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Aristotle's Attitude Towards Homer

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ARISTOTLE'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS HOMER

by

Donald J. McGuire, S.J.

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

February 1977
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VITA

The author, the Reverend Donald J. McGuire, S.J., is the son of Joseph Philip McGuire and Ellen Veronica (Kirby) McGuire. He was born July 9, 1930, the fifth of nine children, in Oak Park, Illinois.

He grew up in a home that was filled with the love of Greek and Latin Classics his father had gained early in the century at St. Ignatius College. He completed seven years of elementary education with the Sisters of the B.V.M. at St. Agatha Grammar School where he graduated at twelve years of age in June, 1943. At sixteen, in June of 1947 he graduated with a Classical Honors Diploma from his father's Alma Mater, St. Ignatius High School, where he had had a four-year scholarship.

August 21, 1947 he entered the Society of Jesus at Milford, Ohio where he spent the next two years in intensive spiritual training. During the ensuing two years at Milford he completed most of his undergraduate courses. In August, 1951 he went to West Baden College, West Baden Springs, Indiana to pursue the study of Philosophy. In June, 1952 he received the degree of Bachelor of Arts cum laude there with a major in Classical languages from Loyola University of Chicago. In June, 1954 he received the Licentiate in Philosophy cum laude from West Baden College.
For the next three years he taught Latin at Loyola Academy, a Jesuit secondary school in Chicago, Illinois. In the summer of 1955 he completed all the courses required for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy at Loyola University of Chicago. At the completion of four years' study of Theology he received the Licentiate in Theology cum laude from West Baden College and was ordained a priest in June, 1961.

From June, 1961 until February, 1965 he lived in Europe. The summer of 1961 he studied the German language and culture in Bavaria. From September, 1961 to June, 1962 he engaged once again in intensive spiritual and Apostolic training at Münster in Westphalia, Germany. From October, 1962 to February, 1965 he did special studies at the Philosophical Institute of the Theological Faculty of the University of Innsbruck, Austria. During his stay in Europe, besides mastering German and French, he did extensive priestly work during vacations in Germany, Austria, England, and Ireland--retreats, parish work, hospital and military chaplaincy, and the teaching of Theology. During the summers of 1962 through 1964 he traveled extensively in Europe, studying cultures, but especially visiting the academic institutions of twenty countries to evaluate the balance of scientific and humanistic studies at every educational level.

After returning to the United States he taught Classical Greek and Theology at Loyola Academy in Wilmette,
Illinois from February, 1965 to February, 1970. There he became Chairman of the Classics Department and co-founded an Honors Program which featured an in-depth introduction to Eastern and Western cultures, in which the students studied seven semesters of Classical Greek language and literature along with six semesters of Mandarin dialect and Chinese culture.

In February, 1970 the author began his work towards the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Classical Studies at Loyola University of Chicago. In February, 1974 he received the degree of Master of Arts in Classical Studies from the same University.

Throughout the last ten years of teaching and study he has continued priestly work, concentrating on parish work and especially retreats.
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CHAPTER ONE

DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM
ITS SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

Praise did not flow readily from the pen of Aristotle. It seemed to have very little place, in fact, in the intensely critical and analytical method of the Philosopher. His generous praise of Homer, therefore, is all the more surprising, when it soars exuberantly above the quiet, even plane of his very ordered, disciplined argumentation.

He calls Homer 'godlike'\textsuperscript{1}--an epithet that would be extravagant even from an extravagant critic! Coming from this precise, conservative thinker it deserves especially serious attention and very careful evaluation.

That Aristotle was not alone in recognizing the enormous presence of Homer in the world of Greek thought and culture would not be difficult to demonstrate. Aeschylus comes to mind immediately when he spoke of his works as "slices from the banquet table of Homer".\textsuperscript{2} The words of Dionysius of Halicarnassus echo the same thought: "Homer is the source of every sea, every river, and every spring".\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1}"Τεσπέσιος ἄν φανεῖη," \textit{Poetics} 1459a, 30.

\textsuperscript{2}"οὐδ' ἐπὶ νοῦν βαλλόμενος τὸ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ λαμπροῦ Αἰσχύλου, δε τὸς αὐτὸς τραγῳδίας τεμάχη εἶναι ἔλεγεν τῶν Ὄμηρον μεγάλων δείπνων. Athenaeus 8 347e.

\textsuperscript{3}Dionysius of Halicarnassus, \textit{De Compositione Verborum} 24.
The statement implies that the poets who follow Homer are utterly dependent upon him. But Dionysius did not limit the Poet's influence to poetry. He asserts that through Homer all other studies came into Greece, including philosophy. 

Modern Homeric studies have strengthened rather than diminished this ancient judgement. Giacomo Soleri wrote in 1961 of the impossibility of a Greek of the ancient world prescinding from the Homeric influence.

Era praticamente impossibile a chiunque, vivente nell'ambiente greco, prescindere da Homero, limitandosi ad ignorarlo....

Certainly then, in a sense, Aristotle had no choice as a Greek but to live in an Homeric world. This insight has led many to explain Aristotle's frequent reference to Homer on this basis alone—that he had to speak of Homer. This is certainly a facet of the explanation of Aristotle's great involvement with the Poet. But it is not the whole answer. In saying it we have really begged the question, since we are simply stating that Aristotle, himself, like his pupils, submitted to a profound Homeric influence.

Some have suggested that he went to the defense of the Poet because he felt the attacks on Homer were attacks on Poetry itself. To defend Homer therefore meant to defend

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4 Ibid.
poetry. Again there is truth here, but a begging of the question. We have still to answer the question--why did Aristotle identify poetry with Homer? Why was Homer The Poet, as he called him? Why did his thoughts turn so frequently and with such unfailing admiration to the Poet?

This defense-of-poetry explanation exposes the problem even more, since it reveals that not all Greeks shared Aristotle's unbounded admiration for Homer. We are driven even further to inquire into the extent and reasons for the Aristotle-Homer special relationship.

The question revolves around the determination of whether Aristotle's choice of Homer was ultimately on his part free, or determined by the circumstances of Greek culture and education. The only route to an answer to that question, it seemed, lay in a thorough examination of Aristotle's expressed attitude towards the Poet.

It is the aim of this study to determine Aristotle's attitude towards Homer from an examination of all the many references he makes to Homer in his extant works as they are contained in the Immanuel Bekker edition of Aristotle. It aims to present all the passages where he cites or alludes to Homer, to analyze their significance, and discover

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aspects and interrelationships of Aristotle's views on Homer for a full and balanced picture.

Before the text-by-text analysis the state of scholarship on the question of Aristotle's attitude towards Homer will be examined in the second chapter. The primary purpose there will be to determine to what extent scholars have ever attempted an analysis of Aristotle's attitude towards Homer by examining his citations of and allusions to the Poet in the course of his writings. Works, therefore, related to this study will be compared in the light of its purpose to note especially: the texts of Aristotle they select, the methods of analysis they use, and the conclusions they draw about Aristotle's attitude towards Homer.

The main body of the study will center in chapters three, four, five and six, where all the Homeric citations and allusions of Aristotle are examined and evaluated. This is how the preliminaries of the study proceeded.

Using Bonitz's *Index Aristotelicus* as a basic reference and guide all the pertinent texts were collated with the lists drawn from Heitz and Ross. The dependability

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of each text was noted—the Aristotelian and Homeric texts in themselves, but especially whether Aristotle's Homeric text differed from our textus receptus. All the discrepancies and difficulties discovered in this investigation of the texts will be noted and evaluated in every case in the course of this study.

After the Aristotelian and Homeric texts were studied in their separate larger contexts, they were grouped according to the particular attitude they manifested. Four classifications or groups were determined.

The first group of texts, which will be examined in the third chapter, exemplify Aristotle's view of Homer primarily as a master of the arts of language—as poet and rhetorician. 'Primarily' is an important qualification here, since it should be noted at the outset that these classifications represent a primary not an exclusive characteristic. For example, when the Philosopher views Homer as "the Poet" his view extends beyond language to many of the deepest insights into man's life and destiny.

The second group of texts, treated in the fourth chapter, will center around Aristotle's view of Homer as a source of scientific and philosophic information. The third group will see Homer primarily as a teacher of human values. These will be studied in the fifth chapter, while the last group which escape simple classification will be treated in the sixth chapter as 'other texts'.
In the treatment of all of these texts, particularly helpful insights of ancient and modern commentators will be noted.

In the course of the four textual chapters (Three through Six), whenever an Aristotelian passage containing an Homeric quotation is cited, the Poet's words will be set off from the Philosopher's with a smaller, Greek elite typeface. Aristotelian passages without such elite typeface will be recognized as containing only allusions to Homer. In the Footnotes, all Homeric citations—for quotations or allusions—will be preceded by an equal sign and enclosed in parentheses, e.g.: (=Odyssey i.l.).

All the Homeric quotations and allusions found in the Corpus Aristotelicum of Immanuel Bekker will be included in this study, even those from treatises judged not the work of Aristotle by the last hundred years of Aristotelian scholarship—On the Cosmos, The Problems, On Wonderful Things Heard, and Books IX and X of The History of the Animals. The Homeric references from these works, considered not authentically Aristotle's, will be studied chiefly for three reasons along with those viewed quite universally until recently as strictly Aristotle's.

First, the present uncertainty about the 'Aristotelian Problem'—what is genuinely Aristotle's work?—justifies an openness to every work or fragment that has been seriously attributed to the Philosopher. The whole atmosphere sur-
questions than answers. Where is the true doctrine of Aristotle to be found—in those extant treatises that the last century of scholarship has unquestionedly called authentic or only in the fragments of the dialogues? If the fragments prove to be the only authentic Aristotle, would not the whole Corpus, and not just those treatises considered spurious until now, fall into the non-authentic category? Which fragments or parts of fragments are authentically Aristotle? To what specific lost work does each fragment or part of fragment belong? What works and doctrine of Aristotle did those who prepared the spurious works of the Corpus have before them? How much did they adhere to or deviate from his doctrine? Anton-Herman Chroust, in the general preface of his recent (1973) two-volume work on the Philosopher vividly presents this uncertainty of Aristotle's authorship injected into the world of Aristotelian scholarship:

Both Rose and Jaeger, it will be noted, never so much as questioned Aristotle's authorship of the Corpus. In 1952, Joseph Zürcher, in his Aristotle's Work and Spirit (Paderborn, 1952), advanced or, more accurately, implied the startling thesis, subsequently rejected by almost all scholars, that certain treatises incorporated in the Corpus, especially the Metaphysics, must in large part be credited to Theophrastus and to the Early Peripatetus, although it is quite certain that some Aristotlian compositions actually came to be included in the Corpus. . . . Presumably, at some future time, we might, whether we like it or not, be compelled to rename the present Corpus Aristotelicum and call it more discriminately Corpus Scriptorum Peripateticorum Veterum, that is, a 'collection' of
writings which not only includes authentic Aristotelica, but in all likelihood also contains authentic Peripatetica. . . . It is possible . . . that further investigations may, indeed, remove any and all reasonable doubts about the authenticity of the whole Corpus Aristotelicum and thus assuage our justifiable apprehension.11

The second reason for justifying the inclusion of the presently named spurious works of the Corpus in this study is that obviously, in some true sense, they are Aristotelian. Until we have resolved some of the above-mentioned questions about genuine Aristotelian authorship and come to a better understanding of why these works were included in the Corpus in the first place, it seems reasonable to include them here, as expressing Aristotle's mind just as validly as any treatise accepted as authentic.

The third reason for including the Homeric quotations and allusions from the spurious works is that a study containing all Homeric references in the Corpus Aristotelicum contributes to the understanding of a true phase of Aristotelian scholarship. Bekker's Corpus is a universally recognized landmark in the history of our understanding of Aristotle. Immediately after its publication the critical work of scrutinizing the judgements that caused the inclusion or exclusion of works on the basis of authenticity began and has continued into our time. In fact, since Jaeger's study of the development of Aristotle's

thought appeared, the increased intensity of investigations of the *Fragments* revitalized interest in the question of determining the authentic work of Aristotle. Paul Wilpert observed this:

When Werner Jaeger in his important book interpreted the dialogues as belonging to Aristotle's early writings and pointed to the difference between the doctrines of the dialogues and those of the treatises as marking a development of thought, the reports of the lost works became important for the understanding of Aristotle's philosophy and its development. The fragments were studied with growing interest, and recent years have seen a great number of scholarly publications dealing with particular titles. The outcome was that Rose's *Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta* were looked upon as real fragments of lost writings. The collection, which originally included everything ascribed to Aristotle by ancient tradition, was now regarded as containing the remains of lost genuine works.

Until these problems about authenticity, which have developed since Bekker's *Corpus Aristotelicum* was published, reach a more comprehensive resolution it is essential that other studies of Aristotle go forward, even provisionally. This is true especially of a study like the present one which has never been done for the Bekker edition before. Every allusion or quotation drawn from a treatise which is presently judged spurious will be noted as such, of course. Since the spurious Works will be noted clearly, for

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simplicity's sake 'Aristotle' or 'the Philosopher' will be spoken of as the author in the general conclusions.

The Fragments which contain their author's citation of or allusion to Homer will be included in an appendix. Since there is so much study precisely about the authenticity of the Fragments it seemed better to set them all apart from the Corpus and not include them in the conclusions of this study. It is evident that all the Fragments constitute a continuing crucial but separate problem of Aristotelian scholarship and deserve a thorough separate study.

Paul Wilpert traced the chief modern problem with the Fragments to Rose's conviction that led him to decide to list them as belonging to Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus for the Bekker edition of Aristotle.

Rose's conviction that the tradition represented by the Fragments is spurious was based upon the observation that the doctrines attributed to Aristotle in the Fragments very often do not agree with the thoughts of the treatises. He assumed that the majority of the fragments of lost, putatively Aristotelian works, together with the associated doxographical comments, had nothing to do with Aristotle at all; and on this assumption he collected everything that had been attributed to Aristotle at any time in later antiquity.\(^\text{14}\)

Wilpert concludes that modern scholarship on the Fragments must break with the Rose limitations.

There is urgent need for another critical survey of the material which contains evidence of Aristotle's lost works. No satisfactory results can be expected as long as we continue to base our researches on a collection

\(^{14}\text{Wilpert, op. cit., p. 258.}\)
which was meant to give a conspectus of pseudepigrapha. To a greater or lesser degree, later investigations are influenced by Rose's material. . . What we have to do is to establish which of the texts and which of the evidence can be assigned to Aristotle and in particular to a given work of Aristotle, with as much certainty as is attainable under the circumstances. 15

Recently Chroust has echoed Wilpert's observations:

The basic scholarly attitude towards Aristotle's lost works still is determined and, hence, prejudiced by what Rose had said in support of his unusual (and questionable) thesis contrived about one hundred years ago. . . Barring a few isolated instances, the present status of the many problems connected with the lost works of Aristotle does not permit us to establish with any degree of certainty which particular texts are genuine fragments or excerpts, and which are merely doxographical accounts of frequently doubtful value. Neither does it really enable us to determine with any degree of certainty which texts may be safely credited to Aristotle or, perhaps, to a particular composition or title. 16

Based on these realistic appraisals of the present reliability of the Fragments, citations from them, as previously stated, will be simply included as a separate appendix to this study. It is hoped that at some later date they will be subjected to an investigation similar to the one the Corpus Aristotelicum is receiving in this study and throw more light on the conclusions reached here.

The main goal of this study is limited, therefore, to examining all Homeric quotations and allusions in the Corpus Aristotelicum to gain an understanding of the attitude towards Homer they manifest.

15Ibid., pp. 262-263.
In view of the uncertainties surrounding the authenticity of the treatises of the *Corpus* and in view of the work that remains to be done with the *Fragments* there is no intention here of trying to determine a development or change in the Philosopher's opinion of Homer. This study will have to rest with the determination of: inconsistencies, if there are any; aspects of Homer's thought included in the view of the Aristotle of the *Corpus*; and finally, the importance of the Philosopher's stand on Homeric studies.

A clear underlying purpose of this effort is to gain, too, a greater knowledge of the *Nachleben* of Homer--Homer's influence on those who followed him, in this case, the Aristotle of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*.

G. Glockmann maintained in 1968 that the influence of the Poet has not yet been fully researched.¹⁷

Guided by this realization surely G. Lohse produced earlier his fine series of three articles on the Homeric citations in Plato¹⁸. This same conviction led Jan Fredrik Kindstrand to research Homer in the work of Dio Chrysostom, Aelius Aristides, and Maximus of Tyre. Kindstrand's apology for his work is even more appropriate here since this study deals with an earlier and more important link binding Homer and ourselves--namely, Aristotle.


If it is true, as Kindstrand observes, that Homer's importance does not diminish with the passing of time but rather grows in power over his listeners, then surely the greatest and most important surge in the growth of Homeric influence occurred when Aristotle enthusiastically let the mighty river of Homer flow into his own great sea.

CHAPTER TWO

RELATED LITERATURE

Thorough searches into the history of Aristotelian scholarship surprisingly revealed no work identical in scope and intent with the present study. In view of the obvious clues to Homer's pervasive presence in the works of Aristotle still more surprising was the revelation that nothing even similar in scope to this work was ever undertaken. No study appeared, therefore, which attempted to present an analysis of all Aristotle's Homeric texts and allusions with the purpose of evaluating the Philosopher's attitude towards the Poet.

Exhaustive bibliographical research uncovered only some works related more narrowly to Aristotle's use of Homer. Indices of the actual Homeric texts and allusions to Homeric texts in Aristotle have been published, as well as evaluations of Aristotle's literary theory and judgement, especially as related to the *Poetics* and *Homeric Problems*. Philological evaluations of the Philosopher's Homeric texts appeared too, along with an evaluation of his literary judgement as derived from his Homeric texts and allusions in the *Rhetoric*, *Poetics*, and *Nicomachean Ethics*. Some few works appeared, narrower in approach than the present study. These indicated that Aristotle viewed Homer as
contributing more than just literary values to him.

Some of these related works proved very useful for locating, evaluating, and especially verifying the texts of the Philosopher and Poet presented in this study.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine and compare in the light of the present study all the other works found to have examined in any way the textual relationships of Aristotle to Homer. This is to demonstrate: how the objectives, methods, and conclusions of these other studies differ from our own; what distinct understanding of the relationship of the Philosopher to the Poet they give; and in what way their conclusions support or complement our study.

First we will consider the indices which mainly provided only the list of loci in the Corpus Aristotelicum that cited or otherwise referred to Homer: the Index Aristotelicus of Hermann Bonitz for the second edition of Immanuel Bekker's Aristotelis Opera, the index of Firmin Didot's Latin edition of the Aristotelis Opera Omina, the separate indices of William D. Ross's Oxford English edition of the Works of Aristotle, and Arthur Ludwich's Die Homervulgata als voralexandrinisch erwiesen.

Next we will examine the studies which are exclusively concerned with the reliability of Aristotle's Homeric quotations and the reasons for the variations of his Homeric text from our own -- the studies of George E. Howes, T. W. Allen, Stephanie L. West, Adolph Römer, and Richard
Then we will give special attention to the work of W. S. Hinman, part of whose professed purpose most closely approximated our own. He intended, at least from the *Rhetoric*, *Poetics*, and *Nicomachean Ethics*, to draw some conclusions about Aristotle's attitude towards Homer and the other writers he quoted.

The next group of studies we will review -- by Frederick von Schlegel, Ludwig Adam, Mitchell Carroll, Henrietta V. Apfel, Frederic R. White, and Hubert Hintenlang -- have a much newer purpose. They engage in various approaches to the understanding of the Philosopher's more sustained studies of the Poet: *Poetics* XXV, Προβλήματα Ὀμηρικά, and the ἀπορήματα Ὀμηρικά.

Finally we will examine the studies of James Hogan, Howard B. Schapker, S. J., P. W. Forchhammer, and Otto Körner. All of these move beyond the Philosopher's evaluation of Homer as literary source and model. They view Aristotle as recognizing the Poet's influence on his thinking in the realm of ethics, rhetoric, and physical science.

Let us turn first to the Aristotelian indices.

Under the word "Ὅμηρος" the *Index Aristotelicus* of Hermann Bonitz provided the primary list of Aristotelian

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citations and references to Homer and served as the chief reference and guide for the whole study. Bonitz's very norms for the division and arrangement of the citations provided considerable help in our compilation of the texts. He indicated all the texts in which the name 'Homer' or 'Poet' appears and noted texts that simply referred to rather than cited Homer. He pointed out obviously contaminated or missing verses as well as texts differing slightly from ours and isolated single words quoted from the Homeric text by Aristotle. He singled out Homeric verses in Aristotle that are absent from our Homer and texts that are not found in our codices.

Bonitz, however, did not include many passages of Aristotle which simply allude to rather than cite the Poet's verses. Our decision to include these texts in our study was strengthened by our discovery of them in the index of the Firmin Didot Latin edition of the *Aristotelis Opera Omnia* and in the pertinent separate indices of the Oxford English edition of *The Works of Aristotle*. Arthur Ludwig's *Die Homervulgata als voralexandrinisch erwiesen*  

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was very useful too for this process of selecting the Homeric texts of the Philosopher.

Next let us consider studies concerned exclusively with the reliability of Aristotle's Homeric text and its comparison with our own.

George E. Howes' article, "Homeric Quotations in Plato and Aristotle"\(^5\) evaluates the reliability of the text of each of Aristotle's citations from Homer. Howes discusses all the texts including the fragments but excluding those texts that are simply allusions to Homer, adhering closely to the list established by Bonitz. His purpose was "a study of the quotations from Homer found in our manuscripts of Plato and Aristotle" to "show whether these authors quoted accurately or not" and to "shed some light upon the Homeric text of their day."\(^6\)

Howes' evaluation of the dependability of each Homeric citation in Homer is valuable. He groups the Philosopher's Homeric texts in eight categories: \(^7\)

A **No Variants:** Twenty-eight quotations show no readings different from the best manuscripts of Homer.


\(^6\)Ibid., p. 154.

\(^7\)Ibid., pp. 210-236.
Slight Variants: Thirty-nine passages in which the variants of Aristotle and Homer are so few and slight that they are undoubtedly due to scribes.

Agreement with the Best Manuscripts of Homer: Twenty passages in which the manuscripts of Aristotle agree with the best Homeric manuscripts although some variants exist in the scholia of Eustathius.

Quotations Adapted Into the Text: Eight quotations in which Aristotle evidently adapted Homer's words to his own sentences, using the same readings as our Homer or very consistent with our Homer.

Aristotle's Variants Substantiated: Ten texts in which Aristotle's Homeric text differs from ours but can be substantiated by manuscripts of Homer, scholia, Eustathius or ancient authors.

Homeric Verses Omitted in Aristotle: Three.

Verses Not Found in Our Homer: Eleven verses of the Poet familiar to the Philosopher but not found in our Homer.

New Readings in Aristotle: Eighteen passages in which Aristotle quotes Verses found in our Homer but gives readings unsupported by other testimony.
Howes concludes:

I think we may say that there are occasional passages where the presumption seems very strong that he has quoted from memory and quoted wrongly. We cannot, however, dismiss all, or even many, of his variants in that abrupt way. Whether he quoted from memory or not, for the following reasons I feel that his readings are entitled to a careful consideration, and that where they differ from the traditional text of Homer, in most instances they probably give us variants of high antiquity.⁸

A clear conclusion that we can draw from Howes' work, whether we agree with the details of his solution or not, is that we are not in a position to reject as not authentically Homeric even the most problematic of his cited verses from Homer.

T. W. Allen, in his book on the transmission of the Homeric texts, discusses the additions, omissions, and different versions of Homer's verses in Aristotle. Although he directs some unwarrantedly harsh barbs at the Philosopher's artistic ability--"... mistakes of memory are admissible, for far from being a cunning artist like Plato, Aristotle is no artist at all, he adduces Homer for scientific not artistic purposes ..."⁹ His conclusion is much the same as Howes'.

When therefore we have made the allowances called for by the Aristotelian corpus, it is plain that texts of Homer were extant in his day varying considerably from

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⁸Ibid., pp. 236-237.

the later vulgate and not infrequently containing extra lines. 10

Allen's judgement is supported too by the more recent work of Stephanie L. West. 11

Adolph Römer, in a lecture he delivered in Munich on May 3, 1884, recognized the high place that Homer's poetry held throughout the works of Aristotle.

Aristoteles in allen denjenigen seiner Schriften, deren Inhalt sich nicht durchaus in rein abstracten Dingen bewegt, von allen griechischen Dichtern am meisten die beiden grossen Gedichte des Homer heranzieht, um seine eigenen Lehren an schlagenden und feinsinnigen Versen des Dichters zu erläutern und seinen Lesern einzuprägen . . . aus seiner eigenen innigen Verehrung des Dichters ist jene reiche Menge von Citaten geflossen, mit welchen die Werke des Philosophen durchwoben sind. 12

Römer was a philologist but he wanted to tread a middle ground between an appreciation for the great respect Aristotle showed for Homer in his frequent citations of the Poet and the sharp and sometimes destructive evaluations of texts produced by philological study. With that purpose Römer goes on to investigate the Philosopher's Homeric citations in the corpus and fragments, especially evaluating the accuracy and applicability of the more problematic quotations. Römer takes the position that Aristotle's

10 Ibid., p. 260.
tendency to quote from memory and as briefly and pointedly as possible led to corruptions in his Homeric text.¹³

Richard Wachsmuth's dissertation¹⁴ takes a new look at the accuracy of Aristotle's Homeric text in the more difficult variants of his accepted works, the Homeric problems, and the fragments. He concludes that seeing these together would help shed light on them. He offers some interesting insights into various problem texts.

