Parent Education as a Means of Fostering Moral Development in Beginning Primary Age Children

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PARENT EDUCATION AS A MEANS OF FOSTERING
MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN BEGINNING
PRIMARY AGE CHILDREN

by

EILEEN PEMBROKE

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

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VITA

The author, Eileen Pembroke, is the daughter of John J. Pembroke and Rosemary Shortall Pembroke. She was born July 3, 1951, in Chicago, Illinois.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A revival of interest in moral development and education began with Kohlberg's doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago in the early fifties. Since then, a comprehensive theory proposing a hierarchical organization of developmental stages of moral reasoning has evolved. Conditions necessary for advancement in moral reasoning have been identified and include a given level of cognitive development (Keasey, 1975), a given level of social perspective-taking (Selman, 1975), and cognitive conflict and exposure to reasoning a stage above one's own stage of reasoning (Blatt and Kohlberg, 1975; Sullivan and Beck, 1975; Selman and Lieberman, 1974). In some cases, merely participating in moral discussions was not sufficient to produce change. Instead, subjects had to be actively involved in decision-making processes, and in activities that allowed them to make applications to real life situations and that gave them varied role-taking opportunities, before change in level of moral development occurred. (Mosher, 1975; Kohlberg, Kauffman, Scharf, and Hickey, 1975).

Researchers have developed and published moral development curriculums. Teachers have been taught to be effective moral educators. Still relatively unexplored is the education of parents as moral educators. Grimes (1974) was successful in helping 11 year old children move from Stage 2 to Stage 3 of Kohlberg's hierarchy through moral discussions...
that included their mothers. The present study attempted to teach parents to be moral educators, but the program involved more than parents conducting moral discussions with their children. In some cases, this was insufficient in producing change in the absence of active participation in decision-making and in the absence of various role-taking experiences. Effectiveness of the parent education program was assessed by measuring the developmental change in their children over a seven month period. The subjects were on a primary level (ages 5 to 8) in school. Significant results in working with the parents of young children would lend support to the idea that moral education curriculums could be effectively introduced earlier than junior and senior high school level, where the primary focus on moral education now lies. Also, if parents can be taught to be effective moral educators, the conditions for development will become a part of the child's daily life, rather than being limited to a once or twice weekly discussion for the duration of the school year.

Researchers have felt that there may be an effective as well as a cognitive component to moral development (Simpson, 1976; Selman, 1976; Gilligan, 1976). For this reason, self-concept in relation to level of moral development will be considered.

Specifically, children's self-concept, irrespective of any experimental manipulation will be examined in relation to level of moral development, to determine if children with better self-concepts develop moral reasoning to a higher level at a given age. Also, after conducting the parent education groups, the experimental and control groups
of children will be compared to determine if significant increases occurred in: (a) level of moral reasoning; and (b) self-concept as a result of the experimental manipulation.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

In this chapter, a review of the literature pertaining to Kohlberg's original research and resulting model, and to related research is presented. The conditions necessary for encouraging moral development and the supporting research is reviewed. Also, educational implications and programs developed from Kohlberg's model is presented. Before introducing current research, a historical perspective on moral development theory in the field of education is established and Kohlberg's theory is more fully explained.

Presentation of Kohlberg's Model of Moral Development

At times during the history of American education, moral education has been emphasized to varying degrees. In the early 1900's, a common form of moral instruction in schools involved the "bag-of-virtues" method in which honesty, service, and self-control were stressed. Little empirical research existed to support theorizing about moral development. Two exceptions were the classical studies in 1928, by Hartshorne and May, and in 1932 by Piaget. Hartshorne and May found that the virtues children were encouraged to practice were really just labels for assigning praise and blame. One's behavior was considered to be a matter of situational forces and rewards. If a person cheated in one situation, he wouldn't necessarily cheat in another. Thus, it was not a character trait of dishonesty that made one cheat.
Piaget focused on cognitive rather than emotional aspects of moral development. He found that younger children in the heteronomous stage were unable to recognize intentions of the actor but rather focused on the consequences of the act. Children in the heteronomous stage suggested that the degree of blame was proportional to the degree of damage. This is understandable in terms of the child's overall cognitive development at this point, which prevents him from taking another person's point of view, thus being unable to recognize intention. Also, he is unable to decenter and consider two aspects of the situation at once (intention and consequences). Older children, at the autonomous stage, could recognize intention and consider consequences of an action concurrently. They rejected the idea that punishment must be severe in order to be effective.

Until the 1950's, there was a relative hiatus in this area. Kohlberg began the revival with his doctoral thesis at the University of Chicago, which resulted in the major cognitive theory on moral development in the field of education. Kohlberg's theory was an outgrowth and further development of Piaget's theory. Aspects of Piaget's theory incorporated into Kohlberg's included the concept of invariant developmental sequence of stages, irreversibility of the process of development, and the concept of a socially based nature of morality. Both Piaget and Kohlberg reject the notion that the role of the educator is to transmit values to the child. Cognitive conflict is essential for development to occur. Interaction with the environment, and particularly the peer group, is essential.
Kavanagh (1977) found interaction with peers to be essential. In a study with experimental conditions involving peer group discussions with no adult involvement and adult-guided peer group discussions, the group without the adult leader showed significantly greater gains in level of reasoning. Change, according to Piaget, occurs as the result of maturation, interaction with the social environment and physical environment, and especially through self-regulation. Self-regulation means students should be allowed a maximum of activity of their own so that they develop real understanding rather than having a structure imposed on them by others.

Kohlberg proposes a three-level theory that is ultimately an interpersonal theory dealing with a person's rights and responsibilities. Each of these three levels is divided into two stages, resulting in a scheme of six developmental stages. Kohlberg assesses developmental level by presenting open-ended dilemmas to which the person offers a solution to the problem presented, and more importantly, his reasons for choosing that particular action. It is not the choice of action, but rather the rationale for acting that determines a person's level of moral development.

A very important condition for moral development, according to Kohlberg, is the ability to take the perspective of another person. Selman (1975) presents a structural-developmental model for an ordered sequence of social perspective-taking levels, each of which describes a form of reasoning concerning the relation of the self's perspective on social situations to the perspective of others in the environment.
Like Kohlberg, Selman uses open-ended dilemmas and presents questions concerning the person's concept of inter-personal relationships. Individual responses then are used to exemplify the person's level of perspective-taking. Selman presents five levels of social perspective-taking, and says that a given level is a necessary but not sufficient condition for development to a correlated level of moral development. Hickey (1972) found that delinquents have a level of social perspective-taking equivalent to non-delinquent peers, but that their level of moral development is at significantly lower stages. Wright (1978) also found students identified by teachers as delinquent and non-delinquent to differ significantly on level of moral reasoning. This is understandable if moral reasoning is a reflection of how people should think and act toward each other, and social perspective considers how and why people do, in reality, think and act toward each other. The delinquent subjects had a relatively mature conception of the way the social world operated, but an immature conception of what it should be like, what was in fact morally right. The following presents a comparative summary of Kohlberg's stages of moral development and Selman's stages of social perspective-taking. (See Appendix F for a tabular presentation).

Kohlberg's Stage 0, the premoral stage, recognizes that judgments of right and wrong are based on good and bad consequences, and not on an individual's intentions. Choices about a course of action to follow are based on the subject's wishes that good things happen to himself. The child will simply state his choice without attempting
to justify or provide reasons.

At Stage 1, the punishment and obedience orientation, the child has no appreciation of the value of rules, but simply responds to a more powerful authority. The child focuses on one perspective, that of authority. Right action is defined in terms of the consequences of an act, and not in terms of the actor's intentions. Morality is equated with obedience and the child's conception is that anyone who is punished is bad because disobedience is inevitably followed by punishment. The accomplishment of this stage is that an individual's behavior comes under the control of society.

At Stage 2, the instrumental-relativist orientation, the child recognizes that he has wishes and desires which may differ from others. Right action in this stage is that which is instrumental to a person's own best interests and which satisfies his desires. Beginning social cooperation occurs and is seen as a means to ensure one's own wishes in order to get his own demands met. Thus, a beginning awareness of purpose of rules is achieved.

At Stage 3, the interpersonal-concordance orientation, emphasis is placed on establishing and maintaining positive and enduring relationships. Actions are good if they are based on prosocial motives. Being moral implies concern for someone else's approval, and it requires an awareness that they are evaluating you, as well as you are evaluating them. Reliance on a stereotype of a good person is the basis of conformity. Social cooperation is extended past the "one-shot-deals" of the instrumental-relativist period to more permanent relationships,
but is limited to a few relationships with family or friends.

While at Stage 3 of Kohlberg's hierarchy, the individual was concerned with maintaining order in interpersonal relationships with family and friends, at Stage 4, the law and order orientation, the rules are extended to strangers or society at large. Instead of the interpersonal reciprocity of Stage 3, a transpersonal reciprocity emerges which allows people to live together in a society with shared expectations based on law. That is, all people can be expected to pay taxes, obey traffic laws, register firearms, etc. Order is maintained through laws which are enforced impersonally. No personal considerations can supersede the law. Respect for authority is part of one's responsibility to society. The major accomplishment of this stage is a society-wide system of cooperation.

Where Stage 4 deals with establishing societal relations and emphasizes authority, Stage 5, the social contract-legalistic orientation, adds equalization of products and tries to minimize arbitrary inequalities. The idea of a hypothetical rational person is used to devise rules that would satisfy this person and benefit the most people. Laws are no longer considered to be absolutes, but rather are arrived at by a consensus of people and are subject to change if the majority agrees.

At Stage 6, the universal ethical-principle orientation, the individual is concerned with more than the process for changing laws. Rather, he is concerned with the principles by which the system should be judged. These principles are abstract and are arrived at through
the use of reason. Where at Stage 5, the emphasis was on collective will, Stage 6 recognizes that just because the majority agrees to something, does not mean that it is right. Evaluation of one's actions is made on the basis of adherence to individual principles, rather than the majority will.

Each of the following levels of social perspective-taking proposed by Selman are necessary but not sufficient conditions for advancement to each of Kohlberg's parallel stages. At Level 0 of Selman's hierarchy, subjects are highly egocentric and unable to differentiate another's perspective from their own, although they do have a sense of differentiation between self and others. The individual's perception at this stage is that everyone sees things as he does, and feels the same in a given situation.

At Level 1, the child begins to realize that his own perspective is not unique and that others can view the same situation differently. He is aware of other's thoughts and feelings. However, he cannot maintain his own perspective and recognize another's concurrently. For example, if a boy breaks a lot of dishes by accident, the child at Level 1 may recognize that the mother is angry or that the boy did not intend to do it, but not both at once.

At Level 2, the individual who had previously recognized that others have a different perspective from his own, now realizes that others are aware of him as a unique person, and no person's perspective is viewed as absolutely right or valid. A reciprocity of perspective occurs in that the person is aware that others are observing and evalu-
ating him as well as he is observing and evaluating them. By putting himself in another's place, the individual has a way of judging his intentions, purposes, and actions.

At Level 3, each person is simultaneously aware of his own and other's abilities and perceptions, and he begins to see interpersonal relations in terms of abstract mutuality. He is aware that others are attuned to his feelings and perceptions at the same time he is aware of their feelings and perceptions.

At Level 4, the person begins to realize that mutual perspective-taking does not always lead to complete understanding. Social conventions are seen as necessary because they are understood by all members of the group. Another's perspective includes both a view of self and a complex psychological system of beliefs, values and attitudes. Relationships can be understood at different levels and one person can be viewed in many roles - friend, acquaintance, son, etc.

At Level 5, perspective-taking focuses on the interaction between subjects rather than on individual subjects. It becomes evident that interactions can mean different things to different people. Interactions can have multiple meanings, some of which may not be consciously apparent to either party in the interaction.

**Developmental Characteristics and Conditions Necessary for Moral Development**

Kohlberg proposes a six-stage model of moral development, with each stage reflecting a cognitively more mature level of reasoning about issues of a moral nature. Kohlberg considers several conditions
as necessary in order for development in this area to occur. Also, his model represents a developmental hierarchy with distinctly different levels of reasoning. The following discussion articulates the concept of the developmental hierarchy and the conditions necessary for development to occur.

Inherent in Kohlberg's theory are several assumptions about the nature of moral development. First, stages are structured wholes or organized systems of thought, which means individuals are consistent in level of moral reasoning. Kohlberg (1970) has found that a majority of an individual's thinking is at one stage with the remainder falling a stage above or below the individual's major stage.

Secondly, stages form an invariant sequence with development always occurring in an upward direction. Regression, except in cases of extreme trauma, never occurs. Results from Kohlberg's twenty year longitudinal study showed subjects to be at the same stage or one stage higher on three year retests. Wefnreich (1977), in replicating Kohlberg's original study with a British population, found that as age increases lower levels of reasoning drop out and an increase in higher levels of reasoning is seen. As in Kohlberg's original study, a positive correlation between age and level of reasoning was seen.

Finally, stages are hierarchically integrated. That is, a person at a higher stage comprehends but rejects lower stage arguments as too immature and tends to function at the highest stage he comprehends. Rest (1969) found that individuals exposed to statements at each of the
six stages understood statements at or below their own level of development, but failed to comprehend statements more than one stage above their own. They ranked as best, the highest stage comprehended.

Kohlberg considers several conditions as necessary for development in the moral realm to occur. Presentation of arguments a stage above a subject's own level is effective in creating conflict regarding one's own current moral structure, leading to dissatisfaction with the current moral reasoning level and promoting development. Blatt and Kohlberg (1975) conducted weekly moral discussions on open-ended dilemmas with a group of students at various stages of moral development. Since the group was a heterogeneous mixture of stages, they served as models of higher stage reasoning for each other. Significant increases in level of moral reasoning occurred in comparison to a control group and were maintained on a one year follow-up.

