Costa Rica in the World Community of Nations, 1919-1939: A Case Study in Latin American Internationalism

Suzanne O'Connor

Loyola University Chicago

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COSTA RICA IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY OF NATIONS,

1919-1939: A CASE STUDY IN LATIN

AMERICAN INTERNATIONALISM

by

Suzanne M. O'Connor

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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VITA

The author, Suzanne M. O'Connor, is the oldest child and only daughter of Robert E. O'Connor and Agnes (Ellsworth) O'Connor. She was born March 30, 1947, in Chicago, Illinois.

Her elementary education was obtained in the parochial schools of Chicago, Illinois, and secondary education at The Immaculata High School, Chicago, Illinois, where she was graduated in 1965.

In September, 1965, she entered De Paul University and in February, 1969, received the degree of Bachelor of Arts with honors with a major in history. In September, 1966, she was elected a member of Alpha Lambda Delta, the national freshman women's honorary sorority.

In January, 1969, she was employed with the National Association of Independent Insurers as an assistant to the Research Director. At the same time, she began part-time studies at the Graduate School of De Paul University. In December, 1970, she was elected to Pi Gamma Mu, the national social sciences honorary. In June, 1971, she was awarded the degree of Master of Arts with distinction in Latin American history.
In September, 1973, she was granted a teaching assistantship in history at Loyola University of Chicago, where she began full time doctoral studies. In May, 1975, she was awarded a Schmitt Dissertation Fellowship.
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CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The purpose of this study is to achieve an understand­
standing of the international attitudes and policies of Cos­
ta Rica from 1919 to 1939. In this chapter, some of the is­sues and concerns which predate that period, but which have significance during it, will be discussed.

A natural starting point would seem to be an account of the history of the birth of the nation. With Costa Rica, however, there is considerable difficulty in pinpointing the actual date of birth. Under Spanish colonial rule, Costa Rica, along with its Central American neighbors, was governed as the Captaincy General of Guatemala, whose administrative independ­ence from the Viceroyalty of New Spain varied from time to time under different circumstances. Within that administrative convenience called Guatemala, there had developed regional groups whose self identity as "states" was quite distinct, des­pite their official affiliation, and who reflected the jeal­ousies of rival states.¹ The usual difficulties in dealing

¹Thomas L. Karnes, The Failure of Union, Central Ameri­
with the nationalism of any state are thus complicated when one speaks of any of the Central American nations. Costa Rica in particular manifests differences not only from its neighbors but also from the remainder of the hemisphere and the world while at the same time being linked to them in a unique manner. For example, Costa Rican policies in the early twentieth century emphasized isolation from the other Central American nations, and the language of unity among them was an effective tool used by Costa Rica at times when unilateral policies would not have sufficient force to resolve problems.

The independence of Central America from Spanish domination was achieved in conjunction with the establishment of the empire of Agustín de Iturbide in Mexico. With Iturbide's fall from power, this affiliation ended and Central America began a separate existence by the formation of a union of the diverse "states" of the old Captaincy General. The federal association which was formed lasted from 1823 to 1839. At that time forces which had traditionally divided the "states" of the Captaincy General brought about their division into separate nations. 2 Despite this division, federal union was much sought after throughout the nineteenth century by certain individuals in each country. 3 There have been twenty-five


3 Chester Lloyd Jones, Costa Rica and Civilization in
attempts at federal union since that first failure. One of the primary forces which brought about the separation was the differences among the member states in size and population. Guatemala alone had a population nearly eight times that of Costa Rica, whose population was among the smallest of the five member nations of the confederation. The fear of the smaller states that their confederation would be dominated by the overwhelming populace of Guatemala, plus a growing awareness of the differing needs and goals of their states led to the dissolution of the confederation in 1839. For the majority of Central Americans, independent national status had begun with the formation of the confederation in 1823.

Another problem which would manifest itself in Costa Rican national life as a consequence of this confederative beginning was the ill-defined status of boundaries between Costa Rica and her neighbors. The boundary disputes, which would embroil Central America during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, were both a cause and effect of the intense nationalism felt by the various states. In discussions over unsure boundaries, nationalism often came into play in the opinions

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4Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 243.
5Ibid., p. 6.
6Ibid.
7Ibid., p. 247.
of the contesting parties, becoming stronger as it was necessary to justify their own exalted positions. At the same time, boundary disputes were occasioned by feelings of nationalism and the feeling that the nation should be extended to the farthest reaches possible.

For Costa Rica, there were serious boundary disputes with both Nicaragua and Colombia that endured for nearly a century each. The Nicaraguan dispute would not be settled until the 1930's and the Colombian dispute, carried on by the successor state, Panama, would not be resolved until 1941. In both instances, the conflicts were responsible for an increase of Costa Rican nationalism and the adoption of a policy of isolationism in Central America. More will be said of these disputes below.

It is quite evident that dealing with the Costa Rican nation in isolation from its world environment is next to impossible. Of course, there were throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century certain issues and problems which could be labeled as strictly national. However, a strong case could be made that even among these "national" issues there were few that did not have some basis in the world community and Costa Rica's relationship to it. These will be dealt with at a later part of this study. But,  

whether one refers to strictly national or international questions, the self image of the Costa Rican nation would be the starting point in determining the origin of policies and attitudes adopted.

Costa Rica's image of itself as a nation among other nations emerged from various factors. First, and perhaps most importantly, Costa Ricans prided themselves on the stability and continuity of their national governments. They were extremely proud of the lack of political uprisings and the absence of caudillo rule in Costa Rica.9 Unlike their neighbors, only four constitutions had existed during the nineteenth century, discounting the various confederative constitutions; also during the nineteenth century, there had been only three presidential coups in contrast to far more elsewhere.10 Whether this notion of stability is a true image is not within the scope of this study. However, there is some evidence that Costa Rican claims are somewhat justifiable if only on a scale relative to their neighbors.

Second, the Costa Ricans felt themselves to be of a higher cultural level than any of their Central American neighbors. The reasons for this relate to their claimed racial homogeneity.11 This homogeneity would also contribute

9 Rodríguez, Central America, p. 49.


to the dominance of a select aristocracy or oligarchy in Costa Rican political life which in part serves as a causal factor in the relative political stability noted above. There is also the importance given education during the early national life, making possible the boast that "Costa Rica has more school teachers than soldiers." Even today Costa Rica has no standing army, navy or air force, but relies on a police force alone for domestic order which implies that this often repeated boast is still true.

A third factor shaping Costa Rican self image was her dealings with foreign investors. In the majority of cases, foreign investments in Costa Rica actually served the best purposes of the nation without substantial loss of political self-determination which seemed to be the case elsewhere, since Costa Rica seemed able to turn foreign investments into national projects rather than seeing the exportation of all profits from such investments. While the idea that Costa Rica had been free from control by investors would be challenged in later years, in the early twentieth century Costa Rica managed to achieve at least economic independence from any other nation, mainly

12Ibid.

13U.S. Chargé Leo R. Sack at San José to the Secretary of State, 18 December 1935, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Costa Rica, 1930-1939, 818.20/16, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

by means of its foreign investors. The question of the nation's economic independence from the investors, however, was not dealt with at this stage. As will be demonstrated below, the most important foreign investors were viewed in Costa Rica as Costa Ricans, a status which they apparently accepted. Further, their profits were frequently put back into the national economy in the form of roads, telegraph lines, etc. Specific examples of the positive results of large foreign investments can be seen in the fact that through foreign investment, crop diversification was first attempted in Central America by Costa Rica, allowing a lesser degree of dependence on a single crop, coffee, and a consequent ability to bargain more freely on world markets for necessary imports. In addition, Costa Rica was the first Central American state to produce an export crop of bananas. This capability resulted directly from the establishment of the banana industry by Minor C. Keith. Keith serves as a prime example of the contribution made to Costa Rican self-sufficiency and economic independence by foreign investors.

As was mentioned, Keith and his fellow investors,


16Jones, Costa Rica and Civilization, p. 65. The Watt Stewart biography of Keith does not deal specifically with the broad issues of Keith's responsibility for changes or improvements in the Costa Rican economy.
insofar as the Costa Rican nation was concerned, were really Costa Ricans, since they had married into prominent Costa Rican families and were genuinely committed to the national interests. Beyond the consistent reinvestment of profits, this commitment is reflected by the attitude of Minor Keith himself in remembering the Costa Rican nation in his "Last Will and Testament," in which he endowed a charitable institution of a kind to be determined by the nation with the funds which remained after the settlement of his debts and provisions for his family.

Economic modifications made possible by foreign investors such as Keith did a great deal to enhance the prestige of the Costa Rican nation as a trader in world markets. By crop diversification, Costa Ricans no longer had to view themselves in the shadow of Brazilian price setting for coffee crops. It can be assumed that the reinvestment of profits into public works or transportation and communications enhanced the Costa Rican self image by demonstrating their modernity in such developments.

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17 Keith's wife was Cristina Castro Fernández, whose father, Dr. José María Castro had twice occupied the presidency, been the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and was a past minister of foreign relations. Her mother, Doña Pacífica Fernández de Castro was credited with the design of the Costa Rican national flag and coat of arms. Watt Stewart, Keith and Costa Rica, A Biographical Study of Minor Cooper Keith (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1964), pp. 50-51.

18 Ibid., p. 197.
A final factor influencing Costa Rican self image before 1919 is directly related to the trans-oceanic canal projects undertaken or entertained by the United States during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Costa Rica in particular, and Central America in general, feared United States domination of their nations if such plans were brought to fruition. The location of the Panama Canal to the immediate south made Costa Rica especially important to the defense of Canal approaches, but it would have no control over how that defense might be implemented if the projects remained solely a United States enterprise. Thus as new canal proposals were brought under discussion, Costa Rica sought to have itself included as an interested party. Of particular concern here is the extremely bitter dispute among the United States, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The problem between Nicaragua and Costa Rica was rooted in their long-standing boundary dispute. At one point in the negotiations over the disputed territory between the two nations, a treaty was concluded in 1886 with the mediation of Guatemala, which provided that each nation had the responsibility to consult with the other before concluding any treaty regarding the construction of a canal. This agreement was disregarded by Nicaragua in the subsequent negotiation of a

canal treaty with the United States.

When the negotiations between Nicaragua and the United States became publicly known, Costa Rica immediately raised the issue of its treaty with Nicaragua.20 By the admission of the Costa Rican President, Ricardo Jiménez, the issue of canal negotiations was of primary importance to the Costa Rican nation, along with the continuing boundary dispute with Panama,21 which might also be said to have canal-related implications. The principal concern of Costa Ricans in this matter was apparently related to their understanding of the nature of the "protectorate" which they understood was to be established by the United States in Nicaragua. They had reached the conclusion that the treaty embodied, through the use of something similar to the Platt Amendment for Cuba, a surrender of Nicaraguan sovereignty.22 Further, it was felt that any such protectorate would "seriously affect the autonomy of the Republic of Costa Rica."23 They based their


22 Minister of Costa Rica in Washington, D.C. (J. B. Calvo) to the Secretary of State, 7 July 1914, 817.812/85, ibid., p. 959.

23 Ibid.
fear on the "special ties" which linked the Central American republics and probably on the fear of being surrounded by two United States "puppets." 24

The United States, in response to Costa Rican protests, noted that the 1886 treaty provided only that Costa Rica be consulted but that it did not have the right to veto any proposed treaty. Further, the United States Minister in Costa Rica assured the President that the United States had no intention of violating Costa Rican sovereignty in any way, and that Costa Rica had nothing to fear from the treaty. 25

Upon further consideration, the United States Minister suggested to Washington that Costa Rican national pride might be assuaged by a part ownership of any proposed canal. 26 However, Costa Rica continued to insist that its primary concern in the matter was the preservation of sovereignty in Nicaragua and the related sovereignty of all Central America. 27

Late in 1914, it became evident that any attempt to

24 Ibid.

25 Secretary of State to U. S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José, 24 July 1914, 817.812/106a, ibid., p. 963.

26 U. S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José to the Secretary of State, 13 August 1914, 817.812/134, ibid., p. 967.

27 República de Costa Rica, Memoria de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores Gracia y Justicia Culto y Beneficencia Presentada al Congreso Constitucional por el Secretario de Estado en el Despacho de esas carteras Manuel Castro Quesada, 1914-1915 (San José: Tipografía Nacional, 1915), p. xii. The title of this publication varies by year—all subsequent references will note the year reported in the publication and the abbreviated title Memoria.
deal with Costa Rica on any other Central American matters would be useless until the issue of the Nicaraguan treaty, the subsequent Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, was resolved. 28 At that time, reports of rebels gathering in Costa Rica to move against Nicaragua were received in Washington. The United States sent word to Costa Rica to see to their removal but Costa Rica chose to view the alleged rebels as foreigners residing in Costa Rica who were protected by the provisions of the Costa Rican constitution. 29 Whether these individuals were rebels setting out to disrupt Nicaragua cannot be determined. It was obvious, however, that Costa Rica was not going to cooperate with either the United States or Nicaragua to ascertain the facts. The United States decided not to move any further than its initial warning on the matter, 30 realizing that the true issue was not rebels bound for Nicaragua.

Negotiations were begun in 1915 with the Costa Rican Minister in Washington to provide a canal treaty for Costa Rica. The issue of the so-called Platt Amendment in the Nicaraguan agreement was also clarified so that in the view of


30 Secretary of State to U. S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José, 29 December 1914, 817.00/2382, ibid., p. 184.
the Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, Costa Rica understood that there would be no protectorate in Nicaragua of the magnitude which Costa Rica feared. All seemed well on the path to resolution for the time being. However, in less than a month the United States Minister in Costa Rica reported that it was apparent from the local press in San José that the misunderstanding over the treaty persisted. He further indicated that Costa Rican national pride in the matter could not be "bought off" as he had initially believed. Rather, he now felt that Costa Rica would have to be assured further that its national rights were not being violated by the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty and any payments to be made to Costa Rica for similar treaties must be made in proportion to the rights of Costa Rica.

Costa Rica went even further in pressing the United States on the issue of the canal. The Minister of Foreign Affairs in San José, Manuel Castro Quesada, assured the representative of the United States that Costa Rica did not wish to interfere in any way with a canal which would be beneficial to it as well as to the rest of the hemisphere. However, Costa Rica maintained that the United States, in any negoti-
ations regarding canal treaties or any other matters, must respect the treaties already in existence. Thus, they stated that the United States must respect the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican treaty of 1886 and must consult Costa Rica before concluding any canal treaty with Nicaragua.

Negotiations continued throughout 1915, while at the same time the United States was considering the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty in the Senate. Compounding the Costa Rican resistance to the treaty was the growing belief in Central America that the United States was attempting to subvert any attempts at federation there. When the treaty was at last approved by the United States Senate in February of 1916, Costa Rica, along with El Salvador and Colombia, complained bitterly that it subverted their rights. Although only Costa Rica had a treaty with Nicaragua (1886) which was violated by the Bryan-Chamorro agreement, El Salvador and Colombia joined in the protest due to the potential threat to other similar bilateral agreements to which they adhered. They were met with Secretary of State Robert Lansing's reply that there was no jeopardy to their rights implied or stated in the treaty and that the matter was concluded between two sovereign states,

33 U. S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 65, 12 February 1915, 817.812/111, ibid., p. 1108.

34 Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 252.

35 Notter, Origins of Wilson's Foreign Policy, p. 497.
the United States and Nicaragua, and was of no concern to them. 36

At this point, Costa Rica took the matter to the Central American Court of Justice which had been formed following the 1907 Central American Conference held in Washington, D.C. as a means to achieve the peaceful settlement of disputes among the Central American states. 37 Filing its petition for a review of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty in March, 1916, it received a ruling favorable to its position in September of that year. 38 Secretary of State Lansing responded to the decision by stating that the Court had no jurisdiction over the matter. 39 Then, in a serious error of judgment, both political and legal, the United States and Nicaragua proceeded to completely ignore the decision of the Court and viewed the Treaty as final. 40 Both acted completely out of self interest and with total disregard for the procedures which had been established for the maintenance of peace and cordial relations in Central America.

The Central American Court of Justice, as another attempt at joint action by the Central American republics, was

36 Ibid.

37 The Central American Court of Justice is not fully treated in any of the sources cited here. However, the most complete description can be found in Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 202.

38 Howland, American Relations, p. 223.

39 Notter, Origins of Wilson's Foreign Policy, p. 497.

40 Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 252.
already well on the way to failure before this incident. However, it can be argued that the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty administered the final blow to the institution which the United States had promoted so strenuously only ten years before. More important to the study here, however, is the effect of this course of events on Costa Rica. The disregard shown by the United States for the sovereign rights of the Costa Rican nation would prove a galling sore to Costa Rican national pride and hinder amicable relations between the two nations for some time to come. The issue of the canal treaty was resolved by the acceptance of Costa Rica in 1921 of a payment from the United States in return for a cession of canal rights through Costa Rican territory. But the enthusiasm of the Costa Rican nation for the Central American Court of Justice was probably the last time the Costa Ricans became seriously involved in any attempts at joint action on the part of the Central American nations until the economic union formed after the Second World War.

The Central American Court of Justice was only one of the results of the United States-Mexican sponsored Central American Conference held in Washington, D.C. in 1907. The conference itself was brought about by a variety of factors, not the least of which was the desire of the United States

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42Howland, American Relations, p. 224.
Secretary of State Elihu Root to begin modification of the "Dollar Diplomacy" which had characterized policy of previous years. Root, in cooperation with Porfirio Díaz of Mexico, sought a consensus among the Central American states on the issues of peace and arbitration of disputes involving only Central American states. The conference produced several agreements, most of which were ratified by the five participants, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. As stated previously, the Central American Court of Justice, founded as a result of the Conference, was essentially destroyed as a result of the actions of the United States and Nicaragua in ignoring the decision of the Court on the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty in 1916. The goals of the Conference, as expressed by its president Luis Anderson, a Costa Rican, included attempts at peaceful and harmonious cooperation in Central America as a reasonable alternative to confederation. These attempts accepted the idea that confederation was simply not a workable solution to Central American problems. Essentially it was hoped that with the measures adopted by the conference, including the Court of Justice, the Central American states could reach the same spirit of cooperation they had

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44 Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 191.
attempted in the past through confederation. Thus it can be seen that anything which adversely affected these measures would be viewed as an obstruction to Central American unity.

Another measure of the 1907 Conference which fell into disrepute was the Tobar Doctrine, an agreement which would deny recognition to governments which had gained power by revolution. Costa Rica, along with the other conference participants, would adhere to this agreement. But in this instance, the Central American states themselves would find this an unacceptable restriction following the problems encountered by the revolutionary Tinoco regime in Costa Rica and the equally revolutionary Martínez regime in El Salvador in achieving the recognition of the United States after having been recognized by the other Central American states. The problems of both of these regimes will be discussed at greater length in subsequent chapters. The important thing to note here is that the Central American states reached a decision with regard to an internal issue of order on the question of recognition, whereas in the case of the Court of Justice, external pressures, combined with the cooperation of one Central American state, brought about its demise.

The decision of the Central American states, led by

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45 Ibid.
Luis Anderson, the Costa Rican theorist, to refrain from another attempt at confederation in 1907 prevented still another failure in the series of attempts to combine five separate and sovereign states into a single unit. Both the role of the United States in these events and the leadership exercised by a Costa Rican in the Washington Conference would have an impact on the events in years to follow.

Another aspect of the Costa Rican self image as a "loner" or leader in Central American affairs was the continuing Panama boundary dispute, which was in many ways similar to its problems with Nicaragua. The national press of Costa Rica reflected the concern that only isolationism would maintain Costa Rican sovereignty with the existence of a United States dominated sphere of influence just to the south. Costa Rica assumed the attitude that it had to deal only with Panama on this issue for fear of the interference of the United States. However, as events developed, the United States came to the side of Costa Rica in the boundary question, perhaps seeking a "trade off" in the Nicaraguan question. The support of the Costa Rican position in the dispute came from the mediation of Chief Justice White of the United States Supreme Court in 1914. The matter was submitted to him for investigation at the insistence of Costa Rica and as far as Panama was concerned, it was to be

47La República (San José), 28 July 1908, cited in Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 195.
merely a clarification of the previous award mediated by President Emile Loubet of France, which had ruled in favor of Panama.⁴⁸ The White award reversed the Loubet decision and indicated that the territory in question belonged to Costa Rica rather than to Panama. All the objections of Panama notwithstanding, the United States adhered to this decision throughout the discussions which transpired during the 1920's and 1930's, which will be discussed in a later chapter. Panama objected on the grounds that the United States had, by virtue of its canal treaty with them, sworn to guarantee the territorial integrity of Panama, which the White award failed to do.⁴⁹

This position by the United States had a long-reaching impact on the position of Costa Rica in the Central American community. If it were the intent of the United States to seek a favorable Costa Rican attitude toward the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, this did not succeed as has been shown above. It might also be speculated that this was part of a "divide and conquer" mentality on the part of the United States in its relations with Central America. According to at least one author, this simply would not have been necessary if the United States had sought to "conquer" Central America, since it had


⁴⁹ Ibid., II:303-312.
It would be entirely misleading to say that Costa Rica took on any great significance in the eyes of the United States because of its resistance to the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty or, as indicated, by the United States's favoritism for its cause in the Panamanian boundary dispute. In fact, quite the contrary might be said to be true. When another matter of great importance in inter-American affairs, the recognition of the revolutionary government in Mexico, came up for discussion, Costa Rica was relegated to the status of a non-participant and was notified after the fact of the decision made by the United States, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Guatemala in the matter. For the Costa Ricans, however, the question was not of any great importance, since it had already made its own policy and was quietly pursuing it. Throughout this period of revolution in Mexico, Costa Rica had maintained consular posts in the major Mexican cities and continued to do so with or without the concurrence of other American states.

The independence of action shown by Costa Rica in the foregoing, which characterized its international behavior in the period before 1919, was indicative of the strong national-

50 Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 208.
51 Secretary of State to the Minister of Costa Rica at Washington, 19 October 1915, 812.00/16614a, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, 1915, p. 771.
52 Memorias, 1914-1915, p. 123.
istic sentiments motivating Costa Rican policies during this period. Such independence would continue to mark later Costa Rican policies.

This introduction to Costa Rica's policies and attitudes poses more questions than it answers. The paucity of information about some of these issues makes them difficult to study and even more difficult to fit into any conclusive pattern. However, in the following chapters an attempt will be made to resolve the major question of Costa Rican self image as it was manifested in national policies and international relations during the 1919-1939 period.
CHAPTER II

THE TINOCO REGIME

Before considering Costa Rican internationalism during the period under study (1919-1939), it is important to note the internal political events and issues which would effect international policies and attitudes. The most significant political development to the 1919-1939 period was the coup d'etat led by Federico Tinoco in January, 1917. This coup touched all the important issues which were part of Costa Rican internationalism and established patterns which characterize the following twenty years.

As was indicated previously, political conditions in Costa Rica during the nineteenth century, and in the early twentieth, were unusually stable for a Central American republic.¹ This fact, while a matter of considerable national pride, is related by some sources to the strict control of the processes of government by a dominant element within Costa Rican society,² which included its manipulation of an

¹Among other sources see Busey, Notes on Costa Rican Democracy, p. 4; Howland, American Relations, p. 220.

²U.S. Chargé Marshall Langhorne at San José to the
elaborate electoral system characterized by numerous checks and balances. An assessment of the role of an oligarchy in Costa Rican politics is extremely difficult to make due to the ill-defined nature of that group. The difficulty arises from the fact that the "oligarchy" was not a static group, nor was membership in it determined by a select list of family names or occupations. Yet, most observers of Costa Rican society are in agreement that such an oligarchy did exist. Land ownership represented the essential ingredient for measuring the political power of members of the oligarchy. Much of the land held in large lots by Costa Ricans was devoted to coffee growing. Eventually, the introduction of bananas as a money crop changed the power base in Costa Rican politics, but this would not occur until after World War I. However, land and the profits it produced were the sole basis for power prior to that time. Before the First World War and the emergence of bananas as an important cash crop, the large landholders did not control the loyalty of people as a consequence of their landowning. Approximately one half of the

Secretary of State, No. 64, 27 May 1913, 818.00/42, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Costa Rica, 1910-1929, National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy 669. Referred to hereinafter as MC669.


4Ibid., p. 18.

5Blutstein, Handbook for Costa Rica, p. 22.
land was divided up into numerous small landholdings operated by the owner and his family. The other half of the land was tied up in large plantation-size holdings. \(^6\) Labor for the plantations was generally drawn from the ranks of the small landholders who worked for wages on them. \(^7\) But since better than two thirds of the small landholders supported themselves solely on the income of their own land, \(^8\) the large landowners could not get any economic strangle hold on their loyalties.

The greatest strength of the landowning aristocracy early in the twentieth century lay in the relative political apathy of the small independent landowners. The large landowners could well afford political activities and used their wealth to dominate the government of the nation. This too would change in the course of the early twentieth century, but not until after the educational reforms enacted at the turn of the century aroused and equipped a rising middle class. \(^9\) But the change of power would be surprisingly free of any vehement class antagonism, primarily because of the positive results of land ownership by the politically dominated classes. Perhaps an additional reason for the lack of hostility between the oligarchy and the lower classes can be

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\(^6\) Denton, *Patterns of Costa Rican Politics*, p. 16.

\(^7\) Busey, *Notes on Costa Rican Democracy*, p. 63.

\(^8\) Ibid., p. 64.

\(^9\) Ibid., pp. 50-51.
found in the fact that at no time could the oligarchs be characterized as nonproductive or parasitic members of society which at least one author regards as a primary cause for major social upheavals. 10

Despite changes which would mark Costa Rican society and the character of the elements which dominated national politics, early in the twentieth century the oligarchy still controlled the political life of the nation. As will be discussed, the strength of this oligarchy would elect Alfredo González Flores as President in 1914 and then unseat him in 1917.

This oligarchy of wealthy aristocrats also had among their number the majority of past Presidents as well as governmental officials of all levels. This led to a situation in which electoral campaigns in Costa Rica were personalist rather than ideological in character. There were actually no political parties as that term is usually understood until after the changes in society which were noted above. 11 All groupings which might be construed as political parties were in reality personalist organizations which advocated the candidacy of a specified individual.

A further result of the dominance of Costa Rican political affairs by the oligarchy was the fact that, until 1913, 

10 Ibid., p. 48.

11 U.S. Chargé Marshall Langhorne at San José to the Secretary of Secretary of State, No. 64, 27 May 1913, 818.00/42, MC 669.
presidential elections were conducted by an electoral system in the Congress, whose members were also not directly elected by the populace. Thus presidential elections were removed from the electorate by the oligarchy.

Election reform laws, which brought about the first popular election of the Costa Rican President were put into effect for the 1913 elections. The candidates were, as usual, members of the oligarchy. The campaign, as usual, was a battle of personalities rather than of issues. However, the results of the voting were inconclusive, with none of the candidates receiving a clear majority. This, according to one reading of the reformed election laws, left the selection of the president in the hands of the Congress so that, despite the changes of the law, the election was not a direct one as had been planned.

Again, the campaigning was quite bitter and directed at the personalities of the candidates. However, exercising its somewhat uncertain prerogative to elect whomever it chose,

12 Busey, Notes on Costa Rican Democracy, p. 4.

13 U.S. Chargé Marshall Langhorne at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 64, 27 May 1913, 818.00/42, MC 669.

14 U.S. Chargé Marshall Langhorne at San José to the Secretary of State, 5 June 1913, 818.00/143, MC 669.

15 U.S. Chargé Marshall Langhorne at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 18, 9 May 1914, 818.00/45, MC 669.
the Congress selected Alfredo González Flores as President.\textsuperscript{16} In addition, a completely new slate of three candidates for the three Designados, or Vice Presidents, was chosen.\textsuperscript{17} Usually these were the select assistants of the president or the runners-up in the presidential voting. In this instance, on what appeared to be a whim of the Congress, the Designados were not chosen from the list of the previous candidates. The Congress was not governed by any specific legal ruling on this part of the issue. It should be remembered that since there were no real political parties or ideological differences to speak of among the candidates, a situation placing the runners-up in the Designado position would not necessarily present any grave problems.

There had been considerable politicking throughout the Congressional deliberations, with González Flores's candidacy advocated by a group led by the prominent Tinoco family.\textsuperscript{18} As a reward for this assistance, Federico Tinoco was chosen as the Minister of War in González Flores's cabinet. In addition, he received a vague promise of similar assistance from González Flores in a future presidential election.\textsuperscript{19}

Federico Tinoco and his family were members of the

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
oligarchy described above. They were not outstanding in wealth or reputation among their peers as evidenced by the lack of specific information about them. But they were capable, at the time of the 1914 election, of putting together a coalition in the Congress to achieve the election of González Flores. Since the Tinoco family had the political influence to accomplish this, it is somewhat puzzling that they did not seek to elect one of their own family. However, this probably can be answered by the politics of the day in that the time was not yet right for a Tinoco candidacy.

The unusual means by which González Flores was elected would be extremely important to subsequent events. According to at least one Costa Rican historian, the election was received with considerable indignation by the populace at large due to its affront to the dignity of the constitution.\textsuperscript{20} The Congressional choice of an individual who was not one of the original candidates would become a matter of some dispute as well. Whether the Congress had the right to overlook the three candidates who had undergone the popular vote would be increasingly questionable as the President's popularity waned, and the issue provided a point at which his enemies could strike. However, the role of the Tinoco family in the political maneuvers which brought about the election of González

Flores would be overlooked or simply forgotten.  

The personal involvement of the Tinocos in the election was important, especially in the rewards they were promised or thought they had been promised. In any event, it is important to remember that this election, despite its alleged popular beginnings, was like those which had preceded it in that it was an internal affair of the oligarchy rather than a universal reflection of Costa Rican public opinion.

González Flores as President proposed several reform programs, the most important of which were economic changes to meet recent financial crises. In attempting to establish relative fiscal stability for the nation, he proposed tax increases and some new taxes. The main thrust of this tax program would have been felt by the oligarchy, who bitterly resented any imposition of taxes upon their wealth. In some ways it is extremely difficult to comprehend González Flores's motivations for a program with such predictable reactions. However, it can only be said in his defense, for

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21 Ibid.

22 Special Report on the Political and Financial Situation of Costa Rica from Vice Consul Albert B. Pullen at Port Limon to the Secretary of State, 18 December 1917, F. W. 818.00/-- MC 669.

23 U.S. Chargé ad interim Stewart Johnson at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 124, 2 May 1918, 818.00/--, MC 669; U.S. Chargé E. J. Hale at San José to the Secretary of State, 31 January 1917, 818.00/67, MC 669.

24 Ibid.
lack of any contrary evidence, that this may have been the only viable avenue open to him for additional tax revenues. The discontent was heightened further by the bitterness felt at this reward for the assistance in securing González Flores's election, plus the fact that he attempted to stifle criticism of his measures by allegedly hindering the "freedom of the press" and of the vote of the populace in the Congressional elections of 1915.\textsuperscript{25} Although it is difficult to determine whether the ambition of Tinoco himself or the instigation of the oligarchs brought about succeeding events, the issue is not really a crucial one.\textsuperscript{26}

Further, there were negotiations in progress between González Flores and foreign investors who were interested in receiving oil exploration concessions from the Costa Rican government. González Flores exercised his influence in favor of one group of foreign businessmen, which stirred some serious animosity on the part of those who were left out, not to mention the Costa Ricans who were associated with these groups. One such group had forged rather strong ties with the Tinoco clan and hoped to benefit from the close association of the family with the government. When their proposal was passed over, the Greulich-Valentine or Sinclair-Greulich

\textsuperscript{25}León Fernández Guardia, \textit{Historia de Costa Rica}, II: 104.

\textsuperscript{26}U.S. Chargé ad interim Stewart Johnson at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 124, 2 May 1918, F.W. 818.00/\textemdash, MC 669.
group (the two names are interchangeable) conducted some rather indiscreet business with the Tinocos, which would have a serious bearing on the future course of events surrounding Tinoco. More will be said about this below.

