Some Conventional Existentialist Aspects of Philosophy and Some Applications To Education, Guidance, and Nondirective Counseling

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SOME CONVENTIONAL EXISTENTIALIST ASPECTS OF PHILOSOPHY
AND SOME APPLICATIONS TO EDUCATION, GUIDANCE,
AND NONDIRECTIVE COUNSELING

by

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Theotonius Joseph de Sales was born in Poona, India, on February 18, 1928.

He attended St. Vincent's High School, Poona, a Jesuit elementary and secondary school from which he matriculated in 1944. From 1944 to April, 1948, he was a student of N. Wadia College, Poona, at which he studied obtaining a Bachelor of Arts Degree with History Honours from Bombay University. From June, 1948 to October, 1950, he studied at the Law College, Poona, obtaining a Bachelor of Laws Degree in the second class from Poona University. After that he passed the Bombay High Court Advocates' Bar Council Examination in 1951 and became a legal practitioner till June, 1955 in Poona and Bombay.

Then he joined the Papal Seminary, Poona, in 1955 and obtained his Licentiate in Philosophy in 1958. In 1959, he joined the Jesuit novitiate in Bombay, and on returning to Poona, received his Licentiate in Theology in 1964 from the Papal Aenasum there.

Thereafter he enrolled in the Graduate School of Loyola University, working for his Master of Arts Degree in Education, with guidance and counseling as his special field.
I. Purpose of Thesis:

I have attempted in this thesis to offer a synthetic presentation of some existentialist philosophers and a few applications of their precise philosophy to the fields of education, guidance, and nondirective counseling.

II. Preliminary Problems:

When looking through a number of textbooks on "Philosophy of Education," I found a rather limited treatment of existentialism and its educational implications and applications and some made no reference to it. By contrast, many books of philosophy deal with the existentialists.

I felt the need to study this philosophy because of its growing importance and relevance to modern life and education. As the number of prominent existentialists was on the increase, I chose to limit myself to those whom I have called the "conventional existentialists." These include Soren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, Jean Paul Sartre, Karl Jaspers, and Gabriel Marcel. I have described them as "conventional" because much of modern literature and philosophy have treated them as existentialists.

Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) is generally regarded as the father of modern existentialism. His writings remained buried till they were discovered, revived and translated in this century. It was then that his original stamp as a philosopher and his prophetic insight into the depersonalization forces at work in modern life, already evident to him in the Industrial Revolution and its aftermath, came to the fore. Thereafter he was hailed as the discoverer
of a philosophy and a new way of philosophizing which brought philosophy down from the heights within the intelligible reach of ordinary men. Existentialism caught on like wild fire, and assisted by the insights of Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, and others in more recent times, bid fare to become one of the leading philosophies of the day. Its powerful glow became a light and inspiration for others to follow.

Some of the insights of existentialism are not altogether new. My efforts to trace the roots of existentialism are confined to the modern era—the last and present centuries. But the roots certainly date much earlier. I have referred to the influences of Socrates and Pascal as some of the conventional existentialists have specifically mentioned these. However, the existentialist tradition "includes," in the words of Arturo Fallico, "the bards of the Upanishads and the Buddhists, as well as the Augustines, the Kierkegaards, the Thoreaus and the Sartres of the West." Indian traditions, especially Hindu but also Muslim, have spotlighted the meaning of human existence in many other than pantheistic trends.

Again, Jacques Maritain considers St. Thomas and some of the scholastics and a number of present day Christian scholars as being vitally concerned with the "existent"—human and non-human. I take up this point for comparative studies in the thesis.

Coming to more recent men like Heidegger, Sartre, Jaspers, and Marcel, we are faced with the problem of some of their own denials that they are existentialists. Heidegger has explicitly dissociated himself from existentialism. Certainly his conception of Existenzial philosophie is not the same as Jaspers' Existenz philosophie. The former, as we shall see, did try to build a universal
ontology which the latter denied as a possibility. In more recent years, both Heidegger and Marcel have distinguished trends in their thinking from Sartre's philosophizing. Sartre has professed to be an existentialist. Marcel has been veering recently to certain essentialist positions which may account for his distinguishing his own and some existentialist outlooks. Incidentally, he developed his existential trends early, without a knowledge of the other so-called existentialists. Hence, our designation of the five writers chosen for study is a group of "conventional existentialists" or those commonly held as such. We will try to note refinements in their thinking and differences from one another in important philosophical issues.

III. Procedure

In view of the need for an overview of existentialism, I have restricted myself to the philosophical aspects of the five conventional existentialists. To start with, I give some of the more general backgrounds of existentialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the first chapters. Here my endeavor has been to bring together various factors discussed by the existentialists and commentators accounting for the rise of existentialism. I have tried to identify these in three broad categories—first, the philosophical situation and the advancing sciences; second, the impacts of these on Christianity; and third, the drives towards individuality and equality. Then I proceed to biographical accounts of the five existentialists and relate these to their respective writings. This relation is especially strong because of the existentialist outlook on personal involvement.

My second, third, and fourth chapters endeavor to give a brief but synthetic approach to their metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. The reason for
this approach, as stated earlier, was the limited treatment of the subject in educational treatises.

George Kneller's book, Existentialism and Education, is one of the finest of the larger works on this subject presently available. However, Kneller was so interested in the educational implications of existentialism that he did not delve into the philosophical aspects to the extent I would like to have seen for better synthesis and evaluation. I have, therefore, made wider use of several of the original sources. Besides, I have taken certain well-known expositions of existential philosophy like John Wild's The Challenge of Existentialism, K. Reinhardt's The Existential Revolt, James Collins' The Existentialists, and F. Molina's Existentialism as Philosophy, to compare and contrast philosophical views. I had necessarily to restrict myself in introducing too detailed refinements of views. In the process, I also tried to identify general propositions or outlooks which could be worked into the final chapter on "Applications," especially on Guidance.

In dealing with their metaphysics, I have examined in what respects man is the chief object of their philosophical study. This called for clear statements of what were among their chief philosophical standpoints, but not necessarily distinguishing features compared to other philosophies. Some common features of their conceptions of human existence, authentic and unauthentic, have also been referred to. The importance of the study of "being" in general arose with regard to Heidegger and to a lesser extent with Jaspers and Marcel. I have made references to their views on questions like Phenomenology and Truth to show the intimate link between their metaphysics and epistemology. Vectors of being assume a prominent place in their metaphysics. Some attention has
also been paid to other problems like God, potency, and change, and time and history often scantily dealt with in texts of philosophies of education. Regarding their epistemology, only Sartre has really proposed a whole theory of knowledge which is examined; others make useful but fragmentary contributions. The fundamental relations of truth and being with particular niceties of outlook are described, but chief attention is paid to peculiarly existential modes of being which also turn out as modes of knowing, like anxiety, boredom, care, and dread. Marcel's theory of reflections—poorly touched upon in textbooks—as also the existentialists' relation of freedom and knowledge, together with existentialist phenomenology, are given their due place here.

The close connection between existentialist metaphysics and epistemology with their ethics is emphasized. A special effort is made to estimate their strongly subjective outlooks together with their evaluation of concepts like law and moral order. Both these assume special significance in relation to authentic and unauthentic existence, as well as their bi-polar concepts of knowledge.

In the final chapter, an evaluation of existential philosophy has been woven into the discussion of concrete applications. With regard to education, guidance and counseling, only some applications were made and examined which touched the basis of their philosophy. In the latter, nature was a principal aim of education in fostering authentic existence—the use of nondirective teaching and the Socratic method—so too the peculiarly existentialist approaches to art, literature, sciences, philosophy, and history.

Existentialist guidance applications have been confined to describing propositions which our five writers would accept as a "credo" for their
guidance workers. I have tried to adhere here closely to existentialist thinking and phrasing, and in this way hope to supplement meagerly a chapter of Carlton Beck's excellent work, *Philosophical Foundations of Guidance*.

Finally, in describing the nondirective counseling process and logotherapy in the context of existential psychology and psychotherapy, the peculiar and telling insights of existentialism are brought to a close. As will be obvious from the various writings, which we have cited, here too we are lacking in a "synthetic approach" which is partially attempted here. There is also lacking more definite connection between the existentialists' precise viewpoints and relation to the above three fields. I have also compared some prevailing educational concepts to existentialist concepts to indicate possible contributions these may make to educational theory and practice.
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8. Basic needs and values of a person are those which promote his authentic existence.

Guidance techniques -- Non-directive counseling -- Logotherapy -- Conclusion
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

How Existentialism Arose

Philosophy or any school or trend in philosophy does not exist in a vacuum. However abstract the schools may be, they arise generally as reactions to particular situations and a definite historical context.

This is true of existentialism as it has developed and is developing today. Indeed existentialists, in a wide sense of the term, have been peculiarly sensitive to environmental conditions, especially in relation to the individual. They have, therefore, focused their attention on basically three contemporary situations.

The first of these situations may be described as the philosophical situation and the progressing sciences; the second, as the position of Christianity due to the industrial and technological revolutions; and the third, as the drive towards individuality and equality especially in this and the last centuries.

The philosophical situation and progress of sciences:

Idealism was one of the leading philosophies of Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Immanuel Kant (1726-1804), for instance, had shown the limited power of reason, competent on the one hand to organize intersubjective experience, but unable to know the thing-in-itself. Georg Hegel (1770-1831) on his part proclaimed anew the supremacy of reason which he put back into
nature and history. In these analyses, consciousness in general became aware of an object-of-knowledge. The Absolute defined as spirit became an object to itself, the human mind being one of the manifestations of this Absolute. However, in neither case did the real personal self in its body and situation encounter the independent objects of its experience.

On the other hand, positivism was wholly preoccupied with the objects of empirical experience. Positivists and materialists were deeply impressed with the strides of the sciences and the tendency to "master" nature. Their methods were chiefly observation, forming hypotheses and experimentation. They ignored metaphysical issues even regarding their own assumptions. When they did pay attention to the thinking mind, it was only to consider it as a "thing among other things." These two schools of thought, idealism and positivism, led to intellectual abstractions or segmentation of reality. They left the existentialists cold with universal concepts and laws. Hence these men experienced the desire to be involved with existential reality, "to know themselves and others in their uniqueness and individuality."

The position of Christianity:

Under the impact of the industrial and technological revolutions, the Christian faith had to face new challenges. The challenge to the faith arose from several sources—critical philosophy, biblical criticism, and the advancing sciences. It was no longer possible to rest secure in the complacent assumption that Christianity was the revealed and established truth guaranteed by the Church, the Scriptures, and Tradition. The reaction of some men was to regard Christianity as myth which they had outlived or as fable outgrown by the progress of the sciences. On the other hand, other men stood up to face these
challenges. These men proposed a variety of responses, not all of which we need consider here. Hegel, for instance, substituted rationalization for faith. He held that Christianity was indeed the absolute religion and the doctrines of Christianity were true. Philosophy in his view grasps the rational essence of the truths which Christian theology presents to religious consciousness in pictorial form. Kierkegaard, among other Christian existentialists, rejected this approach to skeptical humanists who could not bear to listen and accept Christianity and, more particularly, Catholic doctrines as final truth in their traditional forms. Religious faith, some of these existentialists held, could not be settled on evidence or the applications of reason. God was not a hypothesis, and faith could not be falsified by any experience. In fact, the question of faith had to be settled solely on one's own responsibility. At some stage in a man's life he was free to decide whether he would accept such faith as his total, personal response. Thus, existentialists made their presence and views felt in the religious crisis which the industrial and technological ages gave rise to. Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), as one of the pioneer existentialists, felt vitally concerned about this crisis, starting with his own life.

The drive towards individuality and equality:

There have been many milestones in the history of democracy. The English "Magna Carta," together with the long struggle for parliamentary and individual rights, the French Revolution which began in 1789, the American Revolution, and even the Bolshevik Revolution of 1919, proclaimed in different ways the equality of men, the rights of self-determination, and the personal dignity of each man. True, practices have not conformed to theory in the
effective realization of these rights in these different countries. Besides, the conceptual formulations have differed due to the various cultural, philosophical, social, and other backgrounds. This is true of other parts of the world as well.

Among the factors which have practically weakened a healthy individualism in existentialist thinking, have been Hegelianism, Marxism, and the growth of modern sciences and industry. Hegelianism, particularly, has been much under fire by the existentialists. The rationalistic individualism of the Enlightenment was succeeded by the feeling for totality, a marked feature of the German Romantic movement. On the political plain this tendency is expressed in the Hegelian exaltation of the nation-state, of collectivity, of the universal even though the sphere of "Absolute Spirit" is superior to the State. So the Hegelian man was viewed as realizing his true nature in the state, in his identifying himself with the totality. This was Kierkegaard's interpretation of Hegelianism. It negated the existing individual. Indeed, without Hegel so intending it, his philosophical and political views were made the basis of Nazism and Marxism, we know now. Bismarck played a principal role in the unification of Germany by his diplomacy and policy of "blood and iron." He kept alive Prussian militarist traditions which Frederick the Great fostered. Reeling under the blows of World War I and as a reaction to the Treaty of Versailles, Germany found a leader in Hitler who sought to glorify the German nation-state using Hegelian, Bismarckian, and Nietzschean ideas. Hence, the Nazi was willing to do in the name of totality, what he would never do precisely as an individual.

Hegelianism also paved the way for Marxism, which substituted the economic class for Hegel's nation-state. Hence, the class counted, not the
individual. Marxists may not theoretically hold totalitarianism as their ultimate goal. In practice, they look upon individualism as an outdated, bourgeoisie prejudice and favor the conditioning of men according to set patterns. Jean Paul Sartre's existentialism expresses a reaction, possibly against both Nazism and Marxism in his condemnations of totalitarian systems.

The growth of modern sciences and industry:

The factory system with its "sweat-shop" methods, division of labor, monopolistic capitalism, etc., tended to dehumanize man. Urbanization, with its overcrowding; division of labor, with its highly specialized training to the neglect of the liberal studies; and the mechanization of transport conveniences and luxuries of life, all have come in for a fair share of existentialist criticism in swamping and degrading the individual. True, many other voices than the existentialists' were raised against such depersonalization of man. Indeed some of these voices, like Fyodor Dostoevsky's and Fredrick Nietzsche's, provided the overtures for the swelling themes of existentialism.

Dostoevsky was no serene philosopher. His pitch was new. He indulged in a strained protest. He was rather self-preoccupied. The Romanticists, like Novalis, John Keats, and William Wordsworth, sought a flight from the present world into an idyllic past, a utopian future, a world of dreams. This was self-deception and an escapist's attitude seeking deliverance from his cross.

As Kaufmann so ably describes Dostoevsky's writings:

What we perceive is an unheard of song of songs on individuality; not classical, not Biblical. . . . Individuality is not retouched, idolized or holy: it is wretched and revolting, and yet for all its misery, the highest good.¹

This comes to us strongly when we read his *Brothers Karamazov* or his *Notes from Underground*. So Dostoevsky has deserved a place along with St. Augustine and Blaise Pascal in realistically depicting depravity and sin. He has thus emphasized that the richness and variety of individuality defies the neat classifications of Plato and Aristotle, no less than Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.

Fredrick Nietzsche (1844-1900), too, was an "apostle of passion and a critic of hypocrisy," but never passion at the expense of his reason. He rejected Christianity because he felt it to be the "arch enemy of reason." So he wrote his *Zarathustra*, where he says, "Wearness that wants to reach the ultimate with one leap, with one fatal leap—this created God and the underworld's." Again in his *Anti-Christ*, he regarded faith as "not wanting to know what is true." His madman proclaimed in the *Gay Science*, "God is dead. God remains dead and we have killed him." Nietzsche welcomed this as an invitation to men to live more dangerously, in a more manly way, with a will to power, free from nauseating, pious sentiment, ready to "carry heroism into the pursuit of knowledge" and "wage wars for the sake of thoughts and consequences." Nietzsche's name has been linked with the Nazis, but then Nietzsche also attracted men like Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, and Jean Paul Sartre, as also Man Scheler, Thomas Mann, George Bernard Shaw, and Andre Gide. "Existentialism without Nietzsche would be almost like Thomism without Aristotle: but to call Nietzsche an existentialist is like calling Aristotle a Thomist."4

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Karl Jaspers, in particular, has described briefly the present day novel situations which rouse personal existence to meet these challenges. Among them, besides those named earlier, are the unity of the globe and the interdependence of peoples and nations; a vast increase of world population; the appearance of inert masses of men subject to control by vast propaganda; the appearance of two world powers engaged in mortal combat, each possessing weapons of sufficient power to destroy all civilization; a universal sense of menace and impending catastrophe; the application of this materialistic viewpoint to social policy; the passive acceptance of mass death in mechanized total warfare; the fanatical willingness to kill whole peoples with indifference and the reduction of religion to the observance of Sunday rest and relaxation.  

The Background of Five Existentialists

We are concerned in this thesis chiefly with those who are known as "conventional existentialists." They are Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), Karl Jaspers (1883- ), Gabriel Marcel (1889- ), Martin Heidegger (1889- ) and Jean Paul Sartre (1905- ). Many philosophical and educational writings regard them as existentialists, though some of these men like Heidegger, Jaspers, and Marcel have disowned this label. A brief view of their lives, writings, and milieu is especially important, because they were (and some still are) vitally concerned and involved with personal problems and/or the problems of their day. This is very much in keeping with their viewpoints about existential philosophizing.

Soren Kierkegaard has been regarded as the modern progenitor of existentialism. He was born in Denmark in 1813 of Jutland peasant stock. His father was reared in dire poverty but rose through sheer hard work and frugal habits to be a prosperous merchant in Copenhagen. This man was stern and God-fearing, a strict Lutheran who reared his children with a severe hand in these traditions. Young Soren, though outwardly cheerful, inherited a melancholic disposition from his guilt-ridden father, which he never quite shook off in his life. A rebel against this upbringing, Soren entered Copenhagen University in 1831 to study Lutheran theology as his father wished, but he devoted much more time to historical, philosophical, and literary studies. During his ten years there, he dissipated his energies, played the dandy, visited the theater much, was frequently drunk, and fell into heavy debts which his father paid off. At this time, apparently, he even toyed with the idea of suicide. After receiving his Master of Arts degree, he became engaged to Regina Olsen. His father was now dead, but he began to feel he owed a great deal to him and to the simple, young girl, Regina, aged 18, who was six years younger than Soren. Yet he reached a stage in his life when he broke off his engagement with this young lady, believing himself unworthy of her, though she was willing to accept him as he was. Soren went out of his way to publicly pose as a model of degeneracy, and Regina was still willing to forgive and forget, but all in vain. When the news finally reached Soren two years later that she had married Fritz Schegel, it almost broke him. It was partly his own guilty feelings about his past life and partly an awakened interest in Christianity which led to these developments. He adopted an unconditional "either-or" attitude, throwing himself on the side of "becoming a Christian," rather than indulging less important desires as a
reaction against the sham or shallow Christianity of his day. His *Journals, Either-Or, Concept of Dread, and Fear and Trembling* are a few of his writings philosophizing about his own poignant struggles and the crisis Christianity was facing in the new industrial age.

Martin Heidegger, a German, raised a Roman Catholic, was another of the existentialists. His academic training brought him first under the long-lasting influence of a neo-Kantian school, and this brought him into contact with Edmund Husserl and his phenomenology. He taught at the University of Marburg and succeeded Husserl at the Freiburg University. In 1933 he delivered a speech partially approving of the National Socialist Revolution when Adolf Hitler was coming into power. In 1935 he did not accept Hitler's invitation to be rector of the Berlin University. After the defeat of Germany and the occupation of Southern Baden by the French, Heidegger was not permitted to resume his teaching. Later, as Professor-Emeritus, he conducted seminars and offered a few lecture courses in Europe. He was well versed in the scholastic tradition, especially Thomistic and Scotistic. At one time, it appears, he wished to become a Catholic priest. He has been described as a peasant by birth and tradition, stocky and stubborn, rooted in the maternal earth of his homeland, dwelling in his advanced years on top of a mountain in the secluded Black Forest region, searching for truth. He did not seek to encourage others in this lonely path. He lived with the sufferings of the German people during the two World Wars and this may account for his existential strains in philosophizing. From his pen have flowed writings of wide philosophical scope and deep vision, like *Being and Time*, *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*, *Letter on Humanism*, and others.
Jean Paul Sartre began his career as a freelance writer and philosopher at the age of nineteen. He taught for many years in the French secondary schools and played an active part in the French resistance movement during World War II. He won international fame by his publication of *L'etre et le Neant* (Being and Nothingness), as well as by his numerous novels and stage plays like the *Ways of Freedom, Les Mouches*, and others. He was influenced much by Heidegger's thinking. He showed much concern for the personal problems Frenchmen faced in an atmosphere in which anticlericalism, Marxism, and freedom movements grew. In 1939 he was taken prisoner by the Germans after being conscripted, but was released later for medical reasons, resulting in his leading a group in the resistance movement. His experiences at this time provided much of the drive in his philosophizing, with its emphasis on freedom, risk and even death for a cause personally believed in. Sartre has done very much to popularize existentialism.

