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This Dappled World: The Poetic Vision of Gerald Manley Hopkins

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THIS DAPPLED WORLD: THE POETIC VISION OF GERARD MANLEY HOPKINS

by

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VITA

The author, Rev. George Leonard Cochran, O.P., is the son of the late George Hunter Cochran and the late Louise Marie (Gailmard) Cochran. He was born August 19, 1928 in Tampa, Florida.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Leonard Cohen, in the April, 1974 issue of The Hopkins Quarterly, writes:

It was Alan Heuser's seminal essay, The Shaping Vision of Gerard Manley Hopkins (1958), that first took up the challenge of posing the questions: "How did Hopkins arrive at the puzzling coinages 'inscape' and 'in-stress'? Were they arbitrary, or did they have a natural growth recoverable to readers?" Unfortunately, too many scholars have ignored or responded only casually to Professor Heuser's contention that "there are three strands in the development of these terms -- the aesthetic recording of types in nature, the philosophical theory of ideas, the linguistic sharpening of word-codes and idea-images."1

At another point in the same article, Cohen observes that

the critical work that deserves to be written is an in-depth study of the relationship that most certainly exists between the prosodic and theological connotations of "in-stress," "inscape," "pitch," and "stem."2

The work of this dissertation will, to some extent at least, attempt to fill in the lacuna in Hopkins studies so accurately detailed by Professor Cohen.

There are more than 170 instances of dapple imagery in the writings of Gerard Manley Hopkins, the vast majority of them occurring in the journals and poems. Frequently,

2Ibid., p. 16.
the pied nature of a thing is indicated by the use of one or more of a number of different specific words, e.g., brinded, mottled, streaked, etc. The remainder of the instances utilizes some combinations of images to express the notion of dappling.

Even the most casual reader of Hopkins' poems must be struck by the number and variety of approaches he makes to the expression of variegation in nature. Moreover, the very number of such instances suggests a series of questions. Why is he so concerned with this kind of image? Can it be that these images rose simply from the man's subconscious? Or is there a calculated use of pied images to express a more profound concept in the poet's mind?

A consideration of these questions prompts the discussion which is the work of the present dissertation. And in studying the complete corpus of the poet's writings, I have concluded that the abundance of pied imagery in Hopkins is a natural outgrowth of the notions behind what he describes as instress. I am convinced that dapple imagery best expresses for Gerard Manley Hopkins what he meant by instress.

The work of this dissertation, then, falls quite naturally into two parts. In the first, I shall attempt to delineate what Hopkins meant by instress. This will necessitate a discussion of the peculiar vocabulary of his poetics, with special reference to the full range of mean-
ing of the words stress and instress. The result of such an investigation will be a working definition of instress.

The second part will consist of an analysis of pied imagery throughout the writings of Hopkins. The principal thrust of such an analysis will be to argue the point of the dissertation, i.e., that pied imagery best expresses instress as it is understood by Hopkins. This will not, however, rule out some presentation of dapple imagery from the viewpoint of the literary critic/analyst. Thus, some purely linguistic analysis will occur in these sections, along with literary considerations.

Some description of the method of this dissertation is in order.

With the exception of a few minor essays and notes, all of the known writings of Gerard Manley Hopkins have been edited and published in six volumes of notes, diaries, poems, letters, and sermons. A few uncollected letters have appeared recently in The Hopkins Research Bulletin.3

The individual volumes have been arranged in chronological order, but there is no overall chronological arrangement of the poet's works. Consequently, my first task was


to construct, insofar as possible, such an arrangement. This is admittedly incomplete, since it is not possible to date precisely some of the writings. I xeroxed the entire six volumes, then made a paste-up of the works in as strict a chronological order as possible. The result was 1699 pages in order, with an additional 118 pages which could not be so arranged because they consist, to some extent, of sections which are variously dated.

The advantage of such a procedure is twofold. First, and more important for this dissertation, it allows an immediate placement of cross-references from one volume to another. The principal corollary of this is, of course, that one is also enabled to follow the process of development in usages of images and/or technical language. For example, Hopkins used certain words quite often during some periods of his life, and knowing this gives any student a deeper insight into the precedence of his ideas. The secondary advantage of this chronological paste-up is that it provides a much better portrait of the man than can be gleaned from reading the volumes separately. For instance, what was Hopkins writing about in his correspondence at the same time that he was keeping his journals? Did his poetry find a reflection in his sermons and/or spiritual writings, or vice versa? Frequently, too, it is in the letters that we are able to detect a frame of mind not reflected in the journals of the same period. Again, the attitudes recorded in the
notes and journals may not be those of the letters, especially the letters to certain individuals. Not much of this is obvious unless one is able to read Hopkins' output in its entirety in the order in which he wrote it.

Once this paste-up had been completed, my next step was to read through the entire corpus, simply to get the "feel" of Hopkins the man. Next, I re-read the works, this time making notes of the images I wished to consider in this dissertation. Finally, my third reading was for the purpose of isolating each instance of Hopkins' use of what I have already referred to as his "peculiar vocabulary of poetics."

For this last reading, I proceeded much as I had in the chronological arrangement of the works, xeroxing all the pertinent passages and arranging them under appropriate headings, e.g., all the passages in which the word instress or any form of it was used, etc. Once this had been done it became possible for me to take any one of the words of Hopkins' poetic vocabulary and read in chronological order everything he had said about the word and each use he had made of it. It was from this paste-up, principally, that I drew my conclusions as to the meanings Hopkins associates with these words.

This dissertation consists of seven chapters. Chapter One is by way of an introduction. Chapter Two is in two parts, the first consisting of my own analysis of the
relevant words in Hopkins' critical vocabulary, viz., stress and instress. These words were never defined by the poet, and as a result have been subjected to tireless analysis, a process which, I suppose, will never end. The second part of the chapter is a distillation of current published opinions regarding Hopkins' use of these words, with some attempt at reconciliation with or refutation by my own theories.

Chapter Three is an analysis of the poem "Pied Beauty." Since this poem is a direct expression of the poet's vision of the world as dappled, I am assuming it as a starting point for determining just what constitutes dappling for Hopkins, and what objects or ideas can be considered dappled. I do not believe that he limits this capability to sense objects. A concept made of the union of contraries may well fall under the description of "all things counter." There is a certain peripheral area in Hopkins' work which must be treated. In addition to specific instances of dapple imagery, he was much concerned with contrast of all kinds. While perhaps not directly related to pied imagery or objects, this concern with the "counter" is certainly connected indirectly and forms a constituent of the "whole Hopkins."

Chapter Four treats the images, juxtaposition of ideas, and rhetorical arrangement of the sermons insofar as they are illustrative of Hopkins' theory of instress.
Chapters Five and Six study the images in particular and in general. Since Hopkins is remembered primarily as a poet, and since it is as a poet that his place in English literary history is assured, the emphasis of the second part of this dissertation is on the poems, without, however, neglecting the imagery of his other writings.

Chapter Five is an in-depth consideration of the thirty-three specific dapple words and their occurrence.

Chapter Six is a study of variegation as evidenced in the poems and other writings exclusive of images which use specific dapple words, e.g., mottled. Among the considerations of this chapter are poems which, taken as units, represent a "pied" cast of mind, although they may contain no particular dapple images.

Finally, the conclusions of the dissertation are elaborated in the seventh chapter.

It should be noted that apodictic conclusions are rarely if ever the fruit of literary criticism, or for that matter, of critical analysis of any of the fine arts. In most cases the best that can be hoped for is a strong conclusion to a meticulous dialectic, or what the medieval logicians called a probable as opposed to a certain conclusion. It is the author's belief that he has arrived at such a probable conclusion.
CHAPTER II

INSTRESS AND ITS PLACE IN THE POETICS
OF GERARD MANLEY HOPKINS

Part One

Statistics make notoriously boring reading. They are, however, sometimes of great value. Obviously, one indication of the importance of a word to its author is the frequency with which it is used. And when that word, or words, is a key element in the man's thought, the quest for its importance is more than justified.

What I have chosen to call the critical vocabulary of Gerard Manley Hopkins consists of sixteen words, four of which appear so much more than the others as to constitute them the core of this vocabulary. These four words are in-scape, instress, scape, and stress; and from 1868 until 1887, two years before his death, he used them a total of 212 times.

These words, and to a lesser extent about a dozen more,¹ are the vocabulary in which Hopkins expresses the

¹The other twelve words and the frequency of their appearance are: pitch, forty-eight (however, thirty-seven occur in one essay on freedom of the will and grace, and have no significant contribution to make to Hopkins' critical vocabulary); forepitch, two; install, seven; stem, three; for-stalling, twelve; stalling, three; outstress, one; keepings, two; outscape, one; offscape, one; sakes, one; distressed, one. I shall introduce these words wherever they become
philosophy behind his vision of the world. And because this vision finds artistic expression most completely in his poetry, I have chosen to refer to his "poetic vision." Thus, in what is designedly an oversimplification, I maintain that those words which Hopkins uses to explain his world vision are constitutive of a critical vocabulary while those words and images which he uses to express that world vision are constitutive of his poetic vocabulary. This distinction will be useful for purposes of discussion, but I would not want to argue its validity too closely. It is not slipshod, however, and seems to me legitimate enough for the use intended.

Much has been written concerning the supposed influence of John Duns Scotus on Hopkins. It is a recognized fact, nonetheless, that the key words in the poet's vocabulary were coined prior to his recorded discovery of Scotus.

There is no question that Hopkins found Scotus a confirmation of his own ideas, nor that from the time of the poet's introduction to the English Franciscan he took first place with Hopkins. In his journal for 3 August 1872, he writes:

At the time I had first begun to get hold of the copy of Scotus on the Sentences in the Baddely [sic] library and was flush with a new stroke of enthusiasm. It may come to nothing or it may be a mercy from God. But just then when I took in any inscape of the sky or sea I thought of Scotus.²

Certainly from this date we must accept the possibility of an influence by Scotus. Nevertheless, the words **inscape**, **instress**, **scape**, and **stress** all appear prior to his discovery of the English philosopher and theologian.

**Scape** first appears in the early notebooks. From a notebook headed "Notes on the history of Greek Philosophy, etc.," dated 9 February 1868, comes the following:

That idea itself has two terms, the image (of sight or sound or *scapes* of the other senses), which is in fact physical and a refined energy accenting the nerves, a word to oneself, an inchoate word, and secondly the conception.³

The word and its forms then appear, up to August 1872, eighteen times out of a total of thirty-eight throughout Hopkins' complete works.

Included in the same notebook is an essay on the Greek philosopher Parmenides. And in this essay appear for the first time the words **stress**, **inscape**, and **instress**.⁴

**Stress** appears three times prior to 1872. It is used on forty-six occasions throughout Hopkins' entire writings. Until August 1872, **instress** or some form of it occurs nineteen times out of its fifty-four total appearances; and **inscape** or some form of the word appears thirty-nine of the eighty-one total occurrences of the word in his complete writings.

³Ibid., p. 125.

⁴Ibid., p. 127, essay on Parmenides.
Thus, the use of the key words of Hopkins' critical vocabulary begins before the vital journal entry of 3 August 1872.

The reason for belaboring this fact is that it provides a natural point of departure for discussion: how does he use the words in question before and after his discovery of Scotus? Hopkins may have been an "unconscious Scotist," as W. A. M. Peters maintains, in which case Scotus serves more as a reinforcement than an influence; or, his use of, and meaning for, the words may have been affected significantly by his reading of Scotus, in which case the Franciscan must be adjudged a major factor in Hopkins' thought.

While my own intention is to establish the meaning of a word, and not necessarily the provenance of that meaning, the date of 3 August 1872 provides an interesting dividing line around which to operate, and any information uncovered relative to Scotus' influence, or the lack thereof, on Hopkins will be of value.

Neither inscape nor instress appears in either the 1928 or the 1933 editions of the Oxford English Dictionary. The work on the monumental OED began during Hopkins' lifetime, but he did not live to see its appearance. "The connexion of the first editor with the work began in 1878 and the last page of it was passed for press in 1928, the issue of the 125 constituent fascicles extending from 1 February 1884 to 19 April 1928." Preface, OED, p. v. The work was re-issued, with a supplement, in 1933. A new, three-volume supplement began to appear in 1972 with Volume A-G.
Undoubtedly, they will be listed in the supplement currently in preparation. These two words, then, must be acknowledged Hopkins' brainchildren. Both stress and scape appear in the 1928 edition, with supplemental meanings indicated in the 1933 edition. To what extent, if any, Hopkins depends upon accepted dictionary definitions will be determined in the course of this chapter.

The whole question of what Hopkins meant by stress, instress, scape, inscape has become over the years an increasingly thorny thicket, into which only the most intrepid explorer dare venture. Since my own thesis concerns itself with the meaning of instress only, I shall limit my adventures in the wilderness of Hopkins' language to a discussion of that word and its implications.

Ideas do not develop in a vacuum. Whatever may be the certain facts surrounding the creation of Hopkins' peculiar critical vocabulary -- and it is well to remind ourselves that the most convincing theory will always be just that, a theory -- it surely seems reasonable to begin with a word already in common usage, stress. I am assuming, for purposes of discussion, that Hopkins' coinage of instress derives from this already existing word. Assuming this, the next step is to determine what, if any, original meanings Hopkins will attach to it.

The OED (1928 edition) lists ten meanings for stress as a substantive and five as a verb. To these, the supplement
of 1933 adds one meaning in the substantive category.7

Our immediate task is to isolate Hopkins' use of the


2. a. Force or pressure exercised on a person for the purpose of compulsion or extortion. Obs. b. to do or make (a person) stress: to put force or compulsion upon; to oppress. Obs. c. strain upon endurance. Obs.


5. Physical strain or pressure exerted upon a material object; the strain of a load or weight. Now rare exc. in scientific use: see c. b. Naut. Strain on a cable, due to violence of wind; a time when the cable is strained. Phrase, to ride a stress. Obs. c. In mod. physics, used variously by different writers: see quotas. d. Strain upon a bodily organ or a mental power. c. ?Anglo-Irish. (See quot.)? Obs.

6. a. Testing strain or pressure on a support or basis; weight (of inference, confidence, etc.) resting upon an argument or piece of evidence; amount of risk ventured on some assurance; degree of reliance. Chiefly in phrase to lay (occas. put, place) stress on or upon, to rely on, rest a burden of proof upon. Obs. b. Weightiest or most important part, essential point (of a business, argument, question). Obs. c. Argumentative force; also, impressiveness, telling effect (of a composition). Obs.

7. Exceptional insistence on something; attribution of special importance; emphasis. Chiefly in phrase to lay (occas. place, put) stress upon (formerly used with different meaning: see 6).

8. Relative loudness or force of vocal utterance; a greater degree of vocal force characterizing one syllable as compared
word, determine its meaning(s) as exemplified by his usage, and compare these with the OED definitions.

As we have noted earlier, Hopkins' first use of the

with other syllables of the word, or one part of a syllable as compared with the rest; stress-accent. Also, superior loudness of voice as a means of emphasizing one or more of the words of a sentence more than the rest.

II. 9. Law. A distraint; also, the chattel or chattels seized in a distraint: =DISTRESS sb. 3,4. Phrase, to take (a) stress, to take stresses =to distrain. Obs. except dial.

III. 10. Attrib., as (senses 3,c,d,) stress-memorial; (sense 5, 5c) stress-axis, -component, -difference; (sense 8) stress-accent, -prosody, -rhythm, -syllable; stress house, ? a house of detention, lock-up.

Stress (v.1) 1. trans. To subject (a person) to force or compulsion; to constrain or restrain; to compel to (do something). Obs. b. To abridge the liberty of; to confine, to incarcerate. Obs.

2. a. To subject to hardship; to afflict, distress, harass, oppress; in passive, to be 'hard up.' Obs. b. to tax or burden (one's pecuniary resources). Obs.

3. a. To subject (a material thing, a bodily organ, a mental faculty) to stress or strain; to overwork, fatigue. Now chiefly sc. b. intr. for refl.? Sc. c. Mech. (cf STRESS sb. 5c).

4. To lay the stress or emphasis on, emphasize (a word or phrase in speaking); to place a stress-accent upon (a syllable). b. fig. To lay stress on, emphasize, bring into prominence (a fact, idea, etc.). Chiefly U.S.

5. intr. Of tears: to burst forth, gush. Obs.

Stress (v.2) Obs. exc. dial. [aphetic f. DISTRESS v.] trans. To levy a distress upon, distrain. Also obsol."

from SUPPLEMENT:"Stress, sb. 10. Add: stress mark Photogr." p. 258. This is the 1933 supplement to the original dictionary.
word *stress* prior to August, 1872 occurs in the essay on Parmenides. As a matter of fact, Hopkins uses the word three times in this essay, the only appearance of *stress* prior to the Scotus entry of 1872.

We must bear in mind that Hopkins uses the word in a context of explaining Parmenides' thought, not necessarily his own. However, it is Hopkins' word, not Parmenides', and we may assume that it carries Hopkins' meaning, used to assist in the unfolding of the Greek philosopher's thinking. The essay itself is concerned with Parmenides' concept of *being* and *non-being*.8 The word *stress* first appears near the beginning of the essay:

There would be no bridge, no stem of stress between us and things to bear us out and carry the mind over: without stress we might not and could not say Blood is red/ but only/This blood is red/or/The last blood I saw was red/nor even that, for in later language not only universals would not be true but the copula would break down even in particular judgments.9

At first glance it might seem that Hopkins equates the notion of stress with that of universality. Closer examination, however, indicates that it is *stress* that allows the mind to "hold over," as it were, the *fact* of universality. Were it not for this "emphasis" or stress, the mind would be bound to the particular instance, *viz.*, "This blood is red"

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8Hopkins, Journals, p. 127. "His great text, which he repeats with religious conviction, is that Being is and Not-being is not --"  
9Ibid., p. 127.
or to the remembering of a particular instance, "The last blood I saw was red." Because of stress, however, the mind holds within itself the constant awareness of universality. Earlier, in the same essay, Hopkins writes that "nothing is so pregnant and straightforward to the truth as simple yes and is." I take this statement to refer to the notion of stress. Stress is the mind's "holding on" to the concept, or rather it is whatever there is in or about being that allows the mind to understand being as universal. It is the bridge between the thing and things (of the same genus); it is whatever we recognize in the particular that allows us to move immediately to the universal. It is the quality or characteristic of or in or about being which grounds the mind in the affirmation and recognition of the fact of a persistent universality.

The final occurrence of stress prior to 1872 takes place in the second half of the essay:

To be and to know or Being and thought are the same. The truth in thought is Being, stress, and each word is one way of acknowledging Being and each sentence by its copula is (or its equivalent) the utterance and assertion of it.

Whether Hopkins thinks Parmenides means that Being and thought are numerically the same or simply simultaneous is not completely clear. However, he distinguishes thought from the truth in thought, and this truth is what he calls

10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., p. 129.
Being, or stress. A word, then, "is one way of acknowledging being [stress] . . . ." Since a word by its nature is assertive, or emphatic, in that it brings to communicative existence something first residing in the mind as a concept, we again see the element of "holding on," of affirmation/recognition.

Of the meanings listed in the OED, the closest to that of Hopkins is the seventh definition of stress as a substantive, with its corresponding definition as a verb (#4). It is obvious, however, that in these dictionary definitions the word does not possess the philosophical nuances attached to it by Hopkins. For Hopkins, stress has much more of the notion of endurance, of existence. It connotes emphasis, just as the more common (#7) usage does, but it implies a reality, not simply the underscoring of a reality. Thus, Hopkins alters the conventional meaning to suit his own purposes. We may note here that he did not find it necessary to coin a word to develop the concept of "holding-on" as he interpreted it in Parmenides. It may be a minor point, but it seems to me that it is indicative of Hopkins' respect for language that he does not go out of his way to invent words where their invention is not called for. If we accept this evaluation of the poet's attitude, we are forced, it appears, to see in those words he did coin a depth of meaning, or at least a radical difference of meaning: they are new words because they express genuinely original ideas, at least in the mind of the man who coined them.
Stress is used as a noun in each of its occurrences prior to 3 August 1872. Thus, at this point in our investigation, we may attempt a working definition of this key word. Stress may be defined as a quality which allows the mind to grasp the fact of universality. This is a tentative and unrefined definition, subject to qualification as we proceed in this study.

Hopkins very definitely appears to equate, in some way, stress with being. It is well to note that in the most obvious instance of this, he capitalizes Being, thus distinguishing it from this or that being. In other words, he equates stress with universal being. Now, the equivalency must be only an apparent one, or at least not a perfect one, or he would not have found it necessary to use another word (stress) to express his meaning. For this reason as well as the context in which we see the word when it first appears in Hopkins' writings, I emphasize the nature of the word stress as representative not simply of Being as universal, but of Being recognized as universal.

There is no significant alteration in meaning in the first recorded usage following the Scotist entry of 3 August 1872. In his journal for 18 September 1873, he records awakening in the midst of a nightmare:

This first start is, I think, a nervous collapse of the same sort as when one is very tired and holding oneself at stress not to sleep yet/suddenly goes slack and seems to fall and wakes . . . 12

12Ibid., p. 238.
There may be some question here as to whether stress is used in one of its generally accepted meanings or in Hopkins' more specialized one. I record it because it certainly may be taken either way. There is a certain kind of strain or stress, in the ordinary sense of the word, which one places on the system in attempting to fight sleep. However, at least figuratively, this is akin to the idea that waking is to life as sleep is to death; therefore, stress as a synonym for being is acceptable here. And, in the same entry he writes, about the same incident: "I had lost all muscular stress elsewhere but not sensitive . . . ."13 where it seems to me he is clearly using stress in one of its commonly accepted meanings.

On 8 October 1874, he and Clement Barraud went to Holywell, where they bathed in the well and Hopkins, thinking about the "bounty of God in one of His saints," writes, ". . . and the spring in place leading the thoughts by its spring in time to its spring in eternity: even now the stress and buoyancy and abundance of the water is before my eyes."14 Taking the part of the sentence following the colon as a summation of his memory of the place, we can see the use of stress to assist in the understanding of the place-time-eternity relationship evoked by the spring. The being of the well here and then and in the future is so strong in its presence that the

13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p. 261.
memory of the incident is still very real to him.

The word does not appear again in Hopkins' writings for a period of more than a year. Then, in 1876, he uses it four times, each time in the same poem. That poem is, of course, his masterpiece, "The Wreck of the Deutschland."15

In the second stanza, we read:

I did say yes
0 at lightning and lashed rod;
Thou hearest me truer than tongue confess
Thy terror, O Christ, O God;
Thou knowest the walls, altar and hour and night:
The swoon of a heart that the sweep and the hurl of thee
trod
Hard down with a horror of height:
And the midriff astrain with the leaning of, laced with fire/
of stress

Although it is difficult at first to see stress used here as in any way indicative of either being or the recognition of universality, a case for just such usage may be made, and quite strong at that. We must remember that we are dealing with poetry and with the figures of such. In this stanza, the poet is concerned with the awful greatness of God's acts, and, therefore, with Being itself. Stress (Being) leans heavily upon him, burns him with its fire, overwhelms him. Thus, he acknowledges that this omnipotence, this universal weight of being, must be recognized.

Again, we read (stanza #5): "his mystery must be in stressed, stressed" and in the following stanza, he acknowledgments that this omnipotence, this universal weight of being, must be recognized.

ledges that it is "Not out of his bliss/Springs the stress felt," the "stress that stars and storms deliver" but rather that "it rides time like riding a river." Here we see the metaphor of the constant presence of this Being (stress), riding the line of time as thought it were a stream.

In a sermon preached 11 January 1880 on the subject of God's Kingdom, Hopkins remarks:

Hold fast the thought, I say it once more: a commonwealth is the meeting of many for their common good, for which good all are solemnly agreed to strive and being so agreed are then in duty bound to strive, the ruler by planning, the ruled by performing, the sovereign by the stress of his obedience.16

It seems clear to me that in the context Hopkins is speaking not about the promptness of obedience, but rather its universality. Here is an excellent example of stress as a word preferable to being. Stress is an active word, being a passive one. Thus, its use emphasizes the recognition of the universality of obedience owed by the governed to the governor and through him back to the governed again. It is a stronger word than being, and it carries with it the connotation of a dynamic rather than a passive or static being.

With this passage we have come to a clearer understanding of the difference Hopkins attaches to stress as a possible synonym for Being: it means the same thing, but connotes more, i.e., universality plus the active recognition of universality.

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At this point, then, and given these distinctions, we may safely interchange stress with being, and, moreover, with universal being. Thus, as we noted in the stanzas from "The Wreck of the Deutschland," God's mystery must be stressed, i.e., actively realized by the creature.

In the poem "Brothers," written in August of 1880, the line "Told tale with what heart's stress" is nothing more than the use of stress as a synonym for strain. We may move to the next occurrence of the word.

These next appearances of the word are of some significance. According to Christopher Devlin, it seems that some of Hopkins' spiritual writings, done for the most part in 1881-1882, "were meant as the raw material for a treatise on the Exercises." Devlin concludes that, because of gaps and digressions, the extant writings cannot be considered a full-fledged commentary. In the section entitled "on Principium sive Fundamentum," dated 20 August 1880, and either completed or abandoned 12 August 1882, the word occurs three times.

Following a discussion of the unique awareness of self, he states: "Nothing in nature comes near this unspeakable stress of pitch, distinctiveness and selving, this self-

19 Ibid.
being of my own."\textsuperscript{20} Here, it is the recognition, the awareness of one's own individual personality, depth, being, that Hopkins is concerned about. And the pitch and distinctiveness and selving, the self-being is all stressed, i.e., recognized as such. Here is a departure in Hopkins' usage to this point. There is no question here of a universality; rather it is the unique, unsharable characteristics of his being that he talks about. But he preserves the aspect of stress as an emphatic recognition (awareness) of something, in this case himself. He returns to the notion of stress as somehow related to universality, to existence, in the following passage when he is discussing "From what then . . . do I come? Am I due to chance?"\textsuperscript{21}

Chance then is the energēia, the stress, of the intrinsic possibility which things have. A chance is an event come about by its own intrinsic possibility. And as mere possibility, passive power, is not power proper and has no activity it cannot of itself come to stress, cannot instress itself.\textsuperscript{22}

He is saying that things which come about through chance had the intrinsic possibility of coming about. As having energēia (stress, being, existence) things have the possibility of happening, but because possibility is a potency passive in character, it must be actualized \textit{ab extra}. Whatever lacks

\textsuperscript{20}Hopkins, \textit{Sermons}, p. 123.
\textsuperscript{21}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22}Ibid.
the capability to actualize itself, to instress (we shall discuss this word later) itself, to come to stress, i.e., to come to being on its own terms, is subject to chance. Obviously, we must be aware of the order in which Hopkins operates. All things, in fine, are dependent upon Almighty God. Some things under that dependency, however, are ordered to act, others to be acted upon.

In a letter of 22 December 1880 to Richard Watson Dixon, Hopkins writes:

In the particular case of Tennyson's Ode to Memory I find in my own case all these: it has a mysterious stress of feeling; especially in the refrain -- I am to my loss less sensitive to that; it has no great meaning of any importance nor power of thought -- I am to my advantage more alive to that; from great familiarity with the style I am deadened to its individuality and beauty, which is again my loss; and I perceive the shortcomings of the execution, which is my own advance in critical power. Absolutely speaking, I believe that if I were now reading Tennyson for the first time I should form the same judgment of him that I form as things are, but I should not feel, I should lose, I should never have gone through, that boyish stress of enchantment that this Ode and the Lady of Shalott and many other of his pieces once laid me under.23

He speaks of "stress of feeling" and "stress of enchantment." These expressions must mean more than the simple fact of the existence of feeling, enchantment. It is the pervasiveness of the feeling, the enchantment, to which he refers. Here stress is used in the sense of something that is universal, something that overwhelms. We have seen earlier the use of stress as representative of the dynamic as opposed to the

static.

I shall consider two final instances of Hopkins' use of the word *stress*, both of them from the poems. The first is from a fragment (#155 in the 4th edition). Speaking of God, he says:

What I know of thee I bless,
As acknowledging thy stress
On my being and as seeing
Something of thy holiness.

I think we may take the word in one of its common meanings, i.e., the poet acknowledges God's "presence" upon him. Nevertheless, it is not inconsistent to interpret stress here as "thy Being on my being," thus concluding that he recognizes that his *ens* is subsumed under God's.

The last example of Hopkins' use of the word occurs in the sonnet "Harry Ploughman," completed in 1887, two years prior to his death:

By a grey eye's heed steered well, one crew, fall to;
Stand at stress. Each limb's barrowy brawn, his thew.

24 Considering GMH's short life, what can be considered his mature thought on the words *stress* and *instress* takes on a qualified meaning. The only, or at least the nearest, thing to an extended treatment of these two words occurs in the notes and commentaries from the years 1881-1883, although the dating is inexact. There are four passages in which he uses the two key words at some length. Since there is much juxtaposition of the words, and their use and meaning is obviously very much a case of mutual relationship, I have waited until the conclusion of the section on *instress* to present an analysis of these four sections and relate the findings to whatever we have arrived at in the previous analysis.


The word here has its customary meaning: the ploughman is simply standing at the ready, he is tense.

What, if anything, has been added to the notion of stress as first conceived by Hopkins in his early notebooks? It seems to me that nothing of a substantial change affecting the original usage appears in Hopkins' subsequent writings. However, it does appear that there is a gradual deepening, a honing of that concept. Hopkins explicitly places the word stress in apposition with both energeia and being, and less explicitly but no less obviously he uses the word to mean the mind's recognition of the fact of universality. We have seen, too, that except for the one instance when he used the word stress in a discussion of his own personality, the element of universality is present in the word.

At this point, then, we may refine our definition somewhat. If we understand being as universal, recognized as such, and dynamic, then we may define stress as a synonym for being.

At the same time it is important to take note of the fact that for Hopkins the distinction between essence and existence apparently does not obtain. At least it is certainly not so necessary a distinction for him as it is for the Thomists. For this reason it would be unfair to accuse him of imprecise language when it gradually becomes obvious that the words stress, being, and existence are all fairly interchangeable in his vocabulary. All of this must be kept in mind when we consider the words of our tentative
definition.

Another point to remember is that whatever Hopkins' kinship with the philosophy of Parmenides, his use of his own language to explicate that philosopher's thought is what interests us. Whether or not Hopkins was a disciple of Parmenides or even an admirer who agreed to some extent with his theories is not of consideration here. The value of the early notebooks is that they contain the peculiar words which form the core of Hopkins' critical vocabulary.

