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A Study of Happiness in the Major Works of Immanuel Kant

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A STUDY OF HAPPINESS
IN THE MAJOR WORKS
OF IMMANUEL KANT

by

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A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

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LIFE

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PREFACE

For the purpose of study Kant's works have been divided into his Pre-Critical and Critical works. His critical works begin with the Critique of Pure Reason and include all his works published up to the time of his death in 1804.

The study of Kant's meaning of happiness will be limited to Kant's major works of the Critical Period. This study will not include his reflections and notations published posthumously since they were never specifically put in final form by Kant himself. The thesis is limited to the critical works because a study of happiness according to the pre-critical works has already been made by Dr. Paul Arthur Schilpp in Kant's Pre-Critical Ethics, Chicago, 1938.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"[O]ne's own happiness is, no doubt, an end that all men have (by virtue of the impulse of their nature). . . ."¹ Philosophers, in general, agree with this observation of Immanuel Kant. The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle is an attempt to show that living well and doing well are the constituents of the happiness for which man strives.² The central problem for the Greek philosophers was the problem of the ἀταφαίκα, that is, how man can maintain his peace of soul. The Epicurean sought to establish the thesis that this peace is maintained through the quest for happiness. The Stoic, on the other hand, argued against the Epicurean by pointing out that one must first pursue virtue to maintain his peace of soul and only then can man be happy, since consciousness of his virtue constitutes the essential element of his happiness. Saint Augustine


finds in man's quest for happiness a basis for arguing to the existence of God. While Aristotle had emphasized the subjective nature of man's natural quest for happiness, Saint Thomas Aquinas considered at greater length the ultimate object of this quest. 3

Turning to some modern philosophers, we find Helvetius maintaining the futility of proposing any standard of virtue, except that which conduces to general happiness. 4 Then Jeremy Bentham based the correctness of certain legal reforms on the principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, a principle which he took over from the last book of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, and which had been explicitly professed by the Italian jurist, Beccaria. So, also, previous to Bentham, the British moralist, Hutcheson, had written that "moral evil or vice is as the degree of misery and number of sufferers; so that the action is best which accomplishes the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers." 5 Bentham's norm for happiness would be based on the majority. J. S. Mill maintained that Bentham's rather quantitative theory of

3 S. T., I-11, 1-5.
6 Leslie Stephen, The English Utilitarians, I (London, 1900), p. 178, n., citing "Enquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil," iii, par. 8. Stephen also refers to works by Priestley and Beccaria in which some form of the greatest happiness theory had been previously used.
happiness as the foundation of man's activity should be modified by making the measure of happiness qualitative and by substituting mankind for the individual as the norm. Thus, for Mill, man's activity should be governed by the principle, the greatest happiness of mankind rather than by the greatest happiness of the individual. 7 Mill himself had already been influenced by the French philosopher, Auguste Comte, 8 who had given prominence to the greatest happiness principle under the name Altruism. In this same age, John Henry Cardinal Newman reiterated Aquinas' position that "the soul of man is made for the contemplation of its Maker; and that nothing short of that high contemplation is its happiness. ..." 9 Finally, in our own century, Morris R. Cohen pictures the background of American tradition by telling us that a "nervous restlessness and unquenched quest after pleasure sets the tone and character of American recreation; the phrase 'pursuit of happiness' is typically American." 10

The problem of happiness does not arise because philosophers deny the fact that happiness is an end for which man strives. Happiness becomes a problem when one tries to decide two things.

8Ibid., p. 49.
First, what is happiness subjectively considered? Secondly, in what objects or object is happiness to be realized? The answer to this question will result in the objective concept of happiness. For the Stoic, the subjective state of happiness is that of calm possession of self or that of complete control over one's interior state. His objective concept of happiness is a good whose attainment is within the capacity of his natural powers. The Epicurean would agree with the Stoic with regard to the objective concept of happiness, but the object must be capable of yielding an enjoyment. For the Epicurean, the subjective state of happiness is pleasure. Saint Thomas Aquinas placed the ultimate object of man's happiness in God. The subjective state of happiness consists in contemplating and loving God and all things in Him. Again, while Mill may disagree with Bentham as to whether the greatest happiness principle should be qualitative rather than quantitative, subjective happiness for them both is to be found in seeking pleasure and in avoiding pain.

Why then are there different ideas as to the meaning of happiness? The reason for this diversity seems to be that the concept happiness grows out of an involves a man's whole philosophy of life—metaphysical, epistemological, psychological, ethical, and religious. The concept happiness, as a consequence, differs according to a philosopher's view of reality and its meaning, and, more precisely, according to his concept of the nature of man. Thus, not all philosophers conceive of human nature as involving the same
relationships to different goods. Some philosophers will include in their concept of human nature a man-God relationship, a relation to society, a relation to equals, and so on. Others will deny this or that relationship in their conception of human nature. Ultimately, it becomes a question of determining the nature and reality of the good.

If God is denied recognition, He cannot be the object of man's happiness. If the man-society relationship is held to dominate in the concept of man, man's happiness is subordinated to the natural good of the State. Thus Auguste Comte's concept of human nature in its various relationships will omit man's relationship to God in favor of a relationship of man to humanity. The problem of happiness would then consist in working out a hierarchy of values for mankind apart from God, and this would suppose a norm by which one could judge what is the good of man apart from God.

In short, we may say that the history of human thought shows that the concept of happiness can be found to be dependent upon the two main factors mentioned above: one's concept of the nature and meaning of reality and, especially, one's concept of man in relation to the good. Therefore, in studying Immanuel Kant's concept of happiness attention must be given to these two points. Once Kant's position on these two points are recalled to mind and the reasons why he adopted his own characteristic doctrines on these

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points, we can proceed to examine: (1) What his concept of happiness is; (2) Why he makes happiness empirical; (3) Why he cannot make happiness the end of man; and, (4) What relationship happiness has to morality.

Our procedure will be to examine the major works of Kant and to draw out the meaning from his use of the word happiness in each particular context. Principal secondary sources will be used wherever they are found useful.

Using the two factors outlined above, the chapters of this thesis will fall under four headings. In Chapter II our intent will be to learn what effect, if any, Kant's philosophy (epistemology) has upon his concept of man and, in turn, upon his concept of happiness. In Chapter III a consideration of the primacy given by Kant to morality will be directed to show how Kant broadens his concept of human nature and how this, in turn, affects his concept of happiness. In Chapter IV we will be in a position to consider the essential notes assigned to happiness by Kant and to establish the correctness of the conclusions reached in Chapters II and III. Chapter IV will also consider happiness as it is made a constituent of Kant's *Summum Bonum*. We will thus be enabled to consider the relationship Kant has established between happiness and morality. Chapter V will consist of a brief summary of conclusions reached in this study together with an indication of some of the problems resulting from Kant's position.
CHAPTER II

MAN AND HAPPINESS WITHIN KANT'S

EPISTEMOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

[A]s far as our nature as sensible beings is concerned, our happiness is the only thing of consequence. . . .

The philosophy of Immanuel Kant is largely a result of his age's concern for certitude as to the real. In reading Kant's works one becomes aware that the real for Kant was twofold: the world of morality and the world of determined mechanistic reality. As to the sciences of mathematics and physics, Kant says: "We often hear complaints of shallowness of thought in our age and of the consequent decline of sound science. But I do not see that the sciences which rest upon a secure foundation, such as mathematics, physics, etc. in the least deserve this reproach. On the contrary, they merit their old reputation for solidity, and, in the case of physics, even surpass it. The same spirit would have become active

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in other kinds of knowledge, "If only attention had first been directed to the determination of their principles." However, Kant found that John Locke and David Hume had reduced science to a habit of the mind and morality to sentimentality. In Kant's eyes, Wolffian metaphysics had not only failed to reconcile science and morality for the scientist, but had also allowed freedom in human activity to be crumbled into the ruins of fatalism and atheism. The real, for Kant, was under attack. If moral activity, responsibility, was to have any meaning, Kant saw that morality had to be grounded on a universal and necessary principle and not on Rousseau's sentimentality. If the sciences and their methods were to have universal application and validity, Kant determined that he had to wrest from the principle of causality and other categories of being Hume's label, "an empirical habit of mind." Kant's argument, then, is against those who would interpret the world merely in terms of what is revealed to the senses in favor of those whose interpretation would also include a world of freedom or moral activity. His argument is also against the metaphysicians whose vindication of these realities he found to be faulty. They were, Kant felt, causing scandal by their endless disputes. He points out that the cause of

2 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London, 1950), p. Axi, n. a (9). First page number refers to the first German edition by Friedrich Hartknoch, 1787; second number refers to the Smith translation. B numbers, which refer to the second Hartknoch edition, will be given when passages are in both editions. This work will be designated simply as Pure.

3 Ibid., p. Bxxxiv (31-32).
these disputes was due to their failure to utilize a correct method in philosophy. It was Kant's intention to give to philosophy a correct method.

Kant's method of approach is similar to that of Descartes and John Locke. Locke, reporting on a meeting in which the discussion centered on the problems of morality and laws of nature, wrote: "It came into my thought that we took a wrong course; and that, before we set ourselves upon inquires of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with . . . ."

In like manner Kant began with an analysis of the faculty of reason. He tells us that the critical method of transcendental philosophy "is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge . . . ." His approach does not begin with the fact that an object (other than the awareness of the mind and will) is. His inquiry is directed to the principles involved in the acts of knowing and willing—how we know and will. As Kant visualizes the problem, only in the process of explaining how we know and will can one proceed to say what he knows. Thus, any inquiry into the nature of happiness according to Kant must take into account the principles according to which happiness can be known. Is happiness real for Kant? What relationship does it have to other Kantian realities? Is happiness as im-

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5 Spur, p. A12, B26 (59); cf. Ibid., n.
portant in one's life as science and morality. If an answer is sought independently of a consideration of Kant's critique of the knowing mind and of what was the real for him, our answers would reflect little of his true notion of happiness and less of the reasons why his notion of happiness can only be empirical or in time. Our first step, then, will be to inquire about Kant's method. The second step will be to consider the grounds on which the suppositions of the first step are based. Our third step will be to ascertain the effect of the conclusions found in steps one and two on Kant's concepts of man and happiness.

"[T]o know an object I must be able to prove its [real or logical] possibility." 6 Now by proving real or logical possibility Kant means that we must show what a priori principles must be posited in any act of knowing and willing if we are to understand an object to have real existence or only logical existence. Since judgments are the record of one's knowing acts, Kant's method begins with an analysis of judgments. This analysis ultimately leads to his decision as to the logical and the real possibility of objects. The problem then is one of finding out in what judgments real possibility of an object, as opposed to logical possibility, is


7For Kant, "to understand" an object embraces knowledge both of its existence and of its essence in terms of phenomena. To understand is opposed to the act to think. To think an object is not to affirm the object's existence or knowledge of its essence, but rather to show the logical consistency of its notes. The object which is "thought" can become an object of faith if practical reason deems it practically necessary, but it never becomes an object of knowledge.
Kant found that the logical possibility of an object results from an analytic proposition. He postulates that in such a judgment only a "clearness" of knowledge results. In such a judgment one only "thinks" the consistency of the notes of an object, that is, he elucidates the content of the subject thought. For example, the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something hidden in the latter concept. Important here is Kant's position that nothing new is added by the predicate to the concept of the subject. The mind need not go outside itself to ascertain the notes of the predicate. Furthermore, analytic propositions are the products of the faculty of reason as opposed to the faculty of understanding. Finally, analytic propositions have the character of universality and necessity since they are the activities of reason alone. Thus, in Kantian terminology, they are called a priori judgments.

The second type of judgment, a synthetic judgment, testifies to the real possibility of an object, that is, that it does exist, and that one can have knowledge of the existence of such an object. Any object signified by a synthetic proposition can be known as real. Here Kant postulates that an "expansive" knowledge results, that is, that the predicate lies outside the concept of the subject but is yet connected with it. Hence, there is more in a synthetic proposition than just a "clearness" of knowledge or a process of "thinking" by reason. More important for Kant is his further distinction of synthetic propositions into a priori and a posteriori.
While the object signified by both types of synthetic judgments really exist, the ground for the connection between the subject and predicate of the a priori proposition is necessary and universal while the ground for the a posteriori proposition is only contingent. The problem of chief import, then, is to ascertain the "ground" according to which Kant makes judgments that are sometimes analytic and sometimes synthetic. This ground on which synthetic propositions are based will also enable us to distinguish between synthetic propositions and analytic propositions according to some ultimate norm. This ground will give to us a criterion for distinguishing real objects from logical objects of thought. This brings us to step number two of our inquiry. Before proceeding to the inquiry into the nature of Kant's criteria for known reality it may be pointed out that Kant has reduced the problem of explaining how the mind works to the problem of finding the a priori principles which he considers to be necessary if synthetic propositions are to be rendered intelligible. He states the problem very broadly: "How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?" 8

In the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of the first Critique, Kant takes as fundamental that all synthetic judgments expand knowledge and prove the real possibility of an object. The sources of such judgments are two: sensibility and understanding, whose roots, he tells us, are unknown to us although they may be common. Kant's

criterion for knowledge of real objects is that objects be intuited sensibly and known through the faculty of the understanding.

Considering first the root of sensibility as a source of knowledge of real objects, Kant establishes the ideality of space and time as pure a priori forms of the subject knowing. That is, the outer sense is subject to the pure form of space. Hence, the outer sense will give us the material of our representations (extension, hardness, etc.) only in the background of space. The inner sense is subject to the pure form of time. Hence, the inner sense will only represent the manifold of things successively, that is, in time. Hence, whatever is known is known as object, intuited and ordered through sensibility with its a priori forms of space and time. Sensible intuition, to be more specific, ordered by these forms constitutes the first element necessary to know what objects are real and which are logical.

In the "Transcendental Analytic" Kant discusses the second source of knowledge—the understanding. Here Kant is interested in establishing the ground for the distinction between a priori and a posteriori propositions. Thus, he distinguishes between empirical concepts (a posteriori) and a priori concepts. Empirical concepts are fashioned in the understanding by abstracting from experience. However, by abstraction Kant does not mean that the resulting concept indicates the essence of an object. A concept is the understanding's way of synthesizing or connecting together under one general name the diverse perceptions given through inner
and outer sense and ordered by the forms of space and time and the faculty of imagination. The empirical concept merely designates one group of diverse phenomena as tree, desk, house, body, etc. All empirical concepts are gained through this process of synthesis.

A priori concepts or categories of the mind, Kant maintains, are not abstracted from sense perceptions. They are derived from pure reason alone. They express the general combining activity of understanding which seeks to bring perceptions presented to it under the mind's own ordered unity. For example, understanding combines phenomena in relation to one another according to the mind's a priori and universally necessary law of cause and effect, or into a relationship of substance and accident. Kant is now ready to answer his question as to the possibility of synthetic propositions and especially a priori synthetic propositions.

In the case of an a posteriori synthetic proposition the ground which enables us to get beyond a conception and add new elements is the new experience or the empirical perception. Ultimately, the sensible intuition or perception is the ground for the distinction between a real and a logical object of thought. We have seen too that the intuition is the ultimate reason for the distinction between an analytic and a synthetic proposition, since Kant conceives the analytic proposition to be but an expression of an identity between the subject and predicate and not a synthesis. Now Kant tells us that the matter of the intuition is the ground for the connection between the subject and predicate of an empirical
proposition.

In the case of an *a priori* synthetic proposition, its possibility is grounded, first, on the *pure forms* (space and time) of perception, and secondly, on the *matter* of perceptions. Finally, it is grounded on the *a priori* concepts. By reason of the fact that this type of synthetic propositions is grounded on the *a priori* forms of space and time and the *a priori* categories, primarily, it is an *a priori* synthetic proposition. It is distinguished from the *a posteriori* because the latter rests primarily on the matter of the perceptions.

This analysis of propositions to determine the real or logical possibility of objects leads to Kant's characteristic doctrines. First, intuitions without concepts or concepts without intuitions can never yield *knowledge* either of the fact or of the *quiddity* of real objects. Secondly, since the forms of perceptions are *a priori* and the manner in which the subject and predicate of any proposition are connected depend upon the *a priori* categories of thought, Kant concludes that what man knows is the appearances of things-in-themselves. What man knows is only the procession of diverse and unique phenomena: sights, feelings, sounds, thoughts, choices, etc. Hence, Kant made his well known distinction between noumenon (essence or thing-in-itself) and phenomenon (appearance). Such a distinction, he maintains, saves him from complete idealism. His argument is simple. Granted, he says, that we cannot know the essence of a thing except in terms of phenomena, the word phenomenon
has no meaning except that it be an appearance of something. Thus, we can know that something (noumenon) exists but we have no intuition of it directly since what we intuit is also ordered by our subjective a priori forms of space and time. Finally, this analysis leads Kant to think that he has placed the sciences once again on a firm foundation. By reducing the science of mathematics, physics and geometry to a priori synthetic propositions, their universality and necessity is insured through the a priori forms of space and time together with the a priori categories of thought.

The consequences of the "Analytic" are further delineated in the "Transcendental Dialectic." We need only recall Kant's conclusions very briefly; they are necessary for our purposes because his doctrine on the transcendental ideas will have reference to his doctrine on ideals. The latter involve his notion of happiness.

In the "Dialectic" Kant sets out to deliver the death blow to the metaphysicians. He does recognize that the mind has a propensity for a greater synthesis of knowledge than that given by the forms of the categories of the understanding to phenomena: knowledge "starts with the senses, proceeds from thence to understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which there is no higher faculty to be found in us for elaborating the matter of intuition and bringing it under the highest unity of thought." 9 Two things are to be noted. First, Kant only admits a propensity for knowledge beyond

9Ibid., p. A 299, B355 (300).
the unity of the understanding. He does not say there is knowledge in his understanding of the word. Secondly, the faculty of reason is introduced as playing a role in this propensity for knowledge. Here Kant sets reason its field of activity and its limits. Since knowledge is limited to objects which can be sensibly intuited, supra-sensible objects cannot be known to exist by the understanding. Such supra-sensible objects are the objects of reason's thought, and among these objects are what Kant calls the three transcendental ideas and the numberless ideals of reason.

The three transcendental ideas—God, Cosmos, and Soul—are the products of speculative reason. Reason is compelled to "think" these ideas by its very nature, but reason cannot prove or disprove the existence of these objects signified by the ideas. The reason is that these ideas are concepts without either sensible or intellectual intuition. Hence, reason cannot know or prove their real possibility, nor can anyone prove that such objects do not exist. Kant tells us that the ideas function as a negative norm for speculative reason in the sense that speculative reason realizes its lack of intuition, and hence, the limits of its power in gaining "expansive" knowledge of either the noumenal or phenomenal world. He concludes that the metaphysician wastes his time by speculating on the objects signified by the transcendental ideas. The positive use that Kant has for the transcendental ideas will be considered in Chapter II. In general, he tells us that the thought of complete unity realizable through the ideas does motivate us to set up ideals
for the continued exercise of the understanding. Furthermore, it stimulates the mind to seek completion of its work, and the mind, in turn, then seeks to bring the events and objects of experience into a unity of its own making. An ideal is such a unity, that is, a "thought" which cannot be realised as knowledge. Were one to ask what constitutes a transcendental object, Kant replies that although "no answer can be given stating what it is, we can... reply that the question itself is nothing, because there is no object [corresponding] to it... We have here a case where the common saying holds, that no answer is itself an answer."\(^\text{10}\)

This concludes our second step in which we have summarized the essential principles presupposed by Kant in his critical approach to philosophy. We can now proceed to our third step of determining how Kant's concept of happiness falls into the pattern of this epistemological framework.

The first consideration will be to determine under which category of judgment one's propositions about happiness fall. Is a judgment about happiness an analytic proposition? If so, does it remain an ideal statement so that nothing is expressed concerning the real possibility of happiness in one's experience? Or, is a happiness-judgment synthetic, and if so, does this judgment express necessary or only contingent knowledge about happiness?