Karl Jaspers, a German by birth, had a remarkably diversified academic career. He studied law, medicine, and psychiatry at various German universities like those of Munich, Berlin, and Gottingen. At Heidelberg University he held the professorial chair of psychology and philosophy. For political reasons, he was relieved of his academic duties in 1937, but received reappointment after the collapse of National Socialism. His knowledge of psycho-pathology and psychology led to his publishing *Allgemeine Psychopathologie* and *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*. He owed much to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in his thinking. His varied background of studies especially qualified him to discuss the relations of philosophy and the sciences. His *Reason and Anti-Reason in Our Time, Way to Wisdom, Existenzphilosophie*, and *The Perennial Scope of Philosophy*
testify to a considerable philosophical output and manifest a keen, systematic mind at work. These works also show a sustained interest in the human problems of our age.

Gabriel Marcel was born in Paris in 1889 and lost his mother at the age of four. In his lonely youth he developed strongly his imagination. He wrote two plays at the age of eight and had a continuous interest in the drama. For him the drama and philosophical reflections were "two summits of equal height." Here he could present the themes of loneliness, misunderstanding, disappointment, friendship, and happiness as he drew them from his own experiences. To the agnosticism of his father who was once a Catholic and to the extremely strict moral discipline imposed by a Jewish aunt, who later became Protestant, his guardian from his mother's death to adolescence, Marcel has ascribed the "atmosphere of instability and rigidity" he grew up in. He revolted against the pedagogical system of the lycée, though he was an excellent student, but he profited most from his visits to European art centers and from his acquaintance with eminent political and literary figures. He was steeped in a knowledge of Anglo-Saxon and German writers. He submitted his academic thesis at eighteen, and he taught from the age of twenty at schools and colleges in Paris and other cities. During World War I, he served in the Red Cross where he saw firsthand the spectacle of human suffering. He spent much spare time before and after World War II in philosophic and literary research, as well as in prominent lecture engagements. His war experiences and his inquisitive search to fill the emptiness of positive religion drew him to God and the Catholic Church in 1929. His writings, among them Man Against Mass Society, Metaphysical Journal, The Mystery of Being, and The Philosophy of
Existence, philosophize about a wide range of human encounters, situations, and attitudes.

Against this personal background of the existentialists and their countries and world problems, we sense the spirit of human restlessness and despair of which was born a renewed approach to the problems facing man and to philosophy itself.
CHAPTER II

METAPHYSICS

Existentialist philosophizing assumes special relevance and urgency in our modern age with the deepening crisis of "man's alienation." This is an alienation from his true personal self, an alienation of man from man, and more important, an alienation of man from God. The metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology of the existentialists come to grips with these issues. Though these branches of philosophy are treated here separately, they are very much linked up in the conventional existentialists' thinking. It will, therefore, be really difficult to draw hard and fast lines among these disciplines, though some of these matters discussed seem more readily to fall in with one discipline or another. This problem arises with various schools of philosophers, but is accentuated in the present case because of these men's peculiar focusing and attitudes towards the meaning of human existence.

The Existentialists' Views on Man and Being

If we are asked what the distinguishing features of the existentialists are, we may initially assert that "man is their great theme." Preceding and more classical schools of thought spotlighted the problems of "being," but the existentialists' main interest is in man and his problems. We do not suggest that other philosophies ignored man, nor do the existentialists suggest this. Rather, they suggest that man was given a secondary role on the stage of existence and that the manner of dealing with man was more as an object than as a subject of inquiry.
Man as subject in philosophy and other beings:

For the present we shall confine ourselves to the philosophical importance attached to man by the existentialists. They do not, however, attach the same degree or manner of interest in man. Hence our initial proposition requires modification and clarification. To appreciate this better, we shall examine their respective viewpoints.

Kierkegaard's thinking especially developed as a reaction against idealist and notably Hegelian philosophy. For Kierkegaard, abstract philosophic idealism was a fashionable game that could be easily and comfortably played in the professorial chair and in the lecture hall, but not so easily in real life because reality and existence were formidable obstacles. Such idealism expressed on the highest level was for Kierkegaard the peculiar depravity of the modern age, "its dissolve pantheistic contempt for man." This is specially clear in the Hegelian dialectics resulting in the mediation of opposites. As John Climacus, representing Kierkegaard's own views, says, this mediation was

... a rebellion of the relative ends against the majesty of the absolute, an attempt to bring the absolute down to the level of everything else, an attack upon the dignity of human life, seeking to make man a mere servant of relative ends. 6

In a similar manner, he attacks Hegel's conception of pure thought, which ceased to be someone's thought as a result of which "the existing subjectivity tends more and more to evaporate." 7 So Hegelianism inspired him with a profound mistrust. The occasion of this attack was Hegel's statement that


7 Ibid., p. 112.
Every man is a whole world of conceptions that lie buried in the night of the "Ego." ... It (the Ego) is not a mere universality, but the universality which includes in it everything.8

Kierkegaard has written much else in a similar vein, rescuing the individual from the mighty Juggernaut of the Absolute—the grand climax of Hegel's dialectic process and lengthy metaphysical classifications. On his part, Kierkegaard has shown no interest in such neat systematization and centered his attention on the individual man, not man in general, nor being in general.

Sartre is much in the same line in highlighting the individual person's role in his philosophizing. In La Nausée, Antoine Roquentin, one of Sartre's characters, faces the brutal reality of existing things in contrast to the phantomlike reality of ideas representing idealism saying, "The objects should not concern us at all, for they are not alive. ... I am afraid of entering into relation with them, just as if they were animal organisms."9 Before this world of "dead objects," man experiences a horrible fear of his openness to the "being-there" of things. Thus, Sartre expresses an interest in the phenomena around man, but only inasmuch as they rouse or affect the individual man. Man is the only existent aware of the gigantic realm of being—so he alone matters in the world.

For Heidegger, too, man holds a very important place in philosophy. Man poses the problem of being. Therefore ontology ought to begin with him as subject. In his major philosophical work, Sein und Zeit, he wrote:


Being as the basic theme of philosophy is no kind of being; nevertheless it pervades each entity. . . . Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, beginning with the problem of human existence.  

He has reacted strongly against the tendency to view being with some kind of being—physical or mental being, as in the case of materialists or idealists. This gives rise to a priori reductionism, since being and its structure are quite distinct from every entity and from any real determination of an entity. In his view the whole tradition of Western philosophy has basically misunderstood man by regarding him as a mere thing with determinate properties and ignoring his peculiar ways of existing.  

Being is not to be identified with that which is; rather, our free existence is the dwelling place of being.  

Heidegger's interest in man is not that of a self-enrolled ego, but a man in the world, a man with other men, a being open to other beings. Unlike Descartes, he sees no need to prove the reality of the external world through inference. Hence, Heidegger is primarily an ontologist, unlike most of the other existentialists we study here.  

In the case of Karl Jaspers, it is true that he centers his attention around the affirmation of the Transcendent, while placing emphasis on human choice and man's realization of his own potentialities. Philosophy cannot view

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11. Ibid., p. 65.

12. Ibid., pp. 39-43.
man as the sciences of biology or psychology do. These sciences regard man as an object and study him from a particular point of view. In philosophizing, however, man cannot convert himself into an object and stand back, as it were, from the reality of himself, cancelling out the meaning of his own understanding. Jaspers, therefore, objects to describing philosophy as the "universal science of being" and rejects a universal ontology, or theory of being, binding on all. Any efforts to study being as such, in a universal science, would amount to studying particular beings. These views of Jaspers have a distinct Kantian coloring.

I do not feel, however, that these objections to a theoretical science of being lead to a denial of a metaphysics of being, but rather suggest the need for a new approach distinct from the classical one to the problem of being, to the scope and aim in considering such a problem. This new approach is evident in viewing man against the world of objects as Existens which is the potentiality of his own being. Other reality is also of interest to man. Thus man discovers he is a transcending being reaching out to all reality—including the Transcendent, but not as object. Jaspers' attempt to understand being and man in particular, in spite of his peculiar and sometimes obscure, inconsistent epistemology, lead him to an openness to the Transcendent, unlike Sartre; but his ontology remains incomplete.

Marcel, too, draws considerable attention to the human person. Like Heidegger and Jaspers, metaphysics is not alien to him. He has some fine insights in this field, which, however, he did not build up as the other two did.

He, too, regards man as subject and not object in philosophy and proceeds to analyze his and other men's experiences from within these experiences. Man is not just subject, but a subject who enters into relations with other subjects. This leads to relations like love, fidelity, friendship, not merely of men to one another, but of man to God as well. Personalism emerges as the keynote of Marcel's thinking. Interpersonal relations become vital for human existence. This explains the pains he takes to investigate the rich, mysterious, pervasive data of human experience so that even philosophy must use the empirical approach to understand existence. He abhors the classical approach which tries to universalize and sum up the uniqueness of existence in general concepts and abstract principles. He will therefore urge that human existence is not a problem or problems to be solved, but a mystery refusing to be marked off and isolated. Hence also, he speaks of being in terms of "presence." It is by the act of existing that things and persons make themselves present to us. Human existence and thought become meaningful in terms of "responsiveness." Therefore he posits "an organic connection between presence and mystery. . . . Every presence is mysterious." This leads us to the next metaphysical question vis: "Existence precedes essence." 

The relation of essence to existence in some classical views is another of the propositions which existentialists have taken up and generally attacked. Plato and those following the idealist outlook have treated essence as preceding

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2) Ibid., p. 268.  
existence. They were so deeply concerned with the question "What is being?" so that they overlooked the more important consideration "that being is."

Other old schools of philosophy have also accepted that "existence precedes essence" in the sense that nothing can belong to any class or have characteristics unless it exists. Even scholastic philosophers would agree that existence is not a predicate like "white," "short," or "heavy." But the existentialists had other interpretations besides this one. Sartre said,

Man is a being who exists before he can be defined by any concept. . . . At first he is nothing. Only afterward he will be something, and he himself will have made what he will be. Thus there is no human nature since there is no God to conceive it.17

Sartre has made much use of this proposition to justify his atheism. He was reacting to Plato's world of "forms" considered superior to individual beings. But he carried his ideas further by asserting that there were no such things as eternal ideas in the mind of God or essences which preceded the existence of things. The theistic existentialists, like Kierkegaard, Jaspers and Marcel have not spoken in this way. A second meaning given by Sartre is "there are no objective essences at all as essences are determined by human interest and choice. The essence merely ties together the successive 'apparitions' of existents and is thus nothing but a phenomenal appearance."18 Gabriel Marcel would agree about value of human decisions but for him the primacy of the existential in man was man's participating in being through "incarnation." My body is not to be thought of as a mental object nor as an instrument. It is not right to say "I have a body" nor to say "I am my body" for this means "to

17 Ibid., p. 12.
18 Ibid., p. 18.
negate, to deny, to erase that gap I would be postulating as soon as I asserted
that my body was merely my instrument.”

Before man objectifies the distinct
concepts of "age" and "body," man must experience this incarnation historically—in space and time. Secondly, Marcel would disagree that there are no
common structures or essences. He has spoken of essence and existence as being
correlative. There was no "realm of essences" as such. This was "reifying"
abstractions. However, Marcel has pleaded for and defended "real, active
essences" in his writings. He writes:

One cannot protest too strongly against a kind of existentialism, or a
kind of caricature of existentialism which claims to deprive the notion
of essence of its old value and to allow it only a subordinate position.

Heidegger, too, does not accept Sartre's interpretations, accusing the
latter of merely reversing Plato's theory of pre-existence of "essences." For
Heidegger, human essences are not to be conceived as fixed, determined proper-
ties so that man has nothing further to accomplish. Yet he uses the expression
"the essence of man rests in his 'being-in-the world' to imply what he calls
'the nature and condition of man." Equivalently, Heidegger is asserting that
the subjective element in man gives specific direction to his objective nature.

He prefers to express himself thus, "The essence of man lies in his
existence," emphasizing existence as a reaction against essentialism. Generally,


20. G. Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, trans. G. S. Fraser (Chicago: Regnery

21. G. Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, trans. G. S. Fraser (Chicago:

22. M. Heidegger, Über den Humanismus, trans. F. Reinhardt (Milwaukee:
the existentialists following Kierkegaard right shy of the term "essences" as implying hard and fast categories rather applicable to inert things than to the uniqueness and unpredictability of man's mode of being. A man is his possibilities and in his being somehow understands these. Consequently, authentic existence with which the existentialists are chiefly concerned accompanies or follows upon man's understanding his own nature as Aristotelians and Thomists use this term. Even Heidegger then who does not use the term authentic existence much, because of the possible idealist conclusion that unauthentic existence is subordinated to a higher category, has been compelled to recognize certain stable conditions like death and need for food, which pertain to men everywhere.23 Cooperatively, only Jaspers seems to have despaired of finding stable structures anywhere.

There appears to be only one other sense in which Sartre's proposition may be understood vis. that no man's character is determined by birth and that he is free to mold and shape his life. Such an interpretation is implicit in the existentialist's outlook but this view is also shared by other non-deterministic schools and is not peculiar to the existentialists.

With Copleston, I therefore feel that the proposition "Existence precedes essence," though useful in indicating some directions in existentialist thinking, is not its distinguishing feature.24 For the same reasons given above with regard to divergent views about being and essence, I would not agree that existentialism is primarily a philosophy of becoming and not being. For the

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conventional existentialists, however, such becoming though important in both
ethics and metaphysics is yet more firmly rooted in being and its structures.

Existentialist philosophizing from viewpoint of actors:

The conventional existentialists have charged classical philosophy with
being much concerned with systematizing, with dealing with the problem of being
rather as objective scientists, dispassionately considering the evidence before
them; with looking upon man as a thing among other things. Aristotle and
Hegel are cited as "minds" philosophizing about the causes of being or the
unfolding of the Absolute Spirit in art, history, etc. The existentialists,
however, are said to have preferred a more personal, flesh and blood, body and
mind approach. They did not wish to deal with human problems as spectators
on the edges of a swimming pool but favored plunging into the waters of life
itself.

I would accept this proposition again as a point of emphasis, than as
embracing a complete truth. In a certain and important sense, no philoso-
phizing is possible without a dispassionate, detached outlook. While the
philosopher draws from his rich immediate experiences, he abstracts, reflects,
judges, generalizes, evaluates, etc. All this even the existentialists have
done though the terms abstracting and systematizing may have rational com-
notations abhorrent to some of them. They view philosophy not so much as
elucidating choices but the possibilities of human choosing. This conclusion
itself implies use of these classical processes.

Although some of the existentialists lost sight of this fact, they have
rendered a valuable contribution to philosophy by their examples of personal
involvement in their philosophizing. However, their manner of giving evidence
to this involvement has differed. Kierkegaard and Marcel have been the most biographical in their writings and were keen to philosophize in the context of their own problems. Thus Marcel’s sensitivity to interpersonal relations reflect his own spiritual odyssey, the warmth of personal interactions he experienced and the emptiness he felt without faith or deep religious conviction till he found his way into the Catholic Church.

On the other hand, Sartre and Jaspers seem less concerned with their own problems and much more with revealing to man his potentialities. Heidegger, however, has proved to be more the spectator than actor, preferring to retire to the loneliness of a mountain in the Black Forest region and withdrawing from regular lecturing, to study the problems of being, starting with man. His Sein und Zeit has shown that he is the new Aristotle of being in general, but vitally concerned to fathom the depths of being a human person.

Herein lies the secret of the existentialist appeal. Existentialists have made philosophy more human by their personal warmth and realism in turning to the entire condition of man. They shrank from fragmentizing human reality by purely positivistic or idealistic thinking and sought a wholistic approach where the ascent was on the entire person.

Existentialists’ concern for man as free, transcending individual subject:

This proposition, I feel, put forward by the conventional existentialists has typified their basic attitude and gives the keynote of their philosophy. Existentialism is “the form taken in a particular, historical epoch by the recurrent protest of the free individual against all that threatens or seems to threaten his unique position as an existent subject.”

25 Ibid., p. 137.
their metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical positions. For convenience, however, I will enter this topic in dealing with their ethics where it seems especially pertinent. At this stage, it is sufficient to note the deep ramifications of their evaluations for their entire philosophy.

**The existentialists' wide use of phenomenology:**

The phenomenological approach to existence, particularly human existence, has also emerged as a differentiating characteristic of this philosophy. This is a question of methodology and is better treated in connection with their epistemology. Phenomenology was another means to probe reality, but no longer with the coldness of the scientist, but rather allowing human observation and analysis to penetrate the concrete data of immediate experience, the vastness and contradictions of man's existence and relation to other existents. Hence the wide use of novels, plays, and stories by the existentialists.

The observations made in all the above topics will point to the reasons for the common man's interest in existentialism. It is said of Aristotle that he brought philosophy down from the heavens to the earth. Of the existentialists, we may say that they brought philosophy from the countryside (or some would say desert) to the buzzing marketplace and cafes of a metropolis. Indeed this is not a pure metaphor for it is said of Sartre that he frequented cafes and restaurants where he spent long hours reflecting, observing, and studying men. In like manner, plays and novels like Sartre's "La Nausée," "Les Mouches," or Marcal's "Le Coeur des autres" have popularized existentialism for the common man.

**The importance of existential vectors:**

Existentialist ontology may be described as a new form of empiricism. The existentialists build up their philosophy from concrete data. They have
made a radical break with Cartesian subjectivism. They do not arrive at an external world of persons and things by any circuitous inference. As Gabriel Marcel says, "What is given to me beyond all possible doubt is the confused and global experience of the world inasmuch as it is existent."\textsuperscript{26}

Reason then clarifies this original, confused data through phenomenological description and analysis. This leads to the idea of one world and not two worlds—a private world of psychic impressions and a public world of physical things. I do not think of myself alone—which is an idealist abstraction—but am equally aware of myself as a being-in-the-world. Indeed, without a world, there would be no subjective existence. Heidegger, Sartre, and Jaspers would all accept this formulation.\textsuperscript{27} Thus internal data do not enjoy any special status.

In like manner, I do not have to infer the existence of other minds from any more certain data. Being-with-others belongs to the very texture of my existence. I am also immediately aware of my body, as Marcel tells us in his enlightening studies of the mind-body problem.\textsuperscript{28}

Therefore, it is clear that the existentialists oppose metaphysical atomism and have found it necessary to forge new concepts to express the relational structure of being and awareness. Human existence is never self-enclosed, but is full of vectors. It tends towards, and so being is a being-to-something. It is never to be conceived as distinct units juxtaposed.

\textsuperscript{26} Marcel, \textit{Metaphysical Journal}, p. 322.

\textsuperscript{27} Welt, p. 60.

\textsuperscript{28} Marcel, \textit{The Mystery of Being}, p. 92.
Heidegger especially has named some of these existential vectors viz: a being-in-the-world, a being-with-others, a being-towards-my-death, etc.\(^{29}\)

Or as Sartre put it, "I really am this towards another—I-am-not."\(^{30}\) These are not bonds between two atomic entities. We may rather conceive this relation as the "magnet active-on" and the "filing susceptible to." This vectoral theory hits at the idea of internal relations and a monistic absolute. Positively it brings out a more complete and objective view of human reality.

**The existentialist theory of Truth and Good and Evil:**

At this stage, we need not enter these problems at length. Truth is distinguished from being but is centered in man. So, too, good and evil are never separated from man, like independent fixed qualities or properties applicable to man. Hence Sartre's saying, "I am my choice." Here again we see clearly how neither epistemology nor ethics may be neatly separated from their ontology. Truth and value are in man's existence due to his relational exigencies. This is a different approach from the classical schools which regarded being as good, true, beautiful, etc.

**Contradiction and contingency; potency and change:**

These are important metaphysical considerations which we prefer to leave to our study of existential ethics and epistemology. In general, we may note that no adequate theories have been formulated to explain them. The theory of "nothingness" advanced by Sartre and Heidegger have, however, revived ontology and contingency has been explained by a subjective interpretation of the principle of sufficient reason. Potency and change feature much in existentialist

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\(^{29}\) Wild, p. 67.

\(^{30}\) Ibid.
thinking especially in regard to man but with no exact ontological basis. Our existentialists have squarely faced the fact of death and contingency. These factors have made existence more meaningful for them even in the face of the "absurd."

**Human Existence**

Through the phenomenological analysis, the conventional existentialists have pinpointed many negative and positive aspects of human existence.

a. Existence is not equivalent to certain pragmatical and idealist conceptions. The existentialists have attacked views which express the idea of a stream of life moving towards cosmic goals. Such is the Hegelian view of the universe and man as manifestation and evolution of the Absolute Spirit.

b. Existence is not known objectively. It is not grasped by the faculty or faculties as an object. Kierkegaard typifies this thinking when he wrote

... For existence corresponds to the individual thing, the individual which even Aristotle teaches lies outside or at least cannot be reduced to a concept. For an individual animal, plant, or man, existence (to be—or not to be) is of quite decisive importance; an individual man has not after all a conceptual existence.\(^31\)

Besides, existence can never be apprehended as an object of thought. To regard oneself as an object is to ignore that practical awareness which leads to oneself as an existential being, committed and engaged. Therefore, existence is only known internally or subjectively by one who exists.

c. Existence is not identified with body or possessions. It does not consist of the limbs and senses of a man's body; nor of his home, tools and

goods; nor even his learning and culture. It is an inner core of his being which defies being conceptualized. We sense this in the individual's acceptance of truth "as an objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation process of the most passionate inwardness." It is not reason or reason alone which comes into play here, but a whole world of the individual's feelings, values, etc., which escape analysis.

d. Existence has no parts nor degrees. It is not something which may be referred to in terms of desires and needs as life is. While not being external to me, it may consist of many more internal elements than I suspect. It functions in unique ways.

e. Existence besides had not to be identified with passivity and quietism. Authentic existence is active.

f. Dasein and Existenz: Pour soi; ensoul. Dasein and Existenz are both terms which occur much directly or equivalently in existential literature. They are especially used by Heidegger and Jaspers. Pour soi and ensoul, however, were concepts introduced by Sartre with similar connotation at a certain level, viz. consciousness.