It was at this time, too, that the young Hopkins, honing his vocabulary on the demanding grindstone of philosophical study, was sharpening the language he would always use with such precision. It would be difficult to over-emphasize the effects on the young student of sharing the scholastic philosopher's constant quest for exact definition. The notebooks represent the early trail of Hopkins' pursuit of the perfect word.

Those same early notebooks provide us with the source of one of the most important of Hopkins' inventions, instress. The word appears three times in the "Parmenides" essay.

His great text, which he repeats with religious conviction, is that Being is and Not-being is not -- which perhaps one can say, a little over-defining his meaning, means that all things are upheld by instress and are meaningless without it. An undetermined Pantheist idealism runs through the fragments which makes it hard to translate them satisfactorily in a subjective or in a wholly outward sense. His feeling for instress, for the flush and foredrawn, and for inscape/
is most striking and from this one can understand Plato's reverence for him as the great father of Realism . . . . But indeed I have often felt when I have been in this mood and felt the depth of an instress or how fast the inscape holds a thing that nothing is so pregnant and straightforward to the truth as simple yes and is.27

Now, it is apparent that the closest thing to a definition in these three usages comes with the first. The two other occurrences are merely instances of the word in use, Hopkins assuming the meaning. The context provides no help. However, "all things are upheld by instress" lends itself to substantial consideration. But first, some introduction is in order.

I assume that the words stress and instress are words related to one another, whether as complements or in opposition. It is not necessary to posit which came first, for the following reasons. Supposing Hopkins to have arrived at the notion of instress (whatever that may be) and supposing that notion to have been but one aspect of a many-sided concept, or at least a two-sided concept, then what is more natural than to take an already existing word and give to it a special meaning? The contrary is just as tenable a position. Beginning with the idea of stress, he coins a complementary word. The other possibility is, of course, to have given special meanings to two already existing words. And the answer to that is in two possibilities: either the meaning of instress is so original as to

27Hopkins, Journals, p. 127.
require a new word, or: Hopkins felt that the importance of the whole concept demanded an original word. Whatever the answer to the question of how the two words originated, their relationship seems inescapable.

Let us pursue the following possibilities, then. If stress is to be taken as a synonym for being (given the qualifications and expansions previously noted), then instress should be related in some way to being. Merely on the common usage of the prefix as indicative of something within, we can argue to the intrinsic nature of instress. Stress itself, however, is not apparently anything tangible, but something intelligible only, i.e., a quality, a dynamism, a characteristic in or about being, present in being, but not physically separable from being. Therefore, the relationship of the two words is a relationship of two meanings, of intrinsic, intangible, intelligible characteristics or qualities. Thus, if stress is being, can we posit instress as some kind of force holding being in existence? In the usage of the words themselves, stress is maintained by, supported by instress, e.g., this seems to be what Hopkins means by the expression "all things are upheld by instress," where Being can be substituted for "things."

Let us then proceed with this rough, hypothetical definition of instress as the "force which holds being in existence."
Hopkins' next use of the word occurs in a journal entry for 27 June 1868, and provides no assistance towards a definition: "Query has not Giotto the instress of loveliness?" The next entry, however, for 4 July of the same year, opens up a fresh avenue of investigation:

From the top the lake of Brienz was of the richest opaque green modulated with an emotional instress to blue. What is likest it is turquoise discoloured by wet.

The key word in the passage is the adjective emotional. Whatever instress may be, are we to assume that there are different kinds? Perhaps, if there is an "emotional" instress, there may be an "intellectual" one as well? Or are we attaching too much significance to the adjective? For an answer, it is necessary to depart for a moment from our strictly chronological study and pass over some occurrences of the word until we arrive at another journal entry, that of 14 September 1871:

By boat down the river to Hamble, near where it enters Southampton Water, and a walk home. On this walk I came to a cross road I had been at in the morning carrying it in another "running instress." I was surprised to recognise it and the moment I did it lost its present instress, breaking off from what had immediately gone before, and fell into the morning's. It is so true what Ruskin says talking of the carriage in Turner's Pass of Faido that what he could not forget was that "he had come by the road." And what is this running instress, so independent of at least the immediate scape of the thing, which unmistakeably distinguishes and individualises things? Not imposed outwards from the mind as for instance by melancholy or strong feeling: I easily distinguish that instress.

28 Ibid., p. 168.
29 Ibid., p. 176.
I think it is the same running instress by which we identify, or better, test and refuse to identify with our various suggestions/a thought which has just slipped from the mind at an interruption. 30

Whatever "running instress" may be, he distinguishes it from that instress which is "imposed outwards from the mind as for instance by melancholy or strong feeling." This latter I take to be "emotional [strong feeling] instress." Therefore, we have at least the distinction in his own words between "running" and "emotional" instress, with emotional retaining more or less the commonly understood meaning of "strong feeling."

The passage, in addition to isolating the fact that Hopkins considered instress to be of different kinds, provides some concrete insights into those different forms of instress, as we have just seen with relation to "emotional" instress. In particular, we have some very definite indications of what he regarded as constitutive of "running" instress, obviously the more important of the two.

We learn, first of all, the function of running instress, what it does: it "unmistakeably distinguishes and individualises things." We learn that it is not a product of the viewer, not produced by the mind of the observer, not imposed ab extra, as is emotional instress. Thus, it must be peculiar to the object, either as intrinsic or as an extrinsic, observable characteristic or accident.

30Ibid., p. 215.
Now, comes the difficult part. Hopkins equates running instress with whatever it is that allows us to "identify, or better, test and refuse to identify with our various suggestions/a thought which has just slipped from the mind at an interruption." Here we enter a much more dangerous area of speculation, one impossible to avoid, however, if we wish to make an attempt to discover what the poet means. He seems to be saying that there is some way in which the mind, in attempting to grasp again, or return to a thought which had been forgotten, makes use of the characteristics or qualities of that thought (its running instress) to bring it into existence again. It is these qualities which enable the mind to reject like thoughts ("various suggestions"), testing and rejecting until it settles upon that "which unmistakeably distinguishes and individualises things." We still do not know what there is about running instress which enables the mind to do this, but we are at least narrowing it down. Apparently, also, Hopkins believes that this running instress is so bound up with the immediate here and now of one particular instance that the same object on another occasion might have a different instress, for he says that he had been carrying it (the cross road) in "another 'running instress'" and that as soon as he saw the road, "it lost its present instress . . . and fell into the morning's."

Thus, we draw the following conclusions regarding running instress:
(1) it is related to a specific time and place, i.e.,
the instress of a thing may vary from moment to
moment, but is still a part of that thing, i.e.,
recoverable to the observer, even capable of
displacing a present instress. Thus, it would
seem that no instress is ever "lost";
(2) it is apparently something intrinsic, although the
observer plays some part in it;
(3) and, finally, its function is to distinguish and
individualize a thing.

If we add to this the tentative definition we drew
from the "Parmenides" essay, we may construct the following,
again tentative, definition: (Running) instress is an intrin­
sic force which holds things in existence and serves to dis­
tinguish and individualize these things.

The expression "running instress" does not occur
prior to the September 1871 entry, nor is it used again. By
the same token, neither does "emotional instress" appear any­
where but in the notation about the lake of Brienz. Never­
theless, the distinction between the two is so clearly made
in the 1871 entry that we cannot ignore it. It seems ob­
vious that Hopkins uses the word in one or other of these
senses each time it appears, since these are the only dis­
tinctions he makes as to the different kinds of instress,
viewed from the position of what instress is, or the defin­
ition of instress, its nature.
In addition to the two we have thus far considered, Hopkins attaches the following different adjectives to the word instress: "double . . . direct"31 "true . . . false"32 "simple"33 "fascinating"34 "odd"35 "deeper"36 "nervous . . . muscular"37 completing the list with these,

31Ibid., p. 199. "Great brilliancy and projection: the eye seemed to fall perpendicular from level to level along our trees, the nearer and further Park; all things hitting the sense with double but direct instress."

32Ibid., p. 204. "What you look hard at seems to look hard at you, hence the true and the false instress of nature."

33Ibid., p. 207. "The blue of the sky was charged with simple instress, the higher, zenith sky earnest and frowning, lower more light and sweet."

34Ibid. "It is most likely the fascinating instress of the straight white stroke."

35Ibid., p. 218. "I could not but strongly feel in my fancy the odd instress of this, the moon leaning on her side, as if fallen back, in the cheerful light floor within the ring, after with magical rightness and success tracing round her the ring and steady copy of her own outline."

36Ibid., p. 231. "Bluebells in Hodder wood, all hanging their heads one way. I caught as well as I could while my companions talked the Greek rightness of their beauty, the lovely/what people call/ 'gracious' bidding one to another or all one way, the level or stage or shire of colour they make hanging in the air a foot above the grass, and a notable glare the eye may abstract and sever from the blue colour/of light beating up from so many glassy heads, which like water is good to float their deeper instress in upon the mind."

37Ibid., p. 238. "I had lost all muscular stress elsewhere but not sensitive, feeling where each limb lay and thinking that I could recover myself if I could move my finger, I said, and then the arm and so the whole body. The feeling is terrible: the body no longer swayed as a piece by the nervous and muscular instress seems to fall in and hang like a dead weight on the chest."
"Westcountry"\(^{38}\) and "terrible."\(^{39}\)

We have already seen the important distinction developed by the use of "emotional" and "running." We shall now proceed to a brief discussion of these other adjectives and their effect, if any, toward establishing more useful distinctions of instress.

It is apparent that the majority of these words may be dismissed as indicative merely of the feelings or reactions of the observer rather than as having any relationship to the definition of instress. Fascinating, odd, deeper, nervous, muscular, and terrible are most obviously used not so much to clarify or explain the nature of instress as to delineate the reactions of the observer (fascinated, terrified); to place the position of the instress (nervous system, muscles); or, finally, to interpret the

\(^{38}\)Gerard Manley Hopkins, The Letters of Gerard Manley Hopkins to Robert Bridges (2nd ed. rev., London: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 88. "His [Barnes] poems used to charm me also by their Westcountry 'instress,' a most peculiar product of England, which I associate with airs like Weeping Winefred, Polly Oliver, or Poor Mary Ann, with Herrick and Herbert, with the Worcestershire, Herefordshire, and Welsh landscape, and above all with the smell of oxeyes and applelofts: this instress is helped by particular rhythms and these Barnes employs . . . ."

\(^{39}\)Hopkins, Sermons, p. 137. "The seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are spoken of as seven spirits, seven jets or currents of breath; so it may be of 'the breath of the Lord that kindled Tophet of old,' the stress of God's anger which first 'prepared' or called into being fire against the Devil and his angels -- that it was an intensification of or terrible instress upon the substance of one, Satan, first of all, casting that, with straining in one direction (which is the being cast down to hell) . . . ."
observer's point of view or state of mind toward the instress (it was an odd instress, it made a more profound impression).

Westcountry instress refers simply to a locality and is explained fully in Hopkins' journal entry of 8 August 1874:

Then near Bishopsteignton from a hilltop I looked into a lovely comb that gave me the instress of "Weeping Winefred," which all the west country seems to me to have. . . 40 (Italics mine)

The words double, direct, true, false, and simple are not so easily dismissed. There is, however, much less certainty about these adjectives and their possible effect upon instress than we have seen in the case of the distinction between emotional and running instress. Nevertheless, we may advance some tentative hypotheses.

If we assume that emotional instress resides entirely, or at least for the greater part, in the observer, and running instress is intrinsic to the observed, then there is no reason to deny the simultaneous existence of both kinds of instress. Thus, we may have a double instress, one on the part of the observer, one on the part of the observed. The contrary of this may be what Hopkins means by simple instress, although we should logically look for the dichotomy to be represented by double/single and simple/complex.

40Hopkins, Journals, p. 250.
Direct instress would most naturally be opposed to indirect, but Hopkins never uses the latter term, nor does he provide a possible alternative (as in simple/double above). Perhaps, direct instress is that which is perceived immediately and remains, as opposed to that which is recalled and replaces a present situation (cf. the incident of the cross roads).

No statement of Hopkins is so positive and at the same time so enigmatic as the journal entry of March 1871: "What you look hard at seems to look hard at you, hence the true and the false instress of nature" (cf. note 32). He follows this opening statement with a description of cloud formations:

When long streamers were rising from over Kemble End one large flake loopshaped, not a streamer but belonging to the string, moving too slowly to be seen, seemed to cap and fill the zenith with a white shire of cloud. I looked long up at it till the tall height and the beauty of the scaping -- regularly curled knots springing if I remember from fine stems, like foliation in wood or stone -- had strongly grown on me. It changed beautiful changes, growing more into ribs and one stretch of running into branching like coral. Unless you refresh the mind from time to time you cannot always remember or believe how deep the inscape in things is.41

I believe that the final remark about refreshing the mind is significant, and perhaps accounts for the difference between the true and false instress. Although the statement is made in reference to the perception of inscape, the idea may be applied to instress. Is the impact of some-

41Ibid., pp. 204, 205.
thing, anything, on the observer so great that unless he attends carefully, i.e., is totally aware of the stress and the instress, the scape and the inscape of the thing itself and his feeling about the thing, he is simply overwhelmed by what he sees, and thus receives a false instress? The instress would be false because it would be incomplete, i.e., it would lack the awareness of the observer, his recognition of the individuality of that which he observes. This view is strengthened by Hopkins' statement that he watched the scene until "the tall height and beauty of the scaping . . . had grown on me." In other words, the observer has made himself aware, fully conscious of what he was seeing and the experience had been carried over from a simple emotional reaction to beauty into a recognition and awareness of all that surrounded and characterized the scene here and now, the stress (in the terms of the meaning of that word as we have defined it), and, consequently, the instress. The observer becomes, then, a dynamic observer. He becomes an integral part of the scene by working to appreciate the individuality and the uniqueness of the objects observed. He has, in effect, a univocal view of the cloud formation.

If this explanation is acceptable, then we may equate "false" instress with "emotional" instress. This will further refine the concepts of both emotional and running instress. If an instress so overwhelms an observer that he is
unable to associate himself with it by way of recognition, then he has received a false instress of the object. It is only by in some way coordinating, or relating, one's feelings with one's awareness that a true (running) instress may be realized.

It appears that the most clear-cut distinction made by Hopkins is that between "emotional" and "running" instress, although even here one must probe the writings to see it. Certainly, in my opinion, this is the most important distinction of those we have so far noted.

By way of recapitulation, then, the following remarks are in order:

(1) emotional instress comes about on the part of the observer alone, and is exemplified in such adjectives as fascinating, odd, deeper, etc. It occurs when the observer is so overwhelmed by the observed that he is unable to advert to the "thisness," the individuality, of the thing observed;

(2) we have already given a tentative identification of running instress:

(3) double instress is one in which both the emotions of the observer and the singular nature of the observed are in some kind of balance, or proportion, i.e., the observer is moved in his own soul by what he sees, and at the same time is intellectually aware of the autonomous nature of the observed;

(4) simple instress, then, would be an instress in which
one of these two kinds (emotional or running) is missing;

(5) direct instress may be (and this is the most elusive of the identifications) an instress which is the instress of the moment, rather than one from the past which replaces it (again cf. the cross roads incident);

(6) false instress is emotional instress only;

(7) true instress is running instress at least, but can be double instress as well.

Thus, it is quite possible to have an instress that is simultaneously emotional, running, double, true, and direct, since we have seen that some of the distinctions made are done so according to different objects, and some simply overlap. (See the following footnote for an example from Hopkins of simple direct instress.)

Since it is not the work of this dissertation to explicate each use of instress, but only to establish a workable definition from those uses, I shall not make further applications of these definitions to every instance of the word in Hopkins' writings. However, I am appending all of the instances which have not been quoted up to this point, with the exception of those mentioned in note number twenty-four, which explains the treatment of four special passages.

It is to these four passages that we must now turn.

42 Ibid., p. 188. "The Lady-chapel (1321 sqq.) has
Accurate dating is impossible because, apparently, Hopkins utilized passages written at one time to complete walls bordered all round with an ogee-canopied arcade of great richness, but the E. and W. windows are strangely clumsy. -- The all-powerfulness of instress in mode and the immediateness of its effect are very remarkable.

_Journals_, p. 206. "Take a few primroses in a glass and the instress of -- brilliancy, sort of starri-ness: I have not the right word -- so simple a flower gives is remarkable. It is, I think, due to the strong swell given by the deeper yellow middle."

_Journals_, p. 212. "At eight o'clock about sunset hanging due opposite the house in the east the greatest stack of cloud, to call it one cloud, I ever can recall seeing. Singled by the eye and taken up by itself it was shining white but taken with the sky, which was a strong hard blue, it was anointed with warm brassy glow: only near the earth it was stunned with purplish shadow. The instress of its size came from comparison not with what was visible but with the remembrance of other clouds: like the Monte Rosa range from the Gorner Grat its burliness forced out everything else and loaded the eyesight."

_Journals_, p. 215. "A pair of three-light lancets in each clearstory of the S. transept, which dwell on the eye with a simple direct instress of trinity . . . ."

_Journals_, p. 228. "I saw the inscape of Parlick Pike though freshly, as if my eye were still growing, though with a companion the eye and the ear are for the most part shut and instress cannot come . . . ."

_Journals_, p. 244, note on: "Millais -- Scotch Firs: 'The silence that is in the lonely woods' -- No such thing, instress absent, fir trunks ungrouped, four or so pairing but not markedly . . . ."

_Journals_, p. 249. "The comet -- I have seen it at bedtime in the west, with head to the ground, white, a soft well-shaped tail, not big: I felt a certain awe and instress, a feeling of strangeness, flight (it hangs like a shuttle-cock at the height, before it falls), and of threatening."

_Journals_, p. 253. "Tall wychelms on a slope of a hill near the lake and mill, also a wychelm, also a beech, both of these with ivory-white bark pied with green moss: there was an instress about this spot."
sections written later, a practice not particularly strange, considering that he wrote from a notebook. One purpose of a notebook is, of course, to record thoughts for later use. Therefore, some time between the years 1881-1883, he composed brief tracts on the following subjects, in all of which he utilized the words stress and instress: "The 5th

Journals, p. 257. "To Westminster Abbey, where I went round the cloisters, examined the drapes, took in the beautiful paired triforium-arcade with cinque-foil wheels riding the arches (there is a simplicity of instress in the cinque-foil) etc."

Journals, p. 258. "Looking all round but most in looking far up the valley I felt an instress and charm of Wales."

Journals, p. 263. "We went up to the castle but not in: standing before the gateway I had an instress which only the true old work gives from the strong and noble inscape of the pointed arch."

Poems, p. 53. "His mystery must be instressed, stressed."

Ibid., p. 81. "To its own fine function, wild and self-instressed."

Correspondence, p. 37. "Against these I set their [RWD's] extreme beauties -- imagery inheriting Keats' mantle, the other-world of imagination (constructive imagination is rare even among poets), the 'instress' of feeling, and a pathos the deepest, I think, that I have anywhere found." Hopkins is referring to Dixon's poems, which he had been asked to criticize.

Ibid., p. 63. "'The Woodpecker' reminds one of Cowper's poems in this metre and has the same sort of 'instress' of feeling but not quite the same satisfactory cadences."

Ibid., p. 68. "Terror is a somewhat slight sample of that instress which is felt in the Wizard's Funeral and many other places."


As is obvious from the title, the meditation on hell is part of Hopkins' unfinished commentary on the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius Loyola. In this brief essay, Hopkins continues to use stress and instress as we have previously defined them. The only significant addition to our development of these words is in the following lengthy passage:

The fall from heaven was for the rebel angels what death is for man. As in man all that energy or instress with which the soul animates and otherwise acts in the body is by death thrown back upon the soul itself: so in them was that greater stock of activity with which they act, intellectually and otherwise throughout their own world or element of spirit, which is perhaps, as I have thought, flushed by every spirit living in it. This throwing back or confinement of their energy is a dreadful constraint or imprisonment and, as intellectual action is spoken of under the figure of sight, it will in this case be an imprisonment in darkness, a being in the dark; for darkness is a phenomenon of foiled action.

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University Press, 1956), p. 319. "L'Allegro -- the passage about Golden-Tongue is sour and to my taste flavours the whole too much, so that allegrezza is not quite the spirit or 'instress' the poem conveys to me."

Ibid., p. 320. "And in general in this and all the early poems the acuteness of the intelligence is in excess of the instress or feeling and gives them a certain cold glitter."

43Hopkins, Sermons, pp. 135-142.
44Ibid., pp. 146-159.
in the sense of sight. But this constraint and this blindness of darkness will be most painful when it is the main stress or energy of the whole being that is thus balked. This is its strain or tendency towards being, towards good, towards God -- being, that is/their own more or continued being, good/their own good, their natural felicity, and God/the God at least of nature, not to speak of grace. This strain must go on after their fall, because it is the strain of creating action as received in the creature and cannot cease without the creature's ceasing to be. On the other hand the strain or tendency towards God through Christ and the great sacrifice had by their own act been broken, refracted, and turned aside, and it was only through Christ and the great sacrifice that God had meant any being to come to him at all.47

We must first note that Hopkins equates energy with both instress and stress ("all that energy or instress with which the soul animates and otherwise acts in the body" and "it is the main stress or energy of the whole being"). Both stress and instress represent concepts of some kind of energy, in the first case the energy that is existence, that is being; in the second, that energy which maintains existence, which maintains being. And we see that for Hopkins, the energy of being, the energy or stress that he has in other passages equated with being, i.e., the constant struggle to continue in being. Thus, we have a further refinement of stress as dynamic existence, as being-in-struggle, as engaged continuously in the "strain of creating action."

By what process, then, does the "main stress or energy of the whole being" tend towards being? It must be by that other energy, instress, by "all that energy or instress

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with which the soul animates and otherwise acts in the body." We are speaking here, of course, about stress and instress in men and angels, but the same explanation will apply mutatis mutandis to all of creation. The dynamism by which stress exists and continues to exist is provided by instress. Now, the on-going tendency towards being is by its nature a struggle of the thing against all that would bring about its dissolution. God alone is simple; all things else have parts. And what has parts tends to "fall apart." Thus, the struggle to maintain existence is essentially a struggle to hold together. Stress is a struggle towards being in genere; it is the inherent nature of being to tend to remain in being, i.e., in existence. Instress is a struggle in specie, i.e., the struggle of this thing to remain in being, to hold together.

Basically, this struggle is one among parts. And instress is Hopkins' word for the tension which holds parts together and which gives the specific drive to stress.

Stress and instress are two differing kinds of energy, one directed to existence in general and one to existence in particular. Thus, the universal characteristics of stress and the particular characteristics of instress, which we have noted earlier in this paper, are both preserved.

The passage we have just examined is especially noteworthy because it is, up to this point, the closest we have come to a precise explication of what might be the
nature of that by which "all things are upheld."

In his essay "On Personality, Grace and Free Will," Hopkins uses the word instress not as a noun but as a verb, and in two instances only. In the first, he speaks of the accession of grace as "instressing" the will:

This access is either of grace, which is 'supernature,' to nature or of more grace to grace already given, and it takes the form of instressing the affective will, of affecting the will towards the good which he [God] proposes.48

In the second, it is the person who "instresses" the will:

It is choice as when in English we say 'because I choose,' which means no more than (and with precision does mean)/ I instress my will to so-and-so.49

And again, in the first case, Hopkins is referring to the determination of the will towards some good, and, consequently, the concentration of the will's energy in the direction of that goal. The same general notion follows in the second example: he quite clearly equates the act of choosing with the act of instressing, i.e., the directing of the energy of the will towards some act or object.

His use of stress is essentially the same as what we have considered so far in our discussion. He speaks of a "scale of stress," an "infinite of stress," and of divine nature as "infinite in stress."50 In each of these instances,

48Ibid., p. 149.

49Ibid., p. 150.

50Ibid., p. 153.
we might just as easily substitute the word being, always, of course, understanding it in the manner in which we have developed it throughout this paper.

Again, Hopkins, speaking of grace as an activity, remarks:

For grace is any action, activity, on God's part by which, in creating or after creating, he carries the creature to or towards the end of its being, which is its selfsacrifice to God and its salvation. It is, I say, any such activity on God's part; so that so far as this action or activity is God's it is divine stress, holy spirit, and as all is done through Christ, Christ's spirit; so far as it is action, correspondence, on the creature's it is actio salutaris; so far as it is looked at in esse quieto it is Christ in his member on the one side, his member in Christ on the other.51

But is this stress not the same as being, the same as energeia? It is the very fulness of God's being that "carries the creature to or towards the end of its being."

The final use of the word comes near the conclusion of the essay. In treating of the action of assisting grace, he describes it as threefold, the third act of which is elevating, which lifts the receiver from one cleave of being to another and to a vital act in Christ: this is truly God's finger touching the very vein of personality, which nothing else can reach and man can respond to by no play whatever, by bare acknowledgement only, the counter stress which God alone can feel ('subito probas eum'), the aspiration in answer to his inspiration.52

Hopkins refers here to the reaction of man's being to God's Being, an act which takes place almost as a reflex ("subito

51Ibid., p. 154.

52Ibid., p. 158.
probas eum" = "suddenly, you test him"), i.e., in the order of a reply, being to Being, or, as Hopkins says, "the aspiration in answer to his inspiration."

Still writing in his commentary, Hopkins, in the section he entitles De Regno Christi, posits the following point for meditation:

First set before your eyes the case ('exemplum') of a temporal king sovereign in the way described and realise the stress and importance the sight or thought of him should and would have on his subjects . . . . "53

I see here no significant development or addition to our present understanding of the word. Stress here simply means the overwhelming impression such dignity, such energy would make on the observer. Or, if you will, the king's being is such that it overwhelms.

Later, in the same essay, he discusses the nature of the lawgiver's will in the following words:

What is written on the last leaf and underscored about sanction must be understood not as we call permission sanction but of sanction as stresses of the lawgiver's will given as motives to action. In duty the lawgiver originates, the subject accepts; in free exercise of right the subject originates, the lawgiver neither originates nor accepts; in grace or supererogation the subject originates, the lawgiver accepts. If the lawgiver's will should ever be without sanction it would seem to be without stress and not to constitute duty.54

In an earlier section of this chapter, we discussed the sermon delivered by Hopkins on the subject of God's Kingdom, the same topic treated in the essay now under con-

53 Ibid., p. 164.
54 Ibid., p. 167.
sideration. In that sermon, he spoke of the subject of a ruler and of the "stress of his [the subject's] obedience." We interpreted the word then to refer to the universality of the subject's obedience to his sovereign. In the passage quoted above, it still appears that we might make the same application if we are willing to accept that what Hopkins is saying is simply that no law is acceptable unless there is a universality of the sanctions which motivate it. Earlier, he had written: "The bindingness or obligation depends on the strength of the sanction . . . ."55 If, however, this seems too strained an interpretation, we can still settle for our old friends energy, being, as we have identified them in this paper. For the sanction provides the impetus; it is the dynamo behind the lawgiver's promulgation of the law. It is what causes the law to tend towards fulfillment just as stress causes being to tend towards its preservation in being.

Instress appears four times in this essay, and is used to describe either the lawgiver or the subject of the law. An act

may be indifferent, gaining no goodness from the instress of the lawgiver (and morality-maker, right-maker, justifier) to which the subject has given his consent or obedience nor yet from the consent or correspondence of the lawgiver in accepting the instress of the subject.56

It seems to me that what Hopkins means here is that

55 Ibid., p. 166.
56 Ibid., p. 167.
whatever might be imparted by the individuality, the "specialness" of the lawgiver; his "instress," is balked by the indifferent nature of the act. And the same holds true of the subject.

Again, Hopkins writes:

Obedience or the subject's correspondence to the sovereign's commandments or instress and initiation is in general nothing else than the relation, the compact in which the commonwealth consists and to it seems in equity or in justice to answer a correspondence, a compliance of the sovereign to the subject's instress of initiation: it does not merit anything but the substantial or essential good which belongs to the commonwealth, the common weal itself.57

Here he is speaking of an interrelationship between the instress of the subject and the initiation of commandments by the sovereign. Instress in this context cannot be taken in a nominal sense. It is the act of the subject, his instressing of the law, his recognition of the uniqueness of either the law or the lawgiver, and of the corresponding sense of obligation which then devolves upon himself, the subject.

On 8 November 1881, during the so-called "long retreat," Hopkins composed a brief tract on "Creation and Redemption the Great Sacrifice." In this essay, he uses, for the only time, the peculiar word, outstress.

The first intention then of God outside himself or, as they say, ad extra, outwards, the first outstress of God's power, was Christ . . . .58

57 Ibid., p. 168.
58 Ibid., p. 197.
This outstress can mean only that Christ is, in His humanity, the outward expression, the outward energeia of God. Hopkins associates this outgoing of God in Christ with sacrifice:

This sacrifice and this outward procession is a consequence and shadow of the procession of the Trinity, from which mystery sacrifice takes its rise; but of this I do not mean to write here. It is as if the blissful agony or stress of selving in God had forced out drops of sweat or blood, which drops were the world . . . . 59

Stress, in this context, maintains its connotation of energy, or being.

Later in the essay, Hopkins comments on the angel Lucifer's pride as a dwelling on his own beauty, an instressing of his own inscape, and like a performance on the organ and instrument of his own being; it was a sounding, as they say, of his own trumpet and a hymn in his own praise. 60

This instressing by Lucifer, this awareness of his own uniqueness, has more significance as an example of instress when we realize that common Scholastic teaching regards each angel as a species in its own right. There is, then a built-in uniqueness, an instress, in the angel which is far more specific than that of any other creature, which must perforce be one in a species containing many. This uniqueness has a double edge, however, in that, once the angel has sinned, his instress becomes an unique unlikeness

59 Ibid., p. 197.

60 Ibid., p. 201.
of God, his creator:

It would seem that their fall was at once the attack of Michael and their own act: Michael and his angels instituted and distressed them with the thought of their unlikeness to the Most High; they from their self-raised pinnacle and tower of eminence flung themselves, like the sally of a garrison, with the thought of/We are like the Most High thinking in their madness their heroism, which was the divine in them, would declare itself as the godhead and would bear them up and its splendour dismay and overwhelm their enemies; but it was a blow struck wide, a leap over a precipice, and the weight of that other word bore them headlong down.61

Here, Hopkins says that the host of loyal angels so perceived (instressed) the true nature, now marred, of Lucifer and his followers that this very act brought home to them, i.e., to Lucifer and his disciples, the distortion they had themselves worked upon themselves. The rebel angels then were made to instress themselves and so were distressed at what this awareness unfolded to them.

