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International and Domestic Politics in Greece During the Crimean War by Jon V. Kofas.

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INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC POLITICS
IN GREECE DURING THE
CRIMEAN WAR

by
Jon V. Kofas

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VITA

The author, Jon V. Kofas, is the son of William Kofas and Matina Kofas. He was born September 29, 1953, in Tripolis, Greece.

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INTRODUCTION

The country in southeastern Europe known as "little Greece" to its inhabitants of the nineteenth century had a population of one million just before the Crimean War and its territory amounted to 47,000 square kilometers.

The newly formed nation became a kingdom in 1832 when Great Britain, France and Russia, the three Protecting Powers of Greece, appointed a Bavarian Prince, Otho I, to reign over the country. Otho came to Athens early in 1833 but the king did not assume his responsibility as a ruler until he was twenty years of age in 1835. The man who dominated the

---

1 The Greeks of the nineteenth century had the Byzantine Empire in mind when they characterized the nation as "little Greece."

2 E. About, Ε Ηλλάδα του Οθώνος (Ε Συνχρόνη Ηλλάδα, 1854), translated by A. Spelios, La Grèce Contemporaine (Athens), 52, who was writing before 1854 recorded that the population of Greece was 950,000. A.R. Rangabes, Greece: Her Present Progress and Position (New York, 1867), 22, maintains that the population of Greece in 1853 was 1,042,529. E. Nomikos, "The International Position of Greece During the Crimean War" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University Press, 1962), 290, has it at 1,000,000 for 1854 and it is safe to say that this is the correct figure.


4 For the text of the Treaty of May 7, see British and Foreign State Papers, XIX, 33-41. Also see C.F. Martens, et al., eds., Recueil des Traités d'alliance, de paix, de trêve et plusieurs autres actes servant à la connaissance des relations étrangères des puissances et états de l'Europe depuis 1761 jusqu'a present, X, 550-64. Gottinque, 1819-1944 (title changes to Nouveau recueil général des traites ... from IX on).
scene and exerted much influence in the government was Count Joseph von Armansperg. After February 1837 Otho became the absolute ruler of Greece as he dismissed Armansperg from his position as Arch-Chancellor. The king ruled without a constitution for about seven years after the Armansperg dismissal, but not without opposition. During that time he managed to accomplish nothing more than hatred from his subjects, rivalry from the Greek political parties and the three Protecting Powers, all elements which contributed to the weakness of the young nation. As Professor Tsivanopoulos points out:

Instead of exerting himself to consolidate the freedom which the Greeks had conquered, the efforts of King Otho were all directed toward the complete extinction of that freedom. The Bavarian ruler, forgetful that he was an elected Monarch, and that his subjects had won their independence by their own swords, thought that he was called to govern after the fashion of his ancestors. The people who had preserved their institutions entirely under the weight of Ottoman dominance, now saw their country transformed into the likeness of a German duchy.

Othonian absolutism was too unpopular among the freedom-loving Greeks who in 1834 revolted and demanded that a con-

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5 Armansperg was appointed president during the first Regency in Greece by a decree of 5 October 1832 of Ludwig, King of Bavaria. Armansperg was known for his liberal tendencies and this is the reason he was favored for the Regency in Greece which he shared with the first regency headed by Professor Ludwig von Maurer and Major-General Karl Wilhelm von Herdeck. See J.A. Petropoulos, Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843 (Princeton, 1968), 155, for the period of the first Regency see 153-217.

6 S.I. Tzivanopoulos, Katastasis tes Hellados epi Othonos kai Prosokiai Aftis Ypo ten Aftou Megalloteta Georgiou A Basilea Hellinon (The Condition of Greece under Otho and Her Expectations under His Majesty George I, King of the Greeks) (Athens, 1864), 4-5.
stitution be drawn up so that the people would have some form of representation in their government.

The principal leaders of the September revolution were military officers who had much of the public support in the capital. The 1843 revolution was bloodless and more important it was successful in driving the Bavarian bureaucracy from Greece and persuading Otho to agree to a formation of a constitution. The French constitution of 1830 was used as the model for the Greek Constitution of 1843 which was to change the political system and hopefully bring economic relief and general progress to "little Greece." In the field of religion, the Greek Orthodox Church was recognized as the official national Church but all religions would be tolerated. (Arts. 1 & 2.) In the field of civil rights important accomplishments were achieved. "All Greeks are equal under the law. ..." (Art. 3.) "The press is free, and censorship is not allowed." (Art. 10.) The new Constitution secured certain legislative rights for the representatives of the people as it stated that the legislative power belongs to the king, the Boule (Parliament), and the

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9 All transliterations and translations in this work are those of the author unless otherwise indicated.
Gerousia (Senate). (Art.15.) "The official interpretation of the laws belongs to the Legislative authorities." (Art.19.)

Even though the Constitution did provide for many political and civil rights of the people, it was still a Constitution which fell short of creating a liberal form of government such as enjoyed by Great Britain at the time. The king was guaranteed such powers that if put to use, as they were, would in fact make him an absolute monarch. The king had the right to appoint and dismiss ministers at will. (Art. 24.) He had the right to declare war and conclude treaties of peace, alliances and commerce. (Art.25.) He also had the right to dismiss the Parliament, (Art.30) and also to appoint senators, (Art.70) and judges, (Art.86). The most important accomplishment of the revolution of 1843 and the constitutional achievement was the elimination of the Bavarian bureaucracy which administered the affairs of the country since 1832, and the theoretical limitation of the monarchical power.

There were three political parties; the "French" party or moshomanga as it was commonly known, the "Russian" party or napist and the "English" party. All parties were in a position to share in the power of governing their country. 10 As the names of these parties indicate they were set up and supported by individuals who were convinced

10 See Petropoulos, Kingdom of Greece, 96-106, for the origin of the parties.
that the Protecting Power, which they modeled their party after, had helped the Greeks in the past and would help Greece more than any other in the future. The parties also designated the internal policy supported by their followers. Those who were affiliated with the "Russian" party wanted the government of Greece to be modelled after that of the Tsarist Russia and to be as friendly as possible to that Protecting Power. Those who followed the "English" tended to be constitutionalists and were opposed to the Bavarian Dynasty in Greece as long as it would insist in ruling absolutistically. The "French" party was somewhere in between the one extreme and the other though it tended to side with the "Russians" more often than with the "English." Naturally the three Protecting Powers infiltrated the political parties of Greece in order to exert the maximum possible influence in the governing process of the country. According to the treaty of 7 May 1832 drawn up by the Protecting Powers, Greece would be under the constant surveillance of Great Britain, France and Russia until it had discharged its financial obligations to these countries. Article XII of the Treaty states that Greece was guaranteed a loan of 60 million francs by the three Powers for which:

"The sovereign of Greece and the Greek state shall be bound to appropriate to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of such instalments of the loan as

\[ \text{The sovereign of Greece and the Greek state shall be bound to appropriate to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of such instalments of the loan as} \]
may have been raised under the guarantee of the three Courts, the first revenues of the state in such a manner that the actual receipts of the Greek treasury shall be devoted, first of all, to the payment of the said interest and sinking fund, and shall not be employed for any other purpose, until those payments on account of the instalments of the loan raised under the guarantee of the three Courts, shall have been completely secured for the current year. The diplomatic representatives of the three Courts in Greece shall be especially charged to watch over the fulfillment of the last mentioned stipulation. 12

Under such conditions it was clearly impossible that the Protecting Powers would not interfere in the internal affairs of Greece. The stage for foreign political dominance was set therefore by the Treaty of May 1832 when the Bavarian Prince, Otho, was elected to rule over the Greek people and when strict measures were set up by the Powers to influence the government of Greece.

The history of the Othonian period in the political sphere is marked by rivalries among the parties and therefore among England, France and Russia. From 1837 when Otho dismissed Armansperg and assumed the role to an absolute monarch until 1840 the "Russian" party was the dominant faction in Greece. 13 From 1841 until 1850 the "French" party enjoyed political supremacy, leaving the "English" party with a brief period of four months in 1844 to play the dominant role in the political sphere. The importance of con-


troling or having a good deal of influence in the Greek Government was immense for the Great Powers. There were economic, strategic and political reasons which made Greece an attractive nation to control in the Near East.

The dominance of one party in the government meant the alliance of Greece with that party's patron nation and her opposition to the patron nations of the other two parties. During the 30-year period of "foreign party" rule Greece became victim of such politics which continuously placed her under the antagonisms of the Protecting Powers. The worst of all the devastating consequences suffered by the young nation was in the period during the Crimean War when her foreign policy antagonised that of the Allied Powers and favored Russia. In this work the development of foreign and domestic Greek policy as well as international incidents which occurred in Greece from 1844 until 1857 will be traced to unfold the whole story of the insurrection of 1854 and the Franco-British occupation of Greece which followed. The reason that this study begins with the Kolettes administration in 1844 and not with the Menshikov mission in 1853 is because the causes which gave rise to the events of 1854 are to be found in the decade earlier. First, the government of Kolettes, founder of the "French" 14 party, supported a policy of irredentism, as opposed to internal development, second, it supported brigand chiefs who were a potential threat to the neighboring Turks, third,

14 Ibid., 137-41.
it opposed constitutionalism in Greece, and fourth, it created a very hostile environment for Greek-British relations which led to a number of confrontations between the two countries, Greece always coming out as the loser.

At the opening of Greek-Turkish hostilities in 1853 the British minister at Athens, Thomas Wyse, felt that the era of the Kolettes administration was responsible for the problems which were currently facing Greece.

"Place" and "Religion," "Hellenic Nationality" and "Eastern Church" against the Proselytism and Anti-hellenism of the Western Religions and Politics, is the cry put forward in plain terms, in all their recent publications. This cry might have been resisted some years ago with every prospect and probability of success, by the counter cry of Commerce and Constitution and by a cordial cooperation in support of both, on the part of the two great Western Powers, England and France. But these claims have of late years much diminished principally owing to the narrow and purely personal policy pursued by France since the Administration of Mr. Coletti (Kolettis), surrendering for the illusory influence derived from ephemeral Portfolios and Court favors that solid power, now required, which can only be attained by honest and preserving exertions for the true interests of the people. 15

As the Kolettist era was linked with the rise of the events of 1854, the Greek-British hostilities from 1847 to 1850 were also responsible for harsh measures adopted by the Allied Powers against Greece during the occupation. The three-year Franco-British occupation, the persistent attempts by the king to carry out a policy of irredentism, and the socio-economic consequences of the war and occupation will

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all be discussed in order to determine what the role of Greece was during the Crimean War.
CHAPTER 1

THE KOLETES ADMINISTRATION AND
ANGLO-FRENCH RIVALRY IN GREECE

A. The Nature of the Koletes Government

John Kolettes, the founder and leader of the "French" party, was appointed Prime Minister of Greece by the king on 6 August 1844 after he had contributed a great deal to the disturbances which led to the resignation of the Mavrokordatos Government. Alexander Mavrokordatos, leader of the "English" party, was elected Prime Minister on 30 March 1844. Besides the political opposition pressures from Kolettes and Metaxas, founder and leader of the "Russian" party, several other incidents occurred which contributed to the downfall of Mavrokordatos on August 4th. The press accused him of "becoming an English organ for a British conquest of Greece according to the method applied by the British in the conquest of India and presently applied in Greece." ¹ Another factor which damaged the image of the Prime Minister was the publication of the Londos, Minister of Justice, letter which ordered the authorities of Patras to "secure his election at any price." Finally, the illegal election of Kalergis,

the General who led the military against the absolutist regime of Otho in the revolution of September 1843, helped to bring the resignation of Mavrokordatos. 2

The new Prime Minister's sympathy with the Crown influenced the royal decision. In a message sent to Desages, the French Charge d'Affaires, dated 29 February 1844, Kolettes expressed his real views about the constitutionalists of 1843. He claimed he had to infiltrate the National Assembly "in order to neutralize the influence of the revolutionary sector," so that the King, the monarchy, and the country would be saved.

Kolettes became one of the most notorious dictators in the history of modern Greece when he realized that his affection for the Crown would give him unlimited power to act at will instead of following the Constitution. Even though he declared in public that he was a firm believer


in justice, impartiality, and constitutional principles, he acted in a dictatorial manner and disregarded the laws of the land. Most of his contemporaries as well as modern historians agree that Kolettes abused the Constitution (of 1843). Nicholaos Dragoumes, affiliated with the "English" party, described Kolettes as a liar, a man who suppressed public authorities, persecuted the press, intervened in elections, and systematically eliminated political opposition.

Another contemporary — a French writer — wrote:

The manner in which Kolettes attempted to wipe out the Parliament, is all new, alien to Greek ethics. . . . The last struggle of the government against the island of Hydra in the election recognized by the examining committee as perfectly legal was cancelled. This struggle proclaims . . . the first step toward the establishment of a system of dictatorship.

Scholars of modern Greek history, whether they are leftists like Kordatos, liberal like Douglas Dakin, or monarchists like Aspreas, all characterize the Government of Kolettes

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5 N. Dragoumes, Historikai Anamneseis (Historical Recollections) (Athens, 1925), II, 124-126.

6 "Revue de Deux Mondes" quoted in Dragoumes, Recollections, II, 127.


9 Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 206-10.
as "Parliamentary Dictatorship."

Born in Epirus and educated in Italy, Kolettes became the doctor of Ali Pasha of Janina which may explain his attitude about government. Bower and Bolitho, biographers of Otho I, write that:

His (Kolettes) idea of ruling Greece was founded on the principles of his former master Ali Pasha; bribery, corruption and malversation of public funds. His party was composed of the least stable elements of the country and he deliberately set out to assimilate as many of these as possible into the administration in order to prevent them from making trouble. 10

At the beginning of his appointment "the Prime Minister of the 6th of August," as Kolettes was known by his contemporaries, had the support of Metaxas and the "Russian" party otherwise he would not have been able to maintain a majority needed to form a government. 11 Metaxas was in charge of the Ministries of Navy and Economics, and the Prime Minister reserved for himself the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, of Internal Affairs and of Ecclesiastical Affairs. The Kolettes-Metaxas coalition was designed to eliminate the threat of constitutionalism in Greece. By the time of the first elections, "having at its disposal the military and political authorities, using force and intrigue, the allied government almost annihilated the "English" party in all of Greece." 12


11 Mavrokordatos had 53 Deputies while the Kolettes-Metaxas coalition had 67. See Fotiades, The Exile, 31.

12 Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 196.
It was not the intention of this dictator, however, to share his power with the "Russian" party and Metaxas. By 30 December 1844 Piscatory, the French Minister at Athens, could write to Guizot that, "the success of Kolettes is continuing. Metaxas until now is following an honest policy. And he sees that his party is disintegrating under the sun of Kolettes' [party]." 13 On July 26th Metaxas gave his written resignation to the King and so Kolettes and the Moschomanga, as the "French" party was commonly known, monopolized political power. 14

With the Napists out of the picture Kolettes had concentrated his power in his own hands but he was also fearful of the political opposition which was building as a result of the government's inability to accomplish anything other than corruption. On 2 September 1845 Aion (Century), the Russian newspaper, published an article exposing the unconstitutional practices of the government. "Greece is ruled constitutionally and Kalerges, Spiro-Melios,

14 The apparent cause for the withdrawal of Metaxas from the Kolettes Government was that the Napists—"Russian" party — wanted to control Church affairs. Metaxas had asked for the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs but was denied by the Prime Minister since two of his men, (R. Palamides and D. Kalifronas), also had a strong claim to it. See Karolides, History of the Greeks, III, 523-24.
Skarveles, Rodites and other "Septemberist" officers are being ostracized, mourning away from their families, and Makrygiannes is considered suspect of discovering the plot against the Constitution." 15 John Makrygiannes, a military hero affiliated with the "French" party, was one of the leaders who fought for Constitutionalism in 1843. In his memoirs Makrygiannes recalled the determination of Kolettes to annihilate the "Constitutionalists" of 1843, and do away with the Constitution itself and its influence on the public mind. In March 1845 Kolettes ordered that the inscription of the Constitution should not be displayed in the public ceremony of the 25th March national celebration. He further had plans to disperse the "Constitutionalists" at the ceremony by the military forces. "They were determined," writes Makrygiannes, "to destroy the Constitution. They make an Association at first, to assassinate at one time all the "Septemberists" all who did not shut up on their own. . . ." 16 The Prime Minister's plans were never carried out for they were discovered by Makrygiannes and his friends, but this one particular case of Kolettist tactics exemplified how his government operated while in power.

15 Aion September 2, 1845.

Kolettes would not have been able to emerge as the dynamic dictator that he was in a country whose monarch was known for his absolutist tendencies even after he accepted the Constitution unless he had the solid support of the Crown. In a letter to Metternich, Otho expressed his greatest satisfaction with his Prime Minister and his achievements.

My present Government for the happiness of Greece has faced fortunately all the storms, which threatened it. I say for the happiness of Greece, for I doubt seriously whether another Government would be in position to insure tranquility in the country. I have also reason to be pleased from the devotion of Kolettes to me. 17

Royal support for the administration of Kolettes secured an unchallenged government in power whose major task was to stay in power. The major opponent of the "French" party was the Mavrokordatos faction which was weakening considerably under the increasing power of the existing administration. Elections were conducted in an openly illegal manner by the use of force exercised by the government in power on the voters in order to secure the re-election of the party member. 18 The result of course was the lifetime Prime Ministership of John Kolettes and the dominance of the "French" party in politics for the decade of the forties.

17 Otho to Metternich, Athens, April 27, 1846, quoted in Skandames, Political History, 942.

18 E. Kyriakides, E Historia tou Synchronou Hellinismou apo tes Edryseos tou Basileiou tes Hellados 1832-1892 (History of Contemporary Greeks from the Founding of the Kingdom of Greece, 1832-1892) (Athens, 1972, I, 523-24.)
Such was the nature of the Kolettes administration; brutal, corrupt, dictatorial, all elements which contributed to the degradation of the young Greek nation in need of economic growth and development. If the word "favlokratia" (government by villains) is applicable to any Greek administration in the nineteenth century, it is certainly a fair label for that of Kolettes. His government set out to achieve the following goals: (1) The restoration of prestige to the Crown, (2) the permanent establishment of his Prime Ministership, and (3) the expansion of the country's boundaries. The first two goals were accomplished; as a result the work of the Constitutional revolution was wasted as Greece once again after the Kolettes administration became in practice an absolute monarchy.

B. The Expansionist Foreign Policy of Kolettes and the Mousouros Incident

Kolettes' foreign policy has been described by historians by the terms Megali Idea (Great Idea). This concept owes its origin to prerevolutionary thought and dreams of those Greeks who believed that one day they would free themselves from the Ottoman Empire and restore in its place the immortal Byzantine Empire. This was a dream which kept the Greek spirit alive amidst a Muslim conqueror. For many Greeks including Kolettes this dream was taken very seriously. In 1844 the "Prime Minister of the 6th of August" conceptualized the Megali Idea in the following manner:
Greece, by her geographical location is the center of Europe; with the East on her right and the West on her left she was destined through her downfall to enlighten the East. Our forefathers executed this task, the second is assigned to us. In the spirit of our oath and this great idea we saw always the delegates of the nation assembling to decide not for the fate of Greece but for the entire Greek race. A nation which through its own downfall enlightened so many other nations, is reborn today, not divided into many small states, but consolidated, with one government and one religion. . . . What do all the Orthodox Christian peoples in Europe, the East, and elsewhere do? All wait to hear whether we still possess the Greek idea. 19

In opposition and as a practical alternative to the foreign policy of irredentism of Kolettes and the Crown the "English" party with Mavrokordato offered a policy of internal development and economic growth.

Mavrokordatos was a liberal whose main concern was the economic strengthening of the weak, young nation. He believed that the Greek Government should not be looking to free the remaining Greek occupied territories of Thessaly, Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace, and Crete but rather it should concentrate on developing internally its economic sector. Once the country was strong enough internally it could take up the challenge of the Ottoman Empire in order to regain its desired territories. Kolletes on the other hand was convinced "that the first and major goal of the young country should be boundary expansion and that the work of internal revival was unattainable with the poor means of the

free fragment of Greek land. He felt that the creation of
the Kingdom was a condition of truce, not peace, and this
truce should be broken as soon as possible." 20 Even though,
as Tatsios remarks, "the solution to the nation's internal
and external problems were identified with two antithetical
political groups, . . ." 21 namely that of Kolettes and
that of Mavrokoradatos, it was clear to most people in the
government and to those comprising an educated public opin-
ion that a policy of internal development was more urgent
than a policy of irredentism which antagonized not only the
Sublime Porte but the Great Powers' Near Eastern policy as
well. 22

The only opposition to the Megali Idea foreign poli-
cy came from the "Russian" and "English" parties. In a
series of articles published in the Aion, the "Russian"
organ, (on the 10th, 13th and 17th September 1847) the
Megali Idea was bitterly attacked as a treacherous policy
dangerous to the interests of Greece. 23 The Western Powers,

20 G.N. Philaretos, Xenokratia kai Basileia en Hell-
ladi, 1821-1897 (Foreign Rule and Royalty in Greece, 1821-
1897) (Athens, 1897), 82.

21 T. Tatsios, "The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish
War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irreden-
tism, 1866-1897" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University,

22 During the Kolettes Administration the Great Po-
wers Near Eastern Policy was the maintenance of the status
quo. See M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923

23 Cited in Fotiades, The Exile, 43.
namely France and Great Britain, also criticized the expansionist policy of Kolettes. The French foreign minister of Louis-Philippe, Francois Guizot, a long time friend of Kolettes, and his most faithful European political supporter, opposed the personal policy of expansionism entertained by Kolettes.

The Near Eastern policy of Guizot during the Kolettes administration was parallel to that of England, namely, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans. In a letter to Kolettes before the new Minister took office, Guizot made it clear that France supported the Integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

You are much preoccupied with the future of the Greek race, but don't be deceived; this will not come tomorrow. It is very far. Be certain as to this. Europe, and when I say Europe I mean the good as well as the bad European policy, our friends as well as our enemies, Europe does not want the near falling of the Ottoman state. . . . Europe had made a firm decision and Greece will not blackmail the hands of Europe . . . direct your attention to the domestic affairs of Greece, in order to rectify her simply as a country governable domestically.

Kolettes, who had found it convenient to lie about his beliefs and convictions concerning the Constitution and the idea of justice for all, also found it convenient to lie to


25 In the correspondence between Princess Lieven and Lord Aberdeen there is a desire expressed on the part of both France and England not to have a confrontation over Greek affairs, Jones E. Parry, *The Correspondence of Lord Aberdeen and Princess Lieven, 1832-1854* (London, 1938-39), I, 216-17, 225.

a European statesman about the foreign policy which he had
designed to carry out. He wrote to Guizot that the present
administration in Athens had no intentions or plans to antag-
onize the Ottoman Empire even though he was firmly convinced
of the injustice of a "little Greece" carved out by the will
of the Great Powers.

This is my belief; but never was it meant that this des-
tiny should be fulfilled by an invasion in the Ottoman
state of by a forced conversion (propaganda). I am there­
fore a devotee of the status quo. This is why from the
beginning of my entrance into the government I seriously
struggled to curb the forceful excitement of the small
prudent and small provident of the Parliamentarians who
push the government on a dangerous and anti-rational road.
The measures which I have taken have pleasant results;
the frontier relations between the Greeks and the Ottoman
authorities are perfectly friendly; and they give cause
for mutual help to each other. I declare my respectable
friend that for as long as I am Prime Minister Turkey
will have nothing to fear for my part. Every unfriendly
movement against the neighboring frontiers I regard least
political and very dangerous. 27

These promises made to Guizot were never kept nor were they
meant seriously. Kolettes knew what the policy of Europe in
the Near East was but he had to choose between following the
wishes of Europe or following his own policy and become popu-
lar with the King as well as with the majority of the people.

By raising the flag of the Megali Idea the "Prime Minister
of 6 August" appealed to the nationalist sentiments of the
masses who were eager to see all Greeks in the Ottoman Pro-
vinces join the mother country. On the one hand the Prime

27 Cited in ibid., 194.
Minister was promising to Europe to support the status quo in the Near East and on the other he was promising the people of Greece expansion of territories. This contradictory policy of Kolettes had as its purpose the popularity of his own government both with Europe and with the Greek people.

Some of his astute contemporaries, however, who were involved in political life could see this contradiction in the government's policy and criticized it as a deceptive policy. "But because the disappointment against the authorities," wrote Dragoumes, "inflamed openly by foreigners, was general, the government was fearful of the springing up of general disturbances, the Megali Idea was forwarded, electrifying the people distracting and altering their attention from the domestic to the foreign grandeur of the country." 28

In this passage Dragoumes explains that the Prime Minister used the Megali Idea policy to distract the people's attention from the domestic to the foreign problems giving them hope of national expansion. It cannot be maintained, however, that the Kolettes administration went no further than verbal promises about national expansion. One of the practical steps that the government which believed in the Megali Idea adopted was the support of Brigandage. Throughout Greece as well as in the Greek-Turkish borders the "war-party" of Kolettes (as it was labeled since they supported war), allowed

28 Dragoumes, Recollections, II, 135.
Brigandage to continue to grow and actually supported it. The Prime Minister viewed the Brigandage chiefs as valuable warriors who would be used in an event of a Greek-Turkish war. "Always the domestic questions were small and secondary," writes Kyriakides, "commerce and industry never occupied his thoughts and his conceptions; about transportation, about road planning he never thought, because he conceives one and only road to plan, that toward Thessalonika, and toward Constantinople; about Brigandage he is never concerned, because the brigands are his future soldiers..." The Ottoman Empire as well as Great Britain criticized the government in Athens for its support of Brigandage.

In the House of Lords, Lord Beaumont criticized the domestic as well as the foreign policy of Greek aggression against Turkey.

Not only had Athens become the scene of the deepest and strangest intrigues... but even beyond the internal affairs of Greece, beyond the frontiers, had that country already shown a total disrespect, not only for treaties, but for the common laws of nations -- for the common practice of international friendship; and set a defiance at the common laws of humanity, by establish-

29 Aspreas, Modern Greece, I 203.

30 Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 527.


32 Brigandage was a phenomenon that had been in existence for as long as Greece was under the domination of the
ing on the frontiers of Turkey an absolute system of Brigandage. 33

The Megali Idea propagated through the government newspapers caused Chekib Effendi, the Turkish minister for foreign affairs, to complain to the ambassadors of the three Protecting Powers on 17 March 1845. Chekib Effendi accused the Greek Government of exciting revolutionary activities in Thessaly and Epirus, Turkish provinces, populated mostly by Greeks. He warned that if support to revolutionary intrigues continued in these provinces the Sublime Porte would resort to strong measures of repression. 34 Under the pressure of the Turkish Government as well as of the Great Powers Kolettes was forced to adopt measures less hostile to the neighboring nation.

The most faithful supporter of the Sublime Porte at this time was the British foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, who reacted with extreme anger toward the government of Athens when informed of Greek anti-Turkish schemes. Influenced by reports from the Constantinople embassy as well as the Lega-

Sublime Porte. Brigands became the heroes of the country during the War of Independence as they took the name of klefts (thieves) and armatoloi (guerrilla warriors). Brigandage continued after the War of Independence as many hoped to free all of the Greek territories.

33 Sessions of May 22, 1845, Hansard, 3rd series. LXXX, 756.

34 George Finlay, A History of Greece from its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time, B.C. 146 to A.D. 1864, VII, (Oxford, 1877), 200.
tion at Athens, the British Foreign Secretary accused Kolettes of encouraging disorder and granting amnesty to bands of brigands.

The government in Athens hoped to counter the British antagonism to Greece by using France, the supporter of the Moschomanga (the "French" party), as its protector. Kolettes was convinced that he needed to counterbalance the power of Lord Palmerston, who opposed the Greek administration in power, with that of French Foreign Minister, Guizot, and the French Legation in Athens who supported the administration. Since France had stood solidly behind Kolettes ever since he took power, the Greek Prime Minister believed that his patron nation would once again come to his rescue.

The situation was not as simple, however, as Kolettes viewed it at the time. Guizot had an obligation to support the pro-French government in Athens but he was also committed to support Mustafa Reshid Pasha, the progressive Turkish statesman who had served as ambassador to Paris after he was dismissed as Foreign Minister in 1841 and was as much pro-French as Kolettes. If Guizot would have decided to support the Kolettes administration his country would have risked


38 Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 525-6.
losing both Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire as important allies. So it was impossible for the French foreign minister to sacrifice the interests of his country by opposing Palmerston and the Ottoman Empire in order to satisfy the expansionist dreams of a petty Greek politician. As the observations made in the House of Lords in 1845 by Lord Beaumont indicate, the Near Eastern interests of both Western Protecting Powers were identical and not conflicting as Koletetes and many other Greeks believed.

The interests of the two countries were essentially the same in both quarters — their object was, and ought to be identical. England and France alike were deeply interested in preserving the independence, integrity and due influence of the Ottoman Empire, who was and could be the only safe keeper of the Dardanelles; for should the key of that gate be wrenched from her, and the opening and shutting of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus be at the discretion of the Northern Power, the trade and possessions of England and France in the Mediterranean be at the mercy of Russia. \[39\]

Since England and France shared common interests in the Mediterranean against Russia it would have been logical for Koletetes to appeal to the Tsar for help but since the revolution of 1843 Russia had taken a back seat in the affairs of Greece. First, the napists were not in control of the government, and second, Russia disapproved of the constitutional change which had taken place in Greece. \[40\] Furthermore, the Tsar had "made it clear" to the British government

\[39\] Sessions of July 31, 1845, Hansard, 3rd series, LXXXII, 1279.

\[40\] Russia approved of the Koletetes government even though she did not support it. Nesselrodo to Meyendorff,
in the summer of 1844, "that he would oppose control of Constantinople and the Straits by any one of the Great Powers (including Russia) or by an enlarged and strengthened Greece."\textsuperscript{41}

Considering that none of the Powers were ready to support expansion of Greece at the cost or upsetting the status quo in the Near East, it would be realistic for Kolettes to abandon his immediate plans of Megali Idea. No force, however, was large enough to control the germ of expansionism in the Prime Minister's mind so he continued searching for an opportunity to strike at Turkey. Such an opportunity presented itself during the crisis of the Mousouros incident.

The Mousouros Incident

Greek-Turkish relations continued to deteriorate even after the warnings of the British government to Greece and the complaints of the Sublime Porte to the Great Powers. In 1847 the "Mousouros Incident" was responsible for the total break in diplomatic relations between the government of Athens and the Ottoman state. This affair, which was to have far greater consequences than any one in the Kolettes ministry could foresee, began in January 1847 when Tsames Karatasos, asked for a Turkish visa to visit Constantinople.

\textsuperscript{41} Anderson, \textit{Eastern Question}, 112.
The Turkish embassy denied Karatasos the granting of a visa because he was involved in insurrectionary schemes against the Porte. When the secretary of the Turkish embassy, Komenou Bey, told Karatasos that he could not renew his passport without the proper authorization from the Turkish government, the latter replied that such a rejection was an insult to the king of Greece, and proceeded to report the incident to the Prime Minister. Kolettes seized upon this incident and chose to blow it out of proportion in order to create friction with the Sublime Porte. The reasons that the Greek Prime Minister acted in such a manner was first because he needed public support and second because he desired to open hostilities in the Near East for the purpose of gaining the adjacent Turkish Provinces of Thessaly and Epirus. As Professor Karolides explains:

That Kolettes through these and other aggravating internal and foreign diversions, precisely in order to rid himself from these diversions inventing a great and more serious foreign matter, he asked to provoke a rupture in the Ottoman state, in order to domestically direct the attention of the Greek people to the Megali Idea while externally to provoke a clash and a Greek-Turkish war, extending it very likely to an Anglo-French and possibly

42 W. Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and its Successors, 1801-1927* (Cambridge, 1936), 177.


44 Karatasos was an aid de camp of Otho, Fotiades, *The Exile*, 48. Also see Athanasios Angelopoulos, *Dimitrios Tsamis Karatasos* (Balkan Studies, XVII, 1976)

converting it into a general European, so that in the general confusion of everything he would rise as a great political man, a great Greek patriot. 46

the king was informed of the affairs involving Karatasos and the Turkish embassy at a palace dance which Mousouros, the Turkish charge d'affairs in Athens, attended. 47 Otho approached the Turkish representative and angrily said, "J'esperais, que le roi de la Grèce meritait, plus de respect que vous n'avez pas montré monsieur," and he returned his back on Mousouros. When Mousouros related the incident to Edmund Lyons, the British minister at Athens, the latter advised the Turkish minister to leave the Palace with his entire personnel. 48

Two days later, (15 January) after further instructions from Lyons, Mousouros blamed the king's attitude towards him on Kolettes. 49 The Turkish government 50 and all the representatives of the Powers — except for the French — in Constantinople sympathized with the Turkish minister in Athens. When Kolettes refused to personally go to the Turkish


47 Mousouros was a Greek Phanariot (Constantinople) who was loyally serving the Sublime Porte.

48 Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 557.

49 Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 205, claims that the British embassy in Constantinople was also giving instructions to the Turkish embassy in Athens, Lyons and Kolettes were on very hostile terms, (see Bower & Bolitho, Otho I, 136) so the former had personal as well as political reasons to blame Kolettes for the occurrence at the palace dance.

50 The Sultan was Metzid a peace loving ruler Grand Vizier was Reshid Pasha, and foreign minister Aali. Both
embassy and apologize on behalf of his government's conduct, the Turkish foreign minister, as Aali had demanded, diplomatic relations between Greece and Turkey broke off and were not to resume for an entire year. There was a long correspondence between Otho and the Sultan during 1847 which was a rather fruitless attempt to restore relations between the two countries since the Great Powers behind the scenes exercised a great influence in the major foreign policy decisions made by either Greece or Turkey. The incident therefore remained unresolved and the two powers were only to resume diplomatic relations after the death of Kolettes, the man responsible for the entire affair.

C. Anglo-French Rivalry in Greece

Anglo-French rivalry in Greece existed before the pro-French government of Kolettes as a result of conflicting interests and power politics among the Great Powers. When Mavrokoridatos resigned and Kolettes became Prime Minister in 1844, however, the antagonism between France and England over political influence in Greece was greatly accentuated. Kolettes made no particular efforts to hide his antipathy for Great Britain and, especially, for Edmund Lyons. Both Lyons and Palmerston, who supported Mavrokoridatos' policy of internal

Aali Pasha and Reshid Pasha were "European-minded" politicians.

51 See Petropoulos, Kingdom of Greece, for the period before 1844 for Anglo-French rivalry in Greece.
reform and development, despised Kolettes' policy of irredentism. Palmerston described Kolettes in a letter to Lord Normanby as follows:

I have no doubt that Coletti would, as Wallenstein says, prefer France to the gallows, but I do not see why he should be reduced to that alternative. To be sure, St. Aulaire said to me the other day that Coletti was a necessary minister, for that he is the chief and leader of all the robbers and scamps of Greece, . . . Otho loves him as a second self, because he is as despotic as Otho himself; and as long as a majority can be had for Coletti in the chambers, by corruption and intimidation, by the personal influence of the king and by money from France, Coletti will remain minister. 52

Guizot, however, felt that Kolettes was a good Prime Minister for Greece and supported him against the British government's attacks. 53 During his administration Kolettes made numerous attempts to have Lyons replaced as minister to Athens. In August 1845 Kolettes persuaded the king to use his influence in removing Lyons from Athens. In August 1845 Kolettes persuaded the king to use his influence in removing Lyons from Athens. When Otho was informed that the Queen of England would visit Germany accompanied by Aberdeen he wrote to his father:

. . . quite pleased I was informed that the Queen of England will travel to Germany. . . . I hope therefore, that you will have no difficulty in meeting her . . . then perhaps the Queen since she has a will power of her own may be won over by your politeness dear Father, and


53 Robert Bullen, Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale (London, 1974), 75-78, also see Guizot to Aberdeen, October 28, 1844, quoted in E. Driault
that she will believe in your guarantee of my friendly feelings toward England and realize the necessity of recalling Lyons without jeopardizing his career. One can't ignore the danger of Lyons's violent prejudices, and no order even from his government, would prevent him from intriguing in secret. You most probably know yourself that recently, when he was talking to your minister, he said that if Greece was not able to pay its foreign debts, then it was apparent that the country was too small for a monarchy. 54

The conflict between the Moschomanga and the "English" parties did not have an effect on the Anglo-French rivalry or the Kolettes-Lyons power struggle but its influence extended to the people of Greece who fell victims to power politics. As Aspreas explains:

As the parties evolved, Greeks fought against Greeks, but the flags under which they were fighting were not Greek. Piscatory was no longer behind Kolettes and Lyons behind Mavrokordatos. The representatives of the two rival Great Powers had openly come to the arena. They were the opposing party leaders under whose inspiration the Greeks fought, wearing out their strength, paralyzing the country and giving a pitiful view of political idiocy. 55

Piscatory, who was devoted to Guizot, and Lyons "who had begun his diplomatic career as a protege of Palmerson," were not on speaking terms and were constantly attacking each other in the Greek press. 56

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54 Skandames, Political History, 940, also see Bower and Bolitho, Otho I, 139.
56 Bulen, Entente Cordiale, 75.
The continuing support of Guizot to the Greek govern-
ment forced Aberdeen to order Lyons to break off all re-
lations with Piscatory. The ascendancy of the "French" party in Greece not only presented a political threat to the British interests in the Near East but an economic threat as well. One of the instructions by the British government to Edmund Lyons was to promote British economic interests in Greece. As Thouvenel wrote to Desages:

England has interests in Greece. The neighboring Ionian Islands, the between Syra and Patra's commerce, the London based colony of Chios' merchants, the totally profitable grain transport executed under the Greek flag, finally the commerce of imports, all these elements give England a material place in Greece.