We can now turn to a consideration of the work whose purpose, at least in part, most nearly approximates our own. W. S. Hinman's *Literary Quotation and Allusion in the Rhetoric, Poetics, and Nicomachean Ethics*¹⁵ moved closer to our study under two important aspects than the other works we have considered. First, he included allusions to Homer as well as citations from Homer found in Aristotle's works. Secondly, he attempted to draw some conclusions about the Philosopher's attitude towards the writers he quoted. He

¹³The clumsiness of papyrus rolls led ancient scholars (e.g. Plutarch) to quote from memory. It would have been too time-consuming and laborious for an ancient to verify the accuracy of all his quotations.


stated his purpose clearly:

> From the comparison of the quotation or allusion with the context of the paragraph in which it occurs we shall try to discover what were the reasons for Aristotle's quoting or alluding.\(^{16}\)

Hinman fulfilled the letter of this stated purpose. In each case he did relate the Homeric quotation to the particular reasoning of the paragraph of Aristotle in which it was found. But, he made no attempt to gain any common insights by comparing and collating all the paragraphs in which the Philosopher quoted Homer.

Hinman's expressed purpose was, after all, literary. This purpose he did fulfill. He described it when he wrote:

> We may also discern some indication of Aristotle's literary preferences and antipathies both as to authors and as to kinds of literature.\(^{17}\)

But here too, I fear, Hinman's success was moderate since he based his judgement mostly on a quantitative analysis rather than on anything intrinsic to what Aristotle states.

In a sense Hinman attempted too much and too little. He attempted too much since his study was directed at all the literary quotations and allusions in the three works of Aristotle mentioned. His attempt was too modest since he limited his study of Aristotle to the *Rhetoric*, *Poetics*, and *Nicomachean Ethics*. The reasons he adduced for this limitation are not cogent. He argued that the three


\(^{17}\) *Ibid.*
treatises formed a sufficient basis for valid conclusions since they contained many literary quotations and allusions.

Hinman's work was very useful to the present study. It provided corroborative insight for many of the quotations and allusions examined here. With regard to the Homeric allusions found in Aristotle, Hinman's was the only comparable study I could find to test my own judgements about them.

In the final analysis, however, the value of Hinman's work was vitiated by his drawing conclusions from simply quantitative analysis and, as one critic of his study has pointed out\(^\text{18}\), by his unsubstantiated dismissal of Aristotle as a sound literary critic. His reasoning was not at all cogent when he argued:

> Wherever a reason can be determined for a quotation and allusion, that reason shows that Aristotle has used a literary illustration solely for the sake of elucidating the point under discussion. He has not turned aside from his topic for the purpose of quoting some beautiful passage or alluding to a favorite author. Many a quotation ends abruptly although its aesthetic and even literary value would be enhanced by its extension.\(^\text{19}\)

This was a strange argument that would turn the incisive mind of Aristotle from his perfectly appropriate method to 'purple patches' just to make him fulfill some arbitrary

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\(^{19}\)Hinman, op. cit., p. 167.
definition of a literary critic.

Hinman's categorization of texts was very useful along with Howes' for collating and evaluating all of Aristotle's Homeric references in the present study. He grouped quotations as "exact," "inexact," "incapable of being tested for accuracy," or "doubtful". Allusions to Homer he classified as "supported by other evidence," "not supported by other evidence," or "incorrect allusions". In the three works, Homer is quoted seventy-two times. "Of the sixty-four quotations from him that can be tested, forty-eight are given exactly—seventy-five percent." Homer is alluded to forty-four times in the three works. Hinman listed forty-one allusions as supported by other evidence, only one as not supported, and two allusions (to the *Margites*) as incorrect—ninety-five percent accurate.

Hinman seemed to accept, but not wholeheartedly, the possibility of tracing Aristotle's 'inaccuracy' to truly variant ancient texts. In discussing the question: "Did he use a manuscript of Homer different from any extant today?" Hinman discussed some problematic texts and concluded:

When we consider that Homer is quoted by Aristotle with seventy-five percent of accuracy where that can be tested, and also that there are seventy-two quotations from Homer in the three treatises combined it is as difficult to reject these doubtful quotations as it is to accept them. At best they may indicate that

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20 Ibid., p. 170.
21 Ibid., p. 177.
Aristotle had a text of Homer which contained lines that were later deleted by Alexandrians, but the evidence is too weak to prove it. These peculiar lines may have been rejected by the Alexandrians, or Aristotle may have erred in quotation.  

After W. S. Hinman's work, the literature related to the present study narrows to works that pursue an understanding of Aristotle's explicit Homeric studies. These are studies on the Poetics, especially Chapter Twenty-Five, the προβλήματα δημιουργία, and the ἀπορήματα δημιουργία.

We propose here to examine briefly seven of the more important studies of this kind, with the seventh forming a natural bridge to the last three studies we wish to consider in this chapter and to the broader perspective of our own study. They will be discussed in the order of their chronological appearance.

Two essays by Frederick von Schlegel appeared in 1822 in successive chapters of the Third Book of his collected works. The first essay traces the attitude of the Greeks before Aristotle towards the Homeric works. The second analyzes Aristotle's view of them, especially artistically as it was expressed in the Poetics. Both essays are

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22 Ibid., p. 178.


laborious Hegelian musings, outstanding for their lack of practical information.

The second work was Ludwig Adam's *Die Aristotelische Theorie vom Epos* which appeared in 1889. After establishing the central place that the Homeric epics held in the culture and education of the Greeks prior to Aristotle Adam emphasizes the Philosopher's high praise of Homer. Examining the epics as the forerunners of tragedy, Adam stresses the tragic element that Aristotle saw in Epic. He demonstrates too that Aristotle's position on Homer strongly influenced the Alexandrian school's attitude towards the Poet. Especially valuable is Adam's brief bibliography of essays and lectures that appeared in Germany between 1830 and 1867 on the topic of Aristotle's view of Homer. Only one of these works appeared in any standard bibliography I consulted.

Mitchell Carroll's doctoral dissertation, *Aristotle's Poetics: Chapter Twenty-Five in the Light of the Homeric Scholia* which was published in 1895 demonstrates that

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the difficult Twenty-Fifth Chapter of the *Poetics* contains the elements of a systematic treatment of the faults of poetry and of Homer's inconsistencies. He bases his conclusion on a study of the Porphyrian ζητήματα of the Homeric scholia, of which the προβλήματα ὁμηρικά of Aristotle and his followers was a source. The προβλήματα ὁμηρικά considered and answered the criticisms and censures of Homer by philosophers and sophists. As a result the Fragments preserved for us furnish us with numerous illustrations of the principles stated in *Poetics* XXV in which objections of critics to poetry and proper methods of answering them are discussed. Carroll makes his point by analyzing Aristotle's method.

The Philosopher begins by laying down certain general propositions as a basis for the consideration both of the critics' objections, ἐπιτιμήματα, and of the solutions to the objections, λύσεις. Carroll explains that Aristotle had twelve explanations for the faults found in Homer. They are grouped under three headings: those from consideration of the objects imitated, those from consideration of artistic correctness, and those from consideration of the method of representation. These are carefully examined in *Poetics* XXV along with examples of typical attacks on selected quotations from Homer and possible defenses against those attacks.

Carroll's scholarly investigations of the intimate connection between Aristotle's *Problems* and Chapter Twenty-
Five of the Poetics bring to light the great effort the philosopher expended in the defense of Homer. Carroll argues that the other evidences of Aristotle's activity in the study of the Poet justify his chapter in the Poetics which is devoted almost exclusively to the defense of Homer. His evidence of the Philosopher's concern for Homer is impressive:

Aristotle's hearty veneration for Homer is shown by the numerous citations of the Iliad and Odyssey in his works and by the frequent expressions of admiration occurring in the Poetics; perhaps to this we may attribute his appearance as a defender of the Poet against his many detractors. Isocrates testified that the Homeric poems were objects of study in the Lyceum and Dio Chrysostom is the authority for the statement that Aristotle in a number of dialogues concerned himself with Homer. Besides these and other indications of Aristotle's Homeric activity a peculiar interest is in a special work which had the Homeric poems for its exclusive object, and which has come down to us under different titles, ἀπορήματα ὄμηρικά or προβλήματα ὄμηρικά.31

Henrietta V. Apfel's article on Fourth Century B.C. Homeric Criticism32 appeared in 1938. When she discusses Aristotle she stresses the fact that he seemed to have regarded it as his task to defend the great epics against Plato's attacks. He did this, she indicates, in his two major works on literary questions, the Rhetoric and Poetics, but especially in the fragmentary Homeric Problems.


32Henrietta V. Apfel, "Homeric Criticism in the Fourth Century, B.C.", Transactions of the American Philological Association, 1938 (245-258).
She begins the main thrust of her article when she takes up the consideration of the fragments of this work. The work which Aristotle devoted to the defense of Homer has unfortunately come down to us only in fragmentary form. There is sufficient however to show us his methods which he indeed had already shown in Chapter Twenty-Five of the Poetics. 33

Demonstrating that Aristotle's greatest service to the Poet lay in his defense against the attacks of the moralists, Apfel clarifies briefly each one of the fragments. She concludes her treatment of Aristotle's defense of Homer in the Fragments with an observation about the text of Homer which Aristotle used.

The text of Homer which Aristotle used apparently differed considerably from extant MSS. It is true that he often quoted only a few words, or only those which he needed to prove his point, regardless of their sense in the positions where he quoted them. He sometimes deliberately deformed a passage to suit his purpose. 34

Apfel's article manifests a fine awareness and control of the more important recent work on Aristotle's criticism of Homer. She refers directly to Howes, Carroll, Hinman, Römer, and Wachsmuth.

Frederic R. White submitted a doctoral dissertation in 1942 to the University of Michigan on the development of Homeric criticism. 35 White's evaluation is concerned only with criticism in the literary sense. He tries to make the

33 Ibid., p. 254.
34 Ibid., p. 257.
point that the Philosopher imposed norms upon the Homeric epics and fails to grasp the obvious preoccupation of Aristotle with discovering his very norms for literary judgement in the Homeric Epics. This prejudice of White which leads him to trace the faults of Alexandrians to Aristotle is clearly expressed when he says:

Aristotle, the master of those who know rather than of those who, with Socrates and Plato, question and search and finally leave the matter open for further discussion, provided a convenient code for conscientious critics.\(^{36}\)

One would wish that White who so summarily dismisses one of the greatest questioners and searchers of human history would heed his own advice, and regarding Aristotle "question and search and finally leave the matter open for further discussion." Fortunately White's approach is not characteristic of other students of the relationship of Aristotle to Homer who leave the matter open for much further discussion.

The next pertinent work appeared in 1961 with the publications of Hubert Hintenlang's Heidelberg dissertation about the *Homeric Problems*.\(^{37}\) This author examines in great detail the texts of the *Homeric Problems*, compares them to the Twenty-Fifth Chapter of the *Poetics* and shows that they harmonize well with Aristotle's theory. Hintenlang demonstrates a very exact parallelism between

\(^{36}\)Ibid., p. 74.

Chapter Twenty-Five of the *Poetics* and the *Problems*, showing the practical application of the Philosopher's own theoretical principles. His bibliography lists numerous valuable studies both of special and general interest on Aristotelian criticism of Homer.

Finally, we can turn to the studies which see Aristotle as recognizing Homer's influence on his ethical, rhetorical, and scientific as well as literary thinking with our consideration of the latest important study, an article by James Hogan on the *Poetics* which appeared in 1973.\(^{38}\) Hogan is impressed by the importance that Aristotle gives to Homer's epics in his consideration of tragedy.

From the discussion of principles in the first five chapters to the comparison of epic and tragedy in the last four, Homer provides the prototype and model. We find, moreover, a constant stress on the dramatic values in Homer and the clear implication that the techniques of the two genres, at their best, have much in common.\(^{39}\)

Hogan collects and assesses all the references to Homer and epic poetry found in the *Poetics*, presenting them as they occur in the text. He offers some observations on Aristotelian notions like "ἀμωρτία, which though not explicitly applied to epic in the *Poetics* might be thought relevant to an Aristotelian interpretation of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey.*"


\(^{39}\)Ibid., p. 95.
Hogan's final observation forms an intriguing introduction to the last few works we consider in this chapter and to the broader perspectives of this study.

Much of what has been said touches on or implies a continuity in ethical values between the time of the epics into the fourth century. Though his (Aristotle's) criticism is certainly more aesthetic than ethical in its origin and argument, some typical ideas, e.g. the emphasis on action, have deeper roots in Greek thought than the tragedy of the fifth century. . . . If we proceed somewhat negatively it may be said that the frequent use of the Homeric paradigm to illustrate formal procedures suggests that Aristotle did not perceive a fundamental lack of harmony between the ethical premises of the Poetics and those of epic. 40

Hogan's statement opens the study of the relationship of Aristotle to Homer to fresh, broader perspectives. That Aristotle was profoundly influenced by Homer in his literary judgement is not seriously challenged. This is clear from the present chapter. But what of the other facets of Aristotle's multiple genius--ethical, religious, social, scientific? As Hogan opens up to examination the whole area of Homer's influence on Aristotle's ethical considerations, it seems reasonable to pursue a study of Homeric influence on other areas of Aristotelian thought.

Many more studies like the Master's thesis of Howard B. Schapker, S.J., at Loyola University of Chicago in 195941 would help to demonstrate empirically the fact of this broader influence of Homer on Aristotle. Schapker clearly

40 Ibid., p. 108.

41 Howard B. Schapker, S.J., Aristotelian Rhetoric in Homer, Master's Thesis under the direction of Raymond V. Schoder, S.J., Loyola University of Chicago, 1959.
shows the presence of many of Aristotle's canons of rhetoric in the speeches of the *Iliad*, although he does not draw the obvious conclusion that Homer's practice influenced Aristotle's theory.

When the *Iliad's* more accomplished oratorical efforts are considered, then, the close rapport between the two Greeks is as remarkable as it is indisputable. 42

Schapker's work is singled out here since it shows that because of the broad nature of Greek rhetoric itself this community of rhetorical principles between the Philosopher and the Poet manifests a much broader similarity than simply literary. Part of the community in rhetorical principles that Schapker discovers in Homer and Aristotle approximates the community in ethics that James Hogan speaks of above. Schapker writes:

> In short, Aristotle requires an orator to have a complete and integral theoretical understanding of man's nature, and to be master of all practical means, argumentative and psychological, of inducing men to make correct judgements. 43

In the world of science too the Homeric presence in Aristotle deserves more scholarly attention. In 1885 P. W. Forchhammer published an article in the magazine section of a Munich newspaper entitled simply *Aristoteles und Homer*. 44

The central point of Forchhammer's argument was that if we

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42 *Ibid.*, p. 120.


44 Peter W. Forchhammer, "Aristoteles und Homer", *Beilage zur Allgemeinen Zeitung*, Nr. 242 (München: September, 1885), 3562-3563.
follow Aristotle's insight into Homer's use of metaphors we can uncover the factual events he clothes with fantasy. Forchhammer applied the insight to Homer's description of Achilles' battle with the rivers of Troy. After personal observation of the Spring flooding around the Trojan plain he suggested that Homer's description of Achilles' battle with the rivers was not merely allegorical. Homer was working with the solid meteorological fact of Spring flooding that interfered with the Greek siege of Troy.

Forchhammer fortifies his position with observations from Pausanias, Strabo and Plutarch who recognized the tendency of the ancients to describe their physical world in myths. Certainly we have discovered in our times that this grasp of the mythologizing by the ancients has led archaeologists to break through mythical packaging to wonderful discoveries in the ruins of the ancient world.

Forchhammer's observations, if not his conclusions, lead us to recognize how Aristotle could confidently accept empirical facts from Homer, although they were embedded in fantasy.

Otto Körner, an expert on Homeric zoology, who published his first book on the subject in 1880,\(^4\)\(^5\) expresses in the second edition fifty years later, his impatience with the failure of zoologists to record the extraordinarily accurate details of Homeric zoology.

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\(^4\)\(^5\)Otto Körner, *Die homerische Tierwelt*, Berlin: 1880.
Die homerische Tierkunde ist bis in die neueste Zeit von den Geschichtsschreibern der Zoologie teils vernachlässigt, teils ganz und gar übersehen worden.\textsuperscript{4,6} In a book in 1917 he devoted his efforts to demonstrating the importance of the Homeric animal classification systems for those of Aristotle.\textsuperscript{4,7}

All of Körner’s painstaking research confirms the existence of the broader influence of the Poet on Aristotle. Körner’s studies establish that influence in a purely empirical science—zoology.

The principal governing this chapter was to examine every study which approached in any substantial way the relationship of Aristotle to Homer. The purpose was to establish the distinctiveness of the present study as well as its dependence on these other related studies, which fell into five groups: 1) indices, 2) text reliability studies, 3) W. S. Hinman’s work which stands alone and draws conclusions about Aristotle’s attitude towards Homer from Homeric quotations found in the \textit{Rhetoric}, \textit{Poetics}, and \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, 4) studies of Aristotle’s more extended literary approaches to Homer, (\textit{Poetics} \textit{XXV}, \Προβλήματα Ὀμηρικά, and the \Διπορήματα Ὀμηρικά), and 5) studies exemplifying Aristotle’s acceptance of a broader than just literary influence of Homer on his thought. How then is our work distinct from these and how does it relate to them?

\textsuperscript{4,6}Körner, \textit{op. cit.}, 2d ed., München, 1930, 1.
\textsuperscript{4,7}Körner, \textit{Das homerische Tiersystem und seine Bedeutung für die zoologische systematik des Aristoteles}, Wiesbaden: 1917.
Our study makes use of the first category listed above, the indices examined, but is not just a specialized index of Aristotelian texts that quote or allude to Homer. It depends on the second category, the studies that seek to establish the reliability of Aristotle's Homeric texts, without undertaking on its own any special test of textual reliability. Our study is like the Homeric part of Hinman's work in that it works with allusions as well as quotations and draws conclusions about Aristotle's attitude towards Homer. It is not limited as Hinman's to the literary values from Homer which Aristotle accepts in his *Poetics*, *Rhetoric*, and *Nicomachean Ethics*. Our work extends to the whole *Corpus Aristotelicum* and to Homeric principles and insights accepted by the Philosopher in all fields of human thought and endeavor. The studies of the fourth category, limited to *Poetics xxv*, the Προβλήματα and Ἀπορήματα, give us an insight into the intensity of Aristotle's admiration of the Poet, but are clearly much narrower in their approach than our study. The last works of this category, beginning with Hogan's article, serve as an introduction to the fifth and final category of studies—those which recognize some influences of Homer on the Philosopher other than literary. Once again, however, these studies are much narrower in their approach to the question of Aristotle's attitude toward Homer.
At the very conclusion of this chapter, where we have considered the important works related to our study, we have presented a natural bridge in the work of Hogan, Schapker, Forchhammer, and Körner to our analysis in the next four chapters. We can more confidently begin the work of demonstrating the true extent of Homer's influence on Aristotle's thought—an influence that touched not only his literary and aesthetic judgement, but his ethical and religious, as well as his scientific and philosophical theory and practice. In the face of the mass of Aristotelian scholarship that has ignored it, the opening we have seen is small, but it is an opening that deserves to be widened if only a little more.
CHAPTER THREE

ARISTOTELIAN REFERENCES TO HOMER
AS MASTER OF THE ARTS OF LANGUAGE

The approach of Aristotelian scholarship to the Philosopher's judgement of Homer has centered quite naturally on his treatment of Homer primarily as poet and then as rhetorician. There has been a solid tradition of study of Aristotle's evaluation of the Poet's poetic and rhetorical excellence. The present chapter in no sense will attempt to supplant these studies. It will simply analyze the texts of Aristotle which explicitly view Homer as poet and rhetorician to show what they reveal of Aristotle's attitude towards the Poet.

There are eighty-five places in the extant works of Aristotle in which Homer's rhetorical and poetical character is touched. Forty-one times Homer is cited or mentioned in this light in the Rhetoric, forty-two times in the Poetics, once in the Topics, and once in the Sophistical Refutations.

The art of rhetoric as seen by Aristotle eludes a single modern category. It is not just concerned with language and style, although these are a necessary part of his Rhetoric. Ancient rhetoric, and more properly here, Aristotelian rhetoric, examines a wide range of human
behavior and values as well as techniques of language.

Lane Cooper summarizes it well:

His principles . . . he (Aristotle) sought . . . in the living pattern of the human heart. All the recesses and windings of that hidden region he has explored; all its caprices and affections, whatever tends to excite, to ruffle, to amuse, to gratify, or to offend it have been carefully examined. . . . The Rhetoric of Aristotle is a practical psychology and the most helpful book extant for writers of prose and for speakers of every sort . . . and the modern psychologist commonly will find that he has observed the behavior of human beings less carefully than did Aristotle, even though the author keeps reminding us that in the Rhetoric his analysis of thought and conduct is practical, not scientifically precise and complete.¹

J. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire suggests the strong emphasis Aristotle gives to the behavioral or ethical side of his Rhetoric:

. . . Aristote ne méconnait pas la partie technique de l'art; mais il la subordonne; dans son ouvrage, cette partie tient moins de place peut-être que la morale, la politique et la psychologie.²

According to Aristotle rhetoric is the study in which one learns "what to say persuasively in every case."³ This 'whatness' leads the Rhetoric into the study of human values. To speak nobly, wisely, and persuasively to the assembly or jury one must understand and influence human passions, motives, and ideals.


³*Rhetoric* 1355b, 26.
Because of the dual nature of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*—its literary aspect and its ethical aspect—nineteen of the Homeric citations in that work will not be included in this chapter but will be discussed in the fifth chapter. The present chapter deals with Aristotle's attitude towards the poet as master of the art of language itself—of 'how to speak' rather than 'what to say'. The above-mentioned nineteen citations strongly exemplify the ethical side of Aristotelian rhetoric. They will be treated, therefore, in our later consideration of Aristotle's attitude towards Homer as a teacher of human values.

Aristotle's isolated reference to Homer in the *Topics* can serve to set the tone of this whole chapter. He points to Homer as the exemplar of the important facet of style he is discussing. He is advising the student of argument to adduce examples and illustrations to clarify his argument. Almost casually he says the examples should be to the point and drawn from things that are familiar to the hearer, "of the kind which Homer uses and not the kind that Choerilus uses; for thus the proposition would be rendered clearer."

Εἰς δὲ σαφῆνειαν παράδειγματα καὶ παραβολὰς οἰςτέου, παράδειγματα δὲ οἰκεία καὶ ἐξ ἐν ἑμεν, οἷα Ἡμερὸς μὴ οἷα Χοιρίλος· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν σαφέστερον εἰη τὸ προτεινόμενον.

In the *Rhetoric*, in counseling the orator to use language most effectively and persuasively, Aristotle turns to the example of Homer twenty-three times.

"*Topics* 157a, 14-17."
In presenting the appropriate purposes of each of the three kinds of oratory—deliberative, forensic, and epideictic—Aristotle demonstrates how all other considerations in a speech are subordinated to the one ruling purpose of that kind of oratory. Since the purpose of the epideictic orator, he argues, is to praise what is honorable and fault what is disgraceful, he does not consider what is more proper to deliberative oratory, namely, what is expedient or harmful. In fact, the epideictic orator often praises a man for disregarding what is expedient and in his own interest, to perform some honorable deed. An example of this the Philosopher finds in Homer since Achilles is praised for disregarding his own safety to protect the body of his comrade Patroclus and avenge his death.

Aristotle said there were five 'inartificial' proofs that properly belonged to forensic oratory: laws, witnesses, contracts, torture, and oaths. After discussing laws he spoke of the two kinds of witnesses the orator should use for persuasion—ancient and recent. The 'ancient' had to be poets and men of good repute whose judgements were known to all. The first such ancient witness that the Philosopher

\[\text{\textit{Rhetoric} 1358b, 37-1359a, 6 (No quotation from Homer but a true statement paralleled in the \textit{Iliad}.)}\]
mentions is Homer, of course, to whom the Athenians appealed, he says, in the matter of Salamis. Aristotle's allusion is to *Iliad* ii.557-558, where the Poet says that Ajax led his twelve ships from Salamis and took his position with the Athenians.

Περὶ δὲ μαρτύρων, μάρτυρεῖς εἰσὶ διίττῳ, οἱ μὲν παλαιῶν οἱ δὲ πρόσωποι, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου οἱ δ' ἔκτος. Αὔω δὲ παλαιός μὲν τοὺς τε ποιητὰς καὶ ὀσῶν ἄλλων γνωρίσσων εἰσὶ κρίσεις φανεραί, οἷον Ἀθηναίοι ὁμήρῳ μάρτυρι ἐχρήσαντο περὶ Σαλαμίνος.

