuries she had passionately desired a warm water port on the Black or Caspian Seas. Imperial expansion was a method that she felt would satisfy her needs and feed her glory. In her quest for power Russia aimed at the control of the Danube and its contingent provinces and the Araxes, and the exclusion of all rival naval power from the Black and Caspian Seas.

Through the treaty of Unkia Skelessi in 1833 and the Straits Convention of 1841, Russia had obtained the exclusion of foreign warships from the Straits as long as the Porte was at peace. Russia in the Straits Convention had actually procured as a principle what was in 1833 by the treaty of Unkia Skelessi no more than a temporary concession to Russian armed force.

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Since the guarantee of her position expired in 1841, Russia obtained in the Straits Convention a new guarantee, a collective guarantee, in which the five powers agreed to maintain the status quo. Russia after this enjoyed a special privileged position which was hallowed and disguised by the Convention's appeal to ancient custom. 2

The treaty of 1841 really did not present an obstacle to the entrance of an English fleet into the Straits in 1853; in fact, Urquhart thought that the crisis during the spring and summer of 1853 was an excellent opportunity to abrogate it. The will to do it, however, was wanting. 3

The Turks actually desired the passage of the English fleet through the Dardanelles, for they felt that the fleet altered the balance of power in their favor. 4 Urquhart was not believed when he asserted that the Porte desired the passage of an English squadron. His views, however, were confirmed by the correspondent of The Times who announced that the inhabitants of Constantinople were so confident that the English and French flags would float side by side in from of Constantinople that quays were crowded with spectators eagerly waiting to hail the first appearance of the allies in Turkish waters. 5

Everyone in Turkey attributed the absence of the English fleet to the


3Urquhart, Progress, p. xxxi.

4Ibid., p. xxvii.

5Ibid., p. xxviii.
objections of Russia. 6 Urquhart was firmly convinced that Lord Palmerston
above everyone else was the English minister who was preventing its entrance.
His suspicions of Palmerston's interests in this matter dated back to the
time when he was secretary of the embassy at Constantinople. At that time
a document in the embassy's archives prevented the passage of the fleet.
Since six foreign ministers had excluded the fleet when they could have
brought about its passage, Urquhart believed that this secret document was
still to blame in 1853. He clearly remembered the words that Palmerston
spoke to him in 1831 which suggested his intention to exclude the fleet.
Urquhart also was censured by the government around this time because he had
offered to obtain a request for its passage. He was certain that the Turks
wanted the fleet. 7 In 1853, Palmerston, however, was apparently not respon-
sible for the detention of the fleet, because in a memorandum to Clarendon
before the cabinet meeting of October 7, 1853 he expressed a wish to support
the Turkish declaration of war by sending the fleet to the Black Sea. 8

On October 22, 1853, the joint Franco-British squadron entered the
Dardanelles and anchored off the Golden Horn. A dangerous lull followed, 9
during which (in the mind of Urquhart) Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was to
play the most prominent and crucial role on the diplomatic stage. Lord

6 Ibid., pp. xxvii-xxviii.
7 Ibid., pp. xxix-xxx.
8 B. Kingsley Martin, The Triumph of Lord Palmerston (London, 1924),
p. 157.
9 Seton-Watson, p. 312.
Stratford stated that the presence of the Anglo-French squadron in the Bosporus was incontestable proof of the pro-Turkish interests and sentiments of the British and French governments. But now Urquhart, apparently changed his mind. Before, he had wanted a squadron to enter the Straits. Now he was sure that this interest was neither favorable to Turkey, nor were the sentiments honorable. The support, in his estimation, was only a political move and was not intended for military or naval purposes. 10

Although most Englishmen rejoiced when the fleet was sent up the Dardanelles, Urquhart declared that it was sent to coerce Turkey and oversee Constantinople. He believed that this rejoicing was a manifestation of English imbecility. Supporting his interpretation of the situation, a letter from a prominent Wallachian, whom he does not name, contained the prediction that "The Turks will win the battles, but England will then interpose with a note. The Russian generals (at Bucharest) do not conceal their utter inability to meet the Turks, but at the same time they make no scruple in avowing their confidence that the Anglo-French squadron will come to their aid with another Navarino."11 Urquhart claimed that he could produce many more statements like these from Turkish subjects—Englishmen, Germans, Frenchmen, and Christians—who thought that Turkey would win the war only if she stood alone. 12

Urquhart believed that Russia never could have risked her dangerous

policies in the Near East during 1853 if she had not been certain that Stratford de Redcliffe was to be England's representative at Constantinople. At the beginning of that year when there was some doubt as to his being sent back again, the Russian representative in London made evident his satisfaction with a negative decision. The Russian government felt that such a display would cause the English government to think that Russia did not appreciate Stratford, and he consequently would be sent to Constantinople to secure England's interests against Russia. But the English government even went further; everything was left to his judgment, knowledge, and prudence. Russia knew de Redcliffe's attitudes and that the Porte would probably follow his suggestions encouraging caution. Since England had no policy, and yet tremendous power to stop or start war, the most serious decisions would hinge on the temperaments of the individuals who occupied the key positions. As Urquhart saw it, Russia played her game of conquest through the manipulation of these accidents. But more than Stratford's antagonism toward Russia was needed by Russia to make the game safe. It was equally important to prevent M. Von Prokesch from being there as representative of Austria. He had actually been designated to that post when Russia interposed so openly that it reached public notoriety at Vienna and Berlin. Riza Pasha also had to be kept out of office. Russia was equally fortunate in having Palmerston and Aberdeen in the same cabinet, neither of them ostensibly being foreign minister. In this manner Russia, Urquhart thought, had arranged the setting for the war and had left nothing to chance.13 She

13 Urquhart, Progress, pp. xliii-xliv. At this time Urquhart believed that Stratford's interest in the welfare of Turkey was "unquestionable."
knew the characters and attitudes of the key figures, and their reactions when confronted with given situations.

Even though Russia had undertaken immense preparations, which were always written and talked about during 1853, she only had thirteen line-of-battle ships in the Black Sea. In 1829 she had the same number. Half the squadron at the time of Sinope was hardly seaworthy, as Laurence Oliphant in his travels to Sevastopol attested. The native Russians in the crews had been recently replaced by drafted and unwilling men from the Baltic. The wages of the seamen were atrociously low. That strengthened this disparaging view of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea was the story concerning the Vixen affair in 1836 in which the crew of the Russian ship Ajax proposed to the English sailors that if they would lead them out of the Black Sea they could carry off their ship. Mrs. Urquhart did not think that Marshall Marmont in his book on Southern Russia accurately appraised the Russian fleet. Russia could only have acquired Marmont's estimated thirty vessels by uniting both the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, which was an obvious impossibility.

Both Urquharts knew that Russian naval strength was little more than a myth. When the Porte declared war against Russia, Russia's southern prov-

14Urquhart, England's Part, p. 3.


16Urquhart, England's Part, p. 4.

Inces were thrown into panic, fearing a Turkish naval attack for which they felt their fleet offered little protection. The inhabitants of the port towns fled inland. Even published Russian documents gave evidence of the general apprehension. 18

In a final effort for peace the British cabinet asked Stratford to request a delay of the Turkish operations initiated by Omar Pasha in the Principalities. Stratford successfully persuaded the Porte not to send its fleet into the Black Sea, but he was unable to prevent the dispatch of a light flotilla to Sinope. This flotilla was completely destroyed there on November 30, 1853 by the Russian fleet. 19

Russia intended this victory to counterbalance the defeats that she had suffered a month earlier in the Principalities. This naval action was visualized in England as proof of the weakness of Turkey; therefore for Russia it produced its intended effect. 20 Even Seton-Watson states that it was "the Turkish fleet" that was sent to reconnoitre in the Black Sea. 21 In reality, the whole Russian fleet had engaged only seven small Turkish frigates. It was a fight between line-of-battle ships and frigates, being, therefore, an outstanding naval encounter for the Turks. 22 The Turks not only did not strike their flags before such obvious superiority, but fought

18 Ibid., p. 68.
20 Free Press, May 2, 1860, p. 45.
21 Seton-Watson, p. 320.
22 Free Press, May 2, 1860, p. 45.
back so effectively that one of the Russian ships sank before it was able to return to Sebastopol. 23

When the "massacres" occurred a correspondent of an English journal at Constantinople reported:

The Greeks, with their usual malicious feeling, exclaim that it is England that has brought about this little Navarino, in order to obtain peace at any price. It is, however, really a question what the English and French fleets are doing here; the only answer to which seems to be, that their sailors and officers get drunk in the public streets, insult women, and violate the sanctuary of private houses. Besides this, the fleets serve the ambassadors as a means of threatening the Turks, so to restrain them from marching on Bucharest, and forcing them into an arrangement such as the Two Powers may please to dictate. 24

The correspondent of The Times asserted that England never seriously thought of opposing Russia. What led that reporter and many others in England to this estimate of the situation was that the Englishman, Admiral Slade, commander of the Turkish fleet, was suspected of purposely leaving the small Turkish force at Sinope. It also was suspected that because of arrangements between him, Admiral Dundas, and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe the orders of the Turkish council to their fleet to convey the detached vessels to the Bosphorus had been disobeyed. The whole thing had been so unblushingly managed, Urquhart stated, that "three days before the news arrived, it was reported at Constantinople that the squadron had been destroyed at Sinope." 25

24 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
25 Ibid.
Admiral Slade scorned the charge of which he probably was not guilty. He denied having given any such order; so also did Mustafa Pasha. No one knew who gave the order to leave the seven small frigates unprotected at Sinope. Later the ambassadors themselves made it known that they had interposed to prevent the Turkish fleet from proceeding to convoy the flotilla home. It was their "fear of the possibility of an encounter with an enemy of superior force" that made them act in this manner. Since it was more than one hundred and fifty miles to Sebastopol from Sinope, the three weeks' lapse between the arrival of the flotilla and its destruction conveniently gave the Russians time, as Urquhart saw it, to send for the rest of the Black Sea fleet. Initially they had only three line-of-battle ships and four small frigates near Sinope, and with these they did not dare attack the Turkish squadron.

A startling statement in an article in The Morning Advertiser during January, 1854, was read with disbelief by the public. It alleged that it was Stratford de Redcliffe who had prevented the main body of the Turkish fleet commanded by Admiral Slade from entering the Black Sea. He did this by threatening the Turkish government that if it sent its fleet into the Black Sea to meet the Russians, he would immediately order the English fleet to leave Constantinople. Urquhart regretted, but felt compelled to vouch for the truth of this allegation, based on some of his private sources.

26Ibid., pp. 9-10. Sir George Sydenham Clarke in Russia's Sea Power on page 86 states that there were only six Russian "ships-of-the-line" attacking, and that they were known to be in the area ten days before the action. The total Black Sea squadron he estimates at fifteen "ships-of-the-line," and about the same number of miscellaneous ships.
Had it not been for the interference and threat of de Radcliffe the Turkish fleet would have met and destroyed the Russian fleet. And so the only sensible conclusion that Urquhart saw was that the guilt of the catastrophe at Sinope rested on the head of England.27

There was one point that passed unobserved which nevertheless conclusively pointed out the purpose of the allies, or at least of England, to betray the vessels. Since the Turks certainly possessed the superior fleet, Stratford's fear of the Turkish fleet encountering a superior force was not genuine. On the other hand, if the Russian fleet was superior why, then, was not the Sinope squadron immediately ordered to return, instead of being allowed to remain there for approximately three weeks? Sinope afforded no protection.28 Since no reasonable explanation was offered for these actions, no alternative explanation to collusion was possible in Urquhart's estimate. Lord Stratford was certainly not acting in the best interests of the Turks. Yet in the judgment of Seton-Watson, Stratford was acting with duplicity in not carrying out the instructions of Clarendon.29 If Stratford was privately urging the Turks to war for the humiliation of Russia and undermining attempts to maintain peace, the question why Stratford restrained the Turkish fleet from aiding the Sinope squadron and from pursuing the Russian fleet must still be answered. His actions certainly must have

28 Ibid., p. 10.
29 Seton-Watson, pp. 316-318.
appeared quite mysterious to his contemporaries.

The Porte called on the ambassadors of England and France to declare themselves after the massacre of Sinope. They delayed their answer for eight days, and so prevented the pursuit and destruction of the Russian squadron. In their answer they admitted that they had exercised their influence to arrest the operations of the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea. They explained that it was due to defective Turkish material and crews, and the possibility of an encounter with a superior Russian force. This was astounding, Urquhart thought, since Sinope had clearly shown how much the Russians feared the Turks. The Turkish fleet was actually superior. It commanded the entrances of the Danube, and had taken possession of the Phases, but what was that, Urquhart thought, against the word of the ambassadors? After all, it was their will that Turkey should be weak, and therefore she was. 30

Before Sinope the Turks did not fear an encounter with the Russians. When Lord Stratford stopped their fleet in the beginning of November, their intention was to seek out the Russian fleet for battle. The result of such an engagement is suggested by the heroic resistance the Turks gave at Sinope without their warships. Urquhart was quite sure that if the Turkish fleet had not been hindered it would have entirely annihilated the Russian Black Sea fleet. A Turkish fleet then would have been in control of the Black Sea. If Stratford had not hindered the Turks in the Principalities, they also would have been in control there. In Urquhart's mind the words of

Count Nesselrode to Sir H. Seymour substantiated this belief: "You know very well that the existence of Turkey had never been in danger. Had Russia and Turkey been left to themselves, the quarrel would have ended long ago."
The danger here expressed by Nesselrode was for Russia, Urquhart thought, and through Sinope she had averted her imminent defeat.  

In the final analysis Urquhart was probably not far from wrong. The government, if taken as a whole, had negotiated and maneuvered apparently to prevent war, or to prevent local war from becoming a European conflagration. Yet the Turks apparently desired war—a war in which they were confident they could win if England did not interfere. As Clarendon declared, England and France were not going to allow the peace of Europe to depend on the national spirit of Turkey, which had evidently gotten out of control of the Turkish government. And finally Lord Clarendon informed Turkey that she was not to be permitted to attack Russia in the Black Sea, until after the Porte had agreed to submit the operations of the Turkish fleet to the control of the English and French admirals. As Mrs. Urquhart aptly stated in her analysis of the pertinent diplomatic communiqués, it was the Sinope affair by which England under the pretense of securing the peace of Europe protected Russia from the naval power of Turkey.  

31 Free Press, May 2, 1860, p. 45.
32 Ibid., p. 46.
In his pamphlet, *The War for Russia, Not Against Russia*, David Urquhart seriously questioned the nature of that war on which England had embarked in support of Turkey. Russia and England were virtually invulnerable from attack by each other while each remained within its own territory. Russia did not have a large navy; England did not have a large army. Each, however, exposed its weaknesses when involved in a war within a third state. Russia had done just this when she invaded the Principalities. She had placed herself at the mercy of England's maritime power. When it became evident that England did not intend to exert that power Urquhart saw the issues in question being tried on grounds which successfully blurred them. Therefore, before the conflict between Russia and England could be clearly understood, the apparent contest had to be overlooked.¹

Urquhart did not think that there had been a lawful declaration of war. The queen had sent a message to Parliament which did not dare utter the word, "war," but which did, however, introduce the word "peace." She stated that England was "bound to afford active assistance to her ally." Of Russia the queen dared only say that the negotiations to maintain peace had been

terminated, and the power and resources of the nation would be employed "for protecting the dominions of the Sultan against the encroachments of Russia." In Urquhart's eyes every man that engaged in such an action with the prostituted title of war was a bandit or a pirate. This was a repetition of the declaration of Simla by which English troops were sent out in the Afghan War to dethrone a prince who was not subservient to Russia. Some of the documents concerning that war had been forged to cover up conciliatory or treasonable acts, and Urquhart was quite confident that the Crimean War would be treated in the same way.  