The momentum against González Flores continued throughout his term. However, since reelection was not permissible by the Constitution, his return to the presidency was not of great concern until late in 1916 when rumors began to circulate that he either intended to seek reelection or at least control a successor of his choice, who clearly would not be Federico Tinoco. The issue was complicated by an alleged announcement from a prominent member of the oligarchy, Manuel Castro Quesada, that he would lead the reelection campaign for González Flores. The only source for this news of González Flores's intentions and Castro Quesada's role in the matter is Tinoco himself. A possible explanation for the assumption that González Flores sought his own continuation

27 Dr. Greulich was a United States investor who represented not only his own interests but also those of the Sinclair Oil Company. The Valentines, Lincoln G. and Washington S., were "agents at large" functioning for various interests throughout Latin America, in this instance for the Greulich-Sinclair concern.

28 W. H. Field (Montealegre & Bonilla, Import & Export), to J. H. Stabler, Department of State, 31 January 1917, 818.00/78, MC 669.

29 President Federico Tinoco to U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José, 27 January 1917, Enclosure in U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 111, 3 March 1917, 818.00/111, MC 669.
in power was that he was attempting to name his successor to the presidency. Since such a practice might be construed as a violation of free election laws, he may be culpable in part for the wrongs attributed to him in this matter. However, even pro-Tinoco sources do not directly maintain that González Flores intended to bypass constitutional elections for his chosen successor. Later events would not confirm or deny the allegations, but the fear among the oligarchy that González Flores would seek a second term or would use his power as an incumbent to forward a chosen successor who would continue his policies was strong. While they could obviously have prevented such abuses, the oligarchs would resent any interruption of the status quo and the potential loss of profit to their various business enterprises which such actions might represent.

On January 27, 1917, Federico Tinoco, with the assistance of his brother Joaquín and others, very peacefully seized the telegraph and radio facilities and, by late afternoon, he had been installed in the presidential palace, taking power on the basis of González Flores's unconstitutional intent to remain in office. González Flores, in the company

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of some of the members of his Cabinet and a few Congressmen, fled to the American legation where he was granted asylum pending the instruction of the State Department, which were delayed because of Tinoco's control of all outgoing communications. 32

Depending on the account which can be believed, the revolution of January, 1917 was either a bloody, cutthroat manifestation of Tinoco's power hunger, 33 or it approached comic opera proportions. 34 Since the accounts reflect the partisanship of the witnesses, it is likely that neither extreme is accurate. There were, however, few, if any, casualties reported 35 as a result of the coup; therefore, it can be assumed that the bloodthirsty description is considerably exaggerated. Further evidence is that González Flores and his group were allowed to leave the country unmolested. 36

9, F. W. 818.00/—, MC 669. This source will be cited hereinafter as _La Caída del Gobierno Constitucional_.


33 Ex-president Don Alfredo González Flores and Ex-Chargé to the U.S. Rafael Oreamuno to President Woodrow Wilson, 12 November 1918, 818.00/509, MC 669.

34 John M. Keith to U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José, 7 March 1917, Enclosure #1 in U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 113, 15 March 1917, 818.00/116, MC 669.

35 U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 113, 15 March 1917, 818.00/116, MC 669.

36 Ibid.
Tinoco's support for this coup came from several sources. Among these he claimed a wide popular following, with substantial support among the important people of Costa Rica and the approval of the majority of the Congress as the "savior of the country."\(^{37}\) It is difficult to uphold his claim to popular support. The views expressed in the national press were favorable to Tinoco,\(^{38}\) but since there were strict codes of censorship enforced by him, admitted by all sides of the question, press opinion is of little significance in answering this question. However, there was obviously no broad popular movement to bring about his downfall, and when he was finally supplanted, it was again by the powerful oligarchy which had brought him to power. In the interim, however, the country seemed to be united behind him and a "condition of complete harmony" existed.\(^{39}\)

There is another side to the possible sources of support for Tinoco's coup other than those motivated by his stated claim to solving an unconstitutional situation.\(^{40}\)

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\(^{38}\) *Proceso De La Restauración O La Intervención Americana En Costa Rica* (San José: Imprenta Librería Y Encuadernación Alsina, 1922), p. 21.

\(^{39}\) John M. Keith to U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José, 7 March 1917, Enclosure #1 in U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 113, 15 March 1917, 818.00/116, MC 669.

\(^{40}\) President Federico Tinoco to U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José, 27 January 1917, Enclosure in U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 111, 3 March 1917, 818.00/111, MC 669.
González Flores and many of his supporters would claim and insist they could prove that Tinoco had been paid to rebel against legally constituted authority by United States financial interests. This claim that Tinoco was a puppet of American capitalism referred to information which linked him to Lincoln G. Valentine, the representative of the Greulich oil interests. For the benefit of the United States State Department, a pamphlet of unknown authorship was published by the González Flores's lobby in Washington, which presented genuine documents proving that Valentine had planned to buy the favor of the Tinocos by granting them large portions of the capital stock of the oil corporation which would be formed to work the concession granted by the Costa Rican government. According to this pamphlet, Valentine had undertaken this plan when González Flores chose another concessionaire over the Greulich proposal. Tinoco then allegedly used the "constitutional" argument merely to deceive the people. This pamphlet was also presented to the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee as it took up the matter of recognition of the Tinoco government.

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42 Sworn Statement of Lincoln G. Valentine, Enclosure #2 in U.S. Minister William J. Price in Panama to the Secretary of State, No. 1868, 27 March 1918, F. W. 818.00/—, MC 669.
44 Ibid., p. 49.
credibility, it is unfortunate that there is no further information available concerning the origins of this pamphlet. It was one of a group of unnumbered documents preceding the regularly numbered documents in Microcopy 669.

Here again, the facts of the matter are somewhat difficult to ascertain. Valentine was by no means an idealistic individual who would be limited by the constitutional means available to him to get the concession if these proved impossible or would deprive him of profits. In the manner of lobbyists, he certainly was not above granting favors to influential individuals in the government who would further his cause. In the realm of Costa Rican politics, presents of stock and direct financial support for those governmental officials who would further one's cause were not frowned upon. In fact, such gifts and gratuities were considered part of the operating expenses of most major corporations. Thus, it is entirely likely that Valentine had paid the Tinocos to support his claim and would be willing to pay handsomely for the new Tinoco government to annul the concession granted to others by González Flores and grant it instead to the Greulich interests. It should be remembered that the evidence supporting the case against Tinoco and Valentine was a part of González Flores's attempt to bring about United States intervention in Costa Rica and it is thus difficult to determine the truth in the matter. However, it was concluded by

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45 Proceso de Restauracion, p. 15.
John Foster Dulles, acting as a special investigator for the State Department, that there had been absolutely no foreign involvement in the instigation of the coup and that the entire issue was one of domestic politics.46

In any case, after the substantial investments in time, effort, and money made by Valentine, the Greulich interests did not receive the concession which Tinoco granted to a British concern, nominally headed by a United States citizen, Amory.47 Valentine himself received less than courteous treatment by the Tinoco government, which at one point jailed him.48 It is simply not realistic to say that Tinoco would treat the source of his funds for revolution and continuation in power in this fashion. There may be some truth to the allegations that Valentine had influenced Tinoco and others who were dissatisfied with González Flores in planning the coup, but that is what Tinoco himself claimed publicly.49

The importance of this whole issue to this study is

46 John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of State, 1 May 1917, 818.00/142, MC 669.

47 U. S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 494, 11 March 1919, 818.00/571, MC 669.

48 Lincoln G. Valentine to W. H. Field, 1 February 1919, Enclosure in U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 494, 11 March 1919, 818.00/571, MC 669.

49 President Federico Tinoco to U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José, 27 January 1917, Enclosure in U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 111, 3 March 1917, 818.00/111, MC 669.
that the State Department and Woodrow Wilson chose to believe González Flores's claims about Tinoco's sources of support.

There were conflicting reports as to the popularity of Tinoco's regime, but due to the policies adopted by the Wilson administration, they chose to accept only those reports which supported the view that a president who rose to power without benefit of an election must be unpopular. The acceptance of González Flores in the United States legation and his subsequent welcome to Washington would further make it extremely difficult for Tinoco or his adherents to get a just hearing in Washington for their government. Even though Lincoln G. Valentine would come forward and sign an affidavit for the American Consul in San José swearing that he had not paid Tinoco to engineer the coup, this story was believed until the last day of the Tinoco regime.\(^{50}\) In addition, once Valentine had been ruled out as the source of funds for the coup, Minor C. Keith was proposed as a possible donor due to his support of the Tinoco regime.\(^{51}\) There was even consideration in the United States of treason charges against Keith for his activities which were viewed as inimical to the interests of the United States.\(^{52}\)

\(^{50}\) Ibid.

\(^{51}\) Memorandum of John Foster Dulles to Hon. Charles Warren, Department of Justice, 24 August 1917, 818.00/234a, MC 669.

\(^{52}\) Ibid.
The coup d'etat had other important ramifications for Costa Rican international affairs. First and foremost was the damage done to the constitution. John M. Keith,\textsuperscript{53} the nephew of Minor C. Keith and a long time resident of Costa Rica, who, though a United States citizen, had married into a prominent Costa Rican family, believed Tinoco had no alternative but to rewrite the constitution. According to Keith, the coup d'etat completely discredited the constitution as if it were a "humpty dumpty" which could not be put together again.\textsuperscript{54} Keith argued, however, that this was not due to any lack of democratic spirit on the part of the Costa Ricans or Tinoco, but rather reflected the fact that the Latin American mind did not associate the spirit of a democracy with the man-made instrument of a constitution. Like all other man-made devices, constitutions occasionally died and had to be replaced by newer and younger instruments.\textsuperscript{55} Therefore, the loss of a constitution could not be viewed as the loss of a democracy, but merely as a change or improvement on the accessories of democracy, and in this case, since the revolt

\textsuperscript{53}John Keith had extensive business ties in Costa Rica. He did not, as had his uncle, sell the major part of his holdings to the United Fruit Company. Keith expressed a knowledgeable sympathy for the Costa Ricans and Tinoco.

\textsuperscript{54}John M. Keith to U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José, 7 March 1917, Enclosure #2 in U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 113, 15 March 1917, 818.00/116, MC 669.

\textsuperscript{55}Ibid.
had come in response to a corrupt government, the revolt
could be viewed as the first step in reform. However, this
view was not shared by the United States government in the
policies which it adopted toward Tinoco, as will be discussed
in the next chapter.

Relevant to the internal affairs of Costa Rica, how­
ever, is the fact that the gradual severing of economic ties
with the United States resulting from nonrecognition con­
tributed to the general economic instability of the Tinoco gov­
ernment and, as United States Minister E. J. Hale had pre­
dicted, its eventual political demise. Politically, the
tacit support of the United States for González Flores's con­
tentions concerning Tinoco's motives did Tinoco grave damage.
In effect, the United States harbored Costa Rican dissidents,
encouraged them in their resistance to the de facto govern­
ment and thus gave heart to those dissidents who were in Cos­
ta Rica, preventing Tinoco from ever establishing real politi­
cal stability.

In spite of these handicaps, Tinoco managed to hold
his presidency together for over two years. During that
time, according to the account one consults, there was either

56 Ibid.

57 U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José to the Secre­
tary of State, 18 August 1917, 818.00/134, MC 669.

58 León Fernández Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, II: 105.
democratic rule based on a truly constitutional presidency (Tinoco had held elections within four months of attaining power) or there was severe oppression supported by phony, engineered elections led by a tyrant, as González Flores contended. In this instance, it is not too difficult to determine the truth. There was certainly some lack of political freedom under the Tinoco regime. But when it would not have been necessary to do so, he held elections to legalize his position. In addition, Tinoco arranged for a new constitution to be written. For the reasons noted above by John M. Keith, this was an absolute necessity for his duration in power and for the continued health of the democratic system in Costa Rica. However, these same facts viewed by a new United States Consul in San José, Benjamin F. Chase, led to far different conclusions. According to the individuals who held that post during the Tinoco presidency (Primarily Benjamin F. Chase and Stewart Johnson), there were constant purges of opposition leadership, the jails were full of political prisoners and free men were afraid to walk the streets. As to the first contention, it was only natural that Tinoco remove those opposed to his presidency from all positions in the government. Second, the political prisoners received an early

59 U.S. Minister E.J. Hale at San José to the Secretary of State, 2 April 1917, 818.00/123, MC 669.

60 U.S. Chargé ad interim Stewart Johnson at San José to the Secretary of State, 2 June 1917, 818.00/164, MC 669.
amnesty, with González Flores and all of his main officers allowed to leave Costa Rica in peace within a matter of weeks after the coup. As to the third contention, even the State Department was a little leery of Chase's evaluation, since he had requested gun boats off the Costa Rican coast to protect American lives and property. It was noted in a State Department memorandum that Chase was being a little "hysterical" about the state of affairs in Costa Rica.

Once again it is important to emphasize that while Tinoco was no altruist, it is the opinion of this author that he did the best job possible as president under some extremely difficult circumstances. If there was political bribery and graft, this was as much a part of González Flores's presidency as it was of Tinoco's. If there were concessions to the interests of foreign capitalists on Tinoco's part, this was also a part of González Flores's strategy to achieve the most advantageous financial arrangements for the nation. It is important to remember on this issue that, although the charge that Tinoco was bought by Valentine was made, the concession which was at stake was finally granted to another individual. Finally, if there was a repression of opposition spokesmen and leaders under the Tinoco regime, this, too, was a part of the long-established political tradition in Costa Rica. Had Tinoco,

62 Acting Secretary of State Polk to the American Mission in Paris, 15 May 1919, 818.00/613, MC 669.
as Minister of War, spoken out against González Flores's political policies and presidency, he would have been replaced in office at the very least.

When in the summer of 1919 Tinoco's regime fell, there was no great victory to be celebrated for the forces of right and democracy. The physical defeat of the Tinoco regime was accomplished by revolutionary forces harbored in Nicaragua with the encouragement or at least the tacit approval of the United States. The leadership of these forces was comprised of the members of the oligarchy who were as disenchanted with Tinoco in 1919 as they had been with González Flores in 1917. Finally involved in that defeat was the strangulation of the international side of the Costa Rican national image. It is a sign of the importance of that international side that the deprivation of normal relationships with the rest of the world community of nations, would, within a matter of two years, bring about the fall of an immensely popular regime which had had as its starting point the restoration of constitutional rule and the support of the powerful oligarchy. However, the question of Costa Rican internationalism during the Tinoco period and in the years immediately following them will be discussed in the next chapter.

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63 Don Alfredo González Flores and Rafael Oreamuno to President Woodrow Wilson, 12 November 1918, 818.00/509, MC 669.
CHAPTER III

THE TINOCO REGIME AND RECOGNITION

(JANUARY, 1917-MAY, 1918)

In the matter of the recognition of the Tinoco coup d'etat by the United States and by the rest of the world, there were a number of legal questions to be resolved. First, it was necessary to consider the standing in international law of Tinoco's government. Traditionally, recognition was granted to de facto governments by the majority of nations due to the impartiality of such a position. To adopt a policy of de jure recognition implied partisanship, since it involved interpretation of the law of another state. Conditions could be added to the de facto recognition, such as the United States's addition of the ability of an incumbent regime to pay the nation's debts before being judged de facto. This, of course, presumed that the incumbent regime was not really out of line with the political philosophy of those nations from whom recognition was sought. However, with a morally righteous statesman like Woodrow Wilson in control of

1Neumann, Recognition, p. 5.

2Ibid., p. 7.
the mechanisms of international relations, there was a shift in the emphasis from de facto to de jure recognition, and the addition of the concept of constitutionalism to the consideration of de jure status.\textsuperscript{3} This implied that the new government, in order to achieve the status of a recognized state, must be in compliance with the body of law of the nation in question, as interpreted by other nations. In effect, there was to be a constitutionally valid line of succession from one government to the next, much like a royal blood line in its application.

Thus, in the case of Tinoco's coup, the problem was already clouded by the question of Tinoco's legitimacy within the context of Costa Rican law. If, as Tinoco himself maintained, González Flores had preempted the constitution in seeking reelection,\textsuperscript{4} then he was not legitimately entitled to a continuation in power. However, this assumption did not extend legitimacy to Tinoco or to any other usurper, unless it could be proven that he had acted within the provisions of the constitution. The proper legal remedy would have been simply to defeat González Flores in his bid for reelection. However, this too was a complicated issue. As the incumbent

\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., p. 13.

\textsuperscript{4}"Proclama del General don Federico Tinoco al Pueblo de Costa Rica," from \textit{La Gazeta}, 28 enero 1917 in \textit{La Caída del Gobierno Constitucional}, p. 9; Federico Tinoco to U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José, 27 January 1917, Enclosure #1 in U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 111, 3 March 1917, 818.00/111, MC 669.
president, González Flores controlled the very closed Costa Rican electoral system. In addition, one of the marks of his regime had been the electoral frauds perpetrated on the people of Costa Rica. So, it might be argued from Tinoco's viewpoint that since González Flores had effectively cut off all legal remedies, revolution was justifiable.

This left Tinoco no other avenue but revolt in the context of the Jeffersonian nineteenth century liberal philosophy which he apparently espoused. The next stage in the legal complex then became whether Tinoco was the appropriate leader of any such revolution. Obviously, Woodrow Wilson, who referred to Tinoco as "...that impossible person," did not regard him as such. Moreover, Wilson would not allow that there was even a need for revolution in Costa Rica, adhering to the Tobar Doctrine of the 1907 Central American treaties and his own 1913 declaration, which repudiated all changes of government by revolutionary means. It would be his view that there was absolutely no excuse for revolution as a means of remedying the political or legal problems of the


6Federico Tinoco to U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José, 27 January 1917, Enclosure #1 in U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 111, 3 March 1917, 818.00/111, MC 669.

7Woodrow Wilson to the Secretary of State, 6 August 1919, 818.00/824, MC 669.

8Neumann, Recognition, p. 13.
Costa Rican nation. All appeals by the "advocates of democracy" in Costa Rica to the contrary, Wilson would not modify his stand that Tinoco had seized power without legal right to do so.

An understanding of the nature of the revolution and its ramifications upon the constitutional structure of Costa Rican government would have been most useful to Wilson in his decisions on the Tinoco regime. The comments of John M. Keith, referred to in the previous chapter, would have provided much of the information required to make an intelligent and just decision. Unfortunately, Keith's insights were not shared by the policy makers in the United States, although they had received a copy of his letter to United States Minister Hale in Costa Rica as a part of Hale's regular dispatches.

In many respects, Tinoco was most unlucky in that it was Woodrow Wilson to whom he had to look for acceptance. To Wilson, as to any righteous and moralistic United States democrat, there could be no excuse for the destruction of a constitution nor of a constitutionally elected government.


10Chargé ad interim Stewart Johnson at San José to the Secretary of State, 26 April 1918, 818.00/111, MC 669.

11John M. Keith to U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José, 7 March 1917, Enclosure #1 in U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 113, 15 March 1917, 818.00/116, MC 669.
The United States Minister in Costa Rica during the coup, E. J. Hale, disagreed with the home government. Basically in agreement with his friend, John M. Keith, Hale indicated in his reports to the Secretary of State that while the revolutionary nature of Tinoco's rise to power was deplorable, he felt that for practical reasons and out of deference to the right of the nation to self determination, the government should be recognized. Hale was not alone in his conclusion. John Foster Dulles, a Special Agent for the Secretary of State, recommended recognition of the Tinoco regime because he observed that there could be no guarantees that any successor government would be any improvement over Tinoco. Further, Dulles noted that Tinoco was inclined to refuse financial aid which had been offered by the German community in Costa Rica in order that he remain clearly pro-Ally in the war effort. The possibility that Tinoco might turn to the pro-German group in Costa Rica was also raised by the commanding officer of the United States military forces in the Panama Canal zone. General Plummer also warned that this would threaten the de-

12 U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 113, 15 March 1917, 818.00/116, MC 669.
13 Summary of the Confidential Report on Costa Rica by John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of State, 21 May 1917, 818.00/200, MC 659.
14 Ibid.
15 Report of Brigadier General Plummer, Commanding General, Panama Canal Zone, 24 May 1917, Enclosure in Secretary of War to the Secretary of State, 8 June 1917, 818.00/166, MC 669.
fense of the Canal zone. His concern extended further to the possible restoration of González Flores, whom he reported was decidedly pro-German. In spite of the fact that Hale had such support for his views, he was quietly replaced in April, 1917. There is no correspondence which directly indicated the reasons for his removal, but his successors at the United States Legation in San José were far less sympathetic to the Costa Ricans, Tinoco, and John M. Keith's advice than Hale had been.

The problem which confronted the Wilson administration can be further clarified in view of the fact that Tinoco, after the fact, decided that González Flores had not been constitutionally elected, even though Tinoco was himself a part of the government. The constitutionality of González Flores's election was supported by some of the legal advisors called in by the State Department to assess the matter, but it was not this issue that concerned Wilson. He simply refused to recognize the government of Federico Tinoco and the changed constitution which it enacted because of their revolutionary origins. Furthermore, Wilson either directly or by omission allowed the United States to appear to support any and all insurgent groups against Tinoco. Although he would later deny that this had

16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
been the case, it is likely that without the encouragement that the United States would not intervene, many of the insurgents would never have initiated their movements. Nicaragua, in particular, was careless in letting it be known that various Costa Rican insurgent groups were forming within its boundaries and that no action would be taken against them beyond meaningless warnings.19

So extreme was the dislike and discontent of the United States with the Tinoco regime that at one point it entertained the idea of funding González Flores to lead an expeditionary force from the United States against Tinoco, with the assurance of special agents of the State Department that this would turn the tide in an irreversible fashion against Tinoco.20

It can be strongly argued that only the involvement of the United States in the World War at that time prevented the implementation of this plan, but it was fortunate for the future relations between the two countries that it did not do so.

The issue of United States recognition was important to Tinoco. The lack of an accredited relationship with the

19 Senator George H. Moses to the Acting Secretary of State Polk, 19 January 1919, 818.00/542, MC 669; Acting Secretary of State Polk to Senator George H. Moses, 28 January 1919, 818.00/542, MC 669; U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Political Relations Between Costa Rica and Other States, 1910-1929, National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy 671. Referred to hereinafter as MC 671.

20 Memorandum of John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of State, 27 August 1917, 818.00/315, MC 669.
United States was an economic death knell for the Tinoco regime, coming as it did hard on the heels of the German submarine blockade of Europe, and the subsequent shift of Costa Rican trade to the United States. There was the continual fear that the United States might choose to extend the nonrecognition so that United States citizens would be forbidden to trade with Costa Rica, which would be a rapid and painful death for the nation as well. In fact, one of E. J. Hale's replacements, Stewart Johnson, suggested that the "requisition" for the war effort of United States ships used for the exportation of Costa Rican crops would immediately topple the most stable government.

In addition, there was the fact that the nonrecognition policy severely restricted the involvement of United States citizens in Costa Rican economic affairs in general. As has been mentioned, there was consideration given to prosecution of Minor C. Keith for his involvement with Tinoco, which was precisely the kind of pressure the Tinoco regime feared might be exerted. For the purpose of clarity, the issue of United States and nonrecognition and its impact on Costa Rican internationalism will be discussed at a later point in this study.


22 U.S. Chargé ad interim Stewart Johnson at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 154, 11 August 1917, 818.00/210, MC 669.
The pressures exerted by Alfredo González Flores and his party in Washington, D.C. upon President Wilson to effectuate a nonrecognition policy were not so significant as they would have liked to believe. They would claim that it was only on the basis of their appeal to Wilson for justice that he decided not to extend recognition to Tinoco under any circumstances. However, this was not quite the case. For Wilson, as for all idealists, there was simply no gray area in the decision not to recognize Tinoco. The fact that he was a revolutionary leader, no matter what the cause he espoused, was enough to deny him the legal status he sought in the world community of nations. Tinoco, and a variety of the supporters of his coup, would claim that such rigidity condemned the people of Costa Rica, as well as those of the rest of the world, to endure tyrannies, unjust rulers, and all violations of their natural rights at the hands of anyone who could manipulate an election in his own favor as González Flores had done.

The issue of Tinoco's recognition by the United States was not a simple matter. There were arguments on both sides of the issue which complicated the policy decisions developed by Wilson's subordinates and which were quite separate from

23 Alfredo González Flores, Manifesto a Mis Compatriotas (San José: Imprenta Minerva, 1919), pp. 4-5.

24 Federico Tinoco to U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José, 27 January 1917, Enclosure #1 in U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 111, 3 March 1917, 818.00/111, MC 669.
Wilson's personal moral decision. First, there was the involvement of foreign investors and interests in the instigation and support of the Tinoco regime. The role of Lincoln G. Valentine and the Greulich oil interests, which was discussed in the previous chapter, would be reopened and reexamined repeatedly throughout the two years of Tinoco's tenure at the insistence of González Flores and his adherents in Washington.25 In the view of these individuals, the interests of American capital in Costa Rica, which had been thwarted by González Flores's plans for the nation's economic stability and independence, would bring about the Tinoco coup and control its course.26 As has been demonstrated, however, the individuals involved in this particular concession later, quite vehemently, denied these charges.27 The facts of the case are extremely difficult to ascertain, but it is evident that the favored position which Valentine sought with the Tinoco regime and the favored position which González Flores claimed Valentine had received is simply not borne out by the facts or the treatment Valentine subsequently received at the hands of Tinoco.28

25 Alfredo González Flores, El Petróleo y la Política en Costa Rica (San José: Imprenta Trejos Años, 1920), passim.

26 La Caída del Gobierno Constitucional, p. 52.

27 Lincoln G. Valentine to W. H. Field, 1 February 1919, Enclosure in U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 494, 11 March 1919, 818.00/571, MC 669.

28 Ibid.
While it may well be true that the search for petroleum off the Coast of Costa Rica was of great interest to entrepreneurs of several nationalities during this period, it is unlikely that the economy of Costa Rica would have changed overnight from an agriculturally dominated one to one of an industrial character. Then, too, the big money normally associated with oil and its discovery would not have been in evidence at the early stages of exploration. In 1922, there was a controversy over the failure of various concessionaires to pay the government appropriate fees for their grants. They claimed in their own defense that they had found no oil and therefore could not share the profits of such oil with the Costa Rican nation. So it is unlikely that during the Tinoco presidency any substantial amounts were actually paid out to Costa Ricans. Some fees may have been granted to obtain concessions and shares of future profits promised, but without some production to pay the bills, there was likely to be little more than promises.


30 Ibid.

31 In the evidence presented by González Flores in the case against the Greulich concern, reference was made to providing Tinoco with capital stock in the oil corporation being formed. Obviously, there would be no income from these shares until oil was being produced. La Caída del Gobierno Constitucional, p. 52.
Another factor that complicated the recognition of Tinoco in the eyes of Wilson's subordinates was the involvement of Minor C. Keith with the Tinoco regime. At first, it was thought that Keith had interests of a purely business nature, separate from official affairs of state. Subsequently, Keith was accused of supporting the Tinoco coup for his own political purposes, or of supporting it for the concessions which he might receive, which would seem to put him in the same category as Valentine. Here, too, the facts are somewhat difficult to ascertain. An investigation was undertaken by the United States Department of Justice at the insistence of the Department of State concerning the scope of Keith's involvement with Tinoco in the interests of pursuing a criminal case against him for his activities to the detriment of the United States. It was found that Keith had backed various bond issues, in return for which he had received a variety of concessions, including cattle grazing.

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32 U.S. Chargé ad interim Stewart Johnson at San José to the Secretary of State, 28 July 1917, 818.00/193, MC 669.

33 U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, 4 December 1918, 818.00/520, MC 669.

34 Summary of the evidence adduced in the Supreme Court, Special Term, Part III, Before Mr. Justice Greenbaum In the Case of Lardizabal vs. Valentine, 19 January 1918, and Statements made by Witnesses to Counsel and Department of Justice Concerning the Revolution Which Occurred in Costa Rica, 27 January 1917, 818.00/385, MC 669.

35 Ibid.
lands and a Pacific Coast shipping monopoly. In fact, it should be noted that these concessions were not made to Keith outright but had to undergo Congressional approval. In some instances, such approval was quite difficult to achieve. The only arrangement between Keith and Tinoco which could not be construed as a "good business" deal for Keith was his guarantee of a shipping service from Costa Rica's Pacific Coast with no guaranteed profit. But from Keith's point of view, this investment may have paid off in other, far more profitable ventures. What might be an accurate description of the Keith interest in the political stability of Costa Rica. Thus he felt it important to support a de facto government which demonstrated a measure of stability in order to maintain "business as usual" as much as possible. However, to observers at the State Department, who looked for a culprit in the Tinoco affair, Minor C. Keith was an excellent choice.

36 U.S. Chargé ad interim Stewart Johnson at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 143, 20 July 1917, 818.00/73, MC 669.

37 Specific reference is to a cattle concession sought by Keith and presented by Tinoco for Congressional approval which took a great deal of effort on Tinoco's part to reach approval. U.S. Chargé ad interim Stewart Johnson at San José to the Secretary of State, 11 October 1917, 818.00/73, MC 669.

38 Memorandum of John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of State, 15 January 1919, 818.00/307, MC 669; U.S. Chargé ad interim Stewart Johnson at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 154, 11 August 1917, 818.00/210, MC 669.


40 Woodrow Wilson to the Secretary of State, 21 July 1919, 818.00/306, MC 669.
Surprisingly enough, although his nephew John M. Keith was also financially tied to the regime, and was quite outspoken in his support of it, he was not found culpable in the same degree as was his uncle.41

There were other issues involved in the arguments on the recognition of the Tinoco regime for the Wilson administration. As was noted previously, some strategists felt that the defense of the Panama Canal Zone was extremely vital if the United States were to become involved in the European war.42 A failure to recognize Tinoco might throw the government to the German side in the conflict, especially in view of the rather large and active German community in San José which had repeatedly offered Tinoco funding.43 There were those who argued that Tinoco ought to be recognized, since he was anti German whereas González Flores had been decidedly pro German.44 This was demonstrated by the fact that one of

41 John M. Keith also subscribed extensively to the Tinoco bond issues. U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, Telegram, 19 May 1918, 818.00/434, MC 669.

42 Report of Brigadier General Plummer, Commanding General, Panama Canal Zone, 24 May 1917, Enclosure in Secretary of War to the Secretary of State, 8 June 1917, 818.00/166, MC 669.

43 Summary of John Foster Dulles’s Confidential Report on Costa Rica to the Secretary of State, 21 May 1917, 818.00/200, MC 669.

44 U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 89, 15 November 1914, 818.00G58/02, MC 669; Special Agent John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of State, 1 May 1917, 818.00/142, MC 669.
González Flores's closest advisors was Juan Kumpel, a German.\textsuperscript{45}

It was also reported that Tinoco had reopened a series of prewar negotiations with German interests for the purchase of coal lands in Costa Rica.\textsuperscript{46} The worry over such an entanglement was serious but not serious enough to prompt President Wilson to act, even though there were also reports that the German government had offered to recognize Tinoco. There was no reaction, probably because Tinoco refused the German offer.\textsuperscript{47}

It seems puzzling that Tinoco would have refused the German offers of aid and recognition, given his eagerness to achieve recognition and legitimacy. However, in his refusal of German offers, Tinoco probably acted for practical reasons. For the most beneficial results of recognition, the resumption of high levels of trade with Europe, so long as the United States withheld recognition, was necessary. Costa Rica would therefore have to wait until the conclusion of the war.

\textsuperscript{45} Baker, "Wilson's Non-Recognition Policy," p. 12; U.S. Minister William J. Price to the Secretary of State, 14 March 1917, 818.00/115, MC 669; U.S. Chargé at Panama to the Secretary of State, No. 1298, 14 March 1917, 818.00/118, MC 669.

\textsuperscript{46} U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, 3 May 1918, 818.00/2, MC 669.

\textsuperscript{47} U.S. Chargé in Venezuela to the Secretary of State, No. 1019, 12 October 1917, 818.00/249, MC 669; Summary of Mr. Dulles's Confidential Report on Costa Rica to the Secretary of State, 21 May 1917, 818.00/200, MC 669.
before such a program would be effective. Further, since Costa Rica itself had no merchant marine fleet, it was dependent upon other nations, in this instance primarily on United States's shipping, to deliver its products to markets. While nonrecognition by the United States continued, it would not be a practical policy for Tinoco or any other Costa Rican president to antagonize Woodrow Wilson and the United States any further by alignment in any way with Germany, even the acceptance of recognition. Therefore, it can be assumed that Tinoco acted out of practical good sense with regard to his German policy.

