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Un-Selfconcern in Aristotle's Notion of Happiness

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UN-SELFCONCERN IN ARISTOTLE'S NOTION OF HAPPINESS

by

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Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of Master of Arts in
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CHAPTER I

THE QUESTION OF ORIENTATION IN ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY OF MAN

A philosophy of man seeks insight into the actions and experiences that make up the variegated total which is called human life. It seeks to realize a unity in the multiplicity which human life presents, to project or discover structure in what is otherwise only a series of happenings without ultimate shape or significance.

Some kind of order is never wholly absent from human acts. The most minute acts, acts of the least duration or importance, exhibit real meanings and purposes behind their varieties. Men are continually employing various standards, at least implicitly and unreflectingly, in their daily activity, and in this they reveal attitudes toward reality. The patterns which result from an interplay of such motivations are simply part of the actuality of human experience. It is these that form the subject matter of a philosophy of man and are the starting point of its investigations.

Philosophy seeks to discover the patterns latent in men's actions and powers, and the basic aims that reveal themselves in men's reasons for doing what they do. Thus philosophy may seek a formal or a teleological unity, but at last the truth or good that it seeks is the same: to know how human life functions when it is in working order. A structuring of human life has truth when it expresses a meaning that corresponds to the variety of human experience and illuminates it. This structure is an expression of a universal and
totalizing order in human things, the hierarchisation of all that is found in human action and experience around the good which the examination discloses, to develop it and fulfil it.

The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle seeks to give expression to such a unity in human life. Its focus is mainly teleological; that is, the structure it reveals is in terms of purpose in human action, of ends proximate and ultimate, of fulfilment of capacities or powers found in the human person. This finalism is the method common to a great part of Aristotle's systematic philosophy, and in terms of it Aristotle's treatises find whatever over-all unity they have. This is true of the Psychology and the Physics; it is especially true of the Metaphysics, where a loose series of analyses gains a suggestive but attenuated sort of unity from Aristotle's almost incidental analysis of finality of motion in the universe, the inserted Book A of his earlier theology. The Ethics, however, with a subject-matter less vast, manages to realize a completer unity, but still on this basis of finality. 1

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Subsequent references to these authors as well as to other commentators will cite only locus and author's name.
The **Ethics** is not a treatise independent of Aristotle's other works. It stands in need of completion by the treatise on Politics. (Ethics is only part of the larger topic of life in society, which the *Politics* in its proper sense comprehends.) Furthermore its finalistic structures derive many of their principles from analyses which Aristotle has made in other parts of his system of teaching and which came to be embodied in other treatises. Thus the **Ethics** presupposes many of the observations of human activity which Aristotle incorporated in his *Rhetoric*. It presupposes much of the analysis of human powers which was eventually incorporated in passages of the *Psychology*. Nor does the *Nicomachean Ethics* stand by itself as Aristotle's only work in the field of a philosophy of man. For example, the dialog *Protrepticus* and the *Eudemian Ethics*, of Aristotle's Platonic and transitional periods respectively, are representative of the author's earlier attempts to find unity in human actions. The *Nicomachean Ethics* thus still gains in intelligibility when it is seen in the context of the rest of the Corpus Aristotelicum and in its place in the historical development of Aristotle's teachings.  

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2Cf. Jean Léonard, *Le Bonheur chez Aristote* (Brussels, 1944), appendices II and III, for a detailed account of the various periods represented within the *Nicomachean Ethics* composition. This account and that of Jaeger, of which it is a more recent and detailed development in the area of the Ethics, are presupposed in the interpretations of Aristotle's doctrine which are to follow in this study.

It is to be noted however that a recent critic such as Josef Zürcher, *Aristoteles' Werk und Geist* (Paderborn, 1952), attributes almost the whole of the presently acknowledged Aristotelian corpus to the later Peripatetics, chiefly Theophrastus. Cf. ch. II, which dismisses the authenticity of the four complete ethical writings at some time attributed to Aristotle, the *Virtues* and *Vices*, *Great Ethics*, *Eudemian Ethics*, and *Nicomachean Ethics*. (Note especially the brief argument which finds in the true Aristotle of the fragments a complete disdain for outward goods and in the pseudo-Aristotle a developing regard for them all the way to an inclusion of them in the *Nicomachean Ethics* notion of happiness.) Cf. also ch. 21, in which the author sketches his notion of the
But beyond these explicit or nearly explicit presuppositions of the
argument of the Ethics—presuppositions which lie out of sight only in the
present work but open to view in the author's statements in other parts of his
writings—exists the whole body of those presuppositions which Aristotle seems
not to have examined.

The order of human actions which Aristotle proposes in the Ethics will be
meaningful only in light of human nature as it exists in Aristotle's under-
standing of it; that is, it depends on the inner structure of human nature as
Aristotle sees it. But this hierarchy of powers and values within human nature
owes all its order in Aristotle's understanding to some more basic human value
as the measure of all other human values. This standard in turn must hold its
place in a consistent understanding of the universe of experience or must be
the basis of such an understanding. Yet the very grounds on which such a
wider order stands do themselves imply a final orientation in the mind of the
thinker, an attitude.

In other words, every examination of patterns or standards implies a more
fundamental standard which in turn either is accepted without examination, or
is examined further but not without leaving deeper levels of the question yet

strictly historical Aristotelian positions. —The present study seeks only to
examine the philosophical orientation of the author of the Nicomachean Ethics,
whoever he was, whether Aristotle as tradition has it, or, if Zürcher's thesis
proves correct, Theophrastus. Since the work even in this later theory is
still attributed to a single man, and the same man to whom the other main
Aristotelian writings are also to be ascribed, the question of the philosophy's
authorship is related to the present historical study of the philosophical
doctrine but does not intrinsically affect an understanding of it.
to be touched. In either case a line of reflecting on principles goes to a
certain depth of its own, then stops at that depth. The philosopher,
supposedly, could carry the examination deeper than he ever actually does; or
if he is practically unable to carry it deeper, other philosophers at least need
not stop where he does. For countless areas of difference in natural endowment,
experience, and especially, historical perspective, equip each philosopher
uniquely for the reflections he will make. New perspectives raise new
questions: they seek broader unities, they require deeper probings into the
suppositions of any given question and answer.

Such is the purpose of the present study; namely, to examine Aristotle's
structuring of human life, and to do so with a view to making explicit the
standards on which that structure depends.

Aristotle's reflections on the unity of human life, its experiences and
goals, find expression in his use of the term happiness (εὐδαίμονία).³

³Cf. Ross, p. 190: "Aristotle accepts from 'the many' the view that the
end is εὐδαίμονία. The corresponding adjective originally meant 'watched over
by a good genius'; but in ordinary Greek usage the word means just good
fortune, often with special reference to external prosperity. The conventional
translation 'happiness' is unsuitable in the Ethics; for whereas 'happiness'
means a state of feeling, differing from 'pleasure' only by its suggestion of
permanence, depth, and serenity, Aristotle insists that εὐδαίμονία is a kind
of activity; that it is not any kind of pleasure, thought pleasure naturally
accompanies it. The more non-committal translation 'well-being' is therefore
deeper. If the question be asked whether Aristotle was a hedonist, it is
better to go by his repeated and deliberate statement that the end of life is
activity rather than by his use, for want of a better word, of one which
suggests not action but feeling." Note also that both εὐδαίμονία and
happiness suggest by their etymologies an element of the adventitious which is
foreign to Aristotle's concept.
Most of the length of Book One of the *Ethics* is devoted to a general examination of the chief directions of human action in light of the unity which the notion of happiness introduces into them. But this notion appears more in its function of unifying the other subordinate directions than in its own significance. Even Aristotle's definition of happiness as *activity in accord with excellence* serves less to tell what happiness is in itself than it does to lay down the lines which later clarifications of its meaning will follow. At least the true significance of the definition cannot be seen until the meaning of activity and excellence have become clear through the extended discussions of the rest of the *Ethics*.

Further explicit development of the idea of happiness does not occur until the last passages of the *Ethics*, where Aristotle describes that activity which he considers the chief expression of human happiness. Again, this discussion does not directly clarify the meaning of happiness; yet some of the author's understanding of the term can be drawn from his treatment of the activity in which he finds its chief instance. Meanwhile in other earlier passages, chiefly in Books Seven and Ten, he has contributed to distinguishing happiness from the rest of men's actions by his discussion of pleasure and its distinction from activity.

It may be only by indirect inference from these distinctions and exemplifications that one can uncover the standard which gives meaning to Aristotle's definition of happiness. The meaning does not exist in a state of explicitness in Aristotle's own handling of the subject. Thus the very standard on which he bases the chief conclusions of his *Ethics* remains at least in expression undetermined. One can pass readily and with a large part of certainty from
Aristotle's explicit statements to this implicit standard, though. The principle which underlies the structure is not very far from actual explicitness, even if it is not formulated.

But the examination of Aristotle's idea of happiness can be carried deeper than this. Once the author's standard of happiness has been made explicit by the foregoing examination, it is still possible to seek the more fundamental philosophical orientation on which this standard itself is based. This will amount to a question why the content of Aristotle's notion is such as it is, what there is in his general approach to philosophizing that determines for him such a standard.

The purpose of this study, then, is twofold. First, to make explicit the meaning of happiness in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, that is, to discover the implicit standard by which Aristotle judges the ultimate worths of the various forms of human activity. (This standard, it will be seen, is human life patterned by orderly action and reflective thought, in short, the presence in man of the Ideal.) Second, to project this standard on the background of a deeper orientation in Aristotle's thought. (This orientation will appear as a focus of philosophical attention on the eternal and unconditioned excellence of pure form and an attendant inattention to the subject in which form is found.)

The explicitation of Aristotle's notion of happiness—and the primary concern of this study—will be achieved by an examination of the main passages in the Nicomachean Ethics, Book One, which treat the notion happiness; next of those passages in Books Seven and Ten which develop the meaning of pleasure—a reality which must be carefully distinguished from happiness; and finally in Book Ten, of the culminating chapters of the Ethics, which show the activity of
reflection to be the highest form of human happiness. These three steps of the examination will take place respectively in Chapters Two, Three, and Four.

The further examination, locating this standard of human happiness in the larger context of Aristotle's basic philosophical orientation, is a vaster problem and can be only touched on in the present study. Such an examination goes beyond Aristotle's own consideration of the matter. Hence there is no passage in his writings which gives special support to the interpretation that will be established. A reliable examination could extend to the whole Aristotelian corpus. The present inquiry does not ambition this kind of thoroughness, but intends only a further refinement of Aristotle's standard, a deduction, by way of corollary, from the conclusion which the first examination will have achieved. Hence it will proceed by a comparison of Aristotle's standard of happiness with the implications of other passages in the Nicomachean Ethics in which he discusses the foundations of friendship and self-love and the meaning of the life of honor. This comparison, along with a summary of the argument and a final estimate of its conclusions, will constitute Chapter Five of the present study.
CHAPTER II

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HAPPINESS

Book One of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* is composed of a series of discussions centering more or less strictly around the subject of happiness. The first three chapters are devoted to a general introduction to the whole treatise on ethics: its function as science, its importance as the science which puts order into the matter—human activity—on which all the other sciences converge, finally the dispositions in the philosopher which its study requires. Chapter Four introduces the common conviction that happiness is the goal of all human actions but points out that disagreement enters when it is asked what happiness is. In Chapter Five Aristotle sketches out the four main views of what happiness is—pleasure, honor, wealth, and reflection—and briefly dispose of the first three of them as inadequate, while postponing discussion of the fourth until a later time. Chapter Six returns to a consideration of the approach to be made to the problem, with a discussion of the Platonic theory of a universal good underlying all specific and particular goods; this approach is rejected in favor of an inductive method centered on human activity.

The more systematic treatment of the problem begins in Chapter Seven with a description of the way ordinary human activity subordinates certain actions to purposes which they serve, and with an analysis of the notion of goal in both its relative and absolutely final senses. This prepares for the question of
what human activity best fulfills this notion of finality. At last a definition of happiness appears—activity according to excellence—and this is to serve as a guide toward determining what happiness is. In Chapter Eight this formulation is compared with a number of traditional ideas of happiness and thus more of its characteristics are brought to light.

Chapter Nine initiates an informal series of questions on the subject of happiness, the answers to which serve to define still more the meaning of this state. To a question about luck as the source of happiness Aristotle shows the dependence of happiness on character. In Chapters Ten and Eleven Aristotle discusses how far changes of fortune can affect happiness. In Chapter Twelve he describes how men's ordinary ways of speaking betray a regard for happiness over other goods. Finally in Chapter Thirteen, with a division of man's faculties into sub-rational and rational, he prepares for the detailed discussions of excellence in distinctly human activity which are to occupy the remaining books of the *Ethics*. ¹

The order of Aristotle's approach to the meaning of happiness is clearest in the central Chapter Seven, while the later chapters, which contain important

¹Cf. H.H. Joachim, *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics*, ed. D.A. Ross (Oxford, 1951), Introduction, pp. 1-10, for a general view of the structure of the *Ethics*, and its place in the Aristotelian Corpus. Cf. also Stewart, for a more detailed, though less up-to-date, running commentary on the whole text; the concise summaries of W. D. Ross of the whole Aristotelian system; and Robin's detailed paraphrase and criticism of the principal doctrines.
segments of the doctrine of Book One, lie outside the tight structuring of the passages that introduce the definition and comment on it. Thus it is hard to formulate a brief but adequate expression of Aristotle's doctrine without departing somewhat from the original order of its presentation.

The definition itself is satisfactory in the way it reduces Aristotle's notion of happiness to the simplest possible formula: "The active exercise of the human soul's faculties in conformity with excellence...." This functional viewing of happiness is consistent with Aristotle's preference for a teleological structuring of his subject matter. Moreover it is the key to Aristotle's digression from the question of happiness throughout most of the length of the Ethics. For such detailed discussions of the virtues in general and particular are not necessary for an understanding of the happy life (which seems in Aristotle's final view of the question to lie beyond the concerns of

The same difficulty presents itself in ordering the doctrine of the passages treated in Chapters Three to Five of this study, where a commentary-style treatment would be justified for a leisurely perusal of the text but rearrangement and schematisation of the doctrine is necessary for brevity and clarity of presentation and consistency of approach.

1096a17. The Greek is more succinct: "Ψυχή εὐπρεπής... κατ' ἀρετήν". Unless otherwise indicated, all English quotations of Aristotle are from The Works of Aristotle Translated into English, ed. W. D. Ross, 2nd ed., 12 vols. (Oxford, 1950-1952); English translations of the Nicomachean Ethics, however, are from H. Rackham's Loeb Classical Library translation of that work. Greek quotations are drawn from the texts of the Loeb Classical Library editions of Aristotle's works, T. E. Page, gen. ed. (New York, 1929-1938). All references to Aristotle's works follow the Bekker pagination system, and are to the Nicomachean Ethics unless some other of the works is specified.
the moral life); but such a series of discussions does have a place in a full
understanding of the implications of "activity in accord with excellence" since,
as Aristotle makes clear, excellence is of at least two kinds, moral as well as
intellectual.

Yet Aristotle's treatment of happiness even in Book One contains much more
than the skeleton definition suggests. The notion of a hierarchization of
values, for example, is barely hinted at in the phrase "in accord with excel-
ence," while this hierarchization is perhaps the most important aspect of the
doctrine; nor does the important question of happiness's dependence on outward
conditions receive adequate notice. Hence it will be useful to put Aristotle's
general notion of happiness into a more explicit formula, though this will in
its own turn require further subdivision as the discussion becomes more pointed.
According to this formula, happiness will be characterized as a natural
activity that is perfect and enjoyable. Each of these four characteristics
opens onto an important aspect of happiness, while adequate discussion of them,
especially of the subordinate meanings which the terms perfect and activity
imply, will involve covering the whole range of Aristotle's remarks, but in a
less random fashion.¹

¹For Aristotle's own summary of the conclusions reached in the course of
this book see his recapitulation in Book Ten, 1176a30-59, 1177a12,13: "Having
now discussed the various kinds of Virtue, of Friendship and of Pleasure, it
remains for us to treat in outline of Happiness, inasmuch as we count this to
be the End of human life. But it will shorten the discussion if we recapitulate
what has been said already.

"Now we stated that happiness is not a certain disposition of character;
since if it were it might be possessed by a man who passed the whole of his
life asleep, living the life of a vegetable, or by one who was plunged in the
deepest misfortune. If then we reject this as unsatisfactory, and feel bound to
class happiness rather as some form of activity, as has been said in the earlier
part of this treatise, and if activities are of two kinds, some merely
1. Happiness as natural

Happiness is natural in the sense that it is to be understood in the context of an adequate understanding of human nature. It follows the patterns laid down by human nature and is attainable within that nature. This orientation of happiness receives only oblique reference from Aristotle, but is implicit in the whole work, if for no other reason than that no power or influence outside the scope of human nature itself is appealed to.

Happiness is according to nature. This principle is present in the line of arguing that culminates in Aristotle's definition of happiness. By an examination of the way man characteristically acts will be discovered what is his typical function (ἐπρον). "Are we then to suppose that, while the carpenter and the shoemaker have definite functions or businesses belonging to necessary means and desirable only for the sake of something else, others desirable in themselves, it is clear that happiness is to be classed among activities desirable in themselves, and not among those desirable as a means to something else; since happiness lacks nothing, and is self-sufficient.

"But those activities are desirable in themselves which do not aim at any result beyond the mere exercise of the activity. Now this is felt to be the nature of actions in conformity with virtue; for to do noble and virtuous deeds is a thing desirable for its own sake."

"But if happiness consists in activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue [i.e. excellence: ἀρετή]; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us." Thus Aristotle will lead into his discussion of the reflective life.
Moreover, the good man, whose experience and preferences usually are
Aristotle's guides in deciding the excellence of a way of life, leads a life
in which conflicting desires and cross purposes have no place, for the very

51097b29-31. Cf. 22-28: "To say however that the Supreme Good is
happiness will probably appear a truism; we still require a more explicit ac-
count of what constitutes happiness. Perhaps then we may arrive at this by
ascertaining what is man's function. . . . [It] may be held that the good of
man resides in the function of man, if he has a function." Also Part. An.
639b14-22: "Plainly, however, that cause is the first which we call the final
one. For this is the Reason, and the Reason forms the starting-point, alike in
the works of art and in works of nature. For consider how the physician or how
the builder sets about his work. He starts by forming for himself a definite
picture. . . and this he holds forward as the reason and explanation of each
subsequent step that he takes, and of his acting in this or that way as the
case may be. Now in the works of nature the good and the final cause is still
more dominant than in works of art such as these . . . ."; ibid. 641b10-30,
for an extension of this concept of finality in nature to the whole universe;
De An. 415b15-18: "It is manifest that the soul is also the final cause of its
body. For nature, like mind, always does whatever it does for the sake of some-
thing, which something is its end. To that something corresponds in the cause
of animals the soul and in this it follows the order of nature; all natural
bodies are organs of the soul"; ibid. 434a31: "For all things that exist by
Nature are means to an end, or will be concomitants of means to an end."

6The whole present passage is an example of Aristotle's dependence on this
standard. See 1095b18-8: "Perhaps then for us at all events it is proper to
start from what is known to us. This is why in order to be a competent student
of the Right and Just. . . the pupil is bound to have been well trained in his
habits. For the starting-point or first principle is the fact that a thing is
so; if this be satisfactorily ascertained, there will be no need also to know
the reason why it is so. And the man of good moral training knows first
principles already, or can easily acquire them." Cf. Stewart, I, 51-57 on this
passage. See also 1151a18,19: "No more in ethics than in mathematics are
the first principles reached by a process of reasoning, but by virtue, whether
natural or acquired by training in right opinion as to the first principle";
1166a13: "In virtue and the virtuous man seem to be the standard in everything,
also 1094a29-1095a11, 110a12-14, and Pol. 1338a9. For an examination of
Aristotle's use of this standard and an indictment of his failure to give it a
more solid foundation than the common agreement of gentlemen of his day, cf.
Marjorie Grene, "An Implicit Premise in Aristotle's Ethics", Ethics, 1945-46
(56), no. 2.
reason that his likes follow the directions that nature lays down and nature
does not contradict herself.\(^7\) It is possible for men to develop various
perverted tastes or be disposed to them because of faulty constitutions, or
simply to act against the virtues by excess or defect\(^8\), but all such
aberrations are recognized by normal persons for what they are, namely
departures, blameworthy or not, from the rule which the rational element in men
naturally ought to impose on the lower appetites.\(^9\)

Further, happiness is attainable according to nature. Once it is held
nature acts purposively producing definite means for definite ends, it does not
make sense to talk about achieving ends that lie beyond the means at one's dis-
posal. When the question is raised whether happiness is a gift of the gods or
of luck\(^10\) Aristotle does not directly deny the possibility of happiness'
coming from such directions. The question of divine intervention in human
affairs is not a matter than can be discussed in the context of the present
argument. On the other hand, the rise and fall of luck is known to affect
happiness but not in any essential way. Nor would it be fitting for chance to
play a very important role:

\(^7\)1099a12-16.

\(^8\)E.g. the discussions of bad actions as a departure from the mean, 1104a12-
bb\(_4\), and of the various states of incontinence and bestiality, esp. 1149b27-
1150a3.

\(^9\)1102b13-1103a3.

\(^10\)1199b9-1100a9.
Happiness can be attained through some process of study or effort by all persons whose capacity for excellence has not been stunted or maimed. Again, if it is better to be happy as a result of one's own exertions than by the gift of fortune, it is reasonable to suppose that this is how happiness is won; inasmuch as in the world of nature things have a natural tendency to be ordered in the best possible way, and the same is true of the products of art, and of causation of any kind, especially the highest [i.e. intelligence]. Whereas that the greatest and noblest of all things should be left to fortune would be too contrary to the fitness of things. 11

In another context Aristotle distinguishes wishing from choosing by this difference, that the former can be concerned with impossibilities while the latter only with things within attainment. "Choice cannot have for its object impossibilities; if a man were to say he chose something impossible he would be thought a fool; but we can wish for things that are impossible, for instance immortality. No one chooses what does not rest with himself, but only what he thinks can be attained by his own act." 12

The activity that will perfect man will be, after all, something possible to him because he has a natural capacity for it. What he has no capacity for

11 1099b18-24. In this and in other quotations throughout the present study the translation excellence replaces Rackham's or Ross's virtue wherever the text seems to favor a less restricted rendering of Aristotle's ἔπηγα. This applies to cognates of the word as well.

12 Impossibility of attainment was also the reason why the Platonic Universal Good had to be excluded from Aristotle's discussion of the good for man: "And likewise with the Idea of the Good; for even if the goodness predicated of various things in common really is a unity or some thing existing separate or absolute, it clearly will not be practicable or attainable by man; but the Good which we are now seeking is a good within human reach." 1096b31-34. Cf. also 1112a18-34.
will never take place in him. The capacity does not constitute the activity; the activity must be brought about by effort and even the disposition so to act must be developed beyond the state of mere capacity to that of habit. But the capacity is basic:

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\neg/N/ not one of the moral virtues is engendered in us by nature, for no natural property can be altered by habit \neg/ whereas, of course, virtues are susceptible of corruption \neg/ yet the virtues \neg/ are engendered in us neither by nature nor yet in violation of nature; nature gives us the capacity to receive them, and this capacity is brought to maturity by habit.

Moreover, the faculties given us by nature are bestowed on us first in a potential form; we exhibit their actual exercise afterwards. This is clearly so with our senses: we did not acquire the faculty of sight or hearing by repeatedly seeing or repeatedly listening, but the other way about—because we had the senses we began to use them, we did not get them by using them.\textsuperscript{13}

Thus it is not necessary for Aristotle to have made explicit reference to happiness' achievement solely within the scope of nature. Such a channeling of human purposes and powers is the natural presupposition of the discussion, and, except for a few instances like those uncovered in the present examination, passes without the author's advertence.

2. Happiness as activity

Happiness is an activity (\textit{épéryeia}). This term\textsuperscript{14} signifies the presence of a reality in the true sense of the word actual, not merely dispositional. Moreover in its very derivation (\textit{év-épyov}) it suggests a quality of immensity,

\textsuperscript{13}1103a13-31.

\textsuperscript{14}Cf. H. Bonitz, \textit{Index Aristotelicus} (originally vol. 5 of the Royal Prussian Academy edition of Aristotle), 2nd ed. (Crats, 1955), p. 251a2-bh2, for the Aristotelian uses of the term. Also see Met. 10b35-1051a34 as a summary of it.
of reality that takes place within the person and is independent of outward conditions.

First, happiness is a state of actuation. To be active (in the right kind of activity) is to be happy, while merely to be well disposed to such activity is not by that fact to be happy.

Aristotle's language simply identifies happiness with the activity that best achieves it. "Let us identify the end with certain actions and activities for thus it falls among goods of the soul and not among external goods."15 And again: "Our definition accords with the description of the happy man as one who 'lives well' or 'does well'; for it has virtually identified happiness with a form of good life or doing well."16 Is this an accident of language is what Aristotle really intends to say, not that happiness and right activity are the same thing, but that happiness results from right action? On the contrary, there is no reason to reconstrue his words when they are plainly for identification, and when in other contexts he is careful to distinguish

151098b17-19. (Ross, tr. Cf. note 29 for further discussion of this reading.)

161098b20-22. Aristotle usually pairs happiness and doing well in parallel constructions: as infinitives, for example, eu'daimonéin and eu-práttéin, or as substantives, eu'daimónia and eu'praëtiá, even eu'swía. See also 1095a19-21, where the same parallelism is present in his language; and 1178b28, where the specific activity of bēmptéin is singled out as identical with eu'daimonéin.
activity from qualities which result from it, and at the same time does not thus distinguish activity from happiness.

As actual, activity goes beyond mere dispositions. Virtue (excellence of character, good habit) is a disposition to do what is good. But there is no actual good until one moves into action according to his disposition. Disposition by itself counts for nothing.

17Cf. Ch. III, no. 2, of the present study for the distinction of pleasure and activity. In 1097b4,5, however, Aristotle's language does seem to imply some sort of relationship, thus lack of identity, between activity and happiness: "But we also choose them [honor, pleasure, intelligence, and excellence of character] for the sake of happiness, in the belief that they will be a means to our securing it." (Italics added.) Compare: "αἰροῦμεθα δὲ καὶ τὴν εὐδαίμονίαν χάριν διὰ τοῦτον ἐπολαβήσαντες εὐδαιμόνεσιν . . . ."

A line earlier, in another connection, διὰ is used with the accusative to express the unmistakably causal or intentional propter. But the διὰ here is different because in the genitive. Cf. Bonitz, p. 177, a7-b4, on Aristotle's use of the preposition διὰ with genitive and with accusative. The accusative is the usual way of expressing cause. The genitive on the other hand is used locally and temporally, or modally, or to convert nouns to adverbial use. In this last sense, then, διὰ with the genitive suggests an intimacy between activities and happiness which is constitutive rather than causal, so that it is less misleading to render διὰ τοῦτον "in exercising them" than "they will be a means to securing". Thus the apparent sundering of an activity and happiness as terms of a relationship is not necessitated by Aristotle's own wording, though the phraseology does not preclude such a reading.
But no doubt it makes a great difference whether we conceive the Supreme Good to depend on possessing virtue or on displaying it—on disposition, or on the manifestation of a disposition in action. For a man may possess the disposition without its producing any good result, as for instance when he is asleep, or has ceased to function from some other cause; but virtue in active exercise cannot be inoperative—it will of necessity act, and act well... so it is those who act rightly who carry off the prizes and good things of life. 18

The same view of activity and the happiness identified with it is present to Aristotle's mind when he is discussing the happiness of the dead, even if in this context he does not seem to draw as full conclusions from the viewpoint as he might be expected to.

