Aristotelian Rhetoric in Homer

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ARISTOTELIAN RHETORIC IN HOMER

by

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LIFE

Howard Bernard Schapker was born in Cincinnati, Ohio, February 26, 1931.

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

"I shall, I think, be right in following the principle . . . .
With Jove let us begin," and in beginning with Homer. He is like his own conception of Ocean, which he describes as the source of every stream and river; for he has given us a model and an inspiration for every department of eloquence. Quintilian's encomium of Homer is doubly significant. Coming as it does from the most influential rhetorician of his own as well as of late Roman times, it can be considered as representative of contemporary tastes, to a large extent. More important, the last great classical theorist and teacher of rhetoric very appropriately fixes his own seal to the centuries-old tradition of Homeric rhetoric.

The actuality of this tradition is easily sketched. A century before Quintilian, Cicero (106-43 B.C.) wrote: "If eloquence were

1 Homer, *Iliad*, XXI, 195-197


3 Quintilian lived from 35 A.D. to approximately 96 A.D.
not highly esteemed in Trojan times, Homer would hardly have
singed out for distinction Odysseus' and Nestor's oratorical
skills. For to the former he gave power, to the latter a soothing
quality of speech. What is more, all this would hardly have been
possible, unless the poet had been an illustrious and consummate
orator in his own right.  

Down through Hellenistic times, a running battle was fought
between rhetoricians and philosophers on the precise point of
Homer's eloquence. Philosophers sought to discredit the rising
tide of rhetorical studies. They cited Homer as proof that rhet-
orical skill is purely a natural gift, for which no formal art is
possible or needed. The rhetoricians answered that Homer's
speeches display only a rude sort of eloquence, which was the
natural concomitant of "logical reasoning and a certain sharpness
of mind." Their art of rhetoric, they alleged, originated with

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5 The philosophers found their chief spokesman in Plato. His
Gorgias attacks rhetoric as being opposed to the end of philosophy,
which is the pursuit of truth. In the Phaderus, Plato modifies
his position, as will be shown.

6 Kennedy, George A., "The Ancient Dispute over Rhetoric in
According to the author, the feud over rhetoric in Homer reached
its highest pitch in the second century B.C. Cf. page 30, note 19.
the Sicilians Corax and Tisias.

The important point for our purposes is that many ancients were aware of Homeric eloquence, no matter how they explained it or explained it away. For many of them three of the heroes in the Iliad exemplified the three main branches of classical oratory. Odysseus' speeches exhibited the grand style, Nestor's the middle style, and Menelaus' the plain style.\(^7\)

Modern scholars, after examining the development of classical oratory, draw what they consider to be sure conclusions. Freese writes, "Homer was the real father of oratory,"\(^8\) while in Roberts' opinion, "the Greeks rightly thought that, even for the prosaic politician or lawyer, there were no better models than some of the speeches found in the Iliad and the Odyssey."\(^9\)

Only authorities on classical rhetoric may venture such statements. As far as Homeric oratory is concerned, our more modest effort will attempt to bring out the rhetorical elements in some few of the Iliad's many speeches. Without trying to resolve the

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\(^7\) Cicero and Quintilian both held this traditional viewpoint. Cf. Kennedy, 26, where other prominent writers holding this opinion are cited.


ancient quarrel over rhetoric in Homer, it should be both possible and profitable to give concrete justification to Quintilian's high regard for Homer's eloquence.

Our study, however, could be facilitated and made much more interesting if it were broadened somewhat. The immediate problem arises of finding an authoritative criterion against which Homer's speeches can be evaluated. It would only be fair to Homer if the criterion selected were Greek no less than he is. For this reason we have chosen Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is useful to this study for other reasons. An immediately recognized contribution to its field, it is a complete, concise, and easily manageable fusion of Greek rhetorical theory and practice. Furthermore, in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle summarizes past and contemporary academic rhetorical theories, while placing his own theory and practice on distinctly Aristotelian philosophical foundations. For this reason it evinces an order and unity not present in other more exclusively practical treatises. The latter tend to be diffusive random compilations of helpful procedures.

If the *Rhetoric* is to serve as a criterion, it will be necessary to devote some space to analyzing the Aristotelian approach to rhetoric. This study, consequently, must be broadened
to a type of comparative study of Aristotelian theory and Homeric practice.

But this comparative study should serve many other purposes than merely providing a criterion for evaluating Homer's speeches. In the course of it, problems like the following will be raised and, we hope, answered, to some extent at least. The first will be that of the rise and development of Greek academic oratorical theory up to the time it received its most complete theoretical expression in Aristotle's Rhetoric. The second will be to determine precisely the characteristics of Homer's rhetorical artistry. To settle this problem objectively, our Aristotelian criterion will be of great assistance. Obviously enough, a thorough study of Aristotle should provide anyone who approaches Homer's speeches with a complete viewpoint of oratory, which will be operative implicitly in his criticisms, even though no explicit reference is made to Aristotle's work itself in each case.

A third interesting outcome of this study should be to notice the contrast between Homer's more primitive and natural brand of oratory, and the more highly developed, intellectual, and sophisticated rhetorical practices of Greek fourth century orators. But along with the contrast, there should emerge basic similarities between Homer's and Aristotle's ideal orators, as the rudiments of
later Greek oratorical viewpoints and practices come clear in the analysis of the Iliad's speeches. Thus, not only a contrast, but a comparison of the two will be possible at the conclusion of the analysis.

This thesis, therefore, is a limited study of Greek oratory, comprising Aristotle's theoretical expression and Homer's practice of it. We are not seeking an evaluation of Aristotle's rhetorical theory in relation to other prominent theories of his day. Nor must we establish Aristotle's definite dependence on Homer. If, on the other hand, many of Aristotle's principles and practical hints are illustrated in Homer's speeches, the conclusions of Freese and Roberts, among others, are strengthened. Along the same line, if Homer "measures up" to the rigorous demands Aristotle makes of orators, another facet of Homer's genius will emerge—the fusion in him of rhetorical as well as poetic excellence.
PART ONE

RHETORIC IN ARISTOTLE
CHAPTER 1.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC

The study of rhetoric originated in Sicily. According to Cicero's account, which he bases on a lost work of Aristotle, the rule of tyrants gradually gave way to democracy on that island.¹ These expulsions of the tyrants brought about a rush of civil processes initiated by returned exiles for the recovery of their confiscated property. Immediately there arose a demand for lawyers, who would be qualified to plead the confiscation cases. To help the new lawyers, the Syracusans Corax and his pupil, Tisias, collaborated in writing a set of acceptable courtroom procedures. This practical summary is the first known manual of rhetoric.

The style of these early Sicilian advocates was in the main simple and unsophisticated.² Early teaching appears to have emphasized the importance of orderly divisions within the speech

¹ Cicero, Brutus, XII, 45. The date of the tyrants' fall-467.
² Roberts, Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism, 36.
proper. Recognized divisions of a speech were: exordium, arguments, narrative, and epilogue. The theorists also taught their pupils the devices, purposes, and styles proper to each division. Probable arguments, sweeping assumptions, and often quibbling dilemmas were the argumentative techniques in vogue.

Oratory had hardly been established in Sicily when Empedocles took an important forward step by introducing literary devices into speeches. From his time on, Sicilian oratory was characterized by a flowery style. It was Gorgias of Leontini (c. 483-375), Empedocles' pupil by tradition, who created a sensation at Athens with his Sicilian brand of oratory. The year was 427 B.C. Gorgias had come to Athens as a representative of Sicilian cities which sought Athenian help against Syracusan aggression. What struck the hitherto matter-of-fact Athenians were qualities which later came to be associated with panegyric orations. Gorgias' speech was "brilliant, exalted, stately, flowery, and full of colour; it soothed the soul by its harmonious euphonies, or it excited the quivering senses by the boldness and grandeur of its

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3 Empedocles was born about the first quarter of the fifth century B.C.
4 Cf. Quintilian, III, 1, 8.
imagery." More specifically, Gorgias introduced the Athenians to new rhetorical figures, rare and compound words, sentences with clauses of similar structure and equal length, rhymed final words and terminations, and striking antitheses.6

Gorgias gained many disciples and imitators at Athens, as did other sophist teachers. Prominent orators of the time whose oratory was in the Sicilian style include Agathon the Athenian tragedian (c. 447-401 B.C.), Polus of Agrigentum,7 Lecymnius, Evenus of Paros, Alcidamus of Elea, Polycrates of Athens, Callippus, and Pamphilus. Although Antiphanes, one of the first Attic orators, (c. 480-411 B.C.), and Lysias were both students of Sicilian masters, they were less influenced by Sicilian and Soph-


6 Freese, The Art of Rhetoric, intro. xi. Aristotle cites several examples of Gorgias' ornateness in Rhetoric III, III, 4. His displeasure with this style of speech is seen from III, I, 9: "And as the poets, although their utterances were devoid of sense, appeared to have gained their reputation through their style, it was a poetical style that first came into being, as that of Gorgias. Even now the majority of the uneducated think that such persons express themselves most beautifully, whereas this is not the case, for the style of prose is not the same as that of poetry." To justify his position, he remarks that the tragic poets are tending more and more toward prose words and rhythms.

7 One of Gorgias' defenders in Plato's dialogue of that name.
ist principles. Lysias hardly shows any traces of his Sicilian training.

The next great name in the line of Sicilian-style oratory is Protagoras of Abdera (c. 485-415 B.C.). Protagoras attempted to refine Gorgias' practices and correct excesses that were inevitable when less balanced artists than Gorgias attempted to imitate him. Protagoras introduced to Athens what Gomperz names a second great type of oratory which developed along with the Gorgian type already described. Protagoras' way of speaking became the model for legal or forensic oratory. It was "sharp, cool, clear, and sober; it moved with hasty steps which quickened at times into an impetuous gait, and its effects were produced by reason rather than by imagination, on the judgment rather than on the fancy." Other prominent orators and teachers who followed in the same high literary style were Prodicus of Ceos and Hippias of Elis.

Mention of Gorgias and Protagoras naturally calls to mind Plato (427-348 B.C.). Some notion of the vigor of contemporary rhetoric and its rapid development is indicated by Plato's many treatments of rhetoric and closely connected questions. In the Gorgias, a bitterly hostile and ironic Socrates argues against

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8 Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, I, 477.
contemporary trends in rhetorical teaching. He will not admit that the rhetoric of Gorgias is an art; it is rather only a knack of gratifying common audiences, a species of flattery, cosmetics, and sophistication. In the Phaedrus, however, Plato attempts to unite the rhetorician's art with dialectic, which in the Republic is called "the coping stone of all learning and the truest of all the sciences." The speaker, he affirms, must also know all the types of human beings, which arguments will win them to truth, and the rhetorical style and adornments of speech that will serve in each case. In short, Plato's concept of high rhetoric as it appears in the Phaedrus requires that true knowledge and oratorical ability be used in the service of what is right, unless the speaker wishes to be called a charlatan. "Without a noble disposition and noble love there can be no genuine philosophy; without genuine philosophy, no true eloquence or artistic use

9 Plato, Gorgias, 455a; 462e; 463a; 465a-c, in Jowett, Benjamin, The Dialogues of Plato. 2 vols., N.Y., 1937, 1, 505-591.
10 Plato, Phaedrus, 260e-262.
11 Plato, Republic, 534e (Jowett's Translation).
12 Phaedrus, 271.
13 Ibid., 262b-c.
The Phaedrus, therefore, represents an attempt to unite dialectic and rhetoric, the science of thought and the art of public speaking. But the Sophists were the teaching rhetoricians and practical educators of Plato's time. As a class, they were irreconcilably alienated by the attacks of Socrates and his pupil. This is not to say that the conflict divided the good philosophers from the evil sophists. While the Sophists often ridiculed philosophy as Plato taught it, they generally cultivated a type of common sense wisdom and practicality. The great Sophists and their followers were very frequently upright and highly dedicated men.

As a result of this split, the teaching of rhetoric was not grounded on formal philosophical principles anywhere, except in Aristotle's school, which would be formed a generation later.

14. Comperz, Greek Thinkers, II, 16.

15. Plato, as far as we know, did not teach rhetoric.

16. But by Aristotle's time the Sophists had long proved themselves as popular educators, having turned out many illustrious orators. Aristotle's work, therefore, was, in a sense, done too late to influence the development of high Greek oratory. As Jebb says, "Had Aristotle's Rhetoric been composed a century earlier, it would have been inestimable to oratory. As it was, the right thing was done too late." Jebb, R.C. The Attic Orators, 2 vols., London, 1876, II, 431.
Cicero sums up the unhappy consequences of the long-term feud:
"Postea dissociati, ut exposui, a Socrate a doctis . . . philosophi eloquentiam despererunt, oratores sapientiam."\(^{17}\) As Hendrickson puts it, "The rhetoricians, looking upon themselves as the heirs of the early sophists, still claimed 'philosophy' as the proper designation of their activity, and on the other hand, the philosophers were fond of indicating the nature and scope of a true or ideal rhetoric."\(^{18}\) Plato's *Phaedrus* is one such attempt.

Before going on to Aristotle himself, it will be convenient to mention the rhetoric pedagogue who was his chief rival. Isocrates of Athens (436-338 B.C.) continued in the line of the great exponents of Sicilian and Sophist oratory.\(^{19}\) His school of rhetoric in Athens was celebrated throughout the ancient world. Quintilian writes that "the pupils of Isocrates were eminent in every branch of study."\(^{20}\)

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17 Cicero, *De Oratore*, III, 72.
19 Isocrates almost spanned the combined lives of Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle lived from 384-332 B.C. Isocrates was said to have been taught by Gorgias, Protagoras, Prodicus, and Theramenes. Cf. Jebb, *Attic Orators*, II, 15.
20 Quintilian, III, 1, 14.
According to Norlin, Isocrates held that the highest oratory should concern itself with broad, pan-Hellenic themes, and that the "style of oratory should be as artistic as that of poetry and afford the same degree of pleasure." He avoided Gorgias' concentrated poetic elegance. In this he resembled Protagoras. Peculiar to Isocrates himself were subordination of words and phrases to large unities, prose rhythm, and the use of the long, periodic sentence skillfully constructed as the basic structural unit. "Thus Isocrates took from Gorgias a style which was extremely artificial and made it artistic. In so doing, he fixed the form of rhetorical prose for the Greek world, and through the influence of Cicero, for modern times as well."  

Quintilian states that when Isocrates was "already advanced in years ... Aristotle began to teach the art of rhetoric in his afternoon lectures." Aristotle turned to teaching rhetoric
expressly to compete with Isocrates. \textsuperscript{24} His approach to rhetoric was characterized by greater literary and philosophical emphasis, as will be shown.

Aristotle regarded rhetoric highly throughout his life. \textsuperscript{25} In the \textit{Sophistical Refutations} and \textit{Politics} he notes with favor the "growth and advancement" of rhetoric. \textsuperscript{26} In the \textit{Ethics} he affirms that "rhetoric is one of the most highly esteemed of

\textsuperscript{24} Cicero's account of the competition and its consequences, given in \textit{De Oratore}, III, xxxv, 141, is interesting enough to be quoted in full: "Itaque ipse Aristoteles cum flore Isocratem nobilitate discipulorum videret, quod (ipse) suas disputationes a causis forensibus et civilibus ad inanem sermonis elegantiam trans-tulisset, mutavit repente totam formam prope disciplinae suae versusque quendam Philoctetae paulo secus dixit: ille enim turpe sibi ait esse tacere, cum barbaros, hic autem, cum Isocratem peteretur dicere; itaque ornavit et inlustravit doctrinam illum omnem reremque cognitionem cum orationis exercitacione coniunxit."

Isocrates, it appears, fought back. In his \textit{Panathenaicus}, 33, he attacks those "who chant their verses and prate about (the) poets in the Lyceum." Relations between the two men were never friendly. The reasons for their mutual animosity are not clear. Aristotle probably carried over much of Plato's detestation for what he regarded as Isocrates' superficial and unphilosophical character.

\textsuperscript{25} In the Peripatetic school "rhetoric was both scientifically and assiduously taught." Jebb, \textit{Attic Orators}, II, 431.

capacities."\(^{27}\) Hepauses early in his treatise to defend rhetoric against a blanket condemnation placed upon it in the Gorgias:

"If it is urged that an abuse of the rhetorical faculty can work great mischief, the same charge can be brought against all good things (save virtue itself), and especially against the most useful things, such as strength, health, wealth, and military skill. Right employed, they work the greatest blessings, and wrongly employed, they work the utmost harm."\(^{28}\) Thus, while correcting Plato's extreme position, Aristotle makes common cause with his master. As is clear from the first chapter of the Rhetoric, Aristotle requires uprightness and moral integrity of the orator no less than Plato. What else he requires of the orator we shall soon see.

The Rhetoric was written about 330 B.C., at the earliest 336 B.C., during Aristotle's second residence at Athens.\(^{29}\) Grant


\(^{28}\) Rhetoric, I, 1, 13. The references to the Rhetoric will follow Freese's annotation given in the Loeb Classical Library edition. English passages from the Rhetoric will be taken from Cooper, Lane, The Rhetoric of Aristotle. New York, 1932. The latter translation, we feel, expresses Aristotle's thought more clearly in English.

\(^{29}\) Freese, Intro., xxii, and Gomperz III, 421. Aristotle returned to Athens in 335 B.C.
places the first two books of the Rhetoric between the eighth book of the Topics and the Sophistical Refutations. These last mentioned works had been preceded by the Topics (Books I-VII) and the Analytics. The interval between the first two books of the Rhetoric and the third book was spanned by the Nichomachean Ethics, Politics, and Poetics. Following the third book of the Rhetoric came the first of the physical and biological treatises.

30 Grant, Aristotle, 45. For a summary of reasons why the third book of the Rhetoric was probably written some time after the first and second books, cf. Hendrickson, "Origin and Meaning of Characters of Style," 251, note 2.
"Now previous compilers of 'arts' (δέχωμαι) of Rhetoric have provided us with only a small portion of this art, for proofs (πίστευσις) are the only things in it that come within the province of art (ἐπίτεχνον ἐνόμον); everything else is merely an accessory. And yet they say nothing about enthyemeses which are the body of proof, but chiefly devote their attention to matters outside the subject (κῶν ἐξω τοῦ πράγματος); for the arousing or prejudice, compassion, anger, and similar emotions has no connection with the matter in hand, but is directed only to the dicast."¹

A closer look at this passage will reveal the direction Aristotle takes in his own rhetorical theory. His criticism of pre-

¹ Rhetoric, I, 1, 3-4. As Hendrickson points out in "Origin and Meaning of Characters of Style," 252, Aristotle is perhaps speaking too strongly in placing non-argumentative means of persuasion outside rhetoric proper. In I, 11, 2, he distinguishes "technical" from "non-technical" means of persuasion, and keeps to this distinction throughout the Rhetoric. Arousal of emotions is one of the technical means of persuasion, to which subject much of Book II is devoted.
deceivers and contemporaries, in addition to what has been said about his relationship with Isocrates, indicates that he, like Plato, reacted to what was currently being done in rhetoric teaching and practice. He is convinced that rhetoricians overlook the true center of rhetoric. His own conception of what this center should be, namely arguments and "proofs," shows him in basic agreement with Plato. It also indicates that his own theory of rhetoric will be largely concerned with logic, dialectic, and the argument. The means of arousing emotions, questions or order, style, and delivery will be given their proper, though secondary, emphasis, and no more.

Excessive concentration on arousing audience emotions is not the only contemporary practice which Aristotle criticizes. It will be recalled that most instructors insisted on a fixed arrangement of parts within a speech, and that each part was studied in itself. Of the traditional practice Aristotle has this to say: "It is clear that our authors of handbooks, in attempting to define the proper content of the poem, the narration, and the other divisions of the speech, and the like, are dwelling upon irrelevant matters, for their rules have to do, simply and solely, with

²Cf. Chapter I, page 1.
the production of a certain mental attitude in the judge. These authors tell us nothing about artistic proofs—nothing, that is, about the way in which one is to become a master of the enthymeme. 3

In the above citations Aristotle decisively goes on record against two widespread contemporary rhetorical practices. 4 What is more important, he rejects them both for the same reason. It is not that audience disposition and orderly speech arrangement are irrelevant to the speaker. The point is that exclusive concentration on them takes the student and speaker away from what is at least equally as important—the speech’s logical and argumentative content. 5

If Aristotle rejected undue emphasis on arousing emotions and arranging the speech just right, the question arises of his own alternatives to these traditional practices. 6 To begin with, he

3 Rhetoric, I, 1, 9. (Italics ours)

4 In Against the Sophists, 12, Isocrates also takes to task those teachers who apply “hard and fast rules to a creative process.”

5 In Rhetoric, I, 1, 11, the enthymeme is called the “strongest of rhetorical proofs (μυριώτατον τῶν πίστεων ).” In 1, 1, 3, it is “the body of proof (σῶμα τῆς πίστεως ).”

6 Aristotle himself confines his treatment of parts of a speech to a short chapter (III, xiii) on order in general. One chapter (III, xiv) is given to the proem, and one (III, xix) to the epilogue.
clearly recognizes that speeches are made by men to other men. The purpose of the speaker is to bring his hearers to make true judgments. His concept of persuasion, therefore, is that of an appeal primarily to the audiences' intellect. Once this fact is borne in mind, the Aristotelian emphasis on argument is better understood. But if the Rhetoric is taken as a whole, it becomes equally certain that Aristotle recognizes that the emotions and the will can either prevent or assist the intellect in making correct judgments. Consequently no orator can afford to overlook them.

