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An Analysis of the Performance Appraisal Plan for Principals of the Chicago Public Schools

Charles Vietzen

Loyola University Chicago

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL PLAN FOR PRINCIPALS
OF THE CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS

by

Charles Vietzen

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Education

January

1981
Charles R. Vietzen
Loyola University of Chicago

AN ANALYSIS OF THE PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL PLAN FOR PRINCIPALS OF
THE CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS

This study sought to analyze and make recommendations concerning
the Performance Appraisal Plan of the Board of Education of the City
of Chicago. More specifically, the study sought to determine the
PAP's effectiveness in terms of its original objectives, to determine
whether or not the plan was implemented as described in the Board of
Education manual, to determine whether it followed guidelines for
performance appraisal as recommended in the literature, and to make
recommendations for performance appraisal for administrators in
Chicago, as well as other urban school systems.

The author interviewed a hierarchial sample of principals,
district superintendents, an associate superintendent and the
Deputy Superintendent. The two groups (principals and superin­
tendents) were in substantial agreement that twelve objectives or
aspects of the PAP had been successful, while seven objectives or
aspects had not been successful. No conclusions could be drawn
on nine others.

Undermining the entire plan were the negative attitudes
resulting from the Board of Education's failure to implement the
salary aspects of the plan as originally recommended and promised.
Also, the notable lack of sound inservicing and field-testing
produced much discontent and confusion.

Despite these negative aspects, however, principals and
superintendents still favored a Management-by-Objectives approach
to administrative evaluation. Not one individual interviewed expressed a desire to return to the previous system of the supervisor merely giving a "grade" at the end of the year.

In one district where the superintendent demanded highly quantitative objectives directly related to instruction, the principals admitted an improvement in their reading achievement.

The literature supported the administrators' conclusions, but raised more fundamental questions. The question of salary's relation to performance seems unlikely to be answered until McGregor's "Theory X" versus "Theory Y" question is resolved. Also, there was a question of whether the Board of Education expected too much of this one plan. The objectives might have been overly ambitious.

Finally, many school boards and businessmen wrongly equate MBO and performance appraisal. The former should precede the latter, although in education, the reverse seems to be more prevalent. This might account for much of the negativism.
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Sincere thanks is also extended to the many principals and superintendents who participated in this study, as well as to the Chicago Principals' Association for their cooperation.

Finally he thanks his children, Chuck, Paul and Sheila, for the many hours, evenings and weekends which they gave up in order that he might achieve this goal, and his wife, Sheila, without whose patience, encouragement, and understanding this project never would have been finished.
The author, Charles Vietzen, was born on June 4, 1935 in Chicago, Illinois, the son of Elmer and Isabelle (Farmer) Vietzen. He attended Fenwick High School in Oak Park and received a Bachelor of Science degree in mathematics in 1957 from Saint Joseph's College of Rensselaer, Indiana. In 1961 he was awarded a Master of Science degree in mathematics from the University of Notre Dame.

After serving as a high school mathematics instructor and a high school mathematics consultant for the Chicago Board of Education, he was appointed by the same Board in 1969 to serve as the principal of the W.E.B. DuBois Elementary School. In February 1980 he was appointed to additional responsibilities as the first principal of the Poe Classical School for gifted students.

Besides having been awarded a graduate assistantship in mathematics by the University of Notre Dame in 1957, as well as two National Science Foundation summer fellowships, he served for the 1972-1973 school year as an administrative intern to the Superintendent of the Glenbrook (Illinois) High School District. In May 1980 he was awarded a Superior Public Service Award as the Outstanding Supervisory Employee by the City of Chicago.

Mr. Vietzen is married to the former Sheila Sullivan and is the father of three children, Charles, Jr.; Paul; and Sheila.
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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

Traditionally, public education in the United States has been a reflection of community needs and standards. As such, it has been extremely vulnerable to pressures from a variety of sources: parents and students, educators, business and industries, labor unions, politicians, and sundry taxpayer groups. The degree of direct citizen involvement in public education is tremendous and growing. The tendency has also increased to place upon the public schools the responsibility for meeting many of the social needs of the day: driver education, drug abuse education, health and sex education, and the establishment of commemoratives for a wide variety of causes and historic figures. Some of these demands and community needs place great emotional and economic strains upon the public school systems: Witness one of the most pressing and controversial social issue of our generation - the racial integration of schools and the accompanying issue, busing.

Further, inflation and a general suspicion of administrators and bureaucrats, a result of the Watergate scandal, have resulted in another expectation of the public schools - administrative accountability. This demand for accountability has focused on three main areas: student achievement, as exemplified by the growth of proficiency and minimum competency exams; teacher accountability, as seen in the growth of measurable performance
and behavioral objectives; and administrative accountability, as demonstrated by the widespread use of MBO (Management-by-Objectives), PPBS (Program-Planning-Budgeting-System), and performance appraisal.

These seek answers to the following questions: How can the public and the school boards determine whether or not they are getting their "money's worth"? Is a particular administrator really doing the job which he is supposed to be doing? Is he getting the most that he can from his staff and his budget? On what basis do we promote, demote, or dismiss administrative personnel?

Perhaps the latest rush for accountability is merely a return to or a demand for tangible evidence of the fulfillment of what William H. Whyte, Jr., wrote about in his Organization Man:¹

Officially, we are a people who hold to the Protestant Ethic. Because of the denominational implications of the term many would deny its relevance to them, but let them eulogize the American Dream, however, and they virtually define the Protestant Ethic. Whatever the embroidery, there is almost always the thought that pursuit of individual salvation through hard work, thrift, and competitive struggle is the heart of the American achievement.

Whatever the cause of the accountability demand, the next question which must be asked in the area of administrative accountability is: By what process can we hold an administrator accountable for all of the varied and unique aspects of his job? Those demanding accountability usually say that we only have to look to business and industry for the answer. The reasons are as follows:

1. Many businessmen sit on school boards or are active in other

school matters.

2. The operations of schools involve vast sums of money, the management of which typically has utilized business practices.

3. Systems of accountability have long been present in business and industry and much research has already been accomplished in these fields.

Whyte, however, again in The Organization Man,\(^2\) sounded a possible warning:

The influence of business (on education) is going to increase, in character as well as degree. Up until recently, business was one of many supporters of education, and its support was diverse...the corporation must assume a much greater share of the burden...There is nothing inherently wrong with this kind of support...Yet the pitfalls are considerable nonetheless.

Management-by-objectives became popularized and widespread in business and industry in the 1950's. Odiorne defined MBO as a "process whereby the superior and the subordinate jointly identify goals, define individual major areas of responsibility in terms of results expected of him, and use these measures as guides for operating the unit and assessing the contribution of each of its members.\(^3\)

Many other management authorities, including Drucker, McGregor, and Heier wrote extensively on MBO and performance appraisal. These are treated in Chapter II.

In the early 1960's, another term appeared in the account-

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\(^2\)Ibid., p. 116.

ability literature evidently because too many organizations were merely emphasizing the objectives without concern for actual results. Thus, MBO/R (Management-by-Objectives/Results) made its appearance. This soon led to what is called performance appraisal; that is, the assessment of an individual's work efficiency through a management-by-objectives technique. Knezevich wrote that "what many call MBO ends up in fact as an approach to appraisal of administrative personnel." This, he says, is especially true of school systems in which performance appraisal was introduced as a first step toward MBO, even though in business the latter preceded the former by many years. It would seem that this was an attractive program through which school boards and superintendents met the cries for accountability in the early 1970's.

In 1971, the Board of Education of the City of Chicago formally adopted a program of administrative evaluation in which an administrator's evaluation, rating, and compensation would be tied to performance. The specific plan was recommended by the firm of Cresap, McCormick, and Paget, a group of consultants well-known in the area of industrial relations. Chicago was the first and only large, urban public school system to adopt such a plan. The title of the program was "The Performance Appraisal Plan" (PAP) or "The Administrative Compensation Plan." Several promising statements

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were made in the introduction to the plan:5

"...the plan is based upon tested and accepted business management practice...put into terms of the actual achievement of objectives which are specific and meaningful...reduces the element of subjectivity...equitable for all participants and provides motivation for administrators to improve their performance in their present positions..."

The introduction continued:

"...should provide for maximum participation by the person appraised...involves comparison of actual results accomplished during the review period in relation to the objectives previously agreed upon...will help to improve individual performance...will result in the improvement of instruction..."

Six years and six review periods later, many believe that PAP has not lived up to many of its promises. Others believe that it has accomplished its basic objectives - to make administrators accountable and to improve performance.

Those opposed to PAP point out that Board of Education members have complained that too many ratings are high and repeatedly balked at carrying out the administrative salary aspects of the program to the extent that that portion of PAP has already been discarded; revisions have been proposed and made several times for the program; Board members have complained that they have yet to see any tangible "results"; the Chicago Principals' Association has voted to request that the entire program be rescinded; middle-management district superintendents have been inconsistent in their directives for completing the program since 1974, and rumors abound as to con-

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continuing revision of the program or its total demise.

Those defending the program maintain that while it has weaknesses, it has met its basic objectives and that revisions can take care of problems. The basic idea is still a good one. The program's original purpose was to strengthen such areas as administrative evaluation, teacher evaluation, achievement scores, and community involvement, and improvements have been evident.

It is easy to look back and to be critical of decisions made under the turbulent conditions and the extreme pressures of the late 60's and early 70's. But one must seek an honest and sincere answer to the question, "Has the PAP worked?"

Has The Performance Appraisal Plan worked in terms of the purposes of administrative evaluation? Has it worked in terms of its original objectives? Has it worked technically as originally prescribed? Did the Chicago Performance Appraisal Plan follow the guidelines for such programs as given by authorities in the field? More importantly, was it a sound management program that fostered performance improvement?

**Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of this study was to analyze and make recommendations concerning the Performance Appraisal Plan of the Board of Education of the City of Chicago as a system of administrative evaluation.

This was done by the accomplishment of the following ob-
Objectives:

1. To determine the PAP's effectiveness in terms of its original objectives.

2. To determine whether or not the PAP was implemented as set down in the original Board of Education manual.

3. To determine whether the PAP followed the guidelines for performance appraisal programs as recommended in the literature.

4. To make recommendations concerning the future of PAP in the Chicago public schools as well as the future of performance appraisal; in general, in a large urban school system.

Definition of Terms

Following are the definition of terms pertinent to this study:

accountability - the condition that occurs when resources and efforts are related to results in ways that are useful for policy-making resource allocation or compensation.6

administrative evaluation - the process by which the work efficiency of administrators (superintendents, principals, and other staff or line personnel) is appraised.

District Superintendent - that person in the Chicago public schools who is responsible for the administration and supervision of the schools in one of the administrative sub-

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districts.

Management-by-Objectives (MBO) - the process whereby the superior and the subordinate jointly identify goals, define individual major areas of responsibility in terms of results expected of him, the subordinate, and use these measures as guides for operating the unit and assessing the contribution of each of its members.7

Performance appraisal - the assessment of an individual's work efficiency through a management-by-objectives technique.

Performance Appraisal (PAP) - Administrative Compensation Plan - that plan originally approved by the Board of Education of the City of Chicago March 24, 1971, which was an outgrowth of a study by the consultant firm of Cresap, McCormick, and Paget. The basic goal of the plan was to institute a program of performance appraisal for all Chicago public school administrators.

Principal - the chief administrator and supervisor of an elementary or secondary school.

Productivity - the total achievements or accomplishments of an administrator and those for whom he is responsible.

7Odierno, p. 55.
Program-Planning-Budgeting-System - the application to education of a system used in business and government to relate goals, planning, and budgeting to results desired and accomplished.

Delimitation of the Study

The following delimitations were defined for this study.

1. The study was conducted among principals and other administrators in the Chicago public schools.

2. All of the above served for at least three years and three PAP review periods between 1971 and 1977 in the former administrative Area A (south side of Chicago).

3. Also included in the study were the former Associate Superintendent for Area A and the Deputy Superintendent to whom he reported.

No delimitations were defined according to sex, race, or length of service although a broad sampling, including all of the above categories, was obtained.

Limitations of the Study

Limitations of the study were those which are inherent in the interview method itself. Many people are more willing to communicate orally than in writing and, therefore, will provide data more readily and fully in an interview than on a questionnaire. From the respondents' incidental comments, facial and bodily expressions, and tone of voice, the interviewer was able to acquire information that would not be conveyed in written replies.
A structured interview was incorporated since this type of interview is more definitive in nature than unstructured ones, yet respondents were given the opportunity to express their thoughts freely.

A further limitation of the interview method concerned the employment of a common vocabulary with the respondents. Since the interviewer is involved with the Performance Appraisal Plan and is, himself, a Chicago public school principal, he is conversant in the idiom and had no difficulty relating the conceptual framework of the interview to the operating conditions of the respondents.

**Research Procedures**

The research portion of this study was divided into four parts: (1) Review of Related Literature, (2) Presentation of Data, (3) Analysis of Data, and (4) Conclusions and Recommendations.

**(1) Review of Related Literature - Chapter Two**

In this section, the literature pertinent to the theory and content of MBO and performance appraisal as they are related to Educational Administration was reviewed. Authorities who have written specifically about performance appraisal in education include Knezevich, Odiorne, and Gordon. This section also deals with literature concerned with the technical aspects or procedures of performance appraisal. A detailed comparison was made later between the PAP guidelines which have been recommended by several authors, particularly W.D. Heier.
Chapter Three is divided into two sections. The first reviews the history of the Chicago Performance Appraisal Plan, the parent document, The Administrative Compensation Plan, as well as modifications which have taken place during the last eight years. At various times, other suggestions were made as responses to problems but were not implemented. The current status is somewhat confusing and an attempt was made to clarify the situation through interviews with key figures in the Board of Education.

The second section presents data gathered through a series of focused interviews with a hierarchial sample of administrators who have been involved with the PAP for at least six years. Specific results, along with examples, were requested rather than just the interviewees' subjective perceptions.

The plan for this latter section was to interview the Deputy Superintendent of schools, the former Associate Superintendent of schools for Area A (south side), as well as three district superintendents formerly under his supervision in the staff hierarchial plan. In turn, six principals who worked under each of the above district superintendents were also interviewed (18 principals in total).

The purpose of selecting a hierarchial sample of administrators, as described, was to bring continuity and uniformity to the interview and results process and to gain the perceptions of
of persons at different levels of administration on the same problems.

The number of administrators interviewed (1,3,18) was decided upon because in each case this represents approximately one-third of the number of administrators in these positions. That is, there were three area associate superintendents; within each area there were nine district superintendents; and 18 is the average number of schools per district. Therefore, six principals from each district were selected. One-third or 33\% is considered to be a very reliable sample, statistically.

Interviewees in the first two categories were selected solely on the basis of their willingness to participate. Principal interviewees were chosen by lottery from those in that particular district who served as principals since PAP was initiated. Because of constant turnovers in administrative positions, this was hardly a random sample. There was little choice for the sample.

The focused interview, almost by definition, is somewhat loosely structured and, although a definite list of topics and questions were prepared prior to the interview, the emphasis of the interview was directed and shifted by the responses of the interviewees. Also, new topics, not included in the original group, were pursued as a result of the interviewees' responses. Whenever appropriate, further probes were used to elicit in-depth responses. Supporting data and documents were used for corroboration.

Frequently, the interviewer includes perceptions of the responses in his analysis; that is, such things as the in-
tensity of the response and facial and bodily gestures gave clues to a true indication of the interviewees' feelings.

In order to validate the questionnaire and ascertain any problems in advance of the interviews, preliminary interviews were conducted with three principals not involved in the study, but who had similar expertise or backgrounds as those in the study.

The items used in the interviews are as follows:

1. Studying the Performance Appraisal Plan (Administration Compensation Plan) manual from March 1971, many indications for improvement in administration were made at that time. Eight stand out, particularly:

- clearly relates compensation to performance results
- reduces the element of subjectivity
- equitable for all participants
- provides for administrators to improve their performance
- comparison of actual results...to the objectives previously agreed upon
- will result in the improvement of instruction
- affords the opportunity for administrators and their superiors to communicate more effectively
- identifies individual needs for training and development as a means of improving the principal's performance

a. With regard to each of the above areas, please provide examples of the success or failure of PAP in achieving these objectives.

b. Please describe other positive or negative side effects of PAP with examples.

(Item #1 is related to Purpose #1)

2. Following are some specific directives included in the PAP manual regarding the implementation of the plan:

- the district superintendent and principal mutually agree upon the latter's objectives at the beginning of the school year
- the district superintendent and principal discuss these objectives during the school year
- all objectives are set at significant and attainable levels
- Principals involve members of their staff, community and (high school only) student body in the preliminary identification of programs and plans
- the district superintendent has completed his PAP before meeting with his principals and uses it as a guide for theirs
- the principal's accomplishment reports are used by the district superintendent as a basis for planning and assistance in developing new and revised objectives for the following year

a. Which of these directives are adhered to?
b. Which are not adhered to? Please explain.
c. For what reasons might some directives not have been adhered to completely?

(Item #2 relates to Purpose #2 and #3)

3. The PAP manual also states that several behavioral changes should take place among administrators:

- administrators will plan their work more effectively
- administrators will focus their attention and effort upon the most basic and critical functions of their positions
- administrators will look at their performance in practical terms
- administrators will identify areas in which assistance from central or district staff personnel would be helpful
- administrators will channel their primary efforts into areas where the need is greatest
- administrators will mutually grow in competence and will communicate more effectively

a. With regard to each of the above behavioral changes, provide examples of the accomplishment of the change.
b. Identify behavioral changes which were not accomplished and provide reasons for their not being accomplished.
c. Describe other positive or negative behavioral changes which you have observed which may be related to PAP
(Item #3 relates to Purpose #1)

4. a) What have been the three best attributes of PAP?
   
   b) What have been the three greatest faults of PAP?

(Item #4 relates to Purpose #1)

5. The mission of the Chicago public schools is to educate the children of Chicago. PAP promised to aid in the achievement of that goal.
   
   a) Provide specific examples of the ways in which PAP has aided in the accomplishment of that goal.
   
   b) Provide specific examples of the ways in which PAP has hindered the achievement of that goal.

(Item #5 relates to Purpose #1)

6. Among the key elements found in the PAP are:
   
   - A Management-by-Objectives approach to administration
   - Individual and specific written goals and standards for administrators
   - Participation by community and staff in the formation of the above
   - Interim review and opportunity for revision of goals and standards
   - Comparison of results to objectives through the accomplishment report
   - Specific numerical "ratings"
   - Using the goals and accomplishments of one year to prepare for the next
   - Salary increments tied to performance ratings

In regard to the above elements:

a) What elements or aspects of the plan should be continued?

b) What elements of the plan should be changed? Please be specific.

c) What elements of the plan should be discarded?

d) How could PAP be adopted for use as a teacher evaluation plan?

(Item #6 relates to Purpose #4)
7. Assuming that some form of administrative evaluation will always be necessary, which would you prefer?
   a) PAP (with some changes possible)
   b) Annual conference with superior for informal evaluation
   c) Formal checklist or other evaluative instrument
   d) Other form of evaluation (Please specify)

(Item #7 relates to Purpose #4)

8. Should administrative evaluation be tied to salary increments?
   Yes or no ________ Why

(Item #8 relates to Purpose #4)

Please make any other comments on PAP, the reasons for its success or failure, or on this interview

(3) Analysis of the Data - Chapter Four

Data was analyzed as follows:

I. Analysis of Interview Data. This was accomplished in three ways:
   A. Comparing and contrasting among principals
   B. Comparing and contrasting among superintendents
   C. Comparing and contrasting between superintendents and principals.

II. Analysis of Interview Data and the PAP Document. In this section, the two sources were compared and contrasted with one another and various statements from the interview instrument were accepted or rejected.
III. Comparison of the Overall Chicago Performance Appraisal Plan (as evidenced by the PAP document and the interview data) and the Relevant Literature.

IV. Analysis

(4) Conclusions and Recommendations - Chapter Five

Summary

Administrative accountability was a demand of the early 1970's. The Chicago public schools' answer to that demand was the Performance Appraisal Plan. Many believe it has achieved its objectives; others contend it has not.

This study attempted to resolve the difference of opinions in terms of (1) the plan's effectiveness according to its original objectives, (2) the degree of accuracy to which the plan was implemented, and (3) the degree to which it followed the recommendations found in the literature. The study also resulted in recommendations for the future of performance appraisal in large, urban school systems.
Chapter II
A REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE

Introduction

The history of management-by-objectives and its sub-area, performance appraisal, is centered in business and industry. Various accounts of their development and rise in popularity and use are common in business and industrial literature. Authors such as Peter Drucker\(^1\), Alfred Sloan\(^2\), and George Odiorne\(^3\) have all written extensively on the historical backgrounds of these areas of management. David Gordon in his dissertation, "An Analysis of Performance Appraisal Systems for Public School Administrators: The Problem and the Process",\(^4\) also summarizes this development in the business and industrial world.

Rather than repeat this often-stated history, the thrust of this review was to trace the development of performance appraisal in the literature of educational administration.


\(^3\)George S. Odiorne, Management by Objectives (New York: Pitman Publishing Corp., 1965).

The Beginning

Performance appraisal came to educational administration somewhere around 1969 or 1970 and began to appear in the literature about that same time. In his 1969 dissertation, "Evaluating the Job Performance of the High School Principal," MacQueen made absolutely no mention of any preset objectives or individually-tailored approaches. This could indicate the uncommon, and possibly unheard of use of performance appraisal at that time.

This was surprising since performance appraisal was well-established in business by the middle 50's and was thoroughly critiqued by many business authorities and academicians in the late 50's (A quite scathing critique was made by Douglas McGregor in 1960 in *The Human Side of Enterprise*). Some of his experiences with performance appraisal and its place in his Theory X - Theory Y scheme were quoted by Knezevich in 1973.

Perhaps performance appraisal's "re-birth as an educator"

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5 Warren F. MacQueen, "Evaluating the Job Performance of the Public High School Principal" (Ph.d. dissertation University of Southern California, 1969).


was not altogether surprising if we recall Robert McNamara and his "whiz kids" of the 1960's who promoted the idea of bringing to various levels of government the "tried and true" practices of business and industry. Indeed, Cresap, McCormick, and Paget, the consulting firm for the Chicago Performance Appraisal Plan, is a business rather than an educational consulting firm.

Status In 1971

In 1971 Educational Research Service sent a questionnaire to all school systems in the United States having 25,000 or more students. Of the responding systems, 84 of 154 had formal evaluations for administrators, but 70 still used very informal methods.

The study was quoted in a speech by George Redfern to the 1972 Convention of the NASSP. Several other interesting findings were discussed:

1. An increasing number of school systems had developed and were carrying out systematic evaluation procedures for principals and other administrators. In 1964 only 50 evaluation programs - many very informal - were reported in operation; by 1968 the number had increased to 62 and in 1971, the total was 84.

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2. The larger the school system, the more likely an evaluation program existed for principals and other administrators.

3. Evaluation programs applied to all administrators in most instances; the most common practice was to evaluate personnel annually.

4. Among the various purposes of evaluating principals and other administrators, four reasons predominated: (a) to identify areas needing improvement, (b) to measure current performance against prescribed standards, (c) to establish evidence to dismiss personnel, (d) to enable the individual to formulate appropriate performance objectives.

Redfern quoted five basic assumptions of his own which were re-enforced by research:9

1. The principal's productivity can be evaluated; not only can it be evaluated, but it should be evaluated.

2. The principal should understand what's expected of him. Responsibilities and expectations should be stated in written form and, if not in writing, oral understandings should be clear and carefully delineated.

3. The principal should know to whom to look for direction and supervision and should understand that evaluation is an inherent component of accountability.

4. Standards of excellence should be designed to be used by

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9Ibid., pp. 86-87
the principal as yardsticks against which his performance may be measured.

5. Performance objectives, related to the standards of excellence, should be formulated cooperatively by the principal and his evaluator and used to evaluate performance.

