The Chilean Student Movement: A Family Matter. The Intimate and Conflicting Construction of Revolution in a Post Dictatorial Country

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THE CHILEAN STUDENT MOVEMENT: A FAMILY MATTER
THE INTIMATE AND CONFLICTING CONSTRUCTION OF REVOLUTION IN A
POST DICTATORIAL COUNTRY

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BY

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ABSTRACT

In 2011, thousands of students filled the main streets and occupied most educational establishments of Chile to demand a profound transformation of the educational system – one of the main reforms of Pinochet’s government. Like students in many other countries, the Chilean Student Movement has been struggling against the pervasive effects of neoliberalism on the higher educational system, aiming to recover the public sense of education. Students from all over the country began to organize to struggle against profits in the higher education system. In doing so, students denied the very core of the neoliberal economic system and deeply (re)politicized the Chilean society after an apparently submissive period of Transition to Democracy, after the end of dictatorship.

Because of the power of this movement, understanding how it emerged is of important scholarly interest. Most analysts of this movement have focused on the neoliberal features of Chilean education to explain it, using secondary sources of evidence. However, few address the question of how the movement’s ideas were historically forged, and the sites and actors involved in this process beyond educational institutions. This latter problem is especially surprising, because many of these scholars highlight the effects of the higher education system crisis on family life in particular. Yet, there is little written about the role of activists' families in the formation of student consciousness.
In this dissertation, I examine this key but still understudied aspect of social movements. I study the process of the formation of critical consciousness in a diverse group of active students' families, that is, the process of transformation of the ideas through which people use to explain their material circumstances to obtain the ability to act as historical agents. To do so, this dissertation first examines the origins of the neoliberalization of higher education in Chile, and then turns to an examination of the role of family life in the formation of student critical consciousness.

The main discovery is that the process of formation of critical consciousness in a post-dictatorial country entails family-based intergenerational struggles that run through different stages of development, which follow a conflictive course. In turn, these stages involve different types of consciousness, which always involve rational motivations despite the contradictory travails of traumatic memories in the (re)construction of resistance under the particular Chilean historical conditions.
INTRODUCTION

In 2011, thousands of students filled the main streets of the nation every two weeks during seven months to demand a profound transformation of the Chilean educational system - one of the main reforms of Pinochet’s government. Like students in Quebec, England, or Mexico, the Chilean Student Movement was and is struggling against the pervasive effects of neoliberalism on the higher educational system, aiming to recover public education. In Chile, students from all over the country began to organize to struggle against lucro (profit) in the higher education system. In doing so, students not only denied the very core of the neoliberal economic system, but deeply (re)politicalized Chilean society after an apparently submissive period called Transition to Democracy after the end of Pinochet’s dictatorship.

The most common forms of mobilization were the systematic occupation of schools, universities and public institution buildings. The movement demonstrated great creativity in communicating its demands, gaining a strong support of the Chilean population, despite the wide media coverage of the isolated incidents of violence at the end of the mass marches that could easily have discredited the movement. In spite of such coverage, in September 2011, the demands of the movement were supported by the 89% of citizenry, while the support of then-President Sebastián Piñera reached only 22%. Despite the up and downs in the movement’s visibility and support, the strength of the movement’s ideas became so strong that all the presidential campaign agendas were
forced to include them during the 2013 elections. Equal access and increasing of public investment in the higher education system are the main ideas that are installed in the public arena up to now.

Because of the power of this movement, understanding how it emerged is of important scholarly interest. Most scholars of this movement have tended to focus on the neoliberal features of Chilean education to explain it. And, they have tended to use secondary sources of evidence (see Bellei, Cabalin and Orellana 2014; Fleet 2011; Salinas and Fraser 2012). However, few address the question of how the movement’s ideas were historically forged, and the sites and actors involved in this process beyond educational institutions. In other words, the researchers have been more focused on how the university itself and its economic relations have shaped the emergence of the social movement. But they have failed to explain the actual formation of consciousness of the activist students, nor to examine social institutions outside the university that might contribute to consciousness formation. This latter problem is especially surprising, because many of these scholars highlight the effects of the higher education system crisis on family life in particular. Yet, there is little written about the role of the active students' families in the formation of student consciousness.

In this dissertation, I examine this key but still understudied aspect of social movements. It examines the process of the formation of critical consciousness in a diverse group of active students' families, that is, the process of transformation of the ideas through which people use to explain their material circumstances to obtain the ability to act as historical agents. To do so, this dissertation first examines the origins of
the neoliberalization of higher education in Chile, and then turns to an examination of role of family life in the formation of student critical consciousness.

The relation between the neoliberalization of higher education and the rise of student movements to recover the public sense of education, in Chile and elsewhere, is irrefutable. Yet the precise national mediations involved in the neoliberal turn of the case of Chile, which is often seen as the paradigm of neoliberalization, are not well understood. For that reason, the first part of this dissertation addresses the process through which neoliberalism was imposed in Chile using economic and repressive shocks, and then conflictively legitimimized by using sophisticated ideological mechanisms to depoliticize the population. With an emphasis in the role of traumatic memories, in Chapter 1 I offer to the reader unfamiliar with the Chilean recent history a general view of the Chilean neoliberalization and its mechanisms of domination, legitimation and resistance, which have changed several times during the process. With an emphasis on genesis of what I call the Neoliberal Higher Education (NHE) ideology in the Chilean context, in Chapter 2, I offer a general view of the emergence of the student movement.

Once the national mediations involved in the neoliberal turn of the paradigmatic case of Chile are presented, in the third and fourth chapter I resume the focus on the formation of student consciousness from below using in-depth interviews with a diverse group of active higher education students' families, to uncover the role of family in the formation of critical consciousness in the Chilean student movement.

Specifically, in Chapter 3, I compare students and their families in different social classes to capture how class issues are working within the conflicting process of
formation of critical consciousness of activist students’ families. In Chapter 4, I develop a comparison based on family political background to understand how this political background and its respective memories of the recent past of the country are working within the process of formation of critical consciousness of activist students’ families. Finally, the Conclusion proposes some ideas for understanding the contradictory role of family under neoliberalism from the case of the Chilean student movement, that is, as a place that reproduces economic and cultural domination of the higher educational market, but also as a place of formation of political resistance.

**The Economic Impact on Families of Chilean Neoliberal Education**

During the peak of the protests of the Chilean student movement in July, 2011, a group of university students of design were producing different posters for the people attending the upcoming weekly march. This practice, they said, was a regular task during the *tomas* (occupations) of their campus. However, this not typical of what one might find at demonstrations against neoliberal educational systems: One of posters shows the drawing of a nuclear family sitting around the table at tea time, with this intriguing message: “*Este es un asunto familiar*” (“This is a family matter”).

The Chilean student movement has pushed into public discussion the economic impact on families of the neoliberal policies introduced during the military regime (1973-1990) in the educational system. Accordingly, most analysts of this movement, as said, have focused their attention on this topic. At the base of these policies, among other things, was the redefinition of higher education as a private economic investment (Mayol 2012a; Mönckeberg 2005; Spooner 2011). As a result, the family became the main funder
of the educational system in Chile. Although 2.1% of the gross domestic product (GDP) goes to higher education, most of the education expenditures come from the budget of thousands of families\(^1\), while the state contribution has decreased proportionally and is among the lowest in the world (Mayol 2012a). As a result, those families whose incomes and wealth make it impossible for them to afford the most expensive college tuitions in the world have had no choice but to go into debt to educate their children, and pay back up to five times the original amount loaned by the bank (Alexander 2009; Mayol 2012a; Mayol 2012b; Mönckeberg 2005; Mönckeberg 2011; Salazar 2011; Solimano 2012; Spooner 2011).

This problem is not isolated. The economic impact on families of the neoliberalization of higher education has been a concern for most nations where the neoliberal version of capitalism has landed since the 1970s. As many researchers point out, contemporary universities are increasingly viewed as companies managed in accordance with the economic logic of markets (Frickel and Moore 2006; Holmwood 2014; Kleinman and Vallas 2001; Kleinman 2003). As a result, the structure of college funding has been completely altered (Shen and Ziderman 2009) and private college loans have become a new market to consume the surplus product of capitalism (Hudis 2009), within the lending and borrowing boom that has characterized the financialization of the economy (Albo, Gindin and Panitch 2010; Foster and Magdoff 2009; Harvey 2005; Hudis 2009; Husson 2008; Schweickart 2011; Wolff 2008). Families have had to put affording a college education for their children near the top of their list of worries as

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\(^1\)On average, the 20% of the family income is destined to pay higher education costs (Mayol, 2012a).
parents (King 2008), despite unclear state regulations and concerns about quality for private educational institutions (Salerno 2004; Shen and Ziderman 2009). Therefore, huge college debts – much more than other type of debt – has become one of the most powerful weapons for disciplining dissent (Chomsky 2014).

**Early Marxist Conceptualization of the Family**

The privatization of the higher educational market in Chile and abroad is certainly a family matter since consumption of higher education is organized in family units. From a Marxist perspective, this is not surprising considering that Marxist writers since Marx and Engels’ times have preferentially discussed the family issue in terms of its economic function in the reproduction of capitalism. Engels (1884) defined “monogamous family” or “modern individual family” as the economic unit of capitalist society. Marx, in turn, criticized the bourgeois family as monument of dehumanized alienation, in which the exchange-value dominated motivations of civil society had invaded family, reducing it to a mere money relationship, and distorting its “ethical” side (Jay 1996; Weikart 1994). Furthermore, Marx denounced the absence of the family among the proletariat, for the exploitation of children, for prostitution, and for the sexual exploitation of women in the factories (Weikart 1994). Although some scholars strongly warn us regarding the differences between Marx and Engels when discussing the family and related matters, Weikart (1994) states that both subordinated in a significant way their critique of the family to their critique of economics.

However, the analysis of the role of family in the reproduction of capitalism cannot be reduced to a mere center of consumption and reserve labor. Early twenty-first
century scholars recognized this, such that the analysis of family from a Marxist perspective was enlarged to incorporate feminist insights to Marxism, in order to establish a unitary theory of gender and class oppression (Brown 2012). Nonetheless, most of these Marxist feminists were still very tightly tied to economic determinism (Brown 2012; Weikart 1994). In 1914, for example, Emma Goldman argued that marriage is primarily an economic arrangement that makes woman an absolute dependent, annihilating her social consciousness and, thus, incapacitating her for social struggle. Even in the nineteen eighties, when some feminist activists and scholars opened the domestic labor debate to understand the relationship between patriarchal and class power (Bottomore, Harris, Kiernan, and Miliband 1983; Delphy 1980), the economistic reductionism that complicates Marxism was again a problem difficult to solve (Miles 1983). This debate criticizes the Marxist development of the concept of production, and proposes the existence of two modes of production in our society: (i) most goods are produced in the industrial mode, generating capitalist exploitation; (ii) domestic services and child rearing are produced in the family mode, generating patriarchal exploitation (Dalla Costa and James 1975; Delphy 1980; Hartmann 1981). However, according to Miles (1983), Marxist categories were not originally developed to deal with labor in the home (see also Harrison 1973). Therefore, the domestic labor debate discusses from various positions the admissibility of redefining who are the working class by stretching Marx’s categories, and the correct way to apply stretched or unstretched categories (Dalla Costa and James 1975; Miles 1983). Despite these efforts, as Bottomore et al. (1983)
points out, the domestic labor debate’s participants were unable to locate the material basis of women’s oppression within domestic labor itself.

Another group of Marxist scholars in the Frankfurt school was also working on a broader understanding of the family, this time challenging the analysis of its character as entirely private, and proposing the recognition of family as a social institution and ideology (Jay 1996). This perspective belongs to those efforts made by Marxist theorists to reject orthodox Marxism, idealist Marxism, or scientific socialism (Boggs 1984; Bocock 1986; Bronner 2011b; Mouffe 1979; Sartre 1960), the reductionist understandings of Marx’s work that, among other consequences, have developed an economistic understanding of the function of family under capitalism. Conversely, a complete philosophical reworking of Marxism – that in turn meant a rediscovery of Hegel’s stress on consciousness – has emerged to confront passive materialism (Boggs 1984; Jay 1973; Kellner 1989). With a focus of praxis, thinkers such as Gramsci, Korsch, Lukács, and the early Frankfurt School took on the challenge of understanding how economism is related to other sources of ideology, consciousness, and identity (Aronowitz 2011; Boggs 1984; Mouffe 1979).

These ideas were at the center of the Frankfurt School of thought, centered at the Institute for Social Research in New York City, founded in 1923 to recover what they saw as the substance of Marxist theory, to develop critical theory from the ethical imperative of connecting empirical analysis of the contemporary world and social movements that were working to transform society (Bronner 2011; Horkheimer 1972b; Jay 1996; Kellner 1990; Wiggershaus 1995). To do so, they sought to move the
dialectical method formulated by Hegel in a materialist direction, thus, to describe the complex set of *mediations* in concrete historical contexts that interconnects consciousness and society (Jay 1973; Kellner 1990). However, over time this promise did not pan out: the work of the Institute for Social Research scholars increasingly distanced itself from social research, to turn the preservation of individuality (instead of social transformation) into the central preoccupation of critical theory (Berendzen 2013; Bronner 2011).

**Horkheimer and Families as Sites of Ideological Capitalist Reproduction**

This shift is exemplified by the work of the one of the premier Marxist analysts of family: Max Horkheimer. In “Authority and the Family” (1936), Horkheimer argues that family has a contradictory role in mediating between material substructure and ideological superstructure (Jay 1996). In the nineteenth century, Hegel had already recognized this position, but his main focus was on the role of family as a center of ethical resistance against social dehumanization (Horkheimer 1972a; Jay 1996). Although Horkheimer (1972a) did not entirely reject Hegel’s emancipatory potential of the family, he agreed with Marx regarding the growing erosion of family life and conjugal love under capitalism. In other words, the role of the family as a source of strength to resist the total dehumanization of the world could not, argued Horkheimer, overcome its principal role within the authoritarian structure of capitalist society: education for authority (Horkheimer 1972a; Jay 1996). For that reason, he focused his intellectual analysis on the function of the family in the process of socialization for submission, a function that has been transformed through history (Delphy 1980; Glass, Bengtson and Dunham 1986; Jay 1996). According to Jay (1996), in the era of advanced capitalism, with the decline of
father’s authority, social institutions outside family received father’s “metaphysical” aura and enjoyed the immunity from criticisms that the early bourgeois father had to some extent earned. In addition, he argued, the emancipation of women in bourgeois society has proved to be less of a liberation than once assumed: Women in most cases have adapted to the system and became a conservative force in bourgeois societies. By this token, according to Horkheimer (1972a), family gives to the human being an indispensable adaptability for a specific authority-oriented conduct on which capitalism largely depends.

However, since Horkheimer’s theoretical work on Authority and the Family was never integrated with empirical studies (Berendzen 2013), he could not really identify how the family as mediation interconnects consciousness and society in concrete historical contexts. When he criticized to Hegel (Horkheimer 1972a), Horkheimer also failed to grasp the dialectic process in the opposition between family and society: it is at once reinforcing and contradictory (Jay 1996). Moreover, Horkheimer is mostly focused on the decline of family. It is necessary to say that this problem is not privative of Horkheimer’s work on family. Most scholars of critical theory agree that the radicalization of critical theory was paradoxically accompanied by a pervasive pessimism and disconnection of the project to radical praxis (Bronner 2011; Jay 1996; Kellner 1989). Indeed, when ignoring the real movements and real ideas in conflict in those frightening times of Hitler’s Germany and the wake of the Second World War, the Frankfurt School embraced the reification of thinking that they nominally sought to

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2In the 1940s, in exile in California, Adorno and Horkheimer wrote “Dialectic of Enlightenment” to discover “why humanity, instead of entering a truly human state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism” (Tiedemann 2003; see also Wiggershaus 1995; Wheatland 2009).
In this way, Critical Theory was depoliticized and rendered impotent in its capacity to not only analyze, but to critically engage social movements that challenged capitalism (Horkheimer 1972b; Kellner 1989; Wiggershaus 1995).

**Families as Emancipatory Sites**

Since then, the mediating role of family between consciousness and society under capitalism has received virtually no scholarly attention within Marxist thought, despite the fact that family remains a durable market under the neoliberal version of capitalism (Gillespie 2013). This gap is not an abstract but a practical problem: we do not yet understand how family has been involved in the development and retreat of revolutionary consciousness through history. This study proposes to fill this gap using the experience of family life in the construction of the Chilean student movement, which has claimed that the crisis of the higher educational market and the rise of the student movement is “a family matter” (sic). If true, the student movement would not be just helping to recover the emancipatory potential of education, as historically student movements have tried to do (Wiggershaus 1995), but also to recapture the underestimated emancipatory potential of family.

In doing so, this work proposes to (re)politicize family, as a foundational political category in the process of formation of critical consciousness, that is, the process of transformation of the ideas through which people use to explain their material circumstances (Bottomore et al. 1983). This consciousness allows them to become aware of the dialectical nature of their existence, i.e., to relate their actual conditions under capitalism to a potential reality still sleeping in the present (Thompson 2011). The study
aims to understand how people come to have the ability to act as historical agents, which is the most “decisive moment” in the revolutionary process (Bronner 2011; Lukács 1967; Thompson 2011). But because the formation of critical consciousness in each family is carried out in permanent struggle with its conservative role, this study also examines the effects of neoliberal capitalism on consciousness, as precondition for transformative action (Bronner 2011).

Extant literature that examines consciousness formation does so from the context of advanced capitalism, and with two clear emphases. First György Lukács and later the Frankfurt school suggest that people’s consciousness has been anesthetized by capitalism (Marcuse 1969; Wiggershaus 1995). The cause, according to Lukács (1967), is Taylorism, the scientific method of organizing work for the development of mass production (see also Castel 2003; Taylor 1914). As Lukács says, the fragmentation of the object of production necessarily leads to the fragmentation of its subject, who in consequence becomes less active and more contemplative.

Building on this insight, by developing a synthesis of Marx and Freud, the Critical Theorists attempted to discern the processes through which individual consciousness was adjusted to the functional requirements of the capitalist system (Habermas 1989; Kellner 1990). What Frankfurt School scholars observe is the development of a culture industry that has desublimated culture, integrating sex into work and public relations (Habermas 1989; Marcuse 1964). Although this seems on the surface to represent an improvement for people’s quality of life, “repressive desublimation” made people feel happy and free while being entrapped (Langman 2007; Schweickart 2012). What they feel is not
happiness but euphoria, which is exactly the same that occurs with the process of integration into consumerism that, with the help of mass media, manipulates this “happy consciousness” or “false consciousness” (Habermas 1989; Langman 2007; Marcuse 1964). Therefore, the “false consciousness”, i.e., a consciousness that erroneously attributes an autonomous character to a partial phenomena of social life, becomes the true conscious, making the very notion of alienation questionable: people now recognize themselves in their commodities (Korsch 1998; Marcuse 1964). In other words, there is only one dimension of social life (Marcuse 1964).

Nonetheless, given the already mentioned pessimism that early Frankfurt scholars shared about the development of a revolutionary consciousness (Jay 1996; Langman 2007; Marcuse 1964), only Marcuse (1964) believed that the one-dimensional society was not the final state of capitalism and consciousness formation, and that false consciousness could shift, because it is historical (Schweickart 2012). Likewise, in the wake of the events of 1968, another intellectual branch rejected the idea that mass entertainment and mass communication have turned us into “mindless robots” unable to question the legitimacy of the given socio-economic order (Schweickart 2011). This perspective recovers Gramsci’s work to challenge the conception of ideology as false consciousness (Mouffe 1979) by recovering Gramsci’s distinction between “direct” domination and hegemony. As Mouffe (1979) clarifies, a class is dominant in two ways: a class dominates the opposing classes, and rules the allied classes (Mouffe 1979). Bourgeois “direct domination” is exercised through physical coercion (or the threat of it) by the state apparatus and “juridical” government. Hegemony, in turn, is exercised through popular
“consensus” achieved in the ensemble of organisms commonly called “private” or civil society (Boggs 1984; Gramsci 1995; Mouffe 1979). In sum, if a radical philosophy, or world-outlook, seeks to be “hegemonic” it cannot be imposed by force, but through rational understanding along with emotional and moral consent (Bocock 1986).

Critical consciousness can begin to emerge when motivations for consent begin to fail, producing a series of distinct crises, leading to what Habermas (1975) calls “legitimation crisis.” Habermas argues that above all, the crisis is produced because people have moral expectations about the state; when performances of economy and state remain below a society’s levels of aspiration and expectation, harming the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld and its identities, systemic disequilibria become crises, and conflict and resistance arise (Habermas 1975). What Habermas did not do, however, was to demonstrate either through which mediating institutions, or through what social processes, this sense of crises was produced in ways that shift consciousness toward revolutionary action. It is to these issues that I turn to next.

The Student Movement’s Determinate Choice

To understand the conflict-ridden process of the formation of critical consciousness within the family as part of the Chilean student movement, it is important to identify those aspects of family life by which the mechanisms of economic domination and moral legitimation of the Chilean educational market started losing their capacity to rule. To do so, I rely on the concept of “determinate choice” (Marcuse 1964; Marcuse 1969; see also Wiggershaus 1995). “Determinate choice” is the concept through which Marcuse updated Marx’s proposition that individuals make their own history but make it
under given conditions (Marx 1978). Among other conditions, Marcuse states that determined are the specific contradictions “between the potential and the actual” (Marcuse 1964: 208). In the Chilean case, the struggle for the recovery of the public sense of higher education (the potential) could not be detached from the particular mechanisms of economic domination and moral legitimation of the Chilean higher educational market (the actual).

These mechanisms, moreover, were closely tied to the specific historical circumstances from which they emerged, were reproduced, and made into a crisis. I argue that in countries recovering from authoritarian regimes the development of the determinate choice of actors in social movements involves, also, conflicting memories over the past and individual political trauma (see also Sapiro 2004). In these circumstances the process of the formation of critical consciousness within family and other institutions is determined by the specific contradictions between the potential, the actual, and the past.

This theoretical precision turns the family into a much more relevant site of research for understanding how the family shapes political consciousness in the case of the Chilean Student Movement. As Hartmann (1981) states, although family meets crucial requirements for the reproduction of the capitalist system, people in households still manage to retain power over crucial resources and particular areas of decision, thus creating the potential for social change (see also Habermas 1989).

One central hypothesis in this study is that in Chile critical consciousness emerged around the management of debt (and other related economic constraints), and
over memory transmission. But to avoid reifying the family, I use the concept ‘intimate kin’ used by Han (2012) to identify those close relations through which the disadvantaged groups struggle with debt and mitigate the forces of economic precariousness in Chile. ‘Intimate kin’ is also connected to the concept of ‘community of memory’ used by Bellah et al. (2007) to explain that the processes of memory transmission requires a real community that, in order not to forget its past, and “is involved in retelling its story, its constitutive narrative” (Olick and Robbins 1998; see also Connell and Dados 2014; Ros 2012). Since the family is the social space where generations confront each other directly (Poster 1978), the family can be seen as an arena of intergenerational struggle (and solidarity) that not only has the power of maintaining but also of convulsing the status quo (Hartmann 1981).

**Questions, Evidence, and Analytic Strategy**

The evidence used to answer the question of the role of the family in the formation of critical consciousness comes from five months of fieldwork in Chile between May and September of 2013. I carried out in-depth interviews, first with college students participating in the student movement, and then with the most significant members of their ‘intimate kin’. The questions I asked sought to illuminate the dialectical process of legitimation-delegitimation of the higher educational market, and its articulation with the dialectical process of intergenerational negotiation of memory in the family. The interviews were recorded digitally, and then transcribed using aliases.

I selected 45 higher education students that for more than one year had been actively participating in the movement and financing their studies with loans. I recruited
students from good, medium and low quality universities (see Chapter 3 for more detail on how I captured these qualities), trying to represent as much as possible the class diversity among the higher education students participating in the movement, which in Chile is highly tied to the level of quality of the higher education institutions.

Although family’s political background and traumatic memories were another focus of analysis, these aspects could not be used to guide the selection of cases because of ethical restrictions. When a researcher puts at stake traumatic memories of violence and terror, the research procedures must emphasize the voluntary nature of participation in interviews and the confidentiality of informant identities, while conducting interviews with incredible delicacy in private and comfortable settings (Wood 2003). For these reasons, any mention to family’s political background and/or personal or other’s traumatic experiences was the spontaneous result of the conversation, and never pushed by direct questions. In addition, as a general rule, interviews were held in a place selected by the interviewee. Students mostly chose central public places, while adults preferred to be interviewed in their homes. The distribution of interviewees by type of higher educational institution is summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. Interviewees by Type of Higher Educational Institution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of higher educational institution</th>
<th>N° active students</th>
<th>N° family members</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good quality</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium quality</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low quality</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As Poster (1978) states, we must look at the households in the society under study without anticipating at all that the people who live together and interact daily are tied together by blood or kin status. I did not, however, set out to interview family and kin, but rather, their importance was an *a posteriori* result. When I asked students to identify the most significant adults in their lives, they identified family members, although I was open to integrate any significant member of the students’ intimate kin.

I did not look for students with a leadership profile. On the contrary, I tried to contact “regular students,” based on my *a priori* understanding of social movements’ leaders as part of elite within any social movement, which would not represent the situation of most active students participating in the movement. However, my key informants – after looking for a while – made me understand that although most of my interviewees did not have a leadership position at the moment of the interview; it was very difficult for them to find active students without leadership experience. As long as they were active students, they probably had had a history of activism including the performance of leadership positions. To be precise, most of the students interviewed were leaders since high school. In addition, because this is a national movement with many organizations within and outside the universities and the schools, the odds of finding an active student without a leadership profile were few.

In Chapter 1 and 2, I will examine the origins of the neoliberalization of higher education in Chile. Then, in Chapter 3 and 4, I will examine the role of family life in the formation of student critical consciousness. To finish, the Conclusion proposes some
ideas for understanding the contradictory role of family under neoliberalism from the case of the Chilean student movement.
CHAPTER ONE
THE CHILEAN NEOLIBERALIZATION AND THE ROLE OF TRAUMATIC MEMORIES (1920S-2012)

Introduction

This dissertation offers strong evidence to defend that the role of families in the formation of the activist students’ critical consciousness is a key but still underestimated aspect within the study of the Chilean student movement. For that reason, this research has been mostly framed as a qualitative study of the process of formation of critical consciousness in a diverse group of active students’ families. Yet this process does not occur in a vacuum. The historical relation between the neoliberalization of higher education at the global level and the rising of student movements to recover the public sense of education at the global level is at this point irrefutable. However, this study was structured to incorporate in the analysis the national mediations involved in the neoliberal turn of the paradigmatic case of Chile as well. Particularly, the process through which neoliberalism was imposed in Chile, by an economic and repressive shock, and then, conflictively legitimized by using sophisticated ideological mechanisms to depoliticize the population.

Therefore, with an emphasis in the role of traumatic memories, in this chapter I begin offering to the reader unfamiliarized with the Chilean recent history a general view of the Chilean neoliberalization and its mechanisms of domination, legitimation and
resistance, which have changed several times during the four moments of the process.

Next, in Chapter 2, I will finish the analysis of national mediations by offering a general view of the emergence of the student movement, with an emphasis on genesis of what I call the Neoliberal Higher Education (NHE) ideology in the Chilean context.

The Chilean Neoliberalization: A Marxist Approach

There are many ways in which the Chilean neoliberalization process can be addressed. Here I start by identifying three different types of accounts, and then explain my own version. First, the most important accounts of the neoliberal counter-revolution have a universal interpretation (see for example, Albo, Gindin and Panitch 2010; Foster and Magdoff 2009; Hudis 2009; Husson 2008; Wolff 2008). They perceive the neoliberal shift as something exogenous and relatively uncontrollable, neglecting the work of local actors in each country; especially in the developing world (see criticism from Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002). These types of accounts are grounded in the experience of the Global North, with a consequent totalitarian explanation that replaces particularity by the universal (see Connell and Dados 2014; Korsch 1998; Meszaros 1970; Sartre 1968).

A second group of scholars, from a state-centric perspective, highlight the mediations of unique economic, social and cultural domestic processes to describe the neoliberal transitions of developing countries (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Silva 1996; Winn 2004). And a third group of scholars, from a dialectical global-local perspective, discuss the production of the necessary conditions for economic globalization at the local level since the early ‘70s (Brenner 2003; Giddens 1997; Harvey
1990; Harvey 2004; Mongin 2006; Ortega Valcárcel 2000; Sassen 2003; Sassen 2004; Sassen 2007; Smith 2001; Veltz 1999).

My approach proposes the understanding of how the economic conditions for economic globalization have been related to other sources of ideology, consciousness, and identity (Aronowitz 2011; Boggs 1984; Mouffe 1979) at the local level, considering especially the socio-cultural experiences and intellectual production of the so-called Global South (Connell and Dados 2014). From a Marxist perspective, in this chapter I particularly focus on the specialized intellectual production to construct an analysis of the national mediations of production, legitimation and resistance involved in the neoliberal turn of the paradigmatic case of Chile.

I consider the case of Chile paradigmatic because many scholars agree that Chile experienced an authentic capitalist revolution and not just a process of “structural adjustment,” and that that revolution was the result of unique historical circumstances (Ffrench-Davis 2002; Martinez and Díaz 1996; Taylor 2006). Because of this, the neoliberalization in Chile has been the focus of intense study, for two reasons.

First, Chile was the first and most comprehensive case of neoliberal orthodoxy put into place in either the developed or developing world, positioning Pinochet, along with Reagan and Thatcher, as one of the early political leaders of free-market economics (Alexander 2009; Büchi 2009; Connell and Dados 2014; Frank 2004; Ffrench-Davis 2002; Hellinger 2012; Lagos, Hounshell and Dickinson 2012; Solimano 2012; Taylor 2006; Winn 2004).
And second, despite the particular economic and political circumstances under which it was implemented and its deleterious effects, Chile has been the most successful showcase for the alleged merits of neoliberal reform agendas. Particularly, what has been promoted by the political elites of the transition is the so-called “Third Way” of the center-left governments of the *Concertación* coalition: a reformed neoliberalism that emerged in the nineties from a political transition considered exemplary for its efficient and peaceful nature, and which has been able to combine sustained economic growth with political stability (Frank 2004; Martinez and Diaz 1996; Silva 1996; Taylor 2006; Winn 2004).

In addition to these reasons, I maintain that two other reasons explain the importance of the Chilean case. The Chilean version of the contentious memory question (the struggles between official and counter official ways to remember Pinochet’s Chile) has had international significance, which has proved central to the remaking of Chilean economy, politics and culture (Stern 2006). As Stern (2006) points out, Chile’s 1973 crisis and violence marked a “before” and “after” for the global Human Rights Movement, a symbolism that was reactivated in 1998, when Pinochet was arrested by the London police due to crimes that were understood by prosecutors and many observers as crimes against humanity. And as Stern (2006) also suggests, Chile is Latin America’s example of the “German problem.” That is, the paradoxical coexistence of barbarism and an alleged political, cultural and economic sophistication in the same land. In the case of Chile, unfortunately, both Chileans and outsiders have believed in a myth of exceptionalism. This could help to explain why the so-called “Truth and Reconciliation”
post conflict justice model that was used in the Chilean transition from dictatorship to
democracy is a formula that has been applied around the world (Lagos, Blake, and
Dickinson 2012).

The fourth reason, that is the emergence and growth of the internationally
recognized Chilean Student Movement since 2011 came to reinforce and update the
importance of the Chilean version of the contentious memory question. Several authors
indicate that the financialization of global capital and its current level of “accumulation
by dispossession” (Harvey 2005) in which debt becomes the main weapon for
disciplining dissent (McNally 2009; Moulian 2002) has been identified as the perfect
time for a “legitimation crisis” (Habermas 1975; Schweickart 2011). In this context, as
Habermas (1975) states, education has been one of the motivational patterns for the
functioning of the system that is currently breaking down, since education no longer
guarantees equal opportunities of employment. In fact, after many years of forced
depoliticization, the Chilean students and allies have returned massively to the streets
since 2011 to demand a profound transformation of the Chilean educational system, a
system which is one of the main reforms of Pinochet’s government (described in detail in
Chapter 2).

To organize the discussion, this chapter seeks to assess the general Gramscian
distinction between “direct” domination and hegemony from the particular process of
neoliberalization of Chile and its particular historical conditions. As Mouffe (1979)
clarifies, a class is dominant in two ways: a class dominates the opposing classes, and
rules the allied classes. From this perspective, I initially proposed that Chileans’
traumatic memories not only came out of the mechanisms of direct domination exercised through physical coercion (or the threat of it) by the respective state apparatuses (Boggs 1984; Gramsci 1995; Mouffe 1979). Additionally, they came out of the mechanisms used by them to (re)achieve hegemony and legitimation, which according to Bocock (1986) cannot be imposed by force, but through rational understanding along with emotional and moral consent (see also Habermas 1975).

Having described my approach to address the Chilean neoliberalization process, and from an exhaustive review of the specialized literature, I argue that the mechanisms of domination, legitimation and resistance of Chilean neoliberalism have changed several times in response to important historical events. So did the role of traumatic memories within the process. For that reason, the chapter is organized according to four moments of the Chilean neoliberal restructuring identified by the literature: the Gradualist, the Radical, the Pragmatic, and the Transition.

**The Gradualist Phase of Economic Restructuring (1920s-1972)**

Although the coup d’état of 1973 symbolizes the crisis and rupture of an era, the process of Chilean neoliberalization, to be comprehensively addressed, must be placed in the context of previous periods (Büchi 2009; Ffrench-Davis 2002; Martinez and Diaz 1996; Roniger 1997; Salazar and Grez 1999; Taylor 2006).

Paradoxically, during the second half of the twentieth century, all governing elites before the neoliberal revolution were self-proclaimed revolutionaries as well, but from very different points of view (Martinez and Diaz 1996). In general, the guiding postwar paradigm in developing countries was import – substituting industrialization, a
developmentalist form of the state that was crystallized around the project of encouraging capital accumulation through domestic industrial expansion (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Taylor 2006). Since 1948 in Chile, the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, CEPAL in Spanish), Latin American development theorists, and numerous anticapitalistic movements had all embraced the “dependency approach,” which stressed the unbalanced integration into the capitalist world market, the exploitative role of foreign capital and multinationals, and promoted the import substitution development strategy (Fischer 2009; Martinez and Diaz 1996). In parallel, as Salazar (2003) points out, the economic crisis of 1930 forced foreign commercial conglomerates to leave the country, producing a strategic fissure in the economic leadership of Chile. In addition, the country had to face the crisis of “salitre” (or sodium nitrate, the main export good at that time), and the denationalization of cooper.

Hence, in a context of escalating social tensions, the state assumed the economic leadership of the country in conducting the industrial expansion, but with a national-developmental vocation, and excluding the capitalist class (Salazar 2003). Nevertheless, because the development strategy was always liberal and the Chilean economy always needed the foreign support of capitalist conglomerates, the transition to industrial capitalism was never finished, maintaining the foreign investment and the import of technology, instead of producing them internally (Salazar 2003). Moreover, the strategy was sustained by considerable U.S. financing through President Kennedy’s “Alliance for Progress,” an initiative that, in the wake of the Cuban Revolution of 1959, sought to prevent further revolutions in Latin America by promoting moderate social change
Therefore, the institutional expansion of the Chilean state was developed to increase the ability to consume domestically-produced goods, to face the difficulties of the external market and the opposition of the internal capitalists, and to achieve political support within the working class (Salazar 2003; Taylor 2006).

According to Salazar (1986), the mainstream explanation of the crisis of this phase, which ended with the 1973 coup d’état, considers that the expansion of the state was not the “the remedy to the problems of Chilean society but the source of those very ills” (see also CEP 1992; Taylor 2006: 11). These efforts of development made Chilean society even more politicized and antagonized, contradicting the attempt of the U.S. financed “neo-capitalist” strategy (Taylor 2006). While resources became restricted, the traditional political parties struggled to contain an escalating movement for more radical social change. By the 1960s and early 1970s, social movements and interest groups pressured the state for material compromises, and therefore the resolution of conflict over wages. Thus, the conditions of labor became national political issues. As a result of these trends towards social politicization ongoing since the 1920s, the left had come close to winning the 1958 presidential elections, and the Unidad Popular (UP) candidate, the socialist Salvador Allende, was elected president in 1970 (Jaksic 1989; Salazar and Pinto 1999; Taylor 2006).

Many consider that Chile represents the South American case in which the threat of revolution was most pronounced (Hellinger 2012). The main goal of the self-proclaimed “revolution in democracy” was to pave the way for an electoral majority sufficiently large to implement deeper structural changes. After half century of populist
politics in Chile, according to mainstream scholars, the strategy selected by the UP’s economic policymakers was again straight populism without regard for macroeconomic equilibrium. By this token, during his first year in office, Allende’s government sought farther reaching “structural” change, particularly with respect to property, extending the agrarian reform and nationalizing “the commanding heights” of the economy: ninety percent of private banks, more than seventy strategic and monopolistic companies, and the mining industries of cooper, coal, iron, nitrates, and steel (Ffrench-Davis 2002; Frank 2004; Winn 2004). But in the process, Chile’s workers and peasants transformed themselves into protagonists of their own and their nation’s destinies, reaching historic heights of income, status, and organization, and their representatives won unprecedented power and influence on issues of national policy (see for instance Winn 2004).

Nevertheless, according to the Chilean Marxist historian Gabriel Salazar, the Unidad Popular government – and its alternative project for a “socialist society” – became a general idea of socialism disconnected from the particular Chilean situation (Salazar 1986), being unable to go beyond reformism and only reaching a pre-revolutionary stage (Salazar 2003).

According to Silva (1996), the role of capitalist elites in the national developmentalism process was secondary; they and landowners tolerated democracy as long as they could defend their property and profits.

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1He was also a member of the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) until 1973, imprisoned and tortured in Villa Grimaldi by the military afterwards. His work is highly respected by the Chilean student movement nowadays, conducting several talks and seminars organized by them in different universities and schools. In this context, he became a legitimized analyst of the student movement, the educational crisis and the challenge of reformulating the current constitution by popular movements, both for mainstream and alternative media (see for instance: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h9bFH1xYx8Y; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SFdSfqMY9x8; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rHF5L_BzFqo; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jYjeDgf2iAw).
However, most scholars of the Chilean neoliberalization ignore the role of social movements and mainly focus on the top-down counter hegemonic forces. Thus, they need to go further back in history to explain the genesis of resistance to the “revolution in democracy,” explaining why this phase is called gradualist. An oncoming alternative economic program for radical neoliberalism was woven outside the state since the 1950s by a counter hegemonic movement that came out from a systematic collaboration between a politicized Chilean capitalist class and the U.S. government (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Silva 1996; Taylor 2006). Although the elites had apparently accepted the nationalization of the copper industry and the extension of agrarian reform, the opposition turned against democracy itself with Allende’s regime plan to forge a Social Property Area comprised of key industrial sectors (Silva 1996; Taylor 1914). Crucial protagonists in this regard were the representatives of the conglomerates, who orchestrated the economic and political destabilization of Allende’s government with the support of conservative political parties and the U.S. government, organizing economic boycotts and a collapse of private transportation, among other measures (Fischer 2009; Silva 1996).