He advises the use of common and frequently-quoted maxims if they are appropriate for persuasion since their very commonness seems to earn them universal acknowledgement as true. His first example is exhorting soldiers to risk danger. Here he cites Hector's words to Polydamas who has threatened him with an adverse omen; the best of omens is to defend one's country.

καθόλου δὲ μὴ δυντος καθόλου εἰπεῖν μάλιστα ἀρμότει ἐν σχετισμῷ καὶ δεινώσει καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀρχικοῦν ἢ ἀποδείξαντα. χρησάθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταῖς τεθρυλμέναις καὶ κοιναῖς γνώµαις, ἐὰν δεῖ κρῆςιμοι διὰ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι κοιναί, ὡς ἰδιολογούντων ἀπάντων, ὅρθως ἑχειν δοκοῦσιν, οἷον παρακαλοῦντι ἐπὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν μὴ θυσαμένους "εἰς οἶνον ἀριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης."

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*Rhetoric* 1375b, 26-30 (=*Iliad* ii.557-558). Aristotle does not indicate any Homeric passage, and line 558 is disputed and attributed to Solon. Athens and Megara were struggling over the possession of Salamis. The Spartans, who acted as arbitrators, awarded Salamis to the Athenians on the strength of these two lines of Homer.

Ἀλὰς δ' ἐκ Σαλαμίνος ἀγεν δυσκαλίδεκα νῆσας, στῆσε δ' ἄγων ἐν ' Ἀθηναίων ἔσταντο φάλαγγες.

*Rhetoric* 1395a, 8-14 (=*Iliad* xii.243). The Homeric quotation is accurate here but Aristotle's interpretation is loose, since Hector is correcting a bad omen.
His second example of the effective use of a common maxim is exhorting soldiers to battle when they are outnumbered. Here he turns to Hector's words when he is about to fight Achilles.

καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ Ἑττοὺς δόντας "ἕνως ἐνυάλλος,"

In forensic accusation or defense, enthymene as well as examples, according to Aristotle, should be used as a means of proof. The use of enthymene demands a grasp of all that really belongs or appears to belong to the subject of the defense or accusation. The argument is easier when facts are used more plentifully and when the facts used are less common and more intimately related to the subject. To praise Achilles because he went to Troy would not single him out, but praise because he killed Hector could be intended only for him.

It is not surprising that the Philosopher is probably alluding to the twenty-second book of the Iliad here.

As Aristotle turns to various language devices which the orator may use for greater effect he frequently invokes

*Rhetoric* 1395a, 14-15 (=Iliad xviii.309).

*Rhetoric* 1396b, 9-17 (=Iliad xxii).
the Poet. He cites Homer as giving a good example of the use of paromoiosis at the beginning of a clause when it should always be in entire words.

Then he turns to the use of metaphors. Similes are metaphors, he argues, since they differ from them very little. When Homer says Achilles "rushed on like a lion" he used a simile. If he had said, "a lion, he rushed on," he would have been using a metaphor. Because both Achilles and a lion are courageous he transfers the sense and either calls Achilles a lion (metaphor) or compares him to a lion (simile). Similes are used in prose, but less frequently, he cautions,

"Εστι δὲ καὶ ἢ εἰκών μεταφορά· διαφέρει γὰρ μικρῶν· δια τού ἄγρον εἰπη τόν 'Αχιλλέα "ὁς δὲ λέων ἐπόρουσεν," εἰκών εστιν, δια τού λέων ἐπόρουσεν, "μεταφορά· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἄμφω ἀνδρείους εἶναι, προσηγορεύει μετενέγκας λέοντα τόν 'Αχιλλέα. χρήσιμον δὲ ἢ εἰκών καὶ ἢ λόγῳ, ὁλιγάκις δὲ· ποιητικὸν γὰρ."

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10 Rhetoric 1410a, 22-30 (=Iliad ix.526).

11 Rhetoric 1406b, 24. Although Homer does compare Achilles to a lion, nowhere in our Homer do we have the exact expression quoted by Aristotle as Homeric. If we were to conflate two passages from Iliad XX we would come close to his expression,

Πηλεύδης δ' ἐτέρωθεν ἐναντίον ὃρτο λέων ὃς, (Iliad xx.164);

αὐτάρ Ἀχιλλέως ἐμμεμάδρ ἐποροῦσε κατακτάμεναι μενεαινών, (Iliad xx.441-42).
He wants the orator to produce an impression of intelligence. He argues that to learn something with ease is a naturally pleasant experience and that all words that make us learn please us. Metaphors, he suggests, are the best teachers and therefore most pleasant. Citing Homer's calling old age 'stubble', he shows us that in that metaphor learning comes through the genus since both old age and stubble have lost their bloom.

Treating metaphors again Aristotle demonstrates how Homer uses them often to invest inanimate objects with life. This technique, he notes, produces an effect of vivid here-and-now action, an effect of lifeliness. To this precise ability Aristotle attributes Homer's popularity. He cites five examples, one from the Odyssey and four from the Iliad. The Odyssey example charges ruthlessness to a stone:

Twice in the Iliad too Homer uses similar expressions to compare Diomedes to a lion:  
\[\text{\(\omegaς\ \deltaε\ \lambdaεων\ \mu\acute{\eta}λοισιν\ \alpha\sigmaμ\acute{\iota}νοισιν\ \epsilon\piελθων,\ \text{(Iliad x. 485)}\);}\]
\[\text{\(\omegaς\ \deltaε\ \lambdaεων\ \epsilon\nu\ \betaουσι\ \thetaορων\ \epsilon\xi\ \alphaυ\chi\epsilon\nuα\ \alphaξη\ (Iliad \nu.161).\)}\]
Agamemnon too is compared to a lion in the Iliad:
\[\text{\(\omegaς\ \deltaε\ \lambdaεων\ \epsilonλ\acute{\alpha}φοι\ \tauα\chiε\iota\nuς\ \nu\acute{\eta}πια\ \tauεκνα\ \rhoη\iota\deltaιως\ \sigmaυν\acute{\epsilon}αξε,\ \text{(Iliad xi.113-114).}\)}\]

\[\text{12 Rhetoric 1410b, 10-15 \text{ (=Odyssey xiv.213).}}\]
'Again the ruthless stone rolled down to the plain',
καὶ ὡς κέχοηται Ὁμηρος πολλαχοῦ τῷ τὰ ἀψυχὰ ἐμψυχὰ λέγειν διὰ τῆς μεταφορᾶς. ἐν πάσι δὲ τῷ ἐνέργειαν ποιεῖν εὐδοκίμετ', οἷον ἐν τοῖσδε, "αὕτως ἐπὶ ὀδηγεῖαν κυλύνετο λάδις ἀναλοῖς". 

In the Iliad an arrow is pictured as bitter:
' [the bitter] arrow flew'
καὶ ἔπιατ ὀὔστός,"14

Or the arrow is described as eager:
' [the arrow] eager to fly towards the crowd,'
καὶ ἔπιπτέσθαι μενεαύων,"15

In the Iliad too spears are seen as desiring flesh to eat:
' [the spears] were buried in the ground, longing to take their fill of flesh,'
καὶ ἐν γαύῃ ἵσταντο λιλαλόμενα χρόος ἀσαλ,"16

Or the spearpoint is characterized by eagerness:
'And the spearpoint, quivering eagerly, sped through his breast,'
καὶ ἀλχην δὲ στέρνοντο διέσυντο μαυλώσων."17

The Philosopher concludes that the Poet attaches these vivid attributes to inanimate objects by using proportional metaphors--as the stone is to Sisyphus so is a ruthless

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13 Rhetoric 1411b, 31-34 (= Odyssey xi.598).
14 Rhetoric 1411b, 34-35 (= Iliad xiii.587,592). Reading= variant from MSS. Our Iliad reads: ἔπιατο πικρῶς ὀὔστός.
15 Rhetoric 1411b, 35 (= Iliad iv.126).
16 Rhetoric 1411b 11-1412a, 1 (= Iliad xi.574).
17 Rhetoric 1412a, 1-2 (= Iliad xv.542).
person to the person he is treating ruthlessly.

The Philosopher then observes that Homer does the same thing with his much admired similes, achieving the same vividness by giving life and self movement to inanimate things. He cites a single example from the *Iliad*, describing waves:

Another species of metaphor is the accepted hyperbole according to Aristotle. He judges that they are youthful since they show passion and those who are impassioned usually use them. Achilles' words in Book IX of the *Iliad* he finds a good example of this youthful passionate hyperbole.

Not even if he offers me gifts as numerous as the sand and dust . . .

Will I marry a daughter of Agamemnon, son of Atreus,

Not even if she rivalled golden Aphrodite in beauty, or Athene in accomplishments.

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18 *Rhetoric* 1412a, 2-6.

19 *Rhetoric* 1412A, 6-9 (=*Iliad* xiii. 799).
When Aristotle advises the proper use of asyndeta he again turns to Homer. Observing that an asyndeton produces amplification, he cites the Poet's handling of Nireus. Mentioning his name frequently and successively Homer seems to say more than he actually does. Through this fallacy he increased Nireus' reputation. Although mentioning him in only one passage and never again, he perpetuates his memory.

In treating exordia he tightens the bond between forensic oratory and epic. He says that in speeches and epic poems exordia should give the hearer an early preview of the subject to avoid confusing him with an undefined theme. He cites the opening lines of the Iliad and the Odyssey as

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20Rhetoric 1413a, 28-34 (=Iliad ix.385, 388, 389, and part of 390). This is the only case where Aristotle omits intervening lines when quoting. cf: Hinman, ibid., p. 42.

21Rhetoric 1413b, 31-34; 1414a, 1-7 (=Iliad ii.671-673). Aristotle quotes the exact beginning of each line: 671, 672, and 673, omitting the rest of each line.
examples of good exordia, showing how Homer gives his hearers control of the themes from the outset.

Sing the Wrath, O Muse . . .

Tell me of the man, O Muse . . .

dē tois lógois kai ἐπει δείγμα ἔστι τοῦ λόγου, ἢν προειδοθεῖ περὶ οὗ ἢν δ λόγος καὶ μὴ κρέμηται ἢ διάνοια·

Aristotle counsels that in the exordium an orator should arouse the hearer's good will. This primary effort of any speaker he finds exemplified in the Poet when he has Odysseus pray that on reaching the Phaeacians he may find friendship or compassion.

πόθεν δ’ εὖνοις δεῖ ποιεῖν εἰρηται, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκαστον τῶν τοιούτων. ἐπει δ’ εὖ λέγεται

Continuing his discussion of exordia Aristotle argues that in deliberative oratory the speaker must often work to remove prejudice. The last of several methods he suggests could be used by both accuser and defender. Since the same action may have been done from different motives, the accuser, he suggests, must disparage it by attributing the worst motive, while the defender must praise it as proceeding from the best motive. An Homeric situation comes first to

22 Rhetoric 1415a, 11-16 (=Iliad i.1; Odyssey i.1).
23 Rhetoric 1415b, 27 (=Odyssey vi.327).
the Philosopher's mind. When Diomedes chose Odysseus he could have done it because he saw him as the bravest of men or as a coward and therefore too insignificant to be his rival. Aristotle's allusion is clearly conjectural here but is based on the fact that Diomedes does choose Odysseus in the tenth book of the *Iliad*.

In advising the speaker to avoid burdening the hearer with unnecessary material, Aristotle tells him to mention past events only if they arouse pity or indignation and if they are presented as actually happening. As his prime example of good handling of the past he cites Odysseus' narration of his wanderings to Penelope. Odysseus had told the long story to Alcinous in Books IX to XII. Here, in Book XXIII, since the hearer already has the facts, Homer has Odysseus relate it to Penelope very effectively and vividly in 60 lines.

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24 *Rhetoric* 1416b, 8-14 (=*Iliad* x.242 ff.).

25 *Rhetoric* 1417a, 11-14 (=*Odyssey* xxiii.264-284, xxiii.310-343).
Aristotle counsels the speaker to accompany his speaking with unmistakable facial expressions and bodily gestures that will communicate what is characteristic of himself or his adversary. Such details are persuasive since they are recognized by the hearers and suggest what he does not know. Of the numerous examples of this which he says are in Homer he cites the reaction of Odysseus' nurse Eurycleia after Penelope reminds her of the lost Odysseus. Aristotle remarks that those about to weep put their hands to their eyes.

When she [Penelope] stopped speaking the old nurse covered her face with her hands.

ἔτι ἐκ τῶν παθητικῶν λέγειν, διηγοῦμενον καὶ τα ἐπόμενα καὶ ἡ ἱσασι, καὶ τὰ ἱδία ὁ αὐτῷ ἢ ἐκεῖνω προσόντα. "ὅ δ᾽ ἡχειτο με ὑποβλέψας." καὶ ώς περὶ Κρατύλου Ἀισχίνης, ὅτι διαοίζων καὶ τοῖν χεροῖν διασειῶν· πιθανὰ γὰρ, διότι σύμβολα γίνεται ταῦτα ἡ ἱσασι ἐκεῖνων δῶν οὐκ ἱσασιν. πλεῖστα δὲ τοιαῦτα λαβεῖν ἐξ Ὀμήρου ἔστιν.

ὡς ἄρ ἡμη γρηῆς ὅε κατέσχετο χερῆ πρόσωπα;

οἱ γάρ διακρούειν ἄρχομενοι ἐπιλαμβάνονται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν.

Since forensic oratory is concerned with the existence or non-existence of facts, Aristotle argues that demonstrative and necessary proofs, therefore enthymemes, have a place in it. He recommends against the use of too many enthymemes in succession, however, since they destroy one another. He ends tersely with a warning against prolixity, "there is a limit to quantity," quoting Menelaus' recommenda-

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26 Rhetoric 1417a, 36-38; 1417b, 1-7 (=Odyssey xix. 361).
dation to the youth Pisistratus.

Friend, since you have said as much as a wise man would say . . .


In the very first chapter of the Poetics, Aristotle bestows the title of poet on Homer as he summarily dismisses Empedocles as a poet. He declares that the only thing these two had in common was meter, making it clear that he parted from those who felt meter made the poet.

This affirmation of Homer as poet is significant since it betrays the poetic primacy Aristotle saw in Homer. With his first thought about poets the name of Homer occurs first to him.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{27}}\text{Rhetoric 1418a, 1-8 (=Odyssey iv.204).}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{28}}\text{Poetics 1447b, 13-20. cf: Plato, Theaetetus, 152 E, in which Plato expresses the same opinion as Aristotle about Empedocles.}\]
As the Poetics progresses, a clearer idea of the depth and complexity of Aristotle's concept of 'Poet' is gained as well as of the precise reasons for which he recognized and honored Homer as the greatest of poets.

Living persons, that is, men doing or experiencing something, are represented in certain arts. Ethically they must be better or worse than we or on the same plane with us. Homer's people are 'better', he says.

In representing these living persons three approaches are possible: first, partly narrative and partly through characters, secondly, the narrator remaining himself throughout, and thirdly letting the characters carry out the whole action themselves. Homer's method, he observes, is the first.

29 Poetics 1448a 1-5; 1448a, 11-14.

30 Poetics 1448a, 19-24. cf: Plato, Republic, 392 D-394 D, in which Plato characterizes Homer in the same way as Aristotle—as narrating and dramatizing his story.
Sophocles (who is significantly the tragedian most honored by Aristotle) is compared with Homer. In one respect he sees them as the same kind of artist. They both portray good men.

 Aristotle attributes the famous satire *Margites* to Homer. He says that he could not name any satire prior to Homer although he concedes there were probably many satirical poets.

He concludes that just as Homer was the supreme poet of the heroic style he was first to mark out the main lines of comedy. In epic he excelled because his representations were made not only good but dramatic. In the *Margites* he formed his drama out of the laughable as such, not out of personal satire. His *Margites* therefore, Aristotle argues, is analogous to his epics: the *Margites* is to the comedies what the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are to the tragedies.

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31 *Poetics* 1448b, 25-27.

32 *Poetics* 1448b, 28-30. Whether Aristotle was right to attribute the *Margites* to Homer is not the issue here. We wish only to examine what Aristotle judged was Homer's work.
Homer based the unity of his epics on singleness of action. "Supreme in all other respects" says Aristotle, he achieved this either from instinct or knowledge of his art. He excludes events of Odysseus' life like his wounding at Parnassus and his feigned madness because they did not relate to the single action of his epic. He followed the same principle in the Iliad.

Tragedy should have a single rather than double outcome according to Aristotle. He cites the Odyssey as an epic with a double outcome, since it ends in opposite ways for the good and bad characters. Tragic playwrights, he judges, seem to favor the double outcome, which is more proper to comedy, just to please audiences.

\[33\] Poetics 1448b, 34-38; 1449a, 1-2. cf: supra, footnote 32 on the matter of the Margites' authenticity as Homeric and the relevancy of that question to our study.

\[34\] Poetics 1451a, 22-29. Note that although 'the wounding' belongs to the Odyssey (xix.392-466), it is not part of the poem's action. 'The madness' is not in the poem at all.
The Philosopher's inclusion of the Odyssey in this discussion suggests only mild criticism. The Odyssey does not fall into his worst category in which "nobody kills anybody at the end." Even more to the point, his discussion is about tragic not epic ideals. Furthermore, in another place he clearly says what is appropriate here too, that even poorer forms in the hands of the Master are masterly.

Here occurs one of the few negatively critical uses Aristotle makes of Homer in all his works. Discussing tragedy he states that a play's dénouement should be caused by the plot and not mechanically as it is in the Medea and the embarkation incident in the Iliad. (Only the uncaused intervention of Athene stops the flight of the Greeks.) Of course here Aristotle is discussing the norms of tragedy and not epic. The intervention of the gods in epic is more acceptable than in tragedy—in fact it is integral.

35 Poetics 1453a, 30-39.

36 Cf. infra., Footnote 59 concerning Aristotle's unbounded admiration for the Poet.

37 Poetics 1454a, 31-1454b, 1-5 (=Iliad ii.155-181).
The tragic poet is advised here by Aristotle to depict short-tempered or lazy people or others with similar character traits truthfully, yet to present them as persons of worth. He cites the example of Agathon and Homer in their portrayal of Achilles.

οὗτω καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν μιμούμενον καὶ ὀργίλους καὶ ραθύμους καὶ τάλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντας ἐπὶ τῶν ἠθῶν, ἐπιεικείας ποιεῖν παράδειγμα καὶ σκληρότητος δεῖ, οἷον τὸν Ἀχιλλέα Ἀγάθων καὶ Ὀμηρός.\(^{38}\)

In his discussion of 'discovery' that follows, Aristotle looks to Homer again. He takes up the least artistic kind first—discovery by tokens or marks, saying that these are used mostly because of lack of inventiveness. The best use of tokens is with spontaneous rather than contrived recognition. In Homer he cites one better and one poorer use of tokens. The better, since it follows naturally, occurs when Odysseus' nurse Eurycleia discovers the old scar on his thigh as she bathes him (Od. xix.386-475). The poorer, since it is contrived, occurs when Odysseus tells Eumaeus the swine-herd who he is, proving it by showing his wound (Od. xxi.205-225). The first is produced by the logic of events, since it was at least probable that Odysseus would be bathed by Eurycleia when he arrived.

Gerald Else, in his Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument, (Cambridge: 1963) argues that in place of ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι one should read ἐν τῇ Ἀὐλίδι (referring to Iphigenia at Aulis of Euripides). His arguments are persuasive and save the Iliad from completely unwonted criticism by Aristotle.

\(^{38}\)Poetics 1454b, 11-14.
as a stranger. The other is manufactured by the poet and does not follow from the logic of preceding events.

'Aναγνώρισις δὲ τί μὲν ἔστιν, εἰρηται πρότερον· εἰς δὲ ἀναγνώρισις, πρώτη μὲν ἢ ἀτεχνοτάτη, καὶ ἢ πλείστοι χρώνται δι' ἀπορίαν, ἢ διὰ τῶν σημείων. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τούτοις χρῆσαι ἢ βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον, οἷον Ἄδυσσεῦς διὰ τῆς σύλης ἄλλως ἀνεγνώρισθη ὑπὸ τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλως ὑπὸ τῶν συμβοτῶν· εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ μὲν πίστεως ἐνεκὰ ἀτεχνότεραι, καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται πᾶσαι, αἱ δὲ ἐν περιπετείαις, ὡσπερ ἢ ἐν τοῖς Νίππροις, βελτίους.39

Here again a somewhat negative criticism of Homer is implied, one might conclude, first, because he uses token discoveries at all, and secondly because he has used a contrived token discovery. Careful review of the facts, however, reveals a very mild criticism if there is any at all.

Aristotle is careful to say tokens are 'mostly' used because of to lack of inventiveness. One might safely conclude from Aristotle's very elevated general view of Homer, that he does not accept Homer's use of tokens as anything but inventive. It seems significant too that his prime example of a proper use of discovery by token is from Homer, as if to say, if anyone used a token discovery inventively it was Homer.

Without evaluative comment the Philosopher cites Homer as giving an example of another type of discovery—the discovering person is distressed upon seeing something that

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39Poetics 1454b, 19-21; 1454b, 25-30 (=Odyssey xix. 386-475; Odyssey xxi.205-225).
evokes a sad memory. According to Aristotle the Poet exemplifies this kind of discovery in his story of Alcinous when Odysseus is moved to tears as he hears the tragic events of his own wandering recounted by the minstrel. ⁴⁰

In the case of the contrived use of token discovery the following should be kept in mind: Aristotle once again is offering here norms for good tragedy, not epic. A subsequent observation of his seems to apply here as well as to the example in Homer he cites when he makes the observation. He states that the inexplicable finds far greater scope in the epic, since we do not actually see the persons of the story. He cites the example of Achilles' pursuit of Hector, observing that the episode would be ridiculous on stage but is acceptable in epic.

Αριστοτέλης δείχνει τη γραφή του Δωδεκανότατου, μάλλον δ' ένδεχεται έν τη έποποιία το διάλογον. οί δ' θαυμαστοί έν τον πράττοντα, έπει τα περι την "Εκτός τοις δίωξιν τι ληστής αν γελοία αν φανεί, οί μέν εστιτες και ού διώκοντες, ο δ' άνανευών· έν άν θεσι ανθηδανεί." ⁴¹

Aristotle demonstrates the brevity of the basic Odyssey story, remarking that its length comes from its numerous episodes.

έν μέν ουν τοις δράμασι τα ἐπεισόδια σύντομα, ή δ' ἐποποία τούτοις μηκύνεται. της γάρ ὠδυσσείας μακρός ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, ἀποδημοῦντος τινός ἐτη πολλά καὶ παραφυλαττομένοι ὑπὸ τοῦ Ποσειδώνος καὶ μόνου ὄντος, ἐτε δε τῶν οίκων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἢτο τα χρήματα ὑπὸ

⁴⁰Poetics 1454b, 37-1455a, 4 (=Odyssey vii.521ff.).
⁴¹Poetics 1460a, 11-17. (cf: Iliad xxii.205).
Advising against making a tragedy consist of many stories as in epic, he observes that the length of the *Iliad* gives each part its proper size.

A poet should not be seriously censured for failing to distinguish matters that belong more properly to elocution; for example, when Homer uses a command instead of a prayer in the opening line of the *Iliad*.

The *Iliad* springs readily to Aristotle's mind as an example of unity. A phrase, he says, may be a unit because it signifies one thing or is a combination of several

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42 *Poetics* 1455b, 15-23. *cf: Hinman, pp. 113-114 on this citation for interesting argument about whether Aristotle recognized books XXIII and XXIV as authentically Homeric.

43 *Poetics* 1456a, 10-15.

44 *Poetics* 1456b, 11-19 (=*Iliad* i.1).
"phrases". 'Man' is one because it signifies one thing, but the *Iliad* is one because it is such a combination of phrases.\(^4\)\(^5\)

Aristotle takes up some examples of language devices and techniques and cites Homer frequently.

One kind of metaphor is the application of the term for the genus in place of the term for the species. The Poet says: "Here stands my ship." Lying at anchor is a species of standing.

A type of metaphor is the application of the term for the species in place of the term for the genus. When Homer speaks of Odysseus doing 10,000 noble things he is simply saying Odysseus did many noble things, since ten thousand is a species of many and is substituted here for 'many'.

A way of inventing or 'coining' an expression is the use of a word, poetically, to express a meaning it does not ordinarily have. This is exemplified in the *Iliad* when Homer uses the word ἄρητη (prayer) three times to mean

\(^4\)\(^5\) *Poetics* 1457a, 28-30.

\(^4\)\(^6\) *Poetics* 1457b, 6-11 (*=Odyssey i.185; xxiv.308*).

\(^4\)\(^7\) *Poetics* 1457b, 11-13 (*=Iliad ii.272*).
Iēreús (priest).

Πεπωνημένον δ' ἐστίν δ' ὅλως μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ τινών αὐτὸς τίθεται ὁ ποιητὴς· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνιὰ εἶναι τοιαῦτα, οἷον τὰ κέρατα ἐρνύγας καὶ τὸν ἱερέα ἀρητήρα.⁴⁸

Lengthening a word is making use of a longer vowel than usual or inserting a syllable, as Πηληνάδεω for Πηλείδου.

