Agesilaos II and the Politics of Sparta, 404-377 B.C.

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AGESILAOS II AND THE POLITICS OF
SPARTA, 404-377 B.C.

by
James G. DeVoto

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Thucydides 1.10.2: Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν γὰρ εἰ ἡ πόλις ἐρημωθείη, λειφθεὶη δὲ τὰ τοι αἱερὰ καὶ τῆς κατακευῆς τὰ ἐδάφη, πολλὴν ἄν οἶμαι ἀπιστίαν τῆς δυνάμεως προελθόντος πολλοῦ χρόνου τοῖς ἑπείτα πρὸς τὸ κλέος αὐτῶν εἰναι.

Plutarch Moralia 210d: ἄλλου δὲ ἐπιζητοῦντος διὰ τὰ ἀτείχιστος ἢ Σπάρτη, ἐπιδείξας (sc. Ἀγησίλαος) τοὺς πολίτας ἑξοπλισμένους "ταῦτα ἔστιν," εἶπε, "τὰ Λακεδαιμονίων τείχη."
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to the many people who helped make my graduate career at Loyola a happy one. I am most indebted to my director, Professor James G. Keenan, whose suggestions and understanding helped sustain my enthusiasm for the project. To Professor George J. Szemler I am especially grateful; without his rigorous but kind guidance, I would have strayed far from the path on occasions too many to enumerate. I am in the debt of Professor John F. Makowski for various details of organization, and I gratefully acknowledge, for points of style and syntax, the sharp eyes of Professor Leo M. Kaiser and the Rev. Joseph S. Pendergast, S.J. I might add that much credit for this work's completion is owed to the patience of my wife, Paula, and the skill of my typist, Esty S. Daly. Finally, with the indulgence of these people and others whom I cannot mention nominatim, I hereby dedicate this dissertation to the memory of my father:

φιλατέω πατρί

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PREFACE

The purpose of this study is to investigate thoroughly the effect of Agesilaos' career on the Greek world from 404 to 377 B.C. The usefulness and originality of the study lie partly in its being the first comprehensive treatment of the king in more than a century. It is also the first to incorporate fully the writings of the Oxyrhynchos historian in its presentation of events. Moreover, it offers several new interpretations of particular developments and trends.

Because modern historians have limited their works to one aspect or another of Agesilaos' career or have simply written lengthy surveys of the epoch, such questions as the nature of politics in Sparta, the extent to which Agesilaos and his friends created the Spartan hegemony, and the degree to which his designs were opposed have not been adequately addressed. This study attempts to bring these and other matters into clear and coherent focus.

A final note: the abbreviations for journal citations which appear in the notes throughout this work are those standard in L'année philologique.
VITA

The author, James G. DeVoto, is the son of the late Leo C. DeVoto, Jr. and Audrey (Middlebrook) DeVoto. He was born on May 18, 1948 in St. Louis County, Missouri.

He attended numerous grammar schools in St. Louis County, as well as St. Louis University High School in the city of St. Louis, Missouri. After his graduation in 1966, he entered the College of the Holy Cross in Worcester, Massachusetts, where he majored in Greek and Latin studies. During the 1968-69 academic year, Jim spent the year at the Loyola University Rome Center of Liberal Arts. He was awarded the Bachelor of Arts degree in Classics from the College of the Holy Cross in June of 1970.

Having received a fellowship for study at Washington University in St. Louis, Jim entered the graduate program and took his Master of Arts degree in Classics in December, 1972.

In September of 1975, Jim enrolled in the Department of Classical Studies at Loyola University of Chicago as a teaching assistant. He received a John and Helen Condon Fellowship for the 1978-79 academic year, and an Arthur J. Schmitt Doctoral Fellowship for the 1980-81 year.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND EVALUATION OF THE ANCIENT SOURCES

Agesilaos II became king at a critical juncture in Spartan history. During his long reign (ca. 399-360 B.C.), he witnessed both the zenith of Sparta's power and her irreversible decline after the battle of Leuktra. The background to his accession, the unusual manner in which it occurred, his highly effective campaign in Asia Minor, the role he played in the conduct and settlement of the Corinthian War and his control of Spartan policy in the decade following the settlement are the subjects of later chapters. First, however, a brief discussion is needed of the ancient evidence upon which understanding of Agesilaos' influence on Spartan politics must rest.

Epigraphical remains will often clarify aspects of Greek military, diplomatic and political life while Agesilaos was king. Yet with a single exception from the Artemision at Ephesos there are no ancient inscriptions which directly attest to Agesilaos. Similarly there is no numismatic material bearing on him since the

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1 The most convenient collections of these remains are Meiggs and Lewis' Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C., Oxford, 1971, and Tod's Greek Historical Inscriptions, Vol. 2, Oxford, 1968. Bengtson's Staatsverträge des Altertums, Vol. 2, Munich, 1962, which combines epigraphic and literary material, is also a very valuable tool for research: see the bibliography.

Spartans steadfastly refused to mint their own coinage for nearly a century after the king's death. Thus knowledge of Agesilaos' life and influence must be derived almost exclusively from literary sources.

Xenophon

The most extensive contemporary source for the king's life is the works of his personal friend Xenophon. Of Xenophon's many extant works, the Hellenika and his *enkōmion* the Agesilaos are of primary importance. Although the *enkōmion* preserves biographical details of Agesilaos' career, it is more an uncritical eulogy written after the king had died, perhaps as a gift to his son Archidamos. That Xenophon used the *Hellenika* extensively to compose it is clear because often the description of events in the *enkōmion* parallels almost verbatim corresponding passages of the *Hellenika*. The *enkōmion* omits

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3 Jenkins, *Ancient Greek Coins*, New York, 1972, 11, writes "In Sparta, in fact, there was a rigid and typically puritanical prohibition of the use of coined money which persisted until the third century B.C." Nonetheless, on certain occasions the survival of coins supplements our knowledge of Spartan policy. Thus, works such as Hill's *Greek Historical Coins*, Chicago, 1976, and Kraay and Hirmer's *Greek Coins*, New York, 1966, will aid the understanding of Sparto-Persian relations from 404-387 and provide evidence of the decline of Sparta's influence in the Aegean after the battle of Knidos in 394.

events not reflecting favorably on Agesilaos, yet details not preserved elsewhere occasionally occur. The problem of the *Hellenika* is more complex because the work purports to be a general history of the Greek world from 411 to 362 B.C. In such a work Agesilaos, though prominent, is merely one individual among many whose deeds are recorded. It is therefore necessary to consider briefly Xenophon's worth as an historian, not as an encomiastic biographer or essayist.

Several distinct problems emerge almost at once. In the wake of Athens' defeat and the excesses of the restored democracy (one of which was the execution of his mentor Sokrates), Xenophon adopted what became a *commenis opinio* in an age when the Spartans were restoring *πάτριοι πολιτείαι*. Many came to look upon democracy with deep suspicion. It seemed to lead eventually to mob rule and tyrannical imperialism which deprived victims of autonomy and freedom. The victorious Spartans sought to remedy such excesses and secure their own hegemony by imposing "ancestral constitutions" which were in effect pro-Spartan oligarchies.

Another influence which affected Xenophon (and Plato for that matter) was a growing admiration for monarchy. Xenophon's

5Westlake, "Individuals in Xenophon's *Hellenica*," Essays on Greek Historians and Greek History, New York, 1969, 222, n.41, observes for example that the *enkomion* makes no allusion to the conflict in Asia Minor between Agesilaos and Lysander.

6Meyer, Vol. 5, 273-75; Lesky, 691-93.
service with Kyros the Younger's Greek mercenaries exposed him to a man whom he later regarded as a model for the ideal ruler. Kyros the Younger apparently embodied many of the virtues which Xenophon would describe in his imaginary biography of Kyros the Great, the founder of the Persian empire. Thus it is important to recall that because of his disenchantment with democracy, Xenophon developed this strong undercurrent of sympathy for monarchical rule. 7

A second tendency in the Hellenika is a distinct philolakonian bias. While Xenophon is not blind to certain defects of the Spartan character and at times takes exception to Spartan conduct, 8 he evinces a generally favorable outlook on the polis which provided him with his Eleian estate at Skillous. As Grote observed long ago, 9 Xenophon could obtain copious information on Greek politics from pro-Spartan sources, while composing his work from a Lakedaimonian point of view, because he lived only 3.7 km. south of Olympia.

7Meyer, Vol. 5, 360; Lesky, 694.

8For example Xenophon believed that the Spartans had incurred divine displeasure for their hybristic seizure of the Kadmeia in 382 B.C. (Hell. 5.4.1). He also records the wide-spread resentment of Agesilaos' campaign against Phlius in 381 (Hell. 5.3.16).

Now that the two most salient traits of the *Hellenika* have been identified, it remains only to estimate Xenophon's worth as an historian. In antiquity Xenophon was usually regarded as more the philosopher than a historian. He tends to oversimplify and after the second book of the *Hellenika*, his work lacks the coherence of perspective from within Sparta itself. In the later books of the *Hellenika* he retains only a certain sympathy for the Spartans. Here his deficiencies most clearly emerge. He was unable to discern a pattern in the great welter of data before him, presenting only certain somewhat disjointed episodes which lent themselves to compelling literary treatment. He entirely neglected the career of Epameinondas until the end of the *Hellenika* where he only grudgingly admitted that the great Theban was a brilliant general. He passed over in silence the Boiotian constitution and the changes it underwent after 386. He makes no reference to the revival of Athens' maritime league in 377 and failed to explain the causes and significance of Kinadon's conspiracy at Sparta in 398. These omissions lay bare his difficulty in rendering data into a coherent and meaningful whole despite his considerable literary ability.

Some scholars have judged Xenophon rather harshly. Meyer has taken a more balanced approach. He admits that the *Hellenika* betray

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10Brown, 96.

11Lesky, 693; Brown, 96.

12Beloch, 3.1, 401, remarks that "Xenophon's *Griechische Geschichte* ... ist kaum mehr als eine recht unvollständige
much evidence of bias and partiality, but cautions that it would be a mistake in most cases to doubt the reliability of the evidence which Xenophon presents.  

On balance then, Xenophon's testimony about Agesilaos must be approached with certain things in mind. It is necessary to be aware of Xenophon's monarchic sympathies and qualified pro-Spartan perspective. As a friend of Agesilaos he almost always strove to present his benefactor in a favorable light. This tendency caused him to gloss over or suppress what another author would set forth routinely. Finally there is a clearly episodic tone to the Hellenika in which Xenophon sketches certain details with great literary flair. The work nonetheless is marred by serious omission, occasional negligence, antipathy to Thebes and a lack of thematic and interpretative unity. Also because Xenophon abandoned Thucydides' scheme of dividing years into summer and winter phases after book two, his chronology often is vague and confused.

Although as an historian Xenophon falls short of the stature of Herodotus or Thucydides, he is still valuable and the information

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Materialensammlung, die in diese Form wahrscheinlich gar nicht zur Herausgabe bestimmt war." Hatzfeld, Les Helleniques de Xenophon, Vol. 1, Paris, 1939, 15, wrote that Xenophon lacked the qualities of a true historian, grasping as he did only details, not substance. See also Jacoby, RE Suppl. 2, 513.

13 Meyer, Vol. 4.1, 263.
14 Breitenbach, RE 9A.2, 1671-72.
which he presents, while incomplete, is usually reliable.15

The Oxyrhynchos Historian

A contemporary of Xenophon who also wrote a continuation of Thucydides' work is the as yet unidentified Oxyrhynchos historian, usually referred to as P. Some tantalizing problems emerged with the publication of fragments from this author's work. The consensus is that P continued Thucydides' history.16 It was originally supposed that P concluded his history with the battle of Knidos in 394, but with the publication of additional fragments in 1949, some scholars decided that he carried his account of Greek affairs down to the imposition of the King's Peace in 386.17 There is even less agreement about the author's identity. Grenfell and Hunt, who discovered the longest

15 Meyer, Vol. 4.1, 263; Beloch 3.1, 401; Lesky, 693; and Brown, 87. Ivo Bruns, Das Literarische Porträt der Griechen in fünfte und vierte Jahrhunderts vor Christi Geburt, Hildesheim, 1961 (reprint of 1898 edition), 41-42, writes that Xenophon does not attempt to analyze Agesilaos' motives. His descriptions of the king are to draw attention to the subject, not the context of events. Bruns also remarks, 136-37, that in the enkomion Xenophon presents Agesilaos in such a way that the reader can draw his own moral conclusions, a tendency which derives from Isokrates. Even less than in the Hellenika, however, does Xenophon attempt to analyze Agesilaos' goals or mentality. Instead, he presents a mere narrative of events. Unlike Thucydides, Xenophon does not ask about a man's absolute worth which depends not on moral activity, but rather the forces of nature.


17 See Accame, 5-6; Bruce, 4 and Lesky, 700.
fragment in 1906, argued for Ephoros. Meyer believed that Theopompos of Chios was the most likely candidate. Jacoby believed that Daimachos of Plataia was the best choice because P shows a remarkable knowledge of Boiotian matters. Kratippos, Dilylos or Androtion have also been mentioned as possibilities, but Bruce's suggestion is perhaps the best. He believes that we indeed have the Oxyrhynchos historian's name before us, but cannot decide which name is the right one for lack of evidence. In any case it is unlikely without further papyrological finds that the Verfasserfrage will ever be satisfactorily resolved.

18 Grenfell and Hunt, *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, Vol. 5, London, 1908, 142-44. Jacoby convincingly eliminated Ephoros from contention by showing that Ephoros' arrangement κατὰ γενός (P followed Thucydides' annalistic framework) and the fact that he himself used P obviously precluded the possibility of Ephoros and P being the same person. See Bloch, *Abhandlung zur Griechischen Geschichtsschreibung*, Leiden, 1956, 319-20.

19 Meyer, *Theopomps Hellenika*, 17-20. Jacoby in Bloch's *Abhandlung*, 316, also shows that although Theopompos did continue Thucydides, his pro-Spartan bias, Isokratian style and the fact that he was not a source for Ephoros eliminate him from contention.


21 Laqueur, *RE* 5A.2, 2196. Jacoby believes that Kratippos, though he also continued Thucydides, was a poseur who lived in the first century B.C., not a genuine 4th century writer. See Bloch's *Abhandlung*, 329-30.

22 Bruce, 26-27. Bloch, "Studies in Historical Literature of the 4th Century B.C.," *Athenian Studies, Presented to W.S. Ferguson*, Harvard, 1940, 340-41, who prefers to leave P anonymous, writes that it is best "not to force the leading historians of the 4th century into the Procrustean bed of the *Hellenica* of Oxyrhynchos." Bloch believes that P's work did not survive because the work of his plagiarizer Ephoros superseded it, his style was rather dull and, unlike Ptolemy Soter whose work lay unused in the Library of Alexandria for centuries, P found no Arrian to resurrect him (Bloch, 339-40).

23 That such finds are possible has been shown with the recent
P has an important bearing on the early phases of Agesilaos' reign because he provides a remarkable counterpoint to Xenophon's description of the Asian campaign in 395. Adhering to the chronological framework of Thucydides, he provides parallel accounts of Konon's naval activity, the outbreak of the Korinthian War, and the best description of the Boiotian constitution before 386 to survive from antiquity.

Almost at once P came to be regarded rather highly for his conception of history. He exhibits an excellent knowledge of Anatolian geography, and gives detailed accounts of naval and military operations. Also his political analysis evinces superior judgment and insight. P is clearly inferior to Xenophon in literary ability as his style is rather plain, but his interpretation of history surpassed that of his more renowned Athenian contemporary. He has a publication of a fragment of P which deals with events of 409/08 in Ephesos. Ludwig Koenen, working in the Cairo Museum, has brought this new piece of evidence to light. See Koenen, "Papyrology in the Federal Republic of Germany and Fieldwork of the International Photographic Archive in Cairo," StudPap 15, 1976, 55-67.

24 See ch. 4.

25 Bruce, 157-64.

26 Jacoby, Fr.Gr.H., 2A.2, 6-7; Laqueur, RE 5A.2, 2197; Meyer, Theopomps Hellenika, 17-20; Walker, The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, Its Authorship and Authority, Oxford, 1913, 119-20, 132, believed that P is superior to Xenophon in matters of operational detail, but falls short of the latter's political insight. This opinion is not shared, however, by Griffith, "The Greek Historians," 198-99, in Platnauer's Fifty Years (and Twelve) of Classical Scholarship, Oxford, 1968 or Bruce, 17-20.

27 See Bruce, 8, 11.
better grasp of detail and analytical ability than Xenophon. Because of the foregoing and his work's central focus, he was one of the most reliable writers of history in the ancient world. It therefore is much to be regretted that P wrote in an age when rhetorical ornament was more important than sober historical analysis. It is likely that his bare, rather lapidary style probably doomed his work to eventual neglect.

In addition to his limited literary ability, P exhibits an occasional weakness despite the generally favorable regard he enjoys. For example his preoccupation with military detail often leads him to omit or gloss over diplomatic matters. He apparently disapproved of the radical Athenian democrats and the Ismenian faction in Thebes. In general he manifests a distinct sympathy for oligarchic government and a favorable attitude to Sparta. A significant oversight in his account of the campaign of 395 is his failure to mention that Agesilaos was appointed supreme commander both by land and by sea, the first time in Spartan history such a thing had happened. P does, however, offer

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29 Bruce, 9-10.
30 See Bruce, 10-11.
31 See ch. 4.
a much more realistic analysis of Agesilaos' Asian campaign than Xenophon despite his occasional lapses or omissions.

Had P's Hellenika come down to us intact, it is almost certain that our knowledge of the end of the fifth and beginning of the fourth century would be considerably greater than it is. This is especially so if Accame's assertion is true that P concluded his work with the Peace of Antalkidas in 386, not as originally supposed, with the battle of Kaidos.32 Finally, it is important to note that P, who was Ephoros' source for the years from 411-386 B.C., had an indirect influence on Diodorus.

The Ephoran Tradition of Diodorus

Another important source of information about Agesilaos is Diodorus Siculus whose work from Book 11 to Book 16 is an epitome of Ephoros.33 Born in Kyme during the first quarter of the fourth century, Ephoros began his work sometime after 350 B.C. His was the first universal history,34 arranged in part episodically and in part geographically. His work in thirty books, beginning with the Dorian migrations and ending with the life of Philip of Makedon,35 strongly

32 Accame, 5, 17-20.

33 The major study which established the relationship between Ephoros and Diodorus' Books 11-16 is Untersuchungen über die Quellen der Griechische und sizilische Geschichte bei Diodor XI-XVI, Kiel, 1868. See also Jacoby, Fr.Gr.H., IA.1, no. 70 and 2A.2, 22-27.

34 Lesky, 701.

35 Book 30 detailing the life of Philip was completed by his
reflects the "rhetorical" tradition of his teacher Isokrates. The Isokratean view of history, which ultimately came to prevail, was that it should be the handmaiden of politics.\textsuperscript{36} Despite his penchant for moral pronouncements, his work lacked political passion and human warmth which made him quite distinct from his contemporaries Theopompos of Chios and Kallisthenes of Olynthos.\textsuperscript{37} Unlike the Ionians, Ephoros had little interest in geography, natural science and the human condition. His work is a universal history of the Greek people at home and in the colonies which induced him to discuss barbarian events. Yet barbarian matters did not concern him \textit{per se}, but only as they affected the Greek world. Because of his lack of interest in other lands he was the first historian to separate completely geography from its historical context, describing it in Bks. 4 and 5, but largely neglecting it later.\textsuperscript{38} Since his work spanned 700 years, dealing with matters all over the Greek world, he was compelled to choose a thematic

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\textsuperscript{36} Finley, \textit{The Use and Abuse of History}, New York, 1975, 30-31, 33 observes that, for the ancient Greeks and Romans, historiography was contemporary; the distant past was nearly irrelevant except for a general sketch. Information about remote periods, the Dorian migrations for example, was even scantier for Ephoros than for the modern author who has at least the archaeological remains with which to work. Thus the chief purpose of non-contemporary historiography had become to serve up moral paradigms by the mid-fourth century B.C. Jacoby, \textit{Fr.Gr.H.}, 1A.1, no. 70 and 2A.2, 22-27.

\textsuperscript{37} Jacoby, \textit{Fr.Gr.H.} 2A.2, 23.

\textsuperscript{38} Jacoby, 25.
arrangement in contrast to Thucydides' annalistic approach, which is suitable only for war monographs. His work which lacked Thucydides' intellectual incisiveness, resembled that of Hellanikos or Herodotus, though inferior to the latter in literary merit. On balance, then, Ephoros succeeded rather well in giving his work a unifying focus amassing a great deal of information, and clearly distinguishing the vague unreliable tales of the mythical period from the much more ascertainable data of the recent past. His weaknesses were that he was somewhat deficient in critical faculties and his work is marred by a dull, heavy-handed moralism. His work is not as strongly biased as Xenophon's or Plutarch's Agesilaos despite a mildly pro-Athenian cast and a tinge of chauvinism for his native Kyme. What he reports of the early fourth century through his epitomizer Diodorus, therefore, will often supplement or correct information missing or distorted in Xenophon and Plutarch.

Diodorus' history is a universalist compilation written in the first century B.C. which presents Greek and Roman history in the form of synchronistic annals. Diodorus gathered material for his work from a

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39 Jacoby, 27.

40 Brown, 109 and Lesky, 701.

41 See Schwarz, RE 6.1, 15-16; Brown, 114-15; Jacoby, 28; and Barber, The Historian Ephoros, Cambridge, 1935, 105, who notes that some of Ephoros' weaknesses stem from the fact that "he lived in an age when the pragmatic historian was also a rhetorician." In antiquity Polybios (12.28.10) generally assessed him favorably as a historian.

42 Lesky, 871.
variety of different authors, but as noted earlier, for Agesilaos' lifetime, his work is an epitome of Ephoros. In general Diodorus' value depends upon the reliability of his source, since he merely summarized the author he happened to be reading at the time. His work is flawed by carelessness, poor critical judgment, confused chronology and lack of central intellectual focus. The chief value of his is that it preserves fragments of better historians and an occasional bit of information not available elsewhere.

For the career of Agesilaos, Diodorus is important because the Ephoran tradition which he preserves is often at variance with that of Xenophon and Plutarch. There are for example many discrepancies in what the three authors write of Agesilaos' campaign in Asia Minor, the liberation of Thebes and Agesilaos' reaction to it. Therefore despite the many flaws and weaknesses in his rambling compendium, Diodorus at times provides insight into aspects of Agesilaos' life which other authors have neglected or suppressed.

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43 See note 33.

44 Beloch 2.2, 26, believed that Diodorus was important because he has preserved a more or less continuous history of the Greek west. Meyer, 4.1, 237, 265, writes that his careless and imprecise annalistic arrangement has often produced great chronological confusion and outright error.

45 For details see chs. 4, 8 and 9.

46 Judgments of Diodorus' general worth are not especially favorable. While not dismissing him out of hand, Schwarz, RE 5.1, 663, states "ein Werk kann man das Buch nicht nennen." Rose, A Handbook of Greek Literature, New York, 1960, 412, preserves Macauley's even harsher assessment that he was "a stupid, credulous, posing old ass." Rose goes on to say, "and it goes without saying that the best which
Plutarch

After Xenophon the most extensive source for the career of Agesilaos is Plutarch, especially his biography the Agesilaos. Although Plutarch's fame derives chiefly from his biographies,\textsuperscript{47} one should resist the impulse to include him in the ranks of ancient historians for the following reasons. First one of his major traits is an interest in antiquarian material. This leads to the various collections of anecdotes which have little or no central purpose other than their amusing quaintness. These collections were common in Hellenistic times and the early principate,\textsuperscript{48} but as such they are not connected history. Also Plutarch's secondary aim in writing the biographies in pairs was to preserve Greek tradition in a world where Roman might had long since subsumed Greece politically.\textsuperscript{49} Nonetheless Plutarch strove to show underlying similarities in the two cultures, especially as Rome had adopted much of the Greek intellectual and can be expected of him is that he will copy his authorities correctly and arrange events under the right dates so far as he knows them. His book is a mine in which to dig for fragments of better works. If we had the older historians, no one would read him." Lesky, 842, writes that he is only as good as his sources because he völlig unselbständig arbeitet.

\textsuperscript{47}Lesky, 921.

\textsuperscript{48}Lesky, 920.

\textsuperscript{49}Plutarch composed his biographies in the second half of the first century a.d. See Lesky, 922-23.
artistic tradition. His purpose was to reconcile Greece and Rome by highlighting similarities in their greatest historical figures.\textsuperscript{50} Finally his major purpose was to exemplify private virtue (or vice) in the careers of great men. This leads to an emphasis on the subject's education, personal manners and lifestyle with a heavy reliance on anecdotal material.\textsuperscript{51} He tells us himself that his object is not to write history, but rather to reveal τα τῆς ψυχῆς σημεῖα.\textsuperscript{52} He is, therefore, not primarily interested in analytic history which seeks the causes and explanation for events and trends as part of nature, but rather he seeks to portray great figures as their many small deeds reveal them.\textsuperscript{53} This moralistic influence on his purpose and manner of composition is traceable to Isokrates' Euagoras and Xenophon's Agesilaos.\textsuperscript{54} The θόος of the subject is revealed by his πράξεις. That certain traits and similar situations can recur makes possible the various συνκρίσεις which Plutarch appends to each parallel pair. Nonetheless many of these comparisons are somewhat forced and today they are regarded as largely ineffectual.\textsuperscript{55}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{50}Lesky, 923; Ziegler, \textit{RE} 21.1, 899-901.
\textsuperscript{52}\textit{Plut. Alex.} 1.2-3.
\textsuperscript{53}Lesky, 922.
\textsuperscript{54}Ziegler, \textit{RE} 21.1, 905-08.
\textsuperscript{55}Lesky, 923.
\end{quote}
In composing the *Agesilaos*, Plutarch drew upon several sources for information, but relied most heavily on Xenophon. There is, nonetheless, information in Plutarch's biography which cannot have come from the writings of Xenophon. Plutarch refers directly to Theopompos of Chios and obliquely to Ephoros of Kyme in the *Agesilaos*.\(^{56}\) From this testimony and comparison of other passages in the biography with fragments of these two fourth-century writers, it is clear that Plutarch had their works before him while writing the *Agesilaos*.\(^{57}\) By the same technique the influence of Kallisthenes of Olynthos is also discernible in Plutarch's narrative fabric.\(^{58}\) By consulting these authors Plutarch occasionally expanded on Xenophon's version of events, but only rarely contradicted his chief source.\(^{59}\)

In addition to these authors Plutarch also drew upon his own collection of anecdotes in a section of the *Moralia* known as the *Apothegmata* to compose the biography. It is likely that Plutarch compiled these anecdotes to serve as notes for the composition of all

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\(^{56}\) Plut. *Ages.* 10, 30 respectively.


\(^{58}\) Dippel, 116.

\(^{59}\) Dippel, 115-16; Meyer, Vol. 5, 195-96; Jacoby, *Fr.Gr.H.* 28.1, 357-58; and Ziegler, *RE* 21.1, 905-08 also discuss the influence of Theopompos on the composition of Plutarch's *Agesilaos*. Jacoby, *RE* 11.2, 2069, observes that Ktesias of Knidos, court physician to Artaxerxes, influenced Plutarch's biography of Artaxerxes and was also a source for his writings about Greeks who had extensive contact with the Persian empire, including *Agesilaos*. 
By themselves the Apothegmata most closely resemble the genre of Sammlungen represented by Aelian's Varia Historia. While the Apothegmata cannot be regarded in any sense as connected history, they often furnish useful information not elsewhere available. **61**

The Strategemata of Frontinus and Polyainos

Another type of Sammlung which has a bearing on the life of Agesilaos is the Strategemata. Frontinus, who lived in the first century a.d., wrote series of military reminiscences arranged by type of operation. Although his work includes famous Greek commanders, most of the stories concern Romans. It is unfortunate that he did not preserve more episodes from Agesilaos' career, because not only his arrangement of material, but his judgment in selecting it greatly exceeds that of Polyainos who wrote a century later. **62**

Polyainos, a Makedonian by birth, compiled a similar work which he dedicated to the Roman emperors Lucius Verus and Marcus Aurelius. Unlike Frontinus, who was a man of considerable military experience, it is quite evident that Polyainos was primarily a rhetorician. **63** Although

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**60** See Ziegler, RE 21.1, 905-08 and Lesky, 921-22.

**61** Ziegler, RE 21.1, 863-65. It is interesting to note that Plutarch's collection preserves more stories about Agesilaos than even Alexander or Caesar.


**63** Lesky, 952, so describes him and deems his collection quasi-historische.
he had access to Thucydides, Eforos, Theopompos and others, he exercised little or no judgment in the selection of examples. He arranged his material in chronological order by individual commander, though his information is only as good as his sources. At times Polyainos' anecdotes offer important insight into events and personalities, but his carelessness and credulity too often make them misleading or even worthless.64

The Attic Orators

Of the rhetoricians in Athens, the three who shed the most light on aspects of Spartan policy from Athens' defeat in 404 to the revival of her naval alliance in 378/77 are Isokrates, Lysias and Andokides. The latter is important because his speech περὶ τῆς πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίων εἰρήνης is the only source attesting directly to a second peace conference in 392. The first occurred in Sardis and involved both Greeks and Persians, but the second some months later in Sparta had only Greek participants. Andokides was one of the legates who pled the cause of ending the Korinthian War, but his plea was unsuccessful and the irate Athenians forced him into exile for the second time. His speech highlights the differing aims of groups in both Sparta and Athens, including that of Agesilaos.65

64 Lammert, RE 21.2, 1432-36; Rose, A Handbook of Greek Literature, 394; Lesky, 952.
65 See Lesky, 403 and ch. 5 for detailed analysis of the events in 392.
Lysias' speech κατὰ Ἐρατοσθένους starkly and dramatically reveals the excesses of Lysander's small cliques of extremist oligarchs. In many areas of the Greek world after 404 B.C. the Spartans tacitly supported these cliques in the name of restoring πάτριοι πολιτείαι. This speech and the κατὰ Ἀγοράτου help make plain the serious decline in Sparta's prestige as liberator of Hellas and the anti-Spartan resentment which eventually led to the outbreak of the Korinthian war in 395. Also important for grasping the partial revival of Spartan prestige after the Korinthian War is Lysias' fragmentary oration, the Olympiakos which was probably delivered in 384.

Most interesting is the strong contrast in tone between the attitude expressed about the Spartans in Lysias' Olympiakos and Isokrates' Panegyrikos which was written for the Olympiad of 380. Although Agesilaos is nowhere mentioned by name, the Spartan policy of which he was architect after 386 is bitterly denounced. Besides the tone of the work, the oration also provides many scattered, but useful bits of information about Spartan policy over a 25-year span.

In a sense the Panegyrikos is a more developed expression of

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66 See Lesky, 666 and ch. 2 for details.

67 Lesky, 666. Although there is some question about its date (388 is possible), the Olympiad of 384 seems the better choice. See also ch. 7.

68 See Lesky, 656-57.
sentiments originating in the immediate aftermath of the King's Peace of 387/86. In his περὶ εἰρήνης Isokrates laments the overweening influence of foreign powers (i.e. the Persians) in Greek affairs, an influence to which the Spartans and Agesilaos had acquiesced. In his letter to Archidamos, Agesilaos' son, Isokrates expresses admiration for Agesilaos, but points out a certain inconsistency in his policy toward other Greeks in the king's long reign. Isokrates' works are thus a minor, but important source for knowledge of Agesilaos' career, not only for the information contained in them, but also because they show the shifting attitudes of other Greeks to the Spartans over a long period of time. Also his encomiastic tribute to Euagoras, Kypriote king and long-standing ally of Athens, influenced, as did Xenophon's eulogy of Agesilaos, all subsequent Greek biographical writing.

Cornelius Nepos and Justin's Epitome of Pompeius Trogus

Apart from Frontinus, there are two Latin authors whose works occasionally touch on the life of Agesilaos. The first is Cornelius Nepos, a contemporary of Cicero, whose compendium

69 See ch. 7 and Lesky, 656-61.

70 See Lesky, 658 and note 4. The notion that Isokrates' letter to Philip of Makedon was a redaction of an earlier epistle to Agesilaos has now been discredited. See Blass, Die Attische Beredksamkeit, Vol. 2, Berlin, 1874, 89, 293 and Norlin, Isokrates, Loeb Ed., Vol. 1, XI. The reason for rejecting such a view is the strong anti-Spartan tone of the Panegyrikos which was composed at the height of Agesilaos' power and influence. There is, in the writings of Isokrates, an admiration for Agesilaos as a man, but marked ambiguity about his purpose and policies.
of sketches of famous foreign leaders (de excellentibus ducibus exterarum gentium) contains a synopsis of Agesilaos' career. These rhetorical exercises, which rely on matters of education, personal manners, and major events in the subject's life, are much more anecdotal than analytical. Nepos' synopses represented an early culmination in Latin letters of the Hellenistic tradition which found its fullest and most charming expression in the Parallel Lives of Plutarch. Although Nepos is little more than a popularizer of doubtful skill whose style is dull or pretentious, his sketches of Agesilaos and other Greek leaders of the fourth century are not entirely without merit. Although his work traces only the barest outlines of his subjects' lives, Nepos' biographies sometimes afford glimpses of Spartan policy or an aspect of Agesilaos' career not preserved elsewhere.

The final ancient author whose work occasionally sheds light on Agesilaos is M. Iunianus Iustinus who epitomized the histories of Pompeius Trogus. Trogus wrote in the latter half of the first century B.C. His universal history in forty-four books had for its central focus the Makedonian conquest and the spread of Greek civilization especially to Rome and the west. He evidently exercised considerable care and good judgment in the selection of his material,

71See Lesky, 920-23.

72Bayet, 177-78 and Rose, A Handbook of Latin Literature, 208-09.
eschewing rhetorical devices to present an analytical rendition of fact.\textsuperscript{73}

Much like Diodorus who synopsised large portions of Ephoros' work, Justin has preserved the histories of Trogus in epitome. Unfortunately while Justin's work is at times valuable for the information it contains, it does not exhibit anything approaching the apparent good historical sense of Trogus' original. In addition to providing only a "sampling" of his model, Justin, by eliminating everything which had no dramatic or moral interest, robbed his own work of a unifying focus. Despite his occasional flair for detail and mastery of basic rhetorical technique, Justin's compilation is stylistically and historically little better than mediocre.\textsuperscript{74}

With the discussion of Justin's Epitome of Trogus, the brief survey of the ancient sources dealing either directly or obliquely with Agesilaos is complete. How these sources illuminate the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War and the events immediately preceding Agesilaos' accession is the next matter for investigation.

\textsuperscript{73}Bayet, 292; Rose, \textit{A Handbook of Latin Literature}, 312.

\textsuperscript{74}Bayet, 420; Rose, \textit{A Handbook of Latin Literature}, 312-13.
CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO AGESILAOS' ASIAN CAMPAIGN

Before considering the Spartan campaign in Asia (396-394), it will be necessary to review briefly the course of events from the close of the Peloponnesian War in 404 to the decision to mount the expedition in 397. Although a detailed analysis is not needed, some discussion of the relations among the Greek states and the major thrusts of Spartan policy in these years will be helpful. The first sections of this chapter will deal with the Spartans' treatment of the Greeks of Asia and the Aegean. In the next, the focus will be on her relations with the members of her Peloponnesian alliance and other poleis on the mainland. The final section will be a review of her dealings with the Persians.

Sparta and the Greeks of Asia Minor and the Aegean, 404-400.

What the role of the Spartans in Greek affairs after the war with Athens might have been and how it actually developed is given a sad, and perhaps intentional, irony in Thucydides. The occasion was Alkibiades' address to the Spartan assembly (apella) in 414. In the speech, he urged his listeners to come to the aid of the beleaguered Syracusans and concluded his plea with the following words: καὶ μετὰ

1(6.92.5), see Gomme and Dover, An Historical Commentary on Thucydides, Vol. 4, Oxford, 1956-81, 366, who observe that the rule of an ἄρχων by force is the norm. To rule by good will alone would be a rarely achieved ideal. Alkibiades' plea here is compared with that of the Theban embassy to Athens in 395 (Xen. Hell. 3.5.14).
After the surrender of the Athenians in 404, Alkibiades' prediction proved to be only partially correct. Sparta indeed ruled all Hellas in relative security, but only by relying on force and with little good will on the part of her subjects by the time Agesilaos departed for Asia. With the collapse of Athenian resistance in the spring of 404, Agis withdrew the allied army from Dekeleia and dismissed the several contingents to their native cities. At the same time, Lysander set sail to Samos to suppress the last pocket of resistance to the Peloponnesian victory. After the Athenians' defeat at Aigospotamoi, the Samians alone refused to desert them and actually rose up to massacre their oligarchic leaders. The response of the grateful Athenians is preserved in an inscription which praises the loyalty of the Samian demos and grants them citizenship. Upon arriving in Samos, Lysander laid siege to the democratic defenders who had refused his terms. Faced with the overwhelming superiority of the allied forces, the Samians eventually capitulated without a struggle on the following terms: each person was to leave the island with only one cloak; all else was to remain behind; the oligarchic faction would be restored and Lysander would choose ten from their number to form the government. This was the first of the notorious dekarchies to be installed after the conclusion of the general peace.

The activity of Lysander was not confined, however, to the suppression of...
the democrats on Samos. At this time the Spartans were busily engaged in the dispersal or forced expatriation of Athenian klerouchs from Euboia, Lesbos, Naxos, Melos, Histiaia, Skione, Torone, Poteidaia and elsewhere. The purpose of this, of course, was to complete the extinction of all vestiges of Athens' maritime ἥραξ.

The nature of Spartan policy and the manner in which she sought to implement it throughout the Greek world have been examined in detail in two major studies. These studies and evidence from antiquity show that Sparta's relations with the Greeks rested on three bases. The first was a system of harmosts and garrisons, the second, that of Lysander's forced oligarchies which the ephors later modified to πατρίων πολιτειών, and, finally, an abrasive and intimidating diplomacy against both allies and adversaries not under her military supervision.

Sparta undertook these harsh measures for a number of reasons. First, the male Spartiates numbered only about 4,000. These homoioi ruled over perhaps 250,000 to 300,000 people in Lakedaimon and Messenia and held sway over as many as two or three million.

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3 A wealth of literary and inscriptive evidence attests to the extent of the Spartans' efforts in this regard: Xen. Hell. 2.2.9; Plut. Lys. 14, Diod. 14.10.1. See also Tod, GHI, nos. 94 and 95, and Meyer, Geschichte des Altertums, Vol. 5, 6, Stuttgart, 1958.


5 For a very clear formulation of this in antiquity, see Herodes 764A.


Spartans lacked economic contacts and did not mint their own money. Individual Spartans were actually forbidden to own precious metals, and those who were caught with such in their possession could face the death penalty. For ordinary commerce between themselves, they relied on "leather coins," and, for exchange with the rest of the world, they used the monies of Persia, Aigina and Athens. A third reason was that Sparta had little experience in dealing with political systems different from her own. Finally, the Spartans relied heavily on the good will of at least two foreign powers, the Persians and Syracusans. If one bears these things in mind, the direction of her foreign policy becomes readily explicable.

After Lysander had reduced Samos, installed a dekarchy, uprooted the Athenian klerouchies and resettled the natives whom the Athenians had displaced, he dispersed the various allied contingents to their native cities. He then took all but twelve triremes captured in the Peiraeus back to Lakedaimon. With these, he brought the crowns awarded to him by the various cities, 470 talents left from the money assigned by Kyros for prosecuting the war and all other booty. Moreover, he had instituted a system of tribute which would bring the Lakedaimonians an annual revenue of 1,000 talents. He delivered all of the foregoing at the end of the summer of 404.

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10 Diod. 14.10.2; Xen. Hell. 2.3.8-9.
In 405/04, Lysander established a series of dekarchies throughout that part of the Greek world formerly subject to Athens. The members of these governments in each case were drawn from the oligarch clubs. Cavaignac supposes that the members of these were of the same approximate age, shared a common interest in art, music and politics, and had banded together to protect themselves from the excesses of the extreme democrats. Their numbers were usually small, ranging from perhaps twenty to thirty. They were drawn from the aristocracy and wealthy mercantile class whose interests were best served by social stability and peace. Many of them had participated in the Ionian defections from Athens in 412/11. They had attempted to force oligarchic governments on their cities in the hope of suing for peace with Sparta. After the battle of Kyzikos in 410, however, many of these club members were forced into exile. Eventually they found refuge with the satraps or the Spartans. They later became ardent supporters of Lysander at his headquarters in Ephesos from 407 to the end of the war.

We can be certain that it was from their ranks that Lysander created the dekarchies. Although ancient authors referred to them only in general terms, Cavaignac believes that we can recover at least some of their names by considering the victory monument dedicated to Pythian

11 Plut. Lys. 13.3-5, 14.1; Diod. 14.10.1.
12 Cavaignac, 289.
13 Ibid., 289.
14 E.g. Diodorus 13.70 and Plut. Lys. 5.3. Xenophon (Hell. 2.4.19) mentions Charmides, son of Glaukon, as one of the ten who held sway in the Peiraeus while the thirty ruled in Athens.
Apollo by Lysander in honor of his triumph over the Athenian navy at Aigospotamoi. This monument lists the allied navarchs who aided in the Athenians' defeat. From it we might deduce a partial inventory of the dekarchs who ruled in Asia Minor and the islands after the Peloponnesians' triumph. The names appearing on the monument are those of the commanders from the Dorian islands, such as Melos and Rhodes, and the Ionian poleis, like Miletos, Ephesos and Chios. An examination of the epigraphic evidence and Pausanias will reveal the names of a few of these characters who later became dekarchs.\textsuperscript{15} Cavaignac's supposition, of course, is that Lysander would likely have assigned those who supported him in war to positions of authority in their native cities in peacetime.\textsuperscript{16}

Not all of Lysander's undertakings in 405/04 were narrowly partisan or destined to incur the outrage of the Greek world. There apparently was widespread approval of his measures to restore the Aiginetans, Melians, Skionians and others to their native lands. The Athenians had uprooted and expelled all of these peoples during the Peloponnesian War.\textsuperscript{17}

Still on the whole the reaction of most Greeks was one of bitter disappointment. They quickly perceived that public affairs were

\textsuperscript{15}See Tod, GHI, Vol. 1, nos. 94/95, and Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, no. 95 for a complete listing from the 13 marble fragments recovered at Delphi. Pausanias (10.9.7-10) lists some names which are now lost from the inscriptions.

\textsuperscript{16}Cavaignac, 300.

\textsuperscript{17}Plut. Lys. 14.3.
to be in the hands of the most ambitious and violent of Lysander's partisans to the exclusion of all others.\textsuperscript{18} The story was told of the Spartans who, like mischievous barmaids, gave the Greeks a sip of the sweet wine of freedom, only to dash it with the bitter vinegar of servitude.\textsuperscript{19} On the eve of Leuktra, Autokles, a delegate from Athens to the peace conference at Sparta, recited a catalogue of Spartan abuses after their victory in 404.\textsuperscript{20} The Spartans, he said, were the greatest obstacle to autonomy despite their vaunted advocacy of it. They compelled submission from their allies, even forcing them to make war on cities with which they enjoyed friendly relations. They set up odious governments of ten or thirty to support Spartan policy without question. Finally, he accused the Spartans of securing their aims by force (the ubiquitous harmosts and garrisons), not by law, thereby making a mockery of their slogan "freedom for the Greeks," and showing themselves in truth to be the champions of despotism.

In 403/402, there were two developments which illustrate the drift of Spartan foreign policy and the impact of changed conditions on her society. The first occurred during the civil strife in Attika when the thirty tyrants had appealed from Eleusis to Lakedaimon for aid against both Thrasyboulos' democrats in the Peiraeus and the moderate oligarchs who held the city. Lysander was initially given command of the army and his brother Libys was made navarch to cut off the Peiraeus by land and

\textsuperscript{18} ibid. 13.4-5.
\textsuperscript{19} ibid. 13.6.
\textsuperscript{20} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 6.3.7-8.
sea. King Pausanias, however, persuaded three of the five ephors to raise another army. He did so to counter the self-serving interests of Lysander (whose creatures the thirty were) and to achieve a more equitable settlement. Pausanias relieved Lysander and eventually brought off a compromise whereby the democrats and moderate oligarchs were reconciled. The remnants of the thirty and their supporters seceded from Attika and created a separate state in Eleusis. They were eventually attacked and killed at a peace conference in 401, and Attika once again became a single political entity. The important thing, however, is that Lysander's power and influence at Sparta suffered a major setback because of internal political opposition. As subsequent events would show, Pausanias may have been the leader of a conservative and traditionalist faction. The aims of this group were two-fold: they wished to curtail drastically adventurism beyond the Peloponnesos and to uphold unswervingly the Lykourgan politeia. 21

Pausanias (3.5.2) preserves further evidence of internal political wrangling at Sparta. He records that the enemies of King Pausanias brought him to trial upon his return from Attika. Cavaignac points out that these were the supporters of Lysander who did so in order that their leader might "ressaisir l'ascendant qui lui échappait." 22 Although Agis, the other king and once a friend of Lysander, may have sympathized with

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21 Xen. Hell. 2.4.28-42; Plut. Lys. 21.1-3.

22 Cavaignac, 300
Pausanias' efforts to curb the famous navarch, he voted with fourteen of the twenty-eight γέρουτες to condemn his colleague.\textsuperscript{23} That Lysander's influence was on the wane, however, is indicated by the fact that Pausanias was absolved. Although fourteen of the γέρουτες and Agis had voted against him, the other fourteen and all five of the ephors had voted to acquit.

In the fall of 403, after his chastisement in Attika and the acquittal of Pausanias, Lysander set out for Asia at the ephors' behest. He clearly intended to strengthen the hand of his supporters in the Greek cities, the various dekarchs.\textsuperscript{24} Many cities, perhaps heartened by the acquittal of the conciliatory Pausanias, sent delegations to Sparta to complain of the highhandedness of Lysander's creatures. Finally, Pharnabazos, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, perceived an opportunity to take advantage of turmoil in the Greek cities of Asia and wrote a letter to the ephors in which he protested the policies and conduct of Lysander. Fearing for his position, Lysander attempted to win over the satrap with blandishments. He pleaded with the hostile Pharnabazos to send another letter withdrawing the accusations of the first. Pharnabazos agreed and even showed Lysander the conciliatory epistle. The wily satrap, though, had secretly penned yet a third letter in which

\textsuperscript{23}Rahe, \textit{Lysander and the Spartan Settlement}, 407-403 B.C., Diss. Yale, 1977, 19-22, suggests that Agis, who greatly advanced Lysander's career, may have withdrawn his support by the time of Pausanias' incursion into Attika. The reason would be that both kings may have feared the navarch's vaunting ambition and his appetite for power.

\textsuperscript{24}Xenophon passes over this episode in silence and Plutarch (\textit{Lys.} 19-21) erroneously places it before his command in Attika. See Grote, \textit{A History of Greece}, Vol. 7, 372, n.2; Meyer, Vol. 5, 41, n.1; Beloch, 3.1, 16, n.1.
he repeated the accusations of the first. The ephors had summoned Lysander to answer the many charges and, with what he believed was Pharnabazos' letter of retraction, he departed for Lakedaimon. When he arrived, however, he was removed from command and became a laughing-stock upon the ephors' receipt of the satrap's letter. Pharnabazos had deviously substituted the inflammatory third letter for the second when he affixed his seal.  

At the same time, Lysander's friend Thorax, harmost of Samos, was tried on a charge of possessing private money. He was recalled, convicted and executed by the strict Lykourgan ρητρα which forbade private ownership of any precious metals. In addition, other Lysandrians such as Derkylidias, harmost of Abydos, and Klearchos, who had replaced Sthenelaos as harmost of Byzantion, were recalled.  

The affair of Klearchos is interesting in that it shows the effect upon Spartans that access to great wealth and the wielding of nearly absolute power in other Greek cities might have. Klearchos apparently had proved ruthless, arbitrary, and brutal in imposing his will in Byzantion. As a result, the citizens secretly sent to Lakedaimon to protest. The ephors, in keeping with their campaign of restoring πάτριοι

25 Plut. Lys. 19ff.; Nepos Lys. 4, and Polyainos 7.19.1. Beloch, Vol. 3.1, 16, n.1, observes that the dating of this incident is highly problematical. Nepos and Polyainos give no chronology and Plutarch's is confused. Andrewes, "Two Notes on Lysander," Phoenix 25 (1971), 212-13, believes that the story of the satrap's deception does not "sound like the stuff of serious history," and believes it to be a "low-grade fiction."

26 Xenophon (Lak. Pol. 7.6), Plutarch (Lyk. 30), and Aelian (V.H. 14.29).

27 Xen. Hell. 3.1.9; Diod. 14.12.
πολιτεία wherever possible, sent an army under Panthoidas in the spring of 402 to relieve Klearchos of his command. After withdrawing his troops and booty from the city, however, Klearchos decided to resist. He was subsequently defeated and fled to Kyros, who received him hospitably. The ultimate consequences of Klearchos' excesses and defection to Kyros are the subject of Xenophon's *Anabasis*.28

Thus it was probably in the spring and summer of 402 B.C. that the ephors disseminated their directive throughout the Aegean and Greek Asia that the πόλεις πολιτεία were to be restored.29 The man who had a statue of himself being crowned by Poseidon set up at Delphi and who had been accorded divine honors by the Samians30 found himself out of favor less than two years later. Parke believes that a fragmentary inscription from Delos31 was at least in part a manifesto reasserting the power of the ephorate and kings. Cavaignac thinks that the five ephors listed on the inscription, if it can be dated to 402, were the same five who voted to

28Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.1.9, 2.6.2) depicts Klearchos as the ideal military leader. The Ephoran tradition of Diodorus, of course, is not so clearly pro-Spartan as that of Xenophon and presents Klearchos' flaws as well as his virtues. Plutarch (*Artax.* 6) preserves a tradition in which the ephors ordered Klearchos to aid Kyros.

29Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.2.