Since the Czar disdained to notice the English ultimatum, England only appeared to declare war. But a message instead of a declaration of war came from the government. The Times, which Urquhart felt was an organ of Russia and the English cabinet, informed the nation that morning "that a declaration of the motives and objects of the war," it presumed, would be prepared for publication in the London Gazette. Why was it not stated, Urquhart queried, that a declaration would be issued? What was stated is that these formalities, a legal declaration of war, were not strictly necessary to create a "state of war." That was true, but they certainly were necessary.
to create a "state of war." That was true, but they certainly were necessary for a "lawful war," a type, he thought, which England found repugnant. Would it not have been much easier for England to have placed herself within the law? What was the reason that there was so much care taken to place England outside of it? England had assumed as the basis of war that Turkey was in the unalterable process of decay, and yet she was proposing to go to war to support Turkey. Urquhart concluded that England had not brought about the Crimean War in a scramble for the spoils of a decaying Turkey, but for the destruction of Turkey, and the protection of Russia. The war was not conducted for the purposes stated, and so that no judicial action could take place, no specific declaration was made.

Parliament listened to the message in breathless silence. Afterwards, members asked one another if it was or was not a declaration of war. Apparently, no one was able to answer this question, not even the legal advisers of the Crown. Urquhart was certain that it was not a declaration of war. Lord Aberdeen, he remembered, had said that to defend the Ottoman Empire was not to attack Russia, and neither was it to defend Turkey. In this light the message of the Crown certainly did not embody what traditionally might be considered a declaration of war.

5 The state of war, Urquhart thought, was a judicial sentence against an enemy by which on land or sea his person could be destroyed, or his property seized. When war is declared everyone in the state making the declaration is bound to do his best "to kill, take, and destroy the enemy until he submits. Free Press, February 1, 1860, p. 17.

6 Urquhart, War, pp. 8-9.

7 Ibid., p. 2.
The documents, then, were prepared to render war against Russia impossible. War was pretended, and yet the fields of operation and the weapons available to defeat Russia were restricted. Such a situation simultaneously constituted a state of war and peace. There could be no balance in the effects of such a condition; Russia was favored, and Turkey harmed. Furthermore, it was decided that the state of possession was not to be altered. No attack, then, was planned against Russia. If an attack later materialized, it would not be for the purposes of regaining Turkey's lost territory.

In a letter to the Circassian tribes on May 8, 1854, Urquhart told them that there actually was no war between England and Russia. It was only a pretense to deceive the English nation and the Ottoman Empire, in order that a treacherous government might use their military forces under the guise of an ally. This diabolical scheme had been successful in regard to Turkey, and Urquhart expected that it would be used on the Circassians also. Even though seven months had elapsed since Turkey had admitted the Anglo-French squadron through the Dardanelles, the Russians were still in the Principalities, and the Sultan was for all practical purposes a prisoner in the Seraglio.

The squadron that was admitted was not even intended for action against Russia; it was far too powerful. Instead it was intended to coerce Turkey. The English and French controlled Constantinople, through their fleets, but


Urquhart foresaw that Russia would soon obtain this control after she had fomented a war between England and France. The plan of serving Russia by sending armies to fight her, had not commenced with Turkey. The experiment had already been made in the Afghan War. ¹⁰

The English people were actually faced with a dilemma when they considered the relations between England and Russia. Either they had to admit that the Czar was insane, or that there was treason in the British cabinet. For a long time most Englishmen thought Nicholas was insane, and in this manner explained away the mysterious relations between the two countries. But upon close analysis, Urquhart thought, this explanation was falacious. Only treason in the British cabinet could adequately explain the incongruities. ¹¹

It bothered Urquhart that the Russians had not been driven from the Principalities. He thought that nothing could have been easier than to cut off the Russian army in the Principalities. If that had been done the whole conflict would have ended then and there. That Russia's expulsion was not the intention behind the conflict was obvious to Urquhart, since a squadron was being sent all the way to the Baltic. Such an action would have been entirely superfluous had the expulsion been intended. Also, English troops were sent to Turkey when the naval squadron actually sufficed to dislodge the Russians. And in the end since the Turks actually sufficed to defeat

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 10-11.
¹¹Urquhart, War, p. 12.
the Russians, the presence of the squadron also proved that the Principalities were not the main reasons for which the war was being fought. England had opened the Principalities to the Russians. She had held back the Turks. If England had so desired she could have immediately moved the Turkish forces to the rear of the Russians. If, then, instead of using the forces in the Principalities which she already had available, England moved forces and ships of her own to other points, it followed logically for Urquhart that England had no intentions of fighting against Russia, and was only masking her supposed inaction by these displacements. 12

As English troops moved into the war apparently on the side of Turkey, Urquhart became sure that the plan of the campaign was not to expel the Russians from the Principalities. The English troops were (as The Times stated) to occupy the Thracian Chersonese, and the extremity of Thrace, on which Constantinople stood. What else than occupation could it be called when English and French troops landed in force on Turkish soil, and instead of proceeding to attack the enemy, entrenched themselves on lines covering and commanding Constantinople and the Dardanelles. It was, Urquhart thought, an insult to the Turks to pretend to defend their strongest positions, against which attack was almost impossible. It was not a defense, it was an occupation. The Turks would soon become discontented with this state of affairs. Insurrections would occur. But the allies were capable of repressing such local insurrections, and the allied naval squadron was always nearby in a channel which commanded Constantinople and bisected the empire.

12 Ibid., pp. 4-6.
Since the allies were in effect preventing the Turks from fighting the Russians, he felt that soon the allies would probably have to fight the Turks themselves:13

Such, then, is my answer to the question often put to me when I speak of dangers of defensive war, "How can an additional force endanger Turkey?" It will do so, because Turkey is already too strong, and such is precisely the argument used by Russia at Vienna—"Turkey is too strong therefore take care of yourselves." And this, be it observed, I announced at the very beginning of this struggle. "You are now alarmed at Turkey's weakness; the day is not far distant when you will be terrified at her strength."14

Lord Ponsonby in 1854 even though he was not a soldier, did believe that he knew the difference between a defensive and aggressive war. The Turks would not be grateful to the allies for doing what they could have done themselves, he thought, or for the English attacks directed against strong instead of weak Russian positions. Ponsonby thought that English intervention was absurd, if defense were the end sought. But for that matter he thought the government's policy was imbecile throughout the whole progress of the Eastern Question.15 He did indeed think that the best policy was one that encompassed decisive and extensive action. Russia should be expelled from every place which she had acquired by force or fraud from the Turks or the Persians. Those territories should be restored to their former owners. This was the best basis for a policy, because it would give security against future attacks of any sort by Russia. It also would afford

13Ibid., pp. 11-12.
14Ibid., pp. 13.
a guard against disputes between the European powers by thus leaving nothing
to be obtained or demanded. It was, in fact, the meddling of the European
powers in the affairs of Turkey that brought about the conflicts in the Near
East. If they would have left Turkey alone, she could have worked out in a
satisfactory manner everything that concerned foreigners. 16

Some months after March, 1854, Urquhart asserted that some of the mili-
tary authorities did not share the delusion that Turkey was weak and in
danger from Russia. Immediately afterwards, Lord Clarendon stated in the
House of Lords that the "military authorities" concurred with the political
authorities, and declared that the expedition was sent out not to repel
Russia, or to save Turkey, but to secure Constantinople. 17 During March,
1854, however, Urquhart had conversed with General Hardinge and Colonel
Mottsin. The impression left upon him by the conversation was that these
officers entertained opinions similar in character, if not in extent, to
his. They accepted the illustrations he offered from the last Russo-Turkish
war, and from topographic considerations; and they also accepted the testi-
mony he bore as to the character and feelings of the Turkish army. Urquhart
felt that these officers clearly understood the effect that English troops
would have on the Turkish army which was full of courage and vigor and con-
scious of its power to crush the Russians. Urquhart thought that the Turks
could only feel then that the English troops were sent to restrain them.
Such a feeling would soon turn the hatred which the Turks initially had for
the Russians against the allies. He further felt that the Turkish nation

16 Ibid., October, 1854, p. 32.
17 Ibid., p. 28.
was much more powerful than its government thought it was, and that the Turks would not be subdued even by all three powers. Lord Clarendon observed that "the national spirit of Turkey which might have been so useful against the aggressor, had now become dangerous to its own government." But it had become so only because that government, Urquhart concluded, had yielded to foreign counsels.  

Sometime before November 10, 1855 Urquhart had an extraordinary conversation with the Turkish ambassador, Namic Pacha. Urquhart maintained that Turkey was able to defend herself; the latter maintained that his countrymen were no match for the Russians. He therefore implored the British government for aid, and was quite annoyed at Urquhart's estimate of Turkish bravery and power.

Russia, Urquhart thought, would be better able to resist a European instead of a Turkish army. Therefore, it made sense that when England was allied to Turkey, and English troops composed the greater mass of the army, Russia was better able to resist Turkey. After all, if England had really wanted to support Turkey and to curb Russia, all she had to do was employ the most effectual means which was not war, but the restriction of Russian trade. Since England did not use these means she had no intention of befriending Turkey, or of injuring Russia.

19 Free Press, November 10, 1855, p. 2.
20 Ibid.
Most of his ideas on defensive war, statements of fact and predictions, David Urquhart embodied in a letter to Lord Raglan dated March 21, 1854. He appealed to Lord Raglan to take steps as commander-in-chief to rescue England and Turkey from a convulsion that also might lead to war with France. 21

What was the nature of the Anglo-French alliance? Considering the part that Russia had played in bringing Louis Napoleon to power, Urquhart wondered how France could really have been hostile to Russia? In speaking of the future map of Europe some months before he wrote The Spider and the Fly, he said that "Louis Napoleon must sell the English squadron or be driven by an insurrection from Paris." Urquhart was quite astonished at what he considered the imbecility of the English public in respect to France. A thorough analysis of the reasons for the alliance, after all the enmity between England and France, would in any case have been reasonable. Yet, Englishmen dreaded to look seriously at the alliance. Urquhart was constantly reminded of the words of Prince Lieven when he described the Duke of Wellington: "He dreads and even avoids the examination of his position and trusts to events the care of overcoming difficulties." Here, in a single phrase, was explained that characteristic of England and all of Europe which enabled Russia to use other countries for her advantage. 22

Considerable evidence moved Urquhart to be quite suspicious of France's intentions. The planning of a man-of-war harbor at Boulogne and the suppression of the Charivari for its enmity to Russia were two reports that


22 Ibid., p. 25.
impressed him quite deeply. Moreover, even if the winter camp at Boulogne was directed at overawing Prussia it was just as much in the service of Russia. Louis Napoleon had been allowed to fortify the Thracian Chersonese, thereby giving him virtual possession of the Dardanelles. This gave him control over the fate of the English squadron. Even The Times was encouraging the government to send the whole fleet into that trap in the Dardanelles. Such a situation should have been enough to encourage the dullest citizen to reflect for a minute on a situation which was intended to shut up in a sea commanded by France the whole available force of England. And this was all done with the avowed purpose of forcing terms for a settlement between Russia and Turkey, terms which actually violated the sovereignty of Turkey which England had undertaken to defend. 23

Others also distrusted the intentions behind the expedition. On the authority of The Times Urquhart knew that whenever the expedition was mentioned, the Turks gave "significant, but inarticulate signs of their incredulity and contempt." He also knew that the English officers in command viewed the expedition to Turkey with a "profound feeling of distrust, hitherto unexperienced in British armies, a conviction of treachery." The sentiment was quite general among the officers, although Lord Raglan was an exception. 24

When considering the reasons for the war Urquhart thought that only the pretensions of Russia and her strength were of essential importance. If

23 Ibid., pp. 25-26.
Russia were the patron of the Christians of Turkey, she would have used that patronage, instead of expending great efforts in seeking to obtain it. Had Russia been more powerful than Turkey, Englishmen would have heard of her conquests before learning of her intentions. Russia had actually been beaten already; she had been stopped. Urquhart then could not see why England should undertake such a gigantic and hazardous expedition. 25

Proponents of the expedition supported it with new arguments such as the necessity of repressing Russia through European guarantees. To Urquhart's way of thinking this was only falling back on the original fallacy that Russia was strong and Turkey weak. Events certainly had disproved this. If Turkey was strong, there was no danger to Europe from Russia, so why bother with useless treaties as guarantees. Treaties had not restrained Russia in the past. Even ministers thought that Russia used treaties as stepping stones to conquest. 26 In fact, Russia only used treaties on the grounds that they should be executed in so far as they served to expand her empire. In 1815 the treaty of Vienna gave her Poland, but this did not prevent her in 1846 from disposing of Cracow. The treaty of Adrianople in 1829 gave her the mouths of the Danube. In 1853, however, Russia blocked the entrance in violation of the conditions to which she had agreed. That same year she separately occupied the Principalities which violated the treaty of Balta Liman of 1849 that provided only for a joint occupation. The treaty of London in 1841 had excluded foreign vessels of war from the Buxine on the

25 Ibid., p. 27.

26 Ibid.
condition that Russia respect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and this also did not prevent her in 1853 from violating that integrity. 27

After Russia had been beaten by the Turks, the contest for all practical purposes was over. Russia's armies had been dislodged, and could not return. All Turkey had to do was maintain the state of war, seal off trade by keeping the Dardanelles closed, and Russia would have been placed between extinction and the acceptance of equitable conditions of peace. Urquhart concluded that the allies had relieved Russia from such a predicament by delivering over the Danubian Principalities to Austria, by compromising their own armies in Russian territory, and by keeping the Dardanelles open for her trade. 28

27 David Urquhart, Progress of Russia in the West, North, and South, 2nd ed. (London, 1853), pp. xxxii-xxxiii.

A DISSIDENT MINORITY

David Urquhart felt that the war already in 1854 was one fantastic nightmare. The early stages of the campaign with the slaughters of Alma, Balaklava, and Inkerman fed this feeling of horror. Yet the war spirit of the nation marched fearlessly forward. It was with dreariness and great difficulty that he fought against this seemingly indomitable enthusiasm. These waves of madness did not extinguish his flame of resistance and criticism. He felt that England was committing a great national crime; this increased the tension in his mind. He and his fiancée, Harriet Fortescue, therefore dedicated themselves to preaching against the war.¹ Volumes of letters were written that year, and Urquhart even frequently communicated with his Turkish friends at Constantinople.² In trying to publish their ideas they found that The Morning Advertiser and The Morning Herald were the only newspapers that would print articles with such a radical flavor. The Times would not allow their articles in its columns.³ Whenever he could gather a dozen or more workingmen he tried to arouse their interest in

¹Maria C. Bishop, Memoir of Mrs. Urquhart (London, 1897), p. 73.
²Ibid., p. 97.
³Ibid., p. 82.
foreign affairs. In this way he again undertook the formation and development of his foreign affairs committees. But whatever the means his efforts were largely directed toward averting further action by English troops in the Middle East.

Urquhart's ideas were intensely opposed to current opinions. The ranks of his followers had continuously grown smaller since the thirties. Around May and June of 1854 only a small number of people adhered to him outside of a circle of friends. It was just before his marriage to Miss Fortescue in September that William J. Davidson in writing to Francis Marx said, "Either great moral courage is required or great attachment to the originator of the views held by the few." After all, these followers bore up under great social pressure, or it even might be said that they were persecuted. If it had not been for this pressure, Davidson estimated, Urquhart would have had many supporters. Only a few people, however, were capable of appreciating his self-sacrifice, his labor, and the heights of moral wisdom to which he could attain. As one of them said, he was "one of the most profound thinkers of modern times." Being "quick at perception, skillful in the arrangement of his thoughts, coherent, concentrative and logical in his expression," he fervently and energetically taught his countrymen

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4Ibid., p. 73.
5Gertrude Robinson, David Urquhart (Oxford, 1920), p. 120.
6Bishop, p. 97.
7Ibid., p. 113.
8Ibid., pp. 83-84.
His radical views at first even prevented his engagement. It was probably quite natural that Miss Fortescue's family hesitated in advising her to marry this "eccentric" who opposed the opinions of almost every important person in the country. He was furthermore quite the iconoclast when it came to the symbols of English respectability. His cause seemed lost; his financial future, uncertain; and above all he knew of a mysterious world of secret agents, letter tampering, plots, treason, bribery and other similar actions. Was this a good prospective relative in respectable English circles? He offended her brothers, and bewildered her aunt who was her guardian. Soon, however, the family's resistance broke down, and they were engaged.