The end of rhetoric, then, is correct audience judgment. The art of the rhetorician consists precisely in his discovering "the available means of persuasion in a given case." Rhetorical theories, rules, and procedures sum up and codify these means. But the orator's own acute perceptions must tell him which means will serve to bring his hearers to make the right judgments in any given situation.

What are the orator's chief means of persuasion? To Aristotle's mind, they are not merely tricks of stirring up an aud-

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ience. The orator's primary means of persuasion are three—argumentative content, emotional coloring of his speech, and transmission of his character or ethos. These are the "proofs" Aristotle has been talking about. He insists that they are the "three factors essential for the effectiveness of a speech." While other rhetoricians had merely included some hints about them in their treatments of various parts of a speech, Aristotle made them the heart of his rhetorical theory. They are the "technical" means of persuasion. They are within the art, unlike the "non-technical" means of persuasion.

A further consideration of the three principal means of inducing audience belief and correct judgments leads to Aristotle's second objection to contemporary rhetorical practice. We have al-

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9 Ibid., I, ii, 3; II, i, 1-4.


12 Rhetoric, I, ii, 2. The non-technical (διεγερμένη) means of persuasion are witnesses, tortures, contracts, and the like. They are so called because they are in existence independently of the speaker's invention, and can only be utilized (κατασκευασθέναι).
ready mentioned his dissatisfaction with the traditional concentration on the parts of a speech as ends in themselves. If Aristotle's "Proofs" are means of persuasion, they are definitely not parts of a speech. They are functional means of achieving the speech's purpose; they are not merely classificatory. Their necessity is obvious: "In every speech the orator must seek to prove his point, to produce a definite emotional reaction in his audience, to convey an impression of the speaker's character."13

We have already remarked that Aristotle's approach to rhetoric is philosophical. It is based on the nature and purpose of a public speech. In addition, Aristotle's overall philosophical bent inclined him to conceive of a speech as a whole, as an organic unity implying "a principle of structure and being different from a mere accumulation of its parts."14 Therefore the entire speech, not only the proper succession of its parts, is primary. How this viewpoint affected Aristotle's treatment of rhetoric will appear more clearly later.

It would be going too far to say that the notion of a speech

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14 Ibid., 39. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 2,17 (1041b11-33) for a summary of his concept of form as the totality of a thing, which is different and greater than its parts or their sum.
as a whole never had occurred to anyone before. Perhaps Solmsen is closer to Aristotle's real originality when he says that Aristotle's "primary objective is to elevate rhetoric to a subject of philosophical dignity and standing." Philosophers like Plato had limited themselves to purely theoretical treatises on rhetoric, while the teachers tended to be exclusively practical. Aristotle's Rhetoric unites theory with practice. Its author freely introduces concepts from his Ethics, Politics, Metaphysics, Poetics, and Logical Works.

Other Aristotelian contributions can be briefly mentioned here. Aristotle, as will be shown, systematized rhetorical argumentation by uniting it with his already developed system of logic and dialectic. And instead of being satisfied with merely empirical precepts or examples having to do with each part of the speech taken separately, he included in his treatise a thorough and accurate analysis of human character and emotions.

For example, Plato in the Phaedrus, 264c, says through Socrates: "At any rate, you will allow that every discourse ought to be a living creature, having a body of its own and a head and feet; there should be a middle, beginning, and end, adapted to one another and to the whole? Phaedrus: Certainly." (Jowett's Translation)

Solmsen, 41.

Rhetoric, II, i-xviii.
Aristotle, moreover, divided speeches into forensic, deliberative, and display or epideictic types. Forensic oratory pertains to the law court, deliberative to the popular assembly, and epideictic to public occasions of joy or sorrow. This division is mentioned here because it further illustrates Aristotle's philosophical and analytic approach to rhetoric. All speeches are divided according to their different purposes. But the division also serves Aristotle as a means of ordering his treatise. Each type of speech has its particular premises of argument and peculiar audience situation, which must be separately discussed.

By way of summary, the Rhetoric can be broken down according to books, Roberts' survey recalls Aristotle's rhetorical emphases and innovations. The first book is mainly ethical and political, the second is ethical or psychological, the third mainly literary or stylistic. Of more importance in Book I is the speaker, in Book II the audience, in Book III the speech itself. "To the man who aspires to oratorical success, Book I seems to say 'Be logical. Think clearly. Reason cogently. Remember that argument is the life and soul of persuasion'; Book II, 'Study human nature."

While any speech may contain elements of all three types of oratory, the speech is classified by its purpose and general tendency in accord with that end. A speech too may have more than one end. Cf. Cooper, The Rhetoric of Aristotle, introd., xxx.
Observe the characters and emotions of your audience, as well as your own character and emotions; Book III, 'Attend to delivery. Use language rightly. Arrange your material well. End crisply.' And the whole treatise presupposes good wits and a fine general education.'

19 Roberts, Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism, 50.
CHAPTER III.

ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF RHETORIC

In the Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle remarks that scientific demonstration is not demanded of the rhetorician. In view of what has already been said about his insistence that a speech's argumentation is fully as important as any other means of persuasion, his statement in the Ethics needs explanation. Aristotle explains himself when he states that "rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic." Hendrickson's explanation of Aristotle's meaning deserves to be quoted in full:

In Book I Aristotle aims to establish a new foundation for rhetoric, which shall make of it as exact an instrument of proof as the practical uses of the art admit of. Argument is to be conducted by enthymeme and example, which are merely forms of the syllogism and induction of dialectic.

1 "It is equally unreasonable to accept merely probably conclusions from a mathematician, and to demand strict demonstration from an orator." Nichomachean Ethics, 1094b26-27.

2 Various Aristotelian expressions used to express this relationship are ἄντιστροφός, παραφυς, and μοριόν τι καὶ δημοίωτα (δημοία). Cicero expresses the idea by writing that rhetoric "quasi ex altera parte respondere dialecticae." Orator, XXXII, 114.

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Rhetoric is therefore essentially a form of dialectic, adapted to the conditions which are imposed upon it by the nature of the audience to which it appeals. The proofs are the essential thing and enthymemes are the very heart of proof. The most efficient orator accordingly will be the one most skilled in enthymemes.³

What Aristotle understood the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic to be can be further seen from his notion of dialectic itself:

Reasoning is an argument in which, certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them. (a) It is a 'demonstration', when the premises from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premises which are primary and true; (b) reasoning, on the other hand, is 'dialectical', if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted. Things are 'true' and 'primary', which are believed on the strength not of anything else but of themselves... On the other hand, those opinions are 'generally accepted' which are accepted by every one or by the majority or by the philosophers--i.e., by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and illustrious of them.⁴

Demonstration and dialectic, then, are species of the genus "reasoning." Demonstration is proper to the scientist, who, knowing the first principles of his science, bases his scientific conclusions on them. His conclusions are universal, certain, and necessary because his principles are absolutely primary and in-

³ Hendrickson, "Origin and Meanings of Characters of Style." 251.⁴ Ὄτικας, 1, 1, 25-31. (italics ours)
Dialectical reasoning is non-scientific reasoning. This does not mean that dialectical reasoning never arrives at truth, or does not follow the rules of correct argumentation. Rather the difference is that first principles of dialectical reasoning are not absolute and primary. Consequently its conclusions cannot have the universality, certainty, and necessity of scientific conclusions, since conclusions are never stronger than premises. Dialectical syllogisms, and, as we shall see, the rhetorical enthymeme are at most probable and more or less general. Their truth is basically the truth of fact, not the truth of essences.

So much for the distinction between demonstration and dialectic based on the difference in their first principles and conclusions. What of the field or content to which dialectic is applicable? Unlike demonstration, which is limited to the sciences, dialectic has a wider extension. It is concerned with the rules of argument "common to every art and faculty... It is the business of dialecticians so to examine the refutation that proceeds from the common first principles that fall under no particular special study." Dialectic is, therefore, an instrumental

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5 Sophistic Refutations, IX, 36-39.
science. Since its rules are those of argument as such, dialectic has theoretically unlimited application.

It is in its unlimited application that dialectic differs from the Greek notion of rhetoric, which is limited to politics in the widest sense. The matters rhetoric deals with, public issues and the like, belong to no particular science, since knowledge of them is possible to every citizen, and not only to the scientist. Furthermore, the matter proper to the art of rhetoric is not precisely issues as such, but the means of persuading an audience. Therefore, since audiences are persuaded by argument, and since dialectic is properly concerned with the rules of argument, rhetoricians naturally should make use of the rules of dialectic and be masters of them.

There are two broad types of dialectical reasoning which the orator uses. They are deductive reasoning from general probabilities to particular conclusions, and inductive reasoning, which is

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6 R.C. Seaton in "The Aristotelian Enthymene," *Classical Review*, XXVIII (June, 1941), 115, expresses this idea well by saying that to dialectic the truth of the premises is not directly pertinent, whereas to science it is.

7 Even the scientist must follow the rules of correct argumentation which dialectic properly treats of. His conclusions must be reached by a correct reasoning process if their truth is to be derived from the premises employed.
a "passage from individuals to universals." 8 These two types of reasoning are basic to Aristotelian logic. Aristotle himself states that all learning is through induction or deduction. 9

Deduction is a type of argument in which one term is proved to belong to another by joining both with a third term. 10 The identification of two terms with a third is made in a syllogism. Aristotle defines a syllogism as a "discourse (λόγος) in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity of their being so. I mean by the last phrase that they produce the consequence, and by this, that no further term is required from without in order to make the consequence necessary." 11 If the middle term of a syllogism represents a cause, the syllogism is demonstrative or scientific; if it does not represent a cause, the syllogism is dialectical. 12

8 Topics, I, 12, 13.
9 Posterior Analytics, I, 18. That is to say, the scientist and dialectician must employ either deduction or induction. Reasoning is termed scientific or dialectical on the basis of the primary and absolute quality of the premises of the argument, as has been explained.
10 Prior Analytics, II, xxiii, 33-34.
11 Ibid., I, 11, 18-22.
Induction has already been termed a "passage from individuals to universals." Since inductive premises are particulars, they are not universal, certain, and necessary. Each particular has only the truth of fact. What makes induction so important in Aristotle's scientific method is that through it scientific first principles are arrived at. In Aristotle's system, all universal principles are drawn somehow from experience. But experience is always of individual, contingent facts.\(^{13}\)

For purposes of rhetoric, Aristotle recognizes many advantages of induction over deduction. Nonetheless, the orатор's argumentative device par excellence is the enthymeme.\(^{14}\) Aristotle defines the enthymeme as a "syllogism starting from probabilities or

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\(^{13}\) The complicated questions of scientific first principles, the validity of induction, and other such questions, need not delay us, since they do not pertain directly to rhetoric, which is not a science. Cf. LeBlond, Logique et Méthode chez Aristote, 31-42 for a discussion of the problems in the area of induction, and of Aristotle's own ambiguities in his treatment of them.

\(^{14}\) Rhetoric, I, 1,3-4. Regarding induction, "It is more convincing and clear: It is more readily learned by the use of the senses and is applicable generally to the mass of men, though reasoning (deduction) is more forcible and effective against contradictory people." Topics, I, xii, 16-19. "You should display your training in inductive reasoning against a young man, in deductive against an expert." Ibid., VIII, xiv, 13-14. "In dialectics, syllogism should be employed in reasoning against dialecticians, rather than against the crowd: induction, on the other hand, is most useful against the crowd." Ibid., VIII, ii, 1-3.
signs."15 In their starting points, therefore, enthymemes differ from demonstrative syllogisms, which begin from absolute first principles or premises which are derived from them. The enthymeme functions in rhetoric as the deductive syllogism functions in science.

By "probabilities" Aristotle means generally approved propositions, for example, "the envious hate," or "the beloved show affection."16 A sign, however, is not a general proposition, but a fact that is significative of some other fact.17 It can be an effect which may have been produced by a given cause, though it may also have been produced by some other cause. Another type of

15 Prior Analytics, II, xxvii, 10. The Greek is συλλογισμὸς ἐκ εἰκότων καὶ σημείων. Solmsen in "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," 39, notes that in Aristotle the enthymeme becomes more than a stylistic device. "It is, in fact, a rhetorical syllogism."

16 Ibid., II, xxvii, 6-7. In Prior Analytics, I, viii, Aristotle distinguishes at greater length between necessary and probably propositions.

17 Ibid., II, xxvii, 7-9. The usual word used by Aristotle for a probable "sign" is σημείον. This is opposed to τεκμήριον, which is an infallible sign or proof of some other fact. Solmsen, 306, asserts that rhetorical arguments based on τεκμήρια are valid enthymemes, even though they do not originate from only probable premises. He justifies this stand by the fact that the most frequently used rhetorical premises are not infallible, but only probable. This interpretation seems reasonable, since an argument from τεκμήρια cannot be classified in another way than as an enthymeme. It has not the universality or necessity required of scientific demonstration.
sign used by the orator is the example. This is an historical occurrence which is applied by analogy to an actual situation, or it may be fictitious.  

Etymologically, the word "enthymeme" means a "putting into one's mind," therefore a suggestion. And, in fact, the real character of the enthymeme is its suggestive, but non-conclusive character. It is so called, as Seaton points out, because the premises, even if expressed in full, would not be sufficient to "enforce the conclusion which is pointed at," that is, a certain conclusion about a fact, such as a man's guilt. The conclusion again can never exceed the probability of the premises.

Modern logicians have come to regard the enthymeme as a syllogism with one or more premise missing. Aristotelian authorities, in view of Rhetoric I, II, 13, where Aristotle says that

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18 In Aristotle's theory, reasoning from examples in rhetoric corresponds to induction in science. He concentrates on the enthymeme because he regards it as a better form of argumentation in itself than rhetorical induction through example. The latter may be more suasive when presented to immature audiences. (Cf. Note 14). But a good enthymeme is capable of reaching higher probability. Hence it is the orator's best argumentative tool, even though he might not be wise to use it in every case, due to the limitations of his audience. The best practice, of course, is to combine and vary the two methods of argument.

19 Grant, Aristotle, 81.

often απλά it is generally agreed that suppression of one or more premises is not a necessary characteristic of the Aristotelian enthymeme. Its essential note, as Aristotle's definition indicates, is rather that of a syllogism drawn from probable causes and signs.

After these remarks on the enthymeme, it is possible to consider another significant Aristotelian advancement in rhetorical theory, which is his treatment of the *topoi* or "places," according to the word's literal meaning. Regarding rhetoric, it can have a number of meanings. First of all, as Aristotle's predecessors used the word, the *topoi* were rhetorical commonplace sayings and formulas which were to be used in definite situations to build up or tear down a case, or whatever else had to be done in a given speech situation. In a second meaning they can be general principles which may serve as major premises in a rhetorical syllogism. In this usage they would resemble axioms of a science, such as geometry, from which reasoning is made.

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21 Among these are Solmsen, Simonson, Seaton, and Jebb.

22 The English translations of τόπος as "places" or "commonplaces" are not accurate. Therefore we shall retain the word *topoi*, as many authors do.

23 The various meanings of *topoi* before and after Aristotle are discussed by Donnelly, Francis P., "Lane Cooper, The Rhetoric of Aristotle," Classical Journal, XXVII (1931-1932), 694-697.
Aristotle went beyond these notions of **topoi**. He "conceives the topos as a 'type' or 'form' of argument of which you need grasp only the basic structural idea to apply it forthwith to discussions about any and every subject."\(^{24}\) The abstractive aspect of Aristotle's **topoi** is obvious in that they are independent of any subject matter of content. A study of the four general **topoi** illustrate their purely abstractive and structural nature.\(^{25}\)

In addition to the more general **topoi**, so called because of their wider applicability, Aristotle assembles another set of 28 more particular **topoi**. They are so called because they are more subtle, less widely applicable, and because they require greater acuteness and dialectical subtlety.\(^{26}\)

From what has been said about argumentation, it is clear that Aristotle demands much of an orator if he is to attain mastery of argument. But in addition to the technical knowledge of argumentation, there are many other things outside rhetoric proper...
that the speaker must know. 27 A few of these requirements we can briefly summarize.

The deliberative orator addresses the assembly to exhort or dissuade fellow citizens toward or away from some course of action, depending on whether it is seen as advantageous or injurious to the state. 28 He must know the finances, foreign relations, defenses, commerce, and legal system of his state, along with the pertinent facts of each case. Study of political constitutions and works of historians also is very valuable. He should grasp as well various relationships involving the good and expedient, as well as the greater and lesser good. 29

The epideictic orator praises or blames for the purpose of honoring or dishonoring someone. Such an orator should know what is truly noble and virtuous. He should be master of the ways of praise, the encomium, and the means of bringing about the effect he desires in the audience. 30

27 The Classical tradition of oratory, from Plato or Quintilian, demanded of the orator a broad background of general knowledge. Cf. Cooper, The Rhetoric of Aristotle, intro. xxv.

28 The three types of speeches are distinguished in Rhet., I, iii.

29 Rhet., I, iv, 8-13; v-viii.

30 Ibid., I, ix.
The forensic orator is concerned with accusation or defense in the courts. His purpose is to employ his oratorical skill so that justice is done and injustice avoided. The forensic orator should study the causes of human action and what constitutes matter for blame; the nature of pleasure and its importance as a motive of wrong-doing; the moods in which men most often do wrong; what it means to be wronged; the distinction between positive law, natural law, and equity; comparison of wrongs and the means of magnifying a crime. Finally he should know how to use the non-artistic means of persuasion and minimize their value when they injure his cause. 31

Up to this point attention has been given to the first of Aristotle's three principal technical means of persuasion. The more practical and less theoretical second book of the Rhetoric is devoted to the other two--audience emotion or disposition, and transmission of the speaker's character.

Aristotle, as has been said, realizes that there is more to oratory than clear and logical argumentation. "The speaker must not merely see to it that his speech shall be convincing and persuasive, but he must give the right impression of himself, and

31 Ibid., I, x-xv.
get his judge (audience) into the right state of mind . . . It is highly important that the speaker should evince a certain character.\textsuperscript{32}

How does the speaker evince a certain character? By showing that he is competent in what he is talking about, that he is a man of virtue, and that his chief concern is for the good of his hearers. Thus he will appear as a man of intelligence, character, and good will.\textsuperscript{33} In other words, he will show a character or personality such that a reasonable audience cannot help but trust him.

As for favorable emotional disposition in an audience, Aristotle realistically admits its importance. "The same thing does not appear the same to men when they are friendly and when they hate, nor when they are angry and when they are in gentle mood; in these different moods the same thing will appear either wholly different in kind, or different as to magnitude."\textsuperscript{34} The orator, therefore, must be familiar with the gamut of human emotions, "those states which are attended by pain and pleasure, and which,

\textsuperscript{32}Ibid., II, 1, -3-4.
\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., II, 1, 5-7.
\textsuperscript{34}Ibid., II, 1, 4.
as they change, make a difference in our judgments."\textsuperscript{35} This knowledge will give him further means of persuasion subsidiary to logical arguments. "The study of these emotions enables him to color his speech with his own character in a desirable way, and to give the color he desires to the persons and their acts that are dealt with in his speech. This study also throws light on the nature of the audience, their emotions, the ways of utilizing these emotions as they are, or of arousing or allaying them."\textsuperscript{36}

In short, effectiveness in speech is conditioned by knowledge of the souls of those to whom the speech is addressed.

Aristotle in the second book of the \textit{Rhetoric} characteristic-\underline{a}ly undertakes a detailed analysis of fourteen human emotions. Regarding each, he considers the mental state of the person under the emotion, the persons toward whom they tend to experience the emotion, and what causes commonly arouse the emotion. Finally the emotion's utility to the speaker and the means of dissipating

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., II, 1, 8.

\textsuperscript{36} Cooper, \textit{The Rhetoric of Aristotle}, 131, note.
it if unfavorable to him are investigated. 37

Following this treatment, Aristotle next takes up different types of audiences. The speaker must be familiar with these differences in order to adjust his arguments to the various audience levels and interests. Accordingly Aristotle shows in very shrewd analysis the characteristics of the young, the old, and those in the prime of life. He also indicates how character is modified by fortune, and how wealth and power influence character. 38 The remainder of Book II is taken up with a discussion of the enthymeme and the particular topoi, which have already been treated.

Book III of the Rhetoric is comparatively brief. It is a summary of practical rules dealing with the style, diction, and use of words within the speech itself.

Here it suffices to mention several of the more general

37 Rhet., II, ii-xi. Gompers, IV, 436, suggests that Aristotle's exhaustive treatment of emotions "goes far beyond the end in view." This treatment, he writes, was motivated by "the Platonic ideal of that art as set forth in the Phaedrus; and secondly the wish, cherished no less warmly by him than by his master, to separate the new exposition of rhetoric as widely as possible from the old empirical methods and routine wisdom."

38 Ibid., II, xii, xviii.
principles. 39 One of these is that of good style. This could, in fact, be called the subject of Book III. "Style (λόγος) to be good must be clear, as is proved by the fact that speech which fails to convey a plain meaning will fail to do just what speech has to do. It must also be appropriate, avoiding both meanness and undue elevation; poetical language is certainly free from meanness, but it is not appropriate to prose." 40 In the earlier Poetics Aristotle had said that style "to be good must be clear and free from meanness. The style which uses only common or proper words is in the highest degree clear; at the same time it is mean," that is, not appropriate to cultivated expression. 41

Clear and appropriate style does not call attention to itself. It is a vehicle for the speaker to express his thoughts and his facts, no less than the desired emotional tone and character.

The speaker's own good taste will prevent him from going to

39 We can say with Gomperz, IV, 448: "In dealing briefly with these precepts (of Book III) we do not offend against the author's intentions; for he placed the matter of speeches far above their form, and described the care which is expended on the latter as almost a necessary evil."

