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A Philosophical Study of John Henry Newman's the Idea of a University, Discourses I-IX

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A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF JOHN HENRY NEWMAN'S
THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY,
DISCOURSES I-IX

by
Mark William Haley

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

May 1979
For Franklean and Marla Jean
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VITA

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

One of Newman's favorite images was that of a traveler lost in a strange land or city who, because he has no map of the streets, mounts to some hill nearby to reconnoiter the area and so get a "view." Before getting on with the body of this analysis of the **Idea**, I should like, in what will be an extended introductory chapter, to give the reader a "view" of the scope of this paper and to provide some guidelines indispensable to the reader's finding his way through its area with some benefit from the passage. I will do so by considering: (1) the relevance of the **Idea** to our day; (2) Newman's quest in the **Idea** for a principle of unity; (3) the relevance of this search to the Greek philosophical problem of the one and the many; (4) the fundamental problems to which this study addresses itself; (5) a review of critical literature relevant to these problems; (6) the importance of Aristotle, especially his doctrine of equivocity by reference, to this study; (7) the "mechanism" of my interpretation and some technical vocabulary to be employed; (8) my purpose in brief.

John Henry Cardinal Newman's **Idea of a University** is the work for which Newman is best remembered today.
More to our purpose, it is generally regarded as one of the most significant statements formulated on the nature of university education, perhaps the most important written in the last one hundred and twenty-five years. Its influence on university educational theory has been enormous, and, sooner or later, anyone interested in the subject must come to terms with the issues it raises. They include philosophy and theology, science and religion, humanism and Christianity, reason and Revelation, nature and Grace, conscience and commandment, philosophical habit and moral training, worldly gentleman and Christian gentleman, Liberal Knowledge and utilitarian instruction, dogma and skepticism, Faith and infidelity, to name but a few.

Although these are issues attractive in any age, they hold a special fascination and relevance for the man of faith, the Christian educator, and even the non-sectarian educator of our day. First, Newman's Idea and the issues dealt with therein appeal strongly to the twentieth-century Christian believer. For during an age in which he observes organized religion attacked from without and racked by fratricidal strife from within; when he perceives contemporary man caught up in a vortex of defiance of all religious authority; when he sees, on the one hand, the

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1 In *John Henry Newman* (London, 1956), p. 25, J. M. Cameron points out "that modern thinking on University education is a series of footnotes to Newman's lectures and essays."
loss of respect for traditional orthodox tenets, and representatives of the Church sometimes exceeding and abusing their authority, on the other; and when this same believer sees his theological underpinnings being swept away, and the fabric of his traditional religious beliefs becoming unravelled, he might well wonder that he has any faith at all. But then with this experience before him, he approaches the witness of a brilliant nineteenth-century Anglican turned Roman Catholic clergyman. There he discovers a loyal and devoted son of the Church. There he observes a strong sense of dogma and respect for primitive Christian beliefs blended with a personal and highly intellectualized quest for the foundations of those religious beliefs. Above all, he finds in Newman's witness, with its sense of dogma, doctrine, and fidelity, a fundamental and perennially sound Christianity that reconciles the needs of conscience with the demands of a divinely inspired Church body.

If Newman in the scope of his concern for the foundations of religious truth confronts the contemporary Christian, even more so he challenges the twentieth-century Christian educator who may examine Newman's witness and relevance in the light of a few questions. What does an intellectually bold, progressive, yet faithful exponent of the tenets of orthodox Christianity do when he finds himself called upon to deliver a series of lectures to a mass
of people intellectually alienated and spiritually isolated from the mainstream of a society which reveals itself, in many ways, to be economically self-serving, socially heartless, unbelieving, "liberal" and utilitarian, when, in fact, the course of this society it should be the charge of their Christian heritage to alter? What, moreover, does a loyal son of the Church do who is mandated to lecture on university education in an atmosphere of national distrust, episcopal opposition, lay apathy, and clerical indifference, not to mention in a world of coreligionists who, in their overbearing zeal to protect the central authority of the Roman Catholic Church in any conflict between human and divine knowledge, feel only deep misgivings about any criticism of their religion and extreme reserve toward any independent intellectual research or scientific inquiry? ²

The answers to these questions sound from each page of the Idea. There, Newman, courageous and resolute, begins by pointing up one thinking man's search for the essential intellectual spirit of man regarding the purpose of a university and makes it everyman's, using reason, a tool he feels best suited to the expression of mankind's noblest aspirations from a temporal viewpoint. He includes man's quest for a more meaningful life that also reflects his es-

²See F. McGrath, Newman's University: Idea and Reality (London, 1951), for an excellent historical account of the founding of Newman's University, the forerunner of today's National University.
sentially religious nature. In the process, Newman does not glorify out of bounds the efficacy of reason, a human faculty whose overemphasis is, in part, responsible for the infidelity of his age, but rather weighs in the balance its claims against those of faith. In his educational ideal, he does not postulate themes for a rationalistic world he now cynically believes to be beyond any type of redemptive behavior or values. What Newman does is affirm the value of a quest in which faith and reason are allied. What he does is confirm the validity of an educational program designed to meet man's temporal and eternal aspirations.

Newman envelops the university, the locale of this search, with intellectual and spiritual promise and with temporal and eternal possibilities, not with cynicism and futility. In the end, he makes true intellectual culture distinguishable from academic illusion, separates truly idealistic university goals from false "liberal" hopes, and dramatically proclaims the inherent spiritual and intellectual nobility of man. These are answers to be treasured in any age, not the least of all by Christian educators in our own.

Finally, there is Newman's appeal to the modern educator, regardless of his religious persuasion. Newman approached the founding of his university like an explorer of new educational lands. The opportunity offered him the excitement of an educational adventure in which he had long
been interested. It also conferred the fresh wonder of revolutionary academic discoveries. Revolutions in educational theory or practice -- and Newman's was a revolution in the sense that he urged man to develop or regain a more comprehensive view of knowledge and of life -- are always inspired by the conviction that some significant aspect of current educational thinking is dead or outmoded. Such revolutions usually take the form of exploring new ways to revitalize the educational thought or to modify the academic practice.

Newman began his educational lectures in Ireland at the beginning of an era of technology and professionalism. It was an age characterized by a trend toward specialization. It was a period marked by an increase in knowledge coupled with a different view of the purpose of knowledge. What began to matter now was not so much knowledge for its own sake as knowledge for the sake of its usefulness and the means to its most effective use. This trend caused Newman deep concern because he saw in its effects the certain fragmentation of the wholeness of knowledge and the loss of man's integrated view of reality. Another trend of the day he found almost equally abhorrent was one toward "viewiness," whereby man comes to know a little about everything but not much of a substantive nature about anything. Newman viewed this superficial kind of knowledge as another evil that marked the decline of the humanistic tradition in
education. Against both trends Newman was not alone in open revolt, but he was at the forefront in pointing out their dangers and pitfalls for the future state of university education.

In his view, the majestic vision of education found in the Middle Ages and embodied in the universities of Paris, Bologna, and Oxford was no longer in evidence. Nineteenth-century man had lost his sense of "philosophical comprehensiveness," "orderly expansiveness," and "elastic contractiveness," and he did not know why. Newman explained why in the Idea: Nineteenth-century man had lost his sense of unity. This loss Newman saw evidence of in the Church, in the state, and in the school. As his major purpose in the Idea, Newman set about to rediscover a principle of unity as it would apply to the wholeness of a university education and to the integrity of the human product of that education.

Still another challenge facing Newman in the nineteenth century was the task of educating a man whose status had been or was in the process of becoming sharply reduced. Scientific discoveries were moving in the direction of

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3 The two foregoing statements are paraphrased from a quotation cited in A. D. Culler, The Imperial Intellect, A Study of Newman's Educational Ideal (New Haven, 1955), p. 174. The quotation, in turn, is drawn from the Discourses (1852), pp. 139-40, 142.

4 Culler, p. 174.
pushing back the history of the earth, of locating the earth as a mere speck in the universe, and of assigning man a sharply diminished role among the animals. Man still maintained some relative superiority over the rest, but the image of man made in the likeness of God was fast disappearing. What remained was a highly modified version of that humanistic view of man found in the Middle Ages. Newman counters this position with a strong reaffirmation in the idea that the end of knowledge and of education is the human being himself and the intellectual and spiritual perfection of his nature.

The problems that challenged Newman's educational programs in the nineteenth century have their counterpart in the problems facing educators in the twentieth. In an age notable for the proliferation of knowledge, the explosion of nuclear and space technology, professional overspecialization, and scholarly territorialism, modern educators find man's status further diminished and his view of himself even more fragmented. In the drift from what might be called a humanistic to a dehumanized view of himself, modern man finds himself unable to discover the meaning of the scientific and technological advances which characterize his age. He is at a loss to find his place in them, much less to chart their direction. The wealth of scientific and technological know-how at his fingertips tells him how to do but not why or what to do. As a result, man appears
unable to shape his life or to control the scientific forces he has loosed. He is left a pawn moved by external and internal forces seemingly beyond his control. His values become barren. He dramatizes his pessimism over the loss of values, for he sees in the loss the possible failure of civilization itself. But while his attempts to dramatize the fraudulent aspects of modern life may shock man into an awareness of his plight, one wonders if they do much to rid him of it.

Twentieth-century man needs an educational ideal that would encompass the fundamental meanings he needs to survive. He has, perhaps even more so than his nineteenth-century counterpart, lost his sense of unity -- a comprehensive, unified view of man, reality and the knowledge that reflects reality. He has lost his capacity to see things as one. He has allowed himself and his world to be fragmented, his disciplines to be compartmentalized, and his professional territories to be too rigidly assigned. This brings us to the challenge facing modern educators. It should be their responsibility to develop persons who will do more than bemoan their fate and dramatize their pessimism over their shrunken fragmented state. It is the challenge of contemporary educators to cultivate students who will return a chaotic world into order and who will attempt to rediscover a principle of unity for the multiplicity of modern life. In short, twentieth-century students
must be reeducated in the possibilities of a more humanistic form of education. The effects of such an education will be most evident in the students' desire to seek knowledge in a broader context and to see life with a more comprehensive view.

Although some may consider Newman's educational ideal too visionary, his theme of the interrelated nature of knowledge and his call for an interdisciplinary grasp of the sciences in pursuit of truth appear as meaningful today as when they were first expressed one hundred and twenty-five years ago. There are few vestiges of an ordered world left in the twentieth century. If modern man is to survive, perhaps he will have to impose his vision of oneness on the multiple chaos of this century using a method similar to that Newman proposes in the Idea. For Newman, order is the law of the universe and unity is the law of man's educational pursuits, not chaos. Even if a modern educator cannot subscribe to Newman's alliance of faith and reason, he will do well, at least, to heed Newman's search for unity and call for order.

This quest for unity is the keynote of Newman's Idea. Its presence is indicated from the very beginning of the discourses but may be lost to the reader in the variety of Newman's topics and treatments. Newman's quest pursues a principle of unity among a multiplicity of elements in his educational scheme. It embraces the oneness of the
fact of reality, the fundamentally interdependent nature of the sciences that reflect reality, and an interdisciplinary grasp of those sciences. Ultimately, the search pursues the development of a man whose unified view of the sciences leads him back to God as the Source and End of truth. Faith and reason are allied in this joint venture. In advancing this view of university education, Newman has much to say on the relation of Faith and reason, Liberal Knowledge and utilitarian instruction, philosophical habit and moral training, worldly gentleman and Christian gentleman, and he says it in many ways, always seeking that one which best conveys his primary meaning. In spite of the variety of expression, there is one purpose underlying all: to show the interrelated nature of Faith and knowledge and the university-educated man's need to reflect that relation in his own more comprehensive view of this life and the next.

Earlier, I pointed out that the relevance of Newman's search for unity extends forward even to our day, an age very much in need of a synthesis not unlike Newman's for dealing with its educational and spiritual ills. Newman's quest is also one whose implications extend back to the time of the early Greek philosophers and one of their central problems, the One and the Many. Around the end of the seventh century, B.C., the Greeks turned their efforts away from poetry and mythology and laid the foundation of that discipline we call philosophy. Their concern was a
logical explanation of reality. Their efforts centered on coming to grips with the problem of the One and the Many, a fundamental question that, over the years, has confronted thoughtful men, and one long considered especially relevant to beginning philosophical studies. How does one explain the static and the dynamic, the permanent and the changeable, the unified and the diverse? How can the multiplicity of things be explained in reference to one principle of unity? Correspondingly, how can one nature, form, or thing be explained in view of its plural adaptation? This has long been a root philosophical problem, any dispute over the terminology employed to describe it notwithstanding, that faces any thinking man who would find a key to unlock the door to the mystery of reality. It was a major problem for the early Greek thinkers, and it was a central intellectual problem for Newman as well.

As Frederick Copleston points out, it was to this problem of a principle of unity for the ever-changing multiplicity of things that the early Ionian philosophers began to address themselves. They were much concerned with the obvious changes of birth and growth, decay and death. They were equally aware of seasonal variations, other natural changes, and especially, significant alterations in man himself. Yet they perceived something permanent that

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underwent these transitions. In their attempts to define that permanent element, they advanced various postulates. The important thing to note here is not what they advanced as the basic element, but rather, that they were concerned with the problem of unity in difference in their search for the ultimate nature of things. Later, of course, Aristotle would propose a coherent solution to the problem, one in which the Stagirite would concern himself not so much with how the "one" can be many, as how a "many" can be one.6

From his temporary home in Dublin in 1852, it was not inappropriate that Newman in the Idea should confront across the centuries those early Greek scholars and their fundamental question. The implications of the problem dealt with by them appear not at all a matter of indifference to Newman when one considers his total concern for some principles of unity among a multiplicity of intellectual, educational, and spiritual interests. His whole life provides examples of this, of which his search for a central spiritual authority, for an integrated spiritual life, and for a unified educational ideal are most notable. Even while it overlaps the others, our focus here, however, is

6 According to J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in The Aristotelian 'Metaphysics' 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1963), p. 437, "The Aristotelian approach is the reverse of the Parmenidean. Parmenides sees being as one, and asks how could it be many. Aristotle sees beings as manifold. He asks: "How could any one nature account for their differences?" Also, see Owens, pp. 459-460.
on how Newman confronts the early Greek philosophers, at least indirectly, in the scope of his concern for a unifying educational basis. At its core, the quest for unity in the Idea might be said to come to grips with the problem of the One and the Many. For when Newman asserts that all reality is one, that all sciences are interconnected, that the view of these sciences must be interdisciplinary, and that the person who holds such a view must be one in whom faith and intellectual culture are combined, he is, in effect, responding to the problem of how many segments of reality can be one, of how many branches of knowledge can be one, of how many views of knowledge can be joined in one integrated view, and of how many intellectual and spiritual capacities can be actualized in one university-educated person. These questions appear as no more than variations of that fundamental question raised by those early Greek seekers of truth.

There is, however, another aspect of Newman's concern for a unified educational ideal, a concern most important to the scope of this study, that also lends itself to comparison with that fundamental antinomy of Greek philosophy, and that is his multiple treatment of the university issue, grounds, theme, and gentleman in the Idea. There, Newman discusses the nature of a Catholic university and a university considered apart from religious principle. He approaches his subject on theological and philosophical
grounds. He advances a view that has temporal as well as eternal overtones. He addresses his efforts to the worldly human product of the university, even while he advocates a more Christian gentlemanly ideal. The questions arise of just how the Catholic and university issues, theological and philosophical grounds, natural and supernatural interdisciplinary views, secular and Christian gentlemen are to be unified and reconciled in some measure. Each element of the contrasting pairs appears the same in some ways yet different. They are things said in many ways, but they do possess a certain unity by reference. Newman, then, appears to speak with two voices. His manifold voice is reflected in his dual presentation of the university issue, grounds, theme, and gentleman. Although some critics acknowledge this multiple presentation, they do not explain it. I contend that if the integrity of Newman's educational ideal and its presentation in the Idea are to be understood, there will have to be found some unifying means whereby Newman's dual treatment of these issues can be more adequately explained and his two voices reconciled.

This study of the Idea addresses itself to a number of basic problems, three of which are probably the most important in view of the controversy they have aroused. First, there is the question of the nature of Newman's Catholic university. Second, there is the issue of the nature of Newman's university considered apart from the
Church. Third, there is the problem of the nature of Newman's gentleman. The first question will be viewed in this study as the primary or fundamental issue of the **Idea**. The second and third questions will be approached as more important secondary issues. This study, however, will also devote itself to several other secondary questions. One is the problem of Newman's grounds. How do the supernatural or theological lines of the inquiry stand in relation to the natural or philosophical ones? Another is the matter of theme. What is the relationship between a temporal interdisciplinary grasp of knowledge for its own sake and a supernatural interconnected view of knowledge for the sake of something more? Moreover, does the wholeness of structure in the **Idea** complement its thematic integrity in some way? Still another secondary issue is the relation of the religion of reason found in the man of philosophic habit to the religion of Faith present in the Newman's Christian gentleman. Finally, there is the question of what makes Newman's idea of a university to be what it is -- what is its cause and principle of Being.

The questions raised and the relationships drawn have been addressed by critics in varying degrees and under a variety of headings. These headings include Newman's alleged severance of intellect from virtue in the **Idea**, a conflict between humanistic and religious elements in the work, and the seriousness of Newman's statement on the na-
ture of the gentleman. All of the issues cited above appear closely knit, and the resolution of one may very well enable the reader to clarify the problem and to understand better the solution of the others.

As I indicated earlier, one of the major obstacles to understanding the nature and interrelation of the university issues, grounds, the wholeness of theme and structure, and the types of gentlemen Newman sets forth in the Idea is his multiple treatment of them. If the content of Newman's larger educational philosophy is to be understood, there will have to be found some unifying principle whereby Newman's dual treatment of various elements in the Idea can be reconciled. As I also pointed out, although his presentation of the Idea's material and formal elements has been discussed in some detail by the critics, their efforts have not, so far as I can determine, gone far enough in establishing and in applying a principle that would insure the unity of his treatment and the integrity of his educational aims, leaving him less open to accusations of ambivalence, ambiguity or worse. So too, while critical discussion of the problems of "severance" and the seriousness of Newman's gentleman have oftentimes been provocative, these discussions have, I fear, sometimes cast needless doubts on the wholeness of the work, and even worse, the integrity of the educational doctrine it advances. A suitable key for unifying the Idea's form, and to some extent its content,
would help render these doubts unworthy of further consideration.

That Newman does treat the university issue, grounds, theme, and gentleman with more than one voice appears evident from the text. Regarding the nature of his university, he speaks of it as a place for the advancement of liberal knowledge apart from any reference to religion; yet he maintains Christianity as the root principle of education. The grounds of his inquiry concerning the nature of university education provide a second example. Even while he declares "human reason" to underlie his approach, he conducts his inquiry under the sanction of the Church and he concedes that his subject matter does admit "of a Catholic treatment." Then, too, regarding theme, Newman tells his audience, on the one hand, that knowledge sought for its own sake is an admirable pursuit, but he even more vigorously asserts that intellectual cultivation is not a sufficient end in a university that purports to educate the whole man. Accordingly, even though Newman appears to emphasize the importance of the man of cultivated intellect as the foremost product of university education, he stresses the spiritual deficiencies of such a man and intellectual state left to themselves. In the matter of religious assumptions, we may find a fourth example. Newman disclaims "supernatural discernment," "divine illumination," or a "connection with Revelation" as his starting point.
Yet he makes the existence of a personal God, as the Source and End of the wholeness of knowledge and the interrelated view by which it is to be grasped, an indispensable point of departure. Correspondingly, Newman's view of the religion of reason differs markedly from what he considers true religion. The former type he makes characteristic of the man of philosophic habit, an element in his educational ideal. A fifth example of Newman's two voices is to be found in his gentlemen. Notwithstanding the fact that Newman proposes as the ideal human product of the university a man of cultivated intellect whose appeal lies chiefly in his comprehensive view, he undercuts the integrity of this ideal product by assigning him a host of spiritual deficiencies. Newman seems to demand of him a spiritual perfection that lies beyond his earthly capacities.

That critics recognize Newman's multiple treatment, that their controversies center on problems relating to this treatment, and that they have not yet found a key sufficient to explain them is evident from their commentaries. The scholarly controversy in the wake of the alleged conflict between humanistic and religious elements in the Idea points to Newman's multiple treatment of the university issue, the first of the basic problems on which we said this study will focus. Is Newman's fundamental issue the nature of a university considered in the abstract or the nature of a Catholic university viewed in the concrete?
Although the problem between humanistic and religious elements can be stated in other terms, e.g., a conflict between philosophy and theology, Liberal Arts and theology, science and theology, knowledge and virtue, or sectarian and nonsectarian education, fundamentally, as it emerges in critical discussion, the problem centers on whether Newman's university is a place for the humanistic or Christian development of man. Newman leaves little room to doubt that it is a place for one or other type of human development. But should the university be viewed primarily as a humanistic center in which knowledge for its own sake is set up as an independent and self-sufficient goal? Or rather, should it be considered a place designed primarily for the advancement of one's Faith and the fostering of one's virtue, along with intellectual cultivation? Is the education promoted there humanistic and nondenominational or Christian and sectarian? Is nature or Grace the principle of the university's educational thrust? Does the true spirit of the place emerge from its stamp of Faith or from its mark of Reason? Does Newman place man or a God-like man as the focus of the development it offers? Back of these queries is the more fundamental question of the primary nature of Newman's university. Is Newman's basic concern a university in the abstract that with its humanistic education makes all things subject to man in his far-ranging view, or is it a Catholic University which with its
supernatural orientation makes man capable of viewing him-
self and all things as subject to God?

Critical commentary on the conflict between reli-
gious and humanistic elements in the Idea supports both
claims. It indicates critics have not yet found a prin-ci-
ple sufficient to explain whether Newman's twofold treat-
ment points primarily to a Catholic University or a univer-
sity in its essence. T. Corcoran argues that Newman's Idea
is marked by a philosophy of "severance" between intellect
and virtue that contrasts sharply with "the traditional
doctrine of Christian Europe" that characterized the 1854
Brief of Pius IX on the founding of a Catholic university.7
According to Corcoran, Newman severs the link between in-
tellect and virtue to such an extent that he renders impos-
sible the university's becoming an instrument of the Church
at all. Fernande Tardivel, Michael Tierney, and John E.
Wise challenge that position. Wise, for example, counters
that when Newman affirms knowledge as an end in itself, he

7Corcoran's argument and the quotation cited are
presented by Martin Svaglic in Victorian Prose: A Guide to
Svaglic draws these materials from "Liberal Studies and
Moral Aims: A Critical Study of Newman's Position"
(Thought, 1926). In reference to the former work, I should
point out that Charles Stephen Dessain's guide to research
on Newman's philosophy and theology and Martin J. Svaglic's
presentation on Newman the man and humanist are indispens-
able guides for the student interested in Newman's philo-
osophical, theological, and educational thought and develop-
ment. Hereafter, the work will be referred to as Victorian
Prose.
is speaking of the formal object of a university. Wise
adds that Newman does recognize the dangers of mere intel-
lectual cultivation and that he is aware of the universi-
ty's need of the Church to maintain its integrity. 8 C. F.
Harrold insists that Newman is no more than following his
humanistic theory to its logical conclusion. 9 In support,
Harrold quotes Newman to the effect that

we attain to heaven by using this world well,
though it pass away; we perfect our nature, not
by undoing it, but by adding to it what is more
than nature, and by directing it towards aims
higher than its own. 10

Harrold further maintains that the liberal education of
Newman's university aims not at moral improvement but at
general cultivation of the mind. Notwithstanding this aim,
Harrold singles out Newman's point that a liberal education
left alone may promote pride and self-centeredness.
Charles Dessain calls the reader's attention to the natural
earthly purpose of Newman's university and emphasizes that
the qualities to be gained there "are not virtue, though
they sometimes look like it." 11 Dessain cites Newman's

8 Ibid.

9 C. F. Harrold, John Henry Newman (New York, 1945),
p. 108.

10 Quoted in Harrold, p. 108, from the Idea, 1852
edition.

p. 104.
words to the effect that a university education should prepare one for this world. It is not the education of a "convent" or a "seminary."\textsuperscript{12} For F. McGrath, the Idea advances two separate theses which Newman "skillfully blends."\textsuperscript{13} The first is "the necessity of including religious teaching in any scheme of studies."\textsuperscript{14} The second is the point that "cultivation of mind, rather than immediate preparation for professional occupations, is the primary end of a university."\textsuperscript{15}

While Michael Tierney assumes the position that the main function of Newman's liberal knowledge is preparation in the virtue of prudence, A. Dwight Culler takes up where Harrold leaves off. Culler points up the ambivalence in Newman's attitude toward religious and humanistic ideals,\textsuperscript{16} traces it to problems in Newman's adolescence and evangelical background, and resolves the conflict in a Christian humanism he feels to be characteristic of Newman's educational ideal in its completed form.\textsuperscript{17} Culler asserts that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12}Ibid., p. 105.
\item \textsuperscript{13}McGrath, p. 133.
\item \textsuperscript{14}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{15}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{16}Culler, p. 228.
\item \textsuperscript{17}Ibid., p. 242.
\end{itemize}
the humanistic and religious views taken together "enable man to fulfill his own nature and then to place that nature, fully developed, at the service of God." 18 I find Culler's assertion here inconsistent with his claim elsewhere that Newman's gentleman is not to be taken as a serious expression. 19 This is a matter that will be treated below with the problem of the nature of Newman's gentleman. P. A. Dale, on the other hand, assumes the more radical position that the Idea is fundamentally a justification of Church control of university education. 20 He dismisses the humanistic possibilities of Newman's educational goals.

The criticism cited points to problems in the relationship between Newman's university in the abstract and his Catholic university in the concrete. Some of it recognizes his multiple treatment of the university as a place, on the one hand, that advances humanistic goals, and on the other, as a place that fosters Christian educational ideals. None of it, however, appears to unite Newman's twofold treatment of the fundamental nature of a university in quite satisfactory a manner. Corcoran appears at one end of the critical spectrum; Dale, at the other. In between,

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., p. 238.

there are Harrold and others who draw parallel lines of humanistic and religious development in such a way that there is no possibility of convergence. Culler speaks of a Christian humanistic ideal; yet he elsewhere undermines this position by stating that Newman's statement on the gentleman is an ironic one. There appears to be more ambivalence in the attitudes of the critics than there is in Newman's presentation of what his educational ideal is all about. Noticeably lacking is a key to its unified presentation.

Another problem of this study deals with the nature and interrelation of Newman's grounds in the Idea. This issue, as the critical discussion of it makes evident, bears on the fundamental nature of Newman's university. Does Newman pursue the nature and scope of university education in the abstract on humanistic and philosophical grounds? Or, on the contrary, does he follow more religious and theological lines of inquiry in pursuing the scope of Catholic university education in the concrete?

The tendency of critics has been to reject one set of grounds. Harrold sees Newman "surveying the subject from various lights, advancing and retiring from it, illustrating, confirming, comparing..." He observes Newman

21 Culler, p. 238.

22 Harrold, p. 96.
approaching his subject from many angles, but the two main ones he feels are the vantage points of the humanist and of the Roman Catholic. 23 "We are reminded," Harrold notes, "that Newman's mind and thought were shaped not only by the humanism of Oxford but also...by the Christian humanism of the early Fathers." 24 He concludes that Newman's educational ideal is valid both in the world and in the Church, and so, Harrold seems to suggest, are his grounds. McGrath first states that in Discourses I - V Newman pretty much adheres to his avowed purpose of treating university education from a philosophical standpoint and that the university envisioned is "a university in its essence, and [independent] of its relation to the Church." 25 McGrath continues: "the whole drift of his earlier discourses makes it abundantly clear that his 'university in its bare and necessary idea' excludes, to use his own phrase to Ormsby, 'the assumption of Catholicism.'" 26 However, in speaking of the apparent difference between Newman's and the Pope's view of the nature of a university, McGrath says that it is a matter of approach. The Pope's concern was a Catholic

23 Ibid., p. 115.
24 Ibid.
26 McGrath, p. 172.
university in the abstract. 27 In sum, McGrath states that although Newman initiates the discussion on purely philosophical grounds and maintains this approach through the fifth discourse, the remaining ones reflect a combined philosophical and theological treatment. 28 Elsewhere, McGrath will assert that Newman's sense of balance is demonstrated not merely in his attitude toward human knowledge but in the method of his approach to it. 29 Dessain too claims that Newman "made the basis of his Discourses as broad as possible." 30

Culler acknowledges Newman's multiple treatment of grounds and ascribes its use to Newman's need to satisfy different segments of his audience. 31 Even though, as Culler points out, the discourses present a "philosophical definition of the idea, the inner form or principle, university education," 32 and although Newman employs a "rationalistic approach" to them, the grounds overall emerge

27 Ibid., p. 279.
28 Ibid., pp. 281-282.
29 Ibid., pp. 312-313.
30 Dessain, p. 103.
31 Culler, p. 145.
32 Ibid., p. 173.
as "humanistic" and "religious." This to Culler is not surprising in view of Newman's concern that his approach not be "too philosophical." Culler further observes that the total treatment is marked by a "precarious balance," notwithstanding the fact that the humanistic ideal is presented with some ambivalence.

A third important issue to which this study addresses itself is the nature and interrelation of the Idea's temporal interdisciplinary grasp of knowledge for its own sake to a supernatural interconnected view of knowledge for the sake of something more. The question involves Newman's whole educational scheme and the role of the university within that scheme. It again raises the question whether Newman's university is primarily of a religious or a secular character. It also relates to the matter of Newman's grounds. The issue appears fundamentally to focus on whether the "connected view" should encompass man and this world or whether it ought to extend beyond, as well, to God and the next. Does the intellectual cultivation to which this view is central center on man's temporal intellectual aspirations, or does it look more to man's ultimate spir-

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33 Ibid., p. 227.
34 Ibid., p. 148.
35 Ibid., p. 228.
itical needs, even while it does not neglect the temporal ones?

It is difficult to think of an element more basic to Newman's whole educational ideal than that of "view." If there is a phrase that sums up his idea of a university, it is that of a "connected view." It carries the burden of Newman's educational thrust and the brunt of his educational labors in the Idea. It is to this perspective that any interpreter of the Idea sooner or later must turn. For Newman touches bottom when he declares that all knowledge forms a whole and when he affirms the need of the mind to reflect that wholeness in its grasp.

Newman's treatment of the interdisciplinary grasp serves a dual purpose. It defines to some extent the experience of this special type of "viewing" and establishes it as the goal of the university-educated man. Unfortunately, what Newman's presentation fails to do is fix the parameters of the "view." It tells us that the idea of a university entails an awareness of the bearing of one science on another by which the whole of truth can be perceived.\(^\text{36}\) It tells us that the "view" envelops a knowledge of first principles and relations rather than mere facts.\(^\text{37}\) It elaborates an enlargement of mind that surveys "many


\(^{37}\text{Ibid., p. 121.}\)
things at once and as one whole." 38 and that grasps the "relative disposition of things." 39 Newman's presentation of the "connected view" speaks to the fact that reality is one, that knowledge abstracts segments of reality, that this knowledge is one and should be grasped integrally according to one's capacity. Newman's treatment does not, however, appear to indicate sufficiently the means whereby one can combine lesser views into a single unified vision of reality that accounts for God and man, this world and the next, and man's temporal and eternal concerns. Still this is something, as he himself points out in the Preface, the university must do if it would educate the whole man. 40 Does the "view" look to the development of the university-educated man as a gentleman or to his growth as an intellectually cultivated saint? The "connected view" has an important role to play in perfecting the human intellect and in improving the quality of human life in this world. Does Newman also mean it to play a significant part in man's preparation for the next?

The nature of the "view" advocated in the Idea has generated its fair share of controversy ranging from Corcoran's position which renders that interdisciplinary

38 Ibid., p. 122.
39 Ibid., p. 105.
40 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
view ill-suited for God's purpose to Dale's which leaves the interdisciplinary grasp practically unfit for man's. Wise, Tardivel, Harrold, McGrath, Culler, Dessain, Svaglic, and Clancy assume positions between these extremes. Their stands on the issue reflect in the main their claims for the fundamental nature of Newman's university and his choice of grounds. Harrold, for example, asserts that discipline of the mind is of central importance in Newman's liberal program. He adds, however, that Newman is opposed to purely secular education because "theology gives a unity and coherence to all other knowledge in the light of ultimate ends." Equally important, he points out that the intellectual culture of Newman's university develops the gentleman, while the Church, so influential on Newman's total educational program, is trying to create saints. Harrold also maintains that the general cultivation of mind and its hallmark, the "connected view", do not in themselves reflect Newman's whole ideal. Martin Svaglic takes an equally moderate stand when he affirms that Newman's purpose is "a union of intellectual curiosity and achievement with the humility and charity of the truly religious

41 Harrold, p. 92.
43 Ibid., p. 111.
man -- a humanism, that is, in the Judaeo-Christian tradition."44 In the main, McGrath too points out that Newman holds to the "essential unity of religious and secular teaching."45 For without religion there can be no order among the various branches of knowledge. Without religion the whole man cannot be educated. McGrath's position suggests that the "view" advocated in the Idea involves no real distinction between intellectual and moral training in the whole education of man. Culler sees Newman as changing course in the middle of the Idea. In the eighth discourse Newman seems to refute and to downgrade the philosophical view which previously he felt to distinguish so commendably his cultural ideal.46

Yet another secondary issue pertinent to this study deals with the nature and relation of the spurious religion of the man of philosophical habit to the true religion of the saint. Cast in other terms, the question involves the relationship of Newman's Faith in an Omniscient Creator Whose Presence bears so integrally on the relationship of the sciences as their Source and End and Whose Providence so intimately affects the lives of the men possessing this


45McGrath, p. 277.

46Culler, p. 227.
knowledge to the worldly gentleman's belief in a god of reason and sentiment whose presence appears somehow to regulate one's manners and tastes. On the one hand, the question concerns an approach to religion that dictates there is no positive or absolute truth in religion, that declares religion to be a matter of taste and feeling, and that advocates religion as a matter of personal preference without any kind of objective reality. On the other side of the issue is the claim of the creature standing humbly before the limitless demands of his Creator as he attempts to work out his salvation in a framework that involves all of his human activities and embraces all of his human faculties. Which religious perspective does Newman foster in a university program designed for the education of the whole man? Is it a purely philosophic habit of mind that may very well drive a man only into himself or a combined philosophic and religious habit of soul that can lead him to God? This question too is not unrelated to those previously considered, for the religious spirit Newman purposes to inculcate affects the type of university he fundamentally proposes, the grounds he will employ, and the interdisciplinary grasp that he advocates. Once again, Newman's treatment appears twofold. In the first instance, his presentation develops the religious ideal in the sphere of nature and reason. In the second, it portrays the ideal in the domain of Faith and Grace. Should Newman's religious ideal as part of a
total educational purpose be allied with the forces of man and reason, or should it be associated with the forces of God and Faith in conjunction with reason?

Before any further discussion of the question, we would do well at this point to clarify Newman's meaning and use of the term "religion." C. F. Harrold's words come closest to capturing Newman's position. Harrold states that Newman sympathized not at all with a religion of feeling. Newman himself points out that "religion as a mere sentiment is to me a dream and a mockery." True religion for Newman reflects a total human experience. It is, in Harrold's words "a synthesis, or harmony, of the activities of man." It includes a "metaphysical element" in its dogma as well as an "ethical element in its sanctions and commands." Then too, there is the "aesthetic element" of its "graceful and emotion-stirring rites, symbols and ceremonies." It contains, moreover, a "political element in the organization of the Church as a militant power forever at war with the world." Furthermore, Harrold sees in

\[47\] Quoted in Harrold, p. 55, from the Apologia.

\[48\] Harrold, p. 47.

\[49\] Ibid.

\[50\] Ibid.

\[51\] Ibid.
Newman's concept of religion an attempt to bring into ac-
count "every human faculty to transform the religious ideal
into the real -- cultivation of the intellect, the imagina-
tion, the will, the moral sense, and the social sense." 52
According to Harrold, religion was, for Newman, irresist-
ibly "all-embracing." His intellect admired "logically
articulated dogmas" and welcomed authority with its "rig-
orous bounds," not to mention Newman's respect for the
"elaborate discipline," "ascetic devotions," and "spiritual
hygiene" that reflected its two thousand years of exper-
ience. 53 Newman just as much admired, Harrold notes, "the
great Catholic mystical tradition, with its symbolism, its
sacraments, its ritual, its miracles [and] its realistic
recognition of the reality of the supersensible world." 54

The problem of the two religious views found in the
Idea has been investigated by various commentators. They
recognize the distinction between the religion of Faith
and the religion of reason as fundamental, and they make
the distinction in general terms. But their overall criti-
cical reaction to the problem leaves some serious difficul-
ties unresolved. The most obvious one is that they have

52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., p. 48.
54 Ibid.
not yet found a means of reconciling two dramatically opposed religious views in one educational scheme. There is need of some means, perhaps a suitable philosophical apparatus, to effect the reconciliation. In a question that mirrors the conflict between humanistic and religious elements treated earlier, critics respond much the same as they did on the nature of Newman's university, the problem of his grounds, and the question of his view.

Corcoran's position leaves little room for dealing with the problem at all. Although Wise sees in Newman's treatment a recognition of the need of the Church to maintain the integrity of the university, he does not elaborate precisely wherein that unity lies. Harrold draws a sharp line between the faith and the religion of the man of philosophic habit and the Faith and genuine religion of the saint. Harrold sees in the former the intellectual counterfeit of the latter. But he observes primarily in Newman's presentation two parallel lines of development, one of which is characterized by a false religion of sentiment; the other, by a true religion of a sound Christian spirit. One marks the worldly gentleman; the other characterizes the saint.

Culler's position on the matter is not much differ-

55 Harrold, p. 112.

56 Ibid., p. 111.
ent. He affirms the ambivalence in Newman's thought regarding the two religious views. The religion of philosophy, Culler feels, places man in relation to man. The religion of the saint places man in relation to God.\(^{57}\)

But Culler sets strict limits for Newman's university. The university, he observes, can teach faith and morals as subjects, but it cannot teach one "to believe the dogmas of faith or to practice the precepts of morals..."\(^{58}\) Although Culler concedes that the university can be used by the Church for its higher purposes, he thinks Newman does not so use it. Culler does not assert that the faith and morals of a student are to be neglected in Newman's university, for the Church, Culler points out, "would be present there to care for these things just as a doctor might be present to care for a student's health."\(^{59}\) But this stance runs counter to the nature of a close alliance between intellectual culture and spiritual perfection as part of the total education of the university student. In the matter of a truly unified intellectual and spiritual educational program, the faith and morals of a student would not be merely not neglected; they would be positively fostered and advanced.

\(^{57}\) Culler, p. 232.

\(^{58}\) Ibid., p. 261.

\(^{59}\) Ibid.
According to McGrath, on the other hand, Newman's treatment appears to state firstly that any university must inculcate religious expression and leaven all instruction with religion, and then to state that in a Catholic university such religion would be de facto the Catholic religion.\textsuperscript{60}

McGrath goes on to say that in a sermon given shortly after the opening of the university church Newman took as his major theme the refutation of the assumption "that, to be religious, you must be ignorant, and to be intellectual, you must be unbelieving."\textsuperscript{61} Elsewhere in the same sermon, Newman described the interrelation of religious and secular knowledge. McGrath employs Newman's words from another source to show that, in Newman's judgment, the university church symbolized "the great principle of the university, the indissoluble union of philosophy with religion."\textsuperscript{62}

A fifth issue, one of the most important for this study, is the nature of Newman's gentleman. Is he the embodiment of Newman's educational ideal? Does Newman speak of more than one type of gentleman? Should he primarily be interpreted as a worldly or a Christian model? How ser-

\textsuperscript{60} McGrath, p. 170.

