A Buberian Critique of Four Curriculum Theorists

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A BUBERIAN CRITIQUE OF FOUR CURRICULUM THEORISTS

by

Paul R. Feinberg

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

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I dedicate this dissertation to Tania M., Uri, and Ariella Feinberg, whose strengths and kindnesses helped bring my efforts to fruition.
VITA

The author, Paul R. Feinberg, is the son of Milton A. Feinberg and Danessa (Bachrach) Feinberg. He was born March 30, 1943, in New York City.

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Paul R. Feinberg is married to the former Tania Miliner of Montevideo, Uruguay; they have two children, Uri M. Feinberg and Ariella N. Feinberg.
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A. Purpose

This study will analyze four contemporary curriculum thinkers in relation to the educational views of Martin Buber. The reconceptualist theorists are James Macdonald, Dwayne Huebner, Maxine Greene, and William Pinar. These four persons are commonly concerned with how knowledge is communicated in education. While they offer different points of view, they all address the problem of rational discourse, the spoken metaphor, aesthetics, and intuition as ways of implementing communication through the curriculum.

The specific purpose of this study is to examine the unique personal perspective Martin Buber brings to curriculum criticism and to link this perspective with the above four reconceptualists.

This study also will investigate the possibility of dialogue as a means of discovering more about ourselves in relationship to our larger worlds. The dialogue facilitates encounters among one another and heightens anticipation of discovery within nature.

Dialogue in education implies the possibility of the experience of transcendence. It is one facet of consciousness which is nurtured by human experience, but refers to a limitless passing beyond any material condition or conception. Most importantly, within the act of dialogue
two persons learn to mutually enlarge and refine the scope of their inquiry into new sources of knowledge. The capacity to reach towards another human being is evidence of a degree of transcendence. Certain types of curricular discourse focus on dialogue as a means of freeing the cognitive and affective faculties. While those who reconceptualize the curriculum hesitate to speak of cause and effect, they put value on self-knowledge that surfaces somewhere in the process. For Buber, however, all worthwhile learning is in relationship. "Self-knowledge" is misleading, and even is an obstacle.

Knowledge comes from a variety of sources. We have seen, for example, that though society builds schools, it still educates the young through family, ritual, or training. As society becomes more complex, however, schools become increasingly important. As the frontiers of knowledge and learning expand, the young are motivated to obtain more formal education through the schools. The curriculum of this institution provides a framework for organizing the skills and rituals that the society wants to renew and pass on to the future generations.

This study will also examine some of the critiques of traditional notions of schooling in light of reconceptualization and Martin Buber. The traditional curriculum theoreticians talk a great deal about the problems of returning the person to curriculum, that is, of making the education of all students more humane. However, a good deal of this well-intentioned, principled talk is ill conceived. Educators are still unduly influenced by the behavioral, scientific and technological modes of inquiry. These modes of thought and action are not always conducive
for humane relationships between learner and teacher. They reflect a means-ends rationale that calls for manipulation of variables designed to arrive at a desired end. A cause and effect interaction is assumed, which is the antithesis of the curricular priorities of the reconceptualists. The reconceptualists approach curriculum as an act of critical self-reflection on personal and social issues in relation to particular social content being investigated. This study will locate the resources for implementing a more fully human, personal educational process.

B. The Significance of This Study

This study shows the ways in which Martin Buber's philosophy coincides with some of the contentions of the reconceptualists; differences are also shown; to the author's best knowledge, no other study has shown this relationship. The study will attempt to show the liabilities of theorizing based on empirical and behavioral models. Moreover, reconceptualization claims to be able to show the diminishing returns of technology applied to make education, specifically learning, "efficient."

Proposals for changed conceptions do not take place in a vacuum or on an ad hoc basis. Those who are reconceptualizing the field of curriculum proceed with a historical perspective. There is an on-going inquiry into the theories and practices that characterize earlier generations of curricular specialists. For example, reconceptualists point out that Ralph Tyler proposed a rationale for theorizing over thirty years ago. His rationale consisted of certain inputs and outputs;
curriculum resulted from rational deliberation about means and ends. Current theorists are not unaware of Tyler's search for values, or advice sought from subject matter professionals. But with this in mind, reconceptualists suggest that Tyler's concern for the full person is restricted by certain narrow focuses: Tyler does not adequately show an appreciation of the fact that the students and teacher approach the curriculum with biases and idiosyncrasies. These are also important "inputs" that the Tyler rationale does not adequately consider, but should. The whole student is a fully feeling creature, not an abstraction. It is a "real" person one encounters in a classroom.

The significant contributions of reconceptual theorists go beyond historical critique. They offer what William Pinar has called a "post-critical" response. It is based on a variety of social and intellectual traditions: phenomenology, existentialism, psychoanalysis, Marxism, and Eastern philosophies such as Zen.

These traditions do not contain panaceas; curriculum theorists cannot simply be scholars of these disciplines but must be scholars in the use of the traditions as well. The traditions are sources and sensitizers; they provide us with intellectual, psychological, and spiritual stimulation—"grist for the mill." These traditions, spiritual and intellectual, provoke a new basis for ideas and sensations of our very own. We investigate them in order to re-think and re-feel our assumptions about the political, economic, and social milieu we inhabit. The real significance of the four curricularists and Martin Buber is that they help us to articulate frustration with behavioral or scientific
patterns of learning; they then offer a person-centered approach to learning as opposed to a subject-centered approach.

What distinguishes this research is the breadth and depth of reconceptualist inquiry in relation to Martin Buber. Having critically examined historical precedents in curriculum writing, one recognizes a variety of as yet untapped energies: psychological, spiritual, aesthetic, and intellectual. As human beings we function most fully when we accept that the sources of our being are rooted in two worlds: the objective world of what is seen and heard, tasted, felt, and the spiritual, intuitive world of the unseen. Through language we communicate to one another these objective and intuitive worlds.

This study provides new insights into the limitations, successes and possibilities of language for curricular discourse. The reconceptualists alert us to the fact that modes of communication, in this case language, reflect basic interests that humans share. The empirical and behavioral models geared to means and ends have certainly affected our schools. Now, however, the reconceptualists and Buber suggest a pursuit of knowledge nurtured from a variety of interests. The aesthetic and ethical are two basic human interests that get little explicit consideration through our present curricula. But this condition is liable to change once we squarely face the falsely assumed dichotomy between the objective and the spiritual elements of human existence. This study seeks to locate and describe the possibility of unity between the objective and spiritual worlds.
C. Terminology and Delimitations

This study focuses on four curricular theorists, from among those identified with reconceptualization. The selection was based on similarities and interrelationships with regard to ideology, social-political concern, aesthetic and personal modes of communication. The study develops a comprehensive critical and descriptive analysis of their major works. Their views will be compared and contrasted with Buber's contentions about education through dialogue. An imaginary symposium has been "convened" in which these five persons address themselves to two major issues in curriculum: The role of subject matter content and process as alternative foci for the curriculum. Also, what function does the teacher serve? What is the nature of student-teacher relationships?

This research is not geared to providing any readymade, field-tested curricula. Rather one is called upon to re-think personal values, interests, and tacit knowledge. The theorist provides the educator with the sources by which an evaluation can be made.

The work of the four theorists who provoke us to rethink values and strategies does not allow facile labeling. Educators have not agreed upon an all-inclusive definition of reconceptualization. Generally the term refers to a variety of non-behavioral, non-empirical critiques and suggestions for new curricular directions which are highly personalized; the student functions as an emotional and spiritual as well as intellectual creature.

Martin Buber's formulation of the dialogical principle substantiates and expands some of these critiques and new directions. His
philosophy recognizes and articulates the polarity of our world and seeks to make connections. The core of his philosophical stance is a search for unity: between two persons, between a person and nature, and between a person (as matter and spirit) and Spirit. (This is defined as the process leading to I-Thou.) It is this search for unity which will be explored in the writings of the four curricularists.
CHAPTER II

Part I: MODELS AND CRITIQUES

Introduction

This chapter is subdivided into three parts. It begins as an historical overview of the curriculum field. A critical analysis will then describe the state of much of the field today. Because so much of curriculum is rationally and technologically oriented, emphasis is given to traditional notions of science and its applications. The third section is devoted to a newer group of theorists, identified as reconceptualists, for whom traditional social science paradigms are inappropriate for an expanded person-centered model of curriculum theorizing. The last part of the chapter will cite some of their perspectives and points of departure as an introduction to the work of four representative writers.

Much of what will be said about the early foundations and figures of the field applies to the contemporary scene. Mazza's doctoral research substantiates that "scientific curriculum-making initiated a technological model for the curriculum field that has become the dominant tradition throughout its roughly sixty year history, despite the existence of other approaches to curriculum."\(^1\) Schubert's historical

treatment of curriculum for the last eighty years also concurs that recipe-orientations were the norm "... despite admonitions by such writers as Bode, Rugg, and Hopkins to engage in serious and complex discourse about assumptions that undergird alternative positions on major curriculum questions."²

The small minority who opt for a reconceptualization of the field grew up in these earlier traditions. Their observations, then, are based on both historical and ideological consideration of the status quo. A separate presentation of four curriculum theorists will provide a necessary link between the main emphases of the contemporary field and the contributions of Martin Buber.

A. Some Historical Antecedents and Directions in Knowledge Organization

American social and intellectual tradition is rooted in challenges to the status quo, increased movement of the common person up the social ladder with more open educational opportunity than was available in Europe. The scientific advances of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were soon joined to the cause of social improvement. One of the great pre-Civil War leaders of public schooling, Horace Mann, had nurtured and propogated the ideal of the school as an instrument of universal progress. Cremin has stated: "Mann understood well the relationship between freedom, self government, and universal education.

Like Jefferson he believed that freedom could rest secure only as free men had the knowledge to make intelligent decisions. 3

Efforts to scientifically organize and systematize knowledge were boosted by Darwin's explorations and biological classifications. His work in the sciences had direct implications for the fields of sociology and education. Evolution theorized how the species came to be; new data allowed the researcher to hypothesize in which directions it ought to travel in order to develop its talents, thus surviving and advancing.

Herbert Spencer, who published his theory of evolution before Darwin, felt that the survival of the species hinged on the proper synthesis of knowledge around key social processes. Spencer scientifically organized his structure around a series of activities ranging from self-preservation to those engaged in as part of leisure. 4

Classical liberals like Darwin and Spencer and progressives like Mann utilized and advanced the methods of empirical science. For example, in 1892 a muckraking journalist, pediatrician Joseph Rice, wrote about the disorganized public school system, professionally mismanaged and politically tainted. 5 The ignorance of new scientific methodologies on the part of the professional educator convinced Rice to expand his journalistic broadsides and organizational activity. Progressive education demanded clarity of purpose, substantiated by well-articulated methods and rationally designed means for evaluation. Rugg


goes on to document how empirically oriented studies of time efficiency, standardization of subjects, and formal discipline—as opposed to vivid understanding—dominated curriculum work in the latter part of the nineteenth century.6

One outcome of the joining of new scientific methodologies and progressive social concerns was the formation of educational commissions to rationally organize the schools. The National Education Association appointed committees to derive principles that would guide and structure secondary and elementary education. Their efforts certainly shaped the slope of curricular work for decades with a means-ends orientation.

Kliebard finds a landmark in publication of the NEA's Seven Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education.7 The seven principles were geared to identifying the social requirements of American youth, the basic skills, activities, and conditions of life for progress in the American democratic milieu. Harris had originally spoken of education as a process of elevating the neophyte member into the species;8 Dewey later restated this need, in the context of a pronounced faith in democratic ideals for creating the proper environment: "... there is the necessity that the immature members be not merely physically preserved


in adequate numbers, but that they be initiated into the interests, purposes, information, skill and practices of the mature members . . . education and education alone spans the gap." ⁹

Franklin Bobbit theorized about curriculum as a series of variables made up of ends and means. It is likely that his perspective developed from the original Latin meaning of the word curriculum, a race course or race. ¹⁰ In other words, it was a setting, a place of events which must be experienced in a certain order to provide a foundation for functioning in adult life. He suggested the analogy of a process whose starting and finishing points were unequivocably delineated.

William Kilpatrick spoke of "purposeful activity: the complete act . . . a mind-set-to-an-end [which] implies consciousness besides." ¹¹ Here was a thorough implementation of the ideal of selective readiness through a project method. Experts outside the school were consulted to determine the most fitting exercises based on a thorough analysis of society's needs.

Kilpatrick was one of a group of progressive educators who joined together at Teachers College of Columbia University to pursue education and social justice. The work of other progressives like George Counts, John Childs, John Dewey and Harold Rugg reflected America's growing


infatuation with scientific methodologies and provided meaningful qualifications in the name of humane purpose.

Rugg followed Dewey in articulating education's reforming task of reconstructing experience. However, Dewey opted for a more open-ended approach: "The criterion for all educational and public endeavor was growth; it has no end beyond itself." \(^{12}\)

Rugg took issue with what he deemed to be the excessive open-endedness of Dewey's approach. The latter's instrumentalism lacked a cohesive framework. Rugg identified crucial problems, organizing academic materials into thoroughly integrated courses, rather than separate subjects. One observer has commented on his approach, saying, "Rugg's method seems an eminently sensible one for achieving his desired objectives, namely to alert students to the fact that all is not well in the social order and to start them thinking critically about possible improvements." \(^{13}\)

George Counts also advocated active intervention in the educational process in order to redress social inequities within the larger society. Goals were vague, haphazardly set, individually oriented. A more systematic set of inputs by knowledgeable authorities was required. He became very frustrated with "... social platitudes coined in the days of agrarian culture ..." \(^{14}\) and agitated for a centralized,

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\(^{12}\) Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, p. 62


active implementation of some of these ideals, for instance, democracy and worthy citizenship. Indoctrination of rugged individualism, for example, would not suffice. American society had to be reformed.

... a society which is dominated less by the thought of individual advancement and more by certain far-reaching purposes and plans for social construction might find a firmer and more steadfast mentality desirable. ... Americans ... are becoming completely victimized and molded by the mechanics of industrialism.\(^{15}\)

Education had to be purposeful, which implied a substantial guidance from informed, technically and humanely concerned persons. The school, however, was but one of a variety of influential institutions for helping to reconstruct a new society based on social welfare. A certain amount of ideological imposition would be expected in implementing this new role for the school. Social science techniques would render the techniques for ascertaining the best solutions to problems besetting a depression era America. Science afforded a rationally based means of living within rather than at the mercy of the forces of nature and society.

Whitehead, while acknowledging the creative impulse of the young, argued that organized thought determines organized action. "Logic, properly used, does not shackle thought. It gives freedom, and above all, boldness."\(^{16}\) Science, moreover, provides the necessary framework and method of inquiry for linking our logical thought and ordinary everyday sensibilities. Knowledge improves experience as the result of interaction between person and environment. According to Whitehead,

\(^{15}\)Ibid., p. 188.

ignorance is bondage to that environment. Knowledge has practical utility, and via scientifically based experimentalism, will assure and insure opportunity to make the most constructive choices.

The dominant educational philosophy of the 1930s owed much to Dewey, though others such as John Childs, gave ample expression, too. Childs based much of his theory on American pragmatism, and the ability to identify reasonable humane alternatives in any given situation.

"Even the principles and the 'laws' of science are subject to this continuing test, for ultimate authority rests not with particular findings . . . but rather with the empirical and cooperative procedures by which meanings are formulated, clarified and tested."17

As a result of the Great Depression Childs' critical approach had sufficient opportunity to be developed in a plan called the Eight Year Study. The principles of problem solving were to be implemented in a coordinated fashion by all teachers in a school, while a total of thirty secondary schools experimentally redesigned their curricula. College entrance for those participating was to be directly related to the project. Detailed coordinated planning and evaluation had determined that "the curriculum is now seen as the total experience with which the school deals in educating young people."18

The Eight Year Study was perhaps the most prominent national project of the post-World War I era. As the sponsoring agency, the Progressive  

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Education Association felt that an experimental basis for the curriculum could only be effected through cooperation between the university and secondary school. The PEA received the consent of thirty high schools and over three hundred colleges to experiment with a variety of curricular options with regard to content and organization of material. The stated purpose was to enable greater awareness for understanding the social and scientific aspects of the world into which secondary students were graduating. In an attempt to stimulate self-direction and bring youth's concerns closer to real life, a variety of approaches were experimentally devised. There were, for example, core curricula—a broad fields organization of subjects. The study set a precedent not only for institutionalized reforms but also for their scientific systematic evaluations.

During World War II the needs of student and society were investigated and listed as a basis for curriculum reform in *Education for All American Youth*. The needs were based on purposes that included practical knowledge of the economic system. This led to efficient work, health improvement, realizing the significance of the family, good use of leisure time, and aesthetic, rational, and ethical appreciations. Additionally, the report of the Harvard Committee on the Objectives of a General Education in a Free Society, chaired by James Conant,

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advocated extensive exposure to great themes in the humanities through a comprehensive interdependent curriculum. Conant hoped that the renewed search for relevance (for society and youth) would not result in mere training as opposed to education. Competence, termed "back to basics" in the 1980s, needed qualification: for what purpose? One response might be: the fully functioning, affectively and cognitively motivated student is the foremost reason for a school's existence. Moreover, Conant's recommendation for the comprehensive high school strengthened the contentions of those who argued for a greater democratizing function of secondary education.

There were a number of attempts to help the teacher systematically guide such a comprehensive education. Selecting and organizing objectives and content, identification of activity and means of evaluation reflect the prominent technological bias of the society in the late 1940s and today. Tyler's syllabus provided an underlying philosophy for his rationale, organized around four key questions. He asked about the purposes of the school, the experiences needed to assure their attainment, their appropriate organization, and means of evaluation for verifying the degree of systematic interaction. The attempt to introduce rational, logical sequence to order the educational process reflected the efforts of earlier progressive thinking. By making such basic but profound all-encompassing inquiries, Tyler hoped to account for all the variables involved in developing a systematic relevant curriculum. Taba assumes a certain logical order, too, in which decisions

are made; she proceeds with her own seven steps "to make sure that all relevant considerations are brought to bear on these decisions." The system—involving diagnosis of needs, setting forth of ensuing objectives, content, experiences, and evaluations—is highly rational and purposefully comprehensive. Learning could be structured once one knew the reasons for which certain knowledge was to be pursued.

It was clear that as the country approached and passed into the era of Sputnik, more structured models for knowledge organization and curriculum design appeared at all levels from primary to college. Inquiry discovery methods, equated with induction, spurred new interest in disciplinarity. Separate bodies of knowledge could be integrated by unifying reconceptions, though Schwab offered one caveat: "there are no data from which to conclude decisively that eventually all the disciplines will become or should become one."23

The era was inundated with new proposals for science and mathematics educational reform. Empirical and logical, these disciplines could provide the model for all learning areas. Youngsters would inquire into the structures of their subjects, as if they were scientists, uncovering and discovering new relationships between variables. The challenge to America's pride as the intellectual scientific giant was now met with a reemphasis on technical skills. Bruner, a renowned psychologist, led a seminar on curriculum at Woods Hole which was dominated

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by mathematics and science people. Bruner, in offering a "spiraling curriculum," suggested that each subject had a structure, the inner workings of which could be grasped by rational inquiry and experimentation. Such knowledge would facilitate a general transfer of new information, thereby increasing in a "spiraling" fashion the level of a student's comprehension. 24

B. Behavioral Objectives and Evaluation

Not only was there a structure to each subject or discipline, but the learning process itself could also be similarly analyzed. Bloom systematized levels of performance in a taxonomy of intended behaviors. 25 He also recognized that the actual performance of a task at a later period in one's life may differ from observed skills at the end of a learning period. Moreover, one key ingredient is his expressed neutrality in designing this taxonomy. According to Bloom, "It is outside the scope of the task we set ourselves to properly treat the matter of determining the appropriate value to be placed on the different degrees of achievement of the objectives of instruction." 26 Bloom's cognitive taxonomy, consisting of a six-step hierarchy ranging from knowledge to evaluation, is paralleled by a five-point classification of affective processes, ranging from receiving to value characterization.


26 Ibid., p. 13.
Mauritz Johnson argued that the essence of curriculum is recognizable objectives. The curriculum prescribes that instruction should result in attainable learning products. In recent years educators have seriously expanded behaviorally oriented curriculum writing in the context of back-to-basics. Ornstein has cited Gallup Polls of Phi Delta Kappa from 1975 to 1979 that substantiate the high priority the public gives to this concept.

Nevertheless, the term "basics" in and of itself tells little since there are basics that far outreach a simplistic recounting of the three R's. Ben Brodinsky does find from his observation that testing, accountability, and minimal competencies are increasingly associated with the basics. However, selecting a representative sample of widely-held responses to the "basics question," Brodinsky uncovers a myth about "basics." "Back to basics? Look, we're moving forward to basics. We're broadening our basics to teach children to think, analyze problems, make wise decisions, develop confidence in themselves. As for the three R's, why return when we've never left them?"

The leading representatives of the behavioral objectives movement are agreed that in and of themselves, such target-setting is no panacea. As with any technique or philosophy, success depends on underlying


influencing motivations. For example, Baker and Popham even speak about
the need to "'humanize' the use of instructional objectives" by directly
involving students in a needs assessment approach.30

Plowman accepts the need for accuracy in judgment, difficult to
obtain without behavioral guidelines, but he also argues that affective
concern rates equally high attention.31 Comparing the ability to be
trustworthy and to add six five-digit numbers, he says,

Under most circumstances it would seem more important to be honest
and reliable, a goal which becomes more meaningful when translated
into observable and measurable functions. This translation is neces­
sary if objectives are to be of diagnostic, prescriptive, and evalu­
ative value in directing and assessing learning.32

Payne, too, makes it clear that the most sophisticated objective
setting and evaluation measures may not really reveal the fullest range
of interests or values.33 Moreover, major behaviorists such as Mager34
and Kibler35 are concerned with attitudinal value attainments which can
be observed by inference. Though the exactitude of cognitive and psy­
chomotor measurement is missing in this affective domain, knowledge is

30 Eva L. Baker and W. James Popham, Expanding Dimensions of
pp. 15-17.

31 Paul Plowman, Behavioral Objectives (Chicago: Science Research

32 Ibid., p. xxvii.

33 David A. Payne, The Specification and Measurement of Learning

34 Robert F. Mager, Preparing Instructional Objectives, 2nd ed.
(Belmont, Cal.: Fearon, 1975), pp. 102-104.

35 Robert J. Kibler, Larry L. Barker, and David T. Miles,
Behavioral Objectives and Instruction (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1970),
pp. 55-66.
assimilated and utilized in ways noted other than by physical or mechanical performances. Making ethical choices does imply the capability to judge actions based on reflected experiences or applied cognitive knowledge. Krathwohl admits the difficulty of framing objectives and proceeding with evaluation based on the same behavioral categorization of cognitive learning. It seems best to him to account for the affective phenomenon via the "processes of internalization. . . . It has many elements in common with the term socialization." 36

The setting of objectives requires the design of evaluational methods. Measurement technique is traced to Robert Thorndike, who early in the 1900s convinced educators that human change could efficiently and effectively be measured and evaluated. Moreover, there was a political pride in national excellence. Following World War II the public demanded an upgrading of all skills and deepening knowledge on all fronts so that youth could more efficiently compete in the modern world. The Harvard Report reflected this national priority. Curriculum diversity had to be balanced by interdependent studies to strengthen the forces for unity, a dominant national goal.

The evaluation of the nation's schools in the post-World War II era had stimulated greater concern for technology in an increasingly interdependent world. The public became more sensitized to the issue of evaluation in the wake of large expenditures of federal aid to

education. The launching of Sputnik in 1957 brought about the National Defense Education Act and the establishment of the National Science Foundation—geared to the acceleration of scientific and technical curriculum development. The large expenditures involved in this new educational competition with the Russians demanded precise evaluation of the programs to see the extent massive reform was realized. Evaluation became an industry within an industry. Educational progress had to be tracked. It was believed that only through systematic evaluation would worthwhile changes be effected in curriculum. Objective investigation provided the ideal means.

Cronbach speaks of the ideal evaluation of proficiency that goes beyond selected outcomes of a certain curricular focus. Moreover, ratings ought to be made throughout the course sequence.\(^{37}\) Stake expands Cronbach's distinctions, emphasizing formal objective categories of measurement and explaining the differences between contingency (the relationships among variables such as antecedents, transactions, and outcomes) and consequence (the degree to which the intended antecedents, transactions, and outcomes come to pass). Informal subjective measures do not adequately provide for the priorities of Stake—rational judgments and descriptions.\(^{38}\)

Stufflebeam has attempted to provide a total evaluation model. He bases his argument on distinct types of decision-making settings,

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processes and types of evaluation. Stufflebeam's contribution is quite useful for the practitioner in that there is cyclical feedback. Continuous information is provided the decision maker.

