Transcendental Method and the Crisis of Historicism

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TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD AND THE CRISIS OF HISTORICISM

by

William J. Zanardi

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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LIFE

The author, William Joseph Zanardi, is the son of Louis James Zanardi and Dorothy (Clear) Zanardi. He was born June 4, 1947, in Springfield, Illinois.

His elementary education was obtained at a parochial school in Springfield, and secondary education at the Pontifical College Josephinum, Worthington, Ohio, where he graduated in 1965.

In September, 1965, he entered the college department of the Pontifical College Josephinum, and in June, 1969, received the degree of Bachelor of Arts with two majors, the first in philosophy, the second in religious studies. His degree was awarded Magna cum Laude.

In September, 1969, while enrolled at Bellarmine School of Theology, he began graduate course work in philosophy at Loyola University of Chicago. In June, 1972, he received the Masters of Art in Philosophy. In September, 1974, he was appointed to the part-time faculty of Loyola University.
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INTRODUCTION

The central problem for this dissertation has the following dimensions. Nineteenth-century historians and philosophers of history produced individually successful but diverse accounts of both historiographical procedures and historical events. Not only were the accounts diverse, in some cases they were mutually exclusive. The crisis of historicism occurred when historians recognized that no adequate theoretical basis was available for comparing the diverse accounts and settling the disputes among them. In contemporary terms, the conflicting accounts presented effectively closed systems of thought; their differences appeared fundamental and unresolvable.

We identify the crisis of historicism with a series of problems concerning historical objectivity, the relation of history to science, and historical realism. The disparity between the expectations and the actual achievements of historians produced the crisis. The general expectations were that the aforementioned problems could be solved. But nineteenth-century historians achieved something less than consensus on these basic problems. Throughout the centuries, the lack of consensus among philosophers and philosophies has been the breeding ground of scepticism. The
scandal of disunity repeated itself among historians. Thus, historical works written during the as-yet-unresolved crisis manifest an uneasiness over the foundational issues of historical practice.

We distinguish the crisis of historicism from historicism itself. The latter is identified with two basic theses: the content of the historical field is composed of unique life forms, and these life forms can be explained in terms of their historical development. Historicism itself we will treat as a special instance of the thesis of perspectivism elaborated in Chapter Two. The crisis of historicism is the main issue in the five subsequent chapters. Each of those chapters will consider some aspect of the crisis—problems which first confronted and eventually disillusioned members of the historicist tradition.

The literature both on historicism and on the crisis is extensive. Georg G. Iggers has provided a survey of works on historicism. Since our concern is with the crisis period, we are chiefly interested in the methodological problems usually identified with the analytical tradition in the philosophy of history. Numerous historians have reflected on those problems. We will be making repeated references to the works of R. G. Collingwood.


Henri Harrou, 3 Marc Bloch, 4 E. H. Carr, 5 and Carl Becker. 6 Several anthologies of primary source material will be consulted on the wide-ranging issues of historical method. 7 The problems of objectivity and of the relation between science and history have been discussed at length by philosophers of history. Among the sources to be used are works by Patrick Gardiner, 8 W. H. Walsh, 9 Arthur Danto, 10 Morton White, 11 and D. H. Fischer. 12

The various methodological issues treated in the preceding literature are relevant to the crisis of historicism. For, in the first place, this crisis proceeds from

a lack of professional consensus on basic issues, and questions of methodology involve public controls over individual efforts within a professional community. In the second place, the crisis of historicism is marked by a recurrent scepticism toward attempts to provide critical foundations for historical knowledge. The analytical philosophers of history have been particularly interested in clarifying the foundations of historical inquiry and narration.

However, the previously mentioned works will be used as secondary resources for this dissertation. Our primary sources will be works by Hayden White ¹³ and Bernard Lonergan.¹⁴ The basic justification for this narrowed focus will emerge only in subsequent chapters. To anticipate our defense of this selection—both White and Lonergan approach the crisis of historicism in a novel recognition of two levels in the historical text. Hayden White uses the

¹³Hayden White's major work is Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). (Hereafter we will refer to this work simply as Metahistory.) We will also make use of his translator's introduction, "On History and Historicisms," in From History to Sociology, by Carlo Antoni (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1959).

¹⁴Lonergan's latest work, Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), provides his most extensive remarks on historical method and on the problems belonging to the crisis period. On issues more distinctively philosophical, we will consult his earlier work, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, Second (student's) edition, revised, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958). (Hereafter we will refer to this work simply as Insight.) Use will also be made of articles published in an anthology of Lonergan's works, Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan, edited by F. E. Crowe (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967). In subsequent pages we will simply refer to this work as Collection.
techniques of structuralism to investigate the linguistic deep-structure of historical narratives. Lonergan elaborates the connections between his transcendental method and the procedures of historical inquiry. Both approaches move from the frequently discussed surface elements to the often overlooked foundations of those surface elements.

Our argument is that, in the midst of continued disagreement over problems on the surface level of historical works, an inquirer who investigates what lies "deeper" may discover an exit from the theoretical labyrinth through which those debating the crisis appear to be wandering. Both authors view their own works as contributing to a resolution of the crisis. As a preliminary note, we should remark that neither author proposes a historical monism; multiple perspectives on the past are required if one accepts the first thesis of historicism.\(^{15}\) Their proposed solutions, rather, envision some satisfactory antidote to the prevailing scepticism which characterizes works of the crisis period.

Chapter One will work out the details of White's attempted solution to the crisis. For reasons to be given there, we will argue that his attempt is insufficient. In subsequent chapters Bernard Lonergan's attempted solution

\(^{15}\text{Again, the first thesis is that the content of the historical field is composed of unique life forms. The "uniqueness" of these forms discourages the generalizing ambition of the system-builder. Consequently, multiple historical perspectives are to be expected.}\)
will be studied. The primary connection between the two different approaches to the problems of the crisis is found in their focus on the deep level of historical inquiry. Their primary difference is found in the absence of a cognitional element on the deep level for White and in the presence of such an element for Lonergan. Gradually this difference will be shown to be crucial. Nevertheless, our agreement with Lonergan's inclusion of a cognitional element in the deep level does not require that we disparage White's analysis of historical works. There are barriers in his analysis which hinder a satisfactory resolution of the crisis. These we will challenge. But his analysis of the historical imagination provides insights which complement Lonergan's analysis. A thesis yet to be established is that Lonergan provides a higher viewpoint which incorporates much of what White discovers about nineteenth-century historiography.

Our position, then, is that Hayden White's *Metahistory* is a significant study of the crisis of historicism. His insightful summations of the problems of the crisis will be used in this dissertation to specify particular issues and to focus our own inquiry. That inquiry will largely be given over to a study of Lonergan's transcendental method. Our transition from White's structuralist analysis to Lonergan's transcendental method will be justified: (1) if our arguments in Chapter One are valid, namely, that White's attempted solution to the crisis is in fact
insufficient; and (2) if in subsequent chapters we demonstrate that Lonergan's approach yields more successful results.

Earlier we stated that the crisis of historicism is identified with a series of problems concerning historical objectivity, the relation of history to science, and historical realism. In most instances we will be considering these problems as distinctively historical difficulties. However, the problems have implications beyond the historical field, e.g., a denial of the possibility of historical knowledge may be part of a more general epistemological thesis of scepticism. Therefore, our treatment of these problems, while it will be cast in historical terms, will also have implications for more general epistemological issues. 16

When we seek to relate White's metaphistorical inquiry to Lonergan's, an initial difficulty presents itself in defining what history is. 17 There are multiple types of

16 Chapter Five in particular will expand beyond the issue of historical objectivity to consider a complex notion of objectivity applicable to many distinct fields of inquiry.

17 It is perhaps unnecessary to point out the ambiguity of the English word "history." It can refer both to the past events which are studied and to the study of those events. "Historiography" is sometimes used to distinguish the latter from the former. However, the term is frequently used to distinguish one's study of historians and their works from the study of the past events referred to in those earlier works. Rather than further compounding these ambiguities by adding yet more terms (e.g. historiology), we will take care to ensure that the meaning of "history" is apparent from the context. Where some doubt may arise,
history: Precritical accounts which mix fact and fable, chronicles which assign dates to events without offering to explain the latter, autobiographies and biographies which focus on individual lives and de-emphasize the history of the group, and critical history which has developed its own professional standards and scholarly community since the nineteenth century. Among these multiple types, we will focus our attention on critical history. Our selection is justified on two grounds: first, it is the type of history which was expected to resolve the basic problems characterizing the crisis of historicism; second, it is the type of history which requires methodical inquiry and verifiable results. That is, critical history is not a private undertaking but an established discipline with its own scholarly forums, university curricula, and separate educational faculties. Since the crisis of historicism occurred within a professional community, the type of history practiced by that community should be our primary focus.

Even though one characterizes critical history as an independent scholarly discipline, its definition requires that one introduce the methodical procedures setting it apart from other types. We will not take up those procedures in any detail until Chapter Four. Consequently, we will use "historiography" to refer to the scholarly practice of historians.
will only gradually introduce a meaning for critical history. That meaning will depend upon how we understand historical procedures. In turn, our understanding of such procedures rests upon our understanding of human knowing—its limits and specialized functions in regard to past events. Still, we can anticipate this later conclusion.

Critical history is a methodical inquiry into the past, yielding interpretations subject to the criticism of a professional historical community.

Our problem, then, is how to resolve the crisis of historicism which occurred within the practice of critical history. Our purpose is to investigate how well Lonergan's transcendental method supplies both a critical basis for that practice and satisfactory answers to the basic problems of the crisis.

Some explanation of how we intend to explore these problems should be given here. We have identified the crisis of historicism with certain disputed questions about historical objectivity, the relation of history to science, and historical realism. We will rely chiefly on Hayden White's *Metahistory* to formulate the various aspects of these disputed questions. Other historians and philosophers of history will be used to exemplify in historical practice the various theses which White formulates. Our strategy, then, will be to show a way around the theoretical impasse of the crisis by resolving the problems of historical
objectivity, of the relation between history and science, and of historical realism.

These problems properly belong to a formal study in epistemology. Conditions for the possibility of historical knowledge are the general subject matter. But, again, our focus is narrowed by the specific issues formulated by Hayden White. Lonergan's arguments and positions will be considered insofar as they are applicable to these specific issues.

To anticipate how our envisioned strategy will develop in subsequent chapters, we can foresee four objectives. First, adopting White's metaphor of surface and deep levels in the historical text, we will search for a point of transition between them. Chapter Two makes use of the notions of relative and basic horizons to understand the connections between pre-critical preconceptions about history and the surface procedures of the historian. Once the link is made between surface and deep levels, our second objective is to clarify the cognitional element belonging to basic horizons. Chapter Three suggests that the cognitional structure contained within basic horizons may provide the metahistorical grounds for mediating the disputes of the crisis period. For the structure of cognitional performance is presupposed by all precritical and critical views of historical knowing.

As a third objective, we must work out the implica-
tions of this structure for historical procedures. Chapter Four argues, among other points, that the formulated expression of this structure can be considered part of the "deep structure" of the historical text. This formulated expression is transcendental method. The claims advanced on its behalf are three in number: transcendental method (1) provides critical grounds for evaluating components of the deep structure, (2) is a precondition to detachment from bias in historical inquiry, and (3) sanctions the surface procedures of critical history.

The fourth objective is pursued in Chapter Five: to discover how adequate Lonergan's metahistorical method is for resolving the aforementioned problems of the crisis of historicism. The claim is that transcendental method allows for the elaboration of a universal viewpoint from which to mediate among the conflicting theories and practices in history. Convincing resolutions of these basic problems could open a way beyond the theoretical impasse of the crisis.

There is a need to state clearly the limitations placed on these five chapters. First, no attempt will be made to single out a particular historical perspective as the sole legitimate one. The thesis of perspectivism defended in Chapter Two implies that such a privileged perspective is not available. Our later defense of this thesis will also imply the rejection of the ideal of a single
comprehensive historical interpretation. More positively, the thesis of perspectivism will imply the acceptance of an irreducible diversity in historical perspectives and practices. 18

A notable absence from this dissertation is the issue of value judgments in history. The possibility of objective value judgments on historical achievements has received attention from numerous historians and philosophers of history. Lonergan offers rather brief remarks on this issue under the heading of moral conversion. 19 As Hayden White and other historians argue, aesthetic and moral values belong to the predeterminants of historical perspectives. Yet the present study must have some limits, and epistemological concerns have been selected as our general focus. Consequently, aesthetic and moral problems in historical inquiry will not receive any extensive consideration.

18 We should note in advance that irreducible diversity does not necessarily entail incompatibility among historical viewpoints and procedures. As we will discuss subsequently, not all differences are incompatible or dialectical differences.

At the same time we cannot entirely overlook those aesthetic and moral problems. In the first place, the intellectual performance of historians manifests aesthetic and moral concerns. Hayden White's analysis of nineteenth-century historians reveals the centrality of aesthetic and moral preferences in the decisions guiding historical performance. In Chapter One we will be linking these preferences to other components of historians' relative horizons. Aesthetic concerns show up in the selectivity process necessary to every historical inquiry. Chapters Two and Four will give special attention to this process. Moral concerns will receive a limited treatment in Chapters Four and Five when the problems of historical bias and intellectual responsibility are considered. Therefore, although our focus is on the intellectual side of historical performance, we still will make some references to the concomitant but distinct moral and aesthetic aspects of that performance.

Is it legitimate to allow only a subordinate role to historical value judgments? Are not these value judgments inseparable from historical inquiries? One can only reply "Yes" to the latter question if one grants that evaluation occurs in the selectivity process and if one acknowledges the selectivity process as a requisite to historical inquiry. However, our defense of the secondary place given in this dissertation to value judgments requires
a more complex reply to the first question.

Hayden White speaks of moral and aesthetic preferences in isolation from the cognitional performance of the historian.20 In the second chapter we will argue that a historian's views on his own intellectual/cognitional abilities take their place alongside of and interact with the moral and aesthetic convictions belonging to his historical perspective. In the third chapter we will introduce a metahistorical basis for criticizing precritical elements of historical perspectives. On this metahistorical basis, the remaining two chapters will seek to answer a distinctively epistemological question: Is it possible to elaborate a critical method which can mediate conflicts concerning historical objectivity and historical realism? Our answer to this question will rest on a priori grounds supplied by the structure of human knowing. Given such grounds, our answer will not owe its validity to subjective preferences—even if these preferences transcend themselves in objective value judgments. In other words, if an epistemological position has an a priori basis in cognitional performance, then, although valuing is part of that performance, the structure of that performance will be

20That is, the former preferences are predeterminants of epistemological positions belonging to the surface elements of historical texts. The latter theoretical positions are determined by, but do not determine or require, modifications in the former elements of the deep level. Cf. the Preface to Metahistory, p. x.
invariant across specific differences in valuing. Therefore, one can elaborate an epistemological position without explicit reference to the content of specific value judgments.

We can expand this conclusion to defend our exclusion of certain topics treated at length by Lonergan. He quite obviously can claim both the title of philosopher and the title of theologian. Is it possible to consider his cognitional theory and epistemenology without referring to the religious topics which form a large part of his work? More directly, can this be done without damaging the integrity of his thought? Or are there moral and religious positions presupposed by his cognitional theory and epistemology?

This last question requires a distinction between the historical precedents to the development of a position and the logical-evidential precedents to the validity of that position. The former type of precedent is exemplified in Lonergan's article, "The Origins of Christian Realism."

Religious positions gave impetus to the development of an epistemology consistent with them. But questions about the validity of that epistemology (i.e. questions for reflection) are not answered by a genetic account of its development (i.e. by a response to questions for intelligence). Rather, it must be weighed on its own

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merits as a philosophically arguable position.

Similarly, in doing history one does not accept or reject a previous historian's conclusions simply because he belonged to one political party rather than another. The conclusions must be defensible on the basis of available evidence. If they are found faulty, then a consideration of the author's political affiliation may be relevant. But "relevant" not to the truth or falsity of his conclusions but to the question for intelligence: Why did he assert something without adequate proof?

With the preceding distinction in mind, we can justifiably limit our study to cognitional and epistemological positions in Lonergan's thought. Particularly since our general topic is historical methodology, we can exclude issues which do not directly pertain to the validity of results reached in a methodical way. Furthermore, transcendental method is said to cut across cultural differences. Prior to any theorizing about one's ability to know, and therefore prior to any opinions formed under the influence of personal moral or aesthetic beliefs, there is said to be an invariant pattern in one's actual cognitional performance. This performance as it actually occurs is the measure of all subsequent theories about human knowing. Thus, the very claim to provide a critical and a priori position based on this performance implies the possibility of abstracting from issues of an extra-epistemological sort. Of course, this claim and others are yet
to be established. But what we are selecting as a limited focus for our study does not appear at this point to do damage to the integrity of Lonergan's thought.

Finally, this dissertation is written from a philosophical viewpoint. It is not immediately apparent that this is a limitation. However, since our concern is for methodological problems, it would be possible to expand our discussion to methodological problems within the social and physical sciences. In fact, Chapters Four and Five will briefly touch on such a wider range of issues. But, in order to avoid lengthy digressions, we will maintain a narrowed focus on problems in historical method. Our philosophical viewpoint (based on the cognitional performance presupposed by every discipline) will allow us access to other methods. However, our concern for those other methods will be guided by what they contribute to the clarity and effectiveness of historical procedures.

With this understanding of both our strategy and limitations, we are now ready to explore more adequately Hayden White's attempted solution to the crisis of historicism as well as Lonergan's alternate approach to the basic problems of the crisis.
CHAPTER I

THE CRISIS OF HISTORICISM

This dissertation investigates the claims made by Bernard Lonergan to the effect that transcendental method offers a critical basis for (1) understanding and evaluating the procedures used by the historian, (2) thematizing and evaluating the historian's epistemological presuppositions, (3) locating the sources of conflicts within the historical field which gave rise to the "crisis of historicism." The first two claims can be assimilated to the third. The "crisis of historicism" consists in the recognition that no adequate theoretical grounds are available for choosing among the different ways of doing and of viewing history.1 What is lacking is a critical metahistorical basis for mediating both the disputes over historical procedures and the conflicting claims regarding what constitutes historical "realism." This dissertation investigates the claim made by Bernard Lonergan to supply the needed metahistorical basis. An appraisal of his elaborated arguments will be the central purpose of this work.

1 This formulation of the "crisis" is given by Hayden White in his Metahistory, p. 432.
Hayden White's Study of the Crisis of Historicism

By using the insights and method of structuralism, Hayden White's *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* offers a contemporary analysis of the crisis of historicism. The problems which he outlines will be used in this dissertation to specify the particular issues of the crisis. It will be argued in this introductory section that White's structuralist approach leaves the central problem of the crisis unresolved. In subsequent chapters I will investigate Lonergan's claim that transcendental method yields more successful results.

White's study of nineteenth-century historians and their works documents the widespread success enjoyed by plausible, but (in some cases) mutually exclusive, ways of viewing history.² Significant advances in the technical areas of research seemed to promise an increasingly accurate and definitive account of past events. Yet the great labors of nineteenth-century historians yielded profound, but often incompatible, systems of thought. The disunity within the historical field was a scandal to those who expected consensus and collaboration. Coincident with this disunity was a loss of confidence in the possibility of achieving objectivity in history.³


³ As Nietzsche remarked in regard to the traditional metaphysics and Christian philosophy of the West, the scandal of disunity is the breeding ground of scepticism.
For the historiographer the problem presented by the crisis is twofold: (1) to account for the recurrent disunity in historical studies, and (2) to discover whether the obvious conflicts are reducible, i.e. whether some basis for mediating the disputes is available. Hayden White applies the insights and method of structuralism to both of these tasks. He argues that conflicts in the ways of doing and of viewing history are ultimately traceable to differences in the moral or aesthetic aspirations of historians. Ultimately one adopts a perspective on history for moral or aesthetic reasons. Consequently, the disunity in historical studies reflects a prior diversity in the moral and aesthetic preferences of different historians.

Are there grounds for mediating the disputes which originate in these variable preferences? Such grounds were sought by nineteenth-century historians. It was expected that unequivocal answers could be given to the questions: "What does it mean to think historically, and what are the unique characteristics of a specifically historical method of inquiry?" In fact, no consensus

Indeed the works of historians in the crisis period are characterized by the ironic attitude with its inherent scepticism and moral agnosticism. Ibid., p. 433.

4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p. 1.
was reached in replying to these questions. Instead, multiple claims were put forward as to the form historical explanations should take. Even prior to such claims, there were disputes over what should count as historical data. This disunity on the basic level of the content (data) of the historical field and of the form which an explanation of the content should take indicates that historical perspectives are discontinuous. That is, rather than gradually and cumulatively advancing toward a single definitive account of the past, historians are engaged in different and sometimes contradictory presentations of past events.\footnote{That some historians were convinced of history's gradual movement toward a comprehensive understanding of the past, no matter how remote the completion date, is evident in Lord Acton's remark: "'Ultimate history we cannot have in this generation; but we can dispose of conventional history, and show the point we have reached on the road from one to the other, now that all information is within reach, and every problem has become capable of solution.'" Quoted in Edward Hallett Carr's What Is History? p. 3. A similar viewpoint is present in Fustel de Coulanges' Inaugural Address, in The Varieties of History, p. 181.} In White's terms, they are operating with different historical "paradigms."

In White's analysis the term "paradigm" has a single general reference and multiple secondary references. Most generally the term refers to the historian's expectations of what an explanation of historical events should be. These expectations are said to be basically moral or aesthetic beliefs. The secondary references of "paradigm" further specify the strategies to be followed in meeting
these expectations, in concretely expressing one's moral or aesthetic beliefs. Thus, Hegel, who believed in the ultimate rationality and moral significance of historical events, expressed his historical conception in terms reminiscent of Greek drama. The tragedies which are undeniable and which seem to require an absurdist view of historical processes are incorporated by Hegel into a larger framework of advance-through-conflict. The historical tragedies are not denied, but they are "data" which a higher viewpoint, in retrospect, evaluates as steps in the progressive elevation of humanity.7

7For White's illuminating remarks on the implicit structure of Hegel's philosophy of history, see Metahistory, pp. 81-131. Hegel's critics have often ignored the multiple levels on which his philosophy operates. The value of White's structuralist analysis is its ability to penetrate beyond the surface features which critics find objectionable, to the deep structure from which those surface features derive.

The paradigm theory implies two levels of historical operations: The explicit research and theorizing of the historian is guided by implicit expectations and ideal types. The historical work not only manifests (1) data ordered by (2) theoretical concepts for explaining the data and (3) a narrative structure for unifying the data and theoretical concepts, it also contains a "deep structure."

Hayden White investigates this deep structure in an attempt to find some element of unity in the midst of the disunity of historical styles. Since documents and artifacts are not given in some unambiguous order, the historian must employ a model (or set of models) for organizing them. The choice among possible models is said to be a poetic act which prefigures the historical field, i.e. an act which formally anticipates what can be counted as evidence and as acceptable modes of argumentation. The formalization of this poetic act can take a variety of forms, and White distinguishes them according to the four traditional tropes of poetic language: Metaphor, Metonymy, Synecdoche, Irony. These tropes classify the deep
White's thesis is that the operative paradigm (e.g. Hegel's higher viewpoint) determines the outline of the field of research and the form which is to be given to the structural content of the historical imagination in the nineteenth century. The explicit assumption behind White's use of the four tropes is that, "in any field of study not yet reduced (or elevated) to the status of a genuine science, thought remains the captive of the linguistic mode in which it seeks to grasp the outline of objects inhabiting its field of perception." (Preface to Metahistory, p. xi.) Thus a poetic act (based on moral or aesthetic grounds) leads to the employment of one of the tropes as the dominant mode of historical consciousness in an author's subsequent research and expression. The irreducible metahistorical basis of the historian's work will be (1) the grounds for choosing this dominant mode and (2) the linguistic form which the choice imposes on his subsequent work. The particular moral or aesthetic grounds for the choice and the adopted trope commit the author to a basic perspective on history. This basic perspective, or paradigm, will be what he "expects" historical processes and their explanations to be.

Secondary uses of the term "paradigm" will refer to the particular strategies adopted for meeting his expectations. White distinguishes three levels of historical explanation: explanation by formal argument, by emplotment, by ideological implication. On each of these levels, there are at least four possible modes of articulating one's views of historical processes:

- **Emplotment**: Romantic, Tragic, Comic, Satirical;
- **Formal Argument**: Formist, Mechanistic, Organicist, Ideological Contextualist;
- **Implication**: Anarchist, Radical, Conservative, Liberal.

Every historical work will contain some mixture of modes drawn from the three levels. This mixture will be indicative of the author's expectations of what form historical explanations and historical processes can be said to take. The combination of the modes also yields the distinctive style of the particular historian. Each mode employed will, in the secondary sense, be a "paradigm," i.e. a model guiding his development of and expression of historical understanding. In both the general and secondary senses, "paradigm" refers to a model setting out the form of subsequent historical inquiry and narration.
historian's insights. Among nineteenth-century historians, disputes over what constituted primary historical data and what order they were to be given indicated that different paradigms were being used. In other words, the field of history was not unambiguously defined. A plurality of outlines of the field resulted, each outline being part of a paradigm adopted on moral or aesthetic grounds. One result was that, with a variance in historical paradigms, there was also a variance in what counted as evidence. One then was in a position of measuring the validity of a historical work, not on the basis of its use of evidence, but on the basis of the coherence and illuminative power of the author's vision of the historical field. Any theoretical concern for evidence will follow upon a prior determination of the historical field and of explanatory strategies for ordering the content of the field. Any subsequent appeal to newly discovered data will fall within this prior determination. As a consequence, the admission of new evidence cannot provide grounds for radically modifying the prior model which had been previously governing historical research and representation.

In accounting for the diversity of historical models or paradigms, White emphasizes the role of language in determining the outlines of the historical field. His linguistic study is based on a number of facts. First, 8

8 *Metahistory*, p. 4.
history suffers from conceptual anarchy, i.e. there is no commonly accepted formal terminology for expressing historical insights. Second, in the absence of a formal terminology, the historian makes use of ordinary figurative language with all its inherent ambiguities. Third, since historical documents and artifacts are not given in some unambiguous order, the historian must antecedently organize them according to some model. Now the process of interrelating historical materials will be dependent on how one envisions the historical field and on what linguistic form one thinks apt for expressing those interrelations. To envision the historical field is termed a "poetic insight," and the formalization of that insight will correspond to the adoption of one of the tropes of poetic language. As opposed to formal terminologies in the

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What Hayden White means by "poetic insight" and by its formalization can be elucidated by way of contrast. Scientific systems employ formal terminologies in order to denote their data. The adopted terminology is intended to replace the figurative and ambiguous terms of ordinary language. For example, calculus is employed in discussing physical reality. Its adoption as a formal mode of discourse limits the ways in which physical reality can be designated. But while his scientific conclusions will be expressed within the limits of formal discourse, the physicist's initial insights into the physical world will often be figuratively expressed. His task then will be to cast these insights in the mode of discourse adopted by other physicists committed to a common formal terminology.

Now, for the historian, there is no common formal terminology agreed upon within the profession. Thus his insights into historical events are not limited to a single legitimate form of expression. Instead, his thoughts will be cast in one of the modes of figurative-poetic discourse. Hayden White notes at least four possible modes of figurative discourse—the four tropes of poetic language:
sciences, history utilizes the figurative speech of everyday living. White finds that histories of the nineteenth century involve the use of Metaphor, Metonymy, Synecdoche, Irony. Which one, or which set, of the modes the historian adopts as dominant in his work will be a formalization of his poetic insight which itself is antecedently determined by moral or aesthetic convictions. Thus, Hegel's convictions about the rationality and moral significance of historical events required, first, that historical descriptions be cast in the mode of irony, and second, that historical explanations be cast in the mode of synecdoche. The ironic mode retained the factualness of historical disasters and sufferings. On the level of individualizing description, human greed and violence paint an absurdist picture devoid of both reason and virtue. However, the synecdochic mode integrates the part into the whole, the individual into the larger historical process. What is described as a tragic condition for the individual becomes part of an explanatory scheme in which tragedies serve to promote—at great human cost—the gradual elevation of humanity.

Prior to any analysis of the content of the historical field, the historian will have "prefigured" the field by a poetic act which seeks expression in one of the modes of poetic discourse. Other historians will give predominance to other tropes more in keeping with their moral and aesthetic aspirations. As a result, a diversity of historical paradigms will characterize the work of historians. Conceptual anarchy within the historical profession will be part of the price paid for the richness and diversity of its artistic expression. For Hayden White's comments on the above, see ibid., pp. 31-33, fn. 13. Examples of the prefiguration of the historical field by poetic-artistic means are found in F. H. Cornford's Thucydidest Mythistoricus (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), pp. viii and 132.

10 Hayden White comments that sixteenth-century natural scientists were in the same situation as historians today; they lacked a formal terminological system. At that time different conceptions of science reflected different conceptions of "reality" and different epistemologies based on the latter. A linguistic uncertainty lay at the root of that diversity. But the conceptual anarchy among sixteenth-century natural scientists was largely resolved in the seventeenth century through the adoption of a specific mode of discourse—the technical language of mathematics. White notes that paradigms in the physical sciences periodically win wide acceptance. This indicates a general consensus
century made use of ordinary forms of discourse which can be grouped under the four tropes of poetic language. This general linguistic classification constitutes the unity of the historical imagination in that period. For all their evident diversity, nineteenth-century historians can be classified on a deep structural level according to the linguistic modes in which they expressed their views on history.

The preceding remarks were intended to summarize the underlying positions of White's response to our earlier question—"Are there grounds for mediating the historical disputes which originate in moral and aesthetic preferences?" Those underlying positions consist of the following points. First, prior to the interpretation of the content of the historical field, the field itself must be prefigured as a definite realm with discernible content. Second, the metahistorical element of every historical work will be (1) the poetic act which constitutes the field and selects the mode of expression suitable for analyzing the content of the field, (2) the moral or aesthetic determinants which are manifested in the choice of linguistic forms, and (3) the subsequent strategies of explanation and on what will count as a scientific problem, what form scientific explanations will take, and what types of evidence will be scientifically acceptable. For historians, however, such consensus does not exist and never has. See Metahistory, pp. 12-13.

11 Ibid., p. 30.
types of articulation consistent with one's vision of the historical field.

Further, White's structuralist analysis distinguishes this metahistorical element (or deep structure) from the surface structure of the historical work. On the surface, or explicit, level of the text one finds data for analysis, theoretical concepts for explaining the data, and a narrative style for presenting the data as an intelligible series of events. White locates the epistemological position of the author on this surface level. Likewise, the theoretical operations by which one verifies interpretations of historical data belong to the surface structure. The implication is that such operations and the epistemological position receive an implicit, precritical sanction on the deep level. The metahistorical underpinnings of the surface dimensions (1) "analytically" precede the narrative form incorporating the interpreted data, and (2) sanction the particular theories used to explain the data. Given the above positions, White's response to our initial question is strongly supported. The disputes among historians derive from the adoption of fundamentally different historical perspectives. In each instance the adoption of a perspective derives from precritical, extra-epistemological

12 Ibid., p. ix.
13 Ibid., p. x.
14 Ibid., p. xii.
Consequently, there are no apodictic epistemological grounds for claiming that one historical perspective is more realistic than another. 16

The Unresolved Crisis: White's Proposed Solution to the Sceptical Outcome

The problem of mediating conflicts among different paradigms has been discussed by proponents of a paradigm theory of science. As opposed to an earlier scientific ideal of cumulative and progressive efforts toward a single definitive account of nature, they operate with an ideal of science which is composed of multiple systems individually coherent but discontinuous from each other. 17

15 Since epistemological considerations belong to the surface structure of the text, the choice among possible historical perspectives will be made antecedently on non-epistemological grounds. White suggests the likely grounds for such a choice will be moral or aesthetic in nature, definitely not epistemological. Ibid., pp. xii and 433.

16 To exemplify this position, White recounts the struggle during the nineteenth century for dominance among secondary paradigms of historical explanation. Two paradigms, the Formist and Contextualist, gained dominance as models of explanation for historians. The Organicist and Mechanistic paradigms were eventually treated as isolated instances of an aberrant philosophy of history. The exclusion of them reflects, according to White, a decision by historians not to allow integrations of data (e.g. those integrations effected by Hegel and Marx) modelled on the Organicist and Mechanistic paradigms. This decision rested on precritical opinions concerning the form which a science of man and of society should assume. White points out the ethical aspects of these precritical opinions in ibid., pp. 20-21. (For the different meanings of Formist, Contextualist, Organicist, and Mechanistic paradigms, see ibid., pp. 14-18.)

17 Patrick A. Heelan contrasts these two scientific ideals in his "The Logic of Framework Transpositions,"
For the historical methodologist, this interdisciplinary problem can be phrased in distinctively historical terms: Is it possible to have complementary histories instead of mutually exclusive ones? Historians are generally agreed that no single individual can master all the details involved in complex historical topics. Instead, multiple projects are undertaken, each one of which illuminates specific features of the topic and hopefully contributes a partial but complementary study to other projects concerned with the same complex whole. Under the paradigm theory of history, as envisioned by Hayden White, the complementarity of partial studies is limited. That is, complementary results are possible if the historians producing them share the same paradigm. But, if there is no common paradigm, differing historical interpretations are likely to be contradictory. And the possibility of reducing these contradictions to different but compatible positions will be slight. The basic presuppositions of several historians may be radically at odds and, so, antecedently may rule out the possibility of mediating subsequent

Language, Truth and Meaning, ed. by Philip McShane (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972), pp. 93-94. Kuhn, Feyerabend, Hanson, Sellars are mentioned as representative figures in the ongoing discussion of the different scientific ideals. Thomas S. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Second edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), offers a strong defense of the paradigm theory of science. Israel Scheffler's work, Science and Subjectivity (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), provides a defense of the older standard ideal of science. In Chapter Five, we will refer to both authors in discussing the problems of historical realism and of paradigm changes.
conflicts.

Even if a mediation of "surface" conflicts appears unlikely for works operating under different paradigms, might it yet be possible to settle them indirectly by a critique of the paradigms themselves? Such a critique—if possible—would surely not be part of the surface structure of any text. White's thesis is that basic conflicts of interpretation among historical works have origins which analytically precede the assessment of historical data. And, if at the level of origins there are different paradigms, one must ultimately seek to mediate the conflicts there and not on a surface level, i.e. on the level of organizing and explaining one's data. But a critique of different paradigms requires a privileged standpoint, a truly scientific paradigm. The problem White sees in this requirement is that there is an irreducible ethical component grounding one's choice of a paradigm and one's conception of historical knowledge, i.e. one's epistemology. To attempt to supply epistemological grounds on which to judge the cognitive adequacy of the different paradigms will itself, according to White, represent only another ethical choice. 18

In effect, White is arguing that no one conception of history is more scientific than another because what constitutes scientific history, or historical "realism,"

is determined by the paradigm one employs on the basis of ethical or aesthetic considerations. Given these precritical grounds, one's claim of scientific realism for a particular paradigm will seem gratuitous to those holding other conceptions of historical processes and of historical knowledge. One will have merely stated a preference for what a historical science "ought to be." Consequently, an epistemological critique of historical paradigms is required to escape its own relativity to personal preferences, but such an escape is unlikely given the poetic and precritical origins of every historical viewpoint. As a result, White concludes that each paradigm will continue to present a seemingly exclusive conception of the historical field.

There is a second argument against the possibility of arbitrating the disputes among historical paradigms. The first argument summarized above pointed out the

19 Ibid.

20 In this dissertation we will frequently use the terms "preconception," "preference," and "bias." By "preconception" we mean some vaguely held opinion, usually unthematized, which belongs to the deep level of historical inquiry. In most cases, preconceptions are "taken for granted," they are neither clarified nor defended. By "preference" we mean an individual's choice of a definite opinion or practice from among a number of opinions or practices. His choice need not be biased, but in most cases it is based on precritical grounds, i.e. the question of whether or not the choice is biased has not been asked or answered. By "bias" we mean a preconception or preference which--on critical grounds--is found to block the spontaneous development of understanding. There are multiple types of bias. We will consider some of them in Chapter Four.
exclusivity of individual paradigms: their presuppositions are basically precritical, extra-epistemological opinions. Yet there are changes in paradigms; radical alterations in the way historical events have been interpreted can and do occur. A history of the fluctuating interpretations of the French Revolution or a history of works on the Puritan contribution to American thought would provide examples of such paradigm-changes. Is it possible that such variance in viewpoints is prompted by the discovery of new data? If so, may not historical data themselves be the measure of the adequacy of paradigms and their accompanying theories?

Hayden White takes up this particular possibility of mediation. He notes that theories of history have not won wide acceptance solely on the basis of how adequately they explained the data contained in their narratives. Aesthetic appeal and a coincidence between the theory and a given public's view of its own history are elements to be taken into account. Furthermore, there must be some consensus on what constitute the significant data in need of recounting. White argues that historical data are not brute givens. There seems to be no way of pre-establishing what will be acceptable, irrespective of a particular audience, as a historical datum and as an adequate theory to explain the datum. A partial proof of this position

21 Metahistory, p. 429.
lies in the frequent disagreement among historians over what should count as a specifically historical datum. Such disagreement reflects a prior disagreement over one or several of the metahistorical elements previously discussed. Agreement on what should count as a historical datum and as a theory for explaining it, thus, requires a prior consensus on a metatheory which distinguishes on metahistorical grounds between natural phenomena and specifically historical phenomena. In short, historical

22Understanding this disagreement requires a distinction between the content of the historical field and the level of analysis most appropriate for explaining that content. A general consensus is likely on the historical data assignable to the historical field. All the artifacts, monuments, documents, art works created by men are candidates for inclusion. But the difficulties begin when one seeks to account for the origins of these phenomena. The problem of motivation is particularly troublesome. How far should one push one's inquiry? Psychological, biological, physico-chemical processes all might be considered sources of historical data. Which level of analysis is most legitimate? Does a psychological study have a greater claim to historical relevance than, for example, a materialistic analysis which reduces conscious intentions to biological impulses? The issues raised in these questions indicate that historical data are not easily distinguished from natural phenomena. The French structural anthropologist, Claude Lévi-Strauss, notes this difficulty. "Each episode in a revolution or a war resolves itself into a multitude of individual psychic movements. Each of these movements is the translation of unconscious development, and these resolve themselves into cerebral, hormonal or nervous phenomena, which themselves have reference to the physical or chemical order. Consequently, historical facts are no more given than any other. It is the historian, or the agent of history, who constitutes them by abstraction and as though under the threat of an infinite regress." The Savage Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 257.

23Metahistory, p. 429. In Chapter Five of this dissertation, we will propose metahistorical grounds for such a distinction. Although consensus on the metatheory
data are not the measure of the adequacy of paradigms. Rather, they are subordinate to the metahistorical positions which guide historical inquiry.

The above conclusion leaves us without an explanation of the suggested paradigm-changes. The discovery of new data does not account for radical alterations in the way historical events have been interpreted. According to the paradigm theory of history, such alterations do not provide conclusive proof of "progress" in historical understanding. Each paradigm may be manifested in works which present profound and consistent insights into history. These marks of consistency and profundity account for the "greatness" of the particular work. But they do not automatically establish that work as a more scientific or realistic work than others which operate under different paradigms. Each work may be part of an "effectively closed system of thought, incommensurable with all the others appearing in contention with it."24 Ultimately its incommensurability can be traced to moral or aesthetic variables. The result will be the introduction of discreteness into the historiographical field, a discreteness which eliminates the concept of development-by-accumulation. Multiple

(transcendental method) which supplies these grounds cannot be guaranteed, our basic argument is universal in scope: every development of meaning, every theory about "data," presupposes the occurrence of the component acts of transcendental method.

24 Ibid., p. 432.
histories with basic differences replace the ideal of a gradual approximation to a single definitive account of the past.

Still there are paradigm-changes. How and why they occur is barely hinted at by White.

Placed before the alternative visions that history's interpreters offer for our consideration, and without any apodictically provided theoretical grounds for preferring one over another, we are driven back to moral and aesthetic reasons for the choice of one vision over another as the more 'realistic.' 25

He goes on to paraphrase Kant: just as we are free to make history, so we are free to conceive history as we please. Thus, one freely changes paradigms on the basis of changes in moral or aesthetic beliefs. A new personal discovery on the latter metahistorical level may be sufficiently radical to require a change in one's basic view of historical processes and in one's position regarding historical knowledge.

There is additional evidence that this account of paradigm-changes is White's own position. He suggests at the close of his work that one can overcome the prevailing contemporary mode of historical consciousness (a mode resulting from the crisis of historicism) which is that of Irony. 26 His study of nineteenth-century historians

25 Ibid., p. 433.

26 Ibid. White offers the following description of the Ironic mode of historical consciousness. "The trope of Irony, then, provides a linguistic paradigm of a mode of thought which is radically self-critical with respect
and philosophers of history has established that the Ironic
mode of conceiving history is but one of a number of pos-
sible modes. Realizing this as well as the possible legi-
timacy of other perspectives based on alternate moral or
aesthetic grounds, one is in a position to "relativize rela-
tivism." That is, one can recognize that the Ironic per-
spective is not a necessary view of historical processes.
Instead, one is free to conceive history, determine its
content, and construct its meaning in accordance with the
paradigm most consistent with one's moral or aesthetic be-
liefs. In short, one can will "to view history from anoth-
er, anti-Ironic perspective." 27 This will to choose an
alternative to the sceptical stance of the ironic mind is
the author's program for revitalizing historical conscious-
ness and for reestablishing its links with the golden age
of history in the nineteenth century.

The preceding pages have largely been an analysis of
Hayden White's elaborated position in *Metahistory: The Hist-
torical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe.* This
not only to a given characterization of the world of exper-
ience but also to the very effort to capture adequately the
truth of things in language. It is, in short, a model of
the linguistic protocol in which skepticism in thought and
relativism in ethics are conventionally expressed." Ibid.,
pp. 37-38.

27Ibid., p. 434. This will to believe in a historical
viewpoint consistent with one's moral and aesthetic needs
has been discussed by, among others, Kant and Nietzsche.
While White's position has had many contributors, Kant and
Nietzsche have apparently been central to White's attempted
solution to the crisis of historicism. See Ibid., p. 80
(for Kant) and p. 332 (for Nietzsche).
analysis offers a not too lengthy introduction to the body of the dissertation. Its purpose has been to sketch problems which contemporary historical methodology confronts. More specifically, this introductory essay has narrowed the focus of the dissertation to a number of theses advanced by White. The clarity with which White expresses these positions is exceptional. Often similar theses are present but barely explicit in the works of historians and philosophers of history. Therefore, White's arguments and conclusions are taken to be representative of a complex viewpoint shared, at least in part, by other less philosophically articulate historians. 28

28 Numerous historians have remarked on the aesthetic presuppositions of their work. White cites Benedetto Croce as one instance, in *Metahistory*, p. 380. Carl Becker has argued for both the aesthetic form which sustains the historian's arguments and a preceding "climate of opinion" which Becker describes in terms similar to White's concept of paradigm. In *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers* (pp. 11-12), Becker argues that climates of opinion are effectively closed systems of thought, i.e. no theoretical grounds are available for mediating conflicts between two opposed systems. In his *Historical Inevitability* (reprinted in part in *The Philosophy of History in our Time*, pp. 249-271), Isaiah Berlin writes on the ethical and aesthetic preconceptions to historical analysis. Morton White points out the aesthetic and moral standards which guide the historian's selection of data. He notes, in *Foundations of Historical Knowledge* (pp. 252-254), that such evaluative grounds may not be shared by another historian; thus, diversity in moral or aesthetic aspirations will give rise to different organizations of historical materials.

Positions similar to Hayden White's paradigm theory of history are in evidence. G. G. Iggers, in *The German Conception of History* (pp. 247-248), cites Walter Hofer as a contemporary historian who argues for the priority of a formulated conception of history over a study of materials. Arthur Danto argues for the priority of organizational schemes over one's research into the historical
This complex viewpoint can be summarized in four theses.

1. The disunity in the field of history which marked the "crisis of historicism" is traceable to the diversity of paradigms employed by nineteenth-century historians and philosophers of history. The diversity of historical paradigms reflects a diversity in moral and aesthetic aspirations grounding the different paradigms.

2. There are no adequate theoretical grounds for choosing among the different ways of conceiving history.

3. The theoretical concepts employed by the historian and his epistemological position belong to the surface of the historical text. The historian's decision to adopt those concepts and that position rests on precritically held opinions belonging to a deep structure where theoretical procedures receive implicit, precritical sanction.

4. Each historical paradigm is an effectively closed system of thought. Radical changes in paradigms reflect not the discovery of new evidence but a change in one's moral or aesthetic preconceptions about history.

These four theses offer a clear focus for discussing and criticizing Lonergan's insights into the problems of historical methodology. Below we will offer four alternative theses to White's positions in order to express Lonergan's claims for transcendental method and to focus the argument that Lonergan has shown a way beyond the basic problems of the crisis of historicism. In addition, this field. A thesis developed in his Analytical Philosophy of History (p. 111), is that such unifying schemes are predetermined by specifically human interests. D. H. Fischer provides examples of explanatory historical paradigms, in his Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, p. xv. In the same work (p. 194), Fischer notes that the theoretical doctrines which White takes to be formulations of prior precritical determinants are metahistorical positions which are neither proved nor disproved by appeal to historical data.
paralleling of different theses is a convenient methodical device for narrowing the number of issues to the basic disagreements about the possibility of resolving the crisis.

**Preliminary Critique of White's Solution**

Later sections of this dissertation will treat in turn each of the four theses drawn from White's *Metahistory*. In this introductory chapter we want only to argue that his solution to the crisis is insufficient: first, in the light of historical practice, and second, for what it implies about historical discourse. 29

In the first place, the solution rests on the recognition of free variables at the root of historical paradigms; moral or aesthetic aspirations are the basis for one's choice among historical paradigms. That such aspirations are integral parts of the doing of history need not be denied. But White goes on to argue that critical or "scientific" history is but one of many types of history, all of which are rooted in variable preferences. The implication is that critical history is no more plausible than other types. 30 Each type reflects certain

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29 The arguments for this insufficiency occur here for a purely strategic reason. Without them the impression that White's solution is satisfactory could be given. In that case, the extended treatment of Lonergan's thought would be anticipated as at best a supplement, at worst a mere postscript.

30 White argues that "the demand for the scientization
preferences, and none is epistemologically superior to the rest. But—one can object—a prevalent aspiration, or preference, among historians is to do critical history as opposed to mere propagandizing. A compelling epistemological justification of critical history may be lacking, but the outlines of one may be known. How else can one detect abuses that are then labelled "propaganda"? In practice the normative guidelines for doing history already restrict the range of aspirations which one can fulfill and still be considered a historian. Thus, when Marxist historians of the Thirties and Forties expunged all mention of Trotsky from accounts of the Bolshevik Revolution, they were fulfilling the aspirations of the Stalinist regime but were no longer entitled to the name "historians."

There is a second objection to be made. White's "will to choose" among modes of historical consciousness would appear to require that historians modify the usual form of their knowledge claims. Their conclusions should be prefaced by remarks about the preferential grounds of historical assertions. "I believe..." or "It seems to me..." should be prefatory qualifications attending any conclusions in historical works. Again, the thesis is that

of history represents only the statement of a preference for a specific modality of historical conceptualization, the grounds of which are either moral or aesthetic, but the epistemological justification of which still remains to be established." *Metahistory*, p. xii.
the moral or aesthetic preferences manifested through a particular paradigm qualify the subsequent selection of data and use of explanatory strategies. However, in most instances, historians do not mar their works with such enfeebling qualifications. Could it be that they are suffering from some form of Kant's transcendental illusion and feel no need for such remarks? In any case—-one may still object—White's thesis is not reconciliable with the usual way in which historical assertions are made.

Furthermore, his solution to the crisis involves historians in "pragmatic make-believe." That is, they are to assume the truth of their historical perspectives on the basis of moral or aesthetic aspirations, what they "will to believe." But—-one may object—this assumption or belief is self-contradictory. "A belief that believes only in itself is no longer a belief."31 A historian would not escape scepticism by pretending that his perspective on the past was true simply because it was consistent with his personal preferences. But such pretence may be unlikely; historical assertions are not usually prefaced by disclaimers that one is advancing claims of only personal significance.

31The self-contradiction of pragmatic make-believe is pointed out by Emil Fackenheim in his Metaphysics and Historicity (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961), pp. 4-7. The above quotation is taken from remarks of Erich Frank as found in ibid., p. 5, footnote 3.
If the preceding objections are sound, then White's proposed solution is insufficient. It may be helpful to ask why White did not offer a more satisfactory solution. There are at least three reasons. First, since White locates the historian's theoretical and epistemological exercises on a surface level, he is left with only precritical grounds for adopting and evaluating a historical perspective. The precritical metahistorical elements of every historical work are prior to and determinant of issues of historical objectivity. Consequently a critical justification of one's view and practice of history is effectively subordinated to prior subjective variables.

Second, the demand for critical history is said to represent only the statement of a personal preference. This is one step in White's argument that an epistemological mediation of the conflicts among paradigms is not available. His proposed solution to the crisis is not an attempt at mediating such disputes. Rather it is a suggestion that they be tolerated as inevitable products of conflicting but equally plausible viewpoints.

A third barrier to a more satisfactory solution is present. The historian's adopted paradigm determines what will be acceptable as historical data. Consequently, judgments based on accumulated evidence will never force a radical reappraisal of the adopted viewpoint. The validity of his paradigm is established not by the content of
the historical field but by precritical opinions and the strategies suitable to them for elaborating a consistent vision of the historical field. As a result, any radical paradigm-changes will occur because of a basic shift in the historian's precritical opinions. Such changes are not the product of discoveries of new evidence and an intelligent desire to conform his conceptual apparatus to the new evidence.

**Sketch of Lonergan's Alternate Solution**

The test we envision for Lonergan's claims concerning transcendental method includes weighing his alternative positions against the three preceding "barriers." The implication is that Lonergan's proposed solution to the crisis will only be more satisfactory than White's if such obstacles are shown to be surmountable. First, against White's thesis that precritical elements of one's historical perspective are beyond the reach of any critical evaluation, there must be posed the thesis that critical grounds are available for scrutinizing preconceptions about history. Second, against the thesis that the demand for critical history is but the statement of a preference, we must demonstrate that the normative procedures of critical history express more than personal preferences. Third, against the thesis that no conclusive judgments are possible regarding conflicting views and practices in
history, there must be posed the thesis of a universal viewpoint from which one can mediate the conflicts among historical paradigms.

The counterproposals which must be proved if these alternative positions are to be successfully held are the following.\textsuperscript{32}

1. The counterproposal to White's first thesis is not antithetical but supplementary. To the number of determinants of historical perspectives noted by White will be added elements uncovered by Lonergan's "horizon analysis." The most important addition will be the historian's awareness of his own intellectual abilities.

2. The subject's differentiated basic horizon provides adequate metahistorical grounds for criticizing the cognitional elements of one's historical perspective.

3. Transcendental method formulates the spontaneities of human cognition. In so doing it is the a priori basis for the possibility of detachment from bias and for critical sanctions of theoretical procedures on the surface of the text.

4. Transcendental method makes possible an elaboration of a universal viewpoint from which to evaluate conflicting views and practices in history.

White's four theses and the four preceding counterproposals provide the format for this dissertation. Again, the central issue is that the crisis of historicism continues so long as there is available no metahistorical basis for mediating the conflicts within the historical field. We have argued above that Hayden White fails to

\textsuperscript{32}It should be noted that each of these counterproposals corresponds in its respective order to the central issue of each of the following chapters.
supply the needed basis. It remains to determine whether or not Lonergan overcomes the barriers which hindered White's attempted solution, and thereby offers a more satisfactory methodological position.
CHAPTER II

HORIZONS AND THE THESIS OF PERSPECTIVISM

INTRODUCTION

This second chapter consists of four strategic steps. By first discovering points of compatibility between White's theory of paradigms and Lonergan's thesis of perspectivism, we will establish the possibility of supplementing White's position with insights drawn from Lonergan's work. Then, in keeping with the metaphor of surface and deep levels in the historical text, we can search for Lonergan's view of how the two levels are connected. His notions of relative and basic horizons clarify the diverse connections between the historian's precritical opinions about history and the latter's surface procedures. Out of Lonergan's horizon analysis comes the thesis of perspectivism—a thesis refuting attempts to promote a single privileged viewpoint on the past. Finally, in a fourth step, we argue that White's first thesis is in need of an important supplement. A study is made of how intellectual self-awareness conditions the historian's choice among possible modes of historical consciousness.

While Chapter Three will further clarify the content of basic horizons, this chapter will sufficiently prove the
presence of a cognitional element among the other components of historical perspectives. This conclusion is important because it allows us to move beyond merely preferential variables as the determinants of historical perspectives—the first barrier to White's attempted solution to the crisis of historicism. If this new cognitional element is later found to enter crucially into historical views and practices, then their critical justification may, after all, be more than a matter of prior subjective variables.

Chapter Two takes as its starting point the first thesis drawn from Hayden White's *Metahistory*. Again, the thesis is that the disunity in the field of history which marked the crisis of historicism is traceable to the diversity of paradigms employed by nineteenth-century historians and philosophers of history. This diversity of paradigms reflects a prior diversity in the moral or aesthetic aspirations which ground the different paradigms.

To this relatively unobjectionable thesis is proposed an alternate position which is supplementary rather than antithetical. There is evidence that more elements than White notes are at work in grounding the choice of a paradigm. To moral and aesthetic aspirations will be added: the works of other historians, the personal background of the individual historian, the assumptions of his era, what passes for common sense in his day, and,
most significantly, his estimation of his own intellectual abilities.

It is apparent that Lonergan does not share the paradigm theory of the natural sciences. Yet one cannot simply say that he identifies with an earlier scientific ideal of cumulative and progressive efforts toward a definitive account of nature. He remarks that the scientist's goal is the complete explanation of natural phenomena. But this goal functions as an ideal limit of the scientist's intending of natural phenomena rather than as some doctrine that the universe forms a single explanatory system. The ideal limit has two bases: the first in the finite number of possible presentations of sensibility and the second in the basic structure of the human mind. The

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1 At least two meanings were proposed in the preceding chapter for the term "paradigm." In a general sense, a paradigm is the linguistic form (i.e. one of the four poetic tropes) in which historical narratives are cast. In a more specific sense, a paradigm is the particular set of explanatory strategies with their modes of articulation which the historian adopts as effective means of expressing his moral or aesthetic aspirations. In both senses a paradigm is a model of what historical inquiry and expression should be. In terms more appropriate for the natural sciences, paradigms are thought-systems or theoretical frameworks which are individually coherent but discontinuous from each other. In the sequence of their occurrence, there are incompatibilities which militate against the earlier ideal of cumulative efforts toward a single account of natural phenomena.

2 "Isomorphism of Thomist and Scientific Thought," in Collection, pp. 149-150. Also see Lonergan's remarks in "Dimensions of Meaning," in ibid., pp. 259-260; in Method in Theology, p. 316; in Insight, p. 84.

3 For a denial of this latter position and supporting reasons, see Insight, p. 345.
latter basis will be considered in the remaining chapters. The former basis involves the empirical canon of selection which dictates that empirical science limit itself to theories involving sensible consequences. 4 If sensible presentations are finite, then theories which are applied to them will be finite. The sequence of more comprehensive and coherent theories may not be predictable, but there is no reason to think it endless. Hence, the ideal goal, no matter how remote and unattainable in fact, can be entertained. 5

4 For a discussion of this canon of empirical method, see ibid., pp. 71-72.

5 Lonergan argues that the advance of science has a lower limit in possible sensible presentations and an upper limit in cognitional structure. His arguments are part of a position which affirms that empirical science only approximates, though in an increasing way, to truth and which denies that one must hold scientific progress to be indefinite. Ibid., pp. 303-304. Patrick A. Heelan has studied this position and concludes two things. First, that Lonergan's position in Insight is consistent with the view of the history of science which envisions evolutionary sequences of complementary frameworks. Second, that this position in Insight is compatible with views held by two representative figures of the paradigm school of science, Kuhn and Feyerabend. "The Logic of Framework Transpositions," in Language, Truth and Meaning, pp. 109-110. I seriously doubt this second conclusion since a controversial innovation of the paradigm school of science has been the incommensurability of different scientific systems. There are not only different but complementary frameworks in the history of science, there are also discontinuous and contradictory ones. But again, for our purposes, this issue must be reformulated in distinctively historical terms.
Now our point is not to defend one scientific ideal against another but to argue that there is a point of contact between White's paradigm theory of history and Lonergan's thesis of perspectivism. Initially one might suspect that, given this fundamental difference in regard to scientific ideals, Lonergan's position on historical perspectives will not even touch upon issues raised by a paradigm theory of science or of history. But, irrespective of differences in scientific ideals, we can argue for points of contact between the different positions in respect to history. While Lonergan holds what may be termed the standard ideal of science (i.e. one seeking a complete explanation of nature), he distinguishes history from science at a number of points, one of which is the inevitability of historical perspectivism. More will be said of perspectivism in the third section of this chapter. For now a general description will suffice.

The thesis of perspectivism draws support from a number of sources. First, the complexity of the past defies comprehensive interpretation. Second, the finitude of the historian requires that he be selective in his historical inquiries. Third, the involvement of the historian and of the significance of past events in ongoing history will obviate all claims to pronounce the final word on historical events. The label of perspectivism is thus attached to a theory of historical knowledge which proposes that
only partial and approximate knowledge of the past is possible. Were the historian to aim at a complete explanation of past events, he would need more information than is available (those who left records were selective in what they recorded). He would not be able to digest even the limited but massive amounts of material which have been preserved. He would not be able to foresee the future consequences of past events which might radically alter the significance of those events.

For the above reasons, the study of history cannot be pursued realistically with the ideal that Lonergan applies to scientific inquiry. Lonergan substitutes a theory of perspectivism which, it will be argued below, is compatible with and supplements the paradigm theory presented by Hayden White.

There is an obvious point of agreement between the paradigm theory and the theory of perspectivism. Both share the position that the historian can only achieve an incomplete account of the past. Implied in this position is the activity termed "selectivity." Given the sheer magnitude of preserved materials and the finitude of the historian, some selectivity is a prerequisite when he begins to explore the available materials. A second point of contact for the two theories is found among the prerequisites to the process of selectivity. The activity of selecting presupposes a process of evaluating. As
Croce argued, unless the historian evaluates, he cannot know what fragments of the immense wealth of historical materials are worth interpreting.\textsuperscript{6} There are value judgments to be made before the process of selectivity can get underway. White emphasizes the moral and aesthetic nature of these preliminary decisions. As will be noted below, Lonergan expands the number of components operative in such decisions. In both cases, such moments of evaluation are metahistorical, i.e. they are based on fundamental positions which analytically precede specific historical tasks.

Once we have initially considered the approximative character of the historian's work, we can pass to a few thoughts on the concept of horizon. It is argued that prior to research the historian must evaluate. And criteria guiding his evaluation will belong to his horizon. Moral, aesthetic, cognitive positions provide some of the criteria contained within one's horizon. Lonergan offers a general description of the content of horizons: "Horizons . . . are the sweep of our interests and of our knowledge; they are the fertile source of further knowledge and care; but they also are the boundaries that limit our capacities for assimilating more than we already have attained."\textsuperscript{7} A more laconic statement on horizons is


\textsuperscript{7}Method in Theology, p. 237.
available: "Literally, a horizon is a maximum field of vision from a determinate standpoint."\(^8\)

The second section of this chapter will deal with the concept of horizon and its usefulness in illuminating the presuppositions with which the historian begins his work. There it will be argued that White's paradigm theory and Lonergan's horizon analysis do not arrive at conflicting conclusions. However, horizons include more than the determinants of particular paradigms mentioned by White.\(^9\) The implication, at this point, is that the

\(^8\)Bernard Lonergan, "Metaphysics as Horizon," in Collection, p. 213.

\(^9\)For the sake of clarity, we can bring together and compare in one place the different concepts of horizon, perspective, and paradigm. There is no explicit statement in Lonergan's work on the interrelations of these three terms. However, what follows is compatible with separate remarks which are found in various places in his works.

Of the three terms, "horizon" is the one having the broadest meaning. It includes all that a subject knows or cares about. In terms of one's personal life history, several horizons may be developed. Lonergan labels such a process of horizon development "specialization." It is a process of broadening one's expertise to take in the specialized techniques and languages of distinct disciplines. For example, the common-sense interests of the adult may be expanded to include the interests and pursuits of a theoretical discipline such as contemporary physics. By itself physics requires more than the expertise of ordinary living and ordinary language; it demands familiarity with the formal terminology and competence in the procedures of an autonomous professional community.

We relate "perspective" to "horizon" on the basis of selectivity. Within any specialized horizon there are likely to be further specializations, e.g. micro-biology will be a subdivision of general biology. To specialize is to narrow one's focus, to take a limited area as one's field of inquiry. This limiting of one's area of concern is the adoption of a specific perspective which antecedently determines the outlines of research. In a sense, a
insights of horizon analysis will supplement the position worked out in *Metahistory*.

An additional point of compatibility between the paradigm theory and Lonergan's position can be briefly noted. There is agreement that the crisis of historicism results proximately from the multiplying of conflicting interpretations of the past and more radically from conflicting positions on the issue of historical objectivity. This latter, epistemological issue is formulated in the specialized horizon expands or contracts with the process of selectivity. And the definite point to which it is expanded or contracted will be one's perspective. In this case, the components of one's horizons will be prior to and influential in the forming of one's perspective. They will remain implicit in one's perspective as resources for the work carried on from that particular perspective.

We relate "paradigm" to "perspective" as synonymous terms. Enough has already been written in Chapter One on the meaning of paradigm in Hayden White's work. The significant similarities between the two terms are, first, that paradigms are formalizations of prefiguring insights. In other words, they determine the outlines of the historian's field of research. Second, within the general field of history, there will be subdivisions such as military history, economic history, and so on. At the same time as the historian selects such a subdivision as a topic, he also settles on strategies of explanation deemed suitable for the selected area. The same strategies will not prove equally useful in every area, so he is required to make a selection among available strategies as part of his choice of a particular paradigm. Third, those metahistorical, precritical elements which White terms predeterminates of the historian's choice of a paradigm remain implicit in his paradigm (or perspective) as resources for the work carried on under its guidance.

A recent lecture given by Bernard Lonergan was the source of some of the above remarks on horizons and specializations. "Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation" (lecture given at the University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, November 6, 1974).
question, What constitutes historical realism? If a definite and compelling response to this question can be given, one of the central problems of the crisis will be resolved. This possibility is merely noted here, but the purpose of the dissertation will be to evaluate Lonergan's arguments and conclusions for just such a response.

These introductory remarks to the second chapter established some points of compatibility between two seemingly opposed views of historical work. Though the two mentioned authors hold different scientific ideals, yet, when it comes to the study of history, they hold some positions in common. That only incomplete accounts of past events are possible, that the inescapable process of selectivity presupposes a wide range of subjective variables, that the crisis of historicism can be treated as an epistemological issue—these are points where the two thinkers meet. Lonergan's thesis of perspectivism, thus, will not be extraneous to the paradigm theory of history. To understand this thesis, we must now investigate Lonergan's horizon analysis.

