The Metaphysical and Psychological Principles of Pleasure
According to St. Thomas Aquinas

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THE METAPHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF PLEASURE ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

by

John F. Kramer, S.J.

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

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VITA AUCTORIS

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In June, 1958, he returned to West Baden College to begin his studies in theology in preparation for the priesthood.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Many have said that the headlong pursuit of pleasure is an outstanding characteristic of our age. Surely the commercial advertisements we are forced to look at and listen to seem to bear out this contention: "For your greater smoking pleasure;" "There's more pure pleasure in every drop;" "Have yourself a pleasure-treat." And toastmasters at important functions have been saying "I take great pleasure in presenting .... for years.

Pleasure is a word we use frequently, yet most of the time we do not advert to its meaning. What is pleasure? That is the primary question to be answered in this study. The clear presentation of St. Thomas Aquinas's answer to this question is the ultimate goal of this thesis.

That there is genuine need for such a study has become apparent in the search for secondary sources. So far as can be learned, no really adequate study and presentation of St. Thomas's doctrine on pleasure exists in any language, and practically nothing at all has been written in English.

As was said above, the most important question to be asked and answered is, "What is pleasure according to St. Thomas?" This
will involve an investigation of the location of pleasure among the categories, of its causes, requisite conditions and effects. As the thesis title indicates, only the metaphysical and psychological aspects of pleasure will be treated; the moral aspect will be excluded from consideration.

Briefly, the procedure will be to locate, collate, and expound St. Thomas's teaching on pleasure. The location phase is largely taken care of by the fact that there are three extended treatments of pleasure, each in a major work and each in a different context. The Commentary on the Sentences treats pleasure in a discussion of beatitude; the Summa Theologiae takes it up in a discussion of the passions; the Commentary on the Ethics deals with it in an ethical context. There is also a briefer but still important passage on pleasure in the De Veritate that will come under consideration. These four major works of St. Thomas with their treatment of pleasure will be the primary sources for this thesis. Of course, incidental statements made about pleasure in these and other works will be taken into account and will be found through the standard Thomistic repertories.

In locating secondary sources, all the standard reference works for Thomistic studies have been used, including those bibliographies published in the leading periodicals. The final list of books and articles is selective. The passing references to pleasure made in Scholastic manuals and textbooks of general psychology are too general to be of much help. Much has been written on the
morality of pleasure, of course, but these discussions touch the matter of this thesis only indirectly.

Since this is mainly an exegetical study of St. Thomas, the number and quality of the secondary sources is not of primary importance. They will be used only in an auxiliary manner to clarify, summarize and check or substantiate the interpretation of St. Thomas presented in this study.

In planning this thesis, a key problem presented itself in the very beginning. Should the Thomistic doctrine on pleasure be presented systematically or chronologically? The following considerations have led to the adoption of the chronological method.

First, the four major works cited as primary sources cover a span of about fifteen years in the life of St. Thomas. This presents a splendid opportunity to note development and refinement of doctrine during this period of time, if there be any.

Second, investigation has shown that some development of doctrine has taken place. Taking each work in its proper sequence seems to be the best way to point up this development, for the extensive collation of the systematic approach would lead to considerable overlapping and wearisome backtracking. For the same reason, the chronological method is also better for clarity and ease of presentation and comprehension.

With the chronological approach decided upon, the correct sequence of the four primary sources must be established by determining their dates of composition. This is not an easy task by
any means, and leading scholars on the chronology of St. Thomas's works are not in full accord. To avoid being long and burdensome, we will merely present the conclusions of the latest and best studies by leading scholars together with the references and allow the reader to investigate the question of chronology further if he wishes.

It seems that the earliest of the four primary sources used in this thesis is the Commentary on the Sentences. The commonly accepted date of composition is 1254-56, with the fourth book possibly running over into 1257. Grabmann mentions the possibility of a second redaction about ten years later, but this is still a hypothesis which lacks conclusive proof.¹

The date of the De Veritate is very little disputed by scholars. The commonly accepted date is 1256-59. The reason for the four-year spread in the date of composition is not hard to find. The Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate are a series of class discussions or disputations held by St. Thomas while he was teaching at the University of Paris. They were held frequently for a period of years indicated by the spread 1256-59. Since the section from this work of interest to us occurs quite near the end, we can assume that it was written by St. Thomas in 1258 or 1259, approximately two years after he completed the Commentary on the Senten-

Turning now to the Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, we find very great disagreement among scholars. Dates of composition varying from 1259 to 1271 have been given, accepted by some, rejected by others and the discussion continues unabated. The date given by Mandonnet, 2 1266, stood unchallenged for some years. But within the last decade discussions based on internal evidence have appeared. In an article published in 1949, Gérard Verbeke assigns the date of 1260 to the composition of this commentary. 3 He bases his judgment on a careful analysis of the doctrine of the essence of beatitude and of the role accorded to pleasure in man's beatitude in this commentary and in other important works of St. Thomas whose dates are fairly well established.

R.-A. Gauthier, O.P., published an article in 1951 giving the years 1270 or 1271 as the date of the composition of the Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. 4 His judgment is based on the evolution of the doctrine of the virtue of magnanimity and its opposed vices. In an article published in 1952, Mansion discusses the work of Verbeke and Gauthier but agrees with neither. He


maintains that the terminus a quo of the commentary is after the Prima Pars of the Summa Theologiae and that the terminus ad quem is around the time of the Prima Secundae. This would place it between the years 1266 and 1268 if we accept Grabmann's dates for these two parts of the Summa Theologiae. Grabmann, agreeing with Verbeke, gives 1260 as the date of the Ethics, but mentions that Walz favors 1269.

With such wide divergences among the authorities, it is extremely difficult to assign a definite date for the composition of this commentary. Fortunately, an approximate date will suffice for our purposes here, for if we can place it after the De Veritate and before the Prima Secundae it will have a definite place in the chronological sequence of the four primary sources. Now the earliest date for the composition of the Commentary on the Ethics given by any authority is 1260. This places it at least one year after the completion of the De Veritate. Placing the Ethics before the Prima Secundae, however, is not quite so simple. The date of the Prima Secundae is given as 1266-68 by Grabmann.

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6 Grabmann, Die Werke, 294-301.
7 Ibid., 294.
and 1269-70 by Mandonnet. Both these dates are before Gauthier's date for the Ethics and coincide with Walz's date. But the weight of current opinion places the Ethics considerably earlier, anywhere from 1260 (Verbeke and Grabmann) to 1266 (Mandonnet and Mansion). Therefore it seems best to side with the weight of authority and place the Ethics before the Prima Secundae.

The four primary sources, then, fall into the following chronological sequence: Commentary on the Sentences, De Veritate, Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, and the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae. They will be taken up in this order in the body of the thesis. As each work comes under consideration, a more or less detailed discussion of the loci and context of the passages to be studied will be given. This is imperative for a clear understanding of the doctrine.

Before undertaking the study of St. Thomas himself, it will be well to follow his example in briefly reviewing the opinions of Plato and Aristotle on pleasure. For Thomas rarely speaks of pleasure at any length without mentioning the position of one or both of these men, and he frequently uses their definitions as a starting point for his own discussion.

Plato's doctrine on pleasure is not easy to formulate, for he more often speaks of the place of pleasure in the ethical life of

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9 Mandonnet, Bibliographie Thomiste, p. 13.
10 Examples of this are In IV Sent., 49, 3, 1, and S.T., I-II, 31, 1.
man than of its nature. But in the ninth book of the Republic he speaks of it as χίνησις, "movement," and in the Philebus as γένεσις, "becoming, generation." The latter work contains the more complete development and is the one usually quoted from by Aristotle and St. Thomas. Therefore the Philebus will be the major source for the following brief outline of the Platonic doctrine on pleasure.

As an aid in determining the places of pleasure and knowledge in the good for man, Plato sets up a fourfold classification of all things. Anything which is actual can be placed in one of the following four classes: the infinite or unbounded (τὸ ἄσπευρον); limit; the mixture or combination of both infinite and limit; and the cause or principle which brings them together. Pleasure and pain belong to the infinite, since neither, in its own nature, has a minimum or maximum. But they depend on their antecedents for measure and proportion, and participate in the harmony of their causes.

The subject of pleasure and pain, or that in which they arise, is always a living, sentient being. When the proper balance between the constituents of an organism is disturbed, pain is felt; and when it is restored after being disturbed, pleasure is felt.

13 Ibid., 23c-e, 63-64.
In other words, disturbance of organic equilibrium is attended by pain, restoration of the equilibrium by pleasure. But this is only one kind of pleasure. There is a second kind which depends on mental processes, and is not accompanied by either disturbance or recovery of balance in the organism. Simple examples are the imagination of something pleasant or the memory of a painful experience, which induce pleasure and pain respectively.

There is also a state which is neutral in respect to pleasure and pain. This is the life of thought and contemplation led by the man of wisdom, a life of permanent maintenance of equilibrium. This is probably the most godlike of all lives. It is most nearly approached in the aesthetic contemplation of pure colors, pure mathematical forms, and, generally speaking, the pleasures of learning and knowledge which are not conditioned by some precedent pain. Such pleasures are more pure and more real than the pleasures that accompany the restoration of organic equilibrium.

It seems to be Plato's mind that all pleasures, even those due to mental activity, involve some γένεσις, "becoming," and hence are not fully real. He seems to say that pleasure is an accompaniment of transitions and developments, φαινόμενον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄν. It is experienced while the transition is going on, but ceases when the definite and permanent end of the transition is reached. This no-

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14Ibid., 31d-e, p. 73. See Albert Lafontaine, Le Plaisir d'après Platon et Aristote (Paris, 1902), pp. 51-52, where a similar treatment of pleasure in the Timaeus is outlined.

15Plato, Republic, IX, 584a, p. 457; Philebus, 42c, p. 87.
tion seems to arise from a natural extension of the disturbance-restoration theory to cover all cases of pleasure. On this theory, the good, healthy, or normal state is, of course, that of balance or equilibrium. Pain and pleasure are both felt only when there is a departure from this ideal condition—pain while the process of depletion is going on, pleasure while that of repletion or restoration of the balance is happening. The natural end or goal of this "repletion" is the establishment of an equilibrium, and the best thing that could happen to a man is that the equilibrium, once restored, should be permanent. But on this theory pleasure is felt only during the repletion by which we approach this best condition. When we have reached it and are steadily persisting in it there is no longer any process of repletion and consequently no pleasure. Pleasure accompanies our progress to the good, but not our enjoyment of it; that will be the neutral state, painless but not pleasurable. This is what is meant by the view that pleasure is always "becoming," never is "being." However, it should be noted that intellectual pleasure has more of "being" and less of "becoming" than corporal pleasure. Now the more a thing becomes real, the more it tends toward stability and repose. That is why the philosopher, through contemplation, can reach the mean state between pleasure and pain, where there is perfect stability and repose because there is fulness of being.

Aristotle only gradually moves away from the Platonic view of pleasure. In the early Magna Moralia we find the following defini-
tion: "Pleasure is a restoration of each to its own nature from that which runs counter to it."\textsuperscript{16} Again, something very similar occurs in the \textit{Rhetoric}: "We may say that pleasure is a movement of the soul and a conscious restoration of it as a whole to its normal state of being; and that pain is the opposite."\textsuperscript{17} Probably in these instances Aristotle is not trying to be scientifically accurate. He is content to base his doctrine on a generally accepted definition, at least after he has somewhat modified it.

The discussion of pleasure in Book VII of the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, whether it was originally a part of the \textit{Eudemian Ethics} or not, seems to mark an intermediate or transitional stage of development in the Aristotelian doctrine. Here Aristotle, thinking mainly of the pleasures which involve little or no disturbance of the natural balance, calls pleasure an activity, \textit{ἐνέργεια}. An activity as well as a state (\textit{εἴσεχ}) may be good, he says. The activities that restore us to our natural balanced state are pleasant incidentally, but the activity involved is that of the part of our nature which has remained in its natural condition. There are activities like those of thought which are pleasant without involving a deficiency or disturbance of the balanced state at all. When we

\textsuperscript{16}Aristotle, \textit{Magna Moralia}, 1205 b, 7. The translation is taken from A. K. Griffin, \textit{Aristotle's Psychology of Conduct}, (London, 1931), p. 35. Whether the \textit{Magna Moralia} is an authentic work of Aristotle is doubted by many scholars at present.

\textsuperscript{17}Aristotle, \textit{Rhetoric}, I, 11, 1369 b, 33. The translation is again Griffin's, p. 35.
are in our natural state we take pleasure in what is pleasant in itself; when we are being restored to it, in things not pleasant in themselves. In short, pleasures are not processes of becoming but activities. Furthermore, only some of them are incidental to processes, namely, those that accompany the restoration of our nature; the others are incidental to action. Therefore, pleasure is not a sensible process of restoration but "unimpeded activity of the natural state."\(^{18}\)

The treatment given pleasure in Book X of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is more complete and seems to belong to Aristotle's mature years. He not only criticizes the views of others\(^{19}\) but states his own doctrine positively.\(^{20}\) Pleasure, he says, is like seeing in that it is complete at each moment of its existence; it does not become any more perfect in quality by lasting longer. Therefore it cannot be a movement or a process of transition; for all movement takes time, aims at a certain end, and is complete only when it has attained its end. Each part of a movement is incomplete and is different in kind from the other parts and from the whole. Pleasure, however, is perfect in each moment, as is evident from the fact that being pleased does not take time. Besides, we cannot


\(^{19}\) Ibid., X, 1, 1172 a, 19 - X, 3, 1174 a, 12.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., X, 3, 1174 a, 13 - X, 5, 1176 a, 29.
be said to be pleased quickly or slowly, though we may become pleased quickly or slowly. If pleasure were a transition, a restoration, it would be inferior to that in which it culminates, and while we were pleased we would be restless till we reached the state to which pleasure leads. But pleasure is in fact something complete in itself and satisfactory in every moment of itself, just like the activity of perception or of thought.

It will be remembered that Aristotle defined pleasure in Book VII as "the unimpeded activity of the natural state." In an important passage in Book X he distinguishes pleasure from activity; he recognizes a difference between it and genuine activities like those of seeing and thinking. Pleasure is not something that we do but a sort of crowning perfection that attaches to the doing of things. This distinction is a notable advance over Book VII. The passage is worth quoting. "Pleasure completes the activity not as the corresponding state does, by its immanence, but as an end which supervenes, as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age. So long, then, as both the intelligible or sensible object and the discriminating or contemplative faculty are as they

21Jean Léonard, S.J., distinguishes two Aristotelian views of pleasure in the Nicomachean Ethics. One is found in Book VII, where Aristotle seems to identify pleasure and activity. The other is found in Books II and X, where pleasure is described as a property of an activity. Léonard concludes that Books II and X were written about the same time, while Book VII is earlier. In arguing for the similarity of Books II and X, he cites two passages from Book II, chapter 3: 1104 b 4 and 1104 b 15. He compares these with Book X, chapters 4 and 3 respectively. See Jean Léonard, S.J., Le Bonheur chez Aristote (Brussels, 1946), pp. 83-84.
should be, the pleasure will be involved in the activity."