These various evaluation strategies are integrally involved with the taxonomies of learning objectives. The ability to construct systematic designs such as Bloom's taxonomy implies that knowledge can be organized around structures logically and rationally identified. From its inception the curriculum field has attempted to clarify the nature and organization of knowledge of cultural inheritance. It has focused on the relationship between that knowledge and ways of knowing. Scientific discovery has been integral to a vast array of changes in the field of curriculum. Bronowski suggests why:

The purpose of science is to describe the world in an orderly scheme or language which will help us look ahead. . . . The order is what we find to work, conveniently and instructively. It is not something we stipulate; it is not something we can dogmatize about. It is what we find; it is what we find useful.40

Evaluation as a sub-field of curriculum has developed out of a need for exact measurement. Nevertheless, the issue of ascertaining the results of certain ways of inquiry is not completely resolved in favor of logical positivistic models. As this study will show in an analysis of The State of the Field, there are also strong humanistic considerations to creating a course of study and its method of evaluation. There


is more discussion about the place of inspiration, personal knowing, and transcendence in curriculum.

Science is a multi-faceted phenomenon. One must keep this in mind in designing any evaluational measure. "'We are a scientific civilization,' declared Jacob Bronowski. 'That means a civilization in which knowledge and its integrity are crucial. Science is only a Latin word for knowledge. . . . Knowledge is our destiny.'"\textsuperscript{41}

Part II: THE STATE OF THE FIELD

Introduction

The historical inquiry into the scope of the curriculum field since the turn of the twentieth century should provide a satisfactory perspective for viewing the present day scene. A logical positivistic scientific rationale had prescribed the dominant approach to curriculum then and persists to this day. The first part of this analysis of the state of the field will focus on contemporary critiques of a situation already known to exist. It is basically a reiteration of the theme already noted and personalities already cited although from a sharpened point of view.

This dominant tradition, nevertheless, is confronted by rejuvenated concern for the student-as-person, a chief participant in curriculum making. The reconceptualists have based their challenge of a variety of intellectual, psychological, and spiritual traditions. They have sought to expand the bounds of scientific theory related to knowing.

Following a brief delineation of the contemporary field, the study will proceed with some notions about the expanded boundaries of science. Based on this one key rationale of the newer theorists, the inquiry will lead into a formal introduction to reconceptualization of curriculum studies.

A. The Scientific-Technocratic Orientation

In attempting to counter the argument that the curriculum field has been nonhistorical, Kliebard has attempted to give us necessary orientation for the present.

The production model and the utilitarian criterion applied to all school subjects over the past half century will constitute our fundamental frame of reference. The coming of modern technology, rather than freeing us from the earlier formulations, has served instead only to reinforce or restrict them further. The task of the next fifty years in the curriculum field is essentially one of developing alternatives.42

Authorities use various yardsticks for measuring the scope and depth of the field. What all seem to have in common is that the vast majority of curriculum workers have a utilitarian bias reinforced explicitly or implicitly by technical orientation. This focus will be evident in the analyses of the field by two noted theorists.

Macdonald suggests three recognizable groups performing curriculum work today: 1) those for whom theory prescribes and guides; 2) those for whom it serves to empirically validate identifiable

variables; and 3) those for whom it serves as criticism.  

William Pinar delineates the field in another fashion:

1) traditionalists, [who] have tended to be concerned about principles guiding curriculum; . . . 2) conceptual-empiricists argue that their research functions to serve school practitioners. By creating a science of curriculum, the traditional aspiration of the field can be realized . . . ; 3) reconceptualists [according to Macdonald] "look upon their task of theorizing as a creative intellectual endeavor . . . a more playful, free floating process is called for by the state of the art."  

1. The Traditional Field of Curriculum

Macdonald and Pinar are apparently in agreement that the foremost function of theory in the curriculum field today is to provide a rational framework for determining goals, means, and ends. In this case it refers to the day to day learning going on in a school. Pinar's designation of "traditionalists" will henceforth be used; he cites several for us: Taba; the Tanners; Saylor and Alexander; McNeil; Zais; Smith, Stanley, and Shores; Stratemeyer; and Doll.  

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The traditionalists have really not been theoretical in the technical sense of the word. Those such as Tyler have exemplified the outside-expert syndrome. While research is not foreign to their preparation, their major task is providing a framework or theme helping to unite disparate elements that the practitioners try to organize. The traditionalists' work could either be knowledge- or process-oriented.

The practical utilitarian bent today can be explained by the progressive origins of the field. We recall an earlier inquiry by Kliebard that revealed "a drive toward a supremely functional curriculum largely oriented toward socially useful knowledge and skills." Basically this has been the ameliorative function of curriculum. While investigations and surveys such as the Eight Year Study were implemented under the guise of scientific objectivity, much traditionalist effort was weighted to a conscious liberal change in the social order. The influx of large numbers of immigrants had necessitated massive alterations in the ways academic and economic priorities were set and evaluations carried out in America's schools. Concern for the immigrant student has been replaced today by concern for the new immigrant to the cities, the disadvantaged and bilingual students. Tyler's rational deliberation was extended by Goodlad and Richter, though values for them are more than mere screens as they are for Tyler; they are initial points of departure in


determining to what extent society, learner, and subject matter are sources of curriculum.

The Tyler Rationale hinges on its delineation of objectives. But here evaluation links up ends and means in a rather mechanical fashion; according to Kliebard the manipulation of learning opportunities to reach certain end experiences may not show full appreciation for a student's human capability. 48

Designs, on the other hand, clearly have the purpose to guide or prescribe certain optimally perceived values. Such an approach ought to more fully develop this human valuing capability. Whether dealing with subject matter, social phenomena, or people, the designs selected will reflect the problems of practical decision-making in the school and society at large. 49 Ornstein's recent survey of the field has identified various value approaches according to one of two categories: emphasis on subject or emphasis on student. 50 Designs are value statements which have appeared in a variety of forms throughout the history of the curriculum movement. Today, however, only the subject design is prominent, the core, fusion, correlation, and broad fields forms having become passe.

The logical sequencing of knowledge in the general subject curriculum was not deemed an adequate approach in a sophisticated world.

More synthesis among areas of knowledge was demanded. The correlation, fusion and broad fields approaches of the 1930s and 1940s reflected the specialized viewpoints on knowledge and knowing. But sophisticated curriculum conceptualizations did not necessarily meet the criteria of relevance. The core curriculum was, however, geared to social and personal relevance. Two variations emerged from the Progressive era--the open core and the closed or preplanned core. As a curriculum which stressed common learnings and specific problem solvings, the core--especially the open variety--gave a great deal of latitude to student initiative and personal concern. But the increased emphasis on disciplinarity and the decline of the Progressive influence upon curriculum in the 1950s minimized the prerogatives gained by open-minded inquiry to personal-social problems. Nevertheless, the spirit of the core has had its impact on humanistic education and its development at least in one area--that of reconceptualism.

In humanistic education the accent is on affect and valuation. Here educators have made a serious attempt at a comprehensive vision of a unity of knowledge and personal knowing. Having traced the origins of humanistic education, Patterson finds a classical definition, set two hundred years ago, applicable to our setting

(1) The purpose of education is to develop the potentials--all the potentials--of man as a whole; (2) the essential method for achieving this is the providing of good human relationships between the teacher and student--or as Pestalozzi put it, a love relationship.


Becker and Pritzkau have developed separate humanistic models drawn from a discipline's orientation. Scientific questions are related to social issues as human beings attempt to survive in a technological environment. Moral and theological discourse help relate personal inquiries into the meaning of life.

Weinstein and Fantini have attempted to integrate a variety of knowledge sources under the rubric of humanistic inquiry. They present a curricular model based on three tiers. The first is an information and skills retrieval base (social studies, language, disciplines—it is cognitively oriented); second, the personal discovery base; and third, the group-personal interaction tier.

We regard cognition and affect as complementary, not contradictory forces. They have not played balanced roles in education because affect has received such meager recognition, experimentation and practice. . . . Affect can serve not only to revivify elements of the old subject matter but also, and primarily, to open vistas for new subject matter.

What is there to expect from humanistic designs of the future? Pratt distinguishes needs from events or interests as the major component for the curriculum designer. Based on Maslow's taxonomy (physiological need, need for safety, social needs, need for esteem, need for self-actualization), Pratt suggests, "The basic principle of curriculum


development remains: all valid curricula help people to meet their significant needs; all other curricula are a waste of time." 55

The traditionalist realm is wide ranging, seemingly without any but the broadest common designations. Pinar examines the work of many traditionalists, including Tyler, Saylor, Alexander, and the Tanners, along with humanistic educators and finds, "What they do share is an interest in working with school people, with revising the curriculum of schools. Their writing tends to be journalistic, necessarily so, in order to be readily accessible to a constituency seeking quick answers to practical problems." 56

It is debatable whether or not humanists and other traditionalists are seeking "quick" answers. What can be said is that they provide practitioners with a variety of suggestions for cognitively and affectively maximizing student inquiry techniques. Traditionalists are directly interested in students and teachers.

2. The Scientific Field of Curriculum

Macdonald introduces ". . . a second camp of ofttime younger (and far fewer) theorizers [who are] committed to a more conventional concept of scientific theory . . . primarily conceptual in nature, [whereby]
research would be utilized for empirical validation of curriculum variables and relationships, . . . .

George Beauchamp has been identified as a functioning conceptual-empiricist. The curriculum field, as far as he is concerned, is based in the university in whatever departments address themselves to curriculum issues. In his view there seems little qualitative difference between trained curriculum workers from a traditionalist orientation and the psychometricians who are invited to make technical analyses of certain data. While he argues for more clearly defined notions of who plans and develops curriculum, his bias is certainly with trained social scientists. Following this inclination, Pinar criticizes conceptual empiricists whose increasingly refined methodologies and sustained 'cumulative' research would like to "bring about a science of human behavior." 59

Social science and technological applications of empirical research have provided models found to be quite efficient by some theorists. Briggs' approach sounds as if it were derived from a very effective engineering component. While he speaks of a neutral or value free instructional systems design, the language employed seems clearly to be biased: "[A] 'system' in the present context, is an integrated plan of operation of all components (sub-systems) of a system, designed to solve

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a problem or meet a need. . . . [O]bjectives, methods, and evaluations should be designed to be mutually supportive."60

There is a tacit understanding on the part of most curricularists today that guidance and controlled planning fits the current needs of the field. Although curriculum may have come into being as a self-conscious endeavor with Bobbit's *The Curriculum*, the field has been enamored of the technical theorizing. As Beauchamp has observed, the field has adapted and adopted from other sources. "When scholars have lacked experience in theory development in a field of endeavor, it has been customary for them to look to the patterns set by those who have been successful and to use those patterns as paradigms for beginning efforts."61

Saylor and Alexander have tacitly acceded to the technical pattern setting of which Beauchamp speaks. While they present an overview of many theories, past and present, their suggestions for a "good" curriculum plan reveal a technical bias. There are preset comprehensive goals, learning opportunities that range from lesser to greater, dependent to independent. A plan like this seems to reveal a rather closed process. Feedback is invited from students; the community is to be brought in on the decision-making process; and individualized flexibility is possible. Nevertheless, a plan, as a blueprint, is rather well delineated, controlling and determining outcomes. Saylor and Alexander


summarize their approach to planning in terms of ends and means, in the flow of activities or procedures from beginning to end. 62

Pratt has assimilated a technological orientation that also reflects a commitment to idealism. He strongly believes that engineering design skills can be applied by humane, enlightened educators to maximize learning. He suggests, "Increased effectiveness is likely to be a result of the cumulation of a repertoire of principles and strategies that constitute an applied science or technology of education." 63

Posner and Rudnitsky have prepared a text which gives practical expression to this notion of curriculum based upon applied science and a technology of education. 64 They integrated the selection of intended learning results with educational goals. The authors constructed a blueprint that linearly takes the student from the course planner's values (in terms of learner, society, and subject matter) to actual learning outcomes. Their approach is basically a matter of means, systematically analyzed with regard to original aims, that will result in specific outcomes.

By the latter part of the 1970s, Pratt and Posner and Rudnitsky notwithstanding, most curricularists seemed less imbued with emulating technological models. There was still much effort at generating more sophisticated statistical methodologies, but more expansive views were

63 Pratt, Curriculum, p. 450.
adopted. Schubert reports that curricular books "tended to be more situational, analytic, and interpretive than behaviorist. They tended more toward the conceptual and/or prescriptive than empirical and experimental, although some embraced both."\(^{65}\)

The evaluation subfield, itself research oriented, contributed more than strict empirical guidelines. Some evaluators had grown in the humanistic influences but still appreciated systems; they were also familiar with intuitive, personalist dimensions of curriculum that needed to be studied. Schubert cites Eisner and Hamilton—among others—as exemplifying this expanded, deepened use of science, technology, and the arts. "They offer modes of illumination of curricular phenomena that go beyond . . . the numbers game by examining methods that are naturalistic, literary, and artistic; thus providing . . . qualitative evaluation."\(^{66}\)

The scientific orientation, however, can provide more than simply technological expertise. Science is only a method to help clarify thinking, to facilitate practical applications drawn from a variety of data sources. The most effective designs in curriculum will be drawn from the social and pure sciences and from administrative and human values. Pratt, a designer with a real appreciation for scientific applications, however, points to a larger task for technology:

Technology is value free; it can determine the speed with which we move but cannot determine the path we take. While good will without technique is powerless, technique without good will is sinister.


\(^{66}\) Ibid., pp. 259–60 (emphasis in original).
Curriculum design uses technology but must be guided by a vision of humanity and its future.  

Walker offers a similar view. He does not seem to be an orthodox social scientist. But he does accept some degree of the faith in applying research technique to curriculum problems. He disdains "the image of the technician at the control panel directing the whole operation." Nevertheless, the place of logical positivistic science is assured in some measure, he contends, when its ideals are integrated in a comprehensive fashion: "To reject the possibility is to close off a vital avenue of understanding for all educators."

The resultant knowledge from positivistic inquiry can help build a curriculum based on clarity, precision, order—or so the argument goes. We learn from one who has been identified with the conceptual-empirical school that there is uncertainty everywhere. Posner and Strike admit, "We have very little information, based on hard data, regarding the consequences of alternative content sequences and will need a good deal more research before we are able to satisfactorily suggest how content should be sequenced."

Under the circumstances one might begin to shy away from curricular recommendations based on positivistic scientific findings. We have

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67 Pratt, Curriculum, pp. 450-51.


known for a long time that one can prove almost anything with statistical verifications. Science may guarantee systematic data computation, but educators and the public must bear in mind

... that producing data is a human process. Like any human process, it does not exist in isolation, nor is it controlled by formulas. It affects and is affected by the context in which counting occurs. "How do I go about counting handicapped teachers? I sent out a memo to the teachers asking them to report if they wanted to be listed. I know that one is on the list who only has a sinus condition." 71

Measurement, it would seem from the above example, is a phenomenon that requires qualification: "for what purpose, to what end?" Basically curriculum theory, technically understood, must allow the fullest use of the best available resources: thinking, feeling, moving human beings. Means-ends procedures in and of themselves are likely to be counterproductive without a thorough evaluation of people who are involved in planning. The interface of imprecise or subjective elements with the objectively planned curriculum is more enlightening.

Reid points out how the whole picture ought to be examined:

... the more we insist that curriculum planning is rational and not political, and the more we emphasize aims at the expense of constraints, the more certain we make it that the end of our endeavors will bear little resemblance to the high hopes with which we began. ... For the value laden aspects will always be there, whether we recognize them or not. 72

In other words, we continue to recall Bronowski's dictum: science is simply a Latin word for knowledge. We know with our heads we


are homo sapiens, 'knowing persons.' But there are an infinite variety of ways for knowing our world. Those who would reconceptualize curriculum writing argue for expanded models for inquiry. The ensuing discussion reflects an overview study of those antecedents contributing to reconceptualist curriculum theory.

3. The Reconceptualization of the Curriculum: Some Antecedents

Three scholars have recently studied and critiqued the antecedents, ideology, and applicability of reconceptualist writing. Huber has focused on the intellectual roots of the American antinomian tradition in presenting specific theoretical arguments for heightened consciousness. Mazza has examined newer theoretical critiques of the traditionalist literature to observe how alternative intellectual, political, psychological, aesthetic, and ethical frames of reference affect reflections about and discourse on the curriculum. Finally, Schubert has provided a chronological listing as well as an interpretive and contextual analysis of the texts that have appeared in the curriculum field. His inquiry and summary analysis of reconceptual developments in the latter part of the 1970s has been particularly helpful.

The present study views reconceptualist roots in three areas. These theorists (1) are skeptical about the dominant social science or logical positivist manner of knowing or verification of knowledge—they are open to a variety of inquiry methods; (2) share a belief with the

73 Huber, Renewal of Curriculum Theory.
74 Mazza, Reconceptual Inquiry.
75 Schubert, Curriculum Books, pp. 259-60.
humanists in holistic ways of knowing—their larger perspective is furnished by third force psychologists such as Maslow and Rogers; and (3) focus on the phenomenon of inner-consciousness, centering on intuitive, mystical, religious ways of knowing. These three areas are examined below.

a. Skepticism About Current States of Knowing

Science assists us to describe the world and guides our deliberations over how to act in it. We devise a variety of conceptual systems to make sense of the data that our intellects and emotions assimilate. Roszak observes, "The scientific mind begins in the spirit of the Cartesian zero, with the doubling away of all inherited knowledge in favor of an entirely new method of knowing. . . . A man is a scientist not because of what he sees, but because of how he sees it." 76

Data that come from any of the senses are liable to continual critique, conceptualization, refinement, and possibly inclusion into reconceptualizations. One advanced method of conceptualization is termed paradigms. According to Kuhn they are universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time delineate broad problems and solutions to a community of practitioners. 77

Kuhn claims that economically, technologically advanced societies perpetuate a certain paradigm for knowing. But as any paradigm, it is only temporally viable and may shift as new knowledge and ways of

knowing become available. In our era, the social science paradigm has dominated. But there is a conflict when theorists, under the guise of scientific certainty and objectivity, offer the social science paradigm as the only way to observe and measure reality.

Scientific significance, according to reconceptualists, is not to be derived from any monolithic system of inquiry. There are multiple ways of knowing the world and understanding ourselves. Polanyi identifies two main categories: explicit knowledge of observables, or logic; and tacit knowing, that is, reflected notion and intuitions.

Tacit knowing appears to be a doing of our own, lacking the public, objective character of explicit knowledge. . . . tacit knowing is in fact the dominant principle of all knowledge, and its rejection would, therefore, automatically involve the rejection of any knowledge whatever.

In other words, Polanyi is reaffirming the personal and immediate involvement of the individual in any act of cognition. Since by current biological and metaphysical standards, human beings are finite creatures, their involvement in knowing is subject to error. Certainty can never be obtained since knowing is always mediated by subjective screenings of meaning or interpretation. Neither "right" nor "wrong" in the conventional sense, Polanyi's approach sets the stage for widening the discussion about what and how one knows.

b. Humanistic Education, Values, and Third Force Psychology

Humanistic educational designs have been discussed earlier. At this point we reiterate and detail a bit more of how the goal of a

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dynamic, holistic personal process fits into the reconceptualist cri-
tique. To begin with, one can find that humanistic psychology has been
a response to the kind of harsh world described by Patterson, "... in-
individualization and depersonalization had become apparent in society,
as a trend supported and fostered by the applications of behaviorism.
The newer focus ... is upon the person and his total experiencing."79

The totally experiencing person is that creature possessing
cognitive, affective, and psycho-motor capabilities—all of which are,
ideally, integrated in a fully functional manner. The process of inte-
grating the cognitive and affective means of inquiring into the environ-
ment is termed "confluent." The major task for confluent curricular
specialists, like Brown, is to provide opportunities for choice among
intellectual, intuitive, esthetic ways of knowing and valuing.80

There is great difficulty in developing values in a world of
"future shock" where matters occur so quickly that the knowledge systems
and learning techniques of one generation are obsolete in the next.
Assuming that we base knowledgeable, ethical choices on learned and
reflected experience, it is increasingly difficult to choose at all be-
cause of the multitude of experiences life provides. Toffler, a decade
ago, detailed how our high technological society suffers,

79 Cecil H. Patterson, "Insights about Persons: Psychological
Foundations of Humanistic and Affective Education," in Feeling,
Valuing, and the Art of Growing, eds. Louise M. Berman and Jessie A.
Roderick, 1977 Yearbook of the Association for Supervision and
Curriculum Development (Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision

80 George I. Brown, Human Teaching for Human Learning (New York:
Viking, 1971).
metaphorically, from a peculiar ailment called progeria—death from old age before one's time. His book, *Future Shock*, described how these societies experience super-normal rates of change—for which they are unprepared. 81

Today, the reconceptualists argue, it is of very little benefit to speak of instilled or inculcated values as if there is a means-end, input-output system. While choices can be coerced or controlled in order to obtain certain rewards within school, family, or peer circles, free valuing cannot. It is a process which, when functioning well, is based firmly on personal appraisals. Self-questioning and the legitimacy of conflict in making decisions are part of the approach developed by Raths and others. They have devised a series of strategies, not as a panacea for the problem of choosing in a world of accelerated change, but as a means for facilitating self-clarification.

... if children—or adults, for that matter—are to develop values, they must develop them out of personal choices ... [which] must involve alternatives which (1) include ones that are prized by the chooser; (2) have meaning to the chooser, as when the consequences of each are clearly understood; and (3) are freely available for selection. 82

Confluency and personal value clarification in humanistic education are derived from what Maslow identifies as "third force" psychology. 83 In response to the insufficiency of behavioral or Freudian approaches, the third force psychologist argues that there is little


gained from focusing on unconscious motives or mechanistic processes as a way of deriving meaning. Achievements in personal growth may still only be momentary; over a period of time, however, as psychic and physical deficiencies are satisfied and defenses strengthened, there are occasions of insight, awe, and mystery which he designated as peak experiences. The task of the instructor or facilitator and the student is to locate these moments through the full range of cognitively and affectionately based knowing. The peak experiences which may occur are part of self-actualization, or becoming fully human. It is "the development of the fullest height that the human species can stand up to or that the particular individual can come to. In a less technical way, it is helping the person to become the best he is able to become."84

There is a certain amount of risk taking that goes along with this process. The third force movement asserts that each person has a great deal of potential autonomy; the actualization of it may bring an awareness bearing joy or pain of discovery. But that is the full act of growth; to reiterate, holism—that is, self-integration and assimilation of all possible means—is the ideal. "The plea of the humanist for education is not that we give up behavioral approaches, but that we realistically recognize their assets and liabilities, and therefore use them in proper balance with the humanistic aspects of the problem."85


Educators cannot—in advance—automatically determine goals and objectives, however well researched the "needs" of the student are—and assure lasting personal meaning. No method or perspective will guarantee this, but the humanistic applications of third force psychology provide the greatest possibility. Rogers shares some useful insight from the counseling field that shows the necessity for flexibility and openness: "One cannot teach another . . . . The most one person can do to further it [knowledge of feeling and emotion] in another is to create certain conditions which make this kind of learning possible. It cannot be compelled." 86

In this regard critics of more scientific and traditionally oriented curricula have noted a disproportionate emphasis on "compelling," extrinsically prescribed goals. True human responses to the search for meaningfulness of life and for purpose are not determined by authorities outside the student. The school may demand behavioral responses. Ultimately, however, it is the student—as-person who will ascribe and appropriate significance to any act of learning. The teacher facilitates rather than inculcates. Morris states the task well:

The teacher's role would be to quicken the child's awareness of his own consciousness as pure intentionality, to start him out on the project of defining his own meaning in the world and hence of creating meanings in the world. . . . The point is that he [the child] is the author of them [the meanings] . . . even if they happen to coincide with other people's. 87

86 Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), pp. 204-5.

Curriculum writing in this vein is personalist and subjective, existentialist, whatever the cognitive needs are determined to be. American existentialists have supported a Third Force movement in speaking of the human being as having an essential self, an intrinsic self. Through the free choices that are one makes, one continually "uncovers" or self-actualizes. Choices are nurtured through innerness or consciousness. These data are equally important to the reconceptualists.

c. Innerness, Intuition, and Mystical Knowing

There is another aspect of a holistic mode of knowing. Its origin and expression is in what Jaynes calls consciousness. It is the phenomena of the mind perceiving a sense world of objects and then reflecting upon itself. "It operates by way of analogy, by way of constructing an analogue 'I' that can observe that space and move metaphorically in it." 89

Certain educational theorists appreciate these contentions as they try to design new opportunities for knowledge inquiring. The reconceptualists, advocating multiple ways of knowing, draw on the research from psychologies of consciousness; Robert Ornstein is an example.

Education consists predominantly of "readin', 'ritin', and 'rithmetic," and we are taught precious little about our emotions, our bodies, our intuitive capabilities. A strict emphasis on verbal intellectual knowledge has screened out much of what is or could be


legitimate . . . the existence of "nonordinary realities" is not studied because they do not fit into the dominant paradigm.\footnote{Robert E. Ornstein, \textit{The Psychology of Consciousness} (New York: Penguin, 1972), p. 26.} 

The reconceptualizing curricularists are opposed to a predominant reliance on verbal intellectual knowledge. They extend new possibilities of perceiving and understanding the world in their views of the student-as-a-total person. Each creature possesses a variety of faculties for perceiving, rationalizing, and feeling.