Sullivan and Beck (1975) attempted to raise the level of moral reasoning in a high school group of Canadian students, using a variety of methods including discussions of moral dilemmas in twice weekly meetings for a semester. A pretest, posttest and follow-up test one year later were given. On posttest, no differences were found between experimental and control groups. However, on follow-up one year later, the experimental group showed significant increases in Stage 5 thinking. The results lend support to the cognitive view that interaction with environmental factors in the school setting were needed to act as a catalyst for change, and additional time for cognitive restructuring to occur was needed.
Additionally, given levels of cognitive development are required for moral development to occur past certain points. Keasey (1975) found that a given level of cognitive development is a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral development to occur. He studied a group of 12 year olds in which formal operations were just emerging and a group of 19 year olds in which formal operational thought was fairly well established. Keasey found that all principled moral thinkers showed formal operational thought. However, not all showing formal operational thought demonstrated moral judgment at principled levels. In a comparison of 12 and 19 year olds who achieved comparable levels of formal operational thought, the older group showed significantly higher levels of moral reasoning. It seems as if a time lag is to be expected before cognitive restructuring affects reasoning in the moral realm. In studying a group of 7 and 9 year olds, Keasey found similar results in that concrete operational thought is a necessary but not sufficient condition for advancement to Stage 2 reasoning.

A third condition, previously discussed, is the ability to understand another's perspective. Selman's model was already presented. Mosher (1976) demonstrated the importance of this social perspective-taking element in moral development. In a moral education program conducted with high school students, he used discussions of moral dilemmas presented in films and in written case study form. Additionally, the students were taught counseling skills and served as leaders of moral discussions with younger children. Another program that Mosher conducted involved only discussions of dilemmas and failed
to produce any developmental changes. However, this program resulted in significant developmental changes in moral reasoning. Mosher attributes the success of the program to the activities the students participated in, which allowed them to make applications to real-life situations and gave them varied role-taking opportunities.

Although Kohlberg considers primarily the cognitive aspects of moral development, an important factor in optimizing moral development is considered by some to be the individual's state of affective development. Simpson (1976) considers moral development to be a substantial aspect of ego development, and considers the achievement of an integrated identity a necessary component in the attainment of principled autonomy. She considers Kohlberg's model to be closely related to affective models, such as Maslow's hierarchy of human needs, and proposes that individuals who remain motivated by unmet psychological needs may not be able to function at higher levels of moral development, despite advanced cognitive development. Kohlberg's report (1968) that children of low socioeconomic status progress more slowly through developmental stages than higher socioeconomic status children is explained by Simpson as due to unmet psychological needs. In a study conducted by Simpson (1972), she found that the needs for social esteem and belongingness were negatively associated with principled reasoning, and the need for self-esteem from a sense of competence was positively associated with principled reasoning.

Selman's clinical work with children leads him to consider affective egocentrism and low self-esteem as important factors in delaying
social-moral growth. From a psychoanalytic perspective, Gilligan (1976) argues that fear of shame or loss of face acts as a block to development. He views development along Kohlberg's hierarchy as progressing from a:

Nietzschean 'will to power' shame ethic (Stage 1), in which the goal is to be on the side with the most power by conformity to power figures, to the guilt ethic (Stage 6), in which the motive is to avoid 'self-condemnation' from one's own conscience.

Early in the developmental hierarchy, the motive for behavior is to avoid sanctions perceived as coming from others (shame). In succeeding stages, the motive increasingly becomes to avoid sanctions perceived as coming from the self (guilt), and rule obedience or moral action represents successive degrees of internalization of moral sanctions.

Benniga (1975) evaluated the relationship between self-concept and moral judgment. He found no significant relationship between global self-concept scores and overall level of moral judgment. However, when self-concept was broken into four factors of academic-school, fun, self-assertion, and self-separateness, and moral judgment was broken into the factors of moral realism, 'immanent justice, and reciprocal punishment, all three factors of moral judgment correlated significantly with at least one of the factors of self-concept.

Educational Applications of Kohlberg's Mode

That certain conditions can promote development of moral reasoning has been established in many research studies. Application of the research findings has resulted in the use of moral discussions on the
elementary and secondary level, the establishment of alternative high schools with a participatory democracy, and the publishing of social studies and film strip curriculums to promote development of moral reasoning. The following discussion presents related educational applications of Kohlberg's theory.

The results of many studies, in which change in level of moral development was induced through moral development curriculums, encouraged the development of larger scale programs. Wasserman (1976) reports on an alternative high school established as part of the public high school in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The social studies and English curricula were integrated with a program of moral discussion, in which all students participated as part of the core curriculum. The governance structure was based on a participatory democracy with one vote per person and equal weight given to staff and student votes. Major decisions were reached through consultation with the entire community. All members participated on a discipline committee on a rotating basis. Positive signs of the program's success were evident in an emerging sense of community, high morale, an increased capacity for participating in and leading community meetings. Friendships were established among students of widely varying backgrounds and positive changes in students' behavior occurred.

Fenster developed a social studies curriculum, The Carnegie-Mellon Social Studies Curriculum, that presented moral dilemmas within the text. It was found to be effective when teachers received training in leading moral discussions. Guidance Associates has a series of sound-
filmstrips that present moral dilemmas intended for use with young children. Selman and Lieberman (1974) used the filmstrips with second graders and found significant gains. Lay teachers with no training in cognitive-developmental theory stimulated as much growth as experienced teachers with training in the cognitive-developmental approach.

Group discussions of dilemmas have been shown to be effective in raising level of moral development. However, Kohlberg (1975) and Mosher (1975) have suggested that this technique may only be minimally effective if the justice level of the institution in which the program is operating is low. In addition to moral discussions and curriculums, a moral atmosphere is needed.

The justice structure of an institution is represented by the perceived rules or principles for distribution of rewards, punishment, responsibilities, and privileges. For example, prisons are generally perceived as Stage 1, where obedience to arbitrary commands of a power figure is required and punishment occurs for disobedience. Schools are typically at a Stage 4 level.

A change in the justice structure of an institution was achieved in the New England Prison Intervention Project conducted by Kohlberg, Hickey, and Scharf (1974). They found dilemma discussions ineffective in changing moral reasoning. It was necessary to involve prisoners in the practical aspects of structuring their own community through tailoring and enforcing rules and solving problems experienced within the community through group consultation.

That level of moral development can be affected by participation
in group discussions of a dilemma (Blatt and Kohlberg, 1975; Selman and Lieberman, 1974), establishment of a participatory democracy (Wasserman, 1976; Kohlberg, Hickey, and Scharf, 1974) and by induction of cognitive conflict (Sullivan and Beck, 1975) has been shown. The fact that few adults reach principled levels of moral reasoning despite the fact that many are formal operational thinkers suggests that some sort of moral education program could be beneficial in encouraging development to higher levels of moral reasoning. In the past, this occurred most frequently through moral education curriculums used directly with children and adolescents.

The feasibility and practicality of implementing moral education curriculums as a regular part of the academic program, on a large scale basis, are questionable. In a time when the economic situation is resulting in cut-backs on standard curriculum areas, acceptance of a new curriculum area is questionable. Additionally, when schools are failing to provide adequate intellectual education, and limited academic achievement is a serious problem, schools may be shirking their primary responsibility by assuming the additional one of moral education. A more practical means for fostering moral development would be to work with groups of parents to provide them with the information and skills necessary for fostering moral development in their own children.

Most research with moral education curriculums has been done with late childhood and early adolescent subjects. An exception was Selman and Lieberman's work (1974) in which they found significant gains
in reasoning in second grade children using the Guidance Associates filmstrips. By working with children at younger ages, fixation at lower stages of moral development may not occur as readily and in as many cases.

In the present investigation, beginning primary level students were utilized. However, I did not work directly with them, but rather I tried to induce change in moral development level by teaching parents the necessary skills for this. Grimes (1974) was successful in helping 11 year old children move from Kohlberg's Stage 2 to Stage 3 through moral discussions that included their mothers. However, more than simply moral discussions will occur, as in some studies this was insufficient to induce change (Mosher, 1976; Kohlberg, Hickey, and Scharf, 1974).

The rationale for using young children is that little has been done to induce change in beginning primary level children. Significant results would offer support to the idea that moral education curriculums could be effectively introduced earlier than junior and senior high school. Also, teachers have been effectively trained to induce developmental change in moral reasoning. However, at the time a child enters school, the number of people who play an important part in a child's life are limited. Sullivan (1947) introduced the term 'significant others' to refer to those people around a child who significantly influence him. By working with parents, who are already established as significant influences by the time the child begins school, more immediate results may be obtained. Additionally, the conditions neces-
sary for promoting development are not limited to once or twice weekly discussions for a year in school, but are a part of their daily life if parents practice what they learn.

Specifically I was interested in considering three primary questions. First, is a child's self-concept related to level of development in moral reasoning at a given age level. Second, does participation of parents in the parent education group significantly affect the child's level of reasoning in the areas of authority and justice. Third, does parent participation in the program significantly affect the child's self-concept.

In summary, Kohlberg has developed a six-stage developmental model of moral development which is the basic theory upon which this study is based. These stages are organized systems of thought, forming an invariant sequence, and hierarchically integrated. In order for development to occur, research has shown that a certain level of cognitive development is required. Also, exposure to higher stages of reasoning, as well as the ability to understand another's perspective are necessary. Some applications of this theory have been made in educational settings and this study considers another area where moral development can be encouraged through the education of parents.
CHAPTER III

METHOD

This study investigated the effect of an eight-week parent workshop on beginning primary level children's level of moral reasoning and their self-concept. During the eight training sessions, parents were taught communication skills. The children's levels of moral reasoning was assessed in the areas of justice and authority. Specifically, the hypotheses considered were:

1. Children's self-concept as measured on the Self-Social Constructs Test, is not related to level of social reasoning irrespective of the experimental manipulation.
2. Parent participation in the parent education program does not significantly increase the child's level of moral reasoning as measured on Damon's justice and authority interviews.
3. Parent participation in the parent education program did not significantly change their child's self-concept.

Subjects

The subjects in this study were children of parent volunteers. Parents were obtained to participate in the parent education program from two Chicago public schools, Paderewski and Chalmers.

The schools from which subjects were obtained are in low-income, urban areas of Chicago and are receiving Title I funds. All subjects (N=60) were black children ranging in age from 5 to 8 and participating in Title I, ESEA programs. An experimental group of 30 children was initially obtained. Due to experimental mortality, only 27 subjects remained in the experimental group at post-testing. A control group of 29 children was obtained and at post-testing, 26 remained in the
control group. To control for a possible volunteer effect, the subjects in the control group were children whose parents volunteered but did not actually participate in the group.

**General Procedure**

Written notice of the parent education group was sent to all parents of children in grades kindergarten through third, with a form to be returned to the school, if they were willing to participate. All parents who indicated that they were willing to participate were contacted individually. Prior to contacting them, parents were randomly assigned to experimental and control conditions. Parents of the children assigned to the experimental group participated in the parent education program; parents of the children assigned to the control group were told that they would be put on a waiting list to be contacted when a second group was offered.

All children were pretested in September, prior to the beginning of the parent education group. To control for a possible order effect, half of the children were administered the authority interview first, and half were administered the justice interview first. The parent education group was run for a period of 8 weeks beginning in October, and ending the third week in November. Posttesting occurred 5 months after the termination of the parent group the week following spring vacation. The rationale for delaying posttesting was that time for cognitive restructuring was necessary.

Additionally, since short-term reliability (test-retest) information was not available on Damon's instrument, a reliability study on
the instrument was conducted. Forty-eight additional children were administered both the justice and the authority interviews and were retested on the same interviews one month later. Subjects were obtained from a comparable population, that is, black children from low-income, urban areas, attending schools receiving Title I funds.

To control for experimenter bias in scoring, Melanie Killen, a graduate assistant to Dr. Damon, scored all test protocols from experimental and control groups and the protocols from the reliability portion of the study.

Parents met once a week for 8 consecutive weeks. Two groups were conducted, one in the morning and one in the afternoon, to accommodate parents' varying schedules. The morning group met in the parent room at Chalmers School and the afternoon group met in the parent room at Paderewski School. The room had large tables with chairs which were appropriate for group meetings. The sessions lasted for approximately two hours with a break halfway through the meeting for coffee and rolls. The same material and objectives were covered during each meeting. To control for variability in coverage of topics, a list of topics was developed for each meeting. Mrs. Doris Feltus, the district parent coordinator, attended all meetings and systematically checked off the topics and activities as they were covered in each meeting.

Description of Treatment

The design of the curriculum was influenced by the conditions which Kohlberg considered necessary for the development of moral reasoning, that is, production of cognitive conflict often achieved
through a discussion model, empathy, and social perspective-taking. The intent of the parent group was to teach parents the skills needed to implement these conditions within the home. In the meetings, the conditions necessary for encouraging development (i.e. development of empathy, discussion and exposure to higher stages of reasoning, cognitive conflict) were introduced and made applicable to practical, everyday situations. Specifically, the following objectives for the weekly meetings were met. First, in order to encourage development through discussion, parents needed to be able to communicate with their children. Involving the family in discussion of moral issues would be difficult if the family structure was such that the parents talked and the children listened. A general atmosphere of acceptance of children's ideas is necessary if children are to do more than parrot their parents' ideas. The first objective then was to teach parents to respond to their children with a "language of acceptance" (Gordon, 1975), rather than by ordering, warning, preaching, advising, etc. Specifically, they were taught skills in "active listening." (Gordon, 1975).