\textsuperscript{61} Quoted in McGrath, p. 413, from Sermons on Various Occasions.

\textsuperscript{62} Quoted in McGrath, p. 403, from the Campaign.
iously ought Newman's treatment of him to be taken? That the gentleman is the end product of Newman's university education most critics appear to agree. That the gentleman represents some kind of educational ideal critics also generally grant. There is little critical agreement, however, on whether the gentleman's fundamental nature is Christian or worldly, much less on how seriously Newman's view of him ought to be considered.

Dessain sees Newman's gentleman as "the ideal product of a university, prescinding altogether from religion." Harrold also views him as an ideal and as the product of university training:

"the final product of intellectual cultivation at a university considered apart from religious principle, at once assisting and distorting the development of religious character." Harrold also views him as an ideal and as the product of university training:

Culler too perceives the gentleman as an idealized type. That the gentleman is some type of educational ideal appears not to be at issue. The seriousness of Newman's statement on him, however, is another matter. Although Harrold, Vargish, Griffin, and others assume the position that Newman is quite serious, Culler, Buckler, McGrath, and others advance an ironic or derogatory interpretation which appears to be the more current and popular one. John R.

63Dessain, p. 104.

64Harrold, p. 113.
Griffin attacks the latter stand. He appears most obviously to be addressing himself to Buckler's kind of remark that "the 'gentleman', which is education's best end product, is a figure with which no man of truly imaginative vision would allow himself willingly to be identified."

Griffin cites Newman's remark at the end of Discourse V that "Liberal Education makes not the Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman."

Culler's interpretation of the gentleman also invites special consideration, especially in view of the position on Newman's gentleman this study will advance. According to Culler, Newman did not know what to call his gentleman, and, for want of a better term, he chose to name the one who possesses intellectual cultivation the "man of philosophic habit." For Culler, in addition to being an "idealized type," he is one who reflects an "unattainable ideal" and one whose value is largely "inspirational." He is, moreover, "the living embodiment of Newman's conception of knowledge." His responsibility is to seek the perfection of the intellect: "a clear calm accurate vision

65 *Victorian Prose*, p. 139.
66 Culler, p. 190.
67 Ibid., p. 189.
68 Ibid., p. 190.
and comprehension of all things, as far as the finite mind can embrace them." Equally important is his intellectual duty to be neither too narrow in his range of studies nor superficial in his mastery of them. Culler adds that if there is one thing that characterizes the "man of philosophic habit" more than anything else, it is his ability to view many things "at once as one whole." However, Culler voices his impatience with this ideal because Newman couches its qualifications in "contrasting pairs" and in "negative form." Even more reason for impatience, Culler feels, is the fact that the "man of philosophic habit" emerges from Newman's portrait "not so much a creature of impossible virtues as a creature from whom an impossible number of vices have been subtracted." He asserts that Newman in his efforts to preserve the wholeness of man makes the product of university education the most inefficient of all human types, the "jack-of-all-trades." Finally, in speaking directly of Newman's celebrated definition, Culler states that "it is ironic that this portrait should be taken as a serious expression of Newman's posi-

69 Quoted in Culler, p. 191, from the Idea, p. 139.
70 Culler, p. 191.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid., p. 193.
itive ideal."

In the light of his position that the humanistic view and the religious view in combination enable man to fulfill his nature and to present that nature fully developed in the service of God, I find Culler's ironical treatment of the gentleman inconsistent. Culler identifies the gentleman with the "man of philosophic habit." He constitutes one-half of what Culler calls Newman's positive ideal. If the gentleman represents half of Newman's Christian humanistic ideal, why should he not be taken seriously? If, moreover, the portrait of the gentleman contains Newman's finest comment on the religion of philosophy, a religious view most characteristic of the gentleman and most typical of a more humanistic approach, why would Newman wish this commentary to be viewed ironically? Harrold and other critics stress Newman's point that intellectual cultivation and a religion of philosophy are not enough because they do not add up to Newman's concept of a whole education. To treat Newman's worldly gentleman ironically is to undermine a constitutive element of the total ideal. Such an approach leaves only the Christian part, important as that may be.

There remain two other questions of significance for this study. The first deals with a wholeness of theme in

\[73^{Ibid.}, p. 238.\]
relation to a wholeness of structure. The second concerns the cause and Entity of Newman's idea of a university. Harrold, Culler, McGrath, Svaglic, and others have discussed Newman's theme of the wholeness of knowledge and the integrated view by which this knowledge must be held. Culler and Svaglic have provided excellent analyses of the structure of the Idea. No one, however, has explained the relation of theme to structure in such a way as to show how adequately the structure of the discourses conveys the interrelationship of the various branches of knowledge. If the governing principle of the Idea is one that declares all knowledge to be whole and that proclaims the need of the mind to reflect that wholeness and if the structure of the discourses helps to bear the burden of this theme, then it appears appropriate for the unity of structure to be investigated in relation to the wholeness of theme. The structure of the Idea has its most notable characteristic, wholeness, only according to its reference to theme. The theme of the Idea is a whole of the sort that has two components: a wholeness of subject and a wholeness of view. Correspondingly, the structure of the Idea is another whole that has two parts: one dealing with the relationship of subject to subject; the other, with the mind's interrelating of these subjects by appropriate discourses. Once again, it should be noted that the structure of the Idea appears whole only in relation to the wholeness of theme
The final question pertinent to the scope of this study is the cause and entity of Newman's idea of a university. The problem relates to those previously discussed, especially the one dealing with the fundamental nature of Newman's university because it asks what makes the idea of a university to be what it is, and why it is what it is. I introduce the question not merely to clarify Newman's educational theme but also to provide a philosophical explanation of that which gives the idea its Being, the "connected view." At its core, the question is a philosophical one and must be given a philosophical answer. We have already seen that Newman advocates a liberal education that pursues knowledge for its own sake and that ultimately produces a "habit of mind," the chief attribute of which is a "connected view" of old and new, past and present, far and near. This view perceives many things "at once and as one whole." It grasps not only reality and the branches of knowledge that mirror reality but their relations. It entails a comprehensive perspective or philosophical knowledge that grasps the relationship of all sciences on a natural philosophical level by a man of cultivated intellect who has a predisposition to virtue, though he may more likely be spiritually deficient. It is on the foundation of this rationally connected hold of reality and of all intellectual disciplines, albeit one subject to spiritual
degeneration and moral stagnation, that Newman lays a hope-inducing superstructure of Christ's message and promise which assures that man's real destiny is a God-given immortality. The view of the superstructure embraces a comprehensive perspective of the sciences and of reality by a man of intellectual cultivation whose ultimate purpose is to become a saint with the moral and intellectual attributes of a Philip Neri. In contrast to the secular and mundane goals of the man of philosophical habit, it looks to transcendent and supernatural ones which serve to satisfy both the basic religious and intellectual aspirations of the university educated student. This study's treatment of the cause and Entity of Newman's Idea will limit itself to the philosophical aspect of Newman's whole educational structure.

Not a few literary critics and scholars treat some aspect of Newman's philosophical approach, and some of the major influences thereupon, in the Idea and in his various other works. Speaking of Newman's Grammar of Assent, J. F. Cronin states that in all major issues Newman's position can be reconciled with the philosophy of Aristotle.74 Harrold deals provocatively with Newman's debt to Aristo-

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tle. 75 Culler points to Newman's use of Aristotle's Science of Sciences, and to Newman's concern with the problem of the One and the Many. H. Weatherby addresses his efforts, in part, to Newman's idealism. 76 T. Vargish probes Newman's epistemological framework. 77 Fergal McGrath accounts for Newman's use of some Thomistic principles. Edward Sillem provides a clear introduction to Newman's philosophy in the first part of his two-volume edition. 78 Charles Jessain offers a comprehensive view of introductory studies to Newman's philosophy in his guide to Newmanian philosophical research. 79

Notwithstanding the variety and quality of scholarship and criticism relating to the Idea, I do not believe that anyone has attempted to explain Newman's idea of a university in reference to the cause and principle of its being. No one, so far as I can determine, has tried to analyze what makes the Idea to be what it is and why it is.

75 Harrold, pp. 14, 104, 133-134.

76 H. Weatherby, Cardinal Newman in His Age: His Place in English Theology and Literature (Nashville, 1973).


79 See n. 7, above.
In view of the largely philosophical nature of Newman's total educational ideal and treatment, e.g., philosophical grounds, philosophical habit of mind, philosophical wisdom, religion of philosophy, and man of philosophical habit, such an omission appears a serious one.

In a discussion of the view advocated by the Idea, the question arises whether it should be labeled "a connected view" or "the connected view." The former would be one which sees truth and the relation of the sciences only gradually and in partial steps. The latter would pertain more to the one and only absolutely true view of knowledge and the sciences. Ideally, there is probably "the connected view" or the whole integrated grasp of knowledge and truth toward which the mind should move. Here the object would be truth in all its fullness -- perhaps the Beatific vision of God -- according to one's human capabilities. But even this grasp would be limited and finite because it is grasped humanly, in contrast to the one and only true and complete "connected view" of reality found in the mind of God. Practically, however, the view advocated by Newman as the goal of a university education is a more or less perfect grasp of the relation of one science to another, of one segment of reality to another, as the sciences and the reality they reflect mirror the Ultimate Truth Who is their Source and End. The perception of truth would be gradual and limited according to the individual's capacity to
understand. It would be, however, no mere matter of intellectual cultivation that centers on man but a blend of intellectual and moral cultivation that leads ultimately to God.

This brings us to the point of the importance of Aristotle, especially his doctrine of equivocity by reference and some of his notions on cause and Entity, for this study. Why use Aristotle in an interpretive study of Newman's Idea? Can some of Aristotle's doctrines be employed to explain the integrity of Newman's educational ideal and the unity of his treatment? Is some Aristotelian approach fitting in the light of Newman's educational background and interests, and is it suitable in view of Newman's material and formal presentation in the Idea?

Newman himself observes in Discourse V that "while we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent, being Aristotelians, for the great Master does but analyze the thoughts, feelings, views, and opinions of humankind." Elsewhere he states that Aristotle was "the most comprehensive intellect of Antiquity" and that it was he who "conceived the sublime idea of mapping the whole field of knowledge and subjecting all things to one profound analy-

80 *Idea of a University*, p. 102. A few lines later, Newman adds: "In many subject-matters, to think correctly, is to think like Aristotle."
sis." Then, too, there is the fact that Newman's thought was no doubt affected by the dominant influence Aristotle wielded on the Oxford curriculum till the mid-nineteenth century. Furthermore, the liberal or philosophical knowledge, which Newman advances as the end of a university, exists for its own sake, and it resembles to some extent the wisdom treated by Aristotle in the first book of the *Metaphysics*. Newman even uses terms like "Philosophy" and "First Philosophy" to describe it. Analogues of Newman's premise that philosophical knowledge consists in an awareness of the bearing of one science on another by which the "whole" can be perceived can be found in Coleridge, Gibbon, Bacon, and others, but, ultimately, Newman's approach is an adaptation of Aristotelian doctrines set forth in the *Metaphysics*. It should be noted, however, that while the associations drawn have merit, they must be viewed cautiously. Although Newman's philosophical knowledge does envelop a variety of features similar to those found in Aristotelian wisdom, certain key characteristics can be claimed for it as a whole which distinguish it from the wisdom of Aristotle rather than identify it with that wisdom. Newman's liberal knowledge, for example, at its most

81 Quoted in Culler, p. 187 from the Historical Sketches, pp. 111, 195.

82 Svaglic, p. xv.
Aristotelian is distinct from the wisdom of Aristotle because Newman's consists in an interdisciplinary grasp of the bearing of one branch of knowledge on the other. This is a matter proper to the *Physics*. It is not a study of *Being qua Being* which belongs to the *Metaphysics*. Even so, one still may claim that Newman's philosophical knowledge is wisdom in a secondary sense, if he uses "wisdom" as a term that is equivocal by reference, a consideration that leads us into the major justification of the interpretive scheme to be employed.

For the main reason for using Aristotle in this study centers on the manner in which Aristotle's doctrine of equivocity by reference can be used to clarify the unity of Newman's educational ideal and the way it can be employed to render more intelligible Newman's handling of various issues. Specifically, the doctrine serves to clarify Newman's treatment of a Catholic university and a university in the abstract, theological and philosophical grounds, temporal and eternal "connected views," theme in relation to structure, and worldly man of philosophical habit in reference to the Christian gentleman. Aristotle's doctrine also provides the means to help explain the cause and *Entity* of Newman's idea of a university -- its ultimate "why." Furthermore, Newman's search for unity among a multiplicity of educational elements and his multiple treatment of the university issue, grounds, theme and gentleman,
in the scope of their concern for unity in difference, lend themselves to comparison with that fundamental Greek problem of the One and the Many. Because Aristotle's doctrine of equivocity by reference proves helpful in solving some problems of sameness in difference in Newman's material and formal presentation in the *Idea*, just as it proved helpful in providing a coherent solution to that central problem facing the early Greek philosophers, Aristotle's doctrine appears warranted as a schematic device. Any critical apparatus that would help insure the unity of Newman's educational ideal and the integrity of the elements that elaborate this ideal merits our consideration. Aristotle's doctrine of equivocity by reference, as interpreted by Joseph Owens, is a device that can be presented in such a way that it shores up the unity of Newman's educational doctrine and the integrity of his treatment found in the *Idea*.

While it is true that the reader may not arrive at the final truth of the *Idea*'s unity by such a means, at least he will be given the benefit of a plausible solution to the problems of unity relating to Newman's educational thought, and he will be provided a substantive interpretation of the formal elements whereby Newman presents his university view. The use of an Aristotelian scheme is also

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83 See n. 6, above, for the complete citation of text. Hereafter, this text will be cited as Owens.
supported by our recalling once again Newman's tendency throughout his life to seek a principle of unity among a host of intellectual, educational, and spiritual concerns. In the Idea's discussion of the oneness of reality, the wholeness of knowledge, the comprehensive view of knowledge and reality, and the composite intellectual and spiritual make-up of the ideal product of the university, that lifetime concern is adequately reflected. Given Newman's admiration for Aristotle and Aristotle's influence on Newman's educational development, one sees in the Aristotelian approach a suitable means of pursuing one avenue of Newman's lifetime search.

This interpretation of the Idea is determined by three considerations, if some Aristotelian method is to be followed. The first is that we distinguish clearly the purpose of our interpretation from Newman's formal intent in the Idea. To say that his university issue, grounds, theme, structure, and gentleman can be interpreted after the manner of Aristotelian equivocity by reference is not to say that Newman meant to speak in Aristotelian equivocal terms or that he intended these issues to be so treated. Rather, I mean to say that here is a means whereby the reader may better understand the unity of Newman's educational ideal and the integrity of its treatment in the Idea. But a word of caution is in order. There is an ordinary, common-sense understanding of the word "equivoc-
cal" that is antithetical to the Aristotelian use of the term employed in this study. The two uses must be separated. Aristotelian equivocity by reference does not, according to Owens' interpretation, suggest a use of terms that is intentionally vague, misleading, or ambiguous. It does not suggest a use of terms to deceive, dodge, or hedge. On the contrary, as a later section of this chapter will point out in some detail, \(^8^4\) Aristotelian equivocity by reference refers to things expressed in various ways but always in reference to one nature or form that is the primary form or nature of the thing. Equivocity by reference involves primary and secondary instances of terms and the things they signify. But only the nature or form of one of the things said to be equivocal is primary. Any secondary instance derives its ultimate meaning from that primary nature or form. My Aristotelian use of the term "equivocal" purposes to establish a priority of issues in the Idea. A more current use of the term would more likely provide for a misleading or ambiguous statement regarding their true nature and relationship. So, too, when I claim that some key Aristotelian notions on cause and Entity can be used as part of an interpretive scheme to explain the cause and Entity of Newman's idea of a university, I do

\(^8^4\) See pp. 57-65, below, for an extended discussion of Aristotelian equivocity by reference.
not assert that these Aristotelian ideas were operative in Newman's conception of the university ideal reflected in the lectures. Whether Newman consciously adverted to Aristotle for any of the principles, in terms of which the Idea will be dealt with in this study, is another matter.

A second consideration influencing this treatment of the Idea is the need the Aristotelian scheme satisfies, a matter touched on earlier in the chapter. Although critics recognize Newman's search for a unified educational ideal and even while they acknowledge to some extent his manifold treatment of university issue, grounds and the like in the Idea, they do not provide a satisfactory means of unifying the ideal and elements of Newman's presentation. Culler appears to come the closest, but even he does not go far enough. For Culler points out that the central intellectual problem of Newman's formative years was the problem of the one and the many. He adds that all of the basic problems found in the man of philosophical habit are forms of this root issue and stem from Newman's conception of knowledge. In short, Culler sees Newman's problem as one dealing with the way in which the mind can reconcile the unity its nature so badly needs with the multiplicity of

85 Culler, p. 204.

86 Ibid.
the external world. Culler reduces Newman's problem of educational unity, with its implications for an educational ideal, to a philosophical problem. But philosophical problems require philosophical solutions. If the basic problem of educational unity for Newman is seen by Culler in the light of the one and the many issue, then Culler's solution to Newman's problem should take into account a scheme that also addresses itself to that fundamental question raised by early Greek thinkers.

What is needed is an interpretation that goes a step beyond Culler. What is needed is one that shows the central problem of unity in Newman's educational ideal, i.e., how all knowledge interrelates and the need of the mind to show that interrelation, to have its correlative in Newman's manifold treatment of the elements that elaborate the oneness of knowledge and view in the Idea. What is needed is an interpretive mechanism, such as Aristotelian equivocity by reference, that not only clarifies Newman's cardinal principle of the wholeness of knowledge and the need of the mind to reflect that wholeness in its view, that not only serves to reconcile Newman's multiple approach to the issues of the nature of a university, the grounds of the study, the nature of a "connected view," and his idea of a gentleman, but one that also clarifies, unifies, and reconcile these issues in terms of a specific doctrine geared to answer the problem of sameness in dif-
A third consideration affecting this analysis of the Idea is that the interpretive scheme be harmonious with those elements to which it is applied. In order to give the reader a general sense of the critical mechanism involved and some estimate of its applicability, I will offer an explanation of Aristotelian equivocity by reference, as interpreted by Owens, and I will cite three ways the doctrine will be applied in this study. The overview of Aristotle's doctrine will be drawn from Joseph Owens' solid, scholarly interpretation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Apart from its other notable qualities, Owens' work provides an appropriate Aristotelian critical apparatus suited to the purpose of this study. In its elaboration of Aristotle's doctrine of equivocity by reference, it supplies a plausible means to explain Newman's manifold treatment of elements in the Idea. It also furnishes background on Aristotelian notions dealing with the principles involved in sensible change and the Being of sensible realities. What Owens' thesis does, in short, is afford the critical reader that Aristotelian unifying device necessary to "form" a helpful, more philosophically "connected view" of what makes Newman's idea to be what it is, even while it

87It is mandatory to indicate which of Aristotle's interpreters will be used, inasmuch as their analyses of Aristotelian theory oftentimes differ so markedly.
provides him with the no less important means of unifying Newman's multiple treatment of university issue, grounds, theme, and gentleman in a manner and to an extent not previously attempted. In this study, equivocality by reference will be applied in three ways: first, to Newman's treatment of the following issues: a Catholic university and a university in the abstract, theological and philosophical grounds, temporal and eternal "connected views," theme in relation to structure, and worldly man of philosophical habit in reference to a Christian gentleman; second, to the "connected view" as a cause or principle of change; and third, to the "connected view" as that which gives Entity to Newman's idea of a university. But first an explanation of Aristotelian equivocality is in order.

According to Owens, to understand Aristotle's philosophy, especially his Metaphysics, one must understand his doctrine of equivocality. If he does not, the reader may very well find himself hopelessly lost in a maze of confusion and ambiguities as he attempts to understand the Aristotelian text. But understanding Aristotle's use of equivocals also presents some problems. Part of the difficulty lies in the equivocal nature of equivocality. Aristotle's use of the term is manifold. So many of the things he studies and the terms he employs are equivocal. "Being",

88 Owens, p. 121.
"entity," "cause," "wisdom," and "form" provide a few examples. In his profound concern with the study of sensible things, Aristotle looks at things with the same name to determine whether they are expressed univocally or equivocally. He studies them to ascertain how they are the same in form yet different. He finds that things are in some ways the same and in other ways different. Always his focus is on things known directly and in themselves. Aristotle looks for a universal form within sensible things. He wants to know how a "many" can be a "one." He finds the answer in the form or definition of the thing on a physical level and in the Entity or being of the thing on a metaphysical plane. His doctrine of equivocity is the general means of Aristotle’s physical and metaphysical solution to the problem of how a "many" can be a "one," and its most important element is form.

The Aristotelian doctrine of equivocity concerns "things said -- or meant in many ways." The doctrine embraces terms, concepts, and definitions and the things

89Ibid., p. 126.

90Ibid., p. 127.

91Ibid., p. 130.

92Ibid., pp. 129, 132.

93Ibid., p. 118.
defined. It should be noted, however, that although words and concepts can be said to be used equivocally, it is things that are primarily equivocal.\(^94\) That is Aristotle's primary concern -- the equivocal nature of things. Secondly, he is interested in the equivocity of words and concepts. Once again, Aristotle's procedure, according to Owens, involves looking at things denominated by the same name to determine whether the things are expressed univocally or equivocally.\(^95\) If they are expressed equivocally, Aristotle assigns reasons for the equivocity. He studies and cites various ways the things are equivocally stated. He does not restrict terms to one exact meaning. Rather, he employs them univocally or equivocally as the terms and the things being treated demand.\(^96\) Aristotle's central interest in the matter may be summed up as a search for same-ness in difference.

Understanding Aristotle's doctrine of equivocity imposes two obligations on the reader. One is to determine what is the primary and fundamental meaning of the term, or more precisely, the primary and fundamental nature of the thing signified by the term. The second is to locate sec-

\(^94\)Ibid., p. 130.
\(^95\)Ibid., p. 126.
\(^96\)Ibid.
ondary instances of the term or of the thing signified and to assign some proportional relation of the secondary instance to the primary one. Having done this, the reader will be well on his way to understanding the fundamental meaning of the term and the primary nature of the thing signified, as Aristotle explains it.

Owens further points out that, in the *Categories*, Aristotle mentions univocals, equivocals and paronyms when he speaks of the three classes of things.97 Univocals are things that have a common name and definition. "Animal," for example, is defined the same both in man and ox.98 Equivocals, on the other hand, are things that have a common name but different definitions. In Owens' words, "the things are equivocal, the name is identical, and the definitions (as denoted by the name) are different."99 Paronyms are the third class of things described by Aristotle. Paronyms differ on the basis of what Owens calls grammatical distinctions. For example, grammarians are named from "grammar," the brave from "bravery," senator from "senate," and so on.100 Today, univocals, equivocals, and paronyms,

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98 *Ibid*.
or their literal equivalents, designate terms for the most part. For Aristotle, however, they were defined as things.\(^{101}\) All three classes of things merit consideration, but in view of the scope of this study, equivocals, especially equivocals by reference, warrant our closest attention.

In Owens' view, Aristotle speaks of three types of equivocal: equivocals by chance, equivocals by analogy, and equivocals by reference.\(^ {102}\) Equivocals are "things expressed in various ways."\(^ {103}\) Things are equivocal whose definitions differ but whose names are the same.\(^ {104}\) There are, however, degrees of difference in the definitions. The degree of difference involved in the definition determines what type of equivocality is involved. The difference is total in the case of equivocals by chance, the first type of equivocal Aristotle treats.\(^ {105}\) Equivocals by chance have a common name but totally different defini-

\(^{101}\) Ibid., p. 112. The definition of univocals, equivocals, and paronyms as things would not prevent Aristotle from saying, for example, that a word is used "equivocally." It is just that Aristotle's approach appears consistently to be on the side of things.

\(^{102}\) Ibid., p. 118.

\(^{103}\) Ibid., p. 115.

\(^{104}\) Ibid., p. 121.

\(^{105}\) Ibid.
tions. "Date" meaning the fruit of a tree and "date" signifying a day of the month serve to illustrate this type. The only thing in common is the name, and that is attributed by mere chance. In equivocals by analogy, another type Aristotle proposes, the difference in definition may not exclude a certain unity. Owens cites Aristotle's definition: "By the analogies I mean when the second is related to the first as the fourth is related to the third." Owens notes, moreover, that analogy is the principle of metaphor: "As the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the shameless man to his victim." He concludes that, for Aristotle, "the analogous is also found naturally located in the things themselves."

Equivocals by reference are the third type Aristotle discusses. Here again the difference in definition does not exclude a certain unity. This time it is by reference. Once again, in one sense, the definitions are the same: in another sense, they are different. In this type of equivocity, things are expressed in various ways but always in reference to something one or in reference to one nature

106 Ibid., p. 110.
107 Ibid., p. 123.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
or form that is the primary form or nature of the thing. Differences are overshadowed by some degree of sameness -- of unity, but the differences are still present, and the true nature of the term or of the thing it signifies is to be found only in the primary instance. Equivocity by reference, then, involves primary and secondary instances of terms and the things they signify. The primary or fundamental instance of the true nature of the things is signified by the primary instance of the term. Correspondingly, a secondary instance of the true form or nature is signaled by a secondary use of the term. Furthermore, every secondary instance of the term and that signified has a special independent relation to the primary term and thing.

Three dominant conclusions emerge from Owens' treatment of Aristotle's equivocity by reference. One is that, for Aristotle, terms equivocal by reference reflect the equivocity found in things. A second is that equivocity by reference involves two terms, in contrast to at least four found in equivocity by analogy. One term and thing are primary in importance because it is only in reference to that term and thing that proportional secondary instances have their meaning. But only the nature or form of one of

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111 Ibid., p. 119.

112 Ibid., p. 125.
the two things said to be equivocal is primary. In reference to that, the secondary instance derives its form. The final deals with the need on the part of the reader to recognize the two terms involved and to locate primary and secondary instances of the true meaning of the terms and the fundamental nature or form of the things these equivocal terms signify.

Owens cites various examples of this type offered by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*. For example, a medical treatise and a medical knife are called "medical" through reference to something one, medical science.\(^\text{113}\) The treatise "proceeds from medical science;" the knife is "useful to it."\(^\text{114}\) The form or nature of "medical," here, is located in the primary instance, "medical science," not in the secondary instances of the treatise or the knife, even though they do have their own forms. Each of the secondary instances has a special independent relationship to medical science. Owens points out in Aristotle's words that various things are "medical by reference to medical science -- for one thing is called medical because it possesses medical science, another through being naturally adapted to it, and another through being a function of medical sci-

\(^{113}\text{Ibid., p. 119.}\)

\(^{114}\text{Ibid.}\)
ence."\textsuperscript{115} In a second example drawn from the \textit{Metaphysics}, Owens speaks of things said to be healthy, e.g., healthy color, healthy exercise and so forth. Aristotle explains these instances by stating that "everything healthy is expressed in reference to health, one thing through preserving health, another through producing health, another through being a sign of health...."\textsuperscript{116} Accordingly, the nature expressed in the instance of healthy color, healthy food, and healthy exercise would be found only in the "disposition of the bodily organism."\textsuperscript{117} The other instances have their own proper forms or different natures, but they also have a unity of reference to the nature of the primary instance, that is, in Owens' words, they "are of such a nature as to have some reference to health...."\textsuperscript{118}

But what has Aristotle's doctrine of equivocality by reference to do with the scope of this study? How specifically does it apply to Newman's multiple treatment? In an earlier discussion of certain basic problems raised by the

\textsuperscript{115}Quoted in Owens, p. 119, from Book IV of the \textit{Metaphysics}.

\textsuperscript{116}Quoted in Owens, p. 119, from Book IV of the \textit{Metaphysics}.

\textsuperscript{117}Owens, p. 119.

\textsuperscript{118}\textit{Ibid.}
Idea and in our review of some critical literature pertinent to these problems, we saw that Newman treats various elements comprising his formal and material presentation with more than one voice. We saw that Newman's dual presentation pointed, for example, to a relationship between Catholic university and university in the abstract that was not simple but reflected the complexity of sameness and difference found in Newman's exposition of philosophical and theological grounds, natural and supernatural "connected views," religion of reason and religion of Faith, theme and structure, worldly gentleman and Christian gentleman. We also saw a complexity of sameness and difference in Newman's treatment of these elements as issues. Which are the most important, and which one is Newman's primary question? At the time, I asked how Newman's multiple treatment of these issues could be unified in some measure. How can the questions of Newman's university issue, grounds, theme, gentleman and the like be said to be the same yet different as issues? I also inquired just how Newman may be said to speak variously of grounds, theme, religion and gentleman, and yet be said to speak of grounds, theme, structure and gentleman with some degree of sameness or measure of unity. The question was, and it re-

\[119\text{See p. } 15, \text{ above.}\]

\[120\text{See p. } 19, \text{ above.}\]
mains, whether Newman's manifold treatment of elements can be made one. Aristotle's doctrine of equivocity by reference, as interpreted by Owens, appears ready to supply a solution worthy of our consideration.

Judged in the light of Aristotelian equivocity, "issue" is the first term that should be treated as an equivocal by reference. All of the issues treated earlier as part of the scope of this study suggest a certain unity by reference to each other: Catholic University to secular university, theological to philosophical grounds, Christian gentleman to the worldly man of philosophic habit, and so forth. But these issues also suggest a proportional reference of secondary issues to the primary one. In the Aristotelian context proposed, Newman may be said to express the issues of the Idea in various ways but always in reference to something one, that is, in reference to one issue that is primary or fundamental. Although the differences in the definitions of the issues are restricted by some degree of sameness, i.e., that they are all issues relating to the primary one in some way, still the differences are evident, and the true nature of the term "issue" is to be found only in the primary instance. In this interpretation, the nature of a Catholic University is the primary issue of the Idea. The nature of a university in the abstract, grounds, theme, religion and gentleman are issues only in reference to that primary one. Each one of these secondary issues has a special independent relation to the
primary one. Each depends on the primary issue for its ultimate form and meaning as an issue in the context of the idea. But the nature expressed in the instances of secular university, grounds, theme, religion, and gentleman as issues is to be found primarily in the question of what is the nature of a Catholic university. Each has its own proper form or different nature as an issue. All have a unity of reference to the nature of the primary instance in that they contribute in some way to the fashioning of Newman's Catholic university ideal.

Newman's treatment of issues is not the only one that may profitably be viewed in terms of Aristotelian equivocity by reference in order to render his educational ideal and the formal elements of its presentation more unified and intelligible. As we suggested earlier, Newman's exposition of the relationships of Catholic University to secular university, supernatural to natural grounds, eternal to temporal "connected view," wholeness of theme to wholeness of structure, religion of Faith to religion of reason, and Christian gentleman to worldly gentleman may also be so considered. Here, of course, the focus is on the relationship of grounds to grounds, view to view, gentleman to gentleman, and the like, rather than on their importance as secondary issues in relation to the primary one of the nature of a Catholic University. In this context, "grounds," "view," "religion," "wholeness" of theme and
structure, and "gentleman" emerge not as univocal terms of equal importance and meaning but as equivocal ones whose significance is to be determined by the importance of that to which each term and what it signifies primarily refers. Here again we have instances of terms and things whose definitions show a degree of sameness in difference. Once more, secondary instances have their own proper forms or different natures, but they also show a unity of reference to the nature of the primary instance. In the process of locating primary and secondary instances of these terms, one observes that the Idea's philosophical grounds are called "grounds" through reference to its theological grounds, its temporal "connected view" is called "view" through reference to its eternal "connected view," its wholeness of structure would be "whole" through reference to a wholeness of theme, and its man of philosophic habit is called "gentleman" through reference to its Christian gentleman. Philosophical grounds, temporal "connected view," wholeness of structure, and worldly gentleman would be secondary instances whose importance derives only from their relation to the primary ones, at least in the context of this Aristotelian approach to Newman's Idea.

To understand better the second general application of Aristotelian equivocality by reference to the Idea, that is, to the "connected view" as a cause and term equivocal by reference and as a principle of the change from unrelat-
ed branches of knowledge to interconnected branches viewed in one whole interdisciplinary grasp, it may be useful at this point to review some aspects of Aristotle's approach to cause as interpreted by Owens. Such an overview centers on the motivation, starting point, procedure, and goal that Owens sees Aristotle employing.\textsuperscript{121} To supply motivation and an irrefutable basis for philosophical speculation, Aristotle states that "all men by nature desire to know."\textsuperscript{122} This desire for knowledge exists apart from an utilitarian concern.\textsuperscript{123} Man needs to know the causes of the material universe, and he seeks this knowledge for its own sake. Aristotle goes on to his starting point, sensible reality.\textsuperscript{124} He begins with things of the sensible universe and wonders what are the elements or principles by which such things can be made more intelligible. The Stagirite finds these elements to be real physical principles.\textsuperscript{125} Every object in the sensible universe, he observes, is a union of two ultimate principles: the material constituent or matter, and the formal principle or form, which makes the sen-

\textsuperscript{121}Owens, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{122}Ibid., p. 158.
\textsuperscript{123}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{124}Ibid., p. 172.
\textsuperscript{125}Ibid., p. 174.
sible object to be what it is. This union is an internal one in which that which has the capacity to become a determinate sensible thing does become a determinate sensible thing. The union is one in which undetermined matter which has the potentiality to become an actual, informed sensible reality does become a definite, actual, informed sensible reality.

This explanation of sensible things by means of internal, constitutive principles of matter and form also involves science or knowledge or the causes of things, a consideration which leads into Aristotle's procedural explanation of sensible things through their causes. Strictly speaking, matter and form are the ultimate constitutive principles that make up a sensible object. Again, the matter is that out of which something is made. The form is that which gives matter its determination. For example, the form or shape of a man informs the matter of marble to make up the statue of a man. However, in speaking of knowledge of this or any other sensible object, Aristotle describes these two internal principles, and two external elements as well, in terms of causality. He sees them as physical principles, components, producers, and ends involved in the physical change of what is potentially a sensible reality to what becomes actually a sensible reality. 126

126 Ibid.
Aristotle calls these principles and elements "causes" and speaks thus of them in the *Physics*:

> The causes are expressed in four ways. Of these we say that one cause is the Entity, and the what-is-Being..., another the matter and substrate, a third that from which motion takes its source, and a fourth the cause corresponding to this, the purpose and the good....\(^{127}\)

Aristotle's goal is the ultimate cause that fully and finally answers the questions about which man naturally wonders.\(^ {128}\)

How does this treatment by Owens relate to our consideration of the "connected view" as the cause of Newman's idea of a university? In the process of determining how the "connected view" makes Newman's idea of a university to be what it is, this study will address itself to the internal and external elements involved in the change of mere undetermined learning to determined interrelated learning. The causes studied in this inquiry will be four: the material cause or that out of which the idea of a university is made; the formal cause or that which makes the idea to be what it is; the efficient cause or that from which the movement from unrelated disciplines to related disciplines takes its source; and the final cause, the end or good for which the idea exists. Following Owens' interpretation of


Aristotle's treatment, we will use "cause" as a term equivocal by reference. The causes of the idea of a university will be expressed in various ways, and they will be denominated "cause" only in reference to one cause, the formal cause or "connected view." The burden will be to establish the nature of the four causes, to locate the instances in which the term "cause" can be applied, and to establish some proportional relationship of the instances, one to another. The primary instance of causality will be found in the "connected view." Other principles or conditions of the idea will be said to have their own definitions as the undetermined material of the idea, as that from which the movement of the idea stems, or as that good towards which it moves, but these will be treated as secondary instances of cause.

Our third application of Aristotelian equivocality by reference in this study deals with the term "entity" as an equivocal by reference and how the "connected view" is that which gives Entity to Newman's idea of a university. But this analysis also requires some elaboration of Owens' interpretation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Chapters 3-12, 14, and 19 of Owens' work appear especially helpful in this effort. It is from these sections that I submit a "vocabulary" of Being and summary statement of that part of Aristotle's doctrine of Being, as interpreted and formulated by Owens, which applies to our study. Hopefully, the termin-
ology presented and the doctrine of Being drawn, though dealt with in summary form, will give the reader a reasonable indication of the Aristotelian terminology to be employed in this study of what gives Newman's idea of a university its ultimate principle of Being. Terminology will be clarified and the Aristotelian doctrine expanded in the course of the study as the need arises.

According to Owens, Aristotle's total doctrine of Being has to be "reconstructed" because the notion of Being advanced in the earlier books of *Metaphysics* is not completely developed in the later ones or, at least, their extant versions. The Aristotelian doctrine on Being outlined here is Owens' "reconstruction" based on evidence in the present *Metaphysics*.\(^{129}\) The vocabulary Owens proposes reflects his efforts to render the material of Aristotle's doctrine on Being in the closest possible alliance with the form of its original expression.\(^{130}\)

For Aristotle, Being, as that which signifies whatever is, is a concept or common predicate. But a difficult problem arises in the translation, much less correct interpretation, of what Aristotle precisely means by Being. Aristotle uses *ousia*, and even in its primary significations, the word appears to have various meanings. For it


means the primary instance of Being. Upon it all other Being has some dependence. It is the cause of Being in things. It often signifies something concrete, and it often refers to something individual. Owens does not wish to use ousia. Neither does he wish to employ "substance" or "essence" in order to express Aristotle's concept of Being. In their place, he substitutes the term "Entity" as that word best able to describe the equivocal notion, or more precisely, the equivocal nature of the sensible things Aristotle treats.

An important key, then, to understanding Owens' interpretation of Aristotle's treatment of Being is that all-important equivocal term "Entity" by which Being is expressed in various ways but always in reference to something one or in reference to one form. Entity is the primary instance of Being. It alone contains in itself the true nature of Being, and only in reference to Entity are all other things said to have Being. In using Entity as an equivocal by reference, Owens handles Aristotle's treatment of different sensible things with reference to the nature of their primary instance, or secondary instances in rela-

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131 Ibid., p. 138.
132 Ibid., p. 140.
133 Ibid., p. 153. Owens capitalizes "Entity" to show the reader that it is being used to render the Aristotelian ousia.
tion to primary instances. Entity expresses the primary and secondary instances of the being of sensible things in proper relation. It is the guide to the things denoted, and it assumes the meaning of all instances encountered. From these considerations, "Entity" emerges as a comprehensive equivocal term that expresses the ultimate principles of unity and permanence in concrete things. It is the permanent foundational principle of their being. It is the principle of sameness common to everything that is being. Entity is that which remains permanent notwithstanding the changes something undergoes. The primary instance of entity in a sensible thing is its form or what-IS-being. This form expresses timeless being or what essentially and necessarily is being. The what-IS-being expresses the formal, intelligible perfection of a thing. It is that by which the thing is known.