According to earliest physiological research, these multiple ways of knowing can be subsumed under two main rubrics. Hippocrates recognized the dual nature of the human brain. The "active" left brain is responsible for analysis and logic and verbal skills; the right hemisphere, passively functioning, is related to spatial, aesthetic, physical dimensions of knowing. Deikman evaluates the balance between these two modes of consciousness in terms of our personal and communal welfare.

The action mode has ruled our individual lives and national policies, and the I-It relationship that has provided the base for technical mastery is now the primary obstacle to saving our race . . . . The receptive mode . . . the I-Thou relationship--exists and it may be needed to provide the experimental base for the values and the world view now needed so desperately by our society as a whole.\footnote{Arthur J. Deikman, "Bimodal Consciousness," in \textit{The Nature of Human Consciousness}, ed. Robert Ornstein (New York: Viking, 1974), pp. 85-86.}

Receptivity is heightened by a number of techniques, one of which is Transcendental Meditation. Phenix can speak about "Transcendence and the Curriculum" as a disciplined way ofsecularly reviving our intuitive
reflections in a unified fashion. Furthermore, the art of transcendental meditation can enable one to inquire deeply into as yet unknown energy sources. Curricularists who take this spiritual introspection seriously, believe that new ways of knowing the self and the outer world will contribute to one's total growth.

The emphasis on innerness has come about as a reaction to the perceived inordinate focus on outerness. What is out-there can be sensed; there is certainty, or at least we think so, though Roszak has contended that there is at best a myth of objective consciousness. He is denigrating the near-exclusive reliance on this manner of knowing. In an attempt to refine perception, interpersonal relationships may also be altered for the good. In other words, there is a strong ethical component in this source of reconceptualization. Knowledge potential is as broad and deep as the highly rational, highly idiosyncratic nature of the particular human being in question. There is more to knowledge and knowing than empirically or even logically verifiable propositions.

Roszak suggests a shift in emphasis. "The only way we shall ever recapTURE the sort of knowledge Lao-Tzu referred to in his dictum 'those who know do not speak' is by subordinating the question 'how shall we know?' to the more existentially vital question 'how shall we live?'" 93

Sometimes adults shape their world out of an intellectual sophistication, mistaking maturity and technical expertise for the fullest possible knowing. While mental ability and certain experiences do


93 Roszak, Making of a Counter Culture, p. 233.
provide practical tools for managing in the world, other latent capabilities are equally important. Intuition, in particular, is one other source for knowing, a manner of inquiry into the natural and social order. But intuition is not nearly as prized as rational empirical knowing. Intuition lacks a certain objectivity valued in Western society. But it is, nevertheless, real, vividly nurtured by imaginative perspectives. The reconceptualists certainly do not ignore the need for engineers, doctors, and lawyers to rationally preplan certain technical course of action; however, they would give at least equal attention to the spontaneous, intuitive, imaginative realm of thought. There is a freshness in this approach often characteristically seen in the lives of children. Samples observed, "It led Robert Oppenheimer to remark, 'I could solve my most complex problems in physics if I had not given up the ways of thinking common to children at play.'" 94

We live in a quandry over the need to organize our experience according to preplanned routines and to simply "experience" with the minimum of structure. The conflict is readily acknowledged in the curriculum field, where effectiveness and efficiency are often stressed in behavioral terms. Reconceptual theorists are forcefully challenging this notion.

Part III: CRITICAL RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE CURRICULUM

Schubert credits Schwab with initiating what came to be an unusually insightful way of talking about curriculum; 95 and his approach was


later built upon, expanded, and complemented by the reconceptualists. Schwab addressed himself to the practical in contradistinction to the theoretic orientation characteristic of the social sciences. Schubert summarizes:

The method of inquiry of the theoretic paradigm is induction, assuming the possibility of objectivity and the virtual absence of a Heisenbergian uncertainty principle. On the contrary the practical assumptions hold that illuminating insight stems from interaction with problematic areas rather than induction upon them. . . . [The method] acknowledges the need to see an interdependence of causal factors that are not generalizable but are necessary knowledge for promoting an end of decision and action that rectifies specific problems.96

Curriculum in this sense is seen less as an imposed plan and more as the occurrence of certain interactions. The key factors in this interaction process are the material content of a lesson; the identities of those studying and teaching; the bureaucratic, technical, and pedagogic decisions that affect knowledge inquiry and sharing; and the personal exchanges of all those situated within the physical milieu.

Within that milieu, opportunities for reconceptualization occur. Benham recently has offered a restatement of the phenomena involved.

Reconceptualization, then, aims at altering one's conceptualizations, quite literally; one's ways of looking at things, at life: at oneself, which involves consciousness and leads to the existentialist position; or at the forms of social organization, which involves political action and leads to the structuralist position . . . or a combination of the two.97

Expanded notions of inner consciousness, humanistic and existentialist ideas (cited above) have provided reconceptualization with

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96 Ibid.

certain foci. Bernstein also provides insights that have helped the reconceptualists to formulate their views.

The most important feature in the restructuring of social and political theory has been the reassertion of the necessity and legitimacy of the critical function of theory. . . . We are coming to realize that human rationality cannot be limited to technical and instrumental reasons . . . [there is] practical discourse in which human beings try not simply to manipulate and control one another, but to understand one another genuinely and work together toward practical --not technical--ends.98

The critic here cannot be content with pointing out the superficial structural problems of an institution such as the school or the way in which people interact or fail to interact as individuals. Criticism, to accomplish its purpose, ought to go beyond speculating about the ideal notion of society or personhood. In other words, criticism is not only the mode of communication of the critic, but is also a source of personal transformation. The critic's task is far more than identifying the contours of the field. He must discover his own biases and hesitations. In short, self-knowledge emerges in the act of criticism.

According to Pinar,

Fundamental to our view is the sense that curriculum research must emancipate the researcher if it is to authentically offer such a possibility to others . . . [O]ur aspiration is to gain increasing access to that which is conditioned, allow it to surface, to be released or permitted to remain (in either case in consciousness), hence open to the conscious intentions of the individual.99

The reconceptualists attempt to convince others that assumptions about the ordinary world of power, persons, and possibilities are just that: only assumptions. There is a world of inquiry and sources of

inspiration that transcend the taken-for-granted daily milieu. Persons who are fully alert—aesthetically, intellectually, and spiritually—can locate that world, with its possibilities and limitations. Reconceptualist curricular theory aims to draw one into that world through what Maxine Greene calls wide-awakeness.¹⁰⁰

Paulo Freire established a remarkable model for reawakened, conscious, determined informed action. Called 'praxis,' it relates to the approaches advocated by the critical theorists of the 1970's. Among other things, he stresses the dynamic aspect of language, more from a political than an aesthetic point of view. He tells us that the radical interaction of the two dimensions of the spoken word, action and reflection, result in the act of dialogue as a human phenomenon. "Thus to speak a true word is to transform the world."¹⁰¹ And yet the power of language is finite, especially when it comes to definition.

Kliebard presents a picture of an uncritical, unreflective acceptance of the behavioral-managerial-technocratic orientation in curriculum writing. The curriculum as a model of utilitarian efficiency and consensus is the object of change. Huebner emphasizes a concern with language usage in discussing these same areas; he tries to stress the ethical and aesthetic modes over against the technical and controlling


Language is more than communication. It is the shape of our world. In fact, it is the moral means of making this world. With Kliebard's research at hand, Pinar suggests a rather dismal picture. "The ideal of education evaporates; a residue of schooling, training for profitable existence in a capitalistic economic order, remains."  

It is very difficult to offer any precise definition of reconceptualization. It is process that heightens individual consciousness of self and society and the dynamic dialectic between the two. Pinar tells us what is going on rather than assigning limits or labels to the behaviors described. He points to Apple's ideology and social critique of hegemony, the all-encompassing domination of physical life and consciousness.

The control of schools, knowledge and everyday life can be, and is, more subtle [than determination] for it takes in even seemingly inconsequential moments. The control is vested in the constitutive principles, codes, and especially the commonsense consciousness and practices underlying our lives, as well as by overt division and manipulation.  

In other words, Apple is referring to the ways in which meaning is conveyed through the structures in society. The political, socio-economic relationships, the sexual and racial attitudes, the means of material production, and the value system that pervades it are all critical to any view of curriculum. Apple has tried to highlight the

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relationship between what he perceives to be economic and cultural domi-
nation. The school, through its mores, its bureaucracy, its intellectual
commitments to avoid conflict, is the chief vehicle of this domination.

What can be done? Others are not very optimistic about reform,
however high minded, sincere, and authentic the propagators are. True,
humanistic education offers many possibilities to those who are rela-
tively self-confident, at ease, secure. But radical attention to funda-
mental social, political, economic inequities is needed. Bateman says,
"... tinkering with the surface of things or treating symptoms of deep
underlying causes will not make much difference. Integration, deco-

nization ... none of these liberal answers will contribute much to
the pedagogy of liberation." 105

Reconceptualization is not a liberal answer. It begins as a cri-
tique of the field. It comes from many diverse authorities; in fact,
what seems to unite the critics most is that to which they are opposed.
More than mere opposition, however, must occur if the kind of transfor-
mation spoken of by Freire is to occur. Pinar, therefore, presents a
sequel to curriculum criticizing: the post-critical stage. "The heri-
tage, attacked and discredited now begins to give way to an affirmative
new conceptual order." 106

105 Donald R. Bateman, "Politics of Curriculum," in Heightened
Consciousness, Cultural Revolution, and Curriculum Theory (Berkeley,

106 William Pinar, "Postcritical Reconceptualists," in Curriculum
Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley, Cal.:
The reconceptualization of the curriculum has incorporated intellectual traditions not normally thought to be part of North American curriculum thought. Radical forms of social inquiry and innovative departures (for schools in the United States) have drawn from Marxism, phenomenology, psychoanalysis, and existentialism. The question is one of obtaining meaning, of creating meaning, of interpreting the ordinary and seen, the unseen, and idiosyncratic in human encounter. This, too, is knowledge of a most important sort. These Continental intellectual traditions help to bring knowledge and the acts of knowing together. The approach rests heavily on the interpretive method. Van Manen's review of reconceptualist literature is instructive in this matter.

The interpretative method belongs to a different world of science indeed. Phenomenology and hermeneutics ... are more closely aligned to (but not the same as) philosophy and the arts than to strict science and statistics ... [F]rom the point of view of phenomenological pedagogy, the child's potential for growth is always seen as open—subject to personal experiences, pursuits, choices, relevancies and commitments. ... They conceive of facticity only as the occasion for, not as the causality of, human behavior.\(^\text{107}\)

This interpretive mood has helped bring about a renewal of curriculum theory. There are a multiplicity of suppositions as to what is and what is not curriculum theory. Part of the problem is based on the various definitions and delimitations of the word "curriculum" and the word "theory."\(^\text{108}\) According to McCory, frustration mounts because scholars are in search of either ideal prescriptions or descriptions.

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Schwab, too, is impatient with the misguided approaches to achieving clarity in the field. He claims that there has been a renewal of curriculum theory simply because the older theoretical holdings—based upon empirical design or prescriptive norms—are not appropriate to discourse. Schwab's restatement of the theoretical ironically comes in terms of what he calls the practical and the eclectic,

... the arts by which unsystematic, uneasy, but usable focus on a body of problems is effected among diverse theories, each relevant to the problems in a different way ... It is the discipline concerned with choice and action, in contrast with theoretic, which is concerned with knowledge.

The approach is neither deductive nor inductive. It is an indictment against the perceived abstraction of set principles or of generalization. It calls for the curricularist to face real people in real action situations.

Huebner echoed Schwab's announcement that the field was moribund, overburdened from many diverse interests.

It [the field] did not die because it depended on theory rather than practice, although its sickness might have been diagnosed sooner if there had been greater correspondence between its rhetoric and its performance. It died because the increasing diversity of interest it tried to carry during those hundred years could no longer be held together by a single focus ... Our work is identifying educational content and finding ways to make it available to young people.

Content of the curriculum is related to culture. Huebner feels that more precise usage of language helps clarify what part of the culture is potentially emancipating and which part is restraining.


Much of the discourse in the curriculum field is located within the empirical-technological analytic tradition. Van Manen, echoing Schwab, disdains the emphasis on the practical that emanates from such a means-end orientation. Practicality, or simply getting the job done, is insufficient. The reconceptualization of curriculum studies stresses practicality not as effective control but as effective communication between person. Interpretive meanings are crucial. "From the perspective of hermeneutics there are no such things as stimuli, responses, or measurable behaviors; instead there are encounters, life-worlds, and meanings which invite investigations. The focus is on actions, not behaviors."¹¹¹ These actions refer to what real persons try to do, how they reflect, the manner in which they participate in one another's feelings and thoughts. There are rich experiences to be elicited if teacher and student feel free to share. Will the teacher be open, or just an impartial observer monitoring streams of consciousness flowing through the class? There is a method, however, that helps elucidate these feelings. The way is via autobiography, through a process that Pinar has conceptualized as currere.¹¹²

Schubert and Lopez relate steps taken with students in a Chicago barrio and those in a graduate course to create curriculum. The researchers' findings substantiated the concern that whatever action is undertaken, it should "(1) build upon students' pasts; (2) enable them


to imaginatively project futures to which they can aspire; (3) magnify the bewildering swarm that is their present; and (4) help students create a synthesis of these three great episodes of living."\textsuperscript{113}

The full environment is there to help develop and elicit the point of contact between student and student, student and teacher. The Schuberts experimented with a variety of means for helping students identify the realities in their environment, that of the children and of the graduate student. In the final analysis, it is the total environment in which the reconceptualist tries to situate the curriculum.

\textbf{Renewing Curriculum Theory: A Conclusion}

Whether one works out of the personal setting or the social orbit of interaction, a formulated goal could be lifted from an Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development publication, \textit{To Nurture Humaneness}. This book documented an increasingly growing list of person-centered approaches with the seemingly common thread: "A concern with the learner as a human being rather than simply an organism and as a whole person rather than simply a disembodied intellect or a repository of cognitive processes."\textsuperscript{114}

Education is what a person can become individually, person-ally, and as a member of a community. As one comes to grips with the power of imagination he can personally engage in an active dialogue with


\textsuperscript{114} Patterson, "Insights About Persons," p. 146.
literature, history, or science. These are no longer contents to be
simply mastered, but sources for stimulating the total student.

The task is now to arrive at a curriculum design that allows for
the individual's maximum dialogue with himself, the text or the art
form. "But most curriculum theorizing has been characterized by ab-
straction severed from its concrete ground." But even while the
reconceptualists themselves talk of heightened consciousness, Mazza
observes that a great deal more needs to be done to sharpen the concep-
tual tools to take action. Otherwise they will not meet their chal-
lenge. More is needed if curriculum structures are to allow individ-
uals to become persons, that is, human beings who do not act in a de-
tached, objective way toward other human beings but are immediately
involved with those about them. Much of the social science research has
come to indicate a belief that

... to focus on what is common means ignoring what is not. While
in natural science such a view is evidently necessary, in the human
life sciences it is misleading. With Kierkegaard, I acknowledge that
human life manifests itself in individuals. "Groups," for example,
is a concept we invent for intellectual economy and convenience, to
enable us to refer to similarities among individuals.

Pinar's philosophical orientation is consistent with the methodo-
logy he adopts in setting out the tasks that the theorist must do. It
is a common enterprise, with an openness to the skills and talents of
all who will join in. Keeping in mind that one is dealing with an

116 Mazza, Reconceptual Inquiry, p. 183.
evolutionary phenomenon leads to an appreciation of his inaugural call to all concerned.

As curricularists we must address ourselves to the historically-established concerns of the curriculum field. We must continue to address ourselves to our contemporaries in the field: to traditionalists and conceptual empiricists. We must explicate the nature of our efforts, and at the same time attempt to offer our work in a way which will permit others—not yet on the scene—to make syntheses of reconceptualized curriculum and traditional and conceptual-empirical theory.\textsuperscript{118}

An ancient rabbinic source has given us a rationale for our efforts: "Yours is not the task to complete the work, neither, however, are you allowed to desist from it altogether. The day is short."\textsuperscript{119} So shall we make beginnings, using our forebears, yet always mindful of the tentativeness of their findings and ours. With this in mind, let us now turn to four leading reconceptualists; they are James Macdonald, Dwayne Huebner, Maxine Greene, and William Pinar.

\textsuperscript{118} Pinar, "Notes on the Curriculum Field," p. 9.

CHAPTER III

BRINGING KNOWLEDGE, KNOWING, AND KNOWER TOGETHER: THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF JAMES B. MACDONALD

Introduction

The curriculum field originated, as we have seen above, through the efforts of progressive-minded educators to make schooling a relevant activity. The unprecedented needs of American school children in the latter part of the nineteenth century demanded radical departures. Educators attempted to ascertain exactly which needs had to be met and then organized knowledge into proper curricular frameworks. Scientific discovery and skillful applications encouraged some educators to try systematically to build a new social order. The optimism that imbued school people then is renewed in our day. Friedenberg's credo clearly speaks to us:

The highest function of education, I would maintain, is to help people understand the meaning of their lives and become more sensitive to the meaning of other people's lives and to relate to them more fully. Education increases the range and complexity of relationships that make sense to us to which we can contribute and on which we can bring to bear competent ethical and practical judgment.¹

To a large extent much of the effort to these ends has grown out of empirical research and technically oriented designs. The type of decision-making found in the Tyler Rationale and behavioral taxonomies,

however, does not satisfy those who would reconceptualize the field. Their goal is to expand the type of curricular discourse that focuses on personal and social values. The student assumes the responsibility of being a critic and self-critic; in the larger social milieu, and as a partner in dialogue.

Macdonald says that such critical study ought to focus on the functions that curriculum serves; for example, what are the psychological, political, and ethical implications of the theorist's choice of design or of specific materials. Such choices, he argues, grow out of various cognitive human interests; for the purpose of understanding how choices are made they cannot be detached from the personally held meaning structure of the theorist. The work of curricularists reflect basic inclinations towards social control, consensus, or personal liberation. These interests are manifested in curricular decisions involving interpersonal relationships among students and teachers, selection of materials and the creation of educative settings.

Macdonald's attempts to reconceptualize the act of knowing in the context of the curriculum reflects two major priorities:

One has been expressed in a desire to construct intellectually satisfying conceptual maps of the human condition which were educationally meaningful and personally satisfying. The second has been expressed in a utopian hope that somehow people could improve the quality of their existence, specifically through educational processes and generally through broader social policy.²

The reconceptualists, and James Macdonald in particular, are not detached observers. They contend that neither a broad study of the

field nor discussion of decision making is maximally valuable unless there is an on-going effort at personal integration with content. The theorist's work in this regard is a model for student activity in whatever course of knowledge inquiry he or she has undertaken.

The reconceptualists are committed to expanding curriculum discourse to include more than technical issues such as grouping, distribution and use of materials, and accountability for fulfilling standardized tasks. A larger issue requires attention. How does one achieve a good society; also, in what ways does a person act in such a community? What are the types of moral relationships that emerge within and outside the school? Such questions are not answerable merely by the accumulation of information or an exposure to the methodologies of knowledge acquisition. Whitehead's insight relates to the priorities Macdonald has established.

What I am anxious to impress on you is that though knowledge is one chief aim of intellectual education, there is another ingredient, vaguer but greater, and more dominating in its importance. The ancients called it "wisdom." You cannot be wise without some basis of knowledge; but you can easily acquire knowledge and remain bare of wisdom.3

The Quality of School Life

Critics like Macdonald argue that there is little quality in school life today. The search for knowledge or wisdom is hampered by the absence of human relationships within the structures of mass education. The predicament of education today reflects conditions in the larger society that have affected our consciousness of what is normal or

acceptable. There is a strong inclination to problem solving based on technological methodologies, bureaucratic organization, and a consumer-oriented ethic. Macdonald argues that although "vision" and "transcendence" have been basically ignored, they are necessary and legitimate notions for the curriculum.

Moreover, it seems that for many people the purpose of the school is more school, leading to credentials that alone maintain status, influence, power. The school's purpose, according to reconceptualists, should enable a broad set of human capacities to develop, leading to critically aware, critically functioning persons. However, traditional curriculum work has been geared to guiding principles, prescriptive actions based upon rationally derived values. Macdonald's theorizing attempts to grasp the relationship between what students perceive as happening on a day to day basis and what institutions acknowledge to be their essential purpose. Another way of inquiring into the quality of school life is to ask,

"... in whose interest is the activity of the school?" [This] presents contradictions when the form and quality of work, power, and language create conflicts between the everyday living interests of those experiencing the activity, and other explicit or implicit external agencies imposing school activity in the service of their own interests.

Macdonald agrees that language expresses one's notion of what the world is or should be. It is valuative, though this function is often

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5 Ibid., p. 88.
hidden by claims of alleged objectivity. In the contemporary school setting, linguistic communication through curriculum is frequently based on utilitarian needs. Students are often asked simply to describe the visible characteristics of their worlds in terms of clearly stated causes and effects. Achievement in the areas of history and social studies is geared to lower level cognitive processes of learning. Language usage, however, should reflect a greater concern for aesthetic and moral metaphors in helping the student to derive meaning. Opportunities should be expanded to allow self-critical expressions as students enter the curricular process as autobiographic persons. One's past and present—and imagined future—have a great deal to do with perceived personal significance of arts, humanities, or sciences. The connection between one's personal commitment and bodies of knowledge should be more clearly explicated, as a way of improving the quality of school life.

The quality of school life, however, will not be altered simply by achieving a "new consciousness" of contradiction, discrepancies, or awareness of the school which Macdonald calls a "double agent." Neither will innovative action in the absence of critical thought by the theorist avail. The quality of school life will improve only when

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people learn to evaluate how personally held values affect and derive from norms in the larger society—and then to act on these new recognitions. Macdonald's career provides us an important insight. He "... spent ten years in empirical research and technical development work in which he claims he was enamored with taxonomies [and] general systems theory and technical schemes such as the Tyler Rationale..." Macdonald expresses the importance of bridging the gap between value perception and technical action.

Underlying continuing self-scrutiny and professional self-judgments is his credo, "that all curriculum talk and work is value based. Further examination of much of our curricular talk and work often reveals a failure to clearly identify and relate values to work in progress." He challenges us to be honest, morally forthright about the knowledge inquiry approaches we advocate. Curriculum work requires a strong degree of self-honesty. Macdonald urges other theorists to locate and clarify those values that underly their professional actions to bring about the "good life." He enables others to try to narrow the discrepancies between what one believes, what one says, and, ultimately, what one does.

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Knowledge and Decision-Making

The fundamental reality upon which curriculum is built is the real concerns and aspirations of people. Macdonald refers to this as an ontological focus, which enables him to ask a crucial question: What is or is not learned; what can or cannot be learned; and why? The response is obviously not made in a vacuum but in the realm of the ordinary experiences in the larger world. The political, economic, and social relationships that are identifiable outside the school are viewed as a framework against which the activities of the school can be appreciated: administration, planning, instruction, characteristics of staff and students. The behaviors and interactions observed allow one to talk about curriculum in terms of rationales: the technical, scientific, political, aesthetic, and ethical. Theorists do not create learning environments arbitrarily. Action ensues from knowledge inquiry based upon more than objectivistic empirical analytic means. Summarizing the writing of Habermas, Macdonald cites the limitation of monologic and hermeneutic understanding of meaning. He says, "The trouble with both modes is that they have divorced themselves from self-reflection; for objectivism deludes the knower by projecting an image of a self-subsistent world of


facts structured in lawlike manner; and thus conceals the a priori con-
stitutions of these facts.\textsuperscript{12}

Macdonald appreciates the perspective self-reflection provides for identifying the sources of different curricular value patterns. He proposes three human interests, control, consensus, and emancipation; understanding them is derived from self-reflection.\textsuperscript{13} By control he means the decision-making orientation implicit in scientific-rationalistic methodology. Consensus refers to a practically cognitive means-ends agreement about which knowledge is of most worth and which curricular designs should follow. Emancipation or liberation results from a critically cognitive orientation.

Macdonald recommends more attention be given to the third mode, the emancipatory and liberational. In terms of curriculum, management by objectives--obtained from experts or consensually--does not begin to engage the full human capacities for creative, imaginative actions. On this point Macdonald draws from Piaget and James. The latter two argued that knowing, reason, and reality were known primarily in the act of doing. Of the two, Macdonald says,

Neither man begins with knowledge as a primary starting point, but with "pure experiences" (James) or with developmentally monitored intellectual operations (Piaget). In each case the conclusion is similar—that it is in the doing that we find reality, knowledge and intelligence.\textsuperscript{14}


\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., p. 289.

\textsuperscript{14}Macdonald, "Domain of Curriculum," p. 15.
Figure 1. A Dual Dialectic.  