We have seen that the source of judgment, the concept, is giv-

en either a priori or a posteriori. The empirical concept, based on the matter of an empirical perception, cannot yield any "synthetic proposition except such as is itself also merely empirical (that is, a proposition of experience), and which for that very reason can never possess . . . necessity and absolute universality. . . ."\(^{11}\) Now Kant is very specific at this point in labelling the concept 

happiness empirical: "[T]he elements which belong to the concept of happiness are without exception empirical—that is, they must be borrowed from experience."\(^{12}\) Since we may have synthetic propositions about happiness, we may conclude that happiness has real possibility for Kant. Kant is admitting individual acts of man in time that are resultant of a very concretely determined concept concerning happiness. The proposition may express a specific object, which is considered a part of one's happiness, as desired, or it may express the means necessary to attain some specified objects of happiness. Again, the proposition concerning happiness may have reference to a very concrete interior state. Thus, the elements contained in synthetic propositions about happiness which does actually exist must be very concrete and very real for the individual seeking happiness. Just what constitutes both


\(^{12}\) Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, trans. H. J. Paton, *in* The Moral Law (London, 1947), p. 46 (85). The first page number refers to the second German edition published in Kant's lifetime; the second number refers to the Paton translation. This work will be designated simply as *Groundwork*. 
concepts, the subjective and objective aspects of happiness, will be seen in Chapter IV, below.

If we abstract from the individual concrete elements peculiar to the objective concept, we have a description of the subjective concept of perfect happiness in its abstract state. Kant calls this concept an "ideal." In order to determine the real possibility of perfect happiness, we must submit the concept to the first Critique's norm for the possibility of existence: Does the ideal of perfect happiness result in a synthetic judgment?

For Kant an ideal requires an absolute whole or a maximum of content in the concept. The ideal should be universal, necessary (that is *a priori*), and determinate as to its contents which must be given *a priori* to experience. In the case of happiness, then, the ideal must contain not only a description of the subjective elements relating to the subjective state of an agent seeking happiness, but also it must exhaust all possible objects which might conceivably make up happiness. Applying Kant's general norm for an ideal to his ideal of happiness, we find that happiness is an ideal completely indeterminate in an *a priori* manner. The ideal merely designates an end (abstractly stated) hoped for. All that is contained in the ideal of happiness is a general description and qualities appropriate to the subjective state of an individual possessing or enjoying perfect happiness. The ideal lacks implicit designation of any means by which the state of happiness can be attained. The question arises, then, as to why Kant may call
happiness an ideal when the concept does not measure up to the third required quality for an ideal, that is, a determinate concept. Kant's answer is that happiness is an ideal in a specific sense even if not according to strict definition.

Happiness is an ideal, not of reason but of the imagination. 13

The distinction between these two types of ideals is presented in the first Critique as follows:

The products of the imagination are of an entirely different nature [than the ideal of reason]; no one can explain or give an intelligible concept of them; each is a kind of monogram, a mere set of particular qualities, determined by no assignable rule, and forming rather a blurred sketch drawn from diverse experiences than a determinate image—a representation such as painters and physiognomists profess to carry in their heads, and which they treat as being an incommunicable shadowy image of their creations. . . . [They] are viewed as being models (not indeed realisable) of possible empirical intuition, and yet furnish no rules that allow of being explained and examined. 14

Here, in giving the characteristics of an ideal of the imagination, Kant seems to be very precise in establishing the ideal of happiness on empirical grounds. Hence, the ideal, while it may yield synthetic propositions, cannot yield a priori synthetic propositions. Nor does the ideal result in analytic propositions. Kant says that if it were easy to find a determinate concept of happiness, then the ideal would yield analytic propositions or what he calls imperatives for attaining happiness. 15 Only if the means

13Ibid., p. 47 (86).
15Groundwork, p. 46 (85).
leading to happiness would be explicitly or implicitly in the ideal
could the ideal be analytic. He argues by way of analogy with
mathematics to bring out his meaning. Thus, if one has the work
of dividing a line into two equal parts, implicit in the end pro-
posed is the action required for dividing the line: "I must from
its ends describe two intersecting arcs."16 Cassirer, commenting on
this, says that it may seem absurd to consider even hypothetically
that the concept of happiness could yield analytic propositions
since it is obviously very difficult or impossible to have perfect
knowledge of what we should do to make ourselves happy. But, he
adds that

it is important to notice that the difficulty is in know-
ing how to achieve happiness. It is not at all difficult
to see that if we had full knowledge of the nature of hap-

diness and the means of achieving it, our actions would fol-

dow immediately and would be in strict accordance with our

knowledge.17

In raising the question as to whether the ideal of happiness
will result in analytic propositions, Kant seems to wish to point
out two facts. He stresses the fact that the ideal would be capa-
ble of yielding analytic propositions if it were determined. As we
saw above, objects signified by analytic propositions only have
logical possibility, since one does not have to appeal to sense
intuition to verify the analytic concept. Hence, Kant is pointing

16 Ibid., p. 45 (85).

17 H. W. Cassirer, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Judgment
out that speculative reason would yet have no intellectual or sensible intuition of the object, perfect happiness, to validate its "thinking" the ideal even if it could have a priori a determinate concept of the ideal. The ideal will never have empirical existence.

A second fact that Kant possibly means to stress is that propositions proceeding from the ideal of happiness, while in a sense practical propositions, depend entirely on a concretization process by the faculties of the understanding and imagination. Since these faculties have been limited by Kant to the knowledge of phenomena, it follows that propositions about happiness can only be in terms of phenomenal states and phenomenal objects. The propositions of happiness explain what is known to exist. Hence, the determined proposition about happiness is a theoretical principle of action as opposed to what Kant calls a practical principle. More will be seen of Kant's "practical principle of action" in Chapter II. At this point of our investigation Kant's epistemological framework seems to indicate that happiness will be limited to empirical concepts, that is, limited to states and objects of the phenomenal world. This conclusion will be verified later in his doctrine on happiness. However, it might well be pointed out that not all the commentators agree. In his work, Kant's Pre-Critical Ethics, Dr. Paul Arthur Schilpp gives some consideration to Kant's ideas about happiness. Dr. Schilpp maintains that happiness for Kant in this period is not so much something sensed as something thought. He shows that happiness embraces the noumenal order as well
as the phenomenal order of reality. Finally, Dr. Schilpp's work shows that Kant's doctrine of happiness holds a place of relative importance and is not completely overshadowed by Kant's doctrine of duty in the pre-critical period. For this thesis, it is important that we especially note his concluding remarks:

We may be told that whatever may be true for the pre-Critical period, Kant's formalism in the *Grundlegung*, in the second *Critique*, and in the *Metaphysics* of Morals of 1797 is indubitably that of the "mould" type, the Categorical Imperative standing irrevocably as the central teaching of his definitive ethical treatises. I am not ready to accept such a statement. Rather I suspect that the understanding and interpretation of Kant's definitive ethical thought have been mistaken just as I believe them to have been mistaken for his pre-Critical period. The proof of my suspicion would require a critical analysis of Kant's definitive ethical treatises. This I hope sooner or later to be able to make. Until then I must reserve the right, in view of the results of the present study, to doubt the truth of the current interpretations of Kant's more definitive ethical theory.

Dr. Schilpp has not yet published the proof of his suspicions. However, in view of his warning, it should be pointed out that the positions as to the phenomenal character of Kant's happiness and as to the formalistic method in which duty dominates happiness will be upheld for Kant's Critical works.

Our third step in this chapter requires yet another consideration. As was pointed out in the introduction, the notion of happiness is inseparably involved in the notion of man's nature because


19 Ibid., p. 174.
both concepts involve the notion of an objective good. What, then, can Kant's notion of human nature tell us about his concept of happiness? Concerning man's nature, Kant tells us that "[m]an is himself an appearance... There is no condition determining man in accordance with this character which is not contained in the series of natural effects, or which is not subject to their law..."  

In other words, such diverse phenomena or natural effects as seeing, hearing, smelling, seeing, thinking, imagining, or willing are intuited, subject to the forms of space and time and "thought" as a unit or a whole through understanding's empirical concept or general term, man. All that we know about man is contained in the succession of accidents going to make up the notion man. We have no a priori perception and no a priori conception of the object man as he is. The appearances of man are evidence only to the fact that man is and not evidence of what he is. Nor does one have any self knowledge of what man is, that is, a knowledge which is attained by a simultaneous interior concomitant reflection in the act of knowing an object. The reason, Kant tells us, is that man knows himself only as object and never as subject. The nearest realization of real oneness allowed in Kant's epistemological framework to man is the pure logical form which Kant calls "unity of apperception," an empty "I think" or the transcendental ego. One is not aware of such a logical form. One argues to its existence.

What does such a form tell us? It tells us two things, Kant assures us. First, the fact that I am: "I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am." Secondly, the "I think" expresses the necessity of a synthesis of all appearances according to the forms of space and time, the concepts of the understanding, and the re-presentation of the imaginative faculty into the one group phenomenon, man. Without the "I think" there would be no unity or consciousness underlying the diverse phenomena grouped together as man nor any capacity for the process of synthesis. Without the logical transcendental ego, one could never attribute any activity as belonging to a subject such as man. Nor could anyone ever be aware of the process of how knowledge is constructed without the supposition of the unifying transcendental ego. Furthermore, the "I think" remains only a logical entity for Kant because the form is without a corresponding intuition of self as one substance or unity. Some, Kant says, call the "I think" the soul, but he immediately warns us that the soul "is not . . . knowledge of the simple nature of the self as subject, such as might enable us to distinguish it from matter." To speak of the terms soul or incorporeal substance, for Kant, is merely to designate under those terms what sensations or pheno-

mena come from inner sense. The terms body or corporeal substance, on the other hand, designate what sensations come from outer sense. Thus, to say that man is a union of soul and body is not knowledge of man's nature. The only significance that Kant gives to the terms body and soul is that man may be considered to have a soul in so far as he has an active aspect (understanding and willing) and a body in so far as he has a passive aspect (matter or sensibility). On the supposition that the concept nature, indicates an end, and from Kant's position that man has no theoretical understanding of man's nature, it follows that man can have no theoretical knowledge of man's end or good except in terms of phenomena. A fortiori Kant cannot say precisely what the nature of happiness is except in terms of phenomenal objects since the concept happiness involves in its ordinary comprehension man in relation to some good.

However, the question arises as to how Kant can have knowledge of the phenomenal man in relation to some good. Kant would answer, through the category of relation. The relations which are to be found in all the representations making up the phenomenon man are: (1) relation to the subject; (2) relation to the object; and (3) relation to all things in general. From the aspect of man himself, it is not man, the soul, and the body that is in relation to some some other phenomenal object. Rather man's specific faculties, his feelings, his wants, his desires constitute one term of the rela-

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tion. In so far as these feelings and desires are unified under the logical transcendental ego, man can consider himself in relation to some external good. Happiness will involve these feelings and desires and other bodily faculties and powers and the objects that satisfy them. Happiness, then, will have an active aspect and a passive aspect in so far as phenomenal man must act and be acted upon in terms of the needs of these faculties. On the other hand, the second term of the relation, the good to which the faculties tend or the objects of happiness, can never be any sort of transcendental object, such as God. The term God is only a transcendental idea of reason. The category of relation can never be applied to bring the phenomenal aspects of man into relationship with a transcendental object. The same thing is to be said for the term society. Society is an ideal of reason for Kant. Hence, man's happiness cannot be known to involve the good of society or the good of humanity. If happiness must be explained in terms of the categories of the understanding, then it seems to involve only the goods that can be known to be in relation to the phenomenal aspects of man. Hence, the objects, themselves, must be phenomenal.

Does the idea of spiritual happiness have any significance? Can happiness be spiritual. Kant says that such terms as immateriality, incorruptibility (simplicity), and personality gave birth to the idea of spirituality. He attributes the origin and use of

the idea of these terms to the attempts of the metaphysicians to ascertain the nature of the a priori form of apperception, "I think." Such ideas, according to Kant, are mere predicables inherent in the transcendental idea soul. The only meaning the proposition, "Happiness is spiritual," might have for Kant is that happiness at its best consists in the activity of inner sense as distinct from the passivity of outer sense. In what way is man active with regard to happiness? Kant says that "[t]he greatest happiness a man can experience is to feel that he is the originator and builder of his own happiness and that what he enjoys he has acquired himself. . . ."27

In yet another place, Kant shows what he means by the statement that man is the source and builder of his own happiness: "Man is a being who, as belonging to the world of sense, has wants, and so far his reason has an office which it cannot refuse, namely, to attend to the interest of his sensible nature . . . with a view to the happiness of this life, and if possible even to that of a future."28 To say, then, that happiness is spiritual means only that happiness is to be directed by reason and not suffered (passively) both according to the whims of the passing moment and without rule. Spiritual happiness for Kant cannot mean that the subjective act consists in some experience transcending the natural faculties or

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27 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (London, 1930), p. 127-28. This work will be designated as Lectures.

28 Practical, p. 181 (152).
natural objects. Kant's epistemological principles will allow for knowledge of sensible love but never knowledge of spiritual love. No so-called spiritual reality can be understood as a part of the concept happiness.

Also, according to Kantian principles, the notion eternal happiness arises because of the proposition "The soul is simple, and consequently immortal." Theoretical understanding would understand this proposition to mean that happiness consists of a never-ending series of phenomena grouped together and thought by the understanding as having a never-ending relation to the subject, man. Does such an idea have objective possibility? In accordance with Kantian principles man has no intuition of such a never-ending series which would serve as a ground to the idea that happiness is eternal. The contents of happiness must, then, remain always subject to the a priori form of time and as a consequence appear and be known only in one unique instant. One can never predict with certainty what the next point in time will bring. Happiness, then, is in time, and this means that happiness is restricted in its objective and subjective conceptions to the phenomenal order. Man cannot know that his happiness will be never ending. To say that happiness is eternal because man's soul is simple, or to say that the ultimate object of happiness is spiritual and, hence, eternal, has no meaning for Kant. Such reasoning, Kant points out, is based

29"In time" must not be taken to mean that Kant excludes a future life. Kant holds that one cannot theoretically know this fact.
on the supposition that the natures of God and man can be comprehended.

Kant's picture of man resulting from an epistemological approach has limited man's theoretical understanding of himself to the phenomenal world. Theoretical knowledge is not about man in himself, but about man as he appears. We must be satisfied with knowledge of phenomenal man and not with man as he is essentially. It seems, then, that man's happiness is to embrace only that which is intelligible to theoretical understanding, that is, phenomena. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, happiness is the only thing of consequence as far as our nature as sensible beings is concerned. Happiness is at its best when man is active in planning his happiness and man is aware of the part he plays as an agent of happiness. But even this intellectual contentment is the concern of man as a sensible being, that is, as phenomenal man. It is experienced as phenomenal man and not as noumenal man.

How does Kant evaluate the quest for happiness? Our answer depends upon Kant's evaluation of man as phenomenal man. Thus, for Kant, the faculty of understanding, even though it yields the priceless knowledge of the sciences of phenomena and enables man to attain intellectual superiority over nature, does not constitute a dignity sufficiently worthy of man's title to "pre-eminence over nature and beasts." Possession of intellectual powers does not

30 See page 7, above.
raise man above the level of mechanistic nature. With understand-
ing, man is not so elevated, for the understanding is subject to
the a priori categories in expressing itself. Hence, man's under-
standing operates according to fixed laws. The categories are na-
ture's gifts, and they are mechanically applied to the manifold of
experience much the same as animals follow their instinctive powers.
Writing of the merits of man's speculative and theoretical reason,
Kant says:

I am myself by nature a speculator. I feel a consuming
thirst for knowledge and a compelling unrest to progress
[in advancing knowledge]; also I feel a contentment at
each advance. There was a time when I believed that all
this [knowledge] is what confers real dignity upon human
life, and I despised the masses who know nothing. Rou-
seau has set me right. This blinding excellence disap-
ppears; I learn to honor man, and would find myself no
more useful than the common laborer, if I did not believe
that these considerations could give a value, surpassing
all, on which to establish the rights of human life.31

The path which Rousseau pointed out to Kant, the path on which
the rights of human life are established, the path on which even
the common laborer has excellence surpassing all and worthy of es-
teehm from all men--this path is the path of freedom. In this path,
the ideas of will, faith, and moral activity are the sign-posts.
Since knowledge is limited to things which can be known phenomenal-
ly, knowledge does not make man free. Man's outlook on nature
through knowledge alone is determined and mechanistic. Through

31 Immanuel Kant, Sammtliche Werke, ed., B. Hartenstein, VIII
(Leipzig, 1868), p. 624. Here translated. This work will be desig-
nated simply as Werke.
knowledge man is subjected to the whims of his own nature as well as external nature. The will, on the other hand, is a faculty that can transcend the laws of nature. Nor is the will concerned with knowledge. Hence, the exercise of this faculty in its highest perfection can belong to the rich and poor or the ignorant and learned alike. From these remarks we may estimate Kant's attitude toward the quest for happiness.

Since happiness seems to be limited to objects over which theoretical understanding can have knowledge, the quest for happiness in itself does not confer a title to the rights of human life on man. Nor does the quest for happiness necessarily imply a presence of some quality within man whereby he is worthy of esteem unless in some way happiness can have some relation to the faculty of the will. Kant is preparing the way to bring in man's faculty of will and freedom for a greater role in his concept of man. Kant wishes to broaden his limited concept of man as presented within his epistemological framework. Although he cannot have knowledge of man other than that given by concepts backed up by phenomena, yet Kant feels that he can offer an ideal of man which is more comprehensive than the empirical concept of man. The part that the will plays in this broadened concept of man and the consequences of this on the concept of happiness will be unfolded within Kant's moral framework.
CHAPTER III
MAN AND HAPPINESS WITHIN
KANT'S MORAL FRAMEWORK

Suppose now that for a being possessed of reason and a will the real purpose of nature were his preservation . . . or in a word his happiness. In that case nature would have hit on a very bad arrangement by choosing reason in the creature to carry out this purpose. For all the actions he has to perform with this end in view, . . . would have been mapped out for him far more surely by instinct; and the end in question could have been maintained far more surely by instinct than it ever can by reason. . . . These judgements . . . have as their hidden ground the idea of another and much more worthy purpose of existence, for which, and not for happiness, reason is quite properly designed.1

In the "Preface of the Second Edition" of the first Critique, Kant answers the objection that his Critique is negative and not positive. His critique, he tells us, has removed an obstacle which had long stood in the way of and had threatened to destroy the employment of practical reason. What is that obstacle and what is the employment of practical reason of which Kant speaks? First, the obstacle of which Kant speaks is the illegitimate use of reason in so far as the metaphysician speculates about the existence of ob-

1Groundwork, pp. 4-6 (63-64).
jects not verified by sensible intuitions. Kant believed that speculation about the existence of objects signified by the transcendental ideas led only to the fact that reason could show neither that the objects exist nor that they do not exist. Such speculation, he thinks, had resulted in a contemporary concept of man as a determined or mechanical creature of nature. Furthermore, this speculation had diverted philosophers' attention from reason's more noble use. By restricting the proper task of man's understanding to an inquiry into the functions of sensible phenomena, and of speculative reason to showing the logical consistency of its concepts or ideas, Kant believed he had prepared the way for enlightening mankind, not only as to what exactly the more noble use of reason entailed, but also, as to how the concept of a free man could be maintained. Our second consideration, then, concerns the employment of reason aside from its speculative employment.

"We are convinced that there is an absolutely necessary practical employment of pure reason . . . in which it inevitably goes beyond the limits of sensibility."² Now by the practical use of reason, Kant means in general that which is possible through the concept of freedom.³ Freedom is beyond the limits of sensibility. Freedom, in turn, is the essential condition of moral obligation. Hence, Kant finds that in his moral quest, that is, in the practi-

³Ibid., p A632, B660 (525).
cal employment of his reason man is provided with the necessary clue, not only to the existence of a higher reality than the phenomenal world, but also to the logical possibility of his existence as a free man. Moral activity substantiates what Kant had already posited as necessary in the epistemological framework, that is, the noumenon. Kant reasons that to be moral, man must be free, and to be free man must belong to a realm of freedom. Were our natures entirely phenomenal, they would be wholly subject to the causal laws of the phenomenal world. Hence, man's moral experience points to the existence of an additional essence—a noumenal man. One commentator sums up Kant's reasons for distinguishing between the noumenon and phenomenon by telling us: "Nature takes on a phenomenal aspect for the sake of morality."\(^4\)

For Kant, then, man is more than a creature of nature. He is also a being of freedom whose reason exerts a determining influence on his activity. When reason exerts this influence on man's activity, then reason is considered by Kant to function practically and not speculatively. The big question for Kant is the fact of man's moral quest or that reason does function practically. Can it be proved theoretically? Kant never retrenches from the position of the first Critique. Speculative reason can neither prove nor disprove the existence of freedom.