I think the word distressed in this context is not to be taken as meaning simply "uncomfortable." I believe it to be a very precise word in Hopkins' technical vocabulary, although he uses it, like outstress, but once in his entire work. To be distressed is to be de-stressed, i.e., to have one's stress shorn of its principal function, or any aspect of its principal function. In a passage cited earlier (p. 44), Hopkins noted that a foiled action "is most painful when it is the main stress or energy of the whole being that is thus balked." And he goes on to list what that main

61 Ibid., pp. 201, 202.
stress or tendency is, viz., to tend towards the preservation of one’s own being, towards one’s own good, and towards God (italics mine).

The fallen angels are made to recognize, i.e., they are instressed both by Michael and his followers and by themselves, that a key aspect of the main stress of their whole being, the tending towards God, has been balked by their own actions, and the result is total collapse: "The strain or tendency towards God through Christ and the great sacrifice had by their own act been broken, refracted, and turned aside, and it was only through Christ and the great sacrifice that God had meant any being to come to him at all."

Our investigation of these two key words, stress and instress, in Hopkins' critical vocabulary is completed, and it remains only to summarize the findings.

Gerard Manley Hopkins arrived early at his critical vocabulary and did not, at least in the cases of the two words whose history we have traced in the previous pages, make any significant alterations in their meanings. We may remark here, also, that it would seem that Scotus' influence was for the most part post factum, and I agree with Peters' contention that Hopkins' outlook was essentially Scotistic before he read the great English thinker. My own concern, as I have stated before, is less with the genesis of Hopkins' thought than with the thought itself.
To return to the opening statement of this summation: while there has been no alteration in the root ideas expressed in the words stress and instress, there has been a development of those ideas, a deepening and a clarification which has become more apparent in Hopkins' usage over the years.

These fundamental notions appear first in the Parmenides essay. In that essay, he related stress to being as universal and instress to being as supportive of it. From this point on, until the final use of either word, these basic meanings obtain, clarified and nuanced to some degree, but never substantially changed.

Stress and instress have several things in common. They both represent kinds of energy, stress the energy of the thing as it tends towards existence in general; instress the energy which keeps in existence the particular thing, which upholds a being. In other words, stress is common to all being and is essentially the same in all beings; instress is particular to each specific being, and the instress of one is not the instress of the other. It differs from stress in that the simple tendency to exist is the same in all being; the force or energy, the tension upholding each being differs one from the other. Loosely, we might say that stress belongs to the idea of genus, instress to the individual. Another mutual characteristic is that stress and instress are both intrinsic to being. Again, they are both susceptible to some
extent of existing somehow in both the observer and the observed in nature.

Given these considerations, we may now proceed to the formulation of workable definitions of both words based on our completed survey of their use by Hopkins.

We defined stress initially as a quality in being which allowed the mind to grasp the universal nature of that being. Later, we saw that Hopkins more and more used stress as equivalent to being understood and recognized as universal. Again, we added to this notion of stress as dynamic, stress as a word conveying more the idea of dynamism than the relatively static implications of the word being. And, finally, we saw Hopkins use stress to mean the tendency of being to strain towards existence.

It seems to me, then, that Hopkins uses stress in several senses, all of them related to energy in some way, and none of them mutually exclusive or contrary to one another:

1. stress is being understood as universal;
2. stress is the recognition of the fact of the universality of being;
3. and stress is the dynamic tendency of all being towards being (existence).

Insofar as I can determine, Hopkins departs from the association of stress with universality on only one occasion (cf. p. 23), in which he uses stress in a sense which he
later restricts to instress. This usage is not common, and I invoke the axiom that the "exception proves the rule."

It might be argued with some persuasiveness that the use of stress to indicate a quality expressive of the fact of universality is radically different from its use to mean being understood as universal. The point is not vital to my thesis, but I am viewing more the common bond uniting all three uses: namely, the fact that stress in every instance is concerned with some aspect of being, that no one of these aspects excludes any other one, and that none overlaps. And seen from this viewpoint, there appears to me to be no radical difference.

We have seen, in the case of instress, a rather extensive variety of uses by Hopkins throughout his writings. Although I do not wish to burden the reader with any more statistical information than is absolutely necessary, I think that the following schemata will be useful in isolating the multiple distinctions we have discovered in Hopkins regarding this word.

(1) (emotional: on the part of the observer

- Instress

(2) (double: presence of both emotional and running

- Instress

(simple: absence of either emotional or running
(3) (direct: perceived immediately, a present instress

(3) (indirect): a recalled instress replacing a present one. Hopkins, of course, does not use indirect. He does, however, speak of one instress replacing another, which seems to be the other aspect of direct instress.

(4) (true: running instress, at least

Instress

(4) (false: emotional instress only

Although double instress seems to be the more complete form, since it includes both the awareness of the observer (concerning the individuality of the observed) and an emotional reaction to that awareness, running instress is basic if one is to have a true instress. Therefore, speaking simply, running instress is the more important, in fact, the most important of the distinctions made. Therefore, it is the development and refinement of running instress that we must consider in this summary.

Again, it is to the Parmenides essay that one must turn to find not only the initial mention of the term, but the initial definition, as well. And we learn here, not what instress is, but what instress does, i.e., upholds all things. Thus, we arrived at our opening definition of instress as the force which upholds all being in existence. Later, we added the important element of its function in distinguishing and individualizing things.
The next step in our search for a definition is the formulation of the following definition of running instress: an intrinsic force which holds the thing in existence and serves to distinguish it and to individualize it.

The force which we have utilized as a genus in the definition to this point is energeia. It is the energy of the thing itself, holding it in being and giving it stress, the tendency towards being.

However, since all created things are composed, made up of parts, often even of contraries, the energeia of the thing itself to maintain its being is the energy expended to maintain parts (accidentia) in a unity (substantia). When this energy is expended to keep the union of contraries from disintegrating, a tension is set up, because it is the natural tendency of contraries to exclude one another, at least on a sliding scale (as for example, one color excluding another through a gradual change). The energy which holds together elements (accidentia) whose natural disposition is opposed to unity must itself be evocative of some kind of tension. For this reason, I take the energy which is instress to be more specifically, tension.

And thus, my final definition of instress, and the one which forms the basis for my further discussion, is as follows: (running) instress is the intrinsic tension upholding the unity of being of a particular being and distinguishing and individualizing that being.
Part Two

One of the more obvious choices for the fundament
of a division of opinions concerning Hopkins' use of the
word instress is that of the depth of treatment accorded to
the subject. Some authors scarcely touch upon the word at
all; others recognize its importance in Hopkins' canon of
critical words, but give it little consideration beyond
such recognition; and, finally, there are a few who probe
to some depth the meaning and use of this remarkable word.

It is of little value to list the authors who give
no attention to the question. Of those who mention the word,
some, particularly in the very early studies of Hopkins'
work, do little more than make statements, providing little
or no argumentation supportive of the conclusions they have
drawn.

Elsie Elizabeth Phare, writing in 1933 in her The
Poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins: A Survey and Commentary,
states:

"Instress," another of his coinages, describes the par-
ticular effect which a thing may have upon a particular
person. He speaks, for example, of feeling a "charm and
instress of Wales" meaning both that he was conscious of
the atmosphere of Wales as distinct from all others and
that this atmosphere was charged with a special signifi-
cance for himself. Instress is used at times as though
to describe inscape as it is apprehended by senses other
than the eye.62

62Elsie Elizabeth Phare, The Poetry of Gerard Manley
Hopkins: A Survey and Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1933), p. 82.
And John Pick, in his Gerard Manley Hopkins: Priest and Poet, writes: "'Instress' is a word he attached to the intensity of feeling and associations which something beautiful brought to him . . . ."63

As early as 1933, Christopher Devlin, S.J. had considered the relationship between Hopkins and John Duns Scotus.64 In 1944, Eleanor Ruggles touched briefly on this matter with regard to Hopkins' language:

Yet an awareness of the self element in all phenomena was felt by Hopkins more keenly than by most men and the chief clue to his affinity with Scotus lies in a comparison between the philosopher's term haecctias [sic] or "formal difference with respect to the thing" and Hopkins' own coinages which fleck his prose and poetry: "inscape," "pitch," and "instress."65

Ruggles indicates the elements of a definition, but does not carry them out to a full development of their possibilities:

Instress Hopkins never decisively defines. The cohesive energy of being (as distinguished from nothing and not-being) by which "all things are upheld," the felt effect of inscape, self or personality on the beholder -- these are approximations of its meaning.66

In this early work on Hopkins, the author at least isolates in slight detail the genus of the definition - a


66Ibid., p. 138.
"cohesive energy of being." She does not, however, pursue it.

Another theory, not sufficiently supported, at least to my own satisfaction, is set forth by K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar, in his 1948 study, Gerard Manley Hopkins: The Man and the Poet:

But it is clear enough that "instress" signifies the design cohering the particulars of a scene, that gives each particular item a habitation and a frame of reference, while "inscape" signifies the core of creative purposiveness underlying, and galvanizing into a spiritual entity, the formal design.67

He continues, with "design" now becoming the form, or "underlying unity."

Form is thus the underlying unity, the "instress" that integrates the diversities and mutations in matter; form is eternal, and transcends the dichotomies that at first baffle our understanding, but matter is fluctuating, shifting, dying, and constantly being reborn.68

Geoffrey Hartmann, in his study of Wordsworth, Hopkins, Rilke, and Valery, The Unmediated Vision, strikes at one aspect of the problem with a recognition of the "individualizing" nature of instress, but he introduces what seems to be a highly original notion, that of "resilience."

His [Hopkins] concern is evidently with the spring of the trees, their resilience; and we meet the word "inscape" which together with "instress" is the poet's technical term describing the individual form of


68 Ibid., p. 22.
resilience as the quality or effect of a particular thing.69

Todd K. Bender adds little to the development of our understanding of the word:

But there is some evidence that Hopkins thought of instress at times as analogous to a hydraulic pressure flowing through a body and filling it with power as, for example, a hydraulic press.70

Perhaps the most candid opinion regarding the difficulties involved in determining the meaning of instress is that of Elisabeth W. Schneider, in her The Dragon in the Gate: Studies in the Poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins:

Always the term [instress] has something to do with emphasis, but beyond that I can be sure of no single, consistently maintained meaning. Hopkins never defined it for the benefit of another reader as he did inscape, and he uses it peculiarly often in parallel or coordinate constructions that are apt to sound like uneasy strainings after either a more accurate or perhaps a more intense expression: "all that energy or instress," "the stamp, seal, or instress," "this song of Lucifer's was a dwelling on his own beauty, an instressing of his own inscape" (Devotional Writings, pp. 137, 139, 200-201). These are among the clearest uses of the term and probably also the most nearly alike in meaning. It will be noticed that they all occur in appositional syntax that has somewhat the look of a definition; yet neither the ostensible purpose nor the actual result quite amounts to an informative definition for the enlightenment of a reader other than himself.71


Schneider's observation about the deceptive nature of the "appositional syntax" is true enough, and perceptive, because, at first glance, the reader may be lulled into the notion that he is being presented a definition. However, I believe that I have shown in the earlier part of this chapter that there is a substantive meaning underlying the use of the word, and, therefore, a consistency in that use.

Donald McChesney sees instress as energy which serves to organize and unify nature:

Instress is the underlying energy that organizes nature into pattern and unity -- it runs also through the human mind (which is part of nature) enabling it to make sense of the world. It underlies all particular incenscapes as the total life and personality of the artist lies behind any particular work of art he may produce.\(^2\)

In some particulars, then, McChesney's view is akin to that of Iyengar, i.e., that instress is an "underlying unity."

The first treatment of the word in any depth in a major treatise on Hopkins appears in W. H. Gardner's groundbreaking study *Gerard Manley Hopkins: A Study of Poetic Idiosyncrasy in Relation to Poetic Tradition*, the first volume of which appeared in 1944.

The closest Gardner came to extracting a definition appears in the following passage:

In the vagaries of shape and colour presented by hills, clouds, glaciers and trees he discerns a recondite pattern -- "species or individually distinctive beauty" -- for which he coins the name "inscape"; and the sensation of inscape (or, indeed, of any vivid mental image) is called "stress" or "instress."73

This notion of the meaning of instress is certainly not a profound one, nor a very rich one. And Gardner apparently equates stress and instress, since he indicates that Hopkins uses the words interchangeably, a supposition I do not see verified and therefore cannot accept.

Gardner, echoing other critics before and after his own masterful work, acknowledges that

the word instress is used in a bewildering variety of contexts, but its combined epistemological and mystical value is brought out in the following: "I saw the inscape . . . freshly, as if my eye were still growing, though with a companion the eye and the ear are for the most part shut and instress cannot come."

As in mysticism, solitude and concentration are preliminary to the art of "illumination," the inflow of supersensuous "knowledge." The word instress is also used later in a frankly theological sense to describe an access of Divine grace -- "instressing the affective will."74

I would argue that he attributes far more of a mystical nature to the word than did Hopkins, who, while surely a spiritual man himself, had been through the course in philosophy offered in the Jesuit studium. And it is not necessary, nor even desirable, to go beyond philosophy to an appeal to


74Ibid., p. 12.
mysticism for an explanation of the meaning of instress.

Gardner's final conclusion regarding instress is found in the statement that

to Keats, as to Pater and the Aesthetes, Beauty was single and good -- it was Truth. To Hopkins it was twofold -- "mortal beauty" and "immortal (or supernatural) beauty." Thus the effect or instress of beauty was equivocal; Hopkins saw that beauty could be either an insidious attraction towards the lower levels of being or a constant admonition to the higher.75

This section does little to increase the content of the meaning of instress. Whether it was the instress of beauty or the stress of it, as we have defined stress, which Hopkins saw in this equivocal fashion (if he did), we are still no nearer a conclusive definition.

It is with Father W. A. M. Peters' *Gerard Manley Hopkins: A Critical Essay towards the Understanding of His Work* that we come to the first fullscale attempt to study Hopkins in the context of philosophy.

Here a digression is in order, one which should be read in the light of the first part of this chapter, as well as insofar as it relates to Peters' work.

Gerard Manley Hopkins was not an amateur philosopher, dabbling eclectically in the subject from time to time as fancy moved him. As a Jesuit, he had progressed through the very rigorous and thorough *ratio studiorum* of the Society. Although his own area of teaching involved the classics, Hopkins never abandoned his interest in philosophical studies,

75Ibid., p. 18.
and his writings contain much evidence of the analytical nature of his mind.

All of this serves to provide a background from which Hopkins' vocabulary must be studied. And it seems to me that it is only from such a framework (that is, the philosophical cast of Hopkins' mind and the intense training he underwent in that discipline) that the critic/student can hope to approach anything like a complete understanding of instress.

Fr. Peters' analysis of the reason for Hopkins' choice of the word stress is interesting, particularly to me, since he attributes much the same ratio for it as I have myself.

The preference of 'stress' to 'act,' the normal word in scholastic terminology, most likely finds its reason in the greater expressiveness of the Saxon word, 'stress' well marking the force which keeps a thing in existence and its strain after continued existence.76

Peters equates stress with act, whereas I have understood it as a dynamic equivalent for the more static and more inclusive concept of being in genere.

He strikes at the heart of the meaning of instress when he writes:

The original meaning of instress then is that stress or energy of being by which 'all things are upheld' (N98), and strive after continued existence.77

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76Peters, p. 13.

77Ibid., p. 14.
Peters fails, however, to isolate with any precision the further, and final, nature of instress as a particular kind of energy (as I have attempted to do in Part One of this chapter). He does, however, make a significant distinction in the following passage:

We can now understand why and how it is that 'instress' in Hopkins's writings stands for two distinct and separate things, related to each other as cause and effect; as a cause 'instress' refers for Hopkins to that core of being or inherent energy which is the actuality of the object; as effect 'instress' stands for the specifically individual impression the object makes on man.78

It is important to point out here the nature of the distinction so perceptively made by Peters. The terminology he uses must be understood as technically precise. Therefore, when he states that instress "stands for two distinct and separate things," he is speaking of a distinctio realis, and is not simply using emphatic language.

This distinction becomes important when one considers the nature of double instress and of true instress as I have explained them in the earlier part of this chapter. Since the two aspects of instress as delineated by Peters are real, we can see the value of the exposition of double instress as both emotional and running, i.e., of instress as cause and effect, in the words of Father Peters (although there is not a one-to-one relationship between the words involved). Most significantly, the distinction adds a note of interest to my division and explanation of true and false instress. If I

78Ibid., p. 15.
am correct and if Father Peters' distinction is correct (and I believe that both cases are such), then Hopkins apparently was willing to accept one-half of the distinction (running instress, or the "cause" half) as sufficient for a true instress. And this apparent fact might be taken by the incautious reader as grounds for a pejorative judgment on Hopkins as a logician.

Such is not the case, however, when we realize that the true or false nature of instress is determined by the reaction of the observer. Instress is instress, so to speak, and of itself and in itself, is neither true nor false. Truth and falsity are matters of the judgment (the so-called "second act of the mind" of the logicians). Thus, when the observer fails to advert to the role of instress as "energy upholding" (Peters' cause) or as "individualizing" (Peters' effect) we have false instress.

From this analysis, then, we can note two points. First, running instress as I have defined it includes both the cause and the effect aspects of Peters' distinction. Therefore, we cannot make a simple equation of running=cause and emotional=effect in a combination of the two terminologies. Peters' distinction amounts to a closer reading of my own study of the word. It adds nothing to the foundation of the definition. Secondly, false instress is not the isolation of one or other of the two parts (cause, effect); but, rather, it is the willingness of the observer to be
caught up in a purely emotional reaction, with no adver-
tence to the "thisness" of the thing and to the correspond-
ing energy (tension) which contributes to the individualiz-
ing of the thing.

There is, then, no contradiction, and no failure on
Hopkins' part to make the proper distinctions between true
and false instress. And from my own viewpoint, Peters' dis-
tinction simply contributes to a further and richer under-
standing of the definition of instress as I have attempted
it in the first part of this chapter.

There is one final section of his study which I
should like to quote here, although it does not treat in-
stress as such. The passage does, however, make a point
which is of primary concern for the writer of this paper:
the relationship between instress and imagery.

I must point to another inference from Hopkins's con-
sciousness of instress: it serves him as a source of
imagery. For just as things may be described in terms
of another thing which visually or auditorily is like
or unlike it, so this writer describes an object in
terms of another because the instress that each pos-
sesses for him affords a ground for comparison or con-
trast. I am well aware that this is not peculiar to
Hopkins nor do I hold that a good deal of imagery in
other poets may not be explained in the same way. I
only wish to point out that as a source of imagery,
association of impressions, such as found in Hopkins,
finds its logical explanation in the attention he was
ever paying to the instresses of things.79

Although my own use of this relationship between in-
stress and imagery will be quite different from that of Father

79Ibid., p. 19.
Peters, I am happy to note that he has pointed out with such clarity the existence of such a relationship.

Alan Heuser, whose *The Shaping Vision of Gerard Manley Hopkins* probes deeper (and to me with less success) than Peters into the philosophical background of the Hopkins language, links two of the key words in the following manner:

Each inscape, instress has an interior oneness ('in-') which is distinctive: instress gropes downward to unity of being in feeling, while inscape upholds unity of being in fixed position, in fixed shape.  

Heuser's own language is far from precise in the section quoted. He does, however, introduce the unifying nature of instress, albeit he appears to anchor it in feeling.

In contradiction to Schneider (and perhaps unintentionally emphasizing the controversial nature of critical studies relating to Hopkins), Heuser remarks that "instress has been more readily defined than inscape." He continues:

> In the *Origin of Beauty* beauty is a relation, the apprehension of it a comparison. In *Parmenides* the energy of the relation or feeling of the comparison is instress in the object, stem of stress between object and subject (mind) -- ligature of being in the line pointing to unity within the object, copula of being in an imagined equal sign standing between object and subject. There are eventually three terms of stress and instress: (1) in the object, depth of feeling as spring of its unity; (2) between object and subject, identity of being through a flash of intuition; (3) in the subject, depth of

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feeling in response to the intuition of being. 82

He isolates instress as some form of energy, but I cannot accept his preoccupation with instress as "depth of feeling," except, possibly, as it relates to the subject, and this only as I have treated it in the first part of this chapter. He refines his ideas somewhat in the following passage, but still not to my satisfaction:

In instress the feeling in object or subject is drawn to an interior oneness, energy collected to a simple moment of emotion (fervour) or of will (choice). 83

Here he is most specific in equating feeling with energy, an energy collected and expunged in a "moment of emotion . . . or of will." But I am not satisfied with the ambiguity of the language. Emotion may well be energy, but it cannot under any circumstances be considered as that which upholds all things.

My final quotation from Heuser brings us somewhat closer together, but I cannot accept the basic principles underlying his concept of instress:

Therefore, the known shape of a creature, inscape, and its felt life, instress, are linked together to a common 'inbeing' or idea. By virtue of skapos/stem, inscape is upheld by instress. By virtue of esceap/creation, both instress and inscape have a common root. The pair makes up, then, two words of being. The first word is cognitive form; the second, felt pressure -- the knowing and the feeling linked to being through shape and shaping. 84

82 Ibid., pp. 26, 27.
83 Ibid., p. 27.
84 Ibid.
I am even less able to reconcile my analyses with those of Alison G. Sulloway:

Hopkins's aesthetic concepts embodied in his terms 'in­scape' -- the whole object as it is in all its whole­ness and in each of its specific parts -- and 'in­stress' -- the onlooker's emotional response to that object -- would have been as acceptable to earlier Victorian aestheticians as theirs were to him.85

Perhaps so, if instress were Hopkins' word for an emotional response; but, we have seen that a purely emotion­al instress was not the poet's idea of instress in its full capacity.

Sulloway perceives the use of instress as exempli­fying something in the observer and in the observed, but fails to determine accurately the nature of this relationship:

Hopkins used the term instress to mean many things, but its composite meaning encompasses God's plan for the world as it is revealed in the looks and conduct of natural things -- as opposed merely to those things themselves; and instress also signifies man's response to the divine plan as he praises it and makes copies of it in his art.86

This attaching of the notion of instress to God's plan and man's reaction to it is continued and reiterated:

'Inscape'is what the innocent eye sees; 'instress' is God's plan behind nature's inscapes and man's sub­mission to that plan.87

The most recent study in depth of Hopkins' work is


86Ibid., p. 46.

87Ibid., p. 71.
that of James Finn Cotter, whose *Inscape: The Christology and Poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins* appeared in 1972. It is a difficult volume, ponderous at times in its complexity and concern for the idea of a gnosis. It is devoted, as the title indicates, primarily to inscape considered from a theological viewpoint.

To my mind, Cotter's understanding of instress is quite faulty, never coming to grips with the intrinsic quality of the word.

In each object -- cowslip, waterfall, or cloud -- he sought out the mark and telos of unity that connected each with everything else. For this controlling and incorporating energy and end, the poet coined the word inscape. For the origin, impact, and grip of that inscape when it fused in man as being and thought, he coined a second word, instress.88

Inscape then is gnosis, the act of being-one, where "the fulness is the thought" (J,130). The union of love that follows is "instress," the "saying yes" to Being's I AM.89

Instress may be further defined then as the literal exterior force (the "stress" of "stars and storms") which, delivered through the senses and converging on the mind, results in inscape, the shaping of fresh incarnation in the new man.90

It is obvious from these three citations that Cotter understands instress as something exterior to the object perceived and/or a subjective manifestation of feeling in the


perceiver.

I have not, in this brief survey, treated all of the theories surrounding Hopkins' use of instress. Nor have I given to those I have considered the close analysis they justly deserve, especially as regards the work of Peters, Heuser, and possibly Cotter. I have, however, covered these theories well enough to establish them as the framework against which my own ideas are juxtaposed, and to show the differences between their conclusions and my own.
CHAPTER III

"ROSE-MOLES ALL IN STIPPLE"

Pied Beauty

Glory be to God for dappled things --
For skies of couple-colour as a brinded cow;
For rose-moles all in stipple upon trout that swim;
Fresh-firecoal chestnut-falls; finches' wings;
Landscape plotted and pieced -- fold, fallow, and plough;
And all trades, their gear and tackle and trim.
All things counter, original, spare, strange;
Whatever is fickle, freckled (who knows how?)
With swift, slow; sweet, sour; adazzle, dim;
He fathers-forth whose beauty is past change:
Praise him.

The most concise, and at the same time, most complete statement of Hopkins' attitude towards variegation in nature is found in his sonnet "Pied Beauty." The poem is a hymn to the dappled things of the world, and, as we shall discover presently, the universe of discourse represented by dappled things is far wider than the merely physical.

Because it is the perfect statement of what I hope to show is Hopkins' world vision, an analysis should lead to the establishing of the principles necessary to discover the presence of that vision in the poet's writings in general as well as more specifically in the poetry. Such an analysis is the work of this chapter.

"Pied Beauty," one of Gerard Manley Hopkins' best-known poems, was written, according to his friend Robert
Bridges,\(^1\) in the summer of 1877, while the poet was a student at St. Beuno's, Tremeirchion, Wales, and shortly before his ordination to the priesthood on 23 September 1877. Its provenance is listed by Bridges as "Autograph in A. - B agrees."\(^2\) Again, according to Bridges, Hopkins himself had described the poem as a curtail sonnet written in sprung paeonic rhythm.

While it is not the work of this dissertation to enlarge upon the form and/or meter of the poems, this sonnet is the capstone, as it were, of my theory, and some explanation will not be out of place at this point.

\(^1\)Hopkins, Poems, p. 269.

\(^2\)The following passage from the original Preface to Notes of Robert Bridges' first edition of the poems (1918), is quoted in Gardner and MacKenzie, pp. 232, 233, and will serve to explain the reference:

The sources are four, and will be distinguished as A, B, D, and H, as here described.

A is my own collection, a MS book made up of autographs -- by which word I denote poems in the author's handwriting -- pasted into it as they were received from him, and also of contemporary copies of other poems. These autographs and copies date from '67 to '89, the year of his death . . . .

B is a MS book into which, in '83, I copied from A certain poems of which the author had kept no copy. He was remiss in making fair copies of his work, and his autograph of The Deutschland having been (seemingly) lost, I copied that poem and others from A at his request. After that date he entered more poems in this book as he completed them, and he also made both corrections of copy and emendations of the poems which had been copied into it by me. Thus, if a poem occurs in both A and B, then B is the later, and, except for overlooked errors of copyist, the better authority.
Hopkins' own description of a curtal sonnet occurs in his preface to the poems collected by Bridges as MS book B:

Nos. 13 and 22 [in the First Edition] are Curtal Sonnets, that is they are constructed in proportions resembling those of the sonnet proper, namely 6+4 instead of 8+6, with however a halfline tailpiece (so that the equation is rather 12/2+9/2 = 21/2 = 10 1/2).  

As for Hopkins' peculiar descriptions for rhythm, there are numerous explanations available to the reader. Paul Mariani, in his commentary, puts forth an interesting theory regarding the development of Hopkins' meters: "Hopkins was, then, consciously working toward a new metric which would free his rhetoric." According to Mariani, "Pied Beauty," with its "sprung paemonic rhythm," represents an intermediate step towards this objective.

I have said that "Pied Beauty" is the most complete single statement we have of the poet's view of the world as variegated. If this is the case, then it must be to this particular sonnet that we turn to discover precisely what a dappled world would be. In other words, the extent of piedness in the world, as Hopkins sees it, will be limited by the language and the concepts he utilizes in this sonnet, his specific statement about that piedness. Thus, the poem

3Hopkins, Poems, p. 49.
5Ibid., p. 88.
falls, for the purpose of my analysis, quite naturally into two segments, or divisions: language and content.

The language itself may be further subdivided according to usage into those words which of themselves express variegation: "dappled," "couple-colour," "brinded," "stipple," and "freckled;" and those which are not ordinarily understood as acting in such a capacity or whose force as dapple imagery comes about through their pairings as contraries: "counter," "original," "spare," "strange," "fickle," "swift," "slow," "sweet," "sour," "adazzle," "dim." In addition, we have certain expressions which describe objects or actions which are themselves examples of variegation: "fresh-fire-coal chestnut-falls," "finches' wings." Another category comprises nouns not of themselves indicating variegation, but followed by expressions modifying them as variegated: "landscape plotted and pieced" and "trades, their gear and tackle and trim." The following schema will serve as a structure for our discussion of Hopkins' language in this sonnet.

The language of "Pied Beauty" (do with the notion of variegation (1))
(Single words whose definitions have to (pied (dappled (couple-colour (brinded (stipple (freckled (swift, slow (sweet, sour (adazzle, dim (fresh-fire-coal (chestnut-falls (finches' wings) Expressions (3))

}
The language of "Pied Beauty"

(Single words not normally associated with variegation (4)

(Words modified to indicate variegation (5)

(counter

(original

(spare

(strange

(fickle

(landscape, plotted and pieced

(trades, their gear and tackle and trim

My source for definitions will continue to be the Oxford English Dictionary, a work which was in progress during the course of Hopkins' lifetime. I do not intend to present definitions of every word, particularly of those which are themselves words indicating variegation. It does seem, however, that the principal words indicating variegation, words used to show variety in the world, should be defined. By principal, I do not mean necessarily those words which of themselves most precisely mean variegation, but, rather, those words most associated with Hopkins as indicative of variety, i.e., pied and its forms and dapple and its forms. The title of the sonnet is one of the best-known of the poet's titles, and certainly even readers least exposed to Hopkins' works can say something about a "dapple dawn-drawn falcon." These two words, then, must be defined.

The root word, the most basic word, is one which the poet himself never used, but which I have used frequently in this discussion, variegation. If dapple and pied and all the other words of this ilk are used to mean some form of variegation, then for the sake of completeness this word
should be defined and should stand as the foundation of our discussion.

According to the OED, the noun has two meanings:

1. The condition or quality of being variegated or varied in colour; diversity of colour or the production of this; spec. in Bot., the presence of two or more colours in the leaves, petals, or other parts of plants; also, defective or special development leading to such colouring.

2. The action or process of diversifying or rendering varied in character; an instance or occasion of this.

Variegated is in turn defined:

1. Marked with patches or spots of different colours; varied in colour; of diverse or various colours; many-coloured, vari-coloured . . . .