30Paus. 10.9.7ff.; Plut. *Lys.* 18.4; Bengtson, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums*, Vol. 2, 152-158, has conveniently collected all evidence relating to this period. For a more sympathetic view of Lysander's role during these years, see Prentice, "The Character of Lysander," *AJA* 38 (1934), 37-42.

acquit Pausanias. Finally, Parke suggests that the inscription in which the Athenians praise the Notians and Ephesians for having sheltered the democratic exiles from Samos indicates the demise of the dekarchies. This inscription, which dates to 403/402, could scarcely have been promulgated if the dekarchies were everywhere still in power.

Lysander, on pretext of a vow made to Zeus Ammon, then departed to Libya to cloak his disgrace. According to Ephoros, the actual purpose of the visit was more complex. Briefly, Lysander, after having failed in similar attempts at Dodone and Delphi, tried to bribe the oracle of Ammon as part of a plot to abolish the hereditary kingship. Since Agesilaos played a role in the discovery of this plot after Lysander's death, discussion of the matter will be postponed to a later chapter.

It seems likely that the infamous dekarchies of the "uncrowned king of Hellas" endured from the summer of 405 to the spring of 402 B.C., a period of about three years. Isokrates (Panegyr. 113) suggests that, in one three month period in 404/403, the Spartans might have executed more men summarily than the Athenians had brought to trial during their campaign.

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32 Cavaignac, 300.

33 M. Tod no.97.8-9; Meiggs and Lewis, 286-87; see also Andrewes, "Two Notes on Lysander," Phoenix 25 (1971), 219.

34 Parke, 52.

35 Plut. Lys. 20.6. Thus Plutarch and Xenophon, in writing of this matter, may derive their information from the same source.

36 Meyer's felicitous phrase, Vol. 5, 32, "Er war in der Tat der ungekrönte König von Hellas."

37 See Meyer, Vol. 5, 41, n.1; Beloch, 2.1, 16; Cavaignac, 300-01; Parke, 52-53.
The disavowal of these extremist oligarchies by the authorities in Sparta did not signal the end of Spartan domination in the Greek world. The dekarchies may no longer have enjoyed the support of harmosts and garrisons, but, as Parke has shown, this system was still intact in Hellas. In fact, Sparta's next undertaking in the effort to sustain her hegemony was a military struggle against a neighboring state in the Peloponnesos. Shortly after conducting this campaign, king Agis would die, and the stage would be set for the unusual and momentous accession of Agesilaos.

**The War Against Elis and the Death of Agis**

A major Spartan undertaking in mainland Greece between 401 and 397 was the war against Elis. Although the conduct of the war, at least in outline, is clear enough, there is a certain degree of confusion as to the chronology of its outbreak and duration.

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38 Parke, 41.

39 Two of our three sources (Xen. Hell. 3.2.21-31; Diod. 14.17.4, 34.1) assign a duration of about one year for the war, but one (Pausanias 3.8.5) writes that it lasted for more than two. According to Diodorus, the war began in 402, but Xenophon synchronizes it with the activities of Thibron and Derkyldas in Asia (400-399). Meyer, Vol. 5, 184, n.1; Beloch, 3.1, 34-35; Grote, Vol. 7, 375, who dates the beginning of Derkyldas' tenure to 398, all comment on this difficulty. It seems most likely that the Eleians excluded the Spartans from the Olympics in 420 B.C., when they contracted an alliance with Athens, Argos, and Mantinea. Meyer, Vol. 5, 48, n.3; Beloch, 3.1, 17-18 discuss the chronology of this conflict. Beloch believes the war started in 402/401 and was over in 401/400. Meyer thinks 401-400 are the likely dates. Grote, (in following Pausanias' notion of its duration) Vol. 7, 391-396, believes that the war lasted from 402-400. See Ferguson, CAH 5.9, 255-258, 270-271, and Cary, CAH 6.2, 33-35.
Xenophon's account of the struggle is as follows: while Derkyldas was engaged in Asia, the Lakedaimonians had undertaken a punitive war against Elis.\(^{40}\) Their grievances against the Eleians were several. First, the Spartans accused the Eleians of having joined an alliance with the Argives, Mantineians, and Athenians in 420 B.C.\(^ {41}\) The Eleians had also excluded the Spartans from the Olympic games of that year. In spite of the Eleians' interdiction, a Spartan named Lichas entered a chariot with a Theban driver. When his chariot won, Lichas stepped forward to crown the victor, as was customary. The Eleians, however, recognizing him as a Spartan, beat him about the head and body and drove him from the sacred precinct. Lichas was an old man at this time and a Spartan of some note.\(^ {42}\) His mistreatment at the hands of the Eleian officials undoubtedly was not well received in Sparta. The final insult which evidently tipped the scales in favor of war was that, during the occupation of Dekeleia from 413-404, Agis had been denied access to the temple of Zeus at Olympia where Pythian Apollo had instructed him to offer sacrifice. The Spartans now decided to "bring the Eleians to their senses" (σοφονίσαοι αὐτοὺς ).\(^ {43}\)

The embassy sent to Elis also accused the Eleians of not having

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\(^{40}\) *Hellenica* 3.2.21-31.

\(^{41}\) Thuc. 5.39-48. See also Tod, *GHI*, no. 72; Bengtson, *Staatsverträge* 2, no. 193; Gomme *et al.*, Vol. 4, 54-57.

\(^{42}\) He was sixty years old in 420; see Lenschau, RE 13.1, 211-12, under Lichas. See *Hellenica* 3.2.21 and Thuc. 5.49-50; Gomme *et al.*, Vol. 4, 66-67.

\(^{43}\) *Hellenica* 3.2.23.
contributed their share of expenses for conducting the war against Athens. Since the other grievances may have been almost twenty years old at the time of the embassy, perhaps this is the proximate cause of the war, rather than the items enumerated by Xenophon. The Spartans demanded that the Eleians restore autonomy to several outlying villages which they had annexed. They knew, of course, that this demand would be refused and, when it was, the ephors called out the ban. Lepreon was one town specified by the Spartans in their demand. The allied army was 4,000 strong, with contingents from all allied states except Korinth and Boiotia, which explicitly disapproved of Sparta's motives.

Agis led the army into Elis by way of the Larisos river, but turned back because of an earthquake. At this unexpected turn of events, the Eleians took heart and sent out legates to other Greek poleis, especially Korinth and Thebes to seek aid. The Eleians were disappointed, however, by everyone except the Aitolians, who sent 1,000 picked hoplites. The others were simply too cautious to flout Sparta openly.

The ephors called out the ban again in the following spring (either 401 or 400 B.C.), and Agis proceeded first to Olympia and then to the outskirts of Elis city. Here he was aided by the defections of the Lepreions and the inhabitants of five other small towns in the south (Triphylia). While Agis was laying waste to the surrounding country, an


45 Paus. 3.8.3; see Larsen, RE 19.825-28. Elis was divided into three areas: Elis proper (κόιλη Ελίς), the northernmost section, including Elis city; the central area containing Olympia; and the southern segment containing Lepreon and the other rebellious towns.

46 Diod. 14.17.6

47 Diod. 14.17.9
oligarchic plot led by a pro-Spartan Eleian named Xenias within the city failed. The reason for the failure was the discovery that the leader of the democrats, one Thrasydaios, had survived an initial clash between the two factions. A man resembling Thrasydaios had been killed in the fray, but the real Thrasydaios had been in a drunken sleep when the mêlée broke out. Upon awakening, Thrasydaios rallied his supporters, who then defeated the oligarchs and forced them to flee to the Spartans. With the approach of winter, Agis withdrew to Lakedaimon and left Lysippos as harmost to plunder Eleian lands until the coming of spring. Diodorus, however, reports that Agis wintered in Dyme on the Patraic gulf (14.17).

By the following summer (400 or 399), Thrasydaios sued for peace with the Spartans on their original terms. The Eleians claimed a right to only one of the outlying towns, saying that they had purchased it for thirty talents. The Spartans, though, deemed that a forcible purchase was no more just than a forcible seizure and denied the Eleians' request. They did not, however, deprive the Eleians of their presidency of the Olympic games. They agreed to this because the Eleians promised not to debar the Spartans from future games, and because the Pisatans who had originally held the presidency were now too few to perform the function. When all these matters were settled, peace was concluded and Elis joined

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48 Xen. Hell. 3.2.28-29.
49 Xen. Hell. 3.2.30-31.
50 Paus. 3.8.5.
the Peloponnesian alliance. 51

Three other instances of Sparta's conduct toward the European Greeks remain to be discussed. Another demonstration of Spartan intent to quell dissent within the Peloponnesos was the campaign against their centuries-old subjects, the Messenians. 52 Their purpose was to expel Messenian agitators from outposts in Kephallenia and Naupaktos. 53 Since the former is an island, the decision presumably involved a naval operation, but our only source is content to note that the Spartans succeeded without giving any details. The Spartans then returned the outpost to the Kephallenians. In the case of Naupaktos, located in Ozolian Lokris, the Spartan investiture probably also had a naval phase. Diodorus again supplies no hint as to the numbers involved, the name of the commander, or the nature of the operation. As with Kephallenia, he records only that the Lakedaimonians were successful.

51 Swoboda, RE 5.2, 2400-01 under Elis points out that the chronology of the Eleian war is a classic locus vexatus. Hatzfeld, "Notes sur la chronologie des Helleniques," REA 35(1933), 397, proposes that the war began in 400 and ended in 398. Agis was reluctant to attack and used the earthquake as an excuse to withdraw rather than desecrate the Olympic festival in 400. No such compunction stayed the Spartans, however, in 399. Finally in 398 (a Pythian year), a victorious Agis could dedicate his spoils at Delphi. Xenophon's rough synchronism of this campaign with Derkyldas' activities in Asia, however, could easily refer not to the second, but rather the third and final year. This would eliminate the need to begin a sacrilegious campaign in an Olympic year. Thus the seismic shock would occur in 401, the major effort in 400, and the end of the war and Agis' death in 399. Pausanias (3.8.3-5) observes that the war stretched into a third year, but lasted only a little more than two calendar years.

52 Diod. 14.34.2-6.

53 See. Thuc. 5.35.7 (w. 421/0 B.C.) and 4.41.1 (s. 425 B.C.) and Gomme et al., Vol. 4, 37-38 and Vol. 3, 481 and 495. During the Archidamian War, the Athenians had settled dissident Messenians in Naupaktos and Kephallenia to harass the Lakedaimonians.
The Athenian navarch Tolmides had handed Naupaktos over to the Messenians in 456 B.C., and the Spartans now restored it to the western Lokrians. 54

Diodorus concludes his discussion of these operations by observing that many of the Messenians driven into exile eventually found employment as mercenaries. Some served in the armies of Dionysios I of Syracuse. Others who departed for Kyrene in Libya were apparently all but annihilated in a bloody Kyrenaian civil war.

The second item of note for the period between 404 and 399 is the occupation of Herakleia in Trachis by the Spartan Herippidas. Sparta had intervened militarily in the region of the Malian gulf as recently as the winter of 413/412 B.C. Agis at that time had set out from Dekeleia to collect tribute for a Spartan ship-building effort. He had compelled the Oitaians, Phthiotic Achaians, Malians and others to contribute money and hostages much against their will. 55 The civil strife that had broken out in Herakleia furnished the Spartans with an ideal pretext to set up an outpost in north-central Greece near Thermopylae. 56 Accordingly, Herippidas was sent out to quell the unrest. He convened an assembly in the town and, on determining the 500

54 Diod. 11.84.7; Oldfather, RE 16.2, 1986, 1989, discusses these events in some detail and takes note of the chronological uncertainty. See also Diod. 14.78, 15.66 and Pausanias 4.26.2, 10.38.10.

55 Thuc. 8.3.1; see Gomme et al., Vol. 4, 395. Thuc. 5.51-52 notes that, in 419, the Boiotians had occupied Herakleia. By 412, therefore, it must have been back in Spartan hands. Possibly the Boiotians were inciting unrest in this area ca. 399; see Gomme et al., Vol. 4, 68-69.

56 Diod. 14.38.4-5.
men most responsible for the strife, executed them all. Moreover, he expelled the rebellious inhabitants around Mt. Oite (who included Oitaians, Malians, Ainianians and Phthiotic Achaians). These people fled to Thessaly with their families, where they remained in exile until the Boiotians restored them five years later. 57

A final indication of Spartan activity in northern Greece stems from unsettled conditions obtaining in Thessaly. Lykophron of Pherai was able to defeat a coalition under Larisaian leadership for local supremacy about the time of a partial solar eclipse. 58

By 400 B.C., Sparta's interest in north central Greece appears to have extended to Thessaly and Makedonia. A group of Larisaian exiles were debating whether they should join the Spartans in a war of aggression against the Makedonian barbarians who had occupied their city. The contemplated hostilities, however, did not materialize and so the point was moot. 59

57 Diod. 14.82.6-7; Xen. Hell. 3.5.6; Meyer, Vol. 5, 50, n.2, dates Herippidas' occupation of Herakleia to 398. See also Beloch 3.1, 21, who ascribes the unrest in the region to a conflict between natives and the ἐποικοὶ of Agis' incursion in 413/2. Aristophanes (Lysistrate 1168-70) alludes to the Spartan presence, and Xenophon (Hellen. 1.2.18-19) records an uprising in which 700 people, including the harmost Labotas, were killed. See also Meyer, Vol. 4.2, 323-24 and Parke, 39,41.

58 Xen. Hell. 2.3.4. The eclipse in question occurred on 3 Sept. 404 B.C.; see Oppolzer, Canon of Eclipses, Harvard, 1962, 78, no. 1936.

59 Our only evidence for this affair is a document entitled Ἡμῶν δ' περὶ πολιτείας. Modern scholars, though, have concluded that the speech is an authentic product of the late fifth or early fourth century B.C. They have advanced sundry hypotheses for its date (see Wade-Gery, "Kritias and Herodes," CQ 39, 1945, 22, n.1 and Sordi, "A proposito di uno scritto politico del 401-400 A.C.: Il περὶ πολιτείας dello pseudo-Erode," Riv. di Fil. 33 (1955), 175ff). Others who have troubled over date and authorship are Beloch, Vol. 3.2, 132, n.2; Meyer, Vol. 5, 50,
Summary of Spartan Policy in Greece, 404-399 B.C.

The reaction of various groups within the city to her newly won hegemony determined the major outlines of Sparta's policy from 404 to 397. At first, this policy was essentially the creation of one man, Lysander. Building upon the existing system of harmosts and garrisons which had arisen during the Peloponnesian War, Lysander was able to install small groups of people loyal to him in the poleis of Asia Minor and the Aegean. These narrowly constituted governments of extremist oligarchs, the dekarchies, also included the thirty tyrants at Athens.

After Lysander's two setbacks (Pausanias superseded his command in Attika in 403, and Pharnabazos denounced him to the ephors in 402), his political ascendancy was ended. It is to this period that most scholars date the decree calling for the restoration of the πατριότειον πολιτείας in the islands and poleis of Asia. From 402 to Agesilaus'

n.3; Drerup, /Ἡρώδου/ Περί Πολιτείας, Studien z. Gesch. und Kult. d. Alt. 2.1 (Paderborn, 1908); and Münchener, RE 8, 951-53. The best hypotheses for its date seem to be either 404, if Kritias is the author, or 401/0, if Thrasymachos or one of his students wrote it. In any case, its subject is resistance to the designs of Archelaos, king of Makedonia.

60 Parke, 44-49.

In a recent study, Hamilton has argued on the basis of his reconstruction of internal politics at Sparta that the decree may have been promulgated as late as 397, that the ephors perhaps ordered the disbanding of the dekarchies to conciliate the Persians in the wake of Derkyldas' truce with Tissaphernes, and that the grave domestic turmoil revealed by Kinadon's conspiracy could have dampened the Spartans' fervor for overseas adventurism. See Sparta's Bitter Victories, Cornell, 1979, 117, 128-29. I am inclined, nevertheless, to accept the earlier date for two reasons. First, there is the inscriptional evidence of the joint decree of ephors
succession (ca. 399), there seems to have been little factional strife in Sparta. The Lysandrians could no longer dominate policy as they had from 405 to 402. Similarly, the trial of Pausanias despite his acquittal shows that the most conservative Spartans (whose leader was Pausanias) were unable to assume the ascendancy. That Agis was able to undertake a punitive war against Elis by 401 hints at a consensus for limiting activity to European Greece. With the waning of Lysander's influence, Sparta's attention no longer focused primarily on Asia Minor or the Aegean. Rather she busied herself with the chastisement

and kings at Delos (Tod, no. 99) and that of the second Athenian decree (Tod, no. 97.9-10) which date to 403/02. See Beloch 3.1, 19, n.1; Meyer, Vol. 5, 43. Grote, Vol. 7, 365-66, believes that some withered for lack of Spartan support, but that other endured until as late as 396. As Andrewes, "Two Notes on Lysander," Phoenix, 25 (1971)213-14, observes, Tissaphernes actively worked to undermine Lysander and Kyros by giving refuge in Lydia to a thousand democratic exiles, (Diod. 13.104.5-6). Andrewes also refers to the notion of the dekarchies' survival until 397 as "reviving an old heresey" (ibid., 206). The Delian decree appears to be a reassertion of traditional Spartan authority after Lysander's débacle in Attika (Cavaignac, 300). In the second Samian decree, the Athenians praise the Notians and Ephesians for offering shelter to exiled Samian democrats, while the dekarchs held sway on the latter's native island. It thus seems unlikely that the dekarchs in Samos, Noto, or Ephesos (which had been Lysander's headquarters) could have held unchallenged authority in those cities at the time of the decree (Parke, 52). Second, the decree was probably as much a formality as that of late 404 which forbade any polis from aiding Athens' democratic exiles (Diod. 14.6.1-2). The only practical effect of the decree would have been to deprive the dekarchs of the unconditional support of harmost and garrison. With that prop removed, the extremist oligarchs could not prevent more moderate elements from resurfacing or returning from exile to participate once again in public life. This is not to imply that all dekarchs were at once deposed, arrested or exiled, however, since harmosts and garrisons would remain to aid in dampening violence and recriminations.
of luke-warm or recalcitrant neighbors. 62

Concerning Sparta's relations with the Greek states in Europe, the following points should be made. Some of Sparta's staunchest allies during the struggle with Athens quickly began to have second thoughts after the demise of their common foe. Following Lysander's settlement in Attika (404 B.C.), Thebes, Korinth, Argos and Megara joined in contravening the Spartans' decree against aiding Athens' democratic exiles. Thebes even went so far as to issue a counter-decree imposing a fine on anyone who turned an exile back to the thirty. The Thebans also aided Thrasyboulos in mounting his attack on the Peiraeus. 63 Korinth and Thebes again spurned the Spartans when

62 Some scholars have postulated the existence of three political factions at Sparta during this epoch. The most recent of these is Hamilton, Sparta's Bitter Victories, Cornell, 1979, 80-96 with notes. Hamilton speculates that the partisans of Lysander sought a naval as well as military hegemony and a sharp break with the archaic Lykourgan politeia. This would require the upkeep of a fleet, the imposition of tribute, and the introduction of currency at Sparta. Such people also contemplated the evolution of a more egalitarian society and the abolition of the hereditary kingship. See Aristole Pol. 5.1.5. and 5.6.2; Isok. 12.67-69; Diod. 14.10.2, 13.2-8; Polybios 6.49.8 and Plut. Lys.24-26, Ages. 8; Nepos Lys. 3, for evidence of Lysander's covert plans. The second group under King Agis favored a more modest hegemony confined to European Greece. These Spartans would reduce the original Peloponnesian allies to near vassalage and extend Spartan influence beyond the Isthmos (see Diod. 14.38.4-5 for Herippidas' occupation of Trachinian Herakleia in 399.). The Third faction, led by King Pausanias, represented the most traditional elements in the state. Unlike either of the two hegemonist factions, this group would tolerate no deviation from the Lykourgan system and preferred to remain on terms of rough equality with the allies. They also would have carefully delimited Sparta's role in central Greece, the Aegean and Asia Minor. Hamilton ably discusses the balance of power among these factions, but Cawkwell, CR,30 (1980), 242-44, believes that Hamilton's conjectures far exceed the evidence, and Tritle, CP,76 (1981), 234-37, finds the notion of this factional wrangling too reliant on ideology to the neglect of personalities.

63 For Theban aid to Thrasyboulos, see Lysias fr. 120; Hell. Ox.
Lysander undertook his Attic campaign of 403. Both poleis refused to send soldiers. One reason for this antagonism is not difficult to discern. Once Lysander had embarked the Spartans on a program of Panhellenic hegemony, they arrogantly appropriated all spoils of victory to themselves. The sole exception to this pattern occurred when the Boiotians, who were the largest contingent at Dekeleia, simply took their share by force. The other allies received no share at all. Moreover, Lysander imposed an annual tribute of 1,000 talents on the Aegean and Asian poleis to underwrite the nascent hegemony.

In 401 Thebes and Korinth, by refusing to participate in Agis' campaign against Elis, had failed yet a third time to support Spartan designs. The polis mentality (a deeply ingrained desire for local autonomy) and earlier alliances could explain this reluctance in part, but the Lakedaimonians' short-sighted hybris was progressively alienating some of their most important supporters. The eventual result was that a powerful coalition of former friends and foes would take the field against Sparta less than a decade after the fall of Athens.64

17; Xen. Hell. 2.4.2; Diod. 14.6.1-3; Plut. Lys. 2.7.2 and Justin 5.9.8. That the allies had no share in the spoils of victory is attested by Hell. Ox. 17.4-5; Xen. Hell. 2.3.8, 3.5.5; Diod. 13.106.7; and Justin 5.10.12. A superb and moving account of the excesses inflicted by one of the thirty at Athens is preserved in Lysias' κατὰ Ερατοσθένους. Here the orator pleads for justice against his brother's murderer.

64See also Hamilton, 326-27, for the eventual consequences of Sparta's high-handedness after 404 B.C.
Sparta and Persia, 404-397 B.C.

The most significant development in the Persian empire between 404 and 397 was the revolt of Kyros the younger. In spite of the failure to topple his brother from the throne, Kyros' attempt would have repercussions for more than a decade. Until the outbreak of the revolt (which was due at least in part to Spartan instigation), the internal areas of the Persian realm on the surface appeared quiescent. With the revolt of Kyros, Artaxerxes could no longer ignore Spartan perfidy and meddling in Persian internal affairs. 65

Because he had fought at Kunaxa and proved loyal to the Great King, Tissaphernes recouped the Lydian and Karian satrapies which he had lost to Kyros. By 400 he had arrived in Sardis and demanded that the Ionian coastal cities be subject to him as was his right according to the treaty he negotiated for Dareios in 412/11 B.C. 66 This prompted

65 Xenophon's Anabasis, Diodorus (14.19-31) and the "lost history" of Themistogenes of Syracuse set forth the details of Kyros' revolt. Xenophon (Hell. 2.4.6) gives the name "Themistogenes" who is unknown except for this passage. Laqueur's conjecture (RE 5A.2, 1684-86) that he may have written a history of Syracuse is pure speculation. Prentice, "Themistogenes of Syracuse: An Error of a Copyist," AJP 1947, 76-77, ingeniously suggests that Θεμιστογένης τοῦ Συρακοσίου may be a corruption of Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐν τῶν Κυπείων in which case Xenophon would be referring to himself. Meyer, Vol. 5, 176, n.2, asserts that Themistogenes is Xenophon's pseudonym for himself. The accounts of Ktesias, court physician to Artaxerxes, and Dinon of Kolophon survive in fragments (See Jacoby, Fr.Gr.H., 3C, 522, 688; also Meyer, Vol. 5 174, n.1 and Beloch 3.1, 31, n.1). Dinon’s account seems to have been the source for Plutarch (Artax. 6). Xenophon (Hell. 3.1.1) and Isokrates (4.103-7, 146) record Sparta's activity against the Persians. Plutarch (Artax. 6) claims that the Spartans ordered Klearchos to cooperate with Kyros! Diodorus writes that the Spartans cooperated with Kyros in secret at first and by 401 quite openly (14.11-12, 19.4-5). See Grote, Vol. 7, 181-82, Beloch 3.1, 34 and Meyer, Vol. 5, 184.

66 Thucydides 8.18, 37, 58 (see Gomme et al., Vol. 5, 40-42, 79-82,
the Ionians to appeal for aid to Sparta as προστάτης of Hellas. Because of Ionian resistance, Tissaphernes laid siege to Kyme in the summer and captured many of her inhabitants. The coming of winter forced him to lift his siege, but he ransomed his captives for a huge sum of money.67

Sparta's response to the Ionian plea was to send Thibron with a force of 5,000 men from the Peloponnesos that same summer. He augmented this force by requesting some 300 horsemen from the Athenians who were only too happy to comply with the request, because the 300 had been supporters of the thirty tyrants. He further increased the army's size with the addition of some 5,000 veterans of Kyros who had been operating against the Hellespontine Thracians under Xenophon. Finally, he was able to recruit some 2,000 soldiers from the cities of Greek Asia, bringing his army to a strength of over 12,000 men.68 Since Agis was engaged in the Eleian struggle, Sparta's response to the Ionians' plea indicates the true thrust of her policy. Agis' campaign would seem to be more a police action than a major effort. The

67 Xen. Hell. 3.1.3-4, Diod. 14.35. The exact amount is unknown.

68 Xen. Hell. 3.1.4; Anab. 7.6-8; Diod. 14.37.1-4. The chronology for this campaign cannot be fixed with certainty. Most scholars suggest that Thibron did not arrive in Ephesos until the winter of 400 or spring of 399, e.g. Grote, Vol. 7, 375; Meyer, Vol. 5, 184-85 with notes;
influence of Lysander and his supporters is likely, because these people routinely favored a Spartan presence in Asia, an area rich in potential for exploitation. With the arrival of the Ionian contingent, Thibron marched to Ephesos and set up his headquarters. He advanced to Magnesia, which fell to his assault, and moved on to Tralles. Here his initiative failed because of the city's superior fortifications and natural defenses. He returned to Magnesia and transferred the inhabitants and their property to a nearby hill called δ' θωρης. He did so in the belief that Magnesia, unwalled and situated on level ground, would be easy prey for Tissaphernes' cavalry. When in fact the Persians appeared in large numbers, Thibron withdrew to Ephesos. 69

At first Thibron's successes were largely diplomatic. Almost all Greek cities in Asia Minor were willing to cooperate with a Spartan officer at the head of a sizeable force. With the arrival of Kyros' veterans from Thrace, he was able to move against Tissaphernes' cavalry even in open places. In Pharnabazos' realm, such cities as Pergamon, Teuthrania, Halisarna, Cambriel, Palaigambrion, Myrina and Gryneion came over voluntarily. At Phrygian Larisa, however, the inhabitants frustrated his attempt to invest the city, so the ephors ordered him to lift his siege and abandon Aiolis altogether. He was to march instead against Karia and Tissaphernes. 70

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69 Diod. 14.36.
70 Xen. Hell. 3.1.5-7 and Diod. 14.37.
While he was in Ephesos preparing to march against Karia, the ephors cashiered Thibron and replaced him with Derkyllidas. The allies had complained that Thibron had allowed his troops to plunder Greeks. When he returned home, the Spartans assessed a ruinous fine against him and he went into exile. 71

Thibron's replacement was a man of long experience in Asia Minor. He was renowned for his resourcefulness and bore the nickname "Sisyphos," as well as a grudge against the Hellespontine satrap Pharnabazos. Cognizant of the mutual suspicions between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos, Derkyllidas made a truce with the former. 72 Thus he abandoned plans for the Karian campaign and marched against Aiolis which was only loosely attached to Pharnabazos' satrapy. By refusing to allow his men to plunder Greeks, he quickly won over such cities as Larisa, Hamaxitos and Kolonai on the coast. Cities further inland, such as Neandria, Ilion and Kokylion also came over to him voluntarily. A subordinate of Pharnabazos named Meidias, who was in charge of the Troad, refused to admit him to Kebren, but the city's Greek inhabitants finally forced Meidias to do so. By having Meidias accompany him on subsequent forays, he was able to bring over the towns of Gergis and

71 Xen. Hell. 3.1.8-9.

72 Derkyllidas had served in Greek Asia in 411 B.C. (Thuc. 8.60-62). He was also harmost of Abydos during the navarchy of Lysander in 407/06. (Xen. Hell. 3.1.9). See Niese, RE 5.1, 240-41 and Parke, 41, 66-67. As to his nickname and reputed resourcefulness, see Xen. Hell. 3.1.8-9 and Athenaios 11.101 (Jacoby Fr.Gr.H., Vol. 2A.1, 63, No. 71 under Ephoros).
Skepsis to the Greek site. Derkylidas had won the allegiance of nine cities in eight days. With the summer (399) campaigning season drawing to a close, he decided to seek a truce with Pharnabazos. His purpose was at once to protect his Aiolic allies from Persian cavalry and not to make himself a burden to them, as had his predecessor.  

Pharnabazos, reflecting on the strength of Derkylidas' force which had occupied nearly all of Aiolis, decided to accept the truce. Until he could reorganize and augment his own forces, his Phrygian estates were in imminent peril. Derkylidas then moved into Bithynia, where he passed the winter in plundering the region. He was joined by a force of Odryssian cavalry and Thracian peltasts from across the strait. Apart from a single reverse which occurred when a large mass of Bithynians attacked his camp while his troops were absent on a raid, the winter season was a success.

With the coming of spring (398), a deputation arrived from Sparta to extend Derkylidas' command into the next year. The three Spartan legates also mentioned that the Greek inhabitants of the Chersonesos had complained to the ephors about Thracian raids into their

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73 Xen. Hell. 3.1.16-2.1; Diod. 14.38.

74 In the spring of 398, Ktesias, court physician to Artaxerxes, visited Konon and Euagoras in Kypros after Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos' rapprochement. He also travelled to Lakedaimon on behalf of the Great King to attempt a reconciliation between Persia and Sparta. See Jacoby Fr.Gr.H., Vol. 3C.1, 483, no. 30 (Phot. Bibl. 72), under Ktesias; also Beloch, Vol. 3.1, 36 and Meyer, Vol. 5, 193. The Spartans at the same time sent a legation to Sousa. The Persians, however, kept them under house-arrest to conceal the naval build-up in Phoinikia and Kypros.

75 Xen. Hell. 3.2.2-5.
territory. Their land was very fertile, they said, but they were unable to till it properly because of these raids. They proposed that a force of Peloponnesian allies be dispatched to build a wall from sea to sea to keep the Thracians out. Derkyrides, taking the hint, crossed over to the Chersonesos. En route, Seuthes received him amicably in Hellespontine Thrace. Upon realizing how rich the soil was and having conferred with representatives of the twelve Chersonesian cities, he built their wall. According to the version of Diodorus the construction of the wall coincided with Derkyrides' arrival the year before to assume Thibron's command. Diodorus places the Chersonesian embassy to Sparta in the previous year and he states that they specifically requested Derkyrides. Xenophon, who was present in Asia at the time of these events, is perhaps to be preferred since he was an eye-witness to many of the things he describes and would have had reliable information available for events he did not himself see. Furthermore, it seems likely that the Chersonesians may have waited until early 398 to make sure that Derkyrides did not prove another Thibron who would fatten his own men at the expense of the Greeks he was supposed to protect. 76

After completing the wall, Derkyrides led his army back to Asia. He had determined that all was well and prospering in the Greek coastal regions. The sole exception was that a group of Chian democrats were plundering Ionia from their exile stronghold at Atarneus. He thereupon undertook an eight months' siege and finally occupied the city. The

76 Diod. 14.38.6-7; Xen. Hell. 3.2.6-11.
defenders had held out for so long because they had laid in a sizeable supply of grain. Derkylidas then restocked the city's granaries for his own troops and departed for Ephesos after appointing Drakon of Pellene his governor (F398).77

In the spring of 398, the principal satraps of Greek Asia, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos, had decided to work in concert to expel the Spartans. Putting aside their differences (although Pharnabazos remained secretly jealous of Tissaphernes' appointment as supreme Persian commander), they conferred in Karia. Tissaphernes was receptive to his rival, because an Ionian embassy to Sparta had insisted that the Lake-daimonians press the satrap to grant full autonomy to all Greek cities. The Spartans accordingly decided to mount a two-pronged attack on Karia, where Tissaphernes' residence was located. Derkylidas was to lead the army and the navarch Pharax would co-ordinate naval operations.78

Thus after completing his siege of Atarneus, Derkylidas was preparing in the spring of 397 to march on Karia. The Persians outflanked him, however, and in anticipation of his attack, they recrossed the Maiandros river. Derkylidas alerted Pharax that the Persian forces were in a position to plunder Ionia at will. He thereupon withdrew to the North to protect the Ionians.79

In the midst of this hasty volte-face, Derkylidas suddenly

77Xen. Hell. 3.2.11 and Isok. 4.144.
78Xen. Hell. 3.2.12-13.
79Hell. 3.1.12-15.
realized that the Persian army was bearing down upon him in the immediate vicinity of the Maiandros. Since he had assumed that the Persian objective was the area around Ephesos, his troops were not in formation. Rather than offer battle, both sides agreed to a one-day truce. Derkyldidas was unsure of the reliability of his troops from Ionia (some had fled at the mere sight of the Persians), and he was uneasy about risking a pitched battle. As for Tissaphernes, he was fearful of the formidable reputation of the Greek hoplites. In spite of Pharnabazos' objections, he was therefore receptive to a peaceful resolution. Each side presented its terms. The Persians demanded the departure of the Lakedaimonians and all harmosts. The Spartans insisted on full autonomy for all Greek cities in Asia. It was agreed that the truce should obtain until Tissaphernes could confer with the Great King and until Derkyldidas could inform the authorities in Sparta. Moreover, after Derkyldidas had made his truce with Tissaphernes in late 399, Pharnabazos enlisted the services of the Athenian navarch Konon in 398. Since the battle of Aigospotamoi in 405, Konon had been living in exile at the court of Euagoras, king of Kypriote Salamis. After persuading the Great King, Pharnabazos offered Konon 500 silver talents to outfit a fleet. Euagoras and other leaders in Kypros were induced to furnish 100 triremes. Konon agreed to accept command of the entire Persian fleet because he hoped to avenge Athens' defeat and win glory for himself. Upon accepting his commission in the Great King's navy, Konon took forty triremes

80 Xen. Hell. 3.2.16-20; see Bengtson, Staatsverträge 2, 164-65.
already available and sailed to Kilikia to complete his preparations. 81

According to Plutarch, 82 Konon wrote to the Great King, suggesting that he required a navy just as the king had need of a navarch. No mention is made of Pharnabazos' role in procuring the command for Konon in this version. Pharnabazos most likely did have such a role, as Xenophon reports, but it may also be true that Konon brought himself to the attention of the Great King. Since Pharnabazos was jealous of Tissaphernes' position as supreme commander of the land forces, it seems reasonable that he would attempt to augment his own influence by strengthening Artaxerxes' hand at sea.

Konen spent most of 397 recruiting mercenary seamen and overseeing the construction of the Persian fleet in Kypros. Thus while Derkyldas and the satraps had negotiated a temporary cessation of hostilities on land, Pharnabazos and Konon continued their clandestine efforts to augment dramatically Persian naval strength in the Aegean Sea. This was the situation in the eastern Mediterranean on the eve of Agesilaos' campaign.

81 Diod. 14.39.1-4; it is undoubtedly to this period that the beautiful Kyzikene issue of silver dates with Pharnabazos' idealized likeness and Greek lettering (not Aramaic). See Gardner, A History of Ancient Coinage, Chicago, 1974, 334; Kraay and Hirmer, Greek Coins, New York, 1966, 370 with notes; and Hill, Greek Historical Coins, Chicago, 1976, 57-60.

CHAPTER III

AGESILAOS' YOUTH AND ACCESSION, THE CONSPIRACY OF KINADON, AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE ASIAN EXPEDITION

While Derkylidas was campaigning in Asia Minor, two important events occurred in Lakedaimon. The second of these was the ephors' discovery of a plot to overthrow the government. The year before, with the death of Agis, a dispute had arisen over the royal succession. It was this dispute that first brought Agesilaos into the full light of history. Evidence for his life before he became king is, as might be expected, meagre. The future king was born in 444 B.C., the son of Archidamos II of the Eurypontid house and his second wife Eupolia.

1 See ch. 2, 36, and notes 39 and 51 for the insoluble chronological muddle. Though certainty is unattainable, the best dates for the Eleian struggle are from spring 401 to summer 399. Thus Agesilaos' accession would occur in late summer or early autumn and the detection of Kinadon's plot in late spring or early summer 398.

2 There is evidence for Agesilaos' life as a family man, but it is rather sparse and scattered. Nonetheless at least the outlines are discernible from an occasional reference in our sources. This much can be ascertained: He married a woman named Kleora and had three children by her, a son Archidamos who later became king, and two daughters Eupolia and Prolyta. The evidence for Archidamos' birth occurs in Xenophon's Hellenika 6.4.18. In his first command, he was summoned to aid in the aftermath of the battle of Leuktra. Since a Spartan, even a son of a king, would not normally assume a command before the age of thirty, perhaps Archidamos was born approximately 461 B.C. in order to be old enough to lead out his own army in 371; see Hertzberg, Das Leben des Agesilaos II von Sparta, Halle, 1855, 235. Agesilaos did not command, as Xenophon notes, διὰ ὁμόθενίας. As to the dates of his daughters' births, there is no evidence surviving from antiquity. Hertzberg has speculated that his marriage may have occurred some time after the defeat of Athens in 404, perhaps in the following year. His assumption that Archidamos was the eldest cannot be supported by the evidence.

Plutarch's Agesilaos 10.6, Xenophon's Hellenika 3.4.29, and Justin 6.3 provide information about his wife's family, where her
Since he was not his father's first born, he underwent the rigors of the Spartan ἀγώγη, because only those destined for the kingship were exempted. It was during this period of youthful training that Agesilaos first made the acquaintance of Lysander, a man whose long relationship with Agesilaos' older half-brother Agis made possible his final effort to win permanent influence in Sparta. The former

Justin 6.3. provide information about his wife's family, where her brother Peisandros' name appears (see Ehrenberg RE 19.1., 144). Similarly Pausanias 3.9.3 gives her father's name as Aris tomelidas (Kirchner, RE 2.1, 950), who was sent to Thebes in 396 to enlist Boiotian aid for the Asian campaign. Peisandros was left in command of the Spartan navy when Agesilaos departed for the interior of Asia in 395.

Agesilaos had a younger half-brother by his mother (he and Agis had shared the same father) named Teleutias, (Ehrenberg, RE 5A.1, 398-400), and a sister Kyniska (Honigmann, RE Vol. 12.1., 2). Teleutias will figure prominently in subsequent chapters and Kyniska achieved renown by becoming the first woman in history to enter a winning chariot in the Olympic games (Plut. Ages. 20.1).

Plutarch's biography is the only source for Agesilaos' life as a private citizen and the major emphasis is moral. He notes, for example, that Agesilaos was well suited to rule because he had learned to obey. While learning to obey, he became enamored of Lysander, an older member of his ἀγέλη or "herd" because he was smitten by the latter's physical beauty. Agesilaos was lame in one foot, but the bloom of youth was enough to make up for his deformity. In spite of his handicap, the future king did not shrink from challenge, no matter how strenuous, and proved himself in every way a worthy competitor, (Ages. 1.1.-2.2.). Although a resilient and hardened competitor, he displayed a winning charm and affability. Hertzberg, 232, provides a genealogical chart which summarizes the information about Agesilaos' family. For his date of birth, see Hertzberg, 229, n.2a and 233, n.6; Ni eise, RE Vol. 1.1, 802; and Kleine Pauly, Vol. 1, 127-28. As to the date, there is no reason to doubt Plutarch's statement that the king was eighty-four at the time of his death in Libya in 360 B.C. (Ages. 40.2). Plutarch's reference to the exemption of eldest sons of the two royal houses is the only one about this prerogative to survive from antiquity.
navarch exerted his authority and popularity to win Agesilaos the kingship, and two years later, he maneuvered the king into his first overseas command.  

In addition to what can be gleaned from Plutarch, there is indirect evidence from the histories of Thucydides and, in one instance, from Xenophon's Hellenika about Agesilaos' military experience.

In the summer of 419 B.C., Agis led the Lacedaemonians to their northern border at Mt. Lykaion, but turned back because of unfavorable omens. One year later, at the request of the Epidaurians who were suffering an Argive incursion, Agis led the allies against the Argolid. Later that same summer, having withdrawn from the Argolid, he again led the Lacedaemonians out παραμυθεί, this time against Mantinea in relief of the Tegeates. This expedition resulted in a major Spartan victory. In the winter of 417, Agis took the field against the Argives a third time in full force with all the allies except the Korinthians. Although he seized and dismantled some walls and occupied

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4Rahe, Lysander and the Spartan Settlement, 407-403 B.C., diss. Yale, 1977, 7-9, 19, believes that Lysander was a μονοφαξ, and the protege of Archidamos and later Agis. Thus he participated in the ἄγωγη with Agesilaos, the son and half-brother respectively of his sponsors.

5Thuc. 5.54; see Gomme et al. Vol. 4, 73-75.

6See Gomme et al., Vol. 4, 111-119 for a precise and detailed analysis of this campaign.

7Thuc. 5.64, 5.75; see Gomme et al., Vol. 4, 91
a small town, this action was indecisive. In the early spring of 413, the Spartans under Agis invaded Attika and fortified Dekeleia.8

Finally Lysander was completing his preparations for the blockade of Athens and requested King Agis to occupy Dekeleia a second time in full force to reduce the city to starvation and surrender in the fall of 405 B.C.9

One can surmise in all the instances cited, that Agesilaos participated in these actions under the command of his older half-brother. In the first case, the abortive mission near Mt. Lykaion in 419, Agesilaos would have been about twenty-five years old. In the Spartans' final blockade and siege of Athens in 405/04, he would have been approaching forty. His military experience before his accession, even to judge from this limited evidence, is likely to have been considerable.10

The Disputed Succession and Triumph of Agesilaos

After depositing one-tenth of the booty from the Eleian War at Delphi, King Agis II fell ill and was carried back to Sparta where he soon died.11 A conjunction of three peculiar circumstances made

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8Thuc. 7.19; see Gomme et al., Vol. 4, 395.
9Xen. Hell. 2.2.7; see also ch. 2.
10Hertzberg, 235. See also ch. 2, 25 and 36, n. 39
11Xen. Hell. 3.3.1, Paus. 3.8.7. Several ancient authors allotted at least some space to the disputed succession and turmoil in Lakedaimon after Agis' death. The year in question was in all likelihood 399 (see ch. two for a discussion of the chronological muddle of this period); the authors and their works are Xenophon in his Agesilaos 1.5
Agesilaos' succession possible. First, a cloud of suspicion had plagued the young heir Leotychidas for most of his life. From the time of his birth, he had been suspected of being Alkibiades' bastard. During the latter's exile in Lakedaimon, rumor abounded that Timaia, Agis' wife, had become pregnant by him.\textsuperscript{12} As a result, when she gave birth in the tenth month after Agis had forsaken her bed, the king refused to acknowledge his paternity.\textsuperscript{13} Even the ephors were suspicious, and Timaia's habit of referring to the child as "Alkibiades" in the presence of her helot maids did little to advance the suspect heir's cause.\textsuperscript{14}

Second, the advocacy of Lysander that summer was crucial, because an oracle-monger named Diopeithes had produced an old Delphic augury warning the Spartans "not to lame the kingship." Agesilaos' lameness thus gave a pretext to Leotychidas' supporters to rally to the young heir's side.

Third, in a more speculative vein, there may have been an undercurrent of factional wrangling. The Lysandrians would back a man whom

\textsuperscript{12} See Thuc. 6.88.9-93.1; Isok. 16.9; and Plut. Alk. 23.1. Gomme et al., Vol. 4, 360-61, 366, discuss the implications of Alkibiades' sojourn in Sparta. He arrived in the winter 415/14; thus in 399 Leotychidas could have been no more than 15 years old.

\textsuperscript{13} A nocturnal earthquake had created in Agis' mind a superstitious fear of Poseidon's wrath. Thus he chose not to sleep for a time in the same bed as his wife.

\textsuperscript{14} Plut. Ages. 3.1-2, Alk. 23.7-8, Lys. 22.3-4; Xen. Hell. 3.3.2.
their leader believed would be pliable and willing to support Spartan expansion into the Aegean and Asia. On the other hand, more traditional Spartiates, who believed in the great *rhetra* of Lykourgos and doubted the wisdom of simply taking over the maritime *Δοξή* of Athens, would likely support Leotychidas. Agis after all had finally recognized the boy as his son, and the words of a dying man counted for much.  

In addition to these three circumstances, it is clear that Agesilaos was eminently suited for the role of military leader. He was scrupulously deferential to the ephors and the *γέροντες* who wielded the most power in the state at that time. By skillful and subtle manipulation he was able to augment his own power and largely circumvent these two bodies whose function was to check the power and ambition of the kings. Similarly, he enjoyed cordial relations with ordinary citizens by favoring those amenable to his purposes and winning over his adversaries with encouragement when they served the state well. His only weaknesses were that he was overprotective of his friends and would demonstrate an imperfect grasp of the importance of naval strength.  

Clearly the issues which carried the day for Agesilaos were his proven ability and the question of Leotychidas' legitimacy. Since his

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15 Rice, *Why Sparta Failed*, diss., Yale, 1971, 10-11 and Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, Cornell, 1979, 87-88, n.1, theorize that three factions were competing for power at this time. See ch. 2 for a discussion of the varying aims of each group.  

16 Plut. *Ages*. 4.3-5.2; Beloch, Vol. 3.1, 109; Meyer, Vol. 5, 197-98, 288-89. In this last regard, he was quite unlike his former partisan and Ἐροτής Lysander.
nephew was a mere child, no older than fifteen years, the vigorous and tested adult would appear to have been the better choice for the state. Because of Agis' deathbed acknowledgement of the youth, Diopeithes' advocacy undoubtedly carried weight with the superstitious Spartans. This was so despite Xenophon's description of Diopeithes as Λευκτικής συναγορευμένης which hints at political as well as religious motivation. The key phrase in Lysander's rebuttal of the seer was that the god (Apollo) did not care if a king walked with a limp, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ γυνής ὄν ἡθελείος καὶ μὴ Ἡρακλείος, τὸ τεῦχος τὴν χωλήν εἶναι τὴν βασιλείαν. This interpretation of the oracle, Agesilaos' contention that Agis had forsaken Timaia's bed ten months before Leotychidas' birth, and probably Agesilaos' maturity convinced the ephors to pronounce the more experienced man king. We are told that upon assuming the kingship, Agesilaos divided the estate of his older brother among his mother's poor relatives and drove the hapless Leotychidas into exile.

It should be noted that Lysander's successful ruse was not universally acclaimed as a triumph of justice. From the remarks made by Plutarch in his comparison of Agesilaos and Pompey, it is clear that there was much doubt about the propriety of the accession in the ancient world. Although Agesilaos may have been a favorite of historians

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17 Xen. Hell. 3.3.3.
18 Plut. Ages. 3.3.
19 Ibid. 3.6.
beginning with Xenophon, Plutarch condemns him for injustice and self-serving expediency for the manner in which he became king. He and Lysander stand censured for condemning and exiling Leotychidas and having done the state a disservice by "darkening the oracle of Apollo."\(^{22}\)

The Conspiracy of Kinadon

After describing Agesilaos' accession, Xenophon gives a flawed (by modern standards), but remarkably revealing glimpse into Spartan society in the years following Athens' defeat in 404 B.C.\(^{23}\) The effects of the war on the holdings of some of the Spartiates resulted in their inability to keep up their share of the σφονίτικα. Because of this failure, these men lost their voting privileges in the assembly (apella). One of their number, Kinadon, headed a conspiracy involving other ὑπομείονες, as they were called, perioikoi, and Messenian helots whose purpose was to overthrow the government. Xenophon's purpose in recording the details of this plot was to highlight the role of his friend, the new king. Agesilaos' part was limited to participating in unpropitious sacrifices at the time that the details of the plot surfaced, although he may have had a deliberative role in formulating the countermeasures.

\(^{20}\)Nepos \textit{Ages.} 1.1.

\(^{21}\)Synkrisis 1.2,2.1.

\(^{22}\)Parke and Wormell, \textit{The Delphic Oracle, Vol. 2: The Oracular Responses}, Oxford, 1961, 50. The oracle originally appears in Diod. 11.50.4. This reference dates to 477 B.C. when it was already considered "ancient."

\(^{23}\)Hell. 3.3.4.
The details of the plot are the following. Less than a year after becoming king, Agesilaos failed three times to obtain favorable omens at a sacrifice. The seer performing the ritual interpreted the contrary outcome as an augury of internal peril to the state. A few days later an informer came forward to alert the ephors that a man called Kinadon with other "inferiors", periōikoi and Messenian helots, was plotting to murder the Spartiates and assume control of the state.  

The hatred among the few who were privy to the conspiracy was so intense that they wanted "to eat the Spartiates raw." The ephors at once consulted with certain elders and devised a ruse to entrap Kinadon. They would send him on a spurious mission to the Messenian town of Aulon. They would instruct him to arrest certain helots there and a beautiful woman who reportedly was corrupting Lakedaimonians stationed there, young and old alike. In reality, however, those assigned to accompany him had secret instructions to arrest him as soon as they were outside Sparta proper. In case any of his accomplices should hear of the counter-plot, a squad of cavalry was to assist in his detention. 

It may be that Kinadon had performed such services for the authorities in the past after losing his status as an "equal" (οὐσίος). In any event, he did not find the assignment unusual and thus played into the ephors' hands. Upon his return, the ephors quickly arrested him, and thus the best of the counter-plot was successful.

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24 Chambers, "On Messenian and Laconian Helots in the Fifth Century B.C.," The Historian, 40 (1977), 271-85, observes that much of the difficulty and confusion about the helot problem would disappear if Laconian helots were seen as largely loyal and those from Messenia as disaffected.