Because Mr. Urquhart was so involved in promoting opposition to the war he had to travel extensively. Consequently, he and Miss Fortescue had to grow in love and knowledge of each other through correspondence. This has been of great value in assessing Urquhart's personality. In fact, both of their characters are conveyed with intimate simplicity in their letters. We get the impression that he was not a man overcome with a great phobia, unless he purposely suppressed its manifestations. He does, however, come forth as a man intensely dedicated, and one who was affectionate, understanding, and quite lovable. Yet these qualities were very often concealed.

9 Robinson, pp. 139-140.
10 Bishop, p. 66.
11 Ibid., p. 65.
beneath an impatient and domineering manner which he assumed to propagate his doctrines. Throughout the early part of 1854 it appears that Miss Fortescue and Mr. Urquhart developed an increasing desire for complete moral and intellectual identification in their patriotic effort to awaken Englishmen to the dangers that confronted them.

Miss Fortescue even before she was engaged to Mr. Urquhart studied his writings and appreciated most of his ideas. After the engagement she studied under his direction with great zeal. When she started to write for publication she adopted the pen name of "Caritas," because the names "Fides" and "Spes" had already been adopted by his associates. Under this name she wrote many letters for the press, most of which were published in The Morning Herald and The Morning Advertiser.

In reorganizing the foreign affairs committees Urquhart began in Newcastle with a small committee of "a blacksmith, a carpenter and a blind beggar." Out of these humble beginnings committees sprouted up all over England like new grass after a spring rain. From some of the discussions the pamphlet, Constitutional Remedies, was produced which served as a discussion guide for the committees. Urquhart devoted almost the whole year to their organization. For the most part they were formed of workingmen;

12 Ibid., p. 95.
13 Ibid., p. 114.
14 Ibid., p. 112.
15 Bishop, p. 75.
16 Miss Fortescue to David Urquhart, August 12, 1854, ibid., p. 112.
sometimes merchants and shopkeepers joined and worked side by side with them. In each town he gathered a small nucleus of men whom he attracted by appealing to their passions, interest, or curiosity. Then they settled down to study Vatel, or his own or Anstey's pamphlets on English government, the Near East, or even Russia. Along with these they would study the Blue Books and parliamentary documents relating to recent history. The goals with which Urquhart inspired the groups were the restoration of the English constitution with legal government and justice, and reestablishment of public law among nations. Gradually he convinced these workingmen that the evils they suffered were not going to be remedied by the franchise, the Reform Bill, and the repeal of the Corn Laws, but only by the restoration of all law and justice. In a sense he substituted his own panacea for others, as did Ruskin in his socialistic reforms and extension of education and Carlyle with great and heroic deeds and the leadership of strong men.

On March 30 a meeting was held in the Music Hall on Store Street which helped set the pattern of inquiry for the committees into the conduct of the foreign office, and of the sending of petitions to Parliament to set up a committee of inquiry to read and publish all papers of the foreign office, and to suspend all of its actions till a report was given. A small deputation including Messrs. Nicholay, Coningham, Wilson, Collet, and Wilks even met with Lord Clarendon telling him of the views expressed and conclusions drawn at this meeting. They were quite similar to Urquhart's concerning

17 Robinson, pp. 124-125.

18 Ibid., p. 141.
English diplomacy and the progress of the Crimean War. Of course, Clarendon was stupefied, and is reported to have said, "I hesitate to receive at all resolutions so offensive to the Government, both in matter and manner; so offensively reflecting even on the honesty and good sense of the Government." And he declined to explain these matters to the deputation saying that he had repeatedly given such explanations in Parliament where the British people expected to receive them.

From the published resolutions of another public meeting in St. Martin's Hall on May 11, Urquhart's ideas again seemed to pervade the discussions and conclusions. The English nation, most of them believed, had allowed the Cabinet to gain too much power which rendered it irresponsible, arbitrary, and despotic. Not only did this affect such great concerns as the empire, but also trade and employment, the price of food, the supply of home and foreign markets, taxation for defense, and the conduct of war. They did not feel that the nation was being protected by the integrity of Parliament against the treachery of the government. The only workable solution they saw, was to awaken the nation to the danger which threatened to overtake it.

As the warmth of the summer days absorbed the dampness of the English countryside Urquhart intensified his labors. On June 12 he was urged by his friends to run for Parliament from London. He was allowed to use the

20 Ibid., pp. xii-xiv.
21 Ibid., p. xv.
Guildhall for the rally at which the Mayor of London told him there were three thousand present. Although this and other meetings must have been quite a success, he did not win the election. 22 Such defeats were not new, but certainly his indomitable hopefulness had to seize all available support. Maybe he depended too much on encouraging voices, but with the disappointments and the resultant feeling that he was fighting the campaign singlehandedly he relied upon, and sometimes demanded, the full confidence of his friends. 23 Miss Fortescue certainly was a source of strength, and his frequent letters to her reflect his joy at her confidence in him. By August he appeared exhausted:

It has been the hardest work I have ever had, and I feel it; this is the close of three days of languor, which has perhaps intercepted a breakdown. I saw Nass (afterwards the Earl of Mayo, Viceroy of India) to-night, and he told me that he had come to be informed. He is going to Ireland to-morrow evening, and has not time to come in the morning, but he has been reading in the Morning Advertiser. G. Hamilton congratulated me. I spoke to him like Jeremiah, and he turned pale. Napier I have not spoken to. Colonel Taylor (member for County Dublin and Conservative Whip) was here Saturday, and has promised, after explanation, to write to J. Butler (Lord James Butler, son of the Marquis of Ormonde, and a brother of Lady Clermont) to help about the Dublin meeting if required. 24

Nevertheless, throughout the summer he continuously wrote letters that were published in the Morning Advertiser and Morning Herald, and even talked with the editors. 25

22 Urquhart to Fortescue, June 12, 1854, Bishop, p. 91.
23 Ibid., pp. 91-92.
24 Urquhart to Fortescue, August 13, 1854, ibid., pp. 115-116.
25 Ibid., pp. 115-117.
What must have increased the tension of his life that summer were his suspicions that someone was attempting to poison him and that his correspondence was being watched. He wrote to Miss Fortescue about this; her friends thought that it all was quite illusive and mysterious. Being quite eager to dispel these doubts he produced sufficient evidence during July to convince them that he was not having hallucinations. Even her brothers then thought that "there was evidence for a Court of Justice" in his favor. 27

Some of the postal clerks who opened Urquhart's mail told him about it. This was no surprise to him, because investigations of his mail were not new. He claimed that it was done as far back as 1836 and periodically thereafter, especially in 1848 after he attempted to impeach Lord Palmerston. That his letters had been stopped and opened was known by hundreds of persons, or so he claimed. He wrote to intimate friends for their opinions on the matter. The facts from these letters (most of which were written during July of 1854) were submitted to the Manchester Committee most probably during June of 1857, and were later published in a supplement of The Diplomatic Review entitled, "On the Opening of Letters by the Government." 28 They apparently bear out his suspicions. Some people, of course, felt that he was putting...

26 Ibid., pp. 99-100.

27 Ibid., p. 111.

28 Diplomatic Review, XV (December, 1867), supplement. On the last page of this supplement are listed additional publications of Urquhart, Tucker, Free Press supplements, committee reports, and writings of William Cargill, R. Montieth, H. H. Parish, and G. Stapleton.
forward these accusations falsely to make himself appear important. Some accused him of monomania. But in his evidence it came out that clerks were daily opening his letters, and those of other men also. Under Lord Litchfield's administration of the Post Office Urquhart's letters ceased to be opened. Lord Litchfield had found nothing against him and this was subsequently made known to Urquhart. However, the chief clerk under the next administration mentioned to him the number of his letters that he had himself opened. In 1857 while visiting the House of Commons Mr. Otway told him that he had heard that the letters of the Turkish Association were opened and he and the chairman of a House Committee begged Urquhart to prepare a case for the Commons. Urquhart declined to do so at that time, because he felt that he did not want to get mixed up in the matter, and because his letters were not then being opened. 29

David Urquhart's marriage to Miss Fortescue took place on September 5, 1854. 30 The honeymoon consisted of a few days at Lord Clermont's place in Ravensdale Park, and a short tour in the Highlands. 31

At the instigation of Isaac Ironside, an important Sheffield industrialist, the mayor of Sheffield convened a public meeting on September 25 which became the first really big Urquhartite demonstration. Austrian troops had just occupied the Provinces without a declaration of war in the estimation of those present at the meeting. Ironside stated that no hope

29 Ibid., pp. 1-7.
30 Bishop, p. 118.
31 Ibid., p. 120.
could be expected from Austria as an ally in view of its bad record and the
fact that the empire was obliging Omar Pasha to surrender Hungarian refugees
of 1848 to Hapsburg justice. It was obvious that Ironside was just as vig-
corous a speaker as Urquhart, for he declared that such demands by the Haps-
burgs made his blood boil and his hair stand on end. The crowd cheered, as
it must have done numerous times. Ironside then alluded accusingly to Mr.
Charles Napier's capture of Bomersand, and asked why he had not proceeded to
capture Riga. Bomersand, after all, was nothing more than a "barren and
abandoned fortress." Obviously, these meetings were not subdued affairs.
The meeting even moved to petition the Queen to support their position. The
Morning Herald, a Tory newspaper, looked with such favor on this meeting
that it called on other towns to follow Sheffield's example. 32

Then in October the two Urquharts began working in the other manufac-
turing centers. 33 The meetings which they held in towns throughout England
that autumn were attended by between fifty to sixteen hundred people. 34 By
November or December he had established a foreign affairs committee in prac-
tically all the chief towns. Some of the chairmen elected by the workingmen
showed exceptional acuteness and readiness to examine and to dispute nation-
al and international topics with Mr. Urquhart. 35 He had always encouraged

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32 W. H. G. Armynage, "Sheffield and the Crimean War, Politics and Indu-
33 Bishop, p. 120.
34 Robinson, p. 125.
35 Bishop, p. 120.
questions as the best means to arouse attention and to confound his antagonists. About this time he selected sixty of these exceptional men to undergo a three months' special course of study in Manchester. They were divided into sections each of which was directed by a person who had already worked with Urquhart. Their day lasted from nine in the morning to late at night with only time out for meals. They heard lectures on the law of nations and the constitution of England. Then they would study parts of these subjects, such as the treaty of May, 1852, the Chinese and Afghan wars, maritime law, the commercial treaty with Turkey, England's corn supply, the Holy Alliance, and Poland. Urquhart said of these men that they were "grave, diligent, enthusiastic, and a sight worth seeing." (It must be remembered that this took place in England at a time when the majority of the people and especially the industrial laboring classes were not even getting the barest essentials of an education.) At the end of this three month period, sometime early in 1855, a public meeting was held to which prominent statesmen, lawyers, and ecclesiastics were invited. Some of them were to judge the performance of these men. All of the students were questioned one by one. The best of the sixty were chosen to form a deputation to London to discuss with the members of both houses of Parliament the treaty of Denmark and the right of search.

Some of the same men who had helped Urquhart in 1839 to organise the foreign affairs committees from the ranks of the Chartists helped in the

36 Ibid., pp. 120, 133-135.
37 Robinson, pp. 125-126.
formation of these new committees. Some of these men were Ross of Bladensburg, Monteith of Carstairs, and Charles Attwood. Others who later joined the organizers were Major Poore, Major Holland, Frances Marx, and Charles Dobson Collet, who was well known as the secretary for "The Association for the Repeal of the Tax on Newspapers and the Excise on Paper." By their help and that of other sympathizers in various towns 145 committees were formed throughout England in the next several years. 38

Urquhart and his wife had little rest that autumn. She followed him wherever he went, and played an important role by smoothing over some of the inevitable personality clashes. 39 She also had to look up quotations, keep up a voluminous and sometimes published correspondence, and answer the objections of those not convinced by her husband's arguments. She certainly must have imbibed his way of thinking for she also corrected the false arguments and illogical conclusions of their allies. It is in the reports of the committee meetings which they attended that are found part of the record of his extensive knowledge, his readiness to enter into a discussion of any topic, his startling paradoxes, and his skillful appeal to the intellect and conscience of his listeners. At a meeting in Newcastle on November 21 the discussion revolved around international commerce about which he was able to produce an astounding array of facts and figures. 40 At another meeting on November 30 the subject was the constitution, and how the law was designed

38 Ibid., pp. 135-136.
39 Ibid., p. 120.
40 Free Press, Nov. 10, 1855, p. 2.
to control the acts of the government. Both were quite extraordinary meetings and the evidence that he submitted at them was later incorporated into a combined pamphlet with sections respectively entitled, "Limitation of the Supply of Grain" and "Constitutional Remedies."

Many of Urquhart's predictions concerning the war were also published during April of 1854 in Recent Events in the East, a pamphlet which was a collection of letters that in effect foretold some of the events which occurred during the war. In London that year were also published The War of Ignorance and Collusion and The Occupation of the Crimea. The Duke of Cambridge was one of those persons whom Urquhart had warned of the danger that lurked in the Crimea. The Duke was reported to have been quite disturbed when he saw those predictions realized during the expedition.

The last day of 1854 is illustrative of the extensive correspondence which the Urquharts conducted during that and the following year. On that day twenty-one private letters, five letters for the press, and twenty-nine newspapers and parcels were mailed. Such a day was probably exceptional, but the usual day's outgoing mail always had from eight to twelve letters. And they were not only addressed to friends, but also to royalty, government ministers, politicians, editors, common operatives, and women of all ages and rank. One of the letters mailed that last day of December was

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41 Bishop, pp. 120-122.
42 E. Tucker, p. vi.
43 Mrs. Urquart to Miss Curtiss, January 9, 1855, Bishop, p. 124.
44 Ibid.
addressed to the Sultan warning him of the dangers that were involved in his continued friendship with the allies.  

With the roar of the terrible winter winds and the freezing cold the soldiers and horses suffered and died in the Crimea for lack of supplies. The reports of the misery touched many English hearts; they certainly stirred the Urquharts to greater exertions in their militant campaign against the conduct of the war. Literally volumes of letters and articles were written, and through the continuous reception of foreign and domestic newspapers they must have been two of the best-informed people in England. Mr. Urquhart's unrelenting criticisms and accusations of collusion must have irritated many important people beyond endurance. But he also received his share of this war of words, for calumnies virtually swarmed about his name and destroyed much of his influence. The detractors were people of high position and consequently were ready to believe that Urquhart was actuated by spite because of his earlier dismissal from the Foreign Office. Maybe, some thought, he was mentally deranged. All of this is understandable for he did not feed the English pride with the milk and honey of their greatness. He did the unpopular thing of unsparingly lashing their respectable phrases and national complacency.

45 *Free Press*, November 10, 1855, p. 2.

46 Bishop, p. 124. For instance, on January 9, 1855 twenty-one letters were sent out, two for *The Herald* and *The Advertiser* for the following day's edition. Two articles were sketched in preparation for the next day's work. Twenty-five newspapers were mailed. Fifty newspapers had been ordered, but had not arrived.

47 Ibid., p. 126.
Mrs. Urquhart was one person who sustained her husband during these trying times by her absolute trust in and loyalty to his ideas. Her confidence in the correctness of her husband's position was not without support. He was becoming increasingly successful among the workingmen to which his successful committees and the large attendance at public meetings attest. Of a speech which he made at Newcastle on June 8, 1855, a friend reported to her that "the whole body of workingmen were breathless for three hours and understood every point, jumping down from seats and benches at the end to crowd round the man they felt was the only one to save and rule them." Kossuth, however, claimed that not even Mr. Urquhart could claim to be more sincerely and resolutely hostile to the ambitions of Russia than he was. He felt that he could say to the English people, "Up, and on, in agitation. Hear Mr. Urquhart, profit by his knowledge, learn from him facts; he can teach you much, and you can learn much from him; but give not your judgment into his hands." Mazzini thought quite a bit less of Urquhart. In a letter written during September, 1855 to the Sheffield Committee on Foreign Affairs he stated that he always thought it unjust, unwise, and unstatesmanlike of Mr. Urquhart to oppose the rising of nationalities in the hope of finding a useful ally in the Austrian Empire against Russia. 