Another part of the concern engendered by the war was the proximity of Costa Rica to the Panama Canal Zone and the threat to the defense of the Canal if Costa Rica took an anti-American stance in the war.48 How great a threat Costa Rica alone could have posed to the Canal is questionable. However, the importance of the Panama Canal to the United States policy in the Caribbean cannot be overestimated.49 It is important to remember that at this time Costa Rica had no standing army as such and relied only on its militia units and local police forces so that outside troop or naval assistance would have been necessary for any direct threat to the Canal. By 1918, however, 

48 Report of Brigadier General Plummer, Commanding General, Panama Canal Zone, 24 May 1917, Enclosure in Secretary of War to the Secretary of State, 8 June 1917, 818.00/166, MC 669.

49 Howland, American Relations, p. 311.
with the lessened potential for direct German support, it was unlikely that Costa Rica posed any serious threat beyond that of a nuisance. It is difficult to examine this question clearly, since at no time did Tinoco take an anti-Ally stand in the war. Had he done so, it might have prompted an entirely different approach from the United States.

In the issue of Tinoco's recognition, the war and the safety of the Western Hemisphere received much mention from individuals who were not primarily motivated in that direction because they knew of its importance to President Wilson. Nonetheless, there were other arguments advanced to Wilson and his subordinates for the recognition of Tinoco. Not the least among these were the concerns of American businessmen who had interests in Costa Rica or who were intending to become involved there through recently granted Tinoco concessions. Letters arrived at the State Department throughout the Tinoco tenure from a wide variety of businessmen imploring the United States government to recognize Tinoco because delay of recognition would cost American citizens hard earned profits, not to mention the taxes which the government would miss as a consequence.

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50 Woodrow Wilson to Secretary of State Lansing, 3 April 1918, Baker, Wilson's Life & Letters, 8:70; U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, 4 December 1918, 818.00/520, MC 669; Monge Alfaro, Historia de Costa Rica, p. 254.

51 William Sulzer to the Secretary of State, 30 January 1917, 818.00/63, MC 669; W. H. Field to Woodrow Wilson, Enclo-
The response of the Wilson administration to these inquiries and requests was, of course, an unqualified "No!" Wilson indicated in fact that he felt loyal American businessmen would cease all business affairs in Costa Rica so long as Tinoco remained in power.\textsuperscript{52} Failing that, he entertained some direct action against these businessmen who did not follow his advice,\textsuperscript{53} as in the case of Minor C. Keith. While Keith had achieved some measure of notoriety for his activities in Costa Rica because of the size of his investments and the stature of his prestige there, he was not unique in his involvement. At the same time that attempts were made to exert pressure on the Wilson administration, the same individuals were also advising and encouraging Tinoco with regard to his course toward Wilson.\textsuperscript{54} There was even one report that Keith was responsible for advising Tinoco to declare war on Germany as a sure avenue to the recognition of the United States.\textsuperscript{55} While his motives

\begin{footnotes}
\item[52]William Sulzer to the Secretary of State, 30 January 1917, 818.00/63, MC 669.
\item[54]William Sulzer to the Secretary of State, 30 January 1917, 818.00/63, MC 669.
\item[55]U.S. Consul ad interim Stewart Johnson at San José to the Secretary of State, 19 July 1917, 818.00/306, MC 669.
\end{footnotes}
may not have been altruistic, Keith, like Tinoco, probably sought the most advantageous position possible for Costa Rica. This could only be realistically interpreted as a pro-Ally stance and at the optimum, a cobelligerency with the United States. However, none of these arguments was taken to heart by Wilson, although at various times he did reflect some irritation that materialistic interests of businessmen would interfere with principle. He also refused to allow the profits of American businessmen to involve him in an "intrigue" in Costa Rica which would have brought about Tinoco's replacement. Therefore, it might be said that while Wilson's moral stand on the issue of recognition was not open to suggestion from the standpoint of pecuniary gain, neither was it open to the suggestion of fomenting further revolution to right an alleged wrong. However, as will be demonstrated below, Wilson would not take any negative position toward the revolution which was eventually begun against Tinoco from Nicaragua despite its violation of provisions of the Tobar Doctrine and the 1907 Washington Treaties.

The businessmen who had no luck with Woodrow Wilson or his subordinates in the State Department next turned to the Congress. Senator Lodge asked the White House about the delays


57 Woodrow Wilson to Secretary of State Lansing, 3 April 1918, ibid., 8:70.
in recognition of the de facto regime on behalf of several important business interests included among his constituency.58 There were hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the issue of recognition, prompted by the presence of González Flores and his cohorts in Washington.59 However, contrary to their wishes in the matter, Senator George H. Moses, sponsor of a subsequent resolution for immediate recognition of the Tinoco regime, was not impressed by their lobbying efforts or evidence.60

Tinoco did not go unrepresented in the matter. Early in his administration he had employed the services of the prominent law firm of Douglas, O'Bear and Douglas, who numbered among their attorneys the former Secretary of State under Wilson, William Jennings Bryan.61 Bryan communicated directly with President Wilson on the matter of Tinoco's recognition, only to be rebuffed.62 Wilson asked Bryan to remain uninvolved


59Don Alfredo González Flores and Rafael Oreamuno to Woodrow Wilson, 12 November 1918, 818.00/509, MC 669.


in the Tinoco affair but failed in that effort. Bryan was paid handsomely for his involvement as a prestigious lobbyist for Tinoco in Washington, and it is probably as a result of his efforts, along with a few of the other pressures brought to bear, that the Moses Resolution reached the Senate floor at all. Unfortunately for Tinoco, the Congressional deliberations and lobbying took a great deal of time, and as González Flores and Benjamin F. Chase had predicted, time was his undoing. Before the matter came to a final vote, Tinoco had been overthrown. However, this did not occur before President Wilson had to answer some rather penetrating questions posed by the Senators concerning his activity or lack thereof in regard to Central American affairs relating to Costa Rica.

For example, by the time the hearings got under way, the United States was overlooking the revolutionary movements sponsored in and launched from Nicaragua against Tinoco.

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63 Woodrow Wilson to William Jennings Bryan, 19 July 1918, ibid., 8:286.

64 Hibben, William Jennings Bryan, pp. 361, 376.

65 Manual Castro Quesada to the Secretary of State, 28 February 1917, F. W. 818.00/—, MC 669; Don Alfredo González Flores and Rafael Oreamuno to Woodrow Wilson, 12 November 1918, 818.00/509, MC 669; U.S. Chargé Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 573, 818.00/658, MC 669.

66 Earl B. Gaddis, Secretary of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to F. K. Polk, Acting Secretary of State, 16 December 1918, 818.00/522, MC 669.

67 President Woodrow Wilson to the American Legation in San José, 29 December 1917, 818.00/287 1/2, MC 669. This dispatch comments on the diplomatic difficulties which Wilson
Although González Flores was worried about the warnings sent out by the State Department to Nicaragua,68 and such activity was expressly forbidden by the Washington treaties of 1907, the intent of the United States in the matter was obvious. These same treaties were those by which Wilson refused to recognize Tinoco's government. But an issue of even greater concern to the Senate was the failure of the United States to extend recognition to Tinoco once Costa Rica had declared war on Germany in May, 1918, so the question of aid to revolutionaries was put in the background.69 For the sake of clarity, the declaration of war and its ramifications will be considered in a succeeding chapter.

The pressures brought to bear on the Wilson administration to recognize Tinoco were minimal compared to the pressures brought to bear on Tinoco to achieve that recognition. First and foremost were the economic problems encountered by his regime as a consequence of the nonrecognition policy.70

foresaw if the movements were encouraged or even given tacit approval by the United States.

68 Don Alfredo González Flores and Rafael Oreamuno to Woodrow Wilson, 12 November 1918, 818.00/509, MC 669.

69 Earl B. Gaddis, Secretary of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to F. K. Polk, Acting Secretary of State, 16 December 1918, 818.00/522, MC 669; Woodrow Wilson to the Secretary of State, 5 August 1919, 818.00/807, MC 669; Ricardo Fernández Guardia, Cartilla Histórica de Costa Rica (Sexta Edición, San José: Librería e Imprenta Escolares, 1933), p. 126.

70 U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José to the Secretary of State, 18 April 1918, 818.00/134, MC 669.
While there was never any embargo or quarantine of Costa Rica, there were apparently a number of businessmen who held back investments from Costa Rica until such time as the relations between that nation and the United States were regularized. Tinoco became so desperate on the issue of recognition that at one point he offered to cede the Cocos Islands to the United States and to provide territory for a United States military installation in Costa Rica in return for recognition. The United States was not at this time, nor would it be in the future, interested in such a proposition, although the islands would be assessed closely for their potential strategic value.

The necessity of achieving United States recognition was all the more important for Tinoco, since several nations declared that they intended to follow the lead of the United States regarding recognition of Costa Rica. Although this tendency would be modified as Tinoco maintained himself in power for a time, the initial damage done to Costa Rican stature was severe. European nations, favorably impressed by the

72Special Agent John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of State, 16 April, 1918, 818.00/142a, MC 669.
73Internal Memorandum, Department of State, Stabler to the Secretary of State, 25 June 1917, 818.00/171, MC 669--France; Internal Memorandum, Department of State, 19 April 1918, 818.00/404, MC 669--Sweden. Both notes refer to unofficial visits of members of the respective nations' legations in Washington to the State Department to sound out United States attitudes and to indicate the policy plans of their nation.
declaration of war on the part of Costa Rica, would soon seem to realize that Tinoco had maintained himself in power successfully for an ample period of time to be considered a de facto government. The reactions of the European powers will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

Within the Latin American community, the response was not unanimous. Within the limited sphere of Central America where United States influence can be said to have been the strongest in the early twentieth century, there was almost unanimous disregard for Wilson's warnings. Even though Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, acting on Wilson's instructions, warned that the Central American nations would be viewed in a distinctly unfriendly light if they recognized Tinoco, all of the Central and South American states except Nicaragua and Panama eventually did so.

These states hesitated for a time in their recognition to insure that Tinoco would be able to sustain himself in power and that the United States would not take any direct action against him. Although Wilson considered a suggested invasion against Tinoco, he did not authorize it, choosing

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74 Circular letter to all American Missions in Central America (except Costa Rica) from the Secretary of State, 21 September 1917, 818.00/231b, MC 669.
75 Neumann, Recognition, p. 18.
76 U. S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, 18 June 1919, 818.00/703, MC 669.
instead the middle course of nonrecognition. The invasion was suggested to Wilson by the Special Agent of the State Department, John Foster Dulles. Dulles's plan was based on the belief that popular discontent with the Tinoco government in Costa Rica would prompt a revolutionary movement against it if a spark were ignited. Therefore, Dulles suggested that the United States government discreetly arm and supply González Flores and a band of his supporters and provide them with transportation to Costa Rica. Once they had landed on Costa Rican shores, the populace would rise in support of their movement and Tinoco would be overthrown. This strategy, which sounds very much like the United States activity surrounding the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion into Cuba in 1961, was never tested and never got beyond the stage of an internal memorandum. Nonetheless, it does demonstrate the strength of sentiment against the prolongation of Tinoco's presidency.

However, the choice of nonrecognition by the United States allowed the small nations of Central America to do what they pleased with respect to Tinoco, whereas an invasion would not have. In fact, aid was received by him at various times

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78 Memorandum of John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of State, 27 August 1917, 818.00/315, MC 669.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
from the Cabrera administration in Guatemala. 81 Part of the explanation for the rebellion of the Central American states against the stated wishes of the United States may be found in the fact that there was speculation by some of the Central American leadership that the United States refused recognition to prevent any further discussion of a Central American union. 82

Responding to this favorable climate in Central America, Tinoco sent special missions to the other Central American republics seeking aid and comfort from them and their advice on how to achieve United States recognition. 83 He also attempted to enlist their aid in convincing Wilson of the justice of his position. 84 However, Tinoco did not rely solely on the agency of other governments to press his case. In addition to his missions to Latin America, he also funded agents

81U.S. Chargé ad interim Stewart Johnson at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 206, 19 December 1917, 818.00/298, MC 669; Memorandum from Mr. Robbins, Latin American Division, Department of State, to the Secretary of State, 7 March 1917, 818.00/108, MC 669; American Legation in Guatemala to the Secretary of State, 17 June 1919, 818.00/697, MC 669.

82Minister in Honduras, Dennis, to the Secretary of State, 28 May 1925, 813.00/1241, Reference Note 818.00/1118, MC 669.

83U.S. Chargé ad interim Stewart Johnson at San José to the Secretary of State, 15 October 1917, 818.00/242, MC 669; American Legation in Honduras to the Secretary of State, 12 June 1919, 818.00/681, MC 669.

84Legation of El Salvador in Washington to the Secretary of State, 7 July 1919, 818.00/739, MC 669; American Legation in Salvador to the Secretary of State, 4 February 1917, 818.00/70, MC 669.
to travel to the United States to procure arms and produce propaganda for him. 85 As has already been mentioned in this context, Tinoco acquired the services of William Jennings Bryan to lobby on his behalf with President Wilson.

The remainder of Latin America, those nations in continental South America, were also of some assistance to Tinoco. Several times the Chilean ministers in San José or in Washington acted as an emissary between Tinoco and the United States. 86 There was also a plan to gather together the representatives of the various South American states in San José for a conference to propose a course of action to the United States. 87 Unfortunately for Tinoco, the results of this conference had little effect on the policy of the Wilson administration. However, it was reported that Tinoco had received aid from various Latin American representatives in Costa Rica in organizing an alleged anti-American campaign in response to

85 U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José to the Secretary of State, Telegram, 21 April 1917, 818.00/137, MC 669; U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 619, 11 July 1919, 818.00/791, MC 669.

86 H. P. Ketcher, Office of the Counselor, to the Secretary of State, 23 June 1919, 818.00/715, MC 669; U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, 19 June 1918, 818.00/709, MC 669.

87 U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 617, 9 July 1919, 818.00/783, MC 669; U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, 4 October 1918, 818.00/491, MC 669; U.S. Consul Benjamin Jefferson at Managua to the Secretary of State, No. 697, 23 June 1919, 818.00/760, MC 669; Navy Department to the Secretary of State, Conference on the U.S.S. Castine, 20 June 1919, 818.00/705, MC 669.
the continuation of nonrecognition. 88

It is impossible to determine whether this campaign was genuinely anti-American or whether it was simply a device employed by Tinoco to antagonize the United States into some reaction which somehow could be turned to advantage due to the lack of any but general references to it. 89 In the last months of his regime, perhaps out of desparation or perhaps out of anger, Tinoco allowed the campaign and cooperated with it, showing at least that the Latin American nations with whom the campaign was shared accepted the sovereignty of the Costa Rican nation. 90

In the end, there remained only one group whose favorable inclination toward Tinoco went unanswered. These were the individuals who were motivated by humanitarian concerns with regard to the Tinoco regime in Costa Rica. Their concerns can be classes as "humanitarian" in that they were concerned with the impact of nonrecognition upon the well-being of the Costa Rican people in general. For example, United States Minister E. J. Hale expressed the worry that nonrecognition would lead to economic hardship for the nation and starvation for the less well to do Costa Ricans. 91 The small land-

88 U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 619, 11 July 1919, 818.00/791, MC 669.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José to the Secretary of State, 18 April 1917, 818.00/134, MC 669.
owners, in particular, who were dependent on the income produced by their cash crops would be hardest hit. In addition, Hale was concerned about the effects of political instability, which might lead to civil war and, in his view, unnecessary loss of life.92 Also among this group was Hale's close friend, John M. Keith, who viewed Tinoco as the lesser of two evils and felt that the failure of the United States to recognize Tinoco could only bring hardship to the Costa Rican nation and people.93 Both Hale and Keith felt that the continued non-recognition invited counter-revolution.94 Even these concerns met a negative response from Wilson, who responded to Hale's suggestions by removing him from his post in San José.95

Although he had been supported in his position by the report of Special Agent John Foster Dulles working for the Secretary of State,96 Hale had failed to couch his recommendations in appropriate language or to show appropriate disdain for a revolutionary government. Further, his opinion was suspect for his association with one of the Keiths, albeit a

92Ibid.
93John M. Keith to U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José, 7 March 1917, Enclosure #1 in U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 113, 15 March 1917, 818.00/116, MC 669.
94Ibid.; Emilio Artega, San José, Costa Rica, to the Secretary of State, 25 February 1918, 818.00/351, MC 669.
96John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of State, 1 May 1917, 818.00/142, MC 669.
less-than-notorious Keith.

It is the opinion of the author that of all the advice and suggestions which Wilson received, that of E. J. Hale and John M. Keith was by far the most reasonable and intelligent. It was not founded in any way on personal concern but rather was a reflection of a long thought-out process of understanding for the intricacies of the Costa Rican system and people. That Wilson chose to rebuff their advice was sad from the standpoint of his own position and that of the United States in subsequent years, but for Tinoco it was disastrous. It may be that the intertwining of the recognition issue with some of the issues surrounding the United States' entry into World War I kept some of the pro-recognition arguments from Wilson's serious consideration. However, Costa Rica's declaration of war against Germany should have resolved any confusion which may have arisen. The following chapter will discuss the declaration of war and its aftermath.
CHAPTER IV

COSTA RICA AND WORLD WAR I

The regime of Federico Tinoco in Costa Rica declared was on Imperial Germany in May, 1918.1 Tinoco had been reported to be of pro-Allied sympathies even before he assumed power in January, 1917.2 As indicated in the previous chapter, his predecessor, Alfredo González Flores, on the other hand, was alleged to be pro-German or at least under the influence of various Germans in Costa Rica.3 It is difficult to determine just how serious the pro-German influence in Costa Rica was before the declaration of war. However, it may be assumed that it was approximately the same as other nations in Central America, which were also the recipients of various German offers of investment and funding early in the twentieth century.4 There is really little likelihood

1Ricardo Fernández Guardia, Cartilla Histórica, p. 126.

2Special Agent John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of State, 1 May 1917, 818.00/142, MC 669.

3American Legation in Panama to the Secretary of State, No. 1298, 14 March 1917, 818.00/118, MC 669.

4U.S. Chargé ad interim Stewart Johnson at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 323, 20 August 1918, 818.00/474, MC 669.
that Costa Rica could have declared a formal position other than the one it eventually chose, but it is possible that it might have maintained the somewhat hostile neutrality which characterized the positions of Mexico and Argentina during the war. While neither of these nations was overtly hostile to the Allied interests, they were found to be less than responsive to certain war efforts instigated by the United States.

For the time being, however, Federico Tinoco had to pursue a policy which took into account his non-recognized status in the world community of nations. Despite any inclinations he might have, there were strong sentiments among other nations, especially the United States, that this status prevented him from the sovereign act of a declaration of war. This brings the discussion to a consideration of Tinoco's motives for the declaration of war.

As far as Woodrow Wilson and the anti-Tinoco forces were concerned, the declaration of war against Germany was simply a ploy on Tinoco's part to achieve recognition from the United States. In views held by these individuals, there was no sincerity or principle involved in the decision to declare war but rather a matter of political expediency for a

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5 Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, to Woodrow Wilson, 9 August 1919, 818.00/830, MC 669.

6 Memorandum from Mr. Stabler, Department of State, Division of Latin American Affairs, to the Secretary of State, 26 May 1917, 818.00/316, MC 669.
very hard-pressed government.\textsuperscript{7} To complicate the picture, it was reported that Minor C. Keith, who supposedly advised Tinoco to declare war,\textsuperscript{8} was far more interested in courting the good will of Britain and France than in achieving the formal recognition of the United States.\textsuperscript{9} Keith may have believed that recognition would follow from the acceptance of European powers of Costa Rican cobelligerency in the war. In addition, it may also be that Keith felt it important to court the good will of these nations in an attempt to restore some of the trade which had gone on between Costa Rica and Europe prior to the outbreak of the war. However, without the protection of a sizeable navy, Costa Rica could hope for little improvement in its European trade until the war ended or until it could count on the protection of the United States Navy. So it might be said that there were economic as well as political motives for the declaration of war.

Some measures of consideration must also be given to the possibility that Tinoco and the Costa Rican Congress acted out of sincerity in their declaration. The possibility of this, however, diminishes in view of Tinoco's serious problems and his need to seek a solution. But it would be a gross insult

\textsuperscript{7}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{8}U.S. Chargé ad interim Stewart Johnson at San José to the Secretary of State, 19 July 1917, 818.00/306, MC 669.

\textsuperscript{9}Ibid.
to Costa Rican national pride to say that it might be less convinced of the rightness of its action than was Brazil or any of the European belligerents, or even the United States. The preoccupation of Costa Rica with its domestic problems and political entanglements, not to mention the threat of invasions from neighboring territory which sought to depose Tinoco, make it extremely difficult to perceive if there was any real groundswell of public opinion in favor of the declaration of war. But it is important to note that Tinoco could have solved some of his internal problems by accepting the aid proffered by the German community in Costa Rica as was discussed in the previous chapter. Thus, while Tinoco's declaration of war was probably founded in the expected international benefits he would receive, primarily in the form of recognition at least by the European powers, there was also probably a measure of conviction that the cause of the Allies was a just one.

It is also necessary to take into consideration the various other influences which brought Tinoco to the stage of a formal declaration of war rather than maintaining neutrality as was the pattern among most of the Latin American states.10 Since foreign investors played such a key role in the Costa

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10 Neutrality was maintained by Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Venezuela. Relations with Germany were severed, thus achieving a de facto neutrality by Bolivia, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Peru and Uruguay. Warren H. Kelchner, Latin American Relations with the League of Nations (Boston: World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, Vol. XII, No. 6, 1929), p. 16.
Rican economy, their influence on Tinoco must be taken into account. The benefits of the regularization of Costa Rica's international status to the businessmen would have been immeasurable, if only the harassment of the State Department of the United States were removed as a factor in their daily operations. Further, there may have been an increase of investments from foreign sources which were severely restricted by the injunctions of Woodrow Wilson, not to mention the impact of the war itself upon commerce.

Assessment of the impact of such regularization is not easy. Had the status of Costa Rica changed to that of a diplomatically recognized state, there were no guarantees that investors in war time industries elsewhere in the world would shift any of their capital to Costa Rica. This may in itself be a partial explanation for the declaration of war. If the Costa Rican economy could reflect a war time "boom," investors might have been found. But here again there were no guarantees and no real proof.

Tinoco also had to deal with the pressures exerted by the other Latin American states. Other Central American nations also declared war on Germany, but in the Costa Rican view, this, as well as other Latin American declarations of war, would be due to the domination of the United States.

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11 Besides Costa Rica, war was declared by Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. Kelchner, Latin America and the League, p. 16.

12 Ibid., p. 37.
Costa Rica had never felt any real community of interest between itself and the Central American neighbors, pridefully disdaining all but perfunctory relationships on the basis of its own superiority. Thus, it would have been nearly impossible for Costa Rica to accept the possibility that Central America could share its motivations.

For the nations of South America, which mostly adhered to the path of neutrality, there were the additional motivations that the trade with Europe would eventually be resumed after the war had ended. A declaration of war might alienate a potential future customer for their raw materials.

Then too, there were sizeable and influential German communities throughout Latin America, which would tolerate a neutral national position but might have become active opponents of any government which declared war against their homeland. These views would be passed on to Tinoco by the representatives of states such as Chile, which sought to aid Tinoco. There is not sufficient documentation available on the size of the German community in Costa Rica to allow an

accurate assessment of their direct influence on Tinoco. However, the commentary of United States representatives in Costa Rica would indicate that this group was sufficiently large or influential enough to occasion some concern on their part.\footnote{The reports of John Foster Dulles and General Plummer concerning the potential influence of this community upon Tinoco are the primary sources for this conclusion. \textit{Summary of John Foster Dulles's Confidential Report on Costa Rica to the Secretary of State, 21 May 1917, 818.00/200, MC 669; Report of Brigadier General Plummer, Commanding General, Panama Canal Zone, 24 May 1917, Enclosure in Secretary of War to the Secretary of State, 8 June 1917, 818.00/166, MC 669.}}

From the foregoing, the question is raised as to how Tinoco could completely disregard the impact of his declaration of war upon the German community in Costa Rica, or for that matter, upon the future of trade relations with Germany. As has been stated repeatedly before this, the most influential people in Costa Rica were the businessmen who had sizeable investments there. Leading these were Minor Keith and his nephew, John M. Keith. Primarily, the investors were United States citizens who may or may not have adopted Costa Rica as a "home away from home" as the Keiths had done. The natural inclination of such individuals would be to maintain some degree of affinity with the United States at least to the extent of not declaring war upon that country. Therefore, they would counsel neutrality at the least, and a declaration of war against Germany as an optimum. Given these factors, it might be argued that Tinoco's declaration of war reflected an attempt on his part to reward the United States based inter-
ests which had remained loyal to him.

An additional aspect of this kind of policy motivated by public relations concerns was that Tinoco may have felt that the declaration of war would stir up United States public opinion in his favor to the extent of overriding Wilson's decision not to recognize him. In fact, it was primarily on the issue of his declaration of war that the United States Senate queried Wilson most strongly.\textsuperscript{15} They asked how the United States could continue to deny diplomatic recognition to any nation which had, at considerable risk to its own well being, declared war against an enemy of the United States.\textsuperscript{16} Of course, the risk taken by Costa Rica by declaration of war so late in the contest was minimal, with more real advantages for the nation than disadvantages. So, to a certain extent, if this was a part of Tinoco's plan, it worked. Unfortunately for Tinoco, the results of this effort came too late for his benefit. By the time hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were concluded, delayed to a certain extent by Wilson's intransigence and the lobbying efforts of González Flores and his adherents, Tinoco had fallen from power and the question of recognition was purely academic.

Once the declaration of war was made in May, 1918, there was nothing for Tinoco to do but to await the judgment

\textsuperscript{15}Senator George H. Moses to the Acting Secretary of State, F. K. Polk, 19 January 1919, 818.00/542, MC 669.

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid.
of the world community of nations. Shortly thereafter, arrange-
ments were made with Spain to see to the protection of Costa
Rican lives and property in Germany and Belgium. Notifica-
tion of the declaration of war was sent to the representatives

One disheartening response came when K. Matsui, rep-
resentative of Japan, merely notified his home government and
then responded to that effect to Manuel de Peralta, the Costa
Rican diplomat in Paris. There was no indication in Matsui's
letter of the forthcoming recognition of the Tinoco govern-
ment by Japan. On the other hand, far more positive res-
ponses were received. Great Britain's representative, S. Der-
by, indicated not only his own pleasure at the news that a-
other nation had joined the ranks of the defenders of demo-
 cracy, but also indicated in another communiqué that Costa
Rica was welcomed on an official level by the British govern-
ment. This response reflects some of the quandry in which
Great Britain found itself with regard to Tinoco. At first,
the British government simply adhered to the policy of the

17 El Marqués de Amposta to Don Manuel de Peralta, 3 de
Junio de 1918, Documents Distributed to the Public, Paris
Peace Conference, 1919, Authentic Delegation Propaganda MSS,
Hoover War Library, Stanford University, Stanford, California.
Photoduplicated copies. Referred to hereinafter as Delegation
Propaganda.

18 K. Matsui to Manuel de Peralta, le 31 mai 1918, ibid.

19 S. Derby to Manuel de Peralta, le 29 mai 1918, ibid.

20 S. Derby to Manuel de Peralta, le 1er Juin 1918, ibid.
United States with regard to recognition. Later, as Tinoco began open manifestations of his sympathy with the Allied cause and showed signs of being willing to engage openly in hostilities, it seemed as if the British government would modify its own position. But by the time the Costa Rican declaration of war was made known, the British apparently postponed recognition until they could find a way to do so without antagonizing President Wilson. The French, too, had begun to modify their viewpoint, although they were also bound by a desire not to offend Wilson. For example, in February, 1918 the French Minister in Washington, D.C., M. Laboulaye, called at the State Department to ask whether the United States would have any objections to the French government sending two military instructors to Costa Rica as requested by the Tinoco government. It is unclear whether the United States objected. When Costa Rica declared war, France also sent a note of gratitude to Manuel de Peralta.

Even the United States Minister in Paris, W. G. Sharp, was forced to respond in the proper courteous diplomatic fashion to the announcement. His note, while couched in basically the same language as the others received by Manuel de Peralta.


22Memorandum from Mr. Stabler at the Division of Latin American Affairs to the Secretary of State, 25 February 1918, 818.00/--, MC 669.

23M. Pichon to Manuel de Peralta, 21 mai 1918, Delegation Propaganda.
ralta on behalf of Costa Rica, was somewhat lengthier than the average and spoke of the "noble determination of the valiant Republic" (Costa Rica) which had disregarded the disinterestedness of some nations and had placed itself squarely on the side of the forces of law versus those of oppression. Sharp went on to say that this declaration would lead to a closer sympathy among all of the sister republics of the Americas. 24

While this sentiment expressed to the Costa Rican government of Federico Tinoco might seem to be out of line with the overall policy of the Wilson administration, it does reflect the moral fairmindedness which was also characteristic of Wilson's policies. It is interesting to note the cordial manner in which the declaration of war was received in Paris as opposed to the blatant way in which it was ignored in Washington. If Tinoco had taken heart from Sharp's reference to the possibility of closer relations among the American republics, he was to be sadly disappointed by the reaction of the United States government on an official level. There were little if any grounds for a great deal of optimism on the part of Costa Rica if only the degree of its participation in the war effort is taken into consideration. The nation did little more than offer its harbors to Allied vessels, but at no time were Costa

24 W. G. Sharp to Manuel de Peralta, le 13 mai 1918, ibid.
Rican troops employed.  

There was some question whether Wilson was even aware that Tinoco had issued the declaration of war. However his diary indicated that he had been aware of the declaration from the first but simply chose not to react to it. Later, in reference to the Paris Peace Conference, he would return to his intransigent opinion of the Tinoco regime and its legitimacy. For the time being, however, Tinoco had only Sharp's letter with which to console himself.

Of course there were other responses to the declaration of war, most of which were markedly similar in their language and in the pro forma manner in which they expressed the pleasure of their governments at the Costa Rican action. They were meaningless in that they did not convey a recognition on a formal level of Tinoco's government. The same forces which had prevented recognition from being granted previously still seemed to be in control of the situation in the spring of 1918. Thus, the letters from Great Britain,

25 "Plan for the Preliminary Convention Between the Allied Ministers," 5 January 1919, Paris Peace Conference, I: 386. This allocated representation to the conference on the basis of direct involvement in the war and relegated Costa Rica to the same level as neutral non-participants.


27 "Secretary's Notes of a Conversation held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, 13 January 1919," in attendance: Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson, Georges Clemenceau, Sonnino (Italy), Matsui (Japan), et al. Paris Peace Conference, III:534.
France, Serbia, Italy, and Belgium, among others, were of absolutely no value to Tinoco. The United States Minister in Honduras, Charles B. Curtis, warned that these letters might be used by the Tinoco government to present a case for recognition. While the letters themselves may have been valid, Curtis felt that the United States should make it clear to all interested parties that the letters did not constitute formal diplomatic recognition. The Chargé d'Affaires in Costa Rica agreed that Tinoco might consider the letters as an indication that his government had been recognized. Further, the letters would be useless to Tinoco's successors in their attempts to be admitted to the Paris Peace Conference as befitted their role as a belligerent.

As indicated above, there were communications from other governments. Spain's Minister of Foreign Affairs, El Marqués de Amposta, communicated with Peralta from Madrid that the government of Spain would be pleased to take on the protection of Costa Rican lives and property in Germany and Belgium pending the resumption of diplomatic relations at the end of the war. Further, Spain expressed an interest that those Germans who resided in Costa Rica be treated fairly so

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28 U.S. Minister Charles B. Curtis at Tegucigalpa to the Secretary of State, No. 805, 30 August 1918, 818.00/483, MC 669; U.S. Chargé ad interim Stewart Johnson at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 362, 8 October 1918, 818.00/495, MC 669.
long as they continued to observe Costa Rican law. Since Spain had recognized Tinoco's government, the question of the acceptance of its declaration of war had no weight in deciding that the government was legitimate.