25 Hell. 3.3.4-8.
arrest, he was forced to reveal the names of his principal comrades, and the list which his captors compiled contained even so respected a man as the seer Tisamenes. When the ephors had received Kinadon and his fellows into custody back in Sparta, they asked him why had had undertaken such a thing. His response was that he wished to be less than no one in Lakedaimon. He and the others were subsequently whipped and prodded in public, and presumably executed.\textsuperscript{26}

As Hamilton has observed,\textsuperscript{27} Xenophon surely "commits one of his most serious sins as an historian by failing to analyze the causes and results of Kinadon's conspiracy." The root causes of the plot may have been the growing inequality of wealth among the \textit{ομιότια}, which forced some of them to default in their contribution to the \textit{ομιοτιά}, or common messes. The penalty for such insolvency was loss of citizen privileges. Hamilton suggests that there may have been in Sparta at this time a crypto-democratic movement which hoped to achieve a more equitable participation of all Lakedaimonians in the affairs of state. It was certainly during this period that Lysander had plotted to open the kingship to anyone descended from Herakles, not just the members of

\textsuperscript{26} Hell. 3.3.9-11. Reduction to \textit{υπομειλων} entailed loss of voting privileges in the \textit{apella}. Many Spartiates suffered this embarrassment because they had been unable to contribute their share to the common mess. During the long struggle with Athens, such men had been unable to oversee their estates. See Meyer, Vol. 5, 26-27, 46; Beloch, Vol. 3.1, 28. A brief notice of the conspiracy appears in Aristotle's \textit{Politics} 1306b, where a discussion of the weaknesses of aristocratic governments is under way. Polyainos also briefly summarizes the failure of the plot and the fate of the plotters (2.14.1). Aristotle discusses the growing poverty in Sparta by 404 in \textit{Pol.} 1269-70. Xenophon (\textit{Lak. Pol.} 14.1-7) hints at it.

\textsuperscript{27} Hamilton, 126.
the two ruling houses.28

The internal situation at Sparta in 398 shown by Kinadon's plot was remarkably volatile. The obvious fear it aroused in the ephors, elders, and likely the two kings hints strongly at the changes and turmoil within the fabric of Spartan society. Yet as we have seen, the state easily suppressed the helot unrest, the "inferiors" dissidence and any nascent egalitarian tendencies.

Preparation for the Expedition to Asia

In foreign affairs, specifically touching Greek Asia, the ineffectual Thibron had given way to the popular and successful Derkyldas. After the Spartans' wide-ranging incursions into Lydia and Phrygia, Tissaphernes, the Lydian satrap, had effected a temporary truce with Derkyldas in the spring of 397 (see ch. 2). Pharnabazos, the satrap of Daskyleion in concert with Tissaphernes and Konon, had undertaken a huge Persian naval build-up in Kypros the previous summer (398 B.C.).29 The purpose, of course, was to challenge Spartan naval strength in the

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28 For the discovery of Lysander's plot after his death at Haliartos in 394: Plut. Lys. 24-26, Moralia 229f, 212Cd, Ages. 20.2-3; and Nepos Lys. 3. Both Hamilton, 126-28 and Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, A Regional History, 1300-362 B.C., New York, 1979, 273-75, perceive an intimate link between the conspiracy of Kinadon and deteriorating social stability in Lakonia at this time.

29 Although Spartan legates arrived in Kypros to discuss peace terms, Euagoras and Konon detained them (F398). Pharnabazos and Konon were thus able to conceal the naval build-up in Tyre for a full year. When Artaxerxes' court physician Ktesias came to Euagoras' court with a letter from the Great King, the Spartan legates were released, and Ktesias accompanied them to Lakedaimon. See Fr.GR.H., nos. 688.30.32 and Meyer, Vol. 5, 193-94 with notes.
Aegean. Tissaphernes' temporary truce with Derkyldas would permit a similar massing of Persian land forces with an eye to ridding Greek Asia of the troublesome Spartans permanently. 30

In the fall of 397, word finally reached Sparta of the impending Persian designs on the Greek world of Asia Minor. Tissaphernes' truce with Derkyldas was shown to be a sham, and the true nature of Artaxerxes' and the satraps' intentions became clear from the testimony of a Syracusan mariner named Herodas sailing with his cargo ship to Tyre where he had seen 300 Persian ships either being fitted out or constructed. By discreet inquiry, he learned the purpose of this build-up and set sail immediately for Sparta. After hearing Herodas' story, the ephors promptly summoned the allies to a congress in order to debate the best course in the face of the Persian threat. 31

Lysander also was alerted about the activities in Asia Minor, and he lost little time during the allied congress in Sparta to urge his supporters from Greek Asia to request Agesilaos as commander of the expeditionary force. He intended to manipulate the new king in order to reassert his own influence in the Greek East. 32 He hoped to restore his friends, the former dekarchs, who had fallen out of favor, and thereby strengthen his own faction in Sparta. His role in the deliberations was to downplay the Persian naval threat. He also hoped to restore the

31 Xen. Hell. 3.4.1-2.
dekarchies by procuring the command for his friend Agesilaos and then using the king to advance his own designs. Some have seen in the former navarch's machinations a final, desperate attempt to regain the stature he lost in 402 with his friends' demise in Asia Minor. As a private citizen, he could never hope to rival the power or prestige of a king or even that of an influential ephor. Another successful navarch and accomplished diplomat, Antalkidas, would come to a similar realization some ten or twelve years later. Thus Lysander's only chance was to manipulate a king who in some respects was obligated to him for his kingship and command.

Agesilaos stepped forward to request the command, when the ephors had called the allied assembly. His purpose was to offer the Persians an honorable peace, or if they preferred war, to forestall their design on the Asian Greeks and even to wrest Asia Minor from Artaxerxes' control altogether. Agesilaos clearly showed that he had his own ideas about the expedition and was his own man, something which did not augur well for Lysander's purposes. In any event, the congress voted to name Agesilaos commander and to furnish him with a levy of 2,000 neodamodeis, 6,000 soldiers from the allies, and a council of

33 Xen. _Hell._ 3.4.2.

34 Meyer, Vol. 5, 194-95; Grote Vol. 8, 422; and Cary, _CAH_ Vol. 6, 41.

35 Xen. _Ages._ 1.6-8. It is curious that Xenophon eschews any mention of Lysander's role in this version.
thirty Spartiate advisors, chief of whom was Lysander. At this point, a closing observation about the neodamodeis in Agesilaos' army is needed. Because Diodorus does not even mention these troops while Xenophon and Plutarch do so only cursorily, they have let slip an opportunity to furnish us with an insight into the social conditions obtaining at Sparta in the early fourth century B.C. Moreover they perhaps have overlooked yet another reason for mounting the Asian expedition. It is certainly possible that the authorities at Sparta undertook the campaign not only to meet the threat posed by Artaxerxes and the satraps, but to dissipate the revolutionary fervor of Kinadon's conspiracy. By drawing off an additional 2,000 of the ablest and most vigorous of the non-Spartiate Lakonians, leading Spartans may have hoped to eliminate the basis for other such plots in the future. The battle-tested neodamodeis could expend any residual resentment by plundering the rich provinces of western Asia, rather than by forming subversive cadres in Lakedaimon.

After decreeing the levy of allied troops, neodamodeis and advisors, the Spartans contracted an alliance with the Pharoah Nepherites.

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36 Xen. Hell. 3.4.2, Ages. 1.7; Plut. Ages. 6.3. Diodorus (14.79.1) alludes to the 6,000 allied troops and the thirty advisors, but is silent about the neodamodeis.

37 Grote, Vol. 7, 420-21, succinctly notes that wide-spread civil discord would serve as a motive for dispatching resentful Lakedaimonians on "distant and lucrative military service." He cites the precedent of Brasidas' Thracian expedition of 424-22. See Thuc. bks. 4-5; 1,000 neodamodeis were already serving in Asia with Derkylidias at this time (Xen. Hell. 3.1.4).
The Egyptians, chafing bitterly under the Persian yoke and often in open rebellion against the Great King, agreed to supply the Spartan navarch Pharax with equipment for 100 triremes and 500,000 measures of grain. From his base in Rhodes, the latter with 120 ships then blockaded Konon's squadron of forty Phoinikian vessels at Sasanda in Karia. From this port, he laid siege to Kaunos, some 28 km. inland, but was compelled to lift both siege and blockade upon the arrival of a relief force under Tissaphernes. The Lakedaimonians withdrew to Rhodes, and Konon sailed away to the Knidian Chersonese to recruit an additional forty ships for the Persian fleet. 38

38 Diod. 14.79; Justin 6.1-2; Meyer, Vol. 5, 172, 196; Beloch 3.1, 42, 3.2, 123; Bengtson, Staatsverträge 2, 167: Egypt had been in open rebellion against Sousa since 401 under two pharaohs, Amyrtaios (404-399) and Nepherites (399-393). The most recent opportunity for revolt had surfaced with the abortive attempt of Kyros to dethrone Artaxerxes (Xen. Anab. 2.1.14, 2.5.13; Isok. 5.101).
CHAPTER IV

AGESILAOS IN ASIA, 396-394 B.C.

The Fleet Assembles at Geraistos in Euboia

In deciding to campaign against the Great King, the Spartans had several motives. In 400 B.C., they had promised to maintain the autonomy of the Greek cities in Asia. The expeditions of Thibron and Derkylidas were undertaken in fulfillment of that pledge (see ch. 2). Moreover, they could best dispel the threat of internal disruption (which Kinadon's failed conspiracy had laid bare) by sending abroad to rich and distant lands those most likely to spearhead such activities in the future. Also Lysander and his partisans undoubtedly thought to recover their lost fortunes abroad and fallen status at home. As to Agesilaos' purposes, one might surmise that much the foregoing was at work, but he also seems to have entertained personal designs on an Homeric scale.\(^1\) While Pharax and the Spartan legates were preoccupied in Egypt, Rhodes and Karia, it was not by accident that Agesilaos had the allied fleet assemble at Geraistos in the southernmost tip of Euboia. While most of the army was preparing to take passage to Ephesos (the Spartan headquarters in Asia), Agesilaos intended to perform sacrifices at Aulis in imitation of Agamemnon.

With most of the ships lying at anchor in Geraistos, the king

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\(^1\)Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 277.
sailed up the strait and crossed over to the mainland at Aulis. The night before performing the sacrifice, a dream came to him, advising that he make the same offering to the goddess that Agememnon made before he set sail. Agesilaos reported the dream to his friends and decided to offer a deer instead of his daughter, because he did not wish to imitate his Mycenean predecessor's cruelty.

On the following day, one of the most crucial events in Agesilaos' life took place. It would have far-reaching consequences for his foreign policy throughout his reign. He decided that his own seer would sacrifice the stag at the altar of Artemis. This privilege had been traditionally reserved for the Boiotians. Upon hearing of this breach of convention, the boiotarchs sent cavalry to prevent Agesilaos from acting in a manner contrary to local custom. These riders tore the still smouldering thigh pieces from the altar and cast them aside. This officially sanctioned deed, which to Agesilaos' mind set his whole enterprise on an ill-omened footing, transformed his attitude to the Boiotians from distaste to hatred.

2 Geraistos on the south coast of Euboia was likely the site where a storm destroyed a squadron of Xerxes' fleet. See The Blue Guide to Greece, 379 and Herodotus 8.13. Xenophon (Hell. 3.4.3-4), Pausanias (3.9.3-4) and Plutarch (Ages. 6.4-5) recount the detour to Aulis.

3 Plutarch's inclusion of the dream has a dramatic flavor reminiscent of Xerxes' dream (Herodotus 7.12-18) before the expedition to Greece.


5 Xen. Hell. 3.3.4; Pausanias 3.9.3-4; Plut. Ages 6-10. See also Grote Vol. 7, 424; Meyer, Vol. 5, 196; Hertzberg, 41-42, Cartledge, 267-77. Since at least 404, ill will marked the Boiotians' relationship with Agesilaos' older brother Agis. The Boiotians simply
Arrival in Ephesos, Negotiations, and the Rebuff to Lysander

Tissaphernes, the satrap of Karia and Lydia who had negotiated a truce with Derkyldas several months prior to Agesilaos' arrival did not relish the prospect of an additional 8,000 hostile Greeks in his realm. Before Agesilaos could further augment his forces by local recruitment, the satrap tried to stall for time by demanding why Agesilaos had come to Asia. The king replied that he wished the Greeks in Asia to be as free as those in Europe. Tissaphernes averred that this could be so as soon as he had notified the Great King, if the Spartans would depart. He then proposed a three months' truce to allow time for Artaxerxes' response during which interval both sides would swear not to harm each other. Tissaphernes took the oaths in the presence of Derkyldas, Herippidas and Megillos who swore for Agesilaos. 6

appropriated most of the booty from Attika after the disbanding of the allied occupation of Dekeleia. In 403, they ignored a Spartan decree and openly aided Thrasyboulos in his attack on the tyranny of the thirty. They had refused by 401 to participate in Agis' action against the Eleians and finally in 396, they spurned the embassy of Agesilaos' father-in-law Aristomelidas to join in the expedition to Asia.

The Thebans, however, were not alone in refusing to join Agesilaos' crusade in Asia Minor. The Athenians had also demurred ostensibly on grounds of weakness, but Konon's overt advocacy of the Persian cause figured in their reluctance. Some Athenians dreamed of restoring their vanished δυναμη and most would have welcomed revenge for Lysander's victory at Aigospotamoi (405) and the Peiraeus (404). The Korinthians actually responded at first with enthusiasm to the Spartan summons, but offered regrets when their temple of Olympian Zeus burned down. It is worth noting that these three states and Argos formed a coalition to make war on the Peloponnesians only two years later (see Hamilton, 183-85). Thus the Spartans' campaign involved only the Peloponnesian allies and the Ionian and Aiolic poleis of Asia. Nevertheless it was clearly Agesilaos' aim to continue restoring Sparta's tarnished image abroad by expelling the Persians from the Greek world altogether.

6Xen. Hell. 3.4.5-6.
Scarcely had the oaths been sworn before Tissaphernes perjured himself by gathering and training in the Maiandros plain a large army which he had earlier requested of Artaxerxes. Agesilaos knew of the continued Persian build-up, but he chose to abide by his pledge not to harm the satrap's realm, since the allies too were gathering additional support to counter Tissaphernes' treachery. Mistrust of the satrap produced a willingness to cooperate with Agesilaos even on the part of barbarians, which implies that efforts were under way to swell the number of troops in the allied army. These efforts netted another 4,000 soldiers. The total number of allied troops must have exceeded 20,000, since Lysander's followers, other Asian Greeks and even barbarians were drawn to the king's entourage.  

While the truce was in force, Lysander began in earnest to attempt the restoration of his clients and the recovery of his own fallen status. He began to receive legations from his friends in such ostentatious fashion as to overshadow Agesilaos and make him seem no more than a figurehead. Because of this slight to his dignity (which he also believed could undermine his authority as strategos), the king began turning away Lysander's friends with their petitions unfulfilled. Similarly, he adjudicated unfavorably all matters pertaining to them. His purpose in openly thwarting these people, of course, was to assert his own authority. Moreover, the thirty Spartiate advisors had urged

\[7\] Xen. Hell. 3.4.11, Ages. 1.10-11; Plut. Ages. 9.1; Polyainos 2.1.8; Diod. 14.79.2. See also Schaefer, RE Suppl. 7, 1593; Bengtson, Staatsverträge 2, 164-66; Lins, Kritische Betrachtung der Feldzüge des Agesilaos in Kleinasiern, Halle, 1914, 16; Meyer, Vol. 5, 199.
such steps because they resented serving as aids to Lysander rather than counsellors to the king.\textsuperscript{8}

The former navarch eventually divined the reason for Agesilaos' behavior. He expressed his shame to the king at being treated in so unseemly a fashion by someone he had considered a friend. Agesilaos replied that only those who sought to appear more important than the king were so treated. To drive this point home, Agesilaos made Lysander his steward and told the clients to address their petitions to the king's meat carver. This action was characteristic for a man who had built his power base among the ephors and the common people. Because of the excessive adulation bestowed upon Lysander, it was necessary for the king to demonstrate clearly to all that any power held by one man must derive from legitimate and duly constituted authorities. Agesilaos would permit no man, not even Lysander, to stand above the ephors and the kings.\textsuperscript{9}

Lysander then realized the extent of the error he made in underestimating his old friend. He could no longer deceive himself that Agesilaos would be his tool or that he would control the allied efforts as he had when he served as secretary to the navarch Arakos in 405.\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{8}Xen. Hell. 3.4.7-10; Plut. Ages. 7-8, Lys. 24. Beloch 3.1, p. 41; Meyer, Vol. 5, 197-98; and Grote, Vol. 7, 425-27, note that Lysander's arrogance may have been bolstered by the fact that the Ephesians had erected a statue to him in the temple of Artemis (Paus. 6.3.6).

\textsuperscript{9}Plut. Ages. 8.1. For the importance of Agesilaos' insight into the nature of power and leadership ability, see ch. two, and Meyer, Vol. 5, 197, who observes that no Spartan king in a century had been held in such high esteem.

\textsuperscript{10}Xen. Hell. 2.1.7.
He subsequently apologized for his conduct and volunteered to serve the king and the Greek cause in Daskyleion, the satrapy of Pharnabazos. He set off for the Propontis where he brought about the defection of Spithridates, his family, and 200 horsemen. He obtained quarters for the Persian officer's family and the horsemen in Kyzikos, but brought the man himself and his son to visit Agesilaos in Ephesos. The king was pleased with Lysander's accomplishment, but put him to no further use. Thus at the end of the expedition's first year, Lysander went back to Sparta in relative dishonor. He deeply resented the sway of the two kings and was frustrated at his failure to reinstate the dekarchs in Asia Minor.11

Rupture of the Truce and the Campaign of 396

In midsummer, when Tissaphernes was convinced that his army was sufficiently ready and had received the promised reinforcements from the Great King, he delivered an ultimatum to Agesilaos, threatening to declare war unless the allied army immediately withdrew from Asia. Although Agesilaos' advisors were disturbed by what they perceived as a sizeable Persian advantage, the king not only rejected the satrap's ultimatum, but did so joyously (μάλα φαίδρε τῷ προσώπῳ) because he believed that Tissaphernes' perfidy had alienated the gods from the Persian cause and made them allies of the Greeks. A less pious explanation would include Tissaphernes' timidity in the face of Greek

11Plut. Lys. 24.2; Lins, 17, observes that dispatching Lysander to the Propontis produced Agesilaos' first real success.
hoplites (see ch. 2), the presence of the allied fleet off the coast, a recent treaty with Egypt which guaranteed a supply of grain, the difficulty of controlling a large army in a city, and finally Agesilaos' own eagerness and ambition. The allies' only disadvantage was that they were lacking horsemen, while Tissaphernes' great strength, of course, lay in the renowned Persian cavalry.\footnote{Xen. Hell. 3.4.11, Ages. 1.13; Lins, 17–19, and Kromayer, Antike Schlachtfelder, Vol. 4, 263–64, discuss the strategic situation of both sides.}

After sending the Persian legates back with his response, Agesilaos ordered the Greek cities south of Ephesos to set up market places for his troops. Greek cities to the north in Ionia and Aiolis were to send horsemen to Ephesos. Tissaphernes knew that the allies lacked horsemen and that Karia, his principal residence, was unsuitable for cavalry operations. He therefore ordered his infantry to withdraw south of the Maiandros to defend Karia, while he massed his cavalry in the Maiandros plain, where he expected them to trample the Greek footsoldiers. Agesilaos, of course, had no intention of attacking Karia, even though it was Tissaphernes' home province. Instead, he gave orders to march up the coast to Daskyleion (Pharnabazos' residence), intending to gather horsemen and supplies along the way. Also with Spithridates' defection he had acquired a most reliable guide to the Hellespontine area. Thus the Spartan king adeptly requited the satrap's strategem with one of his own.

Because of their uneasy cooperation Tissaphernes did little or nothing to relieve his ally's plight. Moreover, Persians in the Propontis, not expecting the Greeks to venture so far north, were caught
off guard by Agesilaos' advance. As a result, the allied army, plundering at will, accumulated a great deal of booty. Many cities defected to the allied side, while one perhaps succumbed to a ruse. A sudden sortie of Persian cavalry near Daskyleion routed the Greek riders and only the hoplites' appearance caused the Persians to retreat. After this skirmish, Agesilaos had the army march back to Ephesos for the winter. Because of the obvious superiority of the Persian cavalry, Agesilaos issued a proclamation to all Greek cities in the hope of offsetting the Persians' advantage by the following spring. He declared that every rich man was to supply a horse and rider. If he did not himself wish to serve, he could hire someone else. By the next spring Agesilaos had greatly augmented his cavalry because of this proclamation.

Naval Matters: Konon, Pharax and the Rhodian Revolt

After Pharax had lifted his siege of Kaunos and the blockade of

13According to Frontinus (3.11.2) and Polyainos (2.1.6), Agesilaos induced the Phokaians' surrender by ordering a withdrawal at which their half-hearted resistance collapsed. When the Greek army reappeared, the townsfolk surrendered. The dating of this ruse is not secure, as Beloch, Vol. 2, 147, and Meyer, Vol. 5, 198, point out. It may belong to the campaign of 364 B.C., when Agesilaos returned to Asia after a thirty year's absence. Diodorus mentions only that Agesilaos with Kyme as his base plundered extensively in the Kaystros plain after the truce expired.

14Xen. Hell. 3.4.11-15, Ages. 1.13-19; Plut. Ages. 9, C. Nepos (Ages. 3.1-2) refers briefly to Agesilaos' deception of Tissaphernes and the lucrative campaign of 396 in the Propontis. Plutarch (9.4) asserts that the king cited the precedent set by Agamemnon (Iliad 23.296-99), who had done well to accept a good mare and free a cowardly rich man from service.
Konon at Karian Sasanda, he set sail to Sicily with 30 ships. The Spartans sent him in response to Dionysios I's request that all Greek poleis aid him in repelling a Carthaginian invasion. 15

After the Lakedaimonians departed, Konon lost little time in doubling the size of his fleet to eighty ships. By vigorous solicitation in the Knidian Chersonese, he put to good use the money procured for him by Pharnabazos in 398/7. The exiled Athenian navarch then achieved the first real success in his attempt to avenge Athens' disastrous defeat at Aigospotamoi in 405. By seizing a beachhead at Loryma, Konon induced the Rhodians to defect from Sparta's Aegean ἀρχή, a move for which there was great public sympathy. The Rhodians then intercepted the huge shipment of grain which Nepherites had promised to the Spartans. The Egyptian vessels, carrying the grain and unaware of what had happened on the island, put into the harbor and were promptly seized. 16 The coup at Rhodes precipitated the expulsion of the Spartan garrison and caused the loss of five or six hundred thousand measures of grain. In addition, the Rhodians welcomed Konon and extended their harbor to him as a base from which he was able to enlist the

15 Diod. 14.62.1; Polyainos 2.11.1; Frontinus 1.4.12. Ehrenberg RE Vol. 19.2, 1816-17, and Beloch 3.1, 58 and 3.2, 372, plausibly identify Pharax who blockaded Konon in 396 with the Pharakidas named by Diodous and Polyainos. Meyer, Vol. 5, 106, believes nonetheless that we may be dealing with two different men.

16 Diod. 14.79.6-8; Justin 6.2; Paus. 6.7.26, Grote. Vol. 7, 436, n.3, observes that Rhodes had long been a way-station for Egyptian grain bound for Greece (see Herodotus 2.182 and Demosthenes 56.9-10). See also Bruce, "The Democratic Revolution at Rhodes," CO,11 (1961), 166-70.
services of an additional ninety triremes. The size of the Persian fleet now stood at 170 triremes to the Peloponnesians' 90. The Rhodian defection from the Spartan alliance and the seizure of the grain caused a major shift in Spartan naval policy a few months later in the spring (395). The loss of the grain also profoundly affected the conduct of Agesilaos' campaign. 17

Preparations for the Campaign of 395

During the winter and early spring (396/95), Agesilaos again clearly demonstrated his flair for leadership. He ordered a series of athletic contests in the great Ephesian agora. The purpose of these competitions was to bolster morale and hone the martial skills of the Ionian and Aiolic recruits. There was an Homeric echo in the king's purpose—the new Agamemnon staging games for the troops—more plausibly, though, he sensed a need to develop camaraderie and skill, especially among the Asian Greeks in his army. As Derkyldas in 397, he experienced misgivings about the competence of his Ionian and Aiolic soldiers. 18 Even the more experienced and soldierly troops may have required some training and diversion in view of the rich plunder of the autumn campaign and the inevitable allurements of a large coastal city. Agesilaos also offered prizes to the artisans who made the best weapons

17 See Grote, Vol. 7, 436-39; Beloch 3.1, 42-44; and Meyer Vol. 5, 201. A brief notice of the Rhodian revolt appears in Isokrates (Phil. 63). The orator ascribes Konon's victory at Knidos in 394 to the revolution at Rhodes. See also ch. 5.

18 Xen. Hell. 3.2.17-18.
and tools. As a final device to promote morale, he displayed to his men the naked bodies of prisoners whom the camp vendors had been unable to sell. His purpose was to show to the Greeks what sort of adversaries they were likely to encounter. He selected prisoners whose flabbiness and whiteness of skin betrayed a lack of the soldierly toughness and stamina which stem from hard training and long exposure to the elements. Buyers, he noted, had been found for the clothes and equipment of these prisoners, but not for the men themselves, who were ridiculed for their softness and effeminacy as worthless.19

Agesilaos' humiliation of the Asian captives was a brilliant method of inspiring confidence in his own men.20 He did take care, though, that no one, especially the women and children, went hungry or was abandoned by the vendors as unsaleable.21 He also evinced a flair for diplomacy by eliciting the aid of barbarian deserters. He promised them just treatment in exchange for information. He also spared districts which came over to the allies, whether forcibly or voluntarily.

19 Xen. Hell. 3.4.19, Ages. 1.28; Plut. Ages. 9.5.

20 Grote, Vol. 7, 431-32, contends rather oddly that the display of the naked prisoners was not meant to insult them, but rather to encourage the Greek soldiers. Yet because he quotes Herodotus 1.10: ἀνδρὰς ὀφθήναι γυμνοὺς ἐς αἰσχύνην μεγάλην φέρει: it is difficult to imagine that the prisoners were not humiliated by this treatment.

21 Grote, Vol. 7, 430, n.1, notes that there was a larger market for women to serve in harems and as religious prostitutes in Asian cities. Moreover, there would naturally arise a lucrative trade in eunuchs to attend such women. See Herodotus 5.6, 8.105; Dio Chrysostom. 21.4-6; and Xen. Kyropaid. 7.5.61-65.
He wanted to win these areas over by good will to assure adequate provisioning for his troops. Finally, the king clearly showed his respect for people's religious sensibilities by carefully honoring all sacred precints, Greek and barbarian.  

Before the events of 395 began to unfold, Lysander and the thirty Spartiate advisors set sail for home upon expiration of their one-year tenure. Herippidas and thirty new counsellors replaced them. There followed a reorganization of command in which Agesilaos assigned Xenokles and another officer to lead the cavalry recruited during the winter. He also appointed one Skythes to lead the neodamodeis, and Herippidas assumed command of the veterans of Kyros. Finally, Mygdon took charge of the Greek troops from Ionia and Aiolis. With these developments the stage was set for the second and final year of the Asian expedition. 

The Campaign of 395 B.C.

The Greeks' activity for this year falls into two parts. The first is the spring campaign in Lydia which ends shortly after the battle of Sardis. The second finds Agesilaos and the allies engaged in a series of wide-ranging incursions into the interior of Asia Minor and the satrapy of Pharnabazos. This venture followed quickly upon Tissaphernes' demise and death in late summer.

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23 Xen. Hell. 3.4.20.

24 Agesilaos had led his army as far north as Daskyleion in 396 (Xen. Hell. 3.4.11-15).
For the Lydian operations the sources are as follows: the march from Ephesos to the Hermos valley: Xen. Hell. 3.4.21-22; Ages. 1-28-30; P. 11.1-4; Diod. 14.80.1-2; Plut. Ages. 10.1; Paus. 3.9.5; Polyainos 2.1.9; Frontinus 1.8.12; Nepos Ages. 3.4-5; the battle of Sardis: Xen. Hell. 3.4.22-24, Ages. 1.30-32; P. 11.5-6; Diod. 14.80.2-4; Plut. Ages. 10.3-4; Paus. 3.9.6; Nepos Ages. 3.6; the descent along the Kogamos to the Maiandros and the return to Ephesos: P. 12.1-4, Diod. 14.80.5.  

When Agesilaos was sure that his new officers and recruits were sufficiently prepared, he announced that the Greeks would march τὴν συντομωτάτον ἐπὶ τὰ κρατίστα τῆς χώρας. He set out from Ephesos along the Ka'ystros river, veered north and led his troops through the Karabel Pass. This narrow defile lies near the western end of the rugged Tmolos ridge whose westernmost peak is Lydian Olympos. With

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25 The great differences between Xenophon's narrative (which is the source for Plutarch, Frontinus and Polyainos) and that of Π Οξυρυχνίς (the source for Ephoros/Diodorus) have been discussed in ch. one. Pausanias' description of this phase, though brief, clearly derives from Xenophon. Nepos' account which is longer than Pausanias' also follows the tradition of Xenophon. Isokrates 4.153 alludes briefly to Spartan greed and the Persians' perfidy even to one another at this time.

26 Xenophon (Hell. 2.4.20) believes that this vaguely worded statement was sufficient to deceive Tissaphernes about the Greeks' intent.

27 See Oberhummer, RE 18.1, 315: Kromayer, Schlachtenatlas, Griech. Abt., chart 4, map 8, and Antike Schlachtfelder, Vol. 4, 276. Ramsay, The Historical Geography of Asia Minor, 30, 60-62, points out that Herodotus (2.106, 5.54) erroneously ascribed a Hittite stele in the Karabel to the Pharaoh Sesostris. This path is in fact the southern part of the Royal Road from the seacoast to Sardis.
the peak on their left, the Greeks descended into the plain south of Mt. Sipylos to await Tissaphernes' cavalry. The Persian horsemen appeared on the fourth day and killed some of the Greeks who were scattered over the plain. Agesilaos then formed his men up ἐν πλωθίω better to resist Persian harassment. Before the Persians' arrival only local Lydian defense forces (the γυμνηταὶ of P.) had been present to monitor and impede the Greeks. As more of Tissaphernes' sizeable cavalry force crossed the Tmolos, somewhere near Thybarna, Agesilaos ordered his army to march east toward Sardis at sunrise on the next day. During the night, however, he secretly detached a force of 900 hoplites and 500 peltasts under his cavalry officer Xenokles with orders to march ahead and set up an ambush. With the dawn Agesilaos led

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28 Diod. 14.80.1; see Büchner, RE 3A.1, 276-77. Diodorus records that Tissaphernes had amassed 10,000 horsemen and 50,000 footsoldiers. P. 11.5 places these totals at 15,000 and 10,000 respectively. Xenophon mentions no numbers, but says that the infantry were deployed south of the Maiandros and the cavalry (for quick pursuit) to the north of the river. Diodorus perhaps transposed the figures cited by P. and augmented that of the infantry. Since Ephoros was Diodorus' source, perhaps Pausanias 3.9.6 also reflects the Ephoran tradition when he writes that the Persian force was the largest assembled since Xerxes' invasion of Greece eighty-five years earlier. During these operations, some part of the Persian force remained behind to defend the satrapal residence in Daria. Dugas, "La Campagne d'Agésilas en Asie Mineure," BCH, 34 (1910), 62-65, Bruce, An Historical Commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, Cambridge 1967, 153, have conjectured that some of the differences in the versions of P/Diodorus and Xenophon can be explained by assuming that Xenophon remained in Ephesos during the Lydian phase of this year's campaign. Anderson, "The Battle of Sardis in 395 B.C." Cal. Stud. in Class. Ant., 7 (1974), 32, concedes that this is possible. Cornelius, "Die Schlacht bei Sardis," Klio, 26 (1932), 29-31 believes that Xenophon, after surrendering command of the Kyreians to Herippidas, accompanied the Greeks, but was not privy to Agesilaos and his thirty new advisors.

29 Xen. Hell. 3.4.21 states that the Persians first appear four days after the Greeks had left Ephesos. See Meyer, Theopomps Hellenika,
the bulk of the army eastward, while the Persians and Lydians resumed their harassment of his flanks and rear. When both Greeks and barbarians had passed, Xenokles deemed that the time was right and signaled his men to attack. The concealed Greeks' sudden onslaught threw the enemy into confusion, whereupon Agesilaos wheeled the main column about to trap the barbarians between himself and Xenokles. The enemy fled in all directions over the Hermos plain, however, and most, including Tissaphernes, escaped. The Greeks pursued to the west as far as the Persian camp and killed some 600 of the fleeing army. They overran the small garrison guarding the camp and captured a great deal of booty including the personal possessions of the satrap (see map on following page.)

Xenophon's version of the march and battle differs in some important particulars from those of P. and Diodorus. In his version, the Greeks encounter no resistance in the Hermos plain between Mt. Sipylos and Sardis, but march unimpeded to the outskirts of the city. The Persian cavalry rush to the city's defense, crossing the low-lying Messogis ridge, the Kaystros plain, and the Tmolos by the Hypaipa (Odemis)

13. Later authors also wrote that Tissaphernes was deceived by Agesilaos' vague statement (e.g. Plut. Ages. 10.1-2; 3.9.5; Nepos Ages. 3.4-5; Frontinus 1.8.12; and Polyainos 2.1.9) into thinking that the Greeks' objective was Karia, not Lydia. It is unlikely that Tissaphernes was deceived at all, however, as the strategic situation would dictate that he protect Karia while the naval build-up under Konon and Pharnabazos was in progress.

30 P. 11.1-6, Diod. 14.80.1.3-4. Because the text of P. describing the Greeks' march is mutilated, particulars of the antagonists' crossing of the Tmolos derive from Diodorus whose account of the march and battle is very similar to that of P. Diodorus gives the number of Xenokles' men as 1,400, which led Dugas, 67, and Bruce, 79 to restore P. to bring him into accord with Diodorus. Diodorus has Agesilaos initiate the ambush, not Xenokles (see Bruce, 79) and puts
This map is adapted from Kromayer and Veith's Schlachtenatlas zur antike Kriegsgeschichte, Munich, 1922, griech. Abt., Chart 4, map 8.
route through the Goldjûk pass at 1065 meters. They descended directly into Sardis where Tissaphernes remained after entrusting conduct of the battle to a subordinate (the Ἡγεμόνι of Xen. Ages. 1.30). This officer told the commander of the baggage train to camp west of the Paktolos to await the arrival of Agesilaos and the Greeks. This second subordinate ordered horsemen to attack when he saw that the Greek vanguard was scattered for pillage. Many Greeks died in this attack, but Agesilaos signalled his cavalry to come to the foragers' rescue which induced the Persians to assume battle formation. In the absence of the Persian infantry, Agesilaos believed that the enemy was vulnerable and after favorable sacrifice, he ordered a full assault. The Persians resisted the Greek cavalry, but gave way before the light and heavy infantry. They fled in disarray across the Paktolos, where many were killed, and withdrew into Sardis. The Greeks pursuing to the east captured the Persian camp, seventy talents worth of booty and even some camels which Agesilaos eventually took back to Greece. 31

the barbarian dead at 6,000 instead of 600. Bruce, 83-84, observes, however, that rhetorical exaggeration in Ephoros (Diodorus' source) is not at all uncommon. Because P. is the source for Ephoros, his account should take precedence.

Xenophon is likely correct in stating that the first Persian horsemen did not appear until the fourth day of the Greek march from Ephesos. P. and Diodorus are right in ascribing Persian resistance to Agesilaos in the Hermos plain well to the west of Sardis, however, and their chronology allows an extra two or three days before the decisive encounter. Tissaphernes did indeed lead his men, as P. and Diodorus write, but he led them over the Ovadjik pass at 841 meters to the Hermos plain, not over the Goldjuk into Sardis (see map on p. 85 a). His subordinate, the Ἕλλων, took part of the cavalry and perhaps some infantry to reinforce Sardis and await the Greeks just west of the Paktoles. The purpose of Tissaphernes' strategem, of course, was to trap the Greeks in a pincer, but Agesilaos, upon receiving reports of a second group of Persian cavalry near the city, turned the tables on the satrap and caught him in a pincer movement by dint of Xenokles' ambush. Tissaphernes' camp was the one captured by the Greeks and the remnants of his men, as did the Persians near the Paktoles, withdrew for safety into Sardis without offering further resistance.32

that they could have done so in the Hermos plain either, because of the numbers of the Persian cavalry. Yet if the Persian cavalry made a two-pronged attack to trap the Greeks in a pincer, Delbruck's objection is answered, because they would have been greatly inferior numerically to the Greeks in the Hermos plain between Mt. Sipylos and Sardis. Xenophon mistook the Ἕλλων, who in fact remained in Sardis during the battle, for Tissaphernes.

32P. 12.1, Diod. 14.80.5. The initial resistance that the Greeks encountered near Mt. Sipylos came from Lydian γυναικεῖαι who were later joined by Tissaphernes' cavalry. The satrap would not leave Sardis itself unprotected, since a Greek army had put the city to the torch once before in 498 B.C. (Herodotus 5.99-101; Plut. Mor. 861b-c). Anderson, 43, refers to "local defense forces" monitoring the Greeks progress. Tissaphernes may have decided to split his cavalry into three
For some three days after the battle, the Greeks pillaged the area around the city after setting up a trophy and returning the Persian and Lydian dead under a truce. Agesilaos then led the Greek army southeast along the Hermos and Kogamos rivers until he reached the headwaters of the Maiandros across from Kelainai. Because the Persians were chagrined at the Greeks' success and in awe of Agesilaos, they followed the Greek army, but only at a discreet distance. Agesilaos was thus able to dissolve the πλανθιον and permit his troops to forage at will.

roughly equal parts, one to ride with him over the Ovadjik, one to go with the Ἡγεμών into Sardis through the Goldjük (the route taken by the Greeks in 498), and one to remain in the Maiandros valley in defense of Karia. If P. is correct in assigning 15,000 riders to the satrap, each of these parts could have amounted to about 5,000 men. Delbruck, 338, believes that the numbers cited by P. and Diodorus are considerably exaggerated. In any case, with Lydian light infantry and Persian cavalry in pursuit, Agesilaos' 14,000 Greeks could easily have marched through the Hermos plain after the first appearance of Tissaphernes' cavalry. Some of the Greeks would naturally remain behind to defend Ephesos; see Anderson, 31. (If Xenokles' contingent of 1,400 ambushers amounted to a tenth of those with the king, roughly 6,000 Greeks would have stayed behind to defend Ephesos.) Delbruck's contention that the πλανθιον formation was unsafe unless the enemy's pursuit was desultory or numerically weak would not apply, if the Greeks outnumbered the barbarians in the Hermos plain by almost three to one.

33P. 12.1; Diod. 14.802. Dugas, 61; Bruce, 79 and Anderson, 39, have noted that Diodorus' description of this pillage should have occurred after his account of the battle, not before it.

34The Hermos' modern name is Gediz (Bürchner, RE 8.1, 903-04), that of the Paktolos is Sartqay (Keil, RE 18.2, 2439-40) and the Kogamos is now called Alaschelir Tschai (Bürchner, RE 11.1, 1034).

35P. 12.1-2; Diodorus 14.80.5. Kelainai in later antiquity was renamed Apameia; its modern name is Dinar (Ruge, RE 11.1, 133-34).
After his sacrifices at the Maiandros proved unfavorable, Agesilaos decided not to cross the river to march on Kelainai; instead he ordered the army to follow the river's course along its north bank back to Ephesos. The bulk of Tissaphernes' infantry and a part of his cavalry, of course, had remained south of the river to defend Karia.  

The Fall of Tissaphernes and Truce with His Successor

Shortly after the Greek army withdrew from the headwaters of the Maiandros, Tissaphernes succumbed to a fatal combination of court intrigue and inability to rid Asia Minor of the Greeks. The immediate cause of his fall was perhaps his defeat at Sardis, but the Great King's ire and apprehension had been simmering for some time. After Kyros' failed rebellion, Artaxerxes and his mother Parysatis (who preferred her younger son) were reconciled. Although the satrap ranked high in Artaxerxes' esteem and took over Kyros' districts of Karia and Lydia, Parysatis hated him for denouncing Kyros and helping to suppress the

36 P. 12.3-4. P. (11.3), Diodorus (14.80.1), and Xenophon (Hell. 3.4.21, Ages. 1.29) all refer to Tissaphernes' forces in the Maiandros plain.

37 Xen. Hell. 3.4.25, Ages. 1.35; Plut. Ages. 10, Artax, 23; Paus. 3.9.7. In a recent article, Westlake, "Decline and Fall of Tissaphernes," Historia, 30 (1981), 267-68 writes that Tissaphernes sent a subordinate to harass the Greeks in the Hermos plain, while he proceeded to Sardis. Westlake, 272, thinks news of the debacle near Sardis did not reach Sousa before Tithraustes set out. Thus Tissaphernes' fate in this view had already been sealed.

38 Diod. 14.80.6; Xen. Anab. 1.1.4. Tissaphernes, of course, had a hand in Kyros' defeat.
revolt. She quickly took advantage of his failures against Thibron and Derkyidas to turn the Great King against him. Pharnabazos also strove to undermine his rival's influence at court. 39

Thus when Agesilaos routed the redoubtable Persian cavalry west of Sardis and penetrated Phrygia almost to Kelainai, the King of Kings finally acted. Since only Pharnabazos in cooperation with Konon had been effective against the Spartans, and Ariaios, the Phrygian satrap, was now at risk, Artaxerxes moved to replace the inept Tissaphernes. He therefore dispatched Tithraustes, his chiliarch or "grand vizier," to Kolossai, the Phrygian capital. After Tithraustes and Ariaios had arrested Tissaphernes and executed him in his bath, the head of the ill-starred satrap was sent to Sousa. 40

Tithraustes quickly took charge of Karia and Lydia and sought to reach an agreement with Agesilaos to prevent the Greeks from wreaking further havoc in the late Tissaphernes' domain. He proposed to leave Greek Asia autonomous, though still tributary to Sousa, if the Spartans would disband their army and return home. Agesilaos refused, maintaining that he could not act on such a sweeping proposal without consulting the authorities in Sparta. Because many Greeks were fond of Tithraustes and overjoyed at the execution of Tissaphernes, Agesilaos agreed to a six-months' truce in which he would spare Lydia and Karia. He was now free to operate in the mountainous interior of Anatolia and the Propontis which were the bailiwick of Pharnabazos. Tithraustes also

39 Justin 6.1.3-6.
agreed to give Agesilaos thirty talents for provisions and pay, although at the same time he very cleverly disbursed money to Timokrates of Rhodes for the purpose of bribery on the Greek mainland.  

The Autumn Campaign in Phrygia and the Propontis

With the conclusion of these terms and the advent of summer, Agesilaos assembled his army north of Kyme. He was preparing to march through Mysia to the Anatolian interior when a dispatch (σκυτάλη) arrived from the ephors. Its contents were of momentous impact, for Agesilaos was placed in command of the fleet with discretion to choose his own navarch. This decision was unique in Spartan history, for no one had ever held supreme command both by land and sea. The ephors and γέροντες had perceived Tithraustes' purpose in sending Timokrates to Greece and were aware that only a concerted, two-part effort could thwart the Persians' design to wrest control of the Aegean away from the Lakedaimonians. Timokrates' promise of money from Sousa to underwrite an anti-Spartan coalition in Greece and Konon's activity in Rhodes and Kypros were the gravest threat to Sparta's hegemony since the surrender of Athens. While Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos had failed utterly to dislodge the Spartans from Asia on land, Konon and Timokrates were preparing to do so by naval action and by fomenting war in Greece.

41 Xen. Hell. 2.4.26; Plut. Ages. 10.5, Artax. 23; Bengtson, Staatsverträge 2, 167-68. Isokrates 4.153 states that the truce was to last for eight months. The results of Timokrates' activities in Greece will be discussed in ch. 5.

42 Xen. Hell. 2.4.27-29; Plut. Ages. 10.5-6.
In his new capacity as chief of naval operations, Agesilaos decided to postpone his march to Mysia in order to augment the fleet. Because the Rhodian revolt had deprived the Spartans of the grain and naval equipment promised by Nepherites, the time to counter Konon's strengthening of the Persian fleet had arrived. Agesilaos, therefore, ordered that 120 triremes be made ready for service. He suggested that cities provide some and wealthy individuals seeking to curry favor outfit others. With the coming of autumn some weeks later he was at last ready to begin his campaign in the interior. Before setting out he appointed his brother-in-law Peisandros navarch.

The autumn expedition consisted of three phases. The first

43Lins, *Kritische Betrachtung*, 38-39, suggests that the battle of Sardis occurred in early May. By July, Agesilaos would have returned from the Maiandros headwaters to conclude the truce with Tithraustes. His march to the plain north of Kyme and receipt of the χυτάλη could date to August. By allowing a few weeks for overseeing the construction of the fleet, one surmises that Xenophon's phrase ἀμα μετοπώρῳ (*Hell.* 4.1.1) for the opening of the Mysian campaign is likely to be correct.

44Diod. 14.79.4-7 and Justin 6.2.1-3 (spring 395).

45Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.29; Plut. *Ages.* 10.6. Plutarch writes that this decision was an error, because more experienced men (such as Libys, Pharax and even Lysander) were available. This seems, however, to be little more than tendentious hindsight. He writes that Agesilaos, according to Theopompos (Fr.Gr.H. 115.321), was commonly agreed to be the greatest man alive at that time. Meyer, Vol. 5, 197, notes that Agesilaos was the most highly regarded Spartan king in nearly a century as shown by his supreme command on land and sea. Since 90 triremes were in service, another thirty were needed. See also ch. 5.

46Dugas, 77, believes that P. omitted Agesilaos' extraordinary command and Peisandros' appointment as navarch because he was more concerned with troop movements. Nevertheless, the omission of this detail is significant especially in light of what P. (22.4-5) writes of Agesilaos' intentions for the next year.
was the march from the plain of Kyme to the Paphlagonian border near the Halys River. The second phase comprised the treaty with the Paphlagonians and the return to Kios on the Propontis. The final phase was the march from Kios to the region of the two Mysian lakes just before the onset of winter. This region on the southern shores of the Propontis was also known as Hellespontine Phrygia and was the satrapy of Pharnabazos. Agesilaos and the Greeks entered Pharnabazos' realm after marching north to the eastern end of the Ida ridge. Here the army veered east, crossed the Thebe and Apia plains and entered Mysia. Agesilaos attempted to win the autonomous Mysian highlanders over to the Greek side; those who agreed were spared the customary pillage, those who refused were not. His purpose in all this was to create a series of barbarian buffer regions between the coastal Greeks and the court at Sousa.

The first difficulty of the autumn march arose when the army had reached the southern slopes of Mysian Olympos. The only passage east was a narrow defile and Agesilaos was compelled to negotiate a safe conduct with the local mountaineers. The natives, however, treacherously attacked the Greeks' rear and killed about fifty soldiers who were not in formation. Agesilaos thereupon ordered a one-day halt.

47 See Honigmann, RE 5A.2, 1595-99 for Thebe and Hirschfeld, RE 1.2, 2801 for Apia. Both areas lie near modern Balikesir. While the Greeks were in Lydia, they adhered to the terms of the truce with Tithraustes and avoided pillage. After leaving the Kaikos plain (modern Bahir Tschai, Bürchner, RE 10.2, 1501-02), they resumed pillage.

48 Modern Ulu Dag at a height of 2493 meters, see Ruge, RE 18.1, 314.
to bury the dead while during the night, he had Derkylidas set up an ambush. At dawn the rest of the army moved forward which deceived the barbarians into thinking that Agesilaos was departing in dismay at the previous day's defeat; but Derkylidas' ambushers suddenly fell upon the barbarian leaders who had thought once again to attack the Greek rear. Agesilaos ordered the main body of troops to wheel about in support of the ambushers and this time 130 barbarians died in close fighting.

That evening the Greeks returned to their earlier campsite to await a legation from the villagers which arrived on the following day to gather up the dead. Agesilaos then took hostages from each of several villages to assure the Mysians' adherence to the terms of the original safe conduct. 49

After leaving the slopes of Mysian Olympos, Agesilaos gave the army a few days' rest before setting out to the south and east along the Tembris river. This was a part of Greater Phrygia which he had not penetrated in 396, so he gave his men a free hand at pillage. His guide for this part of the march was Spithridates whom Lysander had detached from Pharnabazos along with his son and 200 riders the previous summer. 50

After passing the winter in the Greek city of Kyzikos, these Persians had joined Agesilaos' march south of Mysian Olympos.

49 P. 21.1-3. Agesilaos demonstrated that the same ruse which had embarrassed Tissaphernes in the Hermos plain could also prove effective against mountaineers in rugged high country.

50 Spithridates vindicated Lysander's judgment and proved quite useful to the Greek cause. He had served under Pharnabazos against the Kyreians after Kunaxa, but took grave offense at the satrap who deceived
Spithridates guided the Greeks along the Tembris\textsuperscript{51} to Leonton Kephalai,\textsuperscript{52} because the city was on the Royal Road. From there they could follow the Royal Road to the Halys and Paphlagonia. Agesilaos was especially pleased that Spithridates joined him because of an amorous infatuation with the Persian's handsome young son Megabates.\textsuperscript{53} When the Greeks arrived at Leonton Kephalai, they attempted without success to reduce the city by siege. After laying waste the area around the heavily fortified town for a few days, the army proceeded northeast along the Royal Road (from Sardis to Sinope) to Gordian which lay on the Sangarios River.\textsuperscript{54} The soldiers were able to collect a great deal of booty and supplies from the territory, but the city's natural and man-made defenses proved too strong despite many attempts to take it by storm. Rhathanes\textsuperscript{55} him into believing that he would marry his daughter. Pharnabazos' real purpose was to make the girl his concubine, since he had long wished to marry only a daughter of Artaxerxes (Xen. Ages. 3.3). Another reason for his defection naturally concerned his own ambitions to which Pharnabazos was insensitive (Xen. Hell. 3.4.10; Plut. Ages. 11.2, Lys. 24). See Kahrstedt, RE 3A.2, 1815-16.

\textsuperscript{51} The Tembris (modern Pursah) is a tributary of the Sangarios. Its headwaters are near Leonton Kephalai. See Ruge, RE 5A.1, 433.

\textsuperscript{52} Modern Afyon Karahissar (Black Opium Castle), see Ruge, RE 12.2, 2052; Dugas, 81, Lins, 42-43. Meyer, Theopomps Hellenika, 25, n.1, doubts that Afyon is the site and places it instead further north. Because Appian (Mithr. 19) says τὸ τῆς φρυγίας ὑμωρῶταυν χαρίον and the Royal Roads from Sousa to Sardis and Sardis to Sinope converge here, Afyon is the preferred identification.