Although U.S. actions widened the breach, Chile’s polarization was largely generated internally: the populist strategy ruling under the same liberal logic collapsed, the authorities were unable to manage the polarization of the country, the conflict moved to the streets, and the way to the coup was paved (Ffrench-Davis 2002; Hellinger 2012; Salazar 2003; Taylor 2006).
Following Gramsci (1995), as every counter hegemonic movement interested in their own expansion, the capitalist elites needed to create a stratum of intellectuals to give homogeneity and awareness of its own function not only in the economic, but also in the social and political fields. The ruling class was the same as before, but throughout the 1960s, the traditional right had lost ground. Thus, they had to be creative enough to adapt their methods of legitimation (Fischer 2009; Salazar and Pinto 1999).

Despite continuing opposition among scholars, an agreement was done in 1956 between the departments of economics of the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile (PUC) and the University of Chicago (Alexander 2009; Fischer 2009). In the course of three decades, more than 150 Chilean students received their training in Chicago and began to be known as “The Chicago Boys,” deeply transforming the education of economics (CEP 1992). In this context, many of the top leaders of the conglomerates that led the opposition to Allende either were trained in Chicago, or collaborated closely with these neoliberal economists from the late 1950s onward (Fischer 2009).

As this process of indoctrination progressed, the capitalist elites began delineating a new project of national unity, which was economically neoliberal, but also based on corporatist ideas grounded in ultraconservative Catholicism. That is, with a strong opposition to political parties (Mönckeberg 2005; Salazar and Pinto 1999). The leadership of this ideological struggle was assumed by the gremialista movement (“guildism”). As Garreton and Martinez (1985) explain, this movement emerged in 1964 at the PUC to separate politics and the university, as a reaction to a national university

2Traditionally, the more politically conservative of Chile’s two main universities (Alexander 2009; see also AEI 2012). Later on, the school of economics of the University of Chile—the best public university—was also converted to neoliberal thought (Mönckeberg 2005).
reform process that sought to recover the public role of universities. Unsurprisingly, the impact of these ideas among those who felt threatened in the face of an over politicized and increasingly polarized historic situation was huge (Fischer 2009; Jaksic 1989). As a result, when most of the country “turned to the left,” the PUC “turned to the right,” and the gremialista movement kept the leadership of the university federation from 1969 to 1985 (Garreton and Martinez 1985; Mönckeberg 2005).

Although the gremialista movement defended the idea of the depoliticization of universities, its role in the national public life was increasingly important, and in 1970, ideologists and economists were linked to politics through the opposition to Allende’s government, “to free the country from the clutches of Marxism” (Fischer 2009; Garreton and Martinez 1985; Lessa and Druliolle 2011; Mönckeberg 2005). From the end of 1972, some high-level Navy officers had made contact with a group of opposition ideologists – “The Monday Club,” composed of some powerful conglomerates leaders, Chicago Boys and gremialistas – who were secretly working to prepare a post-coup economic recovery program. The economic plan, known as El Ladrillo (“The Brick”), was ready for the day of the military coup (Büchi 2009; CEP 1992; Martinez and Diaz 1996; Silva 1996).


The traditional explanation of the Chilean neoliberal turn argues that only direct domination suffices to explain the change: strong authoritarianism and autonomous teams of free market-oriented technocrats (Martinez and Diaz 1996). To some extent, students of neoliberalism as important as Harvey (2005) and Klein (2007) have supported this belief, when highlighting the case of Chile as the first and most radical experiment with
neoliberal ideology and the strategy of shock enacted by the “Mont Pelerin Society”\textsuperscript{3} since the 1950s. Particularly, Milton Friedman, the main mentor of the “Chicago Boys,” stated that “only a crisis produces real change… [and w]hen that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around” (Klein 2007). Therefore, Friedman proposed as a strategy to wait “for a major crisis, then selling off pieces of the state to private players while citizens were still reeling from the shock,\textsuperscript{4} then quickly making the ‘reforms’ permanent” (Klein 2007).

However, when taking into consideration the intellectual work on Chilean neoliberalization from the Global South we can apprehend that the economic shock executed by autonomous teams of free market-oriented technocrats, and the repressive shock executed by military were central but not enough to control dissent during the Chilean neoliberal turn, as I explain below.

**Direct Domination through Repressive and Economic Shock**

**Initial negotiations.** The complex process of rebuilding hegemony began in the middle of 1972. According to Silva (1996), there were two competing views of what type of government should follow and the role of organized business in it. On one hand, it was the *gremialista* movement, which proposed that landowners, medium and small-scale producers, and professionals had an active role in a corporatist government that gave elite deal-makers and political parties less room to maneuver. On the other hand, big business’ owners – who had the best connections to military conspirators – expected the continuation of structural policies of industrial support, with a political order based on a


\textsuperscript{4}My emphasis.
tripartite relationship between gremialistas, political parties, and the military. Accordingly, they rejected the radical economic reform proposed by the Monday Club for being contrary to the Chilean economic trajectory (Martinez and Diaz 1996). Consequently, although “The Brick” was ready in September 1973, during the early years of the dictatorship there were still internal differences within the military junta (government) regarding the effects of a radical neoliberal shock program on pro-coup social actors and on the long-term viability of political restructuring (Fischer 2009, Taylor 2006, Winn 2004). Neither the military government, nor the Chicago Boys, nor the gremialista movement had a project of society. They just had a short-term plan to eradicate the leftist dissent, an economic plan to transform the country into a GDP-producer machine, and a normative plan to depoliticize the country, respectively (Fischer 2009; Mayol 2012a; Taylor 2006). The radical model that came out from the combination of these three plans was the one that finally won as a result of unique historical circumstances.

The Chilean neoliberal state. The opportunity for a radical neoliberal transformation was not developed until 1975, when it became evident that the economy was in a recession. After Friedman met Pinochet during his first visit to Chile at the end of 1974, Pinochet was convinced that only a radical shock treatment could effectively counter the ongoing crisis (Fischer 2009). In addition, Friedman’s ideas fit Pinochet’s own self-image: his willingness to impose harsh measures on their people with “efficiency” and “modernization” in order to “save” Chile matched the military’s sense of mission, which is above politics and private interests (Büchi 2009; Winn 2004).
Furthermore, Pinochet and his closest advisers distrusted right wing politicians – and their demands for a restoration of an “oligarchic” order and land tenure, – whom they considered a serious potential threat to their own position of power (Martinez and Diaz 1996). As a result, mostly “Chicago Boys” and gremialistas scholars (between 26-35 years old) were called into key advisory positions, creating a new civilian technocracy formally independent from more traditional business and landowning interests to control economic policy making – although many of whom did share business ties (Büchi 2009; CEP 1992; Fischer 2009; Martinez and Diaz 1996; Salazar 2003; Silva 1996).

What ensured continuity of the reform policies was the dual loyalty of the scholars, to the minister in charge (typically a military man) and directly to Pinochet. Therefore, the reform team could work continuously in loyalty to Pinochet despite frequent changes at the minister level (Fischer 2009; Martinez and Diaz 1996; Silva 1996). At the same time, Pinochet backed the technocrats unconditionally and allowed them a high degree of autonomy and power in the pursuit of neoliberal planning activities and structural reforms (Alexander 2009; Fischer 2009; Silva 1996). This marked a shift from a military rule by the junta to a personalist rule by Pinochet, concluding the shift from a gradualist to a radical phase. Therefore, the restructuring of the state apparatus and its direct means of domination during the radical phase of the military regime was distinctly characterized by the concentration of power in the hands of one man, the resulting autonomy of the radical free-market reformists, and a brutal repressive military force.

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5 In April 1975, law decree 966 was enacted, naming Jorge Cauas “Superminister” and granting him the greatest economic policy-making power that anybody ever had in Chile in the twentieth century (Büchi 2009).
**Sharing the national cake.** The time for “The Brick” – the most extreme neoliberal plan conducted by a state so far in the world – had come, which defined that economic growth was the only way to reach social development and equitable distribution. In addition, it defined that an economic reform with this aspiration had to be necessarily a radical change, opening up the whole social structure of the country as a field for economic experimentation (CEP 1992; Ffrench-Davis 2002; Lessa and Druliole 2011; Martinez and Diaz 1996; Salazar 2003; Taylor 2006).

In this model the financial system became the dominant decision-making center in the Chilean economy (Ffrench-Davis 2002; see also Salazar 2003). The emerging large economic-financial groups took a clear lead in the new order, having an extremely fluid relationship with the state technocratic elite – in contrast to what happened with the gremio (guilds) organizations of the businessmen (Martinez and Diaz 1996).

As Ffrench-Davis (2002) explains, privatization was not limited to transferring businesses expropriated during the regime of President Allende. These companies were also sold. Because these sales were largely conducted in periods of domestic recession and at very high interest rates, very few economic groups were able to buy. This fact inaugurated the sharp concentration of ownership that still characterizes the country, and also the massive increase in loans from international commercial banks to finance the purchase of companies being privatized, a process that was at the core of the economic crisis that surfaced in 1982 (Ffrench-Davis 2002; Taylor 2006).

**The victims of the Chilean miracle.** Although the Chilean economy never reached an advanced stage of capitalism, the populist but politically fruitful “class
compromise” that Chilean workers had won since the 1930s was also broken by the neoliberal counter revolution (Bocock 1986; Bourdieu and Nice 1998; Harvey 2005; Hudis 2009; Robinson 2011; Schweickart 2011; Winn 2004). This process, however, was even more traumatic given Pinochet’s violent repression of labor unions and worker activists, the main victims of the Chilean miracle (Winn 2004). In addition, whereas the limited benefits went to a minority, the high costs burdened the majority alongside a sharp deterioration of income and wealth distribution (Ffrench-Davis 2002). In the words of Büchi (2009), the plan “meant applying shock treatment by reducing government spending by 20 percent, dismissing 30 percent of public employees…” (see also Ffrench-Davis 2002), while “… social programs should … incentivize individual effort to encourage people to take responsibility for their own destinies.” Indeed, unions were prohibited because the government believed that real wage increases come about not because of labor laws, but from individual worker productivity.

With union activity and collective negotiations restricted, and also with a growing use of subcontracting to shift costs and risks, all the obstacles to rationalization and flexibilization of labor were overcome, enhancing the mobility of financial capital (Martinez and Diaz 1996). This triggered a profound restructuring of the working classes, who were faced with shifting employment structures, decreasing wages and greatly intensified workloads, while many were fired and forced into informal employment or emergency work programs (Ffrench-Davis 2002; Martinez and Diaz 1996; Taylor 2006).
The Depoliticization of Chilean Society

I have argued that the economic shock executed by free market-oriented technocrats, and the repressive shock executed by the military were fundamental but not enough to control dissent. Although linked, additional mechanisms working beyond the direct domination of the state were needed so that people internalize the dominant ideological and cultural neoliberal values (Boggs 1984; Gramsci 1995; Mouffe 1979). For the case of Chile, this meant the “depoliticization” of society,” which means making most citizens believe that formal politics is the main source of conflict and polarization, thus reducing politics to a technocratic and administrative task, and so leaving them in a very malleable condition to deepen the radical free-market reform (CEP 1992, Hellinger 2012, Martinez and Diaz 1996, Mayol 2012a, Moulian 2002).

Two mechanisms of depoliticization were principally employed in this period. On one hand, considering the traumatic character of the neoliberal turn in Chile, hegemony over supporters was necessarily exercised through a permanent struggle over memory (see Stern 2006). In this regard, we observe the making of memory frameworks during the formative early years of military rule by regime leaders and supporters, which initially sought to explain dictatorship as “as a salvation.” The military doctrine of national security, consistent with the ideology of the Cold War, came to define the “internal enemy” as the fundamental enemy of the nation (Alexander 2009; Martinez and Diaz 1996; Mönckeberg 2005; Stern 2006). The supporters of the military regime even today believe that the Unidad Popular government was violently subjecting all individuals to the strictest state control, and thus establishing a totalitarian system, which
forced the intervention of military forces to stop the crisis (Büchi 2009; Salazar and Grez 1999; Taylor 2006).

However, as memory and human rights debates sharpened and coincided with other causes in the late 1970s, regime leaders and supporters promoted a mindful forgetting of the times of the “dirty” war in order to concentrate the energies in the future progress (Stern 2006). In other words, they covered the excesses of the past with the proclaimed “economic miracle” of the late 1970s (Lazzara 2006; Taylor 2006; Winn 2004). On this basis, major figures within the tradition of neoclassical economics visited Chile again to exalt the virtues of their worldview and draw international attention to a new “model” country, justifying with this the IMF’s ideological shift toward Chicago School monetarism and, more important, the global propagation of neoliberalism as a solution to global economic problems (Taylor 2006).

The second mechanism to depoliticize the collective subjectivities of Chilean people and, thus, to reestablish the conditions for capital accumulation and hegemony, was a concerted assault on all institutions that promoted collective social action, reducing societal development to a succession of private, individual and rational market interactions that the state can oversee in an “apolitical” and technocratic manner (Taylor 2006). A new constitution and a new plan known as the “Seven Modernizations” (focused on labor relations, social security, health and education) were designed and implemented to extend the market approach to other spheres of society. Here, the Chicago economic orthodoxy was not the ideological source, but mainly the Virginia
School and Hayekian (Mont Pelerin Society) approaches, with some indispensable “local” adaptations.

On one hand, the lawyer and leader of the gremialista movement, Jaime Guzman, prepared a new constitution that sought to promote three major principles of neoliberalism: the supreme value of private property, severe restrictions on the state’s economic role as producer, and a severe restriction on labor rights and political participation in general (Fischer 2009; Solimano 2012). The new constitution was ratified through a very irregular voting process in 1980, and taking into account that a huge majority is necessary to amend it, it is still Chile’s fundamental charter today (Lagos et al. 2012; Solimano 2012; Winn 2004). Guzman cleverly prevented this situation by the establishment of the so-called binominal system⁶ for electing members of Congress, which “ensured that the political Right would almost always receive more than its share of seats and that smaller political parties, such as the Communists, would almost never gain any seats” (Hellinger 2012; see also Silva 1996; Spooner 2011; Taylor 2006; Winn 2004). Therefore, the so-called “authoritarian enclaves” are still at the core of the justifications given by the political elites when explaining the “restricted democracy” of the country today (see Lagos et al. 2012; Mönckeberg 2005).

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⁶“The binominal system worked by diluting voter support for any political coalition. Each congressional district elected two representatives to each house, although each voter may cast only one vote for one congressional and one senatorial candidate. Political coalitions such as the Concertación or the rightist Alianzapor Chile would present two candidates for each office in every voting district. The candidate receiving the highest number of votes would win one of the two seats in a given district. But the second congressional seat would not go automatically to the candidate receiving the second-highest number of votes. If this candidate belonged to the same political coalition as top vote-getting candidate, their combined votes would have to total more than two-thirds of the ballots cast in their district for both candidates to win both seats. If this did not happen, the second seat would go to the most successful candidate run by the other political coalition” (Spooner 2011).
The “Seven Modernizations” put into practice the principles of the new constitution, inaugurating a new form of legitimation. The privatization of social security, health and education, involving open or implicit subsidies for those choosing to satisfy these needs through the market, allowed the access of middle and upper income groups to services of better quality than those offered by the public sector (Martinez and Diaz 1996). To reach the working class, another sphere of society – as important as labor – for the legitimation of the model was depoliticized: education. As a result of the implementation of “The Brick” and the “Seven Modernizations,” the public sense of education was destroyed and became defined as a private economic investment (Mayol 2012a; Mönckeberg 2005; Spooner 2011), which is described in Chapter 2.

The depoliticization of education was also reinforced by direct domination through repressive shock. As Mönckeberg (2005) describes, during the early years of the dictatorship the most politically active campuses were the focus of military repression, and some of them were evacuated by university authorities to avoid massacres. Many scholars and students lost their lives, disappeared, or had to leave the country. Others had to live clandestinely, or were removed from their offices. Those who stayed worked in an environment characterized by fear and distrust since the military intervened in public universities to “remove the Marxist cancer,” mainly in the social sciences schools (e.g., the teaching of sociology was cancelled). While the Chicago Boys led the training in economics, the gremialistas scholars conducted the academic administration of universities to eradicate politics from the academic environment by rejecting political parties, particularly leftist organizations, and the teaching of Marxist ideologies.
Paradoxically, the *gremialista* movement was the unique legal political party during the dictatorship, which mainly worked in universities. It is important to understand that the *gremialismo* is a conservative fundamentalist movement, with some of their members related to the Opus Dei, the most conservative branch of the Catholic Church, which had (and still have) major influence over the moral aspects of the teaching process in several institutions.

**The Pragmatic Phase of Economic Restructuring (1982-1989)**

**The Debt Crisis (1982-1983) and the “Chicago Road to Socialism”**

In 1982, the radical neoliberal shock program led to Chile’s worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, with GDP declining by 14% (Ffrench-Davis 2002; Taylor 2006; Winn 2004). This crisis had its origin in the insolvency of the speculative bubble that was hailed as an “economic miracle” by the financial-economic groups in a context of unregulated imprudence, and it was precipitated by a high level of debt, coupled with the augmented price of external credit and a declining market for exports triggered by the international crisis (Martinez and Diaz 1996; Silva 1996; Winn 2004). As several scholars explain (Ffrench-Davis 2002; Fischer 2009; Martinez and Diaz 1996; Taylor 2006; Winn 2004), to restore economic stability and growth, the government hitherto hostile to regulation had to develop a pragmatic version of the neoliberal model. Particularly, they decided to liquidate three banks, take over the administration of five, and let the Central Bank supply large credits to the rest to rescue them from bankruptcy.

Paradoxically, during the gradualist phase, Allende’s opponents permanently criticized to his government for its extensive credits to the public sector. For that reason,
as Winn (2004) states, some critical analysts of Pinochet’s regime ironically called this pragmatic shift as the “Chicago road to socialism.” As these analysts also stated, Pinochet’s shock program was based on the “naïveté” of Chicago Boys, who applied a simplistic “textbook” version of neoliberalism to a complex Chilean reality.

This pragmatic version of neoliberalism was conducted by the new Finance Minister Hernan Büchi (1985-1989). He succeeded in restoring the confidence of the IMF and the World Bank by strengthening their ability to ensure orthodoxy, overcoming the reluctance of some members because of continuing human rights abuses (Fischer 2009). Concretely, the IMF and the World Bank approved three structural adjustment loans (1985, 1986, 1987) in exchange for tariff reductions and more privatizations (Fischer 2009; Martinez and Diaz 1996; Winn 2004). As a result, an export-led boom opened up a decade of dramatic economic expansion in Chile, with annual GDP growth rates averaging above eight percent between 1987 and 1997 (Ffrench-Davis 2002; Silva 1996; Taylor 2006). As usual, this greater pragmatism favored upper-income sectors, while a tough position was maintained toward labor and grassroots organizations (Ffrench-Davis 2002). In addition, although the employment situation began to improve, average and minimum wages had not returned to their 1981 level, indicating increasing wage inequality (Martinez and Diaz 1996).

In sum, the Chilean neoliberal experiment provided helpful evidence to support the subsequent turn to neoliberalism in both Britain (under Thatcher) and the U.S. (under Reagan) in the 1980s, exposing the tensions between the theory of neoliberalism and the actual pragmatics of neoliberalization (Harvey 2005). The major lessons of Chilean
neoliberal experiment for the turn to neoliberalism in the Global North was that a strong and – if necessary – coercive state is still crucial, principally for the containment of economic crises produced by the competitive volatility of global finance (Albo, Gindin, and Panitch 2010; Foster and Magdoff 2009; Harvey 2005).

**The Protest Movement: Beyond Structural Explanations of Resistance**

As a reaction to the Pinochet dictatorship and its “shock treatment,” and despite the risks, a growing dissidence – and an open defiance – at the grassroots level emerged around 1977-78 (Winn 2004). Despite the fact that traditional unionism was in a state of severe decline, the copper economy still played a critical role in the Chilean economy. Thus, the power of copper workers had remained largely unaffected by economic and social policy during the decade, and also retained its capacity to link up with middle-class professional organizations (Martinez and Diaz 1996). However, although copper workers led the organized resistance in the first place – particularly against the 1979 labor code – the fear of state repression that had been leveled against strikes in the preceding years forced them to call for generalized street protests (Martinez and Diaz 1996; Taylor 2006). Triggered by this call, between 1983 and 1985, a massive protest movement exploded (Taylor 2006). Thousands of protesters raced through the streets of Santiago shouting: “He’s going to fall!” (Winn 2004).

The protest movement could be explained by referring to the debt crisis of 1982-1983, but a merely economic explanation is not enough (Martinez and Diaz 1996). According to Gabriel Salazar, the dictatorship had destroyed the traditional organizations,

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7° “*Y va a caer!*” In Spanish, a popular chant during dictatorship that was adapted by the student movement since 2011.
eliminated the political leaders, and controlled public space, but it could not reach completely the intimacy of communities despite its aggressive mechanisms of depoliticization (Salazar 2011). Particularly, the support of the “pobladores” (poor settlements’ inhabitants) was fundamental for the cooper industry leaders.

In addition, the politics of memory had been building a new resistance movement since the early years of fierce military government (Martinez and Diaz 1996; Ros 2012). To be exact, as Stern (2006) explains, victims, critics, human rights activists, and persons of conscience built up counter official frameworks that remembered military intervention in 1973 as a cruel rupture, and the “past-within-the-present” as an experience of persecution and moral awakening of conscience centered on the question of human rights. As Stern (2006) says, even though these counter official frameworks did not arise all at once or smoothly, at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s the idea of “memory” itself crystallized into a significant cultural code word in its own right. Later, with the revival of politics against the regime in 1983, dissident memory underwent rapid and turbulent expansion, until it ended up merging with the protest movement. As a result, memory of military rule as a story of rupture, persecution, and awakening turned into a kind of cultural common sense (Stern 2006).

For these reasons, as Taylor (2006) says, although the labor movement and the urban poor remained the primary social base of the protest movement, active opposition began to transcend class lines to include sections of the middle and upper classes. We must also consider that the latter had largely been locked out of decision-making processes since the mid-1970s as well (Salazar and Pinto 1999), a situation deemed
intolerable when combined with the heavy losses incurred during the debt-crisis period (Taylor 2006).

Despite the economic recovery that began in 1984, which increased consumption levels and extended private property, the military government did not recover support from the population (Martinez and Diaz 1996). The protest movement hit in the system’s weak point, that is, its dependence on depoliticization of the public sphere (Castel 2003; Marcuse 1969; Wiggershaus 1995). The dictatorship memory frameworks had lost legitimacy among the Chilean majority, although it stayed valid for a deeply loyal and strategic minority social base that still remembered the military intervention as a salvation. This triggered the loss of consensus among the ruling class, which would only remain “dominant,” exercising coercive power, but not “leading” (Gramsci 1995: 556), exposing to the international public opinion that Pinochet had lost the control of the country (Martinez and Diaz 1996; Salazar 2011). Thus, the struggle for hegemony was opened again, while still in a context of brutal economic and political repression.

In this context, the interclass “alliance” did not endure. According to Martinez and Diaz (1996), the politics of memory was more active than ever, demonstrating in practice that the country was still highly divided regarding the interpretation of the past. In particular, they say, the growing violence in marginal areas, the more intensive use of \textit{allendista} symbols by demonstrators and the open mistrustfulness shown in these areas toward the leaders and their propensity to consensus broke the cooperation.

The situation became critical when this division over memories opened a debate regarding conflicting mechanisms of resistance to recover democracy, originating two
political alliances in 1983. First, it was the *Alianza Democrática* (Democratic Alliance), which preferred dialogue, participated in authorized marches and demonstrations, worked through judicial battles, acquisition of influence and control over legal or semi legal social organizations, and more importantly, planned the construction of a “balance between growth and social cohesion.” And second, it was the *Movimiento Democrático* (Democratic Movement), which preferred the creation of militias, engaged in assassination attempts (to Pinochet), and took part in local strikes (Lagos et al. 2012; Martinez and Diaz 1996; Taylor 2006; Winn 2004).

In the meantime, the emergence of an armed opposition increased the sense of an escalating political crisis within the country, and encouraged the Reagan administration to promote some media access to the opposition, helping Pinochet’s opponents with funds, permitting international observers to validate voting practices, and allowing exiles to return home (Taylor 2006; Winn 2004). At the same time, however, Pinochet found a new reason to reactivate and sharpen the brutal persecution of dissidents and, thus, to ensure his domination⁸ (Lagos et al. 2012).

In sum, although the recovery of democracy in Chile was ultimately negotiated through the old party elites – who triumphed through the use of the very institutional mechanisms designed by the authoritarian regime to perpetuate its power – the original

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⁸“The failure of the protest movement to oust Pinochet… removed the possibility of popular rebellion. The military’s seizure of the armaments hidden in the northern desert for the FPMR weakened the alternative of guerrilla struggle. The option that remained was assassination, and in September 1986, the Manuel Rodriguez Front ambushed Pinochet’s motorcade on a valley road near Santiago and narrowly missed killing him. This failure spelled the end of armed struggle as a realistic political alternative in Chile” (Winn 2004).
impulse came from a profound mass rebellion against the dictatorship (Martinez and Diaz 1996; Salazar 2011).

**Democracy as Mechanism to Reestablish Conditions for Capital Accumulation and Hegemony**

As some scholars state (Martinez and Diaz 1996; Silva 1996), the economic crisis and the protest movement triggered the appearance of new actors. Thus, the key to the Chilean transition was based on the possibility of forming a working alliance among them. On one hand, after being pulled into the crisis by the domino effect that the bankruptcy of certain leading firms transmitted to the banks and other productive sectors, the business community (particularly the productive sector), formed a strong pragmatic neoliberal economic coalition. However, they started to perceive Pinochet as an obstacle to the social and economic stability of the country. Thus, the coalition’s next maneuver was to make the pragmatic neoliberal economic model an “untouchable” item in the future administration, demanding an absolute respect for private property (Martinez and Diaz 1996; Silva 1996).

On the other hand, after 1980 the interest for discussing Chile’s present and past from history decreased among new left elites, and pragmatism raised from the basic need of adapting to new cultures, or from the vital and political need to return to the country (Salazar 2003). The political transformation caused by the protest movement had originated the “renovation” of a large part of the left, which distanced itself from the past ideological confrontations and clearly oriented toward the construction of a new consensus (Martinez and Diaz 1996). Therefore, the *Alianza Democrática* sought to
guarantee capitalists and right-wing political parties that it was not a menace to the established order, but only a legitimate participant in a negotiated transition to democracy, more concerned with political democratization than with economic change (Silva 1996; Spooner 2011). To do that, they had to bargain over the terms of the 1988 plebiscite and various anti-democratic clauses of the 1980 Constitution with conservatives, capitalists, and the military (Lagos et al. 2012; Silva 1996; Solimano 2012; Stern 2010). Thus, this process was developed without the participation of the Chilean popular social movements that had contributed greatly to the downfall of the military regime⁹ (Alexander 2009; Winn 2004). The Movimiento Democrático, lacking an alternative project, was unable to organize the rest of the dissidence (Salazar and Pinto 1999).

In this context, Pinochet underestimated the strength of the united opposition and called for a national plebiscite (or referendum) to determine whether or not he would extend his rule for another eight-year term in office, as mandated by his 1980 constitution (Alexander 2009; Taylor 2006). As a result, the mobilization for the “No” campaign became the most important social movement in the country since the first protests of 1983 (Martinez and Diaz 1996). Despite the exclusion of the grassroots movements in the negotiations, the Concertación por el No [Coalition for the “No”], a center-left alliance of sixteen parties conquered again the hearts and minds of the majority with a strong promise of democracy (Stern 2006; Winn 2004). According to many authors, the Concertación suffered “political schizophrenia,” since it could never meet the social and

⁹This latter situation, like so many aspects, has been shamelessly distorted by the official history of the democratic transition (see Lagos et al. 2012).
economic justice needs of its long-excluded electoral base and still fulfill the demands of its domestic and international capitalist allies (Alexander 2009; De la Cuadra 2010). In fact, despite the defeat at the plebiscite and the subsequent election, the constitutional framework under which the referendum had taken place provided the military regime with over a year’s grace period to prepare the transition and to shape Chile’s future institutional structure, in order to be consistent with the neoliberal transformations (Taylor 2006).

In sum, the specialized literature on the Chilean neoliberalization mainly focuses on the mechanisms to reach hegemony used by the new political and economic elites. Despite the exclusion of popular movements from the negotiation stage, the new left elites would have been able to led to the majority of Chilean people to get “absorbed” by the triumph of the “No” option in the plebiscite, and later by the triumph of the *Concertación* in the presidential elections of 1989, allowing that the economic system and the Constitution imposed illegitimately by Pinochet remained unchanged (Salazar 2011). As Salazar (2011) argues, the majority of Chilean people had the power to force Pinochet to negotiate, but they did not have the political lucidity to control the negotiation of the transition. However, as he maintains, many are nowadays starting to feel that all the efforts made by the citizenry to expulse Pinochet were in vain (see also Fischer 2009; Winn 2004), which became a crucial piece of the memories of the Student Movement (see Chapter 4).
The Transition (1990-2010)

The Paradox of the “Chilean Miracle”

According to Salazar and Pinto (1999), the *Concertación* was at the beginning a diverse intellectual and political group of center-left elites that shared the opposition to the dictatorship, and a perspective for conducting the transition to democracy. The *Concertación* governments put an end to the great historic conflict between Chile’s center and left, but at the cost of renouncing ideological differences that in the past constituted an important engine for change (Frank 2004; Salazar 2011). Although the social safety net for the most disadvantaged was extended, they preserved the system of close interaction with business groups on policy making that had emerged toward the end of the military rule, narrowing the options to address social equity questions, and limiting themselves to the deepening of liberal, not social-democratic, state formation (Silva 1996). Hence, the *Concertación* governments represented the final defeat of an important part of the left: once convinced that they could not change the capitalist hegemony, they incorporated the neoliberal discourse in their actions (Fischer 2009; Salazar and Pinto 1999; Silva 1996; Taylor 2006).

Thus, the period of greatest prosperity for the Chilean economy began. The *Concertación* governments conducted an economic growth that averaged 7.7% a year, lowering inflation to only 6.1% annually, decreasing unemployment to 6.1%, and increasing foreign investment from $885 million in 1990 to $5.8 billion in 1997. In addition, considering the targeted social spending within the context of this economic boom, the *Concertación* was able to halve the 1988’s 45% poverty rate bequeathed by
Pinochet (Ffrench-Davis 2002; Winn 2004). As a result, as Spooner (2011) highlights, the “Chilean miracle” received several recognitions abroad,\(^\text{10}\) forging the international image that the country still has.

These achievements were used as strong mechanisms of legitimation by Concertación governments. On one hand, the international image of the Latin American jaguar (panther) emerged as the parallel to the East Asian economic tigers, reshaping for some years the Chilean collective identity (Alexander 2009; Roniger 1997). On the other hand, in a context of growing international disappointment with orthodox neoliberalism, the legitimacy of successive Concertación governments rested upon their pledge to strive for social justice within the neoliberal model (Taylor 2006). As a result, Chile is today viewed as a potential “Third Way” neoliberal option for Latin America that stands between the old orthodoxy of doctrinaire neoliberalism and the trajectory of populist governments such as Hugo Chavez's Venezuela (Taylor 2006). The economic expansion and the reduction of poverty and unemployment (without increasing inflation) was able to discipline discontent within a context of deep class divisions and restrictive social institutions forged during the last years of the dictatorship (Taylor 2006).

Nonetheless, closer critical analyses of the Concertación’s achievements demonstrated that they were just taking part in a new “neoliberal trap,” which had important global implications regarding the legitimation of the model (Solimano 2012;\(^\text{10}\)

\(^{10}\text{“Transparency International ranks Chile, along with Uruguay, as the least corrupt country in Latin America, while the United Nations Human Development Index, which measures life expectancy, educational opportunities, and living standards, ranks Chile as the best country in Latin America in which to live and 44th out of 182 countries in the world. And in 2010 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) admitted Chile as its first South American member, citing ‘nearly two decades of democratic reform and sound economic policies.’ At a signing ceremony in Santiago, Secretary General Angel Gurría said the ‘Chilean way’ would enrich the OECD on key policy issues and praised the country for ‘combining robust economic growth with improved social welfare’” (Spooner, 2011: 4).}
Taylor 2006). The Concertación’s slogan of “growing with equity” was just political rhetoric, since they could not face the contradictions of neoliberalism without undermining the new institutional context established by neoliberal restructuring (Solimano 2012; Taylor 2006). Even though extreme poverty may have been improved, by 1998 some three million Chileans still lived in poverty, and the relative shares of income of the highest and lowest quintiles remain constant as Chile’s economy grows (Lagos et al. 2012; Silva 1996; Winn 2004). In fact, Chile became one of the most unequal countries in the world, not just in terms of the highly unequal distribution of income but also in the institutionally embedded and profoundly uneven power relationships that span Chilean society (Alexander 2009; Barrera 1998; Larraín and Vergara 2001; Roniger 1997; Solimano 2012; Taylor 2006; Winn 2004). In addition, the distance between the extremely poor and the “merely” poor is so tiny that the latter are still highly vulnerable to market forces (Silva 1996). Furthermore, most analysts ignore how the so-called “Chilean Miracle” was built by weakening unions, lowering wages, intensifying demands for higher productivity, and the loss of job security, all common features of Chile’s extreme labor market flexibility (Alexander 2009; Barrera 1998; Frank 2004; Silva 1996; Winn 2004).

**The Lost Generation: Between Debt and Amnesia**

Despite all these factors, during the 1990s there was not an explosion of social conflict but an atmosphere of seeming social calm, which would contrast with the experiences of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay (Barrera 1998; Martinez and Diaz 1996; Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler 1998; Salazar and Pinto 1999). The traditional explanation
says this was the result of a generational shift the replaced Chile’s culture of solidarity with one of individualism and consumerism as a result of Pinochet’s brutal neoliberal shock (Winn 2004). In the 1990s, the new working class was younger, with a majority who had never experienced the politically active days of the Allende era, and conversely had spent their lives in the Pinochet era alienated from the leftist politics of their parents, and largely influenced by individualism (Winn 2004). Therefore, this “lost generation,” whose childhood took place in the 1970s and whose adolescence witnessed the timid steps toward democracy, was broadly identified with political apathy, consumerism, and amnesia (Pino-Ojeda 2004).

In Chile, as in all the countries where neoliberal capitalism was established, debt was (and still is) a powerful weapon to integrate working classes into financial markets and, thus, to discipline their dissent (McNally 2009; Moulian 2002). Considering the structural importance of debt in the production of capital today (Albo et al. 2010; Foster and Magdoff 2009; Harvey 2005; Hudis 2009; Husson 2008; Mayol 2012a; Schweickart 2011; Schweickart 2012; Wolff 2008), and despite the fact that household debt grows at rates that are greater than the growth of their incomes,11 the consumer credit industry in Chile is in fact one of the most powerful in Latin America12 (Han 2012).

However, the role of debt in Chile is not just determined by the symbolic importance of consumption as the measure of prosperity (Albo et al. 2010; Mayol 2012a;  

11 “By 2006, the national census showed that low-income populations earning between USD 110 and USD 300 per month were spending 36 percent of their monthly income on consumer debts (MIDEPLAN, 2006)” (Han 2012).

12 In 2008 there were 29 million nonbank credit cards in circulation, averaging 3.5 cards per person. Department stores not only offer credit cards but also have opened their own banks. Supermarkets, as well as pharmacies, now offer their own credit and cash advances. Credit cards make up more than half of the financial utility of department stores (Han 2012).
Moulian 2002; Panitch 2009; Wolff 2008; Wolff 2009): among the low-income population, credit has become a resource to cover basic necessities within the context of eroding and unstable wages, as well as the privatization of public services (Han 2012). Thus, the availability of credit has significantly altered the nature of poverty itself, providing access to consumer goods typically outside low-income budgets, such as private education, private health, housing, and clothing (Han 2012; Silva 1996).

Thus, it is not accurate to say that the mentioned “lost generation” is characterized by an absence of conflict. Indeed, if we stay looking for old forms of resistance such as workers unions after so many socio-cultural transformations, the conclusion will surely be the lack of resistance (Moore 2015; Parraguez 2010a). We need a different and closer approach to resistance (or the lack of it) that not only relies in the general accounts of neoliberalization. For instance, in the nineties some research identified some level of conflict, not yet against the model, but within private spaces, such as domestic violence or depression (De la Cuadra 2010; Salazar 2011). Others have said that indebtedness became part of a trauma (Mayol 2012a). Various economic Marxist have described this as a “double squeeze,” in which neoliberal capitalism takes the regular surplus, and the interest on the surpluses lent back to them (Harvey 2005; McNally 2009; Wolff 2008; Wolff 2009). In this context, the instability of new labor conditions contrasts with the stability of debt payments, which forces tremendous capitalist work-discipline on people (McNally 2009; Moulian 2002).

However, as Han (2012) remarks, the homogenous view of capitalist control based on indebtedness does not examine “how unstable work patterns and the expansion
of consumer credit has shaped experiences of poverty, experiences that are manifested and lived in intimate relations.” As she says, despite the dynamics of pervasive economic precariousness, Chilean people make whatever thing to pay on time because not doing so would mean to lose the opportunity of future loans, but also to lose their dignity in front of family and friends. First, the citizen is threatened with excommunication: since 1979 the U.S. owned company “DICOM” has been used as a “character assessment,” i.e., a screening for personal responsibility and discipline through extensive credit reporting systems (Han 2012; Mayol 2012a). Second, there is an intense moralism articulated around the relations of the poor to consumer goods. Although in Chile a household to qualify to be a recipient of state intervention and aid must be deprived of consumer goods, many households do have consumer goods. This “excess” of consumer goods feeds reductionist arguments that the poor are engaged in wasteful spending and that they are not being “responsible” consumers (Han 2012). Both processes articulate new ways to turn economic relations into moral and ideological qualities that operate at the individual level (Moore 2015)

All these explanations, however, fail to connect the emerging conflicts – even at the individual level – to the travails of memories, including the handling of trauma by the transitional political elites to control dissent. On one hand, the new democratic governments sought to preserve stability according to what they defined as “possible” given the framework of the civil-military relationships inherited from the previous period (Roniger 1997; Silva 1996). In this regard, no other military have retained as many “authoritarian enclaves” after the restoration of “democracy” as the Chilean armed forces
(Barrera 1998; Contreras 2014; Hellinger 2012; Winn 2004). Nonetheless, the old argument of “restricted democracy” is just a partial explanation: the *Concertación* governments have used this justification to hide its conservative impulse to maintain the economic and political model undisturbed (Büchi 2009; Hellinger 2012; Mönckeberg 2011; Taylor 2006).