He also makes a distinction between the kinds of pleasure that is more exact and detailed than the one in Book VII. It runs as follows:

For they [pleasure and activity] seem to be bound together and not to admit of separation, since without activity pleasure does not arise, and every activity is completed by the attendant pleasure. For this reason pleasures seem, too, to differ in kind. For things different in kind are, we think, completed by different things—and similarly we think that activities differing in kind are completed by things different in kind. Now the activities of thought differ from those of the senses, and both differ among themselves, in kind; so, therefore, do the pleasures that complete them. This may be seen, too, from the fact that each of the pleasures is bound up with the activity it completes. For an activity is intensified by its proper pleasure.

In view of the doctrine in Books VII and X of the Nicomachean Ethics the following definition of pleasure would seem to represent the mind of Aristotle. "Pleasure is the crowning perfection of the unimpeded activity of the natural, balanced state of a being."

With the presentation of Aristotle's doctrine on the nature of pleasure the work of the first chapter of this thesis is complete. A brief summary of its main points will not be out of place.

The purpose of this thesis is to discover and present St. Thomas's answer to the question, "What is pleasure?" Investigation has shown that St. Thomas has four more or less extended treatments of pleasure in his writings, each in a major work and each in a dif-

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23 Ibid., 1175 a 20-31.
ferent context. These four works will be the primary sources for this study and will be taken up in their chronological order, as follows: the *Commentary on the Sentences*, the *De Veritate*, the *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics*, and the *Prima Secundae* of the *Summa Theologiae*.

St. Thomas himself considers it useful in understanding the problem to advert to the Platonic and Aristotelian views on the nature of pleasure. To Plato, pleasure was "becoming," an accompanying phenomenon of transitions and developments and not fully real. For Aristotle, pleasure was the crowning perfection of the unimpeded activity of the natural state of a being. And now for the view of St. Thomas.
CHAPTER II

DELECTATIO AND PASSIO

In a textual and exegetical study the question of terminology is of primary importance. Recognizing this, chapter two will attempt to clarify and define the two key terms that will come up again and again in this study. Both terms are widely used by St. Thomas and not always with the same meaning, a situation which could lead to confusion and misunderstanding. Therefore, before undertaking the study proper, it seems best to obviate those possible difficulties.

It must first be determined what word St. Thomas uses for pleasure. It seems that there are five possibilities: delectatio, gaudium, exultatio, laetitia, and jucunditas. Investigation has shown that delectatio is the generic term, while the other four are species. This is very clear in the Prima Secundae, where St. Thomas quotes Avicenna with approval: "Respondeo dicendum quod gaudium ut Avicenna dicit in libro suo de Anima, est quaedam species delectationis."¹ In the reply to the third objection to the same arti-

¹Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologicae, I-II, 31, 3 c, ed. Petrus Caramello (Turin, 1950). This work will hereafter be referred to as S.T. I or I-II as the reference may be.
ad tertium dicendum quod alia nomina ad delectationem pertinentia, sunt imposita ab effectibus delectationis: nam laetitia imponitur a dilatatione cordis, ac si diceretur latitia; exultatio vero dicitur ab exterioribus signis delectationis interioris, quae apparent exterius, inquantum scilicet interius gaudium prosilit ad exteriora; jucunditas vero dicitur a quibusdam specialibus laetitiae signis vel effectibus. Et tamen omnia ista nomina videntur pertinere ad gaudium: non enim utimur eis nisi in naturis rationalibus."  

The last sentence of this quotation brings us to an important distinction. Although Thomas says that delectatio is the generic term for pleasure, he usually restricts its meaning to pleasures of the sense appetite; gaudium is the term used in speaking of pleasure of the rational appetite, especially in the later works. This is clear from the body of the article which has just been quoted, where Thomas says: "Delectamur enim et in quae natur-aliter concupiscimus, ea adipiscentes; et in quae concupiscimus secundum rationem. Sed nomen gaudii non habet locum nisi in delectatione quae consequitur rationem: unde gaudium non attribuimus brutis animalibus, sed solum nomen delectationis."  

Thus far only the Prima Secundae has been used to determine the Thomistic term for pleasure. It will be remembered that this

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2 S.T., I-II, 31, 3 ad 3.
3 Ibid., in corp.
was the fourth of the four major sources. What about the other three? A quotation from the earliest of them, the Commentary on the Sentences, will show that the doctrine is similar, even though it is not expressly stated that *gaudium* is a species of *delectatio*.

"*[G]audium et delectatio licet habean unum objectum secundum rem, non tamen est unum objectum secundum rationem. Bonum enim conjunctum realiter facit delectationem; sed conjunctum secundum apprehensionem facit gaudium. Laetitia vero, exultatio et jucunditas sunt idem quod gaudium, nisi quod exprimunt quosdam gaudii effectus, ut dictum est."

Two things in this passage are noteworthy. First, the distinction here made between *delectatio* and *gaudium* again assigns *delectatio* to the sense appetites, but *gaudium* is said to arise when a being knows that it is in possession of some good object. The kind of knowledge is not specified, so *gaudium* is not restricted to the intellectual appetite. The solution to this question in the Sentences indicates only that *conjunctum realiter* means "physically" while *conjunctum secundum apprehensionem* means "intentionally." Second, *laetitia*, *exultatio*, and *jucunditas* are again called effects of *gaudium*. These brief comments by no means exhaust the doctrinal importance of this passage, and it will come up for more detailed consideration in the next chapter.

To sum up briefly, the generic term for pleasure used by St.

4 In IV Sent., 49, 3, 1, sol. 4, ad 1.
5 Ibid., sol. 4.
Thomas is *delectatio*, though in practice this word is frequently restricted to pleasure of the sense appetites. *Gaudium* is a species of pleasure, is restricted to mean pleasure of the rational appetite in later works, but can also refer to the pleasure arising from the knowledge that a good has been acquired. *Laetitia, exultatio* and *jucunditas* are effects of *gaudium* and take their names from the specific effects produced. In passing it might be well to remark that *delectatio* is usually translated as "pleasure" and *gaudium* is rendered "joy."

The term *passio* will be of importance because St. Thomas twice asks "utrum delectatio sit passio," first in the *Commentary on the Sentences*, and again in the *Prima Secundae*. In both instances the answer is in the affirmative. St. Thomas also speaks of *delectatio* as *passio* in the other two primary sources of this study and in other works as well. But simply to translate *passio* as "passion" when it is applied to pleasure would be unwise, for *passio* may mean not only "passion" but considerably more. Besides, pleasure does not seem to be a passion as we understand that word today, but rather a feeling or an emotion. The distinction between the terms "passion" and "emotion" as used by modern philosophers and the term *passio* as used by St. Thomas is well expressed by Father Joseph Le Rochellec.

Les philosophes modernes distinguent entre *émotion* et *passion*. L’*émotion* désignerait un mouvement subit et momentané; la *passion* désignerait un mouvement affectif prolongé, enraciné par l’habitude et devenu une seconde nature. Au dire de plusieurs, les passions seraient des inclinations pervertie. —Saint Thomas, au contraire, prenant le terme
passion dans un sens plus général, parce que plus étymologique et plus métaphysique, lui fait signifier tout acte de l'appétit sensible, qu'il soit violent ou calme, rapide ou prolongé. . . . En tout cas la passion au sens thomiste ne peut jamais désigner une habitude, elle signifie essentiellement une acte.

St. Thomas, says Le Rohellec, uses the word passio in a sense that includes, at least to some extent, what the moderns mean by both passion and emotion. Thomas differs, however, because for him passio always means the act and not the mood or habit which the term "passion" now implies in its technical sense.

The meaning of passio in St. Thomas as given by Le Rohellec, "tout acte de l'appétit sensible," cannot now be accepted as the final definition of the word as applied to delectatio but it will serve as a starting point. For the sake of clarity and accuracy it will be necessary to work out from the text of St. Thomas the chief meanings of passio, so that it may be determined which of these meanings applies when Thomas says "delectatio est passio."

The work of this part of the second chapter will be applied throughout the thesis and as early as the beginning of the third chapter, for Thomas begins his treatment of pleasure in the Commentary on the Sentences with the question "Utrum delectatio sit passio."

To make a thorough study of passio in St. Thomas would be a thesis in itself. The study undertaken here, since it is only a

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7 Such a thesis has been written. See Kenneth M. Kunert, S.J.,
means to an end, cannot be long or exhaustive, and must confine itself to a very few works of St. Thomas. Accordingly, the treatment given in De Veritate, question 26, "De passionibus animae," will serve as the major source, with an occasional reference to the Summa Theologicae for the sake of clarity.

The first article in question 26 of De Veritate is entitled "utrum anima separata a corpore patiatur." At the very beginning of the body of the article Thomas remarks: "Respondeo dicendum, quod ad evidentiam hujus quaestionis et sequentium scire oportet quid proprie sit passio." Here, then, we are at the heart of the investigation. Thomas continues:

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\text{Sciendum est igitur, quod nomen passionis dupliciter sumitur: communiter et proprie. Communiter quidem dicitur passio receptio alicujus quocumque modo; et hoc sequendo significatio-\textit{num} vocabuli: nam passio dicitur a \textit{patin} graece, quod est recipere. Proprie vero dicitur passio secundum quod actio et passio in motu consistunt; prout scilicet aliquid recipitur in patiente per viam motus. Et quia omnis motus est inter contraria, oportet illud quod recipitur in patiente, esse contrarium alicui quod a patiente abjicitur.}
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The general meaning of \textit{passio}, then, is a reception of any kind in the being affected by the action of an agent. But properly speaking it means a change caused by transient action. This change results in the reception of some quality or perfection which forces.

"The Metaphysics of the Passions according to the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas," Unpublished Master's Thesis (Loyola University, Chicago, 1953). The writer is greatly indebted to this work for much of the material in this second part of Chapter II.

\textsuperscript{8} Thomas Aquinas, \textit{De Veritate}, 26, 1 c, 5th Turin ed. (Turin, 1927). This will be referred to hereafter as \textit{De Ver}.

\textsuperscript{9}Ibid.
out its contrary. Therefore in its proper and more restricted sense passio includes the notions of motion and contrariety.

In a later work, the Prima Pars of the Summa Theologicae, St. Thomas goes beyond this definition, enlarging and clarifying it. Note that the order has been reversed, so that passio proprie is spoken of first.

Respondeo dicendum quod passio dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo proprie: et sic pati dicitur quod a sua naturali dispositione removetur. Passio enim est effectus actionis: in rebus autem naturalibus contraria agent et patiuntur ad invicem, quorum unum removet alterum a sua naturali dispositione. Alio modo, dicitur passio communiter, secundum quamcumque mutationem, etiam si pertineat ad perfectionem naturae; sicut intelligere vel sentire dicitur pati quodam. 10

The important advance in this passage is that the notion of passio proprie has been changed to mean the removal of a being from its natural state or disposition, whereas in De Veritate Thomas said that a being undergoes passio proprie whenever it receives the contrary of something already possessed. In other words, the notion of contrariety is not insisted upon in this present passage. This difference will be returned to later.

Another point to be noticed is that St. Thomas refers passio communiter even to perfections of intellection and volition. It will be of help to find out how these two different kinds of passio may be found in a being. In De Veritate Thomas says:

Passio igitur primo modo communiter accepta invenitur in anima, et in qualibet creatura, eo quod omnis creatura habet aliquid potentialitatis admixtum, ratione cujus omnis creatura

10S.T., I, 97, 2 c.
subsistens est alicujus receptiva. Passio vero secundo modo accepta non invenitur nisi ubi est motus et contrarietas. Motus autem non invenitur nisi in corporibus et contrarietatis formarum vel qualitatum in solis generabilibus et corruptibilibus. Unde sola hujusmodi proprie hoc modo pati possunt. Unde anima, cum sit incorporea, hoc modo pati non potest: et si etiam aliquid recipiat, non tamen hoc fit per transmutationem a contrario in contrarium, sed per simplicem agentis influxum, sicut aer illuminatur a sole.11

According to this explanation, any being composed of act and potency can be a subject of passio communiter, for any change from potency to act can be called passio in this broad sense. In its proper sense, however, passio includes the two characteristics of motion and contrariety. Motion is found only in beings which have bodies; contrariety of forms is found only in beings subject to generation and corruption. Therefore passio proprie can refer only to bodies and to bodily changes and modifications.

Passio in its broad, general meaning (communiter) cannot undergo division, for then it would not extend to all cases of change from potency to act. But in its strict sense (proprīe) it is further distinguished in the Prima Secundae. Here we find a triple division of the term passio going from the general sense to the most strict. Note that this new distinction returns to the point made earlier that a being can undergo passio proprie whenever it is removed from its natural disposition.

Pati dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo, communiter, secundum quod omne recipere est pati, etiam si nihil abjiciatur a re: sicut si dicatur aerem pati, quando illuminatur. Hoc autem magis proprie est perfici quam pati. — Allo modo dicitur pati pro-

11 De Ver., 26, 1 c.
According to this triple division, passio in its strictest sense involves the loss of something which is proper to the being receiving the action of the agent, since in this type the patient is especially drawn to the agent causing the ill effect. St. Thomas mentions sickness as an example of this passio propriissime.

There is also a less strict though still proper meaning of the term passio. In this meaning the patient loses something not proper to itself in order to gain something which is properly its own, and the example given is the return to good health from sickness. This is still passio propri because there is motion causing the reception of one contrary with the consequent loss of its opposite. But in this case the thing lost is not proper to the being undergoing the passio, while the thing received is proper and fitting to it.

One further distinction remains to be made. It is the distinction made by St. Thomas between passio corporalis and passio animalis. This new distinction will be seen to apply to the two divisions of passio propri that have just been discussed.
In looking at the terminology of this new distinction, one is led to think that *passio animalis* would refer in some way to acts of intellection, volition and sensation. These acts, however, have already been placed under *passio comuniter*, the most general meaning of the term. The new distinction refers to *passio proprio* with its notes of motion and contrariety, as the following quotation makes clear.

_Alio modo dicitur passio proprio, quae consistit in abjectione unius contrarii et alterius receptione per viam transmutationis; et hic modus passionis animae convenire non potest nisi ex corpore; et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod unitur corpori ut forma; et sic compatitur corpori patienti passione corporali. Alio modo prout unitur ut motor; et sic ex operatione animae transmutatio fit in corpore, quae quidem passio dicitur animalis._

In this distinction Thomas is speaking of the two ways in which *passio proprio* can pertain to the soul. In both of these ways the *passio* pertains to the soul in and through its union with the body and not directly.