Secondly, the development of empathy and the ability to take another's perspective is an important condition for advancement of moral reasoning. Children of beginning school age are often unable to differentiate their own perspective from another's so that they expect others to feel or think the same as themselves in a given situation. A slightly more advanced child may recognize that another can view the same situation differently than himself, but the child cannot maintain his
perspective simultaneously with putting himself in the place of another. The second objective was to help parents promote the development of empathy and recognition of another's perspective in their children. Rather than having parents tell children what they think the child is thinking or feeling (i.e. You think you're so smart), which may be inaccurate anyway, they will respond with what they, the parent, thinks or feels. Specifically, parents were taught to send "I" rather than "you" messages. (Gordon, 1975). This presents the child with two perspectives at the same time; his own as perceived by himself, and the one reported by his parent.

A third important condition for moral development to occur is cognitive conflict. Kohlberg rejects the notion that the role of the parent or educator is to transmit values to the child. Rather, through interaction with the environment, conflicts arise and are resolved and by this process the child's own system of values evolves. If children are not allowed to find their own solutions to problems and are always told or forced to do it their parents' way, development will be delayed. The third objective then, was to teach parents a method of handling and solving problems that occur. The method does not rely on the power of parents to control and enforce, but rather encourages conflict resolution through mutual agreement. Specifically, parents were taught to work in conjunction with their children in identifying the problem, generating alternative solutions, evaluating the alternatives, deciding on the best acceptable solution and then implementing it. The elimination of power as a means of resolving problems is
especially important with this age child. Many children on a beginning primary level respond to rules simply because a more powerful authority is enforcing them. Appreciation of the value of rules is absent and obedience occurs simply out of deference to a more powerful authority. Following is a description of the curriculum. (See Appendix A for an outline of weekly topics and activities covered.)

Phase 1: Baseline. In order to teach parents certain skills, a role-playing method was one mode of demonstrating to parents a skill, and then enabling them to practice it within the group. Before the actual skills to be taught were introduced, parents were involved in role-playing situations. As many parents as were willing were involved in role-playing situations, sometimes playing the part of the parent, other times playing the part of the child. This allowed for the establishment of a baseline in terms of type and frequency of parental response. The role-playing sessions were taped and transcribed. All parent responses were classified into two categories. Responses that could not be classified by one or the other category were disregarded. The categories were directive responses (i.e. ordering, warning, moralizing, advising, lecturing, judging, praising, ridiculing, interpreting, reassuring, probing, humorizing) and non-directive responses (i.e. passive listening, active listening, sending "I" messages). The frequency, in terms of percentage of total responses, was determined for each category.

Phase 2: Communication Skills. This phase involved: (a) a discussion of different ways family members communicate, and rules,
power and punishment in family relationships; and (b) the teaching and practice of active listening skills and confrontation skills through role-playing parent-child conflicts in the group meeting.

After the baseline in the first session, parents were asked to reflect on their own childhoods and the form of discipline used as well as their reaction to it. Children's behavior, factors affecting the behavior's acceptability, and problem ownership were discussed. The twelve roadblocks to communication were presented and discussed. The Maryland Parent Attitude Survey was distributed. (See Appendix B for a copy of it.) Parents were asked to complete and return it before leaving the first meeting.

The second and third sessions were devoted to introduction and practice of active listening skills. Parents were encouraged to practice this skill at home and discuss attempts at implementing it at home in future sessions. Sessions were taped throughout the eight week period. Parent responses in role-playing situations were taped again after all skills were introduced. Responses were again categorized into directive/non-directive classifications. A percentage of total responses for each category was determined again to see if parents were actually acquiring the skills taught in the group. This was determined by an increase in non-directive and decrease in directive responses.

In the fourth and fifth session, parents were taught how to confront their children when the child's behavior was interfering with the parents' own needs. The negative consequences of typical ways
of responding when upset were examined. Then parents were taught the skill of sending "I" messages, which relates the feeling of the person who is upset rather than blaming, criticizing, putting the child down, or solving the problem for him. The skill was practiced through role-play of real and imaginary problem situations.

**Phase 3: The Family Meeting.** This phase involved: (a) discussion of rules, typical means of resolving conflict in families, and negative effects of power; and (b) introduction and practice of a six-step approach to conflict resolution through family meetings.

Session six involved discussions of win-lose approaches to problem-solving, the destructive effects of authority, limitations and effects of parental power. A presentation of a no-lose method of solving conflicts was made and the skill was practiced in the group.

Session seven continued to practice this skill as well as implement the skills of active listening and sending "I" messages in the family meetings using the six-step approach to conflict resolution. Parents again role-played several problem situations, sometimes playing the part of parents and sometimes playing the role of child. These were transcribed and compared to the baseline session to see if a change in response style occurred.

**Phase 4: Value Differences and Value Instruction.** Session eight involved a presentation of social and moral development in children, conditions necessary for the development, and how the skills learned by the parents in the group would promote their child's social and moral reasoning. Parents were shown a filmstrip to illustrate the
technique of leading a moral discussion and it was applied to the home setting. Also, they were involved in a moral discussion. (See Appendix D for the dilemmas used in the parents' discussions.)

Design and Statistical Analysis

To test the first hypothesis regarding the relationship between self-concept and level of reasoning at a given age, the following multivariate randomized block design lay-out was used:

0-A 0-B 1-A 1-B 2-A

5 years
5 years
7 years
8 years

Pretest data from both the experimental and control groups was used, as well as the original data from the children in the reliability study so that a total N of 107 was obtained. The independent variable was level of reasoning, and subjects were blocked by age. The dependent variables were scores on the various scales of the Children's Social Constructs Test (CSSC). The analysis was run twice, once using the justice scores as an independent variable and again using the authority scores as an independent variable, since level of reasoning for any given child often varied from one interview to the other.

The expected outcome was that self-concept (particularly Esteem and Social Interest) would be positively related to level of reasoning at every age with those children of a given age demonstrating higher level of reasoning also showing a more positive self-concept.
In testing the second hypothesis, the following multivariate randomized block design lay-out was used:

**Experimental-Control**

5 years
6 years
7 years
8 years

The independent variable was the experimental/control conditions. Again, subjects were blocked on age. The dependent variables were two change scores for level of reasoning in the areas of justice and authority.

The expected outcome of this design was that the experimental condition would demonstrate significantly greater development in level of reasoning than the control group in the areas of both justice and authority.

To test the third hypothesis, a Hotelling's $T^2$ was used with the experimental/control conditions as the independent variable and the scores in the various scales of the *Children's Self-Social Constructs Test (CSSC Test)* as the dependent variable. The age factor was not considered through blocking because the CSSC Test is not a developmental measure and a relationship between test scores and age has not been established. The expected outcome of this test is that the experimental condition would show significantly greater gains in self-concept.

In addition to the three major hypotheses, the reliability of the authority and justice scales was determined. Forty-eight children,
ranging in ages from 6 to 8 years were administered both scales at a one month interval. Scores on the scales are ordinal and have a 6 point range. They were assigned values 1 to 6. A Pearson-product moment correlation was run on the pre- and posttest data to obtain a reliability coefficient for both the justice and authority interview.

In addition to the stated hypotheses and the reliability study, the data obtained on the justice and authority scales were considered in relation to Damon's findings with his middle and lower-middle class sample. It was expected that with the population used in this present study, lower stages of reasoning would be used by older children than Damon typically found with the population he studied. Consideration of the data was made to determine if there were sex differences in level of reasoning at given age levels. The levels of reasoning displayed by each child on both the justice and authority interviews was considered to see if any consistent patterns of development occurred in the child's conception of justice and authority (i.e. Does his conception of justice develop to a higher level sooner than his conception of authority?)
CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

In this study, parents were taught skills for more effective communication with their children. The resultant effects on the children's self-concept and level of development in the area of moral reasoning were measured. Also considered was the relationship between a child's self-concept and his level of moral reasoning at a given age. The hypotheses were developed with the expectation that children with more positive self-concepts would show higher levels of reasoning at a given age and that making parents more effective in communicating with their children would enhance both children's self-concept and their development in the area of moral reasoning. The results of the statistical analysis of the hypotheses follows.

Analysis I:

A multivariate randomized factorial design was used to test hypothesis I. (Children's Self-Concept is Not Related to Level of Social Reasoning Irrespective of the Experimental Manipulation.) The design was run twice, once using the levels of reasoning on the authority interview as a factor and again using the levels of reasoning on the justice interview as a factor. Age and level of the child's reasoning were the independent variables, with four levels of age and five levels of reasoning. Dependent variables were the scores on the eight scales of the Children's Self-Social Constructs.
Test, (i.e. esteem, social realism, identification with mother, identification with father, identification with teacher, identification with friends, social interest and minority identification).

Table 1 shows the results of this analysis using the results of the authority interview as one factor. There was significant difference in self-concept across age levels. The univariate tests of the individual variables show that the difference in self-concept occurred specifically on the variables of identification with friends, social interest, and minority identification. Consideration of individual cell means in Table 2 shows that on the social interest variable, scores decreased with age, indicating less social interest. On the minority identification variable, scores increased with age indicating less minority identification and then decreased at age 8. Scores on identification with friends increased with age, indicating less identification.

Table 3 shows no significant difference in self-concept across the five levels of reasoning on the authority interview. That is, children exhibiting higher levels of reasoning on the issue of authority did not have significantly different self-concepts from children reasoning at lower levels. Consequently the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, so that children varying in level of reasoning at a given age cannot be assumed to have significantly different self-concepts.

The test of the interaction between age and level of reasoning was not significant, indicating that the main effect for age was a
### TABLE 1

**Multivariate Test of the Significant Difference in Eight Levels of Self-Concept Across Four Levels of Age**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test of Roots</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>DFHyp</th>
<th>P Less Than</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Through 3</td>
<td>1.588</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.045*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Through 3</td>
<td>1.127</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Through 3</td>
<td>.648</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.691</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Univariate Tests**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>F(3.35)</th>
<th>P Less Than</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-esteem</td>
<td>.151</td>
<td>.929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>.371</td>
<td>.774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification - Mother</td>
<td>.943</td>
<td>.424</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identification - Father</td>
<td>2.349</td>
<td>.078</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identification - Teacher</td>
<td>1.794</td>
<td>.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification - Friends</td>
<td>2.811</td>
<td>.044*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Interest</td>
<td>4.202</td>
<td>.008*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Identification</td>
<td>4.184</td>
<td>.008*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 2

**Mean Self-Concept Scores for Subjects Age 5, 6, 7, and 8 on the Variable Identification with Friends, Social Interest, and Minority Identification**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Identification - Friends</th>
<th>Social Interest</th>
<th>Minority Identification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.264</td>
<td>3.842</td>
<td>1.694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 sd</td>
<td>2.574</td>
<td>1.358</td>
<td>.752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.878</td>
<td>3.355</td>
<td>1.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 sd</td>
<td>5.454</td>
<td>1.255</td>
<td>.711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.629</td>
<td>2.815</td>
<td>2.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 sd</td>
<td>2.242</td>
<td>1.387</td>
<td>.487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.291</td>
<td>2.625</td>
<td>1.542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 sd</td>
<td>2.050</td>
<td>1.138</td>
<td>.596</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 3

**Multivariate Test of the Significant Difference in Eight Levels of Self-Concept Across Five Levels of Reasoning About Authority**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test of Roots</th>
<th>$F$</th>
<th>DF Hyp</th>
<th>$P$ Less Than</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Through 5</td>
<td>.960</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>.544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Through 5</td>
<td>.762</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>.804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Through 5</td>
<td>.660</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Through 5</td>
<td>.605</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Through 5</td>
<td>.444</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.777</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Multivariate Test of the Interaction Between Age and Level of Reasoning on the Authority Interview**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test of Roots</th>
<th>$F$</th>
<th>DF Hyp</th>
<th>$P$ Less Than</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Through 7</td>
<td>.886</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>.705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Through 7</td>
<td>.775</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>.843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Through 7</td>
<td>.614</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>.947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Through 7</td>
<td>.559</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>.979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Through 7</td>
<td>.298</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Through 7</td>
<td>.173</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Through 7</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.952</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
true effect and was not confounded by an interaction with level of reasoning.

Similar results were found when using the justice interview as a factor in this analysis and are presented in Table 4. No significant difference in self-concept was found across the five levels of reasoning indicating that a higher level of reasoning about justice issues is not significantly associated with a more positive self-concept at a given age. Again, there was a significant difference in self-concept across age levels, specifically on the variables of identification with friends, social interest, and minority identification.