On the other hand, the *Concertación* governments also sought to preserve stability by stressing “national reconciliation” (coming to an agreement over the past) in a deeply divided and traumatized country, rather than justice for the abuses of dictatorship (Alexander 2009; Grez Toso 2004; Han 2012; Silva 1996). Thus, the “national reconciliation” discourse has been connected to the preservation of the neoliberal economic model imposed by the dictatorship, but also to the continuation of its own hegemony: when calling for a country united in the defense of human rights, the government deflects attention from what made the coup possible – a history of class struggle and unpunished repressive violence – to concentrate the memory question on the figure of Pinochet, which united those opposed to the dictatorship and repression but avoided a critical discussion of Allende’s legacy (Grez Toso 2004; Roniger 1997; Ros 2012; Stern 2010). Between the left’s demand for truth and justice and the right’s willingness to accept reconciliation on the condition that nothing will happen, the *Concertación* found an intermediate solution: “truth and reconciliation” (Lagos et al. 2012; Ros 2012). This sought to define the *past as a moral debt* and restricted the investigation of human rights violations “to the extent possible,” such that the main
results were a set of economic reparations and actions related to commemoration and memory (Han 2012; Lazzara 2006; Lira 2011; Winn 2004).

The Obstinate Memory Question

The obstinacy of Chile’s traumatic memory keeps being essentially contested, despite a future-oriented politics and a general institutional inertia toward amnesia (Lazzara 2006; Olick and Robbins 1998). According to Stern (2006, 2010) thus, instead of oblivion, what emerged in Chile was impasse, a schizophrenic culture that oscillated between moments of prudence and moments of convulsion. In fact, he says, the social climate and power dynamics of early transition favored top-down engineering by political elites seeking to achieve agreements.

However, the memory question resisted reduction to an amoral calculation, and after the arrest of Pinochet in London in 1998 the struggles over memory became more visible and influential (Lessa and Druliolle 2011; Winn 2004). This taught us that simplistic divisions between the political right (as pro-Pinochet) and the political left (as anti-Pinochet) no longer work, and that hereafter we must understand Chileans’ memory narratives as a series of layered positions distributed between two opposed poles (Lazzara 2006). On one hand, some groups (mainly politicians and military people) tried to distort the “public truth” of the 20th century, particularly about [i] the democratic process before the 1973 coup, [ii] the political process under dictatorship (1973-1990), and [iii] the human rights and sovereignty problems during and after the end of such period. The goal was the justification of certain facts, the magnification of some results, and the silencing of others (Salazar and Grez 1999). On the other hand, paradoxically, the silence and
denial regarding the Chilean coup was pulled back by the United States: in September 2000, the CIA released a report in which they “acknowledged for the first time that it had been in contact with coup members and that the CIA was part of an operation to manipulate the Chilean media against President Allende and in support of the inevitable coup” (Alexander 2009). Afterwards, few could keep denying the overwhelming evidence, and for the first time the army itself apologized for some abuses (Alexander 2009).

During twenty years, as Mayol (2012b) says, the Concertación’s legitimation was based on the figure of Pinochet. However, the formula began to wear down with the political death of Pinochet after his arrest in London in 1998, when Concertación politicians had to defend him. The process of delegitimation was complete with the physical death of the dictator in 2006, and later on, with the emergence of the Student Movement, as I describe in the following chapters. All of a sudden, the moral purity of those leaders who were political victims of the dictatorship disappeared. In short, they went from being victims to being victimizers, as Mayol (2012a) concludes. At the same time, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 put an end to the economic triumphalism of the 1990s, and Chileans were more willing to listen critical voices (Salazar 2011; Winn 2004).

**Partial Conclusions**

The role of traumatic memories in shaping the form and direction of neoliberalism cannot be disentangled from other factors in understanding the Chilean neoliberal turn. The incorporation of the struggles over traumatic memories, specifically, the processes
whereby the majority of Chilean people have internalized the dominant ideologies and cultural values, into analyses of the neoliberal turn in Chile help to go deeper into the understanding of the multidimensional nature of domination within the current stage of capitalism (Boggs 1984; Gramsci 1995; Mouffe 1979).

However, Gramscian categories proved to be not entirely appropriate for a developing post dictatorial country. The limit between “irrational” physical coercion (or the threat of it) on the one hand, and “rational” understanding and “emotional and moral consent” on the other became diffuse when (i) the initial phases of the Chilean neoliberalization were imposed from a brutal economic and repressive shock, and (ii) later during transition the inherited system was consolidated on top of a series of authoritarian enclaves that have never been challenged by the transitional political elites. Traumatic memories of the recent past of the country have been permanent mechanisms of domination and legitimation, even during the alleged pacific transition based on “national reconciliation.”

Alongside structural transformations, the Chilean neoliberalization has left a series of traumatic memories in the Chilean population coming from changing mechanisms of domination that oscillates between the use of straight psychological and physical violence, and the use of sophisticated mechanisms of legitimation. The former, in turn, oscillate between an increasing economic and cultural integration of the lower class families based on debt and education, to the articulation of refined political and academic ideas to justify the economic shock. I propose that all these traumatic memories together constitute what I call “the ideology of traumatic memories,” a strongly efficient
ideology used to control radical dissent in Chilean population dissent during the last forty years (see Chapter 4).

However, few intellectuals of the Chilean neoliberalization have addressed from below the individual and collective processes whereby the majority of Chilean people have “consented” (if that is completely possible in a post-dictatorial country) and resist the changing mechanisms of legitimation of the neoliberal turn. The specialized intellectual production about the global neoliberal turn of capitalism in the paradigmatic case of Chile is still in debt to understand the travails of traumatic memories as a contested mechanism of domination, legitimation and emancipation within communities, so within the family.

In this chapter I was able to systematize the persistent efforts by dominant classes to disremember and memorialize in ways that leave some kinds of memory in material form, but denying participation in the official remembrance processes. This way, the Chilean neoliberal elites have disallowed a real collective memory from forming at the public level. However, as the student movement has demonstrated, traumatic memories (which are not negative but highly conflicting memories of the recent past) are not only official and individual. Communities still remember, and so do families, even if their conversations meanings are still dormant.
CHAPTER TWO
THE HISTORICAL BUILDING OF THE NEOLIBERAL HIGHER EDUCATION IDEOLOGY IN CHILE AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE STUDENT MOVEMENT

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I offered to the reader unfamiliarized with the Chilean recent history, a general view of the Chilean neoliberalization and its mechanisms of domination, legitimation and resistance. In this chapter, I complete the analysis of the national mediations involved in the neoliberal turn of the paradigmatic case of Chile by offering a general view of the emergence of the student movement, with an emphasis on the genesis of what I call the Neoliberal Higher Education (NHE) ideology in the Chilean context. Next in Chapters 3 and 4, I will resume the focus on the student movement from below to uncover the role of family in the formation of activist students’ critical consciousness, the central question of this research.

Like students in Quebec, England, or Mexico, the Chilean student movement is struggling against the pervasive effects of neoliberalism on the higher educational system to recover the public sense of education.\(^1\) Despite this conflict is present in several neoliberal countries which threaten to turn it into a global resistance movement, it would

be restrictive to address this movement without a grasp of the particular transformation and crisis of higher education under neoliberalism at the national level. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to show how this particular historical process of neoliberalization of higher education in Chile and its crisis are intimately connected to the emergence of the Chilean student movement. With that purpose in mind, I organize this chapter as follows. After a summary of the neoliberalization of higher education at the global level, I describe Chile’s educational market within the making of what I call the ‘neoliberal higher education’ (NHE) ideology that made families became the main funders of the higher educational system in Chile. And second, I connect these economic and cultural transformations to the historical, discursive and organizational characteristics of the student movement in order to frame it as the direct catalyst of the current crisis of political legitimacy in Chile.

The Neoliberalization of Higher Education at the Global Level

While neoliberalism became the new face of capitalism in the world, the nature and consequences of the profound transformations of the organization of science have turned the attention to the history of relations between science, the state, corporations, and universities (Henke and Gieryn 2008; Mönckeberg 2011). As many researchers point out, contemporary universities are increasingly viewed as companies managed in accordance to the economic logic of markets, in which knowledge is privatized, place-based university-industry relationships are encouraged, and, thus, industry highly

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2To write this chapter, I have used two types of sources. First, I used social science literature and public documents about the student movement and the Chilean neoliberal transition since 2011: particularly, mainstream and alternative journal articles, public videos, and books. And second, and to complement this information, I used some interviews conducted to college students participating actively in the student movement.
determines what kinds of knowledge is produced (Frickel and Moore 2006; see also Henke and Gieryn 2008; Kleinman and Vallas 2001; Kleinman 2003). Universities, moreover, are increasingly viewed as economic engines, producing profitable knowledge that produces growth in the new so-called knowledge society, or producers of the technical classes needed to manage systems of production (Stehr 1994).

In addition, the structure of college funding is completely altered (Shen and Ziderman 2009) and private college loans became a new market to consume surplus products (Hudis 2009), within the lending and borrowing boom that have characterized the financialization of the economy. In the U.S. for instance, the share of state funding going to higher education has declined by more than one-third during the last thirty years, while public higher education enrollments increased more than 50% since 1974, and private higher education institutions have increased their tuition levels, on average, by 2 to 3.5% per year, above the rate of inflation (Ehrenberg 2006).

As the “knowledge societies” discourse spread, and the taken-for-granted “importance of higher education as a vehicle for social mobility” gained more strength (BCEHE 2004; Brennan and Teichler 2008; Ehrenberg 2006: xiv; Loveday 2015; McElhinney 2005; Stehr 1994; Välimaa and Hoffman 2008), families had to put college education expenses for their children near the top of their list of economic long-term priorities (King 2008). In other words, as Benjamin (1940) pointed out long ago, domination is reinforced ideologically by a dogmatic concept of progress that creates a

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1Knowledge societies have been defined as social systems in which “Economic capital – or, more precisely, the source of economic growth and value adding activities – increasingly relies on knowledge. The transformation of the structures of the modern economy by knowledge as a productive force constitutes the 'material' basis and justification for designating advanced modern society as a knowledge society” (Stehr 2007: 2480).
technocratic illusion or consciousness that establishes social progress as a common goal (see also Castel 2003; Marcuse 1964; Wiggershaus 1995). As a result, market-driven student-aid policies are legitimized or gain active consent among students and their families as a new way to pay for higher education (Loss 2012), in which public financial support is directly or indirectly channeled to private institutions despite unclear regulations and concerns about quality (Salerno 2004; Shen and Ziderman 2009).

However, college graduates that emerge from a schooling system with huge student loans and over-credentialized for the flexi-job life have often found themselves unemployed or underemployed (Langman 2013; Standing 2012). In addition, as Brennan and Naidoo (2008) hint, the growing importance of consumerism and markets in the regulation and steering of higher education undermines the public good claims of higher education. As a research conducted in Australia by White (2007) discovered, when education is increasingly viewed as a commodity, teachers are viewed as service providers, students see themselves as “customers” rather than “learners,” and the stage is then set for high levels of student and staff disaffection and anxiety. All in all, education is one of the most important sources of the motivational patterns that maintains active consent to the neoliberal system (Habermas 1975), but it begins to break down under its own contradictions.

In this context, radical movements of students are once again challenging the pervasive pessimism of some critical scholars (Bronner 2011; Jay 1996; Kellner 1989), thus transforming the apocalyptic views of education – such as the idea of educational institutions as the most important “ideological state apparatus” of capitalism (Althusser
1970; Szymanski 1978). With the emergence of these movements, higher education can also be conceived as a “contested terrain” and as a weapon of struggle and transformation for radical resistance (Bronner 2011; Kellner 1989).

The Chilean Educational Market

In 1980, Pinochet’s government (1973-1990) introduced a comprehensive reform to the higher education system, directed to accomplish three main goals (Brunner 1993):

- Deregulation to promote private initiative in the organization of new institutions;
- Diversification, based on a functional hierarchy of educational certificates (first, universities focused on long cycle undergraduate programs leading to professional titles requiring the licenciado degree. Second, professional institutes (IPs) were created to obtain a professional title not requiring the licenciado degree. Finally, technical training centers (CFTs) were created to obtain a technical certificate).
- Partially transfers the cost of state-financed institutions to the students and their families.

By this token, the public sense of education was destroyed by the military regime, which defined education as a private economic investment (Mayol 2012a; Mönckeberg 2005; Spooner 2011). Among other changes, private – but nonprofit – universities could be legally created from that moment, a process that mainly benefited the elites that supported and worked in the military government (Mönckeberg 2005). In addition, the
existing eight national universities were atomized,\(^4\) and their public funding and number of vacancies for students were drastically reduced,\(^5\) forcing them through military intervention to operate with the same principles than the rest of the new private universities: autonomy, depoliticization,\(^6\) and the pursuit of profit (Büchi 2009; CEP 1992; Mönckeberg 2005; Solimano 2012).

As one can read in “The Brick,” the foundational book of neoliberal ideology and reforms for Chile (Büchi 2009; CEP 1992), there is no justification for free higher education and even for public subsidies, since it represents a direct benefit to the individual and most of the students come from upper classes. For that reason, in order to allow an “equal” access to higher education, the state started to provide long-term loans and scholarships, the latter just for the most talented and poorest students. However, as I show below, the educational expenses of Chilean families, to pay for public and private universities, became the highest in the world: 28 percent of household income per capita (Solimano 2012).

The neoliberalization of Chilean higher education did not cease with Pinochet’s defeat in 1989. Two years after the dictatorship ended, the political coalition that took office (the “Concertación”) determined that the inherited educational system was healthy, and that it had to be consolidated rather than reformed (Mönckeberg 2005). Even though the Concertación governments more than doubled the spending on education, they were reluctant to open political debate on changing the Organic Constitutional Law of

\(^{4}\)From the original eight universities were formed 24 universities.

\(^{5}\)There was just one exception: the Pontifical Catholic University.

\(^{6}\)Most student organizations were dissolved.
Education (LOCE) – a law created by Pinochet one day before he left office in 1990 – which established a subsidized voucher system for schools, very liberal conditions to create private universities, and severely constrained public funding schemes for state universities (Solimano 2012; Spooner 2011).

As a result, in 2011, as Guzman and Riquelme indicate, there were one million higher education students in the country, from which 60% are university students, and the rest attend IPs and CFTs. This number of students corresponds to half of Chile’s population between 18 and 24 years old; the target of the educational market. Considering that among OECD countries the coverage reach up to 65%, Guzman and Riquelme (2011) infer that this market can grow even more. Since most higher class position (HCP) youth already attends to higher education institutions, lower class position (LCP) youth are likely those who will come to increase the enrollment numbers. In fact, almost 15% of the poorest income quintile was attending college in 2011 (González and Espinoza 2011). Despite the conditions to acquire higher education loans have changed since 2011, the growing amount of LCP families interested in tertiary education is the best example to understand the effects of the diversification of financial sources for education. To be specific, at the moment the activist students participating in this research entered to a higher education institution, there were three options for higher education credit:

- The Crédito Fondo Solidario (Solidarity Fund Credit) intended for the LCP students attending to Consejo de Rectores de Chile’s (CRUCH, Council of University Presidents) universities. That is, the 25 public and traditional
universities of the country. This credit was created in 1981, under Pinochet rule. The resources are provided by the state, and administered by these universities. The interest rate is 2%.

- The Crédito con Aval del Estado (State Guaranteed Credit, CAE), intended for students with proved academic merit attending to private and public higher educational institutions, including universities, IPS and CFTs. It was created in 2005, under the Concertación rule. The resources are provided by private banks, and the state and the universities are the guarantors. The interest rate was 6%. As Guzman and Riquelme (2011) state, the seven banks that have participated in this system made U.S. $231 million profit between 2006 and 2011, as a result of the economic incentive given by the state to participate in the risky business of financing the education of poor and lower middle classes youth. According to these authors, despite the critiques that these college loans have received, its elimination would close the unique channel by which the poorest students are financing their post secondary education. However, these students generally attend to low quality institutions because they are not generally able to reach the scores requested by better universities, and even less the scores required to get a scholarship. Because of the student movement pressure, the government reduced the interest rate of the CAE to 2%, the same rate of the Crédito Fondo Solidario. The measure, however, is considered only a hoax that fails to fix the problem, according to the indebted student’s organizations (Melo 2012b).
- The Crédito CORFO (State Corporation-of-Development Loan), is an annual loan whose public resources are operated by private banks with an 8% interest rate. Financial assurance must be provided by the student every year the loan is requested, and the cumulative interests have to be paid from the beginning. According to the information of CORFO itself, from the 106,000 debtors as of December 2011, 6,000 were late in the payment of their installments, risking embargoes and auctions. In addition, there are multiple irregularities with this loan, like the signature of blank promissory notes, contracts than do not appear in banks, and even changes in the payment clauses of installments (Pino 2012).  

In all these loans, the amount of borrowed money is measured in Unidades de Fomento (UF) or Monthly Tax Units (UTM). The exchange rate between these units of account and the Chilean peso is constantly adjusted to inflation. In addition, all these loans are linked to aranceles de referencia (referential tuition fees), which are always lower than actual tuition fees. In other words, the student always has to cover a difference that ranges from 2% to 40% (Meller 2011).  

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7I am copying here an excellent example developed by Espinoza and Gonzalez (2013) to explain the different outcomes of having each of these loans: “the final cost of the career of journalism… in a university ranked among the 10 most prestigious of the system has a cumulative total cost -excluding inflation- of $17.5 million pesos [approximately U.S. $34,000]. The cost two years after graduation with the [Solidarity Fund Credit] is 19 million pesos, with [State Guarantee Credit] reaches 23 million pesos, and with the CORFO loan is around 26 million. The latter would amount to a debt of 165 minimum wages (what a worker earns in 14 years)”.

8For more details, see http://www.mineduc.cl/usuarios/becasycreditos/doc/201501231555220.arancelesref_UES2015(3).pdf.
Strategies to Create Profit

As Mönckeberg (2005, 2011) denounced in her seminal journalistic investigations, the higher education system became a great business made up by sixty-one institutions, from which twenty-five are considered “traditional” and the rest “private.” Private institutions are basically oriented to profit-making, despite this is against the law. In order for them to create profits, since the state does not have the tools to control the educational market because the LOCE determined the “autonomy” of universities, these private institutions use irregular mechanisms, such as parallel companies that rent building space and other assets to universities. In addition, most of these private universities are strongly oriented toward teaching. Research, as a less profitable activity, is generally a low priority and almost nonexistent in many private institutions. By this token, the number of undergraduate students in Chile grew from 131,700 in 1990 to 430,000 in 2005. If we include the students of professional and technical institutions, the total was 560,000 (see also Mayol 2012a; Solimano 2012).

Another aspect highlighted by Mönckeberg (2005, 2011) is the huge spending in advertising, which is only surpassed by the retailing industry. Some studies demonstrate that the universities that invest more resources in advertising, are also the ones perceived as having the lowest quality (Carmona 2012; Sáez 2014). These universities — according to a study from 2009 — have higher expenditures in advertising than in scholarships and financial aid, spending approximately 37.7 million dollars in advertising and 11.3 million dollars in scholarships and financial aid. There would be an inverse proportion of expenditures in the case of higher quality universities (Carmona 2012). This reconfirms
the scarce regulation of the higher education system, demonstrating the low levels of reinvestment of these universities, and thus creating the doubt about profits in them (El-Mostrador 2012). It is important to note that these universities are the ones that receive the highest quantity of students from the lowest income quintiles, who need more financial aid for their studies, and who would tend to put more efforts in the “promise of higher education” (Carmona 2012; Simbürger 2013).

Consequently, as Mönckeberg (2005, 2011) states, most advertising campaigns seek to sell the “golden dream” of higher education, with the poor as the main target, highlighting the availability of credit with public endorsement. In fact, when private universities were created in 1990, most of the “customers” were upper class students who did not reach the scores needed to apply to traditional universities. Lately, however, the socioeconomic background of the students became more diverse. As expected, the new loans with public endorsement are contributing to this transformation.

This way, as Mönckeberg (2005, 2011) remarks, the business goes beyond the universities themselves, and the banks became the new main characters in educational systems. First, the students of the most profitable careers are sought as potential customers, and – when possible – quickly incorporated as credit consumers. Second, in 2005 the Concertación government passed a new law that allowed banks to offer credits with public endorsement to private universities students. Particularly, the mentioned Crédito con Aval del Estado (CAE, State-Backed Loan) was put into operation in reaction to the so-called movimiento pingüino⁹ (penguin revolution) raised in Chile in

⁹Directly translated as “penguin movement,” in relation to the uniform that elementary and high school students have to wear. This movement precedes the student movement, and was led by high school
2006, in order to supposedly ensure a wider access to higher education to students coming from the lowest income quintiles.

**The Historical Making of the Family-Based NHE Ideology in Chile**

**Social Mobility**

The high interest rate of the recently created private college loans went from the general premise of social mobility associated to higher education: these students would eventually become professionals, and thus would have a salary that would allow them to pay their loan without problems (Waissbluth 2011). Unfortunately, lower and middle class students and their families trusted in this idea of social mobility, without considering that mobility is a process that can take several generations (Sáez 2014). In addition, these students are the ones who have more difficulty continuing their studies (El-Dínamo 2012). So actually, many among them are unable to finish their studies and end up with a debt that are incapable of paying (Sáez 2014). About 40% of students drop out for economic or academic reasons, while 50% of the students that do finish their academic training are unemployed or employed in a very low paying job due to the bad quality of the training they had. Then, students extend their debts for at least twenty years (Baires and Fossa 2011; Waissbluth 2011).

Consequently, families became the main funders of the higher educational system in Chile. Although the 2.1% of the gross domestic product (GDP) goes to higher education, most of these expenditures come from families, while the state contribution has decreased proportionally and is among the lowest in the world. The problem is that,
according to Mayol (2012a), the Chilean neoliberal model has systematically highlighted the principle of efficiency for its legitimation. However, the education system has demonstrated to be highly inefficient: the high cost for families is complemented by the high cost for the state, because most of these resources go to the financial market. For instance, in 2009 the amount of money that the state paid to the banks as warrantor of the unpaid college loans was higher than the money needed to give scholarships to all those indebted students. In short, as Mayol (2012a) states, the CAE is an invitation to not pay the loans, by which the system is financed by public resources but the provision of services is private, expensive and low quality.¹⁰

**Vertical Concentration of Power and its Relationship to NHE Ideology**

The strength of the family-based NHE ideology, however, was also possible given the particular historical conditions from which the contemporary Chilean educational market was built: the vertical concentration of power, which rose in Chile with extreme speed because of the benefits received during the dictatorship by the elites. In general, “the size, financing, organization, interlocking capacity, representation in official government agencies, control over the media, internationalization, and ability to determine the intellectual agendas of universities” has forged the most powerful and hegemonic business class in Chilean history (Nef 2003 in Taylor 2006). According to Mayol (2012a), vertical integration creates power because it connects finance with the production of export goods and basic services, including education, health, and the

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¹⁰Most of the universities benefited by the state-backed credit have bad academic results (Mayol 2012a).
media. For that reason, one the main difficulties of ex-President Piñera\textsuperscript{11} in governing – since the vertical concentration of power reached its highest level in his government – were conflicts of interest. As Mayol (2012a) says, Piñera is the emblematic case of the concentration of power, and the best caricature of the Chilean neoliberal order.

Accordingly, as Mönckeberg (2005, 2011) denotes, few “educational holdings” – including, religious congregations – concentrate the ownership of elementary schools, high schools, universities and other educational institutions; and the bigger the holding, the bigger the power to influence political decisions in educational issues. In addition, yesterday’s political actors (including those who were active members of the rightist gremialista movement – or “guildism” – during the dictatorship) are still the protagonists in the economy, politics, and universities. Although the participants of the relatively new educational market came from different political factions, the experience has shown that those who participated in the design of the model during the dictatorship were the most successful.

However, as Mönckeberg (2005) says, lobbying practices in educational issues are not exclusive of the right wing, and the higher education issue is currently one of the most critical subjects within the Chilean Parliament. According to one Concertación’s deputy, before the student movement came to scene, it was almost impossible to get the huge number of votes needed to introduce changes in the system, because the ideologies and interests of the supporters, reformists, and those seeking structural changes are irreconcilable. As said earlier, the rejection of structural reforms not only comes from the

\textsuperscript{11}President of Chile between 2010-2014. During this period, he was #589 Forbes Billionaires, #11 in Chile, #49 Powerful People (see http://www.forbes.com/profile/sebastian-pinera/).
rightist political parties, but also from *Concertación’s* politicians who also have economic interests – and, thus, conflicts of interest – in the educational market. The issue was so controversial that most politicians preferred to do nothing and keep the system untouched.

**The Depoliticization of Education**

Another particular historical process from which the family-based NHE ideology got its strength was the depoliticization of education during dictatorship. The free-market economic model launched by the military regime in the mid-1970s was not only a program of macroeconomic austerity, market liberalization, and privatization, but also an attempt to introduce a new set of values and to change the culture of Chilean society around an idealization of free market, a promotion of an individualistic ethic, and the legitimation of profit-making that extended to a vast array of new activities (Solimano 2012). According to a survey done by a former Pinochet’s Minister, Hernan Büchi (2009), after three decades after the liberal reforms were launched, 55% of the Chilean population supports the neoliberal model. However, he says:

... it is [still] necessary to shape a culture that will favor growth. Learning to value entrepreneurship is essential... This is precisely where we have failed (...) a socialist tendency still persists, which ascribes success to the government when the country grows, and blames entrepreneurs for declines in growth and employment. A persisting demagogy keeps repeating that the fate of workers can change by simply passing a law, when it is no secret that only a dynamic economy can create more and better jobs. (Büchi 2009)

In this context, the history of the Chicago boys and of the *Gremialista* movement has demonstrated the power that certain universities can have in the construction of hegemony (Mönckeberg 2005; Mönckeberg 2011; see also Gramsci 1995). Additionally,
the establishment of think tanks,\textsuperscript{12} designed to influence public opinion in a durable fashion, has been especially important in this matter (Fischer 2009).

In addition, as Mönckeberg (2005, 2011) indicates, the elites have learned that private universities are not just a business but are also ideological centers to train professionals under their principles. These institutions have the “mission” to transform society according to the owners’ principles, and according to the financial supporters’ principles as well, who donate money to these universities not only to discount their taxes, but because they consider them trustworthy enough to commend them with the training of future elites. Therefore, it is not surprising when we discover that “Los Andes” University is the main “social initiative” of the Opus Dei in Chile, and that Catholic universities are in general the most favored by donations. For instance, as Mayol (2012b) states, since Opus Dei proclaims the value of submission, its ideas have helped to legitimate inequality among the upper class – and also in some sectors of the lower classes. Actually, in 2007, the private universities of the economic elite\textsuperscript{13} were becoming the first option for the best students of the best 100 high schools (aside from the Catholic University). Therefore, they also became an intellectual elite, since they have the best results in the selection process, and they are paying more than U.S. $4,000 in annual tuition costs. Coincidentally, none of these universities have a student federation.

\textsuperscript{12}The Instituto Libertad y Desarrollo (Freedom and Development Institute, ILD) was founded by Hernan Büchi, together with his Mont Pelerin Society’s colleagues Cristian Larroulet and Carlos Caceres in 1990. In 2000, the ILD hosted the biannual reunion of the Mont Pelerin Society (http://www.lyd.com/).

\textsuperscript{13}“de Los Andes,” “del Desarrollo,” and “Adolfo Ibáñez” Universities.
The Chilean Student Movement

The Mobilizing Power of the “No To Profit” Slogan

According to Mayol (2012a, 2012b), most Chileans have taken for granted the conflicts between employers and workers. The last decades, however, the political, economic, and even the religious elites were performing a new form of violence called abuso (abuse) by the citizens. According to this scholar, this form of violence summarizes the type of relationship between the elites and common people that predominates in the country, which can have economic, political and even a sexual connotations. Nevertheless, for many years the use of the word “abuso” (abuse) was very abstract and general, until the student movement gave us a more defined visualization of this so-called abuso: lucro (profit). No al lucro (No to profit) was a powerful demand that summarized and bonded the dissatisfactions of the majority, who cannot stand the dominance of profit interests in all realms of life. After two decades of difficult but effective legitimation of neoliberalism, students began to struggle against a new idea (profits) that not only denies the economic system completely, but deeply (re)politicizes the Chilean society and put an end to its economic and political transition after dictatorship.

In this context, during 2006 the “Penguin Revolution” was constituted as the most important precedent of the student movement of 2011. Led by high school students, between April and June, nearly a million students went on strike and marched to protest,

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14Since 2011 in fact, customer’s complains have grown exponentially in all businesses, after several extremely serious economic scandals were discovered. Of course, the huge earthquake in 2010, and the negligence of the government to face the emergency and the subsequent disaster made things worse. In addition, several cases of political corruption were exposed. Until 2003 most Chilean believed that Chile was the Latin American country with the lowest level of corruption (Mayol 2012a; Mayol 2012b).
among other reasons, against the lack of enforcement of the Ley Orgánica de Educación (LOCE, Organic Law of Education) enacted the last day of Pinochet’s dictatorship, which dictated that private universities were to be not-for-profit entities (Alexander 2009; Solimano 2012; Spooner 2011).

The Awakening of Private University Students (2011)

As Mönckeberg (2011) highlights, the “Penguin Revolution” in 2006 had an important impact among private universities’ students. They began meeting, sharing their problems, and even organizing protests and strikes, like never before. In “La Florida” or “Maipú,” some peripheral areas of Santiago, students occupied their campuses despite authorities threatened to expel their leaders. One year later, most private universities still did not have an official organization of students yet; despite this is a requirement for the accreditation of universities. However, as some students explained to Mönckeberg (2011), the scenario is not the same because the “Penguin Revolution” opened the debate among private university’s students about the problems of the educational system in Chile, counteracting the strength of advertising campaigns, and exposing the real situation of the educational business. Private university’s students understood the role of their universities in the country: these institutions were created to produce professionals without critical thinking, or with a neoliberal or positivist ideology, with the aim of reproducing the neoliberal model. Nevertheless, some students resist this situation – and the consequent apathy of their classmates – and are trying to promote critical debates beyond their ordinary obligations as students.
In fact, one of the main events at the beginning of the 2011 student movement took place in Universidad Central, a private, medium quality, non-traditional university. At the beginning of that year, the students of this university learned the intentions of the university’s authorities about selling the institution to a holding company. Protests were organized immediately, as some of my interviewees told me when I met them. To them, if this university was sold, its open and communitarian character would have been lost. That is why students resisted any economic transaction, by occupying the main buildings of the university. With this unprecedented strategy of protest for a private and non-traditional institution, they were able to stop the sale. After this event, the issue of profits in the higher education market gained importance as one of the main demands of the 2011 student movement, and for Universidad Central’s students, the first victory against the higher education business was achieved.

**Organization**

The most important organization within the movement, at the higher education level, is the Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile (CONFECH, Confederation of Chilean Students), which includes the presidents of student associations from the 25 traditional universities pertaining to the Consejo de Rectores de Chile (CRUCH, Council of University Presidents). Assemblies in each university have regular debates and reach some agreements, which are then brought to the executive board of CONFECH, where a unified decision is taken (Smink 2012).

The spokespersons of the movement have been mainly the presidents of the two most influential student federations in the country: the Universidad de Chile (the largest
public university in the country), and the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile (the oldest private university in Chile) (Smink 2012). Some observers say that this has helped to create more breadth in the movement, since both universities – even though they are the best two in terms of quality – represent different aspects of the variety within the educational system. This comes in part from the public character of Universidad de Chile, and from the private character of Universidad Católica. These federations have become so influential that their annual election process has been broadly covered by the mainstream press (TV and written) since the beginning of the student movement. Given that the composition of CONFECH changes annually (Ahumada 2014), the claims of the movement have to be legitimized every year by the new federations. So far, the leaders of the most influential federations belong to leftist organizations. Therefore the main claims of the movement have been maintained basically untouched.

The students of non-traditional private education institutions are grouped around the Movement of Students from Private Higher Education (MESUP). The participants of MESUP affirm that CONFECH represent large parts of students through the media, but actually, the percentage of students grouped in CONFECH is much lower to the percentage represented by MESUP (around 70% of Chile’s higher education is private). Thus, the demands of private university students would not be completely included in the movement, since their situation differs from what is outlined in the organizations leading the student movement.

This way, MESUP seeks to establish formal demands from the students of non-traditional private education, in order to represent all the institutions that are part of it.
However, the inexperience of its leaders, the inexistent dialogue between MESUP and the government, and the divisions created when certain student federations of these private institutions joined the CONFECH has created cracks within MESUP, which weakened this organization during 2012. Later on, according to my interviewees, the leadership of this movement passed to the hands of more radicalized groups, who started to mobilize private education students, but always maintaining the main axes of the demands outlined by CONFECH.

An interesting particularity of the student movement is the detachment from the structures of the current institutional system at all levels, including traditional political parties. Although a few of the most important leaders of the movement (Camila Vallejo, Karol Cariola, Camilo Ballesteros) have a clear militancy in the youth wing of Chilean Communist Party, the rest of the representatives never showed an attachment to the country’s traditional political parties (Melo 2012a). In this way, new political collectives have been created within existing student associations, occupying positions of power (Ahumada 2014), and giving political independence to the movement from traditional coalitions (Gonzalez 2012; Melo 2013). For example, in the configuration of CONFECHE 2014, there were no militants of any traditional political party in the executive board, although they have a clear left-wing orientation. One of the presidents of student federations has even publicly declared herself as anarchist (Ahumada 2014; The-Clinic-Online 2013).

Given this situation, the most radical visions took over an important part of the student movement. The changes they demand are not superficial, but point to the roots of
the capitalist system ruling the country. They consider conservative to the militants of the Communist and Socialist parties, together with the center-left ones, because they support current president Bachelet (Ahumada 2014; Fernández 2013).

**Strategies**

The Chilean student movement has used two traditional forms of protest systematically: occupations and marches. From universities to public institution buildings (Yaikin 2012), occupations have been used in multiple forms by the student movement. Even though the “Penguin Revolution” of 2006 had multiple occupations of educational establishments across the country, with the student movement this took on a more serious character. In 2011, occupations extended for several months, and authorities commanded evictions in multiple municipalities of the country. However, these evictions were not only ineffective to the perseverance of the students (Pizarro 2012), but also put into discussion the violence of police forces (Bonnefoy 2012; Diario Universidad de Chile 2012; El Dínamo 2012c; Jaramillo 2012). Later on, students have used occupations as a pressure tactic against the government (Equipo El Dínamo 2012), even occupying schools prior to presidential elections in order to interfere their operation as voting centers.

Marches have also become common in the streets of different cities in the country (Cooperativa.cl 2011; El Diario de Antofagasta 2012; El Mostrador 2013b; Yaikin 2012). It is important to highlight that not only students go out to the streets, but they are also supported by the Colegio de Profesores (Association of Collegiate School Teachers) and other associations of workers, together with mothers, fathers and grandparents of the
students. This way, some student marches have been family activities, in which you can see pre-school children, together with their parents and elder siblings. With music, dances, costumes, and of course, banners in support of their demands, the marches have become carnivals (Vila & Correa 2013; Webber 2011). However, they are also tainted with violence and destruction of public and private infrastructure, due to *encapuchados* (hooded protesters) that confront the police force, which in turn respond by repressing all protesters with water cannons, tear gas, and even rubber bullets (Bonnefoy 2012; Franklin 2013; Ramírez 2011; Webber 2011; Yaikin 2012). This repression includes some cases of sexual abuse from police officers during the detention process (El Dínamo 2012c; Jaramillo 2012; Webber 2011). In addition, some undercover policemen generating disorders and encouraging violence among protesters have been discovered and denounced (Ramírez 2011). For this reason, a group of adults called “Human Rights Observers” emerged to monitor and highlight illegalities in the operation of the police forces during marches and to protect students and other civilians (Bonnefoy 2012).

Beyond these traditional actions, the student movement has been characterized as having a remarkable creativity (Moss 2012; Pulgar 2011; Simink 2012; Webber 2011). For example, they organized the “*kiss-thon for education,*” consisting of multiple couples kissing for a long time in front of the presidential palace. Another one was the “*superheroes for education,*” which involved a sort of theater play of several students performing as superheroes and villains, united to fight for a better education in Chile. One of the most popular in social networks was the “*thriller for education,*” in which
thousands of students performed the popular song of Michael Jackson (Thriller), with a zombie costume. The deceased was, of course, public education.

A particularly interesting event was the “1,800 hours for education,” implying a run for 1,800 hours around the presidential palace organized by a group of university students (El Ciudadano 2011). Eighteen hundred is the number that represents the amount of millions of dollars needed to finance the higher education of 300,000 students during one year. For this activity, there were increasingly more students participating, together with other people like passersby, relatives, workers of public services working near the presidential palace, television hosts and actors, who run at least for some minutes, carrying a flag saying “free education now!” During the 1,800 hours, there was always somebody running around the presidential palace, despite the cold, the rain, the tear gas and fatigue.

The Scope of the Student Movement

Given the high percentage of citizen support for the demands of the student movement, it is plausible to say that these issues not only concern students but the entire Chilean society (Ahumada 2012; Cooperativa.cl 2012a; El Mostrador 2011; El Mostrador 2012b; El Mostrador 2013b; García 2013; Jackson 2012; Jaramillo 2012; Montes 2012; Montes 2013; Pizarro 2012; Pulgar 2011; Veloso 2013; Vila and Correa 2013). As a result, after three years of struggle, the claims of the movement became an

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15 See http://vimeo.com/60796074.

16 According to a national poll, in September 2011, the demands of the student movement were supported by the 89% of citizenry, while the support to President Sebastián Piñera reached only 22%. In October 2012, the support to the demands of the student movement decreased to 70%, with a rejection of 25%. At the same time, the rejection to the management that the government had had regarding the conflict reached 76% (El Mostrador 2012b).
essential part of the presidential campaign agendas, for the 2013 elections. The issues under discussion were not only the need for an educational reform, but also a tax restructuring to finance this educational reform, the nationalization of natural resources and so on.

However, the claims of the movement have demonstrated that the changes need to go deeper, which makes the realization of a constitutional assembly to change the Chilean constitution another important subject of the debate (Webber 2011). The latter is of great importance, since the Chilean citizenry has never participated in the formulation of a political constitution, and since the current one was created and approved under the military dictatorship in 1980. This way, the Chilean constitution is considered in many aspects as one of the bases that maintain the injustices of the current model (El Dínamo 2012a; El Mostrador 2012a). Together with this, the possibility to change the constitution in a participatory way would modify the form in which political participation is traditionally understood in Chile (Figueroa and Ruiz 2012; García 2013; Simonsen 2012). Therefore, the demands of the student movement, coordinated with the claims of other social movements as well, got a different nuance, not only directed to reform the educational system, but to complete the transformation of the old way of understanding the Chilean democracy (Moss 2012).