Hayden White's position has already been summarized. The crisis was brought on by the multiplying of successful but mutually exclusive historical works. The works themselves were produced under different models of historical explanation and expression. One of the features of such models was a determination of what constituted historical realism. Lonergan attributes his understanding of the crisis in part to Karl Heussi's work, Die Krisis des Historismus (Tubingen: Mohr, 1932). For Lonergan's remarks on Heussi's work as well as his additions to the insights of Heussi's position, see Method in Theology, pp. 214-217.
The concept of horizon appears in Lonergan's post-1957 works. Its emergence as a central category for his thinking coincides with a shift in his thought, one which emphasizes historical consciousness to an extent not found in *Insight* or earlier works.\(^{11}\) We will begin by offering a description of the knowing process in which horizons operate. We will follow up by cataloging the general content of horizons.

Lonergan states that, even prior to the writing of *Insight*, he was convinced that the knowing process consists in raising and answering questions.\(^{12}\) Questioning is an act of intending aimed at transforming something unknown into what is known. The act of intending itself occurs between ignorance and knowing. It is not identified with either, for we begin to question only when we recognize that there is an 'x' of which we are ignorant. Our recognition of ignorance about the 'x' implies that we are not totally in the dark, yet, at the same time, it implies

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\(^{12}\) This biographical detail is found in Lonergan's "*Insight Revisited,*" (lecture given at and published by Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1972), pp. 2-3.
we do not have knowledge of it, else we would not need to ask questions.13

A three-fold division is suggested by this analysis of questioning. First, there are all those questions which I can raise and answer--this totality is labelled the "known." Second, there are all those questions which I can raise and think meaningful but as yet cannot answer--this totality is labelled the "known unknown." Third, there are those questions which I do not ask because they are not meaningful for me--this vague area is labelled the "unknown unknown."14 In the knowing process, my horizon has its outer limit between the second and third divisions, between what I am interested in knowing but do not yet know and what I do not seek to know because the relevant questions do not appear meaningful to me. Thus, the child's horizon falls short of the questions which belong to the horizon of the theoretical physicist.

The literal definition of "horizon" was already provided in the introductory section of this chapter. A horizon is a maximum field of vision from a determinate

13"Every inquiry aims at transforming some unknown into a known. Inquiry itself, then, is something between ignorance and knowledge. It is less than knowledge, else there would be no need to inquire. It is more than sheer ignorance, for it makes ignorance manifest and strives to replace it with knowledge. This intermediary between ignorance and knowing is an intending, and what is intended is an unknown that is to be known." Method in Theology, p. 22.

14David Tracy presents a careful summary of these divisions, in his The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, pp. 9-10.
standpoint. The preceding description of the process of inquiry adds clarity to this definition. For the maximum field of vision falls short of the unknown unknown, those questions which lack significance for a particular subject. The determinate standpoint of the subject is finite; his stage of development as a historical fact excludes a number of questions which could not presently be meaningful to him. He will most likely be unaware of the precise limits of his present horizon, but by hindsight he can mark boundaries passed in time. For example, questions once alien to the child's world may through education become meaningful to the adult. As part of one's personal life history, one can mark the points at which one's horizon surpassed former limits.

Besides the subjective finitude involved in any horizon, there is also an objective finitude. That is, besides the questioner there is also that which is questioned. In the first place, the questioner at a particular stage of development will have access to only some "worlds of meaning." Other problems and concerns had by others will at

15 David Tracy defines a "world of meaning" as "that totality of objects with which the subject in his present intentional development can operate." (Ibid., p. 14.) We think this definition can be improved upon so as to include some reference to the stage of development enjoyed by the distinct discipline in which the subject strives to become proficient. We can then speak of a world of meaning which is open both to a particular subject at his present level of development and to anyone at this particular time given the state of the discipline. "Objective finitude" in horizons is, thus, distinguished from the "subjective finitude"
present be foreign to him. In the second place, when one is dealing with distinct specialties such as physics or theology, the stage of development enjoyed by them will not be fixed but will be part of an ongoing process. Historically one can remark on the significant turning points in a particular field, i.e. moments when new discoveries expanded the concerns of a whole professional community. At such moments, the objective limits of a shared horizon are surpassed and, thus, an enlarged "world of meaning" is opened to the subject. In short, there are both subjective and objective limits to horizons. Again, these boundaries are historically unstable; they may expand or contract. But both will be interrelated. The growth of the subject opens up new worlds of meaning for him; the expansion of the objective limits of a shared horizon prompts the subject to continue growing in order to keep up with the questions which new discoveries raise.

This description of horizons obviously presumes that horizon development does occur. The proof for such growth is easily available. Physicists are not born; they emerge from childhood horizons by valuing and pursuing questions of no immediate concern to a child. A child psychologist does not base his claim to professional competence on the fact that he was once a child. Rather, he points to his of one's horizon on the basis of the personal limits of the latter and the public limits of the former.
success in handling the specialized procedures which are part of a theoretical horizon. So horizon development does occur. A special instance of such development is the radical transformation of one's cognitional horizon which Lonergan terms "intellectual conversion." This type of horizon development and the evidence for its possible occurrence will be taken up in Chapter Five.

In his more recent works, Lonergan has distinguished between two types of horizons: relative and basic. The former can be considered the interiorized-personalized version of what has come to be called the "climate of opinion." It is one's determinate standpoint arrived at through personal, psychological, social and cultural development. The objective aspect of such relative horizons will be the level of development presently attained by human sciences (e.g. psychology, sociology, cultural anthropology). These sciences make possible a controlled

David Tracy attributes this distinction to Lonergan's increasing familiarity with contemporary discussions in the human sciences and with the philosophical schools of phenomenology and existentialism. Ibid., p. 19.

This phrase has a long history. One author, who popularized its use in this country, points out that the phrase originally appeared in the seventeenth century and was reintroduced in this century by Whitehead. Carl L. Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers, p. 5.

articulation of the subject's own personal history to the
degree that (1) the subject is familiar with them, and (2)
the sciences themselves are sufficiently developed to ex-
press complex human experiences.

But, besides relative horizons, there is what Lonergan
terms "basic horizon." It is the standpoint of the
subject in relation to the presence or absence of various
types of conversion. In Chapter Five we will take up the
issues of intellectual and moral conversion. Suffice it
for now to say that, while one's relative horizon antedates
one's basic horizon, it may be possible to modify the con-
tents of the former on the basis of the self-transformation
occurring in the latter. The implication for the doing of
history is that it may be possible to eliminate or control
any bias which has attended the development of one's rela-
tive horizon. For now this implication is merely noted.
In this section, we will limit ourselves to relative hori-
zons, their content and role in the work of the historian.

Theology of Renewal I, edited by L. K. Shook (New York:

We have already mentioned Bernard Tyrrell's work,
Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of God, in which the types of
conversion are interrelated. David Tracy provides a brief
description of these conversions in his commentary, The
Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, pp. 19-20. A general de-
scription of the role of conversion in the doing of theology
is offered in the Lonergan article cited in the preceding
The Content of Relative Horizons

A useful distinction can be made in cataloging the contents of a relative horizon. Part of the determinate standpoint of the historian consists of his familiarity with the works of both previous and contemporary historians. This familiarity forms the objective aspect of the historian's relative horizon. In producing his own historical works, he will not be able to acknowledge all that he owes to other historians, but nonetheless he will be indebted to others. Besides this objective aspect, there is a subjective aspect to relative horizons. This is formed out of the personal background of the historian. For the purposes of this chapter, we suggest a four-fold division in this subjective aspect: the education and personal interests of the historian, the linguistic categories he employs, the dominant concerns of his era, the public opinions which pass for common sense in his day.

20 Marcel Proust has expressed this point much better: "... a book is a huge cemetery in which on the majority of tombs the names are effaced and can no longer be read." The Past Recaptured, trans. by Andreas Mayor (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 158.

21 Again, those purposes require an expansion of the number of elements involved in the predetermination of one's historical perspective. The crucial element missing from Hayden White's analysis will be basically a cognitive position. It is part, not of one's relative horizon, but of one's basic horizon. But that point will be argued later. For now we propose to give a fuller account of the subjective variables behind historical perspectives. Our list of these variables presupposes those moral and aesthetic (poetic-linguistic) variables studied by Hayden White. Moral variables would be exemplified in
The innumerable records of past events, the diversity of values once affirmed, and the richness of experiences now past but remembered require that the historian be competent to handle complex materials, be open to values other than his own, and be attentive to his own experience. The more intelligent and cultivated he is the greater will be his ability to understand past events. 22 Put simply, the broader his relative horizon the more likely he is to write great history. Clearly the historian's education and the range of his personal interests will affect both the perspective he assumes on the past and the quality of his subsequent work.

A second element of the historian's background is the language he uses. He inherits linguistic categories, both ordinary and technical, from the society and professional community around him. It is in terms of these categories that he conceives the field of his research, and eventually it is through them that he expresses his results.

Historical perspectives stressing alternately either a politically active role for history (e.g. Mommsen's approach to historical writing) or a culturally isolated role (e.g. Burckhardt's approach). Aesthetic variables are manifested in the anecdotes chosen by a historian to symbolize or to typify an entire period or intellectual movement. There is a poetic element in the representative scene which dramatizes, without fictionalizing, the complex motivations and conflicts of historical figures.

Since the language of most historians (the most ardent devotees of quantified history may be excepted) is the speech of everyday living, the historian will be employing a precritical tool. The positions to which ordinary language commits him unawares are not easily uncovered. Perhaps it is the philosopher of historical method and not the historian who is responsible for clarifying the problems of historical language. In any case, the linguistic categories which the historian neither invents nor consciously appropriates in their entirety are part of his given horizon. In the first place, they are part of his ordinary living. In the second, they are part of the professional equipment which, at least in history, is never far removed from ordinary living.

The dominant concerns of an era, as internalized-personalized by the historian, belong to the predetermining elements of his work. No one would write Gibbon's history of Rome today with the same polemical interests; the

23 Morton White appears to suggest such a division of labor. "Like the philosopher of natural science, the critical philosopher of history is theoretically oriented, primarily interested in analyzing historical language and achieving insight into history as a form of knowledge." Foundations of Historical Knowledge, p. 2.

24 Hayden White argues, along with other historians, that the historian's use of ordinary language is evidence of the proto-scientific status of history. Metahistory, p. 429. Patrick Gardiner has studied the relation between the language in which history is written and the common-sense speech of ordinary living, in The Nature of Historical Explanation, pp. 6-7 and 63.
secular-religious tension of today is no longer what it was in the eighteenth century. Nor, to offer another example, is it reasonable to fault Thucydides for failing to study the economic causes of the Peloponnesian War. Such matters were not part of his climate of opinion though they do belong to ours. Thus, today the Megarian Decrees come center stage in any new accounts of the Greek conflict, while the mythical forms which Thucydides borrowed from Greek tragedy are relegated to the periphery as items of historical curiosity.25 Lonergan provides examples of fundamental changes in the dominant concerns of an age, changes which modified man's image of himself, his world, and his science.26 The upheavals and acts of resistance which mark such transitions are evidence of the close bonds forged between an individual and the prevailing concerns of his era. The historian is no exception. He writes not for all times but for his time, and his license to do so is his rootedness in his own time.

A fourth subdivision of the subjective side of relative horizons is labelled "common sense." Clearly a person is a man of common sense long before becoming a

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25 F. M. Cornford elaborates this point at some length in his brilliant study of the mind of Thucydides, Thucydides Mythistoricus, especially Chapters 3, 4, and 5.

professional historian. Vague collections of everyday wisdom are put to use far in advance of every specialized enterprise. It should be noted that history, as distinct from more abstruse disciplines, does not leave common-sense generalizations behind in its specialized procedures. Rather, the common opinions of daily living provide a valuable resource and starting point for the historian. Lonergan offers a detailed description of common-sense knowledge, its operations and limitations. He compares it to an adjustable tool whose purposes are numerous and whose adjustment is relative to the specific task at hand.

27"Properly speaking, the historian does not proceed by way of deduction or induction. The point of departure must instead be the ordinary or common knowledge which we use in our daily life." (Henri-Irénée Marrou, The Meaning of History, p. 89.) Hayden White concurs in the opinion that common-sense generalizations provide major premises for historians. (Metahistory, pp. 11-12.) W. H. Walsh cites as an example of such common-sense starting points the historian's initial understanding of human nature. See his Philosophy of History: An Introduction, p. 66. Obviously, while common-sense opinions do form part of the beginning of historical inquiry, the responsibilities of critical history require that the level of ordinary opinion not be the only level on which the historian operates. Marc Bloch sounds this warning in his unfinished classic, The Historian's Craft, p. 80.

28See Chapter Six of Insight, especially pp. 173-182.

29Method in Theology, pp. 229-230. There are many similarities between Lonergan's account of common-sense knowledge and Claude Lévi-Strauss' description of mythical thought as a "science of the concrete." Especially relevant are the remarks made by the latter regarding the analogy between activities of the "bricoleur" and the functions of mythical thought. See The Savage Mind, pp. 16-22.
For the historian, this multi-purposed tool lies ready-to-hand as a familiar means to human ends. It is there as part of his horizon in advance of more critical intentions, and it is never far off once such specialized intentions begin to guide his efforts at understanding the past. A thesis, to which we will later return, is that historical explanation emerges as a sophisticated extension of this common-sense horizon.

The objective side and four subdivisions of the subjective side of relative horizons have now been accounted for in the preceding paragraphs. Taken as a whole, they constitute the "historicity" or existential history of the individual historian. This is not the place to digress on the scope of human historicity and the problems of freedom and permanence which it involves.30 What has been attempted is a summation of the elements belonging to the relative horizon which precedes the historian's theoretical work. The developed state of his profession, his own education, the language he spontaneously employs, the concerns he internalizes from his social milieu, the common-sense opinions he shares with his contemporaries—these are preconceptions which the historian brings to his tasks.

30 In the writer's opinion, Emil Fackenheim has offered a very lucid account of these issues in his concise essay cited in the preceding chapter, Metaphysics and Historicity. Lonergan summarizes the theoretical premisses of human historicity in Method in Theology, p. 325.
What does this list of general preconceptions add to Hayden White's account of metahistorical components of the historian's work? His analysis of the poetic act which prefigures the historical field is a further specification of what has been generally described as the linguistic subdivision. The remaining three subdivisions and the objective side of relative horizons are significant additions to White's analysis. Specifically they "socialize" a metatheory which, in concentrating on the linguistic preference of an individual, tends to neglect other debts which the historian owes both to his professional predecessors and to his whole social group. The role of common-sense opinion in historical inquiry is a particularly important topic barely noted by White. But, again, the purpose of this second chapter is not to reject White's first thesis but to supplement it.

Note should be made that White's theory of the poetic-linguistic deep structure of historical narratives is not incompatible with these additional preconceptions. But, insofar as he ignores them, for whatever reason, and insofar as they are in fact metahistorical components of the historian's work, these additions are corrective of a metatheory which overemphasizes the role of language to the detriment of other social aspects of historical inquiry. In White's defense one can suggest that his central purpose was not to account for all the classes of variables apparent in the historical field. His aim was narrower, namely, to work out a typology for characterizing that field in which there is so much diversity. However, insofar as White fails to discover—in the deep structure—a basis for critical criteria of historical practice, we add to his analysis the cognitional discovery introduced in the fourth section of this chapter. Once elaborated in subsequent chapters, this addition will prove to be incompatible with some of White's positions.
Horizons and Presuppositionless Inquiry

The preceding remarks on horizons have prepared the ground for a thesis which negatively holds that there is no presuppositionless history and which affirmatively asserts that the preconceptions of the historian modify his work. This thesis has gained such wide currency today that it is in danger of becoming a cliché. With the disappearance of the positivist school of historiography, the polemical debates which once surrounded the thesis have ceased. But what no longer is questioned may soon pass itself off as common sense, and in theorizing about history this easy acceptance is dangerous. So in the remaining paragraphs of this section and in the following section, this thesis will be studied and its limits discovered.

Lonergan terms the position which advocates doing history without presuppositions the "principle of the empty head." The implication often left unstated is that the historian should proceed without all that he has learned, internalized from his society and accepted as ordinary good sense. In effect, the principle asks him to

32 "To say that the historian should operate without presuppositions is to assert the principle of the empty head, to urge that the historian should be uneducated, to claim that he should be exempted from the process variously named socialization and acculturation, to strip him of historicity. For the historian's presuppositions are not just his but also the living on in him of developments that human society and culture have slowly accumulated over the centuries." Method in Theology, p. 223.
shed his historicity. The improbable consequence of such a hopeless venture would be a second infancy. 33

There may be an alternative. Perhaps the historian does not arrive at presuppositionless history by discarding his horizon but by acknowledging it and by making explicit all that it contains. If the preconceptions contained in his complex background can be thematized, perhaps they can be rationally defended. One can envision this possibility of justifying the historian's horizon by proofs. But, for a number of reasons, this alternative holds out only a false hope. Since the historian employs ordinary language, the proposed alternative would require that, as a first step, he formulate a technical language free of the ambiguities of ordinary speech. Such a formal apparatus is available in mathematics and in most forms of

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33 Lonergan projects the earnings of this methodological program, in his "Bernard Lonergan Responds," in Foundations of Theology, edited by Philip McShane (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972), p. 228. In another place he cites the works of Carl Becker and R. G. Collingwood as offering arguments against the thesis of presuppositionless history. See Method in Theology, pp. 203-205. A logician who has contributed a valuable and exceptionally readable study of historical fictions and misdirected controversies has termed the thesis the "Baconian fallacy." He notes the thesis is deficient in two ways: "it commits a historian to the pursuit of an impossible object by an impracticable method." The historian is expected to conduct an induction of historical particulars without being selective and, as a reward, to attain the whole truth about something. (This recommendation to wander blindly amid a chaos of particulars perhaps deserves Lonergan's more provocative label.) Cf. D. H. Fischer, Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, pp. 4-8.
logic. But it is lacking in history and unlikely to be produced given the human content of the historical field.

Furthermore, the alternative fails because the content of the historian's relative horizon can never be completely explicated. The historian sets to work on the basis of all the common-sense opinions that he has learned and spontaneously assimilated. The wealth of experience at his disposal, particularly his common sense, is not formulated as specific knowledge, nor is it ever available to him in more than an incomplete state. For example, faced with a specific problem, the individual may, on the basis of his common-sense resources, know how to act. But this "knowing-how-to-act" requires an insight into the specific problem and is not complete prior to that insight. Thus, on one occasion a counsel of caution may be appropriate, on another occasion a counsel of haste. Consequently,

34 A more extended discussion of the necessary incompleteness of common-sense knowledge is available in Insight, pp. 175-176.

To admit that the historian cannot thematize all the content of his relative horizon is not necessarily to admit that bias is uncontrollable. First, preconceptions are not necessarily biased opinions. They may in fact be biased, but what separates preconceptions from bias is the occurrence of critical reflection which questions the validity of preconceptions in order to discover hidden bias. Second, as we will note in more detail in Chapter Four, there are public-professional checks on any aberrations in the individual's scholarship. That is, if the individual does not correct the effects of bias in his work, others may; and they are likely to trace the effects back to the causes—the individual's hidden biases.

However, even critics cannot uncover all the content of an individual's relative horizon. This is true not only for historians but for anyone engaged in scholarly
some of the preconceptions of one's personal background are only thematized in relation to specific contexts and cannot be formulated in the absence of those variable situations. In short, the historian's horizon will always be more extensive than his explicit knowledge. Within that horizon there is a fund of implicit "know-how" upon which he can draw to meet particular crises. But, in crisis-free periods, that "know-how" remains implicit and incomplete.

If the content of the historian's horizon cannot be fully explicated, does that force him to admit that bias may well be inescapable? "Bias" has many meanings and must be carefully analyzed if one is not to become confused and, as some writers have done, conclude that the mere presence of bias is an insurmountable obstacle to historical objectivity. But the topic of bias and of detachment from it belongs to the fourth chapter. For now we limit ourselves to two objections against unrealistic demands placed upon the historian. First, he cannot be required to pursue his inquiries without the use of the content of his relative horizon. Otherwise what is demanded is that he become an ahistorical, unsocialized being; or scientific studies. For research in every field begins with common sense and, no matter how far one moves away from everyday speech and understanding, common sense is repeatedly consulted in planning experiments and strategies for convincing one's audience.
and such a creature is not to be found. Second, he cannot be required to thematize all the preconceptions which he brings to his study of the past. In the first place, he lacks the linguistic tools for clarifying all the ambiguities which attend his everyday reflections on his life. In the second place, part of the content of his horizon must remain incomplete. Still, the historian usually distinguishes between competent work and the arbitrary assertions which proceed either from carelessness or from some form of bias. Just as he feels a responsibility to make competent use of his resources, so he usually recognizes an obligation to control his bias. But in both cases his efforts will be distinctively personal. Even in remedying the defects in his background, the historian will be drawing upon resources within that background.

The preceding comments were intended to articulate the meaning of the thesis that the historian's preconceptions modify his work. Some further specifics can be added to this general thesis. First, the historian's horizon promotes neglect of what lies outside his previous interests and developed understanding. Second, his horizon inclines him to choose some interpretations of events and to discard others.

If the historian is not deluded by the principle of the empty head, he will recognize in his actual performance the operation which we have termed "selectivity."
This operation will be based in part on the preconceptions which he brings to his research. The four subjective variables described above have generally characterized the preconceptions which may be involved. The point previously established is that his relative horizon is an irre­placeable guide to his research. Now to discover and to investigate what is compatible with his horizon is not too difficult. But what lies outside his previous interests and his present understanding will only be seen with difficulty. His horizon is limited, and what lies beyond it will not be investigated simply because it will not seem significant. This is to say, his horizon will exclude some matters. For example, Thucydides ignored evidence of the economic origins of the Peloponnesian War. He did so, not because he thought such evidence inconclusive, but because it did not enter his mind that it was evidence. His horizon specified the relevant areas of information, and the suggestion of relevancy never arose in regard to economic conditions.

Given several different interpretations of the same event, a historian's horizon will direct his choice of the most plausible interpretation. Lonergan draws several examples from Carl Becker's work in support of this statement. Lonergan notes that extremes in early Christian asceticism are anomalies to present-day adults. The

\[35^\text{Method in Theology}, \text{pp. 246-247.}\]
motives prompting such practices no longer belong to our general experience. When presented with such oddities, we usually are quick to pronounce them pathological. As a further example, Lonergan cites Carl Becker's remarks on the a priori exclusion of the possibility of miracles. If a person's horizon contains the presupposition that miracles are impossible, then no number of witnesses to the contrary will shake this position. Instead, it will be far easier to categorize their testimony as mass hysteria or willful dishonesty.\(^{36}\)

In summary, the preceding study of Lonergan's horizon analysis has clarified some of the connections between the historian's precritical preconceptions about history and his surface procedures. The multiple points of contact were classified as either subjective or objective components of the historian's horizon. As predeterminants of the historian's surface procedures, these components offer ample evidence to refute the thesis of presuppositionless history. However, the denial of this thesis did not

\(^{36}\)Ibid., pp. 221-223. The examples are drawn from Carl Becker's Detachment and the Writing of History, edited by Phil Snyder (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1958). It is the test of a good historian to overcome initial antipathies to beliefs and values not his own. Whether he ends by sharing those beliefs and values is not the issue. What is important is that he understand them and not reject them out of hand as repugnant abnormalities. In addition, the historian's own horizon can be illuminated and perhaps even corrected by encountering the values and beliefs of other times and other people. A concise statement on this point is offered in Method in Theology, p. 247.
guarantee a clear understanding of the antithesis, and so we transformed the latter from a simple cliché to a formula with a specific meaning. The antithetical position does not automatically entail either scholarly research or arbitrary assertions. The historian's complex horizon can be the basis for competent research, but it can also promote oversights of important evidence as well as a heavy-handed rejection of plausible interpretations. Given this possibility of ambiguous results, the antithesis to presuppositionless history must be investigated in more detail. We will do this in the following section. In turning to the topic of perspectivism, we will be further specifying how from different horizons come different interpretations of the same events.
THEESIS OF PERSPECTIVISM

Lonergan uses the term "perspectivism" in a limited sense. He intends that it apply to different but not incompatible histories. He details three characteristics of such histories: (1) They are not contradictory, (2) they do not provide complete information or explanation, (3) they are incomplete and approximate accounts of very complex realities. With the exception of some disputed details, historical works sharing the same topic are usually compatible. But contradictory histories do occur. One need only explore the extensive bibliographies on the French Revolution or the works on the New England Puritans to find examples. Differences in relative horizons surely lie at the root of such irreconcilable historical interpretations. But, beyond such differences, there are what Lonergan terms fundamental divergences, not in relative horizons, but in basic horizons. These fundamental conflicts in basic horizons will be treated in later

37 Ibid., Method in Theology, p. 224, footnote 91. For a broader use of the term, see W. H. Walsh, Philosophy of History: An Introduction, pp. 106-107.

38 Ibid., Method in Theology, pp. 218-219.

chapters. For now we limit ourselves to a treatment of compatible and not contradictory, historical perspectives.

In the introductory remarks to this chapter, the point was made that the standard progressive ideal of science is not realistically applied to history. The thesis of perspectivism is a substitute for that ideal. By replacing the former ideal, the thesis of perspectivism makes sense of the ongoing revision of historical thought and eliminates the scandal of the incompleteness of every historical work. The latter incompleteness results from the finitude of the historian and from the consequent of that finitude, the historian's selectivity.

The complexity of the past, the masses of records preserved, the diversity of possible areas of historical inquiry--these force the historian to recognize his own limits. He must proceed selectively and forego the hope of producing the definitive account of some issue. W. H. Walsh draws a distinction within the process of selectivity. First, the process is departmental, i.e. an area or set of related areas forms the limited field of investigation. Thus, a historian may select the economic aspects of a particular crisis as his area of concentration while leaving aside matters of religious or military import. Second, the process of selectivity operates within the departmental confines. Not all the economic aspects are deserving of equal emphasis; some of them may be ignored.
altogether. Both areas of selectivity will bear the imprint of the historian's relative horizon. His education, developed interests, common-sense beliefs will be called upon in narrowing down the mountains of potential evidence. But, as noted above, the horizon cannot be fully articulated. Consequently, the process of selectivity is at least partially rooted in sources which escape the control of the critical historian. There is no way of establishing which records are worthy of every historian's interest and close attention. There are no criteria available for arguing that it is better to write biographies instead of monographs.

The unavoidability of historical selection is a commonplace. One historian speaks of a "necessary ignorance" which the modern historian must nourish if he is to write

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40 W. H. Walsh, Philosophy of History: An Introduction, pp. 97-98. The author goes on to point out that the historian's choice among aspects to be included and to be emphasized is, in part, determined by the interests, beliefs and values which he brings to the work at hand. In terms of this dissertation: the historian's horizon directs the process of selectivity. Similar remarks are made by Morton White in his Foundations of Historical Knowledge, pp. 252-253.

41 'The process of selecting has its main element in a common-sense, spontaneous development of understanding that can be objectified in its results but not in its actual occurrence. In turn, this process is conditioned by the whole earlier process of the historian's development and attainments; and this development is not an object of complete information and complete explanation. In brief, the process of selection is not subject to objectified controls either in itself or in its initial conditions.' Method of Theology, p. 218.
history and not to succumb to antiquarianism. But the ensuing problem is whether, in opting for a partial (i.e. an incomplete) narrative, the historian is condemned to presenting a partial (i.e. a biased) interpretation. Raymond Aron argues that incompleteness is a form of partiality or bias. But this position has an unacceptable presupposition. It presupposes that completeness alone is the measure of unbiased historical narration. But then, it is requiring that the historian proceed as an unhistorical being, i.e. as one who has no particular temporal standpoint and no personal life history.

In contrast, we have argued that the determinate standpoint of the historian is the necessary condition for his understanding the past. He must be selective, and the results he produces will be incomplete. But the alternative is the mindless and aimless attempt to say everything, the result of which is to say nothing. So the historian seeks to understand something of the past and his efforts presuppose a finite starting point. But that presupposed starting point.

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42 Edward Hallett Carr, What Is History?, p. 14. Even outside the field of history, this opinion on historical selectivity is held. "In so far as history aspires to meaning, it is doomed to select regions, periods, groups of men and individuals in these groups and to make them stand out, as discontinuous figures, against a continuity barely good enough to be used as a backdrop. A truly total history would cancel itself out--its product would be nought." Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, p. 257.

point cannot condemn him from the very beginning to bias or to a lack of understanding if it itself is a precondition to understanding anything about the past. Consequently, selectivity is not necessarily arbitrary, but it is necessarily a part of the doing of history. \(^44\) That a historian's choice of emphasis or that his decision on what to exclude can distort his results is obvious, but such a distortion is laid at the door, not of selectivity, but of one of the forms of bias. \(^45\)

Variables behind Different Histories

The finitude of the historian and the resulting process of selectivity are two elements accounting for different but compatible histories. A third element was briefly

\(^44\)"Any area of knowledge only becomes intelligible through some principle of selection; the standpoint of the investigator cannot be eliminated because it is the condition of understanding. That is not to say, however, that it must lead to subjective or arbitrary assessments. To find a meaning in a situation is not thereby to introduce it from outside but rather to give coherence to what men have found meaningful." Gordon Leff, History and Social Theory (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1969), p. 46. W. H. Walsh argues convincingly along the same lines. "It ought, however, to be obvious that the fact that history selects by no means implies that it is subjective in any bad sense. If a narrative is condensed, it is not necessarily biased: it may be liable to mislead because of what is left out, but omission is not vicious in itself so long as only the relatively trivial and unimportant are omitted." Philosophy of History: An Introduction, p. 178.

\(^45\)In Chapter Four we will discuss Lonergan's position on the four forms of bias and on the possibility of achieving detachment from them.
noted, namely, the fact that the historian's horizon cannot be fully explicated. This third element does not refer to a static set of beliefs or values. Its general reference is to the historicity of the historian for whom situations constantly change and from whom new responses are repeatedly required. As a result, this historicity is itself something incomplete, and the limited understanding and selectivity which grow out of it will be undergoing change. In short, the elements which compose the thesis of perspectivism are not fixed but are in flux. These are general variables at the origins of different historical perspectives which, in turn, yield different histories.

Additional variables are also found in the preliminary activity of historical questioning. Noted above was Lonergan's view that the knowing process is basically a matter of raising and answering questions. We can agree with this view because, while understanding is sometimes spontaneous, it usually requires effort, and the effort to understand takes explicit form in questioning. Since the historian does not benefit from immediate intuition into the past, he must raise his historical experience to historical knowing by asking questions. Marc Bloch offers

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46 Method in Theology, p. 218.

47 One implication—there are others—of this view is that history becomes not a story-telling discipline but a problem-solving one. D. H. Fischer argues this point in his Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, pp. xii, xv and 131, Footnote 1.
an example of the indispensable role which questioning plays in gaining historical knowledge.

Before Boucher de Perthes, as in our own day, there was plenty of flint artifacts in the aluvium of the Somme. However, there was no one to ask questions, and there was therefore no prehistory. 48

Questioning, then, is a prerequisite to historical research. If this is so, then the thesis of perspectivism implies that variables will also be found in historical questioning.

Such variables are evident in two areas: (1) in the decisions on what questions to ask and (2) in the linguistic categories used to formulate the questions. The first area belongs to the topic of selectivity which we treated above. The historian begins to inquire not out of a vacuum but on the basis of all that he has previously learned and valued. In other words, his horizon is the background for his questioning. On that basis he attempts to pass from the known unknown to the known. 49 And if selectivity is the

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48 The Historian's Craft, p. 64. Bloch goes on to add these remarks: "... every historical research supposes that the inquiry has a direction at the very first step. In the beginning, there must be the guiding spirit. Mere passive observation, even supposing such a thing were possible, has never contributed anything productive to any science." Ibid., p. 65.

49 David Tracy phrases this point concisely: "For every authentic question involves a heuristic anticipation of an unknown (the questionable) that is in some way already known (as questioned)." The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, p. 126. At a phenomenological level, one might talk of such heuristic anticipations as part of the "forestructure" of all interpretation. See Martin Heidegger's Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 189-195.
result of the finitude of the questioner, specific questions will be the form which this selectivity takes. The historian will not be asking the question which intends some single meaning of history. But he will be asking a series of questions aimed, not at knowing everything about everything, nor at knowing everything about something, but at knowing something about something. His choice of that "something" to be questioned will be, at least in part, determined by the interests, opinions and values contained in his horizon. It is in this sense that we can say that historical questioning proceeds from variable sources in the different horizons of different historians.

Variables are also found in the linguistic categories which are used to formulate historical questions. Noted above was the historian's use of ordinary language. In order to ask questions, he must employ some terms, and those most frequently chosen are the ones which lie nearest at hand. But the ambiguities attached to everyday speech are the source of diverse meanings and the potential source of subsequent misunderstandings. The historian's critics

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50 David Hackett Fischer, Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, p. 5. The author remarks that those who ignore these limitations to questioning are either guilty of the Baconian fallacy or have wandered into speculative philosophy of history. Henri Marrou offers some pertinent comments on both the infinite number (practically speaking) of possible questions which could be asked of one portion of the past and the variability of concepts which could be used to formulate responses to the questions. The Meaning of History, p. 235.
may mistake his basic intent and either disagree with a position he never assumed or agree with a position he never thought of holding. From such misunderstandings result conflicting interpretations not only in history but also in historiography. And the ambiguities of ordinary language are much to blame. Hayden White emphasizes the role language plays in historical disputes. Poetic expressions as well as ordinary language account in part for differing interpretations of the same material. Both White's study and the preceding remarks on horizons indicate that one's choice of linguistic categories with which to ask historical questions is a variable. And if the grounds for choosing expressions can vary, then so can the expressions themselves.

In summary, the variable base of the thesis of perspectivism was further specified by two insights. First, historians proceed by questioning, and the questions they choose to ask will vary according to the horizons of the different historians. Second, the expression which they give to their questions follows upon a choice of linguistic categories deemed adequate for their purposes. But those categories often are spontaneously drawn from everyday speech. Therefore, the formulated questions are open to all the ambiguities of ordinary language. There is no

51 For the sake of brevity, we omit examples and specific arguments for this conclusion. Hayden White has amply supplied both examples and arguments for it in his *Metahistory*. 
agreed-upon technical language for the historian, and, as a result, linguistic expressions of inquiry will vary from historian to historian.

Finally, just as perspectivism was said to follow from the rootedness of human finitude and of the process of selectivity in history, so too the historian's questions are affected by his own historicity. The questions he asks and the expression he gives them are never final. To paraphrase Collingwood, historical questioning is a river into which none can step twice; upon returning to a previous question, the historian may find that it has changed.\textsuperscript{52}

It may now seem inadequate or its once unnoticed profundity may now surprise him. In either case, the thesis of perspectivism, which accounts for different histories from different historians, may also cover instances of different histories from the same historian.

\textbf{Historical Revisions}

All of the above elements of historical perspectivism contribute to what is for some a scandal among historians, namely, the rewriting of history by each new generation. But those who find ongoing revision scandalous are likely to have unrealistic views of what the historian does. They overlook the variables noted above; and so, in effect, expect the historian to write from a position above his

own history. But the impossibility of attaining such a trans-historical standpoint is not fatal to communication among historians. Though rooted in his own place and time, the historian can still understand and appreciate the views and values of other people in other times and places. If such understanding and appreciation were not attainable, the historian would be in the paradoxical position of writing only of the present while in fact he intended to say something of the past. But the doing of history is proof of such horizon-transcendence. Furthermore, historians have been known to cooperate on projects. In order to do so, they must be able to understand one another and to move from diverging to converging views on the past. But there is another variable yet to be considered in explaining how interpretations agreed on by the vast majority of historians can still be subject to revision.

This further variable is easily stated: the significance of the past changes with the present. Again, the

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53 The classic example of this expectation is the perhaps apochryphal story about Fustel de Coulanges. Upon being applauded by his students for a lecture he gave, the French historian is said to have remonstrated, "Do not applaud me. It is not I who speak to you, but history which speaks through my mouth."

54 What it means to do history will be a topic of Chapters Four and Five. Historical procedures will be treated at length in Chapter Four. What is asserted in historical judgments (i.e. what from a present standpoint is said of the past) will be considered under the heading of "historical realism" in Chapter Five.
historian understands the past by questioning it, and the questions asked will reflect the ongoing development of the historian's horizon. Therefore, as his interests in the present change, so his questions change, and the answers he finds significant may well be new. In addition, relatively recent events have yet to reveal their full import, for their consequences may still be only partially understood. Thus, the history of the Paris Commune may be rewritten yet another time if the students and workers take to the streets of Paris as they did in 1968. In effect, this is to say that our awareness of the significance of a past event is limited by our ignorance of the future.\textsuperscript{55} Future events may and often do alter the meaning of the past for us. Consequently, revision is possible for even the most widely accepted interpretations.

Of course, revision is not the result of an ever-changing past but of variables in historians' horizons. The past itself is fixed, but it is also enormously complex. Because of the historian's finitude and all the variables described above, this fixed but complex past can only be known incompletely.\textsuperscript{56} And so we can expect future

\textsuperscript{55}Arthur Danto uses this insight to argue effectively against the possibility of a comprehensive history. *Analytical Philosophy of History*, pp. 14-16.

\textsuperscript{56}Lonergan phrases this point as follows: "The past is fixed and its intelligible structures are unequivocal; but the past that is so fixed and unequivocal is the enormously complex past that historians know only incompletely and approximately. It is incomplete and approximate
incomplete accounts which will revise present historical works. At the center of such efforts at revision will be new projects, new interests, which reflect a different present.57

This third section can be briefly summarized. Lonergan adopts the term "perspectivism" to account for different but compatible histories which are incomplete accounts of complex events. The basis of their incompleteness consists of various elements: the finitude of the historian, the selectivity process entailed by this finitude, the involvement of both in the ongoing history of the individual writer. Additional variables which account for different historical perspectives were studied. Questioning appeared as a prerequisite to historical knowledge. And knowledge of the past that gives rise to perspectivism." Method in Theology, p. 220.

57 Both Nietzsche and Heidegger have written at length upon this topic, the former speaking of a "monumental" sense of history and the latter of "authentic historicity." A person looks to the past, not primarily for an accurate understanding of what has been (wie es eigentlich gewesen), but for insight into possibilities for contemporary living. What can the past tell me about what it means to be human? --this is the sort of question to be asked of history. Nietzsche's comments are found in his The Use and Abuse of History, translated by Adrian Collins (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1957), especially pp. 14-17. Heidegger's remarks occur in Being and Time, especially pp. 435-449. Obviously one can argue that critical history has grown out of this prior sense of history and has established its independence through controlled inquiry. But the fact remains that new questions in the present can require a reappraisal of past interpretations. And there seems to be no reason for excluding questions of human authenticity from those questions which may legitimately require a new critical effort to interpret the past.
questioning involves at least three variables: the choice of what question to ask, the linguistic framing of the inquiry, the mutability of the question itself relative to the questioner's own historicity. Finally, a consequence of perspectivism was treated. Historical revisions are the result of the previous variables as well as of the changing significance of the past for those who study it in the present. Our clarification of the variables involved in the historian's work supplements the moral, aesthetic, and linguistic variables listed by Hayden White. As elements determining the historian's adoption of a paradigm or of a perspective, these variables were in need of clarification if an adequate account of the crisis of historicism was to be given. In the final section of this chapter, one additional variable—a crucial one for the purpose of this dissertation—will be added to those already mentioned.
The main thesis of this fourth section is the following: the historian's awareness of his own intellectual abilities is fundamental to his historical perspective. By "historian" we do not mean the neophyte who ventures into the profession eager to learn the techniques of his more advanced colleagues. Rather, we have in mind the professional historian whose years of study and of writing have been occasionally marked by doubts regarding the results of his efforts.\(^5\)\(^8\)

The distinction made in section two between relative and basic horizons is of importance here. Section three was devoted to specifying the content of relative horizons. This content, when joined to the finitude of the historian, provided a list of variables at the root of historical perspectives. The "relativity" of relative horizons was accounted for in terms of these variables. But besides the

\(^{58}\) Lonergan is sounding a common refrain when he notes that most historians have but a vague notion of what historical knowledge is. "The precise object of historical inquiry and the precise nature of historical investigation are matters of not a little obscurity. This is not because there are no good historians. It is not because good historians have not by and large learnt what to do. It is mainly because historical knowledge is an instance of knowledge, and few people are in possession of a satisfactory cognitional theory." Method in Theology, p. 175. The qualifications which Lonergan puts on his first statement are an indication that he is aware of the complaint that philosophers of history often seem to be telling the professional historian what he ought to do. The recurrent controversies over historical knowledge offer sufficient evidence for Lonergan's qualified assertion about historians and the estimations which they form of their own intellectual abilities. John Higham sketches the rhythm of these controversies among American historians. History (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 89-91.
historian's psychological, social and cultural development, there is the estimate he makes regarding his own intellectual abilities. Again, such an estimate may suffer from obscurity, but the professional historian will have some awareness of the different positions advanced in the debates over historical objectivity, and he may even take part in the ongoing controversy. The opinion which he has formulated, no matter how inconclusively, will belong to his basic horizon.\(^{59}\)

Differences of opinion on the issues identified with basic horizons are easily discovered. Lonergan surveys three handbooks on historical method and finds conflicting opinions on the relationship between historical facts and their intelligible interconnections.\(^{60}\) These handbooks were published in the nineteenth century, but the same disputes are found in the twentieth. Carl Becker, R. G. Collingwood, Henri-Irénée Marrou are studied as representative historians of the period which follows the so-called

\(^{59}\) No attempt is made in this chapter to evaluate different relative or basic horizons. Our main purpose is to account for the origins of the different historical perspectives. In this section, we limit ourselves to establishing that what Lonergan terms "basic horizon" is a fundamental aspect of the historian's perspective on the past. As such, a variance in basic horizons may yield different histories of the same events. The diagram on the following page sketches the role of both relative and basic horizons in the choice of historical perspectives and in subsequent surface procedures.

\(^{60}\) Method in Theology, pp. 198-201. The handbooks are those by Droysen, Bernheim, Langlois and Seignobos.
DIAGRAM: HORIZONS AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVISM

The Unknown Unknown

The Questioned (Unknown Known)

↑

Use of Historical Procedures, Selection of Potential Evidence, Narration

↑

The Adoption of Historical Perspectives

↑

The Questioner (Known Known)

(existential history of the questioner)

Relative Horizon

Subjective finitude

Objective finitude

Basic Horizon

View of historical knowing

moral and aesthetic aspirations

use of ordinary language

poetic insights

education

personal interests

received concerns of the era

interiorized common-sense opinions

historian's estimation of his own intellectual abilities

(alternative estimates based on type of horizon: differentiated, troubled, undifferentiated)
Copernican Revolution in historiography. No longer is the historian expected to passively allow the facts to "speak for themselves." The critical and constructive activity of the historian is now recognized as essential to the writing of history. 61 But this revolution did not put an end to disputes over basic issues of objectivity and historical method. Though simplistic notions of objectivity belonging to the positivist school have been retired, there are new controversies over the extent to which bias, relative beliefs, and subjective imagination influence the historical work. 62

Types of Conflict among Historical Perspectives

Again, a thesis of this section is that differences in basic horizons yield conflicts among historical perspectives (or paradigms). First, it should be noted that there are several types of conflicts. Two historians may hold conflicting views simply because one of them does not have all the information had by the other. Such conflicts require further research in order to be settled, and they are


62 A collection of conflicting opinions on these issues has been assembled by Hans Meyerhoff in The Philosophy of History in Our Time. See especially the reprinted articles by Becker, Beard, Aron, Dewey, Walsh, and Morton White.
not actually conflicts either of perspectives or on basic issues of historical knowledge. But there are also the conflicts mentioned in the preceding section on perspectivism. There conflicts of interpretation were traced back to variables in relative horizons. These variables likewise accounted for differences in historical perspectives. Lonergan distinguishes two types of perspectival differences: complementary and genetic. The former type is exemplified by the departmental approach to research, i.e. the historian selectively studies economic, military, political or religious aspects of a set of events. The product of such selective inquiry may supplement other studies based on different aspects of the same set of events. But no single work will be comprehensive. Given historical complexity, each study will remain incomplete. Thus, complementary differences can be attributed to what was described above as the historian's finitude.

Genetic differences are more appropriately traced to the historicity of the individual, i.e. to the ongoing development of worlds of meaning into which he is capable of entering. Genetic differences mark varying points

63 Method in Theology, pp. 235-236.

64 See footnote 15, section two of this chapter. Obviously the finitude and historicity of the individual are intertwined, and we do not mean to separate them. But they can be distinguished for our purposes. For example, Macaulay's history of England is a more advanced form of historical expression than Bede the Venerable's chronicle because the objective pole of the former's relative horizon
along a line of development in the objective and subjective aspects of relative horizons. For example, the history written by Bede the Venerable is anterior to the history of England produced by Macaulay. "Anterior" not simply chronologically but also in the sense that the chronicle antedates and is a less developed historical form than the social narrative. In short, genetic differences will be present whenever two historians operate at different stages of historical expression. A variance in the development of subjective aspects will be in evidence whenever a critical historian opposes the efforts of an author who seeks, for political reasons, to revive the folk legends of an earlier period.

Besides differences in relative horizons, there are fundamental conflicts growing out of different basic horizons. Such conflicts are neither complementary nor genetic, but dialectical. They are dialectical because they lead to mutual repudiation on the part of those involved. Lonergan's description of the dialectical confrontation is was more sophisticated. Both writers were obviously finite, but their "worlds of meaning" were not the same.

Lonergan sketches the stages of development for the objective side of historiographical horizons, in Method in Theology, pp. 182-189.

Examples are presented by Peter Gay. He criticizes the regressive and uncritical positions of some German historians who advanced mythical heroes as historical figures. Weimar Culture (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 49-51.
concise. "What in one is found intelligible is in another unintelligible. What for one is true, for another is false. What for one is good, for another is evil." He cites two examples: astrology as unintelligible to some people, genocide as evil to most. These are positions which, when publicized, reveal horizons which are dialectically opposed to those of at least part of the audience. That both astrology and genocide have their proponents is a fact. But most listeners will find statements in defense of genocide morally repugnant. The most favorable remark they can make is that such statements reflect moral blindness and a naive acceptance of racial myths. And most listeners will ascribe the recurrent interest in astrology to ignorance and intellectual immaturity. Can rational arguments mediate these basic conflicts? Perhaps --but the usual response is either an outburst of moral indignation or the devastating ridicule of silence. That is to say, mutual repudiation is the usual outcome of the meeting of dialectically opposed horizons.

Less dramatic conflicts originating from opposed basic horizons occur in discussions of historical knowledge. What exactly can the historian claim to know? While it is unlikely that any historian would label his own assertions

67 Method in Theology, p. 236.
68 Ibid., p. 237.
69 Ibid., p. 247.
about the past mere inventions of his creative imagination, there are disagreements about historical knowledge which come close to implying just such a conclusion. The positivist school of historiography in the last century argued that historical facts were "givens." In his study of them, the historian was to be free of preconceptions. In a contrary position, historical facts were considered to be primarily instruments for solving social problems in the present. Subjective convictions about past events may lead to action in the present, and it was argued that this allowed for a pragmatic test of the validity of those convictions. Between these two positions lie numerous less controversial opinions which recognize the constructive role of the historian without identifying that role with an apologetics for current social programs.

If the persistence of such disputes is evident, does that prove more than that historians have theoretical

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70 A possible exception may be the work of a philosopher of history who argues in various ways for historical skepticism. J. W. Meiland, Skepticism and Historical Knowledge (New York: Random House, 1965).

71 Fustel de Coulanges is often cited as the classic representative of this position. See his characteristic remark quoted in D. H. Fischer, Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, p. 6.

72 Though he held a number of positions on historical knowledge during his professional career, Carl Becker is frequently mentioned as the leading proponent of this pragmatic theory of historical truth. See the discussion by Robert Allen Skotheim, American Intellectual Histories and Historians (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 114-118.
problems which defy easy solution? Why should such problems be identified with a historian's basic horizon? What is so "basic" about them? Hayden White locates epistemological issues on the surface level of the historical text. More basic than epistemological issues is the deep structure in which opinions on objectivity and on facts receive precritical sanction.73 Translated into Lonergan's terminology, this is to say: the historian's epistemological opinions are first arrived at on the basis of his relative horizon. The variability of relative horizons accounts in part for disagreements on matters of method and factualness. But this is not to say that theoretical advances cannot later modify initial preconceptions about historical facts. It really says no more than that relative horizons are chronologically prior to the clarification of issues belonging to basic horizons. Put more directly, the historian first amasses a wealth of common-sense positions before he engages in theoretical work.74

Genetically Distinct Levels of Meaning

In what sense is the historian's basic horizon more fundamental than his relative horizon? An answer will require a digression on genetically distinct levels of meaning. Already granted is the temporal priority of the

73Metahistory, p. x.
74Method in Theology, p. 85.
individual's relative horizon to his basic horizon. As noted in section two, common-sense opinions are one element of this prior relative horizon. A person is first taken up with the practical concerns of living, and he employs ordinary language to express everyday problems and their solutions. But historically, needs other than those met by common sense have arisen. Lonergan cites Socrates' search for definitions as an example of a need which common sense could not fulfill. The Socratic questions on virtue baffled the best common-sense opinions available. Other examples can be adduced to reflect a historical differentiation of levels of meaning. The primary examples will be drawn from the history of science. What they exemplify is the emergence of a realm of theoretical meanings from the prior realm of common-sense meanings. No longer is everyday language sufficient for meeting the needs of scientific thought. New technical languages are forthcoming which express in a distinctive way the theoretical meanings of scientific disciplines.

What Lonergan carefully outlines is both a historical process and a possible development for individual human consciousness. Historically the development of science by the Greeks marked the differentiation of two modes of consciousness: common sense and theory. Individually it is

75Ibid., pp. 82-84.
76The historical transition made by the Greeks between
possible to become a scientist and thus to operate on both
levels of meaning. But the distinction between these two
modes is not immediately clear. Perhaps common sense is
nothing but primitive ignorance which science gradually
replaces. Or perhaps science is only an elaborate but ab-
tract extension of everyday know-how which allows control
of the environment without providing knowledge of the world
itself. What then is human knowing? These issues raise
further questions, not about the world, but about the hu-
man subject who claims to understand something of the past.
And to meet these questions on their own ground requires a
consideration of the knowing process as it occurs in the
performance of the subject. Inquiry into the knowing pro-
cess need not take the historian far from his routine ac-
tivities. He does research, asks questions, makes discov-
eries, proposes conclusions. He can then reflect on what
he himself has been doing. In Lonergan's terminology, the
historian can carry on an inquiry into his own human inter-
iority. And there is the likelihood that such an inquiry
will lead to the discovery of his own intellectual activi-
ties, their potentialities and the structure of their oc-
currence.77

these two modes of consciousness is recounted in a work to
which Lonergan frequently refers. Bruno Snell, The Discov-
Tracy provides a brief summary of the differences between
common sense and theory, in The Achievement of Bernard

77Method in Theology, p. 83. These points will be
developed in Chapter Three.
We stop short of exploring Lonergan's central theme of self-appropriation and the heightening of consciousness. Other chapters will resume where this section leaves off. A limited goal has already been reached. Historically human consciousness has been differentiated into at least three modes: common sense, theory, human interiority. These distinctions are a matter of historical record from the emergence of science with the Greeks to the turn to human subjectivity which was initially made by Descartes and later elaborated by Kant.78

The preceding digression on genetically distinct levels of meaning was made in order to answer a question: In what sense is the historian's basic horizon more fundamental than his relative horizon? An answer is now possible. The question of historical objectivity (to take but one issue) cannot be answered adequately on the level of common sense.79 And the question is not the direct concern of theoretical consciousness which first attends to objects and not to the attending and thinking process itself. If there is an answer to be found, it will be discovered by

78 Lonergan briefly sketches these transitions, in *ibid.*, pp. 95-96.

79 The writer offers in support of this claim the arguments put forward in Plato's dialogue *Theaetetus*. While not directly concerned with historical knowledge (indeed Plato would say there is no such knowledge), the dialogue offers ample proof that epistemological problems are not settled within the realm of common sense.
the subject's reflection on his own acts of intending which are prerequisites to reaching any conclusions either on the common-sense or on the theoretical levels.

As noted above, the historian may have only obscure opinions on what it means to know. His entrance into the world of interiority may be half-hearted. While aware of scientific views which baffle his common-sense views, he may locate such differences, not within the multiple modes of human consciousness, but in the failings of ordinary language. 80 Whatever his explanation of these differences, there remains evidence of widespread confusion among historians on the distinctions between common sense and theory. 81 Our present position, which will be elaborated in Chapter Three, is that such confusion requires a study of human interiority. For now, the concern is for conflicts in basic horizons. Lonergan draws some distinctions to throw light on the origins of these conflicts. The absence of any awareness at all of differences among common sense, theory, and human interiority is said to mark an "undifferentiated" basic horizon. A partial but inadequate awareness of the three distinct levels of meaning is said

80 Hayden White appears to take just such a position, in Metahistory, p. xi, p. 12, pp. 428-429.

81 A prime example of this confusion occurs in many of the contemporary discussions of "covering laws" and deductive models for historical explanation. Chapter Five will have more to say on this misguided debate.
to mark a "troubled" basic horizon. An explicit understanding and affirmation of the distinct levels both in themselves and in their interrelations is said to mark a "differentiated" basic horizon. 82

These distinctions can be used to classify the varying positions regarding historical objectivity. Our thesis is that the historian cannot get around holding some opinions on the issue of objectivity. The questions involved may seem bothersome, even dangerous if he sees himself being drawn into a philosophical labyrinth. He may dismiss the questions by pleading ignorance of such philosophical issues. He may try to get around the problems of historical knowledge by strictly limiting his work to the narrowest monographs. But try as he may, he will still be assuming a position on the issues, e.g. "An accurate understanding of any complex historical topic is quite rare." And such a position will be basic to his doing of history. It will either limit or encourage him in the projects which he is willing to undertake. It will be the basis for his confidence in the conclusions which he makes public. It will be the standpoint from which he measures the ambitions and works of his professional colleagues. If his position is that of the relativist, then the claims of other historians to provide true accounts of the past will seem so much self-deception. On the other hand, if

82 These distinctions are found in Method in Theology, p. 84.
he is aware of the difference between common sense and theory, then some pragmatic theories of historical knowledge will seem basically misleading. Whatever his stance, the opinions which form his basic horizon will be crucial to his work as a historian.

In summary, this fourth section began with the statement of a thesis: the historian's awareness of his own intellectual abilities is fundamental to his historical perspective. A corollary of this thesis is that differences in basic horizons yield conflicts in historical perspectives. Note was taken of the issues of historical objectivity and of value judgments in history. Though usually attended by obscurity, the opinions of a historian on these issues belong to his basic horizon. The fact that there are conflicts over these issues was briefly exemplified. But such conflicts on the level of basic horizon had to be distinguished from other types of conflict. Borrowing Lonergan's terminology, we described three types: complementary, genetic, dialectical. The first two types derive from differences in relative horizons; the third type from differences in basic horizons. Dialectical conflicts were characterized by the mutual

83 He will find some pragmatic theories misleading because they hold that historical conclusions are measured by their usefulness as instruments of social planning and not by what they accurately relate regarding the past. But this is to hold that historical narratives are only extensions of common-sense intelligence. What is overlooked is the part played by critical-theoretical consciousness.
repudiation which follows upon disagreements over fundamental issues of knowing and valuing.

Given two types of horizons belonging to the same subject, one can ask how they are related. While relative horizons are chronologically prior to the development of basic horizons, the latter are more fundamental in that they determine the scope of an author's historical work. This conclusion was arrived at by means of a digression. Three genetically distinct levels of meaning were studied: common sense, theory, human interiority. The individual may or may not understand these levels of meaning in their distinctness and interrelations. The different possibilities for understanding them are classified according to three types of basic horizon: undifferentiated, troubled, differentiated. The level to which the historian's consciousness of his own intellectual abilities has been developed can be characterized by one of these three types. Whatever level he is at, he will proceed to do history with at least vague opinions about what he can hope to know and about what value judgments, if any, he can legitimately make. If he confuses common sense and theory, his work as a historian may suffer. If he tackles the problem of historical knowledge, he may find that the only adequate approach lies in distinguishing a third level of meaning, human interiority. Thus we come around to our main thesis: the historian's awareness of his own
intellectual abilities is basic to his historical perspective.

**SUMMARY OF CHAPTER II**

This chapter opened with a proposal to supplement Hayden White's account of how diverse historical perspectives originate. Specific variables filled out his account of what lies behind developments in historical perspectives. In almost every case, these new variables were compatible with White's position. However, a crucial addition was proposed: the historian's consciousness of his own intellectual abilities is a basic element of his historical perspective. The type of basic horizon he has will be decisive in his choice of projects, in his expectations of success, and in his appraisals of the works of other historians. In subsequent chapters we will further clarify the content of basic horizons. Later discoveries about this cognitional aspect of every historical perspective promise to resolve basic problems of the crisis of historicism. Our central and most important discovery—cognitional structure—is the topic of the next chapter.
CHAPTER III

DIFFERENTIATED HORIZON AND TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD

INTRODUCTION

This third chapter takes two strategic steps toward reaching the goals of this dissertation. It further develops the "cognitional element" introduced in the previous chapter, thereby clarifying the content of a differentiated basic horizon. It also introduces the metahistorical grounds (i.e. cognitional structure) on which subsequent chapters will base responses to the fundamental problems of the crisis of historicism. If these responses are to be convincing, they must have a non-preferential grounding. Such a grounding is not available within the historical field. But, in this chapter, our starting point lies elsewhere—in human interiority. The cognitional theory which Lonergan develops and defends on the basis of human interiority will be supported by additional arguments. We will be particularly interested in discovering how critical Lonergan's formal account of human knowing is. His formal account is built upon an invariant structure in human cognition. The critical transcendental method formulating the components and dynamic unity
of this structure promises to effect a breakthrough in re-
gard to the theoretical impasse of the crisis of histori-
cism. Subsequent chapters will exploit what for this 
chapter is only initially advanced as promising such a 
breakthrough. Still, in a final section of Chapter Three, 
we will apply transcendental method as a critical tech-
nique to presuppositions of a specific historical perspec-
tive. Even in a preliminary way, this application of 
transcendental method will prove that the crisis is not 
entirely composed of insurmountable theoretical obstacles.

Hayden White argues convincingly that the crisis of 
historicism resulted from the recognition that adequate 
theoretical grounds were lacking for choosing among dif-
ferent historical perspectives. Choices which were made 
were based on personal preferences and had no compelling 
force for other historians. In short, historicism as a 
theory worked out its implications in the crisis period, 
and these were the basis for a radical subjectivism.

1 Metahistory, pp. 431-432.

2 G. G. Iggers notes the logical outcome, i.e. sub-
jectivism, to which historicism led, in his The German 
Conception of History, p. 243. Hayden White's proposal 
to overcome the ironic attitude in history by a new 
choice based on anti-ironic moral or aesthetic aspirations 
does not escape this conclusion. In his work, moral and 
aesthetic grounds for historical perspectives are treated 
solely as variables. Likewise, the historian's poetic in-
sight and subsequent refiguration of the historical field 
are said to be variables. The poetic insight can be cast 
in any number of linguistic forms since no formal termin-
ology has been agreed upon by professional historians. 
Thus, the choice of a linguistic form of expression con-
tributes to the uniquely personal style of the individual 
historian.
This conclusion is implicit in White's second thesis: There are no adequate theoretical grounds for choosing among the different ways of conceiving history.

In Chapter Two, note was taken of the various elements in a historian's relative horizon. White's first thesis on the moral and aesthetic grounds of historical perspectives was accepted but with the qualification that this thesis offered only a partial account of differences in historical perspectives. Among other needed additions to his incomplete survey was the element termed "basic horizon." In this chapter, the counterproposal made to White's second thesis further develops the previous discussion of basic horizons. The counterproposal is the following: The subject's differentiated basic horizon provides adequate metahistorical grounds for criticizing the cognitional elements of the historian's perspective.

The long-range strategy behind this counterproposal can be briefly indicated. Specifically, the process of differentiating a basic horizon is said to reveal the a priori form of all knowing. This claim implies that it is possible to uncover a cognitional performance which is operative prior to all explicit theorizing about it and which does not owe its validity to implicit or explicit ethical or aesthetic concerns. Translated into

3The "priority" involved here is not temporal but analytic. That is, the basic form of the knowing process is a prerequisite to actual theorizing, yet the form is
distinctively historical terms—it is possible to attain a metahistorical position from which to criticize and, if necessary, to correct any precritical opinions about historical knowing which may belong to the historian's perspective. Of course, there are other components besides cognitional ones in the historian's perspective. In Chapter Four, the metahistorical position developed in this chapter will be related to some of these other components.

The counterproposal speaks of "adequate" metahistorical grounds. What measure of "adequacy" is available? An answer to this question is part of the main task of this chapter. There are Kantian precedents to guide a search for this answer. What is sought are the a priori grounds for historical knowledge. To anticipate our conclusions, the adequate metahistorical position envisioned only actual when human thinking takes place. A qualification, which appeared in both of the preceding chapters, must be immediately added. This cognitional performance does not take place in the absence of ethical and aesthetic variables. Indeed, as will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five, to recognize how cognitional performance does take place will spontaneously lead beyond knowing to deciding, i.e. to the question of how one should proceed as an intelligent and responsible knower. But, as will be argued in a later section, a method which is based on this performance will not owe its critical function or the validity of its formulation to a moral or aesthetic position.

For a brief remark by Lonergan which affirms that his inquiry into human knowing proceeds from a moral decision, see his "Bernard Lonergan Responds," Language, Truth and Meaning, p. 310. But this is not an affirmation that his cognitional theory is determined by a moral expectation. The a priori basis of the theory in cognitional structure rules out such an interpretation of this remark.
will be reached by elaborating the formal structure of historical knowing. Again, a qualification must be entered. What is to be elaborated is not a single privileged historical perspective or paradigm. Our interest lies in uncovering an *a priori* basis for all historical perspectives. This may prove to be the basis for modifying some elements of different historical perspectives. But we do not foresee any total reversal of particular perspectives. The arguments given in Chapter Two in support of the thesis of perspectivism preclude any elimination of the diversity of historical perspectives.

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4 The word "structure" suffers from overuse in contemporary philosophical speech. The third section of this chapter will work out a precise meaning for the term.
INTERIORITY AS THE STARTING POINT

Before attempting to locate a starting point for a formal study of historical inquiry and theorizing, we need to retrace some of the steps taken in Chapters One and Two. Specifically one of White's arguments and our response to it need recounting. The argument was as follows:

The historian's adoption of a particular paradigm is based ultimately on precritical, moral or aesthetic grounds. His epistemological/theoretical positions have their prior determination in these non-theoretical grounds. In effect, the former belong to the surface of the historical text while the latter are part of the deep structure of the text. Consequently, any attempt to provide an epistemological/theoretical justification of one's adopted paradigm represents simply another ethical choice. 5

Our response to this argument granted that precritical elements of the historian's relative horizon precede the clarification of his basic horizon and direct his choice among possible historical perspectives. 6 Yet it is possible that the historian's developing awareness of his own intellectual abilities will be the occasion for modifying his previous perspective. Such a modification reflects a cognitional development and basic horizon


6This admission derives in part from the recognition that the historian's starting point is generally not a set of postulates or a widely accepted theory but his own unique mixture of common-sense beliefs. Lonergan's remarks on this point are found in Method in Theology, p. 216.
development (i.e. at least a partial differentiation of levels of consciousness) and not simply another ethical choice. But this is to say contra White that epistemological/theoretical positions need not remain on the surface of the text. They may be explicitly involved in the reformulation of historical perspectives and, hence, may be operative at the level of predeterminations to historical narratives.