Making Curricular Decisions

Paulo Freire's notion of praxis—action with reflection—provides Macdonald with another important basis for his decision-making methodology. It is founded on the idea that one's intuitions, attitudes, perceptions, are located in the realm of tacitly held knowledge. As indicated in Figure 1, values can be elicited only by critical reflection, and then acted upon with more clarity. In contradistinction to the Goodlad and Richter models, however, or the Tyler Rationale—wherein values are discernible and functional in deliberation—"the source of values is not accessible through logical or empirical means... only through praxis. Thus, our values remain hypothetical (in a rational sense), only explicitly known (through inference) by reference to our beliefs and actions."16

He argues that a person forms and clarifies values from a dual perspective: "outer" and "inner." On the one hand people should understand they will be held accountable for actions performed in the public sector, and on the other hand they should be aware of biases, predispositions, and beliefs and how these emerge in behavior. Responsibility means being able to respond, accountable to relate to the social universe of, institutions, technology. One responds to the world in two manners: outwardly in considering the outcomes, moral and otherwise, of our behavior; inwardly in questioning the meaning of our lives, frustrations, and aspirations. One goes back and forth with what he calls a

dual dialectic. Macdonald is quite ready to call "self" that which is
the mediating agency, initiating this reflecting process.

In phenomenological terms one is asked to "bracket out," that is
to say, to "put parentheses" around everyday common experiences, social
happenings, or matter of fact interpersonal contacts. One can never get
to that unconscious world in which these values are rooted; but praxis
or the implementation of the dual dialectic may be able to free thought
and spirit to establish a more creative aesthetic and moral rationality
for the curriculum. The aim is to try to offset the technological mode
of curricularizing.

Utilizing the reflective mode, Macdonald seeks to apply this
methodology to certain specific questions, namely: Which values do the-
orists hold, and how can they be clarified to insure the greatest degree
of meaning for the student and teacher? He bases this application on
the existence of the cognitive interests already discussed. In inter-
acting with various cultural and personal referents, specific values
begin to emerge which are transformed into appropriate designs. One
begins being aware that from value judgments values can be inferred,
given a certain degree of candor and honesty. This "given" points to a
wholeness, a propensity for openness leading to and expressive of real
human growth.

A New Consciousness

Awareness of the tacit dimension is not always satisfying to the
self-reflective critic. In fact, the knowledge that is uncovered may
point to a basic fallibility in one's cultural and personal orientation.
For example, the language one uses may appear to reference deep meaning, as a symbolic expression of reality. But in actuality language is found to stifle meaning, basically because it is detached from the lived worlds of real persons.

We continually carry the tacit assumption—and communicate it to the young—that meanings are in words rather than in people; that words are rather than are not the things they refer to; that abstract words are of the same order of meaning as concrete words rather than on a different level.¹⁸

A person's language ought not to be seen as a mere appendage of the self. Discourse is not simply geared to a technological transmission of information. Macdonald's adaptation of praxis might bring to conscious expression his notion of person versus individual. The two categories are frequently confused and used interchangeably. They are qualitatively different in his approach to knowledge inquiry.

Macdonald cites Piaget, Dewey, Erickson, Bruner, and Kohlberg as examples of developmental social construction of reality—that have exempted the person from the process.

... from Locke to the present day, abstract individualism presupposes a picture of civil society, where members are independent centers of consciousness and possess non-context-dependent interests, wants, natures, purposes, needs, etc. ... Concrete individualism conceives of the individual as a person, an agent of choice—a source of (yet to be discovered) intentional purposes, capable of valuing (yet to be discovered) activities and involvements and capable of (yet to be discovered) forms of self development.¹⁹


In arguing against abstract curricularizing, Macdonald attempts to translate theory into "practical" deliberation and common sense decision-making. In other words, value inquiry requires one to note what is crucial in the process and what is peripheral. Equal weight is not given to all judgments. We are all aware, to begin with, that while society makes rules for itself, not all advances and norms are of the same import. For example, Macdonald distinguishes in a school setting between preference rules, e.g., hall privileges, and constitutive rules, e.g., forbidding cheating. Preference rules and constitutive rules are also found in society as a whole: military service, dress codes, pre-marital and extramarital sex, a college education, and "basic" education, for example. One needs to delineate differences and similarities in order to know what one really must do to translate value judgment into action. The student cannot assimilate all rules as important. "Relevancy" might be judged by the student on the basis of the interchange between preference and constitutive rules.

Socio-drama or autobiography are two means of eliciting our responses: do the questions embodying curriculum design reflect preference rules or constitutive rules? The clarifying process is crucial if we are to really understand the values that affect our selection, interpretation, and organization of content and means of inquiry. "This kind of reflective activity also has the merit of completing the human response to liberation by a momentary and sometimes tentative but real dissolution of the subject-object distinction so prevalent and humanely
damaging in Western Civilization." In other words, this very human
dimension of self-reflection strengthens the battle against means-ends
curriculum work.

From Consciousness to Spirit: Centering as the Aim of Education

Macdonald has already provided us with a transcendental developmental model for curriculum. The aim of this ideology is centering, allowing the person to fully maximize all human capacities. This is done through pattern making, playing, meditative thinking, imagining, the aesthetic principle, physical education, and educating for perception.

Here he is cultivating the meaning of the unseen. It is a proper antidote to the utilitarian, rational business-like verbal approaches to the traditional curriculum. Furthermore, centering is a healing therapy, bridging the mind-body separation. We are biological entities with spiritual aspirations. Centering, as an aim of education, has a definite religious dimension according to a recent reviewer.

Macdonald's appreciation of the potential of our religious traditions to provide an adequate framework for contemporary education is a needed corrective to the historical myopia of those religious educators who, in their search for identity, focus their attention exclusively on the frameworks of a Kohlberg or the rationales of a Tyler.

The religious perspective simultaneously adds a broadening dimension to curriculum work—can anything ever be known completely—and a unique expansiveness. Phenix speaks of the transcendent urge as that which resists the urge towards any "fixed content of knowledge, beliefs or skills that the learner is meant to acquire." Macdonald disdains the instrumental, the thing-a-fication of a life of holistic knowing. He does not ignore science but rather scientism. Science is part of a whole universe, all of which will never be known, none of which should ever be ignored. It is in this mood Macdonald suggests that

The act of theorizing is an act of faith, a religious act. It is the expression of belief, and as William James clearly expounds in *The Will to Believe*, belief necessitates an act of the moral will based on faith. Curriculum theorizing is a prayerful act. It is an expression of the humanistic vision in life.

Theorizing, critical reflection, and praxis require the joint participation of student and teacher. An act of faith, by Macdonald's definition, is not carried forth in solitude. One locates that point in which self realization illumines—while personally relating to another creature. Curricular content, explicitly formulated as bodies of information, facts and figures, may facilitate the approach of centering. He would agree that "hard data" situates one in the world. The teacher can serve as an authentic model of how a person can allow the world to talk through him, not for him.


CHAPTER IV

VALUE, LANGUAGE AND CURRICULUM:

THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF DWAYNE HUEBNER

Introduction

Dwayne Huebner asks curricularists to consider the way they use language in their work. He asserts that the language used in educational endeavors reflects the various value systems to which theorists and practitioners lay claim. Like Macdonald, above, he believes that curricularists are often unconscious of the value frameworks and language usage they implement in their work. Huebner points out how we confuse alleged statements of fact with value judgments; some observers consider this to be practicing philosophical analysis. These values and value judgments and interests do not exist in a vacuum but are manifested in human relationships. Huebner is very concerned that curriculum both mirror and help create caring, loving, open relationships. One task of philosophy is to help clarify our language usages. There is a moral quality to being precise. In simple terms, people ought to know what they mean and mean what they say. Educators need to be particularly sensitive to this issue of clarity in language since the cognitive, affective, and physical growth of a creature is at stake.

Open communication is hampered by the inclination to control and manipulate people. Huebner suggests that schools exist as political institutions whose major category of 'goods and services' is power.
Power itself is neutral; however, it is often exercised by curricularists, practitioners and administrators to limit creative expression and personal inquiries. One example is predetermined expectations for the student, translated into goals, objectives, and specific learning activities. This approach is characteristic of the traditionalists whose guiding principles for curriculum construction were based on assumptions about learning, the needs of society or the pupil. The real problem is that guidance may easily be synonymous with governance, and that is a political issue!

Huebner suggests alternative ways of understanding what is curriculum. Of the various value systems or rationales that structure curriculum writing, Huebner identifies the aesthetic and ethical modes as most important. For him the educative environment is a place of more than physical structures, and tools of the trade—texts, professional apparatus, supplies. The educative environment, in its broadest sense, is where the means of inquiry and discovered knowledge draws out the student's response-ability. It is a place for trying to reconcile order and chaos in an aesthetic sense by personalizing the implications of both. By realizing how states of being exist in one's own life, it may be easier to deal with their conditions in the world at large.

The attempt to find beauty and integrity in the widest range of forms and sources of knowledge is an aesthetic and ethical issue. It has a significant ethical dimension. Huebner advocates that persons in the educative environment seek to restore a wholeness to their lives. Much of the dissension that exists in the world is a result of
incomplete attentiveness. Listening is an art form to be nurtured and helps transform detached individuals into relating persons.

Huebner mentions that conversation is both the content as well as a process that builds relationships. Within the educative environment, concentration makes persons aware of one another as temporal creatures. Conversation implies that two persons actively listen, speak less, and so care for one another more. For him, temporality is related to an appreciation of the present moment with its possibilities for such heightened communication.

The traditional language of learning—goals, objectives, scope, sequence, and activity—are not wrong, only insufficient. Science affords school persons an opportunity to inquire, to test, to establish controlled experiments about human behavior. But there is a question of value that goes beyond the knowledge the scientific method can uncover.

**Value Systems and Language Usages**

Huebner continues Macdonald's argument against a perceived uncritical acceptance of technological rationality. The need for clarity of predetermined goals and effective evaluation of carefully delineated learning activities occupies the traditionalists and conceptual empiricists to a large extent. However, for the reconceptualists curriculum writing should be comprehended from a larger perspective.

Huebner agrees with Macdonald that the characteristic language of the traditionalist literature (and all curriculum writing) reflects basic human interests. Through the reconceptualists' critical theoretical concern with language one can identify and articulate these
interests which result in the formation of special value systems. In short, as theorists, we reconsider options as choosing, self-reflective creatures. The task of the curriculum theorist

... is to lay bare the structure of his being-in-the-world and to articulate this structure through the language and environmental forms that he creates. ... [T]heorists should call attention to the tools used for the shaping [of the world] in order that the world being shaped can be more beautiful and just.¹

Huebner's early professional orientation was instrumental, in a negative way, in guiding him towards a so-called "uncovering" function in his work. From a background in positivistic science he moved into teaching philosophy and religion. Alienated from a goals-objectives perspective in traditional educative environments, he sought alternatives. Contact with varying theological and philosophical traditions brought him new awareness. He thus formed the basis for an expanded methodology for comprehending varying curriculum rationales and language usage. He wondered, "How could one plan educational futures via behavior objectives when the mystical literature emphasized the present moment and the need to let the future care for itself?"²

Huebner is concerned with the processes that mark inner change and transformation. But such an approach does not lead to an ego centered retreat from the affairs of the day to day world. For Huebner, consciousness implies a strong, social commitment. In other words,


"This requires awareness that the concern for the possibilities of the individual without equal concern for the social-political-economic condition within which we all live is hollow and meaningless."³

Huebner and other reconceptualists have tried to identify the value systems that motivate alternative curricular efforts in the classroom. This has heightened our awareness of the possibilities and constraints of the major rationales evident in curriculum writing today. In a recent study of reconceptualization, Mazza identified Huebner as a leader in this critical movement.

The thrust of the aesthetic/philosophic critique is the concern for the intrinsic nature and quality of the educational experience, apart from its utilitarian function for the achievement of goals. The original outline of this critique was forged by Dwayne Huebner in his opposition to the centrality of the categories of objectives and learning in curriculum theory.⁴

Huebner has a multifaceted background. His methodology has been framed by technical training and a predilection to humanistic education. We shall now examine some of the content of his theoretical position.

He speaks of five value systems that curricularists try to identify and/or develop. He labels these as technical, political, scientific, aesthetic, and ethical.⁵ At this point in time, while all five


are crucial to the valuing process, the technical, political, and scientific rationales are dominant. The technical orientation grows from the society's need to remain industrially and economically viable, thus hopefully assuring a guarantee for the physical welfare of its citizens. Of necessity there is a means–ends approach where objectives, activities, and evaluations are clearly delineated. He finds that the discourse systems of psychology and sociology legitimize the "analysis of the individual in the present or future social order . . . in terms of concepts, skills, attitudes or other behavioral terms." 6

Second, he admits that political power is not unimportant in the curriculum enterprise. Politics is the art of influence. Yet in the process of acquiring needed resources for allocation, and the placement of professionals to carry out duties, power may become a manipulatory end-in-itself.

Third, knowledge holds a great deal of power that can be elicited by scientific activity in the form of experimental design. Posing certain hypotheses, the theorist may discover why students react emotionally or physiologically in a given set of circumstances.

Finally, there are aesthetic and ethical value systems, helping us grasp what is going on in the classroom and larger society. One observes how both of these rationales can symbolize a search for wholeness, unity. They supply the moral question, "Why," in regard to the functioning of the first three utilitarian-like value systems. Huebner views the larger picture: "Indeed, the insignificance and inferior

6 Huebner, "Tasks of the Curricular Theorist," p. 269.
quality of much teaching today may be a result of attempts to maximize only the technical and political and perhaps scientific values without adequate attention to the esthetic and ethical values." 7

Both rationales are concerned with the qualitative interaction of a person with the environment. That environment is created through efforts to derive meaning from symbolic representation of reality. People share the ability to see patterns, to express themselves in metaphor, and to act on the basis of that knowledge. Common to both rationales is an avoidance of the ends-means patterning in curriculum where "use" of individuals as things disrupts the natural harmony of life. Huebner says it thusly: "The intent throughout classroom activity is not a search for preconceived ends but a search for beauty, for integrity and form and the peace which accompanies them, and for truth as life is unveiled through the acting and speaking of the participants." 8

Although there are commonalities between the two rationales, each has its own characteristics. Art is the act of transforming chaos to order, the unformed to form, dissonance to harmony. Though each expression is grasped through the subjective perception of the artist, a basic truth is conveyed: one's intelligence, emotions, and spirit join together as meaning emerges through contact with an artifact. Whereas technology symbolizes humankind's domination of the world, aesthetic knowledge seeks for integration of the world with all one's faculties.

7 Huebner, "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings," p. 228.
8 Ibid., p. 232.
Science enables us to analyze constituent parts of the whole; art aids us to appreciate that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

The aesthetic rationale of curriculum is inextricably related to the ethical realm. In both instances, a tension can be felt: limit versus extension, material versus spiritual, the articulate versus the ineffable. Huebner suggests that in confronting an artifact or another creature one is immediately impressed with the particular aspects, the details of what the senses say is there. Nevertheless, the existing object or individual is there, too, as a whole, despite the imperfections in human perception. The artist, the student, the one who is wide-awake (in Greene's terms), senses the possibility of gradually making whole that which is separate and detached. As one focuses on the existing but elusive sense of wholeness in the object of the world, a parallel awareness of an inner personal unity is manifest.

The teacher recognizes this situation well. He or she has been where the student now stands, and in fact continues to sense these apparently irreconcilable tensions. The teacher nurtures that educative environment in which personal awareness of these tensions is the first step of human maturity. In a self-reflective way the student is aided to realize his own potentiality through the act of wisdom. "This is the unique function of the teacher, the human aspect of the specific educational environment, who shares the rhythms of continuity and change, of necessity and freedom, with his students." 9

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The teacher assumes a tremendous responsibility in the presence of students. The ethical rationality of educational activity is nurtured by the teacher who accepts certain key concepts as integral to classroom endeavors. They are response-ability, conversation, promise, and forgiveness.

Imaginative expression of meaning is most significant when shared with another person in the act of conversation. The disciplines are one way we order, analyze, and synthesize the elements of the world. They are one vehicle of our response-ability. The knowledge that one derives from disciplined inquiry can be brought forth as an expression of promise between student and educator. There is joy in study, in uncovering meaning that builds a new future. But the power to influence, to facilitate, to draw out, is complemented by a weakness. The educator is not infallible but is subject to pride, faulty judgment, misinformation. The promise of new knowing is accompanied by readiness to forgive others and oneself for errors committed in common classroom endeavors.

From an aesthetic and ethical perspective one proceeds with an idealized version of wholeness. The type of dual dialectic espoused by Macdonald begins to enable one to see the sources of imperfection in this vision. Critical methodologies inform educators and students alike of the distortions of human relationships and the failure of language usage to express promise and forgiveness. Identifying his methodology as dialectical, Huebner means "... seeing the part in terms of the totality, the present in terms of the past and the future, and recognize

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that contradictions are also a mode of relationship which offer as much understanding as the present moment as cause and effect relationships."\textsuperscript{11}

The methodology emerges from consciousness. It is a mode of knowing one's self-reflective autobiography in the context of one's lived in community. He makes a distinction between teachers who are "individuals"—those who live apart and contemplate only their own needs and aspirations—and teachers who are "persons"—those who see themselves taking part in the larger totality made up of adults and children. Huebner advocates the ethical and aesthetic rationales in order that the manipulation and exploitation can be recognized for what they are: a blatant system of means-ends. In the ideal system persons would be viewed as ends in themselves.

\textbf{Language Usage}

Curricularists' use of language reflects value systems selected by the theorist. Huebner suggests that theorists ought to be much more self-conscious about their forms of discourse since language is often adapted uncritically from other disciplines and misused in the school.

But the unique characteristic of the curricularist is that he is a human being: able to be caught in someone else's web of language, able to make his own, but more significantly, able to stand back and

behold its beauty and form, to study is structure and function, and to generate new web-like patterns.\textsuperscript{12}

Huebner points out that we use (or misuse) language in a multitude of ways—to describe, to explain, to control, predict, or manipulate, rationalize, legitimize, or to seek affiliation.\textsuperscript{13} At the outset, he makes us aware that there is no single way of discoursing about curricular happenings. Curriculum specialists, teachers, administrators, radical critics, and students utilize language according to their immediate operating contexts and motivating interests (see Macdonald). Several examples should suffice to indicate the pitfalls of uncritical talk or possibilities for innovative conversation.

We describe routines in the class, and expectations for grading, as well as school policy. Nevertheless, as Huebner points out, description is used not only for material relations or bureaucratic operations but also for one's fears or dreams via poetry and other literary sources. In other words, the theorist should be aware that students' needs for self-expression cannot be limited to the conventional prose of "short answer essay" if creative classroom activity is to be appreciated in the widest possible way.

Turning to the language of affiliation, one sees how the framing of behavioral and cognitive objectives and evaluations reflects the curricularist's attraction to scholars and empirical scientists with whom they wish to be identified.

\textsuperscript{12} Huebner, "Tasks of the Curricular Theorist," p. 252.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., pp. 253-257.
For example, as curricularists adopt and adapt language from other disciplines, such as psychology, there are certain limitations. "Learning" is a term used to cover many phenomena that can be watched, measured, and evaluated in a clinic, laboratory, or classroom. But learning in that sense is not necessarily an accurate phrase to express the whole experience of the person. Knowledge inquiry and self-reflection may include a great deal more. "When . . . learning is pulled out of psychological discourse and used in another realm, such as curriculum, the scientific checks are not always brought with it. A word or expression current in curricular discourse may be no longer viable in the parent discourse system." ¹⁴ For example, "Basics": the term at one time had conjured up an image of the three Rs. Today the three Rs may well be relevance, response-ability, and reciprocalness—with meanings that transcend mere mechanical skills.

**Language as a Source of Educative Environments**

Huebner reminds us how Dewey suggested the construction of an environment that would educate. For example, scientific research in industry and the military result in a systems approach to learning, while stimulus and response studies often come up with recommendations for the school's efficiency and effectiveness. Curricularists are asked by critics such as Huebner to develop language that will help shape an environment that goes beyond the graphic, material designs brought on by science and technology, however efficient. Perspectives provided by Third force psychology, phenomenology, and mysticism have moved

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 259.
theorists such as Huebner to engage the aesthetic and ethical as key rationales for critiquing designs. But more than rationality and technique are involved. In other words, there are more than "inputs" and "outcomes" involved for the theorist who speaks in terms of vision, transcendence, and personal meaning.

The theorist is sensitive to creating those opportunities within the curriculum for ethical and aesthetic value judgments. Bureaucratic organization may thwart the nurturing of environments receptive to these rationales, but people like Huebner are optimistic that situations can be created which will evoke personal responses, thus shifting some of the traditional expectations of what education can provide. Huebner states that ". . . the educational question . . . 'what can and should young people learn,' can become 'how can knowledge be made accessible for use by people with diverse characteristics.'" 15

In this sense curriculum is what develops in the process of self-reflective, critical inquiry of the sources, regardless of content. Making knowledge available, however, is not simply a pedagogical act. It is also an existential and political matter. The theorist may be unable to make the widest sources of knowledge available to another because he himself is not open. He is blocked in intellectual and emotional development. Therefore, academic decisions about how to go about designing an environment for others are not clearly made. In the discussion of Freire, above, it was shown how an incapacity to reflect on

the nature of our speech reduces our power to act to influence others. Similarly, the power to influence others is political and exemplifies the degree of one's ethical concerns for another. In an unreflective state, "... we justify [the] abridgement of the rights of the young by talk of protecting them, [but] we are perhaps more likely to do it because we want to take our adult world for granted, and not have it brought into question by the young."16

**Temporality**

The world is not to be taken for granted. We have already critiqued value systems and language usages, lest they not be viewed and used uncritically. But we have not elucidated the real underlying problem. That problem is basically one of time, of prescriptions of change, and the ability to structure or control it, first in our own lives and in those of others. Huebner says that this is related to temporality, or the existential nature of man, especially now in a rapidly changing age.

We have noted how Toffler's *Future Shock* documented the unbelievable pace of change, leaving us unprepared and detached. Goals, purposes, and objectives are ways of preparing the student for achievement in the future based on the best of past heritage. However, Huebner goes on, the ability to state the purposes of the school neglects the real flux world in which the student lives. Furthermore,

By their very nature, goals, objectives, and purposes become statements of a desired future—a tomorrow. The present creeps in in the teaching. It is when the educator must deal with the student that he seemingly drops the concern for the past or for the future and focuses upon the present.¹⁷

Criticizing the language of learning (goals, etc.) is not simply a matter of changing the forms of discourse. Altered behavior is not the primary focus for measuring success or failure of a curriculum. More is entailed. Huebner introduces the notion of man as an autobiographical creature, a theme more fully developed by Pinar. Behavioral and cognitive changes, geared to the attainment of some postulated future good—to count by tens, to recite the Presidents by heart, etc.—are rooted in a certain time and place. Temporality implies that life's meaning is to be grasped in much wider terms.

A man's life cannot be described by what he is or what he does at a given time. His life is a complete something, capable of description only when the moments from beginning to end are unified by death. . . . Might it not be possible, then, that insights into curriculum planning for the individual are to be sought in the discipline of biography, as well as within the discipline of psychology?¹⁸

Everything is geared to maximizing the student's ability to confront his future and/or reclaim his past in relational proximity to others. Huebner does not ignore rational empirical sources for this task. A scientific rationality has been shown to be one of the legitimate ways of examining curricular activity. Science, like knowledge, is neutral. It depends upon its technological applications as to what ethical judgment will be made. In this regard Huebner says, "By using


¹⁸ Ibid., p. 242.
learning theory to build educational environments we make it possible for the teacher to enter into significant dialogue with the student as human being, not simply learner. This is the basis for my original distinction between learning and education.19

For example, programmed reading units can expedite the advancement of children with special difficulties. Statistical analysis of test results can reveal the significance of certain aspects of group or individual learning process. Huebner simply argues that the assumption underlying the scientific method and technological applications are not always apt. The self-critical introspective person, in the process of reflection, can create knowledge. Such personal knowledge exists although neither science nor technology can verify it.

The Moral Aspects of Language

Huebner is manifestly concerned about the moral aspects of our communication in school places. The institution does need certain structures that require measurement in terms of scores, group norms, cost effective scheduling of personnel. But if this is the primary thrust of language usage, how can one find out whether detached, compliant, "achieving" learners have gained the power to intuitively value their education—as persons. The society gears us to think about mastery and competence as rungs on a ladder that somehow leads us to the

vague goal of success. But there are other kinds of talk that should be taking place.

First it is necessary for educators and administrators to try to draw students, parents, and community leaders into conversation. It is through this kind of communication that the aesthetic and ethical rationales, earlier discussed, will emerge as primary value systems. Huebner asks that we disabuse ourselves of the illusion that certainty in educational practice is assured by our objective, systematic methods of testing, measurement, and management. A focus on the aesthetic and ethical concern of the school will allow alternative views of success to be legitimated. Through the art of conversation one might come to appreciate how openness that leads to a certain vulnerability, is, in fact, the source of great strength. Greene and Pinar speak a great deal how our structure of knowledge and methods of inquiry ought to allow for more personalist expressions of doubt, paradox, and conflict. The norm of consensus, political or otherwise, may not allow for a true articulation of beliefs or desire for action.