In 1854 the total imports of Greece amounted to 22.3 million drachmas and total exports to 11 million. Corinthian raisin (which British merchants exploited) amounted to 3.5 million. The major importing ports were Syros and Patras, and the following countries contributed the majority of imports to

57 The following letter from Guizot to Kolettes which was sent 17 April 1845 reveals the enthusiasm of the French government toward the Kolettes administration. "mon cher et honorable ami, pardonner moi, mon long silence, j'ai tort, mais je suis pardonnable. ... vous avez tres bien con-
duit les affaires de la Grece. Elle enfin un gouvernement, un gouvernement Grec. Durez, durez et continuant. C'est ce que je vous demande. C'est le premier interet de votre pays comme le premier desir de vos amis en Europe. ... ." cited in Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 534.

58 Ibid., 535.


Greece: Great Britain amounted to 7.3 million, Turkey 4.3 million, Austria 4 million and France and Russia 2 million.

One of the ways by which England exerted its influence and protected its interests in the Near East was by making continuous demands on the Greek government to pay the interest on the guaranteed loan of 1832. When Kolettes became Prime Minister he inherited an empty treasury and a payment of 6.3 million drachmas due to the Protecting Powers. Considering that there was a budget deficit every year but one, 1836, since 1832 interest payments were repeatedly postponed. In 1845 the Prime Minister tried again to postpone payments due to the Powers, and Lord Aberdeen as well as Cochrane criticized Greece in Parliament for not making its payments. Lord Aberdeen stated that:

We have also guaranteed the payment of the interest of a loan contracted by the Greek State, which we have been called upon to discharge ourselves for the last two or three years. This, therefore, gives us undoubtedly a right to interfere so far in the internal affairs of this State as to see that we should be released from these obligations as rapidly as possible. And the Greek Government would do well to recollect that, by the provisions of the Treaty, we are enabled to enter into possession of such of the revenues of Greece as we think


62 This loan of 60 million francs was guaranteed to Greece by the Protecting Powers by the Treaty of 7 May 1832. See Martens, Recueil des Traites, X, 550-64, also Strupp, La situation internationale de la Grece, 125, and Levandis

63 Hansard, 3rd series, LXXVIII, 902-03.
proper for the repayment of the debt so contracted. 64

The concern of the British government over the payments on the loan kept increasing as did their dissatisfaction with the pro-French Kolettes administration. The British wanted the Greek Prime Minister and his government to know just how disappointed the Aberdeen government was with the state of affairs in Greece so Lyons was instructed to send a letter from the Earl of Aberdeen informing the Greek government of its negligent financial practices. The British Foreign Secretary stated that Greece had violated the terms of the Treaty of May 7th 1832 by not making complete efforts to discharge its financial obligations to the three Protecting Powers. Aberdeen further noted that Great Britain was determined to insist on administrative reform and a reduction in the armed forces of Greece.

The expenses of the war department continue to absorb one-third of the revenues of the state. Brigandage has increased. The tranquility of the counterminous Turkish provinces has been repeatedly troubled by acts of rapine; and the Ottoman territory has been repeatedly violated by armed Greek bands. Out of respect for the independence of Greece, Great Britain is unwilling to interfere in her internal affairs. But it is manifest that if Greece desires to be exempt from external control, she must place herself in a position to discharge her own financial obligations without having recourse to the aid of the guaranteeing Powers. 65

Interest payment on the loan was the strongest, although not

64 Session of July 31, 1845, Ibid., 3rd series, LXXXII, 1280.

65 Aberdeen to Lyons, Foreign Office, October 2, 1845, British and Foreign State Papers, XLV.
always the most effective means used by the Peel administration, by Palmerston and by the Earl of Clarendon to pressure Greece to yield to British demands. The British Parliament and certain historians favorable to Palmerston and Great Britain maintained that the concern of the Foreign Office was with the growth and development of the Greek nation and that Great Britain stood for constitutionalism against the absolutism of the Bavarian monarchy in Greece and the corrupt and dictatorial Kolettes administration. 66 Nothing could be further from the truth. As Palmerston's letter to Prince Albert will reveal below, the concern of the British government was not the internal development of Greece and her general economic and social progress, but rather the dominant influence exercised by the French in that country which diminished British influence in the Near East.

Palmerston made it clear to Prince Albert that his nation had nothing against the people of Greece but only against Kolettes. He hinted that Trikoupis, the pro-English politician, was far more capable of governing Greece in a constitutional manner, and that the royal support of Kolettes was resented by the Foreign Office. Most strongly the British Foreign Secretary objected to the French influence in the Kolettes administration.

66 George Finlay, History of Greece, VII, is one of the historians partial to the British government. Also Lewis Sergeant, Greece, shares similar views though not as notoriously British as those of Finlay.
In the foreign relations of the country Mr. Koletti seems to have had three leading objects in view, aggression towards Turkey, subserviency of Mr. Koletti toward France, and insult towards England. The subserviency of Mr. Koletti toward France is too notorious, too evident, and has been too publicly boasted of by the French Government to be now denied. 67

Throughout the month of April 1847 Lyons kept asking for the 700,000 drachmas which the English government paid to the Greek nation for the guaranteed loan.

In Parliament the heat was building against Greece which could not make the payments to the Protecting Powers. 68

At the same time domestic political opposition to the Kolettes administration was building as a result of the Prime Minister's mishandling of the Mousouros incident. In panic, Kolettes consulted with Otho and then dismissed Parliament --- the Boule --- and called for elections. 69 The elections which took place were conducted in the same corrupt and unconstitutional manner which suited Kolettes' purposes. The leaders of the "Russian" and "English" parties decided to form a coalition in order to be able to stop the present administration from getting reelected. Their plan, however, failed as the government was too well prepared and determined to meet the opposition. Makrygiannes described the misfor-

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68 Sessions of February 23, 1846, Hansard, 3rd series, LXXXIII, 1389-90.

tunes of the elections and how Kolettes was able to retain
power as follows:

Grivas went to Bonitsa and raised the flag. They (the
partisans of Kolettes) attacked him, not even having
fired at them, and dumped him in the sea. He would have
been lost if the English had not saved him. Mamoures
took 35,000 drachmas from Metaxas and Mavrokordatos,
which they had collected to help the movement; he cheated
them and turned on the side of the government... Kolettes began his elections. Everywhere in the nation
there were murders and disappearances of residents. 70
Kolettes won all of the electorates out of one hundred.

This process was called "elections" in mid-nineteenth century
Greece. A young nation in need of honest progressive politi-
cal leaders was subjected to rule by villains.

The loss of the "English" party created bitter reac-
tion in England against the existing government. Lord Palmer-
ston openly accused Kolettes in the House of Lords for his
Francophilism.

I cannot understand the great value placed by France in
maintaining in Greece a ministry which is regarded rep-
resentative of French interests. If the French Govern-
ment believes that it is the advantage of France and
the French nation to regard this as its triumph, that
the Prime Minister of Greece is their chief... I
cannot say anything more... no one in England wants
to think of bothering the French dominated events. 71

The Anglo-French rivalry was not destined to last in Greece,
for Kolettes, leader of the "French" party, died on 1 Septem-
ber 1847. The Revolution of 1848 which brought an end to

70 Makrygiannes, Memoirs, 198-99.

71 Cited in Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 421-42.
the government of Louis Philippe also brought an end to the dominating French influence of Greek politics. Even though the struggle for power never stopped, the tensions between France and England tended to ease as they both realized that the foreign policy of the Megali Idea was in conflict with their policy of the Ottoman Empire integrity. The other factor which eased the tensions between French and English policy in Greece was that Otho was not really favorable to either France or England and tended to be drawn towards Russia after 1850.

During the three years of his dictatorial rule Kolettes was successful in accomplishing in the domestic sphere: (1) the alienation of the "Russian" and "English" parties, (2) the violation if not total rejection of the Constitution, and (3) the establishment of the Prime Minister-King dictatorship. In the external sphere, (1) the antagonism of England against Greece, and (2) the support of Brigandage against the Ottoman State, and as a result the antagonism of Turkey against Greece. This is the Kolettes' legacy. The tragedy of it was that its influence extended beyond the decade of the 40's to the war period of the 50's. The king would follow Kolettes' foreign and domestic policies to plunge Greece into a senseless conflict involving Turkey and the Western Powers.
CHAPTER II

ANGLO-GREEK HOSTILITIES AND THE RISE OF RUSSOPHILISM IN GREECE

A. Foreign Policy and Anglo-Greek Hostilities 1847-1850

The period from the death of Kolettes to the Anglo-French occupation of 1854 in Greece was characterized domestically by monarchical tyranny, and in the field of foreign affairs by expansionist schemes directed against the Ottoman Empire. Kolettes reinstated the king's prestige in 1844 after it was downgraded and limited by the Constitutional revolution. When Kolettes was out of the political scene the Greek monarchy was determined to absorb all the powers of the government into its own hands.

The only two powerful leaders, Metaxas and Mavrokordatos, who were likely candidates to replace Kolettes, would not be acceptable to the pro-French Parliament (Boule) and much less to the Crown which both politicians had fought against. From 1847 to 1853, therefore, absolute monarchy was reinstated in practice though not in theory in the background of void in political leadership. The governments which were in power during these seven years were known as "court governments" or "court ministries," since the Prime
Ministers were puppets of the king. 1

During the period of the "court ministries" the constitutional rights of the citizens were abused by the king and his court whose ultimate goal was the full reinstatement of absolutist powers to the Crown. The Kolettes administration had already set the stage for a political system which would give all the governmental powers to the king and create a monarchical dictatorship behind the disguise of puppet ministers.

The first "court ministry" was headed by an illiterate man, Kitsos Tsavellas, who served as Minister of the Army in the administration of Kolettes. 2 Kitsos Tsavellas was the grandson of the infamous Lambros Tsavellas, a hero in the War of Independence. He was not a politically minded man but his devotion to the Crown made him the best candidate for the position of Prime Minister. The primary concern of the Tsavellas government was the suppression of legitimate political opposition to the government which had begun while Kolettes was in power, 3 as well as revolutionary activities throughout Greece which presented a serious threat to the Crown. In the summer of 1847 there was a

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1 For political development during the period 1847 to 1853 see Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 210-220, also Petarakakos, History of Greece, 137-153.

2 Fotiades, The Exile, 74, also Makrygiannes, Memoirs, 300-01.

3 The Greek Senate (Gerousia) or Council of Elders,
wave of opposition to the government of Kolettes. Under the leadership of Makrygiannes and other prominent military figures a coalition of peasants, military officers and politicians of the opposition was formed and called for the restoration of the constitutional principles in government. Otho and his court managed to silence Makrygiannes and his followers by armed force but the wave of revolution which swept Europe in 1848 had too great of an effect on Greece even for Otho to control. 4

As long as the tide of unrest remained free from implicating the Protecting Powers, the Tsavellas government could control it. There were two incidents, however, of major importance which implicated Great Britain in the revolutionary activities of 1847-1848. The first incident involved Theodore Grivas, inspector in the army during the Kolettes government, and Nicholas Kriezotes, Province Inspector in Euboia. Both men were supporters of Kolettes up to the April 1847 elections when the "Prime Minister of the 4th of August" dismissed the Parliament. At that time Grivas and Kriezotes decided to fight against the dictator-

began openly to oppose the unconstitutional practices of the monarchy and asked that the king uphold the principles of the Constitution. This attack on the monarchy by the Senate came as a shock to Otho for senators were appointed by the Crown. See Petrakakos, History of Greece, 140.

4 For the Makrygiannes rising see Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 238-39.
ship of Kolettes even though the latter had promised both of them seats in the senate. Kolettes sent an armed force against Grivas and his rebels but with the help of the British, Grivas escaped to Prevesa where he received assistance and cooperation from the British Consulate and ultimately resorted in the Turkish province of Janina. 5

The second incident involved Merendites, a Captain in the army during the Kolettes administration. Merendites was dismissed from the army by the Tsavellas government for suspicion of being in the opposition. This tragic occurrence in the captain's life prompted him to resort to brigandage. He robbed the Patros Branch of the National Bank of Greece of 25,000 drachmas, the Customs House of 32,000 and he took 92,000 from the Public Fund. He then sought refuge in the Austrian embassy but was not accepted so he went to the British who were eager to give help to anyone in the opposition. 6

In both instances, one with Grivas and the other with Merendites, the Greek government found itself in another confrontation with the British authorities. When Greek officials became aware that the British took part in aiding rebels such as Grivas and brigands such as Merendites

5 Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, 451, also Bower-Bolitho, Otho 1, 168.

6 Fotiades, The Exile, 77.
they became infuriated. Glarakes, the Greek Foreign Minister, complained to Lyons about the role of the British authorities in Greek internal affairs and Lyons reported the incident to Palmerston. The British statesman who had little to be sympathetic about with the government in Athens wrote a very aggressive and degrading letter against the Greek authorities which he sent to Lyons. He maintained that:

Mr. Glarakes will do well to abstain in the future from unfounded accusations against her Majesty's government and her personnel . . . and if this government showed the slightest sympathy towards him (General Grivas) it did this only because he has been a victim of tyranny, oppressing and agitating the Greek people all over, where the activity of this system is now felt: a system provoking natural consequence and evident revolt.

This letter came as a shock to everyone and, especially, the king, who ordered the Foreign Ministry to respond to Lord Palmerston in a "very declaratory manner." The irony of this entire affair was that Great Britain the defender of liberty and constitutional principles, the only one of the Great Powers really to speak out against brigandage in Greece, turned to aid rebels and brigands, which proves that all the talk of Palmerston and the debates in the House of Commons and House of Lords against brigandage was just talk and noth-

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8 For the letter of Glarakes to Palmerston see ibid., 410-11.
When it came to making a choice between the pragmatic interests of their nation and ideology the British put aside their ideological jargon.

As Anglo-Greek relations continued to deteriorate the Greek government was half-heartedly trying to restore relations with the Sublime Porte. The Musouros incident, which occurred during the administration of Kolettes, was unresolved when Tsavellas took power. A solution to this incident was imminent not only because it represented a possible threat to Greek economic, that is to say, commercial interests which were threatened by such a break of relations between the two countries, but also because the Great Powers sympathized with the Turkish position on this matter. On October 4, the Greek Foreign Minister sent a memorandum to the five Great Powers — Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia — stating the Greek government's concessions to the Sublime Porte's demands and the latter's unwillingness to accept these. In response to this memorandum the Sub-

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9 Mr. B. Cochrane declared in the House of Commons that, "I am pleading for a country from which we, in common with all Europe . . . derive all that softens and refines the heart, and all that gives life and animation to our debates. It is the cause not of Greece and her isles . . . but the cause of constitutional liberty in all parts of the world." And Palmserston added to this that the Greek "sovereign should give to the Greek nation a constitutional system of government." Session of March 2, 1848, Hansard, 3rd Series, Commons, XCVII, 137-8.

10 For the memorandum see Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 453.
lime Porte charged that Greek brigands were organizing to invade Turkish territories. The Turks maintained that the Greek position was irreconcilable and should therefore be regarded as hostile by the Great Powers.

Otho realized that unless a friendly power intervened in support of Greece the Turkish demands would have to be met and this would mean diplomatic defeat for the Greek Court and humiliation of the Crown. The Greek Court decided, therefore, to appeal to Tsar Nicholas, who Otho felt, would be more sympathetic to Greece than to the Ottoman Empire. The Tsar answered Otho on 18 October 1847 not at all to the satisfaction of the Greek monarch. "... it always seemed essential to me that Greece, in the delicate position which she is should observe wherever possible, mostly a policy of abstention from displeasing the Porte and England. It was the only way not to fall into extreme tensions which was produced successively in the relations with these two Powers and Greece." 11 The Tsar went on the blame the Kolettes' administration for the existing tensions between Greece and the Porte and England, and did not commit himself to helping Greece resolve her existing problems with Turkey. 12 It should have occurred to Otho that Russia would

11 Petrakakos, History of Greece, 141-45.
12 The letter of Nicholas to Otho is cited in Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, 958-60.
not side with Greece for a minor incident and jeopardize her friendly relations with England.

In the face of political opposition and social unrest domestically, and diplomatic opposition from practically all of the Great Powers the Greek government gave in to the demands of the Sublime Porte. Glarakes wrote a letter expressing the apologies of his government to Aali; on 25 January Mousouros returned to his post and diplomatic relations between Greece and the Sublime Porte resumed. This incident marked the end of Greek-Turkish hostilities which were not to reoccur in the Turkish provinces until 1853.

The revolution of 1848 in Europe had a decisive influence in Greece. Throughout the country there were sporadic revolts expressing the peoples' dissatisfaction with the monarchy, the continuing foreign intervention in Greek internal affairs, the poor economy, and the corruption on all

13 Russia was opposed to the enlargement and the strengthening of Greece. It was also committed to act in cooperation with Great Britain in deciding the fate of the Ottoman Empire. See Anderson, Eastern Question, 111-12.

14 Mousouros was shot and wounded by a Greek radical on 28 April 1848. After this incident he was transferred to the London Embassy. The Sublime Porte took no hostile action against the government of Greece for the shooting of its ambassador. For details on the solution of the Mousouros incident see Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 596-97.

15 See chapter III section A.
levels of government. Under the pressure of revolutionary activity the Tsavellas government fell in March and was replaced by the Koundouriotes' administration. Before Koundouriotes was chosen to head the ministry by the king, Lyons used his offices to pressure Otho to form a pro-British government. Otho would not give in to British pressure even though he knew that he no longer had the support of the French government and that the Russian Court continued to maintain a policy of abstention from Greek internal affairs.

The principal preoccupation of the Koundouriotes ministry in the domestic field was to silence the political opposition and put an end to the sporadic revolts. In the field of foreign relations, the settlement of the disputed Greek-Turkish frontiers and the establishment of friendly relations with the Powers, took precedence. Domestically, therefore, the same problems which faced Kolettes and Tsavelas also threatened the Ministry of Koundouriotes. In the field of foreign affairs also the problems were the existing tensions between Greece and the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers — primarily England.

16 The authoritative work on the 1848 Greek revolts is Tasos Bournas, *To Helliniko 1848* (The Greek 1848) (Athens, 1952).


19 When the government of Louis-Philippe fell from power in 1848 "the prestige of France in Greece fell so low
It was to be expected that any government which could not be influenced by the British would make Lyons and Palmerston adopt a hostile policy towards Greece. In a dispatch to Palmerston 29 March 1848 Lyons expressed his disappointment with the king's influence in government. He charged that the current administration in collaboration with the Crown was responsible for abusing the Constitution and robbing the people of their rights. If there were any ministers in power who wished to alter the course of things for the better, they were prevented from acting out their wishes by a Boule which was at the disposal of the king and the Camerilla which actually governed the nation. Further the British minister wrote,

I am informed that the ministers are determined to resign in case the king would continue to reject the measures which they would like to employ and it is regarded possible that the king will make certain concessions because the news from Paris, Vienna and Munich have created here great disturbance.

Lyons was eager to keep his position in Athens as he had engaged in a personal war with the "French" party. Even though he had at one point told Piscatory, "there is only one good policy -- for France and England to act together," he never acted on this principle himself, and as Seton-Watson main-

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20 For details on the dispute see Karolides, History of the Greeks, III, 434-37.

21 cited in Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 462.
tained, he "treated the Greeks as inferior mortals."  

In 1848, however, Lyons had more than just personal feelings against the "French" party to complain about to the Foreign Office. The European revolutions of 1848 intensified the existing political opposition to the Greek government during the early months of that year. The British Charge d'Affaires at Athens, fearful of further French dominance of Greek domestic politics, welcomed revolutionary activity in Greece which might weaken the government to the point where the king would have to dismiss the Koundouriotes ministry and look to the British for support.

Lyons was not successful in persuading Otho to call for the formation of an "English" government so Stratford Canning was sent to Athens in May of 1848 to achieve this task. Canning's mission proved unsuccessful for the king was determined to keep members of the "English" party out of


24 For the life and career of Stratford Canning see S. Lane-Poole, *The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning, Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe from His Memoirs and Private and Official Papers*, (London, 1888).

25 Canning quarrelled with both Lyons and Sir Richard Church within two days of his arrival at Athens and stated publicly that they -- Church and Lyons -- were personal enemies of the king. This made the position of Lyons in Athens very difficult after this affair even though he still had the support of Palmerston. See Bower & Bolitho, *Otho I*, 173-75.
the government. Finally after immense domestic and foreign pressure the Camerilla came to its senses and dismissed the unpopular Koundouriotes government; this time Otho was ready to give Mavrokordatos a chance to form a ministry. Before he summoned Mavrokordatos, however, the king had an interview with him concerning his domestic and foreign policy. The first question put to Mavrokordatos was, "Which places can and must Greece take?" The answer given was unsatisfactory to Otho. Mavrokordatos felt as he had in 1844 when he was Prime Minister that the internal development of Greece was a far more essential matter to deal with and deserved all the attention of the government, whereas the question of territorial expansion was an issue of the future. Otho's foreign policy was basically identical to that of Kolettes, namely, territorial expansion should be the primary issue of the government. A greater Greece, Otho felt, would mean prosperity for the nation: the domestic problems -- economic and social -- would be solved as the goal of territorial expansion was realized. This basic disagreement on domestic and foreign policy between Otho and Mavrokordatos resulted in the rejection of the latter as a likely candidate for Prime Minister.

26 Camerilla was the label given to the Greek Court as it was often compared with the Spanish Court.

27 For the full text of questions and answers see Dragoumes, Recollections, 137-50.
Once again Lyons asked that Mavrokordatos be summoned to form a government but the king went along with the wishes of Thouvenel and in October 1848 appointed Admiral K. Kanares. 28 The French influence in Greece and the refusal of the king to accept Mavrokordatos or Trikoupis in the government made Palmerston so furious that he declared that he would never approve a government in Greece unless its leader was from the "English" party. 29

Greek-British relations continued to deteriorate even further as a series of incidents occurred in the next five years which contributed to the existing friction of relations between the two countries. The first incident involved the British claim of the two islands Elaphonese and Sapientza, at the southern tip of Peloponnese. 31 The importance of these islands was commercial — they were used as loading bases — but to the Greek nationalists the sentimental value was far greater than the commercial.


30 The period 1844 to 1850 in British relations with Greece has been labeled accurately as "cold" see The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, edited by A.W. Ward and G.P. Gooch, II (New York, 1815-66), 594-96.

31 In 1839 the Governor of the Ionian Islands wrote to Lyons that the two disputed islands belonged rightfully to the Ionian Islands. In 1849 Wyse, who had replaced Lyons, wrote to Glarakes that Elaphonese and Sapientza were under the jurisdiction of the Ionian Islands, so Greek authorities had no legal right to these islands. The Greek government considered
There were three more demands made by Palmerston's government all which were intentionally used to exert pressure on the Camerilla so that Otho would welcome British influence in Greek internal and foreign affairs. The first of these three demands was indemnity for piracy by Greeks of six Ionian ships in September 1847. In this affair Greece was blamed for the acts of piracy committed by Greek citizens. The government of Greece declared that it could not be held responsible for all wrongdoing of its citizenry. Secondly, the British demanded indemnity for damages committed against Dom Pacifico, a Portugese-Jew who was a citizen of England residing in Athens. The damage to Pacifico's property was claimed at 886,736 drachmans, an unrealistically high

the two islands part of Peloponnese and chose to ignore the claims of the British authorities. Great Britain had a legal claim to Elaphonese and Sapientza according to the treaty of Paris (5 November, 1815), the second article of which read "all islands, small and large and those uninhabited lying between the coasts of Peloponnese and Albania" should be considered dependant to the Ionian government. For details on this subject see Fotiades, The Exile, 126-28, also Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 585-87.

32 For documentation on this subject see British and Foreign State Papers 1849-1850, XXXIX under Greece: Correspondence with Great Britain. "Plunder of Six Ionian Boats at Salcina 1846-1847," 315-32.

33 On the day of Good Friday a mob in Athens raided his house -- for he was a Jew and identified with Judas -- and burned and destroyed several of his valuables. Instead of going to the Greek authorities and trying to settle the matter in court Mr. Pacifico went to the British embassy making it thus an international incident. See Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 588-89, also Driault, Histoire Diplomatique, 328-33.
figure considering the value of the money at the time. The British embassy would under normal circumstances turn this matter over to the Greek authorities to handle. They chose, however, to make an incident out of it blowing it out of proportion and interpreting the abuse of the property of a British subject, Dom Pacifico as an act of hostility by the Greek government against the British government. When the claim of Pacifico was handed over to the Greek authorities by the British officials, naturally the reaction of the Greeks was the same as it had been in the case of the pirates who plundered the six Ionian ships, namely, that they could not pay for damages committed by irresponsible individuals and that the matter should be taken to the Greek Court to be settled. 35

Finally, there was a claim of the Scottish historian George Finlay to be settled. 36 In 1842 Finlay wrote to the

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34 For Pacifico's claim see British and Foreign State Papers, 1850-51, XL, 619-26.


36 There were two grievances against Greece by the British government which are of some significance. 1. The ill-treatment of British officers of a ship, "Fantome" by Greek authorities at Patras. See British and Foreign State Papers, 1849-50, XXXIX, (Correspondence between Great Britain and Greece, respecting an outrage committed upon a Boat's Crew of Her Britannic Majesty's ship "Fantome" at Patras 1848), 216-53. 2. Correspondence between Great Britain and Greece respecting the ill-treatment of Ionias at Patras and Pyrgos, 1846-47, 254-313.
Earl of Aberdeen complaining that part of his property had been incorporated into the Royal Garden and he was not indemnified for this property by the Greek government.

Aberdeen instructed Lyons to proceed to represent the claim of Finlay but the matter was not resolved and in 1846 Lyons began to pressure Kolettes for indemnification of Finlay's property. The Greek government felt that the 45,000 drachmas which Finlay demanded for his property was enormous and it refused to meet these demands.

All of the incidents mentioned above started before September 1847 but they were all compiled by Palmerston to form a series of charges against Greece at the end of 1849. The main reason for this as explained by a prominent Greek historian was British fear that Otho might provoke anti-Turkish activities in the provinces adjacent to Greece.

Besides the grave political anomalies of Europe the relations between Russia and Turkey were seriously irritated as a result of Walachia and Moldavia Principalities which were occupied by a large number of Russian soldiers and fears existed concerning an explosion of war between the two powers. Knowing Otho's intentions and fearing the Greek call for disturbances in Turkey, regarded opportune the situation in order to attack Greece during the occasion when the complication of the Powers did not allow them to distract themselves with Greek affairs.

37 Finlay to Aberdeen, London, October 18, 1842. British and Foreign State Papers, XXXIX, 410-12.

38 Lyons to Coletti, Athens, June 17, 1846, British and Foreign State Papers, XXXIX, 430-31.

39 Colokotronis to Lyons, Athens, November 9, 1848, British and Foreign State Papers, XXXIX, 480-81.

40 Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 592-95.
The British government received intelligence reports to the effect that in case of a Russo-Turkish war Greece would side with Russia. The Near-Eastern crisis of the fall of 1849 was the primary reason for the severe demands of Palmerston on the government of Otho, but the desire to teach Greece a lesson in discipline and British dominance in the European community was another reason for what was to follow. At the end of 1849 the threat of Russian attack on Turkey was no longer in existence as the British ambassador in Russia reassured Palmerston. "I think we may reasonably expect that at all events during the reign of the emperor Nicholas no attempt will be made by Russia to subvert the Ottoman Empire." In spite of this reassurance of Russian peaceful intentions towards Turkey, Palmerston sent the following dispatch to the Admiralty.

I have to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands that Sir William Parker should be instructed to return to Athens or Salamis on his way back from the eastern end of the Mediterranean, and that he should, on arriving on the coast of Greece, place himself in communication with Mr. Wyse, Her Majesty's Minister at Athens, who has been instructed to require a final settlement of certain claims which have been long pending the Greek government. . . . Sir William Parker should support Mr. Wyse in his demands for an immediate adjustment thereof.

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41 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 553.
43 Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, Foreign Office, November 30, 1848, British and Foreign State Papers, XXXIX.
On January 3, 1850 the British Fleet of Admiral Parker set anchor at Piraeus. The admiral did exactly as he was instructed by Palmerston; he went to the British embassy in Athens and together with Wyse they visited the Greek Foreign Minister. They gave an ultimatum of twenty-four hours for their demands to be met otherwise they would be forced to execute the orders received from their government. When the Greek Foreign Minister told Wyse that the presence of the other two representatives of the Protecting Powers was required in order for the Greek government to come to a final decision, the British minister simply granted another twenty-four hour ultimatum. The Greek government did not meet the ultimatum so Admiral Parker's fleet proceeded to blockade the port of Piraeus and to place under arrest all Greek vessels. Londos, the Greek foreign minister, immediately informed Thouvenel, the French Minister at Athens and Persiany, the representative of Russia in Greece.

Thouvenel wrote, without delay, to Wyse: — According to Article IV of the Treaty of 7 May 1832, Greece is an independent monarchy under the guarantee of the three Powers. The interdiction which made her dispose freely of her war-vessels must be considered as a first blow to her independence. Without doubt independence equals responsibility and the British government has the right to pursue the recovery of her grievances. But the question does not present itself only in these simple terms.

45 Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 596-97.
For the Greek government demands an arbitration which conforms with the terms and the spirit of the article aforementioned; 46

Persiany also sent a note of complaint to the British embassy at Athens and both ministers — of France and Russia — urged Wyse that Londos' suggestion to settle the Greek-British dispute in the presence of all three representatives of the Protecting Powers be accepted. 47

Europe was shocked at Palmerson's actions. The Tsar wrote a letter to Otho expressing his dissatisfaction with British policy towards Greece. He stated that he was very displeased with the actions of the British government in Greece and he had made his formal protest to the Foreign Office. Nicholas advised the king of Greece not to yield to the British demands for to do so would mean yielding his legitimate claim which belonged to every independent sovereign. "It only remains to heal the country's wounds and also to make good the losses which recent events have caused to the commerce of Greece and Your Majesty can count upon my willingness to lighten, for some period of time the pecuniary, burden which

46 Cited in Driault, Histoire Diplomatique, II, 342-43.

47 Thouvenel to Wyse, Athens, January 5, 1850, and Persiany to Wyse, Athens, January 5, 1850, British and Foreign State Papers, XXXIX. Also see for the Greek translation of these dispatches Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 555-57.
your finances have to bear."  

48 The press in Greece as well as in Europe criticized the actions of Lord Palmerston as severe and hostile towards a friendly small nation.  

49 Popular poetry was written and recited by A. Soutso against the British imperialists while praises were heard of Russia who was assuming the role of the supporter of Greece.  

50 The public mind turned to Russian favoritism and away from the Western Powers who seemed always to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece for their own interests. The layman as well as the politically minded Greeks could see that the national interest of Russia as well as of Greece was the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The Western Powers had a policy of supporting the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Their policy, therefore, ran counter to Greek national interests. Furthermore, the Russians viewed the blockade of Piraeus as an indirect British display of power to Russia.  

As Professor Karolides explains:  

Russia regarded the Parker events in Greece as a continuation of the British fleet's display of Hellespont, and somehow as reprisal to the failure thereof the intended British activities; she took from the beginning of the crisis a hostile position at British action.  

48 Cited in Bower & Bolitho, Otho. 184, also in Petrakakos, History of Greece, 147-49.  

49 Karolides, History of the Greeks, III, 496.  

50 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 559-60.  

51 Cited, ibid., 500.
On February 7, Nesselrode announced that his government was displeased with the hostile activities of the British fleet in Greece. The Count criticized Great Britain for reassuring the Russian government of the harmonious Anglo-Greek relations just before Admiral Parker's fleet entered the Port of Pireaus. He also denounced the secrecy of British operations in Greece and its insistence on leaving France and Russia, the other two Protecting Powers of Greece, in ignorance of British intentions in Greece. He ended his remarks about British involvement in Greece with a strong warning against the illegal blockade of Admiral Parker:

The Imperial Government, commands her ambassador to direct towards the British Government serious remarks, asking her very seriously to quickly put an end to matters in Greece, which are neither necessary and by no means justifiable. The prompt acceptance of this measure would indicate to the Imperial Government in what manner Great Britain wishes to regulate the rest of her relations with the Imperial Government. 52

This announcement of the Russian government motivated France to act in the same respect and denounce Palmerstonian diplomacy in Greece just as harshly as had Russia, out of fear that French influence in Greece might be in danger of being overshadowed by that of Russia. Wisely, the Russian government allowed France to take the upperhand in the matter since French opposition to English policy in the Near East could

only mean the weakening of the Anglo-French alliance which resulted from the Near-Eastern Crisis of October 1849. 53

On February 7 Drouyn de Lhuys sent a dispatch to Palmerston expressing his government's disapproval of the hostile actions taken by Britain against Greece without previous consultation with the French government. 54 Palmerston's answer to Drouyn de Lhuys was very friendly and it revealed his fear that France was drawn away from the recent Anglo-French alliance, siding on the issue of the Piraeus blockade with Russia. He agreed that a French negotiator should be appointed to mediate between Britain and France.

In order to leave the freest scope to the action of the French negotiator, Her Majesty's Minister at Athens shall be instructed not to mix himself up with the negotiation of the French Agent, except in so far as he may be requested by the Agent to do so. 55

Palmerston's kindness to the French in the Greek crisis was due not only to the diplomatic reality of a possible Franco-Russian alliance but also to the internal pressures against his mishandling of the British grievances in Greece. The British Minister for Foreign Affairs was attacked by the

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53 See Taylor, Mastery in Europe, 34-35.

54 Drouyn de Lhuys to Palmerston, London, February 7, 1850, British and Foreign State Papers, XXXIX.

55 Palmerston to Drouyn de Lhuys, Foreign Office, February 12, 1850, British and Foreign State Papers, XXXIX.
press, from both Houses and from the Queen for jeopardizing the role of Great Britain by mindless actions and by what seemed to many a personal foreign policy. In the House of Lords, Lord Stanley not only criticized the "ill-advised expedition to the Dardanelles," but he felt that "we had proceeded to acts of injustice and violence against a friendly foreign Power, or rather, a weak friendly foreign State, the very weakness of which state should have been the strongest inducement upon our part to exercise that greatest forbearance, whose peculiar position rendered any misunderstanding with regard to the affairs of Greece a matter of more importance of the state itself." 56 Palmerston's secrecy regarding his proceedings in the Near East and the official communication between the Powers and England was also criticized by Lord Stanley as well as by the House of Commons. 57

By the middle of February, the blockade in Greece had become a major international matter which was to do the greatest damage to the career of Lord Palmerston. "This Greek question," wrote Charles Greville, "is the worst scrape into which Palmerston had ever got himself and his colleagues. The disgust at it here is universal with those who think at

56 Sessions of February 4, Hansard, 3rd series, House of Lords, CVIII, 258.

57 Sessions of March 11, Ibid., 3rd series, CIX, 645-47.
all about foreign matters; it is past all doubt that it has produced the strongest feelings of indignation against this country all over Europe, and the ministers themselves are conscious what a disgraceful figure they cut, and are ashamed of it." 58

It was agreed by England, Russia and Bavaria that France should send a negotiator to Athens in hope of a settlement. Baron Gros was chosen to mediate on behalf of Greece and arrived in Athens on 6 March. He began negotiations but found progress impossible due to British determination to collect full indemnities and to concede nothing. 59 Drouyn de Lhuys in London also tried to negotiate a settlement for the Anglo-Greek dispute but with no results. In early May, the Greek government in Athens informed the French government that Lord Palmerston used the demands for indemnity payments to the British subjects in an extortionist manner to humiliate and ridicule the Greek government. This gave cause to the government of Prince Louis-Napoleon to recall its ambassador from London and cause a near Anglo-French diplomatic


59 Driault, Histoire Diplomatique, II, 448-50, see also Palmerston to Bloomfield, March 27, 1850, cited in Ashley, Palmerston, 196-97.
rupture. Palmerston believed that the recalling of Drouyn de Lhuys was carried out by the French government as a display to the public in France of Louis-Napoleon's strong abilities and determined leadership in challenging English policy. The House of Lords, however, had a different interpretation on the matter. Apparently it was announced that Drouyn de Lhuys left London of his own free will when he was actually recalled by his government. Upon the news of the truth concerning the recalling of the French minister Palmerston was blamed for keeping secret the facts from both Houses and he was once again criticized for jeopardizing the position of England in the European community. Lord Brougham stated:

'It turns out that the French government, in the exercise of its undoubted discretion, has deemed it to be its duty to take a step which has not been taken since the year 1803. . . . The complaint of the French government is, that London is made to focus of all intrigues against its existence - - that it is source from which all communications are made to the "Parti Rouge" - - so called because it takes the colour of Blood as its appropriate ensign. Yes the "Parti Rouge" takes its orders from the Cassi-dieres and the other erapulous leaders and miscreants who

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60 For the negotiations of Drouyn de Lhuys in London and the rupture of Franco-British relations over the failure to reach an agreement in the Greek crisis, see Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 604-07, also see Karolides, History of the Greeks, III, 520-25, also Driault, ibid., 352-61.

now infest this country after they had been forced to desist from infesting France. 62

The French government, which felt that Great Britain was exceeding its power in Greek affairs as granted in the Treaty of 1832, was really concerned with its own power which was threatened by the presence of the British fleet, but out of a Franco-British diplomatic quarrel Greece benefited, if not in anything more than the removal of the blockade. On July 6th the negotiating parties reached a settlement in Athens and the nightmare which had brought instability to Franco-British relations and deplorable conditions to Greece was over. 63

The blockade of Piraeus cost Greece more than the 180,068 drachmas indemnity damages. The Greek commerce suffered greatly and as a result the already weak economy of Greece was seriously damaged. It would be no exaggeration to maintain that by far the most damage was inflicted in the minds of the Greek people. 64 England, one of the nations which once fought for the independence of Greece and signed

62 Session of May 17, Hansard, 3rd series, House of Lords, III, 159-61.

63 Londos, Greek Foreign Minister, agreed to British demands on April 15th but this settlement which was reached without the French mediation resulted in a total British diplomatic victory. This was the reason negotiations in London were discontinued.

