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Paulo Freire's Concept of Freedom: A Philosophical Analysis

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PAULO FREIRE'S CONCEPT OF FREEDOM; A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

by

Jacinto Ordóñez

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
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I want to express also my indebtedness to my wife, Alicia Sequeira Ordóñez, whose unselfish help has made this work possible.
DEDICATION

To my daughters Sara Alicia and Ana Lidia, and my son Pablo Rolando, who have taught me how they have been affected by the virtues and problems of our present system of education.
The author was born December 4, 1934, in San Juan Ostuncalco, Guatemala. He is the son of Cruz Ordóñez, a Presbyterian minister, and Ventura Peñalonzo, a nurse.

His elementary and secondary education was obtained in San Juan Ostuncalco and Quezaltenango in western Guatemala. His university studies were completed at the University of Costa Rica where he earned three degrees: Bachelor in Philosophy, Professor of Philosophy, and Master of Philosophy (Licenciatura). He has also studied theology at the Evangelical Presbyterian Seminary in Guatemala, Theological Evangelical Seminary in Matanzas, Cuba, and at the Evangelical Seminary of Puerto Rico in Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico.

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Other important positions he has held are: General Secretary of the Latin American Association of Theological Schools (1969-1977), bishop of the United Methodist Church of Panama (1973-1975), Director of Extension of the Department of Philosophy and Arts of the National University of Costa Rica (1975-1977), and president of the Christian Peace Conference of Latin America (1977-1981).
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

This dissertation analyses the concept of freedom in the thought of Paulo Freire, a Brazilian philosopher. The six chapters of this work is divided in three major parts:

First part: I will discuss the method to be applied throughout this dissertation and the circumstances which have influenced Paulo Freire's philosophical principles as a Latin American philosopher. The above elements constitute my starting-point, my terminus a quo.

Second part: I will analyse Freire's thought as a philosophical system, a philosophy of education, and a philosophy of freedom. It is necessary to begin with Freire's philosophical principles in order to have an adequate understanding of his concept of freedom. The analysis of Freire's thought is the via ad, the method leading to my final affirmations.

Third part: I will discuss critically Freire's philosophy of freedom as a political approach by which the concept of freedom has to be understood. This discussion is, according to the method applied, the terminus ad quem of the work as a whole.
PART ONE

THE METHOD AND THE LATIN AMERICAN CIRCUMSTANCES

The first part has two chapters which discuss two necessary aspects: the method applied throughout this dissertation and the Latin American circumstances that have affected Freire's thought.

The method applied is dialectical. However, there are three different contexts in which this method is discussed: European philosophy which discusses the dialectical method in Aristotle, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Marx; Latin American philosophy which discusses the method in Leopoldo Zea and Enrique Dussel; and the dialectical method as used in this work.

The second chapter discusses the historical, socio-economic, educational, and ideological context of Latin American countries, as a broader context of Freire, and of Brazil, as a more restricted context. This chapter also introduces Freire's life and works in the context of his Brazilian experience, his Chilean experience, and his international experience.

According to my method, these two chapters are the terminus a quo of the whole work, i.e. the starting-point of the discussion of freedom.
CHAPTER I

THE LATIN AMERICAN DIALECTICAL METHOD

La filosofía no se hace solo desde los libros, sino desde la realidad de un pueblo oprimido.1 Dussel

When one writes a philosophical work from a Latin American perspective, a dialectical method is a natural approach. I intend to use this method because I have chosen Paulo Freire as the subject of my study. He is both a Latin American and a dialectical thinker.

But what does dialectical method mean? Dialectic is a way and, at the same time, a movement. There are different kinds of dialectic. However, they can be differentiated by two characteristics: the similar, but not the same, starting-point (terminus a quo), and the different place of arriving (terminus ad quem). For instance, the pre-Socratic dialectic started in a physical terminus a quo (the contraries such as cold-warm, hidden-uncovered, and high-short) and arrived at


2 The word "method" comes from meta="according to" and hodos="way."
being; however, Descartes started with "the great book of the world" and arrived at the cogito ergo sum. As we will see, dialectic is the way between the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem. But, at the same time, it is also the movement of reasoning which goes from the terminus a quo to the terminus ad quem.

Given this criteria, my first chapter will discuss the dialectical method from three perspectives: from some European philosophers who have exerted a powerful influence in Latin America, from some dialectical philosophers of Latin America who have looked for a Latin American method, and from my own position which will posit a dialectical method for the present work.

1. THE INHERITANCE OF EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY

Latin American philosophy has inherited, from European philosophy, a dialectical method which will be necessary to discuss in order to understand the Latin American dialectical method. My selection of some of the principal dialectical philosophers of Europe stems from the importance they have to Freire as well as to our study. What I want to discuss is the way in which the European dialectical method is applied by Aristotle, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Marx, and how they clarify that method. As we see, Aristotle started with the

3 For instance Heraclitus and Parmenides.

generally admitted and arrived at the hidden; Hegel started in the isolated and contradictory aspects of the absolute and arrived at the absolute spirit, Kierkegaard started with existence and arrived at the religious stage, and Marx started in "sensuous human activity" and arrived at the transformation of the world. Dialectical philosophers of Europe have argued from a terminus a quo, which is remarkably similar, to a terminus ad quem which frequently differs.

My discussion begins with Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) who makes an important distinction as follows:

(a) It [reasoning] is a "demonstration" when the premises from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premises which are primary and true: (b) reasoning, on the other hand, is "dialectical", if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted... Those opinions are "generally accepted" which are accepted by every one or by the majority of the philosophers...

If Aristotle wants scientific reasoning what he needs are true premises, but if he wants dialectical reasoning, what he needs are facts, even if they are from experiences or ordinary people. The Aristotelian dialectic starts with the "generally accepted," the endoxa, the uncovering of the hidden. Dialectic starts in the experiences of ordinary life (the Aristotelian terminus a quo) and moves toward the first principle (his terminus ad quem).

Aristotle placed the dialectical method before the scientific stage of reasoning. The dialectical method precedes all science and philosophy as a science. Sciences and philosophy start with their

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principles; the dialectic uncovers those principles but does not start with them. Dialectic is at the beginning of all scientific knowledge. It is not a result of, but a precondition for, a scientific theory or a philosophical formulation.

Therefore, dialectical movement of thought is not a deduction, demonstration, universal abstraction, or general idea. Dialectical movement starts in the world as a radical questioning of the whole. By seeing the oppositions between various doxai, the philosopher comes to deny the day-to-day and common sense knowing of things. Consequently, dialectic is negative, penetrative, and perforative in its attempt to uncover the truth. Its examination leads from the obvious to the hidden, from the naivete of appearances to a critical interrogation of them. Dialectic is a critical method, a testing and discrimination of everything, because, as ordinary people understand the world, truth is covered by doxa, i.e. opinions.  

This analysis is confirmed by Joseph Owens who concludes:

Dialectical procedure, then, has a role of primary importance for Aristotle. It is the discussion that brings to light the indemonstrable first principles of scientific demonstration. Of itself it does not yield knowledge, yet it is a necessary step in the quest of knowledge. It shows how deeply for Aristotle the scientific starting points were engaged in the complexities of experience.

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Hegel (1770-1831), one of the most important philosophers of German Idealism, is also one of the most important dialectical philosophers of Europe. I will not review all of Hegel. What I want to do is to focus on a very important aspect of Hegel's philosophy which has to do with dialectical movement of thought. This dialectical movement is explained, as a whole method, in two steps: the first step which is described in The Phenomenology of Mind (1807), and the second step which is described in The Science of Logic (1816).

In the first step, The Phenomenology starts in the terminus a quo of experience, the doxai of human spirit. Related with this starting point, Hegel says:

The knowledge, which is at the start or immediately our object, can be nothing else than just that which is immediate knowledge, knowledge, of the immediate, of what is. We have, in dealing with it, to proceed, too, in an immediate way, to accept what is given, not altering anything in it as it is presented before us, and keeping mere apprehension (Auffassen) free from conceptual comprehension (Begreifen). The concrete content, which sensuous certainty furnishes, makes this prima facie appear to be the richest kind of knowledge...

Dialectical method, here, starts in this primitive stage of "sense certainty," and runs through different stages up to the highest level. The highest level is the self-comprehension of the spirit (the absolute spirit), absolute knowledge, i.e., the level of philosophy as a science. Dialectic is the critical elimination of the daily security that is furnished by either the sensible knowledge and the general understanding of the common people or the empirical knowledge of scientific people.

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Dialectic is the upward movement of the human spirit which loses confidence at each stage, only to obtain a progressively higher stage until it attains real knowledge (the *terminus ad quem*). Dialectic occasions a kind of skepticism. This crisis does not arrive at the naught or at the empty, but denying the contradictions positively generates new and superior forms. Dialectic is the annihilation of all objects which do not fulfill the exigencies of absolute knowledge.

The second step described in *The Science of Logic* begins in the undetermined absolute (*terminus a quo*) and arrives at the absolute knowledge which for Hegel is absolute subjectivity (*terminus ad quem*). In other words, in the second step dialectic moves from knowledge of the absolute spirit which is undetermined to the spirit's own transparency and self-vision.

In one of the last paragraphs of his *Phenomenology*, Hegel makes a preliminary description of the second moment of his explanation:

Since its accomplishment consists in Spirit knowing what it is, in fully comprehending its substance, this knowledge means its concentrating itself on itself (insichgehen), a state in which Spirit leaves its eternal existence behind and gives its embodiment over to Recollection (Enrinnerung). In thus concentrating itself on itself, Spirit is engulfed in the night of its own self-consciousness; its vanished existence—the previous state, but born anew from the womb of knowledge—is the new stage of existence, a new word, and a new embodiment or mode of Spirit. Here it has to begin all over again

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10 Cf. Ibid, pp. 67-145.

at its immediacy... as if, for it, all that preceded were lost, and as if it had learned nothing from the experience of the spirits that preceded.\(^{12}\)

Two elements of this paragraph can help us to see the nature of the dialectical method.

The first element is the term *Erinnerung* which means memory which recollects. This recollection is defined by Hegel as the remembrance of the previous moment (the first step), which, according to his *Phenomenology*, has come to its end. This movement was at one and the same time a necessary "introduction," a distressing search for real knowledge, an act of the "love of wisdom" (*filia* and *sofia*), i.e., "the recollection and the Golgotha of Absolute Spirit, the reality, the truth, the certainty of its throne, without which it were lifeless, solitary, and alone."\(^{13}\) The "recollection" is the first moment, the remembrance, and, for this reason the first step toward the absolute spirit.

The term "new" refers to the absolute spirit as itself, the *terminus ad quem* for the previous process and the *terminus a quo* for the second moment. The "expression" of the absolute spirit is the "pure being," but this expression is confronted by the "other in general" and by "itself" which are "negations" of the absolute. In other words, the absolute spirit is the being in itself, but its expression is determined by the "sum-total of all realities," (the other in general) present in

\(^{12}\) G. W. F. Hegel, p. 807.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., p. 808.
the absolute spirit, and by the self-determination. The sum-total of all realities is the recollection of the first moment (first step) of the dialectical movement. The self-determination is the reflection of the spirit on and in itself which is itself shown into self. The absolute spirit, in addition to "being-in-itself," is also "being-for-itself." That is, the "new" step, the internal moment of the absolute spirit, the movement between the absolute unity and its differentiations, its determinations, its finiteness, and its "negations."

The crucial element appears when we meet, in the second step, the moment of Hegel's philosophy as a science, the self-dialectical method. The "natural" way of the movement of the absolute spirit is also dialectical in the same sense in which we described the dialectic of the first step. Dialectic is not only the method of that pre-scientific and pre-philosophical step, but is also the method of science par excellence, the science of the absolute which is philosophy as a science. Philosophy here is the explanation of the absolute in its immanent oppositions (e.g., subject-object, being-naught, and finite-infinite) and the overcoming of them through the superior unity of the absolute spirit. Thus, Hegel considers the dialectical method as embracing both the first and the second steps of thinking.

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The concept of philosophy is truth knowing itself, the idea thinking itself, the spirit living its thought. Dialectic, the logic of philosophy, is the explication (Ur-Teil) of the Concept in all essential shapes of life, in nature, soul, mind, and spirit. The movement of these living contents and the movement of dialectic thought is one and the same movement. In space and time it shines through disappearing appearances, founding, transcending, and preserving them in their true meaning.16

Dialectic in general is the search of the absolute spirit for the object which is consciousness in and for itself, consciousness as object of consciousness, the self-consciousness. Dialectic is the way in which subjectivity moves; it is the mode of life of the absolute spirit. Dialectic is the idea which divides the identical from itself and projects itself as something different from itself: the objective from the subjective, the finite from the infinite. Dialectic is reason, not the understanding of Kant; it is both negative and positive. Dialectic moves from the first "affirmation" to a "negation" of the affirmation, and from that negation to a "negation of the negation." In other words, the negative characteristic always will deny an absolute and will thus generate movement. This movement in turn will generate the next affirmation, and thus rise to a higher stage of the absolute. Dialectical movement is not an exterior event; it is spirit whose content is itself, as a whole, as a universal, as an absolute, and the concept of that content as well. to think logically and to be what it is are the same.


All aspects of whatever is are originally united in the absolute. The first moment begins in "sense certainty," which is essentially a certainty of consciousness and not a certainty about the things sensed. The dialectical process shatters the daily security that sensation provides and ascends to self-consciousness. The second movement begins when the absolute spirit is in-itself (ansich), for-itself (fürsich), and in- and for-itself (an- und fürsich). The dialectical process is thought thinking thought. In general terms, thinking is the dialectical activity of the spirit (logical level) through its content, the objects which it thinks (ontological level). However, both activity and content are the same process because all thoughts are products of the thinking activity. The objective contents of thinking are thought-objects; they are objects because the absolute spirit makes its own objects. For this reason, we find reality only in thought. There is no reality unrelated to thought, there is no reality outside of thought. All reality is thought and all thought is reality, which is to say, "what is rational is real; and what is real is rational."

The third European philosopher that I want to discuss is Sören Kierkegaard (1813-1855). Kierkegaard posits two theses: "a logical system

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is possible" and "an existential system is impossible." A logical system approach (like Hegel's) begins "with the immediate," without any presuppositions, absolutely. This is logical and coherent, but it is also an abstraction from existence. A logical system cannot include anything from the "existence dialectic;" it cannot incorporate even a relationship with existence. Existence "cannot be a system for any existing spirit" because the existence is a "system" created by God. All philosophical systems bring finality to all things, but existence opposes all human finality. Kierkegaard does not object to any incoherence in the Hegelian system. What Kierkegaard objects to is Hegel's forgetfulness of his own existence, the fact that all systems come after existence, ex post facto. Therefore, Hegel's absolute is not absolute, his immediate beginning is not immediate. "The fact that the thinker is an existing individual signifies that existence imposes its own requirement upon him." All reflection, all understanding, and all thought systems come after the fact. Thus, philosophizing does not consist in fantastic speculation with fantastic language, valid only to fantastic people. To think (in spite of identifying subject-object and thought-being) does not necessarily mean to be engaged in existence; to think only means to

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22 Ibid., p. 201

23 Ibid.
be engaged in thinking. This is the stage of systematic speculation, of a mind alienated, confused, inattentive. This is the stage of one's own pleasure, an uncommitted movement in relation to the existential movement. This is the aesthetic stage, the first of the three stages of Kierkegaard's thought.

It is from this side, in the first instance, that the objection must be made to modern philosophy; not that it has a mistaken presupposition, but that it has a comical presupposition, occasioned by its having forgotten, in a sort of world-historical absent-mindedness, what it means to be a human being. Not indeed, what it means to be a human being in general; for this is the sort of thing that one might even induce, a speculative philosopher to agree to; but what it means that you and I and he are human beings, each one for itself.24

According to this paragraph there are two ways of existing: the way of those who forget their existence and become "comic," and the way of those who confront their existence. Comic existence corresponds to the aesthetic stage, but committed existence corresponds to the second stage, the ethical stage, that is, to the "ought," to the commands of existence. But there is a third stage, the committed existence to the "commander," which is the stage of all authentic existence (including faith, passions, and reason); this is the religious stage. This commitment to our own existence as a whole involves confronting the totally

24 Ibid., p. 203

25 All people who forget their existence provoke a smile in everybody, because those people are comic.
other, who is God, the "wholly Other," as Karl Barth says. The ethical
stage is beyond the aesthetic stage, and the religious stage is beyond the
ethical stage, but there is discontinuity of movement between the three
stages. Nobody can pass from one to another by smooth mediation. The
transition is through a "leap," a qualitative leap. Since reality is
not rational, the movement is an existential movement; it involves an
existential paradox which is characteristic of men. "You clearly can-
not move from doubt to belief by logic, which is a process of linked,
consistent, continuous thinking, step by step." 28 The terminus a quo is
human existence, which is paradoxical. The terminus ad quem is the
religious stage, the superior stage, and the dialectical movement is
through leaps.

Beginning with Kierkegaard, European philosophy "overcomes" Hegel
through philosophy of existence or, as it is commonly called, existential-
ism. Some important existentialists are Edmund Husserl with his phenom-
enological method, Martin Heidegger with his dialectical analysis of

26
Cf. W. H. Auden, The Living Thoughts of Kierkegaard (New York:
David McKay Company, Inc., 1952), pp. 56-114. Also E. L. Allen,
Kierkegaard; his Life and Thought (New York and London: Harper and

27
Cf. Herbert M. Garalick, The Anti-Christianity of Kierkegaard

28
Sören Kierkegaard, Johannes Climacus or De Omnibus Dubitandum

29
Cf. Ibid., pp. 73-83.
Dasein, and Jean-Paul Sartre with his Critique of Dialectical Reason.

The last European philosopher that I want to discuss is Karl Marx (1818-1883). Marx is another important reactor to Hegel's dialectic. He criticizes Hegel's concept of the subjective reality, a concept of reality from itself, in itself, and for itself. One of his clear reactions occurs in his analysis of Feuerbach:

Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from conceptual objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity... (Thesis 1). The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question... The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question... (Thesis 2). Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract thinking, wants (sensuous) contemplation: but he does not conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous activity... (Thesis 5). The highest point reached by contemplative materialism, that is, which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is the contemplation of single individuals and of civil society (Thesis 9). The philosopher has only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it (Thesis 12).

Feuerbach had reacted to Hegel's subjectivism by pointing out the sensuous object, the empirical thing, as reality. Physical things can be verified, examined, interpreted. Marx recognized Feuerbach as "the only one who has a serious, critical attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and who has made genuine discoveries in this field." From his point of view, Feuerbach proves "that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought," that "true materialism" and "real science" are based upon the principle of "the social relationship of man to man", and that the "negation of the negation" leads to "the absolute
positive, the self-supporting positive, positively based on itself." Marx adds that Feuerbach "annuls the infinite, and points [out] the actual, sensuous, real, finite [and] particular." However, Marx says:

The chief defect of all previous materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that things (Gegenstand), reality, sensuousness, are conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectivity. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was set forth abstractly by idealism -which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such... (Theses 1).

Marx criticizes Feuerbach's concept of reality. The limitation of Feuerbach is to see reality as the sensible. His reality is a "contemplative materialism" and a "intuitive empiricism". But, for Marx, philosophy is not a naive and intuitive interpretation; it is not a pure contemplation of a "thing-in-itself". Reality is not a subject contemplating statically and object which also is static. Reality is "sensuous human activity" which is action upon the world, the human being as an active agent. Human activity is the terminus a quo of Marx's dialectic; it is the process of production, the process of working, the dynamic process of "creation." Then, reality is not a physical object (a rock, a star, an animal, etc.) void of human contact; reality is the human activity in which the "objective" event


32 Ibid., p. 329

33 Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," p. 3.
produces objects of "use-values," the cultural objects, and produces its own history.

The human process of action is the transformation of the world (his terminus ad quem). There are two ways of talking about the world: as an object of contemplation which only leads to explanations, and as an object of transformation. For Marx, transformation always involves analysis and interpretation. But idealism, while it involves analysis and interpretation, does not includes transformation; it explains the world but does not change it. Marx's dialectical method leads to practice, which becomes transformation. Marx's philosophy is a philosophy of "praxis".

In summary, from European philosophy we have inherited a tradition of dialectical movement: the presocratics started with physical reality and arrived at being; Aristotle started with the generally admitted and arrived at the hidden; Descartes started with "the great book of the world" and arrived at the cogito ergo sum; Hegel started in

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the isolated and contradictory aspects of the absolute and arrived at
the absolute spirit; Kierkegaard started with existence and arrived at
the religious stage; and Marx started in "sensuous human activity" and
arrived at the transformation of the world. As we can see, the dialec-
tical method is a way and, at the same time, a movement which has two
characteristics: similarity in the terminus a quo, the starting-point,
and differences in the terminus ad quem, the place of arrival. I am
identifying, and also differentiating, different kinds of dialectic
precisely on the basis of these criteria.

2. LATIN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

In order to explain the most important philosophical approaches
in Latin America today, and to point out their own method, it is nece-
ssary to keep in mind the philosophical inheritance which I have already
summarized. European philosophy is what Dussel calls, "the prehistory
of Latin American philosophy and the immediate antecedent of our Latin
American thinking." However, this inheritance is not limited to the
thinkers discussed above. As we shall see, the influence of European
philosophy comes from the classic philosophy of Greece, from the Scholas-
ticism of the Middle Ages, from French, German, and English philosophy,
and presently from the powerful influence of the United States, the
Soviet Union (Lenin), and China (Mao). All of these represent a broad

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"La prehistoria de la filosofía latinoamericana y el antecedente inmediato de nuestro pensar latinoamericano." Enrique Dussel,
Método para una Filosofía de la Liberación, p. 176.
spectrum of thought with a variety of tendencies which, in part, I will discuss in another chapter. For my purposes here, let me discuss two of the most important philosophers who represent the new and perhaps the most important philosophical point of view in Latin America today: Leopoldo Zea (1921) from Mexico and Enrique Dussel (1934) from Argentina.

a) The Latin American Philosophy of Leopoldo Zea

Leopoldo Zea, in his book La Filosofía Americana como Filosofía sin Más, discusses Latin American philosophy, distinguishing it from European philosophy. Let me summarize the most important concepts of his point of view.

Leopoldo Zea begins by pointing out the problem of the human being as a crucial point for Latin America philosophy. He says that the "word" (logos) is an exclusive tool of human beings to locate themselves in the world, to differentiate themselves from other beings, and to order all things in the world. In the history of philosophy, no one has asked about the right to philosophize by using one's own logos; however, this unusual question is one of the basic questions inLatin America philosophy.

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Leopoldo Zea is one of the most distinguished philosophers and thinkers in Mexico. His works are read with as much respect as the works of Benito Juárez, Justo Sierra, Alfonso Reyes, Antonio Caso, and José Vasconcelos.

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Cf. Ibid., pp. 9-31.
American philosophy. Philosophers in Western Culture never thought about this right; they simply thought, ordered, created, and located themselves. In the context of this European philosophy, philosophers in Latin America are thinking strange thoughts (logos) because they are out of tune with the questions European Philosophers are asking; they are forced to justify their own logos and to seek "mental emancipation."

When Europe expanded its borders overseas, it also exported its humanism and demanded from other peoples the justification of their own humanness. Thus, on one side were the human beings (the Europeans) and, on the other side, the inhumane people, those who aspired to be human beings, who were in the process of conforming to the European archetype. Consciously or unconsciously, the European denied the fullness of being to those who were considered strangers, Indians, ignorants, hybrids, and the underdeveloped. Europe imposed its ideal of the human being: to be a human being was to be like a European or, at least, to be in the process of acquiring the fullness of a Human Being (with capital letters) because the people of Latin America had not yet reached such perfection. To the Latin Americans, to be a human being was to prove their similarity to the European archetype, thereby denying their own being and culture, moving away from their own identity, and reproducing, copying, and reflecting the European ideal.

However, "To be a human being [in Latin America] is not to be

a Yankee, a Frenchman, or Englishman. [For a Latin American,] to be a human being is to be, simply, that which one is, Latin American; like the Yankee is Yankee, the Frenchman is French, and the Englishman is English." A philosophy, authentically Latin American, will appear when philosophers find the explanation of their own being in the context of their own culture and not outside of it; a context where they discover the right to pronounce their own logos without borrowing it.

Second, Leopoldo Zea points out the originality of Latin American philosophy. To be original is not to propose a new and exotic system or strange solutions, but it is to confront specific human problems "here and now". Latin American philosophy accepts all previous forms of philosophy but goes beyond them. It does not deny, in terms of a logic, European or North American philosophy. Instead, it follows a dialectical method in which the negation of the previous affirmation does not necessarily mean the elimination, but rather the overcoming of the affirmation. Latin American philosophers try to understand European and North American philosophy to find adequate starting points or appropriate tools; then they try to affirm new solutions but they also deny at the same time all philosophy which is not adequate for their own situation. Each country, each epoch, each philosopher has been original

42 "Ser hombre no es ser yanqui, francés o inglés. Ser hombre es ser, simplemente lo que se es, latinoamericano, como el yanqui es Yanqui, el francés, francés y el inglés, inglés." Leopoldo Zea, La Filosofía Americana como Filosofía sin Más, p. 25.

43 Cf. Ibid., pp. 32-56.
because each of them has confronted different problems and has brought forth different solutions. That has been the history of philosophy. In our present case, to be original is to start with that uniquely which is Latin American, to start from the Latin American reality (*terminus a quo*).

But Latin American philosophers have also been conscious that they are part of all humankind. The incorporation of Latin America into Western society and culture is a fact which is not possible to ignore. What Latin American philosophers point out is how nations which have produced such philosophy have used it to support their expansion and domination, how they have incorporated other countries and subordinated them. European philosophy has created a universal philosophy which postulates a certain ideal of a human being but at the same time denies fullness of being to the dominated people. Philosophers have used philosophy as ideology to justify the European domination. We can see this tendency among the European philosophers. For instance, Plato used his logic and metaphysics to support his ideal Republic; Aquinas to support his church; and Hegel to support the French Revolution. What the Latin American demands is his right to be human as every other human being in Europe, the United States, or in any other part of the world is human. In this sense, Western values have been incorporated within Latin American philosophy which in turn rejects the use of them as an ideology of domination. Latin American philosophers claim dignity for all in spite of their differences of skin color, thought, society, and origin. Once this equality is accepted, the natural result is each one's use of his own *logos*, and each one's right to act as a subject and not simply as an object.
Third, Leopoldo Zea points out the scientific nature of Latin American philosophy and its own ideological commitment. What all philosophy needs to do is to confront rationally the problem arising from its own reality and to search for the most adequate, permanent, and total solution to these problems.

One of the greatest weaknesses of all philosophy is to forget the origin of all philosophy, i.e., the human being. For instance, technology has converted philosophy into a rigorous and precise logic. There is nothing wrong with developing logic to improve technology (the manipulation of nature to serve human beings); what is wrong is an extremism which argues in favor of philosophy as a logic and forgets philosophy as ideology—as it has been in the past—and also as ethics. Latin American philosophers do not pretend to deny the importance of philosophy as a rigorous science, but they ask: why does such philosophy not discuss material, efficient, and final causes? Why does it not discuss the way of using such technology? Why is this technology? Why is this technology used to benefit some people who are minorities (the rich), and not used to benefit people who are the majority? Has not this technology increased the domination of some people who have more sophisticated arms to menace and destroy others? Why do philosophers not discuss the cultural, economic, social, and political factors which produce inhuman life? Why do philosophers not see problems arising from workers working with machines which are not

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Cf. Ibid., pp. 57-81.
their own machines, and producing products which are not their own product? Why do they not question a system which produces the "big machine" even though it also causes human alienation? What ideology is such philosophy serving?

Latin American philosophers are conscious of the importance of technology, the importance of philosophy as a science, and the importance of a rigorous level of thought. However, a Latin American philosophy must have the purpose of analyzing, understanding, and changing the subordination, oppression and underdevelopment of Latin America. Latin America needs philosophers like Merleau-Ponty, Toynbee, Russell, Marcuse, Marx and Sartre, who are scientifically rigorous but who feel the need for militancy in a specific cause. Philosophy in Latin America means not only the domination of science and technology but also the participation of all human beings with equal rights in such management. Latin Americans do not need a philosophy of curiosity, exhibitionism, sport, and competence, or even philosophy as a profession; what Latin America needs is to solve the urgent challenges of its own reality, today. If this point is clear, rigorous thought is welcome to change what must change in the Latin American situation.

Fourth, Leopoldo Zea points out that Latin American philosophy must make constant reference to its own history. Latin Americans are

45 For instance Luis Villoro. Cf. Ibid., pp. 65-70.

46 Cf. Ibid., pp. 82-107.
located between two worlds: the European and their own world. The European world is from the past, is old, and is not felt as their own by Latin Americans. Their own world is the new, the past which must be incorporated into their own experience, and the present which is created by their own actions. They must create their own history which until recently has not been felt to be their own. Latin American philosophers are at the crossroads where a decision becomes urgent.

As a consequence of the two world wars of our century, Europe has acquired the consciousness of the fact that philosophy is not absolute because it is limited and conditioned by the existence of human beings. Transcendental rationalism stumbles on the fact of immanent reality. Transcendence, universality, absoluteness, to be beyond space and time --topics of European philosophy-- cannot be justified without taking into account the human being, his historical situation, and his circumstances (Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Marx, Dilthey, and Ortega y Gasset).

This European crisis coincided with the Latin American search for its own personality. European perspectivism, sociology of culture, existentialism, Marxism, historicism, and other tendencies converted the European limitations into a consciousness of the Latin American possibilities. Latin American turned to its own concrete reality and historical situation in order to find an authentic universality. European philosophy recognized its own philosophy as a philosophy among philosophies, its view of its own humanity as one among many views and therefore not archetypical. Latin American philosophers acquired the possibility of building a philosophy from their
own reality (terminus a quo) because they felt that Latin Americans were human beings among human beings. That which was a crisis in Europe, in Latin America was a capacity to develop philosophy from its concrete situation. When the European crisis shook its classic foundations, this shaking justified and even pushed Latin America to look for its own foundations.

There have been many Latin American philosophers who have arisen, such as Arturo Ardao (from Uruguay), Ernesto Mays Vallenilla (from Venezuela), and Graça Aranha (from Brazil). Ardao affirms that the European crisis was like a certificate of the philosophical independence of Latin America. Vallenilla interprets Heidegger's ontological being (which is being-in-the world) as equivalent with the Latin American expectation which creates its own perspective through action. This action is located among the actions of other human beings, in the context of the historical process. Aranha affirms that Europe must not be expanded or imitated, but Latin America must create its own new perspectives on the human being. There is a basic presupposition: to receive the human being without discrimination, colonization, subordination, instrumentalization, or alienation.

Fifth, Leopoldo Zea says that Western philosophy recognizes its own collapse. Western society stumbles on the fact of humanity, he says. It does not encounter man; it stumbles over him. Europe was sure about its humanness which was the archetype of all humanity. But two

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Cf. Ibid., pp. 108-133.
historical events have broken this surety: the Second World War and the liberation struggles in the Western colonies.

The Second World War put in crisis the Western idea of the human being. Writers like Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, Arnold Toynbee, and others are eloquent. Sartre says that France was hurled to the ground after the Second World War, flat on its own back like a broken machine, and forced to understand its limitations. There were other eyes whose glances made the French people only human beings, not the super-human beings they thought they were. That happened because Western society had denied with its actions that which it proclaimed with eloquent words: its humanism was one thing but how they actually recognized and respected other human beings was quite another thing. The non-Western people came to know Western society through its own wounds and chains; Western society had struck them, martyred them, subdued them, and domesticated them. The non-Western people were discovering their humanness beyond tortures and death. Under oppression, they were turning to their own humanity with greater genuineness. They were decolonizing the Western people and extirpating in bloody operation the colonist who lived inside of those Westerners. As they reviewed their unjust relations with the non-Western people, the Westerns come to see themselves as colonial masters and thus discover the beast, the executioner, and the murderer which has been hidden in its breast. Albert Camus says that he is ashamed because of the violence and crimes of France in Algeria and Indochina. Toynbee tells how Western nations have used Latin Americans, Asians, and Africans as objects of exploitation, taking them as part of the Western flora and fauna.
There is another event which shatters the Western ideal of the human being: the liberation struggles of colonized peoples. There are two Perus—Francisco Miro Quesada says—because in Peru there are those who feel as members of Western society, representing its ideals and perpetuating injustice; and there are those who, acquiring consciousness about their own humanity, have broken with Western ideals, have refused to talk about ideals in the abstract, and have committed themselves to talk about the concrete human being. They are people from the "barrio" and slums, Indians and peasants, those who are looking for their own humanity, for justice. Reconciliation of "both countries" as one is impossible because on one side lies the struggle which claims the recognition of its own humanness as always oppressed, and on the other side Western people who always deny such humanness. These "two nations in one" exist in almost all countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa, and they explain the present day national struggles of liberation.

Vietnam is an example of this struggle. On one side was Western society (the United States) with all its technology, sophisticated weapons, logistical training to defend Western ideals, and on the

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49 Barrio is "a ward, quarter, or district of a city or town in Spanish-speaking countries." Webster's Third New International Dictionary rev. ed. (1964), s.v. "Barrio."
other side were the Vietnamese without that technology, those sophisticated weapons, that logic, but with the powerful resistance of their own humanness. What the United States could not, or did not want to, understand is that it was a struggle between the human being and Western technology.

That Western man is held captive by his own technology is another example of the same struggle. Herbert Marcuse writes about the alienation, captivity, and totalitarianism derived from Western technology. Technology forms human beings with the same mold and subdues human beings with its computers. When Western Democracy represses people, justifies a coup d'état, and puts people in prison for reasons of world or national security, no one is responsible, no people are guilty, because an absolutely dehumanized system has made the decision. Thus, Western youth protest against this technocracy through irrational ways, such as drugs, ridiculous clothes, and violence for the sake of violence. Other races, the unemployed, the hungry, and people in misery are outside of the democratic process. When they walk in the streets without weapons and without protection to ask for the most elemental rights, they are refusing to play the game of Western society. When they walk in the streets consciously confronting the police dogs, bombs, jail, and death, they are confronting their own humanity --and the humanity of those who are captives of the system-- and Western democracy which means technocracy. The problems of the United States are not in Vietnam, in sidereal space, or in the bottom of the sea, but inside of its own borders.

Western society is in a crisis of impotence vis-a-vis free people
who refuse to be subdued. Some of these people have been Ho Chi Minh in Asia, Frantz Fanon and Patricio Lumumba in Africa, and Camilo Torres and Ernesto Che Guevara in Latin America. They cry for the construction of a more just and humane world; they do not talk about the concept of a human being but about the kind of action which makes a human being a real human being. Latin America philosophy asks for dis-alienation, freedom, and change to create a new world. The crucial question is how to act, how to change.

Pierre Tratignon from France, a disciple of Sartre, says that violence is the only way to bring about change because Western society does not want to change or to disturb its vested interests. This violence is an external and internal response to Western violence. A historical and coherent philosophical project must be to kill Western society in order to find freedom. "The way of freedom passes through our death," he says. Tratignon also says that Western society has lost its capacity to make history. History is made by underdeveloped people. The task of Western intellectuals is two-fold: to infect Western civilization with a mortal illness and to criticize radically and subversively in the name of the absolute necessity of justice a principle many times proclaimed. To philosophize is not to construct a philosophy of terrorism; to philosophize is to terrorize. To be philosophers of Western society is to be a mortal poison of their own society.

"El camino de la libertad pasa por nuestra muerte", Quoted from Cahier de L'Arc. Leopoldo Zea, *La Filosofia Americana como Filosofia sin Mas*, p. 132.
Sixth, Leopoldo Zea says that Latin America philosophy is a philosophy of change. There is an inversion of terms: non-Western society shows the West its limitations and alienation. Sartre was surprised when Frantz Fanon did not ignore Europe. Fanon talks about African humanness, but he talks also about the humanness of all peoples, including the humanness of inhumane Western society. Non-Western philosophy tries to establish its own humanness without meaning to deny the humanism of other people. However, such humanness also means the destruction of all inhumanity, all humanness which pretends to be the archetype of all humankind but impedes the creation of the new human being. Non-Western people want to be human, not more but not less. They are looking for a new human being, a new society.

There is no Latin American philosophy if there is not a philosophy of change. Philosophy is not the reflection prior to act, but the reflection from action. Action comes first, philosophy follows it. It is true that Western Society as well as non-Western Society are alienated, but both search for their own dis-alienation in different ways. Western people were subordinated by their own instruments, but the non-Western people were subordinated by the instruments and ideals of strangers. Western people see in their crisis the diminution of their own ideal of humanity, but non-Western people see that crisis as the opportunity to recover their own humanness. Western people need to destroy their own creation, but non-Western people need to construct a

51 Cf. Ibid., pp. 134-160.
new world. Western people look for a zero point of starting, forgetting the past like Descartes, but non-Western people look for their own history in order to improve their struggle of liberation and creation. The important thing is to recognize their own history of alienation, their own questions which make no sense to Western people, questions about their own humane quality, their own capacity to be full human beings, their own action against their own alienation, colonization, and instrumentalization (terminus a quo). The most important thing is to create a new world without the Western limitations, without Vietnams, without internal discriminations. The new human being must not subdue other human beings but must prevent that possibility forever.

b) The Latin American Method of Enrique Dussel

Enrique Dussel is the other Latin American philosopher whose work I want to analyse. Like Zea, in his works Dussel makes continuous references to, and does an analysis of, European and North American philosophy. For my purpose, I have chosen two of his most important books: *Filosofía de la Liberación* and *Método para una Filosofía de la Liberación* in which he explains what the characteristics of Latin American philosophy are; and, in a more explicit way, what the method is.

First, Dussel says that Latin American philosophy starts from a philosophy of history of philosophy which he calls "Histórica".  

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52 Both books have been quoted before.

53 Cf. Enrique Dussel, *Filosofía de la Liberación*, op. cit. pp. 109-115. The term "Histórica" corresponds to the objective "historic" or "historical" but means in Dussel "an interpretation of the world history."
philosophical history can be interpreted from two perspectives: the "center" and the "periphery" which display geographical and philosophical senses. The geographical "center" refers to those countries which have dominated other people such as the European countries, the United States, and Japan. The geographical "periphery" refers to those countries which have been dominated such as the Latin American countries, Black Africa, the Arab World, India, Southeast Asia, and, until recently, China.

The "center" of the empire has generated an ontological philosophy. Its interpretation of what it is to be human has tended to be absolute, unique, total. An example could be the concept of "being" in the Greece of Aristotle’s time. A human being was one who exercised reason, one who could think ethically and politically. This human being was a citizen, a male. He was a man who was a unique and free member of the polis, the only Zoon Politikon. Women did not have the capacity to be citizens, male children were citizens "potentially", and slaves and barbarians were non-beings. Aristotelian ontology justified not only this definition of human being but justified the invasion of Alexander the Great (from Macedonia). Because Aristotle supported the conquests of his former pupil, he died in exile after the death of Alexander. That ontological conception was imposed as the ideal of a human being; it was a total conception which, in illuminating all the world, actually condemned all those peoples who were not included in its conception of what it is to be fully human. Platonic, Kantian, and Hegelian, conceptions of human beings functioned in similar ways. Those conceptions were a philosophy of the center and an ideological ontology. They justified the domination of the colonial countries.
"The problem", Dussel says, "is just that the center has believed itself to be unique, that to be a human being is to be European."

The "center" comprehends the totality of being. The "periphery," outside the center, is the realm of non-being. "Center" and "periphery" are part of one system. The center has all the characteristics of the invader. The periphery has all the characteristics of the invaded.

The "periphery" of the empire has generated a philosophy from outside of the center, i.e., from outside the ideological ontology. The philosophy constructed by those living in the periphery is made from the experiences of ordinary life lived in the "barrio," in one's own town, in one's own world (Dussel's terminus a quo). This philosophy is made in a concrete place which is part of the totality which includes more than the center and which has its explanation in the context of the general project generated and fulfilled by the center. Latin America has suffered from the invasion by the center project which has absorbed the people in the periphery and alienated them from their foundations. People in the periphery who have been turned into

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Cf. Filosofía de la Liberación, pp. 55-77.

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The word "project" is used to refer any kind of social organization with clear ideological principles.
colonials by action from the center can only think from within a context of domination and oppression. For this reason, philosophy has not had the same meaning for the center as for the periphery. The center looks for a justification of its domination, while Latin America suffers that domination and looks for liberation.

Latin America makes a philosophy of the history of philosophy from the perspective of the periphery. The periphery is located inside of the project of oppression generated by the center; all people and all things acquire their value with the project of the center; they have no individual value. Latin American philosophy has to cross (dia) this horizon of oppression, which is the logos of the center, in order to overcome it (dia-lectic), in order to create its own horizon, its own logos.

This interpretation of what it is to be a human being is made from the perspective of the periphery against the classic, modern and contemporary ontology of the center in opposition to it. The ontological perspective of the center is a result of an experience of dominating. Before "I think" (ego cogito), "I conquer" (ego conquiro). Conquest is the practical foundation of "I think". It not only justifies the use of the other people as tools of the project, but it also provides the conditions for the birth of new ideologies of domination. In this sense, ontology is the ideology of ideologies.

Dussel interprets world history (prehistory, protohistory, and

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European expansion) and especially Latin American history (the age of Spain's colonies, the struggles for independence from Spain, English neocolonialism, and now North American neocolonialism), from the perspective of the "periphery". Latin American history is the history of domination and dependence. Such domination is not only economic; it is also political, religious, cultural, and anthropological; it is a domination of every level of the Latin American being.

Second, Dussel says that Latin American philosophy is metaphysics of the other (alterité), from those outside the center. It is a metaphysics of "alterity" because it goes beyond ontology, the project of the center and beyond the presumption that the totality is co-existent with the center. There is another reality, the reality of the other. Metaphysics is the movement from ontology to trans-ontology. Ontology always reflects its own ideal being; the project of the center always subdues people of the periphery; the totality always is the same. But when the "totally other" appears, the submerged become


60  I will use the term "alterity" which means the quality or state of being other: otherness.

61  There are different uses of the term "totally other." Dussel is not using it in the way that Barth uses it to refer only to God. He simply uses it to refer to someone who is completed alienated from the center.
visible, they acquire face. When the totally other appears, horizon, substance, freedom, and responsibility of the other appear also; the alterity becomes reality. That is the meta-ontology. The other can be the other thing, and also it can also be the other human being, the other social class, the other ethnic group, the other cultural group, or the absolute other who is God. However, in all cases, the other appears beyond the ontology of the center, putting in question the ontological way of seeing all things. Ontology, the center, "totality", all become relativized.

In the case of human beings, all people are born facing others, recognizing others, trying to communicate with others. Communication is revelation through the word, its own logos and the logos of the other. The other is an epiphany (manifestation), through its own word, of its own mystery. If the other does not talk, there is no possibility of knowing who the other is. Even if the other reveals itself, there is an incomprehensible reality beyond logos because through logos something is communicated but not the totality. Since this is so, beyond logos and beyond the revelation of the other is the unthinkable. The only way to have communication with the other is to accept (by faith) the other human being who is beyond reason, to love the other human being who is not known, to respect the other human being who is not part of the totality.

In other words, ethics comes first and all philosophical disci-
plines follow it. This is the opposite of the traditional understanding about philosophy. Then, on the basis of this ethical starting-point, we interpret the other by analogy. An "ana-lectic" method means a new attitude: it is to think from the other, from the existence of that which is not yet observed in the other; it is the growing of the totality from the other in order to serve the other in a creative way.

In the case of the other as a social class, there are those who have remained on the periphery in terms of social stratification. When ontologists established being as the starting-point of all philosophy, such being was not good or bad. It was undetermined, undifferentiated, absolute. But when they discovered that the universe of its being was not the whole world, but only a part of it, then, they also discovered the other people of the periphery. Ontology discovers its limitations and its good and bad through the other. But when ontology does not discover its limitations but, on the contrary, expands its own totality, then it eliminates others or subdues them. That is the immorality of totalization. Totalization is assassination of the other. When there is totalitarianism, the totalized people are cut off from the economic benefits they need; they are denied social participation and political action. Again, philosophy begins with an ethical option: either recognizing the right of the other or affirming its own totality by denying the other being. Metaphysicians of alterity know how to

think about the world from the perspective of the other, i.e., from the negation of all ontology and all laws which protect the center; they know how to act to liberate the oppressed classes, how to create a new human being and a new society.

To think about the world from the point of view of the other is not to adjust the other to the inertia of the center but rather to assume a critical attitude. It is to recognize the dominator (the center) and the dominated (the periphery) and to provoke a dialectical movement to the new, overcoming the contradiction. Again the starting-point is an ethical commitment for political action in favor of the oppressed. Metaphysical alterity is when totality hears the voice (logos) of the other and makes a commitment to him or her. It is an act of love, faith, and hope, a historical event.