Both Heidegger and Jaspers were ontologists but vitally concerned with human existence. The German words Dasein literally refer to being-there or the being-thereness of existence—of man, for instance, being thrown into existence in a particular place or time. Existenz, on the other hand, refers to "potential being," to capability of man realizing himself. However, both Heidegger and Jaspers have introduced refinements in these meanings which we need to consider. The term Dasein certainly illustrates what Heidegger

32 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 23.
intends for us to accept as philosophical truth. It implies Being itself in the
person. Heidegger's view that the person is essentially related to being may
have derived from Kierkegaard's notion that the human self is grounded in God.
This seems plausible because of his "essential relatedness" of the Person to
what is other than itself. This other-relatedness is grounded in Existens, the
essence of the Person. Existens is not opposed to non-being. When it is so
opposed, Heidegger uses the term "existentia" derived from the Latin word
"existere," meaning to stand forth, to arise. However, Heidegger's definition
of Existens builds on the fact that human reality is essentially a being-towards.
In this way, he characterizes the person as getting beyond or transcending him-
self. This idea of transcendence characterizes all the five existentialists we
are considering in the above and also other senses.

For Jaspers, Dasein is the simple "being-there" of empirical reality.
It stands in contrast to existence. Dasein signifies the pure givenness of
temporal life and the conditions of the world as experienced by all persons
alike. It is the reality whose laws and structures are studied by science:

The whole of Dasein is the world. . . . The world is Dasein which con-
fronts me as the always determined being of objects; I myself am Dasein
as far as I am an empirical being.

Now human Dasein is not existence, but man in his Dasein is "possible existence"
(mögliche Existens). Man is "that being who is not, but that can be and ought

33 F. Molina, Existentialism as Philosophy (New York: Prentice Hall,
1962), p. 56.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Karl Jaspers, Philosophie, Vol. I, trans. F. Reinhardt (Berlin:
to be, and who therefore decides in his temporality whether or not he is to be eternal."\(^37\) We may press further and ask how does "possible existence" realize itself? "Freedom is the beginning and the end in the process of the illumination of existence.″\(^38\) In the act of choice, I recognize myself for the first time as my true self. The Kantian categories apply only to the level of Dasein, e.g., the categories of space, time, etc. But Existens is illumined only in the light of freedom.

When we come to Sartre, he illumines existence on the plane of consciousness. Consciousness always has an object. It is necessarily consciousness of something which is different from and beyond consciousness. Sartre calls the "being in-itself" l'en-soi and he opposes it to the "being for itself" (le pour soi). Indeed he is primarily concerned with the "for-itself" and gives us an analysis of the structure, projects and limitations of human consciousness. It suffices to say here that man strives to become l'en-soi-pour-soi by divinizing himself, but fails because this is an impossible project. Hence, man is a "futile passion" (une passion inutile). He "is not what he is, and is what he is not. . . . We are existents who can never catch up with themselves."\(^39\)

Yet man seeks to realize himself in action, to forge ahead towards an unattainable goal. Thus man is condemned to be free, realizing the "nihilating" function of human existence. The consciousness of new decisions and plans of his "pour soi" help constitute his possible being in its striving to be united

\(^{37}\text{Ibid.}\)
\(^{38}\text{Ibid.}\)
\(^{39}\text{Reinhardt, The Existentialist Revolt, p. 161.}\)
with the "in-itself." Now, Heidegger, who strongly objects to identifying man with consciousness, does not accept this analysis. Jaspers, Marcel, and Kierkegaard, all in the theistic line, also adopt their own analysis different from Sartre's to account for "possible human existence," as will be more evident soon. They would, nevertheless, agree that in conscious freedom man seeks authentic existence as contrasted with the drifting attitude or indifference implied in unauthentic existence.

"Being with others" is another aspect of existence already indicated, which will be developed in connection with "Ethics."

God

Of our five existentialists, Kierkegaard, Jaspers, and Marcel devote much attention to man's relation to God. Heidegger has defended himself against the charge of atheism and his philosophizing at least keeps an openness to or "a waiting for God."\(^40\) Sartre is clearly in the atheistic line, though even the belief in God, he asserts, would make no serious difference to his approach to man.

While accepting belief in God, the theistic existentialists have urged that God is not to be regarded as an object. He cannot be known as object, and so we ought not to try and prove his existence. This basic position is exposed in various ways.

Kierkegaard has defined the truth as "an objective uncertainty in an appropriation process of the most passionate inwardness . . . the highest truth\(^40\) Copleston, p. 183.
attainable for an existing individual." Or again he writes:

But the above definition of truth is an equivalent expression for faith. Without risk there is no faith. . . . If I am capable of grasping God objectively, I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this, I must believe . . . so as to remain out upon the deep, over seventy fathoms of water, still preserving my faith.

This is not precisely faith in the Catholic sense, but the attitude is shared by Marcel as well.

The human person becomes aware of himself in his interpersonal relations with other persons, Marcel holds. Such a person aspires to self-commitment, fidelity and loyalty to other men. In these relationships man transcends the relation of "having" and enters the sphere of Being. Two persons participate in being in loving. But as man has the dynamic urge towards the absolute and unconditioned, he reflects and invokes the absolute Thou, God, who, as the ground of all being, makes eternal commitment and fidelity possible. No rational process is involved here. "Perfect faith rises above the objectivity of the world and history and experiences God in the pure actuality of an Absolute Presence." In the act of constituting myself as a person in my historical situation, I take cognizance of the universal history of the race and of that Creator-God who is both "enveloping" and Transcendent Reality of myself, of the world and of "my being-in-the-world." Marcel denies any pantheistic coloring to these views because pantheism "seemed incapable of tolerating personal life in its concrete plenitude."

41 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 23.
43 Reinhardt, p. 207.
44 Ibid.
In relating to God, Marcel rests on the plane of experience. He does not deny the value of the Thomistic proofs for God's existence, but these do not exhaust the possibilities of other approaches to God which are largely subjective but also rise from concrete interaction with reality. His idea of a "personal God" and the communion of God and man has led to many fruitful conclusions.

Coming to Jaspers, we notice his preference, too, for the path of experience in positing the Transcendent. However, such experience is not of a mystical sort given to a few only. Jaspers also will reject any scientific approach to God. Man is aware of the Transcendent, in his estimation, because he is a "transcending being." The Transcendent opens up to him after discovering the world of objects and himself as a free, forward-moving being. In this forward movement towards his true self in liberty, he becomes aware of "limiting situations," like sickness, accident, death, etc. At the same time, he is aware of striving to overcome such situations and comes to the enveloping presence of "Being as the ground of all being." Thus he reaches Transcendence as the negative complement of limits but not as an object. This approach sounds similar to Marcel's. It is also based on a purely personal act taking account of three existential impulses in man—towards the world, possible existence, and Transcendence. When Jaspers uses the term "Transcendence" for God, he states: "We can never conceive Transcendence as an individual God separated from the world, nor can we say that "all" is transcendent or that God is the being which contains all." 45

Jaspers admits the use of the traditional proofs as tools for an intellectual approach to the "problem of Transcendence." But they presuppose the idea of God. Therefore, "a certitude of the existence of God, may it be ever so intangible, is a presupposition, not a result of the philosophic argument."\(^{46}\)

In the case of these three existentialists, we have seen how "philosophic faith" led them to God. Kierkegaard and Marcel will proceed further to discuss the God of revelation whom Jaspers pays no attention to.

As regards Heidegger, who was a Catholic, there is much speculation as to his belief in God. His manner of speaking about "Being" has given rise to these controversies. He has been chiefly interested in the problem of being and has been called the "shepherd and guardian of being." No doubt he began his philosophizing with human existence and this has led him to be styled an existentialist. But as he desired being as his domain and not just human existence, he has protested against being called an existentialist, much as Marcel did, because he was interested in essential aspects of philosophy and also in being.

What then is being for Heidegger? Sometimes he speaks of it in this vein: "Being as the basic theme of philosophy is no kind of being and nevertheless it pervades each entity."\(^{47}\) In this sense, it was neither God nor the ground nor cause of the world. It was broader than everything that is, yet nearer to man than any existent. Man has become homeless precisely because he has lost his contact with being and is more absorbed in things and beings.


Heidegger has also made much of nothingness in relation to being and spoken of being grounded in nothingness. However, as nothingness is ultimately revealed as being, all existents are ultimately grounded in the immense realm of "being" which reveals itself behind the veil of nothingness. When Heidegger asserts that "without being there can never be any existent," he opens the horizon towards the Divine Being. It is not on the philosophical plane, however, that God is revealed, but on the plane "of the holy." Heidegger himself clarifies this issue:

In this definition of the nature and condition of man, nothing is said as yet concerning the existence or nonexistence of God. . . . But with the clarification of the meaning of "transcendence," a sufficiently clear concept of Dasein is gained to make it possible to ask how human Dasein is ontologically related to the existence of God. 48

If Heidegger has not affirmed or denied God, he has apparently kept himself open to the Divine Being. This, however, is not the case with Sartre. He defends openly and repeatedly atheistic attitudes. "When we speak of forlornness, a term Heidegger was fond of, we mean only that God does not exist and that we have to face all the consequences of this." 49 The very idea of God, he maintains, is self-contradictory, because it is tied in with the concept of en-soi-pour-soi. If God were just en-soi, being in-itself, possessing the fullness of being, he would be incapable of consciousness or purposive activity. On the other hand, if he were pour-soi, he, too, like man, would be invaded by nothingness and the vain pursuit of an illusory goal. As we have

48 Reinhardt, p. 159.

seen, Sartre considers man’s passionate desire to become a God himself a futile passion. A deeper reason for Sartre’s atheism emerges in these words:

Existentialism is not so atheistic that it wears itself out showing that God does not exist. Rather it declares that even if He did exist, that would change nothing. . . . Not that we believe that God exists, but we think that the problem of His existence is not the issue.50

Man, he opines, would be aware of his freedom and responsibility by keeping God out of his view, and even better still, by denying Him.

The general existentialist interest in the historic condition of man leads us to consider their views about time and history.

Time and History

Their views here arise from human finiteness and contingency. They perceive the difference between “subjective and objective time.” Time for them is not just a measure of movement of thought, as the scholastics held, or action. It hinges on the manner, degree, and importance of the personal commitment. Hence, hours filled with boredom stretch out endlessly, while those marked by authentic choices, even if filled with an awareness of care, dread, and anxiety, become meaningful and may be swift in passage.

Heidegger has put forward views of time and history which bear the stamp of a new approach, but whose elements are partially found in the other existentialists. He refers to the older view which looks upon time as a succession of nows constituting in an even flow the past, present, and future. For instance, the future is a now-not-yet. Everything was said to happen in time with heavy emphasis on the present now, making the future practically nonexistent.51

50 ibid., p. 51.
51 Wild, p. 104.
Heidegger personally felt that time was at the root of the structure of human care. \(52\) Man temporalizes himself in authentic or unauthentic ways. The three "ecstasies" of time, as he called the present, past, and future, were integrated in the unity of his being. Therefore, man is not in time, but rather he is time and exists it. \(53\) I am not confined to the present moment, but project ahead of myself and yet remain the past I have been. In this ecstatic being, it is the future that has precedence. This is also brought out by Sartre. \(54\)

But this being is not exclusively futuristic. It stretches over my past and concerns my present in a single integrated structure. This unity is to be maintained by resolute choice before the present and with the future. As long as I am, I am the unfinished possibilities projected ahead of me and the unfinished past that I have been. So the three ecstasies temporalize themselves all together, but in different ways. The thought of death leads man, in Heidegger's view, to speak of the "passage" of time. This implies running away from the dread of contingency. But I seize my possibilities when facing my death to come and yet taking decisive action in the light of these at the present moment. For Kierkegaard, this present moment, "though short and temporal . . . is yet decisive because it is filled with eternity."

Marcel has written in a similar vein about transcending the fleeting moment by exercising freedom in a three-fold engagement. This I do by confronting my present, accepting my past, and projecting my future. It is my

\(52\) Ibid., p. 106.
\(53\) Ibid., p. 107.
\(54\) Ibid.
fidelity both toward my past and my future which become creative in my future, Marcel holds. In fact, both fidelity and hope triumph over time without denying it and maintain "the ontological permanence of my life."\(^{55}\)

We need not enter here into views about history linked up with the foregoing ideas about time, but shall leave this when considering applications to the school situation.

Conclusion

From the foregoing analysis, it is evident that the existentialists have covered wide areas of metaphysical speculation. As Wild has put it, "one result of the new empiricism is the rediscovery of those pervasive protocols which require ontological analysis and explanation."\(^{56}\) This is especially true of the human being and the problems of human existence. Their revival of ontology has been made possible by regarding man as a subject and not an object. While it is true that they have been much concerned with human choices and acts on an ethical plain, they have sought to elucidate the human condition and authentic existence. Above all, their use of the phenomenological method has awakened the ordinary man's interest in philosophy. Some of them, notably Heidegger and Jaspers, have restored interest in the problem of Being as well. We have endeavored to indicate also inadequacies and weaknesses in the existentialists' thinking, particularly in the line of a subjective approach to reality and in lack of realistic theorizing about essences, which, however, have not been ignored. Very interesting facets of the modes of being--being-in-the-world, being-with-others, etc., in the context of man's contingency, care and dread have also emerged and require further analysis.

\(^{55}\) Reinhardt, p. 211.

\(^{56}\) Wild, p. 64.
CHAPTER III

EPISODE

In this sphere, too, the existentialists have made valuable contributions to philosophy. By their theories about human awareness and truth, and by their wide use of phenomenology, they have cast further light on man's own appreciation and evaluation of the human condition. They will seek to probe the depths of man's feelings and total being in their efforts to understand the general circumstances which call for human decisions.

Human Awareness

Real knowledge in existentialist philosophy is linked to the being of man. It is also generally viewed as a mode of being which in turn is linked to his activity. As human knowledge promotes action, it is chiefly "practical reason" the existentialists will appeal to with their own meanings of this term.

Of our five existentialists, Jaspers seems most infected by Kantian subjectivism. For him awareness implies acts of constructive interpretation. There are no two experiences of individuals which are the same because of this element of interpretation. However, he holds that sciences are able to measure and analyse certain facts which make possible some universal agreement. But even these facts may be subject to individual, philosophical theories. Though skeptical in his general approach, Jaspers feels human existence may be

57 Wild, p. 152.
illumined by phenomenology so as to evoke a universal appeal. It is not clear how he reconciles this latter position with the former. The world thus remains a flickering appearance to him and no basic empirical structures could be known.

By contrast, Marcel, who was more of an idealist, has veered to a more realistic position. His phenomenological analysis provides much stimulating matter for reflection, drawn from the richness and complexity of interpersonal relations. He has complained of the manner in which sense and feeling have been neglected by the intellectualistic traditions of modern thought.\textsuperscript{58} Cartesian, and much more so, Hegelian idealism glorified reason at the expense of sense and feeling, whereas in real life, reason and these factors function together, yielding very reliable knowledge.

It may rightly be affirmed that this importance attached to mood and feeling has been typical of existential epistemology. The tradition derives from Kierkegaard who urged the need for "passionate inwardsness" in the appropriation of process of objective uncertainty and also for the "leap of faith." Heidegger has taken up the cue and carried it even further.

Feeling, in Heidegger's view, has its own peculiar mode of disclosure and gives us much that is opaque to pure theory.\textsuperscript{59} Our cognitive sources reveal to us, and help control, feelings. In a wider sense, moods disclose both feeling tones and external objects which aid or threaten me. My moods rise above mere subjective or objective categories revealing my-being-in-the-world. I become aware in this way of the reality of my situation, of being thrown into it and of struggling to escape it.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., p. 88.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., p. 87.
Heidegger has described understanding as "verstehen," which focuses on my essential possibilities and projects. This for him is the "central core of my being." I am the possibilities which my understanding projects before me. He gives in this manner a voluntaristic and practical turn to knowledge which is an essential mode of my being.

So understanding involves both "unveiling" (Verberfung) and a kind of creation. I am never without possibilities and have continuous insight of these. Knowing, Heidegger describes then as both disclosure and the articulation of practical projects. These latter depend on my ultimate projects. Fitting my projects into a frame is related to the being of Dasein.

Sartre has his own theory of awareness in which he has employed some of Heidegger's ideas. It is clear that Heidegger has not, in the above considerations, given us any ontological analysis and explanation of the noetic act. Hence, Sartre has turned attention to this lacuna.

He has turned aside from the Kantian idea of a "thing-in-itself" which we cannot know. The phenomena we describe are not just appearances but beings existing independent of our knowing them. Consequently, I cannot be conscious without being conscious of something. I am conscious of the tree or table I see, and indirectly, I am conscious of my act of consciousness. This is due to the intentional or relational structure in awareness, and is made possible by the "prereflexive ego." Descartes, on the other hand, failed to see this intentional duality in the I-think-about leading him to idealism. As against this view, Sartre holds awareness to be not a thing, but a relation. Sartre

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60 Ibid., p. 88.
61 Ibid., p. 91.
goes a step further in describing this "disclosure in awareness" as Heidegger would call it. He posited, as I have already indicated, the existence of the pour-soi and en-soi. He regards en-soi or being-in-itself as inert, inactive, with no room for potency, an atomic plemum, as "being-in" and so nonrelational in structure.\(^62\) By contrast, awareness is active, radically relational, ever seeking to be filled. He therefore posits pour-soi with these qualities. Both pour-soi and en-soi are here taken as modes of being.

Awareness, in Sartre's analysis, is beyond being and what is beyond being is nothing. Hence, awareness is non-being. Consciousness is therefore:

... distinct from or negation of ... yet what separates the pour-soi from en-soi is nothing. Consciousness comes into being through the secretion of nothing. A rift or fissure as it were appears in being; and this rift or fissure cannot be explained because it is nothing.\(^63\)

So nothingness is lodged like a worm in the core of being and "nothingness haunts being."\(^64\) This does not mean, however, that consciousness achieves an independence and separation from en-soi once and for all, but constantly reconstitutes itself for every particular object. Consciousness depends on the en-soi and yet is separated from it by nothing.

Sartre also links this theory with his concept of freedom. Even pour-soi separates itself from itself, constituting its own past en-soi. By doing this, I transcend my past and project myself into the future. This ability to separate myself from the past with which I am not simply identical is creative of my own liberty, even though the interval by which I separate myself is nothing.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., p. 92.

\(^{63}\) Copleston, p. 186.

\(^{64}\) Reinhardt, p. 160.
Thus I remain free till death wipes out my possibilities and I become en-soi. But obviously, in Sartre's view, it will be a contradiction in terms for me to be ever fully myself—"pour-soi-en-soi" united. As he has conceived God like man, it is not surprising that this union would be equally impossible in God. As a result, the scholastic concept of God's thought or essence being one with His being is an absurdity for him and a justification for atheism. This briefly represents Sartre's efforts to complement Heidegger's thinking, and we may now pass to an allied topic, the existentialists' view of truth.

Truth

It will be quite evident now that truth will assume a very subjective dimension in the existentialists' evaluation. This view of truth is based on "Man as the measure of all things" and has repeatedly appeared from the time of the Greek sophists to our own day.

Kierkegaard took up this thinking with great passion. While traditional philosophy proceeded from the world through the person, the latter was regarded as an empty, relative point to return to the world. Kierkegaard reversed this order by going from the person by way of things back to the person.

He has reacted strongly against Hegelian rationalism which merged the individual in the universal. But at the same time, Kierkegaard has not lost his bearings with regard to man seeking the Infinite, God. He holds, however, that this is not achieved by the gymnastics of a system. The authentically existing individual will be infinitely interested in himself and his own eternal destiny. This comes about through "the passion of human freedom." Confronted constantly by the Infinite, the individual is called upon to make an "either-or decision" for or against the Infinite. Then he becomes what he is
through subjectivity as he accepts the Infinite.

When subjectivity is the truth, the conceptual determination of the truth must include an expression for the antithesis to objectivity, a memento of the fork in the road where the way swings off; this expression will at the same time serve as an indication of the tension of subjective inwardness.65

There follows Kierkegaard's definition of truth as "an objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation process of the most passionate inwardness."66 While this passionate inwardness holds good for any belief, doctrine or opinion which the individual embraces, it is particularly true of Christian revelation. One of the highest stages a man may attain is the religious stage by the leap of faith which enables a person to plunge into its waters and experience being borne on its waves. To become a true Christian was Kierkegaard's own struggle.

Heidegger, however, has his own ideas about truth somewhat different from Kierkegaard's. As already indicated, he connects the problem of truth with the problem of being. Truth consists in the disclosure of the being of things. In this process, man enters into Dasein. To do this well, the philosopher has to withdraw from the everyday view of things, in a way analogous to the withdrawal of Plato into a cave. Ascending into the light of the sun of truth, the philosopher is able to convey his insights to other men. Such insight liberates man for authentic existence. This is what Heidegger himself tried to do.