64 Karolides, History of the Greeks, III, 520.
the treaty which made that country legitimately recognized in the European community, came to a point of doing her great damage.

The only one in Greece who really benefited politically from the blockade was the king. He was viewed as the defender of the national rights of the people against the interventions of foreign powers. Of the three parties, the "French," the "English" and the "Russian," the last benefited the most from the crisis. France was viewed with suspicion by many Greeks for her role in Greece seemed to be purely selfish, namely, the curbing of British influence in the country, whereas Russia was regarded as the only true defender of Greek interests. As far as relations with England were concerned, Greece got off to a friendly start after the settlement of the British grievances but it

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65 The English government thought that the blockade would cause political turmoil in the country bringing the Court government down from power and making Otho unpopular. Furthermore it hoped that the "English" party would benefit from all of this and would rise as the popular party. None of this occurred however. On the contrary the Greek people stood firmly behind the king. See Aspreas, *Modern Greece*, 182.

66 Fotiades, *Exosis*, 141.

was not very long before another issue, that of brigandage, was to create friction in Anglo-Greek relations. After Trikoupis was sent to London as the representative of the Kriezes government, Palmerston wrote the following letter to Delygiannes, the Greek Foreign Minister:

I have the honor to assure Your Excellency that Mr. Trikoupes has been received and treated with all the consideration and regards due to a representative of a sovereign with which the Queen desires sincerely to maintain relations of the most friendly character. I avail myself to this occasion to offer to Your Excellency the assurance of the distinguished consideration with which I have the honor to be. 68

This letter was written in December 1850. Nine months later the Foreign Office invited the Powers to use their influence in Athens to pressure the Greek government to put an end to brigandage. 69 Even though brigandage was at a considerably low level, only to reach its peak in 1854, there was a good deal of concern in London with regard to the potential threat of brigandage to the Ottoman Empire.

At the same time that the issue of brigandage was brought up there was another crisis developing which was to drive Greece even further away from both England and France and bring it closer to Russia.

68 Cited in Driault, Histoire Diplomatique, II, 362.

69 Ibid. 362-65, for details on the British concern on brigandage in Greece.
B. Russophilism 1850-1853

1. The Synodal Tomos

After the British blockade the attention of the Greek public was shifted to ecclesiastical matters. The Greek Church had been declared independent and autonomous in 1833 and had remained so until 1850. As a result of this the Patriarch of Constantinople broke off all relations with the Greek Church. By 1850, however, it was becoming apparent to most Greeks that the Patriarchate desired to reestablish relations with Athens and the reason behind this factor were primarily political. Tsar Nicholas was in 1832 opposed to an autonomous Greek Orthodox Church, and he resented the fact that a Roman Catholic king would assume the role of the ceremonial head of an autonomous Orthodox Church. After the Anglo-Greek hostilities of 1850 the Tsar urged the Synod and the Patriarch in Constantinople to "soften their position toward Greece in its moment of crisis." The change of attitude toward Otho and the Greek government was due, therefore, to the Tsar's interest in penetrating the higher clergy in Greece and in capitalizing

70 See Laskaris, History of Greece, 53-4.
72 Charles E. Frazee, The Orthodox Church and the Independent Greece, 1821-1852 (Cambridge, 1969), 173.
on the recent anti-British movement in the country. Although the Tsar maintained a cool attitude toward the king and the Greek government from 1833 to 1850 the "Russian" party was won over by Kolettes and his anti-Turkish foreign policy.

By 1850 a great number of people in Greece desired to see an end to the existing schism of the Greek Orthodox Church and the Patriarchate. The king of Greece also desired the same thing but for political and religious reasons. Otho hoped that a resolution to the Church controversy would bring him into closer cooperation with the Tsar whose support he needed. Missael Apostolides was sent to the Patriarch Anthimos IV delivering a message written by the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece with the desired goal that the Patriarchate would recognize the Church of Greece. Anthimos IV rejected the message but the Russian minister to the Porte, Titov, who participated in the discussions concerning the subject of recognition...

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73 The reason that the Tsar and the "Russian" party were against an autocephalous church in Greece in 1833 was because they wished to exert political influence through the Patriarchy in Constantinople. See About, Grèce, 178.

74 Russia did not favor Kolettes, even though the "Russian" party did, for the Tsar felt that Kolettes was devoted to the king and therefore to an autonomous Greek Orthodox Church. See Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 166.

75 The first to normalize relations between the Greek Orthodox Church and the Patriarchate was made by Patriarch Anthimos IV in December 1849 when he attended the funeral of the devoted servant to Otho in Constantinople (Rizo-Neroulos, Minister to the Porte) see Ibid., 171-74.

76 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 567.
tion of the Greek Church, supported it. 77 The Holy Synod met again and decided to ask recognition from the Patriarch once more, only this time they would present an official letter of support to the Synod by Otho. The Patriarch accepted the second request and the king of Greece as well as the "Russian" party achieved a great political victory. Nicholas was also quite satisfied with the realliance of the Greek Orthodox Church and the Patriarchate. He wrote the following letter to Otho as soon as he was informed of the recognition of the Church by Anthimos IV:

Sir my Brother, it is with real satisfaction that I received from the hands of Archimandite Missael the letter of Your Majesty by which it announces to me the canonical recognition of the Church of the Greek Kingdom and from this Synod by the Patriarchal Ecumenical Throne of Constantinople. It delights me, just as Your Majesty, this event, that it responds so well to the desires of the people and fulfills one of their spiritual needs, the most legitimate so far as it restores the unity and the evangelical brotherly relations between her (Greek) Church and the other venerable chairs of Orthodox Churches of the East and of Russia. It was most particularly pleasant to learn that my instructions to my minister at Constantinople have contributed to this happy result, to which the solicitude of Your Majesty wisely prepared the way. 78

Not everyone, however, was as happy as Nicholas, Otho and the "Russian" party about the results of the Synodal Tome. Many progressively minded individuals in Greece opposed the late

77 Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 175.

78 Cited in Petrakakos, History of Greece, 151-52.
recognition of the Patriarchate of the Greek Orthodox Church and believed that it was an insult to the Greek nation that the Patriarchate had acted as though no independent Greece existed between the period of 1833 to 1850. 79 The British government was also displeased with the actions of the Synodal Tomes. The British Minister, Wyse, at Athens was stunned about the reestablishment of relations between the Greek Church and the Patriarchate. He interpreted the recognition of the autocephalous Church as a means which Russia used in order to exert her influence in the affairs of Greece. The French Minister, Sabatier, reacted in the same manner as Wyse.

It is certain today that M. Titov was the grand agitator of this affair at Constantinople and that Russian influence has dictated the Patriarchical Bull. M. Deliany was fooled or seduced but Otho, however, fully accepted the results of the Tomos and as a result the Church of Greece received the recognition it sought from the Patriarch and the Greek government received the moral support of the Tsar. 80

The alliance of the Greek Church with the Patriarchate marked the beginning of friendly Greek-Russian relations and the end of French support to Greece. The solidarity of the Anglo-French alliance of October 1849 which was shaken by the British blockade in Greece was restored when Greece chose to side

79 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 568.

80 Cited in Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 179-80.
with Russia against the Western Powers. This alliance was only to become stronger in the following years when the Holy places controversy broke out.

2. The Role of Greece in the Holy Places Question.

At the same time that the Greek Church was requesting recognition from Constantinople, developments leading to one of the major crises in the Nineteenth Century were taking place in the Middle East. The affair known as the "Holy Places Question" began in the middle of 1850 when Louis-Napoleon decided to demand from the Ottoman Porte Catholic dominion in the Holy Places. The Sublime Porte decided, for purely political and not religious reasons, to grant the wishes of the Emperor risking a possible Russo-Turkish conflict. The Religious policy of Turkey towards the various millets, or religious groupings in the Empire, was very lenient as all regions were treated with equal respect. Traditionally, the Orthodox who were the majority in the Empire dominated the Holy Places as a privileged religious group. So when the Latins requested what seemed to the Sultan's government religious rights in the Holy Places their wish was granted for it was in accordance with the law. "By a


82 Ibid., 287-88.

note February 9, 1852, it (the Sublime Porte) directed that the keys of the north and south gates of the great church at Bethlehem and of the grotto of the Holy Manger 'must be given' to the Latins, 'as of old' and they were allowed to erect a silver star adorned with the French arms in the shrine of the nativity." 84 The French had not counted on direct Russian interference in the Holy Places Question: they thought instead that since this was a matter of religion it would be handled by the Patriarchate in Constantinople which represented the Orthodox millet. Napoleon III used a religious matter for diplomatic reasons, namely, to harm "Russia and the Holy Alliance, surely normal activity for a Bonaparte ruler." 87 Due to the religious controversy over the Holy

84 Miller, The Ottoman Empire, 200.

85 Professor Stavrou maintains that the Holy Places had become a Russian interest center during the decade of the 40's of the nineteenth century. At the same time French interest also began increasing in that part of the world so "this produced a religious and diplomatic debate involving directly Russia and France." The confrontation therefore which broke out into a major diplomatic war in the early 1850's had its origins a decade earlier. See G.T. Stavrou, "Russian Interest in the Levant 1843-1848" Middle East Journal, 17 (1963): 91-103.

86 Saab, Crimean Alliance, 10.

Places, Franco-Russian relations deteriorated considerably to the point that neither side was totally satisfied with the Turkish settlement of the affair. During this crisis the Greeks and the "Orthodox" party, composed of radical pro-Russian elements, sided with Russia against the Roman Catholic French. Russophilism was constantly increasing in Greece and the spirit of revolt and war against the Turks was once again haunting the country. A rising in Montenegro which began as an internal strife contributed to the existing anti-Turkish atmosphere in Greece. Prince Danilo, the ruler (the vladika) of Montenegro, attempted, after he succeeded his uncle Peter II in 1851, to make Montenegro more independent from the central control of Turkey. A minor incident between Montenegrins and Turkish authorities was turned into a major Ottoman invasion at the request of Omer Pasha, a military leader who became governor of Bosnia Mercegovina and Montenegro in 1850.

The revolutionary activities in Montenegro, whose cause was supported by Austria, and the events of the Holy Places set the atmosphere for revolution in Greece. Forth-

88 V.J. Puryear, England, Russia and the Straits Question, 1844-1856 (Berkeley, 1931), 197.

89 Saab, Crimean Alliance, 19, also see for details on the rising of Montenegro Temperley, The Crimea, also F.L. Stevenson, A History of Montenegro (London, 1912), 183-84.
Rouen, the French Charge d'Affaires in Athens wrote to Paris that the conflict in the Holy Places had brought the "Russian" party in Greece real strength. He noted further that the flag of religion which had often been used in Greece, was brought out again. "Religion is in danger and its children are called once more to run to its defence... Religion is in Greece a powerful element of intrigue, and in representing Catholicism as invading, as menacing Orthodoxy... one is sure to move the spirits profoundly." 90 France and England became increasingly worried when Otho appointed Stavro Vlahos, a prominent member of the "Russian" party, a Minister of Worship. Wyse and Forth-Rouen were concerned with the Russophilism of the king as well as of the public. The "Orthodox" party which was totally devoted to Russia was becoming more powerful by 1850 and its activities were widely publicized. The Papoulakos movement 91 became an instrument of the "Orthodox" party openly to express its hostilities against the Catholics, the Liberals -- "French" and "English" parties -- as well as the Catholic king.

90 Cited in Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 184.

91 Chrisoforos Papoulakos was a monk who apparently went mad -- had a vision -- and went around the country preaching that all evils in Greece were due to the Catholic king, Otho. The "Orthodox" party decided to capitalize on this situation of the mad-man in order to revenge the king who was responsible for throwing out of the government the prominent Russophile Kolokotrones, and also for becoming the ceremonial head of the Greek Orthodox Church while he remained a Catholic and refused to convert to the religion of
The representative in Athens of France and England mostly blamed the king for the Russian extremism among the public. They felt that Otho was reflecting Tsarist policy against the interests of the Western Powers in the Near East. Upon the appointment of Vlachos, Wyse commented that the man whom Otho chose to be his Minister of Worship, "is little qualified by his want of religious moderation for the onerous duties of an office become lately of peculiar responsibility." Neither the British nor the French would realize that Otho was not acting as an agent of the Russians against the Near Eastern interests of the Western Powers but that he was acting in accordance with the "Megali Idea" policy which he hoped would bring him personal glory.

C. The Menshikov Mission and Greek Reaction

On January 14, 1853 Nesselrode wrote to Brunnow:

To the indignation of the whole Greek population following the Greek rite, the key of the Church of Bethlehem has been made over to the Latins, so as publicly to demonstrate their religious supremacy in the East. The mischief is done, and there is no longer any question of preventing it. It is now necessary to remedy it.

Nesselrode added:

the Greek people. For details see Fotiades, The Exile, 167-78, also Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 582-88.

92 Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 185-86.
The (Russian) emperor is very irritated with the Sultan and thinks it necessary to intimidate him to avoid being obliged later to come seriously and actually to war, which according to him must at all costs be avoided, whether in the East or West. 93

The measure taken by the Tsar to put an end to the Holy Places controversy was to send Prince Sergeevich Aleksandr Menshikov, head of the Naval Ministry, to Constantinople with a set of Russian demands to present to the Ottoman government. The Menshikov mission was doomed to failure for its purpose as revealed in the Russian demands was one which invited hostilities by the Great Powers and the Sultan's government. 94

As was anticipated by Nesselrode the negotiations of Prince Menshikov and the Turkish authorities were a failure when it was apparent that the Sublime Porte refused to comply with a number of the Tsar's requests and especially the request "for a note from the Sultan to the Tsar, pronouncing his intentions with reference to Greek Christians and guaranteeing Russian rights in Turkey." 95 The government and most Greeks anxiously awaited developments of a Russo-Turkish conflict. They would then be able to strike at the Turks in the provinces of Thessaly, Epirus and Macedonia in order to


95 Puryear, The Straits Question, 261.
free all Greeks from the Ottoman yoke and also expand the national boundaries of Greece. Then the unexpected occurred. Prince Menshikov's aide-de-camp, Admiral Kornilov arrived in Athens on 15 March 1853 on the war steamer, "Bessarabia."
The visit, the Russians explained publicly, was due to the Admiral's archeological and historical interests. For the Western Powers, the Greek government and the people of Greece, the Kornilov visit was somehow politically connected to the Menshikov mission. On March 17th, the day the Russian war vessel departed from Athens to Constantinople the British Minister at Athens wrote to the Earl of Clarendon about the Kornilov visit to Athens expressing his dissatisfaction and suspicions about it.  

Forth-Rouen was even more apprehensive about the unexpected visit of Kornilov to Greece. He expressed his fear that a visit such as the one the Admiral made would have grave consequences in the public mind especially when Russo-Turkish negotiation settlements were prepared for the rights of Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empire.

Five days after the "Bessarabia" had left the port of Pireaus, Wyse had met with the Turkish Charge d'Affaire, Nechid Bey, in Athens to discuss the Kornilov visit. Wyse

96 F.O. 32/205, Wyse to Claredon, Athens, March 17, 1853.
97 Grèce 61 (Files 196-201) Rousen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens, March 27, 1853.
wrote to Clarendon that:

Nechid Bey said that whatever might be given to the contrary he was convinced that the visit was political. He brought dispatches for Mr. Persiany with whom he was in continual communication and had on the day of his arrival a private audience with the king of two hours. The "Bessarabia" war steamer which brought him here, left Constantinople after midnight, and her departure and destination were kept so secret, that it was not known that she had gone till the next day, and then it was believed for exercise to the sea of Marmora. It is also to be added that the Admiral returned to Constantinople in utmost speed, though Prince Menshikov it is understood remains there for some months. Mr. Persiany denied all this; he stated to me the other day that the Admiral came for personal objects only, that he had no private interview with the king, and that he leaves Prince Menshikov and the mission for Russia immediately on his return to Constantinople. 98

If the French and British representatives were suspecting the Russian government's intentions concerning Greece they had every right to do so since events made the Russian position a suspicious one. Contrary to the suspicions of Forth-Rouen and Wyse, however, the Russians had no intention of arousing excitement against Turkey in Greece since the Tsar was determined to avoid war 99 and as long as Prince Menshikov was in Constantinople there was a chance of a peaceful settlement. "Persiany," writes Dr. Donta, "tried to convince the Greek government to prevent the press from pre-

98 F.O. 32/205, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, March 23, 1853. The same observations are made by Rouen, see Grece 61 (No. 25) Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens, March 27, 1853.

99 Theodore Martin maintains that the Tzar had told Seymour that he opposed an extension of the Greek state, but a few months later Russian agents were preparing the Greeks
senting to the people a misleading picture of Russia pressing for war against Turkey.\textsuperscript{100} The Menshikov mission, however, was interpreted in Greece by the people as well as by the authorities as an indication of increased Russian power in Constantinople.

The king and the Greek government thought that the Tsar's plans did not include a Russo-Turkish war nor did they include the reestablishment of a Byzantine Empire with Otho as the emperor.\textsuperscript{101} Even though Paicos, the Greek foreign minister, tried to reassure the representatives of France and England that no hostilities would be undertaken against the Turks, and even though Fort-Rouen strongly urged the Greek government to suppress the anti-Turkish and pro-Russian propaganda in the press,\textsuperscript{102} the public mind was pre-

for a war against Turkey in the frontier. He further claims that Russia helped in organizing troops for the insurrection and that on March 2, 1854 Count Nesselrode sent a note to all Russian representatives abroad "in which active support of Russia to the movement was promised. . . ." It is highly doubtful that Russia gave any support to the Greek insurrection of 1854 other than moral support. The insurrection as it will become clear in the following pages was the work of the Greeks and the Greek government. Theodore Martin, \textit{The Life of His Royal Highness the Prince Consort}, III, (London, 1877), 53-4.

\textsuperscript{100} D. Donta, \textit{E Hellas kai ai Dynamesis kata ton Krimai-kon Polemon} (Greece and the Powers During the Crimean War) (Thessalonike, 1973), 23.

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Ibid.}, 23, also see M.S. Anderson, \textit{Near East}, 69. "(d) Reestablishment of the Byzantine Empire, (e) Reunion with Greece, (f) Impossibility of both."

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Greece 61} (no. 27) Fort-Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens, April 7, 1853.
pared by the "Russian" party propaganda and by the nationalist press, which continuously exalted the Megali Idea, for a Greek-Turkish conflict. In a dispatch on the state of the public mind in Greece, Wyse reported the following:

"Religion" and "race" the two great objects from principle and passion, of Greek devotion, are used as watchwords to stimulate the popular enthusiasm. Heterias never extinguished are again rising. Their organization has been long familiar to every Greek and it requires not time nor discipline but opportunity to bring them into action. 103

Wyse went on to report that the only ones in Greece who were against Russia and did not support a policy of irredentism and Greek-Turkish conflicts were the professional and commercial classes, but that the king and the "Russian" party were in favor of territorial expansion. 104 The commercial class 105 was against Russia and a policy of expansion for the simple reason that a war against Turkey on the side of Russia would be inviting another blockade as in 1850, if not an actual war by the Western Powers against Greece. Such a

103 F. O. 32/205, Confidential, Wyse to Claredon, Athens, March 23, 1853.

104 The government at the opening stages of the Greek-Turkish hostilities was made up of individuals loyal to the Crown! The Minister of Foreign Affairs was A. Paicos, the Minister of Worship and Education was S. Vlahos, the Minister of War, Spiromelios, all affiliated members of the "Russian" party. The Prime Minister Admiral Kriezes, Minister of the Interior, Riga Palmides, and Minister of Justice Sp. Pelikas all were affiliated with the "French" party. Of all the ministers only Pelikas showed any definite signs of opposition to inviting hostilities between Greece and Turkey.

105 Commercial class included primarily Greeks involved in navigation and trading. For details on the com-
conflict would have a disastrous outcome for the commercial class which did a great deal of business with the West. The idea of a Greek-Turkish war appealed to the masses, however, who were constantly under the propaganda machine of the Greek religion and press. These people knew nothing of power politics and were not, as Wyse and Fort-Rouen presented them, more inclined to favor Russia than the Western Powers for any other reason than perhaps the common religion and common enemy—Turkey. As one prominent historian of Greek diplomatic history explains:

The unofficial Greece, however, in the exhortation of Russian extremists, had as its only purpose the dynamic realization of the Megali Idea, because as it proclaimed, the existing suffocating restricted boundaries did not permit Greece to evolve into a contemporary and organized state. 106

mercial families in Greece and their growth see Petropoulos, Kingdom of Greece, 56-7.

106 Donta, The Crimean War, 24.
CHAPTER III

GREEK-TURKISH HOSTILITIES IN 1853 AND
ANGLO-FRENCH REACTION

A. Causes of the 1854 Greek-Turkish Conflict and
Anglo-French Reaction to Greek Foreign Policy

The Turkish provinces of Thessaly and Epirus were
predominately populated by Greeks at the outbreak of the
Crimean War. According to one French official 1 in 1850
the population of Thessaly ranged from 350,000 to 400,000
inhabitants. From the total population only 70,000 were
Turks. In Epirus the population was approximately 450,000
with two thirds Christian and one third Moslem. 2

In a part of the world where religion and common
heritage were regarded as the binding forces of all Greeks
it was only natural that after the War of Independence

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1 E. Grasset to General Lafitte, Salonique, tom. 24
(1850-1858), 82-107, Thessalonike, 24-12-1850, cited in
Elias Pangiotes Georgiou, "Gallikou Schediou Aposbeseos tes
Thessalikes Epanastaseos tou 1854" (French Plans to Extinguish
the Revolt of Thessaly in 1854) Thessalika Chronika,
(Athens, 1965), 746. Nomikos, "International Position of
Greece" has the Thessaly population at 250,000 of whom four
fifths were moslem. The source for these figures is ques-
tionable this is why I have chosen to use the figures de-
rivered from French documentations.

nationalist uprisings would take place in an effort to "liberate" all Greeks from Turkish domination. The geographical position of Thessaly and Epirus as well as Macedonia facilitated the attempt of the Greek nationalists to revolt against the Turks in 1854. These provinces which were predominately populated by Christians and were adjacent to Greece were subject to constant raids from brigands ever since the War of Independence.

The brigandage acts carried out by Greeks on Greek soil as well as on Turkish -- Thessaly and Epirus -- were not entirely acts of looting but were primarily intended to stimulate insurrection in the Turkish provinces. Such acts led to the break of relations between Greece and Turkey and eventually into a war in 1854. There is a complexity of reasons as to how and why brigands were turned into professional revolutionaries and brigandage became a means of expressing the nationalist commitments of the Greek people. Although many brigand chiefs who took part in the rising of Epirus, Thessaly and Chalcidice in 1854 were determined nationalists who needed no external agitation to drive them to fight the Turks, many were recruited by the Greek government either directly or indirectly, and still others joined the brigand bands after they came under the enormous propaganda of the "Russian" party and the Greek Court. 3

3 Greek brigands of Asia Minor influenced by anti-Turkish propaganda were transported on Greek ships to the
A recent study of the insurrection of 1854 in Thessaly entitled *The Insurrection of 1854 and the Thessaly Undertaking* presents the events which led to the war of 1854 as purely acts of liberation on behalf of the Greek people who sought to free themselves and their brothers who were living in the Ottoman Provinces. As it will become apparent towards the end of this chapter there is a certain amount of truth to this thesis, but to go as far as equating the revolution of 1854 with the War of Independence as not only Professor Koutroumbas has done but other Greek historians as well, is misleading if not biased. The reality of the Greek-Turkish conflict and the events which led to it are too complex to be dismissed as another war of independence.

The Montenegro rising, the Holy Places controversy, the Menshikov mission, and the Kornilov visit to Athens were all elements which contributed to an already critical situation between the Turks and the Greeks. Naturally, tensions ran just as high on the Turkish side as they did on the Greek. The Sublime Porte feared that serious trouble on the Greek-Turkish frontiers would be stirred up by the Greek brigands. On March 2nd, 1853, Metaxas, Greek minister to Constantinople Agean Islands with a final destination of Thessaly. Donata, *The Crimean War*, 25.

and a member of the "Russian" party, informed Paicos that Rifaat Pasha, the new Turkish foreign minister, informed him that the Ottoman government threatened to take possession of two villages on the Greek-Turkish frontier which were legally occupied by the Greeks.  

5 The Turkish foreign minister claimed in a dispatch to the Greek government that the villages legally belonged to the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, the Sublime Porte claimed the villages under its authority because of the universal brigandage which threatened the peace of the Ottoman Empire. Rifat further asserted that the Sublime Porte had no desire to go through another struggle with revolutionaries as it had recently in Montenegro.

The Turkish occupation of villages, which the Greeks claimed legally belonged to them, triggered a number of incidents which intensified hostile feelings between the Greeks and the Turks. The Greek government, which really sought an opportunity for confrontation with the Sublime Porte made no effort to compromise, that is to say, to take measures to

5 A.Y.E. 1853 4/1a (no. 330), Metaxas to Paicos, Constantinople, March 2, 1853.

6 The real concern of the Greek government was over the 3,000 armed Turkish troops concentrated on the Thessaly-Epirus frontier. Dona, The Crimean War, 26-7.

7 A.Y.E. 1853 4/1a (No.54), Copy (Dispatch of the Turkish Foreign Minister).
repress brigandage on the frontiers in order to relieve tensions and reassure the Turkish authorities of their peaceful intentions. Instead Paicos wrote the following letter to Metaxas challenging the latest Turkish acts in the Provinces:

The Ottoman Porte has forgotten it seems, that the separate Ottoman State's boundaries in Greece stretched under the terms of the three Great Powers under whose guarantee Greece remains, and therefore the present question cannot be solved by taking the law into one's own hand arbitrarily but the consent of the three Guarantors is required.  

Paicos proceeded to inform the Greek people of the presence of Turkish troops on the frontiers which intended to take over the Greek villages. By thus provoking the anti-Turkish sentiments of the public, Paicos and the Greek government hoped to gain public support in order to justify sending troops to the Epirus-Thessaly frontiers to counter the action of the Sublime Porte. Nothing could be more dangerous and explosive than the presence of both Greek and Turkish troops on the frontier, for immediately the Greeks in Thessaly and Epirus thought that the time for a showdown had finally arrived and they were preparing for war.  

Neshid Bey, the Ottoman Charge d'Affaires at Athens, complained to both representatives of the two Western Powers

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8 A.Y.E. 1853 4/1a (No. 1393), Paicos to Metaxas, Athens, March 19, 1853.

9 Donta, The Crimean War, 28.
about the action taken by the Greek government on the Greek-Turkish frontier. On March 23rd he informed Wyse that Greek emissaries in Albania and neighboring Provinces had been active. He further complained that the Greek emissaries and brigands who were on the frontier and in the Provinces of Epirus, Albania and Thessaly were connected with the parties in Greece and acted under the watchful eye of Greek authorities. Neshid Bey also complained about the Brigands in Asia Minor and the islands and especially Crete. All these events were taking place under the eyes of Greek authorities who allowed them to continue. 10

Wyse informed Clarendon, the British foreign secretary, that Neshid Bey related these complaints of his government to Paicos but,

Mr. Paicos in answer to these remonstrances had promised nothing: nor did he (Nehid Bey) expect from what he had already seen anything really effective from the Greek government. At the same time he was convinced that if his representations continued to be disregarded, this indifference sooner or later would infallibly lead to open dissensions and disturbances in the Turkish villages and to consequences he need not say, the most disastrous. 11

Forth-Rouen also reported to Paris that even though Paicos reassured him that the mission of Scarlato Soutzo and his troops


11 Ibid.
to the frontier was to put an end to brigandage, the Greek troops were there for security reasons only. Forth-Rouen explained to Drouyn de Lhuys, French foreign minister, that in spite of these reassurances the presence of Greek troops gathered on the frontier could only have negative consequences and leave an impression of tensions among the Greeks of the Provinces.

The Greek government was well aware of British, French and Russian policy in the Near East and especially Greece. All three Powers maintained that Greece should not be enlarged at the cost of Turkish territory. Greece had experienced devastating consequences as a result of her long antagonism with Great Britain during the Kolettes ministry and later during the "Court governments" with the Pacifico and Finlay claims. After the Holy Places question her good relations with France deteriorated as both the court and the people sided with Russia. At the opening of the Menshikov negotiations the Greek government was composed primarily of Russophiles and royalists, 13 an indication that the king was blind to Near-Eastern policy of the Western Powers.

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12 Gréce 61 (No. 33), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens, April 1, 1853.

13 Paicos, Foreign Minister, Vlachos, Minister of Education and Religion and Sp. Melios, Minister of War, were all members of the "Russian" party and were supported by Queen Amalia. A Krieze, Prime Minister and Minister of the Navy, R. Palamedes, Minister of the Interior, and S. Pelikas, Minister of Justice, were moderate pro-French politicians who would support the Crown and the "Russian" party.
Otho and his Russophile ministers chose to disregard all realities of international politics and pursued a risky policy of antagonizing the Sublime Porte. In the first week of April, reports showed that regular and irregular troops numbering one thousand two hundred were sent from Athens to the frontier near Lamia by orders of the government. This action was taken on behalf of Greek authorities without informing the representatives of France and England and Neshid Bey. This arbitrary action greatly alarmed both Wyse and Forth-Rouen who immediately requested a conference with Paicos and demanded an explanation of the Greek government's hostile moves towards the Ottoman Empire. Paicos explained that the reason the troops were sent to the frontier was because Rifaat Pasha had threatened forcibly to take the two villages which were rightfully inhabited by Greeks. Forth-Rouen and Wyse warned Paicos of the damaging consequences a Greek military occupation of the villages could have but Paicos reassured the two ministers stating that Greece would abstain from any military advances on the frontier. Wyse in a private meeting with Forth-Rouen found that the French minister was as worried about the turn of events in Greece as he was. When the British minister visited Persiany to

14 Gréce 61 (No. 33), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens, April 1, 1853, also F.O. 32/206, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 7, 1853.
find out what his feelings about the late developments in the frontiers were, he was surprised to hear that the Russian minister also was not informed about the Greek military operations on the frontier. Persiany sympathized with his French and British colleagues and pledged his full support and cooperation to them in this crisis. 15

The cooperation between the Protecting Power's representatives and Paicos reassurances to maintain peace on the frontiers left Wyse, Rouen and Persiany optimistic about the future conditions in Greece although they both expressed concern about the revolutionary and warlike state of mind of Greek public opinion. Reacting to the pressure of the three Powers and fearing another blockade such as the one that had taken place in 1850 the Greek government temporarily retreated from any further agitation with the Turks. Public opinion, however, influenced by the propaganda of the press, and especially Aion, the organ of the "Russian" party, openly expressed its anti-Turkish and pro-Russian sentiments; it was ready for a conflict. An article, which appeared in Aion written as an address to the English state reveals the nature of propaganda to which the Greek public mind was exposed.

15 Graec 61 (No. 33), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens, April 1, 1853, also F.O. 32/206, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 7, 1853.
We love Russia because she crushed the head of the Turk which you want to lift again and to last forever. The all powerful and magnificent eagle of the North, which possesses seven parts of Europe, who has advanced to the new frontiers, the Emperor Nicholas occupied Dacia and Moldavia in the end forcing the English to renounce their protection over the Ionians in favor of the future Hellenic Empire, which it will restore in opportune time Dacia and Moldavia. 16

The Greek Court took no measures to curb propaganda in the press for it wishes that the public be indoctrinated with ideas which conformed to the Megali Idea. Demonstrations and protest gatherings directed against Turkey were allowed to continue in Athens, in spite of solemn promises made to Wyse and Forth-Rouen and to Turkey by Paicos that Greeks desired peace. 17 Not only were the anti-Turkish demonstrations and propaganda allowed to continue, but the Greek government encouraged and supported them. 18

After the Sultan, Abdul-Mejid, had made up his mind not to give in any more to Russia's demands even if it meant going to war, the Ottoman Empire was determined to take strong measures to deal with Greece, Rifaat Pasha who replaced Fuad as foreign minister demanded from the embassy in Constantinople that the Greek troops on the frontier be removed, otherwise the

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16 Cited in Driault, Histoire Diplomatique, II, 376.

17 F.O. 32/206 (copie), Paicos to Neshid Bey, Athens, April 5, 1853.

18 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 600.
Turkish government would resort to armed force. The last thing France and England wanted was another Greek-Turkish conflict over two insignificant villages, during the time when Russo-Turkish relations were becoming more strenuous. Both Clarendon and Drouyn de Lhuys instructed their ministers in Constantinople to intervene between the Sublime Porte and Greece in order to settle the dispute diplomatically.

The Greek troops by the middle of April numbered two thousand. A firm indication that Greece was no more looking for a peaceful settlement than was Turkey. Paicos insisted, however, that the troops were to suppress brigandage and not to begin a war. When a conference took place in Constantinople between the Greek and Ottoman legations "the three Protecting Powers provided that the Greek government on its side would immediately withdraw the troops lately concentrated on the frontier and thus obviate the necessity on the part of the Sublime Porte of augmenting its force in the same direction." In spite of the efforts of the three Powers (Turkey, France and England) to have the Greek troops removed from the frontier, the Greeks did not recall a single

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19 Donta, The Crimean War, 31-2.

20 Ibid., 32-3.

21 F.O. 32/206, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 26, 1853.

22 F.O. 32/206, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 29, 1853.
soldier back to Athens. This indicated that the Greek government was not at all serious about maintaining peace with Turkey. In reality Greece was looking for an opportunity to start a war.

The break in diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey on May 17th and the four-hundredth anniversary of the Fall of Constantinople on May 29, 1853, helped to set the stage for great expectations by the Greek people and, especially, by king Otho.

Now that the Russians had struck at the Turks, the long-awaited moment for increasing his dominions seemed at hand; greater men than Otho might be excused for yielding to this temptation. He would never remember that the guarantee of Greek independence by the Protecting Powers was, in a sense, a two edged weapon. These Powers, or at any rate England and France would be as anxious to protect the existing frontiers of Turkey as those of Greece.

If the king was blinded by the expansionist ideas which he formulated largely under the influence of Kolettes, his ministers and many politicians who embraced the foreign policy of "Megali Idea" were deceived by looking back at the position of France and England during the War of Independence. Many Greeks felt that, in case of a Russo-Turkish conflict, Greece should strike in the Northern Provinces, and if the takeover of the Provinces was successful they argued, the Western Powers

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23 F.O. 32/206, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, May 13, 1853, also see Grece 61 (No. 32), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens, April 22, 1853.


25 Bower & Bolitho, Otho I, 190-91.
would not try to intervene. A similar situation had occurred during the War of Independence, with the only difference being that there was no Greek state to fight against Turkey, only Greeks. In 1853, however, if Greece would strike against Turkey this would mean official declaration of war of one country against another, which could very well mean that Turkey's allies would come to her aid in case of war. Many chose not to follow this course of reasoning and rely on history instead hoping that it would repeat itself in their favor. The realities of international politics, however, were quite different than the reality conceived by most officials in the Greek government.