Third, Dussel says that Latin American philosophy is a "praxis de la alteridad" ("praxis of alterity") which means a praxis from the other who is beyond the center; it is the praxis of the periphery. He distinguishes two kinds of relationships: praxis and poiesis. Praxis (action, transformation) is the relationship of human being to human being; poiesis is the relationship of human being to nature. Concerning praxis, there is a praxis which consolidates the center of domination, and there is a praxis which in questioning the system both theoretical and real is a praxis of liberation. There are four kinds of human relationships: the male-female which is the erotic relationship; the parent-child which is the pedagogical relationship; the brother-brother which is the political relationship; and, the human being-
absolute which is the "archaeological" relationship. Let me discuss briefly each of these relationships as moments of the metaphysical praxis, which is the praxis beyond all ontology; it is the praxis of the meta-ontology.

a. The erotic is the relationship between male and female, the first moment of the metaphysical praxis. Unfortunately, erotic relations are susceptible to many deformations; for example, the dualism of body-soul and aggressive-passive. Starting with a dualism of body-soul, Latin American people have considered sexual relations as evil. Another deformation has been the conception of the aggressive male and the passive female. The "machismo" dominates woman as a sexual object. A woman's liberation should annihilate "machismo." It is the alterity --the other who is the woman-- who in denying the self-sufficiency of the male, constructs the liberation of the couple. This is the birth of the new family and of humane sexual relations.

b. The pedagogical is the relationship of parents to children and teachers to students at all levels. This is the second moment of the metaphysical praxis. Pedagogy is a problem of culture, but at the same time, it is a problem of family and society. Ontological pedagogy

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adopts, colonizes, domesticates, and incorporates the new --who are children and students-- inside of the project of the center. A pedagogy of alterity considers children and students --who are the other-- as the new, the epiphany of the novelty. The pedagogy of alterity is a pedagogy of liberation which raises consciousness about its own location and the real possibilities of its own liberation. Raising consciousness is the work of waking people up to their own situation. Their own situation is part of a dominating culture which always forces them to repeat "the same" from the center. Their own situation is poverty and oppression, as people of the periphery. But to raise consciousness about their own situation is to attempt to overcome such a situation. They must refuse to be part of the culture which is not their own culture. If they wish to be a human being in the pedagogical process, they must refuse the totality of the being of the center with its culture of oppression, adaptation, and domestication, in order to be free from the center.

c. The political relationship is the brotherly dimension of people. This is the third moment of the metaphysical praxis. This means to be benevolent and just to the other, to desire the good for the poor, who are the other. Liberation for the poor is based on relationships of justice between governors and citizens, among different social groups, and among nations. Unfortunately, at the international level, there are powers which support the exploitation of the nations who are in the center. At the national level, oligarchy exploits the rest of the people. The center (the national oligarchy
which is a minority) dominates the periphery (workers and peasants who
are the majority). Real brotherly relationships will come only when
such a system breaks and a new order arises.

d. Archaeology is the relationship of the human being with the 65
absolute, i.e., the philosophy of religion. This is the last moment
of the metaphysical praxis. The absolute is the origin and the end of
all metaphysics. The arche archaeology can be fetishism, the absolutil-
ization or deification of something: a rock, a race, a system, a
"civilization", "machismo", matter, and so on. But archaeology also
can be an antifetishism, i.e., it can be against the deification of
anything. To be antifetishist is to return all things to their place
and truth. But we cannot deny gods without some points of reference
that will not turn out to be new fetishes. However, if we put the
point of reference outside of the world, outside of all things and all
people, we can escape this dilemma and be truly radical. This is the
reason why God, the totally other, the absolute exteriority, the
radical alterity can bring an adequate perspective to a real anti-
fetishism. From this point of view, to be antifetishist is to be
atheist about the deification of anything, any people, or any system.
A philosophy of liberation has its ultimate origin (arche) a meta-
action, i.e. the creation. In the light of creation nobody is absolute.
If all are created, nothing is divine, except God who is outside crea-

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Archaeology comes from arche and means the first principle,
the unprincipled, the origin of all things.
Creation is the atheism of all the cosmos, all things within the world, and all human beings. For instance, if Descartes and Hegel had deified (absolutized) the "I", which was the European "I", atheism would be the necessary condition of all Latin American philosophy.

Fourth, Dussel says that Latin American philosophy is also a poiesis of alterity (from poiein = to make or to do). It is the philosophy of the relationship between human beings and nature. Poiesis of alterity is the philosophy of natural things and cultural things. Nature is the matter of human work, the physical reality which is transformed by the work of the human being. Human work is action upon nature to create artifacts. The poiesis of alterity refers to the other in these two senses: the other as a thing in itself, but also the other as the object of human action. Dussel distinguishes praxis from poiesis by saying that praxis is action at the social level, and poiesis is the action upon physical things. The world of culture includes human action, tools of production, natural resources, signs, production, all things which are necessary to human life. Poiesis of alterity is a philosophy of natural aspects of things and things as they are transformed by economy and technology.

Fifth, Dussel says that Latin American philosophy has an

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"analectic" method. Analyzing the factic or ontic methods of the natural sciences and the dialectical method of the ontological philosophies, Dussel proposes a new way to think, the analectical method. Dialectical method crosses (dia) the ontic horizon and can go from horizon to horizon looking for the foundation of the central horizon. The logos of the other is distinct because the other expresses its own life, its own history, its own exteriority. The logos of the other is beyond the comprehension of the center. The basic point of the analectic method is that the logos of the other arises from the other and not from the center; it arises from the freedom of the other totally unknown by the center. In order to respond to the other and live with it, the center has to believe all that the other says, to think and accept the other as different, to commit itself to the other. In other words, the analectical method is intrinsically ethical, because it demands acceptance of the other; it demands making a moral commitment.

This method permits the making of a new philosophy, a different philosophy, because its terminus a quo is the peripheral exteriority, the non-being of those oppressed by the system. This method opens new dimensions outside of the horizon of the center, gives capacity to create a different theoretical framework, and provides the most

adequate themes for its own situation.

Thus, a principle of Latin American philosophy is not to repeat books, to study systems of the center, to maintain the status-quo. It is to put in radical crisis the ordinary and common life, to eliminate this oppressive and dependent life, to be committed to the struggle for a liberated human being; otherwise, the new human being will not arise and, of course, Latin American philosophy will be only a repetition of the center philosophy.

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In summary, Leopoldo Zea as well as Enrique Dussel, two of the most representative philosophers in Latin America today, point out the following characteristics:

a. Latin American philosophy sees, as its central problem, the Latin American himself. "Mental emancipation" from the European or North American logos is crucial, i.e., the emancipation from the logos of the center, the horizon of the totality, and the explanation of its own being in the center of its own history, culture, tradition, and problems. The terminus a quo is the peripheral reality, which has been alienated, colonized, and instrumentalized.

b. Latin American philosophy includes, as two of its more important characteristics, rigorousness and rationality in confronting its own reality. In other words, philosophy is a science. However, that includes the foundations of such rationality which are understood as anthropological, historical, ideological, and ethical: anthropological
because since all philosophy is an expression of the human being, its origin lies in man himself; historical because all philosophy is located in a concrete historical process and is a result of it; ideological because all philosophy has been used to justify or deny an economic, social and political order; and ethical because, in those conditions, a moral option must come before all philosophy.

c. Latin American philosophy is necessarily the destruction of the Western conception of human being, the ontological philosophy of the center. That destruction began with the Second World War, but it has been accelerated by the struggles of liberation in Latin America and all of the Third World countries. The European human being is an abstract idea which has constructed beautiful theories but has served as a cover for many inhumane actions in the name of an ideal. The peripheral human being is a concrete one who wants to see real humanness for all people. Philosophy from people of the slums, Indians, peasants, all people who are oppressed, will not repeat—as a carbon copy—the ideals of the center, but neither will it impose its own ideal of its own human being. However, there is an inevitable confrontation between an abstract, ideal, and imposed human being (ontology of the center), and a concrete, real, and liberated human being (the rising peripheral logos). Negation of alienation and affirmation of liberation will be key terms; creation of a new human being and a new world will be the terminus ad quem.

d. Latin American philosophy is a metaphysics of alterity, which goes beyond the totality of the center and discovers the other
(human being, social class, ethnic groups, cultural groups, or the absolute). To think from the place of the other is to deny all ontology; it is to act, to change, to be in struggle, to assume a critical attitude, to provoke a dialectical movement toward the new. In other words, a philosophy of alterity is that which discovers a way of overcoming the ontological philosophy through the other, a trans-ontology or metaphysics. That means, at least, two principal consequences for the Latin American philosophy: first, a previous commitment to the poor, to the concrete situation of the oppressed, and to the history and the cause of the periphery; second, the adoption of a new method, the analectical method, beyond the horizon of the logos of the center.

3. THE DIALECTICAL METHOD

Leopoldo Zea talks about a Latin American dialectical method and Enrique Dussel about a Latin American analectical method. Dussel refuses to employ a "dia-lectical" method because it corresponds to an ontological philosophy. The analectical method will arise in the midst of the peripheral reality and will be against all ontological philosophy. The questions are: are there real differences between Zea and Dussel? What is the real method of Latin American philosophy?

European philosophy has been an ontological philosophy, a theory of being. For instance, the Greek being is that which exists (Parmenides and Aristotle); non-being does not exist. It is not the case that being and non-being can exist at the same time (the principle of non-contradiction). Such philosophy justified the Greek domination: the being which existed was the Greek citizen. The slave and the barbarians,
even the Greek women and children, were non-beings. It was the domination of the citizen, the male. Descartes' ontology was the concealment of the French domination: "I think, therefore I exist" was the clear and evident truth of Descartes, the "I think" isolated from the colonization of France, the \textit{cogito par excellence}, ignoring the \textit{conquiro} and thus covering over the domination. Pure and practical reason was the axis of Kant's philosophy: pure reason (the "I think") and practical reason (the moral action), but both of them are reason. In consequence, all things are identified in absolute thought as Hegel affirmed. The movement of being suppresses opposition and deifies absolute thinking (the deification of German being). In all cases, dialectic has served ontological philosophy to demonstrate how the being of the center collects and integrates the totally other, even its own contradictions.

There is a European effort to overcome ontological philosophy. Many philosophers deny the identification of being and thought and point out that there is an unthinkable beyond thought. It was recognized by Descartes when he could not relate the \textit{res cogitans} and \textit{res extensa}. Kant also points out the impossibility of knowing the so-called \textit{noumena}. Kierkegaard denies the logical system of existence because existence is beyond all rational systems. Kierkegaard asserts the existence of God, who is beyond the aesthetical and ethical stages. Feuerbach reacts against Hegel's subjectivism pointing to the sensible or empirical thing. Marx recognizes this reality but points out "sensuous human activity", the historical matter as the basic
reality. Dialectic here helps to overcome the European ontology, to demonstrate how the philosophy of the center has forgotten the "unthinkable" (Schelling), the "existence" (Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre), the physical thing (Feuerbach) and, overall, the human being (Marx). However, this overcoming is still European. That which I shall try to point out is the Latin American dialectical method.

Leopoldo Zea says that Latin American philosophy has, as a crucial point, an anthropological problem. Dussel, helped by Levinas, locates this problem in the peripheral context. This location is obviously explicit in Zea but not developed as such. The peripheral human being is the other in relation to the center, the other beyond the "I think" of the philosophers of Europe and the United States, beyond the comprehension and light of the absolute logos of the center. Given that the other cannot be seen by the center, the only way to know the other, such as it is, is through the logos of the other, through the word which reveals the unknown.

The analectical method rejects the dialectical method because it (the dialectical) is a tool to develop an ontological philosophy. However, some European philosophers have shown also that it is possible to use the dialectical method as a tool to overcome such ontology. An incorrect use of the dialectical method is to develop a solitary

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68 Cf. Erich Fromm, *Marx’s Concept of Man*.

thought in which the only way to relate the others is to invade and oppress them. The correct use of the dialectical method is to take, as a cornerstone, an analectical perspective. Dussel suggests five moments in the correct use of a dialectical method. First, to begin with the ontic reality (his terminus a quo, i.e., the common experience of everyday existence) and go towards its foundation (dialectic). Second, to explain scientifically the existential possibilities of all beings, i.e. a necessary ontology. Third, the confrontation of the existential human being (among all beings) to the face of the other, i.e., the appearance of the alterity, the otherness (analectic). Fourth, the self-revelation of the other, i.e., its right to use its own logos, involves the questioning of all ontology and the birth of a new perspective. Fifth, the new foundation is established; it is an analectic praxis which is beyond all ontology, which is service in behalf of justice, i.e., the terminus ad quem. According to Dussel, these are the principal moments in the correct use of a dialectical method, which he then calls the analectical method. So, there are not divergencies between Leopoldo Zea and Enrique Dussel. Both of them are in agreement that a Latin American dialectical method is possible.

But, for the purpose of the present work and in the context of a Latin American philosophy, I will say that a Latin American dialectical method consists, at least, of three moments:

The first moment is the analysis of the Latin American social

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Cf. Ibid., p. 183.
reality as the starting-point (the \textit{terminus a quo}), the reality which
is the day-to-day experience of Latin American people. This moment lo-
cates our analysis in the most philosophical tradition of the dialec-
tical method from Aristotle to Hegel. Latin American common experience
is, in relation to the center (Europe, the United States and their fol-
lowers in the midst of the Latin American countries), the reality of
being the stranger, discriminated against, conquered, dominated, colo-
nized, instrumentalized, exploited, and oppressed. Latin Americans
have submitted themselves to these acts of oppression; they have become
alienated and underdeveloped. They are treated as if they were not
human beings economically, socially, politically, culturally, sexually,
and educationally. People like the Indians, the peasants, the workers,
the unemployed, and those who live hungry and miserable lives in
"barrios" and slums are described by Hugo Assman, a Latin American
thinker, as:

\begin{quote}
the 800 millions of individuals who live in the world...caught in conditions of absolute poverty, and existence so limited by malnutrition, illiteracy, illnesses, high rate of child mortality, and short hope of life, situations which do not correspond to any rational definition of human dignity.71
\end{quote}

The second moment is the reconceptualization of a world-view,
and all man in the context of this world, in the light of the social reality (the first moment) and the anthropological analysis (the second moment). This is the *via ad*, the method to be follow.

The third moment overcomes an individual, egoistic, and absolute ontology through the appearance of the other, the "totally other." The other is beyond an individual human being, beyond a national horizon, beyond a Latin American horizon. Beyond an individual human being there are another human beings, beyond a national horizon there are other countries, beyond Latin America there are other continents. The other is that which is not reducible to a particular deduction, demonstration, or system. Latin American anthropology moves from the explanation of its own being, its own horizon which is not absolute, to the recognition of the other.

To recognize the Latin American reality, as a reality of oppression, is to negate the inhuman action by those people who are loyal to an ontology of the ideal absolute human being. To recover the real Latin America presupposes not only an explanation of the oppression which is suffered but also an action of liberation to change such oppression. A Latin American philosophy cannot be a theoretical one which formulates concepts; it must be a practical philosophy which can eradicate the inhuman consequences of an absolute ontology. A Latin American philosophy is a philosophy of praxis. That is the reason why a Latin American philosophy must begin with a commitment or a moral option in favor of the struggles of liberation of Latin Americans.

No one can construct a Latin American philosophy without this commit-
ment. The negation of an ontology of oppression is a necessary part in overcoming that ontology; the overcoming of such ontology is a necessary step in bringing about liberation. That is the \textit{terminus ad quem} of the Latin American method which responds most deeply to the Latin American ethos.

The dialectical method is a way, and at the same time, a movement which in any philosophical version is similar in the \textit{terminus a quo} (the starting-point), but frequently has different \textit{terminus ad quems} (the place of arrival). In my method of "dialectical" analysis the starting-point (\textit{terminus a quo}) is the factum, what is really happening right now in Latin America, but its place of arriving (\textit{terminus ad quem}) is liberation, the liberation which is the ethos of Latin America today.

CHAPTER II

PAULO FREIRE, A LATIN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHER

Paulo Freire is a Latin American philosopher and educator, not only because he was born in Brazil, but because his thought and educational practice are located in the historical and cultural tradition of Latin America. He thinks, writes, and talks as a Latin American.

Freire has been accused of idealism, communism, and extremism. The most serious accusations have been that of promoting hate and subversion. His books, his thought, and his voice have been considered to be so forceful and critical that they raise suspicion as well as strong reactions against him. There are countries which have prohibited the selling of his writings and places where he has become persona non grata.

1 "There are those who say, in the United States, that Paulo Freire is a liberal educator. I am not a liberal educator; what I claim to be is a revolutionary educator, which is different." These words were pronounced by Freire in the Auditorium of the Costa Rica University. "Paulo Freire en la Universidad." Universidad 29 de Noviembre 1971, p.6.

However, his books and ideas are read, studied, and discussed throughout all Latin America, inside and outside of universities. His thought and his method are applied in many ways. His prophetic style is awakening a new hope in a philosophy of education and educational practice that has more relationship to Latin American needs. Thus, our study of Freire involves one of the most controversial thinkers in Latin America.

In order to read Freire with comprehension, to make a careful analysis of his thought, a correct interpretation of his principles, and an understanding of his real implications, it seems that it is necessary to describe, in general terms, the reality which gives context to his philosophy and educational practice. Thus, I will begin by describing the Latin American reality as a whole, as the "periphery" of the so-called First World. My second point will be the Brazilian reality which has in its borders both the First and the Third Worlds at the same time. My description will be made from the "peripheral" point of view which reflects the larger part of Brazil. My third point will be the life and works of Freire as a part of this contradictory reality and his commitment with the "peripheral" people.

1. THE LATIN AMERICAN CONTEXT

Given the elements which influence Freire's philosophy and

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the limitations imposed by this work, it is possible to call attention to only four aspects of the Latin American reality: the historical, socio-economic, educational, and ideological contexts. These aspects are discussed with the decade of the nineteen sixties in mind, the period during which Freire acquired national and international importance.

a) The Historical Context

Spain and Portugal promoted the expansion that arose from the European commercial revolution of the 16th century. Latin America is a consequence of that expansion. The disadvantage was that Spain and Portugal were not developed economically to a point where they could provide permanent conditions for later development in their colonies. That explains why Latin America was, in its three hundred years as a colony, a place of exploitation of natural resources without any kind of economic improvement.4

Latin America is also a consequence of the Roman Catholic Counter Reformation. At the moment of the discovery, conquest, and colonization of Latin America, the Iberian peninsula was a bastion against the European Reformation initiated by Martin Luther in Germany. The Catholic kings were particularly active and combative against all

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That explains why Latin American Catholicism has been active and combative. That explains also why the Latin American countries have been confessionally homogeneous up to the coming of Protestantism at the last part of the 19th century.

Dussel, trying to evaluate Latin American Catholicism, up to 1962, says that there were three major types of catholics: the popular Christians who were baptized in the Church and who later were married by the Church; the Christian practitioners who tried to practice Christian principles; and the Christian elite who were a minority but who had a high level of Christian responsibility. Colonial Christianity generated a general acceptance of Christian faith as part of Latin American life.

The coming of Protestant Christianity in the last century has created a minority church. It has been a church with a general sectarian and anti-catholic attitude and with an ideological identification with the liberal ideology.

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Ibid., 190-201.

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The inspiration of the revolutions in France and the United States, the English industrial revolution, the Napoleonic blockade, and other factors provided conditions for the Latin American struggles for independence at the beginning of the 19th century. The struggle for political independence without a basic economic development had provided conditions that made possible dominations by England and the United States.

England promoted a Balkanized independence. Latin America was broken up into a series of small countries, each of which had different possibilities of development. For instance, Venezuela had oil; Bolivia, tin; and Chile, copper. No country had all the necessary natural resources in its own borders. In virtue of these conditions, England consolidated its commercial empire, and Latin American countries shaped their production according to the "international demand." That meant that these countries could not develop their own plan of production and diversification. Their production was oriented toward a mono-cultivation in order to satisfy a mono-exportation. Their national economy fluctuated according to the oscillation of the international market. Given their lack of markets, this style of production resulted in catastrophic consequences during the time of the Second World War.

The growing influence of the United States at the beginning of

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10 Cf. José Claudio Williman, pp. 12-17.
the present century provided the conditions for it to be at the head of the Western nations after the Second World War. This leadership included the promotion of the development of the Third World countries. At the same time, Latin American oligarchies increased the importation of manufactured products and borrowed capital to satisfy that importation debt. Their national industries, concentrating on the production of consumable goods, used foreign models, foreign technology, foreign money, foreign advice, and foreign training. This industrialization has produced a negative impact upon Latin American economy such as the increase of indebtedness, the concentration of capital in the First World, the development of multinational corporations, and as a consequence, the internationalization of production and markets. With these new forms of capitalism, Latin American countries entered a new phase of colonialism. Latin America, participating in international production and markets, provided cheap manpower, cheap natural resources, and cheap products. Latin America had to sell at the price imposed by the purchaser, who in this case was the United States. Given the favorable conditions for the "center," the United States has spread its foreign investments and banks promoting a high rate of concentration of foreign


12 Cf. Pablo Steele, Quiénes son los Dueños de América Latina? (Panamá: Instituto Cooperativo Interamericano, 1972), pp. 55-75.
capital in banks of the United States (70% of all its investments).

b) The Socio-Economic Context

Latin America has been one of the regions of the world with a high demographic rate. In 1950 Latin America had 163 million people, but in 1960 it had 205 million people, growing at a rate of 3% per year. As a consequence, there has been a dramatic increase of young people. In 1960, 50.3% was under 20 years of age; and at least 42% of the whole population was less than 15 years of age.

This accelerated growth of Latin America did not correspond to its rate of economic development and the increase of per capita income. Peasants and employees, who were the majority of people, became poorer. For instance in Mexico, 1957, 65% of the population did not receive any benefits of all from national development. According to Josué de Castro, two thirds of the population in Latin America is hungry. "The

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Cf. E. Odell, pp. 81-83.
wrong is not the race, the weather, but hunger," he says. There are also problems of housing. In 1954, houses without minimum conditions for living in Latin America were 80% of the total. There were also the continuing problems of health and illiteracy.

Another characteristic is the growth of urban areas. The demographic explosion, the low standard of living, the loss of educational opportunity, and the scarcity of medical care have produced a massive immigration of peasants of the cities looking for a better life. This immigration has produced an accelerated growth of the urban areas. The Federal District of Mexico, for example, which in 1950 had three million people, in 1960 had reached five million. Obviously, this immigration has created a serious housing shortage and unemployment. The immigration has generated an agglomeration of people living in inhuman conditions. Quoting a Peruvian anthropologist, Julio de Santa Ana notes:

In Caracas, 25% of the population live in quarters called "ranchos" which are in the hills around the valley of the city. In Rio de Janeiro, the infamous "favelas" have almost 20% of the population. In Lima, the "barriadas" have 19% of the population. In Santiago de Chile more than 10% of the population live in "callampas." In Buenos Aires, 5% of the population occupy the "vi-


llas miserias. The numbers are 10% for Bogota, 30% for Guayaquil, 30% for Guayaquil, 30% for Cali, and 20% for Maracaibo.

There are also big sectors of Indians who are "marginalized." In some places, like Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Brazil, Indians were not eliminated but rather were dominated and subjected to the most cruel exploitation. Indians are a silent presence, the "testimony people" of Darcy Riveiro, who in some places make up more that 60% of the whole population. The major part of the Indian population are peasants, who are exploited as cheap manpower, as small producers, if not even driven from their lands. This condition has produced explosive situations.

There are two kinds of people in the rural areas: those who are the owners of most of the fertile soil and those who work for the owner or who are owners of a little piece of land where they marginally survive as families. The case of Guatemala is dramatic: 2.1% of the landowners

20 "En Caracas, 25% de la población vive en tugurios llamados "ranchos" que ocupan los cerros en torno al valle de la ciudad. En Río de Janeiro, las mal afamadas "favelas" alojan casi el 20% de la población. En Lima, las barriadas contienen el 10% de la población. En Santiago de Chile, más del 10% de los habitantes viven en "callamistas". En Buenos Aires, un 5% de la población ocupa las "villas miseria". Y las cifras son, 10% para Bogota, 30% para Guayaquil, 30% para Cali y 20% para Maracaibo". Julio de Santa Ana, p. 32.

21 Darcy Riveiro, v. 1., pp. 115.

own 72.2% of the fertile soil, while the 91.4% of the landowners own only 21.9% of the land. Latin America has a system of latifundium with the following economic consequences: inconvenient use of natural resources, inadequate use of capital for social interest, inequal distribution of income, and the impossibility of peasants becoming owners of lands. The agrarian reforms made by many governments have not had success because of the economic and political power of the latifundary families.

Latin American conditions during the decade of the nineteen sixties were deplorable, and today these same conditions still exist with even more serious consequences. The reality of evident disparities may be expressed by a series of contrasts such as the explosive population and low growth rate of basic production, high level of technology and primitive structures of social and economic organization, necessary capital to promote national development but low capacity to generate income, and the need for adequate training necessitated by imported technology and low levels of education. Latin America has been a real


25 Cf. Julio de Santa Ana, p. 30

26 Cf. Luis E. Odell, p. 86,87.
economic, social, and cultural "periphery" of the "center" of the developed countries.

c) The Educational Context

Freire's interest in education makes crucial the role of education in the historical and socio-economic context just described above. At all times, education serves the economic, social, and political system in which it exists. Latin American education is not an exception. For instance, during the three hundred years of colonization, universities worked to educate functionaries of the Spanish Crown. When the struggles for independence triumphed, education was serving the bureaucracy by training young people to help maintain effective exportation of agricultural products. Education was used to stimulate the national process of economic, judicial, and political organization; it trained new professionals to play effectively the game imposed by the international "centers." Education was intended to integrate Indians, mestizos, and immigrants to the new nations. The motto was "education for everyone." Economic progress and the European culture were the principal elements in the "project" to confront the "ignorant" in the hope of bringing about a change. However, the ignorant had been all marginalized by the socio-economic system of those who had seized power. In other words, education was the tool to reinforce the social system.

However, the result of these aspirations was a great contradic-

27 The first universities in Latin America were Santo Domingo (1538), Lima (1548), and Mexico (1553).
tion. For instance in Argentina, the country with the greatest number of educated people in 1966, for each 100 children who began elementary school, only 40 graduated; of the 32 who began high school, only 19 graduated, of the 11 who began university, only 5 graduated. But this situation is only a partial picture of the educational reality because these data refer to the people who have had the opportunity to go to school and to Argentina, one of the countries with the highest percentage of people with formal education. In 1959, only 35% of the population between 5 and 15 years of age were registered in school of four Central American countries. An average of 55% of the population of the same age was registered in schools in the rest of Latin America. The educational system serves a national "project" which makes it impossible to improve education and, as a consequence, to improve social and economic participation. Even if people have adequate education, that education does not correspond to the real possibilities for jobs.

There are two consequences of this reality that I want to discuss: first, between 1960 and 1970 we observe a significant improvement in the rate of registration for formal education (179.3% in all Latin America), but at the same time the drop-out rate also increased dramatically. Studies made in fifteen Latin American countries (85.5% of all school-aged children registered in all Latin American schools)

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29
Cf. Luis E. Odell, p. 85.
show an average drop-out rate of 62.8% with an even higher percentage in the rural areas. For instance, UNESCO says that in Uruguay, from 1963 to 1968, for every thousand children registered in elementary school (a period of 6 years), there were 736 who finished their studies in urban areas, as compared with 416 who finished in rural areas. In Guatemala, during the same years, for each 1,000 registered in elementary school (a period of 6 years) there were 496 who finished their studies in urban areas, as compared with only 35 who finished in rural areas. To summarize: in four countries between 20% and 40% of the people were without elementary education; in four other countries between 55% and 65% were without elementary education, and in eleven other countries between 72% and 92% were without elementary education. These percentages correspond to the educational condition during the years between 1950 and 1970.

The second consequence was the high percentage of illiteracy. In 1950, when there were 97 million people in Latin America, between 40 and 42 million people did not know how to read and write. The worst part was that this number was not decreasing; on the contrary, it was...

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30 UNESCO is the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.


32 Cf. Luis E. Odell, p. 86.

33 Cf. Rycroft and Clemmer, p. 58.
increasing, especially in the rural areas. Studies made in the nineteen seventies can illustrate this situation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rural Population over 15 years of age (%)</th>
<th>The year the figures were gathered</th>
<th>Illiteracy (%)</th>
<th>The year the figures were gathered</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia 41.7</td>
<td>(1960)</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>(1970)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil 34.0</td>
<td>(1973)</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>(1970)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile 41.0</td>
<td>(1970)</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>(1970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia 35.6</td>
<td>(1973)</td>
<td>19.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haiti 57.6</td>
<td>(1973)</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>(1960)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico 38.8</td>
<td>(1973)</td>
<td>25.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peru 55.5</td>
<td>(1973)</td>
<td>27.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uruguay 14.0</td>
<td>(1960)</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>(1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela 24.3</td>
<td>(1970)</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>(1971) 34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The document on Education of CELAM II of Medellín, 1968, summarizes the most relevant problems of Latin American education: (1) the educational system does not overcome illiteracy in spite of the emphasis on universal, free, and obligatory education. (2) It imposes the obligations of unrealistic schooling which provokes high drop-out rates. (3) Content is generally abstract and formal (4) Didactical methods are more directed towards transmission of content than toward the creation of a critical spirit. 5) Those methods are

34 Cf. Emilio N. Monti, p. 59. fn. 17

oriented to support the social and economic structures. (6) They are uniform and passive. (7) They are oriented to maintain an economy on the basis of "to have more" rather than to respond to the young people's exigencies "to be more." (8) Education sacrifices the human being to promote pragmatism and immediacy. (9) The human being is asked to serve the economy rather than to serve other human beings.

**d). The Ideological Context**

In colonial times there were no Latin American ideologies. However, when the struggles for independence began, ideological thought and action came also. In the 19th century, there were two kinds of social classes with clear social, economic, and political interests: the landowners with a conservative ideology and the traders with a liberal ideology. Conservative ideology defended the regime of economic exploitation which was operating in the centuries of colonization. Liberal ideology adopted many elements such as European freemasonry, encyclopedism, and the capitalistic liberalism of the 19th century. In our century, there are three elements generally accepted as modifiers of the Latin American ideological background: Socialism, the Mexican Revolution, and Peruvian "indigenism."  

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First, the influence of the European socialism came to Latin America through immigrants. Juan B. Justo organized the first socialist party in Argentina with an impact through all Latin America. This movement includes workers and peasants, social sectors who had been forgotten by traditional conservatives and liberals.

Second, the Mexican Revolution (1910) demanded political freedom, freedom from clerical domination, nationalism, redistribution of land, and the administration of the economic and social justice by instruments of the state rather than by the landowners. This revolution also advocated a representative and democratic government with a free flow of information and free enterprise. Its socialist expression was represented by Lázaro Cárdenas.

Third, there was the influence of APRA a movement founded by Víctor Raul Haya de la Torre in Peru. APRA was not only a political party but an ideological formulation for those who dreamt of a unification of all Latin American countries, with the foundation of the United States of Indoamerica as a nation. This movement incorporated the Indian race as an important part of the Latin American future. Haya de la Torre dreamt of a unique constitution for the Latin American


40 APRA—The Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, known as the "Aprista Movement."
countries, with a common court, bank, and market. APRA emphasized nationalization of lands and industry and the promotion of agrarian re-
form.

Summarizing the ideological panorama in the decade of the six-
ties, Hiber Conteris points out four kinds of ideologies: the surviving ideologies, authoritarianism, the reformism, and the revolutionary ide-
ology.

The "surviving ideologies" are the conservative and liberal ide-
ologies. The conservative ideology generally acts or reacts against change. It is a "reactionary" ideology. It is traditionally supported by the landowners' oligarchy, the hierarchy of the church, and the army. Its reactions are generally violent: coup d'état, election fraud, and military intervention. The liberal ideology is more sensible to change and is supported by the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. Its foundations are individualistic democracy and economic capitalism. Liberalism identifies with the West and Christian nations in the confrontation with the Communist and atheist countries. However, the failure of free enterprise in Latin America and the appearance of the leftist alternative as a possible way to solve the worst problems have brought about political alliances of the two surviving ideologies in order to

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Cf. Ibid., pp. 335-357.

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confront the danger of Communism.

Conservative ideology has generated two kinds of "authoritarianism": first, an authoritarianism which supports dictatorships, maintains regimes of police forces for the purpose of repression, and has support of foreign capital. Some examples have been Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Somoza in Nicaragua, Batista in Cuba, Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela, and Rojas Pinilla in Colombia. Second, an authoritarianism which has the capacity to support some kind of progress and modernization without abandoning the conservative principles. Supporters of this view assume a nationalist stance which justifies the expropriation of properties of foreign corporations. They look for popular support for their programs in the areas of salaries, public services, social benefits, jobs, and housing; they promote public education, strong bureaucracy, and repressive control. Getulio Vargas in Brazil and Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina are two examples of leaders of such regimes.

Liberal ideology has generated the so-called "reformists" whose principal characteristic is the desire to avoid violence. Reformists recognize that the worst problems of Latin America are at the level of economic and social structures. They are in favor of change but through "democratic" ways, i.e. through the existing order, and through the

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Cf. Jorrín and Martz, pp. 239-269.
guarantees provided by the present institutions. Reformists have constituted parties or governments that are left of center; they try to change the "peripheral" situation, to help the poor, exploited, and oppressed. Fernando Balaunde Terry in Peru, Eduardo Frei in Chile, and Joao Goulart in Brazil are examples of such regimes.

Julio Barreiro, quoting Jacques Chonchol from the United Nations, summarizes the principal factors which are generating the "revolutionary" ideology: (1) Latin American countries are experiencing increased dissatisfaction. (2) The economic regime of a colonial capitalism has been an evident failure. (3) The political system has failed also. (4) Subsequently, there is a loss of faith in the ruling classes, a rising consciousness of the existence of a regime of injustice, and the evident contradiction between the Latin American reality and the kind of education received. (5) Latin America is ceasing to be the "back-yard" of the foreign policy of the United States. The principal characteristics of rising revolutionary ideology are: anticolonialism, anti-imperialism, Marxism in its method of analysis, and centralized government with a unified party. Some examples of this new ideology have been clearly demonstrated in three revolutions: the Mexican revolution of 1910, the Bolivian revolution of 1952, and the Cuban revolution of 1959.


The Cuban revolution is the clearest model of a Marxist and Leninist ideology.

The Latin American people have seen in Cuba a possible alternative not because they are Marxist but because the other ideological alternatives have been ineffective in solving their economic and social problems. The Cuban revolution has demonstrated success, at least in three aspects: medical care, housing, and education.

In summary, all Latin American countries—with the exception of some islands of the Caribbean area—have a common history which began with the Spanish or Portuguese colonies and with a decisive and profound participation of the Catholic church. The struggles for independence brought about a political independence, but with economic dependence and with high demographic growth. The lack of growth in per capita income, national immigrations, the growth of rural areas, the silent presence of a high percentage of Indians, and the high percentage of peasants without lands have created a periphery who compose, according to

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to some sociologists, 75% of all Latin American people. The educational system does not satisfy the needs of the majority of the people, especially those of the rural areas. The ideological context has provided new ways of economic organization, social changes, and political action. Revolution is one of those ideologies which has become more persuasive. Paulo Freire also identifies himself as part of this new ideology. "I am not a liberal educator," he says, "what I attempt to be is a revolutionary educator."

2. THE BRAZILIAN CONTEXT

The Latin American reality is more understandable when we see the global situation of Brazil and find the same factors operating at the national level there. The following points try to show how the historical, socio-economic, educational, and ideological contexts are decisive in the development of Freire's thought.

a). The Historical Context

Brazil is an outgrowth of the former colonies of Portugal. A few year after the Spanish discovered Latin America (1492), Portugal claimed its rights to the lands discovered by its navigators. In the three hundred years of colonization, Portugal succeeded in providing protection for its colonies, especially from French and Dutch incursions. However, like Spain, Portugal did not have much success in organizing its colonies for future development. Portugal's major interest was the exploitation of sugar and gold.

Similar to the rest of Latin America, the religious colonies of Brazil were especially active in the evangelization, catechization,
and moral training of the Indians. Some of them tried to raise the moral level of colonists and to protect Indians against slavery. Catholicism was strengthened when it had to confront other religious tendencies such as the animism and fetishism brought by African slaves, and, of course, indigenous religions. Since the sugar-cane economy depended on the work of African slaves, Brazil was one of the Latin American countries having a strong relationship with Africa, especially with Angola.

One of the effects of the revolutionary and Napoleonic epochs in Europe as well as of the forced refuge of the Portuguese Crown in Río de Janeiro (1808) was that Brazil acquired equal status with the mother country (1816). When the king of Portugal returned to Europe, Brazil acquired its independence easily and without violence (1822). When Pedro I, son of the king of Portugal, was proclaimed emperor, Portugal did not fight to retain Brazil. Unlike the Spanish colonies, the Portuguese colonies acquired their independence as a unit and became the largest country of Latin America.

The collapse of the Brazilian empire was followed by a republican government, but the situation did not change because the "new" politicians were in large part the former monarchists. The national economy was dominated, up to 1930, by the international demand for raw

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50 Brazil is exceeded in size only by the Soviet Union, China, Canada, and the United States. It has an area of 3,286 70 sq. mi.
materials; it was a colonial economy. Most of the fertile soil was in the hands of the big landowners, and production was oriented to monocultivated products (sugar, rubber, or coffee) for the purpose of monoexportation. The economic depression of 1929 had shown that the future of the national economy could not be in the hands of the big landowners.

After fifteen years of the dictatorship of Getulio Vargas (1930-1945), a transition from a colonial to a national economy began. The Second World War made impossible the selling of national products in Europe and, as a result, Brazil was pushed toward production for domestic needs. The participation of Brazil in the Second World War also provided the conditions to receive from the United States not only military help but help for the industrial infrastructure. However, the inflationary process was not slowed down in spite of the ambitious developmental progress of Kubitschek's administration (1956-1961). Interregional highways, hydroelectric power projects, the expansion of iron, steel, petroleum, and coal production, the rapid growing of private industry, and the construction of Brasilia (the new capital city in the midst of the inland plateau) did not contribute to the improvement of the lives of the people. National production rose, but the standard of living of the majority of the people was either stationary or in decline.

The situation created the beginning of an atmosphere of popular expectation of radical changes when Janio Quadros became president (January 31-August 25, 1961). Quadros tried to change Brazil's foreign policy by opening economic relations with the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other socialist countries, but his domestic changes were rejected by the Congress. After Quadro's resignation, Joao Goulart became president (1961-1964); he tried to change the national economy by promoting agrarian reform, nationalizing oil refineries, and pushing for adequate education. His educational emphasis began with a strong campaign for literacy in which Freire participated. Joao Goulart was accused of surrounding himself with extremist advisors and permitting communist penetration. As a result, Goulart was removed from office by military intervention.

b) The Socio-economic Context

Brazil is a very good example of high demographic growth. In 1960, it had 70.1 million people compared with 51.9 million in 1950, a 35% rate of growth, or 3% per year. Thus, in 1960, Brazil could be called a young nation in terms of population: more than 50% of the people were under 20 years of age and only 10% were more than 50 years old.

Brazil is also an example of economic development with internal

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contradictions. There are two societies in Brazil: the archaic society and the new society. The archaic is composed of people who live under a colonial situation managed by an oligarchy which looks out for its own interest. For instance, 70% of the peasants of Brazil are living in subsistent conditions without even a semblance of a dignified life. According to Josué de Castro, in the Northeast 81% of all families cannot buy the milk necessary for adequate nutrition. The new society has been built upon the archaic one. Brazilian development has not been a development of all the people. Technological development is not the result of the growth of production of the Brazilian people but the result of importation. There is a high level of industry, but at the same time there are feudal conditions of agricultural production. There is an auto industry, a beautiful and modern capital (Brasilia), and a project to build the atomic bomb. But at the same time are many similarities to other Latin American countries in terms of hunger, malnutrition, poor housing, illness, poverty and inadequate education.

After the failures of Quadros and Goulart, economic help from the

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54
Cf. Luis E. Odell, p. 83.

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Cf. Quotation, Julio de Santa Ana, p. 28.

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United States was provided in the context of an agreement between U. S. corporations and the Brazilian bourgeoisie, mediated by their governments. The impulse to develop the Brazilian economy satisfied international demands instead of meeting the internal needs of majority of the people.

Brazil had also had an accelerated process of internal immigration. There are four states which have exerted a powerful attraction upon the other 22 states and federal territories. Those four states have suffered the subsequent problems of great concentrations of people immigrating, especially into the urban areas. In 1950, Sao Paulo had 2,198,000 people and in 1960 it had 3,674,000. In 1950, Rio de Janeiro had 2,377,000, and in 1960 it had 3,220,000 people. There were also two principal places from which the departure of people was more frequent the Northeast states and Rio Grande do Sul.

The economy of the Northeast region, which is our special interest because Freire is from that area, is fundamentally agrarian. Socioeconomic conditions make it impossible to overcome the long dry weather suffered each year; problems abound such as low level production, high level economic necessity, poor technology, monocultivated production (sugar-cane or cotton), a bad system of transporting products, high costs, poor medical care, and lack of educational opporr-

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Cf. Julio de Santa Ana, p. 32.
In a way similar to other countries in Latin America, Brazil has the problem of distribution of lands. For instance, in Pernambuco (Garanhuns), 1.34% of the landowners own 31% of the fertile soil, and in Para (Santarem) 0.2% own 59.4% of such lands. The disparity in distribution of land has created a latifundium with its consequent problems. According to Luis Odell, only 2% of the national land is cultivated.

There are two Brazils: the developed Brazil of the "center", with its high technology which satisfies the demands of the international "center," and the archaic Brazil of the "periphery," which comprises the majority of the people. One name masks an internal contradiction.

c) The Educational Context

During the three hundred years of the colonization of Brazil, Portugal had prohibited schools, publication of newspapers, circulation of books, formation of associations, discussion of ideas, libraries, factories, political organizations, and any other forms of cultural movement or production. During these years, Brazil was "outside the process of civilization": production which was not agrarian was

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59
Cf. Waldo Cesar, pp. 32-34.

60
Cf. Ibid., p. 31.

61
Cf. Luis E. Odell, p. 87.
deliberately forbidden; so, too, was the education of the "mestizo." The "aulas regias" of Pombal reinforced colonial control. Seventeen seminaries were established to educate priests who were working for the Christianization of Indians. This added element greatly lessened the violent process of colonization.

The Portuguese King Joao VI (1808) founded two military schools, one school of fine arts, and two schools of surgery. As a result of these foundations, Brazil had upper level and professional schools without having primary and secondary schools. Dom Pedro I, the first king of the independent Brazil, founded the Faculty of Law in Sao Paulo and another in Olinda, but he was not interested in creating schools in towns and hamlets. Dom Pedro II created the first secondary schools. Between 1840 and 1889 elementary studies began in many cities and towns, and many states founded lyceums and normal schools.

National coordination of education took place when the Ministry of Education was founded in 1930. According to some historians of education, the royal empire and the "old republic" (1908-1930) only functioned as the modernization of the old colony. Up to 1930, Brazil was a vast archipelago of farms primarily raising cattle or growing coffee, both being managed by a "colonel" with his "cabras," i.e., his

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62 The "mestizo" is half-breed. The "aulas regias" were the "royal classrooms" founded by the Marquis of Pombal.
personal army. With the Reformation of Francisco Campos (1931), Brazil instituted the structuralization and systematization of national education beginning in the elementary grades and continuing to university studies.

However, in addition to other problems of formal education —centralization, decentralization, diversification, high percentage of drop-outs,— the major problem of Brazil seems to be the high percentage of illiteracy. According to statistics quoted by Emilio Monti, in 1970, illiteracy among peasants 15 or more years old was 33.8% and in 1973, the percentage of illiteracy among peasants over 15 years old was 41.7% of the population. Given the high percentage of drop-outs in the first years of school, it is not an exaggeration to say, as Julio de Santa Ana did in 1964, that in the years of the nineteen sixties 50% of the Brazilian population was illiterate. This problem was especially great in the rural areas. For instance, in the Northeast region in 1950, of 10.3 million people who were over 5 years old, 7.7% million were categorized as illiterate. This represented 75% of the population.

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64 Cf. Emilio N. Monti, p. 50.

65 Cf. Julio de Santa Ana, p. 29.

66 Cf. Waldo Cesar, p. 34.
d) The Ideological Context

The Latin American ideologies discussed above have been shown to be present in Brazil: conservatism (the ideology of the landowners), liberalism, and its later expressions: authoritarianism and reformism. Conservatism dominated as Brazil's ideology up to the revolution of 1930.