Though in the last section of Chapter Two we gave examples of how explicit cognitional discoveries were applied to precritical elements of relative horizons, we did not argue, on the basis of a formal theory of historical knowing, that prior preconceptions about knowing could be critically measured by a criterion derived from that formal cognitional theory. Such a criterion would allow us

7This counter-argument is perhaps stating the obvious. Most historians quickly learn that common-sense positions are not adequate for all the tasks they undertake. Certainly scientists discover this inadequacy even sooner. In any case, while common-sense opinions provide a major resource for directing investigations, the complexity of the field of inquiry, whether historical or scientific, will soon require the use of more technical resources. A broadening of the adopted perspective is required by the needs of theoretical inquiry and not solely by specifically ethical aspirations. Marc Bloch provides examples of the limits reached by common sense and of the subsequent need for rearranging some of the historian's preconceptions. (The Historian's Craft, pp. 80-81.) However, to recognize the need for changing earlier opinions does not guarantee that one will change them. What is required is that a new discovery about cognitional performance be implemented in subsequent performance. Thus, a decision must be made to conform one's doing to one's knowing. Such a decision is discussed under the headings of intellectual responsibility and moral conversion. These topics will be treated in Chapters Four and Five.
to note any differences between what a historian says about his professional procedures in reaching conclusions and what actually occurs when he attempts to reach those conclusions. In other words, it uncovers differences between the historian's cognitional opinions and his actual performance. This issue of a critical cognitional position involves the foundational questions of a transcendental critique of historical knowledge.

Where does one begin such a critique? The starting point will not be found in some newly discovered historical data for two reasons. First, a transcendental critique is not concerned directly with what is known but with how one knows. Thus, the data which are of interest to the

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9 Wilhelm Dilthey attempted to provide such a critique but left his work unfinished. An excellent study of Dilthey's project as well as a brief exercise in comparing Lonergan and Dilthey is contained in a lengthy article by Matthew Lamb, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology," Language, Truth and Meaning, pp. 115-166.

10 Accordingly, the phrase "transcendental critique" is used in a Kantian sense. Note Kant's remark: "I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori." Critique of Pure Reason, translated by
historian are not the immediate concern of the historical methodologist. Second, as will be argued in a later chapter, historical data are not given prior to or independent of a particular historical perspective. The historian's perspective provides an antecedent framework which regulates what is acceptable as potential evidence.\textsuperscript{11} If the needed starting point were identified with certain historical data, we would be presupposing the privileged status of the historical perspective which included those data. But this would be unacceptable for two reasons: (1) the starting point would then be uncritically accepted; (2) our adoption of the antecedent perspective of the starting point would be uncritical. The consequence would be to eliminate any basis for mediating the disputes of the crisis of historicism. Again, those disputes occur among historical perspectives, and to attribute primacy to one perspective over the rest is not the way to settle the long-standing disputes.


\textsuperscript{11} Hayden White's position on antecedent paradigms and on their determination of what will count as historical data is the source of these remarks. See Metahistory, p. 430. Morton White argues to a similar conclusion, in his Foundations of Historical Knowledge, p. 254. Note must be made that our acceptance of Hayden White's conclusion does not extend to his theory of paradigms as effectively closed systems of thought. The problem of closed frameworks will be treated later. The suggestion will then be made that antecedent frameworks are heuristic structures which are open to criticism and, if necessary, to correction.
Although historical data cannot provide the needed starting point, that is not to say that the starting point must be non-empirical. Besides the data of sense, there are the data of consciousness. It is the latter which Lonergan proposes as his starting point. The beginning, then, lies not in the realm of common sense nor in the realm of theory but in that which Lonergan terms "human interiority." Though we must prove that such a starting point is critical, the suggestion is made that the data of consciousness are not bound by the same restrictions which were mentioned above in relation to historical data and particular historical perspectives. They are not so bound because they do not belong to the surface of the text. At this point one can surmise that the data of consciousness may offer a way beyond the theoretical impasse which is called the crisis of historicism.\(^\text{12}\)

Already in Chapter Two we made note of three genetically distinct levels of meaning: common sense, theory, human interiority. The third level can become explicit through the attempt to understand the problematic relation between the first two levels.\(^\text{13}\) And the thesis advanced

\(^\text{12}\) Much is being anticipated here, and it will only be in the next section that arguments are presented to back up these preliminary remarks. Matthew Lamb's article briefly hints at the possibility of advancing Dilthey's historical project through the adoption of just such a starting point in human interiority. "Wilhelm Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology," Language, Truth and Meaning, pp. 145-146 and 158.

\(^\text{13}\) The disputes in modern philosophy over primary and
at this point is that in interiority we will find the starting point for a formal theory of historical knowledge. Moreover, the claim made by Lonergan is that this will be a "privileged" starting point in that the data of consciousness supply empirical grounds for judging all claims to knowledge. The arguments for these assertions will occupy the rest of this chapter.

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secondary qualities exemplify this problematic relation. See Insight, pp. 84-85, and 130-131. Additional examples are provided in Method in Theology, pp. 84 and 258.

COGNITIONAL STRUCTURE

The second chapter advanced the thesis that the historian does not come empty-headed to his task. Much space was devoted to clarifying the general subdivisions of the historian's relative horizon. Only in the final section was any emphasis given to what the historian knows about himself. The topic of self-knowledge is re-introduced in this section. What does the historian know about himself? More specifically, what does he know of his own procedures as a curious, intelligent, and responsible interpreter of past events? Every historian claims to know something of the past, but what does he know of the process which leads to that knowledge? If Collingwood and others are correct in claiming that historical knowledge is only secured in its foundations by the self-scrutiny of the historian, then inquiry into cognitional operations has priority over the writing of history.15

15"Self-knowledge is desirable and important to man, not only for its own sake, but as a condition without which no other knowledge can be critically justified and securely based." R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 205. The inquiry into cognitional operations is not undertaken before the historian begins his work. But, for the experienced historian, the problems of his field will eventually require some reflection on matters of human knowing. The "priority" mentioned above is consequently one of theoretical justification of what the historian finds himself already doing. Lonergan remarks on the priority of this task, in his Introduction to Insight, p. xxix.
The Problem of Introspection

There is an ongoing debate over the possibility and mode of attaining self-knowledge. This is the problem of introspection. How does the human subject gain self-knowledge? For our purposes--how does he come to know about his own acts of cognition? In the first place, the subject is already seeing, touching, understanding, and evaluating prior to any reflection upon these personal acts. The acts themselves are transitive in the psychological sense that in them the subject is aware of objects, i.e. he intends objects. By the act of seeing he intends the seen, by evaluating he intends the valued, and so on. In the second place, there is the subject who acts consciously, who in seeing is present to himself as seeing, and so on. Hence, besides making present intended objects, conscious acts of the subject make the acting subject present to himself.\(^{16}\)

The presence of intended objects to the conscious subject and the presence of the subject to himself are distinguishable. The spatial metaphor of external and internal experience is frequently used to distinguish these two

\(^{16}\) Method in Theology, pp. 7-8.
modes of intentional presence.\textsuperscript{17} Objects are present to the subject as seen, as attended to, as reflected upon. A subject is present to himself in the seeing, in the attending, and in the reflecting. This second mode of presence is simply the subject experiencing himself in intentional acts. In being conscious he is present to himself, not as an object which vies for attention with intended objects, but as that which is intending objects. Thus, the subject can be conscious as seeing and yet give all his attention to the object seen.\textsuperscript{18}

The problem of introspection arises when the subject attempts to discover his own subjectivity. The problem is twofold: (1) as regards what is intended, (2) as regards the mode of intending. To catch the subject in its "being the subject" is a hopeless quest. To turn back, as it were, on the subject discovers not the subject as subject but the subject as object. The elusive subject discovers but is not discovered as subject.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{17}Lonergan uses and defends the use of this spatial metaphor, in "Cognitional Structure," \textit{Collection}, p. 226.

\textsuperscript{18}Method in Theology, p. 8. In his description of the two modes of presence to consciousness, Lonergan presents an interesting example to put across his point that objects are present to the subject because the subject is present to himself. "As the parade of objects marches by, spectators do not have to slip into the parade to become present to themselves; they have to be present to themselves for anything to be present to them; and they are present to themselves by the same watching that, as it were, at its other pole makes the parade present to them." "Cognitional Structure," \textit{Collection}, p. 226.

As regards the mode of intending, the term "introspection" gives rise to certain problems. Often the term is used to denote a type of inward inspection, a "glance within." We can disregard the spatial metaphor and concentrate on the analogy to ocular vision. Lonergan argues that inward inspection is a myth. His point of attack is the implicit assumption that knowing is a matter of taking a look. Later in this section of Chapter Three, we will give more consideration to this assumption. If the assumption can be shown to be fallacious, then introspection cannot be described as a type of inward looking.

Thus, the twofold problem of introspection is not solved by attempting the impossible: to intend the subject as subject. Nor is it helpful to imagine that the subject is a thing which may be "seen" in some vague internal way. Lonergan suggests an alternate approach to the problem. The term "introspection" may be used to refer not to the intending of the subject as subject but to the intending...
of what the subject consciously does. In that case the subject intends the data of his own consciousness, e.g. his questioning, his searching for evidence, his recognition of a clue to a puzzle. Such acts can be reflectively apprehended. But this is not an "inward look;" rather, it requires purposeful attention to what the subject has been doing spontaneously. If he begins to understand what occurs in questioning and how he searches for clues, then he may be able to make clear statements about his own cognitional acts.

To consider reflectively these acts and to formulate a tentative understanding of them is a step in the objectification of the contents of the subject's own consciousness. That is, the subject raises to the level of self-consciousness those acts which occur spontaneously as the subject's presence to himself. What is heightened is the subject's level of activity, for he is now self-consciously attending to his everyday acts of sensing, imagining, understanding, and so on. The curious thing about this is that, in attending to his acts, the subject is duplicating them, e.g. he is then attempting to understand

21 "Cognitional Structure," Collection, p. 227. It should be noted that we are limiting our discussion of self-knowledge to cognitional self-awareness. Obviously there is much more to know about ourselves than this. Lonergan remarks on this point, "In the main it is not by introspection but by reflecting on our living in common with others that we come to know ourselves." Ibid., p. 238.
his acts of understanding. This duplicating maneuver is introspective in that it seeks self-knowledge through an intending of the objectifiable acts of the subject.

Cognitional Acts

Self-knowledge can then be sought through purposeful reflection on the data of consciousness. Again, these data are the acts of the subject, e.g. his hearing, questioning, understanding, judging, valuing, deciding. Each of these acts occurs as part of our experience. Advertence to one or several of them is motivated in both the scholar and layman by the injunction "Know Thyself." As noted above, the injunction may take the form of a problem: how are common sense and theory related? But in this case the subject's advertence is not random but is specifically guided by the traditional issues of the problem of knowledge. What does it mean to know? Which of the data of consciousness, which activity or activities, is to be identified with human knowing?

The history of philosophy presents numerous conflicting responses to these questions. To those who suggest that perceiving, hearing or tasting can be considered acts of knowing, others point out that perceiving without understanding can only be an indeterminate gaping, a type of

\[22\text{Ibid.}, p. 224.\]
blindness. Of those who hold an identity between understanding and knowing, others quickly ask, What is it that is understood? Without content supplied by the senses, the latter charge, understanding would have nothing to understand, and so the act of understanding would not occur. But if sensing and understanding cannot be individually identified with knowing, perhaps when taken together they can be. Lonergan argues persuasively that acts of judging cannot be ignored. It is precisely those acts which distinguish fact from fantasy, history from legend, astronomy from astrology. But then judging cannot stand alone as accounting for human knowing. "To pass judgment on what one does not understand is, not human knowing, but human arrogance. To pass judgment independently of all experience is to set fact aside." 

Lonergan's conclusion is that none of these acts apart from others is sufficient for human knowing. He

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23 This objection has been made in varying ways from the time of Plato (see his Theaetetus) to the present day (see Heidegger's Being and Time, pp. 190-192).

24 "Cognitional Structure," Collection, pp. 222-223. To both of the preceding controversies Kant's famous observation is apropos: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind." Critique of Pure Reason, p. 93.


26 Ibid., "Cognitional Structure."
distinguishes between elementary and compound knowing. The former is knowing in a loose or generic sense; the latter is knowing in a strict or specific sense. Elementary acts of knowing are the different cognitional activities as distinct from one another. Compound acts of knowing are the conjunction of several elementary acts of knowing into a single knowing. Elementary cognitional acts, when taken separately, are not identified with human knowing. But surely knowing is not something other than these acts. We make assertions about what we experience, and our assertions formulate our understanding of that experience. If pressed for proof, we back up our assertions by making explicit the evidence which tacitly ratified our assertion to our own satisfaction. Our claims to knowledge appear to unite several distinct components into some kind of whole. In Lonergan's terms, acts of knowing are not single operations, but wholes whose parts are operations. Put another way, human knowing is a compound act which is reached by a series of elementary acts. To say more of this, we must discuss the structure of human cognition.

27 Ibid., p. 224.
28 Method in Theology, p. 12. In other places Lonergan emphasizes that single cognitional acts are not properly termed human knowing. See Insight, p. 432; "Cognitional Structure," Collection, pp. 222-223. His position is that elementary acts of knowing are components which prior to an act of judgment are not complete as human knowing. Insight, p. 489.
29 "Cognitional Structure," Collection, p. 223.
By "structure" Lonergan means a whole the parts of which are functionally interdependent. In its internal relations the whole is complete and in no need of addition. Should one part be removed, the whole would be destroyed.\textsuperscript{30} But there are different types of structures. Inanimate and animate, natural and artistic, macrocosmic and microcosmic are terms which describe distinct types. Lonergan concentrates on dynamic structures, i.e. wholes the parts of which are activities. He distinguishes materially dynamic and formally dynamic structures. A dance as a pattern of bodily movements and a melody as a pattern of sounds exemplify the former. Here the emphasis is on the content of the structure, on the parts which are patterned activities. Formally dynamic structures are exemplified by the growing organism which produces its own organs and lives through them.\textsuperscript{31} Here the emphasis is on, not the parts, but the whole which is self-assembling and self-constituting. Formally dynamic structures assemble themselves, they summon the appropriate activities in their proper order until the whole process is complete.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{30}"Each part is what it is in virtue of its functional relations to other parts; there is no part that is not determined by the exigencies of other parts; and the whole possesses a certain inevitability in its unity, so that the removal of any part would destroy the whole, and the addition of any further part would be ludicrous. Such a whole is a structure." \textit{Ibid.}, p. 222.

\textsuperscript{31}\textit{Method in Theology}, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{32}\textit{Ibid.} See also "Cognitional Structure," \textit{Collection}, p. 222.
Lonergan applies the preceding distinction to human knowing. It is materially dynamic because activities are its components. It is formally dynamic because the knowing process is self-constituting. To prove his point, Lonergan asks his reader to reflect upon his own experience. Arguments, some of which occur above, are available for proving that knowing is not a single cognitional act but a series of them. However, the strongest and most direct proof lies in the introspective operation of objectifying the data of the reader's own consciousness. Are there or are there not activities of seeing, hearing, conceiving, evaluating with which I am familiar? Have I not referred to them as means of gaining knowledge? As a teacher, have I not structured lectures and explanations around these different activities in the hope that students would pass from inattention to careful listening and eventually to a clear understanding of my point? If so, then the knowing process is at least materially dynamic.

Arguments are also available to establish that this materially dynamic process is also self-constituting, i.e. is a formally dynamic structure. But, again, the path of self-reflection offers the strongest proof. Have I puzzled over something I observed? Did the puzzlement leave me inert or did I begin to make guesses? On some

\[33\] We have already discussed this process of objectification. The subject can "heighten" his presence-to-self by intending those cognitional acts which are themselves conscious acts of intentionality.
occasions have I not made "lucky guesses" and felt satisfied at solving the puzzle? If pressed to translate my lucky guess into action or to publicize it as a correct way of solving a problem, have I not gone back to check it out? Has this rechecking gone on indefinitely or have I finally concluded something about the validity of my former guesswork? Specific details could fill out these rhetorical questions, but the important point is to grasp the sequence of operations which these questions describe. In functionally interrelated steps I have moved toward knowledge of what was first observed with puzzlement, then intelligently grasped, and finally judged to be the case. Intermediate steps may have occurred, e.g. choosing a method of investigation, inventing imaginative hypotheses, discarding first one guess and then another. But, for now, the important feature of this process is its spontaneity.

Experience spontaneously provides unforeseen difficulties. Not everyone stays out of harm's way, and so some thought must be given to overcoming difficulties. Scientific intelligence seeks an eventual control over the difficulties which endanger human welfare. Methodical inquiry into diseases which threaten men yields insights which can be formulated as preventive measures. But these measures are not adopted without further testing lest the cure be worse than the disease. Only after much care has been expended will the nod of assent be given to the
application of laboratory results on human subjects. And that nod presupposes a reflective appraisal of the safety and of the probable benefits of the well-tested measures.

Our point in the above example is that the knowing process begins spontaneously and only comes to term in the reflective moment of assent. But that moment has come at some time for everyone, and so it is likely that the series of operations which led up to that moment can be retrieved. In this possibility of retrieval lies the possibility of recognizing the formally dynamic structure of human cognition. What is retrievable are the first moments of puzzlement and the hints of a possible solution, then the sudden awareness of the dimensions of the actual solution, and finally the affirmation of the way out of the puzzle. Analysis of what is retrieved yields a growing awareness of how spontaneous acts on the part of the subject intelligently moved toward the point where he could assert, "I have the answer." Through such spontaneous acts human cognition constitutes itself, i.e. brings itself to completion through a series of elementary acts which occur in an orderly sequence.

In summary, arguments were advanced that knowing cannot be identified with any single act of human intentionality. To singleness was counterposed the unity of a series of cognitional acts. This formally dynamic unity is retrievable through an intending of the subject's own
conscious acts. Therein lies the possibility of recognizing the functionally interrelated steps which he has spontaneously followed in coming to know. To understand these steps in their distinctness and in their interconnections is an exercise in objectifying the subject's intentional acts and formulating a clear understanding of them. Eventually the question will arise, Is that understanding correct? What is called for is the reflective nod of assent or a return to renewed inquiry.

But, if assent is given, what is it that is affirmed? Lonergan schematizes the elements of the affirmation under three headings. In the first place, the subject affirms his own sensitivity on the basis (1) of experiencing the intended acts of seeing, hearing, and so on, and (2) of understanding them as distinct intentional acts on his part. The subject goes on to affirm his own intelligence on the basis of his experiencing and understanding of his own efforts at asking questions of, conceiving possible solutions to problems, and so on. A similar process takes place regarding the subject's rationality. Has the subject had experiences of reflecting on the soundness of his work, of testing his hypotheses, of affirming the strength of some conclusions and the weakness of others? Then those experiences along with an understanding of them are the basis for affirming the subject's own rationality.34

The preceding schematization requires that the subject recognize qualitative differences in his experience of coming to know. That is, when the subject asks questions, he recognizes that more than perceiving is involved, and at the same time he recognizes that the first plausible answers may not be the ones he finally accepts. The above schematization is of different levels of intentional operation. There is the sensitive (or empirical) level of sensing, imagining, feeling. There is the intellectual level of questioning, forming hypotheses, coming to understand, expressing new insights. There is the rational level of reflecting, weighing evidence, judging the truth or falsity of conclusions. For the sake of brevity, Lonergan denotes the multiple operations of the three levels by the principal occurrence on each level. Thus, the

35 Method in Theology, p. 9. To these three distinct levels of operations we have yet to add the level of responsibility on which what we understand and affirm becomes the basis for decisions and actions. While some mention of this fourth level will be made later, our concentration on epistemological issues will preclude an elaborate treatment of this fourth level. What we will develop is how the subject's spontaneous curiosity does not usually halt once it has reached answers to its intellectual questions; it often goes on to ask what changes should be made in past works and what new steps should be taken to avoid repeated mistakes. Our later thesis will be that intellectual responsibility is found among the spontaneousities of human consciousness. Thus, the fourth level of intentional operations is a concomitant aspect of the spontaneous performance studied in this chapter. A detailed schema of the basic levels of human interiority is presented at the end of Matthew Lamb's article, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology," in Language, Truth and Meaning, p. 164.
operations are termed in general: experiencing, understanding, judging.\textsuperscript{36} Again, these distinct acts are conscious operations and therefore can be intended. But if they are distinct acts, then the subject's intending of them will turn up qualitative differences among them. Consequently, the subject will not assert that knowing is an undifferentiated intuitive process.

This section of the third chapter began with the thesis that self-knowledge is a precondition to securing the foundations of historical knowledge. The work of the second chapter provided the broad outlines of the preconceptions with which the historian operates. However, to outline the general features of relative horizons is not a substitute for the efforts to thematize the specific content of my own relative horizon. These efforts are ostensibly aimed at increasing self-knowledge. But given the preceding descriptions of the knowing process, I can expect these efforts to occur in a certain sequence. From an initial interest in my preconceptions, I move to an investigation of them.\textsuperscript{37} Gradually I may move to an understanding of them. Perhaps I will be recognizing and formulating

\textsuperscript{36}Ibid., Method in Theology, p. 14 and Insight, pp. 272-275.

\textsuperscript{37}This investigation usually moves forward by means of contrast. For example, I read someone else's view on what I take to be an important issue of the day. If I find we disagree, I may seek out the origins of our disagreement. On occasion this will lead me to reflect on what I must be tacitly assuming in order to hold my position.
some preconceptions for the first time. As argued in Chapter Two, I cannot expect to expliccate all of them, but there will be some preconceptions which I can elaborate. I can check their implications and then either accept or reject them. But this is to say that my efforts toward self-knowledge will be carried out on those basic levels of intentionality which were outlined above. Consequently, in order to know about my preconceptions, I must engage in the intentional operations of cognitional structure. The formal pattern of cognitional acts will be the precondition to knowing any of my preconceptions. The import of all this is that the demands for self-knowledge can be redirected away from the specifics of my relative horizon to the antecedent form of my basic horizon.

Mention has already been made of three points which are relevant to grasping the form of basic horizons. First, acts of human intentionality are conscious. Second, what is conscious can be intended. Third, to know what knowing is requires a duplication of the structure of human knowing. Put another way, the subject objectifies his conscious cognitional acts by attending to his intending, by understanding the diverse acts which it involves, and by judging his understanding of the acts to be correct.

These three points are preparatory to a distinction between consciousness and self-knowledge. We have already made use of the distinction in saying that intentional acts
are conscious and can be intended. Yet usually the subject pays attention to the objects he intends in those acts, and only a special act of retrieval turns his attention back on what he himself has been doing. Consciousness, then, is a component of self-knowledge, but by itself it lacks the completeness which is reached by the subject's compound process of knowing that he is knowing. The proof of this lies in asking someone what seeing is or what understanding is. Both types of intending lie within a person's experience; they are part of his consciousness. Yet even if he gives a satisfactory account of seeing, he is unlikely to articulate an equally coherent account of understanding. The reason for this is that he has not given much prior thought to the matter. But in that case, there will be conscious acts which are not reflectively known.38

The main purpose of this section has been to uncover the structure of human cognition and, by doing so, to move

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38"Cognitional Structure," Collection, p. 225. It should be pointed out that language plays a key role in the concretization of the subject's knowledge of his intellectual abilities. Self-knowledge requires more than attentiveness to the data of consciousness, more than a correct and affirmed understanding of them. It requires that the subject carefully express the intentional content of his consciousness and thereby stabilize his basic horizon. This function of language is noted by two theorists in the sociology of knowledge. "This capacity of language to crystallize and stabilize for me my own subjectivity is retained (albeit with modifications) as language is detached from the face-to-face situation. This very important characteristic of language is well caught in the saying that men must talk about themselves until they know themselves." Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967), p. 38.
through the first stage of a formal and critical account of human knowing. Our starting point was no historical datum but, rather, the data of consciousness. Two questions which have been implicit in preceding paragraphs can now be explicitly asked and answered. Are there in fact data of consciousness? Is there in fact a basic pattern to their occurrence?

Arguments are not difficult to find for the actual occurrence of cognitional acts, i.e. for the reality of the data of consciousness. What subject would deny that he has ever experienced sensations or ever had feelings? Has he ever conversed with others while at the same time maintaining that understanding what another person says is an impossibility? Has he ever addressed an audience only to remark that he has not pre-considered whether what he is to say is true or false? Curiosities, indeed, would be those subjects who denied that they had ever felt, understood or defended a position.39

Is there a pattern to the occurrence of these acts? The distinction made above between consciousness and self-knowledge comes into play. Prior to intending our intending, we are caught up in everyday tasks which demand our full attention, our practical know-how and quick reactions. In these hurried moments we do not recognize the acts of cognition as distinct from one another. The relations

39Method in Theology, p. 17.
among them go unnoticed. What we experience is the undifferentiated unity of consciousness. But this is to affirm again an earlier thesis: relative horizons precede the clarification of a basic horizon.

The world of interiority opens up to us only when we respond to certain problems. Then it is possible to set to work analyzing the functioning unity of cognitional process. The acts themselves may be distinguished from one another and their interconnections may be worked out. We will then be in a position to recognize that both the acts themselves and the pattern of their occurrence have been implicit in our conscious living. The spontaneous efforts to move from puzzlement to understanding and to test the proposed solution are recognized as movements which have occurred prior to any attempts on our part to formulate the stages in which they occur. But, after making explicit these stages of cognitional process, we will discover ourselves to be multi-levelled subjects. The acts we now reflect on are recognized as what constitutes our sensitivity, intelligence, and rationality. The proof of this lies in occasional lapses from intelligence

40 "But the point to the statement that the pattern itself is conscious is that, once the relations are formulated, they are not found to express surprising novelties but simply prove to be objectifications of the routines of our conscious living and doing. Before inquiry brings the pattern to light, before the methodologist issues his precepts, the pattern is already conscious and operative." Ibid., p. 18.
and rationality. For in not bothering to understand, we must plead ignorance and remain puzzled; in not bothering to weigh evidence, we leave ourselves open to the charge of intellectual irresponsibility. On occasion we may even feel uncomfortable with the awareness that we have not taken the trouble to separate rumor or fantasy from fact. Such a feeling can be considered evidence both of the formally dynamic unity of the knowing process (which does not of its own accord remain incomplete) and of the usually irresistible development from curiosity to plausible answers grounding future inquiries and decisions. On the other hand, to terminate the cognitional process short of fact and to substitute rumor is a common failing. But rumors can be tracked down and either confirmed or disconfirmed. To do just that or to ignore them entirely will characterize the actions of an intellectually responsible person.

The preceding arguments establish (1) that there are data of consciousness, and (2) that such data occur as components of a formally dynamic structure. These two conclusions mark the attainment of the first goal of this chapter, namely, to provide a formal theory of human knowing. It remains to establish that this is a critical theory. This we will do in the next section by reviewing Lonergan's transcendental method.

In summary, this third section has been an exercise
in self-knowledge—that self-knowledge which is a precondition to critical history. The problem of introspection rises up to confront anyone who attempts to explain how he knows about himself. The problem is compounded if one conceives introspection to be some type of inward look. However, in contrast to the myth of inward self-inspection, there is the subject's intending of his own conscious acts. And, studied closely, this intending reveals a series of distinct acts compounding themselves into single acts of knowing. The notion of a formally dynamic structure expresses how this series of cognitional acts develops toward its term in the complete act of knowing.

Now an important discovery lies in the recognition of the data of consciousness and of the pattern of their occurrence. Those data, or cognitional acts, were present prior to our recognition of them. They were spontaneously assembling themselves prior to our exercise in self-knowledge. So, what we were previously conscious of but did not reflect upon or know was a cognitional structure operating independently of any methodological interest in it. But, then, this is to say that we have uncovered the a priori form which specific acts of knowing take. The implications of this discovery for critical history will begin to manifest themselves in the next section when this discovery is conceived as transcendental method.
The task of this fourth section is twofold: (1) to establish the critical function of the a priori form, or structure, of human knowing; (2) to argue that a metahistorical method based on this structure can criticize and, if necessary, correct cognitional elements in one's historical perspective. Both of these goals require a study of transcendental method. The initial claim is that transcendental method allows the methodologist to discover any conflicts between a mistaken cognitional theory and the prior performance of the mistaken theorist. The implication is that a metahistorical standpoint is possible from which to modify preconceptions about historical procedures and historical knowing.

Lonergan introduces his transcendental method in a series of steps. We have taken one of those steps already in the preceding work on cognitional structure. Another step is to indicate what method is and why it is needed.

A method is a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results. There is a method, then, where there are distinct operations, where each operation is related to the others, where the set of relations forms a pattern, where the pattern is described as the right way of doing the job, where operations in accord with the pattern may be repeated indefinitely, and where the fruits of such repetition are, not repetitious, but cumulative and progressive.

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41 Ibid., p. 21.
42 Ibid., p. 4.
Lonergan bases this description on method in the natural sciences. He points out the recurrent operations in the natural sciences: inquiries, observations, descriptions, discoveries, hypotheses, deductions, experimentation. Next he notes how these operations are interrelated. Everyday experiencing can become scientific observation through specialized inquiry; description can stabilize what is observed; what is stabilized for one scientist may be problematic for another, and the problem will be settled only by new discoveries; hypotheses are tentative formulations of such discoveries; the implications deduced from the hypotheses are subject to experimentation. These distinct activities are related; their occurrence is not haphazard but forms a pattern which is the accepted mode of conducting scientific projects. 43

43 Ibid., pp. 4-5. The preceding description of method also mentioned cumulative and progressive results. The scientist finds that his experiments turn up new data, observations, descriptions which may or may not support his guiding hypothesis. He then must either gather further evidence in support of his hypothesis or he must modify it on the basis of disconfirming evidence. With a modified hypothesis, he will again construct experiments which may yield a new round of discoveries. Lonergan concludes that method gains its cumulative character from this broadening of the field of observed data, from the addition of new discoveries to previous ones, from the facility with which new hypotheses and theories express new insights as well as incorporate those valid insights contained in what the new positions replace. From these accumulations springs the conviction that progress is being made toward the scientific goal of a complete explanation of all natural phenomena. (Ibid., p. 5.)

We took note in Chapters One and Two of Lonergan's acceptance of the standard-progressive ideal of science, i.e. the comprehensive and definitive account of nature.
Two observations of some importance to the historian are made regarding the above description of method. First, the mentioned operations are not exclusively logical ones in which the investigator aims at coherence among basic terms and consistency in developed propositions. Logical operations are not lacking (e.g. formulating hypotheses and deducing implications), but there are also operations of a non-logical type (e.g. observing, inquiring, choosing experiments). The recurrent and related operations of method are neither exclusively logical nor exclusively non-logical. The second observation is that the conjunction of these two types of operations allows an open process of inquiry, discovery, hypothesizing, experimenting, verifying. In other words, the investigator is not wholly bound by a set of prior rules which direct his work and

Also noted were the works of some contemporary philosophers of science who challenge this ideal and substitute for it a paradigm theory of science. It was argued in the opening pages of Chapter Two that Lonergan's view and the paradigm theory are not incompatible when they are applied to history. The thesis of perspectivism is held in common by both sides in the disputes over historical models. However, this compatibility does not appear in their different ideals for the natural sciences. Still, we can suggest that, when taken in a limited sense, Lonergan's description of scientific method with its cumulative and progressive aspects is compatible with the paradigm theory of science, that is, when the description of method is limited to procedures of scientists who share the same paradigm. In this case, their efforts may yield an increasingly coherent and comprehensive account.

44 Ibid., p. 6. Lonergan contrasts this view of method with the "static fixity" which characterized Aristotle's search for necessary and immutable laws. He also contrasts it to the closed system within which the Hegelian dialectic operates. (Ibid.)
limit the scope of his insights.

These observations on scientific method are pertinent to the historian's work, (1) because his own procedures are not formalized in any complete logical manner, (2) because the fact of historical revision and the fact of diverse perspectives on the past imply that history is an ongoing occupation which defies completion. Thus, scientific method, despite all its differences, is not something totally foreign to historical method. Their differences will be studied in Chapter Five. For now, it suffices to note that a complete separation of the two methods would overlook not only the presence of non-logical operations in both but also their resulting openness to future developments.

In what sense can both history and the natural sciences be termed methodical? First, they are not methods for collecting random pieces of information. Rather, they both involve formal principles and non-logical operations which are aimed at systematically exploiting a selected field. The label of "antiquarianism" is attached to the contrary aim of assembling bits of data on all the events of a given era. But the historian does not realistically entertain this ambition. In the first place, such a total collection is impossible; in the second, the lack of any

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45 W. H. Walsh discusses this point of commonality, in his Philosophy of History: An Introduction, pp. 35-38.
principle of relevancy results in a flat landscape of equally undistinguished events. A diplomat's sneeze would appear as important as his signature on a treaty.

But there are other reasons, beyond the avoidance of antiquarianism, for the historian's methodical approach. With the proliferation of historical studies in the nineteenth century, problems of cultural, historical, and religious relativity appeared. While men had always been making history, it was only the rapid development of historical consciousness which brought to the foreground the problems associated with human historicity. But such problems are not adequately handled by the spontaneous and sometimes unmethodical measures of common sense. The historian, instead, needs to explore and to criticize methodically the sources and products of human historicity. Problems posed by bias, ideology, and cultural pluralism will be met by a historical profession which ideally has settled on common norms for investigating disputed issues. Examples of such norms will occur in the next chapter.

Although the need for a common method and norms was quickly recognized, their attainment did not follow with equal rapidity. The reasons for the delay are worth investigating. Lonergan describes two stages in the development of most methods. The first stage is imitative.

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Method is learned by following the example of a master. So, in the historical seminar, the student learns both from the achievements of his teacher and from the latter's criticism of the student's performance. But the insights and procedures gained in this way are usually limited to a single school of thought. Conflicts among different schools over basic methodological issues remain. The second stage is hierarchical. An estimate of particular norms and procedures is made in relation to the dominant science of the age. If the investigator's discipline is not this particular science, then he proposes an analogy of science in which he attempts to conform his procedures to the successful approach employed in that science.47 Descartes' use of a geometrical model for his metaphysical system and Hume's adherence to Newtonian precedents in his moral philosophy are examples of such attempts at conformity. Today we find the natural sciences, physics in particular, resting at the top of the heap. History, when not dogmatically excluded from the hierarchy of scientific disciplines, lies some distance from the top.

Lonergan points out flaws in both approaches to method. In the first case, a discipline which is struggling for recognition from the scientific community will, because of its youth, lack masters to imitate. In the second case, an analogy of science leaves the less successful

47Method in Theology, p. 3.
discipline at a low spot in the hierarchical order. It struggles along with borrowed preconceptions and procedures; it lives an ersatz existence which may be not at all suited to its particular subject-matter. Dilthey fought against the tyranny which a positivistic model forced on the historical thought of his day. His efforts to provide a distinct method for history followed upon a basic distinction which he made between the natural and the human sciences. If his Verstehen method did not win over the historical profession, still his distinction freed historians to develop their own method.

If today the imitative stage has been outgrown and the hierarchical stage has been challenged, it does not follow that historians are at peace among themselves on methodological issues. Contemporary disputes over the role of bias and its possible elimination, over the role of value judgments and their liability to ethnocentricity, and over the form of historical expression and explanation are evidence that the problems which first indicated a

48 Ibid., p. 4.

49 For Lonergan's estimation of Dilthey's work, its strengths and weaknesses, see ibid., pp. 210-212.

50 One writer observes that many historians treat such issues with suspicion and even with hostility. Perhaps they foresee themselves being trapped in a philosophical labyrinth by the attempt to work out a basic justification of their procedures. David Hackett Fischer, Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, p. ix.
need for historical methods have yet to be answered.

Lonergan attempts a third approach which is more sophisticated than imitative ones. It is an approach more cognizant of the differences between history and natural sciences than were those approaches of historians who held that history was a science--nothing more and nothing less.\textsuperscript{51} This third approach is based on the operations of the human mind. We have prepared for its introduction (1) by detailing the data of consciousness and the basic pattern of their occurrence, and (2) by presenting a general description of method which Lonergan derives from procedures in the natural sciences. A method based on the operations of human intentionality is both more general and more fundamental than methods employed in the natural sciences.\textsuperscript{52} Such a method is concerned with the basic pattern of operations employed in every field of inquiry, scientific or otherwise. It thereby takes up issues which regional or particular disciplines must presuppose, namely, the activities of human consciousness. Because it lacks the particularity of regional disciplines, it is a more general method. Because it investigates what they all presuppose, it is a more fundamental method. This third, more general

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\textsuperscript{52}Lonergan makes this claim in \textit{Method in Theology}, p. 4.
and more basic approach is transcendental method.

What precisely does Lonergan mean by transcendental method? He identifies it with the basic pattern of operations which occurs in every cognitional task.\footnote{Ibid.} It is termed "transcendental" because those operations are the intending, not solely of determinate objects, but of all that can be understood, known, and valued.\footnote{Ibid. This is a transcendental method, for the results envisaged are not confined categorically to some particular field or subject, but regard any result that could be intended by the completely open transcendental notions." Ibid., p. 14. The distinction between categorical and transcendental intending is discussed by Lonergan in ibid., pp. 11-12.} These two

\footnote{Ibid. There is a need to distinguish transcendental method from the cognitional theory elaborated in the preceding section. The center-piece of the cognitional theory is the invariant structure of human knowing. Transcendental method is the methodical exploitation of the content of human interiority, i.e. it is the transcendental procedure which works out the implications of the basic pattern formulated in the former theory. In a sense, this distinction between the structure of knowing and knowledge of the structure of knowing is no distinction at all. For transcendental method is the reflective appropriation of what has belonged to cognitional performance all along. However, the inquiry into human interiority can be distinguished from the result of the inquiry (i.e. the appropriation of critical consciousness) because the latter brings out into the open that which previously was only implicit. And what is brought into the open now requires a continued critical reflection on one's actual performance. Thus, transcendental method becomes an explicit technique for present and future inquiries. At the same time, it was the implicit guide to previous intelligent inquiry and reasonable affirmation. More important, it was implicitly used to discover and to prove the former cognitional theory since that discovery and proof were marked by intelligent questions and reasonable arguments.}
statements can be joined to yield a definition. Transcendental method is the dynamic structure of human intending which has as its field of inquiry all that man can ask about.55

Before working out the implications of this definition, let us relate it to some positions which have already been established. First, it was argued that the basic operations of cognition develop spontaneously in consciousness. The subject spontaneously desires to know, asks questions, learns, and attempts to verify some of his opinions. Second, the pattern of these acts is present in consciousness prior to any explicit understanding or formulation of it. Third, by following through these activities, the subject establishes his own intelligence and rationality. By short-circuiting them, he establishes himself as stupid and intellectually irresponsible.

Given the preceding positions, if transcendental method is the basic pattern of cognitional acts, then it develops spontaneously in human consciousness. Prior to the subject's explicit formulation of it, i.e. prior to

55"Finally, while it is, of course, true that human knowing is limited, still the transcendental notions are not a matter of knowing but of intending; they intended all that each of us has managed to learn, and they now intend all that as yet remains unknown. In other words, the transcendental field is defined not by what man knows, not by what he can know, but by what he can ask about; and it is only because we can ask more questions than we can answer that we know about the limitations of our knowledge." ibid., pp. 23-24.
his objectification of the content of his own consciousness, transcendental method is active as a routine of daily living. Insofar as the subject is attentive, intelligent, and reasonable, he is following transcendental method. Insofar as he is inattentive, close-minded, and stubbornly resistant to arguments, he is rejecting his own development as a sensitive, intelligent, and reasonable person.

We can now return to the definition offered above: transcendental method is the dynamic structure of human intending which has as its field of inquiry all that man can ask about. This is the structure which develops spontaneously in consciousness, which is operative prior to any explicit formulation of it, which differentiates attentiveness from inattentiveness, intelligence from stupidity, reasonableness from unreasonableness.

Now, if the alternative to being attentive, intelligent, and reasonable is a state of unintelligent gaping and uncritical acceptance of the latest curiosity, then transcendental method has a normative function. That is, the subject either develops as a sensitive, intelligent, and rational subject or he stifles this spontaneous development for the sake of something else. But, in the latter case, he cannot avoid the need to ignore inopportune data, to suppress unpleasant inquiries, and to descend to sophistry in order to buttress a weak position. Continued long enough, these exercises in obscurantism will corrode his
sense of what intellectual curiosity and evaluation are. An ideology may be developed in order to justify his suppression of evidence and his intolerance of the free exchange of ideas. But before an ideology is worked out, there are those conscious acts which implicitly assert that the subject should be attentive, intelligent, and reasonable. He first learns by living spontaneously according to these acts. To discard this way of living later requires a special effort to block their continuing occurrence. But the fact that a special effort is required witnesses to the normative function of transcendental method.

Lonergan formulates what he calls transcendental precepts to explicate this normative function: Be attentive,

56 The result of such flights from transcendental method is termed "scotosis" by Lonergan. He analyzes the origins, defenses, and psychic disturbances of such flights from human intelligence, in Insight, pp. 191-203.

57 In Insight, Lonergan discusses ideology in terms of the forms of human bias; see pp. 191-206 and 218-232. In Method of Theology, he explicitly refers to ideology as the self-justification of the subject who refuses self-transcendence; see pp. 357-359. This refusal is the mark of the alienated man, for his spontaneous development toward intellectual, moral, or religious conversion is blocked and, hence, he settles for something less than openness to future personal growth. The negative nuance usually attached to the term "ideology" is justified by an ethical judgment: the intellectual self-transcendence of the subject must be matched by a desire to make his doing consistent with his knowing. In Chapter Five, we will offer arguments in support of this ethical judgment. For now, we are interested in showing that what comes first is the spontaneous movement from curiosity and understanding to renewed inquiry in keeping with what has been learned. Obstacles to this movement may occur secondarily, and then they put the intellectually responsible subject to the test.
Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. But the thesis is that, even prior to the formulation of these general norms, they are tacitly presumed by the subject who spontaneously wonders, intelligently seeks answers, and rationally ponders alternative solutions. The proof of their tacit presence lies in those occasions when a person lapses into an indifference which asks no questions, values all opinions equally (that is to say, values none), and asks only not to be disturbed. If prolonged, this intellectual lethargy becomes self-destructive. The indifferent person must still cope with everyday problems. He must be shrewd in protecting his isolation. Therefore, his indifference is not complete; when his personal interests are at stake, he will be most attentive and careful to choose the course of action best suited to his ends. Consequently, despite his flight from the turmoil of public living, he still will not cease to follow transcendental method even if it is only allowed to operate within a narrow area of his life.

Method in Theology, p. 20. There is a need to relate these precepts to transcendental method. As noted above, the formulated precepts express the normative function of transcendental method. Now, just as this method is implicit in all critical thinking, so too the norms, or precepts, are implicitly at work guiding inquiry and affirmation. However, transcendental method, once made explicit, introduces a difference into cognitional performance: one is now concerned with continually reflecting on this performance in order to avoid bias and failures to understand correctly. Likewise, once the transcendental precepts are formulated, one is more aware of and more responsible for how one carries out inquiries. In other words, the normative function of transcendental method becomes a recognized standard of both critical thinking and critical practice.
The Problem of Formalism

But a serious objection arises both to these precepts and to transcendental method. Are they anything more than formalistic imperatives? Do these precepts not suffer from that generality which Hegel charged to Kant's categorical imperative?\(^{59}\) That is, are the precepts—Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible—empty of content and capable of receiving any content? A response to this objection can be made in two parts. First, the precepts and transcendental method presuppose that there is a difference between attention and inattention, intelligence and stupidity, reasonableness and unreasonableness.\(^{60}\) In any person who has been inquisitive, proud of his discovery yet careful not to publish it without further checking, there has been at least a vague awareness of the difference. Consequently, he will consciously undertake some activities and reject others because they either advance his work or

\(^{59}\) Hegel's charge is succinctly put: "[Kant's] duty as such is form void of all content and capable of any." The Phenomenology of Mind, translated by J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 672. The complaint has been voiced frequently. The categorical imperative determines only the form one's maxims ought to take; it does not prescribe specific actions. Consequently, some critics have concluded that Kant's categorical imperative is completely devoid of specificity and indifferent to all particular actions, whether moral or immoral. Space does not permit a counter-argument to this conclusion. But the grounds for a counter-argument lie in the fact that Kant offered several formulations of the categorical imperative and, by doing so, placed limits on which actions could conform indirectly through maxims to the categorical imperative.

\(^{60}\) Method in Theology, p. 20.
guarantee his failure. But this is to say that the transcendental precepts, even prior to their formulation, are the basis for rejecting some acts, i.e. "content." Therefore, the second part of the charge of formalism, namely, the indifference of the precepts to content, falls.

The first part of the objection states that the transcendental precepts are so general as to be empty of specific content. Two responses are made to this part of the charge. First, it is through acts of observation, discovery, and verification that a subject constitutes himself in fact as a sensitive, intelligent, and rational person. The defective individual who suffers nearly total sensory deprivation will not become such a person because the constitutive acts are beyond his very limited abilities. But it is from a study of the constitutive acts that Lonergan derives the transcendental precepts. In effect, he is arguing that their content will be all that a subject has previously learned through being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible.

An immediate objection will be that this conclusion relativizes the precepts themselves. If their content belongs to the personal history of the individual, then what they prescribe will vary from individual to individual. But this is the point in formulating them as formal transcendental precepts. What an individual learns through being attentive and intelligent and reasonable is not
limited to what he has intended in those acts. He also learns through repetition how to be more attentive, how to control his inquiry, how to structure his experiments. In other words, he builds up a competence that improves upon what was initially spontaneous. What originally was only a vague awareness of the difference between being attentive and inattentive, intelligent and stupid, reasonable and unreasonable can in time become a developed facility in careful observation, rapid grasp of solutions, and diligent pursuit of oversights. In short, the precepts will be a working part of the specialized know-how of the subject. And this specialized know-how does not remain private, but becomes social in the recommended procedures and canons of a professional community. The differences between intelligence and stupidity, between intellectual responsibility and reprehensible dishonesty, are not left entirely to the individual to discover. Rather, they are concretized in the advice given in graduate courses and in methodological publications.

The second response to the charge of formalism argues that the generality of the precepts is not in fact separable from all specificity. The individual constitutes himself as an intelligent subject by specific acts of intelligent inquiry. For example, the child develops routines of behavior which allow him to master his narrow world. But there are larger environments in which these
routines will prove inadequate. If challenged by problems which require theoretical solutions, the adult puts aside his daily routines and takes up the technical tools of his profession. Among such tools will be the method appropriate to his theoretical task. His method guides the activities which solve problems. But his success in the present is not guaranteed by simply following a prescribed series of operations. He must also ask the right questions, hit upon the suitable experiment, and be wary of accepting his first results as conclusive. These operations belong to the non-logical elements of method which were mentioned above. They require an attentiveness, an intelligence, and a critical sense which, in a much less sophisticated way, were first used in solving the problems of the child. Therefore, whatever the specific problem to be solved may be, the required operations will be specifications of the transcendental precepts. The normative generality of the latter is found to be presupposed by the operations of specific methods. For the above reasons the charge of pure formalism does not warrant acceptance.

61 "All special methods consist in making specific the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. But before they are ever formulated in concepts and expressed in words, those precepts have a prior existence and reality in the spontaneous, structural dynamism of human consciousness. Moreover, just as the transcendental precepts rest simply on a study of the operations themselves, so specific categorical precepts rest on a study of the mind operating in a given field." Ibid.
The Critical Function of Transcendental Method

In the final section of Chapter Two, we argued for the possibility of applying explicit cognitional positions to the precritical content of relative horizons and, thereby, of modifying those horizons for theoretical and not ethical reasons. However, we did not argue that this application was critical. Our argument had to await the introduction of transcendental method. It is the latter which has a critical function to perform. That is, it provides a basis for discovering whatever contradictions there may be between what a person asserts about his acts of knowing and what actually occurs when he knows.62 We have argued that, prior to any formulation of the basic structure of human knowing, prior to any preconceptions about acts of knowing, there is a dynamic self-constituting process already at work in the intentional acts of the subject. Now, if through his study of human interiority Lonergan has thematized the normative a priori pattern of that process, is he not in possession of a critical basis for evaluating assertions about human knowing? For our own purposes, do we not have a viewpoint now which allows us to measure against knowing as it actually occurs every explicit cognitional theory and every preconception about human knowing?

The groundwork has already been laid for answering these questions. First, epistemological positions need

62 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
not be limited to the surface of the historian's text, i.e. they need not owe their validity to prior moral and/or aesthetic preferences. The process of differentiating the subject's basic horizon can lead to a modification of preconceptions for distinctively theoretical reasons. Second, through a study of human interiority and a differentiation of basic horizons, there is uncovered the a priori structure of human knowing. This a priori pattern is operative in intentional acts prior to all theorizing about it. Third, this formal schema of cognitional process is a normative precondition to intelligent preconceptions about history. Poetic insights into the field of history or moral expectations about the meaningfulness of past events belong, not to the somnambulist, but to the inquisitive and intelligent historian.

From the three components of the groundwork, we conclude the following. The basic structure of cognitional

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It should be pointed out that the discovery and proof of cognitional structure is a task that properly is located within the world of interiority and not the world of theory. Recall that the issue which prompted the consideration of human interiority was the conflict between common sense and theory over disputed claims to furnish knowledge. A theoretical solution would only settle the conflict to the satisfaction of those who were on the side of theory from the beginning. Consequently, an acceptable solution must be distinguishable from both parties in the original conflict. However, if the solution is found in interiority, still the arguments derived from that solution can be properly labelled "theoretical reasons." Cognitional theory rests on the structure of human interiority, but the theory itself contains positions which elaborate the implications of that structure.
operations, having a validity independent of all ethical or theoretical preconceptions, can provide the critical metahistorical basis for judging all accounts of human knowing. The claim to provide a basis for judging all accounts of human knowing is an aspect of this conclusion which deserves a more explicit treatment. Specifically the aspect of universality will be open to a number of objections.

A relativist would quickly challenge this claim to universality. In effect, is not this cognitional pattern merely a set of theoretical propositions which express an incomplete and, therefore, conditional understanding of human knowing? May not others in coming to self-knowledge find a different pattern in their cognitional acts? If so, then there is nothing universal about Lonergan's formulation of the pattern. What he has discovered is not something unconditional in the human subject but a series of activities which may well vary from individual to individual and almost certainly will vary from one culture to the next.65

64 Note that this question has been constructed in order to bring out a frequently overlooked presupposition: for something to be known unconditionally it must be known completely. A partial understanding is relative to the knower and may in fact be mistaken. Chapter five will consider this presupposition in more detail.

65 This charge is consistent with Dilthey's conclusion that nothing unconditional is discovered in the human subject. May this not be one reason for the incompleteness of his lifelong project? "The question whether the subordination to something unconditional, which, after all, is
The response to this challenge both grants a portion of it and denies a portion. It grants that human self-knowledge is in process and so is incomplete. What we have said about cognitional structure, which is only a part of that self-knowledge, can surely be revised and improved. But this is not to grant the possibility of finding a different pattern in cognitional acts. A distinction must be made between the pattern immanent in these acts and the expression which formulates our understanding of it. The latter, as a matter of linguistic expression, is obviously open to revision. Has not the basic pattern already been described in several different ways in this chapter?

But is the pattern itself open to drastic revision? Could someone else discover a radically different

a historical fact, can be traced back with logical conclusiveness to a universal, not temporally limited, condition in man, or must be viewed as a product of history, leads ultimately to the profundities of transcendental philosophy which lie beyond the empirical sphere of history and from which even the philosopher cannot extract a certain answer. Wilhelm Dilthey, *Pattern and Meaning in History*, edited by H. P. Rickman (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 165.

66 *A distinction must be drawn between the normative pattern immanent in our conscious and intentional operations and, on the other hand, objectifications of that pattern in concepts, propositions, words. Obviously, revision can affect nothing but objectifications. It cannot change the dynamic structure of human consciousness. All it can do is bring about a more adequate account of that structure.* Method in Theology, pp. 18-19. For Lonergan's views on the instrumentality of linguistic expressions which in themselves are neither true nor false, but merely adequate or inadequate, see *Insight*, p. 556.
pattern in cognitional activities? To discover such a difference, he would have to come across data of consciousness which previously were ignored or misapprehended. Then he would have to offer a more adequate explanation of both the new and the old data. Finally, to prove his point, he would have to offer evidence and argue the greater probability of his account. But, in that case, the reviser will have followed that very pattern of activities which he is attempting to alter. Thus, a revision of the basic structure of cognition is limited to the expression which is used to formulate it. And even in such attempts at revision,

This is a brief summary of Lonergan's argument as found in *Method in Theology*, p. 19. A lengthier treatment of the same position is available in *Insight*, pp. 335-336. Dilthey may have been aware of the strength of a similar position which places limits on revision. Matthew Lamb points out that Dilthey was aware that, even if all theories are relative and hypothetical, still the recurrent activities which form, correct, and expand those theories are not open to radical revision. See Lamb's article, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology," *Language, Truth and Meaning*, p. 323, footnote 36. Lonergan makes much the same point in *Insight*, pp. 276-277.

It seems that Lonergan's argument on the limits of revision has an acceptable presupposition, namely, the intellectual responsibility of the person attempting to alter radically the basic pattern of cognitional acts. The argument does not apply to any attempt to assert arbitrarily a counter-argument as part of some polemic. But then what is gratuitously asserted can be gratuitously denied. And it is likely that what is so denied will be labelled "intellectually irresponsible." Such censure is earned because we automatically suppose that what one knows should guide how one speaks and acts. This assumption will turn up in Chapter Five as part of our analysis of the moral conversion which is needed to effect the changes required by intellectual conversion.
care must be taken to distinguish and to interrelate the empirical, intellectual, and rational levels of operation. To do otherwise would be to overlook the very steps through which the process of revision itself goes forward.

The counter-argument of the relativist is correct to the extent that it argues that cognitional theories can always be clarified. But, given our preceding remarks, if such efforts to clarify are to succeed, they must follow the pattern of spontaneous cognitional acts. Otherwise, in failing to be attentive, or to ask intelligent questions, or to entertain critical doubts, the proponent of a new cognitional theory will be left with a deficient and not an improved theory of human knowing. But this is to say that the pattern, once explicaded, is the universal measure of accounts of human cognition. This is its critical function—that every exact theory of cognition will be confirmed and every inaccurate theory of cognition will be refuted. 68 The first part of our twofold task is thus completed: The a priori structure of human cognition is a critical basis for judging all accounts of human knowing.

The Metahistorical Grounds Provided by Transcendental Method

The second half of the task remains: to establish that a metahistorical method based upon this normative structure can criticize and, if necessary, correct

68 Ibid., Method in Theology, p. 20.
cognitional elements in a historical perspective. Already we have argued that the differentiation of the subject's basic horizon reveals genetically distinct levels of meaning. Among them is human interiority. An investigation of it reveals the a priori pattern of human cognition. Transcendental method formulates the distinct but interrelated components of this pattern. Thus, transcendental method is a metahistorical method provided by a differentiation of the subject's basic horizon. The issue is whether this method contains adequate metahistorical grounds for criticizing the cognitional elements of the historian's perspective.

Lonergan suggests that the needed measure of "adequacy" is not necessity but matter-of-fact. The spontaneities of human knowing supply the factual basis for evaluating the cognitional elements of historical perspectives. When an individual begins a study of human interiority, he already has a personal history of asking questions, grasping possible answers, and working toward the correct ones. This is the human subject in his unobjectified attentiveness, intelligence, and reasonableness. This is the ultimate basis of human knowing. In any attempt to find an even deeper foundation, the subject must make use of that same cognitional process which he already spontaneously employs. Consequently, any "deeper" foundation would

69 Ibid.
presuppose and not justify that cognitional process. Now this foundation provided by the unobjectified activities of the subject is established by his spontaneous living and intending. Both are a matter-of-fact, not a necessity. The fact is undeniable as soon as one inquires, begins to understand, and struggles to get things right.  

This argument indicates that Lonergan is not unmindful of charges made against Kant's transcendental approach, namely, that Kant attempted to justify critically the results of human cognitional process all the while using that process to perform his critique. For Lonergan the issue to be met directly is one of objectifying the factual routines of that process. The result, as was argued above, is a basic pattern of operations with a normative function. Transcendental method thematizes in formal

70"Self-affirmation has been considered as a concrete judgment of fact. The contradiction of self-negation has been indicated. Behind that contradiction there have been discerned natural inevitabilities and spontaneities that constitute the possibility of knowing, not by demonstrating that one can know, but pragmatically by engaging one in the process. Nor in the last resort can one reach a deeper foundation than that pragmatic engagement. Even to seek it involves a vicious circle; for if one seeks such a foundation, one employs one's cognitional process; and the foundation to be reached will be no more secure or solid than the inquiry utilized to reach it. As I might not be, as I might be other than I am, so my knowing might not be and it might be other than it is. The ultimate basis of our knowing is not necessity but contingent fact, and the fact is established, not prior to our engagement in knowing, but simultaneously with it. The sceptic, then, is not involved in a conflict with absolute necessity. He might not be; he might not be a knower. Contradiction arises when he utilizes cognitional process to deny it." Insight, p. 332.
precepts the general operations which yield human knowledge. Negatively, it implies that neglect of those operations condemns the subject to ignorance and sophistry.

Now, if the historian is concerned with securing the foundations of his historical perspective, he will know in advance that clarity in his assumptions and strength in his arguments are assets. His inquiry will extend beyond cognitional theory. He must bring to light much of the content of his relative horizon. He must clarify the moral and aesthetic expectations which he brings to his research. The linguistic-poetic framework for his historical narrating may be investigated. But throughout his inquiry into this implicit content, the historian will either be following transcendental method or he will be thwarting his ambition to explicate his presuppositions and to establish their worth. Again, he most likely will not have formulated transcendental method. But, inasmuch as he is familiar with the differences between attention and inattention, intelligence and stupidity, reasonableness and arbitrary conclusions, professional responsibility and intellectual dishonesty, he will be following the transcendental precepts. Consequently, the attempt to secure the perspective which he finds himself already possessing presupposes that the historian will make use of transcendental method. Concomitantly, if he discovers an error or an unacceptable implication in his prior perspective, the removal of it and
replacement by some other position will be a matter of improving his understanding of the issue involved, of arguing the superiority of the new position over the old, and of responsibly implementing changes in earlier works.

In short, our argument is that inquiry into a particular historical perspective, while infrequent, is not impossible. But the success of such an inquiry depends upon the historian's at least implicit adherence to transcendental method in clarifying, checking, and perhaps even revising elements of his historical perspective. The basis for this conclusion is proximately Lonergan's cognitional theory which formulates the invariant structure of human knowing. Ultimately the basis for this conclusion lies in the factual spontaneities of human consciousness which are not complete until what is discovered and verified becomes the guide for intelligent decisions (e.g. decisions to revise earlier works). The cognitional theory which expresses the universal form of these intentional routines supplies a metahistorical position for evaluating attempts to clarify historical perspectives.\(^7\) The cognitional theory

\(^7\) That is, it supplies a metahistorical position which has a normative function to perform in regard to how the historian should proceed in intelligently exploring the content of historical perspectives. How he proceeds will, on the surface, be a matter of implementing rules for evidence and of doing competent exegesis. But, on a deeper level, he will be following the transcendental precepts which implicitly guide the actual use of such rules and the labor of exegesis.

As perspectives are clarified and their implicit assumptions are detected and criticized, the historian's self-understanding develops. But, reciprocally, his
which expresses the invariant pattern of intentional acts supplies a critical basis for clarifying and, if necessary, for correcting cognitional elements in historical perspectives.

This conclusion completes the two-fold task assigned at the beginning of this section. The arguments leading to the preceding conclusion can be faulted for lacking specific examples. The fifth section of this chapter will offer examples of presuppositions in a historical perspective. On the basis of Lonergan's cognitional theory, recommended changes in the cited presuppositions will be defended.

Before we summarize the ground covered in this fourth section, a few remarks will be entered about what has not been accomplished. First, we have described the process of differentiating the subject's basic horizon. But primarily this description has been of an anonymous mind. This writer has had to work through much of this process for himself. But the presentation has rarely been in the first person, so the anonymous subject remains. It remains as an invitation and as a warning. There is the invitation to continue increased self-understanding requires that his preconceptions be further clarified, their implications worked out, and the whole matter subjected anew to critical reflection. What remains fixed in this reciprocal process are the recurrent operations which establish, test, and advance the historian's understanding of history and of himself. Lonergan phrases this more generally: "Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding." Ibid., p. 748.
reflecting on cognitional acts. There is the warning: no one can carry out this exercise in self-knowledge for another person. Lonergan's writings entice one to the effort but are no substitute for it. So the work of this fourth section is not to be identified with the actual event of self-appropriation, but it has been preparatory to and descriptive of the content of that event.

Second, this fourth section has not provided a transfinite perspective on history. No single perspective on the past has been singled out for exclusive adoption. Nor has an a priori historical method been detailed. Transcendental method offers a formal account of how the historian operates as an intelligent, rational, and responsible subject. But the specific rules he follows and the questions he asks as a historian will vary with the task at hand. The hypotheses which he employs, the evaluation of

72 Matthew Lamb sounds a strong warning against any attempt to argue that transcendental method is the basis for discovering the meaning of history. "The invitation to a self-appropriation of this basic horizon is not to reach above or behind history nor autocratically to impose some pattern on it, but to discover in one's self the open and dynamic structures of one's own constituting of history and, through collaboration with others, gradually to articulate the complications, concretisations, amplifications and differentiations of this basic horizon in the historical process itself. To appropriate the empirical, intelligent, critical and existential structures of conscious intentionality is the exact opposite of boasting an Archimedean lever that would permit one immediately to pry into all problems. For such an attitude would be an inattentive, unintelligent, uncritical and irresponsible forgetfulness of one's radical historical finitude and so evince the absence of self-appropriation." "Wilhelm Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology." Language, Truth and Meaning, p. 125.
sources which he makes derive from personal decisions which cannot be made a priori. Both the finitude of the historian and the non-logical character of his questioning are left intact by the conclusions of this section. As a result, the diversity of historical perspectives and the thesis of perspectivism which accounts for this diversity are also left intact.

In summary, the task of this fourth section was twofold: (1) to establish the critical function of the a priori structure of human knowing; (2) to argue that a meta-historical method based on this structure can criticize and, if necessary, correct cognitional elements in historical perspectives.

The first part of this twofold task required the introduction of Lonergan's transcendental method. This introduction was carried out in a number of steps. Those worth recalling here were (1) the discovery of both logical

73Henri Marrou discusses the dependency of method on the questions asked by the historian, in The Meaning of History, pp. 65-66.