The Western Powers had a much greater problem to solve in order to allow Greece to become an obstacle in their Near Eastern policy. On May 7th Wyse sent a formal letter to Paicos expressing "the regret of her Majesty's government that at a moment when it was so manifestly desirable to preserve the public tranquility, measures should have been adopted by the Greek government which could not fail to produce the greatest public excitement." 26 The efforts of the "Russian" party continued to press for open hostilities against Turkey. With the exception of the small professional class and the classes of merchants and businessmen, the majority of the

26 A.Y.E. 1853, Wyse to Paicos (copy) Athens, May 7, 1853.
country the peasants and much of the working class supported the "Russian" party and the king. The actions, military or brigandage, taking place in the Provinces against the Turks were wholeheartedly supported by the masses in Greece. Towards the end of May a band of brigands from Lamia murdered the ex-demarch (mayor) of Eubea and wounded several persons while the two thousand troops of the Greek government were stationed in the frontiers with their only purpose being to suppress brigandage, and maintain tranquility.

During the time that hostile actions were taking place on the Greek-Turkish frontiers and were allowed to continue under the watchful eye of the Greek local authorities, the government in Athens placed an order for twenty-five thousand to twenty-seven thousand rifles from France which were to be shipped without delay to the National Arsenals. The French government obviously turned down the request but the fact that the Greeks ordered arms from the French with the covert intention of using them against the Turks shows their naivete about international politics. The irony of this entire affair is that Paicos continued to reassure Wyse of the Greek peaceful intentions towards the Ottoman Empire while the intelli-

27 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 599-600.

28 F.O. 32/206, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, June 2, 1853.

29 A.Y.E. 1853 (copie), Paicos to Wyse, Athens, May 13, 1853, also A.Y.E. 1853 (copie) Paicos to Wyse, Athens, May 26, 1853.
gence reports of the British Legation in Athens indicated that Greece was indeed preparing for war or an organized revolt in the provinces of Thessaly, Epirus and Chaliidice.

The efforts of the Western Powers after the month of May to neutralize Greece in case of a possible open war between Russian and Turkey became more intense. On June 4th Wyse sent a dispatch to Paicos pointing out the determination of the Western Powers to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

I have the honor to inform you that I am instructed by the Earl of Clarendon to state to you that her Majesty's Government have had much reason to complain of the Greek Government for sending troops to the Frontier and keeping their intentions secret from the representatives of the three Powers at Athens; that at a moment, when it was important to allay invitation these troops were sent under circumstances calculated to increase and to turn to account the pressure of Prince Menshikoff and Constantinople and the unfounded rumors currently respecting the object of his mission; that in thus causing excitement, and creating false hopes, in the minds of the Greek people the Greek Government have displayed a want of judgement as well as knowledge of the policy of the Great Powers of Europe, who have never been more firmly determined than at the present time, to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire.

Even though this warning dispatch came as a shock to the Greek government and took by surprise both Persiany and Forth-Rouen, it cannot be argued that the British government had not warned Greece before about its hostilities towards Turkey and that Clarendon was not justified in taking such extreme measures to warn Greece about any anticipated plans of war against its

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30 A.Y.E. 1853 4/1c, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, June 4, 1853, also, F.O. 32/206, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, June 4, 1853.
The British suspicions about Greek anticipation of war were well founded. The British and Ottoman intelligence had discovered that, as early as June, Greeks from London, Vienna, Trieste collected funds in order to aid the Greek population in Turkey in case of war. 32

France was as concerned about the developments in the frontiers as England. The Quai d'Orsay had been informed that the Orthodox, pro-Russian Greeks, identified with the Russian cause and that Greece would find herself in danger if she followed a policy which endangered the interests of the Western Powers in the Near East. 33

At the same time troubles and incidents among the irregular troops stationed on the Greek Turkish frontier and

31 Dr. Donta argues that there was no call for such harsh warning by Clarendon to Greece, since it could do little good and even perhaps cause the Greek government and the people to become more attached to Russia. It remains, however, that the Greek government had done nothing to show that the troops in the frontiers would be removed and furthermore brigandage continued to grow. Given that the Greek court government and the majority of the people were turning pro-Russian and anti-Turkish there was very little else Clarendon could do under such circumstances. For Donta's argument see The Crimean War, 44-5.

32 F.O. 32/207, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 17, 1853.

33 See Grece 62 (No. 47), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, June 7, 1853. France was also concerned over the fact that Menshikov had frequently visited the Greek Charge d'Affaires while in Constantinople. See Grece 62 (No. 49), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, June 10, 1853.
the residents began to annoy the Turkish authorities. Also the Greek press kept increasing its anti-Turkish propaganda and was not at all discouraged by the government's injunction to refrain from attacking a friendly neighboring nation. Finally, Nechet Bey complained about the developments in Greece which placed the Ottoman Empire in a defensive position and jeopardized the peaceful coexistence of the two nations. Paicos replied to the Turkish Charge d'Affaires that he would endeavor to maintain tranquility in the border provinces. He stated, however, that he could not regulate or suppress the press which was engaged in a press war with Turkey. "Permettez-moi, tout-fois de vous faire observer qu'il n'est pas à son pouvoir de corriger le langage de quelques journalistes, ni de régler les idées et les pensées de tout le monde." He went on to charge that bands of brigands were supported by Turkish authorities and "were admitted to the public service" of the Ottoman provinces.

The Paicos communiqué was obviously not intended to soften Neshid Bey but he was correct that there were brigands used by the Turks to run the provinces and, as the inter-Legation correspondence concerning the frontier indicates, Greek subjects under Ottoman rule in the provinces were harshly treated throughout 1853 (another reason why so many Greeks of the provinces of Thessaly and Epirus joined the insurrec-

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34 A.Y.E. 1853, Paicos to Nechet Bey, Athens, July 7, 1853.
tion as will be shown in following sections). The maltreatment of Greeks by the Ottoman authorities was due partly to the rise of Russophilism in Greece and anti-Turkish propaganda, and partly to the recent developments on the frontiers which made the Turks very apprehensive as they very well knew that liberation of all of Greece — from Crete to the gates of Constantinople — was the goal which they had to confront.

The Greek government sought the opportunity to capitalize on the cruel treatment of Greek subjects in the provinces and on the use of brigandage by Turkey. On July 8, the Greek ministers in London, Paris, St. Petersburg and Munich expressed to the Protecting Powers and to the European community the Greek government's grievance against the irregular Albanian troops, and the government's desire to maintain Greek troops in the frontiers for the sake of keeping order in the troublesome areas. All the Protecting Powers advised the government in Athens and the king to retain order

35 For more on this see A.Y.E. 1853 4/1b, Peri ktematon kata ta Methoria Pro xenike Allelographia (Concerning the Embassy Correspondence of the Lands on the Frontier). (No. 8508), D. Kyriakides to the Embassy of Epirus and Albania of His Majesty the King, also (No. 142) Gregoriades (agent at Arta) to the Epirus and Albania Embassy of Greece.

36 The Ottoman regular troops were pulled out of the Provinces in June and reports from the Greek embassies in the Provinces complained about Albanian irregular troops abuses.
and not to step out of line. 37 The plan to gain the sympathy of Europe - - as during the War of Independence - - did not work for it was obvious that Otho and his Court had more in mind than keeping peace in the Provinces. 38 While the government in Athens promised Europe that her plan for the future only included peaceful coexistence with Turkey, there were undergoing secret preparations for war. 39 On September 19, Wyse wrote to Paicos that he had been instructed by the Earl of Clarendon to bring to the attention of the Greek government several incidents involving ammunition transport on Greek vessels. Gun powder was transported from Syra to the ports of Prevesa and Arta for the use by the Greek brigands. The transportation of gun powder and other war supplies were carried out with a prior knowledge by the Greek authorities, Wyse charged and further

37 Donta, Crimean War, 47.

38 The movement for a Greek-Turkish war was pushed behind the scenes by such extremist nationalists as Spiromilio and Scarlato Soutzo who were instrumental in having their influence exerted in the Greek Court, see Grèce 63 (No. 69), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens, July 29, 1853. Also Grèce 63 (No. 74), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens, August 17, 1853. It cannot be deduced from this that the king was really pushed into a conflict he did not ask for. Because as the next section will reveal the role of the king in the preparations for war was very much of his own will.

It has been stated to the Lord High Commissioner (of the Ionian Islands) that a large depot of powder and other military stores had been framed at Syra by persons in connection with the Greek Metaerias, and Signor Posali, a responsible merchant at Corfu, while he denies any connection with the present cargo admits that to his knowledge many similar consignments have been made from Syra to Prevesa and Arta during the last few weeks, the object of which can be easily understood.

While preparing for war the Greeks searched desperately for allies who would support their expansionist policy. Obviously, England and France would never support Greece since its foreign policy stood in opposition to theirs. Russia would have no part in supporting Greece in extending its territory since Nicholas feared that the creation of a strong state in the south would mean limitation of his country's power in the Aegean Sea. Greece therefore appealed to Bavaria for help but the Bavarian Court would not support an expansionist policy since the Tsar had declared that he opposed Greek territorial expansion. The situation for Greece and especially for Otho who was the most devoted supporter of the Megali Idea was critical. He had to make a difficult decision:

40 Metaerias were the various nationalist liberation organizations which provided money and supplies for the cause of freeing the Greeks from Turkey and reestablishing a "Greater Greek" nation.

41 A.Y.E. 1853, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, September 19, 1853.

42 See Donta, Crimean War, 49-50.
either to go to war with Turkey and thereby risk an Allied blockade of Greece, even an occupation, or to give up all immediate plans for expansion and wait for the propitious moment in the future.

B. Otho's Support for Greek-Turkish Hostilities

Historians of contemporary Greek history agree that Otho and the Greek Court were responsible for pressing for a Greek-Turkish war and territorial expansion. Even though the king has been praised by some scholars for acting on behalf of the nation's interests, most agree that the foreign policy executed by him during the Crimean War period was disastrous to the welfare of the nation. "Otho and Amalia," writes Philaretos, "nursed under Kolettes in the Megali Idea, were thirsty for greater ambitions in which they found consolation from the bitterness of their childlessness and weariness from the domestic convulsive wailing. Thus Otho became the leader of the war policy himself assuming the direction of every operation." Another prominent Greek historian writes:

The war-like psychology of the Greek people as we saw, was adopted by Otho and Amalia, not because they were patriots and wished to free Epirus and Thessaly, but so

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43 Aspreas who is a royalist argues in this manner, see Modern Greece, I, 224-30.

44 Philaretos, Foreign Rule, 98.
that they could strengthen their throne which was shaky. And they succeeded by pretending to be warlike. So for a period they succeeded to win the sympathies of the greater mass of the people. 45

King Otho was confronted with a very peculiar situation in 1853. He remembered how he became popular with the masses in 1850 during the British blockade for not giving in to the demands of a Great Power. Now he had once more the opportunity to become popular by posing as a Greek nationalist and if everything went his way he would be popular and a king of a "Greater Greece." At the same time, however, he was confronted with serious warnings from the Western Powers against any undertakings in the Turkish Provinces.

In June Otho wrote to his father that he had to postpone his trip to Germany due to the developments in the Near East. "The latest events," he wrote, "have irritated the Great Powers to the point that in order to calm them I have to remain here." 46 A month and a half later the situation in Greece was much more critical and the king expressed his thoughts about it as follows:

Conditions here are stretched at the highest level, as a result of the Russo-Turkish dispute. I believe that the matter will result in war. . . . And this because

45 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 605.

46 Otho to Ludwig, Athens, June 7, 1853, cited in Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, 970.
the fanaticism of the Turks has reached such a point that
the Sultan is afraid of the question of retreat because of
the possible disastrous consequences. I am trying to calm
the minds of my faithful subjects. . . . But at the same
time I am convinced that Divine Providence has decided the
enlargement of Greece. 47

The need to increase and secure his power became increasingly
urgent for Otho.

In September 1853 the king called for elections be-
cause he feared the power of the opposition would diminish
his popularity in the country. 48 Very few people partici-
pated in the elections and the general public apathy caused
rumors that the king was preparing a coup d' état and ultimate suppression of the Constitution. The day before the
elections Wyse sent the following report to the Foreign Of-
lice:

It is unnecessary to point out the consequences if such
(coup d' état) a movement is successful; suppression of
all freedom of the press and of all publicity, personal
liberty placed at the mercy of a party; of finances le-
vied, and applied at their caprice and for their pur-
poses; . . . the military occupation of the kingdom would
be exclusively in the hands of the king. 49

47 Ibid., 971.

48 The Constitution had not really been enforced in
Greece since Kolettes became Prime Minister in 1844 (see
Chapter I). Otho had nothing to fear from opposition since
he had done away with the Constitutionalists of 1843. Metaxas
was sent to Constantinople as ambassador, Mavrokordatos to
Paris and Trikoupis to London. So the leading politicians
who could get elected were not even in Greece. For details
of the 1853 elections see Petrakakos, History of Greece, 153-55,
also Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 576-81.

49 F.O. 32/207, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens,
September 27, 1853.
Wyse went on to urge to the Foreign Office that English policy and intentions in the Near East should be spelled out to the Government in Athens.

Our best means of standing against Russian or other influences, is the just confidence we inspire that we shall always continue to in the cause of national liberty, good administration, public order, commerce and industry in a word Western civilization against Eastern barbarism. The least semblance even, of a departure from such a policy would be not only an infringement of our former engagements, but I am quite convinced a manifest sacrifice of our most solid and important interests here, and would amount to little less than a wholesale transfer of the sympathies of a large body of this people in our favour, to Russia or France on the other.

Among other things, this dispatch of the British Minister reveals that although British Near Eastern policy paralleled French policy, British interests were naturally the primary objective of the Foreign Office. Besides the economic interests, which England had in Greece, it was also essential to develop a machinery, through the "English" party of course, of political control. All the talk of "liberty," "justice" and "western civilization" was not to be taken seriously for the purpose of the Foreign Office was to secure

50 Ibid.

51 The F.O. series for the years 1853-1857 contains numerous reports concerning British economic interests in Peloponese, and especially in Corinth. In many of these dispatches the Consul at Patras ask Wyse to use his influence with the Greek government to favor the interests of the British commerce. See Appendix 254-255.
and promote British interests and not to teach the world a lesson in liberalism. Greece was nothing more than a tool for England, at times a tool which was difficult to control for other Powers had a share of it. The main obstacle to exert British political control in Greece was the king. In 1853, however, the king was left with no one major power to support his policy so at his moment of weakness it would be easier for the British government to intervene in Greek affairs than in the past.

Otho, however, did not bend as easily as the Foreign Office would have liked. Clarendon warned him three times in 1853 of the English determination to uphold the Ottoman Empire's integrity but the king who was the main architect and supporter of the aggressive acts taking place on the frontiers against the Turks chose to disregard them. In early October additional troops were being armed to be sent to the frontier and once again Paicos did not inform Rouen, Wyse and Nechet Bey about this matter. When questioned by Nechet Bey as to when the new troops were to be sent to the frontier, Paicos replied that he did not know and that he had to ask the Minister of War. Finally, when pressed for an explanation the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote to Wyse that, "as far as the marching of ad-

52 The last dispatch in A.Y.E. 1853, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, September 14, 1853.

ditional troops to the frontier from Nauplia is in question
his colleague, the Minister of War, informs him that a sin-
gle soldier has not quitted that fortress, a company only
of artillery with four pieces of cannon left Athens within
these last few days to replace another at Lamia." 54 The
intelligence reports of Nechet Bey and the British Legation
in Athens, however, indicated that "an Hetaeria is in full
operation in Lamia and in communication, with sympathizers
on both sides of the frontier, under the eyes of Greek au-
thorities and without any effectual means having been taken
for their repression." 55 It was no secret to any one that
ever since brigand chiefs were affiliated with the Court
they were used as its weapon to manipulate events in domes-
tic and foreign affairs. 56 Wyse feared, as had Lyons before
him and many British statesmen before 1853, that brigandage
in Greece was a threatening element to the stability and peace
in the Provinces for it was bands of brigands who were con-
verted into revolutionaries and fought for an independence in

54 F.O. 32/208, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, October 7, 1853.

55 Ibid.

56 About, Grece, 231-35. Certain brigands were used as defenders of the regime. They exercised police functions and were used as the private army of the king.
1821. 57 The king knew this just as well and this is the reason he liked to patronize chieftains. In November he addressed the following letter to his father:

A few days ago I said to an elderly Epiriot who gives great significances to a prophetic book, The Good Angel, that we in the period of one year will be in Constantinople. If this book determines time or not I do not know. But it is known to me . . . that a Bavarian is about to reign there. 58

After the garrison from Nauplia moved to the frontier, Otho wrote to his brother Maximilian that he "was convinced that providence had decreed the expansion of Greece" and pointed the necessity for replacing the old weapons with new ones. Maximilian disapproved of Otho's activities and intentions, and Otho appealed to him again, saying "that it was the duty of all Christians in Europe to fight for their co-religionists who were downtrodden by the Crescent." 59

Otho determined to carry out his dream of a greater Greece even though his own relatives discouraged him from engaging in acts which could endanger his throne. In February 1854 Napoleon III wrote a letter to the king of Greece trying to discourage him from going too far with his plans to antagonize the Turks.

57 F.O. 32/208, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, October 26, 1853.

58 Otho to Ludwig, Athens, November 27, 1853, cited in Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, 972-73.

The recent attitude of Your Majesty's Government has shown me that its intentions are very different from what I expected. Instead of enlightening Your Majesty's subjects on the situation, the Government has allowed them to be misled; and through the weakness and connivance of the authorities, matters have come to such a point that the insurgents in Epirus are openly recruiting supporters, not only among Your subjects, but even among Your troops. Under any conditions I would regret bitterly if Greece were to compromise her destiny by provoking disturbances in the Near East, but Your Majesty will understand that today I should be forced to consider any attack directed against the Ottoman Empire as being directed against France herself. 60

After Baron Forth-Rouen delivered Napoleon's letter to Otho, the king was taken by surprise never expecting such strong warning to come from France, a nation, unlike England, with which Greece had had fair relations for most years since its existence. The king answered Napoleon in a very touching letter pointing out that he could not conceive that French soldiers who once fought by the side of Greeks would now turn their guns against them. He went on to add that the crisis in the Near East was not to be blamed on the Crown of Greece and that even though there were sympathies in Greece for the Christian subjects of the Provinces, there was no attempt on the part of the kingdom to promote a revolt or engage in war against Turkey. 61

60 Translation used here is from Bower & Bolitho, Otho I, 193-95. For the French and Greek texts see Petrakakos, History of Greece, 155-57.

61 Ibid., Petrakakos, 157-60.
It has been argued that Otho was convinced that the expansion of the Greek kingdom would work not only to the advantage of his own country but also to that of the Western European countries as well. He felt that a greater Greece would be able to maintain the balance of power in the Near East by checking the Russian power. Otho did not entertain an expansionist foreign policy because he was concerned with the problem of balance of power in the Near East. Among other sources, the memoirs of Spiridon Pelikas, Minister of Justice during the Kriezes administration, unfold the full implications of the king's involvement in planning, triggering and supporting wholeheartedly the insurrection in 1854, for more reasons than that of his own egotistical goals.

When the revolution broke out in Epirus, Soutsos, confident of Otho, informed the Ministerial Council which was convening with the king about the events in the Turkish Provinces. The matter of the insurrection was then opened for discussion by the ministers and all agreed to support it secretly but they agreed not to allow the Sublime Porte to become suspicious of the government's involvement. The king agreed that the meeting of the Ministerial Council was secret.

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62 Donta, Crimean War, 80, has put forward this argument.

and he dismissed the council.

All of us unhesitantly were waiting, as was natural and expected to return again to the Ministerial Council so that the matter can be determined and to set the grounds which we were supposed to keep in mind in order to conduct the manner of our activities. Unfortunately the King, distrustful as it seems, not unjustly of certain ministers did not give us the necessary information, if he had from Europe and from the outer Provinces. Therefore as the public, neither did we at the beginning think that the King would have positive hopes either from France or Germany. Only after two or three months I learned from outside sources various data, which led me to believe that the insurrection was not genuine, but was instigated from within (the Court). 64

This indicated that the king did not take the advice of the Powers in regard to his foreign policy and deliberately kept the Ministerial Council ignorant of the facts so one can only conclude that the greater part of responsibility for the Greek government's actions in the insurrectionary developments in Northern Greece lies with the Greek Court and Otho himself. Otho used the patriotic movement of the Greek people for his own goals. Otho ignored the interests of Greece and went ahead to side with the Russians and hoped that they would be victorious in the Crimean War so that he would benefit from their victory. In April 1854 he wrote to Tsar Nicholas:

As a Christian and as King of Greece, I follow with the greatest interest everything Your Majesty wished to do in the final cause to protect in an effective manner the religious rights of the Eastern Church in Turkey to which belong the great majority of my subjects and to which will belong my children, if God gives me any, and in any case, the heirs to my throne. The decision which Your Majesty is to take in favour of the Christians who, pressed to drive out, grabbed the arms for the defence

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64 Ibid., 140.
of the Church and their homes, not a less noble and loyal manner by which Your Majesty has announced His eminent and firm will coming in aid to introduce a summit to all the wishes of these populations... And I do not act either to satisfy the general sentiment of the deepest acknowledgement in addressing Your Majesty my most sincere gratitude. 65

This eulogy to Russia and devotion to the Tsar by Otho was naturally understandable since Russia was the only possible ally Greece could have which would approve its foreign policy.

C. "Internal" and "External" Causes of the Insurrection

As has already been stated there were a number of complex causes for the insurrection of 1854. From the study of the insurrection, its nature, its beginnings, and its direction, it can be concluded that its causes were of two types, "Internal" and "External." In the "internal" causes can be included the social, economic, religious and political problems facing the Christian subjects of the Turkish Provinces who chose to join the revolution. In the "external" causes can be listed the foreign elements which were to be found in the insurrection, namely, the involvement of the king and the Greek government, and also the contribution of fanatic nationalists who took part in the insurrection but were not part of the community of Christians under Ottoman rule.

One of the most firm supporters of a Greek revolt against Turkey was the "Russian" party. Their newspaper Aion had been publishing severe criticisms of Turkey and eulogies of Russia ever since the Menshikov mission and in 1853 this newspaper was so blunt as to publish an article which openly expressed hostility against the Turkish government. The article was signed by P. Soutzo, a poet, and N. Bambas, professor of philosophy at the University of Athens. Wyse felt that it was an outrage that a public servant was allowed to write such an article against a friendly power. Naturally Nechet Bey went immediately to Wyse after he read the article and complained that the Greek government did not refute the article in the government press and took no action against Professor Bambas, the co-signer of the article. Wyse immediately brought this to the attention of the Greek Foreign Minister who promised to take appropriate action in the matter. The relations between Greece and Turkey were on a steady decline in the Fall. The Sublime Porte had been hoping to avoid confrontation with Greece which would result if carried to extremes in a war, and a

66 See F.O. 32/208, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, October 27, 1853. For the French translation of the Aion article see F.O. 32/208, X/Lo6972, 82-6.

67 Paicos took action against Professor Bambas but the article was not censored to the satisfaction of the Turkish Charge d'Affaires or Wyse. See Ibid.
two-front war was an adventure the Sultan's government could do without. Nechet Bey wrote to Paicos on December 3rd accusing Greece of actively seeking deterioration of relations with the Sublime Porte. He stated that the Sublime Porte wanted to maintain good relations with Greece but the latter showed no effort of good-will by continuing to send troops to the frontier. 68

As the Turkish authorities felt threatened by the presence of the Greek troops in the frontier, Greek authorities constantly complained about the mistreatment of Christians by the Ottoman authorities. It was only to be expected that the sympathies of the Greek Orthodox subjects with the Russian cause would create alarm among the Turks. On October 7th, three days after the announcement of Aion that the war between Russia and Turkey was under way, Lambros Beikos, an officer of the Greek army, entered Epirus with a company of three hundred men. This was an obvious sign that the Greek government had every intention of capitalizing on the Russo-Turkish war. Suleiman Bey Frasare, General Derven Aga of Epirus, was forced to gather two hundred men from the Turkish Provinces and five hundred irregulars from Albania to go after one of the Greek military leaders, Koutsonika, who was known to engage in revolutionary activity. The Greek

68 A.Y.E. 1853, Nechet Bey to Paicos, Athens, December 3, 1853.
ambassador in Epirus upon receiving this news called on the Lieutenant Commander of Western Greece to concentrate his troops in the frontier as "a display of strength." 69

This movement caused great concern to the European community as well as to the governments of the involved parties. The Greek government realizing the danger involved in the consequences, Anglo-French threat, of such activities sent to the frontier lieutenant Skylodemo to disperse the rebels, and immediately placed the blame for the entire incident on the Nomarch (Governor) of Aitolia and Akarnania for allowing the incident to take place. The Turkish authorities having the full support and cooperation of the Allied Powers did not take the incident lightly especially when later another Greek revel, Theodore Ziakas entered Thessaly. 70

Wyse sent the following report informing the Foreign Office of the incidents on the Frontier:

This, however, is not the only instance, I regret to say of disposition on the part not only of the Government but of the Court to add to the unsatisfactory nature of the relations between the two governments. Neshid Bey complained to me a few days since that the lately appointed ministers had alone omitted him among their round of visits, and that on several occasions of late, their Majesties had passed him by, though close to them, without the honor of the usual salute. 71

69 Donta, Crimean War, 62-63.

70 The Ziakas movement gave rise to revolutionary societies in Thessaly, see Koutroumbas, The Revolution of 1854, 60, 70-2, also Donta, Crimean War, 63-4.

71 F.O. 32/208, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, November 17, 1853.
Wyse advised Nechet Bey to communicate with the Greek Foreign Minister before he officially notified the Sublime Porte.

Paicos was in a real dilemma. On the one hand he was overtly trying to prevent a war or revolution from breaking out for he feared the Anglo-French threats to Greece and on the other hand the Greek government was too deeply involved in the events on the Frontier and Provinces. In a dispatch to Trikoupes, Paicos expressed his fear that if Greece dared to engage in a conflict with Turkey, France and England would support the Sultan not only by their moral but their armed force as well. 72

The majority of Greek statesmen had a difficult time understanding that the two Western Powers which contributed to their independence and fought for the creation of the Greek nation would fight to prevent that same country from expanding its borders and taking territories which, in their view, were rightfully Greek. The decision had to be made, however, whether Greece would follow a policy of expansion or stay neutral. The dilemma could only be resolved by Otho; the king chose to glorify his Crown. 73

72 A.Y.E. 1853, Confidential, Paicos to Trikoupes, November 15, 1853.

73 In December 1853 Otho chose to send ambassadors and other agents to foreign countries "without requiring the sanction of the Greek Chambers." This caused a good deal of concern at the Foreign Office and Clarendon instructed Wyse to inform Paicos of Her Majesty's government dissatisfaction with the king's abuse of his powers. The concern of
The external causes of the Greek-Turkish war were reinforced by the internal causes which did not play as important a role in international politics but did contribute to the explanation of the beginnings of the revolution in the Provinces. One could easily understand why the representatives of the Allied Powers would not admit the "internal" causes of the insurrection even if they were looking for them. Wyse denied any possibility of the existence of "internal" causes for an insurrection and in December he wrote:

I do not perceive any immediate probability of such, [internal causes] nor do I think it at any rate time likely to make much way, unless originated or continued by the Greek Government or stimulated by reports of Russian success. 74

This reflects to a great extent the official British governmental attitude concerning the causes for the insurrection. They placed all emphasis on the influence and actions of the Greek Court and government, the "Russian" party, and the propaganda of both Greece and Russia concerning the condition of Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empire. All of

Clarendon was not so much the abuse of power by the king, as the over-spending for civil and military maintenance. "... at a time, when the establishment both civil and military is kept up in Greece, is far too great for its revenue, any measures which entail unnecessary expense, can only be considered as exhibiting an absence of good faith towards their governments, who are still burdened with the debt of Greece." See A.Y.E. 1853, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, December 15, 1853.

74 F.O. 32/208, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, December 17, 1853.
these are "external" causes which are applicable but only partially explain the reasons behind the insurrection. There was no place allowed for Greek Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire who did not want to be ruled by the Sublime Porte for religious and ethnic reasons, and Greeks living in Turkey or other Christians were mistreated or murdered many a time when there were strained relations between Greece and Turkey. Legation reports from the Northern Provinces and other accounts indicate that the events of 1854 were triggered partially by socio-economic, religious and ethnic causes. The pressures of the Turkish officials on the Christian subjects was one of the reasons many Greeks welcomed the opportunity to strike back. 75 One of the first villages to revolt was Radevishi. The reasons for this were, (1) there was jealousy among Albanians because Greeks from Radovichi were on the payroll of the Sublime Porte used as troops to maintain order in the Provinces, 76 and (2) they objected to the heavy taxes imposed upon them by the Ottoman authorities. 77

The movement of Radovichi was known to the Greek authorities and it was allowed to continue. What is astonish-

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75 Koutroumbas, The Revolution of 1854, 24-5.
76 Ibid.
77 The General Derven Aga Suleiman Bey Frasare was pressuring the villagers of Radovichi to provide the necessary funds for the salaries of 2,500 of his men. Zeine, an Albanian Turkish agent at Arta went to the villagers of Peta demanding money and food supplies. These abuses of the Turks
ing, however, is when the news reached Athens that the villagers of Radovichi took up arms against the Turks, there was a general enthusiasm all over Greece and the events were compared in many minds to 1821. 78 In the minds of many the time had arrived for the liberation of all Greek subjects and territory.

One Greek writer 79 maintained that the insurrection was doomed to failure before it even began for lack of money needed to carry out a successful attack against the Turks. Despite an empty treasure in Greece the chieftains were urged to continue their venture against the Turks not only by the government sector but also by the private sector. When the Roumeliotes asked for a loan of 30,000 drachmas early in 1854, the President of the National Bank of Greece, G. Stavrou, replied that he did not have the funds available but they should continue their struggle against the Turks with his blessings. He clearly implied that the loan could and would

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could not be tolerated by the Greeks who knew that they had the mother country to rely in case they took arms against the Turks. See Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, 639-40, also see for the Radovichi uprising A.Y.E. 1854 (4/1) No. 18, Papakopoulos to the Province of Valtos, January 16, 1854, also A.Y.E. 1854 (4/1) No. 54, Skylodemos to the Earch of Valtos, January 19, 1854, also A.Y.E. 1854 (4/1) No. 557, A. Deoulas to the Ministry of the Interior, January 17, 1854.

78 See Pelikas, Memoirs, 140-44.

become available to them in the near future. Such reassurances from the top in both private and public sectors left the insurgents confident that they had more than just the moral support of Greece.

The greatest mistake the government for its part could commit in the insurrection, as Metaxas pointed out, was to support such a movement (in Radovichi) after the Western Powers had decided on a policy which would call for the suppression of such a mission, and before the Russians crossed the Danube. Nevertheless, the revolution of 1854 began in Radovichi and it provided the spark needed to cause other Christians in the Northern Provinces to revolt. The spirit of 1821 lived among the leaders of the revolution since many of them had seen or participated in the War of Independence and others were sons of chieftains. Two of the most prominent leaders were Spyridon Karaiskakes and Demetrios Grivas, the son of Lieutenant-General Theodore Grivas.

80 Ibid., 643.

81 Pelikas, Memoirs, 141.

82 "It is apprehended that in the event of movements in Servia, Macedonia or Epirus, England and France may be induced to take coercive or precautionary measures by occupation or otherwise." See F.O. 32/208, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, November 1853.

83 Pelikas, Memoirs, 141.

84 Karaiskakes with 2,500 men seized the town of Arta and Grivas with 300 men took over Pente Pegadia and Peta of
On January 29 all the revolutionaries met at the villages of Peta, Neochori and Kombote to organize new attacks against Arta. Karaiskakes delivered the following historic message to his men on January 30th:

Greek! While dying my father cried: Redeem Athens! Leaving as the only inheritance to me his sword, he died. Taking the inheritance of my father and finding Athens free, the land of his birth is enslaved. . . . Oh people of Epirus! The flag of freedom I raised among us. Greeks! The second Turkish war is coming; the revolutionary flame has started and the holy spirit of freedom and faith has descended from heaven and is increasing the flames of the fire. Look at the Heptanesos (seven islands -- Ionian Islands) as a seven-headed serpent it hisses, Epirus is moving, Thessaly is shaking, Macedonia is stirring, Thrace is waiting; Courage, then Courage! During the first Turkish war (that of Independence) the Greeks with 50,000 soldiers defeated 500,000 men from Asia, Europe and Africa. Today autonomous Greeks, Epirotes, Thessalois, Macedonians and Thracians, six million we are fighting a weak kingdom which is been fought at the Danube by multi-numerous and threatening armies. . . . Forward. The cross on the one hand, the sword on the other. . . . Freedom or death. This is the voice of 10 million Greeks, Serbians and Bulgarians in Europe and 4 million Greeks in Asia. 85

It was apparent from this speech that the spirit, at least some of it, of 1821 was once again being recreated in 1854. In many ways 1854 was the year that many hoped to see bring

Epirus. At the same time that Karaiskakes and Grivas were making advances other revolutionaries (Kitsos Tsavelas, Giannes Bagos, Giannes and Nicholas Stratos, Andreas and Demitri Iskos and George Barnakokes, all volunteers) entered into Turkish soil and began attacking Turkish villages. See Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 610-11, also Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, 640-3, also Koutroubas, Revolution of 1854, 68.

85 Cited in Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 611.
the War of Independence to a full cycle and free all Greek Christians from the Turks.

The historian who relies solely on British and French sources for the causes of the insurrection can be misled a great deal for Western European sources only reflect the partial observations of Western Europeans primarily who did not have access to the Greek documents and were also under the influence of the political biases and policy of the Allied Powers. It was impossible, therefore, to come to the conclusion that any "internal" factors existed in the revolution if one does not review the Greek sources. A typical view of a contemporary Western European concerning the causes of the insurrection is that of the Scottish historian, George Finlay. "But in spite of Greek and Russian encouragement," he maintains, "the Christian subjects of the Sultan refused to take up arms the public administration was so bad in Greece, that independence offered few attractions when the result on the value would be subjection to Greek misgovernment." 86

Even though the observations of Finlay — a mishellene, hater of Greeks, as labelled by Greek historians — are to a certain extent correct since not every Greek took up arms and marched to fight the Turks, there is ample evidence of a great number of people who joined and did so for they had political, economic, and social reasons. 87

86 Finlay, History of Greece, 222.

87 The wealthy Greeks did not join the revolution for
After Mehmet Fuad Pasha, former minister of foreign affairs (1852-53), who was entrusted by the Sultan with suppressing the revolts in northern Greece, had published the warning to all Christians who joined the insurrection, the Greeks of Epirus and Thessaly sent him the following message:

To the brightest Fuad Effendi. We former ragiades etc. cursed by the Sultan, until yesterday were sitting on glass and nails and on our rahati (back) as you would say. And seeing that from the taxes on the value of products, from instalment taxes, from taxes on sheep, from taxes on trade, from fire taxes, from luxury taxes and from commerce taxes... not even saliva was left in our mouth. The irregular Turks of our territory and the Nizamledes sent by Ali Osman... have stripped us... They'll slaughter us like goats... There is no other way but to ask for help from our King Otho. Farewell till we meet at the Byzantium, if you haven't left there before we come. The Greeks of Epirus and Thessaly.89

The Greek subjects of Thessaly and Epirus had fallen victims to a semi-feudal system of Turkish government which could not reform fast enough for the liberal and nationalist demands of the Greek people. The Tanzimat came to these Provinces in mid 1840's 90 and its effects were insignificant since, as it would mean risking their property for an ideal called "Greece." Ibid., 634.

88 See below, page 132.

89 Cited in Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 85.

90 Saab, Crimean Alliance, 140.
as Bailey maintains, it was not a radical reform program to satisfy the rebelling spirit of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire. On June 2, 1853, a letter of the British Consul at Prevesa reported to his government that the Christian subjects of Thessaly and Epirus were "oppressed by fiscal exactions, and subjected to intolerable acts of violence and injustice..." He further noted that these people would readily take up arms in support of an insurrection against Turkey. In another report by Lord Stratford on July 4, 1853, the Turkish authorities were charged with treating the Christian subjects with "cruelty, rapine and murder." A "proclamation to all Greeks and Philhellenists, believers of Christ," dated January 9, 1854, is not only a good indication of Greek propaganda before the insurrection of 1854 but it also serves as an example of Turkish tyranny and reflects the nationalist and liberal spirit of the Greek people. Europe, at least Western Europe, had progressed economically, politically and socially. Greece and the Greek subjects of the Ottoman Empire were aware of

91 Frank Edgar Bailey, British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826-1853 (New York, 1970), 228, maintains that the Tanzimat was only "a step away from the old autocratic feudal order."

92 Sessions of March 13, 1854, Handard, 3rd series, CXXXI, 706.

93 Ibid., 707.

94 Saab, Crimean Alliance, 141.
this progress and compared their devastating condition to that of Western Europeans so they desired to abolish all form of oppression.