The scope of the student movement can also be measured through the great public saliency gained by its main leaders, both nationally and internationally (e.g., Carmona 2012d; García 2013; Guzmán 2012; Franklin 2013). They have received prizes in the name of the student movement, and given speeches in several countries to disseminate
the struggle of Chilean students (Emol 2012). In addition, they constantly publish press columns both in mainstream and alternative media. Furthermore, former leaders such as Camila Vallejo, Giorgio Jackson and Francisco Figueroa have published books to share their experiences and ideas (see Figueroa 2012; Le Monde Diplomatique 2011).

In line with the above mentioned, another “achievement” of the student movement has been the integration of some former-leaders in the parliament. In the 2013 elections, six former student leaders run for a deputy position (parliament representatives). Their campaigns varied in terms of their political affiliation. Two of the candidates (Camila Vallejo and Karol Cariola) run for the Communist Party – as said, they were militants before the student movement rising – which in turn belong to the Nueva Mayoría, a new political coalition that is basically composed by the same parties of the old Concertación (the center-left political coalition that ruled the country between 1990-2010) and included for the first time the – now much moderate – Communist Party. Three other leaders (Gabriel Boric, Francisco Figueroa and Daniela López) run for the political association with which they reached positions in student governing bodies. This is a left-wing organization, aside from traditional parties, called “Izquierda Autónoma” (Autonomous Left, not yet a political party). Finally, another leader (Giorgio Jackson) created his own political association (“Revolución Democrática”: Democratic Revolution) with other important leaders of the Catholic University, and run for deputy with them.

In March 2014, four of these former leaders were incorporated to the Parliament: Camila Vallejo, Karol Cariola, Gabriel Boric and Giorgio Jackson. As can be deducted,
this is not considered something positive by those students that reject traditional politics. Even though the young deputies (Parliament representatives) claim to be with “one foot on the street and the other on the Parliament,” some radical (so-called ultrones) sectors have considered this situation as treason to the struggle of the Students for cooperating with the maintenance of the current political system (Ahumada 2014; El Dínamo 2012b; Toro 2013). However, the most moderate groups (pejoratively called amarillos) within the student movement see the position of these former leaders as an opportunity to renovate traditional politics. As I mentioned before, this discussion alone illustrates the wide variety of political perspectives within the student movement, although all of them consider themselves left leaning.

However, beyond how the transition of former leaders from the streets to the Parliament is evaluated, it is worth noting that their incorporation into traditional politics creates a generational change that is unusual in Chile. Political power in Chile has been historically reduced to an elite comprised by a certain number of families, creating family trees that bridge economic and political power (Carmona 2012d; Carmona and Macari 2012; CrearIzquierda Amplia 2011a; CrearIzquierda Amplia 2011b; Mono Gamba 2012; Sepúlveda 2011). The arrival of Gabriel Boric to the Parliament, supported by an independent leftist university association, together with Giorgio Jackson, who was supported by an association created by himself and his collaborators, changed the way of understanding political advancement. They embody a major shift, in which independent organizations grow alongside traditional coalitions (Campos 2013; Fernández and Carmona 2013).
Partial Conclusions

The major impact of the student movement cannot be reduced to the traditional conceptions and actors of political change. Although major changes have happened within community and, thus, family, they remain underestimated. After a comprehensive revision of literature and public documents it was possible to construct a detailed discussion of the intimate relation between the particular historical process of neoliberalization of higher education in Chile and the emergence of the Chilean student movement. None of these sources, however, addresses how this intimate connection was built in daily life practice, and even less the role of family on it, despite the well-known impact of this processes on the students´ family realm, and the broad intergenerational support the student movement´s claims and strategies have received. Again, the history of the Chilean student movement is at risk of being just told from the perspective of academic and journalistic elites.

This not just has theoretical but serious practical consequences. After five years of the rising of the student movement, and despite an unprecedented delegitimation of the transitional elites ruling the country since 1990, the key students´ claims remain systematically evaded. On the one hand, we need to understand why this would probably be a limited understanding of the impact of the student movement in the Chilean society. On the other hand, we need to understand why moderation still threatens historical change in Chile despite all the information uncovered by the movement regarding the incompetent and abusive practices of the transitional elites. In this context, the next three chapters resume all these conundrums, reassessing the making of this history from all the
contradictions, challenges, mistakes, weaknesses, and strengths of the activist students and their families, the underestimated victims of the “Chilean miracle.”
CHAPTER THREE

HIGHER EDUCATION IDEOLOGY, CLASS AND FAMILY:
THE INTIMATE ORIGINS OF THE CHILEAN STUDENT MOVEMENT

Introduction

Having presented the national mediations involved in the neoliberal turn of the paradigmatic case of Chile, in the following two chapters I resume the focus on the student movement from below to uncover the role of family in the formation of activist students’ critical consciousness, the main question of this research. Particularly, in this chapter I develop a class-based comparison to understand how class issues are working within the conflicting process of formation of critical consciousness of activist students’ families. In the next chapter, I will develop a comparison based on family political background to understand how this political background and its respective memories of the recent past of the country are working within the conflicting process of formation of critical consciousness of activist students’ families.

In the last forty years, higher education became an aspiration for thousands of families in Chile. The diversification of private loans led by the post dictatorship governments made the incorporation of lower class position families easier. However, given the ever-increasing cost of higher education, indebtedness became also a need for many higher class families. A few years later, these families started noticing the first stressing economic effects of these new education-related economic responsibilities,
within their already constrained economic situation. In 2006, the so called Penguin Revolution raised the first signs of concern regarding the critical economic situation of higher education students’ families. The highest peak of protests against the commodification of tertiary education and its effects on family was in 2011. Nevertheless, the number of students interested in getting a post secondary degree did not decrease, and most families while supporting the student movement struggle, kept paying their loans. Clearly, the economic crisis of these families was not enough to break their strong commitment to the education of their children. Something else has been working on.

The results of this research proves that for these conditions to be successfully installed and spread, strong ideologies were put in motion by the Chilean version of the neoliberal system, convincing many families to change or adjust the post secondary plans they had for their children. In this chapter I focus on the neoliberal higher education (NHE) ideology, the general historical motivations to pursue tertiary education that have spread beyond elite families in the last forty years through the introduction of public and private higher education loans, which made families became the main funders of the higher educational system in Chile. Although this is an ideology working at the global level to legitimize the neoliberalization of tertiary education, the strength of the family-based NHE ideology in Chile was just possible given the particular historical conditions from which the contemporary Chilean educational market was built (see Chapter 2).

That said the particular question I want to answer in this chapter is: how are class issues working within the conflicting process of formation of critical consciousness
within activist students’ families? To answer this question, I develop a class-based comparison among families. To be exact, “higher class positions” (hereafter HCP) and “lower class positions” (hereafter LCP) were the two categories by which families were classified\(^1\). To make this distinction, I considered the educational background of the significant adult(s) interviewed, the type of high school the student attended to (private, subsidized, public), the municipality where the family lives, and the level of economic constrains related to education (e.g., paying by their own, 100% college loan, 100% tuition waiver, over-indebted, etc.).

Within each class position, when possible, I make a comparison according to the quality of the educational institution of the student (high, medium and low quality). Among my interviewees, however, there were no higher class positions’ students in low quality institutions, and just one in medium quality institution. Otherwise, the few lower class positions’ students attending to high quality institutions needed to be brilliant enough to get a merit scholarship.

The evidence collected from interviews shows that differences between classes became even sharper in this period of family life cycle. In the first section, I develop a class based comparison of the motivations families had to legitimize the neoliberal

\(^1\)I did not use the traditional distinctions of ‘upper,’ ‘middle,’ and ‘lower’ class to name the socioeconomic situations of the Chilean families directly involved in the process of resistance formation in Chile. I sustain that the regular classification method based on household income do not comprehensively grasp the particular economic vulnerability of these families. On one hand, economic constrains, self-exploitation to face college debt and the excessive cost of higher education in the country are present in all these families, despite income level and/or educational background differences. On the other hand, I am doubtful regarding the access of the poorest families to higher education after 2011. That year, the Student Movement brought into public discussion the impossibility to afford the abusive conditions of the available higher education loans by the poorest families of the country. As a result, the interest rates were reduced, but the criteria to qualify for a loan became stricter. Most of my interviewees began their careers during or after this shifting period. This even make me think that the involvement of poor families in the Student Movement was reduced in the following years to a minority of brilliant student’s families that, as said, only can access to higher education with a full scholarship.
ideology of higher education. In the next section, I focus on the economic struggle arising from this decision for each class position. Finally, I analyze how all these families, despite class and after years of struggle, have shaped their motivations to pursue a tertiary education for the younger generations. Higher education is still a moral duty, but not only for the attainment of private benefits. The public sense of higher education is being recovered in practice.

**Education-Focused Families: Where Education and Politics Originally Meet**

Most activist students interviewed share similar attributes despite their class position and the political background of their significant adults. Most of them had a trajectory of academic success and leadership. However, these characteristic were not shared in a vacuum, but during a very important moment in the history of the Chilean student movement. Most of the students were attending high school during the so-called “Penguin Revolution” in 2006. Although the involvement of my interviewees in that movement is in general described as active but confusing, given the inexperience and lack of information about a very complex issue, all of them remember this historical moment as crucial for their academic and political future. They share the memory of participating in something absolutely new in their lives: the first march, the first *toma* (seizure), the first arrest, the first public political debate.

…It was very hard to understand the issue of 2006… [Then] I realized how much inequality there was in education… because I, somehow, understood that public and private education were very different, but I used to take it for granted. But, when I realized that that was wrong… that sort of gave me the energy so as to try and organize myself, along with my classmates. So, after school, we went out and protested. Actually, we were the first school here in *Arica* (a northern city) which was taken by its students… and later, there was a point in which the whole city was protesting. In fact, the first big demonstration was the most repressive and
most massive one. In fact, that was the first demonstration that I was involved in during my whole life, and it was the first one where I ended up in jail… (Alfonso, 23 years old, 5th Sociology, medium quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% loan, LCP)

…we participated in the pingüinos meetings, we created the first private and public school’s democracy congress at our school, the presidential candidates attended the debate, and all the student leaders were there… (Carolina, 24 years old, 5th year Journalism, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% loan, HCP)

Beyond the preceding level of politicization of each school and, thus, the diverse level of experience in political matters of each student, all of them were able to connect their own experience as high school students with the debate on educational inequality conducted by the “Penguin Revolution.” The lessons obtained during that period were crucial to guide the election of careers for many of them, and also influenced their disposition to be an active part of the student movement in 2011.

The process of formation of critical consciousness for these students had already been triggered. The school was, as showed, an important site to impulse this process. However, the evidence shows the active participation of the students’ nuclear family in the educational and political development of their children was the decisive condition for this process to begin and get completed.

This is a particular type of family in which most everyday decisions have been based on the belief that education is “the best heritage,” one of the most firmly fixed ideas in neoliberal Chile, no matter class differences. The evidence also shows that in Chile these families have an additional characteristic that make them so fruitful for the formation of critical consciousness: the importance given to politics and leadership. No matter the political background of their significant adults, most students highlight the
importance of political debate in their families as a regular practice. Otherwise, it would be difficult to understand how the intergenerational debate on memories of the recent past was also so important for the process under study, as I discuss in the next chapter. Parents and grandparents, in turn, were not just proud of the academic achievements of their children. Adults consider leadership experiences during high school as an important part of the early success of their children. This attribute make them feel confident regarding the future success of their children, which not only depends on academic credentials but also on the social networks constructed during their political trajectory.

**The Higher Educational Ideology**

**The Higher Education Ideology for LCP Families**

Most LCP adults are workers who grew up in poor working class families, often living or migrating from the countryside, and which never expected their children to follow post-secondary education, and in no event a traditional college degree. After finishing school, if so, their parents expected they could work and economically collaborate with the family budget. Therefore, LCP adults are now pretty aware about the importance of family support to pursue a professional career. None of them had this “privilege,” they say. Their respective parents were guided by a very different ideology, based on early hard working.

…when I finished school, I started working with my dad. My dad was a merchant and I followed his footsteps. To me [there was not much] questioning. I had to work, and so I just worked, period. There was less encouragement, I think, on our parents’ part, regarding going to university. I believe that, partly, it has much to do with parents. Mine were absent from my studies. I don’t remember my parents participating in my education as much as my wife and I do in our children’s…

(Adolfo, baker, Javier’s father, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% scholarship/complementary loan, LCP)
Similarly, the evidence shows that LCP families’ decisions were not always informed by the NHE ideology. They legitimized it later, during the last years of their children high school education, and even later, when financial issues for their children's career were set. Adults’ expectations were, at the most, a short technical or professional credential, in order to speed up the entry of their children into the workforce. Often the arguments, however, did not respond to ideological but to economic motivations. In other words, if they already appreciated the benefits of higher education given the strength this ideology already had in the country, any expectation was often annulated by the impossibility of paying for it, and/or the urgency for an additional salary. In fact, many LCP activist students were sent by their significant adults to technical high schools.

…people with a low income don’t intend to [have their children go to university]. I mean, deep down, one would like that. But, if not, a technical professional would have been just as good. I mean, I would have still felt content. But, I always intended them to finish their [secondary] education. I never allowed them to work while they were studying, up to their last year of high school. I never allowed them to work, only in their studies… (Adelina, housekeeper, activist mother, Association of Students Swindled by CORFO Credit, low quality institution, Concertacionista political background, LCP)

It is important to notice that I am not talking about poor families living in poor settlements; that is, the traditional image of the urban poor of the Global South. LCP families’ vulnerability cannot be caught just visiting their homes and neighborhoods, and looking at their apparent material conditions of living, but instead, understanding their permanent fears about how to maintain an adequate quality of life for all members of their family. The cost of higher education in Chile, especially if the students’ expectations are high and the educational formation of siblings is still in process, was
unaffordable for them. Many LCP families are also monoparental, with a mother already working hard to give a decent level of life to their children without any support from the father. From this perspective, it is not difficult to understand the urgency to finish their “mission” as parents or grandparents by financing a short technical career that would give economic independence to their children as soon as possible. This situation was present even in those families whose children ended up attending to a high quality institution.

…No one ever opposed [that I went to university], but my grandparents had their reservations, specially my grandmother, because I studied in a technical school and she preferred that I obtained my technical school diploma. So, I started to work right away; because, if I started studying, there was no certainty that they could pay for my education… (Rosa, 23 years old, 2nd History, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% scholarship/complementary loan, LCP)

The evidence shows that the strong determination to pursue a higher education career in LCP families came from the children, who at school and at other important socialization spaces (like extended family members, friends, and media) were imbued of the NHE ideology. Before 2011, this ideology also included uncritical information about the diverse requirements to apply depending on the quality level of the institutions, and on the financial “opportunities” to afford it. Therefore, most LCP students knew that their academic preparation was not sufficient, and made arrangements to level it. Or simply lowered their expectations regarding the quality of the institutions they aimed to. Hence, sooner or later, most adults supported the resolution of their children, convinced that this was the right thing to do.

…At some point [I doubted that she studied at university], because I’d been diagnosed with breast cancer. So, I said to myself: ‘I don’t know how much time I have, what my life will be like in the future.’ So, the logical thing for me is that she has a foundation, so I put her in a commercial or technical high school where
she could get a foundation, she’d be able to work and not as a house maid, but that she could work at an office, and in the last case she’d pay for her education herself, if she wanted to continue studying. [She said] ‘I don’t want to, mom. I want to go to a regular high school’. I wanted her to move forward; but I couldn’t see how. I couldn’t see any possibilities. I didn’t have any money. How could I pay for her university? I worked for a while, and for another while I was sick. And what dad made was very little. We survived, but we didn’t have enough money to think of future studies… (Regina, laboratory technician, Rita’s mother, medium quality institution, Pinochetista political background, 40% scholarship, 60% higher education loan, LCP)

In some families of course, the higher educational ideology was more latent than in others. For example, when one of the adults is an elementary teacher, and/or some close relatives have a university student child. In these cases, a less tough struggle regarding economic issues was necessary between generations. Eventually, most adults became very enthusiastic regarding this issue, becoming part of the “social pressure” that most students agree to have felt in the last period of high school. Ultimately, the possibility of no further study was unthinkable for them. Hence, the neoliberal higher educational ideology became a strong family issue for most LCP families.

…I was motivated to go to college because of the school that I was in. [Up to eighth grade] I was studying in a public school, and there, a teacher forced my mom to change schools, because they had seen potential on the grades I had. My mom didn’t have a job, and she had to start working, so she could pay me a partly subsidized school education. Then, I was transferred to a totally different school: different teaching, different discipline, different study training. There, you get the bug of having the obligation to enter university, there’s no other option. I convinced [my parents], that I’d be able to finish my major using my average and regular grades … (Graciela, 29 years old, Lawyer, medium quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% higher education loan, LCP)

It is very important to mention, however, that despite a latent higher educational ideology some LCP students could never overcome their urgent economic needs (like already having their own families) and ended up studying a short technical or
professional career in a low quality technical training centers (CFTs) or professional institutes (IPs). In other words, despite a spread ideology of higher education, there are still children whose families cannot support their motivations to pursue a college degree because it would mean postponing the urgent. These students understand, however, that this was not a choice but a consequence of their material condition. As I show below, however, this was not an impediment but a strong trigger of radical critical consciousness development. We must remember that all activist students’ families have also a strong social commitment with politics and leadership, the other half of the equation that allowed these students to become brilliant activists within the movement. In addition, as I show in the next chapter, the activist students have developed a deep process of self training beyond the formal academic program of their careers, despite the quality of the institutions they are studying in.

…I enrolled at La Araucana [Professional Institute] [first, because] there was not enrollment fee. Second, because it was a credited institution, so I could use my [CAE] loan there. I intended to study Law, as I had studied Legal Consultancy [before], but in [that] institute there’s no Law School, so [I went for] Risk Prevention Engineering. Along with the loan, I got the meal plan… (Eugenio, 25 years old, risk prevention engineer, low quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% higher education loan, LCP)

As I have said, those LCP students who are attending high quality universities could just made it because they were brilliant and poor enough to get a scholarship. In the best traditional universities of the country, outstanding students coming from LCP families can get access to different scholarships to pay tuition, materials, food and housing. At the Pontificia Universidad Católica (PUC), particularly, these benefits are fairly new and a result of negotiations conducted by the recent leftist federation, which is
aware of the stressful difficulties of LCP students in that university. Before that, the scholarships available did not cover the entire college expenses, leaving a considerable fraction to be paid by these families, with the respective consequences for their quality of life. Despite this improvement, as I show below, the LCP students in high quality universities constantly test their creativity to overcome the high costs of secondary expenses of their careers.

Anyhow, these aids mainly respond to a meritocratic criterion that just gives the opportunity to a very selective group of students. In Chile, many students with academic aptitudes never get the opportunity to access high quality educational institutions. According to Francisco Javier Gil, equity adviser at UNESCO, in Chile there are 3,300 schools, of which 450 (14%) are schools where no child obtains the minimum score for admission to college (Educacion2020 2015). “We rebel to believe that there aren’t at least one, two or three young academic talents there,” he says.

Paradoxically, as evidence shows, outstanding academic and even leadership talent is not just a source of proud but mainly stress for LCP parents and grandparents. An especial mention deserves those over indebted and/or internal migrants who left behind their intimate kin with which they used to sort the daily constrains of economic strictures. In a predominately HCP university located in a very expensive city, scholarships help but are not enough.

Aurora: … [Pedro] always feared that we couldn’t…
Leslie: What do you mean by fear?
Aurora: If he didn’t get the scholarships… he was concerned, because [after being accepted] at Universidad Católica, I asked [my husband] ‘How are we going to do this?’ I got really worried. For me, as long as he studied wherever he wanted, we would do whatever possible. Work. Work as whatever and… thank God it
hasn’t been like that, as I thought it would be... (Aurora, agrarian temporary worker, Pedro’s mother, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% scholarship, LCP)

Despite diverse processes and paces, most LCP families ended up increasing their expectations about education as the best mean of upward mobility. They accepted to include the neoliberal ideology of higher education as part of their motivations as family group because of the promise of economic security for all of them, an expectation that is often assumed as a personal responsibility by the students. For adults, higher educational credentials became “the” way to break the history of economic deprivation of the family; that is, an opportunity of generational break. As one of the LCP mothers clearly states, “If you are not a professional, you are nobody.” Therefore, supporting their children’s decision became a moral responsibility for adults. To deny it would be a negligent act, condemning them to unemployment, poverty and mediocrity for the rest of their lives.

…but [my family] didn’t have like a conception of what higher education was. None of that. I mean, they actually used to say that university was the only option. But, in economic terms, I mean, they have like the conception that it is the best choice in economic terms, because it guarantees more security. [To them, a bachelor’s degree] seems to automatically guarantee a better economic stability than a technical education... (Lautaro, 20 years old, 2nd year Philosophy and Maths, high quality institution, Pinochetista political background, 60% scholarship, LCP)

The intergenerational struggle, then, was mainly about pursuing or not pursuing a post secondary career. The election of career was relevant just for a small group of families. Common sense was in general the unique criteria to define if a career was or not profitable. Thus, they generally rejected the election of any artistic and pedagogy training. Paradoxically, the profile of these students made them to pick social sciences or humanities, the group of careers that LCP families in general have less information about.
It was not until their children became active participants of the student movement in their respective institutions that most parents and grandparents could appreciate what their knowledge is useful for.

**The Higher Education Ideology for HCP Families**

None of the HCP families sent their children to a technical high school, and none of them mentioned technical post secondary education as part of their plans for their children. For HCP adults, technical formation is not an alternative. For that reason, when Daniela decided to pursue a technical career, her mother Nora felt disturbed. It was something absolutely unexpected within her life world:

… [When Daniela decided to study something technical] I must confess that it was unsettling for me. There was no criticism, but it was sort of something out of the blue. It was upsetting at some point for me. To me, college was better, it didn’t matter what, like she did something challenging to open up her world… (Nora, Teacher, Daniela’s mother, high quality institution, *Concertacionista* political background, 100% loan, HCP)

For these HCP families, attending to college after high school is the minimal expectation for their children. Their particular focus on education, leadership and politics under relatively better material conditions made them work very hard to obtain the best from their children, educationally and economically speaking. Most students were aware their parents are very exigent, and that the cost of their expectations is excessive, but none of them showed once a real intention to oppose that. That is how, on one hand, most HCP students went to prestigious private schools that, in turn, are also college-focused, allowing them later to be accepted in one of the two best traditional universities of the country. Given their academic background, many of these students could have studied with a tuition waiver scholarship in a medium quality university. But that was not enough
for their parents, although it would have meant an economic relief for the family.

Similarly, for families living in regions other than Santiago, the decision to migrate to the capital city - where these top universities are located - was indisputable. Just one student decided to apply to a less expensive medium quality university, because otherwise his single mother could not afford the college training of her four children.

…my mom always says that our heritage has been education, because they have made a huge effort to have us study at St. George’s School, which is a private one. So, deep down, what they wanted for us is to be at that school and then to study at a good university. And, my mom always used to say that it had to be a traditional university. In fact, my two older brothers have studied at the University of Chile, and me, at Universidad Católica, and the little one is now a senior high school student, so she will have to continue… (Carolina, 24 years old, 5th year Journalism, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% loan, HCP)

On the other hand, most of them grew up learning from the relatively successful professional and/or academic experience of their adult relatives and friends. Therefore, it is not surprising that most of these students got excellent scores in the Prueba de Selección Universitaria (PSU, a SAT-like test), obtaining a privileged freedom to select the university and career they want to. When this achievement was not possible at the first attempt, the family invested again in a private preuniversitario (PSU preparing institution) until the necessary score would be obtained.

The motivation for all these decisions, among HCP families, is a long-established ideology of higher education defining “being professional as a life style” (Gonzalo, Architect, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, loan just one year, HCP).

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2 A private market of test preparing institutions that offers a wide range of alternatives with heterogeneous qualities, forms, and prices and without much public information on these attributes (Banerjee et al. 2012).
… I chose la Católica (PUC) because at that point it was very clear that la Católica and la (Universidad de) Chile were very similar in terms of prestige and quality. So, my decision depended mostly on whether I got the score for one or the other. I got enough score for both of them, according to my calculations. So I had to make a choice: la Católica or la Chile. I remember that, at that moment, people frightened me, saying that la Chile was going through a quite sensitive restructuring process. I believe that, also, there is an issue with circles and closeness. All the architects, or most of the architects that I know belong to la Católica. And, I don’t know, the world of architecture has some clearly defined circles… (Jose, 23 years old, 5th year Architecture, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, higher education loan just one year, HCP)

College training in a high quality university is crucial for these families because it offers a particular way to understand the world to their children, coming from the contact with different knowledge, social experiences, and intellectual discipline. Even Daniela, whose first election was a technical training, discovered after a short time how important was for her a more academically challenging training. Nora, her relieved mother, supported immediately her reapplication to a high quality university, although her decision this time was for an artistic career.

It is plausible to think, however, that higher education ideology in HCP families is not just related to intellectual development. Upward mobility is also an active part of this ideology, even in the richest families. They know – by experience – that prestigious schools and universities offer top level networking, a key element for economic success (especially in Chile's small social, economic and political elites). Even for artistic careers, as Nora perfectly knows, the opportunities of economic success are relatively higher in these universities.

However, the experiences of their adult relatives and friends have also showed to these students that some naturalized beliefs are changing, such as the supposed economic
success of traditional careers. Nonetheless, the economic difficulties are not serious enough to make these traditional careers lost their appreciation within the top preferences of these families.

… [His grandfather] was a big influence in the major Maximiliano decided to follow, which is Law, because my father is also a lawyer. [Maximiliano] obtained a national high score at the History part of the PSU. So, the success at such an important test, as a university selection tool, led him to choose a major such as Law, but I believe that deep down he wanted to become a professor, a history teacher (Gloria, Social worker, Maximiliano’s mother, high quality institution, Pinochetista political background, 5 years scholarship/2 years 100% loan, HCP)

**Common Expectations, Different Processes of Legitimation**

All in all, evidence from interviews shows that, despite the expectation to pursue a post-secondary training is common to lower (LCP) and higher class positions families (HCP), class differences mattered in terms of 'when', 'how' and 'why' the ideology of higher education was accepted in each family. The legitimation of the higher education ideology was a recent second-hand evidence-based decision for LCP families, and thus, the assessing of this formula for economic success is an ongoing process. Meanwhile, legitimation of the higher education ideology has been a longstanding first-hand evidence-based decision for HCP families, and the general picture shows that the formula has worked so far. And although both groups of families expect upward mobility, the quality level of the institution and, thus, the predominant class level would be the main factor of success or fail. However, this is knowledge that generally just the HCP families have the opportunity to take advantage of.

…here, you don’t just stop having a job because of the employment market. And, if they have economic problems, there will always be someone. In that sense, university means to them to be able to open doors of which life project they want to build. I believe that, in that sense, the university does have a role, which is
socializing. The issue of employment has more to do with your background. I mean, people who are first generation going to college are the ones in trouble, you know?, as well as people who don’t know anyone at the capital city… who don’t have any contacts. It’s not the case of my children… (Nora, Teacher, Daniela’s mother, high quality institution, **Concertacionista** political background, 100% higher education loan, HCP)

Therefore, I could find clear motivations to legitimize the neoliberal ideology of higher education in each group of families. All of them, however, were ahistorical. The lack of discussion about the new rules imposed during the historical transformation of the educational system, when deciding about the post secondary plans for their children, contrast with the traumatic nature of this change. Paradoxically, just LCP families were able to develop some level of resistance given their former experiences with the neoliberal material squeezes. In fact, they were particularly conscious regarding the extra challenges that pursuing a post secondary education would represent to the family's quality of life, and their children were aware of their responsibility in this matter. Although LCP adults adopted the ideology and even became strong advocates of it, the economic dilemma was never eliminated. Anyway, the ideology was legitimized, since the benefits were about to come. For HCP families, in turn, the decision was much more passive. The ideology of higher education was naturalized before the character of the educational system was completely altered by Pinochet’s dictatorship. They grew up with this ideology, and directly experienced their benefits, without noticing that the structural conditions that have sustained their privilege had been transformed.

…my mom makes a lot less money than my dad, and my dad didn’t even finish high school. My mom has a technical degree. My mom is always, like, not having a regular job but working temporarily, because she gets fired, or because she gets sick. So, it’s not certain, and it’s little money. And with my dad’s longtime debts, and we were going to get foreclosed, and stuff. There are debts that we absolutely
must pay, so sometimes, I don’t know, there is not enough even to go to open air markets… (Rita, 20 years old, 2nd Psychology, medium quality university, *Pinochetista* political background, 40% scholarship, 60% loan, LCP)

…I believe that, because of my socioeconomic level, [the issue of going to college] is not a choice, it’s something you just do. Especially in my family, which was very demanding, and, like, a very educated immigrant family, and a very hard working one. So, you had to leave Puerto Montt soon, and study elsewhere, in Santiago… (Maximiliano, 25 years old, Lawyer and Historian, high quality institution, *Pinochetista* political background, 5 years Parent Deceased Scholarship/2 years 100% loan, HCP)

Therefore, discontent regarding the higher education system was present long ago in LCP families. In addition, any tertiary student more or less aware of what was going on around them, beyond regular classes, knew that students were never passive despite democracy was recovered in 1990. However, I argue that ahistorical motivations can be legitimized and delegitimized without necessarily trigger the formation of critical consciousness. As long as the crisis of these motivations were not connected to the particular historical conditions that created and reproduced them, any dissent was not a real threat to the continuity of the system and partial reforms were able to reactivate consent.

Nevertheless, the commodification of higher education in Chile eventually brought unexpected economic effects both to LCP and HCP families. With clear class-based differences, as I show in the next section, the economic squeeze associated to indebtedness became an interclass situation. The moral dilemma of the ideology of higher education was democratized, and the younger generation massively began to unearth uncomfortable questions about our recent history.

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3Puerto Montt is a city in the south of Chile, a thousand kilometers away from Santiago.
The Economic Squeeze Brought by the Legitimation of NHE Ideology

For years, it has been said that debt is the mechanism to integrate working classes under neoliberal capitalism. Many scholars agree that the combination between wage stagnation, growing economic inequality, and the need to maintain a determined standard of living, plus the increasing symbolic importance of consumption as the measure of prosperity, made working people extraordinarily vulnerable to new consumer credit (Albo et al. 2010; Moulian 2002; Panitch 2009; Wolff 2008; Wolff 2009). Chile has not been the exception, of course. According to Paez (2015), the 61% of family budget comes from debt. However, the evidence of this research shows that the motivation for indebtedness in Chile is not just consumerism and maintaining a decent standard of living. The spread of the higher education ideology beyond elites transformed higher education in a valuable commodity. As a result, families who could not afford college tuition in the past began to get indebted for educating their children (Alexander 2009; Mayol 2012a; Mayol 2012b; Mönckeberg 2005; Mönckeberg 2011; Salazar 2011; Solimano 2012; Spooner 2011), despite Chilean higher education is the most expensive in the world (Gonzalez and Montealegre 2012). That is how 68 percent of the youth between 18 and 29 years old have requested a higher education loan (Paez 2015). According to Meller (2011), Chilean higher education students have the highest level of indebtedness in the world.

…we never [questioned ourselves on how we were going to pay for college], we were always thinking that even if they were loans, whatever, we had to ask for one and we had to be able to do it. (Luz, retired teacher, Ines’s grandmother, low quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% scholarship, LCP)
…we did it because we didn’t have enough money to have the three elder ones at college and the youngest one in school. We asked for a loan for two children. I would have never liked to ask for a loan for them, but there was no other choice. At that minute it was just not possible… (Cecilia, nonprofit foundation project manager, Jose’s mother, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, loan just one year, HCP)

Despite many have reported that post secondary education is very expensive for Chilean families, we know few about how LCP and HCP families face this economic squeeze and, if so, how this challenges their motivations to legitimize the NHE ideology and eventually trigger a family-based process of formation of critical consciousness. The evidence coming from interviews not only uncovers the unsustainable economic situation of LCP families, but also challenges the naturalization of HCP families’ financial position as unproblematic. The results of this research demonstrate how the abuses of the system became interclass, throwing overboard those arguments that reject universal free education, and that assume that HCP families do not have any problems to finance college education for their children. While the promise of upward mobility reached LCP families, convincing them to extend in time their economic responsibility over their children to include now the financing of higher education, the irrational costs of high quality college education turned indebtedness into a must for all HCP families participating in this research. In fact, sending their children to a post secondary institution became a lifestyle for most families, with expenses that go beyond tuition. Class-based differences, however, prevail, showing the importance of the still effective privileges of some groups within neoliberal Chile.

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4It is important to remind here that one of the requisites to select interviewees was that they studied with some type of debt.
The Economic Squeeze of LCP Families

Having at least one of their children studying in a higher educational institution is a source of proud and distinction for LCP families. Even though their children have been – in general – excellent students during high school, having a professional child is more than they originally expected to achieve as parents. Most LCP students form the first generation of their families to pursue a higher education degree. In fact, 42% of the students enrolled in a university in 2013 belong to the first generation of university students in their families (Simonsen and Herrera 2013).

This helps to explain how they agreed to go into debt, despite already having serious problems with over indebtedness. According to Han (2011, 2012), the expansion of the credit system in Chile has produced perpetual indebtedness while being a resource amid unstable labor for the urban poor (see Chapter 1). Thus, serious economic constrains were of course existing aspects of their everyday life, making the pressure to legitimize the post secondary aspiration of their children very stressful. However, the education-focused character of these families convinced them this time to see indebtedness as an “opportunity” of development, and not just as a mechanism of surviving.

… a friend who also studied with [CORFO loan] told me: ‘look, there’s a loan where you pay a very low fee of 15 thousand pesos (US$22) at the beginning’, so I went myself, I made the inquiries, I mobilized. The truth is that, in that moment, when you decide on a loan, you think it’s the only choice and you even feel happy, because thanks to that you’ll be able to study. Because, if not, I wouldn’t have had another choice, but now I ask myself, to what cost?... (Leslie, 29 years old, Lawyer, medium quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% loan, LCP)
Unfortunately, before the uprising of the student movement, the conditions of the private loans were not questioned. Their knowledge about the financial aspects of this process was very superficial, and most decisions were taken under a complete ignorance about the economic consequences of this step for the quality of life of their families. The requirements that each family had to meet to obtain the loan depended on the type of loan requested. My evidence shows that, no matter how demanding these requirements were, all families found out the way to meet them. The top priority was studying, no matter how. In medium and low quality institutions, the situation was so normal that remained publicly unchallenged until 2011.

…economically, you may sometimes have some reservations, whether you will be able to [pay for university] but, I believe it wasn’t something you could question. I mean, for me, my son was going to college, and I, no matter how, would have to pay for his major, no matter how. Well, for me, it would be great if he didn’t have to get indebted and pay for it later, but if it was the only option, we just had to take it. I mean, it’s not the best, but all in all it’s fine because what mattered to us was that he could study and that was possible… (Bernardita, restaurant manager, Javier’s mother, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% scholarship/complementary loan, LCP)

Nonetheless, after a couple of years, most LCP families recognize their quality of life had worsened even more since the higher education of their children became the priority. Neither scholarships nor loans fully covered the expenses of the students. The economic constrains became so serious, that students have to literally choose between eating or photocopying a textbook.5

Paradoxically, the most common consequence of the legitimation of NHE ideology by LCP was the integration of students, and their mothers, to the labor force.

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5In Chile photocopying a textbook is a regular practice among students. Despite copyright issues, the cost of books is so high that the photocopying market is considered a legal activity within each campus.
Although the NHE ideology convinced these families to extend the maintenance of their children longer, the unexpected – and ever-increasing – critical economic situation of the family forced most LCP students to find a part time job in their limited free time. We must remember these are politically activist students, whose unpaid academic and political activities already overflow their schedules. However, at certain point, the students could not stand being mere bystanders of the huge efforts made by their significant adults to pay for the accumulative interest of the private loans, or to pay for the amount of money that is not covered by public loans, or simply to pay for food or transportation. Indeed, most activist students’ families have more than one student to maintain. Furthermore, when the students could not be maintained by their parents or grandparents anymore, and/or became the supporters of their own families together with higher education loans payments, these economic pressures forced them to switch to an evening regime\(^6\) and eventually put their career on hold. The latter is particularly common in medium and low quality institutions in which LCP students are more concentrated, with the respective consequences for political organization.

…you realize that you’re no longer at an age to be a burden, and yet you’re still a burden, and it’s hard to work by the hour. There was a time when I was working on weekends, but what you actually make at any part time job is not much either, so it’s mostly useful to cover small expenses, such as bus rides (in my case going out with friends), but it wasn’t enough. It was stressful, because at that time we didn’t get along very well [with my brother], for the same reason, because you think ‘since you are working, why don’t you pay for yourself?’ We started discussing money, which had never been an issue before. So, that changed our relationship a lot at that time… (Jimmy, School Teacher, Nahuel’s brother, low quality institution, Pinochetista political background, 100% loan, LCP)

\(^6\)The situation is so common that some institutions predetermine that classes of the last semester are in evening hours.
In addition, adults must work harder than ever. As showed, the NHE ideology transformed the post secondary training of their children in a moral responsibility for them. For these families, any other alternative would condemn their children to poverty or, in the best case, to mediocrity. Accordingly, all the significant adults interviewed repeated as a *mantra* this phrase, so convenient for the neoliberal educational market reproduction: “You keep studying. One way or another, we will get ahead.”

Even those families whose children study with scholarships have faced very stressful situations, because of changing socioeconomic criteria, to keep their benefits, every year. And this is a problem that these students had to face isolated, given the elitist character of high quality institutions. In addition, other economic pressures are always present. This situation is particularly serious at the PUC, in which some professors assume that economic resources are not scarce, conditioning academic success to high materials and travel expenses. These institutions are not aware of the class based segregation this produces among students.

…we are a minority, the ones who are at a not so favorable situation in terms of money, as most of who are here. Professors do not realize that, they often assume that, hmm, our reality does not exist, so sometimes they make us print things, I don’t know, a document for a hundred thousand pesos and they don’t even think about it. I’ve had to manage in very unorthodox ways, [for example] I signed up for the audiovisual workshop for a bunch of reasons, but one of them was that I probably wouldn’t have to spend money on printing models… (Javier, 22 years old, 4th Design, high quality institution, *Concertacionista* political background, 100% scholarship/complementary loan, LCP)

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7 This means that having financial aid is not very common for the majority of the students in these institutions.

8 Almost half of the minimum wage in Chile.
This way, the permanent dilemma of these families, between the former and the current family ideology, is pushed to its limits. Adults feel proud of the extra effort made by their children when deciding to work, while feeling frustrated that again in their lives, the economic issues control their decisions as family. With the incorporation of the higher education ideology, by first time in adults’ lives, economic survival is not the main goal guiding their decisions. After their children are forced to work to cooperate with financial obligations imposed by college loan(s), college indebtedness loses its character of opportunity and starts to become a fraud.