In the first way, *passio* pertains to the soul in so far as it is united to the body as its substantial form. Because of this substantial union the soul *compatitur*: that is, it undergoes the same things that the body undergoes. This manner of "compassion" is called *passio corporalis*.

In the second way, *passio* pertains to the soul in that it is united with the body as its mover, as the source of the body's motion and the principle of its action. In this case the soul is

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13 *De Ver.*, 26, 3 prn.
considered not only as the substantial form of the body but also as the form giving the body and the composite the power to act. Thus the soul through its various operations is the cause of bodily changes. This type of bodily change in which the soul is involved as mover Thomas calls passio animalis.

With this distinction the work of Chapter II is complete and a brief summary is in order. The generic term for pleasure used by St. Thomas is delectatio. But quite often, though not always, delectatio is restricted to mean pleasure of the sense appetite and gaudium is employed in speaking of pleasure of the intellectual appetite. Laetitia, exultatio, and jucunditas are effects of gaudium.

Five meanings of the term passio were discussed. First there was the most general meaning, passio communiter, which extends to any change from potency to act, even when the change involves the perfecting of a being as in intellection, volition and sensation. The second meaning of passio, the proper sense or passio propriie, was seen to involve the two notes of motion and contrariety. St. Thomas then divided this second meaning into passio propriissime and passio minus propriie. In the most proper sense passio denotes the loss of something proper to a being receiving the action of an agent. In its less proper sense passio denotes the loss of something not proper to a being when it gains something which is properly its own.

A final distinction, applying to both divisions of passio propriie, was found in the terms passio corporalis and passio ani-
malis. The soul is said to undergo or participate in (compati) passio corporalis when it is affected because of its substantial union with the body as the substantial form of the composite. The soul is said to undergo passio animalis when it acts as mover in the various operations of the composite which result in bodily changes.

Lest there be any misunderstanding, the writer does not mean to imply that these are all the meanings and distinctions of the term passio in the writings of St. Thomas. Only those distinctions and meanings were discussed which will aid in the study of the primary sources in the succeeding chapters. Now that the way has been prepared, it is time to turn to the first of the primary sources, the Commentary on the Sentences.
CHAPTER III

PLEASURE IN THE COMMENTARY ON THE SENTENCES

The principal discussion of pleasure in the Commentary on the Sentences occurs in Book IV, distinction 49. This distinction is concerned with "the rewards of the good," and is divided into five questions. The first question treats beatitude; the second, the vision of God, "in which beatitude principally consists"; the third, pleasure, "which formally completes beatitude"; the fourth, the gifts which are contained in beatitude; the fifth, the aureola, "by which beatitude is perfected and adorned."¹

The third question is divided into five articles which treat of the nature of pleasure, its causes, its relation to sadness, the morality of pleasure and the relation between spiritual and corporal pleasures. The exact titles of the five articles are interesting, for they throw light on the viewpoint and approach of St. Thomas. The first article asks "whether pleasure is passio"; the second, "whether the only cause of pleasure is an unimpeded operation of a habit conformable to nature"; the third, "whether sadness is contrary to pleasure"; the fourth, "whether every pleas-

¹In IV Sent., 49, 1 prin. The Parma edition of the Opera Omnia, Vol. VII, has been used throughout.
ure is good"; and the fifth, "whether bodily pleasures are stronger than spiritual pleasures."²

St. Thomas begins his inquiry into the nature of pleasure by asking "whether pleasure is a passion."³ This is the first article, where his viewpoint is more metaphysical than psychological. He opens his reply by remarking that a thing gains stability and vigor when it acquires a perfection proper to itself. Now a being can be moved toward a proper perfection in two ways. The first is by natural inclination which requires no knowledge, as when a stone falls. This is called natural movement. But a being can be moved toward a perfection proper to itself in another way which requires that the being be endowed with the power of cognition. This second way is called either animal appetite⁴ or intellectual appetite, depending on whether the cognition involved is sensory or intellectual. Thomas then points out a similarity between natural movement and animal appetite.

²Ibid., q. 3 prin.
³Ibid., a. 1 prin. For the sake of uniformity and convenience the term passio will hereafter be translated as "passion." Note that in this article Thomas is determining whether pleasure falls under the category of passion rather than giving it a psychological classification.
⁴"animal appetite" translates the Thomistic phrase appetitus animalis.
tionem perfectionis nondum habitae; et talis vigor sive quietatio appetitus vocatur delectatio; unde etiam Commentator dicit in 10 Ethicorum quod delectatio est quaedam superfloritio naturae.  

In the passage just quoted occurs the first description of pleasure. It is called *vigor sive quietatio appetitus*, which might be translated "a feeling of satisfaction of the appetite." Thomas makes an important point when he says that pleasure presupposes knowledge of the acquired perfection, just as appetency presupposes knowledge of the perfection to be acquired. It is noteworthy that only animal appetite is compared to natural motion. In dealing with intellectual appetite Thomas says:

Est autem duplex appetitus, sicut et cognitio, scilicet sensitivae et intellectivae partis. Appetitus autem sensitivae partis est virtus in organo corporali, et est immediatum principium corporalis motus; unde omnia quae accidunt in appetitu sensitivo sunt conjuncta cum quadam transmutatione corporali; quod non accidit in his quae sunt in appetitu intellectivo, nisi passione large accepta, et improprie, ut supra dictum est; unde delectatio quae est in appetitu sensitivo quaedam passio est; non autem delectatio quae est in intellectivo, nisi passione large accepta.

Three things in this passage deserve special note. First, it seems

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5 In IV Sent., 49, 3, 1, sol. 1.

6 In the very beginning of the solution from which this passage is taken we read: "Quaelibet res quando portingit ad propriam perfectionem, consequitur stabilimentum et vigorem; sicut corpora quando perveniunt ad terminos motus sui naturalis, quia in loco naturali conservantur." (Stress supplied.) At first glance the terms *vigor* and *vigoratio* seem opposed to *quietatio* and *stabilimentum*. Yet on second thought they seem to be an attempt to describe the dynamic and static aspects of what we mean by a "sense of well-being" or the feeling that "it's good to be alive."

7 Ibid.
clear that the appetites, both sensitive and intellectual, are the seats of pleasure. Second, Thomas uses the term appetitus sensitivus here instead of appetitus animalis, yet he seems to be talking about the same thing when he uses these terms. The rest of this article and the succeeding ones lend support to the conclusion that the terms are synonymous. Third, a distinction is made between pleasure of the sense appetite and pleasure of the intellectual appetite. The sense appetite is a material faculty and is the immediate principle of bodily movement. Therefore movement of the sense appetite will necessarily involve bodily movement and give rise to a passion in the strict sense, passio proprie. The intellectual appetite, on the other hand, is an immaterial faculty and hence is not moved in the strict sense. Further, it is not an immediate principle of bodily movement, so that its operation does not necessarily involve bodily change. Therefore a movement of the intellectual appetite will be a passion only in the wide sense, passio communiter.

But Thomas has said that pleasure is a quieting of the appetite, not a movement of it. How then can pleasure be a passion? The objection is answered as follows: "Non est inconveniens motum per accidens terminari ad alium motum. . . . Delectatio ergo, inquantum hujusmodi, semper consistit in aliqua terminatio motus. Sed tamen quia in terminatio motus appetitivi consurgit quidam motus, in quo passio animalis consistit; ideo passionem inesse
accidit delectationi; sed inest per se delectationi sensitivae."\(^8\)

Even here, however, Thomas does not explicitly assert that pleasure is a passion. He rather says that the quieting of the appetite gives rise to a movement in which the psychical passion\(^9\) consists. Nor does he say that the termination of the movement of the appetite is a passion. The use of the verb **inasse**, "to belong to, to be bound up with" instead of **esse** is significant.

Thomas's hesitation to call pleasure, even of the sense appetite, a passion in the strict sense is further revealed in the following two passages. The first passage shows that pleasure is unique among the passions because it consists in the **termination** of the movement of the appetite. Discussing whether or not pleasure is in time Thomas says:

\[\text{Etiam aliae animae passiones quantum ad id quod est ex parte animae, non sunt in tempore nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet eis conjungitur motus ex parte corporis; tamen delectatio magis habet rationem quod non sit in tempore quam aliae passiones: quia aliae passiones consistunt in appetitu secundum quod tendit in aliquid, sicut ira in vindictam et odium in nocentum alterius; sed delectatio consistit in appetitu secundum quod ejus motus in suo appetibili adepto}\]

\(^8\)Ibid., ad 1.

\(^9\)This is the writer's translation of **passio animalis**. It will be remembered from chapter II that this is the type of **passio** the soul undergoes when it acts as mover of the body and the principle of its action. It would be very helpful to know more about this movement in which the psychical passion consists and which has its origin in the quieting of the movement of the appetite. Some light on the point is given in the following passage from the reply to the next objection. "Operationem appetitus sensitivae consequitur quaedam corporalis transmutatio secundum dilatationem et constrictionem cordis et alia hujusmodi." In IV Sent., 49, 3, 1, sol. 1 ad 2.
terminatur; omnis autem terminus motus non est in tempore, sed in instanti.\textsuperscript{10}

In the second passage Thomas says that the bodily changes which follow upon the operation of the sense appetite are the passion strictly so called. "Quamvis operatio, inquantum operatio, non sit passio; tamen potest habere passionem annexam, vel sicut praecedentem, vel sicut subsequentem: . . . sed ut consequentem; sicut operationem appetitus sensitivi consequitur quaedam corporalis transmutatio secundum dilatationem et constrictionem cordis et alia hujusmodi; et sic quamvis delectatio sit circa operationem, tamen inquantum est delectatio sensitiva, est in passione quadam consistens."\textsuperscript{11}

In brief, St. Thomas simply does not call pleasure, even of the sense appetite, a passion in the strict sense. The reason is not far to seek. It will be remembered from Chapter II that passion in the strict sense involves the notes of motion and contrariety.\textsuperscript{12} Since pleasure is the \textbf{termination} of appetitive motion it cannot be a passion in the strict sense. But since pleasure is so closely connected with appetitive movement "est in passione quadam consistens."

To make the picture complete, however, a brief passage which occurs in question 1 of distinction 49 cannot be overlooked. In

\textsuperscript{10}In IV Sent., 49, 3, 1, 3 sol. ad 3.
\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., sol. 1 ad 2.
\textsuperscript{12}See above, pp. 21 and 22.
view of what is said there, it is surprising that St. Thomas does not take up the point in his major treatment of pleasure in question 3, which has just been discussed. The passage reads as follows:

[D]uplex est delectatio. Una quae praeceedit assecutionem finis, et haec est ordinabilis in alium: potest enim ordinari ad perfectam operationem, inquantum videlicet illa in quibus delectamur attentius agimus. Alia delectatio est quae consequitur assecutionem finis; et illa efficitur per operationem quae fini conjungit: et ideo haec delectatio non est ipsa beatitudo, sed quaedam beatitudinis perfectio, et forma, ut supra dictum est.**13**

Thomas here indicates that there is a certain pleasure in the very movement of the appetite, before the desirable object is gained. This might be called a pre-delectation. It is impossible to say why this point is not taken up later when pleasure is explicitly treated. The point finds full development only in the **Prima Secundae**. A conjecture is that St. Thomas is reacting against the Platonic doctrine of pleasure as a generation or becoming. Allying himself with the Aristotelian position that pleasure is the crowning perfection of an unimpeded operation, he calls it the termination of the movement of the appetite instead of the movement itself. The Aristotelian influence comes out clearly when St. Thomas speaks of pleasure as "quaedam perfectio operationi superveniens, ut decor juventuti."**14** This perfection is not the form which specifies the operation, but one which is superadded in the manner of a secondary

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13In IV Sent., 49, 1, 2, sol. 2 ad 3.
14Ibid., 3, 4, sol. 3.
perfection like health. Neither is pleasure the operation itself, but something destined to complete and perfect the operation.\textsuperscript{15} Here the viewpoint is more psychological and there is no effort to assign pleasure to one of the categories.

St. Thomas is always mindful that pleasure is more a perfection than the suffering of change, or as he would put it, "est perfici plus quam pati."\textsuperscript{16} That is why he does not assign pleasure to the category of passio without reservation, usually in the form of a qualifying phrase or expression. He does, however, assert that pleasure is passion in the wide sense, just as intellect, volition and sensation, for example, are passions in the wide sense.\textsuperscript{17}

Now that the nature of pleasure in the Sentences has been determined, an investigation of its causes is the next step. Undoubtedly, a knowledge of the causes will throw more light on the nature of pleasure.

St. Thomas devotes an entire article to the causes entitled "Whether the only cause of pleasure is an unimpeded operation of

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, ad 2 and 3.

\textsuperscript{16}The reader may have the impression that too much stress is being placed on pleasure as a quieting or termination of the movement of the appetite. In addition to the passages already quoted, the following deserve consideration. "Cum delectatio consistat in quietatione appetitus..." (In IV Sent., 49, 3, 2, sol. prin.) "Conveniens enim adveniens pericit id cui convenit et quietat inclinationem in illud: et haec quietatio, secundum quod est percepta, est delectatio." (In III Sent., 27, 1, sol. 2 ad 3.)

\textsuperscript{17}In IV Sent., 49, 3, 1, sol. 3 ad 3.
a habit conformable to nature." He begins the solution by remarking that pleasure, in so far as it is a passion, is common to both body and soul. Therefore, like other things common to body and soul, it will have a formal element from the soul and a material element from the body. From the material element, only how a being is disposed to pleasure can be learned, but from the formal cause comes the knowledge of how a being is actually pleased.

The formal cause of any passion or operation is its object. The object of pleasure is a suitable good that is possessed, "bonum conveniens conjunctum." St. Thomas reasons to this as follows. Since pleasure belongs to the appetitive part of the soul, its object must be some good, otherwise the appetites would not be moved. But since pleasure belongs to an appetite residing in possession of its object, the object must be some suitable good that is possessed.

Now this suitable possessed good which is the proper object of pleasure must be some operation of the being which is pleased. Three reasons are assigned. First, the ultimate perfection of a being or faculty lies in its operations. Second, the suitable possessed good which causes pleasure must be known as such, but it can be known only in and through some operation. Third, we come into contact with goods through the operations of our faculties. Every good which attracts us can be gained and satisfy our appetites only through the mediation of some operation. Therefore, operations are

\[18\] Ibid., a. 2
of themselves the cause of pleasure.