Such were the internal causes of the revolution and it is really difficult to determine their weight in the entire scheme of things. As they present themselves, the facts tend to incriminate the Greek government and especially the Greek Court for the insurrection of 1854, but this does not mean that the effect of the "internal" factors must be minimized since it took the combination of both "external" and "internal" factors for the creation of what was intended to be the second War of Independence for Greece.
CHAPTER IV

WAR AND OCCUPATION

A. War in Thessaly. Epirus and Chalcidice

The Radovichi occurrences obviously created much excitement not only among the Greeks but also among the Turkish and European governments. Turkey was always fearful of facing a two front war, one at the Danube and the other at the Greek frontier. The Sublime Porte knew that the enemy at the Danube was much too strong to be held back by the Turkish forces, so all troops had to be concentrated in the Russian front. Aware of their shortage of manpower the Ottoman authorities wanted to end the revolution before it spread into a major war. Accordingly, they adopted severe measures in dealing with the Christians in order to discourage them from engaging in any adventurous revolutionary activities. 1

On February 9, about one thousand men were sent to take Pente Pegadia (Five Wells) held by Greek insurgents. Pente Pegadia was a village between Arta and Janina which the rebels had taken along with Peta. It became one of the main headquarters for the insurgents. The Greeks forced the Turks

1 Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 75-7, also see Pelikas, Memoirs, 151.
to defend themselves from Arta. When the latter were unable to emerge victorious in their struggle, reinforcements were sent but they too failed to defeat the insurgents and retreated to Janina. 2 The Greeks were left free to attack the neighboring Turkish villages and possibly take Arta, the village still held by Turkish forces after the rebels unsuccessfully tried to capture it on February 12.

Another attempt was made by the Turkish military forces to send help to Arta, this time eight hundred men in addition to the seven hundred regulars and two hundred armed police. 5 Like the previous reinforcements these also met with defeat as they were stopped by the bands of Greek chieftains led by Rago, Strato and Karaoules.

On February 16 the Greeks scored another victory against a group of three hundred Turks who attempted to rescue those at Arta. 4 In Epirus, at the village of Peta, the rebels defeated the Turks as they had in Thessaly. Theodore Grivas with three hundred men scored a victory at Koutsoulio, 5 and on February 28 he was a few miles outside Janina. In the

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3 Ibid., Nomikos, 153.

4 These Turks were carrying supplies and were captured by Nico Kaskares and his band. See Kyriakodes, Contemporary Greeks, 644.

5 Wyse reports on March 5 that Grivas had increased
early days of March many villages fell into the hands of the Greeks and it seemed that the revolutionaries were successful in their task. After the outbreak of the insurrection the notables of Agrafa made the following announcement:

Patriots, a cry had been poured in our hearing, that our Epirotes compatriots have taken arms asking for their freedom against the centuries long tyrant. Grab, therefore, fellow-patriots your arms, place your hand in your heart, . . . imitate our predecessors, and cast your blood for the honor of religion, the honor of your freedom. 6

Epirus came under the leadership of Kitsos Tsavelas, former Inspector General of the Greek army, who had left the military along with a number of others to join the revolution. Peta was the headquarters for the insurgents in Epirus and it was from where Tsavelas and Karaiskakes operated. In the eparchy of Janina Grivas and his son were in control and headed for the town of Janina. Still other insurgent bands operated from Paramethia. 7

The revolution spread from Thessaly and Epirus to Macedonia where Ziakas with two hundred men from Lamia entered into Turkish territory.

They occupied the strategic position of Spileon and the passage between Melia and Krania in the area between

his forces from three hundred to four hundred. F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, March 15, 1854.

6 Father Basilios Sioufas, E Epanastasis tou 1854 kai e Katastrophe tes Cralistes (The Revolution of 1854 and the Catastrophe of Cralistes) Thessalika Chronika (Athens, 1965), 464

7 Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 68, 82, also see Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, 645, also Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 156-57.
Metsovo and Grevena. Ziakas' plan was to bar the crossing of Turkish troops from Epirus to Western Macedonia, and to unite the insurrection in Epirus, Thessaly and Macedonia through Grevena.

The reaction from the people of Greece to these sporadic uprisings in the north was alarming. Many who were indoctrinated in the beliefs of "religion" and "nation" took up arms and ran to the troubled Provinces feeling they had a holy mission to carry out. Wyse wrote that:

Recruiting, I am informed, is going on in the open day and under the very eyes of the Government officials and local authorities, not only in Missolonghi, but in many other Provinces, even so far down as the Peloponesos. . . . A still more daring spirit is conspicuous at Athens. Four committees have been regularly formed and are in permanent sitting here, for the purpose of receiving subscriptions and enrolling recruits, presided by Deputies and others of authority in town, one of these immediately opposite Neshid Bey's house. Another similarly organized for the same purpose at Patras.

It was not only the indoctrinated masses who applauded the revolts but the king as well. He wrote to his father when the Epirus uprising occurred that the Christian subjects of Turkey were mistreated by the officials and they desired to free themselves from the Turkish yoke so they could join the mother country, Greece. He added that even though the uprising was not timed rightly for it broke out in the middle

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8 Nomikos, *International Position of Greece*, 158

it did, however, prove that it was not caused by Russia, as the Western Powers suspected, but was indeed genuine. 10

The Turkish authorities did not take any serious measures against the repression of Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empire until after the Tsar announced that the war against Turkey was fought on behalf of the "repressed brothers." 11 Fuad Effendi, the former minister of Foreign Affairs, who became commissioner extraordinary in charge of all operation in Thessaly and Epirus, was entering Prevesa with three thousand men as T. Grivas and N. Zervas were making advances toward Janina. Fuad Effendi landed with three war ships accompanied by a British frigate, an obvious indication that Great Britain had taken the role of an advisor to Turkey in military operations. 12 Seinel Pasha, who was assigned as General Dervend in Thessaly and Epirus was sent to Volos with one thousand five hundred to two thousand five hundred men 14 on two steamers which were also escorted by


11 Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 82.

12 Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 159.

13 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 614.

14 Ibid., Koutroumbas, 83.
a British and a French steamers. The Turks also sent troops by land to stop the spreading of the insurrection. Fuad Pasha published a proclamation holding forth a general amnesty for all those who were willing to return to their duty and effective protection to the peaceable and well disposed. The publication read as follows:

Though you were staying in your homes inside our borders, men came . . . and destroyed our lands. Those who desire to remain under the authority of the Sultan, Kotsombasedes etc. disassociate yourselves from the insurgents and come with me. (1) Those who did not participate in this stirring of events will be treated kindly by our Sultan. (3) Those who remain armed will be punished and with a different treatment. (4) Villages which did not accept the revolution, will be paid by other villages who did. (5) Those, Greeks by any chance caught, brigands amongst the residents will not be tolerated and will immediately be punished.

On March 1st Lieutenant General A. Hatzi-Petros, an aide de camp of Otho, entered Thessaly with five hundred men. Another aide de camp of Otho, Lieutenant General Dimitris Tsames Karatasos, also joined the revolution which of course was converted into a full scale war after the Turkish troops from Constantinople had arrived in the Provinces. Dimitrios or Tsames Karatasos, son of Athanasios Karatasos, fought with

15 Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 162.

16 F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, March 17, 1854.

17 Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 85.
his father in Macedonia and other parts of Greece during the War of Independence. Many observers in Greece believed that the revolutionaries had a good start and the chances of a Turkish victory were slim since they needed their forces to hold back the Russians. Wyse explained the situation to the Foreign Office as follows:

In Greece the impression is, that the force as yet sent is too feeble, to stop the current, and that even twice that number would still be inadequate to oppose any effective resistance to a movement which they believe will become before another month, Pan hellenic. The passage of volunteers from the border provinces, is every day increasing, nourished by these hopes and reports of a constant succession of victories.

The Turkish offensive, however, began to build up gradually as more help from France and England came to assist them in fighting the Russians. General Grivas suffered a defeat on March 23rd at Metsouo by Abdi Pasha, who commanded two thousand five hundred men. Grivas retreated to Peta with the other chiefs and after a long battle with the Turks, which the Greek insurgents lost they dispersed and this marked the end of the revolutionary effort in Epirus. Abdi Pasha in conjunction with "Fuad Effendi, followed up his (Abdi

18 See Athanasios A. Angelopoulos, Dimitrios Tsamis Karatasos, XVII, Balkan Studies, 49-51.


20 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 615-16.

Pasha's victory by taking Pente Pigadia, and reopening the communications between Arta and Ioannina [Janina]."  

Thessaly also was ready to Turkish hands as a force of three thousand men stationed at Almiro were determined to put an end to the advances of Papakosta at Platanon. Even though the forces of Papakosta proved to be much more effective in holding back the Turks than Grivas' forces, the internal disputes among the chiefs resulted in the general weakness of the movement.  

Disputes among the chiefs were not, however, the only cause which lost the war for the Greeks. One of the worst loses suffered by the rebels was at Volo. By March 30th six thousand Egyptians and a French steamer, "Heron," came to the aid of the Turks and for all practical purposes the undertaking was well on the way to being crushed under such military power.  

The next important battle was fought on May 10 at Kalambaka. Before this battle took place, Soutso, Minister of War, gave orders on his own accord without consulting with the Minister of Justice, Pelikas, that prisoners from Chalcide should be allowed to go free so that they may join the insurrection.  

The Kalambaka battle between Hadji-Petro and

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22 F.O. 32/216, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 27, 1854.

23 For the Platanon Battle see Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 94-9.


25 Pelikas refused to pardon the prisoners as the other ministers wished. See Pelikas, Memoirs, 147-49.
Selim Pasha marked the height of insurgent victories in the North. The Macedonian revolts were inspired by those of Epirus and Thessaly but started late in March.

The two men responsible for organizing the Macedonian movement were N. Filaretos and Tsames Karatasos. The grievance the Christians of Macedonia had against the Turks was about land which was granted to them by the Turkish Court but was not obtained by them. A Secret revolutionary group of three hundred and ten men organized by the two Greek chiefs, and on March 23rd Filaretos started from north Euboia to Pelio. By the end of the month the effort was completely demolished by a combination of factors. (1) Filaretos felt that the people of Pelio were not ready for revolution and war, (2) disputes among the insurgent leaders, and (3) one Demitrios Gabriel announced everywhere that "ten thousand British were coming to Prevesa to punish the rebels," which obviously scared everyone involved in the insurrection.

The revolts in the Provinces were unsuccessful for a variety of reasons. One of them, the most important, was

26 For details see Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 145-52.

27 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 227.

28 Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 101-03, also Kordatos, Ibid., 621-42, uses many sources to cover the Macedonian revolt.
that Turkey had the support of Western Europe whereas Greece had only Russian moral support during the entire affair. The Foreign Office instructed Wyse on March 23rd. that:

If it should turn out that the Greek troops have violated the Turkish territory, in the name of Her Majesty's Government, strongly to protest against the act and the unworthy attempt of the Greek Government to accuse the Turkish troops (of crossing the Greek frontier). 29

The Greek Court and the expansionists in the government would not listen to threats of the Allied Powers. When the Turks captured Chrone Nasdeke at the Battle of Perivolia, of Volos, they found on him documents incriminating the Greek government in the revolution. They immediately sent these documents to Constantinople as official evidence of Greek government's aggression against Turkey. 30 This caused the Turks and their allies to become even more serious and determined in their efforts to extinguish the revolution. Great Britain and France warned that the conduct of the Greek Court and government and, especially, the king and Queen, had brought the two Powers to the point where they were seriously considering breaking off diplomatic relations. They further warned, "that the coasts of Greece would be blockaded, Greek commerce put an end to, and that ulterior measures would then be determined on." 31

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29 F.O. 32/216, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 7, 1854.

30 Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 100.

31 F.O. 32/216, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 14, 1854. Rouen and Wyse addressed a note to Paicos on April 11th
Paicos and the Court were not about to give in to demands of the Allied Powers as long as they knew that the insurrection still had a chance of accomplishing something. Furthermore, it was too late to pull out and stop everything as though nothing had happened. The people burned with nationalism, the king was more determined than ever to give full support to the movement until it was successful, and the press kept the war propaganda stronger than ever before.

There were other factors, however, besides pressure from the Allied Powers which resulted in the failure of Greeks to capture the Turkish Provinces. First, there was no fully organized effort on behalf of the Greek government to engage in war. The authorities in Greece allowed the revolt to occur, supported it morally and materially, but as a result of British and French threats and pressure the Greek government abandoned the effort of the insurgents while it was still flourishing. If there was more determination on the part of the king and those in government who supported the revolution of 1854, a greater effort could have been made to risk everything in order to win the designated Turkish Provinces.

There was also still another factor which has already been mentioned, namely, disputes among the leaders of the insurgents which made the movement very weak in its internal

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warning him that the Naval Forces of France and England were instructed to visit Greek ships even on Greek waters, which were suspected of carrying arms and munition. See F.L. 32/216, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 26, 1854.
The following letter of Grivas to Georgandas reveals much about internal feuds among the chiefs:

After the battle of historic fame at Metsovo, of which I send you the description and plan today, seeing the greatest conspiracies and treacheries existing against me on the part of my companions in arms, I was compelled to retreat from thence and take the direction of Thessaly. On my arrival there I found the same divisions prevailing between the different chiefs, and I came to the resolution to remain quiet in Agrapha, until I could come to some understanding with the Government of His Majesty. . . . The struggle which we have undertaken is great; it is higher than that of 1821, in as much as we aim at the restoration of the Greek Empire. But such a struggle requires union, subordination, order, primary means in abundance, and a Commander in Chief, otherwise there is an end to all hope. . . . The Government ought either at once to take up the struggle appointing publicly the proper persons to a regular army at a regular pay or let us sit down quietly at home, so that we may not be the causes of destruction of our fellow Christians. 32

Considering these elements, Anglo-French opposition, no organized Greek governmental support to the revolutionaries and internal feuds among the chiefs, the movement which ambitiously began as a repeat of 1821 ended in failure. All this much to the disgrace and devastation of the people who in the name of religion and nation had taken up arms to free themselves from the backward Ottoman Empire.

32 F.O. 32/217, Grivas to Georgandas, Agrapha, April 2, 1854, also see "Moniteur Universel" (No. 132), May 12, 1854.
B. Rupture of Greek-Turkish Relations and Anglo-French Reaction to the Insurrection

Western Europe was convinced that there was a definite connection between the Russo-Turkish disputes and the Greek uprisings in 1854. There can be little doubt that fragile relations between Russia and Turkey provided a strong reason for the Greeks to go through with an uprising in the south-western front of the Ottoman Empire since it would have been necessary for the Turks to concentrate their forces on the northern front. That the insurgents were taking direct orders from the Russians was untrue. Nesselrode made an announcement on March 18 dispelling all such accusations. He stated that the Tsar sympathized with Greece and with the Christians who were trying to free themselves from the Turkish yoke, as they had once before in 1821. 33 There was little doubt in the minds of Western Europeans, however, that the Greek revolts were indeed used by the Russians as strategic tools of distraction against the Turks. During the month of January the reports received at the Foreign Office were mostly about the widespread propaganda influence of Aion, the "Russian" party newspaper. The press propaganda received more attention than the real causes of the revolution, so obviously

33 See T.E. Evagelidos, Historia tou Othonos Basileos tes Hellados, 1832-1862 (History of Otho King of Greece, 1832-1862) (Athens, 1893), 549-50.
the British government and British public opinion were influenced by what were in many respects the effects of the insurrection and further the pro-Russian Greek newspaper *Aion* which had primarily the following only of those who sympathized with the "Russian" party. 34

In February, Wyse sent a report to his government expressing his fears of Russian influences in Greece and he linked the uprising on the frontier entirely to this influence. According to him when Kornilov visited Athens in 1854, he charged that the present ministry had radical pro-Russian elements which were dominant in the government and that the Foreign Minister allowed Greek government officials to contribute money for the *Megali Idea*. Further, Colonel Soutso deliberately substituted old officers of the army with young pro-Russian ones who favored Russian interests. Wyse went on to write:

The simple impression of the whole case (however it may be disguised is thus: a Russian government prepared to take advantage under Russian protection, for purposes of aggrandisement, of any contingency which in the course of events may chance to arise. Should such a contingency occur, should war for instance, become inevitable and be followed by any decided success on the part of Russia, or insurrectionary movements sufficiently serious in the Turkish Provinces contiguous to Greece, I am persuaded it would be a signal for the general movement. 35


The Greek embassy in London also reported the apprehensions of the Foreign Office concerning Russian involvement in Greece, but until February 9th there was no implication by the British government that the insurrectionary movements in the Provinces involved the Greek Court.

Russian influence and anti-Turkish sentiments in Greece caused concern to all European representatives at Athens. Baron de Thile, the Prussian minister at Athens, visited the king on one occasion after an anti-Turkish demonstration by the university students and a number of Greek soldiers which took place in Athens. The Baron pointed out to the king the political danger of such demonstrations and expressed his disapproval of such events. Finally, upon the suggestion of Wyse, the representatives of the four European Powers — England, France, Austria and Prussia — decided to send a collective note to the Greek government asking that it not get involved in the insurrection and that it remain in a position of neutrality. Paicos was warned that, "not only was the tranquility of the country endangered, but the King's liberty of action, his

36 A.Y.E. 1854 (No.3), Trikoupis to Paicos, London, January 19, 1854, also (No.5), Trikoupis to Paicos, London, February 6, 1854.

37 A.Y.E. 1854 (No. 9), Trikoupis to Paicos, London, February 9, 1854.

rights and person, and perhaps the dynasty." 39 This came as a shock to Otho, not so much because he and his throne were threatened as a result of this court's involvement in the insurrection, but because the Prussian and Austrian representatives signed this warning.

The four ministers who sent Paicos the warning about Greek government involvement in the insurrection advised Nechet Bey on diplomatic matters and gave him their full support. Upon the advice of Wyse, Nechet Bey, wrote to Paicos to protest "against the incursions of armed men into Ottoman territory and accused Athens of not having done anything to stop these hostile activities." 40 Paicos replied that he was doing everything he could but the nation simply did not possess the necessary military force needed to intervene in the uprising taking place in the Turkish Provinces. 41

Nechet Bey felt that Paicos was not complying with the requests of the Sublime Porte so he went once again to Wyse and Rouen for advice. They suggested that another note of warning should be sent to Paicos signed by the four European representatives. Baron Leykam, representative of Austria, and Baron de Thile did not sign the note. As they explained,


they did not have the proper authorization from their governments to do so. After the note was sent, Wyse and Paicos visited the king so they could get Otho's verbal commitment that Greece would follow a non-aggressive policy towards Turkey. The representatives took the opportunity to warn Otho that general war would have dangerous consequences for his throne. In order to be on the safe side, Wyse, Stratford Canning and Sir Henry Ward, the Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, "thought it necessary to use part of the British fleet stationed in the Mediterranean," for any unexpected developments in Greece. Instructions were also sent from London and Paris empowering the British and French ministers to order a blockade of the Greek capital, if they thought it necessary.

Lord Clarendon took further steps to instruct Wyse to relay the British government's disappointment with Athens and with Paicos' refusal to conform to Nechet Bey's requests. Twenty-four hours before a final telegram was sent to Paicos with a list of demands by the Turkish Charge d'Affaires in


43 Donta, Crimean War, 90-1.

44 Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 232-34.

in Athens Clarendon wrote the following letter to Wyse:

You will inform Mr. Paicos that as friendly advice has not been wanting but has been disregarded as the connivance of the Greek Court and Government with the hostile movement against Turkey is now beyond question, and as Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French are determined that their policy shall not be thus thwarted; the Greek Government must be prepared for the consequences of its own acts. If these consequences should be to endanger the throne and future welfare of Greece, the responsibility will rest upon the Greek ministers who have shown themselves to be ignorant or careless of the true interests of their own country. 46

On March 7th Nechet Bey sent a telegram to Paicos with the following list of demands: (1) The officers who took part in the uprising should be punished after trial in a Greek court of law, (2) those officials who helped to rouse the people against the neighboring state should be punished, (3) those in the political circle (in government) should be penalized if they contributed to the insurrection in any manner whatever, (4) Aion and other government newspapers should be regulated so that they do not excite the public mind with propaganda in favor of the revolution, and finally:

(5) to give assurance to the Sublime Porte that an investigation will be conducted to find the officer who opened the prisons of Chalcida and armed the criminals, and in conclusion, if after forty-eight hours until the setting of the sun of Tuesday 9 March, the Greek government has not granted a satisfactory answer to the demands of the Porte, he (Nechet Bey) is forced to ask for his passport as well as those of the entire personnel of the embassy. 47

46 Mavrokordatos Archive 008,873, Clarendon to Wyse, Foreign Office, March 6, 1854.

47 Evagelides, Otho, 550.
The time had come for the king to make a decision which would either mean blockade and suffering of the consequences for the Greek people or to take that daring step towards the realization of the Megali Idea and ignore the Turkish demands.

In reality, at least in the reality as seen through the eyes of Pelikas, the king wanted to fulfill his dream but at the same time he was afraid of the numerous warnings from Western Europe. In his memoirs Pelikas writes.

In the morning, the postponed Consular meeting took place before the King. The opinion not to give a hint that the Greek government was at fault prevailed. The necessity to buy time because the opportunity would be uncomparably better for us, when the Russian army had made advances, was clear. . . . With this spirit we examined one by one of Nechet Bey's demands and we thought, which one we should give an answer to. When we came to the resignation of the Professors, we said, that this sacrifice should be made for the good of the nation and the rest of the Ministers agreed. But the King with a certain emotion said: How! to start dismissing my personnel? Never! Paicos suggested, and we all approved, to present the answer tomorrow to the Parliament, as they do in all Constitutional States in order to gain support of the nation, and to appear to Turkey and to the Western Powers united and that of one will is the government and the nation. . . . The next day (after the secret meeting concerning the drafting of the answer to Nechet Bey) we returned. Paicos had worked with the King, who had kept the plans. We stayed almost to midnight, but the plans were not sent to us, when we received an announcement from the four ministers bringing to the attention of the government, the announcement of Nechet Bey for its serious results. Because we announced during the day, that we rejected the requests of Nechet Bey, the ambassadors hurried then to make their announcement. 48

On March 10 Nechet Bey announced the rupture of Greek-Turkish relations and left Athens. The Sublime Porte began to exile

48 Pelikas, Memoirs, 157-60.
Greek residents of the Ottoman Empire as soon as relations broke off. All commercial relations were also broken between the two countries and the Sultan did not allow ships with the Greek flag to sail into Turkish ports and also ordered all the Greek diplomats in Turkey to leave. 49

The four Powers were quick to express their displeasure, as Pelikas pointed out above, to the Greek government's answer to Nechet Bey and naturally blamed Greece for the rupture of relations. 50 Wyse went so far as to say that:

Mr. Paicos' note to Nechet Bey which like so many other similar communications seem only to have in view to drive the Sublime Porte to a declaration of hostilities which would rescue this government from disgrace of any longer maintaining this ignoble hypocrisy, but which at the same time would give the signal of a national war, inviting every class and person, however, objecting to the present conduct of the government in the disastrous struggle. 51

Even though Greece tried to defend its position in the recent interruption of relations with the Sublime Porte the fact remained that both Greek court and government were expecting such an outcome and many of them, perhaps most, were happy with the interruption of relations with a country which they

49 A.Y.E. 1854, (4/1d) see file labeled as Diakopai Sheseon Hellados-Turkias ( Interruption of Greek-Turkish Relations), Also A.Y.E. 1854 (4/1) Fuad Pasha.

50 Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 256.

never regarded as friendly. Pelikas wrote, that the morning after Nechet Bey left the Queen expressed her enthusiasm of the affair and that of her husband. 52

The month of April brought a renewed tide of diplomatic opposition by the Western Powers against Greece. Baron de Thile visited the palace at the request of the king after the interruption of relations with the Sublime Porte. Instead of trying to cover up or blame the Turks for the recent events Otho and Amalia told the Prussian minister that the king of Greece was not at liberty to retreat. The reason for this as Wyse reported to the Foreign Office was that:

He [Otho] had received the divine mission to liberate the Christian races from the yoke of the Mohammedan and that mission he was bound to answer, and must at every venture fulfill. . . . The Baron de Thile considers all further effort fruitless and looks with dismay on the probable results to their Majesties personally and the Dynasty from the course now pursued. 53

The Bavarian as well as the Austrian Court was very much displeased with the recent events in Greece and with the king's position in the entire affair.

Austria was especially concerned with the uprising in the Turkish Provinces, perhaps as much as France and England for there was a real threat that the revolution could

52 Pelikas, Memoirs, 162-63.

53 F.O. 32/216, Wuse to Clarendon, Athens, April 1, 1854.
spread to Montenegro. Since the Greeks were an ethnic minor-
ity and were revolting in the name of nation and religion the
rest of the Balkan people could sympathize with their struggle.
Count Buol cooperated closely, therefore, with Clarendon and
Drouyn de Lhuys. He sent a war vessel to Prevesa on April
21, and he was ready to cooperate militarily with the Turks
in suppressing an unexpected uprising at Montenegro. 54 Bri-
tain and France were ready to take more radical steps against
Greece. Five days before the Allied Powers warned Paicos that
they were also considering interruption of relations with
Greece, Clarendon instructed Wyse to inform the Greek govern-
ment that he felt Nechet Bey's demands were fair and moderate.
Further, the British government was greatly disappointed with
Paicos' decision to reject the Turkish demands. The Greek
government's answer to Nechet Bey was evasive and unsatisfac-
tory. Clarendon went on to write:

That the so-called national movement to which their Majes-
ties and the Greek Government affected to yield, has been
created and stimulated by the Court and Government, that
its subject was to excite the peaceable Christian subjects
of the Porte to revolt, that the Court and Government of
Greece were therefore deliberately aiding the cause of the
Emperor of Russia, with whom England and France are at war,
and in injuring the Sultan, whose cause England and France
are pledged to support, and that these being acts of direct
hostility against two of the Protecting Powers, the King
and Queen of Greece must be prepared for the consequences. 55

54 Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 259-60.

55 Mavrokordatos Archive, 008,888, No. 39, Clarendon
to Wyse, Foreign Office, April 8, 1854.
Matters appeared very critical for Greece. If Great Britain decided once again to blockade the ports of Greece she would have French military naval support and the moral support of the entire European community. In 1850 Palmerston's blockade of Piraeus was opposed by every government in Europe and by most politicians in Europe including most British. 56 The case, however, was not the same in 1854. No nation, including Russia which was the only country which approved of the Greek uprising, would come to the rescue of the young nation. The philhellinism of the Europeans no longer existed at the level it had during the War of Independence, so if the Allied Powers took measures against Greece they would have the approval of European public opinion. The government in Athens knew very well that its international position was weak and having no allies on its side who were ready to support her, Greece had necessarily to conform with the demands of the Western Powers.

Reports from the Greek embassy in London to Paicos indicated that it was absolutely necessary for Greece to declare neutrality or suffer an Allied occupation. Two days after Clarendon's dispatch of April 18th to Wyse, Trikoupis informed Athens that a meeting took place in London between Clarendon and the French minister there. They decided that

56 Parliamentary opinion was against the blockade of 1850. In 1854 the Greek insurrection, however, was severely criticized. See sessions of March 13, 1854, Hansard, 3rd series, CXXXI, 704-52.
their governments should order their representatives in Constantinople to prevent the Sublime Porte from declaring war against Greece, but for the present "to seize the ports of Greece as a payment for the borrowed loans to these (England and France)." When Wyse visited Paicos on the 13th the latter knew of the intentions of the Allied Powers so he was prepared to answer to the warnings and threats of Wyse with excuses and justifications for the present position of Greece. The Greek foreign minister did not attempt to conceal the role of his government in the uprisings, and even confirmed that Greece had indeed purchased the Russian ships at Trieste for 120,000 florins.

On April 11, Forth-Rouen and Wyse informed Paicos that any ships flying the Greek flag would be searched for arms and munitions, and if such are among the cargo of the ships they would be confiscated. Furthermore, the two representatives warned that the Russian ships purchased by Greece for purposes of war would "be stopped and detained by the English and French naval forces" if they were to be put to use against Turkey. Paicos realized that the worst was yet to come. He wrote to Mavrokordatos in Paris and asked

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57 A.Y.E. 1854 (18/3), Trikoupis to Paicos, London, April 10, 1854.

58 F.O. 32/216, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 14, 1854.

59 F.O. 32/216, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 26, 1854.
him to appeal to Drouyn de Lhuys and Thouvenel in order to review the situation in Greece. The Prime Minister felt that the threats from the French and British were unjustified since Greece, after all, did try to arrive at a compromise with the demands of Nechet Bey but the latter chose to break relations with the Greek government instead of working out the differences.

But how could France compromise her Near Eastern interests for the sake of Greece? The compromise had to be made by Otho for he was in no position to do otherwise. Instead of softening his position, however, the king was more determined than ever to carry out his expansionist foreign policy. He was convinced that the revolution would be successful and that the Western Powers would then have to recognize that their interests were with a greater Greece and not with a weak Turkey. The Queen went even further:

What can the Western Powers do to us, the Queen added, they'll take over Athens? Let them come; See here, we leave them our palace; we won't touch anything. If they wish to stay here we are moving to Thessaly. They'll prevent our ships from sailing? See here, Divine Providence is helping us; . . . they'll take a few of our war ships and will not allow us to move toward the sea? . . . they will not tie our hands and feet and then say to the Turks: "Come and kill them." But they will burn a few of our cities or our ships? In the revolution of 1821 also they burned but Greece rebuilt, the damage is only material. 61

60 Mavrokordatos Archive, 008-897, Paicos to Mavrokordatos, Athens, April 30, 1854.

61 Pelikas, Memoirs, 166.
The only experience Greece had of a blockade was that of 1850, and it was primarily the commercial class which suffered more than any other class. The economy in general was also effected, however, since the commercial class was one of the strongest economic sectors of Greece. The king only experienced humiliation of a political and moral nature not of the economic stress which did his people.

In face of the threats and warnings of the Western Powers the Greek Ministerial Council was divided, some fully supporting the foreign policy of Otho, others too afraid to follow extreme measures which could lead to damaging results for the welfare of the nation. Two of the ministers, Pelikas and Provelgios, who were realistic enough to foresee the consequences of the Megali Idea policy asked Otho to accept their resignation as a means of protest and disapproval of the present course followed by Greece. 62 Not even protests from his own ministers, however, were sufficiently strong to change the king's plans.

The British and French ministers at Athens realized that if the pro-Russian ministry was dismissed by Otho and was substituted by "English" and "French" politicians, then possibly the king would be persuaded, if not forced, through the influence of the two Western Protecting Powers to give up his policy of expansionism. In a meeting with the representatives of Austria, Prussia and Bavaria, who tried to per-
suade the king to change the course of his actions, Otho flatly rejected the idea of change of ministry. All the ministers of the four Western Powers admitted that even if there was to be a change of government "it would be impossible ... to find anyone in the present state of affairs, to accept such an arrangement, or if they did, there was no one, after former experience, who could trust His Majesty." On April 21, Wyse informed the Foreign Office that the king of Greece ignored the advice not only of the Allied Powers but also of the Germanic Powers and "still insists on believing the Russian promises." Otho was not so much sold on Russian promises, however, as he was on the Megali Idea. At one point after the Greek-Turkish break of relations he wanted to lead an expedition to Thessaly and to proceed on with an army to Constantinople. He was persuaded, however, not to carry out such a mission by his ministers, especially by Pelikas and Provelgios. Under such leadership it was inevitable that an occupation was the next calamity that Greece would suffer.

C. The Occupation of Greece

On April 9, the four European Powers -- England, France, Austria and Prussia -- signed a protocol at Vienna

63 F.O. 32/216, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 21, 1854.

64 Ibid.

65 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 646
laying down the measures to be taken concerning Greece.  

There was disagreement between the French foreign minister and Clarendon as to how the occupation of Greece should be handled. Drouyn de Lhuys feared that a blockade at Piraeus such as that of 1850 would create panic and chaos in the mainland whereas a blockade in Thessaly and Epirus was more practical under the circumstances since there were the areas of trouble. Clarendon opposed this proposition because he feared that an Anglo-French blockade in Epirus and Thessaly would stimulate more uprisings which could possibly spread as far as Constantinople. 67

The Germanic Powers on the other hand which were sympathetic to Otho and were deeply concerned about the effects an occupation would have on his throne voiced their opinions against both Clarendon's and Drouyn de Lhuys' plans of occupation. Franz Josef wrote to Maximilian:

I will willingly give you the promise that, whatever results the war might have, I would not permit any agreement which would be against the continued existence of the kingdom of Greece under the Bavarian Dynasty. I would even enlist my good services with England and France so that these Powers could express their opinions and act accordingly. I would look upon it as a political advantage, 68 if Greece were to find her supporters in the Germanic Powers.

Otho was fortunate in that he still had some protection for his throne from the Germanic Powers. As he was aware of this he

66 Donta, Crimean War, 122-23.


acted as the absolute monarch which he was from 1837 to 1843. On May 2, he ordered the chambers closed by royal ordinance. Pelikas immediately protested this act. Other politicians also protested for they felt that at times of crises, as the one Greece was suffering, there was a need to maintain the Chambers in session. 69 The king argued that the government was in need of funds so he thought that by closing the chambers he would save money from the salaries of senators. The reason behind Otho's act, however, was the fear that "the senate might take some hostile act leading to the fall of the Cabinet." 70

The Allied Powers (France and England) decided to use the payments due by Greece to the Protecting Powers for the guaranteed loan as an excuse to justify legally their occupation of Greece. Wyse addressed a note to the Greek government on May 10th stating that:

Her Majesty's Government will no longer allow the revenues of Greece, the first proceeds of which should by Treaty be appropriated to the payment of the charges of the Greek loans, to be diverted from that object and applied to the promotion of schemes in the interest of a Power with which they are at war; and that if it persists in its present misguided policy the Greek Government must not be surprised if measures are taken by England and France. . . . to control the receipts and expenditures of the Greek ex-chequer, and to deprive the Greek Government of these pecuniary resources which are so wantonly misapplied. 71

69 Pelikas, Memoirs, 199-201.


71 Cited in Levandis, Greek Foreign Debt, 50.
Rouen sent a similar note to Paicos stating the rights of French interference in Greek Affairs since Greece had not been capable of discharging her obligations to the French government. 72 Drouyn de Lhuys was even more severe with the Greek government than Clarendon. He warned Paicos that Greek war ships should not sail in the open sea, and if any of them violated this warning they would be subject to confiscation by French naval forces. 73

On May 13, French and British war ships entered the port of Piraeus. The next day Wyse and Rouen sent an ultimatum to the Greek government. When Otho realized that his throne was at stake he gave up his current policy and publicly declared the neutrality of Greece in the conflict between the Allied Powers and Russia. 74 All the advice and warnings from the European leaders concerning a possible Anglo-French occupation in the event Greece antagonized Turkey were insufficient to persuade the king to change his policy. He was so blinded by the enthusiasm of the Megali Idea that only a foreign invasion could make him realize the stupidity of his foreign policy. As a result of the irresponsible conduct of the Greek monarch and of the British and French who were ready to occupy any country that would stand in the way of

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72 Le Moniteur Universel (No. 134), May 14, 1854.
73 Donta, Crimean War, 127-28.
their political, economic and strategic interests, the people of "little Greece" suffered a three-year long invasion.

With the declaration of neutrality came the fall of the pro-"Russian" ministry as the Allied Powers had wished and Alexander Mavrokor-datos was summoned by the king on May 16, to form a new ministry. The new administration announced shortly after it took power the position of Greece in relation to the Western European Powers:

We feel the dreadful position of Greece in which the nation's matters are found. Commerce was eliminated from the hands of thousands of businessmen, navigation was condemned to idleness, and other dangers threatened the nation, abandoned to the disfavor of the Great Powers. . . . His Majesty our King, respecting in his fatherly concern these sufferings and dangers he consented to the two naval Powers, England and France, complete neutrality because from this the dangers are prevented and the benefits, we were being deprived of, are being recovered. We respect as no one else the kind sympathy of the Greeks for our brothers in whose fortune are concerned the Great Powers. 76

The new cabinet was made up of members of the "English" and "French" parties who were against the policy of expansionism and were not puppets of the Crown as were previous ministers ever since Kolettes. As a result of the change of ministry, and of course the Anglo-French occupation, the king's power

75 A. Mavrokor-datos, President of the Council and Minister of Finance, Riga Palamides, Minister of the Interior, Admiral Canaris, Minister of Marine, P. Argyropoulos, Minister of Foreign Affairs, General Kalergis, Minister of War, Calligas, Minister of Justice, and Psylas, Minister of Religion and Public Instruction.