Meanwhile during that winter Isaac Ironside had kept in touch with J. A. Roebuck who was the member in Parliament for Sheffield. The views of his constituents certainly affected his actions, and with all the meetings and

48 Ibid., pp. 126-127.
49 Free Press, December 29, 1855.
committees and the resulting clamor he decided on January 26, 1855 to place a motion before the House of Commons "to inquire into the condition of the army before Sevastopol and the conduct of those departments of the government whose duty it has been to minister to the wants of that army." This vote of censure on the government passed in an uproar with a majority of 157. Lord Aberdeen's government fell because of this inquiry, and Lord Palmerston became Prime Minister. 50 A vast mass of evidence concerning the conduct of the war was collected from eye-witnesses, ranging from the Duke of Newcastle downwards. The causes of the confusion, the lack of supplies, and the general mismanagement of the war were, however, difficult to discover. Of this inability to get at the root of things Roe buck said, I felt corruption round about me, but I could not lay my hand upon it."51 Mrs. Urquhart in analyzing the government report of this investigation in The Story of the War thought that almost every answer was evasive, ambiguous, or contradictory. She saw that the committee found it impossible to extract a single direct answer as to what was the source of the Crimean expedition. In exasperation she stated that "we cannot even get the 'opinions' of political authorities, respecting the 'opinion' of the military authorities, from the very head of the Government itself, or so much as a statement of their own."52 But no matter how much historians pass over the mismanagement of the war as condonable because of prevalent conditions in the army or party

50Armytage, p. 447.  
politics, the criticisms of these radicals must be seen as warranted, right, and just when we see the war as it was apparently conducted.

Ironside's Municipal Association, or the Sheffield Inquiry Committee as it called itself, was deeply stirred by the revelations of the parliamentary investigating committee. On July 4 another mass meeting was convened to consider the propriety of petitioning Parliament to discuss another motion of Mr. Roebuck. This motion was intended to censure every member of the cabinet who had advised the Crimean expedition which led to the military disasters. Announced by placards inscribed "Men of Sheffield be Men," several thousands attended to hear among others that eccentric character, G. S. Phillips, who was better known as "January Searle," roar defiance at Lord Palmerston. Available evidence does not suggest Urquhart's presence.53

During August, Harriet Urquhart, little more than a month before the birth of her son, joined David at Birmingham. After Birmingham they attended meetings at Worcester, Bath, Bristol, Gloucester, and Stroud. Each meeting was successful, and in each town they found a committee formed and working. Stroud, however, proved to be a greater success than the others. The large hall was densely crowded with men on the main floor and women in the gallery. All seemed eager, enthusiastic and excited. Even a group of Russellites were there who at the beginning sneered and scoffed at Urquhart's statements about Lord John, but later slipped away with apparent embarrassment. The chairman was a workingman. The people flocked in from the neighboring villages, and it was reported that in every hamlet Mr. Urquhart's

53Armytage, p. 478.
meetings were talked of even by the children. 54 Newcastle at this time was also a stronghold of "Urquhartism," as the critics termed his ideas. But here, Mr. Cowan, their representative in Parliament, was considerably influenced by these Urquhartites as must have been the case elsewhere. 55

Harriet Urquhart bore David's first son on September 11, 1855 in Castle Bromwich near Birmingham, which presently served as his headquarters. It was with the birth of his son that he really began his family life. New opportunities opened to him in which he became a builder rather than a reformer. He was resolved to rear "a man" after his own idea, and to set an example for all Englishmen. As the head of a family his enthusiasm for good hygiene developed, and he even made up his mind to teach Englishmen the use of the Turkish bath. 56

An increase in the price of bread was brought about by the war which brought untold hardships to the lower classes. Following other monster meetings a meeting was held in Hyde Park on Sunday, November 4, for the purpose "of getting the price of bread reduced." Another public meeting was announced for November 7, without Urquhart's permission, although it was announced that he would address it. 57 This meeting and another on the following night were held in the Town Hall. 58 Charges were made against the

54 Bishop, p. 133.
55 Ibid., p. 127.
56 Ibid., pp. 136-137.
57 Free Press, November 10, 1855, p. 4.
58 Ibid., November 4, 1855, p. 4.
English navy which, it was said, had recently captured as prizes Turkish vessels leaving the Danube and "for ought we know" coming to England. Why instead had not Russian grain-ships been captured? When Urquhart rose loud cheers greeted him. He told the meeting that the committees had the whole country in an uproar because of the high prices of bread. 59 And G. S. Phillips asserted that England had paid £ 17,000,000 in gold to Russia to help slit the throats of English heroes at Balaclava and Inkermann. More telling still was his allegation that Palmerston had received Russian gold amounting to £ 20,000. This money was supposedly won around 1826 from a Mr. Hart, who had been working under the orders of Princess de Lieven. Palmerston was also accused of embezzling £ 353,652-6s-0d of the Greek loan in 1836. 60 Whether Phillips got this information from Urquhart is not clear, but the general accusations, not the specifics, Urquhart did make against Palmerston.

On Saturday November 17 an article appeared in the Leader which criticized Urquhart's and the committee's view that England was controlled by Russia. Its author claimed that the majority of intelligent persons, not only in Sheffield, but in Birmingham, Newcastle, and other northern and Midland towns, had long been aware that the statements were not true, because the promised evidence was never forthcoming. Still, the article read, a section of men with vulgar appetite for violence and mystery, met in the Town Hall. The great crowds at these meetings came not because they believed

59 Free Press, November 10, 1855, p. 4.
60 Armytage, p. 478.
the ideas, but only out of curiosity. Mr. Urquhart's views were regarded as the "hallucinations of a half-witted mystery-monger"; he was looked upon as an "egregious egotist"; and his followers were viewed as "the actors of his company." The Birmingham Journal, it was declared, had discredited the "vapid ravings" of The Free Press. The only importance of the sheffield agitation consisted in that there was a sign of political life among the working class. 61

Even while constantly attacking the conduct of Lord Palmerston and English foreign policy as treasonable, Urquhart found time in 1855 to re-edit his essays on familiar words. Many of them had appeared in The Morning Advertiser nine years earlier. To these a second series was added and then published in a small volume entitled Familiar Words in 1855. 62 He attacked in these pages the time-honored English phrases, and showed the real meaning of words which had been made ambiguous by their varied use in English speech. This seems to have been the first attempt to examine popular beliefs dearly held by most of the people. He chose his points of history quite shrewdly to support his political contentions, but it is quite clear that most of his readers probably had never heard of them before. His remarks were both witty and paradoxical, and not philological. 63

In a letter to Lord Panmure on the employment of Turkish troops by the English government, Urquhart referred to Russian military writers, especially

61Free Press, November 24, 1855, p. 2.

62Some of the essays in this collection are entitled "War and Peace," "Religion and Politics," "Standard of Value," and "Public Opinion."

63Bishop, p. 123.
Valentine, who thought that the ability of the Turks as soldiers could not be properly assessed by European standards. In fact, soldiers prominent in European wars had failed in their operations in Turkey. But as usual, he reminded Panmure, the Turkish contingent in the war was rated lowly by English officers. However, it had to be remembered that this was based largely on one retreat, a retreat from an advanced untenable position near Balaklava where they had no support and little protection. After all, they retreated before twenty thousand Russian troops. This was immediately represented as cowardice by the English officers. Only four thousand remained from the fourteen thousand; and when these last returned Urquhart foresaw that they would spread their hatred for the English and soon the Turkish army would believe that the English government had planned its destruction.

On December 22 Urquhart gave notice of the third edition of his book, The Progress of Russia in the West, North, and South. Commenting on this new edition Britannia believed that although he had for many years been stigmatized a Russophobe, the present course of events, which had made history of his predictions, could now also make him justly proud of his nickname. No one, it continued, who watched attentively, could ignore the aggressive policy of Russia in the west, north, and south as the stepping stones of her conquest of England's Eastern empire. It was Mr. Urquhart, The Eclectic stated, who had taken the trouble to collect the evidence of Russian craft from the diplomatic history of the last thirty years. And the readers of The Manchester Advertiser were reminded that David Urquhart

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64 Free Press, December 15, 1855, p. 4.
was one of the most remarkable men in the country, who had given his life, energy, and talents to the Eastern Question. Most professional politicians had avoided the Eastern Question as much as possible. Urquhart, on the other hand, had studied it in the European press, and had talked with almost every important public person. He had been closely associated with every phase and crisis of the question. He had been in Greece, conferred with the chiefs of the Albanians, been secretary at the embassy at Constantinople, held consultations with William IV, and had known the leaders of the Circassians in the Caucasus, who called him "David Pasha." Whether his opinions were correct or not, he was the only Englishman who had the details of the Eastern Question on his finger tips. And most likely the future, the author thought, would discover that Urquhart's dread of Russia and admiration of Turkey were more solidly founded on fact than had been England's toleration of Russian aggrandisement and her contempt for the character of the Turks.

In late 1853 or early 1854 a Mr. Tucker began publishing some small pamphlets known as Tucker's Political Fly-Sheets. Being disgusted with the unreasoned support many people gave to the actions of Lord Palmerston and noticing an article by Dr. Karl Marx reprinted from The New York Tribune in The Glasgow Sentinel, he reprinted it as the pamphlet Palmerston and Russia. He felt that it appropriately expressed his own views. Shortly afterwards he met Marx, who supplied more material which formed the second

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65 Free Press, December 22, 1855, p. 2.

66 The bound collection is entitled Tucker's Political Fly-Sheets, but the pamphlets were read and known under their own titles.

67 Carr, p. 124.
pamphlet, Palmerston: What Has He Done. At that time Tucker was also acquainted with Urquhart, being employed to reprint Urquhart's Progress of Russia. Tucker thought that Urquhart better understood contemporary events, so he continued to reprint selections of his letters, which were appearing daily in the press. With this material he continued his fly-sheets. Recent Events in the East was the first reprint in pamphlet form of his letters printed in The Morning Advertiser during 1853, and it was published in April 1854. It included Urquhart's letter to the Circassians, and a selection of resolutions of public meetings which were specimens of what was discussed in some fifty or sixty meetings throughout England. Tucker also printed The Political Testament of Lord Ponsonby. It exhibited England's actions toward Turkey for the past sixty years. Urquhart agreed with its content, and possibly even helped compose it. Other publications by Tucker of Urquhart's ideas were England's Part in Turkey's Fall; The War for Russia, Not against Russia; The Spider and the Fly; The Words of Palmerston; Louis Napoleon,—Russia—Circassia; The Invasion of the Crimea; Urquhart for Premier; and The Home Face of the Four Points. By 1855 pamphlets became one of the principal means that Urquhart employed to place his protests on record, and bring his knowledge within the reach of everyone.


69. Harriet Urquhart is the author of The Words of Lord Palmerston.

70. On pages five and six of The Spider and the Fly, Urquhart said that in some of the letters he had written at the end of September of 1854 he had been accurate in his prediction of events. After he had written the letters the journals that were accustomed to publishing them would not longer do so, and he was forced to publish them in pamphlet form.
After the war an article in The Manchester Guardian expressed interest and praise of the efforts that were made to inspire the middle classes to take an active interest in foreign affairs. The author regretted that this enthusiasm was involved with David Urquhart's "wild fancies and personal resentments." In order that the movement should have any lasting success, these organizations had to free themselves from the taint of their association with Urquhart and pursue lines of independent inquiry with the help of tried, true, and respected representatives of their cause. Eighteen fifty-six had not found many of these organizations pursuing truth and working out their own conclusions, but acting blindly in the service of foregone conclusions imposed upon them from a person whom most significant persons had judged as malevolent or insane. None of the ideas and notions that these organizations entertained would have arisen independently in the minds of the members. Only a "mountebank" like David Urquhart could have inspired them to conceive of treason in the cabinet and collusion in the war, of a paralyzed Parliament, of a corrupted press, and of a vast conspiracy to hand Europe over to the Czars. 71

CHAPTER VI

KARL MARX, DAVID URQUARDT AND
THE FREE PRESS

It seems incongruous at first sight that two men as different as Karl Marx and David Urquardt should have had any ground for common thought or action. Since the points of contrast were more numerous than the points of agreement, it is paradoxical that Marx should have even temporarily and in a limited field sought the inspiration and guidance of Urquhart. Both detested Palmerston and the English bourgeoisie. That a native Englishman would accuse an English statesman of venality and treason gave Marx great satisfaction. Both detested Russia. Marx in apparent agreement with Urquhart thought that Russia's traditional policy of aggression had to be opposed, and she definitely had to be kept out of Turkey. But on the other hand he differed with Urquhart as to the state of Turkey. To Urquhart Turkey would have been able to resist Russia if she had only been left alone, but Marx thought that the Ottoman Empire had to be reconstructed and the

1Marx was not the only German of importance who acknowledged his indebtedness to Urquhart. Lothair Bucher, a friend of Lasalle and Bismarck, thought highly of Urquhart and profited by Urquhart's knowledge of diplomacy. Gertrude Robinson, David Urquhart (Oxford, 1920), pp. 130-133.


status quo had to be changed. As far as Marx was concerned the Western governments were almost as reactionary as Russia and certainly were too impotent and timid to bring into existence a Greek empire or federal republic of Slavonic states. 4

Marx like Urquhart thought that the objects of Russia's foreign policy and her manner of pursuance could be determined from the ample testimony recorded in the pages of history. In relation to the Eastern Question Marx felt that there was "no transaction, no official note, which does not bear the stamp of quotation from known pages of history." 5 He traced Russian policy back to that of Peter the Great and thought that the undeniable success of this announced and hereditary policy proved the weakness of the Western powers and Russia's inherent barbarism. 6 As the basic motive for Russian expansion southward he saw her economic and military need for access to the Mediterranean. Therefore the Czar's policy toward Turkey was one of separating "one after another, the remotest members of the Ottoman Empire from its main body, till at last Constantinople the heart, must cease to beat." But in the years just prior to 1853 these Russian designs were endangered by the apparent improvement of Turkish government. So the Czar "counting on the cowardice and apprehensions of the Western Powers, ... bullies Europe, and pushes his demands as far as possible, in order to appear magnanimous afterwards, by contenting himself with what he immediately

4 *New York Tribune*, August 5, 1853; Marx, pp. 71-75.
5 *New York Tribune*, August 12, 1853; Marx, p. 78.
6 *New York Tribune*, August 12, 1853; Marx, p. 80.
In the spring of 1853 Charles Dana, the foreign editor of The New York Tribune, asked Karl Marx to write some articles on the Eastern Question. Marx confessed to Engels that he knew little about the problem, since it was essentially geographical and military. At this time he did not think that the Eastern Question would ever be the starting point of a European war, an idea, that he soon would change. But would not Engels help him produce another article for The Tribune? Engels apparently had also been concerned about the problems in the Near East, and having read some of Urquhart's writings, hinted that Marx do likewise. In studying the voluminous writings of Urquhart, Marx soon realized that far more could be made of the Eastern Question than he had first perceived. Meanwhile Engels, who had recently perfected his knowledge of Slavic language and military science, prepared five articles for Marx, in which he reviewed the antecedents of the question. Attempting to be non-committal Engels criticized The Times for supporting Russia, and The Daily News for supporting Turkey. Marx thought that they were quite excellent and forwarded them to The Tribune as his own.

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7 New York Tribune, August 5, 1853; Marx, p. 74.
8 Carr, pp. 120-121.
9 Engels to Weydemeyer, April 12, 1853, Karl Marx and Friederich Engels, Karl Marx and Friederich Engels on Britain (Moscow, 1953).
10 Carr, p. 121.
12 Carr, p. 121. According to P. W. Blackstock and B. F. Hoselitz, the editors of The Russian Menace to Europe, Marx's first article was published
From June, 1853 onwards Marx began to write the articles on the Eastern Question himself. Throughout the summer Turkey and Russia seemed to be inevitably stumbling toward war. The influence of Urquhart became increasingly apparent as Marx sent article after article to The Tribune. He lashed out against The Times' cowardly advocacy of England becoming a defensive ally of Turkey, but yet not a belligerent against Russia. He thought that this was a "tortuous and cowardly system" of The Times, and nothing less than "an incredible combination of all the contradictions, subterfuges, false pretenses, anxieties and lâcher de of Lord Aberdeen's policy." And Aberdeen's policy was nothing less than one of connivance, and it was this policy that allowed Russia to be so bold.