ἔπεκτεταμένον δ' ἐστίν ἡ ἀφηρημένον τὸ μὲν, ἐὰν φωνή-εντι μακροτέρῳ κεχρημένον ἢ τοῦ οἰκείου ἢ συλλαβῇ ἐμβεβλημένη, τὸ δ' ἐὰν ἀφηρημένον τι ἢ αὐτοῦ, ἔπεκτεταμένον μὲν οἷον τὸ πόλεως πόλις καὶ τὸ Πηλείδου Πηληνάδεω,⁴⁹

Altering a word means coining a part of the word but leaving the rest of it unchanged: δεξιτερόν instead of δεξιόν.

ἐξηλαγμένον δ' ἐστίν, ὅταν τοῦ ὀνομαζομένου τὸ μὲν καταλεῖπῃ τὸ δὲ ποιῇ, οἷον τὸ "δεξιτερόν κατὰ μαζῶν" ἀντὶ τοῦ δεξιόν.⁵⁰

Aristotle argues that the poet should mix unusual or rare words with ordinary and commonplace words. Too much of either sacrifices necessary values. The rare or unusual expressions give the poetry distinction and dignity while the ordinary and commonplace provide clarity. He recommends altering experimentally the balance of commonplace and rare expressions in a Homeric verse to experience its resulting

⁴⁸Poetics 1457b, 33-35 (=Iliad i.11-12: οὕνεκα τὸν Χρύσην ἢτίμωσεν ἀρητήρα 'Ατρείδης.
=Iliad i.94: ἀλλ' ἔνεκ' ἀρητήρας, ὁν ἢτίμησ' Ἁγαμέμνων.
=Iliad v.78: δὲς δα Σκαμάνδρου ἀρητήρ ἐτέτυκτο, θεὸς δ' ὡς τίετο δήμωλ'.

⁴⁹Poetics 1454a, 1-4 (=Iliad i.1).

⁵⁰Poetics 1458a, 5-7.
deterioration. He provides three examples of the kind of experiment he suggests.

οὖν ἐλάχιστον δὲ μέρος συμβάλλονται εἰς τὸ σαφὲς τῆς λέξεως καὶ μὴ ἱδρυτικὸν αἱ ἐπεκτάσεις καὶ ἀποκοπαὶ καὶ ἐξαλλαγαῖ τῶν ὀνομάτων· διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἄλλως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς τὸ κύριον παρὰ τὸ εἰσόδος γιγνόμενον τὸ μὴ ἱδρυτικὸν ποιήσει, διὰ δὲ τὸ κοινωνεῖν τοῦ εἰσόδοτος τὸ σαφὲς ἔσται.

τὸ δὲ ἀρμόττον δῶσον διαφέρει, ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπών θεωρεῖσθαι, ἐντιθεμένων τῶν ὀνομάτων εἰς τὸ μέτρον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γλώττης δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μεταφορῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἱδεῶν μετατιθέεσθαι ἄν τις τὰ κύρια ὀνόματα κατίδοις διὶ ἀληθὴ λέγομεν.51

καὶ

νῦν δὲ μ᾽ ἐων ὀλύγος τε καὶ ὀμιδάρας καὶ ἄκλινος,

εἰ τίς λέγοι τὰ κύρια μετατιθέεις

νῦν δὲ μ᾽ ἐων μικρὸς τε καὶ ἄσθενικός καὶ ἀειθῆς.52

καὶ

διφρόν ἀεικέλλου καταθεῖς ὀλύγην τε τράπεζαν.

διφρόν δοκηοδύνακαταθεῖς μικράν τε τράπεζαν.53

καὶ

τὸ ἡμέρας βοῶσιν" ἡμέρας κράζουσιν.54

When he finally takes up narrative poetry explicitly, Aristotle criticizes other epic poets for a lack of organic unity in their works. Homer is called 'divinely inspired' since he did not attempt to dramatize the Trojan War as a whole because it would have to be too long or too complicated, but organized his poem around one part of the story and used many other incidents as episodes (e.g. the catalogue of ships) to put variety into his poem. His excellence lies in the way he relates the other parts to his theme.

51Poetics 1458b, 1-5, 15-19, 24-31.
52Poetics 1458b, 24-27 (=Odyssey ix.515).
53Poetics 1458b, 28-30 (=Odyssey xx.259).
54Poetics 1458b, 31 (=Iliad xvii.265).
In the direct comparison of the elements of tragedy that are common to epic, Homer receives the highest praise again from the Philosopher. Epic he declares, must be simple or complex and revolve about character or catastrophe. It must have reversals, calamities and discoveries as well as good thought and diction. Homer, he says, pioneered and excelled in all these elements, making the *Iliad* exemplify simplicity and suffering and the *Odyssey*, complexity and character.

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55 Poetics 1459a, 31-37; 1459 b, 1-7.

56 Poetics 1459b, 8-17.
Again Homer excels, according to Aristotle, in the matter of the role the poet should play in his own character. Unlike other poets he recedes immediately and remains out of sight while the people he has created dominate the scene, each with his own distinctive character.

Aristotle judges that above all else Homer has taught others the proper way to trick their audience or use fallacy, leading their audience unobtrusively to draw its own false conclusions. He cites the example in the washing episode when Odysseus tells Penelope he is a Cretan from Knossos who once entertained Odysseus on his voyage to Troy. He describes Odysseus' dress and companions as proof. Penelope is guilty of the fallacy: he can only know these details if his story is true; but he does know the details, therefore his story is true. She recognizes the truth of Odyssey XIX, lines 220-248 and because of that accepts the untruth of lines 184-200.

57 Poetics 1460a, 5-11.
Aristotle proceeds to an argument that reveals his unbounded acceptance of the Poet. He flatly asserts that the inexplicable elements in the story of Odysseus' landing would clearly be unacceptable if an inferior poet had written them. Since it is Homer, Aristotle says, the absurdity of those elements is concealed by the charm of all the poet's other qualities. The inexplicable elements Aristotle is referring to are Odysseus' ship running aground at the harbor of Phorcys in Ithaca and the Phaeacian sailors carrying him ashore without waking him.

Aristotle turns to the defense of Homer against a dozen or more criticisms that have been levelled against certain Homeric approaches and expressions.

First, he counters the charges against poetry itself. He grants that a poet errs if he portrays an impossibility, but he argues that it is justifiable if the poet thus achieves the object of poetry--making that part or some

\[58\text{Poetics 1460a, 18-26 (=Odyssey xix.164-260).}
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\[59\text{Poetics 1460a, 27-29; 35-36; 1460b, 1-2 (=Odyssey xxiii.116).}\]
other part of the poem more effective. As an example of this effective use of the portrayal of impossibility, he cites the pursuit of Hector.

Next he considers the charge that what the poet wrote was untrue. His first example is stories about the gods. Here Aristotle has Homer in mind since he cites Xenophanes who opened the assault on Homeric theology at the end of the Sixth Century. His defense of Homer is that he was simply recounting the accepted tales and texts.

The second case about untruth to which Aristotle offers a solution is the expression "their spears stood erect on butt-spikes." It had been argued that this would be a bad position for the spears since they could easily fall and cause alarm. Aristotle's solution is that Homer did not defend this arrangement but merely stated it as a fact. He

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60 Poetics 1460b, 22-29 (=Iliad xxii.205).

61 Poetics 1460b, 32-36; 1461a, 1.
adds that this was still the method of handling spears in Illyria.

Some objections to Homer's language can be solved by appropriate changes in diction. A good example of this argument is the plea that the Poet is using a rare expression instead of an ordinary one. For instance, in the first book of the Iliad some object that Homer has Apollo attack the mules and swift-footed animals first with his arrows. In sending the plague on the Greek army, they object, why should he attack the mules first? Aristotle's solution is that the word οὐρήμας means sentinels here, not mules.

A similar objection argues that Homer says Dolon was a swift runner but he was deformed. Aristotle's solution is that Homer's expression, 'distorted of form', really means, as in the Cretan expression, distorted or ugly in feature. In that case the man's ugly face certainly would not necessarily hinder his running swiftly.

62 Poetics 146la, 1-4 (=Iliad i.152, 153).

63 Poetics 146la, 9-11 (=Iliad i.50).
The final case of this sort is the expression, "livelier mix it". Aristotle argues that it may not mean 'undiluted' as one would give wine to a drunkard, but 'quicker'.

καὶ τὸ "ζωρότερον δὲ κέρατε" οὐ τὸ ἀκρατον ὡς οἰνόφλυξιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἑάττον.⁶⁵

The Philosopher argues that other Homeric expressions should be understood in a metaphorical sense to resolve seeming contradictions. An example of such an apparent contradiction that he cites seems to arise from his confusion of two widely divergent but similar situations and texts in the Iliad. Aristotle clearly wants to refer to the situation at the beginning of the tenth book. There Agamemnon lies awake pondering how he can save the Greeks from disaster, while the other chieftains sleep. As Aristotle sets up the seeming contradiction he seems to quote mistakenly the first two lines of Iliad II which describe Zeus as he comes to the decision to send a dream to the sleeping Agamemnon. These lines portray Zeus lying awake pondering how to honor Achilles, while the other gods and men sleep.

τὸ δὲ κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἰρηται, οἷον "Ἀλλοι μὲν ὃ θεοὶ τε καὶ ἄνερες εὐδοὺ παννύχλοι."⁶⁶

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⁶⁴ Poetics 1461a, 11-14 (=Iliad x.316).

⁶⁵ Poetics 1461a, 14-16 (=Iliad ix.203).

⁶⁶ Poetics 1461a, 16-17 (=Iliad ii.1-2: "Ἀλλοι μὲν ὃ θεοὶ τε καὶ ἄνερες ἵπποκροσταί εὐδοὺ παννύχλοι, Δία δʹ οὐκ ἔχε νήσουμος ὑπνός, mistakenly quoted for Iliad x.1-4:"
After seemingly stating the rest of gods and men were asleep, Homer would appear to contradict himself when he states a little later that Agamemnon marvelled at the voices of flutes and pipes rising up to him from the Trojan plain. If literally everyone except Agamemnon were asleep none could be awake playing pipes and flutes. Aristotle resolves his seemingly mistaken contradiction, however, by arguing that the ἄλλοι of the first statement refers not to 'all' the rest but metaphorically to 'many' of the rest. If only 'many' therefore and not 'all' were asleep, some, he concludes, could have been awake to play flutes and pipes.

The second problem that Aristotle judges can be answered by a metaphorical interpretation occurs when the Poet seems to say that the constellation, Ursa Major, alone of all the constellations 'does not share in the ocean's baths.' In this reference to the 'Great Bear' which Homer makes once in the Iliad and once in the Odyssey there seems to be an error since the other Northern constellations also do not set. Aristotle's solution is that the word 'alone' may be used here metaphorically for one of its species, 'best known.'

"Ἀλλοί μὲν παρὰ νυσίν ἄριστης Παναχαιῶν ἐθάντα παυνυχίοι, μαλακῶς δεδημένοι ὑπνών ἄλλ' ὁμικρὴν Ἀρείην Ἀγαμέμνονα, ποιμένα λαῶν, ὕπνος ἔχε γλυκερὸς πολλὰ φρεσὺν ὀρμαίνοντα.

Poetics 1461a, 17-20 (=Iliad x.13-14)."
Objections to the meaning of some Homeric texts may be answered, Aristotle judges, by changing the accentuation of a crucial word in those texts. He cites two examples, both of which occur in the On Sophistical Refutations as well as in the Poetics. The same argument (Aristotle attributes it to Hippias of Thasos) is advanced in both these works to justify Homer by shifting the accent of a key word in each of the texts.

The first such Homeric text Aristotle clearly thought he was quoting from the beginning of the second book of the Iliad. The sequence described there from which the Philosopher thought he was drawing the problematic phrase portrays Zeus as he instructs and sends a dream to Agamemnon.

κατὰ δὲ προσωφόλαν, ὥσπερ Ἰππίας ἔλυεν ὁ ἔδαφος τὸ "δίδομεν δὲ οὐ".68

Poetics 1461a, 20-21 (=Iliad xviii.489; =Odyssey v.275).

Note that our Iliad ii.13-15 reads as follows: "Ἡρὴ λεισομένη, Τρώςοι δὲ κήδε ἐφήπται. The expression, "δίδομεν δὲ τοι εὐχος αρέσκατ" is found in the twenty-first book of the Iliad, line 297 of our Homer. There Poseidon, accompanied by Athene addresses Achilles, and tells him he will not be vanquished by the river, must confine the enemy within the walls and after killing Hector return to the ships. The sea-god ends with: "We grant you to win glory."
If we accept the phrase "διδομεν δε ω" as part of Aristotle's *Iliad* II, 15, the problem centers around that expression. As it stands Zeus is telling a lie since he would be directing the Dream to lure Agamemnon to disaster with a promise he knew was deceitful. By changing the accent from the first to the second syllable (διδομεν to διδόμεν) the statement becomes a command (a shortened form of the infinitive διδόμεναι used as an imperative). The deceit, by this means, is transferred to the lips of the Dream and Zeus's honor as being truthful is preserved.

The other text Aristotle cites which he feels can be saved by simply changing the accent of a single word describes a 'completely withered' stump of oak or pine that rises a fathom above the earth and 'does not rot in the rain.'

καὶ "το μεν ου καταπύθεται διμβρφ." 70

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70 *Poetics* 1461a, 23 (=*Iliad* xxiii. 328). Cf. also: *On Sophistical Refutations* for the identical solution of this textual problem by change of accent: Παρά δὲ τὴν προσφονίαν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀνευ γραφῆς διαλεκτικοῖς οὐ ρήματον ποιησαι λόγων, ἐν δὲ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις καὶ ποιήσαι μᾶλλον, οἷον καὶ τὸν "Ομηρον ἐνυλον διορθοῦντα πρὸς τοὺς ἐλέγχοντας ὡς ἀτόπως εἰρηκότα" το μεν οὐ καταπύθεται διμβρφ, λέγοντες τὸ οὐ δέξυτερον.
As it stands the statement is incredible—a completely withered stump that does not rot. To resolve the problem Aristotle alters the breathing mark from ὀό to ὀὅ so that the text now means that part of it (the withered stump) rots in the rain.

In another case the solution to a problem text of Homer lies in the ambiguity of an expression and saves the Poet's arithmetic. The problem occurs in the tenth book of the *Iliad* when Odysseus tells Diomedes the night is almost over since 'more' than a third still remains. If 'more' than two parts of the night were already gone a third of the night could not be still left. Aristotle's solution is that πλέω is ambiguous here and means 'full' rather than 'more'. Homer, according to the Philosopher therefore says here 'a full two-thirds of the night is gone.'

> τὰ δὲ ἀμφιβολία, "παράψηκεν δὲ πλέων νυσ." τὸ γὰρ πλέων ἀμφιβολὸν ἐστιν. 71

Other objections can be answered by accepting an expression not literally but according to its usual rendering. Just as wine and water are often called 'wine', so greaves made of copper and tin alloy can be called 'tin', since compounds are called by the name of their more important part.

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71 *Poetics* 1461a, 26 (=*Iliad* x.252).
Another objection is answered by accepting an expression as metaphorical. Ganymede is spoken of as pouring 'wine' for Zeus, although the gods do not drink wine. But here nectar is metaphorically being referred to as "the wine of the gods".

In conclusion Aristotle offers a general principle for handling seeming contradictions in the words of the Poet. He suggests that the often different ways an expression can be understood should be examined before one makes an unwarranted presupposition and arrives at an adverse verdict. A case in point is:

'The spear of the hero was held fast in the gold.' The problem was how could a spear that penetrated two folds be held fast in an exterior layer of gold. The solution seems to be in the fact that the gold was enough to stop the movement of the spear even though its point dented the layers of brass underneath.

72 Poetics 1461a, 27-29 (=Iliad xxi.592).

73 Poetics 1461a, 29-31 (=Iliad xx.234). The fact that the gods abstained from wine is given in Iliad v. 341, but we will not take it as a separate allusion since it is commonly held.
Finally, near the very last lines of the *Poetics*, after heaping the highest praises on Homer, Aristotle embarrassingly states a criticism of the epic genre itself, as compared with the genre of tragedy. Of the Poet's works only the *Iliad* falls under the shadow of negative criticism. The awkward inclusion of the *Odyssey* in the Aristotelian text can be ignored as an interpolation. The criticism of the epic is based on the dilution that occurs when it includes many separate episodes along with its main action.

First he praises tragedy for its shorter span and more concentrated form. The *Oedipus* of Sophocles would suffer, 

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74 *Poetics* 1461a, 33 (=*Iliad* xx.272).

75 cf. Gerald Else, pp. 648-649. "The conduct of the argument here betrays a certain embarrassment: naturally, since it implies a criticism of Homer. Aristotle does not reveal this at once. He begins with the indirect evidence from tragedy and only brings in the *Iliad* obliquely, exempli causa:

(λέγω δὲ οἶον . . . ὡσπερ . . .).

Thus the critique of Homer is not--Aristotle carefully keeps it from being--the main business of the passage. But to continue, 'As the *Iliad* for example has many such sections'--namely such as could be developed into separate tragedies--'which have bulk in themselves also'--that is, in addition to the bulk of the main action--'and the *Odyssey*.' This last remark is more than an awkward afterthought, breaking into Aristotle's construction and word order; it is an interpolation . . . "

cf: Else's whole discussion, pp. 638-650.
he says, if it were put in as many verses as the *Iliad*.

Next he goes on to his explicit criticism of the epic, obliquely using the *Iliad* as an example. If the epic is composed of a number of actions it can give the impression of being heavily diluted, he says. The *Iliad* has a number of parts of that kind which have bulk in themselves, and is still as well constructed as the epic permits; that is, it is as much an imitation of a single action as it can be. Aristotle clearly speaks here of an inherent limitation in the epic genre which he feels is handled as well as can be by the Poet. As Gerald Else says: "He wants to prove the superiority of tragedy without allowing his ideal poet to be involved in the defeat of his genre." 77

With Aristotle's suggestion here that there is a weakness in the epic form itself rather than in Homer we have completed our review of all the Philosopher's references to the Poet as master of the arts of language. We have

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76 *Poetics* 1462b 1-3.

77 Else, p. 650.

78 *Poetics* 1462b 5-9.
seen Aristotle clearly present Homer over and over again
as a model for orators and for tragic and comic, as well as
epic, poets. We saw him recommend that every orator should
imitate Homer in the effective use of examples, illustrations, facts more relevant to his subject, figures of speech, ingratiating introductions, unmistakable facial expressions, and bodily gestures. Like Homer every orator, we have
learned from Aristotle, should avoid prolixity and burdening his audience with unnecessary material.

After he attributed the origins of satire and the main
lines of comedy to the Poet we saw him recommend Homer's poetic technique too, as the best and most worthy of imita-
tion. His portrayal of only good or 'better' people should be imitated, as well as his adherence to a unity of action and outcome and natural development of the denouement from the plot itself. Tragic writers, following the example of Homer, should, Aristotle advised: portray inferior people as having worth, observe brevity, use discovery gracefully, form tragedy from a single story, maintain unity of plot, admit defects that do not destroy tragic art form, and use figures of speech creatively. We saw the Philosopher en-
courage epic writers, too, to follow the Poet's lead by
relating the parts of the epic closely to its central theme, by making a simple or complex epic excel in its own class, receding personally in the story, employing fallacy in-
geniously, and making acceptable what is inexplicable.
In the end we saw Aristotle's admiration of Homer perhaps in its strongest light as he patiently defended the Poet against a whole series of criticisms based on Homer's alleged untruthfulness, portrayal of impossibility, and involvement in contradictions.

We move now to the next chapter and a consideration of Aristotle's references to Homer as a source of Philosphic and scientific information. Before we go on, however, we can conclude that the examination of this chapter has led clearly to a single resounding affirmation; in the Corpus of his writings Aristotle recognized Homer as the master of the language arts.
Aristotle's recognition of Homer's mastery of the arts of language may come as no surprise. His acceptance, however, of the poet's authority in philosophic questions and many scientific areas is another matter. At least it must lead those who wish to evaluate Homer or Aristotle or Aristotle's relationship to Homer to base their judgement on a much broader perspective than has been the custom.

The evidence for this chapter is quite extensive. In philosophic and scientific matters the Philosopher turns to Homer thirty-five times citing or alluding to fifty-three Homeric texts to support some observation of his own. In the Historia Animalium he finds examples in Homer to exemplify his judgement ten times, in the Motion and Progression of Animals and the Generation of Animals, once each. The Poet's backing is established six times in the Problems, again six times in On the Cosmos, three times in the Metaphysics, twice each in About the Soul, On Marvelous Things Heard, and the Nicomachean Ethics and once each in the Meteorologica and the Politics.

This chapter will show that Aristotle sought Homer's
support in the main questions of his Philosophy of God and in a wide range of scientific areas, touching anthropology, bio-chemistry, geography, geology, medicine, meterology, physics, physiology, psychology and zoology. It will analyze the thirty-five Aristotelian texts that approach the Poet as a source of philosophic and scientific information, to shed light on the Philosopher's attitude towards Homer.

Questions related to the existence of the first cause of the world would be surely classified as central to Aristotle's philosophy of God. In four of those questions he cites Homer to illustrate his conclusions—the nature of the first cause, God's existence, God's place in the universe, and God's control and providence over all things.

In the Metaphysics he discusses the various ancient positions on the nature of the original force in the world. When he is treating of those who maintained that the original force was water he singles out an opinion of his times. He says that some think that men of very ancient times, who first speculated about the gods, held that the primary force was water. They represented Ocean and Tethys as the parents of creation and the oath ('oaths are sworn by what is most ancient') of the gods to be by water—Styx, as the poets called it. In the Poet we find the Philosopher's observation verified clearly five times.

εἰσὶ δὲ τίνες οἱ καὶ τοὺς παμπαλαίους καὶ πολὺ πρὸ γῆς νῦν γενέσεως καὶ πρῶτους θεολογήσαντας οὕτως οὗτοι περὶ τῆς φύσεως ὑπολαβεῖν. Ὀκεανὸν τε γάρ
καὶ Τηθύν ἐποίησαν τῆς γενέσεως πατέρας, καὶ τὸν ὄρκον τῶν θεῶν ὄδωρ, τὴν καλουμένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν Στύγα τῶν ποιητῶν. τιμιώτατον μὲν γὰρ τὸ πρεσβύτατον, ὄρκος δὲ τὸ τιμιώτατον ἐστὶν.¹

Later in the Metaphysics he is careful to note, however, that the early poets agree that the first governing principle of the universe was single. They assert, he observes, that Zeus was King and ruler, not the original forces, such as Night, Heaven, Chaos, or Water. An example of the Homeric formula that states this primacy of Zeus is found in Book I of the Iliad.

οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ ὁ άρχαῖοι ταύτη ὅμοιως, ἥ βασιλεύειν καὶ ἄρχειν φαινόν τοὺς πρώτους, οὗτος νῦν καὶ οὐρανόν ἢ χάος ἢ Οὐκεανόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν Δία.²

In the Motion and Progression of Animals, when the Philosopher asks whether or not an immovable cause of the movement in the universe must necessarily exist at rest outside the universe he poses the primary question of his

¹Metaphysics 983b, 27-33 (=Iliad xiv.201). Homer names Ocean and Tethys as the gods' origin: 'Ὠκεανόν τε, θεῶν γένεσιν, καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν, (=Iliad xiv.245-246--Homer names Ocean alone here as the source of all the gods: καὶ ἄν ποταμοῖο δέσθη 'Ὠκεανοῦ, δὲ περ γένεσις πάντεσσι τέτυκται'. In three places Homer names Styx as that by which the gods swear their oaths. If the gods swear their oaths by it, Aristotle reasoned, it must be the most ancient thing, since oaths are sworn by the most ancient things. (=Iliad ii.755): ὄρκον γὰρ δεινοῦ Στυγὸς ὢδατὸς ἔστιν ἀπορῷ. (=Iliad xiv.271): ἄγρει νῦν μοι διομίϑον ἀδατον Στυγὸς ὢδωρ, (=Iliad xv.237-238): καὶ τὸ κατειρβόμενον Στυγὸς ὦδωρ, δὲ τε μέγιστος ὄρκος δεινοτάτος τε μέλει μακάρεσι δεοίς, (=Iliad xv.37-38).

²Metaphysics 1091b, 4-6 (=Iliad i.494: καὶ τότε δὴ πρὸς "Ολυμπὸν ἵσαν θεόι αἰὲν ἐόντες πάντες ἡμα, Ζεὺς δ' ἔρχε.
whole philosophy of God. We know his response to this question is a resounding affirmative in the twelfth book of the *Metaphysics.*³ Here he suggests agreement with those who hold this view and finds support in the *Iliad* when the Poet says that not all the gods and goddesses together could pull Zeus down to earth from the highest point of heaven.