76 Cited in Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 648.
was substantially diminished. If it was not for the powerful influence of the Germanic Powers who had not yet committed themselves in the Crimean War, 77 the king of Greece would have been forced to abdicate. Baron de Thile received instructions from his government to protect the king's rights against any possible abuses of the Occupying Powers. 78 The king of Prussia was very disappointed to hear of the Anglo-French occupation of Greece and was mostly worried about Otho's future when he wrote Maximilian that the kingdom of Greece was dearly regarded by him. Otho's father, Ludwig, further wrote that he opposed the sinister plans of the Protecting Powers with regards to Greece and that their recent occupation was illegal and would never be recognized by his kingdom. He noted that:

A state which has been brought into existence by Three should be devasted by Two, secondly, that the creation of the Three shall be accepted and represented in the European family of States. In the same way "we" will only recognize the disintegration of the state of Hellas by the general decision of all. European Monarchs: but we can guarantee immediately that we shall not recognize such a beginning. This is my proposal. 79

Even though Otho still had the German support, the occupying forces made his position very difficult in the realm. He

77 For the ambivalent attitude of the Hapsburg Empire in the Crimean War, see B. Jelavich, The Hapsburg Empire in European Affairs, 1814-1918 (Chicago, 1969), 69-79. Also see Paul W. Schroedor, Austria, Great Britain and the Crimean War (Cornell University, 1972), 143-231.

78 Donta, Crimean War, 134-35.

79 Cited in Bower & Bolitho, Otho I, 200, also see Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, 978-79.
began retreating to the wishes of Wyse and Rouen on matters of policy and of government personnel. One of the matters in which the two representatives of England and France came to sharp opposition with the king of Greece was about the appointment of General Kalergis as Minister of War. Kalergis was exiled to England where he had met Napoleon III and had become a very close friend of his. When the occupation began Kalergis, as well as the other members of the Ministerial Council, was forced upon the king. At first Wyse objected to the Kalergis appointment because he feared that the General was a radical pro-"French" politician and could present problems to the British interests in Greece. Rouen, however, insisted that Kalergis be retained in the ministry and the French minister's wish was fulfilled.

The removal of the king's pro-Russian advisors was another desired goal of Wyse and Rouen which was achieved with the occupation.

Before the ministry would accept office they required the retirement of General Spiro Millos, General Mamouris, General Gardiakotti Grivas and General Molokotroni, Grand Marechal, from their post of aides de camp to His Majesty. This post is more than honorary in this country. It allows

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80 Kalergis took part in the September Revolution of 1843 and was one of the most hated enemies of Otho.

81 Donta, Crimean War, 135-36. Kalergis wanted to replace Otho with a French Prince and this presented a direct threat to Otho but also an indirect threat to Great Britain, see Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 650.

82 Donta, Crimean War, 137-38.
continual and easy access to the royal ear; these generals have been recently charged with the special task of supporting the insurrection and generals, Spiro Millos, Mamouris and Kolokotronis, have been the zealous and unscrupulous abettors and chief leaders under Russian auspices of the whole intrigue. 83

Kalergis was instrumental in many schemes to degrade Otho for reasons of revenge and for political reasons as well. As long as he had the French Legation's support, Kalergis was ready to display his powers with unlimited selfishness and disregard for the humiliation of Greece which the Occupying Powers were responsible for and he was an instrument of their plans. "The conspicuous role," writes Donta, "which the French dramatized with Rouen as its leader, allowed Kalergis, since Mavrokordatos had not yet arrived from Paris, to become, in the protection of the French, all powerful." 84 The king and Greece itself were further humiliated by the continuous displays of French military strength which Admiral Tinan, 85 head of French occupation forces, was so anxious to parade in the streets of Athens and even in front of the gates of Otho's palace. 86

83 F.O. 32/217, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, June 12, 1854.

84 Donta, Crimean War, 139.

85 In March 1854 Admiral Tinal warned the Greeks of Thessaly that France was committed to help defend the Turkish soil and that they, the Thessaloi, should not aid the revolutionaries. See Georgiou, "Thessaly Insurrection of 1854," 740.

86 Dragoumes, Recollections, 192.
Such abuses by the French and General Kalergis forced Otho to call quickly for Mavrokordatos' return to Athens. The new administration had been declared in the middle of May but the new Prime Minister was not in Greece to lead the government. After he received a letter from the king on May 27th, requesting that he form and lead the new ministry, Mavrokordatos responded that he preferred to serve as ambassador to Paris. The reason for the decline of the king's request by the minister was that he wanted to be certain that Otho understood clearly that there would be no pro-French favoritism played by Mavrokordatos, and he further wished to clarify the king's position toward the future government of Greece. The king wrote to Mavrokordatos once again persuading him to return to Athens by the middle of July.

The new Prime Minister was sworn-in on the morning of July 29, and took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, held by Argyropoulos who became the Minister of Finance, since May 16. Otho assured the new Prime Minister of the coopera-

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87 Mavrokordatos Archives 008,909, Otho to Mavrokordatos, Athens, May 27, 1854.

88 Donata, Crimean War, 141. Otho had sent an official dispatch to Mavrokordatos on May 16 ordering him to become Prime Minister, see Mavrokordatos Archives 008,911, Otho to Mavrokordatos, Athens, May 16, 1854.

89 Mavrokordatos owed the sum of 50,000 dr. in debts to French lenders which had to be paid by the Greek government if he wished to be allowed to leave Paris. This delayed his return to Greece. See Petrakakos, History of Greece, 163, also Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 158-59.
tion of the Court in both domestic and foreign affairs, so there were no problems to be expected since no antagonism between court and government would exist. Otho, however, was used to being an absolute ruler and his sense of the word "co-operation" did not mean subordination to the Occupying Powers, as Rouen and Wyse thought.

Before Mavrokomandatos was sworn-in he met with the representatives of the Allied Powers on July 23rd to discuss what they thought "ought to be the policy of the government before he formally accepted office." The king was informed by Mavrokomandatos that it was his intention to schedule such a meeting with Rouen and Wyse and Otho had approved, but not without expressing his discontent with both representatives. Rouen wrote to Drouyn de Lhuys that, "the king's insistence in forcing the new ministers to protest against the Anglo-French occupation, had produced a very bad impression on public opinion and he has given reasons concerning the steady willingness of this Prince to keep his promises opposite France and England." Wyse also wrote to his government that Rouen denied that there were any grounds for the impressions which had taken possession of the king. He also main-

90 F.O. 32/219, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 31, 1854.


92 Grèce 68 (No. 87), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens, June 7, 1854.
tained that the policy carried out by both the French and British Legations in Athens was straight forward and could be summarized in two categories, (A) the observance of Greek neutrality and (B) a radical political change in system for the future. Wyse went on to write:

With regard to the second object we held in view, a radical change of the whole system. . . . There was no one department of government which did not need the largest and most sweeping reforms. Each of these would in turn demand and receive his most careful attention. Elections were to be made free, finance rescued from ruin, corruption repressed, good faith and national credit restored. In seconding all these desirable ameliorations, our two governments had but one policy, as one purpose, the permanent happiness and security of Greece. 93

If one reads beyond all the fine things Wyse and Rouen had in mind for Greece, it is obvious that political and financial control were the objectives strived for by both France and England. The occupying Powers were promising freedom from the bonds of absolutism, the restoration of the principles of the constitution and stability, economic and political, for Greece while their naval forces occupied Greece thus denying her independence. Furthermore, Wyse and Rouen, wished to eliminate the powers of the king and give those powers not to the poeple of Greece but to their respective countries. What is worse than the hypocrisy of the Occupying Powers is the fact that the Greeks believed in the myth that the Protecting Powers would really help their nation to achieve its goals, whether they would be national expansion, as in the

93 Ibid.
case of the "Russian" party, internal reform as was the case with the "English" party or both as the followers of the "French" party believed.

One of the immediate concerns of the Allied Powers was the restoration of Greek-Turkish relations and the end of all traces of the revolution in the Provinces. In order to be successful in their task the complete cooperation of court and government were essential. Monsieur Guerin, French Consul at Syra, was selected by Rouen to represent France in Lamia where negotiations were to open in order to end hostilities and restore relations between Greece and the Sublime Porte. Merlin, vice consul at Athens, was the British representative and Colonel Pakenor represented the Greeks. The Greek ministry and especially General Kalergis worked with the British and French representatives to insure the end of the insurrection and the end of brigandage so further hostilities with the Sublime Porte might be prevented. Most of the

94 Professor Georgiou, Thessaly Insurrection of 1854, maintains that the Thessaly undertaking was terminated primarily due to the intervention of the Allied Powers and especially France when M. Guerin was sent to Lamia in June. See Georgiou, 740-45. Colonel Pakonor was sent to disband the large force which Hadji-Petros commanded in Thessaly. According to Wyse 10,000 men were led by Hadji-Petro who fought his last battle against the Turks on June 6. See F.O. 32/217, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, June 7, 1854. Also see Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 166-68.
chiefs of Greek insurrectionary bands were out of Turkish territory by the middle of June. 95 Rouen reported to the Quai d'Orsay on June 7th, that,

Theodore Grivas, Tsavellas, Ragos and a great number of officers returned to Greece already, in order to declare submission to the government. Epirus may regard such time as very peaceable. The defeat of the Greeks in Skoulilagar gia provoked the last blow in the revolution of that province. 96

Grivas, as well as other leaders of the insurrection promised to support the new ministry even though it was in fact a "ministry of occupation." 97 One of the immediate consequences of the Anglo-French occupation was the political division created among politicians as well as the public. There was a sharp division between those who supported the Anglo-French intervention in Greece and those who were Russian supporters. The division was even sharper when the king became the spokesman against Anglo-French occupation and Kalergis the spokesman of the occupying forces. In June the Minister of War went so far as to defend the foreign troops to a group of Greek army officers who had been outspoken about the abuses of the French in Piraeus and in Athens. 98

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95 F.O. 32/218, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, June 17, 1854.
96 Grece 68 (No. 87), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens, June 7, 1854.
97 Grivas was considered suspicious by the new administration and was not trusted by the ministers. See Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 178. For the retreat of the chiefs see F.O. 32/218, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, June 17, 1854, also Mavrokordatos Archive 008, 916, Grivas to Louka, May 26, 1854.
98 F.O. 32/218, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, June 27, 1854.
Public opinion was an important concern of both Wyse and Rouen. In the beginning of the occupation Wyse believed that the people of Greece were thrilled to see foreign troops on their soil. By the middle of August, however, he was very concerned about the rising of anti-French and anti-British attitudes among the Greeks. Wyse was convinced that the attacks of the Greek press against the foreign troops at Pireaus were in the interest of the Russians and the "Russian" party as well as the Camarilla. He wrote to Clarendon that there was little that he and Rouen could do to control the slanderous remarks of the press because it had the support of the entire government behind it. He went on to write that:

The chief of these organs here are the Aion and the Elpis; the Aion the old supporter of Russian policy and proceedings and now of the Court; and the Elpis the newly stipended advocate of the same party, at times repeating in its columns the very language of the Palace, and even of the Queen.

Wyse was correct in maintaining that the press shared the nationalism of the court and the "Russian" party but it also reflected the nationalist sentiments of the public which wished nothing more than the defeat of Turkey and her Western Allies who were occupying Greek soil.


100 F.O. 32/220, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, August 22, 1854.
Besides the blow to their independence shattered by the Powers who helped to create the nation of Greece, the occupied subjects fell victims to a physical disaster brought by the occupation forces. One of the worst cases of cholera ever to hit Greece was responsible for the lives of thousands in a very short period. A French ship carrying soldiers from Crimea came to the port of Piraeus in early June. A number of men carrying the deadly disease were taken off the ship to be hospitalized in a temporary hospital set up by the occupying forces. This was the beginning of a disaster which claimed, it is estimated, seven thousand lives in Piraeus and thirty thousand in Athens. 101 A panic hit the country as people began leaving their property and loved ones to escape death. In Piraeus only sixty families were left after a few days of the spreading of the disease. Dragoumes who was fortunate to live through this catastrophe describes it in the following manner:

After a short while the streets were converted to deserts, the working shops shut down, inside the houses all voices were morbid and the town from one end to the other became quiet from the infinite lack of people; only the sound of your own footsteps ascended to your and it roused your fright. Here and there you'd meet a man slow-walking alone with a face of wonder and lividness... Laws, police, hospitals, doctors, everything and everyone had been paralyzed by fear and death. 102

101 Fotiades, The Exile, 227.

102 Dragoumes, Recollections, II, 197-98.
The disease spread as far as the islands when many people who carried it tried to escape the horror of Athens and Piraeus before they died. Due to the cholera the occupying forces asked to be allowed to relocate at Patesia (an area outside Athens which was not contaminated), but their request was flatly denied by the Prime Minister who threatened to resign if the Anglo-French troops relocated.

Mavrokokordatos was only trying to prevent the disease from spreading any more than it already had, but apparently his denial of the forces' removal was received in bad faith by the French Admiral de Tinan. The Admiral chose to create a major incident and once again displayed his authority to the devastated Greek nation. When the Minister of Justice, P. Bargoles, recalled the alternate district attorneys of Patras and Nauplia and proceeded to promote the Justice of the Peace of Piraeus, Admiral Tinan accused the minister of being a Russophile and even threatened him personally that action would be taken to have him removed from office. In view of such direct intervention by officials of the Occupying Powers in the affairs of the Greek state, Mavrokokordatos could only vigorously protest to Wyse and Rouen and insist

103 Fotiades, The Exile, 297-98

104 Evagelides, Otho, 572-79, also Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, 672-73.
for an immediate settlement. Realizing the impact such an affair could have on the public mind and the European community after the press picked it up, the two representatives settled it immediately. Direct and indirect intervention in Greek state affairs by the Allied Powers was what Greece could expect under the circumstances. It was the price that Greece had to pay for the foolishness of a nationalist-expansionist foreign policy pursued by an irresponsible monarch and a pro-Russian and royalist cabinet.

D. Restoration of Greek-Turkish Relations
and the Treaty of Kalinja

The occupation of Greece by the two Western Protecting Powers was illegal for it violated the treaty of 1832 which guaranteed Greece its independence. Just as the British blockade of 1850 was illegal because France and Russia had not been informed of it until after it took place, similarly 1854 Franco-British occupation was illegal because Russia, the third Protecting Power, did not consent to the actions of the other two Protecting Powers.

For most Greeks as well as those sympathetic to Greece it was expected that the occupation like the blockade of 1850 would be a temporary affair, but more than eight months had passed since the Franco-British naval forces landed in Piraeus and there was no sign that they would be leav-

105 Evangelides, Ibid., 579-81.
ing. In an attempt to justify the continuing Anglo-French occupation of Greece Wyse wrote the following dispatch to the Foreign Minister of Great Britain:

The "occupation" was designed to secure Turkey from lawless aggression, and to establish good government in Greece. The Frontier is tranquil, but good government has only commenced. The most important organic laws, respecting Electoral and Municipal Reforms, the Regulation of the Press, the liberalizing of the tariff, the reorganization of Education, the reconstruction of the army, the ensuring the independence and purity of the bench, the revival of Commerce, the development of Industry, the reestablishment of friendly relations, based on commercial and extradition treaties, with Turkey, have all to pass. The purification of every Department of Administration from the corruption and incapacity in which the old system had flung them, has to be effected. 106

If the facts supported these claims of the British minister perhaps the Greek historians would regard the period of the occupation as one of the greatest in Modern Greece. But how can any "occupation" of one nation by another, no matter what the good intentions of the Occupying Powers are, be beneficial to the occupied people when it is a recognized fact by all those politically conscious that the first guiding principle of all nations is their own national self-interests.

In spite Wyse's theoretical jargon which was only intended, as was pointed out above, to justify an occupation of a helpless country, the issue of immediate concern to both ministers of the Allied Powers in Greece was the restoration of Greek-Turkish relations. The occupying forces would never

106 F.O. 32/227 (No. 7), Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, January 17, 1855.
leave Piraeus if relations between Greece and Turkey re-
ained broken. In an interview which took place at St.
Cloud between the Emperor Napoleon III and Mavrokordatos
before the latter became Prime Minister, Napoleon expressed
his determination to have Greece observe neutrality towards
Turkey. He told Mavrokordatos that the king of Greece and
the government must reestablish relations with the Sublime
Porte otherwise, if the king intended to adopt another con-
duct, "he (Napoleon) should not only retain the force of
5,000 men now in Greece but if necessary increase it to
10,000 or even 20,000, until it was sufficient to accomplish
this object." 107 The restoration of relations with Turkey
was Mavrokordatos' desired goal who believed that Greek ex-
pansion was a dream for the present and a policy only for
the distant future.

Early in August the Prime Minister took the first
steps to open negotiations with the Sultan's government. He
communicated with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and proposed
to send M. Barozzi, ex-consul at Andrianople, to represent
Greece in Constantinople. 108 During this time Mavrokordatos
also took measures to end brigandage in the Greek-Turkish

107 F.O. 32/218, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 8,
1853.

108 F.O. 32/219, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, August 11,
1854.
frontiers realizing that the presence of this element in Greece presented a threat to the Ottoman Empire and could affect the Greek government's attempts to restore relations with Turkey. Furthermore, the new administration made efforts to restore Ottoman property plundered by the insurgents.

In the first conference which was held in Constantinople between the representatives of England, France, Greece and Turkey, the Sublime Porte expressed its enthusiasm with the Mavrokordatos government and was pleased with his proposal of a commercial treaty between Greece and Turkey. Reshid Pasha, the Turkish representative at the conference, however, continued to press for "the recognition for the principle of indemnity," which meant that an already economically weak Greece would have to pay for damages it never committed directly since it never declared war on Turkey. Stratford de Redcliffe, who was just as anxious as Napoleon and Mavrokordatos to have Greek-Turkish relations normalized again, was more concerned with the security of the Greek-Turkish frontiers than anything else for he feared that the threat of a


110 Mavrokordatos Archive 008,971, Barozze to Mavrokordatos, Constantinople, September 28, 1854, also F.O. 32/221, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, September 27, 1854.
nationalist revolt could change the character of the Eastern Question. The Greeks on the other hand hoped to gain in commercial and navigational benefits from the Treaty. So the problem was to draw up such a compromise settlement which would satisfy all parties involved. Stratford wrote to Wyse on this matter that:

It is essential to have the bases of the commercial treaty in a more intelligible and definite form. Turkey is securing to Greece the advantages desirable from commerce and navigation with the Imperial territories is entitled to have its tranquility guaranteed on the score of abuses in protection, and other matters of intercommunication between the two countries so delicately circumstanced towards each other. 111

Stratford de Redcliffe accused Mavrokordatos of delaying the conclusion of the Treaty by not conforming to the stated wishes of the Sublime Porte, namely, the guarantees of security and the principle of indemnity. 112 By early December the Greek Prime Minister was persuaded by Rouen and Wyse to meet the demands of the Sublime Porte so that the treaty could be worked out. 113

One of the major objections which the Greek government had concerning the procedure for the treaty negotiations before

111 F.O. 32/222, Private, Stratford de Redcliffe to Wyse, Constantinople, November 29, 1854.

112 Barozze informed Mavrokordatos that Stratford de Redcliffe was a philhellen and "hoped for a great future for our country" but that he wanted things his way. Mavrokordatos Archive 008,971, Barozze to Mavrokordatos, Constantinople, September 28, 1854.

113 F.O. 32/222, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, December 7, 1854.
the substance of the treaty began to be negotiated was the
demand of the Sublime Porte that Mavrokordatos should send
to Constantinople an Envoy Extraordinary who was to beg par-
don on behalf of the king of Greece, for what had happened
in Epirus, Thessaly and Chalcidice. This seemed an outrag-
eous demand to the Greek Court as well as to many supporters
of Otho who felt that by fulfilling such a demand Greece would
be admitting the king's involvement in the revolution. It was
not only a humiliating act against the king but also against
the honor of the Greek nation.

Immediately the Greek press attacked the Sublime Porte
and its Allies for making such a demand on an occupied country.
The following article was published in Elpis (Hope) in early
January.

That neither Mr. Mavrokordatos, nor any other minister of
Greece will ever consent to such humiliation, is to us
quite certain. We are only sorry to see that Mr. Mavro-
kordatos, who has sufficient perspicacity, did not long
ago forsee that which we so long repeated; that as long
as the war shall continue between the Western Powers and
Russia, the reestablishment of our relations is an idle
fancy. Since the Governments interested, in order to
justify before the public opinion of Europe the measures
taken against Greece, qualified the last struggle of the
Christians in Turkey and the part which Greece took there-
in, as a Russian Movement; . . . the hatred against Russia,
inspired the Belligerent Powers, as well as those who re-
main neutral, with the desire of humiliating her, and orig-114
inated also the idea, that every Greek was a spy of Russia.

Mavrokordatos' position was that of the middle man who was con-
tinuously pressured by Rouen and Wyse on the one hand and Otho

114 ELPIS (No. 788), Athens, January 1, 1855.
on the other to carry out contradictory policies.

At the beginning of his appointment the Prime Minister seemed to please the king because he checked the power of Kalergis. Otho believed that Mavrokkordatos would not be the sort of puppet to Wyse and Rouen that Kalergis was and, furthermore, the king was convinced that the new Prime Minister would be devoted to the Crown. The good relationship that existed between the king and Mavrokkordatos in July was replaced by antagonism in September. The reason for this, primarily, was the fact that the French and British representatives' pressure in Athens kept the new administration as far from the king's influence as was possible. In a letter to Francis Joseph, Otho complained that he had entrusted his Prime Minister the full cooperation of the Court but as he put it:

Mavrokkordatos was not able though until today to live up to my hopes, with which we supported him. . . The foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the country which is based on the strength of the foreign forces stationed near the capital, prevent him in his actions. . . . I beg you then, as is the interest of the independence of Greece, that you take a stand and declare, that it is time to finally put an end to the occupation. 115

Opposition to Mavrokkordatos came not only from the king but from faithful ministers to the king whose devotion to Otho exceeded their devotion to their parties. Riga Palamides,

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115 Otho to Francis Josef, Athens, September 1, 1854. Cited in Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, 980-81.
Minister of the Interior, and Christides, Minister of Finance, were two of the most prominent political figures who turned against the Prime Minister, thereby, creating a schism within the administration. Consequently, the polarization of the two opposing forces, the Anglo-French on the one side and the royalists on the other, was becoming greater and the power of Mavrokordatos was diminishing.

On December 12, Riga Palamides wrote a letter to Fuad Pasha cautioning him and his government against the intentions of Greek Prime Minister who happened to be a Phanariot. He warned Fuad Pasha that Mavrokordatos should not be trusted in so far as the negotiations for the restoration of Greek-Turkish conflict were concerned. When the British representative in Athens discovered that Palamides had warned Fuad Pasha about Mavrokordatos' intentions and that Christides in collaboration with the Minister of the Interior were waging war on the Prime Minister he felt that the entire affair was the scheme of the Crown. He wrote to Clarendon that:

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116 Phanariotes came from a section in Constantinople and many of them worked in the Greek or Turkish government. They were well off and many took part in the War of Independence. The Turks viewed them with suspicion.

117 Mavrokordatos Archive 009,043, Secret and Confidential, Barozze to Mavrokordatos, Constantinople, January 3, 1855.
Mr. Christides' opinions are well known, and his late alliance with Riga Palamides and Gardiakotte Grivas is based on the hopes of giving them early effect. He would not venture on such a course, however, without the countenance of the Court, no more than the Court would show such countenance, unless they witnessed the intimacy of M. Christides with the French Legation, and entertained the presumption, that no control had been exercised over his designs, or such control had been in vain.

The Mavrokordatos administration was made up of politicians affiliated with both "French" and "English" parties and because the occupying forces had one policy in the Near East it was assumed that these two parties would hold the same. Even though this assumption holds true to a large extent for the consensus on the foreign policy of the Mavrokordatos ministry, the same did not hold true for any other measures. Furthermore, Mavrokordatos was a member of the "English" party which those who belonged to the "French" had traditionally opposed. But the feuds that were developing among the members of the ministry were not due simply to party differences but to basic differences between support of the Crown which to many meant support of Greece or support of the Occupying Forces. And it was primarily the king who was behind such a movement, for the obvious reasons, and not as much the French Legation as Wyse emphasizes.

Palamides and Christides charged that Mavrokordatos and the Allied Powers were responsible for stalling the treaty

118 F.O. 32/227, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, January 24, 1855.
with the Sublime Porte and by so doing they were responsible for the economic loss suffered by the Greek commerce and navigation. Barozze, however, gained the confidence of the representatives of England, France and Turkey in Constantinople and he made considerable progress in the negotiations. By early May the Greek Court and the two Western Powers agreed to a large extent on the terms of the treaty between Greece and the Ottoman Empire. Upon the advice of France and England, Andreas Koundouriotes was appointed Minister to Constantinople and Riza-Halel Bey, Minister at Athens. The treaty, which took almost a year to be worked out, was signed at Kalinja on May 27th 1855, by Koundouriotes and Fuad Pasha. The title of the treaty was "Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire" and some of the key articles in it are listed below:

Article I. "The subjects of His Majesty the King of Greece and those of His Imperial Majesty, the Sultan, can in each of the two States, exercise reciprocally commerce by land and by sea, with total freedom and security."


120 Mavrokordatos Archive 009,051, Barozze to Mavrokordatos, Constantinople, January 27, 1855. It was fortunate for Mavrokordatos that the Sublime Porte did not take the propaganda letter of R. Palamides seriously and continued the negotiations in good faith, see Mavrokordatos Archive 009,048, Barozze to Mavrokordatos, Constantinople, January 20, 1855.
Article II. "The subjects of each party in the contract will be exempt in the state of the other from all conscription and from all military service on land or sea, of whatever nature it may be."

Article IV. "The merchant ships, of the two High parties contracted, whether they are empty or carrying a cargo of merchandise or other articles of whatever type will navigate in complete freedom and security, under their own flag in the seas and waters of either country."

Article VIII. "The war vessels of each Power which meet ships belonging to the merchant marine of the other, will allow these to freely continue their route and even aid them in case of need."

Article XII. "The subjects of one and the other Power can freely buy and trade in any part of the two respective states merchandise bought from foreign countries without being subject to various dues. . . ."

Article XIX, "It is agreed that no war ship can provide and arm in the ports and the shores of either of the high contracted parties." 121

After Koundouriotes was appointed Minister at Constantinople Fuad Pasha expressed his governments full confidence in Mavrokordatos, see A.Y.E. 1855, 19/1 (No. 71, Koundouriotes to Mavrokordatos, Constantinople, April 24, 1855.

121 For the full text in Turkish, Greek and French see
This treaty which normalized commercial and navigational relations between the Sublime Porte and Greece lasted until 1897 when Greece made another attempt to bring the Megali Idea into reality, and after the resolution of that conflict it was modified and it lasted until 1923.

France and England, and especially Stratford de Redcliffe, believed that they had achieved a major diplomatic victory by the negotiation of and success of this treaty and Redcliffe wrote to the Greek Prime Minister after the treaty was signed to express his satisfaction with its results. Greece was also pleased with the establishment of the treaty. On June 8th, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate passed the treaty and issued it henceforth as a law of the nation.

A.Y.E. 1855 a.a.k/Η. This treaty is also in British and Foreign State Papers, LVI, 1381-89, also in G. Moradounghian, ed., Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'empire Ottoman, II (Paris, 1897-1903), 437-44.


123 Donta, Crimean War, 144.

124 Mavrokordatos Archive 009,088, Stratford de Redcliffe to Mavrokordatos, Constantinople, June 9, 1855.

125 Mavrokordatos Archive 009,087, The Treaty and the Resolution of the Chambers and Senate are included.
Wyse felt that the Treaty placed the relations of Greece "with Turkey, on a far surer and clearer foundation, than they were before and . . . it will much facilitate, it is to be hoped, for the future, the maintainance of peace and order between the two countries." The people who benefited most were those in commerce for during the year of disrupted relations with Turkey they suffered greatly and as a result the Greek economy also deteriorated considerably. As Wyse remarked in a note appraising the Treaty:

Its (the Treaty's) immediate results to the commercial interests of this country are incalculable. Mr. Consul Wilkinson states it to me, to be his conviction that had the state of interruption and exclusion, consequent on the breaking up of diplomatic relations between Greece and Turkey been allowed to continue, it necessarily would have been had not overtures for the present Treaty been made through this Legation and the Embassy in Constantinople, there is little doubt, that Greek commerce would have suffered a disturbance very little different from general bankruptcy and ruin.

In spite of the general approval and enthusiasm concerning the Treaty there was some opposition by the press under the control of Riga Palamides, C. Levídes, Soutso and Christides, all well known royalists who were opposed to Mavrokoordatos and the Anglo-French attempts to restore Greek Turkish relations. Otho and his followers did not care so much about

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127 Ibid.

the fact that the economy of Greece benefited from the Treaty as they could only see that the Treaty was the result of Anglo-French collaboration with Mavrokordatos, and the Sublime Porte representing the defeat of the court's foreign policy.
CHAPTER V

THE PROLONGED OCCUPATION, 1854-1857

A. Otho's Expansionist Foreign Policy

After the Declaration of Neutrality

One of the questions which scholars of modern Greek history and the Eastern Question are concerned with is the long and illegal Franco-British occupation of Greece. Why did the Anglo-French naval forces stay in Greece almost a year after the Treaty of Paris was signed? What was the purpose behind the prolonged occupation? It is clear why troops had to be sent to Greece in May 1854 but the question of why these troops stayed there for such a long period of time has not been dealt with in detail by historians. To answer these questions the factors of economic and political control of Greece by the Western Powers as well as a persistent expansionist, pro-Russian in many respects, foreign policy of Otho will be examined in this final chapter.¹

¹ There is only one work which deals with the role of Greece in the Crimean War, that of Domna Donta, Crimean War. This study focuses on the years 1853-1854, from the beginning of the Menshikov Mission to the beginning of the Mavrokordatos administration. It does not cover the entire history of the occupation and its consequences. Another recent study on the Greek-Turkish war of 1854 is that of Dimitri Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854. This is a study focusing mostly on the Thessaly revolt of 1854 and does not go beyond that year. Other works on
Otho's foreign policy was responsible for the occupation of 1854 and its devastating economic, political and social consequences. Yet some of the most prominent Greek historians have vigorously defended that foreign policy. Kyriakides writes the following:

The policy of Otho was the national policy, indoubtably then it was the duty of the Greek people to observe this stand, which it observed; if it was not benefited, if it was harmed, this is irrelevant; its stand, its past, its history, this was the policy sketched and this was what King had to follow having in conscience his national mission. 2

Another historian eulogizes the policy of the Greek Court in the following manner:

This policy not rightfully, was characterized as exclusively dynastic policy. It was a policy which the people wanted. . . . As much as it looked Russian on the surface as from the facts that policy, the responsibility from which the Crown courageously resumed, was Greek policy. 3

Another Greek historian who favored that policy of the Court characterized the Queen as brave and patriotic and sympathized with the difficult problems facing Otho and Amalia. According to Filaretos, the king and Queen were determined "in the fulfillment of the country's duty." 4

the Othonian period such as Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, Trifonas Evagelides, Otho, and other works mentioned throughout this study have not dealt with the diplomatic aspects of the period 1854 to 1857 nor have they covered the consequences of the occupation. Driault's Histoire Diplomatique is the only work which briefly covers the diplomatic relations of Greece and the Great Powers beyond 1854 but it fails to tie in the domestic political scene.

2 Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 674.
3 Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 224-25
4 Philaretos, Foreign Rule, 103-04.
Undoubtedly nationalist and royalist favoritism has prevailed in the interpretations of those historians at the expense of historical objectivity. But if for the sake of this so-called "historical objectivity" such motives as nationalism and royalism are set aside, the policy of the Greek Court turns out to be very unrealistic and harmful, in the light of the deplorable condition of the Greek nation and also the Near Eastern policy of the Western Powers.

Otho and Amalia vainly pursued a dream of expansionism since the Kolettes administration reintroduced the Megali Idea to the Greek people. The king and queen sought the opportunity since the Mousouros Incident to antagonize the Ottoman Empire and to have an open conflict with the Turks in hope of gaining the Turkish Provinces north of the Greek frontier. During the Holy Places controversy the Greek Court prepared the people through its propaganda to be ready to face the Turkish enemy in war. And before the Menshikov Mission had finally been declared a failure Otho had started supporting the insurrection in the Provinces of Thessaly and Epirus.

The foreign policy of the Megali Idea which began as a dream for Otho and Amalia during the Kolettes administration was on its way of becoming a reality in 1853, at least as far as many Greeks were concerned. It was clearly a deception, however, for the king and many government officials to believe that Greece could expand its frontiers when the Great Powers were all against such a measure. One wonders,
therefore, if it was wise of Otho and Amalia to risk the destructive consequences of an Algo-French occupation, which lasted from May 1854 to February 1857, for a dream that could never come true under the circumstances of 1854. It was a greater wonder, however, that the royal couple pursued the dream of the Megali Idea even after Greece was occupied by the foreign forces. Indeed, it was true that the Greek Court never changed the foreign policy which was handed to it by Kolettes, until the force of the Occupying Powers fell so great upon Greece as to make certain that the policy of expansionism would not be repeated.

A few days after the king announced the neutrality of Greece in the Crimean War the British Legation in Athens informed the Foreign Office of secret Court support to the insurgents. Wyse wrote to Clarendon concerning the king’s covert attempts to continue the insurrection.

At Athens cart loads of powder and other ammunition continued to be conveyed with secrecy, for the purpose of being formed into cartridges to the different stores. At the Piraeus, a considerable quantity of powder was transmitted to the government magazine there by superior orders for the purpose, it would seem, of being embarked covertly. . . . On the 25th inst. a body of 300 armed volunteers were collected together at Argos by the Deputy of that place, who had received 20,000 drachmas from Athens for the purpose, and a short time afterwards they started for the frontier.

This report of the British Legation in Athens indicated that the king and a great number of sympathizers of the insurrection were determined to continue the struggle against the Turks even after the king's official declaration of Greek neutrality. Otho never really made the transition from the Megali Idea policy to a course which called for internal development and economic growth. Rouen reported to his government after the occupation took place that the king had not accepted the full implications of his neutrality declaration and that Otho wished to present his position in the European community as a victim of the Occupying Powers. Wyse also hinted the same thing to Clarendon when he wrote that if Otho had accepted the terms of neutrality he would not have any objections to the changes of his Russophile advisors who were all connected with the developments of the insurrection. Such an attitude of the king gave cause to the Allied Powers to suspect Otho of Russophilism and as long as such suspicions existed and the Crimean War continued there was no chance that the occupation of Piraeus would be ended.

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6 Grece 68 (No. 90), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens, June 17, 1854.

7 F.O. 32/217, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, June 12, 1854.
Only two weeks after the declaration of neutrality Otho wrote to his father:

I would prefer undoubtedly instead of retreating in the supremacy of force, to attack Turkey and with bravery (palikaria) to bring through and to win the goal, which I designed. . . . I retreat with difficulty when the cession of a certain thing is attempted with impudence and with repression. 8

The king meant every word he wrote. Incidents which revealed his support to the Megali Idea policy occurred almost as soon as the Allied forces had landed on Piraeus.

On June 25, a senator and a doctor by the name of Tasseos left Piraeus with ammunition and money in order to renew the aggression in Pelio, a village in the Province of Thessaly. Tasseos was captured by a French agent, however, before he reached his destination. 9 According to the intelligence information of the British Legation in Athens:

This attempt has been got up at the instigation of the "Russian" and Court party here, that it has been aided by funds and ammunition supplied by them, that among the chief agents in the matter are not only persons directly connected with the late administration, but also persons at this moment in the immediate service of His Majesty and in constant communication with him, and that a portion of these funds was supplied by the Directors of the National Bank. 10

After the Tasseos incident it was discovered that the queen of Greece was personally involved in a scheme concerning

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8 Otho to Ludwig, Athens, June 3, 1854. Cited in Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, 977.
9 Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 162.
another insurrection to take place in Crete. Apparently, Amalia had received 140,000 roubles from Russia for the purpose of exciting an uprising in Crete. Various individuals in Greece who shared the dream of national expansion with the Court gave another 70,000 drachmas to the Queen. A group of three hundred Cretans then assembled outside of Athens ready to depart for Crete at about the same time that a new ministry was forming. The insurrection never took place in Crete because General Kalergis who was supposedly sent to Paris in order to bring back arms for the Cretans did not return to the island with the ammunition. Even though nothing became of the queen's attempt to start a Cretan insurrection, it did not help the position of Greece at all because the Allied intelligence found out about the scheme.

The Occupying Powers' concern was not limited to the expansionist plans of Otho and Amalia but extended to the press propaganda, to the political groups which were pro-Russian and wanted to see a Greater Greece, and to the various Hetairias (secret organizations) whose goal was to free all the Greeks from the Ottoman Empire by raising money, arms and recruiting volunteers. Both Wyse and Rouen knew that the insurrection had public support and both representatives felt that their job was to prevent any further excitement among

the public which could lead to renewed Greek-Turkish hostilities.

There were two means through which a great deal of propaganda against the Turks was carried out. The first was the press which continuously attacked the Allied Powers for illegally occupying Greece while at the same time it supported the king and the insurrection. The second was the local government officials who by virtue of their position had an enormous influence on the public mind. Most government officials throughout Greece were appointed before the Mavrokordatos ministry of 1854 and therefore were pro-Russian. So even though the central government had changed, the majority of government officials had remained the same and they continued to propagate war against Turkey even after May 1854.