Analysis II:

A multivariate randomized factorial design was used to test hypothesis II. (Parent Participation in the Parent Education Program Does not Significantly Increase the Child's Level of Moral Reasoning as Measured on Damon's Justice and Authority Interviews.) The independent variables were the experimental/control condition and age. The two dependent variables were the change scores for level of reasoning in the areas of justice and authority. Table 5 presents the results of this analysis. The multivariate tests show no significant change in level of reasoning between experimental and control conditions or across age levels. However, the multivariate test of the age variable approached the .05 significance level and the univariate test showed a p value less than .05 on the authority interview. Since the multivariate test was not significant, however, this cannot be
### TABLE 4

Multivariate Test of Significant Difference in Eight Levels of Self-Concept Across Five Levels of Reasoning on the Justice Interview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test of Roots</th>
<th>$F$</th>
<th>$DF_{Hyp}$</th>
<th>$P$ Less Than</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Through 5</td>
<td>1.133</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>.274</td>
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<td>2 Through 5</td>
<td>.925</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>.578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Through 5</td>
<td>.714</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Through 5</td>
<td>.560</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Through 5</td>
<td>.340</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 4

Multivariate Test of the Significant Difference in Eight Levels of Self-Concept Across Four Levels of Age on the Justice Interview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test of Roots</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>DF Hyp</th>
<th>p Less Than</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Through 3</td>
<td>1.611</td>
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<td>.040*</td>
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<td>1.121</td>
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<td>.343</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Through 3</td>
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Univariate Tests

<table>
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<th>Variable</th>
<th>F(3.86)</th>
<th>p Less Than</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-esteem</td>
<td>.148</td>
<td>.931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>.388</td>
<td>.762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification-Mother</td>
<td>.936</td>
<td>.427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification-Father</td>
<td>2.488</td>
<td>.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification-Teacher</td>
<td>1.305</td>
<td>.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification-Friends</td>
<td>2.911</td>
<td>.039*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Interest</td>
<td>4.122</td>
<td>.009*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Identification</td>
<td>4.107</td>
<td>.009*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 4

Multivariate Test of the Interaction Between Age and Level of Reasoning on the Justice Interview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test of Roots</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>DF/Hyp</th>
<th>P Less Than</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Through 6</td>
<td>.963</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>.547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Through 6</td>
<td>.573</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>.977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Through 6</td>
<td>.488</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Through 6</td>
<td>.306</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Through 6</td>
<td>.231</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Through 6</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.956</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE 5

Multivariate Test of Significance in Change in Social Reasoning Between the Experimental and Control Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test of Roots</th>
<th>$F$</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Hyp</th>
<th>$p$ Less Than</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Through 1</td>
<td>1.827</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>.173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Univariate Tests</th>
<th>$F(1.45)$</th>
<th>$p$ Less Than</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>3.340</td>
<td>.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test of Roots</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>DPHyp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Through 2</td>
<td>2.024</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Through 2</td>
<td>1.430</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Univariate Tests</th>
<th>F(3.45)</th>
<th>P Less Than</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>1.562</td>
<td>.221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>2.997</td>
<td>.040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## TABLE 5

Multivariate Test of the Interaction Between Group and Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test of Roots</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>DF Hyp</th>
<th>P Less Than</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Through 2</td>
<td>1.382</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Through 2</td>
<td>1.243</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.293</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
considered a valid indication of significance and this hypothesis cannot be rejected. Table 6 shows the mean change scores on the two interviews for the experimental and control groups.

**Analysis III:**

A multivariate one-way analysis of variance was the statistic used to test hypothesis III. (Parent Participation in the Parent Education Program Did not Significantly Change Their Child's Self-Concept.) The independent variable is the experimental/control condition, and the dependent variables are the scores on eight scales of the Children's Self-Social Constructs Test. Table 7 shows that there was no significant change overall in self-concept due to the experimental manipulation. In view of the lack of significance on the multivariate test, the significant increase in social interest shown on the univariate test cannot be considered valid. Table 8 shows the mean change scores on the eight scales of the self-concept test for the experimental and control groups.

**Analysis IV:**

In addition to the three major hypotheses, the data obtained from all subjects in the study were analyzed to determine if there were any age or sex differences in the children's level of reasoning and to determine whether reasoning in one area of either justice or authority developed sooner than in the other area. Table 9 shows the tests of significance for both age and sex. There were no significant differences among males and females in level of reasoning at any of the age levels measured. However, there was a significant
TABLE 6

Means and Standard Deviations for Change Scores for the Experimental and Control Groups on the Authority and Justice Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Justice</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experimental</td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Experimental</td>
<td>Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>.333</td>
<td>.333</td>
<td>.700</td>
<td>.700</td>
<td>.222</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.949</td>
<td>.949</td>
<td>.441</td>
<td>.471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>.375</td>
<td>.375</td>
<td>.143</td>
<td>.143</td>
<td>.250</td>
<td>.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.518</td>
<td>.518</td>
<td>1.215</td>
<td>1.215</td>
<td>.886</td>
<td>.690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.707</td>
<td>.707</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.707</td>
<td>.394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>.625</td>
<td>.625</td>
<td>.750</td>
<td>.750</td>
<td>1.250</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.916</td>
<td>.916</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.886</td>
<td>.816</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 7

**Multivariate Test of Significance Between Experimental and Control Groups on the Self-Concept Measure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test of Roots</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>DFRhyp</th>
<th>DFErr</th>
<th>P Less Than</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Through 1</td>
<td>1.269</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>.284</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Univariate Tests**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>F(1.51)</th>
<th>P Less Than</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-Esteem</td>
<td>.138</td>
<td>.712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>1.531</td>
<td>.222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification-Mother</td>
<td>.972</td>
<td>.329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification-Father</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification-Teacher</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification-Friends</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Interest</td>
<td>5.095</td>
<td>.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minoritly Identification</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.772</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 8

Mean Difference Scores and Standard Deviations for Self-Concept Variables for the Experimental and Control Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Experimental</th>
<th>Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-Esteem</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.159</td>
<td>4.872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>-0.346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.672</td>
<td>1.672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification-Mother</td>
<td>1.333</td>
<td>0.615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.026</td>
<td>2.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification-Father</td>
<td>0.593</td>
<td>0.515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.965</td>
<td>2.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification-Friends</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>0.481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.906</td>
<td>3.906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Interest</td>
<td>0.519</td>
<td>-0.577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.553</td>
<td>1.963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Identification</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>-0.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.121</td>
<td>0.895</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 9

Summary of a 4x2 ANOVA for Age and Sex with Level of Reasoning on the Justice Interview as the Dependent Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>P Less Than</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23.344</td>
<td>27.153</td>
<td>.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.880</td>
<td>2.184</td>
<td>.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age x sex</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.098</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>.952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explained</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.616</td>
<td>12.348</td>
<td>.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>.860</td>
<td>.300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of a 4x2 ANOVA for Age and Sex with Level of Reasoning on the Authority Interview as the Dependent Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>P Less Than</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.929</td>
<td>17.551</td>
<td>.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age x sex</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.270</td>
<td>.367</td>
<td>.777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explained</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.575</td>
<td>7.704</td>
<td>.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>.737</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
difference in level of reasoning between children at different age levels.

Mean levels of reasoning and standard deviations for both the areas of justice and authority are reported for the four age levels in Table 10. A t-test for uncorrelated means was used to compare levels of reasoning at the four age levels on both the authority and justice interview. The children's levels of reasoning did not significantly differ on either interview at any of the four age levels.

Multiple comparisons between 5 and 6 year old children, 6 and 7 year old children, and 7 and 8 year old children were made and the results are reported in Table 11. Findings indicated that 6 year olds reasoned at a significantly higher level than 5 year olds and that 7 year olds reasoned at a significantly higher level than 6 year old children. No significant difference in level of reasoning occurred between 7 and 3 year old children. These results were true for both the justice and the authority interview.

Ancillary Analyses

Test-Retest Reliability of Damon's Interviews. In addition to the major hypotheses, the short-term reliability over a one month interval was established for the two interviews used in this study. All children were tested on both interviews and retested within 28 to 31 days following the initial testing. The pre- and posttest scores were correlated, using the Pearson-Product Moment correlation statistic. The results are provided in Table 12.

Although the overall reliability of both interviews is similar,
### TABLE 10

Means and Standard Deviations for Level of Reasoning on Authority and Justice Interviews and Test of Significance Between Mean Levels of Reasoning at Each Age Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 5 M | 1.8095    | 1.5238  | 40 | 1.165| 2.021
| 5 sd| .6026     | .5118   |    |      |    |
| 6 M | 2.7714    | 2.5714  | 68 | 1.195| 1.980
| 6 sd| .9103     | 1.0371  |    |      |    |
| 7 M | 3.4074    | 3.5926  | 52 | -1.034| 2.000
| 7 sd| .5439     | 1.0099  |    |      |    |
| 8 M | 3.1167    | 3.7083  | 46 | -1.695| 2.000
| 8 sd| .9286     | .9079   |    |      |    |
TABLE II

Test of Multiple Comparisons Between Children Ages 5 and 6, 6 and 7, and 7 and 8 on Level of Reasoning on Both the Authority and Justice Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comparison</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 to 6</td>
<td>4.06*</td>
<td>4.092*</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 7</td>
<td>2.892*</td>
<td>4.299*</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 to 8</td>
<td>.339</td>
<td>.445</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Starred items indicate significantly higher reasoning in the older age children.
### TABLE 12

Reliability Coefficients for Damon's Authority and Justice Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the justice interview is much more reliable for males in the 3 to 8 year old range, and the authority interview is much more reliable for females in that age range.

Attitude and Behavior Change in Parents. In addition to considering whether Damon's clinical interviews were reliable over a short time period, I was also concerned with whether any attitude change occurred in the parents who participated in the program. Adoption and use of the communication skills taught during the program would seem to require a certain philosophy regarding the nature of children and child-rearing practices. That philosophy would include a feeling of acceptance toward children, faith in their ability to handle problems and make decisions, respect for their feelings and an elimination of the use of power to control children.

The Maryland Parent Attitude Survey was administered to the parents at the first and eighth weeks of the 8 week workshop. The survey was also mailed to the parents in the control group. Scores were obtained on four scales, that is disciplinarian, indulgent, protective, and rejecting. Because scores are ipsative and a reduction in one area necessarily means an increase in another area, only the scores on the disciplinarian scale were considered to determine if that area was significantly reduced.

Of the 22 questionnaires distributed to the experimental group during the first meeting, only 13 were returned with sufficient identification and complete enough answers to be used. At posttesting, the survey was again distributed to the 13 individuals who had adequate-
ly completed the initial survey. Of these thirteen, only 11 adequately completed the survey. Adequate completion is defined as leaving no more than 15 percent of the questions unanswered.

The survey was also mailed out to the control group of parents. After two mailings, only two surveys were returned, so that these data for the control group were not considered in this analysis. A t-test for matched samples was used to evaluate the pre- and posttest data to determine whether there was any significant change in attitude on the disciplinarian scale of the attitude survey. The calculated value of the statistic is \( t(10) = .411 \). Since this is less than the critical value of \( t_{.05} = 2.25 \), it cannot be assumed that any significant change in attitude on the disciplinarian scale occurred.

In addition to a paper-and-pencil measure of change in parents, observations of behavioral changes were made from the beginning of the program to the end of the program. Behavior is defined as verbal responses made by parents during role-play situations. At the first and the seventh meetings, parents were given four problem situations and asked to role-play the situation, taking turns as the parent and as the child. Parents who were willing recorded their role-plays and the tapes were later transcribed. (See Appendix E for a copy of the problems and the transcription of the role-plays.) Responses were categorized into either directive responses, that is ordering, warning, advising, judging, questioning, praising, reassuring, or into non-directive responses like passive listening, active listening, or sending "I" messages. The frequency, in terms of percentage of total
responses for each category was determined and is presented in Table 13.

A chi-square analysis of this data gives a calculated value of $\chi^2 = 16.688$. Since this is larger than the tabulated value of $\chi^2 .05.1 = 3.84$, it can be concluded that there was a significant decrease in the frequency of directive responses.

Since the material in the workshop was presented in two sessions, an attempt was made to control for uniform coverage of the concepts and activities in both the morning and afternoon sessions. A checklist of activities and objectives was provided prior to each meeting. The parent coordinator at the Chalmer's School attended both the morning and the afternoon sessions and checked off topics as they were covered in the meetings. Of the total 55 objectives, all but 6 or 89 percent of the topics were covered in both groups. Appendix A presents the weekly checklist.

Weekly attendance was also taken at the morning and the afternoon meetings. Average attendance at the meetings was 77 percent for the entire group. The average attendance for the morning group was 72 percent, and for the afternoon group, attendance averaged 78 percent.

**Summary of Results**

In summary, the results of these analyses showed that some self-concept variables (i.e. social interest, minority identification with friends) were related to age, but not to level of reasoning on the authority and justice interviews. Therefore, the first hypothesis, proposing a positive relationship between self-concept and level of
TABLE 13

Frequency of Parent's Responses in Role-Play Situations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Week 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Week 7</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-directive</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directive</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
reasoning about authority and justice issues is disconfirmed. Because parent participation in the parent education program did not significantly alter children's self-concepts, the second hypothesis could not be rejected. Level of reasoning on both the justice and authority interviews did not change significantly as a result of the experimental manipulation. Consequently, the third hypothesis could not be rejected. Certain tests approaching significance showed a tendency for children in the experimental group to change more in their reasoning about issues of authority than children in the control group. This tendency was not seen with reasoning in the area of justice. Also, a tendency for more change in reasoning on the authority interview was seen for 8 year old children. As in Camon's studies (1977), no differences in reasoning were found between males and females. Level of reasoning was found to increase with age which supports the developmental nature of the variables being measured.

The justice and authority interviews were found to have adequate reliability in relation to other projective and personality measures. The justice interview was found to be more reliable for males and the authority interview was more reliable for females. Change occurred in both upward and downward directions over one month's time, which tends to contradict the "invariant sequence of stages" concept. However, the variability could be due to the nature of the instrument and not the trait measured.