Redfern was much in favor of a system of performance appraisal for administrators. Of the aforementioned 84 responding school systems, about 75% used some predetermined performance standards, while 25% had adopted the performance objective method. However, performance appraisal was more common in small systems (Chicago was a notable exception here). He also quoted Arch Patton, who was paraphrasing Arnold Toynbee that a "hard" rather than an "easy" environment is more likely to generate leadership, growth, and productivity than impede its development.10

Redfern continued and stated that he advocated an evaluation process that has as its primary purpose the improvement of performance. Systematic evaluation is one such method. He also said that performance appraisal increases job understanding, sets standards of excellence, and allows for concrete and specific objectives, tailored to the particular needs of individual principals and designed to implement action. It makes accountability more than a cliche.11

10 Ibid., p. 87.
11 Ibid., p. 90.
Growth of Performance Appraisal

During the four years from 1970 through 1973, a wide variety of writings appeared in the literature - some were very much in favor of administrative accountability, in general, and performance appraisal, in particular. Others warned of possible pitfalls in implementation and urged the principal to "seize the accountability initiative."²

Edwards surveyed principals, teachers, superintendents, school board chairmen, and county commission chairmen in North Carolina. He made three general conclusions:

1. Most were in favor of some sort of accountability.
2. They also believed that accountability should be shared.
3. They felt that most of the responsibility should lie with those in direct contact with students.³

Barnes indicated that school boards and superintendents see accountability as desirable, but said nothing of the principals' attitudes,⁴ while Carr, studying job satisfaction of high school principals, stated that participation in the decision-making

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⁴Donald E. Barnes, "Performance Assessment for an Elementary School Principal" (Ph.d. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1972).
process was most important to principals - not salary.15

Crowder made a study of appraisal systems for administrators and supervisors in the Virginia public schools and concluded the following:

1. There should be evaluation for administrators.
2. There must be a set of definite policies and procedures for each evaluee.
3. There should be multiple appraisals throughout the school year.
4. Criteria for such appraisals should be individualized for each evaluee.
5. Performance goals are the best tool for individualizing these appraisals.16

Milton said that the performance of the principal must be evaluated in terms of all the roles he plays. Checklists and the like are not enough.17 Roald Campbell stated that a set of criteria for functions defined in behavioral terms is necessary for an evaluation of administrative personnel,18 while Castetter and Hesler wrote


that "performance appraisal is essential in school organization-administration".\textsuperscript{19}

Joseph Lamb of Columbia was of the opinion that school boards must measure and assess the performance of administrators and teachers. The most effective method for administrators - MBO. "It increases control through a clarification of purpose".\textsuperscript{20}

The "father of PPBS in education," Harry J. Hartley, had something to say about evaluation's relation to PPBS, another phase of MBO: "PPBS brings out into the open most of our shortcomings in evaluation. Issues include:

1. Will PPBS be used to evaluate teachers and programs?
2. In the evaluation of programs, will arbitrarily selected criteria be imposed on supervisors by the central office?

The better approach might be to ask the supervisors to identify what criteria and levels of performance they will accept as a basis for evaluating their performance."\textsuperscript{21}


Biglin studied the attitudes of faculty and administrators relative to performance appraisal. He found no differences in regard to age, sex, length of tenure, etc. There was only a difference as to need for more evaluation.22

Everett Nicholson of Purdue, writing for the NASSP Bulletin in 1972, indicated that "concerted efforts are directed toward determining how administrators might undergo formal evaluation and thus be classified in the accountability spectrum." He advised principals to seize the initiative in the "accountability game," since he felt it was an inevitable trend. He suggested three "musts" for the principal:

1. Establish a strong frame of reference for the development of performance objectives.
2. Become familiar with the hierarchy of administrative task areas which need priorities in the implementation of performance objectives.
3. Become skilled with the techniques of analyzing administrative performance.23

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Barilleaux agreed with this and said that

Principals should view the accountability syndrome for proactiveness rather than the usual reactivity. These conditions should be welcomed, but only on the assumption that a critical element of the accountability process is honored; principals must share in the formulation of the objectives for which they are to be accountable. 24

Howard Sampson, in his dissertation on applying a systems management theory to a large school system, stated that MBO is frequently perceived as an effective mean, but is not well-implemented. One reason for this is that school systems frequently rush into an MBO system without adequate in-service work. 25

Feltes agreed and strongly recommended that any evaluation system be field-tested to find out first if performance improves. 26

Anthony Mattaliano stated that--

experience has shown that there are several kinds of dangers and abuses faced by people working with MBO. Some of them included:

1. The superior may write the management objectives and impose them on the subordinates.


2. The weak administrator or supervisor may suddenly be "approvable" if he is a creative writer of management objectives. In some cases he may actually feel that he is now doing the job because he looks good through management-by-objectives paperwork.

3. Management objectives may become an end in themselves rather than the means for improving educational ideas. If there is a "handing-in-time" when piles of objectives are sent in without a conference schedule for discussion between superior and subordinate, there is an increasing danger that both are "going through the motions."

4. Unless there is a strong sense of "help the weak," there is a distinct possibility that people-resources and money-resources will accrue disproportionately to already strong schools or administrators. They will most likely be the writers of the most impressive, creative, and effective looking management objectives.27

Knezevich's Summary

Undoubtedly, the culmination of this "era" in the literature came in 1973 with the publication of Management by Objectives and Results - A Guidebook for School Executives by Stephen Knezevich for the AASA.28 Chapter 2, "Management by Objectives by Results as a Personnel Management System"29 was most germane to this topic.

28Knezevich
29Ibid., pp. 9-22
The author did an outstanding job of applying theories, practices, and lessons learned from the realm of private industry to education administration.

Knezevich stated that "this chapter is concerned with the human relations dimension of MBO/R and the leadership strategies that are consistent with it." He referred to Douglas McGregor's The Human Side of Enterprise and said that in a Theory Y atmosphere, managers "rely less on threats of punishment to motivate, and more on opportunities for creative expression and non-monetary rewards, such as recognition."³⁰

Knezevich also believed that "what many school systems call MBO ends up in fact as an approach to appraisal of the administrative personnel."³¹ He quoted Odiorne who refers to this idea of MBO as a "results oriented system" where goals or objectives replace personality traits as appraisal criteria.³² (In that same work, Odiorne said that this narrow view of MBO is its greatest weakness and is frequently viewed in business as another personnel gimmick.)³³

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³⁰ Ibid., p. 11
³¹ Ibid., p. 11.
³² Ibid., p. 12.
Knezevich quoted Heier's theory that MBO can be implemented without appraisal results, although this is rare. Heier also stated that none of the system can be imposed. He praised MBO/R and stated that it can be a tremendous morale booster, can assist in spotting future leaders, and that it must be properly launched with all involved receiving a thorough prior briefing. (A review of a 1970 article of Heier's in "Personnel" gave some pertinent guidelines for this research in terms of performance appraisal philosophy, inservice training, and techniques. He pointed out that many training sessions must be held before implementing a PA program. Sincerity and enthusiasm for the program are essential. He also stated that a good deal of time should be spend on the formulation of objectives and that the trainer should work with all management groups as there must be a high degree of continuity and standardization present throughout the organization. Middle management must be convinced of the value of the plan before submitting it to upper management. A company cannot institute by fiat! PA will work much better on a voluntary basis.)

Knezevich pointed out that "evaluation by jointly determined job targets is not entirely new to education," although

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34 Knezevich, p. 12.

it was usually more concerned with instruction. In business and
industry it is sometimes called "management personnel-evaluation-
by-objectives-and-results" - MPEO/R. He agreed that this is the
most commonly used phase of MBO in education.36

Written management contracts or output-oriented-position
descriptions were discussed. These are similar to what Redfern
called "cooperative appraisal (as opposed to unilateral) or
job-target appraisal" instruments.37

Levinson evidently approved of MBO in theory but "re-
cognized the shortcomings of what sounds rational when it is
put on paper......no matter how detailed a job description,
it is essentially static...the higher a man rises in an
organization and the more varied and subtle his work, the
more difficult it is to pin down objectives that represent
more than a fraction of his work...may perpetuate and intensify
hostility, resentment, and distrust between a manager and sub-
ordinate...because it is based on a reward punishment psychology,
the process of MBO in combination with performance appraisal is
self-defeating...one of the greatest management illusions...
fails to take adequately into account the deeper emotional

36Knezevich, p. 12

37Ibid.
Knezevich then discussed the relationship of appraisal by results to salaries and increments paid. He said that although school board members and other lay members think of MBO/R as an answer to the merit pay problems, "the reverse may occur - MBO/R may lose its inherent potential if it receives too much emphasis as a tool for determining the compensation for administrators."  

Dealing with professional growth, Knezevich said that MBO/R "may reveal the kinds of special training needed to give the administrator an opportunity to know his position better than anyone else, to integrate system objectives with managerial efforts, and to become a self-starter with the organization."  

And McGregor: "Performance appraisal has one of five purposes: salary administration, promotion, transfer, demotion, and termination."  

McGregor was also quoted as saying that the "God complex" of some evaluators also may be the most important reason why most appraisal systems do not work very well. Performance appraisal should be used only for counseling - supervisors do not like to play God.

39 Ibid., p. 15.
40 Ibid., p. 16.
41 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
More from Levinson: "...cannot be objective in a society—
all goes back to subjectivity....highest point of self-motivation
arises when there is a complementary conjunction of the man's needs
and the organization's requirements....examine any appraisal plan
to see the extent to which it: (1) expresses the conviction that
people are patsies to be driven, urged and manipulated, (2) fosters
a genuine partnership between man and organization, (3) requires
group action—needs direction from top and from each other,
(4) provides for appraisal of managers by subordinates."42

Although Knezevich relied upon McGregor to a great extent
in his treatise, a review of The Human Side of Enterprise revealed
even more about the latter's emotions concerning performance ap-
praisal. In general, it could be said that McGregor was not
anti-MBO, but disliked its formalization and threatening use in
something as rigid as performance appraisal. He was an advocate
of formulating objectives but as a means to self-improvement and
"integration" with company goals. He was most assuredly opposed
to the tying of performance appraisal to salary but recommended
the "Scanlon Plan" which essentially distributes salary bonuses
to groups of employees who have achieved a savings or goal.43

42 Ibid., p. 18.
43 McGregor, pp. 90-123.
Herzberg, Mausner and Snyderman arrived at no conclusions which could be considered contradictory to McGregor. They found that such things as salary, working conditions, poor supervision and administration could be "dissatisfiers" if not adequate for employees but that these factors did not serve as "satisfiers" or result in motivation to any degree. For this reason they are called "hygienic" factors because they can only prevent dissatisfaction. Such factors as achievement, recognition, the work itself, responsibility and advancement were the real satisfiers and could result in a high degree of motivation.\footnote{\textit{Frederick Herzberg, Bernard Mausner, Barbara Snyderman, The Motivation to Work,} (New York; John Wiley and Sons, 1967).}

Pursuing some other pertinent references given by Knezevich: Drucker: "The absence of hygiene factors can make a person unhappy, but their presence does not necessarily make a person happy. He must be given challenging work and responsibility."\footnote{P. F. Drucker, \textit{The Practice of Management}, (New York: Harper-Row, Inc., 1954). p. 187.}

Oberg: "Work standards are becoming common (The organization sets the goals)...match practice to purpose in choosing appraisal techniques."\footnote{Oberg, "Make Performance Appraisal Relevant," \textit{Harvard Business Review,} January-February 1972, pp. 61-67.}

Wikstrom: Reported in 1966 that evaluatees were setting and achieving
"easy or low" goals. "Salary administration tied to MBO defeats the developmental aspects of the program."\textsuperscript{47}

McConkey: "Objectives must come from top to down. Should be a clear direct and demonstrated relationship between MBO and the compensation program."\textsuperscript{48}

\textbf{Industrial Relations News}: "Evaluees must be told salary incentives ahead of time."\textsuperscript{49}

Schleh: "A management plan that does not tie the results that have been defined into pay is usually missing a prime spur to accountability."\textsuperscript{50}

Quite obviously, the opinions and comments through 1973 were quite varied and somewhat unconnected. Certainly adequate sources can be found to reinforce most any position on performance appraisal.

\textbf{Since 1973}

Beginning in 1974, there was a marked decline in the output of literature relative to performance appraisal. Whether this in-

\textsuperscript{47}W. S. Wikstrom, "Management by Objectives or Appraisal by Results," \textit{Conference Board Record}, 1966, pp. 27-31.


\textsuperscript{49}Industrial Relations News, November 28, 1964.

dicated the beginnings of a disenchantment with performance appraisal on the part of educators or merely an indication that the subject had been "exhausted" was difficult to say.

The only pertinent and significant research in this latter period was achieved by David Gordon of the University of Pittsburgh in his dissertation, "An Analysis of Performance Appraisal Systems for Public School Administrators: The Problem and the Process."51

Gordon traced the literature of performance appraisal primarily as it developed in industrial management. He stressed the human relations theories related to performance appraisal as formulated by McGregor and Argyris.

Gordon's research concluded,52 after studying nine Pennsylvania school districts which had implemented systems of performance appraisal, the following:

1. Both the time and financial resources necessary for introduction and implementation of a performance appraisal plan were justifiable due to the positive results already being obtained by school districts participating in his study. Furthermore, administrators being evaluated generally took an affirmative view of the process and believed it capable of producing good results.

2. It was possible for introduction and implementation to be

51 Gordon.

52 Ibid., pp. 220-227.
inhibited by insensitive, poorly conceived planning and development of performance appraisal regarding job security, compensation, fringe benefits, working conditions, confidentiality of final evaluation reports, accurate descriptions of job responsibilities and authority, acceptance and non-acceptance of final evaluation report, and bias of individual administrators in the system before the implementation. There was little evidence to show that ineffectiveness had occurred in any of the nine participating districts but rather that a cautious optimism was expressed regarding performance appraisal in its ability to deal equitably with these elements. These conclusions amply demonstrated the need for sound, in-depth planning done in the atmosphere of flexibility and sensitivity to these important concerns.

3. The statistical data showed a moderately positive outcome that reflected a cautious wait-and-see or a still-willing-to-be convinced attitude regarding organizational needs and goals being met and satisfied by performance appraisal. Furthermore, responding administrators believed that performance appraisal can work and can provide much that is positive in their day-to-day workings on the job. It was also apparent that the communications processes between superiors and subordinates and the teamwork approach to administration should be emphasized, better understood, and used to a greater extent. Inservice programs needed to be developed, as did counseling mechanisms for admin-
istrators within the systems, if the systems were to provide the information that was necessary to carry out the intended procedures and purposes of performance appraisal.

4. A moderately positive outcome was justifiable based on the data regarding the human needs and goals being met and satisfied by use of performance appraisal. Responding administrators believed that performance appraisal does provide clearly stated job descriptions, the ability to be included in policy formation, and the opportunity for correcting the individual administrator's job weaknesses. Responding administrators believed that performance appraisal does not provide them with compensation commensurate with their responsibilities or established written grievance procedures that are either adequate or usable, or the ability to seek counsel or advice without it being considered a weakness. Administrators are not accountable for stewardship of time and financial resources but board members did express greater satisfaction with reference to both accountability of time and money spent by administrators. Clearly, this last statement presented a contradiction. Finally, administrators believed the major focus of the appraisal process is self-motivation for self-improvement. There are also community demands that can be satisfied by the introduction and implementation of an administrator performance appraisal system.
5. Based on the beliefs of the superintendents in this study and other limited data from administrative respondents, a tentative conclusion was that performance appraisal can provide accountability of time and financial resources that satisfied the demands of school boards and communities.

6. It was the overall conclusion that performance appraisal is worth the effort, the time, and the financial resources necessary to develop it, if it is conceived as a long-term project. The most difficult aspect of performance appraisal is what appears to be the easiest - its human elements. The tact, sensitivity, trust, and concern for one's fellow administrators seems not to be given the consideration required.

Gordon's Recommendations

Gordon recommended the following:

1. During the conceptualization stage prior to any formal introduction, it would be well to remember that superintendents and central office staffs should introduce the idea of performance appraisal before the school board demands it.

2. Even if a school board member, rather than the central office staff, introduces the appraisal, it would be wise for administrators to develop a rationale for putting off an immediate connection with salaries for at least one year,

53 Ibid., pp. 228-235
preferably two. This was confirmed by the dissatisfaction registered with regard to any questions dealing with salary considerations of administrators. Interviews and written comments served as a further proof that salary was the issue around which most administrators believed the system was breaking down. Obviously, the problem is such that its relevance to the success of any performance appraisal implementation is crucial. It should be pointed out that administrators in all districts believed that salary ultimately should be tied to performance appraisal, but not at its introduction.

3. The following were recommended for introducing a performance appraisal system for public school administrators:

(a) All administrators should be made aware that plans are under consideration for a major change in the way things are to be done.

(b) Regular weekly or biweekly meetings should be held to supply information about the progress regarding the plan for development in the performance appraisal systems to be designed for use in the system.

(c) Each administrator should be given the opportunity to have substantial input in the development and design of the strategies, instruments, and subsystems of the proposed appraisal program.

(d) There should be pilot testing of appraisal instruments and procedures before any final approval is given for the new system.

(e) Performance appraisal for school administrators should move from first introduction to actual implementation in not less than a period of two years.

(f) There should be constant and continuous discussion of the performance appraisal system's implementation and planning stages at school board meetings.
Members of the teaching staff should be consulted and given an opportunity for advisory input into the development of the appraisal system that is to be implemented for administrators. Although many administrators did not believe that teachers should have any part in an administrative performance appraisal system's implementation, there were many who believed that by giving the opportunity for advisory input it would prepare them for the eventuality of an MBO appraisal system for the teaching staff.

Objective experts should be made available to the administrative staff to help every administrator understand the complexities of an MBO performance appraisal system and to help design the instruments, strategies, and sub-systems that will be part of it.

A commitment and endorsement of the designed and pilot-tested MBO performance appraisal system should be firmly established before final implementation takes place.

Administrators should be involved in developing a school board policy that is broad enough to include all the intents of the proposed performance appraisal system.

Administrators should establish a contractual agreement with the school board, postponing any formal attachment of compensation to the appraisal system for at least one year after the newly designed program takes effect. Administrators should also establish a written guarantee concerning their right to take part in any decision concerning an attachment of compensation to the results of the appraisal system.

The following group of recommendations revealed what provisions should be considered for inclusion in any performance appraisal system's introduction:

A provision for detailed specific job descriptions that include the following: the specific skills required to carry out that position, a list of those things for which this position is held fully accountable, a list of

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Ibid., pp. 229-231
responsibilities which are shared in accountability, a clear statement of the limits of the authority of the position including a statement that reflects decision-making ability without a prior consultation with superiors.

(b) A provision in the position description or individual contract detailing the rights of the individual in case of controversy that would lead to either censure or dismissal from the position.

(c) A provision that insures the confidentiality of an access to all personnel files that result from the appraisal processes. It should also deny the intention of performance appraisal to provide data to justify transfer, demotion, or dismissal but rather foster a process of self-motivation for self-improvement to benefit the school organization.

(d) A provision establishing the process of building a self-development plan based on the results of yearly appraisal.

(e) A provision detailing the method by which objectives are to be written, reviewed, and the results shared with board members. The objectives should be written so that they can be shown whether they are maintenance objectives or high-risk problem-solving or creative objectives. Further, the risks or intangibles should be spelled out in the writing, and provision should be included as to how the results of yearly appraisal will be reported to the school board and the community. Properly carried out, the results are powerful justification for needed budget requests concerning equipment, curriculum, innovation, and salary increases.

(f) A provision instituting a yearly or bi-yearly accountability report on all areas under the MBO system to be given to the school board. This suggestion was meant for those wishing to carry MBO appraisal to their teaching staff and could further result in the implementation of a total PPBS plan.

(g) A provision that on a regularly planned basis, once a year at least, administrators sit down together privately and assess the needs of the organization and their own needs to see if a reasonable congruity exists. For this to be possible, a great deal of trust and confidence in each other and the existing power structure must be present. If this trust is not present, this
recommendation should be ignored, since it would only lead to greater difficulty. Further, these meetings could provide the basis for discovering special skills possessed by individual administrators and provide individuals with an opportunity to meet a personal challenge.

(h) A provision that teachers be included in an advisory capacity in planning and executing the appraisal program should be given careful consideration.

(i) A provision that a team approach to educational administration be adopted by administrators seeking to use MBO/R as a basis for performance appraisal.

(j) A provision requiring administrators to attend inservice programs and workshops in the area of group dynamics, sensitivity training, humanizing school climates, needs assessment, and evaluation techniques.

(k) A provision requiring each administrator to take time to meet with his immediate subordinate as frequently as possible as a method of both facilitating communication and providing for counseling and advising of the subordinates when this is necessary.

(l) A provision for a written grievance procedure providing for internal settlement of administrator conflicts.

(m) A provision that the processes of communication should not be limited to paper and pen but should occur at regular intervals in the form of face-to-face meetings of the whole administrative staff, even to the point of having a bi-monthly meeting to discuss problems relating only to the appraisal process.

(n) A provision for a step-by-step evaluation of the procedures and instruments used in the appraisal process with the goal of continuous growth and change in the process becoming a built-in part of the process.

(o) A provision that any change in the appraisal process be made acceptable to a three-fourths majority of all administrators concerned.

(p) A provision that the recycling process of the development of objectives for a new school year not be decided upon at the same conference session that a final yearly appraisal session occurs. Further, that
administrators have the opportunity to appeal any decision if they are in near or total disagreement with a final yearly appraisal result that will influence yearly compensation.

(q) A provision establishing a formula for compensation that is consistent and also provides a cost of living increase for all administrators regardless of the results of performance appraisal.55

Gordon's Conclusions

Gordon made some interesting concluding comments:

1. Performance appraisal should not be expected to produce automatic or instant results. Like any technology, it contains no inherent magic - it demands careful planning, attention to details, constant check-ups on activities, and the ability to be flexible continuously according to conditions and people. It should be remembered that performance appraisal is not a man-machine system but rather a man-job-results system that relies almost exclusively on man in the present educational context.56

2. System building in education must continuously be aware of the uniqueness of its product - better, more able human beings. If the systems used to evaluate employees or schools are dehumanizing, their purpose in educating youth better is not well served.57

55Ibid., pp 231-235.
56Ibid., p. 238.
57Ibid., p. 239.
Development of performance appraisal that is sensitive to individual and human needs becomes a potent challenge. Again an MBO/R approach offers the best hope for success, and with greater dissemination of what is already known and prospects for further developments from the behavioral sciences, even greater success can become a reality.58

Chapter Summary

Performance appraisal was introduced to educational administration in 1969 or 1970. It received a great deal of attention in the literature through 1973, at which time Knezevich wrote a summary of its use in education. Since 1973, very little has appeared on the subject with the exception of Gordon's dissertation in which several practical recommendations were made.

58 Ibid., p. 45
CHAPTER III
PRESENTATION OF THE DATA

Introduction

The gathering of data for this research was divided into two parts. The first consisted of a thorough study of the historical background of performance appraisal in the Chicago public schools. This included a study of the roles of the General Superintendent, the Board of Education, and the Chicago Principals' Association. The study also had to include an analysis of several pertinent documents, most notably "Development of a Compensation Plan for Administrative Positions"¹ which was submitted to the Board of Education by the consulting firm of Cresap, McCormick, and Paget and "Administrative Compensation Plan,"² the document which eventually became the official manual for the implementation of Chicago's system of performance appraisal.

The second part of the data gathering process was accomplished through interviews of key administrators who were highly involved in the development and implementation of the Performance Appraisal Plan. These interviews are presented empirically with analysis following in Chapter IV.


Part I - Historical Background of Performance Appraisal in the Chicago Public Schools

Dr. James F. Redmond was appointed General Superintendent of the Chicago public schools, effective September 1, 1966. He succeeded Dr. Benjamin C. Willis, a Superintendent renowned for his administrative abilities and the massive school construction programs he supervised to meet the great migration of the 1950's and early 60's. He did not communicate well with minorities and community groups, however, and many claim this led to his contract not being renewed by the Board of Education.

James Redmond brought much promise to the job and within a comparatively short time made significant changes in the school system: Decentralization was accomplished when the city was divided into three administrative "Areas," each with its own Associate Superintendent; more blacks were appointed to top administrative positions and the Office of Human Relations was greatly expanded; a Deputy Superintendent was appointed to be responsible for the day-to-day operations of the system (Dr. Manford Byrd, Jr., a black who had earlier been appointed by Redmond as one of his two administrative assistants), and, in 1970, "community selection" of principals became a reality.

Quite early in his tenure, Dr. Redmond had responded positively to the expressed desires of several Board of Education members that principals and other administrators should be held more accountable, that Board members and
upper level administrators should have a better appraisal of the quality of the work of a specific principal (perhaps because of community pressures on many principals), and that salary raises should not be granted en masse to every principal and administrator, both good and bad.\(^3\)

More specifically, the above desires were aired openly at a Board of Education meeting early in 1968. Teachers had been granted a salary increase effective January 1 of that year as a result of Board and the Teachers' Union negotiations. A corresponding package had been worked out for principals and other administrators. In approving the administrative salary increase, one Board member, Mrs. Louise Malis, reiterated earlier remarks concerning her desire for administrative salaries based on some sort of merit.\(^4\)

The Recommendations Of Cresap, McCormick, and Paget

Within the next few weeks, however, members of the Chicago Principals' Club flooded Board of Education members with letters and telegrams stating opposition to merit pay provisions. Faced with mounting opinions on merit pay, both pro and con, the Superintendent told the Board of Education that he would be returning to them with recommendations on

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\(^3\) Interview with anonymous Board of Education staff member, May 1978.

\(^4\) Interview with anonymous Board of Education staff member, January 1979.
this subject. On August 28, 1968, the Board of Education approved a contract with the management consulting firm of Cresap, McCormick, and Paget to conduct a study of administrative salaries and to recommend to the Superintendent and the Board of Education a plan for relating salary to the evaluation of performance. Presumably other consulting firms were contacted and interviewed regarding this project but Cresap, McCormick, and Paget (CMP) was selected because of its extensive experience with similar projects in business and industry.