\textsuperscript{53} P. 21.4; Xen. Ages. 5.4-6 lauds his hero's restraint in not yielding to passion, as does Plut. Ages. 11.2, 5-6.

\textsuperscript{54} The Sangarios is one of the longest and most important rivers in Anatolia. It has even retained the essence of its ancient name, known today as the Sakarya (Ruge, RE 14.1, 535-40). Gordion has been identified with modern Germa (Ruge, RE 7.2, 1590).

\textsuperscript{55} P. 21.5-6. Rhathanes (or Rhathines) is also mentioned in
coordinated the Persian resistance and after six days Spithridates persuaded Agesilaos to march east to the Halys. At the Halys, the army turned north and marched along the river to the Paphlagonian border. Here at the Phrygian-Paphlagonian boundary, Agesilaos sent Spithridates to negotiate with a Paphlagonian chieftain. Spithridates returned with the chieftain and in exchange for a promise of 1,000 horsemen and 2,000 foot soldiers, Agesilaos offered his new ally the hand of Spithridates' daughter in marriage. He then led the army directly east to the Sangarios, where the forces promised by his new ally joined him. Following the river's north bank, the Greeks marched to the city of Kios on the Mysian-Bithynian border. Here the Greeks and their allies tarried for ten days to engage in looting and pillage, although, as Leonton Kephalai and Gordion, the city itself proved invulnerable to assault. Agesilaos next led the army on a punitive expedition to the northern slopes of Mysian Olympos in requital for the highlanders' }

Anab. 6.5.7, Kyropaid. 8.3.32, and Hell. 3.4.13 by Xenophon. Also Isokrates(4.144) notes that Agesilaos reached the Halys River (modern Kizil Irmak, longest river in Asia Minor), Ruge, RE 7.2, 2286-87.

56 P. (22.1) names the Paphlagonian Gyes. Xenophon (Hell. 4.1.3 and Ages. 3.4) calls him Otys and Kotys respectively and writes that he was a king. Plutarch (Ages. 11.1) also calls him Kotys. Lenschau, RE 18B.1, 1889 notes that it is impossible to recover this man's real name. See also Dugas, 83-84.

57 P. 22.2; Xen. Hell. 4.1.3. This girl, whom Kallias transported by ship to her new home, was reputedly quite beautiful and likely the one whom Pharnabazos had insulted which precipitated Spithridates' defection. Agesilaos thus created a dynastic marriage between two rebellious subjects of the Great King.

58 Modern Gemlik on the southeast shore of the Propontis (Ruge, RE 11.1, 486-88). According to P. 22.2, Agesilaos led the army back to the Propontis because he believed it would be less strenuous for the troops
treachery some months before. 59

The army finally arrived at its last objective for the campaign of 395, the region of the Mysian lakes and Daskylion where Pharnabazos reputedly kept his treasury. In 396, the Greeks had penetrated this far north from Ephesos, 60 but retreated to their winter quarters with no lasting result. On this occasion marching from the east, Agesilaos intended to conduct extensive operations in the region and, if possible, to seize the satrap's treasury. His first object was Miletou Teichos, 61 but once again Lakedaimonian siegecraft proved inadequate to the task and the army, having crossed the Rkyndakos River 62 withdrew to the shores of the Daskylitis lake. 63 The region of the Mysian lakes and Daskylion contained many prosperous villages, a series of game preserves and the Makestos, an excellent river for fishing. It was here who faced a lack of food with approach of winter. See Dugas, 85-86; Lins, 43; and Meyer, Theopomps Hellenika, 26-27.

59P. 22.3; for the earlier episode, see P. 21.2-3.

60 Xen. Hell. 3.4.13, Ages. 1.23.

61 Modern Kirmasti (or Kemalpasa), south of the eastern lake known in antiquity as the Apolloniatis, now the Apolyont (Ruge, RE 15.2, 1659).

62 P. 22.3. Munro, "Dascylium," JHS, 32 (1910), 57-67, identifies this lake with the modern Lake Manyos, as does Ruge, RE 4.2, 2220-21. At a depth of 60 meters, this lake was easily navigable by Pankalos' triremes (see next page). Munro, however, believes the satrapal residency and treasury were one and the same, whereas Ruge and Dugas much more plausibly locate the residence on the coast. The Daskylion treasury (whose bullion was minted at Kyzikos some 26 km to the northwest) probably lay at Top Hisar near the modern town of Conlu; the satrap, who was an accomplished naval man, had his residence on the coast near modern Tiulye.

63 The Rhyndakos in the region of the Mysian lakes is known today as the Kirmasti or Kemalpasa. At its source, however, it is called the Adunas Tschai (Bürchner, RE 1.A.1, 1286-87).
that Agesilaos decided to pass the winter. He sent for Pankalos, a subordinate of Cheirikrates who was navarch of the Hellespontine region. Pankalos arrived with five triremes, sailed up the river to the Daskylitis lake and laded all the booty which the Greeks had accumulated since setting out from Ephesos in the spring. Leaving the lake, Pankalos sailed down river to the Propontis and deposited the plunder near Kyzikos so that Agesilaos would be able to pay his men for the next year’s campaign. Agesilaos then dismissed his Mysian soldiers, but told them to return in the spring. The Greeks spent most of the winter conducting raids and pillage in the Mysian Lake region.

On one occasion a Greek foraging party was scattered over a level area when Pharnabazos suddenly appeared with two scythe-bearing chariots and 400 horsemen. He fell upon the 700 or so scattered Greeks and killed or captured about 100. Spithridates some four days later learned that the satrap was in the village of Kaue about 30 km. away. He informed Herippidas who in turn asked Agesilaos for 2,000 hoplites, a similar

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64 Xen. Hell. 4.1.15-16. The Makestos today is called the Simav Tschai, Ruge (RE 14.1, 773). As Munro, 63, observed, Agesilaos led the Greeks upstream and to the west in search of Pharnabazos’ bullion stores, not downstream along the Propontis to the satrapal residence as Dugas, 87 believed. Ruge, RE 4.2, 2220-21, points out there were no less than five sites called Daskylion in western Asia Minor.

65 p. 22.4. Kyzikos was an autonomous Greek city which enjoyed amicable relations with Pharnabazos whose bullion the Kyzikenes regularly minted. The Daskylitis lake at a depth of 60 meters and the Makestos river were fully navigable by trireme. Munro, 58-59, rightly dismisses the notion of a vanishing marshpond as the ancient Daskylitis for precisely this reason. See Ruge, RE 12.1, 231-33 and Kraay, 370, No. 718.

66 p. 22.4; Xen. Hell. 4.1.16.
number of peltasts and as many of the Greek, Paphlagonian and Spithridates' Persian horsemen as he could persuade to accompany him. His purpose was "to do something glorious." Unfortunately less than half the contingent he requested showed up, even though his sacrifices proved favorable. In order not to become a laughing stock for the thirty advisors and the king, Herippidas set out with his diminished force and overran Pharnabazos' camp. He captured a great deal of booty and many of the satrap's pack animals after killing most of the Mysian guards. Pharnabazos and the other Persians, however, escaped. The Greeks' success was nonetheless marred by a dispute which arose over the distribution of this booty. Herippidas insisted on taking charge of all of it himself, refusing to allow the barbarians in his force to keep anything. When Spithridates and the Paphlagonians tried to take their share, Herippidas surrounded them with hoplites and forced them to turn over everything to him. His motive was to sell the booty to the merchants and thereby enrich himself. Because of the grave insult to his honor and the plain injustice of Herippidas' decision, Spithridates fled during the night with his own troops and the Paphlagonians to Sardis where he joined the rebellious satrap Ariaios.67

After the loss of Agesilaos' Persian and Paphlagonian contingent to Ariaios, Pharnabazos sought to come to terms with the Greeks. For most

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67 Xen. Hell. 4.1.17-28; Plut. Ages. 11.3-6. Xenophon and Plutarch both write that nothing so bitterly angered Agesilaos during the entire Asian campaign as the loss of this Persian officer and his men. Moreover, the strategic mishap was enhanced by a personal loss, that of Spithridates' son Megabates, of whom Agesilaos was enamored. Xenophon (Ages. 5.4) and Plutarch (Mor. 209d) write of the king's self-restraint on one occasion (before Herippidas' gaff) in resisting the urge to embrace and kiss the handsome youth.
of the late autumn and winter of 395/94, the presence of the hostile Greek army had compelled the satrap to keep constantly on the move. He, therefore, believed that with this first reversal, Agesilaos might be willing to talk. Apollophanes of Kyzikos, a man trusted by both sides, arranged a conference. As the elder of the two principals, Pharnabazos spoke first. After recalling his services to the Greeks during the war with Athens\textsuperscript{68} he complained about the unseemly devastation being done by his former friends to his father's lands and possessions. The thirty advisors were ashamed and kept silent, but Agesilaos himself finally spoke. He pointed out that even Greek cities which were once allied had made war on one another and he offered to accept Pharnabazos as an ally, if he, like Ariaios, were to revolt from the Greek King. The satrap's response was that he would do so if Artaxerxes were to replace him as supreme commander in his own satrapy.\textsuperscript{69} If, however, the Great King retained him in a position of honor, he would be obliged to resist Agesilaos in whatever way possible. At this Agesilaos shook the satrap's hand, expressing his regret that he could not have such

\textsuperscript{68}See Thucydides 8.18, 8.37, 8.58 and Justin 5.1.7 (412-411 B.C.); also Comme et al., Vol. 5, 40-42, 79-82, 138-46; Bengtson, Staatsverträge 2, 139-143. Pharnabazos, some two years after the conclusion of the alliance, made a truce with the Athenians and offered an Athenian legation safe conduct to Sousa. See Xen. Hell. 1.2.8, 11; Plut. Alkibiades 31.1; and Diodorus 13.66.3; also Bengtson, Staatsverträge 2, 147-48.

\textsuperscript{69}Pharnabazos, of course, was fully aware of Timokrates' mission to Greece and its intent to create an anti-Spartan alliance. Thus the likelihood of any further warfare under Agesilaos' leadership in Asia Minor was greatly reduced; see ch. 5.
a man as an ally and a friend. Moreover, he agreed to withdraw from Pharnabazos' territory and, if continued warfare were necessary, he promised to spare the satrap's land from further invasion. Agesilaos then withdrew his army after exchanging gifts with Pharnabazos' son. He encamped in the plain of the Thebe near the temple of Astyrene Artemis and continued to augment his forces for the spring campaign. Because of the formation of the anti-Spartan coalition in Greece, the ephors sent a herald named Epikydidas with a σκυταλὴ summoning him back to Greece "to defend the fatherland." What Agesilaos intentions were for the coming year, had he remained in Asia are fairly clear. With his brother-in-law Peisandros in charge of the fleet at a strength of 120 ships, he planned to coordinate naval and military strategy. Peisandros would sail down the coast to harass Konon by retrieving Rhodes and forcing him to withdraw to Kypros. At the same time Agesilaos would lead the army through Kappadokia and the Kilikian Gates to the Tauric coast just north of Kypros where

70 Xen. Hell. 4.1.29-38, Ages. 3.5; Plut. Ages. 12.1-9.

71 Xen. Hell. 4.1.39-40; Plut. Ages. 12.1-5. Many years later Agesilaos aided this young Persian when he had been unjustly exiled by his brothers: Plut. Ages. 13.6-7, Mor. 191b, 209e, 807f.

72 Xen. Hell. 4.1.41-4.2.2, Ages. 1.36; Diod. 14.83.1; Paus. 3.9.12; Nepos Ages. 4.1; Justin 6.2.17. For Astyra (just s.e. of Abydos), see Jessen RE 2.2, 1878.

73 The Kilikian Gates are a pass in the Tauros mountains at an elevation of 1100 meters. The modern name of this site is Gulek Boghaz; Ruge RE 11.1, 389-90.
the Great King's fleet was under construction. The Spartans by advancing over land and sea might have recovered Rhodes, thwarted Konon in Kypros and seriously crippled Persian naval operations in the Mediterranean by burning the Kypriote base. Since Ariaios, the Phrygian satrap in Sardis, was already in revolt from Artaxerxes and the Spartans were allied to the Pharoah Nepherites, a two-pronged attack was certainly feasible. 74 The chiliarch Tithraustes and Agesilaos' would-be ally Pharnabazos with the collusion of Konon and Timokrates of Rhodes, however, had already undermined any such project by the spring of that year. Much to his chagrin and disappointment, Agesilaos was, therefore, compelled to abandon any designs for further achievement in Asia.

74 P. (22.4) and Nepos (Conon 2.3) are quite specific about Agesilaos' intentions. P. even gives an estimate of the distances involved, saying that a N-S march to the seacoast of Phoinikia from Gordian through Kappadokia and the Kilikian gates is similar in length to an east-west one from Sinope to Gordian. Although the name of the latter city is missing from P. because the papyrus breaks off, it is quite clear that the Royal Road from the Black Sea to the Aegean coast is what P. had in mind. Xenophon (Ages.1.36) and Plutarch (Ages.15.1) rather wildly suggest that Agesilaos' purpose was to march on Ecbatana and Sousa to overthrow the Persian empire; see also Diod. 15.31.3. Dugas,89, and Bruce, 16, remark that P. has given a much more realistic assessment of the king's strategy for 394. Neither Agesilaos nor Peisandros could have anticipated the dramatic increase in Konon's fleet strength to 170 ships which made possible the Rhodian revolt, but Agesilaos' program to build 30 ships would have restored the Peloponnesian fleet to its earlier strength. Even at a disadvantage of fifty ships, a naval campaign against Konon was, therefore, quite feasible, if well co-ordinated with vigorous activity on land.
Although Agesilaos' campaign into the Anatolian interior had resulted in no permanent occupation, he had brilliantly succeeded in creating a basis for widening the already latent disaffection with Sousa. Moreover, his relentless pillage had greatly swelled Spartan coffers while Spartan prestige in Asia soared after slipping badly during the tenure of Lysander's dekarchs. He had shown that the Persians were venal, disloyal and militarily inept even with the advantage of their formidable cavalry.¹

While the Persians' soldierly reputation and the loyalty of many of the Great King's subjects were deeply suspect in Asia Minor, Pharnabazos and Konon had greatly advanced the Great King's position at sea. Too, the chiliarch Tithraustes, by temporizing with Agesilaos and buying him off for thirty talents, was able to send Timokrates to Greece once again with another fifty talents to cement the anti-Spartan coalition.² Pharnabazos had sent Timokrates in the fall

¹Pharnabazos must be exempted from the charge of disloyalty as he remained the faithful servant of the Great King throughout his long career. See Lenschau, RE 19.2, 1847; Olmstead, History of the Persian Empire, 387; Isokrates (4.142-44) explicitly cites the Persians' incompetence to deal with the Greek invaders in this period.

²Xen. Hell. 3.5.1; Pausanias (3.3.9) erroneously attributes the outbreak of the war to this second mission in 395. As Meyer, Vol. 5, 228; Beloch, Vol. 3.1, 67, n.1; Bruce, 59, Hamilton, Sparta's Bitter Victories, 182-83; and Lenschau, Phil. Woch., 47 (1933), 1326-27, have observed, the war was already in progress. Plutarch (Artax. 20.4, Lys. 27.1, 103
of 396\textsuperscript{3} to exploit the growing resentment against Sparta by dispersing 50 talents with a promise of further support to the leaders of anti-Spartan factions in various mainland poleis.\textsuperscript{4} After Tissaphernes' demise in the summer of 395 and the truce with Agesilaos, Tithraustes decided to engage the services of the Rhodian agent provocateur. He sent Timokrates to Greece with another fifty talents and a promise of continued Persian support in the fledgling confederacy's struggle against the Spartan alliance. This mission came at a crucial moment and showed that despite Persian military weakness, the empire was well served by the diplomatic brilliance of her northwestern satraps, the great skill of her Phoinikian and Greek sailors and the vast wealth of the imperial treasury.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{3}P. 7.2. Polyainos (1.48.3) does not mention Timokrates by name. Bruce, 59, sees a conflation of P. and Xenophon in Polyainos and prefers to date the first mission to 397. Hamilton, 188, thinks that 396 is more likely since Tissaphernes' treachery and Agesilaos' surprise attack in Daskylion could well have moved Pharnabazos to rid himself of the Spartans obliquely. If so, this would be the satrap's first meeting with Konon since he went to Sousa in 398 to begin the naval project. Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos' relief of Konon, whom Pharax had blockaded at Kaunas in 397, however, remains a possible date for the first mission.

\textsuperscript{4}These leaders were Kylon and Sodamas in Argos, Timolaos and Polyanthes in Korinth, Ismenias and Andрокleidas in Thebes and Kephalos and Epikrates in Athens. Since the latter two were not in power, Xenophon avers that the Athenians officially rebuffed Timokrates. Kephalos and Epikrates, however, undoubtedly accepted Timokrates' Persian largess on an unofficial basis. P. 2.2; Xen. Hell. 3.5.2, Paus. 3.9.8.

\textsuperscript{5}Olmstead, 287-88. For the likelihood of two separate missions to Greece, see Barbieri, Conone, Rome, 1955, 90; Bruce, 60; and Hamilton, 211.
After the second mission of Timokrates, the leaders of the pro-Athenian faction in Thebes decided that the time had come to galvanize all Greece into an armed struggle against the Spartan alliance. Thebes was torn by factional rivalry at this time and Ismenias' group believed that resistance to Sparta was not only feasible but necessary for their own political survival. Ismenias and Androkleidas, who along with Argive, Athenian and Korinthian leaders had benefitted from Timokrates' visits, believed that Theban Lakonophiles were plotting to eliminate the city's pro-Athenian faction. They knew that not even the other Boiotarchs would be willing to attack Sparta openly, because the Lakedaimonians "ruled Greece" (διδέων τῆς Ἑλλάδος). It would, therefore, be necessary to devise a suitable ruse. They persuaded a group of Phokians to attack Ozolian Lokris over a disputed area on the western ridges of the Parnassos massif. In the past, much wrangling had arisen over grazing rights and each side on occasion had plundered the other's sheep. In every case, however, the matter had been submitted to arbitration. This time Ismenias and Androkleidas' men persuaded the Phokians to respond to such a raid by a full-scale invasion. The Lokrians, whose land was cut and burned, sent a legation to Thebes requesting military aid. Since the

6p. 16.1, 17.1.

7p. 18.2; Xen. Hell. 3.5.3.

8p. 18.3.
Lokrians and Boiotians had long been friends, Ismenias and Androkleidas were able to persuade the Boiotarchs to come to the Lokrians' aid. When the Phokians learned of this decision, they withdrew from West Lokris and sent to Sparta a request that the Lakedaimonians interdict the Boiotians from invading Phokis. Though mistrusting the Phokians' story, the Lakedaimonians nonetheless sent legates to Thebes who forbade any hostilities and insisted that all disputes be submitted to arbitration in Sparta. Ismenias' faction, however, incited the Boiotians to reject the Spartans' demand and mount the attack on Phokis.

When the ephors called out the ban, they sent Lysander ahead to await the full allied levy under King Pausanias. Militarily, of course, the Spartans' intent was to entrap the Thebans and Lokrians in a classic pincer movement. Lysander also achieved diplomatic success

9 P. 18.3-4.

10 P. 18.4. The essence of Ismenias' plan was the deceit to provoke the Lokrian request for Boiotian aid. Xenophon (Hell. 3.5.3-5) writes that Theban leaders induced the Lokrians to charge rent to the Phokians for use of the disputed land. This was to cause a Phokian invasion which would move the Lokrians to request Boiotian help. At this request for help, Androkleidas persuaded the Boiotians to invade Phokis, a long time ally of Sparta, which would convince the Spartans that the treaty had been violated. Xenophon erroneously makes the eastern, not western, Lokrians the object of Boiotian aid while making no reference to any Spartan attempt at a diplomatic resolution. Plutarch (Lys. 27.2-3) blames the Thebans for attacking Phokis and Lysander for desiring vengeance. Diodorus (14.80.1-3) also attributes the war's outbreak to the Boiotian invasion of Phokis. The diplomatic mission from Lakedaimon mentioned in P. indicates that Pausanias was at first reluctant to open up a second Spartan war effort against the Greeks while Agesilaos was still in Asia. The rebuff of this embassy and the Boiotians' invasion of Phokis, as Plutarch makes quite clear, induced Lysander to create a major shift in Spartan policy. Xenophon's erroneous ascription of disputed land to the eastern Lokrians, his
in that he detached Orchomenos from the Boiotian league after recruiting a force of Phokians, Oitians, Herakliotes and Malians near Lebadeia. Just as in 396, when he detached Spithridates from Pharnabazos, Lysander proved himself a gifted diplomat and had now recovered much of the influence he lost after being disgraced by Agesilaos.

The Boiotians' response to the Spartan initiative was to send a legation to Athens. In their speech to the Athenian assembly, the legates noted that the only way for the Athenians to regain some measure of their former influence would be to go to war against the Spartan alliance. They mentioned the great discontent with Sparta in Argos and omission of any reference to Spartan diplomacy or Ismenias' brilliant ruse make it likely that P's explanation should be preferred. See Oldfather, RE 13.1, 1200-01. Hamilton, 193-95, who repeats Xenophon's error about which Lokrians were involved in the dispute, believes that Xenophon derived his information from a biased Spartan source whose purpose was to cloak the Thebans' embarrassing rejection of Pausanias' diplomacy. Thus it is likely that before this rejection and the actual invasion of Phokis, most Spartans were unwilling to go to war against the Boiotian league despite Xenophon's assertion (Hell. 3.5.5). These purported grievances were probably more irking to the Lysandrians than anyone else.

11 Andokides (3.20) cites this loss as the reason for the war. Surely it was an annoyance to the Boiotians, but it was not the casus belli. It did, however, prompt their embassy to Athens.

12 Pausanias' description (3.9.9) τοῦ στούν ἡκμαζοντα indicates that May 395 was the precise date of the Spartan mobilization (φρούραν φαίνεται). See also Xen. Hell. 3.5.6 and Plut. Lys. 28.

13 Plut. Ages. 20.2 and Lys. 28.
Korinth and the willingness of these states with Persian support to join an anti-Spartan coalition. Finally, the Boiotians insisted that many poleis would welcome Athenian aid against the oppressive Spartan har-mosts and garrisons. Thus sometime in July or August, the Athenians voted to enter into an alliance with the Boiotian league.14

At about this time, Pausanias assembled the full allied levy at the Lakedaimonian frontier (Skiritis), obtained favorable sacrifices, and marched to Plataia to await word from Lysander who was pillaging near the town of Lebadeia. Lysander sent a letter to Pausanias in which he requested a rendezvous near Haliartos whose citizens he was trying to win over with diplomacy. The man carrying this letter, however, fell in with Theban scouts who reported back to the city. There an Athenian levy was placed in charge, while a Theban force marched to the Haliartians' relief. Without waiting for Pausanias, Lysander moved his line forward from the hill he had occupied outside the town. As he approached the gates, a force of Thebans and Haliartians suddenly rushed out while the Theban relief force outside the walls rose up against Lysander's rear. In the ensuing struggle the Spartans lost their greatest naval commander, his personal priest and about 1,000 of their allies. The Theban losses amounted to 300 men who, in their anxiety to dispel any suspicion of "lakonizing," pursued the fleeing allies into

14Xen. Hell. 3.5.7-17; P.(18.1) notes that it was widely expected that the Argives, Korinthians and Athenians would join the Boiotians in a war against Sparta. See also Tod, GHI, nos. 101-02, Bengtson, Staatsverträge 2, 168-70 with full notes and bibliography, Meyer, Vol. 5, 230; Beloch 3.2, 69; and Hamilton, 201.
rugged terrain where the advantage reverted to the Peloponnesians.\textsuperscript{15}

Word reached Pausanias of Lysander's demise while the main army was on the road between Plataia and Thespiai. When the king arrived at Haliartos, he conferred with his advisors and decided to recover the fallen Spartans under a truce. The Thebans would allow them to recover the dead only on condition that they withdraw from Boiotia. Pausanias agreed and led the army back across the Isthmos. When he returned to Sparta, however, he found himself on trial for his life. The Lysandrians, who were stunned and outraged at their hero's death, accused Pausanias of failing to arrive at Haliartos on the specified date, of recovering the dead by truce instead of offering battle, and of allowing the Athenian democrats in the Peiraeus to escape chastisement (a charge of which he had been acquitted eight years before!). Realizing that his case was hopeless, he fled for sanctuary to the temple of Athena Alea in Tegea where he eventually died in exile.\textsuperscript{16}

During that same summer (395), Tithraustes, after coming to terms with Agesilaos, sent Timokrates to Greece with another fifty

\textsuperscript{15}Plut. Lys. 28.1-12. Xenophon who relied on a Spartan source is clearly in error when he asserts that the rendezvous at Haliartos had been arranged in Lakedaimon (\textit{Hell.} 2.5.6). Similarly, he writes that Lysander did not wait for Pausanias at Haliartos, but rather that he approached and was either surprised by the Thebans near the town walls or simply chose to resist their advances in expectation of defeating them (\textit{Hell.} 3.5.17-21). Xenophon puts the Theban losses at over 200 with no mention of the number of allied fallen who fled at Lysander's death. For a brief synopsis of Lysander's death, see also Diod. 14.81 and Paus. 3.5.3-5, 9.32.5.

\textsuperscript{16}Xen. \textit{Hell.} 3.5.17-25; Plut. \textit{Lys.} 29.1-30.1; Diod. 14.81.2-3, 89.1-2; Paus. 3.5.6. See also Beloch, 3.1, 71 with notes.
talents. The Theban and Athenian success against Lysander and Pausanias at Haliartos, Timokrates' second disbursal of Persian silver and the long-smouldering resentment in Greece at Sparta's high-handed oppression resulted in the creation of the anti-Spartan coalition at Korinth in the autumn. The envoys of these states quickly undertook a diplomatic offensive to detach as many states beyond the Isthmos from the Spartans as possible. That autumn the anti-Spartan coalition brought over to its side the Euboians, Chalkidikians, Medios of Larissa (whom they aided militarily in his struggle with Lykophron of Pherai) and the Ambrakiotes, Akarnanians, and Leukadians.

Ismenias with 2,000 soldiers and aid from his new ally Medios captured Herakleia, expelled the Spartan garrison and repatriated the town with its original inhabitants. He then defeated a force of Phokians commanded by a Spartan officer near the town of Naryx in Lokris which in legend was the birthplace of small Aias. One thousand allied soldiers fell, while the coalition lost 500.

Athens during the winter and spring of 395/94 was also actively

17 See Bengtson, *Staatsverträge* 2, 171-72, Tod, *GHI*, no. 102, and Hamilton, 207.

18 Diod. 14.82.1-6. Hamilton, 215, points out that the coalition needed an ally in Thessaly because the Spartans had a garrison at Oite and Herakleia, while the Orchomenians held Thermopylai for them. Thus, if Agesilaos were to march home from Asia, he would encounter significant resistance south of Mt. Olympos.

19 Diod. 14.82.6-10. Thus in late 395 the Spartans suffered embarrassing, but not crippling military and diplomatic losses in central Greece.
recruiting new members for the coalition. She brought Lokris and Eretria into the fold by treaty.\textsuperscript{20} By the spring of 394, a considerable number of hostile troops had gathered at Korinth and Sparta could no longer ignore the growing military threat. The ephors therefore decided to move against the coalition and took two steps to this purpose. They called out the ban and named Aristodemos commander, since Pausanias' son Agesipolis was too young to assume military responsibilities. Because a regent was chosen to lead the Peloponnesians, it was clear that Sparta intended a full-scale effort. The second measure was to summon Agesilaos home from Asia.\textsuperscript{21}

Ancient and modern authors have advanced various explanations for the outbreak of what was to be known as the Korinthian War. In antiquity some attributed the hostilities to Persian diplomacy.\textsuperscript{22} Others have explicitly rejected this notion and insist instead that deeply felt resentment against Sparta and factional politics created the necessary conditions.\textsuperscript{23} One author ascribed the war to the defection of Orchomenos from the Boiotian league.\textsuperscript{24} Modern scholars have seen

\textsuperscript{20}See Bengtson, \textit{Staatsverträge} 2, 170-71 and 176-77.
\textsuperscript{21}Xen. \textit{Hell.} 4.2.1, 9; Diod. 14.83.1.
\textsuperscript{22}Xen. \textit{Hell.} 3.5.1-2; Plut. \textit{Ages}. 15.8; Paus. 3.9.9.
\textsuperscript{23}P. 7.2-3, 16.1, 17.1.
\textsuperscript{24}Andok. 3.20.
mere ill luck and accident as the cause,²⁵ fear of Spartan intervention in the internal affairs of the coalition states,²⁶ and serious economic strictures on Athens and Korinth,²⁷ all of which created violent opposition to Lakedaimon. The best and most inclusive explanation would discover the war's cause in the complex welter of social, political and economic conditions stemming from the defeat of Athens in 404 B.C.²⁸ In any case, it was the outbreak of this struggle which ended forever Agesilaos' dreams of conquest and glory in Asia.

The March Back from Asia

After withdrawing from Pharnabazos' territory, Agesilaos began to make plans for his spring offensive. He made strenuous diplomatic overtures to Greeks and barbarians to induce their defection from the Great King and to accept his leadership. He also toured extensively during these weeks to restore stability to Greek cities in which bloody factional strife (the legacy of Lysander's dekarchies) had undermined civility and order. He was able to achieve this without resorting to violence, banishment or executions. After composing the cities' internal strife and greatly swelling his own ranks with defectors, he

²⁵Bruce, "Internal Politics and the Outbreak of the Korinthian War," Emerita, 28 (1960), 75-76.
²⁸Hamilton, 183-84.
assembled his forces in the Thebe plain near the shrine of Astyrene Artemis, an area about 30 km. southeast of Abydos. Sometime during the winter, Agesilaos had made a dedication to the Ephesian Artemision which had been extensively damaged by a fire. This donation to help rebuild the temple has yielded our only bit of physical evidence of Agesilaos' presence in Asia during these two years. That he would set aside some of the booty to dedicate a column to the goddess was important to his soldiers, Greek and non-Greek, as proof of the king's dedication to higher powers.

With the arrival of Epikydidas in May of 394 to recall him from Asia, Agesilaos suppressed his bitter disappointment and submitted to the ephors' authority. He informed the Greek and barbarian allies of the Spartans' decision, but promised not to forget them. He said that as soon as matters in Europe were resolved, he would return to accomplish whatever they might need. At this, many of the allies burst into tears and volunteered to accompany him back to Greece. He then

29 Xen. Hell. 4.1.41, Ages. 1.35-37; Plut. Ages. 15.1; for Astyra, see Jessen, RE 2.2, 1878. The site is near modern Kinazli.

30 The evidence is a column base in the British Museum whose dedicatory inscription Borker, "König Agesilaos von Sparta und der Artemis-Temple in Ephesos," ZPE 37 (1980), 74-75, restores to read ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΑΓΓΙΣΙΑΟΣ ΑΝΕΘΗΚΕΝ ΆΡΤΗΜΙΔΑI. Wesenberg, "Agesilaos im Artemision," ZPE 41 (1981), 178-79, believes that the inscription was intentionally mutilated after Sparta surrendered the Asian Greeks to Artaxerxes in 387 (see ch. 6).

31 Xenophon (Ages. 5.7) and Plutarch (Ages. 14) describe Agesilaos' careful attention to, and respect for, even barbarian places of worship.
appointed Euxenos harmost after assigning him 4,000 troops to safeguard and garrison the cities.  

In order to determine which troops to take with him and which to leave behind with Euxenos, as in the previous year, he instituted a series of competitions. He did this after observing that many of his troops seemed more eager to remain in Asia than to cross over into Europe. He also wanted to be certain of the Ionian and Aiolic troops' readiness, since so many of these men had volunteered to accompany him. The final decision, he announced, would be made near Sestos after the army had crossed the Hellespont. Contests would be held in each of the following categories: one for the city sending the best contingent, one each for the captain of the best equipped hoplites, peltasts, archers and cavalry. The winning captains of hoplites and cavalry would receive beautifully wrought sets of armor, while those in the other categories would earn wreaths of gold. The value of the armor and wreaths amounted to no less than four talents. When the army reached the area of Sestos, Agesilaos chose the Lakedaimonians Menaskos, Orsippos and Herippidas and one man from each allied city as judges. After the distribution of prizes, Agesilaos led his army along the same route as Xerxes had almost a century before when the Persians had invaded Greece.  

32 Xen. Hell. 4.2.3-5, Ages. 1.38; Plut. Ages. 15.5. See also Meyer, Vol. 5, 230 and Beloch, 3.1, 72.  

33 Xen. Hell. 4.2.5-8, Ages. 1.39; Plutarch (Ages. 15.5-8) writes that Agesilaos gave the finest example of obedience to legitimate authority ever seen by returning from Asia at the ephors' summons. Hamilton, 219, believes that Epikydidas' description of the outbreak of war in Greece further exacerbated Agesilaos' resentment of the Thebans.
While the army was breaking camp at Sestos, Agesilaos wryly observed that 10,000 of the king's archers were driving him out of Asia. The reference was to the bribes disbursed by Timokrates to the anti-Spartan leaders in Greece and the fact that many Persian coins were stamped with the figure of a bowman.\(^3\) As the army passed through Hellespontine Thrace, Agesilaos sent envoys ahead to ask but one question: would they permit the Greeks safe passage? All tribes chose to receive the army in a friendly spirit except the Trallians.\(^4\) This people, to whom even Xerxes had paid a transit fee, asked for 100 talents of silver and an equal number of women as the price of passage. Agesilaos responded that they should come and take what they wanted, prompting the Trallians to draw themselves into battle formation. Agesilaos, however, routed and killed many of them with little or no allied losses. After this the allies encountered no further resistance and arrived at Amphipolis.\(^5\)

While encamped near Amphipolis, Agesilaos received two legations. The first came from the island of Thasos which lay some 80 km. to the east. The purpose of this mission was clearly flattery.\(^6\) A second more

\(^3\)Plut. Ages. 15.6 and Mor. 211b. The figure in the Moralia is 30,000 archers. Whichever is correct, it is clear that Epikyddidas had briefed Agesilaos well about Persian monetary initiatives in Europe. For the type of coin in question, see Regling, RE 2A.2, 2316-22, and Kraay, 369, with notes and bibliography.

\(^4\)Plut. Ages. 16.1, Mor. 211C. For a discussion of the fiercely independent, semi-civilized tribe, see Lenk, RE 6A.1, 407.

\(^5\)Xen. Hell. 4.3.1; Plut. Ages. 16.1-3.

\(^6\)See Jacoby, Fr.Gr.H. 2B.1, no. 115.22 under **Theopompos**
serious legation under Derkyldas arrived from Sparta whose purpose was to inform Agesilaos about the outcome of the battle of Nemea. 38

as preserved in Athenaios, Deipnosophistai 657b/c. The Thasians hoping to win Agesilaos' favor brought cattle, sheep and some of their exotic island dishes. The king, however, remarked that only beef and mutton were fit for consumption by soldiers of Lakedaimon and distributed the exotic items to the helots who were welcome, he said, to perish from the food's ill effects. According to Plutarch (Mor.210d), the Thasians offered to deify Agesilaos, claiming it was in their power to do so. He dismissed them, however, saying that they should make themselves gods first before offering to do so for others. This offer was meant to be reminiscent of the Samian deification of Lysander (see ch. 2).

The anti-Spartan coalition accelerated its activities when it became clear that Sparta was mobilizing in the Peloponnesos and had summoned Agesilaos home from Asia. Timolaos of Korinth urged swift action to check the Spartans before they could assemble the full allied levy, but the coalition, by squabbling over command positions and phalanx depth, lost the opportunity to act on his advice. When the allied army reached the Korinthia and fell to pillaging, the coalition finally drew up its forces on the eastern slope of the dry Nemea river bed. The two camps were separated by only 1.85 km. when the armies finally engaged. Xenophon (Hell.4.2.13-23) and Diodorus (14.83.1-2) are the only ancient authors to preserve a record of this encounter. Diodorus' version is very summary, providing only the numbers ranged on either side of the river bed and the casualties. Xenophon's description is much longer and lists the contingents by city. In his reckoning, the Peloponnesians had 13,500 to the coalition's 21,500. Kromayer, Antike Schlachtfelder 4, 595-96, suggests that Xenophon (who was travelling with Agesilaos at this time) neglected to include almost 9,000 Achaian, Mantineian and Tegeate hoplites in spite of mentioning that the Spartans had collected them en route. Diodorus similarly appears to have omitted the 6,000 Athenians. The actual figures, therefore, were 21,500 coalition troops against the Peloponnesians' 23,500. In different sectors of the field different sides had the advantage until the Spartans detached and routed the Athenians (who had changed places with the timorous Thebans because the latter refused to face the Spartans). At this the rest of the coalition line broke and fled to Korinth whose pro-Spartan citizens locked them out and sent a legation to Lakedaimon to sue for peace. Diodorus tells us that the allies lost 1100 men to the coalition's 2800 and Xenophon notes that the Spartans erected a trophy. Epigraphical evidence of Athenian participation in the battle survives and is discussed by Tod, GHI, nos. 104/05. Pausanias (1.29.11) describes this stele which lists eleven fallen cavalrymen of a 600-man contingent. This is perhaps a listing of only one tribe's fallen. In any case the battle was indecisive, although
Derkylidas reported that only eight Lakedaimonians had perished, while a great many of the enemy had fallen. Perhaps only eight Spartaies fell, but a figure of 1100 seems more likely for the allied side. Agesilaos then decided that it would be well to inform the Asian Greeks of this victory and remind them of his promise to return. He, therefore, sent Derkylidas back to the Hellespont (July 394). 39

Agesilaos then left Amphipolis and led the army into Makedonia after sending envoys to King Airopos to ask for safe conduct. Airopos, suspecting that the Lakedaimonians were weak in cavalry, at first refused. When Agesilaos ordered all animals to be mounted, thus creating an impression of a much larger cavalry force than he actually had, Airopos abandoned his bellicose posture and allowed the army to pass. 40

In Thessaly a somewhat different situation confronted the allies. Here they could not merely request safe passage because, like the Chalkidikians, most Thessalians had sided with the anti-Spartan

the Peloponnesians seem to have enjoyed a slight advantage. For a full analysis of numbers, topography and interpretation of this encounter, see Pritchett, "The Battle Near the Nemea River in 394 B.C.," Studies in Ancient Greek Topography, Part 2, 74-84; Cavaignac, "À propos de la bataille du torrent du Nemée," REA, 27 (1925), 273-78; Anderson, Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon, Berkeley, 1970, 141-50; Kromayer, Schlachtenatlas, Griesch. Abt., maps 1 and 2, 29-30; and finally Accame, Ricerche intorno alla Guerra Corinzia, Naples, 1951, 65-87, who discerns a potent anti-Theban bias in Xenophon's entire description of this battle which occurred in July 394.

39 Xen. Hell. 4.3.2-3. Derkylidas, Xenophon writes, was fond of travel.

40 Plut. Ages. 16.4; Polyainos 2.1.17; Paus. 3.9.12.
coalition. Medias now repaid the Boiotians for their help by harassing the allied column when it had crossed into Thessaly east of Olympos and had begun to march up the Peneios River toward Larissa. Agesilaos, understanding the implications of his reception in Thessaly, attempted to detach the Larisaians through diplomacy. He sent Xenokles and Skythes to the city, but the inhabitants arrested them. Against the indignant advice of his counsellors, Agesilaos decided not to besiege the city. Rather, he chose to secure the envoys' release by negotiation.

Since entering Thessaly, Agesilaos had ordered the troops to march with half the horsemen in front and half behind the square to counter Thessalian harassment. The Pharsalian Polycharmos began to press the allies so vigorously south of Larissa that Agesilaos ordered all his cavalry to the rear except those forming his own bodyguard. This convinced Polycharmos and his men that it was not the right moment to engage Agesilaos' hoplites, so the Thessalians began an orderly withdrawal. Agesilaos, however, suddenly decided to attack his adversaries and ordered his mounted bodyguard to wheel about and pass the word to the rearguard horsemen not to allow the Thessalians a retreat. The sudden rush of the allied horsemen took Polycharmos by surprise. Most of his men fled in confusion back toward Pharsalos and Polycharmos with a few others, who chose to resist, fell fighting.

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41 Diod. 14.82.1-2; thus it is evident that Agesilaos could not have followed precisely the same path as Xerxes had.

42 Plut. Ages. 16.5-6.
Agesilaos took some horsemen captive and erected a trophy between Mt. Pras and Mt. Narthakion to celebrate his victory. He was especially pleased that the cavalry he had personally recruited and trained were successful against a people who prided themselves on horsemanship. The next day he crossed the borders of Achaia Phthiotis into eastern Lokris and the Spercheios valley near Mt. Oite, a friendly territory.

Here he was met by the ephor Diphridas who bade him enter Boiotia at once. Agesilaos had intended to augment further his forces before marching southeast along the Kephisos into hostile territory, but once again he obeyed the ephors' command. Arriving with Diphridas were fifty of the strongest and fittest young men from Lakedaimon to serve as the king's personal bodyguard and honor him for his services to the state. He then gave an order that two morai, one from the Korinthia and one from Orchomenos, join him, announced to his troops that the day was at hand for which they had left Asia and set out. He led the army along the Kephisos past Chaironeia and Lebadeia to the outskirts of Koroneia on the northern flanks of Mt. Helikon.

On 14 August 394 B.C. there occurred a partial solar eclipse and

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43 Xen. Hell. 4.3.3-9; Plut. Ages. 16.6-8. Mt. Narthakion lies some 6-8 km. south of Pharsalos and its peak is 1011 meters high; see Stahlin, RE 16.2, 1760-61. Mt. Pras is immediately to the east. Today Mt. Narthakion is called Kassidhiarisi.

44 Plut. Ages. 17.4; the Spercheios forms the southern boundary of Thessaly. The army would have passed by Lamia, crossed the river and encamped between the eastern flanks of Oite and the pass of Thermopylai.

45 Xen. Hell. 4.3.10; Plut. Ages. 17.3-4.
Agesilaos received word of the Peloponnesians' sweeping naval defeat near Knidos and the death of his brother-in-law, the navarch Peisandros. Although shocked and in sorrow at the news, the king ordered those who had brought the tidings to announce that Peisandros had died, but that the Peloponnesian fleet had been victorious. He then put on a garland and offered the sacrifice for glad tidings. He also sent portions of the victims to the leaders of the several contingents of his army to keep up their spirits. Shortly after the sacrifice, the vanguard of the coalition army arrived from the Isthmos. Buoyed by their king's good spirits, the Lakedaimonians gained the upper hand in a minor skirmish.

The Battle of Koroneia

With the arrival of the main coalition army from the Isthmos, the two sides drew up into battle formation. Having received orders to enter Boiotia from Diphridas the ephor, Agesilaos' purpose was clearly to inflict a decisive defeat on the coalition, neutralize and detach Boiotia and trap the Argives, Athenians and Korinthians at the Isthmos between two Peloponnesian armies. With the loss of the hegemony's naval component in the shoals and waters of the Knidian Chersonese,

46 Xen. Hell. 4.3.13-14; Plut. Ages. 17.5; Polyainos 2.1.3. This incident shows yet again that Agesilaos was gifted with superior leadership ability and, in his fifty-first year, possessed a thorough understanding of human nature.

47 Xen. Hell. 4.3.14.
Agesilaos had double incentive to carry the day. He had already told his Asian Greek allies that the day of decision for which they had marched from Asia was at hand. A successful issue would have made a return to Asia Minor feasible. Second, the Peloponnesians were in an excellent position to chastise severely the Thebans for having incited the war, an incentive which was paramount for every allied soldier in the field.

Although Agesilaos had left 4,000 men in Asia, he had been able to recruit others in his homeward march from Sestos. Thus, the allied army which was deployed in three components stood at a strength of some 20,000 men. When they had left camp, Agesilaos with the Lakedaimonian wing occupied the right side of the line as tradition dictated. In the center Herippidas commanded the Asian Greek soldiers and finally the Phokians and Orchomenians were arranged on the allied left. Opposed to them were the Argives on the coalition left, the Lokrians (eastern and western), Ainianians, Euboians, Korinthians and Athenians in the middle and the Boiotians on the right. The coalition line faced in a northerly direction, while that of the allies looked south toward the

48 Plut. Ages. 17.2.

49 Xen. Hell. 3.4.15; Ages. 2.9; Plut. Ages. 18.1-2; Diod. 14.84.1. See also Kromayer/Veith, Schlachtenatlas, Griech Abt., 28, map 3 and Pritchett, Studies in Ancient Greek Topography 2, 93-95.

50 The general terrain of the battle had the Kopaic marsh to the east and Mt. Helikon to the south (and the town of Koroneia), the Herkyna river to the west and the Kephisos to the north. Just to the southeast of the battle lines lay the temple of Athena Itonia (today the Chapel of the Metamorphosis). See Kromayer/Veith, ibid and Pritchett, ibid.
flanks of Mt. Helikon. Since the coalition troops were the same who had fought at Nemea a month before, they would have numbered about 20,000 also. Once again, therefore, the two sides were evenly matched, although the allies had more peltasts. 51

As at Nemea, the Thebans raised the war cry and attacked first, this time charging into the Orchomenians and Phokians. When Agesilaos signalled the Lakedaimonian wing to advance, the Argives fled to Mt. Helikon. The center of both lines held, but when Agesilaos discovered that the Thebans had broken through to the allied baggage train, he wheeled his own men about to aid the routed Orchomenians and Phokians. During this manoeuvre, the coalition center began to give way to Herippidas' Asian Greeks and undertook a steady withdrawal to join the Argives on the slopes of Helikon. When the Thebans realized that their Argive and other comrades were retreating, they regrouped for a charge southward to rejoin their fellows. Agesilaos, rather than opening his line to let them pass, decided to meet their charge head on. 52 During the course of this bitterly fought, hand-to-hand combat, Agesilaos himself sustained several wounds and had to be carried away to safety. Had it not been for the vigorous efforts of the fifty Spartan youths sent with Diphridas to be his honor guard, Agesilaos would have lost his

51 Xen. Hell. 4.3.15, Ages. 2.9.

52 Rather than letting the Boiotians pass and taking them in the rear as they retreated, Xenophon (Hell. 4.3.19, Ages. 2.12) in a classic understatement writes that Agesilaos displayed great courage by not choosing the safest course. Plutarch (Ages. 18.4) more realistically observes that the king was carried away by passion and martial ardor. This effort was perhaps necessary, however, if the Spartan plan to crush and
Eventually most of the Boiotians escaped to Mt. Helikon to join their comrades, but many others died in the Spartan onslaught.

As they lay wounded near the Spartan camp, Agesilaos forbade the slaughter of eighty enemy soldiers who had taken refuge in the nearby temple of Athena Itonia. On the following day, in order to test the enemy, he ordered his troops to wear garlands and erect a trophy. The Boiotians made no move to offer battle, but instead sent envoys requesting a truce to recover the dead. Agesilaos granted this request and ordered his army to withdraw to the west. The Spartans abandoned hope of subduing Boiotia while the coalition forces retreated to occupy the Isthmos. After the allies reached Delphi, where the Pythian games were in progress, Agesilaos received medical attention for his many wounds and dedicated 100 talents, a tenth of his Asian booty, to Apollo. He then ordered the polemarch Gylis to conduct pillage in western Lokris. This venture was indecisive, however, and Gylis with seventeen other Spartiates lost his life.

When the games were over and Agesilaos had recovered sufficiently to travel, he dismissed the various contingents of the army and sailed home from the Krisaian Gulf. Marching back through Megarides and the Isthmos was, of course, out of the question, because detach the Boiotians from the coalition were to work. If the largely unscathed Boiotians succeeded in rejoining their comrades on Mt. Helikon, the Spartans would have lost their chance to put an early end to war. Unfortunately for the Spartans, this is precisely what happened.

53 Xen. Hell. 4.3.18-19, Ages. 2.12; Plut. Ages. 18.3.

54 See Pritchett, 95.
the coalition had secured that area in force, thus blocking the allies' path. The bulk of the Peloponnesians probably crossed over from Antirhion to Rhion at the western end of the Gulf of Korinth where the channel separating the northern land mass from the Peloponnesos is only about 2 km. wide.

From Koroneia to the Failed Peace of 392

Although the Thebans enjoyed the first success of the war at Haliartos and were elated by their performance at Koroneia when their comrades from other poleis had broken and run, the Spartan alliance controlled the field at both Nemea and Koroneia. The encounters, however, were inconclusive and the chance to crush Boiotia had slipped from the Spartans' grasp three times in as many months. The Lake-daimonians' three greatest commanders had failed to attain this crucial military objective; Lysander had died, Pausanias was in exile and a seriously wounded Agesilaos had been compelled to withdraw to the comparative safety of Phokis and disband his army. Thus the Korinthian War, as it came to be known, while mildly encouraging for the coalition, was...

55 Xen. Hell. 4.3.17-4.4.1, Ages. 2.9-16; Plut. Ages. 18.5-19.3. Summary accounts of the battle appear in Diod. 14.84.1-2; Paus. 9.6.4; Nepos Ages. 4.5; Frontinus 2.6.6; Polyainos 2.1.3-4; and Justin 6.4.13. Xenophon's account of this battle is particularly detailed and vivid because he participated in it as Plutarch (Ages. 18.1) tells us and Xenophon himself (Anab. 5.3.6). Diogenes Laertius (2.6) also makes note of Xenophon's trek back to Europe with Agesilaos.