We must not lose sight of Kant's method in treating of moralit-

The terms morality and practical reason are, for Kant, mere ideas of reason. One does not have a sensible intuition of the existence of morality or of practical reason which verify what Kant or anyone else might have to say about these ideas. This is according to Kant's own premises. Hence, Kant's approach to morality and practical reason is hypothetical in nature: "If morality exists and if reason is practical, then this is what these concepts must mean in order to have intelligibility." Time and again Kant will repeat that his analysis of morality is not a theoretical knowledge of what the noumenal moral-world is. Speculative reason merely examines the consistency of its ideas about morality and practical reason, and practical reason puts these consistent concepts to use by commanding activity in accordance to them. Speculative reason merely spells out what ought to be. Practical reason wills what ought to be (morality, or the freedom of man) to exist actually by putting into action what speculative reason manifests. Thus, Kant never claims that his moral insights are knowledge or that his judgments are true. Knowledge and truth belong in the sphere of man's faculty of understanding with its categories and a priori perceptions of space and time. Morality, on the other hand, belongs to the realm of the good which is unknowable by theoretical reason but attainable through practical reason. Thus, Kant puts the good outside the field of knowable being. The good cannot be said to be true or false since, according to Kant's theory of correspondence, there is no intuition corresponding to any
one notion of the good. Thus, one cannot have certitude with regard to the good where the good is something transcending phenomena. But one can have practical certitude. What evidence does Kant offer to substantiate the possibility that man has a moral quest, that reason functions practically, and that a moral good is practically certain and necessary? The answer involves Kant's hypothetical explanation of man's possibility to act as a moral agent. What is man when he is really human or moral, and how certain is man that he can be free and act morally? Kant busied himself with these issues in his *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and the *Metaphysic of Morals*. In giving a brief summary of Kant's answer to the question of morality and its constituents, our purpose will be twofold: to lay stress on the importance of man's moral quest in Kant's concept of man; and, to show the part happiness as conceived by Kant plays in this moral quest and its importance.

Philosophers of the Enlightenment attempted to establish a theory of ethics apart from the eternal law of God. Since Kant believed that his *Critique* had shown the futility of all attempts to prove the existence of God, he had to follow in their footsteps. Summing up the attempts of Baumgarten, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson, each of whom had based a self-sufficient ethics on pleasure and pain or a moral sense, Kant says that it would be "superfluous labor" to refute them, for they had asked the wrong question. They had

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5 *Groundwork*, p. 93 (111).
asked "What motivates man basically--pleasure, happiness, perfection, or self-interest?" Kant says that they should have asked: "What kind of men do people ordinarily consider good?" Is it the man who has attained happiness and self-contentment, or a man who has managed to make his pleasures outweigh his pains, or a man of great talent? Kant replies that it is none of these. His reason is twofold. Against the above mentioned opinions Kant observes that a man may be contented, talented, and successful, but if he has no right intentions, he is considered as immoral. Hence, Kant offers his own solution. Thus, the man whom people consider good is the man of good will. The only unqualified good to be aimed at, the one good whose attainment will make man morally righteous and truly human is the good will. What, then, makes the will good?

Even if, by some special disfavour of destiny or by the niggardly endowment of step-motherly nature, this will is entirely lacking in power to carry out its intentions; if by its utmost effort it still accomplishes nothing, and only good will is left; ... even then it would still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add to, nor subtract from this value.6

Thus the will is not good by what it accomplishes or even by its lofty desires. "It is good through its willing alone,"7 and the only possible interior principle in willing is man's motive. Here is Kant's objective foundation for morality. He paralleled his

6Ibid., p. 3 (62). Italics not in original.

7Ibid., p. 3 (63).
revolution in ethics to his "Copernican revolution" in his epistemology. By shifting from an objective norm—the eternal Divine Law—to the subjective intention of man in a specific act as the sole norm for objective good, Kant abstracts from the material content of man's acts, the conditions, circumstances and objects, and considers only the form of the will. What is the motive that makes an action of man to be moral or fully human?

The essence of man's moral experience is his sense of duty. Kant defines this "sense of duty" as the necessity, not only of acting in conformity with the law, but also of acting out of duty's sake or reverence for the law—not for any specific law but for law in general. An act done from the sense of duty is an act for the sake of the good will as distinct from an act motivated by man's craving for pleasure or by an impulse to avoid pain, or by love or fear of God, in a word, by anything exterior to the will itself. The motive of duty in contrast to any exterior motive is an a priori motive. This means it is the motive of pure reason alone, without any dependence upon experience. Thus, it is a motive applicable to all rational creatures and not just man. Kant sums up in a formula how any good will having duty as its motive will act: "I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law." This rule expresses, for Kant, nothing but the form that all maxims motivated by duty will

8Ibid., p. 16 (70).
take. Thus, any particular maxim motivated by duty should be capable of universal application. For example, the maxim "I ought to tell the truth," is a maxim motivated by duty, and is universal or categorical only if this general law remains that this exact form when carried over as a practical principle for one's activity. If one would say, "I ought to tell the truth because I do not wish to be punished," then, his practical principle of action is no longer a law because something personal has been added to the law. Hence, as a principle of activity the principle ceases to be universal for all men. Punishment, for Kant, is not a motive of action capable of raising man above nature since man is acting from passion rather than from the sake of duty. All acts proceeding from passion or extrinsic force are, for Kant, amoral, that is, not immoral, and yet not moral. If someone should ask why he ought to tell the truth, the only answer that can make a consequent act moral is "because he ought." No other motive can enter into a man's practical principle of activity if his resultant act is to be moral. Now with the hypothesis that duty is the motive which makes the will good Kant has connected a sense of duty with the good-will. The clue which enables Kant to postulate the existence of morality as a logical possible, and at the same time argues to the fact of the existence of a noumenal world is man's awareness of a sense of duty. This sense of duty is Kant's given. This given, for Kant, expresses the essentials of morality, and Kant has connected duty to the essence of morality by analyzing what the ordinary man consi-
ders as essential to a good man, that is, the good will. Kant's hypothetical conclusion is that if morality is not be be an illusion, then, it must be possible for a man, a moral man, to act from the motive of duty alone, or, at the most, as the principle motivating cause of activity. Upon the completion of this analysis Kant then turns to a second analysis of the concept of practical reason. His purpose is not to prove the existence of such a reason, but rather to show its logical possibility and what is meant by the term.

When Kant says that reason is practical, more specifically, he means its capacity of effecting changes in the phenomenal world. If reason is practical, then it forms practical judgments which serve as principles of action. Thus Kant's analysis of practical reason, like the analysis of pure reason, consists of an analysis of the relationship between the subject (representing practical reason) and the predicate (representing some action to be undertaken) of judgments assumed to be practical. Some of these judgments he calls categorical imperatives, and others, he calls hypothetical. What is the difference? Before Kant answers this, he inquires into the origin of the concept imperative.

Kant asserts that the concept imperative arises because a rational creature works not in "accordance with laws" inherent in nature but in "accordance with his idea" of laws. In explanation of this, Kant gives as an example a hypothetical rational being whose

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9Ibid., pp. 36-37 (80).
ideas of law would infallibly determine the will. For such a being there would be no imperative, because the acts of such a being would always be determined in perfect accordance with his idea of the law. Such a will would be a holy will. At the other extreme, would be the irrational creature which acts only in accordance with laws of instinct. For this brute animal, there would also be no imperative. An imperative arises only where a being is subjected to reason and to the sensible elements of nature. Consequently, a man, who is subject to both, will act through his animal will (arbitrium brutum) or through his elective will (arbitrium liberum). Thus, an imperative arises precisely because a conflict results between the two wills when man seeks to bring his activity under the rule of his idea of the law. Kant concludes that "[t]he conception of an objective principle so far as this principle is necessitating for a will is called a command (of reason), and the formula of this command is called an Imperative."¹⁰ By taking different examples, Kant shows that some imperatives are true practical laws, commanding actions categorically. Others, while called practical principles, are not true practical laws of reason for the reason that they command only hypothetically, and are based on knowledge, not on faith.

In an hypothetical imperative, the action is connected with the will only under a condition of a desire, or an inclination for something to be attained. For example, "If I want success, I ought

¹⁰Ibid., p. 37 (81).
to develop my talents." In this proposition, the predicate, "developing my talents," is connected with a conditioned subject, "I, influenced by the desire to succeed," and for that reason the command is hypothetical. Perfection of my talents depends on my desire.

The categorical, on the other hand, simply says, "I ought to develop my talents." The proposition is categorical and not hypothetical. The subject I is not modified by any exterior influence. The basis for the connection between the subject and predicate, Kant says, is the will itself. The will, then, is unconditioned, that is, free from any inclination. Hence, in the categorical proposition, there is expressed an absolute necessity. The subject, representing the will, is not influenced by any ifs. The hypothetical proposition, in contrast, involves only contingent necessity: Do this, in order to gain that. The hypothetical imperative is optional because the command depends upon an end which can always be rejected without moral scruple. For example, a slothful man who had no desire for success would see no necessity for developing his talents. The moral man at all times develops his talents because of the categorical command, "I ought to develop my talents." Thus, Kant concludes that if reason is practical, the principle of its activity must be expressed in the manner of the categorical or hypothetical imperative. But a true practical law is only categorical.

Advancing one more step, Kant makes use of the analysis of judgments accomplished in the first Critique. He finds that the

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11 Pura, pp. A6-10, B10-24 (18-58); see pp. 10-12, above.
categorical maxim is both synthetic and a priori since the predicate is not contained in the subject nor is the ground for the connection between subject and predicate based on the contingent phenomenal world. On the other hand, he finds that the hypothetical imperative is purely analytic since the subject—the will affected by the desire of success—already contains implicitly the predicate—developing of talents. This position on the analytic proposition can be summed up as follows: "[T]he proposition 'If I fully will the effect, I also will the action required for it,' is analytic; for it is one and the same thing to conceive something as an effect possible in a certain way through me and to conceive myself as acting in the same way with respect to it." 12

The significance of this distinction is that it determines what Kant means when he says that reason is purely practical. When reason is purely practical, it manifests itself through an a priori synthetic proposition (categorical imperative). Analytic propositions, on the other hand, express the form of reason functioning theoretically. 13 Hence, in analytic propositions, inclusive of hypothetical propositions, reason is not purely practical because it acts according to knowledge and not in accordance with what is thought, that is, one's ideals or ideas of reason. To act according to knowledge is merely to act according to nature, and Kant often

12 Groundwork, p. 45 (85).

13 See pages 19-20, above.
speaks of this use of reason as an instinctive action. Where knowledge is concerned it is always the evidence of the sensible intuition—either the matter of the manifold or the a priori forms of space and time—and the limited categories of the understanding that explain propositions. Where reason is practical, reason does not act from knowledge but from its own self-imposed ideas, or rules, or categorical imperatives. Kant's final step is to abstract from the matter of all possible categorical imperatives, and to describe the manner in which the will is practical: "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." What has Kant done in this final step?

A comparison of the formula of the categorical imperative with the one expressing the form of a morally good will shows that both formulae are substantially the same. While in the first analysis Kant has connected the hypothetical essence of morality with the sense of duty in the form of an imperative, in the second analysis he has connected morality and duty with the idea of practical reason in the form of an imperative. This step is important for Kant since it is with a morality both based on a sense of duty (rather than on God) and brought into existence through practical reason that Kant hopes to save the concept of a morally responsible man. Morality has no foundation but practical reason itself and its a priori categorical commands. With regard to both formulae, by

14Groundwork, p. 52 (88).
calling them synthetic a priori propositions, Kant has reduced the
defense of a morally responsible man to the technical terminology
already seen in his epistemological framework: How is a categori-
cal imperative completely a priori and yet synthetic possible? He
considers that his analyses of the concepts of the good will, moral-
ty and practical reason have shown only the consistency of the con-
cepts, that is, their logical possibility. The latter concepts
have meaning for Kant only when explained in terms of acting from a
sense of duty. But to show the real possibility of the objects
signified by these concepts, Kant must return to the method of the
first Critique and show what postulates are necessary if the cate-
gorical imperative is to be synthetic and a priori.

Kant reiterates that we do not enjoy the advantage of having
the reality of morality given in experience. Thus, according to
Kant's hypothetical explanation of the essence of morality, morali-
ty depends on one's intention, and the form of a morally good will
is that of the categorical imperative. Now experience manifests
only external activity, not internal experience. Kant concludes
that one cannot predict that his motive of activity will rest or
has rested solely on a sense of duty rather than on some inclina-
tion: "If we look more closely at our scheming and striving, we
everywhere come across the dear self . . . ." Hence, the justifica-
tion for morality, that is, the possibility of the categorical

15 Ibid., p. 49 (87).
16 Ibid., p. 27 (75).
a priori synthetic imperative can come about only through what Kant calls a synthetic deduction.

In brief, the deduction begins with the fact that man has an awareness that he ought to dosomething--his sense of duty. How is this sense of duty possible because experience only indicates that man is determined. Kant replies that one can never act from a sense of duty "except under the idea of freedom..." The idea of freedom, then, is the first postulate on which the real possibility of morality depends. But, Kant continues, freedom in its positive sense forces man to further postulate the idea of a noumenal will opposed to the phenomenal will. In fact the idea of freedom makes "me a member of an intelligible world." Without the postulates of freedom and noumenal will, man's given awareness of a sense of duty is unintelligible.

In the technical terminology of his philosophy Kant explains that the categorical imperative or one's sense of duty arises in the following manner. To the idea of phenomenal will is added the idea (postulate) of the noumenal will or free elective will. Then, the conflict that results in man's consciousness because of these two wills explains the origin of the given--the "I ought," which is the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative, then,

17 Ibid., p. 100 (115).

18 Spontaneous causality conforming to some "special kind" of immutable laws (different from nature). Cf., Ibid., pp. 97-98(114).

19 Ibid., p. 111 (122).
must be a priori. It opposes itself to man's phenomenal will which proposes activities from experience for empirical purposes. The triumph of the noumenal will over the phenomenal will is precisely what raises man to the level of freedom.

Kant must now justify his assertion that the imperative is synthetic. This step is necessary for the real possibility of any object signified by the proposition. The categorical imperative, Kant believes, signifies man's sense of duty. Kant tells us that the concept of the predicate (some activity represented by the phenomenal will—-the sensible element) is not contained in the concept of the subject (noumenal will), but that the subject and predicate are joined by reason of their connection with a third term in which both the subject and predicate are to be found. That third term of which Kant speaks is the idea noumenal world. Both wills, he explains, have their foundation in the noumenal world in the sense that the noumenon is conceived and postulated not only as the ground of the sensible world and its governing laws, but at the same time as legislating the laws for the intelligible will immediately, that is, without any instrument. Thus, Kant has conformed to his norm for real possibility. First, the concept is that of the categorical imperative given by the noumenal will. Secondly, there is the sensible intuition of an external act represented by the phenomenal will. Hence, the categorical impera-
tive is synthetic as well as a priori. It is important to understand what Kant feels he has proved and what he has not proved.

First, he will admit that he has shown the real possibility of the categorical imperative or one's given sense of duty. Kant does not prove the existence of the given fact precisely because it is a given. Granted the existence of the given fact, Kant says that this sense of duty is the essence of morality, of the good will, and of the concept of practical reason. This is his hypothesis. He states that he nor any one else can understand morality except in terms of a sense of duty. But Kant does not think that he has proved the existence of morality, nor does he believe that anyone else can.

Furthermore, given the awareness of duty, then, Kant says, if we are to make it intelligible we must suppose the postulates of freedom and the distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal wills. Again, he denies that his analysis has given any intuition into the existence of either the noumenon or freedom, as far as theoretical reason or knowledge is concerned. Freedom exists only when practical reason, accepting the theory of morality based on duty, does in fact act out of a sense of duty. The existence of one's awareness of duty would lead one to believe that freedom exists. Hence, man will act as if freedom does exist. But, as to the fact, that man did in a certain moment of time act free from all external motives and subject only to the categorical imperative can never be proven. Kant simply denies that one can be aware in any given moment that he could have done other than what he in fact did. One must be
satisfied with the practical necessity for the existence of freedom. We must have faith that we can act free from the mechanistic forces of nature contrary to what we know of phenomena. We come now to the final development of Kant's categorical imperative which has a great significance for understanding his concept of man.

Kant does not rest with the idea that a sense of duty constitutes the essence of morality. He expands the meaning of the categorical formula into the formula of the kingdom of ends and the formula of autonomy. Kant admits that these formulae are merely different aspects of the original categorical formula, but they bring out a more precise quality belonging to an agent who acts from a sense of duty. Not only will man act as if he belongs to a kingdom of ends, but the principal goal to which these step by step formulations lead seems to be the paramount notion of the autonomy of man's practical will: "We have merely shown by developing the concept of morality generally in vogue that autonomy of the will is unavoidably bound up with it or rather is its very basis."21

Kant has gone through considerable argumentation to show that the ordinary common sense notion of a good will implies the sophisticated notion of the elements proper to an autonomous will. What are its characteristics that give value to the nature of man?

The autonomous will simply stated is the will that is a law to itself. Primarily, it is a will which enacts law, yet it is not

21 Ibid., p. 95 (112).
lawless. The autonomous will is free in the positive and negative sense of freedom. Negatively, freedom means independence of any determination, especially of natural laws which govern phenomena. Positively, freedom is spontaneous activity in effecting changes in the phenomenal world according to the self-imposed laws of pure reason itself. It is easy to see, then, why Kant says that the autonomous will sets its own end. The most important element of the autonomous will is that the will sets itself as its own end:

Rational nature separates itself out from all other things by the fact that it sets itself an end. An end would thus be the matter of every good will. But in the Idea of a will which is absolutely good--good without any qualifying condition (namely, that it should attain this or that end)--there must be complete abstraction from every end that has to be produced (as something which would make every will only relatively good). Hence the end must here be conceived, not as an end to be produced, but as a self-existent end. It must therefore be conceived negatively--that is, as an end against which we should never act. . . ."22

Thus, Kant does not make the good will as an end to be attained. Rather, he makes the good will a pre-existent end. The good will seems to be a higher part of the will directing the lower to become conformed to the higher and also to have duty as the motive of activity. The higher is also the autonomous will for which reverence is had. The lower evoking no praise for its excellence in no way transcends nature. The lower part has its maxims which are subjective and particular as opposed to the objective and universal imperatives of the higher part. Kant himself express-

22 Ibid., p. 82 (105).
ly states that a man, in following a subjective maxim which cannot be universalized, has a will at variance with itself. 23

Thus, Kant's concept of man finds its pre-eminent characteristic in moral activity. Only through moral activity does man transcend what we know as phenomenal man. Only through exercising freedom does man become truly human. Chesterton once observed that the hungers of humanity are never merely hungers for humanity or for a completely humanized humanity because a self-contained and self-centered humanity would chill us in the same way as does a self-contained and self-centered human being. Man, Chesterton continues, will be haunted by something which is emphatically not human and which can only be explained rationally by calling it superhuman. 24

Kant has attempted to explain man's need for transcendency by taking what other philosophers have considered as belonging to man, that is, moral activity, and making it supra-human. In the Kantian man, all forces are directed to the will commanding. Kant's primary objective is not to tell what man must choose and command as the object of the will. His purpose is to tell man how to will, since the will itself is its own end. Kant turns the emphasis away from the thinking man to the willing man, and the willing man is the man who belongs to a "kingdom of autonomy" rather than to the "kingdom of nature."