74The invariant form of cognitional process is a dynamic pattern, or structure, which allows for diversity in the content of specific acts of historical knowing. Arthur Danto uses an interesting example to show how what is invariant is compatible with what is variable. "One does not find sonnets less interesting or beautiful upon being told that all sonnets have an invariant form. If anything our admiration for poetic creativity increases upon learning that so many distinctly individual and dissimilar works should all have been produced in conformity with the most rigid and invariant set of rules!" Analytical Philosophy of History, p. 256.
and non-logical operations in methodical inquiry, and (2) the importance of method for historical inquiry and for the handling of certain theoretical problems which first presented themselves with the development of historical consciousness in the nineteenth century. But, because method can develop in a number of ways, a commonly accepted set of norms for handling these problems has not been available. Lonergan proposes that transcendental method supplies both a more general and a more fundamental approach than any of the previous attempts. As such, it offers the possibility of resolving some of the historical problems and of being the basis for a consensus on historical norms.

Consensus is possible because transcendental method formulates spontaneities of living, i.e. it formalizes the routines of human intentionality with which every historian operates in writing history. Since these routines occur in an invariant pattern and since the patterned performance of the subject can be formulated in transcendental method, there is available a fixed base from which to judge cognitional theories. Errors and omissions contained in the latter will turn up when the latter are measured against the actual pattern of the subject's cognitional performance. Transcendental method, therefore, has a critical function to perform in relation to all accounts of human knowing.

The second half of the twofold task translated the
arguments and positions of the first part into distinctive-ly historical terms. Cognitional structure is a precondi-
tion to (1) the subject's adoption of intelligent opinions about his own work as a historian, and (2) his study, eval-
uation, and possible revision of historical perspectives. The method which formulates that structure will be pre-
supposed by the historian in his efforts to clarify, check, and even replace elements in his own historical perspective. He may not recognize this implicit method. But, if he does, his explicit understanding of transcendental method will provide him with a metahistorical basis for criticiz-
ing the cognitional elements of other historical perspec-
tives. In the final section of this chapter, we will offer an example of just such an application of transcen-
dental method.
TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD APPLIED

A promise was made toward the end of the preceding section to supply examples of presuppositions in historical perspectives. The purpose of these examples is to indicate how the critical application of transcendental method can bring about needed changes in historical perspectives.

A problem immediately arises. To criticize presuppositions, one usually must first thematize them; but not all presuppositions can be explicated. This is particularly true for the historian. His starting point is not a set of axioms or even a set of insights which could be explicitly formulated in an unambiguous way. In Chapter Two, the analysis of relative horizons listed some of the components of the historian's starting point. His personal life history and received common-sense opinions were but two of the components listed. And these components defy a complete elucidation. However, even though all of his presuppositions and preconceptions cannot be thematized, still some of them can be. Only a person who insisted that, until one knows all there is to be known, one knows nothing at all—a presupposition in itself—only such a person would deny that he can know some presuppositions. But the

75 Lonergan remarks on these points and on the impossibility of systematically objectifying the historian's development in understanding the past, in Method in Theology, p. 216.
goal of comprehensive knowledge has already been shown to be foreign to the historian's work.

Some presuppositions and preconceptions remain implicit; self-consciousness does not pervade all of the historian's past. But this is not to deny the possibility of knowing some presuppositions. However, a second problem confronts even this limited possibility. Granted one can bring to light and formulate some preconceptions, still the statements expressing them fall within the boundaries of a particular perspective. In other words, the meaning of the statements belongs to the perspective within which the subject works. The statements do not prove the validity of his perspective, they presuppose it. Consequently, if they are to be criticized, thematic presuppositions require a new framework which is more fundamental than the framework which first justified them. Otherwise a critique of these positions will be based on grounds which originally validated the positions.

The solution to this problem has already been found. Transcendental method is not based upon particular opinions or upon the variables of a personal life history; it is not the privileged possession of a certain theoretical or historical perspective. Rather, it is the formulation of the pre-systematic and dynamic operations which give rise both

76Lonergan makes a particular application of this point, in "Metaphysics as Horizon," Collection, p. 214.
to intelligent preconceptions about history and to developed historical theories. It has already been argued that transcendental method does not owe its validity to any ethical variable. Its precepts are a priori in respect to every historical theory and are the measure of all accounts of historical knowing. Thus, transcendental method commits the historian to no single historical perspective; instead, it makes possible both his knowledge of and his critique of preconceptions about history. Again, it is the critical base upon which to build an account of historical knowing whose only debt is to the factual spontaneities of human consciousness.77

Having cleared away the two preceding problems, we can begin to discuss specific examples of presuppositions and needed changes in historical perspectives. In his famous study of the French Enlightenment, Carl Becker argues that the preconceptions of one's age, or the prevailing "climate of opinion," close one off from other ages and prevent one from passing judgment on the arguments and conclusions of thinkers of an earlier time. Those arguments and conclusions are sustained by a climate of opinion in which we no longer share. Consequently, for us they are neither true nor false, but only irrelevant.78

77 The brevity of this argument will be compensated for in the following study of Carl Becker's work.

78 Becker cites two instances of "climates of opinion" which are effectively closed to contemporary critical
Becker's position is not an isolated one. Hayden White's theory of paradigms as effectively closed systems of thought is comparable. The bugbear of ethnocentricity among many anthropologists arises from a similar notion of the exclusivity of cultures and values. What these positions have in common is the assertion that the critic is not competent to judge the beliefs, values, and reflection: the theological works of the thirteenth century and the political thought of the eighteenth century. "The one thing we cannot do with the Summa of St. Thomas is to meet its arguments on their own ground. We can neither assent to them nor refute them. It does not even occur to us to make the effort, since we instinctively feel that in the climate of opinion which sustains such arguments we could only gasp for breath. Its conclusions seem to us neither true nor false, but only irrelevant; and they seem irrelevant because the world pattern into which they are so dexterously woven is no longer capable of eliciting from us either an emotional or an aesthetic response." (A provocative thesis, indeed, for the author of the Verbum articles.)

Carl L. Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers, pp. 11-12.

Becker continues in his second example: "I have chosen to say something about the political and social thought of the eighteenth century, something about the Philosophes. If I could stand on high and pronounce judgment on them, estimate authoritatively the value of their philosophy, tell wherein it is true, wherein false—if I could only do all this it would be grand. But this, unfortunately, is not possible. Living in the twentieth century, I am limited by the preconceptions of my age." Ibid., p. 28.

Garrett Barden has some critical remarks to make on the ambiguity of many critiques of ethnocentricity. He faults anthropologists for accepting a too easy relativism in place of working out the details of critical consciousness. In effect, they dodge two difficult tasks: (1) discovering the source of any errors in what they are studying; (2) becoming critical subjects themselves by analyzing their own viewpoints. See his article, "The Intention of Truth in Mythic Consciousness," Language, Truth and Meaning, pp. 18-21.
explanatory theories of a culture or school of thought of which he is not a member. He can describe those beliefs and values and understand those theories, but any attempt to evaluate them will be unavoidably tainted by cultural prejudice. Therefore, diverse historical paradigms, or perspectives, are presented in a formal study by Hayden White, but he intends to avoid any judgment of their validity. In effect, he consciously adopts an ironic perspective which conceals an inherent scepticism behind a purely formalistic and purportedly value-neutral study.

80 Metahistory, pp. 3-4. In this writer's opinion, although Hayden White intends to avoid any criticism of historical paradigms and of their philosophical implications, he does leave behind his value-neutral analysis in the sections on Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. See ibid., pp. 237-243 (for Schopenhauer), and pp. 371-374 (for Nietzsche).

In Chapter Four we will discuss this question of value-neutral inquiry. For now, we merely note an interesting (ironic?) paradox in White’s purportedly value-neutral study. He begins with a claim to value-neutrality, but in the end he recommends that historians adopt whatever value systems fit their various moral and aesthetic aspirations. In other words, value-neutrality gives way to a free choice of partisan positions. Is there an arbitrary element here? In a purely preliminary way, we can suggest that the fourth transcendental precept expresses an immanent restraint on arbitrariness. The subject chooses positions in the light of what he knows and believes. More detail will be given to this immanent restraint in Chapter Five.

81 Ibid., p. 434. As noted before, White's thesis is that this ironic attitude can be laid aside at the conclusion of his study. By then the ironic perspective appears as only one of many possible perspectives on the past. The historian is free to adopt from among them a perspective consistent with his moral and/or aesthetic aspirations. The weaknesses of this "solution" to the crisis of historicism have already been pointed out in Chapter One.
What presuppositions lie at the base of this cultural relativism? A lengthy study cannot be undertaken here, but some presuppositions, their implications, and possible modification can be supplied. First, the differences among climates of opinion are presumed to be fundamental. One cannot investigate the sources of these differences; they—the differences—are simply given. Second, what is not given is a standpoint from which to grasp the origins of the differences. Rather, every standpoint is intrinsically related to a particular climate of opinion and, hence, is bound by the prevailing beliefs, values, and theories. What these two positions imply is that the subject is imprisoned in a closed world of meaning—the climate of opinion into which he happened to be born. Furthermore, the positions imply that efforts to understand oneself, to attain self-knowledge, fall exclusively within the boundaries of the inherited worldview. There is no question of finding in the subject a trans-cultural and invariant base upon which to develop critical consciousness.

Perhaps a critique of different perspectives is possible if the historian attempts to do presuppositionless history. If he can cancel the subtle influences of his

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82 Carl Becker allows mailing privileges to those in confinement: We may not be able to evaluate the arguments of the Summa, but—"We can. . .understand what is therein recorded well enough to translate it clumsily into modern terms." The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers, p. 11.
own personal background, then his critical remarks on other viewpoints may be considered objective. This, at least, seems to be the ideal of objectivity which is implicit in Becker's position. But, of course, he recognizes that the ideal is unattainable. Whether we must conclude that historical objectivity is therefore impossible is a topic reserved to Chapter Five. For now, the possibility of criticizing the previously mentioned presuppositions and their implications will not depend on the possibility of doing presuppositionless history. That would be to invoke the principle of the empty head which was challenged in Chapter Two. Becker and others are correct in arguing that statements made within one "climate of opinion" owe their meaning to that prior perspective.

But it does not follow that differences in climates of opinion are absolutely fundamental, i.e., that the sources of such differences cannot be located and criticized. It does not follow if the starting point of the investigator is, not a set of statements intrinsically related to a particular perspective, but the performance of the intelligent subject. An inquiry can be made into the intentional acts which elaborate historical perspectives and which manifest the historian's assumptions. The latter perspectives and assumptions presuppose these acts. Whether or not a particular perspective and its subordinate theories give a mistaken account of this prior performance does not change the
fact that intentional acts occur and can be objectified.\textsuperscript{83} It is the human subject who constitutes diverse meanings, develops theories which exploit and defend them, and takes a stand on certain values to the exclusion of others. His performance is logically prior to the finished product whether it be a series of statements, a partially thematized perspective, or a vague set of assumptions.

We have already argued that this performance can be objectified, that objectification reveals an invariant pattern which is present prior to all cognitional theorizing, and that, hence, a position which formulates this \textit{a priori} pattern is not dependent on the subjective variables of a particular perspective. We have also argued that the normative function of transcendental method can be expressed in transcendental precepts, of which specialized modes of argumentation are particular applications. In addition, we warned that transcendental method is not a privileged historical perspective. Rather, it is an affirmed position on human knowing which opens out onto all developments of understanding.

Now our argument, which concludes to a modification of the preceding positions held by Becker and others, can be simply put. If the critic begins with the actual performance of the subject, then he can "get behind" the diverse meanings of varying climates of opinion to the subjects

who constitute those meanings. In this case, the differences among perspectives are not absolutely fundamental. (Thus, the first presupposition is denied.) Next, if the objectification of the subject's performance yields an invariant pattern of intentional acts, then the critic can formulate a position which cuts across the diverse beliefs, values, and theories of different cultures. If this formulated position is normative and regulative of all specific modes of inquiry and argumentation, then the critic can identify sources of dialectical differences among historical perspectives. (Thus, the second presupposition is denied.) Finally, if transcendental method opens out onto all developments of understanding, then the critic who appropriates his own cognitional structure is not confined to a single perspective. He not only can understand the beliefs of other cultural groups, he can also learn from them and take note of their mistakes. (Thus, the two implications are rejected.) The thesis of closed worlds of meaning, or climates of opinion, is replaced by discovering in the subject an invariant pattern of acts of meaning. Cognitional structure supplies the universal standpoint which embraces all intelligible theories, beliefs, assertions, and their supportive frameworks. 84

84 Chapter Five will unpack this final statement to get at the hermeneutical tasks which can be carried out from this standpoint.
The preceding arguments apply to more than just the cognitional aspects of Becker's position. There is also a moral and aesthetic content in his thesis of divergent climates of opinion. He states that the conclusions of an alien climate of opinion are neither true nor false, but only irrelevant. And the reason they are irrelevant is that the perspective to which they belong is no longer capable of eliciting an emotional or aesthetic response from contemporary men.85 No response is forthcoming because the dominant concerns and problems addressed by those conclusions no longer hold our attention. The moral aspect of this viewpoint is derived from Becker's opinion on the functional purpose of historical inquiry. "'Historical thinking is . . . a social instrument, helpful in getting the world's work more effectively done.'"86

Now, just as we argued that the differences among


86Carl Becker quoted in Robert Allen Skotheim, American Intellectual Histories and Historians, p. 112. Becker was one of the leading members of the Progressive Tradition in American historiography. That school envisioned history, not as a refuge from the troubles of the day, but as a discipline capable of contributing to social progress. Far from being the neutral ground inhabited by antiquarians, history was rather a storehouse of ideas, projects, values which could be of use to the present. Unfortunately an overemphasis on the pragmatic value of history developed in this school of thought. However, after the Second World War, Becker modified the theoretical relativism which had been part of his pragmatic view of history. Both Skotheim (in ibid., pp. 121-122) and Lonergan comment on this change. See Method in Theology, p. 232.
perspectives are not fundamental, so we can add that diversity in problems and in their solutions is not fundamental. Admittedly, some of the problems which confronted thirteenth-century theologians and eighteenth-century philosophers are no longer of central importance today. Still, the critical subject can learn from the intellectual performance of those historical figures. He can admire the intellectual passion which prompted their inquiries, and he can imitate the standards for honesty which they imposed on their own thinking. He can take note of where individuals fell short of these standards and of the resulting errors in judgment. The moral and aesthetic ideals of his predecessors may be formulated in antiquated terms, but the critical subject does not begin his research with only a set of propositions. His ability to understand and to estimate the moral decisions and aesthetic ideals of other ages is based on more than the prevailing opinions of his day. The distance between two ages can be crossed because the same invariant structure which governed the performance of his predecessors has been appropriated by the critical subject. 87 Consequently, the irrelevancy of past conclusions

87 This invariant structure is not the basis for eliminating the relativity of specific cultural values. Again, transcendental method does not raise the critical subject above his own historicity. However, transcendental method does allow the subject to form a judgment about how well earlier subjects expressed what was known about the reciprocal responsibility between the individual and the group. Presupposed here is a transcultural moral imperative: One's doing should be consistent with one's knowing. Since
to contemporary problems is no absolute barrier to understanding and to reflective criticism of those conclusions as products of human intelligence and rationality.

In summary, this final section was to apply transcendental method to the presuppositions of a historical perspective. Two obstacles to this application were considered: not all presuppositions can be thematized, and a critique of presuppositions which itself remains within the supporting perspective of those presuppositions presumes their validity from the start. After clearing away these obstacles, we drew examples of presuppositions and of their implications from the work of Carl Becker. First, different climates of opinion were said to be mutually exclusive. Second, there is no standpoint from which to locate and to criticize the sources of differences among climates of opinion. The implications were, first, that the subject is bound to his own climate of opinion, and, second, that his development of self-knowledge will not turn up any transcultural base for critical consciousness. In contrast, we argued that transcendental method provides the needed knowledge both advances and declines, an element of relativity characterizes specific value statements and the acts which they describe. Still, the precept, Be responsible, expresses a transcultural aspect of value judgments, namely, the subject's responsibility to value what he knows to be good. To offer more than these preliminary remarks would take us too far afield. In Chapter Five, we will return to defend the transcultural element involved in the fourth level of intentional operations.
standpoint for a critical evaluation of the sources of differences among climates of opinion. Finally, the thesis of closed worlds of meaning was undercut by finding in the subject's cognitional performance an invariant pattern which has a normative function in respect to every elaboration of an intelligible perspective.

Summary of Chapter III

The purpose of this chapter was to establish the validity of our second counterproposal: The subject's differentiated basic horizon provides adequate metahistorical grounds for criticizing the cognitional elements of the historian's perspective.

Section two outlined the primary requisite to reaching this goal, namely, a formal theory of the preconditions of historical knowing. Chapter Two had already supplied some of these preconditions, but a transcendental starting point was still missing. Section three discovered the needed starting point in the data of consciousness. Arguments followed to the effect that intentional acts occur in an a priori pattern which is the basic structure of all knowing.

The fourth section accomplished a twofold task. It established the critical function of the a priori structure of human knowing. Next, it indicated that, through the objectification of his intentional horizon, the subject
can attain an adequate metahistorical position for evaluating the cognitional elements of historical perspectives. Finally, section five applied transcendental method as a critical tool to certain presuppositions in a selected historical perspective. However, throughout these sections, we have stopped short of raising the issue of bias. In any of its many forms, bias may be at work both on the level of historical preconceptions and on the level of historical procedures. The obstacles it raises to the application of transcendental method will be the topic of the following chapter.
CHAPTER IV

DETACHMENT AND THE WRITING OF HISTORY

INTRODUCTION

Chapter Four takes up Hayden White's third thesis and the counterproposal to it. In this introductory section, both positions are outlined, their respective problems noted, and the proposed solutions sketched. The second section of this chapter offers a summary of historical procedures—those procedures occurring on a surface level which, White argues, are determined by precritical opinions belonging to a deep level of the historical text. Finally, the third section presents arguments for the possibility of detachment (or freedom from bias) in the writing of history. These arguments will be derived from an analysis of how transcendental method sanctions the specialized procedures which were previously summarized in the second section.

White's third thesis is the following: the historian's theoretical concepts and his epistemological position belong to the surface of the historical text. The historian's decision to adopt this set of concepts and this particular epistemological position rests on precritically held opinions. These opinions belong to a deep structure
where theoretical procedures receive an implicit, precritical sanction.¹

To this thesis the following counterproposal is made: Transcendental method is the basis for a detached attitude and can provide a critical, non-biased sanction of theoretical procedures.²

Before expanding on the preceding counterproposal, we will review the background to White's third thesis. He sets himself the task of analyzing the deep structure of the historical imagination. The classics of nineteenth-century European history provide a focus for his analysis.

¹Metahistory, p. x.

²To anticipate remarks which are to follow later in this chapter—we grant that precritical opinions are part of the relative horizon of every historian. It is likely that some form of bias will also be present. However, an inquiry into human interiority may lead to the development of critical consciousness. The latter, coming to expression in transcendental method, has normative and critical functions which are able to modify and, if necessary, to correct precritical opinions contained in relative horizons. Bias may, therefore, not be an irreducible aspect of every historical work.

For the sake of clarity, we should repeat the distinctions made earlier among preconceptions, bias, and preferences. We understand preconceptions to be precritical opinions which may or may not be biased. What distinguishes them from bias is the absence of critical reflection which seeks to discover any hidden bias in them. Bias we take to be a distortion of the subject's spontaneous intellectual development. It sets up barriers which prematurely halt the process of understanding. Preferences are expressed choices among varying and sometimes conflicting opinions. They are basically a matter of individual partiality even though a large group may favor the same opinions. In any case, neither the individual nor the group justifies its preferences on compelling theoretical grounds.
What emerges as the content of the deep structure is a set of precritically accepted paradigms which dictate the plausible forms for historical explanations. These paradigms are the metahistorical element of the historian's work. A spatial metaphor expresses the distinction between this element and other dimensions of his work. Surface procedures are preceded by operations on a deep level which are basically preconceptual and poetic. On the surface, or manifest, level there are obvious differences in how history is conceived. One author stresses the diachronic elements of the past while another emphasizes the synchronic. One historian reconstructs in impressionistic fashion the "spirit of the age" while another penetrates to the "laws" which guided the course of events. One author argues the relevancy of history for solving contemporary problems while another underlines the basic differences between past and present and, thus, discourages the presentist concerns of his counterpart.³

These manifest differences are said to reflect more fundamental disagreements over the form which historical explanations ought to take. Hayden White cites the case

³*Metahistory*, p. 4. White cites Michelet and Ranke as historians who produced diachronic narratives; Tocqueville and Burckhardt as historians who produced synchronic narratives (ibid., p. 10). We have already noted the presentism of Carl Becker. His counterpart might well be Hegel. See the latter's remarks in the Introduction to *The Philosophy of History*, translated by J. Sibree (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), p. 6.
history of Organicist and Mechanistic modes of explanation to exemplify how surface differences originate in deep structural conflicts. These two paradigms of historical explanation have been excluded from contemporary professional circles in favor of the more "empirical" paradigms of Formism and Contextualism. The professional historical community is fairly unanimous in its avoidance of the philosophies of history practiced by Hegel (Organicist type) and Marx (Mechanistic type). But (1) inasmuch as the excluded paradigms provide insights into the past which are unachievable through other paradigms, and (2) inasmuch as history is not a rigorous science committed to a single terminological system, the decision to exclude some paradigms in favor of others must rest on precritical opinions about the way past events should be recounted. These opinions, according to White, manifest a preference for one or more sets of explanation over others. Insofar as the preference is precritical, it is likely to be no more than the bias of those who express a choice among paradigms. At least it may appear so to anyone making an alternate choice among historical paradigms. 4

White's preceding conclusions are part of his more general thesis: when the historian chooses among alternate perspectives on history, the likely grounds for his choice

4See ibid., Metahistory, pp. 20-21, for an expanded discussion of the points made in this paragraph.
will be moral or aesthetic preferences.\footnote{Tbid., p. 433.} Nineteenth-century historians attempted to justify their choices on epistemological grounds, arguing that their modes of explanation were more scientific or "realistic" than others. However, all these theoretical arguments belong to the surface of the historical texts. They reflect ethical or aesthetic commitments which lie on a deeper level. It is these commitments which sanction theories used both to explain historical data and to justify the selection of narrative forms.

There are numerous problems entailed by Hayden White's third thesis. We have already taken note of some of them in Chapter One. In the first place, if both the historian's choice of a paradigm and his subsequent attempts to justify that choice are based on precritical grounds, then, to those not sharing this paradigm, his choice and defense will seem gratuitous. His arguments will seem so many expressions of personal temperament.

We apprehend the past and the whole spectacle of history-in-general in terms of felt needs and aspirations that are ultimately personal, having to do with the ways we view our own positions in the ongoing social establishment, our hopes and fears for the future, and the image of the kind of humanity we would like to believe we represent.\footnote{Tbid., p. 283.} White's remarks emphasize personal needs or aspirations. But one can ask, Are there not general human needs which cut across individual differences as part of communally adopted aspirations? Such needs might assure the historian of a certain type of public objectivity if his work were based on a widely accepted set of values. White does not speak of this possibility. He does mention
One implication of this position is that the writing of history is not so much an account of past events as it is a self-revelation on the part of the writer.\(^7\)

Other implications can be drawn from White's thesis. First, if each historian works under the guidance of a pre-critically accepted paradigm and if that antecedent framework predetermines his use of evidence and modes of argumentation, then his work is above criticism from those who adopt other historical perspectives. Their precritical choices will not contain grounds for criticizing the work of others who make different choices. In effect, we are back to the previous position studied in Chapter Three. That is, differences among systems of thought are final; there is no access to the source of these different systems, the intelligent human subject. Second, if historical procedures are justified only on the basis of individual preferences, then conflicting historical interpretations cannot be mediated. What strikes one historian as a biased

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that conflicting paradigms win supportive audiences, but he locates the link between historian and audience on a pretheoretical, and specifically linguistic, level of consciousness. (Metahistory, p. 429.) In view of how he attempts to resolve the crisis of historicism, the possibility of universal needs or values would seem to be out of the question. Such needs or values, if they were discovered, would themselves present a challenge to the ironic mode of consciousness implicit in White's formalistic study.

\(^7\)W. H. Walsh discusses this type of paradoxical implication, in his Philosophy of History: An Introduction, p. 109.
use of evidence may seem quite appropriate to another. What is condemned as bias by one school of thought may be praised as moral conviction by another. The implication is that any bias in a historical work is irreducible; there are no grounds for critically establishing that it is in fact bias. 8

What these implications reflect is a series of obstacles preventing any resolution of the crisis of historicism. 9 Since the main purpose of this dissertation is to estimate the strength of Lonergan's claims for transcendental method, these obstacles must be related to that method.

8Room is left by this conclusion for understanding what other historians talk about. But what is lacking is a set of criteria for evaluating what one has understood. This situation sums up the extreme individuality of nineteenth-century historicism. Friedrich Meinecke aptly described its outcome: "It understood everything and forgave everything, and so (to quote Dilthey's words) ended up in "an anarchy of convictions."" Friedrich Meinecke quoted in the Introduction by Carl Hinrichs to Meinecke's Historism, translated by J. E. Anderson (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), p. xlviii.

9Hayden White's limited solution (outlined in Chapter One) fails to overcome these obstacles. He is correct in locating theoretical procedures on the surface of the text. However, when he limits the deep-structural content to precritical opinions and poetic insights, he is effectively excluding critical grounds for judgments which mediate the disputes of the crisis. The grounds he does offer are moral convictions and aesthetic preferences. But, for him, these are variables which leave intact the incompatible differences of historical paradigms.

The variables (e.g. moral convictions about what social relationships should be) might be shared by a wide audience. Then it is possible for a limited number of paradigms to dominate the historical field. However, White takes for granted that such convictions and their dependent paradigms have not been justified on any compelling theoretical grounds. No matter how large a plurality is won by
This fourth chapter argues that theoretical operations on the surface of the historical text can be critically sanctioned. The basis for this critical sanction cannot be merely another set of ethical or aesthetic preferences. Nor can the basis be part of the surface structure. That transcendental method is correctly termed part of the deep structure of historical works can be argued in the following way. It is not based on an appeal to historical data, nor on a theory of history, nor on a preferred mode of historical narration. The latter are surface elements. But transcendental method is the \textit{a priori} condition to meaningful arrangements of historical data, to convincing theories, and to intelligible narratives.\footnote{We distinguish here between \textit{a priori} and \textit{a posteriori} conditions of historical knowledge. To the former belongs the inquisitive and rational subject through whose efforts critical history is produced. To the latter belong the materials which may become evidence to support an interpretation of past events. Transcendental method which formulates the intelligent and rational operations of the historian interrelates these conditions. Human intelligence is an \textit{a priori} condition to historical works, but that intelligence is constituted through acts of inquiry which take up the materials of research as empirical evidence.} It, therefore, precedes and conditions all subsequent operations on the manifest level of historical works.

Finally, the critical sanction envisioned by this one party, there are always other parties with alternate convictions and their dependent perspectives. And what the crisis of historicism means is that subsequent disputes over convictions and perspectives lead to no satisfactory conclusion. That is, the perspectives are fundamentally different, their grounds are variable, and it is up to the individual to choose sides.
chapter implies the possibility of detachment from bias. It must be possible, first, to discover bias as bias, and second, to offer an alternative to it. A detachment which has an a priori foundation in critical consciousness supplies an alternative to the "anarchy of convictions" which prevails in the crisis period.
The counterproposal of this chapter can be divided (1) into the issue of a critical sanction of theoretical operations, and (2) into the issue of detachment from bias. The first issue will be our initial concern. Put negatively, this part of the counterproposal denies that in every instance theoretical operations must be based on subjective preferences. A review of the conclusions reached in Chapter Three will indicate how far we have come in proving this part of the counterproposal.

We argued that the subject can enter the realm of interiority and, through the occurrence of particular questions, can begin to differentiate the multiple levels of his own consciousness. This differentiation of a basic horizon reveals the a priori form of all knowing. The discovery of the basic structure of human knowing gives us access to a performance that is prior to any theorizing about it. Once this performance is formulated in a cognitive theory, we have available a metahistorical position upon which to base a critique of precritical elements in historical perspectives. In addition, we argued that transcendental method which is part of this formulated performance has a normative function in relation to all special methods and theoretical procedures.

Two of the conclusions can be rephrased in terms of the problems taken up in this chapter. First, the
metahistorical cognitional position provides the basis for criticizing the precritical opinions which sanction, at least initially, the theoretical operations proper to the adopted paradigm. Second, transcendental method allows access to the subject's performance "under" the manifest level of the historical text. This method formulates a cognitional pattern which is presumed by every theoretical operation. Now if this method has a normative relation to every surface procedure, and if prior opinions affecting historical procedures can be measured against a critically based cognitional theory, then precritical differences among historical paradigms are not "too deep" for criticism. That is, both they and their consequent differences on the manifest level are not absolutely fundamental. In the first place, different paradigms have a common deeper origin in the performance of the subject—and that performance can be formulated. In the second place, conflicting historical interpretations which ultimately derive from different presuppositions can be checked by procedures which conform to the deeper transcendental method.

Of these last two statements, we take the first to be already proved. This section of Chapter Four takes some initial steps toward a proof of the second statement by outlining the intelligent and rational procedures of the historian. In other words, it summarizes specific operations which form the surface level of the historical text.
The third section of the chapter will show the possible conformity of these operations to transcendental method and, thereby, will reveal an unbiased basis for a mediation of historical conflicts.

**Formation of Contexts**

We begin our survey of historical procedures by presuming two things: (1) that our hypothetical historian knows how to do research, and (2) that, aware of the pitfalls of exegesis, he therefore proceeds with caution. Our survey presumes rather than investigates these two points because of the numerous variables which are involved. For example, medieval charters are not subject to the same tests as contemporary dispatches between embassies. In this country, the student of history is initiated into these variables largely through the professional exempla offered in the graduate seminar. Likewise, we presume that arguments in Chapter Three established that knowing is a compound act. Thus, historical procedures leading to historical knowledge can be generally subdivided among historical experience, historical understanding, historical judging.

There are two inseparable dimensions to historical experience: individual becoming and social becoming. The individual experiences his own growing out of a past and into a future. This experience is not of a succession of instants but of a flow of intertwined intentions and
activities. At this level of individual experience, the subject lives the temporal unity of past and future. This unity of intention and act is a distinctively historical process. It accounts for our historical being, for we are what we are becoming and have become. Human being is accordingly translated into action-terms; it is self-making process. 11 However, what has been constituted by the subject as his own historical being is not isolated from the historical experience of the group. What the individual remembers of the past is usually conveyed to him by the anecdotes and narratives, the rules and institutions of his community. This community owes its identity to the common traditions it preserves and to the institutions which predecessors saw fit to establish and maintain. A sudden collapse of social traditions will produce a loss of identity in the group. Then the individual reverts to an earlier stage of development and, along with others, must again build up the traditions and institutions which weld a group together as a historical community.

Both the individual's personal experience and the shared maintenance of customs and institutions are materials for a rudimentary history. Written histories may

11 For Lonergan's remarks on this point, see both Method in Theology, (p. 181), and his essay, The Subject, (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1968), pp. 19-29. An expanded discussion of human historicity is found in Emil Fackenheim's careful study, Metaphysics and Historicity, pp. 27-48.
incorporate them. Mythical exploits and legends of heroes are mixed in to inspire the community and to educate it by examples from the past.\textsuperscript{12} But, in fact, historians have made the transitions from rudimentary history to ever more complex forms of history. Lonergan sketches the developing sophistication of history from early rudimentary forms to the distinct specialty of history which is the concern of a separate professional community. Autobiography and biography are intermediate forms which concentrate on individual lives. According to Lonergan, the specialty of history concentrates on the "times" and, thereby, includes the content of biographies within an expanded treatment of social development or decline.\textsuperscript{13}

Throughout the more developed forms of historical writing, a common set of procedures occurs. The historian investigates materials assembled by prior research. From among them he selects the apparently significant details of the life and/or times which he chooses to study. He abbreviates the routine and omits the commonplace. This

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., Method in Theology, p. 182.

\textsuperscript{13}For a more extensive treatment of autobiography, biography, and history proper, see Ibid., pp. 182-184. Lonergan's claim that history proper is more than a series of biographies is argued on the basis of the incommensurability between individual deeds and social processes. Institutions and communal values are more than the sum of individual lives; they provide part of the context in which such lives are first lived and later recounted. This claim and its arguments are similar to the position taken by Maurice Mandelbaum in his article, "Societal Facts," reprinted in Theories of History, pp. 476-488.
process of selectivity has already been discussed in Chapter Two. Next, by inquiry and gradual discovery, the historian pulls together the details into an imaginative sequence of events. He surmises how events might have occurred and then proceeds to search for confirming or disconfirming evidence of his imaginative scene. Some occurrences may be readily verified, others may not. With what is verified the historian will proceed to organize a series of limited contexts in which issues are ranked according to importance. 14

Lonergan's notion of context is worth some special attention. He notes a heuristic meaning in which "context" refers to the framework in which an issue is raised. For example, a study of Boswell's Life of Johnson has as its context the author's other works, his own life and times which he shared with Dr. Johnson, and the values and aims of the author. The literary commentator places his selected issue in this broad context and relates it to other issues falling within the same boundaries. The result is a skeletal framework, or heuristic structure, for a subsequent literary study. 14

The importance of historical issues is Janus-faced. The historian is concerned with their importance to those who lived the events and the significance of their outcome for those who came later. It is in the latter case that one can say that the significance of the events of 1789 is still an open question. Gordon Leff points out that the central dialectic of historical knowledge is to reconcile events as they happened with their outcome. See his History and Social Theory, p. 24.
But there is another meaning of "context." In this second sense, "context" is the interconnection of questions and answers in limited groups.\(^{15}\) The historian begins his inquiry by isolating the significant issues for his chosen topic. By asking and answering questions, he builds up a series of positions which complement or challenge one another on the significant issues. Through repeated efforts to understand, his grasp of a complex topic may improve, mistaken surmises may be eliminated, and what remains may be organized into a coherent whole. Now this interweaving of limited positions into a coherent whole is the raising of particular contexts to a higher unity in which parts are interrelated and the overall view assigns each part its place in the general scheme.\(^{16}\)

To illustrate how limited contexts develop to an overview of a complex topic, let us set up a hypothetical instance of historical inquiry. Suppose a historian decides to study the economic conditions of the American cotton trade between 1840 and 1860. The limits of his topic are initially chronological. Shipping manifests, bills of trade, market quotations supply data for his study. Out of this jumble of dates and numbers, the historian selects materials which represent a cross-section of the transactions carried out within the specified period. Then he

\(^{15}\)Method in Theology, p. 163.

\(^{16}\)Ibid., pp. 164-165.
searches for patterns in these representative materials. Are there trends to be noted, recurrent fluctuations in cotton prices, noticeable differences between prices at one port and those at another? Such questions may uncover significant patterns in trading over a number of years. But answering these questions will give rise to further ones. Why this sudden drop in prices in 1850? Did foreign competition depress the market or was the overproduction of cotton in new areas west of the Mississippi to blame? Such questions will recur, but, given a limited topic, they will not be endless. Gradually the historian will build up an understanding of two and three-year periods of cotton trading. Exceptional market conditions will be distinguished from the normal flow of business. The good years as well as the bad will be arranged in an overview of twenty years. Then the historian may be in a position to grasp the long-range prospects of the cotton trade during those two decades. Were there signs of decline or of prosperity? To answer this question, he must pay attention to more than the limited context of a two or three-year period. He must interconnect all the contexts set up by the preceding inquiry and so round out his view of the full twenty years. Trends may be established which suggest that, with some exceptions in particular locales and in years of drought or heavy rainfall, the cotton market was extremely healthy during this age and gave many indications of
continued expansion.

Now the purpose of this hypothetical example was to illustrate what Lonergan means by limited contexts which can be organized to form an overview of a complex topic. The historian begins with a general issue: The economic condition of the cotton trade between 1840 and 1860. Multiple questions turn up related but less general problems. Solution of the lesser problems is a step toward discovery of the components of the more general topic. An arrangement of these component answers into a larger pattern requires that the historian recheck his solutions, eliminate any errors, and strive to move from the economic trends of a few years to the broader perspective of twenty-year trends. When the component trends have been arranged in a general scheme, when problems have been settled to the historian's satisfaction or the remaining ones are of doubtful relevancy, then he can say what was going forward during the twenty years. And his assertion can be backed up with the converging evidence supplied in limited contexts of two or three-year periods. 17

17 Ibid., p. 164. Lonergan distinguishes the task of the historian from that of the exegete. The latter aims at understanding what his subject meant, but the former goes beyond this accomplishment. "He wants to grasp what was going forward in particular groups at particular places and times. By 'going forward' I mean to exclude the mere repetition of a routine. I mean the change that originated the routine and its dissemination. I mean process and development but, no less, decline and collapse." Ibid., pp. 178-179.

This description of the historian's task obviously
An additional purpose is served by the preceding example. The historian's procedure aims at winning an understanding of a complex topic. He solves problems, answers specific questions, and tries to interrelate his answers. Now this procedure comes to a provisional end when the relevant questions have been answered and the intelligible connections drawn. Then a historical judgment is possible on the topic previously investigated and illuminated from many sides. Recall that historical knowing has been accepted as a compound act. The study of materials, the understanding of limited contexts in their particularity and interrelatedness and the reasonings linking them come to term in a judgment on the overall interpretation built up out of these many components. Does the historian think his task complete? The answer depends on whether other significant problems remain, whether further relevant questions occur to him. Without the impetus supplied by further problems and questions, the historian will not limit him to a study of the intentions of his subjects. "What was going forward" at some time was largely unknown to those who participated in the process. For the details of Lonergan's argument on this point, see ibid., p. 179. We can take this argument as a challenge to Collingwood's thesis of historical intentions which are to be re-enacted by the historian. The challenge is specifically to the exclusive claim to identify such re-enactment with the task of the historian. See The Idea of History, pp. 176-177. Gordon Leff states the challenge to Collingwood's thesis in a paraphrase of Marx: "The historian owes his role to the fact that though men make their history they do so without knowing how they do so." History and Social Theory, p. 48.
seek no further insights into his topic. And without additional insights, there will be no new discoveries on his part which will complement, revise, or correct the interpretation he has made.¹⁸ In effect, he will be satisfied with his interpretation and feel assured of its high degree of probability.

There is an obvious ambiguity in the statement, "Judgment rests on the absence of further relevant question."¹⁹ Does the statement mean that there are in fact no additional relevant questions, or does it mean that the questioner is unaware of any more? Questions occur to individuals who are seeking to understand some point or other. If an individual considers his present understanding of some issue sufficient and believes that any remaining obscure points are only minor matters which cannot revise his understanding of the issue, then he will judge his understanding to be correct. Yet, needless to say, the remaining points of obscurity may involve major problems. Were they to be investigated, the individual might have to alter radically his understanding of the issue. The actual absence of further relevant questions implies an end to the search for insights into a particular issue. In turn, this precludes the possibility of new discoveries, and so the achieved understanding of the issue will in fact

¹⁸Ibid., Method in Theology, pp. 163-164.
¹⁹Ibid., p. 166.
be correct. But, if only to the best of his knowledge there are no further relevant questions, then the individual may say that his understanding is probably correct. 20

We began this subsection by discussing how the historian isolates and develops limited contexts. Our purpose was to offer insights into the gradual process of organizing the elements of a complex historical topic. By interconnecting questions and answers, the historian builds up a series of complementary but partial viewpoints. As concretized in our example of the pre-Civil War cotton trade, an overview of the partial viewpoints may eventually be reached. Then a judgment on the complex topic becomes possible because the parts of the complex whole have been understood in themselves and in their interrelationships. Complexity is thus mastered in historical inquiry. In what follows, we will be detailing how such mastery is won in a methodical way.

Five Aspects of Historical Procedures

A fuller treatment of historical judgments will occur 20Ibid., p. 191. The thesis of perspectivism accepted by Lonergan implies that the "relevancy" of further questions is, at least in part, dependent on the horizon-content of the individual historian. Hence, the historian can aim at a high degree of probability for his interpretations of complex topics, but certainty will elude him. Still, in regard to fairly simple issues and in regard to negative conclusions (i.e. how something could not have happened), certitude in historical judgments is likely.
in Chapter Five when we take up the issue of historical objectivity. At this point our interest is in clarifying the procedures which lead the historian to make claims of objective knowledge. These procedures are not the same for every type of history. In fact, objectivity is not sought in every historical inquiry. Consider the exception presented by rudimentary histories of folk heroes. Clear insights and correct judgments give way to other purposes in such accounts. Since, in this chapter we are concerned with the relation between historical procedures and transcendental method, we must distinguish between precritical forms of history and the methodical operations of a professional historical community.

Among several features differentiating precritical from critical history, Lonergan emphasizes the practical function of the precritical. The latter seeks to strengthen the identity of the group and to foster devotion to its institutions. This practical aim translates into an educational task: to communicate a strong appreciation of the group's heritage and a concern for its advancement. On the other hand, critical history replaces this practical aim with a concern for settling matters-of-fact. Lonergan reiterates Ranke's famous maxim to characterize this interest in what actually happened. An argument is offered in support of this distinction. If the work of critical history is not pursued apart from political or apologetic
aims, the historian is likely to find himself serving two masters. Records will be twisted to read as he wants them to be read for the sake of some ulterior goal. The argument can be expanded. If there is a difference between propaganda and history, then, no matter how many failures occur, the historian will still strive to detach himself from the apologetic concerns of precritical history. The alternative is an unscholarly submission to the vagaries of popular causes and a willingness to hold in check his critical abilities. In such a situation, attentive selectivity would be foreworn. In addition, any attempt to justify such submission would stumble over an obvious question: How would a historian know that he is able to produce only propaganda if he did not first know of an alternate way of doing history?

Further, if critical history is primarily concerned with judging matters-of-fact and if history proper involves an inquiry into what was "going forward" in the group at a particular time, then critical history is more than a compilation of chronicles. It is not only attentive, it is also intelligently selective of events. On the other hand, chronicles work within the limits of historical experience; events are arranged in temporal sequence as their contemporaries experienced them. But a serial listing of experiences does not suffice to make sense out of historical

21 Ibid., p. 185.
processes. It is simply not intelligently selective or discriminating in regard to significant events. Again, contemporaries of the events often did not foresee the outcome of their actions; thus, they were unaware of the full significance of the events. It is up to the historian to work his way from isolated events to an understanding of the larger context. The road to understanding both the events and their consequences will be marked by a series of discoveries. As previously noted, the process of historical discovery begins with the selective question which is directed toward a specific issue. For Lonergan, the beginning of a critical study lies with a question for historical intelligence: What was going forward in this situation at this time?22

This questioning is not without its presuppositions. The question for historical intelligence is framed according to the inquirer's previous historical knowledge. Without some prior acquaintance with the selected topic, he would not know what was problematic and needed further inquiry. So questioning begins with an incomplete understanding of some issue ("incomplete" because otherwise there would be no reason to seek to know more about the

issue). The more familiar the historian is with the issue, then the more materials he will be able to use and the more questions he will be able to ask and the greater his apprec­iation will be of the complexities of the issue. In a word—the more intelligently selective he will be. To return briefly to Chapter Two, the historian's questioning occurs between an unknown known and a known known. The former is what he intends, the latter is what he brings to his intending. The wider his background, the better his chance of selecting the right questions and of intelligent­ly directing his inquiry toward satisfactory results.

In searching for a more complete understanding of the selected issue, the historian engages in what was previ­ously termed an imaginative and tentative reconstruction of events as they have happened. There is a second aspect to this procedure: the heuristic. Henri Marrou has ana­lyzed it. Upon asking a question, the historian may

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Ibid., Method in Theology, p. 187 and p. 216. See also Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 247. Our discus­sion in Chapter Five of the hermeneutical circle will elab­orate this idea of historical fore-knowledge.

immediately formulate one or more possible answers. The question takes the form of a hypothesis which is yet to be verified: "Could it be the case that...?" With this type of question, the historian will be specifying the possibilities to be investigated; he will be giving direction to his historical inquiry. The heuristic function of hypothetical questions aims at a precision which is far from the random collection of data and the "pure seeing" of past events. Eventually such hypothetical probes require verification. But the whole purpose in making them specific is to anticipate the gathering of relevant evidence.

This may be the best place to enter an aside on the term "evidence" as it affects the selective, heuristic questioning of the historian. Collingwood makes the point that nothing is evidence except in relation to a definite question.25 The historian does not attempt to embrace at once all the materials relevant to his topic. Instead, he proceeds by isolating key issues, figures, events; then, by gradually interconnecting them, he builds up an overview of the myriad details. The questions-hypotheses which give direction to his work require verification. Thus, just as knowing is a compound act and just as the process of interconnecting limited contexts is a gradual achievement, so too the determination of evidence is a step-by-

step process. First, the historian determines potential evidence, i.e. materials which are available to him and which may or may not be relevant to his inquiry. Second, he determines formal evidence, i.e. materials which he actually uses to ask and to answer his questions. These are the materials, or data, which he determines to be relevant to his initial hypotheses. Third, he determines actual evidence, i.e. materials which are not only relevant to his topic but are used to support a judgment either for or against a historical conclusion.26

These distinctions in the determination of evidence are parallel to the pattern of cognitional activities. Potential evidence is data as available here and now for the historian's use. Formal evidence is data as available and understood in relation to some broader context. Actual evidence is data as both available and understood and, then, as reflectively adopted for warranting some historical judgment. Arguments can reinforce not only these distinctions but also this parallelizing of evidence and cognitional acts. First, research turns up more materials than will be relevant to a specific inquiry. Selectivity intervenes to save the historian from entanglement in countless details of only potential worth. Second, there are false starts in every type of inquiry. A heuristic insight may

26 Method in Theology, p. 186. On the basis of our epistemological arguments in the next chapter, we will place restrictions on the notion of potential historical evidence.
initially seem pertinent to the matter at hand only later to be discarded as misleading. The investigator may have understood correctly; it is just that the understood evidence is better used elsewhere. Third, just as inquiry grows more specific as a study advances, so too the evidence is narrowed down. Some of the original materials have been discarded, some of the insights into the remaining materials have been limited to remarks in footnotes; but other materials have been used to bolster arguments in the text. The historian has a reasoned interpretation to propose, and it will rest on the intelligently assembled evidence which he thinks appropriate and convincing.

The preceding remarks were a digression from the heuristic aspect of historical inquiry even though evidence is anticipated by selective questions-hypotheses which probe for solutions to historical problems. But, just as evidence is no simple historical "given," so too particular formulations of questions are not inviolable. They may be so altered during the process of investigation that they scarcely resemble the original questions with which the historian began. Such changes occur when the original questions do not lead to satisfactory results. If insights are slow in coming, then new questions will be formed. Gradually the historian may clarify his selected issues. At some point he will attempt a surmise or provisional description of what he is studying. This requires
that he pull together the fragmentary insights into some kind of unity. What is involved is an interrelation of tentative insights. This process is the **constructive** aspect of the historian's procedures.

Previously we spoke of the imaginative reconstruction of events by the historian. A creative effort on his part is called for if coherence is to be made of multiple insights. Complex issues do not unravel themselves, data do not simply fall into historical forms ready for publication. What is required is the use of hypotheses (the heuristic aspect) and the interconnection of several of them to form a tentative account of the chosen topic (the constructive aspect).

Immediately the problem of idealism arises. Does the historian create or reconstruct something other than what actually happened? This question cannot be settled in advance of the historian's presentation of evidence. The use of constructed hypotheses and organizational schemes does not preclude the possibility of a verifiable interpretation. 27 By themselves hypotheses are neither valid nor

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27 Arthur Danto cites Charles Beard as one historian who mistakenly distinguished history and natural science on the basis of the historian's use of constructed hypotheses. Beard thought the procedures of natural science did not include the use of hypotheses. The historian made use of them but to the detriment of his discipline. Beard was mistaken on two counts: (1) that scientists do not use hypotheses; (2) that hypotheses somehow hinder the discovery of verifiable interpretations. See Danto's *Analytical Philosophy of History*, pp. 99-102.
invalid, they are heuristic means for reaching definite results which can then be tested. Only if there is confirming evidence will the historian argue that his creative effort is headed in the right direction. But there is an intermediate stage where tentative descriptions persist or fail. If they lead to further related insights and if the formed opinions coincide with the evidence as more and more of it is assembled, then the tentative descriptions will persist and develop. But if further questions and insights are not forthcoming, then the historian must drop the proposed descriptions and try another approach. Furthermore, even if more questions and insights occur on the basis of the original hypothesis, still he must be attaining more than new sets of hypotheses. If only a series of surmises is being gained, the historian may be on the wrong track and so be in need of a new starting point.²⁸

In short, the constructive aspect offers no guarantee that hypotheses and tentative descriptions will prove accurate, but neither does it necessitate that the historian fictionalize the past.

A fourth aspect of the historian's procedure reinforces the statement that historical fictions can be avoided. "Ecstatic" is the somewhat unusual name which Lonergan gives to this aspect. The label refers to the outcome of the historical inquiry which we have already outlined.

²⁸Method in Theology, p. 187.
From prior historical knowledge and researched materials to selective questions, to the formation of hypotheses, to further understanding, to converging evidence—this is a cumulative process. Lonergan notes that, as the historian's insights increase and he recognizes that his initial guesses were not wide of the mark, a shift occurs in the way the historian asks questions. Originally his hypotheses were largely a matter of guesswork though prior historical knowledge did lend them some focus. But the gradual accumulation of insights and the isolation of specific problems yet to be solved are the basis for additional questions which are less dependent on guesswork and more directly connected with the materials under study. There may be a movement away from the assumptions and viewpoint with which the historian began. Increasingly he will be aware of what positions and viewpoints are pertinent to the issues themselves. He will leave behind previous opinions regarding issues which his cumulative inquiry has now cast in a clearer light. To the extent that new discoveries are corrective of former opinions, the historian is, figuratively speaking, taken out of himself.29 Hence, the term "ecstatic" conveys an idea of both developing understanding and, if required, self-correction.

Up to this point four aspects of the historian's procedures have been described: selectivity in materials;

29 *bid.*, pp. 187-188.
heuristic devices which promote possible answers to questions; constructive schemes which elaborate initial discoveries; the ecstatic discovery of the questions and viewpoints best suited to the issues under study. A fifth aspect is termed the "critical" or discriminating aspect.

In any lengthy inquiry the historian will recognize that some of his insights are superfluous. To return to a previous example, a study of the cotton trade between 1840 and 1860 will involve materials from many sources. Under the rubric of selectivity, not all the materials will be given equal weight. But what happens in the case of potential

30 We have already used the term "critical" in reference to the relation between transcendental method, which formulates the performance of the subject, and cognitional theories about that performance. The term also occurred in the distinction between precritical and critical history. Much as in the case of "structure" and "ideology," the word "critical" suffers from overuse and a consequent vagueness. It has a general meaning in philosophical thought: critical thinking is doubting, questioning. The "critical spirit" is philosophical intelligence committed to question everything. Ideally the philosopher hopes to take nothing for granted.

Lonergan's use of transcendental method is critical in this latter sense. He begins his project, not with a statement, but with a performance, namely, the act of questioning. To attempt to doubt questioning requires a question: Do questions occur? Therefore, his starting point is a commonly experienced, indubitable act. (See Insight, p. 330.) Lonergan shares this "critical" starting point with Emerich Coreth and other members of the rather loosely allied school of Transcendental Thomism. While their positions develop along different lines, they are in agreement that human performance, and not some theory about that performance, should be the foundation. Lonergan analyzes Coreth's starting point, in "Metaphysics as Horizon," in Collection, pp. 214-215.

Since some confusion could result from these multiple meanings of the term "critical," we will use the term "discriminating" to characterize the fifth aspect of historical procedures.
evidence will recur in regard to formal evidence. Insights based on certain materials may at first seem relevant, but continued study may show them to be otherwise. For example, the historian may at first suspect that a depressed cotton market in 1850 resulted from overproduction in the newly planted areas west of the Mississippi. Further investigation, however, may determine that levels of production were steady in these areas a number of years prior to 1850, and no increase in production was recorded in that year. The assembled materials and accumulated insights on these areas and their productivity may be of use in another study, but they contribute nothing positive to an understanding of the depressed market. In short, the historian will discriminate between insights suitable to his topic and those which are not. Here one notices the self-correcting process of historical learning.

Lonergan is more specific in regard to this discriminating function. He distinguishes between direct and inverse insights.31 The former involve an understanding of how multiple details fit together; the latter occur when the inquirer recognizes that the details being worked with do not fit the matter under study. That is, they throw no light on the problem to be solved.32 In our previous

31 For an extended discussion of inverse insights as well as examples of them, see Insight, pp. 19-25.

32 Method in Theology, p. 188. Inverse insights do occur. Anyone who has, after much labor, discovered that
example, the discoveries about cotton production in newly cultivated areas did not account for the depressed state of the market in 1850. Those discoveries may be of some use in other studies, but it will take a direct insight into their applicability before they will be put to use. In other words, inverse insights can be followed by direct insights which grasp the suitability for a new context of what did not fit into an earlier context.

In summary, five aspects of the historian's process of developing understanding have been noted. The process is selective, for not all the available materials can be used and not all are of equal importance. It is heuristic because the historian anticipates the unknown by precise questions. It is constructive in that he synthesizes fragmentary insights in a tentative description which focuses future inquiry. It is ecstatic because the historian has been on the wrong track will recognize what is meant by the above description. But there is a problem which should not be overlooked. How is the historian to determine "what fits" or "what does not fit" in regard to an explanation? He may in fact conscript some materials as evidence which do not prove the specific argument he is making. D. H. Fischer labels such a mistake the "fallacy of the irrelevant proof." (Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, pp. 45-47.) Similarly the historian may omit as irrelevant those details which, if entertained, would seriously challenge his present interpretation. Decisions on the relevancy of materials may be influenced by bias—witnessed either in an overeagerness to shore up one's shaky position with irrelevant proofs or in the blinders which conveniently exclude damaging evidence. The critical, or "discriminating," aspect of the historian's procedure is in need of another critical function, namely, the one formalized in the transcendental precepts. Section Three will elaborate this second form of critique.
gradually comes to depend less on initial hunches and more on the viewpoints suggested by the materials which he is beginning to understand. Finally, the process is discrimin­ating, for he distinguishes between insights which are appropriate to his task and those which have nothing to contribute through a self-correcting process.33

33Ibid., Method in Theology, pp. 188-189. Lonergan remarks that a distinctive characteristic of critical his­tory is the double occurrence of these five aspects. First, the historian must understand his sources, their authors, social contexts, purposes. Second, he must employ his un­derstanding of the sources in order to learn about his selected topic. In the former instance, he concentrates on understanding the intentions of authors, their projects, and how they carried them out. In the latter instance, he uses what he has learned from the sources to understand the events which are referred to in them. There is a recipro­cal aspect to this duplication of the process of historical understanding. Insight into original sources casts light on the events under study. A developing understanding of the events may lead to new insights into and uses for the original source materials. In both instances the histori­an will be selective in his use of materials, creative in putting questions to them, discriminating in respect to an author's strengths and weaknesses, and concerned with ap­plying a proper grasp of someone else's perspective to the events under investigation. See ibid., p. 189.

On these issues Lonergan is speaking from his own experience. His works on Aquinas' various notions of grace and of the act of judgment provided him with a practical understanding of historical method. Cf. Verbum: word and Idea in Aquinas, edited by David B. Burrell (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970); and Grace and Free­dom (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971). The different schools of thought surrounding Aquinas' various theories had to be related to what Aquinas himself wrote. This work with both primary and secondary sources required a discriminating use of secondary sources as well as a con­structive approach to the different positions as Aquinas developed them over a period of years.
A Sixth Aspect: The Reflective-Judicial

Our discussion of five aspects of historical procedures pointed out the primacy of the question for historical intelligence: "What was the long-term economic condition...?" After much labor the historian may in fact succeed in isolating the relevant materials, in forming them into a provisional web of interconnected insights, in grasping solutions to multiple secondary problems, in attaining and overview of the whole topic. If that is the case, then a new question arises: "Is my grasp of the materials, of their interconnections, and of the selected topic accurate?" This is a question for reflection. It is answered in the affirmative or the negative, or the historian begs off for a time with an "I do not know." But, whatever his answer, he makes a judgment about his understanding of the topic: That it is accurate, erroneous, or insufficient at the present time. This aspect of the historian's procedure is named the reflective or judicial aspect.

Given a limited topic and the competence to handle complex issues, the historian is likely to bring his inquiry to a close. To reach that end, he must answer questions, interrelate answers to form a coherent whole, and support his interpretations with evidence. This process may not proceed smoothly. He may have to retrace his steps

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34 The distinction between questions for intelligence and questions for reflection is treated in Insight, pp. 271-274.
because new discoveries require a correction of previous positions. Points previously thought crucial may be demoted to footnotes; obscure materials may eventually be the central pillars of his historical thesis.35 But the process is unlikely to go on indefinitely. Eventually the historian covers what are to him all the relevant issues; he asks the seemingly important questions and makes discoveries which clarify the complex issues. How does he recognize his proximity to the end of an investigation? Lonergan suggests that the cessation of further relevant questions is a sign of such proximity. His argument is convincing. As noted in an earlier part of this section, an understanding of some issue can be corrected, complemented, or revised only if further discoveries pertaining to the issue are possible. The condition for this possibility is the occurrence of further relevant questions. If, in fact, all the relevant questions have been asked and answered, then an understanding cannot be significantly altered. Hence, the historian can affirm the validity of his interpretation.36

A qualifying statement must be entered immediately. The judicial aspect is part of the intelligent and rational work of fallible individuals. The absence of further relevant questions may be a sign that an individual's under-

35Method in Theology, pp. 190-191.
36Ibid., p. 191.
standing is sufficient. If in fact there are no more questions, then his understanding is correct. But in history it is more likely that complex issues are never closed issues. The historian's knowledge is admittedly limited; so, when he experiences the cessation of his own questions, he simultaneously should note the possibility of new questions from his professional colleagues. For him there may be no problems left unresolved, but the limits of his knowledge require a caveat about claims to offer the definitive account. As far as he knows, the issues have been thoroughly explored, but another historian may uncover evidence which demands startling revisions. And besides the discovery of new evidence, there is the previously mentioned dialectic of historical knowledge. To reconcile the historical event with its outcome is in many cases an unfinished task. Recent events or events of long-range significance (e.g. the colonization of Africa by European nations) continue to have consequences for groups which were not contemporaries of the original events. The significance of such past events may be tied to events in the future. Consequently, no final word is possible on their role in historical developments. 37

37 Ibid., pp. 191-192. At this same place, Lonergan points out that both the discovery of new sources of information and the as-yet-indeterminate meaning of recent events do not invalidate the results of competent historical work. The massive evidence and the arguments which support previous interpretations must be taken into account by later historians. Some interpretations may be refuted,
In short, given the fallibility of the historian and the two sources of possible revisions, historical judgments are usually only probable. We say "usually" because negative judgments are often likely to warrant claims of certitude. The historian can be certain that a charter attributed to Charlemagne is a forgery if it mentions individuals or events of a later period. But to discover whose work the charter actually was is a more difficult task. The inferential work of the historical detective may establish with certainty who was not at the scene of the crime: but to find the guilty party may depend on purely circumstantial evidence.

The reflective or judicial aspect of historical procedure occurs a second time in the commentary and criticism of the professional historical community. Evaluations published in journals and delivered in papers at conventions provide an institutional check on the research and conclusions of the individual historian. In order to understand the work of a fellow-historian, others will follow the procedure previously outlined. The discriminating aspect others de-emphasized, and still others filled out. But well-argued historical positions rarely cease to be of further use to later scholars.

"But as in natural science, so too in critical history the positive content of judgment aspires to be no more than the best available opinion." Ibid., p. 191. For a brief statement of the change in scientific ideals from certitude to probability, see Lonergan's "Dimensions of Meaning," in Collection, p. 259.
will be part of their evaluations. Just as the individual historian discriminated between insights which were relevant to his topic and those which were not, so his successors, who perhaps have a broader understanding of his topic, will discriminate between his valuable insights and conclusions and those which in time prove faulty. 39

Lonergan remarks that this discriminating function of the professional historical community provides historical knowledge which historians presuppose when they begin their inquiries. 40 The cumulative work of past historians is a reservoir upon which a historian may draw in framing hypotheses, locating evidence, and avoiding faulty arguments. By discriminating between the strengths and weaknesses of past works, other historians will avoid uncritical homage to their predecessors and may learn how those earlier scholars made breakthroughs in the development of critical history. Procedures followed in the present are owed to the efforts of those predecessors—both efforts which succeeded and those which failed.

In summary, this second section of Chapter Four has outlined the intelligent and rational procedures which, in the absence of bias or intellectual deficiency, lead to


40 Mention was made of this point in Chapter Two when we discussed the objective (i.e. public) aspects of the historian's relative horizon.
historical knowledge. These procedures (e.g. the use of hypotheses, the interconnection of limited contexts, the tentative formulation of an overview) belong to the surface operations which, Hayden White argues, are ultimately determined by subjective preferences. Now the purpose of this chapter is to establish critical grounds for sanctioning theoretical operations on the surface of the historical text. Consequently, the third section of the chapter will argue that the previously outlined procedures can conform to transcendental method and, hence, be free of subjective bias.

A possible objection to this remark is made by those who claim that bias is precisely what is never absent from historical procedures. But all that we have asserted is that these procedures are means to historical knowledge. (Chapter Eight of Method in Theology is written within the same limits; see pp. 195 and 196.) Something may interfere with attempts to do critical history. One of the forms of bias may misdirect or limit these procedures. But that possibility does not negate the worth of the procedures; it only establishes the need to thematize the basic cognitive acts which support the procedures and to apply reflectively one's newly acquired self-knowing to any obstacles presented by bias.
THE POSSIBILITY OF DETACHMENT

This third section forwards the project of Chapter Four by linking the procedures outlined in the preceding section to transcendental method. It will be argued that the conformity of these procedures to transcendental method is the criterion of detachment from subjective bias. In Chapter Three we argued that cognitional structure provides a critical basis for a subsequent evaluation of precritical elements in a historian's perspective. Among such precritical elements are subjective variables which antecedently sanction surface procedures. Hayden White has brilliantly explicated and categorized some of these variables. But we have supplemented his list with the content of the historian's basic horizon. This addition gives us some access to the sources of historical conflicts. By formulating the cognitional structure which is implicit in every basic horizon, we can criticize diverse preconceptions which both produce historical conflicts and condition the historian's surface procedures.

Furthermore, we have argued that, insofar as transcendental method formulates the a priori structure of human knowing, it can be considered part of the "deep structure" of historical works. Consequently, the manifest procedures will presuppose the pattern of conscious acts formulated in transcendental method. Now some preconceptions and forms of bias may block the spontaneous sequence of
cognitional acts, and they may misdirect historical procedures. But if transcendental method permits a critique of historical preconceptions, and if it has a normative function in regard to historical procedures, then these obstacles to understanding can be located and alternate ways of proceeding can be suggested.

A major implication of the preceding argument is that bias is not an irreducible component of every historical work. On the one hand, there is an invariant basis for a critique of bias which is already established in a historical perspective. On the other hand, the normative function of transcendental method is a counterweight to new forms of bias. Both the argument and its implications must be further analyzed. The analysis will be carried out in two parts. First, the relation between transcendental method and specific canons governing theoretical procedures will be sketched. Our purpose is to exemplify the normative function of transcendental method in regard to special methods. Second, the issue of detachment must be closely studied. Types of bias which hinder the development of understanding and which interfere with the mentioned procedures will be contrasted to a limited detachment.