A significant change in parent's verbal behavior occurred as a result of the experimental manipulation. However, no attitude change
occurred. This lack of change in attitude may be a major factor in the lack of significant change in children's self-concept and social reasoning and will be further discussed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

The primary aim of this research project was to determine whether teaching parents skills for effectively communicating with their children would significantly affect their child's level of social reasoning and self-concept. The results presented in the previous chapter will be further discussed in terms of factors related to children's developmental level of reasoning, reliability of assessment techniques, and implications for future research.

Analysis I:

The results of the first analysis showed that there were no significant relationships between a child's self-concept and his level of reasoning about issues involving justice and authority, therefore confirming null hypothesis I. (Children's Self-Concept is not Related to Level of Social Reasoning Irrespective of the Experimental Manipulation.) Children with higher self-esteem and greater social interest on the Children's Self-Social Constructs Test did not reason at higher levels on Damon's authority and justice interviews. In Simpson's (1972) study, social esteem and belongingness were negatively associated with principled reasoning and self-esteem from a sense of accomplishment, and competence was positively associated with principled reasoning. Although no subjects in this study were reasoning at principled levels, no relationship between self-esteem and level of reasoning was found.
at the lower levels of reasoning measured in this study. This does not mean that a relationship does not exist. Self-esteem is a complex variable that can be measured in many ways. Simpson measured two aspects of subjects' esteem and found different associations to level of reasoning for both areas measured. Improvement in the measurement of personality variables, particularly for children, is needed before the relationship between self-concept and social reasoning can be more accurately established. Also, clearer definition of the variables measured is needed.

In this analysis a significant association between age and three self-concept variables was found. Generally, as age increased, social interest and identification with friends decreased. Social interest is defined as the "degree to which a person perceives himself as a part of a group of others, as opposed to a perception of the self as an individual." (Henderson, Long, and Ziller, 1973). As children get older they become less dependent and more able to function independently of the group. That identification with friends also decreases with age may be understood in light of increasing independence. Children develop their own unique identities as they grow older and are able to separate themselves from their friends and recognize their own unique attributes. These results on the identification with friends variable, however, are contradictory to the test constructor's expectation that patterns of identification gradually expand as the child matures.

Less consistency in the relationship between minority identifica-
tion and age is seen. Minority identification increased with age through 7 years and then decreased. This factor is reportedly an indication of a person's perception of his similarity to or difference from other people. Interpretation of the meaning of this variable is not clearly indicated by the test constructors. If a person perceives himself as similar to others it could be associated either with feelings of security and acceptance or with feelings of ego-diffusion and lack of personal distinction. The basis on which a person compares himself to the group is also not clear, that is on the basis of race, sex, academic achievement, physical attributes and so on.

In summary, although no relationship was found between self-concept and level of reasoning in this study, this lack of significant results may be a function of the measurement technique rather than the attribute measured. Clearer definition of the variables measured as well as improvements in measurement techniques are needed. There was a significant relationship between some self-concept variables and age, suggesting that what was measured was a developmental characteristic.

Since a factor analysis was not done during the validation of this instrument, the extent of intercorrelation among these variables cannot be measured. It's possible that identification with friends and social interest are measuring the same construct, but have only been given different labels in the test. Since factor analysis is based primarily on the use of correlation techniques, all personality measures developed to measure social interest should have a high correlation with each other but a low correlation with tests developed to measure identifi-
cation with friends. If this does not occur then the results on both scales represent some shared common factor. Not only should there be little correlation among subtests of a given instrument, but instruments claiming to measure a given construct, for example, achievement motivation should have a high correlation with other instruments claiming to measure that trait. Only when this occurs can the term achievement motivation really be given any concrete meaning.

In developing a self-concept measure, a large number of, and variety of tasks would need to be used, representing what was felt to be the multiple dimensions of self-concept (i.e. self-perception in relation to siblings, peers, authority, achievement, etc.). Only after using factor analysis to analyze the results, would it become apparent how many dimensions of self-concept were actually being measured. Then, through construct validation, meaning could be attributed to the various dimensions. A main problem in using factor analysis here would be in finding "pure" items, that is questions or tasks that did not correlate with several traits.

Analysis II:

The second analysis was aimed at determining whether the experimental treatment did in fact cause a significant change in children's level of reasoning in the areas of authority and justice. No conclusive evidence occurred to support null hypothesis II. (Parent Participation in the Parent Education Program Does not Significantly Increase the Child's Level of Reasoning on the Authority and Justice Interviews.) However, consideration of Table 5 shows that the uni-
variate test for the authority interview approached significance. Consideration of cell means in Table 6 shows that the experimental group changed more in level of reasoning than the control group. That the change occurred more in the area of authority than in the area of justice is understandable in terms of the nature of the experimental manipulation. The intent of the treatment was to alter and improve communication between parents and children, primarily by teaching parents new skills. Children were never directly treated so that little carryover of skills to peer interactions would likely occur. Children's conceptions of justice are based to a large extent on their experiences with their peers. It is more likely, then, that the child's conception of authority, which is based to a larger extent on interaction with adults and especially parents, would change more than his conception of justice.

Again, although not significant, there was a tendency for change in reasoning on the authority interview to be related to age. The presentation of cell means in Table 6 shows that eight year old children showed much greater increases in mean level of reasoning on the authority interview than younger age children. This suggests that this program of parent education may be more effective in improving reasoning in children in the middle and upper grades in school (i.e. grades 4-9) rather than with children in the beginning years of school.

These results, with the greatest amount of change occurring at 8 years of age, would contrast with Freudian theory. Freud proposes that the superego, which is the basis for one's moral functioning,
develops as a result of parental identification occurring during the Oedipal stage. Also, the severity of the superego is proportional to the intensity of the Oedipus complex and the amount of energy used in its resolution. This would suggest that the basis for one's moral judgments occur from about 3 to 6 years of age, during the Oedipal stage, and that later experiences will do little to alter this basic foundation.

Learning theorists would contradict Freud by claiming that human behavior is the result of variables in the present environment (i.e. alter environmental variables and the behavior can be altered). Variables in the environment can be altered by providing reinforcement, punishment, and social modeling, and behavior can change as a result at any point during a person's life.

In terms of other cognitive theorists, Piaget proposes that until age 7, a child shows no appreciation for the nature and function of rules but that between the ages of 7 and 10, development of a genuine social sense, acceptance of common rules, and realization of the need for cooperation occurs. The results of this study lend support to a major change in reasoning occurring during this period of 7 to 10 years.

A final consideration would be the relationship between the age trends found in this study and traditional Roman Catholic doctrine. The age of reason has traditionally been accepted as occurring when a child is about 7 years old. The results of this study lend support to a major shift in moral reasoning occurring at that age level.
The lack of significant change in reasoning for children of parents who participated in the parent education program could be due to a couple of factors. In the additional results presented in Chapter IV, a significant change in behavior but not in attitude was reported for parents participating in the program. This could mean that parents did not use the skills at home, although they were able to use them in the group situation when instructed to do so. It is also possible that they were practiced at home, but because of the lack of attitude change, would not continue to be used over a long time period. Even in the role-play situations where parents used the skills taught, consistency in use was lacking, and in every situation parents ended by giving the child some sort of solution or order. This is against the basic philosophy of accepting the child and his capacity for making decisions. As children become older, parents naturally allow them more freedom which may account for the greater change in authority reasoning for eight year olds.

Another less likely reason for the lack of significant change in reasoning may be due to insufficient time for cognitive restructuring to occur. Five months may not have been long enough for the desired changes to occur.

The limited size of the sample should be considered when analyzing these results. A larger sample may have resulted in actual significance on findings which in this study approached the .05 level of significance. Also, due to the time limitations, only two dilemmas were used, representing essentially a two item test. Each additional item would add approxi-
mately 20 minutes of testing time. Also, the range of scores was limited to 6 points and in actuality subjects scores ranged over only 5 points. Since this is the case, large amounts of change would be required or change in proportionately greater number of students would be required in order to achieve significant results.

Analysis III:

No significant change in self-concept occurred as the result of the experimental manipulation, thus disconfirming null hypothesis III. (Parent Participation in the Parent Education Program Did Not Significantly Change Their Child's Self-Concept.) A tendency toward greater social interest is suggested by the univariate test. However, this cannot be considered truly significant because of the lack of significance on the multivariate test.

The lack of significant change in self-concept as measured with the Children's Self-Social Constructs Test could be attributed to a couple of factors including the instrument itself. Since self-concept is a complex variable, change in areas not measured with this particular instrument (i.e. extroversion/introversion, masculinity/femininity, etc.) may have occurred. Also possible is that sufficient time for measurable change has not passed. Although parental relationships significantly affect a child's self-concept, additional factors such as sibling and peer relations and school achievement also have an effect which could retard or counteract any positive effects achieved by the program.

Analysis IV:

This analysis considered age and sex differences in relation to
level of social reasoning in children. The findings of the analysis indicated that there was significant differences due to age but not to sex. This supports Damon's findings. In the final chapter of The Social World of the Child, Damon (1977) concludes:

In the period between infancy and adolescence, a child's knowledge develops in a predictable, age-related manner... The longitudinal results showed that, at least for the concepts of positive justice and authority, individual children generally advance from earlier to later levels of social knowledge as they grow older.

Damon found no sex differences overall or at any specific age from 4 to 9 on the justice or authority interview. This pattern was also found in the present study.

In the present study using primarily lower-class subjects, scores on the justice interview ranged from 0-A to 0-B for 5 year olds, from 0-A to 2-A for 6 year olds, and from 0-B to 2-A for 7 and 8 year olds. With the middle and upper-middle class sample from Berkeley, California, Damon found a predominant trend for 5 year olds to reason at stages 0-B to 1-A, at stage 1-B at ages 6 and 7, and at stage 2-A at age 8 on the same interview. See Figure 1 for a pictorial presentation of this comparison. Damon predicted that:

Children from a more economically or culturally mixed community would probably have produced weaker age trends, since major variance in justice scores might have arisen from factors other than the age-related development of the children.

This was proven to be true as exhibited by the wide range in levels of reasoning with much lower levels than in Damon's sample exhibited at all the age levels considered in this study.
FIGURE 1

Graphic Comparison of Levels of Reasoning on the Justice Interview for Damon's Sample and the Sample in this Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>5 years</th>
<th>6 years</th>
<th>7 years</th>
<th>8 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-B</td>
<td>⬛</td>
<td>⬛</td>
<td>⬛</td>
<td>⬛</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-A</td>
<td>⬛</td>
<td>⬛</td>
<td>⬛</td>
<td>⬛</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-B</td>
<td>⬛</td>
<td>⬛</td>
<td>⬛</td>
<td>⬛</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-A</td>
<td>⬛</td>
<td>⬛</td>
<td>⬛</td>
<td>⬛</td>
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<tr>
<td>0-B</td>
<td>⬛</td>
<td>⬛</td>
<td>⬛</td>
<td>⬛</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-A</td>
<td>⬛</td>
<td>⬛</td>
<td>⬛</td>
<td>⬛</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Damon's Sample
Figure 2 shows a pictorial presentation of the following comparison. Levels of reasoning on the authority interview ranged from 0-A to 1-A for 5 year olds, 0-A to 2-A for 6 year olds, and from 0-B to 2-A for 7 and 8 year olds. In Damon's sample using this same authority interview, he found reasoning at level 0-A only among 4 year old children. Five year olds reasoned predominantly at levels 0-B to 1-A. Six year olds reasoned at levels 0-B to 1-B. Seven year old children reasoned predominantly at levels 1-A and 1-B, and 8 year olds reasoned at levels 1-B through 2-B.

Again lower stages and wider ranges of reasoning on the authority interview are seen in the sample used in this study. Level 0-A reasoning is seen in children through the age of 6 whereas in Damon's sample it was seen only among 4 year old children. Level 0-B reasoning was seen through age 8 where Damon found thinking to be generally two or more stages higher than this level. No evidence of reasoning at level 2-B was seen for any of the 107 subjects in this study.

Factors other than age-related development again may account for the difference in range and level of reasoning between the sample used in this study and Damon's sample. Both dilemmas used were felt to be within the realm of experience of the children in this sample, even for children who were just beginning school. However, verbal fluency, attention span, and ability level of the children, seemed to vary greatly and would affect their ability to respond to the two interviews.

The data in this analysis revealed that there were no specific trends for reasoning in either the area of justice or authority to
FIGURE 2

Graphic Comparison of Levels of Reasoning on the Authority Interview for Damon's Sample and the Sample in this Study

2-B ---
2-A ---
1-B ---
1-A ---
0-B ---
0-A ---

5 years 6 years 7 years 8 years

Damon's Sample
develop first. Consideration of individual scores show only 40 of the total 107 subjects or 37 percent to reason at the same level on both interviews. Twenty-eight, or 26 percent reasoned at a higher level on the justice interview. The remaining 39 subjects, or 37 percent reasoned at a higher level on the authority interview.

Ancillary Results

In addition to the major hypotheses, short-term reliability of the authority and justice interviews was assessed. Damon (1977) had done a one year test-retest reliability evaluation of the interviews used in his research. He found a significant correlation for his original justice interview over a year’s period of $r = .61, p .001$. A significant correlation between the original interview and the justice interview used in this study over a year’s period was found with $r = .48, p .01$. The short-term reliability of the justice interview can be considered as a fairly strong correlation in relation to other projective and personality measures. However, considering the breakdown for males and females, the justice interview is a much more reliable measure for use with boys than girls.

The stability of scores over time, with change occurring in a positive direction is what Damon uses to support his hypothesis of invariance of sequence. Damon found in his research with the justice interviews that change occurred in both positive and negative directions, but that there was a significant tendency for subjects to change their scores in positive direction from one year to the next.