According to Owens' interpretation, the problem of being becomes the problem of Entity. Among other things, "Entity" means the formal cause of the Physics. Entity also means that permanent substrate that does not change in sensible things, while its "affections" do. Entity means the ultimate subject of predication and of accidental change. Entity means the substrate of the accidents, the matter, the form and the composite in that substrate. 134

134 Ibid., p. 456.
Primary Entity means a form without matter or a form that does not inform matter. 135

The primary instance of Being in the *Metaphysics* is Entity. The primary instance of Entity in sensible things is the form. Moreover, efficient, final, and material causes have their ultimate basis in the formal cause. Owens sees the Aristotelian formal cause as the "act" or "energy" observed in sensible things. Owens further points out that while the Aristotelian form contains elements of the Platonic form, in that it is "knowable," "determined," "necessary," and "unchangeable," the Aristotelian form is essentially actual, in contrast to the potentiality and the passivity of the Platonic form. 136 The Aristotelian form is essentially act, and something that does act, does know, and does provide "knowability" to composite sensible things. Again, the Aristotelian forms are "knowings," by way of contrast to the Platonic "knowables." 137

Furthermore, Owens notes that things differ specifically because of their different formal causes. Each one of the specific forms or separate Entities is a "what-IS-


The presence of matter, that which is unknowable, differentiates them, not by adding to the form, but by introducing plurality and indefiniteness. For Owens, Aristotle explains plurality within sensible species thus: he begins with that which is knowable in the sensible universe; he perceives a variety of forms, separate Entities or "what-IS-Being" in different things; he reduces these forms to some kind of unity. Aristotle does not, in Owens' thesis, choose a "one" and ask how it can be a "many." Rather, he takes a "many" and questions how it can be one.\textsuperscript{139} His response is the unity of a form that gives Entity and Being to the matter and the composite. Again, Entity as formal cause is form as act. Ultimately, sensible things have "Entity" because their form is, or can share, in the permanence of the "eternal" and "divine."\textsuperscript{140}

In explaining the science of Being \textit{qua} Being, Owens explicates the science of Entity and so adds to our understanding of Aristotle's use of the term. According to

\textsuperscript{138}Ibid., p. 459. Although somewhat of an oversimplification, it is not too far wide of the mark to say that for Owens the "what-is" pertains to the matter of a thing; the "what-IS-Being," to its form. Owens capitalizes the "is" to signify that the word expresses "timeless Being" as the basis of formal necessity.

\textsuperscript{139}Ibid., p. 460.

\textsuperscript{140}Ibid., pp. 461-463.
Aristotle, as interpreted by Owens, there is a science of Being **qua** Being. It is the science that concerns Being universally.\(^{141}\) Man naturally seeks to know the "first causes" of Being according as it is Being. These four "first causes" must be considered in a unity that binds them under one science. In such a context, all causes pertain to one nature, namely, Being "qua" Being.\(^{142}\) Owens recapitulates Aristotle's manifold use of Being in reference to some things as Entity, to others as "affections" of Entity, to still others as they are "corruptions," "privations" etc. -- all instances of Being referring back to the primary instance of Being, Entity.\(^{143}\) It is the primary instance that contains the true nature of Being. Accordingly, Being, or Being according as it is Being, or the true nature of Being, can be found in Entity alone.\(^{144}\) Being thus considered is not, in Owens' interpretation, used as a genus, but as an equivocal by reference.\(^{145}\) Only


\(^{143}\) *Ibid.*, p. 265. Being, dealt with in the metaphysics is expressed in many ways. As an equivocal by reference, Being denotes one nature, as well as many natures. Its true nature is that of its primary instance, Entity. But Entity has primary and secondary instances also. Form is the primary instance of Entity in sensible things.


thus can there be one science that deals with all Being. Things will be denominated Being, mediately or immediately, by reference to Entity. Entity comes across as the common nature referred to by everything considered as Being. All "first causes" pertain to Being "qua" Being. All relate to Entity and are applicable to whatever Entity includes.

In relation to matter as Entity, Owens points out that for Aristotle the most distinctive characteristic of matter is its potentiality. Matter alone has no determination of Being. Only form gives it that determination. Something can be or not be. This capability is, for Aristotle, the matter. It is the matter of a thing that enables it to become something else. Matter is an expression of the "what-is" of a thing. The "what-is" can be considered the thing's matter; it can also be viewed as form in the sense that the matter gets its actuality from the form. So too, may the "what-is" refer to the composite in the context that there is under consideration the matter al-

146 Ibid., p. 270. Under consideration here are different expressions of Being, not divisions of Being. Being extends to its various instances as an equivocal by reference. Again, the primary instance of Being is Entity.

147 Ibid., pp. 272-273.

148 Ibid., p. 339. One may express Entity as matter, but only in a secondary and potential way.
ready determined by some form.\textsuperscript{149} The "what-Is-Being," however, refers only to the form.\textsuperscript{150} The matter may be considered the thing itself. The matter is the thing viewed as potency. It is in reference to form, and so, in reference to Entity, that matter is said to be or to have some Being. In short, matter is a secondary and potential expression of Entity because whatever Entity it has derives from a form.\textsuperscript{151} There appears to be consistently present for Owens a significant identification of Entity, form and act with determination.

For Aristotle, in Owens' view, form is act; matter, potency. Aristotle treats of a potency "to be acted upon," as well as a potency "of acting upon something else."\textsuperscript{152} Accordingly, he distinguishes act and movement. Act does not seek an end outside of itself. The end of the act is the act itself. In movement, however, act is the thing being acted upon.\textsuperscript{153} The more perfect kind of act is that in which the act is agent. Act has priority over all kinds

\textsuperscript{149} "But to know a thing is to know its "what-Is-Being," not its "what-is."

\textsuperscript{150} The "what-Is-Being" is that which belongs by its own proper nature. "what-Is-Being," is per se.

\textsuperscript{151}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 345.

\textsuperscript{152}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 403.

\textsuperscript{153}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 404-405.
of potency.\textsuperscript{154} Potency can be understood only in relation to act. These considerations relate especially to the final cause. So considered, the final cause is ultimately the formal because that is the purpose intended -- the end of the act is the act itself.\textsuperscript{155}

Again, it is significant to note for this study that all Aristotelian causes, as interpreted by Owens, have their ultimate basis in the formal cause. Efficient causality is described in reference to form. The form is the agent that can cause that form elsewhere. The efficient cause of one thing can be considered formally identical to the formal cause of that same thing. Efficient causality is "imperfect" and "incomplete" because it finds its complete actuality only in something else.\textsuperscript{156} When agent and patient are in proper relation, a certain effect is inevitable. The actuality of the efficient cause is in the patient, not in the agent, which, considered as a perfect form, cannot have any actuality outside of itself.

Owens also makes the final cause dependent on the formal in his explication of Aristotle's position. The final cause is ultimately the form because that is the purpose intended in the instance of act when the end of the

\textsuperscript{154}Ibid., p. 406.

\textsuperscript{155}Ibid., p. 407.

\textsuperscript{156}Ibid., p. 406.
act is the act itself.\textsuperscript{157} Ultimately, there is involved a search for the unchangeable and permanent -- what Owens calls "the restless seeking of the divine, the imitation of the divine."\textsuperscript{158} Finally, material causality is identifiable with formal causality. The matter is the form potentially, and it can be known and explained only in terms of form. In short, all causality, in Owens' scheme, must be considered in relation to formal causality, for only to the formal cause can each of the other three ultimately be reduced.

In relation to our study of what gives Newman's idea of a university its Entity, Entity will be treated as an equivocal by reference. Its primary instance will be located in the form of the idea, the "connected view," for that makes the idea to be what it is and explains why it essentially and necessarily is. Again, it is important to note here that if Newman's idea of a university is to be known at all, it will have to be known after the manner of Entity. For, as Aristotle points out, to know anything is to know it as Entity. Accordingly, to know the idea of a university is to grasp its form, what-Is-Being or Entity. Knowledge of the idea requires a reduction of knowledge to Entity because in seeking the Being of the idea we are

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{157}Ibid., p. 407.
\item \textsuperscript{158}Ibid., p. 469.
\end{itemize}
seeking its Entity. The Entity of the idea is identifiable with its formal cause, the "connected view."

Furthermore, in seeking to explain the Entity of the idea of a university, we should bear in mind that the fundamental question concerns why the matter of mere learning or unrelated sciences is something. The answer, of course, is the form or what-Is-Being of the idea. The interdisciplinary grasp is the cause of the idea's Being. Accordingly, we must look to this form for the Entity of the idea. The idea has Entity or Beingness only because of its form. In the foregoing context, the four causes are conceived in much the same way as before. Only now, they will be treated not so much as principles of change, but rather, as principles of the idea's Being. Once again, material, efficient and final causes will be absorbed in a study of the formal cause since it alone constitutes the primary instance of Entity. It alone is the primary cause of the idea's Beingness.

After these lengthy but necessary considerations of the relevance of the Idea and its quest for unity, some problems and critical literature pertinent to the scope of this analysis of the Idea, the Aristotelian schema to be employed and the reasons for its use, one more task remains in the chapter, namely, a summary statement of this study's purpose. Basically, its aim is to present an exposition of the argument of the Discourses and to interpret the argu-
ment in terms of an Aristotelian framework. Specifically, the study calls for an adaptation of Aristotelian equivocity by reference to these areas of the Idea: first, to its issues, grounds, theme, structure, and gentleman; second, to the "connected view" as the cause or principle of the change from unrelated disciplines to sciences grasped in a unified, interdisciplinary fashion; and third, to the "connected view" as that which gives Entity to the idea of a university. The object of this adaptation is to render the content of Newman's artistic statement on the nature of university education more meaningful, his structure more intelligible, and his total presentation more unified. The means to this end is Joseph Owens' interpretation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. For it enables one to show the extent to which Aristotle's treatment of the unchangeable in changing sensible things, his efforts to reduce a plurality of forms to some type of unity, and the manner in which Aristotle's notions on equivocity, cause and Entity can be employed to reduce Newman's multiple treatment of scope, grounds, theme, and gentleman to some kind of unity, even while these notions enable one to see better what makes Newman's idea of a university to be what it is.

Aristotle's treatment of equivocity by reference, cause, and Entity, as interpreted by Owens, also lends itself to a more effective analysis of the unifying view that forms the idea of a university, a totality that determines
the structure of its presentation, and an integrity that characterizes the living embodiment of Newman's ideal — the natural man of philosophic habit whose potential Newman expands by means of a supernatural view. Again, Newman's approach to view is twofold in the Idea. In terms of Aristotelian equivocity by reference, the primary instance of the view advanced is that "connected view" or interdisciplinary grasp of all sciences by a man of intellectual culture in whom Faith and reason are allied. A man with such a view actively cultivates his mind, and he even more actively pursues Christian perfection. His is a joint venture having natural and supernatural overtones. In the case of this primary instance of view, the nature of a Catholic university emerges as the primary university issue, theological and supernatural as the primary instance of grounds, and the Christian gentleman as the primary instance of the university's human product. In the light of Aristotelian equivocity by reference, the secondary instance of view advocated is that interdisciplinary grasp of the sciences held by a man of purely intellectual culture. In the context of this view, the nature of a university considered apart from the Church surfaces as Newman's secondary university issue, philosophical or natural lines of inquiry as the secondary instance of grounds, and the man of purely intellectual refinement as the secondary instance of Newman's gentleman.
Newman's educational ideal encompasses spiritual as much as it does intellectual growth. It looks to the development of the whole man whose integrated view, according to its capacity, embraces all branches of knowledge with the philosophical habit serving as its system and Revelation as its guide. Newman's ideal seeks out the mysteries of reality and the wisdom of the universe. It aims at the satisfaction of man's loftiest aspirations for truth and human perfection. But more than this, it purposes to lead him to the End of Truth or Source of Perfection that gives all things their ultimate meaning and value.
CHAPTER II

THE TYPE OF BUILDING:

BASIC ISSUES IN NEWMAN'S PREFACE

As I indicated in Chapter I, this study of the Idea addresses itself to a number of basic issues notable for the critical controversy they have aroused. Three of these questions Newman raises and tentatively answers in the Preface. The first considers the nature of a Catholic University. A second deals with the nature of a university considered apart from any relation to the Church. The third concerns the nature of Newman's gentleman. As I also pointed out in the previous chapter, each issue has been subjected to critical investigation under such varied headings as Newman's alleged severance of intellect from virtue, his conflicting presentation of religious and humanistic elements, and his serious or ironic treatment of the gentleman. Earlier, I proposed that the major obstacle to ascertaining Newman's ultimate responses to various issues is his multiple treatment of the issues. Further, I suggested that Newman speaks with two voices; and that, if Newman's manifold treatment of issues is to be reconciled, there will have to be found some unifying principle to effect a reconciliation.
In my review of critical literature on the Idea, I looked to a number of highly qualified commentators on Newman's Catholic university and secular university issues and found an abundance of incisive commentary but no unifying key. As a result, I proposed one in the form of Aristotle's doctrine of equivocity by reference as interpreted by Joseph Owens. The purpose of this chapter will be to implement that proposal in regard to the issues advanced in the Preface. I will do so, first, by an elaboration of the argument Newman supplies in response to the nature of a Catholic university and in response to the nature of a university abstractly considered; and second, by an interpretation of these issues and responses in terms of Aristotelian equivocity by reference.

Using "issue" as a term equivocal by reference, I propose to unify in some measure Newman's treatment of issues in the Preface and to determine which issue is his fundamental one. All of the issues discussed earlier as part of the scope of this study suggest a certain unity by reference to each other. These issues include: the nature of a Catholic university, the nature of a secular university, the grounds of the inquiry, the nature of the "connected view," and the type of gentleman. All issues, except, of course, the primary one, also suggest a proportional reference of secondary issues to the primary one. In the context of Aristotelian equivocity by reference, Newman ex-
presses the issues of the Idea in various ways but always in reference to one issue that is primary. Although the differences in the issues are restricted by some degree of sameness, i.e., that they are issues, yet the differences remain, and the true nature of the term "issue" is to be found only in the primary instance of issue. In this study, the nature of a Catholic university will be treated as the primary issue. The others will be viewed as issues only in reference to that question. Each secondary issue, including the two -- the nature of a secular university and the type of gentleman -- raised in the Preface, will be treated as having a special independent relation to the primary one. Each will be seen as dependent on the primary issue for its ultimate form and meaning as an issue in the Idea. Furthermore, each secondary issue will be viewed for its contribution to the fashioning of Newman's Catholic university ideal.

In dealing with "issue" as a term equivocal by reference, one must bear in mind that the relative importance of issues does make a difference in understanding the Idea and Newman's formal educational ideal. He must be equally conscious of the order in which various issues are addressed. For the very meaning of one question may hinge on the resolution of another. For example, in order to understand secondary questions, like those of Newman's secular university, grounds, "connected view," and gentleman, one must
first address the question of the nature of a Catholic university. Only in reference to that issue must all others be considered because only in reference to that question are all other issues of the Idea ultimately meaningful—at least, in the context of the Aristotelian scheme proposed for this study.

In general, John Henry Newman uses the Preface of the Idea to indicate the scope of the nine subsequent discourses. Central to his definition of purpose is a statement of the question and delineation of subordinate issues. The question of what is a gentleman, which will generate a later issue of whether Newman's idea, as it is formulated in Discourse VIII, is a serious expression or not, is part of another issue of just what is the nature of a university.¹ That question, in turn, is part of a still larger issue of what constitutes a Catholic university. This latter appears to be the foundational issue Newman elaborates by means of the two foregoing subordinate ones.

"The view taken of a university in these discourses," he begins his Preface, "is the following: That it is

¹As I indicated earlier, although Harrold, Dessain, Vargish et al. take Newman's definition of a gentleman in Discourse VIII as a serious expression, Culler, McGrath, and others advance an ironic or derogatory interpretation, which appears the more current and popular one. However, John R. Griffin's "In Defense of Newman's 'Gentleman'", (Dubr, 1965) is corrective of Culler and McGrath.
a place of teaching universal knowledge."\(^2\) In the second paragraph, Newman adds,

such is a university in its essence, and independently of its relation to the Church. But practically speaking, it cannot fulfill its object duly, such as I have described it, without the Church's assistance; or to use the theological term, the Church is necessary for its integrity.\(^3\)

Having touched upon those two root concerns, he proceeds, two paragraphs later:

...some persons may be tempted to complain, that I have servilely followed the English idea of a university...and they may anticipate that an academical system, formed upon my model, will result in nothing better or higher than in the production of that antiquated variety of human nature and remnant of feudalism, as they consider it, called 'a gentleman.'\(^4\)

A few paragraphs later, Newman goes on,

Returning, then to the consideration of the question...thus much I think I have made good, -- that, whether or no a Catholic University should put before it, as its great object, to make its students 'gentlemen,' still to make them something or other is its great object, and not simply to protect the interests and advance the dominion of science.\(^5\)

It is in these four statements, drawn from the Preface to the nine discourses, that Newman immediately introduces what I consider to be three of the major issues with

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\(^2\) Idea of a University, p. 5.

\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^4\) Ibid., pp. 5-6.

\(^5\) Ibid., p. 8.
which he will concern himself in *The Idea of a University*. The first asks what is the nature of a university considered apart from the Church. The second questions what is the nature of a university of which the Church is an essential part. The third inquires what is the nature of the human product of a university. Then, the question arises concerning what order of priority one ought to assign these issues, a question I will approach in terms of Aristotelian equivocity by reference.

Although Newman deals initially with the nature of a secular university or the natural form of a university, I submit that his ultimate concern is the nature of a Roman Catholic University. That was his original charge -- the founding of a Catholic University. Was that not the purpose "contemplated by the Holy See in recommending just now to the Irish Hierarchy the establishment of a Catholic University," he reminds us, early in the Preface.\(^6\) When the Supreme Pontiff advocates the establishment of a university, it is in the "interests of Revealed Truth" and "for the sake of Religion."\(^7\) I don't think it too wide of the mark to say that Newman can be considered, regarding his ultimate purpose, one with the Pope in rejoicing "in the widest and most philosophical systems of intellectual education,

\(^{6}\)Ibid., p. 6.

\(^{7}\)Ibid.
from an intimate conviction that Truth is his real ally..." and in affirming that "Knowledge and Reason are sure ministers to Faith." Moreover, if it becomes the Successor of the Apostles to align himself with St. Paul in saying, "Non judicavi me scire aliquid inter vos, nisi Jesum Christum, et hunc crucifixum," so does it become John Henry Newman, as a worthy and devoted son of the Church, to make the Figure and purpose of the Cross his ultimate concern in founding a Church university. Moreover, if the Church founds a university for the sake of her children, with a view to their spiritual welfare and their religious influence and usefulness, with the object of training them to fill their respective posts in life better, and of making them more intelligent, capable, active members of society, does it not befit Newman, as the instrument of the Vicar of Christ and the Irish Episcopate, to establish a university in Ireland with a similar purpose? Just as he gives abundant evidence, in the discourses, of his preoccupation with the charge of the Holy See and the Irish Hierarchy, so too does Newman provide early indication of the start of his concern with the nature of a Catholic university when he speaks, in the Pre-

8 Bid.
9 Ibid., p. 7.
10 Ibid.
face, of the university's need for the Church's "assistance," when he questions whether the object of such an institution ought merely to be an "English Gentleman," when he wonders "whether or no a Catholic University should put before it, as its great object" to develop something more, but especially, when he speaks of the university's need of the Church to maintain its integrity. After all, should the student of a Catholic university be exposed to a "cultivation of mind" unequal to that of his Protestant counterpart? 

Apart from the witness of the Preface itself, Cardinal Newman's lifetime devotion to the cause of Revealed Religion, the vital and life-unifying force of his personal beliefs, an awful awareness of God's Presence within himself, his profound sense of the immediacy of the Church, and his sensitivity to the urgent wishes of the Sovereign Pontiff leave little room to doubt the nature of Newman's

11 Ibid., p. 5.

12 It is worth noting that Newman's quarrel is not with Protestant education so much as it is with secular non-Christian education. The alternative to Catholic education is not Protestant education but purely secular education which has at its core a philosophical knowledge that sees the relationship of science and all earthly things as subject to man. The point of view here would be natural and philosophical. Newman contrasts this worldly type with Christian education that provides for transcendent supernatural goals and Christian perfection. This latter type makes man, science, and all of reality subject to God.
ultimate educational interest.\textsuperscript{13} When the foregoing considerations underscore so heavily the primacy of his concern with spiritual matters, why should it be otherwise in his case for the nature of a Catholic university? I say this notwithstanding the fact that the view he assumes most immediately is that of the university as a place for "universal knowledge."

In incidental reference to the role of the Church in Newman's idea of a university -- the fact that fundamentally and ultimately Newman's idea is spiritually oriented -- there comes to mind a statement ascribed to Dr. Whately in the biography published by his daughter in 1866. Although, contextually, Whately is addressing himself to the problem of "mixed education," his charge might be regarded as not untypical of a perennial criticism levelled at Roman Catholic education. Dr. Whately states, "The principle on which that Church is constructed, the duty of uninquiring unreasoning submission to its authority, renders any doubt fatal."\textsuperscript{14} How can any man, he goes on to ask, survive in a Church "which claims the right to think for him?"\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13}See Dessain, pp. xii, 20, 27, and 50 for a rather extensive treatment of the impact of Revealed Religion and God's Presence upon Newman's life.

\textsuperscript{14}Jane Whately, \textit{Life and Correspondence of Richard Whately, D.D.} 2 vols., (London, 1866), 11, p. 244.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid.
can a person, he further demands to know, "who is commanded not to think for himself" not ultimately disassociate himself from such a communion? Cardinal Newman's whole educational philosophy, especially his ideas on the nature of a Catholic university, provides some ready answers to the objections made by this prominent former friend and associate of Newman at Oxford, for the letter and spirit of his educational ideal run distinctively counter to the core of Whately's contentions.

The Preface to Newman's Idea tentatively recognizes, and the subsequent discourses readily approve, the traditional Catholic philosophy of education, in which intellectual and religious instruction are allied, science and religion interrelated. Newman never doubts the necessity for moral development in the whole education of man. Again and again he shows the need for an omnipresent spirit of religion in university matters. Newman doubts not at all that a university's purpose is to infuse a religious spirit. This was always his position, both as an Anglican and Roman Catholic. In a report giving early expression to his idea of a university, Newman states:

All academic instruction must be in harmony with the Principles of the Catholic Religion, the Professors will be bound, not only not to teach anything contrary to religion, but to take advantage of the occasion the subjects they treat may offer, to point out that religion is the basis of Science, and to inculcate the
love of Religion and its duties.\textsuperscript{16}

Newman's view of a Catholic University, or of a Catholic education if you will, is fundamentally a spiritual one, but in no way is it "uninquiring" or "unreasoning." Neither would Newman have the educational view of his Catholic University students be unthinking. On the contrary, it should be pointed out, in the words of C. F. Harrold, that Newman's "whole career, both as an Anglican and Roman Catholic, was devoted...to rendering institutional Christianity acceptable to the critical and historical sense of nineteenth-century man."\textsuperscript{17} Furthermore, Harrold is no doubt accurate in saying that Newman's efforts centered on a "rational and imaginative justification of existing orthodox Christianity for educated men and for their responsible leaders."\textsuperscript{18}

If, on the one hand, a desire for order and system, a deference toward authority, and a reverence for tradition so markedly distinguish his career, so, on the other, does a profound respect for intellectual boldness, dialectical skill, and solid reasoning characterize an organic part of

\textsuperscript{16}Quoted in McGrath, p. 118, from the Irish Report which, among other things, gave to the professors involved a definite status, along with certain legislative and administrative powers.

\textsuperscript{17}Harrold, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., p. 54.
his practical efforts. While Calvary is the source and ultimate end of Newman's religious and intellectual views, he sees man's testimony to those central facts not restricted to eternal efforts, but also extended to temporal ones. Consequently, Newman voices his concern over the inferior standards of Catholic education. As Dessain aptly points out, Newman

wanted Catholics to come out of the ghetto and take their place in the world, to adapt themselves, to enlarge their minds in the confidence that truth could never contradict truth, and to be guided like responsible men by their duly enlightened consciences....

The Preface reinforces the notion that Newman seeks the widest possible intellectual culture, not an intellectual isolation that is culturally stagnant. In that context, "cultivation of mind," "culture of the intellect," and a "connected view or grasp of things" are important watchwords.

Furthermore, in reference to Newman's idea of a Catholic university, still another possible criticism comes to mind, an objection which, like the previous one of Whately, I raise in view of my claim for the importance of the Catholic university issue. In Newman's preoccupation with the nature of a Catholic university, with its stress on the role of the Church, as initially proposed in the Preface to the Idea and later developed in its discourses,

\[19\] Dessain, p. 168.
some critics may see contradictory or irreconcilable elements. For, in the very first paragraph of the Preface, Cardinal Newman states that a university is a place for teaching "universal knowledge." In the discourses following, Newman provides extensively for theology and argues against its exclusion. But should he not argue as well, critics may claim, for the inclusion of other theologies, and not just that of the Roman Catholic Church? They may also demand to know how Newman's stress on the natural scope of a university is to be reconciled with his supernatural or spiritual concern for its foundation. Is there not more than ambivalence at stake in the statement and delineation of issues? Might there not even be a certain measure of incompatibility in his claims for dogmatic, theological teaching and liberal education? 20

It would be easy enough to respond simply that Newman believes the Roman Catholic Church to be the repository of Revealed Truth, with the charge of conserving and interpreting that truth. According to that charge, the Gospel would be, in the words of Newman, "no mere philosophy thrown upon the world at large, no mere quality of mind and thought, no mere beautiful and deep sentiment or subjective

20 T. Corcoran maintains, in effect, that the Idea's religious and secular university goals are irreconcilable. Culler sees an ambivalence in Newman's presentation of humanistic and religious ideals. Dale eliminates the humanistic possibilities altogether. See above pp. 21-24.
opinion, but a substantive message from above, guarded and preserved in a visible polity." Accordingly, to the Church has been entrusted this revealed message and the awful responsibility of carrying it to the whole world as a matter of Faith. But this Faith, Newman would add, requires system, doctrine, propositions -- a corpus of theological truth. It is this theological system that would give unity and coherence to all knowledge in light of an ultimate purpose. In view of this response, it would not at all be surprising that Newman assign the Church a certain preeminence and its theology a proportionately more significant status in the composition of his university. But this response would probably strike these same critics as too facile.

If so, then one could reply to their contention in terms of one or two practical considerations. In the Idea, Cardinal Newman is addressing himself primarily to Catholics, though his call certainly does not preclude appeal to those of other communions. He wants an intelligent, well-educated laity, and clergy for that matter, who can exert a proper influence on their Church and society. He desires them to maintain their spiritual integrity in an age marked by secularistic, specialized, and naturalistic interests. For this reason, Newman says, "I want the intellectual lay-

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21 Quoted in Dessain, p. 142, from Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching.
man to be religious and the devout ecclesiastic to be intellectual." 22

In addition to the matter of audience, there comes to mind a second practical response. Newman has been charged with the founding of a Catholic university by the Pope and the Irish Hierarchy. In the spirit and letter of that delegation the Holy Father does, in a Papal Brief, exhort the Irish Bishops, and Newman indirectly, to take any measures necessary to insure the founding of a university deserving of its Roman Catholic designation. 23 In much the same vein, the early Irish Episcopal advocates of the Catholic university, in their Address to the People of Ireland, also propose "to provide for the Catholic youth of Ireland education of a high order, every way commensurate with the intellectual wants of the time...." 24 These practical matters would appear to supply some justification for Newman's emphasis on the Catholic Church and its theology in his university scheme, if one chose to use them.

Notwithstanding these considerations, it is possible that our concern here ought not to be dispute over whether Newman is right or wrong in assigning some priority to Ro-

22 Quoted by McGrath, p. 277, n. 1, from Sermons Preached on Various Occasions.

23 Ibid., p. 273.

24 Quoted by McGrath, p. 100.
man Catholic theology, but rather, to determine whether he, in fact, does so; and if he does, what is the nature and extent of the priority. Father Dessain asserts that Newman "claimed a place for theology in education on general grounds, without introducing pleadings that applied to any particular religion." Newman appears to bear out Dessain when he states, in a later discourse: "But I have been insisting simply on Natural Theology..." and also when he professes, in a letter to R. Ornsby, that "I am going to treat the whole subject not on the assumption of Catholicism, but in a way of reasoning, and as men of all religions may do."

In spite of Dessain's assertion and Newman's disclaimer on the preeminent role of the Church and its theology, it would appear that the Preface and Discourses do point up their importance in Newman's thought. Now, although the matter of their relative importance can be clarified by means of a real and logical distinction, there is another interpretation that may prove more useful. This explanation concerns itself with a proper understanding of the particular point of view regarding issues Newman assumes at specified times in the Idea. It is to a closer

25 Dessain, p. 103.
26 Idea of a University, p. 71.
27 Quoted by McGrath, p. 142.
examination of these views in the Preface that I would now return for a substantiation of my contention that Newman's ultimate issue is, in fact, his idea of a Catholic university and not merely his idea of a university. For, if the former question is foundational, one must show how it can be reconciled with the view or notion of a "university in its bare and necessary idea" which would exclude "the assumption of Catholicism" and insist on a "Natural Theology," and which would reflect an abstract investigation with its focus on "universal knowledge," an emphasis evident from the initial paragraph of the Preface.

I believe that the objection of possibly contradictory or irreconcilable elements in Newman's concept of a Catholic university, the claim of a possible conflict between his natural and supernatural objectives in the establishment of a university, and the fundamental relationship of two cardinal issues can be handled effectively by an examination of what constitutes Newman's primary and secondary issues, with "issue" being used as a term equivocal by reference. This examination will lead, I might add, into my treatment of the second major issue Newman proposes in

28 Quoted by McGrath, p. 172.
29 From Newman's letter to Ornsby dated April 14, 1852.
30 Idea of a University, p. 6.
the Preface -- the nature of a university considered in its "essence" or natural form.

In his profound concern with scope, Newman points out, midway through the Preface, that when the Church founds a University, she is not cherishing talent, genius, or knowledge, for their own sake, but for the sake of her children, with a view to their spiritual welfare and their religious influence and usefulness....

That statement is of no little importance because it helps one ascertain the priority of Newman's issues. It clarifies the relationship between a Catholic university and a university in the abstract. It points to a complexity of sameness in difference in Newman's treatment of the nature of a Catholic university and the nature of a secular university as issues. It also provides a fairly clear response to the question whether Newman's fundamental concern is a secular university that with its liberal education makes all things subject to man or a Catholic university which with its supernatural orientation makes man and all things subject to God. The priority of issues is important because the issue that prevails here may very well determine the primary grounds Newman will employ, the dominant "connected view" he will advocate, and the preeminent human university product he will advance. If Newman's fundamental issue is the nature of a Catholic university, then his

31 Ibid., p. 7.
grounds will more than likely be theological, his view, a supernaturally connected grasp, and his gentleman, a Christian one. If, on the other hand, Newman's primary issue is the nature of a secular university, then his grounds of inquiry will more likely be philosophical, his "connected view," temporal, and his gentleman, worldly. The quotation cited helps support the position that Newman's fundamental concern is the nature of a Catholic university, a university concerned with its students' intellectual and spiritual welfare. In accord with the Church, Newman considers the university as a place for the advancement of one's Faith and the fostering of one's virtue, no less than the cultivation of one's mind. It is in line with this concern that I propose the question of the nature of a Catholic university as Newman's primary instance of issue and the question of the nature of a university abstractly considered as a secondary instance of issue. I do so using "issue" as a term equivocal by reference.

In the case of Aristotelian doctrine, as formulated by Owens, the secondary instances of things said to be equivocal have their true nature or form only in reference to the primary instance. Accordingly, in this interpretation of Newman's issues, a secondary instance of issue, the nature of a university, is denominated "issue" only to

32 That is, they are in a certain way expressed according to one form. Owens, p. 121.
the extent that it relates to the primary instance. The form or nature of the primary instance makes Newman's university issue to be what it really is. It gives entity, if you will. The nature of a Catholic university is the primary instance of what the nature of Newman's inquiry is all about. It reflects a primary instance of issue, from which other issues derive their form. The nature of a Catholic university is that which distinguishes Newman's fundamental question from any other issues raised. This question concerns the nature of a university in which both temporal and eternal matters count rather than one in which merely temporal affairs are of paramount importance.

Then, depending on the viewpoint of issues he assumes, Newman can speak variously on the nature of a university, without doing a disservice to the issues or subject matter. Thus, in one breath, he is able to speak of the university as a place for "universal knowledge," of a "university in its bare and necessary idea," or of a university in the abstract that disclaims "the assumption of Catholicism." For the same reason, Newman can, in the next breath, address himself in the Preface, to the university's "practical need for the Church's assistance," and elsewhere, maintain that "Christianity and nothing short of it.

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33Idea of a University, p. 5.
must be made the element and principle of education."

Thus is he also able to say at the end of the Preface:

At least it is a matter of deep solicitude to Catholic Prelates that their people should be taught a wisdom, safe from the excesses and vagaries of individuals, embodied in institutions which have stood the trial and received the sanction of ages, and administered by men who have no need to be anonymous, as being supported by their consistency with their predecessors and with each other.

Needless to say, it is a matter of deep solicitude for Cardinal Newman as well.

The foregoing treatment of the first issue, with its emphasis on the fundamental role of the Catholic Church and its relation to the secondary issue viewed equivocally, is not intended in any way to downgrade the importance of the secondary issue -- the nature of a university considered apart from its relation to the Church. Nor is it meant to deemphasize the concern for liberal education that Newman displays. It purposes only to place a secondary issue and Newman's view of it in due relationship with what I regard as the ultimate issue and primary instance of Newman's treatment of issues.

The secondary issue, the nature of a university abstractly considered, cannot be lightly dismissed because

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34 Quoted by McGrath p. 279, from The Tamworth Reading Room.

35 Idea of a University, p. 15.
its importance is readily apparent in the implementation of Newman's educational plan and ultimate resolve. In Discourses I-V, Newman maintains, in large measure, his avowed purpose of treating his subject from a philosophical standpoint and of concerning himself with a "university in its essence, and independently of its relation to the Church." Moreover, it is to the nature of a university abstractly considered that Newman devotes a significant measure of his efforts even in the Preface. In the Preface and subsequent discourses, this secondary instance of issue has its own proper form, nature and importance, even though as an issue its ultimate significance derives from the primary instance of issue. The nature of a university considered apart from the Church looks to a "discipline and refinement of intellect," a "cultivation of mind," or a "culture of the intellect" that alone characterizes the goals of a university whose scope is purely natural. It is to this same end that Newman speaks when he says that the qualities sought are "the force, the steadiness, the comprehensiveness and the versatility of intellect, the command over our own powers, the instinctive just estimate of things as they

36 Ibid., p. 9.
37 Ibid., p. 10.
38 Ibid.
pass before us...." For Newman, cultivation of that objective would start early with the "first step in intellectual training [being] to impress upon a boy's mind the idea of science, method, order, principle, and system; of rule and exception, of richness and harmony." Then Newman adds:

Let him once gain this habit of method, of starting from fixed points, of making his ground good as he goes, of distinguishing what he knows from what he does not know, and I conceive he will be gradually initiated into the largest and truest philosophical views....

Cardinal Newman's treatment of the primary issue, as I tentatively interpret its presentation in the Preface, is certainly consonant with orthodox and traditional Church concerns that emphasize an alliance of literary and religious instruction and a unification of knowledge and religion with appropriate stress on moral improvement. It should be noted, however, that the view advocated in his treatment of the primary issue is far more intellectually comprehensive than the rather narrow, ecclesiastical, or lay perspective of some contemporaries who, in their overzealous regard for authoritarian demands, would tolerate no criticism from within or without the Church. His view on

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid., p. 12.

41 Ibid., p. 13.
the nature of a Catholic university is in no way that of some contemporaries who could not suppress their apprehension regarding any intellectual research or scientific inquiry, however loyal, docile, and reverent the spirit in which it is conducted. Newman's notions on the nature of a university that combines intellectual and spiritual cultivation admit to no confusion of misguided personal feeling with traditional Church Doctrine. His is not an overwhelming concern that the authority of the Church will be disputed, much less lost in a world of rapidly changing values, by the bonafide intellectual endeavors of its devoted sons.

Newman fears, rather, the intellectual apathy of the Catholic with no views at all, "the mere hereditary Christian, who has never realized the truths which he holds...."\(^{42}\) For if, according to Newman, even fallacious views consistently held are much more influential and inspirational than no views at all,\(^{43}\) how much more respectable ought that view which reflects a solid, intellectual grasp of the proper relation of things from a natural standpoint to be considered. Further, if even a purely philosophical point of view is so commendable, even greater benefits will derive from a rational view that has Reveala-

\(^{42}\)Ibid., p. 12.

\(^{43}\)Ibid.
tion as its guide, for then, that view will truly reflect "a wisdom safe from the excesses and vagaries of individuals, embodied in institutions which have stood the trial and received the sanction of ages...."\textsuperscript{44} In the former and latter statements I see a rationale for the two views advocated in relation to the nature of a Catholic university and in relation to the nature of a university considered apart from the Church. The view expounded in the framework of a Catholic university reflects a primary, formal instance of "connected view" that looks to the "relative disposition" of things in this life and the next. As the view advanced in the context of the nature of a Catholic university, it will take precedence over the secondary instance of "connected view" advocated in reference to the nature of a university considered independent of the Church. This view, of course, would look more to the "relative disposition of things" in this world. Both views will be dealt with extensively in subsequent chapters.\textsuperscript{45}

The third issue Newman raises and tentatively answers in the Preface concerns the relation of the university and the Church to the nature of a gentleman. Although the question will be treated in a later chapter of this study, with special attention being devoted to whether Newman's

\textsuperscript{44}Ibid., p. 15.

\textsuperscript{45}See Chs. IV, VI, and VII of this study.
definition of a gentleman in Discourse VIII is a serious or ironic expression, it is necessary to point out, here, that Newman's idea of a gentleman is an issue closely allied with the two issues treated thus far, and the primary and secondary instances of the "connected view" touched on. Tentatively and from a natural, philosophical view of the nature of a university, Newman calls for a man whose cultivated intellect and considered view set him apart from his fellows, for he speaks as one who knows what he is talking about. From the more supernatural view of the nature of a Catholic university, Newman wants to produce a university man with a more comprehensive view that includes eternal matters. It is in light of this latter view that Newman so admires St. Philip Neri and will offer him as a model for Catholic university students whom he desires to make not merely gentlemen, but Christian gentlemen with an integrated intellectual and spiritual grasp of this life and the next.

If, thus far, my presentation of the issues Newman has raised in the Preface and of the tentative answers he has proposed therein appears disproportionately to concern itself with the primary issue, it does so only because the secondary issues raised in the Preface appear ultimately

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46 See Ch. VII of this study.

47 Idea of a University, p. 11.
significant only in reference to the primary one. Again, it is not my purpose to negate the importance of these secondary issues to which Newman will dedicate a large part of his efforts and to which an important part of the philosophical analysis of the present study will be dedicated. But some position on the relationship and priority of these issues has to be established before these same issues or some additional questions, like those of grounds, theme, and structure, can be addressed.
CHAPTER III

THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL GROUNDBREAKING IN DISCOURSE I

As an educator, philosopher, and theologian, John Henry Newman evolved, and the task of charting his development in philosophy and theology, much less his progress as a critic and commentator on education, is not an easy one.¹ The philosophical and theological principles that surface in The Idea of a University lend themselves to no simple explanation. Neither do these principles, as they underlie his statement of issues in the Preface or Discourse I, adapt themselves to any simple clarification. No individual works embody Newman's philosophical and theological manifestoes. Neither does any single work capture his doctrine on university education, although the Idea does come

¹In Victorian Prose, p. 166, Charles Stephen Dessain points out that "the best way to understand Newman's philosophy and theology is to read and reread his own writings." A. Dwight Culler reminds us, in The Imperial Intellect, p. xii, that the general biographies of Newman too often focus on the development of Newman's religious opinions from too restricted a viewpoint, namely, the content of the Tractarian movement and the proximity of his thought to Rome. Culler adds that a number of significant influences, like the five illnesses of his youth and early maturity, have not been adequately explained.
Newman has, however, produced an awesome array of books, sermons, letters, notebooks, journals, and manuscripts. To some of these and to some solid, critical expositions and studies of them, the student of Newman can advert for help in tracing the genesis of the philosophical and theological ideas that serve as a foundation for the superstructure of his educational theory and practice. To the foregoing he can also turn for background material helpful for an understanding of the basic issues as they are formulated and developed in the Idea.