Not every operation, however, is the cause of pleasure, but only those which are unimpeded and proceed from habits; for an acquired good will not afford pleasure unless it is also suitable and natural. Operations are made suitable and "second-nature" through the formation of habits. Naturally, if an operation is impeded by hindrances from within or without it will give rise to little if any pleasure. "Therefore," concludes St. Thomas, "the proper formal cause of pleasure is an unimpeded operation of a habit conformable to nature." 19

Having presented his positive doctrine, Thomas turns to answer the obvious objection that there are many suitable goods for a being besides its own operations. His answer is that, while there are indeed many suitable goods, pleasure is derived from them only by means of some operation. The reason is that a being comes into contact with goods outside itself and becomes aware of goods within itself only in and through operations; there is no other way. 20

It should be noted that in this reply St. Thomas has shifted his ground somewhat. In the body of the article he spoke of operations as the formal causes of pleasure, since they are its proper object and specify the pleasure to be of one kind rather than another. But in this reply he seems to be speaking of operations as

19Ibid., "Sic ergo causa formalis propriæ delectationis est operatio connaturalis habitus non impedita."

20Ibid., ad 1.
efficient causes upon which pleasure follows as a kind of natural complement. The following passage would seem to bear this out.

"[D]eclatatio enim operationem consequitur. . . . Nec illa duo sunt consideranda quasi duo bona, sed quasi unum bonum. Sicut enim ex perfectione et perfectibili fit una res perfecta; ita ex delectatione et operatione fit una operatio perfecta, quae est felicitas; cum delectatio sit operationis perfectio."\(^{21}\)

Another brief passage that will throw light on this point is the following. "The proximate cause of pleasure is an operation, but the remote cause is the object of the operation; just as in the pleasure of the blessed, . . . the proximate cause is the vision of God, but the first cause is God."\(^{22}\) The context indicates that efficient causes are here spoken of, for very rarely is there question of proximate and remote formal causes.

The conclusion is, then, that operations are both formal and efficient causes of pleasure, but under different aspect: formal, in so far as they are the objects of pleasure and specify it to be of a particular kind; efficient, in so far as they are the means through which a being comes into contact with and possesses goods which are suitable to itself.\(^{23}\)

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\(^{21}\) In IV Sent., 49, 3, 4, sol. 3.

\(^{22}\) Ibid., a. 5, sol. 4.

\(^{23}\) An interesting comment on this point is the following. "Operatio causat delectationem partim in genere causae efficientis, inquantum delectatio non oritur nisi mediente operatione, ex qua sequitur per naturalem resultantiam, sicut passio sequitur ex ess-
The material cause of pleasure must be looked for in its subject. "The subject of pleasure and of all passions of the soul is the animal spirit, which is the proximate instrument of the soul in the operations which are performed through the body."\(^{24}\) Exactly what St. Thomas means by *spiritus animalis* cannot be determined, for the term is not further defined or amplified.\(^{25}\) From the rest of the present article, however, it seems that the term is an attempt to explain what modern psychology calls the "bodily resonance of an emotion. Thomas speaks of an abundance of these spirits which are the causes of the dilation of the heart, and, presumably, of faster pulse rate, more rapid breathing, and the like. One thing seems clear. St. Thomas is here thinking of pleasure as a *passio animalis* in which the soul is said to undergo passion because it acts as the mover of the body.

\[\text{sentia subjecti: partim in genere causae formalis, inquantum operatio conveniens est objectum delectationis, eique speciem tribuit: delectatur enim quispiam non tantum de re bona, sed etiam de re\textit{istius} assecutione et operatione circa illam. Priorem modum causali\textit{litatis tradit B. Th. Q. 33, a. 4, ad 2. Posteriorem in IV Sent., dist. 49, q. 3, a. 2 c." Fr. Silvii, Commentarli in totam pr\textit{imam} secundae, Antuerpiae, 1714, p. 219 D.}\]

\(^{24}\)In IV Sent., 49, 3, 2, sol.

\(^{25}\)Schütz's Thomas-Lexikon and the Tabula Aurea give only two other references to *spiritus animalis*, neither of which treat of its nature. However, this notion is probably derived from the Stoic doctrine of *pneuma*, a hot, breath-like substance which was supposed to be the principle of life. Armstrong traces this doctrine through Aristotle and Plato back to the pre-Socratic "living-stuff." Copleston notes its appearance in Bernardino Telesio (1509-88) and in Descartes. See A. H. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy (Westminster, Maryland, 1949), pp. 122-23, and Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy, (Westminster, Maryland, 1953), III, p. 252.
Only the final cause of pleasure now remains to be discovered. St. Thomas does not explicitly mention the final cause of pleasure, probably because it is easily deducible from what he has said about the nature of pleasure. For, as the crowning perfection of an unhampered operation, it seems clear that pleasure is of itself in the order of finality. However, the suitable good, the bonum conveniens, may be looked upon as the final cause of pleasure, since it attracts a being and causes it to place those acts and operations which will put it in possession of the good and give rise to pleasure.

Briefly, then, the four causes of pleasure are as follows: formal, unimpeded operations proceeding from habits conformable to nature; material, the animal spirit, which is the proximate instrument of the soul in the operations which are performed through the body; efficient, the various operations which are the means through which a being comes into contact with and possesses goods which are suitable for itself; final, none needed strictly speaking, for pleasure is already in the order of finality, but suitable goods may be considered as final causes of pleasant operations.

No account of the causes of pleasure would be complete without a discussion of the role of knowledge in pleasure. Knowledge can be said to be the cause of pleasure in two ways. This is true first, on the part of the thing that is known, as when a man comes

\[26\] In IV Sent., 49, 3, 3, sol. 2 c. The word used for knowledge here is apprehensio.
to know some good that is suitable for himself and is pleased, presumably at the prospect of acquiring the good. In this way knowledge is the cause of every pleasure, for the appetites are aroused through the knowledge of some good for the being. Second, knowledge is said to be the cause of pleasure on the part of the knowledge itself, as when a man is pleased not by the thing known but by the very cognitive act through which he knows the thing. In this second way, Thomas seems to be speaking of the operation of knowing as the object of pleasure. Therefore, knowledge taken in this sense would be a formal cause of pleasure, for the formal cause of pleasure is an operation as object, as has been seen. In the first way, considering knowledge from the aspect of the thing known, apprehension of the suitable good seems to be more a condition than a cause. For unless the good were somehow known it could not stir the appetites and arouse desire for itself. This seems to be St. Thomas's meaning when he says that knowledge of the suitable is the cause of every pleasure. But he might also be referring to the knowledge which makes a being aware that it is actually in possession of the good it has sought after and acquired; this too is a necessary condition of pleasure. However, it should be borne in mind that pleasure belongs to the appetitive powers, not to the apprehensive.27

Now that the role of knowledge in pleasure has been determined

27In III Sent., 15, 2, 1, sol. 2.
St. Thomas's distinction between pleasure and joy can be more easily understood. Pleasure and joy have this in common, that they are caused by the possession of some good that has been desired. 28 Now a good or perfection can be possessed in two ways, physically (realiter) and through knowledge (secundum apprehensionem). When a good is physically possessed, pleasure is experienced; when a good is known, joy arises. 29 Therefore joy is concerned with the hope of future goods and the memory of past goods as well as with those present, but pleasure is concerned only with suitable goods actually present and physically possessed.

Some interesting applications of this distinction are made to the various cognitive powers and their operations. Because the exterior senses apprehend only things physically present, we are said to be pleased by their operations. The interior senses apprehend things both present and absent; therefore we both rejoice in and are pleased by their operations. One of the goods actually present to the interior senses, and thus a source of pleasure, is their own operations. The same operations will also be a source of joy inas-

28 In IV Sent., 49, 3, 1, sol. 4. In this discussion of pleasure and joy "to be pleased" translates delectari and "to rejoice" translates gaudere. "pleasure," of course, translates delectatio and "joy" translates gaudium. It is to be noted that joy is not restricted to mean pleasure of the intellectual appetite here in the Sentences nor in the De Veritate.

29 Ibid., and ad 1. "Gaudium et delectatio licet habeant unum objectum secundum rem, non tamen est unum objectum secundum rationem. Bonum enim conjunctum realiter facit delectationem; sed conjunctum secundum apprehensionem facit gaudium."
much as the interior senses know their own operations as well as the operations of the exterior senses. It seems that a parallel argument could be made for pleasure in the operations of the intellect, for these operations are surely present to the intellect. But strangely enough the intellect is mentioned only once in this discussion, and in an example, as follows. We are said to rejoice in the eating of sweets, for the interior senses and the intellect apprehend this as a suitable good for the exterior senses and for the composite. We are pleased also, of course, for the sweets are a good really present to the exterior senses. Therefore, the same good can afford both joy and pleasure, for it can be actually possessed through the operations of the exterior senses and possessed through knowledge by the operations of the interior senses and the intellect. St. Thomas expresses this as follows:

"[I]dem est causa delectationis et gaudii, sed non eodem or-dine: primo enim et per se est causa delectationis; secundario vero est causa gaudii. Numquam enim aliquid apprehensum facit gaudium, nisi inquantum aestimatur ut conjunctum vel conjun-gibile secundum rem ad faciendum delectationem; et ideo con-junctio perfectionis primo et per se facit delectationem; sed inquantum apprehenditur ut delectationem faciens, facit gaudi-dium etiam quando delectationem actualiter non causat; unde delectatio naturaliter prior est gaudio."30

The basis of this distinction between joy and pleasure, then, is the way in which a good object is in the possession of a being. If the object is really present and known through the exterior senses, pleasure will be experienced. If an acquired or acquirable object

30Ibid., ad 2.
is estimated to be a suitable good for the being or some of its faculties by the \textit{vis cogitativa} or the intellect or both, joy will be experienced. Therefore pleasure is caused by the operations of the exterior senses and joy is caused by the operations of the interior senses and the intellect when these faculties are in contact with suitable objects. Whether St. Thomas here means to restrict \textit{delectatio} to the enjoyment of material objects cannot be said with certitude. But on the basis of the distinction as given it seems that \textit{gaudium} will be a part of every pleasant experience. The reason is that apprehension of a suitable object both as acquirable and as acquired is a necessary condition for pleasure.\footnote{Noble maintains, and correctly it seems to the writer, that pleasure and joy always involve one another, at least in some small degree. See H.-D. Noble, O.P., "Le plaisir et la joie," \textit{RSPT}, V (1911), 705.}

Another but very different distinction between pleasure and joy is made in Book III of the \textit{Commentary on the Sentences}. This new distinction raises considerable difficulties, but it must be presented in giving a complete and honest summary of Thomistic doctrine on pleasure in the \textit{Sentences}. It will also pave the way for much of the material to be seen in the next chapter on the \textit{De Veritate}.

Up to this point the doctrine has been taken exclusively from Book IV of the \textit{Sentences}, where the general context has been a discussion of beatitude. This new distinction between pleasure and
joy occurs in Book III where St. Thomas treats of the human defects which Christ took upon Himself when He assumed a human nature. In distinction 15, question 2, articles 1 and 3, Thomas discusses whether the body of Christ was able to suffer and whether He experienced actual pain in His senses. It should be noted that only sense pleasure (delectatio sensibilis), not pleasure in general, is here distinguished from joy. The distinction is based on a comparison of pleasure with pain and of joy with sorrow. The way must be prepared by a few short quotations, as follows.

"The impression left in the concupiscible part from the presence of good is called pleasure or joy; but the presence of evil is called sorrow (tristitia) or pain (dolor). How sorrow and pain differ has been indicated above in distinction 15. Sense pleasure and joy differ in the same way."32

Before turning to distinction 15, the following notes on the nature of sense pleasure will be helpful. "Sense pleasure is caused by the possession of something suitable by the senses. . . . Complete sense pleasure is only in the perception of the sense of touch, just as pain is in its wounding."33

Now for the distinction between sorrow and pain, which is the same as the distinction between joy and sense pleasure. "Because

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32 In III Sent., 26, 1, 3 sol.

33 Ibid., d. 15, 2, 3, sol. 1. "Delectatio sensibilis causatur ex conjunctione convenientis secundum sensum. . . . Completa delectatio sensibilis est in sola perceptione tactus, sicut dolor in laesione ejus."
pain begins in wounding and is terminated in the perception of the sense of touch, pain is there completed; but sorrow begins in apprehension and is terminated in appetency; therefore pain is in the sense of touch as in a subject, but sorrow is in the appetite. From this it is clear that sorrow is a psychical passion, but pain is a bodily passion."34

According to this distinction, sense pleasure is a bodily passion (passio corporalis), is in the senses as in a subject, and is caused when the senses, especially the sense of touch, come into contact with a suitable good. Joy is a psychical passion (passio animalis), is in the appetites as in a subject, and begins with apprehension and terminates in appetency.

Up to this time, Thomas has consistently said that pleasure belongs to the appetites, but here we find him stating that sense pleasure belongs to apprehensive powers, the five exterior senses. There seem to be two possible explanations why St. Thomas here says that sense pleasure is in the senses as in a subject. The first would be that every faculty has a "natural appetite" to perform its own particular operation. Thus it is said that the eye, for example, has a natural tendency to see. When a perfect operation of vision takes place, pleasure crowns that operation "sicut quaedam superveniens finis." Therefore the sense of sight might be looked upon as the seat of pleasure, the natural complement of its own

34Ibid., sol 2.
perfect operation.

The second possible explanation would be to interpret this new distinction as follows: *delectatio sensibilis* will arise when the operation of one or more of the exterior senses is the formal cause of a pleasant experience; *gaudium* will arise when the operations of the other apprehensive powers are the formal cause of pleasure. The following passage seems to support this interpretation, for it refers to sense pleasure as belonging to the exterior senses. "*[G]audio opponitur directe tristitia; delectationi autem opponitur dolor, secundum quod delectatio est in sensu exteriori, et praecipue in tactu; sed secundum quod est interius, non habet aliquid oppositum quam tristitiam: posset tamen habere, si esset nomen positum."35 Mention is here made of another kind of pleasure besides *delectatio sensibilis*. No name is given to it, but some idea of its nature can be gained from the following passage.

"*[S]icut delectatio distinguitur a gaudio, ita dolor a tristitia, ut sic per oppositum tristitia respondeat gaudio, dolor vero delectationi: sed quia dolor proprie accipitur in sensu, et praecipue in sensu tactus: delectatio etiam proprie loquendo se extendit ad interiores vires; ideo delectationi non solum dicimus opponi dolorem, sed etiam tristitiam."36 This second kind of pleasure, then, extends to the interior apprehensive powers, presumably to the opera-

35 In IV Sent., 49, 3, 1, sol. 4 ad 3.
36 Ibid., a. 3, sol. 1 ad 3.
tions of the interior senses and possibly even of the intellect. It is opposed to sorrow, while sense pleasure is opposed to pain. Thus there seems to be a sound basis for the interpretation that sense pleasure arises when the operation of one or more of the exterior senses is the formal cause of a pleasant experience, and this interpretation furnishes a plausible explanation why St. Thomas says that sense pleasure is in the exterior senses as its subject instead of in the appetite.