One example of an authoritarian was Getulio Vargas, president of Brazil during the period from 1930 to 1945. He proclaimed his government an "authoritarian democracy." Inspired by European Fascism, Vargas made possible the transition from a semicolonial status to nationhood. His authoritarian paternalism represented the nationalistic populism of the revolution of 1930. Vargas had popular support, promoted nationalism, education, strong bureaucracy, strong dictatorship, and national development without changing the social structure. His government developed extensive social legislation, principally in the realm of labor, such as eight-hour work days, six-day work weeks, and minimum salary. 67

An example of a reformist was Joao Goulart, president of Brazil between 1961 and 1964. He maintained the foreign policy of former president Quadros, a policy of economic relations with the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other socialist countries. He also tried to maintain economic relations with the United States, and this effort made it possible for him to visit the United States in April, 1962. Popular expectations, the revolt of the peasants which took place in the Northeast under

67 Cf. Jorrín and Martz, pp. 239-249.
the leadership of Francisco Juliao, the strike of the General Workers Union (September, 1962), and other factors pushed the President to make more radical changes. These changes included the nationalization of foreign investments, the proclamation of "authentically national" agrarian reform, increased government participation in education, broadening of electrification and telecommunications, and the nationalization of the petroleum industry. Accusations of extremism and communist orientation frustrated this attempt for structural change through institutional ways. \(^{68}\) Joao Goulart headed a reformist government inspired by a liberal ideology. The last part of his government was characterized by more revolutionary decisions. The military intervention of April, 1964, was clearly an opposition to social change on a structural level. The new government, in the hands of the generals, was to serve the national oligarchy.

There are other ideological tendencies which have had importance in the life of Brazil: Spiritism, a kind of primitive and magical cult, came to Brazil through the old beliefs of African slaves. Fascism exalted the will to power and the will of the state. During recent decades, however, a new ideology was been growing through the influence

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of Marxism.

In summary, the primitive world of the forest, the medieval economy in the rural areas, and the advanced industry in the urban areas have revealed a new reality which philosophers never saw before. As Joaõ Cruz Costa says:

The anxiety which today possesses Brazil's intelligentsia --which will not be resolved simply by the solutions of an imported anguish or the juggling tricks of a neophilosophism-- will find its salvation only if we have eyes to see, ears to hear, and, above all, the wisdom to taken action.71

Sociologists like Celso Furtado have helped people to see their own reality. The theological interpretation of that reality given by people such as Helder Camara (Bishop of Recife), Hugo Assman, and Rubem Alvez, and the philosophical interpretation of people such as Freire and Pierre Furter have demonstrated a critical attitude toward European and North American solutions. The historical, socio-economic, educational, and ideological context show us an internal contradiction which Paulo Freire will analyze from a new perspective, the Latin American perspective.


3. PAULO FREIRE, HIS LIFE AND WORKS

Paulo Regulus was born in Recife, September 19, 1921. Recife is the capital city of Pernambuco state, one of the chief parts of northeast Brazil.

That Northeast is famous as one of the world's most poverty-stricken areas, scorched by recurrent droughts that, combined with the unbelievable maldistribution of land, have made it an ideal place for studying the geography of hunger.72

His father was Joaquín Temístocles Freire, a military police officer, a spiritist, and a "good, intelligent man, with great capacity to love." He "died long ago, but he leaves me indelible impressions." His mother was Edeltrudis Neves Freire, a "Catholic, a sweet, good, and just" woman, who "actually loves and suffers, but who trusts unceasingly in God and His goodness." Freire talks gently and lovingly about both of them. They were to him examples of love, of using dialogue, and of showing respect for the choices of other people.

With them I learned that dialogue which I have tried to maintain with the world, people, God, my wife, and my children. The


74 "Católica, dulce, buena, justa...," "Ella vive y sufre, confía sin cesar en Dios y en su bondad." Paulo Freire, "Yo, Paulo Freire," Ibid.
respect of my father for the religious beliefs of my mother taught me, from my infancy, to respect the options of other people.75

When he was eight years old, his family suffered the consequences of economic depression. At age ten his family moved to Jaboatao, looking for a better life (April, 1931). In Jaboatao Freire experienced hunger, and at this time he began to understand the hunger of others. "I was a middle class child," he says, "who suffered the impact of the 1929 crisis and who knew hunger... I know what it is like not to eat, not only qualitatively but quantitatively,"76 As Jeréz and Hernández-Pico say:

His father kept up the appearance of solvency: he never gave up wearing a tie, and he held on to the family house, although it was almost empty. Freire admits that only his father's stubbornness made it possible to continue with his education. In those hard years, though, he fell behind his schoolmasters' performance and labored under what his teachers interpreted as mild mental retardation.77

His father died in Jaboatao and Freire finished his primary school two years later than expected. He also had difficulties getting admitted to secondary school. When the family's financial situation improved, he

75 "Con ellos aprendí ese diálogo que he tratado de mantener con el mundo, con los hombres, con Dios, con mi mujer, con mis hijos. El respeto de mi padre por las creencias religiosas de mi madre me enseñó desde la infancia a respetar las opciones de los demás." Paulo Freire, "Yo, Paulo Freire," Ibid.


77 Jeréz and Hernández–Pico, p. 29.
completed his school and was admitted to the Faculty of Law at the University of Recife. He confesses that in law he was a "mediocre student." However, while studying law, he was also reading some Portuguese and Brazilian grammarians, some basic works of Brazilian literature, and some writers of other countries. When he was twenty years old, he began to study philosophy and psychology of language. Later, in order to help support his family, he became an instructor of Portuguese in a secondary school.

Paulo was disillusioned by the church. He found inconsistency between that which was preached and that which was lived in real life. Thus, he withdrew from the church for a year, "but not from God," he says. His absence gave great pain to his mother. Paulo returned when he began his readings of Tristao de Athayde, one of the neo-scholastic philosophers of Brazil. He also was reading some French neo-scholastic such as the novelist Georges Bernanos, and the philosophers, Jacques Maritain and Emmanuel Mounier.

When he was 23 years old (1944), he married Elsa Maria Costa Oliveira, a grade school teacher, later principal of schools. She was a devoted Catholic. Paulo and Elsa have three daughters (Magdalena, Cristina, and Fatima) and two sons (Joaquim and Lutgardes). Talking about his wife, Paulo says:

I owe much to Elsa... Her courage, her comprehension, her capacity to love, her interest in all that I do, her help which she never

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has refused and for which I do not even need to ask, have supported me in many problematic situations. It was precisely from the beginning of my marriage that I began to be interested, in a systematic way, in the problems of education.79

In relation to the development of Freire's work in education, I have found three important factors: the Brazilian experience, the Chilean experience, and the international experience.

a) The Brazilian Experience

When Freire received his Licenciatura in Law (his master's), and even in his early years as labor union lawyer, he was more interested in education, philosophy, and the sociology of education than in law. According to his own confession, his first legal case was enough to show him that the law was not his profession. He was more comfortable organizing adult education seminars for the slum workers of the unions.

Freire preferred to work in the Social Service Department of his University. Later, he was appointed director of the Educational and Cultural Department of SESI (Social Service) of the State of Pernambuco. From 1946 to 1954 he worked as Superintendent of SESI. That work gave him the opportunity to be with the dispossessed, to be involved in adult education, to lead seminars, and to teach courses in history and philosophy of education at the University of Recife.

79 "Debo mucho a Elsa... Su valor, su comprensión, su capacidad de amar, su interés por lo que hago, la ayuda que jamás me ha rehusado y que ni siquiera tengo necesidad de pedir, me han sostenido siempre en las situaciones mas problemáticas. Fue precisamente a partir de mi matrimonio cuando empecé a interesarme de una manera sistemática por los problemas de la educación." Paulo Freire, "Yo Paulo Freire," p. 211.

80 Jerez and Hernández-Pico, p. 29.
Between 1946 and 1961 Freire performed experiments in educational methods. In 1947, he began to implement his method of teaching adult peasants to read and write. At that time, he identified two basic problems in traditional education, especially in elementary and secondary studies: first, traditional education usually manipulated students and, second, traditional education usually "domesticated" rather than gave freedom to human beings. Traditional methods did not work, and they were inefficient. In spite of these discoveries, Paulo considers this time as his "assistencial" practice of education. When his experiments became famous, the University of Recife gave him an honoris causa degree of Doctor in Philosophy (1959).

In the decade of the sixties, Brazilians lived in a climate of political ferment. When President Quadros began his administration (January, 1961), political organizations were looking for solutions to national problems. In 1960, socialists, communists, and populists, confronted a nation of 34.5 million people, of whom only 15.5 million were able to vote. A high percentage of people in the electorate could not vote because they were illiterate. It was no surprise that a few

81
Myra Bergman Ramos explains: "Assistencialism: a term used in Latin America to describe policies of financial or social assistance which attack symptoms, but not causes, of social ills." Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, p. 15, fn. 14.

82
Jeréz and Hernández-Pico, p. 30

83
Ibid.
months later, Joao Goulart, sucessor of Quadros, was interested in the peasants' leagues, radical economic solutions, assistance programs, a literacy campaign, and other efforts to improve the political participation of all Brazilians. That was the reason the economist Celso Furtado was appointed by SUDENE (a government agency) to improve the Northeast region. That was also the reason Francisco Juliao was organizing and extending his peasant leagues. It was in this context that many popular movements made up of students, labor leaders, Christian activists, and workers began to awaken.

The Popular Culture Movement of Recife was founded by Freire and others in 1961. Freire's method owes its birth to the effort made by this movement for educational and political change. His organized work began when Freire was Director of Cultural Extension of the University of Recife. According to Francisco C. Weffort, the Northeast states were inhabited by 25 million people, and 15 million of them were illiterate. He says that Freire's method made it possible to teach 300 peasants to read in only 45 days. In 1962, thousands of peasants learned to read and write in a surprisingly short time.

Given this success, the Minister of Education of the Goulart government adopted the method of Freire as the method for the whole


85 Ibid., p. 11.
nation. From 1963 to March 1964, Freire's teams worked throughout the nation organizing seminars and training leaders. According to Wefort, the training of "coordinators" of "circles of culture" went on in almost all the capitals of the states. For instance, in the state of Guanabara 6,000 leaders were registered.

The plans during 1964 anticipated establishing 20,000 circles which would have made it possible to teach about 2 million illiterates during a year (30 in each circle, with a duration of 3 months in each course).86

The illiterate peasants lived, especially in the Northeast states of Brazil, to serve the interests of the dominant minority of the landowners. At the same time, they were marginalized in relation to the economic, social, cultural, and political life of the nation. However, the literacy campaign had raised expectations in different ways. The government expected an increase in the number of voters, such an expectation is a characteristic of a populist government like that of President Goulart. For instance, in Sergipe State, the government expected between 80,000 and 90,000 new voters. In Pernambuco between 87 800,00 to 1,300,000 new voters were expected. Freire's teams expected not only to teach people how to read and write but also how to

86 "O plano de 1964 previa a instalação de 20,000 círculos que ja se encontravam capacitados para atender, durante este ano, a aproximadamente 2 milhões de alfabetizados (30 por círculo, com duração de 3 meses cada curso)." Ibid.

87 Ibid, p. 20.
The educational practice of Freire was not only a technique in education but also a technique based upon a process of "concientização" (conscientization), which is consciousness-raising through the process of action-reflection mediated by one's own reality. Illiterate peasants expected to participate freely in decision-making in order to solve their problems, especially those problems which affected them directly. The traditional passivity and fatalism of peasants were disappearing, and "consciousness-raising" was pushing them toward political participation. The powerful landowners, and the military forces with them, expected the end of a system which gave them privileges. As such, they saw a dangerous politicization. The method of Freire increased dissatisfaction and the possibility of insurrection. Attendance of peasants in circles of culture every night for six or eight weeks increasingly vexed the big landowners; they were fearful of losing their power, prestige, and economic privileges.

In April 1964, President Goulart was overthrown. The military people of the coup d'etat stopped all economic and social reforms of the administration of President Goulart, including adult education and the so-called popular culture. Their repression was so irrational that they destroyed 20,000 film projectors donated by the Czech government for the literacy campaign.

89 Jeréz and Hernández-Pico, p. 30.
Freire and many of his co-workers were thrown into jail, accused of "subversion of the democratic order." Freire was questioned intensively; after 70 days, he was released and told to leave the country. Freire looked for refuge at the Bolivian embassy (September, 1964) and escaped to Bolivia and later to Chile. In relation to the questioning to which he was submitted, he says:

They (the judges) wanted to prove, in addition to my "absolute ignorance..." the danger which I represented. They considered me an "international subverter," a "traitor of Christ and of Brazilian people." "Do you deny -- asked one of the judges -- that your method is like the method of Stalin, Hitler, Peron, and Mussolini? Do you deny that by means of the so-called method you want to make Bolshevists of all of the country?" 91

In these days of imprisonment, Freire began to write his first book, Educação como Prática da liberdade (Education as the Practice of Freedom) which was completed in exile. In this book, Freire summarizes the educational situation, the method, and philosophy which he applied in Brazil.

b) The Chilean Experience

Paulo Freire arrived in Chile with his wife and children while Eduardo Frei Montalva was president (1964-1970). Chilean history,

90 Ibid.

91 "Lo que se que quería probar, además de mi "ignorancia absoluta"... era el peligro que yo representaba. Se me consideró como un "subversivo internacional", un "traidor de Cristo y del pueblo brasileñio". ¿Niega usted –me preguntaba uno de los jueces– que su método es semejante al de Stalin, Hitler, Perón y Mussolini? ¿Niega usted que con su pretendido método lo que quiere es hacer bolchevique al país?" Paulo Freire, "Yo Paulo Freire," p. 22.
society, economic stratification, educational conditions, and the ideological and political situations were different from Brazil's in many ways; however, they were parallel to the historical, social, educational, ideological, and political situations of the rest of the countries of Latin America. Chile and Brazil had similar problems with similar characteristics.

Eduardo Frei had become president with the support of the Christian Democratic Party under the slogan "Revolution in Freedom." Frei tried to make important reforms such as the "Chileanization" of copper mines; he also made agrarian and banking reforms. He was interested in solving problems of housing, labor, education, and cultural development. For instance, the new law of agrarian reform (approved in 1967) enabled the government to expropriate uncultivated lands, to limit the amount of land which could be conserved by each owner, and to organize peasants in cooperatives.

Literacy was added to government programs to improve the standard of living of the masses of peasants and of the people in the slums of the urban areas. President Frei wanted the participation of these people in solving problems arising from "jobs, local and regional life, the necessities of the family, the culture of the common people (la cultura de base), and the economic-social organization." The government

created a Planning Office for Adult Education (1965) led by Waldemar Cortés.

Cortés thought that the materials for adult education needed to be reviewed. Up to this point, Cortés had not heard of Freire. Cortés was informed that the renowned Freire had come to Chile. Upon meeting Freire, he discovered in Freire's work precisely what he needed. However, the first problem was to persuade people to accept a method which was considered subversive in Brazil. Once the method was accepted, it was applied through institutions which were working in close relationship with rural areas which had a high rate of illiteracy. The Planning Office worked only in the development of pedagogical material and training of coordinators.

Chile was, in two years, one of the five nations of the world which had best succeeded in overcoming illiteracy. In 1968 there were about 100,000 students and 2,000 "coordinators." The expectation was to reduce illiteracy to a 5% level within 6 years. Meanwhile, Freire was working as a consultant to UNESCO's Institute of Research and Training in Agrarian Reform (ICIRA) and also as a professor at the University of Chile, up to 1969.

Three important works were published during this time: Sobre la Acción Cultural, Extensión o Comunicación? and Pedagogía del Oprimido. Sobre la Acción Cultural discusses how to make change by humanizing agrarian reform. Extensión o Comunicación? La Concientización en el Medio Rural makes a semantic analysis of the two words extension and communication. The business of the agronomist educator is not "cul-
tural invasion" but the bringing about of communication through an authentic dialogue. In these years, he also published his controversial book *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, perhaps his most philosophical and rigorous work. He discusses the principles of pedagogy from the perspective of the oppressed and demonstrates how this pedagogy can be the education of people who are walking in the way of freedom.

c) The International Experience

In 1969, Freire was invited by Harvard University to be a Fellow of the Center for the Study of Development and Social Change and to be a Visiting Professor at Harvard's Center for Studies in Education and Development. With the invitation of Harvard, Freire not only left Latin America but became a world figure in education. His experience in the United States (1969-1970) not only provided him contact with a new culture, but the opportunity to confirm his theory of education. The "culture of silence," which in Latin America was generally a peasant culture, was also present in the sub-cultures of the first world.

After his work at Harvard University, Freire moved to Geneva to serve as Special Educational Consultant of the World Council of Churches (1970-1980). In Geneva, Freire had a world platform where he could dialogue with the whole world and promote his ideas through a wider medium. He traveled all over the world assisting nations and churches with their educational programs. For instance, he has been invited by Tanzania and Guinea-Bissau in Africa and by Nicaragua and Costa Rica in Latin America.

The apparent opening up of the government of Brazil caused Freire
to think of the possibility of returning to his own country. Returning to Brazil had always been a dream which he maintained during his years in exile. Thus Freire returned to his country --in Summer, 1980-- sixteen years after his expulsion. A new chapter in his life has begun at age 60.

This world experience gave him the opportunity to write two important works: Cultural Action for Freedom and Cartas à Guiné-Bissau. During his residency in the United States, he wrote two important articles published in a volume called Cultural Action for Freedom. This volume is perhaps the first summary of his educational theories. Taking as a point of reference the "culture of silence," he discusses themes such as alienation, domination, and oppression. Cartas à Guiné-Bissau, Registros de uma Experiência em Processo is an explanation of the process of education in Guinea-Bissau under the advice of Freire. It includes also a collection of pedagogical letters related to this process.

His work consists not only of his published books but also includes many articles written to explain different aspects of his method of his principles. He also has written articles to discuss specific experiences. Many of his publications are interviews or dialogues transcribed from recording tapes, and mimeographed materials duplicated for specific purposes. There are collections of articles or parts of articles published as books under his name. For instance, El Mensaje de Paulo Freire, Teoría y Práctica de la Liberación, published in Spain by INODEP, has also been published in Colombia under another title: Concientización, Teoría y Práctica de la Liberación. This book
is a collection of 14 articles, some of which are by Freire. There are also journals which have published his articles such as Cristianismo y Sociedad (Special Supplement), and Fichas Latinoamericanas, n. 4. Some of his articles are not easily found because they are only mimeographed editions with limited distribution, or because publication of his works has been prohibited in some places.

Attempts to classify Freire in a particular school of thought have only demonstrated how diverse, varied, and important are the influences of others upon him. Many of his insights have come from these philosophical, psychological, sociological, educational, and theological influences. His rich experience in the Third World Countries (Asia, Africa, and Latin America), as well as at the universal level, makes it difficult to have a global picture of Freire's thought. Talking about the experience of reading Freire's works, Fausto Franco says: "in all places we listen to known sounds, but at the same time, we experience vividly the harmony as a whole which becomes new." 93

Some influences are evident such as influence from Christian principles, especially through those philosophers who are personalists (Tristao de Athayde, Maritain, Bernanos, and Mounier); influence from German idealists, especially from Hegel, influence from existentialists,

93 "Por todas partes se escuchan sonidos conocidos, pero al mismo tiempo se experimenta vivamente que la armonía de conjunto resulta nueva." Fausto Franco, p. 20.
especially from Sartre, Jaspers, Marcel, Heidegger, Camus, and Buber; influence from humanists, especially from Marcuse and Fromm; influence from Marxists, especially from Marx, Engels, and Mao.

Denis Collins, trying to explain the coincidence of different branches of philosophy in Freire, some of which seem contradictory, says:

His thinking flows from his life experiences and is eclectic, a synthesis of many strains of thought which do indeed lead him to the conclusion that education must lead to political liberation. Because of his syncretism he has been called an idealist, a communist, a "theologian in disguise," a phenomenologist, and an existentialist.94

If eclecticism means "to borrow doctrines from different sources," to "attempt to retain them side by side," "without possessing a fundamental or unitary system,"95 then Freire is not an eclectic thinker. Freire is not a neo-scholastic, an idealist, an existentialist, or a Marxist, but neither is he an eclectic. In other words, Freire is not an European philosopher living in Latin America as many Latin American philosophers have been.

Latin America has had philosophers of the "center" and philosophers of the "periphery." Philosophers of the "center" have received, transmitted, and adapted European and North American philosophy. In other words, Latin American philosophy has usually been the recipient


of the philosophical production of the intellectual centers such as England, France, Germany, Spain, or the United States. So we have had scholastics and neo-scholastics in Brazil and other parts of Latin America. We have had neo-scholastics such as Tristao de Athayde and Leonel França in Brazil and Octavio N. Diosio and Osvaldo Robles in other parts of Latin America. We have had positivists such as Luis Pereira Barreto and Miguel Lemos in Brazil, and Enrique Jose Varna, Gabino Barreda, Justo Sierra, and Jose Ingenieros in other parts of Latin America. We have had Kantians such as Tobías Barreto and


98 Cf. Jorge J. E. García, pp. 42,43.

99 Cf. Guillermo Francovich, pp. 37-55 and 147-150. Also Joao Cruz Costa, pp. 82-175.

Raimundo Farias Brito in Brazil, and Samuel Ramos, Eduardo García Mayney, Francisco Romero, Risiery Frondizi, Francisco Miro Quesada and Augusto Salazar Bondy in other parts of Latin America.

The second kind of philosophers receive European and North American philosophy with a critical attitude. Their point of reference is, at the national level, the distinction between thinking as part of the oppressor classes (the national center) and thinking as a part of the oppressed people (the national periphery). At the international level, the starting point is the distinction between thinking as part of the great empires (the center) and thinking as part of the colonies (the peripheries of those empires). These philosophers refuse to create philosophy which has no relation to the Latin American reality and which does not respond to Latin American needs.

Freire has committed his life and thought to the colonized and the oppressed. He can be numbered among the most important Latin American philosophers along with Leopoldo Zea in Mexico, Enrique Dussel in Argentina, Arturo Ardao in Uruguay, Jose Antonio Portuondo in Cuba, and Pierre Furter in Brazil. When Freire says "I am not a liberal educator; what I attempt to be is a revolutionary educator," he is also saying...


that he is not an European philosopher but a Latin American educator. Freire is a revolutionary educator, a revolutionary philosopher of education, because his starting-point is not the "center," as all philosophy has been up today; rather, it is the "periphery" (his terminus a quo). He is a revolutionary because his point of arrival is not an abstraction which directly or indirectly supports, helps, dissimulates or simply remains silent about the domination by the center. His terminus ad quem is freedom. Freire has recognized the contribution of European and North American philosophy; however, he has assumed a critical attitude toward it because the most important work is to philosophize from his perspective as a participant in the Latin American reality. When he has been accused of lacking originality, he has responded, quoting John Dewey: "Only silly folk identify creative originality with the extraordinary and fanciful; others recognize that its measure lies in putting everyday things to uses which had not occurred to others." What is this new use of everyday things which has not occurred to others? What is Freire's philosophy and his concept of freedom? These will be the questions answered in the second part of this dissertation.

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PART TWO

PAULO FREIRE'S THOUGHT

From the perspective of my method, the following three chapters are parts of one unit: Freire's thought as a whole. This unit is the via ad of the whole work, i.e., the analysis of Freire's work as a way to understand his concept of Freedom. The first part is "Freire's Philosophical Thought" (Chapter III), the terminus a quo of the analyses of Freire's thought. The second part is "Freire's Philosophy of Education" (Chapter IV), the dialectical relationship between Freire's philosophy and freedom. This is the via ad of the analysis of Freire's thought. The third part is "Freedom and Liberation" (Chapter V), the terminus ad quem of the analysis of Freire's thought. The same method is used in the analysis of the main divisions of each chapter. The following schema will help the reader understand the analysis of Freire's thought.

Chapter III - "Freire's Philosophical Thought," the terminus a quo of all my analysis of Freire's thought.

1.- The social Weltanschauung, the terminus a quo of Freire's philosophical thought.

a) The closed society, the terminus a quo of Freire's social theory.

b) The society in transition, the via ad of Freire's social theory.

c) The open society, the terminus ad quem of Freire's social
theory.

2. - The philosophy of praxis, the _via ad_ of Freire's philosophical thought.

a) The contradiction of oppressor-oppressed, the _terminus a quo_ of Freire's philosophy of praxis.

b) Praxis, the dialectical method, the _via ad_ of Freire's philosophy of praxis.

c) The overcoming of the contradiction, the _terminus ad quem_ of Freire's philosophy of praxis.

3. - The anthropology, the _terminus ad quem_ of Freire's philosophical thought.

a) Anthropology as a keystone, the _terminus a quo_ of Freire's anthropology.

b) Anthropology as a reconceptualization, the dialectical method the _via ad_ of Freire's anthropology.

c) Human freedom as the highest anthropological realization, the _terminus ad quem_ of Freire's anthropology.

Chapter IV - "Freire's Philosophy of Education," the _via ad_ of all my analysis of Freire's thought.

1. - The anthropological foundations, the _terminus a quo_ of Freire's philosophy of education.

a) The cultural contradiction, the _terminus a quo_ of the anthropological foundations.

b) Conscientization, the dialectical method, the _via ad_ of the anthropological foundations.

c) The overcoming of the cultural contradiction, the
terminus ad quem of the anthropological foundations.

2.- The reconceptualization of education, the via ad of the Freire's philosophy of education.

a) The "banking" concept of education, the terminus a quo of the reconceptualization of education.

b) The dialogue, the dialectical method, the via ad of the reconceptualization of education.

c) The "problem-posing" concept of education, the terminus ad quem of the reconceptualization of education.

3.- The education for freedom, the terminus ad quem of Freire's philosophy of education.

a) The "pedagogy of the oppressed," the terminus a quo of the education of freedom.

b) Knowledge, the dialectical method, the via ad of the education of freedom.

c) The pedagogy of the free people, the terminus ad quem of the education for freedom.

Chapter V - "Freedom and Liberation," the terminus ad quem of all my analysis of Freire's thought.

1.- Freedom and Limitations, the terminus a quo of the concept of freedom.

a) The social limitation, the terminus a quo of the problem of freedom and its limitations.

b) The cultural limitations, the via ad of the problem of freedom and its limitations.

c) The educational limitations, the terminus ad quem of the
problem of freedom and its limitations.

2.- Liberation, the dialectical method, the *via ad* of the concept of freedom.
   a) Liberation, a revolutionary process, the *terminus a quo* of liberation as dialectical method of freedom.
   b) Liberation, a praxiological method, the *via ad* of liberation as dialectical method of freedom.
   c) Liberation, a struggle for humanization, the *terminus ad quem* of liberation as dialectical method of freedom.

3.- Freedom, the permanent search, the *terminus ad quem* of the concept of freedom.
   a) Freedom, a revolutionary concept, the *terminus a quo* of freedom as a permanent search.
   b) Freedom, a dynamic concept, the *via ad* of freedom as a permanent search.
   c) Freedom, a political concept, the *terminus ad quem* of freedom as a permanent search.
To be human is to engage in relationships with others and with the world. It is to experience that world as an objective reality, independent of oneself, capable of being known. Freire.1

Given the importance of the Brazilian experience in Freire's thought and his criteria to differentiate societies, I will try to explain how this philosophical thought was born from his understanding of his own social world. When he writes about his educational experience, he does not explain only his theory and method; he starts by analyzing his social reality. His philosophical principles and his philosophy of education always begin with this reality, i.e., the terminus a quo of Freire's philosophical thought.

Freire's purpose is not to write a philosophical system; however, his philosophy of education suggests a clear philosophical framework. My intention is not to develop such framework. What I want to do is to point out the first principles which are explicit in his works. As we shall see, his comprehension of the nature of social reality and of the human being is mediated by a universal, unitive and rational mode of thinking, the via ad of Freire's philosophical thought.

1 Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, p.3.
Whatever would be the explanation of the philosophical first principles and the world—the social reality in the case of Freire—they do not only make room for human beings but generate an anthropology. Freire is explicit in his conceptualization of "human being" and his clarification of the place of man in his world. The concept of free human beings is the terminus ad quem of Freire's philosophical thought and the keystone of his philosophy of education.

Thus, the present chapter will have three major points: the social world-view of Freire's reality (the terminus a quo of Freire's philosophical thought), the philosophical principles (the via ad), and the anthropological principles (the terminus ad quem of Freire's philosophical thought).

1. THE SOCIAL WELTANSCHAUUNG

Freire's thought is not understandable without a knowledge of his social reality. My second chapter tried to explain the Latin American and Brazilian reality. However, his thought also is difficult to grasp without an understanding of the process of Freire's thinking about his own reality. The first affirmation here is, as Maria Fiori says, that "Paulo Freire is a thinker committed to life; he does not think ideas, what he thinks is existence." In order to comprehend his thought, it is essential to take into account that Freire thinks about

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the historical process of his own society and his experience in this process.

Freire's social world includes his whole nation and specifically the reality of Recife, the capital city of his state, and the rural areas of the Northeast region of the state of Pernambuco. Likewise, his invitations from around the world, as an educational consultant, have also demonstrated Freire's consciousness of the differences regarding social reality. From his point of view, it is of paramount importance to learn about the immediate context before suggesting a philosophy and becoming an educator of a specific group of people.

The world-view of Freire (Weltanschauung) is the social universe, the order (cosmos) of human relations. But, what is his understanding of his own concrete world in Brazil? On the basis of his analysis of the Brazilian society and history, he differentiates three kinds of societies: the "closed," the "transitional," and the "open" society. The closed society is the social terminus a quo, the transitional society is the social via ad, and the open society is the social terminus ad quem.  

b) The Closed Society

For Freire, the Brazilian closed society was the "colonial

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Paulo Freire, Cambio (Bogotá: Editorial América Latina, 1970) p. 67. The social theory of Freire is explained in four of his most important works: Educação como Prática da Liberdade, Pedagogía do Oprimido, Cambio, and Education for Liberation.
slavocratic," "reflex," and "antidemocratic society." This society is illustrated by the three hundred years of colonial history of Brazil and Latin America.

The colonial economy of Brazil was based on a commercial enterprise where the colonizer never came to cultivate or industrialize the colony but to be the dominator, to be "over" the people, and to exploit them. The colonizers came to make themselves rich. Brazil was left to the "gluttonous incursions of adventurers." Brazilians were living in fear under Portuguese rule. Other countries of Latin America during the years of colonization had similar experiences. These closed societies grew, existed, and developed outside the center of decision-making. They were a "reflex" of another economy and another culture. They were objects and not subjects.

The social organization of the colony in Brazil was built upon the rights of the large landowners to oppress workers and slaves who came from Africa. Landowners were proprietors of big "fazendas" (plantations) and "engenhos" (sugar mills). They possessed immense tracts of lands. They also possessed people who lived or worked on their land. Inhabitants and workers had no other alternative than to be proteges of their masters because they needed protection from the sporadic incursions of Indians, the raids of the other masters, or the

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5 Ibid., p. 22.
violence of the tropics. That which the colonial "epoch" witnessed was people who dominated or were dominated, who oppressed or were oppressed, who protected or were protected. People lived in a system of oppression, dependence, and marginalization with a mentality of oppression which embodied both extremes: masters and slaves, oppressors and oppressed. It was a feudal system.

In other words, the colonial economy depended on an external economy, i.e., the "international" market. It was not a national economy because the economy did not respond to the national interests. Brazil was a country which produced raw materials to satisfy external demands. Portuguese colonizers imposed a life without the press, foreign relations, schools, and other means of communication. The colonizers restricted communication among people drastically; that is, they restricted external relations as well as relations among provinces. The international market and internal production were controlled by the oppressor. Law and decrees favored the masters; the system generated despotism, stimulated a masochistic desire to submit to others, and created a climate of ambition to be all-powerful.

Brazil had not had the opportunity to achieve a democratic experience from the early years of its history. There could be no real democracy when the center of authority was in the hands of landowners, governors, captains, viceroys, and the Portuguese crown. The center was located in external authority, and the Brazilian people did not have the opportunity to form a communitarian life and participate in solving common problems. The sporadic solidarity of workers with
their own masters was merely apparent. For instance, the creation of cities was imposed, the municipal councils and senate provided opportunity to the privileged classes: the sugar aristocracy, the powerful landowners, the highborn, and wholesaler. Ordinary people were forgotten. They had no rights, they could not participate in the political, social, and economic life of the nation, except as the oppressed. They were abandoned left to their work and isolated from the rest of the world, living in obedience far from the center of power, working other people's lands, and being unable to communicate with others. This situation generated an uncritical consciousness and a rigid and authoritarian mentality.

Brazil had not had an opportunity for a democratic experience when the Portuguese crown arrived at Rio de Janeiro (1808) or even when Brazilian independence was proclaimed (1822). These two events promoted industry, schools, press, libraries, universities, and new customs. However, they changed only the style of oppression. Participation in the center of power was more evident in the cities than in the rural areas. More power was in the hands of the bourgeoisie than in the hands of the landowners. More privileges were given for the European, or the people with a European lifestyle, than the ordinary people. The moving of the Portuguese crown to Brazil was, in fact, a superimposition upon the feudal situation. Independence created bewilderment for the majority of people. Even the model of democracy was imported and imposed as had been the conquest. The previous extremes of masters and slaves were reinforced, and new extremes were created such as rich-poor,
Europeans-Africans, or bourgeoisie-natives.

In reality, then, Brazil has had a history of being an "antidemocratic society." The majority of people have had an "insurmountable barrier": inexperience in self-government, in social and political participation, and in the creation of their own society with "their own hands"; in a few words, they have had the "inexperience of democracy." People continued to be defeated, crushed, and silent. People did not use their voice in crucial situations; they suffered a kind of "mutism." They were victims of communiques but never could dialogue. The colonized generally were adapted and inactive; they had no opportunity to assume responsibility or to have an experience of solidarity, and they remained at the "periphery" of their historical events. They participated when the elite led them demagogically into the events. The elite was superimposed on and not integrated with the people.

The closed society embraced a "series" of aspirations, concerns, and values generated by the large landowners, bourgeoisie, nobles, and their elite in power. Such a series had to confront certain "obstacles" to their fulfillment. Series and obstacles were expressed by "epochal themes" which formulated and represented these series and obstacles. Such epochal themes proposed "tasks" which ordinary people had to perform on behalf of their own interests. On the one hand, the ordinary people of the closed society --who form the larger part of the nation-- could not grasp these themes and tasks. On the other hand, the elite in trying to consolidate the "themes" of the closed society tried to fulfill their tasks without questioning the reality to which those themes referred.
Ordinary people of the closed society developed a consciousness in a low level of transition which Freire calls "semi-intransitive" consciousness. With this consciousness people focussed on problems arising out of biological necessity. Their sphere of perception was limited to their immediate needs. They were satisfied by illogical or magical explanations because they could not see the causes of social phenomena. They were alienated and separated from their economic, social, cultural, and political reality. For this reason they were incapable of really knowing themselves, their limitations, and their possibilities; they oscillated between ingenuous optimism and desperation, between idealism and pessimism. They imported foreign models of thought without taking into account the original context of such models, so different from their own.

From what has been said, the characteristics of a closed society are five-fold: 1. The economic center of decision-making is located outside of its own geographical borders. 2. Social organization is rigid and authoritarian; there is no upward and downward social mobility; society is static. 3. The national power is in the hands of an elite who obey the prescriptions of the center and the prescriptions of the local representatives of the center. 4. The closed society conserves the status in every way possible: through technology, the educational

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system, the importation of new models, and through all the social insti-
tuciones.

b) The Society in Transition

Transitional society in Brazil has two contradictory elements co-existing: the closed society and the open society. The closed so-
ciety depends on values which justify the old way of life; it gener-
ally looks back on "yesterday," rejects participation of the people, empha-
izes old themes, and maintains naive attitudes. The new soci-
ety defends new values, new themes, and new tasks; it improves partici-
pation of people and gives rise to critical attitudes. Only a critical atti-
date makes possible the perception of new themes, new obstacles, and new tasks.

A transitional society appears when the discordant elements inher-
ent in a closed society disturb the people of the open society. It be-
gins when old themes collapse and new themes emerge. For example, Brazil experienced this transition between a closed and an open soci-
ety during the decade of the nineteen sixties.

Some "alienated intellectual groups," who had been in their mental life living apart from the social conditions in which they were embedded, decided to face their own reality. In Freire's terminology, they began "integrating" with their reality. As a consequence, they developed a critical consciousness and discovered their own themes and their own tasks. When they understood their own reality, they dis-
covered their place in the world in relation to that reality, their limitations, and their real potentialities. They also discovered that
their social order was not an accomplished fact never to be revised, but it was in the process of creation. Hope replaced hopelessness, critical perception replaced ingenuous optimism, reality as challenge replaced reality as inevitable destiny, and purposeful action replaced the automatic response.

When these groups, the "progresistas," rejected accommodation and claimed the right to participate, the reactionaries saw clearly the threat to their interests. At first, the elite who were under the control of the reactionaries reacted spontaneously. Later, the elite created a program of social benefits, sent social workers to assist the people, tried to apply "band-aids" to the problems, and tried to create special institutions to promote social welfare. When the "progresistas" began to participate, society began to change dramatically. The new society was in labor and the old society was trying to survive. The new society was groping toward the shape it would assume, and the old society was in the process of disappearing.

As we have seen, a society in transition proposes two alternatives to its people: the first alternative is to be "reactionary" which means to be "in" one's reality, to be "submerged" but in opposition to the process of transition. Reactionary people obstruct any advance, maintain the status quo, look backward, or simply react against change. The second alternative is to be "progresista" which means to be part "of" the process of transition, to "emerge" as subjects of the historical process. "Progresista" people renounce folding their arms, being only spectators, and demand intervention in the process and full par-
ticipation. Persons in this society in transition must choose between the options of being an object or a subject of history; they must opt for the new or for the old; they must make a commitment which is radical.

There is a distinction between the sectarianism of the reactionary and the radicalism of the "progresista." Sectarian people are uncritical and anticommmunicative. They follow myths, absolutize half-truths, make propaganda and slogans, impose their choice and goals, and reduce people to masses. Because they are uncritical, they act without reflection. They depend on the reflection of somebody else. Ingenuously, they think they are the proprietors of history because they think of themselves as capable of stopping or of changing history. When they are successful, they stop all changes because they are incapable of creating an open society. They only take people into account when they want to use them for their goals. Other people are only followers, only objects. Sectarians are fanatics, and fanaticism brutalizes people and generates hate.

The radical option is "to take root in one's own option," in other words to assume a critical, loving, humble, and communicative attitude. Because radical people are critical, they reject every attempt of the reactionaries to silence others, to abuse their rights, or to suppress their freedom. Radicals submit all action to reflection.

"Enraizamento que a homen faz no opcão." Paulo Freire. Educação como Práctica da Liberdade, p. 50. The term "radical" comes from the Latin word "radix" which means "root."
They are the real subjects of history because, in recognizing the epochal themes, obstacles, and tasks, they can act in order to change what must be changed, and they can create the new society. They are actors and creators. However, they do not feel that they are the exclusive proprietors of history, the only ones who can change history. Other people have the same capacity and are also subjects. Radicals want to solve problems "with" people and not "for" people or "upon" people. They reject "assistentialism," impositions, and fanaticism. Thus, they demand deep changes.

However, the Brazilian people were not prepared to assume a critical attitude at the moment of transition. The elite as well as the masses embraced sectarianism. At the very time the "progresistas" were attempting to change the situation, the sectarians, not seeing any other possible solution, provoked a coup d'etat with the aid of the military forces (1964). The reactionaries, generally centered around latifundia, were helped by outside forces which did not want the advent of an open society in Brazil. These forces exerted their own pressures and recommended their own assistential solutions.

The radicals disturbed the elite. The reactions of the elite were justified by a so-called defense of democracy. Firstly, their spontaneous reactions were the consequence of an uncritical and emotive position. Secondly, their reactions were assistential and violent.

8 "Assistentialism" refers to social assistance which focuses on the symptoms, but not the causes. "Assistentialist" is the person who makes an assistential service. See p. 89, fn. 81.
"Assistentialists" attack symptoms but not causes, treat others as recipients and passive objects but consider themselves as subjects and as people who make decisions. Assistentialists will not allow the recipients to participate in the solution of their problems. They impose mutism, passivity, and non-dialogue; they convert a group of persons into an undifferentiated mass. They domesticate people. For this reason, assistentialists will never create a democracy.

Violence is an irrational action which is the "natural" consequence of sectarianism with its system of egoistic interests. The concept of democracy of the elite is a sui generis one. Sectarians think that the "disease" of people is to speak and to participate and that "health" is to be silent and inactive. In this kind of democracy, the elite protect the people from "foreign ideologies," which means denying them participation in their own historical process. If people participate, they are "subversive" because they "threaten order." The elite defend the social "order" which makes them the dominators. For this reason, the elite preserve their order at all costs.

By way of summary, a transitional society has the following theoretical characteristics:

First, a transitional society has two contradictory elements: it is a closed and an open society at the same time. The closed society loses its aspirations, concerns, and values, and the new society comes

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with new aspirations, concerns, and values. The transitional society is the coincidence of a society which looks for consolidation against change and a society which is in change. In these conditions, all people have two alternatives; to be reactionary or to be "progresista." All must choose one or the other.

Second, when the participation of "progresistas" is more than words, reactionaries and their elite react with an assistential or violent attitude.

Third, this tension produces a movement characteristic of transitional society: the movement of "flux and reflux, advances and retreats." Retreats can retard or distort the process but they cannot stop it. When there are retreats, the new themes are repressed but they do not disappear. New themes persist underground up to the moment in which there are new opportunities for transitions.

c) The Open Society

The roots of the open society in Brazil are to be found at the end of the last century. The industry "upsurge" (1885), the civilizing movement vigorously supported by immigrants, the suppression of the slave regime (1888), the increase of production, and the new economy of free labor were important factors in bringing about the transformation of social and economic structure of Brazil. New aspirations, new concerns, new values, new habits, and a new mentality arose, especially in the urban areas.

The growth of the open society was more evident after the First World War (1920) and especially after the Second World War (1945)
when Brazilian industrialization made its strongest movement forward. These changes affected culture, arts, literature, and science. People began to see their own reality and were able to identify and solve their own problems. People began to participate in their historical process. Democracy began to be learned through the "exercise" of democracy and through experience of popular participation. The open society was at hand.

When some intellectual groups, even some representatives of the elite, began to be integrated --not accommodated-- in their own reality, plans and projects which were the product of serious and deep researches into their own reality were substituted for the imported prescriptions which were formerly used. This integration gave them an understanding of their own history and their location in the process, an understanding of their own themes, obstacles, and tasks, and their best course of action.

Some important changes appear in this new society: naive optimism and utopian idealism disappear; critical optimism and realistic hope appear; pessimism, frustration and desperation are overcome; consciousness of problems, obstacles, dangers, and possibilities arises; people acquire a transitive consciousness and every day are more receptive and questioning; they engage in dialogue. There are opportunities and participation for everybody; there is a climate of freedom and democracy, "Before it (democracy) becomes a political form," Freire says, "democracy is a form of life, characterized above all by a
strong component of transitive consciousness."

In summary, the characteristics of an open society are:

First, equal opportunity for action. All people are subjects. The contradictions oppressor-oppressed, dominator-dominated, and subjects-objects disappear. The people are in touch with their own reality and are looking for new themes and new perceptions. The people have the power to create a future they themselves desire. The people can participate in the historical process by means of their action.

Second, critical consciousness. The people act rationally and lucidly. They confront rationally their own reality in order to act upon it. People reflect on all things --all social structures, all aspects of their world, all experiences in their world, even their own action-- in order to make all the changes necessary.

Third, freedom. The open society is a transitional society without the obstacles of reactionary people. In other words, the open society is free because the reactionaries no longer exercise paternalism, assistentialism, or violence. The open society has an open future which will be fashioned according to human needs.

Fourth, democracy. A free society is one in which everybody is free, i.e., a democratic society. In such a society all people are

10 Paulo Freire, *Education for Critical Consciousness*, p. 29

united and when all societies are be free, then all nations will be united. No one uses power to crush other people and nobody manipulates others. All people must be on guard against sectarianism, fanaticism, and irrationalism which are the enemies of freedom and democracy.

According to four of the most important books of Freire, his theoretical conclusions about his social world view are based on a clear understanding of his socio-historical moment. This moment I want to emphasize: Brazil had lived as a transitional society between 1950 and 1964. The closed society was in decline and an open society was emerging. However, the Brazilian people were not ready for the new epoch, the open society. The majority of people had remained at the margin of historical events or were led to these events demagogically. The closed society produced a "retreat" from the new society with the coup d'état of 1964. The military regime was rigid, authoritarian, and proclaimed a false democracy. Brazil was there, waiting for the opportunity to begin again its movement toward total liberation, the winning of real freedom, its real democracy.

The social principles of Freire are related to the transitional society, the via ad, which moves between the closed society (the terminus a quo) and the open society (the terminus ad quem). The tran-

The four books are Educação como Práctica da Liberdade, Pedagogía do Oprimido, Cambio, and Education for Liberation.
sitional society is the context in which are present simultaneously the closed and open society, the old and the new, which is to say there is stability by reason of the open and the new. Both of them are constituent of the social structure. The theoretical implications of this transitional society will be important to the comprehension of Freire's philosophical principles.

2. THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRAXIS

As I have said, Freire has not constructed a philosophical system because his major concern has not been philosophy as such; he is more a philosopher of education. However, he suggests a clear philosophical framework which I want to point out. I will not develop all of its implications. What I want to do is an analysis of the first principles which are explicit in his works and which constitute the universal, unitive, and rational points of reference to all his thought.