… [Once, I went to pay my daughter’s loan bill and I told the bank teller] ‘I come to pay for this shamelessness’ Look, I got so upset [by her answer]. She said: ‘Madam, why do you think I am working here? Madam, the State Guarantee [Credit] is just another shamelessness. With my major, I have to work here and on my studies, because, if not, I don’t have enough to pay it back’. So, I asked her: ‘What are you talking about?’, [and she answered] ‘I owe 20 million pesos’…(Iris, Biomagnetism therapist, Sarah’s mother, medium quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% loan, LCP)

The most serious situation, however, is that of CORFO debtors studying in medium and low quality institutions. Without the possibility to obtain the scores for a high quality institution, the option of free education disappeared early on. The State Guaranteed Credit (CAE) was not an option for many because it does not cover the entire tuition, and a good credit history was one of the requirements. Therefore, many went for the Crédito CORFO (State Corporation-of-Development Loan). The requirement of solvent endorsement was solved with the help of their families and friends. The most common strategy was requesting the support of relatives or neighbors with a better economic situation to sign as guarantors. The problem is that this arrangement was

920 million pesos correspond to nearly USD30,000, 80 times Chile’s minimum wage.
necessary every year the loan was taken, and after 2011 the requirements became even harder. In addition, as said, cumulative interests must be paid in advanced from the beginning.

Consequently, for most activist students’ parents and grandparents this is a regular consumer credit, with the same warnings and measures of pressure of any credit when it is not paid. The difference is that year after year many acquaintances were involved in this situation, thus the pressure to pay became much higher. This, considering that foreclosure is the most common threat received by these families. Fear and ignorance of their rights is so high, that many LCP families ended up requesting a new consumer credit to cover the default. The precarious working situation of the students once the degree is obtained completes the scene. According to LCP students and their families, most of the graduated must complement their regular jobs to avoid late payments and their consequences.

… I was so distressed when my father and I went, not long ago, to speak to someone at the bank about a possible loan discount. I was hopeful. Mistakenly, I thought: ‘I’m going to pay a hundred thousand pesos per month’. [But,] they told me that [the discount] would be like [only fifteen thousand]. You know, it was like a bucket of cold water. I remember we walked downtown, and I never, ever, ever cry. But, you know, I couldn’t hold it in and I wept all down Paseo Ahumada.¹⁰ And my dad hadn’t noticed, but when he did (I remember and get emotional, because my dad is older now), he turned around and he hugged me, and you know, he started sobbing like a child… (Nahuel, 29 years old, Physical Education School Teacher, low quality institution, Pinochetista political background, 100% loan, LCP)

All in all, family life is completely altered with a rising level of tension.

Economic constrains and the pressure to finish the career on time and then work for paying higher education debts affects negatively the individual and family mental health.

¹⁰Paseo Ahumada is a very busy pedestrian street downtown Santiago.
The limited scope of some recent modifications to the CORFO loan has further increased this sense of general discomfort. Eventually, stress, anger and impotence among adults and students became the first signals of the neoliberal higher education ideology crisis among LCP families, and, as I show in the next chapter, an intergenerational struggle on the historical interpretation of this problem began.

…my girlfriend is in the same situation. She’s currently studying *and* working. She studies from 8.30 in the morning until 5.30 in the afternoon, and after that, she has to go off to work from 6.00 in the afternoon until midnight. So, then, we started realizing that we practically had no family life… (Jaime, 24 years old, Psychopedagogics –on hold, low quality institution, *Pinochetista* political background, 100% loan, LCP)

**The Economic Squeeze of HCP Families**

To say that HCP families’ economic situation is comparatively better is stating the obvious. What is fairly unknown is that higher education indebtedness is an issue present even among these families. According to Meller (2011), in 2010, 60% of the students belonging to the poorest families of the country (i.e., quintiles 1, 2 and 3) was in debt, while 40% of the fourth quintile requested a higher education loan. Within the richest quintile, in turn, the 21% was indebted. However, statistics are still very general and fail to reflect the diverse and complex situation of these families. It is true that, despite all the support I obtained from students movement’s leaders to contact indebted activists studying at the PUC, this was a difficult task. Most of these students live in the so-called
barrio alto (upper income concentration zone). Furthermore, 61.3% of the one hundred best PSU scores applied to this university as their first preference, in 2015.

HCP students that ended up participating in this research are pretty aware of this situation, but insisting that it significantly varies according to each career. Manuel (22 years old, 3rd year Design, Pinochetista political background, 70% loan, HCP), for instance, states that in his campus, most students’ families would directly finance their children careers and complementary expenses, without noticing the socioeconomic situation of a minority that study with scholarships and/or college loans. However, the results also show that being indebted is not a situation that HCP families enjoy to share. This could help to explain why most of the richest 10 percent of the country have ended up wrongly categorizing themselves as “middle class,” an increasingly common behavior in Chile in the last years (Ruiz-Tagle 2008).

…we could cover the other expenses [related to his major], [but as] a middle class person, you have to get indebted. Salaries are not enough to pay for a major, to educate a child with all the expenses that implies. The only way, as I say it again, for a middle class person to go forward, [is] getting indebted, otherwise you can’t. When you have a salary limit [it’s not enough to receive] none of the benefits that exist, because you are a middle class person… (Marta, housekeeper, Eladio’s mother, high quality institution, mixed political background, 100% loan, HCP)

In this context, this research helps us to make visible the situation of HCP families, particularly those whose economic constrains were also related to the formation of critical consciousness and to the rising of the student movement in 2011. All these

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11 See the first map in “Where do college students live?” (http://www.sentidoscomunes.cl/donde-viven-los-estudiantes-de-cada-universidad/)

12 See http://www.uc.cl/en/students/18799-mas-de-la-mitad-de-los-puntajes-nacionales-decide-estudiar-en-la-universidad-católica

13 So far, it has been impossible to obtain statistics about indebtedness in this particular university.
families have had to request higher education loans at least once since their children entered to college. To be exact, just Jose’s father paid the expensive career of his son by his own, excepting for one year that he divorced Jose’s mother. The rest of the families have paid for the studies of their children with a 70% to 100% higher education loan. With ups and downs, most of these families have not had enough economic resources to sustain their living costs and their children’s careers at the same time.

Leslie: Can’t you pay for your three children’s majors?
Gloria: Under no circumstance, under no circumstance. Today I’m paying the [State] Guarantee Credit, and with all the expenses that having three children out of home studying implies, it’s extremely complex for me to maintain three children, very complex, because I’m not even paying off the debt, I’m paying the interests of two [loans] every month, which is nearly seventy, eighty thousand pesos\textsuperscript{14}… (Gloria, Social worker, Maximiliano’s mother, high quality institution, \textit{Pinochetista} political background, 5 years Parent Deceased scholarship/2 years 100% loan, HCP)

The first thought that came up to my mind when analyzing this situation was the case of Giorgio Jackson,\textsuperscript{15} one of the main leaders of the student movement in 2011, and currently a deputy, who studied in a private school while living in \textit{Las Condes},\textsuperscript{16} and later an expensive traditional career at the PUC. Few believed that his HCP mother-supported family could not afford the entire cost of his career, and that for this reason he owes U.S. $15,000 to the bank (Alonso and Rivas 2011). Therefore, explaining the motivations of HCP students struggling in the student movement as mere solidarity is an oversimplification. The material constrains derived from a traditional higher education

\textsuperscript{14}Seventy thousand pesos corresponds to USD 101.
\textsuperscript{15}See http://www.giorgiojackson.cl/.
\textsuperscript{16}One of the top three richest municipalities of the country.
ideology – that persists despite changing macroeconomic conditions – were also working in the formation of critical consciousness of these students and significant adults.

...if I’m in the fifth income quintile, and I’m like this, I can imagine what it must be like for the rest. We’ve consumed all of my dad’s heritage, of what we received when he died, and my mom has had to ask for several consumption loans to pay off previous debts. I mean, not from university, but for everyday things. University is always the first thing that is paid off really. My grandparents and my aunts and uncles, who have a better situation, have supported us several times. I don’t know the exact amount, but I know... (Maximiliano, 25 years old, Lawyer and Historian, high quality institution, Pinochetista political background, 5 years Parent Deceased scholarship/2 years 100% loan, HCP)

As stated, these families share with LCP families a strong ideology of higher education that makes them to prioritize undergraduate education of their children at all costs. For that reason, when these large families realized that higher education is much more expensive than the already costly private schools, they were forced to transform their distrustful perception of college loans and just borrow money. Paradoxically, when indebtedness became accepted as the unique mechanism to finance college education among these HCP families, banks increased their requirements, and the task to obtain a new loan for the next student in the family became a feat. In addition, my evidence shows that even considering the average high educational level of adults, many were not completely aware of the abusive conditions of the college loans available for HCP families at that moment. Just few adults were able to realize that, as Gonzalo (Architect, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, loan just one year, HCP) states, it “is just like requesting a consumer credit for buying a car.”

Leslie: Is it a convenient loan?  
Gloria: I don’t understand much of that, I think it’s the one the market offers. I don’t know, I don’t get it at all. The thing is that, that’s all there is, and it’s not my concern. I just went and signed, like to... pay as a co-signer, I’m, what is it? Co-
In this context, these families complain that the requirements for obtaining a scholarship are “absurd” (Alvaro, 20 years old, 3rd Sociology, medium quality institution, *Concertacionista* political background, 100% loan, HCP). The fact that an important part of family income goes to pay college expenses not covered by loans does not qualify as an indicator of financial need. Anyhow, although the students are the responsible of signing the loan contract, most parents and grandparents assumed it was their responsibility to pay both current and future monthly payments. Adults want to provide education, but not indebtedness, resisting any option to transfer this duty to their children. Among the students there is a conflictive perception about this issue.

… [I feel] terribly abused, very much abused. Because I feel that, for me, it is a very high cost having to afford this, but also, it seems abusive that after he receives his degree, he has to pay almost double… (Monica, Teacher, Alvaro’s mother, medium quality institution, *Concertacionista* political background, 100% loan, HCP)

Beyond college indebtedness, their higher class position has hardly allowed them to afford other costly college-related expenses, which could begin even before being enrolled in a university. For example, having a private teacher and enrolling in private *preuniversitarios*\(^\text{17}\) were common investments among these families to secure the access of these students to the best universities. Once they were enrolled, college-related expenses multiplied. Beside their own expenses, adults must finance materials, housing (when students come from a different region), food, and extra expenses derived from their intensive social life as university students. In Chile, most HCP students live with

\(^\text{17}\) PSU (University selection test) preparing institutions.
their families. According to Gonzalo (Architect, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, loan just one year, HCP), these expenses are an adults’ responsibility since the Chilean university system is not designed for studying and working at the same time, unlike most developed countries where students do not live with their parents.

Unlike LCP families, there is not a moral dilemma between a working and a higher education ideology. For that reason, HCP university students are not generally “forced” to work beyond the usual teaching assistantships, which have a different social significance. The ability to practice solidarity with their parents and grandparents and, thus, to maintain an austere life is all the help they demand. In fact, the results of this research show that many HCP activist students do work, but mostly to collaborate with the extra expenses of their university life. A moral conflict emerges among these students, who feel guilty to complain for their stress in an already very time-consuming academic and political career, given their relatively privileged position.

… last year I worked half the year at a part-time job, and there, I kind of didn’t ask for money to my parents. That happened while I had the time. This semester I haven’t had the time to work, and now, my parents do give me money. [They can’t give me an allowance since] neither of them has a regular salary. I’ve been responsible for that too, and whenever I can work I do it, I try to ask for money the least possible and I try to cover my own expenses, to find a job, to be always looking for income sources. I don’t think it’s a family [problem], I think it’s more of an issue for me. [Because], to me, it’s a problem trying to make money and study… (Manuel, 22 years old, 3rd year Design, high quality institution, Pinochetista political background, 70% loan, HCP)

In sum, for a long time most HCP families uncritically assumed the economic constrains that college expenditure would mean for the family budget, despite most siblings – when present – are in the same life cycle. As said, these families are
particularly resistant to publicly discuss about their economic difficulties. However, their children became increasingly aware of all the sacrifices and even economic mistakes their significant adults must do to hardly maintain the level of life they are use to. HCP parents and grandparents, from a close complicity with their children, find the needed grounding to keep working hard and to obtain the necessary economic resources just because studying has historically proven to be the right thing to do. From the same logic, one student even acknowledges in shame how their family has obstinately persisted with their focus on higher education out of dubious business and permanent over indebtedness.

… it was a hard and tense time. I mean, there were moments when I needed more money, and there wasn’t any and that created stress in the family and to my mother. Many times, I couldn’t see how I was going to finish college, or sometimes my dad told me ‘son, I have no more money, I don’t know how you’re going to study’. My dad was lucky, because he knew the market and could create businesses, so we could get by… (Eladio, 25 years old, Political Scientist, high quality institution, mixed political background, 100% higher education loan, HCP)

Therefore, high levels of stress also threat the emotional stability of HCP families. With a high level of anxiety, some of these families see how their youngest members are finishing high school and preparing for college admission with high expectations, while the economic situation remains the same. The combination between wage stagnation, growing tuition fees (Meller 2011), and a nonnegotiable NHE ideology have been enough to create a permanent state of economic squeeze in these families. In addition, the family cycle associated to higher education is exceptionally long for HCP families, thus, the odds of suffering many economic bumps in a free-market economy as extreme as the Chilean one are pretty high.
The main difference is that HCP families have comparatively better social networks, material heritage, and extended family economic support to face these constrains. However, none of these advantages have eliminated the need of indebtedness, and not only to cover college expenses but also regular consumption. As Monica (Teacher, divorced, medium quality institution, *Concertacionista* political background, 100% loan) states, even the ordinary decision of going to the supermarket or buying shoes for their four children became tough. Actually, she was the unique HCP adult that despite their high expectations was forced to push her son to attend to a more affordable medium quality university. Even so, mother and child describe their lives are persistently stressful, since they rarely have the resources to pay the monthly payments on time of college and other consumer loans. In this context, it is not difficult to understand why most of these HCP families have needed to renegotiate their credit contracts with banks to avoid financial penalties.

…when I was about to enter college, my dad was thinking, as he always has, that he would be able to afford my college tuition. [So,] I didn’t ask for a loan or scholarship. My brother had a scholarship because of his grades and for the PSU test, which went well for him and all that, and he mobilized, because he knew. But, I was kind of a little brat. I mean, really immature, and what I did that first year was to ask for a [consumption] loan, which I ended up paying last year. It was, let’s say, a million pesos (U$1,418), and my mom paid the rest. So, two hundred thousand were paid a month, plus the loan, which was a hundred thousand a month. On the second year, I applied to the CAE (State Guarantee Credit) and I remember perfectly, that day I went to sign the contract, but I had no idea what it was about. I mean, I thought: ‘right, a loan’, but only by 2011 I finally found out what it was all about… (Carolina, 24 years old, 5th year Journalism, high quality institution, *Concertacionista* political background, 100% loan, HCP)
The Reproduction of the Higher Educational Market and the Role of (Grand)Mothers

Taking into account the situation of LCP and HCP families together, it is plausible to sustain that the reproduction of the tertiary education market, based on the spread of the NHE ideology, as most family issues, is not a gender neutral mechanism of legitimation. On one hand, this has been forced by relatively worse material circumstances of women in Chile. This is predominantly true in HCP activist students’ families, which were all women sustained ones. All of them were led by impoverished women after divorce, widowhood, or in charge of the maintenance of the children after their couples got ill.

Beyond well-known economic inequalities, on other hand, most LCP and HCP (grand)mothers were stronger advocates of the NHE ideology, leading the majority of the education-related decisions in the family. The moral power of (grand)mothers in these families is strong, with the respective economic pressures this involves when most elemental parental duties, such as education and health, are now profitable commodities in this country.

… When Sarah had just started studying, we weren’t in a good economic situation, and I made a cash payment [of her first year of college] by making *sopaipillas*.18 I told her: ‘Sarah, don’t you worry, they’re my hands’. She didn’t want me to do all that sacrifice, but I told her that ‘where there’s a will, there’s a way’ and that we were going to thrive anyway. Because I have to admit that I’m like an ant. Whatever I have to go out and sell, I do it… the thing was that it had to be enough for us… (Iris, Biomagnetism therapist, Sarah’s mother, medium quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% loan, LCP)

… I went to several banks, and in some of them, they said I didn’t qualify, and it was a definite no, because they were not interested. I wanted to borrow money to

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18 *Sopaipillas* is a traditional Chilean fried dough, sold in the street, for a cheap price.
pay for my children’s studies in any way possible, if not, they couldn’t study…(Gloria, Social worker, Maximiliano’s mother, high quality institution, Pinochetista political background, 5 years Parent Deceased scholarship/2 years 100% loan, HCP)

However, the “at all cost” interclass conviction regarding the benefits of tertiary education was present in all participating families, despite some level of moral dilemma in the case of LCP adults. In other words, (grand)mothers are not exclusively performing an active conservative role that has been very functional to the reproduction of the Chilean educational market in the last decades. I argue that this is more related to the key role family plays when adults accept to extend in time their responsibilities over children. I did not observe any particular predisposition of mothers to play a conservative role in comparison to fathers. This became even clearer since 2011 when all these mothers and fathers were forced to pay more attention to the crisis of the higher educational market and the rising of the student movement. As long as the post secondary experience of their children was politicized, their education-focused relationship as family was inevitably altered forever.

In the next and final section, I analyze how these families, mostly but not exclusively supported by women, began to understand their particular situation as a collective issue. Even though the first student struggles against the commodification of higher education began in 2005, it was not until their children were actively involved in the movement that a definitive – but diverse – process of critical consciousness formation was triggered both in LCP and HCP activist students’ families.
The Beginnings of the Politicization of Education-Focused Families

Although all of these students remember the Penguin Revolution (2006) as a turning point in their political career, the radical transformation of their ideas about higher education did not begin until they entered to a post secondary institution and joined the student movement around 2011. Before that their motivations to assume leadership responsibilities in academic and other volunteering experiences at high school were very important for their political formation, but they were hardly connected with structural problems.

Those were also the times in which most ex leaders of the Penguin Revolution ended up understanding how the failed agreement between Bachelet’s government and the leaders of the secondary movement in 2006 was just a trick to calm the protests. As a result, the student struggle began to be radicalized mainly at universities. Although secondary students have been always an important actor of the movement, the first collective actions and the main leaders were produced within these institutions. However, most of the activist students participating in this research did not entirely realize yet that the crisis of higher education was so serious. For instance, many LCP students decided to participate in the movement just to avoid going home and deal with all the family stress caused by debt and other economic constrains. In turn, many LCP adults initially rejected the participation of their children in the movement because if they were making a big effort to pay college expenses, their expectation was to see their children attending classes, not participating in a very demanding movement and propitiate a strike or seizure that was keeping them away of a classroom.
… when I started at this university… our family was in a very heavy emotional crisis, besides economic. [Then,] I said to my mom ‘I’ll take a leave, I’ll work in another thing from Monday to Friday and I’ll help you with the expenses’. But she said: ‘no, your dad and I will figure it out, you just carry on with your major’. I got into the students’ association. I had so many emotional problems that I did it to get distracted by something. That was in 2011, and my mom didn’t like that I was more [at university] than at home. So, I said to her: ‘I don’t want to be selfish’, even more, I was trying to be generous with myself and other mates that could go through a crisis… (Sarah, 25 year old, 4th Social Work, medium quality institution, *Concertacionista* political background, 100% loan, LCP)

Diverse sources triggered the process that finally politicized activist students and their significant adults’ consciousness. Sooner or later, most students began to question the ideas that had guided most important family decisions in the last years in reaction to their material consequences. Particularly, after two or three years, the decision of requesting a college loan turned from being a source of happiness to be a source of regret. However, the NHE ideology was still effective. That is, the situation was still being analyzed as a private family issue. For instance, Nancy began feeling resentful with her father because he was “the adult” when the decision of requesting a college loan was taken. Her argument was still based on the temporal extension of the moral responsibilities of adults over their children that the NHE ideology encourages.

I used to blame my dad, because I was seventeen when I signed that contract. By the time I was twenty one, I realized the stupidity that I’d gotten myself into. [But,] doing a historical overview, I can’t blame him either, because his economic life has not been so good either. So, I don’t really know who to blame. Well, blame is actually a deeper topic, it’s an issue of the system. Because I actually find it absurd that you have to get indebted to be able to study, to be able to choose a better life, to be able to learn. And that everything that has happened had to happen, and what I’ll have to go through, for ten more years… (Nancy, 24 years old, Psychologist, medium quality institution, *Pinochetista* political background, 100% loan, LCP)
Likely, most activist students could finally realize that they were part of a majority that can access higher education only because of predatory higher education loans. This is particularly true in medium and low quality institutions, and, thus, among LCP families. Actually, the first public campaign of the student movement in 2011 was intentionally focused on this issue.\textsuperscript{19} According to Maximiliano, an important leader of the student movement in 2011, the concept of “economic fraud” became central for the identity of the movement. Conversely, those studying with scholarships in high quality institutions rapidly realized they were part of a rare minority that despite this “privilege,” have to still manage many others unsolved economic constraints.

… Children have gone out on the street because of their parents’ debts. I think that, in that sense, there are many children who see that their parents are already drowning in the issue of tuition and fees. I think that this matter has been dragged around for many years; people’s dissatisfaction [can be seen] on many things, not just in terms of education… (Marta, housewife, Eladio’s mother, high quality institution, mixed political background, 100% loan, HCP)

Just in a few cases, both students and adults were directly involved in the movement. In this sense, the shaping process of LCP families participating in the Association of Students Swindled by CORFO Credit has been particularly interesting in terms of an intergenerational sharing of experiences and knowledge. Despite being pretty affected by the abusive conditions of the CORFO credit, Graciela’s (29 years old, Lawyer, medium quality institution, \textit{Concertacionista} political background, 100% loan, LCP) parents did not understand the severity of the problem until they were invited by their daughter to the main assembly she led, and listened many other’s family stories. It was a turning point for the family. Adelina (housekeeper, single mother, low quality

institution, *Concertacionista* political background, LCP), in turn, became herself an activist of this organization motivated by the over victimization of her daughter, as a CORFO and Universidad del Mar’s swindled student whose college loan expenses has been totally assumed by her mother. Adelina’s structural understanding of the crisis, thus, became comparatively impressive given her limited educational background.

… the system is the one [to blame]. I cannot blame the president for the model we have in the economy. I mean, the rich one can do whatever he pleases. I’m not against rich people, ok? I have never been, but they do get away with a lot…

(Adelina, housekeeper, single mother, low quality institution, *Concertacionista* political background, LCP)

However, these cases are an exception. Most adults have just participated in the movement by attending to some marches, if so. Nevertheless, this would be a reduced evaluation of the political role of family in the building of the student resistance. Given the direct participation of their children in the student movement, and the historical importance that these adults give to educational and political issues at home, most of these families have developed a critical understanding of the crisis and, particularly the students, a critical consciousness that seeks a radical transformation of the Chilean order on behalf of their families.

Most students highlight how the student movement, after a long process of maturation, was able to connect the crisis of the higher educational system with their economic and ideological roots. Sooner or later, they understood this was a problem of the totalitarian neoliberal system that rules in Chile since the seventies, which forced

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20Universidad del Mar was in a complex economic situation due to financial irregularities driven by its owners to increase profit. Eventually, this university became the icon of the problems of Chilean higher education: a low quality university, which was profiting from education, with thousands of indebted students that had no place to go to complete their studies, while their debt was increasing (Fech.cl 2012). All of this under the protection of the now discredited National Commission of Accreditation (CNA).
them to pay for studying and suffer the consequences of that decision without any protection. In this sense, they also realized that there is a state that has systematically worked for the private sector, thus, without any interest of establishing regulations to protect citizens.

… The Constitution [of Pinochet, which none of the other governments dared to change,] ensured a place for private universities. The most important thing here is to get a degree, and, as so many people want to do the same, majors are getting more and more expensive. So, many people get indebted. Education, as well as dying, as well as being born, is about money. Everything is about money… (Jimmy, School Teacher, Nahuel’s brother, low quality institution, Pinochetista political background, 100% loan, LCP)

The idea of higher education as key to upward mobility and even happiness has proven to be false since most families ended up poorer than before given the predatory conditions of college indebtedness, creating the profound inequality that characterizes the Chilean society. In some sense, they understand that this is a traditional mechanism of capitalism to create profit, and that the system is not just interested in irrational profit but also in control, using indebtedness to transform people into slaves. They say it is irrational, because they see how banks borrow money to the over indebted poor that hardly finishes their careers because they are not able pay back.

How is it possible that a person who is overly indebted, who has a regular salary, so to say, as to have the basic needs covered, gets a loan, considering the level of interests that they have? So, in the end, they enslave people… (Nancy, 24 years old, Psychologist, medium quality institution, Pinochetista political background, 100% loan, LCP)

From relatively radical political perspectives, this outstanding ability of analysis was present in all students regardless the level of quality of their higher education institutions. What is also important to visualize is that their understanding of the situation
became even broader and more profound, reaching other areas of life beyond higher education. At the beginning of their critical consciousness formation process, thus, the main concern was the crude profit interest that prevails in all spheres of Chilean society, concentrating all the wealth and privileges in a small group of families.

… [Students] want to express that this is wrong, that Education in Chile is a lie, that Health in Chile is a lie, that in the end all of the richness goes to the ten percent of the population and the rest is just here… (Nahuel, 29 years old, Physical Teacher, low quality institution, Pinochetista political background, 100% loan, LCP)

Simultaneously, because most of these activist students still live with their families in their original neighborhoods, their critical consciousness also help them to realize the contrasting situation of the majority of the poor youth who do not pursue a tertiary education. This is particularly conflicting for LCP students, who realized the importance of their nuclear families to become a relatively privileged minority within the poorest population in the country. Despite unstable work patterns, illness, and pervasive economic indebtedness (Han 2012), these families were able to open a window for the development of their brilliant children. According to the activist students, without a significant adult to get support from, the chance to access higher education for most brilliant poor youth studying in public and subsidized schools became harder. And, thus, other ideologies offering fast avenues for upward mobility operate, such as crime, drug trafficking, or soccer are legitimized. In these environments, the struggle of the student movement is perceived as something unjustified, given the already privileged position of higher education students.

… University, despite everything we can say, is nowadays handing better tools than paid labor. Notice what I’m saying. I mean, look at how precarious education
is right now, and look at how precarious professionalization is right now. Imagine the rest. Imagine how precarious the life of the rest of the people is… (Alvaro, 20 years old, 3rd Sociology, medium quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% loan, HCP)

Therefore, higher education has not lost their value among activist students, and some important motivations are still practical. Thus, the legitimation crisis proves to be a very contradictory process. For instance, the students are also aware that the Chilean labor market still discriminate those people without a higher education degree, which make their moral position become conflictive. Despite many regret regarding their passive acceptance of the NHE ideology in the past, all of them still expect their own children pursue a college degree in the future, but from adjusted motivations.

… in today’s society, having a degree does matter. If you don’t have a degree, you will be frowned upon. And if you have another goal in life, you have to go for that goal and not just satisfy society’s needs, because these are not necessarily what people need. I am not going to be one more producer in a system that I don’t like and that I know that someday may repress my child or my nephew… (Rita, 20 years old, 2nd Psychology, medium quality university, Pinochetista political background, 40% scholarship, 60% loan, LCP)

Hence, the NHE ideology has not been overcome, but transformed. First, upward mobility is still important, especially for LCP families. Nobody would want their family to keep living under economic constrains. In this sense, because they understand this will be a long-term struggle, the need of college indebtedness is strongly criticized, but still difficult to reject completely. For these activist students, there are still strong motivations to sacrifice their quality of lives for the happiness of their future children. Anyhow, they are already encouraging their close young relatives to make an extra effort during high school in order to get access to a high quality public institution and all the privileges associated, including more alternatives for funding.
Second, higher educational institutions, as mechanism and site for emancipation became the main motivation to persist with this choice in the future. Therefore, the ideology of higher education is not a second hand evidence-based decision for LCP families anymore. Although the assessing of this formula for economic success is still an ongoing process, their motivations are now based on direct experience. For all the activist students, these institutions have been more a place for a broad intellectual and moral development, than a place to learn to just produce more and make others richer.

… Today I don’t want to become a veterinarian just because I want to make money, and because I’m going to a farm and kill cows, you know? I could just kill a thousand cows per minute, dude, and I can check them, you know?, and with that I get the cash. Not me, what I want today is to have a major that serves my country. I mean, I’m not giving my knowledge away so that somebody gets richer, I’ll use my knowledge so that we all become richer… (Ines, 26 years old, 4th veterinary medicine, low quality institution, *Concertacionista* political background, 100% scholarship, LCP)

… [To my children] I would say that they must decide with more awareness, and considering more factors than I did. [I would tell them to enter] preferably a university belonging to the Council of University Presidents. If not, a private one with certain characteristics, where they do not prohibit students’ organization, where professors are not censored, where they’ll have some kind of social mixing… [universities] with a genuine intention of bringing something to the public debate and to the shaping of people, and which are not a business model… (Maximiliano, 25 years old, Lawyer and Historian, high quality institution, *Pinochetista* political background, 5 years Parent Deceased scholarship/2 years 100% loan, HCP)

As a result, the concept of education has been adjusted. All of these activist students mostly seek a simple but happy life, which means among other factors, that their future children could access to a decent education since preschool, which teaches them to think critically to transform their societies, and never again have an educational system that trains children focused on production and money making. Anyhow, if this is not yet
possible, the active students and most of their significant adults are now aware of the power that family has in the emancipation process conducted by the student movement. Their descendants will be raised under an adjusted ideology of higher education. “…one of the things that motivates me to be inside the student movement is changing the concept of what education is…” (Jaime, 24 years old, Psychopedagogics – on hold, low quality institution, Pinochetista political background, 100% loan, LCP)

After many family conversations with their activist children, parents and grandparents ended up understanding that a higher education credential is not a safe passage to economic success. These adults mainly highlight how higher education was transformed into a lucrative business, with increasing tuition fees, being the integration of banks in the college financial system the solution proposed by the Concertación governments to this problem. They agree that this was a good opportunity for LCP families for getting access to higher education, but at a material and mental health cost that became abusive: high levels of indebtedness and self exploitation, with low quality academic and professional results for the students. The activist students, thus, struggle for radical changes that go beyond the educational sphere, to reach the health system and the labor market. In fact, income inequality is the problem that for adults summarizes the motivation for students to struggle.

…the educational system in Chile is totally unfair, is very unfair. Because, even though it’s true that my son has been able to study at Universidad Católica thanks to his effort, and so to say his intelligence, there are students who are totally qualified to pursue a career, but they’re not accepted if they don’t have money or a scholarship. The system is worried about making money… (Ismael, construction worker, Pedro’s father, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% scholarship, LCP).
However, the academic and political experiences of their children in these institutions have become a mechanism of emancipation that must be spread to the coming generations. For most adults, this is a new source of proud and a more than satisfactory reward for all their sacrifices. For students, these experiences, and the formation of critical consciousness derived from them, have been a priceless privilege in times when most people just live for working and paying their debts. These learning are now defined as something to be placed at the service of the other. In this sense, the recovery of the public sense of higher education is already on practice by these students and their families, when their processes of critical consciousness formation are shaping the motivations to pursue a higher educational career. The main family’s expectation now is raising children with critical thinking to protect them against the neoliberal domination that define post secondary training as a mechanism to reproduce the capitalist system. As Sarah points out, “when you want to struggle against the system, it is better doing it from university, because your voice will be heard much more” (25 year old, 4th Social Work, medium quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% loan, LCP).

…I am aware that there are unemployed university graduates, and I don’t want that for my child. [But,] in my opinion, it is still worth to study, because he won’t be an ignorant person. Because nobody is going to fool him and say ‘no, it just has to be like this and what I’m saying is the truth. You have no studies, so you have no idea of what you’re saying’… (Aurora, seasonal agricultural worker, Pedro’s mother, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% scholarship, LCP)

All the above helps us to understand better why the student movement struggles for educaciónpublica, gratuita y de calidad (free and good quality public education), and not just for free education as many adults believe. To be sure, the demand for universal
free higher education has been established by the movement only as a requirement to rebuild public education, i.e., that institutions of higher education guide their work according to the needs of our society (CEFECH 2015). However, despite the efforts of the movement, the government and media have deliberately maintained the discussion about the higher education system reform in an ahistorical fashion. That is, just around the demand of free education, predisposing the terms for family discussion. Any reference to the public education debate not only would represent an unlikely revision of the neoliberal foundations of the educational market, but also an improbable revival of the debate on the historical origin and political responsibilities of this issue.

Nonetheless, this cannot be the main explanation of why most adults, particularly low class position ones, reject the demand for universal free higher education. Certainly, funding is their main concern, and they know the country has enough but unevenly distributed economic resources to reduce the financial responsibility given to families in this matter. Nevertheless, despite the huge impact of indebtedness in their lives, they argue that every family should pay based on income level.

… [My mom] didn’t support free of charge education for the rich. She would say ‘hey, but, Why will rich people have free education?’ So I tried to talk to her about this practically philosophical conception of equality, that if we wanted equality, it had to be equal for everybody. Now, How will this be financed? The rich will have to pay more taxes and the poor will have to pay less, and so conditions will be, so to say, balanced… (Eugenio, 25 years old, risk prevention engineer, low quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% loan, LCP)

Nonetheless, the material aspects of the critical consciousness formation process are not enough to understand its contradictions. NHE ideology has deeply informed most decisions of adults for many years. From this ideology, the older generation has
understood as mandatory the need to work as much as necessary to afford the expenses of the tertiary education of their children. Thus, conceiving higher education as a universal right is morally challenging for these families. During last decades, most adults have consented that just people in authentic need must be helped by the state to accomplish this and other family duties. In fact, the Chilean state is defined as subsidiary by the Constitution, and thus the social policies are focalized to the poorest. This was the concept of state that Chilean people had to relearn since the seventies. Exploitation and inequality have been internalized with a clear limit: material poverty, a concept under permanent revision in the last decades.

… Regarding [that] university should be free, I disagree. I agree that they help, for example, those who are more in need. For example, if the university asked me ‘can you pay for fifty percent of your child’s studies?’ I would work my butt off and make an effort to do so. [You should pay] according to the skills you have, but not for free. Gratuity is not good, in the sense that, for example, when the poor receive freely given things, they get used to it… (Efrain, importing company worker, Marcos’s father, medium quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% loan, LCP)

In addition, in a country where collective ideologies became traumatic for the older generations, rejecting the NHE ideology threatens to leave these adults in the most complete anomie again. This is particularly strong for LCP adults. Paradoxically, most of them are aware that free education is not an illusion but an historical loss. This is another evidence for arguing that there was a level of rationality when deciding to accept the NHE ideology. With more or less historical accuracy, most of them remember that higher education funding was defined according to income level before the coup d’état, and even those elites governing the country nowadays paid a symbolic amount for what was defined as a right, and as one of the cornerstones of the development of the country.
Conversely, few HCP adults mentioned this fact in their analysis of the higher educational market crisis. Those who bring it up not only remember how cheap university was for their ancestors, who would have needed to borrow money as well if this had not happened, but also that higher education was in service of the country development.

… I feel much anger, and that’s why I support Ines so much, as well as all the children who are fighting. I studied for free, and it wasn’t that we were given things freely, we had to make the effort, or else we would lose the opportunity and had to start paying. And those who had more money, used to pay. I had classmates who paid fees. It wasn’t much, but they paid. All of that could be done by the state… (Luz, retired teacher, Ines’s grandmother, low quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% scholarship, LCP)

Most HCP families, despite having serious economic constrains, focus their analysis mostly in the problem of inequality. They highlight how the crisis of the higher educational market uncovered that the promise of upward mobility has just worked for them, i.e., a minority of families who are able to send their children to private schools and elite universities. The problem, however, cannot be reduced to monetary resources. The integration of banks in the educational market and the access of thousands of students to post secondary formation have not altered the extremely unequal economic distribution of wealth in the country. The system remains highly segregated at all levels.

… education is a very good opportunity. You can put together a person who has millionaire parents with a person who’s had a much more difficult situation. So, if they meet in the same place, which for me was school as a child, such different people, they’ll understand why the other person thinks differently, and they’ll learn to get acquainted and relate. So, education is a tremendous opportunity to, sort of, level the field. If you are also equally qualified educationally, you get access to the same opportunities… (Jose, 23 years old, 5th year Architecture, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, loan just one year, HCP)
This is the main reason to reject the simplification of the student movement struggle to the issue of universal free education. It is essential to include the debate on quality and the role of higher education institutions in the development of the country as well, as permanently the activist students insist on. Indeed, most HCP families agree that higher education must be a right, and support the idea of creating at least one public, good quality and free university, to somehow reverse the unequal opportunities of the current educational system. For HCP families, good quality higher education, and probably nothing else, has that power. Actually, as Gonzalo (Architect, high quality institution, *Concertacionista* political background, loan just one year, HCP) points out, universities have been the places where politicians are formed the last forty years.

…the state should have a policy that said ‘look, I’m interested in a country with these characteristics. These are the resources that we have, these are the needs we have, this is the future that we project, and therefore, this is what I’m interested in building as professionalization. Whether it’s technical, whether it’s academic, whatever it may be, but, this is the profile of the citizen we want’. And offer the opportunities, because these are all the citizens that are going to work for the estate eventually. I mean, it’s not a gift, that’s what citizenship consists of… (Nora, Teacher, Daniela’s mother, high quality institution, *Concertacionista* political background, 100% loan, HCP)

**Partial Conclusions: The Paradoxical Role of Family Economic Constraints**

Despite all the above mentioned, the debate on the public character of higher education has been silenced by the authorities in the last years, and the attention has been deviated to the material aspects of the crisis. Paradoxically, the revolutionary potential of family economic constrains associated to the crisis of the higher educational market was damaged and became to some extent instrumental to capital.
In this context, most activist students have realized how complex is discussing about “free and good quality public education” with the older generation. First, it is a philosophical debate based on the concept of equality. Second, it is a technical debate about redistribution policies and tax reform. Last, but not least, it is a debate about a recent and traumatic past. For these reasons, the critical situation of the higher educational market in Chile cannot be defined as a family matter anymore. Activist students and their families now understand that this is not the result of uninformed personal decisions, but one of the most important effects of economic and political decisions taken by the elites ruling the country in the last 40 years, which meant a violent defeat for some, and a triumph for others.

However, this conclusion has been the result of relatively intense family conflicts and negotiations, and the respective effect on critical consciousness formation vary depending on the original political background of the adults and the level of radicalism of children’s ideas. Hence, the formation of critical consciousness and the respective transformation of the higher educational ideology in each family cannot be understood without considering the family disputes on memory issues regarding the interpretation of the recent past of the country, which is the subject of the following chapter. As historical materialism teaches us, “[a]ll mysteries… find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice” (Marx 1888).
CHAPTER FOUR
TRAUMATIC MEMORY IDEOLOGY AND FAMILY’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND: THE INTERGENERATIONAL STRUGGLES BEHIND THE FORMATION OF THE CHILEAN STUDENT MOVEMENT

Introduction

In the preceding chapter, I began the qualitative analysis of primary information to uncover the role of family in the formation of critical consciousness in the Chilean student movement. Particularly, I made a class-based comparison to understand how class issues are working within the conflicting process of formation of critical consciousness of activist students’ families. In this chapter, I finish this analysis by developing a comparison based on family political background to understand how this political background and its respective memories of the recent past of the country are working within the conflicting process of formation of critical consciousness of these families.