Another important letter was the one received from the Brazilian representative, Olyntho de Magalhaes. He, too, pointed out the pleasure of his government at receiving the declaration of war and the notice that Costa Rica had joined those disinterested nations in the pursuit of justice and the preservation of civilization. An interesting facet of the Brazilian message, however, is the closing statement of the Minister with regard to the obligatory nature of the note. It would seem that the Brazilian Minister, representing the only active belligerent among the Latin American nations, apologized for the necessity of communicating his pleasure at Costa Rica's action in a form letter. Although this was not directly stated, there is a great deal of flattery reflected concerning Costa Rica's action. The question of Brazilian leadership among the Latin American nations in subsequent events relating to the League of Nations and the Paris Peace Conference will be discussed in subsequent chapters. However, it could be that the Brazilian

29 El Marqués de Amposta to Manuel de Peralta, 3 de Junio de 1918, Delegation Propaganda.

30 U.S. Minister at San José to the Secretary of State, 23 August 1917, 818.00/211, MC 669.

31 Olyntho de Magalhaes to Manuel de Peralta, Delegation Propaganda.
government felt that in this case "imitation was the sincerest form of flattery," and that it now saw a special kinship with Costa Rica for its action. How this response might have been anticipated by Tinoco, and how much he may have counted upon Brazilian support for his regime with the United States, since Brazil had already recognized him is questionable. However, it is an aspect of the declaration of war which should not be overlooked.

For whatever reasons, Tinoco declared war on Germany and Costa Rica aligned itself officially with the Allied powers. The rewards received by the Costa Rican nation were minimal in terms of increased international prestige or recognition. As has already been mentioned, there was a movement in the United States to reconsider the policy of the Wilson administration toward Costa Rica. But before this movement really got off the ground, Tinoco was overthrown. The revolutionary movements which brought about his political demise, launched from Nicaragua, were another bone of contention with the interested Senators, but here, too, their interest was too late to be of any benefit to Tinoco.

In addition, although the declaration of war brought a great deal of sympathy from the involved European powers, that sympathy did nothing to improve Tinoco's condition.

32 Senator George H. Moses to the Acting Secretary of State, F. K. Polk, 19 January 1919, 818.00/542, MC 669.
Neither the British, the French nor any of the other belligerents could afford to alienate Woodrow Wilson in any way that would jeopardize the assistance they were receiving from the United States in the war effort. So while they might have been inclined to extend recognition to Tinoco and even to resume their pre-war levels of trade with Costa Rica, both were impossible. Recognition would have incurred the wrath of the United States. Moreover, resumption of trade was impossible while their resources were tied up in the war.

A possible remedy for this situation was seen in the peace negotiations that followed the war. For the Tinoco regime, these efforts were simply too late. But Wilson's attitude toward the Tinoco regime extended to its immediate successor, that of Juan Bautista Quirós. Quirós had been appointed by Tinoco to assume the provisional presidency as he was fleeing the country in July, 1919. As the United States had warned, Quirós was also refused recognition because he had been appointed by an unconstitutional president and therefore was himself illegitimate. Not even Quirós's obvious desire to

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33 U.S. Minister in San José to the Secretary of State, 23 May 1919, 818.00/437, MC 669; American Legation in San José to the Secretary of State, 13 August 1919, 818.00/829, MC 669.

34 Secretary of State to U.S. Minister in San José, No. 11, 19 August 1919, 818.00/829, MC 669; Memorandum, Division of Latin American Affairs (Stabler) to the Secretary of State, 6 February 1917, 818.00/105 1/2, MC 669; Secretary of State to the U.S. Minister in San José, 30 August 1919, 818.00/866a, MC 669.
placate the Wilson administration by holding elections as soon as possible and by offering to step down in favor of whichever individual the United States designated satisfied Wilson.\textsuperscript{35} It was felt that Quirós acted out of fear for the approach of the revolutionary troops from Nicaragua. These troops were the ones about which the United States had issued the warnings but which Nicaragua had continued to harbor.

It would be difficult to say that the activities of the Wilson administration with regard to the recognition of a Costa Rican government and the attitudes toward the recognition of a Costa Rican declaration of war constituted anything less than a direct interference in the internal affairs of the Costa Rican nation. Because of the intrusion of World War I, what might have been solely a Western Hemispheric affair was catapulted onto the stage of worldwide affairs. Obviously, Costa Rica had suffered a gross insult at the hands of the United States. How this would continue and develop through the Paris Peace Conference and the early years of the League of Nations will be discussed in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{35}U.S. Minister in San José to the Secretary of State, 22 August 1919, 818.00/845, MC 669.
CHAPTER V

COSTA RICA AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The conclusion of World War I occurred before the United States and Costa Rica resolved the problems of the recognition of the Tinoco government. Thus, because of pressures exerted by the United States on the European Allied powers, Costa Rica never achieved the status of a recognized belligerent in the war effort.¹ This fact assumed greater significance as plans were made for the Paris Peace Conference. Preliminary planning, conducted by various committees and which reflected several years' thought on the part of all of the nations in question, recognized the importance of including the nations which had not participated in the war, in particular the Latin American states, in the deliberations.² One suggestion of the planning committees indicated that the Latin American states were to be included only because of the in-

¹James Brown Scott and David Hunter Miller to Woodrow Wilson, 30 December 1918, Skeleton Draft of Peace Treaty, Appendix on Signatories, Exclusions from Belligerents, Paris Peace Conf.185/151, Paris Peace Conference, I:305; Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, 9 August 1919, 818.00/830, MC 669.

terest of the United States in having them in attendance and because whether they deserved inclusion or not, the Latin American states themselves would expect to be counted in on the deliberations.³ At one point, it was even suggested that the United States could represent Latin America to "avoid crowding" at the peace deliberations.⁴ That the Latin American states expected to be included is undeniable, especially in connection with those Latin American states which had declared war on Germany. Surprisingly enough, however, Costa Rica was not included in this category because of the insistence of Woodrow Wilson that it not be.⁵

Wilson tried to control the planning stages of the Paris Peace Conference by striking a bargain with the major powers on the status of Costa Rica in exchange for their desires on organizational matters.⁶ He insisted that the question of the inclusion of Costa Rica in the deliberations was a moot one, since that state did not have the official status

³Ibid.

⁴French Foreign Office's Scheme of Procedure, Part III, Representation of the Powers and of the States, 15 November 1918, ibid., I:348.

⁵Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, to Woodrow Wilson, 9 August 1919, 818.00/830, MC 669.

⁶Secretary's Notes on a Conversation held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, 13 January 1919, in attendance: Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson, Georges Clemenceau, Sonmino (Italy), Matsui (Japan), et al., Paris Peace Conference, III:534.
of a recognized nation as far as the United States was concerned. Therefore, if Costa Rica were included in the conference, the United States would object most strenuously. The implication which can be drawn from Wilson's comments was that he would have separated the United States from the proceedings of the Conference rather than be forced into an ipso facto recognition of Costa Rica, as his advisors warned him he would be. The European powers, primarily the Great Powers who were involved in these early deliberations, acceded to Wilson's demands. This point was not a particularly difficult one for Wilson to achieve, since Lloyd George, who represented Great Britain, was adamantly opposed to any status for the Latin American belligerents which would equate them with the small powers of Europe which had incurred the devastation of the war upon their homelands and had sacrificed so many lives, while the Latin American states had done virtually nothing. Wilson further strengthened his argument by declaring that the question of Costa Rican participation and recognition was not

7Ibid.


9Secretary's Notes on a Conversation held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, 13 January 1919, in attendance: Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson, Georges Clemenceau, Sonmino (Italy), Matsui (Japan), et al., ibid., III:534.

10Ibid., III:534-535.
one which belonged before a world group, since the problems entailed in the question of the constitutionality of its government were purely American ones. That is to say, they were of concern only in the Western Hemisphere. Wilson explained that Costa Rica had only declared war on Germany as a ploy to achieve the recognition of the United States. Since United States nonrecognition was based on a policy designed to discourage revolution in the Americas, he asked to be upheld in not recognizing Costa Rica's belligerency so that the solidarity of American policies could be maintained.

The status which Woodrow Wilson and the other leaders discussed was not a matter of great significance. For purposes of representation at the Paris Peace Conference, several categories of nations were devised, including the major belligerents, small European belligerents, nonparticipating belligerents, neutrals, and so on. There were also distinctions made as to the special interests some nations, such as those being newly formed, might have in the peace deliberations. In one of the preliminary plans for the conference, Costa Rica was included among those nations which had not participated

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11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
directly in the war effort and which had no special interests in the war settlements.\textsuperscript{15} In effect, this included Costa Rica among the neutrals and the nations being formed which received only one plenipotentiary each.\textsuperscript{16} However, not even that single representative was granted Costa Rica as Woodrow Wilson was able to convince the leadership of the major European delegations to accede to his demands with regard to Costa Rican recognition.\textsuperscript{17}

Wilson's claims that the issue of Costa Rican recognition was not one over which the world group had any authority reflected not only his continued intransigence with regard to the Costa Rican situation in particular, but it also reflected a response on his part to the critics of his world peace plans in the United States. Since part of those plans for the peace conference included the formation of a world peace organization, there was concern by some United States Senators that such an organization would jeopardize the Monroe Doctrine.\textsuperscript{18} This issue is more accurately placed in the

\textsuperscript{15}Plan for the Preliminary Conventions Between the Allied Ministers, 5 January 1919, \textit{Paris Peace Conference}, I: 393.

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., I:386.

\textsuperscript{17}Secretary's Notes on a Conversation held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, 13 January 1919, ibid., III: 534-535.

questions surrounding the formation of the League of Nations and will be discussed in greater length in that context. However, for the time being, it should be noted that Wilson had to begin early in his discussion in Paris to demonstrate that nothing to which he agreed in Paris would in any way endanger the status or prerogatives of the United States in the Americas.

As was mentioned previously, Costa Rica did not accept the decisions of the preliminary conferences in Paris. Manuel de Peralta, the Costa Rican diplomat in Paris, circulated copies of the letters which he had received regarding the declaration of war to all of the delegates at the Peace Conference. In addition, there was an open letter to all of the delegates which emphasized the Costa Rican position in the war and indicated the justice of Costa Rica's participation in the conference. But these efforts were to no avail.

Since Costa Rica had not been admitted to the Peace Conference, a state of war still existed between it and Germany. This was finally solved by an enactment of the Costa Rican legislature which was answered by a decree of the German government proclaiming an end to the state of war. At

19 See the individual letters referred to in the previous chapter to Manuel de Peralta from El Marqués de Amposta, K. Matsui, S. Derby, W. G. Sharp, et al.


21 The Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Asso-
the same time, the status of Germans residing in Costa Rica was clarified with a law allowing them to seek naturalization under Costa Rican law, which they had not been able to do during the hostilities because of the closed diplomatic channels. However, the United States Consul in Costa Rica reported that there had been no confiscations of German properties during the war. Nor had there been any adherence to the "Enemy Trading List" published by the United States to prevent the infiltration of German firms into the Americas. This proved that no serious efforts had been made to participate in the war effort.

While the failure of the Tinoco government to achieve representation at Paris was attributable to the same problems which led to nonrecognition by the United States, it was the expectation of the Costa Rican government after the overthrow of the Tinoco regime that it would be included in the deliberations of the Conference. However, since the Conference was essentially over before relations between the United States and

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Costa Rica were regularized, this was not possible. There was little if any concern on the part of other Latin American states for the status of Costa Rica at the conference, since it seemed that each nation was most concerned with its own status there and the promotion of its own ideas. The support which the Tinoco regime had received from Latin America ended with his fall from power. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, his immediate successor, the provisional president, Juan Bautista Quiroz, never received United States recognition and was soon replaced by Francisco Aguilar Barquero, who had been one of the Designados in the González Flores administration. Barquero called elections which resulted in the election of Julio Acosta late in 1919.

Julio Acosta had been part of the insurgent group which caused Tinoco's fall from power, and much of his support in the election derived from his opposition to the Tinoco regime.

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25 U.S. Minister at San José to the Secretary of State, 2 September 1919, 818.00/870, MC 669; U.S. Minister Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 687, 9 September 1919, 818.00/904, MC 669.

26 León Fernández Guardia, *Historia de Costa Rica*, II: 108; U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, 8 December 1919, 818.00/944, MC 669.

27 U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 714, 21 October 1919, 818.00/928, MC 669; U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 685, 4 September 1919, 818.00/899, MC 669; U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 826, 12 August 1920, 818.00/1000, MC 669.
In effect, according to Benjamin F. Chase, the United States Consul at San José, the majority of the voters viewed Acosta's election as a final repudiation of Tinoco. But there was another aspect of the election to be considered. The anti-American press campaign which began in the last days of the Tinoco regime flourished during Acosta's election campaign, heightened by the failure of the nation to be admitted to the Paris Peace Conference as a result of Woodrow Wilson's efforts.

Further, it was maintained in at least one publication that Quirós had been replaced by Barquero on "radiographic" orders from United States Secretary of State Robert Lansing as well as through the influence of a group of Wall Street capitalists.

The election of Acosta, the failure of Costa Rica to obtain representation at the Paris Peace Conference, and the failure of any Latin American state to come to the nation's aid gave the distinct impression to the Costa Rican public that the only sovereignty which remained to the nation was that allowed by the United States, which finally extended

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28 U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 714, 21 October 1919, 818.00/928, MC 669.

29 U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 709, 14 October 1919, 818.00/927, MC 669.

30 La Verdad (San José), 7 September 1919, cited in U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 687, 9 September 1919, 818.00/904, MC 669.

31 Ibid.
recognition to Acosta's government late in 1920.\(^\text{32}\) This bitterness would not come to full bloom during the Acosta presidency, despite the fact that some of the delay in extending recognition to Acosta was due to Wilson's illness following the peace conference and his campaign for the support of the League of Nations.\(^\text{33}\)

Wilson's campaign for the support of the League of Nations in the United States was quite difficult due to substantial differences of opinion as to what the League would mean to the United States. Wilson had a great deal of support for his view that it should be a universal alliance for the preservation of peace as opposed to a supranational power, with a military arm, which would enforce the preeminence of certain powers.\(^\text{34}\) Further, Wilson saw the League as a logical, worldwide extension of the United States's effort, by means of the Monroe Doctrine, to prevent the spread of reactionary ideologies.\(^\text{35}\)

However, there was significant opposition to the League

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\(^{32}\)Secretary of State to the U.S. Consul at San José, Telegram #16, 2 August 1920, 818.00/991a, MC 669.

\(^{33}\)U.S. Consul in Costa Rica to Joseph R. Tumulty, Secretary to President Wilson, 26 November 1919, 818.00/949a, MC 669. This letter stresses that, although Wilson was ill, immediate recognition was important.


in the United States, the leadership of which found several strong arguments with which to lead their campaign. One such argument was that the League of Nations would subvert the Monroe Doctrine and the position of leadership of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, not to mention the necessity for revision of the Constitution.\textsuperscript{36} The rationale for this opposition lay in the fact that any of the other members of such a worldwide organization would be able to challenge the position of the United States granted by the Monroe Doctrine.\textsuperscript{37} Within the context of a peace organization in which all sovereign states were equal members, any of the Latin American nations, not to mention any nation hostile to the United States, could challenge a unilateral doctrine embracing the entire hemisphere as the Monroe Doctrine did. A potential threat to that doctrine existed in that Mexico could lead such a challenge to United States policy as revenge for the treatment it had received during its revolution,\textsuperscript{38} especially since Mexico had been granted membership in the League of Nations on the basis of United States recommendation.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{36}Fleming, The U.S. and the League, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., p. 151.
\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., p. 123.
\textsuperscript{39}James Brown Scott and David Hunter Miller to Woodrow Wilson, 30 December 1918, Skeleton Draft of Peace Treaty, Appendix on Signatories, Exclusions from Belligerents, Paris Peace Conf. 185.1/151, Paris Peace Conference, I:315.
No consideration was given to the possibility that Costa Rica had equal grounds for challenge based on its problems due to the unilateral decision of the United States not to recognize the Tinoco regime and thereby to exclude Costa Rica from the Paris Peace Conference. The leaders of the opposition to the League in the United States used the term "Monroe Doctrine" freely in their arguments, mustering support for their position among masses of people who probably were not even aware of what the doctrine meant. If the arguments of this opposition group were carried to a logical conclusion, it would follow that no Latin American nation should belong to the League of Nations because of the exclusive hegemony reserved to the United States in the Western Hemisphere on the grounds that each nation posed a threat to a unilateral policy of the United States.

Wilson received some support for his problems from Great Britain in answering this criticism which was understandable in view of the role of that nation in the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine, as well as its interest in protecting similar arrangements of its own. The British suggested that the League Covenant include a recognition of the special nature of the arrangements that existed in the Western

\[40\text{Fleming, The U.S. and the League, p. 76.}\]
\[41\text{Ibid., p. 214.}\]
\[42\text{Ibid., p. 185.}\]
Hemisphere by virtue of the Monroe Doctrine. It was even suggested that the Monroe Doctrine be mentioned by name. By the same token, there was French opposition to including the Monroe Doctrine specifically on the rationale that official recognition of the doctrine might limit future United States involvement in Europe, which could jeopardize French safety.

Another problem arose over whether the Covenant should define the Monroe Doctrine specifically. If it were defined, then any United States application of the doctrine would be subject to scrutiny as to how it fit the description laid out in the Covenant. If it were not defined, there was still the problem that the doctrine could be challenged by any member of the League. In the end, the problem was resolved by including a mention of the Monroe Doctrine as a "regional arrangement" in Article 21 of the League Covenant. This satisfied the fears of the United States's opposition to the League on the basis of potential jeopardy to the doctrine but at the

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43Ibid.
44Ibid.
46Ibid.
same time left it sufficiently vague enough to satisfy those who feared that the enforcement of its provisions would be taken out of the hands of the United States.

Surprisingly enough, there was little response to this inclusion on the part of the Latin American states which stood to lose the most by it. At least for the time being, all of these states were willing to allow the mention of the Monroe Doctrine to stand.\textsuperscript{48} For the most part, in the early days of the League, Latin America was aligned with the small neutral nations of Europe in seeking a guarantee of their territorial integrity and sovereignty from the organization, supporting disarmament and cooperating on the issue of Germany's admission to the League.\textsuperscript{49} In fact, it was precisely this guarantee that Wilson used in his arguments against the jeopardy to the Monroe Doctrine. He claimed that any organization which guaranteed the integrity of nations could not in any way interfere with an internal affair such as the Monroe Doctrine.\textsuperscript{50} In this, Wilson had been advised by former president William H. Taft that the political approval of the League Covenant


\textsuperscript{50}Fleming, The U.S. and the League, p. 86.
would be more certain if the Monroe Doctrine were recognized in the Covenant. 51

Another aspect of Latin American participation in the early days of the League of Nations was the attempt to bring about the consolidation of a Latin American bloc in the League. More than any other group, the Latin American nations acted in concert in the League of Nations by rotating their representation on the Council, by decisions made in conferences among their delegates and by providing some leadership for member states in policy decisions. 52 However, few if any of the policy decisions in the early life of the League of Nations concerned Latin America directly. 53 One of the earliest questions was the admission of those Latin American states which had not been granted original membership in the organization. Costa Rica was finally admitted to membership in the League in December, 1920. 54 There was no solution to the problems which had surrounded its exclusion from earlier meetings, but by that time the United States had formally recognized its government. Joining the League of Nations changed very little of Costa Rica's relations with the re-

51Ibid., pp. 183-184.

52Kelchner, Latin America and the League, p. 11; Walters, League of Nations, I:335.

53Kelchner, Latin America and the League, p. 140.

mainder of the world, since it had little part in the Latin American coalition, being preoccupied with its internal problems and the restoration of its relationship with the United States.

When the invitation to join the League was finally extended to Costa Rica, the Acosta Administration immediately accepted in time to send a delegate to the First Session. Manuel de Peralta was assigned to attend the sessions in Geneva as well as to continue to hold his post as ambassador to France. However, the readiness of the Costa Rican government to join the League was not unanimously popular in Costa Rica. Much of the unpopularity was related to the sentiments expressed toward the Presidency of Julio Acosta himself. Acosta took office in May, 1920 and was noted for his efforts to restore the economic and political stability which had been seriously damaged during the Tinoco interlude. Depending upon the time and place, one finds Acosta referred to as either very popular or very unpopular. As far as the two United


56U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 123, 23 March 1923, 818.00/1064, MC 669; Leon Fernández Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, II:108.

57For references that Acosta was popular see: U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, 30 September 1919, 818.00/909, MC 669; his unpopularity was referred to in: U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 709, 14 October 1919, 818.00"927, MC 669.
States Chargés in San José during this time were concerned, Acosta's identification with the overthrow and replacement of the Tinoco regime made him a well-liked leader. However, both Benjamin F. Chase and Walter C. Thurston noted that Acosta had serious problems due to his over-identification with the United States. While it may well be true, as Chase in particular observed, that the Costa Rican nation was grateful to be rid of the problems of the Tinoco years, there was also strong sentiment in reaction to the sacrifices of national prestige which had occurred because of United States policy toward the nation. Unfortunately for Acosta, he was directly associated with, or identified as, one of those individuals responsible for the policy which had been adopted toward

58 U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 685, 4 September 1919, 818.00/899, MC 669.

59 There was also specific mention that Tinoco's fall had been caused by U.S. nonrecognition. U.S. Chargé Clarence B. Hewes at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 289, 13 July 1923, 818.00/1076, MC 669; U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 872, 14 October 1920, 818.00/1005, MC 669.

60 U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 816, 12 August 1920, 818.00/1000, MC 669.

61 U.S. Chargé Clarence B. Hewes at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 282, 29 June 1923, 818.00/1073, MC 669; U.S. Chargé Clarence B. Hewes at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 264, 25 May 1923, 818.00/1068, MC 669; U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 14, 7 February 1921, 818.00/1023, MC 669.
pride. An excellent example of this was the resignation of Juan Bautista Quirós from the provisional presidency to which Tinoco had appointed him before fleeing the country. In the view of many Costa Ricans, Quirós could have held elections just as legally and just as effectively as did Francisco Aguilar Barquero, whom the United States had seen as an acceptable provisional president.

Then, too, there was the delay in the United States extension of recognition to Julio Acosta once he had been constitutionally elected. There was a time lapse of nearly nine months from the election and four months from the inauguration before full diplomatic recognition of Costa Rica was extended by the United States. Although the delay was due in part to Woodrow Wilson's illness at the time, this was no consolation to Costa Ricans. Further, the delay could be seen as proof that Acosta was no United States puppet as some maintained, but Acosta himself did nothing to help his own cause in the issue, choosing instead to issue statements about the "close ties and

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63 U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 687, 9 September 1919, 818.00/904, MC 669; Monge Alfaro, Historia de Costa Rica, p. 279.
64 U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 709, 14 October 1919, 818.00/927, MC 669.
65 U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, 8 December 1919, 818.00/944, MC 669.
friendship" between Costa Rica and the United States. From the foregoing, one can speculate that the advocates of national pride in international relations would view a refusal to join the League of Nations on Acosta's part as a far more desirable policy to promote Costa Rican status in the world community of nations. Nonetheless, Acosta accepted the membership.

Apart from specific issues within Costa Rica which argued against membership in the League of Nations, there were broader issues which encompassed much of Latin America and which, in general, revolved around the uselessness of the League in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. For example, the issues which preoccupied the League of Nations as a whole in the early years of its existence were primarily ones of organization and structure of the activities of the League. What became apparent was that each of the member nations, including the Latin American states, had its own view of the purposes of the organization and in some instances, was intransigent in seeing its own views brought to fruition. Unfortunately for the Latin American states and the smaller states of Europe, the design of the League gave the

66 Extract from Address of President Julio Acosta to the Congress, 1 May 1920, cited in U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 779, 14 May 1920, 818.00/983, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations, 1920, I:884.

greatest emphasis to the so-called Great Powers. This spread of authority within the League, which is reflected in the United Nations by the Security Council, would be a bone of contention for the smaller nations. 68

For the most part, they met this problem by seeking the seating of the small states on the League Council with permanent status similar to that of the Great Powers. 69 Brazil was in the forefront of those states which felt that it had the right to be so situated. 70 The Latin American nations seemed to agree that at least one of their members should sit on the Council, but the problem of choice soon resolved itself into a struggle for the leadership of the Latin American contingent. 71

Initially, the Latin American states were included with a group of European states which shared a temporary seat on the Council which rotated among them all. 72 This meant that at some times, there was no Latin American representation on the permanent governing body of the League. All of Latin America had agreed upon the necessity of a permanent seat for one of its members, but Brazil managed to arrange

68 Ibid., I:35.
69 Ibid., I:126-127; Kelchner, Latin America and the League, p. 65.
70 Walters, League of Nations, I:126-127.
71 Kelchner, Latin America and the League, pp. 21, 67.
72 Ibid., pp. 66-67.
matters so that it would acquire that position for itself when the seat was eventually granted.\textsuperscript{73} When the Council was reorganized in 1925-1926, Brazil was not satisfied with the arrangements and tendered its resignation from the League.\textsuperscript{74} The rules of procedure did not make the decision a final one for two full years, but Brazil withdrew at the time of its notification.

When Brazil resigned, the question of leadership among the Latin American states was again open to discussion. A logical successor in terms of contemporary Latin American politics might have been Mexico or Argentina. Since Mexico had not yet joined the League and would not do so until 1931,\textsuperscript{75} this left Argentina, which had not had representation at the League since its legation walked out during the First Session over the question of German representation.\textsuperscript{76} Chile stepped in and took advantage of the absence of Mexico and Argentina and replaced Brazil.\textsuperscript{77} Unlike Brazil, however, Chile was not convinced of the relevance of League membership to American affairs and was quite outspoken in that belief.\textsuperscript{78}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{73}Ibid., p. 90.
\item \textsuperscript{74}Ibid., pp. 71, 90.
\item \textsuperscript{75}Fleming, \textit{The U.S. and the League}, p. 417, n.1.
\item \textsuperscript{76}Walters, \textit{The League of Nations}, I:24.
\item \textsuperscript{77}Kelchner, \textit{Latin America and the League}, p. 90.
\item \textsuperscript{78}Ibid., pp. 89-90.
\end{itemize}
As a consequence, the Chilean delegates were not in a position of sufficient authority to prevent the diminution of Latin American representation at Geneva or the withdrawal of other Latin American states from the League. In fact, for the same arguments which Chile presented as to the unimportance of the League to the Americas, more and more Latin American states began to divert their energies from the League to the Pan American Union and the Inter-American conferences. 79

In an attempt to answer some of the Latin American grievances about the irrelevance of the League to American problems, a Latin American Liaison Office was formed which was to provide a two-way channel for information from and about the Latin American nations. 80 As it developed, this office became a training school for diplomats of the Latin American states, since it provided internships for promising young Latin Americans as well as some public information services about the League in the home states of Latin America. 81

However, in general, it must be admitted that Latin America was less than a wholehearted participant in the League of Nations. In its early years, several Latin Americans served in positions of responsibility in the League, such as President of the League Assembly, president of some of the

79 Ibid., pp. 89-90.
80 Ibid., p. 147.
81 Ibid., p. 162.
League divisions, and chairmen of some of the League Committees. The International Labor Office was also a dubious success insofar as Latin America was concerned. It is interesting to note that of all the Latin American nations, Costa Rica was the only one never to send a delegate to the International Labor meetings. For the most part, however, Latin America relegated the affairs of the League to a secondary position in its concerns, as few League measures ever received ratification from the Latin American states. Further, arguing that the League did not deal with American questions, the Latin American states unanimously opposed attempts to raise budgets or quotas for the financing of the League. Add to these problems the fact that few of the European nations recognized the advantages possible with full Latin American participation, and Latin American dissatisfaction becomes understandable.

Among the Latin American states, Chile soon became a leader in the discontent with League membership. After Brazil resigned over the issue of its permanent seating on the

83 Kelchner, Latin America and the League, pp. 196-197.
84 Ibid., p. 163.
85 Ibid., p. 171.
87 Ibid., I: 341.
League Council, Chile assumed the position of prominence which it had held.\textsuperscript{88} Chilean delegates were quite explicit in their explanation that the Pan American Union handled American questions quite effectively and was therefore more important to the Latin American states than was the League.\textsuperscript{89} This position served to put the Pan American Union and the League into competition, a situation which neither organization anticipated or welcomed. Nevertheless, the logic of the Chilean arguments was not lost on the Latin American membership. The strongest part of their argument was that the United States did not belong to the League\textsuperscript{90} and that it insisted on the separation of American questions from League concerns.\textsuperscript{91} If it was admitted that the United States held a dominant position in the Americas, or at least aspired to one, then it only made sense that any discussions involving American problems had to be conducted where the United States could be involved in arbitration and negotiation. More on the development of the inter-American system during this period will be discussed in subsequent chapters. However, it should be noted that it was precisely the success of the Latin American states in their dealings with the United States through the Inter-American Conference system during the

\textsuperscript{88}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{89}Kelchner, Latin America and the League, pp. 89–91.

\textsuperscript{90}Walters, The League of Nations, I:350–351.

\textsuperscript{91}Kelchner, Latin America and the League, p. 89.
1920's and early 1930's which led to the growing disenchantment of those states with the League of Nations.

Costa Rica was no exception to these general patterns. Represented at the League by Manuel de Peralta, who had celebrated his fiftieth anniversary in the diplomatic service of the Costa Rican nation in 1923, Costa Rica took no position of prominence in the early years of the League of Nations. It was, as mentioned, the only nation never to send a delegate to the International Labor meetings. The main preoccupation of Costa Rica during the early 1920's was with domestic affairs and the restoration of smooth-running constitutional government. For the most part, the relationships maintained with European nations were on matters of trade. However, there was the intrusion of the problems occasioned by the nullification of the legislation of the Tinoco regime. The most serious problems, after a somewhat difficult passage of the laws of nullification, arose from the cancellation of the Amory oil concession. Great Britain objected strenuously to this cancellation of a concession granted to its nationals, demanding indemnification if the concession was not upheld.

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93 León Fernández Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, II: 108.

The United States took a neutral stand in the matter after having ascertained that the nullification acts did not affect any American holdings. The negotiations on the Amory concession continued for a number of years, with the matter finally settled in favor of the cancellation in the Costa Rican courts.

The Amory concession, along with the activities of the nation with regard to the League of Nations, would do much to discredit President Julio Acosta as a puppet of the United States. The anti-American sentiment, which had been manufactured at the end of the Tinoco regime, was heightened by policies which seemed to favor United States investors over English businessmen, although the picture was quite different from the United States's viewpoint. Evidence to support the view that Acosta was controlled by the United States was found

95 U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, 4 September 1920, 818.602/12, ibid., I:838.
96 Pan American Union, Bulletin LVIII (February, 1924), p. 196.
97 U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 872, 14 October 1920, 818.00/1005, MC 669; U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 14, 7 February 1921, 818.00/1023, MC 669.
98 U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 872, 14 October 1920, 818.00/1005, MC 669.
99 U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 97, 1 June 1921, 818.60/--, MC 669.
in his public statements as well as in various other policies undertaken by his administration.100 A revival of the Panamanian boundary dispute in 1921 with armed action by both parties, which led to favoritism for Costa Rican interests by the United States, was also detrimental to Acosta in this sense. Panama insisted that the issue be taken before the League of Nations, while Costa Rica insisted that the arbitration of the United States was effective in solving the problem.101 In essence, this prevented League interference since the League could only arbitrate upon the invitation of the disputants. Panama argued that the exclusion of the boundary dispute on the basis of Article 21 (the recognition of the Monroe Doctrine) did nothing but secure the power of the United States in the Americas.102 More will be mentioned concerning this dispute in the discussion of American affairs. As far as public opinion and the press were concerned, United States favoritism for Costa Rica in the matter probably stemmed from Acosta's concessions to the United States.103

100Pan American Union, Bulletin LI (December, 1920), p. 634; U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 779, 14 May 1920, 818.00/983, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, 1920, I:884.

101Kelchner, Latin America and the League, p. 120; Controversia Entre Panamá y Costa Rica, II:160.

102Controversia Entre Panamá y Costa Rica, II:239.

In addition to these problems, there was the matter of the affordability of League membership. That is to say, Costa Rica felt that the quota fees which it paid to the League of Nations were simply not worth the return in services or prestige which it received.104 However, in the final analysis, there were other factors which affected Costa Rica's decision, as well as the decisions of other Latin American states, to dissociate themselves from the League of Nations. In Costa Rica, the matter of resignation from the League for what were ostensibly financial reasons came under discussion as early as 1921.105 It was maintained that in a time of economic crisis such as then existed, the membership fees for the League were an expense that could not be justified and therefore, they should be eliminated.106 But since Costa Rica's share of the League budget came to only $24,000 per year,107 this argument can be seen as somewhat superficial.