Are we then to count no other human being happy either, as long as he is alive? Must we obey Solon's warning, and 'look to the end'? And if we are indeed to lay down this rule, can a man really be happy after he is dead? Surely that is an extremely strange notion, especially for us who define happiness as a form of activity! 19

If, as can happen, circumstances keep a man from acting the way he would if he were unhindered, it will make little difference what his dispositions are. His excellence of character may remain but it achieves nothing if the act to which it disposes him cannot take place. Disposition must be able to move into act if happiness is to be present. In a later passage summarizing the conclusions of Book One, Aristotle will illustrate the notion of happiness' activeness by mentioning two instances in which good disposition may remain while happiness nevertheless is absent: "Happiness is not a certain

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18 1098b32-1099a7.
19 1100a10-11.
disposition of character; since if it were it might be possessed by a man who passed the whole of his life asleep, living the life of a vegetable, or by one who was plunged in the deepest misfortune. Troubles in life is one of the main hindrances to the activity which constitutes happiness. It is mainly through trouble that outward realities have influence on the essentially inward reality that is activity.

For in its second quality activity is a reality inwardly possessed, not something separate from oneself and alienable like a piece of property.

This immanence, or independence of outward reality, is the meaning of the term self-sufficiency (autárkeia) which Aristotle applies to happiness as an essential note of it. "Take a self-sufficient thing to mean a thing which merely standing by itself alone renders life desirable and lacking in nothing, and such we deem happiness to be." Immediately afterward in the same text Aristotle makes the meaning of this self-sufficiency still clearer:

Moreover we think happiness the most desirable of all good things without being itself reckoned as one among the rest; for if it were so reckoned, it is clear that we should consider it more desirable when even the smallest of other good things were combined with it, since this addition would result in a larger total of good, and of two goods the greater is always the more desirable. Thus whatever activity constitutes happiness will be all that one requires to

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20 1176a33-35.
21 1097b16.
be happy, while all other goods will be on a different level from this. They may be dispensed with if only one may continue the chief activity.

But such independence of outward realities has to be qualified, indeed it has already been qualified by the remarks which introduced the discussion of happiness' independence. For the self-sufficient activity is carried on in society and for man this must always be the case.

It is felt that the final good must be a thing sufficient in itself. The term self-sufficient, however, we employ with reference not to oneself alone, living a life of isolation, but also to one's parents and children and life, and one's friends and fellow citizens in general, since man is by nature a social being.23

Of course, the range of one's dependence cannot be extended indefinitely; a person does not need mere acquaintances of his the same way in which he needs his family and close friends. Yet the difference is only one of degree, and at any rate he is not simply sufficient unto himself. For this reason, whatever occurs in the milieu in which he lives will have some effect on his personal life.

The lack of complete independence is important to the notion of human happiness. For human happiness must be a lasting thing if it is to deserve the name happiness. Immediately after achieving his definition of happiness Aristotle thinks fit to conjoin with it the quality of durability: "Moreover this activity must occupy a complete lifetime; for one swallow does not make

23 1097b8-11. Cf. Pol. 1253a27-29: "The individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficient; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god; he is no part of a state."
spring, nor does one fine day; and similarly one day or a brief period of happiness does not make a man supremely blessed and happy."\textsuperscript{24}

Thus the question of the relative influences of inward and outward reality is an important one for the understanding of Aristotle's notion of self-activity as constitutive of happiness. How far does a change of outward circumstances influence one's happiness? The answer must be sought in two passages of Book One: the seventh chapter, in which Aristotle classified the chief human good as an inward good, and then the tenth, in which he discusses the resistance of virtuous activity to changes of fortune.

Aristotle makes use of the traditional division of all goods into those that are outward, those that belong to body, and those that belong to soul, and he gives preference to the third class.\textsuperscript{25} Goods of the soul are "good in the fullest sense and the highest degree."\textsuperscript{26} Shortly afterward, however, this three-part division is changed for a division into two classes: Goods of the soul are unqualifiedly contrasted with outward, and bodily goods, apparently, are to be classed among outward goods. The end of human life is shown to "consist in actions or activities of some sort, for thus the End is included among goods of the soul, and not among external goods."\textsuperscript{27} This realignment,

\textsuperscript{24}1098a18-20.

\textsuperscript{25}Cf. Stewart, I, 119, 120, for a discussion of the origin of this division and Aristotle's various uses of it.

\textsuperscript{26}1098b12-17: "Now things good have been divided into three classes, external goods on the one hand, and goods of the soul and of the body on the other; and of these three kinds of goods, those of the soul we commonly pronounce good in the fullest sense and the highest degree."

\textsuperscript{27}1098b18,19: "...πράγεις τινες λέγονται καὶ ενέργειαι τὸ τέλος ὡς τὰς περὶ γαμής ἀριστοῦν πινόται, καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐκτάς."
which goes without comment, assigns to soul all the functions of the human person, those usually referred specially to the body, as well as those higher functions usually reserved to soul in the sense of some higher than physical capacity, while these functions taken in sum are contrasted with goods from without. The effect is a realignment of the traditional three-part division into a division of two parts: outward and personal. These personal goods are actions and activities referred to the living principle.

Some bodily goods, however, may be included among the outward goods, not all of them among the personal; in this case, higher and dynamic bodily goods, like actions and activities, will be referred to the living principle, i.e. be considered personal goods, while static bodily goods like beauty or health will be referred to what somehow lies outside the living principle, to the body.

28 μυιή, the living principle, is more adequately expressed by the word person than by soul, since the latter has a narrower meaning to the modern mind than it must have had for Aristotle, while on the other hand, person, unless taken in its technical meaning conveys better the sense of living totality which Aristotle's use clearly presupposes.

29 109b 11b. According to Ross's translation, "and psychical actions and activities we class as relating to soul" (for reading: "τας δε πράξεις και τας ψυχικας ενέργειας περι ψυχήν τίθημεν "). Rackham translates, "But it is our actions and the soul's active exercise of its functions that we posit (as being happiness)" for the conjectured reading "τας δει πράξεις και τας ενέργειας τας περι ψυχήν τίθημεν ".
as receiver of life from the soul, and thus will be counted outward goods.\textsuperscript{30}

The line of division between personal and outward is not yet definite; it will be settled more satisfactorily later on, when Aristotle describes the perfection of happiness. For the present, the main meaning of outward lies in its exemplification by a number of possible objects of human desire which are approved as necessary or rejected, according to the way they enter into the constitution of life or do not.

A certain amount of outward prosperity cannot be dispensed with. \"The remaining good things \[the outward\] are either merely indispensable conditions of happiness, or are of the nature of auxiliary means, and useful instrumentally . . . \"\textsuperscript{31} Any number of things are clearly not personal goods, yet somehow, for one or other of the reasons mentioned, have to be included among the goods which a happy man possesses:

For many noble actions require instruments for their performance, in the shape of friends or wealth or political power; also there are certain external advantages, the lack of which sullies supreme felicity, such as good birth, satisfactory children, and personal beauty: a man of very ugly appearance or low birth, or childless and alone in the world, is not our idea of a happy man, and still less so perhaps is one who has children.

\textsuperscript{30} The basis of the distinction is hardly clear in Aristotle, though the conclusions he draws from it are adequately set forth as the doctrine develops. Cf. Raskham, note c. to I, viii, 2: \"The turn of phrase associates \'bodily goods\' with \'goods of the soul\', both being personal, in contrast with the third class, \'external goods\'. But it at once appears that the important distinction is between \'goods of the soul\' on the one hand and all the rest (\"the goods in the body and those outside and of fortune\‘ . . .\") on the other. Hence in \#3 \'external goods\' must include \'bodily goods\', as also \#\#1, \#s, where external goods are subdivided into the instruments and the indispensable conditions of well-being (and so in more scientific language cix. 7), the latter subdivision including beauty, the only bodily good there specified.\"

\textsuperscript{31}t099b27,28.
or friends who are worthless, or who has had good ones but lost them
by death.  

Now there is a difference between those outward goods needed for *exercise* of the
actions that make one happy, and those outward goods needed as *accompaniments*
of such actions; the former are only means, the latter seem to have a value
surpassing that of mere means, since they contribute to the action not by just
making it possible but by making it desirable.

If there were question only of outward goods as means, a problem would not
arise here: something can be an indispensable condition without entering into
that of which it is condition. But if the outward must be added to the
personal to make the personal desirable—in other words, if the personal is not
desirable or is even less desirable without the outward—outward prosperity is
not altogether extrinsic to happiness after all. Outward goods, then, in some
occasions at least, occupy a more important position in the constitution of
happiness than Aristotle indicated when he equated the goods constitutive of
happiness with Personal goods.

The problem is not immediately resolvable. But Aristotle devotes three
later chapters to a discussion of fortune's effects on happiness and finally
achieves a delicate, not altogether unambiguous, balance between happiness'
dependence and independence. The treatment focuses around the case of a man

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32.1099a1-6.

33.1099b8-1101b7. The three chapters entitled in Ross's translation: "Is
happiness acquired by learning or habituation, or sent by God or by chance?"
"Should a man be called happy while he lives?", "Do the fortunes of the living
affect the dead?"
who has known a high degree of happiness in life and finally met overwhelming misfortunes: such is the case of Priam, King of Troy. To the question whether a person in such circumstances can be happy Aristotle usually answers in the negative: "\( \text{No one would pronounce a man living a life of misery to be happy, unless for the sake of maintaining a paradox.} \)" But this commonsense view of happiness coexists with another which makes happiness something essentially inward, thus not really susceptible of influence from without. Aristotle's treatment seems to make the core-reality of happiness at once admit and exclude conditionings from outside it.

Aristotle first of all makes it clear that the problem of influences on happiness arises only in the case of very serious misfortune, since trivial or passing troubles can affect an inner state only superficially or not at all.

\( \text{There have assumed happiness to be something permanent and by no means easily changed, while a single man may suffer many turns of fortune's wheel. For clearly if we were to keep pace with his fortunes we should often call the same man happy and again wretched, making the happy man out to be a "chameleon and insecurely based". Or is this keeping pace with his fortunes quite wrong? Success or failure in life does not depend on these, but human life, as we said, needs these as mere additions, while excellent activities or their opposites are what constitute happiness or the reverse.} \)

The question we have now discussed confirms our definition. For no function of man has so much permanence as excellent activities. ... Stability, then, will belong to the happy man, and he will be happy throughout his

\[^{34}\text{1096a1. Cf. 1100a8: "\( \text{No one calls a man happy who meets with misfortunes like Priam's, and comes to a miserable end}\); and 1153b19-21: "Consequently those who say that, if a man be good, he will be happy even when on the rack, or when fallen into the direst misfortune, are intentionally or unintentionally talking nonsense."} \]
Yet such resistance to change as this is due more to the relative lightness than to the fact that the trouble is only outward. For serious changes of fortune do affect one's inner state.

But the accidents of fortune are many and vary in degree of magnitude; and although small pieces of good luck, as also of misfortune, clearly do not change the whole course of life, yet great and repeated successes will render life more blissful since both of their own nature they help to embellish it, and also they can be nobly and virtuously utilized; while great and frequent reverses can crush and mar our bliss both by the pain they cause and by the hindrance they offer to many activities.

The double effect of outward changes is again apparent: the action itself is affected, and the agreeableness of it, and a significant change in either works a change in happiness.

Aristotle's last statement on the Prior difficulty combines both viewpoints in a distinction between happiness and blessedness (ευδαιμονία-μακριά) between a state of happiness that is defective yet still happiness, and a state of plain unhappiness.

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35 l100b2-21. (Tr. W. D. Ross.) Italics added.

36 Cf. l101a21-b8, where Aristotle discusses the effects which the vicissitudes of family and friends would have on one deceased. The fortunes of such persons probably have some effect on the dead (if the dead are aware at all), but it cannot ever be a serious effect. The criterion again is one of degree.

37 l100b22-30. Note that here, in either case, of good luck or bad, Aristotle indicates two ways in which luck affects happiness: it can embellish the activity or mar it; or it can contribute to the activity itself (be utilized) or hinder it. The distinction amounts to one between the more superficial and the more penetrating effects of fortune.
Yet nevertheless even in adversity nobility shines through, when a man endures repeated and severe misfortune with patience, not owing to insensibility but from generosity and greatness of soul. And if, as we said, a man’s life is determined by his activities, no supremely happy man can ever become miserable. For he will never do hateful or base actions, since we hold that the truly good and wise man will bear all kinds of fortune in a seemly way, and will always act in the noblest manner that the circumstances allow. . . . And this being so, the happy man can never become miserable; though it is true that he will not be supremely blessed if he encounters the misfortunes of a Prior. 38

In this formulation of the theory, happiness as such remains an inward state that can be essentially affected by circumstances only if circumstances cause to be discontinued the actions which constitute happiness. For example, destitution can rob one of the leisure required for the pursuit of activities worthwhile in themselves; disappointment can lead to discouragement and thence to slackening of effort; sickness can make activity simply impossible. In such ways outward events can interrupt the activity itself. On the other hand, the extra agreeableness which outward circumstances can add to the happy activity remains extrinsic to the activity itself. Thus removing the agreeableness does not affect the activity essentially—unless in the radical sense of making the activity cease altogether.

This solution is mainly satisfactory. Aristotle does maintain that happiness in the midst of misery is paradoxical, and that Prior’s misfortunes left him a miserable, not a happy, man, and that a happy man can be dislodged from his happiness by a series of severe and frequent misfortunes. 39 Yet this

38\textsuperscript{1100 b30-1101 a3}.

39\textsuperscript{As, for example, in 1096 a1, 1100 a8, 1101 a11.}
can be understood in light of the principle that outward misfortunes affect happiness intrinsically only in the sense that they can make the good activities that constitute it stop. And this view is consistent with the distinction between happiness and blessedness found in his solution of the Prior question. Even though it can be said that Prior ended his days unhappily (Aristotle himself used this language earlier), it is more accurate to say that "the happy man can never become miserable" but may indeed lose the state of supreme blessedness. In the present context, moreover, Aristotle seems to apply the same standard to Prior: that he maintained some kind of happiness at least in its essence though he lost all else and could no longer be called blessed. He could still be called happy as long as he could at least act as a noble man would.

The variation in Aristotle's view of Prior reflects his imperfect resolution of the stresses between the intellectual and the bodily nature of man, and between man's private and social character. On the one hand is the fact that one in a condition of extreme misfortune can hardly be expected to maintain the activity which is his happiness; on the other, the fact that there have always been cases where men in such disaster nevertheless maintained a state of soul that is admirable and not inappropriately likened to happiness.

Thus the full meaning of activity's inwardness remains partly unresolved. But it does so because Aristotle's view of the human person itself remains

\[\text{\textsuperscript{140}}\] Cf. 1153b16-19: "Happiness is essentially perfect; so that the happy man requires in addition the goods of the body, external goods and the gifts of fortune, in order that his activity may not be impeded through lack of them."
partly unresolved. An investigation of Aristotle's doctrine on the composition of the human person will probably not bring out any final and definitive Aristotelian answer to the question. But it can perhaps serve to heighten the diverging tendencies of his thought on the matter. Such an investigation is implied in an adequate treatment of the next characteristic of happiness which has to be singled out for special notice. 41

3. Happiness as perfect

The characteristic of perfection is probably the most basic in Aristotle's idea of happiness, since it regards the teleological subordination of all human actions under the ultimate human good. Happiness is called perfect in two senses: it exists for its own sake, and thus does not look beyond itself to some end higher than itself; second, it is a function of the highest part of man, and thus excels the functions of every lower human faculty. Happiness is final and most excellent. 42 These two senses of perfect are closely related. It is only after an extended development of the meaning and levels of the concept of goal that the distinction on which the two senses are based at last emerges.

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41 Cf. Ch. II, no. 3 (immediately following) of this study, and more especially Ch. IV, no. 3, in which a discussion of the perfectness of contemplation leads again to the question of the composition of human nature.

42 I.e. the double sense of the Greek τελειος, adjective based on the noun τέλος (finis, end, goal, purpose) comprehending first the categone sense of final, and second the extended meaning of finished, hence perfect or again excellent. Cf. Benitz, p. 751a59-752a8 on τέλειος, and 752a9-61 for the derivatives of this adjective form.
Happiness exists for its own sake. At the beginning of Book One Aristotle discusses the profusion of activities in which men engage and the purposes which these activities represent. Some of these activities are performed more or less for their own sakes; some merely for what they produce. \(^{13}\)

But among all activities is discernible what may be called a scaling of values: not every purpose looks only to itself; some are obviously aimed at a further purpose, and no one would think of them as purposes in themselves. Actions like those of the crafts exist for the articles they produce, work exists for what it accomplishes, medicine-taking for health. \(^{14}\) However, there are certain activities which are more or less generally agreed upon as the chief pursuits of mankind. These amount to goods which fall under one of three broad divisions—the so-called Three Lives:

To judge from men’s lives, the more or less reasoned conceptions of the Good or Happiness that seem to prevail among them are the following. On the one hand the generality of men and the most vulgar identify the Good

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\(^{13}\) See 1094a1-7: "It is true that a certain variety is to be observed among the ends at which the arts and sciences aim: in some cases the activity of practising the art is itself the end, whereas in others the end is some product over and above the mere exercise of the art; and in the arts whose ends are certain things beside the practice of the arts themselves, these products are essentially superior in value to the activities." And 1094a19-23: "If therefore among the ends at which our actions aim there be one which we wish for its own sake, while we wish the others only for the sake of this, and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (which would obviously result in a process ad infinitum), so that all desire would be futile and vain), it is clear that this one ultimate End must be the Good, and indeed the Supreme Good.

\(^{14}\) 1094a6-19. E.g. 1096a5-7: "The Life of Money-making is a constrained kind of life, and clearly wealth is not the Good we are in search of, for it is only good as being useful, a means to something else."
with pleasure, and accordingly are content with the Life of Enjoyment—
for there are three specially prominent Lives, the one just mentioned, the 
Life of Politics, and thirdly, the Life of Contemplation.\textsuperscript{45}

These pursuits seem to stand on their own as goals desirable in themselves.
Nevertheless on serious consideration some of these ends have to give up their 
claim to being final. Wealth, for example, often comes to occupy a prominent 
place in men's aims; yet little reflection is needed to realize that money is 
desired only for what it can bring in the way of material advantage, influence, 
or the like.

Even the high order of values that honorable reputation represents holds a 
place probably subordinate to a more basic kind of value.

Men of refinement, on the other hand, and men of action think that the 
Good is honour—for this may be said to be the end of the Life of Politics. 
\ldots \textsuperscript{46} But men's motive in pursuing honour seems to be to assure them- 
selves of their own merit; at least they seek to be honoured by men of 
judgment and by people who know them, that is, they desire to be honoured 
on the ground of excellence. It is clear therefore that in the opinion at 
all events of men of action, excellence is a greater good than honour; and 
one might perhaps accordingly suppose that virtue rather than honour is 
the end of the Political Life.\textsuperscript{46}

If reputation among men is valued not for what it is itself but for being a re- 
cognition of an excellence, honor is in no sense final among goals.

\textsuperscript{45}1095b15-19. Cf. Stewart, I, 58-62, on the origin of the triple division 
of Lives, its development in Plato's Republic, 581). See also Aristotle's 
other listings of the chief ways of life: 1097b2: \ldots honour, pleasure, 
intelligence, and excellence in its various forms. \ldots \textsuperscript{47} 1174a5: \ldots sight, memory, knowledge, virtue. \ldots \textsuperscript{48} The lists are parallel though varied 
in expression, the three chief lives appearing under somewhat different forms, 
namely, agreeable use of senses, use of intelligence, life of moral character. 
Thus Aristotle can speak of the life of Politics in one context and in another 
context call it the life of Honour, whereas honor, as will be seen, and 
politics are both logically subordinate to the life of good character, the 
active life.

\textsuperscript{46}1095b22-31.
In Book Ten Aristotle will treat another class of goods which are final with regard to the actions that exist to support them, but are not final without qualification: the various agreeable activities called pastimes. Aristotle's notion of the meaning and rank of these pursuits is not altogether clearly defined in his extant works. Most of the activities that men turn to once work is done, in last analysis come quite close to being little more than ways of relaxing or letting off tensions. In this they are useful means toward well-being but ought not be pursued without that medicinal end in mind. Whatever the ambiguities of his doctrine, Aristotle hardly leaves room to consider such pursuits final in the full sense. Amusements cannot stand as a final value any more than money can or honorable reputation.

It was after a gradual subordination of many common human pursuits to more basic purposes that men came by Aristotle's time to the opinion that all goods of man must reduce to one or more of these three values: pleasure, excellence of character, intellectual development. Each of these is somehow final.

"Honour, pleasure, intelligence, and excellence in its various forms, we choose indeed for their own sakes (since we should be glad to have each of them

47 Cf. Chapter IV of this study, pp. 83-92, where the question of leisure activities is treated at length.
although no extraneous advantage resulted from it. . . . .

There is an intrinsic value in each of these states; they are not desired the way a means to some further end is desired. (In that case, the means would not be desired at all if the end could be gained without it.) But pleasure, excellency of character, intelligence are desirable simply for what they are, thus are in a certain sense final. Yet they are not final in the strict sense in which Aristotle wishes to use the term.

Happiness alone is final in this sense. It is final at least as much as the other three are final, in regard to all outward-looking pursuits; but in addition it has a finalness of its own even in regard to these three. They are desired for themselves, to be sure. But in some deeper sense they are desired because happiness is desired, they are three basic expressions of that "urge to perfect existence" which Aristotle will discuss in Book Ten. This radical desire for perfection is to be identified with the desire for happiness.

In speaking of degrees of finality, we mean that a thing pursued as an end in itself is more final than one pursued as a means to something else, and that a thing never chosen as a means to anything else is more final than

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1097b2-3. Cf. 117b4-8, where Aristotle enumerates a list of goods of final value. These two lists are parallel (cf. note 10) and contain the same matter except that the later list treats pleasure in quite a different way: "Also there are many things which we should be eager to possess even if they brought us no pleasure, for instance, sight, memory, knowledge, virtue. It may be the case that these are necessarily attended by pleasure, but that makes no difference; for we should desire them even if no pleasure resulted from them." Thus Aristotle substitutes actions sight and memory (as representative of sense activity) in place of pleasure, and thus adapts his language in accord with the new refinement of his thought on pleasure as it develops in Book Ten.

1175a10-13.
things chosen both as ends in themselves and as means to that thing; and accordingly a thing chosen always as an end and never as a means we call absolutely final. Now happiness above all else appears to be absolutely final in this sense, since we always choose it for its own sake and never as a means to something else; whereas honour, pleasure, intelligence, and excellence in its various forms, we choose indeed for their own sakes... but we also choose them for the sake of happiness, in the belief that they will involve it. But no one chooses happiness for the sake of honour, pleasure, etc., nor as a means to anything whatever other than itself. 50

If the urge for happiness is what ultimately moves men, the three basic desires in which this urge expresses itself are worthy of attainment insofar as they are capable of achieving happiness, just as all other values are worthy of attainment only insofar as they serve in achieving one of these three. In this kind of finality the three are on a par. As far as this finality is concerned pleasure is just as final as excellence of character or intelligence. But considered in relation to the finality of happiness, which looks to absolute perfection, they take on a relativeness of their own. Though they are equally valuable in one respect, in another—in relation to the attainment of perfection—one of them may be more valuable than the others if its looks to a higher level of perfection.

For happiness is the highest good in man. Aristotle goes on to sketch out the steps by which it is determined what human activity approaches closest to absolute perfection. 51 But the chief part of this question he reserves for Book

50 1097a30-b7.

51 1097b23-1098a17. The method will consist in an examination of the various typical forms of human activity (with much of the Ethics devoted to a clarification of the norms present in these activities at their best) and finally a selection of the activity or activities which best fulfil what is known of the capacities of human nature.
Ten, in which he will discuss specifically the activity from among all human activities that constitutes man's happiness.52

These two requisites of ultimate human value are what is meant by the two senses in which perfection characterizes happiness. Happiness is final because it is sought absolutely for its own sake and all else for happiness' sake. Happiness is most excellent because, as will appear in the discussion of contemplation, it consists in an activity that is according to the highest capacity of man, the capacity that seeks to achieve in the most perfect way the most perfect objects. And it is this excellence that is the reason for its finality.  

Happiness as enjoyable.

A man who spends the significant part of his life in such an active possession of the most worthy objects in the most worthy way, is happy by this very fact. The definition of happiness which Aristotle repeatedly gives underlines the identity of the state happiness with the state of perfect activity itself; and for this reason there is no question of happiness arisings as result of activity or any other relationship between the two.53 Pleasantness on the other hand is described as a property of such activity, something closely necessarily, connected with it, as a quality would be, inseparable, yet distinct and supervening.54 Pleasantness is attributed to activity, just as

52 1176a30-1179a33. Cf. Ch.IV, no. 3.

53 Cf. note 17.

54 1099a7-30, especially 29: "ἀπαντα γὰρ ἐπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίσταισ ἐν εἰρήλαισ." Cf. Aristotle's use of the verb ἐπάρχει with the dative, in its attributive function: Bonitz, p. 78 a12-b4.
goodness and fineness are; but none of these qualities can be identified with activity.

And further, the life of excellent activity is essentially pleasant. For the feeling of pleasure is an experience of the soul, and a thing gives a man pleasure in regard to which he is described as 'fond of so-and-so.' Things pleasant by nature are pleasant to lovers of what is noble, and so always are actions in conformity with virtue, so that they are pleasant essentially as well as pleasant to lovers of the noble. Therefore their life has no need of pleasure as a sort of ornamental appendage, but contains its pleasure in itself. ... But if so, actions in conformity with excellence must be essentially pleasant.  

Pleasure is so closely connected with activity that a deficiency of pleasure indicates a deficiency of activity, and absence of pleasure absence of activity. A man that performs a certain action and does not take pleasure from so acting, is in fact only going through the motions of it. Since the activity is not congenial to him he is not genuinely disposed to it. But so far as he lacks disposition or capacity for an action, he is really unable to perform it.  

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55 1099a7-30.

56 Cf. 1101a27-1105b12, viz. passim: "An index of our dispositions is afforded by the pleasure or pain that accompanies our actions. A man is temperate if he abstains from bodily pleasures and finds this abstinence itself enjoyable, profligate if he feels it irksome; he is brave if he faces danger with pleasure or at all events without pain, cowardly if he does so with pain." "Again, as we said before, every formed disposition of the soul realizes its full nature in relation to and in dealing with that class of objects by which it is its nature to be corrupted or improved." "We may then take it as established that virtue has to do with pleasures and pains, that the actions which produce it are those which increase it, and also, if differently performed, destroy it, and that the actions from which it was produced are also those in which it is exercised." "Acts done in conformity with the virtues are not done justly or temperately if they themselves are of a certain sort, but only if the agent also is in a certain state of mind when he does them; first he must act with knowledge; secondly he must deliberately choose the act and choose it for its own sake; and thirdly the act must spring from a fixed and permanent disposition of character." For an act does not consist merely in something the body goes
Pleasantness is an essential quality of the excellent activity whose chief characteristics Aristotle has been describing in the abstract throughout Book One, and is consequently an essential quality of happiness, which is identified with that excellent activity.

Thus the question arises how the two are distinguished and related: happiness, which Aristotle conceives as the supreme end of life; and enjoyment, or pleasure, which is commonly taken to mean much the same as happiness.
CHAPTER III

THE INTERRELATION OF HAPPINESS AND PLEASURE

Aristotle's two treatises on pleasure\(^1\) are to some extent parallel. The earlier passage\(^2\) is mainly concerned with refuting the arguments of the Academy against pleasure and with establishing its intrinsic excellence and even supreme desirability. The later passage repeats this defense in briefer form emphasizing its positive aspects, contrasts pleasure to imperfect states, and introduces a significant distinction between pleasure and the activity from which pleasure takes rise. It represents a more subtly developed view of the subject than Aristotle's earlier formulation of the relationship; the very contrast between the two puts Aristotle's matured intention in special relief.