More than once Marx mentioned Urquhart's name respectfully. He praised Urquhart's role in lambasting the reputation of Lord Palmerston and predicted that Urquhart's opinion would be confirmed in the future. But he never said that he perfectly agreed with Urquhart's position on England, Russia or the Eastern Question. In fact, in response to a cholera scare which

The author, however, was not Marx but Engels. Likewise, with the article of April 19 of which the editors state Marx ridiculed Urquhart's position on Turkey, we must conclude that since Engels was the author that it was essentially he who ridiculed Urquhart's views. Also after the middle of 1853 The Tribune took the liberty of taking sections of Marx's articles and printing them anonymously as leaders with or without his permission (Carr, p. 130). Blackstock and Boselitz were apparently unaware of this.

13 Carr, p. 123.
14 New York Tribune, July 8, 1853; Marx, pp. 44-45.
15 New York Tribune, July 1, 1853; Marx, pp. 40-47.
16 New York Tribune, January 10, 1854; Marx, p. 213.
brought about the Epidemic Disease Act, Marx stated that "if I shared the opinions of Mr. Urquhart I should say that the Czar had despatched the cholera morbus to England with the 'Secret mission' to break down the last remnant of what is called the Anglo-Saxon spirit." And he criticized Urquhart's statement that the penal laws of England had to be exercised so that the English traitors (Aberdeen, Clarendon, Palmerston, and Russell) could be prosecuted as "good for nothing." For who would judge these English statesmen, but "the stockjobbers" and "peace-mongering bourgeoisie," those "infamous adorers of the golden calf," whom they represented, and who also were surrendering Europe to Russia.

That autumn Marx composed his articles on the career of Lord Palmerston which were later printed by Tucker. They appeared, at first, both in The Tribune and in The People's Paper, and were almost exclusively derived from Urquhart's pamphlets. In writing to Engels on November 2, 1853 we find Marx telling him that after following the career of Palmerston through twenty years he had come to the same conclusion as that "monomaniac Urquhart" that Palmerston had been sold to Russia for several decades. Later, he made the discovery that the word "honour" did not exist in the Russian

17 New York Tribune, October 7, 1853; Marx, p. 140.
18 New York Tribune, October 4, 1853; Marx, p. 132.
19 Tucker was so pleased with his successful fly-sheets that he advertised the publication of The Political Autobiography of Lord Palmerston by Karl Marx. It was to be printed only if five hundred subscribers at the price of a shilling could be signed up in advance. It proved impossible to find this number.
20 Marx to Engels, November 2, 1853, Der Briefwechsel zwischen Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx, trans. A. Bebel and E. Bernstein (Stuttgart, 1919), I, 443.
vocabulary, and in this same article he acknowledged his indebtedness to Urquhart: "This is a fitting occasion to give his due to Mr. David Urquhart the indefatigable antagonist for twenty years of Lord Palmerston, to whom he proved a real antagonist—one not to be intimidated into silence, bribed into connivance, charmed into servitude; while, what with cajoleries, what with seductions, Palmerston contrived to change all other foes into friends." 21 Marx never gave another Englishman a finer tribute, and certainly to only a few other Europeans. 22

The first article that Marx wrote on Palmerston was entitled "Palmerston and Russia," and the second, "Palmerston, What Has He Done." In these and other articles on Lord Palmerston Marx did not go as far as Urquhart and charge that Palmerston was in the pay of Russia. But probably equally as damaging was his statement that Palmerston had been the willing tool of Nicholas I for twenty years. This was the only time in his career during which Marx took part in a major controversy affecting English domestic politics. During this period only these articles of all his writings were read in contemporary England. 23 When Marx leveled his guns at the British government he was not only agreeing with Urquhart, but must also have spoken the language that Horace Greeley liked to hear. Lord John Russell he described as "that diminutive earthman." 24 Palmerston was that "Quixote of

21 Carr, p. 123.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 124.
24 New York Tribune, September 2, 1853; Marx, p. 103.
'free institutions' and that Pindar of the 'glories' of the constitutional system." The Prince Consort had "devoted his time partly to fattening pigs, to inventing ridiculous hats for the army, to planning model lodging-houses of a peculiarly transparent and uncomfortable kind," and besides having a below average intelligence, was also "a prolific father, and an obsequious husband." 26

In the beginning of 1851 The Sheffield Free Press was established. 27 It apparently was not until the winter of 1854 that Urquhart actively joined Isaac Ironside 28 and the group publishing the paper to spread his views. 29 Ironside and Urquhart must have worked rather well together, for in their similar interests they eagerly crusaded against Palmerston, Clarendon, and other prominent Whig statesmen as agents in the pay of Russia. 30 The paper campaigned for the reform of local government, regional government along the lines advocated by Toulmin Smith, 31 and the abolition of the newspaper tax or, as they called it, "taxes on knowledge." The very people who were some of the chief contributors to the columns of The Free Press—Holyoake,

25 New York Tribune, October 19, 1853; Marx and Engels, Britain, p. 396.
26 New York Tribune, February 11, 1854; Marx, Question, pp. 228-229.
27 Free Press, September 6, 1856, p. 32.
28 Ironside was a Sheffield industrialist who was mainly responsible for the organization of the Central Democratic Party in that city.
30 Ibid., p. 476.
31 Toulmin Smith is not listed in the DNB.
Collet, and Ironside—were also the leaders of a National Association for the Repeal of Taxes on Knowledge. 32

One of the most important contributors to The Free Press was Karl Marx. 33 Some of his articles on Palmerston were reprinted in it. Urquhart read them and was apparently quite pleased. As a token of his appreciation Urquhart sent to Marx in January of 1854 one of his speeches. With the addition of an introduction and a conclusion Marx sent it as one of his own articles to The Tribune. 34

In February of 1854, Marx and Urquhart met for the first time. Urquhart made the mistake of trying to impress Marx with the same methods that he used on others. The meeting certainly did not have a favorable effect on Marx. In fact, as a result of this meeting Marx lost his enthusiasm for Urquhart. Marx told him that they agreed only on the subject of Palmerston. 35 Continuing in this scepticism he later commented in The Tribune on June 24, 1854 that since "Urquhart is strictly opposed to the only party prepared to overthrow the rotten Parliamentary basis on which the Coalition Government of the oligarchy rests, all his speeches are as much to the purpose as if they were addressed to the clouds." 36 Marx in writing to Lassale

32 Armytage, p. 479.

33 At this time Marx was thirty-six years old, and living in appalling poverty on Dean Street, Soho.

34 Carr, p. 124.


36 Marx, Question, p. 373.
around February, 1854 described Urquhart as a kind of a romantic reaction-
ary. 37

The Globe launched a vigorous attack against Urquhart in April of 1854,
scorning at the short fidelity of his adherents. This attack was promptly
rebutted in The Morning Advertiser by an Urquhartite who used Mr. Marx as an
example of a faithful and energetic supporter. But Karl Marx found it dif-
ficult to publicly disavow Urquhart, because Urquhart had another follower
named Francis Marx who, if there were such a disclaimer, would claim to be
the one mentioned in The Morning Advertiser. Marx kept quiet, but mainly
because he found that it would be financially inconvenient to sever his con-
nections with Urquhart. But Urquhart's financial help did prove to be quite
limited. Nevertheless, with the outbreak of the war and Urquhart's subse-
quent campaign against secret diplomacy, and his work in setting up the
foreign affairs committees with the help of prominent Chartists, Marx was
inclined to continue his support of Urquhart's work. 38

The Free Press brought much attention to Urquhart's attacks against
secret diplomacy and Marx's rather long and detailed articles. In fact,
Ironside, the London editor during 1854, thought that Marx was burying the
paper beneath masses of information. Since he was committed to the success
of the newspaper, he complained to William Cyples, the Sheffield editor and
secretary of the Sheffield foreign affairs committee. Cyples undiplomati-
cally conveyed Ironside's thoughts to Marx. At this Marx became greatly

37 Carr, p. 126.
38 Ibid., pp. 126-127.
irritated with both Ironside's observations and Cyples' tactlessness, and replied to Cyples, saying, "I positively decline to make myself guilty of manslaughter by administering another 'dose' to Mr. Isaac Ironside and 'entombing' him in the sheets of his own paper." As the prospect of losing the powerful pen of Karl Marx alarmed Urquhart, he sent C. D. Collet to pacify Marx by promising more regular payments for his articles and stating that The Free Press would soon become a London publication. Marx retracted his refusal, but soothed his wounded pride by telling Engels that "Money is the only interesting point for me in my intercourse with these calibans." 39

Owing to the repeal of the newspaper stamp duties on June 15, 1855, The Sheffield Free Press was first issued as a national publication on October 13, 1855. From this time until 1866 the local part of the title was dropped and it was called The Free Press. 40 This did not prevent it from giving a certain amount of local news, especially the weekly reporting of Tuesday meetings of the Sheffield foreign affairs committee. 41 The paper was now mainly intended to spread Mr. Urquhart's ideas. Urquhart and his wife wrote many of the articles. It certainly was not difficult to gather material for the initial issues, for there were stores of accumulated articles ready for printing. From 1855 to 1877 both Urquhart and his wife wrote


40 There is a slight discrepancy between Bishop and Armytage. Bishop states that this national publication was founded in September of 1855. In 1866 the title was changed to The Diplomatic Review.

41 Armytage, p. 475.
the greater part of the leaders and summaries of events. Other familiar figures, such as W. Cyples, C. D. Collet, G. J. Holyoake, and Karl Marx, also wrote for its columns. Many times the articles that Engels wrote for Marx were simply reprinted from The New York Tribune. Marx's articles on the fall of Karl were reprinted in summary form and created a sensation. A special vote of thanks was given to Marx by the Sheffield foreign affairs committee for "the great public service" he had rendered "by such a remarkable expose." Bishop feels that the paper was caviar for the general public, and that while influencing a chosen few who read it intelligently and without prejudice, it probably was too serious to have had an extensive circulation. But it is an interesting fact that the paper had many readers abroad.

On December 22, 1855 The Free Press announced that it was going to devote a considerable portion of its pages to subjects of permanent interest. These articles, it stated would later be reprinted in serials so as to form in time a diplomatic library for public instruction. The paper was obviously not intended as merely a newsheet. On the contrary, it was to provide explanations of the causes of events and an exposition of the principles that guided the actions of the participants. Some of the serials or supplements that were ready for publication and others that were in preparation were "The Nation Cheated Out of Its Food;" "The Principalities of the

42 Maria C. Bishop, Memoir of Mrs. Urouhart (London, 1897), p. 73.
43 Armytage, p. 476.
44 Bishop, pp. 138-139.

The publication of The Free Press was commenced in London on August 16, 1855. This move was made to facilitate circulation and distribution, and also to lower the price so that the workers for whom it was designed could better afford it.46 It seems that with the move to London Ironside had considerably less, if any, influence over the paper. It was by this time essentially under the direction of Urquhart. The Free Press now claimed to favor no politicians, class, or interest. It intended to judge public acts according to the law of the land and of nature, and with a perfect knowledge of the circumstances. It was to address a nation that had forgotten its laws. It did not propose to teach anything new, but only what had been forgotten by the nation. Public opinion was to be ignored; the paper intended to appeal to private judgment, so as to restore the right use of reason, which would be required to rescue England from immediate crises and to save her decaying institutions. It was therefore dedicated to the restoration of the Crown's prerogatives in appointing the important officers of state; the restoration to the Privy Council of the functions of government; the

46 Ibid., August 16, 1855, p. 4.
restoration of solemnity to international intercourse by the abolition of permanent embassies; the restoration of impeachment; and the restoration of the power of the purse to the people in their separate counties and boroughs. It was also with the first London issue that the series of articles comprising Karl Marx's "Revelations of the Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century" began. This series explained in detail the expansion of Russia since the time of Peter the Great.

On September 27, 1856, there began in the supplements of The Free Press Mrs. Urquhart's analysis of the investigation conducted by Roeckuck's committee in 1855 and of passages from the correspondents of The Times and The Morning Herald. It was entitled The Story of the War by Caritas. Later in 1857 it was published in pamphlet form. Essentially, it sums up the chief facts and mysteries of the Crimean expedition. Mrs. Urquhart claimed that the mass of details shrouding the testimony gathered by the Roeckuck committee, clouded the public's understanding. Most people probably read the committee's findings as news and discussed them as gossip. Few shortly afterwards recollected what had happened, or were able to perceive the ends which were intended.

Mrs. Urquhart protested to C. D. Collet, the editor of The Free Press, when he took upon himself the liberty of making some changes in her first installment of "The Story of the War." She was afraid that his uncited

47 Ibid.
48 Free Press, September 27, 1856, supplement.
additions would destroy the reader's confidence in her. In dealing with such a subject, she thought it was of supreme importance that the reader have complete confidence in the calmness, deliberation, and accuracy of the author. She even threatened to stop future installments if he would not print her protest, and stop interpolating and arranging her material into chapters. 50

One month later David Urquhart wrote a letter to the editor expressing his interest in the supplements concerned with his wife's analysis of the war. He seems to give the impression that he did not know the author. "The Story of the War," he thought, was probably the best means by which the English people could be made conscious of what happened in the Crimean War, so that they could avoid its consequences. 51

After the spring of 1857 the signature of Karl Marx never again appeared on the pages of The Free Press. Though he kept up intermittent relations with Urquhart, the end of the war and the resultant hollow ring of their attacks on Palmerston for all practical purposes put an end to their association. 52 Although twenty years later when any relation between them had ceased Marx still could be found denouncing the supineness of English policy toward Russia in the tradition he had learned from Urquhart. 53

50 Free Press, October 11, 1856, p. 68. Gertrude Robinson in David Urquhart on page 319 states that Collet Dobson Collet was the editor of The Free Press from 1856 to 1866.

51 Free Press, November 8, 1856, p. 100.

52 Carr, p. 127.

53 Ibid., p. 123.
CHAPTER VII

THE CRIMEA

As the war gathered momentum and The Times clamored for the siege of Sebastopol, Urquhart thought that neither a campaign in the Crimea nor the destruction of the Russian fleet would have any real effect upon the result of the war. The course of the war had actually spared the Russians in the Danube and the Phasis from any hostile action by the allies. Urquhart thought that by bringing the forces of the allies to bear on the Crimea, Russia would be relieved of their employment against her in the Principalities. As soon as the English troops entered and secured possession of that exposed province, they would be placed on the defensive, because they must hold the ground against Russia. The fifty thousand men of the allied armie would then be absolutely isolated; cut off by the marshes of the Azof and the steppes of the Black Sea from the Circassians to their left, the Cossacks in the rear, and the Poles and Hungarians to their right. England's difficulties would just begin once she had captured the Crimea.¹

Urquhart had never claimed the traits of the practical English politician in being able to secure votes in Parliament. He did, however, claim to know the countries in which the English were fighting much better than most of the men in the government who had never ventured from England's shores.