With the authority interview, Damon found after one year, 33 percent
of the subjects had higher scores on the authority interview, with 50 percent of those increasing two or more levels in reasoning over a year's time. Stability in the area of reasoning about issues of authority was much weaker than in the area of reasoning about issues of justice. Damon felt he had more statistical support for the invariant sequence of development of authority knowledge than justice knowledge. The short-term reliability of the authority interview of $r = .59$ obtained in the study is comparable to the justice interview and again can be considered fairly strong in relation to other personality and projective measures. Again, there is considerable variability between males and females, with the authority interview being much more reliable for females.

Based on the results of the present reliability study, strong support for the invariant sequence of stages is lacking. Individual scores on both the authority and justice interviews changed in both upward and downward directions as much as two levels over one month's time. Of the 48 subjects, on the justice interview 7 moved upward one stage, 4 moved upward two stages, 4 moved downward one stage and 3 moved downward two stages. Upward movement could conceivably be understood in terms of development in reasoning. However, in view of the relative stability in reasoning over a year's time, development of reasoning by two levels would not likely occur in such a short time. Downward movement cannot be explained in terms of invariant sequence of stages.

On the authority interview a similar trend was seen, with down-
ward changes in reasoning in 10 of the 48 subjects. Although the variability in reasoning over one month’s time seems to be considerable, factors outside the trait measured could contribute to this variability. The range of scores and the number of items are positively associated with the correlation coefficient. In this case, the range of scores obtained was 5 points and the number of items in each reliability analysis was essentially one. Consequently a lower estimate of reliability could be expected. Because of the nature of the scoring, where the highest level of reasoning exhibited, rather than an average of all levels exhibited, becomes the score, more variability can be introduced. A chance response, which exhibited a high level of reasoning given during one interview, may not be elicited in the other interview. Probe questions by the interviewer vary according to the nature of the child’s responses and the particular question that elicited a high level of response one time may not be asked another time. Variability in the child’s attention, cooperation, and rapport with the examiner could account for difference from one test to the other. Factors applicable to personality testing in general apply in this case, for example, subjectivity of scoring, verbal fluency of subjects, and willingness of subjects to cooperate and reveal something about themselves.

In addition to the measures of change in children’s level of reasoning and self-concept, parent’s attitudes and behavior were measured. The results on the Maryland Parent Attitude Survey did not indicate any change in parent’s attitudes. However, a change in their verbal
behavior in role-play situations did occur. They showed a significant increase in the use of communication skills taught in the parent education program. It would seem that an attitude change would be necessary before a change in behavior occurred. The absence of any attitude change despite a behavioral change can be explained in two ways. The pencil-and-paper test used to measure parent's attitudes may not have actually measured the area where change occurred. It is also possible that parent's behavior change may have been merely the result of compliance with the demands of that particular situation, that is to role-play the skills learned, and not really an indication of a more generalized response in their everyday interactions and communications with their children.

Factors Affecting Internal Validity

Since this study involved applied rather than basic research, control of the factors affecting internal validity were lessened. Despite the fact that a checklist of objectives were covered in both sessions, intrasession history could not be controlled completely because the experimental treatment occurred each week in two distinct sessions. Factors such as rapport between experimenter and group, energy level of the experimenter in the afternoon as opposed to the morning, and parental involvement fluctuated from morning to afternoon sessions. Since subjects were not randomly assigned to sessions but were allowed to choose the session to fit their own time schedule, intrasession history was not completely controlled.

Also, the measured effect of the program on the children's reason-
ing was thought to be dependent on the extent to which parents im-
plemented what they learned in the workshop at home. This was never ob-
served directly, but rather was inferred through observations of par-
et's verbal behavior during the treatment session and a paper-and-
pencil measure of attitude.

Testing could have been a factor adversely affecting internal
validity, particularly where the parents were concerned. The length
of the test seemed to deter parents from completing the attitude sur-
vey during the pretest. Also, the same instrument was used at post-
testing and some parents objected to completing it a second time since
they had already answered the questions once. Also, the type of test
used to assess children's social reasoning, although suited to the
nature of the variable measured, lacked standardization in terms of
the questions asked. Since the same person conducted all the inter-
views there was probably less variation in questions than if several
different testers had been used. However, probe questions did vary
according to how the child responded.

Since random assignment to control and experimental groups was
used, the effects of maturation and regression toward the mean were
minimized. Experimental mortality did occur in both the experimental
and control groups but not in significantly great amounts.

A couple of additional factors should be considered in examining
the results of this study. The fact that a white experimenter con-
ducted the sessions with black parents may have minimized effects that
could have been significant had a black experimenter conducted the
groups. Being basically an outsider may have made parents less willing to listen to the experimenter. Also, the experimental group was primarily low income, with many parents having completed only a year or two of high school. Different results may have been obtained with middle class, better-educated parents. Also, considering the amount of variation and the wide differences in standard deviations for the mean scores tested, the power of the test was not very great. Since the tests used were not very powerful, the likelihood of accepting the null hypothesis when it was in fact true decreases and the likelihood of accepting the null hypothesis when it was false increases.

Following will be a discussion of how some of these factors can be improved or eliminated in future research.

Implications for Further Research

One of the major detriments to obtaining significant results in changing children's reasoning and self-concept is believed to be the lack of attitude change in parents. Although parents did acquire the isolated skills as demonstrated in the final role-play situations, they did not adopt the philosophy behind the program, as evidenced by the lack of consistency in use of the skills and by a continuing practice of giving orders and offering advice. The purpose of the present study was to look at the relationship between parent's adoption and consistent use of the communication skills and children's reasoning, and not to determine whether parents' attitudes could be changed. Consequently, further research should use parents who already have adopted the underlying philosophy of the program and would
be more likely to carryover into daily practice what is taught in the program.

A predictive measure which would identify parents of that particular philosophical orientation could be developed and validated by using questions which discriminated between, for example, instructors trained by Parent Effectiveness Training Institute and the average population. The assumption made here is that instructors of the program would accept the general philosophy on which the program is based. Assuming that these instructors "practiced what they preached," a self-concept measure that discriminated between their children and the general population could also be developed and used in future research. Only parents who scored above some cutoff point on the new attitude measure would be used in the experimental and control groups. This would eliminate the need for changing attitudes before ensuring that parents would implement the skills.

Also, a measure of parent and child interaction in the home should be made to determine whether carryover is truly occurring. Tape recording of family interactions could be made on at least a weekly basis, for example during the dinner hour or during a problem-solving session, to see if skills are used at home. This would also be likely to encourage use of the skills, since much research in the area of behavior modification shows that monitoring a certain behavior is often sufficient to cause a change in frequency of the behavior. Having to present a weekly tape recording of some family interaction until the time of posttesting may encourage continued application of the skills.
Because of the tendency for older age children, specifically 3 year olds, to show more change in reasoning, a wider range of subjects should be used to determine whether change can be induced only in older age subjects. This would have carryover implications for educational programs aimed at raising children's level of social reasoning. Selman and Lieberman (1974) were able to induce change in reasoning in 7 and 8 year old children in a classroom setting. Possibly, below this age, it may be difficult to induce change.

Finally, the relation of self-concept to social reasoning in children needs to be further explored. Many adults with a sufficient level of cognitive growth and social-perspective taking never develop to a comparably high level of moral reasoning. Possibly self-concept variables, including values, biases, and prejudices could contribute to this. If a relationship between these variables exists and can be identified, correction in childhood would be easier and more likely to occur than in adulthood.
CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY

Current theory in the field of moral education has been influenced as a result of Kohlberg's 25 years of research in this area. He and other researchers have shown that a certain level of cognitive development, the ability to understand another's perspective and exposure to higher stages of reasoning are necessary conditions for development of moral reasoning. In the present study, an attempt was made to provide these conditions in children's daily lives by teaching parents communication skills which would establish these conditions if practiced at home. The 8 week parent education program involved teaching parents active listening skills, skills to use when confronting a problem, and skills to use for mutual decision making.

Self-concept and social reasoning in the areas of justice and authority were measured for the 5 to 8 year old children of the parents who volunteered to participate in the program and who were randomly assigned to experimental and control conditions.

The primary purpose of this study was to determine (1) whether self-concept was associated with level of social reasoning, (2) whether parent participation in the program increased children's levels of social reasoning, and (3) whether parent participation in the program significantly improved children's self-concepts. Also considered was the relationship of age and sex to level of reasoning. The short-term
reliability of Damon's authority and justice interviews, used to measure social reasoning, was established.

The results of the statistical analyses showed that some self-concept variables (i.e. social interest, minority identification, identification with friends) were related to age, but not to level of reasoning on the authority and justice interviews. Participation in the parent education program did not significantly alter children's self-concepts or their levels of reasoning in the areas of justice and authority. Certain tests approaching significance showed a tendency for children in the experimental group to change more in their reasoning about issues of authority than children in the control group. This tendency was not seen with reasoning in the area of justice. Also, a tendency for more change in reasoning on the authority interview was seen for 8 year old children. As in Damon's studies (1977), no differences in reasoning were found between males and females. Level of reasoning was found to increase with age which supports the developmental nature of the variables being measured.

The justice and authority interviews were found to have adequate reliability in relation to other projective and personality measures. Change occurred in reasoning in both upward and downward directions over one month's time, which tends to contradict the "invariant sequence of stages" concept.

Finally, parent's verbal behavior but not attitude changed as a result of the experimental manipulation. This lack of change in attitude may be a major factor in the lack of significant change in child-
dren's self-concept and level of social reasoning.


Outline of weekly topics and objectives covered in the parent meetings.

Objectives and activities were obtained from two sources, that is from Thomas Gordon's Parent Effectiveness Training Workbook and his Parent Effectiveness Training Instructor's Guide. A check mark indicates that the topic was covered during that particular session, that is the morning or afternoon session.

Week 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A.M.</th>
<th>P.M.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Introduction of the instructor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Goals of the workshop will be presented.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Methods used in the sessions (lecture, discussion, role play) are presented.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Presentation of the test instruments used to evaluate change in the children will be made.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Small groups will practice the role play technique using four different problem situations.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>The &quot;behavior window&quot; concept will be presented. The concept of acceptable and unacceptable behaviors will be discussed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>The concept of &quot;Problem ownership will be discussed as well as indications that a child is having a problem. Exercises on p. 11 of the workbook will be completed and discussed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>The &quot;Bonnie&quot; tape will be played. The mother's role in facilitating communication and the idea that the presenting problem is not always the real problem will be discussed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>The twelve roadblocks to communication will be presented. Exercises on p. 16 of the workbook</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The effects and hidden messages in roadblocks will be discussed.

Week 2

<table>
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<th>A.M.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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</table>

Review the concept of "behavior window:"

Review the twelve roadblocks.

Roadblocks in the transcription of parent's role play situations from the previous week will be identified in the group discussion.

The concept of acceptance and the results of using a language of unacceptance will be discussed.

Alternative approaches to using roadblocks (silence, noncommittal acknowledgement, and door-openers) will be presented.

Advantages and limitations of these alternative approaches will be discussed.

The concept of active listening with several examples will be presented.

Listen to "Ventilating Tape" and discuss in relation to the active listening concept.

Do workbook exercises on p. 18 and 19.

Week 3

<table>
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<tr>
<th>A.M.</th>
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<tr>
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</table>

will be used to consider feelings elicited by the use of the roadblocks.
Break into dyads and share a real problem, with each partner having a chance to be a listener, and a sender.

Discuss active listening with infants and non-verbal kids. Review feedback chart. Do workbook p. 22 on active listening with non-verbal kids.

Brainstorm to come up with feeling words.

Discuss appropriate conditions for active listening in a sender and a listener.

Discuss common errors in active listening.

Present child/recess problem (p. 37 of trainer's manual) with instructor playing the role of the child and parents taking turns responding with active listening responses. Discuss what happened during the course of the conversation.

Do workbook exercises on p. 20 and 21.

Discuss parent's attempts in implementing active listening skills at home.

Discuss attempts using active listening skills at home.

Review concept of behavior window. Talk about when the parent owns the problem. Contrast the situations of when the child owns the problem to when the parent owns the problem.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Week 5</td>
<td>A.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Experiencing roadblocks exercise: Each member presents a problem to the instructor and isfed-back a roadblock. Discuss how the roadblock made the person feel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Discuss hidden messages contained in roadblocks and why they are ineffective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Present the concept of the &quot;three-part I message.&quot; Involve parents in making up examples for each unacceptable behavior presented by parents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A.M.</strong></td>
<td><strong>P.M.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week 5</td>
<td>Review concept of the three part I-message. Talk about why I-messages work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Talk about the benefits of I-messages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Have the class write several I-messages of their own and share with the class.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Talk about modifying the environment as a means of eliminating unacceptable behavior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Have parents share ways they added to the environment, removed from the environment, changed the environment, and planned within the environment to modify behavior. Do workbook p. 36-39.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Review concept of three part I-message. Discuss preventative and positive aspects of sending I-messages. Have the class write at least one preventative and one positive I-message. Do workbook p. 32-33.

Present the concepts of authoritarian (Method I) and permissive (Method II) methods of disciplining children.

Talk about the effects of a permissive approach to disciplining.

Talk about the conditions necessary to have power and the need for it in a Method I situation.

Have each participant think of a situation where someone had power over them. Talk about how they (and children) coped with a situation where they were powerless.

Diagram Method III and discuss the six steps. Give an example.

Listen to the T.V. "during dinner" tape. Identify the six steps of the Method III problem solving techniques that the family used to solve their problem.