40 Rhetoric, III, ii, i.

41 Poetics, XXII.
stylistic excesses of ornamentation or to a coarse and plebeian style of speaking. He will avoid, too, similar extremes of prolixity and curtness. Good style, therefore, will be a mean. It will be "made agreeable by the elements mentioned, namely by the good blending of ordinary and unusual words, and by the persuasiveness that springs from appropriateness."42

It would be erroneous to suppose that appropriateness only pertains to use of language. It relates to the whole manner of delivery, which must express emotion and character proportionate to the subject. Thus if an outrage is in question, the speaker's manner will convey indignation. In a shrewd observation, Aristotle cites the need for such appropriateness. "It will make people believe in your facts. In their souls they infer, illegitimately, that you are telling the truth, because they, in a like situation, would be moved in the same way as you are; accordingly, even when the facts are not as the speaker says, the audience think he is right. Indeed, they are always in sympathy with an emotional speaker even when there is nothing in what he says; and that is why many an orator tries to stun the audience with sound and fury."43

42 Rhet., III, xii, 6.
43 Ibid., III, vii, 4-5.
Similes, their use and formation; metaphor, the basic stylistic device of oratory; prose dignity and rhythm, and the structure of a periodic sentence are some components of appropriate style. As for the traditional parts of speech, a good proem should state the speech's purpose clearly, arouse or allay prejudice, and engage or divert the hearer's attention if necessary. The speaker should use the epilogue to leave behind a favorable final impression of himself, to magnify and minimize the arguments which help or hurt him, and to make a final appeal to audience emotions. An adroit recapitulation of the entire speech will also serve the orator's cause.

Aristotle ends his Rhetoric with an apt epilogue in the form of an asyndeton: "I have done; you all have heard, you have the facts; give your judgment." 44

44Ibid., III, xix, 6.
CONCLUSION

Before going on to analyze Homer's speeches, it would be instructive to recall the reasons for studying Aristotle's theory of rhetoric. Principal among these was to find in his work an objective foundation or criterion for criticizing Homer's speeches. Along with this, a sketch of Greek academic oratory indicated the general historical setting of Aristotle's Rhetoric.

The question, then, naturally suggests itself: what type of criterion does the Rhetoric suggest? In other words, what is the Aristotelian picture of the ideal orator?

We have seen that Aristotle placed rhetoric on a philosophical foundation, which, in the main, consists of his logical system, his theoretical and practical psychology, and his ethics. Aristotle's orator, accordingly, must be a master of argument. In addition, he must know men thoroughly. He must accept the limitations and responsibilities which the moral law imposes on him.

The orator's purpose, Aristotle says, is persuasion. This means that he induces his hearers to judge correctly through the use of apt rhetorical means of persuasion. These are three: argumentation, emotion, and ethos.

Aristotle, however, did not place these three means of persuas-
sion on an equal footing. Primary always is argumentation. By relating argumentation to his logical system, Aristotle systematized it. His interest in this means of persuasion, however, indicates that his concept of persuasion was that of an appeal primarily to the audience's intellects, not to their emotions. This notion of persuasion is distinctly Aristotelian.

We now turn our attention to finding out how Homeric oratorical practice compares and contrasts with the Aristotelian theory just studied.
PART TWO

RHETORIC IN HOMER
INTRODUCTION TO PART II

"But that which is beyond everything distinctive not of Greece only, but Homeric Greece, is that along with an outline of sovereignty and public institutions highly patriarchal, we find the full, constant, and effective use of the two great instruments of government, since and still so extensively in abeyance among mankind; namely, publicity and persuasion."¹

In this study it will be necessary to forego studying the political institutions of Homer's world and the light thrown on them by the Iliad's many speeches, their occasions and circumstances. What matters to us is that the Homeric age was a period of history in which the gift of public speaking was highly prized. The period's ideal man, the hero, was a man who was looked up to not only because he was a superior warrior, but because he was a commanding orator in the assemblies as well. According to one scholar, "oratorical ability was considered on a par with prowess in battle. The combination of the two made the ideal Homeric

Homer himself pays his highest tribute to fine oratory through the words of Odysseus. Speaking of the accomplished orator, Odysseus says, "His hearers behold him with delight; he speaks with tempered modesty, yet with confidence in himself; he stands preeminent among the assembled people, and while he passes through the city, they gaze on him as on a god."  

In the same speech, Odysseus enumerates the three great gifts of the gods to man—corporeal beauty, strength and bearing (φυτή); judgment or good sense (Φρόνεια), and the power of discourse (Φωνητικός).

As one reads Homer's epics he comes upon excellent speeches, and audiences who are capable of appreciating them. For example, in the eleventh book of the Odyssey, as Odysseus was speaking, dead silence fell on all, and they were spellbound throughout the shadowy halls.  

One can hardly be surprised at such an audience response. "Nor is it possible that in any age there should be in

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2 Smith, Gertrude, "Homer Orators and Auditors," Classical Journal, XXI (February, 1926), 359. Phoenix, we remember from Iliad, IX, 443, taught Achilles to be a "speaker of words and a doer of deeds."

3 Odyssey, VIII, 170-3. Some other pertinent Homeric Loci are Iliad, 1, 290; 111, 726-32; 1X, 37; XIII, 729.

a few a capacity for making such speeches, without a capacity in many for receiving, feeling, and comprehending them." In other words, to attempt to persuade people who are incapable of being persuaded would be pointless.

The orator, in fact, must conform his practice to what will move his audiences. So the basic argument regarding Homeric oratory runs this way: "As when we find the speeches in Homer, we know that there must have been men who could speak them, so, from the existence of units who could speak them, we know that there must have been crowds who could feel them." The crowds were "childlike, and alert to good speech." This is suggested by the number of times the Homeric audiences are either closely attending or spontaneously shouting out their approval at a good speech. Such reactions are only to be expected in debate contexts of parliamentary or deliberative nature, where strong characters clash through the medium of spoken words. In such a context most of Homer's orators deliver their speeches.

5 Gladstone, Ill, 107.
6 Ibid.
7 Smith, "Homeric Orators and Auditors," 355-57.
8 Ibid., 357-58.
A convenient way to divide the Iliad's speeches is according to their degree of emotional intensity. This is usually inversely proportionate to their logical coherence. Accordingly, M. Delaunoix proposes four categories into which most of Homer's speeches can be placed: the "plan psychologique désordonné"; the "plan psychologique légèrement ordonné"; the "plan de simple logique"; and the "plan logique plus étudié." According to M. Delaunoix, most of Homer's speeches fall into the first class. They show almost no purely logical coherence or progression. The unity is rather psychological, since the speaker is carried along by intense emotion, which dictates what he says and how he says it.

In the second class, speeches still display a preponderance of emotional stress. But present too is a rudimentary logical structure, as well as some divisions of thought and distinctions of language.

The orator of the third class is not laboring under emotional stress of any kind. His ideas follow a natural and rational pattern, but without any subtle rhetorical arrangement or idea to speak of. His speech is orderly, without being systematised as many speeches were to become in later Classical times.

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9 Delaunoix, Marcel, "Comment Parlent les Héros d'Homère," Les Études Classiques, XX (January, 1952), 84-90.
The fourth class of speeches is also present in Homer, although more rarely than the first three types. These speeches are more consciously rhetorical. Present in embryo are the three traditional divisions of a speech—exordium, statement, argument, and conclusion—which grounded the model structure of later academic speeches.

We shall now consider samples of each class in the following analyses.
SPEECH TEXTS FOR CHAPTER I (Second Part)
1, 131-147 AGAMEMNON'S ATTACK ON ACHILLES
"μὴ δὴ σὺν ἰστός, ἀγαθός περ ἐὼν, θεοεκέλει Ἄχιλλε, κλέπτε νῦν, ἐπεὶ οὐ παρελεύσεις οὐδὲ με πείσεις. ἦ θέλεις, δόρρ' αὐτὸς ἔχεις γέρας, αὐτὰρ ἐμ' ἀδών ἕσοδεν, κέλει δὲ με τὴν ἀποδύνας; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν δόσουσι γέρας μεγάλης Ἀχαιοι, ἀραίτες καὶ θυμὸν, ὅπως ἄνταξιον ἔσται· εἰ δὲ κε μὴ ὀφείλοι, ἐγώ δὲ κεν αὐτὸς ἔλομαι ἢ τεῦν ἢ Λαυτος ἰῶν γέρας, ὣ 'Οδυσσεός ἀξώ ἑλών· ο δὲ κεν κεχολώσεται ὅν κεν ἱκώμαι· ἀλλ' ἢτοι μὲν ταῦτα μεταφρασόμεσθα καὶ αὑτόν, νῦν δ' ἄγε μή μέλαιναν ἐρώσσομεν εἰς ἅλα διαν, εὖ δ' ἐρέτας ἐπιτίθεσθαι ἄγερομεν, ἐς δ' ἐκατόμβην θείομεν, ἄν δ' αὕτη Χρυσῆθα καλλιπάρρην βήγομεν εἰς δὲ τις ἀρχὸς ἄνὴρ βουληθέρος ἔστω, ἦ Αἴας ἦ 'Ιδομενέως ὣ διὸς 'Οδυσσεύς ἢ ἰὲ σὺ, Πηλείδη, πάντων ἐκπαγλότατ' ἄνθρωπον, δόρρ' ἢμῶν ἐκάργον ἠλάσσεαι ἠρὰ λέξας."
I, 131-147 AGAMEMNON'S ATTACK ON ACHILLES

"Not that way, good fighter though you be, godlike Achilleus, strive to cheat, for you will not deceive, you will not persuade me. What do you want? To keep your own prize and have me sit here lacking one? Are you ordering me to give this girl back? Either the great-hearted Achaians shall give me a new prize chosen according to my desire to atone for the girl lost, or else if they will not give me one I myself shall take her, your own prize, or that of Alas, or that of Odysseus, going myself in person; and he whom I visit will be bitter. Still, these are things we shall deliberate again hereafter. Come, now, we must haul a black ship down to the bright sea, and assemble rowers enough for it, and put on board it the hecatomb, and the girl herself, Chryseis of the fair cheeks, and let there be one responsible man in charge of her, either Alas or Idomeneus or brilliant Odysseus, or you yourself, son of Peleus, most terrifying of all men, to reconcile by accomplishing sacrifice the archer."
1, 149-171 ACHILLES' DEFENSE
"ος μοι, αναδείηη  ἐπειμένε, κερδαλεόφρον, πῶς τὰ τοι πρόφρων ἔπεσεν πελάθται Ἀχαιῶν ἢ ὅδιν ἐδέχεσθαι ἢ ἀνδράσιν ὑφί μάχεσθαι; οὔ γάρ ἐγώ Τρόών ἐνεκ' ἡλιθον ἀχμητῶν δειρὸ μαχητήμενος, ἐπεί οὔ τι μοι αἰτιοὶ ἐσον ὅπερ πό τὸν ἔμας βοῦς ἠλασαν οὖδὲ μὲν ἦποιος, οὔδὲ ποτ' ἐν θύμῃ ἐρμηθάλαιῳ βωτιανεῖρη καρπὸν ἐδηλήσαντ', ἐπεί ἡ μάλα πολλά μεταξὺ οὐρεά τε σκίσατα δάλασα τε ὀχύρωσιν ἀλλὰ σοι, ὦ μέγ' ἀναδείη, ὦπ' ἐσπόμεθ', ὅφρα σὲ ἁλίρης, τιμῆν ἀριστέμενοι Μενελάος σοι τε, κυνώτα, πρὸς Τρώον' τῶν οὔ τι μετατρέπῃ οὔθ' ἀλεγίζεισ' καὶ δὴ μοι γέρας αὐτού ἀφαιρήσεσθαι ἀπειλεῖς, ὃ ἐπὶ πόλλα ἐμάμημα, δόσαν δὲ μοι ὅτε Ἀχιλῆς. οὐ μὲν σοι ποτὲ ἵσον ἔχω γέρας, ὅπερ' Ἀχιλῆς Τρώων ἐκπέρρωσιν' εὐ ναυμένου πτολεόρον' ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πλεῖον πολυάκιος πολέμοιο χεῖρες ἐμαὶ διέπουσ', ἀτὰρ ἤν ποτὲ δασμός ἱκνηται, σοὶ τὸ γέρας πολὺ μείζον, ἐγώ δ' ἄλλον τοίχων τε ἔρχομ' ἔχουν ἔπι νῆσας, ἐπεὶ κε κάροι πολεμίζουν. νῦν δ' ἐμί θυμῷ', ἐπεί ἡ πολὺ φέρτερον ἔστιν οὖκαδ' ἤμεν σὺν νησὶ κορωνίσων, οὖδὲ σ' ὅδόν εὐθάδ' ἀτιμος ἐδών ἄφενος καὶ πλούτου ἀφώξειν."
I, 149-171 ACHILLES' DEFENSE

'O wrapped in shamelessness, with your mind forever on profit, how shall any one of the Achaians readily obey you, either to go on a journey or to fight men strongly in battle? I for my part did not come here for the sake of the Trojan spearmen to fight against them, since to me they have done nothing. Never yet have they driven away my cattle or my horses, never in Phthia where the soil is rich and men grow great did they spoil my harvest, since indeed there is much that lies between us, the shadowy mountains and the echoing sea; but for your sake, o great shamelessness, we followed, to do you favour, you with the dog's eyes, to win your honour and Menelaos' from the Trojans. You forget all this or else you care nothing. And now my prize you threaten in person to strip from me, for whom I laboured much, the gift of the sons of the Achaians. Never, when the Achaians sack some well-founded citadel of the Trojans, do I have a prize that is equal to your prize. Always the greater part of the painful fighting is the work of my hands; but when the time comes to distribute the booty yours is far the greater reward, and I with some small thing
yet dear to me go back to my ships when I am weary with fighting.
Now I am returning to Phthia, since it is much better
to go home again with my curved ships, and I am minded no longer
to stay here dishonoured and pile up your wealth and your luxury.
CHAPTER I

QUARREL

Most of the orators in Book I speak under the influence of anger or indignation. Achilles' pent-up resentment against Agamemnon and the latter's jealousy of Achilles overflow in a series of short, but decisive speeches. In this chapter we shall limit our attention to Achilles' crucial speech of defense and accusation, and to the exchanges leading up to it.¹

In the opening book of the Iliad, Agamemnon demonstrates a knack for angering people, such as he never shows again. His first words, spoken to Chryses, priest of Apollo, are uncouth taunts and insults. Although the Achaeans in assembly had "cried out in favor" of the old man,² Agamemnon, in sharp contrast, harshly drove him away with a strong order upon him."³

¹Iliad, I, 149-171.
²Ibid., I, 22.
³Ibid., I, 25. The king's impudence towards Chryses is most fully expressed in lines 26-32.
In answer to Chryses' appeal, Apollo promptly visits the Greeks with nine days of death-dealing plague. On the tenth day Achilles, prompted by Hera, calls an assembly of the Achaeans. His suggestions for ending the plague are sincerely and respectfully made. Let the seer Calchas reveal the true cause of Apollo's anger.¹

Calchas knows the reason for the Greeks' sufferings. But before he reveals it, he makes sure of Achilles' protection. His words mirror the awkwardness the old seer feels before the king and the assembly. He intimates that what he has to say is going to offend the king himself. But before getting on to the unpleasant business, he has to pause to moralize in general terms about kings burying the hatchet, only to take it up at a later date.²

In these few lines Calchas offers the king and assembly a half-excuse for asking Achilles' protection. Furthermore, the change of pace shows the old man's wish to divert his hearer's attention away from what he had just said about offending the king.³

¹The Greeks regarded Apollo as the god of health and sickness.
²Ibid., I, 80-83.
³Finsler thinks these three lines show Calchas' deep-seated fear of Agamemnon which goes back to the sacrifice of Iphigenia at Aulis. Finsler, Georg. Homer. 3 vols. Leipzig, 1918, II, 13.
The seer's use of maxims is also sound oratorically. As Aristotle says, "The use of maxims is suited to speakers of mature years, and to arguments on matters in which one is experienced... for a maxim invests a speech with moral character." And so, by speaking in general terms, Calchas simultaneously takes attention away from himself, defends himself in a way that no one can object to, and reminds his hearers that he is a wise man.

Achilles promises to protect Calchas, "even if you mean Agamemnon, who claims now to be far the greatest of all the Achaeans." Calchas, reassured, tells the cause of the plague with unvarnished directness.

Agamemnon is the first in the assembly to lose his temper. But he does not lose his head. His defense is artful. Calchas is called a "seer of evil," who never did Agamemnon any good.

7Rhetoric, II, xx1, 9; 16.

8Iliad, 1, 91. Seymour and Anthon agree that ἅρπαγμα εἶχεν should not be rendered as "boasts to be," but "claims to be (profitetur esse)." Anthon, Charles. The First Six Books of Homer's Iliad, N.Y., 1870, and Seymour, Thomas D. The First Six Books of Homer's Iliad, N.Y., 1889. Note to lines 89-91. Seymour, II, 14, adds "The Homeric heroes were always frank of speech."

9Ibid., I, 106-120.

10Ibid., I, 105-108. "Some ancients thought this referred to the seer's words at Aulis, where he showed that Artemis demanded the sacrifice of Agamemnon's daughter Iphigenia in return for a proud word of the king." Seymour, 16.
Thus doubt is immediately thrown on Calchas' impartiality and motives. Furthermore, the king's anger itself is an oratorical device. Indignation is effective, "whether to support a case or upset it," when the arguments for the speaker's case are weak or few in number."11 Such is Agamemnon's position here.

The king proceeds at once to belittle the seer's charge, as the words ἵνα νῦν and ὅς ὑπήσονται.12 Then, after indulging his liking for irony, he suddenly changes about and states plainly his reason for sending Chryses away. The fact of the matter is simply that he wants Chryses for himself.13 This is the core of his defense.

Agamemnon at this point may have noticed unfavorable reaction in the assembly at this selfish and peremptory demonstration of personal interest over the good of the army. He interrupts his explanation to say, "I myself desire that my people be safe, not perish."14 In view of what follows, this avowal rings a bit hollow.

11 Rhet., II, xxiv, 4.
12 Iliad, 1, 109-112. "Agamemnon speaks only of the rejection of the ransom, not of the slight offered to the priest; but gives prominence to the odious charge that he, their king, was the cause of the suffering of the Danai." Seymour, 16.
13 Ibid., 112-116. The words γάρ ὅτα ("For, you see," ) introduce Agamemnon's attempt at justifying his choice of Chryses.
14 Ibid., 1, 117.
low. The king concludes by making another selfish proposal. Honor, he claims, demands that if Chryseis must be surrendered, she should be replaced by another prize.15

Homer artfully suggests what Achilles is thinking at this point. He is angry, but self-controlled. His dissatisfaction with the king is contained in the only abusive epithet he uses in this speech.16 Agamemnon is "most lordly, greediest for gain of all men." But Achilles goes no further than this. The remainder of the short speech very sincerely and respectfully points out that all the prizes have been distributed. But if the king will wait, he will be richly rewarded when Troy falls.

Agamemnon's reply, on the other hand, is blunt and insulting. It beautifully characterizes a man of power, who has had one of his blunders exposed, but must at all costs save face by parading his power. The king's main oratorical device is, as one would expect, anger and indignation.

131-2. In a direct statement, Agamemnon ironically (μὴ ὁν δὲ τυγώς) assures Achilles that he is not putting anything over on him.

15 Ibid., I, 118-20.

16 Ibid., 122-9. His question beginning with μή (123) implies the absurdity of the proposition. Aristotle says that questions are effective "when you are about to show that your opponent contra-
dicts either himself or what people believe." Rhet., III, xvii, 3.

17 Iliad, 131-45.
The words ἄγαθός and θεοείκειαι are ironic compliments, as their position between μὴ δὴ οὖνες and κλέπτε νόος brings out. So too, νόος with κλέπτε suggests cunning instead of intelligence. This in itself is "an accusation most hateful to the outspoken Achilles."18

133-4. In an apt change of pace, "Agamemnon asks Achilles directly if he expects the king to sit idly by, the only Greek without a prize, while the others enjoy theirs. The clumsy and ambiguous sentence mirrors Agamemnon's anger.19

135-9. Enough insinuation for the present, Agamemnon thinks ἄλλος. He will now make his proposal. The first alternative is advanced in 135-6. The breakoff is very effective, foreshadowing the ominous ἄλλος μὴ δύναμιν of line 137. In the next line, however, the king directs another insult at Achilles by mentioning him first of the Greek chiefs after the pompous ἄνδρα μὴν αὐτὸς ἐλεγὼ in 1937. Agamemnon seeks to complete his intimidation of the Greek chiefs by adding parenthetically, "going myself in person:

18 Seymour, 18.

19 "Agamemnon, in a passage remarkable for its large number of broken, three-part lines, which suggest the labored breathing of an angry man, thrusts aside the protests of Achilles and hints at an ulterior, dishonorable motive on his part." Clark, Frank Lowry, A Study of the Iliad in Translation, Chicago, 1927, 22.
and he whom I visit will be bitter."\textsuperscript{20} The third future form 
\(\mu\epsilon\chi\omicron\alpha\omicron\lambda\acute{\omicron}\varsigma\alpha\tau\) appropriately and prophetically suggests that the
king's victim will be bitter for a long time to come.

