The Foreign Policy of President De Gaulle: A Study in East-West Diplomacy

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THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PRESIDENT DE GAULLE:
A STUDY IN EAST-WEST DIPLOMACY

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by
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INTRODUCTION

Throughout the period of the Fifth Republic in France, there has been increasing speculation concerning the orientation of French foreign policy. The growing uncertainty concerns today is the best whether to approve of or to condemn the independent initiatives of President de Gaulle in international politics. This research endeavor is intended in the context of the East-West struggle. This research, therefore, has attempted to place the De Gaulle's policies under questions which guided the direction which this research pursued. What are the fundamental, general goals and objectives of French foreign policy? These initiatives have been regarded by many as anti-American or non-aligned. This research endeavors to delineate his policy goals. What success have French efforts had? What has been the reaction of the Soviet or these Gaullist efforts? What consequence have the independent French policy had on the position of France vis-à-vis the other nations of the world? What impact, if any, have

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Throughout the period of the Fifth Republic in France, there has been increasing speculation concerning the orientation of French foreign policy. A great deal of uncertainty exists today in the West whether to approve of or to condemn the independent initiatives of President de Gaulle in international politics. The problem is most acute when considered in the context of the East-West struggle. This research, therefore, has attempted to probe the realities of the Gaullist position in the "Cold War." Certain fundamental questions guided the direction which this research pursued: What are the fundamental, general goals and objectives of French foreign policy? Why did the independent French initiatives emerge at the time when they did? Why have these initiatives been regarded by many as anti-American or pro-Soviet? What methods have been employed by de Gaulle to implement his policy goals? What success have French efforts had? What has been the reaction of the Soviets to these Gaullist efforts? What consequences has the independent French policy had on the position of France vis-à-vis the other nations of the world? What impact, if any, have
these initiatives made on the "Cold War" situation in world politics?

The methods employed in this research were descriptive and analytic; the subject matter had to be first approached descriptively in order to establish a sufficient body of factual data to permit fruitful conclusions; in general, however, this research proceeded in an analytic manner in an effort to develop some theory of Gaullist foreign policy. This theory then served as a measure in determining the success of French foreign policy.

In any such study, certain assumptions must be made before the research is able to proceed; this research was no different. The enunciation of the basic goals of every nation's foreign policy was borrowed from Professor London and presumed to be valid:

A country's foreign policy determines its course of action toward other nations. It consists of short-range measures and long-term programs, all designed to carry out the objectives of a foreign policy for, obviously, every such policy has goals and purposes. On the whole, foreign policy reflects the sum total of those principles which have grown out of a nation's history, beliefs or ideologies, power potential, and its cultural predilections.

The fundamental policy objectives of every sovereign nation are the preservation of territorial integrity, the maintenance of political and economic independence, and the attainment of as high a living standard for the population as conditions permit. These are, of course, minimal requirements, essential for the continuation of national life. They are therefore premises rather than objectives. Beyond these requirements, a nation's foreign policy seeks to formulate and achieve its aims in accordance with historic aspirations, its political philosophies, and its physical potential.1

1Kurt London, The Making of Foreign Policy: East and
From his speeches, memoirs, and other writings, de Gaulle's preoccupation with history is evident, as well as his determination to continue France's "glorious" history into the future. De Gaulle has clearly identified his political philosophy with his theory of history. The position taken is basically that taken by those political theorists who are commonly called "political realists." De Gaulle regards ideology only as a guise for individual national aspirations and the individual nation-state is construed to be the fundamental unit of action in the international arena. This theory naturally leads to the conclusion that the international order consists in an equilibrium of force—a "balance of power" as it has frequently and historically been called.

Beginning with this conceptual framework, de Gaulle believes that there are alternatives to the present "iron curtain," "cold war" balance; and since each nation-state must act in its own self-interest (as the political realist believes each nation does and must do), then there is no reason why some alternative could not and should not be sought for the existing balance. In fact, several alternatives are available to the policy-makers of France.


3For a detailed explanation, refer to Ibid., pp. 167-223.
Europe could serve as a buffer between East and West if arrangements could be made to integrate this area into the respective economic and political structures of both ideological camps; a French-British pact could balance the scales between the U.S.-U.S.S.R. hegemony; a possible French-German pact could unite Europe as a "third force"; or a possible Franco-Soviet pact could balance the Anglo-Saxon hegemony and check the German "menace." Which alternative France chooses is not significant to the President of France; what is at issue is that France regain her prestige in international affairs and maintain her individual personality.

De Gaulle's re-evaluation of Communism definitely dates at least to 1956. The de-Stalinization program indicated a political " thaw" that did not go unnoticed. Moreover, the Communists at this time realized that Poland and Hungary could not be conquered; with this realization, many have argued, the movement lost its dynamism. The West had indicated a general acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe (although there was still some talk among isolated political segments in the United States of "rolling back" Communism) and the Communists could no longer dream of coming to power in Italy, France, or Germany. Accompanying this loss of dynamism was an emergent spirit of nationalism within the Communist world, a spirit which manifested itself most spectacularly in the Sino-Soviet rift. From this
assessment of the Communist world De Gaulle concluded that the existing balance of power was unnatural, precarious, and unwise. Thus the foreign policy of France was ripe for revision at the time when de Gaulle assumed power in 1958.

The broad objective of French foreign policy had to be re-assessed in light of contemporary needs. The following objectives were formulated under the Fifth Republic as the policy-goals: national independence; reunification of Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals"; economic and cultural advancement; security; equality or prestige. By allowing situations to develop and mature slowly, by manifesting force and vigor and yet remaining flexible, by taking advantage of the diplomatic blunders of other powers, de Gaulle has set out upon a course which has achieved a degree of independence for France, but at the same time has succeeded in isolating France from the consensus of Western foreign policy. By entering upon a complete reapproachment with the Soviet Union, de Gaulle could gain for France considerable economic advantages, and incrementation of French prestige in the non-aligned world, and a reasonable degree of security owing to its strategic geographical position. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, could secure a definitive acknowledgement of the status quo in Europe, increased economic opportunities, and security from a potentially-potent German militarism. De Gaulle realizes, however, that to commit France to any agreement that would be acceptable to the Soviets at this time would necessarily involve a sacrifice
of his position in the West--a position which he has struggled to attain during the past eight years. Thus such a complete accord could not be reconciled with the fundamental objectives of his foreign policy.
PART I
THEORETICAL BASIS OF GAULLIST FOREIGN POLICY

...
CHAPTER I

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF DE GAULLE

Old Earth, worn by the ages, wracked by rain and storms, exhausted yet ever ready to produce what life must have to go on!

Old France, weighed down with history, prostrated by wars and revolutions, endlessly vacillating from greatness to decline, but revived, century after century, by the genius of renewal!

Old men, exhausted by ordeal, detached from human deeds, feeling the approach of the eternal cold, but always watching in the shadows for the glimmer of hope.1

With these words, General de Gaulle of France concludes his memoirs; but with the same words, he indicates a new road which is opening for himself and for France. The prospect of renewal is soon to become the most pervasive component of the foreign policy of the Fifth Republic. Maurice has found these memoirs to be a profound act of faith, a faith that is based on a critical assessment of history. De Gaulle did not hesitate in assuming his role; rather he positively sought to fulfill his "mission" and to perform his "duty to assume

the burden of France."  

There are many, on the other hand, who speak quite critically of de Gaulle and regard his policy-goals with extreme disdain. Alan has presented such an estimation:  

Gaulism is two things. It is, first, the ambition of an egocentric old man to carve himself a place in history less constrained than the niche he occupied in 1940; and to do so by trying to restore his nation and continent to the position from which their own collective folly toppled them during the first two decades of the century.  

Second—and lower down on France’s political pyramid—since it offers no precise program, Gaulism is essentially a state of mind: an obsessive chauvinism nourished by the militarism, xenophobia and resentments of the classical Right. It thrives on the complexes of ordinary citizens, troubled for longer than he cares to remember by France’s instability and constant involvement in pointless and generally humiliating wars, yet taught by schoolmasters, editorialists, radio commentators and politicians that France is the most enlightened nation in the world.  

But it would be complete foolishness to dismiss de Gaulle and his policies, considering them to be mere manifestations of a personal and national megalomania, without realizing de Gaulle’s genius for negotiating and his gift for exploiting every diplomatic advantage. Formerly in history, greatness has generally been closely tied to power: the history of the Second World War and its aftermath, however, reveals the greatness of de Gaulle that is independent of national power. In fact, any assessment of French national power must be  


contingent upon the greatness of de Gaulle.

De Gaulle's politics are not accidental; rather they are the result of his analysis of society and his historical perspective. Aron asserted that no other politician has ever allowed so close an association to develop between his own personal beliefs and sentiments and his policies. Accordingly, the Gaullist personality permeates all of French politics and policies today. In his Mémoires de Gaulle recalls a pledge that he made to himself and to France some twenty-five years ago:

If I live, I will fight, wherever I must, as long as I must, until the enemy is defeated and the national stain washed clean. All I have managed to do since was resolved upon that day.

Since that day when de Gaulle so clearly chose the path he would pursue, he has talked at great length and on every possible occasion about his resolution. Scarcely is there any statement that he makes that is not introduced by a lengthy analysis of universal history. Unfortunately these commentaries have been written off as verbiage, as the wandering thoughts of an old man. After twenty-five years of refinement, though, they reveal coherence and considerable

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6De Gaulle, Mémoires, p. 39.
Recalling a conversation with de Gaulle, Aron cites what he regards as one of the most revealing insights into the thought of de Gaulle:

We were talking about the current political crisis in France and I asked him, 'Don't you think, mon General, that the origin of the crisis lies in the failure of the Front Populaire in 1936, which marked the failure of the last attempt in France to alter the structure of the country?' He looked at me. 'No, you're wrong,' he said, 'the political crisis in France goes back to 1313 or even, if you prefer, to 1425,' and he gave me a perfectly valid explanation of his view, based on long historical perspective. Thus in forming his estimate and appreciation of contemporary events, and in his awareness of his own role in the politics and history of our country, his judgments are governed not by short-term criteria but by a genuine historical vision—a vision, moreover, which one finds also in certain passages of his memoirs.

De Gaulle's political philosophy begins with his view of France. Traditions, geography, and history are all important elements of this conceptualization. This vision of the political world is a mixture of de Gaulle's regard for himself as the predetermined leader of France and his deep involvement in France as a living personality. De Gaulle approaches the making of policy with a certain degree of fatalism, since he allows his sense of history considerable latitude in co-ordinating his political imperatives. Duverger argues that de Gaulle has been extensively influenced by the thought of Hegel and that this has resulted in an

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Identification of France with the Ideal: 10. For whatever reason, events of the past decade clearly indicate that de Gaulle's political endeavors have been purposeful, and continually reflect the thesis which be restated in the opening paragraph of his Memoirs:

"All my life I have thought of France as a certain way. This is inspired by sentiment as much as by reason, and the emotional side of me tends to be68 the feeling that the present is my own, and that the principle in the French concept of destiny is the idea of living in the present, dedicating the future to an individual who is to be saved. If we think of this, it is because we have the feeling that we are entitled to use the present in a positive way. It is not in our mind, but in our country, that we can make the best of the present.

Moreover, only when the people of France have the will to live in the present, and when they are united, can they hope to be happy and have the security of future. In short, I feel that, unless France is France, it cannot be French without greatness.

"The present way in which de Gaulle regards France is a very clear example of this ideal. The conjunction of these two fundamentals has produced the reality of Gaulle's vision, as we have seen.

Worthy of attention, therefore, is the life and education of de Gaulle. His father was a teacher of history, literature, and classical languages at a Jesuit school in Paris. Charles grew up in an environment of patriotism and loyalty to the notions of God and King. The de Gaulles, being a typical rightist family, abhorred the Republic and all regimes which had followed 1789; thus from childhood Charles was able to distinguish between the idea of France and the actual situation in which France existed; from childhood, Charles longed for a legitimate sovereign or a God-sent leader to be the incarnation of the nation. This strong attachment to the state did not, however, imply any reactionary views. Regarding the Dreyfus affair, de Gaulle's family were to be found among the partisans of the Left. The de Gaulle heritage was clearly of a dual nature; the political behavior of de Gaulle today continues to reveal that synthesis of respect for the state and devotion to liberty and to justice. Luty summarized this fundamental premise as follows:

What has been joined to the faith that was instilled in the cradle, and what has differentiated de Gaulle from the intellectual environment in which he grew up, is something that at first appears very banal, but which has been decisive; namely, that very early he added to the glories of ancient France the glories of the revolutionary and Napoleonic armies. A monarchist by instinct and molding, he ceased to be

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13 General biographical data is readily available from abundant sources. This particular fact of de Gaulle's background was highlighted by Luty, "Peace and Policy," p. 363.
one by ideology; indeed, with one stroke he disen-
cumbered himself of all ideology, in order 'to serve
only France.'