Huebner draws on Paul Tillich and Paul Ricoeur, a noted French philosopher, to put these questions of strength and fallibility, doubt and certainty into perspective for the school situation. Technical competency, skills and traditions need preservation; we are obligated to increase their accessibility for a contemporary nation must have the
widest range of talent from which to draw to insure creativity and viability. "But having them does not entail imposing them." 20

Huebner illustrates a related problem stemming from a misunderstanding about how certain assumed values make us competent.

Conformity, loss of aspiration, and hiding feelings are not a sign of personal strength. They are a sign of inadequate social structures. The reason that teachers do not know what to do when they recognize these weaknesses, mistakes and embarrassment on tapes of their teaching is that they do not work in a social context that recognizes that doubt and fallibility as essential—to maintain one's humaneness and essential as a source of continued growth and development. 21

Huebner's great contribution is helping us reevaluate what are the strengths and weaknesses in the value systems we implement through our educative environments. We know that we invoke a political rationality when we decide what aspects of our heritage are to be represented in our classrooms. The choice of content leads to decisions how to create that educative place which reflects the technical values of utility and efficiency. But that technical role ought not to be seen as the fundamental concern of education, though it may be the educator's main concern for training. "He forgets that the basic quality of education is its moral character, that the function of a fabricated environment is to enable men to be more human, and that even fabricated conditions can


21 Dwayne Huebner, "Developing Teacher Competencies," paper presented at the Meeting of Western Canada Educational Administrators, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, October 1979, p. 5.
be subservient to man, symbolic of his spirit, and tuned to his trans-
scending qualities." 22

Assisting the reader to focus on alternative interpretations of
environment, Huebner has still been criticized by White for not provid-
ing adequate practical suggestions. It is a question of what one means
by "practice." White is bothered by the beautiful descriptive talk
about the moment of "vision" when the "'evolving, emergent educatee
meshes with the historically developing society in a hermeneutical
classroom activity.'" 23

Although White the practitioner is bothered by the flights of
Huebner the theorist, it does not mean that there is is not "applicabil-
ity" elsewhere. Huebner explicitly has said that skills and techniques
must be made accessible—only not be imposed. That is, the real world
of the school is made up of two facets. There are instances where cer-
tain structural requirements of the school must be met—organizational
groupings and evaluations of students—and there are instances where
knowledge is presented, but not as the only symbol system for deriving
meaning in life. Huebner has reminded us of some questions to ask about
the relationship between the two and that is practical advice.

As Postman and Weingartner indicated more than a decade ago, "teach-
ing is a subversive activity." It can undermine neat political assump-
tions about the ideals of democracy, the neat assumptions we make about

22 Dwayne Huebner, "Moral Values and the Curriculum," paper pre-
seated at the Meeting on Moral Dilemma of Public Schooling, University

23 Kirk White, "The Work of Dwayne Huebner: A Summary and a
the infallibility of science to provide unqualified ease and comfort, and the assumptions we make about the words we use to describe what we do. It can question the power relationships that distinguish the classroom, or any other client-manager type of organization. It can undermine our own self-image as purveyors of means-ends, cause-effect techniques. But then all of this requires a self-honesty about what we want to be and do, vis-a-vis our students. Huebner forces the question when he asserts that we must hear what we say, and say what we hear. Any curricular endeavor is ideally predicated on this issue.
CHAPTER V

CONSCIOUSNESS, THE AESTHETIC AND THE CURRICULUM:

THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF MAXINE GREENE

Introduction

The reconceptualists have consistently suggested that curriculum be conceived from the perspective of heightened consciousness or critical awareness. They have argued for the use of phenomenology, critical theory, politics, theology, and language analysis. They contend that the malaise pervading our knowledge-rich, power-dominant society demands a radical response from the schools. One could say that the reconceptualists thus far cited have tried to legitimate the kinds of critical inquiry that challenge scientific cause and effect and technologically organized knowledge. The curricular orientations of the traditionalists and conceptual empiricists have been found wanting as ways of dealing with depersonalization and alienation.

In this context, we are drawn to the works of Maxine Greene. She is preoccupied with teaching people to be self-reflective and critically aware of the relationship between thought, feeling, and behavior. Implicit in her writings is a feeling that unity among these three dimensions is no longer perceived. Considered by many observers to be an existentialist philosopher or theorist, Greene urges us to personalize our investigations into various knowledge sources and the value positions we take. Greene and others argue that this situation has
developed from educators who, in Huebner's words, have given primary
attention to the technical and scientific domains of curriculum.

Along with other existential thinkers in the twentieth century
America, she [Greene] takes a stand against the unexamined assump­
tions of a society steeped in positivist thinking and social self­
righteousness. . . . And within society, oppressive social institu­
tions perpetuate that single view of reality by discouraging
consciousness.1

Kliebard, Macdonald, and Pinar have all identified this positivism in
the practical means-ends application of technically and scientifically
based curriculum making. Rational input/output systems have been the
convenient symbol utilized by administrators in their bureaucratic
guidance of practitioners in their work.2 It is necessary to redress
the imbalance; rationality is not enough.

The reconceptualists, including Greene, would persuade us to open
our eyes to what Alfred Schutz calls "multiple realities." Greene, her­
self much influenced by Schutz, has aesthetically related this issue to
education:

The curriculum, as I see it, may be regarded as a number of provinces
of meaning, each associated with the kinds of experiences available
to young people of different ages, with different biographies, . . . .
Our concern in teaching, it seems to me, is to enable our students to
interpret these experiences, to acquaint them with and free them to
reflect on the range of cognitive styles.3

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1 Margaret Ann Huber, The Renewal of Curriculum Theory in the
1970's: An Historical Study (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan,
1979), p. 57.

2 See Herbert M. Kliebard, "Bureaucracy and Curriculum Theory," in
Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar

3 Maxine Greene, "The Artistic-Aesthetic and Curriculum," Curricle
Some Critical Concerns of Maxine Greene

Greene does not consider herself a theorist but rather as one who engages in or "does" philosophy; she specifically wishes to avoid the reconceptualist designation.\(^4\) Frankly, given the wide ranging philosophic, literary, aesthetic, critical, and historical dimensions constituting reconceptualist approaches, her caveat is more academic than real. We certainly honor her opinion; nevertheless, her philosophic position substantiates the rationale offered by critical, morally, and ethically concerned reconceptualists.

As a philosopher, Greene does not expect each teacher or student to eclectically devise some sort of all-encompassing system by which to derive meaning from life. Each encounter with texts and companions can evoke a unique response in the teacher or student. "The teacher has to decide what makes sense for him. The decision is, after all, the object of 'doing philosophy': to find aperatures in the wall of what is taken for granted; to pierce the webs of obscurity; . . ."\(^5\)

Greene asks the student to inquire into the tacitly held value systems by which we live through everyday activity. For example, what are our attitudes toward our work; how and why do we relate in certain ways to family members, companions, colleagues, and strangers? By "doing philosophy" one removes questions such as the "value" and the

\(^4\) Maxine Greene, written communication to Paul R. Feinberg, December 2, 1980.

\(^5\) Maxine Greene, Teacher as Stranger (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, 1973), p. 263.
"purpose of life" from the universal or abstract realm of discourse to the concrete person.

Greene argues that art draws us out of our regimented, objectified existences. Literature, works of art, music, and dance can involve one as more than a mere observer or perceiver. Art motivates us to return to our homes, our leisure, and our work places more sensitive to the problems, the satisfactions, and the aspirations of the people we meet. It seeks to make the fragmented perceptions of life more whole.

A concern with indivisibility—and with the difficulty of encountering another as a person—is what leads me to turn to literature and the arts as a means of making understanding possible, not so much as an understanding of the idea of mankind, as some prefer, but for a sense of ourselves.6

One emerges from detached contemplation and self-reflection to act in the world. Janet Miller observes a strong social component in Greene's doing of philosophy:

... encounters with works of imaginative and art enable us to break with the mundane and to come in contact with ourselves, and that the more fully engaged we are in the human community, the more "richly individual we become" and the more we are able to take action upon the world in order to effect change.7

Greene prefers to classify herself as a philosopher of the arts and not as a curricularist, or in particular as a reconceptualist.8 The fact is that the arts do provide certain language usages that expand discourse for imaginatively dealing with personal valuing necessary in


8Huber, "Renewal of Curriculum Theory," p. 52.
curriculum study. Through the imagination, art helps articulate the struggle between fixity and the status quo and the intellectual and social challenges of each new generation: ". . . imagination cannot alter or distort reality. It can, however, impart value and significance; it can create new integral wholes; it can overcome man's alienation from his world." 

Art can give the opportunity to realize that the "reach can be beyond the grasp." Art is a change agent, a catalyst helping us to see within and beyond our ordinary everyday sights. Werner Haftmann has put Greene's approach into a large perspective, observing a transition from aesthetic passivity to dynamic expression: ". . . the traditional approach to art was based on the concept that reality was something 'out there' to be conquered; in contrast the modern view of reality . . . , is one which is created within man." 

For example the writer is only tangentially interested in "the jungle" as one moves into The Heart of Darkness. The reality of such a place, however, is uniquely perceived through the self-reflections of the reader. The meaning of the Congo transcends geography.

Imagination does not mean folly. Imaging is a way of looking in upon oneself. It was originally the antithesis of imitating what was perceived from the sense world. It signified the spark of creativity, 

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uniqueness. The imagination demonstrates the power of one kind of discourse. The conversations of scholars debating the authenticity or meaning of historical documents and the implications of empirical data signify another way of speaking about reality. Here the focus of knowing is objectified, beyond the knower. Greene says, "In contrast to the transparencies of discursive literature, the language of imaginative literature is like a mirror. The reader does not look through it to referents in the external world. He finds pointers to the interior silence, the original self."\footnote{Maxine Greene, "Literature, Existentialism and Education," in Existentialism and Phenomenology in Education, ed. David E. Denton (New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1974), pp. 83-84.}

The critically aware, socially conscious, contemplative person attempts to retrieve the elusive original self. Just as the artist makes his subjectivity the essence of a creative work, so the perceiver encounters the aesthetic object and refines it in terms of his consciousness.

**Consciousness and Its Moral Implications**

Greene argues that works of art are reflections of the designer's human experience and not simply manifestations of technical expertise. Moreover, it is the artist's way to try to come to grips with the existential dilemmas of life. The artist makes a conscious effort to articulate his visions and express frustrations within the finite, imperfect world he inhabits and creates. Therefore, it is in terms of one's own consciousness that aesthetic forms are perceived. The reader needs to be open to a variety of clues as he moves through the text. Greene
says, "His subjectivity is the substance of the literary object; but if he is to perceive the identity emerging through the enactments of the book, he must subordinate his own personality, as he brackets out his everyday 'natural world.'"  

Greene directs our attention to Kafka's *Amerika* in order to show how the aesthetic mode can induce the process--this subjectivity, this phenomenon--of self-consciousness. A young immigrant arrives at these shores bewildered and dislocated. He cannot grasp the meaning of social conventions or the role models of those about him. Clinging to a box of childhood memorabilia, he is incapable yet of focusing, of initiating the kinds of responses that would help him to determine his environment rather than being determined by it. As a result of certain traumatic events, the young man becomes wide-awake; he is aware of the need not only to break with the past but to positively act to build a new future.

Greene draws an analogy to the curriculum in which prescribed knowledge is reflected in the structured institutions that the young immigrant unpreparedly had to encounter. She says:

I have suggested that the individual, in our case the student, will only be in a position to learn when he is committed to act upon his world. If he is content to admire it or simply accept it as given, if he is incapable of breaking with egocentrism, he will remain alienated from himself and his own possibilities; . . .  

Greene's experience at the university makes her familiar with vast numbers of students who are, as she says, "effectively


13 Ibid., pp. 312-13.
domesticated.” Despite the fact that they are reticent about the possibilities for consciousness, a teacher must find those relevant themes that will draw the separated individuals together as dialoguing persons. But the "subject matter" doesn't matter.

Whatever it turns out to be, it may be well to locate it in some outer horizon for a while, to be examined after inner horizons are explored. If inner horizons are not explored . . . . there will be little possibility of discovering the causes of existing reality and the ways in which, in individual life histories, it came to be. 14

Before teacher and students encounter one another in this joint search for meaning, the teacher has a personal agenda with which to deal. Greene believes that new teachers must find ways to nurture self-consciousness as a way of engaging themselves and others in a self-initiated process of perspective knowing.

Too frequently, students arrive at teachers colleges with fantasy . . . . stemming from a childhood notion of what a teacher represents. . . . The process of becoming conscious of self as historical being may be very painful; but to teach people in a radical fashion is to awaken them to as much of the problematic as possible. 15

Janet Miller, one of her reviewers, was led to a bracketing-inducing consciousness as a woman. Miller was astonished, she says, by what she had taken for granted and as absolute in comprehending her own life. "How reluctant I am at times to let go of the security that others' definitions provide. The pain is necessary, however, if I am to participate in the remaking of a world constituted by my own vision." 16


Miller has attempted to retrieve those episodes that seem to have unwittingly shaped her previous world. She epitomizes the ideal of the teacher-as-model, trying to locate inner meaning in herself before projecting this vision on to another person. She has recalled her past, thereby loosening the psychological barriers that restricted her emerging consciousness. This process is one of the key elements in reconceptualization—awareness of one's autobiography.

Greene believes that this process of becoming self-aware has significant humanizing implications. Autobiography is not merely an ego-gratifying exercise in narration. The truly wide-awake teacher cannot be cloistered "into himself." Greene cautions, "We are all aware that consciousness does not mean mere innerness or introspection . . . . It refers, in fact, to the multiple ways in which the individual comes in touch with objects, events, and other human beings." 17 Thus a conscious person is more likely to be open to others. But being open to the inquiries of others and to share one's deepest concerns, aspiration, biases, or fears, leaves one quite vulnerable. For some, to be uncovered is to be unguarded. Greene tells us of one defense mechanism against vulnerability. "Lecturers seem to presuppose a 'man within man' where they describe a good teacher as infinitely controlled and accommodating. . . . His personal [feelings or] biography is overlooked." 18

Consciousness is the process as well as the phenomenon of liberation. The teacher and student ask questions of one another, thus

18 Greene, Teacher as Stranger, p. 269.
transcending the factual or procedural approaches in a given discipline. Freire referred to such emancipation as praxis. Problems of life, of economies, of politics, have a personal dimension else they are not truly problems. And any action undertaken to respond to these problems is continually reflected upon, lest behavior be action for its own sake. Greene offers a prescription.

Working in a dialogical relation with students, the teacher must try to move himself and them to ask the kinds of worthwhile questions that lead to disclosure and engage individuals in praxis. . . . Somehow, the struggle to master the cognitive structures composing curriculum must be made continuous with the quest for meaning. . . .

Aesthetic Inquiry

Huebner has observed that the aesthetic rationale is highly undervalued as a means of expanding the meaning of whatever knowledge we are pursuing. Feelings of confidence, exhilaration, jealousy, hatred are sometimes only freed in our consciousness through the catalytic efforts of a piece of art or literature. Greene puts it still another way:

. . . in the aesthetic experience the mundane world must be bracketed out or in a sense distanced, so that the reader, listener, beholder, can enter the aesthetic space in which the work of art appears. Captain Ahab's manic search for the white whale cannot be checked in any history of the whaling industries.

Aesthetic discourse in the curriculum provides the student with the opportunity to create metaphors, facilitating inquiry into the degree of correspondence between an artifact and day to day existence.


Melville intends for us to recreate Ahab's preoccupation with the white whale in terms of our own consciousness of daily events. One critic, however, has found Greene's use of literature to accomplish wide-awakening problematic. Pagano observed,

She sounds dangerously like our old elementary school teachers. Literature "discloses to us modern aspects of our own lived worlds" . . . . Surely there is something more valuable contained in the aesthetic experience than the opportunity provided for entering into vicarious experience for "broadening one's horizons." 21 Greene might say that her work is dedicated to human symbol making. Literature enables her to be an active agent in creating personal meaning.

Through curriculum we continually ask questions, disclose meaning, and go beyond the everyday. Greene has not sided with the romantic critics, such as Holt, Illich, and Neill, who view the needs and wants of the individual as sacrosanct, incapable of realization within the restrictive structures of society. She agrees that we can go about our "symbolic ordering" within the very tension that is created as a result of the on-going conflict between the individual and the civilization. As long as one is willing to "try and defy determinism . . . to break with the crowd," then compromises within the status quo are inevitable, even acceptable. 22 The tension is not reducible. Greene writes:

Education, because it is takes place at the intersection where the demands for social order and the demands for autonomy conflict, must proceed through and by means of the tension. Teachers, whose risks

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and failures are functions of the uncertainty, can only try to enable students to understand how the social reality affects them, ... how they can take action to transform.\textsuperscript{23}

**Conclusion: A Prescription for Action**

Heightened consciousness is a major dimension of radical curriculum work. For the reconceptualists it signifies a grasping of "multiple perspectives and need for choice."\textsuperscript{24} Choice implies alternative action. But Greene is not interested in abstract notions of right and wrong. She advocates new ways of creating opportunities for human justice.

One of Greene's critics perceives a kind of relativism he says mitigates her claim that the teacher is a leader of those who seek just alternatives. The perceived absence of guidelines for selecting any one philosophical tradition weakens her claim to activism; Rainsberry states, "By reducing the problem of value choice to a relativistic level, Greene misses one crucial point: value choices are not made in isolation, but rather depend on a constant dialogue within a community."\textsuperscript{25}

There is a social context, however, to both aesthetic and philosophical work. Emphasis on radical teaching and accompanying radical criticism squarely places her within a community aiming for justice. It may well be an imperfect community as far as the alienating structure of the school is concerned. It may be a community in which there are no


\textsuperscript{24}Huber, "Renewal of Curriculum Theory," p. 52.

guarantees of the transformation of social reality. But it is a community, nevertheless, where the radical educator is committed—in Freire's terms—to think and work, not without, nor for, but with the people. Greene writes: "... it is a luxury, not a waste for us to go off in search of alternative communities. Manipulations have to be dealt with inside the institutions that exist... Above all, cynicism and hopelessness must be overcome through serious work in the midst of the system...."26

Greene does not relegate all philosophic clarification of values and purposes to the school. While she is dedicated to inquiring into the predicament of the individual, this solitary creature does inhabit a larger world than the classroom. The individual lives within institutions that must be improved, not hopelessly ignored.

... I have suggested that educational philosophers may have a role to play in criticizing and clarifying what is happening [taxes, employment, educational expenditures, inflation]. It seems to me that our focus ought to be the political arguments taking place when educational policy is made.27

Greene is committed to action intentioned by thought and to thought which is realized through action. This dynamic, i.e., critical reflection upon which action is based, was Freire's methodology with Brazilian peasants; it helps loosen awareness of the relationship between power, knowledge, and human interests. For Greene, praxis ideally


leads to an overcoming of social domination and self-alienation; in such acts a community-in-formation emerges.

It reminds this author of a tale from Jewish folklore. Two men, each having lost his way, chanced to meet in a forest. Spying the other, each was elated, hoping that his new-found companion would know the way out. To no avail. But there was reason to rejoice. Said one to the other, "For certain I know that the way I have come will not lead us out. But together, friend, we can find the way." Ideally, our curricular inquiries will prove as fruitful.
CHAPTER VI

LIFE HISTORY AS CURRICULUM:

THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF WILLIAM PINAR

Introduction

Pinar's curriculum theory focuses upon the individual in relation to cultural shifts in the last two decades that have produced new sources of alienation: economic destabilization, social and racial conflict, and bureaucratization of public life.

Pinar has been sensitive to this state of affairs from his earliest days as an undergraduate in the 1960's. The war, urban riots, and politics of the "new left" affected him deeply. He expressed the need to emancipate the so-called intellectually dulled child he found to be emotionally repressed, psychosocially immature, and morally underdeveloped, who had been constrained by the dominant mode of schooling.¹ Pinar's goal was to synthesize the knowledge he had derived from these new left sources as well as from psychoanalysis, educational theory, and American and English literature. He also readily acknowledges the profound influence of Paul Klohr and Donald Bateman as major intellectual mentors. Huebner and Greene, too, helped to develop his perspectives.

Teaching in a Long Island suburb, Pinar's insights sharpened as he watched the process of his students' writing. After designing a

psychoanalytically based humanities curriculum at Ohio State University for his Ph.D., he went to Rochester and attempted to expand his familiarity with meditation, phenomenology, and curriculum. Pinar admitted his need for growth in the kind of setting provided by the university. His task was to sensitize others to the significant difference between training—acquiring information that allows for credentialing—and education—allowing the data of training to alter one's total cognitive, affective, psychomotor condition.  

Within this social context he extrapolated from the experience of new left thinkers of the 1960's generation in the United States to give currency to the work of Paulo Freire in Brazil. The latter's theme of limit situations and critical consciousness helped articulate what people like Pinar had been feeling. Benham points out that Freire, in his work with Brazilian peasants, demonstrated an

... effective method of combining cognitive skill-building with political and personal consciousness-raising—a synthesis that contained the essence of reconceptualist theory. ... Thus, he had shown that the theory need not always precede practice, although practice must be grounded in theory.  

Macdonald and Huebner, and to an extent Greene, have also developed a cohesive focus based on Freire and the radicalized social and political thought of the last two decades. In the same way that Pinar

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had opted for the university to pursue curricular, pedagogical, and hence moral concerns of human relationship, reconceptualists have not discarded the schools, imperfectly structured as they are.

**Pinar's Major Themes and Methodology**

Huber has pointed out that the locus of his orientation derives from a combination of personal and professional backgrounds. "A shift from teacher-centered or material-centered curriculum to a person-centered focus or inner experience in education is a part of what Pinar considers a new conceptualization in the curriculum."4

This perspective grows out of an understanding of the shift in the nature of the culture we now inhabit. The present historical period represents the concluding materialistic stage in an industrial age. It has been a time marked by consciousness of objects, performance objectives, and behavioral psychology. Now a new era is beginning; it mirrors an increased concern with processes and human relationships.

What we are seeing is a person-centered curriculum theorizing that begins with the researcher. Pinar argues that the functioning theorists, or practitioners, must first and foremost come to grips with their own biases, valuing process, and personal behavior. Prior to intervening in the lived worlds of others, one must squarely face how individual expression of a theory is rooted in one's own life history. Such a self-critical awareness is brought on through the process of "wide awakeness," or, according to Greene, by bracketing.

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Education may ensue only in the wake of this type of penetrating self-analysis. And, following Pinar, one sees curriculum actually occurring between the unique self-conscious person and the subject matter studied. Such an approach can neither be suggested nor stimulated until the theorist takes the first steps to deal with his or her own alienation. Pinar says, "The self-estranged researcher is unlikely to do research of another character. If he is dissociated from his experience unaware of how, when and why he learned what he learns . . . then necessarily he must project his naivete onto whatever he studies."  

Ross Mooney, writing from a reconceptualist vantage point, considers there to have been an undue bias toward the empirical, linear, objective dimension of Western thought; therefore, most research is from what he calls a consumer's point of view. The theorists simply take in data and restate the data without really producing anything new. It is composed of "impersonal truths which exist on their own account independent of me . . . not to be concerned with what is 'good,' only with what is 'true.' . . . I am to depend on logic and testable demonstration, not on feelings and imagination."  

Mooney does talk in aesthetic, personalist terms of the antithesis to this approach as the optimal condition of research. Like Pinar's contention: the curriculum at large, and research in particular, ought


to be seen as a person-centered phenomenon. "Research is an operation by which I am trying to become a better self-teacher so that my experience can say more things to me, give me more to think about and feel."  

All of this discourse about person-centered curriculum, research and teaching can be subsumed under the category of life history and biography. In this regard Pinar's views are reminiscent of Huebner's position that education be considered the concern for the way the biography of the person confronts the developing history of the community. The individual must make active choices. For example, the community requires schools to "produce"; the school acts as an assembly line. Will the theorist intuit these values in designing performance based frameworks, or does a basic uneasiness about such apparently mechanistic approaches alert him to search for people-centered alternatives? 

Moreover, does one's biographical consciousness rooted in reminiscences of personal school-based catastrophes or exhilarations guide investigation of options for writing curriculum? Finally, each school person must ultimately face the inquiring student's puzzlement or attack: "What do you really believe is right?" Here is the moral dimension of curriculum work! Pinar's close associate, Madeleine Grumet, says, 

We propose to employ theory of autobiography and autobiographic writings to help teachers examine the ways in which they have moved within conventional forms in the expression of their own authentic statements. . . . Thus we would work to speak with teachers about

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7 Ibid., p. 200.
schooling, not as a static system of signs, but as a language that they simultaneously live, maintain, and transform.\(^8\)

This requires one to recall a past phenomenologically and psychoanalytically and then to project a future while situating these impressions and expressions in a certain cultural and political context.\(^9\) In short, while all of these remarks seem explicitly geared to the instructor, they ultimately ought to be integrated into conversations between student and teacher. The student needs a model of clarity, self-honesty, and creativity. This will be found within the reconceptualizing teacher.