During the next three months, CMP conducted an intensive review of administrative organization and salaries in the school system. Over 100 individuals were interviewed, questionnaires were sent to all administrators and past records and board reports were studied in great detail. On December 10 of that same year, CMP submitted its preliminary report with recommendations to the General Superintendent. The title of the report was "Development of a Compensation Plan for Administrative Positions" and was divided into six parts: Introduction; Present Compensation Plans; Evaluation and Grading of Positions; Development of the Administrative Salary Plan; Salary Administration Policies, Procedures and Controls; and Suggested

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6Interview, January 1979.
Course of Action.7

(Before continuing, the reader should note the heavy focus throughout this report on salary: The impetus for CMP was derived from salary considerations, the title of the study was "Development of a Compensation Plan"..., and most of the emphasis in the study dealt with salary. This emphasis on salary rather than administrative evaluation or performance appraisal will be crucial as conclusions are drawn and recommendations are made later in this paper.)

The objectives of CMP were:

1. To develop a method for determining internal relationships and for classifying all positions included in the program.

2. To establish a grading structure for the classifications which will provide a sufficient number of levels in proper relationship to assigned duties and responsibilities, internal consistency, and organizational requirements.

3. To establish a pay structure based on the grading structure which reflects competitive requirements and appropriate relationships to other positions within the Board of Education.

4. To prepare written descriptions of the classifications.

5. To outline a system of policy guides and procedures which provides for the continuing maintenance and administration of the plan, ensures orderly and consistent treatment of

7Cresap, McCormick, and Paget.
employees, and affords effective control over grading and pay matters.

6. To review and recommend any needed improvement in the organization, staffing, and operations in the Board's Department of Personnel related to compensation.\(^8\)

As the preceding section titles indicate, the Introduction was followed by quite thorough analysis of the then-current pay structure which, in turn, was followed by the most controversial area of the report, Evaluation and Grading of Positions.

The latter was accomplished through six steps: Securing position information, classifying positions, selecting evaluation factors, evaluating positions, weighting evaluation factors, and determining position grades.\(^9\)

The results of this process were bound to be controversial because of the highly subjective nature of the process. For example, the evaluation factors selected were accountability, prerequisite knowledge and skills, relationships responsibility, and supervisory responsibility. The weights assigned to these four factors were 20, 15, 10, and 5, respectively.\(^{10}\)

...The net result was that all administrative positions were classified into twelve grades.\(^{11}\)

\(^8\) Ibid., I, 1.
\(^9\) Ibid., III, 1.
\(^{10}\) Ibid., III, 7.
\(^{11}\) Ibid., III - 3.
In Part IV, Development of the Proposed Administrative Salary Plan, CMP based its recommendation for salary "ranges" primarily on "prevailing salary data for comparable positions in other, large urban school districts."\(^{12}\)

Part V, Salary Administration Policies, Procedures and Controls, dealt with the specifics of implementing the plan. The first recommendation was to place principals on a twelve-month employment basis, and to grant proportional compensation and paid vacation time. Each administrator was to be placed within the appropriate salary range, which, for most, meant a raise. Also, an Administrator of Salary was recommended and periodic review and up-dating of position grades and salary ranges, using the twelve major cities. Other miscellaneous problems were addressed: hiring rates, re-hires, promotions, demotions, transfers, position re-evaluation, and salary control. It was at this same point in the report, however, that the term "performance appraisal" appeared for the first time along with "merit increases."\(^{13}\)

Of performance appraisal, CMP stated:

1. Effective salary administration relates compensation rewards to performance appraisal results rather than only to time spent in a position.

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\(^{12}\) Ibid., IV, 2.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., V, 9-11.
2. Each employee's performance should be appraised at least once a year, using an objective, formal performance appraisal procedure.

3. Each employee's performance should be appraised by his immediate supervisor and reviewed by at least the next higher supervisor.

4. The performance appraisal procedure should produce overall ratings at three levels to correspond with the guidelines for determining merit increase amounts: Above satisfactory, Satisfactory, Below satisfactory.14

CMP went on to recommend that a performance appraisal plan "must be based upon the supervisor's appraisal of the employee's attainment of specific performance standards and objectives which are mutually discussed and agreed to by the employee and his supervisor." Also, "that a committee, composed of the following: Assistant to General Superintendent, a Director, a District Superintendent, a Principal and the Administrator-Salary Administration, be formed to develop the program in the next six months and train all supervisors to its application."15

Regarding merit increases, CMP recommended that these be granted annually "depending on the employee's performance and on the placement of his salary rate within the applicable salary range." A chart suggested percentages of merit increases which were: Satisfactory - up to 7%, Above Satisfactory - up to 10%.16

14Ibid., v, 9.
15Ibid., v, 10.
16Ibid., Exhibit V-2
Chicago Principals' Club

The involvement of the Chicago Principals' Club (now known as the Chicago Principals' Association - CPA) is crucial to an historical account of the Cresap, McCormick, and Paget report. The reason for the CPA's involvement being crucial goes back to CMP's statement that performance appraisal objectives must be mutually acceptable to evaluatee and evaluator. Obviously, the entire "Performance Appraisal Plan"\(^1\) could not be successful unless both supervisors and those being supervised (principals) mutually believed in the plan's value and fairness as a basis for administrative evaluation.

This is verified by the fact that in its report, CMP several times stated the importance of involving the principals' groups and that on December 26, 1968, the preliminary report was submitted to the CPA's president and the group's support was requested. After some slight modifications, the report was endorsed by the CPA and letters were written to Board of Education members urging their approval of the report.\(^2\)

The CMP report was approved by the Board of Education, and three committees were formed to deal with the plan's implementation: Salary, Evaluation of Positions, and Merit Pay (to determine the


\(^{2}\)Samuel F. Doinick to members of Board of Education, City of Chicago. 7 January 1969. Files of Chicago Principals' Association.
specifics of performance appraisal). Only the latter was considered in this research.

CMP was asked to continue as a consultant on the performance appraisal aspects of the plan and submitted a draft of a proposal for implementation. The draft was rejected by the CPA for the following reasons:

The proposal:

1. is not objective, but is completely subjective.
2. does not provide for any built-in promotional guidelines or criteria.
3. is discriminatory in that no other group of certificated personnel is placed on a merit pay scale.
4. has a built-in quota system limiting the number of people who will be rated above satisfactory.
5. does not define "below satisfactory" in relation to "unsatisfactory" and destroys built-in safeguards of the E-1 and E-2.
6. is an obvious attempt to circumvent the Illinois School Code in demoting a principal without cause, and
7. contains the possibility of unlimited abuse and harassment against principals by their superiors.¹⁹

The "honeymoon" between Cresap, McCormick, and Paget and the Chicago Principals' Association was obviously over.

It is unclear why the CPA "strongly urged" the adoption of the original CMP report and "completely rejected" the performance appraisal aspect of the plan. One can only surmise that the CPA

did not understand what performance appraisal implied or found the increased salary benefits, particularly the placement of principals on a twelve-month basis, attractive enough to outweigh the negative aspects of the original CMP report.

The Early Years

The years 1969 and 1970 were ones of great discord and confusion as far as performance appraisal was concerned. The CPA documented twenty different meetings held between March 9 and August 12, 1969. Besides CPA representatives, the Board of Education staff members usually present were the Director of Employee Relations, the Assistant Superintendent of Personnel, the Administrator in the Office of Employee Relations, the Associate Superintendent for Administration, and representatives of the District Superintendents' and Directors' Associations. Generally speaking, there seemed to be serious disagreement as to whether various revisions of the CMP draft reflected objections raised at the various meetings or whether staff members, representing the Board of Education, were maintaining a predetermined position. On December 1, 1969, the CPA again rejected the performance appraisal draft for the same reasons given earlier. The principals insisted that the plan had not been developed with their cooperation and that they had never had the opportunity to voice their objections personally to members of the Board of Education as a committee of the whole.20

In any case it would seem that the plan was already in deep trouble as a meaningful instrument of evaluation as correspondence of November 25 from the CPA's President to Dr. Redmond indicted the plan as having "reprehensible facets" and referred to statements of Redmond to "blast" the Association for its opposition.21

Nevertheless, Board Report 69-674 set up a pilot-basis Performance Appraisal Plan (PAP) for the academic year 1970-1971 and the PAP proceeded.22 Finally, in March of 1971, a final version of the Performance Appraisal Plan was approved by the Board of Education for full implementation beginning in September of 1971.23

Curiously enough, the manual which was issued concerning the plan was still entitled "Administrative Compensation Plan." Although the manual does contain many board reports related to salary, the bulk of the booklet concerns the specifics of implementing the performance appraisal portion of the plan. The two titles are still a frequent source of confusion among many Board of Education employees which perhaps might have been avoided by a more evaluation-oriented title.


23 "Performance Appraisal Plan for Administrative Employees."
The Performance Appraisal Plan

The manual consists of a total of 60 pages. The first five are devoted to the March 24, 1971, board report entitled "Adopt Administrative Compensation Plan"; the next sixty are devoted to "Exhibit A - Performance Appraisal Plan for Administrative Employees." The last twelve are concerned with various charts concerning salary and position evaluation.

The performance appraisal portion is divided into eight chapters:

I. Introduction
II. Key Responsibilities
III. Performance Objectives
IV. Interim Review
V. Reporting of Results
VI. Performance Appraisal
VII. Review Meetings
VIII. Additional Administrative Considerations

Key elements of each chapter are as follows:

I. Introduction:
1. States general objectives and advantages of a performance appraisal plan.

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24 "Minutes of the Proceedings of the Board of Education, City of Chicago" Chicago, December 12, 1969

25 "Performance Appraisal Plan for Administrative Employees."
2. Makes several promising statements, e.g. "...clearly relates compensation to performance results in a position...reduces the element of subjectivity...equitable for all participants...provides motivation for administrators to improve their performance...will result in the improvement of instruction." 

II. Key Responsibilities:

1. States: "The basic functions of every administrator can be described in terms of general, or overall, responsibilities. These general functions can be broken down into specific duties and responsibilities."

2. Continues: "In addition...every administrator is faced with a number of specific problems or circumstances which may effect the achievement of successful performance of some of the key responsibilities of this position. These specifics are called "key factors" in the performance appraisal program."

3. Gives numerous examples of both of the above and how they should be stated on individual performance appraisal document.

III. Performance Objectives:

1. States: "Performance objectives are written statements of the goals which administrators and their superiors agree should be

26 Ibid., 1-3
27 Ibid., 4-7
accomplished during the review period."

2. Gives purposes and guidelines for writing performance objectives. Major guide is the setting of performance objectives that are specific and established at significant and attainable levels.

3. States that administrators should involve members of their staffs, communities, and, for high school, student bodies. Also, there should be "preliminary" performance objectives which are discussed with superior before the actual setting of goals.

4. Continues that "the meeting between the administrator and his supervisor to establish objectives is the focal point of the PAP."

5. Further continues that the standards for achievement of objectives should be qualitative and quantitative. Also, each objective should be weighted; the total being 100 percent.

6. Concludes with guidelines for writing memorandum from administrator to supervisor, timing schedule (e.g. initial meeting between district superintendent and principal should require three to four hours), and illustration of format to be followed.28

28 Ibid., 8-16.
IV. Interim Review:
1. States "Regularly scheduled individual reviews, with specific
discussion of the objectives and accomplishments, should be
made to keep close track of progress and to provide for
assistance as needed. The review of progress should not be
left to chance."

V. Reporting of Results:
1. States: "Accomplishment reports are written reports by ad-
ministrators to their superiors briefly summarizing the
results they have accomplished...These reports tell the
superior the actual results which have been accomplished
compared to the performance objectives...."
2. Gives purposes of and suggested format for accomplishment
reports.
3. Emphasizes that this report "should be sufficiently clear
to afford easy comprehension by managers at...succeedingly
higher levels above him."  

VI. Performance Appraisal:
1. States "The performance appraisal provides an organized
method for the supervisor to reduce to writing on a scheduled
basis his appraisal of a subordinate's performance. The

29 Ibid., 17.
30 Ibid., 18-20.
basis for reaching these judgments is a review of the degree to which the results have met, exceeded, or failed to meet the performance objectives and other responsibilities.

2. Defines the three levels of performance to be used by the supervisor.

3. States that evaluation must consider the circumstances under which the results were accomplished. "During this analysis and judgment phase, the supervisor will want to ask himself certain specific questions about the employee's work and to reflect at the same time upon possible extenuating circumstances...."

4. Continues with guidelines for specific numerical system wherein each objective is given "performance rating points" of 1, 3, or 5, which when multiplied by weightings give the "weighted score." Total weighted score determines whether the "Summary Performance Appraisal" is Level I, II or III.

5. Finally gives illustration of format to be used by evaluators.31

VII. Review Meetings:

1. States: "The basic purpose of the meeting is to look carefully at the immediate past as a means of improving both planning and performance in the immediate future."

31 Ibid., 21-29.
2. Emphasizes that this meeting should be "controlled and frank," that this is a learning session, and that the subordinate should be shown a copy of the performance appraisal form.

3. Concludes that "The concluding portion of the meeting should be slanted toward the future so that, before the meeting is ended, a new set of performance objectives for the next period is agreed upon."32

VIII. Additional Administrative Considerations:

1. Covers miscellaneous topics such as personnel changes, appeal process, unsatisfactory performance (E-1, E-2 procedure to be continued), and the recommendations of a committee to meet in one year to review the plan and make recommendations.33

1971-72

The academic year 1971-72 saw the first full-year implementation of PAP. At its conclusion, in November of 1972, Dr. Redmond recommended to the Board of Education salary increases of 4½% and 5½% for those administrators whose performance evaluation was at Level II and Level III, respectively. (The reader might recall that the original recommendation of CMP was for 7% and 10%, respectively).34

32 Ibid., 30-32.
33 Ibid., 33-35.
34 Interview with Thomas Finnegan, Salary Administrator, Board of Education, City of Chicago, January 1979.
That same month the Chicago Principals' Association repeated some of its objections regarding the PAP.

1. A salary loss suffered in the switch from ten to twelve months. (Principals were now being paid the equivalent of fifty weeks of their former salary for fifty two weeks work. This was contrary to the original recommendation of CMP for the equivalent of fifty two weeks of former salary).

2. Administrators had not received the general raise granted to teachers the previous September, nor had their schedule been updated on the basis of the twelve largest cities, as originally planned.

3. Principals no longer received a supplementary salary for administering after-school social centers. Instead, they received "category points" which were not sufficient to raise the category for most principals.

4. The CPA claimed that many procedural aspects of the PAP had not been adhered to during the first year.35

It should be noted again, however, that three out of the above four objections to the first year's program were salary related. Additional statistics which might explain the Board's hesitancy to grant the originally recommended increases were:

68% of the administrators received Level III performance ratings;

35Statement of Thomas S. Burke to the Board of Education's Employee Salary Hearings, November 30, 1972.
29% received Level II; and 3% received Level I.36

1972-73

The academic year 1972-73 was virtually a re-run of the previous year from the standpoint of the Administrative Compensation Plan and performance appraisal. Increments of 4% and 5% were granted to Level II and Level III principals, respectively.37 The CPA continued to complain for the reasons stated previously, but in addition many principals' salaries had been virtually "frozen" because they had reached the top of their range, while the ranges had not been revised as originally promised. Still, however, criticism focused on salary with the aspect of performance appraisal being lost.

1973-74

During the 1973-74 academic year, no change was seen in the aforementioned pattern until June 1974 when the Board's Administrative Salaries Committee made its report and recommendations. The report acknowledged many of the salary inequities which had been pointed out by the CPA: 196 teachers in the city were making more than their principals, 174 administrators would not receive any raise on September 1 of that year.


37 Interview with Thomas Finnegan.
The committee recommended that the system of ranges and quartiles be eliminated and that the Board return to the "step advancement concept of compensation," Provisions were made for exceptional circumstances.

More important to this study, the committee stated: "This revised compensation retains the concept that salary increases are related to an administrator's performance. However, it modifies the current plan by granting performance appraisal increments as performance compensation which is added to the administrator's salary for a period of one year only. In order to receive a performance appraisal increment for the next school year, an administrator must once again receive a summary performance appraisal evaluation of Level II or III."38

Additional guidelines for evaluation of administrative positions were given and re-classification of schools was again promised. (The last time schools had been re-classified was January 1, 1973. As of this writing, 1980, re-classification still has not taken place).

Also, the report stated: "Reaffirm the continuance of the performance plan...with the following modifications; (All salary related)." In addition: "Four-fifths of the average increase granted other employee groups shall be added to the administrative

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salary schedule.... The remaining one-fifth...shall be added to the performance appraisal percentage increment...for the ensuing year only."

The report was passed with slight modifications on July 24, 1974.

One other noteworthy event: In late 1973, the CPA conducted a survey of its membership. According to the membership, the procedural aspects of the PAP were not being adhered to in about 40% of the cases. Principals voted overwhelmingly to work toward the elimination of the PAP.

In addition to the new schedule, the performance appraisal increments for that year were 4\% and 5\%.

1974-75 and 1975-76

The years 1974-75 - 1975-76 saw no significant changes in terms of the PAP. At the conclusion of the 1974-75 year, all administrative salaries were raised by 7.2% with additional performance appraisal increments of 2.2% and 2.6% for Levels II and III, respectively. The following year saw a general administrative increase of 5.68% but the Board then balked at granting the additional "one-fifth" stipulated in 1974. After the filing of a

39Ibid., 7.
41Interview with Thomas Finnegan.
grievance and the threat of a suit by the CPA, the additional 1.42% increment was granted to Level II and III administrators.\textsuperscript{42} This same school year also saw a general financial crisis which resulted in the school year being shortened by 16 days and administrators laid-off an additional five days. For all practical purposes, this was the end of full-year employment for principals.

In February of 1976, the Board's administrative Salaries Committee again made some recommendations regarding the PAP. These were as follows:

1. The total number of objectives should not exceed seven.
2. Evaluator and evaluee \textbf{must} mutually agree to final list of objectives and also to standards.
3. Evaluator and evaluee shall mutually agree to a definition of those standards for each objective which is required to attain a Level II Summary Appraisal.
4. When it appears that an evaluee will receive a Summary Appraisal Level I for an appraisal year, one or more reviews of progress must be held.
5. An appeal procedure is provided if mutual agreement of the objectives is not obtained or if the Summary Performance Appraisal is not accepted by the evaluee.
6. The second level review (Area Associate Superintendent) shall be eliminated (areas had been abolished that year).

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid.
7. Beginning with July 1, 1976, at the discretion of the evaluator, administrators whose most recent Summary Performance Appraisal is Level III need not be evaluated annually. However, such evalee must be evaluated every other year.

8. When an appeal of the Summary Performance Appraisal is requested, the evalee may, if he so desires, have the president of the employee group, or the president's appointee, participate in the review without a vote.

9. Consideration be given to the advisability of disassociating the performance appraisal increment from the Administrative Compensation Plan.

10. The evaluator and evalee shall have a face-to-face Summary Appraisal conference. The evaluator shall sign the appraisal form prior to presenting it to the evalee and the evalee shall sign after the conference. The evalee's signature is not to be construed as concurrence with the evaluation. The final portion of the conference should be slanted toward developing a new set of performance objectives for the next evaluation period.\(^4^3\)

All of the above, with the exception of number 7, were eventually implemented. The fact that many of these were restatements of practices which were supposedly already in existence indicated that not everyone was adhering to the guidelines of the

\(^4^3\) The Chicago Principals' Association Newsletter, 26 February 1976.
The PAP remained in effect during the years 1976-79, but as indicated in the preceding, salary increments were no longer given. Raises corresponded to those given other education employees.

Two additional items, directly related to the PAP, should be mentioned:

First, on August 11, 1976, the Board adopted "System-Wide Goals and Objectives." In a letter to the administrative staff on October 22 of that year, the General Superintendent stated:

The establishment, distribution, and implementation of system-wide goals and objectives are critical to our efforts to provide quality education, develop appropriate and innovative programs and resolve problems facing our school system. Several of the critical priority goals have been selected for the establishment of local school profiles. Additional information and guidelines on the continued implementation of our goals and objectives and their relationship to the PAP will be submitted to you within the next two weeks. In the meantime in order to avoid duplication of effort, staff are requested to delay the submission of objectives for this year as provided in the PAP and to use the enclosed materials to establish directions for the achievement of our system-wide goals and objectives.

The "priority goals" given to each school, along with data from the previous three years for that school, were: Index of Vandalism, Teacher Absenteeism Rate, and Faculty Integration. It

\textsuperscript{44}Board of Education of the City of Chicago, "System-Wide Goals and Objectives," August 11, 1976.

\textsuperscript{45}Dr. Joseph P. Hannon to members of the staff, 22 October 1976, Board of Education, Chicago.
was not until February 8, 1977, that the Deputy Superintendent for Field Service issued a directive for PAP objectives which were to include objectives to meet the priority goals.\textsuperscript{46} The CPA argued, of course, that there was a conflict with this direction of goals and the long-standing policy that goals should be "mutually" formulated.\textsuperscript{47}

In the two PAP years since that time, these priority goals have also been included in the principals' objectives. The debate between the Board and the CPA continues; the CPA claiming that the PAP has never been altered since July 1974. The CPA's Newsletter of September 14, 1978, stated: "Objectives mandated for all principals from above - such as teacher attendance, pupil attendance, vandalism, etc., must be considered as being something separate and apart from the PAP."\textsuperscript{48}

Secondly, schools have not been reclassified since January 1, 1973, even though the original Administrative Compensation Plan said that this was to take place annually. In November 1977, reclassification almost took place. The Board's Finance Committee,

\textsuperscript{46} Dr. Bessie F. Lawrence to staff administrators, 8 February 1977, Board of Education, Chicago

\textsuperscript{47} The Chicago Principals' Association Newsletter, 14 September 1978.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
III. 1979-80 School Year Plan for the Improvement of Schools:

A sample of the statistical analysis which was given to each principal for his school, including test scores, reading objectives, teacher absenteeism and student attendance.

IV. Explanation of Building Level Profile Variables: Definitions and descriptions of various terminologies used in the program.

V. Building Level Plan - Elementary School: The actual form to be used by elementary school principals in setting objectives, some mandated and some optional, in view of the previous year's statistical data for that school. Five mandated objectives, derived from the System-Wide Goals and Objectives, were to be "weighted" to reflect between 50% and 80% of the principal's total efforts for that year with additional objectives added with the mutual agreement of the District Superintendent. For each objective, there was a goal, a performance objective, a plan for evaluation, and an action plan.

VI. Building Level Plan - High School: Similar to the elementary school plan, except that four mandatory goals are given which must be weighted to reflect between 40% and 60% of the principal's total efforts that year.

VII. Tentative System-Wide Goals and Objectives - September 1979: These goals covered the following eleven areas:

**Part II - Data From the Focused Interviews of Selected Administrators**

As stated in Chapter I, focused interviews were conducted with six principals in each of three districts in a former administrative area of the Chicago public schools (a total of 18 principals). Also, the three district superintendents supervising these principals were interviewed along with the former area associate superintendent who supervised the three district superintendents. In addition, the Deputy Superintendent of schools, to whom the area associates reported, was also interviewed.

The principals concerned were chosen at random from those who had worked with PAP and with that particular district superintendent for at least three years. The interviewed principals represented a valid sampling of the Chicago principals' population: 56% were male; 44% female; 17% secondary principals; 83% elementary; and 28% were black and 72% were white. The mean lengths of administrative experience in Districts "X", "Y" and "Z" respectively, were, 9, 15½, and 11 for an overall mean of 12 years.

Following is the presentation of data by item and district along with appropriate or unusual comments or examples cited by the various interviewees:
Item #1: Improvements in Administration

Principals - District X

The six principals of District X rejected the statement "that compensation was clearly related to performance results," except for one who said that this had been achieved "temporarily." They also said that "the element of subjectivity" had not been reduced and that PAP was not equitable for all participants. They were more divided on whether PAP provided for principals to improve their performance: Two said it did, two said it did not and two said it did not because of the lack of any monetary incentives.

They were evenly split on the question of the plan's effectiveness in comparing actual results to the objectives, but almost all in this district said it did result in the improvement of instruction. Only two said it afforded the opportunity for better administrator-supervisor communications--however, these two said the opportunity was not fully taken--and two others said it did not help to identify needs for training and improvement. The reason one gave was that "it presupposes that the district superintendent has the expertise to accomplish this."

Some comments were that the PAP sets up an "adversary situation between the principal and the district superintendent", that the plan "unified the staff to achieve goals" and that the "principal does not accept goals he cannot accomplish."
District Superintendent - District X

The district superintendent said that compensation was not related to performance, subjectivity had been reduced and that he "tried" to be equitable for all. He felt that it did provide for administrators to improve their performance, but that its success in comparing actual results to objectives was "limited." It did, he said, "help identify priorities and give the district superintendent values across the District." He said PAP would result in the improvement of instruction depending upon the "aggressiveness" of the principal. PAP is a good method of communication, but does not "per se" identify individual needs.