The treatment of pleasure thus falls into two parts; first, the defensive passages from Books Seven and Ten, which consider pleasure in itself as a genuine good; second, the positive passages from Book Ten, which consider the origin of pleasure in activity and the relationship between the two.

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\(^1\) 1152b1-1154b34; 1172a19-1176a29.

\(^2\) Cf. Léonard, especially Chapter III and Appendix III on the chronology of Book Ten in relation to Book Seven and the rest of the Corpus Aristotelicum.
1. Pleasure itself as a good

To establish that pleasure is a good Aristotle makes use of a triple approach. He defends pleasure against accusation of the Academy that it is an evil; next he develops, defends, and qualifies, the opposite view, Eudoxus's opinion that pleasure is the chief good. After this he introduces pleasure's relation to activity, and thus shows that pleasure derives from a perfection in the one who enjoys rather than an imperfection in him. This third approach involves problems—not recognized in the earlier passage—thus making it necessary to close discussion of pleasure by itself and open discussion of its relation to activity.

Members of the Academy argue against pleasure in any of three ways. Speuscippus holds that it is not good at all; for it is only a process, the temperate avoid it, the discreet do not seek it (rather, absence of pain), it interferes with thought, it is not the end of any art, inferior beings like children and animals seek it. These varied reasons amount to an argument against pleasure because it lacks finality. What is only the way to an end or is not itself the end of something else is not itself desirable. What is desirable only to lesser beings, not to those whose preference carries weight, is at least not properly desirable. Other members of the Academy argue that even if certain pleasures are good, most are bad, since some of them do harm and some are admitted to be indecent. The third argument, recalling part of the first, is that even if

31052b13-20.
4Ibid., 21, 22.
all pleasures are good a pleasure nevertheless cannot be the chief good because it is only a process. 5

The chief argument against pleasure, then, is that it is not to be desired at all since one should rather do without pleasure altogether than enjoy it by being subject to the imperfection it implies. Except for a few preliminary considerations Aristotle postpones discussion of this difficulty until the other arguments have been disposed of. These lesser arguments, that pleasure is not the object of respectable desire, and that it sometimes happens that pleasure is harmful or indecent, Aristotle solves by distinguishing the meaning of good.

He makes use of two distinctions of good. First, good is either good without qualification or good in a certain respect. 6 Second, good is either good in itself or good because of some circumstance. 7 Aristotle does not consistently apply these distinctions in the two defenses that follow, but applies first one, then the other, then both, depending on whether the general goodness of pleasure is conceded or denied.

If one grants that all pleasures have some element of good in them, it is still possible to say that many of them are not good without qualification but need to be used properly (They could be used with harmful effect even though they are good), or are more suitable to one class or age than to another (They are not to be used by just anyone at all even though they are good).

5 Ibid., 24.
6 1152b27: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπάθεια, τὸ δὲ τινὲς i.e. simpliciter or secundum quid.
7 1152b34: κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς i.e. per accidens, as would be contrasted with per se, or καθ' ἑαυτὸ.
The arguments that the temperate man avoids pleasure, and that the prudent man pursues freedom from pain, and that animals and children pursue pleasure, are all met by the same reply. It has been explained how some pleasures are absolutely good, and how not all pleasures are good \(\text{i.e. not without qualification}\). Now it is those pleasures which are not absolutely good that both animals and children pursue, and it is freedom from pain arising from the want of those pleasures that the prudent man pursues; that is, the pleasures that involve desire and pain, namely the bodily pleasures (for these are of that nature), or their excessive forms, in regard to which Profligacy is displayed. That is why the temperate man avoids excessive bodily pleasures; for even the temperate man has pleasures.\(^8\)

But the pleasures which the wise man values are more intrinsically valuable, that is, approach closer to goodness without qualification.

On the other hand, if one denies that certain functions considered pleasant are really good, it is still possible to explain how their pleasantness may be the result of some circumstance even though they are themselves not pleasant. The prime example of this is the pleasantness associated with various processes of restoration, such as convalescence or eating. In these the pleasure belongs to the health or balance of nourishment, that is restored; the process of reaching that balance is not itself pleasant—it even involves the pain of deficiency—but derives its pleasantness from the state to be achieved and from the state of other faculties not affected by the deficiency but capable of enjoying the fact of anticipated restoration. In this way even disagreeable medicines or the discomforts of healing are pleasant \textit{per accidens}.\(^9\)

\(^8\)1153a27-35.

\(^9\)1152b28-1153a34-b2; 1u-21.
This same distinction may be applied to pleasures which do harm and to those which are indecent. A given function may itself be quite good and pleasant, yet do harm to other functions under certain circumstances. The pleasure involved in any given activity does not interfere with that activity; the pleasure of thinking helps thinking, the pleasure of work, work. The fact that the pleasure of one activity interferes with another activity—say, that of work, with thinking—is no argument against pleasure. 10 This applies also to cases where a real loss is involved, not merely a temporary distraction:

To argue that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are detrimental to health is the same as to argue that health is bad because some healthy things are bad for the pocket. Both pleasant things and healthy things can be bad in a relative sense, but that does not make them really bad; even contemplation may on occasion be injurious to health. 11

Again, indecent pleasures need not be simply evil because they involve evil. Here Aristotle makes use of both distinctions. In one view of the matter, the acts in which indecencies are involved are themselves good and pleasant; they are not good without qualification, though, and thus can be misused, for example, by being used to excess. 12 This is the argument that Aristotle follows in Book Seven. In Book Ten he argues more fully. Indecent pleasures may be considered not pleasant in themselves, but enjoyable per accidens because a perverted or diseased appetite finds its satisfaction in them. 13 Or they may

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101153a21-25.
111158a17-21.
121154a12-21.
131173b21-25.
be considered pleasant in themselves but not desirable or pleasant in the wider sense since they have to be obtained in ways that are undesirable. A third attitude would consist in judging the goodness or badness of all pleasure by the goodness or badness of the action from which it proceeds. This solution is perhaps the most basic because it grows out of Aristotle's notion of the relation of activity and pleasure.

By this set of distinctions Aristotle defends pleasure against the Academy's accusation of badness. The objections brought up against pleasure do not indicate that it is bad, only that certain pleasures are not good in every respect, or that they sometimes are detrimental to other goods or involve actions that are bad. Before going on to consider the Academy's main argument against pleasure—that it cannot be a good because as a mere process it is not anything final—Aristotle presents a number of considerations to indicate the goodness of pleasure in a positive way. These arguments are from the hedonistic school of Eudoxus, who uses them to prove that pleasure is the chief good.

The most basic indication of the goodness of pleasure is the fact that all beings seek it by a natural instinct.

Moreover, that all animals and all human beings pursue pleasure is some indication that it is in a sense the Supreme Good:

No rumor noise abroad by many peoples
Comes utterly to naught.

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11 Ibid. 25-28.
15 1173b29-1174a8.
But they do not all pursue the same pleasure, since the natural state and the best state neither is nor seems to be the same for them all; yet still they all pursue pleasure. Indeed it is possible that in reality they do not pursue the pleasure which they think and would say they do, but all the same pleasure; for nature has implanted in all things something divine.\textsuperscript{16}

The members of the Academy do not accept this reasoning. Aristotle counters their disagreement only with a more explicit application of the principle that nature always seeks the best.

Those on the other hand who deny that that which all creatures seek to obtain, is good, are surely talking nonsense. For what all think to be good, that, we assert, is good; and he that subverts our belief in the opinion of all mankind, will hardly persuade us to believe his own either. If only the irrational creatures strive to obtain what is pleasant, there would have been some sense in this contention; but inasmuch as beings endowed with intelligence do so too, how can it be right? And perhaps even the lower animals possess an instinct superior to their own natures, which seeks to obtain the good appropriate to their kind.\textsuperscript{17}

A second consideration favoring the contention that pleasure is good derives from pleasure's opposition to pain as a good to an evil. The Academy rejects Eudoxus's opinion on the ground that both pain and pleasure may be evils opposed in contrary directions to a mean of neutral feeling. Aristotle returns to the rational choices of men, indicating the true nature of pleasure and pain.

\textsuperscript{16}1153b25-32. Cf. Book Ten, 1172b9-15, where the same argument is given, this time with a qualification that it proves pleasure a good, not necessarily the chief good.

\textsuperscript{17}1173al-5. Cf. also Met. 1072b3, and Joachim, p. 238 and pp. 291-7.
If both pleasure and pain were in the class of evils, both would be also of necessity things to be avoided, and if in the class of things neutral, neither ought to be avoided, or they ought to be avoided alike; but as it is we see men avoid pain as evil and choose pleasure as good; it is therefore as good and evil that they are opposed.\textsuperscript{18}

Moreover, pleasure is considered a necessary ingredient in the life of a truly happy man. But if pleasure is not a good there is no reason why it should be desirable at all. It is desirable because it enhances, and only what is good can make something else better.\textsuperscript{19} "The addition of pleasure to any good—for instance, just or temperate conduct—makes that good more desirable; but only the good can enhance the good."\textsuperscript{20}

Aristotle mentions also an argument of Eudoxus which recalls his own view of pleasure or pleasurable activity as one of the three final goods. "That thing is most desirable which we choose not as a means to or for the sake of something else; but such admittedly is pleasure: we never ask a man for what purpose he indulges in pleasure—we assume it to be desirable in itself.\textsuperscript{21}

The Academy's main argument against the goodness of pleasure is that it lacks the finality which the very notion of good involves. Pleasure lacks this finality because it is a process; and process itself is not good but only looks to the good which will have been produced when process has come to an end. Aristotle's answer to this objection is that it is quite right if pleasure is a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18}1173a6-13. Cf. 1153bl-7.
\item \textsuperscript{19}1154al-7.
\item \textsuperscript{20}1172b24-26.
\item \textsuperscript{21}1172b20-23.
\end{itemize}
process. The fact that some of the most typical pleasures arise in the course of restorative processes like eating or recreation lends plausibility to this view, through a consideration of other pleasures like sensations of smell or hearing or intellectual pleasures, none of which arises on the filling-in of a deficiency, could at once call the theory into question. Though frequently found in company with processes, pleasure is not itself a process, but owes its existence to activity, which is a state of perfection rather than a way to such a state.

The less fully developed argument of Book Seven identifies pleasure and activity:

Again, it does not follow, as some argue, that as the end is better than the process towards it, so there must be something better than pleasure. For pleasures are not really processes, nor are they all incidental to a process: they are activities, and therefore an end; nor do they result from the process of acquiring our faculties, but from their exercise; nor have they all of them some end other than themselves; this is true only of the pleasures of progress towards the perfection of our nature. Hence it is not correct to define pleasure as a 'conscious process'; the term should rather be 'activity of our natural state', and for 'conscious' we must substitute 'unimpeded'. Some thinkers hold that pleasure is a process on the ground that it is good in the fullest sense, because in their view an activity is a process; but really an activity is different from a process.

In this sense, a pleasure will be the supreme good; the supreme good of a man, his chief happiness, will be the activity of his highest faculty, and pleasure is the unimpeded activity of a faculty.

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22 ll72b13-20.
23 ll53a8-17.
Since every faculty has its unimpeded activity, the activity of all the faculties, or of one of them (whichever constitutes Happiness), when unimpeded, must probably be the most desirable thing there is; but an unimpeded activity is a pleasure; so that on this showing the Supreme Good will be a particular kind of pleasure. . . . 24

The passages in Book Ten which treat this question base the distinction between pleasure and process on a psychological examination of the characteristics proper to each. Essential to the notion of process or motion is the incompleteness of any part of it. Consideration of any moment or period in it discloses something intrinsically incomplete, a step on the way to something further, a fragment of a whole. In a sense even the whole process is something incomplete insofar as it is considered only in itself with achievement of the goal and end of the motion—toward excluded as lying outside the process proper. No part of a process makes sense unless seen as a step on the way to something, nor does the series of steps unless seen in the final and process-ending achievement of a purpose that stands by itself. 25

But pleasure differs from process in its essential completeness. Any given fragment of pleasure is still pleasant taken by itself. Qua pleasant, it does not have to be seen as a step on the way to something itself desirable. Duration of a pleasure may be desirable, but any moment of a pleasant duration possesses all the qualitative excellence that a long period would afford, so that the only difference between a long pleasure and a short one is quantitative.

241153b10-13. In Book Ten Aristotle revises this equation of pleasure and supreme activity.

251174a19-25. Cf. Joachim, pp. 269-275, for a summary of the Aristotelian theory of change in its various kinds, substantial change, process, and different motions; and 275-279 for detailed application of this doctrine to the argument at hand.
not qualitative. Process, on the other hand, requires duration because its completeness or perfection is only something to be achieved, not something in fact possessed.

Now the act of sight appears to be perfect at any moment of its duration; it does not require anything to supervene later in order to perfect its specific quality. But pleasure also appears to be a thing of this nature. For it is a whole, and one cannot at any moment put one's hand on a pleasure which will only exhibit its specific quality perfectly if its duration be prolonged. . . .

Every moment of pleasurable consciousness is a perfect whole. These considerations also show that it is a mistake to speak of pleasure as the result of a motion or of a process of generation. For we cannot so describe everything, but only such things as are divided into parts and are not wholes. 26

Aristotle has solved the Academy's chief argument against pleasure by demonstrating pleasure's intrinsic perfection, its wholeness in active actuality; he has placed the most general criterion of the excellence or badness of the various pleasures in the excellence or badness of the activities from which they proceed. Such considerations are helpful for evaluating pleasures; especially they are useful in treating certain rather specific problems that arise in connection with them. To this purpose most of the passages of Books Seven and Ten have been devoted. But the validity and larger worth of these individual solutions depends on some deeper view of the realities which these problems indirectly suggest. It is necessary for Aristotle to indicate more exactly the structural relationship of pleasure to the activity or actuality which is its raison d'etre.

26 1174a14-18; b9-12.
2. Pleasure and activity

Pleasure arises from activity and is inconceivable apart from it. What is the meaning of this activity on which pleasure, as well as, in an earlier context, happiness, is said to depend? Aristotle's doctrine of activity or activation as the fulfilment of a faculty is a special application of his general doctrine of actuality-and-possibility\(^2\) to certain realities found exclusively in animals and men: the special types of actualization which are sensation and intellect. The principle of actualization is applied in a number of ways.

First, to any body at all—living or not—insofar as it has some form. Thus, the possible element is the matter which is capable of supporting this or that form; the actual element is whatever determination the matter comes to support. The actuality is the fact of such matter's supporting such a determination.

Again, the principle can be applied to any living body in regard to the most basic functioning of anything that is alive, the actuality of nutrition. In this case actuality is more than mere informing of a certain matter. Here the actual element, the living soul, already determining in the first way a

\(^2\)Cf. a) Phys. 189b30-191a22; 201a9-615, Met. 1069b3-34; general application of the principle of actuality and possibility to the theory of matter and form; b) De An. 412al-413a10, 415b12-14; application to theory of soul as the principle of life; c) De An. 429a10-432a13; application to intellect. Cf. also Joachim a) pp. 7, 5, 176-186, 271-275; b) 38, 39; c) 279, 280, 288-291.
certain matter that belongs to it, its body, proceeds, without altering its first way of functioning, to a second function, that of adding to its body by assimilating to itself matter which has hitherto existed under other forms.

The third kind of actualization belongs to certain living beings by reason of cognitive faculties. Here the faculties of sensation and intellection are non-physical ways of actualizing in the soul the forms of beings distinct from it insofar as they are cognized. 28

The activities of the various faculties are rooted in the living principle, which is itself the actuality of the body that it informs. 29 Each of the functioning of the powers of life is at once manifestation and further actualization of the living body. The bare minimum of life is continued activation of the power of vegetation; without at least this level of actualization beyond merely informing a physical body life is not present. 30 Life itself is noneother than the totality of such actualizations.

And life is defined, in the case of animals, by the capacity for sensation; in the case of man, by the capacity for sensation and thought. But a capacity is referred to its activity, and in this its full

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28 Cf. pp. 68-75 of the present study for more detailed treatment of knowing.

29 De An. 412a20-28.

30 Ibid. 415a23-28; 413a31-33.
The being lives by activating the powers proper or most proper to it; this is what life means: activation of the various vital potentialities.

Life is a form of activity, and each man exercises his activity upon those objects and with those faculties which he likes the most; for example, the musician exercises his sense of hearing upon musical tunes, the student his intellect upon problems of philosophy, and so on. And the pleasure of these activities perfects the activities, and therefore perfects life, which all men seek. Men have good reason

31 ll70a16-20. Cf. also, ll70a34: "τογαρ ἔιαi ἡ αἰσθανόται ἡ νοεῖν". Strictly, Aristotle distinguishes a 'first' and a 'second' actuality in the informing of a living body by soul. "Now the word actuality has two senses corresponding respectively to the possession of knowledge (ὅς ἐπιστήμη) and the actual exercise of knowledge (ὅς τῷ Θεῷς). It is obvious that the soul is actuality in the first sense, viz. that of knowledge as possessed, for both sleeping and waking presuppose the existence of soul, and of these waking corresponds to actual knowing, sleeping to knowledge possessed but not employed and, in the history of the individual, knowledge comes before its employment or exercise." De An. 412a23-27. Again: "Consequently, while waking is actuality in the sense corresponding to the cutting and the seeing [i.e. to the second grade of actuality], the soul is actuality in the sense corresponding to the power of sight and the power in the tool [i.e. to the first grade of actuality]; the body corresponds to what exists in potentiality; as the pupil plus the power of sight constitutes the eye, so the soul plus the body constitutes the animal." Ibid. 413a1-3. Nevertheless in the view revealed by the passage from the Ethic cited above, it is not inaccurate to speak of life as constituted by actual exercise of the faculties of sensation, thought, etc. For this is said to be true 'in the full sense of the word (καταρρίως: preeminently'). Cf. Met. 10.0a2-17, especially: "For animals do not see in order that they may have sight, but they have sight that they may see."

32 De. An. 414a28-b5.
therefore to pursue pleasure, since it perfects for each his life, which is a desirable thing.33

This is the sense in which pleasure belongs to activity. It is present when the activation of vital power reaches its natural fullness. Since any activity of sensing or knowing depends on the meeting of its two principles, the faculty and the object, it can be full only when the faculty is integral enough to be truly receptive and the object strong enough to act on it.34 A sense whose organ has deteriorated cannot take in the signal which the object should set up; an object that lacks definiteness or is too far away to set up a good signal cannot produce much effect in even a healthy organ. On the other hand, the higher the faculty—the more wholly it is receptive—and the higher the object—the more exact a form it has—the better is the grade of activation.

The grade of activity follows on the grade of its principles, and pleasure follows on the grade of activity.35

So long therefore as both object thought of or perceived, and subject discerning or judging, are such as they should be, there will be pleasure in the activity; since while both the passive and the active parties to a relationship remain the same in themselves and unaltered in their relation to one another, the same result is naturally produced.36

331175a11-17.
341174b14-20.
351175a22-28; 1176a3-9, 26-29.
361174b35-1175a3.
A sign of pleasure's dependence on activity is found in the fact that pleasure in an activity lessens when the action is prolonged. Continuance of any activity consumes energy and results in fatigue; fatigue in turn causes a relaxation of effort or attention, and thus a fall-off in activity. Lessened activity explains lessened pleasure.37

Another sign of interconnection is the promotive effect that pleasure has on the activity proper to it (and conversely the hindering effect it has on alien activities). An occupation that carries itself along by absorbing all the subject's interest is a pleasant one. It is pleasant because it is intense, and can be intense because it is pleasant. An unpleasant job requires a constant effort to maintain it, and effort expended in maintaining it cannot also be spent in the act itself; hence activity suffers and must eventually be abandoned for fatigue sooner than it must if less effort were required. On the other hand, one activity is distracted by some pleasure coming in from another activity. The fact one is appealed to by the other activity indicates that he has a bent for it and easily moves into exercising it. The fact that he actually is enjoying it to some degree indicates that he is already engaged in it to some degree. Without an expenditure of energy he cannot maintain the activity he is less inclined to when by natural bent he keeps entering into the other. He cannot enjoy both at once because he cannot concentrate his faculties on two objects at once.38

371175ab-11.
381175a29-b2k.
Pleasure and activity, then, run parallel. The very criterion of the excellence or badness of a pleasure is the quality of the act that belongs with it. What conditions activity conditions pleasure at the same time. They are inseparable.

Thus the pleasure of a good activity is morally good, that of a bad one morally bad; for even desires for noble things are praised and desires for base things blamed; but the pleasures contained in our activities are more intimately connected with them than the appetites which prompt them, for the appetite is both separate in time and distinct in its nature from the activity, whereas the pleasure is closely linked to the activity, indeed so inseparable from it as to raise a doubt whether the activity is not the same thing as the pleasure.

Aristotle's treatment of pleasure in Book Seven identified pleasure and activity. This emphasized that pleasure is something final, containing a certain completeness of meaning within itself without reference to any end beyond it, and distinguished it from any kind of process. If pleasure had to be either process or activity, it was clearly the latter because of its perfection.

Here such an identification is abandoned though not formally repudiated. Some have raised a doubt whether activity is not the same thing as pleasure. However, we must not regard pleasure as really being a thought or a sensation—indeed this is absurd, though because they are inseparable they seem to some people to be the same.

Aristotle does not declare the reason for his inability to "regard

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40 1175b28-34. Cf. 1174b27-32.
41 Cf. p. 48 of the present study. Cf. also Léonard, Ch. III, esp. 1 B.
42 1175b33-36. Italics added.
pleasure as really being a thought or a sensation". The falseness of so regarding it is apparent, more or less without demonstration. It did not sound unreasonable to equate activity and pleasure; but to equate being-pleased and a specific activity such as thinking or hearing somehow reveals a lack of parity between the two terms. The distinction is necessary even if the exact ground of it is not expressible. Without actually developing the impossibility of identifying pleasure and activity, Aristotle established the distinction between them in such a way that proof does not need giving.

It is the perfection or achievedness of pleasure that raises it above process; it is by this characteristic that it is associated with activity, since activity itself is achievement of capacity. Pleasure indeed is made the very achievedness of activity. "For each sense has a corresponding pleasure, as also have thought and speculation, and its activity is pleasantest when it is most perfect, and most perfect when the organ is in good condition and when it is directed to the most excellent of its objects; and the pleasure perfects the activity."43

Other elements also are said to contribute to the perfection of activity. The activation that constitutes sensation or intellection owes its completion to faculty and object, and derives its degree of perfection from each of them and their relation to each other. This has already been seen. But pleasure perfects activity in a way that is superior to this. "The pleasure does not however perfect the activity in the same way as the object perceived and the

431174b21-24. 'Perfects': ἐπελευθερο".
sensory faculty, if good, perfect it; just as health and the physician are not in the same way the cause of being healthy. The analogy of health is not apt in every respect, but it suffices to point up the difference between causes or conditions of a state, and the state itself in which other causes terminate. Pleasure and health are achievement; the organs that exist to make sensation possible, the objects themselves which might as well not exist if they are unknown, or the various means to health including the physician—all are prejacent to achievement and draw their meanings from it.

Again, disposition (ἐπιθέσεις) is a perfection much closer to activation than either organ or object is. Disposition is more intimately connected with the faculty than is the perceptible object, which always remains physically outside the perceiver. It is probably as a kind of disposition or bent that the activating aspect of mind converts the merely sensible object into an intelligible. Disposition is thus also superior to faculty, which as such is mere passive capacity. But this superiority of disposition is still prejacent to the greater finality of activation, which is the achievement of disposition. Moreover pleasure is called in a special sense a perfection even of activity. And this, even though Aristotle denies that pleasure itself is activity.

It is as perfection of a different sort from all such contributing elements that pleasure contributes to the already final perfection of activity. Aristotle does not develop the question what it is precisely that pleasure gives to activity; at this point he is more suggestive than exact. Pleasure is

*De An.* 430a16. Cf. also pp. 71-73 of the present study.
a "supervening perfection, like the bloom of health in the young and vigorous."\(^{46}\) This is analogy almost become metaphor. But the psychological reality conveyed by the image of fresh coloring and resiliency\(^ {47}\) is valid and would serve well to indicate Aristotle's intention even in the absence of other, more philosophical, expressions.

Pleasure is something supervening (ἐπιρημόμενόν τι); it does not enter into the constitution of the activation, is not necessary for the activation to be what it is, is really something extra even though it is inevitably present when the activation is whole. Before, when demonstrating that pleasure is not process, Aristotle described activity in terms that anticipated this distinction between what constitutes and what supervenes. "Now the act of sight appears to be perfect at any moment of its duration; it does not require anything to supervene later in order to perfect its specific quality."\(^ {48}\)

\(^{46}\) 1174b33: "...ἐπιρημόμενόν τι τελος, ὅπως τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὑπα.

\(^{47}\) Cf. 1174b10. Cf. also Rhet. 1389a3-b11, where Aristotle's description of the vigor and passionateness of the young suggests some of the qualities which the present use of ὑπα may have implied for him.

\(^{48}\) 1175a1-16: "ὅ εἰσ ἀκτέρος ἐπιρημόμενον τελείωτερον. The description is introduced as illustration of what is meant by the perfection of pleasure. The line that immediately follows this quotation, "But pleasure also appears to be a thing of this nature", does not indicate that pleasure possesses the same kind of perfection as activity possesses (for pleasure itself is something supervening on activity), only that neither perfection regarded from its own character requires anything further to constitute it. Both are in fact accompanied by other qualities (activity by pleasure, pleasure by duration), but these are only supervening on them, not constituting them in themselves.
Again, Aristotle describes pleasure, in the language of Book Seven, as "unimpeded activity". This use of "unimpeded" suggests the qualities abundance and easiness, and recalls the conditions health in organ and suitability of object which he says are necessary for the right activation of a faculty. An activity is agreeable when it goes along as it should. If a machine or a faculty operates smoothly, there is present to the operator a certain sense of wellbeing, an exhilaration that contributes to the act something indefinable and irreducible, something unexplainable in terms simply of the operation.

Passages from Book Nine, in Aristotle's description of likeness as the foundation of the highest forms of friendship, help to explain this peculiar note of pleasure—the something that it adds to the perfection of activity—in terms of self-awareness or consciousness (αισθησις). The passages are concerned with other problems, so what testimony they give is pleasure is only indirect; but it is at least suggestive.

True friends are alike in excellence, thus the excellence of a friend is much the same as one's own. Friendship offers one the chance of regarding his own excellence laid out before him in the person of another. This is a better way of viewing any excellence than the introspective method can afford, for it puts the quality under view in a sort of perspective.

But why is such attention to a friend's excellence pleasant? It is

49.1153a11b-16.

50.1169b23-1170a19.
pleasant because the excellence that a friend possesses is one's own (the friend being by virtue of likeness another self), and the realization that one is in possession of a good is essentially pleasant. "But, as we saw, it is the consciousness of oneself as good that makes existence desirable, and such consciousness is pleasant in itself." The passage suggests that the quality which pleasure adds to activity is consciousness of possession by self: that what distinguishes the good enjoyed from the good merely possessed (if such were possible) is the fact of self as possessing it. Another passage seems to say still more: "In their awareness of possessing what is in itself good they find pleasure. . . ."

It is not clear from the context whether Aristotle himself would regard this as the distinguishing note of pleasure. "The sense that a thing is our own is . . . pleasant." All that Aristotle says in these passages predicates pleasantness of such awareness; nothing states that self-awareness is the cause or even necessary condition of pleasure. The only certain meaning of the statement is that such consciousness of possessing good is in fact agreeable. Yet the passages suggest more than they require.