This is another underlying premise which deserves
serious emphasis. De Gaulle cannot be portrayed as anti-
Fascist; nor can he be described as anti-Communist. Because
of a particular ideology, a nation will neither be branded
as a friend or enemy by de Gaulle. To de Gaulle, history
involves people, nations, genius, and opportunities. Repeatedly
in his speeches, de Gaulle recalls the accomplishments of
French history; repeatedly he recalls the periods of crisis.
Since political regimes and ideologies are transitory, only
the nation and its people can serve as a basis of inter-
national peace. Thus it is not difficult to realise that
de Gaulle would regard Europe as one continent and would
minimise any temporary division over which geography and
history were sure to prevail. In a speech at Bourges in
May, 1959, de Gaulle clearly indicated his conviction that
no ideology could surpass the determinations of history:

Voici qu'arrive la grande confrontation qui
avait, qui est, et qui probablement demeurera longtemps
nécessaire entre--comme on dit--l'Est et l'Ouest,
c'est-à-dire entre les deux fractions de nos vieux
peuples, de nos vieux peuples, civilisées depuis
longtemps, d'après les mêmes règles et le même esprit,
même quand ils pratiquent des régimes--comme on dit--
des régimes différents.

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16 Ibid., p. 565.
17 George A. Kelly, "The French Restoration of History,"
18 Quoted in Andre Fasseron, De Gaulle Parle (Paris:
By making his appeal to history and not to ideology, de Gaulle has secured the allegiance of many from both the right and the left. Having realised that patriotism is not the monopoly of any single family, class, or political party, he ambitiously strove to be the heir to the whole national past.¹⁹

The attachment which President de Gaulle has for France is based upon his general outlook on the nature of the nation-state and its role in world politics. This entity is regarded as the most durable and inclusive form of association. This fact was stressed by de Gaulle when he affirmed the necessity of a national setting within which human beings could emote, act, work, and obey.²⁰ No clearer statement of de Gaulle's assessment of the need for a strong state can be found than the following:

"Let us be lucid and strong enough to create and to observe the rules of national life that will tend to unite us [nous rassembler] at a time when we are ceaselessly driven to division among ourselves! Our whole history is the alternation of the immense sorrows of a divided people and the fruitful greatness of a free nation mastered under the aegis of a strong state."

What de Gaulle meant by a strong state is evident from his writings and speeches; more particularly, it is evident from the events that have taken place since he assumed the Presidency of France. Only in recent months, however, has

²⁰ Mackridge, Impeccable Ally, p. 3.
the promise of a free nation began to materialize. This concept must not be simplistically construed; it serves as a fundamental a priori of Gaullist political reasoning. In order for any social or economic history to be possible, the argument goes, the conditions of a people's existences must be assured. And it is these conditions which de Gaulle has defined in terms of the political. 22

On many occasions de Gaulle has offered those who give him their attention a critique of these political conditions which confront France in world politics. A typical statement is that included in the following radio and television messages:

France, throughout her existence, has passed through periods in which the general process of evolution demanded a regeneration on her part, under penalty of decline and death. This was the case, for example, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, when our monarchy succeeded in bringing a definite end to feudalism, for both internal and external conditions demanded a centralized state and national unity. This was the case with the Revolution, which brought about liberty and equality within our nation and intervention outside, because democracy, competition and proselytism corresponded to the political, economic and social character of the period that was beginning. And this is certainly the case today, for the age in which we are living—marked as it is by the acceleration scientific and technological betterment, the need for social settlement, the emergence of a host of new states, the ideological rivalry between empires—demands a vast regeneration both within ourselves and in our relations with others. The problem is to accomplish this without France's ceasing to be France. 23

22 Maurice, De Gaulle, p. 118.

In light of this statement and similar statements, the "Grand Design" of de Gaulle makes sense. De Gaulle has made his conception of world political realities contingent upon his conception of the political position of France in the modern world. France lacks the wealth which is deemed essential by the modern world if a state is to be considered a superpower; on the other hand, France does not have the poverty that is characteristic of the underdeveloped world. Thus the political reality which confronts France is a world of tension and conflict wherein each state must strive to maximize its own gains. In order to develop a mutuality of interests and the accommodation of conflict, the fundamental problem confronting the state is the determination of its goals and the extension of these interests vis-à-vis the other nations of the world. 24

Only within such a political framework is it possible to perceive the essence of "that certain way" in which de Gaulle has always thought of France. A sovereign, restored France is what de Gaulle seeks as the basis of French power; and to accomplish this, de Gaulle has only limited means at his disposal. In somewhat of a eulogizing style, Mauriac has discussed this Gaullist design. 25

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25 Mauriac, De Gaulle, p. 45.
Still my admiration for the game de Gaulle has played since 1940 continues unabated, a game that satisfies me all the more because his means are so limited and his adversaries so powerful. Since 1940, he has never ceased to be David confronting two Goliaths. Twenty-four years after the struggle began, the weakest antagonist continues to behave as if he were the strongest, not by a miracle, but by an intelligent submission to what is imposed day after day. A submission and at the same time a domination, for in the long run de Gaulle submits to reality only to make himself its master. 26

If France were to play its proper role in world affairs, de Gaulle reasoned, it would need a strong state. Each nation has real and immutable national interests which must be gauged above any particularisms. If the state is to be strong it must be united; to Gaullist logic, this unity can only be achieved through some guide, namely, a leader who incarnates the nation and acts on its behalf. 27 The first task which de Gaulle set down for a political leader is that of uniting the people and dominating their thoughts and emotions:

It is the task of political leaders to dominate opinion; that of the monarch, of the council, of the people, since it is from these that they draw their authority. They have no value, and can do nothing, except in the name of the sovereign power. But their abilities matter less than their skill in pleasing, and promises are more effective than arguments. The statesman, therefore, must concentrate all his efforts on captivating men's minds. He must know when to dissemble, when to be frank. He must pose as the servant of the public in order to become its master. He must outbid his rivals in self-confidence, and

26Ibid.
only after a thousand intrigues and solemn undertakings, will he find himself entrusted with full power. \textsuperscript{18}

De Gaulle explained that a leader could only show his worth by what he accomplished, by the difficulties that he faced and overcame, and by his willingness to risk himself in times of crisis. In this way the leader would radiate a magnetic force and symbolize the goals and aspirations of the nation.\textsuperscript{29} It is significant that de Gaulle sees the need for a leader to be involved in spectacular undertakings and difficult situations. This fact is valuable in making any evaluation of de Gaulle's objectives. He summarized this basic belief as follows:

The power to vivify an undertaking implies an energy sufficient to shoulder the burden of its consequences. The man of character finds an especial attractiveness in difficulty, since it is only by coming to grips with difficulty that he can realize his potentialities. Whether or not he proves himself the stronger is a matter between it and him. He is a jealous lover and will share with no one the prizes or the pains that may be his as a result of trying to overcome obstacles. Whatever the cost to himself, he looks for no higher reward than the harsh pleasure of knowing himself to be the man responsible.\textsuperscript{30}

Since de Gaulle admitted years ago that a political leader must seek out the situations wherein his greatness can be manifest, there is little wonder why the Fifth Republic has been so concerned with foreign policy. It is in this


\textsuperscript{29}Ibid., p. 63.

\textsuperscript{30}Ibid., p. 42.
arena, where the ever-present reality is conflict, that de Gaulle has found a vehicle for engineering national greatness.31

Soustelle offered the following insight into the Gaullist mind:

De Gaulle thinks in terms of nations and of power, and his aim is to play his own game—which he likes to refer to as 'France's game'—among all the nations and powers. One of the General's favorite quotations is Nietzsche's famous description of the State as 'the coldest of all cold monsters.' De Gaulle sees himself as the embodiment of one particular cold monster, France, which must make its way among other cold monsters named Britain, Russia, the United States, and China.32

Although emotion, affection, friendship, and gratitude may be valuable to individuals, to the nation-state ('the coldest of all cold monsters') they are meaningless. What matters in politics is power. In the absence of real basis for power, de Gaulle determined to accomplish his goals through prestige.33

Volume III of de Gaulle's Memoires has been quite revealing. According to these writings, the sole aim of internal policy is to achieve unity and order, thus allowing the state freedom in the international arena. To de Gaulle, foreign policy is the only true political policy.34 More recently, de Gaulle

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31 Macridis, Implacable Ally, p. 5.
reaffirmed this saying: "it is only the States that are valid, legitimate and capable of achievement."

Macridis has posed a very substantial criticism of Gaullism—a criticism which must be considered in any political analysis—namely, that the Fifth Republic has neither a political philosophy nor political institutions around which unity can be forged. Thus he concluded that this regime can be only a transitory phase through which France must pass, a phase in which conflicts are submerged rather than resolved. Whether this criticism is valid or whether it is a misconstruction of contemporary French politics that must be resolved, Lusty would suggest that such a criticism misses the essence of Gaullism. De Gaulle does not pretend to have established lasting political and governmental institutions. Rather, de Gaulle is a product of his heredity. According to this view, when the General was growing-up, international relations were in law and fact carried on between personal sovereigns. The years of French greatness were those when the head-of-state virtually embodied the state; thus it is this sense of personalism, dignity, and continuity which have formed the basis of the Fifth Republic. Its very essence—personalism—defies institutionalization.

was willing to prophesy that post-Gaullist France would not be
inclined to desist "from pursuing, within the measure of its
means, the independence of action favored by the pluralism of
the world system." 38

For Furniss as well, Gaullist policy does not represent
any radically new departures. In fact, he found striking
continuity between the Fourth and Fifth Republics. The major
difference, he concluded, did not lie in the objectives but in
the hope of achievement.39

The major difference is that de Gaulle believes he
can for the first time since the war mobilize behind
a policy of national greatness the many ingredients of
French power heretofore antagonistically arrayed
against each other. The great question now becomes
whether unity and sacrifice can long be imposed on the
French people, even by a man endowed with the charis-
matic aura of the twice-over savior of France.40

In the face of extensive criticism which is occasionally
levied at de Gaulle and his policies, it is worthwhile to
also examine a critique of Gaullism which has been formulated
by an avowed admirer, such as that rendered by Mauriac:

This was Gaullism's contribution to me...It
simply corresponds to the facts: each nation is
powerful and absolute, with its unique characteristics,
passions, virtues, madness, genius--as different from
any other as one human being is from another....France
as a nation is brimming with possibilities which French
advocates of American hegemony continue to deny, overtly
or covertly. And yet in the diplomatic realm de Gaulle


40Ibid.
has demonstrated the intact power France once again possesses, and he has done so with persuasive force increased tenfold by the fact that the maneuver was executed twenty years after the greatest disaster in our history, and during the very years that have seen the liquidation...of our empire. That the French nation has recovered its place, regained its freedom of action, that it today polarizes the hope of the world outside the blocs, under such conditions and despite the unchallengeable position atomic weapons have given Soviet Russia and the United States--this means that Gaullism is less a doctrine than a successful experiment, a verification, a confirmation by the facts of a certain way that the child Charles de Gaulle had of thinking about France.41

41 Maurice de Mauriac, De Gaulle, pp. 56-57.
CHAPTER II

DE GAULLE'S THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Whether de Gaulle's concept of international politics can be explained in terms of his environment and education or whether this has been a product of his own mental creativity, is something of an academic question. The fact is that the manifestation of the Gaullist concept of international relations does reveal the remnants of nationalistic and patriotic education. De Gaulle seems to regard history as a record of a continually shifting equilibrium of power as coalitions were formed and nations divided. In such a world the enemy of today could be the ally of tomorrow and the ally of the moment could, the next day, become the adversary. In such a world, the increased status of one nation necessarily implied the decline of another.¹

Repeatedly de Gaulle has affirmed, as he did in his Eighth Press Conference, that his concern was not with revolving and transitory ideologies (which he regards as nothing more than

¹Luthy, "Pose and Policy," p.566.
veiled ambitions) but rather with the "deep-rooted realities which are human, national and consequently international." 2

Thus when de Gaulle is told that the expansionist tendencies of Russia are a threat to world peace, he must also be inclined to consider such tendencies, although less obvious, which might belong to the United States. The situation is a power struggle for which the responsibility must be divided. 3 Each nation-state, in the eyes of de Gaulle, participates in international politics as though it were an arena of conflict—each continually attempting to maximise its strength at the expense of the others. Each political leadership acts in terms of national considerations and it is only when an equilibrium of power is established that international order can be accomplished. 4