Principals - District Y

The six principals in District Y agreed unanimously that PAP does not relate compensation to performance results but were divided on the questions of whether or not the plan reduces subjectivity. Two believed that subjectivity was reduced and two said it was not. Two others said "somewhat" or "questionable." They were also split on the question of PAP's being equitable for all participants, with one saying that this depended on who the district superintendent was. Another stated that while PAP might be equitable within a specific district, it was clearly not equitable across the city. The principals were evenly split on the question of improving administrative performance, but one who said yes also said that at least it makes the district superintendent give a reason for his evaluation. All but one agreed
that, under the plan, actual results were compared to objectives but
two stated "I made sure that I got good results" and that one's rating
"depended on how well one can write." Only two principals in this
District said that PAP improved instruction; two others commented that
PAP was a "negligible" factor and that PAP made no more difference
than any other evaluation plan. Only two stated that the plan af-
forded better opportunities for communication and one negative
respondent said there was not sufficient time for good communications
anyway. All but two, however, felt that PAP helped to identify areas
of need for training and improvement with two pointing out that "PAP
makes one find weaknesses" and "forces one to look at his job."

District Superintendent - District Y

The district superintendent in Y said that compensation had
been related to results but that this had not taken place in three
year. He also said that PAP had reduced subjectivity and that it
was equitable for all participants. He also said that the plan did
provide for administrators to improve their performance since
principals had begun to make long-range plans and were not planning
as much on a day-to-day basis. This was especially evident during
the last two years.

Also, actual results are compared to objectives because there
is "direct principal input." It will result in improved instruction
since now there is more planning. He and his principals do communi-
cate "much better than before because of PAP," and needs are better
identified but "only for unsatisfactory principals."
Principals - District Z

In District Z the six principals also agreed that PAP did not relate compensation to results, but two said there had been an "attempt". They split two-to-two on the plan's reducing subjectivity; another principal was uncertain and another said that she had no prior experience with which to compare PAP. Only two felt the plan was equitable for all and only two believed that it provides for administrators to improve their performance, one saying that "it makes you look at your job." All but one principal believed PAP compares actual results to objectives while four of six believed it was a factor in improving instruction. One of these, however, said that instruction had improved in the last few years, but "not because of PAP." Four of six said PAP did not afford better opportunity for communication while all but one said it did not assist in identifying needs for training and development.

District Superintendent - District Z

The final district superintendent interviewed believed that PAP related compensation to results "temporarily" and that it reduced subjectivity. PAP is "more equitable than other plans" and "properly handled" PAP will provide for administrators to improve their performance. PAP does compare results and objectives and "because it forced us to set instructional goals" will result in the improvement of instruction. PAP alone will not overcome communications barriers, but it has made principals identify staff needs.
Area Associate Superintendent

The former associate superintendent, now retired, believed that compensation was related to performance but he was not sure that subjectivity had been reduced. He did not think PAP was equitable from one district to another but that it did provide for improvement of performance because you had to "write things down and attach your name." Actual results are compared to objectives "if the objectives are realistic and specific; if vague, no." PAP "somewhat" improves instruction and "may" afford better administrative communications - "Depended on original conference - too little time - too much pressure to get things in - not the design’s fault." He was "not too sure" PAP identified individual needs. "All principals' have a masters or a doctorate. Weaknesses are human relations. PAP not designed for this."

Deputy Superintendent

This gentleman, who was second-in-command only to the General Superintendent, believed that PAP "somewhat" related compensation to results. It did not "100% pinpoint efforts of people." The plan did reduce subjectivity partly because it "narrowed the items in the evaluation." PAP is "generally as good as anything possible" in being equitable and provided for administrators to improve their performance. There was a "serious effort through the accomplishment report" to compare actual results with objectives and it did improve instruction, because "some discussion had to take place" among
teachers, principal, and district superintendent. Also, PAP afforded better communication for opportunities and identified the individual needs of principals.

Item #2: Technical Directives

Principals - District X

The six principals did not all agree that they and the district superintendent had mutually agreed upon the principal's objectives at the beginning of the school year. One of the two not agreeing said that the district superintendent "put in what he wanted." They split three-to-three on whether or not the objectives were discussed during the year with one stating that "only reading scores" were discussed. There was a wide difference of opinion on whether objectives were set at significant and attainable levels. Two said yes; one, no; two did not know; and the last said "Significant - no. Attainable - yes." This group was evenly split on involving community and staff in the identification of goals and three said that the district superintendent had shared his PAP with them before they did theirs. The other three were not sure. They divided four-to-two in agreeing that accomplishment reports are used by the district superintendent to plan for the following year.

District Superintendent - District X

This district superintendent said that all objectives were mutually agreed upon, but that this was "less so with a new principal" and that objectives were not "brand new every year." Objectives are discussed during the year, but he was "not sure if the principals
always realized this." He felt that it was extremely important that objectives be set at significant and attainable levels. If not done, "priorities will not really be established." He also said that principals tended to involve members of the community, et al, during the early years of PAP, but that this has not been maintained. It was less true at the beginning of PAP that the district superintendent shared his PAP with principals. He felt that there was something contradictory with the preceding first statement; that is, that there cannot be mutual agreement if the district superintendent is imposing his objectives on principals. Finally, he said that the accomplishment reports of one year are used as a basis for planning for the following year.

Principals - District Y

In District Y, four of six principals said that their objectives were mutually agreed upon, but they were evenly split on whether objectives were discussed during the year. All said that their objectives were set at attainable levels but did not think they were significant. Two said they involved community and staff in their plans, two did not, and two said involvement was limited. Four said the district superintendent had shared his plans, but two were not sure. There was a two-two division on whether or not accomplishment reports are used in planning for the next year, but two were uncertain.
District Superintendent - District Y

The district superintendent in District Y said that objectives were not mutually agreed upon at the beginning of the year, because the given deadline has usually been much later in the year. Objectives are discussed during the year only if either party wishes, and the objectives are set at significant and attainable levels. "Principals would be crazy to give out their plans to the community. Others should be involved in planning, not in PAP." This district superintendent does give his plans to principals, which recently have included goals from the General Superintendent. Also accomplishment reports are used in planning for the next PAP period.

Principals - District Z

Only one principal in District Z said that objectives were mutually agreed upon at the beginning of the year. The rest all stressed that objectives were agreed upon but not at the beginning of the year. Only two, however, said that they discussed these during the year with the district superintendent. Four-to-one, they said that objectives were set at significant and attainable levels with the last principal again saying that the objectives were attainable but not significant. Only the high school principal said that he involved community and staff in formulating his objectives, but even he did not involve students. All said that they had never seen the district superintendent's PAP and all but one said that accomplishment reports were not used in planning for the following year.
District Superintendent - District Z

This district superintendent said that he "lets principals set their own goals with the exception of one principal" and that he discusses them during the year "only when some are not being adhered to." Objectives are set at significant and attainable levels and his principals do not "formally" involve others in their PAP's. He "generally" shares his plans with others, and he does "make comparisons between the old and new" PAP's.

Area Associate Superintendent

"Yes, it is probably true" that district superintendent's and principals mutually agree upon objectives, but they do not discuss these "much" during the year. "I did not as the Area Associate." Objectives were significant and attainable. This was more true after the first year - after the "bugs were out." Some involve community and staff, but not students. District superintendents were "told to" share their objectives and "most did." Were accomplishment reports used for the following year? "Some yes; others no."

Deputy Superintendent

The deputy superintendent stated his belief that objectives were mutually agreed upon by appropriate parties, but that he could only "presume" that these objectives were discussed during the year. There were "some flaws" in the setting of objectives at significant and attainable levels. It was "in the plans" that communities and staffs should be involved, but "how well?" he did not know. District
superintendents were supposed to share their plans and it was "in the
design" that accomplishment reports should be a basis for planning for
the following year.

Item #3: Behavioral Changes

Principals - District X

Two of six principals in District X thought that they now
planned their work more effectively because of PAP; the others saw
no difference or at least not because of PAP. Four, however, thought
that they now focused their attention and efforts more upon the most
basic and critical functions of their positions. All felt that they
looked at their work in practical terms, but two doubted that per­
formance appraisal had had any role in this. Five believed that it
helped to identify areas in which central or district office per­
sonnel could be of help, but three of the five said that they "didn't
get help anyway." Similar to number two, four believed that the plan
helped them to channel their primary efforts into areas where the
need was greatest, but only three felt that PAP had caused them to
grow in competency and communicate more effectively. In the area
of behavioral changes these principals reported that the PAP:
"effected relationship with the district superintendent," "iden­
tified areas of success," "provided for a logical sequence of
progress on long-range projects," and "made me a better wheeler­
dealer."

District Superintendent - District X

When asked if administrators planned their work more effectively
because of PAP, the district superintendent in X responded, "Somewhat. Some did. Some didn't." When asked if principals focused their attention upon basic functions better, he said, "definitely." He thought the new "School Profile" was poor since it did not give weightings for various schools. Referring to the statement that principals will look at their work more in practical terms, he stated, "Not too much. Too much verbiage, not practical. Should be more specific. Qualifying factors not discussed. Cost factor too important." To the question, do principals better identify areas of help from staff personnel?, he responded "No". But he said "Yes," to the statement principals do better to channel their efforts into areas of greatest need. When asked about priorities, he said "Good progress. Constancy of administration, important." (Good progress had taken place in terms of principals growing in competency and methods for communicating.) When asked to give other positive or negative behavioral effects of PAP, he said, positively: "New people - gave a good original encounter. District superintendent gave opinion - good opportunity for communications." Negatively: "Encounter effect. Some principal rating sessions were painful. Not all the same. Need different evaluations."

District Superintendent - District Y

This district superintendent said that principals do plan their work more effectively now. "Seeing plans in written fashion helps - did not see before." Also, because plans are formalized, principals do focus their attention more upon critical functions
and do look at their jobs more practically. They do not identify areas of help from central and district staff better, because they "always did." Also, they do channel their efforts into areas of greatest need and they have become more competent and communicate better.

Principals - District Z

Only two of these six principals said that they now planned their work more effectively and one stated that this was not because of performance appraisal. Likewise, only two said that they now focused their attention more on priorities, but three said that they looked at their performance in more practical terms. Three said they could identify areas of help from outside staff, but two others said these were usually ineffective, and three stated that they felt they now channeled their primary efforts into those areas of greatest need. Finally, none gave PAP credit for any growth in competency that may have taken place. The only other behavioral effect reported was one Z principal who said he had "become more cynical of the system".

District Superintendent - District Z

This last district superintendent said that principals now plan better because "they have to write it down!" He also stated that the group now focuses its attention on priorities better "if not distracted by community problems." He went on, "Forced some to give attention to priorities. Some used to be only administrators -
not principals." He also felt that principals are now more practical because they "now look at test scores - pragmatic." They can identify areas of help from outside the school "because they go by goals." He conceded that they "may not have gotten help" in the past. He said the next statement was similar to the second and pointed out that frequently "critical implies survival." He did not think that PAP had helped principals grow in competency or communicate better: "Not really - depends on trust level."

Area Associate Superintendent

The former Area "boss" was non-committal on the first: "Some did - some did not." He also said that if a principal was any good, he would focus his attention on the priority areas regardless of PAP. Likewise, he said that PAP "could not make this claim," referring to the statement that principals would now be more practical. Also, he said that principals would find help from outside staff without PAP, but "maybe" they would channel their primary efforts into those areas of greatest need because they must "write something down." Finally, he said principals would "grow anyway and communicate without it."

Deputy Superintendent

The Deputy Superintendent believed that many administrators planned their work more effectively as a result of PAP. "Bulk of people planned to realize their objectives." He felt positively that principals focused their attention more on priorities and that they also look at their performance more in practical terms. He did
not think that principals better identified areas of assistance from central and district staff because of the plan, but did better channel their efforts into areas of greatest need and had grown in competency and were able to communicate better.

**Item #4: Three Attributes and Three Faults**

Interviewees were asked to give the three best attributes and the three greatest faults of PAP. Their responses included:

**Principals - District X**

**Attributes:**
- Set productivity objectives
- Related productivity to pay
- Evaluation process related to job success
- Forced administration to examine the goals of school
- Select priorities for school
- Implementation of goals
- Gave help in deciding use of time
- Made aware of necessity to communicate with community
- Does force one to look in retrospect
- Personal promises for future
- Does make you think about job
- Outline of aspirations for yourself and school
- Personal appraisal
- Causes principal to be introspective
- Planning guide
Faults:

- Failure to develop objectivity
- Lack of consistency in setting and reviewing objectives
- Lack of consistency re merit pay obligations
- Imposition from without - lack of initial understanding
- Pay tie-in
- Final evaluation solely based on district superintendent's philosophy
- Failure to implement as planned
- District superintendent did not have skills or time to discuss real problems
- Did not consider differences in schools and students
- What is written is not realistic
- Board has not put in merit pay. Responsibility but no rewards. Tired of busting my ass and not getting paid for it. Must go to court.
- Too subjective
- No uniformity of ranking within district or from one district to another.
- Lack of true incentives
- Not standardized.

Attributes:

- Built-in requirement for communications in a new school year
- Effort, painful, of supervision to be discriminate - is necessary.

Faults:

- Procedural - too heavy - committee did PAP
- Frailty of assumption that all supervisors are well equipped to rate others
Non-use of qualifying process

1 - 5 scale - no zero

Principals - District Y

Attributes:

Helpful to know superiors' goals

Being forced to write makes you formulate goals - not always in conformity with district superintendent

Makes you think about things

Should be held accountable

Setting specific objectives

Given opportunity to discuss objectives with district superintendent

Lets you direct staff better toward specific goals

Might help you organize thoughts better - clarify better for someone else

Set objectives - one year later take a look at them

Made you think about what you'd do to accomplish objectives

Time to look at ourselves - especially in accomplishment report - makes you sit down and write

Faults:

No mandatory incentives - had to fight for them

No periodic verbal accomplishment reports

Imposed by someone who didn't know school system

Learning process not conducive to this way

Mechanics unrealistic - e.g., three hour talk

Much too structured

Not enough follow-up
Regular revisions necessary

No compensation - not encouraged to do a better job

Tend to do things only for evaluation reasons

Someone claims credit for something you didn't do - tend to exaggerate - district superintendent can't check

Unrealistic job load for district superintendent - cannot be objective

Time consuming - out of proportion with merits

Imposition of key responsibilities from outside

No incentives - pay or promotion

Weighting of responsibilities - capricious and arbitrary

District Superintendent - District Y

Attributes:

Formalizing objectives

Mutual goal-setting between principal and district superintendent - each not having other do work

Improvement of communications between principal and district superintendent

Faults:

Inequity of compensation

Lack of downward thrust from General Superintendent on down

Great disparity of format demands from district superintendents and area associate superintendents

Principals - District Z

Attributes:

Makes one look at job

Necessitated principal - district superintendent communications
Helps you think through program
Causes ideas to be put on paper
Makes you see what you did accomplish
Attempt to give merit pay - doesn't work
If there was a pay raise - some way to identify and reward for running a good school
Helps to identify goals more carefully and realistically
Review accomplishments (some untrue and some can't be measured) and plan for the next year in writing
Taking time out and planning
Writing down objectives and identifying problems
Faults:
Original objectives not adhered to
No motivation - salary increment eliminated
Not implemented equitably
Feedback and follow-up not a part of it
No penalty for failure
Time line not followed
Superiors do not clearly follow guidelines
Salary increments are for all or none - nothing in between
Given under false pretenses - no merit raise
Unnecessary for competent principals
Assumes something about process (writing objectives) that has never been proven
No on-going evaluation
Cannot always set a one-year deadline
Conferences could be improved - objectives not done at beginning

District Superintendent - District Z

Attributes:
- Enabled principal to be compensated at decent level
- Assisted principal in focusing on needs and planning program
- District superintendent can objectively evaluate principals

Faults:
- Accountability of principal, but principal cannot demand of staff
- Terminated merit increases - district superintendent could reward high performance

Area Associate Superintendent

Attributes:
- Had to write things down
- Had to discuss with communities - helped relationships
- If guidelines followed, contributed to balanced viewpoint.

Faults:
- Tying to compensation
- Scoring system poor - not rational
- Too much time required for middle and upper level administrators

Deputy Superintendent

Attributes:
- Asked principal to identify and set priorities - formalized this
- Brought evaluation in touch with his thinking - not vulnerable to someone not in tune with

Review with ideas for coming year
Faults:
Compensation attached - PAP good in own right.

Item #5: Effect on Education

Interviewees were next asked if PAP has had any effect on the education of the children of Chicago. All were asked to name positive or negative effects.

Principals - District X

Five of the District X principals thought that PAP had had some positive effects on the educational program, but two also felt that there had been some negative effects.

These were:

Positive:
Developed process for developing instructional goals
Provided opportunity for program development
Insisted on raising scores and did
Focused on priorities - and did
Improved supervision and administration
Positive effects on scores
Task-oriented
Causes principals to be introspective
Planning and self-evaluation

Negative:
Problem relating money to needs - principals not included in budget preparation
Adversary situation can result
Failure of Central Office to do their part

Some distasteful aspects

District Superintendent - District X

Positive:
Gave opportunity to communicate on mission
Does not improve scores, but is part of process

Negative:
Too much pre-occupation with procedure. Gets bogged down.

Principals - District Y

In District Y only one principal believed that there had been any positive effects as a result of the plan while two said there had been negative effects.

Positive:
Made administration set specific objectives
Evaluation good at all levels

Negative:
Imposed nuisance
Interference with principal's job
If I can't do job, paper and pencil won't do it
Not an aid to education - attempt to impose accountability

Board members thought principals were making too much money - excuse to keep salaries down - principals not only persons responsible.
District Superintendent - District Y

Positive:
Improvement of administration improves instruction

Principals - District Z

Two principals in this third district expressed opinions that there had been some positive effects to PAP, while three made negative comments:

Positive:
Mutual discussion
Goals should come from top - all working on same goals

Negative:
Not an educational program
Just wasted time
Time could be better utilized

District Superintendent - District Z

Positive:
Principals have planned for the improvement of the educational program - resulted in higher achievement levels
Principals can pinpoint areas to which to devote resources

Area Associate Superintendent

The former Area Associate generally spoke favorably about PAP's role in the educational program:

Positive:
If three basic functions adhered to, then PAP was an aid - Administration, supervision, communication.
If built on principles, PAP, particularly in reading, focused on important areas.

Negative:

Only by setting unrealistic goals - incapable or too easy

Deputy Superintendent

The Deputy spoke very strongly on this point

Positive:

Was an educational program

Negative:

Some negative feelings attached - too many ways to doom it

Item #6: Key Elements

Interviewees were asked to identify those elements of the Chicago performance appraisal plan which they believed should be continued, changed or discarded. These were to be chosen from a list of eight key elements.

In addition, principals and superintendents were also asked their opinion of using PAP for teacher evaluation.

Principals - District X

All of the six principals in District X said that they were for the retention of a management-by-objectives approach to administration and individual and specific written goals and standards for administrators. Only two, however, felt that community and staff should participate in the formation of objectives, although one additional thought the community's role should be changed to
one of a consultant. All favored the comparison of results to objectives through the accomplishment report, but all thought that specific numerical ratings should be dropped. All principals advocated the retention of the practice of using the goals and accomplishments of one year to prepare for the next, but they were evenly divided on salary increments tied to performance results. They were also evenly divided on the use of performance appraisal for teacher evaluation. Those opposing this use gave as their reasons: "wouldn't work," "not necessary" and "teachers have different roles - information not always available."

District Superintendent - District X

The district superintendent also favored the retention of an MBO approach and individual written goals for each valuee. He was opposed to community participation because "it's not a part now anyway." He also did not favor the interim review per se saying "Not worth much - do not need another procedure to do this." The accomplishment report was favored as were specific numerical ratings, but they should be "more specific." He also said that the use of goals from one year to prepare for the next should be retained along with salary increments. Of the latter, he said they should be "larger percentages." Regarding teacher evaluation, he said "No. Never get it straightened out. CTU too formidable."

Principals - District Y

Five of six principals in this district were in favor of the
retention of an MBO approach to administration, but only four said they thought that individual and specific written goals and standards should be retained. One of those dissenting thought that these goals should be written but that the present standards were too vague. Only one wanted other participation and that for staff only. All but two of six okayed the interim review. They split, three-to-three, on retaining or discarding the reporting of results through the accomplishment report, but only one favored the retention of specific numerical results. All but one thought that the use of goals from one year to prepare for the next should be retained, but two were in favor and four were opposed to salary increments tied to performance ratings. Only one saw any merit in the idea of using performance appraisal with teachers and she thought that this would not be practical in her school with 45 teachers.

District Superintendent - District Y

This district superintendent was strongly in favor of MBO in school administration, and individual and specific goals and standards. He thought that community participation should take place "only in broad goal-planning sessions." However, he did like the interim review provision, as well as the comparison of results through the accomplishment report. He opposed specific numerical ratings saying that "a superior principal is superior regardless." He thought the use of goals and accomplishments from one year to prepare for the next was good, but was not in favor of salary being tied to evaluation:
"Past record failed; action should be taken on unsatisfactories; makes no difference in principals." He also added at this point: "Need to revise manual; never adequate inservice; not using MBO." When asked about PAP for teachers, he said, "Yes. Each teacher should present goals - not formalized."

Principals - District Z

The six principals in this district all favored an MBO approach to administration but only half of them approved of individual and specific goals and standards. One of those opposed thought that goals should be more "flexible," while another favored goals but not standards. One okayed community and staff participation and another said staff only. Four favored the interim review and four also favored the comparison of results through the accomplishment report. All were opposed to specific numerical ratings, but one said that "more elaboration was needed." All but one were in favor of using one year's goals to prepare for the next. Only two agreed to salary increments tied to evaluation, but an additional principal said: "Yes, but not working now - cannot all get the same - should be graduated." In regard to using performance appraisal for evaluating teachers, only two were mildly interested and both of these said that it should be for planning only - not for evaluation and with no merit pay connected.

District Superintendent - District Z

This district superintendent favored the retention of MBO,
but thought that there should be individual goals, but not standards, for administrators. He approved of participation by community and staff, the interim review, and the accomplishment report. He thought the use of specific numerical ratings should be "simplified," but okayed both the use of goals from one year to prepare for the next and salary incentives tied to ratings. He felt that teachers should be brought into performance appraisal since they "should be held more accountable."

Area Associate Superintendent

The area associate thought that MBO in administration "has value" and that individual and specific goals and standards were good. He was also in favor of community and staff participation as well as the interim review, although "not much done." The accomplishment report was good but specific numerical ratings are "irrational." Using last year's goals for next year was favored but salary increments related to PAP should be discarded. He had quite a bit to say on teacher evaluation re appraisal: "A modified version might work in small schools, but in large schools it would have to be greatly simplified. Prefer to present system, which is outmoded and meaningless."

Deputy Superintendent

The man formerly responsible for the day-to-day operation of the entire school system favored MBO and specific goals and standards for each administrator. He thought that involvement by others should
be modified as follows: "Staff - how they'd be evaluated; educational session with community." The interim review and accomplishment report were approved but numerical ratings needed "some changes." He would retain the use of one year's goals to prepare for the next, but thought the pay increments should be eliminated. He did not favor performance appraisal for teachers, but thought that all teachers should have some objectives.

Item #7: Evaluation Preference

Interviewees were asked next to state their preference on administrative evaluation plans: PAP, annual conferences with superior or informal evaluation, formal checklist or other evaluative instrument, or some other form of evaluation. Preferences were:

Principals - District X

Three of six principals in this district favored PAP (two with some modifications) and three favored an annual conference with the district superintendent. This latter group, however, called for: "an achievement quotient" based on test scores, a formal list of expectations from the district superintendent, and use of PAP as a discussion guide.

District Superintendent - District X

The district superintendent favored a checklist for experienced principals, which he felt was sufficient, and PAP (with revisions) for younger principals.

Principals - District Y

Five of six principals in District Y would like to see an
annual conference with the district superintendent for informal evaluation. One said that this should include some "broad objectives" or that it should be a "modified PAP." One other principal favored PAP with some changes as the administrative evaluation method.

District Superintendent - District Y

This district superintendent would like to see a formal checklist. He explained: "In addition to checklist, specific items for each school between district superintendent and principal - very specific. Should be reflective of existing Board of Education policies and procedures. Should contain formal and open-ended items."

Principals - District Z

In District Z there was a wide variety of evaluation preferences. Two of six principals favored PAP, with some revisions; two would like to see an annual conference with their district superintendent for informal evaluation; one other wanted a combination of an informal conference and a formal checklist; and still another wanted a combination of PAP and an informal conference. One principal pointed out that "the whole thing depends on trust in your boss. If your boss can't be trusted, then a more objective system, such as a checklist, would be necessary."

District Superintendent - District Z

Finally, this district superintendent preferred to see PAP
continued with some changes.

Area Associate Superintendent

"PAP still has value, but an annual conference informal evaluation is probably more practical," said the former Area Superintendent.

Deputy Superintendent

PAP, with some changes, is still the choice of the Deputy Superintendent of Schools.