For whatever reasons, Julio Acosta chose not to consider resignation from the League during his term of office. Perhaps he hoped, as did many other Latin American leaders and

104 U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 94, 7 May 1921, 818.00/1036, MC 669; Memorias, 1924, p. vii.
105 U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 94, 7 May 1921, 818.00/1036, MC 669.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
those of the small nations of Europe, that the League would be able to protect their interests against the hegemony of the Great Powers; in the Latin American case the hegemony of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. ¹⁰⁸ But by the mid-1920's this hope would be seen as futile and other avenues would be sought by which to seek the same solution. Thus, a major campaign issue for the 1924 Costa Rican presidential elections was the anti-American sentiment of some Costa Ricans and the associated desire to resign from the League of Nations. ¹⁰⁹ Since Acosta was not eligible for reelection under the terms of the Costa Rican constitution, the issue of his relationship with the United States and Woodrow Wilson did not have a direct bearing on the campaign. However, the plans of the candidates for the presidency with regard to the national policies toward the United States and the League of Nations was quite important.¹¹⁰

It should be noted that United States representatives like Walter C. Thurston, who served for about three years as the United States Chargé in San José, reported to the State Department that much of the anti-American sentiment which surfaced during the election campaign was attributable to Mexican

¹⁰⁸ Kelchner, Latin America and the League, p. 13.

¹⁰⁹ U.S. Chargé Clarence B. Hewes at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 280, 22 June 1923, 818.00/1077, MC 669; U.S. Chargé Clarence B. Hewes at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 264, 25 May 1923, 818.00/1068, MC 669.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.
propaganda efforts in Costa Rica. In addition, he noted the adverse effect on United States-Costa Rican relations resulting from the development of closer ties between Spain and Costa Rica during this period. In his assessment, Thurston completely overlooked the impact of events in recent years on Costa Rican attitudes and failed to see that Mexico and Costa Rica shared problems in achieving recognition from the Wilson administration which had probably developed a special kinship between them. Perhaps he can be excused for this oversight in light of general State Department attitudes on the same subject.

There was at least one State Department missive which expressed considerable consternation over Costa Rican hostility toward Nicaragua in the early 1920's. If one discounts all potential national rivalries between these two states, not to mention the actions of Nicaragua in the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, there still remains the fact that Nicaragua harbored

111 U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 310, 17 August 1923, 818.00/1078, MC 669; U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 14, 7 February 1921, 818.00/1023, MC 669; U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671.

112 U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671; U.S. Chargé Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 872, 14 October 1920, 818.00/1005, MC 669.

113 U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671.
the insurgent forces which eventually overthrew the Tinoco regime, which many Costa Ricans viewed as a constitutional government. Yet it is precisely this Nicaraguan policy which the State Department cited as good and sufficient reason for the existence of cordial relations between the two nations.114 The rationale for this would be, of course, that Tinoco was a tyrant who had to be replaced at any cost.115 Therefore, Costa Rica should be grateful to Nicaragua for its assistance in the elimination of Tinoco. It can be seen that whatever misconceptions Thurston or his colleagues may have had with regard to Costa Rican attitudes, they came by them quite honestly.

Before turning to the outcome of the 1924 elections, it is also important to consider the overall status of Costa Rica's foreign affairs, since this would have significant impact on the eventual decision of the president elected in that contest with regard to the League of Nations. If it was true that the League was essential to the relationship between Costa Rica and the world community of nations, then perhaps there would have been grounds for opposing the resignation. However, it is apparent that Costa Rica conducted a broad range of foreign policy quite separate from its membership in either the Pan American Union or the League of Nations.

114 Ibid.

115 Ibid.
In the realm of inter-American affairs, which will be discussed at greater length in succeeding chapters, Costa Rica pursued quite independent policies in the early 1920's. For example, during 1921 and 1922, it was associated with another Central American Union project.\footnote{Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 213.} Further, the negotiations with Panama over the disputed boundary continued for Costa Rica refused League mediation and rejected the attempts of the United States to interfere in the armed dispute which arose.\footnote{U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 94, 7 May 1921, 818.00/1036, MC 669; Secretary of State to U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José, 718.00/325a, United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921 (2 Vols., Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1936), II:181.} The period was also characterized by a quite amicable relationship with Mexico.\footnote{U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 14, 7 February 1921, 818.00/1023, MC 669.} While these developments will be discussed at greater length below, on the whole it could be said that Costa Rica certainly had no need of the League of Nations in its dealings with other American states. Within this same period as well, Costa Rica would express some criticism of the Pan American Union and the preeminence of the United States in its affairs. The criticism was directed against the Pan American Union following the failure of that body to adopt some Costa Rican suggestions for organizational
changes, so it might be argued that there were more hurt feelings than good reasons involved. 119

In the realm of European affairs, the most important single problem which arose, other than that of League membership, was the settlement of claims which arose due to the nullification of the acts of the Tinoco regime. Most significant among these was the Amory oil concession, which involved Great Britain and which had been associated with a loan negotiated with the Royal Bank of Canada. 120 As was discussed previously, the Amory concession matter was finally resolved in the Costa Rican courts, with the help of mediation by Chief Justice White and former President Taft of the United States. It was Taft's conclusion that the Tinoco regime had been in fact a legitimate government. 121 Although Great Britain approached the United States for assistance in settling the matter, it was decided by the State Department that the matter was not subject to official intervention, since it could be handled under Costa Rican law. 122 This decision was an important one for Costa Rica, since it allowed a resolution of national problems on purely national grounds.

119 U.S. Chargé Clarence B. Hewes at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 251, 4 May 1923, 818.00/1065, MC 669.

120 U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671.

121 Neumann, Recognition, p. 18.

122 Ibid.
with the aid of voluntary mediation by individuals whom it had chosen. However, Great Britain criticized the United States for taking a position favorable to its own interests rather than one which reflected the justice of the situation.¹²³ This did not in any way affect Costa Rican-British relations and so the independence of Costa Rica's policy was preserved.

Therefore, it can be seen that Costa Rica had no need for the League of Nations to conduct its foreign affairs. This will become even more apparent as these issues are discussed at greater length in succeeding chapters. However, it can be seen that while there may have been emotionalism or anti-Americanism attached to the resignation from the League, the decision was probably one made on logical, well-reasoned principles, including of course, the financial issue.

Thus, in December, 1925 Costa Rica's delegate at Geneva presented written notice of resignation to the Secretary General of the League to become effective January 1, 1927, citing financial considerations as the reason for its decision to withdraw.¹²⁴ It was reported by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the decision to resign had been made after the League published and publicized a list of "debtors," which

¹²³ U.S. Consul Benjamín F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 823, 6 August 1920, 818.00/000, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, 1920, I:835.

¹²⁴ Memorias, 1924, p. vii.
included Costa Rica. He asserted in his annual message to the Congress that such an action gave serious offense and insult to the Costa Rican people. Further, the report specified that the $18,700 owed to the League (or 74,671 colones) could have been used far more profitably for aqueducts, roads, or schools. The matter remained in abeyance for the two calendar years required by the League Covenant for effective resignation. Just prior to that date, however, a letter was sent by the League Secretariat asking that Costa Rica reconsider its decision to withdraw. It should be noted that one historian of the League explains that this letter was sent to Costa Rica not because of any real concern over the Costa Rican resignation, but simply because similar letters had been sent to Brazil and Spain on the occasion of their resignations and it was considered necessary to extend the same courtesy to Costa Rica to avoid insult.

In reality, the Costa Rican response to this letter was not a shocking one, although its implications might be construed as such. In its response, Costa Rica indicated

125 Ibid.
126 Ibid., p. viii.
127 Ibid., p. VII.
that in order for it to make any reevaluation of its decision to resign, it would have to have the League's definition of the term "Monroe Doctrine" as it appeared in Article 21 of the League Covenant. This request was surprising for a number of reasons. First, there had been no indication in the original letter of resignation that there was any objection to the contents of Article 21. This would not have been a surprise in itself, since Article 21 had been a problem from the start. Second, it had probably never occurred to the preparers of the League Covenant at the time that Article 21 was included that they would be put in the position of defining a United States policy such as the Monroe Doctrine without having the United States able to speak for itself. The third occasion of surprise was the source of these problems: Costa Rica. Costa Rica had never been an outstanding member of the League of Nations, nor had it even indicated any tendency to act outside of the pattern for Latin


131Manuel M. de Peralta to Señor Lic. don Rafael Argüello de Vars, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de la República de Costa Rica, 14 de enero de 1925, Memorias, 1924, pp. 154-155.


America. Unless the unusual circumstances surrounding its admission to the League were considered, there was, in fact, no reason to suspect that Costa Rica was bold enough to perpetrate any such shocking or independent actions.

The League Secretariat, as well as the General Assembly when the matter was brought before it, was at a loss as to how to proceed.\textsuperscript{134} At first, an attempt was made to acquire a definition of the Monroe Doctrine from the United States.\textsuperscript{135} For all of the reasons which had been used in opposition to the League of Nations on the grounds of its potential for interference in inter-American affairs, plus the fact that the United States did not belong to the League, the United States refused.\textsuperscript{136} Then, another plan was discussed whereby the League Covenant would be modified to exclude Article 21.\textsuperscript{137} Here, Great Britain objected for the same reasons for which it had supported the inclusion of the Article in the first place, namely the protection of its own "regional understandings."\textsuperscript{138} Finally, it was decided to inform Costa Rica that it was not in the power of the League to de-

\textsuperscript{134}Walters, \textit{The League of Nations}, I:390.

\textsuperscript{135}Ibid., I:391.

\textsuperscript{136}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{137}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{138}Ibid.; Fleming, \textit{The U.S. and the League}, p. 185.
fine the Monroe Doctrine, since it was a "regional understanding" with which, as Article 21 made clear, the League would not interfere since it represented a previous binding agreement among member states rather than anything for which the League was responsible. On that note, Costa Rican resignation became effective.

Where did this unusual request come from? It could be speculated, quite convincingly, that the requested definition of the Monroe Doctrine was meant as a way of bothering the United States or tugging at Uncle Sam's beard, by intimating a misapplication of the Monroe Doctrine. Or, it might be that Costa Rica truly sought a definition of a policy which it believed interfered with the effectiveness of the League in American affairs. However, since it had been the obvious intent of Costa Rica to resign from the League of Nations for some time before this request was made, it became evident that the question was posed in an attempt to force a definition of a policy which simply could not be furnished by the League. Therefore, Costa Rica accomplished the embarass-

139 Prócope, Presidente en ejercicio del Consejo de la Sociedad de las Naciones a el Señor Secretario de Estado de Costa Rica, San José, 1 Septiembre de 1928, Memorias, 1928, pp. 67-68.

140 U.S. Chargé Clarence B. Hewes at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 251, 4 May 1923, 818.00/1065, MC 669.

141 Rafael Castro Quesada, Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores to Señor don Francisco J. Urrutia, Presidente del Consejo de la Sociedad de las Naciones, 18 de julio de 1928, Memorias, 1928, pp. 65-67.
ment of the United States and of the League of Nations in one blow, preserving once again its independence of action in world affairs, unless, of course, Costa Rica was "put up to it" by Mexico or Chile, two outspoken critics of United States influence in the Western Hemisphere as suggested by the United States Chargé Roy T. Davis. This issue will be discussed in succeeding chapters. However, since there is no evidence to support this possibility, it must be assumed that Costa Rica acted completely on its own and would continue to do so.

The decision to withdraw from the League of Nations had been made by Julio Acosta's successor, Ricardo Jiménez. By the time this decision was reached, there was little if any United States encouragement or pressure for remaining in the League. In addition, the resignation served the purpose of establishing Costa Rican independence from United States influence insofar as Costa Rican public opinion was concerned. The preoccupation of the United States with its own internal affairs,plus isolationist sentiment there, prevented any reaction to Costa Rica's Monroe Doctrine question which might have presented problems for Costa Rica. However, the same

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142 U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, 1 May 1924, 818.00/1108, MC 669.

143 Manuel M. de Peralta to Señor Lic. don Rafael Argüello de Vars, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de la República de Costa Rica, 14 de enero de 1925, Memorias, 1924, pp. 154-155.
purpose was served whether the United States objected or not. Costa Rican independence in its international affairs was established and its path was clear for full participation in the Pan American Union.
CHAPTER VI

COSTA RICA AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY OF NATIONS: THE 1920'S

As has been established, the course of international events from 1900 to 1920 led to a situation in which Costa Rica, along with other Latin American states, essentially pursued a foreign policy limited to solely American or Western Hemispheric concerns. It would hardly be realistic to assert that 1920 marked a demarcation line for Costa Rica, after which diplomatic relations with the nations outside the Americas ceased to have any importance. However, as will be discussed in this and the succeeding chapter, the period following 1920 was, for Costa Rica, a time in which American or regional affairs took on primary importance in international relations. The main goals of Costa Rica's foreign policy was to improve Costa Rica's status in the Americas.

If it were the intention of Costa Rican policy makers to concentrate on hemispheric affairs, then logically a start would have been to be made in improving the nation's bilateral relations in the Americas. It is difficult to ascertain how this would be done on the basis of available evidence. All that can be accurately demonstrated is the actual course
of Costa Rican policy as reported officially by representatives of the United States and more importantly by the Costa Rican Ministers of Foreign Affairs in their annual reports when these are available.

In terms of the Costa Rican policy makers themselves, the election of Julio Acosta as President was reviewed in preceding chapters. His term of office extended from 1920 to 1924. The 1924 election was marked by the same initial problems as had marked the 1914 election of Alfredo González Flores. None of the candidates for office received the required constitutional majority, putting the election into the hands of the Congress.¹ The Congressional deliberations ended in the election of Lic. Ricardo Jiménez, whose campaign proposals were not substantially different from those of his opponents.² The only potential problems arising from Jiménez's Congressional election lay in the refusal of the Congress to seat a group of opposition delegates.³

Jiménez was followed in office in 1928 by Cleto González Viquez, whose policies were so similar to Jiménez's as

¹Ricardo Fernández Guardia, Cartilla Histórica, p. 130.
³U.S. Minister Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, 1 May 1914, 818.00/1108, MC 669.
not to be considered a real change. Both could be characterized as pro-democratic moderates with an interest in gradual social changes and an overall improvement of Costa Rica's economy and public works. When Jiménez was returned to the presidency in 1932 for another four year term, it confirmed the fact that the nation was pleased by the stability and gradual progress for which the two leaders were known. With such internal conditions of stability and progress, it should have been relatively easy for Costa Rica to pursue a foreign policy determined by national interests rather than the kind of policy which characterized the years immediately following the overthrow of the Tinoco regime, when the approval of the United States was the primary goal.

The situation among the Latin American states in the early 1920's was still characterized by the domination of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. With Brazilian withdrawal from the League of Nations, Brazil and Argentina alone were in contention for leadership in the Americas, while Chilean efforts were directed to leadership of the Latin American contingent which remained in the League of Nations. At the


5 Ricardo Fernández Guardia, *Cartilla Histórica*, p. 130.


same time, Brazil's close association with the policies of Woodrow Wilson in the early days of the League diminished the effectiveness of its resignation as evidence of its independence. This left Argentina in an extremely favorable position with regard to leadership among the Latin American states in American affairs. It is interesting to note that in 1921, Costa Rica maintained friendly relations with Argentine in spite of the isolationist tendencies of Argentine President Irigoyen.\(^8\) During the same time period, relations with Chile were decidedly cool.\(^9\) However, in all fairness it should be reported that this unfriendliness was due to an alleged insult to President Acosta by the Chilean Minister at a state dinner, which had long lingering consequences.\(^10\)

Relations with the other major South American states were, for the most part, strictly pro forma. At various times and for various reasons, animosity to these nations surfaced in the Costa Rican press. However, these occasions were primarily relegated to cases like that of Peru. In that instance, there was a strong suspicion that Peru had given material and moral assistance to Panama in its boundary dispute with Costa

\(^8\)U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671.

\(^9\)Ibid.

\(^10\)Ibid.
As the 1920's progressed, so too did the nature of Costa Rica's relations with the South American states. Some of that progress could be attributed to the growth of *Hispanismo* in Costa Rica, which emphasized the racial links existing among all Latin American people and including Spain. *Hispanismo* also made Costa Rica particularly susceptible to the "propaganda" efforts of other nations and to attempts at Latin American unity and the diminution of United States influence there. There were exchange scholarships arranged so that Costa Rican students could attend the national schools in South American nations such as Chile, which overlooked the earlier coolness between the two nations. The long range goal was the establishment of a Pan American Institute for the education of promising young Latin Americans from all

11Ibid.

12Diario de Costa Rica (San José), 6 October 1927, cited in U.S. Consul R. M. de Lambert at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 1052G, 7 October 1927, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 23 September-7 October 1927, 818.00/1179, MC 669.


14U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, 24 December 1926, MC 669.

15U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 1384, 30 October 1928, 818.4725/1, MC 669.
nations.\textsuperscript{16} The earlier difficulties which had clouded Costa Rican-Peruvian relations were apparently resolved during the 1920's as evidenced by the lengthy tribute given Peru in the address of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Costa Rican Congress with regard to Costa Rica's contribution to the centennial celebration of the Battle of Ayacucho.\textsuperscript{17} In general, on the level of bilateral relations with South America in the 1920's, Costa Rica was seeking an increased harmony and good will.\textsuperscript{18} There is no indication that there was any concerted effort to support the dominance of any one of these nations in Latin American affairs. For the most part, Costa Rica seems to have joined in the overall Latin American effort to withstand United States domination of the Americas, as will be discussed below.

In the realm of bilateral relations with Central American states, there was also some important progress in the course of the 1920's. A major concern in this area which has already been discussed at some length was the boundary dispute between Panama and Costa Rica. In 1921, the dispute was still unsettled and was approaching the state of armed

\textsuperscript{16}U.S. Chargé Leo R. Sack at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 599, 1 February 1929, 818.4275/2, MC 669.

\textsuperscript{17}Memorias, \textit{1924}, p. vi.

\textsuperscript{18}Memorias, \textit{1928}, p. xii.
conflict between the two nations. Since at that time both nations were members of the League of Nations, it was suggested by the British government that they take the matter to the League for arbitration. In the view of Costa Rica, the mediation of the United States was sufficient to handle the dispute in keeping with any agreements requiring arbitration. In fact, the Costa Rican Congress passed a resolution expressing the gratitude of the nation to the United States and commending that nation for its position in the matter as a reflection of a new and positive policy toward Latin America. However, Panama's view of United States mediation was not as positive. Panama obviously felt that justice was on its side and that the United States should be there as well. As a consequence, the Panamanian government sent letters and news stories in support of its position to major United States news services and publications as well as to the London Times. This was to no avail as troops from Panama and Costa Rica clashed in the disputed area.

19 Robert Lansing and Lester H. Woolsey to the Secretary of State, 3 March 1921, 718.1915/360, MC 671.

20 U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, 28 February 1921, 718.1915/299, MC 671.

21 Controversia Entre Panamá y Costa Rica, II:239.

22 U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 59, 23 March 1921, 718.1915/382, MC 671.

23 Controversia Entre Panamá y Costa Rica, II:171.
United States immediately sent word to the Panamanian government that such hostilities should cease at once, since war would be an inadmissible threat to the defense of the Panama Canal.\textsuperscript{24} At the same time, a much milder warning went to the Costa Rican government, stressing the fact that force was not justifiable in this instance and indicating that such action caused the United States "gravest concern."\textsuperscript{25}

The refusal of Costa Rica to take the matter before the League of Nations may have been reinforced or perhaps even prompted by the attitude of the United States. The United States Secretary of State indicated to the Chargé in San José that it was the desire of the United States to have the boundary dispute finally settled in accordance with the decision of Chief Justice White.\textsuperscript{26} Thus, if this was communicated in any way to the Costa Rican government, it would be supported in its attitude that mediation other than that already offered by the United States was unnecessary. It became clear to observers that the boundary conflict was not one which would be settled easily or promptly. As a conse-

\textsuperscript{24} The Secretary of State to the U.S. Minister in Panama (Price), 3 March 1921, 718.1915/293, United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921 (2 Vols., Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1936), I:177.

\textsuperscript{25} The Secretary of State to the U.S. Chargé in Costa Rica (Thurston), 5 March 1921, 718.1915/325a, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, 1921, I:181.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., I:182.
quence, it was viewed as inevitable that Costa Rican-Panamanian relations would remain unfriendly. The possibility that the United States involvement in the issue was prolonging the intransigence of either or both parties was not assessed at this time, although it would be a consideration in later years. In the interim, Costa Rica, supported by the United States, would be as conciliatory and amicable toward Panama as was possible under the circumstances throughout the 1920's.

There was an additional aspect to the boundary question which would fit into other major developments in Latin American relations during the 1920's. The involvement of the United States in the controversy has been outlined briefly above. However, there was a ramification of that involvement which had considerable relations to the development of a Latin American movement in the 1920's and 1930's to lessen the importance of the United States in Pan American affairs. It was reported that the representatives of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico were supposedly spreading the word in Costa Rica that the United States, in spite of its apparent favoritism for Costa Rica's

27 U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671.

28 Secretary of State to the Chargé in Panama (Munro), 4 February 1926, 718.1915/762a, United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1926 (2 Vols., Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941), I:542.
cause, could have solved the border dispute quite easily by controlling Panama as it had the power to do and by ordering the acceptance of the White award. But such speculation did little to bring about the settlement of the original dispute and probably led to even more difficulties in the achievement of a final resolution.

In the realm of Central American bilateral relations, Costa Rica took on another cause célèbre in this period. For obvious reasons, the criteria for extending diplomatic recognition to new governments would be an extremely sensitive issue with Costa Rican politicians. As was indicated earlier, President Julio Acosta (1920-1924) was repeatedly accused of appeasement of the United States and part of the ammunition for those accusations lay in his acceptance of the 1923 Washington treaty which reaffirmed the Tobar Doctrine of nonrecognition of revolutionary regimes. A test case of the doctrine came in 1931 when General Hernández Martínez seized the presidency by revolutionary coup in El Salvador. He denounced the 1923 treaty and proceeded to establish a stable and well-accepted government. Costa Rica and El Salvador had had especially cordial relations, since they were brought together by their common grievances against the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty

29 U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, 28 February 1921, 718.00/299, MC 671.
30 Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 228.
31 Neumann, Recognition, p. 24.
between the United States and Nicaragua. 32 This cordiality, combined with Costa Rican antagonism to the nonrecognition Doctrine of the 1923 treaty, led to the declaration early in 1933 that, effective January 1, 1934, Costa Rica would join El Salvador in renouncing their adherence to the Treaty. 33 Thus, Costa Rica and El Salvador stood together against the policies of the other Central American states, as well as the United States, which had also ratified the treaty.

There was considerable discussion as to how these nations should proceed. A plan was devised by the United States State Department whereby the three Central American states could announce that although they had decided to recognize the Martínez regime, they still viewed the treaty as binding among themselves. 34 The United States would thus also be free to recognize the Martínez regime without impairing the cordiality of its Central American relations while at the same time not backing down on its treaty obligations. 35 Upon evidence that the Martínez regime was stable and popularly

32 U.S. Charge Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671.

33 Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 228.


35 Ibid.
supported, President Roosevelt agreed to the plan. President Sacasa of Nicaragua drafted an agreement for the Central American states embodying this plan and added the recommendation that Costa Rica's approval be sought before the agreement was concluded as a matter of courtesy. Costa Rica's President Jiménez and Foreign Minister Pacheco were notified of the plan and expressed great pleasure that their lead was being followed. When recognition was extended to the Martínez government on January 26, 1934, Foreign Minister Pacheco made a statement in which he claimed a vindication of the Costa Rican policy. While the Treaty was technically in force between the United States, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Honduras, the principle of nonrecognition embodied in the Toobar Doctrine was in reality finished in Central American affairs. It may be that the success of the bilateral action of Costa Rica and El Salvador should be correctly attributed to the response of the United States to their challenge of the

36 Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles to President Roosevelt, 8 January 1934, 816.01/348 (notations of President on a photostatic copy indicate his approval, the copy is numbered 816.01/350), Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, 1934, V:218-219.

37 U.S. Minister in Nicaragua (Lane) to the Secretary of State, 11 January 1934, 816.01/355, ibid., V:224.

38 U.S. Minister Leo R. Sack at San José to the Secretary of State, 15 January 1934, 816.01/363, ibid., V:230-231.

39 U.S. Minister Leo R. Sack at San José to the Secretary of State, 26 January 1934, 816.01/410, ibid., V:256.

40 Neumann, Recognition, p. 24.
1923 Treaty and specifically to the Tobar Doctrine. However, it took substantial courage and independence of thought and action for these two states to stand up to the potential threat of the "Colossus of the North."

Another nation which is also credited with challenging the United States during the 1920's and 1930's was Mexico. In view of this, it is interesting to look at Mexican-Costa Rican relations during this period, colored as they were by the relationship of the United States to each nation. As noted previously, Costa Rica maintained diplomatic relations with Mexico throughout its controversial revolutionary period. In the early 1920's there were some reports of the propaganda efforts of Mexico in Costa Rica. One United States Chargé in Costa Rica, Walter C. Thurston, noted that "as by virtually every Latin American republic, Mexico is regarded by Costa Rica as the 'advance fort or bulwark standing between Spanish American culture and race and the imperialistic Colossus of the North.'" 41 Thurston went on to observe that Mexico took full advantage of the situation by maintaining amicable relationships whenever possible. 42

By the mid-1920's Mexican propaganda efforts in Central America had become more sophisticated. In 1925, the Mexican ministers throughout Central America approached the govern-

41 U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671.
42 Ibid.
ments to whom they were accredited with offers of broad loans. There is little doubt that Mexican policy was effective in Costa Rica in view of the attack by La Prensa of San José on the United States for its policies toward Mexican President Plutarco Elías Calles. However, this was not to continue indefinitely or without interruption. In the year following the loan proposals, the potential for Mexican intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua arose and there was an almost immediate Costa Rican reaction to that threat. Prior to the realization that Mexico posed a threat to Costa Rica, the government had tolerated Mexican domination of the San José press. But this would subsequently change.

This brief disenchantment with Mexico's motives was ended within a short time as the unity of American states in general was strengthened. The Costa Rican nation seemed to accept its racial link with Spain and to find the American

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43 U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, 29 October 1925, 818.51/316, MC 669.

44 U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 616G, 3 July 1925, Report of General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 20 June-3 July 1925, 818.00/1122, MC 669.


counterpart to Spain in Mexico, the "Aztec nation."47 As was the case earlier in the 1920’s, Mexico followed up on the fellow feeling by giving Costa Rica and other Central American states presents of airplanes.48 The waxing and waning of Mexican influence in Costa Rica was without any real pattern in the 1920’s. Later, as will be discussed below, there would be some correlation between Costa Rican-Mexican relations and the course of Pan American affairs.

As opposed to Mexican relations, Costa Rica's relationship with Nicaragua never had any periods of positive accomplishment. Part of the problem related to the difficulties between the two nations which arose because of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty. When Nicaragua experiences internal political problems early in the 1920's which brought about the intervention of the United States, Costa Rica was found to be in the position of allegedly supporting Nicaraguan revolutionaries. The Costa Rican government, in fact, informed the President of Nicaragua that a rebel band was in Costa Rica

47 La Prensa (San José), 22 September 1927 and El Diarico de Costa Rica (San José), 6 October 1927, cited in U.S. Consul R. M. de Lambert at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 1052G, 7 October 1927, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 23 September-7 October 1927, 818.00/1179, MC 669.

48 U.S. Chargé R. M. de Lambert at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 1341, 3 October 1928, 818.248/1, MC 669; U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 1615, 8 August 1929, 818.248/5, MC 669.
preparing to cross the border into Nicaragua. Somehow it is difficult to overlook the parallel between this situation and the one of previous years surrounding the rebel bands originating in Nicaragua which were responsible for the overthrow of the Tinoco government. Perhaps this is where the explanation for Costa Rican hostility lies. However, the United States took the unusual position that precisely for that reason Costa Rica should feel gratitude to the Nicaraguan nation and that relations between the two states should therefore be cordial. But such an attitude overlooked the animosity felt by those Costa Ricans who had supported Tinoco, the lingering resentment surrounding the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, and the hostility occasioned by the presence of United States Marines in Nicaragua.

The United States took some steps to remedy these latter problems. Early in 1923, the United States and Costa Rica finally signed an agreement by which Costa Rica would be consulted in the event of a decision to construct a Nicaraguan canal so that Costa Rica's interests could receive equitable consideration. Another event which had an extremely

49U.S. Minister Jefferson in Nicaragua to the Secretary of State, 22 August 1921, 715.1715/206, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, 1921, II:554.

50U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671.

positive effect on United States-Costa Rican relations regarding Nicaraguan issues occurred in 1925. At that time, the United States withdrew its marines from Managua in spite of the request of some members of the Nicaraguan government that they be allowed to remain.52 On the other side of the spectrum, this event did nothing to facilitate Costa Rican-Nicaraguan amicability. In fact, the United States was vindicated in the Costa Rican press for its intervention in Nicaragua on the grounds that individuals who would request continued military intervention were not worthy of independent self-government.53

Once again in 1927, Costa Rica came under suspicion for harboring within its borders rebel groups which were opposed to the current Nicaraguan government.54 It is entirely possible that this allegation, if true, reflected the popular opinion that any canal project undertaken by Nicaragua in conjunction with the United States would be disastrous to

52U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 630G, 5 August 1925, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 19 July-30 July 1925, 818.00/1124, MC 669.

53U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 641G, 4 September 1925, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 16 August-4 September 1925, 818.00/1126, MC 669.

Costa Rican sovereignty. Therefore, aiding the disruption of internal order in Nicaragua would delay the construction of the canal and prevent the realization of the threat. If such a canal were constructed, it would be linked by numerous highways and railways which would virtually cut Costa Rica into several long, narrow pieces running north and south between Panama and Nicaragua. 55 Feeling threatened by Nicaragua's relationship with the United States, Costa Rican policy in the 1930's would tend toward establishing close ties with other Central American states, such as with El Salvador in the matter of the denunciation of the 1923 Washington Treaty. Further, an effort was made to improve relations with Guatemala which had taken Costa Rica's part in the boundary dispute with Panama. 56

The thread of United States relations with Costa Rica runs through all of Costa Rica's bilateral relations with other Latin American states in the 1920's. As was indicated earlier, the United States was viewed with mixed emotions by most Costa Ricans, depending upon the attitude held with regard to the nonrecognition of the Tinoco regime, its fall, and

55 La Nueva Prensa (San José), 17 November 1927, cited in U.S. Charge R. M. de Lambert at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 1042G, 2 December 1927, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 18 November-2 December 1927, 818.00/1183, MC 669.

56 U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671.
the original exclusion of Costa Rica from the League of Nations. In general, at the beginning of the decade, Costa Rica was wary of the United States and its motives in Central American affairs. This did not prevent the conduct of day-to-day business, such as the conclusion of a treaty of extradition with the United States in 1922 or a treaty regulating the travel and business of salesmen between the two countries. Primarily due to the ability of both nations to conduct "business as usual" in spite of potential problems, it was possible in 1925 to characterize their relations as "amicable." Adding to that amicability was the agreement concluded in 1926 with the United Fruit Company providing for a loan of $500,000 to the nation.


58 República de Costa Rica, Colección de Tratados [Que Contiene Solamente Los Tratados Vigentes en la Fecha del 31 de diciembre de 1926 (Edición Ordenada por la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, San José: Imprenta Librería y Encuadernación Alsina, 1927), p. 333, 718.00/4, MC 671; Memorias, 1924, p. vi.

59 U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 6044G, 5 June 1926, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 23 May-5 June 1925, 818.00/1119, MC 669.