These principles are, at least, three: the contradiction of oppressor-oppressed as a fact seen by Freire in his social reality (the terminus a quo of Freire's Philosophy of Praxis), the dialectical method as a way — and at the same time as a moment — to overcome such contradiction (the via ad of Freire's Philosophy of Praxis), and the overcoming of the contradiction (the terminus ad quem of Freire's Philosophy of Praxis).

a) The Contradiction Oppressor-Oppressed

Freire's first principles arise from his understanding of social reality. The Freire of the Educação como Prática da Liberdade
and Cambio talks about the closed and open societies, both of them present at the same time, but both of which create a contradictory situation which he calls transitional society. The Freire of the Pedagogía do Oprimido discovers in the core of the transitional society, the contradictory society, an anthropological principle, the contradictory principle of oppressor-oppressed. This principle involves the economic interrelationships, the social composition generated by these relationships, and the political relationship of social groups.

Firstly, the process by which people are located in social classes (lower, upper, and middle classes) is based upon the economic status which gives prestige and power. The economic development determines the social conditions and lifestyle in which the upper and lower classes live. The poorer the nation is and the lower the lower classes are, the more oppressive the upper classes are upon the lower classes. So the upper classes become the oppressors and the lower classes the oppressed, a social contradiction.

The middle class generally accepts the contradiction of upper-lower and oppressor-oppressed. They do not want to supersede this contradiction because they are in transition between a status of the oppressed and the status of the oppressor. Economic stratification makes possible their gradual and ordered promotion to the privileges of the oppressors. What the middle classes want is to leave the

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despicable condition of the oppressed and to aspire to be the oppressor. They lose touch with the anthropological significance of the contradiction and forget the human vocation everyone has, i.e., to humanize themselves.

Secondly, there are two poles which are generated by this kind of distribution of wealth: the oppressive classes, which exploit, dominate, and rape by virtue of their power, and the oppressed classes, which have no power to avoid such abuse. It is a contradiction which cannot exist without the presence of both poles: the oppressed cannot exist without the oppressor because they are oppressed by reason of the oppressor. The oppressor also cannot exist without the oppressed because they are oppressors of the oppressed. Each of them is the antithesis of the other; each of them is related to the other in a dialectical way.

When the lower classes emerge into a state of awareness, the upper classes and their elite in power react with contempt. The upper classes consider the lower classes innately inferior, a caste with only manipulative value. Participation of the lower classes in power is an absurdity. When lower classes emerge, the elite, which represent the upper classes, generally react in one of two ways: they develop a paternalistic way of solving problems or they stop people by force. In the end, the objective is the same: to silence and "domesticate"
lower classes. When the oppressed people speak about their needs, the necessity of reform and of participation in power, the oppressors increase their arms and defend their privileges. These are the circumstances in which an irrational climate, sectarian positions, and mistrustful attitudes appear.

Thirdly, technological modernization has a close relationship to the social conditions of workers, the political values, and the lifestyle of the upper and lower classes. On the one side, technology has required mechanical behavior, has led to a narrow and excessive specialization, has reduced people's horizons, has separated people from their "total project," has cultivated fearful and naive consciousness, and has distorted critical capacity. On the other side, technology has created a climate of transition. Radio, cinema, television, highways, and transportation have been powerful influences of change and participation. Thus, modernization has produced contradictory effects in the social life.

Technology can be used according to the political values of the social system. For instance, the mass media (radio, television, and newspaper) can be used as effective tools to manipulate people, to "up root" people from their reality, and to push them to adopt mythical explanations. Through the mass media people can easily adopt fearful and naive attitudes and conform to mechanical responses without a global

Freire uses the word "domestication" to refer to the dehumanizing way in which an individual, or social group, treat others to force them into a state of conformity and accommodation.
perspective. Through it people can be "domesticated," reduced to a manageable and unthinking agglomeration, and forced to live a life on the basis of illusions without an understanding of the challenges of society. However, the mass media can be used also in favor of the oppressed people to show them their reality, to create a healthy relationship among people, and to motivate a critical attitude. The import of technology has created different kinds of reactions among people: activist attitudes, perplexity, emotive reactions, and popular rebellion. But technology can also create conditions that make possible a critical attitude.

The contradictory principle of oppressor-oppressed involves the economic process: by which people are stratified into social classes, the social power by which the upper classes manipulate lower classes, and the political control by which upper classes domesticate and repress people. Technology can be used either to dominate or to liberate humanity. According to Freire, the social reality of Brazil and the rest of Latin America rests upon that contradiction: to maintain the power of the oppressor and to retain the weakness of the oppressed. The middle class confirms this contradiction when they want to escape from the oppressed condition and look for the privileges of the oppressor. The awakening of the oppressed and the paternalistic or violent reaction of the oppressor polarize the contradiction and make the two poles more evident. Technology, as well as other tools in human hands, can be

used to increase oppression or to improve the process of change and humanization.

b) Praxis, the Dialectical Method

A social reality, like all other cultural creations, exists as a product of human action. Economic relationships, social organization, political values, and criteria for using technology are creations of people who want to live better. For this reason, changing something which is necessary to change only happens by human action. Social change does not come about by chance because social reality does not exist by chance. Now, what is the most adequate way to change a social reality?

Freire says that praxis is the dialectical method best suited to change that which is necessary to change at the physical, social, or thinking level. In the case of the social structure, praxis is the dialectical method which has the capacity to overcome the contradiction oppressor-oppressed. As we have seen, the oppressor-oppressed is a contradiction of two poles in which the oppressor cannot exist without the oppressed and the oppressed cannot exist without the oppressor. Each pole cannot exist without the presence of the other; one is the antithesis of the other, and both are related dialectically. Praxis is the dialectical method with the capacity to confront, to break, and to overcome this dialectical and contradictory reality.

Freire says: that praxis is "reflection and action upon the world
There are two components in the confrontation of reality: reflection and action. Reflection is thinking about external reality and on the human action upon such reality; it is the expression of such reality and such action in concepts or judgments; and it is the lucid spiritual activity to illuminate human action. Action is the work of people upon reality, work which modifies reality and produces new things from this reality. When there is a coincidence of reflection and action, i.e., praxis, something new comes into existence.

However, reflection and action cannot be isolated; they are in a dialectical relationship. If such a dialectical way of interaction does not appear, we have an inauthentic praxis. Inauthentic praxis results when action is simple activity, action without reflection, which is activism, mere pragmatism, without a lucid "integration" in the world. Inauthentic praxis results also when reflection is separate from action; such reflection is only verbalism, just words, "bla-bla-bla." The danger of this inauthentic praxis appears when we realize that praxis is made so as to adjust to reality. The social reality shows that the creation of the human being—in this case the social structures—has turned against its creators. People cannot

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Paulo Freire, "Investigación y Metodología de la Investigación del "Tema Generador", Cristianismo y Sociedad, Suplemento (Setiembre, 1968), p. 27.
avoid the social reality which, in spite of being the creation of human beings, determines human behavior. People and their actions have been alienated. That is what Freire calls the "inversion of the praxis."

Authentic praxis avoids an exclusive subjectivism or an exclusive objectivism. The subjectivist, avoiding the objectivist recognition of oppression, inhibits action, expects that oppression will disappear by itself, and waits passively. The objectivist, avoiding the subjectivist analysis of reality, misunderstands the contradictions of such reality. A real objectivity cannot exist without subjectivity because subjectivity helps objectivity to be more accurate in its understanding of reality. A real subjectivity cannot also exist without objectivity because in this case objectivity gives real and truthful sense to the subjective analysis. Thus, according to Freire, there is no subjectivity or objectivity alone; each of them is complemented by the other. Again, subjectivity and objectivity exist in a dialectical relationship. The dialectic movement here is not an "objective" dialectic which holds in nature, society or a system of thought; neither is it a "subjective" dialectic which holds in a pure reflection of thought, "the absolute mind" of Hegel. The dialectic which transforms the world is that which is related to the subjective and the objective, which is constituted by reflection and action, both of them mediated by the world.

The dialectical relationship between reflection and action overcomes both the contradiction subjectivism-objectivism and the dualism

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Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, p. 36.
human spirit-reality of the world. Freire says that to think about social reality without taking into account the dynamic intervention of human beings is "sociologism" and to think about the subjective activity of the human being without taking into account the reality of the world is "psychologism." To deny the subjective activity of the human being is to deny the lucid action of humans and to permit the fixed scheme of the social reality to dominate humans. To deny the objective world is to deny the possibility of creating new things out of the social reality; it is to deny that the social reality can change and to fill all the world with fantasies separated from real life. When we separate subjectivity and objectivity we fall into that which Freire calls a total ambiguity: "To glorify democracy and to silence the people," "to discuss humanism and to negate man," "to say one thing and to do another." Such democracy and humanism are a farce and a lie.

In summary, reflection and action dialectically related cannot only confront reality and explain it but also transform it. Reality here can be nature, society, or culture. Praxis is a dialectical relationship: reflection and action cannot be isolated. Reflection is the "emergence" of consciousness from its reality and action is the "critical intervention" of humans inside reality.

19
Cf. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 35.

20
Cf. Ibid., p. 80.

21
Cf. Ibid., pp. 68, 100.
reflection always "emerges" from reality or from the action of people upon reality. Authentic action is lucid work upon reality as a result of a lucid spiritual activity mediated by the content of reality. Reflection without action is only ideas without reality. Reflection and action isolated from each other are only "submersion" but not "integration." Praxis is integration in reality, which means "intervention" to change reality. The process of praxis involves the coincidence of these factors which after the first step of reflection-action upon reality generate the next step of praxis in a more lucid way and generate a more critical intervention in reality.

c) The Overcoming of the Contradiction

Freire explains that the contradiction oppressor-oppressed is based on a situation of violence. There is violence in the exploitation of people, in the domination of all aspects of life—in the economic, social, cultural, and political order—and in irrational repression.

When the oppressors want to have more, always more, they try to obtain new possessions no matter the cost to the oppressed. In other words, their possessions are a result of the exploitation of the oppressed. When the oppressors exploit people in order to satisfy their tendencies to have more, they exert violence against the oppressed. This

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22 Freire uses the word "submersion" to express the idea of one's being in the midst of reality without consciousness of it and without the possibility of changing it.

23 Cf. Ibid., pp. 52, 53, 119.
violence has its roots in a materialistic concept of existence. "Having" is the measure of all things and having is the principle of all things. "To be is to have". This conception the oppressors impose as a condition for being human. The violence of exploitation results in the oppressed always having less and less, and sometimes nothing.

The oppressors feel they have possessions because they work. In order to have these things they take risks, and they are skillful in making things. As a result, they contemn the oppressed people; they consider them lazy people who never take risks, who are invariably incompetent, and who are always ungrateful for the "generosity" of the oppressors. The oppressed are envious and potential enemies. The oppressors consider themselves unique people who control the economic, social, cultural and political order. They consider that they have the right of leadership because they have merit and competence. They are good people. However, when the oppressors contemn the oppressed people, when they do not permit the oppressed to have equal opportunity, when they convert the oppressed into a dependent and submissive people, the oppressors are reacting violently against the oppressed.

Oppressors tend to be sadists; they experience pleasure in dominating and controlling others. If they are to control all areas of life, they must subdue and convert the oppressed into "things" or

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Cf. Ibid., p. 44.

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Freire does not consider the "generosity" of the oppressors as an authentic expression of love but as a way to dominate and exploit the oppressed without their protest.
objects. They "de-animate" human beings. They want people who obey, are quiet, and never talk about their rights. They have a necrophiliac's view of the world. In order to dominate the oppressed, the oppressors stop all attempts at investigating new things and put obstacles in the way of creative tendencies. Two effects of the violence of domination and control are that the oppressed become objects and that their most elemental human rights are denied them.

The system in which some people exploit others, dominate others, and repress others is a violent order. This system violates the most elementary rights of human beings and denies the historical and ontological vocation of everyone, i.e., to become "more human". The contradictory system of oppressor-oppressed obstructs the realization of this vocation and the exercise of the human rights in behalf of the interests of a few people, the oppressors. All science, all technology, all education, all religion, and all social institutions are used to maintain this violence. This system carries in its nature a violence which is perpetuated through generations.

This system explains why social violence in history always has been initiated and exercised by the oppressors. The oppressed always have been the victims of the violence. Oppressors do not love others because they love only themselves. Seizing the economic, social, cultural, and political control, oppressors generate conditions of re-
pression. Oppressors protect and maintain their control even if despotism, repression, and terror are necessary. Those who exploit, contemn, and dominate others hate the objects of their exploitation.

The oppressed respond naturally to the initial violence of the oppressors by rebelling. The violence of rebellion is grounded in the necessity of being treated as human beings. The oppressed want to have a system without repression; that is, they want to have a more rational, just, and peaceful order. For this reason Freire says that the act of rebellion of the oppressed can generate love and overcome hatred.

The contradiction between the violence of the oppressors and the act of rebellion of the oppressed has its solution in the struggle of the oppressed. That is so because the violence of the oppressors dehumanizes the oppressed and, in the exercise of oppression, oppressors dehumanize themselves. Yet the struggle of the oppressed for liberation can restore not only the humanity of the oppressed but also the humanity of oppressors lost in the exercise of their oppression. Oppressors never can revolt because they are the beneficiaries of the oppressive system. They cannot struggle for liberation because they cannot fight to destroy themselves. They cannot liberate either themselves or the oppressed. Humanization can only come from the oppressed because unlike the oppressors they do not wish to be other oppressors but simply to be human.

However, there are some members of the oppressors who join with the oppressed; they cease to be exploiters, contemners, dominators, and
controllers; they cease to be indifferent to this oppression or to be the heirs of it. There are some oppressors who move from the pole of the oppressors to the other pole of the contradiction, the side of the oppressed. The risk they constantly have is to be in favor of the struggle of the oppressed for liberation, while at the same time they are prejudiced against and distrust the oppressed. They usually fall into a false generosity; they begin to believe that they must be the executers of change. The oppressors who move to the side of the oppressed desire to transform the unjust order; however, they have to remember that they are not proprietors, givers, or imposers of change. They must choose to be in "comunión" with the oppressed and to trust them. This is a precondition for participation in the struggle. To move to the side of the oppressed is like a re-birth.

But the oppressed people also have their problems in the fulfillment of their liberation. In addition to the different forms of violence imposed by the oppressors, the oppressed have internalized the contradictions of the social structures. The oppressed people are not only socially oppressed; they are also psychologically oppressed. Their psychological oppression is one of the greater limitations on their own liberation. Six aspects of this condition are:

First, the oppressed have internalized "the image of the oppressor" as an ideal model of a human being. So, they feel an irresistible attraction towards the lifestyle of the oppressors.

Second, with the image of the oppressor in the oppressed's consciousness, the oppressed become a people in contradiction. On the
one hand they are oppressed and desire to be free from their oppression; but, on the other hand, they want to resemble the oppressors, to imitate them, and to follow them. So they internalize the contradiction of the social structures.

Third, they are alienated from their own social reality; i.e., they are strangers to their social system which originates their oppression. They interpret their oppression not as a consequence of a violent system or as the exploitation, disdain, and domination of the oppressors but as a result of "the will of God" or the power of destiny. So, they assume a docile attitude when they face their dependence, domination, disdain, and exploitation. They cannot perceive the "organized disorder" which is called "order" and is imposed by the oppressors for what it is.

Fourth, they put too low a value on themselves. Oppressed people internalize the opinion of the oppressors. The oppressed feel they know nothing, are unfit, are incapable of learning anything, are unproductive and lazy. They feel their role is to be listeners because they are ignorant. In other words, they lack confidence in themselves and feel incapable of resisting their oppressors. So, they are reluctant to struggle.

Fifth, they feel that the oppressor is invulnerable. They accept their exploitation with fatalism because they feel disheartened, fearful, and beaten. So, they submit in a passive manner even though they wish to affirm and liberate themselves.

Sixth, they feel like "things" owned by the oppressors. If the
oppressors feel that to be is to have, the oppressed people feel themselves that to be is to be had, to be is to be under the oppressor, to be is to be in dependence.

These characteristics lead to a necrophilic behavior, to one's own destruction. Oppressed people cannot live as humans if one or more of these conditions are met: they have internalized the image of the oppressors; they live "schizophrenic" lives --divided feelings--; they are alienated, self-depreciating, disheartened, fearful, and beaten; or they feel owned by someone else. Thus, the social contradiction cannot be overcome until the moment when the oppressed people overcome the psychological contradictions. When does this moment occur?

The oppressed overcome these contradictions when:

First, the oppressed people discover the image of the oppressor inside of their own consciousness and they discover the real oppressor outside of themselves.

Second, they discover their own contradiction as a simple reflection of the social contradiction and they recognize the real contradiction outside of them.

Third, they identify the contradiction oppressor-oppressed as the first principle and the cause of their exploitation, disdain, and domination, a contradiction which exists really in the structure of the society.

Fourth, they wake up from self-depreciation and discover that they are capable of resisting oppressors, that they can organize the struggle of their own liberation, and that they can be free.
Fifth, they believe that the power of the oppressor is vulnerable and that it is possible to be destroyed; they recognize that their exploitation is not a divine mandate.

Sixth, they discover themselves as human beings who are like any other human being; they feel free of psychological oppression; and they recover their self-confidence.

Thus, the real overcoming begins with the discovering — at a psychological level — of the interiorization of the image of the oppressor in the consciousness of the oppressed, the reflection of the social contradiction inside of the oppressed, and the identification of the real causes in the social structure. If the oppressed people discover this reality, the hope of change of their own situation is born, and self-depreciation ceases.

However, the principle which begets oppression must be superseded. This is the only way to overcome the contradiction. The principle of the two poles as a framework of reference must be replaced by a new point of reference: the search of a human principle for a new society. This new principle is the new concept of the human being as itself. That is the challenge of both the oppressors and the oppressed.

In summary, the contradiction oppressor-oppressed maintains a situation of violence through all aspects of life: the exploitation of the oppressed to satisfy the tendencies of the oppressors to have more; the disdaining of the oppressed as lazy, incompetent, envious, ungrateful, and hostile; the domination of the oppressed as an object; the vi-
olation of the most elemental human rights, and the denial of the ontological vocation of the oppressed, i.e., to be always human beings. In the context of this violent contradiction, hatred and violence always are generated by the oppressors. They use extreme measures such as imposing despotism, repression, and terror whenever they consider them necessary.

The oppressed, despairing in their oppression and repression, react against the oppressors with rebellion and violence. With a high level of urgency, they employ violence to gain humanization and freedom. In spite of the fact that the oppressors never will be able to liberate the oppressed, some oppressors, knowing what the struggle is about, do join with the oppressed. However, these oppressors have many prejudices and much distrust. The real overcoming of the contradiction comes from the struggle initiated by the oppressed. However, the oppressed could be deflected into promoting a reversal of roles. Such inversion only strengthens and supports the contradictory system.

The real challenge of the oppressors is not to have at the cost of the exploitation of others; it is not to consider a few people better and the others lower to the point of contempt, underestimation, and hate. The real challenge of the oppressors is to be human, the ontological vocation of all human beings; it is to recognize others as fully equal human beings; it is to be human "with" other human beings in the struggle for a continuing humanization; it is to be free "with" all human beings who also have to be free.

The real challenge to the oppressed is not to improve one's
own status in the system of social stratification while others are left behind, suffering the consequences of the progress of the few; it is not to be the only ones free by violating the elementary rights of others, oppressing and repressing them; it is not to adapt the individualistic and egoistic ideal of the oppressors. The real challenge of the oppressed is to be human, to liberate themselves, and in the process of this liberation, to liberate the oppressors. If it is true that liberation comes from the struggle initiated by the oppressed, the purpose is not to be another oppressor which will simply invert the terms. The struggle of the oppressed is only the starting point in pursuing the real challenge of all humanity; i.e., to be fully human. The real overcoming of the contradictions eliminates the two poles of oppressors and oppressed and invokes the new concept of the truly human.

Therefore, the principle of new men and new women —not those of either the oppressors or the oppressed— will provide the basis for the overcoming of the contradiction. The new principle means a kind of "denying oneself" as the Bible says (Mark 8:34). Freire calls this denying the "Easter" of everyone: the death and resurrection of oppressors and oppressed. The oppressors must do two things: refuse to oppress others and commit themselves to the struggle of the oppressed.

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Otherwise, they will be under attack by the oppressed when they rebel. The oppressed must refuse to be "hosts" of the image of the oppressor. Otherwise nothing will change. Freire says:

Only the oppressed can liberate their oppressors. But if they themselves become an oppressing class, they will never liberate either themselves or anyone else. They have to struggle in such a way as to resolve the contradiction they are caught in; and it can be resolved only with the appearance of a "new man," neither oppressor nor oppressed, but a man in the process of being liberated.28

The first principles of Freire's philosophy are, basically, three: the present social reality with its contradictory two poles: the oppressor and the oppressed; the dialectical method of praxis to overcome such a contradiction; and the overcoming of the contradiction in response to an anthropological imperative to create a new man, a new woman, and a new society.

The first principle is his terminus a quo which arises from his understanding of his social reality, the everyday experience. This contradiction which maintains the power of the oppressor and the weakness of the oppressed is the structure of the social organization in Brazil as well as in the rest of Latin America.

The second principle is the way in which this contradiction is overcome. The two poles of contradiction exist in a dialectical relationship creating consequences such as subjectivism and objectivism. Praxis is the dialectical method which will break down and overcome this contradiction. Praxis --action and reflection-- not only explains re-
ability but transforms it.

The third principle is the overcoming of the contradiction. The contradictory social reality maintains a situation in which the violence of the oppressor who is against the oppressed denies the ontological vocation of the oppressed, i.e., to be fully human. The system of violence generates in the oppressed the act of rebellion. This rebellion is a violence arising out of the desperation which the oppressed feel. They want to overcome the contradiction and to create a new society. The contradiction of the social structure is reflected in the consciousness of the oppressed people. This reflected "image" could make them passive or could distort their struggle. The overcoming of the contradiction begins when the oppressed people discover their own distortions, identify real causes outside of themselves in the social structure, and understand the main objective of their struggle as the change of such a structure. The challenge is to reject the contradiction oppressor-oppressed, to reject the human ideals of that system, and to replace them by a new principle, the concept of the new human being. This new principle is the kind of human who is capable of struggling for freedom and who is able to create a new society.

The social contradiction is the terminus a quo of the Freire's philosophy of praxis and the overcoming of such contradiction in his terminus ad quem of such philosophy. The dialectical way between them is praxis, the via ad to overcome the contradiction.

3. THE ANTHROPOLOGY

As I have said, whatever the explanation of the world, of the
social world in the case of Freire, it has implicit anthropological principles which explain its world-view. Freire's anthropology begins when the fundamental questions arise, the terminus a quo of his anthropology. At this point, Freire's anthropology becomes the keystone of his philosophy as a whole and especially of his philosophy of education.

The first philosophical principles of Freire generate a reconceptualization of the human being in the context of a society which Freire considers in transition. This reconceptualization is the via ad of Freire's anthropology.

Freire will put the political freedom of humans as the summit of his anthropology. Freedom will be the terminus ad quem of Freire's anthropology as well as of his philosophy as a whole.

a) Anthropology as a Keystone

Freire discusses his world-view based on his experiences in Brazil and later on his experiences in other parts of the world. In his view human beings are central. Freire discusses broadly the basic anthropological question: What is man? Beyond the conception of society, there is a conception of man, his special place in the cosmos—in relation to the world of things and other human beings—and his existence as a being who knows and acts upon the world. Consequently, the principal questions are: Who is man? Where is he? What shall he do? These questions suggest the three basic points in Freire's anthropology.

The first question asks for a new conceptualization of what it is to be human. The question is related to men and women who in
the closed society are unhappy, in the transitional society are in the process of liberation, or in the open society are free. First of all, the first question permits Freire to posit the human being as a problem, an act of 'being at a distance,' in order to visualize what is the nature of the human being. In the second place, the first question permits Freire to reconceptualize the human being as a "located and dated" human, as Gabriel Marcel says. Freire says that "once again we have to go back...not...to an abstract human, but to the concrete one, who exists in a concrete situation." Freire is interested in the clear understanding of what it is to be a man or a woman, in the radical sense of the human condition. In the third place, the first question permits Freire to avoid a simple intellectual curiosity and to create an anthropology motivated by the need of action in the world.

The second question asks: What is the place in which human beings are presently located? Given Freire's understanding of the social structure in Brazil and the rest of the Latin American countries, the question is related to the man who has the capacity to relate "with" his own world and to humanize himself in the relationship. This relationship takes place in the context of a society in transition between the closed and open society. In other words, the "situation" in which humans are


30 "Una vez más tendremos que volver...no... a un hombre abstracto, sino al hombre concreto, que existe en una situación concreta. Paulo Freire, Cambio, p. 42.
located is a contradictory reality. The social reality provides inhuman conditions as well as opportunities of humanization. So, the answer to the question about the place of humans in the cosmos is an:

Answer which considers the problem of economic development and of the participation of the people in this development, and of the critical insertion... in the process of "fundamental democratization" which used to characterize us [when we were in Brazil]. An answer which ought not to neglect the signs of our lack of inexperience in the ways of democracy, our historical-cultural roots which are in contradiction with the new position which that process of change demands of the Brazilian.31

The third question asks for the transformation of the world by the "new" human being. The question is related to the man who has the capacity to know his world and who is able to change it. This question is related to the bringing into existence of the fully human person. Freire says:

Throughout history men have attempted to overcome the factors which make them accommodate or adjust, in a struggle --constantly threatened by oppression-- to attain their full humanity.32

b) Anthropology as Reconceptualization

The social contradiction has in its roots a deformed conception of the human being; it is an anthropological contradiction. Freire

31 "Respuesta que considera el problema del desarrollo económico y el de la participación popular en este mismo desarrollo y de la inserción crítica... en el proceso de "democratización fundamental" que nos caracterizaba. Que no descuidase los signos de nuestra inexperiencia democrática, de raíces histórico-culturales en contradicción con la nueva posición que el proceso exige del hombre brasileño". Paulo Freire, La Educación como Práctica de la Libertad, p. 99.

32 Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, p. 5.
seeks to reconceptualize the human being. Therefore, he responds to the above questions by giving the anthropological bases of his entire philosophical system which I want to summarize:

In the first question --Who is man?-- Freire reconceptualizes man on the basis of his personal history, the terminus a quo of his anthropological reconceptualization. The Differencia Specifica of the human being is to be "with" in addition to being "in" the world. To be "with" means to have relationships and not simple contacts; to face challenges and not mere stimuli, to have responses and not reactions; to be rational and not mechanical; and to be critical and not naive. To have a "semi-intransitive," fanatical, naive, mythical, or irrational consciousness is to be dehumanized. To be human is to be temporal but also transcendent. A human being is temporal because he is inserted within history. He is transcendent because he overcomes his ontological limitations. These limitations put in danger the humanness of human existence; they reduce the human alternatives to only two: to be or not to be. To be human is to have the capacity to objectify, to act, and to change the world. To be human is to change oneself because one always is in the process of completing and humanizing oneself.

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To be human is to be historical, with an inheritance of the past, a perception of the present, and a project for the future. That is the \textit{Differentia Specifica} of humans distinguishing them from animals.

Paulo Freire says:

Animals, submerged within reality, cannot relate to it; they are creatures of mere contacts. But man's separateness from and openness to the world distinguishes him as a being of relationship. Men, unlike animals, are not only \textit{in} the world but \textit{with} the world.\textsuperscript{35}

In the second question --Where is man?-- Freire points out what the situation of humans is in the world. To be "in" the world, of course, means to be under the permanent and powerful impact of the physical, cultural, and social forces of the world. In this sense, humans as well as animals are "in" the world. The difference is that animals are only "in" the world while humans are "in" the world and go beyond being "in" it by being "with" it. To be "with" the world means not only to be immersed "in" the world but to emerge and acquire distance from the world in order to relate "with" it. To be "with" the world means to detach oneself from the world, to objectify, analyze, and change it. The human being is a subject, not an object. Humans put at their disposal all the resources of their world, adapt their world to their needs, and produce

\begin{footnotes}
\item[35] Paulo Freire, \textit{Education for Critical Consciousness}, p. 3.
\item[36] Animals are simply "in" the world, subject to physical conditions (e.g., temperature), to cultural conditions imposed by humans (e.g., domestication), and to social conditions (e.g., living conditions that correspond to the social class of the owner). Humans are likewise subject to the same forces of the world, yet they go beyond mere adaptation to those conditions.
\end{footnotes}
new things. Through their reflection —which is their objectivization of their world— and their action upon their world they create new things and new conditions, they create culture and make history, they humanize their world. To be a subject is to be integrated with but not adapted to the world. To be integrated is to have a dialectical relationship with the world in which the subject and the object are modified. To be integrated means to be located in the world through praxis. Integration is the process of making a provisional home in a world which is always changing. Freire says:

Man becomes a subject through reflection on his situation, on his concrete environment. At that moment the more he reflects on his reality, on his concrete situation, the more he "emerges" fully conscious, committed, and ready to intervene in his reality in order to change it.

If the ontological vocation of a human being is to be a subject and not an object, such a vocation cannot be fulfilled except in the measure in which one... reflecting on the limitations of space and time in which he finds himself submerges himself within them, and measures them critically.37

In response to the third question —What shall man do?— Freire points out the dynamic transformation of the human's own reality. The nature of humans is to know their own reality by perceiving phenomena and their causal links. However, the human mind always can while

37 "El hombre llega a ser sujeto mediante una reflexión sobre su situación, sobre su ambiente concreto. Mientras más reflexiona sobre la realidad, sobre su situación concreta, más "emerge", plenamente consciente, comprometido, dispuesto a intervenir respecto a la realidad para cambiarla."

"Si la vocación ontológica del hombre es la de ser sujeto y no objecto esta no puede realizarse sino en la medida en que..., reflexionando sobre las condiciones espacio-temporales, uno se sumerge en ellas y las mide con espíritu crítico". Paulo Freire, El Mensaje de Paulo Freire, Teoría y Práctica de la Liberación (Madrid: Editorial Marsiega, 1976), pp. 48, 49.
perceiving some things, ignore others; knowledge is never absolute.

Knowledge has a close relationship with action in two ways. First, people grasp a challenge and try to understand its factors and causal links in order to act. Second, their action not only transforms the world but provides the primary sources of knowing. Freire says:

We know when we transform. It is a fact in the history of consciousness that in the process of evaluation theory never precedes praxis. Marx was and is absolutely right. First of all I have to transform. Secondly, I can theorize my actions --but not before... All my books are mere reports of what I did. I never wrote a book before praxis. I was saying earlier that I cannot write letters discussing, for example, the sex of angels. I am not interested in the sex of angels, I am interested in knowing my reality with the people.38

Human knowledge and human action are obstructed by a "semi-intransitive consciousness" which grasps facts but not causal links, by a "naive-transitive consciousness" which grasps facts and causal links but considers links as static; and by a "fanatical consciousness" which grasps only the knowledge of others who manipulate people. "Critical consciousness" is the only one which grasps facts and causal links as they exist.

c) Freedom as the Highest Anthropological Realization.

Three conceptual nuclei support the practical implications of Freire's anthropology: the historical, cultural, and political. These interrelated nuclei could be the three levels of the anthropological explanation of Freire in which the political level is the highest realization of the human being. The political nucleus corresponds to

38 Paulo Freire, "By Learning They Can Teach." p. 2.
the *terminus ad quem* of Freire's anthropology.

In the first place, the historical nucleus incorporates two principles: man as praxis and man as subject; both are related by the conception of man as historical being. To be human is to be historical. "There is no man in the void," Freire says. Each man and woman is situated "in" space and time. "Men live, and their lives are historical," he says; the "here" and "now" is not only the physical space-time but the historical one. Humans live "in" a precise place and epoch. Each of them is "in" a specific social and cultural context. Freire says:

When I speak about men and women I am referring to historically situated human beings, not to abstract ideas. I am referring to people whose consciousness is intimately linked to their real social lives. 42

So, to be human "in" the world is to grasp one's own reality, to understand it, and to transform it. Humans are beings of praxis. Freire says:

Furthermore: man is praxis and because he is so he cannot be reduced to a mere spectator of reality nor to a mere accident of the directive action of other men who transform him into a "thing". His ontological vocation, which he must fulfil, is

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The concept of history here is used to refer to the succession of events through which pass human beings and everything else.

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Paulo Freire, "Are Adult Literacy Programmes Neutral?" Persépolis, September 1975, p. 5. (Mimeographed.)
to be a subject who operates upon and transforms the world.

To be human is also to be a subject and not an object of history, to be "with" and not only "in" the world. Humans "are not only capable of having their own activity, but of being conscious of themselves and of the world in which they live." To be a subject is to be "a conscious being." The human being acquires consciousness of himself, an idea which reminds us of Hegel, consciousness of "the other," which could be the physical, social, or cultural other, and consciousness of his own transforming action upon the world.

So, man as praxis and as subject are the two principles closely united in the historical reality of man. They are the factors which make human beings unique in the world.

In the second place, the cultural nucleus incorporates the two

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43 "Mas aún: el hombre es praxis y porque así es no puede reducirse a mero espectador de la realidad ni tampoco a mera incidencia de la acción conductora de otros hombres que lo transformarán en "cosa" Su vocación ontológica, que el debe existenciar, es la de sujeto que opera y transforma el mundo." Paulo Freire, "La Concepción 'Bancaría' de la Educación y la Deshumanización. La Concepción Problematizadora de la Educación y la Humanización." Cristianismo y Sociedad, Suplemento (Setiembre 1968): 18.


45 Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom, p. 27.

fields of history and education. Culture arises as an effect of the kinds of men who are conscious of themselves, who are praxis and who are subjects in relation to "the other." In addition to being conscious, a subject is a dynamic agent of transformation, which involves decision making, action, creation and re-creation, in one word, work. With the human response, humans add something which is specifically human, i.e., culture.

Culture is --in opposition to nature, which is not the creation of man-- the contribution which man makes to nature. Culture is the grand sum of human activity, of the creative and re-creative effort of man, of his work to transform and to establish relations to other men. Culture is also the systematic acquisition of human experience, but a critical and creative acquisition and not a juxtaposition of information stored in the intelligence or in the memory, and separated from the total being and from the full life of man.48

The human praxis transforms and creates things like goods and objects, social institutions and politics, philosophy and ideologies, science and technology, art and religion. All of these creations as well as other actions of humans not only create culture but also history.

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The concept of history here is used to refer to the explanation and interpretation of historical events. Cf. Paulo Freire, El Mensaje de Paulo Freire, pp. 52-56.

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"Cultura -por oposición a la naturaleza, que no es creación del hombre- es la aportación que el hombre hace a la naturaleza. Cultura es todo el resultado de la actividad humana, del esfuerzo creador y recreador del hombre, de su trabajo por transformar y establecer relaciones con los otros hombres. La cultura es también la adquisición sistemática de la experiencia humana, pero una adquisición crítica y creadora, y no una yuxtaposición de informaciones almacenadas en la inteligencia o en la memoria y no "incorporadas" en el ser total y en la vida plena del hombre". Ibid., p. 53.
Freire says:

Through his ongoing task of transforming objective reality, man simultaneously creates history and becomes a historical-social being. He appears as a subject of history which turning upon him, marks him. Unlike the animal, man can tridimensionalize time in past-present-future which, however, are not unrelated compartments of time. Human history, by reason of these very creations, develops in a permanent flux in which its "epochal" unities become concretized.49

In the measure humans create and re-create, historical epochs are formed and re-formed. History is made when humans identify "epochal themes," recognize their obstacles, and fulfill the tasks that history imposes on them. History is made when humans propose new aspirations, new concerns, and new values; when they formulate new "epochal themes." History is the effect of human responses given to nature, to other people, and to social structures. History is the consequence of the intention to be more and always more human. Freire is thinking of the history of all people, not of the history of an elite, the army, or the governments.

If a human being wants to be situated in space and time, if he wants to be a subject, with the capacity to transform his world, to create culture, and to make history, he has to be educated with this purpose in mind. This education must be for freedom, never for adapta-

49 "A través de su permanente quehacer transformador de la realidad objetiva, el hombre, simultáneamente crea la historia y se hace un ser histórico-social. Aparece como sujeto de la historia que, volviéndose sobre él, lo marca. Porque, al contrario del animal, el hombre puede tridimensionalizar el tiempo pasado-presente-futuro que, sin embargo, no son departamentos estancos, su historia, en función de sus mismas creaciones, se va desarrollando en permanente devenir, en que se concretizan sus unidades "epocales". Paulo Freire, "A Propósito del Tema Generador y del Universo Temático." Cristianismo y Sociedad, Suplemento (Setiembre 1968): 58.
tion, domestication, or oppression. This goal suggests a deep even a total reviewing of the traditional systems of education, their programs and methods. Freire's anthropology forms and informs this pedagogical reasoning and gives the foundations for educative action.

But why education and no other aspect of culture? Freire believes that human being relates to the world through education from his early years; he believes that humans always conceptualize their world, find their place in the world, and control the world through education. Our next chapter (Chapter IV) will analyze Freire's concept of education.

The political conceptual nucleus is the third anthropological reconceptualization, the terminus ad quem, of his anthropology and his philosophy as a whole. Freire's anthropology is a political one which generates a political education and a political freedom.

In the first place, Freire's anthropology proposes a political commitment which requires human to have, at least, the following characteristics: 1. Either to be in a project of life as subjects or to be converted to objects of this project. 2. To be located in the midst of history which can humanize or dehumanize, liberate or oppress. 3. Either to be in the midst of the "epochal themes" which humans can grasp and use to solve their problems or to be on the periphery, in the margin of history. 4. Either to have a critical attitude or assume an ingenuous, magical, mythical, and semi-intransitive consciousness. 5. Either to assume a praxiological attitude or to be merely activist or to be merely idealist. 6. To transform the world which is to discover the real world which is to discover the real possibilities of human nature or to surrender under the human limitations. 7. To be in relationship with
the other which will provide dialogue and communication or to be alone in an individualistic way. These alternatives are political. But what does "politics" mean? Carlos Torres, explaining Freire, says:

Politics, the rational direction of human action, is the encounter par excellence of the individual and collective expectations. In politics all efforts to support or transform reality effectively are synthesized. Only politics is the "art of the possible."51

Education is the "place" in which humans relate directly to the world, the place in which they reflect and find their vocation as subjects. However, education also has a political commitment: education cannot be neutral or aseptic. Freire says:

It is impossible for me to ask you to think about neutral education, neutral methodology, neutral science or even a neutral God. I always say that every neutrality contains a hidden choice. It is impossible for neutrality to exist in the human praxis. Because of this we have education in the human praxis. Because of this we have education that is for domestication or domination as well as education for liberation. So, I cannot use the same methods and techniques which are used to dominate if my choice is to liberate.52

Education assumes all the human limitations, which means all alienations, and assumes all human potentialities, which means all possible projects. To accept the human being as a project is to be in

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50 Cf. Carlos Alberto Torres Novoa, La Praxis de Paulo Freire, pp. 63-70.

51 "La política; la dirección racional de la acción humana, es el encuentro por excelencia de las expectativas individuales y las expectativas colectivas, en ella se sintetizan todos los esfuerzos de sostén o transformación efectiva de la realidad, solo ella es el 'arte de lo posible'." Ibid., p. 61.

"the rational direction of human action," and expectations, i.e., the political strength which gives to all humans their future and their destiny. Fausto Franco says: "The educational vision which Freire discovers impels us to recognize that it is necessary to take a decisive step: the task is to 'construct man' continuously."

Freedom is constructed in the context of human limitations and human potentialities. Freedom is not a gift; it is a task to be fulfilled. When humans reflect on their limitations, they act upon them to transform those limitations; when humans transform them through their action, they acquire more lucid reflection and thus are able to act more lucidly in the future. In each action humans are open to new reflection; and in each reflection humans are open to new action. The dialectical relationship between action and reflection --which is praxis-- makes humans the subjects of their history. Praxis is the anthropological foundation of the political project of all human beings.

Freedom is created through praxis, which is the human exercise of being the subject of the political project. It is a political freedom because it is the goal of all human beings collectively as well as of them personally, because all humans are subjects of history and culture, because the actualization of human vocation to be subjects and free

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"La visión educativa que Freire descubre nos empuja a reconocer que hace falta dar un paso decisivo: se trata de 'construir al hombre' continuamente." Fausto Franco, El Hombre: Construcción Progresiva, La Tarea Educativa de Paulo Freire, fn. 1, p. 147.

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Freire frequently uses this sentence to refer to a free society.
coincides with the individual and collective expectations, concerns, and values to create a humane and rational project. Our fifth chapter will discuss broadly Freire's concept of freedom.

Here is a brief summary of the last section. The reconceptualization of the human being can have three conceptual nuclei: 1. The historical nucleus which incorporates two principles: the human as subject and as praxis; 2. The cultural nucleus which incorporates two areas of knowledge: history and education; 3. Political freedom as the major aspiration, concern, and value of all people, the anthropological and philosophical terminus ad quem of Freire.

As we have seen there are close relationships between the Brazilian experience of Freire and his criteria by which he differentiates societies, between his understanding of society and his philosophical thought, and between his philosophical thought and his conception of human being.

Here is a brief summary of the entire chapter. The world-view (Weltanschauung) is the social universe, the order of human relations and the terminus a quo of the Freire's thought. There are three kinds of societies which are the principal columns of the social structure: the closed society --the terminus a quo of Freire's social theory-- which in Brazil was in decline; the transitional society --the via ad of Freire's social theory-- which moved from the closed to the open society;
and the open society --the terminus a quern of Freire's social theory-- which in Brazil was emerging but which was defeated.

The closed society reigned during the "reflected," slavocratic, and antidemocratic centuries of the Brazilian colony. Economy, commerce, and social organization were defined by the center (Portugal) and were creating a "series" of aspirations, concerns, and values in the periphery (Brazil). These series were based on social contradictions which could be identified in many ways such as dominator-dominated, landowners-peasants, masters-slaves, rich-poor, Europeans-Africans, bourgeoisie-natives, subjects-objects, oppressors-oppressed. The dominant classes used an elite to maintain this contradictory system, even at the cost of a rigid, authoritarian, and repressive regime. These series of aspirations, concerns, and values were expressed by "epochal themes" which also had their "obstacles" to be removed and their "tasks" to be fulfilled. Ordinary people could not grasp such series, epochal themes, obstacles, and tasks; they were living at a level of a "semi-intransitive consciousness" which was a vision limited to biological survival.

The open society arises when new aspirations, new concerns, new values, new habits, and a new mentality arise. The open society begins when some sectors of the society --some intellectual groups in the case of Brazil-- integrate themselves in their own reality and refuse accommodation to the closed society. "Semi-intransitive," fanatic, and "native-transitive" consciousnesses are overcome, and critical consciousness recognizes old "series" and "epochal themes," old obstacles and tasks, and their dangers and possibilities. Critical consciousness is rational and lucid, receptive and optimistic, dialogic and creative.
The open society is an order of critical consciousness, freedom, and equality. It is without contradictions. It is a transitional society *par excellence* because it always looks for new series, epochal themes, obstacles, and tasks. The open society is an order of democracy, Freire's utopian society. 55

The transitional society was the Brazilian situation in which the original contradiction of the closed society was polarized. This polarization appeared when the closed and old society, which always looked for stability, co-existed with the open and new society, which always looked for change. Polarization existed when the closed society was supported by the oppressors and the open society was supported by the oppressed, when the closed society was about to collapse and the open society about to emerge. Then, there were two alternatives: to be "progresista" which means to be in favor of change in order to have an open society or to be reactionary which means to be against change and in favor of a closed society. "Progresistas" can be the subjects of history because they are "with" the oppressed, they are critical and radical, i.e., they take roots in their own reality and in their own option. Reactionaries think they are the only proprietors of history. They are sectarian and acritical; they depend on the reflections and interpretation of somebody else. The polarization produced a transition

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with "flux" and "reflux," a transition from the closed to the open society.

Then, the Philosophy of Praxis --the via ad of the Freire's philosophical thought-- is at least the basic contradiction of the social reality which arises in the transitional society --the terminus a quo of Freire's Philosophy of Praxis--; the dialectical way to overcome such contradiction --the via ad of Freire's Philosophy of Praxis--; and the overcoming of the contradiction --the terminus ad quem of Freire's Philosophy of praxis. These are principles of Freire's philosophy which I have called Philosophy of Praxis.

Freire's social reality rests on the contradiction oppressor-oppressed. Oppressor-oppressed are two poles of the same contradiction which cannot exist one without the other. They are an antithesis one to the other, and they relate to each other in a dialectical way. The economic contradiction determines the social contradiction in which upper classes always oppress, exploit, and rape and in which the lower classes always are oppressed, exploited, and raped. The socioeconomic contradictions also determine the cultural and political contradictions. When the oppressors suspect the possibility of the open society, they react against the oppressed in a paternalistic way to domesticate them or with repression to stop them. When the oppressed discover they can change the social contradiction, they speak about their rights, they act to make some changes, and they try to participate in power. Technology, education, and all social institutions are used either in favor of the oppressor to maintain the power of the oppressor and to maintain the weakness of the oppressed or in favor of the oppressed to liberate them
and to create the new society.