For all that, it must be admitted that the difficulty is not fully solved. This new distinction between pleasure and joy in Book III of the Sentences lacks clarity and precision. Since this particular point is going to undergo considerable development in the De Veritate, it seems best to postponed further consideration of it until the next chapter.

Now that the nature and causes of pleasure have been treated, some attention must be given to the necessary conditions of pleasure. They are two in number and have already been mentioned. First, the operation which is the formal and efficient cause must be an unimpeded operation. This means that it must be free from internal and external hindrances and according to nature or it may not afford pleasure at all.

The second condition is knowledge. In a very basic sense knowledge is required for pleasure, for only a being endowed with the power of cognition can experience pleasure. This is almost obvious, for only cognitive beings have appetite and pleasure
belongs to appetite. Knowledge is also required from another point of view, as an example will show. A man may have a large sum of money in his pocket. This is surely a good really in his possession, but if he does not know he has the money it will give him no pleasure at all. This is true of any bonum conveniens conjunctum; it must be known as really possessed before it will be a source of pleasure. St. Thomas expresses it this way. "[C]um delectatio sit in appetitu, et omnis passio vel operatio appetitus praeexigat apprehensionem; oportet quod bonum conjunctum quod delectationem causat, sit apprehensum."38

Little notice is given to the effects of pleasure in the Commentary on the Sentences. They are mentioned only in passing and are not elaborated. Some of them have been noted already. First, pleasure consists in the termination of the movement of the appetite, so that the quieting of the appetite may be considered an effect of pleasure. Second, operations and activities that are pleasant are performed more diligently and attentively.39 Third, pleasure completes and perfects an unimpeded operation proceeding from a habit conformable to nature.40 Fourth, bodily pleasures may impede the use of reason because of the bodily changes in-

37 In I Sent., 1, 4, sol. 1. In IV Sent., 49, 3, 2, sol.
38 In IV Sent., 49, 3, 1, sol. 1.
39 Ibid., a. 3, sol. 3 ad 3.
40 Ibid., a. 4, sol. 3. In II Sent., 38, 1, sol. 2 ad 6.
With the presentation of the nature, causes, conditions and effects of pleasure as given in the Commentary on the Sentences, the work of Chapter III is finished. Because of the length and complexity of this chapter a summary will be helpful.

By nature, pleasure is the termination of appetitive movement. Therefore it is not a passion in the ordinary sense, but because of its intimate connection with appetitive movement and consequent bodily changes it is assigned to the category of passio. From another point of view, pleasure is a secondary perfection like health which perfects and completes natural and unimpeded operations.

Natural, unimpeded operations proceeding from habits are the formal cause of pleasure since they are its proper object and specify the pleasure to be of one kind rather than another. The operations themselves are specified by a suitable good (bonum conveniens), so the suitable good might be called the remote formal cause of pleasure. The efficient cause of pleasure is these same unimpeded operations, but considered now as the means through which a being comes into contact with and possesses suitable goods, and upon which pleasure follows as a natural complement and secondary perfection. Under this aspect the suitable good can be called the remote efficient cause. Or, taking the two efficient causes to-

\[41 \text{In IV Sent., 49, 3, 5, sol. 1 ad 4.}\]
gther, the good object could be called the *causa quae* and the operation the *causa qua*. Since it is already in the order of finality, pleasure does not need a final cause, but the suitable good may be looked upon as the final cause, for it moves a being to place those operations which will put it in possession of the good and quiet the appetites. It is interesting to note that the suitable good is at once the final, remote formal, and remote efficient cause of pleasure.

Knowledge was seen to be a necessary condition for pleasure in two ways. First, a good must be known before it can arouse the appetites; second, after a good has come into the possession of a being the fact of possession must be known before pleasure will be experienced. Of course, either of these acts of cognition can be the operation which is both the formal and efficient cause of pleasure.

Two distinctions between pleasure and joy were considered, but no definite conclusion could be reached. Finally, two conditions and four effects of pleasure were mentioned. Now it is time to turn to the *De Veritate*, the second of the four primary sources.
CHAPTER IV

PLEASURE IN THE DE VERITATE

Pleasure is treated in the De Veritate in question 26, entitled "The Passions of the Soul." Of the ten articles in this question, the fourth and the fifth treat pleasure more specifically. The fourth article asks, "On What Grounds Are the Contrariety and Diversity among the Passions of the Soul Based?" and the fifth asks, "Are Hope, Fear, Joy, and Sadness the Four Principal Passions of the Soul?" In reading over these two articles one is lead to ask, "Why is joy so frequently mentioned and numbered among the passions, while pleasure receives comparatively little notice?"

The answer to this question goes back to the difficult distinction between pleasure and joy in Book III of the Sentences which was discussed in the last chapter. In that distinction, it will be remembered that pleasure was compared to pain and joy to sorrow, and pleasure and joy were said to be distinct in the same

1Thomas Aquinas, Truth, III, trans. Robert W. Schmidt, S.J., (Chicago, 1954), pp. 261 and 267. This work will hereafter be referred to as Truth with the appropriate question and article numbers following. This translation has been chosen in preference to older Latin editions of the De Veritate because it was made from the definitive Leonine text. The writer has constantly referred to the 8th (Spiazzi) edition of the De Veritate as an aid in interpretation.
way that pain and sorrow are distinct. This was seen to mean that pleasure is a bodily passion, belongs to apprehensive powers (the five exterior senses), not to appetite, and is completed in apprehension. Joy, on the other hand, was said to be a psychical passion, is in the appetites as its subject, and begins with apprehension and terminates in the operation of the appetites. Almost identical doctrine is contained in the section of the De Veritate now under consideration, as the following two passages will make clear. The first passage reads as follows. "In its strict sense pain should not be numbered among the passions of the soul, because it involves nothing on the part of the soul beyond mere apprehension; for pain is the feeling of an injury, but the injury itself is in the body. For this reason even Augustine adds in the same place that he has preferred to use the term sadness rather than pain; for sadness is completed in the appetitive power itself."

It is to be noted that pain is not a passion because it involves nothing beyond apprehension, but sadness is completed in the appetitive power itself. Thomas goes on to say in the very next paragraph:

Pleasure and joy differ in the same way as sadness and pain; for sensible pleasure involves on the part of the body union with something agreeable, and on the part of the soul the feeling of this agreeableness. Similarly spiritual pleasure involves a certain real union of two things that agree with each other, and the perception of this union. Thus in defining sensible pleasure Plato said that pleasure is

2Truth, 26, 4, ad 4. See also q. 26, 3, ad 9.
a sensible process toward a natural state. Aristotle, defining pleasure in general, said that pleasure is the unhindered operation of a habit conformable to nature. For an agreeable operation is that united agreeable thing which causes pleasure, especially spiritual pleasure. Thus pleasure of either kind begins with real union and is completed in its apprehension. Joy, however, begins with apprehension and ends in the affections. The key words here of course are: "Thus pleasure of either kind begins with a real union and is completed in its apprehension. Joy, however, begins with apprehension and ends in the affections." Since pleasure is completed in apprehension, it cannot be a passion for in the next article Thomas says clearly that the passions are in the sense appetitive part of the soul and mentions joy as one of the four principal passions. Small wonder that pleasure gets little notice in this treatment of the passions of the soul, then, while joy is prominently mentioned.

It will be remembered that Thomas hesitated to call pleasure a passion in the strict sense in the Commentary on the Sentences, but for a much different reason. In the Sentences pleasure is said to consist in the termination of appetitive movement, and thus to lack the essential note of motion. But here in the De Veritate pleasure is not called a passion because it does not belong to the appetitive part of the soul at all, but to the apprehensive. This doctrine was clearly foreshadowed in the distinction between joy and pleasure found in Book III of the Sentences and outlined above.

3 R. B. 25, 4, ad 5.
4 Ibid., a. 5, prin. See also q. 25, 3, ad 11.
In the previous chapter the writer attempted to solve the difficulty by appealing to the natural tendency or "natural appetite" that each faculty has to place its own particular operation. When an unhamppered operation occurs, pleasure completes and perfects that operation. Therefore, the five external senses might be looked upon as the source of pleasure when they perform unhamppered operations, and this may be what Thomas means when he says that sense pleasure is completed in apprehension. Jean Langlois, S.J., takes a very similar approach in his attempt to put sense pleasure back into the appetites.

Le bien et le mal sont objet de l'appétit. La présence du bien engendre le plaisir, celle du mal, la douleur. Quand un sens perçoit un objet qui lui est proportionné, et qui, dès lors, constitue un bien pour lui et pour tout l'individu, il se produit une réaction dans l'appétit: c'est le plaisir.

Dans un sens tout à fait équivoque, de même que l'on parle d'amour "naturel," l'on pourrait parler de délectation "naturelle" pour designer l'état de la faculté cognitive lors qu'elle a perçu un objet proportionné. . . . La sensation est dans la faculté de connaissance, mais le plaisir ou la douleur sont dans l'appétit. Voilà pourquoi Jean de Saint-Thomas apporte cette précision: "[Sensus externus] tristatur vel delectatur de sua cognitione non formaliter, id enim pertinent ad appetitum, sed objective, quia de tali cognitione ut de objecto appetitus laetatur." (Curs. Phil., T. III, ed. Reiser, p. 248 b 25)5

St. Thomas seems to leave himself open to this interpretation when he says, "Sensible pleasure involves on the part of the body union with something agreeable, and on the part of the soul the feeling

of this agreeableness." 6

The writer made another attempt to explain how sense pleasure could belong to the sense appetites by saying that sense pleasure arises in the appetite when the operation of one or more of the exterior senses is the formal cause of pleasure. Thomas's doctrine here in the De Veritate seems to admit of this interpretation; for he says, "Thus pleasure of either kind begins with a real union and is completed in its apprehension. Joy, however, begins with apprehension and ends in the affections." His conclusion from this in the very next sentence is: "Thus pleasure is sometimes the cause of joy, just as pain is sometimes the cause of sadness." 7

A way is here opened for getting pleasure back into the appetite; for if pleasure causes joy, then the act of apprehension in which pleasure consists is the cause of movement in the appetite. Thomas says earlier in this same passage: "For an agreeable operation is that united agreeable thing which causes pleasure, especially spiritual pleasure." The agreeable operation in this case would be the act of apprehension. It will be remembered that Thomas also said in the Sentences that agreeable operations are, under different aspects, both the formal and efficient causes of pleasure. 8

6 Truth, 26, 4, ad 5. The passage is quoted in full on pp. 53-54. The Latin version of the "feeling of this agreeableness" is sensus illius convenientiae.
7 Ibid.
8 Chapter III, pp. 35-38.
The notion of **spiritual** pleasure in the passage just dealt with clears up an obscurity noted in the previous chapter. There a certain unnamed kind of pleasure, belonging to the apprehensive powers other than the five exterior senses, was mentioned. Comparison indicates that the *delectatio spiritualis* here mentioned and the unnamed pleasure of the *Sentences* are one and the same. The reason is that both are psychical passions, not bodily passions, and are somehow involved in the operations of the apprehensive powers other than the five exterior senses.

Turning now to the body of article 4 of question 26, we find a threefold distinction in the passions of the soul. The second of the three distinctions is that by which the passions are distinguished in species within the same power. Two different bases are given for the distinction: first, according to contrariety of objects; second, "according as the concupiscible power is referred in different ways to the same object, or in other words according to the different stages that can be considered in the course of an appetitive movement." The place assigned to *gaudium* is of particular interest.

For the pleasurable object is first united psychically with the man who seeks it, by being apprehended as like him or agreeable to him. From this there follows the passion of love, which is nothing but the specification of the appetite by the form of the appetible object. . . . But what has thus been united psychically is sought further with a view to its being united really, so that the lover enjoys the possession of the beloved. Thus is born the passion of desire, which, when the

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object has been obtained in reality, begets joy. The first stage, then, in the movement of the concupiscible power is love; the second, desire; and the last, joy. 10

It is to be noted that joy arises when the object has been obtained in reality, that is, when real union has been established and the appetite quieted. 11 In the Commentary on the Sentences this last stage in the appetitive movement was called delectatio, pleasure. 12

It is almost as though Thomas has substituted joy for pleasure in the De Veritate. This might well be what happened, for Thomas holds in the De Veritate that pleasure is not a passion or a movement of the appetite, as has been seen. Joy seems to be the only other term that could have been used.

In support of this contention the body of the fifth article can be cited.

Now joy and sadness come from the attainment of good or evil, and that essentially; for joy comes from a good inasmuch as it is good, and sadness comes from an evil inasmuch as it is evil. And all the other passions of the concupiscible power likewise come from good or evil essentially. . . . Yet the other passions of the concupiscible power presuppose joy and sadness as their cause; for a good becomes loved and desired by the concupiscible by reason of its being apprehended as pleasurable, and an evil becomes hateful and repulsive by be-

10 Truth, 26, 4 c.

11 At first glance there might seem to be a contradiction here, for in Truth, 26, 4 ad 5 Thomas says that pleasure begins with real union while joy begins with apprehension. But there does not seem to be any reason why the very apprehension which terminates pleasure cannot be the same one with which joy begins. In this explanation, joy would still be the last stage in appetitive movement, though pleasure would be prior by nature. On this point see the passage from the Sentences quoted on p. 70 of this thesis.

12 In IV Sent., 49, 3, 1, sol. 1. See p. 30 of this thesis.
ing apprehended as saddening. Thus in the order of appetency joy and sadness are prior, though in the order of execution and attainment they are posterior. 13

Joy, then, is first in the order of appetency, but last in the order of execution and attainment; or, in the language of article 4, it is "the last stage in the movement of the concupiscible power." Moreover, it enjoys a position of natural priority, for the other passions of the concupiscible power which have good as their object presuppose joy as their cause.

A position opposed to this was held in the Sentences, as the following quotation will show. "Pleasure and joy have the same cause, but not in the same order; for first and essentially it is the cause of pleasure; secondarily it is the cause of joy. For something that has been apprehended never causes joy except as it is known to be really united or uniteable in itself to cause pleasure; and therefore the attaining of a perfection first and essentially causes pleasure; but in so far as it is apprehended as causing pleasure, it causes joy even when it is not actually causing pleasure; therefore pleasure is naturally prior to joy." 14 Note that in this quotation pleasure is first in the order of appetency. Joy is relegated to a secondary position and is not one of the four principal passions as it is in the De Veritate. Although it is not explicitly stated that pleasure is last in the order of execution

13 Truth, 26, 5 c.

14 In IV Sent., 49, 3, 1, sol. 4 ad 2. The Latin version of this passage will be found on p. 43 of this thesis.
and attainment, this has been noted in numerous passages from the Sentences already considered.\textsuperscript{15} The point to be noted is that in the De Veritate joy seems to have the place occupied by pleasure in the Sentences.