140-7. Agamemnon now makes another change around. Realizing
he has gone too far, he seeks, as Calchas did, to divert atten-
tion from his indiscretion. So he turns to the practical plan to
follow, though now without taking one more slap at Achilles in the
process. He suggests certain Greek chiefs as likely leaders of
the embassy of reconciliation to Chryses. They are Ajax, Idomen-
eus, Odyseus, or perhaps, last but not least, "you yourself, son
of Peleus, most terrifying (ἐκκαγλότατο) of all men."\textsuperscript{21}

Agamemnon's provocative speech oscillates from extremes of
relative calm to heated anger. His arguments are at best lame. He
had to rely on sham argumentative devices of indignation and at-
tributed motives to cover up his weak case.\textsuperscript{22} He is guilty too of
slighting the essential point of the situation, namely his insult-

\textsuperscript{20} I, 139. The repetitions in this passage show the speaker's
excitement. Moreover, it "is in accordance with the character of
early eloquence, where the main idea is continually brought for-
ward and dwelt upon," Anthon, 150.

\textsuperscript{21} I, 146. Anthon, 151, thinks that ἐκκαγλότατος is not meant
ironically, but is rather "a surly admission of the possession of
distinguished qualities."

\textsuperscript{22} Cf. Rhet., II, xxiv, 4, and II, xxiii, 20.
ing a priest of Apollo. In its place, he hangs his case on his irrelevant desire for Chryseis. Finally, there is his fallacious post hoc, ergo propter hoc attributing of collusion to Achilles and Calchas. 23

Achilles, we may imagine, loses no time in getting to his feet. The insinuations touching the honesty of his motives, Agamemnon's blind selfishness, the threat to expropriate his legally-won prize, and the last mentioned sneer—all these combine to infuriate him. Yet in his reply, he must redeem his honor, turn the assembly against the king, and humble Agamemnon as far as he can. His speech, therefore, is what Aristotle would call a forensic speech, whose end is to secure justice and redress injustice by means of accusation and defense. 24

149-51. Achilles' opening words, ἢ μοι, are words of one "stung with indignation." 25 His anger emerges in two powerful abusive epithets, followed by an exasperated question to Agamemnon. The king is called ἄναιδείην ἐπιειμέναν καὶ μαρδαλέορον, "clothed in

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23 These last two sham arguments are treated in Rhet., II, xxiv, 6 and 8.
24 Ibid., I, 111.
25 Anthon, 151.
shamelessness," and "with a fox's greedy temper," that is, mixed with cunning and avarice. Achilles' epithets are well chosen to point up the "bad and ugly side of a thing," namely Agamemnon's avarice. Furthermore, they are effective because "a third source (of abuse) lies in the use of long, or untimely, or crowded (epithets)."

Achilles immediately poses a question which amounts to: "How can you possibly expect any of the Achaeans to obey you?" The deliberative, shocked, and incredulous tone of the question is pointed up by the subjunctive μαίνεται. Here to Achilles begins to identify himself with the other Achaeans, saying not μὴς ἐγὼ μαίνεται, but μὴς τῶν ἀχαιῶν by which he means "any one of us Achaeans." His question also is an indirect accusation of shortsightedness and exorbitant demands, made more convincing because it is in question form and naturally invites the audience response, "That's right, how can you?"

In line 151 Achilles drives home

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26 Paley, F.A. The Iliad of Homer. 2 vols. London, 1871, I, 13. Recall that already in line 122 Achilles had called Agamemnon ὕπερταγοντας. Seymour, note to line 149, suggests that ὑπερ-ταγοντας Achilles seeks to insinuate that the king wants to rob him in his absence of what he lacks courage to take in his presence.

27 Rhet., III, 11, 14; III, 11, 3.

28 Ask a question, Aristotle says, "when (your opponent) cannot meet your question save by an equivocal answer." Rhet., III, xviii, 4.
the point by concretely depicting the dangerous missions that all must undertake at the behest of this same tyrant, Agamemnon.

152-7. Achilles breaks off this line at once, brings the argument back to himself, and gives the first reason why Agamemnon has wronged him. The words οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ οὖν amount to: "I do not deserve to be threatened in this way." Consequently, Achilles' first effort is to play up Agamemnon's debt to him and all the Greek chiefs, while prescinding from Agamemnon's regal power. But if he stated in so many words that he came to Troy solely to help Agamemnon, the king would laugh in his face. So Achilles establishes the point by proving the impossibility of its opposite—that he is fighting because of a grudge against the Trojans. They never harmed him, stole from him, or destroyed his crops, Achilles says. Finally, what could he possibly have against men who live so far from Pthia? 30

157-60. After establishing in this way the king's indebtedness to him, Achilles is prepared to make his big point. We can

29 Paley, 13. This is Achilles' working premise. His arguments say equivalently, "I have been treated unjustly. Since I am profiting nothing from the war, I may as well go home." Aristotle would call this an argument of simple consequences. Rhet., II, xxiii, 14.

30 This is an argument from induction, As aristotle describes it in Rhet., II, xxiii, 11.
imagine him to pause then point his finger directly at the king himself as he says: "ἀλλὰ οοί --We followed you all the way to Troy merely to fight for you and redeem your honor." The triple repetition of the you form in lines 158-9 emphasizes the personal favor all the chiefs are doing for Agamemnon (ἀλλὰ οοί · · δίφα σοῦ καίρης · · Ἐνελάω οοί τε). Then in line 160 the you forms drop out and we are left with only the verb forms as Achilles seeks to emphasize no longer the person of the king, but his unappreciative scorn and indifference.

161-171. Achilles now moves from Agamemnon’s unappreciative ness toward all the chiefs to the injustice he has suffered himself. The words in line 161, καὶ δὴ μοι γέρας αὐτῶς, serve both as a transition and a vehicle for irony. They are equivalent to, "Not only are you utterly lacking in appreciation. Now you in


32 The epithet ἄυυυαμα reinforces Achilles’ point and shows his undisguised scorn for Agamemnon. "The dog was with the ancients the type of impudence and shameless effrontery," Anthon, 153. This also may be an effective way to make use of a possible canine characteristic of the king’s face. As Aristotle says, "the speaker may identify a man’s actual qualities with qualities bordering on them." Rhet., I, ix. The last point is admittedly conjectural.
person are going to rob me of my lawful prize. “33 This is unjust Achilles argues, for three reasons. First, he worked so hard for it (162); second, the sons of the Achaeans awarded Briseis to him (162); and third, because Agamemnon as king always (163-4) gets the lion’s share of booty anyway whenever a Trojan town is captured. In this way Achilles strengthens his own case and his bonds with the other Achaeans.

The last reason mentioned suggests to Achilles another contrast between himself and the king, which will register very favorably with the assembly. It comes down to this. “I do a major portion of the fighting. But Agamemnon gets the major portion of the loot, while I go home, weary from battle, with my meager prize.” The contrast here masterfully repeats per modum unius the three arguments stated above in a way that cannot but win sympathy. Precisely why this is so will be clear presently.

169-71. Achilles judges that he has made his point and won his hearers. Now it is time to state simply that he is going home, which he does. In these lines he unifies the speech and justifies his extreme decision by recalling its two-fold cause: he is

33Note the position of ἄνατος, following στὸς γεγονὸς and preceding the strong verb ἀνατριχίζω as further bringing out the king’s arbitrary and rapacious unfairness.
dishonored here at Troy and his efforts only make the king richer.

We have only begun to bring out the close-packed and outstanding rhetorical qualities of this short speech of only 22 lines. It is beyond question the finest speech of the quarrel scene.

The speech clearly is more than a crude vilification of Agamemnon. Yet it succeeds in "getting to" him, as his reply to Achilles indicates. Still, since this is a forensic speech, the audience must also be taken into account. The reason is that "producing the right attitude in the hearer is more important in forensic oratory."34 More particularly, "one must, by means of the speech, bring the judges into the state of those who are irascible and must represent the adversary as obnoxious in those things which make men angry, and as the sort of person who arouses anger."35

How well does Achilles accomplish these purposes? We have already noted the epithets and initial question (149-51) as suitable expressions of Achilles' anger. They also give Agamemnon a taste of his own medicine.36 But perhaps the most important ora-

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34 Rhet., II, 1, 4.
35 Ibid., II, 11, 27.
36 Aristotle says, "Another way (to fight a personal attack) is to meet calumny with calumny." Ibid., III, xv, 7.
torical function of these lines is to arrest audience attention. Here is a soldier chief beginning his speech by openly insulting the king himself! The other epithets in lines 153 and 154 also serve the same audience-attention purposes, along with indicating how much Achilles is being carried away by his anger.37

We have noted Achilles' various moves to gain his audience's sympathy by identifying his and the soldier's interests over against the king's. But we have not as yet mentioned his ethos, or character considered as a means of persuasion. In this case, ethos is of great moment, simply because Achilles is Achilles, the hero among heroes. He takes advantage of his stature by reminding his hearers of it, and thus indirectly makes the king look bad by contrast.38

In order to justify his decision to return home without losing his honor and gaining the hostility of the Achaeans, Achilles must exaggerate the wrong done to him and arouse the pity and indignation of his audience.

37A deeper grasp of Achilles' state of mind can be had by reading Aristotle's treatment of slights and insults as causes of anger in Rhet., II, 11, 3-8. Aristotle also suggests how the suddenness of Agamemnon's insults must have affected Achilles, when he writes in II, 11, 11, "A man is angered by a result that runs counter to his expectation; for the pain is greater in proportion to the surprise."

381, 153, 162, 165-6.
Aristotle suggests several means of exaggerating wrongs suffered. We will apply only three of these. First, "the speaker may say that the wrong-doer has subverted or transgressed many ties of justice . . . so you multiply the one wrong into many."39 Achilles does this by generalizing. In line 163 he says, "whenever δειλότ' the Achaeans sack a Trojan city . . ." And in line 166: "Whenever the distribution comesατάρ ἢ πολε δανομῶς θηται . . . ."

Aristotle's second means of exaggerating wrongs is stated in the principle, "Wrongs are greater in proportion as they bring excessive disgrace upon the victims."40 In line 171 Achilles poses as utterly disgraced. The simple, oblique statement makes it all the more difficult to refute or disbelieve.

Achilles makes telling use of another of Aristotle's ways of exaggerating wrongs: "And a wrong is the greater if it is done to a benefactor; here the wrong-doer is guilty in more than one way—he wrongs his man, and he fails to return the benefit."41 Throughout his speech, Achilles shrewdly prescinds from the Achaeans'

39 Rhet., I, xiv, 5.
40 Ibid., I, xiv, 6.
41 Ibid.
self-interests at Troy. He solemnly avers that he and his fellow chieftains came to Troy only to help out the king. They are the king’s benefactors in the fullest sense of the word.

Further oratorical skill is evident from Achilles’ use of facts familiar to the soldiers which favor him and put the king in a proportionately bad light. It is a fact that Achilles has nothing against the Trojans. It is a fact that Agamemnon has himself threatened to expropriate Achilles’ lawfully acquired prize. It is fact that he has fought long and hard at Troy, that the Achaeans rely on him in battle, that Agamemnon as king gets a greater share of every booty haul than anybody else, and that Achilles’ share is small in comparison.

Besides citing facts, he groups them. In line 167, for example, Agamemnon’s large shares of booty are contrasted with his own small prizes.

Yet another device for arousing audience sympathy and indignation is to pose as defenseless against an aggressor. This Achilles does from 161 to 168, in a sudden and effective change of attitude from the more accusational first section. He cites an experience that all the men present are familiar with — the

\[42\] In I, ix, 7, Aristotle defines indignation as "pain at the sight of undeserved ill fortune."
What is more, Achilles pictures himself returning home with his  ὀξίγονον, his own little prize. All present know the feeling, and perhaps are reminded in this indirect way of Agamemnon’s lion shares.

Mention must be made of Achilles’ concrete and vivid language. In line 151, for example, the incongruity of obeying the ingratitude of Agamemnon is heightened by the soldiers’ “going on (dangerous) reconnaissances or fighting hand to hand with the enemy” for him. In line 152, Achilles avers that he is not fighting Trojans in general, but Trojan spearman, whom all present have faced. Lines 154-58 are extraordinarily vivid, and perhaps serve to arouse a passing sentiment of homesickness in more than a few present. In line 164, the Achaeans do not merely "pick up some loot" but "sack some well-walled city." Everybody knows the risks involved in that operation. In line 165-6, Achilles says, "my hands bear the brunt of the see-saw battles," instead of "I am in the fore-

43 Aristotle says, "It is when suffering seems near to them that men pity." Rhet., II, viii, 13.

44 I, 167. Leaf suggests that the idea is probably close to Touchstone’s "a poor thing but mine own." Leaf, Walter, The Iliad, 2 vols., London, 1886, I, 12. The phrase is a bit sentimental, but effective because used only once and placed within a phrase. As a result, it does not call undue attention to itself.
front," or some phrase equally vague. Achilles realizes that
grimness is secured . . . by putting things directly before the
eyes of the audience. 45

Our last remarks on this speech have to do with its last
line. It is a miniature epilogue, reiterating the main point of
the speech, that Achilles has been badly treated. This is obliquely
stated, however, in a participial phrase of two words. As a
result, primary emphasis falls on the king's avarice and his arbi-
trary manipulation of Achilles, and thus indirectly of the other
Achaeans.

45 Rhet., III, 11, 2.
"χαόρ', Ἀχιλῆς ὁ δαίτης μὲν ἔλατος οὐκ ἐπιδεινεῖς ὑμᾶς ἐνδὲ καὶ ἱεράν ἐν ὀρือ τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἀτρέδαο

τὸ καὶ ἐνδέχεται πάρα γὰρ μεσοικὰ πολλὰ ἀλλοῦ ἀς ἐπιράτου ἔργα μέμηλεν, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ μέγα πήμα, διοστρέφει, εἰσοροπεῖς ἐν δειμων ἐδειμαί ἡ ἀπολέσθαι νόμος ἐφυκέλμους, εἰ μὴ σὺ γε δύσεις ἄλκην. ἕγγος γὰρ ἕκεν καὶ τείχεος ἀλλών ἔθετο Τραῖν ὑπέρθυμοι τηλεκελείτο τῷ ἐπίκουροι, κηδέμενοι πυρὰ πολλὰ κατὰ στρατόν, οὐδ' ἔτι φασὶ σχῆσεσθ' ἀλλ' ἐν ηὐσὶ μελαίησις πεσεύσθαί.

Ζεύς δὲ σφήνι Κρονίδης ἐνδέχεται σῆματα φαίνων ἀστράπτει "Εκτὸς μὲν γέγα σθενεὶ βλεμμαίων μαλάντα εὐπάγλος, πίστους Δία, οὐδ' τί τείχε πεδαῖς οὐδέ δειμων' κρατήρι' δὲ ἐλύτσα ἑδύκεν. ὁράται δὲ τάχιστα φαινέμενα Ἡλίος δι' αὐτὰς τ' ἐμπρύσεν μαλεφοὶ πυράς, αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλῆς ὁμώνων παρὰ τῆς ὀρωμομένος ὑπὸ καπνοῦ. ταῦτ' αὐτός δεδοίκα κατὰ φρένα, μὴ οἱ ἀπειλὰς ἐκτελεῖσθαι τούτου, ἵματ' ἐδ' ἐκ αὐτομόν εἰς φύλασθαι εἰ ἰπρήθαι ἐν Ἀργοὶ ὕπποβότοιο. ἀλλ' ἀν, εἰ μεροῦς γε καὶ ὅψε περ νόμος Ἀχιλῆς
teiromένους ἐρύεσθαι ὑπὸ Τραῖν ὅμμαγδον. αὐτῷ τοις μετόπιοι' ἄχος ἔσσεται, οὐδ' τι μήχος ἐκθέτεις κακοῦ ἐστὶ ἄχος εἰρείς' ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρὶν φράζεις ὅποι δαγιοὶς ἀλέξάσεις κακοῦ ἡμαρ. ὁ πέπον, ἡ μὲν σοι γε πατῆρ ἐπετέλεσε Πηλέος ἡμᾶς τῷ ὅτε σ' ἐκ Φώιης 'Ἀγαμέμνονος πέμπετε' τέκνον ἔμει, κάρτος μὲν Ἀθηνᾶ τε καὶ "Πηρ ὁσσὺν', τι κ' ἐδέλλωσι, σὺ δὲ μηγαλητορα θυμὸν ἵσχειν εἰ στήθεσσιν' φιλοφροσύνη γὰρ ἀμέλειών' ληγέμενα δ' ἐρᾶς κακομυχάνου, ὄφρα σε μᾶλλον τῶσο 'Ἀργείων ἢμέν νεοὶ ἱδὲ γεφωντες.' ὃς ἑπετελλ' ὁ γέρων, σὺ δὲ λήθαι' ἀλλ' ἐτί καὶ μὴν παῦε', ἐα δὲ χόλων θυμαλγία' σοι ὑ' Ἀγαμέμνον' ἀξὴ δῶρα δίδωσι μεταλλήζαιν χόλοιο. εἰ δὲ σὺ μὲν μεν ἁκοῦσο, ἐγὼ δὲ κεῖ τοι καταλέξω ὄςσα τοι ὑ πλασίαν ὑπέλαχετο ῥόρ' Ἀγαμέμνωνν ἐπ' ἀπύρους τρίποδας, δέκα δὲ χρυσοῦ τάλαντα, αἴωνας δὲ λέββαται εἰςκοςι, δώδεκα δ' ἐπούς πηγοὺς ἀδολοφόρους, οἱ ἄθλια τοσσίων ἀρουτο.
οὐ κεν ἄλλος εἰς ὁνήμ φό τόσα γένοιτο,
οὗτε κεν ἄκτημιν ἐριτρίμοιο χρυσοῦ, 
όποι Ἀγαμέμνονος ἔποιε ἀέβλια ποσαίν ὄρους, 
ὡς τί ἐπτά γυναικάς ἀρκέων ἔργα ἱώματος,
Λεοβίδας, ὡς ὦτε Λέσσβου εὐκτιμώμην ἔλες αὐτὸς 
ἐξελθόμενος, ὥστε τάς κάλλες ἐνίκος φύλα γυναικῶν,
τάς μέν τοι δώσει, μετὰ δὲ ἐσσηται ἢ τοῖ τῇ ἀπήρᾳ,
κοῦρη Ἀρτεμίδος ἐπὶ δὲ μέγαν ὄρκου ὁμείται 
μη ποτὲ τῆς εὐνυῆς ἐπιβρίηται ἢ δὲ μεγήναι,
ἢ θέμις ἐστίν, ἁναξ, ἢτ' ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν.
ταῦτα μέν αὐτίκα πάντα παρέσεται· εἰ δὲ κεν αὐτὲ 
ἂντα μέγα Πρώμοιο θεοὶ δόσοι· ἀλαπάζαι,
εἴ μᾶλλον χρυσοῦ καὶ χαλκοῦ νηγασθοῦν

eἰστελθῶν, ὦτε κεν δαπεδοῦσα λῆθ᾽ Ἀχαιοὶ,
Πρωτίδας δὲ γυναικὰς εἶκοσαὶ αὐτὸς ἔλεσθαί,
αἰ κε μετ᾽ Ἀργεῖν τοὺς ἐλένην καλλιστὰς ἔσων.
εἰ δὲ κεν Ἀργοὺς ἴκαλμήθ᾽ Ἀχαίκων, οὐδὰρ ἀρούρης,
γαμβρὸς κεν αἱ ἔοις· τίσει δὲ σε ἰσον Ὀρέστη,
ὅσοι τιμύγες τρέψεται θάλη ἐνι πολλῆ.

τρεῖς δὲ αἱ εἰσὶ θυγατρὲς εἰς μεγάρῳ ἑυπήκτῳ,
Χρυσόθεμοι καὶ Λαοδίκη καὶ Ἰφιάνασσα,
τῶν ἤν κ᾽ ἔδωρον φίλην ἀνάδεικνυν ἀγεσθαί 
πρὸς οἴκον Πηλῆος· ὃ δ᾽ ἀνὰ ἐπὶ μελία δῶσει 
πολλὰ μᾶλλ᾽ ὅσα, ὅσα δ᾽ ὅ τι σε εἰ ἐπέδωκεν θυγατρί· 
ἐπὶ δὲ τοι δῶσει εὐ ναϊμενα πτολέμεθα,
Καρδαμύλην Ἑυώπην τε καὶ Ἰρῆν ποιῆσαν 
Φηρᾶς τε ζειδέας ἢ Ἰανδείαν βαθύλειμοι,
καλὺν τ᾽ Ἀπίσκον καὶ Πήδασον ἀμπέλδεσαν.
πάσαι δ᾽ ἐγγύς ἅλος, νέαται Πᾶκον ἡμαθόντος· 
ἐν δ᾽ ἄνδρες ναούντες πολύληπνες πολυβουθύται,
οὐ κε σε διώτιςμεν θεῶν ὡς τιμήσουσι 
καὶ τοι ὑπὸ σκήπτρῳ λιπαράς τελέσουσι θέμιστας.

ταῦτα κε τοι τελέσειες μεταλλήζασίν, χόλοια,
εἰ δέ τοι Ἀτρέδης μὲν ἀπόχθετο κηρύθη μάλλον,
αὐτὸς καὶ τοῦ δώρα, ὅδ᾽ ἀλλοὺς περ Παιαναῖον 
τειμομένους ἐξέαρε κατὰ στρατῶν, οὐ σε θεῶν ὡς 
tίσουσι· ἣ γὰρ κε σοφὶ μᾶλα μέγα κύδος ἀροῖο.