60 U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 649G, 18 September 1925, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 5 September-18 September 1925, 818.00/1127, MC 669; U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José
The improvement in United States-Costa Rican relations was also noted in the Costa Rican press. The domination of San José newspapers by Mexico was changed so that by late 1925, one major daily news publication was owned by the Associated Press and others featured many despatches from United States papers. Even stories of local origin reportedly "eulogized" United States institutions and ideals. Somehow it is difficult to credit this change of press attitude to a sincere change of opinion about the United States, but the United States Chargé, Roy T. Davis, did so, explaining that Mexican influence had waned and that there was a "higher class of journalists." However, it should be noted that the threat of Mexican domination in Nicaraguan affairs may have led to a swing of opinion favorable to the United States as a viable means of preventing the extension of Mexican domination to Costa Rica.

So strong was this swing of opinion that in a Presi-


62 Ibid.

63 U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 744G, 16 April 1926, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 13 March-16 April 1926, 818.00/1139, MC 669.
dential election campaign, the opponents of Ricardo Jiménez found his alleged anti-Americanism to be ammunition to use against him. 64 However, as time passed, Jiménez's position was accepted as a realistic one. In leading the nation to its withdrawal from the League of Nations, he was credited with understanding that while the League could be a moral force in protecting Costa Rican sovereignty, it could simply not challenge the real power of the United States in American affairs. 65

To the detriment of the United States, the favorable attitude of the Costa Rican press would suffer as a result of United States intervention in Nicaragua during 1926 and 1927. 66 Once again, the Costa Rican press took up the theme of United States imperialism and the threat of United States military power. 67 However, there was some modification of the view as can be seen in the following extract from a prominent San José

64 U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, 8 January 1926, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 26 December-8 January 1926, 818.00/1129, MC 669.

65 El Diario de Costa Rica (San José), March, 1926, in U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 744G, 16 April 1926, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 13 March-16 April 1926, 818.00/1149, MC 669.

66 Howland, American Relations, p. 228.

The danger of Yankee imperialism, as we have stated so many times, is not caused by the activities of the Secretary of State at Washington, but by the maneuvers of the ardent friends which the Yankee Government has in these republics. Almost on every occasion intervention has been solicited by some degenerate dependent upon the support of traitors who are always to be found.68

The reaction of the United States representative in Costa Rica was that Mexican influence was once again rearing its head as evidenced by a belittlement of Charles Lindbergh's accomplishment in comparison with a proposed flight by a Mexican aviator to Argentina.69

Another factor which may have contributed to the wave of anti-American sentiment in Costa Rica during 1927 was the general public belief in the innocence of Sacco and Vanzetti. There were widespread public demonstrations and the threat of a general strike in support of their case.70 However, the

68 Repertorio de Americano (San José), 19 November 1927, Translation in U.S. Chargé R. M. de Lambert at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 1092G, 2 December 1927, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 18 November-2 December 1927, 818.00/1183, MC 669.

69 Diario de Costa Rica (San José), in U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 983G, 24 June 1927, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 10 June-24 June 1927, 818.00/1169, MC 669.

70 U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 983G, 24 June 1927, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 10 June-24 June 1927, 818.00/1169, MC 669; U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 1013G, 12 August 1927, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 21 July-12 August 1927, 818.00/1174, MC 669.
movement died down rather quickly and was even of some eventual benefit to the United States because of the reports that the United States Senate was determined to ignore foreign demonstrations, which gave evidence that the United States might be undergoing a turn toward isolationism, which could mean that its imperialistic designs might be waning. Continued evidence of this was provided to some Costa Ricans by the visit of President-elect Herbert Hoover to Costa Rica in December, 1928, the first such visit by a United States President or President-elect. Many Costa Ricans apparently were ready to accept the messages of friendship and cooperation offered by Hoover and they looked forward to amicable relations with the United States during his Presidency.

It can be seen from the foregoing that it is difficult to isolate bilateral relations conducted by Costa Rica from its multilateral relationships. For example, as was indicated, the on-again, off-again amicability with Mexico seemed to be directly related to the status of United States-Costa Rican relations. In at least one instance, the Central American concern with the potential threat of Mexican domination of Nicaragua...

71 U.S. Charge Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 1030G, 2 September 1927, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 13 August-2 September 1927, 818.00/1177, MC 669.

72 U.S. Charge Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, 4 January 1929, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 17 November-31 December 1928, 818.00GC/7, MC 669.
ragua led to improved United States-Costa Rican relations. It would then seem to follow that Costa Rica would be inclined to participate in multilateral groups such as the Pan American Union or a Central American Union if one existed. Thus, in 1921 when a proposal was forwarded for still another attempt at Central American confederation, Costa Rica was willing to participate in it as it had been to participate in such efforts in previous years.

The attempted Central American Union of 1921 was supposedly part of the celebration of the first centennial of independence. A conference was convened, chaired by a Costa Rican, Alvarado Quirós, in which the details of the confederation would be worked out. As had been the case in previous efforts, it soon became apparent that the divisions among the five Central American states were far greater than any of the unifying influences which had prompted the conference. A federal constitution was to be prepared by which each nation maintained its autonomy in internal affairs, provided actions of this type were not contrary to the broad rules of the constitution. But the constitution was not to be drafted until the pact of union had been ratified and a

74 Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 215.
76 Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 213.
national constituent assembly convened. The first real indication that there would be problems in meeting these preliminary steps came when President Quiros was not present for the official signing of the pact of union. Although the official ceremony was delayed four days to await his return to the conference, his absence, along with the reaction of the Costa Rican press to the proposed union, did not bode well for its success, at least in Costa Rica. Further, evidence of the potential failure lay in the fact that Nicaragua withdrew from the conference when it became obvious that the other participants intended to bring the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty under discussion. Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, nonetheless, signed the pact of union on January 16, 1921.

Once again, there is a suspicion that Costa Rica did not take the success of the union too seriously. Octavio Beeche, the Costa Rican Minister in Washington, D. C., pre-

77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., p. 215.
79 Ibid.
80 El Diario (San José), 14 January 1921, cited in Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 215.
81 U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 4, 22 January 1921, 818.00/1021, MC 669.
82 U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, 19 January 1921, 813.00/1047, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, 1921, I:9.
presented a copy of the pact of union to the Secretary of State, remarking that it was "barely a project" and "has not yet been approved by the Congresses in the respective countries." Ratifications of the pact were achieved in fairly short order in the Congresses of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Since these three ratifications rendered the pact effective, it was sent to the League of Nations for registration. The Costa Rican Congress, meanwhile, rejected a majority report which recommended ratification and voted to postpone action on the union until its next session.

It soon became apparent that Costa Rica was not going to ratify the pact. Although the pact was "viewed very favorably," there was talk of close relations with the federation.

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83 The Costa Rican Minister in Washington (Octavio Beeche) to the Secretary of State, 1 February 1921, 813.00/1050, ibid., I:145.

84 U.S. Chargé Spencer in Honduras to the Secretary of State, No. 70, 15 February 1921, ibid., I:153.

85 U.S. Minister Jay in El Salvador to the Secretary of State, 23 February 1921, 813.00/1057, ibid., I:154.

86 Guatemalan Minister in Washington (Bianchi) to the Secretary of State, 8 April 1921, 813.00/1069, ibid., I:154.

87 Alberto Uclés, Honduran Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Secretary of State, 15 June 1921, 813.00/1088, ibid., I:155.

88 U.S. Chargé Frank Arnold in El Salvador to the Secretary of State, 3 June 1921, 816.00/326, ibid., I:154-155.

89 U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, 22 June 1921, 813.00/1079, ibid., I:156.
rather than membership in it. Thus, this union, like others which preceded it, failed because the five Central American nations could not ratify a pact of confederation. The major analyst of these attempts at confederation in Central America notes that while there are specific reasons which can be attributed to each individual failure, one of the three overall causes was the isolationist behavior of Costa Rica when it came to making the final commitment to union. Thomas Karnes goes on to explain that the primary consideration for Costa Rica was economics. That is to say, there simply were no profitable markets for its products in Central America. Further, on a less specific level, there was the Costa Rican concern that its political stability and high level of culture might be impaired through association with its less stable, less culturally developed neighbors.

In the specific instance of the 1921 Confederation, however, Costa Rica's stated motives were somewhat different from the foregoing. In keeping with the problems it perceived because of United States domination in Nicaragua and throughout Central America, Costa Rica claimed that a political

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90 U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671.
91 Karnes, Failure of Union, pp. 248-249.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid., p. 249.
confederation was impossible and only a spiritual union was feasible. This explanation, in the opinion of this author, is perhaps far more to the overall point than any specific arguments which might be cited. Costa Rica was well aware, with the Tinoco problem still fresh in memory, of the influence that the United States wielded over the lives of the Central American republics. Confederation, or any other project designed to strengthen Central America, could succeed only with the approval of the United States, making the accomplishment of union less important than it was designed to be. Therefore, Costa Rica chose in this instance to retain its freedom of action, much as Nicaragua did, by refusing to join the union. While there had been no indications that the United States disapproved this union, it should be clear from the foregoing that Costa Rican self interest, both in Central America and elsewhere in the world, could be best served by other means.

One way in which Costa Rica obviously sought to serve its best interests was its revival of the idea of an Inter-American Court of Justice. It should be remembered that Costa Rica had been an enthusiastic supporter of the Central American Court until its demise was brought about the the rejection of its decision on the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty by the United States and Nicaragua. The Costa Rican Congress passed

94Ibid., p. 217.
a resolution to propose the institution of an inter-American body in commemoration of the 100th anniversary (1826) of the First Congress of American Nations and in honor of Simón Bolívar. At the same time, there was discussion of an American League of Nations which could handle strictly American problems most effectively because of the distinctive relationships which existed among nations of such similar origin. As will be demonstrated, the latter idea was one which was quite popular with the smaller Latin American states during the late 1920's and early 1930's. However, in view of Costa Rica's rejection of the Central American union in 1921, it is interesting to note its advocacy of this cause. It is entirely feasible that the Costa Rican proposals, as well as others of similar nature, resulted from the failure of the League of Nations to accept any role in the mediation of the Tacna-Arica dispute. However, in this matter as in others, the League deferred to the United States and the inter-American Conference system for a solution.

95 U.S. Chargé ad interim Waldemar J. Gallman at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 773G, 2 July 1926, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 11 June-2 July 1926, 818.00/1144, MC 669.
96 Ibid.
98 Bailey, Latin America in World Politics, p. 149.
This brings the discussion to a consideration of Costa Rican participation, or lack thereof, in the inter-American Conferences of the 1920's. The first of these was held in Santiago, Chile in 1923. This conference had initially been scheduled in 1914 but had been postponed due to the intervention of World War I.\(^9\) The program approved for the conference included nearly twenty items,\(^1\) seven of which could be categorized as political issues which the United States was expected to oppose but which it had allowed in the hopes of preventing their success.\(^1\) These political issues primarily revolved around a proposed reorganization of the Pan American Union with a diminution of the control of the United States as their goals.\(^1\) Prior to this time, representation at the Pan American Union or on the Governing Board was restricted to the diplomatic representatives of the individual countries accredited to the United States and obviously to those nations who had regularized diplomatic re-


\(^1\)Program of the Fifth Conference as approved by the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, 6 December 1922, ibid., pp. 210-212.

\(^1\)Mecham, *Inter-American Security*, p. 95.

\(^1\)Ibid.
lations with the United States. Further, the chairmanship of the Governing Board was held on a permanent basis by the United States Secretary of State. It is obvious from the foregoing that the role of the United States in the Pan American Union was a dominant one, so that the efforts of reorganization were directed to a real problem rather than to an illusion of dominance by the "Colossus of the North."

There were, of course, other issues which the United States could be expected to oppose, such as the idea of an American League of Nations. This proposal was presented as a means of encouraging closer ties among the American nations, with legal strictures such as binding arbitration to cement the nations more closely than did the Pan American Union. In the same vein, the program contained at least two items designed to promote arbitration as a means of solving international disputes in the Americas and proposed the acceptance of a uniform codification of international law, such as the one to be produced by the Inter-American Congress

103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Scott, Conferences of American States, 1889-1928, p. 211.
106 Mecham, Inter-American Security, p. 95.
107 Scott, Conferences of American States, 1889-1928, p. 211.
of Jurists. All of these issues were linked to the diminution of United States influence, since they were premised on the equal sovereignty of all American states and would allow Latin American preeminence by the simply fact that they outnumbered the United States.

The American League of Nations proposal was introduced by President Brum of Uruguay at the Santiago Conference in spite of warnings that the United States opposition to such a program would prevent its passage, which, in fact, occurred. An interesting aspect of Brum's proposal was that he wished to see the Monroe Doctrine as the fundamental principle of the American League, with each American state issuing a declaration of the Doctrine on its own behalf. The United States took particular issue with this aspect of Brum's proposal, maintaining that the Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral policy which could not therefore be appropriated by any other nation. While the United States was able to carry out its opposition to the American League with the majority of the Conference, primarily due to the nationalistic jealousies which existed, it was apparent that such control would not be long lived after

110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
the 1923 Conference.\footnote{112} Costa Rica, represented at the Conference by Alejandro Alvarado Quiros who was the former chairman of the Central American Conference of 1921,\footnote{113} was counted among the delegations in opposition to the United States by virtue of its position with regard to the issues outlines above. In fact, the resolution proposing the creation of a Permanent Court of American Justice was made by the Costa Rican delegate.\footnote{114} The tribunal would, according to the Costa Rican proposal, provide binding arbitration for all signatories and arbitrate any disputes of non-signatories for which a special agreement could be reached designating the Court as arbiter.\footnote{115} However, this resolution was not adopted by the Santiago Conference. It was sent, along with other proposals, such as the codification of American law, to the Congress of Jurists, which was scheduled to meet at Rio de Janeiro in 1925.\footnote{116}

Beyond the referral of the aforementioned matters to

\footnote{112}{Ibid., pp. 99-100.}
\footnote{113}{Scott, Conference of American States, 1839-1928, p. 219.}
\footnote{114}{Proposed Treaty Presented by the Delegation of Costa Rica Regarding the Creation of A Permanent Court of American Justice, ibid., pp. 452-453.}
\footnote{115}{Ibid.}
\footnote{116}{Resolution adopted by the 14th Session of the Conference, 2 May 1923, ibid., p. 284.}
the Rio Congress of Jurists, there was very little of real progress to be noted from the proceedings of the Santiago Conference. As was indicated earlier, Costa Rica would pick up the theme of the American League of Nations in 1926 and would continue advocacy of that idea, as well as its own proposals, in subsequent inter-American conferences.

The next scheduled conference took place in Havana in 1928. Many of the issues which remained unresolved after the Santiago Conference were again put on the agenda, which made the United States aware of the fact that the defeat of controversial matters which it opposed was by no means assured. 117

In response to the Brum proposal made at Santiago which had called for the establishment of an American League of Nations based on a multinational Monroe Doctrine, the delegation from the United States was instructed that the United States did not desire a discussion of the Monroe Doctrine at this and, for that matter, at any inter-American Conference, despite growing Latin American support for the American League idea. 118 The project for the codification of

117Mecham, Inter-American Security, p. 100.

American international law resulted in the Bustamante Code, which was presented to the Havana Conference for ratification. Several of the delegations expressed reservations before signing the convention which recognized the name Bustamante Code and indicated the tentative approval of their nations. Costa Rica and Colombia joined in a reservation indicating their willingness to accept the Code, provided it never came into conflict with provisions of their national constitutions. By November, 1930, ten Latin American states, including Costa Rica, had ratified the Bustamante Code, indicating a willingness to comply with projects designed to increase Latin American unity.

Overall, the Sixth International Conference of American States was a testing and re-testing of the ability of the United States to exert its influence in controlling the Latin American states within the conference system. Costa Rica once again participated in the conference, seemingly on the side of those nations who sought to limit United States influence, but it was not particularly outstanding.

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120 Ibid., p. 443.
121 Ibid., p. 372.
122 Ibid., p. 325.
even in that area.

One outcome of the Havana Conference was an agreement for a Conference of American States on Conciliation and Arbitration to be held late in December, 1928. In essence, this conference was to discuss some of the matters on arbitration which the United States had blocked at Havana. The outcome of the Conference was a General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration, signed by twenty republics, and binding all signatories to arbitration as a means of settling all disputes. Costa Rica was one of the signatories but agreed only with two reservations: first, the provisions of the treaty were not to affect any previously existing agreements between Costa Rica and any other nations, whether both had ratified the treaty or not; second, the provisions of the treaty did not affect any case which fell under the jurisdiction of the Costa Rican courts so long as both parties in the case recognized the jurisdiction of those courts. Ten other signatories of the Treaty adopted either one or both of these reservations. In spite of this, by December, 1930, only six of the original signatories had ratified the treaty.

123 Ibid., p. 458.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid., p. 460.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid., pp. 460-461.
and of these six, four had followed Costa Rica's lead in reservations, although Costa Rica itself had not ratified. The reasons for Costa Rica's failure to ratify the treaty, as well as its reservations in signing, can be found in the boundary dispute with Panama. Six months before the Conference was held, the Costa Rican Foreign Minister had indicated to the United States Chargé, Roy T. Davis, his government's willingness to be bound by a treaty of arbitration provided that there were guarantees that such a treaty would in no way affect the current state of the boundary negotiations with Panama. It was the Costa Rican concern that a general treaty of arbitration might allow Panama to reject all previous negotiations and resubmit the boundary question for mediation. In view of the length and bitterness of the dispute to that point, Costa Rica was simply unwilling to allow this to occur, viewing its own national interests as more important than a general arbitration treaty for the Americas.

Although Costa Rican foreign policy during the 1920's was complex, it was characterized by a dominant theme, namely the pursuit of the best interests of the Costa Rican nation. In the area of great importance to other Latin American states

128 Ibid., pp. 458-460-461.


130 Ibid.
during this period, the limitation of the influence of the United States in Pan American affairs, Costa Rica chose not to attempt to assume a position of leadership. Accepting the pragmatic approach of President Ricardo Jiménez, Costa Rica realized that if it attempted to ignore the very real power of the United States in Latin American affairs, it would be courting disaster. Thus, membership in the League of Nations was seen as a needless expense which bore absolutely no fruit for national policy. Secondly, even if Costa Rica had taken it upon itself to attempt to lead other Latin American nations, there is little evidence to support the contention that any would have followed. Finally, there was every indication at the close of the 1920's that the influence of the United States was to be limited in the future, not only because of the unity of Latin Americans in opposition to it, but also due to a modification of United States foreign policy which would come to be called the Good Neighbor Policy. Costa Rica thus had no reason to continue to oppose the United States as it had in the majority of cases during the 1920's. In addition, its independence of action with regard to other Latin American states would be sustained by the almost universally accepted non interference principles which marked Pan Americanism.
The most significant differences between the two decades under study was that in the early 1930's, the overall scope of Costa Rican foreign policy was greatly reduced. In the 1930 annual report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Congress, it was noted that while the nation attempted to maintain all amicable relationships, economic considerations had forced a cutback in the number of missions open throughout the world and had prevented an active pursuit of policies which sought to establish new, friendly relationships.¹ The worldwide nature of this economic crisis seemingly made the task of remaining Costa Rican diplomats all the more difficult, since economics were held responsible for a variety of political disturbances with which they had to deal.² Nonetheless, Costa Rican internationalism continued to express the goals and desires of the nation, as they were interpreted

¹Memorias, 1930, p. vii.
²Ibid., p. v.
by Costa Rican statesmen. Therefore, as a background to a discussion of Costa Rican internationalism in the 1930's, some consideration should be given to the internal affairs of the nation.

As was indicated previously, the late 1920's were marked by an exceptionally stable political scene in Costa Rica. In 1932, Ricardo Jiménez sought election to his second term as President to succeed don Cleto González Viquez.\(^3\) The election campaign was an extremely active one in which Jiménez was opposed by Manuel Castro Quesada.\(^4\) Once again, the failure of either of the candidates to achieve the required majority put the election in the hands of the Congress, which, by González Viquez's orders, was to follow procedures established by a group of Jiménez supporters there.\(^5\)

The United States took much interest in the outcome of this election, since Castro Quesada, who had been associated with the Tinoco regime, was notoriously opposed to United States

\(^3\)Secretary of the Legation Werlich for the U.S. Minister at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 1251, 31 December 1932, Report on 1932, 818.00/1401, United States, Department of State, Records of the Department of State Regarding the Internal Affairs of Costa Rica, 1930-1939, Manuscript Collection, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Documents from this collection will be cited hereinafter, with appropriate decimal file number for each specific document, as Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.

\(^4\)Ibid.

involvement or economic penetration into Costa Rica, whereas Ricardo Jiménez seemingly had no such objections. When the Congressional deliberations resulted in Jiménez's election, Castro Quesada announced himself in revolt. It was speculated that his motivation was not to seize power for himself, but to force González Víquez to hold new elections in which a neutral third party could be chosen. Since President González Víquez refused to surrender to such extralegal means, the disputants were at an impasse. The United States Minister in San José, Charles C. Eberhardt, became directly involved in the conflict by carrying messages from the Castro Quesada faction to the President and Ricardo Jiménez in an attempt to assist breaking the impasse. He was almost

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6 Memorandum by Walter C. Thurston, Division of Latin American Affairs, Department of State, to the Assistant Secretary of State, 12 September 1931, 818.00/1293, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.

7 U.S. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San José to the Secretary of State, 27 February 1932, 818.00/1341, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.


9 U.S. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 14, 12 February 1932, 818.00/1329, ibid., V:514.

10 Ibid.

11 U.S. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San José to
immediately instructed to disengage himself from any mediation efforts, since this would give tacit approval to the legitimacy of Castro Quesada's revolt which was clearly illegal.12 Without Eberhardt's assistance, conferences were held among the contending factions, during which it became obvious that Castro Quesada's insurrection had ended.13 A pact was signed, witnessed by Eberhardt in his capacity as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, by which Castro Quesada was granted amnesty for his revolt but by which his bid for power in Costa Rican politics failed.14

Following this brief interlude of unrest, with its relatively peaceful settlement, Costa Rican politics settled back down to a pre-election dormancy.15 Much of this tranquility resulted from the personal authority which surrounded

the Secretary of State, 16 February 1932, 818.00/1329, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.

12 Secretary of State to U.S. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San José, 17 February 1932, 818.00/1329, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.

13 U.S. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San José to the Secretary of State, 18 February 1932, 818.00/1335, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.

14 U.S. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San José to the Secretary of State, 18 February 1932, 818.00/1335, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.

15 Secretary of the Legation Werlich for the U.S. Minister at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 1251, 31 December 1932, Report on 1932, 818.00/1401, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
the newly elected President Jiménez. 16 His previous popularity and the stability of his 1924-1928 Presidency combined with a gradual economic recovery to restore the pattern of stability and a gradual progress by which this period was characterized. 17

As a direct consequence of this stability, Costa Rica began to return to policies which reflected its nationalistic nature. 18 In the view of the United States Minister, nationalism led to a resurgence of isolationism in Costa Rica by which it rejected all but the most necessary international relationships. 19 It is interesting to contrast this assessment with the explanation offered by the Costa Rican Foreign Minister in 1930 for the reduction of international activities. 20 There is simply no means by which the causes for Costa Rican cutbacks in foreign affairs can be ascertained. In view of the obvious economic difficulties of the world, it would be impossible to completely ignore their impact, or the use of this reasoning by Costa Rican officials. However, when decisions had to be made with regard to budgetary

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 U.S. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 1285, 25 January 1933, 818.00/1402, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.

19 Ibid.

reductions, it is equally obvious that foreign affairs were not of the highest priority to Costa Rican policy makers who were traditionally characterized as isolationists. In 1933, the isolationist nature of Costa Rican policies took on a new facet as it was reported that popular programs were designed to achieve Costa Rican self sufficiency in the areas of food production, communications, and transportation. 21 A press campaign was launched in support of this program in the important news publications in San José, whose freedom from government control was well known, and whose motives were unquestionably nationalistic. 22 The high literacy rate of the Costa Rican population made such a campaign quite successful and added even more to the public approval for the Presidency of Ricardo Jiménez.

Another new application of the traditional isolationism to national policy was developed in 1935. A movement led by former President Julio Acosta (1920-1924) called for the creation of a standing Costa Rican army. 23 The immediate reason for such a proposal was related to the alleged threats

21U.S. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 1285, 25 January 1933, 818.00/1402, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.


23U.S. Minister Leo R. Sack at San José to the Secretary of State, 18 December 1935, 818.20/16, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
posed to Costa Rican sovereignty by Guatemala's insistence that the nation take part in a new Central American confederation.\textsuperscript{24} Initially, all that Acosta and his supporters called for was the creation of a military school for the preparation of Costa Rican officers and an investigation of the feasibility of requesting military missions from either the United States, Britain, France, Germany, or Chile.\textsuperscript{25} As will be discussed at a later point, the military missions were eventually received by Costa Rica, but in connection with preparations for World War II rather than for purposes of Central American war.

The concluding months of Ricardo Jiménez's presidency and the election of his successor were relatively uneventful.\textsuperscript{26} Lic. León Cortés, who served as president from 1936 to 1940, was known as a man of great integrity and exceptionally conservative politics.\textsuperscript{27} His term of office continued the pattern of stability and national progress established by Ricardo Jiménez. In the realm of foreign policy, León Cortés emphasized the importance of Central America above all other regions to the Costa Rican nation.\textsuperscript{28} He based this emphasis on the

\textsuperscript{24}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{26}Busey, "Presidents of Costa Rica," p. 69.
\textsuperscript{27}Ibid.
spiritual union which existed among the Central American states, including their shared natural wealth and common heritage. In some respects, this represented a change, at least superficially, in Costa Rican attitudes. Rather than an insistence upon the superiority of Costa Rica to its nearest neighbors, León Cortés seemed to believe that Costa Rican foreign policy should be formulated on a solid basis of Central American amicability. The proximity in time to the World War must also be taken into consideration, since United States policy during this period strongly emphasized the importance of hemispheric solidarity to the safety of individual nations.

Also reflecting this change in attitude was the offer of León Cortés to mediate a controversy between Honduras and Nicaragua. More of this will be discussed in connection with Costa Rica's Central American policies. However, the changes in foreign policy were not solely due to the external forces which have been noted. As the 1930's progressed, political party activity increased and became more sophisticated so that by 1940, one analyst noted the beginning of a modern political age for Costa Rica. At that time, the Partido

29 Ibid.


31 Denton, Costa Rican Politics, p. 28.
Republicano Nacional (PRN), founded by RicardoJiménez in support of his candidacy in 1932, elected the immensely popular Rafael Calderón Guardia.\textsuperscript{32} Calderón Guardia, regarded as a progressive in domestic affairs, favored aligning Costa Rica with the policy of the United States in view of the imminence of war.\textsuperscript{33} He recognized that the defense of the Western Hemisphere would rely heavily on the potential of the United States, supported by a unanimous Latin American community.

However, in the decade preceding the election of Calderón Guardia, such attitudes were only beginning to emerge in a clear fashion. Throughout the 1920's the Latin American community of nations had begun to demand the diminution of the overwhelming control of the Hemisphere by the United States. The outcome of these developments, combined with the priorities established by the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations concerning the Latin American policy of the United States, was that by 1940, a Costa Rican President could make an independent choice to follow the United States in world affairs or to reject United States leadership. This change in the relationships among the Latin American nations, labeled the Good Neighbor Policy by the Roosevelt administration, which will be discussed in greater detail below, did not emerge immedi-


\textsuperscript{33}U.S. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 379, 20 August 1938, Memorandum on the Views of R. A. Calderón Guardia, 711.18/44, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
ately at the end of the 1920's. Nor was it suddenly brought to fruition by the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 34 It was not until the eve of World War II, with a number of years of visible implementation of the policy, that the Latin American nations were willing to accept the serious intentions of the United States in permanently denouncing any and all intervention in Latin American affairs. 35 These changes also had the effect of making certain aspects of Latin American foreign policy somewhat difficult to examine due to attempts being made, more and more throughout the 1930's, to present a united front on issues of inter-American relations. An examination of the case of Costa Rica should make these problems clearer, comparing its bilateral and multi-lateral policies in the 1930's with those of the 1920's which were discussed in the previous chapter. Since the relations between Costa Rica and the United States are extremely important to an assessment of the Good Neighbor Policy, these will be discussed first.

In general, the overall good impressions made on Costa Rica by the withdrawal of United States Marines from Nicaragua, plus the realization of a potential threat of domination by Mexico, set the stage for a promising decade in the 1930's.


Further, the economic relationship between Costa Rica and the United States had become more binding by 1932 than it had been in previous years. Imports into Costa Rica came from a wide variety of sources, with the United States providing 42.7 per cent of all imports and Great Britain acting as the next highest source with 10.9 per cent. On the other hand, Great Britain received 47.8 per cent of Costa Rican exports, while the United States received 39.3 per cent. This state of affairs can also be seen as contributing to the increased reliance on the United States, as shipping to Europe and Great Britain in particular was interrupted or made difficult with the onset of the war. However, these factors did not necessarily result in a change in policy for Costa Rica, since the war and its impact on shipping did not become an immediate problem until much later in the decade. The inaugural message of President Franklin D. Roosevelt had the effect of starting the process of improved relations, but only the passage of time and the demonstration of the willingness of the United States to act upon the stated policy would bring the process

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37 Ibid.

38 U.S. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 1396-G, 11 April 1933, General Conditions Report, March, 1933, 818.00G.C./57, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
to completion.

The progress of United States-Costa Rican relations in the 1930's is not truly measurable in large steps. The potential damage from the events surrounding the Costa Rican denunciation of the 1923 Washington Treaty in the matter of recognition of the Martínez government in El Salvador was mitigated to a great extent by the concerted efforts of both sides to avoid a conflict. Costa Rican Foreign Minister Guardián hastened to assure the United States Minister in Costa Rica, Charles Eberhardt, that anti-American demonstrations, which occurred in San José early in 1934, were attributable to the activities of a small group of chronic "yankee baiters." Further evidence of Costa Rica's attempts to respond in kind to the United States reaction to the Martínez question was the expulsion from Costa Rica of a group of Nicaraguans who had been found guilty of insults to the United States flag. It is obvious that both the United States and Costa Rican policy makers were working diligently to maintain the relationship between their nations on at least an even keel. In the opinion of one United States Minister in this period, however, the efforts put forth by the Costa Rican politicians

39 U.S. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San José to the Secretary of State, 5 March 1934, 711.18/40, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.

40 U.S. Minister Arthur Bliss Lane at Managua to the Secretary of State, No. 164, 13 April 1934, 818.00/1454, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
were occasioned by their desire to enlist the aid of the United States and its representatives in their own political causes. In keeping with this view, the "Guardian law" was passed by the Costa Rican legislature in December of 1934. This law provided criminal penalties for anyone found guilty of insulting the representatives or leaders of any friendly foreign government and was the cause of some popular protest on the grounds that it inhibited freedom of speech. Nonetheless, it can be argued that policies such as the Guardian law were part of the overall Costa Rican efforts at amicability. It is entirely understandable that there would be protests over such a policy, since it came at virtually the same time as the stated policies of isolationism and self sufficiency for the nation. The discrepancy between this policy and the Guardian law can be explained in terms of political expediency or as a realistic evaluation of the fact that Costa Rica needed the amicability of the United States for its economic survival.

Not all Costa Ricans supported the efforts to improve relations with the United States. A group of critics of Uni-

41 U.S. Minister Leo R. Sack at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 895, 25 April 1933, 818.00/1486, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.

42 U.S. Minister Leo R. Sack at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 832, 4 September 1935, 818.911/54, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.

43 Ibid.
United States policies in Latin America had existed for many years, and during the mid-1930's they were led by liberal intellectuals, like Vicente Saénz, who had written a denunciation of United States diplomatic and economic policies in Central America entitled Rompiendo Cadenas, which was published in Mexico in 1933.\textsuperscript{44} However, it is important to stress the fact that official government policy was simply not influenced by criticism leveled by the likes of Saénz due to their alliance with Mexicans which made them immediately suspect.

Another indication of the vulnerability of the cordial relations between the United States and Costa Rica can be seen in a reported attempt made by a San José newspaper editor to coerce the United States Minister, Charles C. Eberhardt, into payment of a bribe to prevent unfavorable stories about the United States.\textsuperscript{45} But here, too, there is little probable correlation between the official acts of the Costa Rican government and the attempted bribery by a single private citizen.

The generally favorable nature of United States-Costa Rican relations allowed for the conclusion of a Reciprocal Trade Agreement in 1936.\textsuperscript{46} But within the course of two

\textsuperscript{44}U.S. Minister Leo R. Sack at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 940, 18 November 1935, 818.00/1504, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.