Review the concept of behavior window. Discuss a problem solving method to use (Method III) when sending I-messages and modifying the environment don't change the behavior.

Week 7
A.M.  P.M.

Review the six steps of Method III. (p. 44-47 of the workbook).
Use structured role plays of Method III on p. 48-49 of the workbook. Have the parents play the various roles in the script. Identify the six steps in a discussion.

Have parents do a spontaneous role play of a problem situation (training manual, p. 97) using Method III. The class will be divided into six groups with each group playing one step of Method III.

Discuss the effects and benefits of Method III.

Ask parents to role play the original problem situations presented in the first meeting and to use the skills learned during the preceding meetings.

The parent group as a whole will participate in a discussion of two moral dilemmas. (See Appendix C for the two dilemmas.)

The conditions necessary for encouraging moral development in children will be presented. Skills learned in the group will be related to this.

Guidance Associate's filmstrip "A Strategy for Teaching Social Reasoning" will be shown and applications will be made from the classroom setting to the home setting.

The Maryland Parent Attitude Survey will be re-administered.
PLEASE NOTE:

Copyrighted materials in this document have not been filmed at the request of the author. They are available for consultation, however, in the author's university library.

These consist of pages:

97-112
Maryland Parent Attitude Survey

by

Donald K. Pumroy

Directions: This survey is concerned with parents' attitudes toward child-rearing. At first, you will probably find it difficult; but as you proceed, it will go more rapidly.

Below are presented 95 pairs of statements on attitudes toward child-rearing. Your task is to choose ONE of the pair (A or B) that MOST represents your attitude, and place a circle around the letter (A or B) that precedes that statement.

Thus: (A) Parents should like their children   (B) Parents frequently find children a burden.

Note that in some cases it will seem that both represent the way you feel: while, on other occasions, neither represents your point of view. In both cases, however, you are to choose the one that MOST represents your point of view. As this is sometimes difficult to do, the best way to proceed is to put down your first reaction. Please pick one from each of the pairs.

1. A. Parents know what is good for their children.  
   B. A good leather strap makes children respect parents.

2. A. Parents should give some explanations for rules and restrictions.  
   B. Children should never be allowed to break a rule without being punished.

3. A. Parents do much for their children with no thanks in return.  
   B. Children should have tasks that they do without being reminded.

4. A. Parents should sacrifice everything for their children.  
   B. Children should obey their parents.

5. A. Children should follow the rules their parents put down.  
   B. Children should not interfere with their parents' night out.

6. A. Parents should watch their children all the time to keep
them from getting hurt.
B. Children who always obey grow up to be the best adults.

7. A. Children should never be allowed to talk back to their parents.
B. Parents should accompany their children to the places they want to go.

8. A. Children should learn to keep their place.
B. Children should be required to consult their parents before making any important decisions.

9. A. Quiet, well behaved children will develop into the best type of grown-up.
B. Parents should pick up their child's toys if he doesn't want to do it himself.

10. A. Parents should do things for their children.
B. A child's life should be as pleasant as possible.

11. A. Watching television keeps children out of the way.
B. Children should never be allowed to talk back to their parents.

12. A. Personal untidiness is a revolt against authority so parents should take the matter in hand.
B. A good child always asks permission before he does anything so he doesn't get into trouble.

13. A. Sometimes children make a parent so mad they see red.
B. Parents should do things for their children.

14. A. Children should be taught to follow the rules of the game.
B. A child's life should be as pleasant as possible.

15. A. Parents should cater to their children's appetites.
B. Many parents wonder if parenthood is worthwhile.

16. A. A child's life should be as pleasant as possible.
B. Sometimes children make their parents so mad, they see red.

17. A. Children should not tell anyone their problems except their parents.
B. Children should play whenever they feel like in the house.

18. A. A good form of discipline is to deprive a child of the things that he really wants.
B. Children should do what they are told without arguing.

19. A. Children should be taken to and from school to make sure there are no accidents.
B. Children who always obey grow up to be the best adults.

20. A. Many parents wonder if parenthood is worthwhile.
B. Children should be required to consult their parents before making any decisions.

21. A. If a child doesn't like a particular food, he should be made to eat it.
B. Children should have lots of gifts and toys.

22. A. Children should play wherever they feel like in the house.
B. Good children are generally those who keep out of their parents' way.

23. A. Children never volunteer to do anything around the house.
B. Parents should pick up their child's toys if he doesn't want to do it himself.

24. A. Good children are generally those who keep out of their parents' way.
B. Children should not be allowed to play in the living room.

25. A. Modern children talk back to their parents too much.
B. Children should be required to consult their parents before making any decisions.

26. A. Parents should make it their business to know everything their children are thinking.
B. Children never volunteer to do any work around the house.

27. A. Children should come immediately when their parents call.
B. Parents should give surprise parties for their children.

28. A. Good parents overlook their children's shortcomings.
B. Watching television keeps children out of the way.

29. A. Parents should watch their children all the time to keep them from getting hurt.
B. A child should never be forced to do anything he doesn't want to do.

30. A. Television keeps children out of the way.
3. The most important thing to teach children is discipline.
31. A. Children should do what they are told without arguing.
   B. Parents know how much a child needs to eat to stay healthy.
32. A. Television keeps children out of the way.
   B. A child needs someone to make judgments for him.
33. A. Modern children talk back to their parents too much.
   B. Parents should amuse their children if no playmates are around to amuse them.
34. A. Good children are generally those who keep out of their parents' way.
   B. Parents should pick up their child's toys if he doesn't want to do it himself.
35. A. Parents should see to it that their children do not learn bad habits from others.
   B. Good parents lavish their children with warmth and affection.
36. A. Parents shouldn't let their children tie them down.
   B. Modern children talk back to their parents too much.
37. A. Children who destroy any property should be severely punished.
   B. Children cannot make judgments very well for themselves.
38. A. Most parents are relieved when their children finally go to sleep.
   B. Parents should hide dangerous objects from their children.
39. A. Children should not be allowed to play in the living room.
   B. Children should play wherever they feel like in the house.
40. A. Parents should give surprise parties for their children.
   B. Most parents are relieved when their children finally go to sleep.
41. A. Children should be taken to and from school to make sure there are no accidents.
   3. Parents should clean up after their children.
42. A. Children are best when they are asleep.
   B. Personal untidiness is a revolt against authority so parents should take the matter in hand.
43. A. The earlier the child is toilet trained the better.
   B. A child needs someone to make judgments for him.
44. A. Watching television keeps children out of the way.  
   B. Parents should accompany their children to the places they go.

45. A. The earlier the child is toilet trained the better.  
   B. Good parents overlook their children's shortcomings.

46. A. Parents should clean up after their children.  
   B. Children need their natural meanness taken out of them.

47. A. Parents should give surprise parties for their children.  
   B. Parents should hide dangerous objects from their children.

48. A. Most parents are relieved when their children finally go to sleep.  
   B. Children should come immediately when their parents call.

49. A. Children who lie should always be spanked.  
   B. Children should be required to consult their parents before making any decisions.

50. A. Sometimes children just seem mean.  
   B. Parents should see to it that their children do not learn bad habits from others.

51. A. Punishment should be fair and fit the crime.  
   B. Parents should feel great love for their children.

52. A. Parents should buy the best things for their children.  
   B. Children are best when they are asleep.

53. A. Children should be required to consult their parents before making any decisions.  
   B. Parents should cater to their children's appetites.

54. A. Parents should have time for outside activities.  
   B. Punishment should be fair and fit the crime.

55. A. Children should not be allowed to play in the living room.  
   B. Children should not tell anyone their problems except their parents.

56. A. It seems that children get great pleasure out of disobeying their elders.  
   B. Parents should watch their children all the time to keep them from getting hurt.

57. A. Personal untidiness is a revolt against authority so
A. Children should learn to keep their place.
B. Good parents overlook their children's shortcomings.

59. A. Parents should accompany their children to the places that they want to go.
B. Good parents overlook their children's shortcomings.

60. A. Children do many things just to torment their parents.
B. Parents should insist that everyone of their commands be obeyed.

61. A. Children should come immediately when their parents call.
B. Parents should hide dangerous objects from their children.

62. A. Children do many things just to torment a parent.
B. Children should be protected from upsetting experiences.

63. A. Children who lie should always be spanked.
B. Parents should cater to their children's appetites.

64. A. A child should never be forced to do anything he does not want to do.
B. It seems that children get great pleasure out of disobeying their elders.

65. A. Parents should keep a night light on for their children.
B. Parents live again in their children.

66. A. Sometimes children make parents so mad they see red.
B. Children should be taught to follow the rules of the game.

67. A. Parents should insist that everyone of their commands be obeyed.
B. Children should be protected from upsetting experiences.

68. A. Good children are generally those who keep out of their parents' way.
B. Children should not tell anyone their problems except their parents.

69. A. Children who destroy property should be severely punished.
B. Children's meals should always be ready for them when they come home from play or school.
B. Parents should have time for outside activities.

83. A. A child needs someone to make judgments for him.
    B. Good parents overlook their children's shortcomings.

84. A. Parents should make it their business to know everything their children are thinking.
    B. Quiet, well-behaved children will develop into the best type of grown-up.

85. A. Children who destroy any property should be severely punished.
    B. A good child always asks permission before he does anything so that he does not get into trouble.

86. A. A good form of discipline is to deprive a child of things that he really wants.
    B. Parents know how much a child needs to eat to stay healthy.

87. A. The most important thing to teach a child is discipline.
    B. Parents should give their children all that they can afford.

88. A. Parents should amuse their children if no playmates are around to amuse them.
    B. Parents shouldn't let children tie them down.

89. A. Parents know how much a child needs to eat to stay healthy.
    B. Parents should frequently surprise their children with gifts.

90. A. Sometimes children just seem mean.
    3. If children misbehave they should be punished.

91. A. Children should be taught to follow the rules of the game.
    3. Parents should do things for their children.

92. A. Parents shouldn't let their children tie them down.
    3. Children should depend on their parents.

93. A. Children who always obey grow up to be the best adults.
    B. Parents should clean up after their children.

94. A. Children's meals should always be ready for them when they come home from play or school.
    3. Children do many things just to torment a parent.
95. A. A good child always asks permission before he does anything, so that he doesn't get into trouble.

B. Parents should buy the best things for their children.
In recent years medical science has advanced sufficiently to the point where it is possible to transplant organs, such as an eye, a kidney, and a heart from one person to another. However, these transplants involve a number of ethical problems. In order to be able to transplant the organ from a dying person, you have to remove it from him either at the instant death occurs or before he is quite dead. That means you have to shorten his life. In addition, in many cases people who are about to die are unconscious. That means that somebody else must decide for the dying person whether or not he should donate his organ.

1. Is it right to shorten one person's life for the benefit of another?

2. Who should decide whether or not it is alright to do the transplant?

3. Do you have an obligation to arrange to have your organs donated after death if they can be used? Why or why not?

4. If you died would you want your heart, etc., to be used by someone else? Why or why not?

5. Is it right to take the heart, kidney, etc., of someone who has not left any instructions to do so? Why or why not?

6. Is it right to take an organ from someone (who said he didn't want to donate it) if that is the only way to save another person's life? Why or why not?
NOISY CHILD

During World War II, a group of people were trying to run away from the German Gestapo who were trailing them. One of the women in the group had an infant who was ill. It was not known what was wrong with the child but it cried continuously. All of the people were hiding together in a small attic of a large house. One of the men in the group suggested that they kill the infant because it made a great deal of noise. Otherwise, the Germans might discover them and kill them all.

1. What should the mother of the infant do and why?

2. Is it justified to kill one person if it will increase the chance of saving a lot of people?

3. Suppose they killed the baby and the Germans never came into the house, are they guilty of murder?

4. Can you consider this kind of killing murder or self-defense? Why?
APPENDIX D
Dilemma 1: The Child's Conception of Justice: Fair distribution and Sharing

These four kids—Linda, Mary, Darnell and James—are brothers and sisters. They came from a family that doesn't have too much money, so they don't get much of an allowance. But they all want to have some spending money for candy or for going to the movies and stuff like that.

One day, Ellen has a real good idea. She says that they should all go out and deliver papers. They could all share a paper route together and split up the money. The kids decided to do this, and the paper route earned them ten dollars every week. The kids work the paper route together and do a real good job. They all carry papers, although Darnell and James carry the most because they're boys and they can lift more. Linda and Mary carry some papers too, even though Linda is a very young girl and can't work as hard as the other kids. But, together, the kids make ten dollars every week.

Now after the first week, the kids found out right away that they have a problem. How do they split up the ten dollars they have made?

1. What do you think? What is the best way for them to split up the money? (Poker chips will be used to represent the ten dollars.) Why is that a good way?

2. Mary says that it was her idea in the first place, so she should get extra money. Is she right? How much extra?

3. Darnell and James said they do the most work, so they should get the most money. What do you think?

4. Is it fair to give more to Linda and Mary because they are girls? Is it fair to give more to Darnell and James because they are boys?

5. What about Linda, who doesn't work as hard as the other kids? Should she get less? The reason she doesn't do as much is because she's younger and a girl. Does that matter? What if the reason were because she's just plain lazy? Should she get less then?

6. Mary and Darnell are the oldest kids. They say that they should get more of the money because it's in place of an allowance and older kids get more allowance than younger kids. Are they right? How much more?