The two papers which engaged in editorial attacks against the occupying Powers and were both sympathetic to Russia and to Otho were the Aion and Elpis. By the middle of August, after the cholera had broken out, these two papers were waging such a verbal war on the Occupying Powers that Rouen demanded that Mavrokordatos take positive action against the editors responsible. Mavrokordatos was not at liberty to carry out every demand the French and British representatives

12 There were other papers which were against the Allied Powers. Panhellenium ran an article after the occupation questioning its legality. See Moniteur Universel, June 19, 1854.
had to make for he had the force of the Crown checking his powers constantly. 13 As a result of the Prime Minister's failure to act upon the command of the French minister, a group of forty men were sent from Piraeus to Athens on September 21, by the order of Admiral Tinan to smash the printing presses of the Aion, close the office of Elpis and place under arrest the editors of the two newspapers, John Philimon and Constantine Levides. 14 Wyse maintained and, undoubtedly, so did Rouen that:

The real object (of the press) was to establish such a state of opinion and feeling in the Provinces and especially in the frontier, as regarded both Russia and Western Powers, no matter by what means, as should render it practicable the first opportunity to resume the late system of excitement and aggression, and furnish them with minds and men as well as funds and ammunition, entirely for the invasion of the Turkish Provinces. 15

There was a certain element of truth in this observation but it was no justification to destroy the property of the Greek newspapers and to illegally arrest the two editors. The violation of Greek independence first occurred in May by the Anglo-French invasion of Greece. Then private property violations

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in Greece by foreign troops and finally the violation of the citizens' freedom guaranteed by the Constitution was executed all in the name of the national interests of the Occupying Powers.

The French and the British felt that by the destruction of the opposition press they would win over the public to their side but as in the case of the 1850 British blockade this did not happen. Instead, the people turned Russophile more than ever before and this only increased Wyse's and Rouen's irritation. It seemed that the germ of Russophilism which began to spread ever since 1850 kept spreading beyond control and one of the reasons for this, besides the course of events and the press propaganda, was the influence on the public mind which the local government authorities exercised.

The government authorities and most people who sympathized with the insurgents believed that the Anglo-French occupation as well as the Mavrokordatos ministry, which was publicly known as the "Ministry of occupation," were only temporary. Many Greeks thought that since the blockade of 1850 did not last long by the same token the occupation of 1854 would be terminated quickly. As Wyse informed his government in early September:

The authorities, mostly placed in their situation by a pro-Russian Ministry, are still nourished with the false hope that all present men and measures are temporary,

16 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 554.
that the incursions on Turkey are only suspended, that the German Powers will compell, at least by diplomacy the two Allied Powers to withdraw their troops from Greece, that the King thus free from further control, will once more resume his ancient Counsellors, with whom he has never ceased to communicate and that the "status quo ante" will be reestablished triumphantly and without difficulty. 17

This line of thought was also shared by Rouen and both representatives of the Occupying Powers were pressing Mavrokoradas to adopt strict measures against Rusophilism. The Prime Minister could not do so in the open and directly because to fight Russophilism would mean attacking the Court and the king himself. He came to the point where he could no longer be torn by the two forces of the Western Powers on the one side and the Court on the other, so he threatened to resign if he was not left alone to run the government his own way. 18

In a personal visit to the Prime Minister by Wyse and Rouen, the two representatives listed a number of complaints, all tied to the issue of Russophilism and the government's failure to repress it. Mavrokoradas told the two ministers that:

He was occupied in devising remedy to the evil, (spread of Russophilism) by a change in the Municipal Law itself, but until this could be brought to bear, he much feared he could not accomplish what he felt, as well as we, (Rouen, Wyse), was every way so desirable. I admitted the reasoning of Mr. Mavrokoradas as far as it went, but I regretted it did not go further. 19

18 Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 233.
19 F.O. 32/221, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, November 12, 1854.
The Prime Minister further indicated "that it was much easier to make or accept these suggestions, then to give them effect." Besides the issue of Russophilism in the Court, in the press and in public offices, there was an even more serious matter which attracted the attention of the Allied Powers in Greece, namely, brigandage. This was an old problem which always worried the Turks for it presented a threat to their Christian occupied Provinces. Brigandage was also Palmerston's concern from 1844 to 1851 and it received criticism from the French who like the British were determined to defend the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. After Otho declared Greek neutrality in May 1854, the Turkish authorities in the Greek-populated Provinces of Thessaly, Epirus and Macedonia took advantage of their superior position, since they were aided by Anglo-French forces, and began mistreating and even murdering Christians in the Provinces to avenge the acts of Greek insurgents. As a result of the Turkish mistreatment of Christians and the intensive hunt for the Greek insurgents the latter were forced to become brigands in order to survive. The problem of Brigandage after the end of the

20 Ibid.
21 Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 176-80.
22 There were 8,000 Epirotes, 6,000 Thessaloi, 2,000 Cretans, Hydraens, Maniates and others, see Ibid., 178.
Greek insurrection of 1854 was partially the result therefore of Turkish determination to mistreat and eliminate Greek insurgents in the Provinces.

By November 1854, only a few months after the occupation, brigandage was steadily increasing not only in the Turkish Provinces where the Greek revolts took place, but on the Greek-Turkish frontiers and throughout the entire country of Greece making life for the inhabitants as well as the government in Athens increasingly difficult. The European embassies informed the Greek government that they regarded brigandage in Greece as an obstacle to their Near Eastern policy and an advantage to the Russians. Wyse who was the most severe critic of the rising brigandage went to the Greek Prime Minister and once again asked for his cooperation to repress this dangerous phenomenon. Mavrokordatos could do very little against the brigands for as Wyse noted in one of his dispatches to Clarendon, "there appears to be no Law in the Greek Code, sufficiently effective, to meet such a state of disorder.

..." Even if there was a law against brigandage Mavrokordatos could not wage an open and total campaign to suppress the brigands because the pro-Russian elements in the country and many others who sympathized with the Court's Megali Idea

23 A.Y.E. 1855 (a.a.k./1), Confidential, Potles to Trikoupis, Athens, September 22, 1855.

24 F.O. 32/222, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, November 27, 1854.
policy would be against such a measure. Furthermore, the Prime Minister knew very well that Otho and his Court would greatly disapprove of brigands' repression since the king himself supported brigandage morally and in many cases materially.

The Greek Court put the blame on Kalergis for the rise of brigandage even though the Minister of War did more than his share to cooperate with the Occupying Powers in suppressing brigandage. As Wyse's report indicates Kalergis was eager to suppress brigandage:

When General Kalergis mentioned to His Majesty a few days since that he was ready to take the most energetic course which could be desired to put down this growing calamity, the Queen opposed the difficulty which was to be expected from the Chambers and the Constitution, and on General Kalergis proposing an appeal to the country — "Never," was her answer, "as long as the occupation troops of the Allied Powers remained here." 25

As far as the Western Powers were concerned brigandage was born and maintained as part of the Greek Court's policy. I mentioned above that under the Kolettes administration the government patronized brigand chieftains who were indeed considered as soldiers who would someday liberate all of the Greeks from Turkish oppression. The king viewed brigands in the same respect since after all it was the contribution of the Klefts and Armatoloi who helped to liberate the Greeks in 1821. In so far as England and France were concerned

25 F.O. 32/228, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 4, 1855.
Greek brigands were a Christian army when they crossed over to the Ottoman territory and that presented a threat to the peaceful coexistence of the two neighboring states and more importantly brigandage served to the Russian advantage under the present circumstances.

There was apprehension among the Allied Powers that the "Russian" party in collaboration with the Greek Camarilla were planning renewed hostilities with Turkey so this explained their unwillingness to cooperate with Wyse and Rouen in suppressing brigandage. When the two representatives discovered that there were funds in the king's name at the National Bank of Greece which were to be used as the king wished, their suspicion about the king's intentions were confirmed. This prompted Wyse to accuse Otho of still following the same policy currently as he had before the Allied occupation. He wrote to Clarendon:

... such an attitude on the part of their Majesties and Court, as shall unmistakably discourage, in those who boast of their implicit obedience to their wishes, that continued hostility, sometimes open, sometimes concealed, against the government and the policy of the Western Powers which thwarts their effects, and proclaims to the country that the protection granted to Russia Partisan-ship is not extinct and that the opportunity is not perhaps distant when it may again be called, under royal auspices, and with hope of better issue, into action.

27 A.Y.E. 1855 (a.a.k./A), No. 129, Note Verbal, Athens, August 12, 1855.

The Greek government tried to do its best to convince the Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay that effective measures had been adopted to deal with the problem of brigandage. Britain and France were convinced otherwise. Walewski expressed his discontent with brigandage in Greece to M. Roque, Minister at Paris, after he had been informed of a certain case of brigandage in the village of Micali. Roque defended the Greek government as he reassured the French Foreign Minister that the authorities were doing their best to repress the existing menace. It was useless to defend, however, acts which were taking place out in the open. By the spring of 1855 the problem was so severe that the Allies were forced to guard the roads between Athens and Piraeus in order to safeguard their own troops.

Admittedly some of those engaged in bands of brigandage were out to rob anyone but there was a number of ex-insurgents who were condemned by the Greek government for taking part in the revolution. According to British intelligence reports certain brigands in Boetia wanted full amnesty

29 A.Y.E. 1855 (a.a.k./A), No. 203, Potles to Trikoupes, Athens, October 15, 1855. (Potles was foreign minister under the Boulgaris administration, see below section C.)

30 A.Y.E. 1855 (18/2), No. 259, Confidential, Roques to Potles, Paris, October 14, 1855.

31 Bower & Bolitho, Otho I, 203.
and they claimed that brigandage was the means they used to attain their goal. In a letter to Boulgaris, President of the Council, the Boetia Brigands revealed their former plans of using brigandage as a means of creating the fall of the Mavrokordatos ministry so that they would be granted amnesty when a new ministry would come into power. They warned the Boulgaris administration, however, "that if the Ministers should persist in neglecting them, and not grant the amnesty in question they would act henceforth as real brigands. . . ."  

The Western Allies would never have agreed with the Greek government to grant amnesty to the insurgents and of course the Sublime Porte would flatly reject any such measure in dealing with the rebels. The Turks, however, were anxious to put an end to this problem and Fuad Pasha met in a conference with the Greek Prime Minister at Constantinople and discussed a possible procedure for ending brigandage.

The Sublime Porte was preoccupied with the war in Crimea and had larger problems than the settlement of brigandage in Greece. It could not afford, however, to allow this

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32 F.O. 32/233, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, November 20, 1855. In the same report Wyse wrote that a group of brigands was caught and held for the abduction of the French Captain Bertrand at Piraeus.

33 Ibid.

34 A.Y.E. 1855 (19/1), Np. 35, Confidential, Koundouriotes to Sylvergos, Constantinople, October 10, 1855.
menace to grow at the expense of more uprisings in its Provinces. A quick settlement of this problem was sought, therefore, and in the first months of 1856 the real efforts to end brigandage began. On January 8, it was announced in the Moniteur Grec that the Minister of War, L. Smolenctz had drawn up several articles calling for the order of the Greek government to participate actively in the repression of brigandage in mainland Greece as well as in the Provinces. These articles were later to be adopted into law since no law existed against brigandage as was known in Greece. 35

Two months after the Moniteur Grec announced the government's legal repression of brigandage, a treaty between Greece and the Sublime Porte was signed at Kalinja which called for the two countries' cooperation to suppress brigandage. 36 By the conclusion of this treaty it can be argued that technically Greece and Turkey were back on stable and friendly relations which were only to be disturbed again in the Cretan insurrection of 1866-1869. 37

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35 Moniteur Grec, Athens, January 8, 1856, No. 30382, in F.O. 32/239.

36 The Treaty was ratified 3 June 1856, signed 8 April, 1856. See Noradoughian, Recueil d'actes internationaux, II, 90, 93, also see British and Foreign State Papers, LVI, 1389-1391.

B. The Fall of the Mavrokordatos Ministry

Ever since the "ministry of occupation" came to power, a political struggle began between the king and the Mavrokordatos administration. For the first time after a period of over twenty years of absolute rule the Bavarian dynasty in Greece was forced by France and England to share power with a ministry under their control.

At first Otho believed that Mavrokordatos would be able to check the abusive influence of the occupying Powers in Greek internal and foreign affairs, and he also hoped that the Prime Minister would control the hostile acts of Kalergis (Minister of War), which the king thought were directed against him personally. As was pointed out in the last section, the Prime Minister had made it clear to Otho that he would have liked to rule constitutionally with as little foreign influence as possible. To run a "ministry of occupation" without the influence of the Occupying Powers, and to administer in a country which was ruled by an absolute monarch for as long as it had existed was an impossibility. Mavrokordatos was pulled by two opposing forces -- the Monarchy and the Allied Powers -- constantly until he got to a point where he was totally ineffective in so far as exercising his own will in matters of government. During the first few months of the "ministry of occupation" Mavrokordatos enjoyed the confidence of the king as well as that of Western Europe. The declaration of neutrality, the change of ministries and the
new administration's attempts to restore relations with the Sublime Porte were all positive signs of good faith on the part of Greece toward the Allied Powers. Of course it took an armed force at Piraeus to win the good faith of Greece, but the important factor was that Greece won the confidence of both Clarendon and Drouyn de Lhuys. When Greece requested to resume possession of the three Russian frigates purchased by the Kriezes administration, but detained in Dalmatia, both Clarendon and Drouyn de Lhuys consented to the Greek government's request.

The Anglo-French Powers were also determined to maintain good relations with Otho and several months after the occupation even the king of Greece was optimistic about the friendly course of Greek foreign relations. "The Emperor of the French," he wrote to Ludwig, "expressed himself very friendly towards me and Greece, . . . Clarendon wrote confidentially a while ago to the British ambassador here the following: 'I wish as Otho will allow us to be his friends, and he will never have the least cause to regret this.' You see from this that our

38 A.Y.E. 1855 (99/1), No. 107, Trikoupis to Argyropoulos, London, June 25, 1854.

39 Greece was also allowed to regain possession arms and ammunition detained at Malta and Corfu. See A.Y.E. 1855 (99/1), Clarendon to Trikoupis, Foreign Office, July 5, 1854, also A.Y.E. 1855 (99/1), No. 145, Trikoupis to Mavrokoridatos, London, September 9, 1854.
foreign relations have improved." On the surface it appeared that Greece was finally following a policy parallel to that of France and England but there was indeed a power struggle between the Greek Court and the Allied Powers for political domination in Greek internal and foreign affairs. As the Greek Legation in Paris informed Mavrokordatos, the main concern of France and England was the consolidation of Turkey and the reestablishment of equilibrium in Europe. Greece, ever since the crisis of the Holy Places, had sided with Russia and its foreign policy was an obstacle to the plans and policy of Western Europe in the Near East. Even after the "ministry of occupation" had come in control, Clarendon could call Greece "a misgoverned country." No matter how much effort went into trying to convince the Western Powers that Mavrokordatos had good intentions and that he was ready to cooperate willfully with them, it was difficult to win their total confidence as long as they knew that the Bavarian dynasty in Greece was pro-Russian and would never give up their hopes of territorial expansion.


41 A.Y.E. 1855 (18/2), No. 776, Roque to Mavrokordatos, Paris, August 2, 1854.

42 Ibid.

43 A.Y.E. 1855 (a.a.k./A), Confidential, Argyropoulos to Roques, Athens, July 9, 1855.
Otho wanted to rule by himself and he knew that somehow he had to remove the "ministry of occupation" and replace it with a Court ministry if he was to start drawing power away from the hands of Wyse and Rouen. Alone the king could not achieve such a political victory. He had to use diplomatic means and make use of his influence in the German Courts. In September 1854 he wrote to Francis Joseph the following letter complaining about the intervention of the Occupying Powers in the state affairs of his kingdom:

The condition of Greece, unfortunately, instead of improving, is continuously deteriorating. He (Mavrokordatos) feels it also but is unable to improve it. The foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the country, which is based on the strength of the foreign troops near the capital, prevent him, in his actions. You can understand with how much difficulty the prolongation of the occupation is connected. And I resort to your mediation for the removal of the occupation. 44

The Austrian emperor answered that he would be glad to use his influence in the French Court on behalf of Greece but he felt that the possibility of renewed hostilities in the Turkish Provinces by the Greeks was highly likely to reoccur so he thought that for the time being the occupation served a purpose. 45

Otho was determined to have the influence of Wyse and Rouen diminished as much as possible and would not give up

45 Ibid.
trying to fulfill this goal. As was mentioned in the previous section, the "ministry of occupation" was divided among extremists like Christides and Palamides, who were royalists and opposed actions Mavrokordatos had taken after the French and British Legations' consultation in Athens, and Kalergis with Rouen and Wyse behind him who went out of his way to please the Occupying Forces. Kalergis was a personal friend of Napoleon III and, apparently, the Emperor of the French was very pleased with the work and position of General Kalergis in the Greek government.

The Minister of War took advantage of the fact that he had powerful friends and became very obnoxious towards the king. Otho waited for the opportunity to arrive so he could dismiss Kalergis. This opportunity came in July 1855. There was a scandal involving the Minister of War and the wife of P. Pelygiannis, Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1849 during the Kriezes administration. This scandal received much publicity in the anti-Western press and was used by the queen to degrade Kalergis.

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46 On June 10th Kalergis treated the troops and other British and French officials to a dinner at the Parthenon which was converted into a restaurant to accommodate the invading forces. Potiades, The Exile, 224.


48 Petrakakos, History of Greece, 164.

49 He would go to the palace to get the king's signature and he would ask that the orders be signed without delay, Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 656.
and diminish his power hopefully resulting in his downfall. After the king requested the resignation of the Minister, Mavrokordatos promised on July 26 that in forty-eight hours he would have Kalergis' resignation at the palace. Instead of a resignation delivered by the Prime Minister, Otho received a visit from Mercier, the French representative who replaced Forth-Rouen, and Wyse who had come for an explanation of the king's actions. The two ambassadors asked Otho not to take any affirmative action until they had time to contact their governments. On September 2, Otho was informed that both France and Britain were against the Kalergis dismissal for they did not know of anyone who could replace him as Minister of War. The king declared, however, that all services between the Court and the Ministry of War were stopped and he would not sign any ordinances drawn by that ministry as long as Kalergis was in charge. All this chaos was devised by the Court to lead only to one thing, the fall of the "ministry of occupation" thus Otho's political triumph. In this respect Otho was successful for he had the help of the German Courts.

The Mavrokordatos administration would have fallen, however, even if a scandal involving one of his ministers had

not occurred. First, there was factional division in the ministry, second, it was an administration set up in an emergency situation and under foreign force and finally, it represented the will of two opposing sides, the Crown and the Allied Powers. Mavrokordatos could not rule between such forces and had become very weak. As Wyse observed:

If Mr. Mavrokordatos does not make up his mind to more explicitness, determination and activity, he may as long find himself placed in a position before the King on the one side and the public (he implies the Allied Powers) on the other which will leave him no choice between permanent acquiescence or a sudden retreat. 53

The Prime Minister could not openly oppose the King's policy and obey orders given by the foreign invaders, but when the French and British asked for cooperation this is precisely what they had in mind. Both Mercier and Wyse felt that Mavrokordatos was becoming gradually weak and was unable to make government decisions.

In September the Greek Prime Minister went to see the British ambassador to discuss the difficulties of his administration. At the meeting Mavrokordatos stated that before he left Paris he was assured by Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord Cowley that there would be no change in the Greek dynasty or the removal of the king as long as the interests of the Allied Powers are not damaged by Greece. Further, he understood his position as that of a mediator between the king and the Powers.

in that sense he understood his mission, and was desirous to give effect to it legally and constitutionally. But he found here little either of Law or Constitution. He would conceive of two kinds of governments a constitution frankly carried out, or a despotism; but not a despotism under the forms of a constitution. . . . That is the present state of Greece and with that difficulty he has to contend. The government as it is now cannot act and cannot go on. 

Wyse of course placed all the blame for the weakness of the Mavrokordatos administration on the king but the Allied forces with their continuous demands on the Prime Minister, as Otho pointed out above, were also responsible for this phenomenon.

In the final analysis the Court was in many respects more desirous to end Mavrokordatos than the Allied Powers who merely regretted his weak position. The members of the Chamber, all appointed by the king, waged a war on the Mavrokordatos administration using as an excuse the Kalergis scandal. The press and public servants alike, all directed by the Court, also turned against the "ministry of occupation." In a dispatch from the British Legation in Athens Wyse summarized what he considered the main causes of Mavrokoordatos' fall from power:

All these circumstances combined leave no doubt of a common hostility, and concerted movement against M. Mavrokordatos. But this would be of little moment if M. Mavrokordatos were another man, or had long since, or would even now adopt another policy; the conspiracy might easily be defeated if he did not also continue to conspire himself. Such, however, is, unfortunately, not the case. His first step was a mistake. He attempted to unite the character of a minister

54 F.O. 32/231, Most Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, September 4, 1855.
chosen deliberately by the king, with that of a minister selected by the Allied Powers. He has had his eye fixed on the chances of the future, instead of the necessities of the present; he had been consulting the stronger side and more permanent authority, whilst he should have acted without reference to either. . . .

Under such strenuous political circumstances it would have been difficult for any Prime Minister to retain the necessary unity and strength of the administration to run the government efficiently and without encountering the sorts of problems which were responsible for the fall of the Mavrokordatos ministry. A much greater force had to intervene to bring about this fall, however, than merely the wish of the king of Greece. Francis Joseph, finally, bent to the wishes of his cousin, Otho, and used his influence to have Britain and France discontinue their support of Mavrokordatos. Otho had used well the only weapon left to his disposal, diplomacy, after the Anglo-French occupation. He knew that as long as the British and the French needed the support of Austria and the Prussian neutrality commitment in the war against Russia, he could use his influence with the Germanic nation to pressure the Allied Powers to remove General Kalergis and of course along with him the entire "ministry of occupation." Wyse wrote concerning the near-fall of the "ministry of occupation":

55 F.O. 32/231, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, September 8, 1855.

56 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 658.
The first impression produced will be one of triumph in the Russian and German pro-Russian party here, and abroad; the assurance already given in the journals that the King, at the instance of Austria and Bavaria, has been restored to all his prerogatives and rights, and the Russian and anti-Western propagandism emanating from the Court, under the inspiration of the Russian Legation, and extending by the instrumentality by the German Camarilla and German Diplomacy, to all parts of the country, and to West and East, will acquire for the moment fresh force.  

It had taken two months for the Germanic Powers (Prussia, Bavaria and Austria) to persuade Napoleon to withdraw his support from Kalergis but finally they succeeded. After the "ministry of occupation" had fallen from power the French government still regarded the ousting of General Kalergis by Otho as "a victory of the Russian party over Western politics." The emperor failed to view the situation as a struggle for power between the king of Greece and the continuous interference in Greek domestic affairs by the Western Powers. Both the British and the French refused to accept Otho's schemes of Greek expansionism in isolation. As far as they were concerned there was a real connection between any Greek plans for expansion and Russian ambitions.

57 F.O. 32/231, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, September 29, 1855.

58 Fotiades, The Exile, 239-240.

59 A.Y.E. 1855 (18/2), No. 259, Confidential, Roques to Poties, Paris, October 14, 1855.
On September 27, Mavrokordatos handed in the resignation of the entire ministry to the king for to remain after the forced resignation of Kalergis would have created antagonisms with the French. So the first victory of the Greek Camarilla was achieved with the resignation of a ministry which was forced upon Greece by the British and the French. For Mavrokordatos, September 27, was to be the last day of his long political career which was to a great extent damaged in 1844 as well as 1855 by a petty Bavarian Prince who believed himself to be more of a Greek nationalist than the Greeks themselves.

C. The Boulgaris Administration

The man who was chosen to replace Mavrokordatos was Demitris Boulgaris. The new Prime Minister was born into a wealthy family in the island of Hydra and was known among the political circles in Athens for his despotic character. His father had worked for the Turkish armada and Boulgaris

60 See Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, 990-91, also A.R. Rangabes, Apomnemoneumata (Memoirs) III, (Athens, 1894), 319.

61 The new ministry was sworn in on October 4, 1855 with Trikoupis as President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, however, he did not accept the position and Boulgaris who was originally chosen for the position of Minister of the Interior became Prime Minister.
like Kolettes had come under the influence of Turkish customs. One of the reasons that Otho selected him to serve as Prime Minister was because he had remained faithful to the monarchy in 1843 and had not participated in the revolution of the Constitutionalists.

Even though Greek historians have not dealt extensively with the Boulgaris administration and one historian even goes as far as to ascertain that the Boulgaris government did not face serious foreign difficulties, it will be seen in this section that the problems of Greece with the Foreign Powers increased and tensions were not absent until the establishment of the Financial Commission of 1857.

The Greek Legation in Paris informed the government in Athens, that, "Monsieur Walewski at the news has reiterated the assurance that any hostile disposition did not exist on the part of France toward the King or against the new Cabinet. . . ." The British were not as pleased as the French appeared to be about the change of ministries. Wyse speculated that:

62 Fotiades, The Exile, 240-41, Also see Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 658-59.

63 Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 235.

64 A.Y.E. 1855 (18/2), No. 254, Roque to Sylvergos, Paris, October 11, 1855.
The object of this ministry, will be to detach the French from the English Legation, to divide the Ministers, and, as they hope, the governments, and the means for this will be the distribution and displacements, without scruple, of office a malignant and treacherous press, in which, in France, as well as here, the most unbounded devotion to France and French Party and French interests will be professed. England, if not calumniated, will be kept in the background, and an intimate union attempted to be brought about between the French partisans so called, and the Russian, in this country to the exclusion always of England, so as at length to bring her to the isolated position in which they formally stood. In a word, it will be the system of M. Coletti on a larger and more vicious scale, and in more critical circumstances, again succeeding to the fatal moderation of M. Mavrokordatos, 65

Given this observation of the British ambassador in Athens, it can be seen why the British government was so apprehensive about ending the occupation. Every victory which the Crown scored the Allied Powers considered not as Greek but a Russian victory. Every time British policy and actions were attacked or intercepted in Greece, the Foreign Office considered it as a victory of the French or the Russians. Both England and France believed that the causes of the Greek insurrection against the Turks in 1854 were the product of Russian propaganda or Greek propaganda inspired by Russia. They also maintained throughout the period of the Crimean War that any act by the Greeks against the Turks or their Allies was an act executed on behalf of Russia, or at least to her benefit against the interests of France and England.

On account of these assumptions entertained by the Allied Powers and, especially, Great Britain the removal of

the foreign troops from Piraeus was a distant goal. In October
Trikoupis, the representative in London, informed his govern-
ment that the Western Powers were just as suspicious of Greek
policy in the Near East a year and a half after the declara-
tion of neutrality as they were during the months of the revo-
lution. "The allies," he wrote to Potles, "do not deny, that
the neutrality is actually maintained, but they regard this
as an act of necessary supervision, and that our Court is al-
ways pro-Russian." 66 After the "ministry of occupation" took
power in May 1854, Otho had the opportunity to abandon the
policy of irredentism and direct the country to a policy of
peaceful coexistence with Turkey and emphasize internal growth
and economic reform. Instead he continued to pursue a dream
which Kolletes passed on to him and he prayed that the British
and French would loose in the Crimean War so he could utilize
his plans for expansion. As the British representative at
Athens observed about the Greek royal plans for expansion:

   It is the state of "reverie" in which Her Majesty the
   Queen admits herself to be until some success of Russia,
   some check of the Allies, some outbreak among the Chris-
   tian races of the Ottoman Empire may present the oppor-
   tunity to convert the "reverie" into project, and the
   project, if possible, into a "fait accompli." This is
   the great end of the existing policy. It may hold our
   hope to Greek vanity or Bavarian ambition, but it is not
   a state of confidence in us, nor of peace and good faith
   towards their Turkish neighbors. 67

66 A.Y.E. 1855, 18/1, Private and Confidential, Tri-
koupis to Potles, London, October 21, 1855.

67 F.O. 32/232, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, October 6,
1855.
Wyse and Mercier began to attack the new administration as soon as it was formed and on October 1, in an interview at the Palace both representatives openly charged that the constitution in Greece was continuously violated and the country was misgoverned. Otho felt that it was not the place of Wyse or Mercier to criticize the administration and sovereignty of Greece, and he strongly considered such obnoxious criticisms as foreign intervention in the Greek internal affairs. Furthermore, he believed that the Treaty of 1832, which guaranteed Greece its independence as a State to be ruled by one monarch, was violated by inconsiderate remarks of the French and British ministers.

When the ministry presented a draft to the king concerning the question of neutrality Otho requested that the paragraph referring to the advantages which Greek neutrality brought to the commercial and political stability of Greece should be modified. The king would not admit to his country that his foreign policy in 1853-1854, before the occupation, was very costly to the nation, and this only irritated relations between Greece and Western Europe. But Otho did not stop infuriating the Allied Powers with his denial that he had embraced the Megali Idea foreign policy. After the interview with Wyse and Mercier, the king decided to visit

68 Bower & Bolitho, Otho I, 206-07.
69 F.O. 32/232, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, November 13, 1855.
the Russian Church in Athens, an act which was intended to openly allow the world to know that he never regretted supporting the struggle against the Turks. The Greek press reported that the king's visit to the Russian Church was not planned but happened by chance. The Western Powers did not believe this story. The British intelligence in Greece informed the Foreign Office that:

The King not only did not come to the Russian Church as pretended by chance, but the visit was arranged two days before, and communications were held between a member of the Russian Legation and a strong Russian partisan in communication with the Court. The Russian clergy here, the singers, and the Russian Legation were all present, and the members of the Legation were in their evening dress, and the Charge d'Affaires of the Legation, M. Persianty, were the Grand Cordon of the Saviour. The prayers actually said were closed I understand with the Docology... which prayers in the Russian Church are followed, by prayers for the Imperial family nomination, and in time of war, with prayers for the success of their arms. At these prayers the King was present.

The king could afford to display his apathy toward the occupying Powers since he had the support of the Germanic Powers and his popularity in Greece had risen decisively as a result of the occupation. Many among the public viewed Otho as a hero, for he embraced the Greek national cause, and because of this, France and England humiliated him and the nation. As in 1850, the popularity of the Crown increased again during the occupation, and with the help of the German Courts, Otho was actually in a much stronger position than he appeared to his contemporaries.

After the first success of eliminating the influence of the Occupying Powers in Greece by causing the Mavrokordatos resignation, the king worked on another scheme which the Greek politicians had used before, namely, the dissolution of the Franco-British Legation coalition in Greece which antagonized the Court. The government press began a press war against England while it praised Napoleon III. Wyse interpreted the king's attempts to undermine British foreign policy in the following manner:

Its real purpose is the propagation of Russian opinions and the maintainance of the present system of government under the collar of German sympathy and protection, guided by the Camarilla and its diplomatic supporters here, and the means to be taken are flattery to France and hostility to England, if not between the Legations, at least between those who affect the designations of French and English partisans, and thus creating mistrust between the ministers, and if they can, between their governments, and allowing free scope to the King and his supporters for the exercise of their arbitrary power. 71

Though the Greek Court's scheme was to divide the Franco-British coalition and to undermine British foreign policy in Greece by presenting the goals of the Foreign Office as contradictory and damaging to French interests in Greece, the king had always been much more favorable to France than to Great Britain. France and Russia had not shown as much interest in Greece since they became its Protectors as had Great Britain. Even during the Kolettes administration when the French Legation

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exercised much influence in the government Great Britain, represented by Lord Edmond Lyons, in Athens, went to extremes in order to assume the protagonist role in Greek internal affairs.

The result of Britain's struggles to become the dominant Protecting Power in Greece during the 1840's resulted in the blockade of 1850. Such measures were never adopted by France and Russia towards Greece although they were equal partners in the Protectorate. There was much more contempt, therefore, in the Greek Court as well as the nation for Great Britain than for either of the other two Protecting Powers.

In March 1855 when Otho wrote to his father to complain about the Occupying Powers in Athens, he stressed that the Emperor Napoleon and his Minister in Greece were much friendlier towards him and his Court than the British government. 72 In the effort of drawing France away from England and breaking their coalition Otho had help from Austria. The following dispatch clearly indicates that the Greek scheme to break the Anglo-French coalition was part of a larger scheme worked out by the Germanic Powers:

... Baron Prokesch (Austrian minister in Athens) had informed the King, that he was enabled to assure him directly from His Majesty, the Emperor Napoleon, (for who he, Mr. Prokesch, had the greatest admiration) that he entertained for him, the King, the greatest sympathy; that the time was approaching when the two governments of France and England would be very probably obliged to relax or dissolve their

union; that already France was drawing closer to Austria, and that Austria on her part becoming much more satisfied with France and proportionally dissatisfied with England; that the result of these new relations would be soon felt in Greece. 73

Mercier, the French Charge d'Affaires in Athens upon hearing this news flatly denied that the insinuations of Baron Prokesch were based on facts and praised the Anglo-French alliance. 74

The Austrians did not stop protecting the Bavarian Dynasty in Greece whether they had the support of the French or not. Baron Prokesch after conferring with the king and queen announced that Otho had fallen victim to bursts of national feeling in Greece against Turkey so he could not be blamed for the events of the uprising of 1854. Furthermore, Prokesch communicated these observations to the Austrian government with the implication that the two Western Powers are unjustified in occupying Greece. 75

The press played an important role in the scheme to shatter Anglo-French relations for the benefit of the Germanic Powers and the Bavarian dynasty in Greece. Elpis (Hope), the newspaper edited and published by C. Levides, whom in the fall of 1854, the French troops had arrested, continued to publish

74 Ibid.
75 F.O. 32/239, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, February 26, 1856.
articles with the intention of creating an Anglo-French rivalry in Greece such as the one which existed during the administration of Kolettes.

King Otho understood his mission in the East, not such as the convention of London considered it to be, when it formed a kingdom of a span's length, but such as Western Diplomacy should have considered it, had it looked upon the Greek Kingdom, as a political structure and not as a mite bestowed by Christian charity.

Concerning France the paper took a different attitude.

The French Nation has generous sentiments, and does not measure politics with the mere yard of its manufactures: it became great by pursuing a generous policy and not a policy of "the yard." 76

A number of other papers 77 also tried to do the same sort of thing as Eplis, and there was little doubt that behind them were the officers of the Greek Court and the "Russian" party. 78

All the efforts, however, on the part of the king, the press and the Austrians, to flatter the government of France and to create some kind of friction between the French and British Legations in Athens did not help at all the situation of Greece at the Paris Peace Conference. The Greek government wished that it should have a representative at the Paris Peace

76 Elpis, No. 833, December 21, 1855.

77 F.O. 32/239, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, February 6, 1856, also F.O. 32/239, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, January 8, 1856.

78 Anexartetos, No. 253, Athens, January 14, 1856, (a court paper) published an article pointing out the dilemma facing the Western Powers in regards to the Eastern Question. The conclusion arrived in the article was that the Christians of the Ottoman Empire would eventually win their cause for
Conference, if not for any other reason, than the termination of the Franco-British occupation which had already lasted for two years. Alexander Rangabes, the Minister for Foreign Affairs from February 1856 to February 1857, had made extraordinary efforts to have his country represented in Paris but the French and British governments argued that Greece did not participate in the Crimean War therefore could not be among the participants at the Conference. Count Alexander Walewski, the French Foreign Minister, informed the Greek Charge d'Affaires in Paris that his country would not be represented in the Peace Conference and that she would not even be consulted concerning the privileges of the Christian subjects living under the Ottoman rule.

Turkey is getting weaker and Christians and Muslims cannot co-exist equally in the same state. The Crimean War only helped the Christian subjects of Turkey but weaken the Ottoman State which was wrongly supported by the Western Powers.

When Alexander Rangabes was notified by the Prime Minister that the king chose him as the new minister for Foreign Affairs he went to Otho and explained that he could not accept the position for he and Wyse had "bad relationship." The king and queen insisted, however, that Rangabes should accept the ministry so the former yielded to the wishes of the Crown. See Rangabes, Memoirs, III, 325-29.

Laskaris, History of Greece, 411. Trikoupis reported to the Greek government that Greece was excluded from the Conference before Rangabes became Foreign Minister. See A.Y.E. 1856, No. 33, Confidential, Trikoupis to Potles, London, February 21, 1856.

Driault, Histoire Diplomatique, II, 411.
At the peace negotiations Baron Brunnov, who along with Count Orlov represented Russia, brought up the subject of the Franco-British occupation. The Allied Powers maintained that there was a need to keep the troops in Greece as the situation of brigandage had not been totally resolved and there were still incidents on the Greek-Turkish frontier caused by Greek radical nationalists who still hoped to liberate the Provinces of Epirus, Thessaly and Macedonia from the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, the British and French representatives stated that there was still an excitement for war among the Greek people and under such conditions they argued the presence of the Franco-British troops was necessary to insure tranquility in that country. The Germanic Powers, Austria, Bavaria and Prussia, revealed the same concern about the occupation of Greece as had the Tsar's representatives, but neither the French nor the British wished to go into any detailed discussion concerning the future status of Greece in relation to the Protecting Powers.