Items #8 and #9: Salary Increments and Comments

Interview responses for Items #8 and #9 have been combined because of the relevancy of the two. Explanations of why or why not a principal or superintendent was in favor of evaluation tied to salary increment, and general comments on PAP, usually were quite similar.

Principals - District X

Four of the six principals in District X were in favor of administrative evaluation tied to salary increments, while two were opposed. One of the four was opposed to such increments when responding to Item #6. She stated she was for the increments "if done the right way - fairly." Others in this group indicated their opinions that the process is "too subjective," "favoritism" was shown, and the plan causes "too much pressure."

General comments on PAP included: "Lack of proper implementation by the Central Office," "Low priority of district super-
intendent," "No original input," "low credibility," "no inservice," "subjectivity exhibited by district superintendent," and "failure to meet merit pay objectives."

District Superintendent - District X

This district superintendent spoke strongly in favor of salary increments, saying that they should be large enough to offer a real performance incentive.

Principals - District Y

Only one of six principals in District Y approved of salary increments tied to evaluation, although one who gave a negative opinion had responded positively on Item #6. Comments were:

"Did not follow plan," "Should be reward and punishment, but no money involved," "Persons doing it had no idea on time," "Too cumbersome - bound to fail," "Board didn't live up to terms - took away salary," "Good plan, if followed. Unfair when part of plan has been reneged on," "A failure - not objective - different procedures," "Goals now given," "Not possible to evaluate in terms of objectives - too many changes - resources not available - no control over variables." "Failure attributed to time - most looked on it as a punitive tool. Salary increment withdrawal made it a farce," "Prepared by group who did not understand school administration. Human element cannot be measured," "Tends to be more valuable to good writers. District superintendent has said you must have 2 pages."
District Superintendent - District Y

The district superintendent of District Y was not in favor of pay increments as a result of evaluation. "PAP has fallen into disuse. Looked good at the beginning. Not refined to meet changing times - too cumbersome. Time element important. No allowance in schedule to allow for this type of document."

Principals - District Z

Principals in this district split three-to-three in their opinions of salary increments tied to evaluation. Among their comments were: "Failure - no follow through. Recognition and penalties should be a part. Also, training and assistance for those who need it," "Concept good, but not followed," "I've never seen Hannon's or district superintendent's goals," "Do not need pay increments. If good, then will be promoted," "Inadequately researched concept. Superimposes unnecessary format," "Regularizes a principal's objectives - brings out need for general objectives," "district superintendent still uses other criteria for evaluation."

District Superintendent - District Z

This was the second district superintendent to speak very strongly in favor of pay increments tied to evaluation. He said that it "provides for opportunity to reward. PAP successful until no money."
Area Associate Superintendent

This gentleman was not in favor of salary increments. "Not done well. Large system too hard. Twenty-five district superintendents - all with own viewpoints. Not in principle - not possible without considerable work. Are criteria for everyone? Time must be provided to make it work. Maybe wrong time of year - maybe calendar year."

Deputy Superintendent

The Deputy Superintendent expressed the opinion that some changes have to be made in the method of allotting pay increments, but that he was in favor of such pay. "Like to reward outstanding. Some should be rewarded. Reward differences in commitment. Give some principals scholarships - bonuses - maybe as high as 10%. Don't have right vehicle. Happens because of work. Needs to be something."
CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

Introduction

The summary and analysis was divided into four parts:

Part I - Summary of the Interview Data

Part II - Comparison of the Interview Data and the PAP Document

Part III - Comparison of the Chicago Performance Appraisal Plan (as evidenced by the PAP Document and the Interview data) and the Relevant Literature.

Part IV - Analysis

Part I was undertaken in three phases:

A - Comparisons and Contrasts among Principals

B - Comparisons and Contrasts among Superintendents

C - Comparisons and Contrasts between Principals and Superintendents

The four parts, as given above, provided for comparisons and contrasts among all of the data components gathered in the research.

On the basis of this summary and analysis, conclusions and recommendations were made and reported in Chapter V.
Part I - Summary of the Interview Data

A. Comparisons and Contrasts Among Principals

Item #1: Improvements in Administration

Of the eighteen participating principals, only three thought there had been any attempt to "relate compensation to performance results" through the Performance Appraisal Plan. Comments throughout the interviews indicated that this was the element that embittered principals most. They believed that PAP had been "sold to them" primarily on this point and that the Board of Education had "reneged" on its part of the deal. Feelings were so strong on this point that it made the job of obtaining an objective viewpoint on the remainder of this and the other items quite difficult.

Nine principals, on the other hand, believed that some effort had been made to "reduce the element of subjectivity." All but one of these were assigned in Districts Y and Z, where there was obviously a much greater degree of trust and friendship toward the district superintendents. Open hostility toward the district superintendent in District X was quite apparent in most interviews. This hostility might be attributed to the fact that several principals in District X reported that, during the first PAP year, this district superintendent had rated half of the principals in Category III (highest possible) and the other half in Category II. The second PAP year, these ratings were reversed exactly.

Six principals were of the opinion that the plan was
"equitable for all participants." Again, all but one of these were in Districts Y or Z. Those voicing a negative opinion on this point generally indicated that they felt the plan was equitable within their district, but not among the twenty-seven districts across the city (Many variations in format and ratings had been reported over the years by the Chicago Principals' Association.)

On the topic of improving administrative performance, seven also indicated that there had been some positive results because of PAP. Thirteen responded positively to the PAP objective of "comparison of actual results...to the objectives previously agreed upon." This viewpoint was later verified by the principals' approval of Management-by-Objectives, in general. Some indicated that they "made sure they got good results," but there was, nevertheless, a favorable, if begrudged, response to this point.

Perhaps the most interesting response of the entire series of interviews was the next regarding the "improvement of instruction." Eleven principals made positive comments, but five of these were in District X. The district superintendent of X, although not well-liked and not considered to be subjective, had greatly emphasized instruction and the improvement of reading and math scores in his district's PAP's. All of the elementary school principals in his district admitted that this emphasis had helped their instructional programs. Elementary school principals in the other two districts generally indicated that they looked upon PAP as an administrative tool, not an educational one, or that, if instructional improvement
Six principals in all said that the plan had "afforded the opportunity for administrators and their supervisors to communicate more effectively," but ten thought it helped to "identify individual needs for training and development as a means of improving the principal's performance."

**Item #2: Technical Directives**

The first statement in Item #2 really called for agreement or disagreement on two points: "mutual agreement" upon the principal's objectives and "at the beginning of the school year." Although nine principals responded positively to the statement, at least four others disagreed with the statement because the process did not take place at the beginning of the year. Some reported that this took place as late as March.

One-half, or nine of all the principals interviewed, stated that they and the district superintendent do discuss their objectives during the school year, or that there is at least the offer or the opportunity. Two principals in District X indicated that the only thing discussed was reading scores.

The third statement again called for agreement or disagreement on two points: "significant" and "attainable" objectives. While twelve principals approved of both of these, three others said their objectives were attainable but not significant. Two others found this statement too difficult for a response.

Regarding the involvement of community and staff (and in high
schools, the students), only six of the eighteen gave unqualified positive responses. Several others spoke of a general involvement or an involvement in the planning, but not in PAP itself. Two of the three high school principals claimed that they did involve students in their PAP's.

Seven principals said that they did see the district superintendent's PAP before doing their own, three said they did not, and eight were not sure or did not know. This particular set of responses was strange since one would think that all principals within a district would agree that they did or did not see this document. Yet three in District X said yes and three were not sure; four in District Y responded positively and two did not know; three in District Z said no and three were not aware that they had seen it.

Finally, on the question of whether "the accomplishment report is used by the district superintendent as a basis for planning and assistance in developing new and revised objectives for the following year," seven said yes, nine no and two did not know. Again, one would think that responses to these technical statements would be similar within a district, but in District Z only was there any near consensus. In District Z, five principals responded negatively.

Item #3: Behavioral Changes

Regarding behavioral changes which were supposed to have taken place among administrators, only four of eighteen principals
attributed any positive change in planning their work more effectively to PAP. Three others said positive change may have occurred, but not because of PAP.

Seven, however, did give the plan credit for helping them "better focus their attention and efforts upon the most critical functions of their positions." Interestingly, six others said improvement had taken place "but not because of PAP." These latter responses might prompt an interesting discussion as to whether or not the principal must consciously recognize that a positive improvement is due to performance appraisal. Is not the fact that there was improvement in this area the important thing? The original objectives of PAP did not state that administrators would necessarily recognize that any improvement would be due to PAP, but simply that improvement would take place.

In responding to the next statement, nine principals said that they now look at their performance in more practical terms because of PAP. But again, three others, while recognizing improvement, refused to give any credit to PAP.

Nine principals said that the plan helped them "identify areas in which assistance from central or district office staff would be helpful," and eight principals said that there would be "no help anyway." This response seemed to be an indictment of district and central office staff rather than of performance appraisal.

The next statement was very similar to the second, and principals were generally consistent in their responses. Only
three made contradictory statements. Seven of the eighteen said PAP had been successful in this objective and three others said that while improvement had taken place, it was not because of performance appraisal.

Finally, regarding PAP's claim that "administrators will mutually grow in competency and will communicate more effectively," four principals said growth had taken place (three of these were in District X), and four others said yes but not because of PAP.

Item #4: Three Attributes and Three Faults

Because of the wide variety of responses to the open-ended request of Item #4, it was difficult to say which were the three greatest attributes and the three greatest faults of PAP in the opinion of the eighteen principals. However, responses to the first part fell into several general areas:

a) Setting objectives and priorities for the school and for the principal personally.

b) Improving communications, both with staff and community as well as with the district superintendent.

c) Attempting to relate pay to job performance.

d) Developing strategies for the implementation of goals and objectives.

The second part of the question elicited a wide variety of responses:

a) Failure to implement merit pay aspect of plan.

b) Failure to implement plan technically, as originally formulated.
c) Unrealistic mechanics of implementing plan, particularly time factor.

d) Lack of objectivity in implementing plan.

e) Lack of sufficient inservice for participants in plan.

Item #5: Effect on Education

When asked to provide specific examples of how performance appraisal had both helped and hindered the education of the children of Chicago, principals responded in a similar fashion to the sixth statement of Item #1. That is, principals in District X responded with several positive statements regarding instruction, while principals in the other two districts were generally negative.

a) Positive:

Eight of eighteen principals provided specific examples of how performance appraisal had helped from an educational standpoint. Five of these were in District X and four of these emphasized the improvement of test scores. Other examples centered around improved planning, setting objectives at all levels, and improved communications.

b) Negative:

There were eight negative examples, but only two of these were in District X. These centered around PAI's creating a threatening climate between the principal and the district superintendent which could negatively affect the educational program, and, taking time from the educational program.
Interviewees were asked next to state which elements of PAP should be retained, changed, or discarded.

Regarding an "MBO approach to administration," all but one principal was in favor of retaining this aspect of PAP. This approval of MBO agreed with the listing of "objective setting" as the best attribute of PAP.

All but five (none in District X) approved of "individual and specific written goals and standards for administrators." One of these, it should be pointed out, favored the discarding of all aspects of PAP (he even responded negatively to an MBO approach to administration, even though he thought that "the setting of objectives" was among the three best attributes of PAP in Item #4).

Only six principals, however, favored any outside participation in the formation of goals and standards, and of these two said "staff only." Two others were the high school principals who earlier said they were now involving community, staff, and students in this process.

Twelve of the eighteen principals favored the retention of the interim review, but three others pointed out that this was not necessary for all but should be an optional phase of the process which would only take place at the request of either the principal or the district superintendent.

Thirteen approved of the retention of the "comparison of results to objectives through the accomplishment report." These
thirteen included all of the principals in District X. Only one of eighteen principals in the study, however, favored the retention of "specific numerical ratings." Comments on this effort to quantify the ratings to such a degree were negative.

All but two principals favored the retention of the practice of "using the goals and accomplishments of one year to prepare for the next." The two dissenting principals included the one who responded negatively to all aspects of PAP and another who had also favored discarding the accomplishment report.

The most controversial element of PAP was obviously that of "salary increments tied to performance ratings." Seven favored retention, one favored change, and ten said they should be discarded. Only one response was inconsistent with a response to Item #8, Salary Increments. Again, this element evoked the most comment and the most bitterness.

The last part of Item #6 asked the interviewees' opinion of the use of PAP as a method of teacher evaluation. Four of eighteen principals thought the concept had merit. Eleven were opposed to it, and three others favored it to a limited degree; that is, for planning only, not as a method of evaluation. Once again, three of those responding positively were principals in District X. These positive responses seemed to indicate further that there was more of an awareness of the benefits of performance appraisal among the principals of the district than among the others. There was also a tendency to view PAP in more specific and practical terms, e.g., test scores...
rather than in the vague general terms in which principals of other districts viewed PAP. The reasons behind this quantitative approach became even clearer when the responses of the district superintendent were analyzed.

Item #7: Evaluation Preference

When asked to state their preference for the form of administrative evaluation they preferred, six principals gave as their response "PAP with some revisions" (three of the six were in District X). Ten preferred an "annual conference with their superior for informal evaluation," while one wanted a combination of the preceding two and another wanted a combination of the annual conference and a formal checklist. Five of those favoring the "annual conference approach," still wanted some sort of objectives either agreed upon with or imposed by the district superintendent. In other words, twelve of the eighteen principals wanted some sort of objectives with which to work during the year prior to evaluation. This again is in line with their earlier stated preference for an MBO approach to administration. The principals wanted some direction and some goals and did not favor a return to the laissez-faire method used prior to PAP. They did not want, however, the "highly structured, cumbersome, and time consuming" elements of the present PAP.

Items #8 and #9: Salary Increments and Comments

Almost half (eight) of the principals still would like to see a form of merit pay, although many were soured by PAP. Others did
not believe that "favoritism," "lack of objectivity," and the re-
liance on the Board of Education to do its share could be eliminated,
unless, as one principal stated, it was "written into a collective
bargaining agreement."

General comments were negative and centered around the pay
aspects and the failure of the Board of Education to implement the
plan as originally devised.

Additional Analysis

Interviewed principals in District X, a district in which per-
formance appraisal and instructional objectives were emphasized, showed
a markedly different perception of PAP's success. Although almost all
principals were resentful of the Board of Education's failure to im-
plement PAP as originally planned, District X's principals revealed
that the plan had been successful from the standpoint of student
achievement and helping principals focus on the most important areas
of their jobs.

This was somewhat remarkable, since District X's principals
were not at all reserved in expressing their personal resentment and
dislike for the district superintendent. Nevertheless, this seems to
have been the only one of the three districts in which PAP was im-
plemented with specific goals and, consequently, in which specific
results could be shown.

Also, an underlying resentment toward PAP was noted through-
out the interviews, probably because of the Board's failure to im-
plement the salary aspect of the original plan. Principals feel that
PAP has cost them dollars. This attitude has been reinforced again and again by the Chicago Principals' Association. Consequently, when areas were discussed in which there has been progress during the last few years, principals did not want to give any credit to PAP, saying that the success would have happened anyway or that it was not because of PAP.

Principals were in agreement generally on which aspects of PAP should be retained or changed, except for "merit pay" where there was wide disagreement. Most were opposed to expanding PAP to the teaching staff, not because of disagreement over the setting of individual objectives for teachers but rather because it would lead to too much paperwork and would never get by the Chicago Teacher's Union. None was eager to "play God" in dispensing "merit pay," which would lead to charges of favoritism by staffs.

While principals favored a less-structured method of administrative evaluation, none wanted to return to the former system. Most wanted some sort of objectives set for them even if by the district superintendent or in the form of a checklist.
B. Comparisons and Contrasts Among Superintendents

Item #1: Improvements in Administration

Of the five superintendents interviewed (three district superintendents, an area associate superintendent, and the Deputy Superintendent), only one, the area associate, thought that PAP clearly related compensation to performance results." Two district superintendents said no, another said "temporarily," while the Deputy stated "somewhat. Did not 100% pinpoint efforts of people." All but the area associate expressed the opinion that the plan had reduced subjectivity, but the five were quite divided on the matter of equitability: one yes, one no, two "as good as anything," and the district superintendent of District X said he "tried to be equitable."

Regarding the improvement of administrative performance, all gave a yes or qualified yes, one district superintendent citing long-range planning improvement, particularly. All also thought that it "compared actual results...to the objectives..." to at least a limited extent, but three emphasized the importance of priorities and specific objectives. One district superintendent thought it gave him a better perspective "across the district."

All except the area associate believed that performance appraisal had resulted in "the improvement of instruction," and he said "to some extent. Must have: administration, supervision and communication. Then instruction will improve if the goals are
realistic and precise." Three of the five thought the plan had improved communication between themselves and their principals, but one district superintendent did feel that even PAP could not "overcome a communications barrier" if one existed, while the associate superintendent thought that this depended largely on the original conference and that there was too little time for such communications because of other pressures. Only two of the group agreed that PAP identified "individual needs for training and development."

Item #2: Technical Directives

Regarding the technical implementation of PAP, all five said that they and those being supervised had mutually agreed upon objectives at the beginning of the year, except for the district superintendent of District Z who said he let all but one of his principals set his own goals.

Only the Deputy thought that objectives were discussed during the school year. The associate said no, the district superintendent of District X said he did but "the principals might not have realized it," while the other two district superintendents replied "only if necessary."

The Deputy again parted from the rest on the question of objectives being "set at significant and attainable levels." He thought there were "some flaws" in this process, but the others gave unqualified positive replies.

There was a mixture of opinion regarding community, staff, and student involvement in the goal-setting PAP process: The
Deputy stated that he was skeptical of this happening, the area associate said it did happen except for students, the district superintendent of X said it took place at the beginning but "was not maintained," the district superintendent of District Z said it took place "but not formally," while the district superintendent of Y said he thought that "principals would be crazy" to give out their plans. Others should be involved in general planning, but not directly in PAP."

There was also much disagreement on the question of the district superintendent completing his PAP before meeting with his principals and using it as a guide for theirs: The Deputy and associate said "supposed to" and "most did," respectively; District X's district superintendent again said "at the beginning, but not maintained;" while the district superintendents in Y and Z each gave an unqualified yes.

Concerning the matter of "using the accomplishment reports of one year as a basis for planning for the following year," all but the area associate responded positively. This gentleman said that some used the reports, but some did not. The Deputy Superintendent said that using past accomplishment reports was "in the design."

**Item #3: Behavioral Changes**

This item concerned behavioral changes which were supposed to have taken place among principals and, to the first statement, three of five responded "some did and some did not." The district
superintendents in both Districts Y and Z said that administrators do now plan their work more effectively.

All agreed that "administrators do focus their attention and efforts (better) upon the most basic and critical functions of their positions," but one district superintendent added "if not distracted by the community" and the area associate voiced the opinion that "if he's any good, he would do this regardless of PAP."

In regard to looking at principals' performance in practical terms, the Deputy and two district superintendents agreed positively but again the associate said that certain effects might have taken place, but did not want to give performance appraisal credit for their happening. The district superintendent of X also did not think that this practical effect had taken place saying that there was "too much verbiage" involved in PAP and that people were not thinking practically enough. Goals and objectives must be more specific.

Two did not think that the plan would assist principals in identifying areas of help from district or central office personnel, and two said that principals did this anyway. The district superintendent of District Z said that principals "may not have gotten help anyway."

All but the area associate felt that performance appraisal had assisted principals in channeling "their primary efforts into those areas where the need is greatest." To this point he said "maybe - by writing something down."
The area associate and the district superintendent of District Z were the only two who responded negatively to the statement that principals "will mutually grow in competency and will communicate more effectively." The latter said that this growth depended on the trust level between district superintendent and the principal and the former again said that principals would "grow anyway and communicate without it."

**Item #4: Three Attributes and Three Faults**

As with principals, there was a wide variety of responses when the superintendents were asked to list the three best attributes of PAP. Those mentioned most frequently were as follows:

a) The identification and formalization of specific objectives.

b) Built-in communication between district superintendent and principal.

c) Objective and discriminate evaluation of principals. (The district superintendent of District Z added: "Enabled principal to be compensated at a decent level.")

The faults mentioned most frequently were as follows:

a) Tying compensation to PAP.

b) Failure to follow through on compensation plans.

c) Format, including time frame, was poor.

Other points raised by individuals were as follows:

d) Assumption that all supervisors are qualified to evaluate properly.

e) Lack of communication thrust from General Superintendent on down.

f) Principal is accountable, but staff is not.
Item #5: Effect on Education

Interviewees were asked next to give examples of the ways PAP has helped or hindered the education of children in the Chicago public schools. The most common responses were as follows:

Positive:

a) Administrative planning results in higher achievement scores.

b) Good planning pinpoints areas to which resources should be devoted.

c) Opportunity to communicate better on mission.

Negative:

a) Too much procedure.

b) Unrealistic goals set - incapable or too easy.

Item #6: Key Elements

The superintendents were asked to give their views on which elements of PAP should be retained, changed, or discarded.

All were for the continuation of a Management-by-Objectives approach to administration and all but one, the district superintendent of District Z favored the continuation of "individual and specific written goals and standards for administrators."

Only two, the area associate and the district superintendent of Z were for the continuation of participation by community and staff in the formation of these goals. Two others favored continuation in a general way, but not specifically as part of PAP.

The district superintendent of District X called for the
elimination of the interim review process saying "we don't need a procedure for this." All others were in favor of continuation, and all voiced opinions favoring the accomplishment report as presently done.

Only one, however, the district superintendent in X, wanted to see specific numerical ratings continued. In fact, he thought they should be even more specific. This difference of opinion was not unusual for him as throughout his interview he voiced opinions contrary to the other two district superintendents. He indicated support for a much more quantitative approach to performance appraisal. He wanted to see specific numerical ratings, emphasis on test scores, very specific objectives in precise measurable terms, and precisely defined merit pay. He did not want to see PAP more structured, however, and was for the abolishment of much of the paperwork. But he did feel objectives should be specific and measurable.

All superintendents were in favor of retaining the practice of "using the goals and accomplishments of one year to prepare for the next," but only two, the district superintendent in X and the district superintendent in Z, were for the retention of salary increments. The former favored increments because he thought they could serve as a "motivating force for better achievement" and administrative performance. The latter, however, looked upon them as a means "to reward the better principals."

On the question of adapting PAP for use in teacher evaluations, all but one, the district superintendent in District X,
were in favor of the method in at least a limited way. The district superintendent in District X simply thought that the Chicago Teachers' Union would be too big an obstacle to overcome and it was not worth the effort. Others, however, while not favoring a highly-structured system, thought that demanding teacher goal-setting to some degree would be useful.

Item #7: Evaluation Preference

While showing general support for PAP throughout the interviews, only two of the five superintendents favored its retention in its present form or with slight modifications. These two superintendents were the Deputy Superintendent and the district superintendent of District Z. The area associate thought the plan still had value, and so he favored a combination of PAP and an "annual conference with superior for informal evaluation." The district superintendent in District X thought PAP was good for newer principals, but that a "checklist" would be sufficient for more experienced principals, while the district superintendent of Y was for a checklist but with "specific items for each school." This latter plan might seem to many to be very similar to PAP itself.

Items #8 and #9: Salary Increments and Comments

Finally, on the question of tying administrative evaluation to salary increments, two were in favor as stated in Item #6, but the Deputy Superintendent also voiced support for a plan to reward those having a strong "commitment" and doing an outstanding job.
He did not seem to favor tying this method of rewards, however, to a specific and structured plan, such as PAP. "PAP is good in its own right."

The district superintendent of District Y did not think increments would ever work tied to evaluation and the associate superintendent did not think that subjectivity could be eliminated to allow for merit pay.

Additional Analysis

Those superintendents interviewed tended to be more supportive of PAP than the principals that were interviewed. This was illustrated in Chapter III. Nevertheless, two, the former area associate superintendent and the district superintendent in District X, were more critical. The former was skeptical that many "claims" made by PAP were actually due to PAP, while the latter thought that PAP should have been approached in a more quantitative manner.

The responses of the district superintendent of X showed that he viewed PAP more as a "motivational" tool or, perhaps, even as a device of coercion. He said that objectives should be highly specific, that there was presently "too much verbiage," and that numerical ratings should be stressed (other superintendents thought these should be dropped). Perhaps surprisingly, he was not for the retention of PAP, except for new principals. Others, he felt, could function with a checklist once they had gone through two or three years with PAP.
The other two district superintendents were more general in their approaches to PAP, viewing it as just another procedure to go through. One seemed to view it as a good device for justifying salary rewards for his principals. They and the area associate were more skeptical of the accomplishments of PAP, saying that successes would have occurred anyway or that "any decent principal would have done that anyway." Perhaps there was also some resentment on the part of the district superintendents regarding their loss of salary increments.

The Deputy Superintendent's responses were more defensive of the "design" of PAP and more critical of the way in which it was implemented by subordinates. Examples of these were cited in Chapter III. Interestingly, he still favored administrative rewards through "scholarships," but said that these should not be as a result of PAP.
C. Comparisons and Contrasts between Principals and Superintendents

Item #1: Improvements in Administration

Regarding PAP's "clearly relating compensation to performance results," principals and superintendents were in agreement with the vast majorities rejecting this statement. On the matter of reducing subjectivity, however, they disagreed on whether or not PAP had been successful. Four superintendents said it had been, but only six principals agreed. Principals in District X particularly rejected the statement and resented the method of rating used by the district superintendent.