Traditionally, the students movements have been analyzed as a rupture between two generations even when both of them define themselves as leftist (see Ross 2008; Wood 1995). For instance, Habermas analyzed the reasons for the emergence of the student movement in 1968, associating them to a superior psychological understanding of the costs of capitalism, and more permissive attitudes in comparison to the older generations (Wiggerhaus, 1995). According to the evidence of this research, a first
approach of the intergenerational dynamics within each family shows indeed a moderate-radical antagonism between both generations. However, stopping the analysis at this level would be reducing the understanding of the conflictive process of critical consciousness formation in the family realm, particularly when trauma is transversally present in the older generation.

Therefore, the analysis of the conflict – a more accurate word than rupture – between generations cannot be detached from the specific historical circumstances this conflict emerged. Although the struggles over memory is not an explicit claim of the public discourse of the movement, the evidence coming from interviews confirmed that in countries recovering from brutal regimes the “determinate choice” (Marcuse 1964) of the social movements involves conflicting memories over the past and political trauma and, thus, a conflicting process of critical consciousness formation, both at the collective and individual level. Indeed, since 2011 the student movement brought into public discussion underestimated economic inheritance of the Pinochet’s dictatorship, which – among other political and economic revolutionary changes – imposed the neoliberalization of the former public higher educational system. In fact, one of the most iconic chants of the student movement has been “Y va a caer, y va a caer... la educación de Pinochet” [“And it will fall, it will fall… Pinochet’s education system”]. In addition, often we can read posters in the marches with the message Bachelet rima con Pinochet [Bachelet rhymes with Pinochet]. It is evident, then, that memories of the recent past of the country became an important issue for the students’ struggle.

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1It recreates a key anti-Pinochet chant during the dictatorship.

2Concertacionista President between 2006-2010, and then between 2013 to present.
However, we know few about how these memories were constructed and became an important issue for the students’ struggle. The evidence of this research confirms the intimacy of family as a relevant site to understand this process and its political implications. As Hartmann (1981) suggests, although family meets crucial requirements for the reproduction of the capitalist system, people in households still manage to retain power over crucial resources and particular areas of decision, creating the potential for social change (see also Habermas 1989). What I propose is that one of those areas is memory transmission. According to Bellah et al. (2007), the processes of memory transmission requires a ‘community of memory’ that, in order not to forget its past, “is involved in retelling its story, its constitutive narrative” (see also Connell and Dados 2014; Olick and Robbins 1998; Ros 2012). Yet memory transmission within family has never been analyzed as part of the process of formation of critical consciousness of student movements, despite family is the social space where generations confront each other directly (Poster 1978). In this research, therefore, the family is understood as an arena of intergenerational struggle over memory that not only has the power of maintaining but also convulsing the status quo.

In this regard, what do we know so far? In Chapter 3, the discussion opened from the economic aspects that motivated the legitimization of the Chilean educational system, and those that, later on, triggered the consent loss and formation of critical consciousness within these families. However, the partial conclusions of that chapter showed also that the formation of a radical student movement was not possible until the active students’
family motivations to consent to the global neoliberal ideology of higher education were connected with the particular historical conditions that created and reproduced them.

With clear class-based differences, the commodification of higher education in Chile eventually produced unexpected economic and emotional damage to all these families. Stress, anger and impotence among adults and students became the first signals of the neoliberal higher education ideological and material crisis. Yet authorities have reduced the debate to the material aspects of the crisis and have tried to silence the discussion of quality public education. Accordingly, when discussing possible solutions to the crisis, most adults, but especially low class position families, focus their attention on the free education moral dilemma. Thus, the family economic constrains associated to the crisis of the higher educational market eventually weaken their revolutionary potential and became to some extent instrumental to capital.

Therefore, something else had to happen within each family to give strength to the radicalization of students. As we will see the main inspiration of intergenerational debate and, thus, critical consciousness development within family came from the diverging understanding of the historical origin of the educational crisis, an essential issue considering this is a post dictatorial country. In addition, we must remember these education-focused families preserve a crucial place for politics and leadership within

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3) Despite the huge impact of indebtedness in their lives, most low class position parents and grandparents argue that every family should pay based on income level. During the last decades, most adults have conflictively consented that just people in authentic need must be helped by the state. In fact, the Chilean state is defined as subsidiary by the Constitution, and thus the social policies are focalized. This was the concept of state that Chilean people had to relearn since the seventies” (from Chapter Four).

4) The Chilean version of the contentious memory question has proved central to the remaking of Chilean economy, politics and culture (Stern 2006).
their family life. Therefore, since their children entered a post secondary institution and joined the student movement around 2011, an intergenerational debate on memories of the recent past of the country was increasingly introduced within this regular practice no matter family’s political background.

Thus, the family became the main site that inspired and developed an intergenerational reinterpretation of Chilean recent history. This reinterpretation has had a decreasing conflictive character, given the widespread presence of what I call the ideology of trauma, an ideology that could be transformed because it is historical. However, the revolutionary potential of the intergenerational struggle over memory in this realm is not homogeneous. What evidence shows is that family’s political background matters. While important commonalities do exist giving consistence to the students ´struggle, dealing for instance with a Concertacionista grandmother, or instead with a Pinochetista father, prove to be a very different political endeavor.

As a result, the particular question I want to answer in this chapter is: how are a family’s political background and its respective memories of the recent past of the country working within the conflicting process of formation of critical consciousness within activist students’ families? In this research I deal with the process of formation of critical consciousness in the family realm, which I expect to be conflicting because the emancipatory potential of family should be in permanent struggle with its conservative role under capitalism. That said, to answer this question I will develop a comparison of

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5 The evidence shows that in Chile these families have an additional characteristic that make them so fruitful for the formation of critical consciousness: the importance given to politics and leadership. No matter the political background of their significant adults, most students highlight the importance of political debate in their families as a regular practice” (from Chapter 4).
the process of formation of critical consciousness of activist students' families based on
their political background. All activist students recognized their significant adults'
political background as their taken-for-granted political adscription for many years and,
thus, the starting point of their political formation. Based on the results of this research,
the political background of Chilean families has been divided between Concertacionistas
and Pinochetistas. On the one hand, those families with a Concertacionista political
background refer to those activist students' significant adults who supported the pacific
transition project conducted by the political parties grouped under the name of
Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia that ruled the country until 2010, and then
recovered political power in 2014 till the date. On the other hand, those families with a
Pinochetista background refer to those activist students' significant adults who supported
Pinochet's dictatorship. It is important to note that a very small number of activist
students have a mixed political background, that is, the presence of both ideologies in
their nuclear family.

Thus, the traditional categories of political background, i.e., “right wing” and “left
wing” do not capture the political divisions working in Chile anymore. These classic
categories overlook the recent historical roots of that political polarization. And, the main
impacts of the student movement have been, on the one hand, the questioning of the
alleged “leftist” character of the Concertación governments, which have hardly
challenged the neoliberal nature of the economic and political revolution conducted by
Pinochet since the seventies. On the other hand, the student movement has expanded the
debate on Pinochet's legacy beyond the traditional human rights debate, particularly the
economic and political heritage that has negatively affected both dictatorship's opponents and advocates. Therefore, the naturalized identity between “Concertacionistas” and “left wing,” on the one hand, and “Pinochetistas” and “right wing” on the other has been challenged by the formation of the Chilean student movement.

That said it is worth clarifying that the selection of cases was not based on this criterion. The main goal when selecting them was to represent as much as possible the socioeconomic diversity of the active students, which in Chile is highly tied to the level of quality of the higher education institutions (see Chapter 2). Therefore, that 40% of the participants’ families have a Pinochetista or mixed political background is an important finding that contradicts a traditional discourse used by elites to delegitimatize the social movements in Chile, which is to claim that these social movements are managed by the traditional left parties that ruled the country before the coup d’état (Parraguez 2010b). More important, this finding and the comprehension of the processes behind it help to expand our understanding of the impact of the Chilean student movement in the Chilean society. Positivist and, thus, conservative approaches to the struggle conducted by the students still abound in the sociology of social movements in this country, despite the major crisis of legitimacy of the elites who have ruled the country since 1990.

In this chapter, I first examine the common elements shared by all active students regardless political background, particularly, the historical interpretation of the crisis that gave rise to the Chilean student movement in 2011. After that, I will develop the concept of the ideology of traumatic memory. Then, I will separately analyze the struggle over the ideology of traumatic memory both in Concertacionista and Pinochetistas families.
The Active Students’ Memory

Explaining the crisis that gave rise to the Chilean student movement is not a simple task for the students. They know that just describing the pervasive economic effects of the commodification of tertiary education on families is not enough. As most of them clearly state, you must talk about history, because the current crisis is a consequence of facts that happened in the past of this country. How far back do the memories of the students go when explaining the crisis of the higher educational system? They mainly refer to the period that begins with the Unidad Popular (UP), when the socialist candidate Salvador Allende was elected president in 1970. UP and Allende’s government, however, are just indirectly mentioned. In general, when telling the story that explains the current crisis, the students refer to this period as something the dictatorship stole from the older generation. They think of it as a “lost country” ruled with a completely opposite logic to the existing logic. Education was free and with a public sense, completely different than what we are used to nowadays. “…history was the answer to all my questions…” (Eugenio, 25 years old, risk prevention engineer, low quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% higher education loan, LCP).

…in the past, well… in Chile there was public education, where our parents were raised, and where this public education was also free of charge, and where education was obviously considered as a social good and not as a consumer good. (Jaime, 24 years old, Psychopedagogics – on hold, low quality institution, Pinochetista political background, 100% loan, LCP)

Therefore, they mostly associate the origin of the crisis of the Chilean educational system with the changes introduced by Pinochet during dictatorship. However, we can
always observe a discursive continuum that connects the dictatorship period with the transitional phase ruled by the *Concertación* political coalition (1990-2010; 2013-today). They need to make clear that the collapse of public education was during Pinochet’s regime, but the process continued and was consolidated under democracy. The *Concertación* coalition just became an administrator of the model. For them, thus, there is an undeniable ideological identity between both periods. “…and note that the chant has changed and now it goes, ‘and it will fall, and it will fall, Pinochet and Bachelet’s education’…” (Sarah, 25 year old, 4th Social Work, medium quality institution, *Concertacionista* political background, 100% loan, LCP).

In addition, the discussion always goes beyond the transformations introduced to the educational system, to analyze the alteration of most aspects of the Chilean economy, society and culture. The students place special emphasis on the purposive impact on individuals of the policies implemented, inspired by the ideas of Milton Friedman and the Chicago Boys. In particular, they demonstrate a special concern on the process of privatization that destroyed the public character of institutions and the collective spirit of social organizations. In short, the introduction of neoliberal capitalism was a comprehensive revolution that began in dictatorship but continued in democracy, destroying the public character of the social institutions, and the collective interest of social organizations that characterized the country before the *coup d'état*. The students highlight the individualization of Chilean society over any other impact of the neoliberalization of the country.

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6Michel Bachelet, one of the main figures of the center-left Coalition of Parties for Democracy (The *Concertación*), twice elected as president.
In this context, we can understand why the students give so much importance to what they call “the big betrayal” by the Concertación, the center-left political coalition that administrated the political transition. Indeed, the students put the unfulfilled promise of democracy at the heart of their reasoning when explaining the formation of the student movement in Chile. This betrayal has been perceived as a personal offense. Sooner or later, these students have learned by firsthand how important the promise of democracy was for the older generation. Indeed, the process of democratization is seen by them not only as the result of a political negotiation (*democraciapactada*) made by the elites, but the result of the hard work and sacrifice of different social movements and collective actions in which the older generation participated one way or another. As we saw in Chapter One, this former aspect is generally ignored or understated by the scholars of the Chilean transition, who mainly highlight the role of economic, political and intellectual elites. This is true even for those activist students with a Pinochetista political background. Whatever they had originally inherited from their parents and/or grandparents as political adscription, the broken promise of democracy has been very significant for the activist students’ formation of collective memory and, in consequence, for the formation of their critical consciousness.

…the political establishment has simply decided to maintain the economic and social model, betraying society as a whole… because supposedly the transition to democracy was the transition from a dictatorship to a completely democratic country, but they simply devoted themselves to managing a model… Pinochet’s model. (Alfonso, 23 years old, 5th Sociology, medium quality institution, *Concertacionista* political background, 100% loan, LCP)

This was possible because the earliest sources from which they critically learned about the recent past of the country were not exclusively their closest significant adults.
In all cases, the students found complementary sources beyond the family sphere that not only contributed with information, but also transmitted to them emotional and ideological elements to empathize with the position of their parents and/or grandparents at that time, while developing their own critical reasoning of the democratization process. At certain point, this complementary process of self-formation that generally began during adolescence became an important part of the general process of political formation of these students, which was dramatically intensified during the first years of their tertiary education. The main secondary sources of information were school classmates and their nuclear families, teachers and books. This has been facilitated by the intensive use of new technologies of information and communication (NTICs), which have been an essential tool for the formation of the student movement.

... During 2011 I read a lot, I wanted to learn a lot… Umm I read ‘Marx for beginners’, I read umm ‘Poder Popular Constituyente’ [Popular Constituent Power] by Gabriel Salazar, umm… I read ‘The Manifesto of the Communist Party’… my father always, he’s a Christian Democrat (DC), but always paid the communists so much honor and I never understood why... My father is not like the typical corrupted DC, but rather, like the DC baseline, he goes for it, the cannon fodder of the DC… so he would always say ‘the communists are very important um… to this society, they make the effort for everyone, but I consider myself a catholic first’… then I said ‘ok, I’m a Catholic too, but I don’t like how the party is now, so I’m going to see how the communist party is structured. (Luis, 20 years old, 2nd Baccalaureate, medium quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 50% loan, LCP)

However, no matter how important these technological tools are for the Chilean active students, by no means they have replaced the formative power of face-to-face communication. Otherwise, we could not understand the persistent importance of marches, strikes and seizures for the working of the movement despite all the public criticisms these strategies constantly receive in order to delegitimize them.
…I had the complete encyclopedias of Chilean history, but I would not dig in Chile's history to read what happened there because I felt that what my friend's mother was telling me was not going to appear in any book. Then my experience… and also, I've always thought that I can't create my crystal of how I see life from what a gentleman says in a book, from what an author says… because I feel that sets a limit on many things that happen… ah… in a very diverse fashion… (Rita, 20 years old, 2nd Psychology, medium quality university, Pinochetista political background, 40% scholarship, 60% loan, LCP)

**Traumatic Memory Ideology**

Although the general image of the key political problem is basically agreed upon among active students, the (re)politicization of the older generation has been a very complex endeavor because it involves a transversal traumatic memory. However, understanding the scope of this traumatic memory for their parents and grandparents was something progressive, even among those who were raised on the basis of an open dialogue about the recent past of Chile. Therefore, the initial intergenerational dynamics within activist students’ families were merely understood as an ahistorical moderate-radical conflict between both generations. Anyhow, it is interesting to know that this initial conflict was not just present in Pinochetista background’s families, but also in those families whose members were active supporters of Allende’s government, and later radical opponents of Pinochet’s dictatorship. All of them were tightly bound to a moderate understanding of the crisis that gave rise to the student movement, despite having a clear that for their children the “transitional” ruling class has lost its opportunity to conduct the country towards democracy, and therefore, that a radical change is needed.

… I think that students… not only the students… let me refer to the youth… feels totally disappointed… and I think for that too, ah… they fall in violent events… they have realized that the very, so-called, democratic systems… have disappointed them… (Ismael, construction worker, Pedro’s father, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% scholarship, LCP)
Sooner or later, however, the active students themselves were able to elaborate a more accurate explanation: the idea that “history can be repeated” has conquered the minds of the older generation. This is not an abstract idea read in one of the books they studied to enlarge their understanding of the crisis of neoliberal higher education system. They have inferred this after numerous arguments and conversations with their parents and grandparents. In just this way they could really assess how deep the dictatorship and the transitional period have impacted the older generation, not only at the emotional level but also upon their consciousness as the motivating factor for historical change.

Actually, although a fear of repeating history is not effective as a means of domination among students, this does not mean that they are indifferent to it. This fear has been transmitted inter-generationally through family conversations, deeply penetrating activist students´ narratives as well. Particularly, the radical character of students´ struggle makes them feel very close to the situation that once generated the repressive action of the military. For some students, the only difference is that repression during democracy could not result in assassinated or disappeared people. Implicitly, students think there is a moral limit in terms of human right violations despite high levels of violence. Given the radical scope of their demands, however, they do not discard the possibility of a new coup d’état in the near future.

…what does happen if [someone decides] that the education is going to be free of charge?, that Pinochet's pension system is going to be eliminated and that there is going to be a national constituent assembly?… What happened with Allende would obviously happen again, there would be a social class that… might go for the weapons, that might declare a civil war, I don’t know. I really think it would be hard for them? to be such a radical change, because there is a social history… I imagine a 73’, a Coup D'état… because they would be screwing over the politicians and a social class, that are the people who have more acquisition, and
the ones who earn by exploiting the middle and lower class people… (Nancy, 24 years old, Psychologist, medium quality institution, Pinochetista political background, 100% loan, LCP)

This way, memories of the recent past of Chile exposes its paradoxical role in the struggle of the students in Chile, as a realm of critical consciousness formation but also as a sphere in which domination is reproduced. I call this the ideology of traumatic memory, the particular ideology that reinforces at the local level the workings of the general neoliberal ideology of higher education among activist students’ families that controls social dissent. What is interesting is that, again, the presence of this ideology is not exclusive of families with a leftist background. Both Pinochetistas and Concertacionistas families experienced fear during dictatorship because it was present in daily life by other means besides the traditional violations to human rights. In addition, trauma goes beyond the dictatorial period (1973-1989) to reach the democratic transition (1990-nowadays), under the form of political disappointment caused either by Pinochet or by the Concertación to their respective followers. This traumatic memory is ideological since it has been preventing for many years the possibility that active students’ families could challenge (i) the top-down making of memories of the recent past and (ii) the ahistorical understanding of the current conditions of domination in the Chilean context, preventing the development of alternative interpretations.

…I think they've allowed me to see what's happening in the country… [participating in the movement has] allowed them to see the country, and them to me… that there are many things that we took for granted and that we were asleep. I mean, we paid tuition and we didn't complain… to me, democracy in Chile is a huge achievement… to them is huge ballast. Thus, I've also learned to criticize what we have… I think [democracy] had… big flaws… [but] I think that's still a great achievement… and there, there are lots of differences… I feel that the new generation doesn't value what we have because they didn't live what is not having
it… they don't know what is not having freedom, they don't know what is not being able to walk down the street at the time one wants, they don't know what is to be 17 years without voting… (Gonzalo, Architect, Jose’s father, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, loan just one year, HCP)

The evidence show that, after all these years of intergenerational struggle over this ideology, most parents and grandparents have decided to break silence, negotiate their traumatic memories with their children, and when possible reach an agreement on the interpretation of memories. However, the dynamics and scope of this endeavor within the family’s critical consciousness formation process is dissimilar depending on the political background of the activist student’s family. In any case, the development of critical consciousness cannot be considered an absolute outcome but a persisting moral conflict both for activist students and their significant adults. Expecting a total and enduring radicalization would mean do not understand at all how the formation of critical consciousness has worked in the case of the Chilean student movement so far. At most, the intergenerational ideological conflict turned into a mutual memory-based enlightenment that brought contradictory moral values for the older generations, and the adjustment of expectations regarding historical change for the youngest one.

The Struggle Over the Ideology of Traumatic Memory in Concertacionista Families

Sixty percent of the activist students interviewed comes from a family that refused dictatorship and supported the transition to democracy led by the Concertación coalition. When presenting the preliminary results of my dissertation, many comments from the audience highlighted the obviousness of this fact, suggesting a naturalized identity between “leftist” generations. However, having children who totally discredit the veracity of the political project their parents and grandparents fought so much for has been as
healing as destructive to them. Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates that political membership does not say anything about the ideologies that guide the daily life decisions of people. In fact, according to the students, what most *Concertacionistas* transmitted to them was not the history of struggle but the history of fear and disillusion. In general, their parents and grandparents did not talk about the past excepting for remembering how pointless the political struggle was.

…my father was very disappointed in [Ricardo] Lagos⁷… when he had the chance to… [make] a major constitutional change… and what he did was changing its name… the cover, just like that… That was one of the grand disappointment I think the people who voted for the ‘*Concerta*’ [short for *Concertación*] had… They all voted for Lagos at the time and sure… a socialist was coming after so long… they still believed the Socialist Party could do it… [But] no, he didn’t do a thing, he brushed his mustache… I mean Lagos left with, how much?, 65%, 70% of the people’s approval? And the businessmen on their feet celebrating a socialist you know… a businessman applauding a socialist on his feet… (Humberto, 25 years old, 2nd year Education, medium quality institution, *Concertacionista* political background, 100% loan, LCP)

For this reason, the first cause of conflict between both generations when the students joined the student movement in 2011 was the persisting moderation of their parents and grandparents despite a certain agreement on the “big betrayal” of the *Concertación* political coalition. As we will see, all these adults have developed a level of change in their political beliefs and even practices. As Ines (26 years old, 4th veterinary medicine, low quality institution, *Concertacionista* political background, 100% scholarship, LCP) highlights, their closest significant adults now disagree with the neoliberal policies introduced in the last decades, and also with the political corruption lately exposed by the student movement. However, most *Concertacionista* background

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⁷ Lagos was the third president from the center-left Coalition of Parties for Democracy (The *Concertación*).
students agree that the older generation is not still able to be as radical as their children are. Most of them still play along with the game Conciertación vs Alianza por Chile (right coalition), especially during elections.

…When Bachelet gave her speech on free education… the quality of the education… I feel she grabbed on to the student movement, because of the social pressure that the movement had… but my mom says that [Bachelet] is a good person, that she is going to make changes, and all that stuff. Nevertheless I said ‘hey, but Bachelet has been the administrator of Pinochet’s neoliberal model… when education was mostly privatized was during Bachelet’s government… Please tell me, what has she done? … she completely betrayed the student movement’… (Sarah, 25 year old, 4th Social Work, medium quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% loan, LCP)

On the contrary, the Concertacionista background adults state that the political distance between both generations goes beyond the support or rejection of Conciertación’s politicians. They highlight the radical character of their children’s ideology and emotions. What is interesting is that parents and grandparents not only explain the active students’ behavior with the conventional perception of youth as an idealistic and naïve period, but also from the fact that they did not experience the recent past of the country, which taught to the older generation about the impossibility of drastic transformations and the need to accept some situations despite they are not perfect. For Gonzalo (Architect, Jose’s father, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, loan just one year, HCP), the urge for democracy and political stability during the last years of dictatorship was more important than worrying for changing Pinochet’s economic system. From a similar approach, Ismael (construction worker, Pedro’s father, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100%
scholarship, LCP), criticizes the idealization of Unidad Popular’s revolutionary icons by his son: he would be “fanaticized by revolution.”

Within Concertacionista background’s families, the most common topics that trigger this moderate-radical disagreement between generations are the dissimilar opinion regarding the change of the current Constitution$^8$ through an Asamblea Constituyente (Constituent Assembly), and the use violence against the police during marches by the encapuchados (hooded protesters). According to Cecilia (nonprofit foundation project manager, Jose’s mother, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, loan just one year, HCP), changing the Constitution with the participation of the citizens is difficult because recent history has taught us how impracticable it is for people to be taken into account in this matter. In turn, Nora (Teacher, Daniela’s mother, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% loan, HCP) dismisses the strong arguments of his daughter to explain the violence of the encapuchados, using a traditional conception of resistance that always expects clear proposals. For the parents and grandparents interviewed, the use of violence as a mechanism of struggle is unquestionably illegitimate.

However, to understand why the Concertacionista background adults keep conservative despite the “big betrayal” of the transition ruling class, we cannot rely on descriptive explanations, such as the typical moderate-radical antagonism between

$^8$The current constitution promotes three major principles of neoliberalism: the supreme value of private property, severe restrictions on the state in its economic role as producer, and a severe restriction on labor rights and political participation in general (Fischer 2009; Solimano 2012). This constitution was ratified through a very irregular voting process in 1980, and taking into account that a huge majority is necessary to amend it, it is still Chile’s fundamental charter today (Lagos et al. 2012; Solimano 2012; Winn 2004).
generations used to explain the raising of students movements. The issue at stake is the ideology that turned them in a conservative direction, why it was legitimized, and how it was transformed. The students have elaborated sophisticated ideas to clarify this process. Their aim has been to understand what they describe as a “profound ignorance” of the older generation, which contrasted with the increasing amount of information and in-progress formation of critical thought the students were having during the first years of their involvement in the movement. A first approach suggests that something external to the older generation’s minds has been preventing the transformation of their rationality and the emergency of critical though and resistance among them, an issue widely discussed by critical scholars (see Jay 1996; Langman 2007; Marcuse 1964). To be precise, these activist students mention that most of their significant adults’ arguments used to come from the superficial treatment of the educational conflict by mainstream media. As usual, violence in protests has been the main focus of press, occupying most time during news broadcasting. Accordingly, violence in protests became the main concern of Concertacionistas parents and grandparents, using most time during their family arguments and conversations.

… when we watch the TV, the news, ah… there come the marches, and then right away my husband starts calling [Pedro] 'where are you?', 'and [Pedro] doesn't answer me [Aurora], you call him'… and then he starts worrying if Pedro’s all right… (Aurora, seasonal agricultural worker, Pedro’s mother, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% scholarship, LCP)

In fact, for years many critical scholars have identified mass media as an essential political feature of capitalism by fostering conformity, deception, and escapism, making people more receptive to tradition and authority (see Bottomore et al. 1983; Bronner
2011; Habermas 1989; Kellner 1990; Langman 2007). However, the alleged “profound ignorance” cannot be entirely explained by the impact media coverage of the student movement has had in the adult generation. Following Schweickart’s (2011) criticism, it would be over simplistic to say that mass communication has turned Chilean older generations into “mindless robots.” Something else helped to create fertile conditions for the influence of mainstream mass media to reproduce fear. Media needs to point towards a specific moral and emotional sensibility to effectively clean all subversive and transcending elements in the older generation’s minds (see Habermas 1989; Kellner 1990; Schweickart 2012).

…to me, the ideal is that he wouldn't have involved in anything… OK, I mean… that he does express his opinion, that he does have his ideas… but that… like this as a leader… to me was not ideal. I mean, no… I would have liked that he would have a lower profile, like they say… not that involved… because of the fears, because the truth is… the idea that the ones involved in those things could later have, I don't know, reprisals… really remained… (Bernardita, restaurant manager, Javier’s mother, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% scholarship/complementary loan, LCP)

As the evidence shows, the fear that Concertacionistas parents and grandparents feel is historically rooted, deeply installed in their personal memories of the recent past of the country. In consequence, not only the level of violence showed by the news, but also the radical ideas of their children make the image complete, which make them feel living again a history that seemed to be overcome. Thus, they feel very scared that history can be repeated. Although the level of involvement in politics and direct suffering from human rights violations varies among Concertacionistas parents and grandparents, nobody declared that they were indifferent to the horrors of the dictatorship. As some scholars of Chilean transition have suggested in the last decade regarding Chilean’s
dictatorship memory, although the country remains deeply divided regarding the interpretation of the recent past in the public and private sphere, few can deny atrocities of the military regime since most families had a relative, a friend, or an acquaintance touched by one or another type of repression (Grez 2010; Lazzara 2006; Sorensen 2009; Stern 2006).

Iris: … the cost that Sarah is paying is too high… for daring, for liking this… I say to her: 'Sarah, we already lived this'… we lived, in part, when we had part of the dictatorship… we lived really ugly stuff… clandestine stuff were done, because Sarah's father [he's a musician]… went to play in clandestine places… that being midnight, the curfew… and [Eduardo] had not arrived yet… I knew he was concealed in some place. Then for us it was also very bad…

Leslie: … but what has this to do with what's happening to Sarah now?

Iris: Now… [she] has also been thrown down by the water cannon… she was taken prisoner for a while. Then I don't want to live that again… (Iris, Biomagnetism therapist, Sarah’s mother, medium quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% loan, LCP)

Fear, however, did not come just from the memories of the traditional ways of describing the violations to human rights during dictatorship. Fear was present in daily life by other means. To be precise, amongst the adults interviewed, memories of everyday fear during dictatorship highlight for instance the impact of the toque de queda⁹ (curfew) restrictions. As we can read in the Museo de la Memoria web site: “Frequent is the image in those years of a vehicle at high speed with a white scarf leaning out the window, trying to get in the middle of curfew, to a hospital for emergency childbirth.”¹⁰ As Javier’s parents confirm (Adolfo, baker and Bernardita, restaurant manager, high quality parents confirm (Adolfo, baker and Bernardita, restaurant manager, high quality

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⁹Intermittently, and with changes in the schedule, the curfew was an authoritarian measure implemented by Pinochet’s dictatorship between the years 1973 and 1987 to prohibit free movement of people overnight.

¹⁰http://www.museodelamemoria.cl/expos/nacer-crecer-y-morir-en-dictadura/
institution, *Concertacionista* political background, 100% scholarship/complementary loan, LCP) the *toque de queda* was an authoritarian strategy of control that deeply affected the lives of the older generation, no matter their political affiliation.

Adolfo: …because one comes, as my wife says, come from a… a repression that one was afraid of… afraid of certain things, and that they would happen again. Then, you would never want that your children would live the same…

Bernardita: …we lived our young years under dictatorship… let's say, all our young years… in fact, I remember when I went to deliver my daughter, we had to leave like this, under curfew… and my husband had to stay [in the hospital]… until seven in the morning, waiting for the end of curfew to come back home…

Leslie: … and, have you talked to your son about your experiences of repression? The fears you lived?

Adolfo: No, no. No, because I wasn't an active person regarding that… I was never involved in things that take me to extremes… One [tells] what one sees in general… (Adolfo, baker & Bernardita, restaurant manager, Javier’s parents, high quality institution, *Concertacionista* political background, 100% scholarship/complementary loan, LCP)

In this sense, fear of repeating history has even been a conflicting motivation for some parents to keep hiding or disclose to their children the taboo story of their own involvement in the resistance against Pinochet. After a couple of years Pedro (19 years old, 2nd Political Sciences, high quality institution, *Concertacionista* political background, 100% scholarship, LCP) joined the student movement, he was told his father was part of the armed opposition to dictatorship. His father reacted extremely worried after watching in the news some activist students denouncing the use of torture mechanisms after a march, and felt urged to make the statement clear. Marcos (24 year old, 5th year Education, medium quality institution, *Concertacionista* political background, 100% loan, LCP), in turn, is still unaware that his father was a
“revolutionary” during Pinochet’s times. As many other students, he thinks their parents were not involved in active politics, reason why they would not be a definite source of learning about the recent past of the country. Despite Marcos’ serious involvement in the student movement, his father still refuses to confess something about their personal political experience that could encourage even more the political radicalism of his son.

Leslie: How did you react when you learned that your son was involved in the Student Movement?

Efrain: … I laughed, you know why? Because I was also… I was a revolutionary back in the day… and the first thing I thought… I said, 'it's in his blood!'… but that's unknown to my children, and nobody in my family knows it…

Leslie: …why don't you tell them? If you mind if I ask…

Efrain: Could be the fear that… Marcos… takes other path… that, I don't know… that he becomes too revolutionary and you know where… this could end… in this country… revolutionaries are either disappeared, or exiled, or dead… and I don't want that for my son… all people is sure that it won't happen again, but… the oppression… has not disappeared… in this country there's still oppression… it could be that… it doesn't appear on the news… that's being camouflaged… that's being made-up… with other things… but there's still oppression… I'm sure of that, I'm sure… (Efrain, importing company worker, Marcos’s father, medium quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% loan, LCP)

…my parents… were never activists, not even leftists or rightists… they were more like the ones who suffer so much with all problems caused by all of that… but they never participated in an active manner… so the things I've discussed with them, the conversations that we could have… don't generate much information, because they didn't live it in an active manner… (Marcos, 24 year old, 5th year Education, medium quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% loan, LCP)

This proves how necessary it is to put into conversation the voices of both generations when traumatic memories constrain the amount of information people decide to share with the researcher. On the one hand, just this way we can understand how complex has been the process of construction of radical consciousness among students.
Marcos and Pedro not only ended up joining the struggle of the student movement, but also belonging to politically active student organizations, despite the subtle efforts their fathers made to avoid any political radicalization on their children. Many scholars of memory and forgetting state that even silence is constitutive of intergenerational transmission of memory because it could create a space for imagination and curiosity to fill, or force a vicarious relationship with past (Argenti and Schramm 2010; Connerton 2008; Wood 2003). Actually, as said, the activist students’ memory of the recent past of the country was never exclusively built at home. However, scholars of memory and forgetting have never discussed how intergenerational silence on memories within family impacts the construction of dissent. Marcos’ case suggests that when a strong ideology of traumatic memory prevents an intergenerational dialogue on memories of the recent past of the country, the activist students’ explanation of the older generation’s passiveness is kept as an ahistorical conformity and negation. As we will see, this impact is also identifiable in Pinochetistas families who prefer silence over dialogue to solve the intergenerational clash on memories.

By putting into conversation the voices of both generations, therefore, we can assess how limited are the traditional ways of understanding cultural domination and the alleged conservative role of family. The consent of the ideology of traumatic memory amongst Concertacionistas families has not been passive at all. Adults have had rational motivations to present themselves as moderate and to encourage moderation on their children. In this way, we obtain evidence to sustain there is not such a thing as inertia toward forgetting (Benjamin in Lazzara 2006; see also Olick and Robbins 1998), but clear reasons to legitimize the post dictatorial ideology of traumatic memory ruling the
country since 1990. What evidence shows from *Concertacionistas* families’ interviews is that instead of living in a culture of impasse (Stern 2006, 2010; see also Brodzki 2007), a rationale of prudence with significant but harmless moments of convulsion has prevailed. The main concern of these parents and grandparents has been keeping the horror behind, without putting much attention on the real conditions of the Chilean transition to democracy: for them anything is better than dictatorship. This gives also some clues about the origin of one of the main claims of the student movement: the critical importance they give to the discussion about the type of democracy they expect to achieve for the country. Conversely, dominated by the ideology of traumatic memory, their parents and grandparents have left this decision in the hands of the political elites.

…Ines always gives her opinion… and I strongly agree with her opinions. OK, she didn't live what we lived, so she has another perspective to see things… but she really is a very mature person, and has a very objective perspective… and as a young woman, too much momentum… many times I even don't get to understand her, you know… because I'm advanced in years… and one wants like more tranquility… (Luz, retired teacher, Ines’s grandmother, low quality institution, *Concertacionista* political background, 100% scholarship, LCP)

However, the struggle over the ideology of traumatic memory in *Concertacionistas* families has not only helped activist students to understand why it has been so difficult for their parents and grandparents to challenge the authority of the post dictatorship political elites. Despite systematic authorities´ efforts to delegitimize the students´ struggle, the demands of the movement have found a persistent public support, as the popularity of the ruling governments keeps lower than ever.\(^\text{11}\) In this regard, I

\(^{11}\)According to a national poll, in September 2011, the demands of the student Movement were supported by the 89% of citizenry, while the support to President Sebastián Piñera reached only 22%. In October 2012, the support to the demands of the student Movement decreased to 70%, with a rejection of 25%. At the same time, the rejection to the management that the government had had regarding the conflict
argue that public actions of the movement are not enough to promote this transformation. Daily life family interactions within Concertacionistas families have been indispensable to acknowledge this new ideological force, whose purpose goes far beyond the education realm to seek a radically different way to conceive politics and democracy.

For instance, Carolina (24 years old, 5th year Journalism, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% loan, HCP) challenged her parents’ notion of politics when they realized that most active students (including his daughter) do not belong to any political party, as they used to in the seventies. For them, political parties were still important despite that they have lost their ability to represent citizens: because “they provide political principles.” Therefore, it was very difficult for them to understand where student’s principles come from. This way, Carolina’s parents have had to update their beliefs regarding the practice of politics.

However, the Concertacionista older generation’s ideological changes are only recognizable to date from a narrative full of moral inconsistencies. Without a doubt, what adults have learned from the intergenerational struggle over the ideology of traumatic memory has had a deep impact on their beliefs, but important vestiges of moderation are still present in their discourses. Expecting something different would mean a totalitarian interpretation of the critical consciousness formation within these families, that is, the negation those mediations that produce the individual inside a class and within a given society at a given historical moment (see Korsch 1998; Meszaros 1970; Sartre 1968). Not only memories of horror, but subsequent memories of joy when Pinochet’s era came to

reached 76% (El Mostrador 2012). Despite ups and downs, and many other transformations of the students’ struggle, the public support keeps high till date (see http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/26/us-chile-education-march-idUSKBN0P52OZ20150626).
an end are still stronger than disillusion. From this conservative rationale the older generation was able to reconstruct their identity after horror to become an education-focused family, embracing sooner or later the general neoliberal ideology of higher education. “…some were exiled and were concerned and gave their lives to the return to democracy… a democracy that never arrived… so they are like frustrated guys, they are frustrated people” (Matt, 23 years old, 4th year Law, medium quality institution, mixed political background, 60% loan, LCP).

Therefore, after numerous arguments and conversations with their radicalized brilliant children – their most important achievement during this disappointing transition – the struggle over the ideology of traumatic memory was internalized, being still hard to deal with the radical historical critique of the student movement that threatens them with moral emptiness. Thus, pride, anger and disappointment are constantly mixed in their narratives. Ismael (construction worker, Pedro’s father, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% scholarship, LCP), for example, who was imprisoned in the Victor Jara stadium after the coup d’état, stresses how impotent he feels when seeing how the students do not enjoy the freedom conquered by the older generation. At the same time, however, he feels upset because the transitional governments have been the only ones who enjoyed this freedom but just to take advantage of people.