Praxis is the method to overcome the economic, social, cultural and political contradictions. Praxis is reflection and action upon these realities in order to change them. Praxis is the dialectical relation between reflection and action which breaks all dehumanizing contradictions and creates new things. Inauthentic praxis reflects without action (subjectivism) or acts without reflection (objectivism). Authentic reflection always emerges from action upon reality, and authentic action always is illuminated by reflection. This dialectic not only explains reality but transforms it. It is not objective or subjective but the relationship between them. For Freire, praxis overcomes the contradiction in a historical sense, his ethical foundation; it corresponds to the nature of the human being, his anthropological foundation; and it is the method by which one comes to know the world, his epistemological foundation. Freire says:

If men produce social reality (which in the "inversion of the praxis" turns back upon them and conditions them), then transforming that reality is an historical task, a task for men.56

When the process of praxis begins, oppression increases. This growing of oppression shows violence to be an important part of the contradictory system. There is violence not only in the exercise of despotism, domestication, and discrimination against the oppressed. This violence also violates the most elemental rights of humans and denies the ontological vocation of all people, i.e., always to be human. The

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Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 36.
rebellion of the oppressed is a consequence of the violence generated by the oppressors. This rebellion is grounded in the necessity to be treated as humans and to create a more rational, just, and peaceful order. The oppressors, who are the beneficiaries of the oppression, never will generate a struggle against themselves to humanize all people. Humanization can only come from the act of liberation of the oppressed. The historical overcoming of the contradiction will come through praxis. But such overcoming begins with the overcoming of the psycho-social obstacles in the oppressed, i.e., the social contradiction and "the image of the oppressor" in the consciousness of the oppressed people, their blindness to their own alienation, their docility, self-depreciation, fanaticism, and dependence. The obstacles generate a necrophilic behavior and lead to the oppressed's own destruction. The overcoming of the social and psychological contradiction comes when the point of reference given by the two poles of contradiction are superseded by a new concept of the human being.

The Anthropology of Freire's philosophy is the terminus ad quem of the Freire's philosophical thought. The basic anthropological questions are the keystone, the terminus a quo of Freire's anthropology. Freire reconceptualizes the human being, the via ad of Freire's anthropology. He proposes freedom as the maximum goal, the terminus ad quem of Freire's anthropology and his philosophy as a whole.

Freire discusses broadly the anthropological questions: Who is man? is the question about the concept of being human. Where is man? is the question about the place of the human being in the world. What shall man do? is the question of the human capacity to act.
The reconceptualization of human nature begins with the differentiation between animals and human beings, the Differentia Specifica. Humans are "with" in addition to being "in" the world. To be "in" is to be under the permanent and powerful impact of the physical, cultural, and social world. To be "with" is to be the subject, not the object, especially of man's cultural and social world. Such a position in the world makes humans know the world and give them the possibility of transforming it. Such knowledge and transformation is possible only with a critical consciousness.

There are three conceptual nuclei which support the practical implications of Freire's anthropology: first, the historical nucleus which considers man as a being in space and time, i.e., man as historical being. Man is the subject in his own world, i.e., he is conscious of himself and his world. He is praxis, i.e., he acts and reflects to transform his world. Second, the cultural nucleus which considers the reconceptualization of the human being. That means that man, as a being of praxis, is a being of work and creation, i.e., he is a cultural being. He is not only a historical being but a being who makes history, i.e., man creates historical epochs. He can be educated for adaptation or for freedom. Third, the political nucleus which considers the historical and cultural reconceptualization that puts human in a political commitment, i.e., to be oppressed or to be free. Education cannot be neutral, i.e., humans can be educated to be domesticated or to liberate themselves, to alienate themselves or to assume human limitations and potentialities. Freedom is a political construction, the most important task of a human being.
So, the philosophical thought of Paulo Freire has three "first universal principles." First, the social view of his world which, given his experience in Brazil, differentiates three kind of societies: the closed, transitional, and open society. Second, the anthropological contradiction of this social reality, the dialectical method to overcome such contradiction, and the real overcoming of it. Third, the redefinition of human nature as the keystone of Freire's philosophy and the postulation of freedom as the major goal of his philosophy. These principles will determine Freire's philosophy of education which I will discuss in the next chapter.
CHAPTER IV

FREIRE'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Cada época, al crear su cultura, va diseñando un tipo humano, una imagen especial del hombre. Esta imagen genera una teoría de la educación, y de cada teoría educativa fluye un sistema pedagógico derivado.1 Juan Mantovani

The relevance of Freire for us is not the philosophy he constructs as a universal, rational, and unitive system but the relationship he establishes between philosophy and educational practice. His philosophy of education is not a "verbalism" disconnected from concrete experience; nor is his educational experience an "activism" disconnected from critical reflection. Freire's philosophy of education, as well as his philosophy as a whole, is a result of his dialectical relationship. The subjects in his educational "laboratory" were illiterate people such as the peasants of the state of Pernambuco in Brazil or the illiterate of Guinea-Bissau in Africa.

Now, an educational practice is not valid if it does not have

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1 "Each epoch, upon creating its culture, tries to bring about a type of human, a special image of man. This image generates a theory of education, and from each educational theory flows a derived pedagogical system." Juan Mantovani, Educación y Plenitud Humana (Buenos Aires: "El ATENEO" Editorial, 1968), p. 18.

a clear philosophy of what it is to be human, the central subject of educational activity. The anthropological foundation is the educational terminus a quo of Freire's philosophy of education.

If Freire needed --at the philosophical level-- to rethink the traditional conception of the human being, it is clear that he needed also to reconceptualize education, the via ad of his philosophy of education. The educational reconceptualization is made in the light of the educational practice which deals with a human being ever in process.

If education functions as the maintainer of oppression, dependence, and marginalization, then it obstructs freedom. If it works against these social situation, then it helps create freedom. The construction of a free human is the educational terminus ad quem of Freire's philosophy of education.

1. THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS

The anthropological foundations are the terminus a quo of Freire's philosophy of education as a whole which I want to discuss in three different steps. The so-called "culture of silence" which is the terminus a quo of Freire's anthropological foundations of education; such culture is an anthropological contradiction. The educational dialectical method, his concept of conscientization, which is the via ad of Freire's anthropological foundations of education. The culture of freedom, which is the terminus ad quem of his anthropological foundations of education.

a) The Cultural Contradiction

Cultural oppression was characteristic of Brazil and the rest
of Latin American countries in colonial times (the closed society).

"The prevailing kind of economic domination," Freire says, "determined a culture of domination which once internalized, meant the conditioning of submissive behavior." In Brazil, the only voice one could hear was the voice of the pulpit. Freire remembers a homily of Rev. Antonio Vieira who said, "The worst crisis faced by Brazil during its illness was the silencing of its speech." The people of colonial Brazil lived in a "culture of silence."

From the gaining of independence in the last century until the present time, it has been common to say that Latin American countries have been in transition between underdevelopment and development. People who believe that this transition has been occurring use as examples Venezuela and Brazil. However, there is a misunderstanding in the conception of development and modernization. Freire says, "Although development implies modernization, modernization is not, in itself, development." If modernization is imported or developed inside an underdeveloped country without a global development of the entire country, methods and techniques are used to maintain the status quo and to control the order of domination. The only way to have


4 Ibid., 171.

5 Ibid., 172.
development is to break the structures of dependence. Freire says:

Development is achieved only when the locus of decision for the transformations suffered by a being is found within and not outside of him. And this does not happen with dependent societies, which are alienated and, as such, are "object societies." When the sources of decision-making, including the political, economic, and cultural aspects, continues [sic] to be outside, in the metropolitan society upon which the common people depend, only a modernization process is achieved.6

The conditions of oppression, dependence, and marginalization have made possible a "culture of silence" which has survived the colonial times and whose conditions are also the reasons that such culture survives today. Now, according to Freire, when we are living in a transitional society, cultural freedom will never take place if the basic contradiction is not eradicated.

Isobar as they are "closed societies" predominantly dependent, going through a process of modernization but not of development, their power elite, separated from the masses and afraid of structural changes, does nothing but invade the value frame of the popular classes in order to impose its options and frustrate their action and under these circumstances it is not possible to speak about cultural freedom.7

"Culture of silence" is understood only as part of a greater whole. There is a culture which determines the voice of the culture of silence. Culture of silence is not created in a laboratory nor by spontaneous generation. Freire, quoting José Luis Fiori, says:

It is not the dominator who constructs a culture and imposes it on the dominated. This culture is the result of the structural rela-

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., p. 175.
Again, we are confronted by the contradiction of oppressor-oppressed, the anthropological contradiction which generates a culture of the oppressor and a culture of the oppressed. Both pole oppose each other but each of them exists in function of the other.

The culture of the oppressor has the following characteristics:
1. It exists in the center, the "director society," and outside of the oppressed culture.
2. It is convinced of its infallibility and of the excellence of its thought and language.
3. It is certain that it will be followed by the dependent culture.
4. It thinks of itself as free and not alienated.
5. It prescribes and imposes its knowledge and language on the dependent culture.

The culture of the oppressed has also the following characteristics:
1. It exists in the periphery and outside of the oppressor culture.
2. The culture of the oppressor does not give existence to the culture of the oppressed; alongside of the culture of the oppressor but in a silent way. It is a "culture of silence" not because it is less a culture but because the oppressed culture has subjected it to silence.
3. The culture of the oppressed is dependent on the culture of the oppressor.
4. Its thought and language are alienated: they do not correspond to their reality and are inauthentic. The reality in which the oppressed culture lives is an imagined one. Its thinking and words are expressing and reflecting the thought and language of the culture.

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8 Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom, pp. 32, 33.
of the oppressor. 5. It is irresistibly attracted to the culture of
the oppressor even if it is never heard by the oppressor.

The man of the oppressed culture is the same as the oppressed
of the closed societies. The oppressed person is nostalgic. He is
never truly committed to the world and he always wants "to appear like
the oppressor" rather than "to be" a human being. The oppressed cul-
ture is dehumanized. It is dependent and marginalized society. It is
controlled by a regime imposed by an elite which is external to the
local reality, whether they are regimes outside of a specific country
or domestic regimes. Freire says:

The dependent society is by definition a silent society. Its
voice is not an authentic voice, but merely an echo of the
voice of the metropolis --in every way, the metropolis speaks,
the dependent society listens.9

When the "culture of silence" emerges to break its submissive
silence, elites react violently and repression occurs. If the op-
pressed think and speak by themselves, this is considered a crime. In
these conditions, the contradictions are evident and the transitional
times are at hand.

Freire begins his philosophy of education in the midst of the
"culture of silence," not as a member of the culture of the oppressor
but as someone refusing to be an oppressor. His commitment is with
the oppressed and his pedagogy is a "pedagogy of the oppressed." He
says:

9
Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom, p. 34.
At a time in Brazil when the "culture of silence" was being exposed for what it is, I began, as a man of the Third World, to elaborate not a mechanical method for adult literacy learning, but an educational theory generated in the womb of the culture of silence itself --a theory which could become in practice not the voice of the culture, but one of the instruments of that still faltering voice.10

"The pedagogy of the oppressed," Freire says, "must be forged with, not for, the oppressed."

A pedagogy made "for" the oppressed presupposes verticality in which at the top are the people who educate and at the bottom are the people who are educated, i.e., a contradictory relationship. Content, methods and objectives are designed by specialists or technicians, and all the process is managed by educators. If specialists, technicians, and educators are not committed "with" the oppressed, they choose a content which is imposed on the "ignorants," a method which "domesticates" them, and objectives which are not their objectives. The two poles of the social contradiction are evident in this kind of education.

Specialists, technicians, and educators who are not committed to the oppressed are members of the cultural ghetto of the oppressors, and for this reason, members of the social "center." They come from the center to save the people who are in the "periphery." If they are not identified with the oppressed, they are with the oppressors, and

\[10\]
Ibid., p 4.

\[11\]
they fulfill oppressive objectives. Educators "for" the oppressed transform students into "objects" just as the oppressors do in other areas because specialists, technicians, and educators are also oppressors. Agronomists, for instance, are oppressors and invaders when, without taking into account the human presence of peasants, they transfer techniques and knowledge from the center to the periphery.

The crucial fact for Freire is that he has had his most important educational experiences among peasants and in a literacy project. Peasants are the peripheral past of the social structure, and the illiterate are the most oppressed people in all societies. A most "Restless Man" in the task of literacy, Frank C. Laubach, has described what it means to be illiterate:

The real tragedy is that they have no voice in public affairs, they never vote, they are never represented in any conference, they are the silent victims, the forgotten men, driven like animals, mutely submitting in every age before and since the pyramids were built. It is a human weakness not to become aware of suffering unless we hear a cry. The illiterate majority of the human race does not know how to make its cry reach us, and we never dream how this millions suffer.

As we have seen in the Second Chapter, Latin American countries, including Venezuela and Brazil, have had very high rates of illiteracy. Freire's practical education with the illiterates, who socially are at

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the lower cultural point of emergence, was the *terminus a quo* of his philosophy of education. Illiterates are the "culture of silence" of the "culture of the oppressors". They have not had access to the center, and they have not even been permitted to create and re-create their own culture.

b) *Conscientization, the Dialectical Method*

The cultural contradiction exists as a consequence of a contradictory society. However, social as well as cultural realities exist as a result of human creation. As I have said, neither social nor cultural realities exist by chance. They do not have a natural and deterministic origin. Praxis is the way of creation, a point fully discussed in the Third Chapter of this work. But what is the cultural method to deal with an anthropological contradiction? The discussion of man becomes crucial.

Freire begins his discussion of the human being by differentiating him from animals while trying to clarify the uniqueness of human nature. Animals live "in" the world and humans exist "in" and "with" the world. To be "in" involves contacts and to be "with" involves relationships; to be "in" means to knock without communications and to be "with" means to be "open". This exclusive characteristic I have called *Differentia Specifica*.

However, to be "with" is not the negation of to be "in". Of course, to be human is to be "in" the world just as animals are in the world. To be human is to be indissolubly connected to the world, environment, and context. It is to be connected to one's biological
inheritance. Humans need to find their food such as nature offers, just as other beings need to. Human beings have to find shelter from the storms, protection from the extreme cold or extreme heat, and special treatment for illness. To be human is to be under the powerful forces of the physical world.

What Freire says is that humans, in addition to being "in" the world, are "with" the world. To be "with" is that which differentiates human beings from other living beings in the world. Human have a plurality of relations motivated by a variety of challenges unlike animals which face only stimuli. Challenges do not permit pre-established responses even if people face only one and the same challenge. Challenges always demand rational organization to bring the best response. In addition, humans test their response, change their answers if necessary, and act according to their own judgment. Animals "react" to stimuli and are satisfied with simple reaction patterns. In other words, humans are rational (Homo Sapiens) and animals are "reactive." Humans respond reflectively to challenges perceived, and animals react reflexively and automatically to stimuli.

To reflect upon the world means "to gain objective distance from it" and to take reality as object. Humans can sever their adherence to the natural world and transcend it through their reflection. To reflect is to objectivize human existence "in" the world and one's own reflection. As Charles Isaacs says:

"Not only can I reflect on the world but I can reflect on my reflections. I can use reasoning in my reasoning. I am
This capacity, without which humans cannot operate intellectually, enables humans to be temporal and, at the same time, transcendent. Humans have consciousness of yesterday, today, and tomorrow; they are immersed in history. They inherit from the past, incorporate from the present, and modify the future. With their action humans are "in" time and emerge from it. Humans emerge from time because they are "with" time, inside of it but objectivizing it. When they objectivize their own time, they discover their own temporality, i.e., they are not imprisoned by a permanent "today" --as the cat, Freire says-- with an unidimensional present.

When humans emerge from reality and objectivize it, they identify their limitations, their obstacles, and their tasks, which are what Freire calls "limit-situations." But their limitations are not the final frontiers in which the action of human beings cannot be fulfilled but challenges for new actions, challenges to transcend reality. Humans have consciousness of their world and transcend the world and themselves through their action.

Thus, to reflect is not just a vague and uncommitted thinking. Humans always "reflect upon" specific problems in order to "act upon" them. To reflect is never, Freire says, "a mere reflec--

tion of, but a reflection upon, material reality." When humans reflect, they try to act; when they act, they try to transform. The most immediate way to realize a human intention is action and the final point of such action is production. Before humans act, they decide what they wish to do, according to a plan of action which specifies what would be the most adequate tools. Before humans act, they anticipate their work and the product of their work.

The intentional character of the human being gives sense to the world. When humans grasp data from the world, analyze all the data which has been grasped, and plan their action, they see their world not only as a "set of parameters" but as a problem to be solved. The world is not a given, and humans are not in a world without sense: world and humans are with a purpose, the purpose which humans elaborate. Humans are intentional beings who always "project" that which they are expecting to be, to do, or to have. Quoting Marx, Freire says: "At the end of every labor-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the laborer at its commencement." Humans are a force of action, i.e., a force of transformation, of work, and of creation. Action as transformation means that humans act upon the world to adapt it to their needs. They refuse to be adapted. Action

15 Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom, p. 29

as work means that humans act in the light of their reflection. "Only men work," Freire says. The so-called work of animals lacks reflection and intention. Sometimes, the work of animals only reflects the work of men, as in the circus, or only serves men. Action as creation is a force of production. Humans transform their world, invent and re-invent, create and re-create, make culture, and determine history. Freire summarizes his concept of action in the following paragraph:

Action is work not because of the greater or lesser physical effort expended in it by the acting organism, but because of the consciousness the subject has in his own effort, his possibility of programming action, of creating tools and using them to mediate between himself and the object of his action, of having purposes, of anticipating results. Still more, for action to be work, it must result in significant products, which while distinct from the active agent, at the same time condition him and become the object of his reflection.17

Human beings have the vocation to be subjects because they have consciousness of being unfinished, they feel they have not been made complete, they are always in the process of being made. So, they modify the world because they want to be more. They have a necessity --an ontological necessity-- to fulfill themselves, to humanize themselves. When they do not do it, they fossilize and immobilize themselves. Freire says:

Man is an unfinished being, and conscious of being unfinished. This is not the case with "beings in themselves" which are also unfinished. Animals and trees do not know themselves as unfinished. Man is a being who permanently seeks. Man could not exist if he did not search. Just as there could be no search

17
Ibid., pp. 31,32.
Humans are subjects because they "separate" themselves from (reflect upon) their world, their activities, and even themselves; but they are subjects also because in this separation they remain within their world in order to act, to transform, to work, to create, and to produce. These are the anthropological foundations of praxis (action-reflection) which I have discussed in Chapter Three. In each action-reflection humans fulfill their own humanity, and in each praxis humans humanize their own world and their own existence in the world. If humans lack one of the two components of praxis, they dehumanize themselves and become adapted and objects without capacity to live humanely in the world. Action without reflection is only activity without orientation and intentionality. Reflection without action is only words without the power of transformation. Humans cannot be subjects without praxis, because praxis is the dialectical way of relationship between humans and their world, a relationship which Freire calls integration, not adaptation.

Integration is the continual relationship between man and his world and between the world and man, one affecting the other. In this integration, the world is modified by the human being and the human

18 "Como un ser inconcluso y consciente de ser inconcluso (lo que no pasa en los "seres en sí" que, inconclusos también, como los animales, los árboles, no se saben inconclusos) el hombre es un ser de la búsqueda permanente. No podría haber hombre sin búsqueda, de la misma forma como no habría búsqueda sin mundo." Paulo Freire, "La Concepción 'Bancaria' de la Educación y la Humanización; la Concepción Problematizadora de la Educación y la Humanización." Cristianismo y Sociedad, Suplemento (Setiembre 1968):18.
being is modified by the world. When action-reflection takes place, the world is modified; but when the world is modified, human action-reflection is modified also. Action and reflection, which are the exclusive characteristics of humans, create a human world; and the world, which provides limitations to the creation of humans, modifies the reflection and action which makes human the human being. There is a dialectical relationship between human beings and their world.

These relationships occur in a physical and historical context. The physical context is the here of the human praxis. The historical reality is the before, now, and after of the human praxis. The concept of praxis, like the concept of the human being, is not an ideal concept but expresses a real relationship between humans and their world.

Up to this point, I have pointed out the anthropological foundations of praxis which is the dialectical method human beings use to deal with the historical-social contradiction of oppressor-oppressed, which is according to Freire the specific world of the human being. But, what specific method can or should be employed to deal with the cultural contradiction? Freire postulates the process of "conscientização" (conscientization) as a cultural method which will overcome this contradiction. But what does conscientization mean? Basically, the root of conscientization is the concept of praxis. However, conscientization has a more specific connotation as a cultural method. Conscientization is praxis, but praxis which leads from a naive consciousness to a critical one. In this process transformation is the nature of action, and consciousness is the nature of reflection. Both
of them have a dialectical relationship which is found in praxis. Transformation and consciousness are the constitutive elements of the cultural method.

c) The Overcoming of the Cultural Contradiction

The cultural contradiction, as well as the social contradiction, has its roots in an anthropological contradiction. Such contradiction exists because human actions create alienation. If it is true that human action transforms the world, it is also true that the transformation of the world does not always humanize people. "The process of transforming the world," Freire says, "can lead to his humanization as well as his dehumanization, to his growth or domination." Humans, in contrast to animals, are the only beings who can transform the world and, in transforming it, impregnate it with their curiosity and invention, i.e., they can humanize the world. In other words, humans are the only beings who can dehumanize or humanize themselves through their own action. Humanization and dehumanization are two options which humans cannot avoid. Freire says:

Animals cannot "animalize" the world. "Animalization" of the world would be intimately linked to the "animalization" of animals... However, while they skillfully construct their lives and "manufacture" honey, bees remain bees in their contact with the world, they do not become more or less bees.

The people of Latin America have lived in a system of oppression,

19 Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom, p. 31.

20 Ibid., p. 30.
in the anthropological contradiction of oppressor-oppressed, which has generated the "culture of silence" in opposition to the culture of those who "have a voice," i.e., the culture of the oppressors. The culture of the contradiction is a dehumanized culture. Conscientization is the method of praxis which overcomes the contradiction and leads from dehumanization to humanization. We can observe here that the "culture of silence" --the most dehumanized culture-- is the cultural terminus a quo. The culture of freedom, not the culture of the oppressors, is the cultural terminus ad quem.

But a culture of freedom will not come into being without the insertion of humans in their social and anthropological contradiction. People cannot have cultural freedom unless they insert themselves in the struggle to overcome the social and anthropological contradiction. To try to be free without changing the infrastructure is to be condemned to oppression. Freedom is the common objective of both infra- and superstructure. For this reason Freire affirms:

Conscientization implies, then, that when I realize that I am oppressed, I also know I can liberate myself if I transform the concrete situation where I find myself oppressed. Obviously, I can't transform it in my head: that would be to fall into the philosophical error of thinking that awareness "creates" reality, I would be decreeing that I am free, by my mind. And yet, the structures would continue to be the same as ever -- so that I wouldn't be free. No, conscientization implies a critical insertion into a process, it implies a historical commitment to make changes.21

Conscientization is, in strict cultural terms, the process by which one goes from a naive to a critical consciousness. Naive consciousness as a distorted way of being is a dehumanized consciousness. Critical consciousness is the normal way of being; it is the humanized consciousness. But such a process does not happen at the subjective level. Conscientization is, as praxis, the dialectical relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, between reflection and action, between consciousness and reality, between man and the historical world.

The process of conscientization begins with the identification of the so-called "semi-intransitive consciousness," the lowest level of being human. Freire, talking about this consciousness, says:

> In its quasi-immersion in concrete reality, this consciousness fails to perceive many of reality's challenges, or perceives them in a distorted way. Its semi-intransitiveness is a kind of obliteration imposed by objective conditions. Because of this obliteration, the only data which the dominated consciousness grasps are the data which lie within the orbit of its lived experience.22

Semi-intransitive consciousness is so dominated by the social structures that it cannot have the distance from reality necessary to objectivize, perceive, analyze, and know such reality. People with semi-intransitive consciousness do not understand their own situation in daily life and the structural level of reality, i.e., the causal links of the historical-cultural phenomenon. They are not able to perceive causality. What they do is attribute all facts and situa-

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tions to superior powers or to their own "natural" incapacity. In other words, the causal links are thought to be outside of reality, and consciousness turns fatalistic, defensive, and magical. Their action is not oriented towards the transformation of reality but towards themselves or the superior powers, generally through different kinds of rites.

Semi-intransitive consciousness is adapted to its world, has narrow areas of interests, is impermeable to challenges outside of its sphere, is easily prey to magical explanations, and is generally illogical. Because such consciousness blocks out many aspects of reality or cannot discern all elements existing in what it perceives, it disengages human beings from their own reality and from their own existence "in" and "with" the world. Even if these humans do perceive some problems, they distort them. The semi-intransitive consciousness is a "quasi-immersion" in reality, a dehumanized way of being in the world.

Semi-intransitive consciousness is the lower level of consciousness. The so-called "naive transitive consciousness" is the first level of transition of the human consciousness, Freire says:

The transitive consciousness emerges as a naive consciousness, as dominated as the former [semi-intransitive consciousness]. Nevertheless, it is now indisputably more disposed to perceiving the source of its ambiguous existence in the objective conditions of society.23

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23 Ibid.
Naive transitive consciousness is a contradictory consciousness. On the one hand, it maintains semi-intransitive characteristics, but on the other hand, it emerges to a new stage of existence.

First of all, the semi-intransitive consciousness has four characteristics: the condition of domination, the susceptibility to the myths of the oppressors or their elites, the condition of "quasi-immersion," and the gregarious life. So, it is not strange that the naive transitive consciousness carries with it a magical interpretation, a nostalgia for the past, and fanciful explanations. People with naive transitive consciousness oversimplify problems, underestimate their own capacity, lose a spirit of investigation, use fragile arguments and an emotive style, and adapt a polemical attitude. Their dialogue is distorted. These people usually react mechanically to stimuli and become sectarian, irrational, and fanatical.

But the naive transitive consciousness is the consciousness emerging from silence. Something new happens. Consciousness is able to objectivize and analyze elements which were not perceptible before. Thus, people who have naive consciousness begin to be actively present in their historical process, desiring to overcome their silence, applying pressure to the elites who have the power, and anxious for freedom. The naive consciousness comes to grips with its social reality, rejects imported schema, demonstrates the existence of contradictions, demands solutions to their problems, is dynamic, and provokes

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24 Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, p. 18.
conflicts. The people with naive transitive consciousness want to know, in spite of their naivete. They want to create ways of overcoming their state of oppression, dependence, and marginalization.

However, the expectations of overcoming silence and the anxiety for freedom produce in the elites not only surprise but also the anxiety to maintain the status quo. Taking advantage of the naive transitive consciousness, the elite may make a superficial and paternalistic transformation, may give a "political opiate" to maintain the naive consciousness and the habit of being directed, or may accelerate intentionally the process of manipulation, such as has been the case with populist governments.

The consciousness which emerges from a naive transitive consciousness tends to grow in one of two possible directions: toward an "irrational consciousness" or toward a "critical consciousness."

The movement from naive transitive consciousness to a critical consciousness is not spontaneous. It is mediated by an active and dialogical education focused on social and political responsibility. When such education does not occur, naive consciousness moves towards a "fanatical" or "irrational" consciousness. This distortion of consciousness acquires a "pathological form." This distortion is more disengaged from its own reality than was semi-intransitive consciousness. People with irrational consciousness are socially adapted and

dominated; they are converted en masse. People act on the basis of emotions—they have an irrational mystique and never dialogize. They follow prescriptions as if they were their own; they are manipulated and treated as objects.

Freire explains broadly the populist governments as a system which manipulates consciousness. However, another example could be technological manipulation. In spite of the fact that he considers technology as the natural phase of a creative process toward man's humanization, he says that the technological system could result in the creation of a robot human being:

They do not have to think about even the smallest things; there is always some manual which says what to do in situation "a" or "b". Rarely do men have to pause at a street corner to think which direction to follow. There's always an arrow which de-problematizes the situation. Though street signs are not evil in themselves, and are necessary in cosmopolitan cities, they are among thousands of directional signals in a technological society which, introjected by men, hinder their capacity for critical thinking.26

Technological systems dehumanize people by manipulating them. Specialists are, for instance, generally incapable of critical thinking because they lose their vision of reality as a whole. "They cannot even think correctly in the area of their specialization," Freire says. People react to prescriptions received from the mass media. All things are prefabricated; all behavior is automatized.

Critical consciousness arises when some basic distinctions appear. I will point out at least five of them:

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26 Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom, p. 50.
First, when humans discover their own nature. The nature of the human being assumes that being human is the only necessary condition for the perception of phenomena which are presented by the human reality and for the perception of the causal links of those phenomena.

Second, when humans discover the nature of the world. The nature of the world shows that all phenomena and causal links are in a constant process of change. Freire says with Heraclitus of Ephesus (544–483 B.C.) that everything is in continuous flux and permanent change. *Panta rei* was the expression of Heraclitus.

Third, when humans know that their perceptions and knowledge are not absolutes. They analyze constantly all phenomena and their cultural links because reality always is changing. The factors present in a specific moment are different from those in another moment, especially if they are economic, social, political, or cultural factors.

Fourth, when humans see their perceptions and analysis not as an intellectual exercise with a purpose in itself but as one which corresponds to an intention, i.e., to a specific action. Once humans recognize a challenge, they grasp it; they try to understand it in its phenomena and in its causal links; as humans they look for possible ways of responding. They act.

Fifth, when humans discover that the nature of action corre-

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sponds to the nature of understanding. If humans have a magical or
naive understanding, their action will be magical or naive also. If
they have a critical understanding, their action will be critical too.

Critical consciousness begins when consciousness is modified
by the knowledge and experience of human action upon reality. This
critical consciousness is a dialectical process which is acquired
inevitably in the dialectical relationship between reflection and ac­
tion, perception and transformation, knowledge and creation. Critical
consciousness deepens one's interpretation of problems, looks for the
facts and their causal links, tests and reviews all findings, avoids
distortions in the process of grasping, avoids preconceptions in the
process of analysis, and assumes responsibility for the consequent
action. Critical consciousness is active, dialogical, and open. It
is not polemical; it does not reject the old because of its oldness; it
accepts whatever is valid of the old and the new. Critical conscious­
ness is a transitive consciousness which makes people receptive to
outside influences and creates beings with the possibility of relating
with their own world. People with critical consciousness make a
strong commitment to their own existence and always are ready to opt
in favor of that which provides for their own humanization.

Semi-intransitive consciousness is typical of closed struc­
tures. It corresponds to the closed societies which generate the con­
tradiction between the culture of those who "have a voice" and the
"culture of silence" of those who have no voice. Talking about this
consciousness, Freire says:
This mode of consciousness is still found to be predominant in Latin American rural areas where large property holdings (latifundios) are the rule. The rural areas constitute "closed societies" which maintain the "culture of silence" intact.28

According to Emilio Monti, in the decade of the nineteen seventies, the rural areas oscillated between 14% to 80% of the entire population of Latin America. The culture of silence with a semi-intransitive consciousness is, if not the majority of the Latin American population, a significant percentage.

Naive transitive consciousness is typical of transitional societies. Their principal characteristic is the evident contradiction of oppressor-oppressed in the struggle for power. Talking about this consciousness, Freire says:

The passage of the masses from a semi-intransitive to a naive transitive state of consciousness is also the moment of an awakening consciousness on the part of the elites, a decisive moment for the critical consciousness of progressive groups.30

Critical consciousness is typical both of a society in the process of opening, and of an open society. Freire says that critical consciousness is typical of pre-revolutionary times in which the natural reaction of the oppressors is a coup d'etat, i.e., the violent reaction of the oppressors to reduce people to a culture of silence again. But

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29 Cf. p. 67.

Freire says that critical consciousness is typical also of revolutionary times; it is the consciousness of a free people. Here, an open society is a revolutionary society. I will discuss the concept of revolution in my next chapter (Chapter V). Jeréz and Hernández Pico, talking about the critical consciousness, summarize:

Critical consciousness...implies a questioning of the relationship between men and the structural world in which they live, a heightened sensitivity to sloganizing, and ideologizing. That is, to any kind of manipulation. To grasp with the mind the truth of reality, to engage in praxis (i.e., thought-action upon one's world), are the creative postures that critical consciousness makes possible and in which it finds a propitious climate for its growth. Ultimately, only by critical consciousness can men and the societies they live in become the source of their own decision.32

In summary, we can see how the culture of oppression, domination, or silence, --the terminus a quo of the anthropological foundations of education-- inherits the anthropological contradiction of society: oppressor-oppressed. Freire locates himself on the side of the oppressed. The culture of the oppressed emerges when the oppressed discover their own nature: to be "in" and "with" their world. Humans are beings of plurality of relations, challenges, and responses. Submerged in time, they emerge from it, objectivizing, reflecting, and transcending their limitations. Humans are subjects, not objects, of reflection and action which transform their world. They humanize themselves by transforming their world. Praxis (action and reflection) is the method of

31 Cf. Ibid., pp. 42-52.

relating humans and their world. Conscientization --the via ad of the anthropological foundations of education-- is cultural praxis. Conscientization overcomes cultural contradiction. Conscientization emerges from the culture of silence, the culture of the semi-intransitive consciousness, and goes from the naive-transitive consciousness to the critical consciousness, the consciousness of the culture of freedom, the terminus ad quem of the anthropological foundations of education. Such cultural action necessarily demands a reconceptualization of education.

2. THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF EDUCATION

The anthropological contradiction of society and culture, the method of praxis and conscientization which overcomes such a contradiction, and the necessity of reconceptualizing the human being as a point of reference, determine the reconceptualization of education. Freire sees the contradiction of society generating an educational contradiction which he calls "banking" education, his terminus a quo of the reconceptualization of education. There is a new method to overcome such contradiction, the via ad of the reconceptualization of education. This method will propose the so-called "problem posing" education, the terminus ad quem of the reconceptualization of education. I will discuss these three points.

a) The "Banking" Concept of Education

One of the basic characteristics of education as banking is its anthropological contradiction. The relationship between teacher and student is antithetical. The teacher justifies his own existence
in the "absolute ignorance" of students and recognizes himself as the proprietor of knowledge. Students, on their part, accept the "absolute knowledge" of teachers and accept also their own "ignorance."

Teachers are necessary because they know everything students need to know. Students are necessary also because they do not possess the knowledge that only teachers have. Each of them survives in function of the other and each of them has a dialectical relationship with the other.

This contradictory relationship is mediated by a narrative method. "Education", Freire says, "is suffering from narration sickness," another characteristic of the banking education. This education considers teachers as those who use narration to perform their instruction. This method makes the teacher the subject of education, a person who fills up students with the contents of his narration.

"The more completely he fills the receptacles," Freire says, "the better a teacher he is." The teacher has no concern about communicating with his students; what a teacher wants is to send communiques and to make deposits. Freire says:

> According to this conception, the student is like a "vessel" in which the "educator" is making his deposits. A "vessel" which is filled by "knowledge" as if knowing were the result of a passive act of receiving gifts or prescriptions of others."35

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34 Ibid., p. 58

35 "Según esta concepción, el educando es como si fuera una "olla" en la cual el "educador" va haciendo sus depósitos. Una "olla" que va siendo llenada de "conocimientos" como si el conocer fuera resultado de un acto pasivo de recibir donaciones o imposiciones de otros." Paulo Freire, "La Concepción 'Bancaria' de la Enseñanza," p. 17.
Traditional education considers students as those who receive the content of what teachers narrate. Students are listeners. They collect information and catalogue knowledge. They memorize and repeat content mechanically. Students are the passive "receptacles" who have to be filled. They do not participate in a process of communication; they are receivers of communiques. The students are objects, not subjects of education. "The more meekly the receptacles permit themselves to be filled", Freire says, "the better students they are."

Summarizing this contradiction, Freire says:

(a) The teacher teaches and students are taught;  
(b) the teacher knows everything and the students know nothing;  
(c) the teacher thinks and the students are thought about;  
(d) the teacher talks and the students listen meekly;  
(e) the teacher disciplines and the students are disciplined;  
(f) the teacher chooses and enforces his choice, and the students comply;  
(g) the teacher acts and the students have the illusion of acting through the action of the teacher;  
(h) the teacher chooses the program content, and the student (who were not consulted) adapts to it;  
(i) the teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his own professional authority, which he sets in opposition to the freedom of the students;  
(j) the teacher is the subject of the learning process, while the pupils are mere objects. 37

The content of the teacher's narration is disconnected from the dynamic process of reality and is explained without "life," in a "petrified" way. This is a third characteristic of education as banking. This content is completely alien to the existential experience of

36 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 58.

37 Ibid., p. 59.
students. It is also isolated from the totality in which such content is engendered and from which it receives its significance. With this kind of content, teachers isolate the student's consciousness from the world causing an alienation in which the student acquires a fatalistic perception at best of his own situation. Teachers prepare their lessons in their study and, in a second moment, they expound their knowledge. However, students have not the experience of cognition because here knowledge is content, a "private property" of teachers, which is brought as a "gift." Education as banking is a vertical relationship in which teachers always have the academic authority. Teachers resist dialoguing with students and, when they talk with them, they assume a paternalistic attitude. Lessons are "verbalisms" and the words used are alienated and empty of concreteness. "Teacher talks about reality," Freire says, "as if it were motionless, static, compartmentalized, and predictable."

When students consider themselves empty beings to be filled, they not only consider themselves passive entities but are easily "domesticable." Domestication is the fourth characteristic of education as banking. This education not only begins with a false understanding of men as passive objects but maintains them in such passivity. Still more, education as banking strengthens passivity and adaptation. The task of teachers is to regulate the way in which students will be filled. The method with which they will better "fit" in the

38 Ibid., p. 57.
world is that which will make them well behaved, domesticated like animals. Freire says:

The more students work at storing the deposit entrusted to them, the less they develop the critical consciousness which would result from their intervention in the world as transformers of the world. The more completely they accept the passive role imposed on them, the more they tend simply to adapt to the world as it is and to the fragmented view of reality deposited in them... The more the oppressed can be led to that situation, the more easily they can be dominated.39

Education as banking is "necrophilic," the fifth characteristic of this education. The term "necrophilia" is used by Freire in the sense in which Erich Fromm uses it. Fromm says that this world is traditionally used "to denote a sexual perversion." However, in a general sense, he says that necrophilia refers to the people who are "fascinated by all that is not alive, all that is dead." In a paragraph that Freire quotes, Fromm explains:

The necrophilous person loves all that does not grow, all that is mechanical. The necrophilous person is driven by the desire to "transform the organic into the inorganic, to approach life mechanically, as if all living persons were things. All living processes, feelings, and thoughts are transformed into things... The necrophilous person can relate to an object --a flower or a person-- only if he possesses it... if he loses possession he loses contact with the world. That is why we find the paradoxical reaction that he would rather lose life than possession, even though by losing life he who possesses has ceased to exist. He loves control, and in the act of controlling he kills life.41

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Ibid., 60.

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Ibid., p. 41.
Education as banking is necrophilic because it transforms students into objects, passive recipients, domesticated persons. Teachers control thinking because students are obligated to receive the information of teachers, who are academic authorities, in an acritical way. They must accept the partial view of reality which teachers narrate and avoid causal links. In a few words, students are kept from having a critical consciousness; they are condemned to a naive or, still more, a semi-intransitive consciousness. Teachers control action also because students are maintained in ignorance of their reality and isolated from making relevant inquiry. Teachers do not permit praxis (reflection and action) which means that teachers do not permit their students to be human. As we have seen, praxis is part of the essence of human nature. Teachers love death when they convert students into objects. They love students who are adjusted and are manageable. Education as banking is a dehumanized education.

Education as banking is an exercise of domination, the sixth characteristic of this education. It is a subtle indoctrination by which students are conditioned to adapt to the world of oppression. Banking education stimulates credibility in the oppressors. Oppressors react against a free education when fundamental questions arise and students respond with praxis. There is no freedom for questioning the system of oppression. Education is, for oppressors, an act of transmission of deposits which will preserve a culture and not an inquiry to change inhuman situations and alienated knowledge. Education must look for permanence and, in looking for it, education
"becomes reactionary." The basic problem for education is not to change the world of oppression but to change the consciousness of students, to avoid "mal-adjusted" people. Education as banking is an intentional effort to subdue.

The structure of the education as banking is the anthropological contradiction of the closed society, the contradiction of oppressor-oppressed, the Freire's terminus a quo of the reconceptualization of education. This education considers educators as those who know and students as those who do not know, educators as those who transmit contents which they have chosen and students as those who only receive those contents, educators as those who are the owners of an alienated content and students who are alienated from their reality. In this education, educators love "well-behaved" students (necrophilia) and students are dominated; educators are subjects of education and students are objects of it; educators are the oppressors sent to be the "Messiahs" of the "ignorant" and students are the oppressed who are the grateful "redeemed." Banking education stimulates the anthropological contradiction and reduces students to beings who are "in" the world without power to create, transform, think, or even have real knowledge, as we will see.

b) Dialogue, The Dialectical Method

Freire proposes dialogue as the dialectical method --the via ad of the reconceptualization of education-- which overcomes con-

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Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 72.
tradition. When he analyzes dialogue, he finds that one of its essential elements is the word. However, word is not only an instrument to make dialogue possible. What it really is appears when we find the two basic elements of its essence. Every true word has the components of action and reflection; in one word, praxis. To have a word without the dimension of action is to minimize automatically reflection. The word becomes "idle chatter," a "verbalism," and an alienated word. "It becomes an empty word," Freire says, "one which cannot denounce the world." To have a word without the dimension of reflection is to minimize action automatically. The word becomes "activism," i.e., action without the watchfulness of reflection. Whether as verbalism or activism, word loses its power of transformation and does not generate dialogue. In both cases praxis is negated: a word without action generates inauthentic thinking and a word without reflection generates inauthentic action.

Freire says that "word is praxis" which means that word is part of the essence of human nature. The negation of praxis is the negation of the word as well as the negation of the human being. Verbalism and silence deny word: firstly, because verbalism is a distortion of the authentic word, and, secondly, because nobody can live

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Ibid., p. 76.

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without words. When humans confront their world, they name their world and convert it into a problem. When the world is converted into a problem, the word enriches itself and the world is renamed. There is a dialectical relationship between naming the word and the world. Word is praxis because a word pronounces the world and, in pronouncing the world, announces it. When a word denounces the world, it transforms the world. The authentic word exists because reflection and action upon the world exist. The authentic word exists because praxis is the human work which transforms the world.

If praxis is part of the essence of human nature, to speak the word is the right of every man and woman. In other words, word is not the privilege of the few. The authentic word cannot ignore the word of others who also have the imperative of praxis, i.e., to transform the world, to humanize it, and to humanize themselves. If the world transforms the world, dialogue is an existential necessity of everyone. Still more, dialogue is the only situation in which the word exists authentically in relation to the word of others.

"Dialogue is the encounter between men," Freire says, "mediated by the word, in order to name the world." That means that dialogue cannot happen between those who want to name the world --the people who cannot name their world-- and those who do not wish to name the world --the people who deny others the right to speak. The people who do not want to name the world are those who want to say the word for

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Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 76.
others, as a deposit from one to another. However, dialogue is neither a "deposit" of words and ideas, nor an exchange of ideas. This depository kind of "dialogue" Freire calls "antidialogue." Dialogue is not vertical --from one who is superior to one who is inferior. It is not hostile, polemical, imposed, naming the world on behalf of others, an instrument of domination. These characteristics go counter to an authentic dialogue; they are the characteristics of antidialogue. Dialogue is the encounter of dialoguers who, through reflection and action, transform the world, humanize it, and humanize human beings.

Thus, the authentic word generates authentic dialogue, and the inauthentic word generates antidialogue. What are the characteristics of an authentic dialogue? Freire proposes seven characteristics:

First, dialogue is an act of love: love for the world, love for people, love for life (biophilic). Dialogue is the task of people who love others as subjects. Love is commitment to others in the cause of their humanization. Love is an act of courage and responsibility. Love is not sentimentalism but a realistic attitude. It is not bigotry but a rational attitude; it is not a form of manipulation but a way of liberation; it is not a one-sided relation of domination but a mutual relation of freedom. For Freire, domination is a pathology of love; it creates sadism in the dominator and masochism in the dominated. It is impossible to have an authentic dialogue without an authentic love,

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a communion among people.

Second, dialogue is a humble act. To name the word is not an arrogant or self-sufficient act. To learn from the world and to act upon it (praxis) shows one's own possibilities and limitations. All people are in the same conditions, no one is the exclusive owner of truth or knowledge; there are no elites; no one is offended by the contribution of another; and no one is afraid of being displaced. People who lack humility cannot generate dialogue to name the world.

Third, dialogue is an act of faith, faith is one's own power of creating and re-creating, of transformation of the world, and of one's own capacity to follow one's vocation to be fully human. Faith is an a priori before one meets another man. When obstacles block the way of faith, it is reborn. However, faith is not a bigoted and naive attitude but an ontological necessity for man as a subject, i.e., as a human being. Without faith, dialogue is false and becomes paternalistic manipulation.