23 Ibid., p. 56 (91).
How valuable is man's autonomy? Kant says that if anything has a price, something else can be put in its place as an equivalent. But, he continues, whatever has dignity admits of no equivalence and is exalted above all price. Autonomy is Kant's only basis for dignity. Man is an end in himself, but only in so far as he is regarded as making universal law to himself. The share which morality offers man in making universal law is that which makes him fit to be a member in a possible kingdom of autonomy. Autonomy endows man with intrinsic value and entitles all men who possess it to such reverence which should prohibit anyone from using them as means to an end. By following autonomous conscience, by fulfilling one's duty, by conquering nature's inclinations and desires, by overcoming the suspicion that perhaps he alone is faithful in paying reverence to the idea of a kingdom of autonomous men, by restraining his fear that nature, after all, may not work in harmony with his lofty moral commands--these are the noble ways, according to Kant, through which an autonomous man penetrates into the supersensible. These ways are the good will's already present and acting goal. The synthesizing transcendental ego of the epistemological framework becomes a commanding ego in the moral framework. The ego takes care to preserve its autonomous integrity. One commentator well summarized Kant's concept of man when he wrote: "Man in his essential nature, is, for Kant, an agent, the agent, in fact

25 *Groundwork*, p. 77 (102).
In the true spirit of the Enlightenment Kant allows the free autonomy of man to extend not only beyond the bounds of nature but even beyond the condition of all supernatural powers. By removing God's Eternal Law from moral philosophy and by attempting a complete morality without God, Kant was forced to turn to man himself as the source and norm of morality. How does the quest for happiness fit into Kant's concept of this morally autonomous and supernatural man who is his own end? Is happiness a part of man's moral quest so that virtue is happiness? Or, is man's moral quest a part of happiness so that if a man is happy he is also virtuous?

To answer our problem we must consider Kant's concept of the good. Kant argues against his contemporary relativists who denied the reality of an objective good. Equally as well, he argues against those whom he calls "authoritarians," that is, those who not only insist that objective good is available to all men but that its essential nature can be known with absolute certainty, by appealing to authority. Kant seeks a middle road. His position is that man must somehow believe in an objective good and in man's ability to "think" a coherent system concerning this good without claiming infallible moral insight or a knowledge of its nature. Theoretically, for Kant, one must remain agnostic with respect to the nature of the good since man has no intuition to verify his ideal of the good. In practice, one simply proposes "what reason

shows ought to be." The concept good, then, is not open to understand­
ing or knowledge, but remains an ideal of reason to be "thought." What content is "thought" and assigned to the con­cept of good?

We saw in the first part of this chapter that the objective good proposed by Kant is the good will. The good, to be more spe­cific, is nothing but will's command, the proper object of practical reason. Kant uses the word object (of practical reason) in three different senses: the will, the action, and what the will accom­plishes.27 Our question with regard to happiness, then, will be whe­ther or not man's quest for happiness is an objective good in one of these three senses: (1) in so far as the quest produces a good will; (2) in so far as the quest itself, as an activity, is good; and, (3) in so far as the object sought as fulfilling the quest for happiness is itself good.

Kant sets down the principle that when practical reason wills in accordance with some objective principle, objective good is willed to exist. 28 Now by an objective principle Kant means a motive of action which contains the "very same principle of determination of the will in all cases and for all rational beings."29

The first objective principle Kant proposes is the principle

27Practical, pp. 176-180 (148-151).
28Ibid., p. 182 (153).
29Ibid., p. 134 (112).
of skill. This principle states that man must use the necessary means to attain a necessary end. Theoretically, Kant says, such a principle is universal, but when applied in circumstances peculiar to one's individual needs, particular ends always come into play and hence, as applied, the principle ceases to be universal. If one pursues an activity simply because this activity is the means itself to an end or is a means to some object which, in turn, is a means to an end, the very activity and the object pursued is a good to or for someone.\textsuperscript{30} In other words, a good that is relative to some particular person; it is a skill. Kant further comments that perhaps if all rational beings could put themselves into the particular conditions of the agent, with his circumstances of time, place, and the end desired, they would choose the same effective means. Does the principle of skill for that reason offer the possibility of resulting in an activity or a quest good in itself and not merely relative to someone? Kant answers that with the principle of skill there is only the question of placing some activity as a means if the end is wanted. Since the end may be dropped on one occasion or another without moral scruple, such a principle of action is not a true practical law because it does not serve as a principle of determination of the will in all cases and for all rational beings. In other words, there is no obliging necessity for placing a particular activity or for seeking a certain end.

\textsuperscript{30}Groundwork, p. 38 (81).
thermore, Kant concludes, the principle of skill implies knowledge of means capable of effecting an end. As such the principle is basically a theoretical principle rather than a true law of practical reason. The good, according to Kant, is not fashioned according to what is. The good is, rather, fashioned according to what ought to be. Consequently, actions motivated by the principle of skill do not raise man's quest above phenomenal nature's laws of cause and effect.\textsuperscript{31} Hence, the will, the action, and the object to be effected where practical reason's motive is the principle of skill are not objective goods but only subjective.

The second proposed objective principle is that of prudence or self-love. Such a principle states that man by nature necessarily seeks his own well being for the very reason that he belongs to the phenomenal world and necessarily has wants and needs which must be fulfilled. Now it is of great significance that Kant identifies the principle of prudence or self-love with the principle of happiness. Kant's critique of this principle follows the same line as that of the principle of skill recounted in the preceding paragraph. Hence, the principle of happiness is not a true law of practical reason, but only a practical principle of skill. Acting from the principle of happiness produces perhaps a good-for-me. The will, the action or quest for happiness, and the object of happiness are not objective goods in themselves. Thus, the quest for happiness does not give to man's will that character of autonomy which is

\textsuperscript{31} Practical, pp. 126-28 (105-07).
Kant's ultimate in determining a concept of man's good. With the principle of happiness as motive to activity, man does not fashion necessarily what ought to be but only what he knows, that is, what he knows to exist as phenomena.

The only true objective principle of reason which is at the same time a pure practical law is the categorical imperative. Law, Kant says, "carries with it the concept of an unconditioned, and yet objective and so universally valid, necessity. . . ." The principle of happiness, in contrast, can only be characterized as indeterminate and a posteriori, that is, one must always appeal to experience to determine the constituents of happiness. Thus, when one acts from the principle of happiness, Kant says that the ideal is so indeterminate that appeal to experience is necessary to discern whether or not some proposed object of happiness will satisfy its quest. Reason, though it has an a priori and abstract notion as to what is desired in the subjective state of perfect happiness, does not have an a priori and universal notion which is also determinate. To answer our question, then, man's good is not sought in the pursuit of happiness.

As to Kant's notion of the good, we have seen already that on his hypothesis his primary notion of the good is tied up with the autonomous will, that is, the moral will. The only absolute uncon-

32 *Groundwork*, pp. 43-44 (84).
ditioned and a priori good is the quest for or the maintenance of
the autonomous will motivated by one's sense of duty. A good will,
the action producing the continued state of an integral will, and
the object that may or may not be accomplished as a result of the
willed activity--these are the objective goods that ought to be
sought. Because of the motive of duty, any activity which reason
alone commands is good in every kind of circumstance. With the
sense of duty as motive, one cannot act without regard for moral
scruple. The principle of happiness, in contrast, wavers and may or
may not produce a moral good-will on every occasion. The will,
its activity, and its object motivated by the principle of happi-
ness are "morally good in the letter, not in the spirit (the in-
tention)." Goodness, then, in the case of happiness is legal or
right. Is there any sense in which happiness may be morally good,
that is, a time when happiness not only conforms to the law but al-
so proceeds out of a sense of duty (aus pflucht)?

Here we see that Kant does allow for a sense in which the
principle of happiness can be considered as an objective good.
Kant says that an action leading to happiness has real moral worth
only when the indirect duty of furthering one's happiness and not
the universal inclination for happiness which we have by our very
nature determines man's free elective will. At first such a state-
ment would seem to conflict with Kant's view that man has no duty

\[34\] Practical, p. 196, n. (164).
to promote his own happiness as an end. His distinction here is rather subtle but valid. Sometimes, he says what reason proposes as a duty is also an end which man can set for himself as a part of his happiness. As an example Kant cites one's own perfection in a certain line or wishing to secure the happiness of others. However, in so far as any end is a part of our happiness, Kant reiterates the position that nature already inclines us to this end and, hence, reason does not command that we seek happiness as a duty in itself. Ends which are also duties must proceed from reason or noumenal man and not from phenomenal man. How, then, is happiness an indirect duty?

Adversity, pain, and want may tempt us to transgress duty. Hence, Kant allows, to guard against poverty, a temptation to vice and a detriment to happiness as well, indirectly one has a duty to seek his own well being. But Kant hurries to add that "it is not my happiness but my morality [which I seek] to maintain which in its integrity is at once my aim and my duty." Thus, happiness can become a good objectively, but only because of some connection with a duty-motivated act. If man seeks happiness for its own sake, his action is a-moral, or even immoral if not in conformity with law.

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37 The question of the relationship between happiness and morality will be more fully treated in Chapter IV. It suffices to mention at this point that Kant establishes a more significant relation than the example given here. This example is an instance of the happiness-morality relationship in this life only.
If he must seek an end which is part of his happiness and at the same time involved in the preservation of his moral integrity, then he must seek the object of happiness in so far as reason commands and as reason commands. Nevertheless, it remains that happiness, for Kant, is never man's objective good, apart from duty.

This chapter has served to point up the radical dualism of Kant's concept of man: phenomenal man opposes noumenal man and man's phenomenal end of happiness opposes his human end of moral integrity. Happiness concerns objects that are; morality with activities that ought to be, while objects are of no importance with regard to the value of an act. The propositions of happiness are commands equal to imperatives of skill or prudence or self-love, and are the matter of man's understanding when considered concretely as motives of action. The propositions of morality are categorical commands of reason alone and cannot, as a consequence, be disregarded without moral scruple. Moved by the natural desire for happiness, man does not, Kant would say, attain virtue. As to whether the quest for virtue will lead to happiness, we will treat this question at greater length in the following chapter. The moral framework has substantiated our conclusion resulting from Kant's epistemological framework concerning the phenomenal nature of happiness. But, the moral framework has shown why this must be so only to the extent that Kant opposes happiness to morality. The meaning given to happiness within the moral framework follows Kant's concept of man as dualistic. Happiness is thus opposed to morality
or duty as a rival principle or ideal by which man can direct his life. Happiness is discussed in so far as it is a practical principle of activity, directing that life on a phenomenal level.

We are now able to proceed to the central problem of the thesis. We must now consider the exact constituents of the subjective and objective concepts of happiness. Only then can we understand Kant's view that happiness as an end is not particularly capable of explaining why man should be lord of the universe.

38 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard, 2d ed. [revised], The Hafner Library of Classics, ed. Oskar Piest (New York, 1951), Par 87 (p. 301). The paragraph number refers to the original German edition; the page number in parenthesis refers to the Hafner edition. This work will be designated simply as Judgment.
CHAPTER IV

MAN'S QUEST FOR HAPPINESS

AND THE SUMMUM BONUM

The value of life for us, if it is estimated ... (by ... happiness), is easy to decide. It sinks below zero. ¹

When Kant says that the natural end of man is happiness,² one might question his right to use the word end as well as the word happiness as an end. We have already seen that nature,³ for Kant, is a concept of the understanding synthesizing appearances according to the mind's laws and the forms of sensibility and giving no knowledge of a thing as it is in itself. As to man, then, we know only his appearance. Granted that Kant allows man, as a moral agent, to pierce through to things as they are and not as they seem to be, yet this act is only a willing of the fact of existence and not a knowledge of what is. How, then, does Kant come to speak of an end of man's nature without understanding man as uni-

¹ *Judgment*, Par. 83, n.10 (p. 284).
² *Groundwork*, p. 69 (98).
³ Nature here is considered in a material sense as being the sum total of phenomena or the sum total of the laws governing the existence of phenomena. Cf. *Pure*, p. A419, B446, n.b (392).
fied through an inherent and dynamic principle of finality? Kant finds no phenomena of ends, purposes, goals, or final purpose, and much less, the phenomena of perfect happiness. Nor does Kant allow the concept of end, unlike *a priori* concepts of cause, effect, relation, etc. to be a category of the understanding. In the third Critique Kant seeks to justify his use of the concept of end, although he has already found necessary the use of the concept in the first Critique. By the time of the third Critique his thought had advanced to the point where he realized that man does seek a greater unity in the knowledge of the world than that allowed by determinant judgment (understanding) and a unity less than that offered by the transcendental ideas. Before the third Critique there was the opposition between knowledge, where phenomena were related to one another by the categories, and morality, where pure reason conceived its transcendental ideas and manifested itself in the particular as a practical will commanding free actions. In the third Critique Kant seeks for some relation between these two spheres of action. This relation is brought about by introducing a third faculty, the faculty of reflective judgment, or the faculty of feeling.

By means of the faculty of reflective judgment, Kant says that one brings phenomena in relation to one's own self-consciousness.

What we cannot know or will according to understanding and reason, we can feel. In other words, we can, with the faculty of reflective judgment give a unity to phenomena which is not actually a knowledge of phenomena, but which is only the unity of the mind it-
self. This unity involves an ideal of reason, that is, design. In order to understand Kant's attempt to give a concept of a more unified man, we will consider how he establishes his right to use the concepts design and purpose. We will later see that he employs the same method in his determination of the concept of happiness.

DESIGN IN NATURE

Two facts forced Kant to accept design. First, he recognized the fact that scientists proposed hypothetical laws to establish the unity of empirical principles under higher ones, and then they seemed to proceed to verify them in nature. The ordinary man would say that success results because such laws are inherent in objects of nature. The critical philosopher would say that reason "thinks" the law coherently and primarily for the sake of order in the mind, and not for the order of nature itself. Kant, then, is faced with the question as to why the scientist would ever think that nature is in conformity with the laws proposed by his own mind. Kant replies that reason cannot help but think "purposiveness of nature in its variety," through which nature is represented "as if" design was inherent in nature. 

The second fact that caused Kant to propose the function of reflective judgment with its principle of design was his interpretation of the beautiful and the sublime as entailing a universal and a priori pleasure, that is, a pleasure not dependent on nature. In explaining the pleasure that is consequent upon the activities

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4 Judgment, Introduction, Par. IV (p. 17).
of the arts and sciences, Kant found the need for the use of the idea design.

Kants tells us that the concept of design must have been "sportively" introduced into the nature of things by a "rationalizing subtlety" intent on making nature comprehensible according to some analogy rather than to afford our gain in knowledge based on objective grounds. 5 We will follow him as he explains this "ration-alizing subtlety".

Kant tells us that observation of inanimate things or artifacts would never introduce the idea of design. The reason is that while one part is for the sake of another where inanimate things are concerned, each part does not exist by another's means. Even though a thing has external moving power, unless it has internal "formative" power, mechanical laws alone, Kant believes, give adequate cognition of such things. 6 However, Kant finds that a living whole, an organism, does not seem capable of explanation through blind mechanism. Thus, in the case of an organized whole, the whole seems to be prior to and to determine the parts, while the parts and the whole seems to be reciprocally ends and means to each other. Hence, only by this process of thought does reason arrive at the notion of design in nature. But Kant immediately reiterates that this reasoning process is merely the "thinking" of speculative reason, and in reflecting upon these organisms scientists only feel

5 Ibid., Par. 61 (p. 205-06).
6 Ibid., Par. 65 (p. 220).
design as a "guiding thread" for judgment and not for phenomena. However, Kant has not yet accounted for the concept of final end or purpose.

Final end or purpose, as men ordinarily conceive it, tells us what a thing is for. But, Kant notes, an organism seems to be an end in itself; it is "purposiveness without purpose." Nevertheless, if we go beyond the organism and consider its relation to the environment, two questions arise: (1) What is the final purpose of the organism? (2) What is the final purpose of nature or the world itself? In seeking to answer these questions Kant finds that there are many things in nature for which no purpose can be assigned. Also, Kant finds that nature works against us, for we can never experience a totality of successive phenomena, and, consequently, we never have a complete picture of past, present, or future phenomena. How then is one to come to a knowledge of the purpose of nature which is given to us successively, and never as a whole? Reason has reached its limit. We can never know what the end of nature or of any particular organism is. However, Kant admits, once the ideas of final end and purpose have been suggested, speculative reason can find no contradiction in the notes assigned to the concepts even though it cannot verify the concepts in reality. For that matter one cannot prove the final purpose of nature devoid of all possibility. Reflective judgment can then make use of the idea

Ibid., Introduction, Par. V (p. 22).
in order to give greater unity to empirical laws. Man can "interpret" nature and give it a greater and more personal significance than understanding's picture of mechanism in terms of cause and effect and other categories of the understanding. Practical reason, however, can give legitimate use to the idea of design or final end. This use pertains to activity. Thus, practical reason connects final end with man's freedom in moral activity, and views nature as a moral universe. Reflective judgment feels design; practical reason wills design to exist by willing an activity in accordance with its own ideas of the law. In short, final purpose is merely a concept which has practical value and not speculative value. The concept is not abstracted from any experience for theoretical knowledge of nature, not is it applied to the manifold of sense perceptions in order to understand nature. So much for Kant's account of the "rationalizing subtlety" that introduced the concept of final end.

THE PRACTICAL METHOD OF KANT

Much the same method used for the introduction of the concept of end or of purpose is used for arriving at the concept of happiness. The concept of happiness is not a prime concept such as the concepts of blue, hot, hardness, table, etc. There is no phenomena of happiness as there would be the diverse phenomena contained in the concept man. How, then, is the concept of happiness introduced?

Kant's method begins with some objective fact. Reason "thinks" out a hypothetical coherent system by reflecting on this objective
fact. Practical reason then gives reality to the idea of theoretical reason, either out of expediency or out of necessity, by commanding activity in conformity with the idea. Caird explains this procedure as follows: "[W]hen the ideas of reason are conceived, not merely as determining the object of itself, but as capable of giving a new determination to our consciousness of the objects of experience, they are regarded as principles of action." For example, the idea of freedom, though having no foundation in phenomenal experience, can be regarded as giving a new determination to one's consciousness of phenomenal experience. The ideas of freedom and morality cause man to will activity as if reason, unmoved by phenomenal motives, commands through and of itself alone. De facto, man can never have knowledge (proof) that he has so acted. Hence, morality and freedom, as ideas, are not valuable to theoretical reason but to practical reason only. Again, the transcendental idea of God becomes a practical idea when one wills an act of religion in conformity with the content reason gives to the idea of God. The idea of God, then, is not important for theoretical purposes but only for practical purposes. The scientist, also, gives new determination to phenomenal plurality. He conceives this plurality as the Cosmos, not for the sake of knowledge, but for the sake of activity. Thus, conceiving the phenomena as unified, the scientist will search for more general laws in order to bring

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his consciousness of phenomena to a greater unity. If it is true that the transcendental ideas have practical value, it is no less true of Kant's ideals. Historians of philosophical thought give great prominence to Kant's transcendental ideas, but little is said about his ideals. Yet, the ideals play an important role in man's everyday living. The ideals are needed to fill the tremendous gap between Kant's categories of knowledge and the three transcendental ideas. For example, end, purpose, morality, happiness, the state—these are all ideals. They are neither categories of the understanding nor are they transcendental ideas. Yet, they are needed in man's everyday speech.

An ideal is that to which no actual phenomenal experience has ever been completely adequate and yet one to which every phenomenon must in a sense be related as to a norm. An ideal entertains a hope because it is based on faith, and, for Kant, faith is based ultimately on speculation which cannot be verified and not on knowledge. Kant explains the use of the ideal in a very concrete example. Thus, he considers Plato's Republic as an ideal for the use of practical reason. The Republic, Kant explains, is like an ideal constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all the others. . . . [This] is at any rate a necessary idea which must be taken as fundamental, not only in first projecting a constitution but in all its laws. . . . This perfect state may never, indeed, come into being; none the less this does not affect the rightness of the idea, which, holds up this maxim as the archetype toward which the actual system of law and order for mankind may advance as a goal. For what is to be the highest stage, where mankind may have to come to a halt, and how great a gulf may ever have to be left between
the idea and its realization, these are questions which no one can or ought to answer. For this event depends upon freedom; and it is in the power of freedom to pass beyond any and every specified limit.

Thus man, through the use of the ideal of Plato's Republic, seeks to bring a society into existence in conformity with this mental ideal. However, according to Kant, man must not imagine that he has attained an insight into the essence of society. Plato's concept is not knowledge. It is merely a blueprint of what one considers "ought to be." This ideal remains an a priori ideal of reason. What is ultimately effected is explicable in phenomenal terms.