νῦν γὰρ χλ Ἔκτορ ἔλοις, ἐπεὶ ἄν μάλα τοι σχεδὸν ἐλθοῖ 
λόγοιν ἔχων ἄλοιμ, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ὅτι φησὶν ὁμοίον 
οἱ ἐμείναι Δαναῶι, οὐς ἐνθάδε νηκὲ ἐνεικαν."
IX, 225-306 ODYSSEUS' SPEECH

"Your health, Achilleus. You have no lack of your equal portion 225
either within the shelter of Atreus' son, Agamemnon,
nor here now in your own. We have good things in abundance
to feast on; here it is not the desirable feast we think of,
but a trouble all too great, beloved of Zeus, that we look on
and are afraid. There is doubt if we save our strong-benched vessels 230
or if they will be destroyed, unless you put on your war strength.
The Trojans in their pride, with their far-renowned companions,
have set up an encampment close by the ships and the rampart,
and lit many fires along their army, and think no longer
of being held, but rather to drive in upon the black ships. 235
And Zeus, son of Kronos, lightens upon their right hand, showing them
portents of good, while Hektor in the high pride of his strength
rages irresistibly, reliant on Zeus, and gives way to no one
neither god nor man, but the strong fury has descended upon him.
He prays now that the divine Dawn will show most quickly, 240
since he threatens to shear the uttermost horns from the ship-
 sterns, to light the ships themselves with ravening fire, and to cut down
the Achaians themselves as they stir from the smoke beside them.
All this I fear terribly in my heart, lest immortals
accomplish all these threats, and lest for us it be destiny
to die here in Troy, far away from horse-pasturing Argos.

Up, then! If you are minded, late though it be, to rescue
the afflicted sons of the Achaeans from the Trojan onslaught.

It will be an affliction to you hereafter, there will be no remedy
found to heal the evil thing when it has been done. No, beforehand
take thought to beat the evil day aside from the Danaans.

Dear friend, surely thus your father Peleus advised you
that day when he sent you away to Agamemnon from Phthia:
"My child, for the matter of strength, Athene and Hera will give it
if it be their will, but be it yours to hold fast in your bosom
the anger of the proud heart, for consideration is better.
Keep from the bad complication of quarrel, and all the more for
this the Argives will honour you, both their younger men and their
elders."
So the old man advised, but you have forgotten. Yet even now
stop, and give way from the anger that hurts the heart. Agamemnon
offers you worthy recompense if you change from your anger.

Come, then, if you will, listen to me, while I count off for you
all the gifts in his shelter that Agamemnon has promised:
Seven unfired tripods; ten talents' weight of gold; twenty
shining cauldrons; and twelve horses, strong, race-compétitors
who have won prizes in the speed of their feet. That man would not be poor in possessions, to whom were given all these have won him, nor be unpossessed of dearly honoured gold, were he given all the prizes Agamemnon's horses won in their speed for him. He will give you seven women of Lesbos, the work of whose hands is blameless, whom when you yourself captured strong-founded Lesbos he chose, and who in their beauty surpassed the races of women. He will give you these, and with them shall go the one he took from you, the daughter of Briseus. And to all this he will swear a great oath that he never entered into her bed and never lay with her as is natural for human people, between men and women. All these gifts shall be yours at once; but again, if hereafter the gods grant that we storm and sack the great city of Priam, you may go to your ship and load it deep as you please with gold and bronze, when we Achaians divide the war spoils, and you may choose for yourself twenty of the Trojan women, who are the loveliest of all after Helen of Argos. And if we come back to Achaian Argos, pride of the tilled land, you could be his son-in-law; he would honor you with Orestes, his growing son, who is brought up there in abundant luxury. Since, as he has three daughters there in his strong-built castle, Chrysothemis and Laodike and Iphianassa,
you may lead away the one of these that you like, with no bride-price, to the house of Peleus; and with the girl he will grant you as dowry many gifts, such as no man ever gave with his daughter. He will grant you seven citadels, strongly settled:

Kardamyle and Enope and Hire of the grasses,
Pheral the socratesanct, and Antheia deep in the meadows,
with Alpeia the lovely, and Pedasos of the vineyards.
All these lie near the sea, at the bottom of sandy Pylos,

and men live among them rich in cattle and rich in sheepflocks,
who will honour you as if you were a god with gifts given
and fulfill your prospering decrees underneath your sceptre.
All this he will bring to pass for you, if you change from your anger.

But if the son of Atreus is too much hated in your heart,
himself and his gifts, at least take pity on all the other Achaillans, who are afflicted along the host, and will honour you as a god. You may win very great glory among them.

For now you might kill Hektor, since he would come very close to you with the wicked fury upon him, since he thinks there is not his equal among the rest of the Danaans the ships carried hither.
IX, 308-429 Achillēs' Reply to Odysseus
“... Δαιρτιάνη, πολυμήχαν’ Ὅδυσσε, ἔχοντες ὁ μὲν ὅπόθεν ἀπηλεγόντας ἀποπειρεύσθαι, ἥς ἡ δὲ φρονέω τε καὶ ὅς τετελεσμένου ἐστιν, ὥς μοι μοι τρύπημεν παρῆπτεν ἄλλοθεν ἄλλοθεν.

ἐχθρὸς γὰρ μοι κείνος ὁμοίος Ἀλθαο πῦρσος ὁ δὲ ἔτερος μὲν κεδὸθ ἐν φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἶπε. ἀυτὰρ ἐγὼν ἐρώτα καὶ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀριστα’ ὃτ’ ἔμεγ’ Ἀτρείδην Ἀγαμέμνονα πεινέμεν ὅων ὁδὴ ἄλλους Δαναούς, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἄρα τις χάρις ἔχει μᾶρωσθαι δῆλοιν ἐπ’ ἀνδράσι νολεμὲς αἰεί. Ἡ τὴν μοῦρα μένοντι, καὶ εἶ ὁ μᾶλα τις πολεμίζοι’ ἐν δὲ ἑ γι’ τιμὴ ἥμεν κακός ἢ δὲ καὶ ἐσθόλος’ κάταβαν’ ὁμοίος τ’ ἄρ’ ἀρείας ἄνθ’ ὅ τ’ ἐπεὶ πάλαι ἄλγεα θυμῷ, αἰεὶ ἐμὴν ψυχὴν παραβιάσαμεν πολεμίζετεν. ὥς δ’ ὅρος ἀπέηει νεοσσοῦτι ὑποκέφαστ’ μάστακ’, ἐπεὶ κε λάβησα, κακῶς δ’ ἄρα οῖ πέλει αὐτῇ, ὡς καὶ εἶχ’ πολλὰς μὲν ἄντιπποι νῦκτας ῥανοῦ, ἕμετα δ’ ἀλματέσθησα διέπθησαν πολεμίζετεν,

ἀνδράσι μαρνάμενοι ὄμοιοι ἐκεῖ σφετεράνως.

δώδεκα δὴ σὺν ἡμοὶ πόλεις ἀλάπας’ ἀνθρώπων, πεῖσε δ’ ἐνδεκά φημε κατὰ Τροήν ἐρίζωλον τάος ἐκ πασέων κεκηλία πολλὰ καὶ ἐσθόλα ἐξελοῦμεν, καὶ πάντα πέροις Ἀγαμέμνονος δόσκον Ἀτρείδην’ ὃ δ’ ὅποιε οὖ οἶκοι παρὰ ἡμοὶ δῆσιν δεξάμενοι διὰ παύρα δασάκετο, πολλὰ δ’ ἠέχοσκεν. ἀλλὰ δ’ ἀριστήσασθε δίδου γέρα καὶ βασιλεύσεις, τοῦτο μὲν ἐμείδα κεῖται, ἐμεί δ’ ἀπὸ μοῦνον ’Αχαιῶν εἰλετ’ ἔχει δ’ ἀδοχὸν θηράμει’ τῇ παραφάνει τερπέσθω. τὶ δὲ δεῖ πολεμίζετεν Τρώεσσιν Ἀργείους; τὶ δὲ λαῶν ἄμηγαγεν ἐνθάδ’ ἀγέλας Ἀτρείδης; ὡς Ἐλένης ἕνεκ’ ἡμικόμου; ἦ μοῦνοι μιλέων’ ἀλέχος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων Ἀτρείδης; ἐπεὶ οὐς τις ἄν’ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐξέφρων τὴν αὐτοῦ μιλέει καὶ κῆσται, ὡς καὶ οὐ τὴν ἐκ ὕμων μιλέων, δουρικτητὴν περ ἐσώτερα.

καὶ δ’ ἐπεὶ ἐκ χειρῶν γέρας εἰλετο καὶ μ’ ἀπάτησε, μὴ μεν πειράτων εἰ εἰδότας’ ὅδε με πείτε. ἂλλ’ Ὅδυσσε, σοῦ σοι τε καὶ ἄλλους καὶ βασιλεύσεις φρασέθως μῆσεσιν ἀλλεξέμεναι δῆσιον πῦρ...

μὲν δ’ ἐπεὶ ἐκ χειρῶν γέρας εἰλετο καὶ μ’ ἀπάτησε, μὴ μεν πειράτων εἰ εἰδότας’ ὅδε με πείτε.

ἄλλ’, Ὅδυσσε, σοῦ σοι τε καὶ ἄλλους καὶ βασιλεύσεις φρασέθως μῆσεσιν ἀλλεξέμεναι δῆσιον πῦρ...

μὲν δ’ ἐπεὶ ἐκ χειρῶν γέρας εἰλετο καὶ μ’ ἀπάτησε, μὴ μεν πειράτων εἰ εἰδότας’ ὅδε με πείτε.

ἄλλ’, Ὅδυσσε, σοῦ σοι τε καὶ ἄλλους καὶ βασιλεύσεις φρασέθως μῆσεσιν ἀλλεξέμεναι δῆσιον πῦρ...

μὲν δ’ ἐπεὶ ἐκ χειρῶν γέρας εἰλετο καὶ μ’ ἀπάτησε, μὴ μεν πειράτων εἰ εἰδότας’ ὅδε με πείτε.
αλλ' οὖν δις θυσιάζω σύνεος Ἐκτόρος ἀνδροφάνους
 ἱσχιν' ὄφρα δ' ἐγὼ μετ' Ἀχαιοίσιν πολέμιζον
 οὐκ ἔθλεσε καί χάριν ἀπὸ τέχνης ὅρμυμεν Ἐκτόρος,
 ἀλλ' ὅσον ἐς Σκαίδας τε πόλας καὶ φηγὸν ἰκανεν'
 ἔνθα ποτ' οἴον ἔμμυε, μόγις δέ μεν ἐκφυγεν ὅρμυμιν. 355
 νῦν δ' ἐπεί οὐκ ἔθλεσεν πολέμιζέμεν' Ἐκτόρο τίθ',
 αἰθριον ὅρα διὰ ρέξας καὶ πᾶσι θεοῖς,
 μηχανας εὐ μήσας, ἔπνευ ἀλαδε πρεσεῦσων,
 ὅνεα, ἢν ἐξέλησα καὶ αἱ κώ τοι τὰ μεμήλη,
 ἢμι μᾶλ' Ἐλλήσποντον ἐπ' ἱχθυόντα πλεούσας
 νήσας ἐμάς, εὖ δ' ἀνδρας ἐρεσσέμεναι μεμαίτας:
 εἶ δὲ κεν εὐπλαίην δόῃ κλείτον ἑμνοῦσαῖος,
 ἠμαίκε κε τριτᾶτῳ Φώτῳ ἔρβαλαν ἱκοῖμην.
 ἐστὶ δὲ μοι μάλα πολλά, τὰ κάλλιτον ἐνθάδε ἔρρων'
 ἄλλον δ' ἐθυγάδις ἤρων καὶ χαλκὸν ἐρυθων 360
 ἣδε γυναῖκας εὐξύνων πολιῶν τοι κύδηρουν
 ἀδόρας, ἀστ' ἐλαχῶν γε' γέρας δέ μοι, ὡς περ ἐδωκε,
 αὕτης ἐφιμηθετών ἐλευτερὸν ἔρχεν Ἀκαμήμων.
 Ἀτρέδης' τῷ πάντῃ ἄγορειμεν, ὡς ἐπιτέλλω,
 ἀμφαδῶν, ὄφρα καὶ ἄλλοι ἐπησκύνουται 'Ἀχαιοί,
 εἰ τιμὴ ποὺς Ἀκαμήμων ἐτί ἐπέτατε ἐξαπατήσας,
 αἱν ἀναίδειτο ἐπιεικείας οὔδ' ἂν ἔμοιγεν
tετλεις κόκεια περ ἐὼν εἰς ἀπά θεό
 οὔδὲ τι οἱ βουλῆς συμμπάσσομαι, οὔδὲ μὲν ἔργουν
 ἐκ γὰρ δὴ ἡ' ἀπάτης καὶ ἥλιεαν' οὔδ' ἄν ἐγ' αὕτης 375
 ἐξαπάθος' ἐπέεσσων ἀλις δέ οἳ ἀλλὰ ἐκήλογ
 ἐρέμα' ἐκ γὰρ εὐ φρένας ἐλευτερος Ζεὺς.
 ἔχρωδ δέ μοι τοῦ δώρα, τί νὰ μῦ ἐν καρός αλη,
 οὔδ' εἶ μοι δέκασι τέ καὶ οἰκοσάκης τόσα δοιῃ
 ὅσα τέ οἴ ν ἔστι, καὶ εἰ πολέν ἄλλα γένους,
 οὔδ' δ'(ἐ δὲ Ὀρχομενδ' ποτιδάσσεται, οὔδ' ὡς Ῥάβας
 Λεγέττας, δόλι πλείομα δόμοις ἐν κτῆματα κεῖται,
 αἱ θ' ἐκάτωπυλος εἰςι, διηκόσιοι δ' ἄν' ἐκάστας
 ἀνέρες ἐξοιχεύειν σὺν ὑποσιν καὶ ὄχεσφιν
 οὔδ' εἶ μοι τόσα δοίῃ δοσα ψάμαθος τε κώνις τε,
 οὔδ' κέν δὲ θαῦμα ἐμὸν πεισει 'Ἀγαμήμων,
 πρὶν γ' ἀπὸ πᾶσαν ἐμὸν ὠμοὶ θυμαλγεί λάβην,
 κοίρης δ' οὐ γαμέω 'Ἀγαμήμωνος Ἀτρέδαις,
 οὔδ' εἰ χροσείη 'Ἀφροδίτη κάλλος ἐρίζων,
 ἔργα δ' 'Ἀθηναίη γλαυκώπιδι Ισιφαρίζου' 390
 οὔδε μὴν ὡς γαμέω' ὃ δ' Ἀχαίων ἄλλον ἐλέσθω,
 ὡς τις οἴ τ' ἐπέοικε καὶ ὃς βασιλέυτερὸς ἑστιν.
 ἦν γὰρ δὴ με σώσω θεοὶ καὶ ὀκιαδ' ἵκωμαι,
 Πηλεῖς δὴ μοι ἐπείτα γυναῖκα γε μᾶστενα ἀυτός.
 πολλαὶ 'Ἀχαιότες εἰσίν ἀν' 'Ελλάδα τε Φώτην τε,
 κοίρας ἀριστήσων, οἵ τε πολλόθρα ῥύονται,
 τάον ἦρ' χ' ἐξέλωμεν φίλην ποιήσαμε οἴκουν.
 ἔσα ὅδ' μοι μάλα πολλών ἐπέσυντον θυμός ἀγήνωρ
 γῆμαντι μεσοτήν ἀλοχον, ἔκειναν οἴκοιν,
κτήμασι τήρησαν τὰ γέραν᾽ ἐκτήσατο Πηλέως.
οὗ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ψυχῆς ἀυτάξιον οὖν ἀπὸ φαινὼν Ἰλιου ἐκτήσατο, εὗ ρακόμενον πτολεόροιν,
τὸ πρὶν ἐπ᾽ εὐρήμησι, πρὶν ἐλέοιν νίας Ἀχαιῶν,
οὔτε ὅσα λαῖνος νιύδος ἀφήτορος ἑτοῦς εὐρείς,
Φοῖβοι Ἀπόλλωνος, Πυθῶν ἔνει πετρήσεσθε.
λῃστοι μὲν γὰρ τε βόες καὶ ἱφια μῆλα,
κτητοὶ δὲ τρίποδες τε καὶ ἵππων οὐδὰ ἄρνη.
ἀνδρός δὲ ψυχὴ πάλιν ἠλθέων οὔτε λείστη
οὗτ᾽ ἐλετή, ἐπεὶ ἀρ κεν ἀμέσεσται ἔρκος ὦδοντων.
μήτηρ γὰρ τε μὲ φητὶ θεᾶ Θέτις ἄργυρόπεζα
δικαθάλας κήρας φερέμεν θανάτου τέλοςθε.
εἴ μὲν κ' ἀδικό μένων Τρώων πάλιν ἀμφιμάχομαι,
ὁλετό μὲν μοι ρόστος, ἀτὰρ κλέος ἀφθίτου ἔσται:
εἴ δὲ κεν οὐκαὶ ἵκομι φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν,
ὁλετό μοι κλέος ἐσθλῶν, ἐπὶ δηρόν δὲ μοι αἰῶν
ἐστεναι, οὐδὲ κέ μ' ὦκα τέλος θανάτου κινεῖν,
καὶ δ' ἄν τοὺς ἀλλούσιν ἐγὼ παραμυθησάμην
οὐκαὶ ἀποπλέειν, ἐπεὶ οὐκέτι ἄγετε τέκμορ
Ἰλιου αἴπεινής μίλα γὰρ ἔδει εὐφράτα Ζεῦς
χείρα ἐν ὑπερέσχε, τεθαραῦκας δὲ λαοῖ,
ἀλλ' ὅμεις μὲν λούτες ἀμφισμόσου Ἀχαιῶν
ἀγγελίαν ἀπόφασθε—τὸ γὰρ γέρας ἐστὶ γεράντων—
ὅφρ' ἄλλην φράζωται ἐν φρέσι μῆτιν ὀμέλιον,
ἡ κέ σφιν χάσε το σόφο καὶ λαῶν Ἀχαιῶν
ὑποῦσιν ἕπι γλαφυρῆς, ἐπεὶ οὖ σφυιῶν ἦδε γ' ἔτομη,
ἡ νῦν ἐφράσσατο ἐρεί ἀπομυτίσσατος
'Οφρ' αὖτα παρ' ἀρμι μένων κατακαυμηθῆτο,
ὅφρα μοι ἐν νηέσσι φιληρῳ ἐς πατρίδ' ἔπηται
αἴριον, ἢν ἐθέλησεν' ἀνάγκη δ' οὖ τί μιν ἀξω."
IX, 308-429 ACHILLES' REPLY TO ODYSSEUS

'Son of Laertes and seed of Zeus, resourceful Odysseus:
without consideration for you I must make my answer,
the way I think, and the way it will be accomplished, that you may not
come one after another, and sit by me, and speak softly.
For as I detest the doorways of Death, I detest that man, who
hides one thing in the depths of his heart, and speaks forth another.
But I will speak to you the way it seems best to me: neither
do I think the son of Atreus, Agamemnon, will persuade me,
nor the rest of the Danaans, since there was no gratitude given
for fighting incessantly forever against your enemies.
Fate is the same for the man who holds back, the same if he fights hard.
We are all held in a single honour, the brave with the weaklings.
A man dies still if he has done nothing, as one who has done much.
Nothing is won for me, now that my heart has gone through its
afflictions in forever setting my life on the hazard of battle.
For as to her unwinged young ones the mother bird brings back
morsels, wherever she can find them, but as for herself it is suffering,
such was I, as I lay through all the many nights unsleeping,
such as I wore through the bloody days of the fighting,
striving with warriors for the sake of these men's women.
But I say that I have stormed from my ships twelve cities of men, and by land eleven more through the generous Troad. From all these we took forth treasures, goodly and numerous, and we would bring them back, and give them to Agamemnon, Atreus' son; while he, waiting back beside the swift ships, would take them, and distribute them little by little, and keep many. All the other prizes of honour he gave the great men and the princes are held fast by them, but from me along of all the Achaeans he has taken and keeps the bride of my heart. Let him lie beside her and be happy. Yet why must the Argives fight with the Trojans? And why was it the son of Atreus assembled and led here these people? Was it not for the sake of lovely-haired Helen? Are the sons of Atreus alone among mortal men the ones who love their wives? Since any who is a good man, and careful, loves her who is his own and cares for her, even as I now loved this one from my heart, though it was my spear that won her. Now that he has deceived me and taken from my hands my prize of honour, let him try me no more. I know him well. He will not persuade me. Let him take counsel with you, Odysseus, and the rest of the princes how to fight the ravenous fire away from his vessels. Indeed, there has been much hard work done even without me; he has built himself a wall and driven a ditch about it,
making it great and wide, and fixed the sharp stakes inside it. 350
Yet even so he cannot hold the strength of manslaughtering
Hektor; and yet when I was fighting among the Achaians
Hektor would not drive his attack beyond the wall's shelter
but would come forth only so far as the Skaiian gates and the oak tree
There once he endured me alone, and barely escaped my onslaught.
But, now I am unwilling to fight against brilliant Hektor,
tomorrow, when I have sacrificed to Zeus and to all gods,
and loaded well my ships, and rowed out on to the salt water,
you will see, if you have a mind to it and if it concerns you,
my ships in the dawn at sea on the Hellespont where the fish swarm
and my men manning them with good will to row. If the glorious
shaker of the earth should grant us a favouring passage
on the third day thereafter we might raise generous Phthia.
I have many possessions there that I left behind when I came here
on this desperate venture, and from here there is more gold, and
red bronze,
and fair-girdled women, and grey iron I will take back;
all that was allotted to me. But my prise; he who gave it,
powerful Agamemnon, son of Atreus, has taken it back again
outrageously. Go back and proclaim to him all that I tell you,
openly, so other Achaians may turn against him in anger
if he hopes yet one more time to swindle some other Danaan,
wrapped as he is forever in shamelessness; yet he would not, bold as a dog though he be, dare look in my face any longer. I will join with him in no counsel, and in no action.