Two comparatively minor points remain to be considered in the De Veritate. The first concerns the notion of "pre-delectation" mentioned in the previous chapter.\textsuperscript{16} Thomas touches on this point in the De Veritate when he says that the movement of the concupiscible and irascible powers can be considered in two respects, namely, in desiring and in executing. In desiring, "the concupiscible power is moved to enjoyment upon the mere apprehension of the pleasurable object."\textsuperscript{17} Now "moved to enjoyment" seems to indicate that there is a kind of "preliminary pleasure" in the appetite even before the actual possession of the good object. More definite information on this point will be found in the chapter on the Summa Theologiae.

The last point concerns pleasure of the intellect and is found in the reply to an objection.\textsuperscript{18} The burden of the objection is that passions in the strict sense, with their essential note of contrariety, are in the intellect. Thomas solves the difficulty

\textsuperscript{15}\textsuperscript{16}In IV Sent., 49, 3, 1, sol. 1. In III Sent., 27, 1, 2, ad 3. In Chapter III, p. 34.

\textsuperscript{17}Truth, 25, 6, ad 3. "Sed concupiscibilis, ad solam apprehensionem delectabilis, movetur ad fruitionem delectabilis."

\textsuperscript{18}\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., 3, ad 6.
by distinguishing between the act of understanding and the thing understood. Intellectual pleasure is caused by the union of the intellect and a suitable intelligible object through an intelligible species; that is, by an act of understanding. But nothing is contrary to an intelligible species, for even the species of contraries are not contrary in the soul. Therefore, from the viewpoint of the act of understanding, there can be no contrary passion in the intellect and pleasure will necessarily follow.19

But broadly speaking, sadness or pain can be said to be in the intellect when the intellect understands something as harmful, to which the will is averse. "Because that harmful thing, however, is not harmful to the intellect as understanding it, sadness or pain is not contrarily opposed to the delight of the intellect, which comes from understanding something suitable to the intellect in so far as it understands."20

In this reply there is mentioned a third kind of pleasure, delectatio intellectualis, which follows upon the act of understanding considered as an unhampered operation. Obviously, Thomas looks upon intellectual pleasure as a crowning secondary perfection of the intellect, the act of understanding being the primary perfection.

With this the consideration of pleasure in the De Veritate is

19For almost identical doctrine see In IV Sent., 49, 3, 3, sol. 2.

20Truth, 26, 3, ad 6.
finished. Pleasure in the Commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* will be the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER V

PLEASURE IN THE COMMENTARY ON THE ETHICS

Since this chapter will study St. Thomas's doctrine on pleasure in one of his Aristotelian commentaries, it will be well to preface a few remarks about his intention and method in these commentaries.

Where intention is concerned, it seems clear that Thomas meant primarily to expound the work of Aristotle. If one consults any of the commentaries, he finds a careful, even a painstaking division, analysis, and exposition of the Aristotelian text. Secondary sources call attention to an important point of extrinsic evidence, namely, contemporary history.¹ At the time Thomas wrote most of his Aristotelian commentaries, Aristotle's works were suspect and under heavy fire from Christian theologians and scholars at Paris and even from the Pope. Introduced to the works of Aristotle by St. Albert, who was the first great Christian commentator on the Stagyr ante, Thomas recognized how valuable Aristotle could be in building a truly Christian philosophy. He wanted to preserve Aris-

totele from false interpretation, especially the Averroistic, and from consequent papal condemnation. To do this he chose the soundest and most lasting way, writing careful and accurate commentaries to expound Aristotle's work correctly. Thus from both internal and external evidence, it seems clear that St. Thomas's intention is to expound the text of Aristotle carefully and correctly.

A few words will suffice on St. Thomas's method in these commentaries. They are all literal expositions of Latin translations of Aristotle. Speaking of the commentary on the De Anima, Ivo Thomas says: "It cannot be too clearly emphasized that the Commentary is only what it calls itself, an exposition of a text. It is that even before being an exposition of what is said in the text; that perhaps more than an exhaustive assertion of what in detail the commentator held to be the truth."2

St. Thomas's standard procedure is something like this. Each lectio or main division begins by showing the place within the whole work of the passage under immediate consideration. The passage is then logically divided and subdivided down to small phrases. Only after this formal analysis of the text has been made does St. Thomas go on to explain the material contained in it. Thus it is clear that his method is in full accord with his intention to ex-

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ound clearly and accurately the text of Aristotle.

When this has been said, the question naturally arises, "Can these commentaries be looked upon as sources of Thomistic doctrine, or does St. Thomas confine himself strictly to expounding Aristotle?" The Aristotelian commentaries are far from being the richest sources of Thomistic doctrine, but neither are they completely barren. They must be read carefully to ascertain when Thomas is expounding Aristotle, when he is explaining or quoting Aristotle with approval, and when he is giving his own doctrine. In preparing this fifth chapter, the writer has tried carefully to distinguish between these three levels and to present what seems to be Thomas's own doctrine.

A final preliminary consideration is this. The present chapter deals with St. Thomas's commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. At once, therefore, we are in an ethical context. It is well to keep this in mind, for even when he speaks of the nature of pleasure Thomas's basic viewpoint will not be metaphysical or psychological, but ethical.

In the Nicomachean Ethics pleasure comes in for discussion in several places, as follows: in Book I, where the questions relating to happiness are raised; in Book II, chapter 3, where the nature of good acts and virtue is under examination; in Book III, chapter 19, in connection with the virtue of temperance; in Book VII, chapters 11 to 14, where continence and incontinence are treated; and in Book X, chapters 1 to 8, where the nature of pleasure and its
relationship to happiness are discussed. The most extended and important passages are in Book VII and Book X, which will be analyzed here, but with regard for the other sections.

In the very beginning of Book X St. Thomas gives us one of those very helpful guideposts which looks both forward and backward. It reads as follows.

Et dicit quod post prae dicta consequens est, ut pertrans-eunter, id est breviter, de delectatione tractetur. Tractave-
rat quidem supra in septimo de delectatione, inquantum est materiae continentiae. Unde ibi potissime sua consideratio
versabatur circa delectationes sensibiles et corporales. Nunc autem intende determinare de delectatione secundum quod ad-
jungitur felicitati. Et ideo praecipue determinat de delecta-
tione intelligibili et spirituali.3

With the way thus pointed out, we turn to Book VII, where consideration is given chiefly to sense pleasure.

It will be remembered from the first chapter that Plato held that all pleasures involve generation or becoming, and therefore are neither good nor fully real. To answer Plato, Aristotle makes an important distinction that St. Thomas explains and approves.4 Not all pleasures, he says, are generations or involve generations. Those that do involve generation are the acts which are constitutive of habits, but there are also pleasurable operations.

Operations are more perfect than the habits from which they proceed. Habits must be acquired by repeated acts and, once formed,


4In VII Eth., 12, nn. 1483-93.
give rise to operations. For this reason habits are called first perfections, while the operations proceeding from them are called second perfections. It is true that the acts which form a habit may be pleasurable, but this is only accidental. These acts constitutive of habits are the generations of which Plato spoke, but even they participate in good because they are ordered to the formation of first perfections or habits. To sum up in the words of St. Thomas: "Sic ergo vere et per se delectationes sunt illae quae sunt circa operationes procedentos ex habitibus, seu naturis et formis jam existentibus. Illae autem delectationes quae sunt constitutivae habituum et naturarum, non sunt vero et simpliciter delectationes, sed per accidens." 5

Aristotle goes on to formulate a definition of pleasure to replace Plato's faulty definition, which reads: "Delectatio est quaedam sensibilis generatio in naturam." 6 Plato's definition will fit only those accidentally pleasurable acts which are constitutive of habits. A definition must be formulated which will include true pleasures, those which arise from operations proceeding from habits. The definition finally formulated and its explanation is as follows.

Delectatio est operatio non impedita habitus qui est secundum naturam, idest qui naturae habentis congruit. Impedimentum autem operationis difficultatem causat in operando, quae delectationem excludit. Ideo autem quibusdam visum est quod delectatio sit generatio quaedam, quia delectatio est circa id quod est principaliter bonum, idest circa operationem quam ex-

5 In VII Eth., 12, n. 1488.
6 Ibid., 11, n. 1474.
This definition clearly puts pleasure in the order of finality because true pleasures have to do only with unhindered operations, which are secondary perfections proceeding from habits. But one important question must be asked about the definition. Is pleasure the unhindered operation itself, or is it caused by the operation? The following passage, taken from the next lesson, throws some light on the point.

What seems to be said here is that unhindered operations give rise to happiness (felicitas), and happiness in turn causes pleasure. But full clarification of this point will have to wait until Book X is taken up.

Before turning to Book X, one important passage concerning the cause of pleasure should be considered. This passage occurs in Book III, lesson 19, where Aristotle deals with temperance. The

7 Ibid., 12, n. 1493.

8 Ibid., 13, nn. 1505-06.

9 In I Eth., 10, n. 130, felicitas is defined as operatio propria hominis secundum virtutem in vita perfecta.
passage is long, but it merits full quotation.

Distinguit delectationes. Et dicit quod eorum quaedam sunt animales, quaedam corporales. Corporales quidem delectationes sunt, quae consummuntur in quaedam corporali passione exterioris sensus. Animales autem delectationes sunt quae consummuntur ex sola apprehensione interiori. Et exemplificat de delectationibus animalibus, incipiens a causa delectationis quae est amor. Unusquisque enim delectatur ex hoc quod habet id quod amat. Invenitur autem in quibusdam amor honoris, et in quibusdam amor disciplinae, quae non apprehenduntur exteriori sensu, sed interiori apprehensione animae. Unde uterque eorum, scilicet et ille qui est amator honoris, et ille qui est amator disciplinae, gaudet per id quod amat, dum scilicet habet ipsum. Et hoc gaudium non fit per aliquem corporis passionem, sed per solam apprehensionem mentis.10

In this passage we find first a distinction between bodily and psychical pleasures. The basis of the distinction is the way in which the two types of pleasure arise, bodily pleasures by movement of the exterior senses, psychical pleasures by interior apprehension alone. What is meant by interior apprehension is shown by two examples in which abstract things like honor and order are desired. The cause of pleasure is desire, for a man is pleased because he gets possession of what he desires. Now some men desire honor, and they rejoice when they attain it. This joy does not arise from a bodily change, but from the mind's understanding that honor has been won.

It should be noted that desire is said to be a cause of pleasure, and that pleasure arises when the desired good is actually possessed, presumably through suitable unimpeded activity on the physical or sense level. But joy (gaudium) does not arise from

10 In III Eth., 19, n. 600.
bodily change, but from mental apprehension. St. Thomas seems to present here a third doctrine of the difference between pleasure and joy. He seems to indicate that suitable unimpeded activity on the physical or sense level gives rise to pleasure, and that like activity on the rational level gives rise to joy. Clarification and confirmation of this point will be noted in the next chapter.

Now our attention must be turned to Book X, where St. Thomas begins by saying, "Nunc autem intendit determinare de delectatione secundum quod adjungitur folicitati. Et ideo praeclipe determinat de delectatione intelligibili et spirituali."¹¹

In the very beginning of Book X the following interesting statement occurs. "Praecipue enim consistit virtus moralis in ordinatione appetitus, quae cognoscitur per ordinacionem delectationis et tristitiae, quae consequuntur omnes appetitivae partis motus, ut supra in secundo dictum est."¹² Pleasure and sadness, then follow all movements of the appetitive part of the soul. The reference made to Book II is worth investigation, for it clarifies the quotation just given.

Et ideo enumerando passiones, dicit quod passiones sunt concupiscentia, quam nominamus desiderium, et ira, et timor, et audacia, et invidia quae continetur sub tristitia, et gaudium quod continetur sub delectatione, est enim delectatio non corporalis, sed interiori apprehensione consistens: et amicitia, et odium, et desiderium. Quod differt a concupiscentia: eo quod concupiscentia est delectationis corporalis, desiderium autem cujuslibet alterius delectabilis. . . .

Addit autem quod universaliter ad omnia praeclcta sequi-

¹¹In X Eth., I, n. 1954.
¹²Ibid., n. 1955.
tur delectatio et tristitia; quia omnia alia important motus quosdam in bonum et malum, ex quorum superventu causatur delectatio vel tristitia. Unde omnes aliae passiones terminatur ad delectationem et tristitiam. 13

The chief point to be noted is that pleasure and sadness follow upon all the passions here mentioned. The reason is that all these passions involve movement of the appetites in regard to good and evil, and the attainment of the good desired or evil feared is the cause of pleasure and sadness. Therefore all the passions are terminated in either pleasure or sadness. It seems that pleasure and sadness are themselves passions, for Thomas says omnes aliae passiones.

Another point to be noted is that delectatio is here made the generic term and gaudium is one of its inferiors. Gaudium is said to be non-bodily pleasure, consisting in interior apprehension of some good. Further, a distinction is made between concupiscencia and desiderium. Concupiscence is the passion which precedes bodily pleasure, while desire is the passion which precedes all other pleasures.

The doctrine presented here is quite consistent with what has already been seen, especially in the Sentences. Knowledge of a good gives rise to appetitive movement toward that good. When the appetite finds rest in possession of the good, pleasure results.

Another insight into the nature of pleasure is given in lesson 3, where the Platonic doctrine is under discussion. "[D]electatio

13 In II Eth., 5, nn. 294, 296.
est passio animae. Patet ergo, quod delectatio non est ipsa reple­tio seu generatio, sed quoddam ad hoc consequens. Facta autem re­pletione aliquis delectatur, sicut facta incisione aliquis dolet et tristatur."14 Here again emphasis is placed on the notion that pleasure is not movement, but something consequent upon movement. This notion will soon be developed fully.

In lesson 5 of Book X there is a long discussion proving that pleasure is neither motion nor generation. The viewpoint of this lesson is entirely negative and most of the material has already been seen, but one passage merits quotation. In this passage pleasure is compared to vision, the operation of the sense of sight.

Sed visio statim in momento perficitur. Et idem est de delec­tatione. Est enim delectatio quoddam totum, idest completum in primo instanti quo incipit esse, ita quod non potest accipi aliquod tempus in quo fiat delectatio, quod requirat amplius tempus ad speciem delectionis perficiendam, sicut contingit in his quorum generatio est in tempore. Potest enim accipi aliquod tempus generationis humanae, quod requirit amplius ad speciem humanam perficiendam.15

This passage definitely recalls a parallel question in the Commentary on the Sentences where Thomas denied that pleasure was in time. Because it consists in the termination of appetitive move­ment, pleasure is instantaneous and therefore outside of time.16

The next lesson, lesson 6, presents Aristotle's positive doc­
trine on pleasure. This is by far the fullest treatment of pleasure in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Thomistic commentary is a rich source of Thomas's own doctrine.