Another example of Kant's use of this practical method is found in a later work. Here Kant tells us that ethics views "a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature," and in this case the latter is "a practical Idea used to bring into existence what does not exist but can be made actual by our conduct." 10 Here, also, Kant tells us, pure practical ideals always pertain to morality and are brought into existence by practical reason, that is, the objects signified by them are made to exist. On the other hand, the

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9*Pure*, p. A316, B373 (312). Elsewhere Kant writes: "Although we cannot concede to . . . ideals objective reality (existence), they are not therefore to be regarded as figments of the brain; they supply reason with a standard which is indispensable to it, providing it . . . with a concept of that which is entirely complete in its kind, and thereby enabling it to estimate and to measure the degree and defects of the incomplete" (Ibid., p. A570, B597 [486]). See, also, a discussion on Kant's method by Charles W. Hendel, "Freedom, Democracy and Reason," The Philosophy of Kant and Our Modern World, ed. Charles W. Hendel (New York, 1947), pp. 110-113.

10Groundwork, p. 80, n. (104).
ideals of reflective judgment are not purely practical but reflect an interpretation of the phenomena: "Teleology views nature as a kingdom of ends," but in this case the latter is only a theoretical idea used to explain what exists."\(^{11}\) Not until practical reason makes use of a speculative ideal can the ideal said to be practical. When practical reason does make use of these types of ideals, Caird \(^{12}\) explains that we must not regard judgment or practical reason as merely applying a universal which it receives from the hands of reason. Rather, we ought to conceive reason itself as going beyond its abstract unity to the determination of that which is distinct from itself. In this way, reason becomes dynamic or practical, and able to transcend the limitations of speculative reason. Thus, when Kant's philosophy is said to be practical, the meaning is that ideals of reason and of the imagination, although not strictly knowledge of the essence of things, govern man's activity in the world and allow man to assert that he is free.

KANT'S CONCEPT OF HAPPINESS

Among the apparently numberless ideals of the imagination is that of happiness. Man seeks to use this ideal as a principle for his activity. Happiness is introduced into Kant's first Critique as a principle of action. Man seeks to give a new determination to his perceptions which of themselves they do not have. He seeks

\(^{11}\) Ibid.
\(^{12}\) Caird, p. 383-84.
to bring phenomena in relation to our consciousness by subsuming certain phenomena under the concept of happiness. Thus, as mention was made above, the concept of happiness does not label phenomena as does a concept of the understanding. Such concepts as red, blue, cold, hard, and the like are basic concepts. Furthermore, such concepts as man, dog, table, and the like are the result of a synthesis of many basic perceptions into one thought. Such concepts are not ideals of what ought to be, but they are concepts of things we know to exist even though we only know them as they appear to us. Happiness, then, does not label phenomena in the same sense that we know them to be, but rather the concept of happiness labels phenomena as an agent feels that they ought to be. The manifold of experience becomes related to our consciousness as something personal or as something affecting our personal lives. The way that phenomena is subsumed under the concept of happiness does not give us knowledge of the phenomena, but as before stated, a new way of determining phenomena in one's own consciousness. In his epistemological approach to philosophy, Kant would simply never consider the question of happiness by starting with phenomena and seeking to induce the concept from reality. There is no phenomenon of happiness given in the synthesis of the faculties of the senses and understanding. Hence, we cannot have knowledge of happiness in so far as it is an ideal. The question arises, then, as to the origin of the ideal. There is no problem as to the fact that man does seek to utilize the ideal of happiness as a principle for
guiding his life. On investigation we will find that there is an analogous "rationalizing subtlety" on Kant's part that introduces the ideal of happiness just as there was that "subtlety" in introducing the ideal of design.

The fact with which Kant begins is the observation that man has many needs to meet, many desires to satisfy, and the evidence for this is phenomenal experience. Granted the idea of end, Kant says that through "reflection" on phenomenal man, reason feels man to be a whole; hence, as having internal design and final purpose. Reason, then, concludes that man must be capable of effecting changes in the phenomena. Otherwise, man would be completely passive and wait upon nature's mechanical laws to fulfill those needs. Now for Kant, man is essentially a doer; one who elicits, chooses, and wills: "Man is a being who, as belonging to the world of sense, has wants, and so far his reason has an office which it cannot refuse, namely, to attend to the interests of his sensible nature, and to form practical maxims...."13

What are these practical maxims? They involve a plan of life for sensible nature. Kant sees the maxims as a "fitting into a whole" of the different wants of man: "[R]eason employs the unity of maxims in general... merely to bestow upon the incentives of desire, under the name of happiness a unity of maxims which other-

13Practical, p. 181 (152).
wise they cannot have."

At this point Kant is stressing the fact that men use the practical maxims of happiness to order their activity. Reason gives an undeserved unity to the diverse complexities of man's inclinations or drives which are given as phenomena. As an example of what he means, Kant says that one who wants to avoid the anxiety of making his lies agree with one another and of not being entangled "by their serpent coils" will adopt the principle of truthfulness to put order into his life. The same applies to the principle of happiness. Reason does not induce the fact that the end for which all men strive is happiness from experience. Reason "thinks" the ideal because of the fact that man is not in possession of complete satisfaction of all his inclinations. Through the category of relation man understands himself in relation to many objects. Consequently, what is really known is not the essence of happiness but phenomena synthesized as one thought through understanding's concepts of inclination and desire, and these phenomena are put in relation to some external object or phenomenon. Man simply gives a greater unity to the multiple phenomena under the term happiness: "The concept of happiness is not one that man derives by abstraction from his instincts, and so deduces from his

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14 Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore Meyer Greene (Chicago, 1934), p. 32. This work will be designated simply as Religion.

15 Ibid.

16 Practical, p. 133 (112).
animal nature, but it is a mere idea of a state that he wishes to make adequate to the idea under merely empirical conditions.

What, then, are the essential notes of this ideal state as thought by reason? Kant will consider happiness under two aspects: the ideal or perfect happiness and the particular or determinative concept which one uses in a practical proposition. The ideal of happiness is described as "the satisfaction of all our desires, extensively, in respect of their manifoldness, intensively, in respect of their degree, and protensively, in respect of their duration." Thus, the ideal of perfect happiness must include the field of all the appetites. The faculty to be satisfied must be capable of receiving gratification in proportion to its highest developed potentiality. Also, fear of loss must be absent. Kant's well known definition describes happiness as "the condition of a rational being in the world with whom everything goes according to his wish and will." The big question for Kant about both of these definitions is the determination of the ideal since what man wishes and wills can be anything at all. What is the measure of the wish and will. Kant says experience shows that specification of the ideal is done through "empirical principles; for only by means of experience can I know what desires there are which are for satisfaction;

17 Judgment, Par. 83 (pp. 279-80).
18 Pure, p. A806, B834 (p.636).
19 Practical, p. 265 (221).
or what those natural causes are which are capable of satisfying them.\(^{20}\) In both the moral and epistemological frameworks, Kant has stressed the fact that the ideal does not include the objective concept as it should if happiness were a true ideal of reason.

What, in experience, determines the ideal? "[I]t is every man's own special feeling of pleasure and pain that decides in what he is to place his happiness. . . ."\(^{21}\) For Kant, then, we must first experience an object and then decide whether it is an object of happiness if we use the principle of happiness as a rule of life. What is to be said of this? The statement leads one to think that Kant is equating pleasure with happiness.

We cannot escape the fact that Kant explicitly gives the ideal of happiness a hedonistic "bent" when he says that happiness is "a rational being's consciousness of the pleasantness of life uninterruptedly accompanying his whole existence. . . ."\(^{22}\) If this is Kant's only meaning for happiness, then it is true that happiness and pleasure, for Kant, are one. However, as Paton points out, this definition of happiness is obscure and confused in the light of his more common considerations of happiness as the total satisfaction of our needs and inclinations. Paton comments further that Kant has done this "perhaps in order to contrast happiness as

\(^{20}\) Pure, p. A806, B834 (636).

\(^{21}\) Practical, p. 135 (112-113).

\(^{22}\) Ibid., p. 129 (108).
sharply as possible with morality," Paton's view that we should take happiness according to a meaning embracing Kant's major works as a whole seems correct. As early as the first Critique Kant had already spoken of happiness as a union of all ends prescribed by our desires into one single end, and not as a regard for pleasure alone. Furthermore, Kant says that happiness must be estimated:

"[O]ur happiness is the only thing of consequence provided it is estimated as reason especially requires, not by its transitory sensation, but by the influence that this has on our whole existence."

In other words there are other constituents than just pleasure in the concept of happiness. Is this in contradiction to the statement that what is pleasing determines the concept? The answer is no, if we consider that while pleasure must always be bound up with the object estimated, still reason ought to choose what is best for the satisfaction of one's whole existence: "[T]here is required for the Idea of happiness an absolute whole, a maximum of well being in my present, and ... future, state. ... [The idea] is rational so far as ... that end is chosen which can accord with the greatest and most abiding welfare, and, on the other, the fittest means are chosen to secure each of the components of happiness." 

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25 Practical, p. 181 (152).
26 Groundwork, p. 26 (85); Religion, p. 41, n; cf., also, Religion, pp. 60-61.
From this quotation it seems more in keeping with Kant's thought to say that his ideal of happiness involves the activity of choice of the ends and means; that pleasure is a necessary but not the chief constituent; that happiness is a well or welfare or contentment, which for Kant means what is good for me and not necessarily pleasure. Furthermore, when Kant says that happiness is rational, he means that happiness is willed through the elective will and not the brute will. We saw this distinction in the preceding chapter. We saw too that the elective will never can be influenced by instinct or pleasure if the will is to be morally good. But Kant does allow a sense in which happiness is objectively good. 27 Happiness, then, does involve more than pleasure.

Kant is more specific and clear in a later work when he says that happiness is a concept unifying "all man's purposes possible through nature, whether external nature or man's nature..."28 Thus, man has more purposes than mere pleasure. What are some of the types of objects making objective happiness? "Power, wealth, honour, even health and all that complete well-being and contentment with one's state... and goes by the name of happiness."29 Again, we find Kant considering the different ends that might constitute happiness: "Is it riches that he wants?... Is it know-

27 For the treatment of happiness under reason, see pages 60-61.
28 Judgment, Par. 83 (p. 281). Italics not in original.
29 Groundwork, p. 2 (61).
ledge and insight? ... Is it long life?"\textsuperscript{30} The quotations, in context, are precisely in regard to the constituents of the ideal of happiness.

Furthermore, from the definition of an inclination we can argue that Kant ought not to be interpreted as saying that happiness consists merely of pleasure. Kant says that an inclination always indicates a need which is an interest in some thing. He then points out that "what interests me is the object of the action (so far as this object is pleasant to me)."\textsuperscript{31} A quest for happiness, then, is not exclusively a quest for pleasure, for self-love, or for the fulfillment of illicit desires. Granted that pleasure is one norm for one's interest in the object of happiness, the fact remains the object of happiness can be other than pleasure. If happiness is willed only by the brute will, then, to be sure, pleasure is the concern of the agent. But Kant has specifically stated that happiness must at time be willed by the elective will, and when so done, pleasure cannot be the object of happiness sought. There must, then, be another norm other than pleasure that will determine what the objects of happiness will be, and that norm was, for Kant, reason. In most places Kant does speak of happiness in relation to the norm of pleasure. He seems to regard that many men use pleasure as the only norm in determining the objects of happi-

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., pp. 46-47 (85-86).
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p. 38, n. (81). Italics not in the original.
ness. That is, perhaps, the reason why Kant cannot accept the ideal of happiness as the prime principle of moral activity. Yet, the fact remains that Kant allows, and in fact demands, that the ideal also be capable of being determined by reason. In such a case, pleasure would be rationally subordinated in the hierarchy of objects making up happiness.

We come then to what we may conclude to be an accurate description for the ideal happiness. Happiness is a principle of action or a motive of action. The resulting activity is a dynamic possession of an object. Kant says happiness is contentment "with the possession and enjoyment of anything." He does not say "with the enjoyment" alone; he also says "with the possession." The act of possession is not to be considered as a static state, that is, passivity in which one is aware only of pleasure. In the Kantian spirit of a voluntaristic philosophy, man is an agent. Man is essentially an actor. Hence, the act of possession is the moving towards an object as well as contentment in finally attaining it. Happiness is activity in originating, choosing, willing, seeking, attaining, and resting in an object. The act of contentment is the possession of an object overflowing into sensible and intellectual enjoyment. This of course is the ideal of happiness. If men determine the ideal in concrete circumstances by the norm of pleasure, then happiness becomes passive and equivalent to pleasure.

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32 Judgment, Par 83, (p. 280). Italics not in the original.
However, this would be what men make happiness become for themselves. Kant cannot be said to agree that they have an objective notion of happiness.

We may now turn our attention to the objective and subjective concepts of happiness in so far as the ideal is determined concretely by pleasure or by reason. With regard to the subjective state of happiness, what specifically are the different interior states of happiness? Is inner peace which follows on observance of the moral law an example? Is the consciousness of perfection leading to intellectual joy a description of a state of happiness? With regard to objective happiness, is the moral law an object of happiness? Is Virtue happiness? Our purpose now will be to determine the extent of the objects which determine the abstract ideal of happiness; and the exact concrete designation of what does and what does not belong to the subjective concept of happiness. Our method in answering these questions will be to follow Kant where he discusses happiness as a principle of activity. From the manner in which Kant speaks of the principle and according to the way the principle is used, we will be able to learn the significance of happiness along with its concrete designations.

Kant's concern is whether or not the principle of happiness should be the first of principles which guide man's activity. He answers this question by asking another: Does the ideal of happiness when used as a principle of activity in fact enable man to achieve happiness? Since happiness is man's end, and since men
everywhere will admit that they want happiness, it would seem that 
happiness could be attained. Kant answers that "what man under-
stands by happiness and what is in fact his proper, ultimate, natu-
ral purpose ... would never be attained by him," for, he contin-
ues, man cannot "rest and be contented with the possession and en-
joyment of anything whatever." Is the reason that of St. Augus-
tine, that is, that our hearts are made for God, and they will not 
find rest except in Him? Such an answer would imply knowledge of a 
man-God relationship, which has been ruled out by the first 
Critique.

Kant's first answer is that we try to find happiness follow-
ing the ideal of happiness as a plan of life. Kant says that prac-
tical reason requires for a plan of action for life an ideal that is: (1) determinate; (2) a priori and necessary; and, (3) univer-
sally applicable to rational beings. How does the ideal of happi-
ness measure up to this norm? We have seen that man wishes to 
make the ideal adequate to himself according to his own welfare or 
to his own empirical conditions. But Kant says that this is vain 
because: (1) there can be no totality of any series of conseqeu-
ces resulting from the choice of any one object as a part of happi-
ness because phenomena appear to us successively and not simultane-
ously; (2) not all inclinations or appetites to be satisfied are 
yet known and probably never will be known; and yet happiness re-
quires a sum of all inclinations; (3) even a sum of inclinations

Ibid.
have no discernible hierarchy or primacy among themselves and, consequently, no principle of unity within the concept other than one added a posteriori, that is, pleasure; (4) since pleasure desired in possessing an object is the norm for many men in the choice of the objects of happiness, universality of choice among rational beings is impossible; and, finally, (5) reason can find no rational grounds within the concept of happiness to determine a reasonable hierarchy of values among the different proposed objects of happiness. If pleasure is present in happiness, it must be reasonable. This concludes our discussion of Kant's first answer concerning the capacity of the ideal of happiness to serve as a rule of life. The ideal simply does not conform to the norm for an ideal.

Kant has added little to his line of argument given in the moral and epistemological frameworks. The commands of happiness are hypothetical rather than categorical, because, according to Kant, nothing commands man to seek the ideal state of uninterrupted contentment. Man already has this drive for the ideal in virtue of his very nature. But Kant's presupposition is that man cannot be fully human by following the laws of nature alone, especially since what nature offers as a norm is pleasure. Also, abstract meaning of the ideal of happiness is concretized by reason through the imagination and understanding. Hence, the ideal relates only to the phenomenal order and does not allow man to be considered as a noumenal man since what is proposed through the imagination is explicable through the natural laws of cause and effect and other categories.
of the mind. If then one desires only this uninterrupted contentment, and Kant holds that man should not, then one commands an activity which will attain such a state. However, such a command is not categorical but hypothetical because it is based on nature and not on pure reason alone.

Kant's second reason why the ideal of happiness cannot lead to the attainment of happiness is more involved. He asks us to suppose that we could reduce the notion of happiness to a very minimum of true natural wants agreed on by the whole human race. Could we not then have a necessary, a priori, and definite or limited number of inclinations and objects specified in the ideal itself? Could we not also determine the objects to fulfill those limited inclinations according to the norm of the more noble pleasures in life as did Epicurus? Kant does not give a direct response. He merely states that if this could be done, the concept would still be dependent upon nature and, hence, not a priori. Hence, man would only interpret reality the way it is according to phenomena, and not in the way it ought to be. Furthermore, even allowing this limitation to what is most universally wanted, man would still find that there is no rest in one's quest for happiness according to the ideal. The reason is, he tells us, that nature (both man's own nature and external nature) is and must be at war with man. This conflict must necessarily exist, Kant continues, precisely to turn man away from the ideal of happiness to the true ideal or final purpose of nature.
How does the conflict between man and nature turn man away from happiness to the true ideal? What are the true ideals of nature? In explanation of these points Kant posits (he would say that reason posits) two norms that must be fulfilled for a thing to be designated as the true final purpose of nature: (1) the purpose must transcend nature; (2) and at the same time, the purpose must still retain some "connection" with nature. This connection, however, cannot be one of cause and effect according to the categories of understanding since no such relation between phenomena and the transcendent can be verified through intuition. Kant then looks for an end that can fulfill these conditions. He considers the possibility of man as the final purpose of nature. Should not man be the final purpose of nature because he is the only phenomenal being who can "make out of an aggregate of purposively formed things a system of purposes?" We can understand why Kant held this reason to be specious if we have carefully followed Kant's views concerning the faculty of understanding. This faculty merely follows the natural laws of the mind in applying its categories of thought. In his use of understanding man acts according to nature as he does when operating through some other instinctive power. Thus, some men have a greater intellectual insight than others. This is due to nature. If one does not have a high degree of insight, there is not much he can do about it. Furthermore, Kant points out, men do

Ibid., Pan 82. (p. 276).
not respect others primarily because of their degree of intellectual power; they envy them for this. Rather, they respect men for the degree of their holiness or dynamic personality. This holiness requires spontaneity in activity and such activity transcends nature. But man's connection with nature through possession of the faculty of understanding leaves out the norm of transcendency, and for this reason alone, man cannot be the end of nature.

Kant turns to a second possible connection between nature and man, and this connection is nature's beneficence toward man. But Kant finds that if man is the final end of nature for this reason, then man's happiness definitely would be the end of nature because happiness is the endowment or gift for which man has to thank nature. In pursuing this possibility, Kant again notes that man is largely passive in receiving nature's largess, the benefits of happiness. Man awaits nature's activity and his own inclinations to set him into action and not upon his own creativity (spontaneity). Kant is not here denying that happiness has an active aspect. His thought is that happiness does not categorically demand an active aspect according to the ideal, and, hence, allows the possibility for passivity. Kant's conclusion will not come as a surprise: although we cannot see a priori why the happiness of rational beings should not be the ultimate purpose of nature, if man makes it his whole purpose, he "renders himself incapable of positing his own

35 M. of Morals, p. 231 (297).
existence as a final purpose [of nature]."  

Kant adds to his argument by pointing out that nature does not exempt man from its natural laws just as it does not exempt any brute animal. Man is no darling of nature. The evidences for this are many: the countless plagues, the hunger, the frosts, and other assaults of nature against man that daily confront him. All these activities of nature cause pain and interfere with happiness; they do not contribute to happiness. Furthermore, Kant concludes, man's own natural dispositions rush him headlong into conflict with other men, the barbarism of war, misery and oppression. Does anyone really expect nature to be in harmony with his private though necessary end?