2. Marked or characterized by variety; of a varied character, form or nature; diverse.

3. Varied or diversified (in colour, appearance, etc.) with something.

4. Characterized by variegation (of colour).

5. Produced by variation; variant.

It is important to note especially meaning no. 2 of the past participle, since I maintain that Hopkins' delineation of variety in general and in particular in "Pied Beauty" includes much more than a variety in color, or simply physical variation. It is this second meaning which justifies my own use of the word variegation to express Hopkins' ideas.

Dappled is defined as "Marked with roundish spots, patches, or blotches of a different colour or shade; spotted,
Pied is parti-coloured; originally, black and white like a magpie; hence, of any two colours, esp. of white blotched with another colour; also, of three or more colours in patches or blotches. Also, wearing a parti-coloured dress.

This is, of course, the most commonly understood definition of pied and is the one which applies to Hopkins' use in the sonnet. There is, however, and particularly in view of the Jesuit poet's lifelong fascination with language, a stratum of meaning in the word which should be noted.

An historical meaning of pie, pye as a substantive is:

1. A collection of rules, adopted in the pre-Reformation Church, to show how to deal (under each of the 35 possible variations in the date of Easter) with the concurrence of more than one office on the same day, accurately indicating the manner of commemorating, or of putting off till another time, the Saints' days, etc. occurring in the ever-changing times of Lent, Easter, Whitsuntide, and the Octave of Trinity.

6It may be of interest to quote in full the introduction to the definition of the sb. dapple: "Unless this is the first element in dapple-grey (q.v.), it is not known until late in the 16th c., being preceded somewhat by example of the adj. of the same form, and followed by those of the vb. in the simple tenses; the (?) ppl.) adj. dappled however appears two centuries earlier. The mutual relation of these and the derivative and etymological development of the whole group are, from the want of data, still uncertain. The primary meaning of dappled was 'spotted, specked, blotched', which might arise either from a vb. 'to spot' or a sb. = 'spot, blotch.' A possible connexion is the Icel. depill (found in 13th c.) 'spot, dot'; according to Vigfusson 'a dog with spots over the eyes is also called depill.' This is app. a dim. of dapi pool: cf. mod. Norw. dape, depel muddy pool, pond, dub; MLG dope, dobbe. Thus dapple might perhaps originally mean a 'splash', and, hence, a small blotch or speck of colour."
These "ever-changing times" and "35 possible variations" may very well be more integral to the notion of piedness than one would at first think them to be. For another definition of pie is "a mass of type mingled indiscriminately or in confusion, such as results from the breaking down of a forme of type." It is a short step from this definition to its transferred meaning as "a disintegrated and confused mass: a jumble, medley, confusion, chaos; a 'mess.'" And then we learn that:

Origin [of pie] obscure: supposed by some to be a transferred use of PIE sb., 2 in reference to its miscellaneous contents; others think of PIE sb., 3 [i.e., the definition given above: "A collection of rules, etc."], and the unreadable aspect of a page of the pie.

Thus, if we take pied as related to pie, 7 and one meaning of pie (in a transferred sense) is "a disintegrated and confused mass," then we shall approach the principal thrust of this dissertation: Hopkins' use of dapple imagery to exemplify his concept of instress. For if, even by extension, pied can mean not only "parti-coloured" but "dis-integrated, jumbled," then a dapple imagery is admirably suited to stand for the mass of contraries held together, held in existence by the tension of instress. This hypothesis is not far off the mark, as I hope to show in the argumentation of my thesis.

It is obvious from a glance at the schema that

7As it most certainly is, at least to the first listing of pie as a substantive: "Applied to a pied or parti-coloured animal . . . ."
another division might have been made, using as a fundament the difference between the concrete and the abstract. Thus, there are words and expressions which of themselves denote concrete, or material, realities. These words and expressions can be conceived of only by analogy as relating to anything beyond physical reality. On the other hand, there are words which can apply without extension to the realm of the abstract, or the purely non-physical. I shall, of course, consider both of these categories; but I wish to point out especially at this stage of the discussion that these elements are present, i.e., language is used in such a way - properly - as to indicate the pied nature of the non-physical world. This is an important point to keep in mind, particularly in relation to the comments made earlier where I have noted the connection between pied as a description of physical nature and its possible meaning (no. 2 in the OED) as referring to variation in "character, form, or nature." I do not intend to base my study of non-physical variegation on this connection primarily and want to be clear that the stronger basis for the theory is in the use of language which is more properly descriptive of variety in "character, form, or nature." This being said, we may now move on to the consideration of language in the sonnet as it depicts physical variegation. This will include words in groups one, two, three and five in the schema.

The remaining words of group one, it seems to me,
are obvious in their applications to the notion of variegation. "Couple-colour" is self-explanatory judged against our definition of variegation; "stipple" and "freckled" are themselves by definition descriptive of dappling. A word may be said here about brinded. Gardner and MacKenzie gloss it as an "early form of 'brindled,' streaked."8 The OED gives as a definition, after listing it as an archaic word: "Of a tawny or brownish colour, marked with bars or streaks of a different hue; also gen. streaked, spotted; brindled."

The entire consideration of the second group of words, the paired words, depends upon this very fact of their pairing. Taken individually, without the contrasting force which appears once they are played off one against the other, the words are indicative of variety only by implication. For example, if I say there is sweetness in this apple ("This apple is sweet"), it is only implied that there could be sourness. The mind of the hearer must make this connection before any element of variety enters. It is only when one adverts to the possibility that the apple might as easily have been sour that one then also adverts to the possible variety in the apple. From here, one may as easily move on to the consideration of all the other possibilities: color, size, shape, etc.

Admittedly, this is a wide-ranging application of the notion of dappling, i.e., where the various possibilities

8Hopkins, Poems, p. 269.
of arrangement of accidentia are considered analogous to, say, the actual colors in a multi-colored object. However, and this is of paramount importance, Hopkins means to take this view, for he has consciously arranged pairs of contraries in such a way as to accentuate the existence of these possibilities, and he has done so in a poem entitled "Pied Beauty."

Contraries are accidents which cannot exist at the same time in a substance, e.g., an apple cannot be green and red at the same time, nor sweet and sour at the same time. Bittersweet flavor and tartness, the apparent presence of bitter/sweet/sour at the same time is only that: the apparent presence. The flavors are so parallel as to seem intermingled. The gustatory organs, however, register only one flavor at a time. They are so closely run together as to seem simultaneous. The explanation for this is that contraries may have a medium or scale through which one contrary runs to another. For example, the apple in turning from green to red moves through a spectrum of colors or shades before it reaches its terminus.

The third group consists of two expressions which describe things which are themselves variegated in some way. "Finches' wings" presents no difficulty, since it simply calls to the reader's mind the fact that the wings of finches are colored in such a way as to be dappled, or pied in appearance. "Fresh-firecoal chestnut-falls" requires some
In a journal entry for 17 September 1868, Hopkins records the following: "Fine. -- Chestnuts as bright as coals or spots of vermilion." Now, there is no contrast in the portrayal of chestnuts as resembling coals or vermilion spots. The key to the problem is in the words "Fire-coal" and "-falls." According to the OED, the combination form firecoal is attributive. And it has the general sense of the third definition for the noun fire: "Fuel in a state of combustion; a mass of burning material, e.g., on a hearth or altar, in a burning furnace, etc." -falls here is part of the noun "chestnut" and the whole forms a combination word, still a noun, which is the name of an action completed, i.e., the action of burning chestnuts which, like burning coals, have disintegrated. The affinity between this image and the similar one in the Windhover poem is only apparent.

In the line from this poem, which he regarded so highly ("I shall shortly send you an amended copy of The Windhover: the amendment only touches a single line, I think, but as this is the best thing I ever wrote I should like you to have it in its best form."), Hopkins is not concerned with the same purpose as he is in "Pied Beauty," despite the parallel nature of the imagery.

9Hopkins, Journals, p. 189.
10Hopkins, Letters, p. 85.
In the line "and blue-bleak embers, ah my dear,/ Fall, gall themselves, and gash gold-vermilion" Hopkins is using an image to parallel the Resurrection. In the lines just previous to this final image, he has described how the plow, buried in the clods of earth ("sillion") comes up shining. Now, in the closing lines, he packs on another image: the embers, apparently dead ("blue-bleak") fall into the grate and in their falling shatter ("gash") themselves and we see that the embers are not dead, but having broken themselves open ("gall" and "gash"), they spring to life. All the action is in verbs: fall, gall, gash. It is the life still in the seemingly dead embers which is important as an image of Christ's own Resurrection.

By contrast, the operative language of "Fresh-fire-coal chestnut-falls" is entirely nominal. It is the end result of chestnuts, glowing like live coals, having fallen, having burst, now lying on the grate or grill. They are a collection of contrasts: the darkened hulls, the split kernels displaying their light interiors, etc.

Group four is distinguished by virtue of the fact that, like the language of the second group, they would, used alone, indicate variegation only by implication. That is, the mind of the hearer or reader would have to work to a notion of the land as variegated, or of trades as variegated. Obviously, we can all recall examples of landscape which are striking because of the very variety of colors and textures
represented. But, we do not ordinarily advert to such. Even less do we do so in relation to trades, which image, even here and although modified to assist us, presents a problem which we shall attempt to solve, the solution revolving about our understanding of the (apparently) more obvious image of the landscape.

Hopkins makes certain that the pied nature of the landscape comes home to us by using the expression "plotted and pieced" as a modifying element.

At first glance, the simple definitions of plotted would appear to satisfy any demands on this word:

1. Planned, premeditated, pre-arranged by plot. 2. Laid down or delineated on or in a plan or chart. 3. Constructed or furnished with a plot.

However, let us compare these definitions with those of pieced: "1. Composed or made up of pieces joined together. 2. Mended, patched, made up." The conclusion to be drawn seems obvious enough, namely, that Hopkins refers to a landscape made up of pieces joined in some kind of a plan, "laid down or delineated on or in a plan or chart." But, if this is so, then neither of these adjectives serves to offer contrast, properly speaking. Suppose a field made up of pieces (of land) neatly arranged in some kind of pattern. Where is the variety we expect in "Pied Beauty"? We must look somewhat closer for the answer.

The word plot is defined as a substantive: "A small portion of any surface (e.g., of the skin, a garment) differing in character or aspect from the rest of the surface; a
patch, spot, mark." This is an obsolete usage (although the most recent occurrence is listed as 1834, only forty-three years before Hopkins wrote his sonnet) and I will not argue that Hopkins is using the word **strictly** in this sense. The fact, however, that the word **can** mean "a . . . portion of any surface . . . differing in character or aspect from the rest" justifies the consideration that it may possibly be the case that Hopkins consciously uses it in this sense. There can be no doubt that he is talking about landscape that is in some way variegated. Given the title of the poem, this fact can hardly be denied. And if he is using it in this sense, then "plotted and pieced" means "composed of pieces" (**pieced**) which are, at least some of them, pieces which differ in "character and aspect from the rest." Thus, plotted here would mean constructed of plots, composed or made up of plots.  

The point of this line of argumentation is simply this: if there is no distinction among the "pieces" which are "plotted," then where is the variegation? And if there

11 However far-fetched this at first may seem, we might well call to mind Hopkins' background, particularly in relation to his interest in the use and development of the English language. Two of the examples given in the OED of the use of *plot* in this sense are from authors with whom Hopkins was most certainly familiar, namely, Langland and Lyly: (1377) Langland P.Pi. B xiii 275-76 "He hadde a cote of cryst-endome . . . Ac it was moled in many places with many sondri plottes, Of pruyde here a plotte, and there a plotte of un-boxome speche." (1583) Lyly Epist. in T. Watson *Centurie of Loue* (Arb.) 29, "I could finde nothing but . . . loose stringes, where I tyed hard knots: and a table of steele, where I framed a plot of wax."

is no variegation, then what happens to "landscape plotted and pieced" as an image of "pied beauty"? My point is that if we do not interpret it this way, then we have only one option: uniformly same sections of landscape pieced and plotted and allowing of no readily identifiable differences are pied simply because the landscape consists of different things. The ramifications of this interpretation are far-ranging, but not, I believe, inconsistent with Hopkins' view of the world. The world itself is dappled; the very fact of two things only numerically distinct is sufficient to justify this conclusion. But, we shall see more of this later.

Whatever we accept about the landscape figure, the next one to be considered seems to me to offer but one interpretation.

The key words are gear, tackle, and trim. The fifth definition of gear as a substantive is: "Apparatus generally; appliances, implements, tackle, tools." Tackle is: "Apparatus, utensils, instruments, implements, appliances; equipment, furniture, gear." The definition of trim seems narrower than for the preceding words, but has basically the same application. The third definition for trim as a substantive is: "Adornment, array; equipment, outfit; dress: usually in reference to style or appearance; hence sometimes nearly=guise, aspect."

There does not seem to me to be any way to interpret these modifiers as indicative of piedness except by defining
piedness in the very widest sense as variegation by reason of difference in things, i.e., as numerical difference. Thus, a trade is an example of pied beauty simply because it uses different tools, or equipment, as well as in the fact that one trade is not another. This is a far cry from the common understanding of the word pied. A calico pony is one entity which is parti-colored, thus dappled. But what is a trade? For Hopkins, apparently, the trade is one unit whose piedness is exemplified in all the equipment which is a part of it. Again, we are right up against Hopkins' worldview.

I have said that our understanding of this second image revolves about the interpretation we make of the landscape image. Perhaps, this relationship may be seen with greater clarity if we work backwards from the trade image. We can justify the interpretation of the landscape image as one dependent upon an understanding of piedness as including numerical distinction, and oppose its interpretation as an image using an obsolete definition of plot on the grounds that the only interpretation of trades as an image is one based on numerical distinction. Thus, we can argue that if Hopkins accepts this wider interpretation of piedness in one instance, he will accept it in another. And the apparently less obvious image of the trades figure becomes in actuality more precisely delineated than its immediate predecessor.

Group four leads us into the second area of the
division of language according to the concrete and abstract. Here we shall meet words whose normal association is far from anything related to dappling or to piedness. And yet we have been prepared for it, for we have seen the gradual progression of levels of definition from the more obvious to the less obvious. And so the jump now from the concrete to language which just as easily encompasses the abstract should not be too much of a shock to our critical sensibilities.

We must consider by definition each of the words of group four, keeping in view at the same time that we are consciously seeking definitions which fit a conclusion already arrived at. We are not attempting to show that the language of the fourth group (or for that matter, any of the groups we have so far considered) is illustrative of pied concepts. We know this as a fact from their presence in a poem entitled "Pied Beauty." The problem is to attempt to show how the language fulfills the promise of the title.

The first thing to note is that all of the words in this group are adjectives. Thus, all of the following definitions are of the adjectival forms of the words. Counter is listed as "acting in opposition; lying or tending in the opposite direction; having an opposite tendency, to the opposite effect; opposed, opposite." The following information, which is relative to our present discussion, precedes the description of counter as a prefix:
Counter has thus become a living element of the language, capable of entering into new combinations even with words of Teutonic origin. It may be prefixed, when required, to almost any substantive expressing action, as motion, counter-motion, current, counter-current, or even to any word in which action or incidence is imputed, as measure, counter-measure, poison, counter-poison. Hence it is often viewed as an independent element, written separately, and practically treated as an adjective.

Original. The following definition is listed in the OED as rare: "A thing of singular or unique character; a specimen or example of originality." However, a more common definition is:

Having the quality of that which proceeds from oneself, or from the direct exercise of one's own faculties, without imitation of or dependence on others; such as has not been done or produced before; novel or fresh in character or in style.

The word spare presents problems of its own, and, it seems to me, cannot be understood out of its particular context in the poem. I shall, for the sake of completeness, give all of its definitions.

1. Not in actual or regular use at the time spoken of, but carried, held, or kept in reserve for future use or to supply an emergency; esp. Naut. (see quot. 1769); additional, extra.

2. That can be spared, dispensed with, or given away, as being in excess of actual requirements; superfluous.

3. Of speech: Sparing; marked by reticence or reserve.

4. Of persons, their limits, etc.: Having little flesh; not fat or plump; lean, thin.

5. Of persons: Sparing, temperate, or moderate of or in something, esp. diet or speech.

6. Characterized by meanness, bareness, economy, or frugality, esp. in regard to food.
There are sixteen definitions given for the adjective strange, and it would serve no useful purpose to list all of them here. Consequently, I shall include only those which are necessary for a discussion of the usage, adding the numbers as they are given in the OED.

7. Unknown, unfamiliar; not known, met with, or experienced before.

8. Of a kind that is unfamiliar or rare; unusual, uncommon, exceptional, singular, out of the way.

10. Unfamiliar, abnormal, or exceptional to a degree that excites wonder or astonishment; difficult to take in or account for; queer, surprising, unaccountable.

Fickle: "1. False, deceitful, treacherous. 2. Changeable, changeable, inconsistent, uncertain, unreliable."

These definitions are the raw material with which an analysis must be made. It is easy to see, however, that the definitions taken alone will never supply the conclusions. More than any of the rest of the language used in the sonnet, these require the support of context.

We begin with the assumption already pointed out: the poem has to do with pied beauty; therefore, the images and the language will in some way contribute to an understanding of what piedness is, if not in the reader's mind, at the very least in the poet's.

How, then, does a word like counter contribute to such an understanding? It is at this point that Hopkins enters into the area of implication, at least in the sense that for the imagery of counter, original, spare, etc., the reader
must engage himself to a greater degree than with the other images. We have seen how the necessity of implying was solved in the pairs of opposing words. Rather than insist that the reader deduce from *swift* its contrary *slow*, Hopkins put both words, pairing the opposition very neatly and explicitly. We are dealing now with a group of words which do not have such assistance. The reader is now, more than ever, an active element in the poet-poem-reader relationship.

I have noted the definition of *counter* as "having an opposite tendency . . . opposed, opposite." And the *OED* points out that this association is so intimate that the word "is often viewed [not as a prefix, but] as an independent element, written separately, and practically treated as an adjective."

Now, if this is the case, then the word itself will trigger in the mind of the reader an awareness of some kind of opposition. What is *counter* is *counter to something*. And it is not necessary to know *what* in order to appreciate the figure. *Counter*, then, must be understood in the same sense as I have explained earlier the use of the paired words, save that now the notion of contrary opposition as exemplifying piedness is implied rather than explicit.

*Original* does not lend itself to interpretation quite so readily, nor can it be taken in the sense of contrast. It is, however, related to the two following words, i.e., *spare, strange*, as I shall attempt to note.
The fact that these words do not lend themselves to interpretation as elements in pairs of opposition, or in pairs of contraries, does not preclude our understanding of them as in some way indicative of opposition. Because whatever is different is in some sense opposed to all those things from which it differs. Thus, when we note in the definition of original the expression "novel or fresh in character or style," we have immediately identified an opposition between whatever has these characteristics and everything that is not "novel or fresh in character or style."

The most difficult, perhaps, of the three words, is spare, since there seems to be no single one of the six definitions which will provide us with a starting-point. However, an overall view, a kind of penetration to the character of the word, will give us an insight into its possible meaning for Hopkins.

There are two categories of meaning into which the definitions appear to fall. The first two delimit the word as meaning something kept in reserve or as something besides. The last four are more concerned with the notion of spare "without excess." In one sense, the first two look at spare as naming some thing or quality which is superfluous, while the final four tend more to deny superfluity to whatever is described as spare. And it is among these final four that I think we shall locate the meaning which applies to the word as Hopkins uses it.
Ranging through these four definitions, we find the following characteristics: reticence, reserve, lean, thin, temperate, moderate, bareness, economy, frugality. Thus, whatever is spare is opposed in its simplicity to all that is superfluous. And, again, we find the opposition necessary to piedness.

We find the same elements in the word strange. What is strange is "rare; unusual, uncommon, exceptional, singular, out of the way." It is "exceptional to a degree that excites wonder or astonishment." And therefore, it sets itself apart from what is ordinary, what does not excite "wonder or astonishment." And seen against such a prosaic background it is like one color set against a background of another. And this is pied beauty!

The final word in this group is at the same time the most difficult to justify and one of the most important in my interpretation of what Hopkins understood by piedness. Obviously, we may dismiss the first definition. This leaves us with "changeable, changeful, inconstant, uncertain, unreliable." None of these seems to fit with any degree of acceptability. And yet the word is well-chosen. And an example from the purely physical will illustrate this statement.

In late twilight, just before the sun sets, the shadows cast by a heavily-leaved tree, combined with a gentle breeze, will, because of the breeze and the rapidly setting
sun, change their forms in quick succession. These sha­dows are "changeable, changeful, inconstant, uncertain, un­reliable." In a word, they are fickle. And yet the pat­terns of the shadows on the ground are a contrast, a kind of dappling, or piedness.

I have considered in some detail the language of the sonnet, and some statement synthesizing the poet's con­cept of piedness is in order. Before this, however, a sum­mary of the analysis is in order.

We have seen that Hopkins uses language at several levels:

(1) he uses words which, by their very definitions, re­fer to variegation (pied, dappled, etc.);

(2) he uses words which describe variegated objects (chestnut-falls, finches' wings);

(3) he uses words in pairs to indicate variegation by contrary opposition (swift, slow; sweet, sour, etc.);

(4) he uses words which do not by definition refer to variegation but which are made to do so by modifi­cation (landscape, trades);

(5) and, finally, he uses words which must be inter­preted in context to refer to variegation (counter, original, spare, etc.).

There is, then, a very clear and easily detectable hierarchy of progression in the language and the imagery uti­lized in the poem, a movement from the more readily to the
less readily grasped description of variegation.

Now, I should like to digress for awhile, a digression not outside the scope of the treatment so far applied to "Pied Beauty."

The question of a progression of images as a poetic device has not, at least in my opinion, been given the critical attention it deserves. I suppose that poets, or at least some of them, would be among the loudest disclaimers of any assertion that poetry is discursive rather than intuitive. Nonetheless, whatever poetry may be, the human mind is far more discursive than it is intuitive. And by discursive, I mean, at the very least, that it moves from opinion to opinion, fact to fact, until, hopefully, it rests in an acceptable conclusion.

That Hopkins consciously practices such a "discursive" approach to his poetry seems to me to be a legitimate conclusion. I have identified such a procedure in the images and the language of "Pied Beauty" and I shall, in this digression, attempt to support the larger contention that it is a part of the poet's methodology.

In May of the same year in which Hopkins wrote "Pied Beauty," he completed his most famous poem and the one which he seems himself to have considered his masterpiece, "The Windhover." Because I shall consider it at length, I take the liberty of quoting it in full.

\[12\text{Cf. note 10.}\]
I caught this morning morning's minion, kingdom of daylight's dauphin, dapple-dawn-drawn Falcon, in his riding
Of the rolling level underneath him steady air, and/
striding
High there, how he rung upon the rein of a wimpling wing
In his ecstasy! then off, off forth on swing,
As a skate's heel sweeps smooth on a bow-bend: the/
hurl and/gliding
Rebuffed the big wind. My heart in hiding
Stirred for a bird, -- the achieve of, the mastery of/
the thing!

Brute beauty and valour and act, oh, air, pride, plume,/ here
Buckle! AND the fire that breaks from thee then, a/
billion
Times told lovelier, more dangerous, O my chevalier!

No wonder of it: sheer plod makes plough down sillion
Shine, and blue-bleak embers, ah my dear,
Fall, gall themselves, and gash gold-vermilion.

In this poem, Hopkins makes use of three images as representative of the redemptive action of Christ: the buckling falcon, the buried plow, and the falling embers. These images are progressive, in my opinion, and designedly so, since they exemplify the poet's discourse with himself from the moment he is first attracted by the sight of the falcon's "riding/Of the rolling level underneath him steady air."

He first sees the beauty of the bird and its effortless grace. From this point he is led to compare the bird to Christ. He then sees the falcon dive upon its prey. It appears to "buckle," to collapse. Here is a perfectly reasonable description of the impression one receives: the bird circles gracefully, then suddenly, upon sighting its prey,
folds its wings and plummets towards the unsuspecting victim. This maneuver of the falcon looks very much like the act of "collapsing," or "buckling," so the word is well-chosen. To all appearances, the bird is in the act of self-destruction. Its flight is halted abruptly, not by alighting, but by falling. But this is the very moment when it is "more dangerous," since it is in this act that it achieves the conquest of its quarry. So Christ, in the very act of his buckling, his death upon the cross, when to all the world he is a failure, is "more dangerous." The falcon may be paralleled with the hound in Thompson's famous poem. And in this act of self-immolation on the cross, Christ achieves the conquest of his quarry, the human soul. However, the fact that the falcon only appears to engage in an act of self-sacrifice is the very reason the image falls short and so the poet progresses to the next figure.

By now, Hopkins is completely concerned with Christ. The falcon has served its purpose, and that has been to introduce the poet to his meditation. The plow "shines," or perfects itself, accomplishes its goal, only by burying itself, an act reminiscent of both self-sacrifice and of Our Lord's burial in the tomb. Once again, however, the image is not quite sufficient. For while the plow comes closer to self-immolation than does the bird (the plow must actually bury itself in the ground to achieve its goal), it is still not the perfect image, since the plow does not go through a
change-in-itself. It buries itself and then is "resurrected" shining, but it has not undergone any change.

The blue-bleak embers, on the other hand, provide the perfect image. They are dark and unattractive, drawing no attention and accomplishing nothing until they fall and burst open. In this act of dying, they suddenly come to life. They fall and splash about, creating new fire where the disintegrating parts fall.

The plow buried itself and returned to the surface a shining instrument by virtue of its act. But it was still the same plow. The embers "fall, gall themselves, and gash gold-vermilion" and in that act not only give forth heat and light and beauty, but are themselves changed. The original embers have torn themselves apart. Yet, they have not destroyed themselves; rather, they appear now under a new aspect. Their death is a birth. Thus, they encompass as an image not only the death of Christ, but his Resurrection as well. And the progression is complete, from the buckling falcon to the buried plow to the gashed embers.

Now, the question arises as to the legitimacy of, or even more precisely, the necessity of such progression. Does the effect of the imagery stop with each image in the mind of the reader, and, a fortiori in the mind of the poet who wrote it? That is to say, are we as readers simply drawn to an appreciation of the cleverness of the juxtaposition of falcon, plow, embers, and Christ, or do we register an insight
which was not present before? Is our appreciation of Christ's act richer by virtue of its further delineation in the images of the poem? How does the progressive nature of the imagery affect the reader?

In the first place, it gives him an opportunity to adjust the pace of his comprehension. We have seen in "The Windhover" how each image, as it reaches only a certain level of exposition of the concept, that is, as it fulfills in a partial manner only the requirement of the comparison the poet intends, is abandoned and the poet moves on to another image. With each step he comes closer to the construction of an analogy which will express in its entirety the idea. The mind of the reader, then, is not overwhelmed with an intuition suddenly presented.

Thus, the progressive nature of the images provides the reader with a gradual unfolding of what the poet wants to say, a gradual presentation which is entirely consistent with the meditative nature of the poem.

Before we move to a consideration of the second effect of progressive imagery, we may profitably take a look at the nature of the image or metaphor, since I have placed such emphasis on the progression of these figures, and also because some of the conclusions which I shall draw eventually in relation to "Pied Beauty" will hinge upon such an understanding.

I shall begin with what, for want of a better word,
may be called the traditional, or classical, theory of metaphor and simile. It is important to note that simile is another kind of metaphor, in some sense a "weaker" form. Thus, what is said of metaphor is said mutatis mutandis, of simile. This theory is a legacy of the philosophers. Their approach to the subject was more by way of completeness than of interest. That is to say, in the study of analogy, which is of great importance to philosophy, metaphor forms a small part. Therefore, for the sake of a complete coverage, if for no other reason, it was necessary to consider it. As a result of this,

the traditional theory noticed only a few of the modes of metaphor; and limited its application of the term metaphor to a few of these only. And thereby it made metaphor seem to be a verbal matter, a shifting and displacement of words, whereas fundamentally it is a borrowing between and intercourse of thoughts, a trans-action between contexts.13

What, then, constitutes this traditional theory? If, for the sake of brevity, we turn to the simplified definition of the average literary textbook, we shall arrive immediately at the focal point of the discussion. Analogy is the comparison of unlike but related things or ideas. (In the simplest of terms, then, metaphor will make this comparison without syncategorematic elements, by an attribution of the predicate to the subject; simile makes the comparison by using as or like.) More specifically, we may divide analogy according to

to the traditional school in the following manner:

\[
(\text{attribution})
\]

\[
(\text{proportionality})
\]

\[
(\text{proper})
\]

\[
(\text{improper})
\]

In this discussion, we shall be concerned with the analogy of improper proportionality, which is what scholastic philosophers call metaphor. (A complete explanation of the schema may be found in any one of a number of standard texts.)

In the traditional presentation, there are three elements, the two disparate terms and the relationship between them. Thus, there are in all cases at least three things to be considered: the primary analogate, the secondary analogate, and whatever quality there is in one which permits the other to be likened to it. For a very elementary analysis, let us look at the simple example, "He is a lion in battle." The reason a human being can be called a lion stems from the fact that there is some "thing" (quality) which this man and a lion share in common, namely, a certain way of acting under certain conditions. But this activity, when observed in the man, is so great that he can be compared only to a wild beast. Hence, he is said to be such. Now, the very fact that his conduct in battle is such that

\[14\text{There are a number of manuals available. One of the standard scholastic treatments is that of Joseph Gredt, O.S.B. R. J. Kreyche covers the subject sufficiently in his First Philosophy. See the bibliography for these works.}\]
we are reminded of a wild beast is an indication that this ferocity is not really what we might expect in a human being. It is, in other words, more proper to the animal. For this reason, we refer to the lion as the primary analogate, since that quality which establishes the relationship between man and lion, that which allows us to refer to the man as a lion, is properly in the lion and not in the man. Therefore, the term man is called the secondary analogate. Obviously, the first thing to be noted here is that, since this quality of ferocity does not exist in the same manner in the lion as in the man, we must have a clear understanding of what it is like in the lion before we can apply it to the man, that is, before we can say the man acts as a lion acts. This is important to realize because it accentuates the fact that the quality of ferocity cannot be said formally of both analogates. Thus, the transferred sense of the quality of ferocity finds its foundation not on a resemblance of natures but on a purely fictitious resemblance between the action of the lion and the action of the man.

Modern theory, as exemplified in such critics as I. A. Richards, emphasizes the effectiveness of figurative imagery.