Aristotle begins by showing that pleasure is the perfection of an operation. The argument runs as follows. For an operation two things are needed, a faculty and an object of this faculty. The better disposed the faculty is to good operation and the more suitable the object is to the faculty, the more perfect will be the resulting operation. Now experience testifies that the more perfect an operation is, the more pleasing it is, and that we experience pleasure in the operations of all our senses and even of our intellect. The conclusion is: "Si ergo operatio perfecta est delectabilis, perfectissima autem delectabilissima, consequens est quod operatio, inquantum est perfecta, sit delectabilis. Delectatio ergo est operationis perfectio." 17

The next step is to show how pleasure perfects the operation. Pleasure has a role to play different from either the faculty or the object in perfecting the operation. Pleasure perfects the operation per modum formae, and in this respect can be compared to health. Health does not cause healing, but rather crowns the successful efforts of the doctor to heal a sick person. In the words of St. Thomas:

Sicut etiam ejus quod est sanari non eodem modo est causa sanitas et medicus; sed sanitas quidem per modum formae, medicus autem per modum agentis. Similiter autem perficit opera-

17 In X Eth., 6, n. 2026.
Fortunately, further information is provided about the meaning of *per modum formae*. After stating that pleasure perfects the operation not efficiently but formally, Thomas distinguishes two kinds of formal perfection. The first is intrinsic and constitutes the essence of a being. The second is extrinsic and perfects a being already constituted in its species. Pleasure partakes of the latter; it is a certain crowning perfection which completes an operation that has arisen from causes that are well disposed. To quote St. Thomas: "[D]electatio perficit operationem non sicut habitus qui inest, idest non sicut forma intrinseca essentiae rei, sed sicut quidam finis, idest quaedam perfectio superveniens, sicut pulchritudo venit juvenibus non quasi existens de essentia juventutis, sed quasi consequens bonam dispositionem causarum juvenitis. Et similiter delectatio consequitur bonam dispositionem causarum operationis."19

One last point deserves note. In discussing whether pleasure or the operation is desired for itself, St. Thomas lets fall a definition of pleasure which seems to be entirely his own. "For pleasure is the repose of the appetite in the pleasing object,

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18 Ibod., n. 2027.
19 Ibid., n. 2031.
which a man has gained possession of through an operation."\(^{20}\)

Again Thomas returns to conceiving pleasure as the repose of the appetite in an acquired good. This does not contradict his agreeing with Aristotle that pleasure is the crowning perfection of an unimpeded operation, but merely looks at pleasure from another point of view. In fact, this definition contains two notions or views of pleasure that Thomas has been striving, whether consciously or unconsciously, to unite: the Christian Platonic "quietatio appetitus in bono" and the Aristotelian doctrine of unhindered operation and its crowning perfection. These two notions are contained in this one definition, but they are still far from being harmonized and united. That will have to wait until the more mature work of the Summa Theologiae.

It will be remembered that earlier in this chapter the question was raised whether pleasure is an operation or is caused by an operation.\(^{21}\) From what has been seen it is clear that pleasure is not an operation, but a formal perfection of an unimpeded operation. But it seems that pleasure might be identified with the operations of the senses and the intellect, since it is so often connected with the operations of these faculties. This possibility is ruled out because pleasure pertains to the appetitive part of the soul. In the words of St. Thomas: "Nec tamen est idem quod op-

\(^{20}\)Ibid., n. 2038. "Nam delectatio est quies appetitus in redlectante, qua quis per operationem potitur."

\(^{21}\)p. 68.
eratio intellectus, neque idem quod operatio sensus. Nam delectatio magis ad appetitivam partem pertinet. Est autem inconveniens si delectatio aliquibus videatur esse idem operationi, propter hoc quod ab operatione non separatur."22 In the last sentence there is the interesting observation that pleasure is not separate from the operation it perfects, and for this reason some have identified the two. Rather than an operation, pleasure is an epigenomenon, an "after-effect," a formal perfection which completes and perfects those operations which proceed from proper and well disposed causes.

If pleasure is a formal perfection, it is also a perfection in the order of finality, for it is a good superadded to a being that is resting in possession of an acquired good. In the words of St. Thomas, pleasure perfects an operation "sicut quidem finis, idest quaedam perfectio superveniens."23

With this the work of Chapter V is complete. An investigation of the Summa Theologiae, the fourth and final primary source, will be the work of the next chapter.

22 In X Eth., 8, n. 2054.
23 Ibid., 6, n. 2031
CHAPTER VI

PLEASURE IN THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE

Although St. Thomas mentions pleasure several times in the Summa Theologiae, two treatments of it stand pre-eminent. Both occur in the Prima Secundae. They are of major importance because of their length and completeness, and the fact that they treat pleasure directly, not just in passing.

The first is found in the treatise on the last end of man at the very beginning of the Prima Secundae. In the sixth article of the second question Thomas asks whether man's happiness consists in pleasure. In the first article of the eleventh question he treats of enjoyment or fruition, which is an act of the will. These passages, however, deal with pleasure in an ethical context, and do not take up expressly the nature and causes of pleasure.

The second important treatment of pleasure in the Prima Secundae bears directly on the work of this thesis. It is found in questions 31 to 34 and occurs in a treatment of the passions of the soul. After speaking of the passions in general, St. Thomas takes up each of the passions in particular. The passions of the concupiscible part are dealt with first. Love, hatred, desire, pleasure and sadness are considered in that order.

The four questions on pleasure methodically consider the
nature of pleasure, its causes, effects, and goodness or evil. The doctrine is presented largely from a metaphysical standpoint and with a firmness and clarity belonging to Thomas's later works.

In the first article of the question dealing with the nature of pleasure Thomas asks whether pleasure is a passion. The answer is in the affirmative. The basic reason why pleasure is said to be a passion is that it is a movement of the sense appetite following upon sense apprehension.¹ This is somewhat surprising, since Thomas has always spoken previously of pleasure as the termination of appetitive movement, and for this reason has hesitated to call it a passion in the strict sense. The explanation of the change can be found in the reply to the second objection, where two movements of the appetite are distinguished, one of desire for a good, the other of pleasure in this good once it has been acquired. The prior movement of desire also causes an exterior movement toward possession in the order of execution. This passage must be quoted in full.

Ad secundum dicendum quod in animali duplex motus considerari potest: unus secundum intentionem finis, qui pertinet ad appetitum, alius secundum executionem, qui pertinet ad exteriem operationem. Licet ergo in eo qui jam consecutus est bonum in quo delectatur, cesset motus executionis, quo tenditur in finem; non tamen cessat motus appetitivae partis, quae, sicut prius de-

siderabat non habitum, ita postea delectatur in habito. Licet enim delectatio sit quies quaedam appetitus, considerata praesentia boni delectantis, quod appetitus satisfacit; tamen adhuc remanet immutatio appetitus ab appetibili, ratione cujus delectatio motus quidam est. 2

Here for the first time pleasure is said to be a real movement of the appetite and therefore a passion in the strict sense. The reason is that Thomas here recognizes a movement of the appetite after it has gained possession of a desired good. It is true that the first appetitive movement of desire has ceased, and that the external operation toward possession has come to an end, but the appetite still continues to be moved to pleasure by the suitable good still present and now in its possession.

More information about this newly mentioned movement of the appetite is certainly desirable, but St. Thomas does not provide much. Only two instances can be cited. The first occurs in a discussion of one of the effects of pleasure called dilatatio. Admitting that this effect can be predicated only metaphorically of the soul, Thomas asserts that it can be applied to operations of both the apprehensive and appetitive powers. In the case of the appeti-

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2Ibid., 31, 1 ad 2. Of interest and importance here also is the commentary of Cajetan, who says that pleasure formally consists in the movement of the appetite. "In primo articulo quaestionis trigesimaeprimae, collige requisita ad delectationem. Et vide quinque exigi: subjectum, objectum, et tres actus; scilicet conjunctionis eorum, . . . quam significat ly constitutio; cognitionis tam objecti quam conjunctionis, et hanc significat ly sensibilis; et immutationis appetitus, quae est formalis delectatio, et hanc significat ly motus animi. Objectum exig ly consonaturalitatem: quam significat ly naturam existentem. Conjunctio vero exig ly simultatem: quam significat ly tota simul."
tive powers, Thomas speaks descriptively, as follows. "Aliud autem est ex parte appetitivae virtutis, quae assentit rei delectabili, et in ea quiescit, quodammodo se praebens ei ad eam integrius capiendum. Et sic dilatatur affectus hominis per delectationem, quasi se tradens ad continentum interius rem delectantem." The movement of the appetite is here described as an enlargement, an attempt to reach out and take within itself the good with which it is in contact.

The second description of this movement of the appetite occurs in discussing whether pleasure causes desire for itself. In the course of the discussion Thomas mentions that a good present to a being may be possessed only imperfectly by that being. This may be due, first, to the nature of the good object. If it can be possessed and enjoyed only gradually, like a seven course dinner, for instance, it will simultaneously arouse pleasure and desire. A man sitting down to such a dinner will be delighted by the appetizer, but "dum . . . delectatur in eo quod habet, desiderat potiri eo quod restat." Thomas remarks that almost all bodily pleasures cause desire for themselves in this way.

On the part of the being which is in contact with a pleasing object, this being may be incapable of enjoying that object all at once, even though it is present and attainable. The pleasure aroused by partial or imperfect possession of the object stirs up

3S.T., I-II, 33, 1 c.
4Ibid., 2 c.
desire for perfect possession.

Now it might be argued that the desire for further enjoyment aroused by the first pleasurable contact with a suitable object is that \textit{immutatio appetitus} which Thomas has made the formal component of pleasure. But a better explanation would seem to be this: the "rest in possession" is a \textit{vital} thing, a kind of nervous excitement, one might say, not a passive state or a kind of inertia. It does involve desire for more, but that desire is not \textit{what} the pleasure \textit{is}. Rather, pleasure is the movement of an appetite in possession of a suitable good, the movement being caused by the continued presence of the good.\footnote{Licet enim delectatio sit quies quaedam appetitus, considerata presentia boni delectantis, quod appetitus satisfacit; tamen adehuc remanet immutatio appetitus ab appetibili, ratione cujus delectatio motus quidam est. \textit{Ibid.}, 31, 1, ad 2. See also 33, 2 ad 1.}

Now that it has been definitely established that pleasure is a movement of the appetite, the question arises whether or not pleasure is in time. Thomas's answer is quite similar to the one he gave in the \textit{Sentences}, holding that pleasure is only accidentally in time. The reason is that pleasure has as its object a good already possessed, and this is as it were the end of appetitive movement. But if the acquired good undergoes change, the pleasure in it will be accidentally in time, for the pleasure will change in a way corresponding to the change in its object.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 31, 2 c and ad 3.}

St. Thomas next clarifies a point that has been troublesome,
namely, the distinction between pleasure and joy. He begins by saying that joy is a species of pleasure, but asserts that this term is used only to denote pleasure of the rational appetite. He further observes that, in the case of rational beings, whatever affords them pleasure may also afford them joy. However, he makes clear by repeated assertion that joy follows only upon intellectual apprehension of a suitable good. The following passage contains a good summary of the doctrine.

[D]electatio quaedam sequitur apprehensionem rationis. Ad apprehensionem autem rationis, non solum commovetur appetitus sensitus, per applicationem ad aliquid particularis; sed etiam appetitus intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas. Et secundum hoc, in appetitu intellectivo, sive in voluntate, est delectatio quae dicitur gaudium, non autem delectatio corporalis.

Hoc autem interest inter delectationem utriusque appetitus, quod delectatio appetitus sensibilis est cum aliqua transmutatione corporali; delectatio autem appetitus intellectivi nihil aliud est quam simplex motus voluntatis.

Before leaving the distinction between pleasure and joy, it must be noted that joy is a passion only in the wide sense, for it does not involve any bodily movement or change. This is directly opposed to the notion of joy in the De Veritate, where it was held to be one of the four principal passions. However, joy was not there restricted to pleasure of the intellectual appetite.

7Ibid., 3 c and ad 1. See also q. 35, 2 c, where there is a clear explanation of the terms interior apprehensio and exterior apprehensio.

8Ibid., 31, 4 c prir.

9Ibid., ad fin. and ad 2.
The cause of pleasure is the next point discussed by St. Thomas. The first article of question 32 discusses whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure. The body of the article reads as follows. "Respondeo dicendum quod ... ad delectationem duo requiruntur: scilicet consecutio boni convenientis, et cognition hujusmodi adepctionis. Utrumque autem horum in quadam operatione consistit: nam actualis cognition operatio quaedam est; similiter bonum convenient adispersio aliqua operatione. Ipsa enim operatio propria est quoddam conveniens. Unde oportet quod omnis delectatio aliquam operationem consequatur."\(^{10}\)

It is to be noted that St. Thomas here specifies two operations that are required for pleasure. One of these operations must unite a cognitive being with a good suitable for it, and the other operation must give the being knowledge that it is actually in possession of this suitable good. In this passage Thomas mentions only in passing a point he made much of in the Commentary on the Sentences. This is that the very operation which unites a cognitive being with an object is itself a suitable good and therefore a cause of pleasure. In the Sentences it was even stated that the unimpeded operation of a habit conformable to nature was the proper formal cause of pleasure.\(^{11}\) The reason given was that these unimpeded operations specify pleasures to be of one kind rather than

\(^{10}\)Ibid., 32, 1 c.

\(^{11}\)In IV Sent., 49, 3, 2 c.
another. Similar doctrine is contained in the reply to the first objection in the article from the Summa now under discussion. This reply brings out more clearly than the body of the article that pleasure does not merely follow the operation but is caused by it.

Every pleasure, therefore, can be reduced to some operation as its cause, for suitable goods come to be possessed by a being only through the mediation of some operation. The operation itself is the proximate cause of pleasure; the good which is the object of the operation is the remote cause.13

What kind of causality does the operation exercise, formal or efficient? It was recently noted that Thomas spoke of the operation as the formal cause of pleasure in the Sentences, though he by no means excluded it from exercising efficient causality. Here in the Summa we read: "[C]ontingit quod duo sibi invicem sunt

12S.T., I-II, 32, 1 ad 1.

13Of course, the operation must be natural and in due proportion. "Operationes sunt delectabiles, inquantum sunt proportionatae et connaturales operanti." Ibid., ad 3. For the parallel doctrine in the Sentences see In IV Sent., 49, 3, 2 c, which is discussed on pp. 36-38 of this thesis.
causa, ita quod unum sit causa efficiens, et aliud causa finalis alterius. Et per hunc modum, operatio causat delectationem sit causae efficiens; delectatio autem perficit operationem per modum finis. Here is a clear statement that the operation is an efficient cause of pleasure. The reason is that a cognitive being can possess a suitable good only through some unimpeded operation conformable to its nature. When the good has been acquired, pleasure follows upon the operation as a natural effect, completing and perfecting it. The operation is also a formal cause of pleasure, for it specifies the pleasure to be of one kind rather than another. The operation, of course, is specified by its object, some suitable good. Thus it seems correct to say that the operation and its object are as one composite good which both causes and specifies the resultant pleasure.