De Gaulle has refused to become a crusader in international politics for a particular ideological system; rather he has asserted that "France merely acknowledges the world as it is." 5 Kelly pointed out that this Gaullist notion of the world "as it is" does not correspond necessarily to the way the world appears to others. Rather, it must be considered in the context of

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de Gaulle's concept of the nation-state. Since the General regards the world to be multiple and national, it would be consistent for him to regard the world as manipulable even by those nations which are not superpowers. 6

Perhaps the Gaullist foreign policy shows far more insight into the "realities" of international relations than it is credited of perceiving. Certainly this is true if London's commentary on foreign policy is accepted:

A workable foreign policy can never be static. In formulating policies, it is necessary to keep in mind that international conditions, like human life, are subject to constant change and that to build a policy on the basis of the status quo is an illusion that can only lead to disappointment, if not disaster. For nations, like human beings, are born, grow through a period of adolescence, become mature and—as history demonstrates—more often than not disintegrate.Maintenance of a status quo is unnatural and can lead to a premature death. On this small globe there are few isolated issues. Problems of international relations are interconnected and rarely can one issue be considered in a vacuum. In other words, foreign policy has become intercontinental policy and as such is indivisible. 7

It is precisely this status quo notion of international relations to which de Gaulle objected. According to Vernant, the first task which de Gaulle set for himself when he regained power was to rid himself of the ideologies which had emerged after World War Two and which prejudiced the position of France in world affairs. 8 Those ideologies which confronted de Gaulle were

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defined as follows:

1) Le monde est divise en deux par une lutte, qui marquerait cette seconde moitié du XXe siècle, entre la doctrine du liberalisme politique et celle du totalitarisme communiste. L'Occident doit, en consequence, regrouper ses forces materielles et morales, afin de s'opposer aux assauts d'un adversaire qui agit tantot par la ruse, suivant un plan centralise de longue haleine. Un cequence pratique de cette conception manichéenne est que toute rupture de la solidarite du monde libre en face de l'adversaire ne peut que favoriser ses entreprises.

2) Cette division du monde selon des camps ideologiques antagonistes s'accompagne d'une repartition bipolaire de la puissance politique, militaire et economique....

3) Corollaire des deux principes enonces ci-dessus ...

... on considereait ordinairement comme adme

a) par les puissances coloniales europeennes que la liquidation de leurs positions Outre-Mer mettait un terme a l'influence de la metropole dans les territoires qui dependaient d'elle et...

b) par le monde occidental dans son ensemble que la liquidation de l'influence euro-americaaine dans le Tiers Monde impliquait, en contre-partie necessaire, l'augmentation de l'influence sovietique et des progres dans l'implantation du communisme.9

Since the war the realities of international politics have changed; or at least the President of France believes that they have changed. As a result, de Gaulle has come to regard the present balance of power as unnatural, precarious, and unwise.10 Believing that the world is on the threshold of re-shuffling regarding international alliances, de Gaulle's task is at once apparent to him. He must understand these forces and guide their operation. To do this it is necessary to focus attention on the perennial national conflicts that he believes


10Macridis, "De Gaulle's Foreign Policy," p. 176.
override ideologies.\textsuperscript{11}

The belief that the present balance is unnatural can be traced to de Gaulle's contention that the growing bipolarization of the world is inconsistent with the secular realities of international realities.\textsuperscript{12} Vernant argued that this revision demanded in international relations was necessary almost from the earliest years after World War II. The causes, which he perceived, were five:

a) parce que les régimes évoluent;
b) l'usure des régimes implique que le temps peut faire son œuvre;
c) parce que d'une manière générale, la politique n'est pas affaire d'idologie;
d) parce que le monde est par nature divers beaucoup plus que dualiste, les 'tiers' y sont de plus nombreux et leur capacité d'action s'accroît à mesure que la période de l'après-guerre s'estompe dans le passé;
e) parce qu'il n'est pas sur que, comme on le croit souvent, la bipolarité...soit une garantie de la paix.\textsuperscript{13}

France is convinced that, although fundamental differences remain between the two power blocs, there no longer exists the strict cleavage of former years. Within his conception of the communist camp, Cousse de Nerville explained, an emancipation and transformation has taken place. The mutual relations between this bloc and the free world have undergone an inevitable recovery; and the accession to full sovereignty of dozens of

\textsuperscript{11}Macridis, "De Gaulle's Foreign Policy," p. 178.
\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., p. 176.
\textsuperscript{13}Vernant, "Politique Exterieure Francaise," pp. 460-61.
formerly colonized countries has, today, built a new world
equilibrium, assuredly more stable than that of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{14}

In a statement at Montbeliard in 1962, de Gaulle said:

\textit{Ces peuples et ces Etats de l'Europe doivent,}
\textit{ensemble, organiser la cooperation et la pratiquer, en}
\textit{vue d'arriver a un ensemble puissant, attractant, fraterno-

nel, qui ne peut pas ne pas produire ses effets sur les}
\textit{peuples de l'autre cote du rideau de fer. Ces peuples-la}
\textit{sont immensement desireux de trouver le moyen un jour}
\textit{d'etre avec nous fraternellement comme des hommes qu'ils}
\textit{sont et que nous sommes.}\textsuperscript{15}

This conception of the international situation wherein the former
foes are regarded as possible future allies has been a major
tenet of Gaullist foreign policy from its inception. As early as
1959, de Gaulle was preaching this view:

Doubtless Soviet Russia although having helped
Communism become established in China, realizes that
nothing can prevent it, Russia, a white European nation
which has conquered part of Asia and, in short, is quite
well endowed with land, mines, factories, and wealth—
nothing can happen to prevent it from having to reckon
with the yellow multitude which is China—numberless and
wretchedly poor, indestructible and ambitious, building
by dint of violence a power which cannot be kept within
limits and looking around at the expenses over which it
must one day spread.\textsuperscript{16}

Perhaps more significant is the French realization (even
if premature) that the Soviets are no longer anticipating a
take-over in Europe. In fact, recent years do not reveal any

\textsuperscript{14} Maurice Couve de Murville, "French Policy Today,"

\textsuperscript{15} June 17, 1962; found in Roger Massip, \textit{De Gaulle et}

\textsuperscript{16} de Gaulle, "Second Press Conference," November 10, 1959,
\textit{Major Addresses}, p. 58.
significant Soviet threats or offensive initiatives. The French, therefore, whether correct or not in their judgment, determined that the time was ripe for new approaches to foreign policy. 17

Another fundamental of Gaullist foreign policy is the evaluation of the present world situation as being extremely precarious. The continuous brink confronting both large and small nations is a danger which must be dispatched. 18 The fear revealed in this concept of the unexpected is also a perennial characteristic of the General's political thought. In his memoirs the General recalled his determination of April, 1942, when he declared that Fighting France would stand by her allies on the condition that they stand by her. His concern was the recognition of the Vichy government by those nations supposedly dedicated to democratic principles. As early as this date de Gaulle, realizing that France had been betrayed by her ruling class, looked forward to the revolution which he hoped to accomplish. He realized, however, that the superpowers could not be trusted to guarantee the peace. He concluded his remarks by warning that the situation would be intolerable "if the self-styled realism that, from one Munich to another, has led liberty to the very edge of the abyss were to continue to impose upon

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18 Macridis, "De Gaulle's Foreign Policy," p. 146.
ardour and to betray sacrifice..."\(^19\)

In de Gaulle's attempt to realistically evaluate the world-situation, he has continually believed in the need which great powers have to perform some world mission. Spacious utopias are fundamental to their ideologies. Thus years of experience have taught de Gaulle to be somewhat distrustful of the residual chauvinism which masquerades under liberal ideologies. This chauvinism is symptomatic of an international bipolarity. This has become a predominant fear of French policy-makers in recent years and has resulted in de Gaulle's determination to end the dual mastery of the superpowers.\(^20\)

The most basic factor which has compelled de Gaulle to reject the notion of bipolarity is its contribution to international tension. It could almost be said that such a bipolar framework is nothing more than an institutionalization of Cold War tensions. By attempting to negotiate with all participants in the world political arena, de Gaulle hopes to restore the normal conditions of traditional diplomacy.\(^21\)

One other element which de Gaulle found distasteful in the present balance was the lack of wisdom which it displayed. By allowing two nations--the United States and the Soviet Union--each of which de Gaulle considered to be junior members of the

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world community, to exercise unrestrained hegemony, the independ-
dence and liberty of world politics seemed jeopardized. The
French regard both of these political giants as inexperienced
and impatient negotiators. Part of de Gaulle's grand design
involves the peaceful consolidation of Europe; naturally France's
place in this Europe would be central. The fear, then, of the
Gaullists is obvious. Perhaps these two powers will definitively
agree to a permanent division of Europe. De Gaulle, on the other
hand, hopes to organize and lead a more traditional diplomatic
course and thus reunite Europe. This fear was expressed in
his eighth press conference:

...the United States which, since Yalta and Potsdam, has
nothing, after all, to ask from the Soviets, the United
States sees tempting prospects opening up before it.
Hence, for instance, all the separate negotiations between
the Anglo-Saxons and the Soviets which, starting with the
limited agreement on nuclear testing, seem likely to be
extended to other questions, notable European ones, until
now in the absence of the Europeans, which clearly goes
against the views of France.

At an even earlier date, de Gaulle was even more pessimistic:

Probably the sort of equilibrium that is estab-
lishing itself between the atomic power of the two camps
is, for the moment, a factor in world peace, but who can
say what will happen tomorrow? Who can say, for example,
whether some sudden advance in development--particularly
in the field of space rockets--will not provide one with

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22Macridis, "De Gaulle's Foreign Policy," p. 176.

23Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., "The Grand Design of Charles de
pp. 178-79.

24de Gaulle, "Eighth Press Conference," July 29, 1963,
Major Addresses, p. 235.
such an advantage that its peaceful inclinations will not hold out? Who can say whether, in the future, if basic political facts should change completely, as has already occurred on the earth, the two powers that would have a monopoly on nuclear weapons might not make a deal with each other to divide the world between them? Who can say whether, should the occasion arise--while each side might follow a policy of not hurling its devices at the principal adversary, so as not to be threatened by it--who can say whether the two rivals might not crush others? Who can very well imagine, for example, that on such a terrible occasion, Western Europe might be destroyed from Moscow and Central Europe from Washington. And who can say whether the two rivals, as a result of some unforeseeable political and social upheaval, will not come to the point of uniting?²⁵

After assessing the present power balance and finding it to be inadequate, de Gaulle has concluded that France could once again become a major influence in world affairs. The cause of mankind was assumed by France and, acting under the guise of this ideology, de Gaulle hoped to pursue the cause of peace, progress, and world advancement. In order to contribute to the lessening of opposition and contrast of the bipolar world, he undertook a policy calling for the multiplication of diplomatic relations. Thus it would be possible, according to de Gaulle, "that in this way the souls of men, wherever they may be on his earth, will meet a little sooner at the rendezvous that France gave the universe some hundred and seventy-five years ago, the rendezvous of liberty, equality, and fraternity."²⁶

In his evaluation of the Cold War situation, Burgess

noted, that Europe has not only made a tremendous economic
recovery, but also is today less harried by ominous soundings
from the East. A significant factor in this lessening of tension
is the conclusion of the treaty limiting nuclear testing. Com-
plimenting this, the Russian military offensive has become less
credible to Western Europe.27

There can be little mystery, therefore, shrouding the
policy-decisions of de Gaulle, which cannot be penetrated if they
are considered in the light of this political philosophy. The
General has repeatedly stated that he believed that world politics
were destined for new directions and that international align-
ments needed to be re-evaluated. One indicator of this was to
be found in the internal disorder of the totalitarian bloc:

As far as the totalitarian powers are concerned, it seems obvious to us that each spectacular propaganda
offensive is intended to alarm and thus to sidetrack the West. But nonetheless, we can appreciate the in-
ternal difficulties encountered by these leaders in all the efforts they are making, either to impose on the
peoples a system which is contrary to human nature, or to make those corrections in that system which are, little
by little, being demanded by the rise of new elites and by the silent pressure of the masses.

Nor are we unaware that in their camps the struggle between political trends, the intrigues of clans, the
rivalries of individuals periodically lead to implacable crises, whose sequels—or even whose premonitory symptoms
—cannot help but unsettle them. Moreover, we know that in these countries there are conflicting national grievances in spite of the absolutism of their ideology. We realize therefore only too well that they readily indulge in virulent utterances and sensational outbursts in order

27W.R. Burgess, "Economic and Political Consequences of
General de Gaulle," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 78
(December, 1963), p. 345.
to lead people astray—within their own country and outside—without, however, overstepping certain bounds.  