It [metaphor] is the supreme agent by which disparate and hitherto unconnected things are brought together in poetry for the sake of the effects upon attitude and impulse which spring from this collocation and from the combination which the mind then establishes
between them. There are few metaphors whose effect, if carefully examined, can be traced to the logical relations involved.15 (Italics mine)

It is in the final sentence that Richards puts his finger on the problem. There is more to the metaphor than the bare bones of its component parts: "Metaphor is a semi-surreptitious method by which a greater variety of elements can be wrought into the fabric of experience."16

The question is most obviously one of the breadth of metaphor. George Whalley, writing in the Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, has this observation to make regarding the analytical approach of the traditional school:

Although analysis by resemblance may be suitable for analysing resemblances it is inadequate - even irrelevant - in most of these cases if we take into account not merely some notion of semantic equivalence but the actual sensation these metaphors induce.17

We are immediately taken out of the field of the logician and of the language analyst, and into the arena of the poet. The concern is with the "actual sensation these metaphors induce," and it seems to me that this phrase is coincident with the one from Richards about metaphor as that by which "a greater variety of elements can be wrought into the fabric of experience." The contemporary theorist seeks

16Ibid.
an overall effect rather than simply a "prettifying" phrase. Thus, for the present day theorist, the conjunction of the elements of the metaphor represents some new thing, some new concept or cognitive fraction.

If this is so, then how does more come out of the metaphor than goes into it? Why is my description of someone as "lion in battle" more vivid and more perceptive than my simply saying that he "fights very fiercely"? This may appear on the surface to be a somewhat superficial question; but the answer to it is just precisely what we are seeking. What is it that makes Richards and many others uncomfortable with the parts-analysis approach of traditional theoreticians if it is not the very fact that it seems to them that the analysis fails to come to grips with this question?

But is it, after all, a fact that the metaphor exceeds in its totality and in some mysterious manner the sum of the potentiality of its integral parts?

The answer, of course, is yes, it does. The imagery brings about this effect because in the case of the individual metaphors the union of the disparate elements based on a shared quality allows for a sufficient number of nuances. And this is the crux of the entire discussion, or so it seems to me. If the metaphor is to be something more than the sum of its parts, the only possible way it can accomplish this is to present somehow a concept upon which the mind can work. I mean that the mind will be able to perceive notions that
are peripheral to the ideas represented by the separate parts of the metaphor. And it is only from a combination of the elements that the mind can extract these nuances. Taken individually, the parts of the metaphor are not susceptible to the manifold variants the mind draws once the union of the parts is effected. To give a more precise example: my understanding of the ferocity of the lion and the anger of the man is that they are distinct and quite different in quality. But, once I have made a connection between man and lion as exemplified in the man's activity in battle, my mind no longer sees the man's activity as distinct from that of the lion as to its quality in this particular instance, i.e., the man in battle. So, the characteristics of the man as angry are absorbed into my understanding of the lion's ferocity. The characteristics of the man are absorbed, but enlarged upon. I see the man under a quite different aspect. I do not see him angry in a way normal to man and yet I recognize that the ferocity he possesses under certain conditions and in certain circumstances is still not properly and really the same as that of the lion. My understanding of the man's reaction in battle, then, is not exactly the same as my understanding of anger in man or of ferocity in animals. It is something distinct, yet composed. Granted, it is an attribution made from the standpoint of a fictional quality; but once that transference is made, then the mind goes to work on all its
possibilities: man functioning not as a rational being but enveloped in emotion, etc.

Let us return to the nuances presented in the "Windhover" images. Having established the progressive nature of the imagery, I may go one step further and take a closer look at the images as collective rather than as progressive. Taken collectively, they represent the comparison of natures animate and inanimate in a wide range of possibilities. Thus, in the poet's likening of Christ's activity to that of creatures, he manages to be fairly inclusive. Christ as man represents humanity; the falcon represents the brute world; the falling embers represent the inanimate world as existing naturally, and the plow represents the inanimate world as artificial, or manmade. The poem encompasses in its imagery the world as living and non-living, as natural and as artificial. And Christ came to redeem the world. And is not my ability to see Christ as metaphorically present in any aspect of creation an enriching experience in my overall understanding of the poem? I think it is. But it is only by virtue of the metaphor that I can see this, and not by any consideration of the individual parts of each metaphor. Only the effective union of parts opens up this view to me. And because this union brings to me a greater understanding along with an accompanying emotional response, I may legitimately speak of it as a cognitive experience. And it is a cognitive experience above and beyond the similar experience
111

of each element in each metaphor.

Let us return to the image of the plow. If I consider the plow as such, I cannot but see it as a utilitarian instrument. Perhaps, I can see it as artistic in the curve of its blade and the sheen of its metal, but my first approach to a plow will ordinarily be on the purely practical level. When, however, it enters into a metaphorical relationship with the redemptive act of Christ, it takes on a new appearance. Or does it? Is it the plow or the idea which arises in my mind brought about by the union of the plow's action and the notion of Christ's act that is new? Obviously, I am not seeing the plow or its action in a different light save as they are united with the notion of Christ and his action. The same holds for the falcon and the falling embers. My understanding of Christ's redemptive act is somehow enriched and made more perceptive because my mind has been triggered by these images to a consideration of ideas which are not at all conceivable in the falcon, the plow, and the embers, and perhaps only implied in my idea of Christ. It is the union of the two analogates which produces an entity upon which my mind can meditate and about which my mind can conclude. Once I have grasped the union of falcon and Christ, of plow and Christ, of embers and Christ, of each of these images as metaphors for the redemptive act of Christ, I no longer see any part of any of the individual metaphors as individual. It is no longer
bird, plow, embers, Christ; it is bird-plow-embers-Christ.

We have seen that the single metaphor exceeds the meaning of its individual elements, does, in effect, constitute a third entity, a new element as a whole unit, with nuances of meaning which exceed those of either of its components. It is the effective union of primary and secondary analogates which allows for the new insights which in turn give rise to entirely new and distinct concepts relative to the metaphor itself, taken in its entirety. We have also seen, in our analysis of the "Windhover" images as collective, that the effect of this progression of images results in what is itself a wider view of the thrust of the imagery: the poet does not stop with one image to illustrate his point of view, but, rather, piles image upon image to achieve a kind of cumulative image, the ramifications of which themselves extend far beyond the simple numerical fact of two, or three, or four images, each illustrating the same theme. What can this be other than what the French poet Paul Valery means when he writes:

The difficulty experienced at first in understanding comes from an extreme contraction of figures, a fusion of metaphors, the rapid transmutation of images extremely compressed and subjected to a sort of discipline of density, which the poet has imposed upon himself and which is in accordance with his intention of keeping the language of poetry always definitely and almost absolutely distinct from the language of prose.18

We have considered in some depth the question of

progressive imagery, not simply because it is a device
Hopkins makes use of, but principally because his use of it
is germane to our own discussion.

We have seen that the nature of progressive imagery
is such that it has two effects on the reader: first, it
produces a graduated development towards a particular goal,
i.e., as I have noted, the progressive nature of the images
of the poem satisfies the discursive nature of the human
mind, which is led, step by step, as it were, to a more pro-
found understanding of the overall thrust or theme of the
poem. Secondly, the congeries of images in a poem results
in a cumulative effect on a reader, so that, in a real
sense, the images themselves become in turn one image. The
many images, because they are related in a progressive or
developmental way, then form a unity of their own, based on
this mutual interaction, the result of which in turn takes
on the characteristics of an image. The poem, then, made up
of images, is itself an image. And I hope to show the impor-
tance of this cumulative effect in relation to one particu-
lar poem, "Pied Beauty."

I have also treated in some brief detail the nature
of the metaphor itself, and the overriding effect of the
image when the terms of its construction are considered as
a unit rather than as individual elements. Again, it is
this union based on shared characteristics which makes of
the metaphor (simile) a third element in its own right. The
metaphor then becomes larger in extension than the simple mathematical sum of its parts. This particular insight, too, is necessary in the conclusions I shall draw regarding "Pied Beauty" and Hopkins' overall concept of dappling.

The progression of images in "The Windhover" is developmental, in that we move in succession from the less revealing image to the one which finally serves as the perfect representation of Christ's redemptive act.

In "Pied Beauty," this kind of progression is not present. The progression is neither developmental nor is it of single images only (e.g., the falcon, the plow, the embers). "Pied Beauty" is on the whole, as far as its imagery is concerned, a much more complicated poem. To begin with, in the purely physical images, there is no progression. The poet opens his sonnet by a simple statement: glory should be rendered to God because he has created dappled things. Then, we are offered a list of examples: skies (and by suggestion, cows); rose-moles on trout; chestnut-falls; finches' wings; landscape; and, finally, trades. We have here a series of examples, but there is no apparent movement from less complete images to more complete. Is a finch's wing more of an example of piedness than a brinded cow? The progression is from group to group rather than from thing to thing. Thus, skies, cows, trout, chestnut-falls, finches' wings, landscape, freckled, adazzle, dim are all visual images. Sweet, sour are gustatory; swift, slow are difficult to classify, falling
perhaps under both visual and some non-sensory aspect. Counter, original, spare, strange, fickle are all open-ended as far as the senses are concerned, applicable to any or to all of them.

There is, then, in the physical order alone, a progression of groups (skies, cows, trout, etc. all taken as one group, visual) to mixed (swift, slow) to gustatory (sweet, sour) to one/all (counter, original, etc.). Insofar as these groups are expressive of the perception or grasp of piedness, no one group nor any single image in a group is more complete. The possibilities of the last group are infinitely wide, but at the same time are much vaguer. It is the cumulative nature of the imagery which produces the effect in the reader, which creates the feeling of piedness and of the beauty of the pied world. And, finally, for our purposes, the most significant progression is that from purely physical images to non-physical. Therefore, it is to the final group of words that I wish to address myself at this point.

The words counter, original, spare, strange are words which may be used to describe things physical and non-physical. An idea can be counter (contrary), original, spare, strange. So may a plan of action, or an invention, etc. This fact does not of itself mean that they are used in the poem in both senses, although that will be my contention. What leads me to argue for this interpretation is the def-
inition of the word *thing*, the use of *whatever*, and the gradual unfolding of the groups of images into an ever-widening universe of discourse.

First, as to the definition of *thing*:

3. That with which one is concerned (in action, speech, or thought); an affair, business, concern, matter, subject; pl. affairs, concerns, matters.

5. That which is said; a saying, utterance, expression, statement; with various connotations, e.g.: a charge or accusation made against a person (see 2); a story, tale; a part or section of an argument or discourse; a witty saying, a jest (usu. good thing). b. That which is thought; an opinion; a notion; an idea. (Italics mine.)

There are a number of other definitions making the same point: a "thing" is not at all necessarily some physical entity.

Next, regarding the word *whatever*, I take it to mean exactly that: anything. Anything that is fickle, freckled, etc. And this includes the abstract as well as the concrete world.

Finally, what is for me the strongest reason for arguing that Hopkins' world is pied all over, i.e., non-physical as well as physical things: the progression of the imagery from a purely physical-oriented group of words to a group whose possibilities extend to the non-physical and abstract.

If this seems to be stretching the interpretation, then perhaps one more argument will be of significance.

In terms of our discussion of metaphor, we may, using the nomenclature of that discussion, refer to physical
nature as the primary analogate with reference to piedness. Thus, piedness is attributed properly to physical
nature, and, as a matter of fact, to colored physical nature: *dappling* is fundamentally a visual phenomenon. Therefore, any use of *pied*, *dappled*, etc. to describe an image
ordered to any sense other than sight is a transferred use. In other words, the common and first use of *pied* is to de-
scribe a visual image and, therefore, any other use of the
word is an analogous one. Consequently, Hopkins, in intro-
ducing pairs of contraries (swift, slow; sweet, sour) is al-
ready using the terms in a transferred sense. My contention
is that he simply carries this extended use, this analogical
use, to its logical conclusion.

Working from the opposite direction, and based once
again on common usage as well as the dictionary definitions,
the word "fickle" is ordinarily said not of anything physi-
cal, but, rather, of human beings. It is a character trait.
Obviously, certain elements of nature may be legitimately
referred to as fickle -- the weather comes most immediately
to mind. And the example given earlier is, it seems to me,
quite acceptable. But, again, these are analogous. *Fickle*
is said of the weather in a transferred sense. The primary
analogate is human nature, or, at least, a particular kind
of human being: "False, deceitful, treacherous."

My point in the preceding paragraphs is that Hopkins
has taken language which has a common usage, a generally
understood and agreed upon usage, and transferred that use to a less common one. And he has done this from both sides of the scale, so to speak. He has taken language which refers primarily to visual images, to colored visual images, and used it as a base for referring to other sensory images; and he has taken language which generally refers to non-sensory elements and used it to express physical concepts.

The cumulative effect of the language and the imagery of "Pied Beauty," then, is one of the overall piedness of the world at large, a piedness which includes not only the physical objects of the world, but the non-physical as well. Ideas and qualities, emotions, actions, reactions -- all are as subject to dappling, or to being described as dappled, as are skies and cows, trout and finches' wings. And if the emphasis of the imagery used to express this is on the sense objects of the world, there is a reason for that, also. And we shall explore that reason now.

So far, our treatment of this sonnet has been centered upon the language and the imagery. Now, we must turn to the content.

What, precisely, is Hopkins saying? At first glance, the answer is simple enough: praise God for having created a dappled world. What a dull world we should have if it were made up of single-faceted things: all the same color, having the same odor; all personalities exactly the same, all things solid and indistinguishable in grade, the perfect democracy:
all the world equally drab. But, the last complete line introduces an element not always adverted to: all this dappled beauty comes from Him who is "past change." God is not fickle, freckled, pied, dappled, brinded; he is not swift, slow; sweet, sour; adazzle, dim. In short, God is none of the things so highly praised in "Pied Beauty." He is not counter, original, spare, strange because all of these words imply some kind of comparison of objects or ideas or emotions: created ideas, objects, emotions. In other words, a comparison of things on their own level. God is not any of these things simply because he is unique in the sense of "of which there is only one" and that one is in an order of existence quite removed from the order of created existence.

There is one final contrast, however, and that contrast is between created nature and God. Created nature is parti-colored, and multi-sensory, and inconsistent and counter, a bundle of changing and moving contraries. God is simple, spiritual, the Pure Act of the philosophers, so intrinsically beautiful that there can be no increase, no variation in that beauty, which is past any change.

The beauty of God, then, is not a pied beauty. It is a beauty whose simplicity is such that it includes all beauty, much as one color is sometimes said to include all the colors of the spectrum. We are not familiar with this beauty because there is no beauty like it in the created
universe. But Hopkins, in this sonnet, by the wide-ranging images and the introduction of the whole created world into his concept of piedness, has come as close as one may to this awful beauty of God. The sum total of the parts of this multi-natured world are a reflection of the totality of the beauty of the single-natured God. The emphasis is on physical imagery because the contrast is between the created and the uncreated, between the complex and the simple, between the essentially material and the totally spiritual.

The principle of Hopkins' vision of the world as pied is the principle of opposition: the existence of contraries, of the original, the spare, the strange, of that which is counter. And he can see this opposition, the existence of the original and the spare, even where the only distinction is numerical. Two things of the same species, differing only in number, are for Hopkins in contrast to one another because no two things are exactly alike. Two rocks of the same size, shape, and color are never in nature exactly the same size, shape, and color. And it is upon this subtle difference that Hopkins fastens. The primacy of the individual is of paramount importance for him. Where there is a difference, then, there is a contrast of some kind. And Hopkins sees the world as one of contrasts. And a world of contrasts is a pied world.

We may conclude, then, that Hopkins makes full use of the notion of piedness, from the strict use of the word
to mean parti-colored to its analogous use to mean opposed or contrary. Thus, *pied = the world (or any part thereof) seen as exhibiting contrast or difference*. In the simplest reduction of this idea, we might say that all Hopkins needs for his dappled world is two things, any two things. Nevertheless, the definition I have offered should be understood in the sense in which Hopkins generally expresses the notion of piedness, i.e., there is an observable and/or intelligible contrast present where he uses any word or image or congeries of images in this way.

At the conclusion of the first part of the first chapter, I defined instress as the intrinsic tension upholding the unity of being of a particular being and distinguishing and individualizing that being.

Now, if I have shown successfully that Hopkins' idea of piedness consists in the perceiving of contrasts (contraries) and instress is the tension holding in being the contraries which go to make up a thing, then for Hopkins the natural and most effective expression of instress would seem to be words and images which specify and concentrate on piedness. The tension (instress) which holds a thing in existence is intrinsic force, one not seen or touched. It is intelligible, not sensible. But, for the poet, a concrete image is the most effective way to express something. Therefore, the best (not always necessarily the most satisfying) image is one in which the reader can see or intellectually
grasp the existence of contraries. Thus, we have brinded cows, finches' wings, and whatever is counter, original, fickle, etc. These conclusions will be developed in the final chapter.

For the moment, we have at hand, following the labors of this lengthy discussion, a working definition of Hopkins' notion of piedness. What remains is to apply this definition to his writings.
CHAPTER IV

THE EGG AND THE QUILL

The published works of Gerard Manley Hopkins contain but a relatively short supply of his sermons. And yet they are the bulk of what has been left to us.

The sources of Parts I and II of this volume are two distinct manuscript units. Part I, the sermons, is the entire contents of the stout cahier known as 'Fr. Humphrey's book.'

Thus writes Fr. Christopher Devlin, S.J., in the foreword to The Sermons and Devotional Writings of Gerard Manley Hopkins.

Later, in his introductory essay, "Hopkins as Preacher," we read:

It was Fr. Humphrey, passing through Oxford in June 1879 preparatory to settling there in the new scholastic year, who seems to have impressed on Hopkins the usefulness of having sermons ready to hand when called upon. He gave him the stout cahier now known as 'Fr. Humphrey's book' which contains almost all the surviving sermons.

There are a total of twenty-six sermons, preached over the course of three years: six, from 6 July 1879 through 21 September 1879, at Oxford; seven, from 5 October 1879 through 14 December 1879, at Bedford Leigh; and, finally

1Hopkins, Sermons, p. vii.
2Ibid., p. 3.
thirteen, from 4 January 1880 through 26 June 1881, at Liverpool. Some of the sermons exist only in the form of his notes, and this fact accounts for the cryptic nature of a few of the passages which appear in this chapter.

Of course, there are examples of Hopkins' approach to preaching contained in his spiritual writings and in certain isolated discourses. For the purposes of this dissertation, however, it does not seem necessary to enter into these writings to any great detail in this chapter. In the poems and the sermons, we have the bulk of what may be called "the public Hopkins." And certainly in the poems and sermons we have a sufficient number of examples of his "pied" viewpoint to justify the claims of this paper.

The great danger of looking for contraries to justify a worldview which we call pied is simply that every man uses them. There is no one who at some time or another does not play off one element against another, who does not speak or write of contrary opposition (whether or not he knows the technical name is irrelevant). And it is hardly the claim of this writer that every man sees the world as somehow and in some way dappled.

Nevertheless, a man who does see the world from such a viewpoint will, of necessity, use expressions which bring into focus such an outlook. Thus, if these words and expressions are there they cannot be excluded on the grounds that others, lacking the same outlook, also use them.
The point, of course, is that we arrive at Hopkins' own peculiar world vision in a cumulative fashion. The weight of the evidence is not to be taken piecemeal but in its entirety. Thus, Hopkins' use of contrast and pied imagery must be seen in relation to his idea of instress and in connection with the certainly pied images of the poems.

Bearing all this in mind, then, we can recognize an obvious two-fold division of the words, expressions and images to be treated in this chapter.

First, there are isolated or obvious examples of contrast, ones which we might judge to be made by any speaker or writer, ones which not only lend themselves to use because of the nature of the subject matter, but which are, in themselves, less consciously worked out; and, secondly, those which appear to be consciously developed and which, as such and because of their nature, are words, expressions, or images which might more naturally and more easily flow from the world outlook which I have attributed to Gerard Manley Hopkins.

In his Oxford sermon of 10 August 1879, preached on the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican, Hopkins remarks:

Moreover good and bad come to men from their employments and ways of life: he who touches pitch etc. and in like manner he who handles flour will be whitened.3

Not, admittedly, a startlingly original example, but

3Ibid., p. 16.
still an example of contrast. And the contrast is visual. And again, if we refer to the definition of pied as given in the OED ("originally, black and white like a magpie") there is some ground for holding that the figure for Hopkins is more than simply a handy illustration.

On Sunday, 5 October 1879, at St. Joseph's, Bedford Leigh, Hopkins preached on the text from St. Matthew ix, 1-8, the cure of the man sick of the palsy. Following an introductory paragraph in which he enumerates the disabilities peculiar to the palsied, contrasting them most forlornly with other kinds of illness, he says: "Nevertheless, all is not lost, they might well be worse -- for they have power of the mind, that is not palsied, that works and has its play."4

He thus sets up in the same person the contraries of helplessness and independence. He stresses that, even though the body of the victim is helpless, his mind and will are not. The victim's desire to be cured is so great that his mind functions in a grand scheme: he will have himself lowered through a hole in the roof into the presence of Jesus. What is a more powerful example of contraries existing in the same subject: strength of will and weakness of body, like the couple-colored sky or the brindled cow, or the spots on the swimming trout?

On the same day, in the evening, Hopkins preached on
the rosary, that Sunday being the day of the Feast of the Most Holy Rosary. His notes for the sermon include the following:

She [the] BVM is in fact the universal mother; however unlike her children loves them all. No wonder she can, for in her met things that are thought to be and even are opposite and incompatible, viz., maidenhood and motherhood; then courage and meekness, height and lowliness, wisdom and silence, retirement and renown.5

In another of his Bedford Leigh sermons, that of Sunday, 9 November, Hopkins makes use of a startling image. One wonders how effective the image was on his congregation; but that is not a part of our discussion. The text for the day was that of St. Matthew ix, 18-26, in which the evangelist recounts two of our Lord's miracles: the healing of Jairus' daughter and the woman with the issue of blood.

Hopkins makes a great point of the fact that the one miracle, that of the healing of the woman, is "sandwiched" between Jairus' urgent request for help and the actual raising of his daughter from the dead. He describes it in the following manner:

In this Gospel two miracles, not one after the other, but first the beginning of one, then the other, then the end of the first; as when you drive a quill or straw or knitting needle through an egg, it pierces first the white, then the yolk, then the white again.6

The preacher then goes on to point out that the other Gospel accounts are the same "though commonly the Evangelists

5Ibid., p. 29.
6Ibid., p. 30.
change the order of things freely according to the purpose they have in hand; but here they all agree to follow the order of the events."7 And he then adds that "there must be a reason for this and there is."8

Hopkins see the two miracles as all of a piece, a bringing together of two people who had faith, a faith which was "true, but shortsighted."9 For, both Jairus and the woman believed that Christ could accomplish the miracles asked. Jairus' faith fell short because he thought Jesus had to touch physically the object of his miracles, and the woman because "she thought Christ would not know."10 Hopkins explains that what Christ aimed at in his miracles was to breed faith in him or it being bred to nurse it; to breed it and to nurse it, I say, both in the receiver of the miracle and in all who should witness it or hear of it.11

But, "this afflicted father had to wait while Christ healed the woman and . . . the Evangelists make his story wait, turning to the woman's . . . ."12

Thus, because Jairus is forced to wait until Christ gets to his house (and because he believes that Jesus must be physically present to work a cure), his faith is being

7Ibid.
8Ibid.
9Ibid., p. 31.
10Ibid., p. 32.
11Ibid., p. 31. 12Ibid. p. 32.
bred and nursed, or at the least tested more, which perhaps is the same thing in Hopkins' view. The woman, of course, had waited twelve years, at least in the sense that she had suffered her affliction for the length of time.

Hopkins sees the lives of these two bound up in the nature of the miracles Christ performs and the disjointed character of their performance. Just as the contrasting element of the egg (white and yolk) are united in one by the "quill or straw or knitting needle," so the lives of these two people are brought together by the action of Christ which pierces their lives. So, two persons whose contact with one another would be minimal, if that, the ruler of a synagogue and an unknown woman whose affliction "made unclean those she touched," are united in both their anguish and in the quality of their faith. And Christ eases the anguish at the same time that he strengthens their faith. Hopkins sees contraries brought together in these incidents: "Christ's wisdom: the same act should build up both her faith and the father's, correct both her self-love and that father's."  

The next sermon, still at Bedford Leigh, returns to the "black and white" or, perhaps a better word might be "magpie" image. The text is that of St. Matthew xiii, 31-35,

13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Preached Sunday, 16 November 1879.
the parables of the mustard seed and the leaven.

Hopkins points out in the very first words of the sermon that Christ "takes pains to shew, it [the kingdom of heaven] will be mingled, that is in this world it will, of many sorts, of good, bad, and indifferent." The preacher goes on to develop this statement:

And yet men are scandalised when they find it not all perfect: here there is one bad, there a bad family, somewhere else a bad town or country, and one whole age of the Church may be not so good as another. There will be black sheep among the white . . . (Italics mine)

In the particular section of St. Matthew's gospel from which this text is taken, Christ has been talking about the word of the kingdom and the many ways it is received among men. He illustrates this with the famous parable of the sower whose seed fell on differently receptive kinds of ground. A later parable is that of the enemy who sows cockle among the wheat.

One might argue, of course, that it is Christ and not Hopkins who is using this notion of the mingling of the good and the bad. But this is a possibility only if one accepts that the point of this section of the gospel is that the kingdom of heaven is mingled with both good and bad, black sheep and white sheep. There is a question in my mind that this is anything more than incidental, at most.

16Hopkins, Sermons, p. 33.

17Ibid.
The point of the parables is that those who are good ground are the members of the kingdom of heaven; those who accept the word of God and live it are the wheat; those who reject that word are the cockle. All that Hopkins says is true, and is a legitimate way to look at this section of the gospel. But, and this of course is my thesis, it is a way peculiar to Hopkins to latch on to the apparent contradictions in the kingdom of heaven and to try to reconcile them. Surely, the kingdom of heaven is made up of the saints who work out their salvation in this life. And, therefore, in a sense one may say that, until this is done, the kingdom of heaven in this world is a kingdom that is mingled with good and with bad. We can accept this kind of pied view. But, again, it does not seem to me that this is at all the principal, or even a secondary, thrust of Christ's parables in this section. The kingdom of heaven, strictly speaking and even in this world, is made up of those who "heareth the word, and understandeth, and beareth fruit, and yieldeth the one an hundred fold, and another sixty, and another thirty."18

A much more explicit example of Hopkins' tendency to look for the unity of contrarieties occurs in the opening paragraphs of the sermon he preached at St. Joseph's on 30 November 1879, the First Sunday of Advent. The text is St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, xiii, 11-14, especially on the

words, "Let us walk honestly, as in the day, not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and impurities, not in contention and envy."

He opens his sermon with the emphatic statement that "this life is night, it is night and not day; we are like sleepers in the nighttime, we are like men that walk in the dark." And he expands upon this with the following explanation:

For though the translation says the 'night is past,' this is not to be understood as if it said the night were wholly past and day come, but rather, as we see by looking at the original language, that the night has got on and day is approaching.

And he accentuates this intermingling of night and day by the summation of his argument: "Life is night, although he bids us walk in it as if it were day." Hopkins was caught up in the image of day and night as somehow existing simultaneously, as mixed:

So then the Scripture in one place calls life night and in another calls it day. But these two do not disagree. In respect of truth and the clearness we see it with life is night and what comes after life is day; in respect of doing work in God's service and earning a reward hereafter life is day and what comes after is night.

He continues with the example of men who go to their daily labors in the darkness of the mines:

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19 Hopkins, Sermons, p. 39.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
To most men the daylight is the place to work in but those that work in the pit go where all is darker than night and work by candlelight and when they see the light of day again their work is over, as if day were night to them and night day.

According to Hopkins, then, life is both night and day, taken simultaneously, for even as we struggle to attain to "truth and the clearness we see it with" (night), we are also and at the same time "doing work in God's service and earning a reward hereafter" (day). The example of the miners who work by candlelight in the darkness becomes the perfect image to express this union of contraries: they work where it is both dark and light, day and night, at the same time. This theme of light and darkness, day and night, is sustained throughout the first six paragraphs of the sermon, or for just short of half of the entire work.

Probably the most apt image in any of the sermons is one which occurs in the sermon Hopkins preached "to open a triduum to be kept in honour of the 25th anniversary of the Definition" of the Immaculate Conception. The triduum began on the evening of Friday, 5 December 1879.

Naturally, the preacher dwells upon the nature of original sin and the totality of Mary's preservation from any taint or aspect of that sin:

I must also add that she was not only not guilty of it but that God kept her also from the worst effect of it, which effect of original sin always accompanies the

\[23\text{Ibid.}\]
\[24\text{Ibid., p. 43.}\]
guilt of original sin.25

He continues, showing that the effect of original sin is "concupiscence, that is to say/a readiness to commit sin, fresh sin of their own, which all men have in them."26 Hopkins argues that should God keep a man from falling into sin, "as perhaps he may have kept St. John Baptist . . . still such a man would have the inclination to sin left though he did not yield to that inclination . . . ."27 He then uses for illustration: "A watch wound up but kept from going has the spring always on the strain though no motion comes of it."28

There are few if any better images in Hopkins illustrative of the marriage of apparent incompatibles in the created world. Man is a mixture of conflicting and contrary elements, in this case emotions, and these elements are maintained in check and in balance (in this instance, in the temperate man).

On the two Sundays of 11 and 18 January respectively, in the year 1880, Hopkins preached sermons in Liverpool on the general theme of God's Kingdom. He had planned to link these with two others, one of which he had delivered on 4 January (which does not contain material relevant to

25 Ibid., p. 44.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
our consideration), and one which would be the concluding sermon of the four, to be delivered on 25 January.

The sermon of 11 January was concerned with the nature of God's kingdom before the Fall. In it, Hopkins discusses the characteristics of the contract between ruler and ruled in general, and as it obtained in the state of original justice. At the conclusion, he remarks:

Next week, my brethren, with the divine assistance we will look at God's first kingdom in detail, first in its early glory, then in its melancholy fall.29

As it turned out, he was thrown off his schedule because he became too involved in "its early glory" and, consequently, was forced to relegate the subject of the fall of God's kingdom to a succeeding sermon: "Next Sunday then, with God's assistance, of the Fall."30

His notebook lists the following observation regarding that proposed sermon of Sunday, 25 January:

I was not allowed to take this title [on the Fall of God's First Kingdom] and on the printed bills it was covered by a blank slip pasted over. The text too I changed to last week's, and had to leave out or reword all passages speaking of God's kingdom falling.31

We have the sermon, apparently as he had planned to preach it, but it, too, has no bearing on the discussion at hand, other than as it forms part of the proposed sermon series. Thus, of the four sermons linked in Hopkins' mind

29Ibid., p. 58.
30Ibid., p. 62.
31Ibid.
with the kingdom of God, the middle two are the ones which interest us.