**Curriculum Criticizing and the Postcritical**\(^10\)

One problem with curriculum today can be understood by discussing the research issues of "quality" versus "quantity" in terms of particular understanding and general understanding, respectively.\(^11\) Pinar is concerned with the problem of qualitative research. He suggests that we understand curriculum in a general or particular way. Do we focus, as

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\(^8\) Madeleine Grumet, "Toward a Poor Curriculum," in *Toward A Poor Curriculum*, eds. William Pinar and Madeleine Grumet (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt, 1976), p. 79.


\(^10\) This is Pinar's term to describe those who have gone beyond traditional or conceptual empirical theorizing to create an "affirmative new order." "Postcritical Reconceptualists," in *Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists*, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley, Cal.: McCutchan, 1975), p. 209.

the traditionalists do, on goals, objectives, designs that call for certain learning activities in the Tyler or Taba mode, or do we focus primarily on the person—that unique, functioning student who has certain relationships with the teacher and other students. Pinar and the other reconceptualists tell us that to the degree we focus on the particular, our research is qualitative.

There is an imbalance in the curriculum, weighted to the "general" category, concerned with guiding principles or frameworks for categorizing and quantifying. While some external control is obviously necessary, the problems arise in not being able to differentiate between the times when the ethical or aesthetic response is needed and the times when the logical, rational response is needed. For example, how does one react to or analyze a particular work of art: from a logical, historical point of view or art appreciation. As Pinar adds,

The more exclusively one relies upon rules of conduct—such as objectives for one's class to achieve—the more frozen becomes the situation ... In a discipline's effort to achieve objective knowledge it has absolutized the relative, atemporalized, and historical, and rationalized the political status quo.12

The argument against inappropriate or excess reliance on "general understanding" in quantitative research can apply also to theorizing. Cremin and Kliebard have pointed out how the conventional view of curriculum theory is rooted in the technical, managerial origins of the field. Theory was a guide to practice, a way of "staking out the field" with observable markers to inform the practitioner of directions to choose, of optimal behaviors, materials, and content.

12 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
Pinar suggests "caring" is a relevant part of the curriculum process. It serves as an antidote for the unhealthy effects of the objectification of curriculum. He addresses this issue in responding to Nel Noddings' "Caring."13 Pinar observes that caring is an emotionally based state of receptivity to another creature, that evolves from giving special attention to inner realms of meaning often dulled by attention to persons as "things." Society exerts a major influence in the latter direction. Pinar, drawing from Sartre and Freire, explains the institution's functions as those of caretaking, feeding, taming, or domesticating. Teacher and schools do not facilitate inquiry nor engage in this process except in the most routine matter-of-fact way. Rather, they encourage the following:


Pinar addresses himself to modes of consciousness, to the realm of within-ness as a way of combatting these forms of illness. As a point of departure, he offers some alternative notions about theory that go beyond the instrumentalism of earliest curricular thought.


Toward an Expanded Notion of Theorizing

The reconceptualists recognize that a person's imagination is a treasure trove of resources for emotional growth. It stimulates cognitive and affective creativity for dealing with one's traumas and enriching one's satisfactions. These more personalist, subjective, lighter possibilities for dealing with curriculum and/or theory were characterized by Macdonald as "playful" and "freefloating."  

Pinar traces the recent developments of this newer mode of conceptualizing from the 1930's when Boyde Bode commissioned his student, Harold Alberty, to try to cultivate a more humanistic curriculum field. Klohr succeeded in reconceiving a more self-critical theory, one concerned less with efficient management guidelines and more with transformative visions. In 1947, at the University of Chicago, Herrick and Tyler spoke of theory which would critically uncover human relationships between issues and supporting frameworks as well as projecting future ways of dealing with problems that emanate from the relationships. Applied to today, one might ask, How does one facilitate "personal growth" in the bureaucratic morass of sprawling school systems, or why are the arts or the aesthetic the first area to be eliminated when funds are curtailed?

These questions are asked by those who are very much a part of the community. The self-reflecting person knows that one's personal feelings and unconscious desires do not emanate from a vacuum. Each

human being is in part determined by the political, economic, religious dimensions of a particular environment. The goal is to understand the structure of all the elements in the cultural milieu in conjunction with the biographic dimension of the concrete, particular person. Pinar is almost fixated on the life history of the person in the realm of both life and history of the individual and the community. There is a real "I" in the process, which is sometimes lost. Particularly among intellectuals there is a tendency to immediately abstract from the concrete situation and begin analysis. One's effort is always to return to "the things themselves." 16

The theory he is driving at does not overly emphasize either the individual person or the society: Both are important. The theory is rooted in the life history of the individual, his self-knowledge and idiosyncratic characteristics, but this person lives within the structural world of politics and social intercourse. It is with one's similarly-searching contemporaries that the link is made between the temporal, linear world of duration and continuity and the realm of infinite possibility, or what others term "transcendence." In a personal vein Pinar shares an impression. "By working to improve the ontological quality of my own life, I am at the same time working for improvement of the ontological and hence political quality of my contemporaries' lives." 17


Methodology

Our educational experience is thwarted by a continual reminder of our finitude. We are limited creatures whose span of existence may be cut short without warning. The harder we try to wrest some measure of outer security through physical manipulation or intellectual pursuits, the more likely there is to be disappointment. The world is a given with its possibilities and liabilities. Pinar's approach to education simply accepts this matter-of-fact description of reality, including the fallibility of rational persons and our inevitable biological deaths.

Reconceptualization does attempt to situate the theorist in the middle of this lived-world that is neither adversary nor ally in any absolutist sense. One questions whether institutionalized schooling provides the student with enough chance to reflect, fantasize, and invent responses to the dilemmas posed above. The ability to manipulate the scientific method or to comprehend an historical critique and master related historical facts does not assure the student of the kind of intellectual and emotional growth that the curriculum ought to provide. Pinar strongly contends that once we in the school free ourselves from reliance on equating knowledge only with stimulus and response or management-by-objectives, our deepest Selves will emerge. He does not tell us whether we then go around in a state of perpetual awareness or consciousness, as if on a continual high. He simply says there are messages that well up from within.

There is trustable knowledge that we can gain of our motives, our priorities—shall we read?; what shall we do with our leisure?; do spiritual matters have me?; or, am I afraid of either asserting acclaim or
registering complaint? Our newly discovered views are, of course, sub-
ject to misreading, but that possibility attained in the honest "brack-
eting" marks the fullest degree of one's humanity, errors and all. "It
may be likely that we can achieve only a more-or-less correct identifi-
cation, but identification must be attempted. By focusing one's atten-
tiveness inward, the long slow process of access to the lebenswelt
begins, offering the hope of finally transcending it."18 Intuition is
that deep kind of knowing that informs one of the reasons for being
afraid--of a new grade in school, a pending geographic move, or going
out one's first date. Huebner, through his critique of language, has
helped to sensitize us to nuances within language, and the more sen-
sitive one becomes to language usage, the more sensitive one's intuition
becomes.

Pinar's recourse to etymologies is helpful again. He alleges
that true understanding far exceeds the codes, graphs, or memorized geo-
graphic locales. Understanding--in the sense of the original meaning of
theory as contemplation--is not, for example, an abstract notion of
goodness, harm, or even peace. Understanding emerges through a person
fully in touch with reality, conceived originally by the term physis.
"Physis is [sic] understood by the Greeks derived from lived experience,
not from the abstracted generalization associated with natural studies
like physics."19

18 William Pinar, "The Analysis of Educational Experience," in
Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar
19 Pinar, "Whole, Bright," p. 20.
Lived experience is that accumulated knowledge that one can self-critically retrieve in order to make a value judgment. Pinar and Greene in particular feel that life-experience can be "tapped" most readily by a confrontation with a text. There is a special relationship that inheres in the coming together of artifact, instructor, and environment. Through the following approach we learn not what that relationship is, but what it can be.

First one reads a text. Later one inquires into the language through note taking. The meaning in the text evolves in the reader's perception like the responses to a Rorschach inkblot, conjuring up images of familiar and unfamiliar sensations. Whereas Greene stresses the consciousness-raising function of literature in our educational lives, Pinar addresses the situation historically: "Autobiographic description and analysis offers the curriculum field a point of view it simply has not had. In the literature we have no concrete descriptions of an individual's experience of texts, teachers, students." Autobiography challenges the view that human development is increasingly vertical, that in terms of human meaning, greater is better than less. Autobiography is an associative technique that is firmly wedded to the given educational experience of the person and initially derives from it.

Phenomenology and existentialism are keys to the inquiry method


21 Ibid., p. 79.
provided by autobiographical reference. Grumet tells us succinctly, "As phenomenology repudiated psychologism and empiricism, as existentialism repudiated idealism, currere repudiates behaviorism and technocracy." As an example of currere in operation, let us follow Pinar's analysis of Kafka's *The Trial*, focusing on the person of Joseph K. Kafka's man Joseph is unreflective, sees only meaning in surface orders of things, and depends on technical rationality alone. In fact, the more bogged down he becomes in personal misadventures, the less adept his psycho-social orientation is for lifting him. Joseph K. is arrested, his psychic-social growth stilted. Pinar allows the text to be a catalytic agent.

One first reads the text carefully, engaging in textual analysis. Second, one places the piece in a literary and intellectual historical context. The personal responses of the reader then follow. That latter move in itself is designated the educational significance and prepares the ground for the fourth and most important stage, the reader's personal context.

This context requires one to address personal recollections and the relationship between self and others in a given field of study; also, one notes the various configurations of those impressions that

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inform the subject how he has come to know, argue, and discourse. Here Pinar is referring to one's personal intellectual development, social environment, colleagues, and family.

Pinar has adapted the method of currere to his own life. The approach is both painful and rewarding. He discovers sources of psychosocial alienation as well as physical self-neglect. These disrupting awarenesses ultimately contain the seeds of new growth. His candor and self-honesty make him even more trustworthy in his advocacy of currere in the school setting.

Implications

Frankly, those intent on reconceptualization have not operationalized their concerns. Will there be suitable time and space for theorist to engage in metaphor-making, and environment construction based on non-controlling use of language and material? One observer makes a similar point.

But the efforts of reconceptualizing the field of curriculum inquiry have not produced, as yet, a significant body of literature that is practical in a pragmatic or didactic sense of the term. There is not enough as of yet that actually shows us how you do something like phenomenological analysis or how you work for curriculum change in a critical theory sense. Pinar related that to the best of his knowledge there is no school presently implementing a reconceptualized curriculum. He implied  


that it is still in the building-clarifying stage.\textsuperscript{26}

Curricularists who are sympathetically inclined to reconceptualization are frustrated even while they are stimulated by its methodology. There are those who attend curriculum symposia that can excite the imagination, thus opening new possibilities for students and teachers to grow beyond the opportunities provided by the traditional models. Consciousness and transcendence as "content" for the type of curriculum theorizing is an enchanting prospect, but

While it is very exciting to speculate about the possibilities of developing higher consciousness through curriculum, the teachers and curriculum specialists in the small group kept returning to the practical. In a word, back home awaited pupils to teach and teachers to prepare, and the higher speculations contained in the conference papers neglected such everyday realities.\textsuperscript{27}

Such skepticism is helpful. It alerts us to the unfinished business "back home"; and this type of theorizing does not suggest prepackaged learning units. But in such uncertainty there is a direct benefit. We have a need to master a whole new vocabulary of personal meanings. We come aware of how little we yet know about ourselves in the process of studying and teaching. If classrooms, however, will continue to be only arenas for implementing technically mechanically designed systems, this bit of autobiographic awareness is not germane beyond creating an innocuously nice atmosphere. But if we are engaged in study with our

\textsuperscript{26}William Pinar, telephone communication to Paul R. Feinberg, March 10, 1981.

students, rather than teaching subjects to them, such psychological and philosophical inquiry is crucial.
INTRODUCTION: LIFE IS LIVED IN MEETING

Buber was concerned with the problem of maintaining authentic relationships. The resolution of the problem was not a matter of philosophic speculation; rather it was to be found in a demonstration of personal responsibility. The authentic creature, Buber claimed, is able to make a response through total attentiveness to another person. He spoke of being present before, or turning towards, another creature.

There are obstacles that hinder expressions of response-ability, or turning towards another. The difficulty must be understood in the context of the proliferation of all types of empirical and logical studies of man. The scientific inquiry process is based upon a subject/object distinction. One may, in fact, analyze a person, a place, a thing, or a process in terms of many constituent parts. While such an investigation may bring concrete, quantifiable results, it masks a more fundamental concern—that which Buber calls the wholeness of man. He implicitly means grasping

... man's special place in the cosmos, his connection with destiny, his relation to the world of things, his understanding of his fellow man, his existence as a being that knows it must die, his attitude in all the ordinary and extraordinary encounters with the mystery with which his life is shot through, and so on—not one of the problems is seriously touched on.\(^1\)

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\(^1\) Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith, Afterword trans. Maurice Friedman (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 120.
The philosophical disciplines are of little help, too, in solving this problem. Buber argues that the disciplines are weak to the task from two points of view: they may consider man as only "another part" of the universe and neglect his whole nature related to all other life; on the other hand, through its unique focus a particular discipline may neglect the necessary interconnectedness of all ways of knowing from other fields of study. In the process of coming at either of these two alternative outcomes, the difficulty of authentic interhuman relationship becomes crystalized. Buber states, "... for in every one of those disciplines the possibility of its achieving anything in though rests precisely on its objectification, on what may be termed its "dehumanization."\(^2\)

Buber is here arguing against the way the disciplines and empirical science have seemingly preempted all other ways of knowing. For Buber, life is lived in and through authentic relationship, and not intellectual forms alone. But the basis for choosing such a life today rests on too narrow a foundation. He urges persons to work towards a new integration of vital cognitive and affective powers within the realm of the spirit. While the mind is critical in helping to render the physical environment meaningful and habitable, it is by no means self-sufficient. For Buber, the intellect does not provide a significant explanation for the problem of man. He assigns this integrating role to the spirit. "Spirit, then, is not just one human faculty among others. It is man's totality that has become consciousness, the totality which

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 122.
comprises and integrates all his capacities, powers, generalities, and urges."

One who is wholly self-conscious in this way is actually capable of turning towards another creature in a non-manipulative fashion. Through the act of dialogue a person speaks the word Thou.

It must be emphasized that the search for the unifying dimensions of reality can only take place in the presence of others. A narcissistic retreat into one's deepest thoughts or escape into the larger collective of groups does not address the real problem. Moreover, metaphysics, though aiding the process of analysis, still leaves one with an abstract truth. If the wholeness of human beings is at stake, communication must reflect this concern. Buber cites a personal event that influenced the rest of his life. He calls this "a conversion."

I had a visit from an unknown young man, without being there in spirit. . . . I conversed attentively and openly with him—only I omitted to guess the questions which he did not put. Later, not long after, I learned from one of his friends—he himself was no longer alive—the essential content of these questions; . . . What do we expect when we are in despair and yet go to a man? Surely a presence by means of which we are told that nevertheless there is meaning.4

Buber is extremely candid in this self-realization about the need to make a decision to be more intensely with others. Again, to emphasize, it is inner knowledge mediated by an urge to know about the world including its quantitative and qualitative dimensions. Buber starts with no logical theorems or empirically verifiable formulae. Knowledge is found in the "meeting" of persons, that is, being together. As he


4Buber, Between Man and Man, pp. 13-14.
says, "all actual life is encounter." There are no preformed responses from authorities or written works to tell us how to derive the necessary knowledge to prepare for future relationships. People sometimes came to Buber to ask him for an explanation of his approach. He offers some evidence, however, of a very personal sort.

Instead, he turns the question back and asks his interlocuter to search his own life to see whether he can recall any experience in which a facet of nature arrested and engrossed him by the power of its uniqueness. Then and only then can Buber and his questioner talk, and necessarily in philosophical terms of what transpired and of its significance for human existence.6

The World at Large: Two Possibilities

One lives in a state of flux according to two basic orientations. Buber describes these as dispositions or attitudes, defining the two-fold possibility of an act of relationship.7 I-Thou is that condition when one partner addresses another with a desire for mutuality, when the focus is not on the particulars or the details in the other's make-up, but rather on his or her wholeness. The other basic expression, I-It, is never articulated with this sense of wholeness, but rather is a form of communication that grows out of an inclination to use, to experience, or to manipulate another individual. This expression is the antithesis of that which is whole. I-It is the address of a subject to an object, as a thing. Buber suggests that in the choice of attitudes


7 Buber, I and Thou, p. 53.
we distinguish our basic temperament, the spirit of our being. He says, "Whoever speaks one of the basic words enters into the word and stands in it."  

One's relation to the world is not limited to the sphere of human interchange. There are in fact three spheres: life is lived with nature, with people, and with spiritual beings. Within each of these areas, Buber suggests one can speak what he calls the primary word, Thou or It. As an example, he cites how a tree comes into his focus as an object, with all of its particulars; yet simultaneously, by "will and grace . . . I am drawn into a relation and the tree ceases to be an It. The power of exclusiveness has seized me."  

The power of exclusiveness allows one to set off all extraneous details of the object, to elevate that which was an It to a Thou. He speaks of this as a basic movement of turning, of being unconditionally present and attentive. Through another recollection he verifies what can be actual, real, immediate, in the life of a human being vis-à-vis an animal. On his grandparents' estate young Buber encountered an old grey horse, in a stirring moment of realization. "If I am to explain it now, beginning from the still very fresh memory of my hand, I must say that what I experienced in touch with the animal was the Other, the

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8 Ibid., p. 54.
9 Ibid., p. 57.
10 Ibid., p. 58.
immense otherness of the Other, which, however did not remain strange
like the otherness of the ox and ram . . . ."\textsuperscript{11}

Common sense, however, dictates that a horse, a tree, and a per-
son are not the same in regard to an act of meeting. Buber is not
oblivious to the problem of the gradations of mutuality that inhere in
the various relationship within the three spheres of life, noted
above.\textsuperscript{12} But he insists, in regard to the encounter with the tree, that
there is a profound experience of joining together.

The living wholeness and unity of a tree that denies itself to the
eye, no matter how keen, of anyone who merely investigates, while it
is manifest to those who say You, is present when they are present
. . . . Our habits of thought make it difficult for us to see that
in such cases something is awakened by our attitude and flashes
toward us from that which has being.\textsuperscript{13}

Buber is present before the tree; he is present before his horse,
and certainly he attempts to be present in the immediate realm of
relationship with another human being. But he suggests that from the
gradations of mutuality one does not infer there is a scale of better to
goodness. He says, "To this end, rather, our whole knowledge about the
world must cooperate, a knowledge that is ever again renewed through the
I-Thou relation, but is not born by it."\textsuperscript{14}

Buber would argue that life with nature, humans, or spiritual
beings is not a matter of either/or, Thou or It. While rational thought

\textsuperscript{11} Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{12} See Philosophical Interrogations (response to Malcolm Diamond),
Sidney and Beatrice Rome, eds. (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston,

\textsuperscript{13} Buber, "Afterword," I and Thou, p. 173.

\textsuperscript{14} Philosophical Interrogations, p. 37.
tries to categorize and analyze, he argues against dichotomizing. There is continual tension, as we have seen from Buber's idea of wholeness of life. Life is filled with necessary moments where an I-It attitude is more likely to prevail and other possibilities where wholeness, spoken through I-Thou, will emerge. The relational event—being present—reflects a possibility for more of the same—though it can never be planned—or its antithesis when consciousness and objectification takes over. One moves back and forth between the apparent satisfaction and security of the It world and what he calls "pure present." He advises us, "And in all seriousness of truth listen: Without It a human being cannot live. But whoever lives only with that is not human." ¹⁵

What is crucial to see is that the two attitudes are not unique to certain persons or situations. In other words, there are not two types of individuals but two poles within each of us. I-Thou and I-It are not exhaustive alternatives.

I by no means hold human "inner life" in general, and within it human thinking in particular, to be exclusively composed of occurrences of the one and the other kinds. . . . In the one moment he is over against another as such, sees him present and relates to him thus. In the other moment he sees everything collected round him and from time to time singles out, observes, explores, applies, uses. Both these moments are included in the dynamic of lived life. ¹⁶

Buber argues that one accept the reality of this dialectic—the movement back and forth of Thou and It—as the only way of surviving in the world. While organizations may only know the person as a specimen

¹⁵ Buber, I and Thou, p. 85.

or cog, and our feelings may be directed erotically onto an object of desire, there is the equally strong capacity to step out of what seems to be an "unlimited sway of causality." The institutions do not breed evil, any more than matters of the flesh are evil compared with the soul. Evil, says Buber, inheres in the absence of recognizing that there is a difference in the two states of being, and consequently not trying to alter the balance through actualizing one's living potential for I-Thou attitude. The process requires a choice within the realm of interpersonal connections or the larger community, "and if there were a devil he would not be the one who decided against God but he that in all eternity did not decide." 17

**Dialogue: Limitations and Possibilities**

Buber, does not provide a blueprint for decision-making. He allows a general basis for choice: alternatives are drawn from one's own sensing of the attitudes demonstrated in the everyday act of living.

Dialogue encompasses the possibility that human beings act in a reciprocal manner with one another and the rest of nature. The major obstacle is one's inability to distinguish true being from appearance, essence from form. But an awareness of the obstacles brings about the bright flash of realization of what can occur, the awareness that there is a difference between the "is" and the "ought." Maurice Friedman, Buber's biographer and synthesizer, addresses the issue as a dialectic of essence versus image.

The essence man looks at the other as one to whom he gives himself. His glance is spontaneous and unaffected. He is not influenced by the desire to make himself understood, but he has no thought for the conception of himself that he might awaken in the beholder. The image man, in contrast, is primarily concerned with what the other thinks of him. . . . There is, in addition, a third realm of "genuine appearance" in which a young person imitates a heroic model . . . .

Buber observes gradations in the way one lives and relates within the world; and he makes certain judgments as to what is more or less authentic. Nevertheless, the person himself is the final arbiter of insights and prodding to act differently. Buber watches others carefully, which may be ultimately the clearest way of knowing oneself. He tells us that there are those who go through life observing, looking on, or becoming aware. He refers here to those people who analyze others for details but miss character, those who let an object freely "happen to [them]," as in the perception of an art object, and finally those who elicit our response, who neither objectify nor desire objectification. One might say we engage in degrees of relating to another, ranging from mere detailing and record keeping to direct address.

The limitations of daily life hamper the realization of the last possibility. Buber refers to these limitations at one point as the crises of the modern world. He remarks how the human soul is paralyzed from the deceptive tactics people engage in to mask debilitating, alienating lonesomeness. Bustling activity does not hide a fundamental emptiness, a realization that the most vaulted expectations for human improvement are not realizable under the present circumstances. In the


19 Buber, Between Man and Man, pp. 8-10.
realms of technology, economy, and politics, one can detect the failure of the human soul. Machines no longer serve man but have appended man to them; the means of production and equitable distribution of resources are not based on cooperation but manipulation; the desire to influence others has meant self-aggrandizement of the powerful at the expense of all others.

Buber's social commentary grows out of a perception of the two great illnesses of our time: the urge for unmitigated individualism and the drive toward collectivism. Both conditions abstract, depersonalize, and contribute to the alienation of each creature—from his essential self and from others towards whom he ought to be present. "The individual is a fact of existence in so far as he steps into a living relation with other individuals. The aggregate is a fact of existence in so far as it is built up of living units of relation. The fundamental fact of human existence is man with man." 21

The more one goes toward the extreme of either individualism or collectivity, the less possibility there is for essential person-hood. One can be alone, living in solitude either as a hermit or as part of the larger social network of family, business, school. Kierkegaard embraces this solitude, renouncing the world of men and women, as the only way of resisting evil and meeting God. Buber inveighs against such a view, arguing that only in "meeting" others can one counter loneliness, can one find "himself" or "herself"—his or her essential self,

20 Ibid., p. 158.
21 Ibid., p. 203.
not mere appearance. The Single One, for Buber, lives with an auto-
biographical awareness that includes the possibility of relational
events with other creatures. Always implicit is the infinite possibil-
ity to transform It into Thou. There is a spiritual presence, God, in
the midst of individuals who encounter one another. While Kierkegaard,
in his zeal for God, admits the cessation of common ties with other men
and women, Buber argues otherwise:

The Single One is the man for whom the reality of relation with God
as an exclusive relation includes and encompasses the possibility of
relation with all otherness, and for whom the whole body politic, the
reservoir of otherness, offers just enough otherness for him to pass
his life with it.22

**Beginning to Dialogue**

Buber accepts the ordinary world, recognizing its limitations as
a reservoir for I-It, but proclaims the opportunity for I-Thou. This
attitude of I-Thou, however, becomes lost as the person becomes more and
more aware of and even attuned to self-isolation. Retreating from
unqualified perceptions of others into the realms of indirect formal
address, one increases "distance." The conceptualization of this phe-
omenon, "distance" and "relation," helps describe the interplay between
the two-fold way of knowing the world, I-It and I-Thou.

Buber admits that we periodically turn away from moments of "pure
present" in the world, from the sparks of realization that emanate from
"meeting" in order to comprehend the world—its parts or the sum of its
parts. The setting of the world at a distance, however, expresses a
critical antecedent to the act of relating. One steps back and

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22 Ibid., p. 65.
appreciates that other creatures exist independently round about him. One grasps the world in its particularity. The act of distancing in a sense is a neutral move, for it can become a condition for either I-Thou or I-It. As he says, the first movement (distancing) relies on perceptions of mutually existent creatures in an even and fundamental way.