The next six references, which treat the place where God dwells and his governance of all things, are drawn from *On the Cosmos,* of which D. J. Furley says: "The probability is that it was a deliberate forgery."⁵ But of the author Furley later observes:

. . . he certainly reproduces enough genuinely Aristotelian thought to make it reasonable that he should wish to usurp Aristotle's name. This is an important point. Those who have proved that the work is a forgery have sometimes overlooked that it is a forgery of Aristotle . . . of the *Protrepticus* and

³*Metaphysics* 1072a, 19-1073a, 14.

⁴*Motion and Progression of Animals* 699b, 32-700 a, 3 (=*Iliad* viii.20, 21, 22). Note that the lines are not quoted in the proper order. Also the πάντων of Aristotle's text reads μήσωρ' in our text.

De Philosophia, the Aristotle whose 'flumen orationis aureum' was praised by Cicero, rather than the Aristotle of the school treatises which survive today. 6

Apropos of the texts about God's existence and governance that this present study is about to examine, Furley notes:

Those who believe that knowledge of Aristotle's work was absolutely confined to the published writings until Andronicus's edition, will say that the author of the De Mundo (On the Cosmos) shows knowledge of doctrines (e.g. of the Unmoved Mover, if this was not contained in the De Philosophia, and various meteorological details) which were known only after Andronicus. . . . I am inclined to believe that the author of the De Mundo could have known all the Aristotelian matter that he reproduces before the publication of Andronicus's edition, and that the style and manner of the work indicate a date, before this edition made Aristotle's school-treatises more widely known. 7

In his work, On the Cosmos, the Philosopher delves further into the question of the place where God exists. He sets the question in the context of God's providence which he declares is essential for the preservation of all things--'an unwearying power by which he controls even things that seem very distant.' His home is in the highest place, as Homer indicates, he says.

σωτήρ μὲν γὰρ οὐντως ἀπάντων ἐστὶ καὶ γενέτυρος τῶν ὀπωσδήποτε κατὰ τόνδε τόν κόσμον συντελουμένων ὁ θεὸς, οὐ μὴν αὐτουργοῦ καὶ ἐπιθόνου χόου κάματον ὑπομένων, ἀλλὰ δυναμεὶ χρώμενος ἀτρύτω, δι’ ἡς καὶ τῶν πόρων δοκοῦντων εἶναι περιγίνεται. τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀνωτάτω καὶ πρῶτην ἔδραν αὐτὸς ἔλαχεν, ὑπατός τε διὰ

6 Ibid., p. 339.
7 Ibid., pp. 339-340.
A little later he states that God holds a place high above the cosmos, bright and untroubled which we call 'heaven' because it shines all over. He finds support in Homer when the Poet describes Olympus, the dwelling place of God, as safe, without wind, rain, snow, or clouds, radiant and airy.

All ages of men have always testified that God inhabits the region above. All men lift their hands to heaven when they pray. Homer, he says, testifies to this when he asserts that the wide heaven in the aether and the clouds belongs to Zeus.

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8 On the Cosmos 397b, 20-27 (=Iliad i.499). cf. Iliad v.754 and viii.3 for similar expressions of the place where God dwells.

9 On the Cosmos 400a, 3-14 (=Odyssey vi.42-45).

10 On the Cosmos 400a, 15-19 (=Iliad xv.192).
Returning to the theme of providence in the *On the Cosmos* the Philosopher states that God was an impartial, unchangeable law over all things. He administers the well-ordered arrangement of heaven and earth guiding even the tiniest things serenely and harmoniously. His governance extends as Homer says to 'sweet figs and olives.'

Aristotle continues the same theme stating that God's guidance touches trees that bear no fruit, too, but have some other purpose. He governs plane-trees, pines, box-trees and as Homer says, 'alders, poplars, and sweet cypresses.' Once again he finds illustrations of his insights in the Poet.

Aristotle concludes the theme of God's provident care of vegetation with further support from Homer sustaining the lovely lyrical tone of this whole passage. God's providence extends to those trees that bear a sweet but perishable harvest in autumn. Homer speaks of them--'pear, pomegranate,

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12 *On the Cosmos* 401a, 2-4 (=*Odyssey* v.64).
and apple trees with their shiny fruit.'

αἱ τε καρπῶν ὑπὸς ἴδιον ἄλλως δὲ ὑσθησαέρστον
φέρουσαι,
δὲχαὶ καὶ ὑσταὶ καὶ ὑπέλαι ἀγλασκαρίποι, 13

Furley is right when he observes of the God of On the
Cosmos:

He maintains the order of the cosmos by means of an
undefined 'power,' which relieves him of the dishonourable
necessity of personal intervention. Clearly we
have here a development, however remote, of Aristotle's
Unmoved Mover. 14

Furley, however, moves in a much more productive direc-
tion--one taken firmly by Chroust 15--when he turns a little
later to the Aristotle of the Fragments and notes:

Aristotle himself, however, seems to have spoken with a
rather different voice in his published works. In the
De Philosophia he said that the orderly movement of the
heavenly bodies was one of the reasons for man's belief
in gods. 16

Leaving Aristotle's Natural Theology or science of God
we will turn now to the sciences in which he touches men
most immediately--anthropology, psychology, physiology, and
medicine. Four times in anthropological considerations he
cites Homer to illustrate his own observations. Twice he

13 On the Cosmos 401a, 5-7 (=Odyssey xi.589).
14 Furley, op. cit., p. 336.
15 Chroust, op. cit., 'Aristotle's Religious Convic-
tions,' Chapter XVI, Vol. I, pp. 221-231; 'A Proof for the
Existence of God,' Chapter XIII, Vol. II, pp. 159-174; 'The
Concept of God in Aristotle's Philosophy,' Chapter XIV, Vol.
II, pp. 175-193. Chroust concludes that the Aristotle of
the Fragments came not only to a provident but also a
personal God.
turns to the Poet in psychological judgements, and once each in physiological and medical observations.

The first anthropological consideration occurs in the History of the Animals when he is discussing the winter migrations of cranes to the marshlands south of Egypt where the Nile River has its source. In a brief single sentence digression Aristotle says that there the cranes fight the Pygmies, a true, not fabled, race of dwarfs who live in underground caves. He accepts here Homer's observations about the Pygmies in the Iliad.

Two considerations that touch anthropology relate to the social and political mode of existence of the Cyclopes, Homer's race of giants. The first reference occurs in the Politics in which the Philosopher says that Homer's Cyclopes are a good example of the earliest form of political existence. It is found, he notes, in early cities, in some of his contemporary foreign peoples, and in family-founded colonies. Homer tells us the Cyclopes lived in scattered families, each of which had its own rule based on its own household, and their political ties were based on family ties. We cannot conclude here that Aristotle accepts

\[1\] History of the Animals 597a, 4-9 (=Iliad iii.6).
the Cyclopes as a true race of men, as he accepted the Pygmies. Very clearly, however, the Philosopher says that when Homer was describing the socio-political existence of the Cyclopes he was describing the true earliest form of socio-political life among peoples.

διδ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλεις, καὶ νῦν ἐτι τὰ ἔθνη· ἐν βασιλευομένων γὰρ συνήλθον. πάσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου, ὡστε καὶ αἱ ἀποικίαι διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ὁ λέγει ὁ Ὀμήρος, "Ἀπειστεύει δὲ ἐκαστὸς παιδῶν ἢ’ ἀλόχων." ὁποράδες γὰρ· καὶ οὗτῳ τὸ ἀρχαῖον φύσιν. 18

The second reference is found in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle states that only Sparta binds its citizens by law to a proper diet and physical exercises. Other states neglect this matter, he says, and let every man live as he pleases, like the Cyclopes of Homer, 'laying down the rules for his wife and children.' Here the Philosopher is noting that governments of his own time were as primitive as the Homeric Cyclopes in the matter of governing proper diet and physical regime for their citizens. Once again, however, we are noting here only the anthropological aspect of the passage—Aristotle's acceptance of Homer's record of a very early form of socio-political organization. He refers again to the same text in the *Odyssey* noted above.

ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ Δακεδαιμονίᾳ πόλει μετ’ ἀλίγων ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν ὁποῖη πεποιηθοῦσα τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων· ἐν δὲ ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων ἐξημέληται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ὅ’ ἐκαστος ὡς βουλεῖται, κυκλωπικῶς θεμιστεύων παιδῶν ἢ’ ἀλόχου. 19

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18 *Politics* 1252b, 19-24 (=*Odyssey* ix.114,115).
19 *Nicomachean Ethics* 1180a, 24-29 (=*Odyssey* ix.114,115).
The final consideration of Aristotle that relates to anthropology is concerned with the attractive qualities of the Trojan women who settled in Daunia. The Philosopher tells of the honor in which the women of that district were held by the Greeks. They were descendants of the Trojan women who settled there after the fall of Troy. They burned the ships of their Greek captors to avoid slavery at the hands of their captors' Greek wives and to become themselves the new wives of their Greek captors. Aristotle reminds us that Homer recognized the special traits of these Trojan women when he spoke admiringly of them as "long-robed" and "deep-bosomed."

The next two passages are drawn from the Problems which scholars have attributed to an author or authors other than Aristotle. In the preface to his translation of the work, E. S. Forster, says:

The inclusion of the Problemata in the Aristotelian Corpus is no doubt due to the fact that Aristotle is known to have written a work of this kind, to which

20 On Marvellous Things Heard 840b, 8-17: Trojan women are spoken of as 'trailing-robed'; (=Iliad vi.442; Iliad vii.297). They are characterized as 'deep-bosomed' (=Iliad xviii.122, Iliad xxiv.215). This treatise is viewed as spurious and composed mostly as excerpts from Theophrastus.
reference is made in his genuine works and by other writers. An examination of these references shows that some of them can be connected with passages in the *Problemata*, while others cannot; from which it may be concluded that, while the *Problemata* is not the genuine Aristotelian work, it nevertheless contains an element derived from such a work. It is also obviously indebted to other Aristotelian treatises especially those on Natural History, to the Hippocratean writings, and to Theophrastus.21

In Book XXX of the *Problems*, the Philosopher is concerned with problems connected with thought, intelligence, and wisdom. He raises a question at the beginning that places him in the realm of psychology and the problem of psychosomatic connections. He asks why all men outstanding in philosophy, poetry, and the arts are melancholic. Some, he said, are even affected by the diseases of black bile, like the epilepsy, sores, and frenzy of Heracles, the sores of the Spartan, Lysander, and the insanity of Ajax. Many other heroes, philosophers and poets have suffered similar things. Homer, he said, gives us the evidence of Bellerophontes, depressive and reclusive, driven to wander the desert restlessly. He suggests that something about the nature of these gifted people produces these psychological and physical sicknesses.

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From this problem he moves naturally to the example of the effect imbibed alcohol has on different people. Clearly, he said, alcohol makes the type of person he has just discussed melancholic. Alcohol's effect changes as drinking progresses, he notes. Varying the quantity of alcohol consumed varies the effect on the drinker. The different transient characteristics produced by alcohol are comparable, the Philosopher observes, to the more permanent temperaments caused by nature. He suggests that there are substances in the body which produce various psychological traits we find among human beings. In the *Odyssey* he finds support for his examples of the effect of alcohol on the psychology of the individual who is consuming it.

Psychology is the subject again in three different contexts in which Aristotle examines the relationship between man's sense perception and his true thought. He

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22 *Problems* 953a, 21-31 (=*Iliad* vi.200+.201 sq.).

23 *Problems* 953b, 7-12 (=*Odyssey* xix.122). (Note text differs from MSS).
emphasizes how really distinct they are. He recognizes, however, how most men have failed to grasp the great difference between sense perception and thought. In fact, as he observes, they have for the most part identified them. Homer, too, he thinks, seems to identify thought with sense perception. This is one of the few places in which the Philosopher suggests any negative evaluation of the Poet.

Aristotle's strongest statement in the matter occurs in his work *On the Soul*. He says that the older philosophers actually assert that thinking and perceiving are identical. After observing that Empedocles held that judgement grows with what appears to a man and that a man's thinking continually appears to him in different forms, he concludes that Homer implies the same thing when he says in the *Odyssey*, "Such is the nature of man's thought." All these authors, he argues, suppose the process of thinking to be a bodily function like perception.

What the Philosopher is attempting to preserve here throughout is the mind's ultimate independence of matter. He is not denying, therefore, the ultimate origin of man's knowledge in the senses--it is fundamental to his whole

24 About the Soul 427a, 21-27 (=Odyssey xviii.136).
doctrine here in the third book of this treatise. He finds in the ancients a failure to distinguish adequately the mind and its spiritual realm and faculties from the body and its corporeal world and sense faculties.

This judgement of the Philosopher is evidenced clearly in an earlier passage of the same treatise On the Soul. Here he says Democritus actually identified soul and mind and believed that truth was subjective. This same thinker, Aristotle says, regarded as accurate Homer's description of Hector, in his dazed state as "lying thinking other thoughts." Democritus does not use the word mind to denote a faculty concerned with the truth, he argues, but identifies the soul and the mind. (Note that the Philosopher is not objecting here to Homer's statement but rather Democritus's use of the Poet's observation.)

In the Metaphysics Aristotle touches again finally on the same question, quoting the above Homeric passage once again. Here he is stressing the ancient philosophers' belief that thought is completely dependent on bodily

25 About the Soul, III, 2-8.

26 About the Soul 404a, 27-31 (=Iliad xxiii.698- This is the only passage we have in our Homer that describes such a "thinking of other thoughts," but it refers to Euryalus, not Hector.)
condition. According to their conviction reality therefore is what each man’s physical perception makes it to be according to his physical condition at the moment of that perception. These thinkers, the Philosopher observes, maintain that Homer also clearly held this view when he made Hector, stunned by a blow, lie with thoughts deranged. This implied, he argued, that even those who are 'out of their minds' still think, although not the same thoughts. If there is more than one kind of thought, these ancient philosophers concluded, there must be more than one kind of reality.

In the History of the Animals he is discussing human physiology and touches on man's main vascular system. As he describes the vena cava (including the jugular vein), its location and its connection with the other main blood vessels of the upper part of the torso he observes that Homer spoke of this blood vessel in the Iliad.

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Footnote 26 for evaluation of this text.)
In a discussion of the treatment of wounds and bruises in the *Problems*, Aristotle questions why both thapsia, which is hot and caustic, and cold bronze are used in the treatment of bruises. The use of cold bronze he finds exemplified in the *Iliad*.

\[\text{Διὰ τὸ ἡ θαψία καὶ ὁ κῦαθος τὰ ὑπόπτα παύει, ἢ μὲν ἄρχόμενα, ὅ δὲ ὄστερον, ἕναντιά δύνα; ὁ μὲν γὰρ κῦαθος ψυχρὸς, ὃσπερ καὶ ὁ ποιητής φησὶ "ψυχρὸν ὅ ἔλε χαλκὸν ὀδοὺσιν" ἢ δὲ θαψία θερμὸν καὶ καυστικὸν.}^{29}\]

Moving on now to science related to the animal world, we find Aristotle illustrating and supporting ten of his zoological observations from the pages of Homer. In fact, as Otto Körner points out, he accepts Homer's evidence in zoology as on a par with actual observation.\(^{30}\) Seven of these observations occur in the Philosopher's History of the Animals, one in the *Generation of Animals*, one in the *Problems*, and one in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

The first of Aristotle's references to Homer in a zoological context is found in the *History of the Animals* when the Philosopher is discussing traits of Laconian hounds. After stating that the male of this breed lives ten years and the female twelve, he notes that bitches of other breeds generally live fourteen or fifteen years and some as

\(^{29}\) *Problems* 890b, 7-10 (=*Iliad* v.75). From a work considered spurious. *Cf:* Footnote \(^{21}\), *Supra.*

many as twenty. This is why some people, he says, accept Homer's statement that Odysseus's hound Argos died in his twentieth year.

The next two Homeric zoological citations come a little later in the same work of the Philosopher. Here while he is making observations about the traits of bulls he declares that five years of age marks the bull's prime. For this reason, he says, Homer is commended for using the expression 'a five-year bull.'

The Poet is commended too for another description of a bull in his prime, (identical in meaning to the above phrase according to Aristotle) 'a nine-seasons' bull.'

Again in the History of the Animals Aristotle confirms an observation about an animal by citing Homer. In this

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31 *History of the Animals* 574b, 29-575a, 1 (=*Odyssey* xvii.326-327. The text is as follows: "Ἀργον δ' ἀδ' κατὰ μοίρ' ἔλαβεν μέλανος ὀδάντολο, αὐτίκ' ἵδντ' Ὄδυσση ἐεικοστῇ ἐνιαυτῷ.

32 *History of the Animals* 575b, 4-6 (=*Iliad* ii.402ff.; *Iliad* vii.315; *Odyssey* xix.220).

33 *History of the Animals* 575b, 6-7 (=*Odyssey* x.19).
context he is describing characteristics of the wild boar, and states that, as Homer observes, castrated wild boars grow larger and fiercer.

Aristotle's fifth citation of Homer's authority in zoological matters occurs when he considers the evidence that the long-horned ram of Libya is born with horns. The Philosopher extends Homer's observation, which is limited to rams, to include either ewes or other horned animals. 35 Homer, the Philosopher notes, says the long-horned ram in Libya is born with horns.

The next three passages, as was indicated earlier, are drawn from the ninth book of the History of the Animals, which is viewed by many scholars as spurious. A. L. Peck, 34 History of the Animals 578a, 32-578b, 2. Note that this citation is a mixture of two loci in Homer: Iliad ix.539: ὁρεύει ἐπὶ χλούην σὺν ἄγριον ἀργόλοδοντα, and Odyssey ix.190, 191+: καὶ γὰρ θαῦμ᾽ ἔτέτυκτο πελώριον, οὐδὲ ἐφεξε ἀνδρί ὑπετοφάγῳ ἀλλὰ ρώς ὑλήσετι. It is questionable whether the word χλούην here has the meaning Aristotle gives it.


34 History of the Animals 606a, 18-20 (=Odyssey iv.85).
in the preface of his translation of the work, observes:

In the ninth Book A.-W. (Aubert and Wimmer) find inconsistencies, irrelevancies, and repetitions, and some un-Aristotelian obscurities of style; it may, they think, have been put together from notes left by Aristotle, but it is a disorderly composition and some of it is "careless bungling" (zum Theil gedankenloses Machwerk). Dittmeyer follows them in rejecting it, and endorses Joachim's view that it was put together by some Peripatetic at the beginning of the third century, incorporating matter from Theophrastus. 37

Again in the History of the Animals the Philosopher supports his animal observations with the evidence in Homer. He describes the cymindis, a black rarely seen mountain bird, long and slender, about the size of the 'dove-killer' hawk.

Later in the same work Aristotle cites the support of the Poet when he is mentioning various species of eagles. He describes a species called the Plangus. It is second among eagles in size and strength, lives in mountain meadows and near marshy lakes, and is called 'duck-killer' or 'black eagle'. Homer, he says, speaks of this bird when Priam visits the tent of Achilles to seek the return of Hector's body.


38 History of the Animals 615b, 5-10 (=Iliad xiv.291).
The next citation of a Homeric text by Aristotle in the History of the Animals to support his own zoology occurs in a long discussion of the traits of lions. The Philosopher says that two statements about the lion are true—one that he is particularly afraid of fire, and the other that, keeping his eye trained on the hunter who strikes him, he pounces on him. The first trait, he says, is clearly mentioned by Homer.

Another observation on the traits of the lion is found in the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle discusses the virtue of temperance and the vice of profligacy. They are concerned with those pleasures which man shares with the lower animals. These lower animals, he observes, derive pleasure from smell and sight only accidentally, that is, only in so far as they relate to eating. The lion takes pleasure, not (in the words of the Poet) in the sight of a stag or mountain-goat, but in the prospect of a meal.

39 History of the Animals 618b, 23–26 (=Iliad xxiv.315–316). The Oxford text of Homer reads:
αὐτίκα δ᾿ αἰετὸν ἥκε, τελειότατοι πετενών, μόρφων ἔπνητηρ’, ὃν καὶ περικυνὲν καλέουσιν.

40 History of the Animals 629b, 21–24 (=Iliad xi.554; xvii.663).
In the *Generation of Animals*, Aristotle makes another zoological observation that he supports with evidence from Homer. He is discussing the aging process in a man and the other animals. In his explanation of the greying process he notes that of all animals beyond man, the horse seems to grey the most. The reason for this greying of the horse, he feels, is the thinness of the bone that surrounds its brain. This is demonstrated by the fact that a blow delivered to this spot can kill a horse. An example of this, he notes, can be found in the *Iliad*.

The final zoological observation Aristotle makes for which he cites an Homeric example is found in the *Problems*. In a rather complex argumentation about the characteristics of eunuch bulls and rams he argues that maleness leads to

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41 *Nicomachean Ethics* 1118a, 17-24 (=*Iliad* iii.24).

42 *Generation of Animals* 785a, 11-16 (=*Iliad* viii.83-84).
growth in breadth and depth as well as height. Femaleness, however, produces growth only in height. The eunuch bull or ram, therefore, losing its maleness, grows only in height. Homer, he says, exemplified this when speaking of the orphaned daughters of Pandareus, he said that 'Sacred Artemis gave them height.'

Coming finally to sciences of the simply physical world, Aristotle makes five observations for which he finds support in the Homeric poems. The first, a geological-geographic observation, occurs in the Meterologica, when the Philosopher is discussing the settlement of people in marshy areas that gradually develop into dry land. The precise time and place of earliest settlement in such gradually changing areas is forgotten, he thinks. The settlers usually inhabit the dry land as it becomes available very gradually over a very long period of time. This he observes is what happened in Egypt, whose ancient name was Thebes. Homer, he observes, supports the evidence of Egypt's ancient name.

Footnote 21 Supra.
the matter of Egypt's changing terrain. He mentions Egypt as though Memphis either were not there or at least were not as important as in Aristotle's time. The Philosopher's argument from the Poet here—an argument from silence—is not as strong as his usual argument.

Besides the mention in the ninth book of the *Iliad*, Egypt surfaces in three places in the *Odyssey*, again without any mention of Memphis. The first two citations are brief, the third extended. Menelaus tells Telemachus in the first citation how he 'wandered over Cyprus, Phoenicia, and

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4-5 *Meteorologica* 351b, 27-35 (=*Iliad* ix.381-382: οὐδ' ὲσ' ἐς 'Ὀρχωμένον ποτὶνοῦσεται, οὐδ' δοὰ θῆβας Ἀλεπτίλας) Leaf (The *Iliad* p.398, n, 381) argues that Aristotle is accepting an interpolation here, since the Thebes referred to is probably the city in Boiotia.

4-5 *Meteorologica* 351b, 35-352a, 9.
Egypt'. The text of Homer reads:

Κύπρον Φοινίκην τε καὶ Ἀιγυπτίους ἐπαληθείς, Αἰδηοπάς
θ' ἰκόμην καὶ Σιδόνιους καὶ Ἐρεμβόν καὶ Λιβύην,"6

A little later in the same book Homer is describing how Helen mixed a drug into the wine served at the banquet Menelaus was having in Telemachus' honor. She had gotten the drug from 'Polydamna . . . a woman of Egypt, for there the earth, the giver of grain, bears the greatest supply of drugs'. It would be unlikely that Memphis, whether it existed or not, would be mentioned by the Poet here. The Homeric text reads as follows:

In a final, extended passage (lines 245-291 of Book XIV) about Egypt, Odysseus is describing his decision to journey to that land, his voyage and sojourn there and departure for Phoenicia and Libya. One could reasonably expect mention of Memphis here, but it is not forthcoming. In describing his arrival there he speaks of the river, the fair fields, the plain, the city, but nothing of Memphis or the changing terrain of Egypt. The most pertinent part of the long Homeric passage reads:

"Πεμπτατοί δ' Αἰγυπτιῶν ἐξωρείτην ἰκόμεσθα,
στῆσα δ' ἐν Αἰγυπτῷ ποταμῷ νέας ἀμφιελίσσας.

4 Odyssey iv.227-229.
In a discussion of the possible bio-chemical change of the color of an animal's coat due to the water it drinks, Aristotle asserts that for this reason the same animal can be white when raised in some regions, and black when raised in others. After speaking of rivers that make rams white and others that make them black, he says 'it is widely believed that the Scamander makes them yellow.' For this reason, the Philosopher declares, they say Homer calls that river Yellow instead of Scamander.

In his On Marvelous Things Heard, Aristotle finds support for an historical conclusion based on geological evidence that he agrees was clearly illustrated in Homer. He discusses geological limitations that some say would have precluded certain routes for Jason out of the Pontus. For

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48 Odyssey xiv.257-268.

49 History of the Animals 519a, 16-20 (=Iliad xx.73-74).
example, he accepts along with other proofs 'still more convincing evidence' that the voyage out did not take Jason and the Argo through the Symplegades. The 'still more convincing evidence' is found in the *Odyssey* when the Poet says it is impossible to sail past this place because of the very dangerous eruptions of Mount Etna.

In the *Problems* the Philosopher cites Homeric support for his explanation of a light phenomenon he observed in the physical properties governing the sea's waves: Water set in motion appears darker. Homer recognized this, Aristotle says, when he said that the wind made the sea black. It appears lighter, the Philosopher observed, because it is more transparent when it is still. Movement makes the water less transparent and therefore blacker to the eye.