In a more recent statement in the same vein, Couve de Murville expressed in even more positive terms the view that the French had taken regarding what has frequently been called a "chasm" in the international tensions:

In the East, everything is dominated by the confrontation between China and Russia; this is a real rupture, the result first of an opposition of national interests which goes as far as the traditional frontier conflicts. The countries of Eastern Europe have taken advantage of this by speeding up an already noticeable tendency toward emancipation and by behaving in such a way that the disparaging label of satellite is becoming, with the exception of East Germany, less and less justified.

In the West, on the contrary, there are no conflicts. Mutatis mutandis, the underlying interests remain mutual. The alliance is a reality and a necessity recognized by everyone. But this solidarity on the fundamentals does not prevent the automatic alignment of the past from having become an anachronism, and little by little and to different degrees, it does not prevent some members from rediscovering their personality and their freedom of action. The natural result of the economic re-establishment, the consequence of a solution in which the threat, without being much less real, has become more diffused, is an awakening at least to the need to find themselves once again.

The French are not the only ones to have perceived a change in the international arena. Brzezinski has stated his conviction that the Soviet Union has in recent years become susceptible to the attraction of Europe. He considered the former

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attitude of the Russians—on the one hand, arrogantly talking of Moscow as a "third Rome;" on the other hand, revealing a sense of deep-rooted inferiority to the West. The task has remained for the communists of the Soviet Union to combine this sense of ideological universality and superiority with a drive to erase the inferiority. The means chosen to accomplish this task was to create a relationship with the West that was equal and honorable through a narrowing of the technological, economic and cultural gap. The problems with China have, at the same time, destroyed any pretense of universality. Soviet control of Eastern Europe also played a vital role as a transmission belt for ideas and values between the great political powers. 30

According to Sulzberger, de Gaulle began to reappraise the Soviet situation as early as 1956, two years before he came to power. He noted that the West had accepted the situation in Europe although there still existed violent resistance in other parts of the world (such as the Middle East). At this same time, the program of de-Stalinization that had been launched marked a political thaw. When the revolts broke out in Poland and in Hungary, these positive political signs could not have been unclear to the Soviet leadership. Certainly they must have realized that Eastern Europe could not be conquered, that although Soviet influence

could be felt through military means, the people had not intern-
alized the goals of the Soviet leadership and had not accepted
the legitimacy of the movement. With this realization, the
General regarded the communist movement to have lost its
dynamism. The status quo in Europe had been tacitly accepted
by both sides. Just as the United States could not realis-
tically hope to "roll-back" communism, so to the Soviets
abandoned any hope of coming to power in Germany, Italy or
France. The seemingly emergent nationalism within the bloc
which at this time was manifesting itself substantiated the
General's historical conception of the nation-state and
therefore added greater weight to the evaluation which
de Gaulle had made. He truly regarded the Soviet leaders as
politicians who were interested in enhancing their own power
and serving the cause of national advancement.31

Against a background of this logic and taking into
consideration the General's view of France, it is not difficult
to understand a statement such as the following which de Gaulle
made very early in the Fifth Republic's history:

After years of international tension, it seems
that on the Soviet side of the world a few indications
of relaxation are beginning to appear.
I am not speaking merely of what has been said
by men in positions of responsibility who, having
called a truce on invective, are proclaiming their
desire to see peace become a practical reality. But
I am referring to the fact that in certain troubled
areas—the Middle East, India, Laos, Africa, Central
America, for example—Moscow at this time is refraining

31C.L. Sulzberger, "Foreign Affairs: How de Gaulle Sees
from pouring oil on the fire; I am referring to the fact, that, after having appeared to call on the three great Western powers to put an end to their presence in Berlin, the Soviet Government relaxed its pressure; I am referring to the fact that on the occasion of the present debates in the United Nations, the Russian representatives are to a certain extent turning aside from the conspiracy of ill will and demagogy that a group of States, more or less stirred up, seeking to organise against France; finally, I am referring to the fact that, between East and West, more contacts are being made between leaders, scientists, artists, etc., while awaiting the time when the peoples themselves may perhaps someday exchange without hindrance their goods, their ideas and their travelers.  

De Gaulle has assessed the position of the Soviet Union in view of the past and the future. Gradually the Soviet leaders will come to reckon their best interests, he believes, as being based on cooperation with the West. The impossibility of any universalist ambitions and also the political, economic, and cultural elements all dictate this imperative. An increasing number of states in the world today are pursuing an independent foreign policy. This was traced to the emergence of many new states since the end of the war who have developed a new political philosophy—that of non-alignment; in addition, the various satellites of the superpowers have begun to exercise some degree of independence in their policy-formulating process.

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34 Couve de Muroville, "French Policy Today," p. 616.
This dual concentration of power which had been so accommodating to the major powers had failed after the war to provide any real security or assurance to the other nations of the world. This uncertainty was apparent to the Europeans. By the 1960's, however, this tight alliance system was coming to an end. The bonds were loosening, not only through the natural mutations which time brings, but also as a result of inept policies. Neither the Soviet nor the American leaders were able to take advantage of the rifts in the other bloc since each was confronted with apparently insoluble problems themselves. For the Soviets, the problem was China; for the United States, Vietnam was the issue. Moreover, bipolarity was the very condition of flexibility for the lesser powers since they were able to manipulate so widely under the protective umbrella of their guardian.35 The result of these political influences as well as the economic rehabilitation of Europe has been the rediscovery of their independent personalities by many of the nations of Europe. France, since she is not embroiled in any serious crisis of her own, was in an enviable position to exploit this situation.36

Commentaries in the Soviet Press during this same period of rediscovery revealed that the Soviet Union was undergoing a policy analysis similar to that of the West. One such

The development of international relations has now brought the European states squarely up against the need to set up such a system of collective security in Europe, within whose framework it would be possible to find solutions for the problems not only dividing the Socialist and capitalist states but also creating tensions in relations between the Western Powers themselves.

These problems cannot be solved by the imperialist (often called 'traditional') policy based on an artificial opposition of one group of European states to another, the forming of tight military and political groupings, a runaway arms race, legalized domination of the strongest Power, and restriction and infringement of the sovereignty of the European states.

It is in the common interest of all the European states to help maintain universal peace and security, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in Europe, especially their transfer in any form to the West German revenge-seekers, to bring the German problem to a peaceful settlement, and to improve, step by step, the relations between European states belonging to opposed social systems. 37

The post-war challenge which the Americans and the Soviets posed to one another and to the rest of the world found its basis in the existence of their nuclear might. Beneath this basic fact de Gaulle perceived a two-fold reality. On the one hand, neither of these "Vulcans" could be exterminated; on the other, it was too preposterous to think that any rational foreign policy would ever even consider the deployment of nuclear weapons. To do so would certainly result in the destruction of both. 38

Life in the Soviet Union and in the satellites had


evolved in the years following the war with the natural outcome being an advancement in human desires and wants. Economic and social conditions in these nations were still unsatisfactory, nevertheless, with the improvements that were made, desires increased. Thus popular pressure was also a potent force in reducing the virulence of Soviet policy. But basic to the reevaluation of communism which de Gaulle made was the dispute between the Soviet Union and China:

Finally, concerning its relations with the outside, everything still appears for Russia to be dominated by the dispute with China. Whatever happens in the coming months, the national rivalries, the power struggles within the Communist world, the inevitable incompatibilities between a relatively well provided nation like the Soviet nation and the countless proletarian masses of China, are going to remain for a long time and will consequently make any true cooperation highly problematical.

As early as 1960, de Gaulle had set out to do all he could to bring about a readjustment of the status quo. His plan was based on his concept of history and world politics and revealed an extensive insight into his future diplomacy:

The division of the peoples that inhabit Europe and North America is the main fact and the worst evil of our time. Two camps are set up, face to face, under conditions such that it depends solely on Moscow or Washington whether or not a large part of humanity is wiped out in a few hours.

In the face of such a situation, France deems that there is no territorial disagreement or ideological dispute that has any importance in comparison with the necessity of exorcising this monstrous peril. In France's view, this situation implies three conditions.


40 Couve de Murville, "French Policy Today," p. 615.
The first is a detente, in other words, the bettering of international relations, putting a stop to provocative actions and speeches and increasing trade, cultural exchanges and the visits of tourists in order that a more peaceful atmosphere might be created; failing this, the dizziness of desperation would afflict discouraged men, to such an extent that one day and all of a sudden, for any reason at all, the world would find itself at war, as it was, twice in my lifetime, because the Archduke was dead or because some one wanted Danzig.

The second condition is a specific degree of controlled disarmament, preferably aimed at the devices capable of carrying bombs strategic distances, in order that the possibility— and, at the same time, the temptation— suddenly to provoke general destruction might vanish.

The third condition is a beginning of organized cooperation between East and West devoted to the service of man, either by helping in the progress of underdeveloped peoples or by collaborating in the great projects of scientific research, on which depends the future of all.

There is little if any disagreement among the members of the Western alliance regarding the desirability of increasing contacts and cooperation with the Soviet Union. The question in contention between the United States and France regards the timing that this process of adjustment must have. The United States appeared quite ready in the early 1960's to engage in discussions with the Soviet Union that could possibly have had lasting importance to the nations of Europe. De Gaulle was, of course, opposed to any such initiatives or discussions that could in any way lead to a solidification of the position of the major powers. He hoped that any such deals could be postponed for a later time when Europe would

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41 de Gaulle, "Address Outlining the Principles of French Foreign Policy Following the Failure of the Summit Conference," May 31, 1960, Major Addresses, p. 75.
be sufficiently strong to be among the bargainers. 42

De Gaulle has no illusions about the purpose and intent of either the United States or the Soviet Union. He realized long ago that their efforts in the international arena were expressions of their own national interests. Either a temporary accommodation between these two nations or the continuation of tensions were unacceptable alternatives. To avoid this situation, de Gaulle hoped to create a balance of power which he considered to be consistent with the emerging political realities; such a balance would be one that gave proper recognition to Europe’s economic and political development. 43 As early as 1946, only six months after resigning power, de Gaulle declared that he would favor a restoration of stability based on the old world; that in spite of age-old arguments and disagreements, the nations of Europe would be a potent force in world politics once again. 44

De Gaulle’s resentment of the role played by the United States has been reinforced by what has been regarded as unsatisfactory diplomacy both with respect to objectives as well as to the mode of execution. Too often the United


43 Macridis, "De Gaulle’s Foreign Policy," p. 176.

States has retained a rigidity which resulted in the loss of irretrievable opportunities for negotiating with the Soviets; such occasions when internal disorder rendered the Soviet Union to be diplomatically disadvantaged were the death of Stalinger the 1956 uprisings in Poland and Hungary. America's obsession with restraining and combating communism as an ideology has prevented, as de Gaulle sees it, the United States from exploiting a valuable trump. Following the death of Kennedy, the Johnson administration vacillated in an effort to mark time until after the 1964 elections; this again reinforced French skepticism about the ability of the United States to speak for the West. Steel believes that the final confirmation of de Gaulle's vision of Europe as a valid and vital factor in international politics can be found in the inability of the United States to take substantial control of the developments that are sweeping the newly emerging states and churn their foreign policies.45

Following the war, de Gaulle announced that he looked forward to the day when Europe would be the element of international stability, when Europe would be able to prevent any nation from gaining supremacy over all others.46 This same expectation became fundamental to the foreign policy of the Fifth Republic:


46 Speech by de Gaulle at Lille on June 29, 1947; found in Reynaud, Foreign Policy of Charles de Gaulle, p. 14.
Now, in the last analysis and as always, it is only in equilibrium that the world will find peace. On our old continent, the organization of a western group, at the very least equivalent to that which exists in the east, may one day, without risk to the independence and the freedom of each nation and taking into account the probable evolution of political regimes, establish a European entente from the Atlantic to the Urals. Then Europe, no longer split in two by ambitions and ideologies that would become out-of-date, would again be the heart of civilization. The accession to progress of the masses of Asia, Africa and Latin America would certainly be hastened and facilitated. But also, the cohesion of this great and strong European community would lead vast countries in other continents, which are advancing toward power, also to take the way of cooperation, rather than to yield to the temptation of war. 47