The second section of this chapter outlined procedures which, in the absence of any interfering bias, lead to historical knowledge. In general terms, "bias" is a distortion of spontaneous intellectual development. It
sets up obstacles which bring the process of understanding to a premature conclusion. The multiple ways in which understanding may be blocked will be treated below.

The Six Aspects in Relation to Transcendental Method

At this point our task is to relate historical procedures to transcendental method. The process of attaining historical knowledge was analyzed under six distinct aspects. The first aspect—that of selectivity—presumes that historical materials, or data, are not brute givens which the historian passively receives. Rather, they are materials for his project, i.e. pieces of evidence in which he is interested on the basis of their possible relevance to his chosen task. Historical materials thus belong to a context defined by the interests and competence of the historian. On the one hand, not all materials are pertinent to a limited topic; on the other, the finite historian usually cannot handle all the materials which his predecessors have accumulated. And of what is available and within his reach he will want to make a discriminating use. But this need to select and to exclude gives an opening to bias. The historian's decisions may be based on factional or party interests. Then his attentiveness will be divided between the materials and the predetermined position which they are to support. His partisan attitude will narrow his attentive selectivity so as to exclude those materials which appear to threaten the party line. They
must be ignored or else molded to fit the desired conclusion.

In contrast, it is possible that a detached historian will not allow his attention to be narrowed in such a way. He can do this by subordinating the practical aims of precritical history to the more developed techniques and aims of critical history. In other words, the historian's social and cultural values are not eliminated, but they can take second place to the spontaneous desire to understand the materials and, through the latter, to settle matters-of-fact. He is not substituting passive indifference for an active interest in getting the record straight. Repeated efforts to subordinate all other concerns to the desire to understand require a personal dedication that is alien to the passive spectator. His efforts are directed toward a change in priority from the interests of the propagandizer to the interests of the ideally impartial historian.

This ideal is not easily attained, but the effort

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Friedrich Meinecke comments on the personal dedication evidenced by Ranke. He held an exaggerated view of the historian's detachment which was in contrast to the mark of personal genius stamped on what he himself produced. "Ranke was always anxious to show 'what things had really been like'. In order to let the centuries come through with all their mighty power, he would have liked as it were to efface his own personality. This, as has often been rightly pointed out, was a wish that could not be fulfilled. And yet, however paradoxical this may sound, he needed this desire to inspire him to produce the highest of which he was capable." Friedrich Meinecke, "Leopold von Ranke," (Memorial Address to the Prussian Academy of Sciences, January 23, 1936), reprinted in Historism, p. 498.
need not be wholly individual. The historian has been trained in his discipline; a professional community watches over his work, and his failures to make an honest use of historical materials will not go forever unnoticed. But both the stewardship of that community and the individual's effort to subordinate other interests to his desire to make competent use of available materials will be incarnations of the transcendental precept, Be attentive. How else could that stewardship be exercised and those efforts be made if this preliminary norm of the knowing process did not implicitly guide attempts to know through attentive selectivity?

A second aspect of the historian's procedure, the heuristic, was located between historical curiosity and professional research. Curiosity becomes controlled inquiry by taking the form of a precise question. A question is an act of intending which occurs between the as-yet-unknown and the known. As such it anticipates what is to be known, and that anticipation is guided by prior knowledge. In controlled inquiry the anticipations which take the form of questions or hypotheses are usually guided by rules or canons. In historical studies such canons are often adopted from other disciplines though they may be restated in ordinary language terms. D. H. Fischer recommends

\[43\] Lonergan gives a detailed description of canons of empirical method in Chapter Three of *Insight*, pp. 70-102.
seven canons or, as he calls them, "seven rules of thumb," which in controlling historical inquiry may guide the historian past some of the pitfalls in historical research. 44 As guides to historical practice, these rules work against indeliberate factual errors in research. Since historical ignorance is dispelled by answering questions, it is important to avoid answers which only appear to satisfy the original inquiry. And if that avoidance is not guaranteed in advance, some guides to controlled inquiry are warranted.

Now questions which originate in spontaneous curiosity require a good deal of intelligence if they are to be part of a professional investigation. Direction must be given to them; they must be formulated so as to serve the needs of a selected topic. But these requirements are another way of saying that the historian must be intelligent. Again, this is no surprising discovery but merely the explanation of an implicit routine. Similarly the canons which guide historical inquiry are developed in response to an

44 Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, pp. 62-63. Two of these "seven rules of thumb" can be briefly summarized. Historians recognize that not all the evidence pertinent to a problem is of equal worth. A canon of immediacy requires that the best relevant evidence be selected. Usually this canon dictates that priority be given to evidence most immediate to the events under study. A second canon—a canon of affirmation—requires that evidence always be affirmative. A lack of evidence for the occurrence of an event does not prove that the event did not take place. Rather, affirmative evidence alone can prove that an event never took place.
inner imperative. The immanent requirement is that the spontaneous desire to know be allowed to develop, and the canons of a particular method are developed to forward that process. In fact, the road from a sometimes whimsical curiosity to a methodical investigation is long. Fields of inquiry must be differentiated, their limits set, and proper tools assembled. Once in hand these tools or methods are themselves heuristic devices which guide intelligent inquiry and discourage unintelligent conclusions. They mark the difference between controlled inquiry and the random question of the child because they restrict the excusable errors of competent scholars and show the proper way of amending faulty positions.

The third aspect of the historian's procedure was derived from his use of constructed sets of hypotheses, e.g. the division of history into periods and into geographical areas. Both divisions and constructed sets of hypotheses are employed to focus the inquiry. What they provide is an antecedent framework which ideally situates

45"The division of history into periods is not a fact, but a necessary hypothesis or tool of thought, valid in so far as it is illuminating, and dependent for its validity on interpretation. Historians who differ on the question of when the Middle Ages ended differ in their interpretation of certain events. The question is not a question of fact; but it is also not meaningless. The division of history into geographical sectors is equally not a fact, but a hypothesis: to speak of European history may be a valid and fruitful hypothesis in some contexts, misleading and mischievous in others." Edward Hallett Carr, What Is History?, pp. 76-77.
the details of a selected topic. One historian has collected common hypotheses about the preconditions to civil wars. Some twenty-one hypotheses gathered under five different headings exemplify both the narrowing function of the hypothesis and its usefulness as an antecedent framework. For example, under the heading of social preconditions to civil wars, there is the hypothesis that a lack of social mobility breeds frustration which in turn may foster revolutionary actions. This constructive suggestion adds an intelligent direction to the desire to understand how civil wars originate. In order to test this hypothesis, the historian must apply it to the records of revolutionary movements. Such a process of verification is described by the remaining three aspects of historical procedures.

The critical or discriminating aspect consists of decisions which separate useful insights from those which distract the historian from his chosen topic. The process of understanding a complex issue will frequently turn up inverse insights, those "dead ends" which make no positive contribution to a specified issue. In putting these insights aside, the historian makes use of a canon of relevance. In history more than accuracy in one's facts is required. The historian must also get the "right facts

right."47 It does no good to prove that a man was a sunshine patriot if the issue at stake is his possible collaboration with an enemy occupying his country.

The discriminating aspect also applies to the use of constructed hypotheses. Just as hunches may lead the historian astray, so formulated guesses in the form of precise hypotheses may carry him down a blind alley. Eventually he may recognize that he is headed away from his selected topic. Then a new beginning must be made. And the basis for this turn in his thinking will be the inverse insight that a previous strategy was wayward.48 The pursuit of understanding thus may be on the wrong track for a time, but human intelligence can be self-correcting. The primary need to be intelligent can require a change in

47 "A historian must not merely get the facts right. He must get the right facts right. From this a simple rule of relevance may be deduced: historical evidence must be a direct answer to the question asked and not to some other question." D. H. Fischer, Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, p. 62. For a humorous incident in which this rule was violated, see ibid., pp. 46-47. Lonergan describes a canon of relevance which is part of empirical method in Insight, pp. 76-78.

48 To recognize that inverse insights occur is to recognize the fallibility of applied insights. That is, when applied to a concrete situation, insights may be irrelevant—a supposed solution may be no more than wishful thinking. But insights do not mark the end of the knowing process; they must be verified and critically appraised. The obviousness of this plus the frequency with which Lonergan points it out make it hard to understand how one commentator could charge that Lonergan overlooked the possibility of self-deception in applying insights to concrete problems. See Andrew J. Reck, "Bernard Lonergan's Theory of Inquiry vis-à-vis American Thought," in The Nature of Philosophical Inquiry, p. 245. For Lonergan's reply to this commentator, see "Response," in ibid., p. 256.
basic strategies. How else can one account for the occurrence of inverse insights and the changes in strategy which follow? This self-correcting procedure is an intelligent alternative to any stubborn maintenance of positions which, after the battle has been lost, survive only through rear-guard actions. The desire to understand can, through training, become wary of such total investments in attractive hypotheses. After all, the constructs of the historian are intended to illuminate the past and not to dictate automatically what must have been.

The self-correcting function of human intelligence has been located under the critical or discriminating aspect of historical understanding, but its results are best placed under the ecstatic aspect. For if a historian's initial guesswork proves misleading and if he corrects those early missteps, he will be experiencing the detachment of human intelligence. Not to cling to his first surmises but to outdistance them as his understanding broadens and demands revisions will be the occasion both for an experience and an understanding of his own intelligent unbiased transcendence of developed systems and symbolic constructs.

The historian may not advert to his own critical consciousness, but the experience of learning through the sometimes slow, sometimes fast, accumulation of insights will provide some sign of his self-correcting transcendence.
of particular theories and perspectives. He may succeed in subordinating his ambition (e.g. his ambition to preserve a position won at hard labor) to his desire for further understanding. In this case, he will probably recognize the meaning of the word "ecstatic" when it is applied to the process of historical understanding. On the other hand, he is also acquainted with the feeling of reluctance which often opposes new discoveries when they are in conflict with personally accepted interpretations. But he may also recall his experience of and response to a desire for more adequate interpretations. Not an external stimulus but an immanent desire to know will push him beyond old stances to the renewed efforts of inquiry.

As noted previously under the heuristic aspect, hypotheses require verification. The historian may have omitted irrelevant insights and materials and he may have assumed a perspective proper to his topic, but the activity of weighing evidence and of rechecking the interconnected pieces of the historical puzzle remains. Here one encounters the validating reflective aspect of historical procedures, the sixth aspect.

There is a long-standing controversy over the role of judgment in history because various types and levels of judgment have been confused. Usually the issue centers on moral verdicts passed on those no longer able to defend themselves and on actions which cannot be altered no matter
what the verdict.\textsuperscript{49} This part of the controversy cannot be treated here, for it would require a lengthy digression into moral philosophy and it is not to our purpose. But there is another part of the controversy which must be discussed. That is the question of value-free judgmental studies in history.

In the first place, critical history is distinguished from its less developed predecessors by the primacy accorded to judgments of fact. But the controversial issue of value-free analysis is not limited to the obvious duty of the historian to separate fact and legend. Rather, the issue is one of value judgments which assert, not necessarily what was good or bad (in a moral sense), but what counted as significant events for groups both in the past and in the present.\textsuperscript{50} In precritical history the significant events or legends are those which stir an audience to patriotic fervor. To the extent that critical history abstains from this criterion of historical significance, it may be free of the more unsophisticated value judgments

\textsuperscript{49}Hans Meyerhoff presents a respectable selection of some of the major articles written on this issue. See his \textit{The Philosophy of History in Our Time}, for articles by Geoffrey Barraclough, Herbert Butterfield, Sir Isaiah Berlin, Jacob Burckhardt, Reinhold Niebuhr.

\textsuperscript{50}The selection of "significant" events is a value-charged operation, and its inevitability for the historian has been the basis for multiple denials of the possibility of historical objectivity. For a survey of the controversial issues involved, see William H. Dray, \textit{Philosophy of History} (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 21-39.
which are manifestly a part of propaganda. Also, in empha-
sizing the need to settle matters-of-fact, critical history
is free of a wide range of pragmatic values. Facts require
a prior interconnection of evidentiary materials. But
pragmatic value judgments in history have often settled
for much less; namely, that what is asserted be capable
of educating an audience in the "wisdom" of the past. 51
Their appeal to evidence will forego an empirical base for
one which conforms to the ideological needs of the writer.

However, there is a sense in which history is always
judgmentally value-laden. The process of selectivity re-
quires that the historian determine what is worth recount-
ing. If he does not evaluate, he will be left with an in-
discriminate heap of materials. A straight chronology of
events might avoid value judgments, but then the chronicle
is not critical history. So the historian must evaluate
in order to form interpretations of the past. Again, if
his primary aim is to settle matters-of-fact, then value
judgments, particularly those which advance any ethical
position of the author, will play subordinate roles. But
it is perhaps only in the monograph or the archival report
that this subordination can be safely assumed. 52 Even in

51 Method in Theology, p. 232.

52 Hayden White allows these two exceptions to his
formal theory of historical works. See his Preface to
Metahistory, p. ix. For more comprehensive studies, White
insists that value judgments are unavoidable and that they
manifest prior subjective opinions. Now unless one is
these works of very limited scope, a historian will be selective, and so evaluation will not be entirely absent.

The preceding remarks have not been a digression from our attempts to relate the judicial aspect to transcendental method. Historical procedures which gain direction through selective value judgments gradually yield partial accounts which isolate and clarify subordinate issues in a more general topic. Then partial contexts have to be brought together to form a coherent account of the whole. If, after constructing this larger context, the historian has answered what to him were the significant questions, he is ready to make another type of judgment. This time the judgment refers not to the parts but to the whole work. He does not require additional evidence if his questions for intelligence have all been answered. There will only remain the question for reflection, "Is it the case that . . . ?" And this question requires a review question, "Does the evidence prove that . . . ?" The reflective judgment of the whole then follows upon this review of the total deposit of evidence. In asking the question for reflection and in reviewing the evidence, the judger experiences the transcendental precept: Be reasonable.

willing to hold that all value judgments are biased, the discovery of personal evaluation in historical works is not automatically grounds for historical skepticism. There is at least the possibility of objective valuing. Chapter Five will give a limited consideration to this possibility.
Previously we noted how the absence of further relevant questions for intelligence had to be qualified. We also remarked on two sources of possible revision. New information may require a change in prior historical interpretations; new consequences of a past event may modify the meaning originally ascribed to it. But then there will be other historians and new projects to handle the new information. What these later inquiries will say of an outdated work will vary. But if an earlier author was intellectually competent and made use of the evidence available to him, his successors will not charge that he was unreasonable or dishonest. His conclusions may have been the best available opinion of his day. However, new insights are possible today which go beyond the scope of his work. Consequently, his labors will be judged inadequate, but they will not be dismissed simply as a collection of errors. In short, the inadequacies of his work will be challenged, but any strong points will be built upon by succeeding generations.

A precondition to this cumulative historical effort is a recognition of previous authors as intelligent in their procedures and as honest in their judgments of fact. And if later historians are to recognize these strong points, they in turn must be familiar with the judicial aspect of their own procedures. This familiarity is evidenced in statements to the effect that one can understand
how another historian could base a reasonable judgment on evidence which to present writers is no longer sufficient. A common imperative, most probably unexpressed, is the basis for such a sympathetic understanding. Those later historians will understand the immanent imperative to be reasonable, and they will have noted the efforts of a predecessor to conform to that common imperative.

The theme throughout the preceding paragraphs has been that historical procedures and canons are developments of critical consciousness. An individual is born to whimsical curiosity, and eventually he may enter the world of scholarship and science in which that curiosity becomes methodical. Through the example of other historians and through training in several fields, the individual historian becomes a master of his profession. In addition, he may become an expert in numismatics so as to relate more thoroughly the economic decline of the Roman Empire. He may study contemporary physics so as to relate the history of science in the twentieth century. In most instances, he will find himself drawing upon discoveries and methods which have a wider application outside the historical field. Our theme has been that these procedures have a common origin in the spontaneous desire to know which

53 Historical adaptations of psychoanalytic concepts, of statistical patterns, of carbon-dating techniques come to mind as examples of borrowed tools which historians turn to their own purposes.
first expresses itself in the child's curiosity. But this desire is only an anticipation of knowledge and not knowledge itself. A process of intellectual development must supervene, so that differentiated techniques can be formulated. In turn, these techniques will be the distinguishing marks of competent inquiries in science, mathematics, history, philosophy. The techniques themselves are anticipations of knowledge, but now curiosity is controlled inquiry. And, more significantly, what is controlled are also those interests, feelings, and spontaneous opinions which belong to daily living.

Our conclusion is that the procedures of historical understanding originate in the spontaneities of human intelligence and rationality. Since the procedures are products of a spontaneous desire to know, a critical method which formulates the patterned development of that desire will have a normative function in regard to its products. Transcendental method is such a formulation. Since it is based on the universal and invariant structure of human knowing, it will be a general controlling method (or criterion) of all those derivative procedures and specialized

54"Finally intellectual development has its roots in the detached and disinterested desire to know; but the mere desire is not knowledge of anything; it will lead to highly differentiated structures that are masteries of logic, mathematics, natural science, common sense, philosophy, and human science; but these intelligible differentiations are yet to come, and they come only in and through the process of development." Insight, p. 453.
methods. And since it is based on a performance which is prior to all theorizing, it supplies a priori grounds for criticizing all theoretical procedures irrespective of any subjective preferences. The intelligibility and reasonableness of such procedures is not left to individual variables. In short, transcendental method independently of subjective preferences can sanction the procedures which occur on the surface of the historical text.

Yet it is a fact that one and the same subject can be dedicated to scholarly work and still experience the pull of ambition which counsels haste over careful research. Periodically a scandal will occur in some scientific group because experimental results were falsified for the sake of public acclaim. Such falsification is condemned unequivocally. More than the reputation of the profession is at stake; there is a prior commitment to intellectual honesty. In terms that we have been using—there is a prior commitment to intelligence and reasonableness, a prior trust is placed in the spontaneous development of the desire to know.

We have argued that certain procedures forward this spontaneous development, and that, in the absence of bias, they do lead to historical knowledge. We have also argued that transcendental method can sanction these procedures irrespective of subjective preferences. But our arguments are incomplete. A direct response must be made to the relativist who claims that bias is what can never be absent
from the finished historical product. Even though we will postpone a discussion of moral conversion until the next chapter, we will be able to give a direct response to the relativist in this chapter. So far we have established a criterion for that detachment which, when accompanied by the controlling techniques of a discipline, promises results untainted by bias. That criterion is the repeated advertence to the immanent imperative of one's own critical consciousness, it is the continual advertence to the spontaneous desire to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. It remains to show that such detachment is in fact possible.

Types of Bias

First, we must consider the obstacles to that possibility. There are multiple barriers to detachment; there are multiple forms of bias. Bias can be generally described as a distortion of the subject's spontaneous intellectual development. In *Insight*, Lonergan analyzes four forms of bias which distort and interfere with the process of coming to know. They are dramatic bias, individual bias, group bias, and general bias.

Dramatic bias is located in the subject's preconscous refusal to admit certain ideas about himself and

55The major sections given over to an analysis of the forms of bias are, in *Insight*, pp. 191-206 and 218-238.
his behavior. If his rejection of self-understanding is carried on for very long, the intersubjective checks on individual behavioral aberrations will be excluded. Then the subject withdraws into a closed world of fantasy which yields little understanding of other people's actions and which aggravates the subject's own isolated condition by condoning behavior which will be misunderstood both by the subject himself and by others.

Usually one can expect that, if dramatic bias goes unchecked, it will gradually infect the healthy parts of the subject's life. If the subject is a scholar, his work will eventually suffer. Isolated failures to understand himself and to act reasonably may affect how well he interprets the lives of other people. For the historian writing a biography, those discoveries which he rejects in regard to his own life, he may also avoid in regard to the life he is studying. In Chapter Two, we proposed a thesis about relative horizons: the richer the historian's own experience and the more comprehensive his self-understanding, the more likely he is to write competently about complex matters. But dramatic bias may lessen his attentiveness to certain subtleties in the historical career he is investigating. Explanations of the historical figure's behavior may not occur to the historian simply because they too closely resemble explanations which he has been avoiding about his own behavior. So, in the absence of
certain self-discoveries, his relative horizon remains contracted, and that contraction may weaken his scholarly thoroughness.

The cure for this bias consists in the occurrence of acts of understanding which previously were blocked. But rarely can the individual effect a cure for himself. Armed with the techniques and common-sense strategies of psychoanalysis, the analyst may be able to reach the troubled subject. He may be able to shed light on the origins and self-destructive nature of those barriers with which the subject cannot cope in a detached way. Together analyst and analysand may break through those habitual ways of acting which had only increased the analysand's confusion and insecurity. But initially the analyst bears the responsibility for proceeding in his therapy with the techniques provided by his formal training and by his common sense know-how. His own intelligent use of these resources may overcome the resistance of the analysand and thereby prepare both of them for the discovery of the guarded source of the subject's troubles. In successfully concluding the therapeutic procedure, the analyst may also establish himself as a counter-example to the analysand's prior condition of isolation and avoidance of self-understanding.

The second type of bias is termed individual bias. It is not simply identified with egoism and contrasted with
altruism. But it is identified with an egoism that is incomplete in its development. The subject is concerned in an intelligent way with solving his own problems. With a great deal of care and intelligent planning, he labors "to get ahead." He is even capable of a certain degree of detachment; for, desires and fears of a lesser sort are subordinated to his desire for workable solutions to problems which hinder his advance. But this form of egoism is labelled faulty or biased because the subject refuses to entertain questions about how his actions affect the social group so long as their effects have no bearing on his own aspirations. Time is spent studying the social group so as to learn how he can earn the group's rewards without sacrificing anything personal of great worth. In short, the subject uses his intelligence where his own interests are at stake, but he rejects the use of that intelligence in measuring how compatible his aims and actions are with the existing social order. Thus, his spontaneous desire to know is encouraged where his own interests are concerned, but it is stifled when the interests of the group seem to restrain his self-advancement.

Just as dramatic bias contracts the subject's relative horizon, so too individual bias narrows the subject's self-awareness. Particularly absent will be reflection

56 Lonergan makes use of Aristotle's position in the Ethics on self-love to argue that egoism has a legitimate role in social living. See Insight, pp. 219-220.
on human relationships and the reciprocal responsibilities entailed by living in society. For the historian suffering from individual bias, there may be a subtle undermining of professional standards. Those norms and organs of criticism common to the professional community may be seen, not as aids to competent scholarship, but as regrettable hindrances to quick self-advancement. Instead of being responsible to his colleagues, he may view them as rivals whose favor is to be sought and whose criticism must be turned aside at all costs. Alternately obsequious and obstreperous, the biased historian will be ill-suited to the cooperative tasks of a professional community.

Group bias is the third type to be studied. Quite simply this is the bias evident in any social group which places its own political/economic interests above the welfare of society as a whole. The group will weigh prospective social changes according to the single criterion of its own preservation and advancement. Now what is specifically biased about this narrow opportunism is the arbitrary way in which new social plans are rejected. Groups not in power will propose programs and responses to crises, but, if these new insights do not serve the interests of the empowered group, they will be rejected. Just as in dramatic bias and individual bias there is resistance to an understanding of existing problems, so too in group bias there is a guarded blind spot regarding needed changes which
might lessen the group's power. If social problems are serious enough and if they are neglected long enough because the needed solutions are too costly to the empowered, then there will be the makings of a revolutionary party. What the dominant group rejected, oppressed groups will champion. Eventually the latter may seize control and implement the envisioned changes. But then they too will be liable to group bias, for their tenuous hold on power may breed a reactionary stance which takes its turn in suppressing the voice of intelligent criticism.

Group bias has been evidenced by historians. Different schools have favored historical interpretations which justified, even glorified, the gradual accumulation of wealth and power by certain groups in society. Alternately some historians have identified with those outsiders whose history had not been written by professionals occupying endowed seats in major universities. Historians of the "New Left" present radical criticism of laws and institutions--criticism which is usually labelled "iconoclastic" by the pooh bahs of the professional community.

Each party may be guilty of factionalism or group bias. Each may argue that history is on the side of one segment of society. But then there will be inattentiveness to how societies advance or decline depending on the presence or absence of social cooperation. The contributions

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57 Ibid., Insight, p. 223.
of minority groups may be misunderstood, perhaps entirely overlooked. As a result, the historian knows less about the past which he investigates. He feels no responsibility to account for contributions made by those outside his narrowed focus. His inattentiveness may lead him to overlook crucial pieces of evidence; his lessened sense of responsibility may make him unsympathetic to the viewpoints expressed by historical figures who were in their own day "outsiders." Consequently, his thoroughness in inquiry and in explanation will be lessened. The limited contexts which he builds into overviews of complex issues will be marked by partisanship. And if his judgments on the parts are tainted with bias, his conclusion about the whole may also be biased.

General bias, the fourth type of bias, is not limited to the individual or to specific groups. All men are liable to it. To varying degrees all men recognize the competence of common sense to satisfy their curiosity about concrete daily matters. In contrast, the world of theory is entered with difficulty; the world of interiority is even more remote. Few in number are those who are willing to inquire into all the levels of consciousness. What is near at hand are the routines of thought and action which are usually labelled "common sense." And these routines repeatedly prove their worth by producing immediate concrete results. In contrast, the interests of the
theoretical mind appear abstract and remote. The training required seems wasteful in terms of time and less than expeditious in terms of concrete results. On the other hand, common-sense routines yield immediate results and, for the most part, are indifferent to the long-term considerations which consume the time and energy of theorists. Now if the subject's concern for issues that have an immediate bearing on his life is allowed to dominate other issues of a theoretical nature, then he has succumbed to general bias.

Lonergan works out the implications of this type of bias for the group which values expediency over careful planning and long-range reflection. In general terms, the community suffers from a lack of understanding. In the name of a no-nonsense practicality, barriers are set up against theoretical inquiry into the long-range effects of present policies. Individual members of the group rationalize their avoidance of intellectual development by means of the same slogan. But eventually stop-gap measures and hasty responses to unforeseen crises cannot prevent deterioration of the community. Just as the person who suffers from dramatic bias sinks deeper into his fantasy world, so a community afflicted with general bias loses control of its own life. Political debates become more strident and erupt into street brawls. More and more

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58 Ibid., pp. 228-232.
of the population grows receptive to myth-makers and political charlatans. Eventually the only intelligibility expected of political affairs is found in the latest newsclippings on attempts to balance national powers and to equalize economic pressures.\textsuperscript{59}

Moreover, efforts to criticize the current turmoil and to offer remedies to the spreading confusion are viewed as soft-headed idealism. Long before the situation has deteriorated this far, human intelligence and critical thought have been assigned academic posts far from the political arena in which they are thought to be of no use. In short, the belief spreads that human intelligence and reason are unable to control historical events. The detached critic has nothing to offer a society which must hasten to respond to one crisis after another.

The historian may be one of those exiled to an academic island in the midst of turbulent social crises. But he also may be caught up in the slogans and catchphrases of the day. Then he will be less able to investigate and to criticize the preconceptions of his own relative horizon. He may extend his facile indifference to the basic assumptions guiding public policy. He may view historical events as uncontrollable, or at best, as something alien to his own critical abilities and responsible decisions. What happens in the community at large is no

\textsuperscript{59}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 229.
concern of the academic world.

General bias can also infect his continuing education as a scholar. New techniques which require time and careful study to master may be ignored. Questions which seem pertinent to a problem in hand may never be followed up because they would cause delays in immediate results. New sources of evidence may be left unexploited for the same reason. As a result, the historian's hypotheses and imaginative reconstructions may be short-sighted. His eventual conclusions will then have a less adequate base in both supporting evidence and comprehensive understanding. Is there an alternative to this dismal scene? To find one, we will have to turn to the question of detachment, i.e. to the question of whether these premature closures of historical inquiry are inevitable.

A Limited Detachment

We began the preceding paragraphs on bias with a general description: bias is a distortion of spontaneous intellectual development. The implication is that detachment involves a challenge to such distortions. The detached attitude is identified with a willingness to allow criticism of every issue. But the central question remains—Is detachment in fact possible? We approached this question by way of contrast, i.e. by sketching obstacles which in fact suppress critical thinking. Therefore,
our question becomes more specific: Are these obstacles in fact surmountable? We must also approach this question by way of contrast; for detachment has been conceived in different ways, and not all of these ways are acceptable.

How an individual conceives the struggle for detachment depends on his theory of knowledge and of morals. Lonergan's own ethical theory has not been discussed because of its complexity and because at this point the cognitional theory already outlined is adequate for our purpose, namely, to establish the conditions for the possibility of a limited detachment.

In the first place, we cannot conceive detachment as a process of excluding from one's inquiry everything that is subjective. Any ideal of detachment as pure passivity is likely to rest on a cognitional theory which understands human knowing to be a matter solely of receptivity to empirical facts. But we have already argued that knowing

60 Method in Theology, p. 231.

61 In the following chapter our neglect of Lonergan's ethical theory will be partially remedied by a consideration of moral conversion. His theory of cognition has, of course, been introduced in Chapter Three. Chapter Five will contain an extensive treatment of the epistemology which is based on that cognitional theory.

For the basic distinctions which Lonergan makes among cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics, see ibid., pp. 25 and 316.

62 That is, if one is to know, then one must be attentive to the given facts and careful not to add anything which was not found in the initial observations. Criticism of this view of knowing takes many forms. Lonergan's remarks usually contain some mention of the "principle of
is a compound act which is irreducible to any single component. Furthermore, the impulse to inquire arises spontaneously in the subject. It is the intelligently controlled curiosity of the historian which promotes the use of heuristic devices and of critical techniques for handling available materials. Finally, it is up to him to evaluate carefully the strength of his interpretation. Far from being a side-line spectator, the historian only understands and solves problems by much labor and personal dedication to his profession. If he retains some variant on the passive ideal of knowing, then some of his procedures will be either overlooked or considered detrimental to the objectivity of his work. In the latter case, his expectations both about detachment and about objectivity cannot be fulfilled, and so he argues that history involves an irreducible measure of subjective bias. But if the historian began his work without the expectation of passive receptivity, then the occurrence of value-laden selectivity and of the reconstruction of the past by imaginative schemes would not be a personal scandal. On the contrary, he might

the empty head" which was treated in Chapter Two. Even though this understanding of human cognition is attacked from many sides, some writers continue to expect that objective knowledge should be this product of pure receptivity. They may recognize that this expectation cannot be fulfilled, but then they turn this discovery into an argument for relativism rather than returning with renewed interest to a study of the cognitional performance which precedes theoretical expectations about human knowing.
even find it scandalous that any historian ever conceived detachment as the passive receptivity of the automaton. 63

What we have in mind is a limited detachment which is an ongoing effort rather than a fixed achievement. The historian may be devoted to social and cultural goals which he intends his scholarship to forward. He obviously does not dispense with the content of his relative horizon in writing history. But there is such a thing as "intellectual passion" of which Michael Polanyi has written at length. 64 Then, for the sake of correctly understanding a chosen topic, the scholar may subordinate social and cultural goals to his desire to solve historical problems and to answer accurately historical questions. He will draw on past experiences and education to pose direct questions, but he will be willing to admit that past events were different from present events and must be accorded some measure of uniqueness. And the historian will not be alone in this effort to remove any interfering opinions

63 Hannah Arendt, in a paraphrase of Noam Chomsky, has expressed such a reaction. "Absence of emotions neither causes nor promotes rationality. 'Detachment and equanimity' in view of 'unbearable tragedy' can indeed be 'terrifying,' namely, when they are not the result of control but an evident manifestation of incomprehension. In order to respond reasonably one must first of all be 'moved,' and the opposite of emotional is not 'rational,' whatever that may mean, but either the inability to be moved, usually a pathological phenomenon, or sentimentality, which is a perversion of feeling." On Violence (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970), p. 64.

from his study of the past. While not so fully objectified as in the natural sciences, historical techniques and canons are available to guide his inquiry. In addition, there are other historians capable of examining the same evidence and of using it to check the individual's arguments. Moreover, the historian will be communicating his results to an educated public which eventually becomes wary of mere assertions and demands proof. In short, there are public arenas in which subjective bias becomes glaringly obvious and in which failures to transcend parochialism are regretted.

From the preceding remarks we conclude (1) there are techniques and canons developed to help the historian avoid bias in his work; (2) there is a bar of professional peers and public scrutiny which exposes bias and passes judgment on the work of the individual historian; (3) the historical profession explicitly recognizes that the preoccupations of the present must be transcended if the historian is to understand the problems which confronted his predecessors. But will the historian make use of those techniques? Will he submit his work to the judgment of his peers? Will he recognize that past groups had ends of their own distinct from his? Answers to these questions

can only be given by the individual historian. A willingness to allow his intelligent and rational activities to develop unimpeded by personal bias cannot be imposed. Otherwise one could not speak of the historian's intellectual responsibility. But the alternatives are (1) a willingness to persist in ignorance and to invest more heavily in a personal obscurantism, and (2) a willingness to battle with critics despite all costs to professional standards and intellectual honesty.

The test, then, of detachment from bias and willful obscurantism is the subject's willingness to allow spontaneous inquiry and reflection to carry him beyond the limits of his relative horizon and beyond any impeding bias contained therein. Just as childhood curiosity originated with a spontaneous desire to know and just as theoretical inquiry is a controlled formulation of that same desire, so the further questions which disturb his familiar ways and firm convictions will stem from that same source.

Now such troubling questions may be suppressed by the subject's fears for his own security which he identifies with certain limited positions. Self-protecting screens may be thrown up to exclude difficulties and doubts over long-standing positions. But the problem is that these questions have not an entirely external origin. Of course, specific questions may be suggested by what someone else said or did, but the faint hint that perhaps the other
person's words or deeds pose a valid challenge to the subject's position is the product of the subject's own intelligence. The desire to know may take on the form of a nagging doubt about his previous self-assurance. This is to say that difficulties or doubts suggested by something external are interiorized. In effect, the desire to know becomes an immanent source of further questions which may require a change in familiar opinions or ways of acting.

What we have sketched in the preceding paragraph is a psychological function of transcendental method. That methodformulates the spontaneous exigencies of critical consciousness. In a subject committed to scholarly pursuits, there will likely be conflicts between these exigencies and lesser ones which demand the avoidance of deeply troubling questions. Tension results; for, on the one hand, a radical openness to new ideas and reasonable proposals is required, and, on the other, retention of the established, security-giving positions is desired. Whether this tension is successfully resolved (we do not say "eliminated") is a matter of intellectual conversion. More will be said

66 David Tracy offers some brief comments on this function, in The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, p. 144. We might add that this function is specialized in psychoanalytic techniques. Barriers to self-understanding and resistance to needed changes in behavior are sometimes so deeply rooted that the subject's own conscious efforts to overcome them will not be adequate. The therapeutic counsel of the analyst may strengthen these conscious efforts, but in the end there is no substitute for the subject's willingness to accept help and to be open to troubling new thoughts.
of intellectual conversion in the next chapter. For our present purposes, a brief comment will suffice.

Intellectual conversion is one of the three types of conversion analyzed in Method in Theology. The basic conditions for its occurrence are treated in Insight. Repeatedly the point is made that the act of self-appropriation which carries out this conversion is an act of personal discovery. But though the act of discovery is an achievement of the individual, still the content of the act, what is discovered, is another matter. What is discovered and made explicit is the threefold process of human knowing. And the universal and invariant structure of this process has implications beyond the personal discovery that one is in fact a knower. The major implication is that the desire to know cannot be restricted in advance by bias. We first are curious, and the only barriers to that curiosity which can be said to exist in advance are the limits to our questioning. That is, the only prior restrictions are not what we do not want to know but what we do not ask about because the relevant questions do not strike us as meaningful. Bias comes later when the sweep of our questions has touched on areas that begin to trouble us, and so we restrict our inquiries. In effect, we decide not to know. But such a decision cannot be made in advance of the spontaneous desire to know, and it must be

67 See Chapter Eleven, pp. 319-347.
repeatedly made if that prior desire is to be kept in check. 68

Again, the issue of this chapter is the possibility of a limited detachment. "Limited" in the sense that evaluation and subjective construction are unavoidable, indeed necessary, conditions for historical knowledge. This issue of detachment has been tied to the possibility of intellectual conversion. Since the latter possibility will not be treated at length until the next chapter, it would seem that the goal of this chapter could not be reached. However, enough steps have been taken to present an argument for the possibility of detachment. Chapter Five will add to those steps without requiring any major shift in our argument.

We began this chapter with the thesis that bias is an irreducible component of every historical work. In the first part of this third section, we argued that transcendental method offers a sanction of historical procedures irrespective of subjective bias. However, in the second part, we recognized that the possibility of actually employing these critical grounds was yet to be established. Specifically, the relativist may accede to the presence

68 A possible topic for another paper would be the long-term effects of this suppression of the desire to know. Is intellectual "death" possible? Is there some point beyond which the spontaneities of human consciousness could not recover from the repeated efforts to stifle them?
of the desire to know in the human subject. But he will quite legitimately also point to those other desires and interests which conflict with this basic intellectual passion. He will argue at length that these other interests cannot be successfully subordinated to the desire to know, and hence, bias will be an irreducible element in every historical work.

Preparation for a response to this thesis was made in three steps. First, how we conceive the possibility of overcoming bias (i.e. the possibility of detachment) will depend on our cognitional theory. Against the ideal of passivity before historical facts, we posed the constructive activity of the intelligent and rational subject. Consequently, only a limited or qualified detachment was envisioned.

Second, the desire to know which is the basis for both the child's questions and the scientist's sophisticated hypotheses is also the origin of further questions which carry the subject beyond his accepted positions. Conflicts may occur between this desire and lesser interests, but the resulting tension is a product, in part, of the immanent desire to know. Hence it cannot be avoided; a willingness to persist in ignorance and to engage in sophistry will, at least initially, increase the tension.

69 See the previous comments in section two and in this third section on the ecstatic aspect of the historian's procedures.
rather than eliminate it. The issue of detachment is thus located within the subject's own consciousness and is not primarily a matter of external pressures. The secondary external pressures will be public controls on the perpetuation of biased historical accounts. Accepted canons of research and common modes of argumentation, the critical review of the historical profession, and the opinion of an educated public are public checks on historical bias.

Third, whether the historian respects these external controls and, more important, whether he subordinates lesser interests to his desire-to-know cannot be determined in advance. Nor, for that matter, can a choice of obscurantism be necessitated in advance. There is only a question mark placed over his willingness to make an immanent desire-to-know the primary motive of his historical inquiries.

On the basis of the preceding points, the following reply can be made to the thesis that subjective bias is unavoidable and intellectual detachment is factually impossible. First, the possibility of detachment lies not in the affirmation of some theory but in the appropriation by the subject of his own intelligent and rational performance. And this act of appropriation yields knowledge of an invariant structure in that performance. As formulated in transcendental method, this metahistorical position

70 *Insight*, pp. 473-475.
excludes no interpretations a priori and accepts none a posteriori until reasonably convincing evidence is forthcoming.

Second, both prior to and after the act of appropriation, the subject finds himself already holding opinions which are mixtures of good sense, bias, and the cliches of the day. Such opinions will be influencing his historical procedures. In previous chapters we argued that transcendental method (1) is the basis for a critical evaluation of preconceptions about history, and (2) has a normative function in respect to all specialized methods and procedures. Consequently, the subject's prior opinions of mixed origin can be investigated and an estimate formed of their influence on historical procedures.

Third, the actual use of transcendental method to criticize preconceptions and procedures depends on the willingness of the individual historian to bring his prior opinions and procedures into conformity with what he now knows about human knowing. This willingness cannot be imposed. But just as the desire to know led him to develop a cognitional position consistent with his spontaneous performance, so it can lead him to a willingness to check

71 Our line of argumentation presupposes that what the subject knows about human cognition (the result of intellectual conversion) demands of him a corresponding willingness to make his doing consistent with his knowing (the result of moral conversion). Chapter five will have more to say on this point.
repeatedly his historical procedures against that new awareness. This desire prompts further questions which may turn up lapses in critical thinking. If these lapses are rooted in long-standing bias, much effort will be required to remedy them. There may well be a struggle between what the subject knows his historical performance should be and those alien interests which make that performance something less. But if he has appropriated his own critical consciousness, then he can recognize the distorting effects of bias on his procedures and conclusions. And to recognize bias for what it is (a distortion of intellectual development), while not guaranteeing that the subject will try to eliminate it, is at least to recognize an alternative to bias. Hence, because there is a recognized alternative, bias is not unavoidable. Moreover, bias that is already present is not irreducible because a way is seen beyond the distortive screens, i.e. the subject knows what his performance should be. It remains for him to modify any faulty preconceptions or practices and to be

72"The immanent source of transcendence in man is his detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know. As it is the origin of all his questions, it is the origin of the radical, further questions which take him beyond the defined limits of particular issues. Nor is it solely the operator of his cognitional development. For its detachment and disinterestedness set it in opposition to his attached and interested sensitivity and intersubjectivity; and the knowledge it yields demands of his will the endeavour to develop in willingness and so make his doing consistent with his knowing." Insight, p. 636.
on guard against equally biased replacements.

This lengthy argument concludes the second part of this third section. In summary, the section undertook to argue two positions. First, transcendental method has a normative function in regard to the historical procedures outlined in section two. Second, conformity to transcendental method in one's theoretical procedures is a criterion of detachment from subjective bias. The major implication of these two conclusions is that bias is not an unavoidable or irreducible component of every historical work.

Summary of Chapter IV

Both the thesis and the counterproposal of this chapter were concerned with a single major problem: If subjective bias is an irreducible component of every historical work, then the crisis of historicism cannot be resolved. White's fourth thesis implies that this will be the case since historical procedures which might eliminate bias are themselves grounded in variable preferences. But our counterproposal argued that transcendental method can be reflectively applied to these procedures so as to reveal distortions arising from antecedent preferences.

The second section of the chapter argued that transcendental method could reach beyond the manifest level of the text in order to carry out a critique of precritical
opinions belonging to the implicit level. In keeping with our application of transcendental method to both levels of historical works, we then turned to the study of surface procedures. These procedures were first classified in relation to historical experiencing, understanding, and judging. They were then analyzed under six distinct headings, thereby clarifying stages in the methodical process of attaining historical knowledge.

But this process may be disrupted by the distorting influence of bias. As a counterweight to such interference, we proposed the reflective application of transcendental method to the previously outlined stages of historical method. Methodical procedures and historical canons were said to be part of a controlled inquiry which specializes the spontaneities of critical consciousness. Since transcendental method formulates the basic structure of these spontaneities, it will have a normative function in regard to the developed procedures and canons. But then, as opposed to White's thesis, there is a metahistorical basis for a critical sanction of surface procedures.

Will this critical sanction be applied or will pre-critical opinions be left to determine how the historian conducts his inquiry? This question cannot be answered in advance of a decision which the historian himself must make. At stake will be his own detachment from bias. But if he has formulated the basic exigencies of his own
critical thinking, he will know what his historical performance should be. Moreover, he will recognize failures to allow that performance to develop unhindered by one of the forms of bias.

Our concluding argument was that to recognize these failures as lapses in critical thinking is already to recognize an alternate way of proceeding. This recognition by itself does not guarantee the elimination of bias and the ongoing maintenance of critical detachment. But it does indicate that there is an alternative to bias. Hence, bias is not of necessity the lot of every historical inquiry. We thus have removed the barrier implied in White's thesis to any resolution of the crisis of historicism and have established the possibility of resolving the crisis. In the following chapter, arguments will be advanced in support of a recommended strategy for moving from this possibility to an actual resolution of the crisis.
CHAPTER V

HISTORICAL OBJECTIVITY

INTRODUCTION

A central issue has been repeatedly formulated in the preceding chapters. In the absence of a critical metahistorical basis for mediating conflicts within the historical field, the crisis of historicism remains unresolved. We have already argued in a number of places that Hayden White fails to supply the needed basis. His structural analysis of historical works achieves significant results in classifying the types of historical conflicts and in locating variables at the root of the historical conflicts. But obstacles remain to prevent a transition from his descriptive study to an explanatory position which both accounts for historical differences and contains the grounds for a critical evaluation of the basic differences. The preceding chapters have been building up to a determination of whether or not Lonergan's methodological proposals can surmount these obstacles and thereby succeed in advancing beyond the limits of White's work.

By raising the question of historical objectivity, this fifth chapter becomes an explicit study in epistemology. Our previous analysis of Lonergan's cognitional
theory will be the basis for this study. What is at stake is the issue of historical "realism." This is the issue on which there was no consensus among nineteenth-century historians. Their disagreements took the form of diverse and often conflicting modes of historical consciousness. The implications of these disagreements are formulated by Hayden White in a series of theses. This chapter takes up his fourth thesis: Each historical paradigm is an effectively closed system of thought; radical changes in paradigms reflect not the discovery of new evidence but a basic change in one's ethical viewpoint. Consequently, any attempt to offer an epistemological justification of one's paradigm represents only a prior ethical choice.¹

The counterproposal to this thesis agrees with it in part. Lonergan's horizon-analysis turns up results which are compatible with the thesis that paradigms are prior to evidence, i.e. that they are frameworks which predetermine

¹"In my view, there are no extra-ideological grounds on which to arbitrate among the conflicting conceptions of the historical process and of historical knowledge appealed to by the different ideologies. For, since these conceptions have their origins in ethical considerations, the assumption of a given epistemological position by which to judge their cognitive adequacy would itself represent only another ethical choice. I cannot claim that one of the conceptions of historical knowledge favored by a given ideology is more 'realistic' than the others, for it is precisely over the matter of what constitutes an adequate criterion of 'realism' that they disagree. Nor can I claim that one conception of historical knowledge is more 'scientific' than another without prejudging the problem of what a specifically historical or social science ought to be." Metahistory, p. 26.
what will be acceptable as historical data. With a variance in prior frameworks, there will be a consequent variance in what counts as historical evidence. So, by itself, evidence cannot require the radical modification of its prior framework. But part of White's fourth thesis can be challenged. The assertion that paradigms are closed systems of thought raises problems which the contemporary discussions of the hermeneutical circle have addressed. Lonergan's analysis of the self-correcting process of learning is a valuable addition to these contemporary debates. In conjunction with this analysis, there are complex notions of evidence and of objectivity which can be opposed to some of the conceptions of historical knowledge held by historians. If the epistemology which supports these complex notions can be proved to have a privileged claim to "realism," then paradigms which support alternate notions may be open to modifications for other than ethical reasons.

In order to elaborate and to defend the counterproposal, two goals must be reached. First, arguments must establish that critical consciousness which develops systems of meaning can also transcend the inherent limits of its thought-products. Second, in contrast to White's position on the preferential basis for every historical theory, it must be possible to offer an epistemological justification of some historical theories over others. Both of these aims are steps in the elaboration of a universal
viewpoint from which to criticize different historical perspectives. It was the previous absence of just such a metahistorical viewpoint which hindered any solution to the historical conflicts of the crisis period.

The preceding chapters have prepared for the introduction of this universal viewpoint. In Chapter Two, the predeterminants of historical perspectives were expanded to include the historian's basic horizon. Thus, a cognitional element was identified as part of the deep structure of the historical text. In Chapter Three, this cognitional element was further analyzed; its structure and formulation in transcendental method were outlined. Taking an example from Carl Becker's work, we applied the developed cognitional position to certain viewpoints in that author's basic horizon. This application specified the previous conclusion that a differentiated basic horizon provides metahistorical grounds for criticizing precritical elements of historical perspectives. Finally, in Chapter Four, we took up the question of whether a critical, non-biased evaluation of historical perspectives and practices was in fact possible. On the basis of previous arguments, transcendental method was shown to be in the unique position of mediating differences on both the deep and surface levels of historical works. It can be both the basis for detachment from precritical, biased opinions about history and also the norm for procedures guided by those prior opinions.
Consequently, bias which may be part of historical paradigms is not necessarily a permanent aspect of historical work done under the guidance of those paradigms.

The fifth chapter will build on earlier chapters in an attempt to supply an epistemological criterion of historical realism. If this criterion does not represent simply another set of preferences, then the differences among historical paradigms may be criticized on grounds other than the subjective variables allowed by White.

The work of this chapter will be carried out in four sections. This introductory section has already stated the thesis and counterproposal. Before concluding this section, we will review aspects of Hayden White's thesis as well as problems entailed by it. In the second part of Chapter Five, the topics of historical models and of the hermeneutical circle will introduce specific problems which confront all claims to historical objectivity. The third section advances beyond the second by proposing and defending a complex notion of objectivity. This proposal is part of an analysis of Lonergan's epistemology, and we will borrow from his theory key insights into historical realism. Finally, the fourth section pulls together the preceding conclusions on paradigms, objectivity, and historical realism in order to answer the difficult question: Can conflicts over historical realism be mediated?

The obstacles to be surmounted in this chapter are
apparent in White's arguments as they terminate in his fourth thesis. Again, his thesis is that any attempt to offer an epistemological justification of certain paradigms will represent only a prior ethical preference. This thesis is first defended against an alternate suggestion that paradigms be measured against historical evidence, i.e. a convincing historical position will be one which adequately comprehends the available data. To this suggestion White replies that what has not been settled is precisely what counts as a historical datum and as a theory for explaining what the data mean.\(^2\)

In the absence of a metahistorical solution to this problem, the historical theorist can only point to the diverse viewpoints which conceive historical data differently.\(^3\) He has no grounds outside of personal preferences for adopting one viewpoint rather than another. Furthermore, as "surface" elements of the text, historical data fall within the predetermining boundaries of the chosen model. Therefore, the prior model cannot be disproven by the discovery of new data, for data will only be admitted

\(^{2}\)Ibid., p. 429.

\(^{3}\)In his structuralist approach, White traces these different conceptions of historical data to prior poetic insights and variable preferences. His classification of the latter tacit elements in historical works does not answer the question of which conceptions of historical data are to be preferred. The diversity of different and even incompatible paradigms remains irreducible.
as evidence if they conform to antecedent expectations.\textsuperscript{4}

The major implication of this conclusion is that historiography will continue to witness mutually exclusive interpretations of the same events, each of which may, with equal legitimacy, claim to be "realistic."\textsuperscript{5} While the authors of these interpretations may argue from their accumulated evidence, White's analysis indicates that the validity of the interpretations is ultimately rooted elsewhere. The consistency, coherence, and illuminative power of the overarching vision of historical processes are the measure of validity.\textsuperscript{6} The injunction appears to be: Maintain consistency within your basic historical perspective. An attempted justification of your perspective will merely reflect prior ethical decisions; it will not be compelling for anyone not sharing your initial assumptions.

From the preceding conclusions there emerge problems which this chapter must treat in some detail. First, there is the problem of discrete incommensurable systems of thought. The thesis of perspectivism takes account of an irreducible diversity in the historical field, but here we are talking about incompatible differences which supposedly cannot be mediated. Only a formalistic comparison is

\textsuperscript{4}Metahistory, pp. 4 and 430. White applies this conclusion to the conflicts over Marxist interpretations of historical processes, in \textit{ibid.}, p. 284.

\textsuperscript{5}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 428.

\textsuperscript{6}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 4.
allowed, e.g. a linguistic theory of tropes applied to narrative forms. The problem to be faced is whether some standpoint can be taken "beyond" these differences which will allow for a critical mediation of them.?

A second problem involves the depreciation of an epistemological concern for evidence. If historical evidence is subordinated to the adopted paradigms, and if the paradigms are subordinated to precritical preferences, is it possible to retain any notion of objectivity? It would seem that White answers in the negative. Among the different conceptions of historical knowledge proposed by nineteenth-century historians, no one of them proved to be more "scientific" than the others. The meaning of "objectivity" stands in need of clarification as does the relationship between science and history. This clarification will be part of the following sections. To anticipate how those sections will handle the two preceding problems: first, our notion of objectivity will not be based on theoretical

7 In a work prior to his Metahistory, White noted that a failure to find such a standpoint was one of the reasons for the crisis of historicism. In his words, the problem is one of finding grounds within history for distinguishing between realism and a purely imaginative vision of history. See his translator's introduction, "On History and Historicisms," in From History to Sociology, p. xv.

8 Metahistory, p. 26. The question of whether history is or can be or even ought to be a science has been treated by numerous commentators. The fourth section of this chapter will clarify the similarities as well as the differences between history and science. Then our question will be, not which of the many paradigms is more "scientific" than the others, but which of them can be considered appropriate devices for anticipating historical knowledge.
norms but will be derived from the structured activities which constitute the world of human interiority. Thus, the measure of objectivity is neither wholly logical nor wholly scientific. Second, the problem of incommensurable systems of thought will be contrasted (1) with the heuristic and ecstatic aspects of human intelligence, and (2) with an epistemological position derived from the prior analysis of cognitional structure. On the one hand, changes in paradigms may reflect a development in understanding as well as basic changes in ethical values. On the other, conflicts over what constitutes historical realism may be settled in a preliminary way by first settling what historical "objects" are and what objective knowledge of them might be.

The following section will undertake the first of these two contrasts, namely, the contrast between closed systems of thought and the heuristic and ecstatic aspects of human intelligence. These introductory remarks have indicated that the contrast is qualified by some areas of agreement between White's position and the work of previous chapters. In the first place, historical evidence is not some "pure given" but is dependent upon the questions,

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9 It is not wholly logical because the methodical procedures of critical consciousness involve non-logical operations. It is not wholly scientific because the standard is primarily identified with a personal appropriation of one's own structured interiority. This act will allow a return to the world of theory/science in a methodical manner. See Matthew Lamb's article, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology," in Language, Truth and Meaning, p. 158.
interests, and variables which the historian brings to his task. Second, evidence is understood in terms of the models, hypotheses, constructs which guide historical inquiry. These heuristic frameworks predetermine what will be acceptable as evidence; and, so, evidence by itself will not require any radical changes in the prior frameworks. But a contrast is still possible because there are areas of disagreement. To closed systems of historical thought will be opposed the self-correcting process of learning. To the thesis that paradigm changes reflect only shifts in basic ethical beliefs, there will be contrasted changes which are required by an epistemological argument.
PROBLEMS OF OBJECTIVITY

In *Die Krisis des Historismus*, Karl Heussi argues that a simplistic notion of objectivity entertained by historians was the occasion for the crisis of historicism. Expectations about the fixity of the past and about the ability of historians to give definitive accounts of it were brought low in the crisis period. In this section we will take up aspects of the problem of historical objectivity which receive the attention of contemporary writers. While the relevant issues will be treated as specifically historical problems, in section three the developed notion of objectivity will have a wider application. Again, one of our aims is to supply an epistemological basis for countering the inherent relativism of the crisis period. But that basis will have a more general application to the problem of relativism wherever it occurs.

Historical Data

Perhaps the most frequently mentioned difficulty encountered by claims to historical objectivity is the determination of historical data. Some consensus is evident insofar as documents, art works, and tools are concerned. These are products of distinctly human origin. But how is

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one to discover the motives and intentions behind these human creations? Human consciousness has multiple threads woven through it which form a fabric of psychological, biological, physico-chemical patterns. Should the historian limit his inquiries to the conscious intentions of historical figures? Or should he view the latter as surface manifestations of more basic neurological impulses? He may even treat individual creations as the products of more general social forces such as class consciousness or the "spirit of the age."¹¹

These difficulties provide two arguments for asserting that historical data are not simply "given." In the first place, there are ongoing debates over just where historical data are to be found. If one accepts an art work by Leonardo da Vinci as an expression of historical significance, can one study it solely as an art historian would, or must one proceed in the manner of Freud to probe that creative expression for signs of the artist's own psyche? Second, as we have argued before, historical data only

¹¹"Much depends on how far one wants to pursue the inquiry into motive and intention. One can try to penetrate to the interior of consciousness, where motives and intentions merge first with psychological, then with biological, and ultimately with physico-chemical processes in the depths of human being. But this would expose thought to the threat of an infinite regress. The decision of a conventional historian to take the statements of conscious intention of historical agents at face value is neither more nor less legitimate than the decision of the Materialistic Determinist to reduce conscious intention to the status of an effect of a more basic, psycho-physical cause, or that of the Idealist to interpret it as a function of a more general 'spirit of the age.'" Metahistory, p. 430.
become specified as "historical" in relation to some task which anticipates their potential worth to an understanding of the past. And the prior evaluation of their potential worth has its own preconditions. The data will be noticed only if the historian's previous understanding is sufficiently developed to be able to include them. That is, his scholarly competence must be a match for the intricacies of research, otherwise potential materials will be overlooked. 12

Both these preconditions and the uncertainty of where specifically historical data leave off and the data of other disciplines take over are the basis for a denial of ready-made historical data. 13 The meaning of a historical

12 An additional precondition involves the linguistic sophistication of the researcher. He must have an understanding of categories and distinctions commonly used in his profession. Otherwise he will lump together complex realities which an advanced discipline already has analyzed into significant parts. For example, a study of class structure in France circa 1850 will be aided by Marx's concept of the lumpenproletariat. But if a researcher were to be ignorant of that special classification, he might misconstrue the support of the Parisian mobs for Louis Bonaparte as an initial revolt of the working classes. All of which is a way of saying that, if the words are absent, the data cannot be referred to directly and are likely to be left unanalyzed. *Method in Theology*, pp. 347-348.

13 In other words, historical materials do not enjoy a fixed meaning which exists in advance of the historian's questions. Otherwise those variable questions would eventually converge on a single interpretation of the same events. But, as argued in the thesis of perspectivism, an irreducible diversity in historical interpretations is to be expected. This diversity need not include incompatible differences, but diversity itself will be unavoidable if historical materials can have multiple meanings depending on what questions are asked of them. This potential for multiple meanings is, I think, the basis for Collingwood's
document does not leap out at the reader but must be discovered by competent research. All that appears to be given are the ink marks on pieces of paper. But these marks are not by themselves historical data. In order to become historical materials, the critical techniques of the exegete, the questions of the historian, and the interest of a professional community must be turned in their direction. Then these ink marks begin to convey a message but only because an intelligent subject who perceives them is both interested in and able to understand them historically.14

Let us grant that historical data are such because of a relationship they have to the historical interests of inquiring subjects. Those interests may vary; for example, the critical interests of the professional historian can be distinguished from the interest which produced the minstrel's song of chivalrous knights. And if the interests vary, then the relationship of historical data to the inquiring subjects will vary.15 But the point which we want provocative thesis that in history there are properly speaking no data. See The Idea of History, p. 243.

14 An example of this last statement would be the various rock strata which Indian tribes often perceived in canyon walls. For these to become measures of geological/historical time, perception was not enough; a link had to be made between these remains and processes of stratification and erosion. And such a link was only made when historical interests prompted the relevant investigations.

15 Our previous remarks in Chapter Two on pragmatic views of history exemplify this conclusion. Historical
to make here is that historical data are relative to the intentions and goals of those who take an interest in them. This is a simple enough proposition, but the implications for certain controversies in the philosophy of history are significant.

There is the controversy over what types of entities can be classified as historical materials. From what historians usually write about, one can conclude that human intentions and motives are readily accepted as historical entities. No difficulty is encountered in expanding this class to include the human creations which externalize these intentions, e.g. laws, monuments, documents. But doubts arise when unconscious drives and psycho-physical impulses are said to be matters for historical inquiry. An infinite regress threatens historical work from two directions. The external record of human achievement has innumerable components, so much so that it is a record which could never be compiled. The internal landscape is like a Chinese box with conscious intentions giving way to unconscious instincts which in turn have biological recesses behind them. The catch-phrase nihil humanum alienum does not dispel the threat. The thesis of perspectivism only data may also be the means for an approximate account of what took place and why. On the one hand, they are tools for constructing social bonds. On the other, they are means for answering questions and advancing historical understanding.
points out that multiple interests of equal legitimacy will continue to prompt historical inquiries which borrow from anthropology, psychology, biology. It appears that there is no standard way of thinking about the subject matter of history, i.e. no consensus on what limited range of objects should stand in a particularly historical relation to inquiring subjects. 16

Does the work of previous chapters offer any help in these difficulties? In a tentative way we can argue that primacy can be accorded to a certain region of historical entities. Chapter Three presented arguments for the formally dynamic structure of conscious acts. The unity of conscious intentions which is self-constituting allows us to distinguish the patterned development of conscious acts from the physical, chemical, and neural activities which are not conscious activities. 17 When the historian considers actions in relation to the intentions of

16 The absence of such a standard is noted by W. H. Walsh in Philosophy of History: An Introduction, p. 116. The problem is not without ramifications. If the field of historical objects is not clearly delineated, the canons of interpretation for investigating that field will also not be a matter of general consensus. The obvious outcome will be a repetition of the slogan of some nineteenth-century historians: Everything can be treated in terms of its historical development. But the optimism which once accompanied that slogan may now be absent. Anything can be treated historically, which is another way of saying, history is not precisely focused on something.

historical figures, he can attempt to recapitulate the experience which was a background for those actions, the intelligibility which the actors thought they were expressing, and the probable defense they would have or perhaps even did give for their decisions.

Except when he suspects that a historical figure was suffering from a neurosis or psychosis, the historian presumes that the conscious side of human thinking, deciding, and acting was in control. And in the actor's conscious flow of intentions and decisions, there is a pattern or sequence of distinct acts which the historian can provisionally reconstruct. The clues which guide this reconstruction are the actor's preserved words, the recollections of contemporaries, and the shrewd estimate of human behavior upon which a competent historian relies. The latter is familiar with human ambition; he knows how skilled some men are in directing others toward certain goals. He has experienced the ease with which rationalization covers over both tainted success and disappointing failure. So his inquiries need not be naive; statements of conscious motives are initial clues and not immediately decisive in questions of motivation. But more than individual motives and actions are his concern. What he seeks in the assembled clues is more than the historical agent's purpose and meaning. He seeks to unravel the puzzle of how individual thoughts guiding decisions lead to actions altering for
better or worse the condition of a particular group. In other words, he seeks to learn how and why human subjects made history in a particular way.

Now we began this discussion of the subject matter of history with the suggestion that some limited range of historical entities could be given primacy over others. Comments in the preceding paragraphs mention intentional acts which can be distinguished from biological and chemical functions. They also mention the actions which follow upon conscious intentions. However, the statement is added that the historian is concerned with more than the individual's intentions and actions. This "something more" is the mutually constitutive relations which obtain, first, between a conscious subject and his actions, and second, between a historical agent and his community. The deeds objectify the man to himself and to others. The community is constituted by the deeds of the many and reciprocally constitutes individuals by what it accepts from and

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18 The implicit reference here is to the task of critical history, namely, to discover what was "going forward" in the group at a particular time and place. Thus, the reconstruction of motives is only part of the more complex issues of societal development or decline. Historical biographies, of course, may occasionally avoid this broader issue, but usually their subjects were public figures who influenced the institutions of their day. Consequently, some reference of the individual to the group will be necessary simply to write an adequate biography.

19 We include under the heading of "deeds" the spoken word. The word externalizes and stabilizes the subjectivity of the individual just as the words of others mediate their complex beings to him.
gives to them in return.