¹David Urquhart, Spider and the Fly (London, 1855), pp. 22-23.
Not only had Urquhart travelled through these areas, but he felt that he also had mastered the same process through which the servants of the Emperor of Russia acquired their knowledge. English ministers might perceive their errors of judgment after the event had occurred, but Urquhart felt that only a person in his position could tell in advance what the servants of Russia intended to do. And in this context he claimed that it was the servants of Russia who had planned the invasion of the Crimea, over which Russia was quite jubilant.²

Urquhart had complained since the beginning of the war that the conditions laid down by the allies for its conduct were utterly absurd, especially the condition that prohibited any conquest. Why then, he asked, should there be a Crimean expedition at all? That it was for the defense of Constantinople or Turkey was absurd, because the Turks had already defeated the Russians in the Principalities, which left the Russians unable to attack Constantinople by land. Why should not the expedition to the Crimea be justified with the object of diminishing Russia's aggressive power, her Black Sea fleet, which she might use against Turkey at some future date? As far as Urquhart was concerned such a view of the Russian fleet was quite erroneous, because the fleet he knew to be decrepit. But the nation and Europe had gradually been brought to believe that Constantinople was in danger from Sebastopol in that its fortress protected the fleet. The government even issued a statement explaining its reasons for the expedition, and therein conveyed to the nation only the naval implications of the operations. This

²Ibid., pp. 6, 7.
first ministerial announcement of the expedition was made by Lord Granville, President of the Council, at a Staffordshire yeomanry dinner where he expressed himself in these terms:

The Government does not conceal from themselves the great responsibility of their urging on the commanders of both services the attack on Sebastopol. They are not ignorant of the opinion entertained by many distinguished officers of every country of Europe, that, if not impracticable, the attempt is of a very difficult nature. But they feel that the integrity and independence of Turkey is a mere joke so long as that fortress is deemed impregnable situated as it is in the very centre of the Black Sea (!) as the only point from which vessels can come in and go out with safety(!!) they felt it was the very key of the position. ³

But if it was the intention of the British Government to diminish the aggressive means of Russia, Urquhart thought, it never would have considered the vessels lying in Sebastopol, because they were not a source of danger. If the government did not intend to destroy the aggressive means of Russia, then the instructions to Lord Raglan and the articles of The Times were, he concluded, only pretexts to get the English army into the Crimea. ⁴ In an honest war the invasion would have been sheer folly, and only sensible in a collusive war, because it was not a position from which England could operate against the interior of Russia. He pointed out that while invading the Crimea England neglected attacks on more vulnerable points as Odessa where


⁴Ibid., pp. 65–67. The supplement of August 25, 1855 expressed some of the same views that were later expressed in the *Story of the War*. Mr. Urquhart alludes to the report of the Sebastopol Committee, and knew that information current in the newspapers. Because of this it is assumed that the opinions expressed by his wife in the *Story* were already in existence in 1855. Because he undoubtedly helped her prepare this pamphlet, her views will be considered as reflections of his.
she could have fatally injured Russia. 5 Since the expedition was undertaken neither for the purpose of breaking up Russia's power at home nor of reducing her to a political nullity in international affairs, but rather was undertaken with a view to negotiation, Urquhart thought it was launched under pretense. Not only did these military actions manifest collusion, but so did the reasons assumed for the operation, namely, that the Turks were unable to cope with the Russians at home, and that the Crimea was or contained the center of Russian power. Urquhart considered these to be false premises. And so he concluded that since the expedition was launched on false premises, it therefore was incapable of being successful. 6 The invasion tested the sincerity of the government's prosecution of the war, and the government was therefore found, in his judgment, to be guilty of collusion.

In the pamphlet, Spider and the Fly, he predicted that the war would be proved a collusive one, if what was gained in the Crimea was afterwards surrendered, and no indemnity was required of Russia. 7 This surrender ironically took place, because shortly after the war the forts destroyed by the allies were repaired and soon occupied by the Russians. Furthermore, no indemnity was required from Russia. Without doubt this proved to Urquhart that the English government was insincere in its prosecution of the Crimean War. The invasion of the Crimea was not dangerous to Russia, and certainly

5 Urquhart, Spider, pp. 4, 5.
6 Ibid., p. 3.
7 Ibid., pp. 4, 5.
was detrimental to Turkey.  

If, as popular opinion believed, the Crimea menaced the Ottoman Empire that menace he thought ended when the allied fleets entered into the Euxine. This eliminated any possible danger to Turkey, and also enabled the allies to attack the Russian armies from the rear. Odessa was the more important port, because it was from this port and not from Sebastopol that the Russian forces in all former wars had been despatched. England should therefore have attacked Odessa to capture the Russian armies, Urquhart believed, and then imposed penalties on Russia. Once Odessa was taken, the trade of much of Russia would have been strangled, and through the consequent pressure which would have been imposed upon Russian landlords, merchants, and finally the Czar the war would have ended quickly and inexpensively.  

The fact of the matter was that Russian commerce was not being destroyed by the war, and was actually protected by the Order-in-Council of March, 1854. The Russian ports of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azof as late as August of 1855 were not blockaded, while the Bosphorus and the Danube were closed by this legal means. In this way, Urquhart reasoned, the English government was furnishing Russia with the pecuniary means to carry on the war. The blockade of the Danube was therefore intended to impoverish the Principalities and to restrict England's supply of grain from them while the ports in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azof were left free to furnish reinforcements, ammunition, and provisions to the Russian troops in the

8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid., p. 3.
A blockade of the Black Sea, however, had actually been ordered, but political circumstances were given by the Duke of Newcastle as the principal reasons why it was not being enforced. The government and not the admirals was chiefly responsible for the order not being fulfilled. The Duke of Newcastle testified that "difficulties arose at the seat of the war of a political character, not connected with any disobedience on the part of the admiral of our fleet." Although Admiral Dundas was ordered to blockade the Russian ports, they were still open to merchantmen. Even small groups of the Russian fleet went in and out of Sebastopol. Admiral Dundas was "surprised that more did not come; if they had been an enterprising enemy they would have come out."

Shortly after the allies came to Varna, a blockade, or rather the appearance of a blockade, was raised. But beyond having a war-steamer pass Sebastopol once a week or so, the English left the Russians to themselves.


11 In commenting on the testimony of Sir James Graham and Admiral Dundas before the Sebastopol Committee Harriet Urquhart thought it possible that Admiral Dundas was never really ordered to blockade, and in the committee hearings was made the "scape-goat" of the ministry. Story of the War, pp. 35-37.

12 Harriet Urquhart, p. 31.

13 Ibid., p. 32.

14 Ibid. The Morning Herald’s correspondent reported that three transports sent from Sebastopol to Nicholasoff for timber arrived safely. The Vladimir made seven voyages in the Black Sea after the declaration of war, and captured small Turkish vessels on the coast of Asia Minor. He continued, "In the beginning of July four sail of the line, with two or three frigates and steamers, quitted the harbor, and cruised for two or three days off Sebastopol, out of sight of land." One of these floated undisturbed in the sight of an allied ship.
At Odessa no signs of a blockade were visible. Some vessels were loading there, and many more were expected to arrive since the British embassy at Constantinople had assured the masters of trading-ships that they might visit any of the Russian ports on the Black Sea or the Sea of Azof without being molested. ¹⁵

For the explanation of such strange actions Urquhart looked to the economic motives that Russia had for starting the war. As he saw it, the main reason that Russia invaded the Principalities and brought about the war was to stop the decline of her own trade. ¹⁶ Before the war he had shown that the Russian grain trade was being replaced by the Turkish. But, he also realized that there was an increase in the Russian trade after 1851. The export of wheat from Odessa and the Black Sea in 1851 was 800,000 quarters; in 1852, the trouble then beginning, 1,400,000 quarters; in 1853, the Russians having crossed the Pruth, 3,160,507 quarters. But these figures, after all, do not give a complete idea of the total increase that occurred. To that number must be added 1,500,000 quarters of grain in the Principalities which were ready for shipment to England. Even though this was only a portion of the grain export, the Russian armies consumed that amount during their occupation. While this grain was prevented from reaching England, Russia had the opportunity of selling England 2,300,000 quarters more than she had done in 1851. The total amount consumed by her armies in the


¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 3. Information is in a quote from the *Aegemeine Zeitung*.
provinces amounted to approximately 2,500,000 which made the invasion quite a profitable venture. On the other hand the cost of this invasion to England due to the rise in the price of bread was about £25,000,000 which netted Russia another £6,000,000. The amount of linseed oil exported from Russia actually increased during the war: during the financial year ending May of 1853 it was 6,500 quarters; during the year ending May of 1854 it was 10,906 quarters; and during the year ending May of 1855 it was 41,440 quarters. Actually, the total imports from Russia during the war far exceeded the exports to her. The main significance of the blockade then was in its failure to restrict the trade of Russia.

In September of 1854 Urquhart saw Englishmen confronted by three major questions: was it necessary to send an expedition to the Crimea to humble Russia? would the taking of the Crimea humble Russia? and what was Russia's object in making England attack her in the Crimea? It was unnecessary, he thought, to send an expedition to the Crimea to humble Russia, because she had already been humbled by Turkey in the Principalities. In fact, an invasion was not even worth discussion, because England had not threatened Russia before she had invaded the Principalities, nor had she resisted Russia when Russia occupied those provinces. In fact, England had avoided every act that savored of war. To humble Russia was indeed a very simple operation for an English minister, because Russia had been made by England in the past two centuries. If England once withdrew her sustaining hand

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17Ibid., pp. 3, 4. Urquhart cited the circulars of Messrs. Charles and Smith as his sources for this information.
Russia would immediately crumble. Urquhart thought that many means were at
the disposal of an English minister. Among others he could have backed Tur-
key from the beginning. He could have let war itself destroy Russian com-
merce. These measures, Urquhart maintained, had to be adopted by a govern-
ment really at war with Russia. And since they were not, he concluded,
there was no intention of defeating Russia. If the English government was
not using its power to crush Russia, then it was using it to protect Russia;
and an expedition to the Crimea could only have been undertaken with the
view of humbling Turkey. 18

The state of military preparedness at Sebastopol up to 1852 was nothing
for the allies to fear. The fortifications were till that time generally
neglected. In 1852 in contemplation of the war the fortifications were re-
paired and extended. Urquhart realized that this would take many years to
complete, and if not completed the fortifications would be utterly useless.
To prepare Sebastopol to withstand a siege would have required a line of
complicated fortifications running along the heights surrounding the bay
with detached forts for the culminating points beyond. This would have in-
volved great expenditures, and an army of some two hundred thousand men for
an adequate defense. The truth of the matter was that the work was not com-
pleted, and that few defenders were there. 19

Laurence Oliphant, who reported in 1853 on the condition of Sebastopol,
corroborated Urquhart's view of the poor condition of that fortress.

18 Urquhart, Spider, pp. 9-10.
19 Ibid., p. 21.
Oliphant admitted that Sebastopol appeared formidable when viewed from the sea, and any fleet would have been commanded by its twelve hundred pieces of artillery. But these were not, however, formidable obstacles to, or protection for Sebastopol, because upon firing the batteries the rotten and poorly constructed placements crumbled. Oliphant was informed that the rooms in which the guns were fired were so narrow and ill-ventilated that the artillerymen would have inevitably been stifled had they attempted to fire their pieces. The Russians were furthermore crippled by the apparently wholesale corruption that so undermined the navy. The mortality rate of the Russian army in the Caucasus Oliphant estimated at twenty thousand annually.

All of this led him to conclude that the Russian army was really most inefficient and scarcely worthy of that exaggerated estimate which the British public had formed of its capabilities. 20

A Polish officer, a Captain Hodasevitch, who had deserted to the British, also sheds some interesting light on the conditions inside the fortress. He stated that Fort Severnaya was useless, and that Major-General Pavlovsky, who had charge of the fortifications of Sebastopol, proposed to destroy Severnaya. The citadel of this north fort was in a state of neglect and not a single gun was mounted. In the whole of the north fort there were no more than eight guns, and these were in a very dilapidated condition. The only remarkable thing about the fort was that it had a four-thousand-foot subterranean passage from the citadel to the Soukhaya Salka. He

further stated that up to August 27 (probably 1854) some additions were made to the fortifications of the town; the full number of guns had been placed on the lower first tier of Fort St. Nicholas; at every second, third, or fourth embrasure on the second tier depending on the side; and on the third tier it was considered too dangerous to place more than a few. Then every third gun was fired for practice the whole fort shook, stones fell, and embrasures were ruined. Considering that the walls were only faced with stone, and the space between them was filled with rubbish, this was quite natural. 21

Even if the town was fortified, what reason was there, Urquhart thought, to attack Sebastopol when it was the fleet, the contents of the harbor, that England was ostensibly after. No one, apparently, had observed that the Russian fleet was not protected by Sebastopol. To destroy the vessels there was no reason to take the city. All that was needed, he thought, to accomplish this mission was six mortars, or six Paixhans guns for horizontal shells and red-hot shot. Once a position on one of the western hills was secured, the ships could be sunk right in the harbor. If they left the harbor the allied fleet could catch them. The Russian fleet simply could not escape destruction. 22

Contrary to prevalent opinion the Russian fleet had done very little in the Crimean War up to the time of the invasion of the Crimea. Russia wished Englishmen to believe that her fleet was important, and because she took pains to influence English minds to think so, Urquhart felt the opposite

21 Harriet Urquhart, p. 79.
22 Urquhart, Spider, p. 22.
was true. The Sinope affair had not been so great an exploit as many Englishmen were disposed to believe. But Sinope had achieved its intended result: the entrance of the English squadrons into the Black Sea and Russia's entrance into the war. Back in 1833 the Black Sea squadron suddenly appeared at Constantinople with an army, but that, Urquhart felt, was only through collusion with an English minister. Unkia Skellessi soon followed and was considered the death blow of Turkey. But out of the ashes of that funeral pyre, and notwithstanding the daily menace of the Russian fleet, Turkey restored her army and her fleet. She had so recovered her power that she was on two occasions able successfully to defy a joint menace of Austria and Prussia, and at a later period to compel Russia to withdraw her forces from the same Danubian Provinces which they occupied in 1854. So it was not true that the Black Sea fleet menaced Turkey, because for twenty years that fleet had never been employed. On the other hand it did bring about the restoration of Turkish power by its very presence, because it disturbed the lethargy of the Turkish Empire. 23

But what of the physical condition of that supposed bugbear of Turkey? Laurence Oliphant described most of the thirteen ships of the line he saw anchored in the harbor as in poor condition, because after ten years their timbers of improperly seasoned fir or pinewood were perfectly rotten. There also abounded in these muddy waters a worm that constantly decayed the wood, cost the Russian government thousands of rubles, and was one of the most serious obstacles to the formation of an efficient navy on the Black

23 Ibid., pp. 23, 24.
Besides, the Russian navy was plagued by an elaborate system of plunder of its funds, because of the low pay. Many of the ships were not seaworthy, and probably only two of all the ships were in condition to undertake a strenuous voyage around the Cape.

The Russian fleet had therefore long ceased to be a means of overawing Turkey. Turkey was already far beyond the reach of Russia's physical blows. But it also was well known when the English fleet left the shores of England as well as when it cruised in the Black Sea that the Russian ships would take refuge in the harbor where they were protected from a seaward attack. Under these circumstances the display of the allied fleet, Urquhart thought, was absolutely useless. Not only was the Russian fleet a pretext to get the English fleet into the Black Sea, but also to bring the armies to the shores of the Crimea.

If Russia had intended to use the fleet for aggressive purposes, it would have been the fleet that she would have strengthened and not the fortifications of Sebastopol. Between 1828 and 1853, however, not a single line-of-battle ship was added to the squadron of Russia in the Black Sea. If Constantinople was the intended prey of a Russian expedition, then Russia would have expended her resources on new vessels. But Russia apparently

24 Oliphant, p. 255.
25 Ibid., p. 256.
26 Ibid., p. 257.
28 Harriet Urquhart, p. 74.
had defensive tactics in mind in preparing for the defense of Sebastopol.

It certainly was not being protected against the Turks, for if Russia had apprehended an attack from Turkey she would have fortified Odessa. If Russia feared a real attack from England and France, she also would have fortified that city; but since, as Urquhart saw it, Russia knew that they would not, she fortified Sebastopol.

The decision to invade the Crimea can be described as an "after-thought." When The Times announced it on August 5, 1854, most people did not believe that it was true. The nation, it must be remembered, had been so indoctrinated that Russia was invulnerable and Sebastopol impregnable, that many considered the difficulties of the expedition insurmountable. By these means, Urquhart thought, the belief was gradually established that to invade the Crimea was to strike a serious blow against Russia. The nation finally accepted the Crimean expedition as a grand military exploit, and as evidence of ministerial integrity in the light of the long friendship between the English and Russian governments. The season in which the expedition was undertaken also supports the idea that the expedition was an "after-thought." It was initially proposed and discussed with the military authorities during the month of March, and then set aside on the grounds that it was of no value as a military operation. During the summer it was decided to invade the Crimea. But the same negative conditions and prospects existed in August as well as in March of 1854 to prevent

the expedition. But why then was it decided upon in August? The only reason that Urquhart saw possible was that some new motive or combination had arisen. Something had to be done to satisfy the anxiety of the public, and the dissatisfaction of the Queen. There had to be a delay to make Europe believe that the Crimea really was the center of strength, and so the allies could take the negotiations for peace out of the hands of the Turks.\textsuperscript{31}

Urquhart believed that another fact which proved the expedition an "after-thought" was the government's statement that it was the original design of the war. Here Urquhart formed the government's statements into a law of procedure for he says "It would be unworthy of the position of the Government to state what was true. Its only object in speech is falsehood."\textsuperscript{32} To his readers this statement must have seemed preposterous. It was one thing to point out instances of false government statements or even acts of collusion, but such a condemnation was apparently irresponsible.