Near the conclusion of the 11 January sermon, the preacher states what seems to me to be a guiding principle in his discussion of the nature of God's kingdom:

He [God] brings together things thought opposite and incompatible, strict justice and mere mercy, free grace and binding duty.32

The theme, or at least one of the dominant chords, of these two sermons especially is that of the unity of opposites, the bringing together of things normally looked upon as diverse. This is Hopkins' pied world.

In this second of the four sermons, then, Hopkins begins with a discussion of God as our king and what makes him to be such.33 From this he moves into a consideration of what constitutes the relationship between ruler and ruled,34 a consideration which occupies the remainder of the sermon.

The reasons for the construction of a commonwealth are innumerable.35 But, no matter how one interprets them, they constitute an amalgam of many and diverse aspects of human needs and desires.

Hopkins sees justice as the moving principle behind

32 Ibid., p. 57.
33 Ibid., pp. 53-55.
34 Ibid., pp. 55-58.
35 Ibid., p. 56. "For a thousand reasons all gathered up in the words common weal or commonwealth."
such a cohesion of opposing and contrary elements. In a very telling, and at least intellectually comforting image, he illustrates the equalizing (and unifying?) notion of justice:

A covenant, a contract, an agreement. I mean of course a lawful one, once made binds in justice and as it cannot be broken without injustice and wrong, so it cannot be kept without justice and right: therefore two that make and carry out a contract are both just, both in the right. And mark this too, both equally just, equally in their right. For this is the wonderful property of justice to equalise those who share it: if I buy the baker's bread I cannot be juster, righter, for paying my silver than he for delivering his bread, nor yet he juster and righter for his bread than for my silver, but the fair price having been asked and paid, we are both in our duty, both in our right, both equally in the right of it.36

In the third of the sermons, that of 18 January, he continues the theme of the commonwealth which results from the contract between God and man. And he asks:

Now then what are the terms of that contract between God and man, in other words what was the constitution of the commonwealth? what was the good it aimed at? what the duties to be done in it? what its laws? and what its forfeits?37

The entire sermon then is taken up with answering these questions, beginning with the distinction between the ranks or estates one finds in any commonwealth, and their relationships to one another. In the "divine commonwealth" which existed prior to the Fall, Hopkins distinguishes God and man.38

36ibid., pp. 56, 57.
37ibid., pp. 58, 59  38ibid., p. 59.
Man was at first but one man, Adam, who was mankind, he was all man in one person; then there were two; and there were to have been more, Adam and Eve's children; and when they were born they would have entered at once into the compact with God, would have stepped into their places in the commonwealth, without any fresh agreement or act of mercy on God's part but of right and justice.39

This commonwealth was predicated upon a common weal, or a common good: "It was that God should be glorified in man and man in God."40 And Hopkins continues:

This was the good that first commonwealth aimed at, this was its common weal; and surely it was the good of all persons, parties, and estates in the commonwealth, all bound up together, in a way and to a degree truly worthy of the divine wisdom that planned it.41

For Hopkins, then, the commonwealth was a harmonious unity of diverse elements, brought together ("all bound up together") by the performance of duties on the part of both God and man:

A commonwealth, we said, was bound together by duty; the sovereign was bound by duty as the subject. Here then what was the duty God undertook? -- Providence. That was the part, function, office, and duty in that commonwealth God took upon himself, first to foresee both his and man's joint and common good, then by his policy and legislation to bring it to pass; to make the laws, allot the posts and duties; find ways and means, lend sanction and authority. And man's duty was to obey the laws the sovereign made, fill the posts, use the means, and put the policy in execution. These were the duties.42

39Ibid.
40Ibid.
41Ibid.
42Ibid., pp. 59, 60.
Nor, according to Hopkins, did those duties begin and end in the Garden of Paradise. He carries his theme of reconciliation of opposites into the world beyond the Garden:

And next as man multiplied man was to spread over the earth, then as now outside Paradise full of thorns and thistles, and reclaim it piece by piece to the condition of Paradise itself.43

Even a cursory reading of these two sermons would be sufficient to catch the overriding thrust of Hopkins' vision of the kingdom of God prior to the disobedience of Adam and Eve. From the very beginning, the "divine commonwealth" is a union of two parties (God and man) who differ to a degree that would be irreconcilable were it not for the omnipotence of the one. And from that point on, the contraries and the differences multiply, even to the degree of the vast differences between Paradise and the world beyond the flaming swords of the cherubim.

In his sermon delivered at St. Francis Xavier's, Liverpool, on 15 May 1880, he considers the account of Our Lord's final discourse to his apostles at the Last Supper. In the course of the opening paragraphs of the sermon, Hopkins has occasion to refer to various actions in the past and in the near future which indicate a lack of understanding on the part of the apostles: "In all this sorrowful love of theirs there was mingled something imperfect, unspiritual, earthly, and mistaken . . . ."44 And he categorizes these

43Ibid., p. 60.  44Ibid., p. 96.
imperfections in some detail:

He foretold to them that he should rise again, the holy women told them he had risen again, but till they saw him they would not, or scarcely would, believe it; Peter and John at least needed to see the linen cloths; as for Thomas, he went further: Unless I put my finger into the print of the nails -- you know the words -- I will not believe.  

He admits that the apostles hoped in him "but hoped what? -- such things as to sit on his right hand and his left, to be greatest in the kingdom of heaven . . . ." (And now he uses that most well-worn of "mixing" images):

See how the dross is mixed with gold and the gold with the dross -- they wanted to be with Christ and in the kingdom of heaven, but to have earthly honours in it; they wanted to have earthly honours, but those in the kingdom of heaven and Christ to give them.

Throughout several of Hopkins' sermons, we are made aware of Christ as symbolizing the notion of unity, the union of many outstanding qualities. "There met in Jesus Christ all things that can make man lovely and loveable." Or, again, God has the ability to "bring together things thought opposite and incompatible" even in the attention he gives to the world. In a sermon on Divine Providence and the Guardian Angels, preached 25 October 1880 at Liverpool, he stresses the fact that "we cannot'do two things at once,' that is cannot give our full heed and attention to two things at once. God heeds all things at once."

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45Ibid.
46Ibid., pp. 96,97.
47Ibid., p.35.  48Ibid., p. 89.
Hopkins sees this union of many in one as extending even to the work of the Paraclete:

Now the Holy Ghost, he too is but one person, indeed, but it is his will and answerable to his name and the manner of his being to shew himself as if he were many. He delights in multitude. When he takes up his dwelling in man it is in the shape of seven gifts, seven spirits they are called by the prophet, he being but one spirit all the while.49

In the final sermon Hopkins preached at Liverpool, or at least in the last one he recorded, that of 26 June 1881, the closing passage includes a stirring attempt to bring together differences which he recognizes as "by general agreement very great."50

He acknowledges the differences between the Middle Ages and the times in which he is presently living, but then goes on to say:

I put aside the great religious changes that have been, the Protestant Reformation and the spread of infidelity; in a word I put out of sight all those things in which men take opposite sides and are divided and I wish to look only at things in which all, roughly speaking, have a common interest, in which all men share alike.51

Earlier, I established that the words, images, and expressions of the sermons would most naturally fall into two categories, those which are commonplace enough to be the property of any/all preachers/writers, given the same set of circumstances; and those obviously the outgrowth of Hopkins'

49 Ibid., p. 98.
50 Ibid., p. 104.
51 Ibid.
conscious worldview. I do not believe it possible to fit into these categories with absolute precision the uses Hopkins makes of the notion of variegation. Nevertheless, the images, the language, the preoccupation with difference and its consequent reconciliation -- all are there, evidently there, in the sermons. There is a sufficient percentage of evidence, to my mind, to establish that Hopkins' peculiar vision of the world as dappled influenced him to the use of comparisons and viewpoints which would not come readily to one who did not enjoy the same outlook. And it is to these examples that I turn in my conclusion. The few images Hopkins used, with the possible exception of the egg image and that of the watch, are pedestrian enough to be common property. The question is: did he use them on obvious occasions or in connection with his own pied outlook?

In the first place, we must take into account the steady concern Hopkins shows throughout his sermons for the notion of unity. He finds the union of multitude/opposites in Christ, in the Blessed Virgin, in the commonwealth, in the kingdom of God, in the misguided ambitions of the apostles. And the two sermons of 11 and 18 January 1880 are shot through with this concern. There is evident in the sermons, then, a general outlook which one can specify only as a tendency always to look for the unity of things, either in the reconciliation of apparent incompatibles or in the harmony of distinct and different compatible elements.
Specifically, there are three examples, each one of them of considerable significance, which seem to me to be original viewpoints in this general attitude towards a union of elements. Each one comprises a substantial part of the sermon in which it appears and cannot, therefore, be dismissed merely in passing. I refer to:

(1) the miracles of Jairus' daughter and the woman with the issue of blood. Here occurs the famous egg/quill image. I think Hopkins' approach to these two miracles, as I have interpreted it earlier, is original with him;

(2) his view of the kingdom of God not as it is ordinarily seen, i.e., as comprised of those who hear the word of God and keep it; but, rather as made up of a mixture of good and bad, the eventual members of the kingdom to be those who accept God's teachings and practice them. We might call this a kind of "preliminary kingdom" view;

(3) and, finally, the fusion of night and day in this world as explained on pages 132, 133 of this dissertation.

There is always the possibility that none of these attitudes, or better, interpretations, made by Hopkins is original. Preachers, more perhaps than any other group of those who use the verbal arts, are prone to work from sources, sometimes acknowledged, sometimes not. Hopkins has an
epigram on the subject of One who borrowed his sermons:

Herclot's preachings I'll no longer hear:
They're out of date -- lent sermons all year.52

My only answer to this is to say once again that, aside from establishing the actual fact of his borrowing from a source(s), the only recourse is to take a cumulative view. Even if these "originals" are not his own, they, taken with the frequent use he makes of similar ideas and with what we have seen in Chapters Two and Three, and are yet to see in the final chapters, play their not insignificant role in the contention of this dissertation.

52Hopkins, Poems, p. 133.
CHAPTER V

THE VARIETIES OF VARIETY

In the Introduction, mention was made of the numerous instances in which Hopkins utilized "dapple" or "pied" words to express his outlook. He uses at least thirty-three different words, each of which has the general connotation of variegation. These words are in addition to the imagery or combinations of words which he assembles for the same purpose. Thus, there is an immediate two-fold division of the methodology of expression: single words and combinations. In this fifth chapter, I shall be concerned exclusively with the single words Hopkins uses to express variegation in his journals, letters, and poems. The combinations of words used for the same purpose will be treated in Chapter Six.

Again, as we noted in the opening pages of this dissertation, there are numerous instances of Hopkins' use of a specific word to stand for a concept of piedness. ¹ It is

¹These instances may be broken down according to the following table:

(1) Dapple, or some variant, is used 19 times.
(2) Pied, or some variant, is used 10 times.
(3) Damask, or some variant, is used 8 times.
(4) Mottled, or some variant, is used 8 times.
(5) Plotted, or some variant, is used 7 times.

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neither necessary, nor of much advantage, to enter into a
discussion of each of these instances. Accordingly, I shall
confine myself to those examples which are most illustrative
of the point of this dissertation or which require an expla-
nation to justify listing them as "dapple" words.

The thirty-three words Hopkins uses throughout his
writings to indicate piedness may be categorized as follows:

(1) words which invariably, or for the most part, call
attention to the variegated nature of that which
they name. Into this category fall such words as
dapple, pied, brindled, couple-colour, cross-colour,
stipple, freckled, blotty, chequered, damask,
dabbled, marbled, mottled, spanked, speckled,
spotty, streaked, and striped;

(2) words which do not invariably mean dappled, or in
any way pied, but which, nevertheless, may be used
legitimately in such a fashion. These include
plotted, pieced, barred, braided, fret (fretted),
lace (laced), mealy, and paling.

(3) words which in certain, specific instances, or in

(6) Mackerel, or some variant, is used 6 times.
(7) Brindled, or some variant, is used 5 times.
(8) Pieced, Fret, and Spotty, or variants, are used 3
times.
(9) Fickle, Barred, Lace, Paling, Peak'd, or variants,
are used twice.
(10) The following appear once each: Couple-colour, Cross-
colour, Stipple, Blotty, Braided, Chequered, Cobbled,
Dabbled, Marbled, Mealy, Spanked, Specked, Streaked,
Striped, Wattled, Betweenple, Footfretted.
certain combinations, indicate dappling, but which Hopkins uses in other contexts for the same purpose. In this category we find the word *mackerel* and its variant forms;

(4) words which have no dictionary meaning relating them to the concept of dappling, but which Hopkins obviously uses in this context. The following are in this category: *peak'd*, *wattling*, and *fickle*;

(5) words invented by Hopkins to mean dappled: *betweenpie* and *footfretted*;

(6) and, finally, words which have no definitions linking them to the notion of piedness, but which Hopkins seems to use in this sense. *Cobbled* is the lone word in this group.

Some of these examples I have already discussed in Chapter Three, in my consideration of the curtail sonnet, "Pied Beauty." Consequently, it will not be necessary to cover that ground again. Others are instances which are self-evident and which do not contribute specifically to the argument of the dissertation. And here a brief word of explanation is necessary.

Because many of the instances of dappling, or pieing, and of the use of words and expressions to indicate these notions are not specifically subject to interpretation supportive of my contention regarding Hopkins' use of dapple imagery to express instress does not mean that they do not
support my thesis when taken together, which is the way they should be viewed, anyway. Once a pattern of activity, or a method of thinking, is established, it is no longer necessary that each instance of an action or a word should be immediately evident as indicative of that pattern or method. If I believe that man is basically an animal capable of ethical behavior, it is still not necessary that each word or action attributable to me must be interpreted as immediately indicative of that philosophy, even though they will be radically interpretable as such. It is only under certain circumstances, e.g., when a specific demand is put upon me to act in accord with whatever principles I profess, that a closer observation will reveal my words or actions as flowing from this basic philosophy about the nature of man. Thus, once I have established what Hopkins means by instress, and once I have established his actual use of pied imagery to express that meaning, I do not have then to view every instance as interpretable in the light of its being a specific instance not only of dappling but of dappling as expressive of instress. I shall contend that it is, radically; but only in the same sense that everything I do or say is radically interpretable as following upon my view of man as basically an ethical creature (in the example given above).

With these few preliminaries dispatched, then, we may now proceed to the consideration of one example in Hopkins' works which typifies this kind of "radical" usage.
A fascinating and peculiar use of the word *dappling* occurs in the journal entry of 22 July 1873:

Very hot, though the wind, which was south, dappled very sweetly on one's face and when I came out I seemed to put it on like a gown as a man puts on the shadow he walks into and hoods or hats himself with the shelter of a roof, a penthouse, or a copse of trees, I mean it rippled and fluttered like light linen, one could feel the folds and braids of it -- and indeed a floating flag is like wind visible and what weeds are in a current; it gives it thew and fires it and bloods it in. -- 2

"Dappled" is no synonym for "rippled." Hopkins gives examples of the effects for the cause, i.e., the fluttering flag is "wind visible" and so are the weeds in a current evidence of the wind's activity or of the motion of the water. It is by observing the "floating flag" that we become conscious of that which causes it to "float," or to flutter, namely, the wind. It is the weeds caught in the current which makes us conscious of that power which moves them, namely, the current, or perhaps the wind moving the current. In either case, Hopkins is writing about the dynamism which supports the observable effects -- "all things are upheld by instress."

This use of the word by Hopkins illustrates quite accurately the point I have just made. There is no justification for understanding the word *dappling* in this passage in its proper sense of meaning parti-colored, or variegated. Taken in the context in which we here see it used, however, and bearing in mind what I have to this point attempted to

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establish concerning Hopkins' outlook and general philosophy, it is the most natural word in the world for him to use. Consider that the overall thrust of this passage is aimed at Hopkins' awareness of the palpability, the activity, the "aliveness" of the wind, and that he uses two examples which are themselves indicative of the viewer's advertence to the causes responsible for observable effects. What has caught his attention is not the wind or the current, shadows or trees, but the dynamic element behind such things, the force which "gives it thew and fires it and bloods it in."

He is thinking of instress; and so he uses a word which is expressive to him of instress, even though in the context of the passage we can find no justification for the use of the word according to its ordinary, denotative meaning. Hopkins, writing out of an habitual, and by 1873, well-grounded worldview, uses the word analogously because the words expressive of that worldview come naturally to his pen.

If "Pied Beauty" is obviously and unsubtly a poem about this dappled world, then "The May Magnificat" is less obviously and far more subtly a hymn to the Blessed Virgin Mary as dappled and as responding to a dappled world.

The three opening stanzas represent the poet's acknowledgement of May as the month of Mary at the same time that he wonders why this should be so.

May is Mary's month, and I
Muse at that and wonder why:
Her feasts follow reason,
Dated due to season----
Candlemas, Lady Day;
But the Lady Month, May,
    Why fasten that upon her,
    With a feasting in her honour?

Is it only its being brighter
Than the most are must delight her?
    Is it opportunest
    And flowers finds soonest?

And in the fourth stanza, the answer comes.

Ask of her, the mighty mother:
    Her reply puts this other
    Question: What is Spring?--
    Growth in everything-----

Thus, it is because May is a springtime month that it is chosen to be hers. But, what is it about spring which lends itself to selection as a time to honor Mary? The answer is twofold, and is given in the remaining eight stanzas.

The first part of the answer is in the middle four stanzas:

Flesh and fleece, fur and feather,
Grass and greenwold all together;
    Star-eyed strawberry breasted
    Throstle above her nested

Cluster of bugle blue eggs thin
Forms and warms the life within;
    And bird and blossom swell
    In sod or sheath or shell.

All things rising, all things sizing
Mary sees, sympathising
    With that world of good,
    Nature's motherhood.

Then, "growth in everything" is why we consecrate a springtime month to Mary. And the comparison is made between Spring (as the month when we become so aware of God's creation) and Mary (whose soul magnified the Lord, enlarging in
her all the finest characteristics of that creation, even characteristics not always thought of as compatible. Recall the Bedford Leigh sermon of 5 October 1879: "For in her met things that are thought to be and even are opposite and incompatible . . . ."

The next stanza is a transition stanza, in which the poet moves from this first reason for May as the Mary-month to the second.

Well but there was more than this:
Spring's universal bliss
Much, had much to say
To offering Mary May.

Therefore, it is not only "growth in everything" that characterizes May as ideal to be the month of Mary, but the added fact of the world's happiness, the "universal bliss" of Spring. And the first stanza to describe the nature of this bliss contains the word "dapple," a lead-in to what amounts to a description of Springtime as pied:

When drop--of-blood-and-foam-dapple
Bloom lights the orchard-apple
And thicket and thorp are merry
With silver-surfed cherry

And azuring-over greybell makes
Wood banks and brakes wash wet like lakes
And magic cuckoo call
Caps, clears, and clinches all---

He describes the blooming of the apple orchard as dapple; the green thickets are spotted with cherries, also found in the thorp. And the greybells cast their bluish tint over banks and ferns so as to make them look like shimmering lakes. The cuckoo's call "Caps, clears, and clinches all."
In these two brief stanzas, Hopkins has managed to get in all of nature: plant, animal, and man. The OED defines thorpe as "a hamlet, village, or small town." And what precisely does he say about these various aspects of God's creation? Simply that they are one, they are united in the over-riding joy of Spring, a joy which is itself made (by the poet) to unite with the joy of the Mother of God. For in the final stanza, he writes:

This ecstasy all through mothering earth
Tells Mary her mirth till Christ's birth
To remember and exultation
In God who was her salvation.

The entire poem is a "pied" poem, a paean to this dappled world, held together by all the loveliest instresses.

Hopkins' approach to his dappled world takes a quite different turn in that "longest sonnet ever made and no doubt the longest making."3 "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves," written in sprung rhythm, is, as Paul Mariani points out, an "extraordinarily heavy sonnet."4 It is also one which has, as Mariani notes, "received close attention from several perceptive critics of Hopkins . . . ."5 He himself feels that the fact "that it is first of all an Ignatian meditation on the state of hell has not, to my knowledge, been adequately

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3Hopkins, Letters, 26 November 1886, p. 245.
5Ibid., p. 199.
stated."\(^6\)

Whether it is such, or more properly a meditation on the Final Judgement, as I am inclined to believe, is not of immediate significance. What is important for our consideration is that it represents a kind of pied conclusion to a pied world. This statement demands some explication.

The poem begins with a multi-adjectival description of evening as it attempts to become night:

Earnest, earthless, equal, attuneable, vaulty, voluminous/ . . . stupendous
Evening strains to be time's vast, womb-of-all, home-of-all,/ hearse-of-all night.

Following this opening statement of what is happening, the poet goes on to describe how it is happening:

Her fond yellow hornlight wound to the west, her wild hollow hoarlight hung to the height
Waste; her earliest stars, earlstars, stars principal,/ overbend/us,
Fire-featuring heaven. For earth her being has unbound;/ her dapple is at an end, as-stray or aswarm, all throughter, in throngs; self in self steeped and pashed -- quite
Disremembering, dismembering all now.

The sun is setting in the west ("wound to the west"); at this particular moment its last light is still visible ("hung to the height"). But it is soon gone ("Waste"), and in the sun's place come the first of the stars. And that which most characterizes earth, the variegation in nature, is no longer observable ("For earth her being has unbound; her/dapple is at an end"). Because the night is now dominant,

\(^6\)Ibid.
one no longer sees the contrarieties of nature as a unity. However they were ("astray or aswarm, all throughter, in throngs"), they are now forgotten ("Disremembering") and dispersed ("dismembering"). And the poet makes this most clear with the next lines:

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Heart, you round me right
With: Our evening is over us; our night whelms, whelms, and will end us.
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He acknowledges what his heart tells him, namely, that he and it are covered over by evening, overwhelmed by a night that will end them. But Hopkins can never get completely away from his pied viewpoint. He has described the gradual, inexorable onslaught of night as it blots out earth's dapple. And he goes on, now, to tell us what he can see:

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Only the beakleaved boughs dragonish damask the tool-smooth bleak light;
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And damask is one of those words which in a transferred sense is used to mean "variegate" or "variegated," according to the OED. The next few words are "black,/Ever so black on it."

Yet, even in the heart of all this blackness, Hopkins fastens upon the contrast between the "beakleaved boughs dragonish" and the "tool-smooth bleak light" against which they form a damask-like pattern.

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Having now established the atmosphere, he moves into the second (meditative) part of the sonnet.
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Our tale, O our oracle! Let life, waned,
ah let life wind
Off her once skeined stained veined variety upon, all
on two/spools; part, pent, pack
Now her all in two flocks, two folds -- black, white;
right, / wrong; reckon but, reck but, mind
But these two; ware of a world where but these two tell,
each / off the other; of a rack
Where, selfwrung, selfstrung, sheathe- and shelterless,
thoughts / against thoughts in groans grind.

He says that what happens at this point, life coming
to an end, is that all that variety which had gone to make
it now comes apart to be gathered up into but two categories
("wind . . . all on two spools"), good and evil ("right,
wrong"). These are, as he says, "black, white," the magpie
image we have seen before.

Of course, Hopkins is saying that all our actions
will be placed into these categories, the right or the wrong.
And that in Hell (or at the Final Judgment), we shall see
clearly in just which category our deeds will fall. And
that moment is one to be wary of, to take note of, when
"thoughts against thoughts in groans grind."

The point of interest to us, however, is that even at
the very end, Hopkins sees contrariety. Because, while the
earth's "dapple is at an end" when night falls, still even
then the "beakleaved boughs dragonish damask the tool-smooth
bleak light." And when all the "once skeined stained veined
variety" is stripped apart to be wound upon the two spools
of "black, white; right, wrong," God's very judgment of man
is made on acts which are contrary to one another. And the
world is still pied.
We have already seen Hopkins' use of the word *pied* as the key word in the title of the sonnet which provides the beginning point of much of the work of this dissertation. There are two more vital occurrences of the word, one in the journals and one in a letter to Canon Richard Watson Dixon, which must be discussed.

Hopkins wrote to Dixon from Manresa House, Roehampton, on 1 December 1881, a rather long letter on a variety of topics, one of which was Dixon's own poems, which the Canon had asked Hopkins to criticize. Hopkins had done so, and in one of the poems so treated ("Too Much Friendship"), he had singled out the lines,

> Rattled her keys, unfavorable sign,
> And on her turning wheel, gan to decline,

listing them as instances of

> A quaint medley of Middle Ages and 'QueenAnnery,' a combination quite of our age and almost even of our decade, as we see in Morris and that school (to which you, I suppose, belong), and having a charm of its own that I relish and admire, but as a thing alien to me.\(^7\)

In a reply to this criticism,\(^8\) Dixon shows an open and refreshing humility, particularly in light of the fact that he, rather than Hopkins, was a successful, published poet. The letter of December 1881 is Hopkins' reply and explanation:

> I should tell you that I by no means objected to the

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\(^7\)Hopkins, *Correspondence*, pp. 82,83.

\(^8\)Ibid., p. 90.
couplet 'Rattled her keys,' I admired it as a happy medley: I thought the fusion or rather the pieing was less happy in the opening of the poem.9

What concerns us is the construction of the final sentence, which, it seems to me, results in the juxtaposition of the words "fusion" and "pieing." Hopkins corrects his original choice of language, reaching for a more precise word: "fusion or rather the pieing . . . ."

The OED gives the following definition for fusion:
"3. The union or blending together of different things (whether material or immaterial) as if by melting, so as to form one whole; the result or state of being blended."

And so we come to a most important point, one which will be treated at greater length in the conclusion of this work: Hopkins' preference for visual images illustrative of piedness. In the passage quoted above, he rejects "fusion" because it is not the correct word. He sees the world as a unity, but as a unity of opposition. "Fusion" implies a union in which all contrariety is submerged into the one, rather than maintained in a state of stress, of existence, by the intrinsic force of instress. Of course, "fusion" implies the existence of at least two things which are fused. I am not quibbling with the fact, but with the conceptual connotation of the word. "Fusion" implies a much stronger kind of unity than does the word "pieing." "Fusion" does not leave room for the mind to grasp any handle of contrary

9Ibid., p. 97.
opposition. Everything is too much one for the mind to advert easily to the complexity that is the fundament of the union. "Pieing" is a word which denotes a basically visual image, one which represents a contrast capable of being seen immediately. And, even when the word is not used to describe visually variegated objects, the original meaning of the word spills over into its analogous usage.

On 17 August 1874, as recorded in his journal, Hopkins was invited by Charles Hughes Clifford, 8th baron, to visit Ugbrooke Park, Chudleigh, the ancestral home of the Cliffords. While there, he explored an area known as the Danish Camp, although, as he remarked, "it seemed to be Roman but was used in Alfred's war with the Danes."\textsuperscript{10} From there he went to "a spot where Dryden wrote the Hind and Panther"\textsuperscript{11} and then to "a great oak . . . which . . . goes by the name of Great Rawber."\textsuperscript{12} He then describes the area:

Beeches rich in leaf, rather brown in colour, one much spread -- Tall larches on slope of a hill near the lake and mill, also a wychelm, also a beech, both of these with ivory-white bark pied with green moss: there was an instress about this spot.\textsuperscript{13}

The immediate proximity of the words "pied" and "in-stress" is, of course, what draws me to a consideration of this passage. We must keep in mind what has been said earlier

\textsuperscript{10}Hopkins, Journals, p. 253.
\textsuperscript{11}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{12}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13}Ibid.
concerning the relationship of Hopkins' conception of instress to his use of dapple images. Let me attempt to trace, in the light of that relationship and my discussion so far, what may have been the impact of the series of events at Ugbrooke Park on Hopkins' thought.

The immediate thing to note is his consciousness of being present at a spot where history of various and vital kinds has been made: an apparently Roman camp which had served Alfred the Great in his campaign against the Danish invaders; a place where one of England's great poets and dramatists had composed one of his most famous works, a work, by the way, having to do with the religious conflict not unknown to Hopkins, a conflict which had taken place in his own heart and mind; and, finally, a place where nature showed forth in all her obvious contrasts: beeches, larches, wychelm, the great oak, and, in the case of the wychelm and one of the beeches, the final evidence, "ivory-white bark pied with green moss." He sees a great stretch of time, from the Roman occupation to the war with the Danes to Dryden to himself, telescoped into the unity of one moment. Time and history are united with the palpable presence of the trees and the remains of the camp: all this diversity united and held together by the instress of the moment. And I do not think it accidental or coincidental that the word "pied" should appear just shortly before his concluding observation: "there was an instress about this spot."
We have one more word to consider in this first category of Hopkins' usages as I have constructed them on pages 146 and 147.

In April of 1879, while at Oxford, Hopkins completed a poem on Henry Purcell, a composer whom, along with Carl Maria Weber, he much admired. Although the word I shall be considering ("mottling") appears in a letter to Robert Bridges, the passage itself involves a discussion of this particular poem. And, since I shall be treating the discussion at some length, I feel that it is to the reader's advantage to have the subject of that discussion at hand. Therefore, I shall take the liberty of quoting the poem in full, for the purpose of easier reference.

Henry Purcell

The poet wishes well to the divine genius of Purcell and praises him that, whereas other musicians have given utterance to the moods of man's mind, he has, beyond that, uttered in notes the very make and species of man as created both in him and in all men generally.

Have fair fallen, 0 fair, fair have fallen, so dear
To me, so arch-especial a spirit as heaves in Henry Purcell,
An age is now passed, since parted; with the reversal
Of the outward sentence low lays him, listed to a heresy, here.
No mood in him nor meaning, proud fire or sacred fear,
Or love a pity or all that sweet notes not his might nurse:
It is the forged feature finds me; it is the rehearsal
Of own, of abrupt self there so thrusts on, so throngs the ear.

Let him oh! with his air of angels then lift me, lay me!
only I'll
Have an eye to the sakes of him, quaint moonmarks, to his pelted plumage under
Wings: so some great stormfowl, whenever he has walked his while

The thunder-purple seabeach plumed purple-of-thunder, If a wuthering of his palmy snow-pinions scattered a colossal smile
Off him, but meaning motion fans fresh our wits with wonder.