Our tentative thesis, then, is that the primary objects of history are constitutive relationships. Motives and actions stand in such a relationship to each other. Actions of individuals which (1) are more than routine and (2) influence the course of social growth or decline, stand in such a relationship to the community. Examples of these relationships are not difficult to find. In Chapter Three we pointed out that the subject constitutes himself as an intelligent and rational being by acts of inquiry and of reflection. Institutions are only founded and maintained by acts of loyal citizens who find them preferable to the vacuum of anarchy. In turn, institutions have a constitutive relation to the subject, e.g. the law prescribes what the subject is to become. The human family is more than a product of nature; it is an organization of relationships, or meanings, which determine basic obligations as well as the initial opportunities for human growth. If the

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20 Lonergan analyzes the constitutive function of meaning, in Method in Theology, pp. 178-179. He makes special note of the institutional carriers of meaning which have meanings as intrinsic components. (Ibid., p. 78.) In relation to the above thesis on the primary objects of history, Lonergan remarks that the constitutive role of meaning in the controlling side of human conscious action grounds the "peculiarity" of the historical field. (Ibid., p. 178.) That is, historical events are distinguished from natural events on the basis of acts of meaning which not only mold the natural to human ends (the efficient function of meaning), but also change man himself. (Ibid., pp. 77-78.) For example, the road building of the Romans altered the natural landscape and also made a centralized government a feature of human living.
constitutive relations change, then the institution changes as witnessed in the weakening of the extended family in industrialized, mobile societies. 21

Now human intentions and decisions, human actions and social constructs are distinguishable from both the chemical/neural events which occur outside consciousness and the events in nature which have no direct human cause. The distinguishing mark will be the constitutive relationships which exist among the former historical entities. 22 Such entities are constituted by acts of meaning and of valuing, and so they bear a human stamp. It is human self-making which ultimately grounds the distinction between historical and natural events. And the products of this self-making are to be accorded primacy as historical objects. 23

We began the preceding discussion of historical objects because one of the problems of historical objectivity is the uncertainty over just what can be counted as a

21 Bernard Lonergan, "Existenz and Aggiornamento," Collection, p. 244.

22 A more extensive discussion of the difference between natural objects and historical objects will occupy our attention in the fourth section of this chapter.

23 We have only argued that constitutive relations are the primary components of the historical field. We do not mean to exclude totally those other entities and events which by themselves are of a natural origin. For example, Napoleon's stomach cancer is not a historical entity, but it will be mentioned by biographers because they think it affected his historical decisions and actions.
historical datum. Already we have argued that, whatever data or materials are accepted, they will not be simply given. Rather, they are relative to the intentions and goals of those who take an interest in them. In making the point that constitutive relationships are the primary objects of the historical field, we have been clarifying this relativity. For the historian constitutes himself as a competent scholar by closely attending to his selected materials and by subordinating all lesser interests to the desire to understand a certain sequence of events. Moreover, as a member of a community, he helps to constitute that community's intellectual life by his own scholarly works. Thus, the thesis of the relativity of data to inquiring subjects is not an admission of arbitrariness in historical research. Instead, it is the recognition that historical data are bound to historical processes and, more specifically, to the beings which make history. Consequently, there can be a history of history (or historiography) because what the historian does stands in a constitutive relation both to himself and to his community.

However, there are other aspects to this relation which have not yet been clarified. In the absence of a convincing argument for solipsism, we must admit that historical data initially have a potential relation to historical consciousness. The medieval manuscript which is discovered buried in some ruins has a potential for
enlightening the historian who stumbles across it. More to the point, the researcher may have overlooked a key passage in some text and may only by chance come across it in a later reading of the text. According to our earlier remarks on selectivity, historians have to cultivate a selective inattention if they are not to be buried by countless details. What they exclude from their initial investigations may be later attended to; and, once attended to, these formerly potential data will prompt further inquiry.24

Historical data cannot be said to be simply given if their constitution as historical data depends at least in part on the interests and competence of the historian. For example, the markings on a Babylonian tablet become

24 The issue of selectivity, of what materials will be attended to, was treated in Chapters Two and Four. History, as distinct from the natural sciences, usually involves a prior evaluation of what is worth recounting. And the basis for this prior estimation will be the historian's relative horizon as well as any opinions he has formed about human knowing, e.g. opinions on the limits of his ability to reconstruct past events. The crucial issue here is whether his selectivity will be entirely a matter of preference. We accept Collingwood's position that historical evidence only becomes such in relation to some historical question. (See The Idea of History, p. 281.) And historical questions belong to the non-logical operations of historical method. Consequently, there is no way to dictate in advance either what questions should be asked or what data should be considered. But the potential relativity of data to as-yet-undetermined questions belongs to uninitiated projects for settling historical problems. If the problems are not arbitrary, then the questions may not be, and the resulting selection of data may also not be arbitrary or solely a matter of personal preference.
items for historical curiosity because there are scholars who are interested in and can decipher them. By themselves the markings communicate nothing. They can be said to be meaningful only because scholars recognize the human imprint of marks on stone and can understand the relationships between marks and human intentions. That is, they can understand the meaning which these signs were intended to convey. So, historical data stand in relation to two human contexts: that of the past and that of some historian's present. In critical history this is especially true; for the statements and traces from the past are not simply accepted in the present without question. They must be investigated and checked. And ultimately the critical criterion for this process is the historian himself.

25 One might argue that this example contains grounds for arguing that there are "raw" historical data. If a scholar finds a tablet on which there are marks from a language he does not know, is he not confronting some simple givens of a historical nature? But how does he know that these marks are signs of human meaning and not the haphazard scratches of weather and natural decay? And if they are signs, then they are more than the marks, for signs refer to something other than themselves—in this case, they refer to a past which is not "given" but must be discovered on the basis of the traces which the historian cannot immediately decipher.

26 Lonergan refers to the position which holds historical materials to be verified simply in their immediate givenness as the fallacious "ideal of the cinema and soundtrack." (Insight, pp. 582-583.) We have gone beyond his stated position in arguing that historical data are constituted by their relation to an inquiring subject. He limits himself to the constitution of historical facts by such a relation. The distinction between data and facts is discussed in subsequent paragraphs. The differences in our positions will show up there.
The responsibility is his for being more than a "mirror" of the traces; he must analyze and pass judgment both on the authenticity of received materials and on the accuracy of past reports. But even prior to this process of verification, our argument is that historical data, precisely as historical, have undergone an interpretative process. The implications of this argument will become clear when we take up the issue of the hermeneutical circle.

From Data to Facts

In keeping with the conclusions of Chapter Four, we can assert that the historian can be attentive to historical data while under the freely chosen control of a detached attitude. Again, that attitude is not to be identified with a pure seeing of some uninterpreted given. Rather, it is a repeatedly affirmed decision to concentrate his efforts on understanding what actually happened. The interference of bias is always possible; but, on the strength of the arguments of the preceding chapter, it can be held that this interference is not inescapable. If the historian substitutes ideological and polemical interests for critical detachment, he may not argue that the substitution was necessary and unavoidable. Prior to any attempted rationalization of scholarly failings, he has a desire to know. And what that desire spontaneously aims for is a translation of historical data into historical facts.
The distinction between historical data and historical facts can be maintained if human knowing is a compound activity. A conclusion of the third chapter was that human knowing is such a compound activity. Our study of historical procedures in Chapter Four further strengthened this conclusion by specifying the formal components of historical knowing. Thus, historical data must be selected, arranged in tentative orders, and used in a discriminating fashion. But even these first steps of a historical investigation involve more than the attentiveness of the investigator. His acts of understanding lay out the initial arrangements of historical materials; they separate promising arrangements from those which appear less than advantageous. So historical data belong to a process which begins with curiosity and heads for a goal that is satisfying to that curiosity. The goal is historical knowledge. And facts are distinguished from data in being the content of this goal.

Between data and facts intervene the critical and interpretative procedures of historical method. These

27It is enough to accept as a prerequisite of all historical study that the letters on a stone or a piece of parchment or the remains of a medieval village or a treatise by a schoolman, do not of themselves provide more than the data on which the historian sets to work; and in order to make them into historical facts—i.e. what he assumes to have been the case—he has to employ a full critical and interpretative apparatus of selection, evaluation, interpolation and rejection...." Gordon Leff, History and Social Theory, pp. 22-23.

Recognizing the multiple steps from data to facts,
procedures and the intellectual effort they require precede the emergence of historical facts. In critical history the procedures and the transition from data to facts are employed twice. Those preserved materials in which the historian initially takes an interest are not immediately accepted as reliable and useful reports on past events. They must first be sifted and tested both for their accuracy and their place on a scale of primary and secondary sources. Once this work with the sources is underway, information of varying degrees of reliability begins to emerge. For the exegete or the editor of manuscripts, reliable information will be labelled historical facts. But since the historian's task is not just to criticize sources but to interpret the events to which they refer, this reliable information is not the goal of historical facts or historical knowledge. The historian's goal is an overview of the limited contexts which exegesis may establish. Consequently, the exegete supplies data for the discovery of historical facts. Between the data and the facts intervenes the interpretative reconstruction which in fact is shown to be supported by the assembled evidence. 28

we can understand Raymond Aron's denial of the existence of any elementary or atomistic historical facts. "Historical facts are historical to the extent to which they are connected with collective things." Raymond Aron, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, p. 143.

28 "It follows that the facts ascertained in the critical process are, not historical facts, but just data for the discovery of historical facts. The critical process has to be followed by an interpretative process, in which
The different points of the preceding paragraph imply a distinction between establishing the meaning of historical materials and determining what was going forward in a particular group at some time.\textsuperscript{29} If the meaning of some Babylonian inscription can be discovered, then, by relating it to other available records, the historian may be able to reconstruct the historical process to which the inscription bears witness. In keeping with our previous discussion of constitutive relationships as the primary objects in the historical field, historical facts, properly speaking, must be more than knowledge of past events, i.e. knowledge of what happened.\textsuperscript{30} So the meaning of the

the historian pieces together the fragments of information that he has gathered and critically evaluated. Only when this interpretative process of reconstruction is terminated do there emerge what may properly be called the historical facts." \textit{Method in Theology}, p. 203. Lonergan applies this distinction between exegesis and history to both the work of the historian and the work of the scientist. See \textit{ibid.}, pp. 348-349.

\textsuperscript{29} In Chapter Four we argued that this latter task was specifically a part of critical history. The main argument is that what a group records for posterity is limited to what the group knows about its own history. But, in many cases, the group misjudges or is unconcerned with the long-range consequences of its actions. Only a later historian can fit their partial self-estimate into a larger context.

\textsuperscript{30} We are disagreeing with Lonergan when he simply states that historical facts are known events. (See \textit{Method in Theology}, p. 202.) This disagreement is not crucial to the purposes of this dissertation. It may in fact not be a serious disagreement at all since, in various places, Lonergan argues that (1) historical procedures come to term in historical knowledge, i.e. historical facts; and (2) for critical history, these facts pertain to the question of what was "going forward" in the past, i.e. what
Babylonian inscription and the events to which it refers become historical facts through the historian's successful efforts to interrelate the known details. He synthesizes them in an overview which reconstructs the intelligible sequence of actions and consequences. Quite simply, historical facts emerge when known events are related among themselves so as to disclose the mutual constitution of act-consequence-historical advance or decline. The act effects a change in the group; the change in the group determines the historical meaning of the act.

Heuristic Frameworks

What we have been doing in the preceding paragraphs course the known events were taking. Consequently, his position appears to be that historical facts, properly speaking, are more than the known events.

Our thesis that historical facts are more than known events draws support from two commentators on history—Henri Marrou and Gordon Leff. Marrou writes: "History attains intelligibility only to the extent that it shows itself able to establish and to disclose the relations that join each new stage of human progress to the past and to its consequences." (The Meaning of History, p. 186.) Of course, we should add that stages of human decline cannot be overlooked. Marrou does not overlook the hiatuses which limit the thoroughness of historical reconstructions. That is, not all events are linked, and so some intelligible relations may be unavailable to the historian.

Gordon Leff remarks in a similar vein: "The study of history—of whatever branch—is to discover how what happened did happen; knowledge of an event alone is not history but merely its raw material: in the degree to which it can be related to other events it becomes an intelligible reconstruction of the past which is the object of history." History and Social Theory, p. 53.
is to clarify the relations between historical data and facts, between historical materials and the inquiring historian. A further clarification can now be made. There is the relation of historical materials to the heuristic frameworks which anticipate a historical intelligibility in the materials. The use of heuristic frameworks was discussed in Chapters Two and Four. There we argued that such anticipatory constructs are not necessarily detrimental to critical history. Usually the contrary view contains the implicit assumption that critical history should begin without presuppositions. Historical knowing is a matter of "observing" the given facts, and so any prior hypotheses will only interfere with this direct grasp of historical facts.32

The myth of the observational historical given is seriously challenged by Hayden White's theory of poetic prefiguration. The objects of the historical field are not invariant throughout changes in basic paradigms. Rather, with a change in paradigms, the data for historical analysis will change. Now we take White's theory to be an elaboration of that "Copernican Revolution" in history which Collingwood identifies with the critical and

32 Previously we noted Arthur Danto's critique of Charles Beard's position on the use of historical hypotheses. The critique is also aimed at Beard's misleading metaphor that the historian can "see" the past through the medium of documents. Hypotheses should be unnecessary if this were the case. See Danto's Analytical Philosophy of History, pp. 95-99.
constructive aspects of historical method. The belief in invariant historical givens is the basis for what Collingwood labels "scissors-and-paste" history. This type of historical narration was in practice surpassed by nineteenth-century historians, but many of the expectations about historical method lagged behind this change. The result was a simplistic notion of historical procedures which was out of touch with what historians actually were doing. Our own analysis of relative and basic horizons further specifies how historical materials are not simply observational givens, but are related to the selective, constructive, and critical operations of the intelligent historian. His use of precise questions presupposes historical knowledge and is an anticipation of what answers are likely. The latter anticipation is reflected in the precise question which takes the form of a hypothesis.

Now the reaction of those who hold to some invariant historical givens is predictable. Are the preceding remarks not an admission that the historian's use of materials is arbitrary? Those remarks indicate that some type of descriptive framework is antecedent to the gathering of historical materials. Whatever is "given" in historical experience is given in terms of the antecedent framework

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34 Ibid., pp. 257-263.
which formulates the expectations of the historian. Consequently, there is no immediate grasp of historical facts. And, if there is no such grasp, then there are no privileged historical facts which every historian must recognize. 35

We accept the conclusion that there are no privileged historical facts which are given independently of a particular perspective. Arguments in Chapter Two for the thesis of perspectivism require this conclusion. It is apparent that we do not share the expectation that historical facts are immediately intuited. But it does not follow that, in the absence of a body of unassailable historical facts, the historian's use of materials must be arbitrary. The complaint actually is twofold. Since there is no single privileged historical perspective, the perspective which is

35 This conclusion is not too different from Collingwood's following remark. "All that the historian means, when he describes certain historical facts as data, is that for the purpose of a particular piece of work there are certain historical problems relevant to that work which for the present he proposes to treat as settled; though, if they are settled, it is only because historical thinking has settled them in the past, and they remain settled only until he or some one else decides to reopen them." Ibid., p. 244.

W. H. Walsh comments on the absence of unassailable historical facts. The conflicts among historical perspectives are sometimes thought to be resolvable by an appeal to independent historical facts. But this expectation has not been fulfilled because no consensus has been reached on either a fixed body of evidence which all historians recognize or on a standard mode of historical consciousness. See Walsh's Philosophy of History: An Introduction, pp. 114-115.
adopted will be marred by personal preferences. And since the adopted perspective determines what counts as historical data, the handling of materials will be influenced by the variable preferences which ground the antecedent perspective.

Admittedly there are preferential variables involved in the choice of a historical perspective. But much of the work of the preceding chapters has been concerned with finding some limit to these variables. Thus, we have argued that there are theoretical grounds for criticizing elements in one's historical perspective. We have argued that these grounds are decidedly non-arbitrary, but are invariant across changes in moral and aesthetic viewpoints. Moreover, in regard to the second part of the complaint, the previous chapter argued for a critical sanction of historical procedures. The historian's use of materials is conditioned by his preferences, his prior expectations about historical processes, his specific hypotheses. But his use of materials can also be subordinated to a reflective analysis which checks his procedures against an appropriated cognitional performance.

These previous arguments have recognized the constructive aspect of the historian's work as well as the possibility of an interfering bias. But what they, and particularly the final section of Chapter Four, have gone on to show is that the historian's constructs can be
products of a detached intelligence which recognizes the difference between bias and critical thinking. When these constructs are the hypotheses which focus inquiry without concluding what the answers must be, then the historian's experience is likely to be a self-correcting process. He sets up plausible constructs, modifies them as his work progresses, and perhaps even abandons constructs which his discriminating intelligence finds to be misdirected. There are at least three effective limits to any arbitrary constructs: the historian's own intelligence, the public controls of a critical professional community and an educated audience, and the accumulating evidence which either reinforces or undermines a tentative thesis. In advance of these controls, there are no privileged historical facts and no single privileged perspective on the past.

We are agreeing with Hayden White that historical models are needed for organizing a field of research. He

36 The proof of this statement lies in the recognition that hypothetical constructs are not ends in themselves but means to historical knowledge. They launch a process of verification which may or may not confirm the initial guesswork of the historian. Thus, the unavoidable use of historical constructs is not a basis for historical idealism. What is advanced hypothetically is a product of both the historian's intelligence and his prior knowledge of some topic. Furthermore, that hypothesis and its presupposed knowledge may be altered by a new encounter with evidence which is acceptable to the historian's perspective without being totally coherent with prior opinions belonging to that perspective. On the problem of constructs and idealism in history, see Henri-Jrénée Marrou, The Meaning of History, pp. 65–66.
notes that documentary records do not immediately present an ordered and unambiguous image of past events. A heuristic framework which provides a plausible order for events is a requisite for a methodical study of the records. Examples of such frameworks abound. The most obvious is simple chronology which differentiates history into periods thereby offering a point of reference for individual events. More complex examples occur when the historian seeks a model for explaining the relations among events. Occasionally a scientific model is adapted to historical purposes, e.g. Darwinian biology and scientific mechanisms have been prevailing models for some historians. These models may be elaborated into speculative philosophies or theories of history. There appears to be some consensus on the heuristic worth of such grand schemes for ordering events. While, as Hayden White proves, there is no

37 *Metahistory*, p. 30.

38 We have already remarked on E. H. Carr's observation that the periodization of history is a necessary tool for historians. (See *What Is History?*, p. 76.) Claude Lévi-Strauss provides insights into the functions of historical dating, in *The Savage Mind*, pp. 258-261.

39 Such models may be employed without much awareness on the part of those employing them. Cultural differences offer some help in explicating one's own preconceptions about historical processes. Our contemporary preconceptions differ greatly from the Greek view of history, and a study of the latter may help us to recognize what we have taken for granted and left unstudied. Cornford's *Thucydides Mythistoricus* provides just such an opportunity.

40 For examples, see Bruce Mazlish, *The Riddle of History*, pp. 428 and 447; also Patrick Gardiner, *The Nature of Historical Explanation*, p. 112; similarly, Henri-Trénée
consensus on which theory or set of theories is actually proper to history, there is agreement that illuminating models can forward historical understanding.

A problem which must be considered is the "givenness" of historical models. Previously we have qualified the statement that historical data are "given." As historical data they have already been classified. That is, they belong to a class of materials having some relation to historical interests. Both these interests and the intended materials are the components of variable historical consciousness. The variability of this consciousness shows up in the antecedent frameworks which both guide the historian's questions and set the boundaries within which data can be found. Now these frameworks or models may be so much a part of the historian's cultural heritage that he does not recognize them as models. Instead, he takes for granted that they are the actual image of historical processes. 41 Let us use the familiar phrase "climate of


41 We have in mind Cornford's remark: "It is impossible for us to tell how pervasively our own view of the world is coloured by Darwinian biology and by the categories of mechanical and physical science." In the Preface to Thucydides Mythistoricus, p. viii.
opinion" to refer to such a set of accepted but unstudied historical models. Our problem, then, is no longer the givenness of data but the givenness of understanding. These climates of opinion are the antecedent ways in which observations are made. They supply the classifications which allow an observation of data to be specifically historical. As such, they raise anew the problem of closed systems of thought. 42

The latter problem was formulated at the close of Chapter Three. We specified the dimensions of the problem by working out the presuppositions and implications of Carl Becker's position on climates of opinion. Again, that position was that the preconceptions of one's own age close one off from the thought of other ages. No valid judgments of truth or falsity pass between different climates of opinion. Two presuppositions of this position were (1) differences among climates of opinion are fundamental givens, and (2) what is not given is a basis on which to build a critique of both the differences and their sources. Two implications of the position were (1) the historian's search for self-knowledge occurs within the

42 Recall that one purpose of this chapter is to determine how human intelligence is related to these antecedent models or thought-systems. Is the relation one of subordination such that the "given" climate of opinion incorporates all our possible questions? Or is it possible to develop increasingly complex thought-models as our experience and understanding outstrip original ways of thinking?
boundaries of his antecedent thought-system, and (2) he will not discover within these boundaries any basis for judging works operating under a different set of preconceptions.

Becker's thesis of the ultimacy of cultural differences stands if one begins with statements about cultural values or historical knowledge. But we have argued the possibility of beginning with the prior performance of the subject, i.e. starting with those cognitional acts which give rise to both statements and their formulated cultural contexts. This performance can be objectified, and its inherent structure is the a priori condition for all developments of meaning. Consequently, a discovery is made of something which is not owed to the particular framework or climate of opinion of the discoverer. Given this discovery, it is possible to reach "behind" both the given climates of opinion and their differences to the subjects

43 To repeat the argument for this conclusion—the climate of opinion is prior to the meaning of statements. The latter do not validate their climate of opinion; rather, it is to their prior context that they owe their meaningfulness.

44 This statement must be qualified. Cognitional structure is a priori both in the sense that it is a pre-condition to developments of meaning and in the sense that it precludes none of them in advance. However, the structure is discovered only by investigating the subject's acts of intentionality. These acts will be carried on within a context of prior knowledge, preconceptions, values, and so on. Consequently, there is an a posteriori aspect to the structure of knowing, i.e. the discovery of cognitional structure takes place within the particular climate of opinion of the discoverer.
who constituted them. This is to say that the two presuppositions associated with Becker's work must be corrected. First, any "given" differences among perspectives or frameworks or theories presuppose the prior performance of their originators. The understanding of historical processes which they express is not simply a factual given, the origins of which must be left in obscurity. Second, transcendental method which formulates the operations of critical consciousness is a basis for criticizing the differences among perspectives because it can note omissions or confusions which occurred at the source of those differences.

The implication of our response to Becker's position is that any "given" historical model or climate of opinion can be measured against the spontaneous performance of the critical subject. Are there questions, problems which the model overlooks or dismisses out of hand? How well does it account for the available materials which a professional historical community accepts as in need of explanation?

45 We need to distinguish here between differences which, according to Becker and others, cannot be made to reveal their sources and differences which the thesis of perspectivism declares to be irreducible. The latter differences are not matters of truth or falsity in historical works, but are products of varying interests and relative horizons. Such differences can be investigated but not eliminated. Indeed, no purpose is served in trying to level them. But incompatible differences among historical perspectives usually can be traced to omissions or confusions in their underlying cognitional theories. These are the differences which can be criticized once transcendental method is applied to them.
In the use of evidence which the model itself allows, are there arbitrary assessments, convenient omissions, or lapses in consistency? In the arguments of historians who employ the given model, are there fallacies which can be traced to basic assumptions in the model itself?

The preceding questions are both too general and too specific. They are too general in that actual cases of historical criticism would involve more concrete examples. They are too specific in that our purpose is to show how questions about the intelligibility and reasonableness of historical models can be connected to critical consciousness. The formal precepts of critical consciousness (i.e. the transcendental precepts) are not openly manifest in the preceding questions. But they are at least implicit as the guiding assumption that one can tell the difference between an intelligent use of materials and a prejudiced use, between a reasonable transition from evidence to conclusion and a non sequitur. 46

Our first question—Are there questions, problems, which the given model overlooks or dismisses out of hand?—is of special importance when considering the relation of transcendental method to historical models. It is the type of question which reveals the possibility of a cross

46 This implicit presence we take to be established on the basis of arguments in Chapter Four. There our conclusion was that transcendental method and, hence, its formal precepts have a normative function in regard to historical procedures.
comparison between different historical frameworks. More is at stake than the historian's accuracy in his work; there is also the question of his ability and willingness to consider new ideas and the probable opinions of those who do not share his framework. The precepts of attentiveness and intelligence require that the historian broaden his vision to include the work of other schools of historical thought. What can he learn from them? Do their divergent views challenge his own position? Do historical models other than his own provide insights which he suspects can be verified? If his suspicions turn out to be correct, is he willing to make the needed changes in his perspective?

47 This cross comparison is called for by Haskell Fain in his *Between Philosophy and History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 244. He inquires after criteria for such a comparison but settles on nothing definitive. Our position is that the formulated performance of the subject, without being identified with strictly logical criteria, provides the needed basis for a critical comparison.

48 E. H. Carr notes the limits which a concern for the historian's accuracy involves. "To praise a historian for his accuracy is like praising an architect for using well-seasoned timber or properly mixed concrete in his building. It is a necessary condition of his work, but not his essential function." *What Is History?*, p. 8. There is also the narrative style which the historian will want to make attractive to a potential audience. Similarly he may be concerned with coordinating his research with the work of his colleagues, so as to advance the exploration of a topic important for his era. Even more important, he may be concerned with giving his work the broadest possible research basis, and this requires that he listen to and evaluate the opinions of historians from different schools of thought.
Now our argument is that, if such questions are in fact possible, then the historian can understand other systems of thought; he can learn from them both what his errors may be and what theirs may be. But this is to say that human intelligence can transcend climates of opinion or systems of thought or historical frameworks which are initially guiding its acts of inquiry and discovery. It is never without such frameworks, but our point is that critical consciousness which develops contexts of meaning can also move beyond the inherent limits of its own products. The key to such a possibility is the occurrence of questions which presuppose a given standpoint but which intend the content of other standpoints. That is, questioning which is not prejudiced in advance can carry the questioner beyond his initial preconceptions to an understanding which modifies and improves upon his starting point.

The Hermeneutical Circle

In a preliminary way we have reached the first goal

49 This conclusion was listed in the introductory section of this chapter as the first of two goals which had to be reached if the fourth counterproposal was to be successfully defended. The problem of the hermeneutical circle—considered in subsequent paragraphs—must be treated before this conclusion is definitely accepted.

50 See the remarks in Chapter Four, section three, on the ecstatic aspect of historical procedures. We noted there the self-correcting process which gradually replaces initial guesswork with questions suggested by the topic under study.
of this chapter: to establish that human intelligence can transcend the antecedent frameworks it employs. There remain the various counter-arguments to this conclusion. They come under the general heading of the problem of the hermeneutical circle.51 In the first place, the historian seeks to understand something about past human events. But since his efforts to understand are not a matter of "pure seeing," he brings to that task a priori understanding of how human beings act, the motives which prompt decisions, and other general information about human living. This presupposed understanding in some way already understands those past human events. Consequently, what is to be learned about those events is not independent of the standpoint of the historian. If he is trying to prove something about those events, he will already be presupposing much of what he aims to prove. If he uses documents to interpret some events, he must first know that they are applicable; but the condition for knowing that they are applicable is to already know how those documents forward the interpretation of the events themselves.52

The circularity here is apparent. The problem is

51The problem of the hermeneutical circle is concisely stated by Richard E. Palmer: "How can a text be understood, when the condition for its understanding is already to have understood what it is about?" Hermeneutics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 25.

52"In defiance of the rules of traditional logic, circular arguments are the normal method of producing documentary evidence.

"An historian who consults his documents in order to
whether it is a "vicious" or closed circle in which one does not advance beyond the initial standpoint but merely unfolds what it implicitly contains. In order to handle this problem, we take a clue from Heidegger's analysis of the hermeneutical circle. The ideal of presuppositionless analysis has been repeatedly proposed as a model for scientific demonstration. However, those who have proposed this ideal have usually argued for the possibility of "pure seeing." That is, any prior understanding of what is analyzed is to be discarded lest one's observation be guided by some prior theory and not by what is there-to-be-seen. But the recommended procedure is actually an exercise in non-understanding. One is to stare and nothing more.  

Our previous study of both Lonergan's horizon-analysis and of the actual procedures of historians indicates that such an exercise in non-understanding has nothing to do with intelligent historical inquiry.  

interpret some political event can judge the value of these documents only if he knows their place within the very same course of events about which he consults them." Edgar Wind, "Some Points of Contact between History and Natural Science," in Philosophy and History, edited by R. Kliban-sky and H. J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 256.

53"When we merely stare at something, our just-having-it-before-us lies before us as a failure to understand it any more. This grasping which is free of the 'as', is a privation of the kind of seeing in which one merely understands." Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 190. The sarcasm of the "merely" is justified on the supposition that inquiry is an intelligent way to seek understanding.

54It also has nothing to do with scientific inquiry if one is to believe those contemporary philosophers of
The Heideggerian clue, then, is that interpretations proceed from prior understanding. This prior understanding, or forehaving, is one of the essential conditions for interpretations. Hence, the apparent circularity of historical understanding cannot be labelled "vicious" because what makes understanding possible in the first place cannot be the basis for arguments that understanding does not occur or does not develop.55

Besides the question of a "vicious circle," there is also the question of precontainment: Is understanding limited to the unfolding of what is already implicit in the standpoint of the inquirer? An affirmative response is likely to proceed from a confusion of deduction with the process of understanding which is termed "insight." A deduction occurs among concepts and propositions when a transition is made from a general formula or premiss to some science who argue that all observation is theory-laden. Patrick A. Heelan summarizes some of the fundamental issues which belong to this contemporary debate, in "The Logic of Framework Transpositions," Language, Truth and Meaning, pp. 93-96. Heidegger's position apparently is that both scientific and historiographical interpretations operate from a prior understanding of their data and topics. Hence, the ideal of presuppositionless inquiry is alien to both the natural and human sciences. For the source of this comment and for Heidegger's warning about misunderstanding the "circularity" of human understanding, see Being and Time, pp. 194-195.

55"But if we see this circle as a vicious one and look out for ways of avoiding it, even if we just 'sense' it is an inevitable imperfection, then the act of understanding has been misunderstood from the ground up." Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 194.
implication. But historical understanding develops in a circuit from prior historical understanding and selected materials to inquiry, from inquiry to tentative schemes and discoveries, from limited contexts to an overview which must be verified first in its parts and then as a coherent whole. Along the way new discoveries are made which challenge earlier hypotheses. Revisions are therefore introduced. And the basis for these revisions is the occurrence of a sudden insight which grasps in a new way how partial discoveries fit into the broader context. Thus, in our example of the pre-Civil War cotton trade, the conclusion about twenty-year trends of healthy market conditions was not deduced from any general statement about economic laws. Our hypothetical example envisioned a gradual learning process in which initial hunches could be revised as the inquiry advanced. As two and three-year periods were isolated and understood, they could be related to other segments of the larger twenty-year period. Gradually an overview was built up out of our understanding of the segments.

Now logically this process is a circle. The overview is reached only by understanding the parts. But at the same time the significance of the two and three-year periods was revealed by actually reaching an overview of

56Lonergan contrasts deduction and scientific insights. The latter account for those "leaps" which leave behind what is insufficient in old positions and introduce more satisfactory positions thereby marking a scientific advance. See Insight, p. 166.
the twenty-year period. However, the achievement of understanding was not a logical deduction. Prior historical understanding allowed the historian to frame intelligent hypotheses about cotton trading in the antebellum South, but the conclusion was not necessarily grasped in those initial hypotheses. They only launched and guided a process of discovery which hypothetically could have turned up unexpected results. So, to learn about that trade and its economic health was a matter of understanding each segment of the period. Then one used that understanding to correct or to fill out the understanding of other segments as well as the prior historical understanding with which one began the inquiry.57 The learning process breaks out of any hermeneutical circle which is construed as a closed system confining the subject to what he already implicitly knows.

Before closing this second section of the chapter, we need to consider a special case of the hermeneutical circle. This special case is linguistic in nature. Words are meaningful within the context of a language. One understands them by knowing how to use the language to which they belong. But obviously one only knows a language insofar as one knows the words and the rules governing their use—hence another circle presents itself. Given Hayden White's emphasis on the linguistic structure of historical

57Method in Theology, p. 159.
works and given his thesis that historical paradigms are effectively closed systems of thought, this special case is worth consideration.

First, the problem is twofold. If methodical inquiry is limited to linguistic formulations, then the language employed in the inquiry will be a closed context, and discoveries will be limited by what that linguistic context allows to be spoken. The second aspect of the problem involves the historian's use of ordinary language. He borrows his terms from a public context that has settled on the meaning of the terms. Consequently, the meanings which he is capable of expressing will be derived from that public context of meaningfulness.

Both aspects of this problem are referred to in Lonergan's discussion of ordinary and original meaningfulness. Ordinary meaningfulness is the public consensus on word-meaning evident in a group's common use of everyday

58 Metahistory, p. 432.

59 We have in mind here a variant on epistemological conceptualism. The historian, through a poetic choice, adopts a linguistic framework for his subsequent inquiries. Other historians use different linguistic frameworks (i.e. one of the other tropes of poetic speech), so that subsequent narratives will be formulated in diverse and sometimes conflicting modes of speech. Given a linguistic position which denies the possibility of a preconceptual insight having critical implications, these differences will be fundamental. There will be no way of criticizing them since whoever attempts such a critique will already presuppose the privileged status of his own linguistic framework.

60 Method in Theology, pp. 255-257.
language. Individuals acquire knowledge of the group's language by learning how it is used on an everyday basis. But original meaningfulness is apparent when new uses are found for existing words or when new words are developed and communicated to a wide audience. Eventually a public may grasp the meaning of new ways of speaking and may adopt them as a part of ordinary language.

Now both a precondition to the preceding distinction and the basis for a solution to the twofold problem we are considering is the occurrence of mental acts which precede linguistic formulations. If one denies that mental acts occur or if one labels them "occult entities" which distract philosophers with pseudo-problems, then the preceding distinction will be overlooked. Similarly, a denial of mental acts will leave one with only linguistic formulations. And these formulations are relative to the linguistic context in which they occur. Other formulations occurring in different linguistic contexts may be incommensurable with each other even though they supposedly refer to the same set of events.

However, the work of the third chapter focused on

61 The ongoing revision of dictionaries is proof enough that original meaningfulness can be distinguished from ordinary meaningfulness.

62 Method in Theology, pp. 256-257. Apparently Lonergan is making an oblique reference to ordinary language philosophers who consider all philosophic problems to be linguistic problems and who limit basic philosophic discourse to the usage of ordinary language.
cognitional acts and established the pattern of their occurrence. Our analysis was not of "occult entities" but of empirical events, the data of consciousness. So mental acts do occur. Their occurrence need not be explicitly linguistic, but an appropriation of cognitional structure requires a linguistic statement of the distinctions and interrelations of human intentional acts. This statement may not be adequate; but the subject's performance continues just the same, and repeated efforts to explain it may yield improved accounts.

The implication of all this is that methodical inquiry is not limited to a juggling of linguistic formulae. There can be insights into intentional acts, and, according to the intentionality analysis of Chapter Three, these insights may reveal the structure of critical consciousness. What is then made available is a basis for analyzing how new terms are invented to express a developing understanding. Also made available is a formal theory of the

63 That is, a conscious act of human sensibility (e.g. touching) can occur without a linguistic component. By itself the act is a conscious expression which occurs as part of a larger flow of expression having both linguistic, bodily, and interpersonal components. Lonergan remarks that mental acts occur only within a sustaining flow of expression. He cites the work of Ernst Cassirer (The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms) as evidence for the interrelation of speech, knowledge, and action. See ibid., Method in Theology, p. 255.

64 Recall the distinction made in Chapter Three between the pattern of cognitional performance itself and the formulation of it. The former is invariant; the latter is open to change though not to a radical revision of its basic terms.
performance presupposed by every historical paradigm. While paradigm-followers adopt their common terms and areas of interest much in the way that the individual learns about the ordinary meaningfulness of the group's speech, there are also the originators of paradigms who break through common usage to new ways of understanding and speaking.\textsuperscript{65} This latter group bears witness both to the distinction between ordinary and original meaningfulness and to the occurrence of mental acts which produce discoveries outdistancing the given linguistic frameworks of the day.

In summary, this second section of Chapter Five treated specific problems confronting claims to historical objectivity. We envisioned a strategic need to handle these problems before proceeding to a complex notion of objectivity in the third section.

The first problem concerned the determination of historical data. A negative conclusion was easily reached: historical data are not ready-made items simply given for historians to inspect. An affirmative conclusion was not so easily reached. Even prior to our clarification of the relation between the historian and his object of inquiry, there is a problem: What types of entities are historical

\textsuperscript{65}The distinction between paradigm-followers and originators of paradigms is made by F. Lawrence in his article, "Self-knowledge in History in Gadamer and Lonergan," \textit{Language, Truth and Meaning}, p. 199.
objects? Our proposed answer was limited. We argued not what must be excluded or what all must be included in the field of historical objects. Rather, we argued only that there are strong reasons for counting constitutive relationships as primary historical objects. One benefit of this viewpoint is the light it throws on what can first seem rather strange: historians treat themselves as historical objects in writing a history of history.

Further efforts were made to clarify the relation between the historian and his data. Our earlier arguments for the relativity of data to subjective interests had to be clarified if we were not to give the impression that historical research is wholly a matter of personal preference. First, we countered this impression by noting a potential relation of data to researcher—the historian does not create his materials. Second, we took note of the work of the fourth chapter. The relation between data and historian contains a critical element: the historian himself who can be intellectually responsible. His cultivated detachment stands in contrast to a purely arbitrary use of historical materials.

Our next move was from historical data to historical facts. The distinction was argued on the basis of the earlier conclusion that human knowing is a compound activity. We added the argument that the procedures outlined in Chapter Four would not make much sense if there were no
distinction. The transition from data to facts is guided by anticipatory hypotheses and heuristic frameworks—this much is assumed after the Copernican Revolution in historiography. But this assumption is sometimes challenged: there must be observational historical givens which are independent of prior interests and constructs. If not, what objective checks can there be on an arbitrary construction of historical events?66 We replied to this question in a preliminary way. Part of the work of the previous chapters was to find limits to the variables which might ground arbitrary historical procedures. Particularly the fourth chapter emphasized the non-preferential check available in transcendental method. Hypotheses and other constructs can be useful devices for guiding a developing understanding. Should they become blocks to understanding, the historian's own intelligence, certain public controls, and accumulating evidence can provide remedies.

The denial of observational historical givens and the affirmation of historical construction present another problem. Heuristic models may be closely identified with the cultural heritage of the historian. Basic assumptions about historical processes and about science may be part of those models—so much so that the historian does not think of them as constructs at all. Instead, they are

66 We should note that this question cannot be satisfactorily answered before we explicitly develop the topic of historical objectivity.
part of that given understanding which forms the individual's climate of opinion. In handling this problem we made use of our earlier study of Carl Becker's work. If it is possible to reach behind various "worlds of meaning" to the performance which produced them, then there is a basis for intelligently criticizing different historical constructs.

However, we went beyond that earlier study of Chapter Three to consider the problem of the hermeneutical circle. We argued against the thesis of presuppositionless history and the confusion of insight with deduction, both of which supported the charge of a "vicious circle" in historical understanding. Our response to this charge consisted in a descriptive analysis of the self-correcting process of learning. Finally, a special case of the hermeneutical circle was considered. Language forms a context of meaningfulness for expressions of preconceptual insights. If mental acts are denied or ignored in favor of linguistic formulations, then one is left with different linguistic frameworks containing irreconcilable propositions about the same events. But previous work already established that there are mental acts and that access can be gained to a performance invariant across differences in linguistic formulation. With these variables clarified, we can turn to the main topic of objectivity in the next section.
EVIDENCE AND OBJECTIVITY

The second goal of Chapter Five is to provide epistemological arguments justifying a conception of historical realism. This goal will be reached in two stages. This third section elaborates Lonergan's epistemology which he derives from his cognitional theory. The following, fourth section, uses this epistemology to criticize the "realism" of different opinions about historical facts. Throughout both sections we will maintain the distinction between surface and deep structures in the historical text. Our previous work has established that an appropriated cognitional structure provides access to, as well as grounds for criticizing, precritical elements of the deep level. That same work has supplied reasons for holding that the bias infecting surface procedures is neither unavoidable nor irreducible. A single thesis remains to be proved: an epistemology which incorporates cognitional structure offers a test of the realism of historical perspectives.

The topic of objectivity belongs to an epistemological study of realism. Dissenting opinions about the possibility of historical objectivity require that the topic

Such an epistemological justification was not provided in any compelling way by nineteenth-century historians. (Metahistory, p. 26.) However, our starting point in cognitional structure may succeed in offering more than simply another epistemological argument having a preferential and, hence, variable basis.
be a central issue of this chapter. The complex notion of objectivity which will eventually emerge will have not only a specific reference to historical issues but also an implicit reference to problems of relativism in whatever field they may occur.

Evidence and Verification

Discussions of objectivity usually involve the topics of evidence and of verification. Our study of these two topics presumes earlier conclusions: that knowing is a compound activity and that distinctions can be maintained among potential, formal, and actual evidence.68

Given the discussion in the preceding section on historical data and their relation to an inquiring subject, we must agree with Collingwood that the notion of potential historical evidence is misleading.69 Lonergan's notion of potential evidence serves a negative function: it poses a limit to the claims of solipsism. But when one speaks of historical evidence, there is already a

68 Method in Theology, p. 186.

69 See The Idea of History, pp. 280-281. Perhaps our point is too subtle. Historical data (or temporally past achievements) stand in a potential relation to historical consciousness--this much must be granted to avoid solipsism. But data and evidence are not equivalent or interchangeable concepts. Evidence is data as attended to and at least tentatively connected to some inquiry. Prior understanding guides that inquiry, so that any evidentiary materials will already be classified in a preliminary way as fitting this or that problem area. Thus, to use Lonergan's terminology, historical evidence will always be at least formal evidence.
classification or interpretation of some entity as historical. The mode of preliminary interpretation is likely to be a specific question which anticipates how data and a problem under study are interconnected. The historian asks a specific question because he thinks he can answer it. And he directs his question to selected evidence which he tentatively supposes will help to answer his question. Therefore, to adopt Lonergan's terminology, though not his position—all historical evidence is at least formal evidence. So we are qualifying earlier statements about Lonergan's triple classification of evidence. This qualification was postponed until after the preceding discussion of how historical interests constitute a field of historical objects. A very strong argument can be made for our thesis that potential historical evidence functions solely as a negative concept. If it were a positive concept, then everything in the world would be evidence for

70 Strictly speaking, formal evidence for Lonergan is not only data as used in asking a question but also as used in answering a question. (Method in Theology, p. 186.) Our use of his term, within the above limits, is defensible since a precise question anticipates possible answers. Such is the meaning for Lonergan of the "unknown known" which a question intends. One commentator puts the same point this way: "...in every question there is a hidden structure directing implicitly the search for answers, and prior even to the formulation of the answer and imposing a structure upon the answer even before it is formulated. This hidden structure is the domain of intentionality and, like the nine-tenths of an iceberg below water, it lies perilously below the level of our cognitive activities." Patrick A. Heelan, Quantum Mechanics and Objectivity (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), p. 156.
historical consciousness. But this conclusion would undercut the thesis of historical questioning as constructive. It would also make nonsensical the debates over what limited field of entities is properly termed "historical." The preceding comments imply a correlation between historical questioning and formal historical evidence. A question is an anticipation of insight. If it is a precise question, it already supposes how an answer might shape up. That is, the question proposes a structure or organization for handling the anticipated intelligibility.


72 In defense of our denial that "historical evidence" is a predicate belonging to objects independently of historical questioning, we can construct an imaginative scene. A hunter walks through a dried-up African river bed. He hears a noise coming from nearby bushes. Eager to flush out some prey, he looks for an object to throw into the bushes. He finds a stone and hurls it. Sometime later a paleontologist walks along the same river bed. He knows that the river which once flowed here cut out what is now called the Olduvai Gorge. He too hears noises. Wanting to scare off any predators, he looks for an object to throw. By chance he picks up the same stone as the earlier hunter. But he stops to examine markings on it. The stone has been shaped by some human force--this much his earlier training and purposeful wandering allow him to detect. Suddenly, for this trained investigator, the object is no longer a natural entity but an item of historical interest. It becomes part of the paleontologist's world of meaning in which antecedent classifications stand ready to receive items of significance. What was not significant for the hunter is a historical puzzle for the paleontologist because he already understands how to perceive objects in a historical way.

of partially understood materials. The inquirer's prior understanding and his heuristic hypothesis may or may not be compatible with fully considered evidence. If they are compatible, then the question was well put and the hypothesis is reinforced. If they are not, then the question does not cease to have a degree of intelligibility; it rather appears to be irrelevant to the investigated problem. A precondition for either outcome is an insight which grasps a possible organization of the selected evidence.

The emphasis is on a "possible" organization because there is still a need for verification. Is the possible organization actually relevant to the evidence? Does the evidence actually warrant an assent to this tentative organization? At stake is what is usually referred to as the "sufficiency" of evidence. Lonergan provides important insights into what is meant by the sufficiency of evidence.

First, what is historical evidence for one school of thought may not be considered evidence by another. Therefore, by itself evidence does not compel assent. It supplies a reasonable basis for assent only if it is understood to be sufficient. Lonergan's distinction between acts of

74 Cf. our remarks in Chapter Four on inverse insights.

75 "What is grasped in insight, is neither an actually given datum of sense nor a creation of the imagination but an intelligible organization that may or may not be relevant to data." Method in Theology, p. 10.
direct understanding and acts of reflective understanding is crucial here. The former provide the tentative connections which are usually formulated in a hypothetical proposition. But the reflective act of understanding grasps not only the meaning of the proposition but also the relations among it, the events of which it may be affirmed, and the initial reasons for affirming it. In other words, a pre-judgmental reflection determines how well a tentative understanding, one's formulation of it, the available evidence, and the events under study correlate with one another. This reflective act yields a determination of the sufficiency of evidence, and this determination is the basis for a reasonable judgment.

The Virtually Unconditioned

The preceding remarks rather hastily summarized a complex position. But they do form an introduction to Lonergan's notion of the virtually unconditioned. The term "virtually" refers to the fact that the judgment made has conditions which are in fact fulfilled. That conditions


77 The basic text for this notion remains Chapter X of Insight, pp. 279-316. The particularly relevant pages for historical judgments are pp. 280-289, and 299-301. Other sources include "Insight: Preface to a Discussion," in Collection, pp. 160-163; and David Tracy's discussion of the notion in The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, pp. 128-132.
are involved in the judgment is evident through the mere asking of a question: Is this interpretation correct? What this question seeks is the evidence (the conditions) upon which the prospective answer will depend. So the question is conditioned (or dependent); and what it is conditioned by (or dependent on) is evidence. Now, in a judgment of historical fact, the initial historical question (the conditioned) is linked to the known evidence (the conditions), and an act of reflective insight grasps the fulfillment of the conditions. Put more concretely, historical problems and relevant pieces of evidence are linked by intelligent questions yielding accumulating insights. This linkage grows stronger as the pertinent questions are asked and answered. Finally, if there are no further pertinent questions, then the conditions are fulfilled, and it is reasonable to assert one's conclusions.

In our introductory remarks to the virtually unconditioned, we noted that by itself evidence does not compel assent. So a determination of the "sufficiency" of evidence requires more than knowledge of accumulated evidence. What is added to the known evidence is the reflective

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78 Another way of putting this—a question or hypothesis will be conditioned if arguments and/or evidence are required to prove it.

79 The basic formal components of a historical judgment are threefold: (1) the judgment is the conditioned; (2) its conditions are known; (3) the conditions are fulfilled. This formal structure applies not just to historical judgments but to all reasoned assertions. Insight, p. 280.
insight which grasps how the conditioning evidence "fits" the conditioned hypothesis. In historical judgments this "fit" is usually only approximate. This is so because historical information is incomplete, and the historian cannot rule out the possibility that further relevant questions may yet arise. But if his research has been thorough and his procedures intelligent, he will be making more than a stab in the dark when he asserts some conclusion. What he asserts is usually termed a probable judgment of fact. Why is it labelled "probable" rather than "certain"? Some expectation is present that the judgment and actual facts to which it refers may diverge. This expectation arises because the historian recognizes how incomplete his knowledge is. But he does not suspend judgment simply because his knowledge is incomplete. What was previously described as the self-correcting process of learning allows him to know when he is on the right track. At least it allows him to claim a mastery of the relevant issues and, therefore, to speak as one who can provide the

80 "On the other hand, the probable judgment results from rational procedures. Though it rests on incomplete knowledge, still there has to be some approximation towards completeness. Though it fails to reach the virtually unconditioned, still it has to be closing in upon that exigent norm. Thus, one may say that guesses are probably true only in the statistical sense of diverging non-systematically from true judgments; but probable judgments are probably true in the non-statistical sense of converging upon true judgments, of approaching them as a limit." Ibid., p. 300.
best available opinion of his day.  

In beginning this section we noted that two topics are usually associated with the broader issue of objectivity: evidence and verification. While both topics are treated above in our discussion of the virtually unconditioned, the topic of verification deserves a more explicit statement. Verification is usually said to be of propositions, i.e. of formulations of insight. But the act of verification comes at the end of a process which also includes previous adjustments of terms to understanding, and of understanding to accumulating evidence. Cognitional process contains these adjustments in various stages of development prior to the judgments which conclude that the conditioned and its conditions are linked and that the conditions are in fact fulfilled. To illustrate these stages

81 "In probable judgments the link is that insights are correct when there are no further pertinent questions and the fulfillment is some approximation of the self-correcting process of learning to its limit of familiarity and mastery." Ibid., p. 315. Our reference to historical judgments as probable judgments is not meant to be an identification. Certain judgments are possible, even likely, when uncomplicated topics are studied or when studies aim only to provide negative conclusions. But usually historical judgments belong to approximate interpretations of complex issues; hence, they are most often probable judgments.

82 "But judgments are the final products of cognitional process. Before the link between conditioned and conditions appears in the act of judgment, it existed in a more rudimentary state within cognitional process itself. Before the fulfillment of conditions appears in another act of judgment, it too was present in a more rudimentary state within cognitional process. The remarkable fact about reflective insight is that it can make use of those more
of development and, thereby, to clarify how historical judgments approximate to the virtually unconditioned, let us return to our earlier example of a historical monograph on the pre-Civil War cotton trade. The following stages in the production of this hypothetical monograph mark advances in the process of verification.

The monograph topic is usually entered into by way of a general question: "What was the economic condition of the cotton trade in these years—prosperous or in decline?" Further questions break down the general problem area into manageable segments: "How heavy were exports in 1850?"; "What market fluctuations have been preserved from the Charleston Exchange, and what do they reveal?" What these specific questions set up is a link between the narrowed segments and available materials. In an anticipatory way, these questions are already forging a link between the general problem area and studied materials.

On the basis of prior knowledge of antebellum economics, the historian may hypothesize that the cotton trade

rudimentary elements in cognitional process to reach the virtually unconditioned." Ibid., p. 281.

83 These links are formed in a rudimentary or tentative way. The historian intelligently anticipates that records of the Charleston Exchange will be important to his topic. However, the link is only tentative. Inverse insights may occur revealing that no relevant link exists. For example, recall our earlier question about levels of cotton production in newly planted areas west of the Mississippi. The materials relevant to this question were eventually uncoupled from the basic problem of an economic slump in 1850 because they did not help to explain why the slump occurred.
was basically sound and probably showed signs of continued advance. This tentative position will influence the historian's selective use of questions put to his materials. Stable or climbing prices paid both to producer and to exporter are a sign of prosperous economic conditions. So the historian's questions will be directed to evidence of price levels. Now the fact that his questions have this direction reflects an anticipation of how the fulfillment of conditions will occur. That is, he is at least expecting that, if the trade was economically prosperous, this is the way to prove it; namely, by charting price levels over a twenty-year period. Of course, verification requires that the price levels actually be stable in the short run and climbing in the long run. Exceptions which can be accounted for as isolated in their effects and short-term in their endurance will not require a major revision of the hypothesis. To discover and to estimate these exceptions is part of the self-correcting process of historical learning.

That self-correcting process involves coordinating with one another the insights into different yearly market conditions. Judgments have to be made on each year's economy, and then further judgments have to be made on the relation between yearly conditions and trends over two and three-year periods. All the judgments must be carefully

\[84\] That is, judgments not only link conditions to the
formulated so as not to claim more than the evidence warrants. Careful formulation is not automatically guaranteed; so, the historian must reflectively study his own expression. Does it correlate with his advancing understanding? Thus, another judgment is called for if the whole enterprise is not to falter over careless wording.

Gradually insights accumulate; market conditions for individual years are understood; the yearly reports are interrelated; and by now the historian is familiar with the evidence which grounds his understanding of both individual years and long-term trends. If he has made a competent study of relevant materials, his evidence may seem quite conclusive. The original question reappears: "What was the economic condition of the cotton trade in this twenty-year period—prosperous or in decline?" The historian's conviction is that the preponderance of evidence points to long-term economic prosperity. Then his question for reflection is, "Was the cotton trade in fact prosperous?" His previous work has linked the conditions (e.g. price levels and yearly market results) to the conditioned (i.e. the original question). He has understood the conditioned (e.g. price levels are a means of evaluating economic growth or decline), but they also link conditions to one another (e.g. the economic health of the cotton market in 1848 is matched by that of the previous year).

In order to avoid the complaint of a false disjunction, we should add, "or a period of mixed advances and declines?" No matter—the self-correcting process will allow for such indecisive results.
conditions and judged his grasp of them to be accurate since he has answered the relevant questions they suggested to him. The act of reflective understanding is spontaneously appropriate at this point. Do these known conditions provide a sufficient basis for the thesis that the cotton trade enjoyed economic health during these two decades? To this question for reflection the historian will reply, "Yes." He knows that price levels are essential indicators of economic health or decline, and he knows that the indicators point to his conclusion (i.e. the conditions of the conditioned are in fact fulfilled).

The key moment of verification lies in this move from the known indicators to the affirmed conclusion. The presupposition for actually effecting this transition is human rationality. This rationality is apparent in the immanent demand that the evidence be sufficient to support the conclusion. This demand (or inner exigence) comes to expression in the question for reflection. It is satisfied only when the questioner judges that his historical conclusion is probably true or is probably not true. By both asking and answering his question, the historian is performing as a rational subject. And what Lonergan's notion of the virtually unconditioned explains is how rational performance occurs. This notion provides an explanatory thematization of the formal elements of both verification

86 David Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, p. 129.
Critical Realism

After working out the relation between the virtually unconditioned and historical judgments, we are ready to elaborate the epistemology which is based on Lonergan's cognitional theory. Our starting point remains the same: the spontaneous performance of the subject. The notion of the virtually unconditioned both clarified the rational component of that performance and provided some guidelines for discussing claims to objective historical knowledge.

The starting point in cognitional performance is specifically curiosity. For our purposes, the starting point in historiographical performance is curiosity concretized in the question for historical intelligence. Chapter Three went to some length to prove that this question is the first stage of a formally dynamic process. To question is not an end in itself but a means to the end of acquiring knowledge. Questions yield insights which may or may not be relevant to what one is curious about. An act of reflective understanding is required to determine

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87Ibid., pp. 127-128 and 130. The term "rationality" has had multiple meanings in the history of Western philosophy. One benefit of Lonergan's virtually unconditioned is to explicate the form of rational performance which occurs prior to the development of theories about human reason. By relating the virtually unconditioned to various types of judgments, Lonergan argues the accuracy of this explanatory account of reason-in-act. Insight, pp. 281-315.
if one's understanding actually "fits" the topic under study. Eventually historical curiosity is satisfied about the particulars of a topic, i.e. the historian has managed to answer to his satisfaction all the questions for intelligence which occur to him. But there remains the possibility that his understanding of the whole is based on an arbitrary arrangement of the parts. So what is understood and formulated as a general interpretation must be analyzed for defects. The process which began with simple curiosity has taken many twists and turns. As a result, the verifying act of judgment has to be built out of numerous subordinate judgments affirming that the correlation of understanding, expression, and evidence is adequate.

As distinct from our previous cognitional issues, the key epistemological question now is, What is the historian affirming when he replies "Yes" to a question for reflection? Simply from a surface analysis of how historians speak, we can say that what is affirmed is the truth. The question for reflection is explicitly a question about truth: Is my interpretation of economic indicators true? To reply "Yes" is consequently to say, "I am affirming the truth of this interpretation." But since, as Aristotle remarked, the "true" can be said in many ways, we must be more precise in responding to the previous epistemological question.

In the first place, the historian's original questions
for intelligence were acts of intending, and what was intended was some content of his historical experience. His questions will suggest an imaginative scheme for relating the selected elements of his experience. The insights which are rudimentary in such an imaginative scheme will grow more precise as he continues to inquire. At some point he will attempt to formulate as a concrete supposition the direction which his insights have been taking. His thinking takes a turn then; what he intends is a formulated interpretation, and an exigence for reflection intervenes to ask, Is it true? Directly intended is the formulated interpretation and the evidence which grounds it; but indirectly, through the formulation and evidence, is intended a past reality, namely, the events which are interpreted.

88 As noted in the earlier analysis of how historical facts are related to historical data, components of the historian's historical experience are the historical "facts" which critical exegesis establishes. For example, the historian may accept another scholar's conclusion that certain documents bearing Lincoln's signature are authentic. His acceptance both makes those documents part of his professional experience and expresses his confidence and belief in a colleague's intellectual honesty and competence. For the role of belief in historical practices, see Marrou's The Meaning of History, pp. 301-316; Lonergan's Insight, pp. 703-705; and Method in Theology, pp. 43 and 233.

89 We have in mind here both the spontaneous curiosity of the historian (which Lonergan analyzes) and the poetic prefiguration of a historical field (which Hayden White analyzes). The collusion of these two basic processes yields an imaginative scheme of how events might have taken place. Initially the interconnections among events are vague and require more careful study.
What we learn from this process of historical intending is that historians do not reflectively posit the truth of historical data, nor do they affirm the validity of mere suppositions. Cognitional acts occur in a formally dynamic pattern. Historical curiosity moves historians from a study of authenticated materials to an understanding of how these materials fit into a larger context. The events referred to in the understood materials become an object of thought. That is, their occurrence and consequences are understood in relation to other components of the historian's accumulated knowledge. This adjustment of prior historical knowledge to new understanding shows up in the care with which the historian formulates a tentative conclusion or prospective judgment. Now the curiosity which moved him from limited contexts to an overview interrelating the parts into an intelligible whole expresses itself anew in a question for reflection. Presupposed is a rational commitment to affirm objects of thought for which there is reasonably compelling evidence. So his question is actually an intending of an object of thought which may or may not be true, i.e. may or may not be a historical fact.

Again, we are presupposing that the task of the critical historian is not merely to grasp the meanings conveyed by authors through written reports, but to understand how these reports belong to the broader context of "what was going forward" at some time in the past.
We began with the question, "What does the historian affirm when he replies 'Yes' to a question for reflection?"

Prior to his affirmation, he is intending (in the question for reflection) an object of thought and the evidence which prospectively "fulfills" or establishes the thought object as a historical reality. Note that what is intended is not merely an object of thought. The question for reflection intends both the conditioned (the historian's formulated interpretation) and the conditions (the known evidence about a past series of events). This act of intentionality, thus, transcends the questioner, i.e. it at least intends what may be understood and not simply the historian's present understanding. Now the "what" which is intended is only indirectly the past series of events. It is the character of past events to be past and therefore not present. Evidence (or "traces") constitutes what is present. But also present is the object of thought or formulated interpretation. In critical history, this thought object is not some thing but a meaningful reconstruction of events: their occurrence, consequences, and significance for the group. Thus, the question for reflection directly intends the thought object and the supporting evidence. But, if

91 An argument from historical language can support this claim. Questions asked by a historian are said to be "historical" questions, i.e. questions about what has been. If those questions only intended his present understanding, they would not be historical questions because there would be no reference, direct or indirect, to the past.
the thought object is affirmed to be true, then the act of judgment intends the series of events. This intending of the past is mediated by what the historian has understood by means of historical traces.

Our previous remarks on the virtually unconditioned help to clarify the mediating functions of both historical materials and historical understanding. A prospective judgment or proposed interpretation is the conditioned. It formulates the new discoveries and prior knowledge of the historian. The conditions are the evidence as understood and as judged relevant to the proposed interpretation. By judging them relevant, the historian has reflectively linked conditions to conditioned. So historical materials mediated his understanding of past events, and his understanding of the materials mediated his judgment that the materials supplied appropriate evidence about those past events. To reach the virtually unconditioned, 

How else would it be possible to make an erroneous historical judgment? Formulations or interpretations which had no reference beyond themselves could be neither true nor false. But historical interpretations refer directly to evidence or "traces." An incompetent use of evidence is likely to yield inadequate or even false historical judgments. Are historical errors then a matter of misunderstanding or misinterpreting evidence? But evidence is evidence of or about something other than itself. So interpretations of evidence are answers to questions about past events, and those answers are mediated by the evidence. Errors occur because one affirms answers to the wrong questions (i.e. the fallacy of the misplaced proof) or because one affirms answers which known or yet-to-be-known evidence refutes.

The "circularity" of these mediating moments of
another act of reflection must grasp the sufficiency of the known conditions for supporting the conditioned. Or, in other words, the known evidence must mediate an understanding that the formulated hypothesis is in fact verified by the amassed evidence. Then follows the judgment which affirms the correctness of the historian's understanding. What the judgment effects is a transformation of a tentative correlation of materials and understanding into a factual correlation.

What, then, is the historian affirming when he answers "Yes" to this last question for reflection? The conclusion we have arrived at is simply put: he is affirming a historical fact. But as in the case of the terms "introspection" and "detachment," many opinions have been expressed on what constitutes a historical "fact." Thus, we must be more explicit about the fact which is affirmed by historical judging.

Our earlier remarks on historical data and historical facts have covered some of the ground already. Historical facts are neither "givens" which historians find ready-made nor are they arbitrary constructs of historical imagination. historical understanding must be qualified by our earlier remarks on the hermeneutical circle. The historian learns something about past events by understanding the traces of those events; he learns something about the traces by understanding the events. But in the self-correcting process of learning, questions about past events can gradually isolate the pertinent materials, and those materials will suggest further questions which qualify or correct the prior historical understanding of past events.
Instead, they are constituted through multiple cognitional acts. Historical facts (for critical history) have the concreteness of an object of experience. They have the clarity of an object which is understood and precisely described. Finally, they have the conditional necessity of what approximates the virtually unconditioned, i.e. they might have been otherwise, but as historical events turned out, the facts cannot now be altered. Consequently, historical facts are past events and their consequences which are known through multiple intentional acts. Again, these past events and consequences are mediated by the evidence which the historian understands, by his formulation of that understanding, and by his rational affirmation that the meaning of his formulation is true.

These conclusions about historical facts presuppose an intrinsic relation of historical knowing to historical

94 For example, newly discovered notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci were proved authentic by testing the age of the paper and ink, and by establishing the correlation of handwriting in the new works with previously accepted works. These notebooks, then, are materials which the critical historian may take as concrete historical data.

95 The historian answers questions until the loose ends of his interpretation are tied down. He formulates his clarified understanding into a descriptive statement of what may have been the case.

96 For the notion of "conditioned necessity," see Insight, p. 331. The levels of intentional acts which yield compound facts are treated in Method in Theology, p. 202.
reality. Multiple intentional acts go beyond historical data to an intelligible arrangement and account of them. A further act of reflective understanding goes beyond what may be an accurate interpretation to an interpretation which is in fact true. That is to say, spontaneous cognitional acts which are self-assembling into compound acts of knowing are likewise a series of intendings which correlate historical materials, historical understanding (the object of thought or the historical interpretation), and historical events as what is known to have been the case. This process of correlation has two sides: cognitional acts assemble themselves into compound acts of knowing; cognitional intendings assemble their partial objects (what is intended) into a single compound object.97 The act of judgment which terminates the cognitional acts is a judgment about historical reality which is not simply given or merely supposed, but which is grasped through the mediation of traces, of formulated interpretations, and of the reflective act which links them.