\textsuperscript{45}U.S. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San José to the Secretary of State, 24 June 1931, 818.911/31, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.

\textsuperscript{46}United States, Department of State, Treaties and
years, this amicability was once again threatened. Mexico's nationalization of oil holdings reportedly received favorable comment and support from the Costa Rican press as well as from official government spokesmen. The issue was complicated by reports in the press that Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles had referred to the "Costa Rican menace" in regard to the current amicability of Central American relations due to their support of Mexico. Welles sent copies of the speech in question, as well as press coverage of it, to the United States legation in San José, asking that as soon as possible, the matter be straightened out, since he had made no such comment. Because he was unaware that there were any specific problems with Costa Rica, he hoped to avoid any misunderstanding of that point.

Costa Rican officials took advantage of the United States preoccupation with hemispheric security in 1938 to put forward the sale of the Cocos Islands to the United States once again. They attempted to persuade the United States Min-


47 U.S. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 72, 12 December 1938, 711.18/45, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.

48 Ibid.

49 Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles to U.S. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San José, 13 December 1938, 711.18/45, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
ister to visit the islands, although William Hornibrook had been specifically instructed to avoid this invitation so that there would be no possible misunderstanding that the United States was interested in the purchase. Then, an attempt was made to convince the United States that the sale of the islands was essential to the Costa Rican economy in view of a bad crop year, and that if the United States would not purchase them, someone else would. This understated "someone else," of course, related to a potential German or Japanese purchase, a constant worry in the 1930's which United States military advisors and strategists recommended preventing in the interests of hemispheric defense. This issue as well as other defense-related questions will be discussed at greater length in the context of Costa Rica's preparations for war. But it should be remembered that the pressures of the approaching war and the related concerns for the defense of the hemisphere would have an important bearing upon the course of United States-Costa Rican relations in the late 1930's.

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51 Memorandum of a Conversation by the Under Secretary of State with the Costa Rican Minister in Washington, 28 January 1938, 818.51/718, ibid., V:468.

52 U.S. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San José to the Secretary of State, 29 December 1938, 818.014C/104, ibid., V:471.
Perhaps the most important single event in the realm of Costa Rica's relations with its Central American neighbors in the 1930's who reflected the same basic progress in their relations with the United States as did Costa Rica, was the crisis occasioned by the question of the recognition of the Martínez regime in El Salvador. Although ultimately Costa Rica chose to act independently of the other Central American states, first indications were that Costa Rica would act in conjunction with them. In fact, the Costa Rican Foreign Minister had told the United States Chargé that any planned course of action would be discussed with the other Central American nations to preserve the "harmony of action." The next stage of the process was that the Costa Rican government informed its neighbors and the United States that it did not intend to extend recognition to the Martínez government in compliance with its obligations under the 1923 Washington Treaty. Within six months, Costa Rican officials began to sound out the United States and the other Central American nations to the possibility that it might change its policy and extend recognition to Martínez. The immediate response to these inqui-
ries was that Costa Rica was bound by the Treaty which it had signed and ratified and could not repudiate that agreement for reasons of "momentary expediency." This response overlooked several factors which played into the Costa Rican decision in the end. There was, of course, the result of the anti-American sentiment which had been prominent during the 1920's and which made it important for Costa Rican government officials to dissociate themselves from policies identifiable with United States domination. Then too, as has been discussed previously, there was the special nature of Costa Rica's relations with El Salvador arising out of their common grievance over the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, plus the all too obvious association of the situation of the Martínez government with the situation of the Tinoco regime.

Thus, when it was reported, then confirmed, that Costa Rica intended to change its policy and recognize the Martínez government, the change was no real surprise to the Central American governments or to the United States. The Guatemalan Foreign Minister, A. Skinner Klee, offered to summon a confer-

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Secretary of State, No. 41, 11 May 1932, 816.01/175, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, 1932, V:597-598.

56 Acting Secretary of State Castle to the U.S. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San José, No. 23, 13 May 1932, 816.01/175, ibid., V:598-599.

57 Secretary of State to U.S. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San José, 11 November 1932, 713.1311/121, ibid., V:330; U.S. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San José to the Secretary of State, 12 November 1932, 712.1311/108, ibid.
ence of the Central American states to discuss the issue but offered little hope for its success in dissuading the Costa Rican decision. Costa Rica indicated interest in such a conference, but Foreign Minister Pacheco readily admitted that his purpose in attending such a conference would be to convince the other Central American republics to follow Costa Rica's lead in the denunciation of the 1923 Treaty and the recognition of the Martínez regime.

During the visit of Foreign Minister Pacheco to Guatemala, which he undertook despite the fact that no conference had been convened, the motivations for Costa Rica's policy were further clarified. One crucial aspect of the decision to recognize Martínez was that the Costa Rican consensus, as seen by President Ricardo Jiménez, held that non-recognition was an inadequate and faulty policy for whatever purposes it was employed. Rather, the signatories of the Washington Treaty should consider policies by which positive assistance could be rendered to constitutional governments to avoid revolutionary overthrows before they could begin. This sug-

58 U.S. Minister Whitehouse in Guatemala to the Secretary of State, No. 816, 14 November 1932, 813.00Washington/388, ibid., V:331.

59 U.S. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San José to the Secretary of State, 15 November 1932, 713.1311/117, ibid., V:333.

60 U.S. Minister Whitehouse in Guatemala to the Secretary of State, No. 834, 30 November 1932, 713.1311/132, ibid., V:340.
gestion essentially represented a request that the United States and the Central American nations pool resources to maintain the status quo and was a considerable departure from the mentality which prompted the justification of both the Martínez and Tinoco coups. If such a policy had been in operation in either case, there is little likelihood that either could have succeeded. For the time being, however, the implementation of such a policy was not given serious consideration. The subsequent course of events concerning the recognition of the Martínez government has already been discussed.

In summary, Costa Rica and El Salvador's joint denunciation of the 1923 Treaty weakened the viability of the treaty to the extent that the remaining signatories eventually extended recognition to Martínez, leaving the treaty effective only between the United States, Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala, and an effective return of Costa Rica to a position of isolation. In the final analysis, the entire episode was a testing ground for the serious intent of the Good Neighbor Policy. The United States was put in the position of choosing between direct interference in Costa Rican affairs by denying the right of the nation to denounce the 1923 Treaty or of al-

60 U.S. Minister Whitehouse in Guatemala to the Secretary of State, No. 834, 30 November 1932, 713.1311/132, ibid., V:340.

61 U.S. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San José to the Secretary of State, 26 January 1933, 818.00/1402, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
lowing Costa Rica to determine its own policy in the matter. The choice made was stated by the United States Secretary of State to the United States Minister in Costa Rica as follows:

We feel that Costa Rica has freely exercised its right to denounce the Treaty and therefore do not desire that you should even unofficially suggest that it rescind its action or otherwise indicate what course of action it should pursue with respect to the Treaty. 62

Following the lead of the United States, the Central American states also respected Costa Rica's right of self-determination, at the same time extending recognition to the Martínez government.

The atmosphere of mutual respect and the obvious success of the Good Neighbor Policy mentality led to a proposal for a Central American Conference in 1934. There was an initial problem, however, occasioned by the preparation of an agenda for the Conference without consultation of Costa Rican officials. 63 Through the United States Minister in San José, Leo Sack, the other Central American nations received a warning that the normal Costa Rican reluctance to involve


63 U.S. Minister Leo R. Sack at San José to the Secretary of State, 30 January 1934, 713.1311/225, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, 1934, IV:426.
itself in any attempted Central American unity of action would be complicated by the hard feelings engendered if it was not consulted on the agenda before its publication. 64 Since the stated purpose of the Conference was a consideration of the 1923 Treaty, it is questionable whether Costa Rica had any legitimate grievance, since by its own choice it had denounced the Treaty. 65 However, President Sacasa of Nicaragua indicated that there was no intention to plan a conference without previously consulting both Costa Rica and El Salvador. 66 When Costa Rica was formally invited to the Conference, it agreed to attend but requested a postponement of the scheduled date due to the death of Foreign Minister Pacheco. 67 Another potential complication arose when President Ubico of Guatemala was temporarily moved to demand that the date of the Conference remain fixed and that Costa Rica either attend at the scheduled time or be excluded. 68 Once again, through the good offices of United States diplomats in the Central American

64 Ibid., IC:427.

65 U.S. Minister Arthur Bliss Lane at Managua to the Secretary of State, 1 February 1934, 713.1311/228, ibid., IV: 430.

66 Ibid.

67 U.S. Minister Arthur Bliss Lane at Managua to the Secretary of State, 13 February 1934, 713.1311/239, ibid., IV: 433.

68 U.S. Minister Arthur Bliss Lane at Managua to the Secretary of State, 16 February 1934, 713.1311/246, ibid., IV: 434.
capitals pressing the importance of neighborly behavior among the Central American states, the problem was avoided and the conference was re-scheduled. 69

Since the preliminary problems were resolved, albeit through the efforts of the United States diplomatic corps in Central America, the Conference was able to consider the real issue which brought about the meeting, the issue of nonrecognition as a means of discouraging revolutionary changes of government. Guatemala circulated its proposal prior to the Conference, which reasserted the principle of nonrecognition of revolutionary governments but provided that recognition would be extended once such a government had "...been legalized in the constitutional manner provided by law." 70 This proposal did not go nearly far enough to satisfy either Costa Rica or El Salvador, both of which had already made their positions clear through the statements of Costa Rican Foreign Minister Pacheco. The United States, on the other hand, felt that any proposal suggesting recognition of illegally constituted governments was unacceptable. 71 However, the United States decided that this position must not be made known to any of the parti-

69 U.S. Chargé Lawton in Guatemala to the Secretary of State, 17 February 1934, 713.1311/250, ibid.


71 Secretary of State to the U.S. Minister Hanna in Guatemala, 3 March 1934, 713.1311/277a, ibid., IV:441.
cipants of the Conference so that there would be no suspi-
cion of attempted interference in the free deliberations of
the Central American states.\textsuperscript{72} As a consequence, there were
no United States representatives in attendance at the ses­sions in Guatemala.\textsuperscript{73}

Notwithstanding the efforts put forth by the United
States to assure the success of the Conference, there was yet
another obstacle to be overcome which no amount of diplomatic
maneuvering seemed able to resolve quickly. Relations between
Costa Rica and Guatemala had never been amicable and the overt
hostility manifested between the two nations before and during
the Conference seemed to assure the failure of all attempts
at compromise between their positions relative to the agenda.\textsuperscript{74}

In fact, an additional postponement of the Conference was sug­
gested as a means of allowing this hostility to subside.\textsuperscript{75}
However, since it was generally accepted that neither Costa Ri­
ca nor El Salvador would be willing to accept a compromise on
the issue of nonrecognition, it was held that any further post­
ponements would serve no useful purpose.\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{73}Karnes, \textit{Failure of Union}, p. 229.

\textsuperscript{74}U.S. Minister Arthur Bliss Lane at Managua to the
Secretary of State, 5 March 1934, 713.1311/269, \textit{Papers Rela­tions to Foreign Relations, 1934}, IV:444.

\textsuperscript{75}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{76}U.S. Minister Arthur Bliss Lane at Managua to the
Initially, it appeared that compromise between the Costa Rican position and that proposed by President Ubicó could be worked out, since the written Costa Rican response to the Guatemalan proposal contained reference to minor disagreements only on free trade policy. In addition, Costa Rican President Ricardo Jiménez approached the United States Minister in San José with a request for the State Department's good offices in easing the "strained relations" between his government and that of President Ubicó. This request was carried out by the United States Minister in Guatemala but the solution was not easily accomplished as the first step suggested by Minister Hanna was the exchange of diplomatic representatives between the two states. The problem was then over which state would take the first step by sending or even agreeing to send a diplomatic agent to the other.


77 U.S. Minister Leo R. Sack at San José to the Secretary of State, 16 March 1934, 713.1311/299, ibid., IV:453; U.S. Minister Hanna in Guatemala to the Secretary of State, 19 March 1934, 713.1311/302, ibid., IV:453.


79 Secretary of State to U.S. Minister Leo R. Sack at San José, 19 December 1934, 714.18/22, ibid., IV:231.

80 U.S. Minister Hanna in Guatemala to the Secretary of State, 8 February 1935, 714.18/28, ibid., IV:232-233.
In addition, the Guatemalans claimed that the decision was made especially difficult by the bad press they had received in Costa Rica. In fact, the United States Minister in Guatemala reported that

...both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the President appear to be quite incapable of comprehending why the press there is not controlled as it is here. They manifestly think that the government restraint which prevents the press here from criticizing neighboring republics is a valuable contribution to good understanding among them and should be imposed in San José.

Although this and other difficulties slowed the process, it was finally agreed that on March 1, 1935, at a designated hour, both Costa Rica and Guatemala would send each other telegrams which indicated their intention to exchange diplomatic representatives.

Other than the beneficial results of these negotiations in long term Central American amicability, the immediate purpose was not really served. The outcome of the 1934 Guatemala conference, which came and went during these squabbles, and which was colored by the ongoing problems, was a watered down pact of fraternity among the Central American states. To the majority of Central Americans, however, the events

81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., IV:233-234.
83 U.S. Minister Leo R. Sack at San José to the Secretary of State, 22 February 1935, 714.18/29, ibid., IV:234.
84 Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 229.
could only be viewed as concrete evidence that the United States intent was to stand by the Good Neighbor Policy. This evidence, without a doubt, would have an important effect on the determination of Costa Rican statesmen to follow the lead of the United States in world affairs and made possible the Presidential candidacy of Calderón Guardia who clearly stated that as his intention.\(^85\)

Between the isolationist tendencies of the presidency of Ricardo Jiménez and the Central American emphasis of the León Cortés presidency, there was little of importance in the area of Costa Rican relations with the American community of nations other than those events already mentioned. There are only two possible exceptions to this generalization. In 1932, at the start of the isolationist period and before the advent of unrest in Central American affairs and their resolution along amicable lines, an editorial appeared in *El Diario de Costa Rica* which pointed out the very real economic threat posed to Costa Rica by Brazil as opposed to the imaginary threat of "Yankee imperialism."\(^86\) The basis of this threat lay in Brazil, "which through its gigantic production has

\(^{85}\)U.S. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 379, 20 August 1938, 711.18/44, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.

\(^{86}\)Dr. Modesto Martínez, "The Real and Imaginary Perils," *El Diario de Costa Rica* (San José), 29 June 1932, cited in U.S. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San José to the Secretary of State, 7 July 1932, 711.18/38, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
driven down our coffee industry to depression limits."\textsuperscript{87}

This threat of Brazilian domination of the Costa Rican economy served as additional evidence which justified the need for Costa Rican self sufficiency and for the desirability of increased friendliness in relations with the United States which might protect Costa Rican interests.

The other event of some significance was the offer made by Costa Rica in 1937 to serve as a mediator in the boundary dispute between Honduras and Nicaragua. The favorable development of Central American relations prior to that date had prompted the offer to mediate which received a great deal of popular support in Costa Rica.\textsuperscript{88} In the end, Costa Rica was joined in the mediation efforts by the United States and Venezuela in compliance with the agreements reached at the 1936 Buenos Aires Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration.\textsuperscript{89} Although the mediation from all three nations was extremely active in the attempt to find an equitable solution, they met

\textsuperscript{87}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{89}Acting Secretary of State to All Diplomatic Missions in the American Republics Except Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua and Venezuela, 21 October 1937, 715.1715/751a, ibid., V:93.
with little or no success.\textsuperscript{90} Regardless of the success or failure of the mediation efforts, the event demonstrated the cooperativeness toward which Costa Rican policy was directed throughout the 1930's. It allows a broader perspective of the isolationism of the Ricardo Jiménez presidency in that this policy was a retrenchment and establishment of a firm national basis upon which the gradual increase of international involvements was based. It confirms once again the importance of a strong nationalism in the foreign affairs of the Costa Rican nation.

Before this pattern can be conclusively demonstrated, however, the inter-American conferences of the 1930's must be taken into consideration. It will be remembered that developments in the inter-American conferences during the 1920's were directed toward the diminution of the authority of the United States in inter-American affairs. In some respects, these attempts were quite successful and it appeared that this trend would continue at the Montevideo Conference in 1933. However, the advent of the Good Neighbor Policy, as expected, had some bearing on those developments.

One topic which appeared likely to be brought up for discussion by Mexico was the Monroe Doctrine. The Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs had indicated to Josephus Daniels,\textsuperscript{90}

the United States Minister in Mexico, that the renunciation of aggression agreed to by the United States obviate the necessity for the existence of a unilateral policy such as the Monroe Doctrine. 91 The United States delegation at Montevideo was therefore instructed that "it is not the desire of this Government that the Monroe Doctrine should be discussed at the Conference." 92 However, on the integrally related issue of intervention, the United States government was more than willing to respect the national autonomy of all Latin American states as long as it reserved the right to intervene on behalf of the lives and property of its nationals. 93 The Mexican delegation was thus blocked from causing any problems, but it did introduce the broader issue of intervention as opposed to arbitration binding on all states in the context of "Economic and Financial Problems." 94 The matter of the maintenance of peace was finally resolved by its referral to a special conference to be convened at a later date. 95

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92 Instructions to the Delegates to the Seventh International Conference of American States, Montevideo, Uruguay, 10 November 1933, 710G/371, ibid., IV:137.

93 Ibid., IV:140.


95 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
reasons cited for the postponement of the discussion, in keeping with the good intentions of the United States in not attempting to avoid any free and open discussion, were that the delegations present at Montevideo, in particular that of the United States, had not been empowered to discuss this point due to possible conflicts with existing bilateral treaties.\footnote{Ibid., p. 28.}

The willingness of the United States to commit itself to a discussion of its unilateral policies, such as binding arbitration of disputes and the essence of the Monroe Doctrine, was a significant step. Besides this commitment, the United States signed and ratified the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States which effectively eliminated intervention as a method of national policy.\footnote{Perkins, \textit{The United States and the Caribbean}, p. 122.}

Another area on which the United States delegation apparently surrendered was on the question of the recognition as a means of national policy. The Mexican delegation at Montevideo raised the question of nonrecognition as a means of direct intervention and this was included in the foregoing agreement. The Estrada Doctrine presented by Mexico was premised on the principle that diplomatic recognition was extended by the people of one nation to the people of another and therefore could not be interrupted by any change of government unless intervention were intended.\footnote{Neumann, \textit{Recognition}, p. 28.} The Estrada Doc-
trine was based partly on the theory of the Costa Rican scholar, Luis Anderson, that the constitutionality of any government was a matter of domestic law, of which any foreign interpretation comprised intervention. 99

Although Costa Rica, through one of its leading thinkers in the field of international law, seemed to have a vested interest in the proceedings at Montevideo, it was the only American nation not represented there. A special message sent by the Conference to President Ricardo Jiménez expressed regret that Costa Rica was not represented. 100 A reply from Jiménez offered no excuses or explanations why Costa Rica did not participate but concurred with the aims of the Conference. 101 Within the context of Costa Rican foreign policy in 1933, it is not surprising that there was no attendance at Montevideo. The isolationism which characterized Ricardo Jiménez's presidency would certainly have militated against any desire to participate at Montevideo. An inconsistency can be seen, however, in the fact that the Montevideo Conference did take up questions regarding the many treaties which existed in the Americas for the maintenance of peace. 102 In view of the support which Costa Rica had given the Central American

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101 Ibid.
102 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
Court of Justice and its proposals for an Inter-American Court of Justice in the 1920's, it would seem likely that the nation would be interested in any conference that would advocate the ideas of an American source of arbitration and reconciliation of disputes. It might be concluded that the rebuff administered to the Costa Rican proposals at Havana in 1928, in combination with the general outbacks in international activity in the early 1930's, explain the failure to be represented at Montevideo. Whatever the reasons were, and because of the unavailability of Costa Rican sources on this matter, it is all the more difficult to speculate. Costa Rica was in the position of a "loner" in American affairs in 1933.

The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace held in Buenos Aires in December of 1936 provided Costa Rica an opportunity to reflect any changes in its international policies which had occurred with the election of León Cortes. This conference resulted in part from the unresolved discussions on arbitration and peace left over from the Montevideo Conference but also in part from the concern for the unity of the hemisphere in the face of the potential threat of war threatening Europe. However, the Latin American states whose interests were primarily directed to a final denuncia-

tion of intervention sought to have the 1936 Buenos Aires Conference reflect their wishes.104

In keeping with the modification of Costa Rican foreign policy, the nation was represented at the Buenos Aires Conference by a delegation of only two members.105 Because the two Costa Rican delegates were physically limited as to the variety of activities in which they could participate, Costa Rica was not a member of the most important committee of the Conference, that concerned with the organization of peace.106 Before drawing any significance from the size of the Costa Rican delegation, reference must be made to the Annual Report of the Costa Rican Foreign Minister for 1936. In that Report, the Foreign Minister catalogued an immense list of conferences, exhibitions, and fairs to which the Costa Rican government had received official invitation. He indicated that it was economically feasible for the nation to support representatives at only a fraction of these events and that volunteers had been sought who would represent the nation for patriotic reasons alone.107 Thus, when it came to the most important event of the year, the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace at Buenos Aires, there were few

104Wood, Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, p. 119.
106Ibid., p. 65.
107Memorias, 1936, pp. vii-viii.
funds remaining so that the nation could only afford to sponsor two delegates, although "patriotic" individuals had been invited to attend at their own expense. 108

While it is perfectly feasible that this explanation is accurate, there is again no doubt that the priorities established by the Costa Rican nation had something to do with the decision. President León Cortés's emphasis on the primacy of Central American affairs in the realm of foreign relations would make the Buenos Aires Conference less important than other matters closer to home. Further, while this emphasis may have led to a consideration of sending no representatives at all, this was not practical because of the importance placed on this conference by the United States, as indicated by the opening address by President Roosevelt to which Costa Rica was very responsive. 109

When it came to a consideration of the matters which had prompted the conference, however, Costa Rica did not show up very well. In an effort to evaluate the existing mechanisms for the settlement of disputes, the conference reviewed the status of the five treaties which it felt reflected the best efforts of the inter-American system: 110

108 Ibid., p. xii.
109 Ibid.
110 Table Showing Ratification of or Adherence to Instruments for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Report of U.S. Delegation at Buenos Aires, p. 208.
Treaty (1923), the Pact of Paris (1928), the Washington Conciliation Treaty (1929), the Washington Arbitration Treaty (1929), and the Rio Pact (1933). Costa Rica, which had ratified the 1923 Gondra Treaty and merely adhered to the 1928 Pact of Paris was matched in its poor performance only by Argentina and Bolivia. These five treaties formed the core of the proposal for peace machinery for the hemisphere, woven together by a Coordinating Convention proposed by the United States. In the end,

111 The Gondra Treaty specified reduction of military and naval expenditures by the signatories and suggested arbitration of international disputes in the Americas through the use of ad hoc commissions of inquiry. The author of this treaty was the eminent Paraguayan Dr. Manuel Gondra. Mecham, Inter-American Security, p. 98.

112 The Pact of Paris, more commonly known outside the Americas as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, was a broad war renunciation agreement. Ibid., p. 118.

113 The Washington Conciliation Treaty was a general convention designed to supplement the Gondra Treaty in that it invested conciliatory functions in permanent diplomats as well as in the commissions of inquiry which were established to meet specific problems. Ibid., p. 106.

114 The Washington Arbitration Treaty bound all signatories to submit international disputes of any nature to arbitration. Ibid., p. 107.

115 The Rio Pact was basically a duplication of the Pact of Paris, although it had been authored in the Americas, by the Argentine statesman Saavedra Lamas. Ibid., p. 118.

116 Table Showing Ratification of or Adherence to Instruments for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Report of U.S. Delegation at Buenos Aires, p. 208.

117 Address of Cordell Hull to the First Plenary Session of the Conference, 5 December 1936, ibid., p. 86.
this kind of program, which would coordinate existing instruments for the preservation of peace, was approved by the Conference. 118 But the language of an allied resolution, calling for the coordination of these pacts with the League of Nations, led to an abstention from both the United States and Costa Rica. 119

Costa Rica abstained from voting on the resolution because, in the first place, since it had resigned from the League of Nations, it was felt that the path of its national policy took it away from association with that organization. 120 In the second place, while there was no disrespect intended for the League or its high ideals and goals, in the Costa Rican view, an American question such as the maintenance of peace in the Americas should not be linked with an organization in which so few of the American states maintained membership. 121 Another possible motive for the abstention, not mentioned by the Costa Rican Foreign Minister in his report, was the desire to follow the lead of the United States in the matter.


119 Ibid.

120 Memorias, 1936, p. xiv.

121 Ibid., p. xiii.
The United States delegation's abstention was rooted in somewhat different motives than that of Costa Rica. In its official report, the United States delegation pointed out that the best possible path for the conference to take was not to associate the American machinery with any outside institutions or organizations, since such association would provoke the opponents of the League and give undue satisfaction to the loyal adherents of the League. The delegates felt that the success of the American peace machinery could be assured only by avoiding the potential of squabbles among the American states over the rightness or wrongness of membership in the League of Nations. In the end, the report concluded that the conference had succeeded in this effort, which was essentially correct, since the League resolution was an addition to the Coordinating Convention rather than a part of it. So it seems that the United States and Costa Rica coincidentally took the same action in regard to the resolution.

For Costa Rica, this resolution was by no means the most important issue raised by the Buenos Aires Conference. In fact, the so-called Consultation Pact was viewed as the most important in that it established a means by which war

123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
and/or intervention could be avoided.\textsuperscript{126} On the same basic issue, the matter of an Inter-American Court of Justice was raised in that the Conference passed a resolution which empowered the Governing Board of the Pan American Union to study and report on all of the proposals for such a Court which had been submitted to the conference and all previous Inter-American Conferences.\textsuperscript{127} The first proposal listed for consideration was that made by Costa Rica at the 1923 Santiago Conference.\textsuperscript{128} Of the eight conventions, two treaties, one protocol and numerous resolutions approved by the Conference,\textsuperscript{129} this resolution was one of the few which noted any special contribution from Costa Rica. Because of Costa Rica's history of isolation and lack of involvement on some of the broader issues dealt with by the conference, it is not altogether surprising that Costa Rica took so small a part in the conference. Nonetheless, their contribution was recognized in a congratulatory message sent by Cordell Hull to the head of the Costa Rican delegation, Dr. Manuel Jiménez.\textsuperscript{130}

In the same spirit, Hull commended the good will and

\textsuperscript{126}Memorias, 1936, pp. xiv-xv.
\textsuperscript{127}Resolution of the Conference, Approved 16 December 1936, Conference of American States, 1933-1940, p. 144.
\textsuperscript{128}Ibid., p. 144, n. 1.
\textsuperscript{129}Mecham, Inter-American Security, p. 125.
\textsuperscript{130}Secretary of State Cordell Hull to Dr. Manuel Jiménez, 24 de diciembre de 1936, Memorias, 1936, p. xix.
determination of all twenty-one delegations in his address to
the closing session of the Conference, which prepared the
way for the next conference of American states scheduled for
1938 in Lima. The Lima Conference was the last regular con-
ference before the outbreak of World War II, but it was al-
most entirely preoccupied with matters relating to the de-
fense of the hemisphere. Due to the European events which
preceded the Lima Conference and the growing awareness of the
Roosevelt administration of the necessity of preparation in
the hemisphere, "...an intensification of the tone of good
neighborliness was beamed on Latin America." 132

Once again, Costa Rica made itself prominent by send-
ing the smallest delegation to the conference. 133 In spite of
its size, the Costa Rican delegation benefitted with all the
other Latin American states from the attitude of the United
States delegation which, "...in accordance with the tenets of
the Good Neighbor Policy, endeavored scrupulously to respect
at all times the dignity and interests of each nation repre-
sented at the Conference." 134 This goal was not always simple

131 Address of Cordell Hull to the Closing Session of the
Conference, 23 December 1936, Report of U.S. Delegation at Bue-
nos Aires, p. 93.


133 United States, Department of State, Report of the
Delegation of the United States of America at the Eighth Inter-
national Conference of American States, Lima, Peru, December 9--
27, 1938 (Conference Series No. 50, Washington, D.C.: Gov-

134 Ibid., p. 38.
for the United States delegation, which sought a demonstration of solidarity against the threat of the Axis powers, since not all of the nations represented at Lima took this threat as seriously as did the United States. However, the basic resolution on continental solidarity did receive the approval of the conference.

In the interests of achieving the success of the resolution, the United States saw that issues dear to the hearts of some Latin American states received the close attention of the Lima Conference. For example, when Costa Rica abstained from the initial vote on continental solidarity, along with Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela, the question of the Inter-American Court of Justice, a favorite project of Costa Rica in previous conferences, was brought up for discussion. Although no steps were really taken to make the Court a reality, it was clear that any demonstration of its potential success would assure its formation. In addition, the idea of

135 Mecham, Inter-American Security, p. 140.


137 Ibid.


an American League of Nations was revived and referred to the International Conference of American Jurists for study with the stipulation that a report be issued before the next Inter-American Conference. Such blatant politicking by the United States for its resolutions' success at the Conference may have led to somewhat sarcastic comments by one analyst about good neighborliness being "beamed" on the Latin American states, but the effectiveness of the program cannot be denied.

It is questionable whether such devious means were necessary in the case of Costa Rica. From all indications, political maneuvering was not necessary on their behalf but may have been for Chile, Brazil or other nations who were as yet unconvinced of the necessity of a unified program of hemispheric defense, or who suspected the motives of the United States in suggesting such a program. Costa Rica was predisposed to favor the proposals offered by the United States by this time, due to the favorable status of their bilateral relations as well as the thrust of long range Costa Rican policies. The development of Costa Rican inter-American policies, beginning in the 1920's was marked at first by the fluctuation between strong sentiments in favor of isolationism and the consideration of membership in a Central American confederation.

141 Mecham, Inter-American Security, p. 140.
Costa Rican national self-esteem prevented a firm commitment to the Central American Confederation of 1921, while at the same time relations with the United States ranged from the low level of the period immediately following the Tinoco regime and the problems with the League of Nations to the moderately good level of amicability which characterized the general policy of the first presidency of Ricardo Jiménez. Periodically throughout this decade, Costa Rica seemed to flirt with closer association with Mexico until the threat of Mexican domination of Central America was realized and resulted in a disenchantment with that nation.

The 1930's showed a far more consistent pattern of development in Costa Rican inter-American relations. Early in the decade there was a cutback on all foreign affairs activities which served a dual purpose in that it made possible substantial economies during a difficult financial period and at the same time permitted the consolidation of nationalistic sentiments which were directed into programs of national self-sufficiency. From this foundation, Costa Rican policy was broadened to an intense involvement in Central American affairs. The nation maintained its independence of action supported by the Good Neighbor Policy which prevented United States interference but which protected Costa Rica, as well as other Central American states, from the threat of overt hostilities among themselves.

Thus, by 1938, Costa Rica achieved the status of an
independent and sovereign state which would choose the policies best suited to its national interests. It had an advantage over some other Latin American states in that its national interests were clearly defined and would not necessarily suffer by association of its policies with those of the United States. To some extent, it could be argued that Costa Rican self sufficiency in inter-American affairs relied heavily upon the United States's enforcement of the inviolability of the sovereign rights of all American states. However, since by the late 1930's Costa Rican policy was premised on this realistic assessment of its own stature in the American community of nations, this was not a negative aspect of Costa Rican policy. The extension of Costa Rican national image into broader fields of world affairs will be considered in the next chapter. This broader view, as applied to non-American affairs, should serve as further confirmation of the foregoing views.
CHAPTER VIII

COSTA RICA AND EUROPE, 1919-1939

Costa Rica's relations with Europe, as well as its infrequent contacts with Asia, were quite different in many respects from the patterns noted in regard to inter-American affairs. Yet in many ways, formal diplomatic relations with Europe followed the same long range policy goals evidenced in inter-American affairs. The 1920's were characterized by a seemingly haphazard waxing and waning of Costa Rican enthusiasms for various alliances or affiliations in the Americas. During that same period, with the exception of a few major issues which will be discussed in the course of this chapter, there was little activity in the realm of non-American relations which can be said to have had any meaningful bearing upon the development of Costa Rican internationalism or of a Costa Rican self-image in international affairs. During the 1930's, when inter-American affairs were characterized by long range goals and planning to the ends of those goals, Costa Rican relationships with European nations were primarily directed to events which were related to preparations for

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World War II. However, before considering the preparations for hostilities, some analysis of the preceding events should be undertaken.