A similar ambivalence appears in a passage near this, in which Aristotle is discussing self-love. Here the possession of a good by itself is made a

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51. "οὐκ ἦν αἰρετόν " (Tr. J.D.)
52. "οὖν αἰρετέων καθ' αὐτὸ ἄραβα ζῆσονταί."
positive factor in choice. "Everyone wishes his own good: no one would choose to possess every good in the world on condition of becoming somebody else... but only while remaining himself, whatever he may be..." One finds his pleasure in a thing because it is something excellent; yet, in a deeper consideration of the matter, this pleasantness involves another element in addition to that of excellence; it involves oneself enjoying it. Such an object is excellent whether or not it is being possessed, such an action is of a certain perfection no matter who performs it. But it is pleasant to this person only if he is the one that possesses it or performs it, and no other instead of him. Even the excellence of a friend brings his friend enjoyment because a friend is another self so that a friend's excellence is one's own excellence—to whatever degree the saying holds true.

Moreover, awareness of excellence as one's own fits well Aristotle's qualification of pleasure as an additional perfection supervening on the perfect activation of a faculty. Such awareness does follow in every operation of sense or intellect and is something at once one with the activity and distinct from it. But granted his words are favorable to an identification of pleasure with awareness of excellence as one's own, Aristotle himself nowhere makes this identification which would explain more clearly the nature of the phenomenon. The description of pleasure as "like the bloom of health in the young and

54 1166a20-22.

55 1170a29-b2.
"vigorous" is as much as Aristotle elaborates his notion of what ultimately constitutes the pleasant.

In whatever way pleasure derives from its proper activity, whatever peculiar quality it adds to that activity, the activity is the essential thing; the pleasure would not exist without the activity which is its basis, but the activity would be just what it is even if per impossible no pleasure attached to it. The activity is primary.

But from a further examination, the activity itself has something of the relative about it, at least in so far as it is such an activity and not another. The most basic activities still, as seen before, look to a totality beyond themselves, to life itself and what perfects life as life: happiness. Every activity is a way in which life is actualized, every activity is desired because it actualizes life. Every being desires the further actualization of its life, the way it has of existing. Ultimately, every pleasure is desirable—is enjoyable—because it indicates that one's existence is being perfected. "It might be held that all men seek to obtain pleasure, because all men desire life. Life is a form of activity, and each man exercises his activity upon those objects and with those faculties which he likes the most... And the pleasure of these activities perfects the activities, and therefore perfects life, which all men seek."

They are so closely interrelated, the drives to both of them are so basic,

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56 Cf. 117hs±8; also note 60.

57 Cf. pp. 32 and 36 of the present study.

58 1175a13±17.
that some cannot tell which is primary: "Men have good reason therefore to pursue pleasure, since it perfects for each his life, which is a desirable thing. The question whether we desire life for the sake of pleasure or pleasure for the sake of life, need not be raised for the present." In fact, Aristotle has already expressed his view that life or perfection of life is primary and desirable in itself even if unaccompanied with the extra perfection that pleasure is. "Also there are many things which we should be eager to possess even if they brought us no pleasure, for instance sight, memory, knowledge, virtue. It may be the case that these things are necessarily attended by pleasure, but that makes no difference; for we should desire them even if no pleasure resulted from them."

Though Aristotle's treatment of the subject does not include an analysis of exactly what constitutes the essence of pleasure, it leaves little ambiguity about the relations of pleasure and activity. They are functionally inseparable, nevertheless distinct. Pleasure is a sort of perfection of activity; activity, however, as the actualization of existence is the more primary.

Now, the same relations that hold between pleasure and activity hold as well between pleasure and happiness, for happiness, as Aristotle has shown in Book One, is in fact an activity, the most perfect activity. Happiness and pleasure, then, are closely related notions, yet they are radically distinct. This distinction between happiness and pleasure reveals itself in all the treatises of the Ethics, nowhere so much as in the treatise on the activity

59 175a17-19.

60 174a18-8. Cf. Ch. V, no. 1 of the present study.
which is in the most proper sense of the word happiness—contemplation, which Aristotle discusses in the second part of Book Ten, in virtually the last pages of the Ethics.
CHAPTER IV

CONTEMPLATION AS HAPPINESS

Aristotle's treatise on happiness in Book Ten\(^1\) begins after he has stated the general rule that the norm by which the value of a pleasure can be determined is the value of the activity from which it proceeds. This consideration leads naturally to a discussion of the relative values of the various activities and of what activities or activity is most proper to man. Answering the question will consist in showing what activity best conforms to the characteristics of happiness which Aristotle outlined in Book One. According to that analysis, happiness is a natural activity that is perfect and enjoyable.\(^2\) The activity which corresponds to these characteristics most exactly is contemplation.

1. Contemplation As Enjoyable.

Aristotle does not spend time in establishing this characteristic. For it already stands established that the enjoyableness of an activity is parallel to its perfection, and can be systematically ranked with other pleasures only so far as its corresponding activity can be ranked in a hierarchy of values.

\(^1\)1176a30-1179a32. The remaining chapter, 1179a33-1181b24, devoted to a discussion of how the values determined in the course of the Ethics can best be put into effect in the state as a whole, serves as a transition to the treatise of the Politics.

\(^2\) Cf. Ch. II, beginning, of the present study.
Nevertheless, conviction that a certain activity is enjoyable can be had through experience. One who has exercised himself sufficiently in an activity knows whether he finds it agreeable. Experience in philosophizing has shown Aristotle that its result, Wisdom, is highly enjoyable in its own way; there is general agreement (at least among the men of good character whose preferences serve as standard\(^3\)) that Wisdom "contains pleasures of marvellous purity and permanance."\(^4\) This is certainly true of the end-product of philosophy even if the achieving of it requires great effort.\(^5\) But this is something that will be known only by experience. One can dispose another to try philosophy, one can introduce him to it gradually, but real conviction of philosophy's enjoyableness comes not from argument, but from practice.

This understood, Aristotle can only repeat that the best guide toward the excellence of a pleasure is the excellence of the activity from which it stems.

But among the pleasures considered respectable, which class of pleasures or which particular pleasure is to be deemed the distinctively human pleasure? Perhaps this will be clear from a consideration of man's activities. For pleasures correspond to the activities to which they belong; it is therefore that pleasure or those pleasures, by which the activity, or the activities, of the perfect and supremely happy man are perfected, that must be pronounced human in the fullest sense. The other pleasures are so only in a secondary or lower degree, like the activities to which they belong.\(^6\)

It is possible at least to reach the rank of a pleasure by discussing its cor-

\(^3\)1176a8-24.
\(^4\)1177a26.
\(^5\)1177a27.
\(^6\)1176a24-29.
responding activity. For a pleasure does not lend itself to direct comparison with other pleasures; an activity, on the other hand, does.

2. Contemplation As Activity.

The immanence and actuality characteristic of activity at its best find exemplary expression in contemplation.

The activity of knowing is in itself actualisation par excellence. It realises in a kind of fullness what the cognitive faculties of sensation suggest only in a primitive, imperfect way. The theory of intellection is one of the highest applications which Aristotle makes of his general metaphysical principle of actuality and possibility. 7

The various faculties of sensation, capacities found only in the higher living beings, and the faculty of intellection, found only in men, consist in the soul's ability to actualise in itself without alteration of its own physical constitution forms which are the actualities of other beings. The divaip which a faculty represents is a capacity existing in the subject above and beyond the various other areas of possible and actual determinateness which constitute its basic make-up, substantial, qualitative, quantitative, etc. This special sort of capacity is open to a special sort of évêpreia, an activity or activation which consists in the actual determination of the capacity by a

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In the case of sensation the organ of sensation, whether sight or hearing or any other, is a member of the physical body whose function it is to remain open to being affected by certain physical conditions. "It is clear that what is sensitive is so only potentially, not actually. The power of sense is parallel to what is combustible, for that never ignites itself spontaneously, but requires an agent which has the power of starting ignition; otherwise it could have set itself on fire, and would not have needed actual fire to set it ablaze." Insofar as a sense is a special area in the soul in a state of alert neutral readiness for activation, its "reality" is quite as distinct from that of the activation which takes place in it, as it is distinct from the physical object whose form determines the activation.

From one viewpoint, the sensation which is produced owes more to the sense faculty, because it is as an activation of the sense faculty that the sensation

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8De An. 42a18-23: "By a 'sense' is meant what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter." Ibid. 42a12-17: "If thinking is like perceiving it must be either a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is capable of being thought, or a process different from but analogous to that. The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object; that is, must be potentially identical in character with its object without being the object. Mind must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible." Cf. Ibid. 43b24-29: "Knowledge and sensation are divided to correspond with the realities, potential knowledge and sensation answering to potentialities, actual knowledge and sensation to actualities. Within the soul the faculties of knowledge and sensation are potentially these objects, the one what is knowable, the other what is sensible. They must be either the things in themselves or their forms. The former alternative is of course impossible: it is not the stone which is present in the soul but its form."

9Ibid. 41a6-9.
exists at all. From the other viewpoint, sensation owes more to the object sensed, because the formality which determines the activation of the sense belongs constitutionally to the object not to the sense, which is open indifferently to any number of determinations. In fact, sensation depends on both elements and is a reality distinct from both.

Ibid. 424a25-b19, viz. "The problem might be raised: Can what cannot smell be said to be affected by smells or what cannot see by colours, and so on? It might be said that a smell is just what can be smelt, and if it produces any effect it can only be so as to make something smell it, and it might be argued that what cannot smell cannot be affected by smells and further that what can smell can be affected by it only in so far as it has in it the power to smell (similarly with the proper objects of all the other senses)." Thus, the presence in the body of a capacity to sense is what turns a merely physical encounter of two bodies into something more: the awareness in one of them of the presence of the other. Cf. also ibid. 126a2-15; viz.: "It is true that the movement, both the acting and the being acted upon, is to be found in that which is acted upon, both the sound and the hearing so far as it is actual must be found in that which has the faculty of hearing; for it is in the passive factor that the actuality of the active or motive factor is realized; that is why that which causes movement may be at rest."

Ibid. 416b33: "Sensation depends, as we have said, on a process of movement or affection from without, for it is held to be some sort of change of quality." Also, ibid., 417a6-9, quoted in note 9, Ch. IV. Cf. François Nuyens, L'Evolution de la Psychologie d'Aristote, Paris, 1948, pp. 283, 284, viz. "la faculte sensitive n'a pas d'elle-meme l'acte de connaisan, elle en a seulement la possibiliti, la puissance. L'actuation de cette puissance est un mouvement, une alteration (κίνησις, ἀλλοχώσις). Ce cas particulier est donc soumis a la loi generale suivant laquelle un mouvement, c.-à-d. un passage de puissance a acte, ne peut se produire que sous l'influence de quelque chose qui possede deja cet acte. Pour tout mouvement il doit y avoir quelque chose qui le subit et quelque chose qui le cause. . . . On voit clairement le role assigne par l'auteur aux objets sensibles vis-a-vis de la faculte sensitive. Les objets sensibles, c.-à-d. les choses individuelles sont les sources motrices ou efficientes de la connaissance sensible." The whole of Ch. VIII, note 51, emphasizes the passivity of mind.
Since the actualities of the sensible object and of the sensitive faculty are one actuality in spite of the difference between their modes of being actual hearing and sounding appear and disappear from existence at one and the same moment, and so actual savour and actual tasting, &c., while as potentialities one of them may exist without the other. The earlier students of nature were mistaken in their view that without sight there was no white or black, without taste no savour. This statement of theirs is partly true, partly false: 'sense' and 'the sensible object' are ambiguous terms, i.e. may denote either potentialities or actualities: the statement is true of the latter, false of the former.

The act of sensation is the actuality in which are fulfilled the capacity (for sensing) which is the sense faculty and the quasi-capacity (for being sensed) which is the formality manifested by the sense object.

The case of intellection involves a function parallel to this: the actuality which constitutes it is the activation of a capacity for receiving in a completely non-material way the form of some object. As faculty open to any

12 i.e. "έτειδε δε μία μεν ἐστιν ἐνέργεια η τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, το ἐ'είναι ἑτερον . . . ."

13 De An. h26a15-25.

14 Cf. Joachim, pp. 293, 294, a development of the idea that "What we really have [in, say, an act of hearing] is not two actualities in relation but a single actuality. . . ."

15 Ibid. h29a13-18: "If thinking is like perceiving, it must be either a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is capable of being thought, or a process different from but analogous to that. The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object; that is, must be potentially identical in character with its object without being the object (τὸ οὗτος αλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦ).

16 "It is not the stone which is present in the soul but its form." Ibid h31b29.
determination whatsoever (since every kind of reality is a possible object of thought), intelligence lacks every determination, "is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing."17 This pure-receptiveness remains mind's chief characteristic whether in its act of gaining new knowledge or in its recall and use of knowledge already attained.18

Actual intellection takes place only when this capacity is activated by some agency which possesses the actuality of which mind is capacity. On the sense level this function is performed by the sensible object; this supplies the determination that fulfils the sense capacity. Thus a meeting of the sensitive with the sensible issues in sensation. This would be paralleled on the intellectual level by a meeting of the intellective and the intelligible issuing in actual intellection.19

The intelligible object, however, which would be the agency that actualizes the capacity of mind, is not found in nature as the sensible object is. (This would have to be some sort of free-floating idea or form which the

17 Ibid. 429al8-27: "Therefore, since everything is a possible object of thought, mind in order, as Anaxagoras says, to dominate, that is, to know, must be pure from all admixture; for the co-presence of what is alien to its nature is a hindrance and a block: it follows that it too, like the sensitive part, can have no nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity. Thus that in the soul which is called mind (by mind I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges), is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing. For this reason it cannot reasonably be regarded as blended with the body: if so, it would acquire some quality, e.g. warmth or cold, or even have an organ like the sensitive faculty: as it is, it has none."

18 Ibid. 429b5-9.

19 Ibid. 429a13-18, (Cf. note 15, where the passage has been quoted). For an explanation of the problem raised by the parallel between sensation/sensible and intellection/intelligible, and of Aristotle's solution of it by the doctrine of active and passive intellect, cf. Hamelin, pp. 16-22. Cfr. also Nuyens, pp. 296-309, on the meaning of νοος ποιητικός De An. III, 5.
mind would come in contact with, just as the sensible object is matter-embodied form which the sense organ comes into contact with. Yet Aristotle's polemic against the Platonic theory of forms denies that any such free-floating forms exist in nature.) The natural object, as such capable of affecting other things only physically, cannot act on mind or actualize its capacity, because mind unlike sense cannot be affected physically. According to the Aristotelian solution of this difficulty, some agency of intelligence bridges the gap between the natural object, as such not actually intelligible, and the intelligible object which achieves the actualization of the intellective capacity. The exact function of this agency, its relation to the intellective capacity of mind and to mind itself, and to the actuality of intellection, is not clear in Aristotle's treatment and in fact raises several critical problems in his science of man.21

20 "The problem might be suggested: if thinking is a passive affection, then if mind is simple and impassible and has nothing in common with anything else, as Anaxagoras says, how can it come to think at all? For interaction between two factors is held to require a precedent community of nature between the factors." "Have not we already disposed of the difficulty about interaction involving a common element, when we said that mind is in a sense potentially whatever is thinkable, though actually it is nothing until it has thought? What it thinks must be in it just as characters may be said to be on a writing-tablet on which as yet nothing stands written: this is exactly what happens with mind." "Since in every class of things, as in nature as a whole, we find two factors involved, (1) a matter which is potentially all the particulars included in the class, (2) a cause which is productive in the sense that it makes them all (the latter standing to the former, as e.g. an art to its material), these distinct elements must likewise be found within the soul. And in fact mind as we have described it is what it is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is another which is what it is by virtue of making all things: this is a sort of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential colours into actual colours." Ibid. 429b23-25; 428b29-430a2; 430a10-16.

21 Cf. Nuyens, p. 300. Cf. also Ch. V, no 3, pp. 152, 153, of the present study, on the bearing of this problem on the unity of the human person and its significance in Aristotle's view of man.
Despite this obscurity in the two principles of intellection, the actuality of knowing in which they issue is still sufficiently distinguished from mere capacity of knowing (especially where the parallel with sensation is recalled) to put in perspective those passages of the *Ethics* where Aristotle contrasts faculty and activation of faculty.

Intellection is thus the chief way in which the human being finds actualization. The function of nutrition, even the cognitive faculty of sensation, involves matter in its actuality and inasmuch as it involves matter it involves restriction and limitation of its actuality. Intellection however does not of its essence involve matter, hence its actualization can extend to any kind of being at all, even to the purely immaterial; indeed it focuses on its objects just insofar as they can be set free from material conditions. Activity par excellence, in which intellection is least concerned with beings in their material restrictions of place and time and partial realization, is the activity of contemplation. The grasping of first principles and of the relations of beings as independent of material conditions is the subject-matter of speculative wisdom.

Hence it is clear that Wisdom must be the most perfect of the modes of knowledge. The wise man therefore must not only know the conclusions that follow from his first principles, but also have a true conception of those principles themselves. Hence Wisdom must be a combination of Intelligence and Scientific Knowledge: it must be a consummated knowledge of the most exalted objects.22

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In this concentration on what is unchangeable lies the supreme value as well as the supreme actuality of wisdom and the pursuit which achieves it, \textit{Deuopia} philosophical contemplation.\textsuperscript{23}

\textit{Contemplation is also the most immanent of activities}.\textsuperscript{24} Thus Aristotle asserts the relative independence of changing circumstances which philosophic activity uniquely enjoys. It is true, the philosopher needs the ordinary goods of nourishment, housing and clothing, agreeable circumstances, as much as any other man. Aristotle insists on this.\textsuperscript{25} A breakdown in these circumstances leads to ill-health, distractions, discouragement. But the wise man needs outward goods only so far as they enter into the general upkeep of his person, that is, so far as they are not really extrinsic to him. Beyond such a function outward goods actually are superfluous; concern with these, and it is hard not to be concerned with them when they are present, is more hindrance than help.\textsuperscript{26}

The philosopher's need of outward goods is like that of other men only in this one respect, the needs of his person. For other ways of life, say, those of the various excellences of character like justice and temperance and courage,

\textsuperscript{23} Cf. pp. 94-100 of the present study, where Aristotle's description of the objects of contemplation is developed more at length and related to parallel notions in the \textit{Metaphysics}.

\textsuperscript{24} Cf. pp. 26-31 of the present study, where Aristotle's relating of the inward state of happiness to outward circumstances is treated in detail.

\textsuperscript{25} 1177a29-31; 1178b33-35.

\textsuperscript{26} 1178b3.
cannot find activation except under circumstances where there is the possibility of their contraries, of injustice, self-indulgence, cowardice. The man of good character cannot actually spend much of his life exercising his particular virtue even though he maintains his disposition to act by it when occasion arises. Other excellences like generosity actually require an abundance of wealth in order to reach full actualization. The philosopher is under no such need of circumstances to fulfil his disposition. "[The wise man on the contrary can also contemplate by himself, and the more so the wiser he is. . . .]" Good actions indeed do not always require extraordinary circumstances; excellence is to be found also among persons of moderate means. But the philosopher's dependence on conditions is still of a different order. If he needs outward goods it is only in his capacity as man and social being that he needs them, not as philosopher.

Yet there is something about the favorable concurrence of circumstances that enhances the philosopher's good. It was seen that extras like beauty, family, friends add to the happy life making it blessed. Aristotle has reference to this idea again when he says that happiness as such requires little

27 L77a31-33; L78a28-b3.
28 L77a34, 35.
29 L79a1-18.
30 Cf. pp. 13-16 of the present study.
Moreover contemplation proceeds better with the aid of fellow-philosophers. In Book Nine Aristotle has developed at length the good effects that the right kind of friendship has on higher activity. Good qualities of character spread from one friend to the other by reason of the imitation which friendship always fosters; one comes to understand his own characteristics when he sees them objectified in his friend; the stimulation and encouragement that arises from association in a common interest is a great spur to excellence in any pursuit. But these advantages are matters of more and less. They make it possible for the activity to reach its fullest development and to continue longer. They foster certain accompanying pleasures, but do not touch the act essentially.

The question how necessary this condition is, is not altogether resolved by Aristotle. On one hand, in the ways enumerated, friendship is desirable because it enhances the higher activities; it is desirable as much as any enhancement is desirable—so far as it really contributes—it is desirable but is not necessary in itself. On the other hand, is it desirable because the higher activity would not be satisfactory without it? Does the man whose contemplation, for example, is the source of his happiness need also the

31 1179a2.
32 1169b28-1170b19.
33 1170a12; 13, 1172a9-14.
34 1169b31-1170ah.
35 1170ab-8.
experience of friendship? Aristotle seems to hold he does: "But that which is desirable for him he is bound to have, or else his condition will be incomplete in that particular. Therefore to be happy a man needs virtuous friends." This seems to mean that contemplation, whose self-sufficiency comprised an essential part of its superiority to other goods, does after all have to be supplemented with a good outside itself if it is to be humanly satisfying. This recalls the problem raised and discussed in Book One—the essentialness or unessentialness of outward goods to a good whose whole meaning looks to what is within. The solution of both difficulties lies in a contrast between an activity integrally complete, that is, possessing every quality that could belong to it, and an activity not integrally complete but at least essentially complete. In other words, Aristotle's distinction between happiness and supreme blessedness. As before, the balance is somewhat uncertain.

This uncertainty suggests another area of uneasy balance in Aristotle's thought, the more fundamental question of what he holds on the unity of the human being. The usual Aristotelian view, contrasted with the Platonic, is that of a unit composed of body and soul: the body is not the man, neither is the soul, only the unity of the two is actually man. But Aristotle himself often speaks differently, especially when he is discussing the philosophic life:

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36 1170b16-19

37 Cf. pp. 28-31 of the present study. Cf. also pp. 59-60, where, especially in note 48, activity is contrasted with pleasure, and pleasure with duration, on the basis of what amounts to the same type of distinction.

38 Cf. Nuyens, esp. Ch. VI, no. 43, pp. 239-243, where a chronology of the Corpus Aristotelicum is built up on the basis of the historical development of a theory of entelechical unity out of an original position of Platonic dualism.
here mind—distinguished from all other powers of the soul, even love—is spoken of as the man, "the true self of each". The sense in which such statements must be taken, hence the best indication of the direction in which Aristotle's thought on this problem moves, is found in the pages where Aristotle discusses the relative values of the active and contemplative lives, and in general the finality and perfection of contemplation.

3. Contemplation As Perfect

Contemplation is the activity that most wholly fulfills both senses of the word 'perfect'; it is most final in that it exists for its own sake and not for any other; it is most excellent in that all other pursuits are concerned with objects inferior to those of contemplation. In the course of treating the perfection of contemplation Aristotle raises two problems which are of especial importance to an understanding of his position. These are the problem of the active and contemplative life, and the problem of the finality of leisure activities.

The active life according to excellence of character "is happy only in a secondary degree." Up to this point Aristotle has not explicitly subordinated the life of excellence of character, which he discusses throughout most of the length of the Ethics, Books Two through Nine, to the life of

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391178a2; 1166a17; 1166b32-35.

40Cf. Ch. II, no. 3 of the present study.

411178a9.
philosophical contemplation. The three lives enumerated at the beginning of the
treatise on happiness, and recapitulated in clearer form in Book Ten — the life
of enjoyable use of the senses, the life of honor, the life of contemplation—
are only in these pages finally weighed one against the other and one of them
chosen as supreme. Here Aristotle proceeds to show that the high level of
excellence which the life of honor represents nevertheless serves a purpose
somehow outside itself.

The life of honor is distinctively a human life. It was seen, the actions
that mankind agree in calling honorable all derive from man's social or bodily
nature. Justice, generosity, agreeableness, friendship come into their own
because of the mutual needs and stresses that exist among men. Temperance, con-
stancy, self-control, courage, prudence serve to regulate the drives and
emotions that stem from man's physical make-up. Had men no bodies, then social
and emotional problems, thus the whole area of excellences concerned with them,
would simply not exist. Now the virtues of our composite nature are
purely human; so therefore also is the life that manifests these virtues, and
the happiness that belongs to it. Whereas the happiness that belongs to the

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12 1097b2, 3; 1173a1-8.
13 1178a9-22.
intellect is separate..."\textsuperscript{44}

These 'human' activities cannot be final without qualification. Nowhere does this appear more clearly than in the absurdity of trying to attribute such concerns to the gods. Virtues like honesty, bravery, generosity, temperance have no meaning for beings exempt from all trial, beings supposed to possess supreme blessedness by their very nature. "If we go through the list we shall find that all forms of virtuous conduct seem trifling and unworthy of the gods."\textsuperscript{45}

But the life of contemplation is another case altogether:

Still, everyone supposes that the gods live and therefore that they are active; we cannot suppose them to sleep like Endymion. Now if you take away from a living being action, and still more production, what is left but contemplation? Therefore the activity of God, which surpasses all

\textsuperscript{44}1178a21-23. Cf. De An. 403a5-8: "If we consider the majority of the affections of soul, there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body; e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and sensation generally. Thinking seems the most probable exception..." Ibid. 408b 21-29: "Thus it is that in old age the activity of mind or intellectual apprehension declines only through the decay of some other inward organic part; mind itself is impassible. Thinking, loving, and hating are affections not of mind, but of that which has mind, so far as it has it. That is why, when this vehicle decays, memory and love cease; they were activities not of mind, but of the composite which has perished; mind is, no doubt, something more divine and impassible." Ibid. 430a22-25: "Mind is not at one time knowing and at another not. When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more; this alone is immortal and eternal (we do not, however, remember its former activity because, while mind in this sense is impassible, mind as passive is destructible), and without it nothing thinks." Cf. Joachim, pp. 288-291, viz. "The\textit{ nous}—the activity of νοῦς or \textit{theoria}—is independent of, and unaffected by, abstract universality."

\textsuperscript{45}1178b17.
others in blessedness, must be contemplative; and of human activities, therefore, that which is most akin to this must be most of the nature of happiness.\textsuperscript{46}

Here, attaining and securing goods has no meaning. What matters with the gods is that they possess their goods. Men differ from the gods in this at least, that they do not simply possess the goods they possess, but must be concerned about getting and keeping them. This is the human side of their existence, or rather the animal side. But men are more akin to gods than to animals because they share, however imperfectly, the experience of happiness, something which is beyond the scope of brutes.\textsuperscript{47} Most human actions, workaday or heroic, look to something beyond themselves; they exist only to provide access to the area where human activity takes on qualities which would not be altogether unworthy of the gods. No one can reasonably claim that virtuous activities exist simply for their own sake. Yet happiness requires absolute finality, the very characteristic which cannot be claimed for them. If what the virtuous activities exist to secure could be attained without them, they would engage no one's efforts at all.\textsuperscript{48}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{46} 1178b18-23.
  \item \textsuperscript{47} 1178b26.
  \item \textsuperscript{48} Compare 1176b8-10: "But those activities are desirable in themselves which do not aim at any result beyond the mere exercise of the activity. Now this is felt to be the nature of actions in conformity with virtue; for to do noble and virtuous deeds is a thing desirable for its own sake." This expression of virtue as a good in itself, typical as it is of the most part of the Ethics, seems in direct disagreement with the present subordination of the virtues to so-called higher goods which the virtues exist only to secure.