Count Pozzo di Borgo\textsuperscript{33} had prophesied as early as 1828 that if England and Russia were ever at war, England would direct her attack against Sebastopol.\textsuperscript{34} When an advance copy of Laurence Oliphant's book, \textit{The Russian Shores of the Black Sea}, was sent to The Times office for review in 1853

\begin{footnotes}
\item[31]\textit{Ibid.}, p. 20.
\item[32]\textit{Ibid.}, p. 19.
\item[33]Count Pozzo di Borgo was a Corsican who entered the Russian diplomatic service, and was ambassador to Paris from 1814 to 1835.
\item[34]A. I. Dasent, \textit{J. T. Delane} (London, 1908), I, 166. Dasent notes Kinglake's mention of Pozzo di Borgo's prophecy. It is interesting that Seton-Watson in \textit{Britain in Europe} on page 147 states that Pozzo prophesied with amazing accuracy the events in France during 1830.
\end{footnotes}
Delane was so struck with the book that he gave it a very favorable notice, and even hired Oliphant as a regular foreign correspondent. This book, Darent states, was the first to call attention to the military and naval strength of Sebastopol, a name with which most Englishmen were unfamiliar in 1853. It seems that he was the first Englishman to predict that if war should come it was through that fort that England would have to strike at the heart of Russia. 35 His book was first published in October of 1853, and it became so popular that by March of 1854 a fourth edition was in the bookshops. 36 So it was through the writings of Oliphant, in accordance with popular sentiment, 37 and with the encouragement of Lord Palmerston, 38 that Delane took the lead in advocating the immediate invasion of the Crimea. 39

Palmerston was the first member of the cabinet to urge the conquest of Sebastopol. 40 Even as minister of the Home Office he soon was producing proposals of a Turkish loan, maps of the Crimea, a Prussian plan for fortifying Constantinople, 41 and all types of diplomatic expedients for Clarenc-

35 Ibid.
37 Darent, I, 175.
38 Diplomatic Review, February, 1866, pp. 16, 17.
39 Darent, I, 175.
40 Ibid.
41 Palmerston in writing to the Minister of War on June 16, 1854 said that there was no danger of a Russian attack on Constantinople. See A. S. Ashley, Life of Palmerston (London, 1876), II, 299.
don's guidance. He had been impressed in March with "the advantage of a
great attack on the Crimea," and by June he was an eager advocate of such
an expedition. In July he pressed his colleagues to stick to their purpose
and plan to go to the Crimea. Probably without the advocacy of Palmerston
the Crimean expedition never would have taken place. This role was approved
even by Mr. Gladstone, who thanked him for his work in helping direct the
strokes of England against "the heart and centre of the war at Sebastopol." 44

Although Dasent states that Oliphant's book was the first to call at-
tention to the military and naval strength of the now-famed Russian fortress
it is apparent in reading his descriptions of the place that it certainly
was not a center of Russian power. But Oliphant, although he minimized the
strength of the fortress and the fleet, did maintain that Russia, itself,
was a menace. B. Kingsley Martin in The Triumph of Lord Palmerston supports
this evaluation of Oliphant. 45

It is impossible to understand how the leaders of the government and
Delane himself, who had read and promoted the book, could have expressed the
attitudes which they did in the light of the evidence that Oliphant pre-
presented. It was notorious that few Englishmen had been in the Crimea, or for
that matter in the Near East; consequently few knew anything about the area.

42 Philip Guedalla, Palmerston (London, 1926), p. 362. See also Ashley,
II, 294-300.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 B. Kingsley Martin, The Triumph of Lord Palmerston (London, 1924),
pp. 188, 189.
From Oliphant's description it certainly was obvious that Turkey, Constantinople, or England had little or nothing to fear from Sebastopol. Oliphant came to essentially the same conclusion as Urquhart: that the Russian fleet was incompetent and decrepit, and certainly not prepared to carry Russian troops on an invasion of Turkey. Sebastopol was not the center of Russian power.

Perhaps Palmerston agreed, but in expressing his thoughts on the subject he placed himself diametrically opposite Urquhart. Palmerston felt that the capture of Sebastopol and of the fleet would be a lasting and important advantage to England. He thought that it would be a more decisive place to fight than in the Danube area. Holding the Crimea and Sebastopol, England could dictate the conditions of peace in regard to the naval position of Russia in the Black Sea. 46

Urquhart thought that Palmerston and Delane had combined to bring about the invasion of the Crimea. Early in the war it had been proposed by the government to send armies into the Crimea, but the proposal failed to get approval because of the resistance of the military authorities, though this was kept quite secret from the rest of the nation. Lord Palmerston, who was at that time Home Secretary, sent for Delane. He must have told him, so Urquhart thought, that Sebastopol was the center of Russian power and that it also was the source of expeditions against Turkey, Persia, and India. Since the nation did not believe these things and since his colleagues in the cabinet were stupid and headstrong, Palmerston looked to Delane through

46 Ashley, II, 297.
The Times to try to make the people understand the importance of Sebastopol. Moreover, the government should be criticized for not recognizing this importance. 47

The more The Times thundered in its pages the more it rendered the Crimean expedition practical in the minds of the people. Its agitation on this subject was without parallel in the history of public discussion. It stated that "Sebastopol is the centre of Russian power!" and until Sebastopol was destroyed there would be "no safety for Turkey, no security for the world," and "no peace with Russia." In this manner, Urquhart believed, Russia dragged the English armies to her shores. Forty thousand Englishmen perished there. The defeats that Russia had suffered at the hands of the Turks, moreover, were wiped away by the discomfited armies of Turkey's allies; and the war that Russia could not have won against Turkey alone, she now was able to continue with the aid of the allies. Russia had set a trap in Sebastopol, Urquhart thought, and The Times had decoyed the allies into it. 48

Even the method of argument that that journal employed was evidence which attested to her intentions. Her columns displayed no proof that Sebastopol was what she said it was. Only statements were made. Even if the writers were misled, Urquhart thought, there still was no excuse for the

47Diplomatic Review, February, 1866, pp. 15-17. Pasent says that Palmerston was the first member of the Cabinet to urge the conquest of Sebastopol (Delane, I, 175, 176). Delane's letters show us the degree to which he was involved in the jealousies and the behind-the-scenes intrigue in the conduct of the war (p. 223).

48Urquhart, Words, p. 299. Page 299 is actually numbered as 2972.
legal and historical falsifications which they employed. 49

As Roebuck's committee of inquiry delved into the conduct of the war, it became apparent that it was impossible to extract a single direct answer from the witnesses as to what was the source of the Crimean expedition. Not only was this the case, but it even was impossible to get opinions on the subject, expressed or entertained by the persons holding military and naval commands. The inquirers could not even get the "opinions" of the political authorities, respecting the "opinions" of the military authorities, from the Prime Minister himself. Most of the testimony, Mrs. Urquhart believed, was evasive, ambiguous, or contradictory. The extracts from the committee's record given in The Story of the War were specimens of the incessant subterfuge and prevarication that took place at the investigation. It was well known that the military authorities were not consulted about the expedition. The testimony of the Duke of Newcastle gave the impression that no military opinions had ever been tendered to the government against the expedition; and that if the commander-in-chief had remonstrated and it had failed, he would have resigned. This proved false, because the commander-in-chief himself, Viscount Harding, stated that he would not have resigned. But then the committee failed to ask Hardinge if he had approved the expedition. Sir John Burgoyne who was sent to the Crimea to examine and report on prevalent conditions was not even consulted before the decision was made. Lord Aberdeen was not even able to give the committee a direct answer to the simple question of whether "in his opinion, so much information was obtained as was

49 Ibid.
necessary to justify the expedition."50

But on the other hand the Duke of Newcastle, the Minister of War, felt at the beginning of the war that he should make every possible inquiry into the condition of Sebastopol. He testified that Lord Raglan was unable to obtain this information. The best information, however, that the Duke received was from a Colonel Du Plat, whom he saw day after day, and who assisted him in investigating all the other information he had gathered. In large part, therefore, the man who bears the responsibility for the expedition was Colonel Du Plat. This Colonel had been previously appointed to the consulship at Warsaw, and Urquhart apparently considered him to be working for Russia. The Crimean expedition was undertaken against the advice of Lord Raglan and other important people.51

Admiral Dundas had made great exertions to get information about the Crimea. During 1853 he obtained very little of the information he thought necessary to accomplish his mission, and none about Sebastopol and the Russian fleet. He admitted that he was hindered from obtaining it by backwardness of some of the English authorities. It was not that he was impeded, but that they were exceedingly slow. He was hindered from obtaining information by the action of Lord Stratford, who was responsible for not sending his interpreter ahead to Odessa and Sebastopol. The difficulty, so Captain Drummond thought, was due to his passport, and so Admiral Dundas' potential

50 Harriet Urquhart, pp. 51-56.

51 Ibid., pp. 49-51.
source of information was sent back to Besika. Admiral Dundas attributed
his inability to obtain information while he was in Constantinople during
November and December of 1853 to the "systematic vigilance and precaution
of the Russian government and the hostility of the Greeks." The inability
of responsible government officials to give clear answers to the committee's
questions, coupled with the evidence concerning the steps taken by the
political authorities to prevent the military and naval authorities from
obtaining information respecting the amount and disposition of the Russian
forces in the Crimea, left no doubt in Mrs. Urquhart's mind that the Crimean
expedition was launched in obedience to the Emperor of Russia.

The Crimean expedition was ordered by the governments of France and
England, and not by any of the commanders in the Black Sea. The Duke of
Newcastle sent a despatch to Lord Raglan dated April 10, 1854, telling
him that he was not precluded from exercising his discretion, but also told
him that there was nothing else for him to do except begin the siege of
Sebastopol. Here, as before, when he was expressly forbidden to dislodge
the Russian army from the Principalities even after the Turks had defeated
them as Silistria, the opportunity to exercise discretion was not afforded

52 Ibid., pp. 43-46. Captain Drummond was in the employ of Admiral
Dundas at Constantinople.
53 Ibid., p. 45
54 Ibid., p. 55.
55 Ibid., p. 54.
56 Lord Raglan was commander-in-chief of the English forces.
him. Now when the troops had scarcely arrived in Turkey he was directed to
attack Sebastopol, and this at the very moment when Lord Clarandon was say-
ing that the most the government expected itself to do was to rescue Con-
stantinople. This despatch ended by declaring that "before the siege of a
fortress reported to be so strong can be attempted, it is necessary that
information that can be relied upon shall be obtained." Lord Raglan's
answer to the Duke of Newcastle was dated August 19, 1854 from Varna. He
told the duke that he had not been able to obtain any of the information
which was required in that despatch. Lord Raglan furthermore protested
against the wintering of the army in Crimea, because it was ill provided
for such an occupation, and it would decidedly prove fatal. The contents
of Raglan's answer eliminates the possibility of his having undertaken the
expedition in conformity with his own judgment, and therefore he undertook
it in consequence of orders. 58

On September 14, 1854 the allied forces landed in the Crimea. Marshall
St. Arnaud at Varna on the 26th of August hailed this by stating that "it
was she (Providence) also who calls us to the Crimea, a country salubrious
as our own, and to Sebastopol, seat of the Russian power, within whose wall
we shall seek the pledge of peace and of our return to our native shores." 59
But, Urquhart thought, it was this providence that prevented there being
coal for the steamers, hay for the horses, huts for the men, communications

57 Harriet Urquhart, p. 40.
58 Ibid., pp. 39, 40.
59 Ibid., p. 55.
for supplies, medicines for the sick, and clothing and food for all. This providence deprived the soldiers of abundant supplies which were located within a few miles of the camps. It led the allies to the least vulnerable of Russian fortifications, and spared the Russians where they were most vulnerable and where attack would have been most destructive. This providence saw fit to spare the allies in the Principalities where they could have defeated the Russians, and called them to the Crimea. That call was, however, delayed so as to give the Russian troops from the Principalities time to reach the Crimea, and for the allied troops to arrive just in time to be caught by the winter. 60

60 Ibid., pp. 55-57.
CHAPTER VIII

THE PEACE AND DECLARATION OF PARIS

In August of 1854, with the diplomatic support of Austria, the allies drew up proposals of peace which came to be known as the Four Points. They provided for a collective European guarantee of the Principalities instead of a Russian protectorate; the improvement of conditions of navigation on the Danube; a revision of the Straits Convention of 1841 which would limit Russian naval power in the Black Sea; and the abandonment by Russia of her claims as the official protector of the Christian subjects of the Sultan. After the battle of Inkerman Nicholas accepted the Four Points in principle but refused to limit the size of his Black Sea fleet, or to surrender territory between the Danube and the Pruth. Opinion in western Europe, and particularly in Great Britain, which regarded the war as directed against the policy of Nicholas, hoped for a change under Alexander II after Nicholas died on March 2, 1855. But since the allies had not won any striking military success, Alexander II was not strong enough to resist Russian patriotic feeling. So when the Powers again met at Vienna on March 15, they agreed on the first two points, but negotiations broke down on the third point. Discussion had ranged between the two alternatives of restricting Russian naval forces on the Black Sea, or maintaining their allied equiva-
lent, neither of which, however, was acceptable to the other. An Austrian compromise solution was rejected by England and France, and the war continued.

Urquhart saw little difference between the peace proposals in the Four Points and the Vienna Note. From the vantage point of the Vienna Note the Menschikoff demands were milder and the Four Points worse. The only difference he saw between the Vienna Note and the Four Points was that the former transferred Turkish sovereignty to Russia alone, and the peace proposals transferred Turkish sovereignty to Russia and the allies.

The object of the Crimean campaign then, as the world saw it, was to secure Russia's acceptance of the essentials of the Four Points. There was to be no indemnity and no alteration of frontiers required; the allies declared themselves not enemies of Russia, but only defenders of Turkey. But Urquhart thought that the great attack at the "centre of Russian power" was not to force the submission of Russia, but to enforce the submission of Turkey.

When the Vienna conference ruptured on April 28, 1855 Urquhart felt that Russia had only used the conference to stall for time, and had actually gained thereby three months. The conference, as he saw it, was opened on the grounds that Russia yielded to everything which logically should have

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4 Ibid., p. 16.
made the discussions superfluous. But then the conference closed ostensibly on the third point without Russia making a counter-proposal. He apparently thought that this was planned, and that the allies needed more time to bring Turkey into submission.\footnote{David Urquhart, \textit{New Hope for Poland} (London, 1855), pp. 12, 13.}

The rupture of the Vienna conference on the third point had the effect, Urquhart thought, of making Russia appear unsubdued. But the truth of the matter, as he conceived it, was that Turkey remained unsubdued. To most readers of the protocols, the conferences at Vienna appeared as a verbal contest between Russia and the allies. This was a delusion which could not have been prolonged, he felt, if the fourth point had been discussed. Urquhart thought that the net result of the Sultan's acceptance of the first point was the surrender of the Danubian Principalities. This the Sultan was prepared to sacrifice. Handing them over to Europe bore at least the appearance of taking them away from Russia. But it was otherwise with the fourth point. The Sultan was not about to agree to stipulations regarding his conduct toward his Christian subjects, which, as Urquhart saw it, would have had the effect of surrendering his sovereignty and therefore the empire.