He cheated me and he did me hurt. Let him not beguile me with words again. This is enough for him. Let him of his own will be damned, since Zeus of the counsels has taken his wits away from him. I hate his gifts. I hold him light as the strip of a splinter.

Not if he gave me ten times as much, and twenty times over as he possesses now, not if more should come to him from elsewhere, or gave all that is brought in to Orchomenos, all that is brought in to Thebes of Egypt, where the greatest possessions lie up in the houses, Thebes of the hundred gates, where through each of the gates two hundred fighting men come forth to war with horses and chariots; not if he gave me gifts as many as the sand or the dust is, not even so would Agamemnon have his way with my spirit until he has made good to me all this heartrending insolence.

Nor will I marry a daughter of Atreus' son, Agamemnon, not if she challenged Aphrodite the golden for loveliness, not if she matched the work of her hands with grey-eyed Athene; not even so will I marry her; let him pick some other Achaian one who is to his liking and is kinglyer than I am. For if the gods will keep me alive, and I win homeward,
Peleus himself will presently arrange a wife for me.

There are many Achaian girls in the land of Hellas and Phthia, daughters of great men who hold strong places in guard. And of any one that I please I might make my beloved lady.

And the great desire in my heart drives me rather in that place to take a wedded wife in marriage, the bride of my fancy, to enjoy with her the possessions won by aged Peleus. For not the value of my life are all the possessions they fable were won for Ilion, that strong-founded citadel, in the old days when there was peace, before the coming of the sons of the Achaians, not all that the stone doorsill of the Archer holds fast within it, of Phoibos Apollo in Pytho of the rocks. Of possessions cattle and fat sheep are things to be had for the lifting, and tripods can be won, and the tawny high heads of horses, but a man's life cannot come back again, it cannot be lifted nor captured again by force, once it has crossed the teeth's barrier.

For my mother Thetis the goddess of the silver feet tells me I carry two sorts of destiny toward the day of my death. Either, if I stay here and fight beside the city of the Trojans, my return home is gone, but my glory shall be everlasting; but if I return home to the beloved land of my fathers, the excellence of my glory is gone, but there will be a long life.
left for me, and my end in death will not come to me quickly.
And this would be my counsel to others also, to sail back home again, since no longer shall you find any term set on the sheer city of Ilion, since Zeus of the wide brows has strongly held his own hand over it, and its people are made bold.

Do you go back therefore to the great men of the Achaians, and take them this message, since such is the privilege of the princes that they think out in their minds some other scheme that is better, which might rescue their ships, and the people of the Achaians who man the hollow ships, since this plan will not work for them which they thought of by reason of my anger. Let Phoinix remain here with us and sleep here, so that tomorrow he may come with us in our ships to the beloved land of our fathers, if he will; but I will never use force to hold him.
CHAPTER II

THE EMBASSY

The difficult errand of conciliation upon which Odysseus, Ajax, and Phoenix are dispatched in Book IX presents an occasion for two remarkable speeches, to which we now turn. They are Odysseus' plea to Achilles to return to the fight before Troy, followed immediately by Achilles' vehement refusal.

Since the speech situation here differs from the rapid and intense dramatic buildup of the Quarrel Scene in Book I, our method of treatment will differ. First to be considered will be Odysseus' speech in lines 225-306—its argumentative structure, psychological shrewdness, and its concrete and vivid qualities.

The speech presents a comparatively clear succession of arguments. Odysseus' first problem is to move from the cordial toast to Achilles with which he opens his speech to the main business at hand. This he accomplishes through an antithesis between the plentiful feast to which the three legates have been treated and the imminent destruction soon to be wrought at the Greek camp by
IX, 225-306 ODYSSEUS' SPEECH
SPEECH TEXTS FOR CHAPTER II
The disproportion aspect of the argument is carried on as Odysseus makes two final points; all Achilles has to do is to return to the fight and he will be loved as a god; finally, he will have within easy grasp the long desired and heretofore elusive chance to kill Hector, who has thrown caution to the winds.  

Such then are the arguments which Odysseus uses. They are in summary form:

1) Hector is on the rampage and the Trojans with Zeus' favor are destroying the Greeks.

2) Failure to help the Greeks will cause Achilles lasting regret.

3) Peleus would certainly want Achilles to overcome his anger and to think more of the eternal glory that could now be his.

4) Rewards of incalculable worth, undying honor and a chance to kill Hector, all await him upon his return to the fight.

As the analysis of the arguments and their classification according to Aristotelian topoi bring out, Odysseus' arguments are basic and effective means of reaching an audience's intellect and influencing the hearer's judgment. But to consider his arguments only in abstracto would be insufficient. Once their basic suit-
ability as arguments is established, the more important further
questions arises: are they suitable for this particular audience?
This brings us to a consideration of Odysseus' psychological
shrewdness as shown in his speech to Achilles. The problem here
is: does Odysseus show that he is aware of his audience's disposi-
tion, prejudices, likes, dislikes, and desires?

The first matter to be settled is whether his arguments are
suitable to influence Achilles. There are four elements in Achil-
les that Odysseus is aware of and towards which he aims his argu-
ments. These are: their mutual friendship and regard, Achilles' basc
nobility as a man and his honor as a soldier, his reverence
for his father, and his craving for immortal fame. Odysseus capi-
talizes on the first in his opening toast, best wishes, and compli-
ments on the feast just completed. There are too the numerous dir-
ect and sometimes familiar man-to-man entreaties made during the
speech.

To actuate the second motive of nobility and military honor,
Odysseus depicts the plight of Achilles' fellow Greeks who have
fought alongside him and who are counting on him now as much as ev-
er. He emphasizes, however, the bravado of the heretofore cautious
Trojans, especially of Hector. The entire situation presents an op-
portunity that a soldier like Achilles would welcome, and Odysseus
depicts it as such. He shrewdly avoids attempting to arouse Achilles' pity for the Greeks, since he realizes that Achilles wishes to bring down general misfortune upon the Greeks in order to work his revenge on Agamemnon through their sufferings.

As for the third quality of paternal reverence, the central position of the words Odysseus puts in Peleus' mouth is apt. It suggests to Achilles emotions of longing for homeland and love for his father that could, if brought into play, soften the anger and wrath within Achilles and actuate the compassion for his fellows that Odysseus had been trying to build up during the first half of the speech. Nostalgia and love for father and homeland are closely associated with compassion. This, then, is Odysseus' primary purpose. What is more, the Peleus section leads nicely into the catalogue of honors, inasmuch as it could be expected to soften Achilles' initial resistance to any effort to change him. This inevitable resistance was due to Achilles' long-standing association of Agamemnon with the Greeks, the identification of their plight with his, and his desire to get at the king by bringing woe upon his soldiers. Thus by mentioning Peleus and putting into his mouth characteristic and well-chosen words, Odysseus for a few minutes at least sought to raise Achilles' perspective beyond himself and the immediate situation to a consideration of his old
father far away. So if any time was ripe for mentioning, with the
least offense to Achilles, the rewards Agamemnon promised, it was
immediately after the Peleus section.

The promise of gifts, the assurance of honors to be paid by
the Greek army, and the virtual certitude of a chance at Hector
are obviously calculated to appeal to Achilles' overweening de-
sire for lasting glory on earth. We might mention Odysseus' wis-
dom in accentuating the gifts precisely as vehicles or channels of
glory, as opposed to a mere venal approach that would seek only to
point out their cumulative worth. The brilliance of the implements,
the beauty and skill of the women, the sweep of the territory, and
the reverence and obedience of the subjects are all adroitly
played up, the last two being given the place of prominence at the
end of the list.

Thus it is clear that ample grounds exist for saying that
Odysseus' arguments, besides being apt oratorical instruments in
themselves, are well adapted to the audience he is addressing.

Aside from the arguments employed, Odysseus' insight into
his audience's character, which Aristotle demands of a competent
orator, is borne out in other ways. One author remarks that Odys-
seus shows surpassing shrewdness in what he says and in what he
does not say. Odysseus mentions Achilles' anger as seldom as possible, and then only with greatest respect and politeness. He makes no mention of the feud between Achilles and the king. He skirts around the subject of Agamemnon's present feelings toward him, as well as the immediate circumstances of the embassy—who suggested it, etc. The king's name is mentioned only four times during the speech. Lastly, Odysseus never directly asks Achilles to give up his anger and make up with Agamemnon, because, after all, Agamemnon is the king and lord of all. Achilles is always asked to rescue the Greeks, never Agamemnon.

Other points may be cited. At the beginning of the speech Odysseus gets right down to the issue at hand. This is very suitable. The two men know one another, each knows where the other stands, and there is no enmity between the two. Each knows perfectly well Odysseus' mission.

In the enumeration of the gifts and honors, Odysseus ranks

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9 Finsler, Homer, II, 90: "Die Rede ist ein Meisterstück überlegter Klugheit in dem, was sie ausspricht, und in dem, was sie verschweigt."

10 In lines 253, 260, 263, 269.

11 Aristotle supports Odysseus' approach here. In III, xiv, 12, he writes: "Proems in deliberate speaking...are least in order. The subject to be discussed is already known; the facts of it, then need no introduction."
them according to the value Achilles is likely to place on them, the least important being first mentioned, and the most important being saved until last. The following Aristotelian hints for good salesmanship further bring out Odysseus' shrewdness in connection with the gifts: "The more lasting goods are greater than the more transient, and the more secure than the less secure." Rhet., I, vii, 8. Accordingly, Odysseus places the more important gifts last, where they will be most remembered. Secondly, "the same things will seem greater when they are separately listed; for then they will appear to exceed in a greater number of points." Rhet., I, vii, 31. Lastly, "what is good for the individual is for him a greater good than what is good abstractly considered." Ibid., I, vii, 32. All the gifts are admirably suited to Achilles' tastes. But more important, they play up to his fundamental yearning for honor and fame.

Moreover, they are judiciously and vividly described, with a use of hyperbole that never does complete violence to the facts. Odysseus thereby shows his personal interest and mirrors through his expressions of wonder the excellence of the gifts themselves.

At the end of his speech, Odysseus seems to realize the possibility that Achilles is not impressed, or suspects he is being bought off. Accordingly he concludes his oration on a nobler note, returning to the plea to save his fellows and appealing to Achil-
lies' deepest and most characteristic desire—for honor and lasting fame. This desire is at the end given a concrete object—the raging, boastful Hector, who will present himself to Achilles almost for the asking.

But to avoid the impression that he is ordering his hearer, Odysseus in lines 303-4 concludes by putting his verbs in the optative, as a sign of politeness. Furthermore, he equivalently points out that Achilles' decision is his, that it cannot be forced, and that his honor and integrity are being respected to the last. In addition, the peroration serves to unify the speech inasmuch as it reiterates what had been first mentioned, that is, the rampaging of Hector.

By way of conclusion, it would be profitable to investigate whether Odysseus in his use of language and word arrangement lives up to what Aristotle expects of an orator when he states that the orator should seek through language the "persuasiveness that springs from appropriateness." Is the language geared to mirror the speaker's thought and emotion?

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14 ἀφόλος-διάλογος, εὐλογεῖ. The optatives serve further to contrast the contingency of Achilles' decision with the actuality of Hector's boasting, which is mirrored in the present indicative φησιν in lines 305 and the present infinitive ἔμεναι in line 306.

15 Rhet., III, xii, 6.
225. The beginning salutation, χαίρε Άχιλε! is direct and flows naturally from the preceding act of filling the wine cup. It introduces a note of familiarity. It is brief, and not forced.

228-29. To achieve the change from a festive mood to one of foreboding is the function of the long syllables and underlined words in the phrase: ἰλλ'ού δαλτὸς . . . ἰλλα λίγον μέγα πημαν.

231. . . . αἱ μὴ οὐ γε δῶσαι δικήν. The pronoun is stated for emphasis. The expression "put on might" is unusual and vivid.\(^16\)

232. Odysseus emphasizes ἐγγὺς . . . νηῶν by taking it out of its usual position. The Trojan advance is concretely described and the danger made extreme by mention of fire in line 242.

236. The tone changes as long syllables and open vowels underscore the doom hanging over the Greeks: Ζεῦς δὲ ὃ το Κρονίδης . . . ἀνέρ υπάρχει. The description of Hector is concluded in line 239 by a personification of might: κρατερὴ δὲ καὶ λύσσα δέδωκεν, followed by a picture of him praying (in present tense) for the

\(^{16}\)To win a man who is conscious of his excellence Aristotle suggests that "you should interweave the argument with bits of eulogy." *Rhet.*, III, xvii, 11.
244-46. Another shift occurs in the somber, foreboding
ταυτ'αλνως δείδοιμα...φρένα. The singular verb suggests Odysseus' personal fear.

247. An equally quick change comes in the elliptical and
direct ἄλλ'άνα!

249. αὐτῷ σοι are given the prominent position as Odysseus continues his direct appeal. The φράζει in line 251 continues the theme of vigorous entreaty.

252. With ὁ πάπος the mood changes as Odysseus makes use of the tender word to remind Achilles of their friendship. The aptness in the old man Peleus' words is seen in the multiplication of soft sounds—mutes, liquids, and sibilants in lines 254-58. The length of Peleus' speech is also noteworthy.18

259-60. The Lines ἄλλ'έτε καὶ νῦν ἡνίχ', ὡς ὁ θόλον
mark a return to a vigorous pace, while the imperatives juxtaposed mark Odysseus' rising intensity.

17Paley sees three reasons for this passage. "Hector is represented as little better than a maniac, partly to excuse the defeat of the Greeks, partly to disparage his valor, partly to show Achilles that he can easily fight one who fights so recklessly." Paley, The Iliad of Homer, I, 312.

18Odysseus' skill in the Peleus section meets Aristotle's counsel, "Speak briefly of events past and gone, except where representing them as present will excite pity and indignation." Rhet., III, xvi, 6.
264-74. A loose sentence structure prevails in the catalogue of gifts, as certain gifts are emphasized more than others. The final position of ὁμήρη Βριοῦς suggests the importance of this gift.

277. The very strong ταῦτα μὲν αὐτίκα μάντα παρέσσεσαι serves to break off momentarily and climax forcefully the enumeration of gifts up to this point.

277-282. The infinitives used as imperatives νησασθαι and έλασθαι are conclusions of vivid future constructions and mirror the intensity with which Odysseus is pressing the point here—that although the prizes are to be had in the future, the probability of Achilles' enjoying them if he returns to battle is very high. The τίς in line 284 and the ἔτη δὲ τοῖς δῶσαι in 291 continue his closing attempt to convince Achilles of the actuality of the gifts and of his chances for owning them, as do the infinitive used as imperative, ἄγασθαι, in line 288 and δῶσαι in 289.

291-98. Odysseus says something distinctive about each of the seven cities.

300-303. The earnestness of Odysseus' final plea is seen in the mixed construction, as the speaker switches from the aorist

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19 Furthermore, "combination and climax . . . make things seem greater." Ibid., I, vii, 31-32.
indicative in the protasis of a past contrary to fact condition to the present imperative ἢλέμερε.

These points then serve to show how Odysseus' language is in keeping with what is to be expected from such a master of argument and reader of human character. His language, his choice of words and their arrangement, serves as a controlled vehicle for clarity and persuasiveness, which is precisely what Aristotle expects it to do in the speech of a competent orator. The syntax also mirrors the successive changes of mood and intensity which make for audience stimulation and persuasion. Thus while coherent, Odysseus is not monotonous or overly logical. While impassioned in the right places, he does not deliver a soap-box harangue.

Achilles' reply is radically different from Odysseus' speech of petition on several counts. To begin with, the speakers' purposes are different. Odysseus sought to persuade Achilles to follow a course of action against which Achilles has for some time determined himself. Achilles in his reply, however, is not seeking to persuade Odysseus to act. He only interest is to explain and justify why he will not return to the war.

The speeches differ too in means employed. Odysseus' speech is relatively well ordered, with arguments and brief emotional climaxes shrewdly spaced. Achilles speaks out in spontaneous
anger to defend his outraged sense of honor. In Sheppard's words, "Unlike the studied utterance of Odysseus, this speech is poured out with the spontaneous vigour of long pent-up indignation." 

If Achilles' speech, however, were only the incoherent stammerings of an enraged victim of injustice, it would hardly deserve serious attention. No one would call it "the greatest speech of all," or "one of the most extraordinary poetic triumphs of the whole Iliad." The speech, in fact, shows a substructure of shrewd argument and psychological insight calculated to achieve Achilles' purpose—justification of his withdrawal from the war and the utter annihilation of Agamemnon's and the Greeks' hopes as represented by the embassy. In our treatment of the speech,

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20 Sheppard, J.T. The Pattern of the Iliad. London, 1922, 76. Paley, 315, makes much the same point: "The intensity of his hate and the greatness of his pride are all the more clearly shown as contrasted with the reasonableness and moderation, as well as the complimentary tone of Ulysses' address." Finsler characterizes Achilles' speech as "ganz Temperament." Homer, II, 90.

21 Smith, Gertrude, "Homerian Orators and Auditors," Classical Journal, XXI (February, 1926), 357.


23 Whitman states the point well: "Achilles maintains a peculiar suave mastery and beats Odysseus at his own game of subtleties." Ibid., 192.
we will attempt to bring out this oratorically skillful fusion of spontaneous wrath and intellectual and psychological control. In this way will be shown the error of those who see in the speech only the first element.

As befits such an Aristotelian analysis as this, since for Aristotle persuasion is the end of oratory and argument the principal means to persuasion, we shall first consider the arguments used by Achilles. Then the question will be answered, whether Achilles makes any attempt to answer Odysseus' arguments. We shall conclude with analysis of the speech's emotional content.

308-14. Proem. With intensity and at some length, Achilles dwells on the need of speaking frankly. The implication seems to be that Odysseus has not been entirely frank, at least to the extent of not saying everything Achilles wanted to hear. Actually he did not (and could not) mention Agamemnon's demand for Achilles' submission. Further, he did not (and could not) bring Achilles the news he wanted to hear above all—that Agamemnon is prepared to make a full public apology for dishonoring Achilles. So it can be said that the perceptive Achilles here is attacking Agamemnon

24 "Odysseus has told no lies... On the other hand, Odysseus has hidden something in his heart, and by this double-entendre Achilles shows that he knows it." Ibid.
25 Iliad, IX, 158-61.
indirectly rather than Odysseus directly.

315-17. Achilles will not fight because he has received no gratitude from the Greeks. 26

318-20. Whether Achilles fights or not, he will have to die sooner or later anyway, along with the laggards. 27

321-22. Achilles has not benefitted in the least from his years of fighting. He again relies on an argument of omission of damaging facts. 28

323-33. While Achilles has worked hard, Agamemnon has done nothing but expropriate much of the booty for himself, and distribute the rest to the other chiefs. For the first time in his speech Achilles sets up an antithesis between himself and Agamem-

26 Besides overlooking the numerous acclamations he must have received at different times, Achilles universalizes Agamemnon's ingratitude. Aristotle explains this trick as a sham enthymeme in these terms: "Another topos consists in asserting of the whole what is true of the parts." Rhet., II, xxiv, 3. Here is employed as well a fallacious argument "from a single event." Cf. Ibid., II, xxiv, 5.

27 Here Achilles fallaciously treats "as a cause what is not a cause." Ibid., II, xxiv, 8. The fact that everybody must die actually has nothing to do with the issue. For if Achilles' argument were applied rigorously, nobody would do anything, which is absurd. The argument, though, is at first hearing plausible, and Achilles does not belabor it.

28 Rhet., II, xxiv, 3. This device is double effective in a speech of defense when the opponent will have no opportunity to reply.
non. In addition he goes to some length to magnify his own deeds and belittle those of his opponent, besides omitting the fact that Agamemnon actually has often fought in battles. The simile of the selfless mother bird, followed by references to sleepless nights and bloody days, and concluded by the figure of 23 enemy cities stormed personally, achieve the intended buildup in his favor. In sharp contrast, however, Agamemnon is depicted, "waiting back beside the swift ships," performing his lordly and agreeable office of distributing the booty won by others.²⁹

334-336. All the other Greek chiefs retain possession of their prizes. Achilles alone has been robbed of his. Here Achilles uses another antithesis, which serves to put himself in a wronged, therefore favorable, light. Once again he uses the device of omission of pertinent facts that would damage his own case. Here he omits the combination of circumstances which led to Agamemnon's taking Briseis for himself. But as in an earlier instance where he used this omission-of-facts argument, Achilles

²⁹ Cf. note 1 of this chapter for Aristotle's comments about antithesis and its function. The techniques for magnifying deeds are taken up in Rhet., I, ix, 38-41. Aristotle's numerous concrete suggestions for using this device of magnifying deeds show that, like Achilles, he realizes its rhetorical utility, especially where praise or blame is intended.
does not dwell long on the point.\textsuperscript{30}

337-45. The expedition to Troy was to reclaim the wife of a son of Atreus. But do the sons of Atreus alone love their wives? Achilles loves Briseis too, but she has been taken away. The series of four questions betokens Achilles' rising indignation. By the way they are posed these questions invite affirmative answers. In addition, the antithetical nature of the passage is further played up in that questions are posed regarding the sons of Atreus, whereas Achilles makes statements about his own feelings and intentions.\textsuperscript{31}

345-55. Here Achilles interposes a passage spiced with contemptuous irony—let the Achaean chiefs alone decide how to defeat the Trojans; the ditch and wall do not appear sufficient; in the past when Achilles was in the field, Hector did not dare to venture far from the Scaean gate.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{30} Lines 315-17

\textsuperscript{31} Here Achilles commits the fallacy which consists in "omitting any reference to time and manner (i.e. circumstances). Ibid., II, xxiv, 9. Naturally it would not serve Achilles' purpose to enumerate the vastly different circumstances which surrounded Paris' abduction of Helen and Agamemnon's seizure of Briseis. So Achilles wisely omits mentioning them, since to make the two injustices parallel strengthens his argument.