De Gaulle has not left the world in the dark about possible alternatives; he has not been critical without attempting to be constructive in his criticism. The concept of balance and equilibrium, as noted, are fundamentals of Gaullist political theory; thus it is not surprising that de Gaulle hopes to rebuild world political alignments on what he regards as realistic power balances. One alternative which has been permanent in the General's plans is a belief that Central Europe and a dismembered Germany could be a "buffer" between the East and the West. By incorporating these states into the economic and political systems of both power blocs, they would have no need to seek security behind the protection of one nor would either of the superpowers feel compelled to lend sovereign support. A second plan to

achieve a "balance" was outlined by de Gaulle in an offer made to Churchill in November of 1944. This plan was to combine forces with Great Britain so that these two Western European nations, together with their then existing empires, could constitute an impressive weight in world affairs. But de Gaulle offered yet another alternative, that of an equilibrium wherein a revived Europe would be a "Third Force"; this was a view of Europe which looked from the Atlantic to the Urals and has since been a persistent notion of Gaullist foreign policy. The exact nature of this revived Europe has never been quite clear and it has been the subject of much concern. It is definitely observable, however, from de Gaulle's words and diplomatic moves that this Europe would not include the Anglo-Saxons; the place of Russia was also somewhat unclear, but her European vocation was never denied. And yet another alternative was available to the post-war diplomats: a world equilibrium based on a Franco-Soviet alliance. This last alternative was consistently regarded by the General as a natural and traditional concomitant to the political orientation of the two countries.\(^{48}\)

This idea of cooperation with the Soviets dates to a surprisingly early date; realizing that Anglo-American influence would be great in Europe after the war, de Gaulle was aware that a rapprochement with the Soviet Union might be necessary. Thomson notes that moves in this direction

\(^{48}\)Macridis, "De Gaulle's Foreign Policy," pp. 176-178.
were being made by France early in 1941, prior to the entrance of the United States into the war. He evoked deep-rooted feelings for this idea by appealing to geo-political arguments. He considered the United States and Great Britain to be primarily sea-powers, whereas France and the Soviet Union were continental powers with similar goals and problems. For decades French schools had depicted France as a regular hexagon with three maritime sides (the Channel, Atlantic, Mediterranean) and three land frontiers (the Pyrenees, Alps, and Rhineland); this suggests, so they argued, symmetry and a naturally balanced perfection. This argument is nationalistic, traditional, and of very little importance in policy-making. Nevertheless, this image has made its contribution to the thought of General de Gaulle.

The question that is presented, therefore, is of determining the direction toward which Soviet Russia must turn. The emerging danger of China, the increasing power of West Germany, and the continuing influence of the United States in Europe (especially in Germany and Great Britain) serve to reinforce what de Gaulle regarded as a "natural" and "traditional" tendency—that of cooperation between the Soviet Union and France. The only obstacle to this tendency which Macridis could find in his 1960 study was the question of

Algeria. Accordingly, today there is ample reason to speculate about this possible alteration in the world power balance. 50

50 Macridis, "De Gaulle's Foreign Policy," p. 179.
PART II

DIPLOMACY OF GAULLISM
CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL ASPIRATIONS AND GENERAL OBJECTIVES
OF DE GAULLE'S FOREIGN POLICY

De Gaulle's political philosophy embraces the totality of the international scene; he believes that France has responsibilities which stretch not only beyond her own borders, but also beyond Europe to the far corners of the world. Her political actions can affect the peace and security of the future. When France, in past years, looked at the military giants, the policy-makers must have been impressed by the insignificance of all other military force in the face of such overwhelming might. The fear that France could be so readily pulverized if it served the interests of these major powers dictated a need to achieve some degree of political and military independence. De Gaulle has repeatedly expressed hopes of building France into the position where she could exercise an independent policy and act as a check, after a fashion, on the power of each of the two international giants. Thus, the independent policy line which de Gaulle is pursuing is suggestive of the past when France, under Louis XIV, served
as the guarantor of world stability. Such an indentification with the historical role of France is clearly illustrated by the following statement toward which Mauriac has directed attention:

Occasionally someone says: 'Oh, that's de Gaulle talking about greatness...'. Yes, it is. France needs it. Our fathers, in every age, could do something meaningful, something important, only if they desired it to be great. And this is where we are today as well. Moreover, this is not the costliest of policies. The costliest policy, the most ruinous policy, is to ask something of everyone and never to obtain it.

Speaking in this same mode, Couve de Murville spelled out the French indentification of the future with the past:

France's vocation is universal. If our country wishes to retain its character—and can it have any other ambition?—it must remain universal. In the past, France played a decisive role in the vast movement of national emancipation which, from the United States to Germany and Italy, from Latin America to Central Europe, forged the world in which we live. The modern problem of emancipation and that of the development of the underdeveloped countries, to which France has already made a basic contribution through her work of decolonisation, is clearly quite different, and first of all it is economic in nature. It would be false, however, to think that it is only material, and that financial aid provides for everything.

The problem is also, and perhaps primarily, political, for nothing and no one can take the place of the countries themselves, in other words, replace a national will by a will from the outside.

Here again France is once more making her contribution through her own example, that of a State which, without being among the biggest, affirms its independence, itelf chooses its path, which is that of freedom, does not seek to impose anything on anyone

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1 Karol, "Poincare Rides Again," p. 698.
2 Speech by de Gaulle at Basse-Terre, March 20, 1964; found in Mauriac, De Gaulle, p. 211.
and offers fraternal cooperation with scrupulous concern for the sovereign personality of each country.\(^3\)

In his drive for independence, de Gaulle has been driven to take actions which appear quite paradoxical and unanticipated. Because he desires to strengthen the national power, he has been forced to restrict and almost decimate the army; in an effort to maximize the national glory, he has liberated most of France's colonies; and although he is regarded as a political conservative, he has assumed the sponsorship of Red China in international politics. All this he has done to achieve his basic and fundamental goal: the supremacy and boundless independence of France. And beneath this effort to achieve European independence is the continuing fear of a Second Yalta; in spite of his desire to see a relaxation of cold war tensions, any negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union to which France is not a part renew his mania.\(^4\)

During the current decade this fear of American domination has swelled--at least until very recent months. The main reason has been the steady increase of American business in Europe and an increasing technology gap. In the early 1950s, European industry appeared to be recovering and many anticipated the day when it would catch up with the United States. In recent years, however, this hope has been dispelled. An interesting indicator is

\(^3\)Couve de Murville, "The Role of France," p. 260.

the "technological balance of payments" (measured by the flow of international payments for patents, licenses, and other instruments for the transfer of technical knowledge); in 1961, this flow favored the United States five to one. Another source of concern to Western Europe is the "brain drain"--the migration of scientists and engineers to the United States. Although the United States cannot realistically be accused of deliberately engineering this form of colonialism, nevertheless de Gaulle still holds the United States hegemony to be the cause of this migration; moreover, he realizes that the position of the United States is re-enforced by it.\(^5\)

The effect that this Gaullist realization will have on the General's policies can be perceived by taking a look into his memoirs, where he speaks directly to the United States concerning French policy independence:

> In mortal danger we French have survived since the beginning of the century, the United States does not give us the impression that it regards its own destiny as linked with that of France, that it wishes France to be great and strong, that it is doing all it can to help her to remain or become so once again. Perhaps, in fact, we are not worth the trouble. In that case, you are right. But perhaps we shall rise again. Then you will have been wrong. In either case, your behavior tends to alienate us.\(^5\)

Alan has considered the independent position which de Gaulle has assumed to be the consequences of his education and family background. Certainly during his schooling he

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6de Gaulle, War Memoirs, p. 761.
was exposed to the writings of Charles Maurras, who has been referred to as the godfather of European fascism. Yet de Gaulle found himself after the war owing his political, military, and personal fulfillment to the nation which Maurras regarded as the continuous enemy of France. It was through the help of the British that France was able to maintain herself in the 1940's; in fact, even as late as 1958, Paris newspapers were claiming that de Gaulle's bid for power was backed by the British in order to establish their man in office. The differences of opinion between the leader of France and the other leaders of the world can be explained in these terms (and no doubt this is a contributing factor although certainly not the total explanation). Perhaps it was inevitable that de Gaulle would seemingly snub those who supported him in his critical periods of leadership to symbolically satisfy his own conscience, to say nothing of his critics.7

In the Edge of the Sword de Gaulle noted the quality of leadership which to him seemed most noble. The power of decision must be found within the leader himself and not imposed by some external order. De Gaulle cried out for a task to perform and the freedom to perform the task.8 The task which he has discovered is to assert the Independence

8de Gaulle, Edge of the Sword, p. 43.
of France and to recapture her sovereignty. France is no longer politically impotent and dependent upon the United States; the task for de Gaulle, therefore, is to make the world aware that this change has taken place. France (and Western Europe) refuses to continue to be treated as though it were entirely dependent upon American economic largess and politico-diplomatic acquiescence. 9

Vernant has explained what this Gaullist determination to be independent means in terms of the political:

D'une maniere tres generale, comment peut-il definir les objectifs de la politique exterieure francaise? D'abord, nous l'avons dit, donner a la France la capacite de faire entendre sa voix propre et de prendre les initiatives conformes a ses interets. Plus precisement, affirmer dans tous les domaines l' unite de l' Europe occidentale, en sert que celle-ci puisse s'affirmer comme une realite, non seulement economique, mais politique et militaire. 10

Prior to the most recent years, an "ideology of convenience" existed in the minds of the foreign policy-makers. The difficulty of planning strategy with more than two players was difficult and as a result there was a tendency to force all facts into the stringent guidelines of the existent bipolar world. In such a world, of course, the decisions of the lesser members had to be subordinate to the decisions of the most powerful member of the alliance. Thus in an effort to regard the world as a more predictable place in

which to live, independent national efforts have been strongly resisted. De Gaulle, however, revolted against this external interference in French policy; moreover, he was convinced that the context of international politics had changed during the previous decade. The balance of terror produced by the nuclear stalemate has produced in the minds of the French a constant suspicion of the major actors in world politics. The American commentators were in substantial agreement that the firmness which the United States showed in the Cuban missile crisis should have been positive proof to the allies that the commitment of the United States was genuine. But to de Gaulle, this situation re-established his former fears. Aware that in the previous year the United States had shown weakness in dealing with the Soviets on the German question, the General concluded that firmness was evidenced in this case only because it involved a direct threat to the United States. Thus the firmness over such direct threats only confirmed the doubts in the French minds regarding what help they might receive if their interests were threatened.

It is significant, however, that de Gaulle has never denied himself the political bargaining power that he has by being loosely associated with the United States in the Atlantic Alliance. American power has been conveniently employed to

13Grosser, "Foreign Policy of the Fifth Republic," p. 203.
serve as a warning to the Soviets that any major attempt to disrupt the present power relationships would result in a major confrontation with the United States. At the same time, France uses every political tactic at her disposal to pursue an ambitious policy without overwhelming military might. Under these circumstances France has been able to some extent to manipulate both the United States and the Soviet Union in an effort to emerge as the arbiter between these two forces. The aims of France are in harmony with the long-range policy aims of a substantial segment of the nations--those which comprise the neutralist "third" world. Gaullism includes the belief that all national differences can be negotiated and can be resolved through diplomacy; and this is the task which de Gaulle believes belongs to France and to himself.

De Gaulle's fixation with the identity of France and his determination not to allow the existence and destiny of France be contingent upon the decisions made in capitals other than Paris is something of an echo from the mouths of the neutralist leaders. It is characteristic, it seems, of nations that are attempting to build their power to be very adamant in their refusal to become a satellite of any major power. France, likewise, although being a member of the Western Alliance, is quite unwilling to allow her position to be

defined automatically. A nation cannot be indicted because it strives to satisfy its own needs and respond to its national imperatives. 16

In a significant explanation of his politics, de Gaulle explained what French independence would mean:

France, because she can do so, because everything invites her to do so, because she is France, should conduct amidst the world a world policy. Throughout the year which is beginning, we will thus work toward the three major tasks incumbent upon us. The union of Europe... the progress of developing countries... a contribution to the maintenance of the peace.