Both groups were divided on the plan's equitability, but again principals in Districts Y and Z tended to accept this statement along with each district superintendent. District X principals, in a district in which the district superintendent said he "tried to be" equitable, rejected the statement. Several, including the area associate, were concerned with the variety of formats across the city rather than within a given district.

There was a rather clear-cut disagreement between the two groups in responding to the statement that performance appraisal "provides for administrators to improve their performance." Superintendents all responded positively, while only seven of eighteen principals agreed. These seven were evenly distributed throughout the three districts.

Superintendents generally agreed also that PAP did compare
actual results...to the objectives previously agreed upon" with a majority (thirteen) of principals agreeing. Some of these qualified their agreement with statements that "they made sure" that they got good results. As indicated earlier, the next statement on "improvement of instruction" was most interesting. All of the superintendents accepted the statement to at least a limited degree, but only eleven principals did likewise. Five of these were in District X, a district in which the district superintendent emphasized the importance of quantitative measure and all of the elementary principals indicated that there had been a marked improvement in test scores, a fact for which PAP was given credit.

Only three superintendents believed that performance appraisal had afforded "the opportunity for administrators and their superiors to communicate more effectively," But only six principals agreed. Ten principals accepted the statement that PAP helped to identify "individual needs for training and development...," with only two superintendents agreeing. Obviously, reaction to both of the preceding statements was hardly enthusiastic.

Item #2: Technical Directives

In discussing the technical implementation of PAP, all superintendents said that the "district superintendent and principal mutually agree upon the latter's objectives at the beginning of the school year." Although a majority of principals accepted the idea of "mutual agreement," a majority rejected the statement that
this agreement took place at the beginning of the school year. Several stated that the PAP cycle frequently began much later in the year.

While one-half of the eighteen principals said that they and their superiors do discuss their objectives during the school year, the superintendents generally rejected this discussion, two qualifying the statement with "only if necessary."

There was also disagreement between the two groups on the next technical PAP directive; that is, that all objectives are set at "significant and attainable levels." While four of the superintendents agreed with the statement, several of the principals interviewed said that objectives were attainable, but not significant. The deputy superintendent had said that there were "flaws in this directive."

Both groups generally agreed to rejecting the statement that "principals involved members of their staff, community, and students (high school only) in the preliminary identification of programs and plans." No superintendent gave an unqualified yes to this statement; one saying he didn't know, another that it was so "only in the beginning," and another that it was not so "formally." Still another said the statement was true for all but student groups. Six principals gave affirmative responses, but two of these were high school principals who also said that they did involve students. Generally, however, the statement was rejected.

Although the three district superintendents said their principals had seen their PAP's, the two higher superintendents seemed
less certain of this taking place. Principals seemed to give confusing
or conflicting responses. Seven said they had seen their district super-
intendent's PAP, and these were all from Districts X and Y.

The other five principals from these two districts did not re-
member or know whether they had seen the document. One would think
that most would or would not remember if such a document had been
distributed for examination.

The superintendents gave almost identical responses to the next
statement that the "principal's accomplishments reports are used by
the district superintendent as a basis for planning and assistance...
for the following year;" the district superintendents said yes,
while the two others seemed less certain. Similarly, seven prin-
cipals responded positively and all but one was from Districts X
and Y. Again, these responses were puzzling, since one would as-
sume that there would be more of a consensus within a district on
these technical statements. Five of six principals in District Z,
however, said that the accomplishment report was not used in planning
for the following year.

Item #3: Behavioral Changes

The superintendents were somewhat less than enthusiastic
about the statement "administrators will plan their work more ef-
fectively." Two said yes, but three said "some did; some did not."
They were not nearly as unenthusiastic as the principals, however,
since only four of eighteen principals responded positively to this
statement. Seven principals did endorse the statement that prin-
cipals "will focus their attention and efforts upon the most basic and critical functions of their positions." This response was compared with four superintendents - all but the area associate who said that if the principal "was any good, he would do this anyway." Also, six other principals said that this focusing of attention had taken place but not because of PAP. This statement was, therefore, accepted even if several principals refused to see PAP's involvement in this improvement.

Nine of the eighteen principals did give PAP credit for helping them look at their performance in more practical terms, and three others admitted this change had occurred but again refused to give performance appraisal any credit in this development. Three superintendents also said that this change had taken place among principals and the area associate said that this change took place but also refused to attribute it to PAP. Again, however, it would seem that both groups accepted the statement.

Neither group accepted the statement that principals "will identify areas in which assistance from central or district staff personnel would be helpful." Only nine principals and only one superintendent agreed with this claim. The latter sided with eight other principals who doubted whether any help would be forthcoming if areas of need were identified.

The next statement, "administrators will channel their primary efforts into...areas of...greatest...need," and the second were very similar. Members of both groups answered quite consistently with only one superintendent and three principals giving contradictory
responses. Both groups accepted the statement if those principals, who said this had taken place but not because of PAP, are included as positive responses.

Three superintendents agreed that principals "will mutually grow in competency and will communicate more effectively" and the former associate said that principals "will do this anyway." However, only eight principals said that this growth had taken place and four of these said that PAP had had no role in this growth.

Item #4: Three Attributes and Three Faults

Although responses to the open-ended question, "What have been the three best attributes of PAP?" were wide and varied, the answers given most frequently by both groups centered around the same two points—

1) the setting of specific objectives, and, therefore, priorities, for the school and the principal personally.

2) the improvement of communications at various levels: principal-district superintendent, principal-staff, and principal-community.

Beyond these, responses were too varied to detect any patterns. Nevertheless, the preceding similarities were striking.

Similarly, the responses given to the question, "What have been the three greatest faults of PAP?" were also very much the same. The response given most frequently by superintendents was "Tying compensation to PAP." This response was not mentioned by any principal, but what was mentioned most frequently was "Failure to implement salary increment portion of plan," the second most-frequently mentioned fault by superintendents. Also, both groups gave as their
next greatest fault the "unrealistic mechanics or format, particularly the time factor" of PAP.

Again, at this point additional responses were too varied from which to draw other generalizations.

Item #5: Effect on Education

All of the superintendents expressed the opinion that there had been some positive educational advantages to performance appraisal, while only eight principals felt similarly. Five of these were in District X and four of this group stated that achievement, as measured by standardized test scores, had been helped. The three district superintendents also mentioned higher achievement as a by-product of PAP. Evidently in District X only had this opinion been communicated to the principals. Beyond this district, individuals in both groups made some rather vague statements about improved planning and communications. These latter statements seem to reflect back to the previous item regarding "attributes" in general, rather that those specifically concerned with instruction.

Only three superintendents made negative comments about PAP and instruction while eight principals, of which only two were in District X, made such responses. Negative responses from the two groups were too dissimilar from which to draw any generalizations.

Item #6: Key Elements

When interviewees were asked to tell which key elements of PAP should be retained, changed, or discarded, they responded in
quite the same way.

Regarding a "Management-by-Objectives approach to administration," all interviewees, except for one principal, favored retention. Four of five superintendents and thirteen of eighteen principals thought that "individual and specific written goals and standards for administrators" should also be retained.

In terms of "Participation by community, staff, and students (high school only) in the formation of goals," only two superintendents and four principals (plus two who agreed to staff only) favored retention. Both groups seemed to agree in their rejection of this element.

Four superintendents said the interim review should be retained although three of these four admitted that they have not been implementing this practice. Perhaps this lack of implementation is why only twelve principals favored its retention although three others said the interim review should be optional.

All superintendents said that they wanted to see "Comparison of results to objectives through the accomplishment report" remain as part of PAP and thirteen principals felt likewise.

Only one superintendent and one principal wanted to see "Specific numerical ratings" left in the plan. Comments from both groups were quite derogatory on this subject, including the area associate, who said numerical ratings were "irrational."

Superintendents were unanimous and principals agreed, sixteen to two, that the practice of "using the goals and accomplishments of one year to prepare for the next" should be retained as is.
The last element listed, "Salary increments tied to performance ratings," provoked the most comments in both groups. Two superintendents and seven principals favored its retention or change. This subject was given further consideration in Item #8.

Finally, on the question of expanding PAP for use as a teacher-evaluation method, four of five superintendents favored a "modified" version. They wanted to see at least some goal-setting on the part of the teachers. Seven principals saw some merit in the idea for planning purposes. Most of the others did not think it would be practical, especially in large schools. Many envisioned "reams of paperwork" that would have to be done personally by the principal, since he is usually the only person in the school with a supervisory certificate. The dissenting district superintendent on this subject thought that the Chicago Teachers' Union "would be too formidable."

Item #7: Evaluation Preference

When asked to give their preference for the type of administrative evaluation plan, both superintendents and principals gave a wide mixture of preferences. This divergence occurred because several chose combinations from the three choices listed: PAP, annual conference with superior for informal evaluation, and formal checklist or other instrument. Superintendents included PAP, or a combination involving PAP, in four instances. The fifth chose a "Formal Checklist," but said there should be "specific items for each school."

Among the principals, seven favored PAP or a combination thereof, while five principals who said they preferred "an annual conference" also wanted some sort of objectives. These choices mean that twelve
principals wanted some pre-set objectives included in their evaluation.

Once again, many seemed hesitant to say they favored PAP, perhaps because of several unpleasant associations or because of the heavily structured system. Nevertheless, two-thirds of the principals and all of the superintendents preferred an evaluation system with pre-set objectives which was consistent with their earlier stated preference for an MBO system of administration. Evidently, many did not want to see these objectives involved in their evaluation.

In no case did any principal state a preference for a return to the prior system of a district superintendent rating a principal with no pre-set objectives or with no communications required between the two parties.

**Items #8 and #9: Salary Increments and Comments**

When asked to discuss in more detail their attitudes toward "administrative evaluation tied to salary increments," three superintendents favored some sort of merit pay, although the deputy superintendent did not necessarily think that this should be tied to PAP. Eight principals still wanted to see a form of merit pay, but the others were opposed to the concept, not for any philosophical reasons, but because they simply did not think it could work.

**Additional Analysis**

Regarding the originally stated objectives of PAP, both groups
responded similarly except in the areas of equitability and subjectivity. District X's elementary school principals were unanimous in their belief that PAP had helped to improve student achievement, but other principals were much less certain of this. The district superintendent of X, although not well-liked for his coercive methods, demonstrated that instructional improvement could take place. The district superintendent of Z, although well-liked and interested in seeing his principals receive salary rewards, did not get the same achievement results.

Regarding the technical implementation of PAP, both groups agreed in their responses with the exceptions of objectives being discussed at the beginning of the year and objectives being set at significant levels. It was unclear whether or not the district superintendents shared their PAP's with their principals and whether or not accomplishment reports were used as a basis for planning for the following year. Again, one would think that if the latter two had taken place, they would be recalled by practically everyone involved.

Regarding behavioral changes in principals, the two groups disagreed only on whether principals grew in competency and communicated more effectively as a result of PAP. Both groups viewed the best attributes and the greatest faults of PAP quite similarly.

Both the superintendents and the principals of District X viewed PAP as having helped to improve achievement scores. Other principals did not view PAP as having made as much educational impact, but then their concept of the program was more vague and
general. It was also viewed by the latter group as more of an administrative tool than an educational one.

Regarding the retention, change, or discarding of certain key elements of PAP, both groups were in agreement except for the interim review. Principals favored retaining the interim review while the superintendents' responses conflicted with their privately stated practices. The latter also favored expanding PAP to the evaluation of teachers, while principals rejected this idea. Again, the district superintendent of X was alone in favoring strict numerical ratings, but his quantitative approach seemed to have received the best results. For example, he had the principals in his district attempt to form a school band and plant shrubbery and tulips in front of their school. His principals were rated on these specific types of achievements.

Both groups stated their preference for a method of administrative evaluation with pre-set objectives, although both groups favored a less-structured system.

Attitudes on merit pay were quite mixed with both groups dividing almost evenly on the subject. Those responding negatively did so because of past experiences with PAP, rather than for ideological reasons.

Overall, support for PAP was remarkably strong from both groups. This was remarkable because of the negative comments it received over the years from individual principals and district superintendents as well as by the Chicago Principals' Association.

Both groups begrudgingly admitted that improvements had taken
place in several areas since PAP's implementation. But in several
instances, the groups also said that the improvements did not occur
"because of PAP" or that they "would have happened anyway."

Perhaps the strongest endorsement of PAP came from the fact
that no one interviewed wanted to return to the prior method of
evaluation: that is, the district superintendent merely giving a
"grade" to the principal at the end of the year. All wanted either
PAP or some sort of pre-determined objectives with most wanting
these objectives tailored for a particular situation.

If interviewees had been asked the question, "Do you like
PAP? Yes or no," most probably would have said "no." But upon
closer questioning and analysis, an entirely different response
came through. It reminds one of Winston Churchill's famous ob-
servation that democracy was the worst form of government ever
devised by man - except for every other form of government.
Part II - Comparison of the Interview Data and the PAP Document

Introduction

The comparison of the interview data and the PAP document was accomplished in the following manner. Interview data used were the results of Chapter III - Part I - C - Comparisons and Contrasts between Principals and Superintendents, which represented the culmination of the data analysis of the focused interviews. The PAP document was represented primarily by items 1, 2, 3, and 6 of the interview instrument with supportive comments drawn from the remaining items. The above items of the interview instrument were developed to be a reflection of both the philosophical basis and the technical directives for implementation of the Chicago Performance Appraisal Plan as represented by the PAP document.

Acceptance of statements from the interview instrument was accorded those statements for which the majority of both groups, principals and superintendents, voiced acceptance. Rejection of statements from the interview document was accorded those statements for which at least one-half of both groups voiced rejection. For those statements for which there were conflicting opinions from the majorities of each group, no conclusions were drawn.

Item #1: Improvements in Administration

Regarding the statement that PAP "clearly relates compensation to performance results," both groups rejected this statement by substantial majorities and, therefore, the statement was rejected.
PAP's reducing "the element of subjectivity" was accepted by the superintendents but by only one-third of the principals, and, therefore, no conclusion could be drawn.

"Equitable for all participants" was accepted by superintendents but was again rejected by the principals (a slight majority of principals in districts Y and Z did support the statement), and so no conclusions were reached regarding this statement.

PAP's claim that the plan "provides for administrators to improve their performance" was agreed to by all of the superintendents but slightly less than one-half of the principals, and so no conclusion was drawn regarding this statement.

Both a majority of the superintendents and the principals agreed that performance appraisal compares "actual results...to the objectives previously agreed upon," and, consequently, this statement was accepted. The next statement stating that PAP "will result in the improvement of instruction" was also accepted by a majority of both groups. District X elementary school principals were particularly emphatic on this point and, although they were not particularly fond of their district superintendent, admitted that he had done much to improve the instructional quality in that district. When interviewees were asked in Item #5 to give examples of PAP's having had a role in educational improvement, all district superintendents responded positively, but only those principals in District X gave specific instructional responses. Other principals tended to be more vague, speaking of better planning and improved
communications which should ultimately help instruction. Many of the latter also rejected the idea and said that PAP was an administrative tool, not an educational one. Thus, the district superintendent of X demonstrated that, if instruction is emphasized in the PAP and if goals are specific (and this same district superintendent would also say "quantitative"), performance appraisal can result in the improvement of instruction. Therefore, this statement was accepted.

On the matter of the plan's affording "the opportunity of administrators and their superiors to communicate more effectively", three superintendents agreed, but the same was true for only six principals, and so no conclusion was drawn. Similarly, no conclusions were drawn on the plan's claim that it "identifies individual needs for training and development as a means of improving the principal's performance," since only two superintendents supported the statement.

Item #2: Technical Directives

Concerning the technical implementation of PAP, majorities of both groups agreed that "the district superintendent and principal mutually agree upon the latter's objectives," However, a majority of the principals disputed that this agreement took place "at the beginning of the school year" and so no conclusion was drawn on the time portion of this statement.

One-half of the principals and a majority of the superintendents rejected the idea that "the district superintendent and principal discuss these objectives during the school year" and so this statement was rejected.
Although the statement that "all objectives are set at significant and attainable levels" was accepted by majorities of both groups, some doubt was cast on the objectives being "significant." The Deputy Superintendent spoke of "flaws" in this concept, although he was not specific, and several principals said their objectives were "attainable" but not "significant." Nevertheless, the statement was accepted.

Both groups rejected the statement that "principals involve members of their staff, community, and students (high school only) in the preliminary identification of programs and plans" by quite convincing margins. Two of three high school principals did claim to involve all of these groups, and so perhaps a difference conclusion might be found for high school administrators. In this study, the statement was rejected.

In regard to the next two statements that "the district superintendent has completed his PAP before meeting with his principals and uses it as a guide for theirs" and "the principals' accomplishment reports are used by the district superintendent as a basis for planning and assistance in developing new and revised objectives for the following year," almost identical responses were given within each group. All three district superintendents responded positively, while both the associate and deputy voiced doubt over either of the above being implemented. Five principals agreed to the first statement and seven agreed to the second. Also, many other principals in both cases said they "didn't know" or
"didn't remember" the above happening, unusual answers to such specific statements. Therefore, no conclusions were drawn on either statement.

**Item #3: Behavioral Changes**

Concerning behavioral changes that were to have taken place among principals, both groups rejected the statement that "principals will plan their work more effectively," only two superintendents voicing an unqualified yes and only four principals agreeing. Therefore, the statement was rejected.

However, both groups accepted the statement that "principals will focus their attention and efforts upon the most basic and critical functions of their positions." The group of principals included only seven who said that this focus was because of PAP, but six others said that improvement in this area had taken place, although refusing to give any credit to performance appraisal. Nevertheless, the intended effect had been realized and the statement was accepted.

Similarly, "principals will look at their performance in practical terms" was also accepted since three superintendents agreed with it plus the associate who did not want to admit that PAP might have played a role in this improvement. Likewise, a total of twelve principals said that improvement had taken place since PAP began.

Neither group accepted the statement that "principals will identify areas in which assistance from central or district staff
personnel would be helpful." Only nine principals and one superintendent saw improvement in this area, and so the statement was rejected.

The next statement "administrators will channel their primary efforts into...areas of...greatest need," was similar to the second, and, as in the case of the second, it was accepted. That is, three superintendents and ten principals voiced approval of the statement even if they did not attribute improvement to PAP.

There was a difference of opinion concerning the last statement, "principals will mutually grow in competency and will communicate more effectively." Superintendents responded affirmatively, but ten principals rejected this claim. Therefore, no conclusion was reached on this statement.

Regarding the "communications" portion of this statement, it should be recalled that when principals were asked to list the three greatest attributes of PAP in Item #4, one of the two most frequently mentioned positive points about PAP was the "improvement of communications." Seven different principals listed some area of communications within their three positive points.

**Item #6: Key Elements**

Responses to statements concerning "key elements" of performance appraisal resulted in the following:

A "management-by-objectives" approach was accepted overwhelmingly by both groups. This near unanimity was supported by Item #5 in which "the setting of objectives and priorities" was
seen as the top attribute of performance appraisal by both groups. This key element was accepted for retention.

Both groups also said that "individual and specific written goals and standards for administrators" should be retained. Four superintendents and thirteen principals supported the statement. Therefore, it was accepted for retention.

"Participation by community and staff in the formation of (goals and standards)" was rejected by both the superintendent (two to three) and principals (four to fourteen; two others said "staff only"). This rejection was not surprising as Item #2 showed that this phase of PAP was not being implemented and that statement was rejected. Therefore, this key element was rejected for retention.

Although four superintendents said that the "interim review and opportunity for a revision of goals and standards" should be retained, this response conflicts with what the district superintendents said they were actually implementing. For example, two district superintendents stated that they did not have a specific interim review session for their principals. One said he did allow opportunity for revision, but he wasn't sure if the principals always realized it"; two others said they offered it "only if necessary." Also, twelve principals supported the concept along with three others who thought it should be an optional phase of performance appraisal. Therefore, this key element was accepted for retention, at least on an optional basis. This acceptance seemed to be a contradiction, as statement two of Item #2 was rejected.
"Comparison of results to objectives through the accomplishment report" was accepted for retention as a key element since all superintendents endorsed it as did thirteen principals.

"Specific numerical ratings," on the other hand, were rejected for retention as a key element by overwhelming majorities of both groups, and "using the goals and accomplishments of one year to prepare for the next" was accepted for retention as a key element because all but one superintendent and all but two principals supported it.

Although response to the statement "salary increments tied to performance ratings" showed that only two superintendents supported such increments, responses to Item #8 showed that the Deputy Superintendent was also in favor of some form of merit pay, but not necessarily tied to performance appraisal. Seven principals responded positively to this statement, but one additional principal responded positively in Item #8 saying that she could support salary increments if they were "done right." Two other principals reversed their positions between Item #6 and Item #8. Therefore, in view of the very divided opinions on this subject and the confusing statements by principals, no conclusion was drawn on this key element.

Additional Analysis

Part II examined the reactions of five superintendents and eighteen principals concerning twenty-eight plan objectives, technical directives, behavioral objectives, and key elements of the Chicago Performance Appraisal Plan.
The two groups agreed on nineteen of these statements, accepting twelve and rejecting seven. No conclusions could be drawn on nine statements since majorities of each group differed in their responses.

The greatest disagreements between the two groups occurred within Item #1, Improvements in Administration, with four statements accepted by superintendents but rejected by the principals, and one statement accepted by the principals but not by the second interviewed group. Also, within Item #2, Technical Directives, there was disagreement on two statements with the superintendents approving each but the principals rejecting each.

A common thread seems to run through most of these statements. The statements are those for which the superior was most responsible. For example:

- reduces the element of subjectivity
- equitable for all participants
- affords the opportunity for administrators...to communicate more effectively
- the district superintendent has completed his PAP before...and uses it as a guide...
- the principal's accomplishment reports are used by the district superintendent as a basis for planning...

It would seem that the superintendents' responses might have been somewhat defensive of the jobs they had done in implementing PAP. One might argue conversely, however, that principals might have been hypercritical of the role of the district superintendents in implementing PAP.
All things considered, the extent of agreement between the two groups was remarkable, especially if one discounts those statements which might have involved an admission of guilt by rejection.
Part III - Comparison of the Chicago Performance Appraisal Plan and the Relevant Literature

Introduction

In this final phase of the summary, the total Chicago Performance Appraisal Plan, as evidenced by the interview data and the PAP document, was compared and contrasted with the literature relative to the subject. More succinctly, the results found in Chapter IV - Part II were compared and contrasted with the literature from Chapter II.

Once again the topics chosen for analysis were those of Items 1, 2, 3, and 6 of the interview instrument. To repeat, the interview instrument was developed to be a reflection of both the philosophical basis and technical directives for implementation of the Chicago Performance Appraisal Plan.

Item #1: Improvements in Administration

Chapter IV - Part II determined that the Chicago PAP had failed to "clearly relate compensation to performance results" as stated in the PAP document. The literature raises a more basic question, however, which is whether or not this is a desirable relationship at all? McConkey¹ and Schleh² thought it was and Industrial Relations News³

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³Industrial Relations News, 28 November 1964.
said it was if evaluatees are "told salary incentives ahead of time."

Others strongly disagreed, however:

Wikstrom: "Salary administration tied to MBO defeats the developmental aspects of the program." 4

Drucker: "The absence of hygiene factors can make a person unhappy, but their presence does not necessarily make a person happy. He must be given challenging work and responsibility." 5

Herzberg, Mausner and Snyderman's research arrived at the same conclusion. 6

Knezevich said that although school board members and other lay members think of MBO/R as an answer to the merit pay problem, "the reverse may occur - MBO/R may lose its inherent potential if it receives too much emphasis as a tool for determining the compensation for administrators." 7

Gordon's research recommended that any connection between performance appraisal and salaries be put off for at least one year, preferably two. He also recommended several provisions in any


performance appraisal plan that would help to minimize the "threatening" aspects of merit pay: an advanced "formula" for salary increments that would include a cost of living raise for all and grievance procedures. 8 Finally, a majority of both the superintendents and principals interviewed felt that merit pay in a large system such as Chicago was simply unworkable.

Perhaps, however, an even more basic consideration should be given as stated by Levinson: "...examine any appraisal plan to see the extent to which it...expresses the conviction that people are patsies to be driven, urged and manipulated and...fosters a genuine partnership between man and organization...." 9

Toynbee had said that a "hard" rather than an "easy" environment was more likely to generate leadership, growth, and productivity, 10 but McGregor said that performance appraisal should be used only for counseling — supervisors "don't like to play God." 11

Perhaps Gordon summarized this latter attitude best: "System building in education must continuously be aware of the uniqueness of its product — better, more able human beings. If the systems used to


evaluate employees or schools are dehumanizing, their purpose in educating youth better is not well served...development of performance appraisal that is sensitive to individual and human needs becomes a potent challenge."\(^{12}\)

In Part II, no conclusion could be drawn on the statement that PAP "reduces the element of subjectivity." Levinson, however, wrote that "...cannot be objective in a society - all goes back to subjectivity..."\(^{13}\)

Similarly, no conclusion was drawn on PAP's being "equitable for all participants." Crowder said that there should be a set of definite policies and procedures for each evaluatee, but the literature offers us no guidelines beyond this.\(^{14}\)

Neither was a conclusion drawn on whether or not PAP "provides for administrators to improve their performance." On this subject there is also controversy in the literature with the fundamental question being: Are performance appraisal and MBO compatible? Knezevich warned that "what many school systems call MBO ends up in fact as an approach to appraisal of the administrative personnel."\(^{15}\) Odiorne also said that this narrow view of MBO is its greatest weak-

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\(^{12}\)Gordon, p. 244.