56 See Bolte, RE 1A.1, 844-45; Rhion is located just northeast of modern Patrai.

57 Plutarch (Ages. 18.9) writes that they believed themselves undefeated, if not technically victorious in the battle.
primarily a triumph for the diplomacy of Pharnabazos, Tithraustes and Artaxerxes.\footnote{Xenophon (\textit{Hell.} 4.4.1, 14) notes that after Koroneia the land war bogged down into a series of skirmishes in the Korinthia. The coalition's advantage was not solid, however, as the Korinthian oligarch's lockout of the soldiers fleeing from the Nemea riverbed and subsequent overtures to Sparta for a separate peace clearly show (Xen. \textit{Hell.} 4.2.23 and Demosth. 20.52-53). Hamilton, 223, notes that in spite of limited resources, the Athenians decided to rebuild their long walls. See Tod, \textit{GHI}, no. 107.}

In order for the Persian grand strategy to succeed, it was not enough that an anti-Spartan coalition come into being in Greece. As noted earlier,\footnote{See ch. 4.} in the early spring of 395 a democratic faction seized control of the government at Rhodes and expelled the Spartan garrison.\footnote{P. 15.1-3; Diod. 14.79.4-7; and Justin 6.2.1-3.} Soon afterwards the new government intercepted a huge Egyptian grain fleet which put in to what the Egyptians believed was still a pro-Spartan port.\footnote{Hamilton, 227, and Bruce, "The Democratic Revolution at Rhodes," \textit{CQ}, 11 (1961), 166-170.} In addition to affecting Agesilaos' strategy in Asia Minor, this coup provided Konon with another base of operations in the Aegean.\footnote{Diod. 14.63.4} In 396 Pharax, a Lakedaimonian navarch, had sailed with thirty ships to aid Dionysios I of Syracuse in his struggle against Carthage.\footnote{Diod. 14.63.4} This reduced the Peloponnesian fleet in the Aegean from 120

\footnote{Xenophon (\textit{Hell.} 4.4.1, 14) notes that after Koroneia the land war bogged down into a series of skirmishes in the Korinthia. The coalition's advantage was not solid, however, as the Korinthian oligarch's lockout of the soldiers fleeing from the Nemea riverbed and subsequent overtures to Sparta for a separate peace clearly show (Xen. \textit{Hell.} 4.2.23 and Demosth. 20.52-53). Hamilton, 223, notes that in spite of limited resources, the Athenians decided to rebuild their long walls. See Tod, \textit{GHI}, no. 107.}

\footnote{See ch. 4.}

\footnote{P. 15.1-3; Diod. 14.79.4-7; and Justin 6.2.1-3.}

\footnote{Hamilton, 227, and Bruce, "The Democratic Revolution at Rhodes," \textit{CQ}, 11 (1961), 166-170.}

\footnote{Diod. 14.63.4}
to 90 ships, which in turn moved Agesilaos, after his appointment as supreme navarch\textsuperscript{63} in late summer of 395, to order the restoration of the fleet to its original strength. Konon, however, had more than doubled the Persian fleet from eighty ships\textsuperscript{64} to 170 with the addition of eighty triremes from Sidon and ten from Kilikia (late winter 396/95, just prior to the Rhodian revolt).\textsuperscript{65} With the death of Tissaphernes, Konon was forced to confront one of the most embarrassing problems of that era for a commander. Since his Persian supporters were in default of their funding promises, he had fallen fifteen months in arrears of pay for his sailors and marines.\textsuperscript{66} He, therefore, sailed from Rhodes to Kaunos in order to confer with Tithraustes and Pharnabazos. After meeting with the satrap and chiliarch, the latter gave him 220 talents from the personal fortune of the newly deceased Tissaphernes. Tithraustes then left for Babylon after placing Ariaios and Pasiphernes in charge of Lydia and Karia and sent Timokrates to Greece. In the meantime, a revolt had broken out in Kaunos and spread as far as the base in Rhodes before Konon was able to suppress it (summer 395).\textsuperscript{67} Rather than risk the sporadic and half-hearted support of satraps and chiliarchs,\textsuperscript{68} Konon decided to deal directly with the Great King after

\textsuperscript{63}Xen. 2.4.27-28; Plut. Ages. 10.9; Paus. 3.9.6; see also ch. 4.

\textsuperscript{64}Diod. 14.79.6.

\textsuperscript{65}p. 9.1-2; Diod. 14.79.8.

\textsuperscript{66}p. 19.2; Isok. 4.142.

\textsuperscript{67}p. 20.1-6; Justin 6.2.11; see also Meyer, Vol. 5, 201-02 and Hamilton, 228.

\textsuperscript{68}p. 19.2.
suppressing the revolt and disbursing the 220 talents to his men.

He, therefore, placed two Athenians in charge of the fleet at Rhodes, sailed to Kilikia, travelled overland to Syrian Thapsakos and finally sailed down the Euphrates to Babylon where he pled his case with Artaxerxes. By the winter of 395/94, Konon had secured Artaxerxes' personal assurances of monetary support and had chosen Pharnabazos as his collaborator to force a decisive encounter with the now numerically inferior Spartan fleet under Agesilaos' brother-in-law, Peisandros.

For a month or two, no such encounter materialized. Both fleets conducted minor operations and made their final preparations. Agesilaos had ordered that the Peloponnesian fleet be restored to its original strength of 120 ships, but by early August, the fleet still stood at only ninety ships. The Lakedaimonians' base was Knidos, while Pharnabazos, having learned of Peisandros' presence, was at Loryma with ninety triremes. Konon had joined him with a few ships, while most of the Greek component of the Great King's fleet was moored at Rhodes.

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69 Diod. 14.81.4-6; Justin 6.2.11-16; Nepos Conon 3.2-4.2. Both Justin and Nepos preserve the amusing anecdote about Konon's refusal to perform προοδήματα which caused an exchange of letters through intermediaries in order to conduct business. One of these intermediaries was Tithraustes who had just returned from Sardis (P. 19.3). Nepos mistakenly attributes the death of Tissaphernes to Konon's pleading at Pharnabazos' behest on this occasion; but as Westlake, "Decline and Fall of Tissaphernes," Historia, 30 (1981), 257-79, has shown, Tissaphernes' fate had been sealed as much as a year before his demise.

70 Agesilaos, of course, was conducting extensive forays and pillage in Pharnabazos' satrapy at this time; see ch. 4.

71 Diod. 14.83.4-5. Isokrates (4.142-44) writes that the Persian fleet was barely able to defeat Peisandros' 100 ships and Xenophon
Peisandros finally decided to try the issue. At the beginning of August he set sail from Knidos with eighty-five ships. His fleet rounded the southern coast of the Knidian Chersonese (the western "finger"), sailed through the straits between Loryma (on the tip of the southern "finger") and Ialysos on the island of Rhodes and put in near Physkos. Konon then brought up the Greek component of the Persian fleet from Rhodes to confront the adventurous and over-eager Peisandros. He was quickly joined by Pharnabazos and the ninety ships from Loryma. Now greatly overmatched, Peisandros realized his only hope was to break through the advancing Persian line of 170 ships. He gallantly led the advance on the right (western) wing, against Pharnabazos' ships but his allies on the left panicked at the sight of Konon's Greeks and fled shoreward. Peisandros nonetheless pressed forward and thirty-five Lakedaimonian ships managed to break through and return to Knidos. Fifty ships were either abandoned by their crews or sunk in the Persian advance and Peisandros died fighting. Some 500 crewmen were captured while the rest escaped on shore.

(Hell. 4.3.11-12) writes that Peisandros' fleet was much smaller than the Persian flotilla. Meyer, Vol. 5, 202, n.3, has written, hier ist Klarheit nicht zu gewinnen, but Diodorus' figures are likely to be reliable.

72Meyer, RE Suppl. 11, 1090-91: The modern name of the site is Marmaris. See also Honigmann, RE 19.1, 569-70, for an excellent map of the Rhodian Peraia of which Physkos was a member polis.

73Xen. Hell. 4.3.11-12; Diod. 14.83.5-7. Brief notices of the sea battle appear in Isok. 4.142; Justin 6.3; Nepos Conon 4.1-4; Didymos 7.45; and Polyainos(1.48.5) who writes that in order to deceive the Lakedaimonians about his precise place in the Persian line, Konon
Immediately after their sweeping victory, Konon and Pharnabazos undertook a diplomatic offensive throughout the Aegean. Many of the poleis visited came over to their side and the Spartans lost nearly their entire maritime realm. The only region to reject these overtures was the Hellespont where Derkylidas' vigorous leadership stiffened resistance to the Persians at the crucial strait of Sestos and Abydos despite Konon's blockade and Pharnabazos' pillage. Some of the poleis which came over to Konon and Pharnabazos were Kos, Nisyros, Teos, Chios, Karpathos, Knidos, Chios, Mitylene, Erythrai and even Ephesos, the Spartans' Asian headquarters for six years under Thibron, Derkylidas and Agesilaos.

After securing the entire Aegean basin (with the exception of the Hellespont) in the autumn of 394, Konon was instructed to carry the

ordered two identical flagships fitted out and another officer to dress exactly as he had. Beloch, 3.1, 76, n.1, rightly dismisses this anecdote as abgeschmakte. The reports given by Nepos and Justin are so summary that Meyer (Vol. 5, 235, n.1 and Theopomps Hellenika, 80) considers them worthless. The versions of Xenophon and Diodorus are not contradictory, therefore one can reconstruct the battle from them. Bürchner, RE 11.1, 918, under Knidos mentions the Lion monument unearthed east southeast of the city which had been erected to those who died in the sea battle.

74 Xen. Hell. 4.8.3-6; Cawkwell, "A Note on the Heracles Coinage Alliance of 394 B.C.," NC, 16 (1956), 69-75, and "The ΣΤΝ Coins Again," JHS, 83 (1963), 152-54, argues that a short-lived symmachy sprang up in the Aegean after Knidos to assure independence from all outside domination, Spartan, Athenian or Persian. See also Hill, Greek Historical Coins, 62-66, nos. 32-33, and Hamilton, 230-31. Cawkwell, moreover, believes that most of the 40 Lakedaimonian ships which survived the Knidian debacle simply "slipped away quietly," that is, defected to the victorious Konon or sailed home. At least a few likely returned to the Peloponnnesos.

75 Xen. Hell. 4.8.3-6 and Diod. 14.84.3-4.
naval war to Lakonia itself the following spring. He accordingly set sail with Pharnabazos for the Kyklades in early 393. He occupied and garrisoned Melos, using it as a base to ravage the Peloponnesian coast. Later he took Kythera for a similar purpose. There the satrap heartened the coalition with a generous disbursal of funds. This was a most welcome gesture since the land war had settled into a series of raids and skirmishes which accomplished little apart from destruction of croplands in the Korinthia. As noted earlier, the Korinthians were in fact divided as to the wisdom of continuing the war. After the battle of Nemea in July 394, a pro-Spartan faction in the city had locked out the fleeing coalition troops and offered to negotiate a separate peace with the Spartans. At the prospect of repeated damage to their fields, the martial ardor of even the most committed anti-Spartan Korinthians must have cooled. In the summer of 393, however, they put Pharnabazos' money to good use and outfitted a fleet. Because the naval component of the Peloponnesian forces had been sheared off near Knidos, the Korinthians were able to regain control of the Gulf by autumn. After visiting the Isthmos, Konon persuaded Pharnabazos to relinquish control of the fleet in exchange for a promise to fund it from revenues collected around the Aegean. He then sailed home to the Peiraeus to be honored with Euagoras at the end of his twelve-year absence. He quickly

76 The seriousness of this blow to Spartan strategy is well attested in ancient literature, e.g. Andok. 3.22; Isok. 4.154, 9.56; Diod. 14.84-4; Plut. Artax. 21; and Justin 6.4.1. See also Meyer, Vol. 5, 235-36; Beloch, 3.1, 77-78 and Hamilton, 230-31. The most obvious consequence of Peisandros' defeat and the disbanding of the harmosts and garrisons was the loss of the tribute originally instituted by Lysander in 404 (see ch. 2).
assumed responsibility for the rebuilding of Athens' long walls, using his share of Pharnabazos' money to enlist his own crewmen, large numbers of Athenians and even some Boiotians. The walls were soon completed and were of uniformly excellent quality. They had rectangular towers at regular intervals and eventually came to be known as "Kononian" because the navarch had supervised most of their reconstruction.77 Thus the year 393 drew to a close. As noted above, the Persians and the coalition seemed on the verge of achieving their purpose. Their brilliant naval and diplomatic strategies had created a stalemate on land and stripped the Peloponnesians of their maritime fiefdom in the Aegean basin. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Lakedaimonians in the spring of 392 should turn to diplomacy.78

Antalkidas, Tiribazos and the Failed Peace of 392

When Agesilaos departed from Delphi in the late summer 394 after depositing his one-hundred talent tithe, evidence surfaced in Lakedaimon of an elaborate plot by Lysander to alter the Lykourgan politeia. Many of Lysander's followers resented Agesilaos and the wounded king sought ways either to blunt their influence or reconcile them. In the course of an investigation of Lysander's personal effects,

77 Xen. Hell. 4.8.6-12; Diodorus 14.84.3-85.3; Plut. Ages. 23.19; Nepos Conon 4.5; and Isok. 5.64. See also Swoboda, RE 11.2, 1329. For the statues in his and Euagoras' honor, see Isok. 9.57 and Paus. 1.3.2.

a speech written for him by Kleon of Halikarnassos was discovered in which abolition of the hereditary kingship was urged in favor of an elective one.\textsuperscript{79} Agesilaos was angered at this revelation and wanted to make it public, but the wisdom of the ephor Lakratidas prevailed and the matter remained a secret.\textsuperscript{80} This incident in the autumn of 394 is our last notice of Agesilaos until his campaign against the Argives in the spring of 391.\textsuperscript{81}

As noted above, the land war had bogged down in the Korinthia where the Peloponnesians controlled Sikyon and the coalition had occupied Lechaion. In the winter of 393/92, the Spartan navarch Podanemos had secured the southern shore of the Korinthian Gulf by bottling up in Lechaion the Korinthian ships financed by Pharnabazos.

\textsuperscript{79}Plut. Lys. 30.3-5, Ages. 20.2, Mor. 212c.

\textsuperscript{80}Lakratidas supposedly advised Agesilaos that it would be better to bury the speech than exhume Lysander. Several scholars have recently taken this incident as evidence for a tripartite political alignment in Sparta during these years. In addition to Lysander's Τοπία, they argue the existence of a faction loyal to Agis' aims (and eventually to those of Agesilaos) and to Agesipolis, the youthful son of the exiled Pausanias. See Rice, Why Sparta Failed, Diss. Yale 1971; Hamilton, 241-43; Cawkwell, "Agesilaos and Sparta," CQ, 26 (1976), 62-84; Seager, "The King's Peace and the Balance of Power in Greece, 386-362 B.C.,” Athenaeum, 52 (1974), 36-63; and ch. 2.

\textsuperscript{81}Because of Knidos and Koroneia, some scholars have seen the two-and-a-half year hiatus as evidence that Agesilaos was out of favor. See Smith, "The Opposition to Agesilaos' Foreign Policy, 394-371 B.C." Historia, 2 (1954), 274, 278 and Hamilton, 243-44.
The Peloponnesians, however, still controlled Phokis and Orchomenos in western Boiotia. Also, neither the Peloponnesians nor the coalition had been able to achieve any real gains after Agesilaos' failure at Koroneia to detach Boiotia and isolate the Athenians, Argives and wavering Korinthians near the Isthmos. In the spring of 392 the war party in Korinth committed an atrocity at the festival of Artemis Eukleia in which 120 pro-Spartan oligarchs were murdered and some 500 driven into exile. The purpose of this coup was to eliminate the growing opposition of some groups to continuing the war. The Athenians, Boiotians, Argives and democratic Korinthians feared that Lakanizing aristocrats, whose lands were suffering the ravages of war, would make peace with Sparta. Some of the exiles who had fled to the Akrokorinth were persuaded to return under amnesty, but the democratic faction was already taking steps to create a sympolity with Argos. Two young leaders of the exiled group, Pasimelos and Alkimenes, soon grew disenchanted with the excesses of the democratic faction, some of whose Argive allies had entered the city and were removing boundary stones.

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82Xen. Hell. 4.4.1-13; Diod. 14.86; and Aristeides 2.370. See also Meyer, Vol. 5, 242-43, with notes.

83Xen. Hell. 4.4.1-6; Diod. 14.86.1. Most of the older men died; only the more youthful had been able to flee.

84Ibid. Also, Grote, Vol. 7, 495-98; Beloch, 3.1, 79-80; Meyer, Vol. 5, 243. Kagan, "Corinthian Politics and the Revolution of 392 B.C.," Historia, 11 (1962), 447-57, believes that three factions were vying for power, the democrats who favored war, oligarchs who favored war and the landed aristocrats who wanted peace and a restoration of their ancient prerogatives. The oligarchs prior to the coup controlled the state in this view.
These occupiers began referring to Korinth as "Argos" which Pasimelos, Alkimenes and their supporters found particularly galling. From this group of young oligarchs and aristocrats would come the attempt later that summer to hand over the city to Praxitas, the Spartan harmost at Sikyon.

Although the allies gained a slight advantage by the opening months of 392, clearly some Spartans felt a need to explore diplomacy as a solution to the alliance's quandary. Because they had lost the Aegean revenue with their naval debacle in 394 and were faced with depletion of the 900 talents brought from Asia by Agesilaos, the ephors sent Antalkidas to Sardis to treat with Tiribazos, the new satrap of Lydia and Karia. The original purpose of the mission was to conduct bilateral discussions with the satrap and convince the Persians to withdraw financial support from the coalition. The Lakedaimonians were no longer a factor in the Aegean, Antalkidas asserted, and were even willing to relinquish their insistence on independence for the Greeks of Asia. He held that Athens' revived naval strength was the greatest threat to Persian interests. When the coalition received word of Antalkidas' 

85 Xen. Hell. 4.4.4-6 and Diod. 14.86.3, 92.1-2. Argives and Korinthians were to share common citizenship, coinage and other appurtenances of a single state. Hamilton, 268-70, believes that this union was effected in two stages, the second in 389. Thus Xenophon's description of it as complete in 392 is anticipatory.

86 Tiribazos, formerly the satrap of Armenia, replaced the rebellious Ariaios after the latter had taken over for the executed Tissaphernes. See Beloch 3.1, 81, n.1; Meyer, Vol. 5, 245-46; and Schaefer, RE 6A.2, 1435.
initiative, the Athenians invited the Argives, Boiotians and Korinthians to join them in a visit to Sardis, since the interests of all were clearly at stake. Upon the arrival of the coalition's legation Antalkidas, who had won over Tiribazos to his side, cunningly proposed that all islands and cities (except those in Asia, of course) be autonomous. This clause was intended to strike at the Argives who had begun the annexation of Korinth, the Athenians who feared for Skyros, Lemnos and Imbros on the route to their Euxine grain sources, and the Boiotians at the head of whose league stood the Thebans. The dissolution of all three of these entities into their component poleis would leave Sparta supreme in Greece. Needless to say, the terms proposed by Antalkidas were completely unacceptable to the coalition so the conference broke up, achieving neither a κοινὴ εἰρήνη nor a bilateral alliance of Sparta and Persia.87

By the summer of 392, Antalkidas' failure and the arrival of Strouthas in Sardis made it clear that further military and naval exertions were necessary if Sparta were to achieve her purposes. Accordingly the Spartans took Tiribazos' money and outfitted a small fleet to secure the Korinthian Gulf against the ships in Lechaion which Pharnabazos and Konon had paid for in the previous year.

87 Xen. Hell. 4.8.12-17. Tiribazos could not conclude a peace without Artaxerxes' approval, so he secretly gave Antalkidas money to raise a fleet and arrested Konon as an enemy of the Great King. When Tiribazos travelled to the court, however, Artaxerxes, still bitterly resenting the pillage of his lands by Thibron, Derkyldas and especially Agesilaos, replaced him with Strouthas who then released Konon and overtly favored Athens. Although Konon sailed for Kypros a
Since Koroneia the Peloponnesians had no means of communication by land with their allies in Phokis and Orchomenos. When Pasimelos and Alkimenes, leaders of the clandestine opposition in Korinth, secretly offered to admit Praxitas, harmost of Sikyon, into the Korinthian port of Lechaion, a splendid opportunity arose to strengthen the alliance's hand. Under cover of darkness, Praxitas led a detachment of troops to the walls of the port where Pasimelos and Alkimenes opened the gates for them. In the ensuing struggle, the Peloponnesians were unable to take Korinth itself, but they occupied and demolished a segment of the long walls. In the succeeding days, Praxitas' forces captured Sidous, Krommyon and Epieikeia in the Megarid before he disbanded his army and withdrew to Lakedaimon.88

To secure their access to central Greece across the straits at Rhion, the Spartan navarch Podanemos (393/92) undertook an offensive to counter the Korinthians' shipbuilding enterprise which Pharnabazos had funded. Because of the satrap's generosity, the Korinthians in their new ships controlled the entire gulf between Rhion and Lechaion by the spring of 392.89

free man, he fell ill there and died by the spring of 391. See Swoboda, RE 11.2, 1332-33. Ryder, Koine Eirene, 30-31, believes that Plato's Menex. (245a-b) and Didymos (7.20) show the Athenian reluctance to cede Greek Asia to Artaxerxes also caused the effort at Sardis to fail.

88Xen. Hell. 4.4.6-13.

89Xen. Hell. 4.8.10.
Podanemos' Lakedaimonians now challenged the Korinthians under their navarch Agathinos for superiority in the Gulf. In a minor engagement, Podanemos lost his life and his second officer Pollis had to withdraw because of wounds. Herippidas succeeded Podanemos as navarch for the rest of the summer and compelled the Korinthians now under Proainos to abandon Rhion. 90

In Athens the spectre of a Lakedaimonian occupation of Attika had arisen once again with Praxitas' capture of Lechaion and his breach of the Korinthian long walls. In central Greece, the Boiotians were still faced with hostile forces in Phokis and Orchomenos, and the Korinthians' temporary naval advantage had evaporated with Herippidas' successful action near Rhion. Only the Argives, who had begun the annexation of Korinth, had reason left to continue the struggle. With these things in mind, the Athenians made an overture to Sparta in late summer or early autumn for a peace. The Spartans were amenable, despite their enhanced position, because they still faced the opposition of Artaxerxes and Strouthas. Although Andokides pled well before the Athenian assembly the people rejected the proposal. 91

90 Xen. Hell. 4.8.11. These events at Lechaion and on the Gulf near Rhion occurred after Antalkidas' failed mission to Sardis. Although minor, the two victories clearly enhanced the Peloponnesians' position. The coalition's only gain was the rebuke to the pro-Spartan Tiribazos whom Artexerxes had replaced with the pro-Athenian Strouthas.

91 Our only sources for this second attempt in Sparta are Andokides' speech, On the Peace with the Spartans (3.17-18 clearly alludes to the summer of 392), its hypothesis and Plut. Moralia 835a. Xenophon (Hell. 4.8.12-15), Didymos (7.17-20), and Plato (Menexenos 245b) mention only the Sardis conference.
Because the Korinthians were badly divided by factional strife\textsuperscript{92} and the Argives would resist any effort to dissolve the nascent sym-
polity, there could be enthusiasm for a general peace only among the
dissidents who supported Pasimelos and Alkimenes. Although the
Boiotians, who regarded Orchomenos as a rival and a threat, were willing
to come to terms, as were the Spartans, the opportunity for a general
peace passed with the rejection of Andokides' proposals by the Athenian
demos. The reasons for their rejection in spite of Andokides' vigorous
advocacy are two. First, the proposed settlement would offer the
Athenians nothing they did not already have. Unlike what the Great
King proposed in Sardis, the Spartans would leave the Euxine grain route
secure (and the integrity of the Boiotian league except for Orchomenos),
while insisting only that the coalition be dissolved and that the
Argives withdraw from Korinth. Radical democrats, however, and others
who resented Sparta's ascendancy, thwarted Andokides' purpose in order to
complete the task begun by Konon and even recover some part of their
former maritime realm. A strong anti-Spartan coalition funded by
Strouthas was a more attractive prospect than a sterile peace.\textsuperscript{93}

Although Agesilaos is nowhere attested in our sources from the
autumn of 394 to the spring of 391, one might well ask whether his
influence is discernible in this singular year.\textsuperscript{94} The conclusion that

\textsuperscript{92}See Kagan, 447-51, who places this intense infighting in high
relief.

\textsuperscript{93}See Beloch, 3.1, 82-83; Meyer, Vol. 5, 248-49; Ryder, 32-33;
and Hamilton, 258-59.

\textsuperscript{94}Because of the muddled chronology of Xenophon and Diodorus
he did have a hand in the events of 392 seems inevitable. That his collaborator Herippidas\textsuperscript{95} finished the navarchy of the deceased Podanemos and reasserted Peloponnesian control of the straits of Rhion is the first significant item. Second, his younger half-brother Telutias\textsuperscript{96} became navarch for 392/91. In the matter of the first peace conference in Sardis, it is abundantly clear that Agesilaos and Antalkidas were contentious rivals and that the king, as much as the Athenians, found the notion of ceding Greek Asia to Artaxerxes repugnant and unconscionable.\textsuperscript{97} In this case Agesilaos emerges as the idealist, while Antalkidas is much more the practical man of affairs. As for the conference at Sparta in the autumn, it matters little whether the proposed settlement was the same as that in Sardis\textsuperscript{98}

(and the former's peculiar arrangement of events on land and sea after Koroneia), a slim possibility exists that the Sardis conference occurred after the initiative in Sparta. In that case the Isthmian games mentioned by Xenophon (\textit{Hell.} 4.5.1) would be those of 392 (see Grote, Vol. 7, 523-25, who believes that the only peace conference of 392 was the one in Sardis), and Andokides' speech would have occurred in the autumn of 393. This reconstruction, which forces considerable compression of events, seems much less feasible than the more flexible chronology which takes Xenophon's reference to the Isthmian games as those of 390. See Ryder, 167-69, and Martin, "Sur une interpretation nouvelle de la Paix du Roi," \textit{Mus. Helv.}, 6 (1949), 127-39.

\textsuperscript{95}Herippidas had replaced Lysander as chief advisor to Agesilaos in 395 and campaigned with him extensively: see chs. 3 and 4.


\textsuperscript{97}Isokrates, \textit{Epistle} 9.8-12; Plut. \textit{Ages.} 23.2, \textit{Moralia} 213b.

\textsuperscript{98}Wilcken, "Zur Entstehung und Zweck des Königsfriedens," Abhandlung der Preussischen Akademie, Phil.-hist Klasse, no. 15, 1941, 4-11, suggests that ceding the Asian Greeks to Artaxerxes was a common feature in both proposals despite Andokides' suppression of it.
or different in some important respects.\textsuperscript{99} Agesilaos would not have found acceptable the lenient and congenial terms offered to the Thebans,\textsuperscript{100} even if the Great King's interests were not an issue. After Knidos and Koroneia, his influence perhaps waned,\textsuperscript{101} but by the spring of 391, in the wake of two failed efforts to secure a peace, it is evident that Agesilaos and his friends surged once again to the fore and, in fact, dominated Spartan policy for the rest of the war and beyond.\textsuperscript{102}

Wilcken also believes that the conference in Sparta preceded the one in Sardis. Both suggestions have been ably refuted by Martin, 128-31; Ryder, 32; Smith, 278; and Hamilton, 254-55.

\textsuperscript{99}Andokides 3.15-18: see also Hamilton, 254, and Ryder, 32-33.

\textsuperscript{100}As is clear from his treatment of the Theban embassy sent to inquire about a settlement in 390 and after the ratification of the King's Peace in 386 (Xen. \textit{Hell.} 4.5.6, 9-10) antipathy to Thebes was still a major component of his foreign policy.

\textsuperscript{101}Smith, 278, n.1, and Hamilton, 239.

\textsuperscript{102}See Smith, 278, and Hamilton, 239, who believe that the failure to reach a negotiated settlement made Agesilaos' domination inevitable. Since a military solution was once again sought, it was only natural that Sparta should turn to her most successful soldier to achieve it.
CHAPTER VI

THE SECOND PHASE OF THE KORINTHIAN WAR TO THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS (KING'S PEACE)

After Strouthas replaced Tiribazos in Sardis (F392), the angered Spartans recalled Thibron from exile and with Tiribazos' money sent him to Asia Minor.¹ Except for Derkylidas in Abydos (who merely clung to a small Hellespontine area in order to resist Pharnabazos and Konon in 393/92), this was the first offensive against the Persians since Agesilaos had pillaged Pharnabazos' Mysian estates in the winter of 395/94.²

Over the fall and winter of 392/91 Thibron won back Ephesos to the Peloponnesians and made it his headquarters. By springtime he had brought over Magnesia, Priene and other small poleis in the Maiandros valley with an army of 8,000 men. Strouthas, however, had gathered a huge force of over 35,000 and had pitched his camp near that of the Greeks. With his best infantry and horsemen near the Koressos ridge,³ he suddenly attacked the careless and disdainful Thibron whose men had scattered for pillage. Thibron, his athletic flute player,⁴ and most

¹Xen. Hell. 4.8.17-19; Diodorus (14.99.1-3) supplies the numbers.

²See ch. 5.

³Bürchner, RE 11.2, 1392 and 5.2, 2781 with map. The exact location of this hill is unknown.

⁴Xenophon (Hell. 4.8.18) writes that Thibron and Thersandros, his flute player, were having a discus-throwing contest when the Persian
of the Greek army perished in the sudden Persian assault. Some Greeks were taken prisoner, but only a few escaped to safety on the Knidian Chersonese.

The defeat and death of Thibron seriously weakened the Lakedaimonian war effort in Asia Minor. That same spring (391), however, Agesilaos persuaded the ephors to launch an attack on the Argives who, in addition to their partial annexation of Korinth, had gained much in the war at little or no expense. Since the coalition still controlled access to central Greece through the Isthmos (the Peloponnesians had secured the straits of Rhion under Podanemos and Herippidas in the fall of 392), Agesilaos' campaign in the Argolid and Korinthia made excellent strategic sense. He spent most of the spring and summer laying extensive waste to Argive croplands, though he did not attempt to besiege Argos itself. When he discovered that the Korinthians and Athenians had rebuilt the segment of the wall that cavalry overwhelmed them. See Meyer, Vol. 5, 253, Theopomps Hellenika 111-112; Beloch 3.1, 87, and Ehrenberg, RE 6A.1, 274-75. Polyainos (6.10.1) describes how Thibron's athletic flute-player was recruited.

The Spartans did not attempt to recover their losses until the spring of 390, when a delegation of Rhodian exiles arrived in Sparta to ask for help in staging an uprising in their homeland. Ekdikos, the navarch for 391/90, set sail with eight ships and put Kiphridas ashore in Ephesos. Diphridas tried to regain what Thibron had lost in the Maiandros valley and by a stroke of good fortune near Sardis, he captured Strouthas' daughter and her husband whose ransom provided him with enough money to pay his mercenaries for many months. Ekdikos sailed from Ephesos to Samos and finally to Knidos where he was able to gather up the survivors of Thibron's débacle. The Rhodian democrats, despite the oligarchs' toehold on the island, were still in control and had twice as many ships as Ekdikos who chose to remain at Knidos. When his navarchy ended in late summer, Teleutias, no doubt in part because of
Praxitas had demolished the previous summer, he marched from the Argolid through Tena to Lechaion and recaptured this stretch of the walls. At the same time his half-brother, the navarch Teleutias, with twelve ships attacked Lechaion by sea and set fire to the Korinthian shipyards. With the approach of winter, Agesilaos disbanded the Peloponnesian levy and returned to Sparta.

In the spring of 390 Agesilaos again led out the Peloponnesian army. This season, however, the objective was not the Argolid, but the Perachora peninsula. The reason for this choice is three-fold. First, Korinthian exiles had informed the ephors that the city kept its livestock near the town of Perachora in the western region of the peninsula. Second, and more importantly, a successful campaign would virtually assure the Spartans an overland access to their Phokian and Orchomenian allies. It would no longer be necessary to rely solely

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Agesilaos, was named navarch for 390/89. He took the twelve ships at Lechaion, circumnavigated the Peloponnesos, added seven more at Samos and sailed to Knidos to relieve Ekdikos. In early spring 389, he captured ten Athenian triremes sailing to aid Euagoras who, after Konon's death in 391, had revolted again from Artaxerxes. Xenophon (Hell. 4.8.20-24) notes the irony of both the Athenians' and Teleutias' initiatives. See also Diod. 14.97.1-4.

6 See ch. 5.

7 This, of course, occurred before the ephors sent Teleutias to replace Ekdikos at Knidos. Xenophon (Hell. 3.4.19) writes that Eupolia, mother of the navarch and the king, rejoiced that both her sons achieved glory on the same day, one by taking the foes' walls, the other his ships.

8 Xen. Hell. 3.4.19, Ages. 2.17; Diod. 14.97.5; Plut. Ages. 21.1-2. For the events of 391, see also Meyer, Vol. 5, 250, 253 and Beloch, 3.1, 85, 87-88, both with notes.
on the precarious and circuitous approach across the Gulf of Korinth. Finally, Agesilaos would be in a position to drive a wedge between Argos and Korinth, thereby forestalling the momentum of the sympolity begun by the atrocity of 392. Since in Asia Diphridas had achieved merely modest success near Ephesos and Teleutias had secured only Knidos for the Spartans, a decisive coup in Europe would greatly strengthen the Peloponnesians' slight strategic advantage after the collapse of the peace initiatives in 392.

While en route to Perachora, Agesilaos discovered that the Argives and Korinthians were preparing to celebrate the Isthmian games. The Argives in fact had taken charge, but fled to Korinth along the road from Kenchreai as soon as they saw the Peloponnesian column approaching. Rather than pursue the fleeing enemy, Agesilaos decided to remain and offer to Poseidon the unfinished sacrifices that the Argives had abandoned. He then directed the Korinthian exiles to celebrate the games. Later in the year when the Peloponnesians had withdrawn, the Argives celebrated the games again and many of the competitors were proclaimed victors twice.

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9 See ch. 5 for a description of the massacre at the feast of Artemis Eukleia.

10 Kenchreai was the Korinthian port on the Saronic Gulf; see Philippson, RE Vol. 11.2, 167-70.

11 Xen. Hell. 4.5.1-2.
When Agesilaos arrived at Perachora, he discovered that the town was heavily fortified and its defenders commanded by Iphikrates of Rhamnous. In a classic feint, Agesilaos withdrew his troops as if to attack Korinth itself. The citizens in fear of betrayal from within sent an urgent request for help to the garrison at Perachora. Iphikrates accordingly led his peltasts out to defend Korinth and passed the Peloponnesians in the night. Agesilaos now had unopposed access to Perachora and the livestock nearby. He ordered the main body of the army to proceed along the coastal road by the "Hot Springs," but he assigned one mora to advance along the heights of Mt. Geranion to his right.

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12 For a brief discussion of Iphikrates' importance in the history of tactics, see below.

13 The memory of Pasimelos and Alkimenes' cooperation with Praxitas in 392 would still have been quite fresh. See ch. 5. Perachora was also known as Peraion in antiquity; see Meyer, RE 19.2, 564-66 and The Blue Guide to Greece, 252.

14 Ancient Therma (modern Loutraki); the hot springs gush forth at 31°C; see Meyer, RE 5A.2, 2376 and The Blue Guide to Greece, 252.

15 The mora which consisted of 600-900 men was the basic unit of the Spartan army. See Lammert, RE Vol. 16.1, 251-52. The most important ancient references are Thuc. 5.68.3; Xen. Hell. 2.4.31; Lak. Pol. 11.4; Diod. 15.32; and Plut. Pelop. 17.

16 See Philippson, RE 8.1, 1236-37. The highest point is 1370 meters, while the average elevation along the ridge is 800-1000 m.
When night fell, a chill set in, accompanied by rain and high winds. The mora on the Geranion ridge had no means to kindle campfires, so Agesilaos ordered ten men to carry fire in earthen pots to the soldiers on the heights with instructions to light as many fires as possible. When the now depleted defenders in Perachora saw great numbers of campfires on the ridge and in the plain, they assumed that a huge army would soon invest their town and fled in the night to the temple of Hera on the westernmost tip of the peninsula. Once again Agesilaos' understanding of human nature and tactical brilliance were quite in evidence.

By deceiving the Korinthians into summoning Iphikrates and the Perachorans into fleeing their town by night, Agesilaos was able to occupy the nearby fortress of Oinoe without shedding a single drop of blood. When his soldiers had liberally partaken of the captured stores, the army marched out to the Heraion where the Perachorans with their wives, children and livestock had taken refuge. Realizing the futility of resistance, they surrendered to Agesilaos and placed their fate in his hands. He decided to turn over to the Korinthian exiles those who had participated in the massacre two years earlier during the Eukleia festival. All others were to be sold into slavery along with

17 Xenophon (Hellen.4.5.3-5) records that a fire broke out that night in the nearby temple of Poseidon. For this shrine and the two dedicated to Hera on the Perachora peninsula, see Meyer, RE 19.2, 565.

18 This Oinoe should not be confused with the Athenian fortress on the Boiotian frontier some 55 km. to the northeast. See Meyer, RE 17.2, 2236-37, under Oinoe (7).
their animals and possessions.\textsuperscript{19}

The envoys of several \textit{poleis} chanced to be present while the Peloponnesians were disposing of the captives' persons and possessions. Among this group were the Boiotians, who were anxious to treat for peace, since their land now lay exposed to a Spartan invasion. Agesilaos, however, refused even to acknowledge their presence despite an introduction by Pharax, the former navarch and Theban \textit{proxenos} at Sparta. The king contented himself by sitting on a circular block and gazing exultingly at the great welter of prisoners and booty. In addition to his personal grudge against the Thebans, Agesilaos realized that a mere cessation of hostilities between the Boiotians and Peloponnesians would not be sufficient. Harsh chastisement, most probably including dissolution of the Boiotian league, would be required for a peace based on Spartan supremacy in central Greece.

Unfortunately, Agesilaos' complacency in the afterglow of the bloodless military victory and diplomatic snub to the Thebans did not last very long. A messenger from Lechaion arrived with news of the near annihilation of the \textit{mora} assigned to garrison the Korinthians' northern port.\textsuperscript{20} The king hastened past Loutraki (Therma) with his

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 4.5.5-6. Agesilaos by freeing Iphrikrates' men from garrison duty had unwittingly made possible the destruction of the \textit{mora}; see below. This was the only unfortunate consequence of his ruse.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} After Agesilaos had outwitted the Korinthians into summoning Iphikrates from Perachora, the Athenian peltast commander lost little time in plotting a \textit{contre-temps} in revenge. Part of the \textit{mora} in Lechaion consisted of Amyklaians who customarily returned home for the
tent companions and a small bodyguard. Upon arriving in Lechaion, he learned that the bodies of the fallen had been recovered, so he ordered his men to ground arms and rest. The next day they marched back to the Perachora Heraion where Agesilaos commanded that the remaining prisoners and property be sold.\textsuperscript{21}

Agesilaos then summoned the Boiotian legates and asked them why they had come. They now made no mention of peace, but requested safe conduct to Korinth to join their own troops. The king laughed, saying they did not want to see their soldiers, but rather the results of their allies' good fortune.\textsuperscript{22} He offered to escort them personally to the Hyakinthia festival even if they were on campaign. The polemarch thus offered to escort these men to an area about 5 km. south of Sikyon. When the company reached that point, the polemarch, after sending the Amyklaians ahead with a small cavalry detachment, began the march back to Lechaion. Iphikrates, however, had laid an ambush in which his specially trained peltasts, supported by Kallias' Athenian hoplites, would attack the unsuspecting 600 Spartans. By a series of brilliant thrusts and retreats, Iphikrates' peltasts slowly wore down the Spartans' numbers and will. Even the appearance of the horsemen who had escorted the Amyklaians was not enough to retrieve the situation. The Spartan cavalry escaped to Lechaion while the crippled mora occupied a small hill about 370 m. from the sea and 3 km. from Lechaion. The Peloponnesians eventually sent boats to rescue their beleaguered comrades, but Kallias' hoplites killed many of them on the beach and even in the surf as they struggled frantically to reach the boats; Xen. Hell. 4.5.11-18; Plut. Ages 22.2; Paus. 3.10.1; and Nepos, Iphicrates 2.3.

\textsuperscript{21}Xen. Hell. 4.5.7-9; Plut. Ages. 22.1-2.

\textsuperscript{22}Beloch, 3.1, 86; and Grote, Vol. 7, 515, write that this was the most portentious and humiliating defeat inflicted on Spartan hoplites since Sphakteria in 425 B.C. in that it seriously undermined the Spartan reputation for invincibility. Grote, ibid., Hamilton, 284-86 (who perceives a rare dramatic power in Xenophon's description of this defeat and its affect on Agesilaos) and Anderson, Military Theory and Practice, 121-31, also suspect that the figure of 250 dead is low and that Kallias' hoplites played a larger role than Xenophon admits in enhancing the proportions of the mora's defeat.
to see what might follow upon the Athenians' victory. When he reached the area near Korinth, he did not dismantle Iphikrates' trophy, but cut down all remaining fruit trees which, he remarked to the Thebans, produced no sign of resistance from the defenders in the city. He then marched back to Lechaion and sent the Theban legates to the Thespian port of Kreusis. In the wake of the Athenians' victory, Agesilaos departed with the defeated mora after assigning a fresh one to Lechaion. On the homeward march, he led his troops into cities late in the day while setting out very early in the morning. He left Arkadian Orchomenos before dawn in order to pass by Mantineia in the darkness, because the Mantineians were accustomed to rejoice at Spartan misfortunes.

With the dispersal of the main Peloponnesian army, Iphikrates was able to recapture the towns in the Megarid which had fallen to Praxitas two years earlier. The Spartans' control of the Isthmos and access by land to Phokis and Boiotian Orchomenos were once again curtailed. This limited them to conducting harassment of the coalition by sea from Lechaion.

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23 Xen. Hell. 4.5.9-11. Iphikrates' improvement in peltast warfare had far-reaching implications. By 390 B.C. the well-trained and innovatively equipped peltast had become a formidable component of strategy. The ancient evidence for Iphikrates' reforms appears in Diodorus 15.44.2-3; Nepos Iphicrates 1; Polyainos 3.9.17; and Plut. Mor. 187a.

24 Xen. Hell. 4.5.18-19. Xenophon notes that all Spartans mourned the death of those fallen in battle except the families of the deceased. These would paradoxically rejoice in the misfortune since their husbands, sons, and brothers had achieved glory by making the supreme sacrifice for the state (Hell. 4.5.10).

25 Xen. Hell. 4.5.19. Xenophon wrote that after 392 the land
In the spring of 389 an Achaian legation arrived in Sparta to request aid against the Aitolians who with their Athenian and Boiotian allies were attempting to detach Kalydon, a town on the northern shore of the Patraic gulf. Kalydon had originally been Aitolian but since 417 it had been incorporated into the Achaean league. In order to hold the town in the last few years, the Achaians had been compelled to garrison it. The Aitolians' latest harassment provoked the Achaians to seek help from Sparta. The Achaians, whose function in the Peloponnesian alliance was crucial to Sparta, made it clear that they would secede unless the requested aid were provided. Therefore Agesilaos and his supporters easily persuaded the ephors to call out the ban and the king, after assuming command, led the army to Rhion. Before crossing the straits, the army, which consisted of two Lakedaimonian morai and two from allied

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27 As Larsen, 807-08, has shown, since 417 the Achaians were responsible for controlling the straits of Rhion which separated the Patraic and Korinthian Gulfs and guaranteed access to central and northern Greece for the Peloponnesians when often, as in the Korinthian War, the Isthmos was in hostile hands.

28 Xen. Hell. 4.6.1-3.
poleis, was joined by the full levy of Achaians. When the Peloponnesian force arrived in the vicinity of Kalydon, the Akarnanians withdrew to the safety of their walled towns and sequestered their livestock in the more rugged and inaccessible regions of their land near the Ambrakiote Gulf.

Agesilaos sent heralds to the Akarnanian capital Stratos to inform the citizens that unless they abandoned their alliance with the Athenians and Boiotians, the Peloponnesian army would lay waste to their land section by section. When the Akarnanian assembly rejected these terms, Agesilaos began making good on his threat.29

The Peloponnesians cut and burned the Akarnanian croplands so thoroughly that the army's advance was only about 2.2 km. daily. This lulled the Akarnanians into a false sense of security which in turn induced them to bring most of their animals down from the mountains while continuing the tillage of land unscathed by the invaders. Aware that his ruse had succeeded, Agesilaos suddenly advanced almost 30 km. in a single day on the fifteenth or sixteenth day from his crossing at Rhion. He arrived at the southern shores of Lake Ambrakia at the foot of a ridge to the east where the Akarnanians had gathered their herds. The swiftness of the march stunned the defenders, allowing the Peloponnesians to capture nearly all the horses, cattle and sheep along with many prisoners. On the next day Agesilaos held a public sale of

29 Xen. Hell. 4.6.3-4.
The Akarnanians did not give up. They dispatched a force of peltasts whose harassment from the heights was so effective that the Peloponnesians were forced with some losses to descend into the plain. During the night the peltasts departed and Agesilaos began his withdrawal the following day. As the Peloponnesians marched with the lake on one side and the spurs of the ridge on the other, the peltasts suddenly reappeared to press their attack. Agesilaos realized that he could advance no farther because of the intensity of the Akarnanians' assault. Accordingly, he ordered his hoplites and cavalry, after drawing the enemy out, to counterattack before they could retreat to the safety of the ridge. When the Lakedaimonians pressed their attack to the ridge, they encountered the Akarnanian hoplites in battle formation.

The Akarnanian hoplites stood their ground against the Lakedaimonian cavalry, but gave way to the Spartan hoplites. After erecting a trophy on the flanks of the ridge, Agesilaos continued his withdrawal to the southeast. As the army approached the Lake Trichonis region, the king again pillaged and burned extensively. At the

30Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.5-6. See Klaffenbach, *RE* 7A.1, 89-90, for a map of the region of Trichonis and the western lake called Lysimacheia. Hirschfeld, *RE* 1.1, 1151, discusses the topography of Akarnania. Oberhummer, *RE* 13.1, 707, describes the area of the modern Lake Ambrakia and the ridge on its eastern shores as the site of Agesilaos' sudden coup in 389. This region was known as Limnaia in antiquity and lies some 30 km. northwest of the fertile area of the Acheloos plain between Lakes Lysimacheia and Trichonis. See also *The Blue Guide to Greece*, 457-58, where Agesilaos' campaign is misdated to 391.

insistence of the Achaians, he attempted to reduce some of the walled towns, including Stratos, but met with no success. At the approach of autumn, Agesilaos wanted to break off the campaign until the following spring. The Achaians, believing that he had accomplished nothing since not a single town had surrendered, wanted him to stay to hinder the Akarnanians’ fall planting. Agesilaos, however, thought this unwise, because the more the Akarnanians planted in the fall, the more they would have to lose the next summer.

The army approached Rhion through rugged Aitolian mountains unmolested because the Aitolians hoped that Agesilaos would help them regain Naupaktos, as he had aided the Achaians in securing Kalydon. While the Peloponnesians were crossing over to Rhion, Athenian triremes (which had sailed down the Acheloos river from Oiniadai) harassed them from the Patraic side of the straits, but could not prevent their safe passage.

In early spring 388, Agesilaos again gathered the Peloponnesian army to fulfill his pledge to the Achaians. As he had surmised some months earlier, the Akarnanians sent legates to Sparta with an offer to conclude a peace. They joined the Peloponnesian alliance when they learned of the preparations for another invasion of their land. They

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32 Xen. Hell. 4.6.12.
33 Xen. Hell. 4.6.13.
34 Xen. Hell. 4.6.14.
reasoned that even in the safety of their walled towns, they would in effect be under siege if Spartans were to destroy their crops. The Lakedaimonians accepted their terms and peace was thereby concluded. 35

With the successful conduct of this campaign, it became clear that Agesilaos had gained the upper hand in Lakedaimonian politics and was gradually becoming the most powerful and influential figure in the state. His rivalry with Antalkidas and the supporters of Lysander was not fully resolved, but the outlines of his plan for a Spartan hagemony in European Greece were now clearly emerging. 36

In addition, Agesilaos' Akarnanian campaign guaranteed Spartan access through Rhion to central Greece, the loyalty of the Achaians and friendly relations with Arkadia and Aitolia.

**Agesipolis in Argos: The Aegean and Hellespontine Struggle**

Although Agesilaos and his younger brother Teleutias had enjoyed a great deal of success in the summer of 391 at Lechaion, the shocking blow to Spartan prestige inflicted by Iphikrates in 390 had emboldened the Argives. Before Agesilaos and Teleutias solidified their hold on Lechaion, 37 the king in 391 had ravaged Argive croplands, but

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35 Xen. Hell. 4.7.1. A synopsis of this campaign also appears in Plut. Ages. 22.5 and Polyainos 2.1.10.


37 Praxitas, harmost of Sikyon, in collusion in 392 with the pro-Spartan Korinthians, Pasimelos and Alkimenes from within Korinth had provided the first chance for the Spartans to break the coalition's grip on the Isthmos. See ch. 5.
his absence in 389 after the Athenians' slaughter of the mora offered the Argives an opportunity to complete their sympolity with Korinth. In spite of the embarrassment caused by the loss of the mora to Iphikrates and Chabrias, the Spartans had seriously weakened the coalition's control of the Isthmos by the time of Agesilaos' Akarnanian venture in 389. In the absence of Sparta's most formidable leader, the Argives decided to act. They launched a full-scale attack on Korinth, occupied the city and surrounding area except Lechaion, removed the boundary stones, and simply referred to Korinth as "Argos." 38

Thus in 388, after the Akarnanians joined the Peloponnesian alliance, the time had come once again to chastise the Argives. Although they still held Lechaion, the Spartans' gains in the Isthmos were at risk. Since Agesilaos had been able to avoid a second invasion of Akarnania, the ephors instead called out the ban against Argos, placing

38 Xen. Hell. 4.4.6; Diod. 14.91.2-9.2.1. As noted in ch. 5, Xenophon's account of the coup in Korinth of 392 (Hell. 4.4.2-5) seems to compress the two-stage assimilation of the city by the Argives into a single season. The actual completion of the sympolity is much more likely to have occurred in 389 when the Argives could seize on Sparta's preoccupation in Akarnania to garrison Korinth and forestall any further attempt at internal disruption by pro-Spartan oligarchs. It was precisely this fear of betrayal from within which led the panicky democrats to summon Iphikrates from Perachora in 390 when Agesilaos' army suddenly turned back from the Geranion ridge toward the city. Thus Hell. 4.4.6 belongs not to 392, but 389. Similarly Diodorus' discussion, while preserving the proper sequence of events (14.86.1 and 14.91-92), is hopelessly muddled chronologically, since he dates the democratic coup and the Argive invasion to 394 and 393 respectively. For an excellent reconstruction of the very difficult chronology of these years, see Hamilton, 269-70, who bases his argument on Griffith, "The Union of Corinth and Argos," Historia, 1 (1950), 236-56.
the young king Agesipolis in command. Because of the Argive occupation of Korinth, the Spartans reasoned that war against Athens and Boiotia was dangerous when an unmolested hostile polis lay on their borders. Because the Argives were in the habit of pleading "holy truces" to avoid invasion (except for Agesilaos' incursion in 391, this technique had evidently been effective), Agesipolis consulted with Zeus at Olympia and Apollo at Delphi before invading the Argolid. Since both gods responded favorably, the young king went ahead. He succeeded in penetrating as far as the city's walls and plundered extensively before unfavorable omens and sacrifices at the end of the summer induced him to withdraw.