As for this last objective, there are conditions imposed upon us. Firstly, we must pursue the effort which should equip us with a thermonuclear arsenal, the only one with a power inadequate to the threat of aggression and consequently the only one which allows us independence... we must, without giving in to the illusions in which the weak lull themselves, but without losing the hope that human liberty and dignity will in the end prevail everywhere, we must envisage the day when... the Communist totalitarian regime, which still succeeds in constraining confined peoples, will gradually come to an evolution compatible with our own transformation. Then there would be open to Europe as a whole prospects in keeping with its resources and its capacities. 17

Thus western observers note that de Gaulle is attempting to forge his own policies, attempting to assert the independence of his nation. Significant examples of the search for independence are the French attempts to develop a new partnership with West Germany, the public recognition of a divided Germany, the recognition of Communist China, the determination to forge France’s own nuclear arsenal, and the

16 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
recent initiatives toward a Franco-Soviet accord. But the insistence of the French upon independence is not a denial of their concern for security; if it can in any way be typified, it represents a longing for peace and security. They desire to escape the need to choose the one to whom they must turn for security, not the sense of security itself. This has frequently been misunderstood, not only by popular opinion but also among those who should be better informed. Acheson recently criticized Gaullist policy for rejecting the security which the United States claims that it provides; he regarded the policies of the French to be such that the world would be projected into inevitable incineration. A more perceptive analysis, however, would reveal that the French are interested in any effort that would allow them some measure of security, positioned as they are so vulnerably in the center of a world that is anything but at peace. Any withdrawal of troops or restrictions on nuclear weapons cannot be regarded by the French unfavorably; if it serves to lessen the tensions, then it makes the world that much more secure.

As early as 1948, de Gaulle revealed his post-war search

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18Crabb, "Gaullist Revolt," pp. 41-42.
20Reynaud, Foreign Policy of Charles de Gaulle, p. 15.
for French security and independence:

I believe that we must defend Europe in Europe, and I believe that by virtue of geography, history, and also psychology, Europe cannot be defended in London. This is a question we will have to take up again, for in the preparation of a possible war, France must be the center of the strength and strategy of Western Europe.22

To clarify any doubts and answer his many critics, de Gaulle clarified his notion of the relationship between France and the United States in a press conference in 1963. He explained that there would be no question that in the event of some major conflict, France would be on the side of the United States. But this is not the situation now confronting the policy-makers. There should be nothing distressing or even surprising in the fact that two nations might take a different approach to the contingent questions arising in international affairs.23 De Gaulle was even more expressive in an earlier statement:

Yet, until we achieve an organized peace, if that is at all possible, France intends, as far as she is concerned, to be ready to defend herself. This means, first of all, that we shall remain an integral part of the Atlantic Alliance...Our alliance appeared a living reality. In order for it to become even more so, France must have her own role in it, and her own personality. This implies that she too must acquire a nuclear armament, since others have one; that she must be sole mistress of her resources and her territory; in short, that her destiny, although associated with that of her allies, must remain in her own hands.24

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This was a variation of the theme that de Gaulle repeated time and again. In *The Army of the Future*, de Gaulle argued that defense must be the ultimate prerogative of the nation; this duty cannot be delegated to any other nation-state nor allowed to be made contingent upon another's decisions. Just as he once urged France to use her industrial and technological know-how to develop a mechanized army, he has now applied this argument to the question of nuclear armament. Without such ability and potential, a nation is relegated to a state of total dependence upon allies. What adds to the crisis of such a situation is the knowledge that there can be no guarantee that the interests of any ally will always remain congruent to the interests of France. Thus without security of her own, France would always be at the mercy of both enemy and ally.25 Perhaps the most definitive Gaullist statement regarding this search for security is the following:

Indeed, the possible adversary is himself equipped with enormous means of the same kind. This being the case, no one, nowhere, can know in advance whether, in the event of conflict, the atomic bombs would or would not be used at the start by the two principal champions; whether, if they did use them, they would use them in Central Europe and Western Europe only, without striking each other directly and immediately; or whether, on the contrary, they would be led right away to hurl death at each other's vitals. Anyhow, and in light of the enormous and inevitable uncertainty, France must herself have the means of directly reaching any State that would be her aggressor, that is, the means

of deterring it from being so and, according to the circumstances, the means of assisting in the defense of its allies, including—who knows—America. 26

He then addressed himself to the very core of Gaullist foreign policy as he self-righteously cast a glance upon history and at the same time considered the future:

In sum, our country, perpetually threatened, finds itself once again faced with the necessity of possessing the most powerful weapons of the era unless, of course, the others cease to possess them. However, to dissuade us, the voices of immobility and demagogy are as always simultaneously raised. 'It is useless,' say some. 'It is too costly,' say others. These voices France listened to, sometimes and to her misfortune, notably on the eve of the two wars. 'No heavy artillery,' they exclaimed in concert in 1914. 'No armored corps, no fighter aircraft,' the same backward and brainless groups cried in unison before 1939. But this time we shall not allow routine and illusion to invite invasion of our country. Moreover, in the midst of the strained and dangerous world in which we live, our chief duty is to be strong and to be ourselves.

Gerholm made a very objective assessment of America's commitment to Europe and it was his conclusion that the nuclear weapons of the United States did not constitute a guarantee of European security any longer. He based his conclusion on recent events and on the statements and opinions of contemporary political leaders in the United States. There was little doubt, according to this study, that the United States would not risk total annihilation unless its interests


27 Ibid.
were directly violated. The strategy of "gradual response" which the policy-makers of the United States projected in recent years fails to give the French the security they desire. The Gaullist concept of European security involves the immediate nuclear reprisal launched against an aggressor's homeland (especially his major cities) in answer to any major offensive in Europe. Thus no NATO command and United States troops would be necessary. Such a battle could be fought and won by the French forces alone. This sense of national responsibility is a natural concomitant to the revival of France as a political and economic personality. France has refused to allow her personality to be swallowed up in internationally organized structures; the French are demanding the right to organize their own security.

The concepts of security and independence are clearly joined to history and explained as joint political imperatives by de Gaulle in a speech delivered before the officers of the Ecole de Guerre in Paris on November 3, 1959:

The defense of France must be French. That is a necessity which has not always been too well understood in recent years. I know this. It is absolutely essential that it become recognized once more. With a country like France, if war should come, then that war must be her war. Its effort must be her effort. If

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it were otherwise, our country would be acting counter to everything it has been since its origin—to its role, to its self-respect, to its very soul. Naturally, should the occasion arise, French defense should be joined with that of other countries. That is in the nature of things. But it is indispensable that our defense belongs to us, that France defend herself by herself, for herself, and in her own way...the government's raison d'etre is to defend the integrity of the territory. It arises from this necessity. Especially in France, all our regimes have been based on their ability to do so.\textsuperscript{31}

The future security of France was to be a definite principle in the Gaullist foreign policy of the sixties. In whatever way this security could best be achieved, the General was determined to discover, and through diplomacy to achieve. Before an audience in Brittany he plotted a course which did not exclude any future alternatives. He explained:

"La France veut assurer sa defense, elle ne veut pas etre submergée et elle a fait alliance avec les autres pays libres pour ne pas etre envasee. Mais sous le couvert de ces alliances elle tend la main aux autres peuples."\textsuperscript{32}

Since coming to power in 1958, de Gaulle has been driven by this objective, of participating in world affairs in the front rank and assuming responsibility for the security of France. These two goals of independence and security, therefore, must be considered in the light of a third goal: that of equality. Regardless of what the foreign policy experts and military analysts might argue, de Gaulle believes

\textsuperscript{31}Quoted in Macridis, \textit{Implacable Ally}, p. 133.

that Great Britain (and perhaps even West Germany) occupies a privileged position within the Western camp. Thus the strategic problems of defense which confront France have been considerably enlarged in scope to include political dimensions. Nuclear weapons and independent responsibility for the defense of France are necessities to the independence which de Gaulle hopes to achieve in the diplomatic sphere. Yet there is one substantial factor that must be used as a frame of reference in approaching the notion of equality, and it is in this respect that the objectives of the Fifth Republic bear a marked similarity to those of the Fourth: this equality is desired by France, for France—not for any of the other members of the Western Alliance. Only in the most recent years has Europe been reborn as a political reality; Europe is confronted with the strange problem, therefore, of choosing the direction that her policies will pursue. And it is in this respect that de Gaulle envisions that the greatness of France can be achieved. He has forced Europe to think for herself. France was rebuked in her bid for a front-row seat as a maker of policy for the entire western group. He has turned to Europe, then, in an attempt to assert himself as a leader. Immediately after he returned to power, de Gaulle made it clear that France did not intend to be limited to the

33Grosser, "Foreign Policy of the Fifth Republic," pp. 204-5.

role that currently was hers. Although it was supposedly secret, de Gaulle addressed a memorandum in 1958 to Henri Spaak, Prime Minister Macmillan, and President Eisenhower pointing out the inequality of the political order as it then existed.

De Gaulle proposed the establishment, within the NATO framework, of a "directorate" to be composed of the United States, Great Britain, and France. This group, which he hoped to establish, would concert policy and serve as the decision makers of the Western Alliance. He concluded this memorandum with the threat that France would reconsider its western commitments if its bid for a position of status were rejected.35

Part of the original plan set down by de Gaulle would be the extension of the influence of the Western Alliance into areas other than the Atlantic region. In this way de Gaulle hoped to re-establish the position of France throughout the world. The refusal by the United States to allow France to participate in the formulation of global policies forced de Gaulle to look for a different way to achieve the equality he desired.36

It soon became perfectly clear that de Gaulle intended to use Europe as the vehicle for achieving the role he desired. He took to himself the cause of Europe and became the prophet of self-reliance; and he pursued this role with a passion.

35 Memorandum of September 24, 1958; found in Macridis, "De Gaulle's Foreign Policy," p. 182.

Yet his almost psychopathic aversion to any genuine union of the European nations made his real ambitions that much more distinguishable. If Europe could be united, so de Gaulle reasoned, then it would be strong enough to resist both the Soviet Union and the United States; moreover, it could serve as the mediator between these power-giants. And if France could assert leadership of this new force, then the equality which is so dearly coveted could be achieved. The appeal that de Gaulle made in his bid to unite Europe behind his leadership was two-fold: he appealed to tradition and to the historical position of Europe as the center of the world; on the other hand, he promised not only security but also independence once equality were achieved. Daniel summarized this aspect of Gaullism in the following way:

Neither war nor peace, capitalism nor communism, conflicting ideologies nor racial differences are really important to him. He is quite willing to acknowledge some truth of the moment which will fit some issue of the day, so long as France can share, on an equal footing with the Great Powers, the leadership of the world. And so long as he, de Gaulle, is one of the people doing the leading.

In the very earliest months after the war, de Gaulle had already begun to make his appeal to rebuild the power of France through the manipulation of the emotional pride of the Europeans:


38 Furniss, Troubled Ally, pp. 24-25.

What then, if not the old, can re-establish the equilibrium between the two new ones? The old Europe that for so many centuries was the guide of the universe is in a position to constitute the necessary element of compensation and comprehension at the heart of a world tending to split in two. The nations of the ancient West, which have for their vital arteries the North Sea, the Mediterranean, the Rhine, geographically situated between the two new masses, determined to maintain an independence that would be dangerously exposed in case of a conflagration...40

The position of France today is readily observable. What de Gaulle seeks of Europe is not a unified entity, but rather a group of nation-states, acting in concert, under the direction and leadership of France. To achieve this desired goal, an appeal has been made to feelings of supra-national solidarity, European pride, a natural desire for power, and the prospect of future prosperity under such a system.41 De Gaulle realized that France could never discover her post-war personality if there were need to continually search to achieve security. It would be senseless to expend energy to attempt in vain to maintain a colonial empire. Rather the initiative would be discovered through a facility of being present and acting, as an autonomous power, at the most auspicious time in the sphere where political activity would be most crucial—that is, in the realm of the Cold War struggle. But de Gaulle also realized that France would not be powerful enough (from the demographic, economic, or military points of view) to enter this arena as an equal

40Speech at Bar-le-Duc, July 28, 1946; quoted in Mauriac, De Gaulle, p. 171.
unless she would succeed in assembling around her a number of the European nations. This was the way de Gaulle planned to discover Europe; this was to become a basic goal of the Fifth French Republic.42

Yet it must be noted that because of the commitment to leadership of the European group, the French have not lessened their desire to occupy a policy-making position within the Atlantic Alliance. The door has never been closed by the French to this possibility. De Gaulle regards equality as something of an equation of position with commitment, power, and purpose. Clearly, of all continental nations, France is the most closely involved in Atlantic diplomacy. Although the other nations are closer to the actual confrontation line, they are limited in their participation in Western diplomacy, because they either lack the commitment to any aspect of the alliance other than the prevention of Soviet aggression, or they lack the power (perhaps artificially as is the case with a divided Germany) to be an effective participant. In the eyes of de Gaulle, France alone possesses that combination of national power, geographical position, and worldwide interests which the others lack; this, together with the stability and national unity imposed by de Gaulle, are the basis of the French bid for equality.43


Couve de Murville pointed out the necessity of an independent European policy based on an equality of positions between the United States and Europe:

"...if there is to be a dialogue, there must be two policies, one defined in Europe and the other in Washington. The two policies would not be hostile, contradictory, or irreconcilable by definition. But there would have to be two. If not, the dialogue would be a monologue."