But the second movement [relating] puts them into mutual relation with me which happens from time to time and by no means in an even way. . . . Here and now for the first time does the other become a self for me, and the making independent of his being which was carried out in the first movement of distancing is shown in a new highly pregnant sense as a presupposition—a presupposition of the 'becoming a self for me', . . .

The I-It is a primal word that cannot be avoided. But within it are two degrees of objectifying: one causes us to perceive others as objects, the other leads us to manipulate and exploit them.

Objective perceptions of others take place in the social realm. Yet the mere fact of being within a group, even one joined out of a sense of sympathetic solidarity, does not assure an existential, personal relationship will be forthcoming. For example, Buber was once part of a group demonstration. Though joined in common cause, he had only a superficial relationship with the people on his right and left. Suddenly his eyes met those of a man sitting at a distance, observing the event. In that spontaneous moment of meeting, he derived a greater effect of wholeness and oneness than was provided by his group marching in solidarity.

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24 Ibid., p. 74.
For Buber the fundamental act of human living is the realm of the between, of the interhuman, which focuses upon the duality of "being" and "seeming," the latter referring to a feeling of being. Somehow it is in this sphere of the between that the real significance of dialogue is noted. And in a larger sense, the reconciliation of these polarities contribute to an interpretation of the problem of man, the essential dilemma to which Buber's philosophic anthropology addresses itself.

There is little doubt for Buber that neither the quality of beingness or seemingness, spontaneity, openness, and the desire to be present before another—is exclusively essential to one type of person. We can only speak in terms of which one predominates in each individual. Each person has the capacity, the tendency, to base a relationship with another on appearances or images rather than to live through a deep and authentic wholeness. There is no content involved, no product that can be analyzed to determine some measure of success in the battle to be whole and to meet another as a whole being. Conversation—which is not mere talk or what he calls speechifying—is one way to establish a meeting with the other person.

The decision is not how to make the world but rather how to be with others in it. Ideally, the educator exemplifies the importance of being with another. One is less present before another when there is more concern about imposing oneself or one's values or in merely

25 See Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 203.
26 Buber, The Knowledge of Man, p. 76.
27 Ibid., p. 78.
conveying information than when one is intent upon helping another to "unfold." He believes thoroughly that within each person is the potentiality of articulating this dimension of the primal word, I-Thou.

In a conversation with Buber, Carl Rogers told of his own notion of acceptance. Buber replied,

Confirming means first of all, accepting the whole potentiality of the other and making even a decisive difference in his potentiality, and of course we can be mistaken again and again in this, but it's just a chance between human beings. I can recognize in him, know in him, more or less, the person he has been ... created to become. ... I confirm him, in myself, and then in him, in relation to this potentiality that is meant by him, and it can now be developed, it can evolve, it can answer the reality of life.

Rogers said he agreed with this view.

Buber's example of husband and wife suggests a similar openness that somehow links a past and future in the moment of presentness. Moreover, the act of gaining confirmation conveys a tremendous source of confidence that one can work towards personal redemption, namely, wholeness.

Ultimately, according to Buber, the occasion for establishing a relationship with another person presupposes the possibility of having an I-Thou relationship with God. The relationship with God does not require one to deny the world of sense and matter. Of course, one detaches from "experiencing and utilizing" things and turns inward as a step towards purification. But such a movement cannot be carried out at the expense of human relationship. It is egotistical to retreat into

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28 Ibid., p. 84.

29 Martin Buber, "Dialogue Between Martin Buber and Carl Rogers," moderated by Maurice Friedman, in Buber, The Knowledge of Man, p. 182.
the "enjoyment of the configuration of one's own soul—that is the spirit's lapse into mere spirituality." And mere spirituality does not speak to the wholeness that is central in his approach. Reason is also involved. Reason is not incidental, but occupies an important realm in man's relationship with others, too.

BUBER: ON EDUCATION

Buber rebelled against education-by-indoctrination, forced-feeding of clever maxims. Buber's on-going dialogue with Hassidism helped to chart his way. Here is one of the tales:

Rabbi Moshe Hayyim Efraim, the Baal Shem's grandson told: "I heard this from my grandfather: Once a fiddler played so sweetly that all who heard him began to dance, and whoever came near enough to hear joined in the dance. Then a deaf man who knew nothing of music happened along, and to him all he saw seemed the action of madmen—senseless and in bad taste."

Unfortunately, in the current vernacular we hear much of role-models. But role seems by definition to convey outward behavior which is to be emulated. With his story, Buber is expressing his own frustration with those who can only perceive outward manifestation of certain actions. There is more to action than behavior. Trust, confidence, affection—relationship may grow through perceived gestures and movements. Or, in other words, one searches for receptivity to wholeness, both within oneself and locating it in another.

Education, Buber posited, must be viewed as only another manifestation of the basic relation of man to man. The primary human

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30 Buber, I and Thou, p. 152.

arrangement, however, is based on power; might coerces right. There are severe forms of exploitation: economic, social, and political. But Buber has hopes that by speaking the primary word, I-Thou, a new ethos and a new commitment will arise to challenge the old relationships. He suggests an approach by saying,

... not your It, your Thou is what is essential, though not surveyable. It is infinite in its possibilities, which nonetheless remain peculiar to it, possibilities given to you not for utilization but for opening up and redemption, all of them to each of you. ... Education arises, no longer subservient to the political relation, willing to melt down and to transform the political human realm, decisive without haste, ready to serve without fanaticism, prepared to wait and yet beginning ... .

Here is Buber's authentic commitment to the possibility of change. It is a steadfast hope, expressed through the Hebrew word, Emunah—faith. Education will accomplish this task to the extent a person chooses to turn towards, rather than manipulate or experience, another.

Some Underlying Ideals

Two major Jewish ideals are manifest in Buber's educational discourse: Hassidut and Halutziut. Translated, the former means a religious way of living that does not separate the pieces of matter from the moments of spirit. It points to that kind of person who is aware of the gap between distancing and relating, and manifests a sense of a

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"notyetness." The Halutz is the pioneer, the farmer in Israel, who has reclaimed the land, in whose absence the home-less Jewish people would still be without a center. Nevertheless, "National ideology, the spirit of nationalism, is fruitful just so long as it does not make the nation an end in itself . . . . [When the nation does become an end in itself,] it annihilates its own right to live, it grows sterile." 34

The Hassid touches the world-as-it-is and reaches beyond his grasp. The Halutz, similarly, in an earthy fashion accepts the material and focuses on its transformation. From the example of the Hassid and the Halutz, one learns how to live in the world comprised of neither pure "meeting" nor pure "distance." But it is the Hassid who teaches the difference between the two aspects of life.

Admittedly, the ideal of the Hassid—which Buber feels has dissipated because of the decline of authentic orthodoxy—and the Halutz, starts with the world of here-and-now. It is the bubbling, pulsating, limiting life known to finite creatures. It is material existence that allows for actualization of man's potential to grow into a more moral creature. Speaking the primary word I-Thou marks a beginning. Though Buber talks as if these are separate individual types, one could imagine that Hassid and Halutz represent varying dynamic aspects within each person's character.

Buber informally synthesizes the Hassid and the Halutz. The Halutz realizes and follows the teachings of the Hassid. The words of the Hassid are translated daily into everyday actions—human renewal in

work, with family and leisure—that have a new spiritual dimension.

Buber argues that neither the land alone for the Halutz nor pure spirituality for the Hassid is sufficient. Yet, neither is denied an important part in creating a religious existence. Similarly, Buber would not deny the importance of the concrete aspects of education—texts, buildings, materials, organizational procedures. Nevertheless, he returns to the emphasis on speaking the primary word of relationship, I-Thou.

And who will take the lead in this task of speaking primary words? Buber is unclear. Will it be a leadership by an elite? All can aspire to become a "great character"; none are prevented from the possibility of becoming one, but not everyone will reach this status. The exceptional "great character," bears an inner unity, as a model and guide, and not as a repository of maxims.

That is, not only what the great character does, and how he does it, but what approaches him, what occurs to him, that to which he reacts, has an inner unity . . . the unity of destiny cannot be exactly demonstrated; it is a metaphysical postulate, or better still, a religious hope.

This is meaningful as long as we accept Buber's approach as an ideal to be realized by some, not all. Nevertheless, though not all will be perceived as "great characters," the effort needs to be made by all. Inspiring younger generations with a vision that brings finite material and infinite spiritual universes together is the charge laid upon this generation of educators.

This generation must be taught to despise the inflexible self-assurance which says: "I am well prepared. Nothing can change me


36 Ibid., p. 550.
fundamentally and transform the world before my eyes. . . . This generation must be made receptive for the Unforeseen which upsets all logical arrangements.\textsuperscript{37}

In short, the young must be taught by their teachers to be wiser, more humane, more receptive to, and able to cope with, change than those who teach them.

**The Teacher**

The teacher is a model, a "madreech," or a guide along the way. The teacher engenders confidence and self-confidence by the way he or she is "present." All other characteristics flow from these designations. The teacher draws out the student's capabilities. He or she attempts to "lift" persons up through education, and not to compel them to react from propaganda. Buber, himself, was a masterful teacher, keenly concerned in deed, not simply a pronounced creed. Hodes' testimony is significant: "He looked for faces that were struggling for form and shape. Then he helped them achieve identity. And those whom he taught in this way, through the power of his person, not by preaching but through answering concrete questions, became his pupils during his life and after his life."\textsuperscript{38}

The teacher nurtures and responds to two major instincts: the ego's desire to originate and the self's need for communion within a larger whole. The teacher is alert to the related tendencies toward spontaneity and constraint. The instructor is not a disinterested party

\textsuperscript{37} Buber, *Israel and the World*, p. 163.

to the educational enterprise. Hence, he senses the pupils' frustration with complete independence or freedom to experience whatever they want and with compulsion that is the demand to fulfill only another person's expectation.

The teacher can act this way because he knows what it is to experience "the other side" by virtue of having been in any given situation the student now faces. The teacher appreciates the fact that the student can gain confidence in the pedagogue, trust and esteem him greatly; there is, however, no way for the pupil to be present in the experiences of the teacher.

The writer recalls a story from an anonymous source: A devoted student sought further wisdom beyond what his saintly teacher could provide. The latter sent him to a distant village to study for six months with a revered sage. Upon returning the young student was inundated by his peers with inquiries about the newly gained wisdom. What meaning lay behind these holy words; what significance was there to the sacred symbols of faith? No response was forthcoming. Finally one cynic from the rear of the room called out, "So what did you learn?" "I learned," said the lad, "how the tzadik [righteous one] ties his shoes." Buber would say that it is always in being oriented "towards" another that any values are taught. Buber "... perceives the personality as a harmony of voices which together form the totality of being human. One of the leading voices in this harmony is the faculty of creativity and origina-

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And so it is with being in the presence of a great one or teacher who facilitates and engenders one's inclination "to be." The ordinary is suffused with the transcendent. In ordinary parlance we would say, "It's just good being around him or her." Moreover, communication is evaluated as much by what is not said as by what is said.

... the master remains the model for the teacher. For if the educator of our day has to act consciously, he must nevertheless do it 'as though he did not.' That raising of the finger, that questioning glance, are his genuine doing. Through him the selection of the effective world reaches the pupil. He fails the recipient when he presents this selection to him with a gesture of interference. ... Interference divides this soul in his care into an obedient part and rebellious part. But a hidden influence proceeding from his integrity has an integrating force. 40

Buber does not give us a blueprint, explicating his prescription: that when one acts consciously, one does so as though he did not. He tells us that the educator awakens the pain of loneliness and separateness. But that, too, is a real part of life. One who cannot address pain as well as pleasure is as inauthentic as one who fails to realize that the primary attitude towards another may include both I-Thou and I-It. Awareness of both aspects constitutes part of the process of becoming genuine. It takes courage to face the reality that also includes the possibility of being present. The teacher faces a real challenge. Buber says, "But, you say, he [your student] lacks the courage. How does one educate for courage? Through nourishing trust. How does one nourish trust? Through one's own trustworthiness." 41

40 Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 90.
41 Philosophical Interrogations, p. 63.
The teacher has another task which is to appreciate two major instincts in the person before him. There is the instinct of origination, that which prompts a person to shape and control material; it grows in solitude, in the absence of mutuality. Contrary to or complementary with origination is the instinct for communion. This affiliative yearning longs "for the world to become present to us as a person ... which chooses and recognizes us as we do it, which is confirmed in us as we in it."42 Buber speaks of the confidence one derives from the realizations of this instinct. It is a quiet confirmation that persons can be with one another without the inclination to "use" or "enjoy" another individual through exploitation.

Both instincts—origination and communion—represent a creative force, a spontaneity that is characteristic of life. Buber sees it moving one outward and inward, simultaneously. The instincts are in continual tension.

The student carries on his knowledge inquiry in a state of freedom throughout the day to day activities that might include field trips, independent research, and examinations. But freedom is not the essential element in Buber's approach. Buber views the student as a chrysalis ready for transformation. But he makes clear that this urge for independence—the instinct for origination—provides

... a footbridge, not a dwelling place. ... Freedom in education is the possibility of communion; it cannot be dispensed with and it cannot be made use of in itself; without it nothing succeeds, but

42 Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 88.
neither does anything succeed by means of it: it is the run before the jump, the tuning of the violin... 43

The teacher continually reevaluates how to act toward the student who demonstrates the urge for origination and the inclination towards communism. There are no formulae. It is not simply a matter of being in charge. One critic has said, "For he [Buber] places educational authority on a ground which is not merely consistent with freedom but also the necessary condition... Moreover, he appears to find the secret in a peculiar and paradoxical blend of self-suppression and self-assertion in the teacher." 44 This is to say, Buber feels that the truly wise teacher, assuming authority based on knowledge and experience in the classroom, can best understand the student's personal needs. The teacher experiences these needs and "pulls back," allowing the pupil to realize his own potential. The teacher provides opportunities but cannot guarantee outcomes.

The educator today must engage in a similar risk and give up some authority and desire to control the student. Buber warns that control can occur in disguised ways. It may come about with a showering of affection on a student but only as a way of "making him or her over" as if he or she were an object. The student still is perceived as simply a ward of the teacher, who [the teacher] only images an openness, a desire for unity, an unqualified show of affection. The educator must neither coerce by power nor constrain by showering an overabundance of

43 Ibid., p. 91.

affection. He or she guides, evokes, elicits, uncovers, with one goal in mind: that his or her presence—turning towards the other—will enable a similar attitude in the student. The point is to be able to see "the subjective justification of the opposite point of view." The realization of this condition points towards a not-yet-full mutuality:

There is an elemental experience which shatters at least the assurance of the erotic as well as the cratetic [sic] man, but sometimes does more, forcing its way at white-heat into the heart of the instinct and remoulding it. A reversal of the single instinct takes place, which does not eliminate it but reverses its system of direction. . . . I call it experiencing the other side.

But there is a qualification. Inclusion is not, ironically, all-inclusive. In an educational milieu, the teacher can go all the way with an ascetic, unerotic, holistic disposition to new knowledge and its critique. But not the student. Turning again to Buber, we see, "The educator stands at both ends of the common situation, the pupil only at one end. In the moment when the pupil is able to throw himself across and experience from over there, the educative relation would be burst asunder, or change into friendship."

There is nothing wrong with friendship! Buber only makes the point that reciprocity, at least, is not always possible. Buber states that the student is incapable of fully gaining access into the world of the teacher. The other side is still beyond.

46 Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 96.
Of course, the teacher does all that is possible to evoke and engender communion, a relationship that refines the primal urge of origination. But the goal of an I-Thou is not presumed. It is not bilateral and would not occur. That is what he found to be real, and he stood by his actual experience. According to one critic, "He did not argue from theory to life. Rather he tried to derive plausible intellectual structures for what life revealed when approached in openness."48

In connection with the discussion of the teacher, one must consider the education of character. The education of character is part of philosophical anthropology, the means of addressing the problem of man, or healing through wholeness, as Buber has already discussed this. Educating character has a universal importance. While the concrete subjects of a curriculum are important, the character that emerges as a student commences, transcends all else. Character allows for future growth, redefinitions, synthesis. One scholar has observed:

Thus, personality is a completion, a given. . . . The teacher may cultivate and enhance it, but the major energies in education must be directed at something more essential: at character education . . . character is task. It is a leap to what lies ahead. It is the link between a particular individual personality and the consequences of his actions and attitudes.49

Buber contributes an illustration of character education. As a novice teacher approached his geography class, he was greeted by a bit of indifference, some rowdiness, and the anticipated weightiness of


49 Joshua Weinstein, Buber and Humanistic Education (New York: Philosophical Library, 1975), pp. 45-46.
ordinary subject matter. Following a simple question by the teacher, however, one student responded by telling a story. Buber was enthusiastic about the student's transformation.

Quite unmistakably he had only in this moment made up his mind to talk about it. In the meantime his face has changed. It is no longer quite as chaotic as before. And the class has fallen silent. They all listen. The class, too, is no longer a chaos. Something has happened. The young teacher has started from above. 50

Education of character presupposes a mutual confidence, not necessarily explicit agreement. This confidence emanates as relationship and grows out of the urge of origination. The desire for communion is revealed through the knowing expression of the teacher. The teacher, too, can learn from the student, although the former may be manifestly more learned. Buber allows this to pass also as a dialogical relationship, though complete reciprocity may not exist.

Subject Matter

Buber was not a curriculum specialist. The classical explanation of curriculum as a "course run" would find no favorable response with him. He did, however, appreciate the need for structure, having taught and administered schools for youth and adults. Knowledge might be organized in some systematic fashion as "subjects," but the decisions as to what should be taught, were not as important as with whom and in which way knowledge was shared. Subject matter for him was a given, to which the teacher--infused with certain ideals and dreams--related indirectly. The teacher proceeds to teach students, not subject "material," though it is obviously part of the process.

50 Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 113.
Buber does not reject skills, tradition, and ideals by any means, but he sees them as aspects of existence which can challenge man to develop, not just intellectually, but wholly and thus in terms of his uniqueness as man. . . . [S]ubject matter for Buber is the concreteness of life selectively made available by the teacher and which the student not only encounters but also uses as a medium through which he encounters or meets the teacher himself.\textsuperscript{51}

There is, however, a single instance in which Buber digresses from this general disposition toward content and sounds remarkably like a classical curricularist. In one publication Buber traces the scope and sequence, at three levels, of a composition course.\textsuperscript{52} Here he envisions communication that begins with storytelling, moves to note taking or record keeping, finally comes to a rendering of thought in lucid exact terms. It seems ironic for Buber to have presented a "system" in light of his aversion to systematic approaches. But, life is sometimes paradoxical!

He advocated that more had to be done than skimming information from sources or memorizing formulae and theorems. The finest texts, the most colorful, ingeniously documented resources are not self-sufficient to the educational goal he envisioned. Herein lies an insight into another dimension of this complex problem of appropriate subject matter of education. As an example, let us examine the activity of reading and the interpretation of a text.


\textsuperscript{52}Buber, "Style and Instruction," in Believing Humanism, pp. 103-5.
Since both interpreter and author are men, interpretation must include an understanding of the preinterpretation of the interpreter and the world view of the writer. Summing up, we may say that the dialogical principle applied to reading means that, in addition to all the objective philological machinery, one must bring to the interpretive task an understanding of man, including that of the specific You who wrote, together with a will to relate to the writer just as though he stood here before me.53

We are speaking here of biography and self-reflection as a significant element.54 The curriculum, the content of the educational process is incomplete—whatever its nature—unless the person, as teacher, allows his life history to be shared with his students. The teacher may be the master of the text and the subject area; the theorist may guide the instructor with a means/ends rationale that is technically adequate but allows for no possibility of relationship as Buber has discussed it. The teacher who adopts such a technological rationale for dealing with his students is perceived as anything but the great character.

... they [the students] have seen the un-persons we have become by virtue of our learning... Worse, how many a man who teaches about society, politics, human behavior or personal values has ruled out of bounds the questions that a troubled world surrounds us with. By contrast, whenever we encounter a man whose discipline, no matter how technical, has somehow become the medium of his self-expression, we are deeply moved.55

Buber admits his fallibility, his limitations. His personal recollections enable us to see a man who has tried to make dialogue a living process. Although he may succeed or fail, his strength is shown by his attempts in full view.

54 See Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 124.
I have occasionally described my standpoint to my friends as the "narrow ridge." I wanted by this to express that I did not rest on the broad upland of a system that includes a series of sure statements about the absolute, but on a narrow rocky ridge between the gulfs where there is no sureness of expressible knowledge but the certainty of meeting what remains undisclosed. 56

The narrow ridge is a metaphorical landmark, directly related to another geographical figure of speech: the line of demarcation. It is continually there, day in and day out, as we try to reconcile the paradoxical situation before us: the primal urge of origination and communication, distancing and relation; the line of demarcation is the boundary between the limitlessness of the search and the limitations indigenous to the inquirer.

. . . the emphasis is given to the situation in which a certain man is posited at a certain time and place, with predetermined, though not foreseeable possibilities and limitations of realization of certain values--commandments. This situation is sent by God and happens to man. He should accept it not passively, but actively, just by finding his "Line of Demarcation." 57

Somewhere between the certainties and uncertainties of living Buber trusts that we shall find a place to live, to teach, to know, through the desire for the shared dreams and the reciprocal actions. This is part of his life of dialogue.

Perhaps the actions of two children on a playground best summarize Buber's ideas. The two children were jostling and bouncing one another with sudden ups and downs on a see-saw. After a while, either from fatigue or boredom with this type of play they settled down to a less exuberant type of play. They geared themselves to try to stay on

56 Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 184.
the see-saw as long as possible by maintaining a symmetry of motion and balance. There was a true demonstration of purpose. In order to succeed at their revised game, each had to simultaneously anticipate the moves of the other and be ready for the unexpected—if their shared play were to continue. Certainly each was keenly aware of the other's physical capability. But beyond this, one noted a joining of wills, of spirit, of purpose. Even if these children were not conscious of this, it seemed part of the underlying meaning of the event. Two single, isolated individuals lived the possibility of momentarily becoming one, even while remaining self-conscious creatures in their own right.
CHAPTER VIII

THE MEANING OF CURRICULUM: A SYMPOSIUM

(The Investigator; Moderator: Martin Buber, Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Participants: James Macdonald, University of North Carolina, Greensboro; Dwayne Huebner, Teachers College, Columbia University; Maxine Greene, Teachers College, Columbia University; and William Pinar, University of Rochester, New York.)

THE INVESTIGATOR:

It is a pleasure to welcome you to this specially convened symposium under the auspices of the Department of Curriculum and Instruction, the School of Education, Loyola University of Chicago. The theme is "The Meaning of Curriculum: Issues and Questions." The participants will be asked to address their attention to two major questions about curriculum: identifying the values that motivate our work and identifying the nature of the student-teacher relationship. The discussion will proceed with a statement of the common concerns that have initially brought these scholars together. In the second part of the symposium the participants will refine the distinctions between them. In this regard they will be asked to argue their position in the context of varying approaches to a high school level course based on Hassidic literature. And now, without further ado, may I present Dr. Martin Buber.
MARTIN BUBER:

Thank you all for agreeing to share your perspectives on the meaning of curriculum. In our academic work we are all conscious that scholarly inquiry can lead to abstraction and objectification. In the most human of all the disciplines—education—we have encountered an increasing tendency towards "facticity"; that education has largely come to mean the acquisition of large blocks of information that can be systematically quantified and analyzed. At this moment we are conscious of how this situation has a strong bearing on depersonalized human relationships within and outside of the school. People are so frequently valued in terms of how much knowledge they can assimilate for rational application to problems; while technology has solved so many problems by utilizing the scientific method, other skills are necessary for building interpersonal relationships. In your own curricular work you have attempted to show how many educators, with their technological orientations, have ignored the personal, the non-material, and the spiritual realms of knowledge acquisition. It seems to me that one of the ongoing tasks of education, through acts of relationship, is to enable students to become aware of values, rationales, or intuitions that incline one towards certain behavior.

JAMES MACDONALD:

These motivations you allude to can be termed human interests, which can be thought of as well as moral categories. Curricular work may emerge, for example, out of an inclination to control thought and action, to produce consensus, modify, or wholly allow free choice.
WILLIAM PINAR:

My own work in phenomenological analysis of personal life history clearly reveals the anguish of self-alienation as the sickness of our students and ourselves. We can nowhere even begin to heal the breaches in our relationships to one another until we grasp the sources of this personal depression: The current malaise in our schools grows from the belief that those in power manipulate those who do not hold power.