While Agesilaos, Teleutias and Agesipolis were securing the Spartans' access to central Greece through Rhion and trying to regain access at the Isthmos, the warring parties were not idle in the Aegean and the Hellespont. Because of Konon's success, Pharnabazos' support in 394/93 and the failure of Antalkidas and Tiribazos to conclude a Sparto-Persian peace in 392, many people in Athens began to work

Since his father Pausanias chose exile at Tegea in 395/94 after the fiasco at Haliartos, the Spartans appointed a regent to serve in his place (see ch. 5). Because this was his first field command in a war which had lasted for seven years by 388, Agesipolis must have become king (i.e. reached the age of 30) in his own right either this year or in 389.

Xen. Hell. 4.7.2-7. Meyer, Vol. 5, 266, and Beloch 3.1, 94, date this incursion to 387 to coincide with Antalkidas' mission to Sousa and the Peloponnesian offensive by land and sea in the Hellespont. Niese, RE 1.1, 805, is non-committal, suggesting either 388 or 387. Hertzberg, 118, dates the incursion to 390 since he accepts the chronology of Diodorus. Grote, Vol. 7, 519-22, and Hamilton, 288, assume that Xenophon's narrative is continuous and take 388 after the Akarnanian settlement as more likely.
openly at least for a partial revival of her maritime realm.\textsuperscript{41} In spite of Antalkidas' ultimate failure to mollify Artaxerxes, such neo-imperialism can not have received much encouragement when the pro-Spartan Tiribazos arrested Konon. Konon's release by Strouthas eased concern at Athens, but the navarch's death in Kypros some months later (391) led to the ascendancy of the moderate Thrasyboulos.\textsuperscript{42}

After Ekdikos and Teleutias had secured Knidos in the summer of 390 to help the pro-Spartan uprising in Rhodes,\textsuperscript{43} Teleutias captured ten Athenian triremes sailing to aid Euagoras' revolt against the king.\textsuperscript{44} Despite Teleutias' modest success at Knidos in giving the pro-Spartan oligarchs a Rhodian toehold and Agesilaos' campaigns in Perachora and Akarnania, some Athenians believed that the Spartans were too weak to resist Athenian expansion in the Aegean.\textsuperscript{45} This group also feared a

\textsuperscript{41}Some early evidence for this assertion appears in Tod, GHI 2, 28-29; and Bengtson, Staatsverträge 2, 176-177. By 390 this activity was indisputable; see Bengtson, 182-84.

\textsuperscript{42}See Clochê, La Politique Étrangère d'Athènes de 404 à 338 a.C., 20; Perlman, "Athenian Democracy and the Revival of Imperialist Expansion at the Beginning of the Fourth Century B.C." CP, 63 (1968), 262; and Hamilton, 289-91.

\textsuperscript{43}See ch. 6, footnote 5. The chronology for these years is muddled, as Beloch, 3.1, 87-88, and Meyer, Vol. 5, 254, n.1, have shown, but a good reconstruction is obtainable by considering the Spartan navarchs. Thus Podanemos and Herippidas 393/92, Teleutias 392/91, Ekdikos 391/90, and Teleutias 390/89 all served as chiefs of the Spartan navy.

\textsuperscript{44}As Meyer, Vol. 5, 258, has shown, this occurred in early 389. For Athens' treaty with Euagoras, see Bengtson, Staatsverträge 2, 182.

\textsuperscript{45}The resounding success of Chabrias and Iphikrates against the Spartan mora in 390 undoubtedly bolstered Athenian confidence.
revival of Spartan naval strength and wished to dislodge Derkyldas from Sestos and Abydos. The two most prominent leaders of this faction were Ergokles and Thrasyboulos who induced the assembly to authorize construction of forty ships. Thrasyboulos intended to help the Rhodian democrats, but before sailing to Rhodes he needed money, allies and mercenary support. He, therefore, composed civil strife between the Odryssian Amadokos and the Thracian Seuthes who then allied themselves to Athens. In Byzantion, after overthrowing the oligarchy, he sold the right to collect the five percent shipping tax to the popular leaders. The Chalkedonians, opposite Byzantion in Asia, now also came over to his side. He then sailed to Lesbos where he led the Mytilenians against Methymna. After the Spartan harmost Therimachos fell in battle, most of the Lesbian poleis came over to Thrasyboulos. Those that did not he plundered for money to hire mercenaries.

Before making a landing in Rhodes, Thrasyboulos sailed around the coast

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46 These Hellespontine straits, of course, controlled the Euxine grain route; see Lysias 22. Derkyldas had been harmost there since July of 394. See ch. 5.

47 Xen. Hell. 4.8.26; Diod. 14.94.2; see Bengtson, Staatsverträge 2, 185-87.

48 Xen. Hell. 4.8.28-30; also Diodorus (14.94.3-4) writes that a storm sank twenty-three of Thrasyboulos' ships off Ephesos before he led the uprising on Lesbos. The speeches of Lysias (nos. 19.22, 27, 28, and 29) and Aristophanes' Ekklesiazousai 814-18, which date to 391-87 B.C., make it clear that the Athenian treasury was almost depleted, which made Thrasyboulos' gathering of booty essential. See also Grote, Vol. 7, 529-30; Beloch, 3.1, 90-92; Meyer, Vol. 5, 259-61; Hamilton, 295.
northwest of Kypros. He had been hiring mercenaries while increasing his fleet strength all along, but because of an ill-advised raid by his men, the Aspendians fell upon his camp one night and killed him in his tent (spring 388 B.C.). The Athenians sent Agyrrios to replace him when they learned of his death.

Because Derkylidas had been ineffective against Athenian resurgence in the Hellespont, the Spartans replaced him with Anaxibios, who arrived at Abydos with three triremes and money to hire 1,000 mercenaries. The Athenians that same spring (388) countered by sending Iphikrates with eight ships and 1,200 men. After some indecisive

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49See Ruge, RE 6.1, 1334; today the Kopru-Su. The Eurymedon estuary, of course, was the site of Kimon's victory over the Persians in 466 B.C. The ruins of Aspendos lie near modern Serik.

50Xen. Hell. 4.8.30; Diod. 14.99.4-5; Nepos, Thrasyb. 4.4 and Aristophanes' Ploutos 550, the production of which in the spring of 388 fixes the time of Thrasyboulos' death; see Meyer, Vol. 5, 259, n.1, and 261.

51Xen. Hell. 4.8.31; ironically the Athenians had ordered Thrasyboulos and his comrades back to Athens to stand trial. As Lysias' orations 28 and 29 and Demosth. 19.180 show, Ergokles, Nikophemos and Aristophanes were condemned to death and Pamphilos, who had failed on Aigina (see below), was fined. The basic reason for these things was that Thrasyboulos and his demagogues were seriously undermining Athenian relations with Persia and draining the treasury.

52Anaxibios had much experience in the Hellespont as navarch in 400 B.C.; Xen. Anab. 6.1.16, 7.1.3, 11, 20,36, 7.2.5, 8. See also Judeich, RE 1.2, 2082.

53Iphikrates had left Korinth the previous summer (389) after the Argive incursion. Xenophon (Hell. 4.8.34) writes that he went home to Athens because the Argives said they did not need him any more after he killed some Korinthian Argolizers. Diodorus (14.92.1-2) states that
skirmishes, Anaxibios grew careless and was killed in an ambush near Kremaste while returning from Antandros. Iphikrates' peltasts had killed 12 Spartan officers and over 250 other Peloponnesians and Abydenes. With Derkylidas' departure and Anaxibios' death, the Athenians were firmly in control of the grain route and the tide in the Hellespont seemed to be turning against the Spartans (summer 388).

The Struggle on Aigina

Spartan fortunes, however, were not entirely black, as during the previous summer they had undertaken a campaign of piracy against the Athenians from Aigina. The Athenian response was to send Pamphilos, who blockaded the island with ten ships and landed a hoplite force. After completing his collection of tribute in the islands, Teleutias hastened to the Aiginetans' aid. He drove off the Athenian ships, but Pamphilos had built a fortress and continued his depredations by land. At the end of the summer, Hierax replaced Teleutias, who sailed home.

the Athenians recalled him because he wished to seize power in Korinth for himself. Hamilton, 296-97, believes Diodorus' explanation is more likely since the Athenians would not wish to antagonize their Argive allies, while conducting operations in the Aegean and Hellespont.

Xen. Hell. 4.8.35-39. See also Grote, Vol. 7, 535; Beloch, 3.1, 92; Meyer, Vol. 5, 265-66; and Hamilton, 297, all of whom observe that while the Athenians were in full control of Hellespontine shipping, the Spartans were confined to Sestos and Abydos.

Xenophon (Hell. 5.1.1-4) writes that, although Teleutias faced no great danger or loss during his second tenure as navarch and effected no clever ruse, he had been immensely popular with his men. This according to Xenophon is the true test of a commander's worth.
Hierax placed his adjutant (ἐπιστολεύς) Gorgopas in command of twelve ships at Aigina, while he sailed to Rhodes. Gorgopas quickly reduced Pamphilos to a state of siege which moved the Athenians to outfit a fleet for the rescue of their beleaguered hoplites. After only four months, the Spartans under Gorgopas were free again to continue their piracy against Athenian shipping in the Saronic Gulf (autumn 389). 56

In the spring of 388, the Athenians outfitted thirteen ships under Eunomos to resist the Spartans' piracy. That this measure was necessary 57 despite severe depletion of the city's finances is abundantly clear from the testimony in Lysias' prosecution of the grain dealers. 58 In the fall of 388, Antalkidas replaced Hierax as navarch. He put into Rhodes with the entire fleet, but sent Gorgopas (Hierax's adjutant) back to Aigina with his original twelve ships. 59 The new navarch then appointed his own adjutant Nikolochos commander of the

56 Xen. Hell. 5.1.1-5. Eteonikos was the previous commander.

57 Xen. Hell. 5.1.5. The campaigns of Thrasyboulos and Iphikrates in the Hellespont in 389-88 were simultaneous with those of Pamphilos and Eunomos in the Saronic Gulf; see above.

58 See Lysias 22.8 especially for a price-fixing conspiracy in a period of scarce supplies in the winter of 388-87: also Meyer, Vol. 5, 262-63 with notes.

59 This was likely a reward for Gorgopas' effectiveness against Pamphilos' Athenians in autumn 389.
remaining twenty-five ships, ordering him to sail to the relief of the beleaguered Abydenes. 60

Early in 387, Nikolochos' twenty-five ships reduced Tenedos, plundered it and put into Abydos. The Athenians countered this move by assembling thirty-two ships from the northern Aegean and Hellespont. They then blockaded Nikolochos at Abydos. 61

In the Saronic Gulf, Gorgopas had managed to capture four of Eunomos' triremes the previous fall (388) in a daring pursuit and battle off Cape Zoster by moonlight. He thereby reduced the Athenian fleet strength in this area to a mere nine vessels for the winter of 388-87. 62 Gorgopas' success, however, was cut short because of Euagoras' request for help which moved the Athenians to dispatch Chabrias with ten ships in the spring of 387. 63 Before sailing to Kypros, he put in at Aigina where he laid an ambush for Gorgopas' men and the Aiginetans. Gorgopas and 350 others died in the struggle and because the remaining

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60 Xen. Hell. 5.1.6; this of course means that the entire Peloponnesian fleet numbered only thirty-seven vessels in the winter of 288-87, a remarkable contrast to the 120 triremes afloat ten years earlier (see chs. 3 and 4). It is also mute, but eloquent testimony to the Spartans' depleted resources.

61 Xen. Hell. 5.1.7.

62 Xen. Hell. 5.1.8-9.

63 Xen. Hell. 5.1.10. As noted before, Euagoras had revolted from the Great King about a year after Konon's death. At the time he had requested and obtained an alliance with Athens (390 B.C.). Agesilaos' brother Teleutias, who was navarch in 390/89, captured the first ten ships sent by the Athenians to help their Kypriote friend and benefactor. See Xen. Hell. 4.8.24 and Bengtson, Staatsverträge 2, 182.
Peloponnesians and Aiginetans refused to serve under Eteonikos without pay, the Athenians again controlled the Saronic Gulf.

By the early summer of 387, with the single exception of Thrasyboulos' death near Aspendos in 388, Athenian fortunes seemed to be better than ever on the surface. Iphikrates' ambush near Kremaste had caused the death of more than 250 Spartan allies and Anaxibios, who had replaced Derkylidas as harmost in Abydos (388). Antalkidas' adjutant Nikolochos had blundered into a blockade at Abydos in the spring of 387 and shortly thereafter Chabrias' trick on Aigina had broken the ephors' two years of piracy in the Saronic Gulf. Because of the treaties with Akoris of Egypt in 389 and Euagoras in 390, the Athenians seemed to be assured of ships and grain in their struggle against Sparta, even if the treasury was dangerously depleted. The reasons for the failure of Athens and her coalition allies to bring the Spartans (whose fiscal resources were also near exhaustion) to their knees must be sought in Sardis and Sousa.

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64 Eteonikos commanded the Spartan force on Aigina in 389 when Pamphilos' troops first landed. He was aided by the arrival of Teleutias from Rhodes, see Xen. Hell. 5.1.1-2.

65 Xen. Hell. 5.1.11-13.

66 For these treaties with rebellious subjects of the Great King, see Bengtson, Staatsverträge 2, 182-84.

67 That the Spartans were resolved to harass Athenian shipping in the Saronic Gulf even though their sailors on Aigina refused to serve under Eteonikos without pay is clear from Xenophon's testimony. The Hellenika (5.1.13-24) recounts the brilliant nocturnal raid on the Peiraeus and coastal piracy off Attica which Teleutias undertook in order to obtain booty and pay for the sullen sailors. Because this
The Diplomatic Navarchy of Antalkidas and the King's Peace.

While Agesipolis was in the Argolid and Anaxibios was wrangling with Iphikrates in the Hellespont, a profound change occurred in the Persian attitude to the Greeks. Because of the rising tide of Athenian neo-imperialism marked by attempts to win over former Aegean allies and undisguised aid to rebellious Persian subjects, the Great King decided to replace the pro-Athenian Strouthas in Sardis with Antalkidas' friend Tiribazos. As noted above, after extending Gorgopas' command in Aigina and placing his adjutant Nikolochos in charge of the remaining Peloponnesian ships, Antalkidas travelled to Sousa to curry favor with Tiribazos and the Great King.68 Tiribazos, with whom Antalkidas had become friendly during the failed peace of 392, supported the navarch's position vigorously. This time Artaxerxes was persuaded that Persian and Spartan interests had coalesced because of the hostile behavior of Athens.69 He, therefore, concluded a peace with the Spartans and sent Tiribazos to Sardis to replace Strouthas and to help occurred during Antalkidas' navarchy in spring 387, Agesilaos' influence most likely lay behind the decision to send Teleutias to continue Gorgopas' earlier good work.

68Fall and winter 388-87; see Xen. Hell. 5.1.6.

69Meyer, Vol. 5, 265-66; Beloch 3.1, 89; and Hamilton, 298, all note that Athens' aggressively independent foreign policy since 392 had eroded any basis for cooperation with Persia. Beloch in fact observes that the aid to Euagoras and Akoris had placed Athens in a virtual state of war with the Great King.
Antalkidas bring Athens to heel. The Spartans also requested aid from Dionysios I of Syracuse whom they had helped in 396. With the twenty Syracusan ships and some twenty-five from Daskyleion, Antalkidas' naval strength stood at over eighty ships. The Spartan navarch quickly proved himself the equal in tactical cunning to Agesilaos' brother Teleutias. He was able to split the Athenian fleet in the Hellespont and break the blockade at Abydos where his adjutant Nikolochos had been trapped with twenty-seven ships.

70 At the same time another close friend of Tiribazos named Ariobarzanes took charge of the Daskyleion satrapy while Pharnabazos travelled to Sousa to marry Apame, one of Artaxerxes' daughters. In addition to fulfilling one of his satrap's long desired hopes (see chs. 3 and 4), the Great King eliminated the last influential Persian supporter of Athens, thereby isolating Iphikrates and the Athenian navarch Diotimos near Abydos. See Xen. Hell. 5.1.28 and Plut. Artax. 27.

71 For this aid to the beleaguered tyrant some nine years earlier, see ch. 4 and Diod. 14.63.4.

72 Xen. Hell. 5.1.28. The Athenians had failed to detach the Syracusans from Sparta in 393, as Sparto-Syracusan ties going back to 414 B.C. prevailed (see Bengtson, Staatsverträge 2, 137-38). For Athens' approach to Syracuse in 393, see Tod GHI 2, no. 108 and Lysias 19.9.

73 He isolated Iphikrates' eight ships at Chalkedon and his Syracusan ally Polyxenos caused Thrasyboulos of Kollytos (not to be confused with his more famous namesake who had died a year before; see Schwahn, RE 6A.1, 575, under Thrasyboulos(6)) to abandon the western approach to the Hellespont. Thus Thrasyboulos' eight ships were captured by an ingenious feint which also lured away enough of the thirty-two triremes blockading Abydos to permit Nikolochos to break free. See Xen. Hell. 5.1.25-28.
operations from Aigina and Antalkidas' recovery of the Hellespont with Persian help, the Athenians realized that they had no hope of successfully prosecuting the war. The Lakedaimonians, if pressed, could reduce Athens to starvation as Lysander had in the winter of 405/04, since Antalkidas had closed off the Euxine sources. Similarly, Teleutias could intercept any Egyptian grain from his base on Aigina. By early summer, therefore, the Athenians were prepared to sue for peace.

None of the other members of the anti-Spartan coalition was any more eager to keep up hostilities. The Argives could no longer plead "sacred truces" to avoid Spartan pillage of the Argolid. Because the Korinthians had been subsumed into Argos, their policy naturally coincided with that of the Argives with the exception of those who bitterly resented the Argive occupation of their homeland. Although the Thebans had contributed little to the war for some years, they still faced harassment from Sparta's Phokian allies and the harmost in Boiotian Orchomenos. Even the Spartans, who clearly enjoyed the advantage, were weary of the struggle. They had maintained garrisons at Orchomenos and Lechaion, while keeping watch over wavering or disloyal allies at great expense. Their recent inability to pay the soldiers and sailors on Aigina and the fact that they could barely keep forty ships in service are eloquent testimony to their fiscal exhaustion. When Tiribazos invited the belligerents to assemble in Sardis,

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74 At the outbreak of the war in 395, the fleet strength stood at 120 ships, ninety in Asia Minor and thirty in Sicily. The financial
all came to hear the formal announcement of the Sparto-Persian alliance and the terms on which the Great King would make peace with the other Greeks. 75

**Agesilaos, Antalkidas and the King's Peace**

When the envoys of the several poleis had convened at the satrapal residence in Sardis, Tiribazos read them the text of the Sparto-Persian treaty and terms for the settlement. The Greek cities in Asia were to remain tributary to Artaxerxes. All other Greek poleis, large or small, were to be autonomous except Skyros, Lemnos and Imbros which would remain under Athenian control. Finally, Artaxerxes promised together with those faithful to the treaty to bring the full might of the Persian empire to bear against any polis rejecting it. 76 Having heard these rather lugubrious terms, 77 the

and physical depletion of all Greek poleis by early summer 387 is noted by Grote, Vol. 7, 547-48; Beloch, 3.1, 94-95; Meyer, Vol. 5, 268-69; and Hamilton, 311-312.

75 Bengtson, *Staatsverträge* 2, 188-92, has compiled a complete listing of all ancient references to the terms of the peace as laid down in Sardis by Tiribazos. Xenophon's *Hell.* 5.1.31) account is clearly the best and most detailed.

76 Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31; Diod. 14.110.3; Plut. *Ages.* 23.1-5.

77 Diodorus (14.110.4) records that the Athenians, Thebans and some other Greeks found the treaty’s first clause, which abandoned the Asian Greeks to the Great King, repulsive.
coalition's envoys had only to report to their home poleis and reconvene in Sparta during the winter (387/86) for formal ratification.

With the adjournment of the conference in Sardis, one might well ask why Agesilaos, an adversary of Antalkidas and fiercely opposed in 392 to surrendering the Asian Greeks, would allow precisely such a thing for the sake of peace with Persia in 387. The answer must be sought in several areas. The most important reason for his change of heart was the growing difficulty of waging a war on two fronts. The Peloponnesian alliance simply did not have the resources, human or fiscal, to defeat the coalition and keep the Asian Greeks free. When Agesilaos left Sestos in 394 he promised to return to Asia Minor as soon as matters were settled in Europe. At Koroneia, though he controlled the field, he unfortunately failed to detach Boiotia from the coalition. Also his brother-in-law's naval disaster near Knidos prevented the Spartans from containing subsequent Athenian expansion in the Aegean. Finally the gradual Argive-Korinthian sympolity (392-89), despite his and Teleutias' best efforts near Lechaion, severely limited Spartan access to central Greece through the Isthmos. All of these things combined to make an inglorious and desultory war of attrition inevitable. A second concern surfaced

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78 Plut. Ages. 23, Mor. 213b.

79 See ch. 5.
with Chabrias' and Iphikrates' annihilation of the mora near Sikyon in 390: not only did Sparta have to contend with hostile Greeks and Persians, but there were growing indications of recalcitrance within her own alliance.\(^80\) A third reason for Agesilaos' change of heart, however reluctant, was the strong resistance to his influence and the war against Persia from the supporters of Antalkidas.\(^81\) In 392 Agesilaos had been able to prevail because of the Athenian refusal to cede the Asian Greeks and Artaxerxes' anger at Spartan depredations at Knidos, Ephesos and Abydos. In 388 Sparta's sinking fortunes in Asia Minor and the Athenian naval revival, which now irritated Artaxerxes more than the Spartans' toeholds at Abydos and Knidos, forced Agesilaos to concede that Antalkidas was correct. The Spartans would either have to surrender the Asian Greeks for peace with the Persians or yield to the hostile coalition in Europe. As painful and distressing as it must have been to him, Agesilaos chose to preserve Spartan security at home at the cost of reneging on his promise in 394

\(^80\) Agesilaos was compelled to lead the survivors of the defeated mora home with caution to avoid exposing them to ridicule, especially from the Mantineians (Xen. Hell. 4.5.18). Also the Phliasians refused to allow any Spartans into their city until Iphikrates inflicted a sudden defeat on them near their own walls (Xen. Hell. 4.4.15); see also Legon, "Phlian Politics and Policy in the Early Fourth Century B.C." Historia 16 (1967), 325-26. During these same years (391-89) the Spartans resented their allies' cowardice in battle against Iphikrates' peltasts (Hell. 4.4.17).

\(^81\) Didymos 7.19; Plut. Artax. 21; see also Meyer, Vol. 5, 265, n.2; Smith, "The Opposition to Agesilaos' Foreign Policy, 394-371 B.C.," Historia 2 (1954), 274, believes that Antalkidas and the king cooperated in 392, but Plutarch's testimony (Ages. 23) and Isokrates' Archidamos (11-12) make this highly unlikely.
at Sestos. 82

The ratification of the peace in Sparta during the winter was not without its stormy moments. The autonomy clause provoked resentment among the Argives and their democratic supporters in Korinth. Similarly, the Thebans bitterly resented Agesilaos' insistence that all members of the Boiotian league sign individually. Theban reluctance eventually collapsed, however, when Agesilaos threatened to declare war. Also the Argives, facing a similar threat, withdrew from Korinth. The Spartans restored the oligarchs, thereby ending the Korinthian experience with democracy. The Korinthian democrats fled into exile in fear for their lives and an oligarchic Korinth rejoined the Peloponnesian alliance. 83

When these matters were settled early in 386 B.C., the Greek world after eight years of warfare was again at peace. The anti-Spartan coalition had been dissolved. With the reluctant cooperation

82 See Wilcken, 12, and Hamilton 307, n.27. Meyer, Vol. 5, 265, n.2, also believes that by 388 Agesilaos reluctantly agreed to lay aside his differences with Antalkidas to secure the best settlement possible for Sparta. He obviously knew that the European situation was much more threatening than the Asian.

83 Xen. Hell. 5.1.32-36. Xenophon is completely silent about Agesilaos' change of heart by 387 and only briefly discusses Antalkidas' brilliant diplomacy in Sousa. Wilcken, 17-18, and Hamilton, 316, n.56, quite plausibly suggest that the reason for his reticence is that the terms of the Sparto-Persian peace (which made the general settlement possible) reflected poorly on Agesilaos who had promised to defend the Asian Greeks' autonomy. That Agesilaos could insist so vehemently on a literal interpretation of the autonomy clause against the Thebans and Argives attests to the effectiveness of his rival. Antalkidas' persuasion of the Great King to include a threat of force against any polis resisting the peace, thereby making Agesilaos' bellicosity possible.
of Agesilaos and Antalkidas the Lakedaimonians had achieved three things: they brought Korinth back into their own alliance, they dissolved the Boiotian league and they humiliated once again their ancient enemies, the Argives. Because of the navarch's diplomacy and the king's change of heart, the Spartans had regained full access to the Isthmos and were poised under Agesilaos to extend their hegemony throughout European Greece. 84

Artaxerxes' gain from the peace is apparent. The Persians would now be free to bring their rebellious subjects in Kypros and Egypt to heel while the Spartan hegemony in Europe would preclude the formation of any hostile coalitions in Greece. See Justin 6.6.1-3; and Diod. 14.111. Olmstead, History of the Persian Empire, 395, suggests that Xerxes had failed!

84 Ryder, Koine Eirene, 36, rightly observes that the major role played by the Persians in the settlement of 387/86 means that it cannot be considered a true κοινή εἰρήνη. This is so because the peace was not forged on a basis of common interest among the Greeks. See also Wilcken, 18-19; Hamilton, 316-18; Meyer, Vol. 5, 269; and Beloch, 3.1, 95-96. On the subject of Agesilaos' change of heart and European Greek attitudes to their compatriots in Asia, Seager and Tuplin, "The Freedom of the Greeks of Asia," JHS, 100 (1980), 141-54, believe that it was during the period of Spartan intervention from 400-387 that the notion of the Asian Greeks as a collective entity first arose. Wesenberg, "Agesilaos im Artemision," ZPE, 41 (1981), 175-180, suggests that the Ephesians tried to scratch Agesilaos' name off the column base in the restored temple some time after 386 because the Spartans had abandoned them to Artaxerxes.
CHAPTER VII

AGESILAOS AND SPARTA'S HEGEMONY IN GREECE, 386-382 B.C.

The most significant result of the King's Peace in Europe was that it redounded greatly to the advantage of the Spartans.¹ In Asia, the Persians realized a long-term goal of their foreign policy. The peace dictated by Artaxerxes and Sparta explicitly stated that the Greeks of the Aegean seaboard were to be possessions of the Great King.² The Persians could now direct their energies in the West to the suppression of revolts in Egypt³ and Kypros.⁴ After nearly a decade and a half, they had finally ridden the northwestern satrapies of the Spartans' irritating and injurious presence, while simultaneously freeing a great pool of mercenaries for the campaigns against Akoris and Euagoras.⁵ The other Greeks of Europe and the Aegean gained little or nothing from the peace which gave Sparta a nearly free hand to consolidate her power on either side of the Isthmos of Korinth. In


²Xen. Hell. 5.1.31; see also Bengtson's complete collection of references to the peace, Staatsverträge 2, 188-93.

³Isok. 4. 140; Demosth. Contra Lept. 76; Nepos Chabrias 2.1; Justin 6.6.3.

⁴Isok. 4.162, Euag. 62; Diod. 15.2.3.

⁵As Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, Oxford, 1933, 1-57, has
marked contrast, however, to their earlier purpose, the Spartans under the leadership of Antalkidas and a reluctant Agesilaos surrendered the Asian Greeks to the Persians. 6

With the conclusion of the peace in early 386, the dissolution of the Argive-Korinthian symphony and the fragmentation of the Boiotian league, Agesilaos stood poised to enhance Sparta's position as προστάτης of the πανσώμον of the Greek world in Europe and the Aegean. 7 To secure his grip in Boiotia, Agesilaos restored the Plataians to their home town which an earlier generation of Spartans had destroyed, thus forcing the inhabitants to flee to Athens. 8 He continued the occupation of Boiotian Orchomenos by a garrison and

shown, there was a dramatic surge in the number and variety of mercenaries during the Peloponnesian War. After 404 B.C., such figures as Klearchos of Sparta, Koiratadas of Thebes, Chabrias and Iphikrates of Athens elevated mercenaries to an importance equal or surpassing that of the citizen hoplite. With the exception of Agesilaos' innovative use of cavalry (see ch. 4), the Spartans were the only ones to make no significant advances in mercenary-warfare. The chief reasons for the rise of the mercenary were impoverishment attendant upon warfare, the decline of agriculture and overpopulation. See Isok. 4.167, 5.122; and Diod. 14.23.4.

6 It is ironic that the Asian Greeks, whose dreams of autonomy were dashed by the settlement of 386, entered into a period of great material prosperity. The off-shore islands also experienced a resurgence of material well-being which continued to elude the war-torn Greek mainland. The only possible exception was Samos whose citizens and economic base had been devastated by bloody factional strife for over a decade. See Meyer, Vol. 5, 286-87 and Olmstead,396-97. In support of his Panhellenist ideals Isokrates in the Panegyrikos, On The Peace, and Letter to Archidamos (Agesilaos' son) takes a gloomy view of the economic and social ills in Greece after 386 B.C.

7 Grote, Vol. 8, 2; Beloch 3.1, 95; Meyer, Vol. 5, 208-09; and Ryder, 35-36, all observe that since none but the Spartans gained from the peace, no polis could challenge or even resist whatever purposes the Spartans intended for years after the settlement.

8 Paus. 9.1.3; Isok. 14.14, 54. For the destruction of Plataia
installed a garrison in Thespiai.⁹

In the wake of the lugubrious surrender of Asian Greece and the Spartans' activities in Europe in early 386, someone reproached Agesilaos by saying "Alas for Hellas, when Lakonians are Medizing." The king answered, "Not at all, rather the Medes are Lakonizing."¹⁰ While what he said was true, the king's ready wit could not disguise the fact that a major shift in Spartan policy had occurred.

Although he had abandoned his earlier Panhellenism when he realized that he would be unable to fulfill his promise to the Greeks of Asia, Agesilaos was in fact at the zenith of his power and influence in Lakedaimon. He had emerged from the Korinthian War as the dominant force in Spartan politics and would quickly assume nearly full control in 427, see Thuc. 3.68, 5.32; Isok. 4.126, 12.101; and Plut. Lys. 14.

⁹Xen. Hell. 5.4.15-20; Isok. 14.14-15; and Diod. 15.32-37. Ryder, 47, writes that Sparta's flimsy pretexts for meddling in the internal affairs of other poleis on either side of the Isthmos show that little more than expediency dictated her course of action.

¹⁰Plut. Ages. 23.2, Artax. 22.2, and Mor. 213b. Olmstead, 396-416, and Meyer, Vol. 5, 286-87, describe in great detail the gradual, but relentless encroachment of Greek cultural, numismatic and military influence throughout the western regions of the Persian realm. Greeks held positions at the highest administrative levels, a practice begun over a century before, but greatly accelerated by the King's Peace. Among the most salient results of this trend in the quarter century after 386 was the successful resistance to central authority made possible in many areas by use of Greek mercenaries.
of foreign policy. Even during Antalkidas' brilliantly effective navarchy (388-87), Agesilaos had secured the Aiginetan command for his brother Teleutias, when the sailors refused to serve under Eteonikos without pay. Earlier Teleutias had served as navarch on two separate occasions (392/91 and 390/89), a most unusual development, since by tradition no man would hold that office more than once. In addition to his campaigns from 391-388, this indirect evidence hints strongly at Agesilaos' influence in shaping Spartan public opinion and policy. His deference to the ephors, loyalty to his friends and rapport with the ordinary citizen made possible his supremacy in the state at this period and for many years to come. It is interesting to note that unlike his elder brother Agis or contemporary Pausanias, the Spartans never put Agesilaos on trial.

Before he could expand Spartan influence beyond the Isthmos, Agesilaos wanted to be certain of allied loyalty in the Peloponnesos. At the conclusion of the Korinthian War, the Spartans routinely

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12 See ch. 6.

13 Xen. Hell. 2.1.7; Aris. Pol. 1271a; see also Meyer, Vol. 5, 254, n.1, and 259, n.2 for chronology.

14 See ch. 2.

15 For Agis' trial in 418 B.C., see Thuc. 5.63 and Gomme et al., Vol. 4, 89-90. Pausanias was tried and acquitted in 403 (Paus. 3.5.2), but fled into exile after an unfavorable verdict in 395 (Xen. Hell. 3.5.25; Paus. 3.5.6; Diod. 14.89.1).
garrisoned many allied cities. Once Agesilaos had broken all lingering resistance to the King's Peace, he directed his attention to nearby allies whose allegiance had wavered or become suspect. Mantinea was the first polis to experience the new direction of Agesilaos' foreign policy.

The Fate of Mantinea and Phlius

A certain restiveness under the Spartan yoke in the earliest years of the fourth century is well attested. Fearful of an imminent Spartan invasion in 395, the Boiotians had sent an embassy to Athens. The Theban speakers listed a number of grievances against Sparta in the Athenian assembly. They observed that many allied poleis, even those in the Peloponnesos, resented the Spartans' arrogance. The Lakedaimonians, they claimed, had failed to allot a fair share of the spoils of war to free men in 404 B.C. and had placed perioikoi and

16 Xen. Hell. 5.1.29.

17 See ch. 6 for details of his dissolution of both the Boiotian league and the Argive-Korinthian sympolity. There is some ancient evidence that Sparta and Thebes contracted an alliance in 386 B.C.; see Isok. 14.27; Plut. Pelop. 4.5; and Aristeides 173. Bengtson, Staatsverträge 2, 193, writes that the existence of this is doubtful. Buckler, "The Alleged Theban-Spartan Alliance of 386 B.C." Eranos, 78 (1980), 179-85, argues that a formal treaty ratified by oaths is unlikely because of Thebes' prohibition against Sparta's Olynthian campaign in 383, Sparta's lack of any reference to such a treaty before the seizure of the Kadmeia, and Leontiades' claim that Thebes under Ismenias had been hostile to Sparta since 404 B.C. Also Agesilaos' most consistent trait, his peculiar antipathy to Thebes, makes such an alliance unlikely. Buckler is either correct, therefore, in asserting that Isokrates lied about this treaty for his own rhetorical purposes or he may have exaggerated an informal liaison between Leontiades' pro-Spartan faction and a sympathetic group in Lakedaimon. If there were such an informal relation, it bore fruit dramatically with Phoibidas' coup (see below).
helots in control of free cities.\textsuperscript{18}

Another sign of discontent surfaced in 391 when the Phliasians requested a Spartan garrison to protect them from Iphikrates' mercenaries. Before Iphikrates' successful attack, however, the townspeople for some time had refused to admit any Spartans within their walls. The Spartans complied with the Phliasian request, but despite their sympathy for the city's oligarchic exiles, they did not insist that the democratic government take these exiles back. Also, they left the city without tampering in any way with its laws.\textsuperscript{19} That Agesipolis used Phlious as a base to launch his incursion against the Argives indicates that the city was still loyal to the Spartans in 388.\textsuperscript{20} Perhaps because of that cooperation Agesilaos decided to postpone the Phliasians' chastisement until he had dealt with the Mantineians whose loyalty was much more erratic.\textsuperscript{21}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18}Xen. \textit{Hell.} 3.5.12.
\item \textsuperscript{19}Xen. \textit{Hell.} 4.4.15.
\item \textsuperscript{20}Legon, "Phliasian Politics and Policy in the Early Fourth Century B.C.," \textit{Historia}, 16 (1967), 326-28, contends that in 388 the city was still democratic. The government allowed the Spartans to mass their troops at Phlious as a gesture of good will. The Spartans, preoccupied with the war, had no intention of forcing an oligarchy on the city at that time.
\item \textsuperscript{21}No better illustration of Parke's remark ("The Second Spartan Empire," 37) that Sparta under Agesilaos was converting the alliance into an \textit{αρχή} occurs than her treatment of Mantineia and Phlious. Cawkwell, "Agesilaos and Sparta," 75, notes that these poleis were the two great anomalies in the Spartan alliance. Because of their walls and prosperity, they had evolved along somewhat independent lines and had become democracies.
\end{itemize}
Relations between Sparta and Mantinea had long been strained. Because of a common border and Mantinea's tradition of democracy, Agesilaos decided to make an example of this polis after all matters pertaining to the King's Peace were settled. An excellent pretext for intervention arose with the expiration of the thirty-years' treaty between the two cities which was concluded in 417 after the Spartans' defeat of a combined Argive and Mantineian army near Mantinea.22 Agesilaos' inherent piety would not obstruct his designs since the sacred oaths were no longer in effect.23

At the treaty's expiration, the Spartans had a list of grievances against the Mantineians. They considered the Mantineians unreliable allies because they had supplied grain to the Argives during the Korinthian War while pleading "holy truces" in order not to participate in allied campaigns. Especially galling to Agesilaos was the fact that he took the remnants of the mora defeated by Iphikrates in 390 past Mantinea at night to avoid ridicule at the Spartans' misfortune. Finally, Agesilaos and many Spartans did not

22Thuc. 5.81.1. Gomme et al., Vol. 4, 148, note the chronological puzzle in Xen. Hell. 5.2.2, since by his account the treaty would have expired in 387, not 386/85. Diodorus (15.5.3) would fix the year as 385 B.C. The agreement seems to be a truce rather than an alliance, but Mantinea remained attached at least nominally to the Peloponnesians.

23For Agesilaos' scrupulous adherence to sworn compacts, see ch. 4.
approve of the Mantineian democracy. 24

In the spring of 385 the Spartans dispatched a legate to Mantinea with an ultimatum. The demands were simple: the citizens would either tear down their walls or face an invasion. 25 The oligarchic faction, which was out of power at this time, was secretly in sympathy with the Spartan demands. Moreover, many of the wealthier Mantineians would not be affected by the demolition of the walls or the dwellings within them because their estates were in the countryside. Some were even enthusiastic about Spartan intervention since it would give them a chance to regain control of the government. 26

Despite the oligarchic sentiment of some citizens when the ultimatum was delivered, the city decided to resist. Agesilaos excused himself from the expedition (spring 385) on the grounds that the Mantineians had rendered many services to his father during the Messenian campaigns. 27 The younger king, therefore, found himself in the possibly uncomfortable role of leading an army against the

24 Xen. Hell. 5.2.2. Diodorus (15.5.2-3) writes that the Spartans had no intentions of honoring the autonomy clause in the Peace of Antalkidas when it was inexpedient to do so. He states that, in many poleis, they would stir up factional strife in order to impose governments loyal to themselves. Ultimate responsibility for this policy must be laid at Agesilaos' feet.

25 Xen. Hell. 5.2.1-3; Diod. 15.5.2

26 Xen. Hell. 5.2.3, 6-7.

27 This is a reference to the aftermath of an earthquake in 464 B.C. which prompted an uprising of Messenian helots. See Diod. 11.63-64.
Mantineian democrats who had been on excellent terms with his exiled father Pausanias. This development shows that Agesilaos was equally adept at political and military tactics. By declining command and letting the onus of the campaign rest on Agesipolis' shoulders, the elder king likely neutralized any opposition to his own purposes. Were Agesipolis to reduce the city, the Spartans would have properly chastised the democrats and installed a government loyal to Sparta. If he should falter in the field, Agesilaos could simply come to his rescue. In either case for the Mantineians, the result would be the same.

When an invasion appeared inevitable, the Mantineians appealed to Argos and Athens for aid. Because neither polis had the strength or will to risk a war, the Mantineians were compelled to stand alone. When even the sight of the allied army failed to induce them to pull down their walls, Agesipolis began to ravage their land. As this too proved insufficient for his intent, he ordered one half of the army to dig a trench around the city under the other half's protection. When the trench was finished, the Lakedaimonians built a wall of their own. The Mantineians did not entirely lack sympathizers during the siege,

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28 Xen. Hell. 5.2.3.

29 Rice, "Agesilaus, Agesipolis and Spartan Politics, 386-379 B.C.", 168, argues that Agesilaos cleverly manoeuvered the ambitious young king into assuming command to suppress internal resistance to his domination. It is possible, however, that Agesipolis merely sought to attain renown on the "field of honor" since his only campaign was the incursion against the Argolid in 388. Agesipolis may well have been in basic accord with Agesilaos' leadership as indeed most Spartans were at this time.
for some neighboring peoples would smuggle provisions to the defenders at night.\textsuperscript{30} That this could happen proves the existence of a certain discontent with the Spartans even among their closest neighbors. Agesipolis finally cut off this clandestine supply line by releasing a pack of dogs whose nocturnal barking would betray the presence of anyone approaching the walls.

Although the city no longer received external support because of Agesipolis' dogs, the citizens had laid in a great supply of grain from the autumn harvest. As a result there was no prospect for a quick surrender until the young king hit upon another ruse. He noticed that winter rains had greatly swollen the Ophis River which ran through the city.\textsuperscript{31} He, therefore, decided to dam the river in order to flood the city. The rising waters turned the whole town into a shallow pond and began to dissolve the baked mud bricks of the walls. As it slowly became apparent that the Spartans would be able to breach the weakened ramparts, the inhabitants chose to break off their resistance. Since they would be forced to tear down their walls anyway, they decided to do so as allies of the Lakedaimonians rather than their prisoners of war. The Spartans accepted the Mantineians' surrender, but added a stipulation that after the demolition of the walls, the

\textsuperscript{30}Polyainos 2.24.1.

\textsuperscript{31}Frazer, Pausanias' Description of Greece, Vol. 4, 205, describes what the river's course may have been in antiquity since there is no trace of the waterway today. He surmises that the citizens may have diverted the channel to keep the water from flowing through the town when they rebuilt it in 370. See also Meyer, RE 18.1, 649 under Ophis (1).
city be broken up into its constituent villages. In the future the Mantineians would receive not one, but several Spartan officers in charge of foreign troops (ξεναγοί).

Because the city's Argolizers and leading democrats feared for their lives after the surrender, the exiled Pausanias made his son promise to permit these people to depart in safety. As the sixty or so men set out, the Mantineian oligarchs had more difficulty in restraining their anger than the Spartans did.

With the conclusion of the Mantineian affair in early 384, a group of exiled Phliasians sympathetic to Sparta saw a chance to be restored to their homeland. They had observed, with encouragement, the Spartans' garrisoning of small Peloponnesian poleis during the last two years in conformity to Agesilaos' purposes. The installation of pro-Spartan oligarchies in these smaller cities had now been followed by the chastisement of the anti-Spartan demos at Mantineia. Moreover,

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32 Pausanias was living some 18 km. to the south as a suppliant in the temple of Athena Alea in Tegea. See ch. 5.

33 Xen. Hell. 5.4.2-7; Diodorus (15.5,12) writes that the city was divided into five villages, not four as Xenophon recounts. Jacoby, Fr. Gr.H., 2A.1, 64, no. 29, preserves this account as an Ephoros fragment. Pausanias (8.8.5-8) describes Agesipolis' siege and its outcome as does Polybios (4.27.6) who censures the Spartans for abusing their allies. See Walbank, An Historical Commentary on Polybios, Vol. 1, 475-76, who writes that Polybios' source perhaps was Ephoros, but more likely was the anti-Spartan Kallisthenes of Olynthos. Plutarch, Pelop. 4-5, writes that in a pitched battle Epameinondas saved a wounded Pelopidas from Mantineia's Arkadian mercenaries. Although some of Leontiades' pro-Spartan supporters may have witnessed the siege, it is unlikely that there were any pitched battles or formal treaty between Sparta and Thebes which would induce two such strongly anti-Spartan Thebans to be present at Mantineia's demise. See Buckler,
the Phliasians' support of the Spartans during the Korinthian War had scarcely been enthusiastic under the democracy. Thus taking heart at the Lakedaimonians' heavy-handed treatment of luke-warm allies, the oligarchic exiles sent a deputation to Sparta in the summer of 384. They asserted that while the city was in their hands, Phlious had always admitted Spartans within the walls and had participated in all allied campaigns. Under the democracy, they continued, the Phliasians were unwilling to serve in the allied army and until 391 barred the Spartans alone of all men from the city. The ephors considered the exiles' charges serious enough to send a legation to Phlious. The legates maintained that the exiles, who were friends of the Lakedaimonians, had suffered unjust expulsion. The ephors, therefore, deemed it right that the city take back the exiles and restore them to their property. Further, if any dispute about the restoration of expropriated property should arise, the Phliasians were to refer the matter to an impartial court of inquiry. Because the democrats feared that the exiles' friends and relatives would betray the city, should the Spartans

"The Alleged Theban-Spartan Alliance of 386 B.C.," 184-85, who along with Grote, Vol. 9, 247, n.3, and Reincke, RE 19.1, 376, rejects this account as spurious and deriving from Plutarch's Alk. 7.3 and ultimately Plato's Symposium 220e-221b.

34 As noted in ch. 6 (Xen. Hell. 4.4.15), the Phliasians had refused to admit any Spartans into their city until suffering a defeat at the hands of Iphikrates' mercenaries in 391. At that time the Spartans did not insist that they take back their oligarchic exiles. Parke, "The Second Spartan Empire," 64, argues that the reason for this was Spartan deference to their allies, but Legon, 328-29, much more convincingly suggests that it was simply inexpedient to aid the exiles because of the full-scale war around Korinth and in Asia Minor.
invade, the government accepted the terms laid down by the league. The Philiasian matter was thus settled temporarily by intimidation rather than force.

**Spartan Adventurism Beyond the Isthmos**

While Agesilaos' policies were firmly taking effect in the Peloponnesos, an opportunity for Spartan expansion to the northern Aegean litoral arose early in 382. A delegation from Akanthos and Apollonia, two cities in the Chalkidike, and from Amyntas III of Makedonia arrived in Lakedaimon to seek Spartan aid against the growing power of the Chalkidic league. The chief spokesman for this combined legation was Kleigenes of Akanthos whom the Spartans invited to address the Peloponnesian assembly. In his speech Kleigenes called

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35 *Xen. Hell.* 5.2.8-10.

36 Cawkwell, 76. Rice, 172, and Legon, 330-31, correctly point out that the ephors did not even give the Philiasians a chance to respond to the exiles' charges. Moreover, the charges were weak at best since the Philiasians had joined Agesipolis' incursion into the Argolid in 388. Thus the ephors were not interested in deciding the matter on its merits, perhaps even believing that the charges would not stand up. Since Agesilaos for two years had been working to install pro-Spartan oligarchies, it is safe to conclude that mere expediency lay at the core of the ephors' decision.

37 Akanthos (modern Ierissos) lies astride the Strymonic and Singitic gulfs just north of Xerxes' canal; see Pietschmann, *RE* 1.1, 1147. Apollonia was situated about 17 km. to the northeast of Olynthos; see Hirschfeld, *RE* 2.1, 114.
the Peloponnesians' attention to the league's forcible absorption of many Chalkidic cities and several of the major Makedonian towns, including Pella. He claimed that the league also had won over the nearest Thracians and had made friendly overtures to the Athenians and Thebans. Although many Chalkidic poleis resented the Olynthian's league, only the Akanthians and Apollonians had thus far resisted absorption. Klcigenes then pointed out that when the league's legates demanded support for the campaign against the Makedonians, the Akanthians, Apollonians and the Makedonian king decided to appeal to Sparta. Finally, the speaker noted that with access to the vast tracts of Thracian timberland and the silver deposits of Mt. Pangaion near Amphipolis the Olynthians' league could become a naval menace in concert with Athens. Torone had recently joined the league, as had Potidaia, which meant that the entire Pallene peninsula would soon fall into the Olynthians' hands. Finally, he stated that even the

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38 In fact, they contracted an alliance with the Athenians in 383 B.C. See Tod, GHI, Vol. 2, no. 119 and Bengtson, Staatsverträge 2, 199-200.

39 Amyntas III had contracted an alliance with the Chalkidic league when an Illyrian invasion of the Makedonian highlands occurred in 393 B.C. Amyntas was routed in battle after turning over great tracts of lower Makedonia to the Chalkidikians for protection and he initially despaired of his throne. With the aid of some Thessalians, however, he was able to repel the Illyrians and regain control of upper Makedonia in only three months. He asked that the Olynthians restore the land he had ceded to them, but they refused. Relations between Amyntas and the league deteriorated until by 384 the league supported the pretender Argaios. In the early spring of 382, Amyntas decided to join Akanthos and Apollonia in an appeal to Sparta. For these events, see Diod. 14.92.2-4; Isokrates Archidamos 46; and Aelian V.H. 4.8.3. Meyer, Vol. 5, 296-97 with notes; Tod, no. 111; Bengtson, 178-80; and Grote, Vol. 8, 42-48, all believe that
Akanthians and Apollonians would not be able to hold out much longer unless the Spartans acted. 40

Despite earlier inattention to such things, Agesilaos and his supporters quickly realized the implications of what Kleigenes had reported. Here was an entity in the Chalkidike which was subverting the autonomy of Greek cities by voluntary or forcible absorption. Sparta as προστάτης of the King's Peace could restore the Akanthians, Apollonians and other Chalkidic Greeks to their πάτριοι πολιτείαι, while simultaneously expanding her own influence in the Northern Aegean. No Spartan force had even passed through that part of the Greek world since Agesilaos' returned from Asia. 41

When Kleigenes had concluded his address, 42 the Spartans convened the full allied assembly which quickly and supinely voted to mount an expedition against the Chalkidic league. 43 To insure a prompt

Amyntas III, the father of Philip II, became king in 393 B.C. Beloch, Vol. 3.1, 101-03 and 3.2, 58-62, believes that Amyntas II was king when the 50-year pact with the league was concluded in 393. Kaerst, RE 1.2, 3006, dates Amyntas III's accession to 389 and the 50-year treaty to 389/88. All scholars agree that Makedonian chronology for the ten years after Archelaos' death in 399 is greatly muddled.