The shift of value which ranks the life of virtue below the life of contemplation corresponds to Aristotle's concept of life lived in the midst of the socio-corporeal needs of the human condition as contrasted with life lived according to its highest capacities, whether these are typical of the human condition or not. In the former case moral virtue is supreme, in the latter it
What they secure is leisure. The business man exerts himself to gain wealth, and wealth exists to secure the goods and graces of an agreeable life. "We are busy that we may have leisure..." There is no reason for war but to protect the life and property of a citizenry in danger from without. Statescraft itself derives its meaning from the lives of the citizens which it safeguards and promotes. For all the anxiety, sacrifice, honor, that attaches to such activities, they have a reference beyond themselves, the Good Life which they variously support.\(^49\) Prosperity, peace, social order are the conditions of

has importance only relative to its supporting a life of intelligence. As seen before (pp. 31-38), both the life of honor and the life of pleasurable use of the senses and the life of contemplation are relative goods: relative, that is, to the ultimate good, which is happiness. If one of the three is taken to be supreme and the other two activities, supreme as they are in their own lines, are subordinated to it, such can happen only because this is considered the one which is intrinsically the most conducive to happiness. It may be that the philosopher is under more of an obligation to achieve virtue than to achieve philosophical wisdom; but this is not because virtue is better in itself—for wisdom is better in itself—but because virtue is better and more necessary for him situated as he is in the human condition.

The life of the mind holds first place in Aristotle's scheme on the solid ground of its intrinsic superiority. His continuous concern for the actual practice of life as it has to be lived, and his unmistakable regard for the qualities of soul which make the man of honor, hold the superiority of the contemplative life in full respect.

man's spending if only so brief a time in the pursuits that he values for himselfs.

The meaning which leisure has for Aristotle reveals the hierarchy in which he places the various human faculties and their activities. Leisure in its basic sense, and the way that Aristotle is accustomed to use it, is contrasted with busyness (σοφία and ἀσοφία). There is no indication that Aristotle uses it in the narrowed sense which it was later to receive, that of time devoted to formal study.50 Nevertheless, in the present context philosophical contemplation is the only activity that is named as a leisure activity. This omission of other activities is not by itself enough to restrict leisure to intellectual pursuits; a page earlier however51 there has been discussion of what Aristotle calls 'agreeable amusements' (τὰ παιδικά τηρεῖν), and the rank that he assigns them strongly suggests such a restriction of the notion of leisure.

Common acceptance of the word leisure includes a number of activities besides the purely intellectual. Games of various sorts would have their place there; sports, notably hunting; receiving company and visiting, and the banqueting and drinking that belong to them; conversation and discussion; entertainments of all sorts, comedy and drama; the enjoyment of dancing and playing music, or of watching others perform.

But such activities as these Aristotle at least implicitly calls amusements not leisure; moreover he assigns them a purpose different from that of leisure. He looks upon them as body-centered and does not consider any, even

511176b10-1177a11.
the highest of them, in their spiritual aspects. They are things that appeal to
the low standards of animals, slaves, children, and profligates, and thus can
hardly have much special worth.\textsuperscript{52}

But agreeable amusements are sought for their own sake, not as means to
other ends. Indeed the preference that men show them is often of greater dis-
advantage than usefulness since it causes neglect of duties, which are more
necessary but less enjoyable. In this they answer to the description Aristotle
gives of leisure pursuits: that men's workaday activities exist to support them.\textsuperscript{53}

This preeminence however is undeserved by amusements. The rich and influ-
ential persons whose pursuit of such pleasures is thought to be their best re-
commendation need not be the best judges of what is good, any more than are
slaves or children. The man of quality and character, the serious man, is the
real standard of worth\textsuperscript{54}, and his interest does not focus on amusements. It is
not for amusements that men spend their days in toil, even though many seem to

\textsuperscript{52}1177a6-10; b12-24. "Also anybody can enjoy the pleasures of the body, a
slave no less than the noblest of mankind; but no one allows a slave any
measure of happiness, any more than a life of his own. Therefore happiness does
not consist in pastimes and amusements. . . ." Cf. also, 1176b17-24: "But
perhaps princes and potentates are not good evidence. Virtue and intelligence,
which are the sources of man's higher activities, do not depend on the
possession of power; and if these persons, having no taste for pure and liberal
pleasure, have recourse to the pleasures of the body, we must not on that account
suppose that bodily pleasures are the more desirable. Children imagine that the
things they themselves value are actually the best; it is not surprising there-
fore that, as children and grown men have different standards of value, so also
should the worthless and the virtuous."

\textsuperscript{53}1176b10-12.

\textsuperscript{54}The \textit{σπουδαίος άνήρ} as measure of all values, of N. E. 1166a13; also
Bonitz, p. 696, b, 55-697, a, 57.
think so. Amusement is useful where it serves to refresh men for work again; but if work itself is for the sake of amusement, the result is a circular argument that arrives nowhere.

Indeed it would be strange that amusement should be our End—that we should toil and moil all our life long in order that we may amuse ourselves. To make amusement the object of our serious pursuits and our work seems foolish and childish to excess: Anacharsis's motto, Play in order that you may work, is felt to be the right rule. For amusement is a form of rest; but we need rest because we are not able to go on working without a break, and therefore it is not an end, since we take it as a means to further activity.\(^{55}\)

Certainly, then, amusements do not hold the privileged place of leisure, of which Aristotle has said, "We are busy that we may have leisure. . . ."

The true scale of value is rather: amusement for the sake of continued activity, continued activity for the sake of leisure, leisure for the sake of pursuits that most deserve men's attention. But this passage has not explicitly named the activities that fall into the class of agreeable amusements. Possibly the amusements that Aristotle here subordinates to work are only the strictly bodily ones. Meanwhile, what should be the rank of activities that lie half-way between the extremes of philosophy and of banqueting—the area of cultural values like music, arts, poetry, the drama—is not indicated in the course of the Ethics.

Book Eight of the Politics\(^ {56}\) is more explicit about these higher activities, at least about those which come under the broad classification of music. The pertinent passages are useful in two ways: they more clearly define Aristotle's

\(^{55}\)1176b28-36.

\(^{56}\)Pol. 1337b4-1342b34.
notion of leisured activities, and at the same time they reveal an inconsistency of standard that may result from a stress between Aristotle's philosophic principles and his acceptance of enlightened human experience as a norm.57

Amusement as such maintains its position subordinate to more serious activities; it must be engaged in only at suitable times, be used only with profit, since it exists to refresh on for activity.58 Play exists for activity; every type of action entails its own fatigue and needs refreshment. Leisure, however, is distinguished from amusement inasmuch as "the first principle of all action is leisure. Both action and leisure are required, but leisure is better than occupation and is its end..."59 In leisure men are able to pursue the activity which they value above all else. If amusement exists only that tiresome occupations of business and statecraft may be carried on without excessive fatigue; if these tiresome occupations exist in their turn only to provide the

57 Cf. Jaeger, Ch. X, esp. pp. 282-5 (also Ross, pp. 19 and 235, 6) in which the composition of this book is shown to coincide with the composition of the Eudemian Ethics, hence to precede the related passages of the N. E. by a number of years. For this reason, the passage in question need not represent Aristotle's final view of the matter, thus need not indicate a final inconsistency in his thought about leisure. But it is the only available indication of what his opinion was, and is not inconsistent with the few references of the later passage.

58 Pol. 1337b3-42: "What ought we to do when at leisure? Clearly we ought not to be amusing ourselves, for then amusement would be the end of life. But if this is inconceivable, and amusement is needed more amid serious occupations than at other times (for he who is hard at work has need of relaxation) and amusement gives relaxation whereas occupation is always accompanied with exertion and effort, we should introduce amusements only at suitable times, and they should be our medicines, for the emotion which they create in the soul is a relaxation, and from the pleasure we obtain rest."

59 Ibid. 1337b32-34.
means and leisure for engaging in finer activities, the refined activities which fill the leisure of a gentleman, on the other hand, tend of their nature to give "pleasure and happiness and enjoyment of life" by the very fact that they exist for themselves and are not only steps on the way to something yet to be attained. 60

Beyond the kind of leisure that the intellectual engages in, the chief leisureed pursuits are the fine arts, especially music. This is introduced into the gentleman's leisure, not because it cannot be done without, not because it provides some useful service, the way ability to write helps business or exercise improves physical fitness or experience in drawing makes for better taste in home decorations. 62 Music is admitted for a higher kind of excellence, for "intellectual enjoyment", and this is something fine in itself and befitting a free man. It needs no further excuse. "To be always seeking after the useful does not become free and exalted souls." 63

Music may be considered in respect to any of three good effects which it works on those who listen to it. It provides some of the best amusement and relaxation. This function is merely a subordinate one; like sleep or drink or

60 Ibid. 1338a1-5.

61 Ibid. 1338a9-14; "It is clear then that there are branches of learning and education which we must study merely with a view to leisure spent in intellectual activity, and these are to be valued for their own sake; whereas those kinds of knowledge which are useful in business are to be deemed necessary and exist for the sake of other things."

62 Ibid. 1338a12-21.

63 Ibid. 1338a21-b4.
dancing, it is valued not for what it is in itself—sleep and drink are not themselves worth anything—but for its "making care to cease". 64 This restorative function of music recalls the purposes which Aristotle assigns to amusements here as well as in the Ethics. 65 But in the case of music, other functions are present besides that of restoration, and they are the more characteristic.

For example, this incidental lower service is distinguished from the second effect of music: the main reason why men introduce it into their leisure is the embellishment it lends to life and social gatherings by its mere presence—its liberal character.

Intellectual enjoyment 66 is universally acknowledged to contain an element not only of the noble but of the pleasant, for happiness is made up of both . . . Hence and with good reason it is introduced into social gatherings and entertainments, because it makes the hearts of men glad: so

64 Ibid. 1339a16-20.

65 And in the Poetics 1449b27 (Cf. Pol. 1341b39,40, for the only other reference to this theory in Aristotle's extant works), where Aristotle's explanation of the effect of tragedy approaches this medical view. Tragedy produces a purgation (κάθαρσις) of emotion in the spectator: and artificial arousal of the emotions of pity and fear results in working them—at least any excess of them—out of the system. Cf. also Pol. 1347b8-16 for the parallel to this process in the area of music itself.

66 The term διαρρόη, "pastime", is idiomatically used of the pursuits of cultured leisure—serious conversation, music, the drama. (Rackham, note 4 to Pol. VIII, iv.) This term is distinguished in 1339b14 from educational pursuits (παιδέα) and from amusements (παιδιά); in N. E. 1177a10 it covers actions of a lower kind as well, 'pastimes' in a less serious sense approximating 'amusements'.
that on this ground alone we may assume that the young ought to be trained in it. For innocent pleasures are not only in harmony with the perfect end of life, but they also provide relaxation.67

The precise nature of this effect is not clear. It is distinct from the first effect, "alleviation of past toil"68, by the fact that men seek it even when they are not tired, so supposedly because it is agreeable to them on its own account.69 But at the same time its pleasantness seems to derive from the fact that a relaxation has been effected: "Amusement is for the sake of relaxation, and relaxation is of necessity sweet, for it is the remedy of pain caused by toil: and intellectual enjoyment is universally acknowledged to contain an element not only of the noble but of the pleasant, for happiness is made up of both."70 Thus the two effects are felt to be distinct, the one desirable as remedy, the other desirable for itself—liberal—though in Aristotle's brief description of them the remedial aspect intrudes into both effects and is probably predominant.

A third, educative, effect of music71 is the training of character and mind by formation of good dispositions. Aristotle asks whether music does not perform some nobler service than that of removing fatigue or agreeably

68Ibid. 1338b11.
69Ibid. 1339b27-40
70Ibid. 1339b15-20.
71'Educative' in the theoretical sense of μαθήσιν, that is, referring to the finer types of pursuit, not 'training' referred to business and mundane ends.
recreating.

In addition to this common pleasure, felt and shared in by all (for the pleasure given by music is natural, and therefore adapted to all ages and characters), may it not have also some influence over the character and the soul? It must have such an influence if characters are affected by it. And that they are so affected is proved in many ways.\textsuperscript{72}

Some types of music affect the movements of character, shaping in them resoluteness; some develop sympathetic capacities, value standards, qualities of temper; some, sensitivity.\textsuperscript{73} This third set of effects is highly esteemed by Aristotle. Its purpose merges with that of the liberal effect. Whereas it would seem possible to distinguish the educative aspect of music—its effect on character and personality—from its liberal aspect—the pure worthwhileness of passing leisure time in intellectual pursuits—such a distinction does not appear in Aristotle's treatment. Indeed, these two functions of music, education of personality and 'intellectual enjoyment', are only two aspects, emotional and intellectual, of the same effect of refinement to which may be given the generic name 'liberality'. Thus it may not be necessary to determine whether spending time in speculation is 'more liberal' than developing refinement of personality through the fine arts, hence more fundamental to the meaning of leisure. Both functions of music are fundamentally leisured, and in their liberality transcend any restorative functions of music. And this, despite the fact that in his psychological explanations of why the liberal arts are

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid. 1340a1-9.

\textsuperscript{73}Ibid. 1340a10-b19.
enjoyable Aristotle seems to rely heavily on an amusement-therapy theory such as that of purgation in tragedy.

In short, Aristotle has not made his standard clear or has not applied it consistently in those activities which lie somewhere between the physically-refreshing and the intellectually-challenging. It may be that there are a few forms of entertainment which possess value irrespective of purposes outside themselves; it may be that all entertainments, even the higher arts are reducible to the amusement-therapy function.

But the place that Aristotle ascribes to the purely intellectual pursuits which make up philosophy cannot be mistaken. These are final without qualification because they occupy an area in life which the rest of life's activities exist in the last analysis only to support and enrich, and because they are valued simply for what they are in themselves without providing any other service: "Contemplation may be held to be the only activity that is loved for its own sake: it produces no result beyond the actual act of contemplation, whereas from practical pursuits we look to secure some advantage, greater or smaller, beyond the action itself."74 This ascendency over other activities once granted, it is easy to see how contemplation fits the characteristic of perfectness which Aristotle required of human happiness in Book One. Contemplation and happiness are in fact to be identified: "Happiness therefore

74[177:1-4].
is coextensive in its range with contemplation: the more a class of beings possesses the faculty of contemplation, the more it enjoys happiness, not as an accidental concomitant of contemplation but as inherent in it, since contemplation is valuable in itself. It follows that happiness is some form of contemplation."  

The liberal character of Wisdom is fundamental in the Aristotelian view of man and human activities:

That Wisdom is not a science of production is clear even from the history of the earliest philosophers. For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; since they philosophized in order to escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to know, and not for any utilitarian end. And this is confirmed by the facts; for it was when almost all the necessities of life and the things that make for comfort and recreation had been secured, that such knowledge began to be sought. Evidently then we do not seek it for the sake of any other advantage; but as the man is free, we say, who exists for his own sake and not for another's, so we pursue this as the only free science, for it alone exists for its own sake.

But why does the intellectual life alone of all human activities have this ascendancy, that is, this unqualified finality of value?

751176b29-32 (italics added), i.e. "οὐ κατὰ συμβεβήκός, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν Θεωρίαν ". Cf. 1174a14-16 (also note 17, Ch. II of the present study), where the perfection of an activity is described in much the same terms; and 1174b33, where pleasure is described in terms consistent with this criterion.

76Cf. Tredennick's translation: "for speculation of this kind began with a view to recreation and pastime, at a time when practically all the necessities of life were already supplied." The Greek admits either interpretation; viz. "σχέδὸν γὰρ πάνων ἁπαρχόντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ πρὸς ὁσιώδεις καὶ διαρρήκτη τοῦ παλαιοτάτου ἠγάμου ἠξέχασαν δὴ τελεῖσθαι".

77Met. 982b11-26.
Because contemplation is most excellent. This answer concluded discussion
of the inferior forms of activity and introduces the passages in which
Aristotle shows that the activity of intellect is the highest way of com-
prehending the highest objects.

But if happiness consists in activity in accordance with excellence, it is
reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest
excellence; and this will be the excellence of the best part of us.
Whether then this be the intellect, or whatever else it be that is thought
to rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble and
divine, either as being itself also actually divine, or as being
relatively the divinest part of us, it is the activity of this part of us
in accordance with the excellence proper to it that will constitute
perfect happiness; and it has been stated already that this activity is the
activity of contemplation. 78

The intellect is that part of man which is thought "by nature to be ruler and
leading power in him"; it is the intellect that has "cognizance of what is
noble and divine", this because it is "itself actually divine" or "the divinest
part of us". 79

Intellect is highest in man because of all his faculties it is capable of
activation with the least possible admixture of material conditioning.
Identity between two is never perfect where both involve matter. Hence,
because mind involves no matter in its constitution, it is capable of
reproducing in itself any determination whatever and is not limited by depend-
ing on the disposition of its matter to receive this or that determination.
It is capable of being determined by the forms even of objects that contain no

78 1177al2-18.

79 i.e. "ἐὰν ἔχει διόν ὑπὸ καὶ αὐτῷ ἐὰν ἔν ὡς ἔχων τοῦ θείοτατον".
matter at all. Indeed, a thing can become object of mind only so far as it can be divested of matter and the limitations due to matter. Intellect is the highest way of actualization because its very essence excluded the conditioning principle which is matter. 80

Intellect (the perfection of which in man is Wisdom) is man's highest capacity because its objects are the highest of all beings in the universe.

80 Cf. De An. 429a3-28: "If thinking is like perceiving, it must be either a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is capable of being thought, or a process different from but analogous to that. The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object; that is, must be potentially identical in character with its object without being the object. Mind must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible.

"Therefore, since everything is a possible object of thought, mind in order, as Anaxagoras said, to dominate, that is, to know, must be pure from all admixture; for the co-presence of what is alien to its nature is a hindrance and a block: it follows that it too, like the sensitive part, can have no nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity. Thus that in the soul which is called mind (by mind I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing. For this reason it cannot reasonably be regarded as blended with the body: if so, it would acquire some quality, e.g. warmth or cold, or even have an organ like the sensitive faculty: as it is, it has none. It was a good idea to call the soul 'the place of forms'. . . ."

De. An. 430a2-19: "Mind is itself thinkable in exactly the same way as its objects are. For in the case of objects which involve no matter, what thinks and what is thought are identical. (Why mind is not always thinking we must consider later.) In the case of those which contain matter each of the objects of thought is only potentially present. It follows that while they will not have mind in them (for mind is a potentiality of them only insofar as they are capable of being disengaged from matter) mind may yet be thinkable.

"Since in every class of thing, as in nature as a whole, we find two factors involved, (1) a matter which is potentially all the particulars included in the class, (2) a cause which is productive in the sense that it makes them all (the latter standing to the former, as e.g. an art to its material), these distinct elements must likewise be found within the soul."
These are the realities that underlie the whole of being, the ultimate principles and causes of all that exists. Wisdom is "intuitive reason combined with scientific knowledge—scientific knowledge of the highest objects which has received as it were its proper completion." The perfection of man lies, then, in the objects of philosophic contemplation. But what does their excellence consist in?

And understanding and knowledge pursued for their own sake are found most in the knowledge of that which is most knowable... and the first principles and the causes are most knowable; for by reason of these, and from these, all other things come to be known, and not these by means of the things subordinate to them. And the science which knows to what end each thing must be done is the most authoritative of the sciences, and more authoritative than any ancillary science; and this end is the good of that thing, and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature.

The value of the objects of philosophic contemplation lies in their universality and necessity, and these qualities entitle it to the name of theology, the divine science. For, traditionally, the divine attributes are eternity, immovability, separation from all conditioning. These qualities Wisdom must possess if it is to correspond to its definition fully, and no

81 Met. 982a1.
82 ll.41a18.
83 Met. 982a30-b7.
84 Cf. Met. 1026a10-32, viz. "Now all causes must be eternal, but especially these [i.e. the principles of things that exist separate from matter and motion]; for they are the causes that operate on so much of the divine as appears to us [i.e. the heavenly bodies]. There must, then, be three theoretical philosophies, mathematics, physics, and what we may call theology, since it is obvious that if the divine is present anywhere, it is present in things of this sort."

Also, Ibid. 1073a3-12: "It is clear then from what has been said that there is a substance which is eternal and unmovable and separate from sensible things. It has been shown also that this substance cannot have any magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible (for it produces movement through infinit
other of even the liberal studies has claim to such qualities.

But if there is something which is eternal and immovable and separable, clearly the knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science—not, however, to physics (for physics deals with certain movable things) nor to mathematics, but to a science prior to both. For physics deals with things which exist separately but are not immovable, and some parts of mathematics deal with things which are immovable but presumably do not exist separately, but as embodied in matter; while the first science deals with things which both exist separately and are immovable. Now all causes must be eternal, but especially these; for they are the causes that operate on so much of the divine the heavenly bodies as appears to us.85

time, and nothing finite has infinite power, and, while every magnitude is either infinite or finite, it cannot, for the above reason, have finite magnitude, and it cannot have infinite magnitude because these is not infinite magnitude at all). But it has also been shown that it is impassive and unalterable; for all the other changes are posterior to change of place."

Ibid. 1073a21-28: "The first principle or primary being is not movable either in itself or accidentally, but produces the primary eternal and single movement. But ... that which is moved must be moved by something, and the first mover must be in itself immovable, and eternal movement must be produced by something eternal and a single movement by a single thing. ..."

Ibid. 1074b1-10: "Our forefathers in the most remote ages have handed down to their posterity a tradition, in the form of a myth, that these bodies [i.e. the stars] are gods and that the divine encloses the whole of nature. The rest of the tradition has been added later in mythical form ... But if one were to separate the first point from these additions and take it alone—that they thought the first substances to be gods, one must regard this as an inspired utterance. ..."

85Met. 1026a10-18. Cf. ibid. 1026a29-31: άλλο μήτις αναφερόμενον στὴν φιλοσοφίαν καὶ καθότι πρώτον (καὶ καθάλλην οὕτως ὑπὸ ἑτέρων)."
In having these realities as its subject contemplation transcends all that is merely incidental or contingent or material. There is nothing in the Universe which could be higher. For the living actuality which is God Himself is precisely the wholeness of thought—object of thought comprehended completely by thought, thought completely actualized by what it thinks. Wisdom has as its focus the perfection of God, perfection that is without shade of conditioning.

Contemplation, which is man's exercise of Wisdom, is to be considered the perfect activity for man because it is final (sought for its own sake) and is

86 Met. 1072b1-29. Aristotle's discussion of the existence of God proceeds from the fact of contingent motions to the fact of a final cause of all motions which is not itself moved but moves the first moved by being desired by them. The unmovedness of this first mover, his necessity, is the principle from which all other motion comes: for it is in itself pure actuality, and actuality is what all else seeks as term of its getting into motion. This actuality is seen to be good since it is universally desired. All that is desired is desired as a good. For example, thinking is desired because it is good, or, in other words, because it is an instance of actualization. (Cf. Ch. V, note 61 of the present study.)

—in this way Aristotle introduces the reality of thought into his description of the first mover, and it is apparently because God is pure actuality that he is pure thought. The other chief characteristics of God—life and eternity—are mentioned after his contemplation, and receive less attention; they do not seem clearly derived from his attribute of intelligence, though God's intelligence, not his actuality, seems the more immediate occasion of positing life in him: "And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God's self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal." It is easier to see that all the qualities converge in one being than that each of them follows from some other quality previously established.

Cf. also, Joachim, pp. 291-3, 296, according to which God as pure act is reached in one reasoning process, and as pure intelligence is reached in another, neither attribute derived exactly from the other. Cf. Jaeger, Ch. XIV, "The Revision of the Theory of the Prime Mover", for a discussion of the composition-time of passages pertinent to this explanation, and of the doctrine itself.
excellent; its finality derives from its excellence. Thus the criterion on which Aristotle has based his judgment that certain activities exist only for the sake of others (whether discussing what activities the gods could be conceived as engaged in, or whether discussing the serious worth of various leisure-time activities) is ultimately an excellence-criterion. But excellence means for Aristotle everything that is typified in the traditional non-anthropomorphic notion of the divine. If, then, the objects of divine activity have already been determined according to a standard of excellence, the reasoning seems to be circular.

—There is in fact a convertibility between the divine and the excellent. Eternity, immovability, separation from all conditioning are of the essence of the divine and are of the essence of the excellent. They are so, because they are fullness of actuality. Here, in actuality wholly free of possible conditioning (ἐνεργεία ἄνευ δυνάμεως), is the fundamental notion of the divine or of excellence in its absolute sense. Every other reality, including all

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87 Cf. Met. 1049b4-1051a21, on the priority of ἐνεργεία , in which the various qualities here attributed to the divine and to the objects of Wisdom are traced to their basis in pure actuality; viz. passim "Obviously, therefore, the substance or form is actuality. According to this argument, then, it is obvious that actuality is prior in substantial being to potency; and as we have said, one actuality always precedes another in time right back to the actuality of the eternal prime mover." "But actuality is prior in a stricter sense also; for eternal things are prior in substance to perishable things, and no eternal thing exists potentially." "Nothing, then, which is in the full sense imperishable is in the full sense potentially existent. . . . all imperishable things, then exist actually. Nor can anything which is of necessity exist potentially; yet these things are primary; for if these did not exist, nothing would exist. Nor does eternal movement, if there be such, exist potentially; and, if there is an eternal mobile, it is not in motion in virtue of a potentiality, except in respect of 'whence' and 'whither'. . . . And so the sun and the stars and the whole heaven are ever active, and there is no fear that they may sometime stand still, as the natural philosophers fear they may. Nor do they tire in this activity: for movement is not for them, as it is for
the activities of men, have excellence just in so far as they approach this unqualified state of actuality by activating the various areas of possibility which are inherent in their natures. In this way men, always with a heavy admixture of unrealized or unrealizable capacity in them, achieve what is theirs to achieve of what exists in its wholeness only in the divine.

The aim of human effort is a perfection which is essentially proper to the divine alone.

4. Contemplation As According to Nature

Aristotle's notion of human happiness is oriented to the divine. This is plain from the previous considerations and from his explicit statement. Moreover, he recognizes the paradoxical character of his conclusion and proceeds

perishable things, connected with the potentiality for opposites, so that the continuity of the movement should be laborious; for it is that kind of substance which is matter and potency, not actuality, that causes this. Imperishable things are imitated by those that are involved in change, e.g. earth and fire. For these [heavenly bodies] are also ever active. . . ." "Obviously, then, actuality is prior both to potency and to every principle of change. That the actuality is also better and more valuable than the good potency is evident. . . . Everything of which we say that it can do something, is alike capable of contraries. . . . The capacity for contraries, then, is present at the same time, and the actualities also cannot be present at the same time, e.g. health and sickness. Therefore, while the good must be one of them, the capacity is both alike, or neither; the actuality, then, is better." "And therefore we may also say that in the things which are from the beginning, i.e. in eternal things, there is nothing bad, nothing defective, nothing perverted. . . ."

88 1177a15-17; 1178b25; 1179a25-31.
to emphasize it:

Such a life as this however will be higher than the human level: not in virtue of his humanity will a man achieve it, but in virtue of something within him that is divine; and by as much as this something is superior to his composite nature, by so much is its activity superior to the exercise of the other forms of virtue. If then the intellect is something divine in comparison with man, so is the life of the intellect divine in comparison with human life. Nor ought we to obey those who enjoin that a man should have man's thoughts and a mortal the thoughts of mortality, but we ought so far as possible to achieve immortality, and do all that man may to live in accord with the highest thing in him: for though this be small in bulk, in power and value it far surpasses all the rest.89

For mortal man "so far as possible to achieve immortality" (ἐπὶ σον ἐνδόξῳ ἀθανατίζειν): this is the sharpest statement of the paradox and at once its resolution. There can be in Aristotle no question of one's accomplishing something which lies beyond his capacity. (Such would be a contradiction of the basic notion which the principle of actualization of possibility expresses.) Man therefore is to deal in immortal things so far as lies in his power. Wherever there is in him an opening to such objects, he is to do his most to fill it. That opening is his intellectual capacity. So far as a man's mind becomes the "all things" which it is essentially capable of becoming90, the man has become divine by leaving behind limitation in time, space, matter.