The failure of Greece to be admitted to negotiations was not only due to the fact that Greece was an insignificant state in the European community, but also because there was an ideological conflict between the irredentist policy of Otho and the guarantee of Ottoman integrity by the Western Powers at the

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82 A.Y.E. 1856 (18/1), No. 70, Trikoupis to Rangabes, London, April 20, 1856.
Furthermore, that Greece was a Protectorate of France, England and Russia placed her a step below the other European nations which were recognized as totally autonomous and independent from the other European Powers.

The Greek Government intended to address a formal "protest to the different Courts of Europe, against the declaration respecting Greece at the Conference at Paris," but instead it "decided on presenting a Memorial or Note containing various propositions to the Legations of their Protecting Powers at Athens." 84 Seeing that there was no hope of gaining any concessions at the Conference, the Greek Government decided to address a note to the Legations of the Occupying Powers in Athens in order to persuade them to reconsider removing their forces from Piraeus. Rangabes stated in the note that his government had friendly intentions toward the Ottoman State and the Western Powers and tried to reassure Wyse and Mercier that there would be no repetition of hostile actions towards Turkey on the part of the Greeks. 85 Neither representative trusted the words of the Greek Foreign Minister for

83 Markezines, Political History, I, 234-36.


85 F.O. 32/242, Rangabes to Mercier, Athens, May 21, 1856.
they were convinced that the Greek government was not in the hands of the Consul but under the absolute control of the king. On this matter Wyse added the following report to the Foreign Office:

We had deliberately and officially informed him that we should withdraw from all intervention either as to measures, or men in his administration, but that considering he had absorbed all the governing powers into his own hands, reduced the Constitution to a shadow, and was to all intents and effects an absolute monarch, we should be directed in our future relations towards him, by realities, and not by names, and placing the responsibility on him solely, and not his ministers or the Nation, for the future proceedings of his government. 86

The French were similarly convinced that the king's intentions and policy could not be trusted as they maintained "that there was always in Greece much sympathy for Russia, much covetousness concealed in the Turkish Provinces." 87 The occupation would be retained therefore until both Britain and France decided that an administration was running the country which was trustworthy and reliable by the Western Powers. Wyse viewed with serious suspicion certain changes that had taken place in the Boulgaris ministry and this was the primary reason for the rejection by both Protecting Powers to lift the occupation.

"The truth is," Wyse wrote, "the whole object had in view for some time past, is to constitute a ministry partly, of daring partisans, partly of insignificant men, or whom the Court in

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86 F.O. 32/242, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, June 18, 1856.

case of need, can implicitly rely. This has now been nearly accomplished." Unless some type of political influence could be exerted in the government in Athens by the Occupying Powers they would not consider leaving. The Germanic Powers were too weak to challenge the policy and actions of the two Powers in Greece and Russia had just finished a conflict with the Western Powers over the Near Eastern Question and the new Russian Tsar, Alexander II, was not about to antagonize either France or England by opposing their occupation of Greece.

The British and the French, to a certain degree, were more afraid of Russian influence in Greece than of new attacks by Greek insurgents against Turkey. The complaints of the Western Powers that Greece was misgoverned and that there was still a fear of renewed hostilities in the Provinces were all used as justification to maintain their military and naval forces in Piraeus. They would remain until a pro-British and pro-French government was in power in Athens. Before the Kolettes administration, Lyons, in a conversation with Prokesch had unfolded the British way of thinking about her Protectorate


89 Russia would only go as far as to commit herself verbally to aid Greece as one of the Protecting Powers. "Baron Brunnow assured those present (at the Conference) that Russia would associate itself in improving the state of affairs in Greece." Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 286.
in the Near East -- a view that later applied to France as well.

A really independent Greece is an absurdity. Greece, is either Russian or English and, since she must not be Russian, she must be English. I cannot see that there is any doubt about that; no man in his senses would doubt it. England's role is outlined in these words -- be sure that she will carry it out and she will smash every obstacle that she meets in her way. It is not a Tory or a Whig question; it is a national question. The King is not on our side, therefore he is Russian -- but, mark you, we have not made a kingdom out of Greece in order to create a Russian Province.

This attitude did not change in the course of fifteen years that had lapsed since Lyons had stated his country's position toward Greece. When in 1856 Britain and France proposed that Greece had to undergo reforms and improvements before the troops were ordered out of the country Russia could very well understand that such propositions were only intended to control Greek politics and finances. This is clearly revealed in a dispatch sent to Clarendon from Wyse:

As Russian Diplomacy seems to be much shocked at the present moment at the language held by the British and French Governments in referring to the state of Greece, and the pressing necessity which exists in the common interests of the three Powers, and of Europe, to provide means for its reform and improvement, your Lordship may perhaps not think it inopportune to recall to the recollection of its agents, who appear to have conveniently forgotten the fact, what was the language, (and it is to be pronounced the convictions of the Russian Government as to the state of this country, the conduct of the Sovereign and the duty imposed upon the Protecting Powers to such and obtain effective redress on former occasions, but especially in 1843, previous to the establishment of the Constitution, a period which they are constantly impressing on us, (As a reason for the suppression of the Constitution) as one, compared to the present, of progress, order, purity and prosperity.

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90 Cited in Bower & Bolitho, Otho I, 106-07.

91 F.O. 32/244, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, August 12, 1856.
The threat of Russophilism in Greece by the Court, the government and the people was indeed a much greater problem for the two Western Powers than was the threat of a nationalist uprising and not until some type of Franco-British control had been established in Greece to prevent a Russian influence in that country would the occupation be removed.

D. Economic Interests of England and France in Greece and the Ending of the Occupation

On 3 February 1853, Wyse sent a sixty-eight page dispatch to his government concerning: (A) the corrupt government of Greece, (B) the injustices practiced on all levels of government against the people, (C) the gross mismanagement of the finances of the country by the authorities. The passage below summarizes the major problems of the Greek government:

One of the crying evils of the Greek system is a machinery out of all proportion to the population and purpose. . . . unhappily in a country like this with no manufacture, little agriculture, the professions crowded, and government employment the only resource, the task especially under the patronage of a Camarilla, is comparatively easy. . . . Ministers are too involved in the inequity themselves, too unprotected by public or parliamentary opinion, and too dependent on the caprices of the King or rather of those who rule him, to think seriously of check or correction of this abuse. . . . The presentation of a budget is an annual comedy; and Representative government itself rendered in the eyes of the country (in accomplishment of the long nourished desire of Court and Camarilla) an object of mistrust and contempt. 92

Another contemporary of Wyse, a French journalist, Edmond About, visited Greece and made the same observations about the political, economic and social condition of the country as Wyse. "Every minister," he wrote, "is ready to do anything in order to retain his post. . . . They think of nothing else therefore but to retain their seat and to benefit as best their influence can be exerted from circumstances." The system of government was indeed antiquated and there were no efforts made to improve the economic or political conditions in the country. Even some of the more conservative Greek historians who sympathize with the Crown admit the serious problems in the economy and the governmental system. Conditions in Greece seem even more deplorable when viewed by contemporaries such as Wyse or About who were exposed to the liberal political systems of France and England, or when viewed by modern historians or politicians who have been exposed to progressive movements of socialism and communism.

One of the accounts concerning the political, economic and social conditions of Greece under the Bavarian Dynasty written by a contemporary, Professor S.I. Tzivanopoulos, shows

93 About, Grece, 153.

that Greece had indeed made very slow progress since its estab-
ishment as an independent nation. The observations of
Professor Socrates I. Tzivanopoulos, who wrote under the dyna-
asty of king George I (1863-1913), are very similar to those
of Wyse and About. He criticized Otho for using the Guarante-
teed Loan of 60 million francs to surround himself and the
Court with luxuries instead of using the money, as it was in-
tended, "for public works, and relieving the distress." 95
Every aspect of Greek society was suffering from a disadvan-
tage of one kind or another. The army was an institution
greatly abused by the Bavarian Dynasty and the Greek politi-
cians.

Under the plea of preparing the means for the realization
of the "Grande Idée" it was gradually increased to about
10,000 men, and swallowed 8,000,000 drachmas out of a bud-
get estimated at 24,000,000. The organization and disci-
pline did not increase in proportion to the numbers and
expenditure, for this army was freely used not to main-
tain order, but to work the constitution and the result
was an army of politicians. 96

The municipal organization of the country was equally devas-
tating.

We see that above 60,000,000 of drachmas of national pro-
duce have been wasted in the last 30 years, without any
attempt being made to improve the internal condition of
the Othonian period as an era of absolutism guided by the
principles of corruption and adventurous imperialism.

95 Tzivanopoulos, Condition of Greece, 4.

96 Ibid., 26.
the country. The demarchs neglect all local business; and the people are powerless to do anything for themselves. No steps have been taken till now by the demarchs to make roads, to build a hospital, or establish a school; to open new markets for the improvement of agriculture, or to extend commercial enterprise. But the majority of them being obliged to act as subordinates to the Eparchs, and as agents of the central administration, became petty tyrants and offered a direct impediment to all material progress of the country. 97

The businessman, the farmer, the worker, were all neglected by the Bavarian Dynasty in Greece and the only point of attention for Otho was the territories of Epirus, Thessaly and Macedonia. He wanted to expand for his own glory and rejected reform and development in a country which needed it the most.

Even though it is generally agreed among twentieth-century historians as it was agreed among contemporaries of the Othonian era that the Bavarian Dynasty in Greece made slow progress for the country, there are opposing views on this matter and one that deserves the attention of the historian is that of Alexander Rizo Rangabes. The ex-foreign minister, unlike Professor Tzivanopoulos, takes a different line of argument and holds that Greece actually started from point zero in 1832 when it joined the community of European nations and it made enormous progress in just a thirty year period under Otho. He concludes that the question for Greece is not internal development at all but territorial expansion. "It is not," he writes, "it will be agreed her example that

97 Ibid., 30.
European diplomacy has a right to invoke, when denouncing that Christians of the East as incapable of self government, in order to evade the solution of the 'Eastern Question,' and to prolong the impossible existence of Turkey."  

The work of Rangabes cannot be taken too seriously for it was written as propaganda tool. It does, however, represent the nationalist point of view typical of those who embraced the Megali Idea in the nineteenth as well as the twentieth centuries. The two works, by Rangabes and Tzivanopoulos, outline the dichotomy that existed in the Greek public mind; the approach of Rangabes had its origin and derived its momentum from the Kolettes-Otho dictatorship, whereas the Tsivanopoulos approach explains the "English," and more specifically the Mavrokorordatos plan for the present and future condition of Greece.

This gap in opposing policies in Greece had to be filled as far as France and England were concerned if they were to prevent Russia from having the dominant role in Greece. Since it became impossible to influence the politics in Greece through the ministry it became necessary to find another means of control, namely, financial.

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98 Rangabes, Greece, 102.

99 The work was first published in France under the title Ca Turkie ou La Grece. When it was published in English Rangabes was serving as representative of Greece in Washington, D.C. in 1867.
Throughout the Crimean War period up to the time of evacuation in February 1857 the Occupying Powers were constantly pressing Greece to meet its financial obligations towards them. In December 1854 the Greek government passed a law which gave it authorization to raise 5,000,000 drachmas loan. Upon receiving this news the Foreign Office objected on the grounds that Greece had first to pay the interest on the 60 million francs loan before attempting to raise another loan. Wyse had informed Paicos in January 1854, that although there was no measure of opposition in Article 6 of the Treaty of 1832 prohibiting the raising of any loan which the Greek government felt it needed, he was surprised to find out that a loan was considered to be raised at a time when there was attempt on the part of Greece to discharge its former financial obligations towards the Protecting Powers. He went on to state that:

. . . when the King and Kingdom of Greece had bound themselves by that Treaty to see that the actual receipts of the Greek Treasury should "be devoted first of all to the payment of the interest and sinking fund for the repayment of the loan and that they should not be employed for any other purpose until those payments should have been completely secured for the current year," and when not withstanding no such payments, with one slight exemption, from deficiency of funds or other causes had been made, I thought it singular and said so that a new engagement should be contemplated (this being the position of the old) or, at all events, without consulting with the Creditors or their representatives here. 100

100 A.Y.E. 1853, 8/1, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, January 5, 1854.
Since Greece was obligated by the Treaty to discharge its financial obligations to its Protectors first before trying to raise any other loans she found that the Great Powers could reject her proposals for new loans if they were not satisfied with the political establishment in Greece. 101

In 1854 the question of interest to be paid on the 60,000,000 francs loan came up again, primarily for political reasons, even though the "ministry of occupation" was in control in Athens. In September Mavrokovordatos informed the three Powers that the Greek government could not meet the payments on the interest of the 60 million francs loan. Persiany, the Russian Charge d'Affaires in Athens, responded mildly stating that he would inform his government on the matter. 102 The reply of the British representative was not nearly as sympathetic as that of Persiany or even Forth-Rouen. 103

The practical disregard shown by former Ministers of Finance to these undeniable claims, by not only not liquidating, but not even attempting to liquidate or even to notify the Protecting Powers, their inability to liquidate the smallest portion of these demands, was only equalled by the insolent indifference to official

101 A.Y.E. 1853, 8/1, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, January 5, 1854.

102 A.Y.E. 1854, 8/1, Persiany to Mavrokovordatos, Athens, September 11, 1854.

103 A.Y.E. 1854, 8/1, Forth-Rouen to Mavrokovordatos, Athens, September 15, 1854.
duty and public opinion, by which through a puerile artifice, they annually paraded in the budget a certain sum, professedly destined for such an object, but of which, as no portion found its way into the Treasuries of the Protecting Powers, it is only charitable to suppose that it was never levied, or was diverted from its legitimate destination at least other state purposes. This with the clumsy annual mystification for the purpose of nominally swelling the return of receipts to some semblance of equality with Expenditure, ... naturally produced in the whole government a disgraceful negligence of the public resources, and what was far worse, a fatal disregard to the most sacred public and private engagements. 104

After the long lecture on economics by Wyse, the British government agreed, as had the other two Protecting Powers, "not to press the Greek government, at the present moment, for payment of the interest on the loan guaranteed by the Protecting Powers," but that Greece should make genuine efforts for regular payment of the interest. 105 As long as the "ministry of occupation" was in power the Western Powers would not pressure Greece as such to meet its financial obligations. Once Otho removed that ministry, however, the Occupying Powers could no longer rely on political influence in Greece, so it became essential for them to start again asking for the delayed payments on the loan and ultimately to set up a system of financial control.

The Boulgaris administration unsuccessfully asked to be included in the Paris Peace Conference. Furthermore, the

104 A.Y.E. 1854, 8/1, Wyse to Mavrokordatos, Athens October 28, 1854.

105 A.Y.E. 1854, 8/1, Clarendon to Wyse, Foreign Office, October 9, 1854.
Allies did not desire to end the occupation. After Rangabes failed to gain any representation for his country in the Peace Conference, he began working towards the goal of removing the foreign troops from Piraeus. In an interview with Wyse and Mercier, the Greek foreign minister openly requested that the occupying forces be removed from Greece, but both representatives instantly rejected his request. The reply of Wyse and Mercier was allowed by Rangabes to be published in the press in order to excite anti-western sentiment among the public. Part of the published reply is as follows:

... that their governments did not see with satisfaction appointed into office men well known as professed enemies of Turkey; that brigandage continued to distress the country, and that the Greek government neglected to carry into operation such changes and reforms as were calculated to promote the internal welfare of the country; that the object of the occupation had not been to interfere with the internal government of the Kingdom. But as the object of the occupation was to impede, on the part of Greece, the disturbance of the Ottoman Provinces on the frontier that the Powers, however, desirous they may be to remove their troops, still they cannot do so until sufficient guarantee shall be given by the Greek government, that Turkey shall remain unmolested on the part of Greece.

This publication naturally aroused great excitement among the Greeks who had been occupied for a period of over two years but the reaction of the Western Powers to this article was also very bitter and immediately Wyse sent a dispatch to

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107 ELPIS, No. 858, Athens, June 23, 1856.
Rangabes complaining that secret diplomatic talks were allowed to be publicized in the press for the sole purpose of exciting the public mind. Rangabes gained support from the public by exposing the Occupying Powers for their refusal to lift the troops from Piraeus, but neither France nor England would be persuaded by Greek public opinion in their policy towards Greece.

The concept of systematic financial control in Greece, which was implicit in the Treaty of 1832, appeared an inescapable resort for the Western Powers. Article 12, paragraph 6 of the Treaty gave the right to the Protecting Powers to collect their money first, before the department of Finance had fulfilled any other financial obligations. Wyse who was familiar with this article of the Treaty was the first to suggest that the three Protecting Powers of Greece should set up a Financial Commission which would provide them with the interest of the guaranteed loan.

It seems, therefore to me, incontestable that the representatives of the Three Powers, in the exercise of their strict right, all in discharge of their duty, not only are authorized under international convention but are required by the position to which this question has arrived, to inquire, why it is the Treasury is not in a position to meet this debt, ... and what remedies are to be applied to check these causes, and to bring the pecuniary condition of this kingdom into such order, as will enable it to fulfill (even in part) its obligations. ... The first step then starting from these premises, which I venture to submit to your Lordship, is a "Commission of Inquiry" into "the state of the Greek Finances." 109


Wyse, as well as Britain and France, expressed the desire to collect their payments on the interest from Greece but also to improve and reform the financial state of the country.

In June 1856, the British Parliament brought to discussion once again the poor and corrupt financial administration of Greece and attempted to justify the prolonged occupation as a result of Greek unwillingness to cooperate with the Western Powers and thinking who had not followed the Constitution of 1843.

If the Greek Government had properly managed its financial affairs there would have been ample means to meet all the charges upon it. It had failed to do so; the liability had fallen upon the Powers which guaranteed the loan, and representations innumerable had been made upon the subject to the Greek Government, but without effect. 110

Restrictions on Greek financial affairs became more rigid during the Doulgaris administration. In the autumn of 1856 the Greek government proposed a set of Laws for the alienation of the National Lands. Both Britain and France strongly objected to the sale of the National Lands and advised Rangabes that his government had no right to take such action without first consulting with the Protecting Powers. The Foreign Office advised Wyse to send the following message to the Greek foreign minister:

I have received instructions from Her Majesty's Government that in as much as the Protecting Powers have a right under the Treaty of 1832 to claim the whole revenues of Greece

110 Session of June 2, 1856, Hansard, 3rd series, CXII, 852-54.
arising from every source, while the National Lands have been mortgaged to the British Landholders with whom the Greek Government contracted loans in England in 1824, and 1825, and in which no interest has been paid since 1827, to protest against any sale or Alienation of the National Lands. 111

The Foreign Minister obviously objected to the interference of the Protecting Powers in Greek internal affairs. But Wyse replied on two different occasions that the Greek government took the proposed measures, concerning the National Lands issue, before the Chambers to be passed before consulting with the three Powers to which Greece still owed money. 112 When Rangabes charged that the Chambers passed the bill therefore it was a matter out of his control, Wyse simply placed all responsibility with the foreign minister. 113 The British and French Legations in Athens were informed that Rangabes actually favored passage of the bill and this is why Wyse entirely blamed him for it. There were, however, political reasons for the Franco-British opposition to the bill besides the obvious economic ones which were stated above by the British representative. These political reasons were described to the Earl of Clarendon by Wyse as follows:

111 A.Y.E. 1856, 8/1, Wyse to Rangabes, Athens, September 25, 1856, also see F.O. 32/245, Wyse to Rangabes, Athens, September 28, 1856, also F.O. 32/245, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, October 7, 1856.

112 A.Y.E. 1856, 8/1, Wyse to Rangabes, Athens, October 14, 1856.

113 F.O. 32/245, Wyse to Rangabes, Athens, October 27, 1856.
Mr. Boulgaris has been outvoted in the ministry, by Mr. Koumoundouros (the ally of General Spiro-Milio, and others of his party) by Mr. Rizo Rangabe and Mr. Chrystopoulos. Out of doors, General Spiro-Milios, Mr. Chrestides, and Mr. Levides give, it is reported, their aid, and laugh at the idea that our protests can have the least weight in retarding these measures, "We have had plenty of these notes," is their reply, "and what harm have they done? have they stopped a single proceeding?" With other observations still more contumelious. They act under the patronage of the Court and of its partisans, and the proposed Laws are represented as emanating directly from Her Majesty. 114

The king as well as the ministers of the Boulgaris administration realized that France and Great Britain had lost the political battle which they had fought since the fall of the Mavrokordatos administration. The two Powers which occupied Greece for three years had failed to formulate a ministry consisting of pro-British and pro-French members, and of course anti-Othonian members. Otho succeeded through his use of diplomacy with the Germanic Powers to prevent the French and the British from securing a Greek administration which would be loyal to the two Western Protecting Powers.

Since France and England failed to exert their influence in Greece by the means of a pro-Franco-British ministry in Athens the two Powers resorted to the measure of financial pressure. They were determined to curb the king's power whether they exerted their influence through a ministry of their choice or whether they forced the government to meet its financial obligations towards the Protecting Powers.

114 F.O. 32/245, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, October 7, 1856.
In December 1856, the Boulgaris administration having no other choice when confronted with the demands that Greece should discharge its financial obligations towards the three Protecting Powers assured the three Powers that the eventual resources of the country would be provided for the Guaranteed Loan. 115 In spite of this reassurance from Athens that Greece would do its best to clear its financial obligations towards France, Russia and Great Britain, Walewski and Clarendon were not satisfied with such promises which the Greek government had made before but had failed to keep. The following dispatch from Clarendon stated the official position of Great Britain and France:

... it is conformity with this principle that Her Majesty's Government have determined in concert that of France to propose to the Greek Government that the Representatives at Athens of the three guaranteeing Powers should form a permanent Commission empowered to receive and if necessary to call for all the information which may be required for enabling their respective governments to judge with regard to the due employment of the Public Funds. ... In a word of duty of the Commissioners will be to keep the three governments regularly informed of what is going on, so that those governments may be enabled to form an opinion of the manner in which the Greek Government deals with the resources which are pledged for the payment of its debts and if necessary retract the aspect given by them to the proposals of the Cabinet of Athens. ... if the Greek Government should acquire in the proposal without reserve, the two governments would be disposed to look upon it as affording a sufficient guarantee to admit of their withdrawing their troops from Greece. 116

115 A.Y.E. 1856, 8/1, No. 35, Communication francais a M. Mercier, Paris, December 6, 1856.

116 A.Y.E. 1856, 8/1, Clarendon to Wyse, Foreign Office, December 12, 1856.
The above dispatch makes it clear that unless the Greek government agreed to the setting up of the Financial Commission the forces at Piraeus would not be withdrawn. Britain and France wanted to lift the occupation and replace it with a system of financial control. The Political victory won by Otho in September 1855, when he replaced the "ministry of occupation" with the Boulgaris administration, was about to be countered with an Anglo-French economic victory in Greece. This time the Germanic Powers could not come to Otho's rescue as they had during the Crimean War, for the simple reason that Austria was no longer needed by the Allies to over-power the force of Russia in the Near East. Russia, the other country from which Otho could expect help, consented to the setting up of a Financial Commission and the Treaty of 1832 made it legal for the Protecting Powers to interfere in the domestic finances of Greece.

The terms under which the Commission was to be set up made it very easy for the Protecting Powers not only to check the Greek finances but to control and operate them. This raised questions in the British Parliament which felt that the occupying Powers were replacing one means of force, the occupation, with another, the Financial Commission. "No doubt," said the Marquess of Clanvicarde, "we ought to have some control over the finances of the country, as it was our debtor, and we ought to take care of our debts; yet if such an arrangement was carried too far, it would involve us in
difficulties." To this objection the Earl of Clarendon responded that Greece had not been responsible to the Protecting Powers in discharging its payments and it became necessary therefore to resort to extreme measures. He defended the idea of the Commission as one which would solve many economic problems of Greece and would end political rivalry in that country among the Protecting Powers.

He [the Earl of Clarendon] believed that the Protecting Powers were about to render essential service to Greece by the advice and assistance which the Commissioners would be able to render to her Government, and it was expected that the Greek Government might in this way have it in their power to effect certain administrative and financial reforms, ... He believed the Commission would be established in a few days and he hoped it would tend eventually to put an end to the contests for influence which had so often taken place between foreign Powers — contests which did no service to the Powers engaged and which only distracted and wounded the public feeling of the country which was so unfortunate as to be the subject of them.

The people in Greek politics felt that no matter how one viewed the Commission, its purpose was financial control of Greece by the Protecting Powers. Rangabes immediately protested to the Powers against the establishment of the Commission but only Prince Alexander Gorchakov, who replaced Nesselrode in May 1856 as Minister of Foreign Affairs, showed any sympathy. The Russian diplomat maintained that the Emperor Alexander would not participate in such a Commission with such rigid

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118 Ibid., 511-12.
measures taken against Greece by the Western Powers. The Russian government's protest forced France and England to reconsider its harsh schemes of financial control and to adopt milder measures towards the Protectorate. When finally established, the Financial Commission was to have recommending and advisory powers only, a proposal which was readily accepted by the Greek government and went into effect in February 1857.

On February 19, the troops of England and France began the evacuation process and by the 27th of the same month they had all left Greek waters. Greece was finally relieved of a three year occupation only to become burdened with the permanent establishment of a Financial Commission.

119 Levandis, Greek Foreign Debt, 51.

120 F.O. 32/252, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, March 3, 1857. Wyse reported on March 3rd that the evacuation was completed as two meetings of the Financial Commission had taken place. The first meeting was on February 18, the second on February 25. The representatives were Wyse, de Montherot, Ogeroff.

121 In the spring of 1857 Wyse returned to England. "On March 27, 1857, it had been announced that the Queen intended to confer on him a knight-Commandership of the Order of the Bath, and on his arrival in England he was received by Her Majesty and by his old friend the Prince Consort, both of whom congratulated him heartily on his services throughout the difficult war years." James Johnston Auchmuty, Sir Thomas Wyse, 1791-1862 (London, 1939).
CONCLUSION

In the years which have passed since the Greek insurrection of 1854 there have been numerous attempts to interpret the role of Greece in the Eastern Question. The predominate view among Greek historians concerning the 1854 insurrection and the role of Greece in the Crimean War can be summarized by the following passage from a modern account of the insurrection:

The revolution in Epiros-Thessaly and Macedonia to shake off the Ottoman yoke, which was instigated by Greece by dispatching volunteer corps and which erupted as a result of the Crimean War, was a continuation of the 1821 struggle as a first endeavor to complete the ideological potential of the nation and the dispositions of the Great Powers in respect to Hellenism. 1

This conclusion is deduced from a close study of the insurrection in Thessaly in 1854. It reflects the typical Greek nationalist point of view held during the Crimean War period as well as today. The role of Greece in the Eastern Question for the Greek nationalist was the same in 1821 as in 1854, 1866-1869 1897, and 1921. 2 The struggle for Greece to become an independent nation began in 1821 and ended -- for most Greeks -- in 1921. Therefore, the focus of this particular point of view is directed at only one objective, namely, territorial expan-

1 Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 217.

2 These dates indicate the struggle of the Greeks who tried to carve out a nation for themselves from the Ottoman Empire.

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sion. The insurrection of 1854 and the insurrections which followed later were all continuations of the War of Independence.

Among the factors which are not considered under this line of thought adopted by Greek nationalists are the role of domestic politics in the events of the nation's history, the influence of international politics in the foreign and domestic policies of the state and finally, the importance of the various socio-economic factors which exercise a great deal of control in society. During the War of Independence there was no nation of Greece, only Greeks who fought with the aid of the Great Powers to achieve their independence. In 1854 there was a nation of Greece and it was the king who actually organized and supported the insurrection against Turkey, therefore the role of Greece in the Eastern Question was totally different in 1854 than it was during the War of Independence.

In the process of change and early development, Greece formed a number of classes, namely, the merchant, the professional, the working class and the peasantry. Political parties were also developed to such a stage that by 1843 there was a successful constitutional revolution by those progressively minded in politics. Finally, the most important factor in the history of the nineteenth century was the constant foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the country. The second phase of the role of Greece in the Eastern Question has, therefore, these elements which are unique and for this
reason the occurrences of 1854 cannot be explained by the circumstances of 1821 or 1897 but only by 1854 alone without of course losing focus of the country's history since the War of Independence.

The socio-economic factor in the insurrection must be viewed historically as it was effected by three important events in Greece: First, a Constitutional revolution and its failure to materialize as a result of the Kolettes triumph in 1844, second, the British blockade of Greece in 1850, and third, the uprising of the Greeks in the Turkish Provinces and the Occupation of Piraeus. The failure of the Constitution and the triumph of Kolettes resulted in the failure of the merchant and professional class to exert its influence in society and win economic and political predominance. Kolettes, unlike Mavrokordatos who favored economic development, internal growth and reform, carved out an expansionist foreign policy which would only damage the interests of the business world in Greece. The merchant class had nothing to gain from such a policy and everything to lose since its trade with Turkey and the Great Powers would be damaged in case of a Greek-Turkish conflict. The administration of Kolettes, therefore, indirectly antagonized by its policy the middle class of Greece which was the backbone of the Greek economy. There was a class schism created as a result of the triumphant exaltation of the Megali Idea; the lower classes, especially the peasants support nationalist expansion while the middle class opposes it. The
third group of people which formulated the strength of the expansionist group was the chieftains and brigands and the wealthy Greeks of Europe who entertained nationalist dreams.

The blockade of 1850 tended to widen the schism between middle class and lower allowing room also for exceptions such as military personnel, brigands, and wealthy adventurers. For the economy of the country the blockade was simply disastrous. The class which suffered the most was the middle class so this experience was the last thing desired to reoccur by merchants and businessmen. Those who were already burning with nationalism became even more radical as a result of the blockade and the rise of Russophilism in the early years of 1850's is a good indication of that phenomenon.

Finally, the events of 1854 completed the schism.

The lower class led by the Court politicians and by brigands fully accepted the idea of a regenerated Byzantine Empire and morally as well as materially supported the insurrection. On the other hand the middle class as well as the large part of working class involved in navigation and commerce resented the insurrection fearing another blockade and perhaps worse consequences. The finest hour for the king and those who supported his cause came in March and April 1854, but it was followed by the sad disappointment of an occupation in May.

The triumph of the middle class was April 1855 when the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was signed at Kalinja. The economy suffered greatly as a result of the Megali Idea policy from
1844 to 1855 and the irony is that the governing class with its broad mass support was engaged in a foreign policy that contradicted the economic interests of the nation, that is, those of the merchant and business classes. In the world of nineteenth century Europe which had seen the rise of the middle class, Greece in its desperate efforts of national expansion jeopardized the very existence of this class.

Aside from the socio-economic factors which were unique to the developments of 1854, the importance of political factors were also unique to the role of Greece in the Crimean War phase of the Eastern Question. If Mavrokordatos had not been forced to resign in 1844 and had remained in power, the 1854 revolution could have been avoided. Kolettes' victory marked the beginning of a new domestic and foreign policy which led to the insurrection and its consequences. He destroyed the work of the Constitutional revolution only to replace it with arbitrary government and handed down to Otho a foreign policy which could only lead Greece to disaster. Parliamentary government did not succeed and internal reform and development were disregarded by the King. The British blockade did not teach Otho a lesson in discipline to the Great Powers and the occupation of Piraeus only excited his dreams of expansion to an even greater level. Pointing out the absurdity of the Megali Idea policy of the Greek Court Dr. Nomikos writes, "in 1854 under the leadership of Otho, this nation of one million people living on 47,000 square kilometers rose to measure it-
self up against the combined might of the Ottoman Empire and the major European Powers." 3 The character of politics cannot be disregarded in the direct influence it exercised over the events of the insurrection of the Christians in the Turkish Provinces. The absence of such politics during the War of Independence is one more factor which accounts for the differentiation of first Greek rebellion against the Turks from the second.

Finally, the role of international politics in Greece contributed to the uniqueness of the 1854 experience. During the Othonian era there was a constant rivalry among the Protecting Powers for political control in Greece. The Anglo-French rivalry in 1844 replaced the Anglo-Russian rivalry and the rivalry between Russian and the combined efforts of France and England replaced the Franco-British rivalry after 1850. Kolettes was responsible to a great extent for the Anglo-French rivalry but in spite of this charismatic dictator who enjoyed antagonizing England, there would have been a rivalry among the Powers for control of policies in Greece since this country was important to control for strategic and commercial reasons.

Great Britain proved in the decade before the occupation that no risk was too great for the political domination of Greece. In 1850 Palmerston blockaded the country's ports because he could not get satisfaction from the Greek government for his political demands. In 1854 both France and England occupied the country for it had decided not to accept their Near Eastern policy. They retained the occupation for three long years, a year even after the Paris Peace Treaty was signed because they wanted to gain political control. When their efforts failed, they decided the next best thing to political control was financial control so they set up the Financial Commission and then removed the occupying forces.

The Germanic Powers and Russia, to a lesser extent, were the balance of power in Greece during the Crimean War period and in many respects during the entire period of the reign of king Otho. Austria, Prussia and Bavaria were the protectors of the crown against any possible abuses which could be inflicted upon it by the Protecting Powers. In 1850 the Germanic Powers joined the rest of Europe in defending Greece against Palmerstonian aggressive diplomacy in that nation. In 1854 and throughout the Crimean War Austria and the other two Germanic states gave Otho their full support when his throne and power was endangered by the Occupying Powers.
Russia during the six year period of 1844-1850 had become, to a large extent, aloof from Greek affairs but in 1850 the Tsar came out very strong in support of the king against Britain. During the Holy Places question Russia took the role of the protector and defender of the Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire and flirted with Greece during the entire affair. In 1854 Nesselrode announced that his country approved of the Greek insurrection and in that same year the Tsar made it known to the world that his struggle against Turkey was in defence of the Christians of the Near East. At the Conferences in Paris Russia tried to eliminate Anglo-French influence in Greece and asked what were these Powers intending to do about the occupation. Finally, Russia defended Greece before the Financial Commission was established by protesting to the harsh measures of the Commission.

The foreign policies of the Powers in Greece, the politics of the court, and the socio-economic factors which existed in 1854 were absent during the War of Independence. Greece discovered after the Crimean War that its role in the Eastern Question had undergone radical transformations so the same goals which were sought for in 1821 could not be hoped to be realized thirty years later under the same circumstances as took place during the War of Independence. One indication of the realization process that took place was the abolition of the "foreign" parties that is "English," "French" and "Russian."
The end of the Crimean War marked the end of these parties as Greeks realized that their interests could not be identical with those of any other country than their own.
APPENDIX

British interests in Greece were not strategic and political only but economic as well. The British currant traders of Patras had established an economic stronghold in Greece and exercised a great deal of influence in the economic policy of the Greek government. In the early months of 1853 the British currant traders urged Thomas Wood, British Consul at Patras, to stop a fixed duty on currants introduced by Christides, minister of France. 1

When losses were suffered in the currant trade as a result of a blight the British Legation in Athens demanded that the Greek government should be held responsible for reimbursing the British merchants since the merchants paid a fixed duty on a bad crop of export. 2

By December 1853, the British currant merchants in Patras and the Ionian Isles demanded a reduction of duty in England for their products. Wyse was able to persuade the new minister of finance, Provelgios, to comply with the demands of the British Legation concerning the economic benefit of the British merchants. The British representative in

1 F.O. 32/207, C.C. Ignate and Co. to T. Wood, Patras, April 26, 1853.

2 F.O. 1/207, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, June 30, 1853.

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Athens felt that a reduction of duty on currants would benefit the Greek economy as well as the British merchants of Greece. He felt therefore that "if the Greek Government are to receive concessions, it ought not to refuse at least its cooperation, to render them available, and reduction of duty in England ought to suggest and be accompanied by a sweeping away of all unnecessary and vixatious interference, and a security for a judicious and steady commercial policy in Greece for the future." The beneficiary of the lower duty on currants from Greece would clearly have been the British merchants of Patras and thus Great Britain. Greece had little to benefit since it would be forced to grant more concessions to the British.

Under the administration of Mavrokordatos fixed duties went into effect much to the satisfaction of the British Legation and merchants of Patras. Under the administration of Boulgaris the ministry of finance thought it profitable to do away with the fixed duty and reintroduce the "old system of Protocols." Upon this news Wyse filed the following report at the Foreign Office. "Currants form a very large item in

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3 F.O. 32/208, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, December 27, 1853.

4 F.O. 32/222, British and Ionian Merchants to T. Wood, Patras, October 10, 1854.
the annual list of her (Greece) exports, and the more or less extension of the market and production, is to her a matter of vital moment. We are the chief consumers, but not dependent for the article on her. If we were to recur to force instead of reason, we have at any time the remedy in our hands." 5

Wyse was successful -- at least -- in persuading the minister of finance not to change the existing law on currant trade. 6 Obviously the presence of the Anglo-French troops persuaded the Boulgaris government to comply with British demands.

5 F.O. 32/240, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 15, 1856.

6 F.O. 32/241, Wood to Wyse, Patras, April 28, 1856.
(VI) Presbeia Ellados en Londino — Spiridon Trikoupis
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(VII) Presbeia en Londino (Embassy in London).

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The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

February 19, 1977
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