Fourth, dialogue is an act of mutual trust. It is a horizontal relationship in which all dialoguers are in close partnership. False love, false humility, and false faith cannot create trust. Trust is that which generates trust. Thus, mutual trust is generated by true

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love, true humility, and true faith.

Fifth, dialogue is an act of hope. Hope is generated by human incompleteness. Humans search, fight, and hope, because they are moved by the imperative to become more fully human. If people fight without expectations, their efforts are "empty and sterile, bureaucratic and tedious." There is no dialogue without a communion of hope. But Freire says also that hope is not a mere passive waiting and wishing that things will turn out for the best; rather, hope is achieved through active participation in the struggle.

Sixth, dialogue is a critical act, i.e., a communitarian expression of praxis. When Freire affirms that dialogue is critical thinking he means that dialogue perceives reality as a process, humans as related dialectically with reality, and humans as transformers of reality. If dialogue is critical, it is critical thinking; if it is critical action, it is the action of transformation in a necessary relationship with critical thinking. In short, dialogue is praxis in the political dimension. Critical dialogue is opposed to a naive dialogue, i.e., the antidialogue.

Seventh, dialogue is an act of communication. Dialogue is the "space" in which one subject relates to another subject, mediated by the word. Dialogue is intersubjectivity. Freire says: "without dialogue there is no communication, without communication there can be

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In summary, dialogue is based on the word which is praxis. If praxis is part of the nature of the human being, the word is also an inseparable part of human nature. Word is praxis, i.e., action and reflection to transform the world. The word is the right of all human beings and takes place in communion with others. If the word is the transformation of the world, dialogue is an existential necessity of all people. Dialogue is the encounter of people mediated by the word. However, in order to have an authentic dialogue, the word has to name the world. That means that people who do not want to name the world cannot dialogue. That which they do is distorted dialogue which Freire calls antidialogue. Antidialogue uses the word against or, at least, for others, as a deposit to impose a word on others in a vertical way. But people do not need only to name the world but to name the world together. That means that the people who want to name the world see the necessity of facing the world with others. The characteristics of an antidialogue are hostility, polemic, the use of the word to oppress and dominate others. Dialogue is, on the contrary, an act of love, humility, faith, trust, critical thinking, and communication. Dialogue is the act which makes possible real education, the overcoming of the banking contradictions. Dialogue is a horizontal relationship which eliminates the banking concept of education and provides a new concept of education, education for freedom.

Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 81.
c) The "Problem-posing" Concept of Education

Problem-posing education breaks with the vertical patterns of communiques, authoritarianism, and, overall, the anthropological contradiction of teacher-student. No one has "absolute knowledge" and no one is "absolutely ignorant." Nobody is superior or inferior. There is no opposition between teachers and students. They each know something and, at the same time, are ignorant of other things. Both of them are teachers and students at the same time. In this horizontal relationship, there is communication rather than communiques and mutual cooperation rather than an authoritarian relationship.

Narration is overcome by dialogue, transference of information is superseded by a real cognition, and "deposit-making" is replaced by posing problems. Through dialogue there are neither "teacher-of-the students" and "students-of-the-teacher" nor "one-who-teaches" and "the other-who-is-taught." Teachers are taught in the process of teaching, and students teach in the process of learning. Freire has a famous expression which summarizes this horizontal principle, an expression which is commonly quoted through all Latin America:

a) Not an educatee of the educator;

b) not an educator of the educatee;

c) but an educator-educatee with an educatee-educator.

That means:

1) no one educates anyone;

Ibid., p. 67.
2) nobody is educated alone;  
3) men are educated among other men, mediated by the world.

The teacher-student is no longer "cognitive" in a first moment and "narrative" in a second moment. What Freirean teachers do is to present to their students material, which is a piece of the students' and teachers' own reality, in order to investigate (the content). Teachers and students draw a plan for what they are about to study. In other words, teachers do not narrate their findings but present the problems of reality. This material is common motivation for both, teachers and students. Both are "critical co-investigators" of the knowledge desired and both are "cognitive actors" in the learning situation. Both know something about the subject; both act upon the content, which is their own reality, to transform it; both modify their earlier knowledge in the light of their experimental action; and both teach to each other their findings. They are not disconnected from their content, from their real problems, or from their own reality. Problem-posing education prevents the formation of abstract men isolated from their world.

Problem-posing education launches teachers and students on a

"a) No mas un educador del educando;  
b) no mas un educando del educador;  
c) sino un educador-educando con un educando-educador.  
Esto significa:  
1) que nadie educa a nadie;  
2) que nadie tampoco se educa solo;  
3) que los hombres se educan entre sí, mediatizados por el mundo."

Paulo Freire, "La Concepción 'Bancaria' de la Educación y la Deshumanización; La Concepción Problematizadora de la Educación y la Humanización," p. 23.
permanent unveiling of reality. Their world challenges all the time and brings new understandings. But the early understandings uncover new but related challenges which again bring new understandings. Thus, teachers and students are involved in a gradual coming to know in which their findings are grasped in their interrelations, in their causal links, in their total context, and in their dynamic "life." Teacher and students increase their critical consciousness because they are not only "submerged in" their world, as passive objects, but they are "integrated" in it as "emerged" consciousness, as knowing and transforming their world.

Problem-posing education considers humans as subjects of their world, i.e., immersed in it and historically committed "with" it. This education leads teachers and students to consciousness about their relationship "with" their world, i.e., their action and reflection upon it. This means that teachers and students are not "domesticated" in their world. They are in their "here and now" but they emerge from it and "intervene" in it. Reality is a world of posing problems which are not unalterable. They are only limits which teachers and students convert into challenges, subjects of their study, objects of their knowledge, and objects of their action. Teachers and students are intentional transformers and creators. When they transform their world, they humanize it and, in the fulfillment of this task, they humanize themselves. In problem-posing education, teachers and students confirm their own vocation: to be always more human, to transcend themselves.

Problem-posing education does not suppose submissive and "well-
behaved" students nor a predetermined future. It presupposes dynamic and creative students because they are beings of praxis (action and reflection), of critical consciousness (knowing and transforming), and of dialogue. Problem-posing education does not presuppose "a static reality, but... a reality in process, in transformation." Thus, education is constantly remade. "In order to be," Freire says, "It must become." It is an education of change and for change, a revolutionary education.

Problem-posing education is "prophetic" in the sense that education is hopeful, moves forward, and looks ahead. It constructs the future, which is an open future; it corresponds to an open society, i.e., a revolutionary society. The students who had formerly been passive "turn against their domestication and attempt to domesticate reality." Any kind of oppression would be irreconcilable with their vocation, i.e. to be fully and free human beings. Thus education has as its terminus ad quem humanization and freedom.

Problem-posing education overcomes anthropological contradiction, narrative method, alienated information, the tendency to necrophilia, domestication, and the domination of the banking education. Problem-posing education posits that men under any domi-

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53 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 71.

54 Ibid., p. 72.

55 Ibid., p. 72.
tion must fight for their liberation. Problem-posing education demythologizes reality, "dialogizes" method, dynamizes the search, eliminates resignation, and gives the priority to freedom to know the truth. Problem-posing education does not serve the oppressor but rather the oppressed who want to be free and who want to create the new human being and the new society.

In summary the new anthropological foundations of culture demand a reconceptualization of education. Education as banking is based on the structural contradiction of teacher-students --the terminus a quo-- mediated by a narrative method. This contradiction corresponds to the anthropological contradiction of oppressor-oppressed. Teachers are the subjects and the students the objects of education. Teachers are necrophiliacs and dominators. They convert students into objects, passive recipients, domesticated and adapted. The anthropological contradiction of education as banking is overcome by dialogue as the dialectical method in which the word is praxis, part of the essence of human nature. It establishes a dialectical relationship with the world. Word is the naming and the transformation of the world. Inauthentic dialogue is antidialogue; it is vertical, hostile, polemical, and imposed. Authentic dialogue is an act of love, humility, faith, mutual trust, hope, critical consciousness, and communication. Dialogue overcomes education as banking and makes possible problem-posing education. Problem-posing education supersedes the educa-
tional contradiction, narration, verticality, and deposit-making. Teacher-students are co-investigators mediated by posing problems, cognition, and dialogue. They have a horizontal relationship. Both are teachers and students; both are subjects of education. Both have critical consciousness of their content, their real problems, their reality. They are conscious of themselves "in" the world, of their relationship "with" the world, and of their praxis. Teachers and students are transformers and creators. Students are not domesticated, passive and adapted objects. Education is biophilic and prophetic; it is for change and for freedom. It is the terminus ad quem.

3. EDUCATION FOR FREEDOM

As I have said, Freire makes his option in favor of the oppressed who are in the culture of silence. Freire rejects the education as banking because it is a practice leading to domination, because such domination is part of the structure, content, and method of education. He proposes problem-posing education because it is a practice of freedom, because freedom is part of the structure, content, and method of education. Problem-posing education is set in the context of the oppression, domination, and marginalization of human beings in order to change such situations. Freire's education favors the oppressed, the terminus a quo of an education for freedom.

The option for an education for freedom involves a dynamic method which is directly related to the dynamic relationship between men and their world. This method has different expressions at different levels: it is praxis at the social level, conscientization at
the cultural level, and dialogue at the educational level. This method presupposes a man who, being conscious of his world and with the capacity to know his world, transforms his immediate world and is cognizant in the process of his transforming action. Reflection and action are the dialectical method through which the world is known. Knowledge is the process which relates dialectically all aspects of education, it is the via ad of education for freedom.

In the educational process "generative themes" of the place and people in which education takes place are selected. Generative themes are codified. Then, these coded themes must be "decodified." Such selection, codification, and decodification are the basic moments, not only of an education for freedom but of an education of free people, which is the terminus ad quem of the education for freedom.

Education for freedom is a "Pedagogy of the Oppressed," the terminus a quo of such education; it is an epistemological method, the via ad of the education for freedom; and it is a pedagogy of the free people, the terminus ad quem of the education for freedom.

a) A Pedagogy of the Oppressed

"Education cannot be neutral," Freire says, "Education...will always be in the service either of the 'domestication' of men or of their liberation." So, the real alternatives for educators are two: education as banking or problem-posing education. There is no third way.

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A third way supposes an education without obligations and an education outside of history. Education, however, is a practice made inside of a social context and dynamically relates to the context. No education is autonomous, no education is isolated. Education always expresses a society and is always an instrument of such a society. It is organized on the basis of prevailing structures. Freire says:

Neutral education cannot, in fact exist. It is fundamental for us to know that, when we work on the content of the educational curriculum, when we discuss methods and processes, when we plan, when we draw up educational policies, we are engaged in political acts which imply an ideological choice; whether it is obscure or clear is not important.57

The relationship between education and society brings up the question of the relationship between infrastructure and superstructure.

Education is the superstructure which functions as an instrument of the infrastructure in which education is embedded. The infrastructure is the social structure created by the relationship between men and their world mediated by their work. Motionless social structures are "sacralized," and education is used to serve that system and to control all inappropriate change.

Freire has opted for the oppressed. When he refers to education of the oppressed, he is referring to the social context in which education takes place, the infrastructure of education. According to

57
Ibid., p. 2.

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Freire, the social structure is based on the anthropological contradiction of the oppressors and the oppressed. He notices that such an oppressive context generates a banking education. If the structures of society are vertical and generate oppression, domination, and marginalization, the culture and education of such a society are also vertical and oppress, dominate, and marginalize the oppressed. Given the infrastructure of education as banking, it is necessarily an education of domination and "domestication."

Freire did not make his option in favor of the oppressors because, according to his social philosophy, change never comes from the oppressors. It is impossible for the oppressors, or for the elites who serve the oppressors, to change education. That is so because, if they were to try to change education, they would inevitably call into question the structure of the social system in which they live, and as I have pointed out earlier, "they cannot fight to destroy themselves." For this reason Freire says: "their real desire, on the contrary, must be...to 'recuperate' the educates, which is as much as to say, to adapt them to the system."

Freire's option is in favor of the oppressed. But the ultimate objective of the oppressed is not to help the oppressed become another oppressor. Thus, this option is not within of the system of

59
Cf. pp. 133,134.

60
Paulo Freire, "Unusual Ideas About Education," p. 3.
oppression in which his alternatives like the present system would share these two poles of contradiction, i.e., the option between the oppressor and the oppressed. Freire opts for the oppressed to liberate themselves from the structure of oppression. Thus, Freire opts for an education for freedom. The alternatives are either education for domination or education for freedom. In liberating the oppressed, the contradiction is overcome and both oppressed and oppressors become free. Education for freedom tries to change the structure of society.

However, it is an illusion to think that education has the power to change society. Freire discusses clearly this fact. For instance, it was not the "bourgeois education" which changed the feudal system but the French Revolution. The bourgeoisie in power established the "bourgeois system of education" to implement their system. Thus, we should not overestimate the power of education. Freire says:

It is not systematic education which somehow molds society, but on the contrary, society which, according to its particular structure, shapes education in relation to the needs and interests of those who control the power in this society."62

What is clear is that, if we want a change of education, such change cannot take place without the transformation of society. The

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Ibid., p. 68.
fundamental problem of educators who want to change the present educational system, which Freire calls education as banking, is to change the social structures --the infrastructure of education-- which determine the contradictory education. To think of a new education is to think a priori of a new society. But, how is it possible?

Freire says that a naive conception of the relationship between education and society can lead to two misconceptions: on the one hand, the overestimation of education, thinking that education has the power to change society and, on the other hand, the underestimation of education, thinking that education has nothing to do with the changing of society which also is false. Freire does not assume a naive conception of the education-society relationship. His method is dialectical and critical. Thus, he says: "The relations between the educational system and the total society are dialectic in nature and not mechanical." If there is a dialectical relationship between education and society, this relationship is reciprocal. Society as an infrastructure molds education but society is also transformed by practical actions not of education but of human beings with certain levels of education. In other words, the transformation of society as well as the transformation of education are not mechanical nor spontaneous. Both of them can be changed by human beings through human praxis.

Freire says:

It is true that infrastructure, created in the relations by which the work of man transforms the world, gives rise to superstructure. But it is also true that the latter, mediated by men, who introject its myths, turns upon the infrastructure and "overdetermines" it. If it were not for the dynamic of these precarious relationships in which men exist and work in the world, we could speak neither of social structure, nor of men, nor of a human world.64

The option of Freire for the oppressed makes sense only if his new education—problem-posing education—includes the dialectical relationship between education and society. As we have seen, praxis is the dialectical method between men and their world in which world, in Freire's thought, is society. Conscientization is the dialectical method between superstructure and infrastructure, in which infrastructure is also society. Dialogue is the dialectical method between teachers-students and their content, which is also part of the human world. To be in favor of the oppressed is to be with them in this dialectical relationship, in other words, to struggle with them for their own freedom. The oppressed are unique in their capacity to transform their social structure because their purpose "is not to be another oppressor but to be human." 65

When Freire opts for the oppressed he opts for the illiterate who in Latin America are the most oppressed of the society. Although Freire's educational experiences were not only with illiterate people, his most important concepts about education were acquired from an edu-

64
Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom, p. 33.

65
Cf. p. 134.
cation of the oppressed, i.e., in a literacy project in which people could supersede their magical or naive perceptions of reality. His \textit{terminus a quo} was the contradictory structure of society his cultural action was to demythologize the contradiction which affected people at all levels of life. His educational practice was for freedom. He says:

We wished to design a project in which we would attempt to move from naivete to a critical attitude at the same time we taught reading. We wanted a literacy program which would be an introduction to the democratization of culture, a program with men as its subjects rather than as patient recipients, a program which itself would be an act of creation, capable of releasing other creative acts, one in which students would develop the impatience and vivacity which characterize search and invention.66

\textbf{b) Knowledge, The Dialectical Method}

Raising the possibility of two opposed alternatives of education, education for domestication and education for freedom, involves two different methods which I have discussed: the method of "deposit-making" and the method of dialogue. These methods have different but important epistemological presuppositions.

In the first place, knowledge as a fact given by teachers corresponds to education as banking. To transfer knowledge presupposes a naive relationship between men and their world and brings merely opinions (\textit{doxa}). Freire says:

Here fact, natural phenomena, things are \textit{preserves} of which people are aware, but which are not revealed in their own true interrelationships. Within the sphere of "\textit{doxa}" in which human beings... are ingenuously aware of the presence of things, and of objects,  

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perception of this presence does not mean "entering into" them.67

Whether we are dealing with pure "doxa" or whether we are dealing with magic thought, we find ourselves faced with ingenious forms of apprehending objective reality. Are are faced with simple forms of prescientific knowledge.68

This knowledge creates an "anaesthetising" or "de-dialectising" thought. It is a "focalistic" vision of reality which ignores the dynamic relationship in which reality is located. It lacks the vision of totality and consequently the vision of context, for all aspects of reality are contained in the totality. As a result if one part is affected, a reflection occurs in the other parts. The presence of new elements produces reactions in the other parts of the totality. Therefore, learners in an education of banking lack the possibility of a genuine act of transformation upon reality. For them reality is a "kind of blind alley, whose contradictions they cannot perceive."70

These students learn about reality through the information of teachers who give them that which students then consider complete knowledge. Thus teachers are the authorities who transfer, bring, give,

67 Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, p. 102.

68 Ibid., p. 106.


and hand on knowledge. The knowledge of students is an "extension" of the knowledge of teachers. In a few words, knowledge as given facts is an alienated knowledge. Such knowledge has made impossible an integrated practice of education. Freire says that his alienated knowledge creates a split in crucial aspects of education.

Education for domestication divides teaching and learning, knowing and working, thinking and doing, informing and forming, re-knowing existing knowledge and creating new knowledge.\footnote{In Freire's essay Extensión o Comunicación? La Conciencia en el Medio Rural, he discusses broadly the concept of "extension" as opposed to "communication." This essay was published in Spanish as a book. The English translation is included in Education for Critical Consciousness.}

To know is reduced to a mechanical dualism expressed in the transference-reception of given facts.\footnote{Paulo Freire, "Unusual Ideas About Education," p. 4.}

The second epistemological presupposition is that knowledge is a permanent process and corresponds to problem-posing education. Everyone who is involved in the process of education, teacher and student, knows something. Everybody has a relative knowledge also. There is no complete and absolute knowledge. It is obvious also that knowledge is not an exclusive possession of anyone because all people have access to the process of knowledge.

This knowledge is a permanent process which arises from the permanent relationship between the human being and his world. That means
that both the educator as well as the educatee assume the posture of "cognitive subjects": subjects because the human nature of both educator and educatee consists of being conscious of themselves, their world, and their action and reflection upon their world, and cognitive subjects because they always "intend" their world and always think their world. That means also that the world is a reality of "knowable objects." The world is susceptible of being known. The relationship between the cognitive subjects and the knowable objects is dialectical. It is a situation in which "one of the poles is the person and the other the objective world."

Knowledge is a permanent process which arises from a permanent double relationship. The basic relation is between men and their world, as I have said. The second relationship is between educator and educatee. This relationship is mediated by the knowable objects, i.e., their world. In other words, knowledge does not arise as a fact first discovered by teachers and then received passively by students. Knowledge arises in the confrontation of both of them with the objects of knowledge. The class is not a place-situation in which somebody transmits knowledge but a meeting-place in which knowledge is sought by everybody. Freire says:

The educator must "die" as exclusive educator of the educatee in order to be "born" again as educatee of the educatee. At the same time, he must propose to the educatee that he "die" as exclusive educatee of the educator in order to be "born" again as educator of the educator. This is a continual passage back

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and forth, a humble, creative movement, which both have to make. 75

Knowledge is a search made jointly by teachers and students. There are not two moments of knowledge in which teachers are the proprietors of it, having come to know and now trying to transmit. Knowledge is a permanent process of teachers and students, and "education is a permanent act of cognition." The task of teachers is to create conditions of knowledge in which teachers and students reconstruct the act of knowing. Freire says:

The task of the educator is to present to the educatees as a problem the content which mediates them, and not to discourse on it, give it, extend it, or hand it over, as if it were a matter of something already done, constituted, completed, and finished. 77

To put the content as a problem is the point of divergence with the epistemological understanding of education as banking. Instead of narrating the findings of teachers, both students and teachers confront the knowable object and "re-enter into" it, think it, analyze it, and grasp it. The task of the educator is to create a problem-situation which, in the dialectical relationship between teacher-students and the content, becomes a learning-situation. The task of the educator is to "re-make" the whole effort of cognition. Freire says:


76 Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, p. 151.

77 Ibid., p. 153.
Remaking the effort does not, however, mean repeating it as it was. It means making a new effort, in a new situation, in which new aspects which were not clear before are clearly presented to the educatee. New ways of access to the object are opened to him or her.78

When the knowable object is taken as a problem, both the educatees as well as the educators are problematized. Problematization is a dialectical process which nobody can avoid. Problematization has two poles: the human being involved in the process of knowledge and the "problem-content" taken from the world. When teacher-student act and then reflect on the "problem-content," or the action, teachers and students are problematized. When teacher-student act upon the "problem-content" in order to know it, the content is problematized. Problematization in the dialectical process between reflection and action, i.e., praxis, the "spinal cord" of the Freire's thought.

Thus, there is no true knowledge without a direct relationship between students and teachers, both of whom are the cognitive subjects of education, and the knowable objects that are taken from the world. The content is not a gift distorted, immobilized, and isolated from reality. On the contrary, content is taken in its reality, such that it remains in its complexity of relationships, in its dynamic presence in the world, and in its temporality. Knowledge is the process of understanding knowable objects as "sub-wholes" of the greater totality.

Knowledge is neither a discourse which somebody transmits nor

78
Ibid., p. 151.
something which is necessary to memorize. Knowledge is the process which arises in the axis of the relationship between cognitive subjects and knowable objects. Knowledge arises as a progressive perception of reality, a process in which such perception becomes each time more lucid (conscientization). Knowledge is not the transmission of information which keeps education at the level of opinion (doxa). Knowledge is the critical perception of reality. Freire says:

The act of knowing...cannot stay at the level at which men understand merely the doxa of reality. 79

Only when it is possible for men to penetrate the very "essence" or nature of phenomena, through the act of splitting their knowable object, can they overcome doxa by logos. This implies the exercise of critical reflection on their existential experience. 80

Knowledge is the process which arises in the bosom of the relationship between educator and educatee. The mind has in its nature the imperative to express its knowledge through linguistic signs. That happens because humans are made for relationships, not only "in" but "with" their world. The knowable objects are not the last objective of human knowledge. The last objective is to be more human, the common vocation of everybody. The knowable objects are only mediators of communication between thinking subjects. Freire says:

The thinking Subject cannot think alone. In the act of thinking about the object s/he cannot think without the coparticipation of another Subject. There is no longer an "I think" but "we think".


80 Ibid., pp. 1/3, 1/4.
It is the "we think" which establishes the "I think" and not the contrary.81

Communication is the interrelationship between thought, language, and content (the knowable objects). There is no thought without reference also. The language in which each subject expresses its thought is possible only with a content provided by reality, a content which is common to a plurality of subjects. For this reason dialogue is the method par excellence in problem-posing education.

Dialogue is an "I-thou" relationship, a relation between subjects. When subjects become objects, dialogue is converted into anti-dialogue, and education into domination. Dialogue means communication and intercommunication, unlike anti-dialogue which imposes communiques. Dialogue is thus the encounter of people mediated by the content expressed by linguistic signs (words).

Knowledge is a process which relates dialectically all aspects of education: teaching-learning, knowing-working, informing-forming, theorizing-practicing. Freire says: "Here [in education for liberation] there is no split between knowing and doing; there is no room for the separate existence of a world of those who know, and a world of those who work."83

81 Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, p. 137.
82 Ibid., pp. 45,46.
c) The Pedagogy of the Free People

Education is a practice of freedom. However, how should it be implemented? The way which Freire suggests is through the preparation of the educational content, the didactical materials, and the function of his classes (his "cultural circles").

We have to remember that the "series" of concepts, aspirations, concerns, values, doubts, and challenges, are generated by the social reality. Such series have their "obstacles", i.e., their limit-situations which contradict them. Series and obstacles are expressed by the so-called "epochal themes" which also are problematized by new themes which emerge. Epochal themes propose "tasks" to be carried out and fulfilled. The whole and complex interaction of the epochal themes constitutes that which Freire calls the "thematic universe."

On the educational level, Freire considers the epochal themes as "generative themes" because they "contain the possibility of unfolding into again as many themes, which in their turn calls for new tasks to be fulfilled." The generative themes are constituted by concentric circles: areas, sub-areas, units, sub-units, and fragments. Each exists in a dynamic interrelationship with the rest of the whole. Thus, to apprehend an area without seeing the relations is to not know reality. Knowledge begins with a vision of totality in which a specific phenomenon is located.

Freedom begins when such epochal themes --i.e., the thematic

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84 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 92, fn. 19.
universe or generative themes-- are understood. The problem with the oppressed people is that they cannot grasp such themes, obstacles, and tasks; they cannot move from the "prison" in which such themes hold them.

There are two kinds of themes: the themes which maintain the social structures, such as the themes generated by landowners, bourgeoisie, nobles, and their elite in power, and the themes which try to change the structures such as the themes generated by the reality of the oppressed who have discovered their vocation of being fully human. For this reason, there is no ontological necessity for understanding these themes. All themes always express the social reality. As we can see, if the social reality is contradictory, it is natural that the themes which express such reality show this contradiction.

The problem for education is how to know such themes. What is the practical process which will convert education into an education for freedom? I will not explain the practical implications of Freire's educational philosophy. What I will do is to explain the foundations of such practice.

For didactical reasons, Freire explains broadly how the "generative themes" can be "coded" in different ways in order to make possible knowledge of such themes and the reality which they reflect. Given the complexity of reality, the themes could appear dense, impenetrable, and "enveloping." Codification is the representation of a concrete and existential situation, "showing some of its constituent
Such representations could be visual (pictorial or graphic), tactile, or auditory, or could be all of these simultaneously. Some coded situations could be sketches, photographs, slides, filmstrips, posters, reading texts, and so on. These codifications are the knowable objects of education.

Codification is the result of a process of investigation about the moments of life of the geographical and cultural area in which educators will teach. The investigators could be the educators and volunteers from the area studied, working as a team. This investigation has four moments:

First moment. Data must be collected under differing circumstances such as types of work, the meetings that people have, the role of women, the activities of young people, the use of leisure hours, games and sports, conversations, apparently unimportant items such as "the way people talk, their style of life, their behavior at church and work... their expressions, their vocabulary, their syntax (not their incorrect pronunciation, but rather the way they construct their thought)."

Second moment. The collection of information must then be evaluated in a series of meetings. The investigators should divide all

85 Ibid., p. 96, fn. 21.
86 Cf. Ibid., p. 115.
87 Ibid., p. 103.
the data according to the principal and derivative contradictions. These contradictions are constituted by limit-situations, themes, and tasks. Investigators select some of the most appropriate contradictions to be used in the thematic investigation of the process of education. The contradictions selected should be organized as a "thematic fan" open to the directions of other themes. The purpose is to communicate to the students their own reality in its totality. Freire says: "Individuals who were submerged in reality, merely feeling their needs, emerge from reality and perceive the causes of their needs."  

Third moment. "Decoding" takes place through dialogue. Decoding is the process of search, identification, and apprehension of the "existential situations," such as social conditions of life, significant actions, systems of thoughts, and all aspects related to the whole situation. It is the critical analysis of the existential coded situation and the discovery of the interaction among the parts of the whole. Decoding is an analysis which goes from the abstract to the concrete, from the situations to the elements present in these situations, and from the whole to the parts. In all the stages of decoding, the subjects of education (students-teachers) know the situation in which they find themselves, they find other subjects, and they discover their own reality. In the process of decoding, the subjects of education exteriorize the way in which they see their world: fatally, dynamically, or statically. The group of educators-educatee decodes through dialogue in a dynamic

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88 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 110.
communication which Freire calls "thematic investigation circles." These circles are led by a co-ordinator (the educator) with the help of two specialists: a psychologist and a sociologist. The coded existential situations are not narrations nor solutions but problem-posing situations to be discussed. Dialogue is mediated by the existential situations. Coordinators must challenge educatees, posing as problems the coded existential situations. The answers the educatee gives to the coded situations must also challenge the answers themselves. The two specialists have to provoke such dynamic and critical dialogue.

Fourth moment. The themes explicit or implicit in the affirmation made during the decoding process are listed. The themes should be classified according to the sciences. Once the identification of themes is complete, each specialist presents a "breakdown" of each theme identifying fundamental nuclei and dividing them in learning units. The themes suggested by people usually do not provide the so-called "hinged themes." These connectional themes will be suggested by the educators.

These four moments are necessary to propose a curriculum of "instruction," to choose the content of the curriculum, and to develop such programs. I want to give two examples of how this education functions for freedom of the oppressed. The first one is related to a

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By "thematic investigation circle" Freire means the investigators who, after the search made in the area of study, meet in order to put in common their findings.
generative theme. The second one is related to the content and function of a specific "subject."

First example: the coding of the theme "culture." It was coded in ten existential situations, each situation represented by pictures containing elements to be "decoded" by "cultural circles." Each representation corresponds to the existential reality of the groups. Freire was working with the peasants of Brazil. The ten pictures make two basic distinctions: first, the distinction between nature and culture. Nature is the world which people do not make. Culture is the world which people have made and make everyday. On the basis of nature which is common to them, all people relate and communicate among themselves. Culture is that which people make and add to their reality. If people understand this differentiation, people change their attitudes. They see themselves as subjects of their culture. When they work, they create culture because they modify nature; they acquire experience; they improve their actions; and they feel that they have the impulse to create and re-create. Second, the distinction between a literate culture and an unlettered culture. To acquire literacy is not only to master reading and writing techniques but to understand and to communicate graphically. It is not to memorize sentences, words, and syllables but to connect them, to create and recre-
ate connections between them and the existential universe. Literate students relate themselves to this content, transform themselves in order to transform their universe and become free people. Words are not donations from teachers but creations of students.

Second example: the content of literacy class. Freire uses the so-called "generative words," words with syllabic elements capable of offering, through combinations, the creation of new words. Thus, people do not come to the culture circles to memorize words but to discover the way in which words are formed. The investigation of the generative words and the process of education have five steps. First, research on the vocabulary of the groups in which the educator is working. The words selected have existential meaning, emotional content, words linked with the experience of the groups. Second, the words were selected according to three criteria: phonetic richness, phonetic difficulty, and pragmatic tone. Third, the "codification" of words (17) in graded order, from least difficult to most. Fourth, elaboration of tentative agenda to be discussed in the culture circles. Fifth, the preparation of "discovery cards" to "break down" each word in phonetic families. Through these cards, students discover phonetic combinations. In making these combinations, students express themselves graphically through familiar speech patterns. Students are free, sub-

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Cf. Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, pp. 61-82.
jects of their own education.

Summarizing the whole chapter, the terminus a quo of Freire's philosophy of education is the anthropological foundation of culture and education. The via ad of his philosophy of education is the reconceptualization of education. The terminus ad quem of Freire's philosophy of education is the option for freedom.

Cultural contradiction is a characteristic of the transitional society in which is visible, with real conflict, the two poles of the anthropological contradiction: oppressor-oppressed. The closed society has created, as a result of the structural relations between the oppressor and the oppressed, the culture of silence which is the culture of the oppressed. The closed society has created also the culture of those who "have a voice" which is the culture of the oppressors. Freire's philosophy of education begins with the culture of silence, in solidarity "with" the oppressed. Freire refuses to be an educator of a cultural ghetto of the oppressors. Instead he decides to be "with" the peasants, especially with illiterate people who are the most oppressed of the closed society.

People from the culture of silence emerge when humans find their own Differentia Specifica, their distinction from animals. They are "in" and above all "with" their world, open to the other, with a plural-

Cf. Ibid., pp. 49-52, 81-84.
ity of relationships, challenges, and responses. They are rational in their confrontation with the world. They objectivize it and reflect upon it. They are also temporal because they are not only submerged "in" time but they emerge from it in their objectivization. They transcend their limitations. They reflect upon the world in order to act upon it, and they act upon the world enriching their reflection. Action and reflection have the intention of transforming the world and of producing something they are hoping for. Humans are beings of "projection." The intention of humans gives sense and purpose to the world. Humans are subjects who feel themselves unfinished, as people who need to be more, to humanize themselves. The imperative behind human praxis lies in the human ontological necessity to be more. Praxis is the tool of human self-realization. It is the method of relating men and their world; it is the method of integration, not adaptation, in the physical, historical, and cultural context. Conscientization is praxis at a cultural level. It is the cultural method which overcomes cultural contradiction. Conscientization is praxis with all its anthropological foundations.

A dehumanized culture is a cultural contradiction, and conscientization is the method which leads from dehumanization to humanization. This method is a process which moves from a naive to a critical consciousness. It is the dialectical relationship between culture and historical-social reality, superstructural and infrastructural dimensions, subjectivity and objectivity, consciousness and reality, reflection and action. In a few words, conscientization
is the method through which man relates to the cultural world. Conscientization emerges from the semi-intransitive consciousness, the consciousness which grasps the most immediate reality but not its causal links. This consciousness attributes the causal links to a superior power and is a fatalistic, resigned, and adapted consciousness. The process of conscientization begins with the naive transitive consciousness which is contradictory: on the one hand it keep its semi-intransitive characteristics and, on the other hand, it assumes the characteristic of its critical emergence. Critical consciousness is the process of lucidly distinguishing between humans and their own world, the lucid grasp of facts and causal links, and the testing and review of findings. It avoids distortions of preconceptions in its analysis. People with critical consciousness know that their perceptions and knowledge are not absolutes. They know their limitations and the appropriate place to act effectively. They know that all their knowledge relates to their action. Critical consciousness is the principal characteristic of a culture of freedom.

The new anthropological foundations of culture demand a reconceptualization of education. This reconceptualization is made in contrast to the education as banking. The structure of the education as banking is the closed society of oppressor-oppressed and the culture of oppression. The anthropological contradiction of the banking education is mediated by a narrative method between teacher and student. In this education teachers are the subjects of education and students are its objects. Content is alienated from its reality; it
is "petrified," and isolated from the context which engenders it and explains it. Education as banking is an education of domestication and domination. It is "necrophilic" because it transforms students into objects. Students become passive recipients, domesticated, and adapted. The basic problem of education as banking is to change the consciousness of students and adapt them to a world of oppression, not to humanize the world.

The anthropological contradiction of education as banking is overcome by dialogue which is a dialectical method. One of the essential elements of dialogue is the word. A true word is composed by action and reflection. The word without action is verbalism; the word without reflection is activism. The true word is praxis, part of the essence of human nature. It is the complex dialectical relationship of the word naming the world in light of the reality of a reflection upon the world and the human action upon it. True word is the annunciation of the world as well as the denunciation of it. If word means denunciation to transform the world, dialogue is an existential necessity of everyone. The authentic word exists with others, in dialogue, to name the world. The authentic dialogue is an act of love, humility, faith, mutual trust, hope, critical consciousness, and communication. Dialogue is the method of overcoming education as banking and the method of a new education, the problem-posing education.

The problem-posing education breaks the anthropological contradiction teacher-student. Narration is superseded by dialogue, vertical information by cognition, and "deposit-making" by posing problems.
Teachers and students are co-investigators; both confront problems, act upon them, and solve them. Teachers and students are mediated by the content; both converse in a horizontal relationship. Each teaches the other. No one is disconnected from the content; which is his real problem, his own reality. Teachers and students are involved in a gradual coming to know in which the content is grasped in a critical way. Both teachers and students are subjects of education. They are conscious about being "in" their world and about their relationship "with" it. They are conscious about their praxis upon their world. They are not domesticated; they are intentional transformers and creators. In this transformation they humanize their world and humanize themselves. Problem-posing education is biophilic for it loves life, it is prophetic for it builds future; it is for change and for freedom. Problem-posing education is a revolutionary education.

The alternatives of educators today are the banking or the problem-posing education. There is no third way. Neutrality is impossible. Freire opts for the problem-posing education, the education of the oppressed. The practice of a "Pedagogy of the Oppressed" is not to make another oppressor but to liberate the oppressed from the oppressive contradiction. The alternatives are education for domination or education for freedom. However, a danger does exist when the power of education to change society is overestimated; but it is equally dangerous when the power of education to change society is underestimated. The option for an education of the oppressed is an option in favor of the illiterate. Illiteracy is not a natural problem but a "phenomenic-reflex" of
the social structure. Literacy education is not to incorporate the illiterate into the system but to train them to participate in the transformation of the system.

The two alternatives of education involve two different methods: "deposit-making" and dialogue. Each of them has two different epistemological presuppositions. Deposit-making education has the characteristic of knowledge as something possessed, as a given fact, and omits the perspective of totality. This knowledge dichotomizes teacher and learning, knowing and working, thinking and doing, informing and forming, and re-knowing and creating. This knowledge is the transmission of the teacher's knowledge, a doxa.

Dialogue implies knowledge as a permanent process of the subjects of education, i.e., teachers and students. Nobody has absolute knowledge or ignorance. Knowledge is a process which arises in the permanent relationship between human being and his world, and between teachers and students. Teachers and students are cognitive subjects confronting together the knowable objects. The task of teachers is to create conditions which are conducive to shared acquisition of knowledge, to put content as problem in order to problematize teachers and students, to "re-enter" the content, to analyze it, and to grasp it. This knowledge is at a scientific level; it does not dichotomize the process of education.

Education for freedom is an education of free people. The practical process of this education begins when teachers investigate the "thematic universe" of the area in which they will teach. Such
investigation is made with the participation of people of the area. For educational purposes the "epochal themes" found are taken as "generative themes" because they unfold in new themes and new tasks. The generative themes are coded in different ways to make easy the process of knowledge. Education for freedom takes place when the "decoding" through dialogue takes place by students in the "culture circles."
The principal themes emerge from these dialogues. The themes are the basis for making the plan of studies. These fundamental steps of education for freedom are a process in which teachers and students participate. The education for freedom is an education for free people.

Then, the cultural contradiction is a reflex of the social contradiction, the terminus a quo of the educational thought of Freire. The anthropological contradiction present at the infrastructural level is present also at the superstructural level, i.e., culture. This contradiction is overcome by the necessary reconceptualization of education, the via ad of the educational thought of Freire. This method formulates an education for freedom, the terminus ad quem of the educational thought of Freire. Education for freedom is a pedagogy of the oppressed which through the process of knowledge enables people to be free. However, what does Freire understand by freedom? This is the problem that I will discuss in the next chapter.
CHAPTER V

FREEDOM AND LIBERATION

The problem we are confronted with today is that of the organization of social and economic forces, so that man— as a member of organized society— may become the master of these forces and cease to be their slave. 1 Erich Fromm

Freedom is the major imperative of human beings, the terminus ad quem of the entire system of Freire's thought. If oppression of the closed society is the terminus a quo of his social theory, freedom of the open society is the necessary terminus ad quem. If the contradiction oppressor-oppressed is the terminus a quo of his philosophical principles, the free human being is the necessary terminus ad quem. If the culture of oppression is the terminus a quo of his cultural analysis, the culture of freedom is the necessary terminus ad quem. If banking education is the terminus a quo of an education for domination, problem-posing education is the terminus ad quem of an education for freedom. The concept of freedom permeates the complete thought of Paulo Freire.

However, freedom is not an idealistic formulation in which there are no external constraints. Freire conceives freedom in the midst of the physical, economic, social, political, and cultural circumstances.

Hence, to talk about freedom is to talk also about its circumstances. In other words, the discussion of Freire's concept of freedom is located in the inevitable discussion of freedom and its limitations. This is the terminus a quo of Freire's concept of freedom.

As a consequence, freedom is not an ahistorical concept, isolated from the dynamic development of history and culture. Freedom is not acquired all at once. Freedom is a process, a dialectical creation which Freire calls liberation. Liberation is the dialectical method of freedom, the via ad.

Thus, freedom is a revolutionary, dynamic, and social concept. It is a historical project to be created, but, at the same time, a reality which is lived at the moment in which the strategic actions for freedom are put in practice. Freedom is a historical reality in permanent search; it is the terminus ad quem of the concept of freedom and of Freire's thought as a whole.

1. FREEDOM AND LIMITATIONS

Freire locates the limitations of freedom in the social world. There are three kinds of societies: the closed, the transitional, and the open society. While Freire explains these societies in chronological order, they are simultaneously present in Latin America today and they relate to each other. The characteristics of the closed society are the limitations of the open society, and the characteristics of the open society are the continual overcoming of the limitations of the closed society. The transitional society is the "place" in which freedom, as the principal characteristic of the open society, comes
into conflict with the characteristics of the closed society. The characteristics of the closed society can be summarized in three words: oppression, dependence, and marginalization. Oppression involves social, economic, and political limitations, the terminus a quo of the limitations of freedom. Dependence involves the economic-social-political limitations in dialectical relationship with the cultural limitations, the via ad of the limitations of freedom. Marginalization involves the economic-social-political limitations in dialectical relationship with the educational limitations. Marginalization is the terminus ad quem of the limitations of freedom.

a) The Social Limitations

In colonial times, the colonizer was the exploiter and domi-
nator. The landowners, the proprietors of immense tracts of lands, were the accomplices of the colonizer and oppressed their workers. The colonies were in the hands of landowners, nobles, governors, captains, and viceroys who followed the policy of the colonizer countries (Spain and Portugal). If any change took place, it was only a change in the style of oppression. In the early years of colonization, the contradiction was between masters and slaves or between landowners and workers. Later, the contradiction was between rich and poor, Europeans and Africans, bourgeoisie and natives. These contradictions were different expressions of the same contradiction of oppressor-oppressed.

National power was in the hands of an elite who obeyed prescriptions of the oppressors. The elite were superimposed upon their people; they did not govern "with" their people. Ordinary people were used as
objects of their own history and did not participate as subjects in their historical process. The social organization was rigid and authoritarian; there was no upward and downward social mobility. Society was static. The dominated classes could never participate in the privileges of the dominant people. The dominant people also never wanted to participate in the dominated life. Economic, social and political status was acquired by inheritance and not by skills and values.

The colonial age inherited a society of oppression in which the oppressed were so immersed that they could not see how oppressed they were. What is important for Freire is that this condition is still present in the social composition of Latin American society today. The oppressed people have not discovered their true humanity; they are not able to recognize themselves as persons; and they refuse to admit that they are members of the oppressed class. They have interiorized the image of the oppressors, and they resemble the oppressor, imitate him, and follow him. Freire says:

If they long for an agrarian reform, for instance, it is not in order to become free men, but to get their hands on land, to be owners themselves, or more exactly, to be the bosses of other workers... The context of the peasant's situation --i.e., oppression-- remains unchanged: the new foreman feels he has to be as harsh as the owner, and maybe more so to protect his job.2

From the three levels of oppression, the economic, social and political, also emerge three main contradictions. Firstly, the economic contradiction generates inequality of distribution of wealth.

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Such contradiction is between the exploiter and the exploited. The oppressors exploit the oppressed using "their power to gain from the weakness of the oppressed." In those conditions, the oppressed lack confidence, the ability to think, and the desire to transform their own situation.

Second, the social contradiction is generated by the social stratification of a society of inequality. The contradiction is between dominators and dominated. High economic status gives prestige, lifestyle, and power. Lower economic status gives loss of reputation, scarcity, and weakness. The upper classes are the dominant sectors, and the lower classes are the dominated sectors.

Third, the political contradiction is generated by socio-economic status. The contradiction is between the elite who have the power and who essentially repress the rest of the people, and the rest of the people who have no power and always are repressed by the elite. People with high income and high social class generate their own elite who run for public office to control the political power. They make all the most important decisions which are imposed upon the rest of the people. People with low income and low social class have no access to the public arena nor have they any possibility to participate in political decision making. They have always been expected to be sub-


missive, and, when they protest or revolt, inevitable repression follows.

Economic exploitation is the terminus a quo of oppression. It provides freedom with one of its fundamental limitations. The contradictory relationship between exploiter-exploited is the "limit-situation" to be overcome. Social domination is the via ad of oppression. Freedom is limited by the social structure. The contradictory relationship between dominator-dominated is another "limit-situation" to be overcome. Political repression is the terminus ad quem of oppression. Freedom is limited by this irrational behavior. The contradictory relationship between repressor and repressed is another "limit-situation" to be overcome.

Freire explains the levels and extent of oppression. Oppression is a limit-situation not only at the economic, social, and political level --the infrastructural reality of everyone-- but also at the cultural, psychological, and educational level-- the superstructural reality. These contradictions determine limit-situations in everyday life. One example of these contradictions is provided by Freire:

A sociologist friend of mine tells the story of a group of armed peasants in Latin America who took over a latifundio. For some reason, they decided to hold the owner as hostage. But no one had the courage to stay and guard him. His very presence cowed them, and maybe they had some sort of guilt feelings. In any event, the boss was certainly "in them."

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b) The Cultural Limitations

During the colonial years a society of dependence flourished. Latin American societies grew, existed, and developed outside of the economic, social, and political center. The closed society was a reflection of another economy, of another society, and of political decision-making by outsiders. The closed society was on the periphery of the center on which it depended.