It seems clear to the writer that St. Thomas has finally solved a major problem here in question 32 of the Prima Secundae. That problem is one of reconciling the traditional scholastic and Christian definition of pleasure as "quietatio appetitus in bono" or "quies in bono adepto" and Aristotle's doctrine of pleasure as an operation or an after-effect of an operation.

More precisely, there are two perspectives of pleasure which Thomas has succeeded in fitting together. The first might be called the Christian-Platonic. An objective good, something ex-

\textsuperscript{14}S.T., I-II, 33, 4 ad 2. For almost identical doctrine see In IV Sent., 49, 3, 4, sol. 3 c, which is quoted on p. 38.
trinsic (specifically, God) is acquired, and this acquisition results in pleasure. The second is Aristotle's position, which says that natures are for operations. When a being of a certain nature performs its proper operation easily and without hindrance, pleasure follows. In this view the objective good practically becomes a matter of indifference.

St. Thomas manages to link these two positions very nicely. The perspective he takes can be seen here in questions 32 and 33, where the operation is seen as linking the person and his good, and then the operation itself is seen as a good of the person. Aristotle would have said only the latter. By this priority St. Thomas keeps himself in the Christian context. It seems clear that the Aristotelian influence on St. Thomas is not as great here in the Summa as it was in the Sentences.

As one observes the variations and changes in St. Thomas's discussion of pleasure, what seems to have happened is this: the Christian-Platonic inheritance which St. Thomas received was gradually shifted to an Aristotelian theory, but in such a way that the old was preserved in the new. It would be necessary to know more about the theories current at the time St. Thomas began writing, and also to be able to determine more accurately whether in interpreting Aristotle as he did Thomas thought he was being literally faithful to the Stagyrite. However, the end result is a theory which preserves the Christian-Platonic philosophy of pleasure as rest in the possession of a good (God), and yet makes use of the
Aristotelian after-effect or "overflow" of a good activity (knowledge).

Brief consideration must now be given to the effects of pleasure. Actually, only one effect of pleasure remains to be discussed, for two other effects were dealt with in treating the nature of pleasure. These two were dilatatio and pleasure's causing desire for itself. In words very similar to those he used in the Commentary on the Ethics, Thomas says that pleasure perfects the operation which is its cause.

\[ \text{[D]electatio dupliciter operationem perficit. Uno modo,}\]
\[ \text{per modum finis; non quidem secundum quod finis dicitur id propter quod aliquod est; sed secundum quod omne bonum completive superveniens potest dici finis. . . . inquantum scilicet super hoc bonum quod est operatio, supervenit aliud bonum quod est delectatio, quae importat quiestionem appetitus in bono praesupposito. —Secundo modo,}\]
\[ \text{ex parte causae agentis. Non quidem directe. . . . In-directe autem: inquantum scilicet agens, quia delectatur in sua actione, vehementius attendit ad ipsam, et diligentius eam operatur.}^{15} \]

The doctrine here is so similar to the Ethics that it requires no comment.

One final point will conclude the presentation of the doctrine on pleasure as found in the Summa. In the chapters on the Sentences and the De Veritate mention was made of a kind of pre-delectation. This term was used to denote the first movement of the appetite by a suitable good before the good was actually acquired. For this reason it was also called a "movement-toward-possession."

\[^{15}\text{S.T., I-II, 33, 4 c.}\]
Here in the Summa this notion of pre-delectation is more fully developed. In discussing whether motion can be the cause of pleasure, Thomas remarks: "[I]d quod movetur, etsi nondum habeat perfecte id ad quod movetur, incipit tamen jam aliquid habere ejus ad quod movetur: et secundum hoc, ipse motus habet aliquid delectationis." By the expression "habet aliquid delectationis," Thomas seems to denote a sort of incipient or pre-delection.

With this the salient points of the doctrine on pleasure in the Summa Theologiae have been presented. The next and final chapter will summarize the work of the thesis.

16 Ibid., 32, 2, ad 1.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

In reviewing St. Thomas's discussion and treatment of pleasure in the four works under examination, it seems clear that in general the discussion focuses around the following questions:

1) Is pleasure a "repos in a good acquired" or is it a "natural unimpeded activity"? In other words, is pleasure a state or a movement? If pleasure partakes of both, how does Thomas reconcile the two?

2) If pleasure is an activity or movement, in what sense is this true? Is pleasure identical with the operation which produces it, or is it rather an epiginomenon, an after-effect, which is consequent upon the operation?

3) If pleasure is an after-effect of an operation, is this also a kind of activity or movement?

4) Is pleasure a passion? That is, is it a real movement or not? (Obviously, this will depend on the answer to the third question).

5) If pleasure is a movement, what kind of movement is it?

6) Does pleasure belong to appetite or to cognition?

7) What is the relation between appetite, cognition, and bodily change in pleasure?
8) What is the difference between pleasure and joy? Is there any relation between them?

The preceding chapters have prepared the way for answering these questions. By recalling points made in these chapters and synthesizing them, the answers to these eight questions should come clear.

The first question: Is pleasure a state or a movement? Right from the first in the Sentences it was noted that Thomas was working with two views of pleasure: the Christian-Platonic "repose in a good acquired" and the Aristotelian "natural unimpeded activity." It is difficult to say how conscious St. Thomas was that Aristotle was working without the context of the objective good, and almost exclusively in an operational context. However, the Aristotelian influence is quite noticeable from the frequent quotations made from the Nicomachean Ethics.

In the Sentences, Thomas stresses that pleasure is the termination of appetitive movement, that is, it is the end of movement to acquire the desired good. This would seem to make pleasure a state. However, Thomas is quick to add that "in the termination of the appetitive movement, a certain movement arises in which the psychical passion consists." He elaborates very little on this "certain movement." But further on he notes that there is a pleasure which follows upon the possession of a good, and that this

1Pp. 31-32 and footnote 8.
pleasure is caused by the operation which unites the being with its good object. In brief, the Sentences does not settle the question, but both the Christian and Aristotelian influences are present.

In the De Veritate, pleasure, at least bodily pleasure, is said to consist in apprehension, but there is very little discussion about whether pleasure is a state or a movement.

In the Commentary on the Ethics the doctrine presented is quite consistent with that of the Sentences: knowledge of a good gives rise to appetitive movement toward that good; when the appetite finds rest in the possession of the good, pleasure results. There is this difference, however: in the Ethics, pleasure is clearly in the order of finality, being the crowning perfection of an unimpeded operation. Still, the nature of this crowning perfection is vague. Is it a state of rest, a further movement of the appetite, or something else?

The Summa Theologicae provides the definite answer. There it is quite clear that pleasure is a movement or activity, not a state. Thomas distinguishes two movements of the appetite, one of desire for a good, the other of pleasure in this good once it has been acquired. The prior movement of desire also causes movement toward possession in the order of execution. When the good object has been acquired desire ceases and the external operation toward possession comes to an end, but the appetite still continues to be moved by the good object still present and now in its possession. Pleasure as such is the movement or activity of the appetite caused
by the possession of a suitable good. Thus it can be seen how Thomas reconciles the Christian and Aristotelian views: pleasure involves both the termination (quies) of desire and movement toward possession, and the activity (ένέργεια) of the appetite in possession of a suitable good.

The second question: If pleasure is an activity or movement, is it identical with the operation which produces it, or is it rather an epiginomenon, an after-effect, which is consequent upon the operation?

The answer to this question is quite consistent in the four works under examination. Pleasure is caused by unhampered operations. Unhampered operations of habits conformable to nature are perfected or crowned by pleasure. Pleasure is the crowning perfection of an unhampered operation.²

The reason for this is not far to seek. Every suitable good which attracts can be acquired and satisfy the appetite only through the mediation of some operation. If this operation is natural and unhampered, pleasure results, crowning or perfecting the operation.

The third question: If pleasure is an after-effect of an operation, is this also a kind of activity or movement? The answer is in the affirmative. The operation puts the being in possession of a suitable good, which satisfies one or more of its appetites. The

²Pp. 38 and 75-76.
presence of this good causes a continued movement of the appetite. This movement is what is meant by an epiginomenon or after-effect. 3

The fourth question: Is pleasure a passion? That is, is it a real movement of the appetite or not? The answer to the question is in the affirmative, but certainly it is given with more emphasis and assurance in the later works.

In the Sentences Thomas hesitates to call pleasure a passion because of his emphasis on the termination of appetitive movement in speaking of pleasure. It thus seems to lack the essential note of motion. But because pleasure always seems to involve some bodily change or movement, Thomas says "est in quadam passione consistens."

In the De Veritate Thomas deals mainly with joy, giving little notice to pleasure. However, he says in effect that pleasure is not a passion because it belongs to the apprehensive part of the soul, not to the appetitive.

In the Ethics Thomas clearly numbers pleasure among the passions of the appetitive part of the soul. But again there is the reservation that pleasure involves the termination of appetitive movement and is something consequent upon this termination.

In the Summa there is no doubt about Thomas's position. Pleasure is a passion in the strict sense, for it is a real movement of the sense appetite caused by the possession of a suitable

3 Pp. 38, 86-87.
This final position that pleasure is always a movement gives a basis for explaining the fluctuating intensity of pleasure. This basis was hardly present in the earlier position, if present at all.

An interesting sidelight on the development of this doctrine is provided by Jean Langlois, S.J. He says that the specific difference between pleasure and the other passions is the notion of quies, repose, satisfaction of the appetite in the possession or real presence of a suitable good. Thomas had to reconcile this with the notion of movement, which is an essential note of passion in the strict sense.

The fifth question: If pleasure is a movement, what kind of movement is it? As has been stated, pleasure is a movement of the sense appetite in possession of a suitable good. But this is Thomas's mature doctrine in the Summa. In the Sentences Thomas seems to place a good deal of stress on the bodily changes that usually accompany pleasure. In fact, these accompanying changes are the reason why he calls pleasure a passion, since pleasure is said to consist in the termination of movement of the appetite toward a suitable good.

In the De Veritate Thomas says that pleasure belongs to the apprehensive powers, not to the appetitive. "Pleasure of either

4 P. 79. S.T., I-II, 31, 1 ad 2.

kind begins with a real union and ends in its apprehension. Joy, however, begins with apprehension and ends in the affections. Therefore it seems that pleasure involves a change only in the apprehensive powers and is not strictly a passion.

In the Ethics Thomas says that pleasure follows upon all movements of the appetitive part of the soul. The reason is that all these passions involve movement of the appetites in regard to good and evil, and the attainment of the good desired or the incurring of the evil is the cause of pleasure or sadness. But just what the exact nature of pleasure is, what kind of movement it is, Thomas does not clearly state.

In the Summa, however, it is perfectly clear that pleasure is a movement of the sense appetites caused by the actual possession or real presence of some suitable good. Desire and movement in the order of execution have been terminated, but the continued presence of the object causes continued movement of the appetite.

The sixth question: Does pleasure lie in the appetite or in cognition? Of the four works studied in this thesis, only the De Veritate states that pleasure lies in cognition, being terminated in the act of apprehension. But even in this work Thomas states that sense apprehension always involves some corresponding movement in the sense appetite. Two different reconciliations of the doc-

6 Truth, 26, 4 ad 5.
7 Pp. 70-71.
trine of *De Veritate* with the other three works were presented in Chapter IV. Certainly the author does not agree with Langlois that there is no possible reconciliation between the doctrine of the third book of the *Sentences* and the *De Veritate*.

The other three works uniformly state that cognition is most often the unhampered operation which is the formal cause of pleasure, but the pleasure itself is in the appetitive part of the soul. All four works clearly state that without cognition there can be no pleasure, but both the *Ethics* and the *Summa* clearly distinguish between the cognitive operation which causes pleasure and the perfection of pleasure which crowns that cognitive operation "sicut quaedam superveniens finis."

The seventh question: What is the relation between appetite, cognition, and bodily change in pleasure? From what has been said, the answer to this question must be evident. To put it in technical language, appetite is the subject of pleasure, cognition is the formal cause and bodily change is the material cause. Cognition is the formal cause, for in addition to making a being aware of a good suitable for itself, it specifies the resultant pleasure to be of one kind rather than another.

The eighth question: What is the difference between pleasure and joy? Is there any relation between them? There is a notable

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8Jean Langlois, S.J., "La défnition de la délectation," p. 182. See also pp. 45 and 48 of this thesis.
9Pp. 75-76 and 84-85.
growth and development of the Thomistic doctrine on this point.

In the Sentences, Thomas distinguishes between pleasure and joy on the basis of real contact and presence. For example, if a man actually eats a good meal, he experiences pleasure. If he only anticipates this good meal or remembers it, or possibly, also reflects on it while eating it, he experiences joy. In other words, the distinction is between real or physical possession and inten­tional possession. This is not the same as the distinction between sensible and rational.

In the De Veritate, the distinction between pleasure and joy seems based on the order of reciprocity. That is, if the pleasant experience begins in the corporeal or appetitive order and ends in the apprehensive, pleasure results. For example, a cooling breeze plays over my perspiring body. When I become aware of this in my mind, I experience pleasure.

However, joy is from the reflexive knowledge of the possession of a pleasurable good. If one reflects on the goodness of experiencing a cooling breeze, this knowledge gives joy.

In both the Nicomachean Ethics and the Summa Theologiae the doctrine on this point is uniform. Suitable unimpeded activity on the sense or physical level gives rise to pleasure; on the rational level it causes joy. In these two works the basis of the distinc­tions is the kind of cognitive and appetitive activity involved in the pleasant experience. In brief, pleasure belongs to the sense appetites, joy belongs to the rational appetite or will.
The four primary sources of this study span approximately fifteen years in the life of St. Thomas. Between the first and last of them especially there is noticeable a growth in clarity, precision, and firmness of doctrine. Although Thomas certainly knew of the Nicomachean Ethics when he wrote his Commentary on the Sentences, the use he there makes of the Aristotelian doctrine does not compare with the way he incorporates it into his own in the Summa. In the Sentences he uses many more words, but the doctrine lacks the clarity and force it has in the Summa. An example is the distinction between pleasure and joy that has just been considered. Thomas dwells on this point at some length in three different places in the Sentences, but fails to present a clear-cut distinction. Yet in the Summa that result is achieved in the space of two short articles.¹⁰ This study has witnessed not only the growth of doctrine but also the growth of the philosopher.

¹⁰S.T., I-II, 31, 1 and 2.
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II. SECONDARY SOURCES

A. BOOKS


B. ARTICLES


C. UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

The thesis submitted by John F. Kramer, S.J. has been read and approved by three members of the Department of Philosophy.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

[Signature]

September 16, 1958
Date

Signature of Adviser