What the preceding remarks imply is that the structure of knowing historical facts is similar to the structure of known historical facts. Lonergan's term for this similarity of structure (or of the relations among components of knowing and the known) is "isomorphism." The similarity

97 "Cognitional Structure," Collection, p. 228.
lies in the relations among components of different sets of terms. In our study of cognitional structure, the relations among intentional acts (or terms) were threefold. The assumption of isomorphism is that the threefold structure of knowing will be reproduced in a similar way as a threefold structure of the known. Is this assumption to remain merely an assumption or can it be justified?

Let us place arguments supporting this notion of isomorphism within a historical context. As Hayden White establishes, historians must make use of heuristic models if they are to approach intelligently the jumbled remains of past ages. He goes on to argue that the models are assumed as a matter of preference and are not theoretically justified in any compelling way. Consequently, if two historians operating with different models come to different conclusions about the same events, then they cannot resolve those differences. Relativism is unavoidable since there

98"Isomorphism, then, supposes different sets of terms; it neither affirms nor denies similarity between the terms of one set and those of other sets; but it does assert that the network of relations in one set of terms is similar to the networks of relations in other sets." "Isomorphism of Thomist and Scientific Thought," Collection, p. 142.

Philip McShane contrasts Lonergan's notion of isomorphism with other views in the history of philosophy. "This isomorphism is a far cry from that of logical atomism or that of Spinoza's ordo idearum est ordo rerum: it is not an isomorphism of propositional structure and fact or of ideas and fact; it is an isomorphism of the structured anticipation of knowing with the real as its object." Randomness, Statistics, and Emergence (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970), pp. 144-145. Cf. also ibid., pp. 252-255.
is no basis for mediating the differences.

But the notion of isomorphism poses a serious challenge to such a relativistic outlook. This notion makes explicit what is presupposed by every intelligent inquiry and reasonable argument. Each of the differing historians has an interpretation to propose and to defend as true. Each, therefore, presumes that intelligent arguments and reasonable judgments will produce a convincing proof of what actually happened in some segment of the past. But this presumption is precisely what is implied in the notion of isomorphism.

Each historian "means" what he says, and he means that what he says is a true account of past events. Now each historian's meaning is doubly-structured since it expresses what he understands about the past through the available traces. His meaning may be wrong, but it still is doubly-structured. And if cognitional process spontaneously moves through experience and understanding to judgment, this doubly-structured meaning will be either affirmed or denied by an answer to the question: Is this interpretation true? Hence, the performance of both historians has the same structure and what they mean has the same structure. That is, they mean to say that their understanding, based on the evidence, corresponds to what in fact was the case. The prospective historical fact is what they mean by their differing conclusions. Perhaps both conclusions
are not correct, but the notion of isomorphism scarcely requires that correctness. What the notion does make explicit is how the pattern of relations between the acts leading to a conclusion is similar in form to the pattern of relations between the contents of those acts, contents which constitute what is concluded, namely, the historical fact. Further, the notion of isomorphism provides

99 Insight, p. 399. In terms of the historical problem mentioned above, this structural similarity refers not to the variable historical models but to the way in which the contents of models are, first, anticipated and, then, actually achieved.

We stop short of investigating the metaphysical implications of the thesis of isomorphism. These implications are worked out in Insight as part of the transition from a latent to an explicit metaphysics. (Cf. pp. 399-401, 444-451, 502-509.) Our methodological interests do not require that we go beyond the earlier position quoted in footnote 98, i.e. isomorphism neither affirms nor denies similarity between the terms of one set of related acts and the terms of another set of related contents. This problematic and controversial area cannot be adequately explored without a lengthy inquiry carried out within an explicit metaphysics. Such an inquiry would carry us too far afield. However, in the diagram on the following page, we do take a metaphysical position. Our arguments for the thesis of isomorphism establish the similarity between the structural arrangement of one set of terms and the network of relations in other sets. Our diagram indicates this by means of unbroken vertical lines. In addition, broken horizontal lines indicate that there may be a similarity between the terms of one set and those of other sets. But we draw an unbroken horizontal line only in regard to the virtually unconditioned in relation to historical fact. We mean to indicate that the grasp of the virtually unconditioned (and not simply an approximation to it in a probable historical judgment) involves an identity between the knower and the known. In other cases (i.e. instances which fall short of the virtually unconditioned), this identity may be reached; at least such an identity cannot be ruled out until disconfirming evidence is available, is understood, and is affirmed.

Also in the diagram we indicate that the self-correcting process of human intelligence occurs between the empirical and intelligent levels of human interiority. This process moves in two directions (as symbolized by our arrows):
part of the basis for comparing the two ways in which two historians experienced, understood, and judged a historical interpretation to be correct. If they differ sharply in their conclusions, perhaps the origins of their differences can be uncovered by reviewing the interrelated acts and the interrelated contents yielding the two different claims to historical fact.

The argument for an isomorphism between knowing and the known can be briefly summarized. The basic assumption is that historical reality is what is reached through an affirmation of correct understanding. What would a denial of this assumption require? First, one would have to criticize the assumption for a failure to understand something either about the way historical events are accessible to us or about what historical facts are. Second, an alternate way of intelligently grasping historical knowing and historical facts would have to be proposed. Third, the alternate position and, hence, the denial of the former assumption would have to be affirmed as a reasonable conclusion. But this is to say that the assumption of isomorphism cannot be denied without an implicit contradiction between the denier's performance and his statements. 100 So the assumption of new experiences may challenge established opinions, new insights may make a difference in what one notices in the future.

100"Briefly, if the assumption that what is real is what is intelligently affirmed to be the case is to be challenged, it is to be challenged by an intelligent alternative or an intelligent criticism and the reasonable
DIAGRAM: ISOMORPHISM BETWEEN KNOWING AND THE KNOWN

The Structure of Interiority

Acts

Empirical

sensing
perceiving
imagining
(selectivity process)

Intelligent

inquiring (questions for intelligence)
hypothesizing (heuristic and constructive aspects)
insights (ecstatic aspect)
(discriminating aspect)

Rational

weighing of evidence (questions for reflection)
judgment of fact (reflective aspect)
grasp of virtually unconditioned

Historical Knowledge contents

historical data, "traces" (what is potentially intelligible)
formal evidence, tentative interpretations (what is formally intelligible)
actual evidence, affirmed interpretation (what is actually intelligible)
historical fact
isomorphism is justified; to deny it one must assume it.

The subheading for this part of Chapter Five was "critical realism." The previous analyses of the virtually unconditioned and of the isomorphism between knowing and the known entail an epistemological position which has been termed "critical realism." The basic epistemological position of critical realism is to identify the real with the true, the affirmed. In the history of philosophy, the real has also been identified with the sensible, the concrete body of external experience, the imaginable, the understood, the coherently hypothesized object of thought. But if cognitional process has its terminus in knowledge, and if knowledge is of the real, and if cognitional structure is a dynamic unity which is irreducible to one of its parts; then the real cannot be identified with anything short of the truly affirmed. Again, the isomorphism between knowing and the known entails that known realities be more than the sensed, the supposed or the understood. Rather, the cognitional acts of the knower assemble their partial objects (i.e. the intended sensible and intelligible objects) into single compound objects (i.e. the realities which are

conclusion, 'therefore it is not so': inevitably, then, the challenger assumes the position he challenged." Philip McShane, Randomness, Statistics, and Emergence, p. 255.

Lonergan relates these alternate philosophical positions to his epistemological stance, in Insight, pp. 411-425. Cf. also "Cognitional Structure," in Collection, pp. 231-236.
affirmed).

What does this epistemological position contribute to a study of historical realities? In the first place, our previous remarks on historical data and historical facts have obviously presupposed this position. But that is not to say that those remarks were made in advance of any proof. Both the above epistemological position and our remarks on historical facts are based on a theory of human cognition. If that theory is proved, and we take it to have been demonstrated in Chapter Three, then historical facts are not to be confused with data or hypotheses or some unrecoverable events of the past ("unrecoverable" because they are no longer observable). Historical facts are affirmed answers to questions for reflection—answers which approximate to, and in some cases reach, the virtually unconditioned.

In the second place, the identification of the real with what is or can be verified (i.e. the rationally affirmed) is based not on precritical preferences but on invariant cognitional structure. Thus, as opposed to Hayden

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102 Those remarks did not identify historical facts with the given materials of historical experience. Nor did they label as "facts" the formulated hypotheses or imaginative reconstructions of the historian. Rather, both materials and formulated insights were termed "means" to historical knowledge. Historical facts emerge when answers are given to questions for reflection. Since these answers are mediated by available materials and formulated meanings, they united prior cognitional acts and their contents into the affirmed historical reality.
White's position, we do not hold that this critical realism is a surface feature of our work which is predetermined by prior subjective variables. Instead, the argument for isomorphism links an already established cognitional theory to an epistemological thesis which, in turn, has implications for understanding how historical realism is practiced on the surface level. 103 This link is rationally based since the denial of isomorphism presupposes it as part of human knowing. And the thesis is affirmed because the conditions for it are fulfilled. 104

In the third place, the identification of the real with the true, the affirmed, allows us to conceive historical knowledge in a critical way. The implication is that other ways of conceiving historical knowledge can be criticized on adequate theoretical grounds. More important, the accepted epistemological position provides access to the sources of divergent views of historical knowledge and allows us to discover how mistakes were made. 105 Part of

103 Section four of this chapter will work out these implications. There our efforts will be directed toward the use of this epistemological position to criticize the "realism" of different historical perspectives.

104 Those conditions are the following: cognitional process assembles elementary acts of knowing into compound acts of knowing; acts of knowing, properly speaking, are irreducible to their component (elementary) parts; knowledge is of the real; there is an isomorphism between knowing and the known.

105 Given the assumption of isomorphism, the performance of the subject, both as intending and as knowing the real, is the standard for views of historical knowledge.
this process of criticizing divergent viewpoints will be attempted in the following subsection on historical objectivity.

**Types of Objectivity**

The purpose of this subsection is to relate viewpoints and problems of historical objectivity to the epistemological position of the preceding subsection. For an epistemology based on cognitional structure, objectivity will be envisioned as an explication of the patterned set of cognitional acts. Those acts occur in a self-correcting process which is both cyclic and cumulative. Accumulated insights serve as a basis for the refinement and adjustment of an individual's expression to the many-sided meaning which he supposes. Still, he can do better than merely to suppose. He intelligently argues and affirms that an interpretation is more than a supposition, it is historical fact. The claim, then, is to have established something that is independent of the individual's own personal likes or dislikes. Given the same evidence, critical techniques, and professional competence, he expects colleagues to come to the same conclusion.

This expectation is implicit in the individual's publication of his conclusions. He usually does not expect

The application of this standard is what Lonergan means by "dialectics." See *Method in Theology*, Chapter 10.
immediate agreement on all his points. He did not arrive at his conclusions in a single step. So in publicizing his results, he is subjecting his claims to renewed inquiry and critical judgment. This time the test of objectivity has a broader base. Others are likely to raise questions which he overlooked and which may be pertinent to his topic. Both he and his critics must answer them and evaluate their effect on earlier conclusions. So the verification process is repeated: new materials may be considered, new discoveries linked to original positions, and questions asked about how well the revised interpretation correlates with the evidence. What this indicates is that objectivity (or the public acceptance on critical grounds of some position) is parallel to the complexity of human knowing. 106

Because of this complexity and because there have been so many conflicting opinions on objectivity, we must approach the complex notion of objectivity by way of contrasts. First, historical judgments which are purportedly objective are judgments about historical objects. In section two of this chapter we argued that the primary historical objects were constitutive relationships or meanings. What becomes apparent, then, is that the term "object" has more than one meaning. In a world of lived immediacy, objects are simply encountered without puzzlement, without questions. The infant who reaches toward the bright

106 Insight, p. 375.
ceiling light and the exhausted runner who collapses on the grass after a race are encountering these immediate objects. But in order to talk about them, we must step back from this lived immediacy. Originally the objects are neither named nor described. To name and to describe them, we must understand them and reconstitute them as meanings. Then our expressions signify that an immediate object is what is already-out-there-now-real.\textsuperscript{107} The immediate object is what is meant by these expressions. In contrast to its primary status as what-is-simply-encountered, the immediate object as signified as an object in a world mediated by meaning.

The object as mediated by meaning is what is puzzled over and questioned. It is what becomes understood, affirmed, and settled as a matter-of-fact by answers. The questioner is related to it immediately by his question and only indirectly or mediatelty by the procedures which yield answers to questions. Thus, in historical inquiries past events are intended by questions, but answers are reached by studying the traces of those events. The answers

\textsuperscript{107}"But in the world mediated by meaning one can recollect and reconstitute the object of the world of immediacy. It is already, out, there, now, real. It is already: it is given prior to any questions about it. It is out: for it is the object of extraverted consciousness. It is there: as sense organs, so too sensed objects are spatial. It is now: for the time of sensing runs along with the time of what is sensed. It is real: for it is bound up with one's living and acting and so must be just as real as they are." Method in Theology, p. 263.
are directly based on the evidence, but indirectly they refer to the past events because they are answers to questions. Historical objects are, therefore, objects mediated by meanings.

Just as there are at least two meanings for the term "object," so there are at least two meanings for the term "objectivity." The standard for objectivity in a world of lived immediacy is the successful satisfaction of animal needs. Food satisfies hunger, the ingestion of edible objects lying ready-to-hand fills that need. But things become more complex in a world mediated by meaning. There is the experiential objectivity of monuments, artifacts, and documents which survive from the temporal past into the temporal present. Their objectivity depends on their "givenness," i.e. they are not created by individuals in the present but are inherited from past generations.

There is the normative objectivity of historical evidence and of historical understanding developed on the basis of research and of intelligent procedures. This type of

108 Ibid., pp. 262-263.

109 Our inclusion of historical evidence under the topic of normative objectivity presupposes our earlier arguments in regard to the determination of the historical character of "given" materials. To say of something that it is "historical evidence" is already to classify what is given and to anticipate how it will be related to other historical pieces of information. Therefore, the selectivity process has already begun, and the question can be raised: Has the historian been attentive and intelligent in his selectivity?
objectivity is constituted by the spontaneous desire to know. That desire produces methodical procedures which specify how one can achieve knowledge in a particular field. The developed procedures and canons are the publicly available standards for the individual's performance. Failure to ask the relevant questions, misuse or oversight of pertinent materials, proposals which express private wishes rather than solidly based insights—these invite public censure. And the basis for this censure is the expectation that there is a right way (a normative way) of proceeding with investigations.

There is the absolute objectivity achieved by reaching the virtually unconditioned. In this third instance, the results of experiential and normative objectivity are combined. Experiential objectivity supplies the fundamental limits within which historical evidence is selected and understood. Normative objectivity supplies the intelligible connections between evidence and the historical thesis. This combination produces a thesis which in fact has its conditions fulfilled or which most probably has its conditions fulfilled.110

A further complexity must be introduced. Not only insights but also judgments accumulate. Spontaneous curiosity can be attentive to a limitless number of problems—

110 Method in Theology, p. 263. Other sources for these distinctions among types of objectivity are Insight, pp. 377-383; and "Cognitional Structure," in Collection, pp. 229-231.
but not at the same time. A shifting attention which is intellectually motivated does not simply discard past experiences and insights in a concern to "see" the latest novelty. Instead, the attentive subject moves to new experiences with a wealth of past experiences, acts of understanding, and judgments. Particularly these past judgments provide a reservoir of reliable positions from which to develop new insights and modes of investigation. Thus, for example, the scientist develops competence in his laboratory techniques. His past experiences and achieved understanding guide his present work. Techniques which he has found useful and results which he has confirmed as highly probable under controlled circumstances are the basis for new experiments. This collection of sedimented understanding and affirmed conclusions is trusted by the scientist. He makes use of it without repeating all the earlier tests and calculations. Consequently, his scientific performance presupposes a patterned context of prior judgments. Lonergan locates the primary notion of objectivity within such a context. This fourth distinction introduced into the notion of objectivity can be both defended and exemplified in historiographical procedures.

111 Martin Heidegger has analyzed the curiosity of the everyday conversationalist. His concise and devastating descriptions of idle talk (Gerede), curiosity (Neugier), and ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit) are presented in Being and Time, pp. 211-219.

112 Insight, pp. 375-377.
In a number of places, we have argued that historians do not come to their work empty-headed. What they do bring with them is likely to be an assortment of prejudices, untested opinions, and gleanings from the works of other historians. This uneven collection of resources belongs to the relative horizon of the historian. But continued research and inquiry can produce replacements for these initial presuppositions. Throughout his professional career the historian accumulates a vast array of technical and not so technical information. Along the way he makes many judgments which future inquiries will presuppose and go beyond. What does he say about his earlier conclusions? Does he say they are merely more opinions piled on top of the opinions which he held at the start of his career? No, he repeatedly makes cross-references between present projects and past conclusions. For the most part the latter are settled and provide a test for new results. But this is to affirm that new conclusions—as individual historical judgments—are usually subordinated to the accumulated and interrelated judgments referred to by the primary notion of objectivity.

113 We do not want to imply that a basic horizon could not evidence an equally varied assortment. Typically the undifferentiated basic horizon will contain a mixed collection of vague opinions about human knowing and about what can be known.

114 We say "usually subordinated" because new discoveries and new sources of information may require revisions within that context of earlier judgments. Again, historical
The value of the preceding distinctions in the term "objectivity" becomes apparent when one confronts less complex views of objectivity. Hayden White notes that nineteenth-century historians proposed conflicting accounts of historical knowledge. Involving these conflicting accounts were varying opinions about historical objectivity. Eager to place history on the high plateau of the natural sciences, some historians identified historical objectivity with the experiential type. In doing so, they manifested a misunderstanding of the performance of the empirical scientist and confused one aspect of historical objectivity with the whole complex notion. Historians of an idealist school of thought supposed that objectivity was a matter of coherence in one's system of thought. They recognized that one could not "see" the past. Rather, there were the data recorded in documents and the historical interpretations constructed upon them. These constructions were products of the mind, a mind which developed coherent symbolic judgments in most cases approximate to but do not reach the virtually unconditioned. Further relevant questions may have been overlooked, and so probable historical judgments are just that—probable—and not certain.


116 For example, Fustel de Coulanges wrote, "'History is a science; it does not imagine, it only sees....'"

"'The historian...seeks facts and attains them by the minute observation of texts, as the chemist finds his in the course of experiments conducted with minute precision.'" Quoted in C. V. Langlois and C. Seignobos, *Introduction to the Study of History* (New York: Henry Holt, 1925), p. 216, Footnote 1.
universes but was not capable of grasping past events. Here the idealist mistakes normative objectivity for the complex notion of objectivity.

How is the complex notion of objectivity related to these alternate views of historical objectivity? First, because it is a notion parallel to the complexity in human knowing, it allows one to determine in what sense these alternate epistemological views are correct and in what sense they are false. What they affirm is correct: there is an experiential component and there is a normative component in historical objectivity. Historical data provide a field within which evidence is selected; the immanent demand for a coherent correlation among evidence, insights, and expression produces an imaginative reconstruction of past events. But these views are mistaken in what they exclude. Just as knowing is not simply a matter of sensing, so objectivity is more than careful observation. Just as knowing is not simply a matter of understanding what is experienced, so objectivity is more than expressing insights into available materials. The historian has to determine whether or not these insights are plausible; he not only links them together in a coherent fashion, he also wants to know whether his elaborate reconstruction is true. So this complex notion of objectivity is a critical standard for the alternate views of objectivity.

[117] *Method in Theology*, p. 239.
But objections will be forthcoming. To the exper-
iential component of objectivity one may object that there
is no independently given historical datum. Now, depending
on how one conceives the givenness of historical data, one
will either accept or qualify this objection. Quite liter-
ally there is no isolated given which is reached through a
pure sensible receptivity, i.e. a receptivity which wholly
precedes interpretative processes. 118 \hspace{1em} But equally so, the

118 This point is argued at some length by Israel
Scheffler in Science and Subjectivity, Chapter 2, pp. 21-44.

Our earlier arguments against the possibility of pre-
suppositionless history are applicable to the radical view
of a pure historical given. Historical data which stand in
more than a purely potential relation to a subject (i.e. are
yet to be noticed) are already classified as "historical,"
and their connections with the subject's prior framework
and prior historical understanding are already drawn in an
anticipatory way (i.e. the anticipatory way in which speci-
fic questions probe for certain possible answers).

Our previous arguments for the qualification of Lon-
ergan's concept of potential historical evidence presupposed
that one could distinguish between data and evidence. Poten-
tial data are the given as given, e.g. a painting is observed
when we enter a room, but we must approach it in order to
discern what it is a painting of. By noticing the paint-
ing in the first place, we have organized a field of vision
which also may include furniture, lamps, other wall hang-
ings. But by a conscious effort we focus our attention on
a particular item and proceed to discern the features of the
given item. Our attention is selective, and so the surround-
ing furniture, etc., "recedes" as a given but undisting-
guished environment.

Evidence, however, refers not to the intended object
alone but to the constellation of questions and of prior
knowledge which we bring to our selective inspection of the
painting. Before we are interested in it and ask about its
origins or historical significance, it is not evidence--
even in a potential way. The basic argument remains the
same: historical evidence presupposes (1) the selectivity
process, and (2) the basis for selectivity; namely, a sub-
ject's interests and inquiry originating in historical con-
sciousness. Given data are not potential historical evi-
dence because what makes them "historical" is not a poten-
tial but an actual relation to historical interests and in-
quiries.
historian does not create the materials which he finds already preserved in archives.

Unless one identifies historical research with staring at archival stacks, the historical objects of research will be more than simply given. As noted in Chapter Two, history is a problem-solving discipline. Therefore, historical research is always about something; indiscriminate potential data are always differentiated when they belong to historical projects. Prior to that differentiation (i.e. the selectivity process), potential historical data are diffuse. The archival stacks (i.e. the undifferentiated field of givens) contain differences, but insofar as the materials simply lie there and are not part of some present project, the differences are unnoticed. Now just as historical research is always about something, so too historical evidence is always evidence for some problem or question of historical interest. We must conclude, then, that the given as given is first of all a negative concept, i.e. it is the basis for avoiding solipsism; and, second, it is a residue which remains after one subtracts from the precise question about the given: (1) the descriptive terms used to indicate the given, (2) the categories or classifications expressed by those terms (e.g. historical entity); (3) the insights on which one's classification is based.119

119"Again, the given is residual and, of itself, diffuse. It is possible to select elements in the given and to indicate them clearly and precisely. But the selection
What this subtraction leaves is an "object" of the world of immediacy. If it remains in that world, such an object is neither named nor described. But this indicates that historical objects always belong to a world of mediated meanings. Marks on paper, papers on shelves, stones on top of stones—these are not given historical objects. But set an intelligent historian to work on them, and he will constitute them as historical by classifying them in relation to other historical objects. His classification depends on his antecedent framework of adopted concepts and modes of explanation, but that framework requires content. Only experience provides that. Consequently, there is a distinct place for the notion of experiential objectivity.

and indication are the work of insight and formulation, and the given is the residue that remains when one subtracts from the indicated:

(1) the instrumental act of meaning by which one indicates,
(2) the concepts expressed by that instrumental act,
(3) the insights on which the concepts rest.

Hence, since the given is just the residue, since it can be selected and indicated only through intellectual activities, of itself it is diffuse; the field of the given contains differences, but in so far as they simply lie in the field, the differences are unassigned." Insight, p. 382.

Israel Scheffler has aptly summarized the relation between categories of meaning and experiential content.

"Categorization does not, in other words, decide the forms of distribution which items will in fact display, nor does it, in itself, determine the categorial assignments of any particular item or class of items yet to be encountered. Such special anticipations may, however, be expressed by suitable hypotheses. Categorization provides the pigeonholes; hypothesis makes assignments to them." Science and Subjectivity, p. 38.

The content of historical experience is identified
Objections may be voiced against the normative component of objectivity. Historians are often dependent on the preserved statements of contemporaries to past events. Those statements are based on actual observations of past events. So long as there is no reason to suspect deception, those statements are the objective standard for the subsequent works of historians. In the absence of trustworthy eyewitness accounts, historical objectivity is impossible. 122

A twofold reply can be made to this objection. First, the meaning of any preserved statement depends on the context in which it was made. 123 Eyewitnesses to a Pharoah's

with neither an undifferentiated, sensibly confronted given nor a wholly constructed datum. Rather, historical frameworks provide antecedent guidelines for distinguishing and correlating historical data. At the same time, they do not supply the data, nor do they determine what particular tentative connections will be made. Experience supplies the data, and the process of discovery leads to hypothetical arrangements of historical materials.

122 J. W. Meiland radicalizes this line of argumentation. Objective historical conclusions are reached by correlating evidence in the present with events in the past. But one can establish a correlation only by observing those past events. Since this is no longer possible, historical objectivity is impossible. The obvious presupposition here is that historical judgments must be based on "seeing" the past. J. W. Meiland, Scepticism and Historical Knowledge (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 113-120.

123 D. H. Fischer cites some obvious examples of this truism. "The statement that a Norman army defeated a Saxon army at Hastings in 1066 is meaningless without reference to a map of England, and also to our calendar. For a Moslem, the same event has the different date of 459." Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, p. 63.
conquest have left inscriptions which exaggerate enormously the numbers of the vanquished and the amount of plunder taken. There is a literal meaning to these inscriptions and a figurative one. Both have a historical significance. The historian must draw upon his prior knowledge and his sense of the plausible to distinguish the two. And this discriminating process requires something belonging to the second part of our reply. To assume that primary historical sources provide the major standard of objectivity, simply because they preserve eyewitness accounts, compounds a basic confusion of knowing with seeing. 124

Primary sources may contain factual statements, but not merely because the writers were eyewitnesses. They had to be attentive to what was going on; they had to understand not every detail of the events but those aspects which then appeared significant. They had to formulate

124 Lonergan works out the steps through which this basic confusion develops until one reaches the point where objectivity appears to be a matter of knowing-through-looking. In "Cognitional Structure," Collection, pp. 232-233.

A further example of this basic confusion occurs in an article by John Brooke, "Namier and Namierism," in Studies in the Philosophy of History, pp. 108-109. The author draws an analogy between our observations of constellations among stars and the patterns of historical "facts" woven by the historian. Just as constellations are relative in appearance to the place of the observer, so patterns of historical interpretation are relative to the standpoint of the historian. Consequently, historical objectivity is impossible. The thesis of perspectivism accounts for relativity in historical interpretations without excluding the possibility of objectivity. The cited example does exclude this possibility because it presupposes historical knowing is like seeing.
their recollections. All this requires more than a look. So, too, critical history makes a discriminating use of primary sources. What did the writers mean? What were they capable of witnessing and what is interpolation? How well does what they say correlate with what is already known about the reported events? What consequences have occurred after those events which were not reported by the same eyewitnesses but certainly altered the significance of the events? These questions proceed from a dynamic intelligence seeking to understand materials and to relate them to a broader context. Both the original production of those materials and a subsequent critical use of them required the operations of direct and reflective understanding. Thus, there is a distinct place for the normative component of objectivity. It is not identified with an experienced there-ness (the observable) but with the distinct level of cognitional acts termed "intelligence."

To the absolute notion of objectivity, one may object that historical procedures are never carried out in isolation from prior preconceptions and values. Historians have no set rules to follow which guarantee unbiased results. They must be selective, and, hence, implicit prejudices can affect what use is made of materials and of professional techniques. The historical understanding which is achieved will be too incomplete, too thoroughly rooted in individual preferences to be considered objective. Any
judgments passed on such understanding will be merely re­assertions of the basic preferences which guided the inquiry from the start.

Two responses can be made to this loosely knit set of objections. First, there is the response which distinguishes between the psychology of historical interpretation and the logic of historical interpretation. There is no denial that, in order to be selective, the historian must evaluate and the basis for his evaluation may be variable preferences, even distorting biases. This predetermined selectivity affects what questions he asks, but it does not necessarily affect how well he answers them. Moreover, the answers that he does achieve have yet to be transformed from hypothesis to fact. So psychological blocks to correct understanding must not merely be possessed by the historian, they must be applied at different levels of his work. They must interfere not only with the questions he asks but also with the procedures which clarify

125 Morton White makes use of this distinction to criticize the historical relativism of Charles Beard. Cf. "Can History Be Objective?" in The Philosophy of History in Our Time, p. 199.

126 "When we ask whether historical inquiry is value free, however, our chief concern should not be with this kind of variability. For the different evaluations of historians involved in their decision to ask different questions will be ingredient, not in their inquiry, but in their choice of it. It is when historians give different answers to the same questions that the problem of objectivity within the inquiry can be said to arise." William H. Dray, Philosophy of History, p. 30.
and interrelate and finally pass judgment on answers to those questions. 127 Given the conclusion of Chapter Four on the possibility of detachment from bias, we may conclude that such a recurrence of blocks to historical understanding and to rational thinking may turn up, but that it will not happen of necessity. Broadly used, the logic of historical interpretation is concretized in both internal and external restraints on perduring distortions of intelligence.

For example, the historian's education involves a process of internalizing techniques for checking the reliability of materials. Such a technique may be manifested in the simple question: Does what this author say in his autobiography seem suspiciously self-serving? Now the historian may initially be suspicious of his subject's expressed motivation; however, suspicions have to be confirmed, and the historian must be careful not to allow any personal antipathy to hasten his judgment. Even if antipathy does get in the way, there are external restraints on its effects in the individual's work. Once published, that work will be liable to the criticism of other historians more sympathetic to the author of the autobiography.

127 Lonergan cites a number of authors who agree that there are critical procedures which caeteris paribus lead to objective historical knowledge. These public procedures offer a measure of control over the variables of personal preference. Hence, it is easier to locate and to remedy mistakes. Cf. Method in Theology, p. 196.
They may be able to marshal evidence and arguments against the individual historian's negative judgments.

There is the objection that absolute objectivity is a notion foreign to historical work because that work is always incomplete. The presupposition here is that one cannot know anything until one knows everything. An ideal of the unconditioned is thus set up: an objective judgment is one based on a grasp of all there is to be understood. This ideal can only be reached through a total understanding which leaves no further questions. Short of this total comprehension, there is only partial understanding joined with partial incomprehension. Historical interpretations are open to revision, and hence, are never objective, i.e. definitive.

But our second response points out that absolute objectivity has been conceived in terms of the virtually unconditioned. That is, a judgment of historical fact affirms, not the whole of history, but a single conditioned having a finite number of conditions which are in fact fulfilled. Historical judgments are, thus, limited commitments to specific problem areas. It is enough that other

128 Ernest Nagel finds a corollary to this presupposition in the metaphysical doctrine of the internality of all relations. Applied to history, this doctrine condemns every historical work as a mutilation of past events. But the same condemnation will have to be extended to science also. "The Logic of Historical Analysis," The Philosophy of History in Our Time, p. 209.

129 Insight, pp. 342-343.

130 Ibid., p. 345.
historians can go over the same evidence, can make the same connections between evidence and thesis, and can judge the results. Historical events are contingent and, for the most part, unique occurrences. But a true affirmation of them is not relative to the one who affirms. All of which is a way of saying that the virtually unconditioned is a basis for the public nature of historical knowledge. Thus, the absolute objectivity of the unconditioned is part of historical work.

Before concluding this section of the chapter, we should comment on the issue of objectivity in relation to ethical commitments. Hayden White considers this issue under the heading of "ideological implications of one's view of historical knowledge." Burckhardt's view of knowledge as "pure seeing" is cited as an example of reactionary political thinking. Charles Beard was aware of similar ideological implications in the "scientific" school of historiography founded by Ranke. "Written history that was cold, factual, and apparently undisturbed by the passions of the time served best the cause of those who did not want to be disturbed."

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131 Ibid., p. 378.
132 Metahistory, pp. 233-237.
133 Charles A. Beard, "Written History as an Act of Faith," The Philosophy of History in Our Time, p. 142.
Hayden White arrives at a similar conclusion. "But objective history, like impressionist art, was a bourgeois phenomenon, the history of the middle class; and in refusing
the complex notion of objectivity? Does the notion of the virtually unconditioned serve party interests?

First of all, the complexity of the notion of objectivity is parallel to the complexity of human knowing. Therefore, this notion has a basis in the performance presupposed by every developed school of thought. The basic epistemological position (namely, that the real is reached by intentional acts terminating in an affirmation of the true, the verified) is likewise derived from an analysis of cognitional performance. The major implication of all this is that historical objectivity is not derived from some external criterion or control which, when accompanied by a passionless devotion or a pure seeing, guarantees factual conclusions. Rather, historical objects belong to a world mediated by meaning and motivated by value. As a result, objective historical judgments are reached only through a subjectivity which develops and adheres to its own spontaneous attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility. Put another way, objectivity is a consequence of authentically developing subjectivity.134

to judge the past, the objective historian begged, like Burke, to escape a judgment of himself." Translator's Introduction, "On History and Historicism," in Carlo Antoni's From History to Sociology, p. xxiii.

134Method in Theology, p. 265. The criterion of authenticity applies to both surface and deep levels. It is the absence of contradictions between what a person says about his performance and what that performance actually is. Therefore, intellectual conversion is required. It is the willingness of the person to conform his procedures
The notion of the virtually unconditioned as the basis of objectivity does not imply necessary truths in history but only judgments of fact. Historians operate on a number of levels of factualness. There are recommendations that historians confine themselves to an exact description of what happened. Given this limitation, historical facts are the reconstruction of what actually happened. But, as argued previously, critical history constructs narratives explaining what was going forward in the past. Therefore, evaluative interpretations are made; significant acts and their consequences are isolated on the basis of criteria consistent with the historian's view of historical advance or decline. The employment of such evaluative criteria presupposes a speculative philosophy of history. Though we cannot digress from the analytic and methodological concerns of this dissertation in order to elaborate such a speculative system, we can briefly to the precepts made explicit through intellectual conversion. Therefore, intellectual responsibility or moral conversion is required.

Since our concern is for the methodological aspects of historical practice, we do not take up the issue of moral responsibility in the non-technical areas of everyday living. However, what is said of intellectual responsibility in regard to the scholar can also be applied to his decisions concerning non-specialized courses of action. Authentic subjectivity is not isolated in a single area of a person's life. Therefore, the same formal maxim applies in both technical and non-technical areas of human living: What one knows should guide one's decisions, so as to make one's doing consistent with one's knowing. We will return to this maxim later in this chapter.
indicate that previous chapters contained two implications for such a speculative philosophy.

First, the reactionary conservatism of Burckhardt's view of human knowing is shown to be misguided. Historical facts are not simply given, but require the intelligent and rational intervention of the historian. So, too, the theory of history which denies the possibility of objective historical knowledge usually contains a basic confusion about historical knowing. This confusion breeds a suspicion that historians are only the artists of a past age and that they contribute no useful insights for contemporary decisions and actions. But a differentiated basic horizon reveals criteria for evaluating the historical acts of past figures. Not only oversights but also the stubborn maintenance of obscurantist positions become manifest. And, in terms of what cognitional performance ought to be, these historical positions are negatively criticized and their future repetition is warned against.

Second, some criteria of historical progress and of historical decline can be proposed. If human authenticity is envisioned as a responsible commitment to the desire to know, then cultures which favor intellectual adventures can be said to be advancing in at least part of their life. On the other hand, closed societies (particularly totalitarian

135 Burckhardt shared this suspicion with others and felt no obligation to participate actively in efforts to change his society. Cf. *Metahistory*, p. 243.
states) can be criticized for thwarting the spontaneous intellectual life of their members. There are many factors to social prosperity besides intellectual freedom. But the absence of intellectual maturity guarantees a lessening ability to respond to the crises encountered by every society. Eventually favorable military, economic, geographical, and agricultural factors will be offset by the unwillingness of subjects or citizens to respond to crises in a cooperative and rational way.

Previous compromises of intellectual responsibility can gradually compound their effects until objectivity is labelled a "myth" and prejudice is said to be all-pervasive and unconquerable. Then the willingness of individuals to respond to social crises in a cooperative way will be rationalized by a widespread belief that human planning and decisions cannot affect the outcome of onrushing events. All of which is a way of saying that the issues of objectivity and critical thinking are not abstruse problems fit only for the classroom or scholarly journal. Rather, their social and ethical implications turn up as part of contemporary problems.

In summary, this third section has taken the first step in supplying an epistemological basis for determining the realism of different conceptions of history. A basic epistemological position has been derived from human cognitive structure. In the following section, it will be
used to criticize claims to historical realism.

Central to our epistemological study was the issue of historical objectivity. We approached this complex issue by first treating the component issues of historical evidence and verification. Historical evidence is usually proposed as a bulwark against solipsism and arbitrary reconstructions of the past. But what is meant by historical evidence is not immediately clear. To clarifying its meaning, we indicated certain preconditions to historical evidence: the classifying function of historical intelligence, the specific question which anticipates an intelligibility in the evidence. These preconditions were the basis for our thesis that historical evidence is always formal evidence. An understanding of the evidence is usually formulated in a hypothetical proposition requiring verification. The process of verifying statements is usually said to require a "sufficiency" of evidence. However, this is another term which is not immediately clear.

Since evidence by itself does not compel assent, there must be another element to the verification process. Lonergan's distinction between acts of direct understanding and acts of reflective understanding allows this other element to become manifest. Direct insights provide tentative organizations of historical events; reflective insights determine how well direct insights, their expression, and the known evidence correlate with one another.
But the concept of "correlation" needs more precision. That precision is supplied by an explanatory thematization of reason-in-act: the virtually unconditioned. We worked through the various steps by which historical judgments approximate to the virtually unconditioned: the conditioned, the known conditions, the links between them, and the act of reflective understanding which grasps the fulfillment of the conditions. So that this explanatory form of the verification process would not seem purely formal, we exemplified how it might work in a hypothetical instance.

Among other functions, the notion of the virtually unconditioned gives a clear insight into the rational component of cognitional performance. This insight was crucial for making the transition from cognitional theory to epistemology. Rational performance occurs in the question for reflection, and the epistemological concern is for what an answer to such a question affirms. We gradually deepened our analysis of the "affirmed." On the level of ordinary speaking, the affirmed is the true. But what is true is, in the first place, a formulated meaning and, in the second place, one's grasp of the interpreted events. Historical affirmations do not take as their object historical data or historical suppositions. What is affirmed is historical fact.

Again, we have a concept requiring clarification. Historical facts are neither given nor arbitrary constructs
(i.e. purely imaginative descriptions). They emerge when answers to questions establish a correlation between an object of thought (the conditioned meaning) and known evidence (the conditions). And since the questions intend past events, the answers are mediations of past events and their consequences. There are two poles to every mediation. In regard to historical facts, there is the side of the knower: cognitional acts assemble themselves into compound acts of historical knowing. There is also the side of the known: cognitional intendings assemble partial objects (what is intended) into a single compound object.

What is the relationship between these two poles? The thesis of isomorphism is Lonergan's response: the structure of historical knowing is similar to the structure of known historical facts.

The thesis if isomorphism is an explicit link between Lonergan's cognitional theory and his critical realism. The validity of the thesis is established by a rather simple argument: to deny it, one must presume it. This conclusion entails the basic epistemological position of critical realism, namely, the real is to be identified with the true, the affirmed. In respect to historical questions, historical reality is what is reached through an affirmation of correct understanding. Put another way, historical facts are affirmed answers (meanings) to questions for reflection—answers which approximate to and sometimes reach
the virtually unconditioned. That same virtually unconditioned was exemplified implicitly by the steps taken to reach this point. The basic position of critical realism was the conditioned; its conditions belonged to the "deep structure" of cognitional performance. The thesis of isomorphism linked the two, and our argument for the validity of the thesis proved that the conditions were fulfilled.

The affirmed epistemological position was crucial to our clarification of historical objectivity. It allowed us to form a notion of objectivity parallel in its complexity to the complexity of human knowing. Just as there is more than one meaning for the term "object," to too "objectivity" has multiple meanings. The primary meaning remains that of a patterned context of judgments, and we exemplified this in both scientific and historical learning. The experiential, normative, and absolute meanings or types of objectivity were clarified. More significantly, we argued the usefulness of these distinct types by contrasting them with less complex views of objectivity. Arguments or objections based on these less complex views were made against the complex notion of objectivity. Since a basic epistemological thesis has been affirmed, our responses to the objections were more than tentative. But in a sense the responses were only introductory to the more complex problems of the following section. Those responses exemplify an application of critical realism to problems of objectivity.
The next section extends that application to issues of historical realism, a science of history, and a strategy for resolving the theoretical impasse of the crisis of historicism.
The primary goal of this section is to manifest how an epistemology based on cognitional structure offers a test of historical realism. The discussion will be conducted initially in terms of the relation of history to science. This way of proceeding is justified because claims of superiority for one historical perspective over others have usually been phrased in terms of a science of history. That is, one conception of history is superior to or more "realistic" than others because it approximates to scientific methods and results.\textsuperscript{136} This phrasing of the issue will eventually be qualified. What will remain intact is the basic assumption that historical realism can be determined only on the basis of a critical method. Because of fundamental differences between science and history, the needed critical method cannot be "borrowed" from the natural sciences. But, as argued already in Chapter Three, there is an explanatory technique which is not derived from but rather grounds scientific methods. Thus, the initial problematic will be rephrased: How does transcendental method

\textsuperscript{136}In Chapter Three, we noted how some schools of historical thought attempted to model their own procedures upon methods in the natural sciences. We also noted the revolt initiated by Dilthey against this imposition of an extraneous ideal. The relationship between history and science, even if it is not one of imitation, must be clarified. Hence, the problem of historical realism will first be placed within the context of this relationship.
function as a critical hermeneutical measure of historical realism?

History and Science: Similarities and Differences

Hayden White's study of nineteenth-century historians outlines the troubled relationship between history and science. In the first place, even among those who advocate a scientizing of history, there is no consensus on what a science of history would be.137 Multiple conceptions of scientific history were advanced in the nineteenth century, but no compelling theoretical reasons established the superiority of one or more conceptions over the rest.138 Some historians concluded that the search for a scientific history was misguided in the first place. White's own conclusion is that the demand for the scientizing of history is but the statement of a prior, precritical preference.139

137 Metahistory, pp. 12-13. Although Hayden White employs the term "scientization" to describe the process of modeling historical procedures on scientific practice, we prefer the term "scientizing." Our reasons are twofold: first, to avoid an unnecessary neologism, and second, to indicate that the "modeling process" is an ongoing process of assimilation—at least as an ideal.

138 Hegel, Marx, Ranke are mentioned as representative figures of different schools of scientific history. Ibid., pp. 432-433.

139 In his own words: "the demand for the scientization of history represents only the statement of a preference for a specific modality of historical conceptualization, the grounds of which are either moral or aesthetic, but the epistemological justification of which still remains to be established." Preface to ibid., p. xii. J. Juizinga has argued similarly for a preferential basis to the desire for
And even among those who "prefer" to do scientific history, there will be different conceptions of what constitutes a science of history--different conceptions again manifesting different preferences.

A study of nineteenth-century historiography, therefore, yields contrasting viewpoints about both the relation of history to science and the determination of historical realism. White identifies one of the key underlying problems to both of these disputed areas. No agreement has been reached over what should count as a specifically historical datum. Those who sought to make history a science recognized that historians did not investigate the same things as scientists studied. Instead, they hoped to study their own field in a scientific way, i.e. they were to borrow methods and not objects from the scientific field. But what was not forthcoming was a consensus on the proper field of objects for methodical historical investigation. So, the preliminary step to be taken is to distinguish historical objects from the objects of other sciences. Obviously such a distinction cannot be made from within the historical field. What is needed is a metahistorical basis for distinguishing natural and peculiarly historical phenomena.140 We can advance toward such a distinction by

140"The resolution of this problem requires a metatheory, which will establish on metahistorical grounds the
considering in more detail the differences between history and the natural sciences.

Specific differences between the two fields of inquiry emerged because of a controversy. One party to the controversy was represented by J. B. Bury's confident declaration: "history is a science, no less and no more;..." The other party took as its motto Goethe's maxim, "Individuum est ineffabile." The latter group argued for the primacy of individualizing description over the generalizing classifications of the natural sciences. Human activities of historical significance were unique events and not the expression of a constant ahistorical human nature. The implications of this ineffable individuality were, first, a distinct subject matter for history and, second, a method of distinguishing between merely 'natural' phenomena and specifically 'historical' phenomena." This problem and the need to resolve it, lest history be tied to nothing in particular, was recognized earlier. See Langlois and Seignobos, Introduction to the Study of History, p. 215.


142 Meinecke placed this maxim at the front of his study of this second party. Cf. Historism, p. vi.

143 "The essence of historism is the substitution of a process of individualising observation for a generalising view of human forces in history." Friedrich Meinecke, in Preliminary Remarks to ibid., p. lv. G. G. Iggers summed up the historicist thesis this way: "There is no constant human nature; rather the character of each man reveals itself only in his development. The abstract, classificatory methods of the natural sciences are therefore inadequate models for the study of [the] human world." The German Conception of History, p. 5.
different from, but hopefully no less accurate than, scientific method. A question mark hung over historical procedures as a result of this controversy. History was unavoidably less precise than science, but in what way was it more than fiction?

To answer this question, the differences and the similarities between history and science will have to be studied. As mentioned previously, a long-standing problem has been how to distinguish between natural and historical objects. On the basis of earlier conclusions, we can propose a solution to this problem. To begin with, the distinction must be the result of an empirical analysis. The natural sciences result from patterned activities (methods) which repeatedly and cumulatively grasp insights that are immanent, not in what is imagined, but in what is observed. Similarly humanistic disciplines advance by methodical procedures which focus on empirical data (e.g. monuments, records, art works). Now the common empirical field which science and history both presuppose is human interiority. The data of consciousness are not the explicit subject matter for either discipline. But the data of consciousness are empirical, and our proposal is to base on them a meta-historical distinction between scientific and historical objects.

144 Another way of saying this—both science and history are constructed in part through acts of conscious intentionality.
The third section of the chapter clarified the notions of object and objectivity. *Empirical* data, whether they be data of sense or data of consciousness, belong to theoretical enterprises. Scientists, historians, philosophers talk about data as experienced. They distinguish what is empirical from what is merely imagined, and in doing so they set up a series of classifications and hypotheses which guide their experience. That is, they mediate their experience through acts of meaning. Among these acts are various ways of denoting the contents of their experience (e.g. as empirical, problematical, measurable). In contrast, "objects" in the lived world of immediacy are the merely encountered, i.e. what is *not* attended to for empirical-theoretical purposes.\(^{145}\) The implication is that both scientific and historical data are objects in a world mediated by meaning.\(^{146}\)

\(^{145}\)We have in mind here the difference between two experiences. In one case, a person accidentally trips over a stone in his path. In the other case, an archaeologist picks up the stone to examine it. The latter shows a theoretical interest guided by an object which for him is an empirical datum.

\(^{146}\)It would not be inappropriate to speak of "worlds" of meaning instead of a single world of meaning. We choose the singular here to force an issue into the open. Previous discussions of closed systems of thought have referred to them as closed "worlds" of meaning. This characterization is intended to explicate one consequence of limiting human intelligence to the level of expressions. Multiple historical perspectives, as Hayden White indicates, manifest prior preferences for different modes of historical conceptualization. These different modes are chosen in advance of historical research; they will determine the ways in which historical data are understood and expressed. Now,
The world mediated by meaning is not identified with the content of anyone's immediate experience. Nor is it identified with the totality of all individuals' worlds of

in the light of two different modes of conceptualization, and on the supposition that meaning is identified with expression, the understood data will not be the same in both historical perspectives. With a variance in modes of conceptualization, there will be a variance in what is understood. Consequently, those who use different perspectives will not be able to talk to one another about the same events. Their speech will be about events in different worlds.

One way out of this conclusion is to insist on the distinction between sense and reference. While the sense of one's terms is dependent on the context in which they are used (e.g. the term "abnormality" will have different senses depending on who is using it, psychologist, biologist, doctor), the referents of the terms maintain a relative constancy. That is, different meanings in different perspectives still can have a common referent in what is observable. (Israel Scheffler uses the distinction between sense and reference to argue along this line. *Science and Subjectivity*, pp. 54-63.)

However, the distinction between sense and reference is not adequate by itself. The basic issue is one of locating a common norm for different ways of speaking about the same events. Reference is to an empirical datum for which there may be many senses. But, on the basis of our previous discussion of objectivity, what is normative will be found not in empirical consciousness (which contains the referent) but in intelligent and critical consciousness. Consequently, it is the intelligent pursuit of insight which can mediate between referents and multiple senses, between the "same events" and different ways of conceiving and talking about them. (Without repeating earlier arguments in section three of this chapter, we are here presuming that understanding and conceptualization, while mutually dependent, are not identical. Rather insight precedes expression.) Our earlier conclusion (cf. section three) bears repeating: critical consciousness which develops systems of meaning can also transcend the inherent limits of its thought-products.
immediate experience. Meanings are, in the first place, acts which not only refer to what is experienced but also express an understanding of the experienced. And usually such meanings belong to a context broader than the individual's lived experience (e.g. insofar as meanings are linguistic, they participate in a common language which the individual does not create but shares). As part of this larger context, meanings do not require the presence of "objects" in an immediate world. Memories are meanings which mediate what is absent; literary works relate an author's past thoughts and experiences; historical narratives relate events which once were lived but now are past.

In a world mediated by meaning, what difference is there between scientific objects and historical objects? Scientific meanings have a basis in experience (e.g. the nuclear physicist tests a thesis against the observable traces provided by an electron microscope); historical meanings have a basis in experience (e.g. the historian takes pains to find evidentiary materials which challenge his interpretation). However, the biologist or the physicist is concerned with objects that have a natural origin. The amoeba is not created by human actions; the structure of DNA is not created by an artist with a flair for complex symmetry (though the imaginative model of a twisting ladder

is a construct). The scientific meanings which mediate these "objects" are constructed by human intelligence striving to understand and to explain how objects function irrespective of human intentions or actions.

On the other hand, historical objects are constituted by human acts of meaning. For example, where once stood jungle, now stand the remains of a great Aztec city. Historical actions transformed a natural environment into a human world. Laws were made to regulate human communication; roads were built in all directions to unite single cities into an empire. Hierarchies of officialdom were set up and preserved to guarantee that the order won at hard labor would survive the founders. The components of these institutions and rules are acts of meaning which themselves have a history. Institutions, laws, roles in society develop through time. Changes in them are not alterations of physical properties but changes in meaning. An empire is radically altered if it loses the loyalty of its subjects. An institution may grow stronger as laws guarantee that every social class have access to its benefits.

In a previous discussion, we proposed that constitutive relationships can be considered primary historical objects. That proposal gains added support from our differentiation of historical and scientific objects.

\[148\text{Ibid.}, \text{pp. 253-254. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann devote a chapter to social institutions as realities composed of acts of meaning and sedimented relationships. Cf. The Social Construction of Reality, Chapter II, pp. 47-128.}\]
Historical objects are both mediated (i.e. understood) by acts of meaning and are constituted by (i.e. composed of and by) acts of meaning. For example, the Magna Carta is more than ink spots on parchment. It is a historical object composed of expressed intentions to regulate the relationship between king and subjects. And the historian grasps those expressed intentions not by simply looking at the document but by his own acts of meaning which interpret what was meant by the writers.

The question invariably arises: Are not the referents of meanings the realities? The meanings themselves are mental constructs which help to clarify what is "really real," namely, the concrete objects of experience. Our previous work allows us to penetrate this ordinary way of thinking. The presupposition is that known objects are the entities of the lived world of immediacy, i.e. the already-out-there-now-real.149 Since meanings, or better, since objects constituted by meanings are not these concrete immediate entities, knowledge of the former is not knowledge of the real but an understanding of mere thought-objects.150 On the

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149 This presupposition is manifest among historians who speak of a term, e.g. "England" or a "Constitution," as a convenient way of speaking but not as a term referring to anything real. What is real are all the concrete objects which are English or all the concrete practices which are constitutional.

150 We take this conclusion to be a restatement of the thesis of idealism. Within this position, the distinction between natural and human sciences will be based on the difference between external and internal experiences. Sciences
basis of previous conclusions, this ordinary way of thinking can be criticized.

First, besides objects merely encountered, there are objects mediated by meanings. In science, there are the meanings (or intelligible relationships) immanent in natural processes which scientific investigation discovers, formulates, and attempts to verify. In history, there are the meanings which historical beings constitute. Historians proceed from traces to a recovery of meaning. They work out the intelligible relationships which contemporaries of past actions may not have known even though they initiated those relationships. And like the scientist, the historian formulates and seeks to verify his organization of past events and consequences. Therefore, the world of lived immediacy does not provide the "really real" which science or history investigates. The world mediated by meaning is the sphere of scientific and historical operations.

Second, the presupposition is that known objects are the entities already-out-there-now-real. But knowing is a consider objects-out-there; humanistic disciplines grasp introspectively that which is part of our inner experiencing—an internal empirical content. Matthew Lamb finds that Dilthey bases his distinction between the natural and human sciences on this difference. For Lamb’s comments and critique, see "Wilhelm Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology," Language, Truth and Meaning, pp. 146-147.

151 Ibid., p. 330, footnote 188.
compound activity, and what is known is parallel in complexity to human knowing. Consequently, known objects are what is correctly understood—in our case, hypothesized arrangements of constitutive relationships which, in fact, have their conditions fulfilled. The ordinary way of thinking confuses one component of the known with the compound object known. This is its empirical prejudice: to view its knowledge claims as basically direct experiences of what is empirically given. If the ordinary way of thinking recognizes complexities in its achievement of understanding, these complexities are usually said to be subjective additions. To know is to grasp what is simply there-to-be-seen; any other operations and their products are ideation and thought-objects. Meanings are, thus, secondary matters; what is important is the meant. But historical objects are meanings constituted by human activities. Those meanings can be correctly understood (i.e. known); and since the real is identified with what is correctly understood, the ordinary way of thinking manifests its own incomprehension.152

152 What we have tried to synthesize under a single heading (i.e. "the ordinary way of thinking") is really two positions. First, objects are what is already-out-there-now-real; and, second, human meanings are constructs which do not reach the "real." If the first position is stressed, then knowing will be a matter of mere observation. If the second is emphasized, then what we understand is not the real but the ideal products of human intelligence. LonerGAN speaks of these two positions as the "horns" of a rather complex philosophical dilemma. "From the horns of that dilemma one escapes only through the discovery (and one has not made it yet if one has no clear memory of its startling strangeness) that there are two quite different realisms,
In summary, we began this discussion of historical objects with a widely recognized problem: How does one distinguish between natural and historical objects? Given Hayden White's analysis of the problem, the required distinction must be based on some metahistorical position. First, we suggested that common grounds for both history and science are found in the empirical data of consciousness. Both fields of inquiry presuppose the patterned activities of conscious intentionality. Second, since both fields are theoretical (though not exclusively so), their intentional objects belong to a world mediated by meaning. But here a difference in objects emerges. Natural sciences intend meanings immanent in natural processes while historical studies intend meanings which historical beings constitute. Human decisions and actions transform both a natural world and man himself. The transformations have a historical meaning which is the relationship between event (or act) and consequence (or expression). Finally, that there is an incoherent realism, half animal and half human, that poses as a half-way house between materialism and idealism and, on the other hand, that there is an intelligent and reasonable realism between which and materialism the half-way house is idealism." Introduction to Insight, p. xxviii.

Because of this common presupposition, the distinction cannot be drawn along the lines of inner and outer experience.

The peculiarly human character of such relationships becomes evident when one considers an example offered by Lonergan. Scientists could take measurements, note activities, and count participants in a legal process but
we noted how some basic epistemological confusions can generate an oversight of the reality of historical meanings. Our distinction between natural and historical objects, thus, rests proximately on an epistemological realism and ultimately on a metahistorical, cognitional theory.

The difference between natural and historical objects is one of a number of differences between science and history. A second difference is apparent in the way that discoveries are expressed in each of the two fields. Scientific discoveries must be expressible as parts of an internally coherent system. The individual discovery must be valid across a set or series of particular cases. This is the characteristic notion of generality or universality applied to scientific results. If an individual discovery is incompatible with a single relevant case, it is refuted. On the other hand, historical discoveries are formulated as parts of narratives. They fit into descriptive accounts of particular persons, places, and times. Usually there is no attempt made to generalize from the particular instance to a larger number of historical instances. In contrast to scientific generality, there is a historical admission of uniqueness.

never conclude, purely as scientists, that they were in a court of law. "Existenz and Aggiornamento," in Collection, p. 244.

155 Method in Theology, pp. 179-180 and 229.

156 Ibid., p. 180. The "uniqueness" of historical
A third and major difference between history and the natural sciences lies in the former's use of ordinary language. Hayden White's delineation of multiple modes of historical conceptualization presumed that historians had not developed a single mode for expressing their insights. Scientific insights may be formulated initially in ordinary language, but professional consensus requires a reformulation of them into a technical vocabulary. The difference events is sometimes contemned when contrasted with the generality (and presupposed sameness in instances) of scientific results. The classic statement is Aristotle's remark in the Poetics (7.5): "Hence poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars." (Quoted from The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon, New York: Random House, 1970, p. 1464).

Two remarks are in order. First, the uniqueness of historical events is never absolute. On the one hand, historical knowledge is not isolated from the common-sense living of the historian and of his audience. What is learned about past events may be of use in the present. Or what is learned about one historical era may shed light on another era which the historian subsequently investigates. This is not to say that the events of a past era are repeatable in any exact way in a subsequent era. However, the analogous connections drawn by common sense between experiences widely separated in time do not require exactness. Ordinary language is not bound to univocal terms in the same way as the natural sciences. Nor are its generalizations required to have the same degree of exactness as usually is demanded in the natural sciences. On the other hand, the term "unique" is not applied in a vacuum. It is used to characterize the distinctively individual traits of a historical person, place, or time. But those individual traits are called "differences," and differences are only noted on the basis of similarities. Thus, the defeat of the Spanish Armada was a unique event both in time and place. But other foiled invasions share a commonality with this particular defeat. At least linguistic classification requires this commonality since many particular instances can be labelled "attempted invasions." Patrick Gardiner discusses a number of misconceptions about historical uniqueness in The Nature of Historical Explanation, pp. 43-46.
here is not just one of expression but also one of object. Scientific inquiries seek to formulate the intelligibility of natural regularities. In contrast, historical inquiries usually pursue not the regular or the routine but the exceptional. A series of past events is usually investigated because the events and their consequences marked a departure from previous routines. Even if the abnormal is not the main topic, still the historian recognizes some uniqueness in his topic. What he reconstructs is a past that most probably will never be repeated.\textsuperscript{157}

Differences in expression and in objects yield differences in knowledge. Scientific explanation is systematic, and its formulations have a generality which allows predictability in regard to individual cases. Historical explanations are similar to common-sense knowledge. Both focus on the particular and the concrete.\textsuperscript{158} Their results express an understanding which may be of use in future

\textsuperscript{157}Ibid., Method in Theology, p. 230.

\textsuperscript{158}W. H. Walsh states this widely held position: History "is not an abstract but a concrete science, and it terminates not in general knowledge but in knowledge of individual truths." Philosophy of History: An Introduction, p. 43. Given our earlier remarks on uniqueness in history, this distinction between general knowledge and knowledge of individual truths cannot be pushed too far. Generalizations about governmental policy during a particular period are made by historians. However, the generalizations are secondary to the determination of individual facts. Perhaps Collingwood takes the wisest course when he argues that no precise separation of history from natural sciences can be made in terms of generalizations in the latter and individual facts in the former. See The Idea of History, pp. 166-167.
inquiries, but that use cannot be predicted or assumed. Rather, a new insight will be needed to determine the relevance of past results to new problems.\textsuperscript{159} It is also the case that a historian's own common-sense opinions cannot be used indiscriminately to guide his study of past ages. Other peoples and other times had a different common sense. Therefore, the historian's own accumulated insights into human motivation, reactions to crises, and rationalizations of mistakes may be foreign to an earlier period. Again, the self-correcting process of learning may gradually introduce him to another way of ordinary thinking and speaking. Then his historical understanding will still not be systematic in any scientific sense, but it will contain the incomplete common-sense wisdom of some former time.\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{159}We have in mind here the incompleteness of common-sense knowledge. Chapter Two considered how a new insight into a present situation must occur before prior common-sense opinions can be applied to it. Similarly, in history, the study of one revolution does not produce results which can be automatically applied to other revolutions. Relevant similarities would first have to be discovered before previous conclusions about how a single revolution began could be said to be applicable to other political upheavals. This is a basis for Lonergan's thesis that historical explanations are sophisticated extensions of common-sense understanding. (Method in Theology, p. 230.) Our discussion in Chapter Two of relative horizons drew the connections between these two modes of understanding, but then we were not concerned with differences between history and science.

\textsuperscript{160}Ibid., Method in Theology, p. 305. The difference between science and history that emerges from the distinction between theoretical expression and common-sense expression is sufficiently apparent that Lonergan proposes to base a terminological distinction upon it. "Science" is the term
Given the preceding differences between history and science, some commentators have concluded that a scientific mode of explanation is superior to common-sensical historical explanation. In the nineteenth century, demands for the scientizing of history were in some cases based on just such a value judgment. However, the preceding differences indicate that history cannot be a science in any complete sense. Its proximity to common-sense knowledge is perhaps the most solid barrier to any complete scientizing of history. Are the demands, therefore, to remain completely unfulfillable?

In the first place, the presupposed superiority of science over history must be qualified. The fields of inquiry are not the same for both. We have already indicated that history is primarily a study of constitutive relationships. The implication of this is that history has a much wider existential field than, for example, mathematics. At the same time, the doing of history presupposes a wider existential commitment on the part of the historian; his relative horizon is more obviously at work in historical interpretations than it would be were he a mathematician. 161

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161 Martin Heidegger notes this difference but argues that each of the fields of inquiry has its own proper
So in different fields of inquiry there will be different demands placed upon the investigator. In history there is a demand for common-sense explanations because the content of the field is made up of unique instances and because the historian seeks to understand the common-sense thinking, speaking, and acting of a former time.

Second, the supposed superiority of science over history is sometimes based on an oversight of diversity in modes of verification. A scientific hypothesis can be tested by repeatable experiments. But a historical hypothesis about fairly unique events cannot be tested by repeating the sequence of decisions and actions leading to those events. Instead, historical verification proceeds by way of inference from preserved and understood materials to a reasonable approximation of what in fact was the case. Now this different mode of verification cannot be labelled "unscientific" or "inferior" (1) because, again, it is the proper way of proceeding for a distinct discipline, and (2) because among the sciences there are fields of inquiry which work in the same way, e.g. geology and some specializations within astronomy. Our conclusion is

controls (methods) and is not to be judged superior or inferior to the other. "Mathematics is not more rigorous than historiography, but only narrower, because the existential foundations relevant for it lie within a narrower range." Being and Time, p. 195.

that the natural sciences are not "superior" to history but are merely different enterprises with different fields of inquiry and different modes of explanation. Both history and the sciences have distinct purposes, and to charge that history is not scientifically rigorous in its results is to confuse the purposes of history with the purposes of the sciences. 163

A contemporary debate among philosophers of history shows a continuing confusion of such purposes. The debate generally focuses on causal analysis in history. The central issue is whether in determining causes of historical events, the historian is either implicitly or explicitly making use of laws. 164 We have already noted that historical inquiry into supposedly unique events is not wholly separate from generalizing and classifying ways of thinking.