In a letter written to Bridges from Stonyhurst College and dated 4 January 1883, the following explanatory passage occurs:

The sonnet on Purcell means this: 1-4. I hope Purcell is not damned for being a Protestant, because I love his genius. 5-8. And that not so much for gifts he shares, even though it should be in higher measure, with other musicians as for his own individuality. 9-14. So that while he is aiming only at impressing me his hearer with the meaning in hand I am looking out meanwhile for his specific, his individual markings and mottlings, 'the sakes of him.'

And here occurs the key word for us. Hopkins goes on to elaborate somewhat the meaning of this final sentence: "It is when a bird thinking only of soaring spreads its wings: a beholder may happen then to have his attention drawn by the act to the plumage displayed."

A much earlier letter, written the month following the completion of the poem, serves to explain even further this notion of the bird. The letter is dated 26 May 1879, and was written to Bridges from St. Giles, Oxford.

The sestet of the Purcell sonnet is not so clearly worked out as I could wish. The thought is that as the seabird opening his wings with a whiff of wind in your face means the whirr of the motion, but also unaware gives you a

15Ibid.
whiff of knowledge about his plumage, the marking of
which stamps his species, that he does not mean, so
Purcell, seemingly intent only on the thought or feel­
ing he is to express or call out, incidentally lets
you remark the individualising marks of his own genius.16

The next paragraph takes up the meaning and uses of
the word _sakes_. (In the later letter, that of January, 1883,
he will admit that "'Sakes' is hazardous: about that point
I was more bent on saying my say than on being understood in
it."17) His explanation in this earlier letter, neverthe­
less, is fresh from the completion of the poem:

_Sake_ is a word I find it convenient to use . . . . It
is the sake of 'for the sake of,' forsake, namesake,
keepsake. I mean by it the being a thing has outside
itself, as a voice by its echo, a face by its reflect­
ion, a body by its shadow, a man by his name, fame, or
memory, and also that in the thing by virtue of which
especially it has this being abroad, and that is some­
thing distinctive, marked, specifically or individually
speaking, as for a voice and echo clearness; for a re­
flected body bulk; for a man genius, great achieve­
ments, amiability, and so on. In this case it is, as
the sonnet says, distinctive quality in genius.18

What Hopkins is saying is simply that actions as well
as words carry connotative impact, sometimes even beyond or
in addition to the intention of the agent, as is also true
with language. But it is a combination of circumstances,
of the observer and of the moment, which mix to create pre­
cisely the right opportunity. And thus, an action done or a
word said will suddenly reveal to the observer, under these
circumstances, a penetration to the individual nature of the

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16 Ibid., p. 83.
17 Ibid., p. 171. 18 Ibid., p. 83.
subject acting or speaking. Hopkins, with his outlook, had trained himself to have an affinity for such moments of insight. He was always "looking out meanwhile for his specific, his individual markings and mottlings, 'the sakes of him.'"

It is important to note here that the poet uses a series of words which do not displace one another, but, rather, reinforce one another. He is looking for "markings," "mottlings," and "sakes." The being a thing has outside itself, its "sakes," is totally and completely tied to the individual as such. This fact is obvious from the examples Hopkins uses: an echo, a shadow, a reflection, a name. "Sakes" also means whatever it is that the thing possesses which gives it this "being abroad." And here he mentions that for a voice, that by which it has a distinctive other existence is **clearness**; for a reflected image, **brightness**; for a shadow-casting body, **bulk**; for a man, **genius**. None of these examples is attributed to a genus, or even to a species; the attribution and the natural association in each case is to and with the **individual**.

Again, in no case do we have existences which are **absolutely** separated from one another: the two-fold distinction of "sakes" describes kinds of existence which are united at least radically, e.g., face and reflection, voice and echo, etc. The totality of separation is only apparent: it is the **same** face which is reflected, the **same** voice
echoed. The clearness in question does not exist divorced from the voice in question, nor does the man's genius have an existence without reference and relation to him or to the work produced by him as flowing from that genius. Thus, we are immediately returned to a consideration of the tension which holds together the "sakes," both the "being a thing has outside itself" and "that in the thing by virtue of which . . . it has this being abroad." And this tension is nothing else but instress.

Of the second grouping of words, I have, in the third chapter, considered the first two (plotted and pieced) at some length. The OED provides the following definitions for the remaining words of this second category: Barred: "3. Ornamented with bars . . . striped, streaked;" Braided:"a. Plaited, woven, entwined;" Fret: "1. Ornamental interlaced work; a net; an ornament (esp. for the hair) consisting of jewels or flowers in network. b. [v] transf. To variegate, chequer, form a pattern upon;" Lace: "c. To intertwine, to place together as if interwoven. 6. To diversify with streaks of colour;" Mealy: "5. Of colour: Spotty, uneven. Of colours of horses: Spotty, interspersed with whitish specks;" and, finally, Paling: "Decoration with 'pales' or vertical stripes."

Obviously, I have been selective in my choice of the variant definitions, for I have assumed all along that where a word can mean pied and where the context will accept a pied
interpretation, Hopkins so uses it. However, one thing becomes apparent immediately, and that is that it is possible to use all, or nearly all, of these words without reference to variegation save in the fact that they involve some kind of contrast. Thus, fretwork can conceivably be composed of an intertwining of the same materials having the same color, thus affording little contrast. The same is true of barring, braiding, lacing, and paling. Even mealy can mean simply coarse-grained or rough-textured. Therefore, when I categorize these words as not invariably meaning dappled, I am referring to the fact that we do not always and immediately associate dappling with them, as, for instance, we must with such words as pied, stippled, mottled, etc. The question, then, is how does Hopkins use them?

Barred occurs twice, once in the journal and once in a poem, "Spring and Death."19 The poem presents no difficulty, but a brief note on the journal entry may be helpful.

On 3 May 1868, the poet recorded that the day was "bright, with haze -- dark-in-bright --, hot, and like summer; when cloud formed it was delicately barred."20

Does this mean color-barred? We have no way of knowing, but I assume it to mean that the contrast noted before ("dark-in-bright") is made more evident by the cloud formation.

20Hopkins, Journals, p. 165.
Braided occurs once, in the journal, where he describes a sunset with clouds through which "Spits or beams braided or built in with slanting pellet flakes made their way." I am not at all certain what the "pellet flakes" may have been, but they were obviously sufficiently contrasting to have gained his attention.

Fret appears three times, all in the journal:

Sept. 2. [1867] Fair, sometimes sunny, sometimes grey with mouldings; bright sand frettings at sunset.

Feb. 7. [1868] Fine morning, cloudy afternoon; Prism. colours on clouds at 9:30 -- on the stationary slips: frets of fine net in motion, expatiating, etc., were passing quickly; some rain in afternoon.

[11 July 1868] All the herbage enthroned with every fingered or fretted leaf.

It seems to me that we are dealing with contrast in texture more than in color. In the first case, he may be speaking about the ridges formed in the sand making a kind of pattern. There is also the possibility that he is comparing the cloud formations with the same formations (those running ridges) one finds at the seashore. In either case, the contrast seems one of mass rather than of color. The second entry provides the possibility of color contrast. He has stated the presence of prismatic colors on the clouds.

21 Ibid., p. 142.
22 Ibid., p. 155.
23 Ibid., p. 160.
24 Ibid., p. 172.
especially on the stationary "slips" or wisps that hang nearly motionless sometimes. About these, however, were intertwinings of fine vapor enlarging and whirling away, I suppose, rather quickly. It is difficult to determine whether he means that these "fine" nets were fretted into and among the "stationary slips" or were separate from them entirely. Either way, the contrast is present. In the final entry, I have difficulty conceiving his meaning to be anything other than that the leaves were each patterned ("fretted") in some way. He does not say the herbage was enthronged with fretted leaves, as if the leaves were all entwined among themselves. Rather, he specifies each ("every") leaf as fretted.

Of the words in this category, I find the last three to be the most interesting because they are, of the group, the least likely to find common use as indicative of dappling. Whatever the alternate possible meanings of braided, barred, and fret, we are not surprised to see them appear as descriptive of piedness. I do not believe this to be the case with the remaining three words.

Mealy, as mentioned above, has the more common impression of something as coarsegrained. And, in the single instance we find of its use, in the early diaries, it could quite easily support this interpretation.

On 23 January 1866, Hopkins recorded a series of trenchant observations about a number of things, among which
the following appears: "Mealy clouds with a not brilliant moon."\textsuperscript{25} Certainly, this is an acceptable description of coarsegrained or rough-textured clouds. However, in the sentence immediately preceding this one, he has noted: "Soft chalky look with more shadowy middles of the globes of cloud on a night with a moon faint or concealed."\textsuperscript{26}

Now, a night "with a moon faint or concealed" is a night "with a not brilliant moon." And clouds that are "mealy" on such a night are also clouds "with more shadowy middles of the globes." Thus, the contrast Hopkins describes as \textit{mealy} is between light and shadow, i.e., it is a visual contrast and thus more properly a dappling.

\textit{Lace} appears twice, each time in poems. The first example is another instance of Hopkins' tendency to merge things. It is from another "pied" poem, one more subtly so than "Pied Beauty," and also, perhaps, not so successful.

In August of 1880, at Hampstead, Hopkins completed a poem which he entitled "Brothers." It was written in "Sprung rhythm; three feet to the line; lines free-ended and not overrove; and reversed or counterpointed rhythm allowed in the first foot."\textsuperscript{27}

The opening lines of the poem set the stage for the point which Hopkins will make in the conclusion:

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{25}Ibid., p. 72.
\item \textsuperscript{26}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{27}Hopkins, \textit{Poems}, p. 279.
\end{enumerate}
How lovely the elder brother's
Life all laced in the other's
Love-laced! --

He then goes on to tell what the incident was which led him to see the intimacy of the two brothers' reactions to one another.

what once I well
Witnessed; so fortune fell.
When Shrovetide, two years gone,
Our boys' plays brought on
Part was picked for John,
Young John; then fear, then joy
Ran revel in the elder boy.
Now the night come; all
Our company thronged the hall;
Henry, by the wall,
declined me beside him:
I came where called, and eyed him
By meanwhile; making my play
Turn most on tender byplay.
For, wrung all on love's rack,
My lad, and lost in Jack,
Smiled, blushed, and bit his lip;
Or drove, with a diver's dip,
Clutched hands through clasped knees;
And many a mark like these,
Told tales with what heart's stress
He hung on the imp's success.
Now the other was brass-bold:
He had no work to hold
His heart up at the strain;
Nay, roguish ran the vein.
Two tedious acts were past;
Jack's call and cue at last;
When Henry, heart-forsook,
Dropped eyes and dared not look.
There! the hall rung!
Dog, he did give tongue!
But Harry -- in his hands he has flung
His tear-tricked cheeks of flame
For fond love and for shame.

The interplay between the two boys, the brashness of the one and the agonizing empathy of the other, is seen by Hopkins as illustrative of the many facets of nature itself:
Ah Nature, framed in fault,  
There's comfort then, there's salt;  
Nature, bad, base, and blind,  
Dearly thou canst be kind;  
There dearly then, dearly,  
Dearly thou canst be kind.

Once again, we note this contrary opposition Hopkins sees so universally: the comfort and the salt; and nature, "bad, base, and blind," can also be kind. The poem is one of contrasts united: the older boy and his uncertainty and concern that the younger will do well; that one, certain of himself, without doubts about his success. And the two brought together in the older's concern: "the elder brother's life all laced in the other." Finally, the larger stage on which the drama is played out: life itself, and the possibilities for contrast which it provides.

The other appearance of the word lace is in Hopkins' remarkable poem of 1888, "That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire and of the Comfort of the Resurrection." The notes to Gardner's and MacKenzie's 4th edition describe it as "Sprung rhythm, with many outrides and hurried feet: sonnet with two [sic] codas."28

That Hopkins would naturally be drawn to an interest in Heraclitus is evident from that philosopher's own outlook on nature: "According to Heraclitus (c. 535 - c. 475 B.C.) all things are in a state of flux, being differentiations produced by strife (polemos) of a single mobile principle -- fire."29

28Ibid., p. 293. 29Ibid., p. 294.
Recognizing the fact that the analogy may not be drawn too fine, I may still suggest the possible equation, or rather, ratio: fire is to flux as instress is to contrary opposition, keeping in mind, of course, that for Heraclitus, fire was also the principle of flux. For Hopkins, instress is not the principle of opposition, but only that force which maintains opposites in "cooperative" existence, or in stress.

The poem itself is in two parts, the first dealing in some detail with nature as Heraclitean, i.e., in constant change, holding together and yet doomed ultimately to dissolution:

Cloud-puffball, torn tufts, tossed pillows flaunt forth, then chevy on an air-built thoroughfare: heaven-roysterers, in gay-gangs they throng; they glitter in marches. Down roughcast, down dazzling whitewash, wherever an elm arches, Shivelights and shadowtackle in long lashes lace, lance, and pair. Delightfully the bright wind boisterous ropes, wrestles, beats earth bare Of yestertempest's creases; in pool and rutpeel parches Squandering ooze to squeezed dough, crust, dust; stanches, starches Squadroned masks and manmarks treadmire toil there Footfretted in it. Million-fueled, nature's bonfire burns on. But quench her bonniest, dearest to her, her clearest-selved spark Man, how fast his firedint, his mark on mind, is gone! Both are in an unfathomable, all is in an enormous dark Drowned. O pity and indignation! Manshape, that shone Sheer off, disseveral, a star, death blots black out; nor mark Is any of him at all so stark But vastness blurs and time beats level.

But, it is the Resurrection which not only redeems
but re-assembles this world. Because Christ had become man, man shares in what Christ is and in what Christ does:

Enough! the Resurrection,
A heart's-clarion! Away grief's gasping, joyless days, dejection.

Across my foundering deck shone
A beacon, an eternal beam. Flesh fade, and mortal trash
Fall to the residuary worm; world's wildfire, leave but ash:

In a flash, at a trumpet crash,
I am all at once what Christ is, since he was what I am, and
This Jack, joke, poor potsherid, patch, matchwood, immortal diamond,

Is immortal diamond.

This poem, too, is concerned with the relationship of opposites, the union of apparent contradictories: a world doomed to die yet promised life; a world dissolved yet re-assembled; a collection of vastly different elements somehow harmonized.

It is shivelights and shadowtackle that "lace, lance, and pair." Shivelights are "strips of light."

The OED gives no compound form shivelight, but does define shive as "a splinter" and lists its cognate sheave as "a variant of shive" meaning "a fragment, splinter." Hence, shivelights are "fragments," "splinters," "strips" of light.

The possible combinations of shadow with other words are numerous, but the OED nowhere lists shadowtackle.

The first definition of tackle as a substantive is: "Apparatus, utensils, instruments, implements, appliances;

30 Ibid.
equipment, furniture, gear." There is no other definition which would be, in my opinion, in any way applicable to the situation of the word under discussion. Consequently, it is obvious already at this point that, in the combination form, we are going to have to take the word analogously.

Shadow is defined in several senses, first as "comparative darkness, esp. that caused by interception of light; a tract of partial darkness produced by a body intercepting the direct rays of the sun or other luminary."

It does not seem that any profitable result is to be obtained by using the word in this sense in the combination form, although the point is arguable and a case may be made. We shall see this later. A more common understanding of the word is the definition:

The dark figure which a body 'casts' or 'throws' upon a surface by intercepting the direct rays of the sun or other luminary; the image (approximately the exact or more or less distorted) which the figure presents of the form of the intercepting body.

Assuming the combination of shivelights and shadow-tackle into "long lashes," it is conceivable that the only contrast necessary to establish "pieing" would be between these two words. Thus, shadowtackle (whatever that might mean) would be in contrast to "strips of light." Therefore, the first meaning of shadow would be acceptable. However, how does one pair the definition of tackle with this? We should have to envision something like "dark equipment," which is certainly possible, but really rather negates the
the need for the word shadow, which itself demands some relation to light. Let us look more closely at the expression itself, and the language which precedes it.

The poet states clearly that it is "wherever an elm arches" that "shivelights and shadowtackle in long lashes lace, lance, and pair." Because of this setting, I take the "shivelights" passage to mean that "strips of light" mingle with the shadows cast in the lowering light, shadows cast by the arching elms. Shadowtackle is understood in a partially figurative sense (the tackle part), as expressing something on the order of "the equipment, or the gear, of shadow-making." In this case, the concomitant furniture is a complex of tree, branches, light. And the dappling effect of shadows and light comes about as they lace and pair.

The OED defines paling as "1. Decoration with 'pales' or vertical stripes," which more or less places the word in the category of "barred," a word I have indicated might as easily mean a purely textural contrast rather than a visual one. Nevertheless, what causes me to place this word among the more interesting uses made by the poet is its appearance in the poem "The Starlight Night." The only other occurrence of the word is in a letter to the magazine Nature, dated from Stonyhurst, 21 December 1883.31 Its use here is obviously one indicating dappling, and does not require further explication. Its appearance in the poem is somewhat

31Hopkins, Correspondence, p. 166.
more significant, however, and I shall consider it in detail.

Once again, and I cannot help but point out the fact, Hopkins gives us a "pied" poem. The inescapable fact of his worldvision is overwhelming.

In the first part of the poem, he compares the star-lit sky with the earth itself:

Look at the stars! look, look up at the skies! 
O look at all the fire-folk sitting in the air! 
The bright boroughs, the circle-citadels there! 
Down in dim woods the diamond delves! the elves'-eyes! 
The grey lawns cold where gold, where quickgold lies! 
Wind-beat whitebeam! airy abeles set on a flare! 
Flake-doves sent floating forth at a farmyard scare!—

Mariani gives us a clear analysis of this view, which, as he says, "to my knowledge has not been pointed out. He radically changes the point of vision and while we are still looking up, up has become "Down" in line four."32 And he continues:

But here Hopkins is deliberately reversing our vantage point, literally turning us on our heads (or perhaps lift-us "above" the sky) to see the unity of all creation and to glean Christ operative in all nature. The dark heavens studded with stars become "dim woods" studded with diamond mines, as well as grey lawns studded with myriad droplets of quivering, translucent dew ("quick-gold"). The stars vibrant in the heavens are white undersides of "whitebeams" and "airy abeles" stirred up and shaking brilliantly and unsteadily in the wind. Again, they are frightened doves scattering in the distance into so many flakes of light.33

And what is the poet's conclusion concerning all this?

32Mariani, A Commentary, p. 98.
33Ibid., pp. 98,99.
What are we to see in all this piedness, and how does it affect us?

Ah well! it is all a purchase, all is a prize.
Buy then! bid then! -- What? -- Prayer, patience, alms, vows.
Look, look: a May-mess, like an orchard boughs!
Look! March-bloom, like on mealed-with-yellow sallows!

Mariani continues:

This beauty and this vision, the speaker tells us, "is all a purchase, all is a prize." But what currency will buy it? what is offered for it? the speaker asks, in auction-room terms. Not money but "Prayer, patience, alms, vows." Insofar as we can possess this fleeting beauty, we can best do this by sacrificing ourselves freely and by buying for ourselves eternal beauty -- Christ. For all of this beauty was bought back by Christ's purchase, by his Redemption.34

But there is more to the poem than this. There are three more lines, important lines, in which occurs the word we are discussing:

These are indeed the barn; withindoors house
The shocks. This piece-bright paling shuts the spouse
Christ home, Christ and his mother and all his hallows.

According to Mariani, "the stars in the heavens ("This piece-bright paling") form a fence (paling) shuttering home Christ and Mary and 'all his hallows.'"35

Basically, of course, Mariani is correct, at least in the fact that the stars are the sources of the "piece-bright paling." However, since paling is defined as made up of "pales" or "vertical stripes," my own interpretation would relate the expression to the words which appear in the first part

34Ibid., p. 99.
35Ibid.
of the poem: "Wind-beat whitebeam! airy abeles set on a flare!" An abele is a white poplar tree. Therefore, if we take the "whitebeam" (ray of light) as the "abele" (tree), we can picture it as flowing or streaming from the star ("set on a flare"). At the same time, then, we have the "pales" or "vertical stripes" (the rays) necessary for our "piece-bright paling" and the contrast against the black sky.

The "piedness" of this poem is evidenced by Mariani's opening comment to the effect that Hopkins has reversed our "vantage point." He has taken his dappled world and turned it upside down, seeing in the heavens all the contrast and variegation so obviously present in the earth.

The word mackerel or some variant of it appears six times in the works of Hopkins, five in the journals and once in a letter to the magazine *Nature*. I have listed this as the only word in category three: words which mean dappling relative to certain things but which Hopkins uses otherwise. For the purpose of developing his use of the word, I shall discuss all six instances.

The OED defines mackerel as meaning dappled only in reference to a sky, and a mackerel-sky is one "dappled with white fleecy clouds (cirro-cumulus)." Note that it is the sky which is dappled, not the clouds.

The word first appears in the journal on 2 June 1866:

Bright and hot, strong blue with bright changing clouds, besides the high thin grassy tails. -- Yesterday, I think, for instance, rain clouds were broken into mackerel at sunset (which then were illuminated dun-colour
parted by pale blue) and near midnight had become smaller fleecy spots which in the moonlight silvered the sky.36

It occurs again in the journal entry for 9 June 1866: "The sky is now (nine o'clock evening) sad grey with dirty darker patterning, scud spots, etc, and some very faintly made out mackerelling -- Western openings pale yellow."37 This entry is followed the next day by the remark: "Bright, with mackerelling now and then."38

There is no reason to read these entries as other than conventional usage of the word to describe the sky. The same is true for the entry of 14 June: "Fair, with more or less mackerelling,"39 although the first possibility of a departure from normal usage arises. What is a "more or less" mackerel-sky? Does that mean a sky with a few cirro-cumulus clouds in it? We may still assume that Hopkins is referring to the sky, but at least one begins (or one may begin) to suspect that he is talking about the clouds themselves. This feeling is strengthened by the next entry, that of 14 August 1867:

Hot; fine, with haze; at six in the evening a wonderful rack of what I hear they call 'flock-of-sheep' clouds, a dapple of plump rounds half parted, half branching from one another like madreporites: the edge was pulled straight, and where in the west the rack

36Hopkins, Journals, p. 138.
37Ibid., p. 139.
38Ibid.
39Ibid., p. 140.
sunk to the earth they were somewhat bright and gaily waved in diminishing pieces: as time went on through all the rack the parts seemed to close up more and form yokes -- whether this was really so or only that the shadows, which continued to grow and run up, bound them together in mackerelling to the eye . . . .

It is, of course, the final few words which concern us. And it is evident to me that Hopkins is no longer describing a mackerel sky, but, rather, mackerel clouds. He writes of the "flock-of-sheep" clouds as being a "dapple." Then, he describes them as seeming "to close up more and form yokes." But, he is not certain whether or not this is merely an illusion: perhaps the contrast of the shadows against these "somewhat bright" clouds "bound them together in mackerelling to the eye."

If there is any doubt that Hopkins tended to transfer the notion of a mackerel-sky to the cloud formations themselves, the letter of December 1883, from which I have quoted earlier, should dispel it:

A bright sunset lines the clouds so that their brims look like gold, brass, bronze, or steel. It fetches out those dazzling flecks and spangles which people call fish-scales. It gives to a mackerel or dappled cloudrack the appearance of quilted crimson silk, or a ploughed field glazed with crimson ice.

He is clearly writing of a rack of clouds which is itself mackerel, a term he equates with dappled.

Hopkins makes use of three words which have no meaning related to dappling: fickly, wattled, and peaked ("peak'd").

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40 Ibid., pp. 150, 151.

41 Hopkins, Correspondence, p. 164.
Yet, he uses them certainly to mean pied.

Fickle appears in two places, one of which, in the sonnet "Pied Beauty," we have already discussed. The other occurrence is in the "Fragment of Castara Victrix," an uncompleted verse drama. Daphnis speaks:

Good Valerian, I will come. (exit V.
Why should I go because Castara goes?
I do not, but to please Valerian.
But why then should Castara weigh with me?
Why, there's an interest and sweet soul in beauty
Which makes us eye-attentive to the eye
That has it; and she is fairer than Colomb,
Selvaggia, Orinda, and Adela, and the rest.
Fairer? These are the flaring shows unlovely
That make my eyes sore and cross-colour things
With fickle spots of sadness;

In the passage which is of interest to our purposes, Daphnis states that there are situations which cause him to see life as pied, but as pied with unhappiness. It might be well to point out the difference between "cross-colour" as it is used here and that other compound, "couple-colour." Both words mean simply parti-colored. But the nuance of "cross" in connection with Daphnis' feelings should not be mistaken. And how does he go about "cross-colouring" things? He does it with "fickle spots of sadness." Any comment on the word fickle should consider the possibility that even in the gloom of his soliloquy, Daphnis may have a subconscious realization that sadness comes and goes, interplaying with happiness in this life. If this is so, then fickle becomes an even better word to describe this changeable aspect of human nature.
Wattled occurs in a combined form in "Penmaen Pool," dated August, 1876. The complete stanza reads:

The Mawddach, how she trips! though throttled
If flood tide teeming thrills her full,
And mazy sands all water-wattled
Waylay her at ebb, past Penmaen Pool.

I cannot find any definition for wattle, or wattled, which indicates dappling or pieing as such. And yet the context of the poem assures the reader that this is the meaning. Mazy means "full of windings and turnings," but, more to the point, it also means "having convoluted markings." Hopkins clearly means that the markings are made by the water at ebb tide, when, as the sea recedes, the sands in the sun actually become "mottled." But, Hopkins does not use the word mottled. Rather, he speaks of sands "wattled" by the water. Wattled is listed in the OED as meaning "interlaced" when said "of branches, twigs, etc." Therefore, I take the expression to mean that the convoluted markings are made up of an interlacing of dark and light patches where the water has been partially dried at ebb tide. The convoluted markings might also be taken for the ridges which form in wavy patterns in beach sand. I prefer the first interpretation, but the second would not alter the understanding of the drying sand as "water-wattled."

Peaked is an example of Hopkins' sometimes daring willingness to use language in contexts entirely unrelated to the original or current meanings of the words involved. There is no definition of peaked in the OED which is even
remotely suggestive of **dappling** or **pieing**. And yet this is precisely how Hopkins uses the word.

In the early diaries, under the date of 14 September 1864, he is obviously experimenting with descriptive expressions. Following upon such phrases as "Stars like gold tufts," "Stars like golden bees," and "Stars like golden rowels," we come upon "Sky peak'd with tiny flames." Now, the word peak does have the meaning of "a small point of flame." And so taken here, we can imagine a pied sky, i.e., blackness spotted ("pointed") with stars. But, this is a descriptive phrase meaning something dappled. That Hopkins uses the word alone to indicate contrast and variety is shown from the entry which follows almost immediately upon the one we are now treating. Almost as a summary, Hopkins writes: "Altogether peak is a good word. For sunlight through shutter, locks of hair, rays in brass knobs, etc. Meadows peaked with flowers." Sunlight streaming through shutters forms a pattern, a dappling effect, as do rays in doorknobs, and the highlights in coiled hair. And a meadow peaked with flowers is a spotted meadow.

As far as I know, Hopkins invented two words to express the notion of piedness. They are **betweenpie** and **footfretted**. The latter we have already met, in the poem, "That

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42 Hopkins, Journals, p. 46.
43 Ibid., p. 47.
Nature is a Heraclitean Fire and of the Comfort of the Resurrection." And I have treated at some length the possible understandings and usages of the word fret (fretted). It means a pattern of some kind. In the case of its use in this poem, Raymond Schader defines it as "stamped into intricate interlaced pattern or fretting."44.

Schader gives the following for the word betweenpie: "Make pied, produce varicolored contrast with and between."45 The word appears in one of the so-called "terrible" sonnets (number 69 in the 4th edition):

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let joy size
At God knows when to God knows what; whose smile
's not wrung, see you; unforseen times rather -- as skies
Betweenpie mountains -- lights a lovely mile.
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Schader remarks: "The verb pie has no recognized standing in this exact sense, but only 'to heap up, jumble,' as of type."46 The pied nature of the word requires no defense: the context is proof sufficient. One interesting point to me, however, is that Hopkins turns to his dappled world to find an expression of happiness in the midst of his anguish.

The final word to be considered in this chapter is one which seems to be a synonym for dappled, but which defies

45Ibid.
46Ibid.
precise categorization.

In the sixteenth stanza of "The Wreck of the Deutschland," the following lines appear:

He was pitched to his death at a blow,
For all his dreadnought breast and braids of thew:
They could tell him for hours, dandled the to and fro
Through the cobbled foam-fleece. What could he do
With the burl of the fountains of air, buck and the flood of the wave?

Cobble has several meanings, most connected with mending, except for: "A water-worn rounded stone, esp. of the size suitable for paving." Cobbled, then, can mean paved with water-worn rounded stones, which does not seem to be of much assistance in the context in which we find the word.

It is possible, of course, that Hopkins uses the word simply because of its phonetic associations with words such as dappled, dabbled, and mottled, all of which convey the notion of piedness. Perhaps, there is a certain sense of nuance in like-sounding words which influences the mind to see like-meanings, as well.

On the other hand, there is a remarkable, at least to me, resemblance of this passage to a section in one of Hopkins' unfinished poems, "Epithalamion." In his note to the first edition, Robert Bridges writes: "It was to have been an Ode on the occasion of his brother [Everard's] marriage, which fixes the date as 1888." It also establishes it as having been written well over ten years after the composition of

47 Hopkins, Poems, p. 317.
"The Wreck of the Deutschland."

In the passage which is relevant to our discussion, Hopkins describes a wood

That leans along the loins of hills, where a candy-coloured, where a gluegold-brown
Marbled river, boisterously beautiful, between
Roots and rocks is danced and dandled, all in froth and water-blowballs, down.

The word "dandled" appears in each passage. In one case it is the helpless seaman who swings to and fro beyond the reach of assistance; in the other, it is the river itself which "is danced and dandled." In the stanza from the "Deutschland," the body of the sailor, caught in the rope's coils, swings above the level of the water, through the pounding spray, which the poet describes as "foam-fleece." In the wedding-poem, the river, dancing as it is between roots and rocks, churns up "froth and water-blowballs." I take froth to be almost synonymous with foam-fleece.