Is it riches that he (man) wants? How much anxiety, envy, and pesterling might he not bring in this way on his head? Is it knowledge and insight? This might perhaps make evils at present hidden from him and yet unavoidable seem all the more frightful, or would add a load of still further needs to the desires which already give him trouble enough. Is it long life? Who will guarantee that it would not be a long misery? Is it at least health? How often has infirmity of body kept a man from excesses into which perfect health would have let him fall!—and so on.

Kant then proceeds to make one final assault on the ideal of happiness. Were the ideal of attaining uninterrupted contentment the end of the world, then a question is raised about the whole idea of design. Design means that faculties are disposed to carry out certain purposes in the best way possible. If then, happiness

36 Judgment, Par. 83 (p. 281); Par. 85, n. 12 (p. 286).
were the purpose of nature, the purpose of nature itself hit upon a very bad arrangement in selecting reason to carry out this purpose. Instinct could have done the job better. Kant concludes that man must possess the faculty of reason for a higher destination than that of guiding him towards happiness: \( ^{38} \) else one must say that reason was not wisely designed since reason, designed for happiness, would not function independent of nature.

What effect on the ideal of happiness does this second consideration have? First, we note that the concept of happiness can involve activity as an essential note. But this activity is not self-perfective in the Thomistic sense of immanent action, but it is activity which seeks an object as an end of its activity. Thus, this activity has the Aristotelian-Thomistic notions of the "moved mover" and transient activity. Man would first be moved by inclination. He is first passive. Reason comes in to legislate after man is moved by the desire for happiness. We saw in Chapter II that the one meaningful note given by Kant to the concept of matter was that of passivity. Happiness, then, for Kant, can have the note of passivity. The connection between happiness and the phenomenal world is simply one of effect and cause. Further indications of the same connection can be noted. Happiness involves actions that instinct could better have taken care of. Hunger, frost, assaults of other animals and man's own violence against his fellow man--

\( ^{38} \text{Groundwork, p. 4-5 (63); Cf., also, Practical, p. 135 (113).} \)
all these are natural forces which, Kant says, can interfere with man's happiness. If these natural forces are disadvantageous to happiness, subjective happiness must involve a phenomenal contentment and possession while objective happiness must be limited to phenomenal objects, because what destroys and what is destroyed must both be phenomenal. Kant allows no relationship of cause and effect between the phenomenal world and the noumenal world, and this is the ultimate reason for the phenomenal character of happiness according to his epistemological principles. It would seem that peace of soul resulting from activity of the noumenal will cannot be a specific designation of subjective happiness; nor can morality be a part of objective happiness.

Kant becomes more explicit in his notion of happiness in his third and last consideration of what is involved in the conflict between man and nature. We ought not fail to note that nature's war against man is a negative relation or "connection" with man. Thus, one requirement of Kant's norm for positing something as the final purpose of nature is met. Can we find out a reason for this connection between man and nature? Secondly, does man meet the second requirement, that is, is there something transcendent in man, and does this transcendent have some "connection" with nature's war? We have seen in the moral framework that Kant labored to explain his ideal that man's free transcendent end is man's good will. In the third Critique Kant calls this end man's culture and moral discipline of his will. What is nature's "connection"
with man's culture and discipline of will? Kant says this "connection" is shown in the inequalities of nature which condemn some men to mechanical drudgery and forces men to be servants to the leisure of others. The latter in their leisure advance the arts and sciences. Other examples concern the conflicts of states which drive men to establish a world community where order necessary for development of the arts and sciences is provided; and, finally, wars which develop talents serviceable to culture and morality by attacking ambition, lust of dominion, and the avarice of the leaders of states. Kant is very careful to make nature's connection with man in this transcendent activity a negative preparation and not a cause. Thus, the conflict of nature with man, while opposing man's natural end of happiness, is a condition for bringing about his transcendent end--the reign of the good will. Man's transcendent end is the true final end of all nature, and for this reason, man can be called nature's final end:

W]e cannot mistake the purpose of nature--ever aiming to win us away from the rudeness and violence of those inclinations (inclination to enjoyment) which belong rather to our animality and for the most part are opposed to the cultivation of our higher destiny, and to make way for the development of our humanity. The beautiful arts and the sciences which, by their universally communicable pleasure, and by the polish and refinement of society, make man more civilized if not morally better, win us in large measure from the tyranny of sense propensions, and thus prepare men for a lordship in which reason alone shall have authority, while the evils with which we are visited . . . harden the powers of the soul not to submit to them, and so make us feel an aptitude for higher purpose which lies hidden in us.39

39Judgment Par. 83 (p. 283-84). Italics not in original.
Kant's reason for saying that man finds no rest in seeking happiness is not because man was made for God, not precisely because nature is at war against his human nature, and not even because reason is inadequate with the principle of happiness as a guide, but primarily, because Kant posits that man's moral self or his humanity is the proper end of man and nature.

From this final consideration we can conclude to an even more definite limitation of Kant's concept of happiness by comparing the activity of transcendent man with the activity of man's nature. From this analysis we find the fields of activity which are excluded from the activities of happiness: man's activity in perfecting the arts and the sciences and in the discipline of his will. Kant says that man has no inclination to perfect these fields of activities. Also any subjective appreciation that might be the effect of such a pursuit, while it may be either an intellectual or sensible contentment, we will find, is not a part of one's happiness. Furthermore, these pursuits are not the highest activity possible to humanity. In relation to man's highest activity, the discipline of his will, these sciences and the arts are merely a propedeutic.

At this point, the average man would probably object that works

40 In the preceding quotation and throughout his works, Kant seems to give the term humanity greater comprehension than the concrete term human nature. He seems to limit the latter concept to phenomenal man; the former, to comprehend man's transcendent moral self, that is, noumenal man. Thus man's duty is to "raise himself out of the rudeness of his nature... to humanity, by which alone he is capable of setting before himself ends..." (M. of Morals, n., P. 232 [297]).
in the sciences, the arts, in morality, and certainly religious experience are essential to one's happiness. By experience man knows that he has a sense of accomplishment, of appreciation, of fervor, and even an esteem in undertaking work in the arts and sciences. Kant would certainly not disagree that we have them. Nor would he say that we do not desire these as ends. But Kant would say that these desires are not a part of inclinations or appetites. What is behind this distinction between desires and inclinations?

The moralists of Kant's age had used the principle of happiness as a foundation for morality, and in Kant's opinion, they had failed miserably in establishing ethics on a solid foundation. Kant accepted their general hedonistic view of happiness although he did not reduce happiness to pleasure. However, he did keep pleasure as one norm for determining what objects are to constitute the concrete notion of objective happiness. In commenting on Baumgarten's fundamental principle of morality, Fac Bonum et Omitte Malum, Kant says that the good for Baumgarten contains "in itself impulsive grounds of action, and that which is superior good contains superior impulsive grounds." Kant points out that this distinction is useless for establishing moral obligation since obligation would then only depend on the coupling of actions to their highest impulsive grounds. But Kant holds that any action originating in impulsive desire could not be commanded unconditionally nor could it be

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41 Lectures, p. 25.
said to be morally good. Take away the impulse and the action becomes morally unnecessary, that is, if impulse is to be the foundation of morality. Thus, Kant says that a distinction between actions caused by higher or lower desires, that is, actions proceeding from inclinations either to intellectual or to sensible objects, is an invalid distinction. Intellectual and sense pleasure-giving objects can never be the basis of distinction between moral and immoral or amoral acts:

It is surprising that men, otherwise acute, can think it possible to distinguish between higher and lower desires, according as the ideas which are connected with the feeling of pleasure have their origin in the senses or in the understanding; for when we inquire what are the determining grounds of desire, and place them in some expected pleasantness, it is of no consequence whence the idea of this pleasing object is derived, but only how much it pleases... However dissimilar ideas of objects may be, though they be ideas of the understanding, or even of the reason in contrast to ideas of sense, yet the feeling of pleasure, by means of which they constitute the determining principle of the will (the expected satisfaction which impels the activity to the production of the object), is of one and the same kind, not only inasmuch as it can be known empirically, but also inasmuch as it affects the one and the same vital force which manifests itself in the faculty of desire, and in this respect can only differ in degree from every other ground of determination.\footnote{Practical, pp. 130-31 (109).}

If this passage is interpreted in the light of other passages, Kant is found here preparing the way for his own distinction between higher and lower desires. He will seek to reduce to one category the notions of happiness, lower desires, and inclinations because he feels that they are nothing but desires for objects that
can arise solely from anticipated sensible enjoyment or intellectual contentment connected with an object. As long as pleasure is connected with happiness, Kant feels that the idea is useless for establishing duty in moral activity and in the advancement of the arts and sciences. As long as men can say that they act because of anticipated pleasure in accomplishing anything—let it be something intellectual, strength of mind in overcoming obstacles, or even perfection—Kant holds that such activity proceeds from a principle of selfishness, that is, the principle of happiness.

With a new basis for distinction between higher and lower desires Kant feels that he can remove activities such as concern man's culture and moral discipline from the sphere of happiness where Baumgarten had left them. The distinction must also be adequate enough to distinguish between the subjective states belonging to happiness and those belonging to morality.

Ultimately, the distinction will rest upon one fact: that which determines the human elective will (Wille):

[W]e can find pleasure in . . . the culture of our mental talents, etc.; and we justly call these more refined pleasures and enjoyments. . . . But to say on this account that they determine the will in a different way, . . . this is just as when ignorant persons that like to dabble in metaphysics imagine matter so subtle, so super-subtle, that they . . . think that in this way they have conceived it as a spiritual and yet extended being.43

What is the different way in which the will is determined?

Kant says that when the rational will (Wille) of itself determines

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43Ibid., pp. 132-33 (110-11). First italics not in original.
the elective will, it does so not as the servant of the inclination. Then the rational will is "really a higher desire to which that which is pathologically determined is subordinate. . . . "44 Thus, higher desire is the rational will as an appetitive faculty in relation to the elective will as the spontaneously free cause determining the elective will (Willkühr) to action. Reason determines the will immediately without the medium of feeling or any external agent. Reason itself is the origin of the desire. No antecedent pleasure or pain causes the determination.

The second way in which the will is determined involves what Kant calls pathological determination. Here the phenomenal inclinations stand in relation to the will as determining the will to action. In this case the will determined is the animal will and not the elective will (the higher part of the will). Thus, where desire for an object originates, not from rational will (Wille), but from the inclinations, this desire, for Kant, is a lower desire. Such a desire is innate to man; it is an appetite. Inclination, in turn, is an habitual appetite. What characteristics are assigned to the higher and lower desires?

The higher desire is a rational desire because reason alone is its origin. It is not innate; it belongs to man's humanity or personality, but not to his nature; it rises spontaneously in the rational will itself without any antecedent cause such as ratiocina-

44 M. of Morals, p. 12 (268); cf., also, Practical, p. 133 (112).
tion or pleasure; reason proposes, in an a priori manner, an action that ought to be. Reason proposes it as a duty and not as pleasurable; reason proposes what is eternally written in the heart of man: "Here, therefore, we treat not of ends which man actually makes to himself in accordance with the sensible impulses of his nature, but of objects of the free elective will under its own laws -- objects which he ought to make his end. 45

Furthermore, higher desires are not primarily interested in any resulting intellectual or material object. Rather, its interest lies in the interior will act, the interior strength of the will, as an end in itself. Rational desires concern ends that ought to exist and not those ends designating objects that already exist or will exist in the phenomenal order. Thus, reason commands perfection in the physical, intellectual aesthetic, or moral realm. Reason commands it categorically. But reason commands no existing


46 Ibid., pp. 230-45 (296-308). Kant does not include a duty to what he calls an "historical" or "statutory" (revealed) religion. Man has a duty only to the "one true religion" which comprises nothing but those truths or practical principles whose unconditioned necessity we can become aware of, and which we therefore recognize as revealed through pure reason (not empirically, through revelation, whether natural or supernatural). Cf., Religion, p. 156. Kant's moral religion consists only "in the heart's disposition to fulfill all human duties as divine commands," but "not in dogmas and rites."-- (Ibid., p. 79). But Kant warns that "it is not meant by this that it is necessary to suppose the existence of God as a basis of all obligation in general (for this rests... simply on the autonomy of reason itself)..." (Practical, p. 267 [222]). Thus, the duty to religion, for Kant is an indirect duty, that is, so far as man "finds it furthering the vitality of his pure religious disposition..." (Religion, p. 170).
and determinate degree of perfection according to which one must measure up. To seek to measure up to some existing norm of perfection would be to act, not from duty, but from inclination for a certain level of attainment. What does determine the degree of perfection is prudence in a given circumstance. Finally, while Kant admits that all desires, both higher and lower, have pleasure or contentment in some way connected with them, yet higher desires are effects of rational will proposing an action as a duty. They are consequent to reason's command, not the cause.

In contrast, inclination is concerned either with possessing what now exists (nature's benefice) or with making a replica of what already is—some blueprint or model. The object of inclination is some determined degree of perfection which man is interested in attaining because of pleasure to be derived or because of some glory redounding to self. Inclination is also interested in activity as a means to the existing object, not as an end in itself. Inclinations are viewed as determining our personality from without. Self-consciousness, then, has no initial part in determining inclinations. The deciding factor which distinguishes inclination from higher desire is this, that in the former reason enters only after inclination has created desire through pleasure. Then reason attends to its prudential job of disposing the means to attain the end. Antecedent pleasure, therefore, arouses desire and

\[\text{\textsuperscript{47}M. of Morals, p. 9 (265).}\]
determines the will as brute elective will. Activities belonging to morality, on the other hand, proceed "from the idea of the possible action through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure in taking an interest in it or its effect to the deed."48

From this consideration we may summarize, more specifically, Kant's ideal of happiness. Since one norm for determining the abstract ideal of happiness is the inclination, the characteristics of the activities of happiness can be based on the notes assigned to inclination:

(1) Happiness is merely the sum of the innate desires of nature, a lower desire that cannot be the primary interest to man's personality or to his humanity since it disregarded noumenal man.

(2) Happiness regards existing objects as replicas to be fashioned or attained through activity. The objects are inseparably bound up with pleasure and self-interest.

(3) Because pleasure is a constituent of the determined concept of happiness, there is always the possibility of pleasure acting as the motivating power for the quest of happiness antecedently to reason's entering the picture.

(4) Based on inclination, happiness, then, will not always originate in man's willing self-consciousness. Man can remain passive with regard to the contents of the ideal. Nature alone would give meaning to life were happiness the ultimate rule of life, not man.

48 Ibid., p. 246 (310).
(5) Happiness is the matter for determinative judgment and the imagination when the question of concretizing the ideal is raised. The contents given to the ideal will be in terms of empirical concepts. The understanding's categories of cause and effect express the relation of objects to one's self-consciousness by bringing the empirical concepts inclinations and their objects into a relation. One can feel this relation as a higher unity under the ideal of happiness.

(6) Happiness, determined by the norm of one's inclinations, is either "the self-love that consists in an excessive fondness for oneself (philantia), or satisfaction with oneself (arrogantia). The former is particularly called selfishness; the latter self-conceit."⁴⁹

(7) Since inclinations have no tendency to the intelligible world, happiness is not a desire to experience the feelings consequent to activity-desires of reason itself. Hence, not all phenomenal states belong to the ideal of happiness.

(8) If one makes the ideal of happiness his rule of life, this man cannot be said to be free or a morally good man. He may be prudent and skillful, not immoral, but he cannot be praised for his goodness. He is self-centered and self-seeking.

We may now consider more specifically some of those activities involving only consequent feeling or intellectual contentment, and which, therefore, do not belong to the activities of happiness.

⁴⁹Practical, p. 197 (165).
They are the activities which raise man from the "rudeness of his nature." Feelings and intellectual contentment consequent on willing duties, commanded by pure reason, are feelings of the beautiful, the sublime, of the purposiveness in nature, and the moral law. Thus, Kant says that the satisfaction of happiness gratifies; the satisfaction of the beautiful, the sublime, and the purposiveness in nature pleases; and the satisfaction of the moral law esteems.⁵⁰ The differences in these satisfactions are only applications of Kant's theory regarding the distinction between higher and lower desires.

Kant says that in contemplating the beautiful the consequent feeling is a "contemplative pleasure or a passive satisfaction."⁵¹ This feeling is distinct from the pleasure of happiness because it does not precede our judging it; and secondly, because the subject is not interested in the existence of any object but only in reflecting upon the idea of an object. Where the beautiful is concerned, pleasure exists without any desire for an object. Possession of the beautiful is through reflection. Reflection, in this instance, is not on any quality in the object. Were this true, pleasure from contemplating the beautiful would be purely subjective. All people are not affected in the same way by some particular quality in a particular object. The object of reflection, Kant

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⁵⁰Judgment, Par. 5 (p. 43).

⁵¹M. of Morals, p. 10 (267).
concludes, must be universal. Kant's doctrine of the beautiful states that the representation of objects makes one conscious of a harmony in his faculties of presentation and not of any harmony in the object itself. Since all men's faculties are posited as being constituted the same, a universal and a priori object is possible. The object is a concrete universal. Thus, in saying that this work of art is beautiful, one merely states a condition of his feelings about the "representation" given in his cognitive faculties. Yet, it is a universal feeling because the feeling results from the harmony of the cognitive faculties perceived through reflective judgment. The consciousness of harmony and the pleasure we take in it are one and the same. Kant compares the pleasure of happiness to that of the beautiful and finds that the former is momentary and ceases after being satisfied while aesthetic contemplation is repetitious and free from inclination. The pleasure of happiness serves a purpose while the pleasure of art does not present itself as useful. The pleasure of happiness disturbs; that of the beautiful is restful.

Even in science Kant finds a feeling of purposiveness or consciousness of harmony which is a universal pleasure resulting from a condition of reflective judgment and not from any objective purpose in nature. This consciousness of the harmony in our faculties arises when the scientist finds two or more heterogeneous empirical laws which can be unified under a common unity given by reason. This pleasure can only be experienced after reason has moved one
to the arduous task of research. Pleasure cannot move one to the activities of scientific research because the research results only from reason's ideal of design in nature. Hence, the pleasure is a result of an *a priori* principle and can be universally experienced. In this way, Kant says, man can transcend understanding's rigid and mechanical laws and interpret nature as something designed for a higher purpose.

By considering the feelings connected with the arts and sciences, we only stress the fact that Kant has limited the principle of happiness to phenomenal activities and, at the same time, excluded certain phenomenal activities. The activities of the artist and the scientist are creative. They are spontaneous and cannot wait upon the inclination of nature, for nature does not tend to that which is difficult and strenuous. Kant conceives that one is not empirically inclined to make progress in these two fields of activity. The type of intellectual contentment connected with the arts and sciences is an "intellectual pleasure," but not intellectual in the sense of being an activity of the understanding. Rather, it results from a practical idea of reason which, for Kant, has practical validity only when it has relation to the moral world of freedom. This is the intellectual contentment of the moral order; it is, however, experienced in the phenomenal world.

In the third *Critique* Kant finds another feeling that truly

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mediates between the phenomenal and noumenal man: the feeling of the sublime. Kant says that the feeling of sublimity is two-fold. It is the feeling of utter helplessness resulting on the part of one who experiences the omnipotence of nature acting through its storms and its earthquakes, or manifesting its grandeur through the starry heavens, and other natural phenomena. At the same time the feeling of sublimity is not merely a negative feeling; it is positive in the sense both of experience of one's freedom from the destructive, mechanical, and powerful forces of nature and of the sense that one belongs to a moral world where he too can command activity. Does nature itself cause this feeling? If so, then the feeling would be an effect of nature's benefice and, hence, a feeling of happiness. However, the feeling of sublimity, Kant says, has a priori grounds. His explanation tells of a feeling of pain which rises out of the consciousness of one's inability on the part of his imagination to estimate the magnitude of nature's grandeur or destructive forces. The imagination in turn is forced to refer its representation to reason's idea of totality—the moral world. There arises, then, the positive feeling of pleasure when reason through reflective judgment makes the judgment that the sensible phenomenal world is infinitely small in comparison with reason's idea of absolute totality. Once again we see that Kant divorces pleasure from an existing object; that he bases the pleasure of sublimity on an a priori cause; and that the pleasure is consequent, not antecedent, to the consideration of reason. The con-
tentment of sublimity is at once intellectual and sensible. It raises man above the phenomenal world to a higher destination—the moral world. In contrast, happiness, under the norm of the inclinations, ties man to the phenomenal feelings of his animality.