Each man, too, has to seek his own disclosures. This comes especially from man's projects as a being in the world. It is wrong to consider the world

65 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 23.
66 Ibid.
as an ordered system and we ourselves as part of a vast cosmic process. This is an attack against idealism, particularly of the Hegelian brand. Heidegger would rather have man consider the world as a world of "tools" (Zweck), as the earth is for the farmer that which he ploughs in order to grow wheat. So man as a being in the world with other beings and even things must use these to realize his own possibilities. He constitutes all these into his own meaningful system and this happens precisely in his forward movement working as he may do with some initial insights. In the light of this analysis, Heidegger's definition of truth is significant. "Truth is the manifestness of the essent. To know is accordingly the ability to stand in the manifestness of the essent, to endure it."67 This manifestness of the essent includes a person's view, attitudes, evaluations of men, society, things, etc. Being unauthentic is analogous, in his thinking, to the notion of being in untruth, as when "we enjoy and amuse ourselves as ONE enjoys, we read, see, and judge literature as ONE sees and judges."68 Thus, not-being-oneself but acting "as one person among others" is untruth.69

Sartre shares in this last view of untruth. He, too, speaks of the world as the totality of existents, as the way I have ordered things or understood them in order to strive for my chosen projects. Every person exists-in-a-world. "Without a world there can be no person; but without a person there can be no world."70 Man finds himself and his truth in his projects and his

68 Ibid., pp. 126-127.
69 Ibid., pp. 175-176.
70 Ibid., pp. 148-149.
own values. In freedom, man becomes his truth.

Marcel's outlook on and approach to truth follow Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Heidegger in their condemnation of idealism, rationalism, and positivism which leave no room for the individual to find his own way to truth. Like Heidegger, Marcel links truth with being. In his search for a new and concrete approach to being, he has found two different kinds of reflection. His "first reflection" has its place in scientific research; the "second reflection" is strictly philosophical.

The first reflection is primarily concerned with problems. "A problem is something which one hits upon, something which blocks one's way." For instance, loving is a concrete, immediate experience. But to inquire why John loves Susan is a problem and may be answered in terms of escapes, repressions, or complexes, like the Oedipus complex. Such problems are akin to the search for "scientific, natural causes." This constitutes "first reflection."

On the other hand, "second reflection" relates to mystery.

... A mystery, on the contrary, is something in which I find myself engaged, whose essence is consequently not to be wholly 'in front of me.' It seems that in this realm the distinction between the 'within myself' and the 'in front of myself' loses all significance.\(^7\)

In the case of John loving Susan, he may enter this loving experience from within the experience and analyze it. This is different from "first reflection" where he could stand apart from himself to seek the cause of his love, like a scientist. In second reflection he keeps the unity of personal communion and reflects on the significance of love as communion of persons or participation

\(^7\) Reinhardt, p. 234.

\(^7\) Ibid.
in being. Mystery gives us philosophical, personal, religious truth involving man. The union of soul and body, the phenomena of evil, of human freedom, etc., are mysteries in which all men and not merely philosophers are involved. So mystery plumbs the depths of man's being, of his relations to his fellowmen, to things, and above all, to God.

In fact, the existential concreteness of being is enhanced by the "encounter." Suppose I meet someone unknown to me on the train and we talk about the weather or some common news. Each remains a someone to the other and both are on the "problematic level," discussing general problems. But

... when I discover that we have a certain experience in common (we have visited the same place, been exposed to the identical danger), a bond is established; a unity is created in which the other and I are we.73

When this real communication is established, persons enter the metaproblematic world of mystery. This is also true of my relation to God, in which I transcend considering Him as a problem and relate to Him as the "Absolute Thou" in "mystery." Marcel's analysis of fidelity, love, etc., especially from his own experiences, have yielded valuable analysis for epistemology. Indeed, the method of exposition that Marcel used is basically common to the existentialists.

Phenomenology

This is the method of philosophizing peculiar to the existentialists. It was first developed by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), among whose students were Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau Ponty, etc. Husserl began his career as a mathematician, but later became interested in philosophy. It was his ambition to convert philosophy into an exact and trustworthy science, and he was convinced that

73Ibid., p. 217.
philosophy could present doctrine and truth of universal validity and univocal significance.

The essence of truth, Husserl asserted, is revealed in a mental act of intuition. This position requires a realism of essences and leads to the "intuition of essences." It may be illustrated in regard to artistic or poetic experiences. An artist may depict some natural scenery. To a scientist this scene is of interest to him as dealing with visible, tangible elements, their qualities and functions. The artist tries to capture these and adds, too, his artistic apperception which, with its peculiar coloring and form, bring out aspects of essence and reality hidden from the senses. This yields the "eidetic knowledge"—a new world and reality of higher validity than the merely sensory. In like manner, Husserl conceived philosophy as a science of essences, but arising from facts. He elaborated sciences of "pure essences," like geometry or arithmetic, and believed such essences could be found in purified intellectual or philosophic intuition.

Husserl elaborated his method, applying it to the analysis of the contents of human consciousness. This required simple and unprejudiced observation and description of these phenomena derived from sense or "eidetic" perception. The object of a phenomenological investigation is, accordingly, to discover evidence of this nature:

... the self-appearance, the self-exhibiting, the self-giving, of an affair, an affair complex (or state of affairs), a universality, a value, or other objectivity, in the final mode: 'itself there.'

Into the natural experience of my everyday surroundings, Husserl introduced a

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Cartesian element—the principle of doubt. If I call in question the existence of these supposedly "real" implements of my surrounding world, nothing will remain but the experienced contents of my conscience. This procedure demanded an "epoché" or suspension of judgment about the existence or mode of existence of the object selected for contemplation, analysis, and description. This then was his famous "phenomenological reduction" which he used as a "propaedeutic" to ontology.

In this reductive process, the I within the phenomenological standpoint was pure consciousness, a "transcendental Ego" to whom experiences are present but who is never part of these experiences and therefore can turn its glances in different ways at this stream. However, it is self-identical with its own stream of experience. This has been possible because the existence of the external world has been set aside, as well as all preconceived beliefs, opinions, convictions regarding these objects. All attention has been turned to essential relations and structures and not so much to particular facts. This was the new method of disclosure.

Now Heidegger altered the use of his professor's teachings and adopted phenomenology not as preparatory for, but as an instrument of ontology. For him philosophy was chiefly a reading of phenomena and also a universal ontology starting out with an analysis and interpretation of man.

A common point of view of the conventional existentialists was to take for granted the existence of the world and of man as a being-in-the-world and being-with-others. Starting with Kierkegaard, they found no need to prove the outside world as Descartes felt called upon to do. These were primary data of experience, practical presuppositions which Heidegger felt could be clarified
and interpreted later. The realists have objected to the use of assumptions and have preferred to keep an attitude of noetic nothingness as a necessary condition to attain true knowledge. Sartre's theory of awareness as nothing may have some use here, but he has also posited the intentional structure of awareness which tends to and accepts the outside world as real.

All the conventional existentialists have used phenomenology in this way as an empirical discipline, especially with regard to man. They have as a first step employed feeling, sense, and reason in their description of the noetic or external, sensory experiences. Then they have analyzed such complex data and their relational forms. We may cite here the descriptions given of existential vectors, Kierkegaard's description of the three stages in man's life, Marcel's analysis of faith and hope, Heidegger's three modes of Dasein called "existentialia" (viz. "Befindlichkeit" or the way man is placed in the world, "Verstehen" or understanding one's purpose in life and one's potentialities, and "Rede" of the faculty of speech and silence).

In the next stage, any factor clearly grasped and any structural phase or relation are taken as reasons for making something as they are. Husserl would call these essences, but the existentialists prefer to describe them in human existence as "the nature and condition of man." This latter, of course, is linked with existence. Therefore, existence is accepted and "a phenomenological ontology is possible." Sartre's view has been shared by the others, except Jaspers, who has used phenomenology, but has found too much of interpretation entering his study to admit a "universal ontology."

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75 Wild, p. 162.
The final stage in the phenomenological process was the formulation of an integral theory, at the same time internally coherent and also taking account of all known entities and phases of being. The data should suggest interpretation and not the other way around. Of this nature would be the theory of nothingness seeking to explain awareness, truth, and freedom as Sartre and Heidegger have given us. Sartre objected to anything like pure consciousness akin to "pure essences" as Husserl referred to. This reason was that consciousness was always consciousness of something and pour-soi could never be one with en-soi. These are explanatory phases of analysis to which Sartre devoted himself than being content more with descriptive analysis as Heidegger was. 76

Logic

Heidegger has complained of the isolation of "logic" as a science from both ontology and epistemology. Formal or symbolic logic, which was for long the central philosophical discipline, began to regard logical entities as separate things. Modern logic, too, was most interested in the instrumental symbols of language than its referential functions. Logic, which is truly intentional in Heidegger's view as Greek logic started out to be, keeps in touch with being and does not develop on mere subject-predicate relations of abstractions conceived as things. 77

Heidegger's logic and those of the other existentialists follow a new pattern of thinking. They have not been interested in the pattern of things as

76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., p. 96.
they are in themselves, but prefer the patterns which emerge from chosen projects. This may be described as "the logic of practice" as opposed to the classical "logic of theory." The latter logic and its adherents typified by the mathematical logicians in Heidegger's words, "dismiss the task of inquiring into the logos itself."  

Sartre exhibits this same view when he identifies consciousness and choice. Underlying these views is the basic tendency of the existentialists to identify human awareness with action.

Communication

Closely related to this idea of a practical logic and of "being-with-others" is the need for communication. However, this will be developed in the chapter on "Ethics," where concepts of society and human relations will be discussed. Communication aids the cause of personal truth and may promote authentic existence.

Existential States—Dread, Care, Anxiety, Boredom

These existential states have been highlighted by the existentialists' giving a more vivid and realistic picture of man's condition in the world than the neat systems of the idealists, rationalists, and positivists have done. Herein our authors brought into play the roles of mood and feeling as modes of disclosures which are not purely subjective.

Dread, also called "anguish," is one of these states which Kierkegaard first described. He distinguished dread from fear. When we are afraid, we


can generally recognize the object of our fear—unemployment, sickness, loss of money, war, etc. But dread has no specific object. It threatens. It comes from all sides. We cannot escape it. The warm and friendly colors of life wear thin. I feel alone, surrounded by alien things and face "nothing." It is anything but soothing. But this is nothing morbid or abnormal. It represents our state of fallenness and this is an incipient experience of arousing and awaking. It shocks us out of what we see as a drab and ordinary state. Then "dread is the possibility of freedom." It becomes a fire-consuming delusion and illusions and leads us where we would go. Authentic existence lies ahead of me.

Heidegger has taken up this analysis and developed it on more disciplined lines. He too has contrasted fear and dread. Fear, he avers, threatens my being or some phase of my being, but dread threatens my whole being-in-the-world. All objects and everything I am sink into meaninglessness and indifference. I dread the facticity into which I am thrown. It makes me lonely but emphasizes the real possibilities which I am, though they lie ahead of me. Now I am aroused to decisive choice and action, provided I break from the everyday world into which I have fallen.

By contrast, fears are derived and debased forms of anxiety, threatening determinate phases of my being. These can be met by shrewd precautions or counteracting measures which do not touch my existence. But dread gives me the

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80 Ibid.
81 Ibid., p. 135.
82 Ibid., p. 99.
choice of genuine existence, liberating me from these fears. In this way, dread brings me a new type of knowledge and disclosure.

Care is another existential state, but much more pervasive in my life. It fills my whole life. Too often we make the error of treating our life as a stream of psychic events arising in the past to occupy the present and then to enter a nonexistent future. Heidegger criticizes this view, asserting man's whole life is active and conative, and "Sorge" or care characterizes this structure. He describes a threefold ordering of human existence which is the structure of care, viz. "ahead of itself, . . . as already in the world, . . . as being with."

The man of care does not live for the moment and is not cast here and there by every object he sees or desires he has. He is future-orientated in his present. Care implies not just acting on something but "being with" it or a person. Whatever one is doing, one is caring for something or not. I am the center of care.

Care appears in a vast variety of forms which may be authentic or non-authentic. Drives and urges are most present-oriented. Desires and interests are on a higher level, as these view the future but only dimly. Wishes concern only a limited view of my real possibilities. The more authentic kinds of care are manifested in purposive choices where basic possibilities are grasped or decisive commitment made.

Boredom, another existential state, is one of the moods of dread. Melancholy and despair also belong to this class.

\[^{83}\text{Ibid.},\ p.\ 100.\]
It is not boredom with particular objects or persons that Kierkegaard is so much concerned with, but more the boredom with oneself leading to a confused indifference and a nameless emptiness. We may try to overcome this by plunging into hectic activity, insatiable curiosity for the novel. Or else it may lead us to authentic existence. 84

When boredom develops, it may lead to despair involving one's very existence. When it reaches this stage, it becomes dread and the individual either avoids dread or seizes it for a genuine existence.

Conclusion

The existentialists have shown much originality in developing their epistemology. They have broken from many traditional patterns of thinking and have drawn attention to the subjective aspects of truth, which seemed most neglected today. But most important of all, they have shown not only reason, but feeling and mood, as significant means to arrive not at abstract truth, but the truth that promotes active, purposive, authentic existence. It is this last aspect of existence we shall take up now and inquire into its nature.

CHAPTER IV

ETHICS

So far we have touched on the existentialists' views in regard to some of the internal structures of human existence, such as awareness, care, time. We also referred to the existential vectors like being-in-the-world, being-with-others, being-towards-death. The ground has been prepared, therefore, for the far more important and complex phenomenon of choice and decision. These are tied in with their fundamental concept of freedom.

Once again, we will notice that the existentialists are averse to considering human freedom as merely a kind of thing or a kind of change or a kind of possibility. It is really a mode of being and therefore touches the basic categories of ontology.

Decision is a basic existential, a way of being in the world which affects us all. But it is not a necessary existential like time. Men cannot exist without time. But they may exist without being free. It is decision which splits our ranks. Kierkegaard made the distinction between those who decide with authenticity and integrity and those who seem to decide this way but really do not. We are thus in the process of coming to grips with ethical issues and will center our attention on authentic and inauthentic human modes of being.

Grounds of Freedom

Decision indeed is regarded by the existentialists as something central to man. It is not like an accident added to a material substance. Rather it
is at the core of man determining the very fabric of his existence. In Jaspers' words, "as far as I choose, I am; if I am not I do not choose."

Or again, Sartre states, "I am my liberty."

This statement of Sartre suggests the absolute nature of freedom. It extends completely to man in everything. It gives no scope to any kind of determinism. Man must accept this burden which no one can relieve his of—neither himself who is this freedom, nor his fellowmen, nor so-called good or evil forces, nor even God—as there is no God.

Sartre connects his freedom, as was mentioned earlier, with his teaching of "nothingness." Freedom results from man not being self-sufficient, not completely real and actually inferior to the fullness of being of the \( \mathcal{A} \). His freedom then follows from his ontological inferiority and his \( \text{une de compression d'être} \), i.e. his diminution of being. Realizing he is divided and incomplete, he aspires to the fullness of being and yet wants to retain his consciousness of his own self which is a self-contradictory goal. In the exercise of his freedom, too, he forges ahead to realise himself, but fails. The heart of the matter is that nothingness is at the heart of his being. "We are existents who never catch up with ourselves." Our self-idealization plans are bound to fail. The insurmountable barrier of nothingness separates man from himself as he projects the possibilities of his existence into time and history, into the past, present, and future. He is and is not his past; and so too of himself and his future, since "nothing" intervenes between time and

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85 Wald, p. 117.
86 Ibid.
87 Reinhardt, p. 161.
his future. But the present always bids him make himself. Hence, the word
"nothing" applies to the rupture in his being. It also applies to that state
which dread brings on, offering me the opportunity to be myself or not myself.
Further, it applies to my being thrown into existence for no reason I can make
out and by no cause I am conscious of. God is ruled out and there is postulated
no need to employ the principle of causality. Finally, as man will never
realise himself, he is proceeding "towards nothingness"—not merely as an
extinction of his possibilities in death, but as engaging in absurd projects
because "I am precisely this kind of absurdity." 36 Hence, the expression that
"man is condemned to be free" 39 and his most meaningful projects do not escape
the miliating tuch.

Heidegger too employs the concept of "nothingness" in connection with
human freedom, but in a different way from Sartre. The latter demands that
"God is dead" so that human freedom may be born. For Heidegger, the essence of
truth is freedom and freedom itself is grounded in the truth of Being. Even his
concept of "nothingness" is related to being. Nothingness is a first step
leading to the elucidation of metaphysics for the "shepherd of being."

From nothingness being emerges. He will also interpret it as evoking
dread. In this sense, it is more than a vague feeling or passing emotion. All
things then seem to slip away from and around man, confronting him with the
possibility of decision which will reverse this process and help him to find
love and understanding.

36 Id.
39 Id.
Though these expressions sound similar to Sartre, they assume a different meaning in the context of his "openness to God." In this sense, nothingness may be an openness to the Transcendent, a possible interpretation of his involved metaphysical discussions.90 Besides, in view of Heidegger's denial of the charge of nihilism against him in his letter on "Humanism," nothingness will not have the implications of a denial of creation or of God endowing man with freedom. If he asserts, on the one hand, that nothingness is revealed as being, he also makes it clear that without being there can never be an existent.

More clearly, Heidegger has asserted that the truth of being liberates man for authentic existence. Heidegger's concept of "overtness" in which the vast realm of being is open to man sounds much like St. Thomas' expression that "the human soul is in a way all things." No doubt man uses the world as tools, but a proper use of these tools is based on a true evaluation of their being and their relation to my being. Thinking, he feels, is also action more potent and consequential than practical application. Truth based on my historical condition makes me conscious of my ability of what and how I may decide or not decide at all. I find freedom in truth. For Heidegger, man is the witness of being; for Sartre, he is the creator and master of being.

Some of Heidegger's philosophizing about freedom may be traced to Kierkegaard, but the latter was no metaphysician in his interest in being as the former has been. It was Kierkegaard who first described "dread," an experience which gave man an awareness of his own freedom. However, he has moved so much in the theological realms of Christianity that these have pro-

90 Copleston, p. 184.
foundly affected his concepts of freedom. Human subjectivity could never become conscious of itself and of its freedom and the need for decisive choice were it not confronted with the Absolute Being. "The existence of a Christian is his contact with Being," he wrote in 1844. 91 In this manner, the individual becomes infinitely interested in himself and in realizing his destiny. It is a passion of human freedom which forces upon the individual decisive choice with all its risks. Reinhardt has ably summed up Kierkegaard's theological bent in regarding Christian existence as

... at once sinfulness and bliss, the annihilation of the individual before God and his rebirth in God, a rebirth which comes about in the supreme venture of faith which passionately embraces the paradox of the eternal in the temporal; the divine has entered human history; the Word has become flesh. 92

Truth is such subjectivity for the Christian and his highest personal self-realization. Besides, while nothingness is a veil of being for man, there comes the paradoxical truth—"God creates everything out of nothing, and that which He wants to use He first reduces to nothing." 93 This act, far from depriving man of his freedom, leads him to the freedom under God in which he realizes himself as a being tending to God.

Marcel is on similar lines when he adopted the motto of Hugo of St. Victor, "To raise oneself to God is to enter into oneself and not only that, but in the depth of the self to transcend oneself." 94 It is really the act of faith which marks the birth of both human personality and human freedom though

91 Reinhardt, p. 42.
92 Ibid., pp. 42-43.
93 Ibid., p. 155.
94 Ibid., p. 209.
this presupposes "freedom of choice." However, freedom of choice is only a prelude to the true freedom of engagement where God and man meet, God freely calling and man freely responding.

Jaspers, like Marcel, finds the origin of freedom in the genuine acceptance of the human situation. Both find in the tension which exists between human freedom and the limitations of the human situation the way to "transcendence." For any rational philosophy, freedom of action presupposes an intellect which can deliberate and weigh motives. But Jaspers posits an anti-intellectual element when he writes, "The science of not knowing is the condition of freedom. . . . If we knew of an intelligible answer to the question 'Whence guilt, strife and evil?' the possibility of existence would be deprived of its genuine, original experience."95 Comparatively, the intellectual element is better related in Marcel's affirmation.

This philosophic reflection functions only in virtue and for the sake of freedom. . . . The very idea of constraint is void of all possible meaning in this sphere. . . . I can freely choose the absurd because I may easily persuade myself that it is not absurd.96

Jaspers could not have put his case more strongly, which is basically that of the other four existentialists too, in these words: "Existence is real only as freedom. . . . Freedom is . . . the being of existence."97

Human Decision: Authentic and Unauthentic

Existence

Freedom provides the basic groundwork for decision. The free man is

95 Ibid., p. 183.
96 Ibid., p. 216.
97 Ibid., p. 181.
faced with decisions which give rise to authentic or unauthentic existence. Decisions affect the core of man's being and all his existential structures. The task of choosing, willing and not merely wishing, of doing and not merely thinking, theoretically is given central place in existentialist appreciation of what scholastics style "the human act." This would be equivalent to positing will in man. Though both intellect and will enter my choices, the existentialists do not differentiate these faculties, but speak of man choosing, deciding, etc. We shall now examine these structures and other related matters to bring out the force of these two modes of being.

**Being in the world:**

This particular existential vector has been best described by Heidegger. It is assumed as self-evident by the existentialists. It a man fails to see his true relationship with the world, he leads an unauthentic existence. This takes place when he treats himself as an artifact and instrument in a world of objects. This tendency has grown in the present day due to industrial and technological growth.