But to leave behind limitation in time, space, matter is something that no man is capable of except in an attenuated fashion. What is most properly the function of the thinker does not require bodily goods. As man, though, the philosopher continues to require certain outward and personal goods (not so many as others require, but still not a few); and as good man he cannot remain

89 1177b27-1178a1.

90 De An. 431b20-22: "ἡ ψυχή τὰ άντα πῶς εστι πάντα."
indifferent to the needs and troubles of others. Thus it is inevitable the needs and duties of his human life continually withdraw his mind from a state of unconditioned attention to the objects of Wisdom. In his life as human being, a man, even a philosopher, can give little time to the free play of his intellect. Contemplation can hardly be called in accord with human nature.

"Such a life as this however will be higher than the human level; not in virtue of his humanity will a man achieve it. . . ." A man achieves the good proper to him when he learns to contemplate. This good is not a good proper to his human nature, though; for most of what belongs to human nature is indifferent to contemplation or withdraws from it. The man's perfection is contemplating, yet his nature is scarcely favorable to it. The conclusion that must be drawn from such considerations is plain: human nature is not what determines the man's perfection, but part of human nature is the determining factor. The good of the intellect is what is a man's perfection. And if a human being is not all of him intellect: then man's good is the good of a part of him.

Yet it would be strange if the good that perfects a man really is a good that perfects something other than himself. 91 Even granted that the 'something

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91 Cf. 1178a3,4: "It would be strange, then, if he were to choose not the life of his self but that of something else." Again, 1166a9-22: "E junk man wishes himself what is good, while no one chooses to possess the whole world if he has first to become someone else (for that matter, even now God possesses the good but this does not matter to all the others that are not God); he wishes for this only on condition of being whatever he is. . . ." (Ross, tr.; i.e. ἐκατῶς ἐσειρίβοιλαταί ταπαθεῖα, ἐνέγμενος ὁ ἄλλος οὐδείς αἱρεταί παρά ἐκεῖν ἐκεῖνο πενῆμενος - ἐξελ γὰρ καὶ νυν ὁ θεὸς ταπαθεῖα - ἀλλ' ἐν οἴτω ποτ' ἐστίν.)
other' is part of him, and that it is the highest part of him—nevertheless, what is only a part of himself is not strictly himself. Contemplation is the mind's good, and the mind is not the man.

Aristotle's response to this implicit difficulty is to declare that the intellect is the man's true self. Hence in choosing the good of his intellect a man is by that very fact choosing the good of his own self. Here the line of Aristotle's reasoning reaches its focus. Not in virtue of his total make-up—as rational being and as animal—is man ultimately to be measured. The measure of man is that element in him by which he can rise to contact with the eternal, universal, necessary aspects of reality. The measure of man is his mind. The rest is altogether, or "for the most part", incidental to this one essential operation.

According to this view of true self-hood, the significance of the individual man seems to lie in his being at least in part a mind. Where there is mind there is the capacity for intellection. Intellectual capacity, however, has intrinsic value inasmuch as it is an area in which the highest kind of actualization can take place.

The goal of human life with the element of mind that belongs to it is,

92 1178a2-4: "It may even be held that this is the true self of each, inasmuch as it is the dominant and better part." ("οδοξεις δ'αυτ και ειναι έκαστος τουτο τοι ειπερ το καρπον και αυτου γενον") Also, 1166a7,18: "And he does so seek his good for his own sake (for he does it on account of the intellectual part of himself, and this appears to be a man's real self)."

("και δευτο τοι εκενα τοι τοι διανοητηκον γαρ, οπερ εκαςτο ειναι δοκει") Finally, 1166a23: "And it would appear that the thinking part is the real self, or is so more than anything else." ("οδοξεις δ'αυτον το νοον εκαςτο ειναι κατα καλη μαλιστα") Cf. also Ch. V of the present study, especially pp. 124-128, in which these passages from Aristotle's treatise on friendship in Book Nine are discussed in relation to the value of self-identity.
finally, to be an instance of that high activity as far as it is capable of being. Not that any individual who instances this actualization in himself will fail to find enjoyment in doing so: pleasure, it was seen\(^{93}\), the agreeable awareness of self as possessor, always and necessarily accompanies the presence of the good activity. But the excellence and desirability of the activity is something distinct (though not separate) from the agreeableness of its being-one's-own, and is independent of it. For the excellence of the activity consists precisely in its being a high degree of actualization, somewhat like the unconditioned actuality that is the essence of divinity itself.

\(^{93}\)Cf. Ch. III, no. 2, pp. 55-57, of the present study.
CHAPTER V

HAPPINESS AS UN-SELFCONCERNED

It is time to draw to a point of focus the main lines of Aristotle's notion of happiness which have been examined in the course of this study.

In Chapter One the objectives of the study were established: first, to formulate the standard on which Aristotle based his philosophical account of the full human life; second, to sound the deeper metaphysical implications of such a standard. Chapter Two presented a general view of the direction and characteristics of Aristotle's treatment of happiness, most notably its dependence on the Aristotelian theories of activity and finality. Chapter Three was devoted to a consideration of enjoyment, its origin in activity, thus its inseparableness from the activity which constitutes happiness, yet, finally, its radical distinctness from happiness. Chapter Four turned to happiness in its concrete and completest possible realization in the activity of the reflective life. Here the two chief currents in Aristotle's treatment of happiness were seen to converge in his identification of happiness and philosophic reflection on the ground that through knowledge man give place in himself to actualities of the highest level—eternal, unconditioned and universal, unchanging form.

1. Happiness As Presence of the Ideal

This is what constitutes the happiness of the happy man: the fact that he
is in contact with actuality in its highest sense. For thus a man approaches closest to what is the essence of the divine. This is happiness in the full Aristotelian sense of the word. If any other qualities are also to be found in the happy man's state, they will be there as result, accompaniment, embellishment of a happiness that already exists in him in its essence. Thus the presence of excellence in a man's activity, which is what constitutes the happiness of his life, has as its first efflorescence in his person his consciousness of this presence. Such a reality corresponds to Aristotle's notion of enjoyment. Other joys too may come to him from other areas of his life and the activities that belong to them. There is no question that such joys add to the fineness of his life; but they come as extras, to fill out a life that is essentially complete without them (for a happy life is already a complete life). Such is the meaning of blessedness in Aristotle's use of the term. Yet remove all the abundance of goods which embellish the happy man's life; discount also (for it cannot be removed) the unique state of pleasure within him at his consciousness of existing at the highest point possible to him: deeper than both lies what ultimately constitutes his happiness, the actual presence in him of the eternal, unchangeable, unconditioned and universal forms that are par excellence the actuality of mind.

The implications of such a standard of human happiness deserve special examination, for an understanding of them is an understanding of the basic direction of Aristotle's philosophy. Despite their importance, however, they receive no explicit attention in the philosophy of man as Aristotle developed it. Any formulations of them, then, and conclusions based on them are apt to seem forced, especially in light of the fact that Aristotle himself never came
to draw them together in such a way. Nevertheless, let this qualification stand, and it is still possible, on the ground of what the examination conducted in the last three chapters has uncovered in Aristotle's handling of human values, to come to a few definite conclusions about the tendency of his thought.

Insofar as the Aristotelian universe has a unity, that unity depends on the subordination of all particular and specific movements to the great and general movement of the outer spheres and in turn the subordination-by-desire of these to the unmoved actuality of God. Thus the state of complete actuality (ἐνέργεια ἀνευ ἀνάμειν) is the ultimately meaningful reality in Aristotle's system, and implicitly at least the standard of every evaluation that has place in it. What is the meaning of actuality? The notion does not lend itself very readily to analysis and formulation, but the general sense of it can be seen in the meaning that is common to its various uses throughout the corpus (for example in the Physics by the theory of matter and form, in the Psychology by the explanation of intellection through the mental presence of forms, in the Ethics by the determination of happiness as the activity of intellection). The meaning of ἐνέργεια common to such places is that of actual form.2

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1 Cf. Ch. I, note 1, as well as Ch. V, note 4.

2 The following exposition of Aristotle's general doctrine of form is based in large part on the doctrines of activity in intellection as treated in IV, 2 (esp. notes 13-20 and the text that they accompany). Cf. Joachim, pp. 165-7, on the ultimate identity of knower and known in the activity of knowing, and 293-5, on immateriality as the ground of perfect identity. Cf. also Hamelin, pp. 4-6, 11-13, and 87 on Aristotelian act-potency in knowledge, with pertinent passages.
At first seemingly quite diverse, the physical form that combines with matter to constitute an individual thing and the mental form that is the immaterial representation by which knowledge takes place do not in fact differ insofar as they are form. In itself the form (or formality or pattern) which gives matter a determinate existence is exactly the same form that determines one’s act of knowing. The difference between a man existing in the flesh and an idea of man existing in the mind of a thinker is the different subjects into which the same form has been received. In the former case the form man is received into matter, and this matter is disposed this way or that, better or worse, to admit the form. But in the latter case the form is received into mind; and being immaterial, mind is open to whatever form will come to it, and will not limit form in any way.

This reality that Aristotle’s formulations point to in the physical order and in the order of knowledge is not a substance or an idea as such, but the formality, the determination, which makes any substance or idea to be the kind it is. A thing is actual in the order of nature because a form has been received in some matter; an act of knowledge actually occurs because a form has become present to a mind. In this world there is no such thing as a form that is not informing something whether matter or mind. Yet the reality of a form is not in virtue of its informing something, but in virtue of its being form. Form that is present in knowledge is more excellent that form present in nature, but this is only because in knowledge form is not limited and can therefore be more truly form.

And this is why it is more excellent. Form is of itself intrinsically excellent, and when it is free of the intermittence and conditioning of
existence in matter, when it is found unconditioned and universal, it is found more like itself. It approaches what may be called here the Ideal.  

3 This particular term Ideal used as a noun with the meaning of goal, acme, value, maximum is an apt one to refer to the notion of unconditioned form which the present discussion has come to formulate as the Aristotelian standard of ultimate value. It has the advantage of being a modern term in common use for a reality like that intended here, and has the etymological overtone of notional which re-relates it to the context of Aristotelian psychology, and of excellent which recalls the value-scalings of the Ethics and Metaphysics and their focus on the divine. Such a use of the term to designate the reality under discussion need not indicate any correspondence to Platonic use of the term idea; such a relationship is arguable but is not the issue here. (Cf. Hamelin, pp. 87, 88.)

On Aristotle’s use of the word Idea see Bonitz, pp. 338b2-339a6, where there are given numerous examples of the expression in Aristotle’s own systematic exposition of doctrine (as synonym of ἐννοοῖς, λόγοις, φανεροῖς) as well as in his criticisms of the Platonic theory. Cf. also Jaeger: Index, p. 464, at Idea; also pp. 45, 46, on Aristotle’s doctrine of soul as form (De An. h12510); and pp. 340, 341, on the development of Aristotle’s doctrine of idea as unconditioned form, and on the primary importance of the notion of form through Aristotle.

Stewart, II, 361 (commenting on 1166a22) indicates the main point of contact between man’s noetic capacity for the unconditioned and universal and his other capacities for excellence and nobility: “Reason is the Form or eidos of man. This Form the good man preserves pure amid the ὑλή of circumstances, as plants and animals preserve their various eidos from generation to generation, realising τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀεί in the permanence of the race-type. It is as corresponding with his whole environment, and not merely as exercising his ‘intellectual faculties’ that man is identified with Reason in this and similar passages . . . though man is not, like God, pure eidos, but a σύνελον or an ἐνυλον eidos.”

Again, II, 249, Stewart describes what is meant by happiness as an inmattering of Idea in man: “If happiness be regarded as an ἐνυλον eidos—as a life concretely realised, it presents itself as the harmonious play of all human functions, intellectual, moral and bodily—as the expression, in many ways, of the concrete unity—mens sana in corpore sano. But since such a concrete result cannot be produced or maintained without Ἡωπία or the organising and regulative agency of Reason—is in fact nothing but the material manifestation of Ἡωπία which is its Form, Law, νόμος ὑπονοία or τὸ ἠερίτικον καὶ: and since the Form or the Law is the thing, philosophically considered. . . it follows that ἐνυλον eidos, considered formally or philosophically, is identified with Ἡωπία its Form or Law. It is especially in Ε.Ν. x that ἐνυλον eidos is so identified.”

If the commentator’s at least apparent limitation of the notion of Ἡωπία to the regulation of things merely human is overlooked, this passage helps
In the argument of the *Metaphysics* actuality in its purity is God, the First Mover. He is simply the Ideal, form without any conditioning, the fullness of what every actuality is in its own degree. It is possible from the viewpoint of form in its greater or lesser degree of purity to trace a line of gradually ascending value in form—greater actuality in it and greater excellence—as form is the actuality of a non-living substance, of a plant, of an animal, of a man; or, within man, as it is the actuality of his composite being, of his somehow supra-material sense powers, and again of his completely un-material intellectual "capacity for all things"; or, beyond the level of sublunar beings, as it is actuality of the celestial intelligences. And according to this line of increasing purity of form and freedom from admixture of matter and potentiality, God will appear as the totality which all approach and never on their levels of actuality achieve. The unique actuality and excellence of God will consist in this that he is in totality and constancy what all others are only partially and intermittently. He is 

to show how the Aristotelian theory of actuality as encountered in this sphere of knowledge is, *mutatis mutandis*, applicable also to the sphere of human actions, though these are not activities in the same strict sense in which the operations of faculties are.
the summit which all beings aim at in the various degrees of actuality.  

In this sense, actuality (ἐνέργεια) is a value—is, according to its 
degree value itself.

4 The theology of Aristotle is certainly a disputed area, not only for the 
sketchiness of its various appearances throughout the extant works, but 
especially for its relations to the rest of Aristotle’s doctrines, particularly 
his latest.

See Ross, pp. 179-186, a concise discussion of the main tenets and 
problems of the doctrine, its purity of conception, its dependence on an 
ascending order of purity of form, its lack of a notion of creation, 
providence, divine interest. Joachim (pp. 291-7) gives a more imaginative 
reconstruction of the place of God in the universe from the aspect of ἐνέργεια 
either as arising out of δύναμις or as self-identical. Both these commentators 
consider the doctrine apart from its historical relationship to the rest of 
Aristotle’s developing, changing views.

Jaeger, on the other hand, brings out the relative earliness and Platonic 
character of the Aristotelian theology as it exists in its most developed form, 
in Book A of the Metaphysics (pp. 219-22) as well as its earliest origins 
(pp. 156-66). He further shows traces of a theological and Platonic 
orientation throughout its extensive development even though its attention came 
to focus more and more on the order and realities and knowledge-worthiness of 
the empirical world, which is notior quod nos. Cf. pp. 385-8. Cf. 381-5 for 
a synthetic view of this theological-teleological orientation, esp. 385: "In 
Aristotle’s teleology substance and end are one, and the highest end is the 
most determinate reality there is. This substantial thought possesses at one 
and the same time the highest ideality as conceived by Plato and the rich 
Determinateness of the individual, and hence life and everlasting blessedness. 
God is one with the world not by penetrating it, nor by maintaining the 
totality of its forms as an intelligible world within himself, but because the 
world ‘hangs’ (ἵππησαι) on him; he is its unity, although not in it. As 
each thing strives to realize its own form, it realizes for its part that 
infinite perfection which as a whole is God."

The reality of the Aristotelian God (as real is opposed to abstract or 
merely formal) is a question worthy of thorough examination, as is also the 
question of what the term ὑπερέα means in its primary sense, whether an 
existent or a formal principle of existence. It is perhaps impossible to state 
with certainty the meaning of the reality of ἐνέργεια which plays such a 
leading role in the Ethics, if the meaning of this still more basic concept 
remains in its ambiguous suspension between real and formal. Cf. Ross, pp. 214, 
156, 157: on the meanings of substance, its primacy; pp. 157-9: the existence 
of universals, intelligences, God; pp. 167-78: on matter and form, 
individuation, priority and eternity of form.
On such a basis as this, it is not hard to see why the life of philosophical reflection is the highest that Aristotle can conceive for man. Whether the philosopher considers the recurring patterns of the world of animals and plants, or the constant laws of human thought, or the eternal cycles of the heavens, it is under the aspect of their universality that he considers them. And it is in this universality and unchangeableness of theirs, not in their particularity and variation, that these experienced actualities are like the pure actuality of the divine. The philosopher achieves happiness as he reaches the Ideal.

The philosopher himself is a man and an individual man, and is subject to all the conditions of time, place, disposition. All these influence his activity, and can even hinder it or keep it from taking place in him. But to whatever degree he transcends these limits and actually exercises his power of thought he is happy. To this degree only. The rest—embellishments of life and even the enjoyment that is his as an individual well occupied—is not precisely what makes him happy. Happiness is presence of the Ideal. The Ideal, however, is never present in a man by virtue of his individuality, this embodiment of human form rather than that, but because the mind he has is in some small degree a power to bypass individuality. So far as a man seeks

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5 True, in the sublunar world men are the only beings with intelligence; and these are only individual men, not man-in-general free of all conditioning and disposed perfectly to reach the unconditioned. The existence of individual men is just as necessary for the achievement of actual intellection in the sublunar world as enjoyment, in its own way, is inseparable from such actual intellection. What is to be noted here, is not that happiness can be had without enjoyment or that happiness can be had except in individual men, but that happiness as such is not a matter of either individuality or of enjoyment. It is essentially distinct from such factors for all its dependence on them and actual connection with them.
happiness he is seeking the Ideal, which is of value not by reason of its particularity but by reason of its universality and transcendence of the individual.

A man who lives up to this notion of happiness completely, Aristotle’s όρνταλος ἀνόρρ, will not be concerned with enjoyment of life, but with making his person open to the presence of the Ideal. On the other hand, a lesser kind of man is concerned with enjoyment; he ignores the pure values which the man of excellence esteems, and pursues instead objects that he knows will bring him a sense of satisfaction. Both are taken up with some sort of activity and with the objects with which this activity is associated. Where the two men differ, though, is in the relative quality of their activities. The lower type does not much care what the activity is just so long as he gets satisfaction from it; if he has preferences it will be because experience has accustomed him to certain ways and left him unaware more or less of others. His pursuits are not likely to extend to very arduous goals—not because they would not be even more rewarding, but simply because he is not one to search then what knows already is good enough. But the man of excellence has another aim in life. His life is a deeply satisfying one even when it requires great effort of him; it cannot help being. But enjoyment is not primarily his concern; excellence is his concern—wherever it may be found, and especially where it may be found most in its purity. The serious man is serious about one thing: that unconditioned actuality may have as large a place as possible in his life. If enjoyment, his own acquiescence in an agreeable and satisfying life, were his concern, he might be content, as is the other man, in a lower grade of activity.
The conclusion, strange as it may seem to Aristotelian terminology, is that happiness means nothing other than this presence of unconditioned actuality. The joys of a prosperous life add to the fullness of happiness if they are present; but they are not necessary for it. And enjoyment cannot help accompanying such happiness. But happiness in its deepest sense is something beyond these concerns of the self. The Aristotelian notion of happiness is that of an un-self-concerned openness to value for its own sake. The self is of significance just insofar as it is a container of the Ideal.

This principle accords with Aristotle's finally achieved standard of happiness, as well as with a broad part of his psychological and metaphysical doctrines, and in fact helps to illuminate and unify them: but it is plainly not Aristotle's own way of speaking. The subordination of self to the ideal actuality which self comes to contain, implicit as it is in Aristotle's philosophy of man, does not exist in explicit statement there, if only because the philosophical distinction of self and non-self has not been elaborated until relatively modern times. The strangeness of these principles may go still deeper, though. Not only may Aristotle's way of speaking have been more adapted to the self-interest mode of presentation found in ordinary language than to modern terminology, but his own thought may well have contained elements that were inconsistent with the disinterest-tendency of his philosophical direction. It is not reasonable to expect in real life self-concern to give way entirely to un-selfconcern even if such un-selfconcern would be the logical conclusion of surrender to the Ideal.

Thus the appearance of self-concern as a way of speaking or even as a partial motive in Aristotle's judgment of human activities need not call into
serious question the fact that his notion of human happiness tends to concentrate on impersonal and universal excellence somewhat to the overlooking of the self.

2. Selfconcern and the Ideal

Nevertheless it is reasonable to expect that the standard of value which has been shown to lie at the heart of the Aristotelian finality and shape the general discussion of happiness will also hold true in more specific problems, where more immediate realities are in question than in the statement of broad principles. It is to be expected the force of the Ideal will be at work in all such questions, most of all in those areas where there is question of self in relation to others. Here three passages of the Nicomachean Ethics are especially pertinent: discussions of friendship and of self-love in Book Nine, and in Book Four a discussion of the virtue of pride.

The Ideal in Friendship.

In one of the earliest chapters of his extensive treatment of friendship, Aristotle carefully distinguishes friendship in the truest sense from a number

6 The discussion of friendship, Books Eight and Nine, nearly one-fifth of the whole Ethics, consists of a general introduction to the problems, kinds, stages of friendship (VIII, ch. 1-6); a discussion of the reciprocity required in it (ch. 7,8), and of reciprocity in the various forms of society: state, family, companionship (ch. 9-12); next a series of discussions which Ross terms "casuistry of Friendship" (ch. 13, 14; IX, ch. 1-3); then a set of considerations which establish the internal nature of friendship (ch. 4-8) and its importance in life (ch. 9-12).

Book Nine, chapter nine, "Why does the happy man need friends?", consists of four lines of argument, the first three of which are (1) a number of popular considerations in favor of friendship, (2) the notion that one can regard virtue better in another person than in oneself, thus appreciate it better, (3) certain advantages that derive from having associates in practice of virtue. The fourth argument, which is the most fully developed and which Aristotle characterizes as more penetrating the nature of things
of relationships that bear the same name of friendship but really fall short of it. Here he shows there are three types of friendship, each based on a form of reciprocity, yet only one of them based on a form good without qualification.

Thus friends whose affection is based on utility do not love each other in themselves, but in so far as some benefit accrues to them from each other. And similarly with those whose friendship is based on pleasure: for instance, we enjoy the society of witty people not because of what they are in themselves, but because they are agreeable to us. Hence in a friendship based on utility or on pleasure men love their friend for their own good or their own pleasure, and not as being the person loved, but as useful or agreeable. And therefore these friendships are based on an accident, since the friend is not loved for being what he is, but as affording some benefit or pleasure as the case may be.7

If Aristotle's happy man needs friendship in his life it will not be on the foregoing bases. It may well happen he will maintain associations of this kind, for even the great man is a man and needs the supports, relaxations, encouragements that come to him as a social being8; but these are necessary

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(φιλικότερον) than the other arguments, will supply the structure of this examination of Aristotle's notion of the good involved in friendship. The argument will be supplemented with selections from VIII, 3 "Three corresponding kinds of friendship", IX, 3 "Occasions of breaking off friendship", IX, 4 "Friendship is based on self-love", IX, 7 "The pleasure of beneficence", and from other places in the two books.

7 1169a11-19.

8 This function of supporting the activity of the reflective life seems to be the ultimate purpose of the three earlier arguments in IX, 9. See 1169b9-1170a13: Friendship is thus considered (1) "the greatest of external goods"; a man needs intimates on whom to confer benefits; "man is a social being" and it is better for one to associate with persons familiar to him than with strangers. (2) It is an aid to the contemplation of virtue to look on the good of one whose good is also one's own. (3) Congenial friends make contemplation easier and more continuous, and, further, subtly influence one another toward improvement.
and helpful in a somewhat extrinsic sense, and so do not directly have place in his happiness.

On the other hand, the true form of friendship is something intrinsic and not merely incidental, thus exists because of a good that does not come and go but has a certain absolute excellence. Such stability of good and such excellence are verified only in the characters of really good men, and this is why true friendship can exist only among them. "The perfect form of friendship is that between the good, and those who resemble each other in excellence. For these friends wish each alike the other's good in respect of their goodness, and they are good in themselves; but it is those who wish the good of the friends for their friends' sake who are friends in the fullest sense, since they love each other for themselves and not accidentally."9 Because excellence is the basis of their union such a union is essentially more noble than a liaison for sake of pleasure or advantage. And because virtue does not easily shift in the way advantage or taste in enjoyment do, such a union is more stable.10 The shared excellence is thus the foundation of friendship in the chief sense in which Aristotle wishes it to be taken. It is apparently the intrinsic excellence which a certain person possesses that one looks to in loving that person for himself. In this sense excellence is not something incidental to a person but deeply his own.

9"δι' αυτούς ρὰρ οὕτως ἐξουσι καὶ οὐ κατὰ σύμβεβλητι." 1156b7-ll.
101156bl2-ll.
But such excellence can hardly be intended as intrinsic in the sense that it belongs to the person and cannot be alienated from him as long as he is a person. For Aristotle later discusses whether true friendship can continue if one of the parties becomes bad, or even if one of the parties grows into a higher degree of excellence and leaves his friend behind on the lower level which they once shared. The negative answer which has already been suggested by his statement that friendship lasts as long as the excellence lasts, is there confirmed explicitly. "Perhaps it is impossible to do so, since only what is good is lovable; and also wrong, for we ought not to be lovers of evil, nor let ourselves become like what is worthless; and, as has been said above, like is the friend of like. . . . They will no longer even enjoy each other's society; but without this, intercourse and therefore friendship, are as we saw, impossible."11 One will not break off from a friend for any superficial reason, of course, because the friendship was founded on a sharing of an intrinsic good; nor need the good friend break off from his friend as soon as he notices a fault in him, for a true friend will look more deeply into the case and try to help his friend regain his footing. But where it becomes clear that the goodness once shared is shared no longer, the basis of the friendship has vanished and that is that.

This aspect of friendship's stability reveals the value which friendship as such ultimately is concerned with: the excellence which each person

11. 1165b1-37. Cf. also 1158b29-1159a5, where disparity in excellence or vice is shown to be an impediment to the sharing (kouvovia) proper to friendship.
possesses, and not precisely the person that possesses it. For "virtue and the virtuous man seem to be the standard in everything."\(^{12}\) A person can be loved only insofar as he possesses some virtue. "Thus a bad man appears to be devoid even of affection for himself, because he has nothing lovable in his nature."\(^{13}\)

Furthermore, the excellence on which friendship is based is substantially the same as that on which the excellence of happiness is based, namely its activeness; and this is not anything personal. Much the same language is used of both friendship and happiness:

It is with friendship as it is with the other excellences; men are called good in two senses, either as having an excellent disposition or as realizing excellence in action, and similarly friends when in each other's company derive pleasure from and confer benefits on each other, whereas friends who are asleep or parted are not actively friendly, yet have the disposition to be so. For separation does not destroy friendship absolutely, though it prevents its active exercise.\(^{14}\)

Moreover it is possible to conceive of an act of love without a return of love, even if this is not the usual way of things. The love of mothers is an example of this and shows that the essence of love lies "more in giving than in receiving affection."\(^{15}\) This is why a person who does a favor out of love reveals more affection than the person who receives the favor. It would seem

\(^{12}\)1166a8-10. Cf. 1157b25-37.

\(^{13}\)1166b26. Also 1166b2-29; 1159b2,3: "Amity consists in equality and similarity, especially the similarity of those who are alike in virtue. . . ."

\(^{14}\)1157b6-9.