From the feeling of sublimity, we can easily make a transition to the feeling of esteem, for the two are closely connected. This feeling is inseparably and necessarily connected with the consciousness of the moral law, but not in such a way that it causes observance of the moral law. Rather, the moral law causes the feeling of esteem or reverence, and sometimes Kant seems to say that consciousness of the moral law is the feeling of esteem. Thus, esteem has its negative and positive aspect. For example, when one is conscious of the moral law and submits to the moral law, there is pain in the act of submitting; this pain is a feeling of humiliation; it is a negative aspect of esteem for the law which neutralizes lower feelings of the inclination and makes us ashamed of our lower inclinations even to the extent that we should almost want to be without them. Yet, Kant says that there is so little pain here that we should not call it pain for, he guarantees, once we are accustomed to the feeling, we can never be satisfied without it.53

The reason is that man believes himself elevated in proportion as he sees the law elevated above the law of his frail nature.

As a positive feeling it is contentment in knowing that the

53Practical, p. 203 (170). The subject of the feeling of esteem (or reverence) is treated in pages 195-207 (164-173).
rational will freely determines the human elective will. Thus, Kant says, esteem is a moral feeling or sentiment, or reverence for the holiness of the law. When Kant says that this moral feeling is a motive for duty, he does not mean that it causes moral activity. Rather esteem or reverence is a condition. Thus, respect for the law in its negative aspect affects the lower inclinations and allows for easier operation of reason's pure causality. Reverence implies fear; it shakes us to want to possess holiness of the will; it humilates and at the same time elevates us; it is dread and at the same time a joy which we cannot help but inwardly feel, given consciousness of the moral law.

Again, we see that respect for the law is excluded from happiness for it cannot be compared to a pathological feeling. It is "far from being a feeling of pleasure. . . ." The reasons are: it is not antecedent to rational determination of the will; it is the result of an a priori cause—the ideal of morality; it is universally experienced as opposed to the selfish feelings of one's animality. Were we to do an action merely to gain the feeling of respect or the positive feeling of self-approval, we would lose the feeling, since the feeling itself is the very consciousness of the moral law commanding, not for the sake of esteem, but for duty.

54Ibid., p. 201 (169).
55Ibid., p. 208 (174) and p. 211 (177).
56Ibid., p. 202 (170); Cf., also, M. of Morals, p. 221 (289).
There remains now only one final aspect of the subjective determination of happiness and morality, and that is peace of conscience. Aside from reverence for the law which precedes the carrying out of a command without having any causality with regard to the will, there is the effect of one's consciousness of having acted from duty's sake. Of this Kant says:

When an upright man is in the greatest distress, which he might have avoided if he could only have disregarded duty, is he not sustained by the consciousness that he has maintained humanity in its proper dignity in his own person and honoured it, that he has no reason to be ashamed of himself in his own sight, or to dread the inward glance of self-examination? This consolation is not happiness, it is not even the smallest part of it, for no one would wish to have occasion for it. . . This inward peace is . . . merely negative as regards what can make life pleasant. . . . It is the effect of a respect for something. . . in comparison and contrast with which life with all its enjoyment has no value. He still lives only because it is his duty, not because he finds anything pleasant in life.57

This passage is a definite statement to the fact that peace of conscience is not a part of happiness. Kant does not say that one can be happy without this peace of conscience. Rather, he means that peace of conscience as part of morality is a necessary condition if we are to enjoy our happiness. A problem does arise as to exactly where Kant does place this contentment. Kant himself finds difficulty in finding a category to cover it:

Have we not, however, a word which does not express enjoyment, as happiness does, but indicates a satisfaction in one's existence, an analogue of . . . happiness?

57Practical, p. 216 (181-82). Italics not in original.
ness. . . . Yes! [T]his word is self-contentment, a negative satisfaction in one's existence, in which one is conscious of needing nothing. . . . This may be called intellectual contentment. The sensible contentment (improperly so-called) which rests on the satisfaction of the inclinations . . . can never be adequate to the conception of it . . . .

Freedom itself becomes . . . capable of an enjoyment which cannot be called happiness, because it does not depend on the positive concurrence of feeling . . . ; and thus, at least in its origin, this enjoyment is analogous to self-sufficiency which we can ascribe only to the Supreme Being.58

By calling peace of conscience self-contentment, Kant adds little to the solution of his difficulty. All we know is that he places inward peace outside of happiness and under the general category of freedom or morality. The same can be said for the feelings resulting from contemplation of the beautiful, the sublime, the purposiveness of nature and determination by the moral law. Arguments in favor of this position can be supported by considering Kant's arguments against those writers who distinguish between moral and physical happiness.

Moral happiness, Kant says, is a self-contradictory nonentity. His argument is founded on his distinction that morality proceeds from the human elective will while happiness determined by the inclinations depend upon the brute will. Using this distinction, Kant tells us that were "moral happiness" the true designation of inward peace, man would involve himself in a circuitous argument. Thus, a man must feel himself bound to do his duty without adver-

58 Ibid., pp. 256-57 (214-15).
ting to the fact that inward peace of conscience will follow upon obedience to duty. Inner peace is an effect only when one is conscious that he has tried to act out of duty. On the other hand, were inner peace happiness, a part of the subjective state of happiness, inward peace of mind would have to be experienced before a man could be moved to duty; in other words, peace of mind would be the cause while acting from duty would be the effect. But acting from duty means simply action caused by pure reason's command. Hence, the contradiction. Kant uses this reductio ad absurdum argument to point up his position that acting from any desire antecedent to duty's determination of the will will never result in a morally good will. Thus, inner peace must be an effect of acting out of duty, not the cause of it. This argument seems to preclude the use of the term moral happiness.

It is significant that when Kant brings up the idea of moral happiness, he speaks of the idea as a misuse of words rather than a nonentity. Yet, again Kant says that inner peace may well be called happiness. Indeed in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, a later work than the three Critiques, Kant regularly adopts the use of the term moral happiness: "[M]oral happiness ... consists of a consciousness of progress in goodness." In answer to this difficulty it may be said that even in the work on

59 *M. of Morals*, pp. 220-221 (287-288); p. 233 (298).
60 *Religion*, p. 69, n; cf., also, p. 61.
religion and in an even later work, *Anthropology*, Kant maintains the same principles of the above given argument which shows that inner peace cannot be an activity antecedent to a categorical imperative. Kant will consistently maintain that inner peace must be consequent not only to reason's command but an effect of an activity performed from duty's sake. It does not seem probable that Kant would change so basic a principle in order to give the designation of happiness to the experience of inward peace of soul. Furthermore, the argument, given above, against the use of the category moral happiness appears in the *Metaphysic of Morals* which is dated 1797, four years after his work on religion. Kant's use of the category of moral happiness may be interpreted as a mere matter of convenience. In a parallel example, a seeming inconsistency on Kant's part turns out not to be an inconsistency, but a "convenient way of speaking." Thus, after criticizing the use of the category "an intellectual inclination" in the second *Critique* in the *Metaphysic of Morals* Kant yields to popular thought and says that "in order to accommodate ourselves to common speech, we may admit an inclination even to that which can only be the object of an intellectual pleasure—that is to say, a habitual desire from a pure interest of reason. This however, would not be the cause, but the effect of the latter interest, and we might call it the sense-free inclination (propensio intellectualis)."  

61 For the chronological order of Kant's works, see "Introduction" to Kant's *Religion*, p. lxxxiv.
In like manner, it seems at least probable that Kant, without admitting a change in principle, is compromising only to the extent of allowing inner peace to be popularly called moral happiness. Paton, without giving a definite solution to this difficulty, says that Kant would hold that a just man cannot be happy on the rack. If we consider that a just man would certainly have an inner peace from knowing that he had acted out of a sense of duty, Paton's statement would seem to indicate that Kant did not consider inner peace a part of happiness. Finally, Kant says that this contentment is a "rational self-love" which is the love of one who knows that it is his maxim to make reverence for the law the highest incentive of his will. In the same place he also says that it is a "worthiness to be happy." Happiness, then, is something in addition to worthiness to be happy. The mere fact of deserving happiness can be a motive by itself, Kant says, without the motive of sharing in this happiness playing any part.

We have seen that happiness as an ideal is so indeterminate a concept that man seeks to make it a definite plan of life by appealing to some external norm: the inclinations and pleasant objects. Yet, Kant holds that happiness is also rational. This

62 M. of Morals, p. 11 (267); cf. also Practical, p. 255 (213), and Lectures, p. 37.
65 Groundwork, p. 104 (117).
means that reason, not finding any possibility of determining the concept according to a rational norm contained within the concept or ideal of happiness, must look for a rational norm outside the ideal. That concept or norm will, of course, be the notion of duty. This brings us to our final problem of the relationship between duty or morality and happiness.

**SUMMUM BONUM**

We have seen that for the concept final purpose, Kant requires as a constituent that which needs no other as a condition of its possibility.\(^66\) The good-will, unconditioned by the contingencies of nature, was found to be the objective good fulfilling this requirement. But, for Kant, the good will, or virtue, is not the sole and complete good. It is the supreme good. But reason must consider man as a whole and in so doing "takes for final purpose the furthering of happiness in harmony with morality. To further this so far as is in our power . . . is commanded by the moral law."\(^67\)

The final purpose of man and external nature, that is, the Summum Bonum, consists in this, that the whole man possess happiness proportioned to his virtue.

The first question that presents itself concerns the reason why Kant thought it necessary to unite happiness and virtue into one concept, synthetic and not analytic. Kant says that reason

\(^{66}\) *Judgment*, Par. 84 (p. 284).

\(^{67}\) Ibid., Par. 87 (p. 302); cf. Par. 88 (p. 304) and *Practical* p. 181 (152) and p. 222 (186).
"finds it impossible for it to render conceivable in the way of a mere course of nature a connexion so exactly proportioned . . . between two sets of events happening according to such distinct laws. . . ." Thus, speculative reason has no intuition to validate its "thinking" a connection between the two since the noumenon does not fall under the understanding's categories of cause and effect. Furthermore experience itself will substantiate the fact that a virtuous man does not necessarily enjoy happiness on account of and in proportion to his virtue. Assuming Kant's definition of happiness, we can understand what Kant means. The good man, as we have seen is not happy on the rack. The moral law of itself does not promise any sensible satisfaction. On the other hand, neither does experience show that happiness produces virtue: "For a man must have a different criterion when he is compelled to say to himself: I am a worthless fellow, though I have filled my purse; and when he approves himself, and says: I am a prudent man, for I have enriched my treasure." Hence, reason and experience both fail to yield an insight into the possibility of a union of happiness and morality. But neither does reason or experience prove that such a union is impossible. Hence, speculative reason can "think" out the consistency or possibility of such an ideal union, provided there is some concrete fact which necessitates the union as a practical

68 Practical, p. 291 (243). Cf., also, Judgment, Par. 87 (p. 301).
69 Paton, The Categorical Imperative, p. 50. Cf., also, Practical, p. 270 (225) and p. 216 (181).
70 Practical, pp. 150-51 (127).
Kant provides us with that fact. First, he says that "to need happiness, to deserve it, and yet at the same time not to participate in it, cannot be consistent with the perfect volition of a rational being . . . ."71 Perfect volition requires that man take account of the needs of phenomenal nature. Since the sum of these needs are unified under the ideal happiness, perfect volition must take account of happiness as well as morality. Thus, Kant insists upon the fact that without happiness the moral man will not have attained his complete good: "If morality can offer me no prospect that my need to be happy will be satisfied, neither can it command me."72 Now Kant has stressed that fact that nature prohibits this prospect from being realized. Hence, if morality, explained in terms of the given fact of one's awareness of duty, is to have meaning, then moral man must be able to attain some share of happiness in the future. Here Kant has connected happiness with his one given and certain fact—the sense of duty. Once a concept is connected with the concept of duty, Kant considers that concept to have practical, thought not theoretical, value. So much for Kant's reason for "thinking" that happiness and morality are in some way connected.

Kant now has the problem of explaining how virtue and happi-

71 Ibid., p. 246 (206).
72 Immanuel Kant, Vorlesungen über die Philosophische Reli-
ness are connected; in other words, how the *Summum Bonum* can be consistently thought to be a practically necessary concept. Kant has established the fact that the *Summum Bonum* is necessary psychologically. To show how it is possible that happiness and virtue can be united into one ideal synthetically, one has neither the benefits of the certitude of experience nor an intellectual intuition that happiness is proportioned to virtue either in this life or in the future. According to Kant's method, the problem resolves itself into a matter of showing what postulates reason conceives to be practically necessary in order to render the ideal possible. 73

Reason, Kant tells us, cannot produce any postulates as necessary from the proposition "Endeavor after happiness produces virtue." This proposition is absolutely false. However, he finds that the proposition, "Virtue necessarily produces happiness," is not absolutely false. What, then, are the postulates which render the concept of the *Summum Bonum* logically intelligible?

73 Kant's procedure with the concept *Summum Bonum* follows the same procedure as with any other ideal: "In order to extend a pure cognition practically, there must be an a priori purpose . . . which determines the will directly . . . and in this case that is the *sumnum bonum* [because of its necessary connection with duty]. This however, is not possible without presupposing theoretical conceptions (for which . . . no corresponding intuition can be found, nor consequently by path of theory any objective reality). Thus by the [moral law] which commands the existence of the *Summum Bonum*, the possibility of these objects of pure speculative reason is postulated, and the objective reality which the latter could not assure. By this the theoretical knowledge of pure reason does indeed obtain an accession, but it consists only in this, that those concepts which otherwise it had to look upon as problematical . . . concepts, are now shown assertorically to be such as actually have objects." - *Practical*, p. 277 (232-33).
Virtue, or holiness, is defined as the perfect accordance of the will with the moral law. But, Kant says, no rational being of the sensible world is capable of this perfect accordance at any moment of his existence because he has a phenomenal as well as a noumenal will. Perfect holiness can be "thought" to be possessed only by a being with a noumenal will alone. Since man's search for holiness is required as practically necessary by reason of his awareness of a sense of duty, holiness "can only be found in a progress in infinitum towards that perfect accordance ..." It follows then that such a progress is possible only on the supposition of an "endless duration of the existence ... of the same rational being (which is called the immortality of the soul.)" Hence, immortality is the first postulate.

The second postulate is that of freedom. Thus, if man is to give meaning to the given fact of a sense of duty, "the cosmological idea of an intelligible world and the consciousness of our existence in it, by means of the postulate of freedom ..." must be held as necessary. As a member of an intelligible world man can be independent of the sensible world and determine his will according to the law of the intelligible world.

On the supposition that man is a member of the intelligible

74 Practical, p. 262 (218).
75 Ibid., p. 263 (218-19).
76 Ibid., p. 276 (230).
world, Kant says that "it is not impossible that morality . . . should have a connexion as cause with happiness (as an effect in the sensible world) if not immediate yet mediate (viz.: through an intelligent author of nature) . . . ." While men directly cause virtue or worthiness to be happy, God is postulated as the Cause or Distributor of happiness proportionate to man's virtue. God can be "thought" to be the principle both in the noumenal and the phenomenal order because He is outside the phenomenal world and not subject to its contingencies as is phenomenal man. Hence, Kant concludes that it is not repugnant to postulate God as freely producing phenomenal effects as part of man's happiness. God, as supremely holy and the Creator of both the determined and free worlds, must effect a happiness proportioned to man's virtue in the future life. The existence of God is the third, and final, postulate which is practically necessary to maintain the consistency of the Summum Bonum.

For Kant, the concept of the Summum Bonum is the doctrine of how man can become worthy of happiness and not how man can be happy. Yet Kant's introduction of happiness into the Summum Bonum, as Greene points out, is a recognition on Kant's part that even in the purest doctrine of morality happiness must not be ignored. Also, this introduction of happiness into the Summum Bonum has the

77 Ibid., p. 252 (211).
78 Greene, "Introduction" to Religion, p. lvi.
merit of giving a rational norm to the ideal of happiness other than the empirical norm of pleasant objects and inclinations. Happiness, then, estimated as an indirect duty can be rational and at the same time an objective good. As such, Kant saves himself from the objection that his concept of happiness means only pleasure, for it would be utterly repugnant that the goodwill should direct even indirectly an activity looking to man's pleasure. Rather the norms for seeking happiness which the will determined by duty imposes on the ideal of happiness are those of "diet, frugality, politeness, reserve, and so on--things which experience shows contribute most to well being on the average."\(^7\) But even with happiness under the guidance of pure reason, Kant states that proportionate happiness cannot be attained at all in this world so far as our own power is concerned, but must remain an object of hope.\(^8\)

The phenomenal world operates under mechanical laws which even noumenal man cannot change. Reason can only propose what on the average contributes to well being or happiness. Hence, man must hope for and postulate the existence of God who will bring about a phenomenal happiness in proportion to his morality. The relationship of happiness and morality in this life and in the future remains, for Kant, not one of cause and effect, but a relationship of condition before the cause can operate. Thus, happiness, solely

\(^7\) *Groundwork*, p. 47 (86).

\(^8\) *Practical*, p. 270 (226).
under the guidance of the brute will, will be determined by the inclinations so that through excess the small portion of happiness man seeks in this life will be lost by resulting sickness. But happiness, under the guidance of man's free elective will, will be determined by the principle of frugality, reserve, will allow man to enjoy a certain amount of happiness provided that he possesses the peace of consciousness that comes from continually acting out of reverence for the law. In this life, virtue and inner peace are conditions to our happiness. In the future life, our virtue and inner peace are the conditions according to which God will reward us with a consequent happiness.

This consideration of the relationship of virtue (worthiness to be happy) and happiness throws light upon one of Kant's best known and most descriptive definitions of happiness: "Happiness is the condition of a rational being in the world with whom everything goes according to his wish and will..." 81 This description is perhaps misleading. Certainly one wishes inner peace and intellectual contentment along with physical contentment. One might then be prompted to say that Kant surely does include inner peace as a constituent of happiness. But logically and explicitly inner peace and physical contentment have been separated by Kant. Kant's definition quoted above calls attention to a condition in life, the future life. The point is that this condition is a state which

81 Ibid., p. 265 (221).
consists not only of happiness but also of the activity that belongs to morality. Kant might better have said that happiness results or follows (not caused) when everything goes according to one's wish and will. Logically this definition seems to be a definition of the *Summum Bonum* rather than of happiness itself. We wish and will happiness, but we also wish and will inner peace or morality. We wish happiness, but we must will the contents of the ideal as conditions for safeguarding our morality, or else, we have no inward peace for man can be at peace only when he is conscious that he has sought to will not only in conformity to duty but out of duty's sake. This seems to say no more than that we wish happiness but in proportion to our degree of inward peace or holiness. Such is the proper definition of the *Summum Bonum*.

In the last analysis, happiness, for Kant, is the act of contentment of one's lower desires in the possession and enjoyment of phenomenally determined objects. Ultimately this contentment, intellectual and sensible, is rational and in proportion to one's virtue or holiness. Virtue and happiness both make up that condition of life which, for Kant, is not happiness alone or virtue alone, but a combination of the two, and Kant calls this the state of the *Summum Bonum*. Kant never seems to have changed his views either on this materialistic concept of happiness or the supremacy of the ideal of morality over the ideal of happiness in his concept of the complete good.

Kant well summarizes the desires belonging to happiness in
a work published in 1803, the year before his death. 82 There Kant says that the desires of happiness can be broken down into three levels: (1) desires where no object is considered and such would be desires for honor, power, and possessions; (2) desires directed to definite objects and these would include desires fulfilled in sexual experience, in possessing material things, and in companionship; and (3), desires embracing the continuance of the preceding two classes and these include the love of life, the love of health, and freedom from anguish, sorrow, or loss of any attained well-being. In no way may these desires for happiness be said to include the higher desires proceeding from practical reason. By nature and by the desires of happiness alone, man is not a moral being. 83 He becomes moral or reaches the state of the Summum Bonum only when he has raised himself above nature and the desires of happiness by turning to the concepts of duty and the law which impose a rational norm on the desires of happiness. Practically speaking, perhaps it does not matter whether this condition or state is called happiness or not. However, philosophically it does matter since philosophy is the science of being, and according to Kant's philosophical principles, inner peace can never be a constituent note of the ideal of happiness in its determined state.