Although, again, the best way to determine Newman's thinking on education is to consider his own words on the subject, and though there is no better statement of his position than in the Idea, F. McGrath, in Newman's University: Idea and Reality, p. 281, issues the warning that "Newman's complete teaching is not to be found in one work alone." He observes, a page afterward, that for a comprehensive view of Newman's definition of a university, one must study the appendix to the first edition of the Idea, along with materials Newman describes as "illustrations of the Idea of a University," which he contributed to the University Gazette in 1854.


The texts of Culler, Dessain, Harrold, and McGrath, already cited in this study, provide good examples. To all four this writer is much indebted for information and inspiration.
Some investigation of these materials suggests the tentative view of a man who unites the offices of student, teacher, and educational theorist to an unusual degree and a man who sees both teacher and student as seekers of a truth whose ultimate value lies in its power to improve the temporal, intellectual lot and the eternal, spiritual prospect of educated men. Faith and reason are allied in this joint venture. Both work to make men better understand the relative disposition of different areas of knowledge and serve to bind men in the strength of an intellectual fraternity and in the humility of a spiritual kinship as sons of God. Newman sees the need on the part of university education to realistically portray and appraise the value of this intellectual brotherhood and spiritual bond, as they relate to mankind's basic desire for intellectual and moral betterment in this world and in the next. In Newman's judgment, educated men should purpose to treasure Faith, their spiritual legacy, primarily, and to value reason as a precious natural tool, but not to the extent that it jeopardizes the supernaturally preeminent position of Faith. For Newman, the educated Catholic's primary criterion should be fidelity to the Church and its theology because they reflect the wisdom and historical continuity of eighteen hundred years of Providentially guided experience. His secondary test ought to be the utility of any philosophical system that aids him in the pursuit of truth and holiness. Discourse I of the Idea, in some measure, bears out these assertions.
This chapter will not attempt any complete summation or appraisal of Newman's philosophical and theological ideas, however important they may be in their impact on his educational theory and practice. Rather, its purpose is to state the argument of the discourse and to relate its material on the nature of the university Newman proposes and the grounds he will employ to the framework of an Aristotelian analysis. The scope of Newman's university and the grounds of the inquiry will be interpreted in terms of Aristotelian equivocity by reference with a view to reconciling Newman's multiple treatment of them. The argument of the discourse provides for the history of the question proposed in the Preface. It traces two germinal questions that emerge from that question's immediate historical elaboration. It offers a rationale for an ultimate answer, and it touches on the historical validity Newman cites for his appraisal. Finally, the argument points to the ultimate authority upon which Newman draws. To the extent that they affect Newman's position in his development of the foregoing matters or that they play a role in the educational thought reflected in the discourse, some early and formative educational influences will be brought out. In relation to this study, the central question of the discourse is whether Newman's primary concern is the nature of a Catholic university pursued on theological and supernatural grounds or the nature of a university in the abstract sought along purely philosophical lines.
Although this introductory discourse might profitably be studied as one whose rhetorical function serves to win the sympathy of Newman's audience, it may also be viewed as one rich in the thematic and structural implications it generates for the other discourses. Most importantly, it is one profound for the light it sheds on what is Newman's fundamental issue in the *Idea* and what are the primary grounds of his inquiry.

Newman begins:

In addressing myself, Gentlemen, to the consideration of a question which has excited so much interest, and elicited so much discussion at the present day, as that of University Education, I feel some explanation is due from me for supposing, after such high ability and wide experience have been brought to bear upon it, that any field remains for the additional labours either of a disputant or of an inquirer.

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6*Idea of a University*, p. 19. It is worth noting that in this statement of the question Newman alters his focus somewhat from the nature of a university to the nature of a university education. The questions appear closely enough related in Newman's mind that he can move comfortably from one in the Preface to the other in Discourse I without doing a disservice to either question. Because Newman's concern is the foundation of a Catholic university in Dublin and the publication of a fairly complete educational manifesto to guide in its foundation, it appears reasonable that he make the nature of the university proposed a key issue. So long as one understands the end or idea of a university to be that liberal or philosophical knowledge which consists in an awareness of the bearing of one science on the other by which the "whole" can be perceived, he should be allowed some flexibility in treating this interdisciplinary grasp and the place in which it is advocated.
Not uncharacteristically, Newman draws his attention, and ours, to the issue raised in the Preface. He is attracted not merely by a question that affects the implementation of his plan to found a university, but also, by an issue that has concerned him from his Oxford days, namely, the nature of a university education. Apart from the fact that his question skirts a controversy surrounding Oxford, it also leads directly to the nature of a university he will found and to a consideration of the ideational structure he will shortly be developing. But now, the position to be advanced will no longer be that of another, a Copleston or a Davison, so much as, in toto, that of John Henry Newman.  

Having reiterated the question, Newman voices his concern over the principles of the inquiry:

If, nevertheless, I still venture to ask permission to continue the discussion, already so protracted, it is because the subject of Liberal Education, and of the principles on which it must be conducted, has ever had a hold upon my own mind.  

In these words, the question of the nature of a university remains the same, but the more specific issue of the nature of a university education is laid bare. Newman considers,

7Harrold, John Henry Newman, p. 105 and n. 11, p. 398. Harrold singles out the influence of Edward Copleston and John Davison upon Newman's treatment of secular and religious education as distinct disciplines. For Copleston's and Davison's impact on Newman's position regarding utility and specialization in a university, see Culler, pp. 220-222.

8Idea of a University, p. 19.
as well, the lines upon which the inquiry is to be drawn. There is also evident, here, the disciplined mind of Newman, logic-bound, viewing possible facets of the question and their implications for himself. His mind appears ever at work grappling and grasping for mastery of the logical framework within which he will carry out the discussion. Should the inquiry be conducted on philosophical or theological grounds? The answer will be forthcoming, a few paragraphs later.

In explanation of the source of his concern and in development of the history of the question, Newman proceeds by calling our attention to that place in which

I have lived the greater part of my life...a place which has all that time been occupied in a series of controversies both domestic and with strangers...the English University, of which I was so long a member, which after a century of inactivity, at length was roused, at a time when (as I may say) it was giving no education at all to the youth committed to its keeping, to a sense of the responsibilities which its profession and its station involved....

Newman adverts to "the singular example of a heterogeneous and an independent body of men, setting about a work of self-reformation...." He specifies the difficulties encountered: "Its initial efforts, begun and carried on amid

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9 Critics tend to reject one set of grounds; yet they offer no satisfactory key to unify Newman’s dual presentation. See pp. 25-28, above, for an overview of various critical interpretations of Newman’s grounds.

many obstacles, were met from without, as often happens in such cases, by ungenerous and jealous criticisms..."11

Having cited the first stage of the controversy and having outlined the second, Newman declares "inutility" and "religious exclusiveness" as the two basic issues emerging from the controversies.12

Apart from any consideration of the foregoing material as allusion to the history of the question or as a statement on the root of Newman's preoccupation with the issue of university education, there is evidence here of the measurable effect that an eminent English university had on Newman when it came time for him to struggle with the problem of establishing a Catholic university. Equally apparent is the influence that the two immediate historical controversies surrounding that university's curricula wielded on Newman when his turn came to formulate an educational manifesto for a Catholic university in Ireland.13 Evident, also, in this introductory discourse is not only a place but people whose ideas and principles might be said to have

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., p. 20.

13 For the role played by Oxford in shaping Newman's Idea and the impact of the Edinburgh Review attacks upon Oxford with resultant controversy, see McGrath, pp. 115, 133-137, 306, 312, and 370. See also Culler, pp. 37, 115, 138, 140-141, 143-144, 146, 220-221. See also Harrold, John Henry Newman, pp. 8 and 105.
provided the intellectual springboard for Newman's Idea. For the formation of his educational ideal no doubt began long before that May day in Dublin when Newman began his series of lectures on university education before a distinguished audience. So too was the foundation of his educational construct laid some time before the Catholic University of Ireland, with barely twenty students, opened its doors on November 3, 1854. Perhaps Newman's educational ideal and construct began the day he set foot on the grounds of Trinity College, Oxford, or the day he awoke to the beauty of his classical studies, or the day he began cultivation of a group of associates, sometimes lifelong friends, as an undergraduate, fellow, tutor, Vicar, and leader at Oxford. At any rate, Newman's allusion to his days at Oxford appears significant in the development of the Idea and the search for a more meaningful intellectual and spiritual university life that it reflects.

If Newman's reference to his Oxford days is significant because Oxford helped mold his educational philosophy, his allusion to the Edinburgh Review attacks is also note-

14 Harrold, pp. 13-19. Harrold surveys what Tardivel sees as the two important formative influences on Newman's religious make-up: "the influence of Oxford itself -- its classical studies, its eighteenth-century interests, its brilliant Noetic school of liberalism, its commanding personalities (especially Keble, Froude, and Pusey); and the influence of the early Church Fathers." Moreover, in much the same way as Guitton, Harrold roots Newman in the English eighteenth century.
worthy in the context of Oxford related experience.\textsuperscript{15} For two issues, stemming from the resultant controversies, have germinal significance for Newman's \textit{Idea}. Specifically, his declaration in Discourse I of the two questions emerging from the \textit{Edinburgh} criticisms provides important structural and thematic groundbreaking for subsequent discourses. The issues to which Newman refers in this discourse are "inutil- ity" and "religious exclusiveness." Both issues will surface as two key questions of Discourse II: whether theology ought to be taught in a university and whether a university should make utility its major concern. In the discourse following, Newman's response to these questions will serve to elaborate and provide responses for the larger issue of the nature of a university and Newman's ultimate question, the nature of a Catholic University.\textsuperscript{16}

Furthermore, by resurrecting in Discourse I the is-

\textsuperscript{15}Harrold, p. 16. In Harrold's words, Newman's "intellectual powers were molded and tempered by Oxford's great classical tradition." Harrold adds that Newman voiced his debt in the \textit{Apologia} for a number of religious doctrines gained from Oxford thinkers. Harrold also observes that it was from the Noetics that Newman really learned to think clearly and accurately.

\textsuperscript{16}Again, regarding the matter of structure, Discourse I, in providing the germ of the two crucial questions of Discourse II, the first of which Discourses II, III and IV will answer, the second, Discourses V, VI, VII and VIII, does, indeed, appear to assume an integral part in the organic structure of the \textit{Idea}. 
sues of "inutility" and "religious exclusiveness," Newman raises two questions with significant transitional overtones. For these matters appear under the dimension of an unresolved controversy of the past and the hope of a future synthesis. Through these issues, Newman looks back to an ideological source, one he fondly views as the educational font from which he has derived so much intellectual and spiritual nourishment; but he also looks forward to something more for which he feels his university in Ireland to be destined. 17 Moreover, these questions also serve to connect the educational heritage and experience of a young man at Oxford with the present, emerging values of a middle-aged religious and educational leader seeking an appropriate educational ideal for a new Irish university with its own special problems. 18 Scanned in the context of the

17 Newman's words from the Historical Sketches, quoted on p. 169 of Culler, testify to this point: "...and in it [Dublin] I see a flourishing University, which for a while had to struggle with fortune, but which, when its first founders and servant were dead and gone, had successes far exceeding their anxieties. Thither, as to a sacred soil, the home of their fathers, and the fountain-head of their Christianity, students are flocking from East, West and South, from America and Australia and India, from Egypt and Asia Minor, with the ease and rapidity of a locomotion not yet discovered."

18 Culler, p. 138. Culler observes that the picture drawn by some of Irish society, along with the attitude toward higher education reflected by that society, was not a happy one. Three of Newman's advisers -- Frederick Lucas, Robert Ornsby and Henry Wilberforce (all Englishmen, converts to Roman Catholicism and Dublin residents) -- depicted the Irish, including the educated ones, as having not the least notion of a university like Oxford.
Oxford controversies, these issues come across as transitory and unfixed. Viewed in the Newman manner, that is, from a naturally and supernaturally connected perspective, they will appear to share in a world of educational doctrine that is immortal and permanent.

In addition to its structural and transitional significance, the question of "inutility" suggests more, in its thematic implications for the whole of the Idea, than a conflict between knowledge and the fruit of that knowledge. It suggests a conflict between means and ends; between ideality and practicality; between classical values and pragmatic, utilitarian concerns; between cultivation of one's mind and cultivation of one's purse; between humanistic-type activity and utilitarian accomplishment; between self-discipline or restraint and intellectual disorder or chaos; between natural and supernatural values; and certainly, between a meaningful and meaningless educational life or perspective.

Correspondingly, the issue of "religious exclusiveness," as Newman treats it, extends well beyond the limits of a dispute over the inclusion or exclusion of theology in a university. For it might also be viewed as a conflict between Reason and Revelation, between Nature and Grace, between gentleman and Catholic gentleman, between Humanism and Christian Humanism, and even a conflict between God and man. But these ramifications of both germinal issues are matters for some development and notation elsewhere. I suggest them
here only as material correlative and especially significant in relation to the import of the two issues stemming from the Edinburgh controversies and any possible interpretation of them.

Furthermore, in regard to the issues of "inutility" and "religious exclusiveness," it should be noted that, although there may be some tension and a degree of ambivalence in Newman's attitude towards them or the contexts in which they might be treated over the whole work, Newman's total position must be evaluated in the light of two factors. One is his ultimate, dominant concern over matters of Faith, Revelation and Dogma; the other, his desire for a principle of unity. Newman sees the Church as a unifying historical principle, Catholic theology as a unifying theological principle, and a "connected view or grasp of things" as a unifying educational principle. Always, in his efforts to resolve differences, to reconcile diverse elements, and to synthesize opposing viewpoints, there is present a concern for the relationship of one whole to its many parts. In regard to the structure of the discourses the foregoing relationship will become most immediately apparent and especially relevant. Moreover, just as the relation of part and whole must be taken into account in ascertaining the impor-

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19 Dessain, p. xii. Dessain presents a strong case for faith and devotion to the cause of Revealed Religion as the root interest and unifying concerns of Newman's life.
tance of "inutility" and "religious exclusiveness," so too must the latter issues, that constitute kernel questions for the rest of the work, not be underestimated in the light of Newman's search for unity and his efforts to found a university whose philosophical perspective does focus on a spiritual end, a union with God, the ultimate One whose stability, order, permanence and fixedness it is the final purpose of the many to seek.

Thus, in dealing with the matter of utility and specialization, Newman is really coming to grips with the all-important question of man's ultimate end or destiny. He sees an answer in continued striving for the development of one's natural talents. He advocates the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. He advances a "connected view" that he would have a university-educated man develop. These are natural goals, but they have their supernatural counterparts. If all knowledge is one, if the subject matter of all knowledge is unified, if, indeed, science and religion are really but a part of the whole, then Newman does have a key for a university ideal that helps place man's temporal interests and ultimate, supernatural concerns

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20 Newman's argument is not with specialization as such. But of the overspecialized and utilitarian approach that emphasizes the product of knowledge rather than the knowledge itself he does take a dim view. Moreover, in the matter of the useful and the specialized, Newman's ultimate criterion is mankind's end in the light of Calvary's meaning.
in proper perspective. The whole of man's life purpose is not sacrificed or neglected for any partial needs, for in Newman's university scheme, man has a "connected view" of all branches of knowledge with philosophical habit his system and Revelation his guide. These are substantial means in a program of temporal and eternal self-growth and development, and that, basically, is what Newman's educational ideal is all about.

Thus far in Discourse I, Newman has restated the question raised in the Preface and has restricted it to the nature of university education. Newman has, in addition, questioned the lines of the inquiry and traced the history of the question in relation to his Oxford experience, citing for special consideration, two issues that emerged from controversial attacks upon that university's curriculum. Now, he will go on to provide a rationale for the approach to the nature of university education he will follow and the grounds he will employ. By his reference to Protestant experience, Newman intimates the mode of his treatment of the nature of a university and what will be the lines of the inquiry. Newman will also attempt to justify his reference to Protestant educational principles and to validate his use of these on the basis of historical Roman Catholic practice.

Newman first points out that his opinions on the nature of university education are lifelong, not occasional
It would concern me, Gentlemen, were I supposed to have got up my opinions for the occasion.... Many changes has my mind gone through: here it has known no variation or vacillation of opinion.... Those principles...were my profession at that early period of life, when religion was to me more a matter of feeling and experience than of faith.21

Natural self-evident truths constitute the grounds of the inquiry and furnish a second reason for Newman's "referring, on this occasion, to the conclusions at which Protestants have arrived on the subject of Liberal Education." He observes:

The principles on which I would conduct the inquiry are attainable, as I have already implied, by the mere experience of life. They do not come simply of theology; they imply no supernatural discernment; they have no special connexion with Revelation; they almost arise out of the nature of the case; they are dictated even by human prudence and wisdom, though a divine illumination be absent, and they are recognized by common sense....22

We note here that Newman's reason for consulting Protestant thought is that its conclusions on the subject of educational grounds reinforce the principles on which Newman hopes to conduct his inquiry.

The foregoing excerpts with their attendant material relate significantly to the matter of Newman's ultimate is-

21 Idea of a University, pp. 20-21. Newman appears, most of his life, however, to have had little time for religion of feeling. His sense of dogmatism seems pervasive and constant from quite early an age. The Apologia testifies to this.

22 Ibid., pp. 21-22.
sue and grounds in the Idea. At the beginning of this discourse, Newman questioned the lines upon which the inquiry would be conducted. Here he affirms that the grounds are philosophical and non-sectarian and that the principles "may be held by Protestants as well as Catholics." If it is possible to determine the issue by the principles and lines of the inquiry relating to it, the foregoing matter does appear to bear out the contention that the primary issue of Newman's Idea is the nature of a university, not the nature of a Catholic university.

Subsequent reasons seem to generate additional support for the position:

But I shall consider the question simply on the

\[\text{23Ibid., p. 22. Although Newman's reference to Protestant thought and experience is meant to clarify his approach to the university issue and his use of grounds, it raises a number of questions. For example, when Newman opposes Catholic education to its alternative, that alternative appears to be Protestant education. But is not Protestant education also Christian education? Newman appears to equate Protestant education with secular or worldly education and grounds. Should they be equated? If by Protestant education Newman means that education which makes all things subject to man, that education in which theology and other sciences are not allied, that education in which Faith and reason are irreconcilably separated, and if by Protestant education Newman means that education which looks to religion as a matter of taste and sentiment, and to God as fate, chance, or some impersonal force, then he appears justified in equating Protestant education with that of a secular or worldly type. For that education should not be called Christian, much less Catholic education, in Newman's judgment. If, however, by Protestant education Newman means that education which provides for belief in a personal, omniscient God, one that views intellectual and spiritual perfection as the joint goal of education, and one that sees man and all things as subject to God, then Newman would surely be misled in making such an equation.}\]
grounds of human reason and human wisdom. I am investigating in the abstract, and am determining what is in itself right and true.... I am concerned with questions not simply of immutable truth, but of practice and expedience.  

When Newman states that this is not a disputation "directly bearing on the subject matter of Divine Revelation," 25 when he affirms his lifelong profession of the opinions to which he gives voice, 26 when he disclaims a purely theological source, supernatural orientation or "divine illumination," 27 when he asserts that the principles on which the inquiry will be conducted can be held by Protestants and Catholics alike, when he points out that "the philosophy of education is founded on truths of the natural order," 28 and when he declares "human wisdom" and "human reason" to be the grounds of the question, 29 Newman is providing ample evidence to support the assertion that the primary issue of the Idea is, indeed, the nature of a university, considered on purely natural, abstract, and philosophical grounds.

But a second look at Newman's presentation leads to

24 Ibid., p. 24.
25 Ibid., p. 20.
26 Ibid., p. 21.
27 Ibid., p. 22.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 24.
quite another conclusion on the nature of his ultimate issue and grounds. It is evident, here, that Newman is using Protestant educational experience to suggest the natural lines of inquiry he will follow and that he is supplying historical evidence for his doing so. It is most important to note, however, that each time he poses the philosophical or non-sectarian grounds of his inquiry, he juxtaposes a Catholic groundwork. Moreover, ever present in Newman's words is a theological and supernatural emphasis that his disavowals and disclaimers do not dismiss but only point up the more forcibly. Examples are many. Although Newman deals with principles, grounds, or lines within a natural scope, he does so under the sanction of the Church. In spite of the natural bent of his mind toward thoughts and disputations distinct from the "subject matter of Divine Revelation," these considerations are important "for Catholic objects" and do admit "of a Catholic treatment."

30 Newman's grounds might be interpreted according to this dialectic. With philosophical grounds constituting his thesis and theological, his antithesis, Newman might be said to synthesize the philosophical and theological lines in an overall groundwork of inquiry that reflects his concern for the development of the whole man, his desire for a Catholic university which provides adequately for intellectual culture, and his search for the man of "philosophical habit" who looks at things from a combined intellectual and spiritual point of view.

31 Idea of a University, p. 20. For Newman, that "treatment" is a theological one that gives unity in the light of ultimate ends.
Newman adds that the opinions he advances might be said to evidence the faith I reposed in the practical judgment of the Church, and the intimate concurrence of my own reason with the course she had authoritatively sanctioned, and the devotion with which I could promptly put myself at her disposal.\textsuperscript{32}

So too, though the opinions he expresses are a matter of lifelong profession, they are sanctioned by the Church and reinforced by Newman's study of the "records of Christian Antiquity."\textsuperscript{33}

Amid these contrapuntal, natural and supernatural grounds of inquiry, the thought suggests itself that, if Protestants are able to arrive at such worthy conclusions on education, as Newman claims they can, if "Protestants, depending on human means mainly, are led to make the most of them: their sole resource being to use what they have," with "knowledge" their "power" and little more,\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{32}Ibid., p. 21. The opinions he advocates might also and again be said to reflect Newman's preoccupation with a principle of unity. If there be any apparent conflict in his position regarding philosophy and theology, between denominational and non-denominational education, between Christianity and humanism, or between philosophical and theological grounds, the conflict is not insolvable viewed in relation to Newman's whole and partial view. It should be noted that philosophy without theology, science without religion, or humanism without Christianity do not constitute the whole of Newman's educational view. Neither, in this investigation, do philosophical grounds. They are a part. They do not constitute the whole line of the inquiry. They are not sufficient in themselves.

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid., p. 22.
how much more ought Catholics, though they be inclined to rest in the knowledge of their "goodly inheritance," be able to arrive at even more solid conclusions and use them more efficaciously, with not the solitary tool of reason, but the added resource of Revelation to guide them? Then, Catholics would be using what they have "by nature to the utmost" and, at the same time, be looking out "for what is beyond nature in the confidence of faith and hope." But, at this juncture, Newman's more obvious concern is to provide historical Church precedent for his use of Protestant experience. He first states the principle involved:

The Church has ever appealed and deferred to witnesses and authorities external to herself, in those matters in which she thought they had means of forming a judgment; and that on the principle "Quoique in arte sua credendum." She has even used unbelievers and pagans in evidence of her truth, as far as their testimony went.

Newman then supplies example:

She has worded her theological teaching in the

35While Newman does not identify "Revelation" with Catholicism, he does see the Catholic Church as the chief repository of Revealed Truth. Her responsibility is to conserve and interpret that truth. Her divine commission is to be the "visible polity" that guards and preserves that truth.

36Ibid. Although Newman acknowledges, later in the discourses, that we attain heaven by using this world well, the focus here appears to be on attaining heaven.

37Ibid., p. 23.
phraseology of Aristotle; Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, Origen, Eusebius, and Apollinaris, all more or less heterodox, have supplied materials for primitive exegetics. St. Cyprian called Tertullian his master; St. Augustin refers to Ticonius; Bossuet, in modern times, complimented the labours of the Anglican Bull; the Benedictine editors of the Fathers are familiar with the labours of Fell, Ussher, Pearson, and Beveridge. Pope Benedict XIV, cites according to the occasion the works of Protestants without reserve, and the late French collection of Christian Apologists contains the writings of Locke, Burnet, Tillotson, and Paley.38

Newman cites further examples of the juxtaposed lines of the inquiry when he states that, even though the principles "almost arise out of the nature of the case," although they "are dictated even by human prudence and wisdom," and "though a divine illumination be absent, it is "in the plenitude of her divine illumination" that the Church has ever used authorities outside the pale.39 In much the same spirit Newman here makes use of Protestant experience regarding educational principles. Furthermore, although the questions of concern to Newman are matters "of practice and expedience," they are matters of "immutable truth" as well.40 Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that he expressly purposes to investigate the question on the basis of "human reason and human wisdom" and that he wishes not to

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid., p. 24.
interject the authority of the Church, Newman does bring that authority into account. As a matter of fact, he appears never to forget it. The weight of Church authority appears important to Newman because the weight of its appearance is constant and suggestive in the context of the grounds he employs.

If some doubt remains concerning the role Newman will assign Church authority in the Idea, he dispels it toward the end of Discourse I where he takes the opportunity of recognizing once for all that higher view of approaching the subject of these Discourses, which, after this formal recognition, I mean to dispense with. Ecclesiastical authority, not argument, is the supreme rule and the appropriate guide for Catholics in matters of religion.41

The founding of the Catholic University in Ireland, along with the educational doctrine propounded on the occasion of its establishment, is such a matter. Here, then, is Newman’s ultimate view. It is a theological and supernatural one. Having formally recognized its preeminent place, Newman places it back of him, but not too far back because, a few paragraphs later, he speaks of the aim of a "University, of which Catholicity is the fundamental principle,"42 and then in the following section acknowledges that he “shall insist on the high theological view of a Universi-

41 Ibid., p. 26.

42 Ibid., p. 27.
ty" with confidence in the knowledge, any criticism or argument notwithstanding, that it is a Catholic University sanctioned by an ultimate authority: "It is the decision of the Holy See; St. Peter has spoken."

The reasons cited midway and the support developed in the latter part of this discourse bear significantly on the question of what is Newman's fundamental issue in the Idea. His treatment yields two possible answers. One suggests that Newman is addressing himself, on purely natural and philosophical grounds, to the root issue of the nature of a university in the abstract. The second proposes that Newman's ultimate issue is the nature of a Catholic university, developed on theological and supernatural grounds. Because the evidence for either answer reflects a measure of ambivalence on Newman's part, it is difficult for the reader to assess the natural and supernatural or the philosophical and theological grounds of the inquiry for their true worth, much less ascertain which issue holds dominance in Newman's educational scheme. Although some clarification of his position rests in the realization that Newman here, as well as elsewhere in the discourse, is attempting to elicit the support of as many segments of his audience as possible, I submit that, while appearing to address him-

\[43\text{Ibid.}
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\[44\text{Ibid., p. 28.}\]
self to the purely natural issue, Newman by his constant reference to the theological and supernatural groundwork, really underscores that question preeminent in his concern and central to his scope, the nature of a Catholic university.

The answer, then, to the fundamental issue of the Idea hinges on a reconciliation of Newman's multiple treatment of the nature of a university. So too, the solution to the problem of Newman's multiple presentation of grounds lies in a unification of his twofold presentation of grounds. Once again, Aristotelian equivocity by reference provides the means to effect the reconciliation and unification. From an Aristotelian standpoint, the fact that Newman speaks variously on the scope of his university and grounds can be explained by the primary and secondary instances that together, in proper relation, reflect Newman's primary and secondary views on the nature of the university proposed. Accordingly, in the secondary instance, the issue is the nature of a university abstractly considered; the grounds are natural and philosophical. But in the primary instance, the issue is the nature of a Catholic university, with supernatural grounds constituting the lines of the inquiry. Considered as the secondary instance of

\[^{45}\text{For a detailed explanation of Aristotle's doctrine of equivocity see Ch. I, pp. 57-65.}\]
his view of the scope of a university, Newman's claim for
the nature of a university considered apart from the Church
and his call for natural philosophical grounds are most
reasonable. Correspondingly, considered as the primary in-
stance of his view of the scope of a university, Newman's
call for the sanction of the Church, a Catholic treatment,
a high theological view, "Catholicity" as the basic prin-
ciple, and ecclesiastical authority is also justifiable.
Once again, it should be observed that, according to Aris-
totelian equivocity by reference, the secondary instances
have Entity and are ultimately meaningful only as they re-
late to the primary instance. This holds true for the sec-
ondary instances of Newman's university scope and grounds.
However important the philosophical grounds and the nature
of a university viewed separately from the Church may be in
Newman's total educational ideal, this issue and these
grounds derive their ultimate importance only in reference
to the primary form or nature of Newman's university scope
and grounds, namely, the nature of a Catholic university
and supernatural or theological grounds. Although the
differences in definition between the corresponding parts
of each set are overshadowed by some degree of sameness --
the unity by reference to the university issue and grounds
-- the differences are still present, and the true natures
of the terms are to be found only in the primary instances.

In the last part of Discourse I, Newman supplies
ample reason for a favorable reception on the part of his audience to the voice of the Holy See. He points out that the Chair of the Apostles has excellent claim on their attention because a wealth of documented experience and historical successes confirm its veracity and Divine Origin. That supernatural origin concerns Newman because he wishes not merely to trust the temporal powers or tools of man, like reason. Rather, he would shore up his position with more of an eternal guarantee from a Providential Source. This Newman feels he has in the Catholic Church and the Vicar of Christ. For this reason can he sound a note in the concluding sections that is triumphant, victorious, and supportive. Newman appears exhilarated by the thought of his Church's Providentially directed resurgence and renewal, oftentimes in the face of humanly insurmountable odds. He feels that, because the Church has ever been successful, so can they be who follow its Apostolic directives on this educational mission.

Newman concludes his introductory discourse with a glowing tribute to the perennial wisdom of Rome and the richness of Ireland's educational history.
CHAPTER IV

THE STRUCTURAL FOUNDATION AND THEMATIC
SUPERSTRUCTURE IN DISCOURSES II AND III

This chapter has two objectives: one expository and the other interpretive. The expository segment aims at providing a summary of the major content of Discourses II and III. It looks to Newman's principle of the wholeness of knowledge and the need of the mind to reflect that wholeness in a "connected view." It also recognizes Newman's belief in the existence of a personal, omniscient God whose influence as their Source and End bears so intimately on all sciences that to apprehend them is in some measure to apprehend Him. This expository part also acknowledges the existence of theology as a science and grants it a rightful place among the sciences. It stresses the point that theology cannot be excluded from the university because its omission would fragment the wholeness of knowledge, cause "neglect" to the other sciences, and compromise the ultimate attainment of truth. No less importantly, it points up Newman's epistemological framework. Finally, it indicates two questions with notable thematic and structural significance for the rest of the discourses.

The second or analytical part of the chapter pur-
poses to render a most important element of Newman's content in these two discourses -- his theme of the wholeness of knowledge -- in the closest possible alliance with the form of its presentation. Specifically, it will attempt to relate theme to structure in terms of Aristotelian equivocity by reference. In that context, "wholeness" of theme and "wholeness" of structure will be considered as equivocal terms. We saw in the two preceding chapters that equivocity by reference pertains to the relative importance of issues and the order in which their treatment ought to proceed. All of the issues discussed -- the nature of a Catholic university, the nature of a university in the abstract, the grounds of the inquiry, and the nature of Newman's gentleman -- suggested a certain unity by reference to each other. All suggested, as well, a proportional reference of secondary issues to the primary one. From the discussion, the nature of a Catholic university emerged as the primary issue. The other questions were treated as issues ultimately meaningful only in reference to the fundamental one. But we also observed in the last chapter that equivocity by reference can be applied to an order of priority in dealing with Newman's theological and philosophical grounds. That treatment centered on the relationship of grounds to grounds as much as it concentrated on the relationship of grounds as a secondary issue to primary question of the nature of a Catholic university. Employing "grounds" as a term equivoc-
cal by reference, we determined that the theological grounds should be viewed as the primary instance of grounds and that the philosophical grounds should be approached as a secondary instance. The treatment in this chapter will focus on the nature of the relationship between wholeness of theme and wholeness of structure in Discourses II and III, and it purposes to show that the relationship carries over into subsequent discourses. The governing principle of the Idea states that all knowledge is whole and that man's mind must reflect that wholeness in its view. The structure of the discourses is shaped in such a way that it helps bear the burden of this theme. Because the relationship between theme and structure is not simple, and inasmuch as it reflects the complexity of sameness in difference found in Newman's overall treatment of issues and in his presentation of theological and philosophical grounds, it will be approached with the same critical apparatus. By means of Aristotelian equivocity by reference, this section of the chapter will attempt to render Newman's theme and the elements of its formal presentation more unified and intelligible.

John Henry Newman's preoccupation with oneness seems not inappropriately reflected in the thematic and structural unity that might be said to characterize Discourses II and III in themselves and in their relation to the other
discourses of the Idea.\textsuperscript{1} As the structure of all the discourses assumes a specific direction in Discourse II, so does the principle of the wholeness of knowledge present itself as a significant thematic and structural device. Still present is the priority of issues and grounds proposed in the Preface and Discourse I; but now, in bolder relief, the principle, along with the assumption of belief in the existence of a personal, omniscient God, surfaces in such a manner as to place the Catholic and secular university issues, along with the natural and supernatural grounds, in firmer perspective.\textsuperscript{2} Both principle and assumption serve to show the ultimate, interrelated nature of all things, to point up the consequent interdependence of one science on another; and to clarify the interdisciplinary view with which one should hold the facts of reality, the knowledge that reflects these facts, and the Omnipotent God Who is their Source. Just as the assumption of the ex-

\textsuperscript{1}See Ch. III, p. 127, n. 19, and p. 134, n. 32, above, for other instances of Newman's preoccupation with unity.

\textsuperscript{2}In the process of analyzing Discourses II and III, this reader finds it difficult to lay aside, even temporarily, the notion that this series of lectures, with its pervasive Catholic tone, is a preeminently Catholic work about a Catholic university and is being delivered primarily for Catholics. If that is so, its apparent disproportionate emphasis on Catholic theology and concern with the Catholic university issue become more understandable. The Preface and Discourse I suggest that interpretation. Discourses II and III tend to confirm it.
istence of God makes more meaningful the principle of the wholeness of knowledge, which, in turn, makes necessary a "connected view or grasp" of theology in relation to other sciences, so does a correlative instance of wholeness render intelligible the structure of Discourses II and III. They form a part, in relation to previous and subsequent discourses, which constitute the whole of the Idea.

In Discourses II and III, Newman is concerned with the establishment of theology as a science and its "bearing" on other branches of knowledge. By implication, he shows equal interest in the relation of university education to the correlative concern of an afterlife. Thematically, he addresses himself to both matters by employing the principle that all knowledge forms a whole, by exercising a "connected view or grasp" of the relation of all forms of knowledge, and by advocating the existence of a personal God Who gives meaning to the whole of knowledge, a personal God Who reflects the ultimate truth which the whole of knowledge comprises, and toward which the interdisciplinary grasp moves in partial steps. Accordingly, he formulates questions in Discourse II whose answers reaffirm the wholeness of knowledge, whose responses point up the need for an interconnected grasp, and whose implications lead toward an Ultimate Truth as the end of the discourses and the whole of the idea.

In Discourse II, Newman raises two questions that
draw our attention to an assumption and a principle which with its specific view will help form this thematic re-
sponse.\(^3\) First, he asks whether theology ought to be taught in a university. Second, he questions whether the university should make utility its major concern. After a brief clarification of the first question, Newman answers it in the form of a syllogism. Its major premise states that a university must teach all sciences; its minor, that theology is a science. The conclusion follows that a university must teach theology.\(^4\) In the main, the discourse develops this response to the first question.

In support of the major premise, Newman states that by definition a university should teach all sciences:

As to the range of University teaching, certainly the very name of University is inconsistent with restrictions of any kind.... I am only putting on its popular, its recognized sense, when I say that a University should teach universal knowledge.\(^5\)

Newman supports this contention by the authority of Dr.

\(^3\)Idea of a University, p. 33. The principle of the wholeness of knowledge applies to studies and students. In reference to studies, it pertains to the subject matter viewed. In relation to students, it concerns the mode of viewing.

\(^4\)Ibid. The conclusion is understood. Regarding the syllogistical support, Culler stresses that the most cogent reason the university should teach theology is that in no other way can it reach truth. See Culler, pp. 180-181.

\(^5\)Idea of a University, pp. 33-34.
Johnson and Mosheim. What matters is not so much their support as the fact that Newman introduces, in this section, the notion that all knowledge forms a whole. It is by this principle that he will establish theology as a branch of knowledge and ascertain its relation to other sciences. Here, he will employ the principle in relation to studies -- in relation to the subject of the view or the interrelated nature of all knowledge. At the same time, Newman will exercise it in reference to students, the manner of viewing or the interdisciplinary grasp. He believes that he can make the whole realm of knowledge intelligible by tracing correspondences that exist between the different segments that make up the whole of knowledge.

According to Newman, one can discuss the exclusion of theology only in the context of two positions. Either theology does not deal with real knowledge, or else, one important branch of knowledge is being omitted. Here,

6 Ibid., p. 34. In his dictionary, Johnson defines the university as "a school where all arts and faculties are taught; "Mosheim, in the role of the historian, points out that, before the rise of the University of Paris, "the whole circle of sciences then known was not taught" and that the University of Paris "which exceeded all others in various respects, as well as in the number of teachers and students, was the first to embrace all the arts and sciences, and therefore first became a University."

7 Ibid., p. 16. By theology Newman means a science that contains a corpus of truth about God and man's relationship to Him. Theology embraces system, doctrine, and propositions. It provides unity to the whole of knowledge in the light of an ultimate end.
Newman is contesting the former view. That view suggests that theological beliefs do not constitute knowledge. It holds that theology does not contain objective and absolute truths, a position Newman cannot abide. For him, such a position is intolerable because it maintains that nothing can be known for certain about the Supreme Being. Such a position is untenable because it excludes from the subjects of one's knowledge "a fact encompassing, closing in upon, absorbing, every other fact conceivable." It is as if one would "investigate any part of any order of Knowledge, and stop short of that which enters into every order." Newman's position is understandable if one admits a God of the type in Whom Newman believes.

He goes on to support his major premise by a general principle:

... when men combine together for any common object, they are obliged, as a matter of course, in order to secure the advantages accruing from united action, to sacrifice many of their private opinions and wishes and to drop the minor differences... which exist between man and man.... Compromise... is the first principle of combination.

Newman then supplies specific examples. Both principle and illustration stress that, in the advancement of universal knowledge, much can be sacrificed that is personal and in-

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8 Ibid., p. 38.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., p. 35.
dividual, but the one thing that may not be sacrificed is "Knowledge itself."\textsuperscript{11} For if knowledge is sacrificed, so is science. If science is surrendered, so is truth. If truth is sacrificed, so is God. Such concessions would render a university, as a place for the fostering of knowledge, science, and truth, unworthy of its name. How can such an institution profess every science, yet leave out the foremost among them?\textsuperscript{12} If, moreover, science, truth, and God are disregarded, then the assumption of God's existence and the principle of a whole knowledge and a whole view might just as well be discarded. Such exclusions would be, for Newman, morally and intellectually reprehensible.