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50 *On Marvellous Things Heard* 839b, 28-34 (=*Odyssey* xii.67-68). N.B.: The treatise is considered spurious and traceable mostly to excerpts from Theophrastus.

51 *Problems* 934a, 13-18 (=*Iliad* vii.64). Cf: Footnote 21 Supra.
In one further observation of a physical science—meteorology—Aristotle cites Homer in support of his position. In the Problems he is discussing the characteristics of the different prevailing winds when he wonders why the south-west wind is the calmest and the gentlest of all winds. He recognizes that Homer agrees with the observation since he describes it as the wind that always blows in the Elysian Fields.

In this chapter we have found Aristotle turning repeatedly to Homer to illustrate or support one philosophic or scientific observation he has made. The range of subjects in which he referred to the Poet was truly remarkable. It swept from the philosophy of God through anthropology, psychology, physiolgy, and medicine in the human sphere, zoology and biochemistry in the world of animals, and geography, geology, meteorology, and physics in the purely physical realm.

The quotations from the Philosopher which we have studied in this chapter reveal that his approach to Homer in these philosophic and scientific matters was quite distinct from his approach to him in the arts of language. The same high degree of admiration and matter-of-fact

\[52\text{Problems 943 b, 21-23 (}=\text{Odyssey iv.567}). \text{ This reading of Aristotle does not agree with our text which reads: } \text{\'αλλ' αἰεὶ ζεφύρου ο λίγο πνεύμονος ἀήτας. Cf. Footnote 21 supra.}\]
respect were just as clearly in evidence, but with a subtle difference. In matters related to the arts of language Homer is approached as the master and teacher. Here, in philosophical and scientific questions we find him approached not as master philosopher or scientist but as the reliable source and reservoir of traditional wisdom and lore.
Searching in human experience and principles for what is good or desirable for man is a central effort of Aristotle's philosophy of man. The record of this quest is scattered throughout the Philosopher's works, but is mainly found, of course, in the three explicitly named ethical works, in the Politics and in the Rhetoric which, as we noted in Chapter Three, has a clearly ethical orientation.

In the course of his inquiry into human values, as revealed in his extant works, Aristotle turns to the authority of Homer fifty-four times to support his judgement about some particular human good. Relating to values he cites Homer twelve times in the Politics, eighteen times in the Nicomachean Ethics, three times in the Eudemian Ethics and twice in the Magna Moralia. Again, too, while treating some aspect of man's values he claims Homer's support seventeen times in the Rhetoric and once each in the Metaphysics and Poetics.

The present chapter will analyze the fifty-four Aristotelian texts that see Homer as teacher of values to deduce what they show about Aristotle's attitude towards the
Homer's epics are stories of men in action. At no point are they theoretical or speculative discussion. It is not surprising therefore to find the Philosopher reaching for Homer to verify some principle not in the abstract but in the concrete world of men's practical lives.

Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is a practical work—a guide to help the orator persuade men to choose, decide, or act. When he weighs human values in this treatise Homer frequently occurs to him.

Early in the work as the Philosopher discusses how the deliberative orator must exhort men to the expedient and dissuade them from the inexpedient he equates experience with goodness. Judging it necessary to grasp first the basic notions of goodness and expediency in general, he assumes goodness to be 'whatever is desirable for its own sake, or for the sake of which we choose something else.'

\[ \xi\sigma\tau\omega \; \delta\eta \; \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\omicron\nu \; \delta\; \acute{\alpha}\nu \; \acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\omicron\delta\omicron \; \acute{\epsilon}n\epsilon\kappa\alpha \; \acute{\iota} \; \alpha\iota\rho\epsilon\tau\omicron\tau\omicron\omicron\omicron, \; \kappa\alpha\iota\omicron \; \acute{\epsilon}n\epsilon\kappa\alpha \; \acute{\alpha}\lambda\omicron \; \acute{\alpha}i\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron,^{1} \]

Pleasure and happiness are good since they are universally desirable, he argues, and they come with the exclusion of evil and possession of good. He lists necessary goods—things generally recognized as excellent in themselves and productive of many other advantages: justice, courage, self-control, magnanimity, magnificence and other

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\(^{1}\) *Rhetoric* 1362a, 21-23.
virtues of soul; health, beauty, and other virtues of body; wealth, friendship, honor and good reputation; eloquence, capacity for action, natural cleverness, good memory, readiness to learn, quick-wittedness, and all similar qualities; all the sciences, art, and life itself.

After listing these generally accepted human values Aristotle gives a principle to determine the goodness of doubtfully good things: the opposite to evil is good or the opposite to the advantage of our enemy is generally good for us. Exemplifying the principle, the Philosopher quotes Nestor's warning to Achilles and Agamemnon that their common enemy would be happy to hear of their quarrel.

καὶ ὁλως ὅ οἱ ἐξήσκεται ἢ ἐφ' ὃ χαίρουσι, τούτων τούτῳ ὠφέλιμον φαίνεται· διὸ εἴ τι εἶρηται "ἡ κεν γνώσας Πριάμως." ἔστι δ' οὐκ ἀεὶ τούτῳ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ: οὐθὲν γὰρ καλύπτει ἐνίοτε ταῦτ' συμφέρειν τοῖς ἑναντιοῖς.2

Since an end is a good, every end or purpose that costs us much labor and expense, Aristotle concludes, is valued as a good by us. This value the Philosopher finds illustrated in Homer when Hera pleads with Athene to prevent the Greeks from leaving Troy and Helen.

καὶ οὐκ ἔνεκα πολλὰ πεπόνηται ἢ δεσπανήται· φαινόμενον γὰρ ἀγάθον ήδ', καὶ ως τέλος τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπολαμβάνεται, καὶ τέλος πολλῶν· τὸ δὲ τέλος ἀγαθόν. θειὸν ταῦτ' εἶρηται, "καὶ δὲ κεν εὐχωλήν Πριάμῳ"3

2Rhetoric 1362b, 33-37 (=Iliad i.255). Aristotle gives only a few words of the quotation, since the line was so well known.

3Rhetoric 1363a, 2-6 (=Iliad ii.160). Another partial quotation is given here, but enough to suggest the rest.
According to Aristotle the same value is illustrated again when Odysseus sympathizes with the Greek army's longing to leave Troy but encourages them to hold out. He tells them it would be disgraceful after fighting so long to return home empty-handed.

Arguing from the general principle that everything deliberately chosen appears as a good, Aristotle reasons that whatever is preferred by a wise or good man or woman must be good—as when Athene preferred Odysseus, Theseus Helen, the goddesses Paris, and Homer Achilles.

Discussing next how to determine greater good or expedience the Philosopher asserts that appearances can alter the value we place on a thing. A good thing, for example, can seem like more and therefore more desirable if it is offered in parts. Conversely, according to Aristotle, something bad can appear worse if it is broken down and presented in parts. This is exemplified in the Iliad, he thinks, when Meleager is persuaded to fight upon hearing of all the evils, considered separately, that happen to a city.

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⁴Rhetoric 1363a, 6 (=Iliad ii.298). Still another partial quotation to suggest the rest of a well known passage.

⁵Rhetoric 1363a, 16-19.
that falls to the enemy.

καὶ διαιροῦμενα δὲ εἰς τὰ μέρη τὰ αὐτὰ μείζων φαίνεται.
πλειόνων γὰρ ὑπερέχειν φαίνεται. ὡδεὶν καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς
φησι πείσαι λέγουσαν τὸν Μελέαγρον ἀναστήναι
δόσα κἂν ἀνθρώπους πέλει τῶν ἄστυ ἀλλή.
λαοὶ μὲν φθινόθεους, πόλιν δὲ τῷ πῷρ ἀμαθύνει,
tέκνα δὲ τ' ἄλλοι ἄγουσιν.6

Another principle for determining a greater good,
according to the Philosopher, is: the natural is a greater
good than the acquired because it is harder. Here Aristotle
means that what a man must develop simply on his own,
without any help beyond his own nature, demands harder work.
The end-product is a greater good, he concludes, since it
was produced with greater personal effort. Homer illus-
trates this, Aristotle thinks, when the Minstrel Phemius,
compelled to sing for Penelope's suitors, speaks of his
being self-taught.

καὶ τὸ αὐτοφυὲς τοῦ ἐπικτήτου. χαλεπῶτερον γὰρ. ὡδε
καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς φησιν "ἀυτοδίδακτος δ' εἰμί."7

A little later in the Rhetoric, Aristotle broadly
defines pleasure as a kind of sudden and perceptible relaxa-
tion of the soul into its natural state. Everything plea-
sant, he maintains, must be experienced in the present,
remembered from the past, or hoped for in the future. He
concludes to the existence of a principle that he discovers
verified in the Odyssey. Not only does the memory of agree-

6Rhetoric 1365a, 10-15 (=Iliad ix.592-594).
Aristotle's text here differs from ours.

7Rhetoric 1365a, 29-30 (=Odyssey xxii.347).
able things cause us pleasure. The remembrance of even some disagreeable things can cause us pleasure too, if they have subsequently brought us some honor or good.

Aristotle concludes that everything that brings pleasure by its presence generally brings pleasure too when it is looked forward to or remembered. Anger affords an example of pleasure derived from something looked forward to. It is pleasurable since it looks forward to revenge. An example of this, according to Aristotle, occurs in the *Iliad* when Homer observes that anger is much sweeter than honey.

The Philosopher makes the same point about anger a little later when he examines anger more closely. He cites the same passage from the *Iliad*. To the pleasure produced

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8 *Rhetoric* 1370a, 32-1370b, 6 (=*Odyssey* xv.400-401). N.B.: Aristotle misquotes the second line, which reads as follows in the Oxford text: ὃς τις δὴ μᾶλα πολλὰ πάθη καὶ πόλλα ἐπαληθῇ; his text differs from ours. Note also that the first quotation (ἠδό. . .πόνων--not hexameter) is from a lost work of Euripides, not Homer.

9 *Rhetoric* 1370b, 10-12 (=*Iliad* xviii.108).
by looking forward to future revenge he notes another more present cause of pleasure in anger. He says that since men dwell upon the thought of revenge when they are angry, they experience a phantasy of carrying out their revenge that causes the same pleasure that accompanies a vivid dream.

Memory of an absent loved one provides an example of pleasure derived from something remembered. For this reason, Aristotle argues, there is a certain amount of pleasure even when the absence of the beloved is painful. Pain is caused by the absence of the loved one, but pleasure comes with the remembrance of his actions and personality. Once again the Philosopher finds Homeric support. The very same formula is used twice to describe how recollections of an absent loved one cause weeping. The formula appears in the Iliad concerning grief for the dead Patroclus. It occurs again in the Odyssey touching the sorrow at Odysseus' long absence from home.

When the Philosopher comes to the closer analysis of anger mentioned above he cites the Poet eight times to exemplify various insights into that human passion. Perhaps he recognized a special competence in Homer on this subject, since the whole story of the *Iliad* centers around the anger of Achilles.

Anger is defined in broad terms by the Philosopher as a desire accompanied by pain for real or apparent revenge for a real or apparent unmerited slight against oneself or one's friend. Dishonor, he maintains, is a characteristic of insult. One who dishonors another belittles and angers him. Achilles typifies this, according to Aristotle, when he protests that Agamemnon has angered him because he dishonored him by keeping his prize, Briseis.

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Achilles expresses his anger at Agamemnon for essentially the same reason on two other occasions, using the same formula both times: because Agamemnon 'treated him like a
dishonored refugee'.

καὶ "ὡςεὶ τῶν ἀτύπητον μετανάστην," ὡς διὰ ταῦτα ὀργιζόμενος.13

Pursuing the nature of insult the Philosopher declares that men believe they are entitled to be highly esteemed by those who are their inferiors in any respect. This was Homer's insight, he thinks, when portraying Agamemnon's wrath he called the anger of kings great.

Προσήκειν δ' οὖν ταῖς πολυρείσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡττών κατὰ γένος, κατὰ δύναμιν, κατ' ἀρετήν, καὶ ὅλως ἐν ὃ ἂν ταύτῃ ὑπερέχῃ πολύ, οἷον ἐν χρήμασιν ὁ πλοῦσιος πένητος καὶ ἐν τῷ λέγειν ἰδιορυακὸς ἀδυνάτου εἰπεῖν καὶ ἄρχων ἄρχομένου καὶ ἄρχειν ἄξιος οἴόμενος τὸ άρχεον άξιον. διδ εἰρηται "ὑμοί δε μέγας ἐστι διοτρεφέων βασιλῆων"14

Aristotle notes that the Poet was expressing the same insight in the first book of the Iliad. Speaking of proud Agamemnon's anger the seer Calchas tells Achilles that a mighty king, angered by an inferior, might succeed in swallowing his anger for a day but will continue to bear a grudge afterwards.

καὶ "ἀλλὰ γε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον," ἄγανακτοῦσι γάρ διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν.15


14 Rhetoric 1378b, 34–1379a, 5 (=Iliad ii.196). In some MSS the singular βασιλῆος is used. (The Oxford Classical text has the plural form.)

15 Rhetoric 1379a, 5–6 (=Iliad i.82). Note that a little later in this same passage there is an observation even more supportive of Aristotle's position. In line 91, Book I of the Iliad Achilles says Agamemnon swears he is by far the greatest of the Achaeans. The Oxford text reads: δὲς νῦν πολλὸν ἀριστος Ἄχαιῶν εὑρεται εἶναι.
Mildness is the opposite of anger. A man is mild, the Philosopher observes, to those who humble themselves before him and do not contradict him. He seems to recognize they are afraid of him, and no one who is afraid slights another. Even the behavior of dogs demonstrates that anger ceases towards those who humble themselves, since they do not bite those who sit down. Aristotle does not refer to Homer here explicitly but we find an excellent illustration of his observation in the *Odyssey* when "Odysseus cunningly sat down" as the swineherd's hounds rushed at him with loud barking.

καὶ τοῖς ταπεινουμένοις πρὸς αὐτούς καὶ μὴ ἀντιλέγουσιν· φαίνονται γὰρ ὁμολογεῖν ἢπτοὺς εἶναι, οἱ δ’ ἢπτοὺς φοβοῦνται, φοβούμενος δὲ σῶδες ὀλιγωρεῖ. δτι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ταπεινουμένους παῦεται ἢ ὀργη, καὶ οἱ κύνες δηλοῦσιν οὐ δάκνοντες τοὺς καθίζοντας.

Examining further what causes men to grow mild rather than angry the Philosopher notes that anger is personal. For this reason a man is less angry (milder) if he thinks the person he wants to punish will never know who punished him. Homer provides an example once more. The angry Odysseus wants Polyphemus to know it was he who gave him his savage injury. This suggests that he would have felt unavenged if Polyphemus remained ignorant who had blinded him and for what.

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16 *Rhetoric* 1380a, 21-25 (=*Odyssey* xiv.29-31: Ἐξεπλήνης δ’ ὁ Ὀδυσσής τοῖς κυνείς ὀλυκόμωροι οἱ μὲν κεκλήγοντες ἐπέδραμον· αὐτάρ ὁ Ὀδυσσεύς ἔξετο κερδοσύνη
Aristotle's next conclusion follows naturally. Since you cannot be as angry with a person who does not know you are angry with him or that you are punishing him, clearly you cannot be angry with the dead. They are beyond pain which is the intent of the angry. Aristotle finds this illustrated in the *Iliad* when Homer wants to restrain Achilles' anger against dead Hector.

After defining indignation as 'pain at another's undeserved good fortune', Aristotle examines the concept more fully. In his analysis he concludes that a particular good must be suitable or proportionate to the individual. There is indignation, for example, at the inferior who challenges one who is superior to him. Cebriones, the son of Priam, provides an example of this in the *Iliad*, as the Philosopher observes. He avoided battle with Ajax lest he incur Zeus' indignation.

17 Rhetoric 1380b, 20-24 (=Odyssey ix.504).
18 Rhetoric 1380b, 24-29 (=Iliad xxiv.54).
Each of the three ethical works, *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Eudemian Ethics*, and *Magna Moralia* contains a formal study of the virtues. Courage is the first virtue studied in all three works.

Rather than give a definition of that virtue he employs his 'golden mean' principle for determining the nature of virtues. He places true courage midway between too much and too little fear. He examines various characters called courageous and shows how they fulfill or fail the norm.

Citizen's or civic courage is not true courage but most closely resembles it. This courage occurs among troops who are rewarded by their state with honors for enduring danger but disgraced or penalized for cowardice. This civic courage, he says, we find among Homer's heroes. The same verse in the *Iliad* that expresses Hector's avowed motive for facing Achilles is cited in all three ethical works as exemplifying citizen's courage. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* it is introduced as follows:

\[ \text{\textit{Εστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιούτων τι, λέγοντας δὲ καὶ} } \]
\[ \text{\textit{ἑτεραὶ κατὰ πέντε τρόπους, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτικὴ} } \]
\[ \text{\textit{μάλιστα γὰρ ἐοικεὶν. δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολίται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτιμία καὶ τὰ} } \]

\[ \text{19Rhetoric 1387a, 31-35 (=Iliad xi.542). Note that only the first verse is in the accepted text of Homer. The second verse is not found in any of the MSS, but it may have been in Aristotle's Homer. Cf: Hinman's enlightening discussion of this line: Op. cit., pp. 43-44} \]
In the *Magna Moralia* it is mentioned in much the same way:

In the *Eudemian Ethics* the introduction is similar but the above Homeric citation is preceded by four words alleged to be Homer's but not found in our Homer.

Another example of citizen's courage the Philosopher finds in the *Iliad* when Diomedes says that if he fails to face Hector the Trojan will boast later in Troy about his cowardice.

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20 *Nicomachean Ethics* 1116a, 15-23 (=*Iliad* xxii.100).

21 *Magna Moralia* 1191a, 5-9 (=*Iliad* xxii.100).

22 *Eudemian Ethics* 1230a, 16-21 (=*Iliad* xxii.100).

23 *Nicomachean Ethics* 1116a, 24-26 (=*Iliad* viii.148-149).
Next Aristotle discusses the courage of troops forced into battle by their leaders. It is similar to the above but inferior since its motive is fear rather than shame, and the desire to avoid pain rather than disgrace. He cites Hector motivating the Trojans with this kind of courage.

In another context in the *Politics* as he discusses a king's authority as military leader in the field the Philosopher finds Agamemnon using the same kind of motivation with his troops.

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24 *Nichomachean Ethics* 1116a, 29-35. The words of Aristotle's citation of Homer here describe in substance what we find Hector saying to his troops in our *Iliad* xv. 348-351:

δ' ἄν ἑγών ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσοντα νοήσω, αὐτός οἶ δάνατον μετίσσομαι, οὔδὲ νῦ τὸν γε γνωτὶ τε γνωτὰ τε πυρὸς λελάχως θανόντα, ἄλλα κόψεις ἔρφουσι πρὸ δάσεως ἡμιέροιο.

But the citation, although not exactly the same, identifies far more readily with the words we find in our Homer, *Iliad* ii.391+, 393+, describing Agamemnon addressing his troops. *cf:* quotation in immediately following footnote.

25 *Politics* 1285a, 8-14 (=*Iliad* ii.391+, 393+) Note that the last line of this Homeric citation is not found in our Homer.
Spirit is in the courageous along with courage. When the courageous encounter danger a certain kind of excitement and impulse of spirit moves them, says Aristotle. This form of courage inspired by spirit seems to be the most natural courage. Reenforced by deliberate choice and purpose it appears to be the truest courage. The Philosopher found Homer speaking often of this concomitant spirit. The Poet uses the expression 'strength of spirit' in the *Iliad*.

Aristotle says Homer mentions might and spirit together, too.

kal "μένος και θυμόν ἔγειρε".

In the *Odyssey* Aristotle notes a description that indicates excitement and impulse of spirit: 'bitter anger welling up through his nostrils.'

kal "δρυμὸς ὅ' ἀνὰ βίνας μένος".

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^26^ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1116b, 24-27 (=Iliad xiv.151): Note two other very similar expressions: Iliad xvi.529: μένος δὲ οἱ ἐμβαλε θυμῷ. *Iliad* xi.11: 'Ἀχαιοίσιν δὲ μέγα σθένος ἐμβαλ' ἐκάστῳ καρδίῃ.

^2^ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1116b, 28. Exactly the same phrase which Aristotle cites from his Homer cannot be found in ours, but we have many equivalents: Iliad xv.232: ἔγειρε μένος μέγα, *Iliad* xv.594: ἔγειρε μένος μέγα, δέλγη δὲ θυμὸν. The identical formula occurs in three passages: Iliad v.470; Iliad vi.72; *Iliad* xi.291: "Ὡς εἰπὼν ὄτρυνε μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἐκάστου, Iliad xxiii.468: μένος ἐλλαβε θυμὸν.

^28^ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1116b, 28 (= Odyssey xxiv.318). This differs from our Homer which reads: ἀνὰ βίνας δὲ οἱ ἕδη/ δρυμῷ μένος προὔτυψε.
A fourth phrase, 'his blood boiled', is quoted but is not found anywhere in our Homer.

καὶ ἑξεσεν αἷμα: πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσούει σημαίνειν τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ἐγερσίν καὶ ὀρμήν. ²⁹

Nobility of courage must be the real motive of courageous men Aristotle observes. Therefore men are not to be viewed as courageous if they simply rush into danger, driven by pain and anger, and blind to the dangers they face. If such were courageous, the Philosopher argues, even asses would be brave when they are hungry. No blows will make them stop grazing. Here Aristotle seems clearly to be thinking of Homer's simile in the Iliad, in which, speaking of Ajax fighting, he describes the stubborn ass who refuses to be driven from grazing by the repeated blows of boys.

οὐ δὴ ἐστὶν ἀνδρεῖα διὰ τὸ ὑπ’ ἀλγηδόνος καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὀρμᾶν, οὐθὲν τὸν δεινῶν προορόντα, ἐπεὶ οὕτως γς καὶ οἱ δυνοὶ ἀνδρεῖοι εἷν πεινώντες τυπτόμενοι γὰρ οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς. ³⁰

²⁹ Nicomachean Ethics 1116b, 29-30. Note that this phrase is found in Theocritus xx.15, who must be borrowing it.

³⁰ Nicomachean Ethics 1116b, 33-36; 1117a, 1 (=Iliad xi.558-568).

ὡς δ’ ὅτ’ ὅνος παρ’ ἄρουραν ἰών ἐβιήσατο παῖς νυφῆς, ὁ δ’ πολλά περὶ ῥόπαλ’ ἄμφις ἔγαμη, κεῖτε τ’ εἰσελκύων βαθὺ λήιον· οἱ δ’ τε παῖσες τύππουσιν ῥοπάλοις· βίη δ’ τε νηπία αὐτῶν· σπουδὴ τ’ ἐξήλασαν, ἐπεὶ τ’ ἐκορέσατο φωρῆς· ὡς τότ’ ἔπειτ’ Ἀλαντα μέγαν, Τελαμώνιοι ύιόν, Τρῶις ὑπέρθυμοι πολυγερέες τ’ ἐπίκουροι νύσσοντες ξυστοῖς μέσον σάμος αἰέν ἐποντό. Ἀλιὰ σ’ ἄλλοτε μὲν μυθοσκετο δούριδὸς ἀλκῆς αὐτслуж ὑποστρεφεῖς, καὶ ἐρητύσασκε φάλαγγας Τρῶιν ἱπποδάμων, ὅτ’ δ’ τε τρωπάσκετο φεύγειν.
Aristotle observes that human virtue, courage, for example, could be so lacking in an individual that he would be called a 'beast'. Conversely virtue could be present on a super-human or divine scale. This latter he finds exemplified in Homer when Priam speaks of his son, Hector, as a god.

In a discussion about wisdom the Philosopher calls it the most perfect kind of knowledge. He implies that there is a general wisdom. It is not limited to a single art as, for example, in sculpture and statuary-- the 'wisdom' that merely indicates a particular artistic excellence. He cites Homer in the *Margites* speaking of a man whom the gods did not make a digger or ploughman or wise in anything else.

**Footnotes:**

31 Nicomachean Ethics 1145a, 18-22 (=Iliad xxiv.258).

periods and conditions of human life. The rich, he says, need friends to share and preserve their wealth. The poor need them often as their only resource. The young need friends to guard them from error; the elderly, to care for them; those in the prime of life, to assist them in the performance of noble deeds. This need of friendship is illustrated by Homer, according to the Philosopher, when he says in the *Iliad* that two together will plan and carry out actions better.

In four different works Aristotle refers to the same phrase of Homer to exemplify a common insight into the nature of friendship—that it is based on attraction of persons like each other. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* he paraphrases it when he says that some people consider friendship a matter of similarity.

In the *Magna Moralia* he introduces the Homeric citation with the other when he asks whether friendship does indeed

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33 *Nicomachean Ethics* 1155a, 12-16 (=*Iliad* x.224). Aristotle’s Homer differs slightly from ours here.