83 Ibid., p. 506.
CHAPTER V

SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEMS PRESENTED IN THE THESIS

We are now in a position to summarize Kant's doctrine of happiness and to answer the problems we set ourselves at the beginning of this thesis. The first problem concerned the nature of happiness. The first characteristic note of Kant's doctrine of happiness is that we cannot know the nature of happiness. Happiness is conceived by Kant as an ideal of one's reason and imagination. Man seeks to use this ideal as a possible principle of action in order to guide his life without at the same time purporting to give any insight into life's meaning. Reason conceives of this ideal state as an uninterrupted contentment with the possession and enjoyment of objects without fear of losing them. Kant's chief problem concerning this ideal was whether or not the ideal as conceived by man is adequate and capable of guiding man's life so that man is raised above his animality and is endowed with virtues worthy of esteem. Kant's answer was that the ideal as formed by reason is completely indeterminate within the ideal itself. The concept, subjected to a process of analysis, does not contain any norm within itself by which reason may determine a priori for all rational
beings what actuated interior states and what objects can bring about a real state of uninterrupted contentment as proposed by the ideal. Kant finds that the general lot of men appeal to experience or to the imagination for their norm. The only norm experience and the imagination advance is that of the inclinations and pleasant objects. Concretely expressed the ideal of happiness is the uninterrupted fulfillment of the sum of the inclinations through the possession and enjoyment of phenomenal objects. These objects may be sensible or intellectual. Kant holds that the quest for happiness is not lifted above the phenomenal order by merely seeking after intellectual objects rather than sensible objects. He pointed out that intellectual objects as well as sensible objects can be sought simply because of the pleasure or joy connected with their attainment. Pleasure, then, was the chief element in Kant's concrete specification of the ideal.

Thus, the second essential characteristic which Kant assigns to the ideal of phenomenal happiness is that of selfishness. In using this concrete principle of happiness as a plan for life, man would judge all his activity purely in reference to his own selfish interests. The ideal is determined to include what Kant calls the lower desires as opposed to the higher desires.

This brings us to the third element characteristic of Kant's notion of happiness. We saw that Kant distinguished between higher and lower desires on the ground that lower desires are the inclinations which can always determine the will prior to the estimation
of rational will. Higher desires originate, in contrast to lower desires, in rational will itself. With this distinction, Kant was able to exclude from the determinate concept of happiness such particular desires as love for the arts (contemplation of the beautiful and the sublime), love for the sciences (recognition of purposiveness in nature in search for greater unity to physical laws), and esteem for discipline of the will and moral activity with its consequent inward peace of soul. Kant seems to have assigned these activities to the category of higher desires for two reasons: (1) because man is posited to have no lower inclinations to advance himself in these fields of activity; one must be virtuous or capable of exercising great strength of will in their pursuit; and, (2) because these higher desires are found to be consequent and not antecedent to rational will's determination of the free elective will; thus, they possess the quality of having a universal and a priori causality.

The higher desires were characterized as belonging to man's higher self. They take him away from the rudeness of his natural inclinations, and, to be more positive, they allow a man to exercise freedom, for they regard man in his humanity as making universal law; they make man a member of an autonomous kingdom of ends in which he opposes all selfishness and self-centeredness, and the tendencies to use one's fellow man as a means to an end. These desires are free desires, and in willing activity in conformity with them, man becomes holy, or rather, preserves the holiness of his
good will. By following these higher desires man shows and mani-
ests his belief in the transcendental existence of a moral world.

In contrast, the concrete concept of the ideal of happiness
was limited to the lower desires. Hence, the ideal of happiness
has the capacity to tie a man to his lower inclinations. The ideal
makes man incapable of regarding the higher destiny of the whole
man (his humanity); it allows a man to use his activities as well as
other men as means to his selfish ends without moral scruple; and
finally, it makes a man to be passive in regard to activity, that
is, man is moved by inclination in the first instance and not by
his own rational creativity or spontaneity. The highest intellec-
tual contentment offered by the ideal of happiness determined
through understanding and the imagination is the satisfaction that
one is the director of his activities in disposing the means to an
end. But Kant remarks that this activity involves no more than the
principle of prudence. Because the ideal of happiness can be de-
termined by the norm of one's inclinations and pleasant objects,
Kant concludes that happiness, used by an agent as a principle for
unifying his life, does not allow a man the opportunity for reading
into life a meaning which is beyond the categories of the empirical
understanding and the imagination. When Kant stated that the value
of happiness is less than zero, he was thinking in terms of happi-
ness determined through the norm of inclinations and pleasant
objects.

Yet, it was found that the pursuit of happiness, for Kant,
had to be rational. Kant admits in all his major works that man must have regard for his own happiness. The quest is a psychological necessity on man's part. Man would not continue his quest for moral holiness unless he was assured that he could enjoy a certain amount of pleasure in this pursuit. What Kant has done here is twofold. First, he has anticipated the objection that he has made happiness and pleasure one and the same. If happiness is to be rational, and Kant many times says that it is, then happiness cannot be identified with pleasure, for, while rational will cannot command pleasure as a duty, yet Kant states in many places that happiness will at times be willed as an indirect duty. Hence, we were able to conclude that Kant's notion of happiness must include the desire for objects other than for pleasure alone.

The second point that Kant established by making happiness an indirect duty was to indicate a second norm for the determination of the ideal of happiness. Granted that the ideal will be specified in terms of inclinations and phenomenal objects, yet the rational will selects and chooses its objects not primarily out of regard for pleasure but according to duty's norms of frugality, reserve, politeness, and others. For example, Kant showed that rational will in certain circumstances must will happiness in order to safeguard man against temptations to his virtue. But, even in this case, rational will does not will happiness as an end, a good in itself, nor as a means to virtue, but merely as a condition or "bulwark" which safeguards his morality. Such a situation allows
man contentment in the possession of pleasant objects, which he considers not only as a part of his happiness but also as part of his moral integrity. We saw one example of such a situation in the case of external religious practices. While rational will does not propose external religion as a duty in itself, it does see the necessity of religious practice where this practice induces reverence for reason's commands of duty; in other words, external religion can safeguard virtue by allowing a greater subjective facility in the observance of the moral law. In accomplishing this, external religion does not act as a positive cause of virtue. Rather, it acts in a negative manner, by opposing our lower inclinations, and, consequently, it leaves man in an undisturbed state where he can allow the free exercise of choice and determination by pure reason. Again, Kant emphasizes that one, in certain circumstances, must seek an increase in wealth to guard against poverty since poverty may lead to a temptation against virtue. Thus, while the quest for wealth and its consequent possession and enjoyment is a part of the quest for happiness, reason also considers this a moral pursuit when pursued with temperance from the command of reason alone.

Kant's doctrine in this matter is similar to and yet differs from Christian morality concerning pleasure. His doctrine is the same in that both recognize that man must have some sensible as well as intellectual joy in the pursuit of holiness. Christian morality recognizes that man's nature requires participation in sensible satisfaction, and that such activity as leads to pleasure
and joy can be moral since God ordered the nature of man just that way. Kant, on the other hand, never allows the seeking after pleasant objects for themselves or as a means to preserve moral integrity to be moral. His distinction here, as we have seen, is rather subtle. His doctrine that there can be no relationship of cause and effect between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds demands that the quest for happiness be a necessary condition but not a necessary means to the attainment of holiness. Sought under the rule of duty, man's quest for happiness becomes not only rational but also morally good. The significance of his doctrine on the rationality of happiness is that the norm for its rationality is external to the concept of happiness. As a plan for life, the ideal of happiness alone is insufficient.

Our second problem was to determine why Kant made happiness empirical. In general, we have seen that morality was the most real and supreme and absolutely best of all existing possible goods. Morality is the good that makes the good will a good in itself. In attempting to salvage the concept of man as a responsible agent, Kant had to oppose this to the contemporary concept of man as a passive creature of determined nature. If man is considered completely passive and determined, Kant saw the futility of trying to draw from this concept of man a sense of duty as a basis for morality. In seeking another foundation for morality, Kant found that the concept of happiness in vogue at that time was essentially hedonistic. Again, Kant must have felt that it would be futile to
attempt to draw analytically a sense of duty from such a concept of happiness. For Kant, man's sense of duty was an indisputable fact and the primary given in man's self-consciousness. Duty alone, Kant felt, could be the ground for morality. Were duty able to be drawn analytically from the concept of happiness, Kant saw that man in seeking his own happiness could yet conceive himself as virtuous by merely determining duty according to the norm of pleasure or some moral sense which only rates intellectual contentment "superior" to sensible pleasure. Hence, for Kant, happiness and duty had to become antithetic; happiness was restricted to phenomenal objects; morality was allowed to transcend phenomenal objects to include the noumenal world of freedom.

More specifically, within the epistemological framework of Kant's system, happiness had to be phenomenal. If morality was to be a priori, determinate (in the sense of having the capacity to offer a plan of life according to duty without going outside the concept itself), and universally applicable to all rational beings, then its activities must be free and transcend phenomenal and self-centered motivation. Thus, we saw that precisely because the activities of the arts, the sciences, and moral discipline proceeded from principles that were a priori, determinate, and universal, these activities were placed beyond the motivation of the phenomenal world, even though their effects are yet phenomenal. By positing the moral or intelligible noumenal world as a postulate to save man's freedom and by limiting knowledge of reality to phenome-
nal reproduction of the noumenal world, Kant was left with the concept of man possessing two opposing quests: the phenomenal quest for happiness and the noumenal quest for morality. Postulating that the activities of the arts, the sciences, and discipline of the will belong to the free desires of man, the rest of man's drives, which can only be traced to empirical causality according to Kant, were summed up under the concept of happiness.

Furthermore, while admitting that the quest for happiness is a universal demand of nature, this happiness necessarily belongs to the phenomenal order, because the only human nature which Kant knows is the nature of man as phenomenal. Happiness is the satisfaction of man's desires as he appears to us. Since the desires of man are known only in terms of phenomena, it follows that these universal and phenomenal drives of man which are given an "undeserved" unity under the term of happiness must be the only known constituents of the ideal of happiness.

But has not Kant said that whenever man acts out of a sense of duty, he is attaining the highest end of humanity? Does not this imply knowledge of man's essence as being essentially moral? Furthermore, when Kant says that happiness is a necessary condition to morality, does not this imply obligation and hence a knowledge of man's essence? Such objections betray perhaps a lack of familiarity with Kant's method. Kant's precise point is that his doctrine of morality and the relationship of happiness to morality does not purport to give insight into man's nature even as a moral being.
Kant argues that if the given fact of man's sense of duty is to have any intelligibility, then man ought to be free, or moral, and consequently, he can be free by willing his activity not only in conformity with but motivated by duty. The concept of man as a moral being, for Kant, has meaning only in terms of duty. At the end of his whole discussion of morality in the *Groundwork*, Kant again insists that we still have no knowledge of man's real nature. His concept of a moral man is proposed as an ideal for man's activity, and if we remember his definition of an ideal, we will remember that knowledge is never the purpose of this mental construct. Thus, both concepts, that of happiness and that of morality, remain ideal ends. They are not abstracted from experience, nor are they drawn analytically from knowledge of human nature. The one contains phenomenal objects toward which activity is directed; the other contains noumenal ends willed from a sense of duty.

Our third problem asked why Kant could not make the end of the whole man to be happiness. Kant's answer was that this would be an end unworthy of man. We have seen that the activities of the ideal of happiness are limited to certain phenomenal activities through the faculties of the understanding and the imagination. A life directed by the happiness-principle alone would be, for Kant, a life of slavery to self and to instinct. Life would be based purely on knowledge, and for Kant this would, for all practical purposes, be the end of freedom, since freedom cannot find support in theoretical reason but only in faith through practical reason.
If, then, happiness is man's end, Kant finds that mankind has little claim to the title of being the lord of the universe. Kant protested on three different occasions that such an end for man would suppose that man's will was given to him only for the purpose of disposing means to attain the objects of happiness. His comment on this proposal was that instinct could better have served that purpose. For Kant, freedom is that property which allows man to transcend the brute and all natural things. When man is no longer moved by nature and by instinct, and, at the same time, with a certain sense of spontaneity and creativity he follows autonomous reason, then can man's life be said to have value worthy of admiration.

Furthermore, since happiness is known in terms of phenomena, Kant could not logically posit it as the end of the whole man without implying that phenomenal man is the whole man. This would deny the very possibility of the noumenal order, and hence, deny freedom whose possibility can be postulated only with the supposition of a noumenal and phenomenal world. Thus, the ultimate reason why happiness cannot be the whole end of man is the fact of one's awareness of a sense of duty. Kant feels that such an experience as the sense of duty must be explained, and to be explained, the concepts of noumenal and phenomenal worlds and freedom must be posited.

The abstract ideal of happiness as an uninterrupted contentment in the possession of phenomenal objects is also incapable of yielding analytically an explanation of one's sense of duty without at the same time basing duty on pleasure. Hence, the concept of happiness


Kant feels, does not explain what ought to be in accordance with the fullness of humanity.

This brings us to our final question: What is the relationship between happiness and morality? In answering this question we must keep in mind that Kant has said that reason cannot *know* the answer to this question. He has shown that only an ideal relationship between happiness and virtue (morality) can be "thought" out and, if the ideal is consistent, then the ideal has practical use for practical reason in guiding man's activity. This ideal relationship between happiness and virtue can be "thought" by making each a constituent in the concept of the *Summum Bonum*. This doctrine is a logical progression of the doctrines of happiness and morality. The abstract definition of happiness proposed by reason is not substantiated in the phenomenal world. Experience can never give man hope that he will attain a state of uninterrupted contentment in the possession of phenomenal objects. If happiness is in some sense said to be known, the reason is that understanding and imagination have determined the ideal in terms of phenomena which can be known. In the same manner, morality is only an ideal "thought" out in terms of man's sense of duty. The *Summum Bonum*, then, is neither duty or happiness, but it is a condition or state of human life in which a man who acts out of a sense of duty does enjoy happiness proportionate to his virtue. Acting from a sense of duty does not bring about happiness. Reason itself with its norms of temperance curbs the enjoyment of happiness. Even that
happiness which reason allows may be interrupted by nature or by
man himself. In this life the quest for happiness always, for Kant,
remains filled with insecurity and frustration. And yet, Kant has
maintained the psychological necessity of some participation in hap-
piness for man if he is to continue his quest for moral holiness.
The significance of the doctrine of the *Summum Bonum* is that it in-
dicates this realization on Kant's part. However, Kant never re-
trenches from the position that one will not be holy by acting out
of the desire for happiness. Duty, even in the doctrine of the
*Summum Bonum* is still the supreme end of man although it is not the
complete end of man. Even in the *Summum Bonum* the proper subordi-
nation of happiness to virtue is maintained. To bring about the
correct relationship between virtue and happiness, a proportion
between virtue and happiness, Kant had to postulate some Superior
Being Who is the Distributor of happiness in proportion to man's
virtue. The postulate of God provides man with a hope of attaining
a degree of uninterrupted contentment, both intellectual and sensi-
ble, in accordance with the desire and striving to be holy. But
this distribution cannot be in this life; it is in the future life.
God is able to be this "Distributor" of happiness proportionate to
man's virtue because He is postulated as the Cause of both the phe-
nomenal and noumenal worlds.

What are some of the problems which arise from Kant's concept
of happiness and its relationship to morality? According to Kant's
theory of man's eternal progress to holiness, the future life of
man must be a mere continuance of life as found on earth. Thus, the quest for holiness demands the continued conflict between the phenomenal and noumenal wills since an imperative arises only upon this conflict. Virtue consists precisely in the strength of will manifested in maintaining the autonomy of the free elected will. Hence, both the phenomenal will and noumenal will must continue in existence. Furthermore, with regard to Kant's doctrine of happiness in the future, man's prospect for happiness must remain a possible and necessary hope if man is to continue his pursuit of holiness. Since Kant has limited happiness to the phenomenal world, it follows that Kant must maintain the continued existence of both the phenomenal world and phenomenal man. These two considerations lead to the conclusion that Kant must hold some doctrine including the resurrection of the body. If we search for a doctrine on the resurrection in Kant's works, the following seems to be his last definitive position on the subject:

The more secret records . . . of his [Christ's] resurrection and ascension . . . cannot be used in the interest of religion within the limits of reason alone without doing violence to their historical valuation. . . . This is so . . . because this alleged sequel . . . involves a concept, i.e., of the materiality of all worldly beings, which is, indeed, very well suited to man's mode of sensuous representation but which is most burdensome to reason in its faith regarding the future. This concept involves both the materialism of personality in men . . ., which asserts that a personality can exist only as always conditioned by the same body, as well as the materialism of necessary existence in a world, a world which . . . must be spatial . . . . In contrast, the hypothesis of the spirituality of rational world-beings asserts that the body can remain dead in the earth while the same person is still alive, and that man, as a spirit . . . can reach the seat of the blessed with-
out having to be transported to some portion or other of the endless space which surrounds the earth . . . . This hypothesis is more congenial to reason . . . because of the contingency to which materialism exposes our existence after death . . . . On the latter supposition (of spirituality) reason can neither take an interest in dragging along, through eternity, a body which, however purified, must yet (if the personality is to rest upon the body's identity) consists of the self-same stuff which constitutes the basis of its organization and for which, in life, it never achieved any great love; nor can it render conceivable that this calcareous earth, of which the body is composed, of which the body is composed, should be in heaven . . . .

Previous to the above quotation Kant said that reason itself cannot have any knowledge of the fact of resurrection other than through the accounts of history. But, he continues, reason must call this historical evidence into question because of the above mentioned theoretical difficulties. Thus, although Kant seems to discount any probability of the resurrection of the body, yet his doctrine concerning the relationship between happiness and the eternal quest for holiness needs and requires such a resurrection.

Another problem regards the contentment resulting from our consciousness that we have fulfilled our duty—peace of soul. Ordinarily men would say that this experience is a part of happiness. Kant himself admits that man cannot be happy unless he has attained a certain degree of peace, but he can only make this inner peace to be a condition to the possession of happiness and not a part of happiness. His inability to make peace of conscience a part of happiness follows from his epistemological principles concerning

1Religion, p. 119, n.
knowledge. Thus, man cannot know the essence or existence of the higher faculties, and that fact necessitates that he postulate their practical necessity. Since the contents of happiness are determined by the faculties of knowledge, and are, for that reason, phenomenal, the inward peace resulting from the operation of one's higher faculties cannot be a constituent of such an empirically determined ideal as happiness. Thus, Kant's epistemological system, in the final analysis, seems to prevail over what he realizes to be a psychological necessity, namely, the possession of peace of conscience in order to be happy, and at the same time, as a part of happiness. The result has been that Kant found it rather difficult to find a category under which the concept of inner peace will fall.

In conclusion, we can ask what kind of happiness man has reason to hope for according to Kant's theory. Since holiness is an eternal quest and since God is postulated as distributing happiness in proportion to man's virtue, man can at least be satisfied that happiness will in some degree be had. But we must remember that God Himself is only the Distributor of happiness in Kant's doctrine. God is never an object of man's happiness. Man's quest for happiness is forever occupied with phenomenal objects of happiness in proportion to his virtue. Since the stresses and conflicts of this life, that is, those between concupiscible nature and the moral law, will always remain involved even in the rational quest for happiness, the best that man can hope for is a limited fulfillment
of his desires. Conflict is of the very essence of man's ideal quest for holiness. Perhaps most men would be satisfied with a perfect proportion between what they do and what they get. Perhaps many could be satisfied if happiness is limited to certain pleasant phenomenal objects. Yet, for many men the prospect of continuing the struggle for holiness through an endless existence, without any hope of final achievement is a dreary thought. Men long for an end of probation, for possession of final peace and a completely satisfying good. They also long for goods and joys that are above the phenomenal order of reality. To such men Kant's doctrine of an eternal struggle, unachieved holiness, and limited happiness will have little appeal.
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APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by W. Paul Johnson, S.J., has been read and approved by three members of the Department of Philosophy.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Jan. 3, 1960
Date

Signature of Adviser