40 Xen. Hell. 5.2.12-19; Diod. 15.19.3.

41 That is since the summer of 394; see ch. 5.

42 Rice, "Agesilaos, Agesipolis, etc.," 176; Cawkwell, "Agesilaos and Sparta," 77; Seager, "The King's Peace, etc.," 41 observe that Kleigenes makes not a single reference to the Peace or Sparta's role as προστάτης. The entire appeal is to the material and military advantage which the Spartans could gain. Ryder, Koine Eirene, 47, believes that the Olynthians' threat to Sparta's hegemony was exaggerated.

43 Xen. Hell. 5.2.20.
check against the seizure of any more cities by the Olynthians, the joint delegation urged the dispatch of an advance force. The ephors, therefore, hastily gathered a contingent of 2,000 men composed of Skiritiai, neodamodais, perioikoi and helots under Eudamidas to march north. Before setting out, Eduamidas asked that his brother, Phoibidas, be given command of a similar force to follow somewhat later. Eudamidas was able to garrison some cities on the Makedonian and Thracian coasts when they requested his aid. After he detached Potidaia from the Olynthians' league, he occupied it and made it the Spartans' headquarters for the rest of the war. Most important, however, was Eudamidas' request that the ephors send another 2,000 men under his brother Phoibidas. That some Spartans contemplated a venture fully as weighty as the Olynthian campaign is strongly hinted by the gathering of this second contingent.

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44 These people who perhaps were perioikoi lived at the northern frontier of Lakedaimon. It was in their territory that the Spartans performed the traditional border sacrifices before setting out on a campaign. See Geyer, RE 13A.1, 536-37. The chief ancient references to this people are Thuc. 5.67-68; Xen. Hell. 5.2.24, Lak. Pol. 12.3, 13.6; and Diod. 15.32.1.

45 Cawkwell, 77, clearly discerns Agesilaos' handiwork in the Spartan decision to mount the expedition. He points out that the first three Spartans to take the field were all partisans or relatives of the elder king.

46 Xen. Hell. 5.2.23-24.

47 Xenophon as a Lakonophile and friend of Agesilaos could never bring himself to admit openly that the elder king had a direct hand in the gathering of Phoibidas' troops. Diodorus' epitome of Ephoros, who had no such compunctions, no longer distinguished the two brothers' separate commands. Rather Diodorus makes Phoibidas polemarch of the
The Seizure of the Kadmeia

Phoibidas, supposedly en route to join his brother at Potidaia in late summer 382, precipitated a remarkable turn of events in central Greece. Acting on secret instructions and with the collusion of a pro-Spartan polemarch in Thebes, he evolved a plot to seize the Kadmeia. Just outside the city walls near the gymnasion Phoibidas encamped his troops where he received a cordial deputation from Leontiades. Ismenias and Androkleidas, the leaders of the rival faction which controlled the government, however, refused even to acknowledge the Spartans' presence. Because of most Thebans' intense anti-Spartan sentiment, the council had passed a decree forbidding any Theban from joining the Lakedaimonian expedition to the Chalkidike. It was, therefore, necessary for Leontiades and Archias' rival faction to make their traitorous proposal in secret. Leontiades offered to lead the Lakedaimonians to the Kadmeia which was the seat of the Theban government. He assured Phoibidas that once the akropolis was in Spartan hands, the city's submission and great glory for the Spartan officer would quickly follow.

entire allied force which, he writes, eventually grew to over 10,000 men. Hence Eudamidas, the brother who first engaged the Chalkidic forces and secured a reliable base on the Pallene just 13 km. south of Olynthos, has been largely forgotten in the afterglow of Phoibidas' notoriety. Plutarch (Ages. 24.1) explicitly states that suspicion of Agesilaos' complicity quickly arose after Phoibidas' light rebuke by the authorities.

48 Meyer, Vol. 5, 293, dates Eudamidas' mission to the spring and Phoibidas' coup to August 382 B.C. Beloch, 3.2, 232, citing Aristeides (258), who states the Pythian games were in progress, also
After the clandestine rendezvous Phoibidas withdrew from the gymnasion as if to join his brother Eudamidas in Potidaia. A short time later while the council was in session away from the Kadmeia because the women were celebrating the Thesmophoria, Leontiades rode out to the Spartans and led them back to the city. It was mid-summer and the streets were deserted when the Spartans arrived. Phoibidas led his men directly to the akropolis where he completed his seizure of the city without a single drop of bloodshed. It remained only for Leontiades to convene an assembly, alert the citizens of their changed situation, and introduce them to their new masters. 49

Some 300 Thebans were able to escape to Athens before the new, meekly pro-Spartan government took over. Ismenias, however, was not as fortunate, as Leontiades ordered his arrest and extradition to Sparta for trial. Another polemarch was appointed in Ismenias' stead and Phoibidas' overthrow of the Theban government was complete. 50

When news of the coup reached Lakedaimon, many were angered and shocked at what they perceived as a gross overstepping of authority and a serious violation of the autonomy clause in the King's Peace.

dates the seizure to Aug. 382. Grote, Vol. 8, 56, n.2; Cawkwell, 79; and Rice, 180, all concur. Reconstruction of subsequent chronology is facilitated by fixing the date of Phoibidas' coup.

49 Xen. Hell. 5.2.25-29; Plut. Ages. 23.6-7, Pelop. 5; Diod. 15.20.2; Polybios 4.27.4; Isok. 4.126; Nepos, Pelop. 1.2-3. Plutarch (Mor.576a) writes that Lysandridas was Ismenias' replacement as polemarch.

50 Xen. Hell. 5.2.30.
Agesilaos, however, quickly came forward to exonerate his friend by stating that Spartan officers were expected to show initiative and that the only standard by which Phoibidas should be judged was whether his actions had served the state. Although the accused was relieved of command and fined, Agesilaos easily persuaded the Spartans to retain a harmost and garrison at Thebes. The light censure of Phoibidas and the decision to sustain the occupation of the Kadmeia were deeply disturbing to many Greeks far beyond the borders of Lakedaimon.

Yet another measure of Agesilaos' control of Spartan policy despite some internal opposition was the trial and execution of Ismenias. His bitter factional rival Leontiades was the chief witness against him. He began his indictment by noting that, for over twenty years, the Thebans had consistently failed to cooperate in Spartan enterprises. They refused to join the attack on the Peiraeus in 403 during the revolt against the thirty in Athens. They snubbed Agesilaos at the outset of the Asian campaign in 396. Ismenias and Androkleidas had gladly taken Timokrates' bribes and launched the attack on Phokis in 395, which was the casus belli of the Korinthian War. Finally, Leontiades noted, Ismenias' government had recently threatened with punishment any Theban who might march with the Spartans against the Chalkidic league. Leontiades ended his plea by observing that under

51 Xen. Hell. 5.2.32; Plut. Ages. 23.6-7 and Diod. 15.19.4. Grote, Vol. 8, 59, thinks the ephors' disavowal of Phoibidas was hypocritical since he was acting on their instructions to neutralize Thebes.

52 See note 49 and Diod. 15.20.3.
his government, Thebes would no longer be an obstacle to the Spartans and insisted that the Medizing war-monger be made to pay for his crimes against Hellas. 53

To Agesilaos and his supporters and even to the elder king's opponents who had suffered in the Korinthian War, Leontiades' charges carried some weight. Although some Spartans were uneasy about not remaining loyal to the oaths taken in 386, Agesilaos' partisans again prevailed. Ismenias was arraigned before a panel of three Spartan judges and one each from the several allied states. In spite of a vigorous defense on his own behalf, he was found guilty of all charges and subsequently executed. With the installation of the pro-Spartan oligarchy, the Thebans were not only subservient, but co-operated with the Lakedaimonians in more ways than were demanded. 54

53 Xen. Hell. 5.2.33-34. Meyer, Vol. 5, 292-93, points out that while Thebes had taken no hostile steps against Sparta, her refusal to join the Olynthian expedition was not something which the Spartans could overlook. Beloch, 3.1, 104, believes that the Spartans (especially Agesilaos) were looking for a pretext to seize control of Thebes because of the hostility of Ismenias and Androkleidas' government. Buckler, "The Alleged Theban-Spartan Alliance of 386 B.C.," 184, believes that Agesilaos' failure to mention any violation of a separate treaty's terms in justifying Phoibidas strongly suggests that there was no such treaty. Had there been a separate pact between Sparta and Thebes, the latter's failure to cooperate against Olynthos would have been an excellent excuse for punitive action.

54 Xen. Hell. 5.2.35-37. Beloch, 3.1, 104-05, succinctly writes that the outcome of the trial was never in doubt. Grote, Vol. 8, 59-61, perceives an iniquity in charging Ismenias with Medism when the Spartans themselves had cooperated openly with the Persians and abandoned the Greeks of Asia to Artaxerxes only five years before. He compares Ismenias' fate to that of Theramenes at the hands of Kritias in 404 B.C.
Retrospective

The events of the years from the spring of 386 to the autumn of 382 reveal with great clarity the adventurism of Sparta under Agesilaos. Although Antalkidas was an obvious opponent of the elder king and the young king, Agesipolis, was a rival of sorts, as one would expect, because of his prestige among the Spartans, Agesilaos was the driving force in making and carrying out Spartan policy. After he abandoned any immediate hope for returning to Asia, he began to consolidate Sparta's grip on the alliance by forced occupation of smaller poleis and districts in the Peloponnesos. When this process was well underway, he directed the Spartans' energies to larger entities whose opposition or recalcitrance was more serious. After the dissolution of the Argive-Korinthian sympolity and the Boiotian league, he was able to persuade the ephors, assembly and younger king to inflict a similar fate on the Mantineians. The young king was the instrument of the elder's policy, since Agesilaos' object was clearly the subjection and dispersal of Mantineia into its original villages. Should Agesipolis falter in the field, which would have

55 See chs. 5 and 6; they put aside their differences for a time during the latter's navarchy to achieve an acceptable and for Sparta, advantageous peace.

56 Diodorus (15.19.4) makes it clear that Agesipolis was the more conciliatory of the two kings in his attitude to the allies.

57 See Isok. 4.113-116 and Diod. 15.1.3-4, 5.1-2.

58 Rice, "Agesilaos, Agesipolis, etc.," 166-68, suggests that Agesilaos cleverly begged off conduct of the siege to neutralize any internal resistance.
been a serious blow to his prestige, Agesilaos could have assumed command and credit for the success. In any case, the young king was all too eager to succeed against the Mantineians and possibly only the intervention of his exiled father from Tegea prevented a blood-bath.\(^{59}\)

With Lysander's death at Haliartos in 395 and Pausanias' exile the following spring, there was no single figure in Sparta who could compete with Agesilaos' record of military, financial and diplomatic successes. Antalkidas' achievements as a negotiator and navarch quickly dissipated when he reverted to the status of private citizen (fall of 387). He and others perhaps did not share Agesilaos' enthusiasm for forcing docile, pro-Spartan oligarchies on the allies or for seeking to humiliate the Thebans, but in his reduced role, he could scarcely compete with the prestige of a king who held office for life. Also those unhappy with Sparta's failure to abide by the oaths of 386 guaranteeing autonomy could not expect the younger king to match Agesilaos' influence either.\(^{60}\)

\(^{59}\)Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.6. Rice's suggestion that Agesipolis was the hapless tool of the elder king's cunning is not necessarily borne out by the evidence. Diodorus' description of him as εὐσημνικὸς and δίκαιος while Agesilaos is termed φιλοπόλεμος and ὀροστικὸς (15.19.4) is likely nothing more than rhetorical balance or contrast in Ephoros. Agesipolis showed no lack of martial vigor in 388 against the Argives (see ch. 6), in 385-84 against Mantineia or in 381-80 against the Olynthians. It seems best to ascribe whatever differences existed between the two kings to the traditional rivalry of their respective royal houses.

\(^{60}\)Parke, "The Second Spartan Empire," 71, and Rice, 169, see in the events of these years and Agesilaos' domination of Spartan policy the full emergence of Sparta, not as ἄγεμος of an alliance, but rather as tyrant of an ἀρχή.
The process begun with the smaller poleis and Mantinea con-
tinued to evolve with the ultimatum delivered to Phlius. Agesilaos
and his supporters were more than willing to crush recalcitrants
simply for the sake of expediency. The joint Makedonian, Akanthian
and Apollonian appeal for aid against the Olynthians' league in 382
suddenly provided Agesilaos with the long sought chance not only to
expand Spartan influence to the northern Aegean, but to indulge his
bitter resentment against Thebes. The Spartan's response to
Kleigenes and the secret instructions issued to all Spartan officers
in the field were perfectly consistent with Agesilaos' policy since
the King's Peace and clearly reflect his control of the state. Phoibidas' seizure of the Kadmeia was the result of policy, not mere
opportunism on the part of an overly ambitious officer. Agesilaos
and his supporters had hoped to occupy Thebes to eliminate Sparta's
only serious rival in central Greece. Because of his antipathy to
Thebes, his great popularity in Sparta and his control of all aspects
of policy, Agesilaos himself certainly was responsible for the "secret

61 See Legon, "Phliasian Politics, etc.," 330 and Rice, 169.

62 See Seager, "The King's Peace, etc.," 41-42. Cawkwell,
"Agesilaos and Sparta," 77, believes that a combined reading of the
evidence in Diodorus and Xenophon gives the complete background for
the Spartan intervention in the north. Although Xenophon does not
mention the pact with Amyntas, while Diodorus is silent about
Akanthos and Apollonia, there is nothing in the two authors which is
mutually exclusive or contradictory. Cawkwell also believes that the
King's Peace was applicable to the Chalkidike, but not to Amyntas'
realm in Makedonia. This would justify superficially intervention on
behalf of Akanthos and Apollonia.
instructions" to reduce the city. Xenophon naturally would emphasize Leontiades' treason and Phoibidas' rashness because implication in the deed would put his benefactor in a poor light. Evidence supplied by Diodorus and Plutarch, however, points to Agesilaos' culpability.

With the fall of Thebes, the Peace of Antalkidas had become moot despite a tenuous pretext for intervention on behalf of Akanthian and Apollonian autonomy. In reality Agesilaos and the Spartans were now poised to consolidate their ἄρχειν throughout European Greece. Agesilaos put into effect a policy of chastising suspect allies, dismantling coalitions and even single poleis in order to impose docile, pro-Spartan oligarchies. With an aggressive, militaristic statecraft oddly reminiscent of Lysander's dekarchies, Agesilaos' leadership completed Sparta's transition from ἡγεμόνευ to tyrant.

CHAPTER VIII

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE CHALKIDIC LEAGUE AND THE FALL OF PHLIous:
THE LIBERATION OF THEBES AND AGESILAOS' REACTION

The War Against Olynthos

With the Thebans docile and garrisoned, the Spartans could proceed with their campaign in the north. Eudamidas, brother of the notorious Phoibidas, had occupied Potidaia in the spring of 382 to prepare for the arrival of the full Peloponnesian levy.\(^1\) The entire Pallene was secure for the allies when the Spartans appointed Teleutias commander of the full levy.\(^2\) In addition to securing this appointment for his half-brother, Agesilaos also persuaded the ephors to send dispatches to all allied poleis with orders to supply Teleutias with men and equipment according to the allies' joint resolution.\(^3\) Since the οὐχόματα were the official leathern dispatches sent by the ephors to Spartan commanders outside Lakedaimon,\(^4\) the success of Agesilaos' policy now becomes clear. Many Greek towns must

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\(^1\)The chronology of the Olynthian War is muddled in places, but Meyer, Vol. 5, 298-99, n.5, places Eudamidas' mission in the spring of 382. Beloch, 3.1, 103, concurs, while Grote, Vol. 8, 54-55, does not attempt to fix the date.

\(^2\)Ehrenberg, RE 5.2, 2367-68, dates Teleutias' march to summer 382 and his death to the following summer. For Teleutias' great success and popularity, see ch. 6.

\(^3\)Xen. Hell. 5.2.37; Diod. 15.21.1-2.

\(^4\)See Oehler, RE 3A.1, 691-92.
have received Spartan garrisons whose purpose was to assure adherence to Lakedaimonian aims. The closeness of the parallel to Lysander's dekarchies is unmistakable and not at all surprising. Although Agesilaos had not installed groups of ten to rule poleis controlled by Sparta, nor had he kept up the fleet's strength since the King's Peace, supinely pro-Spartan oligarchies sprung up wherever the Lakedaimonians had intervened. Agesilaos' purpose in obtaining command for his brother was to continue the policy of dissolving any leagues or federations and garrisoning individual poleis.

5 Agesilaos' great success lay in part in his perception that he must maintain at least formal subservience to the ephors and gerousia (Plut. Ages. 2.5, 4.1-6). Unlike his former mentor Lysander, therefore, he would not impose governments solely on the basis of loyalty to himself.

6 Because of vagueness and ambiguity in the wording of the King's Peace, the Spartans were able to interpret the autonomy clause to their own ends. Many smaller poleis beyond the Isthmos and in the Aegean were freed from domination of the great powers and the Spartans' reputation as liberators was as high in 386 as it had been in 404. When Agesilaos' designs began to unfold, however, first with smaller poleis, then Mantinea, Phlius and finally Thebes in 382, her reputation, as during the dekarchs' tenure, lost some of its lustre. See Ryder, Koine Eirene, 39-45; Ehrenberg, The Greek State, 113-19; and Busolt/Swoboda, Griechische Staatskunde, Vol. 2, 1327-30. Unlike previous epochs, Spartan activity under Agesilaos after 386 was marked by a singular and uncharacteristic aggressiveness. The king and his supporters were no longer content to be leaders of the Peloponnesians, but they now aimed for hegemony over all Hellas to forestall the development of any league or coalition which might threaten their supremacy or force them into an unwanted war. As Ryder, 37-38, observes, this interpretation of autonomy militated against Panhellenism based on opposition to Persia. Throughout Hellas, local patriotism, the desire to protect or increase wealth, and a pervasive war-weariness combined to foster Agesilaos' drive for hegemony. I disagree with Ryder that Lysias' Olympiakos of 384 indicates that Sparta's prestige as liberator was unimpaired; see Ryder, 44. Rather, because of the reduction of Mantinea and other smaller poleis, the cession of the Asian Greeks to the Great King and their alliance with
In order to achieve this purpose more efficiently, Agesilaos presided over a reorganization of the Spartan alliance. With the decision to go to war on behalf of the Makedonians and unaligned poleis of the Chalkidike against the Olynthian's league in 383, the Spartans reintroduced compulsory tribute and ordered every allied state to send soldiers to bring the army to a strength of 10,000 men. For the first time since Lysander's dekarchies (404/03), all poleis in Greece bound to Sparta by treaty were required to send men or money for the campaign. The rate of commutation was three Aiginetan obols per day for each soldier, or twelve obols for a horseman. Failure to supply either men or money would result in a fine of one Aiginetan stater per day for each foot soldier absent from the levy. One reason for imposing this system was to counteract allied reluctance to comply with the constant demands on their manpower.7

After setting out, Teleutias was joined by Derdas, a vassal prince of Amyntas III. Derdas had long since proved his worth to Amyntas and now served as the Makedonians' contribution to the allied effort. His special strength was his horsemen of whom he led some 400.8 The Thebans, aware that Agesilaos' brother was in command of

Dionysios, Lysias (Oly. 1,5,7) explicitly rebukes the Spartans for betraying their heritage as the guarantors of Greek freedom. With the seizure of the Kadmeia, Sparta had become a threat to the very ideals she had championed and the other Greeks held dear. See Ryder, 41-42; Ehrenberg, 117-119; and Busolt/Swoboda, 1331-33.

7Xen. Hell. 5.2.21-22. See also Busolt/Swoboda, 1328, and Ehrenberg, 116. With the submission of Phlious and Olynthos, Agesilaos completed the reorganization of Greece into ten districts at the outset of his Boiotian campaign in 378; see ch. 9.

8Elimia is the mountainous region of upper Makedonia; see
the full levy, also sent a contingent. Teleutias proceeded slowly to avoid antagonizing the allies beyond the Isthmos and to gather the full complement of his force. 9

Upon occupying Potidaia, which lay 11 km. south of Olynthos, the new harmost Teleutias tried to induce the Olynthians to fight a pitched battle. At first he avoided cutting trees down or burning crops, but finally he drew up his troops just under 2 km. from the walls. A sudden Olynthian cavalry sortie nearly put the allied force to flight, but Derdas' men saved the day by forcing the Olynthians to withdraw. 10 For the remainder of that year, the campaign deteriorated into a series of raids and pillage by both sides in which Teleutias partially reversed himself and began to cut down trees to impede the enemy's approach. 11

In the spring of 381 the Makedonians, who had departed with the onset of winter, returned, but the Olynthian cavalry took the initiative. They penetrated as far as the vicinity of Apollonia, some 17 km. to the north, while Derdas and his men were in town. The Makedonians launched a surprise attack, killed eighty Olynthians and drove the rest back to their city. 12 Because no one would venture out-

Kaerst, RE 5.1, 239; and Oberhummer, RE 5.2, 2367-68. Derdas ultimately aided Amyntas III's succession by killing Amyntas II in a quarrel; see Arist. Pol. 1311b.

9 Xen. Hell. 5.2.38-39; Diod. 15.21.2.

10 Xen. Hell. 5.2.39-42.

11 Xen. Hell. 5.2.43; Diod. 15.21.2.

12 Xen. Hell. 5.3.1-3.
side the walls, Teleutias changed his tactics to force the issue. He knew that the defenders could farm only a very small tract of land and that their supply of grain was low. He therefore ordered an extensive campaign of cutting down fruit trees and burning croplands as close as possible to Olynthos itself. His new strategy provoked the Olynthians to dispatch a cavalry force against a group of Peloponnesians across the river which flowed just west of the city. Teleutias, irritated by their temerity, ordered a counterattack, but the Olynthians suddenly wheeled about and killed one hundred of his men, including the Spartan hipparch. Teleutias then lost his head, ordering a full-scale assault on the city. The Olynthian hoplites poured out of the city to aid their retreating cavalry, however, and broke through the allied line when Teleutias himself fell in the fighting. The rest of his troops, who had advanced hastily and in disarray, scattered. The Peloponnesians fled to Potidaia; the Makedonians and Chalkidikians to Spartolos, Akanthos, Apollonia and elsewhere. Some 200 of the finest troops had died in the struggle, leaving the Olynthians to celebrate a major victory.\textsuperscript{13}. In addition to laying in considerable stocks of grain, they recruited many soldiers from their allies in the expectation that the Spartans would soon dispatch another army.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{13}Xen. \textit{Hell.} 5.3.4-6; Diodorus 15.21.2.

\textsuperscript{14}Xen. \textit{Hell.} 5.3.8; Diodorus 15.21.3.
The consternation in Sparta at the news of Teleutias' defeat and death was pervasive. The remnants of Lysander's faction, who perhaps still hoped to exploit the rich areas of Asia under the pretext of a Panhellenic crusade, could take little consolation at Agesilaos' personal loss. Some Spartans, such as Antalkidas and the younger king Agesipolis, who feared a revival of Athenian seapower and favored a much different interpretation of the autonomy clause than Agesilaos, could not have been pleased with a débacle inflicted by a polis recently allied to Athens. Because of recruitment difficulties stemming from allied resistance to Sparta's constant demands for soldiers, the anger of the previous summer at Phoibidas' egregious coup, and now the setback in the north, it was necessary for Agesilaos and his supporters to take decisive steps. As in the case of the Asian campaign, the Spartans placed responsibility for the war in a king's hands to shore up sagging prestige and resolve the impasse.

15 For Sparta to act as προστάτης of an anti-Persian crusade was not really feasible at this time, despite the sentiments bruited about at the great Panhellenic festivals. See Lysias' Olympiakos (1, 5 and 7), delivered in 384 and Isokrates' Panegyrikos(117, 121, 125-28) which dates to 380 and bitterly decries the Spartans as oppressors unsuitable to lead free men against the common despotic foe. Also, as noted earlier, local patriotism, desire for prosperity, and a pervasive war-weariness combined to preclude such a "crusade," see footnote 6.

16 For Antalkidas' opposition to Agesilaos, see Plut. Ages. 26.3-4, Mor. 227d and ch. 9. For the differences between the two kings, see Diod. 15.19.4 and ch. 7.

17 See Bengtson, Staatsverträge 2, 199. That Antalkidas and Agesipolis were not unduly wary of the Athenians can be appreciated by the fact that as early as 384, the city had contracted an alliance with Chios; see Staatsverträge 2, 196-98.
created by the Olynthians' unlooked for victory. Not Agesilaos, but Agesipolis took command and was accompanied by a council of thirty advisors, as the elder king had been in 396.

In order to bolster the army's strength under Agesipolis, sons of foreigners raised at Sparta, μοθωποι, and many periökoi volunteered to march. The young king also received the support of Amyntas and Derdas whose enthusiasm was even greater than it had been for Teleutias. Agesipolis had proved effective, if not brilliant against the Argives in 388 and had carried out Agesilaos' policy at Mantinea in 384. Because the younger king was a potential leader for a faction opposed to the elder king, Agesilaos perhaps found it expedient to allow conduct of the war to pass into his colleague's hands. He could now firm up his base at home, while still achieving

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18 Xen. Hell. 5.3.8; Diod. 15.22.2; see Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 289. Smith, "The Opposition to Agesilaos' Foreign Policy," Historia, 2 (1954), 48, believes that Teleutias' defeat in a war undertaken by Agesilaos' supporters may have caused the elder king to fear for his supremacy. This is perhaps an exaggeration, but that many Spartans and Peloponnesians were unhappy with Agesilaos is undeniable; see below.

19 These were bastards of helot men and Spartan women.

20 Xen. Hell. 5.3.9.

21 See ch. 6.

22 See ch. 7.

23 Parke, "The Development of the Second Spartan Empire," JHS, 50 (1930), 73, observes that Agesilaos' grand criterion for the entire period from 386-379 B.C. was expediency. This is the mark, of course, of any successful leader. Also dispatching Agesipolis to Potidaia could certainly be seen as expedient to Spartan interests as Agesilaos perceived them.
the dissolution of the Chalkidic league.24

Upon arriving at the Pallene, Agesipolis and his advisors were no more successful than Teleutias in drawing the Olynthians out from their walls during the rest of 381. The coming of spring found the defenders no more eager to engage the allied army.25 The reasons for the Olynthians' reluctance are two: they had laid in a large supply of grain after defeating Teleutias and were in awe of the Spartans' military might and the size of the army.

Agesipolis repeated the tactics of Teleutias by ravaging the countryside around the city. He also occupied the middle of the three Chalkidic "fingers," but as the season wore on, he fell ill with a high fever. Despite efforts to break the fever in the cold springs

24Cartledge, 289, thinks that the disagreement between the two kings was principled. He notes that Agesipolis was the instrument of Agesilaos' policy at Mantinea and Olynthos. Although there was internal opposition to Agesilaos, Cartledge points out that until the end of his reign the elder king's supporters either won over or silenced adversaries. Rice, "Agesilaos, Agesipolis and Spartan Politics, 386-379 B.C.," Historia, 23 (1974), 177, n.2, believes that Agesipolis had won the trust of many Spartans and allies especially by sparing, at his father's behest, the Mantineian exiles. By winning the war in the Chalkidike, Agesipolis could install a faction loyal to himself in Olynthos and strengthen the internal opposition to Agesilaos, perhaps even wresting control from him. This is an interesting view, but it rests primarily on speculation. It is more likely that most Spartans were agreed, though perhaps for differing reasons, that the Chalkidike league should be dissolved. In addition to Rice, 177-78, Cawkwell, "Agesilaos and Sparta," CQ, 26 (1976), 77-78 and Parke, 73, see Agesipolis' appointment as manipulation by the elder king. Still on the matter of the Olynthians, the two kings were likely in substantial agreement; but there were some Spartans who did not completely agree with Agesilaos' purposes and methods.

25Xen. Hell. 5.3.18; Diod. 15.22.2.
near the temple of Dionysos at Aphytis, Agesipolis never recovered and died by mid-summer 380. The Spartans, having encased his body in honey, as was customary for a dead king, sent it home to his relatives for burial. Agesipolis' exiled father Pausanias has left a tribute to his son in a Delphic inscription to commemorate his fourteen-year reign which began with the father's self-imposed exile in 394 after the battle of Haliartos.

The Spartans assigned Polybiades to Potidaia to conclude the war (fall 380). This officer was the son of the ephor Naukleides who had accompanied King Pausanias to Athens in 403. Since

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26 Aphytis lies about 15 km. southeast of Potidaia; see Hirschfeld, RE 1.2, 2801 and Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites, 70.

27 Xen. Hell. 5.3.19; Diod. 15.23.2; Paus. 3.5.9. Meyer, Vol. 5, 298-99, n.5, closely connects Agesipolis' campaign with Agesilaos' siege of Phlius to fix the chronology. Diodorus, who places his death in 380, is to be preferred to Xenophon whose version is vague and imprecise because of his emphasis on Agesilaos at Phlius.

28 For the inscription, see Tod, GHI, vol. 2, no. 120.

29 Xen. Hell. 5.3.20; Diod. 15.23.3.

30 Aristeides 14.7; Athenaios 550d; Schaefer, RE 21.2, 1440. Rice, 178, and Cawkwell, 78, observe that Agesilaos' supporters may not have been able to send one of their own to replace Agesipolis because of weakened influence. A more likely reason would be that Agesilaos was conducting the siege of Phlius. In any case, the younger king's supporters perhaps effected the appointment.
Polybiades' strategy was to reduce Olynthos to starvation, he invested the city by land and sea. In late spring or early summer 379, his campaign succeeded with the Olynthians' capitulation. They yielded to the harmost's tactical sense, his numerical superiority and famine by sending an embassy to Sparta to sue for peace. In exchange for lenient terms and the dissolution of the Chalkidic league, the Olynthians agreed to become full allies of Sparta. Following the Olynthians' example, other Chalkidic poleis also enrolled under the Spartan banner.

**Agesilaos and the Fall of Phlius, 381-379 B.C.**

The struggle against the Chalkidic league had begun as a project nurtured and controlled by Agesilaos. Some historians have inferred a decline in Agesilaos' influence because of resentment at the king's methods and his brother's considerable setback near Olynthos in 381. Whether this is so or not, an opportunity arose for Agesilaos

31 Demosthenes (19.264) almost makes it seem that Sparta, not Olynthos, sued for peace. Ryder, Koine Eirene, 45-47, discusses Sparta's uncharacteristic aggressiveness after 386 under Agesilaos and the differences between the two kings. See n. 6 above.

32 Xen. Hell. 5.3.26.

33 Diod. 15.23.4.

34 Rice, 178; Smith, 280; Parke, 72; Cawkwell, 78, suggests that Agesilaos' supporters perhaps obtained this command for him to shore up his sagging prestige. Another explanation is that Agesipolis was absent so a new "crisis" would come under Agesilaos' purvve, especially since Phlius was a Peloponnesian polis.
to take the field himself with the arrival of a legation from Phlious. Shortly after Agesipolis' departure in the summer of 381, a group of pro-Spartan oligarchs arrived in Lakedaimon. After Agesilaos had procured their restoration in 384, the ephors decreed that any disputes arising over confiscated property should be submitted to arbitration. On this occasion the oligarchs brought some Phliasian citizens to corroborate their claim that contrary to the settlement of 384, they were not receiving justice because the democrats controlled the boards of inquiry set up to restore disputed property. After hearing their plea, the ephors were persuaded to call out the ban because word arrived from Phlious that the democrats had fined the oligarchs for an unauthorized visit to Lakedaimon. Here was precisely the pretext Agesilaos needed to stamp out the last major pocket of independence in the Peloponnesos. With Agesipolis in the Chalkidike he had a free hand to take charge of the levy in what was essentially a local

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35 Xen. Hell. 5.2.8-10; as noted in ch. 7, Phlious was a small, but prosperous community just east of the Asopos River about seven km. northwest of Nemea; see Meyer, RE 20.1, 272-73 and the Princeton Encyclopedia, 707-08. In 384 the oligarchs had persuaded the Spartans to deliver an ultimatum to Phlious' democratic government without examining the merits of the exiles' allegations. See also Legon, "Phliasian Politics and Policy in the Early Fourth Century B.C.," Historia, 16 (1967), 325, 327, and 321.

36 The Spartans bore a grudge against the Phliasians since 394 for pleading "holy truces" to excuse themselves from participating in the battle of Nemea. Also they refused to admit Spartans into Phlious until Iphikrates' peltasts routed them in 391; Xen. Hell. 4.2.16, 4.4.15. Legon, 330, n.2, believes that the democrats retained control in 391 because the Spartans were bogged down in a war on two fronts. See also ch. 7.
operation. 37

As soon as sacrifices proved favorable, the king set forth to besiege the small city. He was met by several delegations offering him money to turn back, but he spurned them all. His response to their entreaties was that he was not marching to do injustice, but rather to rectify it. The only way for the Phliasians to avoid war would be to consent to the occupation of their akropolis by a Spartan garrison. The democratic government would obviously reject this condition because it would set the stage for an oligarchic assumption of power. 38 That Agesilaos would make such a demand the sole condition for peace shows that he intended to abolish the democracy. 39

With the inevitable rejection of his demands by the Phliasian government, Agesilaos led his troops to the outskirts of the polis and began to construct a wall of encirclement. In a sentence of

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37 Xen. Hell. 5.3.10-13. Xenophon notes in classic understatement that ἰὴν δὲ σὺν τῷ Ἀγασίπολι καθομένῳ τιμᾷ. He also observes that the Phliasian democrats erred in believing that the Spartans would not attack because Agesipolis was absent. By 381, however, it is likely that any activity on the near side of the Isthmos was considered "local," so it would not be necessary for the other king to remain in Lakedaimon proper. In addition the Phliasian oligarchs had a long-standing relationship with Agesilaos' family. An elder oligarch had been Archidamos' ζένος while Prokles, a younger man, was ζένος to Agesilaos.

38 Xen. Hell. 4.4.15.

39 Rice, 178, suggests that Agesilaos was determined to crush the Phliasian democracy to offset a more lenient settlement by Agesipolis' partisans at Olynthos. There is, however, no real evidence to support this assertion, even if it is true.
remarkable candor Xenophon comes as close to censuring Agesilaos as he can bring himself by writing that many Lakedaimonians said that for the sake of a few, they were becoming hateful to a city of over 5,000. 40

Because the defenders would hold their assemblies in full view of the besiegers, a measure was needed to counter the effectiveness of their resistance. Agesilaos therefore urged the exiles to make common mess with any sympathizers from the city who might flee the walls. The exiles were to supply arms and training to these defectors without regard to expense. 41 When over 1,000 Phliasians eventually joined the allied force, even those opposed to Agesilaos' designs were compelled to admit that he was a man of great political and tactical sagacity. 42 Moreover, the Phliasian defectors were seen as useful comrades in arms and the number of defenders had now fallen to 4,000.

As the siege wore on, by the next summer (380) matters had begun to stagnate when news reached the army at Phlious of Agesipolis' death on the Pallene. Because of the kings' somewhat differing aims

40 Xen. Hell. 5.3.16. Hertzberg, Das Leben des Agesilaos II, 157, 329, believes that such overtly political advocacy by Agesilaos undercut any hope for a Panhellenic crusade against Persia, but see footnote 6 above.

41 Xen. Hell. 5.3.16.

42 Xen. Hell. 5.3.17. Legon, 333, n. 61, observes that the one thousand who eventually defected, compared with the original 5,000 heads in the assembly, gives a rough ratio of oligarchs to democrats.
and personalities, some expected Agesilaos to rejoice at the demise of a rival, but the elder king showed a sincere regret as he and Agesipolis had been personal friends.\(^{43}\)

By the spring of 379, Agesilaos realized that the Phliasians were holding out longer than he had expected because the city had laid in a sizeable supply of grain and had voted to cut daily rations in half.\(^{44}\) Another reason for the city's staunch defense was the leadership of Delphion and a group of 300 die-hard supporters.\(^{45}\) This group would sally forth at night from time to time to harass the men who were building the siege wall. Throughout most of the siege, they had also kept up the spirits of the other defenders in the face of the enemy and defections by friends of the oligarchs.\(^{46}\) At last, however, the shortage of food grew critical which forced the courageous Delphion to request safe conduct to Lakedaimon. He told

\(^{43}\) Xen. Hell. 5.3.19-20; Diod. 15.19.3-4. Isokrates (4.126) bitterly denounces the Spartans for their simultaneous campaigns in 380 at Phlious and Olynthos.

\(^{44}\) Hell. 5.3.21. Legon, 333-34, suggests that the defenders' last chance for successful resistance collapsed with Agesipolis' death. Because the Phliasians may have hoped for an equitable settlement had the younger king lived, Agesilaos perhaps sensed that their last reason for holding out died with Agesipolis. Nonetheless they did hold out until the following spring, nearly a year longer.

\(^{45}\) See Kirchner, RE 4.2, 2517. Delphion is unknown except for Xenophon's description of him in his account of the siege of Phlious.

\(^{46}\) Hell. 5.3.22.
Agesilaos that his supporters wished to leave the city's fate in the hands of the Spartan authorities. Unfortunately Agesilaos saw through Delphion's ruse and resented the slight to his own authority. He therefore sent word to the Spartans that he be allowed to decide the defenders' fate, after which he granted Delphion safe conduct. 47

The Phliasian leader must have suspected Agesilaos' deceit for he and a "marked desperado" who was a master thief escaped in the night. This escape occurred after Agesilaos had ordered tighter security to prevent such things. When the legates returned to Phlious with news that Agesilaos would determine the settlement, the city surrendered. Rather than risk opprobrium, Agesilaos decreed that a committee of 100 citizens, fifty exiles and fifty who had stayed in the city, decide who would live and who would die. Thus he assured a pro-Spartan oligarchy would take power since this committee would also draw up the laws by which the city would be governed. 48 In effect the Phliasians would impose the oligarchy on themselves under the watchful eyes of the harmost and garrison which Agesilaos had funded for six months. Thus ended the experiment in democracy in the second of the two anomalous cities in the Peloponnesos which had

47 Xen. Hell. 5.3.23-24.

48 Xen. Hell. 5.3.25. Legon, 334, believes that all 100 members of the committee were oligarchs. Ryder, 52, believes that 50 were democrats.
built walls and evolved away from aristocracy.49 After a twenty-months' siege, Agesilaos disbanded the Peloponnesian levy and led his own men back to Sparta.50

Sparta and Greece in the Autumn of 379

Virtually all ancient sources agree that with the conclusion of the campaigns against Olynthos and Phlious, Sparta stood alone and unchallenged, the most powerful by far of all the Greek states. Any dissent or independent course within the Isthmos or beyond it had been neutralized or crushed. Her alliance with the Persian dynasty was intact, she enjoyed cordial relations with Makedonia and in the far West, Dionysios I of Syracuse was still firmly committed and on friendly terms.51 Under Agesilaos' leadership the Spartans had chosen to interpret the autonomy clause of the King's Peace in a manner expedient to

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49Cawkwell, "Agesilaos and Sparta," CQ, 26 (1976), 75, believes that the fate of Mantineia and Phlious was sealed because they stood in violation of the basic thrust of Peloponnesian life. Democracies in large, populated centers protected by walls were anathema to a landed aristocracy which relied on "traditional values" for internal stability and cooperation with the Spartan alliance (not fortified towns) for security from external threats.

50Brief allusions to the Spartan suppression of Phlious also appear in Xenophon's Ages. 2.21; Isok. 4.126 and Diod. 15.19.3. Isokrates'use of the present tense to describe in 380 the simultaneous operations at Olynthos and Phlious is quite apt.

51These alliances date, of course, to the end of the Korinthian War. See Bengtson, Staatsverträge 2, 188-95.
their own purposes. Within the Peloponnesos recalcitrant or un-enthusiastic states suffered chastisement. The form of this chastisement was usually the imposition of a harmost and garrison, the introduction of a πάτριος πολιτεία and absorption into the Peloponnesian alliance. The only exception was Argos, but the dissolution of the Argive-Korinthian sympolity in 386 had left the Argives helpless and isolated.

Beyond the Isthmos the Spartans used the threat of Persian help to dissolve by force hostile coalitions threatful to themselves as προστάται of Hellas. The first victims of this narrow and rigid interpretation were the Boiotians who were compelled in 386 to dissolve their league. Similarly the Olynthians' league was dismantled in the wake of friendly overtures to the Athenians and Thebans. In every instance, the individual states made separate treaties with Sparta, not the Peloponnesian alliance.52

As noted earlier, except for lack of a strong naval presence and garrisons in Asia, Agesilaos' leadership came to resemble Lysander's and even more that of his older half-brother Agis.53 He displayed a strong and consistent antipathy to the Thebans which culminated in the secret orders to occupy the Kadmeia. For Agesilaos mere dissolution of

52See Ryder, 51, and note 6 above.

53Agis had chastised and then absorbed Elis into the Peloponnesian alliance while Herippidas had occupied Herakleia of Trachis before Agesilaos' accession; see ch. 2. A sharp point of difference between Agesilaos and Lysander was that Agesilaos did not attempt to install narrowly constituted cliques loyal only to himself as had Lysander after 404.
the Boiotian league was not enough; the Thebans must be brought to heel for their final affront in refusing under Ismenias and Androkleidas to participate in the Olynthian war. This action is perfectly consistent with the king's grudge against Thebes ever since the spoilt sacrifices at Aulis. With the occupation of the Kadmeia, the reduction of Phlious and the dismemberment of the Chalkidic league, Agesilaos' politics and policy had come to full and triumphant fruition.

The best ancient assessments of the Spartans' overweening presence in the Greek world of 379 B.C. are three. Xenophon writes that the Thebans and other Boiotians were completely in the Spartans' control, that the Korinthians' loyalty was unswerving, that the Argives had been humbled and the Athenians isolated while all recalcitrants in the alliance had been punished. He concludes his review of the Spartan αρχή with the following remark: παντάπωσιν ἡ ἡλικία καὶ ἀσφαλείς ἡ ἀρχή ἔδοκει αὐτοῖς κατασκευάσθαι...

54 See ch. 3.

55 Hell. 5.3.27. Xenophon uses the irony of the ἔδοκει to introduce his version of the liberation of the Kadmeia. The Olynthian-Athenian treaty of 383 was dissolved when the Spartans absorbed the Chalkidic poleis into their ἀρχή. See Bengtson, Staatsverträge 2, 199, 201. This completed the Athenians' ἡμελημένος by Sparta.
Isokrates also describes the nature and extent of the Spartan hegemony, but does so in largely disparaging tones. His purpose, especially in the Panegyrikos and the Peace, is to decry the Spartans' (and other Greeks') unsuitability to confront their despotic foes to the east. His writings also contain an occasional reference to the Spartans' subdued naval presence in the Aegean in the years after the King's Peace. 56

Diodorus' evaluation of the Spartan hegemony is even more blunt than Xenophon's. His description of the extent of Spartan influence accords well with that of Xenophon, but he adds that the basis of their power was the other Greeks' fear of their military might. 57 In his description of events in 377/76, Diodorus mentions that the Spartans controlled the Cycladic islands of Skiathos and Peparethos. 58 In addition Agesilaos had extended the net of Spartan influence, if not control, to Thessaly and Makedonia with the conclusion

56 Isok. 4.117, 121, 125-28, 132, 175. Lysias' Olympiakos of 384 had similar sentiments. See note 6 and Grote, Vol. 9, 34, n.1; Busolt/Swoboda, 204; and Ryder, 44, for date.

57 Diod. 15.23.3-5. Part of the Spartans' strength in this Ephoran version lay in πολυανθρωπία, but as noted earlier the Spartiate population during these years had actually declined. What Diodorus must mean, therefore, is that the Spartans relied on their perioikoi and helots. See Cartledge, 307, and ch. 2.

58 Diod. 15.28.2, 30.5. Other allusions to a Spartan naval presence in the Aegean occur in Plut. Pelop. 15.1; Demosthenes' de falsa legatione 4.25; Xen. Hell. 5.4.56 and Lak. Pol. 14.2,4. See also Parke, 41, 73; and Cawkwell, 79, who remarks that Agesilaos never fully grasped the potential of sea power even when he was supreme commander by both land and sea in 395 (ch. 4).
of the Olynthian campaign. 59

Throughout the period from 386-379 B.C. there was some grumbling about Agesilaos' aims and methods. In general Agesipolis and his supporters tended to be more tolerant of democratic leanings in Spartan allies and were not eager to interfere directly in the allies' internal affairs. 60 Also there were those who perhaps still yearned to exploit the rich areas of Asia or, more altruistically, to free the Asian Greeks from Persian suzerainty. This last group, perhaps the remnants of Lysander's supporters, must have long since given up hope of recovering the pre-eminence enjoyed by Sparta in Greek Asia from 404-394. The accommodation reached with the Great King in 387 effectively precluded any such ventures for the foreseeable future.

Because Lysander had been dead for sixteen years in the autumn of 379, and Agesipolis had died a year earlier, we must conclude that the great majority of the Lakedaimonians supported the hegemony forged by the elder king. 61 In point of fact, not only the

59 See the speech of the Thessalian Polydamas (Xen. Hell. 6.1.2) delivered in 374, but with retrospective allusions. Thessaly and Makedonia were not formally bound to Sparta, but to some extent they had accepted Spartan leadership and guidance.

60 See Cawkwell, 75-77; Rice, "Agesilaos, Agesipolis and Spartan Politics, 386-379 B.C.," Historia, 23 (1974), 165; Smith, 279-80 and Hamilton, 326-27, for the notion of three distinct factions competing for power in Sparta after 404 B.C.

61 Cawkwell, 78, speculates that Agesilaos perhaps acquiesced to Agesipolis' conduct of the Olynthian war because he and his supporters may not have been in full control after Teleutias' defeat
King's Peace, which ceded Greek Asia to the Persians, but political realities precluded any sort of Lysian or Isokrater Panhellenism based on a crusade against the Great King. 62

Sparta's hegemony in the fall of 379 seemed assured and Agesilaos' policies triumphant. Although her position was secure, it was not unassailable as events would soon make clear. The emergence of new coalitions and political alignments in Greece which led to the overthrow of the Spartan hegemony began with the liberation of Thebes. 63

The Liberation of Thebes, Dec. 379 B.C.

Apart from the implications for the Spartans, the coup at Thebes in early winter 379/78 B.C. was one of the swiftest and most remarkable turn of events in recent Greek history. No author, ancient or modern, has failed to compare it either with Phoibidas' exploit and death in 381. More to the point, however, is his remark, 77, that Agesilaos' φιλεταιρία worked, where his opponents' toleration of democracies had failed. Smith, 278, notes that in 381 Agesilaos was unpopular with the allies, while Agesipolis was not, but correctly asserts that control of Spartan policy was still firmly in the elder king's hands.

62 Hertzberg, 157, 329, tries to show that Agesilaos' policies prevented such a crusade despite a sort of wistful longing for it in some quarters of Greece. In fact Agesilaos was far too practical a man of affairs to be deluded about its impossibility. Cawkwell, 71, writes that there is no evidence that Agesilaos ever gave up his Panhellenism, but he simply faced the fact that in the 380's and 370's an anti-Persian crusade was unrealistic. See also note 6 above.

63 Cartledge, 289-90, has remarked, "already, then, before 379, there were indications that the feet of the Spartan colossus might be
in 382 or Thrasyboulos’ restoration of the Athenian democracy in 403. Even the Lakonophile Xenophon felt compelled to write that justice was on the side of the Thebans. 64

While Xenophon’s is the only surviving account more or less contemporary with the events, his narrative is flawed in places and requires supplementation and correction by the much later versions of Diodorus and Plutarch. 65

Because of vexation with Spartan behavior since 386, Athens provided fertile ground for a Theban counter-insurgency. As noted in chapter seven, 66 the Athenians favorably received some 300 exiles, of ceramic composition. Within a decade, the feet had crumbled and the giant had been toppled from his pedestal."

64 *Hell.* 5.4.1.

65 Schäfer, *Die Berichte Xenophons, Plutarchs und Diodors über die Bestzung und Befreiung Thebens, 382-379 v. Chr.*, Munich, 1930, 19-22, 68-71, 73, 77, and Judeich, "Athen und Theben vom Königsfrieden bis zum Schlacht bei Leuktra," *Rh.M.*, 76 (1927), 172-80, discuss the difficulties in trying to reconstruct what happened from the divergent accounts preserved by our three principal sources. Schäfer purports to see a Theban tradition stemming from the lost histories of Kallisthenes in Plutarch’s *Pelopidas* and *Daimonion of Sokrates*. He also thinks Diodorus’ version represents a balance of Theban and Athenian perspectives attributable to Ephoros. Xenophon, Schäfer believes, writes in a moralistic vein, attempting to reconcile Athenian and Spartan viewpoints with a distinctly anti-Theban bias. This bias results in his omission of any mention of Epameinondas or Pelopidas. The weakness in Plutarch is that he neglects to note the Athenian role in the coup. Because of the tenuous nature of the evidence, some of the details of this analysis have been challenged. See Pearson, *The Lost Histories of Alexander*, 32; and Jacoby, *Fr.Gr.H.* 28.2, 420-32.