Each one of us occupies a certain place in the world, does particular work, lives for an allotted time. We tend to regard ourselves functionally as serving certain useful purposes. Our goals in life then become extrinsic to ourselves and the world is viewed as independent of us. Another error may arise and we may regard ourselves as "mind-things," failing to recognize our own individual existence and relating to external beings and persons through an abstract reflective process.

The authentic person, on the other hand, is sure of himself in the light of his last possibilities. He knows he is not circumscribed like a thing or
locked up in a mind container. He sees his being stretched out before him and
is aware of his relational structure. He is certain of the world around him
and does not view himself in isolation. An awareness of broader horizons of
reality opens before him. This world picture is of his own making.

Collins has summed up Heidegger's view ably. He states

Man still retains his freedom of interpreting his presence in the world
and toward death. . . . Man's presence in the world is that of a
witness as well as a master planner. 98

He does not find the objects of the world just "at hand," but considers them
"on hand" to be used as tools for his own projects. He does not treat the
world as a finished product, but sets his own patterns of aesthetic, moral,
religious, and ontological significance.

Basically, the other existentialists were emphasizing this same view of
man constructing his world, of accepting responsibility and risk in relation to
his being and other things.

Man in relation to God and moral order

To appreciate existentialist ethics, we have to bear in mind that here
especially, they have reacted against essentialist ethics of some classical
schools. Earlier systems were generally keen to give disciplined accounts of
human nature and its major capacities; they also clarified the hierarchial
order of subordination needed for normal human functioning. They formulated
a clear picture of the ideal life for man, and all man had to do was to apply
these categories to his life. Often enough they regarded God as the basis of
moral order, conscience, natural law, etc. Man was considered somewhat free,

98 James Collins, The Existentialists (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952),
p. 234.
but found himself threatened by the sanctions of the moral law and compelled even against his will to acknowledge this law, though he was not convinced of its value.

This is the picture which emerges from the conventional existentialists. However, they have professed greater interest in existential processes and acts of choice which were neglected by the classical schools. Without a concrete understanding of these factors, these ideal systems could not be realised in concrete history. Hence, the existentialists' study of the modes by which men exercise their freedom and also of limiting factors on freedom. Besides, attention was also turned to forms of autocracy and tyranny which left the natural order intact. Let us turn to specific viewpoints.

Sartre's adherence to atheism, as we have seen, was based on his peculiar theory of knowledge applied to God. He rejoiced at the pronouncements that God was dead to proclaim more urgently and forcefully that man had therefore to face his responsibility in the exercise of his freedom. "No one," he maintained, "can relieve me of this burden; neither I myself who am this freedom, nor my fellowmen, nor a God because there is no God."99

Man had to tear himself from the feeling of security which the classical moral law falsely gave him. This situation is dramatised in his play "Les Mouches," where Jupiter is depicted as the Creator of the World, the Lord of Nature, the Supreme Lawgiver. Jupiter addresses rebellious Creastes to whom he gave power to rule Argos and maintain a regime of order.

"I am a king, you shameless worm," says Jupiter. "Who after all
created you?" "You," Orestes admits with sovereign contempt, "but you
should not have created me free." "I have given you freedom that you
might freely serve me," replies Jupiter. "That's possible," sneers
Orestes, "but it has turned against you. . . . I am a man, Jupiter,
and every man has to find his way." 100

Sartre emphasized man's feeling of dread and loneliness in realizing his free-
dom. He hammers mercilessly at man's blindly clinging to the "precepts of the
law." When it comes to applying these precepts to concrete situation, the
human being is the ultimate arbiter. He tells of the young French boy faced
with the choice of leaving for England during World War II and joining the free
French forces—a hazardous and uncertain enterprise—or remaining with his
mother and helping her to carry on—a more sure scheme.

Who would help him choose? Christian doctrine. No Christian
dogma says, "Be charitable, love your neighbor, take the more
rugged path." But which is the more rugged path? Whom should he
love as a brother? The fighting man or his brother. . . . No book
of ethics can tell him. 101

Even if those precepts and books of ethics gave the man certain suggestions, he
would have to say, "But in any case, I myself choose the meaning they have." 102

Sartre does not seem bound to a Christian code of ethics, but may accept
it as being meaningful in a given context. He favors the idea of a universal
"condition of man," but he distrusts an ontological norm of morality founded on
the will of God or a fixed human nature. Each man must seek his own moral
truths and live them, even if they imply a contradiction of outlooks.

Jaspers, too, follows this attitude when he says, "Existential choice is
not obedience to an objectively formulated imperative." 103

100 Ibid., p. 173.
101 Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, pp. 24-25.
102 Ibid., p. 28.
103 Reinhart, p. 182.
He turns to an internal, personal law which he believes is an indispensable condition in the use of his freedom. This concept of law also embraces a conscious hierarchy of values and an openness to the Transcendent. One of his highest values is the unity of existence and Dasein, fusing the eternal and the temporal.

As soon as the weight of eternity is received into the temporality of Dasein, the eternal envelops and permeates the eternal. ... Such an eternal existence in the fulfilled moment is realized ... in the authentic act of freedom. 104

This seems to refer to an encounter of God and man, so that his ethics may well have a theistic foundation.

Marcel, a convert to Catholicism, has openly accepted the concept of an objective moral order rooted in God. He has developed his thinking on inter-personal lines with a rather theological flavor. Such, for instance, is his view of faith when man responds freely to the appeal of God. In faith, man finds the integrity of his being and also:

I now understand my situation in the world by relating it to the creative will of God. I realize my engagement in history by becoming aware of my divine vocation. 105

He goes on to develop his freedom of engagement both in relation to man and God as promoting authentic existence. He clearly acknowledges that "from the idea of that God who has willed me, I can then pass on to the idea of that God who has willed the world." 106 This acknowledgment of God as creator and man as creature leads in faith to a consecration and restitution of man and all he has to God. What Marcel objects to is not the objective moral order per se but an exclusively objective manner of reaching it and not principally through

104 Ibid., p. 185.
105 Ibid., p. 208.
faith. Objective knowledge for him was neither definitive nor total knowledge. To remain true to itself, it must transcend and give way to the "ontological mystery" which includes history and eternity. Fidelity to God's moral order is a natural corollary of personal faith.

Heidegger, on his part, is also distrustful of specific acts in terms of fixed ethical norms. His openness to the Divine and his distrust of a fixed human nature have given rise to an ambiguous position as to the basis of morality. His descriptions of the universal existential vectors in the case of man do suggest, however, an ontological basis for his morality.

He dislikes the "Kantian portrayal of conscience as a courtroom scene in which a cold and austere reason passes judgment on what we have done," though he would accept the Kantian noumenal category of freedom as being truly existential. Conscience is rather concerned with my whole being and especially with the guiding portion ahead of me. The call of conscience comes to me, he states, from beyond. It is never loquacious. It gives a clear message and informs me that I am guilty and calls me from my evasions to take over guilt and struggle with it. At least, the concept of subjective morality is implied here with a possible "waiting for God" even in conscience speaking.

With Kierkegaard, however, man's relation to God is far more clear than in Heidegger. The moral order to be of real value had to be appropriated by man with a passionate inwardness. Now the moral law in his philosophy would belong to the order of objective truth which man ought to make his own. This is not possible without existential struggle and choices.

107 Wild, p. 121.
Kierkegaard has given us a moving and vivid account of the stages a man passes through before he encounters God. These stages which seem to present Kierkegaard's own experiences are the aesthetic, ethical, and religious stages constituting an "existential dialectic."

In the aesthetic stage, man may take to a sensuous life, have no fixed moral principles, may hate fixed lines and contours, and may taste a bewildering variety of experiences. Don Juan characterizes this stage. Kierkegaard may have had in mind his own youthful exuberance and the sowing of his wild oats during his university days. Despair and melancholia, such as he experienced, may lead to a choice of life where personality was not dispersed.

In the ethical stage, man adopts the universal moral law. This stage was typified by Socrates. Equilibrium enters a man's life. He commits himself to long-range purposes by decisive choice. This approach touches the whole of his life. It withstands the passage of time, repeating its past choices and reiterating these and thus preserving an existential continuity, through passing moments. The law is recognized as not being self-imposed, as obliging me, as having sanctions and creating guilty feelings in me. At this stage, God is dimly glimpsed and the Christian concept of sin not yet grasped. In Either-Or the law was conceived as Transcendence which was abstract and external to me. It leaves us helpless facing the evils and injustices of concrete life which could be conquered by generosity and love beyond justice. But then Transcendence has broken through history in the person of Christ and in individual lives.

At this point, the individual life has entered a third phase—the religious phase. Abraham of the Old Testament typifies this stage. He is aware and

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alert to the call of God to sacrifice his son to Him. This is no impersonal law he has to obey, but through faith, Abraham stood in an immediate relation to God as creature before His Creator. Abraham feels the conflict as he receives this command contrary to the universal moral law "Thou shalt not kill." But in faith, he transcends this order and so becomes an individual in the highest degree possible in pure inwardness with passionate interest. This was really a "leap of faith" Abraham made transcending reason.

These three stages were at first viewed as discontinuous, as in Either-Or. But in Stages on Life's Way, the ethical stage was depicted as being transitional, leading to "fulfillment" in the religious stage. At this stage or substage, decision was called for. Mind and will came into play. But in the passage from the ethical to the religious life, the deeper element of faith entered with an appropriation of objective uncertainty.

By religion, Kierkegaard said, we are given the spirit of "caritas" to fulfill the law. Even in the ethical stage, the moral law was not opposed to freedom. As Kierkegaard clearly held:

Only the law can give freedom. Alas, we often think that freedom exists and that it is the law which restricts freedom. However, it is just the other way: without law, freedom simply does not exist, and it is the law which gives freedom.

Thus even in the religious stage, the moral law is observed. Really a new element—supernatural love—raises the individual to a higher plane.

Value

Closely connected with the discussion above is the existential signifi-

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cance of values. Values are not to be viewed as fixed essences or properties subsisting on their own. Good and evil are ways of existing.

Human value is really to be as a human being, to think and act in the most intensive degree as man. Dis-value is watered down and dilutes existence. 111

The human good is to exist authentically. Unauthentic existence is evil; it does not feel itself to be an individual with an existence of its own. 112 Unauthentic existence dodges the thought of death and is easily taken in by beliefs of inevitable progress, pragmatic meliorism or extreme pessimism, determinism, and retrogressive views. Dread is evaded and such a person suppresses choice.

On the other hand, authentic existence is always personal. It knows itself as limited, contingent and sees the need to face dread and make decision.

Heidegger follows partly Kierkegaard's tradition in his estimation of "values":

Our argumentation against values does not want to assert that all things which are commonly designated as values, such as culture, art, science, human dignity, the world, God, and so on are worthless. . . . By estimating something as a value, this valued thing or being is reduced to a mere object of human evaluation. . . . Every valuation, whether positive or negative, is a subjectivation. . . . Calling God the supreme value means to degrade the nature of God. . . . To argue against values . . . means therefore to protest against subjectivism and to confront thought with the light of the Truth of Being. 113

The categories of the good and evil are also linked with authentic and unauthentic existence for Jaspers and Marcel. The acceptance of some degree of

111 Wild, p. 41.
112 Ibid.
113 Reinhardt, pp. 148-149.
objective value is especially noticeable with Marcel as it was with Kierkegaard. Sartre has emphasized man's forlornness in a world without God as he is condemned to be free. Changeless norms are only means to rationalize our choices. "Before you come alive, life is nothing; it is up to you to give it meaning, and value is nothing but the meaning you choose." In Sartre's thinking, being, freedom, and value are ultimately grounded in nothingness. The "either-or" category of Sartre contrasts with Kierkegaard's "either-or" categories, though both give a personalist approach to authentic existence. Only Sartre finds the supreme value in man, whereas Kierkegaard, Marcel, and Jaspers link this value with God. Heidegger keeps the door open to such a link on a personal level, an attitude consistent even with his rejection of extrinsic teleology for man.

**Being-with-others**

This topic finds a very significant place in existential thinking. Heidegger especially developed it. He has been accused of coining a very equivocal expression, for my "being-with-others" is not the same as your "being-with others." It seems to me, however, that there is a basic analogy—a similarity of proportions between these two based on existential relationships. It is precisely here that problems will arise in understanding the modes of being of persons who are together.

In idealism, there is depicted an unreal world without human beings. But the existence of "the other" shatters the solipsism of the idealistic dream-world. My consciousness, too, of the existence of things for general

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use like roads, letterboxes, etc., leads me to identify myself with "the others." Sartre has pointed to two attitudes especially in relation to the other.

One is illustrated by the phenomenon of love. I may recognize the beloved as a free subject, but the other regards me as en-soi—an object. To attract the beloved, I try to act as a perfectly fulfilled being. Sartre says his beloved would expect him to regard the person of the beloved as also being a center of ontological plenitude. On such basis, reciprocal relations are not possible and Sartre suggests this is the normal pattern.

The second attitude toward the other is illustrated by the phenomenon of sexual desire. Here Sartre says he regards the other as an object to be possessed and whose freedom is to be appropriated. Blinded by passion, Sartre says he forgets the other in the auto-intoxication of lust or sadistically seeks to subdue the other.115

Sartre has claimed that peace, harmony, love, friendship are not natural attitudes among men, but rather hate, conflict, and strife.

Jaspers, by contrast, emphasizes that genuine communication between persons is possible. Self-realization in communication is a new richness of being like a "creatio ex nihilo" acquired and revealed, and conversely, the absence or refusal of communication leads to a corresponding absence or loss of being.116

It is what another is and not what he has which invites communication. "I cannot become myself," writes Jaspers, "if the other does not want to become

115 Ibid., p. 163.
116 Ibid., p. 185.
In genuine communication, those who enter into the existential relationship "open and reveal themselves" to see and be seen, to penetrate and be penetrated, to mold and be molded in a reciprocal give and take. Two persons experience each other's existential truth in the process without, however, losing their uniqueness and individuality. Besides, such communication is undefinable, cannot be conveyed in abstract concepts, and carries with it a certitude distinct from the objective variety. The material effects of communication can be objectively known, seen, and appreciated, but as regards its existential consequences, "The consciousness of possible existence alone is capable of perceiving their truth in the bond of communication." 118

He has also described the use of "ciphers" or enigmatic signs which reveal the Transcendent in an unobjective communication. Scenes of nature, art, mythology, and philosophy are ciphers speaking of the "Transcendent."

Incidentally, both Jaspers and Heidegger have called attention to the current overemphasis on linguistic symbols and the serious corruptions and perversions they give rise to.

Jaspers has drawn attention especially to the emphasis on words and language as such to their neglect as an expression of being as such:

The mass diffusion of knowledge and its expression leads to a wearing out of words and phrases. In the cultural chaos that now exists, anything can be said, but only in such a way that it signifies nothing. ... Today, no attempt is made to use language as a means of contemplating being, language being substitute for being. ... The upshot is that today the manifestation of culture is either imperfectly understood and watered down chatter in which any words you like are used; or else it is verbosity in place of reality. 119

117 Ibid., p. 186.
118 Ibid., p. 187.
This tendency towards empty verbiage has arisen in part by that unique phenomenon of our age—massive conditioning of thought and life by the control of propaganda, standardized rules of life, and the so-called rule of the masses to the extent that

... the masses are our masters; for everyone who looks facts in the face, his existence has become dependent on them, so that the thought of them must control his doings, his cares, and his duties. ... He belongs to the masses, though they let him threaten to founder amid rhetoric and the commotions of the multitude. 120

Heidegger, too, has taken up this theme. He has referred to the depersonalizing agents at work in our lives. These have prevented us from being our true selves. We neither regard ourselves nor others as distinct individuals but all these are identified under the colorless, impersonal, inhuman category of the "one." Hence, "we enjoy and amuse ourselves as One enjoys; we read, see and judge literature and art as One sees and judges." 121 (Underscoring mine.)

This "one" is not really any persons or persons; still "one" presents the appearance of doing our judging and deciding, thereby taking responsibility away from the person. This leads to unauthentic existence and untruth, because it is not linked to the intentional structure of being a person.

On the level of communications, human beings fail to communicate themselves. This is evident when we indulge in "talk" (Xerede) where the emphasis is "on linguistic symbols than any intentional meaning, on curiosity and existential ambiguity." 122 The current philosophical trend of "linguistic analysis" indicates the importance of linguistic symbols over reality. Personally, I

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120 Ibid., p. 34
121 Molina, p. 66.
122 Wild, p. 131.
think this particular criticism is an overgeneralization.

Secondly, communication fails because "the point is to see as much as possible." We confuse sight with insight. The senses play a greater role in our lives than understanding, giving use to curiosity which turns ceaselessly from object to object without any firm position. Thirdly, we indulge in talk and ignore the "voice of conscience" which speaks to us without argument, without verbiage or curiosity. This split in our being makes us content with hazy references, with content when things turn out as we wish them to, with average glimpses at beings as such.

Marcel also would endorse Heidegger's and Jasper's description of the depersonalization of man and the real lack of communication. He, too, will clamor for the true integrity of man in himself and with others. This is made possible by participation which denotes "the actuality of human rapport as revealed in the reality of myself," of the 'thou,' of the 'other' and of the 'Absolute Thou' of God.\(^{123}\)

Thus, man's approach to God as an absolute Presence takes the form of worship. In his relation to both God and man, Marcel finds much scope for fidelity, love, hope, friendship. These are not so many virtues but profound interpersonal relations which transform the being of men. In all these cases, participation is not an accomplished fact, but an appeal to the will to participate. Man remains in this life an itinerant, a wayfarer (\textit{homo viator}). Even of his own body, Marcel says "I do not have being," nor "am I being," but I participate in being.

\(^{123}\) Reinhardt, p. 219.
All these relationships are viewed in an unobjective manner, on the level of second reflection, from within the experiences themselves. He relates all values, including interpersonal ones, to being. These values are incarnate in being.

Value denotes the seizure of being by the human intellect. Value can only be safeguarded where being is safeguarded as a mystery of which I partake from the moment I begin to exist.¹²⁴

Unlike Sartre, Marcel will not place the emphasis on choices as creating values so much as values creating choices. It is values which give rise to the dedication of myself to my human vocation as a person related to the Person of God and other persons, provided I am willing to enter into engagements with them. Engagements in turn presume the more lasting relations like friendship more than acquaintanceship, fidelity more than transitory trust, love and hope founded on dedication than on passing events or fancies. Here, too, the integrity of man is built up on these relations rather than on the loneliness, distrust, forlornness, and pessimism of man in Sartre's writings. Marcel experienced these too in his early, lonely life and in his quest for truth and being in his life. The drama and tragedy of his first world war experiences in the Red Cross, including searches for the missing, led to his increasing closeness to God and man and to a better understanding of human existence.

Marcel, too, has deplored the depersonalization of man through technology, mass media, Marxism, forms of so-called democracy in his two books, Man Against Mass Society and Man in the Modern Age. Man should be appreciated, he asserts, not in terms of his functions to society, but in himself.

¹²⁴Ibid., p. 212.
Kierkegaard was really the first to give the lead of protest among the existentialists against these dehumanizing processes already in the middle of the last century. He was even then keenly alert to the tendency to streamline individual thought and action into mass patterns. He wrote:

There is another view of life which says that wherever the masses are is untruth, so that although every individual silently possessed the truth, if they all came together in such a way, however, that the many acquired any decisive importance whatsoever loud and noisy, then untruth would immediately be present... The crowd is composed of individuals, but it must also be in the power of each one to be what he is. 125

He lists the press as being one of the potent social forces bringing about leveling and demoralizing of individuals. However, he did not lapse into complete solipsism, for he also realized: "It is dangerous to isolate oneself too much, to evade the bonds of society." 126

Yet basically his attitude remains one of distrust of social relations. He has urged the need to live existentially and reach the religious stage of communion with God. To this end, he was willing to sacrifice his love for Regina Olsen and gave up even marriage with her so that he could become a Christian and reform what he considered the nominal Christianity of the Danish Lutheran Church which stressed the need for faith without works.

Situational Ethics

The existentialists have applied their ethical notions to the concreteness of human existence. One of the most eloquent of their spokesmen in this line has been Jaspers who has summed up their view rather well. We may briefly

125 Ibid., p. 43.
126 Ibid., p. 62.
examine these views in terms of boundary or limiting situations of man's existence.

In normal life, man is tossed about from one situation to another. Not all these situations based on configurations of personal and social reactions to persons and things are equally crucial to his existence. The net result is that he may spend some of his life dealing with situations as problems to be solved by clever devices. He avoids coming to grips with basic issues, but a very crucial situation may compel him to confront these squarely. He has then to make up his mind what he is seeking. He realises there is no escape of decision in the light of more immediate or ultimate possibilities. He takes his decision and others following these, showing flexibility to meet changes, but holding fast to ultimate issues of his world.

In these boundary situations, chance, suffering and conflict arise. A man endeavors to rationalise these. He may choose to regard chance as a necessary condition for freedom; suffering and conflict as necessary steps to gain mature knowledge. All these, behind which is death, wreck our purposes. Other rationalistic explanations for these phenomena may be determinism and Providence; or one may devise Utopian schemes for eliminating them. But none of these help him to confront reality. Even the theistic existentialists who believe in a Providence and do not adopt a deistic concept of life rather place the accent on human responsibility and regard a smug appeal to Providence as an evasion of genuine choices. The man who lives authentically, on the other hand, tries to avoid accidents, allay sufferings, and strives for peace. He develops awareness of the inexorable limits of such situations and confronts them sincerely, accepting rather than bearing them.
Guilt is viewed as another limiting situation. This is not necessarily moral guilt. Even ontological guilt may plague man. By acting according to fixed norms which he tries to approximate, he may never be constructing his world. But even if he does act with personal inwardsness, guilt remains in his life. It persists as long as we live, so instead of indulging in "quietistic suicide" by refraining from action, "The authentic man will take over his guilt and admit his responsibility." He neither welcomes nor escapes guilt, but faces and endures it.