\textsuperscript{32} Aristotle very simply notes the principal rhetorical function of irony when he writes, "irony implies contempt." Rhet., II, 11, 25.
356-67. Speaking of Hector, Achilles is not the least bit interested in fighting him. What is more, he is leaving for home the following morning and taking all his possessions with him. The introduction of this imaginary plan is a masterful oratorical stroke. Its purpose is to shatter Odysseus, and that for two reasons. For by announcing his plan to return home, Achilles shows his complete unconcern over the Greeks' plight. What is more, Achilles' plan is in itself the complete contrary of what Odysseus hoped to achieve. Instead of agreeing to return to the fight, Achilles not only will continue withdrawn from action. He will remove himself from the scene, thereby erasing the slightest possibility of his ever rejoining the Greek forces. Nothing could dismay Achilles' adversaries more, given their present desperate situation. The refusal to fight Hector is a severe enough blow. Yet the legates could hope for a future change of heart. Then even this dim hope is crushed outright by the announcement of

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33 Finsler, Homer, II, 92, has no doubt that the whole idea of departure is an on-the-spot inspiration designed to show Odysseus the uselessness of his oratorical efforts. And Whitman, Homer and the Heroic Tradition, 190, traces the gradual dissipation of Achilles' firm decision to the point where Achilles promises later that he will meet Hector when the latter reaches the tents and ships of the Myrmidons.
departure, which is the worse news possible for the Greeks.\textsuperscript{34}

368-78. In a sudden change to invective, Achilles belittles Agamemnon by playing up his venality, likening his audacity to that of a dog, and affirming his own lasting hatred for the king of men. His profound sense of outraged honor, of course, is behind this sustained outburst.\textsuperscript{35} The oratorical utility of indignation consists in its strong appeal to audience emotions of sympathy over unjustly inflicted suffering.\textsuperscript{36}

379-91. At this point Achilles turns to the gifts which Agamemnon has offered through Odysseus. His argument is simply that he is totally unconcerned. His point is made through sustained hyperbole chiefly. Besides mirroring his intense emotional involvement, of the type one would expect from a person of Achilles'...

\textsuperscript{34} No doubt Achilles sensed intuitively that "that is a good of which the opposite is advantageous to our enemies. . . . And in general, whatever our enemies desire . . . its opposite seems to be of advantage to us." \textit{Rhet.}, I, vi, 18-19.

\textsuperscript{35} "If the subject be wanton outrage, your language will be that of anger." \textit{Ibid.}, III, vii, 3.

\textsuperscript{36} "Such means are used when the speaker, without having proved his case, elaborates on the nature of the deed. . . . It produces the impression that the accused is innocent. . . or guilty. There is no genuine enthymeme; the listener falsely infers guilt or innocence." \textit{Ibid.}, II, xxiv, 4.
age and temperament,\textsuperscript{37} Achilles' exaggerated scorn of Agamemnon's gifts serves to contrast them with the only concession from the king that will satisfy him—the making good "to me all this heart-rending insolence."\textsuperscript{38}

393-420. Achilles continues the theme of total unconcern for the king's peace offerings by adding that back home there are plenty of maidens to choose from and goods in plenty to embellish a long and contented life. Achilles then moves to a new philosophical level of argument, in which he affirms that only a certain number of material things can help a man enjoy life, that death is the end of all, and that it is for him to choose between a short but glorious life, and a long undistinguished existence. Right now he leans toward the latter, in view of his recent insights into the stupidity of war. Here Achilles' approach is to adduce a premise contrary to his opponent's. Odysseus premised his appeal chiefly on Achilles' generally known desire for glory. Achilles, however, undercuts Odysseus' argument by stating the premise that military glory and the dignity that possession of bounteous goods entails is empty, and that the contented life is the only happy

\textsuperscript{37} Recall Aristotle's observations on hyperbole cited in Note 13 of this chapter.

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{IX}, 367.
life for man. 39

421-29. Peroration. Achilles suggests that the legates return to the Greeks' camp and urge that the Achaean army sail home. Phoenix is given the choice to sail with Achilles or remain with the Greeks. Achilles by giving Phoenix his choice adroitly reminds the others of his crushing decision and displays a lofty assurance about the entire situation. That his victory is complete is borne out by the reaction of his hearers: "So he spoke, and all of them stayed stricken to silence in amazement at his words." 40

This analysis brings out conclusively that Achilles' speech is much more than an angry man's incoherent ramblings. In his own way, in fact, he has done a masterful job of self-defense. His shrewdness emerges in several ways. First, Achilles' mind seems to think often in opposites, and the contrasts he draws between

39 The technique of adducing a premise contrary to your opponent's is one of four ways to 'bring an objection against an opponent's argument. Bringing an objection is, in turn, one of the two methods of refutation, the other being a counter-syllogism. In the latter method, the contrary of an opponent's conclusion is proved. Bringing an objection, on the other hand, looks rather to the opponent's premises. Hence one may a) attack an opponent's own premise, b) adduce another premise like it, c) adduce a contrary premise, or d) hearken to previous decisions bearing on the matter being discussed. Rhet., II, xxI, 3-4.

40 IX. 430-31.
himself and the Greeks, himself and Agamemnon, the Greeks' need versus his unconcerned plan to sail home, the worth of the presents against his total indifference to them—all are in themselves very effective oratorical devices. Secondly, his controlled use of irony and invective is more telling precisely because it is controlled. Thirdly, he shows consummate cleverness in the way he makes the facts work for him, heightening those which serve his purpose and overlooking those which, if stated, would weaken his position.

A further question is whether Achilles meets Odysseus' arguments or not. In his own way he does. His principal method is to undercut the supposition of Odysseus' arguments. We have already remarked how Odysseus skilfully directed his words to appeal to appetites which he knew were active in Achilles. What Achilles does is to point out that his interests and desires have changed since his withdrawal from battle. Killing Hector holds little present interest. Agamemnon's gifts, for all their superabundance, likewise offer but vain prospects for lasting satisfaction. Even Achilles' drive for lasting fame, up to this point dominant, is

\[\text{Cf. pp. 74-77, in the present chapter.}\]
seen to have its limitations as a primary life value. Odysseus, of course, could hardly be expected to be aware of these changes within Achilles. And it is this lack of basic intelligence about Achilles' actual interior state that dooms Odysseus' effort from the start, in spite of all the oratorical excellence which his speech evinces.

It was stated at the outset of our treatment of Achilles' speech that his reply to Odysseus is in reality a skillful fusion of intense emotional drive and argumentative agility. So far we have sought to bring out the argumentative and psychological elements of the speech.

To conclude our treatment, it is necessary to consider how Achilles' pent-up fury finds release through his words.

A simple idea gives the key to the emotional element in

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42 Odysseus' "Peleus" argument is the only one Achilles does not directly touch upon. He does, however, pose his own notion of what his father would prefer him to do, though not in so many words, as Odysseus does. This is to return home and spend the rest of his days in peace.

43 We are not inferring here that Achilles has necessarily undergone a radical and permanent change of character. It has already been remarked, for example, that his "decision" to return home is makeshift and most probably an inspiration of the moment. On the other hand, parts of his speech suggest that he had deepened in his outlook and awareness of life values since his withdrawal from active service. To take up this problem further, however, would take us too far from our subject.
Achilles' speech. We have already mentioned how Achilles' mind seems to work dialectically, or antithetically, that is, he sets up contrasts and moves back and forth from one opposite to the other. So too here. His emotional intensity is greatest when he is dwelling on either of two ideas, his own injured honor or Agamemnon's high-handed treatment of him. Any other idea constitutes a middle ground between those two polar ideas, and Achilles is calmest when dealing with something that would fall in this middle ground.

321-22. The emphasis on ἵπται and ἱμην ψυ. indicates the first rise in intensity.

321-31. Achilles dwells on his contributions to the war effort. In 325-26 there are graphic portrayals of himself (ὅς καὶ ἔγω) spending ἀναντοὺς νόμιμας and ἡμας ἀλαμάτωνα. Then follow four singular verbs, ἀλάματα̣, φήμα, ἀξελόμην, and δόσκον, whose rapid repetition indicate the emotional rise.

331-32. This mood is heightened as the first contrast occurs with Ἀγαμέμνονι Ἀτραήτης ὁ ὥ. The emotional fervor is intermixed with scorn of Agamemnon, the pompous distributor and expropriator of prizes won by other warriors.

335-41. Achilles returns to himself and the theme of his dishonour διαμετέχει δ’ άλλο μούνα Λαχανίν. This is followed by a series of four short, sharp questions, each of which asks more than the previous questions: ... ὥστε ... ἂν οὖν ... Αργαίδαι; These lines contain the first big climax of the speech.

341-45. From this highpoint there follows a gradual diminishing of emotion, as Achilles vehemently reiterates his principal theme of personal affront: ὡς καὶ ἠγὼ ... and ἔλεεό καὶ μ’ ἀδέητος.

345-366. A period of comparative emotional calm follows. Here the chief feature is sustained and effective irony, in which Achilles dismisses lightly what Odysseus regards as matters of life or death. 45

367-78. Once again the thought of the king’s insult to him returns, as the mood intensifies abruptly: γέρας δὲ μού ... ἔλεεό κρείνων Λαχανίνων Αργαίδης. With sustained invective and per-

45 Gladstone says very well: "But for the great master of this art (irony), Homer has chosen Achilles. As with his invectives he grinds to powder, so with the razor edge of the most refined irony he cuts his way in a moment to the quick." Gladstone, William E. Studies on Homer and the Homeric Age, 3 vols. Oxford, 1858. Ill, 109. Among Achilles’ deft thrusts are his invitation to see the Myrmidons off, his admiration for the Greeks’ emergency defense works, the suggestion that the Greeks take counsel with Odysseus to remedy the situation, and the suggestion that Agamemnon find a more regal heir than he is.
sonal insult to Agamemnon, Achilles lets out his fury in short sentences, a more elliptical style, and several sentences beginning with ὅδε.

379-92. The intensity of Achilles' anger continues to move upward as he turns from his crushing denunciation of the king to consider his gifts. Here is the emotional and argumentative climax of his speech. It is achieved, however, by the relatively simple device of parallel constructions. In this section there are two sentences. The first is an extended negative Vague Future construction composed of four protases, each beginning with ὅδε', ἔτ' , and one apodosis. The second is a mixed construction, with a Vague Future protasis beginning with ὅδε' ἔτ' placed between two conclusions, each with the future indicative ἔφα. The climax function of the future indicatives is apparent in view of the foregoing series of optatives.

393-429. This concluding section marks Achilles' falling emotions as the style becomes more settled, the sentences longer, and as neither polar idea recurs. The speech ends in a mood of comparative peace.

46 In Rhetoric, III, ix, 9, Aristotle stipulates that "this (parallelism) must take place at the beginning or end of the clauses. At the beginning, the similarity is always shown in entire words; at the end, in the last syllables."
From this analysis it is clear that there are two moments of supreme emotional intensity, lines 335-41, and 367-92. Periods of relative calm precede the first high point, separate the first from the second, and follow the second. This apt interspacing of the speech's highpoints has not occurred to every author. Still we think that this analysis has shown that Achilles' control extends even to choosing the right moment to give expression to his fury, and that his speech is something more than "ganz Temperament."

Before concluding this chapter, we must deal with a problem involving Odysseus' speech to Achilles. After our analysis of the latter speech, we must frankly admit that Odysseus failed completely in his effort to persuade Achilles to return to the fight. The problem is this: In spite of all its oratorical excellence, does not candor force one to admit that Odysseus' speech is a bad one? Sheppard tends toward this position when he writes: "It (Odysseus' speech) is a fine speech. The appeal is genuine and moving. But it rather irritates than conciliates Achilles. The arrangement of the material, the psychological finesse are just a little too accomplished."

47 Cf. note 20 of this chapter.
48 Sheppard, The Pattern of the Iliad, 73.
This position seems just a bit too simple. In defense of Odysseus there are many things to be said. To begin with, an unsuccessful speech is not necessarily a bad speech. An orator, after all, is always addressing free agents, whose minds and wills are often positively closed by passion or prejudice to the finest possible argumentative and psychological devices of persuasion. Moreover, a look at the speech indicates conclusively that Odysseus is not in the least trying to be cute. He puts off the offer of gifts until late in his speech because he wisely realizes that offering them at the outset to Achilles would infuriate him. Moreover, Odysseus gets to the point at once, and in the course of his speech makes six direct open appeals to Achilles to rejoin the Greek forces. There are no double-entendres in his speech, and his appeals are always directed to qualities of character he knew were operative within Achilles, as we have tried to point out. What is more, his arguments are in no way specious, but are based on facts without exception.

Why then did he fail so miserably? The answer, we feel, must be sought more from Achilles' side than Odysseus'. The latter is sent on a most difficult diplomatic mission. He represents his chief. Thus the business of the meeting in Achilles' tent is more between Achilles and Agamemnon than between Odysseus and Achilles.
Accordingly, Achilles' speech is a reply not only to Odysseus' appeal, but an expression of his pent-up hatred for the man Odysseus represents. What Achilles wanted to hear was precisely what Odysseus could not utter—the announcement that Agamemnon has agreed to apologize fully and publicly for his dishonoring of Achilles and will admit Achilles' excellence among the Greeks. The fact of the matter is that Agamemnon will do nothing of the kind. To the contrary, he demands recognition by Achilles of his preeminence as king.

So Odysseus must and does skirt the question of Agamemnon's feelings toward Achilles. In this he shows his finesse, but it is the finesse of consummate diplomacy, not of a double-dealer.

Achilles too is very perceptive. It is clear that he senses Agamemnon's failure to render the full satisfaction he demands. Hence his reply is much more a slap at Agamemnon than at Odysseus. The former is vilified repeatedly; the latter not once. Indeed he is welcome in Achilles' tent. Odysseus must suffer only to the extent that he is the king's representative, and is therefore associated in Achilles' mind with the hated king. We agree with Whitman when he says, "There can be little question that Achilles' rejection of the embassy is essentially a rejection of Agamemnon's
gifts and the spirit in which they are offered." Finsler also
defends Odysseus in his summary of the embassy scene, in writing,
"Odysseus calculated quite correctly what would be likely to move
Achilles, but the latter far exceeds the danger point for his
hatred." 50

In summary, it is clear that those who blame Odysseus' fail­
ure on Odysseus are overlooking much positive data which ade­
quately substantiates the opposite viewpoint—that Odysseus' speech is
"extremely habile," but failed in view of Achilles' fixed
hatred for Agamemnon.

49 Whitman, Homer and the Heroic Tradition, 193.
50 Finsler, Homer, I, 92, Cf. pp 77 and 90 for penetrating
analyses of Achilles' single-track state of mind. In Companion to
the Iliad, 180, Leaf agrees that Achilles cares only about redeem­
ing his honor. Whitman's analysis of the problem also supports
the contention that Odysseus' failure springs far more from Achil­
les' side than from Odysseus'.

author continues: "comme tous ceux qui contient le IXe chant, il
est parfaitement adapté aussi bien à la situation qu'au caractère
du personnage qui le débite, et il atteste, en un temps très intéri­
leur a celui qu la rhétorique a commence de maître, combien l'art
de la parole était naturel aux Grecs."
SPEECH TEXTS FOR CHAPTER III
"" ἦ μὲν αὖτ' ἄγορὴ νικῆς, γέρου, ὡς Ἀχαϊῶν,
αἱ γὰρ Ζεὺς τε πάτερ καὶ Ἀθηναία καὶ Ἀπόλλων
tουσθοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες εἶνεν Ἀχαϊῶν
τῷ κε τάχ'
τὸ Περσῶν ἄντυκτος
χερσὶν ὑπ' ἡμετέρῃσιν ἀλοῦσά τε περιβολὴν τε.

"" ὁς μὲ μετ' ἀπρύκτους ἐρίδας καὶ νείκεα βάλλει,
καὶ γὰρ ἔγὼν Ἀχιλέους τε μαχεσαμέθ' εἶνεκα καυχη
ἀντιβλοισ ἐπέσσω, ἐγὼ δ' ἤρχομαι καλεσάνων·
el δ' ποὺ τε γε μίαν βουλεύσαιμεν, οὐκέτ' ἐπειτ
Τρωίαν ἀναβίλλους κακοῦ ἔσσεται, οὐδ' ἤβαινον.

νῦν δ' ἔρχεσθ' ἐπὶ δεῖπνου, ἵνα ξυνάγωμεν Ἀρη.
εὐ μέν τις δόλῳ θηξία, εὐ δ' ἄπιθα δέθω,
ed δ' τε ταῖς ἱπποισι δείπνου δότω ἰκνίττεσσης,
ed δ' τε τάραμας ἀμφὶ ἱδὼν πολέμου μεδέσθω,
ως κε πανημέρουι στυγερῷ κρινόμεθ' Ἀρη.

οὐ γὰρ παυσιλῆ γε μετέσσεται, οὐδ' ἤβαινον,
el μη νῦς ἐλθόντα διακρίνετε μένος ἄνδρῶν.

ἰδρώσει μὲν τε τελαμών ἀμφὶ στήθεσφιν
ἀσπίδως ἀμφιβρότησιν, περὶ δ' ἐγχεις χεῖρα καμείτα·
ἰδρώσει δὲ τε ταῖς ἱπποισ ἔδοξοι ἄρμα τυπαίων.

δι' δὲ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης θέλουσα νοήσω
μμανήζων παρά ὑμεῖν κορώνιαν, οὐ οἴ ἐπείκα
ἄρκιον ἐσεῖται φυγέων κίνας ἧδ' οἰωνοῦς·

'Ὡς ἐφαν', Ἀργεῖοι δὲ μέγ' ἤχου, ὡς ὄτε κύμα
II, 370-394 AGAMEMNON'S SPEECH

'Once again, old sir, you surpass the sons of the Achaïans in debate. O father Zeus, Athene, Apollo: would that among the Achaïans I had ten such counsellors. Then perhaps the city of lord Priam would be bent underneath our hands, captured and sacked. But instead Zeus of the aegis, son of Kronos, has given me bitterness, who drives me into unprofitable abuse and quarrels. For I and Achilleus fought together for a girl's sake in words' violent encounter, and I was the first to be angry. If ever we can take one single counsel, then no longer shall the Trojans' evil be put aside, not even for a small time. Now go back, take your dinner, and let us gather our warcraft. Let a man put a good edge to his spear, and his shield in order, let each put good fodder before his swift-footed horses, and each man look well over his chariot, careful of his fighting, that all day long we may be in the division of hateful Ares. There will not even for a small time be any respite unless darkness comes down to separate the strength of the fighters. There will be a man's sweat on the shield-strap binding the breast.
the shield hiding the man's shape, and the hand on the spear grow weary.
There will be sweat on a man's horse straining at the smoothed chariot.

But any man whom I find trying, apart from the battle, to hang back by the curved ships, for him no longer will there be any means to escape the dogs and the vultures.

So he spoke, and the Argives shouted aloud, as surf crashing.
XXIV, 486-506 PRIAM'S SUPPLICATION OF ACHILLES
"μνήσαι πατρός σοι, θεώς ἐπείδηκεν Ἀχιλλεῖ, τηλίκου ὡς περ ἐγών, ἀλλαὶ ἐπὶ γῆρας ὀδῷ· καὶ μὲν ποι κεῖνον περιμαίνεται ἀμφότεροι τείρουσι, αὐτός τοίς ἐστιν ἄρη καὶ λοιπὸν ἀμώναι. ἀλλ' ἦτοι κεῖνος γε σέθειν ζωότοις ἀκοῦν ἔχρει τ' ἐν θυμῷ, ἐπὶ τ' ἔλπηται ἡματα πάντα ἑσσθαι φίλου νῦν ἀπὸ Τροίηθεν ἱόντα· αὐτὰρ ἔγω πανάπτωμοι, ἑπεὶ τέκου υπὸ ἀργότοις Τροίῃ ἐν εὐρέῃ, τῶν δ' οὐ τυπά φημι λαλέονται. πεντήκοντα μοι ἦσαν, ἦ τ' ἡμίθουν νῦες Ἀχαίων· ἐννεακαίδεκα μὲν μοι ἦς ἐκ θρόνος ὦσαν, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους μοι ἐτικτοὺς εἶλ μεγάρους γυναίκες. τῶν μὲν πολλῶν θόρυβος Ἀρης ὑπὸ γοῦνατ' ἔλυσεν· ὅς δ' ἦν μοι ἦς, εἶρυτο δὲ ἄστι καὶ αὐτοῦ, τῶν οὖ πρῶην κτέινας ἀμφότεροι περὶ πάτρης, "Εκτορα· τοῦ νῦν ἔλυεν' Ἰκάνον ὡς Ἀχιλλεῖ· ἀμφότεροι παρὰ σείω, φέρον δ' ἀπερέλει· ἄπωνα· ἀλλ' αἴθεο θεοῖς, Ἀχιλλεῖ, αὐτῶν τ' ἐλέησον, μησάμενοι σοῦ πατρός· ἔγω δ' ἐλεωινότερο περ. ἐλπίδα δ' οὐ' οὐ πώ τις ἐπιχύνωσι βροτος ἄλλος, ἄνθρωπος παιδιφόνου ποτὰ στόμα χείρ' ἀρέγεσθαι."
Achilleus like the gods, remember your father, one who
is of years like mine, and on the door-sill of sorrowful old age.
And they do dwell nearby encompass him and afflict him,
nor is there any to defend him against the wrath, the destruction.
Yet surely he, when he hears of you and that you are still living,
is gladdened within his heart and all his days he is hopeful
that he will see his beloved son come home from the Troad.
But for me, my destiny was evil. I have had the noblest
of sons in Troy, but I say not one of them is left to me.
Fifty were my sons, when the sons of the Achaians came here.
Nineteen were born to me from the womb of a single mother,
and other women bore the rest in my palace; and of these
violent Ares broke the strength in the knees of most of them,
but one was left me who guarded my city and people, that one
you killed a few days since as he fought in defence of his country,
Hektor; for whose sake I come now to the ships of the Achaians
to win him back from you, and I bring you gifts beyond number.
Honour then the gods, Achilleus, and take pity upon me
remembering your father, yet I am still more pitiful;
I have gone through what no other mortal on earth has gone through.