To provide additional support for his major and minor premises, Newman counters the objection that knowledge pertinent to university study should be limited along certain lines. Once again, principle and assumption play a role in his response. If one admits a God, Newman points out, he admits an all-encompassing fact that cannot be denied without fragmenting the whole of knowledge.\textsuperscript{13} This

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 36.

\textsuperscript{12} The validity of the argument hinges on belief in the existence of a personal omniscient God and the recognition of theology as the science which studies Him.

\textsuperscript{13} Idea of a University, pp. 37-38.
fact holds for natural theology, even more so for Revelation. For Newman, the concept of God refers not at all to chance, an impersonal force or fate. The God Who forms the subject of Newman's theology is "an Individual, Self-dependent, All-Perfect, Unchangeable Being...." Furthermore, belief in such a Supreme Being requires an act of Faith. It also demands an intellectual act whose object is truth and whose result is knowledge. This knowledge forms a science that cannot be cast aside as a matter of mere feeling or sentiment. God does exist, and man has an immortal soul capable of attaining Him in the next life and a mind capable of comprehending Him to some degree in this one. For Newman, there is no natural evidence to controvert these beliefs. At the same time, Newman concedes that if one believes theological facts not to be absolutely true, if he thinks them to be no more than a matter of sentiment or feeling, and if he believes God to be only some impersonal force at work in the world, such a person would have good reason to exclude theology from a university and to think its exclusion impairs the wholeness of knowledge not at all. If, on the other hand, one believes according to Newman's terms, then he cannot exclude theology without dislocating the parts and whole of knowledge and without undermining the assumption of God's existence.

14 Ibid., p. 46.
In Discourse II, Newman pursues the true nature of a university with special emphasis on the first of the two questions the discourse proposes, namely, the place of theology in a university. This is a concern Newman views as fundamental to the establishment of the university's formal nature. In treating the question, he reveals the fine line separating educational reality from pedagogical illusion and theological truth from religious nonsense. He shows how some men operate between each pair as if they were in an educational or theological labyrinth. This is unfortunate because there are natural and supernatural guidelines to insure their not getting lost if only they will use them. Newman proposes these guidelines in the form of a principle and an assumption. Should anyone choose not to incorporate them into his view of university education, Newman adds, that view will be a partial, limited one. Further, should he wish not to employ them, that person will find no reconciliation possible between what a university professes to be and what it actually is. Finally, should he opt to disregard them, he will discover no realistic compromise possible between man's religious and intellectual aspirations. His efforts to find fulfillment in a university framework will go begging. Left unreconciled, these aspirations will force him into an intellectual isolation and an educational dream world that refuses to face theological or secular scientific realities. In short,
Discourse II affirms that to deny theology its rightful place as a science in a university and to separate it from other sciences is tantamount to polarizing equal branches of knowledge, proportionate segments of reality, and corresponding natural and supernatural aspirations. In Newman's judgment, such an effort places man's spiritual and educational welfare in jeopardy.

The assumption of belief in a personal God Whom theology treats in such a manner that the resultant knowledge qualifies as a science, the principle of the wholeness of knowledge with its interdisciplinary grasp of theology and other sciences, all matters apparent in Discourse II, all elements shaping its thematic unity, are further developed in Discourse III. While merely sketching them in the former discourse, Newman details their thematic implications in the latter, providing all the while a second answer to the first question of Discourse II.\(^{15}\) The previous lecture argued that theology ought not to be excluded because to do so would be a grave omission. This lecture points out that the omission of theology would also be prejudicial to other sciences. Its argument merits summary, for it serves to amplify the thematic response of the previous discourse.

\(^{15}\)That is, whether theology ought to be taught in a university.
secular and religious subjects should be taught separately because they deal with different worlds. Newman responds that the omission of religious subjects would be prejudicial to other sciences. His reasons follow along these lines. The object of knowledge is truth. Truth deals in facts and their relations. All that exists, as contemplated by the mind, constitutes a complex fact, a whole which can be broken down into many particular facts with manifold interrelations. Knowledge is the "apprehension" of these facts in themselves and in relation to one another. The human mind knows the whole fact only in "partial views or abstractions. These segments are called sciences. Science emerges as a logical abstraction of the "whole vast fact" of reality as contemplated by the mind. It is a "partial view" by which the mind embraces "larger or smaller portions of the field of knowledge." For, in spite of its capabilities, the mind cannot enfold the fact in a glance or all at once. Rather, the mind must view it "under different aspects by way of making progress towards mastering the whole." Furthermore, each science differs in its

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16 Idea of a University, p. 51.
17 Ibid., pp. 52-54.
18 Ibid., p. 53.
19 Ibid.
importance and impact on the rest. All sciences "viewed together," represent the whole amount of objective truth the mind is capable of grasping. Consequently, the mind moves closer to objective truth according to the number of sciences it has mastered in right relation. Correspondingly, the fewer parts, sciences, or branches of knowledge the mind knows, the less is its grasp of the whole objective truth. One branch of knowledge depends on the others. Each helps maintain the whole circle of knowledge. Again, the more parts the mind knows, the closer it is to grasping the whole. The better it knows the truth in part, the better it will grasp the whole of truth. Finally, if the mind knows only one relation between two sciences, it may know quite a bit, but its knowledge will break down and not be quite so extensive as it would be with the knowledge of additional relations. Newman sums up the principle thus:

I lay it down that all knowledge forms one whole, because its subject-matter is one; for the universe in its length and breadth is so intimately knit together that we cannot separate off portion from portion, and operation from operation, except by a mental abstraction....

Discourse III goes on to point out the theological implications of the wholeness of knowledge. Newman observes:

He of course in His own Being is infinitely separate..., and Theology has its departments toward

20 Ibid., p. 54.
21 Ibid., p. 57.
which human knowledge has no relations, yet He has so implicated Himself with it, and taken it into His very bosom, by His presence in it, His providence over it, His impression upon it, and His influence through it, that we cannot truly or fully contemplate it without in some main aspects contemplating Him.22

Here is the core of Newman's argument in Discourse III and a link in principle and assumption with Discourse II. If we concede that all knowledge forms a whole with one subject matter, that knowledge is the apprehension of facts in themselves and in relation to others, that one's grasp of truth is in direct proportion to the number of relations perceived between various sciences, and that God's "presence," "providence," "impressions," and "influence" bear so strongly on other sciences that to apprehend them is, in some measure, to apprehend Him, then we must also concede that theology, the "science of God" or the "truths we know about God put into a system," is an especially significant branch of knowledge and that its omission would seriously impair our understanding of all sciences and their relations.23 For not to know an important part that bears significantly on other parts is to jeopardize our knowledge of the other parts and the whole. We cannot exclude theology or religious truth without compartmentalizing the sciences.

That the principle of the wholeness of knowledge

22Ibid.

23Ibid., p. 65.
also plays a substantive role in Discourse III is readily apparent.\textsuperscript{24} It underlies the right relation of sciences and underscores their relative importance. To say that knowledge is whole is to affirm that knowledge is one and integral. Omission of a part and neglect of due relations destroys that integrity. Much as it did in Discourse II, the principle gives Discourse III its thematic direction, one pointing toward the ultimate apprehension of the whole truth and one requiring a science whose principles illuminate that truth by shedding their light and influence upon its parts. Thus, the principle might also be said to direct the mind toward an understanding of the nature of a university that purposes to seek the whole truth by teaching all the sciences that reflect it.\textsuperscript{25}

No less apparent in Discourse III is Newman's assumption that God exists.\textsuperscript{26} His whole argument on the ex-

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\textsuperscript{24}Ibid., p. 57.
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\textsuperscript{25}The relationship can be expressed in other ways. For example, we can say that the sciences of a university interlock. This interlock binds all of them. Some links are stronger and, consequently, more important. Theology is such a link. Its strength, especially, binds partial truths with the whole. Without the interlock and without the stronger links, there is no chain, but only separate links. Separate links of knowledge make a whole chain of knowledge impossible.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{26}Idea of a University, p. 62. In Discourses II and III, Newman does not attempt to prove the existence of God. He merely assumes it.
\end{quote}
istence of theology as a science, its merits, relative importance, and consequent inclusion in a university hinges on that assumption. If God exists, then the science that treats of the truths we know about Him should be duly recognized. If God exists, theology or the "science of God" has merit equal to that of any science dealing with a fact of reality. If God exists, the science that specially pertains to Him is important for our understanding of all sciences because His influence extends to all sciences. If God exists, theology is a valid science with an undeniable impact on other sciences. Finally, if God exists, the exclusion of theology from a university would work a disservice on the other sciences, the other parts, because it would impair the whole, mutilate the circle, and throw knowledge out of joint.\(^{27}\) Correspondingly, if God does not exist, as Newman understands Him, then theology would not constitute a science, would not have any merit in itself or importance to other sciences, and its exclusion would be no great loss. But admit a personal God like Newman's and the wholeness of knowledge takes on a significantly different light.

Of equal importance in Discourse III is the interdisciplinary grasp, which is the principle of the wholeness of knowledge applied to students. Here, again, Newman em-

\(^{27}\)Ibid., p. 69.
ploys it as a process of viewing sciences, the parts of knowledge, in their proper disposition to each other and the whole of knowledge. He calls this exercise the "science of sciences." It synthesizes the partial with the whole view, the partial with the whole truth, many segments of knowledge with the whole, and particular facts with the "one large system or complex fact"\(^{28}\) of all that exists, as contemplated by the mind. When Newman affirms that theology cannot be omitted without detriment to the whole and other parts of knowledge, he is no more than exercising the "science of sciences" to develop his theme.\(^ {29}\)

After the content of Discourses II and III has been examined for an assumption, a principle of wholeness, and a correlative view that shape its thematic unity,\(^ {30}\) it might

\(^{28}\)Ibid., p. 52.

\(^{29}\)For a rather extensive treatment of the "science of sciences," see Culler, pp. 182-186, 251, 257, 265, and 270.

\(^{30}\)The influence that the assumption of the existence of God, the principle of the wholeness of knowledge, or the interdisciplinary grasp all wield in shaping the thematic unity of Discourses II and III cannot be overstressed. Principle deals with the partial branches that make up the whole of knowledge. It justifies Newman's contention for the place of theology and its inclusion in a university that purposes to teach not partial knowledge or truth but the whole range of knowledge and gamut of truth. Assumption treats of the whole and parts of knowledge in relation to the existence of a God Who makes them ultimately meaningful. The interdisciplinary grasp incorporates partial views into as whole a view as the mind can comprehend.
also be examined for evidence of yet another cohesive device, that of structural unity.31 Within the structure of the two questions that open Discourse II and the summarized arguments that conclude Discourse III, two answers to the first question are enclosed. Again, that question asks whether theology ought to be treated in a university. The whole of Discourse II provides one complete answer. It responds syllogistically that a university must teach all sciences, that theology is a science, and therefore, that a university must teach theology. The parts of Discourse II support the major and minor of that argument. Correspondingly, the whole of Discourse III provides a second answer to the first question of Discourse II. It states that to omit theology from a university is not only to impair the whole of knowledge by a major omission but also to impair the parts, as well, by the importance of the omission.32

Discourses II and III move from question to answer

31 Before going on to structural unity, one should note that principle, assumption, and view also come to grips in some way with the problem of the one and the many. The principle of the wholeness of knowledge treats of the relation of many parts to the one whole of knowledge; assumption, the relation of many aspects of truth to the one whole truth which is God; "connected view", the relation of many partial views to the one whole view that encompasses the right disposition of all things.

32 Idea of a University, pp. 57-58.
with an organizing principle of wholeness which can be viewed as equivocal by reference to that found in the wholeness of theme. A part-whole relationship can be seen in the structural composition of each discourse. The parts of each contribute to the structural wholeness of both. Used as an Aristotelian equivocal by reference, "wholeness" of structure constitutes a secondary instance of "wholeness" of theme. Then too, for the perception of this structural wholeness, there is required an interrelated view not unlike that exercised in establishing the oneness of theme.

Discourses II and III are structurally unified. Their structural wholeness complements their thematic integrity. When Newman relates one section of Discourse II to another and to the whole to show that theology is a science, which cannot be excluded from a university; \(^{33}\) when he, section by section, shows the relation of one science to another, especially theology to other sciences; when he

\(^{33}\) The sections of Discourse II relate to each other and the whole along these lines: statement of the question; answer in the form of a syllogism; support for the major premise by definition and from two authorities; a general principle and specific illustration in support of the major premise; support for the minor in the form of a response to an objection; a major assumption of the thesis.

The various parts of the discourse constitute Newman's whole first response to the question of whether theology should be excluded from a university. The answer, of course, is that its exclusion would constitute a grave omission, one that would hinder the attainment of truth.
employs the makeup of the discourses to point out that the partial view, representative of one science, must be related to the whole view of all sciences taken together; when he, part by part, shows that the partial truth of one science must be seen in its proper disposition to the whole truth of all sciences; when he by various sections of Discourse III captures the bearing of theology upon other sciences so that its exclusion is not tolerable without neglect to part and to the whole;\textsuperscript{34} when he, in short, uses the structural parts of each discourse to reflect the wholeness of knowledge, and to reflect the need to view knowledge as one, he does then appear to reflect his theme by the appropriate structure. By unifying structurally the segments of each discourse, he shores up his thematic purpose. His structure suggests his meaning because all parts of the two discourses blend to shape the formal structural picture of the two discourses, much the same as all branches of knowledge unite to form his thematic view of the wholeness of knowledge.

Concentration on the part-whole relationship or the complementary nature of theme and structure, however, should not exclude the more distinctively Aristotelian

\textsuperscript{34} In a similar manner, Newman uses the parts of Discourse III to issue a second response to the first question of Discourse II. This response states, in short, that to exclude theology is to impair the other sciences by the importance of that omitted.
interpretation that one may assign to the relation of theme and structure in Discourses II and III. That interpretation, following Owens' thesis, addresses itself to the "wholeness" of theme and the "wholeness" of structure as Aristotelian equivocals by reference.35 Again, it should be noted that such equivocals have a common name but different forms and definitions. Although the forms differ, there is some unity by reference. Furthermore, the true nature of the term or, more precisely, the object it signifies, is found only in the primary instance. Every other instance has a special independent relation to the primary one. In Discourses II and III, wholeness is expressed in various ways but always in reference to something one, one form that is whole primarily. The primary instance of wholeness in the foregoing discourses is the wholeness of knowledge in relation to studies and also in relation to students.36 Accordingly, all knowledge is one, and it must be viewed in an integrated fashion. The unity of the view and the subject viewed is the theme for both discourses. Considered as the primary instance, the wholeness of knowledge makes Newman's theme for Discourses II and III what it


36In general, the principle of the wholeness of knowledge is applied primarily to studies in Discourses II, III, and IV; to students, in V, VI, VII, and VIII.
really is. It gives Entity.\textsuperscript{37} This principle renders Newman's theme formally intelligible and makes his contention for the inclusion of theology in a university eminently reasonable.\textsuperscript{38}

The wholeness of knowledge is the primary, formal instance of wholeness in both discourses. It constitutes a primary, formal, thematic instance of wholeness that takes precedence over any other instance. It is that primary instance of wholeness that distinguishes the part-whole relationship of sciences from the part-whole relationship of structure in the two discourses. The primary instance is a thematic one by which Newman links Discourses II and III in principle and form. The secondary instance in the aforesaid discourses is the structural whole their respective parts do comprise. In this context, structure is whole and has Entity or form only to the extent that it refers to the primary instance, the theme or wholeness of knowledge; for theme alone contains in itself the formal nature of wholeness for Discourses II and III. The Entity of wholeness here is that formed by all branches of knowledge and the integrated view by which they are held.

\textsuperscript{37}The Entity of the wholeness of knowledge is the primary instance of the Being of the wholeness of knowledge.

\textsuperscript{38}As the form, Entity or what-IS-Being, the principle of wholeness provides "knowability". See Ch. I, pp. 77-78, above.
Again, structure derives its Entity only in reference to that thematic oneness.

As equivocals by reference, thematic and structural wholeness appear in some ways the same and in other ways different. They seem the same in that all sciences are necessary for a structurally whole picture of Discourses II and III. Thematic and structural wholeness also appear similar in the sense that both deal with part to whole relationships -- partial knowledge to the whole of knowledge, partial truths to the whole truth, partial views to the whole view, and partial structural segments to the whole developed picture. They differ fundamentally because theme deals with the relation of part to part and part to the whole of knowledge, while structure concerns the relation of partial answers to the complete one. The burden of their equivocality by reference, however, is to be found in the relationship between the primary instance that points to the interdisciplinary relation or view of the sciences and the secondary instance that stresses the structural integrity of Discourses II and III. On this relationship the equivocality hinges. Only in relation to it are theme and structure denominated "whole."

Furthermore, if the importance of any part can be determined by its impact upon other parts, then Discourses II and III are very significant indeed to the overall theme and structure of the Idea. Thematically, Discourse II is
crucial because the principle of wholeness stated therein governs the whole Idea. Structurally, Discourse II is pivotal inasmuch as the direction of subsequent discourses turns on answers to the two questions it proposes. Discourse III is no less important for the elaboration of theme and structure it provides. As its theme, it reaffirms the place of theology in a university, employing the same principle supplied in Discourse II. In its structure it contributes a second answer to the first question of the previous discourse.

In the context of Aristotelian equivocity by reference, Discourses II and III appear equally important for the whole of the Idea because their thematic and structural wholeness mirror the thematic and structural wholeness of succeeding discourses. The primary instance of wholeness for all of the Idea is the integrity of all knowledge and the interdisciplinary view of all sciences. The secondary instance is the structural oneness of the discourses that suitably reflects the basic integrity of various branches of knowledge. From the standpoint of an Aristotelian inquiry that makes the theme and structure of the whole Idea more intelligible, the Aristotelian approach appears well suited. The interrelation of knowledge is applicable to all the discourses, not merely the second and third. It

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39 Idea of a University, p. 33.
registers the highest, the primary instance of wholeness in Newman's work and relates unmistakably to theme. A corresponding oneness of structure not only refers back to theme but also might be said to complement it. If this wholeness of theme and structure can be adequately established and some proportional relation between primary and secondary instances assigned, then the reader will have a useful Aristotelian key to a better understanding of the unity of the Idea.

How, then, do the remaining discourses form a thematic and structural whole? Structurally, Discourses II-IX treat two subordinate issues raised at the beginning of Discourse II. Again, the first of these asks whether theology ought to be taught in a university; the second, whether a university should make utility its major concern. Both issues are considered subordinate because they elaborate a larger issue. They constitute part of a larger question of just what is a university. This, in turn, forms part of a still larger issue, treated earlier as Newman's preeminent concern, the nature of a Catholic university. In general, Newman uses Discourses II, III, IV, VIII, and IX to answer the first question. He employs Discourses V, VI, and VII to respond to the second. In elaborating and responding to the two questions of Discourse II, 

40 See Ch. II of this study for a treatment of that major issue.
the foregoing discourses constitute important structural parts of the whole answer to the question of what makes up the nature of a Catholic university.\(^ {41} \)

The modes of wholeness considered previously reflect some of the ways that wholeness can be treated in the Idea. Wholeness can be expressed in many ways; but in keeping with the Aristotelian schema, it must always be expressed in reference to one definite nature.\(^ {42} \) Again, the one definite nature, the form or the primary instance of wholeness in the Idea, is the interrelated nature of knowledge and the interdisciplinary manner in which sciences are held.\(^ {43} \) Everything else considered whole refers back to this primary wholeness, whether it be that which produces the wholeness, that of which the wholeness is the sign or the one for whom the wholeness is formulated. This dependence holds especially true for the organization of the discourses. Structurally, the Idea is almost an artistically

\(^ {41} \) All of the foregoing discourses, by their elaboration and response to these two subordinate questions, do, in fact, "form" the answer to Newman's question of what constitutes the essential nature and scope of a university.

\(^ {42} \) See Owens, p. 265.

\(^ {43} \) Apart from the Idea, the primary instance of wholeness would probably be that wholeness of knowledge or interdisciplinary grasp of knowledge found in the mind of God. In reference to His interrelated knowledge or "connected view," the one in the Idea would be a secondary instance.
perfect whole to which not much more need be added and from which little can be removed without damage to the whole.

In general, the structural unity of the discourses is assured by the uninterrupted interdependence of the parts -- the issues and the responses. More specifically, structural oneness is achieved by the response of all nine discourses to the primary and secondary issues raised in the Preface and Discourse I, by the elaboration of these issues that the two questions of Discourse II provide, and by the charge they impose for a response in subsequent discourses. The structural unification of the whole Idea is further enhanced by the three questions raised in Discourse VI. While Discourses II and III contribute two answers to the first question of Discourse II, the fourth discourse supplies a third answer to the same question. Discourses V-VII focus on responses to the second question raised in Discourse II. The sixth, seventh, and eighth discourses respond to the issues raised in Discourse VI, serving at the same time to elaborate the second issue raised in Discourse II, which, in turn, elaborates the primary and secondary issues raised in the Preface and Discourse I.

Central to any consideration of the leading questions raised in Discourse II and the proper thematic or

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44 Idea of a University, p. 115. These deal with the relation of intellectual culture to "mere knowledge," "professional knowledge," and "religious knowledge."
structural unification of subsequent discourses is the principle of the wholeness of knowledge. It serves as an ideal unifying principle. It supplies an orderly world or context for the generation of Newman's thematic response to the basic issues he proposes. It might be said to activate or complete, in a formal Aristotelian sense, the matter of Newman's idea of a university. It is the "soul" that informs the "body" of his work. Considered in the context of Aristotelian equivocity by reference, the principle constitutes the primary instance of wholeness in all the discourses. For in addition to unifying thematically the discourses, it structurally relates them to one another and to the whole, specifically, by showing structurally the relationship of theology to other branches of knowledge. To reflect the integral relationship of the sciences, the structural unity of the work also requires an interdisciplinary point of view. The principle of wholeness integrates and harmonizes the nine discourses, moving them well along toward what the Idea structurally ought to be. It provides the form that makes the nine discourses whole. It helps make the work a totality that, one suspects, reflects the totality of view and the integrity of the man who presented the discourses. The totality of the work also appeals to the person who would read the Idea with a total, integrated view.

Much the same as other parts of the Idea, Discourses
II and III strike the reader with a sense of actuality and formality that can be viewed profitably in terms of equivocality by reference. The reader perceives this sense in the subject matter and form of the university program Newman proposes. He also notes it in the formal issue or primary instance of issue that constitutes what is the real question of Newman’s idea of a university. This sense of actuality and formality is no less perceptible in the grounds or primary instance of grounds on which the idea is treated. It is also present in the formal nature of wholeness, the primary instance of wholeness, that specifies theme and structure. The reader can also observe a sense of actuality and formality in the unifying principle that might be said to govern and to activate the whole work. The key to formality and actuality, its primary instance in this case, appears to be the wholeness of knowledge considered in the context of its interrelated subject matter or interdisciplinary view. Repeatedly, primary and secondary instances of the principle of wholeness arise.

Then, too, there is the example of a specific work being actualized before our very eyes. Although this process is evident in many works, it appears to hold especially true in this case where we see the idea of a university -- its issues, grounds, theme, and structure -- being actualized, formed, and perfected in a singular manner. The ultimate factor is the form or formal cause that makes
this idea of a university Newman's and not someone else's. Form gives the idea Entity and provides its what-IS-Being. The formal cause of the idea is the "connected view" or the interdisciplinary grasp of all sciences. It is the formal, shaping, inner, vital, necessary, and unchanging principle that makes Newman's idea of a university distinctive.

It is not enough, Newman says, for a student to know well just one area of knowledge. Neither is it sufficient that an instructor sit in his chair confident in a firm grasp of his own discipline. Both must know and do more than that. Their views must be more comprehensive.

Once we concede that in reading Newman's Idea we should focus on the wholeness of knowledge or the interdisciplinary view as an important key to the form or actuality of the work, our understanding gathers around our formal response to its issues, grounds, theme, and structure because it arises from it. The actuality of the foregoing elements in the work points to the sense of actuality by which they should be interpreted. The correlative pattern of the discourses reflects the interrelated nature of the knowledge or sciences whose relations, especially in reference to theology, the structure of the discourses is supposed to show. In other words, the actuality of issues, grounds, theme, and structure should be mirrored in the actuality of our integrated view of them. If all knowledge
is one, and if the relationship of the various branches is adequately conveyed by the structure of the discourses, then our view as readers or listeners should also be one and integral. If it is, we bear the whole work in our response. Then our response might be said to be formed and shaped by the work's theme. The principle of the wholeness of knowledge mandates that one perceive the proper disposition of the discourses and the branches of knowledge which they treat in right relation to each other and to the whole. Accordingly, our understanding of the meaning of Newman's Idea is shaped by our correct, formal integrated view. This response also renders our vision of the Idea whole, for different facets of the Idea are being read and treated consistently as primary and secondary instances of the wholeness of knowledge or the interdisciplinary view. This approach, used consistently, reflects a valid, philosophically connected view, with Aristotelian equivocity by reference being employed as its most distinctive schematic device. Furthermore, if a sense of actuality is present to the degree pointed out in this chapter, and form is the key to that sense of actuality, then the formal cause of the Idea would appear to merit some extended consideration. This will be given in a later chapter.45

45The interdisciplinary view as the formal cause of Newman's idea of a university will be treated in Ch. VI of this study.
 CHAPTER V  

A DISCORDANT NOTE SOUNDED IN DISCOURSE IV  

In Discourse II, Newman raises the question whether theology ought to be taught in a university. In Discourses II and III, he responds that it should for a variety of reasons. For him, a university that professes to teach all sciences must teach theology. The omission of theology impairs the wholeness of knowledge and inhibits the attainment of truth. Then, too, Newman feels that all sciences bear on each other to such an extent that it is impossible to teach all properly unless each science is taken into account, and that includes theology. Moreover, the omission of theology would be injurious to the whole and parts of knowledge in view of its importance and its pervasive influence on all sciences. In Discourse IV, Newman provides yet another response to the same question. He states there that, if theology is excluded from its rightful place, other sciences will usurp its province and prerogatives. He employs the major part of the discourse to support that assertion.

Underlying the examples used in support is Newman's principle that the dislocation of one important science from the whole territory of knowledge must certainly result
in the rush of other sciences to fill its place and that the rush is oftentimes accompanied by hostility. In Discourse IV, he cites repeated examples of such encroachment and hostility in regard to theology. Because the examples given run so distinctively counter to the educational doctrine advanced by Newman in earlier discourses, they merit our close attention. In this chapter, I purpose to consider the examples in some detail with a view to showing, from Newman's point of view, the damage done when secular sciences exceed their rights and intrude where they do not belong. The first injury wrought by such usurpation is the destruction of the integrity of all knowledge by the practical omission of one of its most important parts. No less important is the damage done to the "connected view." The action of the usurping science undermines the interdisciplinary grasp of all knowledge that ought to be present. Such action reflects a myopic view of the "relative disposition of things." It discounts the value of a real comprehensive view and satisfies itself with the illusion of a partial one. The most damaging effect of all, however, is that the usurpation of theology's province jeopardizes the attainment of truth. For Newman, the object of knowledge is truth. Different sciences supply different approaches to truth. Theology is the best approach to truth, in Newman's view, because its proper study is the One Who comprises the whole of truth. Theology provides facts to
other sciences which they, left to themselves, have neither the capacity nor the means to ascertain. Thus, Newman concludes that secular sciences need theology if a more complete grasp of truth is to be had.

As well as any of its predecessors and better than most of its successors, Discourse IV points up the discord that oftentimes arises between secular science and theology due to a misunderstanding of respective roles and a fragmented view of the wholeness of knowledge. It cites repeated examples of, if not secular science caught up in a vortex of defiance of theological science, at least of correlative, sometimes subsidiary and handmaiden, sciences attempting to usurp the province and prerogatives of theology.\(^1\) Newman asserts most emphatically that

\[ \text{...if you drop any science out of the circle of knowledge, you cannot keep its place vacant for it; that science is forgotten; the other sciences close up, or, in other words, they exceed their proper bounds, and intrude where they have no right.}^2 \]

Discourse IV reflects an acute problem of communications and recognition between theology and other branches of knowledge. It traces the maturation of the seeds of intellectual and educational discord sown and reaped by persons who do not know the limitations of their own sciences and

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\(^1\) *Idea of a University*, p. 77. Newman refers to some Fine Arts as the "special attendants" of Religion.

who do not stay in their own fields. What gives them the right, Newman inquires; for in his judgment

men, whose life lies in the cultivation of one science, or the exercise of one method of thought, have no more right, though they have often more ambition, to generalize upon the basis of their own pursuit but beyond its range, than the schoolboy or the ploughman to judge of a Prime Minister. 3

Although, to some extent, the discourse bears out the need for theology also to maintain its place and not go beyond its scope, it is entirely consistent with Newman's aim that the emphasis should fall on secular intrusions in theological matters. 4 The discourse spells out the wrongs that theology suffers from the secular scientific world in which it finds itself. It affirms that "if Theology is not allowed to occupy its own territory..., sciences which are quite foreign to Theology will take possession of it." 5

If theology is displaced, it further notes,

these foreign sciences will assume certain principles as true, and act upon them, which they neither have authority to lay down themselves, nor appeal to any other higher science to lay down for them. 6

Accordingly, the Painter, the Antiquarian, the Philosophic

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3 Ibid., p. 76.

4 Newman's purpose is that no science be excluded from its rightful place in a university, least of all theology.

5 Idea of a University, p. 91.

6 Ibid.
Historian, the Comparative Anatomist, and the Political Economist will be found exceeding their territorial boundaries and making "enunciations, not of Science, but of Private Judgment." This judgment, in turn, will infect "every science which it touches with a hostility to Theology...." If theology is not taught, the discourse concludes,

its province will not simply be neglected, but will be actually usurped by other sciences, which will teach, without warrant, conclusions of their own in a subject-matter which needs its own proper principles for its due formation and disposition.

Discourse IV underscores the damage done by the usurper in the form of studies fragmented, educational boundaries violated, and legitimate disciplinary rights curtailed. Underlying the treatment is the harm wrought to the wholeness of knowledge and to a "connected view" of such knowledge. If the exponent of one science usurps the prerogatives of another science, the usurper de facto shows he does not recognize the wholeness of knowledge. Furthermore, by trying to make his partial, limited view more than it is, he gives ample evidence of his loss of a "connected view" of the sciences.

Discourse IV also treats of the hostility often

7 Ibid., p. 92.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p. 93.
accompanying this disjointed view of secular and theological boundaries. It points out that

the hostility in question, when it occurs, is coincident with an evident deflection or exorbitance of Science from its proper course; and that this exorbitance is sure to take place...if Theology be not present to defend its own boundaries and to hinder the encroachment. 10

Featured in the discourse are men of various sciences who do not tolerate, much less respect, other sciences. Typically, each has "the obstinacy of the bigot, whom he scorns, without the bigot's apology, that he has been taught, as he thinks, his doctrine from heaven." 11 He is "a man of one idea" meaning "a man of one science." 12 His view, partly true and partly false, has limited value because it is so partial. 13 He may expound principles, all of them true to a certain point, yet all degenerating into error and quackery, because they are carried to excess, viz. at the point where they require interpretation and restraint from other quarters and because they are employed to do what is simply too much for them.... 14

At any rate, the "man of one idea" who tries to make his limited science the whole of knowledge, or at least, more

10 Ibid., p. 91.
11 Ibid., p. 76.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
than it is, plants the seeds of disrespect, discord, and hostility in what should be a garden of mutually tolerant and supportive interdisciplinary relationships. The fruit is unfortunate for all sciences involved.

It is not difficult to see why Newman finds a useful example in the Fine Arts. Modify the proper view and there can be easily visualized these "high ministers of the Beautiful and the noble" no longer serving as the "plain, special attendants and handmaids of Religion." Disregard the wholeness of knowledge and "they are apt to forget their place, and, unless restrained with a firm hand, instead of being servants, will aim at becoming principals." Instead of ministering to the ends of Religion, they will subject Religion to their own limited purposes. The discord, the clash between secular and divine science, would then become readily apparent. Painting and Gothic sculpture might also be used to represent the struggle subsidiary sciences can wage against that science from which they oftentimes draw their greatest vigor and sustenance. The prudence that sometimes comes with age and experience might have dictated another course of action for those arts had they been more wisely employed. But not being so prudent or wise, their ministers defy what is to them an ill-

15 Ibid., p. 77.
16 Ibid.
founded convention of religious authority or responsibility and move on to an ultimately groundless scientific feud. Is this senseless feud of the Church's making? Both sides recognized the province and governance of the Church at an earlier time. Why now are the Fine Arts no longer able to recognize them? Newman responds that they have lost their wholeness of view. The result is the cause of Religion being subverted, while corrupt nature and the powers of darkness are being served.17

In the Comparative Anatomist who denies the immorality of the soul,18 Newman cites another example in support of his point that "any secular science, cultivated exclu-

17Ibid., p. 78. Inasmuch as Newman displays an unfortunate tendency to identify Revelation, theology, Faith, and religion, I think his use of these terms should be clarified. By theology, Newman means the "Science of God, or the truths we know about God put into a system," (Idea, p. 65). Revelation would be the major source of these truths. Faith is the acceptance of Revealed Truth. It is, moreover, an intellectual act whose object is truth and whose result is knowledge (Idea, p. 39). Religion, for Newman, reflects an effort, embracing all the faculties of a man, to imitate Christ. In line with Harrold's apt description (Harrold, p. 47), religion for Newman means a total human experience. It is not a matter of mere feeling or sentiment. It involves "cultivation" of one's "intellect," "imagination," "will," "moral sense," and "social sense" to "transform the religious ideal into the real...." I might add that, for Newman, the relation of religion to Faith and Revelation is one of agenda to credenda. Religion entails the transformation of that which ought to be believed into that which ought to be done.

18Idea of a University, p. 82.
sively, may become dangerous to Religion." 19 This serves as one more example of discord in the garden of the sciences, a disharmony stemming from a fragmented view of the wholeness of knowledge. In this case, the Anatomist does not recognize the respective roles of medicine and theology. Once more, Newman discovers an advocate of one science attempting to make the whole of knowledge what is but a limited part and to foster as a whole view what is no more than a partial one. This attempt is all the more surprising, Newman feels, in view of the fact that "...if there be a calling which feels its position and its dignity to lie in abstaining from controversy and in cultivating kindly feelings with men of all opinions, it is the medical profession...." 20 While recognizing the Anatomist’s duty to pursue his calling, Newman does not understand why he goes beyond his charge by throwing himself upon his own particular science, which is of a material character and allowing it to carry him forward into a subject-matter, where it has no right to give the law, viz., that of spiritual beings, which directly belongs to the science of theology. 21

Yet the comparative Anatomist is reputed to be a respectable man. What Newman has heard of him indicates as much.

19 Ibid., p. 74.

20 Ibid., p. 82.

21 Ibid., pp. 82-83.
It is just that he lays down the law in cases where he has no right.

Another example of the encroachment of one science upon another is to be found in the Anglican dignitary who wrote a History of the Jews.\textsuperscript{22} He appears to Newman a moral-minded man, but he exceeds his disciplinary boundaries because of poor judgment, insufficient ecclesiastical authority, and ignorance of his historical position. His questionable judgment leads him to an external view of this history and to a secular adaptation of it. He does not see that his view in the matter is limited and that the principles which he employs legitimately in one discipline degenerate into "error" and "quackery" when applied to another. Another problem is that this author has "no teaching, to which he is bound to defer, which might rule that to be false which attracted him by its speciousness."\textsuperscript{23} Had he been a Roman Catholic, he might have been saved from this error. Had he been more prudent and knowledgeable of the limitations of respective sciences, perhaps he would not have been "betrayed into a false step by the treacherous fascination of what is called the Philosophy of History...."\textsuperscript{24} More interdisciplinary discord is the only

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 83.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 83.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
fruit engendered by this effort. The Philosophy of History is "good in its place," Newman adds, "but can scarcely be applied in cases where the Almighty has superseded the natural laws of society and history." 25

Discourse IV strikes a further discordant note in the case of the Political Economist and his Inaugural Lecture at Oxford. In this instance, Newman presents yet another example of a rupture in the theological-secular scientific relationship, a break resulting from the economist's distorted view and attempt at aggrandizement. The lecturer, "a gentlemen of high character," in a university "removed more than any other Protestant body of the day from sordid or unchristian principles on the subject of money-making," 26 advances a theory that extends well beyond the scope of his discipline. He does not merely propose that there is a science of wealth with rules for its acquirement, distribution, disposal, and the like. Instead, his object is to recommend the science of wealth "...claiming for it an ethical quality, viz.,...extolling it as the road to virtue and happiness, whatever Scripture and holy men may say to the contrary." 27 These are not matters, in Newman's judgment, that pertain to economics. Moreover, if

25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., p. 85.
27 Ibid., p. 86.
he feels theology abused in the other instances cited, Newman especially feels the hurt of the encroachment of economics upon theological matters in the setting of a Christian university. This, for Newman, is a most representative example of theology falling "prey" to the unwarranted excursions of a science into an area where it does not belong. Theology is being "put out of possession;" its subject matter is being seized by another science too anxious to exceed its rights. As a result of this intrusion, virtue and happiness become questions of "Private Judgment" rather than of theological science, and they are deprived of the higher and more heavenly context in which Newman feels they should be considered. Whether led to this position by an over-zealous preoccupation with his own science or by error of private judgment, the lecturer has created discord among the sciences by usurping the subject area of one of its prominent members, theology. Any more than the Fine Arts, Comparative Anatomy, or History, Political Economy is not to be constituted "the sole exponent of all things in heaven and earth." 28

In antiquarian and historical research, Newman cites still another example of the usurpation attempted by some to the prejudice of theology. He does not deny that the "evidence of History...is invaluable in its place; but, if

28 Ibid., p. 74.
it assumes to be the sole means of gaining Religious Truth, it goes beyond its place." Gibbon sees it otherwise. He "argues against the darkness at the Passion, from the accident that it is not mentioned by Pagan historians...." Protestants argue against Transubstantiation and Arians against Christ's Divinity along parallel lines. Newman argues the lack of scientific foundation for such assertions. In pleading his case before God and man, Newman reveals his respect for the wholeness of all sciences, while displaying his love for theology and filial loyalty to the Church. Once again, the seeds of interdisciplinary discord and hostility are sown through the agency of those who assume a larger office than it is their right to undertake.

In all these examples, Newman's response merits our respect, if not our agreement. To be told that theology is not a science deserving of a Chair in a university would upset anyone with the kind of loyalty Newman felt for the Church. Add to that denial the further dimension of usurpation and hostility, and Newman's reaction becomes more understandable. So does his concern over the consequent disunity in the family of sciences. The right of theology to function in its area confronts the determination of

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29 Ibid., p. 90.