But in order for Europe to play her proper role in world affairs, de Gaulle believes that it is necessary for Europe to be re-united; this, of course, presumes the prior re-unification of Germany. Vernant related these objectives:

"L'unification de l'Allemagne est ainsi l'un des objectifs essentiels de la politique extérieure de la France et comme l'unification de l'Allemagne est impossible sans la réunification de l'Europe, cette unification de l'Europe est aussi le but de la politique française. En bref, l'Europe doit être réunifiée dans des conditions qui assurent sa stabilité interne et lui permettent de jouer son rôle propre dans, les affaires mondiales."

This aspect of Gaullist foreign policy is that which is the most obvious in recent years. Looking at the diplomatic initiatives of the Soviet Union and the United States during the sixties, de Gaulle noted a definite tendency developing to discuss their policies and understand the position of the opponent. His "Yalta complex" once again drove him to revive the spirit of Europe in order to assert his own national position and prevent the European situation from becoming a mere pawn of the major powers. Thus greater stress was once

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again put on the concept of a Europe stretching from the
Atlantic to the Urals; new efforts were made to encourage
communication with the Soviet Union.46

But this concept purposely was left in a rather ambigu­
ous form; for years de Gaulle had spoken of such a Europe
without explaining who it would include or how it would be
achieved. In a press conference in 1950, de Gaulle asserted
his belief that France could take the initiative to unite
Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals" so that even those
on the eastern side of the iron curtain would realize its
consequences.47 In 1953 he offered more explanation by
reminding his listeners that Europe "extends from Gibralter
to the Urals" and that "anyone who sincerely wishes it could
take part in a united Europe."48 In 1954 he repeated his
dream of a Europe extending from "Gibraltar a l'Oural, du
Spitzberg a la Sicile."49 But it was not until his first
press conference as President of the Fifth Republic that
de Gaulle unfolded the plans for the orientation of his
foreign policy. Brzezinski noted that this proposal was
based on a common cultural and historical heritage which

47Press Conference, March 16, 1950; quoted in Massip,
De Gaulle et l'Europe, p. 184.
48November 12, 1953; quoted in Reynaud, Foreign Policy
49Press Conference, April 7, 1954; quoted in Massip,
De Gaulle et l'Europe, p. 184.
de Gaulle hoped to define geographically; thus he would capitalize on a lengthy historical transformation and development if his theory were to be proven correct; this was the gamble of Gaullism.50

We, who live between the Atlantic and Urals; we, who are Europe, possessing with Europe's daughter America the principal sources and resources of civilization; we, who have the means to feed, clothe and house ourselves and to keep warm; we, who have mines and factories going full blast, well-tilled soil, railways where run many trains, roads choked with cars, ports filled with ships, airports full of aircraft; we, all of whose children learn to read, who build many universities and laboratories, who form armies of engineers and technicians, who can see, hear, read what is of a nature to satisfy the mind; we, who have doctors, hospitals, medicines to ease suffering, to care for the sick, to ensure the life of most new-born infants—why do we not erect, all together, the fraternal organization which will lend its hand to the others? Why do we not pool a percentage of our raw materials, our manufactured goods, our food products, some of our scientists, technologists, economists, some of our trucks, ships, aircraft in order to vanquish misery, develop the resources and help in the work of the less-developed peoples? Let us do this—not that they should be the pawns of our policies, but to improve the chances of life and peace. How much more worthwhile that would be than the territorial demands, ideological claims, imperialist ambitions which are leading the world to its death?51

A few months later he spoke about the responsibility that Europe had for establishing and maintaining peace—the responsibility of a Europe united "depuis l'Atlantique jusqu'à l'Oural."52 The ultimate objective of this policy of reunification was made very clear by Fontaine in 1960:

50Brzezinski, "Russia and Europe," p. 438.


52Speech at Strasbourg, November 22, 1959; quoted in Massip, De Gaulle et l'Europe, pp. 184-85.
Everything is aimed to accomplish our objective, however remote, a Europe to its full geographic limits, with African, Near Eastern, and—who knows—South American extensions...A Europe that will no longer be divided between American and Soviet zones of influence, a Europe which might even receive Russia the day it becomes 'Russian' as it is predestined by history, a Europe that will once more become the nerve center of the world and which might if it were necessary arbitrate between the two empires. 53

De Gaulle asserted a similar viewpoint in speeches during April 54 and May 55 of the same year. Again in an interview on October 2, 1961, de Gaulle expressed the readiness of France to assume her position in "a Europe balanced between the Atlantic and the Urals." 56 This same theme was sounded in succeeding years with a great deal more frequency. 57

Regarding the question of German reunification in particular, the Gaullist formula is as follows:

The reunification of the two parts into a single Germany which would be entirely free seems to us the normal destiny of the German people, provided they do not reopen the question of their present frontiers to the west, the east, the north and the south, and that they move toward integrating themselves one day in a contractual organization of all Europe for cooperation, liberty and peace.


56 Speech in Washington, April 25, 1960; quoted in Massip, De Gaulle et l'Europe, pp. 185-86.

57 For additional statements, refer to Reynaud, Foreign Policy of Charles de Gaulle, pp. 16-17; de Gaulle, Major Addresses, pp. 159, 179; Warner, "De Gaulle's Foreign Policy," p. 332.
But, pending the time when this ideal can be achieved, we believe that the two separated sections of the German people should be able to multiply the ties and relations between themselves in all practical fields. Transport, communications, economic activity, literature, science, the arts, the goings and comings of people, etc., would be the subject of arrangements which would bring together the Germans within and for the benefit of that which I call 'Germanness' and which after all is common to them, in spite of differences in regimes and conditions.

As regards turning Germany into a neutralized territory, this 'extrication' or 'disengagement' in itself has no meaning for us which is of any value. For if disarmament did not cover a zone which is as near to the Urals as it is to the Atlantic, how would France be protected? What then, in case of conflict, would prevent an aggressor from crossing by a leap or a flight the undefended German no man's land?58

The single word, co-operation, was all that Mauriac needed to summarize the entire policy objectives of Gaullism. Each state had to collaborate with all the others not only for defense but also for economic, cultural, and political advancement. A world divided between two opposing forces could not be the basis of such co-operation.59 Couve de Murville substantiated this opinion in a recent statement:

French policy is based primarily on two fundamental principles, which have always been hers throughout history: the principle of national independence and the principle of human solidarity. National independence because today, as in the past, and doubtless for a long time to come, the world is made up of nations which can peacefully coexist only in mutual respect. Human solidarity because not one of these nations can claim to live in isolation, because too many vital interests are common to all, because over and above today's realities, the ultimate aim remains the universal advancement of mankind, the first condition for peace.60

59 Mauriac, De Gaulle, p. 177.
60 Couve de Murville, "Role of France," p. 257.
This is the mission that de Gaulle envisions for France. He can crusade in the name of fraternal co-operation and international advancement while he manipulates by his diplomacy the power relationships as they presently exist. Thus the place of France as a front-rank power takes on a messianic necessity and it gives moral justification to Gaullism. The cause which de Gaulle urges is one that cannot be rationally opposed. Although he claimed to be acting for the sake of mankind rather than espousing a particular ideology, this in itself was an ideological appeal. A typical example of his ideological denial of espousing an ideological position is the statement made at the University of Mexico in 1964 where he said: "One cause, that of mankind; one necessity, that of world progress; and consequently, that of aid to all nations that seek it for their development; one duty, that of peace--these are, for mankind, the very conditions of its life." The ultimate justification for this goal of his foreign policy was advanced by de Gaulle at the end of 1962:

In the face of the totalitarian venture raised against the West, social liberty, equality and fraternity--pursued as a result of the economic and cultural progress of the people as a whole, and of the action of a fair and vigorous State--are indeed vital, not only to ensure the unity of the nation, but also to present the opposite side with a striking and appealing demonstration of a way of life more fruitful than theirs.


and to hasten among them this transformation, perhaps already begun, which is the true hope for peace.  

This is a task which France can perform; hence it is a task which de Gaulle, seeped as he is in political insight and diplomatic know-how, has chosen for France in a bid to regain international prestige. As de Gaulle explained: "It is her genius, it is her vocation to assume moral leadership; in any case to point the way." 64 A month later de Gaulle declared:

Externally our country has a human task to accomplish, and it must give the signal, must take the initiative in the co-operation that more favored peoples like ourselves must bring to those who are not, or who are less so, and who comprise the great majority of the earth's inhabitants. It is in this task that, when the occasion arises, if it should present itself in a conference, France will, I repeat, take the initiative. 65

Later on the same day he continued: "...it must be France that sets the example in this matter, that takes the initiative with her three great partners in the world—a task she is disposed to undertake, as soon as she finds the opportunity to do so." 66

The French policy of co-operation with the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America seems to be directed toward the maintenance and extension of French influence without the

64 Speech at Blois, May 9, 1959; quoted in Mauriac, De Gaulle, p. 196.
65 Speech at Saint-Flour, June 5, 1959; quoted in Ibid.
66 Speech at Aurillic, June 5, 1959; quoted in Ibid.
expense or world disfavor associated with colonialism. The projected diplomatic initiatives have been directed particularly toward those areas where the influence of the West (and the United States in particular) has been the most extensive. Thus de Gaulle has entered upon a diplomacy aimed at building his prestige in the emerging world in order to achieve a degree of bargaining power at world conferences.67

Regarding the East-West conflict, by developing co-operation among the European nations, the hope is for an ultimate lessening of Cold War tensions. Looking to the future, de Gaulle envisions the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Eastern nations with the concomitant integration of the most proximate Eastern European nations (notably Poland, Czechooslovakia, and Hungary) into the economic community. These countries would regain the free exercise of their sovereignty and thus they would be able to reassociate themselves with Europe economically and perhaps even politically. The Atlantic Pact and the Warsaw Treaty would be obsolete and would disappear. With the withdrawal of American and Russian troops, France and Russia could undertake massive economic co-operation and mutual advancement.69

This policy of co-operation and mutual advancement was clearly explained recently by the General:

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In this general context, France's policy is prompted as much as possible by common sense and—let us speak plainly—by modesty. She is seeking to accomplish what she believes to be possible and what is within their scope. Taking advantage of the continuity and the stability that her institutions provide, France has, in order to carry out her international action, set herself three chief goals, which are, moreover, linked to each other:

First, to free herself, with regard to the overseas peoples which were formerly under her jurisdiction, of the political, economic and military obligations which she used to have in those countries and which world evolution rendered more useless and more costly each day, and to transform her relations with them into a contractual and regular cooperation that will benefit both development and friendship and that can, furthermore, be extended to other countries.

On the other hand, to contribute to the construction of Europe in the field of politics, of defense and of economy, so that the expansion and action of this ensemble may aid French prosperity and security and, at the same time, re-establish the possibility of a European balance vis-à-vis the Eastern countries.

Finally to coordinate the creation of a modern national force with our scientific, technical, economic and social progress, in that order—within the framework of a necessary alliance and with the hope of an international detente—we should be able, whatever happens, to play our own part in our destiny.69

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL METHODS AND POLICIES OF DE GAULLE

In his Memoirs, de Gaulle reached the Conclusion that "perhaps France is now confronting one of those moments in history when a people is offered a destiny great in proportion to the gravity of its ordeal."¹ This aspect of Gaullist diplomacy is regarded by Aron to be fundamental. According to his concept of history, de Gaulle has been able to make a distinction between long-range political perspective and present political facts. The long-range view is the perspective of French history as a whole and of the history of civilization in its entirety. Day-to-day occurrences are not always found by de Gaulle to be in complete conformity to the long-range perspective, but when the two coincide, when the present joins with the historical, then de Gaulle believes that every word and every gesture will be projected against that historical background and will meet with great success. In those cases where the present situation does not conform

¹De Gaulle, Memoirs, p. 731.
to what de Gaulle believes that history dictates, this commentator argued, then he is inclined to side with history and close his eyes and mind to the contemporary reality. Thus in these moments when the present diverges from the practice of the past, when politics strays too far from the path well-trod by history, then the moment of difficulty appears for the General. When political maneuvers must be carried on without clear historical imperatives, when the issues are less decisive or the circumstances less compelling, then French foreign policy may appear to be hesitant and almost ill-at-ease. For the most fundamental aspect of de Gaulle's political talent rests on his ability to act within an historical framework; he has demonstrated a patient willingness to wait for the most favorable moment, to prepare for that moment, and to act at the most favorable time.