\(^{13}\)Levinson.


\(^{15}\)Knezevich, p. 11.
ness and is frequently viewed in business as another personnel gimmick. Levinson agreed and said that "...the higher a man rises in an organization and the more varied and subtle his work, the more difficult it is to pin down objectives that represent more than a fraction of his work...because it is based on a reward-punishment psychology, the process of MBO in combination with performance appraisal is self-defeating...fails to take adequately into account the deeper emotional components of motivation." Gordon thought that performance appraisal could improve performance if detailed, specific job descriptions including skills needed to carry out the position, a list of things for which the person is accountable, a list of shared responsibilities of the position, and a clear statement of the limits of the authority of the position, are included. Gordon also thought that individuals should be helped to establish a self-development plan based on appraisal results, and should be required to attend necessary inservice programs in important skill training for that position. Redfern also said that standards of excellence should be designed with which the principal could measure his performance, and Lamb wrote that the most effective method for


17 Levinson.

administration was MBO: "It increases control through a clarification of purpose."\(^{19}\) Mattaliano warned that objectives might "become an end in themselves rather than the means for improving educational ideas,"\(^{20}\) but Gordon again reported that administrators believed that performance appraisal does provide the opportunity for correcting the individual administrator's job weaknesses.\(^{21}\) And so the debate goes on, as it does among Chicago public school administrators.

Both Redfern and Hartley were very much in favor of performance appraisal. The former said that this system sets standards of excellence and allows for concrete and specific objectives designed to implement action.\(^{22}\) The latter said that supervisors should identify what criteria and levels of performance they will accept as a basis for evaluating their performance.\(^{23}\) PAP seems to have done this according to a majority of both the superintendents and the principals, that is, it compared "actual results...to the objectives agreed upon."

Regarding PAP's claim to "result in the improvement of in-

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\(^{21}\)Gordon, p. 226.

\(^{22}\)Redfern, p. 90.

struction," very little can be found in the literature. Perhaps this lack of pertinent literature is because performance appraisal was originally used in business and later was viewed in education as an administrative tool. This same attitude was found among many administrators in the interview. A majority of both superintendents and principals, however, thought that PAP was successful in this area if objectives were specific and quantitative. The only real references to instruction in the literature are vague and refer to the necessity of teacher accountability.

Concerning the next two statements of PAP, that is, that the plan "affords the opportunity for administrators and their superiors to communicate more effectively" and that the plan "identifies individual needs for training and development as a means of improving the principal's performance," Part II failed to draw any conclusions since on the first only a majority of the superintendents agreed and on the second only a bare majority of the principals agreed. There is a relationship between the preceding two statements, however, or at least an end-product of these two. That end-product of "communications" and "identifying needs" is "inservice" or "on-the-job-training." Very little is said in the PAP about either of the two and yet this was a glaring weakness of PAP as reported by several administrators. The literature of performance appraisal abounds with references to these areas:

Heier: Said that many training sessions must be held before implementing a performance appraisal program. Sincerity and enthusiasm
for the program are essential. A good deal of time should be spent on the formulation of objectives and the trainer should work with all management groups as there must be a high degree of continuity and standardization. Middle management must be convinced of the value of the plan before submitting it to upper management. "A company cannot institute by fiat!"24

Sampson: Stated that MBO is frequently perceived as an effective mean, but is not well-implemented. One reason for this perception is that school systems frequently rush into an MBO system without adequate inservice work.25

Feltes: Said that any evaluation system must be field-tested to find out first if performance improves.26

Gordon: Stated that it was possible for introduction and implementation to be inhibited by insensitive, poorly conceived planning. Also, inservice programs needed to be developed if the systems were to provide the information that was necessary to carry out the intended procedures and purposes of performance appraisal. Continuing:

each administrator should be given the opportunity to have substantial input in the development and design of the strategies, instruments, and subsystems of the proposed appraisal program.

On a regularly planned basis, administrators should sit down

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together privately and assess the needs of the organization and their own needs to see if a reasonable congruity exists. For this to be possible, a great deal of trust and confidence in each other and the existing power structure must be present. If this trust is not present, this recommendation should be ignored, since it would only lead to greater difficulty.  

Item #2: Technical Directives

The conclusion drawn in Part II was that, although the district superintendent and principal have been mutually agreeing upon the latter's objectives, it did not necessarily occur at the beginning of the school year. The literature had little to say about the latter but a great deal to say about the former:

Redfern: Performance objectives, related to the standards of excellence, should be formulated cooperatively by the principal and his evaluator and used to evaluate performance. He also called performance appraisal "cooperative appraisal" as opposed to unilateral or "job-target" appraisal.  

Hartley: Issues in MBO include: Will arbitrarily selected criteria be imposed on supervisors by the central office?  

Barilleaux: Principals should view the accountability syndrome for proactiveness rather than the usual reactiveness...These conditions should be welcomed, but only on the assumption that

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27 Gordon, pp. 229 and 233.  
28 Redfern, pp. 86-87.  
29 Hartley.
a critical element of the accountability process is honored; principals must share in the formulation of the objectives for which they are to be accountable. 30

Mattaliano: Speaking on the dangers and abuses faced by people working with MBO, "The supervisor may write the management objectives and impose them on the subordinate." 31

Heier: Said that none of the system can be imposed. 32

Both the principals and the superintendents agreed that the statement, "the district superintendent and principal discuss these objectives during the school year," should be rejected. The literature mentioned the topic when Crowder said that there should be multiple appraisals throughout the school year, 33 and Gordon recommends three practices: (1) administrators sit down once a year, at least, and assess the organization's and their needs, (2) administrators take time to meet with their immediate subordinates as frequently as possible as a method of both facilitating communication and advising the subordinate, (3) communications should not be limited to paper and pen but should occur at regular intervals in the form of face-to-face meetings of the


31 Mattaliano.

32 Heier.

33 Crowder.
whole administrative staff. 34

On the contrary, both groups, superintendents and principals, accepted the statement that "all objectives are set at significant and attainable levels." The "significant" portion of this statement, however, was questioned by several interviewees, including the Deputy Superintendent. Mattaliano warned of additional dangers here when he wrote:

The weak administrator...may suddenly be "approvable" if he is a creative writer of management objectives. In some cases he may actually feel that he is now doing the job because he looks good through MBO paperwork. 35

Wikstrom reported in 1966 that evaluatees were setting "easy or low" goals. 36 And Gordon recommended that

The objectives should be written so that (it) can be shown whether they are maintenance objectives or high-risk, problem-solving or creative objectives. Further, the risks or intangibles should be spelled out in the writing (with a statement) as to how the results of a yearly appraisal will be reported... 37

As reported in Part II, both groups rejected the PAP claim that "principals involve members of their staff, community and student body in the preliminary identification of programs and plans." The literature added little to the reactions of administrators outside of general statements by Gordon that performance

34 Gordon, pp. 233, 234.
35 Mattaliano.
36 Wikstrom.
37 Gordon, p. 232.
appraisal can assist in meeting some demands of communities.\(^{38}\)

No conclusions were drawn on either of the last two statements that "the district superintendent has completed his PAP before meeting with his principals and uses it as a guide for theirs" and "the principal's accomplishment reports are used by the district superintendent as a basis for planning and assistance in developing new and revised objectives for the following year." On the first statement, Redfern said that the principal should know to whom to look for direction and supervision,\(^{38}\) but on the second Gordon recommended that the recycling process of the development of objectives for a new school year not be decided upon at the same conference session that a final yearly appraisal session occurs.\(^{40}\)

**Item #3: Behavioral Changes**

Item #3 concerns behavioral changes which were supposed to have taken place among principals as a result of PAP. These behavioral changes were difficult to relate with the literature for two reasons:

1. The objectives of performance appraisal, as stated in the literature, were primarily concerned with the technical aspects of implementing a performance appraisal plan or with the goals of the plan itself, rather than with behavioral

\(^{38}\) Gordon, p. 226.

\(^{39}\) Redfern.

\(^{40}\) Gordon, p. 234.
changes in the person of the principal.

2. Although some references were found in the literature for certain behavioral objectives of PAP, as stated in the PAP document, these were not all satisfactory and no references were found for the first and fourth behavioral objectives: "administrators will plan their work more effectively" (rejected by both groups of administrators) and "administrators will identify areas in which assistance from central or district staff personnel would be helpful" (also rejected by both groups of administrators).

Several general statements were made by various authors concerning personal changes in administrators: Campbell stated that a set of criteria for functions defined in behavioral terms is necessary for an evaluation of administrative personnel, while Heier said that MBO/R could be a tremendous morale booster. Levinson, on the other hand, did not view behavioral changes as a result of PAP in positive terms: "...may perpetuate and intensify hostility, resentment, and distrust between a manager and subordinate...." He implied that performance appraisal used people as "patsies to be driven, urged and manipulated." McGregor also did not like what

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42 Heier.

43 Levinson.
he thought he saw in performance appraisal's relation to people, as did Herzberg, Mausner, and Snyderman.

Concerning the two statements that "administrators will focus their attention and efforts upon the most basic and critical functions of their positions" and "administrators will channel their primary efforts into those areas where the need is greatest," several positive statements were made: Lamb said that MBO "increases control through a clarification of purpose;" Nicholson said that principals should become familiar with the hierarchy of administrative task areas which need priorities in the implementation of performance objectives; and Gordon stated that administrators in his research believed that performance appraisal does provide clearly stated job descriptions, and the opportunity for correcting the individual administrator's job weaknesses. Both of these statements were accepted by majorities of both groups of interviewed administrators.

The statement "administrators will look at their performance in practical terms" was accepted in Part II and Redfern backs up this acceptance with the statement that performance appraisal assists

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45 Herzberg, et. al.

46 Lamb.


48 Gordon, p. 226.
with the particular needs of individual principals and is designed to implement action. It makes accountability more than a cliche.\textsuperscript{49}

Although no conclusion was drawn in Part II on the last statement, "administrators will mutually grow in competency and will communicate more effectively," Knezevich does say that MBO/R "may reveal the kinds of special training needed to give the administrator an opportunity to know his position better than anyone else, to integrate system objectives with managerial efforts, and to become a self-starter with the organization."\textsuperscript{50}

\textbf{Item \#6: Key Elements}

Many of the key elements selected for Item \#6 were repetitious or quite similar to objectives or technical directives in Items \#1 and \#2, respectively, which were previously compared and contrasted with the literature. These include:

3. "Participation by community and staff in the formation of (goals and standards)" which is similar to the fourth statement of Item \#2. The literature concerning these statements was quite limited and both were rejected by interviewed administrators.

4. "Interim review and opportunity for revision of goals and standards" was also quite similar to statement two of Item \#2, for

\begin{footnotes}
\item[49] Redfern, p. 16.
\item[50] Knezevich, p. 16
\item[51] Gordon, pp. 233-4
\end{footnotes}
which Gordon, in particular, had quite a bit to say.\textsuperscript{51} Surprisingly, however, the first statement was accepted for retention, while the latter (which determined whether or not this practice was actually being implemented) was rejected.

5. "Comparison of results to objectives through the accomplishment report" was similar in concept to the fifth statement of Item #1, and Redfern\textsuperscript{52} and Hartley\textsuperscript{53} had much to say about the importance of setting and reporting on objectives in a highly specific manner. Sizable majorities of both superintendents and principals accepted the latter and former statements for retention.

7. "Using the goals and accomplishments of one year to prepare for the next" could be compared and contrasted with literature similar to the sixth statement of Item #2, "the principal's accomplishment reports are used by the district superintendent as a basis for planning and assistance in developing new and revised objectives for the following year." Although Gordon recommended that the review from one year and the formulation of objectives for the next year not take place at the same meeting,\textsuperscript{54} both interviewed principals and superintendents

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{51}Gordon, pp. 233-4
\item \textsuperscript{52}Redfern.
\item \textsuperscript{53}Hartley.
\item \textsuperscript{54}Gordon, p. 234.
\end{itemize}
endorsed this statement overwhelmingly. Again, it was surprising that no conclusions could be drawn on the latter statement since a majority of principals failed to accept it.

8. "Salary increments tied to performance ratings" was also discussed in the first statement of Item #1. Although a majority of interviewed administrators rejected the latter statement—that is, they said that PAP did not clearly relate compensation to performance—no conclusion could be drawn on whether or not this key element should be retained as a part of PAP.

In regard to the other three key elements of PAP, the literature differed somewhat from statements considered earlier or, in the case of the sixth statement, no relevant literature was found.

1. "Management-by-objectives approach to administration" was endorsed repeatedly throughout the literature (disagreement arose over the question of whether or not MBO should be used in evaluation, and beyond that, for salary increments):

Authors such as Redfern,55 Edwards,56 Crowder,57

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55 Redfern.


57 Crowder.
Milton, \(^{58}\) Lamb, \(^{59}\) Hartley, \(^{60}\) McGregor, \(^{61}\) and many others all praised the use of MBO. Interviewed administrators agreed by strongly accepting this key element for retention.

2. "Individual and specific written goals and standards for administrators" was also accepted for retention as a key element by both interviewed groups and the literature supports this joint decision: Redfern stated that performance appraisal must be "tailored to the particular needs of individual principals"\(^{62}\) and Crowder's research concluded that appraisal criteria should be individualized for each evaluatee. \(^{63}\)

6. "Specific numerical ratings" were rejected overwhelmingly by both interviewed groups of administrators. Nothing could be located in the literature to support or criticize this technical aspect of the PAP.

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\(^{59}\) Lamb.

\(^{60}\) Hartley.

\(^{61}\) McGregor.

\(^{62}\) Redfern.

\(^{63}\) Crowder.
Additional Analysis

Items #1, #2, #3 and #6 were again used as a basis for comparing and contrasting the Chicago Performance Appraisal Plan with the literature. Pertinent literature was found to be available relative to most statements with the exception of those statements concerning equitability, improvement of instruction, community and staff participation, effective work-planning, assistance from outside staff, and specific numerical ratings.

The literature disclosed a controversy regarding the question of whether or not performance should be related to salary. The differences seem deep and not likely to be resolved until the more fundamental question of whether or not a "Theory X" or "Theory Y" atmosphere is more conducive to good performance is resolved. (The success of the district superintendent in District X would seem to indicate the former.)

The literature was also non-existent for questions unique to education, such as "improvement of instruction." This was not surprising since most pertinent literature was found in business sources. This raised still another question, however, and that was whether or not Cresap, McCormick, and Paget and the Chicago Board of Education really expected too much of this plan from the outset. For example, would this one plan actually be able to help "administrators plan... more effectively," "identify areas in which assistance from... staff personnel would be helpful," "result in the improvement of instruction," etc.? Perhaps the plan was handicapped from the beginning
by the setting of unrealistic expectations. The literature of business did not seem to expect so many accomplishments from one plan.

The literature also pointed out another pitfall and that was the equating of MBO with performance appraisal. Again, those who expected a program of MBO to grow out of PAP, instead of the reverse, were simply expecting too much.
Part IV - Analysis

The Chicago Performance Appraisal Plan is a major example of what happens when a Board of Education rushes into a program without adequate discussion, proper background, budget analysis, and inservice training. Also lacking was a specific list of objectives which the plan was to achieve and, most importantly, a commitment to and faith in the plan by both middle and lower level administrators.

Boards of Education in large urban centers are frequently made up of a conglomerate of individuals representing many varied interest and pressure groups. In Chicago, where Board members are appointed rather than elected, this is particularly true. The mayor must satisfy everyone with his appointments. The Board of Education in 1970 was comprised of representatives of labor, real estate, banking, the PTA, the League of Women Voters, the Urban League, and business. The Board then and now was criticized for too much factionalism, too much pushing for individual causes rather than for the city as a whole, and much too much bickering. Decisions seemed to be made to satisfy this group or that group without being made in a uniform consistent manner to satisfy the overall needs and goals of the city and its children. A major example of this factionalism was the decision on where new schools would be located. Those groups which exerted the most pressure got new schools; others with more pressing needs, but who were less vocal, did not. Today, many relatively new schools stand half-empty while serious overcrowding still exists in
several parts of the city.

The PAP was another example of this same kind of over-reaction and rushed, ill-conceived administrative recommendations. The "name of the game" in 1969 and 1970 was "get the principal". Board members had asked how they were to know if administrators were really doing their job and how could they hold principals accountable.

Performance appraisal was an answer to the expressed needs and concerns of the Board. A performance appraisal plan would allow for individual goal-setting, and would require more communication between supervisor and supervisee. Such a plan might also involve communities and staff in planning, would be more fair to principals (as opposed to the method of evaluation in effect then), and, most importantly, would institute a program of merit pay, something which seems to be popular with Boards of Education, particularly at budget and pay-raise times.

All of the above were admirable goals. The problems arose, however, when the General Superintendent began to take steps to formulate a plan which could be presented for Board approval. He was under pressure and wanted something fast and something which could be fully implemented within a year or two. He did not want anything which involved several years of field-testing and which did not zero in on the expressed concerns of the Board.

In order to accomplish these things he contracted with the firm of Cresap, McCormick and Paget to conduct an overall study of administrative evaluation and to make recommendations for change. The firm had a history of instituting performance appraisal
plans, so one could logically expect performance appraisal to be included in the final recommendations. But here is where the trouble actually began. CMP and the General Superintendent failed to bring the administrative staff, particularly principals, into their discussions and confidence. Immediately, there was the feeling on the part of principals that something was going to be imposed on them and that the Superintendent was siding with the Board against them instead of defending them.

Perhaps if principals had been included from the beginning, many mistakes made by CMP could have been avoided. First of all, a better statement of purpose was needed. Cresap, et al, gave vague statements inter-changing management-by-objectives and performance appraisal, even though there was no overall management-by-objectives program within the Board. They also failed to delineate a profit-oriented business from an educational and human relations oriented school system. In both the original CMP report, "Development of a Compensation Plan for Administrative Positions", and the follow-up, "Administrative Compensation Plan", CMP promised all sorts of improvements covering a broad range: better planning, improved instruction, identification of areas in which assistance would be helpful, better communications with superior, staff and community, less subjectivity, and merit pay. This one plan was evidently supposed to solve all the problems of the Chicago public schools.

Although they were an experienced firm, Cresap, McCormick and
Paget seemed to display the over-eagerness of a beginning Fuller Brush salesman in trying to sell this plan. One must also recall the naive and simplistic approach of big business in the "performance contracting" fiasco in which business promised that students would learn through business-like methods or the sponsoring firms would not be paid. The public saw how quickly business withdrew from those foolhardy ventures.

Worst of all, however, Cresap, McCormick and Paget deceived a naive staff and an inexperienced and over-eager Board of Education. Much of the literature reported in the foregoing chapters was available at that time. Even perfunctory research would have shown that business itself was having problems with performance appraisal at that time and that many problems later encountered by the school system could have been avoided by following the advice of writers such as McGregor, Heier and Drucker.

With all of these faults, however, there still might have been hope for the plan had not the Board of Education balked at several of the salary provisions of the original report and made "modifications". The Chicago Principal's Association had endorsed the original plan because of the lucrative benefits. Once many of these were eliminated, they began finding fault with the rest of the plan. These faults had been there all along but evidently the CPA had decided to go along with them in light of the substantial financial rewards. But when the Board decided to determine salary on a bi-monthly basis rather than on a two week basis, they reneged on four weeks of pay annually for principals. Later they failed to give merit increases of anywhere near the
percentages recommended by CMP and also failed to update the salary schedule annually as required by their own resolution. Again, one can only surmise that no one had indicated to the Board early in the process exactly what all of these salary benefits would cost. The Board was also aghast when the results of the first cycle of evaluations were released and most of the principals were Category III, the highest ranking. No percentage limitations had been placed on district superintendents. To the Board members this seemed to defeat the whole purpose of the program, to penalize principals. All the Board seemed to have done was to reward most of the principals of the city. Some Board members felt that they had been deceived and that they were the patsies for giving principals big raises. From this point on, everything was downhill.

Part I of Chapter IV showed that the failure to implement the salary aspects of the plan was undoubtedly the biggest fault of the plan. The next biggest failure was the lack of adequate inservicing. From the beginning the PAP was an imposed plan with little or no input from administrators.

As a result, the PAP was not viewed by principals and district superintendents as a means to improve performance, which should be the purpose of any evaluation system. Rather the PAP was looked upon as a coercive program. PAP was also viewed as something to go through every year, rather than as a useful framework for planning and improvement.

Those superintendents interviewed tended to be more supportive
of PAP than the principals who were interviewed. This support was illustrated in Chapter III. Nevertheless, two, the former area associate superintendent and the district superintendent in District X, were more critical. The former was skeptical that many "claims" made by PAP were actually due to PAP, while the latter thought that PAP should have been approached in a more quantitative manner.

The above would imply that not all superintendents were convinced of the merits of PAP from the outset. Again, this attitude showed a lack of adequate inservicing and that the plan was probably imposed upon administrators without fundamental support from middle management. It also implied that even superintendents believed that any positive changes had to be proven to be because of PAP. The fact that change took place was not enough.

The responses of the district superintendent of X showed that he viewed PAP more as a "motivational" tool or, perhaps, even as a device of coercion. He said that objectives should be highly specific, that there was presently "too much verbiage," and that numerical ratings should be stressed (other superintendents thought these should be dropped). Perhaps surprisingly, he was not for the retention of PAP, except for new principals. Others, he felt, could function with a checklist once they had gone through two or three years with PAP.

The other two district superintendents were more general in their approaches to PAP, viewing it as just another procedure to go through. One seemed to view it as a good device for justifying salary rewards for his principals. They and the area associate were more
skeptical of the accomplishments of PAP, saying that successes would have occurred anyway or that "any decent principal would have done that anyway." Perhaps there was also some resentment on the part of the district superintendents regarding their loss of salary increments.

The Deputy Superintendent's responses were more defensive of the "design" of PAP and more critical of the way in which it was implemented by subordinates. Examples of these responses were cited in Chapter III. Interestingly, he still favored administrative rewards through "scholarships," but said that these should not be as a result of PAP.

The above implies that there is an indication that superintendents should take the leadership in identifying instruction and learning-related goals for principals. In districts without this direct leadership, the principals' performance objectives were seldom learning-oriented and were generally vague.

The first statement above implies that principals and superintendents viewed their approaches to evaluation quite differently. Also, the district superintendent of X showed, at least in this instance, that a hard, coercive, quantitative, Theory X method of administrative evaluation was more effective.

Because of a lack of inservicing, both for principal and district superintendents, the plan was implemented in many different ways and with very different emphasis. In District X of the study, a district in which instructional objectives were emphasized, principals showed a markedly different perception of PAP's success than
did the principals in the other two districts. Although almost all principals were resentful of the Board of Education's failure to implement salary aspects of the PAP as originally planned, District X's principals revealed that the plan had been successful from the standpoint of student achievement and helping principals focus upon the most important areas of their jobs.

This success was somewhat remarkable since District X's principals were not at all reserved in expressing their personal resentment and dislike for the district superintendent. Nevertheless, District X seems to have been the only one of the three involved districts in which PAP was implemented with specific goals and, consequently, in which specific results could be shown.

These results show that PAP is most effective when used as a method of supervision-instruction and when objectives are based on highly quantitative and specific objectives. The results also show, that despite a lack of good citywide inservicing, a district superintendent with good leadership qualities, with specific goals which are expressed to principals, and with a very quantitative approach, can implement a successful PAP program. In both Districts Y and Z, the objectives were much more vague and lacked quantitative measures with which to determine success or failure. Consequently, principals rarely saw the potential value to the PAP. "It was just another one of those Mickey Mouse reports we do each year", said one principal.

Again, there was a definite underlying resentment toward PAP that was noted throughout the interviews because of the Board's
failure to implement the salary aspects of the original plan. Interviewed principals feel that PAP has cost them dollars. This attitude has been reenforced again and again by the Chicago Principals' Association. Consequently, when areas were discussed in which there had been progress during the last few years, principals did not want to give any credit to PAP, saying that the success would have occurred anyway or that it was not because of PAP.