30 Ibid.
other sciences to limit or even completely deny that function. If, in Newman's words, the Church would attempt "to determine the orbit of Jupiter by the Pentateuch" or "to install the Thomist philosophy in the schools of astronomy and medicine," then her efforts would be the root of the discord.\(^{31}\) If, moreover, she would remain silent while "Divine Science is ostracized" or not defend her boundaries from the encroachment of Medicine, History, or Economics, then her weakness and temerity would constitute the source of the rupture, and the wrongs done her would be self-imposed.\(^{32}\) If, on the other hand, she maintains her place among the sciences, while respecting the rights of other disciplines, the burden of the responsibility for the disharmony lies elsewhere. It lies, to quote from the discourse itself, with the Antiquarian who says, "Nothing has ever taken place but is to be found in historical documents,\(^{33}\) or with the Philosophic Historian who claims, "There is nothing in Judaism different from other political institutions,\(^{34}\) or with the Anatomist who cries, "There

\(^{31}\text{Ibid.},\ p.\ 92.\ \text{Newman fails to mention that the Church periodically has intruded where she had no right, e.g., in the case of Galileo.}\)

\(^{32}\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^{33}\text{Ibid.},\ p.\ 91.\)

\(^{34}\text{Ibid.},\ p.\ 92.\)
is no soul beyond the brain,"\textsuperscript{35} or with the Political Economist who avows, "Easy circumstances make men virtuous."\textsuperscript{36} If we allow that the various branches of knowledge are one, that none can be neglected without prejudice to the rest, and that any disregard of this oneness can open the door to usurpation, then the foregoing statements appear ignorant and capricious.

There are many parallels in the examples cited in Discourse IV. Each, according to Newman, causes a rupture in the right relationship that should exist between secular and sacred sciences. Each counters the notion, affirmed by Newman in the previous discourse, that "in order to have possession of truth at all, we must have the whole truth; and no one science, no two sciences, no family of sciences, nay, not even all secular science, is the whole truth...."\textsuperscript{37} Each example, moreover, confirms a tendency not to recognize that revealed truth enters to a very great extent into the province of science, philosophy, and literature, and that to put it on one side, in compliment to secular science, is simply, under colour of a compliment to do science a great damage.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{35}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{36}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., pp. 72-73.

\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., p. 73.
Each displays the harm wrought when "impatience acts in matters of research and speculation" or "in the case of every person whose education or pursuits are contracted...." By formal though counterfeit declaration, each also affirms its love and devotion to truth. Unfortunately, the love of each for the whole truth appears as unfounded as the false judgment and statement by which each makes its false claim on a subject matter not its own.

Newman points out that

though they speak truth, they do not speak the whole truth;...they speak a narrow truth, and think it a broad truth;...their deductions must be compared with other truths, which are acknowledged to be truths, in order to verify, complete and correct them.\(^\text{40}\)

Furthermore, each example reflects a measure of blindness, erring judgment, and haste. Each lacks insight. Each reveals deception by the exponent of a given science because that advocate fails to perceive that "the omission of any kind of knowledge whatever, human or divine is , as far as it goes, not knowledge, but ignorance."\(^\text{41}\) While theology suffers most here from the unwarranted excursions of secular science into its area, ultimately all sciences lose, for the encroachment of one science upon another

\(^{39}\)Ibid., p. 76.

\(^{40}\)Ibid., p. 89.

\(^{41}\)Ibid., p. 73.
jeopardizes the territorial security of all.

Discourse IV illustrates well the notion that discord abounds and usurpation follows when there is little mutual respect and recognition between secular sciences and theology. Its examples depict the fragmentation of sciences stemming from a disorder of minds lost in themselves and out of touch with the rights of other sciences and the demands of the wholeness of knowledge. With various examples, it traces the genesis of the discord to a lack of charity, humility, and self-knowledge. It roots scientific discord in intolerance and pride. All of its examples run counter to the principle cited earlier and reaffirmed in Discourse IV that

the various branches of science are intimately connected with each other, and form one whole, which whole is impaired, and to an extent which it is difficult to limit, by any considerable omission of knowledge, of whatever kind, and that revealed knowledge is very far indeed from an inconsiderable department of knowledge....

The family of sciences should be a close-knit unit with a goodly measure of familial affection and respect to compensate for the different scope of its members' principles and subject matter. But the bond which characterized the relationship between theology and other sciences in former times appears no longer evident. Theology's handmaiden and sister sciences no longer respect "the important

42 Ibid.
influence which theology in matter of fact does and must exercise over a great variety of sciences, completing and correcting them." The drift of the examples Newman cites serves only to show how they now begrudge and even deny this right. As a result, the bond of unity is gone, and in its place disharmony, mistrust, and hostility prevail.

Ibid., p. 92.
CHAPTER VI

A PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW OF NEWMAN'S GROUND FLOOR IN DISCOURSES V AND VI

Three earlier chapters of this study have considered the Catholic and secular university issues, the grounds on which they are treated, and the unity that characterizes Newman's thematic and structural development of them, with the Preface and Discourses I-IV serving to initiate the discussion. University issues, grounds, theme, and structure, all have been interpreted in terms of Aristotelian equivocity by reference. Using Discourses V and VI as a point of departure, I propose in this chapter to summarize some of the more significant material of the two foregoing chapters with a view to its interpretation in the light of an Aristotelian schematic device. More specifically, my aim will be to consider: (1) the intellectual and educational context in which Newman offers a "connected view" as his educational ideal; (2) some Aristotelian notions on cause and their application to the "connected view" as a principle of change; (3) some Aristotelian ideas on entity and their application to the "connected view" as that which gives Entity to Newman's idea of a university. The "connected view" as a principle of change and a principle of
Entity will be treated after the manner of Aristotelian equivocity by reference.\textsuperscript{1} Equivocity by reference concerns an order of priority. Up to this point, this study has addressed itself to an order of priority in dealing with the relation of secondary issues, like those of the nature of a secular university, the grounds of the inquiry, and the wholeness of theme and structure, to the primary issue of the nature of a Catholic university. The study has also concerned itself with an order of priority in discussing the relation of Newman's theological grounds to his philosophical ones, and the relation of his wholeness of theme to a wholeness of structure. This chapter will deal with an order of priority in treating that which causes the idea of a university and gives it Entity.

The treatment of the "connected view" as a principle of change and as a principle of Entity addresses itself to two questions. The first asks how the "connected view" is involved in the development of mere learning or unrelated branches of knowledge into the interdisciplinary grasp that is the idea of a university. The second considers how it is that mere unrelated sciences can take on a Being or Entity they themselves do not possess. Both questions relate to previously treated issues, especially that of the

\textsuperscript{1}The material on cause and Entity, along with the schematic device employed, will be drawn from Joseph Oyen's interpretation of Aristotle.
fundamental nature of a university,² because they ask what makes the idea of a university to be what it is and why it is what it is. While it is true that both questions merit consideration in that they may serve to clarify Newman's educational theme, even more significant, perhaps, is the fact that their answers require a philosophical explanation of Newman's university ideal. At its core, the question of what makes the idea of a university to be what it is is a philosophical one and deserves a philosophical answer. Then, too, the questions of the cause and Entity of the idea are appropriate in view of the largely philosophical nature of Newman's total educational idea and treatment, e.g., philosophical grounds, philosophical habit of mind, philosophical wisdom, religion of philosophy, and man of philosophical habit. If, from a purely philosophical point of view, Newman's treatment of that which causes the idea and gives it Entity appears to be manifold, some examination and interpretation of his multiple presentation may very well be in order. But Newman's treatment of the causes of the idea does appear to be manifold. Furthermore, Newman's total educational ideal embraces philosophical and religious elements. It looks to the intellectually cultivated Christian gentleman with a comprehensive view of this life and the next. Moreover, Newman's manifold treat-

²This problem is treated at some length in Chapters I and II, above.
ment of some causes of the idea must be investigated if the philosophical element of his whole educational idea is to be rightly understood.³

That Newman does consider causality and speak of more than one type in relation to his educational ideal is evident from the content of Discourses V and VI. For example, in discussing intellectual enlargement, Newman speaks of "the action of a formative power, reducing to order and meaning the matter of our acquirements."⁴ The material and formal causal implications here are fairly apparent. Elsewhere, in the same discourse, Newman provides a second example of that concern when he wonders "whether Knowledge, that is, acquirement, is after all the real principle of the enlargement, or whether that principle is not rather something beyond it."⁵ In a third example, Newman informs his audience of his purpose: "to show...that the end of a Liberal Education is not mere knowledge, or

³Although, as Martin Svaglic and others have pointed out (Svaglic, pp. ix, xv, xx-xxiii), the dominance of the "connected view" as Newman's idea of a university appears evident from the start, still the philosophical and theological contexts in which it assumes its dominant position have not been explained completely. An ideal that has so many philosophical and theological overtones warrants investigation in the light of those overtones.

⁴Idea of a University, p. 120.

⁵Ibid., p. 118.
knowledge considered in its matter."⁶ For Newman, mere knowledge is a condition of intellectual cultivation but not an end of Liberal education. Still another example of Newman's interest in formal or final causality is to be seen in Newman's declaration that "[Liberal] knowledge is, not merely a means to something beyond it,...but an end sufficiently to rest in and to pursue for its own sake...."⁷ Final causality also comes to mind when we see Newman ponder "what is the end of University Education, and of the Liberal or Philosophical Knowledge which I conceive it to impart...."⁸ Newman supplies additional evidence of his interest in formal or final causality when he affirms that "there is a knowledge worth possessing for what it is, and not merely for what it does."⁹ In a seventh example, Newman points out that "Knowledge is called by the name of Science or Philosophy, when it is acted upon [and] informed...."¹⁰ Although there are other examples that could

⁶Ibid., p. 117.
⁷Ibid., p. 97.
⁸Ibid., pp. 96-97.
⁹Ibid., pp. 105-106.
¹⁰Ibid., p. 103.
be drawn from the text, the ones cited suffice to show Newman's interest in causality and his manifold approach to the causality of his educational ideal.

In contrast to his multiple treatment of cause, Newman has very little to say directly on that which gives Being or Entity to the idea of a university. At least, he does not discuss the matter in those terms. But the interpreter of the idea may so discuss it. In view of Newman's treatment of the causality of the idea, it appears reasonable that the interpreter should follow up a causal analysis of the idea with a correlative interpretation of its ultimate Being. What matters, however, is that the philosophical scheme employed to discuss the Being of the idea should correspond to that used to analyze the causality of the idea. Aristotle's equivocal treatment of cause and Entity, as interpreted by Joseph Owens, lends itself to

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Some equally suitable material will be cited later in the chapter in connection with the interdisciplinary grasp itself. See pp. 207, 208, 210, 213, 214, and 216. below. Examples cited on these pages would pertain, for the most part, to the formal causality of the idea of a university.

For to know the idea of a university, from an Aristotelian philosophical standpoint, is not merely to know the causes involved in the movement from unrelated learning to related learning but also to know that which gives the idea of a university its ultimate Being. The Entity of the idea is the principle of the idea's ultimate intelligibility. The first approach emphasizes more how unrelated sciences become the interdisciplinary grasp. The second concentrates more on why the idea of a university has its Being.
both treatments. More than that, it provides an excellent means of reconciling Newman's manifold treatment of cause.\textsuperscript{13} Equally important, this Aristotelian schematic device makes possible a plausible explanation of those elements found in the change from unrelated sciences to sciences grasped in an interdisciplinary fashion. Beyond that, it offers a plausible means of ascertaining the \textit{Being} of the idea. The system enables one to pursue the ultimate "why" of the idea.\textsuperscript{14} Finally, such an Aristotelian system helps insure the unity of Newman's educational idea and the integrity of the elements constituting it.\textsuperscript{15}

Notwithstanding the fairly extensive critical commentary on certain philosophical aspects of the \textit{Idea},\textsuperscript{16} I do not believe that anyone has attempted to explain the idea of a university in reference to the cause of its becoming what it is and in relation to the principle of its

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13} It does so by enabling one to determine primary and secondary instances of causality and the relationship between secondary instances and the primary one.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Although many readers tend to associate the ultimate "why" of something with its final cause, Owens makes the Aristotelian final cause ultimately identifiable with the formal. For Owens, Aristotle reduces the final to formal.
\item \textsuperscript{15} The study of the idea of a university in the light of its causes and \textit{Entity} and by means of Aristotelian equivocity by reference advances the unity of the idea by the integration of those principles and elements that give it its determination and \textit{Being}.
\item \textsuperscript{16} See Ch. I, p. 45, above.
\end{itemize}
Being. No one to my knowledge has tried to analyze what makes the idea to be what it is and why it is. Again, in view of the causal implications of some of the material in the Idea and in view of the significant role the philosophical element plays in the composition of Newman's total educational ideal, some discussion of that which gives the idea its determination and Being seems in order.

In the context of the schematic device to be employed in this chapter, "cause" and "Entity" will be treated as terms equivocal by reference. In the case of both cause and Entity we will see instances of terms and things whose definitions show a measure of sameness in difference. My purpose in this matter will be to determine what are the primary or fundamental meanings of the terms "cause" and "Entity," or more precisely, the primary and fundamental natures of the things signified by the terms as they relate to what makes Newman's idea to be what it is and why it is what it is. It will be my purpose, as well, to locate secondary instances of the cause and Entity of the idea in order to determine some proportional relations existing between secondary and the primary instances. In the process of locating primary and secondary instances of the cause and the Entity of the idea, the "connected view" will emerge

17 For a complete discussion of Aristotelian equivocality by reference, as interpreted by Owens, see Ch. I, pp. 57-65, above.
as the formal cause of the idea and the dominant principle of its Being. It will reveal itself to be that which makes the idea to be what it really is. Only in reference to this formal cause, a "connected view," will the other causes of the idea be said to be causes at all. Only in reference to the "connected view" will the idea be said to have Entity. Finally, only in reference to this view will the other causes be said to have Entity.

Newman's idea of a university is distinctive for the type of education it promotes. This education is liberal. Its distinguishing characteristic is the "habit of mind" it proposes to inculcate. What, in turn, sets the "habit of mind" apart is its "connected view." This view perceives things in an integrated fashion. It encompasses reality, the branches of knowledge that reflect reality, and their interrelations. It entails an integrated perspective of science and all things subject to man on a natural philosophical level by a man of intellectual refinement who has a predisposition to virtue, though he may also have serious spiritual deficiencies. It is on the foundation of this temporal "connected view" that Newman imposes the eternal comprehensive perspective of science and reality by a man of intellectual cultivation whose ultimate purpose is to become a wholly educated gentleman with the moral and intellectual attributes of a Philip Neri. In contrast to the purely secular goals of the man of philosophical habit,
the view of the intellectually cultivated Christian gentleman looks to transcendent and supernatural objectives, in addition to temporal ones.

The "connected view" or idea of a university advocated by Newman is really a unified philosophical and theological perspective: philosophical, in that it relates to reason and the natural; theological, in that it relates to God and the supernatural. But this view may just as well be labeled a humanistic and religious one. Its humanistic element looks more to the interrelation of all things as they are subject to man. The religious element sees the interconnection of man and all earthly things as they are subject to God. This combined philosophical and theological perspective calls for spiritual as much as it does the intellectual growth of a man. It is characteristic of the development of the whole man whose integrated view, according to its capacity, envelops as many sciences as possible, with reason its system and Revelation its guide. The humanistic and religious perspective called for in the Idea looks to the capacity of the mind for truth and of the soul for perfection. It directs its gaze to the End of Truth and the Source of Perfection that give man and all things their ultimate significance.

Because Newman's treatment of the "connected view" is twofold and such a multiple treatment needs to be reconciled, we should determine which view is primary and what
is its relation to the secondary treatment Newman offers. In terms of Aristotelian equivocity by reference, the primary instance of the view advanced is that "connected view" or interdisciplinary grasp of science by a man of intellectual culture in whom Faith and reason are allied. While such a man cultivates his mind, he just as actively works to cultivate his soul. This is the view Newman pursues in the context of his discussion of the nature of a Catholic university on theological or supernatural grounds, with the end product being the Christian gentleman. In the light of Aristotelian equivocity by reference, the secondary instance of the view is an interdisciplinary grasp of the sciences by a man of purely mental cultivation. This would be the view advanced by Newman in the context of the nature of a university considered apart from the Church and on philosophical or natural grounds. But my treatment in this chapter will not focus on the relationship of the primary and secondary instances of the "connected view."

Rather, it will concern itself with the manner in which a "connected view" can be considered a principle of change and a principle of Entity for the idea of a university.

18 See Ch. I, pp. 28-32, above, for critical commentary on Newman's twofold approach to this view.

19 For a more extensive development of the "connected view" in the context of Catholic and secular university issues, theological and philosophical grounds, and worldly and Christian gentleman, see Ch. VII, below.
The interpretation will restrict itself to an analysis of the philosophical or humanistic part of Newman's educational ideal. It will limit itself to a philosophical explanation of the philosophical elements that give the idea of a university its determination and being.

As I indicated in an earlier chapter, any discussion of the view advocated in the *Idea* raises the question whether the view should be labeled "a connected view" or "the connected view." The former perspective would be one which sees truth and the interrelation of the sciences only gradually and in partial steps. The latter would pertain more to the one and only absolutely complete view of truth and the sciences. The first is the view gradually acquired by man in pursuit of truth. The second is the view held by God Who is Truth. Newman's concern in the *Idea* and my interest in this study are with "a connected view." This perspective entails a more or less complete grasp of the relation of one science to another and of one segment of reality to another, as the sciences and the segments mirror the Ultimate Truth Who is their Source and End. Here, the perception of truth is gradual and limited according to an individual's capacity to understand. Its scope embraces a relatively unified view of the "relative disposition of things." I spoke earlier of Newman's multi-

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20 See Ch. I, pp. 47-48, above.
ple presentation of this view and of the need to ascertain primary and secondary instances of his treatment. Using the "connected view" as a term equivocal by reference, I proposed that the primary instance of view is a blend of intellectual cultivation which centers on man and a spiritual refinement that tends to focus on God, both of which are to be found in the Christian gentleman. As a secondary instance of view, I advanced that interdisciplinary grasp of the sciences characteristic of the man of philosophical habit. Notwithstanding the preeminence of a complete philosophical-theological perspective in Newman's scheme and this study's, I have decided to concentrate on the purely philosophical habit of mind, or secondary instance of "connected view," in seeking to establish a principle of change and a principle of fundamental being for the idea of a university.

In discussing the type of "connected view" advocated by Newman, I do not mean to suggest that the kind of view


\[22\] Ch. VII of this study will discuss the Christian gentleman's blend of spiritual and intellectual cultivation in some detail.

\[23\] i.e., the purely interdisciplinary grasp of the sciences held by the man of philosophical habit. The primary instance of a "connected view" embraces a comprehensive supernatural perspective involving grace, faith, revelation, and theology. Because I am not a theologian, I hesitate to venture into those areas anymore than I already have.
he advances is precisely known. Newman simply does not
define exactly what he means by such a view, however much
he gives indication of his meaning in Discourse V or else­
where. Neither do I mean to assert that Newman, or anyone
else for that matter, has "the connected view." Material
from the text -- I am thinking, here, as much of Part II
(UNIVERSITY SUBJECTS DISCUSSED IN OCCASIONAL LECTURES AND
ESSAYS) as I am Part I -- does seem to suggest Newman's
moving in the direction of "a connected view." Whether he
ever reached a point at which by his own definition he
could say that he himself had developed a "connected view"
we have no way of knowing. The movement on the part of a
student towards a "connected view" appears largely a mat­
ter of groping and of tentatively grasping just how reality 
and the sciences reflecting it hang together. More than
this, the process seems one in which the student views re­
ality, supra-reality, and the sciences that reflect them
with some measure of unity. Finally, I think one must be
cautious in appraising Newman or anyone else's "connected
view" or in describing, for example, the "connected view"
as a movement from a relatively unformed state to a rela­
tively formed one because such appraisals might suggest
that the interpreter has a "connected view" sufficient to
judge the merit of that view held by another. Not having
a "connected view" does not, however, preclude anyone from
moving in the direction of one. In fact, I think that is
the type of lifetime task Newman has in mind for each of us. This discussion of view brings us to Newman’s treatment in Discourses V and VI of the educational and intellectual framework within which “a connected view” is offered as Newman’s educational ideal.

In Discourse V, Newman continues his inquiry into the nature and scope of a university, focusing now on the intellectual framework within which and the view by which one should seek the true meaning of knowledge in a university scheme. He states that “a university may be considered with reference either to its Students or to its Studies.”

In separating his treatment of studies and students, Newman is really distinguishing two applications of the same principle referred to previously, the wholeness of knowledge. In relation to studies, the principle concerns the subject of a view, that is, the ultimately interrelated nature of knowledge. In reference to students, the principle deals more with the mode of viewing, the interdisciplinary manner in which the various branches of knowledge are held.

Newman’s governing principle remains unchanged:

All Knowledge is a whole and the separate Sciences parts of one.... All branches of knowledge are connected together; because the subject matter of

24 Idea of a University, p. 94.

25 The latter application of the principle is the one being treated here as the formal cause of Newman’s idea.
knowledge is intimately united in itself, as being the acts and work of the Creator.26

Newman leaves little doubt in the reader's mind of the ongoing role that the principle of wholeness will continue to play in his deliberations. He adds:

They [the sciences] complete, correct, balance each other. This consideration, if well founded, must be taken into account, not only as regards the attainment of truth, which is their common end, but as regards the influence which they exercise upon those whose education consists in the study of them.27

Fortunately for the seeker of truth -- and that is what Newman would have his university-educated man be -- this framework is based on a solid principle, and it reveals a comprehensive view that reflects an integrated grasp of the relations of knowledge and the different aspects of reality this knowledge mirrors. This view of "the relative disposition of things" appears reasonable because it operates on a unifying principle, the wholeness of knowledge, and it reflects a reasonable explanation of reality -- that all reality is one. It does not appear to be the kind of illusory perspective that operates on no real, that is to say, true principles or that functions on apparent superficial ones which merely shadow reality in some way.

Newman proceeds with his treatment of the scope of

26 Idea of a University, p. 94.

27 Ibid.
a university education, using a number of elements he feels necessary. First is the right academic atmosphere which conduces to the proper end. He visualizes:

an assemblage of learned men, zealous for their own sciences, and rivals of each other [who] are brought, by familiar intercourse and for the sake of intellectual peace, to adjust together the claims and relations of their respective subjects of investigation.28

The result is a "pure and clear atmosphere of thought, which the student also breathes, though in his own case he only pursues a few sciences out of the multitude."29 Newman feels it supremely important that students function in such an atmosphere if they are to grasp the great outlines of knowledge, the principles on which it rests, the scale of its parts, its lights and its shades, its great points and its little, as he otherwise cannot apprehend them.30 Such discriminating powers culminate in a "habit of mind... which lasts through life."31

In discussing the mystique of atmosphere, the essential worth of properly motivated colleagues, and the "habit of mind" which atmosphere and colleagues promote, Newman reaffirms his declaration of faith in the university as the

28 Ibid., p. 95.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. 96.
31 Ibid.
primary source of a dynamic intellectual life and his belief in the integrated grasp of the claims, relations, and outlines of knowledge as the primary test of its quality. He just as readily acknowledges the university's responsibility for seeing a student through and for enabling him to survive with academic integrity. This is "the special fruit of the education furnished at a University, as contrasted with other places of teaching or modes of teaching." Here is an educational atmosphere in which a student can develop his educational potential, one in which he can learn to rely on his own intellectual resources in the process of determining the "relative disposition of things." Given the right atmosphere, colleagues, and that special "habit of mind," he cannot help succeeding.

From a treatment of the academic elements whose presence he feels essential to a proper educational milieu, Newman proceeds to consider more precisely the goal of a university education and the liberal knowledge that is its hallmark. He has much to say on the subject, and he expresses himself in not a few ways, seeking that one which perhaps best embodies his meaning. Newman raises the question thus: "What is the end of University Education, and of the Liberal or Philosophical Knowledge which I conceive

\[32\text{Ibid.}\]
He responds it is that knowledge "capable of being its own end." According to Newman, knowledge can be its own end, and it is rightly designated liberal to the extent that it has no end beyond itself. The essential value of such knowledge is to be found in itself. While this holds true for every kind of knowledge, it especially applies to what Newman describes as that special Philosophy, which I have made to consist in a comprehensive view of truth in all its branches, of the relations of science to science, of their mutual bearings, and their respective values.

He adds that such knowledge is "not merely a means to something beyond it,...but an end sufficient to rest in and to pursue for its own sake...." A few paragraphs later, Newman observes that the quest for such knowledge promises "nothing beyond Knowledge itself." In addition, he establishes that such knowledge is aptly characterized

33 Ibid., pp. 96-97. This question relates to the Catholic and secular university issues treated in Ch. II, above.

34 Ibid., p. 97.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid. Some correspondences between Newman's "Philosophical Knowledge" and Aristotle's notion of "wisdom" are strikingly evident. The two are not, however, identifiable. Newman's "Philosophical Knowledge" is more a matter proper to the Physics; Aristotle's "wisdom" is a matter proper to the Metaphysics.

37 Ibid., p. 99.
by the terms "habit of mind" and "refinement or enlargement of mind." Newman affirms that it is also suitably called "liberal" in that it "stands on its own pretensions, ... is independent of sequel, and expects no complement...."\(^{38}\) He further notes that such "knowledge...is then especially liberal, or sufficient for itself, apart from every external and ulterior object, when and so far as it is philosophical...."\(^{39}\)

The passages collected above offer sufficient indication of Newman's answer to the question raised on the scope of university education. That answer centers on "liberal or Philosophical Knowledge." It takes sharp issue with those who postulate that all knowledge must have some purpose beyond itself -- that it must be practical or utilitarian. It purposes to show the natural and not merely utilitarian character of knowledge. It affirms that knowledge can be its own end and that only knowledge worth pursuing for its own sake deserves to be called liberal. Its essential value comes from within. Such is the nature of that knowledge Newman makes the special end of university education with its comprehensive grasp of all sciences, their proper relations, and their respective values.

Knowledge for its own sake, liberal knowledge, "habit of

\(^{38}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 101.}\)

\(^{39}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 103.}\)
mind," and "enlargement of mind" are equated. All find their focus in the "connected view or grasp of things." He who has this grasp knows the "relative disposition of things."\(^{40}\) Accordingly, the "connected view" is sufficient reason for its Being.\(^{41}\)

Newman feels he has good authority and is on solid grounds in following this traditional view of education. "I am stating," he observes, "what is both intelligible in itself, and has ever been the common judgment of philosophers and the ordinary feeling of mankind."\(^{42}\) Moreover, when he applies the word "Liberal" to knowledge and education, he is no more than expressing "a specific idea, which ever has been, and ever will be, while the nature of man is the same...."\(^{43}\) Knowledge that exists for its own sake satisfies a fundamental need in man. Newman does not deny the validity of knowledge that has a purpose beyond itself. Neither does he reject its need or benefit.\(^{44}\) He merely

\(^{40}\)Ibid., p. 105.

\(^{41}\)It is sufficient reason for its being because it is its own end.

\(^{42}\)Idea of a University, p. 97.

\(^{43}\)Ibid., p. 102.

\(^{44}\)Newman's reasoning and pursuit of this traditional view of knowledge certainly strikes the reader as Aristotelian. This is not at all surprising when we consider what Newman himself observes in Discourse V (p. 102): "While we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent, being Aristotelians...."
believes it useless in explaining the proper scope of a university education that would inculcate a kind of knowledge or philosophy which grasps what it perceives through the senses; ...which takes a view of things; which sees more than the senses convey; which reasons upon what it sees, and while it sees; which invests it with an idea.... Its worth, its desirableness, considered irrespective of its results, is this germ within it of a scientific or a philosophical process. This is how it comes to be an end in itself; this is why it admits of being called Liberal. Not to know the relative disposition of things is the state of slaves or children; to have mapped out the Universe is the boast, or at least the ambition, of Philosophy.45

Any knowledge other than this type Newman does not see as the proper subject of a Liberal Education or as a substantive element in his university scheme. For him, utilitarian knowledge belongs elsewhere, perhaps with commercial or professional education, but certainly not with a liberal one.

In the process of treating knowledge in relation to "mere learning," Discourse VI confirms many of those ideas on the scope of university education and the "connected view" already proposed in Discourse V. While reaffirming that "the business of a University is to make...intellectual culture its direct scope or to employ itself in the education of the intellect...,"46 Newman does more than main-


tain Liberal Education to be the scope of a University. When he observes that "the cultivation of the intellect is an end distinct and sufficient in itself," Newman again asserts more than the fact that Liberal Education promotes Liberal Knowledge. In concluding that "the intellect must have an excellence of its own," Newman once again suggests more than the view of Liberal Knowledge as an end in itself. By the foregoing statements, Newman is, in fact, reaffirming the more radical thesis that a university worthy of its designation must inculcate a "habit of mind" or a "perfection of mind" whereby the student sees the "proper disposition of things." Newman's university ideal in Discourse VI is once more seen to center on the integrated view or interdisciplinary grasp. For to be university trained, to be liberally educated, and to be rightly steeped in Liberal Knowledge is to have that intellect which takes a connected view of old and new, past and present, far and near, and which has an insight into the influence of all these one on another; without which there is no whole, and no center. It possesses the knowledge, not only of things, but also of their mutual and true relations; knowledge, not merely considered as acquirement, but as philosophy.

47 Ibid., p. 115.
48 Ibid., p. 114.
49 Ibid., p. 121. Once again, it should be noted that Newman advances "a connected view" rather than "the connected view." The former view sees truth and the relation of the sciences only in limited, gradual steps.
To know in a truly Liberal manner, then, is to know with a philosophical view. To know in a philosophical manner is to know with a "connected view." That is the fundamental thrust of Newman's contention for the scope of university education, outlined in Discourse V and confirmed in Discourse VI. For Newman, no justification is possible for the existence of a university that does not foster this liberal view of education. No university can function independently of its efforts to promote that "cultivation of intellect," "intellectual excellence," "enlargement of mind," or "philosophical knowledge," to which a "connected view" is central.

In correlative material from the same discourse, Newman observes that "the true and adequate end of intellectual training and of a University is not Learning or Acquisition...." 50 It is not in his words, "mere knowledge, or knowledge considered in its matter...." 51 While such knowledge is a "condition" or "means" of "mental enlargement," it is not the end. For that enlargement consists, not merely in the passive reception into the mind of a number of idea hitherto unknown to it, but in the mind's energetic and simultaneous action upon and towards and among those new ideas, which are rushing in upon it. It is the action of a formative power, reducing to order and meaning the matter of our acquirements; it is a making the objects of our knowledge subjectively our own, or,

50 Ibid., p. 124.

51 Ibid., p. 117.
to use a familiar word, it is a digestion of what we receive, into the substance of our previous state of thought...\(^{52}\)

Such enlargement, accordingly, requires not the passive reception, but the active comparison, correlation, and assimilation of the meaning of mere learning. A few paragraphs later, Newman further comments:

> That only is true enlargement of mind which is the power of viewing many things at once as one whole, of referring them severally to their true place in the universal system, of understanding their respective values, and of determining their mutual dependence.\(^{53}\)

Although Newman touched on these concerns in earlier discourses, here he comes to grips with the scope of a Liberal Education and the whole view it purposes to develop. Academic atmosphere, motivated colleagues, "Liberal knowledge," "Philosophical knowledge," "habit of mind," "intellectual enlargement," all are important watchwords in explaining Newman's university ideal. But the key phrase is the "connected view." It sums up Newman's idea. It helps us ascertain the center of his educational framework. More relevant to my purpose in this chapter, the "connected view" or interdisciplinary grasp emerges as a viable Aristotelian formal cause -- as that which makes the idea to be what it is. It is to the Aristotelian scheme that supplies the machinery for an interpretation of the interdisciplinary

\(^{52}\)Ibid., p. 120.

\(^{53}\)Ibid., pp. 122-123.
grasp as a formal cause that I would like now to turn.

To understand better the first major application of Aristotelian equivocality by reference in this chapter, that is, to the "connected view" as a cause and principle of the change from unrelated sciences to sciences viewed in an interdisciplinary fashion, it is appropriate that we review some aspects of Aristotle's approach to cause as interpreted by Owens. Even though the first chapter of this study provides a fairly extensive treatment of the matter, I believe some additional review would be useful at this point. In an earlier section of his study, Owens sketches what he calls the "starting-point and procedure and goal of the Aristotelian philosophy." According to Owens, a good starting point is Aristotle's statement that "all men by nature desire to know." Such a desire exists independent of any utilitarian concern. Man wants to know the causes of the material world, and he wants this knowledge for its own sake. To gain this knowledge, Aristotle directs him to an appropriate starting point, sensible

54 See Ch. I, pp. 69-72, above.
55 Owens, p. 172.
56 Ibid., p. 158.
57 Ibid.
reality. Study of this sensible reality moves man to wonder what are the elements or principles by which things of the sensible universe can be made more intelligible. Aristotle responds that every object in the sensible universe is a union of two ultimate principles: the material principle or that out of which something is made, and the formal principle or that which makes the sensible object to be what it is. The union is an internal one in which that having the potential to become a determinate sensible thing does become a determinate sensible thing. Every sensible object emerges from this discussion as a union of matter and form. They are the ultimate constitutive principles. Thus, the form or shape of a man informs the matter of marble to make up the statue of a man. However, in speaking of knowledge of this or any sensible object, Aristotle describes these two internal principles, along with two external elements in terms of causality, a consideration which leads into Aristotle's scientific explanation of sensible things. For Aristotle, to have scientific knowledge of a thing is to know it through its causes. The causes which it is the aim of scientific inquiry to discover are four. Aristotle describes them in the *Physics*:

The causes are expressed in four ways. Of these we say that one cause is the entity, and the what-is *Being*..., another the matter and substrate, a third that from which motion takes its source, and a fourth

\[58\text{ibid.}, \text{p. 172.}\]
Aristotle's goal is the ultimate causes that fully and finally answer the questions about which man naturally wonders.60

How does this treatment by Owens relate to my interpretation of the "connected view" as the cause of the idea of a university? The causes studied in this investigation will be four: the material cause or that out of which the idea of a university is made; the formal cause or that which makes the idea of a university to be what it is; the efficient cause or that from which the movement from unrelated disciplines to related disciplines takes its source; and the final cause, the end or good for which the idea of a university exists. In line with Owens' interpretation of Aristotle, "cause" will be used as a term equivocal by reference. The causes of the idea of a university will be expressed in various ways, and they will be denominated "cause" only in reference to one cause, the formal cause or "connected view." The burden of this section of the chapter will be to establish the nature of the four causes, to locate the instances in which the term "cause" can be applied, and to determine some proportional relationship of the instances, one to another.

59 Ibid., p. 173.

60 Ibid., p. 172.
The primary instance of causality will be found in the "connected view." Other principles or elements of the idea of a university will be denominated "cause" as the undetermined material of the idea, as that from which the movement of the idea stems, or as that good towards which it moves, but they will be treated as secondary instances of cause.

A few examples may help to clarify my interpretation of the causal implications of the idea of a university from the standpoint of Aristotelian equivocity by reference. For Aristotle, causes as equivocals by reference are "said in many ways." For instance, the sculptor, the bronze, and the form or shape are causes of the statue in different ways. The bronze is a cause through its being the material; the sculptor, though his being the agent; and the form through its being the determinant. Much the same as with other equivocals of this type, the name is identical, but the forms or definitions are different. Accordingly, the things are "said in many ways." In a second example, we say that parents, the matter out of which the child is made and the human form are causes of the child. Again, these things are causes in different ways: that out of which the child is made through being the material; the parents through being the agent; and the human form through its being that which gives the matter its determination. Agent, material, and form have identical
names "cause," but their forms or definitions are different. In a third example, we say that the builder, the bricks and mortar, and the form or shape of a house are causes of the house in different ways: the bricks and mortar through being the material; the builder through being the agent, that is, the builder building; and the form or shape of the house through giving determination to the matter of brick and mortar. As I understand Owens' interpretation of Aristotle, the final cause, as the good or perfection towards which the matter strives or points, would have to be, respectively, the determined statue, child, and house.

Correspondingly, I say that unrelated sciences, the student connecting, and a "connected view" are causes of the idea of a university in different ways. Unrelated sciences are a cause through their being the material out of which a "connected view" develops. The "connector" or one connecting is a cause through his being the agent. The form or "connected view" is a cause through its being that which gives the matter of unrelated sciences its determination. The final cause, as the perfection or good toward which the matter of unrelated sciences moves, would ultimately be the appropriate "habit of mind" or "connected view" found in the gentleman. Here, once again, the name is identical in that they are all denominated "cause," but their forms or definitions are different. Accordingly, they are things "said in many ways." There is unity by
reference here and a principle of sameness in difference. How the interpretation of the causes of the idea of a university is to be more specifically worked out is a matter that needs further elaboration.

The starting point of this investigation is the sensible reality of the branches of knowledge and a sense of wonder about the nature of their relationship. The procedure involves explaining the causes of the idea of a university in a way that affirms their mutual dependence, while at the same time, confirming their distinctive principles. The goal is the causes that fully explain the idea to the satisfaction of a mind that wonders what principles or elements are involved in the change from unrelated branches of knowledge to sciences viewed in an interdisciplinary manner.

What, then, are the principles or causes of the idea that this study seeks to penetrate? How do they make the idea intelligible? In what sense do they depend on the formal cause for their causality? How are they principles of change or sensible movement? Finally, wherein lies their equivocity by reference as causes? These are the major questions.

As Newman points out in Discourse III, the object of knowledge is truth.61 Truth pertains to facts and their re-

61 I d e a of a U n i v e r s i t y , pp. 52-53.
lations. Facts embrace all that exists. Reality is a complex fact, a whole, which must be analyzed to determine its respective parts. Knowledge concerns the apprehension of these facts in themselves and in relation to each other. One cannot know these facts whole; he knows them only in partial views. The partial views are called sciences. They are branches of knowledge. Sciences, then, are logical abstractions of the whole by which the mind knows larger or smaller segments of reality. Sciences differ according to the amount of truth or enlightenment that they provide. While all sciences have the same subject matter, they differ in the manner and measure of their view of reality. The more parts one knows, the closer he is to grasping the whole. The better one knows the truth in part, the greater is his knowledge of the whole truth. The degree of knowledge should be measured by the depth of understanding regarding the relation of one science to another. The sciences or partial views are comparable to a material cause. So considered, they appear a suitable starting point for a discussion of sensible change in Newman's idea of a university.

Standing unrelated, these branches of knowledge can be viewed as passive knowledge or mere learning. In that sense, they constitute the matter, the material cause, of Newman's idea of a university. However, such passive knowledge does require an actualizing "view" to make it
move towards a total grasp of truth and to attain that which we consider its formal determination. This determining "view" constitutes the form or formal cause of Newman's idea. Furthermore, the activation or development of an interdisciplinary grasp of the branches of knowledge involves a change, a change from unrelated disciplines, mere learning, or passive knowledge to a "connected view" of these disciplines. However, before there can be a "connected view," there must be a matter that is connectible. The change here requires that a potentially "connected view" be actualized.

Such a change may profitable be viewed in the light of potency and act. Indeed, this change cannot be explained, at least in an Aristotelian context, without consideration being given the potentiality involved, in which case, we are, of course, addressing ourselves to the matter of the idea, its material cause. It should be noted that the matter of the idea has import only to the extent that it is required for the realization of the form. For Aristotle, a thing comes to be from that which it is potentially, not actually. Mere learning or the sciences viewed independently are potentially Newman's idea of a university before

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62 In discussing the material and formal causes of Newman's idea of a university, we are addressing ourselves to knowledge-content (studies) or the material to be connected, and to knowledge-view (students) or the mind's integrated grasp of the content.
they actually become so. That is not to say that mere learning or passive knowledge which simply does not reflect the integrated view all at once becomes the integrated view. Rather, the point is that in mere learning are to be found the conditions of the "connected view." If that were not the case, unrelated branches of knowledge could never be grasped in an interdisciplinary fashion; mere learning could never become informed learning. That it does means there is in mere learning the capacity to be shaped and determined by the right determining "view." Even more importantly, that it does means that there is present a shaping or determining principle that has caused mere learning to pass over into a state of informed learning. Mere learning is the undetermined "stuff," if you will, that must be limited, perfected, or completed by the interdisciplinary grasp that is its form. To this end, mere learning or disunified branches of knowledge have the potentiality of passing from one state to another.