A dependent society is that which "is merely [an] object of what another society or another people does to it: Hegel would say it is a 'being for another'." Colonial economy depended on an external economy and did not respond to national interest. The raw materials were produced to satisfy external demands. Internal production and international markets were controlled by the center. Laws and decrees were to favor the center or the local government which was representing the center. Press, schools, foreign relations, and other aspects of life were restricted and controlled by the center.

As I have said, the center of authority was located outside of the country and the local authorities were serving such a center. Still more, the sugar aristocracy, the powerful landowners, the highborn, and the wholesalers were tributaries not only to the economy of the center but to the social prestige generated in the metropolitan society. Dependent society was constituted by the cheaper manpower who had to work and obey. The closed society was a servile society.

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The colonial age inherited a situation of dependence which remains present in Latin American today. Freire says:

Latin American societies have been closed ever since the days of the conquest by the Spaniards and Portuguese, when the culture of silence first took shape. And all these societies, with the exception of Cuba's, are still closed. They are dependent societies, for whom the only thing that changed down the centuries were the metropolises that made the decisions for them: Portugal, Spain, England, and now the United States.7

Based on the contradictions discussed above, there are three levels of dependence: economic, social, and political dependence. Firstly, the economic dependence based on the contradiction of exploiter-exploited. Such contradiction produces a dependence in the exportation of local products (generally raw materials) and the importation of manufactured goods. The oppressors control all importations and exportations according to their own interests. At the national level, the distinction between center and periphery is also evident. The exploiters who are in the center control the lifestyle of all the society and reduce the exploited to a dependent and submissive condition. Second, social dependence based on the contradiction of dominator-dominated produces a rigid and hierarchical social structure. The upper classes have all kinds of opportunities and the lower classes have few opportunities or none at all. The upper classes have a culture characteristic of those who "have a voice," the culture of domination; the lower classes have the culture of silence, the culture of the dominated. Third, political dependence controls all areas of life through the

7 Ibid., pp. 22,23.
mechanisms of government. This dependence is maintained on the basis of power and, as a last resort, on the basis of irrational repression. In its roots, political dependence has the violent contradiction of repressor-repressed. All the social institutions are used to maintain dependence. Freire will especially analyze education as a selective system in which schools are instruments to preserve the status quo.

A dependent and submissive society is silent. But "being silent doesn't mean not having one's own word to speak, but following the orders of those who talk --and who impose their voice, their world." People do not use their voice in crucial situations. Still more, in virtue of long years of dependence, the oppressed assimilate the cultural myths of the metropolitan society, are attracted to its aspirations, concerns, and values, and reject their own aspirations, concerns, and values. The closed society sees its own reality through the eyes of the center. People of the periphery ignore what is going on in their own reality; they do not know their own themes, obstacles, and tasks. To be Brazilian --Freire says-- was to try to be more like the Portuguese in the colonial years or to be like the European or North American in later years. People regret they were born in their own country; they have become ashamed of their own society and yearn for another society. They live in their own country but think in terms of another country and imitate it. To be educated is to be less Brazilian --Freire says-- and more European; to be moral is to follow

8 Ibid., 20.
the moral values of other people. The people always look with contempt on their own values. For instance, they value foreign techniques more than their own simply because they are foreign.

Dependence is a limit-situation not only at the economic, social, and political level—the infrastructural reality of everyone—but at the psychological, cultural, and educational level—the superstructural reality of everyone. The limit-situations for freedom are: first, the dependent and submissive people of the periphery are in contradiction to the dominant and directing people of the center. Second, the lower class has been subjected to a culture of silence, a culture which depends on the culture of the oppressors. This contradiction has promoted the imposition of the culture of the oppressors upon the culture of silence, the culture of the oppressed. Third, the condition of those who are controlled through political ways is in contradiction to those who are considered to have the capacity to alienate others. These contradictions are the cultural limitations of freedom.

c) The Educational Limitations

The colonial years inherited a situation of marginalization. Marginalization refers to the society which was—and still is—outside the borders of the colonizer country, the economic center. In the time of colonization, Portugal in the case of Brazil and Spain in the case of the rest of Latin America were the real economic centers. The economic periphery—the closed society—was only an object of exploitation.

Marginalization refers also to that part of society which does not have the economic capacity to live and sustain human life under minimum conditions. This part of a society is the periphery of the
economic center in contradistinction to the people who have enough economic resources and at times a high rate of income. The wealthy people are the center of the economic structure at a local level; they are the exploiters of the exploited.

Marginalization refers to the lower classes which have no opportunity for education, medical care, and appropriate housing. They do not have the capacity to solve their problems. These classes are dependent on the mercy of those who have real options and the capacity to solve the daily problems. The lower classes are always the dominated while the upper classes are always the dominator.

Marginalization refers also to those people who do not have capacity and opportunity to make political decisions. They react by reflex. As satellites, they receive orders to be followed and they do not participate directly in public affairs at national or local levels. The political center is always the subject, and the periphery is always the object of action.

Marginalization does not refer to people who are "outside of" the system. On the contrary, marginalized people are "inside of" the system. Marginalization is defined as the periphery in relation to the center, as the oppressed to the oppressor, as the dominated to the dominator, and as the repressed to the repressor. Marginalization refers to the people who constitute the wide "bank of the river" in which the majority is the marginalized and the minority the marginalized.

But who has decided to put people on the periphery? Have the marginalized people decided their own marginalization? To think of
marginalization as a free decision of the marginalized, Freire says, is "against common sense." He says:

Is marginalization, with all its consequences --hunger, debility, disease, pain, mental deficiency, death, crime, promiscuity, desperation, the sheer impossibility of going on living --a deliberate choice? No, indeed.9

The center, which has been composed by people who have the economic, social, and political power, has maintained people with less power in the periphery. In doing so, people of the center reject people of the periphery. Such rejection is an act of repression; it is an act of violence, whatever form such rejection may take. An example of this violence on the level of education is the condition of the illiterate people, the most marginalized, most exploited and most dominated people of the society. Freire refers to this violence by using statistical data of illiteracy, data which give a worse picture than the data of Emilio Monti which I quoted. Freire says:

It is difficult to accept that 40% of Brazil's population, almost 90% of Haiti's, 60% of Bolivia's, about 40% of Peru's, more than 30% of Mexico's and Venezuela's, and about 70% of Guatemala's would have made the tragic choice of their own marginality as illiterates. If, then, marginality is not by choice, marginal man has been expelled from and kept outside of the social system and is therefore the object of violence.11


10 Cf. p. 67.

However, the illiterate people have not been expelled from "the social system." What they suffer is the violence of being placed against their will in a position of dependence and exploitation. They are dependent on those who wrongly think they are independent, and they are exploited by those who wrongly think they are free to exploit, dominate, and repress them. Marginalization is part of the system which maintains the contradiction between the center and the periphery. Freire interprets illiteracy as the peripheral side of society whose center is literate.

For this reason, he calls attention to the ways in which he understands illiteracy. He says that illiteracy can be understood from a naive or a critical perspective. The naive understanding, considering illiteracy as an "absolute problem" which will never disappear, assumes a natural determinism on the cultural level, hence the accusation of an "innate apathy" in the illiterate people. Considering illiteracy as a cultural "undernourishing," it also assumes a lack of the "bread of the spirit;" hence the accusation of a low intelligence in the illiterate. Considering illiteracy as a "poison herb" which must be eradicated, it assumes an intrinsic wickedness; hence the accusation of negligence in the illiterate. Considering illiteracy as a "contagious illness" to be cured as soon as possible, it also assumes a natural indisposition; hence the accusation of 

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incompetence in the illiterate. The natural consequence of this naive conception is a mechanical theory of literacy: education is reduced to a complex technique, to a standard style, and a bureaucratic operation. To educate is "to feed" the "hungry" and "thirsty" of spirit. Words are "deposits of vocabulary," "the bread of the spirit which the illiterates are to 'eat' and 'digest'."\textsuperscript{14} Here "to know is to eat." Literacy campaigns are "the medicine" to cure illiterates, to "return" them to the "healthy" structure of society. For this reason Freire says that literacy is an act of "domestication."

The critical understanding in contrast discovers illiteracy as "the phenomenal-reflexive explanation of the structure of a society in a given historical moment."\textsuperscript{15} Oppressors see illiteracy not as something the system develops but as a "choice" made by the illiterate. But Freire says that illiteracy is an internal phenomenon of the system. It is a consequence of marginalization. Illiteracy is outside of the center but not outside of the system. Illiteracy is at the periphery.

To be illiterate does not mean to lack culture, neither does it mean to lack cultural capacity. The illiterate transform their world


\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 8.

\textsuperscript{15} "La explicitación fenoménico-refleja de la estructura de una sociedad en un momento histórico dado". Paulo Freire, "La Alfabetización de Adultos: Crítica de su Visión Ingenua, Comprensión de su Visión Crítica," p. 7.
with their work; they express themselves with their words; and they communicate their thought. In spite of their marginalization, they create their own techniques; they know how to deal with illness without modern medical care; they have particular customs and habits; they have the capacity to create a culture which Freire calls the culture of silence.

Illiteracy is a good example of marginalization. But illiteracy not only refers to the people who do not know how to read and write; illiteracy has a broad sense. Freire relates the conception of illiteracy --traditionally understood as the inability to read and write-- with the inability to read and write one's own reality. Freire has expressed many times his sorrow because all traditional schools (education as banking), from the lowest to the highest levels, graduate good technicians, well-educated people, and scientists who do not have the capacity to read and rewrite their own reality. They know many things about their own speciality, but they have no idea about the problems of their own people, even if the problems directly affect them. Literate and educated people cannot read the economic, social, and political reality. In this sense, they are also illiterate.

At this level, Freire again calls to our attention the way in which systems of education are understood. In the same way in which he understands illiteracy, he also understands education as a whole. There are two understandings: the naive and the critical. Naive education consists in a practice to oppress, dominate, and marginalize students. This education corresponds to education as banking. Freire says:
Systematic education reflects necessarily the ideas and the system of ideas of those who have the power to establish the system of education. It's something obvious, nevertheless many times we don't recognize it. And if you analyze the activities of schools around the world, with some exceptions of course, you can perceive easily that schools are above all instruments for social control.16

Traditional education alienates students by making them more oppressed, dependent, and marginalized. Critical education is a process in which students not only know how to read and write words or know a specific area of knowledge but also know how to read and rewrite the reality in which they are immersed. Critical education consists of a practice for freedom. Freedom here confronts the limit-situations provided by marginalization, i.e., the contradiction of the center and periphery.

In summary, the unequal distribution and exploitation of economic resources determine the first fundamental limit-situations of freedom. These limitations are different expressions of the oppressor-oppressed contradiction. Economic stratification determines the second and social fundamental limit-situations of freedom. These limitations are the different expressions of the contradiction of dominant-dominated social classes. The socio-economic status determines the third and political fundamental limit-situation of freedom. These limitations are different

expressions of the contradiction between repressor and repressed. Oppression generates economic, social, and political dependence, and dependence generates economic, social, and political marginalization. Oppression is the historical limitation, the terminus a quo of limitations; dependence is the historical-cultural limitations, the via ad; and marginalization is the historical-educative limitation, the terminus ad quem of these limitations. Historical limitations are the infrastructure while cultural and educative limitations are the superstructure. Freire discusses cultural dependence as the limit-situations of freedom; i.e., cultural contradictions. He also discusses educational marginalization as the limit-situation of freedom; i.e., the educational contradictions. These contradictions are challenges to freedom.

2. LIBERATION, THE DIALECTICAL METHOD

There are three principal meanings of liberation as a dialectical method of freedom: liberation as a historical and revolutionary process, the terminus a quo; liberation as a praxiological method to fulfill the task of freedom, the via ad; and liberation as humanization, the terminus ad quem.

a) Liberation, a Revolutionary Process

The concept of freedom as liberation is correlated with the transitional society which, according to the social theory of Freire, has three principal characteristics: first, there is a struggle between the closed and open societies; second, there is repression by the closed society; and, third, there are advances and retreats in the continuing struggle.
The closed society is based upon a series of aspirations, concerns, and values which justify its way of life. They and their contradictions are expressed in epochal themes. Epochal themes are contradictions which have to be overcome and are tasks which demand fulfillment. Freire's contradictions of oppression, dependence, and marginalization are epochal themes. These themes have different expressions at the infrastructural level—the economic, social, and political—as well as at the superstructural level—the cultural and educational. His themes and contradictions have particular and specific expressions in a given place and time.

When people separate themselves from their world and from their own activity (objectivization), they recognize a particular expression of epochal themes. The epochal themes of the closed society are contradictions which Freire recognizes as limit-situations. All people are, consciously or unconsciously, served by limit-situations in a direct or indirect way. Situations constitute "limits" because they can be a frontier at which people are discouraged or at which people are challenged. However, Freire says that human nature always finds everything a challenge, an occasion of transcendence, an opportunity to change the world, an opportunity to humanize itself. Still more is that true if the situation is a "limit." Quoting Professor Alvaro Vieira Pinto, Freire says:

The "limit-situations" are not "the impassable boundaries where possibilities end, but the real boundaries where all possibilities begin"; they are not "the frontier which separates being from nothingness, but the frontier which separates being from being
Limit-situations reveal the true nature of reality, whether it be economic, social, and political or cultural and educative. Limit-situations suggest the "places" in which people can act, in which they make "limit-acts." Limit-situations are overcome when people act upon concrete and historical reality.

Limit-situations are fetters of freedom, the obstacles which freedom has to overcome; they appear as insurmountable barriers which freedom has to confront; they are challenges which freedom has to meet. However, when limit-situations are overcome, new contradictions of epochal themes are shown, contradictions which are limit-situations and which have to be overcome again. Thus freedom is a continual process of action upon reality in order to overcome the emerging appearances of limitations. Freedom is a continual struggle; in one word, freedom is liberation. That means that freedom is not static but the act and effect of creating freedom. Freire says: "Since I cannot prefigure a historical era of absolute freedom, I refer to liberation as a permanent process in history." 18

But liberation from what? Freire has pointed out three basic contradictions which are the limit-situations, generally speaking, of the closed society: oppression, dependence, and marginalization. Libe-

17 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 89, fn. 15.

18 Paulo Freire, "Literacy and the Possible Dream," p. 69
Liberation from oppression appears when the oppressed people discover their epochal themes, their historical and concrete limit-situations, and their potentialities. No one can understand better the need for liberation than the oppressed who suffer the effects of oppression. However, liberation will begin not by mere luck but by fighting for freedom. Liberation is the action of the exploited, dominated, and repressed to overcome the various forms of the oppressor-oppressed contradiction. The goal is not to be new oppressors or sub-oppressors, which would be the simple repetition of the old ideal, but to be free people. The contradiction will be resolved when the "new man" arises, when the answer is neither the oppressor nor the oppressed but the man in the process of being liberated.

Liberation from dependence appears when the oppressed people act as subjects and not merely as objects. People act as subjects when they become a "society for itself" and not a society for another society. People act as subjects when economically they do not depend on an external metropolis, or on internal representatives of that metropolis, for their own development. People act as subjects when socially they reject being the servile society for another society in the international contest or when the lower classes reject being the culture of silence for the culture of those who "have a voice" at the national or local level. People act as subjects when politically they reject the control of the elite on political participation in public affairs and deny the repression which they protest angered because of their lack of participation. People act as subjects when historically and concretely they change the
reality of oppression. They begin to be subjects when they discover the image of the oppressed in their own consciousness and decide to expel it from themselves, when they decide not to be another oppressor but to be a free human being. People act as subjects when culturally they reject the epochal themes of metropolitan societies and acknowledge their limit-situations as a task of transforming reality.

Liberation from marginalization appears when oppressed people discover themselves not as people outside of the system, but as people who are for another. It appears when the marginalized understands that he is on the periphery because the center has rejected him, because he is a victim of the polymorphous violence of the people of the center.

Illiteracy, manipulation, even education are acts of marginalization when they alienate people from their reality and make change difficult. Liberation from marginalization arises when the oppressed people overcome these contradictions and act upon reality in order to change it.

In the light of this analysis, we can see that liberation is a revolutionary process which begins in the recognition of epochal themes, their contradictions, and their limit-situations. The crucial limitations of freedom for human beings are the limit-situations, the finiteness of being "in" and "with" their world. Limit-situations offer the only alternative between being or not being. They are radical and ontological limitations which put in danger the humanness of existence. When people objectivize limit-situations, they acquire the capacity

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both to take these problems as objects of observation — as objects of "admiration," Freire says — and to act upon reality to change them. Such limitations are the borders which reality presents to human action, but they also show that such borders are not the absolute end of human action. Limit-situations, indeed all kinds of limitations, are only challenges for new action. Liberated action transcends human limitations.

Liberation is a revolutionary process based on love for the oppressed who suffer the effects of oppressive and dehumanized structures. Liberation is the struggle for freedom in "pre-revolutionary times," when the system of oppression is still in power. Liberation is the characteristic of a transitional society in which the closed and open societies confront each other. The closed society is based on oppression, dependence, and marginalization, whereas the open society is based on freedom. The closed society defends old values, themes, and tasks. Liberation provokes a situation of social change in which the closed society is in process of disappearance and the new society is in a process of formation.

However, when the act of liberation begins to be effective, the coup d'etat is the typical response of the elite. A coup is the arbitrary action of military elites to stop the transition of the entire society towards freedom. For the elite, liberation is subversion. A coup is the antithesis of the revolutionary process. It is an unpopular action to return to the same old society by force. The control of this retrogression is maintained by repression. But such a step is
only a moment of the struggle in which, according to Freire, there is "flux and reflux," ebb and flow. The new themes are repressed but they do not disappear. They survive underground, waiting for a new opportunity to fight and to provoke new transitions. What is necessary at these moments of retreat is to analyze the new limit-situations. Freire says: "The analysis should focus on the dialectical confrontation between the revolutionary project... and the military forces."

b) Liberation, a Praxiological Method

Liberation is an act for freedom, but it is not "activism." Liberation is praxis, action and reflection upon the world to transform it. Liberation is not action without reflection, which could become "libertinism," but an action under a lucid and rigorous rational analysis. Liberation also is not pure freedom of consciousness to reflect only in an abstract way (subjectivism) but is a historical and concrete necessity.

Liberation is the dialectical relationship between freedom and its social and historical limit-situations. This process is mediated by praxis: reflection and action. Reflection objectivizes reality and one's own action upon it. Reality, in concrete terms, is a piece of the world, suggested by limit-situations found in a historical moment, a piece of the world not isolated from the totality but part of the whole. Reality is also not static. All limit-situations are fixed in a world of continual process. Reflection is thinking upon reality, analyzing it, and elaborating strategic plans to act upon it. Action is the human

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work upon a reality suggested by the limit-situations, a reality which is the continual movement. Action is the force that transforms reality, a force that creates, and produces new things.

A dialectical relationship between freedom and its social and historical limit-situations, liberation leads from a naive to a critical consciousness. Liberation is a process of conscientization. People under long-standing oppression, dependence, and marginalization are unable "to stand far enough off" to objectivize their own reality. They generally are immersed in the reality which is around them and cannot perceive their epochal themes, their limit-situations, and their necessary tasks. When they do perceive some of these factors, they perceive them in a distorted way. The only aspects which they can perceive are their lived experience, their basic needs. Freire says that these people have a semi-intransitive consciousness.

However, when people discover in their consciousness the image of the oppressors, dominators, and repressors, when they realize that such an image is the reflection of economic, social, and political structures, and when they identify the external contradictions with possibilities of change, liberation begins. Then, the epochal themes appear, the real contradictions are no longer tolerable, and the limit-situations have to be overcome. Freire says that these people have a naive transitive consciousness. It is naive because it holds on to the problem of the semi-intransitive consciousness but transitive because it emerges from the semi-intransitive consciousness. Conscientization is the process of liberation.

Liberation is consciousness-raising, but it is not a "subjec-
tivism." Freire insists again that liberation is praxis. Liberation is not an arbitrary creation of the mind, a subjectivism "which always tends toward the extreme of solipsism" without action. Liberation also is not an objectivism which always neglects reflection and tends toward the extreme of a decisive determination of the object without any subjective process. Liberation as consciousness-raising is the dialectical relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, between reflection and action.

Each action of liberation is a transformation of reality, and each transformation of reality is a transformation of consciousness. Reality changes and consciousness also changes. However, there is no change of social reality without a change of consciousness, and there is no change of consciousness without a change of reality. Continual reflection produces a continual transformation of reality at the points at which dehumanized structures show their limit-situations. Continual action produces change of the naive-consciousness, making it more lucid and critical. Continual action and reflection produce effects in two directions: in the structure of the society, making political action more effective and provoking important changes, and in the collective consciousness of people, making them more cohesive, more solidary, and more powerful in their action. People of naive-transitive consciousness, by increasing their acuity, begin the transition from naive to critical consciousness.

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consciousness, the process of conscientization.

However, liberation as praxis threatens the economic, social, and political structures, and the elite become alarmed. The elite react at first in a paternalistic attitude providing some help and developing "assistential" programs. When the praxis of liberation increases in effectiveness, the elite make superficial changes but "only in order to head off any real lessening of their power of control." When the elite have a populist tendency, they try to take advantage of the naive consciousness of people and manipulate them. What the elite want is to strengthen naive attitudes and to abort a fragile and incipient awareness. When critical consciousness increases and the elite cannot manipulate people to their own purposes, the oligarchy calls for a coup d'etat, a clear measure of violence, which is generally made by military power. As a result, the process of conscientization may be distorted for a time and the naive consciousness may be reinforced, but people with critical consciousness will remain underground analyzing the new situation and initiating a new process of praxis which will open a new opportunity for transition.

c) Liberation, a struggle for humanization

Freire sees liberation as the natural consequence of being human. To be human is to be open to relationships, to be "with" and not merely "in" the world. These relationships are with the world, with other people, and with oneself. When Freire says that a human being is subject,
he means that a human being is conscious of himself and of all the world. He is integrated with and not adapted to the world. He is able to objectivize the world and even himself, and to recognize both the place he has in the world and his limit-situations.

However, the real conditions of oppression, dependence, and marginalization have distorted this humanness. Such dehumanizing conditions have distorted the ideal of the human being. They have created a contradictory human being, and they have inculcated "fear of freedom." These are three problems of freedom at the anthropological level.

The distorted ideal of being human is the ideal of the oppressor internalized by the oppressed people, creating in them an "adhesion" to the oppressor. The oppressed think wrongly that to be free is to be the oppressor. The oppressed people, thinking the oppressors are free, believe that the path of freedom is to be another oppressor, without overcoming the oppressor-oppressed contradiction and its consequent contradictions. For instance, the oppressed people want reforms because they want to improve their place in the social stratification but not because they want to be human. What they want to be is another landowner like the present landowners, another boss over workers like the present bosses or another proprietor and wealthy person like the present rich people. The oppressed people cannot perceive themselves as the oppressed opposed to the oppressor. They cannot differentiate the ideal man of the oppressors and the "new man" who has to be created. They cannot see their struggle as a struggle for true freedom. Liberation for them is the struggle to be another oppressor and to defend the "order" of
oppression in order to make possible the transition from oppressed to the oppressor. This "liberation" does not humanize people; it does not change reality; it does not further the struggle of freedom. Oppressed people think that to be an oppressor is to be human; that to be individually free and egoistically human, without responsibility to others is to be human; that to be unjust and violent is to be human; that to exploit, to dominate, and to marginalize others is to be human. This is the distorted ideal of being human.

Another problem of freedom is the internal contradiction of the oppressed people, i.e., the "shadow" of the oppressor in the consciousness of the oppressed. This is a reflection of the historical contradiction. The oppressed people enshrine the image of the oppressor within themselves and, at the same time, they are the oppressed. Psychologically dominated by this Trojan horse, the oppressed participate in the process of liberation by fighting against their own freedom. If any process of liberation begins, the oppressed people participate in the same direction as the oppressors, and they may even give their life for the oppressors and deny their own right of freedom.

The third problem is "fear of freedom." Freire has observed "that fear crops up whenever any discussion or even mention of freedom makes them feel it as a threat." That happens with oppressed people, even "very simple people." Oppression, domination, and marginalization are so potent that they produce a fear of freedom. Fear generally leads

to the desire to be an oppressor because oppressors provide a guarantee of immobility and protection for the oppressed.

Oppression is their inevitable destiny. The oppressed are adapted and resigned to the inevitable. They follow the "freedom" of the oppressed; they do not want to take the risk that their own freedom requires; they "escape from freedom" as Erich Fromm says.

However, liberation is the natural consequence of human nature. Liberation is not a gift given by the oppressors but an ontological imperative of all human beings. Liberation is not an ideal located outside of the oppressed, a myth related by the oppressor, but a human necessity. Liberation is an arduous struggle because it is a conquest, a work of never-ending creation. When oppressed people recognize the distorted ideal of the human being created by the oppressor, when they recognize the "shadow" of the oppressors in their own consciousness, when they are no longer afraid to recognize the causes of their discontent, to act then upon that reality and transform it, when they create the process of humanization, then the path of liberation begins to be a reality for the oppressed. When the oppressed discover that without freedom or the struggle for freedom they cannot exist authentically, the whole system of oppression comes to an end and humanization is at hand. The real dilemma for the oppressed is thus summarized:

The conflict lies in the choice between being wholly themselves or being divided; between ejecting the oppressor within or not ejecting him; between human solidarity or alienation; between following prescriptions or having choices; between being spectators or actors; between acting or having the illusion of acting through the action of the oppressors; between speaking out or being silent, castrated in their power to create and re-create,
in their power to transform the world.

When the oppressed accept their vocation to be human and reject oppression, dependence, and marginalization as a human condition, the coup d'etat and repression seem to be the only way the oppressors have to perpetuate their dehumanized system. The act of force by the oppressors consolidates the yearning of the oppressed for freedom and confirms the struggle of liberation as the only and effective way to recover their lost humanity.

In summary, liberation is the dialectical method of freedom. It is a revolutionary process, the terminus a quo of the dialectical method; it is praxiological method, the via ad of the dialectical method; and it is an anthropological method, the terminus ad quem of the dialectical method. Liberation is the revolutionary process which begins with a recognition of the contradictions of oppression, dependence, and marginalization at the economic, social and political levels. Liberation begins by assuming that the contradictions are limit-situations of freedom which have to be overcome. It is a permanent process because at the moment of overcoming the present limitations, new limit-situations arise, limitations which have to be overcome. Liberation is a praxiological method because it is not activism nor verbalism,

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Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, pp. 32, 33.
not objectivism nor subjectivism, but action and reflection dialectically related. Liberation is a process in which arises critical consciousness. Liberation is conscientization, the permanent consciousness-arising of people to transform their reality. It is the natural consequence of being human: it overcomes the distorted ideal of humanness created by the oppressor; it overcomes the "shadow" of the oppressors in the consciousness of the oppressed; it loses the "fear of freedom" and responds to the ontological imperative of all humanity, i.e., to be always human. In a few words, liberation is the process of freedom which goes from freedom to freedom; it is reflection and action to extend the "space" of freedom, a series of concentric circles opening from the center. The human vocation is to be always transcending human limitations.

3. FREEDOM, THE PERMANENT SEARCH

Paulo Freire's concept of freedom arises in the bosom of a revolutionary society—a transitive society—such as the situation of Brazil and, like Brazil, the rest of Latin America. Thus freedom is a revolutionary concept, the terminus a quo of freedom as a permanent search. Given Freire's concept of revolution, freedom is a continual creation which is always incomplete. Thus freedom is a dynamic concept, the via ad of freedom as a permanent search. A revolutionary concept of freedom cannot be individualistic but a freedom of people as a whole. Thus freedom is a political concept, the terminus a quem of freedom as a permanent search.

a) Freedom, a Revolutionary Concept

Freedom has its roots in the closed society, a society based on
conquest and colonization. Conquest was the historical starting-point of all Latin American countries. Conquest imposed the objectives of the conqueror on the whole life of the conquered. Colonization was the consolidation of conquest. Today, Latin American countries have inherited a life-style, characteristic of the old society. About the present "necessity of conquest," Freire says:

The dominant elites of today, like those of any epoch [ancient Rome, for instance], continue (in a version of "original sin") to need to conquer others—with or without bread and circus. The content and methods of conquest vary historically; what does not vary (as long as dominant elites exist) is the necrophilic passion to oppress.25

In order to maintain a system of conquerors, the dominant elites have mythologized the world. In the following paragraph, Freire catalogues the myths which make possible today the preservation of the status quo:

The myth that the oppressive order is a "free society"; the myth that all men are free to work where they wish, that if they don't like their boss they can leave him and look for another job; the myth that this order respects human rights and is therefore worthy of esteem; the myth that anyone who is industrious can become an entrepreneur—worse yet, the myth that the street vendor is as much an entrepreneur as the owner of a large factory; the myth of the universal right of education, when of all the Brazilian children who enter primary schools only a tiny fraction ever reach the university; the myth of the equality of all men, when the question: "Do you know who you're talking to?" is still current among us; the myth of the heroism of the oppressor classes as defenders of "western Christian civilization" against "materialist barbarism"; the myth of the charity and generosity of the elites, when what they really do as a class is to foster selective "good deeds" (subsequently elaborated into the myth of "disinterested aid," which on the international level was severely criticized by Pope John XXIII); the myth that the dominant elites, "recognizing

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Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 137.
their duties," promote the advancement of the people, so that the people, in a gesture of gratitude, should accept the words of the elites and be conformed to them; the myth that rebellion is a sin against God; the myth of private property as fundamental to personal human development (so long as oppressors are the only true human beings); the myth of the industriousness of the oppressors and the laziness and dishonesty of the oppressed, as well as the myth of the oppressed, as well as the myth of the natural inferiority of the latter and the superiority of the former.26

These myths, and many others, are promoted by well-organized propaganda, slogans, and "advertisements," which are spread through the communication media. Their purpose is to maintain the contradictions of the closed society. Their policy is to divide in order to exploit, to manipulate in order to dominate, and to invade in order to repress. These political actions maintain the limit-situations of freedom.

To divide in order to exploit is one of the basic strategies of the oppressors.27 The unification, organization, and struggle of the oppressed are not tolerated because they endanger the interests of the oppressors. What they want is to isolate the oppressed and to create deep rifts among them in order to manipulate them. Some subtle actions of division are the focalization of problems without a perspective of totality, the training of leaders to isolate them from their people, promoting some and leaving the rest without training, teaching some how to manipulate others, favoring some people and causing jealousy in others, reinforcing the "image of the oppressors" in the consciousness of the

26 Ibid., pp. 135, 136.

27 Cf. Ibid., pp. 137-143.
oppressed. The oppressors are interested in isolating students, workers, and peasants. They do not want communication and dialogue.

To manipulate in order to dominate is the second basic strategy of the oppressors. When people are in the process of waking up about what is the truth of their reality and are showing the first signs of aggressiveness, the oppressors begin to use these situations to their own interest. To give the impression of openness and dialogue the oppressors promote changes, but basically they are attempting to neutralize the popular movements and to promote their own objectives. Oppressors support inauthentic organizations; they deceive with promises; they stimulate an appetite for personal success, and they "dialogue" but only for their own benefit and in their own interest.

To invade in order to repress is the third basic strategy of the oppressors. One society or one social class can invade another. Invasion penetrates the context of another group, has no respect for the potentialities of it, and imposes the world-view of the invaders. Invasion is conquest and steering, violence and the necessary "order" to maintain a violent status. Invasion is the violent consequence of an economic, social, political, and cultural domination. In cultural invasion the invaded people begin to respond positively to the values, standards, and objectives of the invaders, to see their reality with the mentality of the oppressor, to consider themselves inferior and the invaders superior, to love the culture of the invaders and to deny their

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Cf. Ibid., pp. 144-149.
own culture. Freire says: "Cultural invasion is on the one hand an instrument of domination, and on the other, the result of domination." Invasion is an act of extension, control, and repression. Oppressors do not want communication but communiques; they do not want dialogue but antidualogue.

Thus to divide, to dominate, and to invade are strategic actions in a situation of oppression, dependence, and marginalization. Revolution begins when oppressed people and their leaders assume two basic commitments: to denounce this situation at all levels of their contradictions and to announce freedom. That means they have a commitment to each other and a commitment to their own freedom. To be with the oppressed is the only way to be human, the only way to overcome oppression, the struggle for freedom.

Commitment to the oppressed leads the oppressed and their leaders to seek the most efficient tools and the most appropriate actions in order to move, in a dialogical and cooperative communion, from praxis to new praxis, from limit-situations to other limit-situations, from a still naive consciousness to a more critical consciousness, from a fulfillment of freedom to another fulfillment of freedom. Freedom is the permanent creation which arises in the bosom of the revolutionary struggle. Freedom is the flourishing of liberation, revolutionary by nature.

b) Freedom, a Dynamic Concept

Immigration of people, suppression of slavery, industrialization,

Cf. Ibid., pp. 150-159.
increase in production, new technology, communication media, and many other factors opened the horizons of people to new aspirations, concerns, and values. Revolution began when the old and the new came into confrontation, when the closed society tried to consolidate its forces against change and the open society tried to attack this stability. The open society begins when the new factors affect the economic, social, and political structures of the closed society, when the new factors have real possibilities of eliminating the contradictions of oppression, dependence, and marginalization, when the oppressed people and their leaders commit themselves to the cause of the oppressed and freedom. The dialogical and cooperative action of the oppressed leads them to assume power in order to implement their project of freedom. To take power is not the last objective of revolution; it is that moment of the struggle when the transitional society ends and the open society begins. Revolution as liberation is characteristic of the transitional society; revolution as freedom is characteristic of the open society; but revolution is a characteristic of both of them. Freire says about the borders of both societies:

The newness of the revolution is generated within the old, oppressive society; the taking of power constitutes only a decisive moment of the continuing revolutionary process. In a dynamic, rather than static, view of revolution, there is no absolute "before" or "after," with the taking of power as the dividing line.31

If revolution is characteristic of the transitional society as

31 Ibid., p. 132.
well as of the open society, change is also characteristic of both societies. Freire says that there are two factors, simultaneously, in the transitional society: the closed and the open society, the old and the new. The old is in power and tries to consolidate and the new is in subjection trying to change the old. When the oppressed take power, two factors are also present in the open society: the old and the new. The old does not disappear when the oppressed people and their leaders are in power; the process of liberation continues. It is necessary to eliminate all remnants of oppression and to liberate all areas of society and all aspects of life in the process of liberation. There is no freedom if some sectors remain oppressed. Freire says:

Nobody gives freedom to anyone else, no one frees another, nobody even frees himself all alone; men free themselves only in concert, in communion, collaborating on something wrong that they want to correct.32

In the open society the old does not govern any longer. What governs is the movement inherent in liberation, which is to say, the process of change in the direction of freedom. Freedom is always reached but, even at that moment, freedom moves away to be reached again. Freedom is a dynamic process.

I am convinced that at the level of history we will be engaged constantly in a permanent process of liberation from certain achievements which, let us suppose, yesterday could represent a very good level of liberation but tomorrow we have to overcome

This dynamic process has two factors which are part of all social structures: the old and the new. The old means stability and the new means change. The old is not necessarily an inheritance from the closed society, but it can shape a new closed society. Stability is the crystallization of a human creation. It conserves the products of human work through social institutions. It stops time, avoids change, or is against it. Change constantly shatters the inertia of stability brought about by human action. Change faces an open future, motivates advanced positions, and renews forms of social structures. Stability and change are two antagonistic positions. However, change cannot exist if there is not something stable and stability cannot exist except in reference to change. This dialectical relationship between stability and change Freire calls "duration."

Stability and change are consequences of human action, i.e., of human work upon the world. When humans respond to the challenges of their world, they act and in acting create their world. However, we cannot understand human beings if we cannot see them also in relation to stability and change in social structure. The option for stability or for change determines the role, which methods, techniques, and profes-

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34 The term "duration" is used by Henri Bergson. Freire uses the same term to characterize the contradiction of stability and change. Freire's use has no relation with the intuitionism of Bergson. Cf. Paulo Freire, Cambio, pp. 13, 14.
sions play at the moment of action. Neutrality is impossible because reality has forces of stability which always try to fossilize and dehumanize, and forces of change which always try to transform structures of oppression and dehumanization and bring about freedom. Stability stops transformations, mythifies reality, and promotes a kind of change which never changes the total structure. Change is freedom from all kinds of myths, fatalisms, and manipulations.

There are three kinds of change. First, there is a change of the closed society which changes the parts without any consequence to the total structure. This kind of change never affects the system of contradictions. On the contrary, it strengthens and supports the system. Second, there is a gradual change in particular areas which bring about a change in the totality. It is the change of one of the structural dimensions which will affect the totality. This is the change of liberation. Third, there is a change which overcomes the total system of contradictions by another totality in which all these contradictions are overcome through the process of freedom.

The concept of the human being, who always tries to fulfill his ontological vocation, i.e., to be more human, entails that humans are the permanent and historical subjects of change. The concept of praxis, which is action and reflection to transform the world, asks for reality


36 Ibid., pp. 9-36.
in permanent transformation. The concept of conscientization, which is the effort for a more critical consciousness, asks for more lucid stages of the revolutionary process. The permanent and historical subjects of change, the permanent transformation of reality, and the increasingly lucid stages of the revolutionary process beget a process of permanent change. Freedom is a dynamic process created on the "edge" of a permanent and dynamic change.

c) Freedom, a Political Concept

Freire supersedes the strategic actions of division, domination, and invasion, characteristics of conquest and colonization, with the strategic actions of unity, organization, and cultural synthesis, characteristics of freedom. There are no more oppressor and oppressed, that is, there are no more "independent" people when others are dependent, no longer marginalizers and marginalized, no longer exploiters and exploited, dominators and dominated, people of the center and people of the periphery. Rather, there is cooperation, the way of freedom. Cooperation is the way par excellence to be "with others." There is no longer merely being "in" the middle of others. Freire says:

The antidialogical dominating I transforms the dominated, conquered thou into a mere it. The dialogical I, however, knows that it is precisely the thou ("Not-I") which has called forth his own existence. He also knows that the thou which calls forth his own existence in turn constitutes an I which has in his its thou. The I and the thou thus become, in the dialectic of these relationships, two thous which become two I's.37

37 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 167.
Cooperation means a dialogical naming of the world, a dialogical action upon the world, and a dialogical "adherence" among people. Cooperation is naming the world because all people --i.e., all subjects-- focus their attention in their reality which becomes a common problem to be solved. That means a critical analysis of reality. Cooperation in action upon reality transforms it because all people are subjects of transformation and all can be actors of their own praxis. That means that no one can transform reality "for" others, that no one can transform reality "without" others, and that reality is transformed "with" others. Cooperation in "adherence" is the "free coincidence of choices" and not an obligation of the vanquished to the conqueror.

In every society, people have different levels of functions and different kinds of responsibilities. Revolutionary leadership, which is fundamental, is one of these responsibilities. However, leaders must not have the right to manipulate people because people cannot be owned by leaders. Leaders must not presume to make decisions without taking into account the wishes and decisions of their own people because people are not merely followers. Leaders must not pretend to be thinkers meanwhile pretending that people are merely "doers" because praxis is the right of everyone. Leaders must not think "without" people nor "for" people but "with" people. "If they are truly committed to liberation," Freire says, "their action and reflection cannot proceed without the

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Freire distinguishes "adherence" from "adhesion." Adherence is free cooperation while adhesion is cooperation by obligation.
Leaders never have to dominate under the pretext of improving the organization, strengthening themselves, acquiring revolutionary power, increasing a unified front, or even under the pretext of freedom. They will never use science and technology to dominate. They will never make the revolution for people, which is the same as making it without them, because all people are the subjects of revolution and history. Freire says:

The revolution is made neither by the leaders for the people, nor by the people for the leaders, but by both acting together in unshakable solidarity.

In this communion both groups grow together, and the leaders, instead of being simply self-appointed, are installed or authenticated in their praxis with the praxis of the people. Leaders as well as people are subjects of dialogue, of intercommunication, and communion. Dialogue is the fundamental relationship characteristic of subjects. Dialogue does not impose, manipulate, or "sloganize," but communicates. Communication is intersubjectivity, the authentic relationship between one subject and another. Communication is communion of people with "utopian vision," the deepest relationship mediated by the praxis of freedom. Dialogue, intercommunication, and communion are the constitutive elements of cooperation which is

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39
Ibid., p. 120.

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Ibid., p. 124.

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Utopia is the denunciation of an unjust reality and the proclamation of freedom. Cf. Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom, pp. 42, 43.
always an act of love, humility, faith, mutual trust, hope, criticality, and empathy. They are elements that reflect reality, transform it, and make history. These elements make possible cooperation among people and between people and their leaders. They make possible the three strategical actions of cooperation, i.e., unity, organization and cultural synthesis.

First, there is unity among people and unity between people and their leaders. If oppression is a system of exploitation and exploitation divides in order to rule, unity is a strategical act of freedom. Unity cuts the "umbilical cord" of the oppressed from the world of oppression, overcomes the individual perspective of oppression, and acquires class consciousness. To be human is not to be oppressed, which is an inhuman way of being, but neither does it mean freedom only for oneself; on the contrary, to be human is to be "with" others, in communion with the "neighbor." So, unity is a human vocation mediated by praxis for freedom.

Second, the organization of people is a consequence of unity. If dependency is a system of domination and domination manipulates people, organization is another strategic act of freedom. Organization is possible when the "witness" to the struggle of liberation shows "consistency" between words and action, shows "boldness" in the permanent risk, "radicalization" in the action (not sectarianism), "courage" in loving people, and "faith" in their capacity. Witness to the struggle of freedom increases critical knowledge of the current historical context, extends the vision of the world, and exposes the contradictions of society. Organization for freedom means united leadership with people,
concrete objectives of freedom, and necessary discipline in the struggle for freedom. Authority --not authoritarianism-- and freedom go together. Freire says:

There is no freedom without authority, but there is also no authority without freedom. All freedom contains the possibility... to become authority. Freedom and authority cannot be isolated, but must be considered in relationship to each other.

Authority can avoid conflict with freedom only if it is "freedom-become-authority." Hypertrophy of the one provokes atrophy of the other. 42

Third, there is cultural synthesis of the knowledge of people and of their leaders. If marginalization is a system of repression and repression invades the periphery culturally, cultural synthesis is yet another strategic act of freedom. People with their leadership create together guidelines for their own creations, learn something together from their action, solve the contradictions of society, construct a common theory of action, and act together upon the social structure, always creating stability and always creating change. That is the nature of the social structure that we call freedom: the dialectical relationship between stability and change. It exists because it is becoming; its reason for being is becoming. These are the "structures" of freedom, the processes of social change. Freire says:

What makes a structure, a social structure (and thus historical-cultural), is neither permanence nor change, taken absolutely, but the dialectical relations between the two. In the last analysis, what endures in the social structure is neither permanence nor change; it is the permanence-change dialectic

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Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, pp. 179, 180.
Thus, cooperation in confronting common problems in the act of transformation of the social world, and in the adherence through dialogue, intercommunication, and communication makes possible political action for freedom, and this political action is the beginning of real freedom. Unity responds to the limit-situation of the division caused by the oppressor. Organization responds to the limit-situation of manipulation. Cultural synthesis responds to the limit-situation of cultural invasion. All three are political actions of political freedom. These actions serve no other purpose than political freedom.

Summarizing the third part of the chapter, freedom is the permanent search which begins in the bosom of a revolutionary society. In order to maintain the system of conquest and colonization --which still exists today-- the elite implement their strategic action of division, manipulation, and cultural invasion in different ways. Revolution is the revolt against that system, first to take power through the process of liberation and, second, once this power is taken, then to implement freedom. Before taking power (in the transitional society) freedom is a liberation process, and after taking power (in the open society) freedom is a revolutionary process. Freedom is a revolutionary concept, the terminus a quo of freedom as a permanent search. In the transitional

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Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 180, fn. 53.
society, revolution is the struggle between the closed and open societies, between the old and the new, in order to be free. The type of revolutionary struggle also exists in the open society. Given that human creation always tries to look for stability, the possibility of the presence of the closed and old is permanent; however, given that the human creation tries also to look for change, the dialectical relationship between the closed and open and between the old and new is also permanent. Stability and change are two elements of the dynamic life of freedom, the *via ad* of freedom as a permanent search. The open society looks toward the overcoming of the strategic actions of conquest and colonization, the actions of division, manipulation, and invasion. The strategic actions of freedom are unity, organization, and cultural synthesis, actions of a new policy of cooperation through dialogue, intercommunication, and communion among people and between people and their leaders. Freedom is a political conception, the *terminus ad quem* of freedom as a permanent search.

Summarizing the whole chapter, I will begin by saying that the concept of freedom, the *terminus ad quem* of the entire system of Freire's thought, begins with the recognition of the limit-situations of freedom --the *terminus a quo* of the concept of freedom--, in the confrontation of these limitations in a dialectical way --the *via ad* of the concept of freedom--, and in the permanent search and creation of freedom-- the *terminus ad quem* of the concept of freedom.
In the first place, the limit-situations can be found at the socio-historical, socio-cultural, and socio-educational levels. The socio-historical level is generated by oppression, and it is the terminus a quo of the limitations. The socio-cultural level is generated by dependency, and it is the via ad of the limitations. The socio-educational level is generated by marginalization, and it is the terminus ad quem of the limitations.