I put my lips to the hands of the man who has killed my children.
CHAPTER III

FURTHER CORRELATIONS

In the previous two chapters it has been established that many Aristotelian principles of oratory are verified in the Homeric speeches analyzed. Up to this point, however, we have been principally concerned with allowing Aristotle's principles to verify Homer's argumentative skill and psychological insight in oratorical attack, defense, and persuasion, that is, in his use of "the means of proof." The chief reason for this concentration is that the sum total of these argumentative and psychological devices constitutes the core of Aristotle's practical treatment of oratory, which is our concern in the second part of this thesis.

The purpose of the present chapter is to elaborate further the correlation between Homeric and Aristotelian oratory by treating some points of oratory not yet considered. The order to be followed will be that of the speeches' occurrence in the Iliad.

Very important to any speaker is to know how to arouse audience emotion. In Book II, lines 370-94, Agamemnon arouses the Greek army to enthusiastic preparation for an approaching battle.
An analysis of how he does this will afford a chance to appreciate from a slightly different viewpoint both Homer's and Aristotle's grasp of practical psychology.

In Book II of the Rhetoric, Aristotle's emphasis is on how to incite or otherwise make use of certain emotions. From Chapter II to XI he sets down the causes and application to public speaking of anger, mildness, love, hatred, fear, confidence, shame, shamelessness, benevolence, pity, indignation, envy, emulation, and contempt. Immediately following, from chapters XII to XXVIII, is a treatment of types of character—the young, the elderly, and those in the prime of life—and their application to public speaking. Next considered is how being well-born, wealthy, or powerful modifies these general characteristics of the various periods of life. We shall concentrate on what Aristotle says about youth and confidence.

As for youth, "they are fond of honor, they are even fonder of victory . . . They are trustful, for as yet they have not been often deceived... They live their lives for the most part in hope . . . Being passionate as well as hopeful, they are relatively brave; the passion excludes fear, and the hope inspires confidence . . . . Their lives are rather lives of good impulse than
of calculation."\(^1\)

This then is the type of audience which Agamemnon faces as he sets out to reply to Nestor's appeal urging immediate battle. It is an audience, moreover, which has the Quarrel Scene still fresh in mind.

370-80. The king wisely sets about removing bad feeling at once. He congratulates Nestor on his wisdom, confesses his error in fighting with Achilles, and expresses his hope for an early settlement. Agamemnon's proem serves its proper function here of removing prejudice at the outset.\(^2\)

381-85. Here begins the exhortation to battle proper. In a series of decisive concrete military commands, Agamemnon orders the soldiers to ready their equipment. The parallel construction

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\(^1\) *Rhetoric*, II, xii, 3-16. The following is especially applicable to Achilles: "the young are passionate, quick to anger, and apt to give way to it . . . for, since they wish to be honored, young men cannot put up with a slight; they are resentful if they only imagine that they are unfairly treated." *Ibid.*, II, xii, 3-4.

\(^2\) Aristotle counsels in III, xiv, 7: "When a defendant is about to present his case, he must dislodge whatever stands in his way, and so any prejudice against him must be removed at the outset. But if prejudice is to be excited, this should be done at the close, for then what you say will be better remembered."
is evidenced by the verbs ἐρχεσθε, ἔθοσθε, ἔσω, δότω, μεθέον. 3 His pose here is that of a confident general whose self-assurance communicates itself in his orders. There is no mention of the enemy throughout.

386-90. Agamemnon concentrates on familiar positive aspects of battle, such as conjure up the thrill of battle and are experienced by winning soldiers. Again a parallelism appears in the series of future indicative verbs which suggest the inevitability of success in the battle: μετέσσωμαι, διακρινέω, ἱδρομεν, κατίζω, ἱδρόμενον. 4

393-93. Agamemnon concludes with a general warning not to hold back from the fight under pain of death. This threat, it is true, points up the total effort to be made, the seriousness of the fight coming up, and the mutual interdependence of all the Greeks. At the same time it brings home once again Agamemnon's

3„We are confident if we think we possess in a greater quantity or in a higher degree those superior qualities which would make our adversaries formidable; that is, if we think we are better off in respect to wealth, bodily strength ... and in the way of military preparations, either all or the most important.” Ibid., II, v, 20.

4„Confidence is inspired both by the remoteness of calamities and by the proximity of sources of encouragement.” Ibid., II, v, 16. And in II, v, 22: “We are confident when in any enterprise we think we are likely, or certain, to suffer no ill, or to attain success.”
clumsiness at handling people. It was within his province cer-
tainly to lay down such an injunction. To make it at the end of
such a speech as this, however, injects a negative note when it is
least called for.

394. Nothing dismayed, the soldiers shout their approval and
begin feverish preparations for the battle. Thus the king's
speech shows by its success what it evidences in its structure and
content—a knowledge gained of long experience of what is neces-
sary to excite the enthusiasm and confidence of a large group of
young soldiers.

Another of Agamemnon's speeches, this one in Book XIX, lines
78-144, enables us to take up the use of narration and fables,
along with the ever-present problem of removing prejudice from the
minds of a hostile audience.

Agamemnon here addresses Achilles for the first time since
the latter's return to the Greek camp. His purpose in this speech
is manifold. He must accept Achilles' offer of reconciliation,
acknowledge that he acted wrongly in the Quarrel Scene, and yet
maintain his regal position of authority over Achilles.

To dispel the bad feeling which had been building up during
the succession of Greek defeats, the king sets out to show that he
did not make Achilles angry deliberately, and, in fact, was not
responsible for what he said to Achilles.\textsuperscript{5} Therefore, his argument runs, he is not responsible for Achilles' withdrawal and its consequences. His chief strategem is to shift responsibility by narrating a fable explaining how Delusion, daughter of Zeus, was responsible for his conduct in the Quarrel Scene. Such a device Aristotle terms a sham enthymeme of a single instance used as a logical proof.\textsuperscript{6} But it has its use, for "in the absence of enthymemes, the speaker must make examples serve the ends of logical proofs.\textsuperscript{7}

But what example is to be chosen? The king selects an apt tale, or fable. His choice can be called a wise one, for "fables are suited to speeches in a popular assembly; and they have an advantage in that it is hard to find parallels in history, but easy

\textsuperscript{5}Ways of shifting responsibility are cited by Aristotle in III, xv, 3: "Another way is to urge that the thing was a mistake, or a mischance, or unavoidable ... Or you may balance your deed with your professed motive, and say that you intended no harm, but to do thus and so; or that you did not wish to do what is slanderously alleged against you." The form of argument here, treated in II, xxiii, 24, consists of stating "the reason why facts appear in a wrong light; for then there is something that accounts for the false impression."

\textsuperscript{6}Here too we have no logical argument," Ibid., II, xxiv, 5.

\textsuperscript{7}Ibid., II, xx, 9.
to find them in tales."\(^8\)

Underlying Agamemnon's decision to tell a story is perhaps the realization that "you may narrate whatever tends to your own credit, or to the discredit of the other side."\(^9\) Moreover, such a narration in itself would be welcome to his hearers. The repetition of innumerable family lineages and myths in Homer's epics shows that the Greeks liked to hear a good story. What is more, they were much more patient than we are in our time of TV, radio, and the journalistic rapidity. Today it is certainly true that, as Aristotle writes of his own day, "there is an absurd demand that the narration be rapid."\(^10\) His own principle, on the other hand, is that "here too the right thing is neither rapidity nor brevity, but the proper mean."\(^11\) This simply means that enough

\(^8\) Ibid., xx, 7. As to examples' effectiveness, Aristotle writes: "When they follow the enthymeme, examples function like witnesses . . . and there is always a tendency to believe a witness. . . . If he puts them (examples)after, one may suffice. . . . on the principle that a single witness, if you have a good one, will serve the purpose. Ibid., II, xx, 9.

\(^9\) Ibid., III, xvi, 5.

\(^10\) Ibid., III, xvi, 4. There is always the danger, when we criticize a fable's length, of projecting present preferences back into an entirely different ancient situation.

\(^11\) Ibid.
amplitude should be allowed to state and play up the ideas which will serve the speaker's purpose.

Agamemnon gets into his story skilfully. In line 86 he affirms simply that he is not responsible. Zeus, Destiny and Erinyes are, since these things happened and whatever happens comes about because "it is the god who accomplishes all things."12

Now this is certainly a generally-accepted truism. And Agamemnon is wise enough not to elaborate the argument further, thereby giving his hearers chance to form counter-arguments in their own minds. Instead he moves immediately into the story of Delusion, the elder daughter of Zeus.13 His narration moves along steadily and dramatically. Miniature speeches break up the narrative in lines 101-105, 107-11, and 121-25. Present too are contrasts and graphic language in abundance.14

Agamemnon's ending is apt. He simply repeats in one sentence the assertion that he was deluded by Zeus. Then he repeats the offer of gifts to Achilles and suggests that his men begin their

12 Ibid., XIX, 90.
13 Ibid., XIX, 91-133.
14 Cf. the picture of Hera departing from Olympus "in a flash of speed" (line 114), or of Zeus taking Delusion by the hair, after which he "whirled her about in his hand and slung her out of the starry heaven." (lines 129-30)
transfer immediately.

The king's speech with its centrally placed myth succeeds in making the best of what is a bad situation for him. For the myth makes his speech, by standing in place of formal arguments which quite possibly could have precipitated the entire feud all over again. Furthermore, by offering a plausible working explanation of his conduct, the myth enables Agamemnon to save face and avoid a formal apology and the likelihood of demeaning himself further before Achilles and the army. It is sufficiently long and self-explanatory, and all the king has to do to end is to turn to the subject of the gifts and the implicit note of his magnanimity.

Among the three principal Aristotelian means of persuasion is one which has not as yet been mentioned in the Homeric section of this thesis. We refer to the speaker's character or ethos as a tool for influencing an audience. This could have been brought up in the treatment of the Embassy of Book IX. But we prefer to reserve its consideration for a speech in which its efficacy stands out with peculiar force. This is Priam's supplication of Achilles. 15

Of ethos Aristotle writes: "As for the speakers themselves

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15 Iliad, XXIV, 486-506.
the sources of our trust in them are three, for apart from the arguments there are three things that gain our belief, namely, intelligence, character, and good will."\textsuperscript{16} The peculiar contribution of ethos to persuasion is that "the speaker who is thought to have all these qualities has the confidence of his hearers."\textsuperscript{17} For by transmitting them to his hearers he "gives the right impression of himself."\textsuperscript{18} As to for how to transmit his character, the speaker must be known as a man of good conduct, and must show an awareness of and respect for the primacy of virtue.

In Achilles' tent Priam is impressive not only in what he says, but no less in what he is. His is a quiet nobility throughout. Aristotle recognizes the force of such a bearing: "most affecting of all is it when in these critical moments the victims maintain a noble bearing. . . . They make the evil seem near to us, and the suffering undeserved, and set the picture of it before our very eyes."\textsuperscript{19} On the strength of these reasons, then, Priam can be said to persuade Achilles by being what he is along

\textsuperscript{16} Rhet., II, 1, 5-7.
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ibid.}, II, 1, 7.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid.}, II, 1, 3.
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Ibid.}, II, viii, 16.
with saying what he says.\textsuperscript{20}

Priam's basic purpose is to arouse Achilles' pity. Accordingly he emphasizes his present desolation by making three principal points:

486-93. Achilles should hearken a moment to his old father Peleus and think how he would feel if he were to lose his only son, Achilles.

494-500. Priam was father to 50 sons, but has lost them all, now that Hector is dead.

505-506. No other man has ever had to do what he is forced to do—to supplicate the slayer of his children.

Capable of inciting pity are "whatever brings pain and anguish, and is in its nature destructive . . . and whatever brings utter ruin; likewise all ills of a sufficient magnitude that result from chance."\textsuperscript{21} So Priam very simply and directly puts before Achilles Peleus' loss. He does more. For by comparing himself with Peleus, he brings his sufferings as it were closer to Achilles. The principle here is, "It is when sufferings seem near

\textsuperscript{20} Cf. Aristotle's strong statement: "We might almost affirm that his (the speaker's) character is the most potent (νυστατησις) of all the means to persuasion." \textit{Ibid.}, I, 11, 5.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Ibid.}, II, viii, 8.
to them that men pity." The comparison is Priam's way of bringing his sufferings nearer Achilles by projecting one-fiftieth of them upon Achilles' father. We might also note the contrast Priam draws between the consolation Peleus will experience on seeing Achilles again versus his own lasting desolation.

Bespaloff puts very well the total effect of Priam's power as achieved through the fusion of his ethos and his words: "Prone at the feet of the victor, he assumes a majesty that does not derive from his office. . . . This speech is quite without vehemence; self-respect gives the words the exact weight of truth. In insisting on his right to pity, the vanquished is not bowing down to destiny in the person of the man he is entreating. The unheard-of ordeal he inflicts on himself, equal to the love that sustains him, has nothing base about it."

This is precisely Priam's triumph and constitutes a test of true nobility. In a humiliating situation he maintains a moral ascendancy. In fact, his suppliant position invests him with a grandeur he would not otherwise possess. It is this grandeur which is his ethos. This in turn gives his words a double

22 Ibid., II, viii, 14.
23 Ibid., II, xxiii, 1.
emotional efficacy, a power which surpasses the mere rhetorical force deriving from his words and arguments considered only in themselves.
GENERAL CONCLUSION

After noting the origins of classical academic oratory and its development in Athens, we summarized the Aristotelian doctrine on oratory compiled in his *Rhetoric*. Itself one of several treatises current in his time, Aristotle's approach to rhetoric was chosen because it is the most compact, coherent, and philosophically grounded study that has come down to us. To summarize and conclude our study, we might begin by posing this question: does anything like an ideal orator emerge from a study of the *Rhetoric*?

Aristotle's orator, it appears, is one whose sole aim is to persuade his hearers to make correct judgments. His eloquence is heavily philosophical and dialectical, for his principal effort is directed to his hearers' intellects. And on the presumption that he will address intelligent audiences, Aristotle's orator must be a man of broad knowledge—of politics, history, social psychology, legislation, and all facts pertinent to any given speech. Intellectual accomplishment is to be accompanied by good character, as well as mastery of argument, analysis, synthesis,
and clear presentation. His speech "court à son but sans s'attarder, sans se laisser distraire, avec une rigueur logique qui domine l'auditeur et qui l'entraîne."¹

The detailed analyses in Book II of emotions, character, states of life, and of correspondingly suitable arguments indicate something else. Aristotle's orator must know people. He must be an accomplished practical psychologist. He must realize that emotions influence judgments, and know the ways to incite or calm them according to his need. In short, Aristotle requires an orator to have a complete and integral theoretical understanding of man's nature, and to be master of all practical means, argumentative and psychological, of inducing men to make correct judgments.

A portrait of a Homeric orator would partially coincide and partially differ from that of Aristotle's ideal orator. To begin with, there is an absence of the subtilities and elaborateness of form which developed later. Homeric oratory is not studied, nor are his orators in any way self-conscious. His speakers rather evince a liberty of thought, presentation, and language. What course of presentation they choose is for the most part dictated

by the speaking situation and the speaker's own limitations, not
by any academic formulations of what is proper. Hence analysis
reveals an intimate blend of argument with genuine emotion, both
couched in an impromptu atmosphere. In short, Homer's heroes
speak as you would expect men to speak who antedate the systemati-
ization of oratory and are closely involved in what they speak
about.

Many of the Iliad's 75-odd speeches mirror the disorder and
emotional intensity that war and its proximity often causes.

Quintilian, the greatest Roman academician of rhetoric,
paradoxically praises Homer for his rhetorical style, his mastery
of the different types of oratory, his mastery of the emotions and
human character, the parts within a speech, his clarity, figures
of speech, and well-turned thoughts. Homer, he says, is absolute-
ly supreme over other epic poets. Cf. Brozowski (S.J.), Hillard
Leon, "Homer the Orator and Quintilian," Classical Bulletin, XXVII
(November, 1950), 5.

This is not to say that Homer's speeches lack all internal
unity. Delaunoix states: "Avant toute theorie, le souci de bien
ordonner ses idees devait le (the Homeric speaker) preoccuper."
Delaunoix, "Comment Parient Les Heros d'Homere," 63.

Cf. for example Diomed's speech (VI, 123-43), Hector's
speech to Diomed (VIII, 161-66), or Achilles' speech to Patroclus
(XVI, 49-100). Andromache's lamentations over the dead Hector
(XXIV, 725-45) belong to this type of Iliad oratory. In fact,
Achilles' speech in Book IX has many earmarks of "war" oratory--
psychological association and contrast of ideas rather than logi-
cal or any reasoned succession, repetition of a basic theme, and
successive moments of extremely intense emotion.
These speeches consist of reflections, mythological episodes often drawn out, or family lineages, invective, threats, exaltation, or other emotions, all in various combinations. Alfred Croiset summarizes the characteristics of war oratory in this way: "Les idées générales sont rares, bornées presque toujours à quelques lois religieuses ou à certaines observations morales très simples. Le dialectique est courte, superficielle, un peu molle; l'analyse des idées est à peine indiquée; l'argumentation se tourne en apologies, en narrations parfois fort belles, mais plutôt longues et qui font digression. C'est de la démonstration populaire . . . . C'est-à-dire de la démonstration plus suggestive que méthodique, avec une allure parfois trainante, vive seulement par instants, sous le coup de la passion jaillissante."5

These "war" speeches are often brilliant poetical triumphs and add immensely to the Iliad's greatness. But the fact that they have little in common with Aristotelian oratorical theory led us to exclude them from this thesis. They are mentioned here to avoid giving the impression that all the Iliad's speeches are as rich in Aristotelian correlations as the ones analyzed. But by the same token, we do not pretend to have pointed out all the

speeches in which correlations could be drawn between the two writers. Much less is it true that all the Rhetoric's principles and practical hints can be verified in Homer. 6

We have taken a sampling of Homeric speeches sufficient to point out that Homer's heroes, especially Odysseus, Achilles, and to a lesser extent, Agamemnon and Priam, were genuine orators. 7 Their speeches show conclusively that they were capable of directing their words in accordance with a definite rhetorical end. They could devise and present arguments in a way suitable for a given situation and audience. Odysseus in his mission to Achilles in Book IX "epuise des tresors d'éloquence." 8 His speech is undoubtedly the Iliad's masterpiece of sustained persuasive eloquence. 9 Achilles and Agamemnon both proved themselves adept

6 In Homer's time epideictic or display oratory had not developed. Nor would many of Aristotle's stylistic suggestions in Book III apply to the less developed Homeric dialect.

7 "In fact, some of the finest specimens of Greek oratory are to be found in the Iliad. On notes in the first book the quarrel of the chiefs and in the ninth the embassy to Achilles." Burrage, Dwight G., "Homer's Education," Classical Journal, XLIII XLIII (December, 1947), 149.

8 De launoix, "Comment Parient Les Héros d'Homère," 86.

9 Odysseus is the Homeric orator who most closely approximates the Aristotelian ideal. A master of subtlety and argument, he is at the same time a consummate psychologist, and a man of character.
masters of oratorical attack and defense. Priam's effort before Achilles shows the persuasive efficacy of pathos and nobility, when the circumstances are right. It was in analyzing the speeches of these three speakers that very many close similarities between Aristotelian theory and Homeric practice could be drawn.

When the Iliad's more accomplished oratorical efforts are considered, then, the close rapport between the two Greeks is as remarkable as it is indisputable. Why is this? In the most general terms, both the theorist and the practitioner of rhetoric understood man. Both perceived the essence of man's nobility—possession of mind and will. Hence both understood what is involved in persuasion, the art of moving men to judge and act as befits their nature. Furthermore, Homeric practice and Aristotelian theory were elaborated in societies where there was a chance, at least, for free public expression on public affairs. In both cases men did not have to fear blind coercion, or threats of torture and death as omnipresent sanctions of the despot's command. Hence oratory flourished in both Greek societies.

So too, neither Homer nor the philosopher Aristotle considered man in abstracto. He was not denatured because some a priori principle demanded it. The approach of both men, on the contrary, was exclusively a posteriori. Aristotle, no less than Homer,
"reste continuellement en contact avec la nature humaine."  

Therefore both men, acute observers as they were, grasped the psychological laws of persuasion upon which the art of rhetoric was eventually based. These laws, both understood, must look to man's passions, states of life, and to all other human components in his makeup, as well as to his intellect. For all these work more or less harmoniously within the framework of integral human nature.

In grasping the whole picture of man, the poet of the Iliad no less than the theorist of the Rhetoric declare themselves to be truly Greeks.

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APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Howard B. Schapker, S.J., has been read and approved by three members of the Department of Classics.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Jan. 13, 1960

[Signature of Adviser]