Death is another of the boundary situations of crucial significance, because it is ultimate in my this-worldly possibilities. The existentialists were right in blaming men for evading and suppressing the thought of their own death. This flight from death has been tellingly analyzed by Heidegger in these expression of our attitude:

Its objectivation as the death of another, its interpretation as a ripening or harvesting of vegetative life, the universalized and abstract version of it as the death of someone in general.

We are inclined to speak of death euphemistically or by using palliative, soothing terms. The authentic man, by contrast, is ready to face the fact of death and does not speak of that moment as uncertain or not right away, but as possible at any time, since death may strike him suddenly. This attitude does not lead to postponement of his projects or indifference, but rather makes him concentrate his being in decisive action here and now so that his whole life

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127 Ibid., p. 143.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid., pp. 143-144.
130 Ibid., p. 144.
Mankind has also been referred to by Sartre as a restricting factor in my choice. It is true that Sartre found some social relationships threatening or destroying individual freedom. Really he, too, like Kierkegaard, foresaw the dangers of extreme solipsism and autonomous morality. Consequently, on the one hand, he asserted, "Hell is other people," and "The essence of relations between awarenesses is not Mitsein; it is conflict." On the other hand, he firmly maintained "One must choose for mankind." Man as a being-in-the-world has a responsibility to others inasmuch as examples of unauthentic existence may be contagious. Even positing acts with perfect inwardness which affect the liberties of others is condemned by him.

He disapproved of the brutalities of the Germans during World War II, even if done with a sense of righteousness. He himself played a conspicuous part in the French resistance movement. But once done, he did not believe that the Germans or anyone else should indulge in idle self-accusations over past faults, but should seek anew to exist authentically. Freedom was not hampered by one's past.

Historical determinism has been posited, however, by Jaspers as a limiting situation. He would not accept Sartre's concept of almost unrestricted freedom for man. To be free for Jaspers meant to be loyal to himself. This self has a history and consequently, historicity narrowed the margin of individual freedom. The historical weight of an original choice was so great in important

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131 Reinhardt, p. 168.

132 Ibid.
matters as to restrict all subsequent choices. He is said to have imparted
something of the nature of "original sin" to an original, unauthentic choice.
Being a medical man and a psychoanalyst, it is not surprising that Jaspers has
based this conclusion on his own knowledge of his patients and their past
pursuing them.

Awareness, care, time, and dread—all vitally affect decision. We
showed, while treating them epistemologically, how all these served to turn the
individual to the need of choice, which became more manifest in these vital,
psychological moments.

Conclusion

From the foregoing discussion centering around freedom and choice, both
authentic and unauthentic, it will be fair to conclude that the existentialists
have revived ethics as part of philosophy. This revival has been primarily
practical, though some theoretical discussions have been unavoidable. Human
existence has come into focus sharply—and the contrast between authentic and
unauthentic existence for the individual have raised not only questions of the
good and bad conduct, but what is most fitting to choose in terms of one's best
known possibilities. Therefore, the terms authentic and unauthentic existence
are not viewed as synonyms of good and bad individuals. The many concrete
stages of life, problems of individuals and their relations to society, of man
in relation to other beings, of modes of existence, knowledge, etc., have
provided a vast field for applications. It is to such more particular applica-
tions we shall now turn.
CHAPTER V

SOME APPLICATIONS OF EXISTENTIALISM

One may consider any number of applications of existentialism to the fields of education, guidance, and nondirective counseling, but I shall restrict myself to only a few of these. In the course of these applications, I will also deal with some salient evaluations and criticisms of existentialism.

Applications to Education

It is true that our existentialists were not primarily concerned with education but their philosophizing has led and is leading to an assessment of their views to this vast field. Sometimes they themselves have directly, and more often indirectly, suggested educational implications and applications of their philosophy.

Aims:

I have pinpointed the existentialists' interest in man as a free transcending subject to whom is open the possibilities of an authentic or unauthentic existence. Each of the existentialists endeavored to describe such human existence from particular standpoints as well. These represent their individual views, but they were much concerned in bringing home even more the basic and general need of man to be aware of his freedom and so exercise it in the best means possible. Their philosophizing thus became a personal appeal to men to know and live up to their true dignity. As Wild said:
By leading us to reflect upon our existence and the implacable boundary situations that hem us in, philosophy may deflate our absurd fanaticism and arouse us to authentic existence. It is in this way that most existentialists now think of their function as philosophers struggling in our present tragic situation.  

All the existentialists, therefore, turn their hopes to the individual and to his sacrificial expression of freedom. Hence, their educational objectives, too, will be vitally concerned with such a goal. As Arturo Fallico tersely expresses it:

For the existentialist teacher, the problem is: How can we guide humans to choose to become self-determining agents in their thinking and in their valuing without asking them to give up the privacy of their own self birth into being?  

This problem has been posed in the context of authentic existence for the individual man. To be dealt with adequately at the school or college levels by all those concerned with education which include both faculty and students, a clear concept of man is essential.

Two major educational trends are especially viewed by the existentialists as distorting a true view of man. The first of these stems from Parmenides' concept of being, giving rise in later centuries to the extremes of Hegelian idealism and Marxist materialism. Human history in these views was made by secret forces, necessities and laws which took no account of human freedom. Man's destiny was held to be determined by matter, by economic laws, and in the case of some thinkers, by the will of a vengeful God, or by man's social functions. According to this last view, man existed for various causes—the

133 Wild, p. 157.
country, the Ideal Society, the Leader, Socialism, etc. Therefore, pragmatism is indirectly attacked here, though it permits individuality. However, "the substance of individuality was to embody the values inherent in social membership." Man existed for every cause but himself and this view invaded the educational fields, too.

The second trend was that of naturalism. It also began with the Greeks, especially the naturalists and atomists. In the last and present centuries it developed in the "sciences" seeking to objectify "man and things" to be able to control, predict about and master them. Experimental psychology and experimentalism are generally believed by commentators to be in question here. George Kneller cites Robert Ulich and Ralph Harper in support of this view that "Psychology fails to comprehend the wholeness of man." Learning may certainly involve tension-reduction but this and similar terms fail to represent the depth and extent of self-transcendence of man in this process compared to the learning of white mice. Besides, existentialism believes man is, among other things, too seeking, erring and bewildered a creature to be comprehended objectively. However, experimentalism and existentialism do resemble one another in their open-ended view of the universe; the former's conception of man's growth and the latter's transcendence do resemble one another in the process of becoming. Testing programs are inclined to sum up students in terms of IQ's, grades, or percentiles. Yet, from the above remarks it will be clear that man is viewed rather as a biological function and as a scientific abstraction.


136 Ibid., p. 120.
Positively, the existentialists view man as endowed with the ability to know, to will and to act. He is capable of ever making himself by means of practical, projective understanding which also implies doing. However, he may choose to remain indifferent, undecided, inactive. The role of the existentialist teacher is viewed as one of helping a pupil to be himself or herself at whatever risks and costs this may be. Such a teacher may assist the pupil in seeing the possibilities open to the pupil — this will be necessary especially in the elementary school. The pupil must not really be induced or goaded into choosing. But once he has chosen, the teacher is expected to stand back and let him face all the consequences of choice. Fallico's words are clear and strong:

The object of education is to make seeming men uncomfortable with themselves, to irritate them out of the lethargy into which home, society, education, propaganda and history necessarily plunge them. Education is a kind of violence that a man does first of all to himself, for the health of his soul.137

He adds, too, these words:

There is no substitute for self-search in the education of man. And no man can help another in these fundamental matters except by denying him palliatives and expedient ways of avoiding the genuine encounter with nothingness which is existence itself. The teacher is the rare person who knows how to withhold and to expose the obnoxious medicaments, and knows how to stand out of the way of a healthy existential crisis, gladly risking the temporary resentment of his students and the more painful but ultimately harmless rigors of the concentration camp, and the firing squad if need be.138

This sounds very dramatic and brings out those aspects of existentialism which make it "a philosophy of crisis." Some educationists, however, would regard the above-mentioned approach as excellent for the critical situations that students may now and then face during their education, but what about the normal situa-

137Fallico, p. 171.
138Ibid.
tions of students? Some writers also suggest that existentialist thinking grew out of the World War I and II experiences and breathed some of the pessimism that these wars generated in France and Germany especially, and are therefore unsuited for peacetime psychology.

I do not think these criticisms are wholly justified. We are still living in a world where cold and hot wars, where tensions and struggles still persist. American school students of yesterday and college students of today have been conscripted and sent to various parts of the world to face these apparently peacetime crisis and localized wars. But we must not forget that if the existentialists wrote under the impact of war conditions, they also wrote in peacetime, and some, like Kierkegaard, were primarily concerned with peacetime crises of men and society. Consequently, the educational aims outlined are as pertinent today as they were during grave national or international crises.

But important questions arise with respect to the areas in which students are to exercise their freedom and their relations to society and authority in society in the process. Will a pupil in school be free to drop out when he pleases? Is he to choose his religion? Is he to suggest teachers, courses, standards to be followed and rules for school conduct? Questions like these have not been specifically delved into, but we may suggest the directions or tendencies in existentialist approaches.

For instance, the existentialists are pretty suspicious of the role of schools in preserving individual freedom. Jaspers is cited as saying that the home is "a symbol of the world which is the child's necessary historical environment," and Kneller adds, the home . . .
... is more organic and deep-reaching in the education it imparts than the school can ever be. Of course, many homes are not ideal. But for that matter, many schools are not ideal either. Even so, classrooms and institutions tend to levelize the child; he becomes simply one of many. In contrast, it is in the home that the child finds the proper soil for cultivation of the authentic self.\(^{139}\)

I do not feel, however, that the existentialists would prefer the home to school in all respects. Obviously, many homes would be inadequate to foster the natural or social sciences or technology with specialized personnel, equipment, laboratory, etc., involved. These aspects of education are not ignored by the existentialists who would prefer to see the schools become more student centered than problem or teacher centered. They would like to see new relationships of mutual acceptance of students and teachers, as well as rapport, prevail in the educational setting for persons similar to the confident, ingenuous home relationships.

The danger for freedom in the public school is depicted by Kierkegaard in the words of his character, John Climacus:

"I am prepared for being an apprentice, a learner which in itself is no small task. ... If only among us there were to be found teachers! ... The teacher of whom I speak ... is the teacher of the ambiguous art of thinking about existence and existing. ... And I cannot suppose that such a teacher could believe that he had nothing else to do but what a mediocre teacher of religion in the public school does: set a paragraph for me to learn every day and recite it the next day by rote. ... In our time, when one says, 'I know all,' he is believed; but he who says, 'There is much I do not know' is suspected of a propensity for lying."\(^{140}\)

The existentialists have been skeptical about group procedures for education and, much more so, mass procedures. Jaspers clearly held that

\(^{139}\) Kneller, pp. 101-102.

\(^{140}\) Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 53.
... the mass diffusion of knowledge and its expression leads to a
wearing out of words and phrases. In the cultural chaos that now exists
anything can be said, but only in such a way that it signifies nothing.

The tendency to regard children as statistical data is accentuated by
the use of tests devised on the basis of atomistic theories of personality.
In a sense, even tests aiming at holistic outlooks and an integral view of
personality fail to capture the uniqueness of individuals and their peculiar
frames of reference. Even new methods devised to check objective and subjective methods of learning will never do away with the personal interactions of
learners and pupils, with growth and maturity that come from true existential
communication, with motivation springing from the challenges of authentic
existence.

Will existential teachers then encourage individual freedom of students
without objective norms to the detriment of social life? This is another
important topic which requires to be explored. I have discussed it partially
in connection with the chapter on "Ethics." It certainly appears that
Kierkegaard and Marcel have considered the importance of the objective law.
Sartre, Heidegger, and Jaspers have, to a lesser extent, realized the need for
universal ethical norms. But I feel that the most serious difficulty in the
way of such an admission springs from an inadequate appraisal of human existence, essence, and man's relation to God.

The existentialists have been reluctant to speak of an "objective
nature" of man, which is an idealistic turn of expression denying the dynamic
tendencies in man. But oddly enough, they have spoken in various ways of the
"stable" and "human condition" of man. Such is man's being-with-others, man's

being towards death, the ability of man to choose be it authentic or unauthentic existence.

All this corresponds to the scholastic's describing essence "in its prime act." Certainly St. Thomas was not content with this static conception and proceeded to show how man realises himself on the level of truth, value, etc., and these processes manifest his essence "in the second act" or actuation stage. Now human essence conceived in this way was that by which man was man, whereas "existence is that in virtue of which a substance is called a being." Fr. Copleston adds here these words: "existence standing to the essence as act to potentiality." Now even those who hold a real distinction between "esse" and "essentia" in St. Thomas acknowledge that

... Existence determines essence in the sense that it is act and through it the essence has being; but on the other hand, existence, as act, is determined by essence, as potentiality, to be the existence of this or that kind of essence.

It may not surprise us then seeing this close relationship of essence and existence and the importance attached to existence by St. Thomas that his philosophy has been called by Jacques Maritain "the philosophy of existence and existential realism."

To return to the existentialists, they, too, conceive of man being thrown into existence but having Existens or "the potentiality of being."

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143 Ibid.
144 Ibid., p. 333.
This is man's essence. In the first act, this essence is the ability to posit what St. Thomas called "human acts," where man's nature and, principally, his intellect and will come into play. Further these abilities in man require to be employed in genuine choice and then he is really on the plain of "essence in second actuation." But as essence is rooted in the being of man and makes man what he is and not a tree or a dog, we may say that even the existentialists have not completely denied "objective essence" by their use of other but similar terms. Their descriptions of states of awareness, more realistic than St. Thomas' since they are not confined to the strictly intellectual processes, also make use of knowledge, choice and doing, integrally linked in man, as in the Thomistic "human acts." In this second sense, even St. Thomas' essence is subject to becoming and change. Thus the theoretical basis of existentialism needs to be strengthened.

The admission of an equivalent to an "objective nature" has led to universal ethical norms which the existentialists have proposed without describing them always as such. For instance, the idea of "choosing for mankind" is proposed by the atheistic Sartre as befitting man. Likewise, following one's mind and being in "bad faith" if one did not do so are other examples. From this angle, some cases of voluntary suicide proposed approvingly by Sartre reflect the more conspicuous tendency towards "a subjective morality." In their practical applications, the existentialists show that they, too, are interested in social and cultural values, though they place the accent on individual choices. Sartre fought for the resistance movement and Kierkegaard sought to become a Christian. As a net result, the existentialist teacher, too, should not be one seeking to encourage a purely subjectivist morality
where the individual is oblivious to all sense of obligations and responsibility. It must be said to their credit that they have revived the ethics of concern, care, and action of the individual and of society. They will not tolerate excuses and rationalizations which shift the blame for personal failure, indifference or negligence in living authentically, to the environment, to theories of determinism, heredity, etc. Sartre writes, "Every man who takes refuge behind the excuse of his passion, every man who sets up a determinism, is a dishonest man." Those of the existentialists who relate man to God develop an even better concept of morality in terms as Marcel does of two creative persons—God and man—meeting, of the temporal and eternal linked in man, as Jaspers holds. But man is also linked to man.

However, the existentialist teacher and student will be wary of any social groups, forces, allegiances which endanger human liberty. Among the informal social agencies of education, the existentialists have been most critical of mass media—the press, television, and radio. I have cited earlier Kierkegaard's condemnation of the demoralization coming from the press. Marcel wrote in a similar vein,

... What we now have to show is how technical progress in recent years has favored this manipulation of opinion; and in particular, we have to emphasize the prodigious part played in this process by the radio. 146

Among the movements and organizations, Sartre has been very critical of Marxism, though he admired the courage of some Marxists:

Revolution is always an individual or collective act of freedom. If everything follows a predetermined course, then the call for freedom and revolt of the proletarian become meaningless. 147

146 Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, p. 53.
147 Reinhardt, p. 169.
The existentialists are also suspicious of democracies where majorities do not tolerate the individual's voice. Hence, Marcel's condemnation of the French Revolution and the famed Reign of Terror. He speaks of the impossibility of educating the masses thus: "What is edusable is only an individual, or more exactly, a person. Everywhere else there is scope for anything but a training." 148 It is the spirit of dull conformity in the masses which Marcel attacks and this he finds equally in democracies and religions, in men of the right and the left:

... Only I should like to add immediately that the men of the Right are very far from having a monopoly of the spirit of conformity and appeasement; there is a conformism of the left. ... 149

I do think that this heavy emphasis on real evils of society and social forces without a balanced view of their beneficial effects works to destruction of society, democracy, patriotism, etc., but to the creation of new, purified social forms. I disagree with those who criticize the existentialists as being anti-social, e.g., Morris goes to the extreme of asserting:

Indeed, if education means the selection and acquisition of certain modes of response over others, it seems almost preposterous to believe that Existentialists could have schools at all. 150

This statement overlooks the reality of committed existentialists running schools for those seeking similar commitments. The existentialists have tried to avoid solipsism, but I believe they have generally failed to suggest concrete ways of building social organizations and society on patterns designed to safeguard the person's freedom. To my mind, therefore, existentially-minded

148 Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, p. 10.
149 Ibid., p. 5.
educators should take up this problem more and more, starting with the schools. This would prevent purely negative social attitudes on the part of the school and college students. In this context, suitable ways of education with a view to develop the whole person and his true freedom become urgent requisites.

Methods of Education

It is here that I feel that some bold men have shown that existentialist thinking may be concretely applied. Two methods seem especially pertinent in this regard—first, the nondirective method, and second, the Socratic method.

Nondirective teaching was demonstrated by Carl Rogers as a real learning technique which was truly student-centered. It has been described by one of Rogers' own students, Samuel Tenenbaum, at some length. He wrote:

... I had some notion of what that term (nondirective teaching) meant, but frankly I was not prepared for anything that proved so overwhelming. It is not that I am convention-bound. My strongest educational influences stem from William Heard Kilpatrick and John Dewey... But this method which I saw Dr. Rogers carry out in a course which he gave at Brandeis University was so unusual, something I could not believe possible, unless I was part of the experience. 151

The course was entitled "The Process of Personality Change." Rogers entered the class on the first day with a few tape records and motion pictures, along with many books, articles, brochures, etc. He informed the students they could use all this material for their course. On calling for volunteers, several came up to arrange a library, to find projectors and tape recorders. The group consisting of twenty-five members was made up of teachers, doctoral candidates in psychology, counselors, several priests, one foreign student, psychotherapists. Three two-hour sessions were held each week.

In the first session, Rogers mentioned that no one could really be taught by another. Four hard, frustrating sessions followed. Students spoke whatever came to their minds without any particular sequence. Rogers received any contribution with attention and regard. But the class was unprepared for this unstructured approach. They were perplexed and they informed Dr. Rogers they would like to have a "Rogers-centered" course. Yet Rogers did not change his attitude of not lecturing, but only showing acceptance of the students. The angry students bunched themselves and drew closer together, communicating with one another as never before. They tried to involve their instructor in a discussion, but he refused to commit himself and continued to reflect their thoughts and feelings.

By the fifth session, a noticeable change occurred.

... Students spoke to one another; they bypassed Rogers. Students asked to be heard and wanted to be heard, and what was before a halting, stammering, self-conscious group became an interacting group, a brand new cohesive unit, carrying on in a unique way; and from them came discussion and thinking such as no other group could repeat or duplicate.\(^\text{152}\)

As soon as the group realized Rogers was not going to play his traditional role, they spoke up more openly and freely, agreed and disagreed with one another. This was learning and therapy, according to Tenenbaum. By therapy he meant not a cure to illness, but

... a healthy change in the person, an increase in flexibility, his openness, his willingness to listen. In the process we all felt elevated, freer, more accepting of ourselves and others, more open to new ideas, trying hard to understand and accept.\(^\text{153}\)

\(^{152}\) Ibid., p. 306.

\(^{153}\) Ibid., p. 305.
Dr. Tencbaum, a great admirer and follower of Dewey, therefore remarked:

I am fairly certain that it would have been impossible to learn as much or as well as or as thoroughly in the traditional classroom setting. If we accept Dewey's definition of education as reconstruction of experience, what better way can a person learn than by becoming involved with his whole self, his very person, his root drives, emotions, attitudes, and values? No series of facts or arguments, no matter how logically or brilliantly arranged, can even faintly compare with that sort of thing. 154

There appeared to be an essentially emotional process at work, making shy persons less shy and the aggressive more moderate. But intellectual content too was present, really meaningful and important for the person. Only three or four of the twenty-five students found this procedure distasteful. At the end of the course, only one student was negative and one critical—the rest were really enthusiastic.

The discussions were free, flowing and open, and when interrupted by irrelevant, but personal remarks, represented life in its even and uneven flow. This procedure gave rise to expectancy and alertness.

One of the reasons for this great enthusiasm was "the lack of closure." Rogers never summarized views at the end of a class, left issues unresolved so that problems raised could be reopened.