De Gaulle has spoken of the vacillation of France from greatness to decline throughout the centuries; he has refused to consider international relations in terms of an eternal dualism; rather he has long anticipated the emergence of the French "genius of renewal" from amid the chaos of contemporary world politics. This notion of playing for time, of striving for durability, of avoiding possible premature burial, of waiting for history to unfold itself and for events

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3Ibid., pp. 27-28.
to be molded, is fundamental to de Gaulle's method. Aron has cited the following as the most significant thought from the General's Memoirs: "In human enterprises it sometimes happens that by virtue of a long-drawnout effort one suddenly obtains a unique impetus from diverse and disparate elements."

That de Gaulle believes such a moment presently exists in French history is beyond serious question. He called attention to the opportune nature of the present time in a recent press conference:

But it happens that, since then, France's position has considerably changed. Her new institutions put her in a position to wish and to act. Her internal development brings her prosperity and gives her access to the means of power. She has restored her currency, her finances, her balance of trade, to such an extent that, from this standpoint, she no longer needs anyone, but to the contrary she finds herself receiving requests from many sides, and so, far from borrowing from others, particularly from the Americans, she is paying back her debts to them and even on occasion is granting them certain facilities. She has transformed into cooperation between States the system of colonization which she once applied to her African territories and, for the first time in a quarter of a century, she is living in complete peace. France is modernizing her armed forces, is equipping them herself with material (sic) and is undertaking to endow herself with her own atomic force. She has cleared away the clouds which were surrounding and paralyzing the construction of Europe and is undertaking this great task on the basis of realities, beginning with the setting up of the economic community by giving, together with Germany, an example of the beginnings of political cooperation and by indicating that she wishes to be France within a Europe which must be European. Once again the national and international condition of our country resembles less and less what it used to be. How could the terms and conditions of her relations with the United States fail to be altered thereby? All the more so since the United States, on its side, as regards

its own problems, is undergoing great changes which modify the character of hegemonic solidarity which, since the last World War, has marked its relations with France.6

The concept of mystere for which there is no precise definition or translation is also basic to Gaullism and its approach to world politics. It involves the refusal to commit one's self openly to a particular policy before the opportune time. This ambiguity is not the same as mystery, since it is not activity carried on with no apparent logic; rather it is an approach that is quite rational and very well-planned. This is the political art of not defining the future until the future defines itself.7 As early as the 1930's, de Gaulle regarded a mastery of this mystere as a necessary element of leadership:

But though there is something in what we call a 'natural gift of authority' which cannot be acquired, but comes from the innermost being of some individuals, and varies in each, there are also a number of constant and necessary elements on which it is possible to lay one's finger, and these can be acquired or developed. The true leader, like the great artist, is a man with an inborn propensity which can be strengthened and exploited by the exercise of his craft.

First and foremost, there can be no prestige without mystery, for familiarity breeds contempt... In saying this I do not mean that he must shut himself away in an ivory tower, remote from, and inaccessible to, his subordinates. On the contrary, if one is to influence men's minds, one must observe them carefully and make it clear that each has been marked out from among his fellows, but only on condition that this goes with a determination to give nothing away, to

hold in reserve some piece of secret knowledge which may at any moment intervene, and the more effectively from being in the nature of a surprise.8

De Gaulle further explained that diplomatic flexibility required the acceptance of the situation as it actually exists. Evidence of the military mind are obvious where the General has condemned the deduction of solutions from abstract principles and has expressed his deep mistrust of rigid ideologies which bind one's hands and curtail the freedom to maneuver. De Gaulle has expressed his preference to plan action in the light of contingencies and the nature and circumstances of the given situation.9

A fair appraisal of de Gaulle's foreign policy must pay particular attention to the actions and gains of this policy; it must look beneath the surface of his statements, realizing that de Gaulle will often do seemingly contradictory things at the same time or over a period of years. This is so because of the Gaullist belief that a statesman must have many irons in the fire at the same time; he must be able to choose and use that one which is most practical depending on the time and circumstances. This practice has been described as la politique de contresurprise or la diplomatie de revers. It has been manifested in the past as an intentional attempt to adopt to the particular circumstances and to revise a policy.

8de Gaulle, The Edge of the Sword, p. 53.
9Ibid., p. 98.
when that policy is discovered to be incapable of success.\textsuperscript{10} This determination to maintain a flexible position would account for the desire of de Gaulle to cultivate friendship with as many nations as possible and to carry on negotiations on the most extensive scale possible. In this way he has hoped to keep as many alternatives open to him as necessary and desirable in promoting his international aspirations.\textsuperscript{11}

One other element essential to this desire of maintaining a flexible position is the avoidance of all long-range commitments; to do so demands an attitude of reserve, a diplomatic silence when silence is demanded. De Gaulle explained this aspect of his political technique very early in his political career:

This attitude of reserve demands, as a rule, a corresponding economy of words and gestures. No doubt these things are of the surface only, but they play a large part in determining the reaction of the crowd. There would even seem to be some relationship between a man's inner force and his outward seeming. No experienced soldier has ever underrated the importance of appearances...

Sobriety of speech supplies a useful contrast to theatricality of manner. Nothing more enhances authority than silence. It is the crowning virtue of the strong, the refuge of the weak, the modesty of the proud, and pride of the humble, the prudence of the wise, and the sense of fools. The man who is moved by desire or fear is naturally led to seek relief in words. If he yields to the temptation it is because by externalizing his passion or his terror he can come to terms with them. To speak is to dilute one's thoughts, to give vent to one's ardor, in short, to dissipate one's strength, whereas, what action

\textsuperscript{10}Duverger, "Man of the 19th or 21st Century," p. xv.

\textsuperscript{11}Macridis, Implacable Ally, pp. 15-16.
demands is concentration. Silence is a necessary preliminary to the ordering of one’s thoughts.\textsuperscript{12}

Yet by de Gaulle’s own diagnosis in this same fundamental work, the statesman and the soldier bring to a similar task very different characters, methods, and anxieties. The statesman prefers to seek his goal in a roundabout way, prefers to seek a long-range solution, through trickery and calculation. Thus it would be characteristic of the great statesman to be quite flexible. The soldier, however, prefers to avoid complex definition of problems in favor of seeing the immediate situation in clear view—a situation which permits control and simple resolution. Thus it is characteristic of the military mentality to demonstrate great force, vigor, and intransigence when necessary.\textsuperscript{13} Brzezinski has explained this aspect of de Gaulle’s method as the result of political necessity. France has definite policy goals but only limited means. This gap between end and means has dictated a posture of obstinate insistence on its point of view.\textsuperscript{14}

This aspect of Gaullist diplomacy has been criticised quite severly by Taylor. He contended that such stiffness and lack of enthusiasm for dialogue in particular situations is a manifestation of weakness, a manifestation that this skilled diplomatist should realize and avoid. According to this criticism, France can only lose by instilling any deep

\textsuperscript{12}de Gaulle, \textit{The Edge of the Sword}, pp. 58-59.
\textsuperscript{13}de Gaulle, \textit{The Edge of the Sword}, p. 106.
\textsuperscript{14}Brzezinski, "Europe to the Urals," pp. 14.
resentment in the minds of the French allies.15 But in all fairness this criticism must be considered against the opposing viewpoint. De Gaulle is attempting to impose leadership upon a disorganized and traditionally divided entity; he is attempting this on two levels: domestic and international. The chief vehicle of this unity is the charisma of his own personality. He appeals to fear of the Europeans; fear of Soviet domination; fear of domination by the United States; fear of losing their right to govern themselves. But he must also appeal to their national pride and to mobilize their national ambitions. He can only do this if he exemplifies great strength and force of personality. This is the gamble which de Gaulle must accept.16

Gaullist political philosophy according to some commentators is more easily defined by what it rejects in contemporary Western politics than by the concrete proposals advanced by the French. Whether this evaluation is valid or not is of no significance to a consideration of de Gaulle's methods. The fact that this estimation is projected, however, is considerably important. De Gaulle realizes that history has emerged for a very long period and that the future will be equally long. Therefore he is not driven to agree with what he finds distasteful to his French nationalism. No allies are required to say no to proposals that are contrary

to the French interest; de Gaulle would rather prefer to wait-out the developments of the unforeseeable future; he only will compromise when France stands to gain. 17

One additional factor that is very hard to analyze and perhaps should not even be considered as an element of de Gaulle's diplomatic technique is the extraordinary good luck that the General has had over the years. Whether this good fortune is the result of exceptionally well-tuned political senses or if the successes that have accompanied Gaullist endeavors has resulted by accident, the fact remains that the results have been extraordinary. 18 Gerholm has described the unusual good luck that de Gaulle has had in dealing with communists in general and with the Soviet Union in particular. 19 Luthy portrayed this aspect of Gaullism against the background of colonialism. As he noted, the loss of the French empire which would have been a catastrophic blow to most political regimes has been transformed by de Gaulle into the very cause of French prestige in the underdeveloped world. 20

One last technique should be noted; and this is perhaps the most characteristic aspect of Gaullism. When a problem appears to be apparently insoluble or the solution seems to be possible only at a very high cost, the solution has

generally been to take the matter to a higher level; it is at the summit level that de Gaulle feels the most at ease and it is here that he is least pressured by public opinion. 21

Concerning this aspect of his overall diplomacy, de Gaulle related:

In any case, France took note of this outcome with composure. But, in her eyes, what was necessary yesterday will still be necessary tomorrow. The detente, the controlled disarmament of strategic weapons, the cooperation of well-provided States in the development of those which are not remain, as much as ever, the goals that the other world powers owe to themselves and to the universe to accomplish together. As for ourselves, we are disposed to return to this course. But also, we believe that in order to follow this course, methodical steps of diplomacy are worth more than tumultuous exchanges of public speeches or the passionate debates in the United Nations, which, alas, are not united. On the bases, which a reasonable preparation will enable us perhaps to lay down, France could, when the time comes, consider the reopening of this Paris Conference which we had decided to hold and which could not take place. 22

De Gaulle appreciates international politics for what he believes that it really is: a game of power. He has refused to allow himself to be led astray by the haughty claims and idealistic aims to which the great powers pledge themselves. He regards international organizations as the contrivances of the great powers to legitimize their power politics; and the General has determined that he will play his hand in this same game. 23 His actions, as Taylor noted,
concerning the organization of Europe, have consistently reflected against consultations carried on through complex institutional frameworks and alphabetical agencies; instead he has preferred to base his actions on a more classical diplomatic style. 24

Throughout his political career, de Gaulle's sympathies have remained true to this traditional diplomacy which placed particular emphasis on the notion of a power balance. Although substantial alterations have been made in the former balance—the old Concert of Europe has been replaced by a new World Concert giving a role to the United States, China, and perhaps India—Europe still remains the dominant actor (if not the dominant force). Those nations which have global power and global commitments must assume their proper responsibilities. They must negotiate international peace with one another and make treaties among themselves that will guarantee this peace. It is only after these agreements have been negotiated by experts in secret that they should be revealed to legislatures and to the public. This has been the approach recommended by France during the Fifth Republic. And it is in this context that Gaullist foreign policy must be seen. 25 Any cooperation among the nations, even that of a purely functional or technical nature, invariably involves political


25 Macridis, "De Gaulle's Foreign Policy," pp. 130-81
calculations and has political consequences. Thus de Gaulle has repeatedly stressed that only properly constituted, national, political authorities are capable of assuming this responsibility which is demanded by international politics. 26

By personalizing the foreign policy of France, de Gaulle has taken a long stride toward establishing a diplomatic framework that would allow him to implement his objectives. By acting unilaterally, he is able to avoid undesirable situations. He has chosen to remain in isolation wherever he believed his position to be weak; he has chosen this path when he knew that his position was strong. On the one hand he feared disaster; on the other hand, he never has conceded what has not been necessary to manifest. The other nations of the world serve as the elevator on which de Gaulle hopes to rise to world prominence. And if de Gaulle continues to follow a traditional diplomatic course, and if he should achieve the position to which he aspires, then his next move would be to attempt to implement the demise of the formerly great powers. 27

This is the Gaullist game; this is the international scene as it is seen through the eyes of the General. The objectives and methods are typically his own. He believes that he must lead. This has been his obsession throughout his entire career. Prior to the Second World War he made

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his views regarding leadership public and it is these same musings of a young soldier that have motivated his actions since. In those early days, he exemplified characteristic foresight when he wrote this summary of his ideal of leadership:

...whatever orders the leader may give, they must be swathed in the robes of nobility. He must aim high, show that he has vision, act on the grand scale, and so establish his authority over the generality of men who splash in shallow water. He must personify contempt for contingencies, and leave it to his subordinates to be bogged down in detail. He must part from him all that smacks of niggling and leave it to the humdrum individuals to be circumspect and wary.28

28 de Gaulle, Edge of the Sword, p. 64.
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