...[I] went shopping, to take a walk with him in Santiago’s downtown, and... it was something very beautiful, I really enjoyed... ah, we went to the Victor Jara

12Just days after Chile’s bloody 1973 military coup, popular songwriter and theater director Victor Jara was dragged down to the basement of [this] indoor stadium that had been converted into a detention and torture center” (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/17/victor-jara-stadium-chile_n_3454617.html).
stadium ... and we broke in tears together... because I... when he was a kid I used
to told him my story when I was behind bars in the Victor Jara stadium... I will
personally never forget that story... that experience... of having fought, of have
been behind bars... for this freedom, you know... for this freedom... and that
sometimes bother me, because these kids are not taking advantage of that freedom
that we, the old generation, gave them... the ones who are indeed taking
advantage of it, the governments that are arriving... I don't speak of right wing
governments... all governments that have arrived from the transition to
democracy, when the so-called democracy arrived to the country... they're the
only ones who have taken advantage... because it's not democracy... no, there's
no democracy here... (Ismael, construction worker, Pedro’s father, high quality
institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% scholarship, LCP)

The Struggle Over the Ideology of Traumatic Memory in Pinochetistas Families

Forty percent of the students’ parents and grandparents interviewed were die-hard
Pinochetistas. Considering there is a general agreement on memories of the recent past in
the radicalized younger generation that completely delegitimize Pinochet’s regime and
his economic and cultural legacy, the analysis of the managing of the intergenerational
conflict on memories within Pinochetistas families offer invaluable clues to understand
how historical change works in practice. Fear of repeating the horrors of the past and
disenchantment regarding the transition period, the main components of the ideology of
traumatic memory, are also present in Pinochetistas and mixed political background
families.

For instance, Maximiliano (25 years old, Lawyer and Historian, high quality
institution, Pinochetista political background, 5 years Parent Deceased Scholarship/2
years 100% loan, HCP) remembers how during the iconic August the 4, 201113 her
mother called him absolutely shocked. That day, “[t]he scenes have been reminiscent of
the pro-democracy protests of the 1980s, when Chileans clashed with the forces of

13Currently commemorated as “student dignity day” by the student movement and supporters.
General Augusto Pinochet,” BBC news said.\textsuperscript{14} In fact, what was happening in the entire
country was a flash back to the dictatorial period for her. Some members of the right-
wing elites have felt threatened as well. As Carolina (24 years old, 5th year Journalism,
high quality institution, \textit{Concertacionista} political background, 100% loan, HCP)
remembers, a close friend of hers – whose father is a \textit{Pinochetista} prestigious scholar and
ex-member of the movement “\textit{Patria y Libertad}”\textsuperscript{15} – freaked out after her father
threatened her to stop participating in the movement. According to him, the movement
would eventually revive the horrid violence of the dictatorship.

[Silvia], the daughter to \textit{Patria y Libertad}’s [José Rojas]…he was eating one day
and said to Silvia in anguish… ‘You have no idea of what you are doing… you all
have no idea what you are doing because you are awakening the government
monster we experienced during the military government… and you don’t know
what that may unleash, so much violence, so you better prepare for what will
come next… (Carolina, 24 years old, 5th year Journalism, high quality institution,
\textit{Concertacionista} political background, 100% loan, HCP)

In fact, the right-wing elites have appeared on Chilean media in several
opportunities warning citizens about the “communist” ideology behind the student
movement’s claims, and the probable consequences of the proposed transformations for
the country.\textsuperscript{16} Paradoxically, the elites that for years have used future-oriented politics to
obtain the consent of the population to govern (Brodzki 2007; Lazzara 2006; Olick 2007;
Olick and Robbins 1998) today are trying to bring back fears of the past to recover the


\textsuperscript{15}‘…an anti-Allende organization that [Manuel Fuentes] describes as ‘nationalistic’ and most
other observers classify as fascist” (Power 2004).

\textsuperscript{16}See for instance: http://noticias.terra.cl/chile/politica/larrain-dispara-contra-reformas-se-nota-la-
mano-comunista,9efb24e52b7f5410VgnVCM4000009bcceb0aRCRD.html; http://www.24horas.cl/nacional/confepa-organiza-marcha-para-exigir-cambios-en-la-reforma-educacional-
1469720; http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2014/07/05/668533/parlamentarios-de-la-alianza-
control they kept unchallenged for 20 years. During those years, “national reconciliation” (coming to an agreement over the past) in a deeply divided and traumatized country, rather than bringing justice for the abuses of dictatorship had been a very successful motivation to preserve economic and political stability (Alexander 2009; Grez Toso 2004; Han 2012; Lagos et al. 2012; Ros 2012; Silva 1996). As a result, the adult generation ended up legitimizing a “restricted democracy” that just made what was allegedly ‘possible’ within the framework of the civil-military relationships inherited from the previous period (Büchi 2009; Hellinger 2012; Mönckeberg 2005; Silva 1996; Taylor 2006). However, after the student movement exposed the “big betrayal” of the Concertación’s peaceful transition, the Chilean ultra-right has adjusted the contents of the ideology of traumatic memory from forgetting to remember the past to keep being a successful mechanism of control of older generations’ dissent, despite the increasing delegitimization triggered by the student movement since 2011.

From the experience of Concertacionistas families we have already learned that intransigent silence present is some families did not secure moderation in the younger generations, but do limit the scope of the critical consciousness formation of the activist students’ families. However, the management of traumatic memories that include some level of taboo memories has been an unavoidable endeavor for both generations in Pinochetistas families. From complete intransigence to mutually agreed memories, all these families have had to deal with morally challenging memories of Pinochet’s dictatorship, a regime all of them once supported. Nevertheless, a complete ideological rupture between generations is probable but never an inexorable outcome of the
radicalization of their children.

**Intergenerational rupture.** Manuel (22 years old, 3rd year Design, high quality institution, *Pinochetista* political background, 70% loan, HCP) did not want to invite his father to participate in the research because “he hates talking about the past.” Furthermore, Manuel and her *Pinochetista* mother have not been able to construct a dialogue between their perspectives on the recent past of the country (and any other issue related to the student movement). When asked, her mother was not able to reproduce Manuel’s political thought because according to her they have never talked about it. Moreover, she discredits the qualifications of student movement activists to face the issues they are claiming to know and talk about. Manuel provides a critical fact without which we could go wrong regarding the interpretation of this case: Manuel’s family has a dogmatic right-wing ideology, and for this reason they decided to ignore his son’s opinions, and keep the discussion short and easy with him since he decided to join the student movement. As a result, Manuel has developed an ahistorical notion of resistance focused in the future, in which the older generation does not have any role in historical change.

…in my family… they don't pay much attention to me… [but] truly, it doesn't bother me much, because I know that the new generations are the ones who will have to make decisions in the future, and is not my parents' generation, nor my uncles', or my grandparents'… I mean, if they [have a responsibility]… they do have it, because… people that vote are adults, you know… and it'll be really good if they take charge… but if they're already so narrow-minded, I know that in the future it won't be them, and it will be today's people… like, in that, I'm more optimistic… (Manuel, 22 years old, 3rd year Design, high quality institution, *Pinochetista* political background, 70% loan, HCP)
In Manuel’s case her mother agreed to be interviewed, despite they knew we would talk about the Chilean recent past. In other cases, however, some students did not even try to ask them. In these cases, my analysis can only be based on the students’ narrative. Without intention to oversimplify the family dynamics behind these family clashes, certain students explained they have an irreconcilable conflict with their progenitors because of their *Pinochetista* ideology. This is the case of Jaime (24 years old, Psychopedagogics – on hold, low quality institution, *Pinochetista* political background, 100% loan, LCP), whose military father never gave up their arguments against what he calls the “student revolution.” Due to this conflict, Jaime does not live with their parents anymore; and although Jaime’s critical consciousness has allowed him to develop a level of intergenerational solidarity with his father’s fanaticism, Jaime’s “ignorance” regarding his father’s particular history just allowed him to explain his submission to Pinochet from a general class-based perspective of domination.

…one time, I asked my father what time he was a member of the military, because I wasn't very clear what time it was… he says it was around 1982, 1983… then all the process of the most algid was past, which was the coup… but he hasn't told me more details of what were his duties, aside from being trained at Escuela Militar [Military Academy]… he has never told me if he went out to the streets or not… in fact, the topic has never been in the table. But, well, there comes another issue… that I also analyze it like this… from much farther back in time… because formerly our parents didn't have the access to information we have currently have… my father is a man from the south… alcoholic father, many times my mother beaten… his life was to raise animals, the land… then, OK, they also can't have… I don't know if calling it intelligence… I better call it ability… to be able to understand things… (Jaime, 24 years old, Psychopedagogics – on hold, low quality institution, *Pinochetista* political background, 100% loan, LCP)

Kenneth (school transport driver, *Pinochetista* political background, Matt’s fathers, medium quality institution, 60% loan, LCP) was not supposed to participate in
the interview that I was arranged with his wife Ann (preschool education technician, *Concertacionista* political background). But he just showed up and joined us to participate actively in the conversation. Although Matt, his son, says nobody in his family has participated in politics, both parents have a clear and very divergent opinion regarding the recent past of the country. Matt’s mother noticeably replicates what she has learned from her son. On the contrary, Kenneth has closed off any possibility to learn from him, because “learning from experience” does not have anything to do with “learning from theory.” However, although Matt’s father insisted in the importance of his experience to validate his support to Pinochet, he clearly reproduces the official version the right-wing have used for years to legitimate the *coup d’état*. Therefore, Matt’s father has built his memories with elements that largely surpass his direct experience, being possible to directly observe how strong has been the influence of official memories of the recent past (see Chapter 1).

Therefore, the struggle over the ideology of traumatic memory in Matt’s mixed political background family has been characterized by a combination of an irreconcilable conflict with the *Pinochetista* father, and an open dialogue with his *Concertacionista* mother. Unfortunately, since Matt rejects his father’s particular version of recent Chilean history and vice versa, the intergenerational process of formation of critical consciousness has had a limited scope. Matt is still just able to explain his father’s submission to Pinochet from a general class-based perspective of domination. Unlike his mother, he says, his father has been a “declassed” and “upstart” person, despite his poor condition. In turn, Ann denotes an important but still mild politicization of her
consciousness, as most *Concertacionistas* adults. Anyhow, Matt has never considered the information about the recent past of the country received from his parents satisfactory, whereupon having to construct his memory of the Chilean recent past mainly outside home with the participation of non-family members of older generations.

Kenneth: …then, I always tell my children: 'it wasn't Pinochet who wanted to say that he would take Allende out and would kill him, it was the economy the country had, which was a disaster’… And I've always explained them, and they say to me: 'no dad, that's because you were brainwashed’… and I say to them: 'no, I did live that'… then my mom said: 'hold it son, you have to go that way, because they're going to sell rice there, or to sell sugar, or oil'… I explain my children that [when Allende was in power] we ate sugar cubes… then we go and they sold us ten sugar cubes… what do we do with that?

Ann: …I think the opposite… I think the others hid stuff to blame Allende for that… [my son] thinks the same… he says that the rightists hid stuff… that it was not only leftist people… because all blame Allende, who had the country all bad… (Ann, preschool education technician, *Concertacionista* political background, & Kenneth, school transport driver, *Pinochetista* political background, Matt’s parents, medium quality institution, 60% loan, LCP)

**Partially agreed memories.** The case on Nancy (24 years old, Psychologist, medium quality institution, *Pinochetista* political background, 100% loan, LCP) is very representative of those *Pinochetistas* families that reached a delegitimation of Pinochet’s legacy based on economic constrains they have had to face during the transition period, particularly after their children decided to pursue a higher education career. Violations of human rights are not a subject the older generation is willing to open to debate. She, like Jaime, has a military *Pinochetista* father. Nonetheless, Nancy still lives with her father and – facilitated by this cohabitation – was able to reach a level of intergenerational struggle over the ideology of traumatic memory with him, through which the conflicting memories of the dictatorship suffered an important, although not definite, rapprochement.
Nancy sustains that after years of arguing with her “Pinochetista” and ex-military father, he radically changed his mind regarding his support to the image of Pinochet as the savior of the country, a mechanism of legitimation used since the beginning of the dictatorship (see Chapter 1). This transformation is considered a personal victory by her. However, the arguments used by Nancy needed to have an important class-based component. Nancy is a member of a college debtors association (*Agrupación de Estudiantes Estafados por el Crédito Corfo*, Association of Students Swindled by CORFO Credit). Her family has been deeply affected by the abuses of the financialization of higher education in Chile. Therefore, as she says, there is a contradiction in those people still supporting Pinochet´s legacy while suffering the material consequences of the neoliberalization of the country.

…If I had been in Vitacura,¹⁷ with a Pinochet supporting father and having totally different material conditions… maybe I would have been a Pinochet supporter… but to think about that in the situation I grew up in, with the classmates I had is a dissonance and a contradiction… So of course I was like… dad, ‘how can you even think about that? How could you be a Pinochet supporter? How could you be right wing? Look at where we live, look at your environment, look at your neighbors, look at the schools we’re in’… [After that my father used to say] ‘Who do you think you are? In fact, my dad has a portrait with Pinochet’s signature… He used to… in fact if you enter my house it’s like a military museum, of things, the medals my dad has had and everything… So, there was a moment when he clicked, and it was quite symbolic, because he left his medals, he left the pictures there… but he took down Pinochet’s portrait… it was a victory… (Nancy, 24 years old, Psychologist, medium quality institution, *Pinochetista* political background, 100% loan, LCP)

Today, Nancy’s father is absolutely disappointed with the situation of the country. The main reason, as said, is material. He is over indebted and without any support from the military institution now that he is retired. He could have said it was only the

¹⁷High class municipality in Santiago, Chile.
Concertación’s fault. However, after many conversations with his daughter, he was finally able to connect the economic crisis of his family with the economic system inherited from dictatorship. To be sure, he is not disappointed of the military culture. The problem was the idolized image of Pinochet and the transformations he made to the country. In sum, he surrendered given the weight of material constrain. Yet the distance is still strong enough to prevent Nancy to invite him to be interviewed. Although he took down Pinochet’s portrait, he never discussed about this decision with her daughter. As she says, he is still a stubborn milico.\(^{18}\)

Despite this distance, and that the main reason for his father to delegitimize Pinochet’s hierarchy was material, Nancy’s family was capable to overcome the intergenerational ideological rupture and challenge the ideology of traumatic memories that deeply control the dissent of Pinochetistas families. Unlike Concertacionistas families, however, a selective silence is needed to reach a partial agreed memory, giving some clues to understand Nancy’s decision to refuse my invitation to interview his father. Although she has learned from her own family’s experience that some level of change is possible in the older generation, she has also been able to grasp how paralyzing the memories of dictatorship can be even for his ex-military father. Nancy, unlike Jaime, has managed to talk with him about his experience during the dictatorship period during which he was on duty. However, she does not mention anything about abuses to human rights. On the contrary, she stresses how his father was also a victim of the horror during the first years of Pinochet’s regime, when his father was not yet a military person. In addition, when telling the story about how two friends of his father were assassinated, she

\(^{18}\)Chilean slang for derogatorily call military people.
stresses twice that those who killed them were *carabineros* and not military people. In sum, unsolved moral issues with his father make Nancy’s narrative inconsistent – being a good question for debate how much moral consistency we can expect from a radicalized student who struggles against the persisting domination of Pinochet’s legacy his father one way or another helped to build.

In Chile, it is well known that a number of ex-military people walk free despite they directly or indirectly participated in human rights abuses. I have no evidence to say this is the case of Nancy. When talking about the experience of his father during dictatorship she does not mention anything about her father’s role as military during that period. However, she is able to go beyond personal responsibilities, and struggle against the domination still exert the right-wing memories of the recent past of the country over her father. Domination that is still effective to prevent we can directly access to the narratives of Nancy’s father.

**Advanced agreed memory.** The cases of Maximiliano and Rita are two emblematic cases that help us to grasp the deep impact of the Chilean student movement in the transformation of the ideology of traumatic memory and, thus, in the (re)politicization of the country. In these *Pinochetistas* families both generations were willing to participate in the research to openly share the long intergenerational process that ended up delegitimizing Pinochet’s legacy from what I call an “advanced agreed memory.”

Maximiliano (25 years old, Lawyer and Historian, high quality institution, 5 years Parent Deceased Scholarship/2 years 100% loan, HCP) was born in a *Pinochetista* upper-
class family in which many members belong to the right-wing political elites of the country. Therefore, the long process of negotiation of memory with his mother involved in turn a less intense but still complex intergenerational transmission of memory with his extended family. This was unavoidable since Maximiliano has been a publicly recognized leader of the student movement. Thus, his ideological “deviation” could not be hidden to the rest of the family. Excepting for his mother, silence was the first reaction among them. Currently there would be a situation of mutual tolerance, although details of how this transformation was achieved and which were the consequences for the adults involved were not obtained.

…I come from a family… politically from the right, completely… to me it has been a complicated issue, definitely, because my parents are obviously aged… to understand that all of a sudden Maximiliano had begun to be on television calling for… let's say, to go out to the streets, to marches… then, it was an issue to assume the political difference of him, so different… but today is not that much… today people talk a lot more [about the topic], and well… positions are just accepted… (Gloria, Social worker, Maximiliano’s mother, high quality institution, Pinochetista political background, 5 years scholarship/2 years 100% loan, HCP)

This situation, however, suggests that the process of transformation of consciousness in Pinochetistas families not only entails personal but also relational moral contradictions. Despite Maximiliano’s mother dramatically changed her conception of Pinochet, she still participates in a right-wing political party being unable to break the family political tradition. To be sure, Maximiliano and his mother agree she has been a sort of revolutionary within her family. Unlike most relatives did, she decided to follow a non-traditional career, social work, which gave her a pluralistic formation instead a
powerful position. Nevertheless, as Maximiliano says, she never could overcome “the condemnation of being part of a right-wing family.”

Maximiliano could be said to have grown up in an enclosed “community of memory” (Bellah et al. 2007) in which supporting Pinochet’s government and talking about politics from a rightist perspective was natural. It was not until high school that Maximiliano broke with his inherited memory of dictatorship. What is interesting to note is that both mother and son identify the same turning point. In those years, Maximiliano’s mother met her actual husband. He was an ex-militant of the socialist party who brought to the family new and disturbing information mainly about Pinochet’s violations to human rights. In those days, Maximiliano was already feeling some suspicion of his relatives’ narrow-minded defense of the dictatorship, which triggered a serious process of self-formation and social exploration beyond the limits of his constricted lifeworld. His mother also identifies his son as another important agent of divergent memories, which finally made her surrender to the facts and challenge the naturalization of Pinochetismo in his family.

My family is very rightist, like members of Renovación Nacional [center-right political party]… my grandfather was in the Conservative Party [old Chilean party, currently non-existent]… then we were very used to talk a lot about politics at home, with a rightist tint… and I always had higher intellectual aspirations… and I think the discussion was not very intellectual because they were militants. I also think that, intellectually, defending the dictatorship is not something simple, then… something begun to make me uncomfortable from my high school years… (Maximiliano, 25 years old, Lawyer and Historian, high quality institution, Pinochetista political background, 5 years Parent Deceased Scholarship/2 years 100% loan, HCP)

After years of vigorous activism, Maximiliano became an important leader of the student movement, and co-founded a recognized leftist political movement within one of
the most conservatory universities of the country. His mother, who despite her privileged origin has needed to get indebted to finance the education of their children, understands the importance and strongly supports the struggle of his son in private, while voting every election for right-wing candidates who reject the claims of the student movement. Thus, inconsistencies not only are present in narratives but also in political actions.

Rita (20 years old, 2nd Psychology, medium quality university, 40% scholarship, 60% loan, LCP) belongs to the Pinochetista family in which the formation of critical consciousness of the most significant adult reached farther. In 2011, she became not only a very committed student movement’s activist, but also an encauchada (hooded protester). Like Maximiliano, she grew up in an enclosed rightist family in which supporting Pinochet’s government was natural. Besides professing the very conservative evangelical religion, her mother Regina (laboratory technician, medium quality institution, 40% scholarship, 60% loan, LCP) is the daughter of a military who was financially favored by the dictatorship. Therefore, similar to Maximiliano, Rita had to find outside home more accurate firsthand information about the legacy of Pinochet.

From conversations with classmates and their parents, Rita began to realize how wrong her mother and her family were regarding the role of Pinochet in Chilean history.

…in school, talking to some classmates… I had a friend that was really a communist and I did not understand what communism was and he was like ‘the Che’ said this, and the Che said that’, ‘Who was the Che?’, I said, so then I would search the internet for Who was the Che? you know? It’s like those kind of things gave me inputs for me to understand… afterwards once I was older I ran into people who… from a different reality… who have missing relatives, exiled, umm asking ‘¿hey, where did your uncle live?’ for example, “he didn’t live here or here and had to leave and I don’t know what else,” a friend’s mother, ‘no, I

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19 Che Guevara, a major figure of the Cuban Revolution (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Che_Guevara).
had to go live don’t know where, I had a terrible time, because this and this had happened at my house…’ and like typical conversations, I started to realize that there was a different world… (Rita, 20 years old, 2nd Psychology, medium quality university, Pinochetista political background, 40% scholarship, 60% loan, LCP)

Regina’s first reaction to Rita’s inquiries was a categorical negation, not because she was completely unaware of the violations of human rights but because she wanted to protect her daughter from horror. In silence, Regina was already collecting information by herself since Pinochet was detained in London in 1998. The arguments Regina used to defend her position were the official memories of the Chilean ultra-right. However, as Regina says, the confrontation became critical after the student movement exploded in 2011. Silence became a strong conflict. Unlike Maximiliano, Rita and her mother did not have the mediation of another significant adult for making mutual understanding smoother.

I thought that all that [Pinochet] did was wonderful… because that's what they made me believe. I followed the story of my dad, he was retired from the Armed Forces and… when [Pinochet] came in, things got fixed at my home… Pinochet to me was the savior… because I really did stand in lines… I [had to] wake up by three in the morning, being so little… I had to be running, because we were eight people at home and one kilo of bread wasn't enough for all… until they got Pinochet imprisoned in London… then I said: 'no, this is more serious than what I was thinking’… and I started to hear, because I didn't hear… [then Rita] started to make questions… I think in seventh [grade]: 'but mom, there's a lot of people disappeared'… I changed the subject because I didn’t want her, so little, to get involved in that type of things… [but] the hard thing was now with the student movements… in which Rita begun to lead and got really involved with that issue… I could not keep making a fool of myself… many times I saw myself like faced to the truth, but me without really knowing the truth… [Rita tried] to talk and I impede it because: 'you didn't live that, you were not hungry, you didn't have to wake up by three in the morning to go and stand in a line’… well, that was before… now things have changed… but those were our conflicts at the beginning… (Regina, laboratory technician, Rita’s mother, medium quality institution, Pinochetista political background, 40% scholarship, 60% loan, LCP)
Nonetheless, at certain point they were able to switch from conflict to negotiation of memories. As a result, Rita understood that disappeared or assassinated people was not the unique impact of dictatorship on Chilean people, and decided to accept her mother’s explanation for her alienation from reality. Despite the well-known impact of repression in daily lives of Chilean people, Regina sustains that her family could experience dictatorship relatively disconnected from what was happening in the country in terms of human rights’ violations. As Maximiliano’s mother, Regina’s family was “living in a bubble,” and similar to Nancy’s behavior, Rita preferred to believe that her military grandfather did not participate in repressive actions. They needed to reach a mutually agreed memory that allowed them to move on. The conflict of being a radical activist and having relatives who supported—and perhaps directly participated—in the Pinochet’s bloody dictatorship need to be integrated in the activist students’ memory in such a way that their strong ties can be protected. By this token, the explanation of “living in a bubble” works for this case as well.

…it's because not all people has experienced to have a tortured family… for example, in my family it wasn't like that… but in a way, even those who are completely alienated have a reason for being that alienated… a reason to explain why they don't know what happens… for example, in my family there wasn't tortured people, assassinated people… the father of my mom was from the Air Force… he wasn't from the ones who send people out to the streets to do crap, but… my mother, for example, never suffered anything… she didn't have to be out on the streets, my mom was not out on the streets, my mother was evanglic… then my mom was like a saint… and my uncles, the worst they suffered was that they were pointed with some gun and sent home, but nothing terrible, nothing bad… then to my mom that was not an issue, and the family was indeed rightist… then my mother didn't have that consciousness of what had happened… that there really were tortures… that terrible things really happened… because my mother lived in a bubble (Rita, 20 years old, 2nd Psychology, medium quality university, Pinochetista political background, 40% scholarship, 60% loan, LCP)
In fact, once mother and daughter reached this agreed memory, the process of formation of consciousness for Rita’s mother could go beyond the point of delegitimation of Pinochet. Although Rita does not mention this fact, her mother reveals Rita’s decision to become an *encapuchada*, and use violence against the police during the student movement’s marches. With this information, we can really assess why making her mother understand people’s reasons to use violence as a mechanism of protest was the highest achievement for Rita. Her mother, rather, recognizes the strong contradictions that this fact brings into her convictions. Again, we can see how Regina has interiorized the contradictory meaning of traumatic memories into her narrative, with the subsequent moral contradictions, which can be easily identified in her narratives. As Rita suggests, it is hard to believe that an ex religious woman who used to hang a Pinochet portrait in the walls of her home, can become a woman able to discuss and understand the reasons for violence against the authority. In fact, Rita’s mother process has not been as smoother as it sounds, and for example she frequently stays awake at night thinking how things became so different than she expected for her daughter. The formation of critical consciousness, thus, is a permanent challenge that some adult people are just willing to take because otherwise the relationship with their children would be jeopardized.

…I don't know if I should say it, but [Rita] participates in all this group of kids that go out to the streets to protest and all of that… and I disagree with that, I don't like it… I said to her: 'look, behind that policeman to which you guys throw rocks, there's a family… then you can't harm people'… that's what I don't like… I mean, I agree that things aren't good, but that's not the way… although I understand, and the contradiction I have is important… although I understand the kids are so angry with the world for the situations they're living: because they have to pay a lot for college, because things aren't as they want… I have a high respect for authorities, but when I saw a policeman that was mistreating the kids… when I saw videos that aren't on TV and are posted on the internet… [then
I said] 'hey Rita, I saw a policeman doing that… he was beating a kid', and I show it to her… and then is when I got really enraged… if they don't respect, how do they ask for respect?… (Regina, laboratory technician, Rita’s mother, medium quality institution, Pinochetista political background, 40% scholarship, 60% loan)

To sum up, when the intergenerational struggle over the ideology of traumatic memory involves the participation of Pinochetista adults, expectations about politization of consciousness must be adjusted. Just surpassing the level of intransigent conflict to create the conditions for negotiation of memories is considered a triumph for the students. Right-wing parents and grandparents most of the time do not challenge their rightist historical identity, but they do are able reach a level of agreed memory and break with the idolized image of Pinochet. Therefore, I propose that for the case of Pinochetistas parents and grandparents the formation of critical consciousness can reach different levels from an irrational obstinate legitimation to a complete delegitimation of Pinochet. When the delegitimation is reached from an advanced agreed memory between both generations regarding the reasons that justified the adult’s support to Pinochet in the past, the process for formation of consciousness can move on. Nonetheless, the contradictory memories do not completely disappear, and we can still find inconsistencies in the narratives of both generations.

Partial Conclusions

The intergenerational struggle over the ideology of traumatic memory within activist students’ families no matter the scope of the formation of critical consciousness ended up in the politicization of traumatic memories. The learning from this process at all levels, but especially from the arguments and conversations with their families, has transformed them in intellectually unpretentious, socially wise and ethically responsible
activists. As Lautaro (20 years old, 2nd year Philosophy and Maths, high quality institution, Pinochetista political background, 60% scholarship, LCP) states, they are not afraid of challenging official interpretations of history, especially those popular among leftist people. The same applies when analyzing the student movement itself. The experiences of their families have showed them that any knowledge the students have acquired during these years from different sources must be contrasted with the experience of common people, in this case, their parents and grandparents. To be clear, any reading or forum that addresses the recent history of the country must be contrasted with the experience of people who experienced this period. Parents and grandparents, therefore, become the human correlate of the ongoing self-commanded process of studying Chilean recent history performed by students. Top-down and bottom-up versions of history are valid while being put into conversation. More important is that this process must benefit society and not personal egos and rigid ideologies. This way, students are already recovering and practicing the public sense of education.

[The conversations with my family] have made me more of a realist in terms of my views… that is, many peers can make interpretations about the Unidad Popular [Popular Union], super idealistic… that ‘it was not the best’… [but] no, people had a terrible time, there were mistakes, there were deaths etcetera, etcetera… and that attitude that I have learned from my family, or that I have acquired through them… as a result of what I hear from my family, also leads to the analysis that I do on the student movement today too, because it means that you cannot analyze with such fixed categories. There is a correlation, so to say, very, open quotation marks, ‘human’, where not everyone is interested all the time… [But it is] fundamental if one wants to make a detailed analysis and not as scrawny, if your analysis wants to be responsible… which ends up being a richer and more precise historical analysis. (Lautaro, 20 years old, 2nd year Philosophy and Maths, high quality institution, Pinochetista political background, 60% scholarship)
I felt that what I was seeing, for example in the forums, that did not contradict what my parents said or anything like it. And it was very believable that the things that they explained in the NAU [New College Action, a student’s political movement] forums, for example, I would go verifying with the things my parents would tell me. Therefore it gave me a certain security, I found it to be believable. (Jose, 23 years old, 5th year Architecture, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, loan just one year, HCP)

In addition, the particular stories and current circumstances of the older generation connected to the common historical roots of the Chilean neoliberal capitalism gave them a source of collective identity that defines them as generation beyond any class difference that the educational system indeed reproduces. They are the children of the Chilean neoliberalization, the process that gives a sense of continuity between the dictatorship and the political transition, and allows them to integrate history and contingency when analyzing the life conditions and conundrums of their families.

…what happens now is that the children of those who in some way confronted those unwanted changes… well, I don’t even know if they wanted or didn’t want them… they simply saw these changes over them, without being able to decide, because there were decisions that were taken during the dictatorship… and I think we still are in a way. What happens nowadays is that today’s generation is experiencing the effects of these changes and do not accept it… what is happening nowadays is that those things that were taken naturally before, are not natural anymore… what we have here is a generation that is opening their eyes, that is seeing the consequences of a regime that was imposed by force and made changes that no one decided, no one legitimized. (Rosa, 23 years old, 2nd History, high quality institution, Concertacionista political background, 100% scholarship/complementary loan, LCP)

In sum, they have learned how important the support of their parents and grandparents for radical historical change in a post-dictatorial country, which became pretty difficult since the contents of the ideology of traumatic memories are being transformed by the conservatory political elites. This has reactivated the fear to repeat history both in Pinochetistas and Concertacionistas parents and grandparents. Therefore,
the younger generations need to go deeper in their understanding of these fears, to be able
to help them to get over it. Therefore, family memories of the recent past of the country
have, at the same time, the potential of being the main obstacle but also the main
opportunity to get these different generations work together. As students clearly show,
mutual understanding between both generations has prevailed, explaining the massive
impact of the ideas of the student movement in the Chilean society.
CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

While I write these conclusions, the newspapers announce a new march of the student movement, this time to demonstrate unity against the unsustainable mechanisms for financing free higher education to the Chileans proposed by the government\(^1\). As two student leaders maintain in a column, even though the government seems to conceive education as a social right at least within public universities, they are still doing nothing regarding the commodification of education in private institutions. Thus, they argue, the economic situation of half of the higher education students and their families remains intact.

The results of this study, however, demonstrate that the situation of active students’ family lives is far from intact, despite the predictable resistance of the Chilean government to introduce structural changes to the higher educational system. I argue that the Chilean student movement has been “a family matter” (sic), but not only for its economic role, but mainly because family has been the main site of the intimate and conflicting construction of critical consciousness among the higher education activist students participating in this research.

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I conclude this dissertation by proposing some ideas for understanding the contradictory role of family under neoliberalism from the case of the Chilean student movement, that is, as a place that reproduces economic and cultural domination of the higher educational market, but also as a place of formation of political resistance. To support this general conclusion, I will present first the empirical findings that answer the specific research questions of each chapter. Then, I will identify some theoretical implications. After that I will give some recommendations for political action. Next, I will delineate the limitations of this study, and how my future research interest could help to advance them. Finally, I will close by defining the general contribution of this dissertation to social movement scholarship.

**Empirical Findings**

In Chapter One, I sought to analyze how extant literature has addressed the general historical process that laid the foundations for the economic domination and moral legitimation of the Chilean higher educational market. I maintain that there are many ways in which the Chilean neoliberalization process can be addressed. However, what I proposed was to analyze the national mediations of production, legitimation and resistance involved in the neoliberal turn of the paradigmatic case of Chile, with a focus on the role of traumatic memories. To do so, I relied on the perspective of the Global South intellectuals specializing in the Chilean neoliberal turn, considered as an authentic capitalist revolution and not just a process of “structural adjustment,” emerging out of unique historical circumstances. For this reason, the process of neoliberalization of Chile has been the focus of my intense study.
However, few have connected the reconstructions of material life and political incorporation in this revolution, with the problem of traumatic memories despite that Chile is a post-dictatorial country. I argued that the emergence and growth of the internationally recognized Chilean student movement since 2011 came to reinforce and update the importance of the role of traumatic memories in this historical national process. After many years of forced depoliticization, the Chilean students and allies have returned massively to the streets to demand a profound transformation of the Chilean educational system, a system which is one of the main reforms of Pinochet’s government.

Based on the results of an exhaustive review of the specialized literature, I argued that the mechanisms of domination, legitimation and resistance of Chilean neoliberalism have changed several times in response to important historical events. So did the role of traumatic memories within the process. For that reason, the chapter was organized according to four moments of the Chilean neoliberal restructuring identified by the literature: the Gradualist, the Radical, the Pragmatic, and the Transition. In the next table I summarize the findings for each phase (see Table 2).

In each of these stages, the role of traumatic memories in shaping the form and direction of neoliberalism cannot be disentangled from other factors in understanding the Chilean neoliberal turn. The incorporation of the struggles over traumatic memories, specifically, the processes whereby the majority of Chilean people have internalized the dominant ideologies and cultural values, into analyses of the neoliberal turn in Chile help to go deeper into the understanding of the multidimensional nature of domination within the current stage of capitalism (Boggs 1984; Gramsci 1995; Mouffe 1979).
Table 2. Summary of Mechanisms of Domination, Legitimation and Resistance during the Chilean Neoliberalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE</th>
<th>MECHANISMS OF DIRECT DOMINATION</th>
<th>MECHANISMS TO REACH HEGEMONY / LEGITIMATION</th>
<th>MECHANISMS OF RESISTANCE</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>THE GRADUALIST</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Democratic transition to socialism</strong></td>
<td>Economic and political destabilization to defend private property (by the representatives of conglomerates, with the support of conservative political parties and the US government)</td>
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<td>(1920S-1972)</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Property reforms (nationalization of copper industry and extension of agrarian reform)</td>
<td>Defense of nationalism and motherhood (by Conservative Women Against Allende)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Improved material <em>conditions</em> of the</td>
<td>A new <em>project of national unity</em> based on economically neoliberal imported ideas (by The Chicago Boys), mixed with local corporatist ideas grounded in ultraconservative Catholicism (by the gremialista movement or “guildism”).</td>
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<td>workers and peasants</td>
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<td>- Workers and peasants achieve</td>
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<td>political power</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>This row focuses on 1970-1973 Allende’s period.</em></td>
<td><strong>No discussion about direct domination during this phase was found in the reviewed literature.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Depoliticizing by handling traumatic memories</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Dictatorship as “as a salvation”</td>
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<td>- Focus on economic progress</td>
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<td><em>Depoliticizing by neoliberalizing politics</em></td>
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<td>- Authoritarian enclaves (1980 Constitution)</td>
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<td>- Social policies incentivize individual</td>
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<td>effort (based on the “Seven Modernizations” of the state), and among other several changes education became a private economic investment.</td>
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<td><strong>THE RADICAL</strong></td>
<td><em>Economic shock</em> (by autonomous teams of free market-oriented technocrats):</td>
<td><em>Depoliticizing by handling traumatic memories</em></td>
<td>Underground politics of memory</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1973-1981)</td>
<td>- Sharp concentration of ownership</td>
<td>- Dictatorship as “cruel rupture”</td>
<td>- Dictatorship as “cruel rupture”</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Growing use of subcontracting</td>
<td>- Focus on economic progress</td>
<td>- Focus on human rights</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Many workers fired and forced into informal employment or emergency work programs</td>
<td><em>Depoliticizing by neoliberalizing politics</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Deterioration of income and wealth distribution</td>
<td>- Authoritarian enclaves (1980 Constitution)</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>Repressive shock</em></td>
<td>- Social policies incentivize individual</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Bloody breaking of “class compromise” (Prohibition and repression of labor unions and worker</td>
<td>effort (based on the “Seven Modernizations” of the state), and among other several changes education became a private economic investment.</td>
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*This row focuses on 1970-1973 Allende’s period.* **No discussion about direct domination during this phase was found in the reviewed literature.*
192

- *Gremialistas* scholars eradicated politics from the academic environment
- Reducing politics to a technocratic and administrative task

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE</th>
<th>MECHANISMS OF DIRECT DOMINATION</th>
<th>MECHANISMS TO REACH HEGEMONY</th>
<th>MECHANISMS OF RESISTANCE</th>
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<tr>
<td>THE PRAGMATIC (1982-1989)</td>
<td><em>The intensification of shock</em>&lt;br&gt;- Increasing wage inequality&lt;br&gt;- Sharpening of brutal persecution of dissidents&lt;br&gt;- Authoritarian enclaves</td>
<td><em>Pragmatic version of the neoliberal model</em>&lt;br&gt;- Strong state to intervene financial system’ crisis&lt;br&gt;- Restoring IMF’ and WB’s confidence by strengthening their ability to ensure orthodoxy (tariff reductions and more privatizations)&lt;br&gt;<em>Increasing consumption levels and extended private property.</em></td>
<td><em>The protest movement</em>&lt;br&gt;- Public and massive opposition was triggered by cautious but still economically and politically influential copper workers. They call for the first general protest (against 1979 labor code).&lt;br&gt;- Protest expands revealing the intimate resistance of poor settlements’ inhabitants (<em>pobladores</em>) whose communities survived to aggressive depoliticization.&lt;br&gt;- “Memory” became a spread cultural code of resistance, and the politics of memory reached sections of the middle and upper classes.&lt;br&gt;- Struggle for hegemony was opened again in a context of escalating political crisis.&lt;br&gt;- Articulation of an armed opposition&lt;br&gt;- Interclass divisions amongst political elites upon memories of Allende and mechanisms of resistance to recover democracy.&lt;br&gt;- Reagan administration abandoned its support for Pinochet and promoted a negotiated return to democracy.</td>
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<td>Democracy as a mechanism to reestablish the conditions for capital accumulation and hegemony</td>
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<td>- Articulation of productive sector to make pragmatic neoliberal economic model “untouchable” in the future administration</td>
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<td>- The vital and political need to return to the country generated a pragmatic disremember in the new left elites, which promoted a new consensus</td>
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<td>- A harmless transitional political elite emerged more concerned with political democratization than with economic change</td>
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<td>- Popular social movements are excluded from the negotiation process with conservatives, capitalists, and the military.</td>
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<td>- The Concertaciónpor el No recovered popular support from a strong promise of democracy, while giving enough time to the military regime to prepare the transition and shape future institutional structure to perpetuate the neoliberal transformations.</td>
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<td>PHASE</td>
<td>MECHANISMS OF DIRECT DOMINATION</td>
<td>MECHANISMS TO REACH HEGEMONY</td>
<td>MECHANISMS OF RESISTANCE</td>
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| THE TRANSITION (1990-2010) | Extreme labor market flexibility  
- Weakening unions  
- Lowering wages  
- Intensifying demands for higher productivity  
- Loss of job security  

Chile: one of the most unequal countries in the world  
- Highly unequal distribution of income  
- Institutionally embedded and profoundly uneven power relationships | The final defeat of an important part of the left  
- The center-left ideological fusion turned off a historical conflict that for years was the engine for change in the country  
- Integration of neoliberal ideology by the “izquierdarenovada” (renewed left)  

The “Chilean miracle”  
- Greatest prosperity period of Chilean economy  
- The international image of the Latin American jaguar (panther) that shaped for some years the Chilean collective identity  
- The “Third Way” neoliberal option for Latin America: economic expansion and reduction of poverty and unemployment (without increasing inflation). Neoliberalism and social justice would be compatible.  