While we need it to explain the change from mere learning to something more, potentiality alone will not suffice. The agency of something actual -- of a form -- is also necessary. Accordingly, although mere learning has the potency to become informed learning, it can never achieve that state without the form that shapes it into something more than mere learning. The form of the idea is the principle of its definiteness, perfection, and determin-
The actuality of this form is prior to the potentiality of mere learning. The form or actuality of informed learning is logically prior to the potentiality of mere learning. For mere learning is not potentially the "connected view" unless it can come to be the "connected view" actually. So too, the potentiality of becoming an interdisciplinary grasp presupposes the actuality of such a grasp. Nothing advances from potentiality to actuality without the agency of something actual. Actuality is prior to potentiality. Accordingly, unrelated sciences are not potentially related sciences viewed in an interdisciplinary manner unless they can come actually to be so viewed. They cannot come to be so viewed except by the agency of something already actual, namely, the "connected view." The potentiality of the former presupposes the actuality of the latter. The potentiality of the former has its roots in the actuality of the latter. The actuality of the "connected view" is the end towards which the potentiality of the separate unrelated sciences points.

Furthermore, just as unrelated sciences have the

63 Owens, pp. 197, 337, 362.

64 Although the material of the last few paragraphs may appear fairly obvious to some readers, it must be covered if the causality involved in the development of the idea of a university is to be adequately explained.
potentiality of being comprehensively grasped, they have the potentiality of not being so viewed; while the necessary, the permanent and the unchangeable form, the integrated interdisciplinary view, must be. The form of the idea is perfect and complete. It is actual. There is no question of its coming to be and then ceasing to be. There is only the case of its being actualized in particular instances. The actuality of the idea is restricted to the integrated grasp. That form, view, hold, or grasp is here construed to be completely and perfectly actual. As form, it necessarily and unchangeably is. It does not begin and cease to be.

The integrated view or grasp is the specific form that completes, determines, and shapes the matter of mere learning or unrelated disciplines. The view is that which gives the idea the perfection rightfully due it. Mere knowledge is a condition of intellectual culture, but it is not the form or end of that culture. The passive reception or acquisition of facts is the condition of intellectual enlightenment, not its formal principle. Isolated

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65 Owens, p. 339. The most notable characteristic of the matter of unrelated sciences would appear to be its potentiality.

66 As the form or what-Is-Being of the idea of a university, the "connected view" is necessary, timeless and unchangeable. Still the emphasis is on "a connected view" rather than "the connected view." See p. 203, above.
facts and sciences are the materials out of which mental enlargement comes, but only the integrated hold of these materials fulfills and completes them. The passive acquisition of facts on however many subjects or disciplines appears not so important as the arrangement, comparison, correlation, and digestion of facts in a unified, harmonious view. Such functions represent the true principle or form of the idea. They are part of that "habit of mind," "mental enlargement," or "intellectual culture" to which Newman refers. In mere knowledge, that is, the passive reception of facts, the nature of the "connected view" exists potentially. For the actuality of this nature, we must look to the form with which its nature is identifiable, the view that sees many things "at once as one whole," that refers them to their rightful place in the universal system, and that understands their "respective values," while, at the same time, recognizing their "mutual dependence." Newman's idea of a university has its nature fully only when it exists actually -- when its form has been realized. Whether this form, the "connected view," be treated in the context of "Liberal or Philosophical Knowledge," "habit of mind," "refinement of mind," "acquired illumination," "inward endowment," or "intellectual culture," it alone distinguishes the idea of a university.67

67 i.e., as its formal cause.
Mere learning, passive knowledge, and independent sciences do then become the idea of a university because they are informed by an integrated view. They are shaped into an integrated grasp because a whole view envelops and actualizes them. This form or view makes them formally intelligible and educationally meaningful. That alone is the inner and unifying principle that makes Newman's idea of a university one, whole, and actual.

Thus far, we have centered our attention on the causes or principles necessary to explain Newman's idea of a university from the standpoint of sensible change. The idea of a university has been shown to require a union of matter and form. The undetermined material of mere learning or unrelated sciences constitutes the matter; the "connected view," as that determining principle which limits what kind of Being it is, appears to satisfy the demands of form. The union is construed as one of internal principles or constitutive elements.

But matter and form are not the only physical principles or causes necessary, in an Aristotelian context, to explain knowledge of the sensible change involved in the development of Newman's idea of a university. Two more causes are required, the efficient and final. They merit our consideration as external conditions, while the formal

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68 Owens, p. 363.
and material are best treated as internal elements. Like the material cause, the final and efficient causes must ultimately be viewed in reference to form. 69

Because, for Aristotle as interpreted by Owens, the efficient cause means that out of which movement comes, 70 we would do well to look again to the formal cause, that is, to the "connected view," for an explanation of the efficient causality involved in the development of the interdisciplinary view. The initiation for the movement from mere learning, passive knowledge, or unrelated sciences to an integrated view of them comes from the form or "connected view." This form is already present in the efficient cause. The efficient cause is able to cause that form in another matter. The efficient cause of separate sciences being connected is the person connecting. The relation is that of the agent to the thing done or of the producer of the change to the thing changed. The immediate origin of the movement comes from the person who connects unconnected sciences. The physical causation of the movement requires the mutual contact of the mover and the moved. A student develops a "connected view" only because he is capable of having a "connected view." Correspondingly, unconnected sciences must have the potential to become connected. But

69 Ibid., pp. 363-364.

70 Ibid., p. 173.
the efficiency involved appears to lie in the fact that because a person is connecting unrelated sciences, unrelated sciences are being connected. When the agent and patient are in the proper relation, a certain effect, namely, the "connected view" is inevitable. It is from the activating source of form that the development of the idea stems, much the same as it is towards that form, its perfection and goodness, that the development moves for its proper end and realization.\(^1\) The movement from unrelated sciences to an interdisciplinary view comes from within in the sense that it originates in the formal, constitutive element or internal principle. The form has within itself a beginning of causing movement because it is actual. Correspondingly, mere learning or unrelated sciences have a beginning of being moved. When the agent, the form that initiates the movement, comes in contact with the patient, the matter of mere learning or unrelated sciences, the interdisciplinary view or idea of a university results.\(^2\) In short and in less ideal terms, it seems fair to say that the efficient causality here amounts to a student's tentatively grasping, in some unified manner, previously unrelated sciences and the reality which they reflect. The form of the idea is once again seen to play a dominant

\(^1\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^2\text{Ibid., p. 406.}\)
role.73

In determining the final cause of the idea, we should bear in mind that the ultimate explanation of mere learning depends on the end that learning serves. For Newman's idea, the end is a relatively unified grasp on the part of the gentleman of all branches of knowledge. The form of the idea is the end towards which the development of the idea moves. The purpose of the potency of unrelated disciplines is the act that properly relates them. They are moved on account of this end. They strive to be actually what they are potentially able to be. The actuality of informed learning in the gentleman is the end towards which the potentiality of mere learning points. The mere acquirement of knowledge strives after the form of interrelated knowledge. It strives to reach the perfection of unified learning. It attempts to reach out for whatever perfection is due it. In so doing, it is really striving to approximate the divine life -- to share in the immortal.74 The "connected view" affords it that proximity because, as form, it alone provides that which is necessary, unchangeable, and permanent in the idea.

In the treatment of the final causality of the idea, the form of the idea has become identifiable with act; the

73Ibid., p. 359.

74Owens, p. 461.
matter, with potency. Now the potency to be acted upon differs from the potency of acting upon something else. According to this difference, act is distinguishable from movement. The form of the idea of a university is act in the more perfect sense that it does not seek an end outside of itself. The form of the idea has a perfection of its own which does not need to lead beyond itself. The "connected view" is knowledge that is its own end. It is whole and unified in itself. Moreover, as liberal knowledge, the interdisciplinary grasp of sciences need not be a means to something else. It constitutes an end sufficient to rest in. So considered, the end or purpose of the idea of a university is the "connected view" engendered in the gentleman. The form or act of the integrated view is the purpose intended in the development of the idea. In the context of Owens' interpretation of Aristotle, one must look to the form or "connected view" for an explanation of final causality of the idea of a university, not only as that which does not seek an end outside of itself, but also as that goodness and perfection towards which the matter of unrelated disciplines strives. Because the formal cause stands preeminent in the interpretation employed in this study, it is more exact to say that the final cause of the idea of a university is the "connected view" or,

75 IbIa., p. 403.
more precisely, the appropriate habit of mind found in the gentleman than it is to say that the final cause is the gentleman in whom the "connected view" has been fostered. As a formal cause, the interdisciplinary grasp that distinguishes the gentleman does not strive toward anything else.

In the foregoing statements, the final cause of the idea reveals itself to be reducible ultimately to the formal cause. It also shows itself to contain, much the same as the efficient cause, some measure of imperfection and incompleteness. Both final and efficient cause depend on form, as the initiator or end of their movement. Both must be described in reference to form for their actuality and knowability. In sum, the final cause of the idea has its ultimate actuality in the form or act of the "connected view." The end or purpose of Newman's idea of a university emerges as the realization of its form in the gentleman since everything necessary for the complete attainment or realization of the idea is found in the form. The priority of act confirms the preeminence of form in this treatment inasmuch as form and act coincide.

What has the interpretation thus far revealed about the cause of the idea of a university? The main burden has been to establish the nature of the four causes involved in the development of mere learning or unrelated branches of knowledge into the informed learning or the integrated
grasp that is Newman's idea of a university. These causes are the four causes of Aristotle's Physics. They are physical principles, and they are real. The procedure has involved naming the instances in which the term "cause" can be applied and establishing some relationship of these instances, one to another.

Having sought out the elements or principles of the idea that can be labeled "cause," having found them to be four, and having located and defined their instances, I can now proceed with my treatment of them as equivocals by reference. As I indicated previously, the true nature involved in such a type equivocal is to be found only in the primary instance. Accordingly, the nature of causality is found in the first instance alone. The primary instance of causality in the idea is located in the formal cause, the "connected view." The form of the idea primarily deserves the name "cause" because it answers the ultimate "why" of the idea. It constitutes the necessary and unchangeable element in the thing. Other principles or conditions of the idea designated by the term "cause" have

76 See p. 199, above.

77 Owens, p. 178.

78 Ibid., pp. 176-177. According to Owens, "the words of Aristotle...suggest that in some sense every type of causality finds its ultimate explanation in the form." Owens adds that various commentators acknowledge this point.
their own definition as the undetermined material of the idea, or as that out of which the development of the idea stems, or as that toward which it moves, but these causes in themselves are not properly the primary cause of the idea. They are secondary instances of cause.

The formal cause, then, is the primary instance of causality in the idea. Final, efficient, and material causes need the formal cause for their clarification. Only in reference to the formal can the other types be denominated "cause" at all. The material cause is reducible to the "connected view" potentially. For scientific knowledge, they must be explained in reference to form. The idea of a university is not knowable and neither does it come to be because of its matter, though the idea cannot be without the matter. It comes to be only because of its form. Mere learning is significant in a causal sense merely because the form requires it for its realization. So considered, the material cause is a secondary instance of cause. The efficient cause appears equally dependent upon the formal. Again, all that is scientifically knowable in the efficient cause is the form. Form is the mover that initiates the movement whereby the idea achieves its complete development. The form of the idea brings over the mere learning, which is able to be the idea of a university, into the state of being the idea of a university. Viewed in this manner, the efficient constitutes another secondary
instance of cause.

The final cause must also be considered a secondary instance of cause. No less than the two previously considered, it is reducible to the formal in an Aristotelian context. It is dependent on form. The final cause of the idea is the end of the production or movement involved in the idea's coming to be. That end is the "connected view" to be found in Newman's gentleman. Furthermore, the end of the idea is to attain the perfection typical of it. That perfection is found in the form. Form makes possible the realization of that perfection rightfully due the idea of a university and the gentleman in whom it is engendered. In sum, as the source, the end, and the determining principle in the movement of undetermined matter to the perfection of determined matter found in the "connected view," the formal cause is duly designated the cause of the idea of a university. As the principle of its complete attainment, actualization, or realization, it is properly called the primary instance of causality.

The second main application of Aristotelian equivocity by reference in the chapter will focus on the "connected view" as that which gives Entity to Newman's idea of a university. But this effort requires some elaboration of Aristotle's idea on Entity as interpreted by Joseph Owens. Although Aristotle's treatment of Entity
was covered to some extent in Chapter I, it bears some elaboration here. According to Aristotle, Being signifies whatever is. As such, it is a concept or common predicate. But Owens sees a problem in the translation and correct interpretation of what Aristotle precisely means by Being. Aristotle's use of the word ousia seems to have various meanings, even in its primary significations. For example, it means the primary instance of Being. Upon it all other Being has some dependence. It is the cause of Being in things. It often signifies something concrete, and it often refers to something individual. Owens chooses not to use ousia to express Aristotle's concept of Being. Neither does he wish to employ "substance" or "essence," two other possibilities. Instead of these Owens opts for "Entity" as that term best able to describe the equivocal notion, or more precisely, the equivocal nature of the sensible things Aristotle treats.

According to Owens, if one is to understand Aristotle's treatment of Being, he must look to the equivocal term "Entity" by which Being is expressed in various ways

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79 See Ch. I, pp. 73-84, above.

80 Owens, p. 138.

81 Ibid., p. 148.

82 Ibid., p. 153. Entity is capitalized by Owens to indicate that it is being used to render the Aristotelian ousia.
but always in reference to something one or in reference to one form. For Owens, Entity is the primary instance of Being. It has within itself the true nature of Being, and only in reference to Entity are all other things said to have Being. In the context of equivocity by reference, Owens sees Aristotle treating different sensible things with reference to the nature of their primary instance, or secondary instances in relation to primary instances. Entity, moreover, conveys the primary and secondary instances of the Being of sensible things in their right relation. It serves as a guide to the things denoted. It also assumes the meaning of all instances encountered. In the context of Owens' interpretation, "Entity" appears as a comprehensive equivocal term that expresses the ultimate principle of unity and permanence in concrete things. It is the permanent, foundational principle of their Being. As the principle of sameness common to everything that is Being, Entity remains permanent notwithstanding the changes something undergoes. The primary instance of Entity in a sensible thing is located in that thing's form or What-Is-Being. Such a form expresses that which is timeless, essential, and necessary about the thing. The What-Is-Being expresses, as well, the formal intelligible perfection of the thing. As such, the form is that by which the thing is known. In relation to Newman's idea of a university, "Entity" will be treated as a term equivocal by reference.
Its primary instance will be located in the formal cause, the "connected view." Other causes of the idea will be said to have Entity only in relation to the formal.

Just how "Being" as a term equivocal by reference extends to all things may be shown in the light of an example involving a thing and its attributes or characteristics. In the realm of changeable things, Entity is the primary instance of Being. All other instances of Being refer immediately or ultimately to Entity. The nature of Being as such -- Being qua Being -- is to be found only in Entity. Returning to the attributes or characteristics of a thing as an example, we say that the attributes do not possess the nature of Being in themselves. The nature by which they are Being is not their own nature. The nature according to which they are Being is the Entity of which they are attributes. For example, when I say "the man is tall," it is the man alone that really is, and it is the man who is tall. The tallness by itself and apart from the Entity of which it is the attribute cannot be said to be in a primary sense. Tallness is only in the sense that the nature of tallness relates to the nature of the man who is tall. Accordingly, we say that the primary instance of Entity would be in the man; the secondary instance, in the tallness. From this discussion, man and tallness emerge as having Being but not in the same way. Because both man and tallness have Entity, the name "Entity" is identical as
applied to both, but the forms or definitions of those things having Entity are different. Just as in all equivocals of this type, we observe here sameness in difference and a unity by reference.

As I indicated above, this example may be used to shed some light on the manner in which Being extends to the causes of the idea of a university. The primary instance of Entity in the idea of a university is the What-Is-Being, "connected view," or formal cause. It is the cause of the idea's Being. It makes the idea of a university a definite something. It possesses the nature of Being in itself. The material cause, or that matter of unrelated sciences out of which the idea of a university develops, does not possess the nature of Being in itself. Neither does the efficient cause, as that from which the development of the idea stems, possess such Being. Nor does the final cause possess the nature of Being in itself. The nature according to which they have Entity is the Entity of the formal cause to which they refer and to which they may be reduced. Accordingly, the material, final, and efficient causes cannot be said to have Entity in a primary sense. They have Being or Entity only in the sense that their natures as efficient, final, and material causes relate to the nature of the formal cause. The Being or Entity as such, then, is that of the formal cause. The rest have Being through reference. Thus, we say that the primary instance of Entity
in the idea of a university is to be found in the formal cause or "connected view." Secondary instances are to be found in the other causes. They are through and in the Entity of the formal cause. All the causes of the idea have Being, then, but not in the same way. The proper question to be asked here is why the matter of unrelated sciences is something. The answer is the formal cause or "connected view." That is the cause of Being.

If the idea of a university is to be known at all, it will have to be known after the manner of Entity. Aristotle himself points out that to know anything is to know it as Entity. If that is so, then to know the idea of a university is to grasp its form, What-Is-Being, or Entity. Knowledge of the idea of a university requires a reduction of knowledge to Entity because in seeking the Being of the idea one is seeking its Entity. The Entity of the idea of a university is identifiable with the "connected view."

Furthermore, in seeking to explain the Entity of the idea of a university, we should bear in mind that the fundamental question concerns why the matter of mere learning or unrelated sciences is something. The answer, of

\[83^\text{Ibid.}, p. 321.\]
\[84^\text{Ibid.}\]
\[85^\text{Ibid.}, p. 337.\]
course, is the formal cause or *What-Is-Being.* Accordingly, we must look to the form for the *Entity* of the idea. The idea of a university has *Entity* or *Beingness* only because of its form. In the foregoing context, the four causes are conceived in much the same way as before. Only now they are being treated not so much as physical principles of change, but rather, as principles of the idea's *Being.* Once again, material, efficient, and final causes are absorbed in a study of the formal cause since it alone constitutes the primary instance of *Entity.* It alone is the primary cause of the idea's *Beingness.*

Mere learning, the simple acquirement of knowledge, or unrelated sciences can take on a *Being* or *Entity* they themselves do not possess. They do so in the composite *Being* of unrelated disciplines and the integrated view of them. This composite is not a sum of material parts. The form in this composite is not just another material element. The form that gives *Entity* and *Being* here is a necessary, permanent, and timeless element. It provides the determination that makes the idea of a university a "what,"

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86 Owens capitalizes the "is" to emphasize "timeless *Being.*" A review of some distinctions made earlier might also be helpful here. In general, the *What-Is-Being* pertains to the form; the *What-Is* to the matter. So too, matter and form, strictly speaking, pertain to the internal constitutive principles of indetermination and determination. However, when we speak of a scientific inquiry into the nature of something, we employ the terms "material cause" and "formal cause."
a Being determined and distinguishable from other things. Form takes the unrelated sciences, which may or may not be grasped in an integrated fashion, and determines them to be so integrated. Form, as the principle of definiteness and permanence within the idea, makes the idea a definite abiding something. Being has been reduced to Entity. More specifically, it has been reduced to the formal cause, the primary instance of Entity in that which we call the idea of a university.

There is, then, only one cause of the idea that is cause in the complete sense and that has Entity in the complete sense. That is the formal cause. All others are denominated "cause" and are said to have Entity only in relation to it. The term "Entity" extends to the material, efficient, and final causes of the idea only through the formal. Again, the formal cause is identifiable with the What-IS-Being of the idea. The what-IS-Being expresses the timeless Being and formal necessity of the integrated view. It expresses the formal intelligible perfection of the interdisciplinary grasp in relation to the matter of mere learning or unrelated sciences, the what-Is, or the principle of contingency and change. The what-IS-Being of the idea of a university also suggests that the "connected view," as the form, expresses the primary Being of the idea. Any other elements in the idea are called "Being" or secondary instances of Being solely in reference to that form. In
that context, the form of the idea constitutes its necessary and unchangeable Being, in contrast to the what-Is, the matter of mere learning which is neither necessary nor unchangeable. The what-Is of the idea conveys the idea of a university as matter, as form, or as a composite. Each can be used to express what the idea is, but only the what-Is-Being expresses the sense in which the idea of a university essentially and necessarily is Being.

Although the Entity of the idea of a university, as an equivocal by reference, can be expressed in various ways, our primary concern with it is in relation to form and substrate. In reference to substrate, the Entity of the idea is the form or "connected view," the matter or unrelated sciences, and the composite. The form is prior to the other two because it is the primary instance of Entity in sensible things. The form as Entity is primary in every sense: in definition, in knowledge and in time. It is primary in definition because Entity appears in every predication of Being; in knowledge, inasmuch as we know something more fully when we know what it is; in time, because, of all the categories, Entity is the only separate one. Mere learning and the composite, on the other hand, are Entity only through the form. Within the composite of the idea, form is the primary instance of Entity. The composite of unrelated disciplines and of the integrated view of these disciplines, i.e., that which makes up a specific, deter-
mined idea of a university, has Entity and derives its Entity primarily from the form.\textsuperscript{87} The composite would be considered a secondary instance of Entity. It is the form within the composite of a specific university idea that provides determination. In reference to substrate, the Entity of the idea may also be viewed as the matter. This matter, however, must also be considered a secondary instance of Entity. Again, it is the form that gives the matter of unrelated sciences whatever Being and determination it has. Form is the reason the matter of mere learning or the matter of unconnected sciences is.\textsuperscript{88} Form shapes and determines. Unconnected learning, considered potentially as the "connected view," is undetermined and unknowable precisely as the "connected view."\textsuperscript{89} Mere learning contains nothing as such to account for the form since it supplies neither determination nor knowability. The form alone provides these.

Also in reference to Entity and substrate, it should be pointed out that the matter of mere learning has the capacity to become a "connected view."\textsuperscript{90} If matter is a

\textsuperscript{87}Owens, p. 335.

\textsuperscript{88}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 337.

\textsuperscript{89}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 338.

\textsuperscript{90}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 339.
principle that can be according to a form, then unrelated learning, not yet the "connected view," is capable of becoming an interdisciplinary grasp. Unrelated disciplines or mere learning is the matter or potency of the interdisciplinary grasp, even after this grasp has been realized and has come into Being. Furthermore, mere learning should be considered the "connected view" and one with the form in the sense that mere learning is the "connected view" as potency. Moreover, when we say that mere learning expresses the Being of the idea and when we speak of its telling what the idea of a university is, we are expressing the Being of Newman's idea as potency. However, when we address ourselves only to the "connected view," we are expressing the idea of a university as act. Unrelated disciplines, then, appear as the integrated view potentially. Mere learning, correspondingly, is Entity, but only poten­tially. The interdisciplinary view is Entity actually. The matter of the idea emerges as a secondary instance of Entity. Matter has been emphasized here because, in the final analysis, substrate means matter, and matter suggests

\[91\text{Ibid.}, \text{ p. 341.}\]

\[92\text{Ibid.}\]

\[93\text{Ibid.}\]
indetermination. Substrate too appears to be only a secondary instance of Entity. In short, whatever Entity the matter or substrate of the idea has comes from the form, the interdisciplinary grasp, which provides the principle of determination, knowability, and Being for the idea.95

Again, the question underlying much of the foregoing treatment has been how the material element acquires a Being it does not have.96 The recurring answer has been the form of the idea, a form which provides definition, determination, and permanence -- that which makes the idea a definite, abiding something.97 The Being of the idea has been reduced to Entity or the formal cause, the primary instance of Entity in the idea. While the focus has been on the material cause of the idea, it is no less important to note how the final and efficient causes also depend on the formal for their Being and Entity.

The efficient cause of the idea appears identical with the formal cause in the sense that the form of the "connected view" initiates the movement of mere learning or unrelated sciences to the interdisciplinary grasp of

94 Ibid., p. 345.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., p. 316.
97 Ibid., p. 376.
them. The form of the idea provides the shaping, constitutive element. It is the principle of knowability. The efficient cause of the idea is known and has Entity only in terms of form because form alone provides Entity or what-IS-Being. Of itself, the efficient cause has neither Being, Entity, Act, what-IS-Being, nor knowability. For any one of them, the efficient cause of the idea must be reduced to the form. This is not to say that the efficient cause is deduced from the form. But to be scientifically knowable and to be understood as Entity, efficient causality must be viewed in reference to formal causality. So considered, the efficient cause of the idea constitutes a secondary instance of the idea's Entity.

Furthermore, the idea of a university does not come into being because of its final cause, any more than it does because of its material and efficient, though it cannot be without them. The idea comes into being and has Entity because of its form. It is toward the realization of the "connected view" found in the gentleman that the matter of unconnected sciences moves for its completion.

98 Ibid., p. 359.
99 Ibid., p. 364.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid., p. 375.
The final cause of the idea does not serve as the inner, shaping principle, the principle of Entity or the intelligible component. But the final cause of the idea is identical in some ways with that form which does provide these. Everything necessary for the complete attainment or realization of the idea -- of its Being and Entity -- is to be found in the form. 102 Again, it is toward this goodness and perfection of the form found in the gentleman that the matter of unrelated disciplines reaches out. The final cause of the idea emerges as another secondary instance of the idea's Entity.

Entity means Beingness. Entity is the common nature found in all things treated as beings. Entity extends to all beings not as a genus but as an equivocal by reference. The idea of a university has Being by its reference to Entity. The Entity of the idea is to be found in that permanent, shaping, inner, vital principle that we have described as a "connected view" -- the formal cause. It provides the foundation for the idea's Being. The idea has Entity only because of this form. Considered in the foregoing manner, the formal cause of the idea is the primary instance of the idea's Entity or Beingness. Entity embraces the material, efficient, and final causes of the idea, but only as they are secondary instances referring to

102 Ibid., p. 407.
the primary instance, form. Thus, the material, efficient, and final causes of the idea can be said to have Entity but only in a secondary sense. The primary instance of Beingness and of Entity in the idea of a university remains as its formal cause, the "connected view."

This concludes a rather extended treatment of the "connected view" as a principle of change and as a principle of Being. The form of the idea or "connected view" emerges as the primary instance of cause and the primary instance of Entity. This primacy is clarified by the use of "cause" and "Entity" as terms equivocal by reference. Accordingly, the true nature of the cause of the idea is located in its primary instance. So is the nature of Entity in its application to the idea to be found there. That is not to say that the other causes of the idea -- the material, efficient, and final -- are not causes or that they do not have Entity. Having their own natures as principles or conditions, they are causes and they do have Entity, but only in a secondary sense. They are not in themselves causes of the idea; they do not in themselves have Entity. They are denominated "causes" and are said to have Entity according to the different relations they bear to the formal cause. In the foregoing context, the dominance of the "connected view" or interdisciplinary grasp as the idea of a university rests assured from the particular Aristotelian point of view employed in this study,
just as it may appear dominant from some other not so philosophical context in which it has been considered.
CHAPTER VII

THE HEIGHT OF THE BUILDING AND THE NATURE OF ITS RESIDENTS -- DISCOURSES VII, VIII, AND IX

In Discourses V and VI, we saw that Newman's idea of a university is notable for the type of education it promotes. That education is liberal. As such, it pursues knowledge for its own sake -- as an end in itself. Its distinguishing characteristic is the "habit of mind" it purposes to inculcate. This "habit" endures throughout one's life. Elsewhere, it is elaborated upon in terms of "cultivation of the intellect," "intellectual excellence," "enlargement of mind," and "philosophical knowledge."

"Philosophical knowledge" applies not to mere instruction, simple learning, the passive acquisition of knowledge, or the plain accumulation of facts about unrelated sciences. It relates to the action of a shaping power. It involves the "mind's energetic and simultaneous action upon and towards...new ideas."¹ The mind orders mere learning and makes it more meaningful. But what truly sets the cultivated mind apart is its "connected view" of the matter of

¹Idea of a University, p. 120.
mere learning or its interdisciplinary grasp of the matter of unrelated sciences. This formal grasp enables the mind to see the "relative disposition of things" and to view "many things at once and as one whole." It is to the man who possesses the "habit of mind" that we now turn in this chapter. For that man is Newman's gentleman. When considering Newman's idea of a gentleman, we will do well to keep in mind Discourse VIII, the one in which his idea is nominally defined. But we must look to the Preface and other discourses, as well, for substantive materials that clarify his definition and provide grounds for our interpretation of it. This chapter will deal with two major questions. The first asks whether Newman's definition of a gentleman should be taken as a serious expression or not. The second considers whether Newman's gentleman is primarily of a worldly or Christian nature. Both questions relate to a fundamental problem raised in Chapter I, namely, the nature of Newman's gentleman.

In response to the first question, I propose that Newman's statement is not the ironical one some have suggested. The issues Newman discusses in the earlier dis-

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2 Ibid., p. 105.

3 Ibid., p. 122.

4 Culler, McGrath, and others advance an ironic or derogatory interpretation.
courses bear out this assertion. So does his treatment of material in Discourses VII, VIII, and IX seem to support the need for a more serious interpretation. I submit, in answer to the second question, that while all discourses show more or less that Newman is discussing the nature of a gentleman in both university and Catholic university contexts, overall they reaffirm the latter one as the primary context. On a natural, philosophical, "university-in-the-abstract" level, Newman proposes as his ideal the man of philosophical habit who has at least a predisposition to virtue, though he may well be a sinner. On a supernatural, theological, or Catholic university plane, Newman is advancing as his idea of a gentleman the man of philosophical habit whose ultimate purpose is to become a saint with intellectual and moral characteristics not unlike those of a Philip Neri.

Critical commentary on these issues reveals agreement on some significant points and marked disagreement on others. Both areas are significant for the light they shed on critical reaction to the fundamental nature of Newman's gentleman. That Newman's gentleman is the ideal human product of a university education critics tend to

5The forthcoming review of criticism pertinent to the questions stated above will be drawn for the most part from a more thorough review of criticism relevant to the Idea presented in Chapter I of this study.
agree. Jessain, for example, labels him "the ideal product of a university." Harrold also views him as such. Then there is Buckler, who speaks of him as "education's best end product." Culler, too, describes him as an ideal. Griffin reaffirms Newman's point at the end of Discourse V that Liberal Education makes nothing else but the gentleman. That Newman's idea of a university finds its embodiment in the gentleman some few critics also grant. Culler, perhaps, stands foremost in declaring that the gentleman is "the living embodiment of Newman's conception of knowledge."

Correspondingly, critics, for the most part, concede that Newman speaks with two voices on the nature of the gentleman, much the same as he does on the nature of the university he advocates, the grounds he employs, and the "connected view" he advances. In the main, critics acknowledge that, although Newman proposes the man of cultivated intellect with his comprehensive view as the ideal product of a university, he undercuts the total worth of such a man by assigning him a significant number of spiritual defects. For instance, Harrold affirms that Newman's

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6 Jessain, p. 104.
7 *Victorian Prose*, p. 139.
8 Culler, p. 190.
liberal education aims not at moral improvement so much as at general cultivation of the mind. Yet, Harrold cites Newman to the effect that a purely liberal education promotes only pride and self-centeredness. Intellectual cultivation alone is not enough. Culler's position in the matter is not much different. McGrath also takes a similar stand, even while he holds for no real distinction between intellectual and moral training in the education of the university's human product. It should be noted, however, that although critics admit to hearing two voices in Newman's response to the nature of the gentleman, they do not determine which voice speaks louder. Neither do they supply a means to reconcile two opposed voices offered in the context of one educational scheme.

Now, while most of the foregoing material points to areas of critical agreement on the nature of Newman's gentleman, critical commentary on other fundamental issues of the Idea correlative to the Christian or secular nature of the gentleman show some substantive areas of dis-

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9 Harrold, p. 105.
10 McGrath, p. 174.
11 I will propose Aristotelian equivocity by reference as a means to effect a reconciliation of the two voices.
12 i.e., Catholic and secular university issues, grounds, theme, and the like.
agreement. These tend more to reveal fundamentally different critical estimates of the gentleman's nature. These estimates are characterized by radical disagreement and some moderate agreement. In the matter of the Catholic or secular university issue, controversy centers on whether Newman's university is a place for the humanistic or Christian development of man. Positions taken on the issue range from Corcoran's, which excludes the possibility of the university as a place for any religious development at all, to Dale's, which precludes the likelihood of any development other than that type in Newman's university. 13 Between these extremes are Harrold, Wise, McGrath, and others who recognize the university as a place for humanistic development but who also acknowledge it as a place for religious training. Which type of development is primary and what is its relation to the secondary type they do not determine.

On the question of grounds, critics focus their attention on whether the nature of a university education designed for a certain type of human university product is to be sought on theological or philosophical grounds. Once again, there is some agreement in that critics tend to reject one set of grounds. Harrold sees Newman approaching

13 See Ch. I, pp. 21-23, above, for an extended treatment of criticism relevant to this issue.
his subject from many angles, the two chief ones being the humanistic and Roman Catholic.\textsuperscript{14} McGrath adds that the inquiry follows philosophical lines through the fifth discourse but in subsequent lectures pursues a combined philosophical and theological approach.\textsuperscript{15} Culler also confirms Newman's use of humanistic and religious grounds.\textsuperscript{16} However, which type of grounds stands preeminent and its relation to other grounds are matters left unresolved. Given the unity of Newman's educational ideal, the likelihood of his using integrated grounds to pursue it, and the relationship of the educational ideal and the grounds to the type of gentleman advocated, I think these are matters that ought not to be left unsettled.

The nature and relation of the Idea's temporal interdisciplinary grasp of knowledge for its own sake to a supernatural interconnected view of knowledge for the sake of something more provides a third area with some significant critical disagreement. The question is pertinent to the nature of the gentleman because it involves Newman's whole educational scheme and the role of the university-educated man within that scheme. Does the "connected view" advoca-

\textsuperscript{14} Harrold, p. 115.

\textsuperscript{15} McGrath, pp. 281-282.

\textsuperscript{16} Culler, p. 227. See Ch. I, pp. 25-28, above, for other criticism on Newman's grounds.
ted in the *Idea* embrace only the intellectually cultivated man's view of this world, or rather, does it encompass a perspective that looks beyond to God and the next life, as well? Corcoran, once more, appears at one end of the critical spectrum; Dale, at the other. According to Corcoran's position, the interdisciplinary grasp advanced by Newman appears ill-suited to God's purposes. In Dale's view, it would seem unfit for any purpose other than God's. Harrold, McGrath, Culler, and Svaglic, among others, assume positions somewhere between these extremes. Some of them tend to agree with Harrold's point that general cultivation of the mind, to which the "connected view" is central, does not reflect Newman's whole educational ideal. Some of them would also grant, with Svaglic, that "intellectual curiosity and achievement" must be united with the "humility and charity of the truly religious person." ¹⁷

The problem of the religious character found respectively in the man of philosophical habit and in the saint offers still another area of critical disagreement. The religion of philosophy concerns man in relation to man. The religion of the saint places man in relation to man and God. Which characterization better describes Newman's university-educated man? As well as the discussion of any

¹⁷Svaglic, xxii. See Ch. I, pp. 29-32, above, for additional critical commentary on this issue.
other issue, critical reaction to this problem is rich in the diverse critical estimates it provides on the nature of Newman's gentleman. Corcoran's basic position that Newman irreparably severs the link between intellect and virtue indicates one extreme. Dale's case for "religious exclusiveness and Church control of university education" offers a counter-perspective. Harrold marks the line between the spurious religion of the man of philosophical habit and the genuine religion of the saint. In the former, he observes a false religion of sentiment; in the latter, the true religion of the sound Christian spirit. Culler's position is similar in a way. He notes the ambivalence in Newman's thought regarding the religious make-up of the gentleman. Yet, Culler leans more to the development of the university-educated man as a gentleman than to his growth as an intellectually cultivated saint. McGrath, on the other hand, holds more for a close alliance between intellectual culture and spiritual perfection in the education of the university student.

One other area of critical disagreement remains. It

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18 Harrold, pp. 111-112.

19 Culler, p. 223.

20 Ibid., p. 261.

21 McGrath, p. 170. See Ch. I, pp. 35-78, above, for other critical reaction to this issue.
concerns whether Newman's treatment of the gentleman is serious or not. Critics differ sharply in their interpretations. Some, like Harrold, Vargish, and Griffin, advocate a serious presentation on Newman's part. Culler, McGrath, and Buckler, among others, advance an ironic or derogatory interpretation. Culler's interpretation holds special interest in view of the position on Newman's gentleman this study will propose. According to Culler, Newman, for want of a better name, calls his gentleman the "man of philosophic habit." He is an "idealized type" and reflects an "unattainable ideal." His value is largely "inspirational." His charge is to seek the perfection of the intellect. His range of studies should be neither too narrow nor his mastery too superficial. Culler is impatient with the "man of philosophical habit" because Newman subtracts an "impossible number of vices" from him. Newman, Culler feels, ends up making the university-educated man a "Jack-of-all-trades." Culler points out further how ironic it is that Newman's portrait of a gentleman

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22 See Ch. I, pp. 38-42, for additional commentary on this question.

23 Culler, p. 190.

24 Ibid., p. 189.

25 Ibid., p. 191.

26 Ibid., p. 193.
"should be taken as a serious expression of Newman's positive ideal." ²⁷

In view of Culler's position that the humanistic and religious views in combination render a man able to complete his nature and to present that nature, fully developed, in the service of God, ²⁸ his ironical interpretation of Newman's gentleman appears inconsistent. Culler equates the gentleman with the "man of philosophic habit." He forms, in Culler's view, one-half of Newman's positive ideal, a Christian humanistic one. If the gentleman or "man of philosophic habit" forms one half of Newman's ideal, why should Newman's delineation of him not be taken seriously? Culler further observes that some of Newman's finest commentary on the religion of philosophy is contained in the portrait of the gentleman. If that is so, would Newman wish such a commentary to be viewed in less than serious fashion? Not to take this commentary seriously is to undercut a religious view most characteristic of one type of university-educated man. It is difficult to believe that Newman would go to such great lengths in formulating the nature of a secular university on philosophical grounds, for the sake of fostering a temporal "connected view" with a specific type of natural religious orientation, for a

²⁷ Ibid., p. 238.
²⁸ Ibid., p. 242.
university-educated man he does not wish to be taken seriously. It would be equally difficult to imagine Newman's developing the nature of a Catholic university on theological or religious grounds with a view to advancing more of an eternal "connected view" and appropriate supernatural religious orientation for a Christian gentleman he wished to be interpreted ironically. For Culler to treat Newman's celebrated portrait of the worldly gentleman less than seriously is to eliminate a constitutive element of what Culler himself describes as Newman's Christian humanistic ideal. Such an approach leaves only the Christian part of the ideal, important as that may be.

What does this review of criticism reveal, and how does it bear on the purpose of this chapter? Among other points, the summary indicates that critics tend to recognize Newman's two voices on the nature of the gentleman. They recognize that he addresses his efforts to the development of a worldly human product of a university, even while he advocates the development of a more Christian gentlemanly ideal. They acknowledge the fundamental distinction he makes between the religion of reason found in the man of philosophical habit and the religion of Faith observed in the Christian humanist. Critics discuss this distinction in general terms, but their overall reaction to the problem leaves some serious difficulties unresolved. The most obvious one is that they have not yet found a
means of reconciling two dramatically opposed concepts of the gentleman within what appears to be a unified educational scheme. They do not unify Newman's two voices. Yet some unification and reconciliation must be made if Newman's presentation of the gentleman is to be aligned with the type of education advocated, the grounds employed, the "connected view" advanced, and the type of religious character promoted. Newman's educational ideal exists for someone. Is he the man of philosophical habit who with his comprehensive view sees all things as subject to man? Or rather, is he the man of philosophical and religious habit who with his temporal and eternal perspective sees man and every other thing as subject to God? Correlative to that issue is the question of how seriously Newman intends either treatment of the gentleman to be taken. Disagreement among critics on this matter is as pronounced as any one will find in the corpus of criticism pertinent to the Idea.