34 *Nicomachean Ethics* 1155a, 32-35 (=*Odyssey* xvii.218). κολοιδὸς ποτὶ κολοιδον is a proverbial phrase not in Homer.
flourish between those who are alike as men seem to believe.

\[
\text{πότερον γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ φιλία ἐν τοῖς ὀμοίοις, ὡσπερ δοκεῖ καὶ λέγεται; καὶ γὰρ κολοιῶς φασὶ παρὰ κολοῖον ἵζάνει, καὶ "αἰεὶ τοῦ τούν ὄμων ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τοῦ ὄμουν."}^{35}
\]

In the *Eudemian Ethics* the Homeric citation is introduced again when the Philosopher begins to examine what men consider the basis of friendship.

\[
\text{ἀπορεῖται δὲ πολλὰ περὶ τῆς φιλίας, πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οἱ ἐξωθεὶν περιλαμβάνοντες καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον λέγοντες· δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν τῷ ὄμων τῷ ὀμοίῳ εἶναι φίλον, δὲν εἰρήται "ὡς αἰεὶ τοῦ ὄμουν ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τοῦ ὄμουν." καὶ γὰρ "κολοιῶς παρὰ κολοῖον." "Ἔγνω δὲ φῶρ τε φῶρα καὶ λύκος λύκον."}^{36}
\]

Aristotle concludes that the extreme views on the nature of friendship are wrong. He rejects equally the principles that only likes or only opposites can be friends. Heraclitus he identifies as one who maintains that only opposites can be friends. He observes that this early Greek thinker rejected Homer's prayer that strife should perish between god and man. Aristotle does not agree with Heraclitus' rejection but simply states it. He would hardly countenance this twisting of the Homeric plea for peace to mean the denial of differences between god and man.

\[
\text{oὶ δὲ τὰ ἑναντία φίλα· καὶ Ἡρακλεῖτος ἐπιτιμᾶ τῷ ποιήσαντι "ὡς ἔρις ἐκ τε θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο" οὐ γὰρ.}
\]

\(^{35}\text{Magna Moralia 1208b, 8-10 (=Odyssey xvii.218+).}

\(^{36}\text{Eudemian Ethics 1235a, 4-9 (=Odyssey xvii.218). The φῶρ proverb is of unknown origin, not in Homer.}
In the *Rhetoric*, while considering what constitutes the pleasurable for man, Aristotle concludes that things that are like each other generally please each other. Among other quotations he cites, in part, the Homeric 'like to like' verse cited above.

The Philosopher proposed that moral virtue is a mean between two vices, one involving excess, the other, deficiency. It was hard, he argued, to be good, since it was hard to find the middle course. He advises, therefore, that we steer ourselves from the more erroneous side—from what is more contrary to the middle course, thus choosing the least of evils. He found this doctrine expressed in the *Odyssey* by Calypso, "Hold the ship out beyond the surf and spray."

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3 7 *Eudemian Ethics* 1235a, 25-31 (*Iliad* xviii.107+).

3 8 *Rhetoric* 1371b, 12-17 (*Odyssey* xvii.218).
To achieve this difficult middle course the Philosopher advises us to guard against things we find naturally pleasant, since we do not judge them impartially. We should, he argues, feel towards pleasure as the elders of Troy felt towards Helen. We should repeat their saying in all circumstances, he says, since we are less likely to miss the mean if we dismiss pleasure.

Desires, which are in the order of attractions, are either common to all men, Aristotle notes, or peculiar to certain persons. The desire for food is natural to all men, as the desire for sexual intercourse is natural to the

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39 Nicomachean Ethics 1109a, 30-35 (=Odyssey xiii.219-220):

tou'tou μέν κατ' αὐτόν καὶ κύματος ἕκτος ἔργε 
věa, σὺ δὲ σκοπέλου ἐπιμαίεο.
This actual citation is the words of Odysseus giving a command to his steersman according to advice he received from Circe, not Calypso in Odyssey xii.108-109:

Alla mála ἐκτὸς σκοπέλῳ πεπλημμένος ὡς 
vēa παρὲξ ἐλάαν, ἐπεὶ ἦ πολὺ φέρτερον ἔστιν.

40 Nicomachean Ethics 1109b, 7-13 (=Iliad iii.156-160):

"Oū νέμεσις Τρῶας καὶ ἐυκνήμοδας Ἀχαιοὺς 
toi̇δ' ἀμω γυναικεῖ πολὺν χρόνον ἄλγεα πάσχειν· 
ἀνή' ἀθανάτησε θεῆς εἰς ζῶπα ἔσινεν· 
ἀλλ' καὶ ὡς τοῖν ἐν ὑπὸ νεόθω, 
μηδ' ἦμῖν τεκέσοι τ' ὀπίσω πήμα λίπειτο."
young and lusty, as Homer observes.

In discussing the traits and values of the 'great-souled' man Aristotle discusses one of his weaknesses. The 'Great-souled,' he says, do not like to hear of benefits they have received from others. They prefer rather to hear of the benefits they have bestowed on others. This is why Homer makes Thetis avoid specifying and rather speak generally and tentatively of the services she has rendered Zeus, although her son has urged her to remind the supreme god of all she has done for him.

Justice, according to the Philosopher, is the virtue that lies at the heart of man's political relationships. It is a virtue that must involve others. When Aristotle treats

41 Nicomachean Ethics 1118b, 8-11 (=Iliad xxiv.130). Aristotle alludes here to Homer's statement that a noble man has intercourse with his wife.

42 Nicomachean Ethics 1124b, 15 (=Iliad i.503-506). "Ζεύ πάτερ, εἰ ποτε δὴ σε μετ' ἄθανάτοιςιν δυνῆσα ἢ ἐπει δὴ ἔργῳ, τόδε μοι κρήνην ἐξέλῳτο· τίμησόν μοι νιόν, δὲς ὡκυμορῶτος ἄλλων ἐπλει." Earlier Achilles has begged his mother precisely to specify her services to Zeus to persuade him to return a favor to her for his benefit. Cf: Iliad i.393-412.
the nature of injustice in the *Nicomachean Ethics* he argues that one cannot treat oneself unjustly. A person experiences injustice only at the hands of another person. To illustrate this he cites the case in Homer of Glaucus giving Diomede arms worth more than eleven times the exchange he would receive for them. Aristotle's point is that Glaucus cannot be spoken of as treated unjustly since he did it to himself.

Later in the same work, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he concludes that uncontrolled desire causes greater injustice than anger that is uncontrolled. He cites an illustration of this conclusion in the *Iliad*, in which the Poet describes one of the emblems embroidered on Aphrodite's belt. There she is pictured in her crafty lust deceiving the wisest men. Her unrestrained desire 'with malice aforethought' surely causes an outrage that shows more contempt and produces more resentment than unpremeditative anger.

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43 *Nicomachean Ethics* 1136b, 9-14 (= *Iliad* vi.236).

44 *Nicomachean Ethics* 1149b, 13-20 (= *Iliad* xiv.217).
In the opening paragraph of the *Politics* Aristotle stresses the primacy of man's political relationships in his philosophy of man. He calls man's association with the state supreme.

In the opening paragraph of the *Politics* Aristotle stresses the primacy of man's political relationships in his philosophy of man. He calls man's association with the state supreme.

Δήλον δ' όσ' πάσαι μὲν ἀγαθοὶ τινὸς στοιχάζονται, μάλιστα δὲ, καὶ τὸν κυριωτάτον πάντων, ἡ πασῶν κυριωτάτη καὶ πάσας περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν καλομένη πόλις καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική.\(^{45}\)

He finds the person who is by nature stateless either at the bottom of the human scale or superhuman. He cites the *Iliad* to illustrate those who are the lowest of human beings, when Homer speaks of the clanless, lawless, hearthless man.

ἐκ τούτων οὖν φανερῶν διὴ τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστὶ, καὶ διὰ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῴου, καὶ ὁ ἄπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἢτοι φαύλος ἐστὶν καὶ κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος, ὡσπερ καὶ ὁ ὑφ᾽ Ὀμήρου λοιδορθεὶς "ἀφρῆ-τωρ, ἄθεμιστος, ἀνέστιος." ἂμα γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμητὴς, ἀτε περ ἄξυξ ὀν ὡςπερ ἐν πεττοῖς.\(^{46}\)

As we noted in Chapter Four, the Philosopher twice cites Homer's description of the Cyclopes' familial form of government as the most primitive form of political partnership. We return to those two passages here briefly only to note that Aristotle did not only cite the Homeric Cyclopes' socio-political organization to record their primitive form

We have φρονεύοντων for Aristotle's φρονέοντος. cf: *Rhetoric* 1380a, 34-36. Here Aristotle characterizes anger as less resented since it fails to show contempt for its victim:

καὶ ταῖς δὲ ὀργῆν ποιήσασιν ἡ ὁμικ ὀργίζονται ἢ ἥπτον ὀργίζονται· οὐ γὰρ δὲ ὀλιγωρίαν φαίνονται πράξει· οὔδεῖς γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος ὀλιγώρει.

\(^{45}\) *Politics* 1252a, 3-7.

\(^{46}\) *Politics* 1253a, 1-7 (= *Iliad* ix.63).
of government. He was also viewing them in the light of the principles of effective government. On these grounds he clearly rejects this early governmental structure as inadequate. In the immediate context of the Politics where the reference is found, however, the Cyclopes are presented in a straightforward historical manner." 7 It is in the Nicomachean Ethics' citation of this same passage about the Cyclopes in the Iliad that Aristotle is clearly critical of this family-centered government as inadequate. With the exception of Sparta, he notes, most states fail to legislate a proper diet and physical regime for their citizens. Every man lives like the Homeric Cyclopes, making the rules for his own household. The best thing, he adds, would be a proper system of public regulation.

Slavery was part of the socio-political system of ancient Greece as it was of the ancient world generally. Even in that pagan context, however, Aristotle's statement about the nature of slaves rings cold and inhuman. In the

4 7 Note text and discussion presented in Chapter Four, pp. 89-90, 109.

48 Nicomachean Ethics 1180a, 24-30 (=Odyssey ix.114-115). Note text and discussion presented in Chapter Four, pp. 90, 109.
process of classifying live and lifeless instruments he
gives the example of sailing and says for the helmsman the
rudder is a lifeless tool and the look-out man a live tool.
Articles of property, he says, are tools for the purpose of
life, and a slave is a live article of property. These live
tools are best since they can do their task when ordered.
The best of these too he seems to conclude are those that
can see what to do in advance, like the tripods of
Hephaestus, which, he says, Homer describes as entering the
heavenly company 'self-moved.'

Two widely divergent passages—one metaphysical and the
other political—find Aristotle asserting the superiority of
a single rather than multiple governing principle. In both
places he illustrates his conclusion with the same Homeric
citation.

The first passage occurs in the Metaphysics. There the
Philosopher is arguing to the existence of a single cause
and governing principle of all being. He concludes the
Twelfth Book of that work with the rejection of those who

49Politics 1253b, 27-37 (=Iliad xviii.369-376).
postulate multiple causes of being. He applies Homer's principle of the superiority of a political government that has one ultimate ruler to the superiority of a single moving and governing cause of the whole universe of being.

The second passage is in the Politics. Here, Aristotle cautions about a democracy in which the people collectively and not the law are sovereign. Demagogues arise, the better classes of citizens are denied their rightful place as governors, and the assembly decrees over-rule the law. Referring to the Iliad Book II text quoted above, he clearly seems to want Homer's support for his judgement. He honestly wonders, however, what kind of rule the Poet had in mind when he disparaged the rule of the many in this text. Was he thinking of many ruling as individuals or many ruling as a single composite monarch?

\[50\text{Metaphysics 1075b, 34-1076a, 4 (=Iliad ii.204).}\]
As the Philosopher develops his basic political principles early in the Politics he equates the rule of a father over his household with the rule of a king over his subjects. Both father and king, he says, are superior in love and seniority. This is why Homer, according to Aristotle, accepting Zeus as father of men and gods designates him King of all.

In the Nicomachean Ethics the Philosopher alludes to the same Homeric passage and many other places where the Poet calls Zeus father. Here he states even more succinctly that the ideal king rules like a father and that this is why Homer calls Zeus father.

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51 Politics 1292a, 2-15 (=Iliad ii.204). Note that this is the only time Aristotle ever questions the meaning of a Homeric text and whether the meaning Homer actually intended supports his position.

52 Politics 1259b, 10-14 (=Iliad i.544).

53 Nicomachean Ethics 1160b, 22-27 (=Iliad i.503, 544 et saepe).
A little later in the same work he compares a king to a shepherd. He argues that both must be guided by a similar spirit of benevolence. The king works for the welfare of his subjects as a shepherd does for his sheep. This, Aristotle says, is why Homer calls Agamemnon 'the shepherd of his people'.

In Aristotle's judgement civil strife arises not only because of inequality of property but also because of inequality of honors. The common people are dissatisfied if property is unequally distributed. The higher classes, he observes, object if honors are equally distributed. This equal distribution results in the situation rejected by Homer in which the noble and the base have the same honor.

The person who shares in the honors of the state, the Philosopher maintains, is a citizen in the fullest sense. On the other hand, the person without those honors is like an alien. To verify this in Homer Aristotle turns to two

\[54^\text{Nicomachean Ethics 1161a, 10-15 (=Iliad ii.243, 772, iv.413 et saepe).}\]

\[55^\text{Politics 1266b, 38-1267 a, 2 (=Iliad ix.319).}\]
citations from the Iliad which he uses to show that anger is caused by dishonor. In the two citations Achilles uses the same formula to express the reason why he is angry with Agamemnon: the King has 'treated him like a dishonored refugee'.

δτι μὲν οὖν εἶδη πλείως πολίτου, φανερῶν εἰς τούτων, καὶ δτι λέγεται μάλιστα πολίτης ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ "Ομηρος ἐποίησεν "ὦσεὶ τιν' ἀτύμπον μετανάστην." ὥσπερ μέτοικος γάρ ἔστιν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων.56

To government and rulers he applies even more appropriately the same principle and Homeric text that he applied to friendship treated earlier in this chapter.57 He recommends that the man who is ruling alone appoint many other men to handle the numerous matters he could never attend to by himself. Citing the Iliad the Philosopher observes that although a good man deserves to rule because he is good, two good men are better than one.

άλλα μὴν οὐδὲ ράδιον ἑφοράν πολλά τὸν ἕνα· δεήσει ἄρα πλείονας εἶναι τοὺς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ καθισταμένοις ἄρχοντας, ὡστε τί διαφέρει τούτο ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸν ἕνα καταστήσασι τούτου τὸν τρόπον; ἔτι, δ ἡ πρώτην εἰρημένον ἔστιν, εἰπερ δ ἀνήρ δ σπουδαῖος, διότι βελτίων, ἄρχειν δίκαιος, τοῦ δὲ ἐνδικὸς ὁ δύο ἄγαθον βελτίους· τούτῳ γάρ ἔστι τὸ "σὺν τε δὺ ἐρχομένω"58

56Politics 1278a, 34-38 (=Iliad ix.648, xvi.59). Cf: Footnote 13 this chapter.

57Note that this same text Aristotle used in the Rhetoric 1378b, 33-34 to exemplify man's need of friendship.

58Politics 1287b, 8-14 (=Iliad x.224). Note that this principle does not negate the principle discussed earlier—that the best government is by a single leader. This present principle is expressed in the context of the ruler's need of counsel. The Homeric text makes this clear. It goes on to say: 'then one recognizes before the other where
In Agamemnon's prayer he finds further Homeric support for the need to share the burdens of government. The king prays for ten more fellow-councillors.

καὶ ἐξῆ ὁ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, "τοιοῦτοι δέκα μοι συμφόρδος." ⁵⁹

After establishing that education of the young is of the highest importance to a ruler Aristotle outlines principles of a curriculum. The major part of his consideration he devotes to music, which he uses as an example of the principle of liberal education. In a brilliant statement of the philosophy of liberal education he maintains that purely liberal pursuits, like music, should be joined to education in the necessary and useful.

διὸ καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν οὐ πρότερον εἰς παιδείαν ἔταξαν οὔ̣χ οὗ ἄναγκαιον (οὔδὲν γὰρ ἔχει τοιοῦτον) οὐδ' ὡς χρήσιμον, ὡσπερ τὰ γράμματα πρὸς χορηματισμὸν καὶ πρὸς ῥηματισμὸν καὶ πρὸς βιομορφήματα καὶ πρὸς πολιτικὰς πράξεις πολλὰς· δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ γραφικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν τὰ τῶν τεχνιτῶν ἔργα κάλλιον· οὔδ' αὐτὸ καθάπερ ἡ γυμναστικὴ πρὸς υγίειαν καὶ ἄλλην· οὔδέτερον γὰρ τούτοις δρῶμεν γιγνόμενον ἐκ τῆς μουσικῆς. λείπεται τοῖνυν πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγήν, εἰς ὡσπερ καὶ φαίνονται παράγοντες αὐτῆς· ἢ γὰρ οἴονται διαγωγὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐν ταύτῃ τάττουσιν. ⁶⁰

In two places in the Odyssey he finds Homer illustrating the liberal or purely pleasurable purpose of music. In both cases Homer's emphasis is on the pleasure that the minstrel will bring to those at the banquet—"the whole advantage lies." (καὶ τε πρὸς τοῦ ἐνόησεν / ὃποδος κέρδος ἔπι.)

⁵⁹Politics 1287b, 14-15 (=Iliad ii.372).
⁶⁰Politics 1338a, 13-24.
purpose of his song. The first Homeric citation is drawn from the Seventeenth Book.

διόπερ "Ομηρος οὗτος ἐποίησεν ἄλλ᾽ οἶον μὲν ἔστι κα-
λεῖν ἐπὶ βασίτα ταλείν, καὶ οὗτος προειπὼν ἔτέρους
τινὰς "οὶ καλέουσιν δολόδον" φησιν, "ὅ κεν τέρπησιν ἀπαντάς."\(^6^1\)

The second citation, followed by the Philosopher's strong demand for a liberal education, comes from the Ninth Book's beginning, where Homer pictures the pleasure of good food and drink accompanied by the pleasure of music.

καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ φησὶν Ὁδυσσεύς ταύτην ἀρίστην εἶναι
διαγωγήν, διὰν εὐφραίνομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων "δαίμονες
δὲ ἀνὰ δῶματι ἀκατάλογονας δολόδον/ ἡμενοὶ ἐξείς." δότι μὲν
τολμὸν ἔστι παιδεία τῆς ἢν οὐχ ὡς χρησίμην παιδευτέον
τοὺς ὑλεῖς οὔδ᾽ ὡς ἀναγκαίαν ἄλλ᾽ ὡς ἔλευθρον καὶ
καλὴν, φανερὸν ἔστιν.\(^6^2\)

This discussion of a good ruler's responsibility for the liberal education of the young completes our study of Aristotle's references to Homer which demonstrate his acceptance of the Poet as teacher of human values. In the Rhetoric we have seen the Philosopher cite Homer in support of his views on an orator's need to understand and employ principles of human behavior. In the explicitly named ethical works of Aristotle we have seen him refer to Homeric examples of principles related to courage, wisdom, friendship, moderation, sexual desire, justice, uncontrolled desire, and anger. Finally, in the Politics we saw him turn to the Poet for illustrations of his political principles.

\(^6^1\)Politics 1338a, 24-27 (=Odyssey xvii.385+). The
We can turn now in chapter six to the few remaining passages in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* which refer to Homer in a less substantive manner.

Whole citation is troublesome, but the substance in our version or Aristotle's supports his point. The first part of his Homeric citation is not found in our Homer, but might have followed line 383. The whole pertinent passage *(Iliad 382-385)* as we have it in the Oxford text follows:

> τίς γὰρ ὣν ξείνον καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν ἄλλον γ', εἰ μὴ τῶν οἱ δημιουργοὶ ἔσαι, μάντιν ἢ ἀντὶρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δούρων, ἢ καὶ θέσπιν ἀόιδῶν, δ' κεν τέρπησιν ἀείδων.

Note that the final line of Aristotle's citation differs from ours but corresponds rather closely to it.

\(^{62}\) *Politics* 1338a, 27-32 (=*Odyssey* ix.7,8).
CHAPTER SIX

OTHER ARISTOTELIAN REFERENCES TO HOMER

All of the passages of Aristotle which touch on Homer in some substantive way have been examined in this study already. In each of these texts the Philosopher cited or alluded to Homer as an exemplar either in Language Arts, Philosophy and Science, or in the teaching of human values.

Only ten Aristotelian texts, in which the Poet is cited or referred to remain to be examined. In none of these texts does Aristotle use the Poet for any substantive reason. In six texts Homer is cited simply to exemplify some problem in predication, grammar, or induction. In one text the Philosopher rejects a false use of the Poet, in another, a faulty evaluation of the Odyssey. In the remaining two texts Homer is cited only incidentally to illustrate some statement of Aristotle.

Rather than attempt any formal categorization of these ten texts, they will be examined separately in the order in which they appear in the Bekker text.

The first of these passages occurs in Aristotle's treatise On Interpretation, in a discussion of types of predication. Here the Philosopher inquires whether predication can always move from the more complex to the simpler--from a predicate of greater comprehension to one of

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lesser comprehension—and still remain correct. Of course it will not remain correct, he argues, if the new predication involves a contradiction. Even if it involves no contradiction, however, it could become incorrect if the comprehension of the predicate is narrowed. The example Aristotle adduces is this: although it is accurate to say 'Homer is a poet,' the inference would be inaccurate to go on and say simply, 'Homer is' (that is, 'Homer exists'), since the 'is' of the first statement was incidental and not substantive.

The second and third Aristotelian texts under inquiry here are concerned about predication too. One is from the *Posterior Analytics* and the other from the *On Sophistical Refutations*. Both are concerned about the very same problem of ambiguity—the ambiguity in the word κύκλος, which could mean 'circle' or in the context of the Homeric poems, 'cycle,' as in 'epic cycle.'

In a discussion of mathematics in the *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle observes that ambiguity is not common in that science but passes unnoticed in dialectical argument. For example, it could be asked: "Is every circle

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1 On Interpretation 21a, 24-30.
(κύκλος) a figure?" Drawing a circle makes the answer patent, but what if someone asked, "Are the epic poems a circle (κύκλος)?" Quite clearly they are not, but the other meaning of κύκλος has slipped in to cause the ambiguity.

Aristotle cites the same ambiguity in his treatise *On Sophistical Refutations* when he is discussing how an argument can be false when it involves a question which can have more than one meaning. The falsity of the argument can lie either in the contradiction, or in the contradiction and the proof, or in the proof alone. In the argument, for example, that 'Homer's poetry is a figure' because it forms a κύκλος the falsity lies in the proof, as the Philosopher rightly concludes.

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2 *Posterior Analytics* 77b, 27-33.

3 *On Sophistical Refutations* 171a, 4-11.
to the first two lines of the *Iliad* to exemplify a hypothetical solecism. The Philosopher argues that it is possible to commit a solecism and not seem to do so, or not to commit one and seem to do so. If, as according to Protagoras, μῆνις were masculine, to call it οὐλομένον (masculine) he would seem guilty of a solecism, but, in fact, would not be.

Σολοικισμὸς δ' οἶον μὲν ἕστιν εἰρήται πρότερον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιουντα φαίνεσθαι καὶ ποιουντα μὴ δοκεῖν, καθάπερ ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν, εἰ δ' μῆνις καὶ ὁ πλήθες ἄρρεν ἕστιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λέγων οὐλομένην σολοικίζει μὲν καὶ έκεῖνον, οὗ φαίνεται δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις, δ' δὲ οὐλόμενον φαίνεται μὲν ἄλλ' οὗ σολοικίζει.5

In the *Physics* Aristotle discusses the relationship of time to things that exist now, have existed, or will exist in the future. Among non-existents those which are included in time must have existed once (like Homer) or will exist in the future (some future event). Once again the example that springs into his mind first and would be most known to his audience is the Poet.

τῶν δὲ μὴ δυντῶν δοσα μὲν περιέχει ὁ χρόνος, τὰ μὲν ἦν (οἶον "Ομηρός ποτε ἦν) τὰ δὲ ἐσται (οἶον τῶν μελλόντων τι), ἐφ' ὅποτερα περιέχει, καὶ εἰ ἐπ' ἄμφω, ἀμφότερα καὶ ἦν καὶ ἐσται.6

4*Ibid.*, 165b, 20-23. Solecism is listed as the fourth of five states to which the debater wishes to reduce his opponent. It is defined as making the opponent, as a result of the argument, speak ungrammatically. τέταρτον δὲ σολοικίζειν ποιεῖν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι τῇ λέξει βαρβαρίζειν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον.


6*Physics* 221b, 31-32, 222a, 1-2.
In the *Parts of Animals* the Philosopher observes that Homer is falsely adduced to support the notion that the severed human head can go on speaking. Aristotle deals with the position bluntly when he says, "Of course speech is impossible once the windpipe has been severed and no motion is forthcoming from the lung." Both Homeric passages that these erroneous critics seem to cite preclude any such interpretation.

While discussing the process of deliberation and choice in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle turns to Homer for an illustration of the deliberative process he is describing. He says a man stops his enquiry about how he is going to act when he gets back to the origin of action on himself—his dominant choosing part, his reason. The Philosopher finds a good comparison for this in the ancient Homeric constitutions according to which kings proclaimed to the people the measures they had chosen to adopt.