If, allowing for the differences in the events which occasioned the poems, we will accept the similarity of the passages, then I shall offer the following as a possible justification for the interpretation of cobbled as meaning dappled, or something quite near it.

In the wedding-poem passage, similar in so many ways to the "Deutschland" stanza, the river is described as "marbled," a word whose pied denotation is a settled question, by definition alone:

2. Variegated in colour like certain marbles. a. Coloured or stained by a technical process with variegated
patterns. b. Veined, mottled, or dappled (with markings of various colours).

I would like to suggest the possible juxtaposition of cobbled with marbled, as I have done with foam-fleece and froth. Then, cobbled becomes a synonym for dappled.
CHAPTER VI

"HOW ALL'S TO ONE THING WROUGHT!"

In the last chapter, several poems were discussed under the general heading of "pied" poems. Strictly speaking, they should have been left for this chapter. However, since in each case a specific, pied word was involved, I felt it necessary to discuss each poem in its entirety, along with the word.

In the present chapter, I shall concern myself with examples of dappling which do not utilize specific words meaning dappling, but which, through a combination of images, convey that effect.

The most obvious immediate division is into those images related to the sense and those which represent a piedness conceived in a more abstract atmosphere.

In the case of the latter, I shall offer but one example. Undoubtedly there are more (we have, in fact, seen some in the earlier chapters). I have selected this one, however, because, first of all, it does not immediately seem to be such an image; and, secondly, it occurs in another of those "pied" poems, "On a Piece of Music."

The poem itself is undated, and the following observations, by W.H.Gardner, are pertinent:
The subject of the poem, as R.B. said (1st Edn., p. 101; this edn., p. 243), is that the artistic individuality is something beyond the artist's control; but the second half of the poem develops the counter-motif of st. 2: -- though pure art may be 'good' and morally neutral, the man underlying the artist has moral obligations; and moral beauty (the 'right') is the higher perfection.¹

The lines I have chosen as representative of piedness in the abstract are the opening lines of the poem:

How all's to one thing wrought!
The members, how they sit!

These are the opening lines of the poem as it is printed in the 4th edition. That there is a possible alternate arrangement is made clear in the notes to the same edition: "The stanza printed last was probably intended, originally, to begin the poem: St. 3, in brackets, was a later variant of it and could be omitted."²

The fragmentary nature of the poem is further accentuated by Professor MacKenzie's addition to the notes: "We now enclose the title in brackets, thus drawing attention to the absence of MS. authority for it. It was supplied by R.B."³

My own arrangement begins with the final stanza (as printed) and omits stanza three. The poems as it appears in the 4th edition is reproduced in the footnotes.⁴

¹Hopkins, Poems, p. 313.
²Ibid. ³Ibid.
⁴The poem ("On a Piece of Music") as printed in the 4th edition:

How all's to one thing wrought!
The members, how they sit!
(On a Piece of Music)

Who built these walls made known
The music of his mind,
Yet here he has but shewn
His ruder-rounded rind.
His brightest blooms lie there unblown,
His sweetest nectar hides behind.

O what a tune the thought
Must be that fancied it.

Nor angel insight can
Learn how the heart is hence:
Since all the make of man
Is law's indifference.

[Who shaped these walls has shewn
The music of his mind,
Made known, though thick through stone,
What beauty beat behind]

Not free in this because
His powers seemed free to play:
He swept what scope he was
To sweep and must obey.

Though down his being's bent
Like air he changed in choice,
That was an instrument
Which overvaulted voice.

What makes the man: and what
The man within that makes:
Ask whom he serves or not
Serves and what side he takes.

For good grows wild and wide,
Has shades, is nowhere none;
But right must seek a side
And choose for chieftain one.

Therefore this masterhood
This piece of perfect song,
This fault-not-found-with good
Is neither right nor wrong.

No more than red and blue,
No more than Re and Mi,
Or sweet the golden glue
That's built for by the bee.
How all's to one thing wrought!  
The members, how they sit!  
O what a tune the thought  
Must be that fancied it.

Nor angel insight can  
Learn how the heart is hence:  
Since all the make of man  
Is law's indifference.

Not free in this because  
His powers seemed free to play:  
He swept what scope he was  
To sweep and must obey.

Though down his being's bent  
Like air he changed in choice,  
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What makes the man and what  
The man within that makes:  
Ask whom he serves or not  
Serves and what side he takes.

For good grows wild and wide,  
Has shades, is nowhere none;  
But right must seek a side  
And choose for chieftain one.

Therefore this masterhood,  
This piece of perfect song,  
This fault-not-found-with good  
Is neither right nor wrong.

No more than red and blue,  
No more than Re and Mi,  
Or sweet the golden glue  
That's built for by the bee.

As Gardner has indicated, in the opening stanza the poet is quite clear that, whatever may be the results of his
craftsmanship ("built these walls"), the artist in that very production reveals the wellsprings from which its inspiration flows ("made known the music of his mind"). But, what is infinitely more important, his artistic production, the object of his genius, still reveals only a partial flowering of that genius ("His ruder-rounded·rind"). Whatever makes him to be what he is still forms the underpinning of the work produced ("His brightest blooms lie there unblown, /His sweetest nectar hides behind.").

The crux of the poem, the statement of the question, is found in these opening lines: whatever the beauty of the work produced, its greater beauty lies in the man who produced it. And this is the theme developed by Hopkins throughout the poem: what you get is not what you see. Even the work of art is a conglomerate of elements, not the least of which is the character of the man who produces it. And so we are immediately introduced to the concept of tension, of contrast and variegation and their unity, as expressed so perfectly in the lines "How all's to one thing wrought!/ The members, how they sit!"

Hopkins is not speaking here simply of music. It is not to notes and chords and harmony that he refers when he writes "How all's to one thing wrought!" He is talking about all that goes into the making of a work of art, even what is beyond the artist's control. As a matter of fact, the artist is "Not free in this because his powers seemed free to play:"
He swept what scope he was/To sweep and must obey." That is to say, in a very real sense, the artist has no choice, no control; he is controlled by both his genius and his art, its rules and materials. The weaver bird has an instinct to build a most intricate nest. Once the process begins, the bird works feverishly until it is completed, not knowing nor understanding the rationale behind its construction or its purpose. Obviously, the artist is in no way determined ad unam as is the bird. But, a close analogy can be made between bird and artist in some respects, most noticeably the "taking over" of instinct, artistic instinct in the man, natural, habitual instinct in the bird. Both are caught up in the objects of their labor, and even the artist is hard put to explain the raison of his actions.

Even though the artist has power of decision ("Though down his being's bent/Like air he changed in choice"), it is still the intrinsic and directional nature of art, of the art ("instrument") which causes him to alter his original choice ("overvaulted voice").

The next stanza, number six, is the transition point separating the purely determined and determining artistic methodology from the moral character of the artist himself. What the man produces is also a product of what makes the man to be what he is. And the man is what he is by virtue of his own free choice to serve -- what? Obviously, for Hopkins, to serve moral right. And in the next stanza, he clarifies this
position.

He tells us that "good grows wild and wide," that it has degrees of perfection, and that there is nowhere a place bereft of good, or a work of art bereft of all good. He is not speaking here of moral good, but of artistic perfection. In the next two lines, he makes evident the kind of choice which "makes the man":

But right must seek a side
And choose for chieftain one.

The artist has the same moral choices and the same obligations surrounding those choices as does any other man. And in the final two stanzas, he emphasizes this distinction between the good and the right: a work of art is neither right nor wrong, morally considered. But, again quoting Gardner, "the man underlying the artist has moral obligations; and moral beauty (the 'right') is the higher perfection."

The poem is ostensibly about music, although, as Mariani remarks: "That the piece deals with music as other than a metaphor is open to question."5

It is basically a study of conflict, the conflict between art and morality. And, while Hopkins clearly prefers moral to artistic beauty, he takes pains to show that the work of art itself is neither right nor wrong, considered from the moral viewpoint.

5Mariani, A Commentary, p. 313.
Would Hopkins, then, hold that the moral character of the artist had no influence on the work produced? I don't think so, despite the separation of the two in this poem. True, the work of art may be morally neutral *qua* work of art. But, the work of art is just that: somebody's work. And he says to ask the artist "whom he serves or no/Serves and what side he takes." Why should this be important? Because "His sweetest nectar hides behind." That which is best in the man, his virtue, is behind his activities. How can a man divorce what he is from what he does? He cannot. So, while an evil man can produce good art, i.e., art which satisfies critical canons, a virtuous man who is also an artist can produce good art which is capable of revealing at least some of that virtue.

All of this converges: "How all's to one thing wrought!" Whatever is in the man, his character, his talent, his genius or lack thereof, his attitude towards life, everything, comes together in the man himself. It is in the artist that the union takes place. What he produces is a fragment of all that is in him. The work of art itself may be morally neutral, but the artist is an admixture of right and wrong, and a man who has chosen one or the other.

Thus, the poem, in its insistence on the detached nature of the work of art, sets up an opposition between the man as man and the man as artist. And it is right here that I see most clearly the poem as pied: the man as man has a moral
choice which he must make; the man as artist is limited by the rules and the materials of his art. And yet, the man and the artist are one and the same, and the tension of this co-existence is emphasized by the poem's intentional concentration on the distinction between the two. It is this emphasis which heightens our awareness of the unity in difference which is so evident in Hopkins' writings.

I shall now turn to the second and larger group of images, those restricted to the senses. Again, an obvious division suggests itself, that of the five senses. Interestingly enough, the vast majority of Hopkins' images are visual, a point which will be of quite some significance when I discuss the nature of dapple imagery as expressive of instress.

I shall consider three instances of sensory images other than visual. There are undoubtedly more, but these are also pied images and, therefore, of greater interest to us.

In the eighth stanza of "The Wreck of the Deutschland," we note the following:

Is: out with it! Oh,  
We lash with the best or worst  
Word last! How a lush-kept plush-capped sloe  
Will, mouthed to flesh-burst,  
Gush! -- flush the man, the being with it, sour or sweet,  
Brim, in a flash, full! -- Hither then, last or first,  
To hero of Calvary, Christ, 's feet --  
Never ask if meaning it, wanting it, warned of it -- men go.

It is the sour-sweet image of sloe which attracts our attention. The question of its use in a pied sense is relevant here, for it certainly does not appear to be so used. Does Hopkins mean that sometimes the bursting sloe is sweet
and sometimes sour? If he does, then the expression is obviously to be taken in a divided sense. However, the OED defines sloe as "the fruit of the blackthorn (Prunus spinosa), a small ovate or globose drupe of a black or dark-purple colour and sharp sour taste."

Now, the only sense I can make out of Hopkins' "sour or sweet" is that he means it to be taken in a composed sense, i.e., that the sloe-berry, while predominantly sour, has a tinge of sweetness, so that, in effect, we are dealing with a kind of gustatory dappling, or overlaying of taste sensations, a combination of contraries.

This sweet-sour image occurs again in a poem entitled "Cheery Beggar," and, in this instance, much more evidently as a pied image. The poem is undated and incomplete. The notes to the 4th edition suggest 1879 as the probable date.6

Beyond Magdalen and by the Bridge, on a place called there the Plain,
   In Summer, in a burst of summertime
   Following falls and falls of rain,
   When the air was sweet-and-sour of the flown fineflour of
   Those goldnails and their gaylinks that hang along a lime;

   Line four is annotated:

   fineflour, thus (twice) in MS., both in discarded draft
   and its revision. The 'fineflower' misprinted in all earlier edns. was from R.B.'s transcription, in A. The allusion is to the pollen washed down from the stamens ('goldnails') by the rain.7

6Hopkins, Poems, p. 311.
7Ibid.
With this note to guide us, then, we may interpret the final two lines of the poem as meaning that the air was pied in odor. That is to say, the pollen filtering through the rain-washed air had a sweet-sour odor.

That Hopkins had an ear as well as an eye for the dappled possibilities of the world is evidenced by the following entry in his journal for the 20th of May, 1866, Whit­sunday: "Cuckoos calling and answering to each other, and the calls being not equally timed they overlapped, making the triple cuckoo, and crossed." 8

This perception of the overlapping, or overlaying, of the birdcalls is similar to the "sour or sweet" of the Deutschland stanza. Both of them are akin to the use of "dappling" to describe the feel of wind on the face, a figure I have discussed in the last chapter (cf. pp. 149, 150).

With these three images, we are certainly dealing with analogous concepts of piedness, the root meaning of which relates it specifically to visual imagery. Nevertheless, I do not see any difficulty in grasping these analogous senses. I have previously (Chapter Three) defined piedness as some kind of a unity of differences, a recognition of variegation, of distinctions present in the world, or in any part of the world, any thing or idea. And Hopkins' sensitivity to gustatory, olfactory, and, in the last example, auditory differences as they unite in any one thing, be it a

8Hopkins, Journals, p. 137.
sloe, the air, or the combined sounds of birdcalls, would only naturally express itself in some pied image or in some expression analogous to piedness.

Once we turn to the strictly visual images, we are on more solid ground. I shall divide the images in this group into those used in the poems and those appearing elsewhere in Hopkins' works.

The first example from the poems is interesting not so much in itself as in the fact that it comes from a very early poem, "A Vision of the Mermaids," dated Christmas, 1862. Hopkins would have been eighteen years old at this time. The poem is 143 lines in length, with lines reading:

Plum-purple was the west; but spikes of light
Spear'd open lustrous gashes, crimson-white;
(Where the eye fix'd, fled the encrimsoning spot,
And gathering, floated where the gaze was not;)

We have seen Hopkins, in a poem composed much later, return to the image of light-rays used to create a dappling effect. Recall the "Wind-beat whitebeams" of "The Starlight Night," which I discussed at length in Chapter Five, pages 176 - 178, where I treated the use of the word paling. Here, we have a dark sky "barred" or "paled" by "spikes of light." The last two lines in this stanza are particularly interesting because they constitute, in reality, a gloss on the word "crimson-white." How can a thing be crimson and white unless it is crimson in one place and white in another? It is the "lustrous gashes" which are "crimson-white." Even at so young an age, the poet is bringing together the incom-
patible, harmonizing the unharmonious. But, in this case, he fears to leave it to the reader to discern the subtleties of the image. That kind of reader-demand will be reserved to the mature poet. And so he explains: once the eye is fixed intently upon the scene, the red gives way. I suppose he refers to some kind of optical illusion which causes the eye to perceive the "gashes" at first as crimson, but upon closer inspection ("fix'd"), the "encrimsoning spot" disappears ("fled"). The same kind of phenomenon occurs in viewing those pictures designed to perform optical tricks, e.g., the skull hidden in the portrait of a young lady before a mirror, an illustration of vanity and its ultimate consequences. It is necessary to "see" the picture in a certain way before the skull becomes apparent.

An untitled sonnet of June, 1865 provides us with the next example of contrast. Mariani describes the poem:

The sonnet is generated on a series of parallel contrasts; the speaker turns from his "unholy" self to his more virtuous friends, which action he compares to one's turning to the brighter and fresher things of nature.9

Again, it must be remembered that this is one of Hopkins' early poems. Still, we see traces of the kind of soul-searching and anguish which is so evident in the stronger "terrible" sonnets of the mature man.

Myself unholy, from myself unholy
To the sweet living of my friends I look --
Eye-greeting doves bright-counter to the rook,
Fresh brooks to salt sand-teasing waters shoaly: --

9Mariani, A Commentary, p. 23.
And they are purer, but alas! not solely
The unquestion'd readings of a blotless book.
And so my trust, confused, struck, and shook
Yields to the sultry siege of melancholy.
He has a sin of mine, he its near brother;
Knowing them well I can but see the fall.
This fault in one I found, that in another:
And so, though each have one while I have all,
No better serves me now, save best; no other
Save Christ: to Christ I look, on Christ I call.

Mariani concludes his analysis:

But none of his friends is perfect, and the absence of
a worthy model to emulate confuses and depresses him.
Line 12 "turns" the argument simply: while all of his
friends are better than himself, only Christ will serve
as best.10

The sonnet is, to a degree, pied. Certainly, the
poet is contrasting his own condition with that of his friends,
and their possible function as consolers to that of Christ.
And he admits that there meet in him all the imperfections
which he finds one by one in his friends. But it is the line,
"Eye-greeting doves bright-counter to the rook" which at-
tracts our attention.

Counter is a word met with earlier, in the sonnet
"Pied Beauty," and I spent some time in Chapter Three develop-
ing the dapple possibilities of the word. In this sonnet, he
says that his "sweet living" friends are in as great a con-
trast to him as are the beautiful ("eye-greeting") doves to
the rook.

The OED defines a rook as "a black, raucous-voiced
European and Asiatic bird . . . nesting in colonies." The
dove becomes, then, a "bright-counter" to this dull bird,

10 Ibid.
with the implicit connotation of the doves' cooing sound as opposed to the raucous crow of the other bird.

"Mealed-with-yellow sallows!" is another image from the previously discussed "The Starlight Night." A sallow is a kind of willow, according to the OED, and, in this instance, Hopkins speaks of it as "mealed" with yellow coloring. We have seen "mealy" standing alone to mean "spotted."

Earlier, I noted Hopkins' reference to a "dappling" wind. In his magnificent tribute to the Mother of God, "The Blessed Virgin Compared to the Air We Breathe," he takes the same theme for the opening lines:

Wild air, world-mothering air,
Nestling me everywhere,
That each eyelash or hair
Girdles; goes home betwixt
The fleeciest, frailest-flixed
Snowflake; that's fairly mixed
With, riddles, and is rife
In every least thing's life.

This image is certainly much weaker as an example of dappling than those we have so far seen. But, it still serves to add to the thesis of this study. Hopkins never seems to see anything in a completely unmixed existence. He is drawn to the world as a world of individuals, each of which is a unity of distinctions and all of whom make up a world of the same. The air does not simply provide breathing material; it is "fairly mixed" and "rife in every least thing's life," even to the extent of circling "each eyelash or hair," and of

11Dated Stonyhurst, May 1883.
finding its way between the most gossamer and delicate of objects, snowflakes.

More than one of the images we have considered up to this point could be listed as a tribute to the acuteness of the poet's eye, sharpened, no doubt, by the fact that it was also an artist's eye. But, what are, to my mind, two of the most singular examples of this kind of close observation practiced by the poet occur in the poems "Il Mystico" and "God's Grandeur."

In a letter to E. H. Coleridge, dated 3 September 1862, and written from Oak Hill, Hampstead, Hopkins states that "the best thing I have done lately is Il Mystico in imitation of Il Penseroso, of which I send you some extracts."\(^{12}\)

The poem is, or at least would have been, fairly long. The editors of the 4th edition include it (142 lines) as one of Hopkins' "Unfinished Poems, Fragments, Light Verse, Etc." Line sixty-five begins:

Or, like a lark to glide aloof
Under the cloud-festooned roof,
That with a turning of the wings
Light and darkness from him flings;

Compare this with the following from "God's Grandeur":\(^{13}\)


\(^{13}\)23 February 1877 and March, 1877.
The world is charged with the grandeur of God.  
It will flame out, like shining from shook foil.

Both of these images are concerned with the opposition between light and dark.  In the first instance, the image is clearcut, leaving little to the imagination: as the bird flies beneath the sky, the rays of the sun strike its wings, which, as they turn, cause the light flashing off them to contrast with the dark of the cloud-filled sky.

The second image is more subtle, for the reader is not told explicitly about light and dark. The contrast is not specified for him as in the case of the first image. However, the shook foil gives off its light, its "shining", because of the contrast set up by the act of shaking: the foil crumples under the force of the agitation, producing the little "valleys," ridges, and indentations against which the light strikes and flashes. The effect is a pied one, with light and dark alternating in place of colors.

I shall consider one more example from the poems. An untitled fragment, given the title "Ashboughs" by Bridges, and probably composed in 1885, is printed in two versions in the 4th edition. I shall record here only the first. The variant does not alter or affect in any way the observations I shall make on the poem.

Not of all my eyes see, wandering on the world,  
Is anything a milk to the mind so, so sighs deep  
Poetry to it, as a tree whose boughs break in the sky.  
Say it is ashboughs: whether on a December day and furled  
Fast or they in clammyish lashtender combs creep  
Apart wide and new-nestle at heaven most high.
They touch heaven, tabour on it; how their talons sweep
The smouldering enormous winter welkin! May
Mells blue and snowwhite through them, a fringe and fray
Of greenery: it is old earth's groping towards the steep
Heaven whom she child's us by.

The image I consider to be an instance of dappling
is certainly not ordinarily so. A "tree whose boughs break
in the sky" is not usually a pied image, although a case may
be made for the pattern (damasking?) of the branches against
the sky. What strengthens my interpretation comes from Hop­
kins' own use of the ashboughs. For, he says that "May/Mells
blue and snowwhite through them." Professor MacKenzie notes
that mells means mixes. Therefore, it is by virtue of the
branches "whether on a December day and furled/Fast" or
"Apart wide" that the pieing effect of "blue and snowwhite"
comes about. Again, it is another example of Hopkins' af­
finity for contrast.

Nearly all of the passages in the letters, diaries,
and journals where Hopkins describes pied effects are straight­
forward expressions. Since he is either writing to explain or
describe, or to put down for further use an impression he has
received, there is no need to develop the subtleties of the
poetic image. I shall list a very few of these passages and
then conclude.

A good percentage of Hopkins' dapple imagery is de­
veloped out of the contrast of light and dark, of sun and sha­
dow, a point I have noted in the discussion of the "Il Mystico"

14Hopkins, Poems, p. 314.
and "God's Grandeur" images. Here are some examples of this
turn of mind as revealed in the journals:

Beauty of hills in blue shadow seen through lacy leaf of willows.15

the mixture of sunlit leaf and dewy-looking shadow in
the chestnuts high up and moving in the wind.16

Late in the afternoon, the light and shade being brilli­
iant, snowy blocks of cloud were filing over the sky.17

the ivy, the ashtrees, and that day the bright pieces of
evening light.18

The woods, thick and silvered by sunlight and shade. . . .19

There are more, but these examples range through the
years 1866 to 1874, the last year in which Hopkins made any
substantial entries in his journal.

In a letter to Richard Watson Dixon, written from
Glasgow on 16 September 1881, he says:

This poem ["Sky that rollest ever"] will always be in
my mind when I see blue and white in running streams
ravellled and unravellled by the current.20

Earlier [26 January] the same year, he had described,
in a letter to Bridges, the ice on the river Mersey:

The river was coated with dirty yellow ice from shore to
shore . . . it was not smooth but many broken pieces

15Hopkins, Journals, p. 134.
16Ibid., p. 137.
17Ibid., p. 142.
18Ibid., p. 215.
19Ibid., p. 259.
20Hopkins, Correspondence, p. 54.
framed or pasted together again ... it everywhere covered the water, but was not of a piece, being continually broken, ploughed up, by the plying of the steam ferryboats ... .21

I have included in the notes22 further examples, by no means all, of this kind of imagery.


22 Hopkins, Journals, p. 19. "Parallelisms ... where the lines describing the twinkling of the sun through the leaves at morning occur."

Journals, p. 48. "And the outlines of the lighted part of the cloud were distinct and touched here and there with spots of colour."

Journals, p. 133. "Hills, just fleeced with grain or other green growth, by their dips and waves foreshortened here and there and so differenced in brightness and opacity the green on them, with delicate effect."

Journals, p. 135. "Blue and white delicately overlacing each other in water."

Journals, p. 147. "Fine; in morning sky festooned with cobwebs; afterwards brighter; silver bright fish-scale-bespattered sunset."

Journals, p. 153. "Then the shadowed sides had cob-web-streaks of paler colour across, and in other parts became transparent and shewed the grass below, which was lit by the sun through the gauze."

Journals, p. 169. "When a low rainbow backed by the Black Forest hills, which were partly dimmed out with wet mist, appeared, and -- what I never saw before -- rays of shadow crossed it, all its round, and where they crossed it paled the colour."

Journals, p. 180. "Flint of the half-chalky sort, for the mountain is covered with snow, while the breaks of rock rimmed one of the dark eyes or spots in the white."

Journals, p. 191. "The sunset June 20 was wine-coloured, with pencillings of purple, and the next day there was rain."

Journals, p. 208. "The bluebells ... stood in
blackish spreads or sheddings like the spots on a snake."


Journals, p. 228. "There all was sad-coloured and the colour caught the eye, red and blue stones in the river beaches brought out by patches of white-blue snow, that is/ snow quite white and dead but yet it seems as if some blue or lilac screen masked it somewhere between it and the eye: I have often noticed it."
CHAPTER VII
THE ARGUMENT

It is most important to realize that a large part of the argumentation in these pages serves to establish an "attitude of mind" in Hopkins. In other words, I am not satisfied to conclude that at certain times, under certain conditions, Gerard Manley Hopkins uses pied images to express the notion of instress. Such a conclusion would be only one-half of my argument. Hopkins had an overall view of the universe as dappled, and this must be taken into account in any understanding of his poetic statement.

At the outset, the express thesis of this dissertation was elaborated in the proposition, "I am convinced that dapple imagery best expresses for Gerard Manley Hopkins what he meant by instress." (p.2)

It is necessary, as in any argument, to make certain preliminary distinctions regarding the terms used. I am particularly concerned with the word convinced, best; and with the expression "for Gerard Manley Hopkins." We have rather thoroughly explored the words dapple and instress, so the only major problems in the statement of the thesis revolve about these other terms.

Convinced is not necessary to the conclusion (since
it is rather obvious that I would not propose a conclusion about which I am not convinced), and will not appear in the final statement of the thesis. However, it does provide an opportunity to re-iterate what I have already stated in the Introduction (p.7). I am convinced probably and not necessarily absolutely. What I have attempted is a meticulous analysis leading to a conclusion of which I may assert, "This has a high degree of probability." And it is of the truth of this kind of conclusion that I am convinced.

In connection with the use of the word best, I should like to fall back on a useful scholastic distinction, namely that of quoad se as opposed to quoad nos.

Sometimes, to explain a thing or to develop an idea in the manner best related to the thing or idea itself does not make it entirely clear to the hearer. Conversely, in explaining a thing or an idea, we are sometimes forced to diminish or to eliminate aspects which are connected vitally with what we are explaining. For example, if a nuclear physicist explains his subject in a way which gives proper place to the technicalities and nuances of the science, that is, if he explains it quoad se (as the science is in itself), then he will perforce be limited, in his audience, to other scientists. If he wishes to present nuclear physics to a group of laymen, he must qualify it, eliminating some elements, simplifying others, so that the subject becomes intelligible to those untrained in science. He must explain it quoad nos,
i.e., according to our capabilities.

Again, the expression "for Gerard Manley Hopkins" must be understood "for the purpose of Gerard Manley Hopkins" and not, necessarily, for the satisfaction of his personal understanding of instress.

Both of these distinctions will be more fully developed in the body of the argument of this chapter.

I have concluded (p.58) that instress is the intrinsic tension upholding the unity of being of a particular being and distinguishing and individualizing that being. We are talking, then, about a unity of differences, a unity which is the result of instress. Consequently, what we must find is an image, or a set or genus of images, which conveys to the reader a notion of unity, but a unity of differences. This becomes apparent from an analysis of the terms of the definition. And once we have such a genus of images, we have images which convey, implicitly, the notion of instress.

But, my argument at this point is simply that dapple imagery does best convey the notion of unity of differences, and, consequently, the notion of instress. It is to this particular premise that I must direct the bulk of the discussion, and so let us return to the distinctions made in the first two pages of this chapter.

That Hopkins himself was capable of non-dapple, or, at best, of scarcely dapple, imagery to express instress will be evident in the two examples I am preparing to discuss.
The first we have seen in Chapter Four, in the instance of the "watch wound up but kept from going" which "has the spring always on the strain though no motion comes of it." This kind of image falls under our definition of pied, but surely does so at its outer ranges. The next example is in no way a dapple example.

In "God's Grandeur," there is what must certainly be one of the most remarkable images ever penned: "It [God's grandeur] gathers to a greatness, like the ooze of oil/ Crushed." The figure can be taken several ways, first of all as the oil flowing from the olive-press, or, perhaps, from any of the oil-bearing nuts, which one might crush with a hammer or other object. For our discussion, it makes no difference, and I am quite willing to take the words literally (as I think Hopkins meant them, anyway). He is talking about a pool of oil upon which one presses, with the hand or a flat object, like a brick, or a trowel. The oil is forced into a larger superficies, a greater spread. As a matter of fact, the image is quite pedestrian and would be, on the whole, humdrum, save for one word which makes it great: gathers. Because, in the common understanding of the term, the oil does not gather, does not come together, but, on the contrary, spreads. The image as it is expressed challenges but does not confound. While it is difficult to envision a "gathering spread," there is something about the image which is acceptable. Even defying ordinary linguistic analysis, it
"feels" right, particularly to an experience poetry reader. I shall suggest that the reason it does feel right is because it expresses rather well, and quoad se, the notion of instress. For, what holds the oil together, allowing it to spread as a single unit and not as a broken series, is instress, tension, as Hopkins understands it. And it is the instress which gathers constantly the elements which would come apart without this bond. It is instress which holds the oil to a unity as it spreads, instress that gathers it in even as it spreads apart.

That this is the explanation for the image's "feel" does not mean that the reader understands it or adverts to it nearly so well as he does to the same expression of instress, of the unity of differences, as is evident in an image such as "rose-moles all in stipple."

Therefore, while the "crushed oil" image may be a better image of instress quoad se, it is not quoad nos.

This leads to the second distinction, namely, that pied images best (quoad nos) express, for Hopkins' purpose, what he meant by instress. And his purpose was to convey to a reader his world-vision. Hopkins, a trained philosopher, may very well have appreciated and preferred the watch and oil images as expressive of instress. But, they are not so evidently images of the clash of contraries as are the dapple images. Thus, dapple images best convey the notion of a unity of differences because they make visually present the
existence in one thing of contraries, of variety and variegation. And, by extension, what conveys this notion of a unity of differences implicitly expresses the notion of instress.

What, then, of those groups of analogously dapple images which I have taken such pains to clarify and classify? Do they, too, fall under my conclusion? Yes, but only to the degree that they come close to the primary analogate: color, or, rather, the parti-colored.

I might mention, as a corollary, a caution or rule, however one may view it, that we must, particularly in a predominantly inductive argument, which for the most part describes this dissertation, be conscious of the cumulative nature of the facts. And it seems to me that one cannot read closely the corpus of Gerard Manley Hopkins' writings without concluding that he did, indeed, live in a dappled world "charged with the grandeur of God."
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