The earlier chapters of this study have dealt with Newman's issues overall and some specific questions, like those of grounds, wholeness of theme and structure, the cause of the idea, and the principle of its Entity, according to an order of priority. Newman's manifold approach to the nature of a university, the grounds of the inquiry, and the "connected view" has been explained according to primary and secondary instances of terms and things viewed as equivocals by reference. In this chapter, Newman's twofold ap-
proach to the nature of a gentleman will be interpreted in much the same manner. The purpose will be to ascertain what constitutes Newman's primary statement on the nature of a gentleman and what comprises his secondary position. Once again, the critical apparatus employed will be equivocity by reference. To understand better its application to Newman's treatment of the gentleman, it may be useful to review some key aspects of the doctrine and to indicate how they will be employed in this chapter.

In this type of equivocity, things are expressed in various ways but always in reference to one nature or form that is the primary nature or form of the thing. Although differences are overshadowed by some degree of sameness, the differences are still present, and the true nature of the term or the thing signified is to be found only in the primary instance. Equivocity by reference, then, involves primary and secondary instances of terms and the things they signify. The true nature of the thing is signified by the primary instance of the term. Correspondingly, a secondary instance of the form is signified by a secondary use of the term. Each secondary instance of the term or thing signified has a special independent relation to the primary term and thing.

In the context of this schematic device, "gentleman" will be treated as a term equivocal by reference. Newman will be interpreted as expressing his idea of a gentleman
in more than one way but always in reference to something one, that is, in reference to one type of gentleman that is primary in meaning. The worldly gentleman and the Christian gentleman will emerge as instances of terms and things whose definitions show a degree of sameness in difference. The primary or fundamental meaning of the term "gentleman," or more precisely, the primary or fundamental nature of that signified by the term, will be found in the intellectually cultivated Christian gentleman. A secondary instance of the term will be located in the worldly gentleman, the man of philosophical habit, and some proportional relationship will be established between the secondary and primary instances. The worldly gentleman will be determined to have form or meaning only in reference to the Christian gentleman.

The burden of the chapter, then, will be to support two claims. First, using Aristotelian equivocity by reference as the major schematic device, I assert that the primary instance of Newman's idea of a gentleman is the Christian gentleman and that the secondary instance is the secular gentleman. Second, I propose that Newman's idea of a gentleman should be interpreted as a serious statement, whatever the instance considered. The primary instance reflects the true nature of "gentleman" as Newman uses the term. It refers to the man of "intellectual cultivation" whose mind is also imbued with Christian principles and
ideals. He is no mere "English Gentleman" or stock nineteenth-century character. Rather, he appears a distinguished man of cultivated mind whose human goals are harmonized with transcendent, supernatural ones and whose human conduct is reconciled with supernatural motivation. The secondary instance of Newman's gentleman shows the profile of a worthy man drawn in the context of purely human goals and natural aspirations. The worldly model Newman treats as a gentleman in a secondary sense has many redeeming human qualities, but he is not the type of gentleman Newman and his university wish primarily to advance. Material drawn from the Preface and from all the discourses will be used to support this assertion.

What some may allege to be the ambivalence$^{29}$ of Newman's thought regarding the nature of a gentleman is reflected as early as the Preface and Discourse I of the Idea. It should be pointed out, however, that as one studies the Preface and succeeding discourses more closely, and as he applies Aristotelian equivocity by reference to the scope of a university, its grounds, and its "view," he senses a more definable position and thematic statement on the meaning and seriousness of Newman's gentleman. Ambivalence gives way to clarity. The seriousness of Newman's statement on the ideal surfaces, and the picture of the

$^{29}$Culler, p. 228.
Christian gentleman with an integrated grasp of the meaning of this life and the next comes more sharply into focus as the university's preeminent human product.\(^{30}\)

Although he defines the gentleman in a later discourse,\(^{31}\) Newman really initiates the discussion of the nature of a gentleman with his statement on issues in the Preface. There, he presents a university groping for the realization of its proper goal. In seeking that most fundamental to the nature of university education, he appears to be dealing with the natural form of a university, but the evidence of the Preface suggests his ultimate concern to be the nature of a Catholic university.\(^{32}\) Newman readily admits that the charge handed him by the Holy See and the Irish Hierarchy is the founding of an institution that would serve the "interests of Revealed Truth" and that would operate "for the sake of Religion."\(^{33}\) Moreover, he wonders aloud whether the goal of such an institution ought

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\(^{30}\) The premises used in this chapter to support my conclusions on the nature of Newman's gentleman and the degree of its seriousness are based on a core of evidence developed in earlier chapters of this study. This earlier treatment the reader should also note in judging the validity and soundness of the arguments presented in Ch. VII.

\(^{31}\) i.e., Discourse VIII.

\(^{32}\) See Ch. II, p. 91, above. See also pp. 6-7 of the Preface.

\(^{33}\) Idea of a University, p. 6.
not to be more than the development of just an "English Gentleman." The Preface reveals that, not unlike the aim of the Church, Newman's purpose in establishing a university must ultimately be judged in the light of Calvary's meaning. Furthermore, Newman's personal beliefs and constant awareness of God's Presence seem to confirm the nature of his ultimate educational goals, even while he cites the university as a place for "universal knowledge." Newman never wavers on the need for moral growth in the overall picture of man's educational development. Not for a moment does he doubt the traditional Catholic alliance of intellectual and religious instruction. A university must infuse a religious spirit. It must respond to the need for an omnipresent spirit of religion in university matters. While Newman respects intellectual vigor and solid reasoning, he feels it is spiritual and moral vitality that crowns the image of the rational man. A cultivated, well-educated laity who exert their intellectual and moral influence constitute his university goal, not a group of religious isolationists.

In seeking to reconcile Newman's emphasis on the natural scope of a university with his concern for its supernatural and religious foundation, I repeat that the reader must bear in mind the point of view on issues that

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34 Ibid., p. 7.
Newman assumes at a given time. Allegedly contradictory positions, a conflict between natural and supernatural objectives, and an apparent conflict of basic issues can be explained in terms of primary and secondary instances. This is a matter for interpretation by Aristotelian equivology by reference. The nature of a Catholic university with its emphasis on the Church, theology, and intellectual and moral development emerges as the primary issue of the idea. With this Aristotelian apparatus we can reconcile Newman's two fold approach to the nature of a university. Without it, Newman's two voices tend to appear dissonant and unmanageable because there is no principle in evidence to unite them in one integrated educational scheme.

If one concedes the fundamental role of the Catholic Church and the importance of spiritual values in Newman's university scheme as outlined in the Preface, and if one acknowledges the primacy of the Catholic university issue, then it is difficult not to concede, as well, that the man of "philosophical habit," the man for whose intellectual

35 i.e., like those of Corcoran and Dale in discussing the role of the Church and religion in Newman's development of university education.

36 See the review of criticism in this chapter and also that of Chapter I.

37 See Ch. II, p. 104, above, for a discussion of issues in that context.
cultivation the university exists, should be taken as a serious model, rather than as a "Jack-of-all-trades," as Culler makes him out to be. From a natural or philosophical point of view, Newman's Preface reveals that a university should aim at developing a student whose intellectual refinement sets him apart from other men. That is Newman's response to the secondary issue. But even more significantly, the Preface proposes that a university should produce an otherworldly man whose broader view includes eternal verities as well as temporal scientific realities.38 That is Newman's response to the primary issue. Newman extends himself too far, and he spends too much time and effort to reveal the lines separating the product of a university abstractly considered from the product of a university considered in reference to religious principles for one to believe that the product is merely an ironic caricature. If the primary issue of Newman's Idea is the nature of a Catholic university, then the primary instance of the man educated in this university is a Christian gentleman.

Discourse I is also rich in clarifying material about the nature of Newman's gentleman. In treating the

38_Idea of a University_, p. 6. With the Vicar of Christ, Newman feels that "achievements of the intellect" ought to be contemplated "simply [but not only] in their relation to the interest of Revealed Truth."
subject and goal of a university education, the discourse moves from the Catholic vs. secular university issue raised in the Preface to the question of the grounds on which the inquiry is to be conducted. The lines are natural and supernatural. Newman's primary and secondary use of these grounds will be employed to justify the statement that Newman's definition of a gentleman is a serious one and that his gentleman is primarily a supernaturally oriented one. Even while Newman affirms "human wisdom" and "human reason" to be the grounds of the inquiry, the presence of other evidence supports the thesis that the subject is not being pursued along merely philosophical or non-sectarian lines. Newman feels the discussion should be conducted under the sanction of the Church. The principles considered are significant "for Catholic objects" and lend themselves to "a Catholic treatment." Ultimately, Newman invokes Church authority. He focuses on the aim of a "University, of which Catholicity is the fundamental principle." He demands a "high theological view of a University." For Newman, the

40 Ibid., p. 27. See also Ch. III, pp. 132-135.
41 Idea of a University, p. 20.
42 Ibid., p. 27.
43 Ibid.
main burden of the discourse is to underscore the issue that dominates his university concerns and to delineate the primary and secondary grounds on which he will ascertain the nature of his university product. Now, the product of Newman's university is the gentleman along with the habit of mind or character of soul that distinguishes him. For us not to take the result of these efforts seriously appears, indeed, to do a grave injustice to Newman's intention and efforts.

Using Aristotelian equivocity by reference as our guide, we see that the nature of a Catholic university emerges from the pages of Discourse I as the primary instance of issue; the supernatural and theological, as the primary instance of grounds. Newman's call for the sanction of the church, "a Catholic treatment," "Catholicity" as the basic principle, and his invocation of ecclesiastical authority confirms our interpretation of his priorities. We observe that such an order leaves the nature of a university considered apart from Revelation and Theology as a secondary instance of issue in Newman's Idea and abstract philosophical lines as a secondary instance of grounds.

This treatment of the Preface and Discourse I sug-

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44 See Ch. III, pp. 138-140, above.

 rests that a serious study of the meaning of Newman's gentleman and its interpretation as a serious or less than serious expression is appropriate if we are to grasp Newman's idea of a university. It proposes, further, that to understand and interpret rightly Newman's statement, we must reconsider the fundamental issues that evoked Newman's definition and that we must assign a priority to the grounds on which he responds. Our examination reveals that Newman's explanation of the relationship between a Catholic university and a university "in the abstract" clarifies the nature of the relationship between the Christian gentleman and his worldly counterpart. It points out that Newman's theological and philosophical grounds and issues are germane to a discussion of the relative merits of the Christian vs. the worldly man of "philosophical habit." Observation suggests that the temporal powers of reason, noble as they are, must be subordinated to the demands of Faith, Revelation, and Scripture.

By delineating issues and assigning grounds, Newman addresses himself to the Christian gentleman who would meet the challenges and come to grips with a secular world without becoming its slave and without compromising his spiritual integrity. In reference to the matter of a secular university and philosophical grounds, it should be noted that Newman feels the search for the goal and product of a liberal education must be expressed in terms of temporal
efforts. So he formulates the nature of a gentleman on a temporal plane. In dealing with the nature of a non-sectarian university on natural philosophical grounds, Newman provides for the human dimension of a liberally educated man. Such a man’s "cultivated intellect" and personal search for intellectual truth move him well along toward some important goals of human existence. But this human approach is only a prerequisite to a more Christian doctrinal approach to man's educational goals. For man and the world he lives in must be reconciled with some transcendent supernatural realities. That is where Newman's emphasis on the nature of a Catholic university and his use of theological grounds come in. They set the stage for the development of a gentleman on a supernatural plane. This formulation looks to the supernatural dimensions of a liberally educated man and his realization of the goal of a supernatural life, namely, Christian perfection. The potentiality of the natural man with his cultivated intellect can only be realized ultimately in the perfection of the Christian gentleman. In the development of this Christian ideal, the lines between Catholic university issue and secular university issue, between natural and supernatural grounds, and between natural and supernatural men of intellectual refinement run closely parallel. But from the standpoint of equivocity by reference, one issue, one set of grounds, and one type of gentleman must stand
If Newman's emphasis in the Preface and Discourse I is on the nature of a Catholic university and hence on the supernatural man of philosophical habit, however much he later discusses his counterpart, and if he shows in Discourse I that the primary grounds of the inquiry are supernatural, Newman's statement on the nature of the gentleman must be taken as a serious expression. To believe otherwise is to assume that Newman takes his Catholic university issue and supernatural grounds in vain.

Discourses II and III provide additional material to help clarify our understanding of the role Newman assigns the gentleman and to help us measure his seriousness on the subject. In the discourses Newman's foremost concerns are the establishment of theology as a science and its "bearing" on other branches of knowledge. Thematically, he pursues both concerns by advocating the principle that all knowledge forms a whole. This principle points up the interrelated nature of all sciences and the interdisciplinary manner in which they must be viewed. Newman also postulates the existence of an Omnipotent God as the Source of

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46 i.e., in the primary instance of the terms "issue," "grounds," and "gentleman." Only there will the true nature of each be found.

47 Idea of a University, pp. 33-34, 51-52. See also Ch. IV, 144-146, above.

48 Idea of a University, p. 57. See also Ch. IV, p. 144, above.
the branches of knowledge and as their end. In the same
discourses, he formulates questions whose answers lead back
to the Source and whose responses move toward Truth.

Apart from their thematic and structural implica-
tions for the whole of the Idea, Discourses II and III
point out that the true meaning of Newman's gentleman and
the degree of its seriousness ought to be measured in the
light of that important assumption, the existence of God.
For the assumption illuminates the interrelated nature of
the knowledge the gentleman, the man of philosophical ha-
bit, should seek, and it also clarifies the integrated
manner in which he grasps such knowledge. To admit the
existence of a personal God is to admit an all-encompassing
fact that cannot be dismissed without fragmenting the whole
of knowledge whose grasp Newman says it is the charge of
the gentleman to seek. The weight of the assumption, the
nature of the charge, and the obligation it imposes make it
difficult to accept an ironical interpretation of the man
on whom the assumption, charge, and obligation weigh most
heavily.

Furthermore, if we accept Newman's assumption that

49 Idea of a University, pp. 37, 38, 46, 57, 62. See also Ch. IV, p. 145, above.

50 Idea of a University, p. 57.

51 Idea of a University, p. 57. See also Ch. IV, p. 156, above.
God exists and his premise that God's "presence," "providence," "impression," and "influence" bear so strongly on other sciences that to apprehend them is in some measure to apprehend Him,\textsuperscript{52} then it appears that we must concede, as well, that the man of philosophical knowledge who views these sciences and integrates them in an harmonious manner ought not to be considered merely as the worldly gentleman who perceives the "relative disposition of things." Assumption and premise dictate that he be treated as a man with a mind capable of comprehending God to some degree in this life and a soul capable of union with Him in the next. If the development of a Christian gentleman is not Newman's preeminent concern, and if this idea of a gentleman is not to be construed as a serious expression, then neither should the type of liberal education he advances, the wholeness of knowledge he stipulates, nor the existence of God he postulates be taken seriously.

Although Discourse IV does not offer so much support as some other discourses for a serious interpretation of Newman's gentleman or the assertion that the Christian man of cultivated mind is the primary instance of Newman's gentleman, it does provide material that can be used analogously to clarify the relation between the Christian and secular gentleman. Discourse IV reveals the discord be-

\textsuperscript{52} Idea of a University, p. 57.
tween secular and sacred sciences stemming from pride and ignorance. It develops representative samples of secular sciences' attempts to usurp the rights and prerogatives of theology. The discourse states, from one point of view, that people who do not know their own limitations or the bounds of their own disciplines create discord in what should be the harmonious relationship of the sciences.

In the right relation between secular and sacred sciences, a relation Newman defines by examples to the contrary, there may be found parallels to the proper relationship that must be established between the worldly and Christian gentleman. Just as secular sciences are rendered more meaningful by God's "presence," "providence," and "influence" upon them -- to such an extent that to know them is to know Him -- so may the worldly gentleman's intellectual goals in this world assume a more meaningful dimension by his realization of some higher spiritual ideals. Unrelated branches of knowledge cannot be considered whole unless viewed in reference to all of truth. For to possess these partial views of truth ultimately is to know God,

53 Ibid., p. 76.

54 Ibid., p. 74.

55 See Ch. V, pp. 180-186, above.

56 Idea of a University, pp. 72-73.
their Source and End. To know God more or less fully is a matter of personal spiritual perfection. Just as the total view of knowledge takes into account more than secular branches of learning, so the picture of the whole gentleman must provide for more than earthly intellectual pursuits. The human goal of intellectual culture must be merged with the divine goal of Christian holiness. Otherwise, the natural gentleman, left to his own pride and selfishness, may live a life counter to the realization of Gospel ideals, even while he appears to seek intellectual truth. His situation would then be analogous to that of a purely secular science which, in the advance of its own interests, works against the truth of theology and Revelation by treating a limited, true perspective as if it were the whole truth. We must acknowledge the limitations of the worldly man of philosophical habit much the same as we admit to the necessarily restricted limits of secular sciences. Not to do so is to ignore the supernatural dimension of man and the ultimate interests of the wholeness of knowledge.

In Discourses V and VI Newman goes on to show that "Philosophical Knowledge," which it is the purpose of the university to inculcate, is an end in itself.⁵⁷ The intellectual cultivation of Newman's gentleman demands a compre-

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 97. See also Ch. VI, pp. 210-211, above.
hensive grasp of truth in all its parts and an integrated hold on the relationship of one science to another.\textsuperscript{58} Liberal knowledge, or knowledge for its own sake, is equated with a gentleman's knowledge. Newman's gentleman emerges as a man university-trained, liberally educated, steeped in Liberal Knowledge, and as a man with an interdisciplinary view. If there is no possible justification for the existence of a university that does not foster that view, and if no university can operate independently of its efforts to promote the "habit of mind" to which that view is central, then it would appear that one must take Newman's idea of a gentleman seriously. For the "connected view" is the hallmark of the university-educated man, Newman's gentleman. If one chooses not to take seriously Newman's statement regarding him, he ought just as well to disregard the interdisciplinary view by which the university-educated man, the gentleman, attains truth while he seeks to grasp the wholeness of knowledge. But to cast aside this view is to dismiss that which, in brief, expresses Newman's university ideal.\textsuperscript{59} Newman designs his university as a place for the development of someone. His education is liberal education. His knowledge is liberal knowledge. His view is

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Idea of a University}, pp. 92-93. See also Ch. VI, pp. 206-207, above.

\textsuperscript{59} See Ch. VI, pp. 215-216, above.
an interdisciplinary grasp. One should not dismiss the seriousness of Newman's statement on the man any more than he should disregard the education, the knowledge, or the view that characterizes the man's purpose in attending the university.

Having discussed "Liberal or Philosophical Knowledge" as an end in itself, Newman moves on in Discourse VII to the "utility" of this knowledge. If pressed hard enough, he can show the usefulness of the liberal knowledge that is properly the gentleman's. He begins by reaffirming that truth is the object of the intellect, that it is grasped in part, not intuitively as a whole, and that the intellect discerns truth by a mental process which is both a matter of training and a matter of rules. Liberal education, or the education of a gentleman, emerges as that process of training, by which the intellect, instead of being formed or sacrificed to some particular or accidental purpose, some specific trade or profession, or study or science, is disciplined for its own sake, for the perception of its own proper object, and for its own highest culture....

Newman adds, however, that while "intellectual culture is its own end,...what has its end in itself, has its use in itself also." He cites the principle that "though the

60 Idea of a University, pp. 142-144.
61 Ibid., p. 135.
62 Ibid., p. 142.
useful is not always good, the good is always useful." Newman adds that "good is not only good, but reproductive of good....Good is prolific."\(^6\) Newman's argument can be reduced to various syllogisms. For one, he argues that which is its own end has its own use; intellectual culture is its own end; therefore, it has its own use.\(^6\) Correlatively, Newman contends that what is good is useful; liberal education is good; and therefore, it is useful. By analogy, Newman argues that

as the body may be tended, cherished, and exercised with a simple view to its general health, so may the intellect also be generally exercised in order to its perfect state; and this is its cultivation.\(^6\)

For Newman, then, the cultivation of the mind is good and useful. Correspondingly, liberal education is a good and useful thing. It is so not in the sense that liberal education prepares a student for "some art, or business, or

\(^{6}\text{Ibid.}, p. 144.\)

\(^{64}\text{Ibid.}, pp. 144-145.\) Newman supports the assertion that intellectual culture has its own end and use by an analogy. Much the same as bodily health, general culture of the mind is good and useful even though it does not effect "any definite and distinct work or production." For Newman, intellectual cultivation serves as an aid to professional and scientific studies of all kinds because it provides intellectual qualities necessary to take up any one of them. In Newman's words, intellectual culture is useful inasmuch as it constitutes "the best and highest formation of the intellect for social and political life" (\textit{Idea}, p. 183).

\(^{65}\text{Ibid.}, p. 145.\)
profession, or trade, or work...." 66 What the "cultivated intellect" does do, "because it is a good in itself," is to bring "with it a power and a grace to every work and occupation which it undertakes...." 67

But what is the point of this discussion in reference to the nature of Newman's gentleman and the seriousness of his expression concerning him? Again, so very much hinges on the premise that the man who acquires Newman's liberal education and who undergoes the intellectual cultivation is Newman's gentleman, a point so many critics grant and one which other readers must also if the idea is to make any sense at all. If such an identification is made, then Newman's gentleman emerges as

the man who has learned to think and to reason and to compare and to discriminate and to analyze, who has refined his taste, and formed his judgment, and sharpened his mental vision, who will not indeed at once be a lawyer, or a pleader, or an orator, or a statesman, or a physician, or a good landlord, or a man of business, or a soldier, or an engineer, or a chemist, or a geologist, or an antiquarian, but he will be placed in that state of intellect in which he can take up any one of the sciences or callings I have referred to.... 68

If liberal education and intellectual cultivation are good and useful in themselves, then the knowledge of the univer-

66 Ibid., p. 144.

67 Ibid., p. 146.

68 Ibid., p. 145.
sity-trained man is good and useful. For it prepares him for just about any calling. Moreover, if the university-educated man and Newman's gentleman are one, then the knowledge of a gentleman is also good and useful. Liberal education then promotes in the gentleman

a clear conscious view of his own opinions and judgments, a truth in developing them, an eloquence in expressing them, and a force in urging them. It teaches him to see things as they are, to go right to the point, to disentangle a skein of thought, to detect what is sophistical, and to discard what is irrelevant. It prepares him to fill any post with credit, and to master any subject with facility. It shows him how to accommodate himself to others, how to throw himself into their state of mind, how to bring before them his own, how to influence them, how to come to an understanding with them, how to bear with them. 69

If Newman is serious here on the good and usefulness of liberal education and intellectual cultivation and if the university-educated man is Newman's gentleman, then Newman is also serious about his definition of a gentleman. The emphasis here centers on what liberal education and university training give the man.

The material in Discourse VII emphasizes the mental attitudes liberal education provides a gentleman, attitudes which make it possible for him to take up learning any job. As such it merits attention as an extension of Newman's statement on the nature of a gentleman, and it helps measure the extent of its seriousness. The following discourse,

69 Ibid., pp. 154-155.
while providing some measure of seriousness, concentrates more on how liberal knowledge, in close alliance with Grace and religious principle, must promote the development of the Christian gentleman and his eternal interests. Left alone on a natural level, the gentleman has too many self-imposed limitations.

In the three previous discourses, Newman has shown that liberal knowledge is its own end, that it is not the mere passive reception of knowledge or of unrelated sciences but rather the active interdisciplinary grasp of them, and that such knowledge is good and useful in that it prepares a man with the attitudes necessary to follow a variety of professional occupations. In Discourse VIII, he pursues more specifically the relation of liberal knowledge and the "connected view" that characterizes it into the area of religion. The intellectual refinement of Newman's university-educated man -- his gentleman -- can be a help or a hindrance to religious cultivation. In Newman's own words, it can be "at once a defence yet a disturbance to the Church..., at one time in open warfare with her, at another in defensive alliance."70 The educated mind is a blessing insofar as it is in a sense religious, that is, "it has what may be considered a religion of its own, inde-

70Ibid., p. 157.
ependent of Catholicism...."  

It may cooperate with the Church "in the conversion of man and the renovation of his nature,... and also in his rescue from that fearful subjection to sense which is his ordinary state." Intellectual culture also works to replace the joys of the sense with those of the intellect, and it draws man from harmful ideas to more rational ones.

Furthermore, while intellectual culture does not produce virtue, it does give the mind a natural indisposition to the excesses of evil. For such knowledge, "the discipline by which it is gained, and the tastes which it forms, have a natural tendency to refine the mind...." This refinement "will often or generally be lively enough to create an absolute loathing of certain offences, or a detestation and scorn of them as ungentlemanlike...." In addition to a scorn and hatred for some kinds of vice, intellectual refinement creates "an irresolution and indecision in doing wrong...." Finally, cultivation of the

71 Ibid.
72 Ibid., p. 160.
73 Ibid., p. 161.
74 Ibid., p. 162.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
intellect makes the soil of man's moral nature more adaptable to virtue.

Yet there is something in such mental refinement that may also make it a threat to the Church. There is, according to Newman, a fundamental difference between intellectual culture and genuine religion, in spite of any apparent similarities. For the distaste which the cultivated mind feels for some kinds of vice has nothing truly religious in it. Moreover, the conscience of such an educated mind may "tend to become what is called a moral sense."  

Then, "the command of duty is a sort of taste; sin is not an offense against God, but against human nature." Virtue becomes a matter of purely subjective criteria — "nothing more than the graceful in conduct." But making conscience a matter of taste places the focus on self, not on God. The "right thing to do" is substituted for true conscience and objective moral standards.

Newman's present discussion turns on the difference between "mental refinement" and "genuine religion." In a sense, so does our treatment of the difference between the worldly gentleman and the Christian gentleman hinge on this

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77 Ibid., p. 165.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., p. 167.
point. Newman's discussion points up the fact that although the goals of the gentleman, considered on a natural level, are worthy ones and his moral attributes are often commendable, these goals and attributes are insufficient to make such a man the desired product of a university. There is something more needed -- a supernatural orientation and perspective. If there is merit in the claim that the gentleman, the natural man of philosophical habit, must have a supernatural dimension to be a whole university-educated man, then there is substance in our assertion that Newman's idea of a gentleman is fundamentally, that is, in the primary instance, his idea of a Christian gentleman. That distinction leaves us with the worldly man of philosophical habit as a secondary instance of the term and what it represents. Whether we speak of primary or secondary instance, we must take both instances seriously.

By providing further clarification of the distinction between intellectual culture and genuine religion, Newman supplies us with additional support for our contention that the Christian gentleman stands preeminent in Newman's university scheme. For while the intellectual cultivation of the gentleman, considered apart from any religious principle, may bring him "half way to Heaven,"

80 Ibid., p. 160.
while it may free him from the bonds of his senses, \(^{81}\) while it may aid in "rescuing the victim of passion and self-will," \(^{82}\) and while it may refine the mind of the gentleman and predisposes his soul to virtue, \(^{83}\) it may also culminate for the man of mental refinement

in...insensibility of conscience, in...ignorance of the very idea of sin, in...contemplation of his own moral consistency, in the simple absence of fear, in...cloudless self-confidence, in...serene self-possession, and in...cold self-satisfaction...\(^{84}\)

Newman adds that the intellectual culture of the "mere Philosopher" may ultimately result in a "godless intellectualism" which begins by "repelling sensuality" but "ends by excusing it." \(^{85}\) Unfortunately, mental refinement too often displays a will of its own and goes its own way.

reason is too ready to pursue its own direction and nature, its own course.

For Newman, the major problem with intellectual culture and the morality stemming from it is that each deals with the exterior, the surface of things. True morality

\(^{81}\) Ibid.
\(^{82}\) Ibid., p. 161.
\(^{83}\) Ibid., p. 164.
\(^{84}\) Ibid., p. 169.
\(^{85}\) Ibid., p. 173.
and supernaturally oriented mental culture, on the other hand, aim at regenerating the interior -- the heart. Here intellectual cultivation cannot effect this spiritual rejuvenation because, in Newman's words,

it does not supply religious motive; it is not the cause or proper antecedent of anything supernatural; it is not meritorious of heavenly aid or reward;... it does not raise us above nature, nor has it any tendency to make us pleasing to our Maker....

In short, the university-trained man -- the gentleman -- needs more than mental culture. He needs Grace, and he needs Faith. These qualities form Newman's composite of the gentleman. They provide the profile of the Christian gentleman, the primary instance of Newman's idea of a gentleman. Grace provides for the "ruined state of man." It addresses itself to the gentleman's "utter inability to gain Heaven by anything he can do himself...." The Catholic doctrine of Grace reaffirms the moral certainty of a gentleman's "losing his soul if left to himself...." It allows for "the simple absence of all rights and claims on the part of the creature in the presence of the Crea-

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86 Ibid., p. 161.
87 Ibid., p. 159.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
It asserts the "illimitable claim of the Creator on the service of the creature" and the "imperative and obligatory force of the voice of conscience." It teaches that no man gains Heaven except by means of it and a "regeneration of nature." But Faith also is necessary for the gentleman to gain Heaven. Without it, he cannot please God. Faith teaches that "the heart is the seat both of sin and of obedience," that "charity is the fulfilling of the Law," and that "incorporation into the Catholic Church is the ordinary instrument of salvation." Newman concludes: "These are the lessons which distinguish Catholicism as a popular religion, and these are the subjects to which the cultivated intellect will practically be turned."

These are also the subjects, in the light of which the true nature of Newman's gentleman must be established.

There is ample evidence here to support at least three contentions. For one, if these are the proper subjects to which the cultivated mind of the university-edu-

90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
cated man must practically, and, in view of the extended discussion, I would say ultimately, be turned, then Newman's idea of a university is fundamentally his idea of a Catholic university. The subject matter of a university considered apart from any religious principle apparently is not enough. Then too, if the man who turns to these subjects must have Faith to guide and Grace to support him, then he is no mere philosopher. He is a Christian gentleman. The mere gentleman tends to follow the demands of his own will, nature, and reason rather than accede to the requirements of Faith and the persuasion of Grace. Finally, whether Newman's gentleman is considered as a man of intellectual culture or whether he is viewed as a man in whom Faith, Grace, and intellectual culture are combined, he deserves to be treated in a serious manner, for the subject areas in which his role is delineated are dealt with seriously by Newman.

In the last paragraph of Discourse VIII, Newman observes that Basil and Julian were both students in the schools of Athens. Basil became a saint and supporter of the Catholic Church; Julian, her scornful and resolute enemy. There is little doubt in the mind of the reader which model Newman would have his university-educated man resemble. A university considered in the abstract and a cultivated mind viewed apart from religious principle are insufficient to explain Newman's idea of a university and
his idea of a gentleman. At the very least, such a mind and university setting may all too easily result in a "godless intellectualism." At the very worst, the result may be a "future Anti-Christ," a "pattern-man of philosophical virtue" -- a Julian.95

Thus far, this treatment has presented the reader with the slow and difficult birth of a response to a vexing question -- the nature of Newman's gentleman and the degree of its seriousness. While the response could have been shaped only in reference to Newman's definition in Discourse VIII, it was not because his definition there does not supply material adequate for a total response. Its complete form has to be drawn from Newman's treatment of various issues, grounds, theme, assumptions, and the like in earlier discourses. As a result, I have formed a response primarily in relation to the nature of a Catholic university, in relation to theological grounds, in relation to the wholeness of knowledge and an interdisciplinary grasp, and in relation to the existence of a personal God. I have also shaped the answer in reference to Newman's equation of liberal and a gentleman's knowledge and in reference to the intellectual cultivation that must be reconciled with Grace and Faith. Perhaps the most significant element, however, in forming a response has been a desire

95Ibid., p. 181.
to integrate Newman's idea of a gentleman with his idea of a university, that is, to develop a "connected view" of their right relationship. Developed in the context of the foregoing relations, the response affirms that Newman primarily advances the development of a Christian gentleman in a Catholic university context and that he advocates secondarily the advancement of a cultivated gentleman in a university considered apart from any religious principle. Both contexts demand that Newman be taken seriously.

Discourse IX supports the arguments that Newman's statement on the gentleman is a serious one and that the Christian gentleman reflects Newman's primary use of the term. Its conclusion on the fundamental nature of Newman's university shores up these arguments. The discourse also helps clear up the duality of Newman's gentleman, while, at the same time, it answers decisively the question of the scope of a university raised in the Preface and Discourse I. In the sense that it sums up the duties of the Church towards knowledge and the university, it might be said to serve as a "theological center" of the discourses. Structurally, the discourse effects a clarifying resolution to Newman's argument on the ultimately Catholic nature of his university. It serves a similar purpose for my argument. If one compares this discourse with previous ones, he notes how well Discourse IX sums up the formal role of the Catholic Church in Newman's whole university scheme.
In discussing the duties of the Church towards knowledge, Newman links the theological and religious declarations of earlier discourses on the nature of a university, grounds, theme, and disciplinary boundaries with a more explicit and definitive statement of the Catholic form or spirit that must characterize the institution and knowledge around which grounds, theme, and disciplinary limits center. His argument proposes, in part, that

if the Catholic Faith is true, a University cannot exist externally to the Catholic pale, for it cannot teach Universal Knowledge if it does not teach Catholic theology. This is certain....96

Only one point needs to be made here. If a Catholic spirit and form should characterize the institution, then should it not also formally stamp the human product of the institution?

From there, Newman's argument is unfolded in a series of contrasts between a truly secular and sacred scope, liberal knowledge and Revelation, mere philosophy and supernaturally oriented dogma, and especially, between institutions materially and formally Catholic. The first terms of each pair account for the failure, in Newman's judgment, of a university education not organically related to spiritual realities. The second terms represent a whole educational view that places heavenly demands and earthly

96 Ibid., p. 184.
goals in perspective. From the contrasts drawn, it appears fairly certain that Newman's ideally educated man is a seriously treated Christian gentleman who seeks to learn the "relative disposition of things," both temporal and eternal.

In the first example, Newman points out that even though a university has

ever so many theological chairs, that would not suffice to make it a Catholic University; for theology would be included in its teaching only as a branch of knowledge, only as one out of many constituent portions, however important a one, of what I have called Philosophy. 97

He feels something more is needed -- "the direct and active jurisdiction of the Church...." 98 In a second example, Newman contrasts liberal knowledge and Revelation. The former, he feels, tends to place self first. It "exerts a subtle influence in throwing us back on ourselves, and making us our own center, and our minds the measure of all things." 99 Newman adds that liberal knowledge or reason clashes first with precept, then with doctrine, and finally, with the very principle of dogma. 100 He further

97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., p. 186.
100 Ibid.
states that mere reason can effect two dire results: one, it can ignore Theological truth; two, it can adulterate the spirit of Catholicism altogether. Revelation, on the contrary, with its emphasis on "grace, its mystery of the Godhead, its preaching of the Cross, its devotion to the Queen of Saints, [and] its loyalty to the Apostolic See," places God before man and temporal concerns. In another significant contrast, Newman distinguishes formally Catholic institutions from their materially Catholic counterparts, like the Spanish Inquisition. In speaking of the latter, Newman says that "considered 'materially,' it was nothing but Catholic; but its spirit and form were earthly and secular." Correlatively, he adds that the "whole of Catholic theology" is not sufficient guarantee of the "Catholicity" of a university. According to his view, a university will not have a Catholic spirit and form unless the Church breathes her own pure and un-earthly spirit into it, and fashions and moulds its organizations, and watches over its teaching, and knits together its pupils, and superintends its action.

101 Ibid., p. 187.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid., p. 185.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
That Newman wants the breath and spirit of Catholicism to formally mark his university there can be little doubt. That he would have the same spirit formally stamp the product of his university appears equally true. If Newman wants his university imbued with Catholic principles, if he wishes it Catholic formally, and if he believes that no university can exist outside "the Catholic pale," then it is more than likely that he also desires the university-educated man, the product of this formally Catholic university, to be more than a mere philosopher. He must be a Christian gentleman.

This interpretation of Newman's gentleman, emphasizing as it does the primacy of Newman's Christian gentleman, is not meant to negate the importance of Newman's more worldly model developed in a university considered apart from its relation to the Church. Neither is it meant to undermine the seriousness of Newman's statement on the gentleman in that context. What the interpretation does purport to do is place the divine and human dimensions of the man of philosophical habit in their right perspective.

Newman sees his university as a place in which natural and supernatural levels of activity must be harmonized. The human dimension of the worldly gentleman has to be reconciled with the supernatural dimension of the Christian gentleman, intent on pursuing his Divine destiny. Thus, the Christian gentleman actively pursues intellectual
truth by an interdisciplinary grasp of the sciences, but he does so in the broader context of a search for spiritual perfection. Newman grants that the philosopher's search for the wholeness of knowledge can move him well along toward worthwhile human goals. But human goals, worthy as they may be, are insufficient for a man delegated to pursue Christian ideals. The pride, the selfishness, and the willfulness of the man of mere intellectual culture may all too easily impede his attainment of supernatural goals. His evil tendencies, left alone, may work against his participation in the kingdom of God on earth. They may estrange him from God in this world. But worst of all, they may cause his damnation in the next. Newman concludes that intellectual culture is not enough. It must be allied with Grace and Faith. Purely human goals must be aligned with transcendent ones. In short, intellectual culture must find its meaning and fulfillment in union with a dynamic spiritual life. Discourse IX states that Faith, Grace, Revelation, and Dogma are the means to the gentleman's becoming a worthy son of God.

Much of the material in this study has been treated in terms of Aristotelian equivocity by reference.¹⁰⁶ That has been the key schematic device employed. Earlier, specific issues, like those of grounds and "connected view,"

¹⁰⁶ For examples, see pp. 106, 139, 162, and 192, above.
were explained according to their primary and secondary in-
stances. Now, because Newman's gentleman appears to lend
itself no less readily to the same approach, it too has
been treated as an equivocal by reference in this chapter.
From that treatment, the Christian man of philosophical
habit emerges as the primary instance. His development,
Newman's university -- at its core a Catholic University --
seeks to advance. In him I locate the true nature of the
term "gentleman" as Newman employs it. He is the Chris-
tian gentleman whose intellectual culture has been tempered
by Gospel ideals. The Christian gentleman is the primary,
formal instance of what Newman's idea of gentleman is. He
represents a primary, formal supernatural instance of human
and supernatural traits that take precedence over the sec-
ondary collection of human qualities and goals that char-
acterize the worldly gentleman. For the secondary instance
of Newman's gentleman, we must turn to the secular model
whose mind has been cultivated in a university considered
apart from any religious principles. But this instance is
a true picture of Newman's gentleman only to the extent
that it relates to the primary one. My treatment has not
allowed for a less than serious interpretation in either
instance because the gentleman in both contexts appears
to play too important a role in the development of Newman's
whole educational ideal. Whether Newman speaks of the man
of intellectual culture in a university abstractly consid-
ered or whether he speaks of the Christian man of philosophical habit cultivated spiritually in a Catholic University, he speaks seriously.
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APPROVAL SHEET

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The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

4/23/79
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