DWAYNE HUEBNER:

Dr. Buber, you have identified the I-It as one of the two major types of relationship or expressions between people. However subtle, it is an attitude that grows from one's perception of another human being as a "thing"; my own work in analyzing language has made me realize how little attention we give to aesthetic and ethical modes of valuing both in theory and application. Indeed, much curricular activity reflects a systems approach whereby goals and objectives and evaluation schemes are preplanned according to certain data about the needs of the society and the student. We may call this curricularizing education, but in reality it is training in the technological sense of input, output. Little attention is given to the realm of intuition; curriculum ought also to anticipate the fears of the one who must organize and assimilate all the new data. The student tends to be manipulated and managed and so later uses the same pattern to get ahead. I recently overheard students emerging from an art history examination ask one another, "How did you do?" Doing, making, assembling, manipulation of facts—all for a grade. Perhaps we need to redefine the humanities.
MAXINE GREENE:

The sorrow of all this, Dr. Huebner, is that we are really unconscious of how much of what we think of as education becomes in actuality nothing more than training. A major issue before us in this symposium and before teachers and students is how to grapple with the conflicting values that affect theoretical work. Are teachers ready to provide models of critically aware thinkers and feelers? Throughout much of our common endeavors we here have referred to the ideal educated student as the "wide-awake one" who knows how to make connections. The connections of which I speak link our personal experiences—life history is a more useful term of which Dr. Pinar is fond—to the content being studied. In general, a more intensive focus on one's "within" will help engender necessary curricular renewal strategies.

For example, I teach in a very large institution. By definition the university is one all-encompassing entity, the parts of which are all supposed to be intricately related to the whole; but we know what happens in mass gatherings of any kind: The individual, that is, the separate persons within, is ignored. I am a part of the machinery of this mass institution with its process of evaluating and credentializing. But I am not ready to succumb to the implicit, often impersonalizing, bureaucratic demands of such a place. The controlling function of the university is at odds with the self-critical, liberating dimensions of literary study I advocate. Perhaps I am being too psychoanalytic, but I feel that each of us in the university harbors both inclinations. I hope the values of "mega-versity" will not dominate.
BUBER:

From our respective backgrounds we have come to similar conclusions about the abstract manipulatory nature of schooling today. The focus of much curriculum work, as you've observed, is concepts, facts, and historical analysis. Today, scientific research provides us with more primary data and critical sources than any previous generation. However, from the earliest grades youngsters are imbued with a primary love and need for information. Customs of quaint communities, the ideas of the famous or infamous historical persons, or the behavior of contemporary people are analyzed and reported on. The abstract nature of this learning process is revealed in the personal distancing, the detachment of the student from the object of inquiry. There is another way of putting the matter: the objectifications of knowledge. Knowledge is valued on the basis of our ability to quantify, to separate into smaller parts, which is then used. The code is simple: the more knowledge, the more credentials, the more material benefits, the more personal professional status. There is a concomitant manipulation of one human being by another within this pathetic situation. Teachers are hard pressed to show results of their efforts while students are anxious to "get ahead"; all this means that the act of knowing anything about the past or present—in the arts, humanities, or even the sciences—in little or no way tends to touch the personal world of the student.

As a response Dr. Greene would have all curricularists become more conscious of the manipulatory aspects of such a system and then locate the inner resources we all have for a wide-awake moral critique
of the status quo. I think this emphasis is misplaced. Such an emphasis could undoubtedly be construed as a renewal of spirituality, as a way of nulling the grosser dimensions of materialism, objectifications, and thing-a-fication of life. No, the response to our malaise is found not in the highly personal private realm of consciousness but in what I have called the "inbetween," the relationship between persons.

MACDONALD:

You are suggesting a different locus of educational emphasis. The problem, as I see it, is that in the absence of clearly delineated self-knowledge, wide-awakeness as Dr. Greene has pointed to, the possibility of entering non-manipulatory relationships will have little chance of becoming actual. But one of the critical dimensions of dialogue, as I understand it, is having a primary understanding of oneself and of your neighbor.

BUBER:

I think we are becoming trapped by the same abstractions that we have criticized in others. We can best delineate our differences by suggesting a specific course of study. Since most of you have used literature as a major focus in your own attempts to reconceptualize the curriculum, I, too, shall use literature. The stories of the Hassidim are as good a place to start as any, though of course I would recognize the Bible as the greatest source book ever for stories.
PINAR:

You have repeatedly stressed the role of the master, the rebbe. He provides the exemplary model for living. The actual experience of the rebbe becomes an archetype for certain types of leadership in the realm of intense interpersonal relationships. If I can say so, it seems like one models the rebbe in an effort to focus attention on one's own inner world. This can lead to uncovering those intuitions and actual recollections which are connected with earlier personal experiences inside and outside of school. The attempt to locate the genuine self may be nurtured by a continual bouncing back and forth between the reaction to the folk literature at hand and a phenomenologic, psychoanalytic grasp of one's own life history. I have already argued against those who assert that this is a type of introspectionism that has no place in curriculum. The act of bringing elements of our history to the surface refines the act of self-understanding so necessary to the teacher who yearns for an authentic non-manipulative relationship with the student.

GREENE:

I agree that the Hassidic literature of which you are so fond, Dr. Buber, provides us with a certain framework for this personalist, impressionistic probing. One begins with the inspired teacher, who himself has broken with the fixed patterns of manipulatory interpersonal relationships in order to discover the spiritual sources for self-purification; and this process of becoming aware leads to facilitating the improvement of others. This momentary break with the world appears to be similar to what others of us have phenomenologically called
bracketing out the taken-for-grantedness of life. Only then can one discover the true origins of perception about the world. These folk tales and legends are textual beacons guiding the teacher through the darkness of self-ignorance that may lead to unconscious explorations of others. The literature helps us to evolve a new curriculum perspective for avoiding enforcement or imposition of ideologies, codes of action.

BUBER:

I am afraid that this degree of self-probing—existentially, phenomenologically, almost psychoanalytically, conceived—has potentially very harmful consequences. Indeed, it is not to deny that in each person there is a uniquely flowering soul, our ego, capable of freely reaching out to shape and recreate the world, but this certain identity or individuality, as others might say, is not recovered by peeling away the levels of this worldly experience as one peels away the layers of an onion. Hassidic literature shows that one's real needs, fears, hopes, are recovered in visible act of dialogue between persons inhabiting and relating to one another in the midst of the physical world. This is unlike certain mystics who claim that only after intense self-scrutiny can one begin to dialogue with the world. The Hassid argues that dialogue with the world is the prerequisite for authentic self-knowing. One simple conversation can reveal a great deal about many hidden elements in one's character.

Rabbi Moshe Loeb of Sason once sat among the farmers of a small community and overheard the following exchange:
"Do you love me?" one asked the other. The neighbor answered: "Of course I do; do I not befriend you in every way; have I not spoken with care; yes, I love you." But the first regarded him sadly. "How," he asked, "can you say you truly love me when you do not know what hurts me? He who truly loves another knows the ground of the other person's being, what his friend is wanting and what he himself is and is not contributing towards that need."

HUEBNER:

I am glad that you selected this story. It is an excellent example of the concerns that ought to motivate curriculars. Student and teacher join into a relationship, the nature of which provides a new perspective on how to get along with persons. Frequently, however, the teacher-student relationship seems only to be an incidental part of the curricular process. My colleagues agree, moreover, that too often the student is perceived as a fixed being with no personal biography needing to be accounted for by the teacher. The instructor's major task seems to be in implementing the design and engineering transfer of information to the neophyte. The reconceptualizers of curriculum urge that in an era enamored of technological patterning and conditioning that education must nurture the authentic temporal self of creatures—those who are, in Heidegger's words, "beings-in-the-world." I do agree with Dr. Buber that this amorphous, unique self becomes known through the so-called natural meeting.

In the tale Dr. Buber narrated, the world-views of the Rebbe and the student are distinctly manifested. Their respective hopes can be intuited through the brief exchange. Introspection is not denied. But the testing ground of any newly acquired self-knowledge is in the
physical act of joining with another, of turning towards another person in conversation.

PINAR:

On this note, I recognize that Dr. Huebner has keyed off one of the major emphases in Professor Buber's interpretation of the Hassidic motif. The qualification that I wish to add at this point should not be construed, however, as an indication that Dr. Buber is "for" knowledge-through-relationship, and the other reconceptualizing curricularists and I are "for" knowledge through self-scrutiny, alone. A point of fact: many of my colleagues literally fled the university in the sixties in search of solitude, through an individualism that wouldn't be tainted by the corrupting social influences of this type of mass community. But I remained to study and teach in this setting, for I keenly subscribe to a need for building bridges between those with similar and diverse points of view--social, political, curricular. I say all of this in view of the fact that my search for a curricular method is admittedly rooted in Jungian psychoanalysis, the radical psychiatry of Cooper and Laing, and selected areas of literary and educational theory. I presume that Dr. Buber finds the emphases growing from these types of inquiries to be potentially narcissistically overwhelming. But I see no significant difference between the Hassid's life of joy and personal fulfillment predicated upon knowing his strengths, weaknesses, and inclinations and our own advocacy of an intensive adherence to one's "within" as a way of rescuing school experiences for the aware, alert, young person. It's all a matter of the point at which one starts the inquiry process.
Is it possible, Dr. Buber, that you have not given sufficient attention to the first part of Hillel's dictum: "If I am not for myself—who will be for me?"

Buber:

Certainly the Hassidic motif is highly personal and impressionistic. It is patently clear that there is no we without an I. But the concern that has agonized me is that many educators have inappropriately tried to compensate for the stress on external valuations—for example, by identifying and rating people primarily according to some number system. The new stress seems to be an innerness, the search for the "real me," the "true self," the "person within." I am fearful that this preoccupation with the self, to the exclusion of seeking communion with others, has become an end in itself. It seems ironic that the impersonalizing aspects of technology have evoked this kind of reaction, whereby one who is frustrated, pained, psychically distraught, seeks solace in egoistic centering.

Rev Shneur Zalman was once confronted by his jailer with the following inquiry, "How can we grasp that an all-knowing God would say to Adam, 'Where are you?'" It is not that God doesn't know, but the question points to our own self-ignorance. But lest we ponder the issue as some kind of metaphysical or psychological inquiry, we should recognize that we are, existentially, in a certain place only in regard to where other persons are located. How does one neighbor meet and greet a companion. Joseph was found wandering in the field. To the stranger's inquiry as to where he was traveling, Joseph responded: "'I'm gone to
find my brothers." So they were to be reunited. The act of re-turning towards his siblings was the way for Joseph to deal with his ambiva- lences about his relationship to his brothers.

MACDONALD:

Elsewhere I have suggested that of the knowledge inquiry models we have, it is the dialogical one out of which curriculum most fully emerges. The curriculum, official notices and manuals notwithstanding, is created in the interchange between the students with a set of lived-in world experiences, the resources brought by the adult monitor, and the adult, as a fully functioning person. The course curriculum for "Jewish Arab Conflicts 1900-1948" emerges from documents, shared ten-sions and anticipations. Of course, however, the values that the stu-dent takes out as his own ultimately develop through an intricate pro cess of self-reflection. It guides one to action based on speculation and back to speculation leading to action. The dialogue is deeply rooted in one's own consciousness.

BUBER:

I am aware, Dr. Macdonald, of your own studies of Paolo Freire and the success that he had in implementing a literary program with Brazilian farmers. He attempted to sensitize them to the notions of the controlling, oppressive values that affected their lives. But your advocacy of Freire's approach would dilute the immediate contacts pro- vided by the dialogical relationship as I have tried to exemplify it. One is obviously called upon to use all the senses in recognizing,
turning towards and addressing another creature. Comparatively speak-
ing, I have urged that we become more clear about our own intentions, not from free speculation, meditation, or cogitation alone, but out of deep human association. Dictatorships abound, controlling our thought and movement. But our awareness of this stifling of the spirit comes not through freedom alone but communion. In other words we need one another in order to benefit from the state of becoming free of external and internal constraints. Life in itself is a kind of game, the rules for which can be learned neither in physical solitude nor via ideological argumentation.

The Hassidim tell how Rabbi Nahum found some disciples of his playing checkers on Chanukah in the House of Study. He overheard them disputing about various aspects of the game. One student claimed that he had a right to move backward whether or not his piece was a king. The companion knew that this was patently absurd and proposed that they ask a neutral third party. At that moment the master appeared. "The rules you argue about are not essential." They were taken aback. "As far as the game itself is concerned, you can consult any authority on this type of play. It's cut and dried. What is crucial is what becomes of the two of you together as you engage in the game. Specifically, you can only move one piece, in one direction, until you've reached your partner's back row. Then you have more options. The end of the competition results in one player being declared more skillful than the other. But the way you play together is infinitely more crucial than who is the winner. The real moves are made in the motivation, the
attitude, the concern that one person has for the other despite the ego allurements, and frustrations born of the competitive world in which we all survive."

Dr. Macdonald, it is in the immediate face-to-face challenges we hurl at one another that we learn most about ourselves. There is no one person nor dialectic that can ultimately determine what another person learns of himself or herself in the act of studying any discipline. The rules of checkers enable us to play with one another. But we create new rules—for living—through our play. It is we, you and I, whose play—that is, life activity—teaches us what we need to know.

THE INVESTIGATOR:

There is a consensus that the unexamined life is not worth living. In an impersonalizing technologically manipulating environment—in which the school is still a focal point—there is the search for the authentic self. Unfortunately, the "search for the authentic self" in each of us almost sounds like jargon. But the psychological popularizers make us cynical only about language; the pain of not knowing which signal we should be attuned to is real. It does not abate. Part of the problem is in the assembly line mentality where the specialists work on us and we, in turn, work on others. Those who would reconceptualize the curriculum would guide us to think and act more holistically while recognizing the sources of our values. These theorists have laid the primary stress upon existential, phenomenological, and philosophical analysis of personal states of being; these being a way to educate and become educated more humanely.
Dr. Buber's central teaching in this context is the dialogic essence of the human personality. Deep probing of the psyche, as a way of eliciting the valued decisions we all make, is too much akin to the type of spiritual flights of introspective quiescence that ultimately doom full human encounter. It is the communal character of one's experience in the educational act of knowledge acquisition that Buber unstintingly has upheld. With respect to Professor Buber and our other panelists, neither position in its entirety will conclusively address the problems of curriculum work we initially highlighted. For each human I-Thou relationship in which we share, we forge a stronger link to the I-Thou presence in which we sense an absolute value. For each act of grueling self-analysis we undertake, theorists argue we are that much closer to the uniting of mind, body, soul—all of which participate in the act of knowing the world through the subject matter at hand. There is a benefit that accrues to the student who is alert to the argumentation between both positions. A new perspective is created, stronger than the separate contribution provided either by Buber or Reconceptualizing theorists.

At this point we enter the second realm of discussion: the teacher as a model, as a functioning partner in the quest for dialogical relationship.

PINAR:

Dr. Buber, each of us at our respective universities is vitally concerned with more than cloistered ivory tower research. It is crucial to be with other human beings through joint inquiry into one field of
knowledge or another. Institutions of higher learning can provide excellent opportunities for wisdom to be shared amongst the generations. Our respective commitments to the classroom obviously reveal how seriously we take our privileges and responsibility towards those who form the lifeblood of the university, that is, the students. There is a kind of consensus among those who reconceptualize curriculum theory, that it no longer is adequate to be a repository of knowledge, teaching subjects. The teacher must first thoroughly be committed to teaching persons. This is the only real way through which we can address the psychic dissolution which one brings to such a high pressured environment.

MACDONALD:

Hopefully, the teacher can help the student via his or her own experience of living through the tensions of simultaneously wanting to separate from, and be a part of, the group. And Dr. Buber has clearly shown us that an inclination towards either of these extremes can become an evil. As I see it, the teacher of education attempts to maintain critical awareness of his own impulses and actions so that he does not succumb to the temptation easily available to the teacher, of moving to one extreme or the other.

BUBER:

The teacher acts to bridge his chasm by virtue of experience, perspective, an in-depth sensing of how one can turn towards, and be present before, another human being. The teacher must be an exemplar of
mutuality as the key antidote to that inclination we all have to use, manipulate, to treat others as things.

One finds the following tale from Hindu literature: The gods and demons were once engaged in a contest. "To whom shall we offer our sacrifices? They [demons] placed all their offerings in their own mouths. . . . Parajapti, the primal spirit, [then] bestowed himself upon the gods."

The ideal essence of each person is rooted in the act of turning away from egoistic solitude, and towards another creature. We have identified this movement as communion. The teacher is the awakener of this possibility for sharing.

GREENE:

I perceive a paradox. How can the teacher be the ideal exemplar of mutuality, of sharing, when in fact there is not parity? You have said that in an educational relationship the teacher can know the soul of the student but the student neither can nor should be able to know the world of the teacher. Only when the educational relationship evolves to friendship can this full mutuality ever exist. I do not understand.

HUEBNER:

Professor Buber, I believe that your distinction between relationship that is educational and friendship seriously detracts from the dialogical priorities you have originally set. If we curricularists
are to learn from you, Dr. Buber, our first task is to comprehend the apparent contradiction evident in these two categories of meeting.

BUBER:

In an educational venture there are certain objective aspects that cannot be compromised. The teacher by his or her status, orientation, and dispositions sees beyond the horizon in a way not allowed to the student. You cannot change nor do I think you want to change the nature of the communication that exists between these two parties in an educational venture. For an illustration: you do not expect the doctor to come to the patient for healing. There is an objective condition between them that cannot be altered. All I can add is that the great source of influence that the teacher holds vis-a-vis the student is humbling! A doctor is forever learning medicine since he is not privy to absolute knowledge about the unfathomable mysteries of the human body. By definition the healer knows what he can and cannot accomplish with the acquired and endowed skills at hand.

The Hassidim held their Zaddick in the highest esteem as one who uniquely understood himself and his fellow creatures. Yet the more wisdom he had, resulting from being able to unite material and spiritual realms in his life, the more he held back from imposing himself. There were, of course, perversions of this model, but the model is, nevertheless, firm and decent. Because of the high calling of the human being, each of us struggles upward and onward to be the measure of all things. The teacher thus, as a part of the whole of the species, assumes a
strategic high point among the disciples. But the higher the stature, the greater the humility. Through the literature we learn!

Rabbi Abraham said, "We say in our prayers, 'Every stone shall bow before you.' When man reaches the highest rung, when he reaches his full stature, only then does he become truly humble in his own eyes and knows what it is to bow before you."

The instructor may well represent a much higher rung than the student in the scope of knowing; but before his own conscience and the presence of God, the teacher realizes his own limitations and ceases any inclination to control or arbitrarily decide what is best. This, of course, is an ideal, but I feel that it is vital in our day to formulate ideals and to strive to attain them.

MACDONALD:

There is a tremendous responsibility placed upon your teacher. Professor Buber, I guess I am cynical after all of these years; many assume the mantle of leadership as they aspire towards articulating what you would call "absolute value." The teacher might act arbitrarily; in the process of selecting the effective world—i.e., the subjects, etc.—he might be imposing and propagandizing his own will.

BUBER:

Professor Macdonald, you are not the first educator who has been skeptical about ascribing this disposition to the teacher. Theoreticians and instructional leaders have, in the process of intellectualizing and psychoanalyzing the act of teaching, recognized their positions
to be vulnerable. You, yourself, have suggested a dual dialectic between outer and inner worlds by which the teacher continually checks his own valuations of ideas and people. If he is clear thinking, he will be able to see the correspondence between what he says and does in the community and what truth he actually nurtures in his soul. Yes, Dr. Macdonald, it is a commendable system for bringing a fresh honesty, an openness to the classroom. But you question my attitude to the teacher out of the same skepticism you apparently hold over your own position.

You see, it should be clear by now that I oppose systems of any sort; especially those that emerge from intricate intellectual and psychic networks. I do not believe we contradict our estimation of the act of dialogue as the highest work of the human being when we simultaneously focus upon the teacher's great calling and superior presence before the student. The authentic person who would teach fully grasps the absolute nature of the dialogical relationship and would do nothing to compromise the integrity of the student. And the moments of dialogue need not even involve words.

There is a tale of a young Hassid who, having exhausted his teacher's great store of knowledge, was sent to another village. There he found a famous rebbe, a teacher in the fullest sense of the word. He spent six months in the presence of this master. Upon return to his home village, all his peers and mentor inundated him with questions: What had he discovered? His answer: I learned how the rebbe ties his shoes!
From this story one gathers that it is in the day-to-day conduct—exemplified almost tongue-in-cheek by the act of shoe tying—that the most profound values are perceived and acted upon.

PINAR:

I appreciate your wider view—

BUBER:

I prefer to think of this as deeper and wider.

PINAR:

—of the educational experience. You do, however, seem to be a purist, Professor Buber. You bemoan the fact that there are no longer any great visions infusing the act of teaching with meaning, yes, you have said elsewhere "eternal meaning." You have accused contemporary pedagogues of being enamored of either the funnel or pump ideology: the student as only a passive receptacle of the wisdom of the ages, of the total source of all wisdom that simply needs to be "pumped out." But you invalidate the methods of some of the reconceptualizing theorists as much too intellectual and psychological for achieving a high level of honesty and communion in the educational setting. I'll admit that I am jealous for the approach I am continually testing and refining, namely, "currere." It is a way of overcoming liabilities inherent in a relationship where one partner, by virtue of age or experience or credentials, is not on the same level as another.
GREENE:

Dr. Pinar sounds like a university professor holding on for dear life. I am a bit surprised.

PINAR:

Deep down I believe there are great truths in the Hassidic treasury about human beings come to share knowledge about their world. Unfortunately, however, the high spiritual calling of some of the most esteemed leaders was compromised by flights of ego leading to manipulation and not reconciliation. I suppose I would like to depend on something more than the "immediacy of relation" to recognize these eternal values which you feel are so far missing in the perception of our teachers and students.

BUBER:

I appreciate your candor, Dr. Pinar. I hope that in these frank exchanges we have all taken something new into ourselves as a result of having turned honestly and lovingly towards one another. Your own work, and that of you others here, deeply interests me. Beyond the scope of your research and the breadth of writing about the problems of living in an I-It world are your personal commitments to help nurture more humane alternatives.

What I find missing, however, is any kind of stimulating vision to help focus our fullest energies. And I believe that occurs because we have basically been doing our work and living our lives as if there were a dichotomy to be preserved between the religious and secular
spheres of life. This is not a theological tract, but I'll venture to say that western man's inclination to compartmentalize the spiritual and material dimensions of existence has contributed to our anomie.

I have elsewhere argued that all education worthy of the name is education of character. The goal of entering into relationship with another is "character." It is the need, perceived and nurtured, to accept responsibility for a word, a gesture, a continuous series of behavior. The Great Character, though not necessarily a moral genius, takes the whole world into account when he responds to a question or addresses another. And the whole world means that through human dialogue one addresses the Eternal Thou. The teacher, because he knows the world of the student and his own world, is best suited for initiating this bridging of the gap between material and spiritual world within each student. Humanistic and religious values are interdependent; the educator who takes both perspectives into his active orientation towards students is complete and mirrors an image of the Great Character. It is a unifying image that would make the humanistic endeavors of the reconceptualists more thoroughly penetrating.

THE INVESTIGATOR:

I believe that Professor Buber has, in his writings, and here, today, more sharply articulated the position of the teacher in the educational relationship. In comparison with the reconceptualizing education, he explicitly verbalizes the great importance and responsibility of the teacher as leader. Thus he is more vulnerable to criticism since his stand for dialogue in an educational relationship and mutuality seem
incongruous. The reconceptualists are all actively part of the teaching corps and have legitimately reacted not out of theoretical concern but out of a fear of what they have seen in educational institutions: those who take advantage of others under the guise of "leadership."

Because Buber does not offer us a step-by-step procedure for teaching a course of literature or provide a handbook for rating teacher behavior, he is sometimes difficult to assimilate. Moreover, these curricularists and philosophers before this day only generally addressed the kinds of interhuman dilemmas that Buber focuses on in detail.

The purpose of this symposium has been to alert both groups of thinkers (theorists and Buber) to the concerns they have explicated in their respective endeavors. This investigator believes that the discourse of university curricularists who are drawn towards the act of reconceptualizing can be enriched from greater familiarity with Martin Buber. The synthesis has not yet been made, but the seeds are sown.

Our teachers relate a story of a person born without a soul. This man pleads with God for a soul. One night, in a dream, he entered Paradise and saw an emporium that sold a variety of wares. He entered and requested a soul. A heavenly creature placed a seed in his hand. The man cried, "I asked for a soul." "But," the angel said, "here we sell seeds, not souls. It is up to you to nurture that seed so it blossoms into a soul."
POSTSCRIPT

A symposium format was selected to effect a synthesis of the reconceptualists and Buber in a "personal" way. The writer has attempted to reflect the imaginative, innovative, playful mood that pervades the works of the reconceptualizing theorists.

Buber was not a curricular theorist, though his views on educational relationships strongly complement those of the four curricularists studied in this dissertation. Therefore, a new dimension of understanding is added by noting additional points of dissimilarity among some issues. While there are only relative differences, a spirit of controversy pervades this symposium, thus expanding the earlier discussion of the four reconceptualists and Buber.

Specific curriculum issues were selected upon which some or all of the symposium members could respond. The five panelists have made their observations in regard to specific topical questions with which educators will deal between now and the turn of the century.
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The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

November 20, 1981

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