> εὐλευτῶν δὲ καὶ προανρέτων τὸ αὐτὸ, πλὴν ἀφωρισμένον ἡδὸν τὸ προανρέτων· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς προκρίθεν προανρέτων ἑστιν, παύεται γὰρ ἐκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνάγαγῃ τὴν ἄρχην, καὶ αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ

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*The Parts of Animals* 673a, 13-17 (=Iliad x.457; =Odyssey xxii.392). Both texts in our Homer read the same with φθεγγομένου which means as he (not 'it'—'his head') spoke. φθεγγομένου δ' ἄρα τοῦ γε καρπον κονίσθιν ἐμίχθη.
Again in the *Nicomachean Ethics* the Philosopher simply illustrates with an example from Homer a point he makes. In a discussion about the comparison between magnificence and liberality, he observes that magnificence involves greater magnitude of giving than liberality. It consists in suitable expenses on a large scale. Magnificent therefore cannot be applied, he argues, to a person who spends adequate amounts on things of small or moderate importance. This would be like Odysseus, he notes, who pretending to be a beggar who was previously wealthy, says 'Often I gave alms to homeless wayfarers'.

In the *Art of Rhetoric* the Philosopher discusses the inductive method of demonstrating a proposition. He quotes Alcidamas' proof by induction that talented people are

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8 *Nicomachean Ethics* 1113a, 2-9. (=*Iliad* ii. 381 ff.) (This allusion to Homer is confirmed here and elsewhere in the *Iliad.*)

honored everywhere. The Parians honored Archilochus, he said, in spite of his evil-speaking, the Chians honored Homer, although he had rendered no public services, the Mytileneans, Sappho; the Lacedemonians, Chilon; the Italiotes, Pythagoras; the Lampsacenes, Anaxagoras. The accumulation of examples of honor bestowed on talented persons affects the truth of the proposition.

Once again Aristotle cites an observation of Alcidamas in the *Art of Rhetoric*. This time however his observation is rejected by the Philosopher in a discussion about the poor use of metaphor. Inappropriate metaphors, Aristotle argues, make prose wooden. He feels Alcidamas used an inappropriate--too far-fetched and therefore unclear--metaphor when he described the *Odyssey* as 'a beautiful mirror of human life.' For Aristotle's taste a metaphor like this needs too much accompanying explanation.

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10 *Rhetoric* 1398b, 9-16.
With the completion of our examination of these ten passages which elude our three major classifications of Aristotle's Homeric references we have finished the study of all the passages in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* which contain a reference to Homer to justify or illustrate a principle. His choice of Homer in these cases seems incidental, since any other name could have been readily substituted. If anything, the Philosopher's use of Homer here simply demonstrates how proximate to his thought the Poet was.

We can now turn to a final review and appraisal of all the passages we have studied and the conclusions we are justified in reaching in this study about Aristotle's attitude towards Homer.
CHAPTER SEVEN

ARISTOTLE'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS HOMER: A SUMMARY AND APPRAISAL

Before we summarize the evidence of the last four chapters and attempt to draw any conclusions from it about Aristotle's attitude towards the Poet we must recognize the limitations of the present study. It represents only the first step in a three-step work that will have to be completed to make any thorough and final judgement about the Philosopher's attitude towards Homer. The next step essential to the work is a study along the lines of the present one, but collating and evaluating the Homer quotations and allusions in the *Fragments* of Aristotle. This must be followed ideally by the final step, a much subtler, more difficult work, based on the clues established in the first two parts: a study of the wisdom of Homer -- its principles of literary art and human knowledge and behavior -- *implicit* in the *Corpus* and *Fragments* of Aristotle's writing. Only when all three of these steps are completed will we be able to come to any final conclusions.

From the present study, however, we can draw certain limited but firm conclusions about the Philosopher's attitude towards Homer as expressed in his references to the
Poet in the *Corpus Aristotelicum*. In very brief summary we can say that he referred to Homer 1) very frequently, 2) in a far wider range of topics than just literary and artistic, 3) with unquestioned acceptance and approval of the Poet's judgement all but five times.

The first conclusion, therefore, that immediately follows from the evidence of the last four chapters: Aristotle of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* turned frequently to Homer, in fact, more frequently than to any other literary figure, and all but five times most approvingly. In one hundred and sixty-nine places in nineteen of the treatises, four of them judged spurious, he invoked the Poet by quotation or allusion one hundred and eighty times. One hundred and twelve of these citations were direct quotations, sixteen of which were in the four works generally judged spurious. Sixty-eight citations were allusions, two of which occur in spurious works.

The very divisions of our study in the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters indicated the wide range of the Philosopher's use of Homer in language, philosophy and science, human values, and simply as a tool of argument. A

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1The available evidence indicates that Aristotle refers to Homer far more frequently than to any other author. Cf. W.S. Hinman, *Literary Quotation and Allusion in the Rhetoric, Poetics, and Nicomachean Ethics*, New York: 1935. Hinman compares the frequency of Aristotle's references in these three works to various authors and concludes that the Homeric references far outnumber those of any other author. No Study comparable to Hinman's is available for the other works of the corpus.
closer look reveals that his Homeric references touch almost every aspect of the Aristotelian man—oral, literary, aesthetic, religious, scientific, psychological, ethical, social, and political. A step-by-step summary of the main part of the study here will serve to emphasize the extent and intensity of Aristotle's admiration for the judgement of Homer.

In the third chapter we examined all the passages of the Corpus Aristotelicum in which Aristotle refers to Homer by quotation or allusion for his excellence in poetry and the literary side of rhetoric. The conclusion of this examination was a resounding affirmation that Homer is seen there as the master of the language arts, the model of orators and poets, epic, comic, and tragic. We found that, to speak more effectively, every orator, according to Aristotle, should imitate Homer. Like the Poet, every orator, in the Philosopher's judgement, should give examples and illustrations deftly to clarify his argument and in epideictic speeches he should praise men who disregard danger and expedience to do something heroic. Like the Poet he should use common maxims effectively, facts more readily associative with his subject, and effective language devices like paromoiosis, simile, metaphor, and asyndeton. In his exordia he should imitate Homer by giving his hearers a clear early preview of his discourse, arousing their good will, and trying to remove prejudice. Finally, like Homer
the orator should employ, Aristotle exhorts, unmistakable facial expressions and bodily gestures, avoid prolixity in his use of enthymemes and avoid burdening his listeners with unnecessary material.

Homer is the Philosopher's model for poets, too. In fact, he is clearly the Philosopher's Poet par excellence from the moment early in the *Poetics* when he dismisses Empedocles as a poet and suggests that Homer earned the title for more than meter. As Hinman demonstrates, Homer holds first place throughout the discussion in the *Poetics*:

Homer ranks first as the source of quotations and the object of allusions, being at the head of both lists, which total forty-nine. Although Sophocles is not quoted at all, the twenty-three allusions to him exceed in number the total of both quotations from and allusions to any other author than Homer. Euripides stands a close third with one quotation and nineteen allusions. Next is Aeschylus with one quotation and six allusions.

Homer who was the first, according to Aristotle, to write satire and mark out the main lines of comedy, typified the best in poetic technique. He represented 'good' people and people who were 'better.' He presented his story most effectively--partly by narrative and partly by action. His story's action was single.

Two principles, more proper to tragedy than epic, should be maintained solidly in tragedy, he argued, in a way that they were not expected to be maintained even in Homer's epics: the outcome should be single for both the

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good and the bad characters; and the denouement should be more natural--caused by the plot and not some mechanical intervention.

Writers of tragedy are advised by Aristotle to imitate Homer's techniques: present inferior people as having some worth, be brief, use discovery aptly, form the tragedy out of a single tale, insist on unity of plot, and accept defects that do not vitiate the tragic art form. They are to imitate his creative use of language devices, too: metaphors genus for species or species for genus, coined words for word parts, lengthened words, and mingling of rare and commonplace expressions.

Epic writers are exhorted also by the Philosopher to pattern their work after the Poet's: to maintain organic unity by relating the parts more closely to the theme, to make the epic, whether simple or complex, excel in its proper class, to recede personally in the story, to use fallacy adroitly and make the inexplicable acceptable.

Aristotle's special regard for Homer is discernible particularly when he demonstrates how typical Homeric problems could be solved through patient interpretation. The Poet's portrayal of an impossibility is justified since it makes the poem more effective. His apparent untruthfulness is refuted in one case, since he is transmitting a traditional story, and in another, since he is relating an
exceptional but true fact. Many problems with Homer's words, the Philosopher argues, can be solved by a change of diction or accent, or by a metaphorical rather than literal reading, or by an unusual rather than common reading.

Aristotle cautions the reader of Homer to look carefully for the sense in which an expression was intended, rather than conclude it is contradictory. In the end, Aristotle's seeming negative criticism of Homer reducibly implied: "Epic has a serious limitation, a weakening that can occur because of its many episodes, but Homer conquers it as well as it can be conquered."

In the fourth chapter we found Aristotle's admiration for the Poet in philosophic and scientific matters just as warm as in the literary arts. In philosophy and science, however, he turned to the Poet not as expert but as the source of traditional wisdom. There we studied all the quotations or allusions to Homer in the Corpus Aristotelicum that view him as a source of philosophic and scientific information. The evidence demonstrated that the Philosopher of the Corpus sought Homer's support for his philosophy of God and a wide range of scientific areas—anthropology, psychology, physiology and medicine in the human sphere, zoology and bio-chemistry in the world of animals, and geography, geology, meteorology, and physics in the inanimate world.
In the philosophy of God, His existence, His place in the universe, and His governance of all things are all supported by Homeric references.

Relating to the science of man, in the realm of anthropology, the battle between the Pygmies and Cranes at the Nile's source, the Cyclopes' patriarchal societies, and Sparta's unique insistence on her citizens' physical regime and diet are illustrated by supportive Homeric texts. In the realm of psychology conclusions about the effect of black bile and imbibed alcohol on human temperament are demonstrated by citations from Homer. In physiology Homeric testimony is cited to illustrate the truth of an observation about the human jugular vein. In medicine Homer's words are used to shed light on a practice in the treatment of bruises.

Concerning man's science about animals in zoology the truth of several observations is confirmed by evidence from Homer: the longevity of Laconian hounds, the prime age of a bull, the fiercer nature of castrated wild boars, and the birth of already horned long-horned rams in Libya. Homeric evidence is adduced too, for: the lion's fear of fire and his eye-fixation on the hunter he is about to attack, the existence of two birds--the Cymindis and Plangus, the greying process of horses which is unique among animals and similar to man's greying process and growth in height as the unique effect of femaleness on
the growing process of animals. In bio-chemistry Homeric
evidence is used to support the observation that the
water an animal drinks can cause the distinct coloring of
his coat.

We turned next to the science of the physical world to
discover that in Meterology Homer is invoked to verify the
Southwest as the gentlest of the winds. In a question re­
lating to geography and geology the Poet is cited to support
the evidence that the gradual drying of a marshland makes
the time of its earlier habitation difficult to determine.
In geography he is called upon to lend support to the fact
of Egypt's changing terrain and the absence of Memphis at a
certain time of Egyptian history. In geology Homer's
testimony about Mt. Etna's volcanic activity is invoked to
support the preclusion of the Argo's supposed route past
it. Finally in physics moving water's loss of transparency
is supported by cited Homeric evidence.

All this evidence of our fourth chapter leaves no
doubt that in the Corpus Aristotelicum the Philosopher does
not only recognize Homer's literary expertise, as was demon­
strated in our third chapter, but readily turns to Homer
for insights in the whole range of human sciences--about
God, man, animals, and the physical world.

In the fifth chapter we considered the many times
Aristotle identified Homer through quotation or allusion as
a teacher of human values. Once again we found him warmly
accepting and approving of the Poet.

The first texts we considered were drawn from places in the *Rhetoric* where the Philosopher is dealing with the understanding of human values incumbent on the orator, who must know in an intensely practical way what moves men to act or brings them to understanding. How do men determine a value or a higher value? What brings them pleasure? What stirs or assuages their anger? Aristotle finds Homeric support for his answer to each one of these questions.

The next texts we studied were found essentially in the explicitly ethical treatises—the *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Eudemian Ethics*, and the *Magna Moralia*. Once again the Poet is cited to back his conclusions about true courage. It is not ordinary citizen's courage, motivated by fear, or risk driven by pain or anger and blind to danger. Courage is accompanied by an elevation of spirit and can be truly super-human. Homer illustrates, too, his conclusions about general human wisdom, the need and nature of human friendship, and the cautions that must be heeded to steer the middle course of virtue. He finds support in the Poet, too, for his observations, that strong sexual desire is natural to the young and that the 'great-souled' like to hear about the benefits they have bestowed, not what they have received. Finally, in his treatment of justice, the fundamental virtue of political life, Homeric evidence backs his conclusions that no person can be unjust to himself and that
uncontrolled desire, since it is premeditated, causes greater injustice than uncontrolled anger.

The last group of texts we examined, which cited or alluded to Homer in support of the Philosopher's judgements on human values deal with man's political life and are mainly drawn from the *Politics*. Evidence from the Poet is adduced by Aristotle to ground a whole series of conclusions about the political order: that the apolitical man is on the lowest rung of humanity; that Sparta's unique involvement in the legislation of her citizens' diet and physical regime deserves imitation; that slaves ought to show initiative in the service of their masters; and that the ruling principle ought to be single, but rulers need counselors. Homeric evidence is evoked in support of these other principles of political order, too: that the ruler ought to be like a father and a shepherd; that inequality of goods disturbs the lower class of citizens, but equality of honors disturbs the upper class; that citizenship is a man's most honored treasure; and that education of the young needs music with its completely liberal purpose--enjoyment.

Finally, to complete our task of examining all of Aristotle's Homeric references in the sixth chapter we gathered the ten remaining passages of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* in which the Philosopher refers to Homer. In none of these was the Poet called upon to justify a conclusion, yet they confirm in their own way the evidence that this study
has presented in the previous three chapters. These references, although they do not evaluate the Poet, at least confirm the conclusion that Homer was close to the mind of the Philosopher, and that as he taught even grammar, predication, and induction Homer occurred to him readily as a most familiar instrument of his reasoning and argumentation.

Surely it could be argued from all this that Aristotle used Homer so much because the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were the most shared common reference of the Greeks he was teaching. But this does not explain the fact that he actually found the truths he discussed verified in the poetry of Homer—-the principles of poetry and rhetoric, philosophy and science, psychology and ethics—concretely exemplified and expressed. He accepted in Homer a heritage of truth and wisdom much as we accept such a heritage in the Bible or even in Shakespeare. Except for a little gentle twisting of the Homeric text, especially in the twenty-fifth chapter of the *Poetics*, there is no sign of coercion. Rather, there is every sign that he turned to the Poet confident that he would find in him agreement with his own conclusions.

Römer a long time ago made the point that must be made here. Aristotle turns to Homer as a φρόνιμος, a source of wisdom, and at one point calls him just that.
abweichend von unserer modernen Auffassung die homerischen Gedichte in so fern das Buch der Bücher, als sie dieselben nicht allein als eine Quelle der ψυχα-γωγία, sondern auch der διδασκαλία betrachteten. 

Nennt und fasst nun auch Aristoteles den Dichter φρόνιμος auf in der Stelle der Rhetorik I.6 1363a 17: καὶ δ' τῶν φρονίμων τις ἢ τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν προέκρινέν, οἶον ὜δυσσέα Ἀθηνᾶ καὶ Ἐλένην ἡσσές καὶ Ἀλεξανδρον αἱ θεαὶ καὶ Ἀχιλλέα Ὀμηρος,

so hält sich doch seine Berufung auf ihn zum Entscheid rein wissenschaftlicher Fragen in ganz bescheidenen Grenzen. . . .

One senses, in fact, a certain reverent confidence in the Philosopher towards the very words of the Poet, as though ordinarily hard-won wisdom were natural to them, simply waiting to be grasped from them and used.

Finally we come to the third conclusion of our study—the Philosopher's almost universally unquestioning acceptance and approval of the Poet's judgement whenever he referred to him. Of the one hundred and sixty-nine times Aristotle turns to Homer, only five times (all of which occur in the Poetics) is there even a suggestion of negative criticism. Each one of these possible negative criticisms was discussed in the third chapter of this study: the double outcome of the Odyssey the divinely effected flight of the Greeks in the Iliad; the contrived discovery of Odysseus' identity by Eumaeus; and the possible dilution of

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the *Iliad* plot through its many episodes. In each of these cases we have seen the note of criticism reduced to almost nothing if not completely eliminated. In the end we have the picture of an overwhelmingly positive stance in the Philosopher's attitude towards the Poet--he admires him, defends him, and relies upon him unreservedly. What can be said of this strange, wonderful homage of the greatest scientific mind of antiquity to the first great poet?

Aristotle's defense of poetry and the poet he identified with poetry was not incidental. It lay at the heart of his insight and played a key role in his approach to education. Since ideas did not have a separate existence for him, but were embodied in nature and man, there was no reason why the poet should not be relied on as much as the scientist to understand reality. For Aristotle, therefore, poetry was not alien or hostile. It 'loved wisdom' as much as philosophy. At one point he said it was "more philosophical than history." 4

We are not surprised to read that towards the end of his life Aristotle is said to have written to his friend Antipater: "The more lonely and isolated I become, the more I have come to love myths." 5 After all, this is the same Aristotle who wrote in the *Metaphysics*: "A person who is

4 *Poetics* 1451b, 6-7.

5 Demetrius, *De Elocutione*, 144 (Frag. 668, Rose).
puzzled and wonders considers himself ignorant. Therefore even one who loves myths is in a sense a lover of wisdom, for the myth is made up of wonders." In these words perhaps we come closest to Aristotle's own defense of his obvious love of Homer. At the center of his thought he perceived a unity between mythologizing and philosophizing. He seems convinced that myth has a vision of the truth that we cannot acquire except through myth. This is inferred in another passage of the Metaphysics which is one of the most intriguing and stimulating of the whole Corpus Aristotelicum.

A tradition in the form of a myth has been handed down to posterity from the most ancient thinkers, to the effect that these heavenly bodies are gods, and that the Divine pervades all of nature. . . . Now if we accept . . . that they supposed the primary substances to be gods, we must regard it as an inspired saying. We should reflect that since every art and philosophy has probably been repeatedly developed to the utmost and has perished again, these beliefs of theirs have been preserved as a relic of former knowledge.

There is a poignancy in this passage that blends well with the fragment of the letter to Antipater quoted above--the sense of despair in 'every art and philosophy' contrasted with the sense of reliance on the beliefs that are handed down in myth. Aristotle was drawn to Homer, it would seem,
because he found in him a wisdom and truth he could discover nowhere else as surely or universally. All his science and philosophy would peak and perish as science and philosophy had peaked and perished before, but the truth of Homer preserved in myth would endure.

There was even more, we can conclude, to the relationship between Aristotle and Homer. It was based on identity—an identity grounded in the unity of the wisdom they reached by their separate paths of poetic insight and philosophy.

In her superb biography of G. K. Chesterton, Maisie Ward tells the story of how Chesterton wrote his book on St. Thomas Aquinas:⁹

He began by rapidly dictating to Dorothy about half the book. So far he had consulted no authorities but at this stage he said to her: "I want you to go to London and get me some books." "What books," asked Dorothy. "I don't know," said G.K.¹⁰

When he received the books,

He flipped them rapidly through . . . and then dictated to her the rest of his own book without referring to them again.¹¹

Later Etienne Gilson, the renowned scholar of St. Thomas and Medieval Philosophy said of the book:

Chesterton makes one despair. I have been studying St.

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¹¹Ibid., p. 619.
Thomas all my life and I could never have written such a book.\textsuperscript{12}

Much earlier in the biography Maisie Ward gives the reason that probably explains why Chesterton could write so penetratingly and with such ease about Aquinas:

He himself had what he attributes to St. Thomas—'that instantaneous presence of mind which alone really deserves the name of wit.'\textsuperscript{13}

St. Thomas and G. K. C. had the same view and spirit. Chesterton's perception of the paradox in things was reducibly the same as Aquinas's recognition of the analogy of proper proportionality in being. No two approaches to truth could seem more opposed than Chesterton's blithe leaps of paradoxical intuition and the incredibly close reasoning of Aquinas's argument for the existence and properties of the human soul in the \textit{Summa Contra Gentes}.\textsuperscript{14} Yet they shared a single spirit of wisdom—"instantaneous presence of mind" or "wit" as Chesterton described it.

Perhaps Rembrandt had a similar insight into the Philosopher and the Poet when he brought them together in his magnificent painting, "Aristotle Contemplating the Bust of Homer." Homer ranged the world of God and nature and man with the free imaginative spirit of the poet interpreting in song and myth what he saw there. Aristotle moved through

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., p. 620.

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., p. 204.

\textsuperscript{14}St. Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa Contra Gentes}, II, cc. xlvi-cx.
the same world with the disciplined systematic approach of the scientist and philosopher producing detailed and closely reasoned analyses and syntheses of a staggering number of subjects. Yet somehow, in the end, the Philosopher and the Poet shared a single spirit. The purpose of this study, we might conclude, was to show that Aristotle recognized his affinity of spirit with Homer and demonstrated it widely in his writings.
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APPENDIX

A List of the Loci in Rose's Collection of the Fragments of Aristotle in Which Homer Is Alluded to or Cited

The first item of each entry—the letter 'f' followed by an Arabic number—represents the number Valentine Rose assigned to that particular fragment in his collection of Aristotle's fragments which were published in 1870 in volume V of the Aristotelis Opera of Immanuel Bekker, pages 1463 to 1589. The second item—an Arabic number following 'R'—gives the number Rose assigned to the same fragment in his Aristotelis Qui Perebantur Librorum Fragmenta which he published in 1886. This is followed by the Bekker number of the Fragment. Finally the specific locus in which the fragment occurs is cited and the Homeric text(s) it alludes to or cites.


5. f65 (R3 75) 1486b 30. Diogenes Laertius 2, 46.

6. f66 (R3 76) 1486b 36-45; 1487a 1-38. Pseudo-Plutarchus. de Vita Homeri 1,3.

7. f66 (R3 76) 1487a 32, 35. "Ομηρος Ἱπτης.

8. fl08 (R3 101) 1495b 9, 21. Athenaeus xv. 674f. (=Iliad i.470; Odyssey viii.170).


13. f139 (R^3 143) 1501b 26-34. Scholion ext. B ad Iliad ii.183.
15. f141 (R^3 146) 1502a 17-27. Scholion ext. B ad Iliad ii.649.
16. f142 (R^3 147) 1502a 28-37. Scholion ext. B ad Iliad iii.236.
18. f143 (R^3 148) 1502b 6. Scholion ext. B(E) ad Iliad iii.276 (=Iliad x.332†).
19. f143 (R^3 152) 1502b 8, 14. Scholion ext. B(E) ad Iliad iii.276 (=Iliad iii.298-300).
22. f145 (R^3 150) 1502b 34. Scholion ext. B ad Iliad iii.441.
27. f149 (R^3 154) 1503a 45; 1503b 1-3. Scholion int. B ad Iliad v.778.


32. f154 (R³159) 1504a 4-17. *Scholion ext. B ad Iliad x.98.


34. f156 (R³161) 1504a 26-44; 1504b 1-12. *Scholion ext. B ad Iliad x.252.


37. f159 (R³167) 1504b 39-44; 1505a 1-2. *Scholion Victor. (Townl.) ad Iliad xxiv.420. (Cf. Suid. s. μεμυκότα.)

38. f160 (R³168) 1505a 3-8. *Scholion int. B (Eustathius 1365) ad Iliad xxiv.569.


40. f162 (R³170) 1505a 17-35. *Scholion T ad Odyssey v.93.

41. f163 (R³171) 1505a 36-45; 1505b 1-6. *Scholion (TQEP) Vindob. ad Odyssey v.334.

42. f164 (R³172) 1505b 8-13. *Scholion HQ et Vindobon. ad Odyssey ix.106 (Scholion T ad Odyssey ix.311).

43. f165 (R³173) 1505b 14-25. *Scholion HT ad Odyssey ix.345 (Odyssey ix.333); Scholion QM (ad Odyssey ix.333) et Vindob. (ad Odyssey ix.315). (=Odyssey vi.4,6—1505b 20,25.)

44. f166 (R³174) 1505b 26-42. *Scholion HTQ (M) ad Odyssey ix.525.

46. f169 (R3177) 1506a 34-40. Scholion Vindob. ad Odyssey xvii. 326.

47. f170 (R3178) 1506a 41-45; 1506b 1-7. Scholion Vindob. ad Odyssey xxiii. 337.


49. f174. 1507a 5-13; 1507b 1-3. Plutarchus de aud. poetis 12 (=Iliad xxiii. 296).

50. f175 (R3100) 1507b 4-13. Athenaeus v. 6p. 188e (=Odyssey viii. 449--1507b 9-10; Odyssey iv. 48--1507b 10-11).

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The dissertation submitted by Fr. Donald J. McGuire, S.J., has been read and approved by the following committee:

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The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

January 10, 1977

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