Even in the matter of grades, there is no closure. A grade means an end; but Dr. Rogers does not give the grade; it is the student who suggests the grade; and since he does so, even this sign of completion is left unresolved, without an end, unclosed. Also, since the course is unstructured, each has staked his person in the course; he has spoken, not with the textbook as the gauge, but with his person, and thus as a self, he has communicated with others and because of this, in contrariness to the impersonal subject matter . . . there develops this closeness and warmth. 155

154 Ibid., p. 306.
155 Ibid., p. 308.
This explains why students met in and out of class late at night discussing why they read and reflected deeply, why they became so flexible and learnt much more than by traditional practices.

Later, Dr. Tenenbaum used basically this same method for his classes, and though he dethroned his role as teacher, he found his more natural self interacting freely, easily, and creatively with his students. He fostered good thinking by showing interest in the "third dimension of feeling," acknowledging man as William James did, as "a speck of reason in an ocean of emotion." This he described a year after Roger's course.

Much remains to be done in experimenting with this nondirective teaching at other levels of school and college. But it holds rich promise because it fosters learning through acceptance of persons and through genuine "existential communication," which Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and especially Jaspers aimed at.

The Socratic method of teaching is another useful approach, but to my mind, less in keeping with existential thinking than the nondirective approach.

Kierkegaard was much impressed by Socrates and his method which he refers to in "The Conception of Irony, with Constant Reference to Socrates," his dissertation for his Master of Arts degree. The appeal of the great Greek philosopher arose from his person. His encounters with the Greek youth and questions about their beliefs shook them out of their complacency. The fact that he did not teach but relied upon dialogue on an "I-thou" basis allured the youth who were brought up on precepts.

Socrates often feigned ignorance or manifested irony, but sought to draw information from his listeners by skillful, direct questions. He placed

156 Ibid., p. 310.
great value on subjectivity and believed an individual could arrive at true wisdom to direct and order his life. Knowledge fostered virtue, while the powers of willing and feeling were undervalued.

This method could be used by teachers, making use of the "inborn knowledge" and experiences of the pupils who would be free to express these. The teacher's questions would enable them to see inadequacies in their thinking and to arrive at fresh or modified views. Socrates usually led his listeners into framing definitions and correcting these where necessary. This would entail proceeding by induction from particulars to universals. Furthermore, the dialectic process would lead from one less adequate definition to a more adequate one. At times, no definite result would follow, but in either case, the ultimate aim was a true and universal definition.

The existentialist teacher would not necessarily be interested in arriving at such general propositions. He would be vitally interested in promoting learning using the subjective experiences, values, attitudes, etc., of his pupils. The teacher's pretense at not knowing would draw out the pupils from their fears and inhibitions and promote free expression of views in terms of truth and interests of the person.

However, I think this professed ignorance of the teacher is not quite in keeping with the idea of the teacher being truly himself. It may be argued that this is only a technique. Yet its weakness would lie more in the questions directed to lead the pupil in the teacher's way. This could, if properly handled, be effective for objective studies like geography, the natural sciences, etc. In both cases, the teacher acts as a "midwife" helping in the birth of the pupils' truth. The Socratic irony was not meant to offend, but to
expose sham and promote personal wisdom. The existentialists go further and
desire wisdom in action. It seems to me that with elementary and secondary
school pupils, the Socratic, rather than the nondirective method better meets
the needs of growing children and adolescents in terms of direction.

In general, it would be true to say the existentialist teacher does not
want imitators or blind followers. He seeks three goals summed up by Kneller:

... (1) the treatment of subject matter in such a way as to discover its
truth in free association; (2) the achievement of what Harper calls 'the
autonomous functioning of the mind,' in such a way as to produce in his
charges a type of character that is 'free, charitable, and self-moving'
... and (3) evidence that his pupils hold something to be true because
they have convinced themselves that it is true. 157

He will encourage them to be aware of and face care, dread, anxiety, and
choice.

Curricula

We now turn to certain general and particular aspects of the existen-
tialist school curricula. Kneller says,

Since for the existentialist truth is infinite, it follows that the
curriculum cannot be prescribed. There is no denial of the integrity of
subject matter; no denial that limits may be set on the extent to which
at a certain point in human development certain material is appropriate;
but far more essential ... is the student's relation to the material
studied. 158

Unlike the instrumentalist view in which the subject matter is secondary to
the individual, the existentialist educator would be more concerned with the
pupil's free relation to the content studied, leading to his losing, denying,
or subjugating himself. In any case, the pupil is to be left free to observe,
inquire, seek release, etc.—in short, "appropriate" the curriculum.


158 Ibid., p. 122.
Certain fundamentals of curriculum, like reading, writing, arithmetic, history, geography, etc., are imparted bearing in mind the existential situation of the pupil and his "felt needs." Sartre once humorously remarked about this study of universals, "One should do what everybody else does, but like nobody else."

The sciences will also find a place in this curriculum. The existentialists have objected to the scientific or objective approach principally in the realm of philosophy and the problems of human existence. Jaspers, who was himself a keen student of medicine, psychology, and psychiatry, urged that a philosopher should possess firsthand the knowledge of a particular science, although for him philosophy lies beyond science. 159 I, therefore, feel that teachers would try to impart up-to-date knowledge of the sciences, but also be at pains to distinguish it from "metaphysics," which was a "questioning beyond" things that are—or "transcendence." Scientific calculation, which Heidegger calls the "will to will" or the "will to power" gives us at most statistics, positivistic accumulation and classification of data. 160 Philosophical-metaphysical speculation transcends this objectifying process. Really it is not the sciences the existentialists regard as hempering human existence, but "scientism," treating science as the only philosophy possible. Hence, I feel courses in existential philosophy should form part of the corrective and balancing procedure for all students against scientism.

159 Copleston, p. 159.
160 Reinhardt, p. 143.
Coming to the realm of fine arts and literature, we would expect the existentialists to foster creativity, or what Martin Buber has called the "originator instinct." In the study and appreciation of art and literature, as well as in its creation, commitment and engagement find an important place, for as Sartre has said, "we know very well that pure art and empty art are the same thing and that aesthetic purism was a brilliant maneuver of the bourgeoisie of the last century." It is the human being who is the revealer of art contrary to philosophical realism. The goal of literature chosen by the writer should be "to reveal the world and particularly to reveal man to other men so that the latter may assume full responsibility before the object which has been laid bare." It is man who sets up relations implied in "smiling meadows" and "frowning skies." Beauty is revealed not by matter or by form, but by being.

Consequently, reading becomes a pact of generosity between author and reader. In his art, the author is bent on provoking the spectator to create what he discloses

. . . so that through the various objects which it produces or reproduces, the creative act aims at a total renewal of the world. Each painting, each book, is a recovery of the totality of being. Each of them presents this totality to the freedom of the spectator. For this is quite the final goal of art: to recover this world by giving it to be seen as it is, but as if it had its source in human freedom.


163 Ibid., p. 18.

164 Ibid., p. 48.

165 Ibid., p. 51.
Hence, freedom becomes the great theme of writers and readers. Significantly, Sartre does not consider this freedom an eternal value. He detests the idea of a given freedom. Man must

... win an inner victory over his passions, his race, his class and nation and must conquer other men with him. But what counts is the particular form of obstacle to surmount, of the resistance to overcome. 166

He will clearly affirm that

... the art of prose is bound up with the only regime in which prose has meaning, democracy. When one is threatened, the other is too. A day comes when the pen is forced to stop, and the writer must take up arms. ... Literature, throws you into battle. Writing is a certain way of wanting freedom. 167

Writers like Marcel and Kierkegaard would object to this glorification of freedom to the neglect of man's relation to the Divine Being, but would accept these interpretations in regard to man’s relation to other men.

Our five existentialists have given us a wealth of novels, plays, pamphlets, philosophical works to drive home the importance they attach to literary forms. Their phenomenological bent inclined them not merely to philosophize in a particular way, but to use such concrete media as novels and plays to bring home deep philosophical truth—like the anguish and estrangement of man in his freedom. However, they have made no regular use of poetry as a vehicle for their thought. Sartre is very skeptical of poetic values, but Heidegger by contrast has attached some importance particularly to the poetry of Holderlin. Therefore, creativity in students should be allowed to develop in media suited to their sense of existential freedom and responsibility.

166 Ibid., p. 61.
167 Ibid., p. 59.
In all these media, they have stood for the freedom of man to illuminate human existence. But such freedom may be threatened by historical institutions and then new literary styles and forms need to be created.

This last consideration leads us to note the place of history in the existentialist curriculum. History will obviously not be viewed as a recital of dull facts and objective evidence. Indeed, history as the recorded annals of Dasein places man within the monumental frame of the social and national community. To make it truly meaningful, in Heidegger's view, the historian will disclose the past "in its potentialities with such forcefulness that its implications for the present and future become evident." The historian becomes a retrospective prophet seeking a "synthetic unity of monumental, antiquarian, and critical historiography." Another interesting interpretation of history may be deduced from Kierkegaard's view about the masses representing untruth. "The crowd is composed of individuals, but it must also be in the power of each one to be what he is: an individual."

The manner in which individuals stand out in history, especially when they oppose historical forms, or mass views, or promote their own or others' authentic freedom, may reveal the structures of care, loneliness, and anxiety they faced. Similarly, Jaspers' descriptions of the historical situations in the last and present centuries disclose world wide phenomena hampering individual and social freedom. Marcel on his part has objected to this view in which "the past, when it is merely known historically ... somehow piles

168 Reinhardt, p. 139.
169 Ibid.
170 Wild, p. 44.
itself up outside our real lives." It is at this point that old diaries, letters, memoirs introduced by the historian begin to be read rather as we read novels and reintroduce the deeply personal element in history. Some of these interpretations of history are not peculiar to the existentialists, but collectively, they do tie in with their views of human existence.

Applications to Guidance and Nondirective Counseling

With the extensive and intensive possibilities existential philosophy has opened up and may further lead to in the educational field, its applicability to guidance and nondirective counseling will not come as any surprise. The entire emphasis on authentic human existence and the realization of what it offers to each individual in his existential situations has made guidance workers and counselors of many schools keenly alert to experiment with the many fruitful insights of this philosophy. At first sight, it will appear inconsistent with existentialism to draw any conclusions for the guidance field. But the whole trend in existential education has brought up the need of outside help to develop one's internal and subjective possibilities. Many persons leading unauthentic existences or desiring to break with these may need assistance, which is not of the nature of pressure and goading, is external to themselves, but offers scope to be internalized, at their levels of existential development. Little surprise then that prominent men in this field have been rapidly and deeply involved and immersed in existentialism for practical guidance purposes.

Existential psychology has, as a result, been growing in importance in recent years. Happily, the groundwork for this development was laid by the

171 Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, p. 32.
growth, particularly, of American phenomenology and Rogers' nondirective therapy. Indeed, it seems fair to regard existential psychology as an extension of phenomenology as Carlcton Beck has done. 172

However, this phenomenological trend is not to be identified at present, at least, with "Daseinanalyse" called existential analysis. Both have made use of the original groundwork of phenomenology initiated by Husserl. But both have also modified these phenomenological concepts or extended them for their own ends. The major differences in their philosophies may be summed up in Beck's words:

1. Daseinanalyse emphasizes the fact that, because of existential anxiety, one may live in two or more mutually exclusive worlds; phenomenology emphasizes the centrality or unity of the experiences of the organism.

2. Daseinanalyse attempts to reconstruct the meaning structure of the world of the individual, or the conflicting structures of his two or more worlds of meanings and influences; it explores how and why meanings have changed. Phenomenology stresses the present field of influences.

3. Phenomenology stresses awareness, consciousness, perceptions; Daseinanalyse is concerned with the total-meaning structure of the client: his life style, his views of life and death, his world choices, and all aspects of his relating to life.

4. There is an inherent belief that certain key concepts influence behavior, although they do not admit of measurement. They are of the deepest fabric of human existence and can be marked "existent." 173

Examples of the last are Heidegger's Vorhandensein-Dasein dichotomy; Binswanger's Unwelt, Mitwelt, and Eigenwelt. Incidentally, Vorhandensein means what is not yet real and what is never necessary. 174

173 Ibid., p. 107.
There are also important differences in approaches between empirical and clinical psychology, existentialist outlooks being linked with the latter. These, too, are vital to understand applications to the counseling field. On the one hand, there was the strictly objective approach based on animal learning. This was based on experimental knowledge and has been essentially non-humanistic and impersonal. On the other hand, there was the other approach based on what Marcel would call the encounter, a meeting of persons who strive to communicate authentically. In this process, there is revealed an existing, becoming, emerging, experiencing being. Of these two approaches, I agree with the comparison of Carl Rogers:

"... it has been clear that in my judgment the warm, subjective human encounter of two persons is more effective in facilitating change than is the most precise set of techniques growing out of learning theory or operant conditioning.\[175\]

This does not amount to a rejection or condemnation of all the contributions of experimental psychology and testing programs based on atomistic or holistic approaches. These may have an objective value of their own, but those guidance workers and counselors with existentialist approaches would never rest satisfied with them. The future may see these divergent currents meeting. Rogers' experimental attitude of testing clinical propositions based on existential analysis points the way to a rapprochement on the basis of science. He has initiated an original psycho-therapeutic procedure\[176\] by induction based on observation, supplemented by listening to electronic recordings, of his psycho-therapeutic interviews with clients. From assumptions

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generated in this way, he deduces operational hypotheses which he tests by
objective measures.

With these comparisons of existentialist and other psychological trends, I now proceed to identify propositions from existentialist philosophy useful in guidance work. I differentiate here between general guidance and Catholic guidance. The latter may be held peculiar to Catholic guidance workers without necessarily excluding the former.

General guidance propositions:

These include propositions generally acceptable to the five existentialists we have been discussing and useful for guidance on existentialist lines.

A. Nature of man:

1. Man must be made aware of his dignity as a free transcending subject. This awareness is not theoretical or purely speculative. It arises from his being thrown into being and discovering he is also Existentia—potential being. In his concrete environment and world view appropriated by himself, he sees revealed the mystery of his own being. The idea of "from nothingness to nothingness" may be interpreted atheistically or theistically as we have seen. The theistic interpretation would see man and his freedom grounded in God. In both cases, man is self-determining. It is the ability to transcend his present and project himself into the future that really matters. The existentialists are weak in their use of causality and this is true even of the theistic writers who do not seek for proofs of God's existence and man's creation as conclusive. Relation to God must be experienced and felt. Religiously oriented guidance workers and counselors will be keen to arouse all such existential awareness even in children.
2. Man is a contingent being, i.e., subject to death. This is another awareness the existentialists would develop. It is not meant to result in fear, morbidity, or inertia. It is a realistic appraisal of his human condition which leads him to live with a view to death sometime. Such realism provides him the incentive and release to realize his conscious potentialities. Herman Fiegel, commenting on this theme, said, "The price of denying death is undefined anxiety, self-alienation. To completely understand himself, man must confront death, become aware of personal death."\(^{177}\) Fiegel has some interesting studies which relate reactions to impending death to a function of intervening factors, some of which are

\[\ldots (1) \text{ the psychological maturity of the individual, } (2) \text{ kind of coping with techniques available to him, } (3) \text{ the influence of such varying frames of reference as religious orientation, age, sex, } (4) \text{ severity of the organic process, } (5) \text{ attitudes of the physician and other significant persons in the patient's world.}^{178}\]

Other reactions of religious and nonreligious persons to death make interesting study for guidance personnel. This restoration of an ancient Christian and religious theme may well induce persons to live more meaningfully and to accept death readily for really good causes.

3. Man is an integral person. This proposition is central to existential thinking. They do not like to view man as just a body-soul composite. Descartes has been accused of bringing in this dichotomy in man and this led finally to the extremes of idealistic and materialistic thinking. The existen-


\(^{178}\)Ibid., p. 72.
tialists speak of man understanding, knowing, feeling, choosing. They do not, as a rule, speak of several separate faculties of man as the scholastics do; rather, they relate knowing and willing to human existence. It does seem that they have attached much importance to feeling and willing. Again emphasizing practical reason, they ignored theoretical or speculative reasoning which they used. It is the total person who acts and reacts, who appropriates the world. This is an invaluable insight for guidance, because it refuses to view a child, adolescent or adult merely rationally or morally. It dislikes to speak of man as an organism which has the danger of relegating him to a "thing among things," even if it has life. Bodily needs are to be recognized, but as belonging to his own person. An incarnational view of man, as Marcel suggests, promotes the integrity of man. Every existentialist guidance worker or counselor, imbued with a sense of his own human dignity, is therefore better qualified to bring this home to those who live unauthentically through the encounter or interview and in other ways.

3. Needs and duties of individuals:

1. The free person must be accustomed to exist authentically. Human freedom is meant to promote authentic existence. It is becoming human dignity to choose. But choice may lead to both authentic or unauthentic existence. Often persons prefer an unauthentic existence because of lethargy, fear of consequences, avoidance of labor, love of easy life. The existentialist would shake an individual out of such passing moods or settled habits. He would drive home the impossibility of genuine existence without risks, anxiety, and care. He would encourage commitment to a cause, be it God, country, freedom, etc. Marcel, Kierkegaard, and Sartre have all spoken strongly for commitment
in life, but not on passing whims. Marcel and Kierkegaard both urge the need for authentic life on a religious level; Sartre for secular causes. The dedication of the existentialists to writing of all sorts, speaking, philosophising suggest a wide range of life activities falling in with their essential philosophical commitments. Thus, commitment is not a restriction but a deepening of human freedom with the possibility of new commitments always open. The committed man is theoretically and practically involved with other beings, too.

2. Each person must be alert as to when choices arise for him in the context of dread or care. This presupposes an awareness to existential ways of knowing. As we have seen, the existentialists do not care to speak about abstracting, speculating, applying objective norms as true means of knowledge. This is their theoretical weakness, though practically they have indulged much in this describing man and the existential vectors. They have spotlighted the crucial moments in a man's life where boredom, care, dread, anxiety plague him. The existentialist would help individuals to identify and face these moments squarely without resorting to defense mechanisms, flights of fancy, projections, introjections, etc. At those crucial moments, a man is confronted with his potentialities, with threats to his person, sense of values, etc. He must risk his all for what he sincerely believes. If he has time, he may reflect or accept counseling, especially for more vital issues in his life. However, I do not think that existentialists have restricted themselves to serious crises or critical situations to the neglect of day-to-day decisions of lesser significance. But all these have meaning only in the light of his own and "world" meanings.

3. A man must be aware of and apply situational ethics to his situation
The existentialists would try to prevent an individual looking for comfortable security in moral or state laws in customs, taboos—indeed in whatever smacks of an objective or social order accepted as pre-existent to himself. He would illuminate the fact that man is constantly in all kinds of situations so that even if he accepted objective norms which he has made his own, these norms must be applied with variations based on sensitivity to these situations. No two situations are ever alike and so each one calls for unique decisions which he must not shirk. It is with such an attitude that guilt, sickness, accident, and death become important to man.

4. **Man is an emerging being sharing in the human condition.** Through each decision, man makes himself and realises the possibilities of his own existence. At the same time, he does not conceive his nature or essence except as related to his being. The existentialists need to formulate their position better here about essence, so that they synthesise their insights of "stable conditions" and the "emerging man,"—not a finished product, but struggling till death.

5. **Man must make his own world in terms of his own needs and values.** This refers to man's relation with other beings and also with other men. It does not imply a selfish, individualistic ethics.

a. **Man acknowledges the existence of an external world.** This proposition was not self-evident to Descartes and the idealists. It required an inferential process to deduce the world. Later, the reality of the world was called in question, and it was suggested that man could never know the "thing-in-itself," but only its appearances. The manifest nature of this proposition is therefore tellingly reasserted.
However, I may add that in their analysis of the processes of knowing, the existentialists have exposed rather inadequate theories which ignore the vital processes of abstraction. Even Sartre's analysis of the noetic act has many obscurities like the nature of pour soi and en soi and knowing the past and relating it to one's future.

b. Man is a being with other beings and with other men. This proposition is important not only because it shows his social and active nature, but also because man is only able to make and realise himself continuously in relation to other beings. If there were no other beings but himself, man would be aware of himself but not to the degree and extent that other beings' presence make possible for him.

Consequently, this awareness "of others" becomes relevant to man as part of his proprium. Heidegger has referred to man's usage of the world as his tools. With these tools, he builds up his personal values. He does not really accept ready-made values outside himself. Truth and value are his very own. They are personal. They arise and grow in man through his interaction with the world. There are many shades of meaning in particular verbal expressions, many relations possible to persons we know, also many human relations to objects—as scientists, as artists, as engineers, farmers, etc. Man freely and uniquely chooses his relations of appreciation and importance. This is value for him.