Costa Rican relations with the world community of nations during the 1920's were conditioned by the events surrounding the Tinoco coup d'état. In fact, one of the primary events of the 1920's in this realm related to the nullification of the acts of the Tinoco regime. The Amory oil concession, granted by Federico Tinoco, was included in the general nullification of his acts after the overthrow of his regime. Amory represented a syndicate comprised of British citizens. As a consequence, the British government entered into negotiations with the government of Julio Acosta concerning their rights, although the Costa Rican government did not recognize the right of the British government to act on behalf of private citizens in the matter.¹

Initially, the British felt that the Acosta government had no right to confiscate the private property of its citizens which was acquired in good faith by the Amory concern, although the United States had taken the position that no business deals with Tinoco entered into by United States citizens were worthy of its diplomatic support and extended the principle

¹U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, 2 February 1921, 818.6363Am6/60, MC 669.
to other claimants. However, this conclusion was drawn after it had been determined that there were no United States citizens involved in the nullification. The Department of State notified the British government that the matter of nullification was a domestic affair of the Costa Rican republic in which the United States could not interfere, despite British requests that it do so. Since the British government hoped to rely on the intervention of the United States to aid its position in the negotiations, this attitude occasioned some hard feelings. Nonetheless, the United States supported Costa Rican officials in their contention that the Costa Rican courts had jurisdiction over the question of the rights of the concessionaires who had received their grants from the Tinoco administration. The continuing negotiations which surrounded the settlement of claims made by the Amory group colored British-Costa Rican relations throughout the early 1920's until a final agreement was reached.

It is not the purpose of this study to judge the

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2 Secretary of State to U.S. Chargé at San José, 9 December 1919, 818.6363Am6/29, MC 669.

3 Secretary of State to U.S. Chargé at San José, 29 August 1918, 818.6363Am6/18a, MC 669.

4 Secretary of State to U.S. Chargé at San José (Martin), No. 7, 13 December 1920, 818.6363/61, MC 669.

5 U.S. Ambassador (Davis) at London to the Secretary of State, No. 1205, 11 August 1920, 800.6363/--, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, 1920, II:665.

6 Secretary of State to U.S. Chargé at San José (Martin), No. 7, 13 December 1920, 818.6363/61, MC 669.
decision of the Acosta administration to refer the British claimants to the Costa Rican courts. It was inevitable that the repudiation of the Tinoco regime would include a repudiation of its acts. Therefore, consistent with the policy demonstrated by the Acosta government which sought the favor of the United States by a complete rejection of association with Tinoco, the Amory concession was nullified. Further, when that nullification was questioned, the matter was referred to the courts as a point of national policy which covered the rights of foreign investors. The support received for that decision from the United States added to the strength of the Costa Rican determination to remain firm in asserting its national sovereignty. 7

It is interesting, although not particularly relevant, to speculate as to the possible differences in Costa Rican policy had there been properties of United States citizens affected by the nullification act. The diplomatic correspondence between the State Department and its representatives in Costa Rica clearly indicates that a thorough investigation was conducted to assure the fact that there were no United States properties involved before a decision was made to support the Costa Rican position. 8 However, Costa Rican

7Secretary of State to U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José, 19 July 1921, 818.6363Am6/90, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, 1921, I:564-585.

8U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Sec-
policy was also determined by the relative importance of relations with Great Britain to those with the United States. As was noted previously, the economic links between the British and Costa Rican nations gradually diminished in the early years of the twentieth century so that by the end of the 1920's, the primary commercial interests of the Costa Rican nation centered on the United States. However, at the time of this controversy, the threat of a commercial boycott of Costa Rican goods in British markets was an extremely serious threat to the well-being of the nation.9 Such a threat was made in veiled terms to President Acosta by the British representative at San José,10 which led to the negotiation of an issue which the United States regarded as a cut and dried legal precept.11 While Costa Rica essentially was forced to negotiate on the nullification of the Amory concession, the leadership of the Acosta administration expressed hope that the United States would provide unqualified support for their

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9U.S. Charge Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, 24 February 1921, 818.6363Am6/60, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, 1921, I:646.

10Ibid.

11Ibid., I:647.
position. 12

In the end, this complex issue was settled fairly amicably. The United States supported Costa Rica's right to settle the matter without interference. The Chief Justice, White, of the United States Supreme Court agreed to serve as a mediator and Costa Rica readily accepted. 13 Further, it was agreed that the Amory concession would be put into Costa Rican hands as the Central Costa Rican Petroleum Company, with the British shareholders maintaining sizeable investments in the venture. 14 By the time the mediation was completed in 1924, the original Amory claim, which was held to be legitimately nullified, 15 no longer existed. As a consequence, British-Costa Rican relations were able to continue on a fairly amicable level, although the shift of trade to the United States minimized the importance of that cordiality to the Costa Ricans.

While preoccupied with the negotiations concerning the Amory concession, Costa Rican officials also entered into ne-

12 U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, 25 February 1921, 818.6363Am6/66, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, 1921, I:647; U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 321, 31 August 1923, 818.00/1079, MC 669.


14 Ibid.

gotiations with several different groups for tracts of Costa Rican land for use as foreign settlements. One such group was a Japanese concern interested in the establishment of a colony along a tide water in Costa Rica. Another example was reportedly a German offer of $1,000,000 in 1918 for a large tract of land. While the United States representative in Costa Rica investigated the matter and found out that there had been no such offer, the original news of the proposed sale to Germany came from the Costa Rican Minister in Italy. This leads to the possible conclusion that Costa Rica was not serious about the colonization proposals. In fact, it might be that negotiations for colonization projects were conducted to please the nations interested in the establishment of Costa Rican settlements at the same time that the projects kept the United States alert to the possibility of problems with Costa Rica and therefore more receptive to Costa Rican views.

A possible exception was a French colonization proposal, sponsored by the Costa Rican consul in Paris, which had ended

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16 U.S. Chargé Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 42, 15 October 1918, 818.52/—, MC 669.

17 U.S. Minister in Italy to the Secretary of State, No. 85, 23 November 1918, 818.52/1, MC 669.

18 U.S. Chargé Benjamin F. Chase at San José to the Secretary of State, 10 December 1918, 818.52/3, MC 669.

19 U.S. Minister in Italy to the Secretary of State, No. 85, 23 November 1918, 818.52/1, MC 669.
"disastrously," complicated by the general dislike for the French consul at San José.20 There is no indication from available correspondence as to the seriousness with which Costa Rica entered into these negotiations. However, the United States was quite concerned about the potential threat to the Panama Canal posed by the proximity to it of large European or Asiatic colonies.21 The idea that colonies located within Costa Rican territory were a threat to the security of the Panama Canal would recur throughout the 1920's and 1930's as reports of various proposals for the establishment of such colonies were made.

The most serious colonization proposal came in the late 1930's in connection with the impending European war. In mid-1937, representatives of the Refugee Economic Corporation, based in the United States, approached officials of the State Department to request United States intervention with Costa Rica in regard to a relaxation of its immigration restrictions.22 Their purpose was to arrange for the purchase of a tract of land in Costa Rica upon which they intended to

20 U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671.
21 War Department U-HLA to the Secretary of State, 21 May 1919, 818.52/6, MC 669; Secretary of State to U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San José, 5 June 1919, 818.52/4, MC 669.
22 Memorandum, Department of State, Division of Latin American Affairs to the Under Secretary of State, Division of Western Europe, 12 May 1937, 818.52G31/1, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
sponsor a settlement of German Jews.\textsuperscript{23} The United States declined any official action at that point, although it was indicated that a "humanitarian recommendation" would be passed on to the appropriate Costa Rican officials.\textsuperscript{24} Initial investigation by the State Department revealed that one of the reasons for Costa Rica's stringent immigration policies related to some previous bad experiences and that a lengthy process of education would be required to distinguish the German Jewish immigrants from other groups.\textsuperscript{25}

None of these initially unfavorable responses seemed to discourage the Refugee Economic Corporation. In August, 1937, the group purchased the Tenorio Ranch, comprised of approximately 50,000 acres at a price of one dollar per acre from the Bank of Costa Rica which had foreclosed its mortgage some years before.\textsuperscript{26} The purchase is only alluded to in the official correspondence concerning the activities of the Refugee Economic Corporation and that there are no details reported there. It is possible that the Corporation hoped to evidence their good faith and financial backing by the purchase, although they had received no guarantees that any

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{25} Internal Memorandum, State Department, to Mr. Duggan, 21 July 1937, 818.52G31/7, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.

\textsuperscript{26} Ireland, \textit{Boundaries and Conflicts}, p. 7.
Jewish emigrés would be allowed to enter Costa Rica. While the United States was supporting the Corporation by humanitarian arguments, it is apparent that the Costa Rican government was also receiving recommendations from the German embassy in San José as to the undesirability of a Jewish settlement in Costa Rica. At this time, the United States representatives retreated somewhat from the issue to avoid the appearance of attempting to influence the Costa Ricans. Further, there was some concern that the hostility felt toward immigrants in general might be "...fanned into a wave of anti-American sentiment which would be unfortunate from the standpoint of our present cordial relations." In the end, the Costa Rican government resolved the issue by declaring the Tenorio Ranch to be an area prohibited for a colonization project. Despite this, the Refugee Economic Corporation continued its efforts to have its settlement project recognized for another two years, although these

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27 U.S. Chargé ad interim Harold M. Collins at San José to the Secretary of State, 6 August 1937, 818.52G31/9, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 U.S. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 2, 6 September 1937, 818.52G31/12, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.

efforts failed. The importance of this series of events to the course of Costa Rican foreign affairs lies in the potential impact of both United States and German policies toward the question of Jewish settlement in Costa Rica. The United States took precautions to avoid any interpretation of its actions as interference with Costa Rican policy decisions. On the other hand, it seems evident that German diplomats took advantage of Costa Rican prejudices and policies against immigration. They also brought pressures by alluding to a potential purchase of canal rights from Costa Rica to influence the Costa Rican decisions. It is difficult to ascertain the relative importance of these factors in Costa Rica's final decision. What is evident, however, is that Costa Rican policy makers chose their own path on the Jewish settlement question, as they would in other areas in the 1930's.

On an indirect basis, Costa Rica was involved with several European nations in this period. There was concern over the placement and employment of numerous European immigrants. Potentially serious problems were caused by Costa Rican unemployment due to the worldwide depression, not to mention the competition presented by immigrants to Costa Rica

32 There are several boxes of State Department correspondence relating to the continued efforts of the Refugee Economic Corporation. All are filed under the 818.52G31 designation in Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.

33 Memorias, 1930, p. viii.
for available jobs. Unfortunately, there are no statistics available to substantiate these fears expressed by Foreign Minister Octavio Beeche in his 1930 annual report. In addition, Beeche maintained that European immigrants were using Costa Rica as a "stop off" on their way to the United States by acquiring the status of naturalized Costa Ricans and then applying for visas to enter the United States. Latin American nations such as Costa Rica traditionally had larger United States immigration quotas than did European nations. Therefore, it was advantageous for immigrants to acquire naturalized Costa Rican status before they tried to enter the United States. Added to these factors were problems of political unrest being attributed to the immigrants by Beeche. Therefore, Costa Rican governments decided to restrict immigration and to toughen up the naturalization laws as well as to make increased use of expulsion of undesirable immigrants. Besides the impact of such a program on the general level of immigration, there was also an important effect upon colonization projects, similar to those already mentioned, undertaken in the 1930's.

34 Ibid., p. ix.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
One rather large group of immigrants, whose status was effected by the tightened up policies, was the Italians. Since the early 1920's, a good many Italians had entered Costa Rica and had become active, especially in commercial circles. 38 These Italian immigrants were well-accepted in Costa Rican society and presented no serious problems until 1932 when negotiations were under way between Costa Rica and the United States to ease and improve the availability of the Panama Canal to ships of Costa Rican registry. 39 The question arose whether Costa Rica would, by virtue of its amicable trade relationship with Italy and by the naturalized status granted to Italian businessmen residing in Costa Rica, have to grant that same status to Italians shipping through the Canal from Costa Rica. 40 However, since the Costa Rican government assured the United States that there was no formal agreement by which it was bound to give Costa Rican national status to Italian traders, there would be no difficulties. 41

The issue of special status for Italians arose again in

38 U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671.

39 Secretary of State to U.S. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San José, No. 174, 15 March 1932, 718.652/5a, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, 1933, V:266.

40 Ibid.

41 U.S. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 836, 29 March 1932, 718.652/6, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, 1933, V:267.
the 1930's when Costa Rica attempted a regularization of its trade relations with a number of European states. The purpose of this was to limit the tariffs which restricted the importation of Costa Rican coffee, bananas, and cacao to European markets.\textsuperscript{42} Of particular importance was the proposed agreement with Italy which included Costa Rican national status for Italian businessmen residing in Costa Rica.\textsuperscript{43} As was indicated, however, that special status never reached the stage of a binding agreement.\textsuperscript{44} But it was obvious that Italy continued to hold a special place in Costa Rican policy.

One possible explanation for this special stature for Italy was offered by the United States Minister in San José, William Hornibrook, supported somewhat by the concerns of the State Department. He speculated that Fascism had taken on a great deal of importance in Costa Rica and that it had to be watched, since the potential for war existed in Europe. The "watching" resulted in a report, late in 1939, about the attendance of Costa Rican officials at a reception at the Italian embassy in San José in honor of King Victor Emmanuel's birth-

\textsuperscript{42}U.S. Chargé Werlich at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 1251, 31 December 1932, Report on 1932, 818.00/1401, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.

\textsuperscript{43}U.S. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 1485, 8 June 1933, 718.653/1401, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, 1933, V:269.

\textsuperscript{44}Ibid.
day. From the fact that the attendance of high government officials, including the President, at the party was not reported in the semi-official daily press, it was concluded by Hornibrook that the influence of Fascism had waned and was therefore no further worry to the United States.46

The worries of the United States's Costa Rica watchers were not reserved to such nebulous concerns as the importance of Fascist influences. As was mentioned previously, during the immediate pre-war years, there were reports of the intention of Germany to purchase canal rights through Costa Rica.47 The primary concern of the United States with such a proposal was, of course, the potential threat to the security of the Panama Canal in the event of war.48 However, this threat was not held to be equally serious by different branches of the United States government, since the State Department felt that the threat was minimal and that a German canal would most likely be used for supply purposes rather than as an offensive

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45U.S. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 962, 13 November 1939, 818.46465/1, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
46Ibid.
48Memorandum from the Division of American Republics, Department of State, 26 March 1938, attached to U.S. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San José to the Secretary of State, 19 March 1938, 818.812/7, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
outpost. On the other hand, military observers were grave-
ly concerned, not only by the potential threat to the Panama
Canal, but also by the threat to the construction of the pro-
posed Nicaraguan canal.

In the end, the civilian viewpoint won out. It was
concluded that no action could be taken by the United States,
since it might be construed as interference with Costa Rica's
rights of self determination. It can be argued that this
decision not to interfere was premised on indications from
Costa Rican sources that no German offers had been accepted
nor were any likely to be. However, the factors leading to
the Costa Rican decision with regard to a German canal pro-
ject were Costa Rican in origin, albeit influenced by the
pragmatic acceptance by Costa Rican leaders of the status of
the nation relative to the strength of the United States.
Perhaps as an indication of its independence from United
States influence, the Costa Rican government also gave serious
consideration to the employment of a German military mission

49 Ibid.

50 U.S. Military Attaché Lt. Col. J. B. Pate in San
José, Military G-2 Report, 18 March 1938, 818.812/8LH, Inter-
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51 U.S. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San José to
the Secretary of State, No. 72, 12 December 1938, 711.18/45,
Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.

52 Ibid.
during 1939. Although this plan was never brought to fruition, it too served as fair warning to the United States that Costa Rica could and would choose its own path in its relations with the European powers as well as with Western Hemispheric nations.

The abortive German military mission was in direct contrast to the Spanish mission, which visited Costa Rica in 1922, to improve Costa Rican police forces and militia units. This mission resulted from the wave of good feeling which characterized Costa Rican-Spanish relations at that time. However, the presence of an officer of the Spanish Civil Guard in Costa Rica occasioned a minor crisis for the Acosta administration in that the Congress balked at approving the agreement with Spain on the grounds that the increased militarism which it represented was contrary to traditional Costa Rican policy. Thus, although the special nature of the relationship between Spain and Costa Rica may have contributed to an interest in a Spanish military mission, in the final analysis

53 U.S. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San José to the Secretary of State, 27 June 1939, 818.20/18, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.

54 U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 102, 7 September 1922, 818.105/—, MC 669.

55 U.S. Chargé Walter C. Thurston at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671.

56 U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 215, 14 March 1923, 818.105/2, MC 669.
the strength of Costa Rican national tradition held firm.

Generally, by the late 1920's there were very few, if any, events of notoriety in Costa Rican relations with Europe. A few commercial ties were maintained, although none was outstanding in any way.\(^{57}\) The relationships with individual nations were, for the most part, not significant enough to merit individual attention. Costa Rica's Foreign Minister, Rafael Castro Quesada, characterized European relations as having become more concerned with humanitarian interests, which occasioned numerous conferences and meetings dealing with social issues such as narcotics and labor problems.\(^{58}\) These issues were not viewed by Costa Rican officials as important enough or as yielding enough demonstrable results to warrant any special efforts on their part.\(^{59}\) As was discussed in connection with Costa Rican participation in the League of Nations, Costa Rica had never been able or willing to send representatives to any sessions of the International Labor Organization. Even in the realm of inter-American affairs in this period, Costa Rica's representation was at best minimal due, in part, to financial problems, as was discussed in the previous chapter.

\(^{57}\) *Memorias, 1928*, p. x.

\(^{58}\) *Memorias, 1929*, pp. vi-vii.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., p. vii.
The path of Costa Rican foreign affairs changed markedly in the 1930's, beginning with the budgetary difficulties which led to cutbacks in diplomatic missions throughout the world.\textsuperscript{60} According to Foreign Minister Roberto Smyth, an additional handicap to Costa Rican diplomacy in Europe was the death of Manuel de Peralta during 1930, after more than fifty years of service in the Costa Rican diplomatic corps.\textsuperscript{61} It should be remembered that Peralta represented Costa Rica at the League of Nations and had been responsible for notifying the European nations of Costa Rica's declaration of war against Germany in World War I. Therefore, between the loss of its premier European diplomat and its financial difficulties, Costa Rica began the 1930's on less than an active level in its relations with Europe.

One problem which intruded on this relative inactivity was that of the formal diplomatic recognition of Soviet Russia and the potential for the spread of Communism throughout Costa Rica. Rather than being a simple matter of recognition of a new government, the extension of diplomatic relations to Soviet Russia was construed as the recognition of the Communist ideology of the government.\textsuperscript{62} There was considerable

\textsuperscript{60} Memorias, 1930, pp. v-vi.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., p. v.

\textsuperscript{62} U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 75, 7 December 1929, 861.77 Chinese Eastern/633, United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the
discussion in the Costa Rican Congress that the establishment of relations with Soviet Russia could enhance the image of Communism in Costa Rica. As a result, while official channels of communication were opened with Russia, it was only through the diplomatic missions maintained by both nations in Paris.

The rather speedy resolution of this potentially unsettling question of Soviet-Costa Rican relations can be taken to indicate any one of a number of possibilities. The isolationism which characterized the inter-American policy of the early 1930's may have already been in operation for relations outside the Americas by the late 1920's. There is the equally likely possibility that financial considerations motivated the limited relationship with Soviet Russia as it limited other relationships in the early 1930's.

In contrast to the limited sphere of Costa Rican foreign relations, the 1930's was a time of great activity for the German government in Latin America. An important goal of German foreign policy was to assure the neutrality of all of Latin America if a war were extended to include


63 U.S. Consul R. M. de Lambert at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 1216, 6 December 1929, 718.61/1, MC 671.

64 U.S. Chargé Roy T. Davis at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 75, 7 December 1929, 861.77 Chinese Eastern/633, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, 1929, II:408.
the United States. The German government felt that the prevailing anti-German sentiment in Latin America would have to be met by a lengthy educational process and the expenditure of considerable sums of money to produce a propaganda effort to counteract that of the United States. German ministers throughout Latin America felt that few if any Latin Americans truly understood the aims of the Third Reich and the New Order. Further, they were concerned about the negative attitude of the Catholic Church in Latin America toward Germany and its influence on Latin Americans. German policy makers were convinced that economic motivations would prompt the majority of Latin American nations to remain neutral, despite the urgings of the United States that they join in the war effort. However, to assure this course of events and to avoid arousing any additional hostility toward Germany, the German missions throughout Latin America were

65 Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX (Freytag), 17 September 1939, Doc. 86-4497/E 105434-37, United States, Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D (1937-1945), (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1953), VIII:87.

66 Ambassador in Argentina (Thermann) to the Foreign Minister, 2 August 1938, Enclosure #1, Memorandum of the Meeting in Montevideo by the Chiefs of Mission in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, 28-29 July 1938, Doc. 624-6903/E 518244-56, ibid., V:863-66.

67 Ibid.

68 Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX (Freytag), 17 September 1939, Doc. 86-4497/E105434-37, ibid., VIII: 86.
instructed to act with great reserve in expressing opinions on political matters and to confine themselves to economic or cultural questions. The reasons cited for this were primarily related to the impact of the Good Neighbor Policy and the effectiveness of the program of inter-American solidarity resulting from the Conferences of American states.

Perhaps the only positive or direct policy which the German missions were encouraged to recommend was that all of the Latin American states join in protests over British "violations of international law," with regard to interference with neutral shipping. This recommendation was a logical one for the Latin American states, including Costa Rica, to follow in any case, since the shipping in question was primarily of Latin American registry. As long as Latin America continued to support the rights of neutral shipping, there was an assurance of German markets for Latin American products.

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69 Copy of a Communication to All Diplomatic Missions in America, Enclosed in the letter from the Director of the Political Department (Woermann) to the Embassy in Spain, 17 October 1939, Doc. 165-4218/E073923, ibid., VIII:304.

70 Ibid.

71 Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX (Freytag), 17 September 1939, Doc. 86-4497/E105434-37, ibid., VIII:88.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.
In more specific terms, Germany was also directly interested in Central America although not in Costa Rica individually. Generally, it was felt that the Central American states would follow the lead, if not the dictates, of the United States.\(^7^4\) Once again, however, it was indicated that an extensive German propaganda effort could at least postpone any action by these nations which would be unfavorable to German interests.\(^7^5\) Nonetheless, the German observers felt that the Good Neighbor Policy would work to Germany's advantage only if these nations believed their independence of action in foreign affairs was being maintained.\(^7^6\) Since this was approximately the same rationale which motivated United States policy during this period, it would seem that all of Latin America, including Costa Rica, would truly be free of any excessive pressures on the course of their foreign policies.

As a consequence, at the end of the 1930's, Costa Rica was confronted with a choice between the neutrality which would in effect support the policy purposes of Germany in that Costa Rica would retain its rights to export foodstuffs.

\(^7^4\)Minister for Central America and Panama (Reinbeck) to the Foreign Ministry, 14 November 1938, Doc. 634-257/168874-75, ibid., V:884.

\(^7^5\)Ibid., V:885.

\(^7^6\)Minister in Mexico (Freiherr von Lüdt) to the Foreign Ministry, 8 April 1938, Doc. 600-257/168777-79, ibid., V:828-829.
to Germany. Or, Costa Rica could choose to respect the "new bonds of solidarity," which characterized the inter-American community of nations in the late 1930's, and join the United States in the defense of the hemisphere. Although there had been a growth of Costa Rican nationalism during the early 1930's, leading to policies of self sufficiency and isolationism, which had been extended to discussions of increased armaments and militarism in Costa Rica, by the mid-1930's, the choice was eventually made to act within the structure of the American community of nations.

As was indicated at the beginning of this chapter, there were few events of any great significance which characterized Costa Rican relations with Europe once the Tinoco interlude ended and Costa Rica resigned from the League of Nations. In part, this can be attributed to the conscious policy of Costa Rican statesmen and in part to the realistic evaluation


79 U.S. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San José to the Secretary of State, No. 1285, 25 January 1933, 818.00/1402, *Internal Affairs, 1930-1939*.

80 U.S. Minister Leo R. Sack at San José to the Secretary of State, 18 December 1935, 818.20/18, *Internal Affairs, 1930-1939*. 
of Costa Rica in the world community of nation during the 1920's and 1930's. As has been demonstrated, Costa Rica was affected by the Great Depression and by the diplomatic maneuvering which characterized the rise of the Third Reich. Consequently, Costa Rican statesmen dealt with the problems which surrounded European immigration and colonization projects. Costa Rican statesmen became more aware that the first basis for foreign policy rested in the security of their inter-American relations and in their realistic appraisal that European powers and their concerns were simply not that important to Costa Rica. Thus, Costa Rican policy once again reflected the independence of action which characterized its inter-American relations.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

The international attitudes and policies of Costa Rica gradually became more sophisticated through the use of diplomatic means in the service of national interests. Before attributing that increased sophistication to any particularly Costa Rican factors, it should be observed that the conduct of foreign affairs by all of the American states seemed to acquire a polish and maturity during the same time period. However, certain patterns which are peculiar to Costa Rica may be discerned.

Internal political conditions to a large degree dictated the nation's foreign affairs immediately after World War I as the Tinoco administration sought to regularize its international status. The personal intransigence of Woodrow Wilson in refusing to accord diplomatic recognition to the Tinoco regime placed Costa Rica's relations with the United States in a primary position which may not have truly reflected the priorities dictated by national interests. In spite of Tinoco's desire to win recognition from the world community of
nations through his declaration of war against Imperial Germany, Costa Rica's international status continued to be dominated by the United States even after Tinoco was overthrown. As a consequence, Costa Rica was not admitted to the Paris Peace Conference; nor was it granted original member status in the League of Nations.

The efforts of Julio Acosta, President of Costa Rica in 1920, to ameliorate relations with the United States jeopardized his own popularity. His administration sought and received membership in the League of Nations but the remainder of Costa Rica's foreign policy demonstrated no discernible patterns. It would be possible to characterize Costa Rican foreign policy under Acosta as a status quo policy which had as its only design the nation's return to pre-Tinoco stature in the world community of nations. The problems which arose with Great Britain over the nullification of the Amory oil concession, as well as the recurrence of the boundary dispute with Panama, were settled with the mediation of the United States in an attempt to achieve the goal of status quo. In addition, in traditional Costa Rican fashion, the Central American Union of 1921-1922 was considered and then rejected by Costa Rican leadership.

The problem of ties binding Costa Rica to the United States was important in the presidential election campaign of 1924. Characteristic of the campaign and subsequent presidency of Ricardo Jiménez was a repudiation of such ties and
the attempts to seek means of conducting relations with the world community of nations which were not associated with the United States. There was a period of closeness with Mexico prompted in part by shared unfavorable experiences with the United States's interference and in part by the growth of *Hispanismo* which stressed the ties among all Latin nations. At the same time, relations with Spain were strengthened as evidenced by Spain's aid in protecting Costa Rican property and lives in Germany during World War I. In keeping with these sentiments, as well as a growing sense of which policies best served national interests, Costa Rica tendered its resignation from the League of Nations during the Jiménez administration. There had been few, if any, benefits to that membership for Costa Rica, and the financial burden of membership was no longer considered justifiable, in view of pressing needs for internal improvements.

Further, in the search for alternative means of conducting international affairs, the Jiménez administration sought to free itself from all appearances of United States domination. There was a reported wave of anti-American press as well as some anti-American demonstrations. This anti-American sentiment can be partially attributed to Mexican influences in Costa Rica which related more correctly to internal Mexican conditions than to the matters under consideration here. However, the main thrust of the anti-Americanism reflected during the Jiménez administration can be found in
the desire to free the nation from all external influences in the determination of its foreign policy.

The succeeding administration of Cleto González Víquez, from 1928 to 1932, was primarily characterized by its attention to the restoration of internal stability and the renewal of the economic strength of the nation as a continuation of part of Jiménez's programs. In the realm of foreign affairs, this administration promoted Costa Rican plans for an American League of Nations and an Inter-American Court of International Justice. Both of these programs reflected the growing awareness of Costa Rican statesmen that the foundation of Costa Rican foreign policy should rest on its inter-American relations and in the realization that European concerns were not of primary importance to Costa Rica.

The assessment that Costa Rica should diminish the level of its foreign involvements was reflected in presidential messages during the late 1920's and early 1930's. The emphasis, however, was on the economic necessity for such a program rather than on any long term foreign policy goals. The thrust of foreign policy during the same period can be seen as an isolationist approach by the second Jiménez administration, from 1932 to 1936. In his second administration, Jiménez articulated isolationism as a need for self sufficiency and stronger nationalistic feeling on the part of the Costa Ricans.

The ultimate success of these plans was assured by the Good Neighbor Policy upon which the United States embarked
in 1932. United States policies of noninterference with the affairs of all American states aided Costa Rican plans for independent action as the nation availed itself of the good offices of United States diplomats in Central America to avert conflicts with its closest neighbors, as in the case of the Guatemalan dispute of 1934. As part of its isolationist policy, Costa Rica also did not attend the 1933 Montevideo Conference of American States, which resulted in the confirmation of the nonintervention consensus among all American states.

By 1936, it could be observed that Costa Rica had succeeded in its attempts to reawaken nationalistic sentiments among the population. With the inauguration of León Cortés as President in that year, the tone of Costa Rican foreign policy changed in that it was broadened to include the concern of the nation with Central American affairs, as opposed to the strict isolationism enunciated during the previous administration. As plans for hemispheric defense developed with the approach of World War II, Costa Rica deferred to the United States on broad policy issues, while it retained the right of choice in other areas. This was evidenced by consideration given to proposals for colonization by Europeans and the canal project sponsored by German interests. Within the context of broad guidelines for hemispheric defense, Costa Rica was free to act as it chose in all matters of foreign policy.

The increased ability and willingness of Costa Rican
statesmen throughout the 1920's and 1930's to accept realistic limitations on Costa Rican international policies enhanced their stature in dealing with other nations, for their decisions were firmly based on a realistic assessment of their ability to act. Therefore, no energy was expended in attempts to circumvent the United States so that the full attention of Costa Rican leadership could be directed to those matters in which their decisions were most meaningful. For example, it could be speculated that Federico Tinoco might have been far more successful in his attempts to acquire diplomatic recognition from the United States had he concentrated his efforts on the achievement of solidarity of opinion among Latin American states as to the legitimacy of his government. The strategy adopted by El Salvador, following the advice of Costa Rica, in the early 1930's to achieve the recognition of the Martínez regime testifies to the importance of even one strong advocate for a nonrecognized government. However, before too rash a conclusion can be drawn, changes in United States policy between 1917 and 1931 must also be taken into consideration. When the Good Neighbor Policy modified the prevailing attitudes of the United States toward the right of self determination in Latin America, Costa Rica was in an advantageous position to assist the Martínez regime, whereas in 1917 there may have been no strong advocate of similar strength for Costa Rica.

The international attitudes and policies of Costa Rica, as they emerged on the eve of World War II, combined many
experiences from the preceding twenty years with favorable policies on the part of the United States, which allowed the nation considerable freedom of action, and a readiness to accept the limitations imposed by the nation's size and strength relative to that of the United States. The strong nationalistic sentiments, which were characteristic of Costa Rica throughout the nineteenth century, continued to serve its leadership well in providing them a strong base of confidence upon which to rely in their dealings with the world community of nations. The lessons of the Tinoco debacle prevented Costa Rican statesmen from making grave overestimations of their influence or authority and therefore added an aura of strength and independence of action to their policy decisions which were carefully chosen not to exceed the real strength of the nation.
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The dissertation submitted by Suzanne M. O'Connor has been read and approved by the following Committee:

Dr. Joseph A. Gagliano, Chairman  
Professor, History, Loyola

Dr. Paul S. Lietz  
Professor, History, Loyola

Fr. Charles E. Ronan, S.J.  
Associate Professor, History, Loyola

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Joseph A. Gagliano