163 "It is mistaken, for example, to claim for scientific explanation a superiority over commonsense explanation: both have their use. We do not want to be scientists all the time. Indeed to quarrel with a commonsense explanation on the ground that it lacks the precision and comprehensiveness of an explanation occurring in one of the sciences is to complain that it should perform a different function from the one it in fact performs,..." Patrick Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation, p. 25.

164 The literature of this ongoing debate is extensive. C. G. Hempel's work is often cited as the starting point for the contemporary discussion of laws in historical explanations. See his article, "The Function of General Laws in History," reprinted in Theories of History, edited by Patrick Gardiner, pp. 344-356. The same anthology contains valuable articles on this topic by Morton White, Alan Donagan, and Michael Scriven. William Dray has produced a thorough study of the issues covered by both sides in the controversy. See his Laws and Explanation in History (London: Oxford University Press, 1957).
But the qualification must be added that, like common-sense knowledge, historical knowledge is not primarily a series of generalizations. Rather, an explanation of the causes of particular historical events remains confined in its application to those events until further insights into different events yield some basis for finding the earlier explanation relevant to the different events.

This incompleteness of historical explanations across different situations implies that one cannot deduce the causes of one set of events (e.g. a revolution) simply by knowing the causes of a prior set of events (e.g. an earlier revolution). Indeed, the term "cause" is not used in the same way in both science and history. For scientists, "causal connections" refer to required conditions of events, e.g. given chemical mixtures of x, y, and z, phenomenon A will be observed. But for historians, "cause" has the loose, nontechnical meaning of everyday speech. "Event B occurred because two people were afraid to trust each other."165 This use of "cause" first appears in the child's curiosity about events around him. The common sense of adults contains multiple uses of the term which

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165Henri Marrou, along with others, recommends that this loose use of "cause" be dropped from historical language. His reasoning is that even scientists have found more precise ways of speaking about connections between events. (The Meaning of History, p. 191.) However, the ordinary language of historical explanation will most likely continue to include this and other terms of imprecise but flexible meaning.
make up in flexibility what they lack in precision.

One may argue that historians' performance rather than a scientific ideal of explanation should guide discussions about how historians explain events. A strong support for such an approach is surely the absence of any convincing example of a historical law other than a truism.166 What historical performance manifests is a constant awareness that generalizations require proof, and usually the more cases that are studied the more watered-down become the generalizations. Truisms will result, but then common-sense generalizations are usually truisms or else principles which can only be applied to specific cases after a further insight into those cases.

So far we have noted a number of differences between history and science. There are differences in objects, in the expression of discoveries, in the use of technical language, in the priority of generalizations, and in the modes of explanation. The study of these differences followed upon two questions. First, history is unavoidably less precise than the natural sciences, but in what way is it more

166 W. H. Walsh strikes at the basic weakness of the theory of historical laws by noting the absence of a single reputable example. See his article "'Meaning' in History," in Theories of History, edited by Patrick Gardiner, pp. 303-304. We might add that the imposition of a deductive model of historical explanation may well proceed from that basic confusion of deduction with insight studied in section three.
than fiction? Second, are the demands for the scientizing of history completely unfulfillable? Answers to these questions can be reached by turning from the differences between history and science to their similarities.

An obvious similarity lies in the methodical investigation of subject-matter. Both history and science proceed in a discriminating and cumulative way. As opposed to collections of random bits of information (the building blocks of some future as-yet-unknown theory), both history and science are guided (1) by commonly accepted procedures and (2) by specific problems which may be studied for any number of reasons. Just because historians speak in the language of everyday living, it does not follow that the everyday man can do competent history. At least one prerequisite is mastery of the procedures relevant to some historical specialty. 167 There are professional, public controls over these procedures in both fields of inquiry. These controls (e.g. the critique of works through book reviews, the questioning which follows delivery of a paper at a convention) are the mark of scientific and scholarly disciplines.

Although history is scientific in the sense that it

167 W. H. Walsh, Philosophy of History: An Introduction, pp. 38-39. John Higham's work, History: Professional Scholarship in America, narrates the historical development in this country from histories written by amateurs (often extremely competent ones) to histories produced by a professional community.
is guided by method, still the results yielded by methods will not be the same in history and in science. Cumulative results in science fill out well-defined systems while cumulative historical results fill out a narration of particulars. What remains true of both ways of proceeding is that the results are public and can be tested by others. However, the modes of testing are more numerous in the sciences than in history. Usually a critic of some historical interpretation will arrive at his counter-conclusions only by going over the same evidence and through the same investigation that the other historian made before him.

If both history and science yield verified results and if those results are publicly verifiable, then there is no difference in their results insofar as truth values are concerned. A nineteenth-century school of historical positivism assumed that historical knowledge, like scientific

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168 The emphasis on public control of individual results is evident in Peter Gay's description of a qualified scientific history: "history is a discipline with its own criteria of excellence; it is public, self-corrective, never complete, and in this sense, scientific. And in its character of science, history is a progressive discipline—that is to say, a discipline capable of progress as well as regression." A Loss of Mastery: Puritan Historians in Colonial America, p. 122. The similarity here to science lies in the possibility of cumulative verification. That is to say, the bias or errors of the individual historian can be corrected by other investigators who readily admit evidence and form hypotheses previously overlooked or willfully discarded.

169 Method in Theology, p. 219. Again, the inferential nature of historical insights limits the ways in which historians can arrive at conclusions. Scientists can devise many different experiments yielding the same results. Historians can reconstruct different imaginative schemes of
knowledge, resulted from a careful examination of observable data; in the case of history, the data were preserved materials. Our previous work has indicated the mistaken exclusions involved in such an assumption. Both history and science use hypotheses and organizing frameworks which go beyond what is given. Both disciplines subject these intelligible schemes to verification processes. For a classical ideal of science, what was verified in science was a general truth which was not a matter-of-fact but a necessary law governing particulars. Since history recognized that its primary concern was for the concrete and particular, the superiority of science with its apodictic and necessary principles was assumed. However, the demise of the classical conception of science eliminates this basis for judging science to be superior to history.\textsuperscript{170} What remains is that in both fields results are verified in degrees of probability and only infrequently are said to be certain.

History then is different from the natural sciences, but it is similar in that both employ methodical procedures sanctioned by professional communities and both yield how certain events might have occurred. But ultimately a limited evidentiary base will allow only some results to be highly probable.

\textsuperscript{170}Matthew Lamb notes that the classical distinction between episteme and phronesis was the basis for this value judgment. "Wilhelm Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology," Language, Truth and Meaning, p. 158.
verifiable results. While these two similarities bring history closer to the sciences, they move it away from literary fiction. Collingwood proposed three general areas in which historical narratives differed from literary fictions. Historians are not interested in possible or imaginary worlds but in events which can be spatially located and temporally dated within one world. Novelists need not respect such limits. In addition, since there is only one historical world, historical interpretations ideally should be compatible with one another. No such ideal governs literary narratives about fictional people, places, and times. Finally, historians are concerned with verifying the results of their methodical procedures. The question for reflection asks, Is it true? Such a question would only be asked of a fictional work if the questioner suspected the author of writing a disguised biography. When the question is asked by historians, it is a question about the sufficiency of evidence. Literary fictions need no more basis than the imagination and good style of their authors.\footnote{R. G. Collingwood, \textit{The Idea of History}, p. 246. Lonergan summarizes these three differences, in \textit{Method in Theology}, p. 219.} It is especially this concern for evidence which makes history something more than fiction.

The question of whether demands for the scientizing of history are completely unfulfillable can now be answered. Some of the differences between history and science rule
out a complete scientizing of history. These differences are simply the result of the proper tasks of history which are not shared with the natural sciences. More important, in view of our promise to supply a metahistorical basis for distinguishing history and science, they are also differences which are established within human intentionality. Particularly the distinction between common sense and theory has a prior origin in human consciousness. Our distinction between historical and natural objects is similarly rooted in human intentionality which constitutes a world of meanings. But besides these differences, there are the similarities of methodical inquiry and verifiable results. To the extent that the natural sciences have led the way in formulating critical techniques for checking hypotheses, history, in an imitative way, is scientific.\textsuperscript{172} Historians will continue to adapt scientific advances to historical needs, but the adaptation will never be total because of the basic differences between the two fields.

One purpose of this discussion was to prepare a reply to Hayden White's thesis that demands for the scientizing of history were merely statements of a precritical preference. His thesis also extended to those who rejected

\textsuperscript{172}The evidence for a partial scientizing of history is found in the adaptation of scientific discoveries for historical purposes, e.g. chemical tests for dating manuscripts, statistical principles for evaluating voting trends in local populations, computerized bibliographies which facilitate research.
these demands: their non-scientific historical models were also the products of precritical preferences. Now our study of the differences between natural sciences and history, and subsequent conclusion that no complete scientizing of history is possible, have had a critical basis.\footnote{We can also point out that demands for a total scientizing of history proceeded, whatever their preferential grounds might have been, from an uncritical acceptance of scientific ideals. An appropriation of one's own basic horizon allows one to return to the world of theory more aware, not only of the differences between theory and common sense, but also of the proper functions which each should be allowed to fulfill in its own way.}

The distinctions between common sense and theory, and between mediated meanings and constituted meanings proceed from a metaphistorical analysis of the subject's basic horizon. A differentiated basic horizon allows us to make the first distinction. An analysis of the intentional forms of that horizon (i.e. the relations among cognitional acts) allows us to make the second distinction. Therefore, the limits we place on a possible scientizing of history derive from more than precritical preferences. Similarly the scientific aspects of historical work can be noted and defended on grounds other than personal likes or dislikes.

The previous work of this chapter has prepared us to take a final step toward the central goal of this dissertation. That step involves the determination of how one can decide on the realism of various historical perspectives.
of history. Our study of both the differences and the similarities between the natural sciences and history requires that the problem be formulated in a new way. Within limits, i.e. as a methodical discipline the results of which are publicly verifiable, history is scientific. But, because of basic differences, history and its inherent problems should be considered distinct from the natural sciences and their inherent problems. Thus, the problem of historical realism is better phrased in terms of an explanatory hermeneutical position which cuts across all differences in historical perspectives.

Explanatory Breakthrough to a Basic Hermeneutical Position

To begin with, let us restate the problem of historical realism. The recognized fact is the presence of multiple conflicting historical perspectives. Among other points of conflict, these multiple perspectives contain incompatible claims about historical realism. According to Hayden White's reading of the problem, there are no compelling theoretical grounds for arbitrating among the incompatible claims. None is more scientific or "realistic" than another.\(^{174}\) All that can be said is that the different

\(^{174}\) Preface to *Metahistory*, p. xii. The leap from the absence of "compelling theoretical grounds" to a denial that any perspective is more realistic than the rest is made on the basis of an argument. The grounds for adopting a particular perspective/paradigm are moral or aesthetic, not epistemological. Hence, any claim to provide a more realistic analysis than another will simply reflect variable
interpretative frameworks are different. The different views of historical realism which they espouse are relative to their authors and approving audiences. Two historians with incompatible notions of historical realism can only agree to disagree.

What is required to resolve this theoretical impasse? There are at least two intellectual requirements and one moral requirement. First, if the differences among historical perspectives are not to remain merely uncriticized differences, there must be a critical method for elaborating the development of diverse perspectives on the past. Second, if this method is to cut across all differences in perspectives, it must be shown to escape relativity to particular audiences and to an author's variable preferences. Third, if the discovery of this basic hermeneutical method is to achieve some breakthrough in regard to the impasse, it must be possible for one to alter a prior position on historical realism for the sake of consistency with this discovery.

The first two requirements or conditions imply a universal viewpoint which would allow one to pass in a critical way from one historical perspective to another. This preferences for a particular type of analysis. That is to say, one's epistemological position will have a prior, precritical basis. In section three of this chapter, we have already provided a counter-argument to this position. Critical realism, as based on cognitional structure and the assumption of isomorphism, has a non-preferential basis.
universal viewpoint would embrace the multiple conflicting perspectives and would be the basis for critically evaluating how realistic they were. The third requirement implies that, if such a universal viewpoint is attainable, then one who attains it can, if needed, modify his own position to conform his historical work to his determination of historical realism.

These requirements or conditions anticipate the steps to be taken in the following paragraphs. We can also anticipate the content of those steps. The main thesis is that the potential totality of all historical perspectives lies in the dynamic structure of cognitional activity.¹⁷⁵ The key argument for this thesis has already appeared. Every intelligible historical perspective is elaborated by acts of an intelligent and reasonable subject. Now it would be naive to suppose that historical perspectives were elaborated in the absence of bias, aesthetic preferences, personal values. Each intelligible historical perspective presupposes not only a potentially reasonable and responsible subject but also a subject liable to errors, omissions, and shortsighted values. Insofar as bias lies at the heart of a particular perspective, we can say that the discovery of a universal viewpoint may prompt its removal.¹⁷⁶ Insofar

¹⁷⁵ Insight, p. 568.

¹⁷⁶ The conclusion of Chapter Four on the reducibility and avoidability of bias is the basis for this claim.
as a historian's perspective suffers from what we shall call "moral irresponsibility," we will have to prove the possibility of moral conversion--hence, the reasoning behind our third requirement. Our strategic goal is to link these three conditions in proving how it is possible to evaluate incompatible claims about historical realism.

What evidence is there for the envisioned universal viewpoint? We can argue that the paradigm theory of history itself provides evidence. That theory concludes that historical paradigms, or perspectives, are discontinuous. They do not fall into a series of increasingly more accurate and comprehensive accounts of a single historical field. In short, there is nothing cumulative about them as distinct and sometimes incompatible models of the past. The implication is that no critical comparison of different perspectives is possible. They are simply different. However, Hayden White does present a comparative study of historical paradigms. Although he limits himself to a formal, non-evaluative study of nineteenth-century paradigms, he still provides a comparison of different conceptions of history. What does such a formal comparison imply?

First, it implies a higher viewpoint which can embrace two different perspectives at the same time, note their differences, and appreciate the relativity of those differences. The situation is much the same for the anthropologist on a field trip. He attempts to immerse himself
in an alien culture and to understand that culture in its own terms. In avoiding the "sin" of ethnocentricity, he is careful not to evaluate that alien culture in terms of his own prior cultural background. But then the anthropologist is holding on to both cultural systems at the same time. He cannot eliminate his own cultural heritage, first, because it is too much a part of him and, second, because his anthropological study only makes sense given the scientific concerns of that heritage. The native culture itself does not, in most instances, produce anthropologists. So the work of the anthropologist implies a higher viewpoint which is not identified with either cultural system but is something distinct.

A distinctively historical example can manifest the presence of a higher viewpoint. A frequently voiced opinion is that Gibbon's history of Rome reflects the preconceptions of his own eighteenth century rather than those of the centuries of the Roman Empire. What do such opinions imply? First, those who voice such a criticism indicate that they know what the thoughts, values, and judgments were of both the eighteenth century and the Roman age. In effect, they are comparing two different periods. More important, they are implying that they are not blinded by or trapped within the preconceptions (the "climate of

177 Peter Berger stresses this latter reason, in A Rumor of Angels (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1970), p. 8.
opinion") of their own age. 178 If they were in fact confined to a single period, then they could not know that Gibbon's work reflected his own age more than it did an earlier one. 179 Consequently, they are affirming a higher viewpoint which can embrace multiple historical perspectives.

The preceding examples do not speak directly to the issue of whether an implicit higher viewpoint permits an evaluative comparison of different historical or cultural perspectives. However, the paradigm theory of history implies that a higher viewpoint does have a critical aspect. According to that theory, historical paradigms are not only discontinuous, they are also incompatible. But that is to imply they are in conflict; they present rival conceptions of historical processes. Now what such rivalry presupposes is some common framework in which, first, a comparison of different paradigms is possible and, second, a discovery can be made of their incompatibility. What that discovery presupposes is that the common framework contains both comparative and evaluative grounds. How else would it be possible to say that two different perspectives not only were different but also were at odds? Consequently, the

178 This implication can serve as an argument for our previous conclusions about the transcendence of closed worlds of meaning by human intelligence.

higher viewpoint must provide a basis for reasonable comparison and criticism of different perspectives. Even if the higher viewpoint does not decide clearly on all the issues over which there is disagreement, still there must be such a critical basis over and above the different perspectives.\textsuperscript{180}

In Chapter Three, an argument for a universal viewpoint was implicitly developed. Historical perspectives are elaborated, revised, sometimes even replaced. Such development and revision presupposes a principle of development or revision which is continuous from one position to the next developed or revised position. In particular, the cognitional pattern of developing or self-correcting understanding is presupposed throughout the changes in meaning and in conceptual order. Since this principle of development or revision persists throughout these changes, it is the \textit{a priori} condition for such changes. In Chapter Three, there were arguments to the effect that this \textit{a priori} condition was invariant, i.e. it was not subject to radical revision itself. We can now add that it is also anticipatory of the totality of potential revisions in meaning and in conceptual order.\textsuperscript{181} That is, as the invariant, \textit{a priori}

\textsuperscript{180}Israel Scheffler develops this line of argumentation in regard to the paradigm theory of science. \textit{Science and Subjectivity}, p. 82.

\textsuperscript{181}Philip McShane, \textit{Randomness, Statistics, and Emergence}, pp. 1-2.
condition for every revision, it anticipates how each revision will be carried out. This claim will have to be clarified and defended.

What needs to be clarified is the "higher viewpoint" implied in the preceding arguments. However, the clarification must ultimately be in explanatory terms. The alternative is to account for this higher viewpoint in descriptive terms; but, then, the resulting description takes its place alongside historical perspectives which are also formulated in descriptive terms. As a result, there would be nothing definitive about this higher viewpoint; it would be a metahistorical position curiously formulated in the same way as historical perspectives are formulated. What we are proposing, then, is an explanatory account of how a higher viewpoint both permits a transition between (i.e. a comparison of) different historical perspectives and provides reasons for modifying them (i.e. the higher viewpoint has a normative function in regard to lower viewpoints).

The normative function of transcendental method has already been discussed. It is the basic method grounding all specialized methods and procedures. The basis for transcendental method lies ultimately in the desire to know

182 David Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, p. 141.

183 Cf. Chapter Three, section four.
which spontaneously moves through component acts to the known. Our account of this development of knowing and of the known through cognitional acts has been both descriptive and explanatory. The descriptive approach was evident in the examples we used of historical procedures. The explanatory approach was evident when we related those component acts together in an account of the formally dynamic structure of human knowing. It was this explanatory account which marked a breakthrough beyond description to definition-by-relation. "But such definition-by-relation-of-things-not-to-me-but-among-themselves is exactly what explanation as distinct from description means." ¹⁸⁴

An explanatory thematization of cognitional structure and the formulation of the normative and critical aspects of that structure were carried out in Chapter Three. It was proposed that an affirmation of this structure and of its intentional correlates was the mark of intellectual conversion. In section three of this chapter, we further explicated the terms of this conversion. From the side of the knower, there is the invariant pattern of cognitional acts. From the side of the known, there is the compounding of partial objects into single complex objects. The links between these two sides are reason-in-act (which was also explanatorily thematized as the virtually unconditioned) and

the thesis of isomorphism. Our conclusion was that the real is to be identified with the intelligently conceived and rationally affirmed.

This epistemological conclusion and its basis, cognitive structure, are components of the envisioned higher viewpoint. Both represent how human intelligence and reason proceed in the development and revision of meanings. A methodical grasp of the structured and normative process of achieving, revising, and verifying human understanding is the first step in attaining the higher viewpoint. What is methodically comprehended is the principle of development or revision which is presupposed by all the shifts from one perspective to another.

What does this comprehended principle mean for the work of historians? The initial position is that intellect itself (or better, the patterned activities of the desire to know) is what is common to all elaborated historical perspectives. Transcendental method formulates the functions of this common framework. But at least initially one is left with a rather formalistic understanding of how historical positions are developed. The relationship between the common principle and historical procedures needs to be exemplified. In Chapters Three and Four we were attempting to do just that by showing the relationship between the transcendental precepts and historical procedures. Lonergan discusses this relationship in terms of a metaphor:
the two blades of a pair of scissors. 185

The upper blade of historical interpretation is the subject's appropriated cognitional structure which provides self-knowledge having universal implications. That is, the act of appropriation is a personal achievement which reveals the a priori pattern of developing understanding in any human consciousness. Therefore, the elaborated meanings which compose any historical interpretation were developed according to this pattern. However, an understanding of a particular historical theory or interpretation cannot be reached solely by knowing how human cognition proceeds. Besides the upper blade of cognitional theory, there is the lower blade of historical method revealing the historical meanings which can be organized by the upper blade. Consequently, historical results are reached in neither a purely a priori nor a purely a posteriori fashion. Rather, for the subject who grasps the universal viewpoint, historical knowledge is the result of a continuing inquiry which moves back and forth between a transcultural base and increasingly organized historical data. 186

The transcultural base is the a priori scheme or cognitional theory which anticipates how any possible set of historical acts of knowing were reached irrespective of place or time. Such a scheme is made possible by the

185 Insight, pp. 577-578.
186 Method in Theology, p. 293.
immanent and invariant structure, transcendental norms, and procedures of the human mind. These are presupposed by every speculative development, e.g. the elaboration of historical perspectives. This transcultural base is put to use only in an a posteriori manner when competent exegesis supplies materials for historical analysis. These materials are made accessible through inductive lower-blade procedures of historical method. 187

Some qualifications should be entered here. First, the envisioned universal viewpoint is not some complete grasp of all that historians do know or can know. A single individual cannot comprehend all present historical knowledge, and what future discoveries will be made is not yet determinate. But the universal viewpoint does provide an anticipatory framework for what is known and what remains to be known. 188 That is, while there is no universal (i.e. complete) historical knowledge, there is a universal order which is determinate in regard to how historical knowing has occurred and will occur. Second, the universal viewpoint does not dictate what steps must be taken to acquire historical knowledge. To know the appropriate steps, one must learn the accepted procedures of the historical profession and then follow them (i.e. the lower-blade methods)


188 Insight, p. 483.
in a more or less trial-by-error approach. Third, the application of the upper blade will not reveal all the steps in the development of a particular historical theory or interpretation. The author of a theory perhaps struggled for years to develop it. Unknown influences may have slowed his work at one time and pushed it forward at another. These and other facets of his developing understanding are unrecoverable.\textsuperscript{189}

Since these qualifications are formulated as negative restrictions, it remains to specify the positive content of the universal viewpoint. The meaning which Lonergan assigns to it will have to be clarified in a series of steps. By "universal viewpoint" he means a "potential totality of genetically and dialectically ordered viewpoints."\textsuperscript{190} We have already indicated that the potential totality is the anticipated order of historical theories and interpretations. More specifically, it is the framework which contains in a virtual way all possible historical perspectives. But this virtual content only becomes determinate through interaction with historical procedures and materials.

The totality is of viewpoints or of what historians elaborate as meaningful contexts for their partial discoveries. The focus of the universal viewpoint is directed

\textsuperscript{189} Lonergan treats these unrecoverable aspects of a development of meaning under the heading of a "canon of residues." See \textit{ibid.}, pp. 590-594.

\textsuperscript{190} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 564.
beyond the elaborated viewpoints to the acts of meaning which occur in understanding and judging something about the past. These are the acts which are components of cognitional process. Thus, for the subject appropriating the universal viewpoint, there is the opportunity to move from his reflective awareness of his own cognitional acts to the acts presupposed by someone else's historical theory. The other person's developed meanings may differ from his own, but the cognitional process "behind" the differences has the same form. The critical point here is to recognize that historical meanings are developed through human intentionality, and the basic outline of that development can be known at least in part.191

The totality of viewpoints is an ordered totality. The ground for this ordered totality is the subject's differentiated basic horizon. Horizon analysis yields knowledge of genetically distinct levels of meaning (common sense, theory, interiority), and this knowledge can be used in retrospect to order the discoveries which have accumulated as present knowledge. On the basis of one's own self-knowledge, one can locate in the discussion of these

191 Ibid., p. 565. This conclusion is opposed by the expectation that historical meanings are "givens" which a simple process of intending grasps immediately. However, arguments in both Chapter Three and in this chapter have shown the epistemological faults of this expectation. On the contrary, sources of meaning are located in the intelligent subject (this is not to deny that external materials supply potentially intelligible data for the subject). The immanent sources of meaning in the subject will have a variable content but an invariant structure.
discoveries various confusions or distinctions among the genetically different levels.\textsuperscript{192} What makes these confusions or distinctions convincing to an audience can be analyzed on the basis of one's own cognitional self-awareness.\textsuperscript{193}

The \textit{universality} of the higher viewpoint lies in its potential completeness. This potential completeness can be considered both from the side of the historian and from the side of the historical field. From the side of the historian, there is an element of necessity in how all possible perspectives can be developed. Historical interpretations may be interpretations of different objects, but the different interpreters must be multi-levelled subjects operating on empirical, intelligent, and rational levels. And, when a historian investigates the expressed meaning of another subject, he shares this multi-levelled subjectivity with him. The recorded meanings of the earlier subject have a material basis in the preserved markings on paper or monuments. But, for meanings to be assigned to these markings, the historian must derive that meaning from the interaction between his subjectivity and the expressed (objectified) subjectivity of the other.\textsuperscript{194}

\textsuperscript{192}Our critique of the imposition of scientific ideals on historical works exemplifies this type of analysis.

\textsuperscript{193}Insight, p. 565.

\textsuperscript{194}"There are no interpretations without interpreters. There are no interpreters without polymorphic unities of empirical, intelligent, and rational consciousness."
From the side of the historical field, historical interpretations conducted within the profession of critical history are proposed as approximate accounts of what actually happened and as probable explanations of what happened. Insofar as they are intent upon settling matters-of-fact, critical historians seek to recover the fixed content of the past and to express their understanding of it in narrative forms which are likely to vary from historian to historian. The assertions expressed in their works proceed from various judgments about historical reality.

As argued previously, the real is identified with whatever is intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed. Previous arguments also located historical realities in a world mediated by meaning. Consequently, there is a potential totality of historical meanings, and four dimensions of that potential totality will exhaust the number of possible combinations yielding affirmed historical meanings. There will be combinations (1) of experiences and lack of experiences (e.g. an oversight of crucial materials); (2) of insights and lack of insights (e.g. a failure to grasp

There are no expressions to be interpreted without other similar unities of consciousness. Nor has the work of interpreting anything more than a material determinant in the spatially ordered set of marks in documents and monuments. If the interpreter assigns any meanings to the marks, then the experiential component in that meaning will be derived from his experience, the intellectual component will be derived from his intelligence, the rational component will be derived from his critical reflection on the critical reflection of another." Ibid., pp. 566-567.
how two events are interconnected); (3) of judgments and of failures to judge (e.g. a lack of critical reflection on one's own work); (4) of the different orientations of a complicated human consciousness (e.g. an implicit bias against one party in a historical dispute). 195

These four dimensions of the potential totality of historical meanings are not arbitrarily presented. Rather, they express the a priori structure of intentional acts which lead to affirmed historical meanings. If that structure is a precondition to the elaboration of historical perspectives, then the four dimensions express how that precondition can be fulfilled in constructing historical perspectives. And to grasp this range of possible combinations is to anticipate the totality of contexts which can be set up as frameworks for historical studies. Again, the frameworks become determinate only when one consults particular authors and their works, but, in advance of that specific inquiry, there is an a priori scheme for organizing the different perspectives. Quite briefly, once one grasps the invariancy of cognitional structure and works out the epistemological implications of it, a universal viewpoint becomes possible. 196

The preceding sketch of the universal viewpoint has not exhausted all the content which Lonergan ascribes to

195 Ibid., p. 567.
196 Ibid., pp. 567-568.
We settle for a partial account because our purpose is limited. This chapter is concerned with the problem of historical realism. For the sake of avoiding lengthy additions to an already lengthy chapter, we have not made explicit mention of the metaphysics contained in the universal viewpoint. Similarly we will not attempt a thorough application of the universal viewpoint to any specific historical perspective. Such an application would require a full hermeneutical study of some historian's work. In attempting that study, we would have to provide a more extensive treatment of historical valuing—a topic appropriate to a speculative philosophy of history. So we propose to consider the application of the universal viewpoint to only one facet of historical perspectives, namely, their epistemological positions on historical facts.

The universal viewpoint envisions not only a genetic sequence of levels of meaning (i.e. common sense, theory, interiority, and the specializations of each), but also dialectically opposed meanings. Some account of dialectical differences was already provided in Chapter Two. The mutual repudiation existing between two dialectically opposed horizons was noted. It remains to account for such dialectical

197 The universal viewpoint which Lonergan studies at length in Insight (pp. 562-594), becomes the functional specialty named "dialectic" to which Chapter 10, of Method in Theology is devoted.

198 Lonergan locates this topic in the functional specialty of dialectic. See Method in Theology, pp. 245-246.
opposition in terms of the universal viewpoint.

The four dimensions of the potential totality of historical meanings can be combined in various ways. Certain combinations will yield dialectical oppositions. For example, a failure to understand what it is to understand may be combined with an experience of historical research to yield the thesis that historical understanding is a matter of closely observing the meanings given in preserved materials. In contrast to this thesis, other historians may take note of the constructive and critical aspects of historical procedures. For them, historical understanding is reached not solely by an attentiveness to preserved materials but in conjunction with intelligible reconstructions of historical events. But this group may itself split into dialectically opposed parties. On the one hand, some historians may consider their hypothetical constructs to be the terminus of historical understanding. The constructs arrange historical records in a coherent fashion, but, because the actual events can no longer be directly experienced and because subjective bias guides the elaboration of historical constructs, these constructs are not truly reflective of the past. On the other hand, some

199 We have already cited Fustel de Coulanges as a representative of this thesis. In another sense, Charles Beard is also representative of the thesis. He operated under the expectation that historical objectivity should be a matter of strict attention to given facts. Since he realized this ideal could not be reached, he concluded to a moderate relativism in historiography.
historians may operate with a notion of objectivity which requires coherence between data and interpretations while not excluding or ignoring the possibility of affirming that true historical meanings mediate past events. The latter group argues that a verified historical interpretation is probably true and that it thus refers to what was probably the case.

The dialectical oppositions in the preceding positions become manifest when one asks what the different groups take to be the objects of historical understanding. For the first group, historical objects or events are what is given in historical experience. To understand these objects, one need only exclude extraneous interests and carefully examine the presented materials. For the first party of the second group, historical objects or events are indirectly preserved in documents, monuments, art works, and so on. They are not presented in any direct way, so one must reconstruct their occurrence through the intelligent and critical use of the available materials. But, for the reasons listed above, what this party produces are not true interpretations mediating the past to the present. Rather, they produce, or assume that they produce, interpretations which reflect the needs and preconceptions of the present instead of what was actually the case. 200

200 Pragmatic theories of history are likely to represent this party. As an example, see Karl Popper's "Has History Any Meaning?" reprinted in The Philosophy of History in Our Time, edited by Hans Meyerhoff, pp. 300-304.
These two positions on historical objects or events do not refer to the same things. The first group refers to "given" meanings in historical remains; the second refers to the mental constructions of historical imagination. In an earlier section, we developed even a third position.

For the critical realist, historical facts are past events mediated by true acts of meaning. Is it possible to mediate these dialectical differences over what historical facts are? The basic problem, again, is one of historical realism. As argued previously, no appeal to historical evidence by itself can settle these disputes. The determination of the historical field and of historical objects belongs to a prior perspective/paradigm adopted for variable reasons. Consequently, the mediation of dialectical differences cannot be grounded within any privileged historical perspective without prejudicing from the very beginning the attempted reconciliation of differences.

However, besides the specialized horizons termed historical perspectives, there is the basic horizon which was sketched in Chapter Two. In successive chapters we have worked out the content of this basic horizon. Gradually a universal viewpoint has taken shape. Can this universal viewpoint mediate the previous dialectical differences? The answer is a qualified "Yes." It is qualified because the universal viewpoint itself only uncovers the
sources of the dialectical differences, it does not automatically mediate them. Such differences originate in radically different perspectives, and proofs of an epistemological sort will not automatically be accepted as disconfirming parts of the developed perspectives. What is required is the radical change in basic assumptions and values which is appropriately named a "conversion."

Care must be taken in relating a radical change, or conversion, to the reasons for that change. Hayden White proposes that a basic shift from one paradigm to another involves a prior change in moral or aesthetic convictions. The implication is that paradigm changes do not occur because of the discovery of new evidence or as the result of reasonable arguments which prove that a change is needed. They occur because of a dramatic shift in one's

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On this point there is an affinity between White's paradigm theory of history and the paradigm theory of science presented by Thomas S. Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The latter argues that the transfer of allegiance from one paradigm to another is the result of a conversion experience. (p. 151) Prior to that conversion, the two paradigms may be in competition, but their differences are not resolved by proofs. (p. 148) Lonergan remarks that the history of science supports the view that new scientific positions do not often win over their opponents as the result of reasonable proofs. He cites Max Planck to the effect that radical changes win acceptance only when those who have opposed them have retired from their positions of authority within the scientific profession. (Insight, p. 526.) However, for Lonergan, the fact of opposition is not identified with the thesis that conflicting scientific positions are unavoidably closed to rational mediation. The more likely explanation is that established positions are invested with years of effort and familiarity, and hence, are not changed without reluctance. Given an habitual way of conceiving certain problems, a scientist
precritical preferences. To some extent this is an acceptable account of the radical changes which mark transitions between historical or scientific paradigms. Antecedent frameworks which organize a field of inquiry proceed from the complex content of relative horizons. Among that content one can find moral expectations and aesthetic preferences. Thus, a change in those expectations and preferences may be reflected in a change of frameworks.

However, is this all that is involved in paradigm changes? There is some evidence that more than precritical preferences are involved. That evidence is found in the debates among followers of different paradigms. Such debates are not conducted with appeals to intuitions or personal experiences or private revelations. Instead, arguments are formulated by the different parties both to justify positions and to convince opponents. This way of proceeding implies at least the belief that reasonable arguments can be the basis for changes in paradigms. This implication expands the number of elements involved in paradigm changes. But, perhaps, paradigm debates imply a belief which actually is only a delusion; namely, reasonable

is unlikely to be receptive to new contrary conceptions. That is to say, the exercise of intelligence and reasonableness is routinized in the older conceptions and will not automatically be extended to the newer conceptions. (Ibid., pp. 525-526.)

Israel Scheffler develops this line of argumentation, in Science and Subjectivity, p. 79.
proofs cannot affect the basic assumptions of an opposed school of thought.

This possibility can be treated in two steps. First, the possibility that followers of different paradigms are deluded in their concern for reasonable defenses of their positions would involve the collapse of a distinction between the psychology and the logic of intelligible frameworks. The preferences, expectations, and variable choices which ground the maintenance of one paradigm against others belong to the psychological origins of thought-systems. Seemingly alien thought-systems will derive from different preferences, and so on. At this point one has differences which appear to be relative to precritical grounds. Given multiple conflicting thought-systems, it will be difficult for one party to understand the historical or scientific conceptions of another party. But a question for reflection addresses not this difficulty but the factualness of those alien conceptions. That is, one asks if they are valid even if they seem foreign to one's way of thinking. By asking such a question, one places limits on the relativity of historical positions to psychological differences. The question for reflection intends the truth value which escapes these relative differences.\(^{204}\)

Still, there is a possibility that such a question

\(^{204}\)Peter Berger argues along these lines, in *A Rumor of Angels*, p. 42.
cannot be answered without simply restating the questioner's own personal preferences. A second step must, therefore, be added to the previous step which distinguished between the psychology and the logic of intelligible frameworks.

This second step has in effect already been taken. The universal viewpoint is independent of one's personal likes and dislikes. Its independence derives from the a priori status of cognitional structure which does not vary from framework to framework. As previously argued, the dynamic structure of cognitional performance can be formulated in transcendental method. That formulation makes explicit the normative aspects of human intelligence in regard to all specialized interests and debates. As a result, the belief that differences among opposed frameworks are subject to intelligent criticism has a firm basis. In other words, one is not deluded in thinking that rational debate can play an effective role in settling disputes over paradigms. There is the upper blade of transcendental precepts which requires that debates be intelligently and reasonably conducted. There is the lower blade of historical procedures which provides the specific content for the debates.205

205 The use of the word "debates" serves a purpose here. Debates are often trials for rhetorical skills; to confound one's opponent takes precedence over the attainment of the truth about some issue. Even outside such rhetorical exercises, debates are often conducted in ways
These remarks were an attempt to clarify the relation between conversions and the reasons for such radical changes. Admittedly the presence of ethical, aesthetic, and routinized ways of thinking makes the background to these changes quite complicated. However, our basic point is that there are rational grounds for the debates among followers of different paradigms. In this chapter we have chosen to exemplify these grounds in regard to the issue of historical realism. Dialectical differences occur in respect to this issue. What, then, are the rational grounds for sorting out these differences?

The basic epistemological position and its implications for historical objectivity which were worked out in section three, provide these rational grounds. In particular, the complex notion of objectivity provides a basic standard for evaluating the adequacy of historical views on objectivity. The justification of this standard is a matter of appropriating the structure of human knowing. Thus, if a historical view of objectivity overlooks one of

that approximate to verbal brawls. No effort is made to understand one's "opponent;" instead, the objective is to demolish his arguments with any means available. Usually such a proceeding descends to sophistry. However, if a universal viewpoint can be formulated to embrace the possible range of positions on the issue, then it is possible to discover the sources of differences prompting the debate. Again, in keeping with the conclusion of Chapter Four, we presume that it is possible to reject bias and forms of obscurantism and so "to close the blades of the scissors" in a critical way.
the elements of the complex notion (whether it be the experiential, normative, or absolute element), that oversight can be traced to a prior failure to understand some element of cognitional performance. Charles Beard has already been cited as a historian whose confusion over the use of hypotheses in science and in history can be accounted for in terms of a cognitional mistake. That mistake was to confuse the logic and psychology of historiography and, thus, to collapse judgment into understanding.206

This move from an explicit theoretical or epistemological position to an underlying cognitional assumption is made possible by the universal viewpoint. It allows one to objectify part of the horizon (in this case, the basic horizon) of another thinker. And if the basic justification for this move lies in one's appropriation of his own dynamic intelligence, then the subsequent objectification eliminates the relativity of the historical interpreter to his own relative horizon. It also eliminates the relativity to a relative horizon of the one whose epistemological position is criticized.207 Both subjects, again, share a common, structured performance. That performance


207 Insight, p. 587.
can be objectified; and the objectification can be made in explanatory terms. Consequently, a statement of the underlying differences in dialectically opposed viewpoints about historical facts or about historical objectivity can be exact and can be defended independently of the preferences of either party.

Two qualifications have to be entered. The upper blade of transcendental method is not a series of formulae which, when applied to historical procedures or interpretations, automatically registers a "plus" or a "minus" in regard to the worth of those procedures or interpretations. Our discussion has been of the subject's appropriation of his own critical consciousness and not of the acquisition of propositions which are guaranteed to expose bias or failures to understand. The basic method is, thus, fallible because human beings are fallible. However, the strength of the method lies in its derivation from the spontaneities of human cognition which occur prior to any deliberate obscurantism. The subject who reflectively acknowledges his own spontaneous desire to know may later deviate from that self-understanding, but his failure to understand is not final. Further questions are likely to occur, so that he again challenges himself to correct past mistakes.

Besides the qualification which recognizes human

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208 Method in Theology, p. 254.
fallibility, there is a qualification which recognizes the historicity of the critical subject. The universal viewpoint does not, so to speak, rise above history either to reveal the meaning of historical processes or to predict future historical or intellectual developments. Rather, the universal viewpoint has its foundation in the dynamic curiosity which becomes specialized in humanistic and scientific disciplines. These disciplines have a history of development and differentiation. And the universal viewpoint permits access to the dynamic consciousness which actually differentiates itself through these specialized modes of inquiry. As a result, the achievement of the universal viewpoint contains both the a priori basis provided by cognitional structure and the a posteriori content provided by actual historical developments, e.g. the Greek differentiation of common sense and theory.

Given our first qualification, intellectual conversion becomes not so much a fixed achievement as a continual reaffirmation, in thought and word, of the basic dynamism of human intelligence and its consequent epistemological realism. That such a conversion does not occur automatically and is not a single event becomes obvious when one investigates conflicting opinions about human knowing. Even before one turns to consider human knowing as a topic for investigation, the so-called natural standpoint is
firmly entrenched. That standpoint involves myths about reality, objectivity and human knowledge. The ordinary assumptions are that knowing is similar to looking, that objectivity is a matter of seeing what is given without adding extraneous subjective variables, and that the real is what is "out there now" to be seen. These assumptions are not easily changed. Even when one begins to recognize the difference between a world of immediacy and a world mediated by meaning, it is quite easy to slip back into old ways of thinking. So intellectual conversion requires that these assumptions be made explicit, their incompleteness recognized, and the various myths eliminated. But all of this is no single achievement. There is a gradual discovery of the complexity of human knowing. Such a discovery corrects past misconceptions, but what replaces them is the product of thinking upon one's own thinking, and this is no simple task.

A large part of our previous work has worked out the cognitional and epistemological content which, through intellectual conversion, replaces the assumptions of the

209 The idées fixes of the natural standpoint become apparent in introductory epistemology courses for undergraduates. The teacher's experience is likely to resemble the gradual process of correction first illustrated in Socrates' conversation with the young Theaetetus.

210 Method in Theology, p. 238.

211 Some of the steps in this task were indicated in Chapter Three. Our discussion of introspection pointed up at least one of the problems involved in thinking upon one's thinking.
natural standpoint. But to expand one's basic horizon in recognizing genetically distinct levels of meaning and in appreciating the complexity both of knowing and of the known, is to present a new set of problems for the critical subject. The basic issue is one of intellectual responsibility. For it is likely that some bias or distortion of human intelligence has been present in the subject's previous work. Intellectual conversion requires that these sources of misunderstanding be rooted out. This is the requirement; the actual transformation requires that the theoretic change of intellectual conversion be matched by the willingness of moral conversion.212

Again, our discussion has not been of universal propositions and what can be deduced from them, but of the subject's appropriation of his own critical consciousness. This appropriation is, in the first place, a series of personal discoveries. Whether the subject will proceed to operate on the basis of his acquired self-knowledge is a question of moral freedom.213 That is, it is a question of


213 The issue of human freedom is usually raised (in the analytic tradition of the philosophy of history) as part of a discussion of the relation between science and history. Our previous discussion of that relation did not digress on this issue. However, even without an explicit mention of the problem of freedom versus historical determinism, that earlier discussion indicated how we would handle such a problem. We argued that historical explanation is a developed form of common-sense explanation both because of the language it uses and because of the particular
whether the self-constituting subject will choose to make his intellectual statements and procedures consistent with his awareness of what human knowing is all about. Put another way—the universal viewpoint embraces the differentiations of human consciousness and the potential totality of combinations among cognitional acts. But the universal viewpoint does not select from among the potential frameworks and cognitional positions those which adequately express the self-knowledge of the critical subject. That selection or decision is made by the subject. Thus, the question of consistency between self-knowledge and self-constituting activities belongs to the fourth level of human consciousness, the level of responsible deliberation and decision.

In Chapter Four our arguments for the possibility of avoiding or eliminating bias led up to this question of responsible decisions based on intellectual conversion.

objects it seeks to understand. Common-sense speech and explanation presuppose human responsibility, e.g. everyday expressions of gratitude, praise, and blame presume that human subjects deserve to be commended or censured. In turn, this presupposes that their deeds could have been otherwise. So common sense cannot dispense with the notions of human freedom and moral responsibility without losing its ordinary way of speaking. Similarly, historical speaking and explaining cannot entirely suppress these notions without losing their ordinary way of speaking historically. Isaiah Berlin develops these arguments in a more thorough way, in *Historical Inevitability* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954). See the selection reprinted from this work, in *The Philosophy of History in Our Time*, edited by Hans Meyerhoff, pp. 249-271.
Chapter Three had already drawn the connection between human knowing and doing, first, by including as part of intentionality structure the level of human deciding, and second, by formulating this fourth level in the transcendental precept: Be responsible. What does all this imply? To begin with, the basis of moral conversion lies neither in universal principles nor in particular judgments. Rather, it lies in that same dynamic structure which is the pattern of developing understanding. Just as understanding develops in the subject's operations which advance through their own inherent exigency, so too the subject who passes judgment on a particular situation is spontaneously faced with the operation of deciding. That is—Now that I understand what human knowing is, what am I going to do about it? The fourth level of human intentionality, thus, completes the process which began spontaneously. 214

The content of acts of deliberation and of deciding will vary with different individuals, different cultures, different contexts. Therefore, an element of relativity is unavoidable in responsible decisions. But the relativity is primarily attached to what the decider knows and has previously done. The child and the adult, the uneducated and the educated, the private individual and the public leader do not bring the same backgrounds to the moment.

of decision. However, what remains the same for all of them is the spontaneity of both deliberation and the implicit precept guiding that deliberation: In the light of what you know, be responsible for what you do.\textsuperscript{215}

What implications does this precept have for a historian's procedures? Given the unity of consciousness, the historian who seeks understanding and is acquainted with the professional techniques which promote clarity and discourage obscurity will spontaneously put those techniques to work. For a specialized consciousness, the desire to know extends from the field of technical understanding and expression to

\textsuperscript{215}An argument for the effective presence of this precept can be constructed out of examples of inconsistency between knowing and doing. The war criminal whose defense rests on the appeal to orders received from a superior, pleads innocent (1) because the presumption is that superiors have reasons for their orders and these need not be told to subordinates, (2) because the subordinate is not expected to deliberate but to follow orders, and (3) any moral hesitation can be put aside in the belief that what is problematic for the subordinate may make sense to superiors. The plea then is to a consistency between knowing and doing, but that consistency is supposed (at least for the sake of a defense argument). It is supposed either that superiors have reasons unknown to subordinates or else that the duty to obey orders takes precedence over private scruples.

The response of the courts to this defense can exemplify the implicit precept. Human responsibility is presupposed and deliberation is expected from the mentally competent. The individual cannot abrogate this responsibility even if he is under orders. The judgment of the courts will reject the defense argument. However, if the subordinate can show that he was unaware of the consequences of his actions, then his charge is lessened. How many pled ignorance of what actually was going on in "those camps"? Were they not trying to preserve at least a semblance of consistency between what they did (or failed to do) and what they knew?
the field of technical and deliberate practice. Thus, the empirically, intelligently, rationally conscious subject is also an intellectually responsible subject.²¹⁶

Of course, there are obstacles both to historical understanding and to historical practice. The multiple forms of bias are instances of potential hindrances of efforts to make practice consistent with knowing. However, those hindrances are neither insurmountable nor unavoidable.²¹⁷ Therefore, intellectual responsibility is possible. The transcendental precept, Be responsible, expresses the immanent imperative to criticize one's practice in the light of one's knowing. Intellectual responsibility is measured by this immanent norm, and moral conversion is the explicit decision that the desire to know shall be matched by one's willingness to act according to what one knows.²¹⁸

Again, as in the case of intellectual conversion, this decision is not a fixed achievement. Flight from self-understanding and rationalization of failures to act responsibly are not forever banished by a single decision. Just as the pursuit of knowledge can engage a subject through years of study, so too moral conversion is a life-

²¹⁶ *Insight*, p. 599.

²¹⁷ The arguments for this assertion form the final section of Chapter Four.

long process. Thus, competence in historical procedures can increase over many years of practice. That increased competence involves an increased understanding of how one should proceed with technical labor if the results are to be in keeping with known standards. But to know how one should proceed does not guarantee how one will proceed.

However, years of historical study have already offered multiple opportunities to criticize bias in oneself and in others. If the historian has used those opportunities to transcend his own failings and to avoid those of others, his present practice is likely to shun the same errors. In other words, facility in solving theoretical problems will likely be matched by a concomitant facility in deciding on the responsible course of action. This facility in his doing and in his knowing may win public recognition. Then his intellectual responsibility is not simply presumed by his peer group. On the basis of his past performance, that group will not be quick to charge his mistakes to any deliberate obscurantism. Such a bond of trust among professionals is a witness to intellectual integrity which has been demonstrated time and again. Implicitly it is a recognition of moral conversion since the group acknowledges the efforts of the individual to propose only what meets the immanent norm of consistency between historical knowledge and historical practice.

In summary, this fifth section has taken the final
series of steps in resolving the problem of historical realism. This problem is central to the theoretical impasse of the crisis of historicism. Our strategy has been to show a way around that impasse by resolving the problems of objectivity, of a science of history, and of historical realism. Previous chapters prepared the groundwork for the resolution of these complex problems, and in this chapter the resolutions have been presented, clarified, and defended.

The question of historical realism could not be handled satisfactorily unless there were compelling theoretical grounds for resolving the dialectical differences over historical objects and historical knowing. We anticipated the content of the needed grounds in two intellectual conditions and one moral condition. There must be a critical method for investigating how diverse historical perspectives are developed. That method must cut across all the differences in historical theories in such a way as to escape relativity to particular audiences and their preferences. Finally, the discovery of this basic method will only lead to a resolution of the crisis if it can be implemented in an unbiased way. The first two conditions were fulfilled in the notion of a universal viewpoint which embraces the potential totality of diverse historical perspectives. The third condition can be fulfilled by a critical effort to make one's historical practice consistent with what is known
Summary of Chapter V

A repeated theme of this dissertation has been that Hayden White's "solution" to the crisis of historicism was insufficient on a number of counts. If a more promising solution were to be offered, certain obstacles to White's attempt would have to be overcome. This fifth chapter concentrated on two of those obstacles: that paradigms are closed systems of thought and that paradigm changes merely reflect changes in precritical preferences. To the first obstacle (as formulated in the problem of the hermeneutical circle), we opposed both the self-correcting process of learning and the universal viewpoint derived from Loner-ergan's cognitional theory. To the second obstacle (as formulated in the thesis that no epistemological justification is available for a view of historical realism), we contrasted epistemological positions on knowing and objectivity which were critically grounded in cognitional performance.

The problem of historical realism turned up in our consideration of both obstacles. Different views of historical realism marked the conflicts among nineteenth-century historical paradigms. Likewise, claims about the superiority of one view over others (i.e. it was a more "scientific" or "realistic" view) were not explicitly based
on critical grounds. Hence, the claims appeared gratuitous to those not sharing the same paradigm. Clearly the problem of historical realism requires a metahistorical standpoint beyond the different paradigms. This standpoint must allow a critical mediation of their differences while at the same time being itself defensible against contrary epistemological positions.

The question of historical objectivity provided a focus for incompatible epistemological viewpoints, and, hence, a focus for arguments in defense of a particular conception of historical realism. In section two of the chapter, we offered some preliminary clarifications of historical objectivity. Special attention was given to the relations between data and the inquiring subject, between data and facts, and among data, facts, and heuristic frameworks. The relations among the last group are currently discussed as the problem of the hermeneutical circle. The problem of circularity in interpretations can be viewed in such a way that one accepts the thesis of closed thought-systems. However, we argued that there is a self-correcting aspect to developing understanding which, in effect, refutes that thesis. Moreover, correctly understood, the hermeneutical circle does not entail that thesis. We suggested that the belief in such an entailment could originate in three ways: through the thesis of presuppositionless history, through a confusion of insight with deduction,
through a denial of mental acts.

The clarifications of objectivity begun in section two were continued in section three. The component issues of evidence and of verification had to be clarified. Historical evidence has its preconditions in the classifying function of historical intelligence and in the use of hypotheses. Such formal evidence is connected to the problems of verification by questions about the "sufficiency" of evidence. What is meant by the sufficiency of evidence can be explanatorily expressed in the notion of the virtually unconditioned. This notion is crucial for two reasons: it formulates reason-in-act and thematizes the rational connection between Lonergan's cognitional theory and his epistemology.

This rational connection was further clarified in noting what was affirmed in answers to question for reflection. To affirm that a historical interpretation is true is to affirm that, on the basis of the known evidence, the object of thought corresponds to past events and their consequences. The clarity of this type of correspondence was not simply assumed. The thesis of isomorphism was presented, clarified, and defended as explaining how through intentional acts the subject transcends himself toward intended objects. A basic argument for the thesis ("to deny it, one must assume it") also proved the validity of an epistemological thesis identified as critical realism:
the real is the truly affirmed. This epistemological position implies multiple meanings for the terms "object" and "objectivity." These multiple distinctions manifest their usefulness and validity when contrasted with less complex notions of knowing, of objectivity, and of the real.

The complex notion of objectivity and the basic epistemological position of section three provide the foundation for the work of section four. There the purpose is to manifest how one can evaluate claims of historical realism. Those claims are usually formulated in terms of a science of history. Thus, we had to clarify the relation between the natural sciences and history. Because of fundamental differences, that relation will not be one of identity or of thorough imitation. Still, since both science and history proceed in methodical ways, have public checks on the individual's work, and yield verifiable results, one can speak of scientific history. Our main contention is that the scientific aspects of historical work can be defended on non-preferential grounds. Similarly, the non-scientific aspects of historical work can be noted and evaluated without reducing history to fiction and without conceding that historical explanation is inferior to scientific explanation.

The question of historical realism is thus removed from its usual context of a proposed scientizing of history. What context is to replace the usual one? White's
comparative study of historical paradigms, the cultural interchange of anthropologists, and a traditional criticism of Gibbon's work provide evidence for a higher viewpoint beyond historical perspectives. If there is such a higher viewpoint, does it allow evaluative comparison of different perspectives? The fact that historical paradigms are said to be "incompatible" implies a common framework having comparative and evaluative criteria.

Chapter Three had supplied the fundamental principle of development and revision in different thought-systems: cognitional structure is the a priori condition for changes in meaning. Therefore, it is also the common framework containing the potential totality of changes in meaning and in conceptual order. The work of Chapters Three and Four had provided explanatory and descriptive accounts of how human intelligence and rationality proceed in the development and revision of meaning. Hence, the common framework was not left mysterious but was comprehended in a methodical way. Transcendental method formulates the evaluative criteria of the higher viewpoint, yet it is not immediately apparent how its formal criteria apply to historical practice.

Chapter Four had already related the formal criteria (i.e. the transcendental precepts) to historical procedures. Chapter Five further clarified the relation between precept and practice by means of the image of two blades of a pair
of scissors. The upper blade of appropriated cognitional structure gives access to the development of understanding presupposed by every intelligible historical conclusion. The lower blade of historical materials and procedures gives specific content to which the upper blade can be applied.

The application of the upper blade has an a posteriori aspect since historical inquiry must supply the materials to be organized. However, there is also an a priori aspect, and this can be formulated as a universal viewpoint cutting across differences in historical perspectives. The universality of the viewpoint derives from two facts: the structure of human intentionality is the same for every historian, and the meanings developed through cognitional acts reflect a limited number of combinations of those acts. That is to say, historical conclusions will reflect how their proponents fulfilled the precondition of cognitional structure in coming to know something about the past. This process of developing understanding can be reconstructed in part, and the normative function of transcendental method allows one to criticize conclusions in terms of the steps taken to reach them.

This universal viewpoint was used to study dialectical differences of opinion about historical facts. These differences belong to the debates over historical realism and are representative of incompatible differences belonging
to the crisis of historicism. Disputes which could not be mediated from within the historical field can be mediated once the universal viewpoint is grasped. However, the universal viewpoint only locates the sources of surface differences in the combinations of cognitional acts and in the distinctions (or absence of them) among levels of meaning. The elimination of confusions and oversights on a deep level can only be effected by a radical change termed "conversion."

Since the need is for a critical mediation of historical disputes, conversions must reflect more than shifts in precritical preferences. What evidence is there for rational criteria prompting conversions? Debates among followers of different historical paradigms provide some evidence. These debates involve exchanges of arguments, so the belief is that rational criteria can make a difference in one's conclusions. Are the debaters deluding themselves? A negative reply is required if at least some difference is allowed between the psychology and the logic of historical inquiry. A stronger basis for a negative reply is provided by the universal viewpoint. The normative function of transcendental method supplies explicit criteria for reasonable debate. In addition, the intelligent criticism of opposed conclusions has a distinctively non-preferential base if it is guided by what is known about cognitional performance.
We exemplified this intelligent criticism in regard to differences of opinion about historical facts. The rational basis for the criticism derived from the epistemological position and complex notion of objectivity developed in section three. One author's difficulty with facts and objective interpretations was traced back to a prior misunderstanding of cognitional performance. Thus, this exercise in criticism from a universal standpoint objectified part of the basic horizon of an author. What was objectified was then criticized on rational grounds, and the critique was ultimately justified on the basis of a correct understanding of human knowing. Consequently, the critique in its origins and conclusions escaped relativity to a particular historical perspective or to a particular set of variable preferences.

Finally, all of these strategic moves around the obstacles to White's attempted solution would be useless if intellectual responsibility were impossible. Our preceding work has pointed out the need for both clarifications and corrections in various historical positions. Will this need be met? Actually we limited ourselves to the question, Can this need be met? Chapter Four argued that a negative reply was not necessitated by unavoidable or irreducible bias. A more positive approach was taken in this chapter.

Just as one and the same person is both thinker and actor, so the spontaneity of cognitional performance merges
with the spontaneity of deliberation and decision. We spontaneously guide our practice by our prior learning. In the technical practice of a scholarly enterprise, that prior learning includes norms for how one should carry out a professional inquiry. Implicitly it is expected that practice should be consistent with what is known. Of course, this expectation is not necessarily fulfilled. But that is only to admit that intellectual and moral responsibility is asked of free individuals. Given the self-knowledge attained through the previous reflection on human knowing, an individual would have difficulty in holding, without qualification, those theses which introduced each of the last four chapters.
POSTSCRIPT

If the theses with which Chapters Two through Five began can no longer be held without qualification, is the way clear for resolving the crisis of historicism? The four theses formulated certain basic difficulties confronting historians and philosophers of history. These formulated difficulties were in turn categorized under the headings of problems concerning historical objectivity, the relation of history to science, and historical realism. In a series of arguments culminating in the lengthy discussion of Chapter Five, we concluded that the aforementioned problems could be resolved in terms of Lonergan's transcendental method. By proving the counterproposals of each chapter, we showed that the difficulties formulated by Hayden White and falling within the more general problem areas could also be cleared up through the same methodological approach. Thus, it would seem that the way is clear for resolving the crisis of historicism.

However, our claims for the successful outcome of this dissertation are more modest. In the first place, our focus has been limited to the three problem areas, and we have borrowed an understanding of the subordinate issues in those areas from the work of a single author, Hayden
White. Second, we have centered our attention on Lonergan's transcendental method without claiming that other schools of thought have nothing to add to what Lonergan says. Indeed, in citing works by historians and philosophers alike, we have admitted that the crisis-problems can be treated in multiple ways. But the narrowed focus we have adopted is not without merit. Hayden White's *Metahistory* was shown to be a brilliant, if not wholly satisfactory, study of the underlying problems of the crisis period. In addition, our successful resolution of certain long-standing issues proves the worth of Lonergan's transcendental method.

A more cogent justification of our narrowed focus is available. The crisis of historicism continued in the absence of critical metahistorical grounds for mediating disputes over historical processes and historiographical procedures. Both White and Lonergan seek the needed metahistorical grounds—the one in terms of a linguistic deep structure, the other in terms of the *a priori* structure of human cognition. Both authors move beyond purely descriptive accounts of historical perspectives and historiographical procedures to explanatory positions accounting for those different perspectives and practices. White's linguistic-structuralist approach yields an explanatory framework composed of modes of poetic speech and strategies of explanation. However, he ultimately grounds his explanatory framework in the subject's moral and aesthetic
opinions. Since, as noted before, the measure of an explanatory position is the definition of things in their relations, not to the subject, but among themselves, White's explanatory framework does not ultimately rest on an explanatory foundation.

This foundational weakness in White's analysis is not insignificant. On a descriptive level, he investigates the origins of diverse historical perspectives—perspectives already classified under explanatory categories. In pointing out the variables at the root of diverse perspectives, he describes how different paradigm-choices are made. However, his descriptive account offers no basis for comparing or criticizing either the perspectives or their variable predeterminants—they are simply different and, in some cases, exclusively so. This inadequacy shows up in his recommended solution to the sceptical outcome of the crisis, i.e. in his advocacy of a "will to believe" in accordance with moral and aesthetic aspirations. An explanatory foundation must offer more than this. The crisis of historicism originates in radically opposed beliefs, and the assertion of one more belief is scarcely the way to resolve the crisis.

On the other hand, Lonergan's transcendental method does have an explanatory foundation in cognitional structure. Throughout the last three chapters, we have developed the implications of Chapter Two's discovery of a
cognitional element in the subject's basic horizon. The strength of this discovery became apparent when we gradually elaborated the critical elements within developing historical perspectives and their subordinate meanings. In Chapter Five, this gradual process culminated in an abbreviated discussion of the universal viewpoint. We argued that such a viewpoint escapes relativity to particular audiences because it rests on the a priori grounds presupposed by all the different ways of viewing and of doing history. Thus, a metahistorical position has been presented which not only is explanatory but also does not owe its validity to any single perspective or to any of the variables "beneath" particular perspectives.

But to discover and defend this metahistorical position is not the same as actually to mediate the disputes of the crisis period. We have indicated a strategy of mediation, an approach which offers compelling theoretical grounds in place of variable preferences. To do more than this would greatly expand the dissertation. In particular, the topics of moral conversion and of the aesthetic elements in historical narration would have to be given considerable space. For our limited purposes these topics were sufficiently investigated. Moreover, even after a second or third dissertation on moral and aesthetic problems, the actual mediation of the disputes of the crisis would remain to be carried out. A historical work written
in conjunction with the developed universal viewpoint would be the actual test for successfully resolving the crisis of historicism. Such a work would not retain the limits of this dissertation. It would easily move into areas proper to the speculative tradition in the philosophy of history. But we have avoided those areas, and hence, we have not attempted to evaluate historical perspectives in their entirety.

An additional limitation was indicated in Chapter Two. We did not undertake a special inquiry into human historicity (Geschichtlichkeit). The additional problems raised by such an inquiry into the historical being of man himself would add an excessive number of pages to our already lengthy work. Such an inquiry is not easily foresworn. Human historicity is the everyday experience from which arise all the diverse types of historical writings. As such it is basic to the critical type of history upon which our methodological discussions focused. But although we did not speak at length of historicity as the fundamental context of specialized inquiry, we did contribute some insights into that context. The elements of relative horizons treated in Chapter Two could be used to specify some of the content of human historicity. More important, the cognitive structure defended in Chapter Three specifies an intellectual and critical aspect of human historicity. The transcendental method derived from that a priori aspect is
the norm for later specializations arising in historical consciousness. Consequently, even within the limits of the dissertation, a key element of human historicity has been explored in detail.

Still, because of the preceding limitations in our work, we can only claim to have shown a way beyond the theoretical impasse of the crisis of historicism. This impasse is composed of certain basic problems, and we have indicated how these problems can be resolved. This impasse can be considered insurmountable—such was one implication of White's various theses. But we have shown that his theses must be qualified. In effect, the three basic problems of the crisis have not remained unresolved nor have the mentioned obstacles remained unsurmounted. So, we can assert that our strategy has reached its goal, and further studies may build on what we have accomplished.
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The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

May 6, 1975

Director's Signature