There are three levels of the socio-historical limitations generated by oppression: economic, social, and political. In the area of economic exploitation, freedom has one of its fundamental limitations: the contradictory relationship between exploiter-exploited, a limit-situation to be overcome. In the social domination, freedom has another fundamental limitation: the contradictory relationship between dominator-dominated, another limit-situations to be overcome. In the political level, freedom confronts another fundamental limitation: the contradictory relationship between elite-people, also a limit-situation to be overcome.

There are three levels of socio-cultural limitations generated by dependence: economic, social, and political. In the area of economic dependency, freedom confronts the contradictions between those who consider themselves "independent" and those who are dependent, a contradiction to be overcome. In the area of social dependence, freedom confronts a contradiction between those who "have a voice" and those who have a "culture of silence," a contradiction to be overcome. In the dimension of political dependence, freedom confronts a contradiction between
repressor-repressed, a contradiction to be overcome.

There are three levels of the socio-educative limitations generated by marginalization: economic, social, and political. In economic marginalization, freedom confronts a contradiction between the center (those who have and can) and the periphery (those who have not and cannot), a contradiction to be overcome. In social marginalization, freedom confronts the contradiction between those who are domesticated and improve their lot within the system and those who are domesticated and remain silent and without any participation (for instance the contradiction between the literate and illiterate people). In political marginalization, freedom confronts the contradiction between those who are the subjects of political decisions and those who are the objects of such decisions. Marginalization generates economic, social, and political violence.

In the second place, the method of freedom is liberation. There are three principal meanings of liberation: liberation as revolutionary process, the *terminus a quo* of the dialectical method of freedom, liberation as praxis, the *via ad* of the dialectical method of freedom, and liberation as humanization, the *terminus ad quem* of the dialectical method of freedom.

The central and derived contradictions of oppression, dependence, and marginalization are expressed in epochal themes which require tasks, at the infrastructural levels —economic, social, and political— and at the superstructural level —cultural and educational. Epochal themes are contradictions which Freire calls limit-situations. These limitations reveal the true nature of reality and the "place" of possible
action. Freedom is action to overcome limit-situations which, once they are overcome, allow new limit-situations to appear. Thus, freedom is continual reflection and action upon limit-situations and continual struggle against the different ways in which the contradictions of oppression, dependence, and marginalization appear. The struggle of freedom is liberation. Freedom is not an absolute concept defined once and for all rather it is an act and effect followed by a new act which will cause other new effects in the continual creation of freedom. Liberation from oppression arises when the oppressed, discovering the epochal themes, refuse to become other oppressors and fight to overcome the contradiction of exploiter-exploited. Liberation from dependence appears when the oppressed become subjects, and not mere objects, of their society. Liberation from marginalization appears when the oppressed people discover themselves as people who are for another, not isolated outside of the system. The objective is to change the dehumanized situation, "the goal is liberation," a revolutionary process.

Liberation is neither "activism" nor verbalism" but praxis, the dialectical relationship between action and reflection upon the world to transform it. Likewise, the dialectical relationship between humans and their historical limitations is mediated by praxis. In these dialectical processes, consciousness goes from naive consciousness to critical consciousness. Liberation is the process of consciousness-

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raising, i.e., of conscientization. Conscientization involves transformation of reality which, in turn, creates more lucid consciousness. That is, by praxis reality changes and consciousness changes at the same time. Praxis is the method which generates change in the economic, social, and political structures. Liberation is praxiological method.

Liberation is the natural consequence of Freire's anthropology. Oppression has distorted the ideal of human being. The oppressed people lodge the "shadow" of the oppressor in their consciousness. This shadow produces a contradiction between being the oppressed and desiring to be the oppressor. The oppressed people have also a fear of freedom. They prefer to be adopted and resigned to the "freedom" of the oppressors rather than to take the risk of following their own freedom. But liberation is an ontological imperative for every human being. It is not the distorted mythical freedom of the oppressors but human necessity, a process of humanization. Liberation is the process of freedom which goes from freedom to freedom, which extends the "space" of freedom, which fulfills the human vocation to be always more human, transcending always human limitations.

In the third place, freedom is a permanent search which arises in the bosom of a revolutionary society. Freedom is a revolutionary concept, the terminus a quo of freedom as a permanent search. Given Freire's concept of revolution, freedom is a dynamic concept, the via ad of freedom as a permanent search. The revolutionary and dynamic concept provides an understanding of freedom as a collective concept rather than freedom as a mere individual act. The political concept of freedom is the terminus ad quem of freedom as a permanent search.
The starting-point of Latin American history is conquest and colonization. Conquest imposed the objectives of the conqueror on the whole life of the conquered. Colonization consolidated the rules of conquest. Oppression, dependency, and marginalization are the ways in which the "necessity" of conquest and colonization are expressed today. In order to maintain this system, the dominant elite has mythologized the world and has promoted such myths through the communication media. They used the following strategy. They divide because dividing the oppressed makes exploitation much easier. Then, they manipulate because by taking advantage of the situation of the oppressed the oppressors create changes that neutralize popular movements and promote their own objectives. They invade by imposing their world view, values, standards, and objectives. The center not only extends its power but controls and represses. When people announce freedom and denounce the strategic action of the elite, revolution for freedom is at hand. When people are committed to the oppressed, then they have begun the struggle to overcome the contradiction. It is at this point where liberation becomes militant, that freedom becomes a revolutionary concept.

In the process of a revolutionary struggle, characteristic of transitional society, liberation is the same as the revolutionary concept of freedom. In that Freirean process which is revolutionary government, characteristic of the open society, freedom is a project dynamically implemented. That is, revolution is not only characteristic of the transitional society, but it is also characteristic of the open society. To seize power is not the last objective of the
revolution; it is only the moment in which transitional society ends and open society begins. In the transitional society the revolution tries to overthrow the power of the old in order to be open to the new. In the open society the revolution tries to implement the power of the new, i.e., freedom, but without the disappearance of the old. In fact, stability and change are created by human action and always are present in the social structures. Stability and change, dialectically related, are the fundamental factors in the dynamic nature of freedom. Stability is the final product of human action and change is the permanent movement toward the new and more advanced positions. Stability cannot exist without change, and change cannot exist without stability. Freedom arises on the "edge" of this permanent and dynamic relationship.

The implementation of freedom supersedes the strategic action of division, manipulation, and invasion, strategies of conquest and colonization, needs of oppression, dependence, and marginalization. Freedom proposes the strategic action of unity, organization, and cultural synthesis, strategies of cooperation and dialogue. There is cooperation in the confrontation with the world, in acting upon it, and in the "adherence" among people. This cooperation is made possible through dialogue, intercommunication, and communion. Cooperation overcomes the forces of division, manipulation, and cultural invasion. Cooperation starts when it unifies its forces against exploitation, when it organizes a systematic struggle against domination, and when cultural synthesis is the strategical action against political control. Dialogue, intercommunication, and communion make possible a cultural synthesis of the
action and reflection of leaders and the people. Unity, organization and cultural synthesis are the strategic action of freedom, the political concept of freedom.
PART THREE

POLITICAL FREEDOM

This part includes the conclusions of the previous analysis. According to the method applied, the sixth chapter is the terminus ad quem of the work as a whole.

The conclusions are discussed critically in three principal contexts: the Latin American reality of oppression, the European philosophical influences (personalism, Hegelianism, existentialism, and Marxism), the social philosophy of education related to Latin American needs. Freire's philosophy of praxis and his philosophy of education result in a philosophy of freedom. One of the practical implications of these principles is an education for freedom.

Freire's thought crystallizes into a philosophy for political freedom which emerges under conditions of oppression. Freire proposes a dynamic struggle of liberation which, even in its success, is an ongoing creation of a political mode of life.
Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just, that his justice cannot sleep forever. Commerce between master and slave is despotism. Nothing is more certainly written in the book of fate than that these people are to be free. Establish the law for educating the common people. This it is the business of the state to effect and on a general plan.1 Thomas Jefferson

At this point, after a careful analysis of the accessible materials, in one sense my study of Freire's thought has just begun. For my analysis has focused only on points related to the general theme of freedom. This chapter summarizes my analysis in its principal points. Then what I will attempt to do is to make a critical evaluation of Freire's thought on Freedom. Finally, I will give my personal conclusions about freedom.

Following my method, I will divide this chapter in three principal sections. First, Freire's thought represents a Latin American philosophical synthesis. Second, Freire's thought expresses a social philosophy of education. Then, my third section will include my general and final conclusions.

1 Quoted from the Thomas Jefferson Memorial, Washington, D.C.
1. A PHILOSOPHY FROM LATIN AMERICA

Freire's thought is a global synthesis of three principal factors: first, the Latin American reality and concretely the reality of Brazil, the terminus a quo of my evaluation of Freire as a Latin American philosopher. Second, the different philosophical branches which influence Freire's thought, the via ad of my evaluation. Third, Freire's relevance for the philosophical thought, the terminus ad quem of my evaluation.

a) The Latin American Reality

Freire's historical, socioeconomic, cultural, and political background are present in all his philosophical elaborations. He thinks, writes, and talks as a part of the Latin American reality, the peripheral side of the so-called First World, the center. That is the reason that Freire is a Latin American philosopher who proposes a Latin American philosophy. Let me review how the Latin American background determines Freire's thought.

Historically, the Latin American countries are a result of European expansion. Europe, the international center of the 16th century, discovered, conquered, and colonized the Latin American territories. Exploitation, dependence, and marginalization --expressions of Freire-- were three aspects of the mercantile policy of Europe supported by the economic, social, political, juridical, educational, religious, and military institutions. The struggles of independence of the 19th century resulted not from the aspirations of the liberal movements of Latin America but from the crisis of the mercantile
system confronted by industrial capitalism during the Spanish and Portuguese decline and the rise of the economic and political hegemony of England. Later, France and Germany became important. Thus, the struggles for independence in Latin America were a part of the struggle of England against Spain and Portugal. England stimulated, and even supported, the struggles for liberty which made possible political independence but not economic independence. Latin American economy was determined by the world market controlled by England. The expansion of the United States coincided with the incorporation of Texas in 1845 and the decline of English, French, and German presence in Latin America. Although the exploitation of natural resources, the domination of the whole area, and the control of the political situation by the center have been crucial factors in the history of each country of Latin America, this exploitation has been particularly apparent in the history of Brazil and has had a most important impact on Freire's thought. Portuguese exploitation affected the production of sugar and the mining of gold in the early years of colonization and the production of sugar, rubber, and coffee in later years. The Portuguese exploited the work of Indians and slaves, including the peasants of Pernambuco, where Freire was born, grew, and began his educational work. From Freire's point of view, the conquest practiced by the Portuguese in the past has simply become a "need of conquest" which is maintained

by the oppressor in Latin America today.

From the socio-economic point of view, the rate of economic development has not corresponded to the rate of demographic growth of Latin America. The reason for such a situation lies, according to Freire, in the system of exploitation, domination, and control which has been in force at both the international and national levels. At the international level, there is the contradiction of oppression between the center of wealthy countries and the periphery of poor countries. This contradiction is also at the national level between the center of wealthy people and the periphery of poor people.

Employees and the rural workers are the poorest people of Latin America today, the peripheral society. According to many sociologists from Latin America, the rural workers as well as the urban proletariat are the lower classes which oppose the bourgeoisie. The concept of the bourgeoisie here involves landowners, the oligarchy and, of course, the social classes whose income comes from the profits of commercial and industrial enterprises. Talking about the Latin American proletariat (urban and rural workers), Josué de Castro says that two-thirds of the Latin American population are starving. The international center, with the collaboration of the national center, has created many ways to solve those problems through policies such as the "Good Neighbor Policy," "Alliance for Progress," and "Hemispheric Security," but none of these solutions has created the expected "national capitalism" or the "associated capitalism" among nations. Since 1930, the manufacturing industrialists, tradesmen, professionals, and the state bureauc-
racy have improved; however, they have not questioned the system of exploitation and dependence and they have only improved their place in the social structure for their own progress. Thus, international and national exploitation, domination, and control were implemented in favor of the international corporations and the national bourgeoisie. The plan to solve the basic problems only benefited them.

Freire has understood the presence of these two poles: bourgeoisie and proletariat. What he points out is that this contradiction of oppressor-oppressed is anthropological. Freire received his professional experience in the Northeast region of Brazil, an area basically rural and characterized by a high level of necessity and a low level of production, by monocultivation which functions to meet international demand and pays no attention to the local needs. His explanation of the social structure came as a direct result of observing this reality.

From the educational point of view, educational institutions have served the economic and political systems in which they have existed. Colonial education served the colonial elite, functionaries of the Spanish and Portuguese crown, priests, and professionals. Schools and universities were ideological institutions that maintained the situation of conquest and colonization. Since independence, the national states used the educational institutions to "integrate" people

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into "civilization" --to the culture of the center-- to establish the national bourgeoisie in the center as a dependent society and to extend the values, normas, and beliefs which justified exploitation, domination and repression. Since 1930, educational institutions have served to produce the social mobility necessary to allow students to ascend the "pyramidal" social structure. Thus such education has existed to incorporate the national bourgeoisie into the system of the center by giving less or no importance to the educational needs to the urban and rural proletariat. This was the reason why, while governments were speaking about "education for everyone," they were creating conditions for a high percentage of drop-outs.

When Freire talks about education, he relates the educational process to the economic, social, and political structures. Freire was impressed by the high investment of money in public education, the relatively few people who were benefited, the cost of education for each student, the quality of the education --structure, objectives, methods, content, and results--, and the high drop-out rate. When Freire thinks about the practice of education, whether formal or non-formal, he cannot separate the economic, social, and political reality from the role which was played by traditional education. Such education strengthened the structures of a society which exploits, dominates, and represses; it was an education of domination and therefore needed

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to be reconceptualized.

From an ideological point of view, it is usual to talk about conservative and liberal ideologies in Latin America. However there are new elements which lead beyond these traditional positions: the influence of European socialism, the Mexican Revolution (1910), and the "Aprista" movement in Peru. Actually, these new elements coincide with the "surviving ideologies," i.e., conservative and liberal ideologies. So, Latin America has had authoritarianism in a conservative or liberal style. Reformism has been the more liberal and progressive ideology. However, the rising of a revolutionary ideology overcomes the traditional positions, generates an anticolonialism and anti-imperialism, and provides a Marxist analysis. Freire was influenced by ideologies' influences: the conservatism of the Brazilian landowners, the liberalism of the authoritarian Getulio Vargas (1930), and the reformism of Joaõ Goulart. However, Freire does not enforce any of these ideologies. He is a revolutionary philosopher and educator.

The philosophical and educational propositions of Freire reflect at least four factors present in the Latin American reality. First, Latin America is an area which has suffered earlier by the expansion of Europe, and later by the expansion of the United States. Such expansion has maintained a situation of conquest and neo-colonialism in spite of the Latin American struggles for liberation. Since the coming of Christopher Columbus, Latin America has not had economic independence. Second, Latin America maintains an economic, social and political system of deep contradictions. Such contradictions are based,
in general terms, in the contradiction of center-periphery, i.e., bourgeoisie-proletariat. Third, Latin America creates an education that supports domination and strengthens exploitation, dependence, and marginalization. That is, only a few people are maintained in power and likewise only a few are allowed to rise from one social stratum to another. Fourth, Latin America is confronting revolutionary times. The traditional ideologies have not had the capacity to solve the acute problems of the majority of people. These characteristics constitute the Latin American reality, and concretely, the reality of Brazil, the terminus a quo of Freire's thought. As we have seen, Freire has given a revolutionary answer to this situation, the answer of the struggle for freedom.

b) The Philosophical Influences

In addition to the powerful influence of the Brazilian and Latin American reality, Freire has been influenced by diverse and varied thinkers from the center. A careful analysis of his thought leads us to find some of these philosophical, psychological, sociological, educational, and theological influences. Since it is impossible to make neat lines of demarcation among those influences without oversimplification, what I will attempt to do is to point out the most obvious influences from a philosophical perspective. In general terms, Freire has had four major influences: Personalism, Hegelianism, Existentialism, and Marxism.

Through European personalism Freire has had contact with two basic branches of philosophical thought: Greek philosophy and Christian
thought. From the philosophical point of view, Freire's concept of change calls to mind Heraclitus of Ephesus (536-470 B.C.); his dialogical method, Socrates (469-399 B.C.); and his epistemology, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.). From the Biblical point of view, Freire's concepts of Easter, liberation, and freedom echo Exodus; his concept of utopia, the prophets of the Old Testament; his concept of faith, hope, and love, the epistles of Saint Paul; and his concepts of new birth, new human being, and new society, the Gospels. Freire has been an assiduous reader of Jacques Maritain, Etienne Henri Gilson, Emmanuel Mounier, and Georges Bernanos from Europe as well as Tristão de Athayde and Leonel Franca from Brazil. These are some of the more representative figures of the philosophy of personalism. Freire has also been in dynamic dialogue with theologians of different tendencies, such as Metz and Moltmann from Europe, James Cone and Richard Shaull from the United States, and Hugo Assmann, Rubem Alvez, Gustavo Gutiérrez, and José Míguez Bonino from Latin America. As a direct influence from personalism, Freire has insisted on the unity of consciousness and reality, the concept of the human being as a person, the primacy and indubitability of the human experience, and the understanding of society as reality. The influence of Christian faith on Freire is of crucial importance. In fact, he has written short theological essays such as Education, Liberation and the Church, Letter to a Young Theology Student, The Third World and Theology, and Teología Negra y Teología de la Liberación.

5 English version: Black Theology and Theology of Liberation.
The powerful influence of Hegel, especially the Hegel of the *Phenomenology*, is clear. Freire's concept of the human being as subject recalls Hegel's concept of subject as reason in "self-consciousness." Freire's concept of the human being intentionally projected on the world recalls the "consciousness" of Hegel who maintains that there is no complete possession of oneself unless consciousness projects toward the objective world and takes the risk of being alienated. Freire's concept of "reflection upon" reality recalls Hegel's explanation that once consciousness is "out of itself," it returns to itself and "reflects." Freire's concept of oppression also brings to mind Hegel's concept of "lordship and bondage" in which the consciousness of slave has its achievements only in the satisfaction of being for "another self-consciousness." Freire's concept of freedom as a way of overcoming contradiction recalls the expression of Hegel "I am free because I am not in an other." Freire sees as imperative the creation of the human being in all the areas of human life, the process of conscientization to a more critical consciousness, and the dialectical relationship between the human being and his world. These imperatives echo the whole process of the Phenomenology of Spirit of Hegel.

Another powerful influence upon Freire is European existentialism. When Freire insists on the concrete existence of human beings (fundamental ontology), their existence in the world of space and time, we are reminded of Martin Heidegger; when Freire insists on the place of

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the human being in the world, we are reminded of Max Scheler; when Freire talks about intentionality as a fundamental characteristic of human beings, we are reminded of Edmund Husserl; when Freire talks about limit-situation and transcendence, we are reminded of Karl Jaspers. When Freire defines human beings as being not only "in" the world but also essentially "with" the world, we are reminded Martin Buber. The concept of freedom conceived as freedom in concrete existence is a direct influence of existential philosophy. Freire has been an enthusiastic reader of Max Scheler, Martin Buber, Maurice Merleau Ponty, Jean Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, Karl Jaspers, and Gabriel Marcel.

The last influence which I want to point out is European Marxism. Some important themes of Freire's philosophy show how deep the influence of Marx is in his thought. Themes, such as economic conditions as the origin of the social classes, the contradiction of oppressor-oppressed, the concept of praxis, the importance of having a synthetic view of history, society, and culture, the necessity of revolution, and the concept of freedom as political liberation, are all inspired by Marxist philosophy. The concept of cultural revolution reminds us also of the cultural revolution of Mao Tse-tung. It is significant that one of the first Spanish editions of his Pedagogy of the Oppressed quoted in the Preface some paragraphs of the Poverty of Philosophy by Marx.

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This publication was made in Bogotá, D.E., Colombia, by Ediciones "CAMILO," under the title: Conciencia Crítica y Liberación, Pedagogía del Oprimido, 1967.
From my point of view, these are the principal influences upon Freire. It is obvious that he has been exposed to many other influences of the First World, but they are closely related to the above branches. I refer to the influence of Neo-Scholasticism which I include as part of personalism, the influence of the Jesuit evolutionist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, or the influence of the humanists Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm. However, Freire is not a personalist, Hegelian, existentialist, Marxist, or eclectic; he is not an European philosopher, a philosopher of those who "have a voice" in behalf of those who are silent. Freire is a Latin American philosopher. What Freire does is to use all the European philosophy as a way, the via ad, to discover the philosophical perspective of those who have the "culture of silence."

c) The Philosophy from The Periphery

According to José Ortega y Gasset, a Spanish philosopher, philosophy can be done only from a specific point of view, that point of view of one's own circumstance. This affirmation is true if and only if the philosopher is able to recognize his own reality, has consciousness about the particularity of it, and locates himself in it. In other words, one does philosophy from one's own circumstance, i.e., when one does not think from another's perspective other than one's own, when one is not alienated, and when one is free. But, what does it mean to be in one's own circumstance, in one's own reality?

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This position is called "perspectivism." Cf. Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, Ortega y el 98 (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, S.A., 1979), pp. 197-212.
Leopoldo Zea points out six basic points which will help us to answer this question. In order to have a philosophy arise from the Latin American reality, Latin American philosophers have confronted the following characteristics: 1. Philosophers have to pronounce their own "word," to locate themselves in their own world, to differentiate themselves from other voices, and to create their own order. 2. Philosophers have to be original, which means to confront the human problems in the "here" and "now," not ignoring the philosophy of the center but going beyond it and overcoming it. 3. Philosophers have to be scientific, i.e., they have to use a rigorous and precise logic but without neglecting the ideological use of philosophy and the ethical implications of it. 4. Philosophers have to make constant reference to their own history in order to have an authentic universality. 5. Philosophers must not neglect, as the Europeans and North Americans have done, the origin of all philosophy, i.e., the human being. They should strive for disalienation, humanization, and freedom. 6. Philosophers have to construct a philosophy for change, for the overcoming of human alienation, for a just and peaceful society.

Enrique Dussel, who is more systematic in his presentation, points out five characteristics of the Latin American philosophy which also help us to answer our question about the role of a philosophy from the Latin America perspective. The characteristics are: 1. Latin American philosophy is a philosophy of history, a philosophy which is interpreted from two perspectives: the center and the periphery. Geographically speaking, the center is the countries which have dominated other
countries; the periphery is the countries which have been dominated. Philosophically, the center is the ontological philosophy which is considered absolute, unique, and total and which is imposed upon others; the periphery is the philosophy generated from the experiences of ordinary life outside of the center, from the people who suffer domination of the center and look for liberation. 2. Latin American philosophy is a metaphysics of the other, a "metaphysics of alterity." The other is those who are outside the center. The option to begin a philosophy from the other is an ethical decision. Thus, a metaphysics of alterity begins from an ethical starting-point in opposition to the traditional understanding of philosophy. 3. Latin American philosophy is a "praxis of alterity," i.e., a praxis from the other who is beyond the center. It is a praxis which starts from the periphery, beyond the absolute, unique, and "total" ontology. Praxis refers to human relations: erotic relationships (male-female), pedagogical relationships (parent-child), political relationships (brother-brother), and "archeological" relationship (man-absolute). 4. Latin American philosophy is a "poiesis of alterity," the relationship between humans and nature. 5. Latin American philosophy has an "analectic" method which begins from the Logos of the other, beyond the comprehension of the center.

Freire is different from Leopoldo Zea and Enrique Dussel. All three of them are different from each other. However, they coincide in their concern to make a critical analysis of their own social reality. Zea made his analysis in the social reality of Mexico. Dussel made his analysis within the social reality of Argentina, and Freire carried out
his analysis within the social reality of Brazil. From different realities, different methods, and different approaches, they are agreed in their conclusions about the nature of philosophy in Latin America. To do philosophy in Latin America is not to repeat the philosophy of the center, neither the European nor the North American philosophy, because those philosophies of the center are tools of domination. While Freire talks about the social reality of Latin America, the contradictory reality of the transitional society, Zea calls the attention to the here and now of the human problem and Dussel talks about the periphery which becomes the victim of domination by the center. These three philosophers are referring to the reality of Latin American countries as well as the reality of their own countries. While Freire talks about action and reflection as the way in which the oppressed becomes free, Zea talks about the philosophy of change to create a more human society and Dussel talks about the "praxis of alterity," i.e., the praxis of the other who has always been invaded and dominated. These three men are referring to a Latin American method that provides for understanding reality --the peripheral reality and its relationship with the center-- in order to explain it and to change it. While Freire says that the struggle of the oppressed is the way to overcome the contradiction of oppressor-oppressed, Zea says that the strangers, Indians, ignorants, half-breeds, and underdeveloped have the primary task to look for their own humanization, and Dussel talks about the metaphysics of the other, the meta-ontology, which is the philosophy of the periphery. All three of them are referring to a terminus a quo which is the
reality of Latin America. However, the three of them differ in the terminus ad quem. While Freire arrives at Freedom, Zea arrives at the characterization of Latin American philosophy, and Dussel arrives at a Latin American philosophical method. As we can see, Latin America is a common reality of oppression and domination, of extreme human problems. It is a reality to be understood and changed (Zea); it requires a method for thinking and acting (Dussel); it needs a method to satisfy the necessity of humanization and freedom (Freire). For this reason we have affirmed that Freire is a Latin American philosopher and that Freire has elaborated a philosophy from Latin America.

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In summary, Freire has located in the Latin American context: historically, economically, socially, educationally, and politically, the terminus a quo of the Latin American philosophers. To be located in Latin America is to be on the periphery of international relationships as well as on the periphery of national relationships. However, Freire has not rejected the contribution of the center, he has not inverted the terms, thinking that the Latin American philosophy has to be imposed on other people; on the contrary, the philosophy of the center is a tool, i.e., the method, the via ad of the Latin American philosophers, to locate themselves beyond the philosophy of the center. What Freire proposes is a philosophy of praxis, a social philosophy of praxis for freedom.
2. A SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Freire's thought begins with an analysis of his own reality, with a concept of praxis, and with the search of human nature. This analysis, concept, and search I have called the Philosophy of Praxis, the **terminus a quo** of Freire's thought as a whole. But Freire is especially interested in education as a method to overcome the contradictory social reality and the dehumanization of human beings. This method --education for freedom-- is the **via ad** of Freire's thought as a whole. But freedom has its limitations, the contradictions of reality which are necessary to overcome. Such contradictions are overcome by liberation, the struggle for freedom, the **terminus ad quem** of Freire's thought as a whole.

a) A Philosophy of Praxis

Freire's world-view is the social universe, the order of human relations. Freire differentiates three kinds of societies: the closed, the transitional, and the open society. These categories have been used by Henry Bergson, Karl Popper, Eric Voegelin, and many others who have been working in a political philosophy of history. However, the unique characteristic of Freire's differentiations is his understanding that he was living in Brazil in an "epoch" of transitional society up to the time of the coup d'etat against Joao Goulart in 1964. He also

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generalizes his social interpretation to other situations, specifically to the Third World countries. For in the Third World there are examples of all three kinds of societies: closed, transitional, and open. This interpretation applied to the Latin American countries makes Freire's explanation crucial for the understanding of the convulsive situations of these countries today. Some examples of closed societies are Haiti with Duvalier and Paraguay with Strossner. Some examples of transitional societies are Guatemala up to the coup against Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in 1954, Argentina up to the time of the coup against Juan Domingo Perón in 1955, Bolivia up to the time of the coup against Víctor Paz Estenssoro in 1964, Perú up to the time of the coup against Fernando Balaunde Terry in 1968, and Chile up to the time of the coup against Salvador Allende in 1973. And Freire would say that some examples of the open society would be the Cuba of Fidel Castro, the Nicaragua of the Sandinista Revolution and the Grenada of Maurice Bishop. However, the importance of Freire's contribution, at the level of philosophy of society, rests in the explanation of the contradictory society in which the open and the closed societies coincide at the same time, i.e., the explanation of

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10 Cf. Octavio Ianni, Imperialismo y Cultura de la Violencia en América Latina, pp. 3-49.

the transitional society. The coups d'état have not help the desired stability of Latin America countries. There are countries, such as Guatemala and El Salvador, which have had coups, which are controlled by military forces, and in which such situations have generated organized guerrillas. There are countries, such as Chile, Argentina, Perú, Bolivia, and Uruguay, which have had coups, which are controlled by military forces, and in which all kinds of violent resistance have been eliminated and strong polarizations has been created. There are countries such as Venezuela and Colombia, which have not had coups in recent decades, but the repressive governments have created guerrillas. There are countries, such as Mexico and Costa Rica, which have had neither coups nor guerrillas but in which polarization is increasing. Freire would say that Latin American countries are living in the "flux and reflux" of the transitional society, a society in which the closed society is in decline and the open society is emerging, the society of freedom.

On the basis of this social understanding, Freire has built his philosophical principles: the contradiction of oppressor-oppressed, the dialectical method to overcome such contradiction, and the overcoming of the contradiction. The contradiction between the oppressors and the oppressed has been clearly pointed out by other people from Europe and
the Third World, such as Marx, Engels, Fanon, and Mammi. This contradiction has different expressions at the economic, social, political, psychological, cultural, and educational levels. However, the economic distribution is that which gives rise to social stratification. As Davis and Moore say: "The [economic] rewards and their distribution become a part of the social order and thus give rise to stratification. The rewards which give more "inducement" are: "the things that contribute to sustenance and comfort," "the things that contribute to humor and diversion," and "the things that contribute to self respect and ego expansion." According to Freire, economic status gives prestige and power and determines the contradictions on all levels: the upper class (and its elite) become the oppressor and the lower class the oppressed; each pole exists in function of the other; each of them is the antithesis of the other, and both relate dialectically.

Praxis is the method best suited to change the social contradiction. The concept of praxis is used by Hegel, Feuerbach, and

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Marx. 14 According to Freire, praxis is reflection and action upon the world --the social world-- to transform it. Action without reflection is activism and reflection without action is verbalism. Praxis is activity but not all activity is praxis, and praxis is theory but not all theory is praxis. For instance, philosophical activity as such is not praxis, even if it has practical implications; also, a philosophical interpretation of reality as such is not praxis, even if it is a theory of a practical activity. Praxis is for Freire reflection and action dialectically related, but --and here is the crucial point-- in order to make a historical transformation of the world, a transformation towards freedom, the overcoming of the contradiction. The philosophical task is not only to analyze and explain reality but also to transform it. The philosophical task is not solely a transformation in itself but a transformation to satisfy practical human needs, that is freedom in Latin America. Philosophy is to serve the human needs of transformation and freedom.

The overcoming of contradiction comes when praxis is used by the oppressed. They are the only ones who can break the contradiction and liberate themselves as well as the oppressors. The social contradiction is a violent situation of exploitation, domination, and repres-

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sion which, in order to satisfy the anxiety of having more, converts humans into objects (necrophilia), denies elemental human rights, and obstructs the human vocation which is to become always more human. The oppressed revolt against this situation in order to stop their exploitation, domination, and repression and to create a more rational, just, and peaceful order. One of the important contributions of Freire is that he sees the necessity of overcoming social contradiction on several levels. His dialectical conception of the relationship between objective and subjective dimension leads him to see the historical contradiction (economic, social, and political level) reflected in human consciousness. Thus, historical praxis is also a psychological one in order to discover in the oppressed the "image" of the social contradictions and in the oppressors their deformation in spite of their good will. There are present in this situation the concepts of necrophilia and the fear of freedom of Erich Fromm. Freire analyzes contradiction and its overcoming from a psycho-social perspective.

However, Freire goes beyond an individual and collective view of contradiction. Contradiction is psychological and social because it is anthropological. Freire's anthropology is the keystone to his philosophy as a whole. Kant also considered anthropology as the fundamental

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15 Cf. Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom.
philosophical science, but he could not formulate his anthropology. Buber asks the anthropological question of Kant — "What is man?" — and Buber answers it on the basis of the wholeness of its essential relations." Freire responds to this question by saying: to be human is to be "in" the world but above all to be "with" the world. The world may be physical, social or cultural but above all it is social. To be "with" is to be with other persons, a political relation. Thus, man is not only in the "cosmos" of Scheler nor is he only in the "blank solitude" of Buber, instead, he is immersed "in" the world from which he emerges. As to the question "where is man?" Freire responds: man is a subject being "with" the world. But what is the essential task of man in the world? Freire says: to think upon and to act upon the world in order to transform it. To be human is to be praxis. In this sense, Freire's thinking coincides with Marx who said, "The

16 Martin Buber says that in Kant's Handbook of his lectures on logic, which have not been published authentically, Kant recognizes four questions of the entire philosophy. Buber quotes Kant as follows: "1. What can I know? 2. What ought I to do? 3. What may I hope? 4. What is man? Metaphysics answers the first question, ethics the second, religion the third and anthropology the fourth." "Fundamentally all this could be reckoned as anthropology, since the first three questions are related to the last." Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (Boston: Beacon Press, 1947), p. 119.


philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it. From my point of view, this anthropology has three conceptual nuclei: man as historical, cultural, and political. Freire emphasizes a political anthropology in which humans assume all their historical conditions and all their cultural potentialities, in which humans as individuals as well as social beings create a world of freedom.

b) A Philosophy of Education

The Latin American reality does not permit Freire to be engaged only in pure philosophy. Conscious philosophers, who see the present situation of Latin American, cannot think with responsibility unless they are committed to some specific areas of action. For this reason, Freire makes his commitment first and his philosophical reflection follows it. For him philosophy is the "second step." Enrique Dussel is correct when he affirms that, for Latin American philosophers, ethics comes first and the other philosophical disciplines follow it. Freire's philosophy of praxis is a social ethic, the terminus a quo of his thought as a whole; and his concrete area of action is education, the via ad of this commitment to the oppressed.

Culture reflects the anthropological contradiction. When Freire


20 Gustavo Gutierrez, a theologian from Latin America, affirms the same related to theology. He says: Praxis is first, theology follows it. Theology is the second step. Cf. Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation (New York: Orbis Books, 1973), p. 11.
talks about those who "have a voice" and those who have a "culture of silence," he describes the Latin American situation today. Two situations can illustrate this affirmation. First, the Fifth Regional Conference of Secretaries of Education of Latin America and the Caribbean area (December 4-13, 1979) expressed its concern about the high percentage of children who never go to school and the high percentage of children who drop out from primary school. Second, José Subirats says that Latin American countries had, up to 1980, 159 million people over 15 years of age, 44 million of whom were illiterates (28%). What we need, Freire says, is a "Cultural Action for Freedom," action which necessarily will lead to a "cultural revolution." This revolution reminds us of the Cultural Revolution of Mao Tse-tung (1966-69). This kind of cultural action is the reason why the elite react violently when the culture of silence emerges. The alternatives for educators—or for any kind of professionals—are to be "with" the oppressed or to be against them. Freire opted for the oppressed.

The method of cultural action is conscientization. Many mistakes have been made in the interpretation of this word. That is the reason why Freire wants to demythologize the concept of conscientization. Conscientization tries to avoid two philosophical mistakes: idealism and mechanism. Idealism interprets objective reality as a creation of
conscience. Mechanism interprets conscience as a reflection of objective reality. Freire does not explain reality idealistically as did Plato, Kant, or Hegel. Freire also does not explain reality mechanistically as did Descartes, Spinoza, or Leibniz. For Freire, conscientization is praxis, the dialectical method between humans and their reality. The transition from naive to critical consciousness is not possible without a concrete commitment to the objective reality. Change of reality is not possible without a progressive transformation to critical consciousness. Freedom does not mean freedom of the subjective spirit. Neither does it mean objective freedom without freedom of spirit. Freedom is created in the dialectical process between subjective and objective realities. 22

The anthropological contradiction of society and culture generates the contradiction of education as banking. Such education describes the situation of Latin American education today. The above-mentioned Fifth Regional Conference of Secretaries of Education of Latin America pointed out, in 1979, five major problems in Latin

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First, high rate of illiteracy. Freire's theory arises precisely at his point. Second, inequality in educational opportunity. For Freire, inequality is a contradiction by the social system. John W. Gardner confirms this clearly when he talks about the problem of the United States: "In the breast of every American are the devotion to equalitarianism and the attachment to individual achievement." Equalitarianism conduces to democracy, and individualism to egoism. Thus the open and the closed reside in the breast of every American, Freire would say. This is the anthropological contradiction which also inspires educational practice in Latin America. Third, the decontextualizacion of the educational content. Freire would say that decontextualization alienates students from their own reality because education has a wrong epistemological foundation. Fourth, problems of planning and administration. Of course, Freire would say, that all plans and all administrative work also serve the elite. The ministers of education are asking for "decentralization" of education. Fifth, the limitations imposed by the economic and social factors. The problems of education are the problems of society, Freire maintains.

How is the educational contradiction overcome? In other words, how does education change in a society that uses it to perpetuate the

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social order? Philosophers of education know that the social system uses education as a means of consolidation and expansion. For instance, Havighurst says: "The present state and structure of the society is mirrored in its schools and reflected through the schools into the lives of its children." He goes on to say that "a society which is undergoing internal changes uses education as a means of facilitating these changes." These affirmations show that education cannot be changed unless society is changed. Havighurst sees two types of social change. First, the "change within a society whose general pattern does not change." This is a change in order to not change. That has been the major emphasis on the part of educators in Latin America. In this sense, we may say with Havighurst that "Education... prepares people for upward group mobility... and higher standard of living even though they stay in the social classes of their fathers." "Upward mobility" and "higher standard" of living are expressions of a society which is not changing. Second, Havighurst talks also about another type of change, that "which affects the society as a whole --its political institutions, its system of economic production, or the major elements of its social structure." Freire discusses education in the context of this second kind of education.


26 Ibid., p. 350.
The overcoming of social, cultural, and educational contradiction is possible through praxis. On the educational level, praxis is a dialogical method. That means breaking the vertical relationships between the two contradictory poles (teacher-student) and the establishment of a horizontal relationships (teacher-student-teacher). The dialogical education is, according to Freire, education for change, i.e., an education for freedom. Freedom here is a political concept.

Thus, problem-posing education is an education for freedom because it responds to the needs of the oppressed, because it enables the student --and teachers as well-- to understand the economic, social and political reality, and because not only does it explain this reality but it enables us to transform it. Problem-posing education is, before taking power, an education for freedom like the education done by Freire in Brazil or Chile. After taking power, problem-posing education is power and education of free people; it is revolutionary education. Such is the education carried on by Freire in Guinea-Bissau or Grenada.


c) A Philosophy of Freedom

Latin American countries have in common two principal aspects: they have a Christian tradition and they have a common history of economic, social, and political oppression. The last aspect is common to the countries of whole the so-called Third World countries. The struggles of independence have given to Latin America a freedom in the "liberal" sense. Liberalism permits "limit-situations" which, in general terms, are economic exploitation, social domination, and political control. These are the contradictions of freedom.

This political liberalism understands freedom as "an endowment from the Creator of every individual man and woman upon which no power, whether economic or political, can encroach, and that not even the government may deny." "An endowment from the Creator" means that "All men were created free and equal." Freedom is a principle of creation. As John Dewey says, talking about liberalism, "the rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" are the "natural rights" of all humanity. "Life, liberty and property," John Locke would say, are the "native tendency in every individual." We can find the same


"naturalism" in Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill, the fathers of political liberalism. Most progressive liberalism is embedded in the same naturalism which calls to mind the naturalistic interpretation of society by Herbert Spencer. If I were to interpret liberalism in a dialectical way, I would say: freedom is a "natural" gift, the terminus a quo of liberalism; i.e., all individuals are "now liberated after centuries of repression, class rule, and heredity privilege." So, all peoples are ready to improve and progress in an evolutionary way, the via ad of liberalism. As Carlos Lleras Restrepo said, "we are evolutionists." That which people want to pursue is happiness, the terminus ad quem of liberalism.

Freire's concept of freedom is completely contrary to the liberal interpretation mentioned above. The terminus a quo of the concept of freedom is the contradiction between an ideal concept of freedom and the "natural" determinism which justifies property, inequality, class rule, and the privileges of the few. The naturalism which justifies freedom justifies also the condition of oppression, dependence, and marginalization. It is not true that Latin America is


already liberated, even if the governments are called democratic and have elections every presidential term. It is not true that Latin American countries are free of repression, class rule, and "hereditary privilege." The challenge and the priority for Latin Americans today are liberation, the struggle of freedom, the via ad of Freire's concept of freedom. Liberation is not an evolutionary concept, it is not a "natural" process; liberation is a revolutionary concept, a social process. Freire makes a clear distinction between "natural" process and social process. The necessity of freedom is to overcome economic, social, and political limit-situations. The terminus ad quem is freedom, the "eternal creation" and not the "eternal vigilance" of liberalism. 36 Freedom is the dynamic process of a permanent search on a political level.

3. CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

It is necessary to include two last points before finishing this work. On the one hand, it is important to discuss some critical considerations which I had begun in the previous parts. These considerations have proposed questions for future research. On the other hand, my conclusions are the natural consequences of the above discussion.

a) Critical Considerations

Freire has not attempted to build a philosophical system, a pure philosophy. The conditions under which Latin America lives today

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do not permit such luxury. A systematic philosophy will arise only as a "second moment." However, this part is that which people of the First World, in their critiques of Freire and other philosophers of the Third World, cannot understand. They misunderstand the situation in which Latin American philosophers are living, the methods which they are using, and the purpose for which they are reflecting. Many of the unfounded critiques against Freire have arisen from these misunderstandings. Nevertheless, that does not mean that Freire may not be vulnerable to some critiques. At this point, I will point out my most important critiques of Freire's work which I have analyzed.

First of all, there are many elements in Freire's work: social, political, ethical, psychological, historical, physical, and metaphysical, but he never develops a philosophical discussion about such areas of knowledge. So, the accusation of superficiality is justifiable. He is a thinker --not a philosopher-- who sees the world "right or wrong." For instance, Freire uses physical, metaphysical and logical categories, but he has never written a treatise on physics, metaphysics, or logic. Such explanations are supposed and therefore are in need of future philosophical analysis. The same thing happens with social, political, ethical, historical, psychological, scientific categories. Another example of this problem comes from the way in which Freire divides the Brazilian society as oppressor-oppressed. He does not explain his criteria for judging the objective exploitation. A third example comes from his anthropology. He defines human being as praxis, as a being of relations, of creations. However, he does not take into
account the emotive, passional, and moral dimensions of human being.

Second, philosophy of education is the central theme of Freire's thought. His principal interest is to rest his pedagogical method on his philosophical foundations. But even here, Freire's vulnerability lies in his lack of an adequate philosophical explanation. For instance, his concept of conscientization tries to avoid the extremes of materialism and idealism. Conscientization—as well as praxis and knowledge—is the dialectical relationship between objective and subjective realities. But what does that reality mean? Freire's explanation of social reality is not thorough enough to allow us to understand its dynamic. His explanation of human commitment to one's own reality is not very clear. People can confuse conscientization with manipulation. This danger is more important in a "cultural circle" where there is involved a political and social purpose.

Third, the same objections can be made against Freire's concept of revolution. There is an excessive confidence in dialogue without an explanation of its limitations. There is an excessive confidence in

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human cooperation, the possibility of unity, organization, and cultural synthesis without a serious discussion of the problem of revolution. For instance, an exaggeration between human beings and nature could lead to a simplistic and optimistic view of the social change without taking into consideration the real problems of such change. In this sense, Freire could be accused of being an idealist.

However, Freire may be accused of superficiality but not of inconsistency. As I have affirmed at the beginning of my analysis of Freire's thought, he does not do a pure philosophy, and he is not interested in a subjective philosophy which will discuss irrelevant aspects. What he constructs is only a shell, a philosophical scheme which has to be taken as an agenda to be elaborated.

b) Final Conclusions

Given the nature of my analysis and method applied to Freire's thought, I have concluded that the contribution of Freire to the Latin American expectations of freedom can be summarized in the following points:

First, freedom is the human vocation of people who live under oppression. Oppression is an economic, social and political order from which freedom arises. If each of these areas is not affected, freedom is not yet at hand. Freedom is a political concept which affects the infrastructural and superstructural dimensions of human life.

Second, freedom is the human struggle of people who, bringing to light their own dehumanization, commit themselves to their own liberation. Freedom and humanization coincide; freedom is an essential
part of the human creation. Freedom is neither the "free competition" among people, a "natural selection" in social terms, nor the struggle between oppressor-oppressed, the "class struggle," but it is the struggle of all people to overcome human limitations.

Third, freedom is the permanent human creation of people who, in liberating themselves with other people, make freedom a permanent mode of life through cooperation. Cooperation for Freire means a system of unity, or organization, and of cultural synthesis, the first principles of any political system of freedom.

In a few words, freedom is the vocation of the oppressed for their own humanization. Freedom is the struggle of all people. No one is liberated alone; no one liberates others; people liberate together. Freedom is the continuous creation of a political mode of life.
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