The conferences at Vienna therefore ceased. Later the allies presented in conference at Constantinople plans for Turkish reform. When at last an agreement was reached with the Turks the \textit{Hatti Humaycum} was published. Then the conferences with Russia were resumed at Paris, from which the treaty emanated. Public attention was focused on this, and the papers regarding the negotiations with Turkey were published unnoticed under the title
"Correspondence Respecting Christian Privileges in Turkey." 6

The Vienna discussions continued throughout April, 1855. As Austria was opposed to the complete neutralization of the Black Sea, the allies advocated a limitation of the naval forces of the riverine states. But Prince Gorchakov rejected this, and suggested that the Straits Convention of 1841 should be abolished and free passage assured to the ships of all nations at peace with the Porte. But France and England refused to accept this proposal as it would have accorded to Russia free access to the Mediterranean. 7

The fall of Sebastopol, however, soon changed the situation. 8 Napoleon due to pressures at home desired to end the war through Austrian mediation; to reduce it to a blockade of Russia; or to enlarge it by an appeal to national sentiment in Poland, Italy, and Hungary. Palmerston reluctantly had to give way, and on January 16, 1856, after an ultimatum from Austria, Russia accepted the four points which included the surrender of territory at the mouth of the Danube and the neutralization of the Black Sea. 9 But Russia, in the eyes of Urquhart, was merely accepting the old terms and rejecting the new. She now agreed to the neutralization of the Black Sea, but then not to that of the Aland Islands. She was willing to restore Kars, but certainly not to cede any part of Bessarabia. Just three days after Russia's acceptance of the Four Points, Urquhart described this continual

7 _Seton-Watson_, p. 338.
8 _Woodward_, p. 279.
9 _Ibid._, p. 280.
diplomatic fencing as nothing more than a game, and felt that conditions were ripe for revolution in many parts of Europe.

The Congress of Paris convened on February 25, 1856, and lasted little more than a month. The problems of Turkish integrity, Turkish reform, naval power in the Black Sea and the Straits, and the status of the Principalities had to be resolved. Compared to the negotiations at Vienna the Congress did not last long. By March 30, the Treaty of Paris was signed. All conquered territory was to be restored with the exception of the rectification of the frontiers of Bessarabia. Turkey was now to be included in the Concert of Europe with its independence and territorial integrity insured. The Straits Convention of 1841 was revised in that the Sultan had to prohibit the entry of war vessels into the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. The Black Sea was neutralized; arsenals were prohibited on its shores; and freedom of trade was established in its waters. Two commissions were to control the navigation of the Danube. Russia's ancient protectorate over Wallachia, Moldavia, and Serbia was abolished, and a collective guarantee by the great powers was substituted for the protection of these states, no one of whom could intervene without previously consulting the others. A convention was later to be drawn up concerning the Roumanian situation.

If the Crimean War had been collusive, then Urquhart was quite logical when he concluded that the peace treaty and the negotiations preceding it had also been collusive. As he pondered the interminable diplomatic

10 *Free Press*, January 19, 1856, p. 3.
11 *Seton-Watson*, pp. 351, 352.
haggling he must have felt that his view of the intent of the war was proving itself correct. He later was to say that the Congress of Paris merely possessed the show of a legal transaction, and was just a cloak for other operations. He thought it quite strange that the meeting was not merely one between the belligerent powers, but also included non-belligerents such as Prussia and Austria. The treaty that resulted was not one of concessions or the granting of privileges, but almost exclusively concerned itself with the internal conditions of one of the allies, namely, Turkey. And this happened to be the power for whose "independence" and "integrity" the war had been fought. Obviously, no side was beaten, and no side was wrong. Interestingly enough, the honor of both sides was preserved. There was no indemnity, no renunciations, and furthermore, no securities were taken. It was obvious to Urquhart that from these stipulations and conditions that the only thing the treaty purported to do was to regulate how Turkey's allies and her enemy would interfere in her internal affairs. 12

The treaty had neutralized the Black Sea, and its waters were thrown open to the merchants of every nation with only sanitary and customs regulations that were favorable to commerce. 13 Both Russia and Turkey were required to retain only a stipulated number of ships on the Black Sea. But this was hardly accepted before the Russians violated it. Whereas Russia armed her merchantmen, Turkey strictly observed the treaty. 14

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13 *Ibid.*, October 5, 1864, p. 82.

violated it both in spirit and letter by restricting all commercial inter-
course with the Circassians to Russian ports. This violation was recognized
and connived at by the British government, so that all attempts made by
Urquhart and others to induce British merchants to open a trade with Cir-
cassia were ineffectual. 15

Before the Congress adjourned France proposed permanently to change the
right of search. Thus the existing law of the sea was revised on April 16,
1856 by the "Declaration of Paris." Privateering was abolished. With the
exception of contraband a neutral flag would now cover an enemy's goods.
Again, with the exception of contraband a neutral's goods were not liable
to capture under an enemy's flag. And blockades had to be effective before
they could be binding. 16 Urquhart thought that Russia had been allowed to
continue in the war so that she could appear at the Congress as a conquered
power. This was necessary, in his estimation, so that she could "bring
about the effacement of maritime power." This would not have been possible
had she appeared as a conqueror. 17 The third and fourth propositions of the
Declaration of Paris were not new, as were the first and second. All that
they were intended to accomplish, or so he thought, was to disguise the
innovation of the first two. But then Urquhart states that the Russian
plenipotentiaries were entirely unprepared in treating of these points, and
so had to refer home for instructions. Apparently, only the English and

15Free Press, October 4, 1864, p. 82.
16Seton-Watson, p. 335.
17David Urquhart, Naval Power Suppressed by the Maritime States
French representatives were willing to go beyond their instructions to make a peace treaty. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether Urquhart thought the Russian action was simple unpreparedness, or an attempt to camouflage their real intentions. The French minister in any event was the one who proposed the declaration, and Lord Clarendon hailed it as "a triumph of civilization and humanity." 18

But the stage for this dramatic surrender of England's most destructive maritime weapon had long been under construction. The "Declaration of Paris" made permanent the waiver of the right of search which had been declared in March of 1854. During the war Urquhart and the foreign affairs committees campaigned against the waiver which they saw as most detrimental to England's defense. For decades two maxims had reigned with unquestioned authority in the minds of British statesmen: the one, the inviolability of Russia in her own territory to the forces of England; the other, the absolute control which England possessed over Russian trade. 19 If England would therefore have attacked Russian trade, it could have bloodlessly and inexpensively defeated her. It was, Urquhart thought, England's acceptance of the principle, "free bottoms, free goods," by which she acted in the interests of Russia. Unless free bottoms made free goods, Russia would have been beaten by England despite the despatches and private letters of the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of War, the Foreign Secretary, and the

18 Free Press, May 2, 1860, p. 42.

19 Urquhart's source for these was Sir John McNeill's, Progress and Present Position of Russia in the East.
Prime Minister. Unless Russia had possessed the most absolute and certain assurance that letters of marque would not be granted to commission privateers, he felt that she could not have ventured even into a simulated struggle. It was, then, Russia's object to see that the maritime laws of England were superseded, just as it was her object to draw the forces of Europe to her soil, and all in order to transform a potential defeat by Turkey into a victory over Europe. 20

It was the right of seizure and confiscation that came into question during the Crimean War, and not the right of search which meant no more than the practice of visiting vessels. The right of seizure, Urquhart was convinced, was a right inherent in sovereignty, and as old as war itself. In this respect it was antecedent to all enactments and all written law, and could not be waived. 21

The day that war was declared against Russia the English government issued an Order-in-Council waiving the right of seizure for the duration of the war. The order was dated the twenty-eighth of March, 1854, and stated that England had relinquished the right of seizing an enemy's goods on board neutral vessels. It was, Urquhart thought, quite different from former

20 Free Press, September 6, 1856, pp. 26, 27.
21 Ibid., August 25, 1855, Supplement, p. 1. Urquhart stated, "The right of seizure constitutes the state of war. War is a judicial sentence against an enemy, to be executed by a compulsion which applies to his person and his goods. The goods are always distrained before the person; and therefore the right of seizing the enemy's goods is contained within the right of killing his person, which is the practice of war." He concluded that to question the right of its exercise, and not the justice of the grounds upon which it was to be used, was to weaken the sovereignty of the state.
treaties or relaxations of treaties. When former relaxations took place it was not in favor of an enemy, but as a concession to a friend. These usually were made in a formal manner, and were entered into with smaller powers. England had defended that right against the whole world, and at the hazard of her very existence. And it was by this means that she was able to break its enemy's power on every occasion. Nothing then was more unimaginable than seeing England go off to war without the right of search as a weapon against her enemy, and especially in respect to Russia, against which it was her only real means of coercion. 22

In order to prevent the seizure of Russia's commerce under a neutral flag a solemn act drawn up by the Privy Council sitting in the presence of the Queen was needed, and not merely a decision of the cabinet. Because Lord Palmerston was unable to procure such a solemn act, he acted without it. Urquhart explained that a document appeared in the Gazette which resembled an Order-in-Council, but the name of the Queen was not at the head of it. She did not sign it, but her name was used in the text as if she had sanctioned it. The document could only have emanated from the Cabinet Council, because there had not been any sitting of the Privy Council "since the 9th of March previous," and the supposed order bore the date of the twenty-eighth of March, a day on which there had only been a meeting of the Cabinet Council at the Foreign Office. The decision had therefore been taken in the Cabinet Council, and not in the Privy Council. But a decision of the Cabinet Council had no legal or judicial value, since that body was not recog-

22Ibid., p. 2.
nized by law. And it was nothing less in his eyes than "a usurpation of the powers of the Privy Council." 23

As late as the twenty-fifth of March, as little as three days before the "fraudulent" Order-in-Council was issued, it is evident that the secret had not yet been confided to Lord Clarendon. A French source thought that on the twenty-eighth the whole cabinet was ignorant of the Order, for Lord Cowley on the morning of that day had announced to the French government that the English cabinet had arrived at the unanimous and definitive decision "to maintain the prohibition of neutral commerce between ports belonging to the enemy..." 24

Urquhart had predicted that as a result of the waiver Russian trade would not be impaired, and that England's maritime power would not be of any importance in the war. Russia, furthermore, he thought, would make a determined effort to obtain the permanency of that waiver. These predictions were realized. Trade between Russia and England never ceased. Even the admiralty advertised for and bought tallow from Russia. The government was finally driven into a corner by many indignant classes of the community and tried to excuse its actions by pretending that it had acted in the interests of English trade. 25

The Congress at Paris in 1856 had not assembled for the purpose of making the waiver permanent, but for concluding a peace treaty. The declaration was not slipped into the treaty, and as Urquhart saw it, it was an

23 Urquhart, Naval Power, pp. 10, 11.

24 Ibid., pp. 11, 12.
"abnormal act" which was merely annexed to the treaty. None of the plenipo-
tentiaries had been furnished with the authority to discuss the question. 26

The persons who signed it did not have the right to do so, and their re-
spective sovereigns did not ratify it. 27 As far as England was concerned,
the Birmingham Foreign Affairs Committee thought that the declaration was
illegal, because it was contrary to the common law of England. Even if the
Crown supported it, the declaration could not have the force of law without
the authority of Parliament. 28 And Lord Clarendon admitted in the House of
Lords on May 22, 1856 that if the declaration would have been submitted to
Parliament with the Treaty, the Treaty would most probably not have been
signed. 29 The resolutions of the declaration not only went counter to the
laws of England, but also the judgments of English courts and the spirit of
resistance that England had traditionally expressed towards the principles
incorporated in the declaration. 30 In fact, never before in recent times,
in the opinion of Urquhart, had such propositions been submitted to a delib-
erative assembly. The decision to change maritime law came about quite
suddenly, and its success was obviously due to the absolute secrecy with
which it had been guarded. 31 Both Urquhart and the Birmingham Foreign

26 Urquhart, Naval Power, p. 5.
27 Free Press, May 2, 1860, p. 44.
28 Ibid., December 27, 1856, p. 150.
29 Urquhart, Naval Power, p. 5.
30 Free Press, December 27, 1856, p. 150.
31 Urquhart, Naval Power, p. 5.
Affairs Committee saw Lord Clarendon's role in accepting the declaration as quite illegal. After all Clarendon had no authority to change the law of England; and since he declared that he had done so, he had grievously offended the Crown, an action for which he could be brought to trial. The Viennese Paper, *Le Fresse*, Urquhart quoted as having stated on December 25, 1861 that "Lord Clarendon, in signing at the Congress of Paris the extinction of England's maritime rights, acted without the knowledge of the Queen or the mandate of the Crown. His powers emanated from a private letter of Lord Palmerston."33

The abandonment of the right of search was in Urquhart's eyes the equivalent of allowing belligerents the right to trade in neutral vessels, and could have no other effect than extinguishing the English carrying trade during wartime. He felt that Cobden agreed with him on this point, and quoted him as having written that "The practical effect then, of the alterations made in our maritime law, at the Paris Conference, if we go no further, would be, in case of war with a naval power, to transfer the carrying trade, even of our own ports, to neutral bottoms."34

33 Urquhart, *Naval Power*, p. 5.
34 *Free Press*, December 13, 1856, p. 139.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

Urquhart can be more readily understood in the context of his times if we view him as a contemporary observer who saw the continual expansion of Russia as an historical fact; and who observed England's fumbling actions toward the Turkish Empire by members of the aristocracy who probably more often than not obtained their positions in government by birth and wealth rather than by character, intelligence, statesmanship, and a good knowledge of affairs in the Near East. Even though Urquhart's charges of collusion may be proven erroneous it must be admitted that the government's ineptitude in prosecuting the war makes it quite understandable for him to have come to such conclusions. His position makes sense in the light of the principles which he thought should permeate society and international affairs. His knowledge of the history of Russia and his acceptance of the "Political Testament of Peter the Great" gave a firm foundation to the structure of his view that Russia intended to gain hegemony over Europe. His experiences in the East confirmed in his mind that Turkey was not in need of Western help, and that it would just prevent her from defeating Russia. His distrust of Lord Palmerston was substantiated by the way he thought Palmerston had handled foreign affairs for the two decades prior to the war. And public opinion which Palmerston made so much of, he knew was only the reflection of the
persons and partisan groups which owned the newspapers.

Matthew Arnold, a contemporary of Urquhart, gives us some good insights into the reasons why Urquhart was so poorly accepted by his contemporaries. In the first of his essays on criticism Arnold conveys the impression that anyone who attempted to criticize the English constitution, government, or popular opinion could not help but be misunderstood. For criticism was at that time in England too immersed in factional strife whether political, religious or social. Arnold also thought that an Englishman valued what was political and practical so much so that he easily came to dislike ideas and thinkers, because they meddled in practical politics. Most probably many of his contemporaries saw Urquhart in this light and their view of him may not be so much a reflection of what he was, as what they were.

But Urquhart can be criticized for over-intellectualizing history. Jacques Barzun attributes to Marx on page 155 in the House of Intellect, two intellectualist errors which also aptly describe those of Urquhart. Both used their minds to bring order to ideas, and then having done so believed that the order was discovered in the facts themselves. Urquhart once having discovered this order, this plan of Russian conquest, he made it imperative truth for his followers. Both Marx and Urquhart also shared the conspiracy theory of history: for Marx it is the bourgeoisie that conspire to gain their ends and for Urquhart it is Russia which does so; both making contemporary events mask the real but hidden movements of life.

It is no simple task to evaluate the validity of Urquhart's views. There is great difficulty in accepting in its entirety his assertion that there was collusion between the British ministers and the Czar. Although
the actions of the ministers were often pro-Russian, it is possible that they were done inadvertently or as a result of a misunderstanding of the situation. This seems to be the more reasonable and easily acceptable explanation. If collusion is considered impossible, the Urquhart will be seen as a quite incensed and raving radical fool. His conclusions are not, however, so hard to believe if collusion is considered possible. Much of Urquhart's evidence (the author presumes and cannot authoritatively say) is difficult to evaluate, because it involves those thoughts and actions that would not be recorded in the diaries or papers of those involved, or in state papers. We have no minutes of cabinet meetings, and as a permanent and legal institution in the governmental machinery it was quite new. Urquhart could have been justified in seeing it as an illegal usurpation by the aristocracy of the powers of the Crown and Privy Council. All these things being true it is difficult to say that the truth will ever be known. If one views the testimony before Boebuck's committee as by intention not probing too deeply into the poor conduct of the war, one can only suspect that the witnesses were also trying to cover up the government's incompetence, or as Urquhart thought, collusion. His case is most often well argued, and he employs a mass of evidence. To evaluate his position it must first be determined if these facts are accurate, and then if his logical analysis of them is in accordance with the events as they happened. But again we are back to the original difficulty of which witnesses to the events can be trusted. And the truth of things is often not in what is written, but in those words and deeds of which we have no record. This is essentially the dilemma.
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APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Joseph Anton Biesinger has been read and approved by a board of three members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

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\text{January 17, 1961} & \quad \text{Signature of Adviser} \\
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