\(^{15}\)1159a28-36.
at first sight the one who stands to gain should show more love. But his interest springs from a need, and insofar as a need is filled the person who has been in need no longer feels the pangs of his need and thus loses interest. His part in the favor is passive, while his benefactor has exercised a power. The receiver sees the favor as a matter of usefulness or pleasure to him, while the giver sees the liberality of his act. There is a parallel between the benefactor and the artist: "Every artist loves his own handiwork more than that handiwork if it were to come to life would love him." This example points to a profounder fact:

The reason of this is that all things desire and love existence; but we exist in activity, since we exist by living and doing; and in a sense one who has made something exists actively, and so he loves his handiwork because he loves existence. This is in fact a fundamental principle of nature: what a thing is potentially, that its work reveals in actuality.16

Aristotle's most serious and developed discussion of the true basis of friendship incorporates this notion of the activeness of friendship as the root of its values. At the end of this argument Aristotle summarizes it thus: "If then (1) to the supremely happy man existence is desirable in itself, being good and pleasant essentially, and if (2) his friend's existence is almost equally desirable to him, it follows that (3) a friend is one of the things to be

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16 1167b17-1168a27, esp. a6-9: "ἡ γὰρ ἐστὶ δυνάμει τοῦτο ἐνεργεῖ καὶ ἔφερ
γως μνήμει." Notice here that the artist loves his work because creating has actualized something in him; he exists more because he has created. The handiwork is regarded not as the expression of an excellence existing already in the artist, but as the occasion of the artist's coming to exist more. Hence the artist's person is viewed rather as an area open to further perfection than as a fullness of perfection flowing out into manifestations of itself.
desired."\(^{17}\) Aristotle thus makes his conclusion depend on the affirmation of two propositions, that a man desires his own existence and that the existence of a friend is much the same to one as one's own existence, or, as the latter

\(^{17}\) 1170blb-16. (Numerals added.) See the whole complicated passage as Aristotle develops it, 1170all-b12: "Again, if we examine the matter more fundamentally, it appears that a virtuous friend is essentially desirable for a virtuous man. For as has been said above, that which is essentially good is good and pleasing in itself to the virtuous man. And life is defined, in the case of animals, by the capacity for sensation; in the case of man, by the capacity for sensation and thought. But a capacity is referred to its activity, and in this its full reality consists. It appears therefore that life in the full sense is sensation or thought. But life is a thing good and pleasant in itself, for it is definite, and definiteness is a part of the essence of goodness, and what is essentially good is good for the good man, and hence appears to be pleasant to all men . . . . But if life itself is good and pleasant (as it appears to be, because all men desire it, and virtuous and supremely happy men most of all, since their way of life is most desirable and their existence the most blissful); and if one who sees is conscious that he sees, one who hears that he hears, one who walks that he walks, and similarly for all the other human activities there is a faculty that is conscious of their exercise, so that whenever we perceive, we are conscious that we perceive, and whenever we think, we are conscious that we think, and to be conscious that we are perceiving or thinking is to be conscious that we exist (for existence, as we saw, is sense-perception or thought); and if to be conscious one is alive is a pleasant thing in itself (for life is a thing essentially good, and to be conscious that one possesses a good thing is pleasant); and if life is desirable, and especially so for good men, because existence is good for them, and so pleasant (because they are pleased by the perception of what is intrinsically good); and if the virtuous man feels towards his friend in the same way as he feels towards himself (for his friend is a second self)—then, just as a man's own existence is desirable for him, so, or nearly so, is his friend's existence also desirable. But, as we saw, it is the consciousness of oneself as good that makes existence desirable, and such consciousness is pleasant in itself. Therefore a man ought also to share his friend's consciousness of his existence, and this is attained by their living together and by conversing and communicating their thoughts to each other. . . ."
notion is often expressed, "a friend is another self."

To establish the first of these notions, that man desires existence, Aristotle develops the two ways in which this desire shows itself; a man (here as in the rest of the discussion it is the good man) desires his existence because it is good and enjoyable. Here existence—life—amounts to activity, for life is defined by the actions for which it is the capacity; thus in man life is sensation and thought, though of course chiefly thought. And it is this that is good and enjoyable. Why is it so?

First, it is good, because it is definite; and we know this to be the case because the good man chooses it for this reason. These are the chief reasons that Aristotle gives and almost the only reasons. "It is definite, and definiteness is a part of the essence of goodness, and what is essentially good is good for the good man. . . ." Again, this view of the human good is consistent with the value scheme that has been pointed out in the other Aristotelian contexts. A good life is one that manifests in itself a sense of form and direction, an order that lives ill-lived do not possess; it partakes of some of the unconditionedness and stability which thought discovers in the regularities of nature and the heavens. Aristotle does not further develop this aspect of existence, its intrinsic worth; perhaps he considers it sufficiently indicated in these few remarks, perhaps he merely takes the fact for granted, and indeed such a view is the climate of the Ethics.

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18 Cf. II, 2, beginning, and III, esp. note 31, of the present paper.

19 See 1106b29, on the necessary definiteness of the good. Cf. also note 3.
The intrinsic enjoyableness of life is another fact that all seem to agree on; but this aspect of the question Aristotle chooses to treat more at length. Life is not something carried on without the living person's awareness of it. For every one of the activities that make life into the thing it is, is accompanied with a consciousness that such activity is present. Now consciousness of the activities that make up life amounts to an awareness of existence itself. Existence, as was seen before, is good because it is actuality. Thus one is conscious in living activity of a good that is present in him. This awareness is precisely what is meant by pleasure or enjoyment: "Life is a thing essentially good, and to be conscious that one possesses a good thing is pleasant. . . ." 21

The second proposition, that a friend is another self, is really the pivotal point of the whole argument. For whatever may be true of the desirability of existence, of life and activity, clearly this has nothing to do with friendship—unless it is also true that the existence proper to another person is yet somehow one's own existence too because he is a friend. There can be no question of Aristotle's opinion in this matter; it is essential to the

20 ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος, sentire, as the activity of an interior faculty—what would seem to amount to a sort of sensorium commune, a basic or central perceptive capacity which unifies the percepts of the other faculties is aware of them, etc.

21 "Φάσει ματάραβμα γίνοι, τὸ δ' ἀραθὸν ὑπάρχειν ἐν ἔστω ἀγαθὸς ἀγαθὸν ἄνθρωπον. Later in the same paragraph Aristotle expresses it somewhat differently: "I ἔστω is the consciousness of oneself as good that makes existence desirable, and such consciousness is pleasant in itself." Viz. "τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἐν αἰρέτον διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ ἀραθόν διὸ, ἢ δὲ τομικὴ αἰσθησις ἢ δὲια καθ' ἔτυμν." It is perhaps not unreasonable to see in this double way of speaking the outlines of a distinction between good quæ good—thus, the definite as good—and good quæ object-of-choice, αἰρέτον—enjoyable as well as definite.
conclusion he wishes to reach, moreover he enunciates the principle in several different forms in the present context. "The virtuous man feels towards his friend in the same way as he feels towards himself (for his friend is a second self). . . ." The friend's existence is "almost equally desirable to him." In the conclusion of Book Nine this same principle is expressed again: "For friendship is essentially a partnership. And a man stands in the same relation to a friend as to himself. . . ." But it is one thing to hold a principle and another to establish it. In the present discussion Aristotle seems simply to take it for granted, since he is content to refer to it, especially in its popular maxim-form without ever actually attempting its justification.

An earlier chapter amounts to the closest Aristotle has come to treating this relation of self-love to love of others. It is an extended parallel between the qualities of a person's regard for himself and of his regard for an intimate friend. True love expresses itself in these five ways: (1) by wishing and promoting the good of the one loved, (2) by wishing the existence and preservation of that person for his own sake, (3) by liking to be with him (4) by loyalty to his state of mind, and (5) by sensitivity to his joys and sorrows. Aristotle shows first how these qualities are to be found in friendship at its best. Next he shows how each of them is verified in the good man's feeling toward himself (and not verified in the corrupt man's)—the consistency and

22. 1171b33: "κοινωνία πάντι ἡ φιλία. καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον."

23. 1166al-b29. The first in a series of three in which friendship is distinguished from self-love, then from mere good-will, finally from the kind of agreement that exists among fellow citizens.
order of his state of mind (4), his contentment even in solitude because of the
good things that are his to think about (3), his keen awareness of what pleases
and hurts him (5).

But especially does he show his love of self in the way he wishes himself
what is truly good and seeks to secure it by his activity, and in the way he de-
sires his own existence:

Also he wishes his own good, real as well as apparent, and seeks it by
action (for it is a mark of a good man to exert himself actively for the
good); and he does so for his own sake (for he does it on account of the
intellectual part of himself, and this appears to be a man's real self). Also he desires his own life and security, and especially that of his
rational part. For existence is good for the man of excellence; and every-
one wishes his own good: no one would choose to possess every good in the
world on condition of becoming somebody else (for God possesses the good
even as it is), but only while remaining himself, whatever he may be; and
it would appear that the thinking part is the real self, or is so more than
anything else.

It is in this passage that Aristotle comes closest to really describing the
driving self-concern that each person experiences in his own attitude toward
himself. True, there is present the tendency of Aristotle to see in the self
little more than a capacity for acts. But the opposite of this attitude shows
itself too.

Even if Aristotle gives this emerging aspect of the fact none of the
special attention which it seems to call for, the passage is nevertheless at
least suggestive of more than the self-equals-capacity view of life. "\(\forall x\) e\(\forall x\)very-
one wishes his own good: no one would choose to possess every good in the
world on condition of becoming somebody else." Here the value of an
individuality as such seems to be the issue. If this passage intends what it
seems to say and is indeed Aristotle's then even on the supposition that one might become possessed of great goods, divinity not excepted, such goods would still not be acceptable if they entailed a loss of self-identity. Thus the self appears to have a significance distinct from the values found in it. This notion accords well with the parallel passage which describes friendship: "A friend is one who wishes the existence and preservation of his friend for the friend's sake. (This is the feeling of mothers toward their children, and of friends who are at odds.)" For even when there is no return of love or the

24 The passage has been rejected by some of the commentators, mainly because of a difficulty in fitting the parenthetical remark into the line of argument. Cf. Stewart, II, 357-61, for an extended treatment of the various views of the text's genuineness and its place in an Aristotelian context. Comparing this text with 1159a9-13, where Aristotle discusses friendship between unequals ("If then it was rightly said above that a true friend wishes his friend's good for that friend's own sake, the friend would have to remain himself, whatever that may be; so that he will really wish him only the greatest goods compatible with his remaining a human being."), Stewart accepts it, and comments: "In the light of the above passage I would explain the section before us as follows—'Every man wishes good things for himself, that is, for himself as remaining the same person; no man desires to become another being, and let that other being possess all good things—thus, no man desires to become God, in order to possess the absolute good which God possesses now and for ever in virtue of being what He is.' God's possession of the good depends on His self-identity; the good man's wish for his own good cannot overpass the limits of his self-identity—he cannot wish good for himself as having become God." The Paraphrast, whom Stewart also quotes, interprets the passage according to the view of the rational part as true self and irrational part as not true self, hence as the 'other' that one would become.

25 1166a5-7. (Tr. J.D.)
exchange of usefulness and enjoyment and community of mind has been lost through a falling-out, there still exists in the person who loves an esteem for the other which can be only for the person.

In such passages as these the author seems to approach the need of discussing good-of-self from the angle of the self rather than from the usual angle of the good. For it is the person as such that the texts focus on and not so much some good found in the person. Nevertheless Aristotle reveals a tendency toward his usual way of speaking in the passage parallel to these where he speaks of the corrupt man's love of himself. "Men who have committed a number of crimes, and are hated for their wickedness, actually flee from life and make away with themselves."26 Here Aristotle could very well have referred to the far more numerous instances in which the degraded, no less than the virtuous, hold on to life and resist every inroad of death, even with great pain, despite the fact that their life is good to them in no Aristotelian sense of the word, since they have no interest in heroic virtue and lack moreover all hopes of bettering their lot. Such a parallel would bear out the tone of the other passages. Instead, Aristotle's example is that of a person who no longer desires life once it has ceased to have a value, for once excellence and enjoyment are absent from life he prefers not to exist at all.

If Aristotle does recognize something naturally of significance in self-identity beyond the fact that it is a capacity for the actualities of virtue and

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26\text{166b12}. 
knowledge, for the Ideal—he is closer to uncovering it here than in other passages of his Ethics. Instead, however, he bases the rest of his discussion on the usual standard and does not come so close again to reexamining it. Thus on the whole, in his treatment of friendship Aristotle does not reveal an attitude toward self radically different from that in his treatment of happiness. The Ideal remains the focus of his attention even in an area like friendship where the richness of the author's own experience could easily have led him to a fuller recognition of the personal elements of human desire. 27

27Ross fails sufficiently to distinguish the warmth of Aristotle's feeling for friendship, as it is revealed in the present passages, from the essentially non-personal standard that he brings to his philosophical discussion of it. Thus in the introduction to his summary of the doctrine on friendship (Aristotle, p. 230) Ross makes the Aristotelian view of friendship take on an altruistic tone which does not, philosophically at least, belong to it (if altruism is taken in the sense of an interest in the other person and not merely as an interest in some value other than oneself). "The discussion is a valuable corrective to an impression which the rest of the Ethics tends to make. For the most part Aristotle's moral system is decidedly self-centered. It is at his own eudaimonia, we are told, that man aims and should aim. In the account of justice there is an implicit recognition of the rights of others. But in the whole of the Ethics outside the books on friendship very little is said to suggest that men can and should take a warm personal interest in other people; altruism is almost completely absent. Traces of an egoistic view are present even in the account of friendship, as they should be, for friendship is not mere benevolence but demands a return. But justice is done to the altruistic element; loving is said to be more essential to friendship than being loved; a man wishes well to his friend for his friend's sake, not as a means to his own happiness."

Jaeger (p. 241) on the other hand is truer to the tone of the passages, though in the light of what has already appeared in Aristotle's attitude toward the self, his use of the word personal has to be interpreted to mean concrete, or embodied in the individual, rather than something more to do with self. "Aristotle retains the kernel of Plato's notion—the basing of friendship on the ethical principle of the Good—but makes the Good a concrete moral value developing within the character of the man himself. The suprapersonal ground of the value of the human relationship no longer diverts attention from the personality of the friend; on the contrary, it is concentrated and incarnated therein. Aristotle's idea is therefore not just another way of referring all social values to the general problem of value; its aim is rather to establish the independent worth of the moral personality, and in the last resort
The Ideal in Self-Love

The chief concern of friendship, then, is not the selfhood of the friend, but the excellence which is to be found in his character making him a good man and worthy of esteem. If altruism means the kind of love that values a person in his own distinct, uncommunicated individuality and prescinds from his worthiness or unworthiness, Aristotelian friendship cannot be called altruistic. It may or may not be that egoism is the only alternative to altruism. If it is, then Aristotelian friendship is egoistic, not altruistic. Indeed, this is the usual way Aristotle refers to it, inasmuch as he insists that love of others is based on love of self, as well as resembles it. 26

One of the questions which Aristotle treats toward the end of the books on friendship is what self-love (φιλαυρία) really means. It is by far the commonest way of speaking, to condemn the man who is taken up with himself:

of human morality in general, as opposed to the cosmic Good that is based on the idea of God.” Thus Aristotle’s distinct contribution is the re-relation of this human value to the beings that generate it rather than to some universal principle which logically subsumes it. But such an advanced precision in the understanding of friendship does not of itself constitute any more deeply personal view than has been shown to be the case.

26 Cf. the whole of IX, 1, in which the parallel between self-love and love of others has already been described by Aristotle, and IX, 8, the chapter from which the following discussion is drawn.
We censure those who put themselves first, and 'lover of self' is used as a term of reproach. And it is thought that a bad man considers himself in all he does, and the more so the worse he is... whereas a good man acts from a sense of what is noble, and the better he is the more he so acts, and he considers his friend's interest, disregarding his own.29

To this viewpoint Aristotle opposes another way of speaking which people recognize that every man loves himself best and cannot help doing so. His own long demonstration, for example, that all the qualities of friendship are verified also of self-love. Or the popular maxims that 'two friends share one soul', and 'what's mine is thine', which amount to figurative ways of saying that friendship overlooks otherness; or 'charity begins at home', which states that love for others begins with love for what is one's own.30 Love is not altruistic.

Aristotle solves the inconsistency of these views by ascertaining what each side means by self-love.

Those then who make it a term of reproach call men lovers of self when they assign to themselves the larger share of money, honours, or bodily pleasures; since these are the things which most men desire and set their hearts on as being the greatest goods, and which accordingly they compete with each to obtain... Accordingly the use of the term 'lover of self' as a reproach has arisen from the fact that self-love of the ordinary kind is bad. Hence self-love is rightly censured in those who are lovers of self in this sense... But if a man were always bent on outdoing everybody else in acting justly or temperately or in displaying any other of the virtues, and in general were always trying to secure for himself moral nobility, no one will charge him with love of self nor find any fault with him. Yet as a matter of fact, such a man might be held to be a lover of self in an exceptional degree.31

29 1168a29-35.
30 1168b1-10. I.e. "μιαψυχή"ορ"κοινα τὰ φίλαν"ορ"τόνι κυνήσε πέριον".
31 1168b15-29.
This new sense of self-love is of course not a familiar one, and so Aristotle sets out to show in the passage immediately following that it is not only justified but is actually a truer way of speaking. The argument is a simple one: A person can be said to love his capacities for intellectual and moral excellence because he seeks their good, that is, their development and fulfilment. Now this capacity of his for intellectual and moral excellence is what we mean by his self. Therefore in seeking the fulfilment of his intellectual and moral capacity he is seeking the fulfilment of his very self—and in seeking the fulfilment of his very self he is by that fact loving it.

"Therefore in all spheres of praiseworthy conduct is it manifest that the good man takes the larger share of moral nobility for himself. In this sense, then, as we said above, it is right to be a lover of self, though self-love of the ordinary sort is wrong." 32

It stands clear, then, what sort of goods they are that most befit the capacity of man for nobility. "It is the most dominant part of himself that he indulges and obeys in all things." 33 Whether the Ideal is conceived in terms of moral excellence in the manner of the earlier-composed parts of the Ethics, or in terms of leisured reflection on the structures of the universe in the manner of Aristotle's more developed doctrine—it is much the same

32 1169a35- b2. This is the paragraph by which Aristotle summarizes the whole argument of the chapter, and is the most succinct statement of his notion of self-love, though it lacks his usual emphasis that this also the most proper sense of self-love.

33 1168b31.
reality in either case, namely, the presence of an order in human life that lifts it beyond itself toward the unconditionedness of divinity. This has been established in other parts of the Ethics, and does not call for special enlargement at this point. Instead, Aristotle’s concern is to establish the important second term of his argument, that a man’s true self is this capacity of his for excellence.

He does so by showing how attention to this capacity and devotedness to developing it is really a triumph of selfhood. First, because it is the dominant part of the composite which is man, reason may rightly be called the man, that is, the chief part may be taken for the whole, just as the ruling body of a state is properly taken for the state itself. Next, Aristotle finds the dominion of mind in the man who is praised for being self-controlled.34

“Besides, a man is called self-controlled or lacking in self-control depending on whether his reason is in control or not—with the implication that reason is the man.”35 Finally, Aristotle turns to the fact that it is the acts which men perform in conformity to reason that they consider most truly their own, not those which have as it were just happened or happened despite their better judgment.36 In this sense it is only those actions which arise from our effort and are free and are reasonable which we claim for our own. Because of this, 

34 The word ἐιρηκρατής and its privative ἀκρατής lack in Greek the explicit reference to self that their English equivalents have.

35 1166b44. (Tr. J.D.)

36 1169a1,2.
certain actions which arise from our effort and are free, thus fulfill the usual conditions for responsibility, are still not claimed for our own in the same way as those which have the further quality of reasonableness. 37

From each of these viewpoints, then, it is the domination of the man by his highest powers that constitutes his real loyalty to himself. Aristotle could go on to a consideration of what the self-love is that is manifested in the ambition and self-seeking of a corrupt man—what the self is when it is not one's reasonableness and nevertheless is something; what it is when in fact it is the base of values to a man who lacks a true sense of values. But, as happens, Aristotle does not undertake to consider this aspect of experience, and concentrates instead on the self which is the center of true values. Thus he can speak of a self-love that is wrong, and in the same context insist that real self-love is always right. Clearly, self does not mean the same thing in both statements. But in last analysis it is only the second sense of the word

37 There appears somewhat of a discrepancy with Aristotle's usual theory of moral actions; but see Stewart, II, 379: "The acts of the rational agent represent a consistent and single personality to which we always refer them; whereas the acts of the ἄκρατις represent merely the prevalence for the time of certain ἐπιθυμίαι, and are regretted and as it were disowned, by the man 'when he comes to himself' again. On this ground the acts of the rational agent are spoken of here as voluntary in a higher sense than those of the ἄκρατις. But it must be remembered that the doctrine of the Third Book (and we have no reason to suppose that Aristotle wishes to modify it here) makes no practical difference between acts done κατὰ λέγον, and those done ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν, qua voluntary. If our good acts are voluntary so are also our bad acts. . . . We may say perhaps that. . . . the statement is made in the spirit of the 'metaphysic of Ethics.'"
that Aristotle has seen fit to examine. True self is the capacity for the Ideal.

By way of closing the discussion of true self-love Aristotle sketches out a number of paradoxical situations in the life of the man of excellence in which he seems to relinquish his claim to goods which would contribute to his state of excellence. But this forgoing of excellence is only an apparent one. For there is only one thing for which the man of excellence may be said to have greed, and that is excellence itself:

But it is also true that the excellent man's conduct is often guided by the interests of his friends and of his country, and that he will if necessary lay down his life in their behalf. For he will surrender wealth and power and all the goods that men struggle to win, if he can secure nobility for himself; since he would prefer an hour of rapture to a long period of a mild enjoyment, a year of noble life to many years of ordinary existence, one great and glorious exploit to many small successes. And this is doubtless the case with those who give their lives for others; thus they choose great nobility for themselves. Also the excellence man is ready to forgo money if by that means his friends may gain more money; for thus, though his friend gets money, he himself achieves nobility, and so he assigns the greater good to his own share. And he behaves in the same manner as regards honours and offices also: all these things he will relinquish to his friend, for this is noble and praiseworthy for himself. He is naturally therefore thought to be virtuous, as he chooses moral nobility in preference to all other things. It may even happen that he will surrender to his friend the performance of some achievement, and that it may be nobler for him to be the cause of his friend's performing it than to perform it himself.

Therefore in all spheres of praiseworthy conduct it is manifest that the good man takes the larger share of moral nobility for himself.\[38\]

This series of paradoxical statements brings out in relief the nature of Aristotelian virtue. The good man focuses all actions (even acts which few
would scruple to call highly altruistic) on the development of his own perfection.

Such a focus has an egocentric tone which it is hard not to notice. Now egocentrism is not easily reconciled with an outlook of un-selfconcern. Hence the question of Aristotle's egocentrism is directly pertinent to the present discussion and calls for examination. It is in Book Four, in his long chapter on the virtue of pride, that Aristotle most fully treats this aspect of human desire.

In passing, it is especially interesting to take notice of the first in Aristotle's list of those goods which the man of excellence is willing to relinquish for the sake of greater nobility. This willingness of a man to give up life itself because of an Ideal at once remarkably transcends the quasi-egoistic context in which it is found, and nonetheless unmistakably belongs to it. The series of paradoxes centers its most striking reality in this particular instance. The same situation, moreover, is to be found as conclusion in the line of argument which arises in discussion of the meaning of the virtue of human pride.

The Ideal in Pride

Pride (μεραλομυχία) is the quality of a man who possesses excellence and knows that he does and cherishes that excellence. The proud man's attitude toward himself is best expressed by Aristotle's brief description of him: "He has high self-esteem and his estimate is right." 39

39\[μεράλων αὑτὸν ἄξιον ἄξις ἄνω ἵνα.\] 1123b3; 16. (Tr. J.D.)
kind would be offensive in the extreme if it were not based on truth, for Aristotelian pride knows nothing of self-deprecation. It is true insofar as the esteem which the proud man has for himself is esteem for an excellence

— Excerpt (1123b31) in an occasional ironic tone and turn of phrase with inferior persons. Otherwise, it is the opposite of what is commonly meant by humility. Cf. Rackham, IV, iii, 1, note: "μεγαλωμαι, magnanimitas, means lofty pride and self-esteem rather than magnanimity or high-mindedness (in the modern sense of the word)." Thus Aristotle marks out for praise a quality which is more commonly looked upon as a fault, with preference shown instead to self-depreciation, a tendency to cover up one's excellence even to a point of being unaware of it oneself.

Yet pride is not arrogance: Aristotle characterizes arrogance as a false form of pride that is found in men haughty and insolent—ὑπεροπταὶ and ὑβρισταὶ—who have an abundance of goods like birth, position, power, but lack the necessary quality of moral excellence, thus despise others and treat them rudely in order to give themselves a specious superiority (1123a25-b7). Nor is pride equivalent to vanity: this fault is the characteristic of persons who want to be thought more than they are, thus it falls short of pride, which claims respect for excellence truly possessed (1123b9, 1125a28-33).

Again, if the description given still seems extreme, it is to be remembered both that Aristotle himself admitted this tone while nevertheless maintaining that it is an extreme that stays within the bounds of virtue and does not err by excess or falsity as its related vices do (1123b13-15), and that the picture is of an ideal man who can be as perfect as the example requires him to be, while all actual men are less excellent and, being honest with themselves, will feel themselves accordingly less entitled to self-esteem. Cf. Stewart's (I, 335-7) remarks on the abstractness of the description: "This spirit in a real man would be intolerable. But Aristotle's μεγαλωμαι is not a real man. He is an ideal creation in philosophy, as Philoctetes or Antigone is in tragedy. He is Aristotle's concrete presentation of that θεωρία which is essential to human excellence. He 'contemplates' the κόσμος or beautiful harmony of his own nature, and allows nothing external to it to dominate his thought or conduct. He thus realises αὐτάρκεια or autonomy, and 'possesses all the virtues' in a fuller sense than other virtuous men, who are conscious of the moral law merely through their ἡπίους, or practical insight and self-knowledge. The μεγαλωμαι is a man of the highest speculative power. . . . The description of the μεγαλωμαι in the Ethics is rather the mise en scène of Aristotle's doctrine of the αὐτάρκεια of the εὐδαιμονία in the Life of Reason, than a portrait-sketch after the manner of Theophrastus."
which he really does possess. There can be no such thing as rightful pride aside from the presence of such excellence; the esteem is a good thing, a virtue, because it recognizes a good for what it is.

The excellence referred to here is not exactly specified. Such excellence is simply the possession of all the virtues, e.g., courage and fairness, for it is the quality which makes a man a good man (ἀγαθός). But pride is unthinkable without the excellence that it is an esteem for.

Now the proud man, since he deserves most, must be good in the highest degree; for the better man always deserves more, and the best man most. Therefore the truly proud man must be good. And greatness in every virtue would seem to be characteristic of a proud man. And it would be most unbecoming for a proud man to fly from danger, swinging his arms by his sides, or to wrong another; for to what end should he do disgraceful acts, he to whom nothing is great? If we examine him point by point, we shall see the utter absurdity of a proud man who is not good. Nor, again, would he be worthy of honour if he were bad; for honour is the prize of virtue, and it is to the good that it is rendered. Pride, then, seems to be a sort of crown of the virtues; for it makes them greater, and it is not found without them.

If there is anything that the proud man seeks it is honour. For honour is the outward recognition of excellence possessed; only an outward good, it is

41 Here, as in most of the early books, the excellence present to the mind of the author is, as far as the writings themselves show, an excellence of character. Not until the last book of the Ethics is the excellence of reflection reestablished as the crowning excellence. Cf. the present study, IV, 3, first part; Ross, pp. 232-3, on Aristotle's subordination of moral to intellectual activities as contrasted with his great emphasis on the moral in the earlier part of the Ethics; and Léonard, ch. V, 2 "Φρόνησις et Σοφία dans l'Ethique à Nicomache", for an extended development of the tension between the two lives, their unity in the hierarchical unity of the person who employs prudence in action to maintain the conditions requisite to wisdom.