7. James, here, is a real sweet kid and everyone likes him a
lot. Should he get some extra money?

8. What's the fairest way to split up the money? Why?

Dilemma 2: The Child's Conception of Authority: Legitimacy and Obedience

This is John (Michelle for girl subjects), and her is his mother, Mrs. Johnson. Mrs. Johnson wants John to clean up his own room every day, and she tells him that he can't go out and play until he cleans his room and straightens out his toys. But one day John's friend Michael comes over and tells John that all the kids are leaving right away for a picnic. John wants to go, but his room is a big mess. He tells his mother that he doesn't have time to straighten his room right now, but he'll do it later. She tells him no, that he'll have to stay in and miss the picnic.

1. What should John do? Why?

2. Was that fair of Mrs. Johnson to tell John that? Why/Why not?

3. What if John sneaks out of the house anyway and goes on the picnic - is that all right for John to do?

4. What if he gets away with it and doesn't get caught because his mother is taking a nap? What if he comes back and cleans his room before she wakes up? Is that still wrong for John to do, is that OK?

5. What should John's mother do to him if she catches him? Is that fair to him? Why can/can't she punish him - what makes that fair?

6. Why does John's mother have the right to tell him what to do? Does he have the right to tell her what to do and to punish her? What's the difference?

7. What is it about mothers that gives them the right to give children orders?

One day John cleans up his room real well, but his mother woke up on the wrong side of the bed and is real cranky. She says "I don't care if I did tell you that you could go out and play, you're staying home and that's that."

8. Does she have the right to tell John that? Does it matter that she's breaking her promise to John? What should John do?
9. Is it OK now if he sneaks out anyway to play with his friends? What if he knows he won't get caught?
APPENDIX E
PROBLEM SITUATIONS FOR PARENTAL ROLE-PLAYS

Problem I: Your first grader comes home from school, throws his books on the floor and shouts at you "I am never going back to school and you can't make me."

Problem II: Your five year old child becomes more and more upset when she can't get your attention as you talk to your neighbor on the front steps. She suddenly yells "You're all mean and nasty and I hate you."

Problem III: Your child comes in from playing with his best friend, James, and says, "I don't like James and I'm never going to talk to him again."

Problem IV: After reminding your child several times that it is past his bedtime and he must turn off the T.V. and go to bed, he says "Just a few more minutes. I don't want to go to bed yet. You never let me do anything."
Parental Role-Plays - Meeting I

C: I don't want to go to bed.
P: It's time for you to go to bed.
C: There's a T.V. show on.
P: You don't have to see the T.V. show.
C: Yes I do.
P: No you don't young lady.
C: Yes I do.
P: Just go in the bathroom right now and put your p.j.'s on and get in that bed.
C: No mama.
P: O.K. then. Let me go get my belt and let me see what you can say then.
C: We'll see.
P: O.K. then you are getting a whipping right now. You're getting it girl. Go to bed. I mean it.

P: Why don't you like your teacher?
C: She's mean.
P: She ain't mean.
C: She is too. She pulls your hair.
P: What did you do?
C: I don't do nothing.
P: She just pulls your hair.
C: Yes, and makes me sit in the corner.
P: You don't be talking in class.
C: I don't be talking in class. I just sit in my seat and that mean old teacher made me sit in the corner. NO, she don't like me. She likes all the other kids and she picks on me all the time.

C: Mama, mama, mama. Listen to me. Listen to me. You all are so mean.
P: Go on and play. Go on and play with the neighbors.
C: I don't want to go play. You so mean and nasty. I hate you.
P: Then you're going to go to bed.
C: I don't want to go to bed, you old mean woman.
P: I'm going to whip you. I told you to behave, now sit down and act like you're supposed to, until I get through talking. Then I'll see what you want.

C: I ain't playing with James anymore. He's always pulling on me. I can't stand him.
P: Why not?
C: He beat me up.
P: Why can't you beat him up?
C: O.K. I'll beat him up next time he start messing with me.
P: That's the way you're supposed to do it.
C: He's bigger than me.
P: If he's bigger than you, get a stick. He'll leave you alone.
C: O.K., that's what I'm going to do.

C: I just had a fight with Johnny and I'm not ever going to play with him again.
P: Did you fight him?
C: No. He's bigger than me.
P: So you still should have hit him back.
C: Why? He hit me.
P: He hit you first so you hit him back.
C: O.K. But I ain't never going to play with him again.
P: So you march right back out that door and hit him right now.
C: But he's bigger than me mama.
P: So what. You go right back out there and hit him back. Right now.
C: What am I going to do when he hits me?
P: He's not going to hit you. You go hit him back.
C: I'll get a stick and hit him back.
P: Get a stick, brick, or bottle, but you go hit him back.
C: He's a bigger boy.
P: I don't care. I don't want to hear that. Don't argue with me. Go outside and hit him back.

P: Jimmy, I told you, turn off the T.V. and go to bed.
C: Oh, mama, just a few minutes more?
P: If you don't turn the T.V. off and go to bed, I'm going to whip you.
C: I'll be in a few more minutes.
P: Not a few more minutes. NOW.
C: I don't never get a chance to watch T.V. I got to go to bed early all the time. Why? Why? Everybody else gets to watch T.V. late as they want.
P: You ain't everybody. You don't do what everybody else does.
C: Tom can sit up. He ain't too much older than I am. You do him better than you do me. That's all.
P: Go to bed.

C: They took my money from me and told that girl to kiss me. I can't stand her mama.
P: Next time you come in the house and tell me and I'll come out and see what's the problem.
C: He say if I tell my mama he going to catch me outside and beat me up.
P: He's not going to catch you outside because I'll watch him.
C: Yes he will. How can you watch him?
P: I'll be watching him. I won't let him do anything to you. I'll have to go and see his mother about him.
C: Don't tell his mama. He going to know I told.
P: I'm going to tell his mama or else he can't come over anymore.

P: It's time to go to bed.
C: Why do I have to go to bed?
P: Because you have to go to school in the morning.
C: But mama, I don't want to go to bed this early.
P: If you don't go to bed, you won't want to get up in the morning.
C: Mama, I'll get up in the morning. Don't make me go to bed.
P: It's time to go to bed now.
C: Mama, I'll get up early in the morning. Just a little more while.
P: Go to bed.
C: Let me stay up till 9:00 and then I'll go to bed.
P: Go to bed and go to sleep.
C: Mama, I can't sleep. I want to watch T.V. Why do I have to go to bed? Tell me why?
P: So you can concentrate on school tomorrow.
C: I can't concentrate no way in school mama. I don't like my teacher. She mean.
P: She's not mean to you, C: Yes she is.
P: How come she don't like you?
C: I don't know. I don't care if I never go to school. I don't want to go to school no more.
P: You don't want to go to school?
C: No, I don't want to go to school.
P: If you don't go to school, you won't learn.
C: I don't care if I don't learn mama.
P: You don't care if you don't get an education?
C: No. I don't want an education. I'll make it somehow.
P: You can't make it without an education.
C: I'll make it somehow. I'll go back to school later on.

Parental Role-Plays - Meeting 7

C: Mama, he be hitting on me.
P: Why's he doing that?
C: I don't know. I wasn't messing with him.
P: And you don't like him to mess with you.
C: No mama, he be hurting me.
P: If he don't stop you better whoop him.
C: But he bigger than me.
P: I don't care. Ain't nobody gonna be hitting on my child.
C: Mama, I can't. He'll get his big brother after me then.
P: You afraid that he'll beat you?
C: Yeah. Everybody be afraid of him.
P: You ain't never gonna get no peace if you don't stand up and fight.
C: He picks up bricks.
P: I worrying about you cause if you can't fight no battle yourself
all the kids be after you all the time.
C: Only James be always messing with me.
P: Then you get out there and beat him.
C: I ain't never playing with him no more.
P: You mad at James?
C: He keep talking about my mama. He be saying you is ugly and nasty.
P: I know you love your mama so you don't be listening to him.
C: But he be telling stories mama.
P: You don't like that?
C: No, his mama should whoop him. His mama be real, real ugly.
P: Don't you be saying nothing like that. I'll wash your mouth.
C: But he be saying it like that about you.
P: I don't care. When you say things like that I feel bad cause I
raise my child to do better than that.
C: O.K. mama but I ain't playing with him no more.
P: Don't be telling me what you all is gonna do. Now get on outside
and play.
C: James makes me sick.
P: Why you saying that about your friend?
C: He ain't my friend no more.
P: You don't want him for a friend? You used to like him.
C: He always want to be doing things like he want. It always be his
way, his way, his way.
P: You want to be the boss for a change.
C: Yeah but then he just go on home and tell his mama.
P: Well you just go on and play with someone else then, if he gonna
be a baby.
C: Yeah he is a baby. But there ain't nobody else to play with.
What can I do now?
P: You don't have anything to do if you don't play with James?
C: Yeah.
P: Well I got work to do so go on outside and play. I ain't got time
for this. If you don't want to play then you can work.
C: O.K. I'll go play.
P: I can't hear what she says when you scream in my ear like that.
C: But mama you taking too long. Let's go.
P: I'm not done yet. Sit down for a few minutes.
C: But it's already been a lot of minutes.
P: You're tired of waiting?
C: Tell me to wait, wait, wait.
P: Don't you be getting sassy. You'll go to bed when you get home.
C: Can we go now?
P: I hardly ever get to visit with my friend and I do not like to have
to leave so soon. If you play with the toys in the bag for awhile
then we can go. Would that be better?

C: O.K. I can play with the toys if you talk only a little longer.

P: Stop that hollering if you know what's good for you.

C: But mama come on and look at this.

P: I'm talking to my friend and I told you before to sit down and be still girl.

C: I'm tired. Can we go?

P: Not yet now sit down or I'll get you across my knee.

C: Mama, mama.

P: Girl be still.

C: My leg hurts.

P: More than that's gonna be hurting. I'll get the stick.

C: O.K.

P: Girl, all that hollering's giving me a headache and I can't hear what she saying.

C: But mama I'm tired.

P: You want to go home?

C: Yeah mama, can we go now?

P: We're not through with our business yet.

C: When can we go mama?

P: In a few minutes when I'm done. Now go play with the kids for a little bit.

C: I hate school.

P: You must of had a bad day today.

C: All that teacher does is yell. Do this, do that. You can't do nothing.

P: You're supposed to listen to the teacher.

C: I do listen to her but I wish she would shut up sometime. All she does is talk.

P: You get tired of listening to her?

C: She just makes me sick. She always be saying now good so and so is. She has all her pets.

P: You don't think she like you?

C: She never says anything nice about me. Always somebody else.

P: I'm sure she like you.

C: She never pays any attention to me.

P: But you're not the only one in the class.

C: I know that. She's always talking about everyone else. Believe me I know I'm not the only one.

P: Why don't you come and have something to eat and you'll feel better tomorrow.

C: No I won't. Not since I have to go back to that place.

Mama I hate school.

F: Was the teacher yelling at you today?

C: No she don't never yell at me.

P: What's the matter then?
C: Nothing.
P: You sure look like something is bothering you.
C: This one boy always be messing with me, talking about me and pok-ing at me.
P: You don't like him messing with you?
C: No. And if I hit him back then he go and tell the teacher.
P: What does the teacher do?
C: She yell at him and me. One time he did that and I had to stay in at home time. Would you call his mama?
P: What's his name? If I call his mama he won't be messing with you no more.
C: Would you call her tonight? He said if I tell his mama he'll get me.
P: After I get through with that boy he won't be touching you.
C: Mama I don't want to go to school tomorrow.
P: But you have to go to school.
C: Why mama?
P: Cause I say so. They can put me in Cook County jail if you don't go to school.
C: But I don't want to go.
P: Did I ask you if you wanted to go?
C: No mama but I don't like school.
   It's too hard.
P: You think the work is too hard for you?
C: Yes, I never get hundred's on my spelling test.
P: You want to get a hundred on the test tomorrow?
C: Yes, but I never do.
P: I'll help you. We can study tonight.

P: How many times do I have to say "Cut off the T.V."
C: Not yet. Just a little longer. Come on.
P: When you stay up past your bedtime I worry that you'll be too tired in school tomorrow.
C: I won't be too tired.
P: You don't think you need that much rest?
C: No I don't. Other kids stay up later.
P: You're not other kids and I think you need more sleep.
   Besides when I tell you to do something you should do it.
C: How about until this program is over.
P: Do I have to get the stick?
C: No.
### Kohlberg's Hierarchy

| Stage 1: Punishment and Obedience Orientation | Right is blind obedience to rules and authority, avoidance of punishment, and not doing physical harm. |
| Stage 2: Instrumental-Relativist Orientation | Right is acting to meet one's own interest. Fairness constitutes an equal exchange, a deal, an agreement. |
| Stage 3: Interpersonal Concordance Orientation | Right is playing a good or nice role, being concerned about others and motivated to meet other's expectations. |
| Stage 4: Law and Order Orientation | Right is fulfilling one's duty in society and upholding the social order. Laws are upheld except in extreme cases where they conflict with other social regulations. |
| Stage 5: Social Contract-Legalistic Orientation | Right is upholding basic rights, values, and legal contracts of a society, even when they conflict with the concrete laws of the group. |
| Stage 6: Universal-Ethical Principle Orientation | Right is determined by universal ethical principles which all humanity should follow and which supersede any law. |

### Selman's Hierarchy

| Ego-centric Perspective | Authority's perspective is confused with one's own. Subjects do not differentiate another's perspective from their own. |
| Social-Informational Perspective | Subjects separate their own interests and points of view from others, but cannot maintain two viewpoints simultaneously. |
The dissertation submitted by Eileen Pembroke has been read and approved by three members of the Graduate School.

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The final copies have been examined by the Director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The dissertation is, therefore, accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

[Signature]

Date