66 Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.31; Diod. 15.20.2.
whose leader was Androkleidas, colleague of the executed Ismenias, after the fall of the Kadmeia. Although Kallistratos of Aphidna's timorous pro-Spartan faction controlled the Athenian government, democratic and anti-Spartan elements abounded. For this reason, the refugees could expect to find aid and comfort, especially in view of Theban hospitality to Thrasyboulos' group in 404/03.⁶⁷

Athenian hospitality and Androkleidas' murder proved the catalysts necessary for a conspiracy. Leontiades' faction in Thebes ordered the murder of the exile leader and others, but the assassins failed except for Androkleidas. With the deaths of Ismenias and Androkleidas the anti-Spartan group, which favored a strong Boiotian league, was leaderless. Although many of the exiles were frightened and demoralized by the assassination, Pelopidas succeeded in keeping their spirits up. As the months turned to years, Pelopidas gradually emerged as the most prominent of the exiled patriots. Under his prodding the exiles slowly realized that they could not remain in Athens indefinitely. Both honor and expediency demanded a bold stroke to expel the traitorous tyrants and Spartan garrison from their city. An opportunity arose when Phyllidas, a friend of the exile Melon, visited Athens and was won over.⁶⁸ Another Theban, Charon, whose name was grimly appropriate, shared Phyllidas' revulsion for the

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⁶⁷ Rice, "Xenophon, Diodorus and the Year 379/78 B.C.," Yale Classical Studies, 24 (1975), 97-98, n.9, trenchantly discusses the significance of factional politics in both Athenian and Spartan affairs and their interrelation to one another. See also Judeich, 175-80.

⁶⁸ Xenophon (Hell. 5.4.2) implies that Phyllidas was secretary to the polemarchs at the time of his visit. Plutarch (Moral. 595a-b,
polemarchs and offered his house as a base within the city.

After a day was set for the coup, the conspirators secretly left Athens to enter Thebes at nightfall. Pherenikos was left in charge of the bulk of the exiles at the frontier between Attika and Boiotia. With this group there was also a contingent of Athenian volunteers commanded by two strategoi. The sequence of events for the next two or three days is quite confused and in places the testimony is contradictory. Numerous discrepancies of detail occur in Plutarch and Xenophon's versions and there are even some differences between the two narratives of Plutarch.

The time was December and the occasion was a festival of Aphrodite which coincided with the winter solstice. The conspirators set out on foot, entered Thebes at dusk and assembled at Charon's house. While their fellows and the Athenian volunteers

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Pelop. 7.1-3) writes that he contrived to become their secretary later.

69 Xen. Hell. 5.4.3, 9; Plutarch (Pelop. 8.1), as noted above, makes no mention of this Athenian aid.

70 Grote, Vol. 8, 77-83, follows Plutarch for detail, noting where he differs from Xenophon. Beloch 3.2, 234-35, as Delacey and Einarson in the Loeb edition, 362-64, observes that the differences between Xenophon and Plutarch are irreconcilable. Schäfer, 51-63, examines the matter in great detail as an exercise in Quellenforschung, but cannot establish with any certainty the merits of one version over another. See also Meyer, Vol. 5, 365, n.1.


72 According to Xenophon (Hell. 5.4.3), there were seven conspirators led by Melon. He assigns a lapse of two days from their massing at the frontier to the tyrannicide. Plutarch (Pelop. 8.1-
waited at the border, the conspirators made their final preparations for the deed. On the night of the festival Phyllidas arranged a dinner at the polemarcheion to celebrate the end of the tyrants' year in office. As Phyllidas had promised, a group of hetairai and komasts arrived after the meal. These of course were the disguised conspirators who, suddenly doffing their outer garments, stabbed Archias and Philippos to death. A second group led by Pelopidas went to Leontiades' house, pretending to have a message from the polemarchs. Leontiades grew suspicious at the sight of the group, however, and reached for his sword. Despite a courageous effort, he was overwhelmed by the more numerous conspirators and killed. A third polemarch, Hypates, tried to flee across the rooftops near his house, but he too eventually perished at the hands of the liberators.

9.1) writes that there were twelve conspirators and that they entered Thebes disguised as hunters during an evening snowstorm with only one day between departure and deed. Xenophon's chronology is probably better.

Since Plutarch specifies the Thriasian plain as the point of departure, the most likely sites would be the border fortresses of Eleutherai and Oinoe on the spurs of Mt. Kithairon. See Weisner, RE 20.1, 1011-13; Princeton Encyclopedia, 70; and The Blue Guide to Greece, 209 with map.

Xen. Hell. 5.4.6-7 ascribes leadership of the second group to Phyllidas. He cites no figures, but Plutarch (Moral. 596a-b, Pelop. 9.1) states that the number of conspirators in the city eventually grew to forty-eight.

This detail is preserved only in Plutarch (Moral. 596 and Pelop. 11.6).
Pelopidas and Melon then proclaimed the tyrants' death and the liberation of the city while calling the citizens to assembly. They also sent for the rest of the exiles and the Athenian volunteers at the border after releasing all political prisoners incarcerated by the tyrants. Some Theban Lakonophiles with the Spartan garrison managed to barricade themselves on the Kadmeia during the uproar in the city. 76

At daybreak the newly armed citizens and freed prisoners launched an assault on the Kadmeia. Two of the three Spartan commanders had sent an urgent request for help to Thespiai and Plataia during the night, but within a few days they agreed to surrender to the new government in exchange for safe conduct. 77 As the Spartan garrison filed out of the city with the Theban Lakonophiles, only the Athenians' intervention cut short a massacre of those who had supported the tyrants. The survivors were then allowed to depart in peace with the Lakedaimonians. 78

With the recapture of their city, the death or expulsion of the Lakonophiles and the departure of the Spartan garrison the Theban

76 Xen. Hell. 5.3.8-10; Plut. Morai. 596, Pelop. 12.3-4. The number of those who fled to the Kadmeia was 1500.
77 Xen. Hell. 5.4.10-12. A third officer chanced to be in Haliartos at the time of the coup, Plut. Pelop. 13, Morai. 597a.
78 Xen. Hell. 5.4.12.
patriots had ushered in a new era in the struggle for supremacy in Greece. Agesilaos' designs for hegemony were now in jeopardy. A rupture had appeared in his network of control beyond the Isthmos. The simple expedient of manipulating opponents at home while imposing docile oligarchies in other poleis was shown to be not without serious risk. Only a few months before the Theban coup, virtually all trace of dissent in European Greece had been silenced or crushed. Sparta stood at the zenith of her political and military ascendancy. Agesilaos, the architect of this pre-eminent position, appeared vindicated in full. It is ironic, therefore, that the first fissure in the king's hegemony should occur with the success of his bitterest foes, the exiles of Thebes.

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79 Diodorus (15.23.1-3) gives a terse notice of the tyrannicide. In his version the tyrants were killed at home in their sleep. At dawn the citizens assembled and launched an attack against the 1500 Spartans and Lakonophiles who had fled during the night to the Kadmeia. Nepos (Pelop. 2.1-4.1) also summarizes the coup briefly. A final curt and rather garbled notice of the tyrannicide appears in Polyainos 2.4.3, but for the historian's purposes, it is virtually worthless.

80 Even Agesilaos' friend and admirer Xenophon (Hell. 5.4.1) adverts directly to the implications of the Thebans' success which he links closely to the eventual collapse of the Spartan hegemony. He cannot bring himself to credit the role played by Epameinondas and Pelopidas, however, which leads Schafer, 60-61, to speculate that Xenophon has set forth the official Spartan version of the coup.

81 Despite appearances, Beloch 3.1, 146-47; Parke, 74; Cawkwell, 80; and Cartledge, 290, all note that Sparta's position was not as secure as it may have seemed in the autumn of 379.
CHAPTER IX

SPARTA'S RESPONSE TO THE THEBANS, SPHODRIAS' RAID
AND AGESILAOS' CAMPAIGNS IN BOIOTIA, 378-377 B.C.

By January of 378, the Theban Lakonophiles and the Spartan garrison in the Kadmeia had surrendered. With the departure of these people, Pelopidas, Melon and Epameinondas set about the business of forming a government in the city and reconstituting the Boiotian league. The new government's first diplomatic initiative had been to dispatch a conciliatory legation to Sparta while the garrison was still blockaded. The Spartans, however, rebuffed this overture. 1

With the rejection of the Theban embassy, Agesilaos easily persuaded the ephors to call out the ban. He decided this time (unlike at Mantinea in 385 and Olynthos in 381) not to manipulate the young king but rather to decline the honor of command himself, citing his more than forty years of military service. 2 The real reason for

1 Isokrates (Plat. 29) shows that the Thebans made this gesture in the hopes of avoiding a war. So soon after the coup, despite the aid of Athenian volunteers, they could not be sure of Athens' official support. Rice, "Xenophon, Diodorus, Etc.," 104, observes that Isokrates has deliberately distorted the purpose of this legation to put the Thebans in a bad light, but with Xenophon's testimony (Hell. 5.4.10-12) and that of Deinarchos (Contra Demosth. 38-39), Isokrates' remarks confirm the unofficial participation of some Athenians in the coup. See also Schäfer, 3.2, 324. Meyer, Vol. 5, 367-68, believes that the Theban embassy mentioned by Isokrates occurred after Kleombrotos' incursion.

2 Xen. Hell. 5.4.14; Plut. Ages. 24.2-3; Diod. 15.27.3.
his decision was concern that after his advocacy of the Philiasian oligarchs, he would again be seen as a friend of tyrants were he to take the field against the Thebans. Moreover, there is evidence of great internal stress at Sparta immediately after the events at Thebes. Bearing these things in mind and the fact that he was renowned for his animosity against Thebes, Agesilaos stepped aside.

3Plut. Ages. 24.3. Agesilaos had seen to it that the ephors made the same demand of the Theban legates as they had of the Philiasians: restoration of the exiles. This naturally was the one condition Pelopides, Epameinondas and Melon could not agree to which made war inevitable.

4After assuming command of the allied force, the young king Kleombrotos had two of the three officers in charge of the garrison at Thebes executed for failing to await reinforcements. One of these officers may have been Herippidas, a long time collaborator of both Lysander and Agesilaos. Plutarch (Moral. 597a) is our only source for the names of these officers, but his text is corrupt. Hertzberg, Das Leben des Agesilaos, 159, accepts the reading Herippidas as do Delacey and Einarson who provide a full discussion of the problem, Loeb Moralia, Vol. 7, 441, 509. Athenaios (Deipnosophistai 609b) in a discussion of beautiful women reports that Agesilaos contrived the execution of Xeinopeitheia and her daughter Chryse during a period of factional strife. Xeinopeitheia, reputedly the most beautiful woman in the Peloponnesos, was the wife of Lysandridas, one of the three officers in charge of the Kadmeia. Because he was away in Haliartos at the time of the garrison's surrender, he was spared the death penalty. Nevertheless the fine assessed against him was so ruinous that he chose exile rather than reduction in status to ὑπομεῖων. At the time of the death of Xeinopeitheia and Chryse, Agesilaos was described as κατωτατομικός. See Meyer, Vol. 5, 367, n.1; Jacoby, Fr.Gr.H., 2B.1, 587 (fragment 240 Theopompos). Also at this time Agesilaos had the contents of Alkmene's tomb at Haliartos transferred to Sparta upon oracular instigation. All that remained was a bracelet, a stone, two urns and a large bronze tablet inscribed with what seemed to be Egyptian hieroglyphics. Agesilaos ordered that copies of the inscription be sent to Nektanebis who became Pharoah in 380 B.C. He requested an interpretation, but no word is preserved of any response; see Plut. Moral. 577e. See also Pieper, RE 16.2, 2234 and Beloch, 3.2, 123-24. The removal of Alkmene's body and the substitution
The internal wrangling at Sparta in the early weeks of 379 made it clear that Agesilaos' strong anti-Theban policy had failed.\(^5\)

It was nonetheless incumbent upon the Spartans to make some sort of response to the Thebans' rejection of their demand to take back the exiles. Kleombrotos, the younger brother of Agesipolis, who had become king upon the latter's death in 380, therefore obtained his first field command.\(^6\)

Kleombrotos led the allied army into Boiotia through the pass defended by the Athenian fortress of Eleutherai which was located some 17 km. south of Thebes.\(^7\) He carefully avoided a clash with Chabrias' Athenian peltasts, but turning west, he routed a group of Theban irregulars composed of the freed political prisoners. After passing through Plataia and Thespiai, he eventually reached Kynos-

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\(^5\) See Smith, "The Opposition to Agesilaos' Foreign Policy," 282, and Rice, "Xenophon, Diodorus, etc.," 105.

\(^6\) Xen. \textit{Hell.} 5.4.13-14; Plut. \textit{Ages.} 24.2-3; Diod. 15.27.3. Hertzberg, 159; and Rice, 104-05, have seen Agesilaos' decision not to take command as another instance of his strategy of allowing those opposed to him to bear the onus of carrying out his designs. In this view Kleombrotos' command would ease the vexation against Agesilaos, deprive his rivals of a strong leader and permit him to keep a close watch on matters at home. Finally, just as in 385 at Mantineia, if the youthful king were to falter, Agesilaos could come to his rescue. Should he succeed, he would merely advance the elder king's policy. See especially Rice, 105.

\(^7\) See Milchhofer, \textit{RE} 5.2, 2345; \textit{The Blue Guide to Greece}, 1978,
Kephalaí before returning to Boiotia for sixteen days. Because his was not a full levy, Kleombrotos merely reinforced Spartan outposts in Boiotia, such as Plataia and Thespiai, rather than attempting to force a pitched battle with the Thebans. Although most strategic passes to the south were garrisoned by Athenians and the winter precluded adequate provisions for a longer campaign, his men were somewhat puzzled when Kleombrotos ordered two-thirds of the force back to the Isthmos. Before leaving Boiotia the young king had made Sphodrias harmost at Thespiai, leaving him a sum of money for recruiting mercenaries and one-third of the allied troops.

In order to avoid entrapment between hostile Boiotian or even Athenian forces, Kleombrotos withdrew along the coastal road of Kreusis. After losing some animals and equipment during a violent storm near Aigosthena in the Megarid, Kleombrotos disbanded the army and went home.

363; and The Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites, 368-69.

8 Xen. Hell. 5.4.14-15. This transpired after the trial and execution of the officers who had surrendered the Kadmeia. The site of the trial was Megara; Plut. Pelop. 13; Diod. 15.27.3.


10 Xen. Hell. 5.4.15.

11 Xen. Hell. 5.4.15.

12 Xen. Hell. 5.4.17-18. Hammond, "The Main Road from Boiotia to the Peloponnese through the northern Megarid," ABSA, 49 (1954), 103-22, discusses the extremely rugged and at times hazardous topography of this coastal area.
During the incursion, which his troops believed was inconclusive, Kleombrotos accomplished the following. First he executed two of the three officers who were present at the surrender of the Kadmeia and fined a third who went into exile.\textsuperscript{13} Also in passing through the Isthmos, his show of strength tempered the reaction of some Korinthians who were ready to revolt from the alliance.\textsuperscript{14} Finally his march dramatically cooled the anti-Spartan ardor of certain Athenians and induced the assembly to condemn to death the two generals who had aided the Theban uprising unofficially. One was in fact executed, while the other fled into exile. At the same time other pro-Theban citizens faced trial on lesser charges.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{Sphodrias' Misadventure in Attika}

While Kleombrotos' army was penetrating central Greece as far as Kynoskephalai, Agesilaos sent a legation to Athens whose mission

\textsuperscript{13}See Plut. \textit{Pelop.} 13, \textit{Moral.} 597a; Diod. 15.27.3.

\textsuperscript{14}Xen. \textit{Hell.} 5.4.19.

\textsuperscript{15}Plut. \textit{Pelop.} 14.1. Rice, "Xenophon, Diodorus, etc.," 97, n.1, believes that Kallistratos of Aphidna's mildly pro-Spartan party instigated these trials to conciliate Agesilaos, whose legates arrived in Athens at this time to urge neutrality. See Hertzberg, 162-63, and Rice, 111.
was to discourage any aid to the Theban insurgents. Kallias, the Spartans' proxenos at Athens, received the three legates Etymokles, Aristolochos and Okyllos at his home. 16 As noted above, the arrival of these legates and Kleombrotos' swift midwinter march induced the assembly to condemn the two adventurous strategoi to death. 17 Thus the Spartans' initiatives in the wake of Pelopidas and Melon's coup were at least partially effective. Although they had not regained control of the Kadmeia, they had shown the rest of the Greek world, especially the Athenians, that they were prepared to maintain the order imposed with the King's Peace by force if need be. 18 Despite the elder king's diplomacy and Kleombrotos' show of strength beyond the Isthmos, a series of events set in motion by the harmost at Thespiai would make war once again inevitable in Greece.

Shortly after Kleombrotos' return to Sparta and the trial of the strategoi at Athens, Sphodrias set out from Thespiai at sunset

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16 Xen. Hell. 5.4.22.

17 Hertzberg, 163, has observed that Agesilaos was responsible for this mission because Etymokles, the chief legate, was one of his partisans; see Xen. Hell. 5.4.32. It is possible that the Thebans' conciliatory, though failed, legation to Sparta dates to the aftermath of Kleombrotos' incursion; see note 1 above.

18 Agesilaos' interpretation of the autonomy clause worked with special severity against the Thebans and the Boiotian league (see ch. 7) in part because of his hostility to the Thebans, but also because he perceived the threat posed to Spartan supremacy in central Greece by a united Boiotia. There is evidence that shortly after the tyrannicide at Thebes, Pelopidas and the other leaders had swiftly taken steps to revive the Boiotian league; see Plut. Pelop. 13.1, Moral. 597a; Polybios 6.43, 44.9; and Paus. 9.1.5. Plutarch notes
in order to capture the Peiraeus. By daybreak he had led his troops some 50 km. to the vicinity of Eleusis in the Thriasian plain. Unfortunately for his intentions, he was still 20 km. short of the harbor. In anger and frustration he pillaged a few houses and seized some cattle before retreating to Thespiai. When a general alarm was sounded in Attika, the hoplites and other citizens naturally rushed to repel what they thought was a major invasion. As the truth became apparent, the Athenians dispatched legates to Sparta with a demand for an explanation and justice. The Spartans, however, had anticipated this reaction, having laid capital charges against Sphodrias. Realizing the enormity of his error, the harmost chose to disregard the ephors' summons in fear for his life.

That Sphodrias' raid was even undertaken points up the difference in purpose between Agesilaos' partisans and those of

that the citizens' assembly elected Melon, Pelopidas and two others Boiotarchs, not polemarchs, for 378. At first the Thebans were largely alone except for their alliance with the Athenians (see below), but by 376 they had restored most of the Boiotian league with the expulsion of the last Spartan garrisons. See Busolt/Swoboda, 1423-24 and Meyer, Vol. 5, 380-81.

19 This is the figure cited by Beloch 3.1, 147 which can be obtained by consulting topographical maps such as that of the Blue Guide to Greece, 1978 ed. Cary, CAH 6, 66-67, gives the distance as 45 miles, a rather large figure, and he believes that the march may have started at Plataia. See also n. 25.

20 Xen. Hell. 5.4.20-24; Plut. Ages. 24.3-6; Pelop. 14.1-3; and Kallisthenes fr. 9 in Jacoby, Fr.Gr.H., Vol. 2B.1, 643; Jacoby, Vol. 2B.2, 418, does not allude to the possibility that Sphodrias acted on Kleombrotos' orders.
Kleombrotos. Xenophon and Plutarch\textsuperscript{21} explain the raid as the result of Sphodrias' foolish vanity and a bribe offered by an agent of Melon, Pelopidas and Gorgidas. According to this version the Theban agent convinced Sphodrias that not only was such a feat possible,\textsuperscript{22} but were the harmost to bring it off, his renown would eclipse even that of Phoibidas who had seized the Kadmeia in 382. Thus fired by ambition and idle hopes, Sphodrias made his ill-fated attempt.\textsuperscript{23}

As soon as the danger had passed, the Athenians arrested the three legates sent by Agesilaos to assure the Athenians' neutrality and urge the prosecution of the two strategoi.\textsuperscript{24} Etymokles was able to persuade his captors, however, that the legates were innocent of any complicity in Sphodrias' attack. With assurances that the culprit would be punished, the legates were set free.\textsuperscript{25}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{21}\textit{Hell.} 5.4.20-21; \textit{Ages.} 24.3, \textit{Pelop.} 14.1, where Plutarch clearly paraphrases his source, Xenophon. See Meyer, Vol. 5, 369, n.1.
  \item \textsuperscript{22}The agent noted that the Athenians would be caught completely unaware and that the "long walls" running from the Peiraeus to the city as yet had no gates (\textit{Hell.} 5.4.20). See also Meyer, Vol. 5, 369.
  \item \textsuperscript{23}Despite its superficial plausibility, virtually no one has accepted at face value the explanation for the raid advanced by Xenophon and Plutarch. See Meyer, Vol. 5, 369; Beloch, 3.1, 147, n.1; Grote, Vol. 7, 86; and Rice, 114.
  \item \textsuperscript{24}Xen. \textit{Hell.} 5.4.22.
  \item \textsuperscript{25}Xen. \textit{Hell.} 5.4.23. There is some doubt as to both the feasibility of Sphodrias' attempt and its date. Disregarding the distances, terrain, or difficulty of night marches, Rice, 116, n.52 believes that it was feasible. A careful consideration of topography, however, taken with the ancient estimates of Sphodrias' character (see note 20), shows that except by horseback, it would be arduous to get from Thespiae (or Plataia) to the Peiraeus overnight. See
\end{itemize}
Because the explanation set forth by Xenophon and Plutarch for Sphodrias' raid is plainly inadequate, it is necessary to consider the much different reason advanced in the Ephoran tradition of Diodorus. Although his chronology is clearly erroneous and his placing of Athens' first official aid to Thebes is out of sequence, his explanation for Sphodrias' raid is surely correct. He writes very simply that ἐπείσευ αὐτὸν κλεόμβροτος ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν λακεδαιμονίων ἀνευ τῆς γνώμης τῶν ἠφόρων καταλαβέσθαι τοῦ Πειραιᾶ.

Because Sphodrias had a good deal of money to recruit mercenaries, it is likely that bribery would be ineffective. Also, with a third of Kleombrotos' levy under his command, one can surmise that more than just the garrisoning of Thespiai was intended. In any case a major figure in Sparta was certainly behind Sphodrias' rash decision to invade Attika. Because Agesilaos' diplomacy in Athens
had been effective since the primary focus of his concern was the Theban coup, it is highly unlikely that the decision was his. If war were necessary to subdue the Boiotians, it cannot have been his purpose to provoke the Athenians or drive them into the Boiotian camp. Since Plutarch explicitly writes that Sphodrias belonged to the group in Sparta opposed to Agesilaos, the combined literary evidence about the harmost's situation points ultimately to Kleombrotos' responsibility for his subordinate's move. 29

As we have seen, the news of Sphodrias' fiasco induced the ephors to lay a capital charge against him even before the Athenians arrived to protest. 30 Also Agesilaos would have taken a dim view of

however, as Eudamidas took 2,000 soldiers to Potidaia in 382 before Teleutias arrived with the full levy of 10,000, Kelombrotos likely had 2,000 or perhaps 3,000 for his midwinter incursion. Thus Sphodrias with as many as 1000 soldiers in Thespiai had far more than needed to garrison effectively the town and money to recruit more! See ch. 7, n.44.

Plut. Ages. 24.4. Despite Lysander's death nearly seventeen years earlier, Rice, 114-15, believes that Sphodrias was a Lysandrian, that Kleombrotos ordered the attack to bolster his prestige after failing to retake the Kadmeia and because the young king believed the raid was feasible. Meyer, Vol. 5, 369, writes that Sphodrias (who disliked Agesilaos) was a member of Kleombrotos' group. Both Kleombrotos and Sphodrias likely underestimated the difficulty of the project, but decided to make the attempt because some Spartans genuinely feared a revived Athens in alliance with Thebes. This interpretation accords very well with the evidence, while obviating the need to posit a tripartite ideological struggle in Sparta. One need only remark that some Spartans understood better than Agesilaos the importance of seapower; see below.

Xen. Hell. 5.4.24.
of Sphodrias' efforts, knowing that a full-scale invasion of Boiotia would be necessary to crush nascent resistance to Sparta's influence beyond the Isthmos. Because he eventually moved to acquit Sphodrias, even though admitting his guilt, a reason must be sought for his change of heart. Xenophon and Plutarch write that it was because of Archidamos' advocacy. Archidamos, Agesilaos' son, and Sphodrias' son were lovers. In this version, Archidamos persuaded his father to have mercy on the culprit. Since Sphodrias had formerly been a good soldier, Agesilaos finally acquiesced, noting that the state could not afford to waste the life of a man of proven worth.

His son's pleas perhaps moved the elder king, but a more likely explanation for his volte-face was news brought back from Athens by Etymokles: Kallistratos' mildly pro-Spartan faction would be unable to contain the surge of anti-Spartan fervor unleashed by Sphodrias' egregious assault.

As noted earlier, the swift retribution against the officers in charge of the Kadmeia showed that Agesilaos was not at all loathe

\[31\text{Xen. Hell. 5.4.34; Plut. Ages. 26.1, Pelop. 15.1; Diod. 15.29.6.}\]

\[32\text{Hell. 5.4.25-32; Plut. Ages. 25.1-5.}\]

\[33\text{Xenophon (Hell.5.4.23) writes that Etymokles, Aristolochos and Okyllos were released after giving assurances that they knew nothing of Sphodrias' attack and that he would be tried for his life. Since Etymokles was Agesilaos' personal friend, it is quite likely that he returned quickly to Sparta with news of the Athenians' mood - a decidedly ugly one regarding the Spartans.}\]
to countenance death or exile, even if he did not press for them personally. Moreover, he was not above procuring the execution even of offending women. In order to compose internal dissension in the face of a combined Athenian and Theban threat, Agesilaos, having decided that Athens was lost, voted to acquit the guilty Sphodrias. Since Sphodrias was a partisan of Kleombrotos, as a conciliatory gesture, unlike Phoibidas, he was not even fined.

When the report of Sphodrias' acquittal reached Athens, what Agesilaos anticipated was not long in coming. The sudden surge of anti-Spartan rancor moved the assembly to declare the Spartans in violation of the King's Peace. For several years the Athenians had been conducting quiet diplomacy in the Aegean. Thus it is unlikely

34 See note 4 above for a discussion of Agesilaos' role in the decision to execute the two officers present when the Kadmeia garrison surrendered and to exile a third who chanced to be in Haliartos. Also Agesilaos had the wife and daughter of the exiled officer killed during a period of factional strife immediately after the Spartan garrison surrendered (Jacoby, Fr.Gr.H., Vol. 2B.1, 587 under Theopompos).

35 Xen. Hell. 5.4.34; Plut. Ages. 26.1, Pelop. 15.1. Diodorus (15.29.6) writes that the two kings cooperated to obtain his unjust acquittal. Hertzberg, 163-66, observes that ultimately both kings and their partisans desired Sphodrias' acquittal for the sake of unity in the face of impending war. Meyer, Vol. 5, 378, surmised that Agesilaos thought Sphodrias' acquittal would not measurably affect Sparta's relations with Athens. Smith, 281, is probably closer to the mark when he suggests that Agesilaos did realize how the Athenians would react, but underestimated the vigor and seriousness of their response.

36 Diod. 15.29.5.
that the turn of events in Lakedaimon caused the Athenians to offer alliance to any polis disenchanted with the Spartans, but it seems to have accelerated an existing trend. The most weighty results of Sphodrias' acquittal were the Athenians' treaty with Thebes and the creation of their second maritime league.

The return of Etymokles' legation to Sparta with news that popular support for the pro-Spartan Kallistratos was crumbling likely induced Agesilaos to seek reconciliation with those opposed to his aims in Sparta. It was necessary for him to settle internal wrangling as his long military and political experience surely told him that war was coming. Because he did not fully appreciate the role of seapower in statecraft, he probably decided that Athens was lost. His long-standing antipathy to the Thebans surged to the fore, as an opportunity arose for him to take the field against them (and

37 For evidence of Athenian diplomatic initiatives before 378, see Tod, GHI, Vol. 2, 56-72 and Bengtson, Staatsverträge 2, 206-14.

38 Besides the more detailed accounts of Xenophon (Hell. 5.4.34), Plutarch (Ages. 26.1, Pelop. 15.1) and Diodorus' chronologically misplaced narrative (15.26), Aristeides(258) and Polybios(9.23.7) also recall the Sphodrias affair and its consequences. Epigraphical evidence for the defensive pact between Athens and Thebes appears in Tod, GHI, Vol. 2, no. 123 and Bengtson, Staatsverträge 2, 203-06.

39 Rice, 97, n.9 and 123-24, in his complicated reconstruction of factional politics in Athens and Sparta in this period believes that Kallistratos was unable to check the Athenians' fury at the official sanctioning of Sphodrias' attack implicit in his acquittal. As a result his pro-Spartan clique was voted out of power and the Athenians prepared to go to war against the Peloponnesian alliance. See also Meyer, Vol. 5, 369.
their new Athenian allies) in Boiotia for the first time since the summer of 394. The collapse of the faction loyal to him in Athens was perhaps regrettable, but the chief order of business was to prevent a revival of the Boiotian league and to chastise the anti-Spartan group.

The recently concluded defensive pact with Athens guaranteed that the Thebans would not stand alone. Diodorus' misplaced passage shows that the Athenians' preliminary expedition to Boiotia consisted of 5,000 men. In addition, the pro-Boiotian party in Athens came to power, setting in motion a massive ship-building effort. With the departure of Demophon's 5,000 men the assembly voted a full mobilization and, realizing the implications of Sphodrias' attack, ordered the long walls to be fitted with gates. There was a resurgence of Athenian influence in the Aegean when the Athenians undertook extensive operations against Sparta by sea. By the summer of 378


41 Xen. Hell. 5.4.34.

42 Diodorus (15.29.7) puts the strength of the full mobilization at 20,000 troops, 500 horsemen and 200 ships. Polybios (2.62.6), however, cites a more realistic figure of 10,000 troops and 100 ships. Kirchner; RE 5.1, 152, no. 6, observes that Demophon and Chabrias, by attacking the Peloponnesians from Thebes in the summer of 377, forced Agesilaos to retreat (Schol. Aristeid. Panath. 173.11).

43 Isok. Plat. 9.
many Greeks who were out of sympathy with the Spartans fell away from
the Peloponnesian alliance to join the Athenians. 44

Agesilaos in Boiotia, 378-377 B.C.

If Agesilaos believed that the Athenian reaction to Sphodrias' acquittal would be of little consequence, he would appear to have mis-
calculated. Nonetheless Kleombrotos' indecisive incursion, Sphodrias' misadventure, and Demophon's preliminary expedition in the early
spring combined to revive confidence in the elder king. Faced with
the hostile alliance of Athens and Thebes the Spartans turned to
Agesilaos for his proven ability in the field. 45 He responded with
enthusiasm to the call, waiving his prior claim of age, but insisted
on bringing to completion the reorganization of the alliance's
military structure begun in 382. 46 Greece had been divided into ten
administrative districts as the full allied levy under Agesilaos showed.
The army was composed of ten contingents which included the Lakedaimon-
ians, Arkadians, Eleians, Achaians, Korinthians, Megarians, Sikyonians,
Phliasians, Phokians, Lokrians, Olynthians and Thracians. 47 The rate

44 Plut. Pelop. 15.1.

45 Xenophon (Hell. 5.4.35) writes that the Spartans thought
Agesilaos would conduct the war φρονιμώτερον ὢν σφίζον τὸ Κλεομβρότου.
Diodorus (15.30) notes the Spartans' choice was based on Agesilaos' courage, intelligence and energy. He also writes that the Spartans
took a much more lenient and conciliatory stance to many Greek cities because of wide-spread defection to Athens' new maritime league and
the renascent Boiotian confederacy.

46 See ch. 8, note 7.

47 Diod. 15.31.2.
of commutation for poleis not wishing to contribute soldiers was two 
ψιλοί equalled one hoplite, while one horseman was the equivalent of 
four hoplites. The daily pay was set at three Aiginetan obols per 
hoplite. 48

When the army marched against Phlius many allied soldiers 
grumbled about the Spartans' incessant demands on their manpower 
evidently to indulge Agesilaos' support of exiled tyrants. 40 This 
time Agesilaos retorted to their complaints with the following device. 
He ordered every tradesman to rise upon hearing the name of his craft 
called out by a herald. In time nearly the entire allied army was 
on its feet except the Spartans. The reason was that Spartans were 
forbidden by a Lykourgan rhetra from learning any trade but war. 50
Thus despite the allies' muttering, Agesilaos maintained that Sparta 
provided more real soldiers than any allied polis or all of them 
together. 51

When the full levy assembled for the march north under 
Agesilaos, there were over 18,000 soldiers and 1,500 horsemen. Before 
securing the area of Mt. Kithairon, Agesilaos had ordered the warring

48 Xen. Hell. 5.2.21, 6.2.16. Hertzberg, 166, believes that 
Agesilaos had a hand in this. Since the project had begun with the 
war against Olynthos, Agesilaos was in fact the architect of the re- 
organization. Grote, Vol. 8, 102-05, discusses at length the 
similarities to Athens' fifth-century maritime δραχμ. See also 

49 See ch. 8, note. 40.

50 Plut. Lyk. 24.2.

51 Plut. Ages. 26.3-5, Moral. 208e; Polyainos 2.1.7.
poleis Kleitor and Arkadian Orchomenos to cease hostilities at once or face occupation.\textsuperscript{52} He then ordered the mercenaries serving these towns to occupy the Kithairon passes. When this had been done, he led the army safely to Theopliai to begin his summer operations.\textsuperscript{53}

That Agesilaos failed to anticipate the vigor of the Athenian response to Sphodrias' acquittal soon became evident. As soon as the allied army set up camp near Thespiai, 5000 soldiers and 200 horsemen under Chabrias arrived to aid the Boiotians who were commanded by the Boiotarch Gorgidas.\textsuperscript{54}

In reviewing Agesilaos' two incursions into Boiotia, an attempt to reconcile two rather divergent traditions is needed. The authors with the most extended accounts differ significantly in emphasis and detail. As in the case of the disparity between the Oxyrhynchos historian's description of the Asian campaign in 395 and that of Xenophon\textsuperscript{55} and the somewhat incongruent reports of Xenophon and Plutarch on the liberation of Thebes,\textsuperscript{56} some analysis will be necessary for an accurate reconstruction of the campaign. As in the


\textsuperscript{53}Xen. Hell. 5.4.36-38.

\textsuperscript{54}Diod. 15.32.5; Polyainos 2.1.2.

\textsuperscript{55}See chs. 1 and 4.

\textsuperscript{56}See ch. 8.
earlier instances information from other authors can supplement or confirm material from the major sources. In the diagram which follows, events of the first incursion of 378 are distinct from those of the second in 377. It is necessary to bear in mind throughout the following discussion that Diodorus has erroneously ascribed both incursions to 377. His confused chronology need not reflect, however, on the accuracy of the operational detail that he presents. 57

The Campaign of 378

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Xenophon, Hellenika 5.4.36-46:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Diodorus 15.32.1-33.3:</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Phase:</strong></td>
<td><strong>First Phase:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Pacification of Kleitor and Orchomenos from Tegea.</td>
<td>1) missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Occupation of Mt. Kithairon</td>
<td>2) missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Arrival at Thespiae.</td>
<td>3) 18,000 soldiers and 1500 horsemen arrive at Thespiae. The army rests for a few days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) missing</td>
<td>4) 5,000 soldiers and 200 horsemen under Chabrias arrive from Athens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Agesilaos lays waste to the land outside the ditch and stockade next to the city</td>
<td>5) Theban and Athenian forces occupy a fortified hill 3½ km. from city. Agesilaos' peltasts try to draw out defenders, but are pushed back.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6) Theban cavalry suddenly charges allied cavalry and peltasts. Hoplites and main allied cavalry wheel about and rout the Thebans. Some losses on each side.

7) In a sally at dawn, Agesilaos attacks an unguarded segment of stockade, burning some of the enclosed land up to the city's walls.

8) missing

9) Agesilaos returns to Thespiai and replaces Sphodrias as harmost with Phoibidas.

10) Agesilaos disbands army at Megara and returns to Lakedaimon.

11) missing

Second Phase

12) Phoibidas harasses the Boiotians from Thespiai.

13) Thebans retaliate by marching out in full strength.

14) Phoibidas' peltasts hem in and thrust back the Theban phalanx.

15) Thebans regroup in a ravine and make a sudden assault against allied peltasts. After Phoibidas dies, the rest of the allied troops retreat within the walls of the city.

6) Well disciplined display on hill by Chabrias' peltasts induces Agesilaos to abandon efforts to force a pitched battle.

7) Agesilaos orders allies to plunder all areas outside city and hill, thus gathering a great deal of booty.

8) Advisors chide Agesilaos for not attempting to force a major battle despite his superior numbers. The king retorts by claiming victory, since the enemy did not defend his fields and crops.

9) Agesilaos returns to Thespiai and makes Phoibidas harmost.

10) Agesilaos disbands army at Megara and returns to Lakedaimon.

11) Chabrias has statues of himself erected in Athens to celebrate his success against Agesilaos.

Second Phase

12) missing

13) Thebans attack Thespiai, but fail to dislodge the Spartans.

14) missing

15) Phoibidas rashly counter-attacks and loses 500 allied lives, including his own.
16) Anti-Spartan exiles find refuge at Thebes. Thebans, rekindling their courage, make raids against other poleis occupied by Spartans.

17) Lakedaimonians suffer losses at Tanagra, where Panthoidas is killed, and at Plataia. New polemarch with mora arrives to take charge at Thespiai.

Plutarch (Pelop. 14.1-5) mentions the Spartan difficulties at Plataia and Tanagra, and records the death of Panthoidas. For the campaign of the following spring, the chart appears as follows:

Xenophon, Hellenika 5.4.47-55, 58. Diodorus 15.34.1-2:

1) Agesilaos orders Thespian har­most to occupy Kithairon.

2) Agesilaos proceeds to Plataia, feigns a march to Thespiai, but turns to Erythrai instead.

3) missing

4) Peloponnesians pass the stock­ade at Skolos and ravage fields east of Thebes as far as the allied city of Tanagra.

5) Deceived Athenians and Boiotians at Thespiai wheel about to the east and occupy a hill to await the allied army.

6) Agesilaos, however, marches against the unguarded city of Thebes.

7) Athenians and Boiotians rush to the city's defense and skirmish with allies.

58See note 42 for Demophon's participation in this sortie.
8) Agesilaos occupies the hill abandoned by the Athenians and Boiotians. Next morning he sets out for Thespiai.

9) Harasssed by Chabrias' peltasts, the king orders the Olynthian cavalry to attack. The peltasts are driven off and suffer some losses.

10) At Thespiai, Agesilaos composes factional strife, withdraws the army to Megara and disbands it.

11) Agesilaos suffers severely swollen leg (phlebitis?) at Megara. Efforts to reduce the swelling by opening a vein almost cause his death. He is carried back to Sparta and remains bed-ridden for the rest of 377 and into the following year.

12) After departure of allied army, some Boiotians captured en route to buy grain at Pagasai escape prison in Oreus and lead an anti-Spartan uprising. A permanent grain supply is thereby assured for the Thebans.

A glance at the diagram reveals a distinctly different tone and emphasis in what each author presents. The gaps in Diodorus' version of the second march result from overcompression and the misapprehension that both marches occurred in 377. Xenophon, of course, interpreting events from a Lakedaimonian perspective, is at pains not to criticize his friend, benefactor and hero Agesilaos. 59 It is not

59 Cawkwell, 63-64, and Rice, 95-96, have thus accurately characterized Xenophon's relation to Agesilaos.
surprising that he should try to minimize the Boiotian and Athenian success in resisting Agesilaos' numerically superior forces. Similarly he highlights his old friend's tactical accomplishments, while suppressing those of his adversaries. Although Diodorus' epitome of Ephoros is sometimes careless or superficial, it has the virtue of not being obviously biased in favor of Agesilaos and the Spartans. Not being under such a constraint, Diodorus more accurately and impartially describes the Lakedaimonians' failure to regain control of central Greece. Even Xenophon could not obscure the fact that the Spartans' only success was to restrict temporarily the Boiotians' food supply. The revolt of Oreus, however, in the northern tip of Euboia (F 377) reversed even this achievement. 61

Regarding the campaign of 378, Xenophon is silent about Chabrias' 5,000 peltasts and 1,500 horsemen. Their presence is attested nonetheless not only by Diodorus, but Polyainos 62 and Nepos. 63

60 See also the remarks on Xenophon's historiography in ch. 1. This case is not the same as that involving the battle of Sardis. In the earlier instance, Xenophon appears to have had only partial and somewhat faulty information from which to reconstruct his account. In the case of the Boiotian campaigns of 378/77, however, he is clearly trying to construe as favorably as possible an essentially inconclusive effort.

61 Xen. Hell. 5.4.56

62 Polyain. 2.1.2.

63 Chabrias 1.1-3.
Xenophon may be exaggerating the size of the area included by the ditch and stockade which the Thebans built to protect their grain and livestock. A sudden allied sortie could have damaged such supplies and caused a loss of some animals, but Diodorus is probably right to emphasize Agesilaos' wide-ranging pillage and large yield of booty. The slightly outnumbered Thebans and Athenians relied on the walls and fortified salients in the field for defense. It should be noted that Agesilaos' tactics, as described by Diodorus, are entirely consistent with his hugely successful Asian campaign. Also Diodorus is likely correct to mention the criticism leveled against the king by his advisors for not bringing about a decisive confrontation. Some of the blame rests with the defenders who naturally were unwilling to risk a pitched battle while their defenses were sound. Although he does not mention the stockade, Diodorus' account more reliably conveys the desultory and indecisive nature of the incursion.

After recounting Agesilaos' withdrawal, Xenophon attempts to portray Phoibidas in more favorable tints than he perhaps deserves.

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64 Xen. Hell. 5.4.38; Diod. 15.32.6.

65 Despite Demophon's 5,000 soldiers, Chabrias' 5,000, 1,500 horsemen and perhaps 3,000 to 5,000 Boiotians, the Peloponnesian levy at 18,000 infantry and 1,500 horsemen enjoyed a numerical advantage.

66 Diod. 15.33.1.
Diodorus states only that a Theban assault on Thespiai failed, but that Phoibidas' ill-considered counterattack caused his own death and that of 500 allied soldiers. Xenophon admits that the Thebans took heart at Phoibidas' death and Plutarch supplies the reason. Under Pelopidas' leadership, a Boiotian force also killed Panthoidas, harmost of Tanagra and forced the Lakedemonians to withdraw from Plataia. These reverses prompted the Spartans to fortify Thespiai with a polemarch and mora.

In the spring of 377 Agesilaos once again tried to subjugate the Boiotians. Xenophon writes that the king ordered the polemarch at Thespiai to prepare a market for the army in order to deceive the Athenians and Boiotians. As soon as word reached him that the market was ready, Agesilaos led the troops directly east from Kithaïron instead of marching north to Plataia and Thespiai. His destination was Erythrai, and en route he passed by the stockade at Skolos which the Thebans had deserted. The purpose of this feint was to draw the defenders to the west of Thebes, while the allies pillaged to the east.

67 Diod. 15.33.5-6.

68 This was the officer sent to relieve Klearchos at Byzantion in 402. He then defeated Klearchos in battle when the latter resisted being replaced. See Diod. 14.12 and Schaefer, RE Vol. 18.2, 776-77.

69 Xen. Hell. 5.4.46; Plut. Pelop. 15.4-5.

70 See Philippson, RE 3A.1, 575, and Princeton Encyclopedia, 993.

71 Geyer, RE 3A.1, 567, and Polyain. 2.1.11.
as far as Tanagra. 72 Xenophon offers as proof of the ruse's success the undefended stockade at Skolos. According to Diodorus' more cursory version, the defenders had fortified many more locales in the countryside during the winter. Agesilaos, realizing this, decided to turn his attention to another part of Boiotia which he had not plundered during the first incursion. Also he would naturally have wanted to see whether he might retrieve the situation in Tanagra after Panthoidas' death. Diodorus implies nonetheless that necessity as much as cunning dictated Agesilaos' course. 73

The Thebans formed up at the base of a hill called the γρααος οτηθος to confront the allies.74 Agesilaos again supposedly deceived the Boiotians by marching on a nearly undefended Thebes. In this interpretation the Boiotians abandoned their hill in a panic to prevent the fall of the city. In the ensuing skirmish both sides suffered some losses, but the allies were able to continue their march westward.75 Chabrias' mercenaries harassed the allied rear until Agesilaos ordered the Olynthian cavalry to repel them. Apart from the account of the tyrannicide, this is Xenophon's only reference to Athenian support of the Boiotian cause. 76

Diodorus, however, preserves a different tradition in which the

72 Xen. Hell. 5.4.47-49.
73 Diod. 15.34.1.
74 In Polyainos (2.1.12) and Frontinus (1.4.3), this feature is called the "Seat of Rhea."
75 Xen. Hell. 5.4.50-54.
76 Xen. Hell. 5.4.55.
Boiotians, having forced Agesilaos to withdraw to the west, erected a trophy after a successful sortie from the city. In this version the Boiotians and Athenians had prevented the Peloponnesians from pillaging west of Thebes, but once again had striven to avoid a pitched battle. What could have changed the defenders' tactics would have been an assault on the city. Agesilaos perhaps reached such a decision because of the fortified hills to the west of the city. Also frustration at being limited to pillage and awareness of his advisors' criticism in 378 likely caused him to order a direct attack on Thebes as the best way to force a confrontation.

With these things in mind after his inconclusive campaign near Tanagra, the king made his move. He may have believed that the city itself was undermanned because of the defenders' efforts to fortify the terrain to the west.\footnote{This is what Xenophon reports (\textit{Hell.} 5.4.51).} The sudden eruption of a sizeable force from within the walls revealed to the king his error in judgment. To avert a rout he quickly trumpeted a retreat. Because they controlled the field, the Thebans erected a trophy in the retreating Peloponnesians' wake.\footnote{Diod. 15.34.1-2.}

After this description of matters on land, Diodorus turns his attention to naval affairs. Xenophon, however, notes that Agesilaos ended the civil strife in Thespiai, thus preventing a slaughter of the anti-Spartan faction.\footnote{\textit{Hell.} 5.4.55.} Perhaps word of this strife induced the
king to cut short his efforts to recover Tanagra, since civil violence in a town occupied by a Spartan *mora* did not augur well for allied cause. Also, since the winter the Thebans had provided refuge for anti-Spartan groups from all Boiotia. Though his assault on Thebes had failed, the king isolated the Thespian insurgents, thereby protecting his line of retreat.

Despite Xenophon's best efforts, the central futility of the two incursions and the Thebans' victory in the one major encounter emerge clearly from the sum of the evidence. The last matter discussed before Agesilaos' illness and brush with death was the disbanding of the army at Megara.

After the soldiers had gone home, Agesilaos left the temple of Aphrodite in Megara one day and was mounting the steps to the *archeion* when he was stricken with severe cramps in his good leg. Inflammation and swelling soon set in, so a Syracusan physician opened a vein. The surgeon, however, was unable to stanch the flow of blood and Agesilaos fainted. Before the bleeding stopped, the king almost died. His aides had to carry him back to Lakedaimon where he

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80 Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.46.

81 Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.55. Although Xenophon's *Hellenika* and Diodorus are our chief sources for the two Boiotian incursions, allusions to these operations also appear in Xenophon's *Agesilaos* 2.22, Plutarch's *Agesilaos* 26.2-3, and a series of anecdotes preserved in Polyainos' *Strategemata*. Items 2.1.2, 18 and 21 seem to refer to 378, but 2.1.9, 20 and 25 could describe events in either year. In general they tend to confirm the desultory and ineffectual nature of the Spartan efforts. Grote, Vol. 8, 121, n.1, and Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 290-91, both discuss these anecdotes briefly.
remained bedridden for months and was unable to resume command of allied operations in the spring. 82

It is perhaps ironic that physical disability should occur just as the cornerstone of Agesilaos' hegemony was crumbling. The rivalry between the king and the navarch who gave his name to the defunct peace flared up again. Antalkidas chided Agesilaos after his return from Boiotia for violating a clause in the great rhetra of Lykourgos. This clause forbade campaigning too often against the same foe lest that foe learn the art of successful warfare. 83

Because he had failed to retrieve matters in Boiotia, Agesilaos cannot have missed the aptness of Antalkidas' remark. Although the most important factor in their success was the alliance with Athens, the Boiotians proved themselves a match for the Spartans because Agesilaos underestimated the vigor of the Athenians' response. The reason for this response was that the Athenians considered the Peace of Antalkidas no longer binding after Sphodrias' acquittal. 84

Even before Agesilaos' protracted illness, the underpinnings of his hegemony had been loosened. Unrest in poleis garrisoned by

82 Xen. Hell. 5.4.58; Plut. Ages. 27.1-2.

83 Plut. Ages. 26.2-3; Moral. 189f. 213f and 217e. In some of these citations Agesilaos is represented as wounded (πληγέυτα ὑπὸ Θηβαίων ἐν μάχῃ), but this is a confusion of the events of 377 with the battle of Koroneia in 394. This injunction appears in Plutarch's Lyk. 13.5, Moral. 227c; and Polyainos 1.16.2.

84 See Aristeides 173.5-15 and 258.10.
Sparta, defection to Athens' new maritime league of cities allied to
Sparta, and the revival of the Boiotian league all signalled a pro-
found shift in Greek political realities. As in the Chalkidike with
Teleutias' death and the liberation of Thebes, Agesilaos' purpose
suffered a setback. Major responsibility for directing the affairs
of state fell to Kleombrotos. Agesilaos' illness was perhaps pro-
vidential; he suffers a six years' absence from our sources, not
reappearing until the peace conference just before the battle of
Leuktra (summer 371). It is possible that Kleombrotos and his
partisans might have increased their prominence in affairs of state
even if Agesilaos had remained healthy. His lack of naval sense
and ingrained hostility to Thebes weakened his perception of the
threat posed by a revived Athenian league. If so it is again ironic
that the 10,000 Athenians on land precluded his success in Boiotia.
Agesilaos likely realized too late the reason for his failure to
retrieve the situation in central Greece.

It is fitting, therefore, that political ascendancy in
Lakedaimon should pass to a group that did recognize the seriousness
of Athens' maritime threat. When Agesilaos re-emerged into full
light of history, his homeland stood on the brink of its greatest
single disaster, the defeat at Leuktra. The Spartans never recovered
from this setback and were reduced to the role of minor local contender
in Greek affairs. From 371 to his death in 360 Agesilaos' role in the

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85 See Hertzberg, 173-74 and Smith, 282-84 with notes.
state had changed dramatically from the days when the Spartan hegemony stood at zenith - the hegemony of which he had been both architect and koryphaios.
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