42 1123b28-1124a2. (Tr. Ross.)
nevertheless the highest outward good. It is the only good, for example, that one would seriously think of offering to men of high station or to the gods—for these already have everything they need in the way of other goods, especially the inner good which constitutes the excellence proper to them, and the only thing that can be possibly added to them is the admiration of persons who recognize their high excellence. But this admiration is after all only an outward good, it takes its meaning from the excellence which it recognizes; let it come or go, it will not make any intrinsic difference to that excellence. It is an embellishment and nothing more. Thus the proud man is detached even toward honor. He enjoys the esteem of persons whose opinions are worth something (the acclaim of the rabble means nothing to him at all), but is not at a loss without it, for he has what is beyond price. He may be thought haughty for this detachment, yet he has reason for his attitude.

It is this cherishing of excellence that is most typical of him. It is the basis of his spirit of independence, of his calmness in the face of circumstances that would make others disturbed, of his reluctance to commit himself to undertakings without serious reflection on their consequences, hence of his reserve and general tone of deliberateness and dignity. For this reason too he does not like to be under obligation to others for favors conferred on him; he prefers to be on the giving-end in such transactions. Thus he considers

\[43\] 1123b16-24. This recalls Aristotle's description of the activity which is proper to divinity: a life whose sole concern is the pure objects of thought.

\[44\] 1124a5-20.

\[45\] 1124b24-32, 1125a13-16.
degrading any form of subservience to persons who are in a position to benefit him, and is apt to be distant with them, while on the other hand he is well disposed to helping others. For by this attitude he keeps himself in mind of what the true value is and disposes himself to acts, such as generosities, that will increase it.46 He avoids boasting, rancor and meanness and spite, and complaining; for the things that give rise to them are trifling matters unworthy of his serious attention.47 In outward possessions he is both independent and liberal.48

The focus of the proud man's attention, then, and the goal of all his efforts, is to esteem and increase the deposit of excellences which he carries in his person. Such an attitude as Aristotle outlines here may sound egotistical and not virtuous. Indeed it is a point always open to question whether any given person with this high regard for self-perfection would ever be really more interested in the element of perfection than in the element of self. But if one should be willing to forgo enjoyment of perfection for the sake of perfection in itself, the desire of self-perfection need not in that case at

46.1124b10-23, 1125a1-3.

47.1125a3-10.

48."For he does not care much even about honour, which is the greatest of external goods more than power and wealth, which are means to it...; he therefore to whom even honour is a small thing will be indifferent to other things as well." Again, "He likes to own beautiful and useless things, rather than useful things that bring in a return, since the former show his independence more." 1124a17-19; 1125a11-13.
least conceal selfishness.

Now Aristotle's remarks on the good man's attitude toward danger and death suggest that it is excellence rather than the self's possession of excellence which commands his ultimate allegiance. "The great-souled man does not run into danger for trifling reasons, and is not a lover of danger, because there are few things he values, but he will face danger in a great cause, and when so doing will be ready to sacrifice his life, since he holds that life is not worth having at every price." 49

This passing allusion in the discussion of pride recalls Aristotle's extended treatment of courage in its own context in Book Three. Courage is a sort of keeping one's balance in the face of fear. There are many kinds of courage in this broad sense, as many as there are forms of evil that befall men; disgrace, for example, and poverty, disease, loneliness, pain, death. But in its strictest sense courage has reference only to the last of these, death, which far surpasses all the other evils in dreadfulness. And even here, Aristotle is not willing to call any and every form of death matter for courage:

We do not call a man courageous for facing death by drowning or disease. What form of death then is a test of Courage? Presumably that which is the noblest. Now the noblest form of death is death in battle, for it is encountered in the midst of the greatest and most noble of dangers. Courage is shown in dangers where a man can defend himself by valour or die nobly, but neither is possible in disasters like shipwreck. And this conclusion is borne out by the principle on which public honours are bestowed in republics and under monarchies. 50

49 1124b7-9.
50 1115a29-31; b4,5; a32,33. (Italics added.)
Death by drowning or by disease is a death one accepts because nothing can be done about it. But true courage faces a death which it needn't face; true courage faces death because under the circumstances that is the right and fitting thing to do. "A man ought not to be brave because he is compelled to be, but because courage is noble." Nobility is what counts even more than life.

The noble (τὸ καλόν) is frequently mentioned in the course of Aristotle's consideration of this virtue, and is tightly bound up with his conception of it. And this quality is in turn bound up with activity as its form and its goal. The value of the one is the value of the others.

For the courageous man feels and acts as the circumstances merit, and as principle may dictate. And every activity aims at the end that corresponds to the disposition of which it is the manifestation. So it is therefore with the activity of the courageous man: his courage is noble; therefore its end is nobility, for a thing is defined by its end; therefore the

51 1116b3. Utility also is rejected as a motive—in the sense of the hired soldier's professional valor, i.e. the calm of a person who is used to the sound of danger and will retreat when real danger appears unless someone forces him to hold that line. Cf. 1115b2,3; 1116a30-23; 1117a10-22.

52 E.g. 1115b21-24; 1116a12-15; b3; 1117a17. Kalόv is the term most commonly in use with Aristotle to designate those qualities to which the present study applies the more general term Ideal. See Rackham, note to I, iii, 2: "Kalόv is a term of admiration applied to what is correct, especially (1) bodies well shaped and works of art of handicraft well made, and (2) actions well done it thus means (1) beautiful, (2) morally right." Cf. Bonitz, p. 360, b, 1-47, on Aristotle's uses of kalόv, esp. 17-20, its synonyms in descriptions of moral character: ὁς ἄθλος, ὁς ὁ λόγος, ὁ βοθώς; and Gen. An. 731b25, in forms of nature.
courageous man endures the terrors and dares the deeds that manifest courage, for the sake of that which is noble. 53

Courage is noble because it is the form of one of the peaks of human activity. It comes into existence where a man is exercising the deliberateness proper to him with a degree of intensity that is rare under less straitened conditions. The high pitch of danger works on the man's natural spiritedness and rouses in him all the physical signs of anger and tension. Animals, it is true, can show signs of physical excitement too, but they are not properly brave. In courage the element of deliberateness must also be present and only men can have this. "The form of courage that is inspired by spirit seems to be the most natural, and when reinforced by deliberate choice and purpose it appears to be true Courage." 54 For it requires a great straining of human powers to maintain oneself in the face of the greatest personal loss, the loss of life itself. "Now the most terrible thing of all is death; for it is the end, and when a man is dead, nothing, we think, either good or evil can befall

53 115b20-24. See Stewart's note, I, 288, on this passage: "We see from this passage what a 'positive' conception of Nature underlies Aristotle's 'teleology'. Human nature is a beautiful organism, and to be beautiful is its raison d'etre. So a plant or animal is its own raison d'etre; it performs the functions of its nature for the sake of maintaining that nature in perfection ..."

Cf. ibid. II, 373; "The kalov is the orderly work of vous, or the active Reason. Being vopiv it can be apprehended for what it is only by vous, or the active Reason. An act which, for the rational agent who has performed it, takes it due place as kalov in an orderly system of life, appears as an isolated and transitory occurrence to the person who is merely affected by it ..."

54 117ah,5. (Italics added.)
him any more."  

It is paradoxical that the action in which the perfect form of courage is exercised is the very action in which the subject of the activity will be hindered from enjoyment of it by pain or anxiety or even be destroyed, and that it is the essence of his glory for him to "endure things that are terrible to a human being and that seem so to him." The paradox is a hard one to resolve.

Hence Courage itself is attended by pain; and it is justly praised, because it is harder to endure pain than to abstain from pleasure. Not but what it would appear that the end corresponding to the virtue of Courage is really pleasant, only its pleasantness is obscured by the attendant circumstances. This is illustrated by the case of athletic contests: to boxers, for example, their end—the object they box for, the wreath and the honours of victory—is pleasant, but the blows they receive must hurt them, being men of flesh and blood, and also all the labour they undergo is painful; and these painful incidentals are so numerous that the final object, being a small thing, appears not to contain any pleasure at all.

By this example Aristotle attempts to show how the true enjoyment of an activity may be overshadowed by the pains which it involves in achievement, and is, nevertheless, the motive which draws the athlete to his effort. In the lines immediately following these Aristotle applies the example to the case of a man facing death. Yet the parallel is not exact (for death is a loss greater than any pain and the man who dies does not live to enjoy any kind of victory even a diminished one) and Aristotle's comparison falters:

551115a27-28. Cf. the present study, Ch. II, no. 2, especially notes 34-36 and the texts they accompany.

561117a16.
If then the same is true of Courage, the death or wounds that it may bring will be painful to the courageous man, and he will suffer them unwillingly; but he will endure them because it is noble to do so, or because it is base not to do so. And the more a man possesses all virtue, and the more happy he is, the more pain will death cause him; for to such a man life is worth most, and he stands to lose the greatest goods, and knows that this is so, and this must be painful. But he is none the less courageous on that account, perhaps indeed he is more so, because he prefers glory in war to the greatest prizes of life.

It is not true therefore of every virtue that its active exercise is essentially pleasant, save in so far as it attains its end.\(^5\)

Here Aristotle might have maintained the parallel with the athlete's satisfaction in wreath and honors, by showing that the hero has a certain enjoyment in anticipating the glory that will be his though posthumously.

Instead, without exactly rejecting such an interpretation, he has ended the passage with an ambiguous statement which appears to constitute an exception to his general theory of enjoyment as a necessary accompaniment of activity. For taken literally, the statement would suggest that Aristotle has envisaged at least the possibility of an activity unaccompanied by enjoyment on the part of its agent.\(^5\)

\(^{57}\)1117a34-b16.

\(^{58}\)The qualification "in so far as it attains its end" seems to call in question the fact that the activity has actually been achieved. For if every activity is accompanied by a pleasure proper to it, then the act of courage will have a pleasure of its own; in this view, if pleasure is missing it is to be presumed the activity has not taken place or has not been completed. Yet in the present case the activity has been completed, since what was intended was the act of facing up to danger, not safety, and the former was achieved if not the latter. The alternative to this interpretation would be that courageous activity is an activity improperly so-called. (i.e. not a single \textit{épèrēia} as such but a congeries of individual acts pleasant and painful, physical and moral, under a single name of bravery—the sum of which would be enjoyable because of the increased awareness and intensity which the danger and effort arouse, despite the fact that the last of them may end up in pain and death.) But Aristotle does not even consider it.

In his commentary on the passage Joachim merely rephrases Aristotle's statement, then draws a conclusion from it which is inimical to Aristotle's
An interpretation of this sort would be highly problematical; moreover the ambiguity of the passage in which the occasion for it arises is such that another, less difficult interpretation is possible, and for this reason preferable. In the usual Aristotelian view of activity, as it has appeared in the course of the examination, every activity—whether in the strict sense of the operation of some faculty, or in the extended meaning of an action—is always accompanied by a pleasure corresponding to it. If pleasure is viewed only in its narrower meaning one is hard-put to see any way in which the hero who gives his life in battle can be said to enjoy his action. But if it is viewed in its deeper meaning, a sense of well-being in the possession of an excellence, it is just as applicable to the hero at his hour of death as it is general theory of activity because it speaks of an activity that involves pain in its exercise without a compensating pleasure once the activity is under way: "This leads Aristotle to the general remark that, with regard to all the moral virtues, we must say that good action is pleasant only so far as the agent attains his end: the actual activity will involve at least effort and often pain." (p. 121)

Stewart (I, 303) gives more attention to the passage, but without resolving its difficulties. He quotes a passage from Grant (Text and Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, London, 1885) which amounts to an anticipated-glory interpretation: "The deep moral pleasure which attaches to noble acts, Aristotle describes as triumphing over even the physical pain and outward horror which may attend the exercise of courage. And he acknowledges that in many cases this may be the only pleasure attending upon virtuous actions." Stewart himself distinguishes the activity of braveness from other kinds of activity in that the others do involve enjoyment in their performance even if such enjoyment is not spontaneous but has to be learned, while actions "κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν" however are not thus in themselves pleasant. They are so painful that it is only the man who has the strongest interest in the chief end, who will bring himself to perform them.

No doubt the difficulty is ultimately the unresolvable one of trying to apply Aristotle's theory of acts that are psychophysical to acts that are moral.
to the wiseman in his lifelong reflection and to the gentleman decently enjoying the good things of life.

It is not a protracted enjoyment of excellence, of course, since it ends almost as soon as it begins. Thus it seems to lack the lastingness which Aristotle earlier has required of happiness. But this moment of intense joy is not the only happiness and enjoyment that the hero has ever known, for by supposition he has led his whole life in the pursuit and attainment of excellence. The moment of self-sacrifice, then, has to be seen in the context of the man's whole life—indeed, as its climax. Whether the final awareness of moral excellence is enjoyed by the hero (This remains the more probable interpretation of Aristotle), or whether the pain and sorrow that attend loss of life cause the joy to be clouded over: this is not primarily what matters in Aristotle's understanding of heroic virtue, nor is it what occupies the hero's mind. The element that matters is the achievement of excellence. When the primacy of this consideration is grasped, the chief point of Aristotle's treatment of the problem has received the understanding it calls for.

The hero who faces death has made of his person the container of an excellence of the highest order, a value—nobility—which deserves well of him and has received as it deserves; and his awareness of this presence is, if only for the briefest of moments, a joy that surpasses any other. This is the meaning of the paradoxical statement which closed Aristotle's consideration of self-love:

59 "Happiness, as we said, requires both complete goodness and a complete lifetime." 1100a5. Also, 1098a18–20.
a concern with the Ideal so genuine, a man "will surrender all the goods that
men struggle to win, if he can secure nobility for himself: since he would
prefer an hour of rapture to a long period of mild enjoyment, a year of noble
life to many years of ordinary existence, one great and glorious exploit to
many small successes." Here the diverging lines of Ideal and self-concern
meet. In his act of greatest un-selfconcern the hero has found his greatest
joy, a joy, it might be said, without personal reference: for at the moment of
sacrifice the self ceases to exist which alone could receive compensation for
its loss. Despite this the hero has deliberately faced up to his loss, has in
fact gone out to meet it; and it is only because of this that his act has the
stature it has. It is possible to say, then, that to such a man the Ideal has
meant more than his own selfhood.

60. 1169a21-24. See Stewart, II, 381,2, on this passage: "We see how far
removed the philautia of the good man is from ordinary self-seeking. For the
sake of the kalos the philautos will lay down his life. He will not cast it
carelessly away as inferior men, falsely called courageous, do under the
influence of anger or other excitation, but will lay it down rationally for the
sake of his ideal of Human Perfection. He knows that Human Perfection, unlike
the Divine Perfection which is realised in One eternal Being, is realised in a
succession of mortal beings. The mere prolongation, as such, of a mortal life
he sees to be a matter of little moment, because Human Perfection is secured
by the succession of lives. He cares only for Human Perfection, and if he
finds that he can further it by doing something that can be done only at the
cost of his own bodily life, he gladly lays down his life. Here all the
ordinary motives operating within the region of the sensibility are left behind,
and the agent rises into the sphere where action is determined by 'reverence
for law universal.' Thus the doctrine of philautia, which in its highest form
amounts to 'self-sacrifice', belongs to what may well be called 'the Metaphysics
of Ethics'. That there is such a 'Metaphysic' is surely a great practical
truth, attested by the fact that men are found thus ready to lay down their
lives."
3. Aristotle's Doctrine as Concern for the Ideal

It would seem to be only Aristotle's occasional way of speaking that stands in the way of an unqualified affirmation of this conclusion.

Admittedly, an author's way of speaking is not without its own significance. For a perceptive interpretation of the various more or less spontaneous turns of expression that appear in an author will reveal facets of his personality which the author did not have in mind as his purpose in writing and which he may even have been unaware of. But this is a matter of interpreting his personality and not precisely of understanding his philosophy, biography not exegesis. The person and the philosopher are the same man, of course, and his person is truly the matrix of his philosophy; hence a better appreciation of the one can illuminate the other. But an understanding of Aristotle's philosophy basically consists in a grasp of his thought explicit and implicit; in other words, it seeks to know what notions Aristotle actually developed in the course of his thinking, and what were the habits of thought which directed his thought-processes and would presumably have directed his thought if he had taken up other problems or gone further along lines he had already entered.

Something has already been said about the personality-revealing turns of Aristotle's language in contrast with the apersonal orientation of his philosophically-developed standards. For the present that is enough. Now is it possible that the more personal elements of Aristotle's experience would eventually have had an influx on his philosophical work which they did not have up to the time of his latest writings? Such always remains a possibility. Yet, if the considerable development that Aristotle's philosophy underwent was toward a greater attention to the realities of direct human experience rather than toward
a more person-regarding standard, his later development of a personal orientation is unlikely though not impossible. Meanwhile it is not with some possible reversal of Aristotle's philosophical direction that the present study has been concerned, but with the doctrines and attitudes which belong to the philosophical direction actually to be found in Aristotle's writings.

Thus it has appeared that when Aristotle approaches questions such as the meaning of human happiness, the relation of enjoyment and activity, the finding of happiness in reflection, and in the areas of friendship, self-regard, honor— he tends consistently to focus his estimates of value on the Ideal which constitutes the excellence of these states rather than the person in whom the Ideal is present.

This examination, carried on in the context of the Ethics, has thus been restricted to one area of Aristotle's thought, though a central one. It has also recognized the importance of further ascertaining the direction and developments of Aristotle's thought in a number of non-ethical matters which touch questions treated in the Ethics, but has had to leave these matters to

61 As appears to have been the case, for example, in the developing orientation of his ethical theory from the religious tone of the early Platonism found in his primitive ethics and in Metaphysics to the world-contemplative spirit of the latest period, that of the Nicomachean Ethics and the introduction to the Parts of Animals. As remarked before (note 27), the increasing personalness to which Jaeger has reference amounts in fact to a greater concentration on the notiota quod nos, but still with the individual viewed only from the aspect of its being a momentary embodiment of the Ideal. Cf. also note 4, and Ch. I, note 2.
settlement in studies other than the present.

One such pertinent area is the Aristotelian theology. Besides the question of how Aristotle arrives at his doctrine of God, the uniqueness of the First Mover, and the nature of his causality throughout the universe, is the question of what the Aristotelian God is in himself. The author's expansive description of certain aspects of God, notably the divine self-knowledge and self-enjoyment, is in contrast to an otherwise apersonal character. For God moves the whole universe simply by being known of, and this without having any active interest in the universe or even any knowledge of it. This view seems to grow systematically out of the Aristotelian universe in its gradations of actuality and potentiality, and is consistent with Aristotle's doctrines of final causality and of knowledge. The more personal notion of God is present in Aristotle's theology too, though its presence is rendered enigmatical rather than clarifying because of the apersonal context in which it is found. It is part of Aristotle's tradition-respecting way of speaking but is elaborated philosophically as well. Whether or not it can be deduced from the systematic notion of God which predominates is a problem in itself. Also problematic a suggestion of divine interest in human affairs, and an inclusion of enjoyment.

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62 See 1179a23-32, viz. "For if, as is generally believed, the gods exercise some superintendence over human affairs, then it will be reasonable to suppose that they take pleasure in that part of man which is best and most akin to themselves, namely the intellect, and that they recompense with their favours those men who esteem and honour this most, because these care for the things dear to themselves, and act rightly and nobly."

among the divine characteristics, 63 though the Aristotelian notion of excellence implies a sort of distinction between excellence possessed and subject possessing it. In short, it seems possible from the viewpoint of the Aristotelian notion of excellence (actuality) and possessor of excellence (capacity-possibility) to see Aristotle's First Mover only as the totality of excellence not as a possessor of excellence. For Aristotle's treatment of the possessor or subject of an activity always regards it only from the aspect of its being a capacity for the activity to take place, and not from the aspect of its being some kind of reality prior to its capacity-ness. Hence any notion of God as subject of activity is self-contradictory. 64 The question which arises from

63 See 1154b25-28: "For if any man had a simple nature, the same activity would afford him the greatest pleasure always. Hence God enjoys a single simple pleasure perpetually." Also Met. 1072bl4-16: The life of God is "such as the best that we enjoy, and enjoy but for a short time (for it is always in this state, which we cannot be,) since its actuality is also pleasure."

64 The distinction between perfection and ground-of-perfection in human activity and unmixed perfection in divine activity is developed at length by Jan Van der Meulen, Aristoteles: Die Mitte in Seinem Denken (Meisenheim/Glan, 1951), who concludes from the argument of Metaphysics A that the full reality of the Aristotelian God consists in his being the totality of determinateness, or definiteness, without however being anything determined, that is, without being a subject (p.283). Men, on the other hand, go beyond the determinateness which the lower animals and other beings possess and in their own ways develop, by the special human characteristic of openness to higher values, by their capacity to become in some limited degree (for they are bodily, and, even in their immaterial powers, potentialities rather than actualities) all things, thus leave the restriction of determinedness-to-one-thing-alone behind. "In diesem seinem wirksamen Sein ist jegliches Seiende auf Gott als das reine Sein selbst bezogen, ja sein Sein ist nur dieser Bezug, und sonst nichts." (p. 286) With determinateness as the ultimate meaning of reality (οὐσία : cf. pp. 282, 31-36), the aspect of being something in which determination comes to take place is ultimately of no significanee and can be dispensed with in God. The problem of the primary sense of reality is the same question that underlies areas of serious ambiguity elsewhere in Aristotle's doctrine as well.
these considerations, then, is whether the Aristotelian God's good consists totally in his sheer ideality, or also in his being a subject of existence. It cannot mean the latter if being a subject implies no more than a capacity for actualization.

Again, the question of Aristotle's notion of the composition of the human being is important for an understanding of the value standard which he applies to human activities. The traditional difficulty of reconciling the lives of action and of reflection in the Ethics is due not so much to Aristotle's failing to subordinate one to the other (for he accomplishes this in the last pages of Book Ten), as to the uncertainty of the basis on which he does so. The thinking part of man "is the man, or is so for the most part" and is the source in him of worth. But how man as a composite being and as a capacity for activity is related to the element by virtue of which thought actually takes place, is not clearly expressed in Aristotle, hence is a matter of dispute. Yet on this point hinges the ultimate value of the individual: whether the excellence of knowing originates in him as an individual or whether his individuality is only a place in which the actuality of knowledge, originating in some other source outside him, may be poured as into a receptacle. In the one case, the qualities of the Ideal, its excellence, eternity, unchangeableness, will find their ultimate reference in the subject, who reveals his own

transcending inner-reality by producing them in his activity. Otherwise, that is, at mere capacity, the individual as such lacks significance.

And this ambiguity in Aristotle's psychology points back finally to the metaphysical question what reality (οὐσία) means in the Aristotelian philosophy: whether there is any one sense of reality to which the variety of uses of the word can generally be referred. It may be that Aristotle never tries to systematize his use of the term; nevertheless it is conceivable that his use may tend to keep one general orientation. If so, two general orientations of meaning suggest themselves as possible: οὐσία as substance (the existing subject), or οὐσία as essence. In the former sense reality will mean an existing being, in which certain perfections exist and others may come to exist, but which is itself, beyond the perfections that may or may not be found in it, a sort of radical perfection, a self. In the latter sense reality will mean essence or Ideal, what amounts to the forms of perfection in their unconditionedness and their indifference to existence in this or that subject. From the one viewpoint the subject of an activity is a reality beyond the level of its activity and has significance on that count; but in the other viewpoint the subject is only a capacity or at best an unconsidered x in which a capacity is found. It has been remarked already which of the two Aristotle's general approach to value suggests.

This characteristic Aristotelian tendency to concentrate on the formal aspects of reality, on the knowable and assimilable patterns of reality in their unchangeableness, unconditionedness, eternalness—in short, this attentiveness to the Ideal, is the quality to which Jaeger has reference in his closing remarks on Aristotle's contribution to philosophy:
The presupposition of this complete devotion to the contemplation of the world is the objectivity, to the ultimate spiritual depths of which we cannot penetrate, in which everything that Aristotle put out is steeped, and which he bequeathed to Hellenistic science. We have already remarked that it is not to be confused with impersonality, but is a suprapersonal form of the mind. It is as far removed from the artistic-objectivity with which Plato in his writings clothes his spiritual passion to transform human life, as from that Thucydidean kind which escapes the pains of a frightful historical fate by regarding it as the necessary course of events and turning it into political knowledge. In those two Attic writers the struggle for objectivity is the reaction of a self that concentrates on sovereign values and is passionately interested in life. In their cases we ought to speak of objectification rather than simple objectivity. The objectivity of Aristotle is something primary. It expresses a great serenity towards life and the world, which we look for vainly in Attica from Solon to Epicurus. It is to be found rather in Hecataeus, Herodotus, Anaxagoras, SudaXus, and Democritus, much as these men differ from each other. There is something peculiarly contemplative and non-tragic about them. Aristotle, too, possessed that world-wide Ionian horizon, of whose soul-liberating breadth the brooding Attic spirit had no inkling. At the same time the essence of the Attic spirit had a profound influence upon him as it had upon Herodotus; it gave to his comprehensive istoiki or inquiry its unity and strictness of principle. Through these gifts he became, what it was not vouchsafed to any of the Ionian contemplators of the universe to be, the compelling organizer of reality and of science.

Such objectiveness is the tendency of thought which the present examination has uncovered in Aristotle's treatment of an area, that of human happiness, in which the personal element could be expected to be of central importance. Instead of the person, however, the Ideal is at center of his thought—as pattern of life and content of thought, as be-all and end-all of a man who is like Aristotle open to the contemplation of the order of things, an objective man.

Objectiveness, then, is the note which characterizes the Aristotelian approach to philosophy. It has left its mark in Aristotle's treatment of happiness and may well be traced in the other areas of his thought. As such

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it is a positive factor, to be discerned, examined, recognized for what it is. It is also in its way a restrictive factor. Aristotle's objectiveness may, by a change of suffix which reflects a difference in critical viewpoint, be called his objectivism. For, corresponding to Aristotle's dominant attention to the Ideal, is his inattentiveness to the existing subject in which the Ideal is found. Revealing itself in the direction in which he doctrine tends to develop itself if not in many of the attitudes present in his daily conduct of life, it is his tendency to put the weight of philosophical concern on that aspect of experience which is other than—in Jaeger's view, beyond—the personal. Aristotle's strong focus on the objective, projectible, structures of experience tends to draw strength away from his vision of what must lie under the structure—the subject as a reality in itself prescinding from its significance as repository of powers and capacities.

This reverse-side of Aristotle's objectiveness Jaeger calls with a certain appropriateness "a supra-personal form of the mind". But such an expression is at least questionable if it suggests that the aspect of reality which Aristotle tends to disregard is inferior to the aspect which he emphasizes. Insofar as reality and the experience of reality presents a twofold aspect, that of objectively discernible structure and that of existing subject, a philosophy will come short of its purpose of total comprehension of reality to the degree that its focus on one aspect of reality results, however unavoidably, in unfocusing its vision of the other aspect.

Discussion of the relationships of the two aspects, of the necessity of both in a comprehensive expression of reality, and of the effect of objectivism in the work of Aristotle and of other philosophers, is a philosophical question,
one of great moment. But historical or exegetical study of an author, the present study included, has as its proper purpose no more than to re-create the thinker's actual train of thought as far as it can be discovered. This interpretative function is a work distinct from the critical and reflective, though ultimately related to it, as memory is related to imagination and understanding, and experience in the past to inventiveness in the present.
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The thesis submitted by Mr. Joseph Disselhorst, S.J., has been read and approved by three members of the Department of Philosophy.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Jan 6, 1960

Date

Signature of Adviser