I have referred earlier to this emphasis on subjective reality. It is truly meaningful only if seen in relation to objective value and morality, which some of the existentialists have acknowledged. Its danger lies in its relativity and the consequent scrapping up of all moral and positive laws as guideposts in conduct.
c. A man must not use other men as means. The existentialist claims
the same freedom for others which he claims and enjoys himself. Sartre has
posed threats to freedom in sex and marriage relations. These are exaggerated
but do pose grounds for conflict, denying the possibility of genuine relations
between persons. The manner of resisting such threats would clearly not be
with real counterthreats. Thus, an existentially oriented person would develop
a delicate sense of the freedom of others. A true democratic order is pre-
supposed here.

d. Each person must choose responsibility for himself and mankind.
This proposition indicates the level of personal and social responsibility.
An authentic choice of man will draw others to similar choices, whereas an
unsatisfactory choice may result in a similar reaction in others. However, the
existentialists have not made any real contribution to the development of
social ethics. They have attacked many existing social institutions and
practices, which they would like to see renewed by safeguarding freedom. They
have justified opposition and even armed resistance to social authorities
crushing freedom. As we saw, Sartre was active in the French resistance move-
ment and both Jaspers and Heidegger refused to bend to Nazi pressures.

e. A moral order is acceptable if truly appropriated. The emphasis
on appropriation is vital for students and counselors. Only a person who has
appropriated such an order will be able existentially to communicate this to
others. Appropriation implies a much higher degree of inwardness than appli-
cations of precepts which has the suggestions of categories external to a
person being conveniently used by him.

f. The counselor, guidance worker and counselee have to beware of
accepting social and mass-media values. This has been touched upon already. Students and counselors may be beguiled by streamlined views and opinions from mass media, which may really crush individual freedom. Little has been said about the benefits of mass media which the existentialists availed themselves of.

g. The counselor and guidance worker must check the appropriation of educational, vocational, and other pertinent values, and encourage this appropriation. I may refer here chiefly to "vocational values." These refer to the particular fields of one's interests, choices, and future occupation. A person must appropriate these, with the help of vocational guidance offered him, and choose without any parental, counselor's or social pressure. Social status of occupations may well mar genuine choice.

The more recently growing concept that choice of vocation is not an event concluded in any point of time, but "a process," would meet with the existentialists' approval. Kli Ginsberg put forward the theory of occupational choice based on a developmental process over a period of ten years. He distinguished three periods here—the period of fantasy choice as a child, the period of tentative choice at about eleven years determined by interests, capacities, and values, and finally, a period of realistic choice from seventeen on with successive exploratory, crystallization and specification phases. The last choice was held to be irreversible, resulting from a compromise among interests, capacities, values, and opportunities. In reviewing Ginsberg's theory, Spur prefers the term "development" to "choice." He favors the use of

individual differences to explain vocational developments and endorses the working concept of "multipotentiality," viz. that each person has the potential for success and satisfaction in a number of occupations. He has also made use of the concept of "career-patterns" springing from intelligence, interests, self-concept, etc.\textsuperscript{180} I feel the existentialists would endorse the ideas of development in vocational choices, multipotentiality and above all the self-concept but not as final and fixed. They would not seek to "master" the causes for a person's choices, but rather would understand the person on his own terms.

With their urgings of personal involvement, we may expect that the existentialists would further choose by inviting persons to take up occupations they desire and to try them out. Some kind of tentative apprenticeship may meet these ends. No man in their view learns only theoretically. Whatever the choice or changing choices to suit the authentic needs of persons, the existentialists would forewarn them not to regard themselves solely in terms of their occupations and functions, but as real persons. One's occupation may be a real or part of a real commitment but does not exhaust one's human possibilities.

h. Basic needs and duties of a person are those which promote his authentic existence. There is nothing like a hierarchy of needs such as Abraham Maslow suggested, which our existentialists have drawn up. They would acknowledge some physiological, biological, psychological, and other needs, but these really boil down to needs of the person. They are not so anxious about safety and adjustment needs. The individuals must be prepared for

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.
decisions and risks not merely bodily safety or psychic security. Even for social adjustment, this is meaningless if it works against authentic existence.

Duties, too, lose some of their personal force without adequate concepts of state, society, etc., and the corresponding individual's obligation to these. They would probably resent the normal use of sanctions by civil, school, or religious authorities as infringing on personal freedom and the rights of conscientious objectors.

Guidance techniques:

The existentialists also consider the most important techniques as those of persons facilitating authentic existence. In general, they would not advocate use of objective techniques in understanding persons. It is not clear to what extent, if any, they would favor or discourage ability, achievement, or aptitude tests. I feel they would favor approaches which sought to understand the whole child. Of this nature would be the use of interviews, autobiography-writing, sociometry, case studies, especially role-playing—psychodrama and sociodrama. These techniques favor the individual being himself without fear of being judged and labeled.

Nondirective Counseling and Logotherapy

Existentialist psychology, therapy and analyses have contributed valuable insights not merely for the field of guidance, but also for the spheres of nondirective counseling and logotherapy. Indeed, these approaches to the human person have resulted in existentialism becoming today one of the major influences in psychological thinking, according to Gilbert Wrenn.\textsuperscript{181}

Nondirective counseling

Nondirective counseling approximates closest to an application of existentialism to human relations. The general principles of existentialist therapy as they are summed up by Rollo May who belongs to this school are:

1. possessing flexibility and versatility, varying from patient to patient and from one phase to another in the same patient.

2. considering psychological dynamisms as always taking their meaning from the existential situation of the patient's own immediate life.

3. emphasizing presence, the relation of one existence communicating with another.

4. "analyzing out" of oneself ways of behaving which destroy presence.

5. enabling the patient to experience his presence as real, to become aware of his potentialities and able to act on the basis of them.

6. emphasizing commitment, the necessity of making decisions.\[182\]

We will therefore spell out the nondirective counseling stages with a view to considering its existentialist coloring and the use of these principles. They may be applied in a wide range of situations, both inside and outside, for both individuals and groups. We shall deal now with individual counseling.

One of its first phases is the meeting of client and counselor. The client approaches the counselor of his own free will. He experiences at the time varying degrees of perplexity, confusion, even distress, due to some threat or threats to his personality. As he begins to unfold his experiences, he desires help but generally finds difficulty in communicating due to his own state of mind and possibly a lurking suspicion of what the counselor might think of him.

The counselor begins to reflect to the client his own responses. He
strives not to a verbal reproduction of the client's statements but a reflec-
tion deeply sensitive to the overtones of feeling and emotion with which these
words are charged or ingeniously suppressed. The counselor gives cognitive
expression to the entire person of the client manifested in his individual
remarks. If the counselor persists in this way in spite of the deep silences
and uncomfortable pauses which punctuate the interview, the client who has been
negative in his attitudes will begin to experience the first glimmerings of
acceptance. Sometimes it takes more than an interview to achieve this effect.

This stage of the interview has been aptly called the "encounter."
It is a true meeting of persons, as Marcel spoke of. It slowly dawns on the
client that he is this person who is accepted as such. The counselor, too, is
keenly aware of his human dignity and in communicating with the client, he is
conscious that he has no techniques or tools to use except those implied in
his being a person.

In his genuine and even strained efforts to understand the client, the
latter in turn is inclined to feel at ease and show a similar acceptance of
the counselor. It is empathy which draws the counselor to the client. The
counselor is painfully aware of the initial negative attitudes of the client
springing from his own previous experiences of rejection, coldness, or indif-
ference towards himself, perhaps through his own fault. It is feelings of
inadequacy which weigh the counselee down. He feels a burden to himself or
others in varying degrees. Hence, this letting-live attitude, this unquestion-
ing and uncritical attitude of himself by the counselor to encourage him to
speak freely spurs him on to be himself. Thus, the counselor has shown himself
imbued with a sense of mission and in meeting the client extends his warm hands of friendship and love. To be able to do this genuinely requires personal integrity, self-awareness and self-control on the counselor’s part. It is the immense need of the client which requires this act of the counselor to lead to what Abraham Maslow called “peak experiences”\(^\text{183}\)--emptying out of self that is totally for the other. Rogers describes this open “givenness” of the counselor as “transparency.”\(^\text{184}\) It is such commitment which breaks through the defenses of the client who has not been accustomed to such acceptance.

As the interview progresses, the client grows in this awareness. The counselor continues this let-live process unconditionally. He keeps away from several professional attitudes. He refuses to diagnose his patient and treat him as a “problem to be solved.” He recognises that this client is not a “problem child or man,” but a man or child with a problem. He will not label his client as paranoid or schizophrenic. Nor will he show approval or support to what the client does. He is not interested in probing or questioning the client to “size him up.” Further, he refrains from suggesting remedies or solutions. He will even avoid some of the usual “huh-huh” to draw the client on some line of thought which strikes him as useful to investigate. He simply allows the client to say what he wants and how he wants to, without interrupting him, but seeking also due clarification where necessary.

On the client’s side, this genuine acceptance builds up his faith in the counselor. Again, we find Marsal developing this theme of faith. He speaks


\(^{184}\) Carl Rogers, *On Becoming a Person*, p. 36.
of man's faith in God resulting, as we say, from the two freedoms of God and man. This is a commitment, too, which "can be made, because a man can transcend the moments of his life-flux sufficiently to give his loyalty to God and, in God, to his fellowmen." Analogous to man's faith in God and similar to man's faith in other men is the client's faith in the counselor. Rev. Charles Curran has developed this idea fruitfully by applying Faith with a capital F to God and faith with a small f to man. Fr. Curran writes:

In the theological parallel of faith, the person must believe that God loves him and must submit himself to this love before he can draw personal strength and meaning from it. In a corresponding way, the client or patient must do this, too. He must believe in the therapist's deeply unselfish concern for him.

It is this faith which breaks down the defenses of the client and enables him to communicate freely. He is aware that the counselor respects his freedom, his uniqueness, his peculiar experiences and outlooks—in short, his "existential situation." He has no fear of being measured, evaluated, and mastered. He has no fear of exposing himself, of being transparent to the counselor in the depths of his being, worries, hatreds, loves and fears. It is precisely this "mystery-mastery complex," as David Baker calls it, operating at all levels, including much of modern psychology which has broken down genuine communication between man and man.

The definition of psychology as the study of behavior is perhaps the outstanding device whereby the two objectives of mystery of the individual and mastery are served. It rules out the psyche by fiat and thus guarantees that it is not a fit area for investigation. At the same

185 Collins, p. 164.

time it takes as its central concern . . . the behavior of the other person. For being able to master another person means to master his behavior, to make him act in accordance with the master's wishes.¹⁸⁷

Baker has linked this mystery-mastery complex with society, urbanization and industrialization whose reflection it is. But he says this approach, however useful in providing tested hypotheses in relation to mice and men, "is rapidly becoming archaic."¹⁸⁸ It fails to meet contemporary crisis of the cold war, possible nuclear war, the problems of educating masses, of interacting with other cultures, of underdeveloped people. All these, he asserts

. . . call for an understanding by human beings of each other at a considerably higher level than before; and neither mystery nor mastery are sensible objectives anymore.¹⁸⁹

Sartre, in his Existential Psychoanalysis, has deplored the tendencies of psychology to explain man in terms of drives, needs, etc. All these, he regards as abstract categories applied from without to individuals.

The transitions, the becomings, the transformations have carefully been veiled from us, and we have been limited to putting order into the succession by invoking empirically established but literally unintelligible sequences (the need to act preceding in the adolescent the need to write). Yet this is called psychology.¹⁹⁰

Sartre has spoken much against general diagnoses of man's problems in terms of heredity, environment, etc. Each of these so-called causal factors really refers to the entire man. We may be aware of the general link between fainting and hypocrisy, but not of this fainting in the light of this individual hypocrisy.

¹⁸⁸Ibid.
¹⁸⁹Ibid.
Traditional psychoanalysis does not cause him (the client) to assume consciousness of what he is; it causes him to assume knowledge of what he is. It is existential psychoanalysis which claims the final intuition of the subject as decisive.  

Precisely here we see how existential understanding and communication become most relevant to the modern world and its complexities of relationships. It is this type of understanding which the nondirective counseling situation seeks to build, neither threatening the freedom of others, nor closing ourselves in our own little worlds. Heidegger spoke of the poverty of modern communications because of the neglect of the intentional structure of our speech. He believes that insight into human existence is achieved only in terms of our active projects.

What we intend, therefore, is not primarily the pattern of things as they are in themselves, but rather the pattern of things as they are arranged in the light of some chosen projects.

It is this world of the client's chosen projects that the client chooses to communicate to the counselor. Once he feels the warmth, security, and rapport of his new relationship to the client, he lets his world and his chosen projects break loose. He is no longer an object but a subject of interest. Everything he says and does is now charged with meaning.

One will not grasp the patient solely by his words. . . . Features of his world are his bodily sensations, his use of his musculature, his gestures, his choice of words. . . . No part of his world is so small as to be meaningless.

With a growing feeling of security, the client now enters the world of his own meanings, encounters, reactions. He begins with the help of the

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191 Ibid., p. 87.
192 Ibid., p. 96.
counselor's continued empathy and congruence to face himself and his attitudes, even those he would normally blush to confess. He can calmly face threats to his personality, defense mechanisms, escapist attitudes, inconsistencies in outlook, reaction formations and the whole realm of psychological factors preventing him from being his true self. He starts to find connections and missing links in his world of meanings. He is on the way to seeing himself integrally, a prelude to being integral. This gradual perception of his limited situations, limited abilities, limited bodily and psychic make-up come home to him. In other words, he is realizing his being thrown into existence as this historical being. In other words, he is becoming "incarnate."

Marcel has developed much of this idea of "incarnation." He says,

In reality, the bond which unites me to my body is concrete and existential. My body becomes intelligible only as an incarnate ego, if my body and myself have been willed by the supratemporal, supramundane creative act of an Absolute Mind.194

The body-soul relation is really a mystery on the level of second reflection. It can therefore be approached only from within the actual-body-soul experiences. This is what the client does more coherently and integrally through the counseling process. He ceases to think or act angelically, but becomes a man. /

Linking the idea of Incarnation and Redemption in the Divine plan of Christian Theology, Fr. Curran relates these two to the "incarnate dialogue" of counselor and client in nondirective counseling. The client who was unincarnate and faced by threats now "becomes aware of his meaning as a person."

By such slow and often painful self-acceptance, he comes to participate in his
own redemption. 195

As the client is more existentially himself and the counselor too in
genuine empathy, a real communion of persons takes place. This fosters development
of authentic human existence. The existentialists were clearly right in
affirming man was a "being-with others." It is only in this relationship with
other beings and subjects especially that he develops self-awareness. Sartre
has been especially distrustful of such relations but finds the counseling
situation very useful to help persons face their anxieties better and reach
their own decisions. This is how he helped the young man caught in the dilemma
of staying home to protect his mother or joining the French resistance movement.
He used no inducements to sway him either way but let him choose. Marcel, of
course, has a much more favorable view of human relationships and would find
fidelity, hope, and love in their own way in nondirective counseling and other
spheres. Men participating in being are aware of their being, in participation
and communication. This is what Harry Sullivan calls "consensual validation" 196
which is a reflected awareness of my worth shown by another's action towards me.

Jaspers has also built up his own theory of "psychoanalyse existentille"
showing the value of communication as therapy.

We now reach the stage where positive responses of the client begin to
increase. He is aware of the threats he was facing. He has experienced before
and during the interviews all the painful realities of boredom, care, dread,

195 Curran, p.

and anguish. Since he has become aware of all these more clearly in the interview, choices open before him. He is now more calm and collected to face these existential modes of his own being. He is ready to choose, no longer asking for objective certainty of the correctness of his choice, no longer afraid to do and dare where formerly he was paralyzed by fears. He plunges into a decision for he knows that he becomes a man in the process. Indifference, lethargy, morbidity leave him in the process. He passes perhaps from one to another of Kierkegaard's three stages of human existence and may be ready for the "leap of faith."

In this way decision may be the prelude to more serious engagement and commitments in life. The counselee, taking counsel with himself with the counselor's help sees now realistically that the structure of care and dread will never be ended till his dying day. As Rollo May remarked,

We have seen that impoverished personalities have relatively little neurotic anxiety; is the converse of this true? This thesis was set by Kierkegaard in his contention that since anxiety arises as one confronts possibility in his own development as well as in his communicativeness with others, the more creative persons are the ones who confront more situations of possibility and hence, more anxiety-creating situations.197

Now this capacity for freedom brings with it anxiety:

Anxiety is the state of mind, says Kierkegaard when he confronts his freedom. Indeed he describes anxiety as "the possibility of freedom." . . . Possibility passes over into actuality, but the intermediate determinant is anxiety.198

The manner of facing these continued situations seem to differ in Europe and America. As Gordon Allport remarks,


198 Ibid., p. 49.
Broadly speaking, the existentialist view of man developed in Europe is more pessimistic than the corresponding American view—a fact that calls our attention to sociocultural influences upon theories of personality.199

The ravages of war in Europe have developed this atmosphere of tension and a heavier sense of duty, whereas in America, a more open, gregarious, and trusting personality has been due to fewer impediments for a rich, full life.

However, nowhere in the world are men able to escape choosing and commitment. The latter implies far greater depth in involvement than mere choice or decision. It extends to words and deeds. It enters the marrow of human existence. Hence, the existentialists are not really atomistic individualists encouraging individuals to be blown about by every passing whim or gust of passion. Even Sartre who denied God has urged commitment in the face of condemnation in freedom and confrontation of the ultimate absurdity and nothingness of human existence. For him failure to accept the responsibility of human freedom meant being in "bad faith."

By contrast, both Kierkegaard and Marcel find the deepest commitment on the religious levels. Baker has referred to the modern need of commitment of men to live with each other and the commitment of mankind to manage its own affairs, no longer trusting fate, destiny, or unguided natural law.200

From the above discussion, it will be evident that we have looked upon the nondirective counseling situation as typical of the dynamics in existential communication applicable to other situations.


Logotherapy

Finally, we may consider this new technique also meant to promote existential communication and authentic existence.

Viktor Frankl is a Viennese psychoanalyst who spent some time in the concentration camps of Nazi Germany. He has used many concepts of existential philosophy and developed existential concepts arising from his own experiences. The principal of the concepts is the "uniqueness of man as a meaning-seeking being," whereas the previous Viennese schools stressed the "will to pleasure" and the "will to power."

Frankl's experiences in the concentration camps impressed him deeply with what meaning orientation may do in a man's life. The most timid persons may be ready to face torture and death when this "will to meaning" becomes strong. Frankl has built on Heidegger's concept of the individual's world view when he says:

... Logotherapy and Existential Analysis presuppose a concept of man which has a place for meaning and value and spirit, the place they actually deserve. ... They presuppose man as a free and responsible spiritual being, responsible for the realization of values ... the concept of man as a being directed towards meaning.202

The sense of meaninglessness really causes frustration to people. There are three ways to realize values according to Frankl—by doing, by experiencing aesthetic values (as in art and love), by suffering or realizing attitudinal values. In certain situations, logotherapy is extremely helpful—where spiritual conflicts are openly brought out by the patient with the therapist,

201 Mother M. Emmanuel Fontes, "Existentialism and Its Implications for Counseling," Insight, p. 10.
where the patient is capable of discussing and appreciating philosophical discussion, where fated conditions like amputation or death must be borne. Often enough in the last case, something like faith is required to endure the inability to grasp meaning in completely rational terms.

Basically, the therapeutic process involved is nondirective. The therapist does not impose his values but opens up the capacity of the patient to face the questions and decide values himself. This may be a spiritual or religious therapy which even medical men may seek to practice. The impossibility of finding rational meanings may well lead to the search for a supramundane thing, as Marcel spoke of.

Man may find meaning through the discovery of what Fr. Curran calls "the Divine correspondence" after experiencing the "human correspondence" on the level of faith, hope, communion, and mystery. The existentialist counselor should let the client seek the religious meanings he desires. Even a child may want to be committed to a religion or just a religious viewpoint. He may want to live with a Christ-centered life and an acknowledgment of the supernatural. He may seek the guidance of the Church and Holy Spirit with passionate inwardness.

Both nondirective counseling and logotherapy may be used for counseling students and others in and outside the educational field. They would be specially useful where students are emotionally tangled and capable of arriving at mature judgments in a nonthreatening atmosphere. However, it is by no means easy to state who have, de facto, this capacity.

203 Curran, p.
This last face has given rise to controversy as to the limits of both these existential approaches in school counseling. Fredrick Thorne has mentioned some of these limitations:

1. The client's self-evaluation is accepted at face value without reference to objective facts.
2. The client may never strike deeply enough to the underlying motives and roots of his difficulties, unless he is guided.
3. Inexperienced nondirective counselors may fail to meet the client's expectations about counseling, leading to dissatisfaction and resentment.
4. The nondirective counselor may fail to give much needed information and advice to the client.

Ruth Strang has also referred to other limitations:

1. When the counselee becomes more and more confused and increasingly impatient of the nondirective approach.
2. When the counselee is a compulsive neurotic whose thoughts go round in circles.
3. When the counselee has a low IQ and lacks ability to make self-analysis.

Although these may be concrete limits to existential psychotherapy, we must not lose sight of three distinct advantages. Both approaches discussed above led to a reappraisal of the person to person encounter as against the

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mere techniques issue. Second, they have emphasized the tremendous values of realistic self-learning where gradients of threat are recognized and faced in an atmosphere fostering personality integration. Third, the new techniques of Carl Rogers, as suggested earlier, promise to build a lasting bridge between directive and nondirective counseling.

Conclusion

We have, therefore, discussed the conventional existentialists and applications of their thinking. Existentialism was viewed here both as a philosophy and a method of philosophizing. Its deep relevance to modern life has followed upon the depersonalization of man. The challenge to authentic human existence in the context of care and dread is thrown out to man once more. The existential processes of genuine choice, decision, and commitment do make life individually meaningful, but never as a completed, rounded-off process. Man to his dying day is becoming.
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APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Reverend Theotonius Joseph De Sales, S.J. has been read and approved by three members of the Department of Education.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

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Signature of Adviser