The ahistorical explanations to an alleged absence of resistance in the nineties  
- The “lost generation”: Chile’s culture of solidarity was replaced with one of individualism and consumerism as a result of Pinochet’s brutal neoliberal shock  
- The new poverty: availability of credit altered the nature of poverty | Politics of memory in democracy times  
- Instead oblivion, there was impasse, a schizophrenic culture that oscillated between prudence and convulsion.  
- Simplistic divisions between political right (as pro-Pinochet) and political left (as anti-Pinochet) no longer work  
- Pinochet’s arrest and dead (in conjunction with Asian financial crisis, 1997-1998) marked the beginning of Conciertación’s delegitimation |
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<th>itself, integrating poor people to the system through debt.</th>
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<td><em>The handling of trauma by the transition political elites to justify economic conservatism</em></td>
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<td>- Future-oriented politics: The arguments of “restricted democracy” and “truth and reconciliation” on behalf of political stability.</td>
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<td>- Memorialize in ways that leave some kinds of memory in material form (such as statues and economic reparations).</td>
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This chapter also sought to assess the general Gramscian distinction between “direct” domination and hegemony from the particular process of neoliberalization of Chile and its particular historical conditions. However, according to the results, Gramscian categories proved to be not entirely appropriate for a developing post dictatorial country. The limit between “irrational” physical coercion (or the threat of it) on the one hand, and “rational” understanding and “emotional and moral consent” on the other became diffuse when (i) the initial phases of the Chilean neoliberalization were imposed from a brutal economic and repressive shock, and (ii) later during transition the inherited system was consolidated on top of a series of authoritarian enclaves that have never been challenged by the transitional political elites. Traumatic memories of the recent past of the country have been permanent mechanisms of domination and legitimation, even during the alleged pacific transition based on “national reconciliation.”

Alongside structural transformations, the Chilean neoliberalization process has left a series of traumatic memories in the Chilean population coming from changing mechanisms of domination that oscillates between the use of straight psychological and physical violence, and the use of sophisticated mechanisms of legitimation. The former, in turn, oscillate between an increasing economic and cultural integration of the lower class families based on debt and education, to the articulation of refined political and academic ideas to justify the economic shock. I propose that all these traumatic memories together constitute what I call “the ideology of traumatic memories,” a strongly efficient ideology that has controlled radical dissent in Chilean population during the last forty years (see Chapter 4).
Nevertheless, few intellectuals of the Chilean neoliberalization have addressed from below the individual and collective processes whereby the majority of Chilean people have “consented” (if that is completely possible in a post-dictatorial country) and resist the changing mechanisms of legitimation of the neoliberal turn. The specialized intellectual production about the global neoliberal turn of capitalism in the paradigmatic case of Chile is still in debt to understand the travails of traumatic memories as a contested mechanism of domination, legitimation and emancipation within communities, so within the family.

I systematized the persistent efforts by dominant classes to disremember and memorialize in ways that leave some kinds of memory in material form, while denying participation in the official remembrance processes. In this way, the Chilean neoliberal elites have disallowed a real, organic collective memory from forming at the public level. However, as the student movement has demonstrated, traumatic memories (which are not negative but highly conflicting memories of the recent past) are not only official and individual. Communities still remember, and so do families, even if their conversations meanings are still dormant.

Relying again on the perspective of the Global South intellectuals and journalists, in Chapter 2, I sought to show how the particular historical process of neoliberalization of higher education in Chile and its crisis are intimately connected to the emergence of the Chilean student movement.

In 1980, Pinochet’s government (1973-1990) introduced comprehensive reform of the higher education system. In doing so, the public sense of education was destroyed by
the military regime, which defined education as a private economic investment. Among other changes, private – but nonprofit – universities and other higher education institutions could be legally created, and existing universities were changed so that they operated with the same principles than the rest of the new private universities: autonomy, depoliticization, and the pursuit of profit. Because most students come from upper classes, the military government started to provide long-term loans and scholarships for the most talented and poorest students to allow an “equal” access to higher education. Yet the educational expenses of Chilean families who were paying for tertiary education became the highest in the world.

Two years after the dictatorship ended, the Concertación determined that the inherited educational system was healthy, and that it had to be consolidated rather than reformed. As a result, in 2011 there were one million higher education students in the country. Fifteen percent belong to the poorest income quintile, a number that will likely grow in the near future, making clear the effects of the diversification of financial sources for post secondary education.

Higher education, thus, became a great business protected by the 1980 Constitution. While prohibiting lucro (profit), one of the most important authoritarian legacies, the Constitution also determines the “autonomy” of universities, justifying the lack of control by the state over these institutions. Some irregular strategies used to create profit included: (i) the creation of parallel companies that rent building space to themselves, (ii) a focus on teaching at the expense of research, and (iii) huge spending in advertising the sale of the “golden dream” of higher education with the poorest families
as the main target, highlighting the availability of credit with public endorsement. In
addition, the banks became the new main characters in educational systems. At a
massively level, students are sought as customers and credit consumers, particularly of
those private credits created during the transition period of the Chilean neoliberalization.

All these strategies rest on what I call the Chilean neoliberal higher education
(NHE) ideology, which share the basic features of the general ideology of higher
education that came with the neoliberalization of tertiary education at the global level,
particularly the promise of upward mobility. However, the traumatic nature of the
Chilean neoliberal turn (see Chapter 1) gives a distinct role to this ideology within the
Concertación’s quest to legitimatize its economic conservatism. By creating
postsecondary education credits with public endorsement the political elites fulfill the
social pressure to open educational opportunities for the poorest families, while creating a
new mechanism to create capital for the financial system. The requirement of a strong
state that came out of the pragmatic version of the neoliberal model outlined during the
dictatorship is again implemented.

The strength of the family-based NHE ideology, however, was also possible given
the particular inherited conditions from which the contemporary Chilean educational
market was built: (i) the vertical concentration of power, which rose in Chile with
extreme speed because of the benefits received during the dictatorship by the elites.
Vertical integration creates power because it connects finance with the production of
export goods and basic services, including education. This ensures power to influence
political decisions in educational issues, especially for the right-wing designers of the
model who are still the protagonists in the economy, politics, and universities. However, the rejection of structural reforms also comes from Concertación’s politicians who also have economic interests in the educational market; (ii) the depoliticization of education, an authoritarian process reinforced from academy and think tanks since the recovery of formal democracy in 1990. The elites have learned that private universities are not just a business but are also ideological centers to train professionals under their principles.

In this context, the student movement’s slogan No al lucro (No to profit) was a powerful demand that summarized and integrated the dissatisfactions of the majority of Chileans. After a long, difficult but apparently successful process of legitimation of neoliberalism, the students began to struggle against a new idea (profits) that not only denies the economic system completely, but deeply (re)politicizes the Chilean society and put an end to its economic and political transition after dictatorship. After the rising of the “Penguin movement” in 2006, the private university students understood and resisted the role of private universities in the reproduction of the neoliberal system. With the awakening of the private university students, the issue of profits in the higher education market gained importance as one of the main demands of the 2011 student movement.

However, along the advancement of the process of formation of critical consciousness, the students have understood that the changes need to go deeper, which makes the realization of a constitutional assembly to change the Chilean constitution another important subject of the debate. Therefore, the demands of the student movement, coordinated with the claims of other social movements as well, had a different nuance, not only directed to reform the educational system, but to complete the
transformation of the old way of understanding the Chilean democracy. Despite a general agreement regarding this vision, there is a clear separation between *ultrones* (radicals) and *amarillos* (moderates)\(^2\) regarding the meaning and, thus, method to accomplish it. On the one hand, the moderate wing has decided to challenge the system from within. Thus, some salient ex-leaders decided to run for traditional positions of power in the congress. In March 2014, four of these former leaders were elected to the parliament. Two of them belong to the traditional Communist party that was recently incorporated to the *Concertación* coalition (which it is now called *Nueva Mayoría*). The other two are leaders of new independent political organizations. Since political power in Chile has been historically reduced to elite groups, the most moderate groups within the student movement see the position of these former leaders as an opportunity to renovate traditional politics. On the other hand, the more radical groups reject traditional politics, thus, broadly criticize the incorporation of ex-leaders to the parliament. They consider it treasonous to the struggle of the students for cooperating with the maintenance of the current illegitimate political system.

Nonetheless, I argue that the major impact of the student movement cannot be reduced to the traditional conceptions and actors of political change. After a comprehensive revision of literature and public documents it was possible to construct a detailed discussion of the intimate relation between the particular historical process of neoliberalization of higher education in Chile and the emergence of the Chilean student

\(^2\)Both are pejoratives denominations of the clashing visions at stake.
movement. None of these sources, however, addresses how this intimate connection was built in daily life practice, and even less the role of family on it, despite the well-known impact of these processes on the students’ family realm, and the broad intergenerational support the student movement’s claims and strategies have received. Again, the history of the Chilean student movement is at risk of being just told from the perspective of academic and journalistic elites.

This not just has theoretical but serious practical consequences. After five years of the rising of the student movement, and despite an unprecedented delegitimation of the transitional elites ruling the country since 1990, the key students’ claims remain systematically evaded. On the one hand, we need to understand why this would probably be a limited understanding of the impact of the student movement in the Chilean society. On the other hand, we need to understand why moderation still threatens historical change in Chile despite all the information uncovered by the movement regarding the incompetent and abusive practices of the transitional elites.

Chapters 3 and 4 take up these conundrums, reassessing the making of this history from all the contradictions, challenges, mistakes, weaknesses, and strengths of the activist students and their families, the underestimated victims of the “Chilean miracle.” In Chapter 3, I developed a class-based comparison to understand how class issues are working within the conflicting process of formation of critical consciousness of activist students’ families. In Chapter 4, I developed a comparison based on family political background to understand how this political background and its respective memories of the recent past of the country are working within the same conflicting process of
formation of critical consciousness. Next, I combine the results of both chapters to understand the role of family not only in the reproduction of the Chilean educational market, but also in the intimate formation of critical consciousness that build up the student movement.

I argue there were clear class-based divergent motivations to legitimize the NHE ideology in these families. The legitimation of the NHE ideology was a recent second-hand evidence-based decision for low class position (LCP) families, and thus, the assessing of this formula for economic success is an ongoing process. Meanwhile, legitimation of the NHE ideology has been a longstanding first-hand evidence-based decision for higher class position (HCP) families, and the general picture shows that the formula has worked so far.

Paradoxically, just LCP families were able to develop some level of resistance given their former experiences with neoliberal material squeezes. Although LCP adults adopted the ideology and even became strong advocates of it, the economic dilemma was never eliminated. Anyway, the ideology was legitimized, since the benefits were about to come. For HCP families, in turn, the decision was much more passive. The ideology of higher education was naturalized before the character of the educational system was completely altered by Pinochet’s dictatorship. They grew up with this ideology, and directly experienced their benefits, without noticing that the structural conditions that have sustained their privilege had been radically transformed.

However, all of these motivations were ahistorical, which means that they can be legitimized and delegitimized without necessarily trigger the formation of critical
consciousness. As long as the crisis of these motivations were not connected to the particular historical conditions that created and reproduced them, any dissent was not a real threat to the continuity of the Chilean neoliberal system and partial reforms were able to reactivate consent.

This was the political situation for years. Nevertheless, the commodification of higher education in Chile eventually brought unexpected economic effects both to LCP and HCP families. Still with clear class-based differences, the economic squeeze associated to higher education indebtedness became an interclass situation. Stress, anger and impotence among adults and students became the first signals of the NHE ideological and material crisis. The evidence coming from interviews not only uncovers the unsustainable economic situation of LCP families, but also challenges the naturalization of HCP families’ financial position as unproblematic. With ups and downs, most of the HCP families have not had enough economic resources to sustain their living costs and their children’s careers at the same time. These adults want to provide education, but not indebtedness, resisting any option to transfer this duty to their children. Unlike LCP families, there is not a moral dilemma between a persisting former ideology (i.e., the working ideology), and the NHE ideology.

HCP parents and grandparents, from a close complicity with their children, find the needed grounding to keep working hard and to obtain the necessary economic resources just because studying has historically proven to be the right thing to do. The main difference of course is that HCP families have comparatively better social networks, material heritage, and extended family economic support to face these constrains.
However, none of these advantages have eliminated the need of indebtedness, and not only to cover college expenses but also regular consumption. Therefore, the material constrains derived from a traditional higher education ideology – that persists despite changing macroeconomic conditions – were also working in the formation of critical consciousness of these students and their significant adults.

However, class-based differences prevail, showing the importance of the still effective privileges of some groups within neoliberal Chile. Paradoxically, the most common consequence of the legitimation of NHE ideology for LCP families was the integration of students, and their (grand)mothers, to the labor force. This way, the permanent dilemma of these families, between the former (i.e., the working ideology) and the current family ideology, is pushed to its limits. Adults feel proud of the extra effort made by their children when deciding to work, while feeling frustrated that again in their lives, economic issues control their decisions as family. With the incorporation of the NHE ideology, by first time in adults’ lives, economic survival was not the main goal guiding their decisions. After their children were forced to work to cooperate with financial obligations imposed by higher education loan(s), indebtedness loses its character of opportunity and starts to become a fraud.

In sum, all of the families, regardless class position, persist and the NHE ideology exposes its real character, as a new rationale to legitimate exploitation. Therefore, I argue that the motivation for indebtedness in Chile is not just consumerism and maintaining a decent standard of living. The spread of the NHE ideology beyond elites transformed higher education in a valuable commodity, but also in a moral responsibility for families.
Nevertheless, most activist students highlight how the student movement, after a long process of maturation, was able to connect the crisis of the higher educational system with their economic and ideological roots. The idea of higher education as key to upward mobility and even happiness has proven to be false since most families ended up poorer than before given the predatory conditions of higher education indebtedness, creating the profound inequality that characterizes the Chilean society. The students understand that this is a traditional mechanism of capitalism to create profit and also to control people, transforming people into slaves. In addition, they define this mechanism as irrational, because they see how banks borrow money to the over indebted poor that hardly finishes their careers because they are not able pay back.

All the above helps us to understand better why the student movement struggles for educación publica, gratuita y de calidad (free and good quality public education), and not just for free education as many adults believe. However, despite the efforts of the movement, the government and media have deliberately maintained the discussion about the higher education system reform in an ahistorical fashion. That is, just around the demand of free education, predisposing the terms for family discussion. Any reference to the public education debate not only would represent a revision of the neoliberal foundations of the educational market, but also a revival of the debate on the historical origin and political responsibilities of this issue.

Nonetheless, this cannot exhaust the understanding of why most adults, particularly LCP ones, reject the demand for universal free higher education. Funding is certainly their main concern, but the material-related aspects of the critical consciousness
formation process are not enough to understand its contradictions. NHE ideology has deeply informed most decisions of adults for many years. From this ideology, the older generation has understood as mandatory the need to work as much as necessary to afford the expenses of the tertiary education of their children. Thus, conceiving higher education as a universal right is morally challenging for these families. Exploitation and inequality have been internalized with a clear limit: material poverty, a concept under permanent adjustment in the last decades in Chile. In addition, in a country where collective ideologies became traumatic for the older generations, rejecting the NHE ideology threatens to leave these adults in the most complete anomie again. Paradoxically, most of them are aware that free education is not an illusion but an historical loss. This is the first sign to argue that there was an important level of rationality when deciding to legitimize the NHE ideology.

   Anyhow, the debate on the public character of higher education has been systematically evaded by the political authorities in the last years, and the attention has been deviated to the material aspects of the crisis. As a result, the revolutionary potential of family economic constrains associated to the crisis of the higher educational market was damaged and paradoxically became instrumental to capital.

   Therefore, something else had to happen within each family to give strength to the radicalization of students. Traditionally, the rising of student movements have been analyzed as a rupture between two generations even when both of them define themselves as leftist. According to the evidence of this research, a first approach of the intergenerational dynamics within each family shows indeed a moderate-radical
antagonism between both generations. However, stopping the analysis at this level would be reducing the understanding of the conflictive process of critical consciousness formation in the family realm, particularly when trauma is transversally present in the older generation.

Therefore, the analysis of the conflict—a more accurate word than rupture—between generations cannot be detached from the specific historical circumstances this conflict emerged. Based on the result of this study, I maintain that family became the main site that inspired and developed an intergenerational reinterpretation of Chilean recent history. However, the revolutionary potential of the intergenerational struggle over memory in this realm is not homogeneous. What evidence also shows is that family’s political background matters. While important commonalities do exist, giving consistence to the students’ struggle, the struggle over the ideology of traumatic memory presents important differences between Concertacionistas and Pinochetistas families.

Regarding the common elements, all active students share a fairly similar historical interpretation of the crisis that gave rise to the Chilean student movement in 2011. To explain the crisis of the higher educational system, they mainly refer to the period that begins with the Unidad Popular (UP). UP and Allende’s government, however, are just indirectly mentioned. In general, when telling the story that explains the current crisis, the students refer to this period as something the dictatorship stole from the older generation. Therefore, they mostly associate the origin of the crisis of the Chilean educational system with the changes introduced by Pinochet during dictatorship. In
particular, the students highlight the individualization of Chilean society over any other impact of the neoliberalization of the country.

However, we can always observe a discursive continuum that connects the dictatorship period with the transitional phase ruled by the Concertación political coalition (1990-2010; 2013-today). Furthermore, the students put the “the big betrayal” by the Concertación, i.e., the unfulfilled promise of democracy, at the heart of their reasoning when explaining the formation of the student movement in Chile. This is true even for those activist students with a Pinochetista political background. Whatever they had originally inherited from their parents and/or grandparents as political adscription, the broken promise of democracy has been very significant for the activist students' formation of collective memory and, in consequence, for the formation of their critical consciousness.

Although there is a basic agreement agreed among active students regarding the crisis at stake, the (re)politicization of the older generation has been a very complex endeavor because it involves a generalized traumatic memory. However, understanding the scope of this traumatic memory for their parents and grandparents was something progressive, even among those who were raised on the basis of an open dialogue about the recent past of Chile. For that reason, the early explanation of the older generation’s behavior was political moderation (being amarillo).

Yet after numerous arguments and conversations with their significant adults, most active students were able to elaborate a more accurate explanation for the older generation’s moderation: after the rising of the student movement, the idea that “history
can be repeated” has conquered their minds. In just this way, active students could really assess how deep the dictatorship and the transitional period have impacted the older generation, not only at the emotional level but also upon their consciousness as the motivating factor for historical change.

Although this fear is not effective as a means of domination among active students, it has been transmitted inter-generationally through family conversations, deeply penetrating their narratives as well. Particularly, the radical character of the students’ struggle in its highest moments has made them feel very close to the situation that once generated the repressive action of the military.

In this way, memories of the recent past of Chile exposes its paradoxical role in the struggle of the students in Chile, as a realm of critical consciousness formation but also as a sphere in which domination is reproduced. I call this the ideology of traumatic memory, the particular ideology that reinforces at the local level the workings of the general NHE ideology among activist students´ families to control dissent. These traumatic memories are ideological since they have been preventing for many years the possibility that active students’ families could challenge (i) the top-down making of memories of the recent past, and (ii) the ahistorical understanding of the current conditions of domination in the Chilean context, preventing the development of alternative interpretations.

Yet the ideology of traumatic memory is also historical, thus, it can be transformed. As evidence demonstrate, after all these years of intergenerational struggle over memories, most parents and grandparents have decided to break silence, negotiate
their traumatic memories, and when possible reach an agreement on the interpretation of memories with their children. However, the dynamics and scope of this endeavor within the family’s critical consciousness formation process is dissimilar depending on the political background of the activist student’s family. In any case, the development of critical consciousness cannot be considered an absolute outcome but a persisting moral conflict both for activist students and their significant adults. Expecting a total and enduring radicalization would mean ignoring the particular mediations working in the critical consciousness formation process of people living in a post-dictatorial country. At most, the intergenerational ideological conflict turned into a mutual memory-based enlightenment that brought contradictory moral values for the older generations, and the adjustment of expectations regarding historical change for the youngest ones.

With regard to the struggle over the ideology of traumatic memory in *Concertacionistas* families (60% of the cases), what most students inherited was not the history of struggle but the history of fear and disillusion. Nevertheless, the older generation still plays along with the *Concertación v/s Alianzapor Chile* (the right coalition) game, especially during elections, a behavior very difficult to understand for their descendants. Conversely, parents and grandparents not only explain the radical active students´ behavior with the conventional perception of youth as an idealistic and naïve period, but also from the fact that they did not experience the recent past of the country, which taught them about the impossibility of radical transformations and, thus, the need to accept some situations despite they are not perfect.
However, to understand why the *Concertacionista* background adults keep conservative despite the “big betrayal” of the transition ruling class, we cannot rely on descriptive explanations. Accordingly, their children have sought to understand what they describe as a “profound ignorance” of the older generation, which contrasted with the increasing amount of information and in-progress formation of critical thought the students were having during the first years of their involvement in the movement. A first approach suggests that something external to the older generation’s minds, such as media coverage of the student movement, has been preventing the transformation of their rationality and the emergency of critical thought and resistance among them, an issue widely discussed by critical scholars.

But what the evidence shows is that not only the level of violence showed by the news, but also the radical ideas of their children make the image complete to make them feel living again a history that seemed to be overcome. Thus, they feel very scared that history can be repeated. This fear, however, did not come just from the memories of the violations to human rights during dictatorship, but it was also present in daily life by other means during dictatorship. In any case, fear of repeating history has even been a conflicting motivation for some parents to keep hiding or disclose to their children the taboo story of their own involvement in the resistance against Pinochet.

This proves how necessary it is to put into conversation the voices of both generations when traumatic memories constrain the amount of information people decide to share with the researcher. Just this way we can understand how complex has been the process of construction of radical consciousness among students. Many scholars of
memory and forgetting state that even silence is constitutive of intergenerational transmission of memory. However, scholars of memory and forgetting have never discussed how intergenerational silence on memories within family impacts the construction of dissent. Evidence shows that when a strong ideology of traumatic memory prevents an intergenerational dialogue on memories of the recent past of the country, the intergenerational process of formation of critical consciousness has a limited scope. On the one hand, the students develop (i) an ahistorical notion of resistance focused in the future, in which the older generation does not have any role in historical change, and/or (ii) a general class-based perspective of domination to explain older generation’s submission to Pinochet. On the other hand, the adults reject learning from their children and, thus, their memories keep mainly dominated by official memories of the recent past.

By putting into conversation the voices of both generations, therefore, we can assess how limited are the traditional ways of understanding cultural domination and the alleged conservative role of family. The consent of the ideology of traumatic memory amongst Concertacionistas families has not been completely passive. Adults have had rational motivations to present themselves as moderate and to encourage moderation on their children. However, the Concertacionista older generation’s ideological changes are only recognizable to date from a narrative full of moral inconsistencies. Without a doubt, what adults have learned from the intergenerational struggle over the ideology of traumatic memory has had a deep impact on their beliefs, but important vestiges of moderation are still present in their discourses. Expecting something different would
mean a totalitarian interpretation of the critical consciousness formation within these families. Not only memories of horror, but subsequent memories of joy when Pinochet’s era came to an end are still stronger than disillusion. From this conservative rationale, the older generation was able to reconstruct their identity after horror to become an education-focused family, embracing sooner or later the general NHE ideology.

The analysis of the struggle over the ideology of traumatic memory in *Pinochetistas* families (40% of the cases) offers invaluable clues to understand how historical change works in practice. Because the ideology of traumatic memory is also present in *Pinochetistas* and mixed political background families, which has been highly efficient to perpetuate the legitimation of Pinochet dictatorship among historical supporters. However, the Chilean ultra-right has needed to adjust the contents of the ideology of traumatic memory from forgetting to remember the past since the rising of the student movement in 2011. Paradoxically, the elites that for years have used future-oriented politics to obtain the consent of the population to govern; today are trying to bring back fears of the past to recover the control they kept unchallenged for 20 years.

From the experience of *Concertacionistas* families we learned that intransigent silence present is some families did not secure moderation in the younger generations, but do limit the scope of the critical consciousness formation of the activist students’ families. The experience of *Pinochetistas* families confirms this conclusion. However, the management of traumatic memories that include some level of taboo memories has been an unavoidable endeavor for both generations in *Pinochetistas* families. From complete intransigence to mutually agreed memories, all these families have had to deal
with morally challenging memories of Pinochet’s dictatorship, a regime all of them once supported. Nevertheless, a complete ideological rupture between generations is probable but never an inexorable outcome of the radicalization of their children.

Those Pinochetistas families who just reached what I call “partially agreed memories” ended up delegitimizing Pinochet’s legacy based on class-based arguments, i.e., the economic constrains they have had to face during the transition period, particularly after their children decided to pursue a higher education career. Therefore, the long lasting mechanism of legitimation of dictatorship that put Pinochet as the savior of the country finally begins to break down. Adults were able to connect the economic crisis of the family with the economic system inherited from dictatorship.

In these cases, while the conflicting memories of the dictatorship suffered an important, although not definite, rapprochement, violations of human rights are not a subject the older generation is willing to open to debate. Openly discuss about violations of human rights when your father or grandfather was a military person on duty during those years appears to be an impracticable expectation or a very intimate experience hard to share. Unsolved moral issues with a military significant adult even make the active student’ narratives inconsistent – being a good question for debate how much moral consistency we can expect from a radicalized student who struggles against the persisting domination of Pinochet’s legacy that his father or grandfather one way or another helped to build. Anyhow, students are able to go beyond personal responsibilities, and struggle against the domination still exert the right-wing memories of the recent past of the country over the older generation.
Nonetheless, the scope of the critical consciousness formation process in 
Pinochetistas families can go further. In some families both generations were willing to participate in his research to openly share the long intergenerational process that ended up delegitimizing Pinochet’s legacy from what I call “advanced agreed memory”. On the one hand, among other sources, adults ended up recognizing to their children as an important agent of divergent memories, which finally made them surrender to the facts and challenge the naturalization of Pinochetismo in his family. On the other hand, the conflict of being a radical activist and having relatives who supported – and perhaps directly participated – in the Pinochet’s bloody dictatorship need to be integrated in the activist students’ memory in such a way that their strong ties can be protected. By this token, that their significant adults were “living in a bubble” was the straightforward agreement on controversial memories that has worked best for these cases.

The evidence shows that once both generations reached this agreed memory, the process of formation of critical consciousness sometimes could go beyond the point of delegitimation of Pinochet, to legitimize for instance the use of violence against the police during the student movement’s marches. To be precise, the possibility of reaching a totally agreed memory proves to be impracticable. The formation of critical consciousness is a permanent moral challenge that some Pinochetista adults are just willing to take because otherwise the relationship with their politically radical children would be jeopardized.

Regardless political background, the intergenerational struggle over the ideology of traumatic memories, no matter the scope of the formation of critical consciousness
process, most of the times ended up with the politicization of traumatic memories. The learning from this process has transformed these students into intellectually unpretentious, socially wise and ethically responsible activists. In turn, parents and grandparents became the human correlate of the ongoing self-commanded process of studying Chilean recent history performed by students. For these students, top-down and bottom-up versions of history are valid while being put into conversation. More important is that this process must benefit society and not personal egos and rigid ideologies.

Accordingly, all these families, despite class differences, have shaped their motivations to pursue a tertiary education for the younger generations. To be sure, providing tertiary education to their children is still a moral duty for them, but not only for the attainment of private benefits. Therefore, the NHE ideology has not been overcome, but transformed, suggesting that legitimation crises are very conflicting process. On the one hand, upward mobility is still important. On the other hand, active students have realized the contrasting situation of the majority of the poor youth who do not pursue a tertiary education, for whom the struggle of the student movement is unjustified, given the already privileged position of higher education students. Thus, higher education as mechanism and site for emancipation to which everyone can access became the new motivation to persist with this choice in the future.

As a result, the concept of education has been adjusted. The active students and most of their significant adults are now aware of the power that family has in the emancipation process conducted by the student movement. Whatever the impact of the
student movement in the transformation of higher education system will be, the new
generations of these families are already being raised under an adjusted ideology of
higher education. The main family’s expectation now is raising children with critical
thinking to protect them against the neoliberal domination that define post secondary
training as a mechanism to reproduce the capitalist system. Consequently, the public
sense of higher education is already in practice by these students and their families. And
not only the crisis of higher education, but also its transformation, have demonstrated to
be a family matter.

Theoretical Implications

The main contribution made by this research to the social movement scholarship,
particularly among Marxists and analysts out of the Frankfurt School, has been the
articulation of theoretical and empirical evidence to identify how the family as mediation
interconnects consciousness and society in a concrete historical context. By this token, I
sought to contribute to the reconnection of the intellectual discussion over critical
consciousness formation to radical praxis, that is, to real movements and real ideologies
in conflict.

That said, I maintain that a process of formation of critical consciousness in a
post-dictatorial country entails family-based intergenerational struggles that run through
different stages of development, which in no way follow a linear trajectory but a
conflictive course. In turn, these stages involve different types of consciousness or ideas
through which adults and students explain their material circumstances and legitimize (or
delegitimize) the Chilean neoliberal order. What is important to highlight is that these
ideas always involve rational motivations despite the contradictory travails of traumatic memories in the (re)construction of resistance under the particular Chilean historical conditions. These types of family-based consciousness are summarized as follows:

i) *Ahistorical Consciousness*, a family-based set of ideas mostly focused in the future. While these family-based explanations of their material circumstances and of their legitimization of the neoliberal system remain ahistorical, i.e., disconnected from the particular historical conditions that created and reproduced them, they can be accepted or rejected without necessarily trigger the formation of critical consciousness. In other words, any dissent is not a real threat to the continuity of the system and partial reforms are able to reactivate these ideas.

ii) *Traumatic Consciousness*, a family-based set of ideas mostly focused in the traumatic memories of the past. When a strong ideology of traumatic memory prevents an intergenerational dialogue on memories of the recent past of the country, the intergenerational process of formation of critical consciousness could not surpass this stage. These ideas are not necessarily irrational or passive, since adults have demonstrated to have rational motivations to present themselves as moderate and to encourage moderation on their children.

iii) *Conflicting Consciousness*, an advanced stage of critical consciousness formation in which traumatic memories have been politicized, but unsolved moral issues prevent to reach a *Critical Consciousness*, an ideal state of
consciousness highly improbable in a post-dictatorial country. Once the development of radical resistance is connected to family-based material needs, moral values and traumatic memories, the development of critical consciousness cannot be considered an absolute outcome but a persisting moral conflict. Expecting a total and enduring radicalization would mean ignoring the particular mediations working in the critical consciousness formation process of families living in a post-dictatorial country. At best, general and particular neoliberal ideologies are transformed, suggesting that the critical consciousness formation is a very conflicting process.

**Recommendations for Political Action**

The results of this dissertation seek to offer an opportunity to the activist students and their families to surpass their blind spot and asses their historical role within the recent history of the country, which has led from below to the worst political crisis of post-dictatorial times. After 2003, the year the fieldwork of this research was developed, the delegitimization process of the transitional elites was sharpened, among other factors, by their own neoliberal nature.\(^4\) At that time, the right-wing and millionaire Sebastian Piñera was about to leave the presidency of the country with the highest level of disapproval a government had reached since the beginning of the transition. The recognized negative effect of the student movement mobilizations on the popularity of the government could never be reversed. However, the explanations for this disapproval

\(^4\)“All that is solid melts into air” (Marx and Engels 1848).
mainly highlighted the business-based right wing ideology of the government that evidently clashed with the student movement’s claims.

Thus, the reelection of the *Concertacionista* (and socialist) candidate Michelle Bachelet in December 2013, with over 62% of the votes, was not a surprise. Nonetheless, the unprecedented abstention of 50% of the voters opened new edges of political debate. Despite this tremendous strike to the representativeness of the Chilean formal democracy, the presidential program generated high expectations of comprehensive reforms that, among a set of strong promises, pledged to guarantee free university education to all. An alleged awareness of the serious consequences that a new failure could have on political legitimation, which even made them to change the historical name of the coalition from *Concertación* to *Nueva Mayoría* (New Majority), brought fresh air to the students’ struggle.

However, although a new law was recently signed to prohibit profits, tuition, and selective admissions in private primary and secondary schools that receive state subsidies, the student movement argues that these reforms do not break with the logic of the neoliberal education system, and may even serve to reinforce it. In addition, the long legislative battle over higher education has been conducted without the participation of the movement. Hence, the “big betrayal” of the *Concertacionistas* parties has not only been broadly exposed by the student movement in the last five years, but also (re)confirmed in practice by the short-range character of the educational reform. As if this were not enough, a land speculation scandal involving Bachelet’s son and his wife, together with a series of campaign finance scandals that have affected legislators from all
parties, ended up dropping Bachelet’s approval lower than Piñera’s level of popularity in its worst moment.

Today, a general sense of political chaos has invaded the Chilean public opinion. However, few care about the intimate origins of this historical change. Since the times of weekly marches are gone, despite the reasons to protest are clearer than ever, many have dared to declare the fatigue or failure of the students’ struggle. Therefore, the results of this dissertation calls to reject uninformed conclusions and assess with strong evidence the student movement’s impact in the recent historical change of this country from the significant but underestimated perspective of activist students’ families. Surprisingly, the key importance of family within the structure of Chilean society contrasts with the little attention given to its historical role to reproduce but also built resistance to neoliberal capitalism.

Again, the activist students and their significant adults obtain evidence to reject reforms and keep strengthening the radicalization of the movement toward the abolition of neoliberal conception of higher education, a process that according to the results of this dissertation is still incomplete. On the one hand, the movement should promote a broader understanding of the changes needed, (i) pointing free education as a natural consequence of recovering the public character of tertiary education and not as a goal itself, and (ii) uncovering how convenient for the elites is reducing the discussion to the material aspects of the educational crisis which leaves untouched the problem of the depoliticization of tertiary education, and the still impunity of the responsible authorities of this imposition. On the other hand, the movement should promote debate among
students about the importance of respectful intergenerational debate on traumatic memories of the recent past within their intimate circles, to deepen a mutual understanding of the persisting moderation of Chilean people. This, considering that total or selective silence is a common strategy of the older generations to promote political moderation in the youth, whereupon sharing experiences of how to cope respectfully with it would be an important objective of action.

Having in mind that the ideology of traumatic memories has been one of the most efficient mechanisms to control dissent among adults despite political background, a sensible intergenerational dialogue on traumatic memories would help to build historical visions of the political crisis, strengthening mobilizing memories at home. Most Chilean people who was alive during dictatorship and transition have been one way or another damaged by economic and moral shock. However, most of the activist student’s families that participated in this research have learned how these memories ended up inspiring revolution on behalf of the traumatized generations instead of breaking with them. The moral conflict that this has produced in the older generation is a complex endeavor to deal with. Consequently, the promotion of debate about how some activist students have been able to transform the contents of the ideologies of the higher education and the ideology of traumatic memories in this context is highly recommendable to deepen the scope of the movement.

**Future Research**

In this work I focused on the specificities of the ideology of higher education, that is, the historical motivations to pursue tertiary education. However, the educational crisis
in Chile goes beyond the effects of neoliberalization on post secondary education. The activist students’ families explain their most important economic decisions as family during parenting time from the ideology of education long before they entered to a higher educational institution. In these families, having a better quality of life has been always related to study. This was particularly evident during school time. When possible, attend to good quality school was a must for both class position families. However, the alternatives were much more reduced for low class position (LCP) ones, and here we are not just talking about economic resources. It is true that the economic cost of private school for higher class position families is huge in Chile and, thus, a challenge for all these families. Nonetheless, the extra weight that spatial socioeconomic segregation of Chilean metropolis put to scarcity of material resources in LCP families shows how class matters when explaining the transversal impact of the neoliberal ideology of education. For instance, spatial socioeconomic segregation has generally forced these students to distant quotidian mobility to attend to a good quality public school generally located in a richer municipality.

In this context, I am currently applying to do a postdoctoral research in Chile whose title is: “The Student Movement and the socio-spatial equity crisis in Greater Santiago and Greater Concepción: A contribution to the praxis of urban sustainability.” This project would be developed at the Center of Sustainable Urban Development (CEDEUS), led by the Catholic University of Chile. That is why I have adapted my approach of social movements to a viewpoint that considers a broad understanding of sustainability in urban settings. Since the Chilean Student Movement has been analyzed
as a spatially plain phenomenon so far, I am proposing that its formation, especially of
the high school movement, is intimately related to a crisis of socio-spatial equity in
Chilean metropolises, which is a crucial issue for the urban sustainability approach.

**Limitations**

Post secondary training became a moral responsibility for families. Unexpectedly,
this led me to address the alleged conservative role of mothers in the reproduction of
capitalism. In fact, the results of this study suggest that the spread of the NHE ideology,
as most family issues, is not a gender neutral mechanism of legitimation. Beyond well-
known gender-based economic inequalities, the moral power of (grand)mothers in these
families is strong. They are potent advocates of the NHE ideology, leading the majority
of the education-related decisions in the family. However, I argue this is more the result
of historical conditions that have resulted in a women-lead family structure, while the
legitimation of the neoliberalization of the country has largely been reached on the basis
of family-based ideologies. This, even when the father is present and is the main
economic provider. However, since this was not the focus of the study, alternative
hypothesis and perspectives are possible, being this is a clear limitation of this study that
I will attempt to deal with in future research projects.

**Final Remarks**

The analysis of the role of family in the reproduction and resistance of capitalism
by Marxist thought is as old as Marxism itself. Yet the mediating role of family between
consciousness and society under capitalism had received virtually no scholarly attention,
Despite the historical economic function of family which remains decisive until nowadays.

In this study I have presented strong evidence to fill this gap, out of the experience of family live in the construction of revolution in the post dictatorial Chile. From this particular historical condition, I have proposed an alternative understanding of the role of family in the development and retreat of revolutionary consciousness.

Paradoxically, ahistorical general neoliberal ideologies working to control dissent at the global level (NHE ideology) have needed to be reinforced at the local level by particular ideologies strongly rooted in particular historical conditions (ideology of traumatic memories). In the post-dictatorial Chile, both are family-based ideologies, turning family as the best site to reinforce domination but also construct resistance.


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VITA

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