These attitudes would imply that Boards of Education should attempt to steer away from relating performance appraisal to salary, at least until the plan has been implemented and well-received by those being evaluated. To some 1969 Board members this latter statement might seem to defeat the whole purpose of the PAP, because the plan was originally requested as a method of better determining who should or should not receive salary increases. Again, one must remember that the purpose of performance appraisal is to improve performance, not to determine salary. If determining salary is the only objective of the plan, then the plan becomes a means of coercion. If salary is the goal of a performance appraisal plan, then Boards and superintendents should not be hypocritical and use such phrases as "mutual agreement", "growing together", and "improved communications". These three are non-coercive terms and are rarely, if ever, used in conjunction with a coercive salary-related plan.

The former is really a key result of the research. In District X, the district superintendent was quite definitely coercive, but he got the best results. He did this, however, by
imposing his objectives, not through any "mutually developed" objectives. In one sense, he did not follow the plan as devised by the Board. In the other two districts, where vague directives were followed and there was less direct leadership, the PAP was not nearly as successful.

Administration and Boards of Education must make a crucial decision as to whether their performance appraisal plan is going to be an imposed, coercive plan with salary as a motivator, or a less coercive, mutually devised program for which there is really no point in relating salary. The above two plans really do not mix, and the worst problems seem to arise where there is a lack of honesty and Boards of Education try to do both.

Boards of Education must make the fundamental decision as to which system they want. In Chicago the Board vacillated in its decision and tried to do a little of both. As a consequence, the district superintendents for Districts Y and Z chose the non-coercive approach while the District Superintendent of X chose the imposed, coercive method. Of the three districts involved in this study, District X seems to have achieved the best results.

Regarding the technical implementation of PAP, both groups agreed in their responses with the exceptions of objectives being discussed at the beginning of the year and objectives being set at significant levels. It was unclear whether or not the district superintendents shared their PAP's with their principals and whether or not accomplishment reports were used as a basis for planning for the following year. Again, one would think that if
the latter two had taken place, they would be recalled by prac-
tically everyone involved.

The implication here is that, at best, the technical aspects
of PAP were approached in a very loose fashion. The above-stated
differences would never have occurred if any degree of uniformity
and control had been applied by the central staff.

Regarding behavioral changes in principals, the two groups
disagreed only on whether principals grew in competency and com-
municated more effectively as a result of PAP. Both groups viewed
the best attributes and the greatest faults of PAP quite similarly.

Both the superintendents and the principals of District X
viewed PAP as having helped to improve achievement scores. Other
principals did not view PAP as having made as much educational im-
 pact, but then their concept of the program was more vague and
general. PAP was also viewed by the latter group as more of an
administrative tool than an educational one.

These latter statements imply again a lack of adequate in-
servicing on the part of the Board of Education. Why did one
district superintendent insist on instructional objectives while
two others virtually ignored them? Was this question not answered
when the plan was first introduced? How could so many principals
and superintendents view the plan as strictly an administrative
tool? Were there no overall "quality controls" placed on the im-
plementation of the plan by the area and central offices? These
questions imply a confusion about the fundamental objectives of the
whole PAP.
Regarding the retention, change, or discarding of certain key elements of PAP, both groups were in agreement except for the interim review. Principals favored retaining the interim review while the superintendents' responses conflicted with their privately stated practices. The latter also favored expanding PAP to the evaluation of teachers, while principals rejected this idea. Again, the district superintendent of X was alone in favoring strict numerical ratings, but his quantitative approach seemed to have received the best results. For example, he had the principals in his district attempt to form a school band and plant shrubbery and tulips in front of their schools. His principals were rated on these specific types of achievements.

Again, the implication here is that there was great latitude shown in the interpretation of PAP directives by district superintendents. If one preferred quantitative objectives, then one also preferred quantitative ratings, and vice versa.

Principals were generally opposed to expanding PAP to the teaching staffs, not because of disagreement over the setting of individual objectives for teachers, but rather because it would lead to too much paperwork and would never get by the Chicago Teachers' Union. None was eager to "play God" in dispensing merit pay which could lead to charges of favoritism by staffs.

The above would imply that Chicago principals are somewhat timid in employing accepted supervision techniques with teachers. They are not eager to become involved in any techniques which might be viewed as coercive and will strive to avoid favoritism.
at any cost. This timidity might be partially attributed to the fact that almost all principals were themselves Chicago teachers, members of the Chicago Teachers' Union, and perhaps still view themselves as the "head teacher" rather than as the administrator. There is also a parallel here with the previous discussion regarding Boards of Education and performance appraisal. Principals must also decide whether they are going to supervise in a coercive manner with imposed objectives and for which merit pay is a motivator.

This style of leadership does not mean that they must act in a tyrannical manner. Frequently such principals are popular with their staffs because they are benevolent and yet display definite qualities of leadership. There is little question from staffs as to the goals and objectives of the school.

The alternative for principals is to be the democratic leader, who encourages mutual development of goals and objectives. He may be well-liked by staffs, but it can also be frustrating to work for him if he lacks leadership and is indecisive. There is frequently a contradiction between democratic supervision and merit pay programs.

Because of their backgrounds, Chicago principals seem to fall more into the democratic category. As indicated earlier, Chicago principals are not eager to become involved in a merit pay system. Because of the strength of the Chicago Teachers' Union, they prefer to play the "good guy" role and avoid the showing of favoritism. As former Chicago teachers and CTU members, they frequently view themselves more as the "head teacher" rather than as the person responsible for the overall leadership of the school.
Despite their negative reactions to the PAP, none of the interviewed principals or superintendents wanted to return to the former system of having the district superintendent merely give a grade at the end of the year. While principals favored a less structured method of administrative evaluation, most wanted some sort of objectives set for them even if by the district superintendent or in the form of a checklist. This desire for objectives showed that principals favor a management-by-objectives approach to evaluation. They want to be judged upon standards suited to their particular job or school. They do not want a laissez faire approach. They want to be held accountable and they want the district superintendent held accountable for how he evaluated them.

Perhaps the latter was the strongest endorsement of PAP, that is, that no one interviewed wanted to return to the prior method of evaluation. All wanted either PAP or some sort of pre-determined objectives with most wanting those objectives tailored for a particular situation. If interviewees had been asked the question, "Do you like PAP? Yes or no?" most probably would have said "no." But upon closer questioning and analysis, an entirely different response came through. It reminds one of Winston Churchill's famous observation that democracy was the worst form of government ever devised by man - except for every other form of government.

Part II examined the reactions of the five superintendents and eighteen principals concerning twenty-eight plan objectives, technical directives, behavioral objectives, and key elements of the Chicago Performance Appraisal Plan.
The two groups agreed on nineteen of these statements, accepting twelve and rejecting seven. No conclusions could be drawn on nine statements since majorities of each group differed in their responses.

The greatest disagreements between the two groups occurred within Item #1, Improvements in Administration, with four statements accepted by superintendents but rejected by the principals, and one statement accepted by the principals but not by the second interviewed group. Also, within Item #3, Technical Directives, there was disagreement on two statements with the superintendents approving each but the principals rejecting each.

A common thread seems to run through most of these statements. The statements are those for which the superior was most responsible. For example:

- reduces the element of subjectivity
- equitable for all participants
- affords the opportunity for administrators...to communicate more effectively
- the district superintendent has completed his PAP before...and uses it as a guide...
- the principal's accomplishment reports are used by the district superintendent as a basis for planning...

This "common thread" implies that the superintendents might have been somewhat defensive of the jobs they had done in implementing PAP. One might argue, conversely, however, that principals might have been hypercritical of the role of the district superintendents in implementing PAP. All things considered, the extent of agreement between the two groups was remarkable, especially if one discounts
those statements which might have involved an admission of guilt by rejection.

The role of elementary principals and high school principals in involving members of the staff, community and student body in their PAP's was shown to be quite different. This discrepancy implies a quite different mode of communication in one type of school than the other.

Both the former associate superintendent and the Deputy Superintendent gave indications several times that they viewed the implementation of many aspects of the PAP quite skeptically. Both of them, of course, reviewed many of the PAP's of principals and district superintendents. The associate was known as an individual who visited schools quite frequently. Perhaps the Deputy and the former Associate Superintendent did not see the kinds of things being implemented that were being reported on paper.

This lack of confidence on the part of these two superintendents would imply that many principals and district superintendents used the PAP as a method of making themselves and their subordinates "look good", as one principal stated. Another principal said that he "made sure" that he got good results.

Despite all of the many failures to implement the PAP in a technically correct manner, the two strengths of PAP that repeatedly surfaced were an MBO approach to evaluation and the improvement in communications, particularly between district superintendent and principal.

These two strengths again implied that principals and district
superintendents want something concrete upon which to base evaluations and that they also wanted the opportunity to sit down and discuss their problems and their achievements with their superiors. Once again, no one wanted to go back to the former method of the district superintendent merely giving a grade with no required communication.

The fact that the interim review was accepted as a key element by both principals and superintendents and yet district superintendents admitted that interim reviews did not actually take place, presented an interesting contradiction. It could imply that, although the district superintendents favor this element of PAP, they found it too cumbersome, time consuming or unnecessary to implement.

In Part III of Chapter IV the literature disclosed a controversy regarding the question of whether or not performance should be related to salary. The differences seem deep and not likely to be resolved until the more fundamental question of whether a "Theory X" or "Theory Y" atmosphere is more conducive to good performance is resolved (The success of the district superintendent in District X would seem to indicate the former.)

The implication here is that "merit pay" should generally be avoided by large urban Boards of Education unless they are prepared to:

1. Undertake an entirely new method of administrative certification and selection which would emphasize leadership and managerial skills, as opposed to promoting teachers from within.

2. Take on the AFL-CIO, AFT and NEA in a battle to impose merit pay on both administration and teachers.
The task of developing a merit pay system as an equitable process is an almost impossible one unless there is a highly-structured, quantitative system based on specific goals. There are simply too many involved persons to allow any system less structured to be manageable. The best that could be hoped for in a less formal system would be a system of scholarships, as suggested by the Deputy Superintendent, which would not be directly related to performance appraisal and for which no set guidelines would have to be adhered to.

This finding again implies that the Board of Education was naive and over-eager to impose a system of accountability. They did not seem to know the difference between MBO and performance appraisal and implemented the latter first contrary to the accepted literature. Perhaps a more experienced business-oriented Board would have known the difference. Instead, both the Board and the central administration "bought" the entire package (except for salary) from CMP. This naivete and over-eagerness perhaps ruined a good idea for many years to come.

The literature of performance appraisal was non-existent for questions unique to education, such as "improvement of instruction" (Much literature can be found which relates MBO to instruction, but it is usually not considered as a factor in the administrator's performance appraisal scheme). This lack of pertinent literature was not surprising since most relevant literature was found in business sources. This finding raised still another question, however, and that was whether or not Cresap, McCormick, and Paget and the Chicago Board of Education really expected too much of this plan from the
outset. For example, would this one plan actually be able to help administrators plan...more effectively," "identify areas in which assistance from...staff personnel would be helpful," and "result in the improvement of instruction?" Perhaps the plan was handicapped from the beginning by the setting of unrealistic expectations. The literature of business did not seem to expect so many accomplishments from one plan.

The PAP tried to do too much at once. CMP was not experienced in the education field and should not have promised that the plan would result in the improvement of instruction, while at the same time improving general administration. Had the entire project started out more slowly, with realistic objectives, with adequate inservicing and with no salary promises (which were soon changed by the Board of Education), then more success might have been realized. It was simply too easy for many to find fault with the plan, and consequently, the whole thing was never successfully implemented for any prolonged period of time.

The literature also pointed out another pitfall and that was the equating of MBO with performance appraisal. Again, those who expected a program of MBO to grow out of PAP, instead of the reverse, were simply expecting too much.

The implications of this study are that despite years of "bad press" from the Chicago Principals' Association, and a Board of Education that constantly reversed itself and failed to live up to many of its promises, and great resentment and disappointment generated by salary losses, the PAP's objectives were generally
accepted by administrators. Administrators want leadership and they want to be evaluated. They want to be praised for the jobs they are doing and they want to demonstrate in tangible ways their many successes. One can only lament the fact that such an opportunity for real success in the area of administrative evaluation was missed. Will a good plan for performance appraisal have any chance of success for many years to come?

First, Boards of Education must decide if they want a system of imposed specific objectives to which merit pay could be attached. This system is not really performance appraisal since it allows for very little mutual goal-setting. It is coercive, but provides for leadership and frequently gets the best results.

As an alternative, Boards of Education can choose the more democratic performance appraisal system, which provides for more communication and mutual goal-setting. With the strong labor unions of today and with pressures for involvement from many groups, this latter alternative is perhaps the most which large urban school systems can realistically hope for.

Either choice, however, calls for much inserviceing and involvement of the participants in the fundamental goals to be accomplished.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Based on the research and analysis, the following conclusions were drawn:

1. Many years of changes and contradictory practices, and failure to implement the original Cresap, McCormick, and Paget recommendations, resulted in much discontent and confusion among administrators, including those at the superintendent's levels, concerning the Performance Appraisal Plan.

2. Lack of adequate inservice, field-testing, and follow-up contributed to this discontent and confusion.

3. A preoccupation with the salary aspects of the overall plan prevented an objective viewpoint of the Performance Appraisal Plan on the part of the administrators. This was largely due to the Board of Education's tying performance appraisal to administrative compensation at the recommendation of Cresap, McCormick, and Paget. This action was considered unwise by several authors, including McGregor, Knezevich, Levinson, and Gordon along with several of the interviewed superintendents.

4. Despite years of discontent with PAP and a resolution by the Chicago Principals' Association stating that PAP should be abolished, most of the Chicago public school administrators who participated in this study were supportive of the following PAP aspects:
a) Compares actual results to the objectives previously agreed upon.

b) Results in the improvement of instructions.

c) The district superintendent and principal mutually agree upon the latter's objectives.

d) Objectives are set at significant and attainable levels.

e) Principals focus their attention and efforts upon the most basic and critical functions of their positions.

f) Principals look better at their performance in practical terms.

g) Principals channel their primary efforts into those areas where the need is greatest.

h) Management-by-objectives approach to administration.

i) Individual and specific written goals and standards for principals.

j) Interim review and opportunity for revision of goals and standards.

k) Comparison of results to objectives through the accomplishment report.

l) Using the goals and accomplishments of one year to prepare for the next.

5. Among those aspects of PAP rejected by both groups of administrators were the following:

   a) Relates compensation to performance results.

   b) The district superintendent and principal discuss objectives during the school year.

   c) Principals involve members of their staff, community and (high school only) student body in the preliminary identification of programs and plans.

   d) Principals will plan their work more effectively.

   e) Principals will identify areas in which assistance from Central or District staff personnel would be helpful.
f) Participation of community and staff in the formation of goals and standards.

g) Specific numerical ratings.

6. No conclusions could be drawn on nine aspects of PAP. Those which were accepted by the interviewed superintendents, but not by principals were:

a) Reduces the element of subjectivity.
b) Is equitable for all participants.
c) Provides for all principals to improve their performance.
d) Affords the opportunity for principals and their superiors to communicate more effectively.
e) The district superintendent has completed his PAP before meeting with his principals and uses it as a guide for theirs.
f) The principal's accomplishment reports are used by the district superintendent as a basis for planning and assistance in developing new and revised objectives for the following year.
g) Administrators will mutually grow in competency and will communicate more effectively.

That aspect which was accepted by the interviewed principals but not by the superintendents was:

a) Identifies individual needs for training and development as a means of improving the principal's performance.

That aspect in which responses seemed contradictory was:

a) Salary increments tied to performance ratings.

7. The setting of objectives and priorities and the improvement of communications at all levels were important attributes of PAP.

8. The failure of the Board of Education to implement the salary increment portion of the plan and the format and mechanics of
implementing the plan were major faults of PAP.

9. No conclusion could be drawn on whether or not performance appraisal should be extended to the teaching staff.

10. PAP can result in the improvement of instruction if objectives are specific and highly quantitative.

11. Although not in favor of PAP specifically, principals and superintendents want a type of administrative evaluation with pre-set, individual objectives. This same group does not favor a return to the previous system of the district superintendent merely giving a "grade" at the end of the year.

12. School systems, generally, have not made clear distinctions between "Management-by-Objectives" and "performance appraisal for administrators." They are not identical and are often confused. The former should precede the latter.

13. School systems adopting performance appraisal for administrators frequently have done so to use financial rewards as motivation for improved performance.

Recommendations Concerning the Chicago Public Schools

Following are specific recommendations to the Chicago public schools concerning the future of its system of performance appraisal:

1. The General Superintendent should recommend to the Board of Education that a moratorium be declared on further implementation of the Performance Appraisal Plan and all other programs involved with administrative evaluation, e.g., System-Wide Goals and Objectives.
2. A committee, including principals, should be appointed by the General Superintendent to review and report on the total program of Management-by-Objectives for the public schools. This report should include a discussion of the role of administrative evaluation in the total MBO process.

3. The plan for administrative evaluation should be modeled after the present Performance Appraisal Plan with the following changes:
   a) No salary increments should be attached directly to the plan.
   b) Direct community, staff, and student involvement should be dropped.
   c) Specific numerical ratings should be dropped and should be replaced by a more general rating system.
   d) A citywide format or form should be adopted.
   e) Specific quantitative objective-writing must be stressed.
   f) Objectives should be significant and attainable, but possibly not attainable within one year's time.
   g) Objectives should come from the "top down," beginning with published objectives of the General Superintendent for that year (this first phase would include the present System-Wide Goals and Objectives), continuing with the published objectives of the Deputy and district superintendents, and concluding with those of the principal. No phase would begin until the previous phase had been completed.
   h) Adequate inservice must be held, probably during the summer months, when administrators are more free to concentrate on planning matters. This revised plan should be field-tested for at least one year with provisions for principal input and revisions.
   i) Provision should be made for at least one period of midyear review with opportunity for revision.
j) Realistic amounts of time must be allowed for planning and writing objectives for the year. This most important phase cannot be squeezed into the already crowded and distracting months of September and October if this is to be a meaningful exercise. One week of time in the summer could easily be spent by principals being inserviced on the General Superintendent's, Deputy Superintendent's and district superintendent's coordinated objectives, planning programs and objectives for the coming year, discussions with the district superintendent and formulating objectives. One week is a minimal recommendation.

k) Performance appraisal objectives should not necessarily be viewed as the sum total of the administrator's duties for the year. Rather, specific projects might be concentrated upon in given years.

l) Adequate time should also be provided for the review and accomplishment reporting period. Again, this cannot be crowded into the month of June if it is to be of any value. One week at the end of the school year should also be allowed for a report by the General Superintendent, Deputy Deputy Superintendents, and district superintendent on the accomplishment of their annual objectives; reviewing strategies with the district superintendent; reviewing statistical reports such as standardized test scores; discussion of evaluation; and changes planned for the following year. Gordon's recommendation that the accomplishment report from one year not take place at the same meeting should be followed.

4. A program of administrative inservice geared to specific needs of specific administrators should be instituted. The Board of Education's present Administrative University and Management Seminars held at the Center for Urban Education are excellent programs, but they are not geared to specific deficiencies in the backgrounds of specific principals.

5. Each principal should be required to hold a general information, input and reporting session with both his staff and community once per year, if not more frequently. Although there would be no direct relationship between these sessions and PAP, results of these sessions would weigh heavily on the principal's ob-
jectives for the year.

6. After revision and approval by the General Superintendent and the Board of Education, the report of the committee recommended in (2), should be published and distributed to all administrators. Provision should also be made for regular review of the total administrative evaluation process. Any revisions must be approved by the General Superintendent and the Board of Education and copies distributed to all administrators.

7. Consideration should be given to a program of "Principal Scholarships" to reward outstanding principals. Rewards might take the form of monetary bonuses, sabbatical study leaves to participate in special programs, involvement in special summer institutes, etc. Recognition should be given primarily to those principals making outstanding gains in instruction and student achievement, the mission of the Chicago public schools.

8. Above all, coercive elements, such as salary increments, must be removed from the process of Management-by-Objectives and performance appraisal. The goal of administrative evaluation should be improved performance through mutual growth. In this way only shall we enhance the welfare of children, our sole educational commodity.
Recommendations Concerning Other Urban School Systems Interested in Instituting a System of Performance Appraisal for Administrators

1. Schools should seek to learn from the successes and mistakes of other systems such as that of Chicago. The recommendations of Gordon would be particularly helpful.

2. Such school systems should begin with a limited, but highly specific, program of management-by-objectives. A decision should be made on eventual goals for this system of MBO. Later, a decision should be made on whether this system or some phase of it, should be used for administrative evaluation.

3. Salary increments should not be attached directly to any administrative evaluation plan, especially in a larger, less personal and more bureaucratic school system. Past experiences have shown that salary increments will become the end in themselves, rather than the program of MBO or the improvement of performance. School systems might consider rewards, monetary or otherwise, for outstanding administrators, but these should not be a direct result of performance appraisal.

4. Although outside consultants might be used on an advisory basis, the final plan for performance appraisal should be formulated at the local level with participation by representatives of the group being evaluated. Imposition of a plan by outside consultants or by district staff will cause resentment and "foot-dragging" on the part of those being evaluated.
5. It is always best that such programs be introduced at the suggestion of those being evaluated rather than by school boards.

6. At all times, the confidentiality of personal records and evaluations on specific personnel must be preserved.

7. Care should be taken that, in the spirit of improving performance, objectives do not stifle the principal, but encourage his professional growth. For this reason, objectives should be identified as "maintenance," "high-risk," or "creative."

8. Provisions should be made in any performance appraisal for regular communications between the principal and his superior, including reviews of objectives and the opportunity for revisions of objectives.

9. Provisions should also be included for appeals of performance appraisal decisions and a grievance procedure.

10. Provisions should also be included for a document outlining specific performance appraisal procedures, including system-wide forms and timelines. It is especially important that adequate time be allowed in the school calendar at both the beginning and end of the appraisal period.

11. Stress should be placed on highly specific and quantitative objectives, rather than vague, difficult-to-evaluate objectives.

12. It is unrealistic to attempt to write objectives whose sum total is all-inclusive of the duties of a principal in an urban school. Therefore, objectives should be aimed at specific problems or projects for that appraisal period or at long-range projects.
13. In a true MBO/performance appraisal situation, objectives must come from the "top down." Therefore, a provision should be made for written objectives beginning at the highest administrative level, followed by succeeding line administrators through the principal.

14. Provision must also be made for adequate inservicing and field-testing before the plan is put into effect. This phase of the program cannot be rushed.

15. Special inservice should also be provided for those administrators in need of specific help.

16. Although direct staff and community participation can be threatening, impractical, and could destroy principal-supervisor confidentiality, some provision should also be made for staff and community input on an advisory basis. It is hoped that this procedure would already be present in all schools.

17. Finally, the goal of school systems should be a humanistic system of administrative evaluation whose objective is the improvement of performance. This goal cannot be accomplished by using relatively small amounts of money as a coercive force. It can be accomplished through a spirit of mutual growth, sharing of strengths and resources, and an over-riding concern for the education and welfare of children.

Recommendations for Future Research

The following are recommended as topics for future research:
1. A study of the effects of salary on performance in a non-profit oriented profession, such as educational administration.

2. A study of the use of performance appraisal as a method of teacher evaluation. Great care must be taken, however, in stressing that this study would be for the purpose of improving performance and would not be used as a weapon of coercion. For this reason, it is suggested that all participation be voluntary.

3. An annual on-going study of the new "modified" PAP as defined in the Manual for Long-Range Planning. This study could be designed as a hierarchial study of administrators, similar to this study.
Summary of the Study

This study sought to analyze and make recommendations concerning the Performance Appraisal Plan of the Board of Education of the City of Chicago. More specifically, the study sought to determine the PAP's effectiveness in terms of its original objectives, to determine whether or not the plan was implemented as described in the Board of Education manual, to determine whether it followed guidelines for performance appraisal as recommended in the literature, and to make recommendations for performance appraisal for administrators in Chicago, as well as other urban school systems.

The author interviewed a hierarchical sample of principals, district superintendents, an associate superintendent and the Deputy Superintendent. The two groups (principals and superintendents) were in substantial agreement that twelve objectives or aspects of the PAP had been successful, while seven objectives or aspects had not been successful. No conclusions could be drawn on nine others.

Undermining the entire plan were the negative attitudes resulting from the Board of Education's failure to implement the salary aspects of the plan as originally recommended and promised. Also, the notable lack of sound inservicing and field-testing produced much discontent and confusion.

Despite these negative aspects, however, principals and superintendents still favored a Management-by-Objectives approach to administrative evaluation. Not one individual interviewed
expressed a desire to return to the previous system of the supervisor merely giving a "grade" at the end of the year.

In one district where the superintendent demanded highly quantitative objectives directly related to instruction, the principals admitted an improvement in their reading achievement.

The literature supported the administrators' conclusions, but raised more fundamental questions. The question of salary's relation to performance seems unlikely to be answered until McGregor's "Theory X" versus "Theory Y" question is resolved. Also, there was a question of whether the Board of Education expected too much of this one plan. The objectives might have been overly ambitious.

Finally, many school boards and businessmen wrongly equate MBO and performance appraisal. The former should precede the latter, although in education, the reverse seems to be more prevalent. This might account for much of the negativism.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPROVAL SHEET

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The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Education.

Date: December 3, 1980

Director's Signature: [Signature]