American Literary Magazines and the "New Imperialism" 1893-1898

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AMERICAN LITERARY MAGAZINES AND THE
"NEW IMPERIALISM" 1893-1898

by
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CHAPTER I
AMERICAN LITERARY MAGAZINES AND THE "NEW IMPERIALISM" 1893-1898

The most tantalizing problems faced by students of international relations are those which revolve around the question of motivation in national action. The role of ideas and attitudes in determining the behavior of nations is an obtrusive factor in every international situation.¹

Thus Albert Weinberg pinpoints a fascinating phase that has special significance in the study of the "new imperialism." Dr. Albert Shaw strengthens Weinberg's assertion, when he declares that expansion is no exception to the thesis that "the power and persistence of ideas lie at the base of all historical movements."² Parker T. Moon, discussing the dynamics of imperialism, stated that "not direct interests, but ideas, not property or profession but principles, activate the public at large," that it is the theories of the propagandists of expansion that impel nations to action.³ Various writers have studied these ideas and attitudes of the "new imperialism" that, as Weinberg, Shaw, and Moon maintain, may determine the behavior of a nation, and they have found in their studies that these

¹Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny (Baltimore, 1935), Foreword, ix.
attitudes and ideas fall into significant patterns of thought. Weinberg states that the ideology of American expansion is:

... its motley body of justificatory doctrines. It comprises metaphysical dogmas of a providential mission and quasi-scientific 'laws' of national development, conceptions of national right and ideals of social duty, legal rationalizations and appeals to the 'highest law,' aims of extending freedom and designs of extending benevolent absolutism.

Here then, are the findings of one author as to the significant patterns of thought that have been found to be a basis for the "new imperialism" of 1898. This thesis accepts the definition of "new imperialism" as generally accepted and studied by Weinberg. To limit so complex a matter as the ideology of expansion to these few concepts is to run the risk of oversimplification; therefore, no claim is made that these were the only ideological stimulants to expansion. But it is likely that these ideas were crucial, and it is believed that they offer a sound basis for the analysis of expansionist ideology here being undertaken.

Other writers on this subject studied America's imperialism from a different viewpoint. Some authors, as Moon and Weinberg, have studied it within the wider scope or vision of world imperialism. Still others, as Ernest May and Theodore Greene have situated their studies in a more political and diplomatic background of events and happenings. Some have given it a predominantly economic slant, as Charles Beard; others a defensive national interest point of view. Most authors have admitted and studied the ideological background, and have pointed out the importance of literature, both

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*Weinberg, Introduction, p. 2.*
newspapers and periodicals, in the spread of these ideas. Marcus Wilkerson analyzed public opinion in general and the Spanish-American War, while Joseph Wisan concentrated on the New York press and the Cuban crisis, and Dr. Richard Matre in a doctoral dissertation analyzed the Chicago press and imperialism.5

This thesis proposes to study the patterns of thought as reflected in certain American literary magazines of that time. Special attention is given primarily to Nation and Forum, to find out if and how these patterns of thought were reflected in the specific periodicals, either responding to or reacting against, these ideas — ideas following the patterns, to an extent, of author Weinberg — of "inevitable destiny," of "white man's burden," and the related ideas of "self-defense" for the United States, of "paramount interest," and of "world leadership." This is the major concern and research of the paper.

Nation and Forum were chosen as being typical of the literary magazines of that time, and other magazines may be cited only occasionally to support or strengthen some idea or to show the similarity of idea in other periodicals. Nation and Forum were chosen because, according to Mott's analysis of them their influence was significant due to the type of writers propounding their ideas therein, and because of the type, not necessarily number, of subscribers to these two periodicals.

It is a truism that great movements are said to begin among the intelligentsia and then drift down to popular expression. Of interest then, would be to see to what extent these patterns of thought are found in magazines devoted to the upper class. The American literary magazine, rather than the general newspaper or popular magazine, form the intellectual milieu of the United States, and it is the intelligentsia who are interpreting these patterns of thought underlying the "new imperialism," reacting to them, and being influenced by them. The intellectuals who wrote for Nation and Forum were often political leaders, reflecting at least one segment of American political thought.

The editors of these American periodicals cannot be passed over. Loretta S. Metcalf, Walter Hines Page, Alfred Ernest Keet, and Joseph M. Rice, as editors of Forum, contributed greatly to the formation of public opinion. Writing on Metcalf, first editor of Forum, F. L. Mott observed:

Metcalf conceived it to be his initial editorial duty to determine what topics were of greatest timely significance and widest public interest, and then to secure experts on those subjects to discuss them in his magazine. This resulted in a very distinguished list of contributors. . . . It would be difficult to find a better exposition of the more serious interests of the American mind in the decade 1886 to 1896 than is afforded by the first twenty volumes of the Forum. 6

Of significance is the notable roll of contributors including senators, bishops, college presidents, and well-known novelists, e.g. Senators Henry Cabot Lodge, George F. Hoar, J. B. Foraker, and Shelby M. Cullom.

Commenting on the Forum at the time of Metcalf's retirement, the Review of Reviews maintained that many men of England considered the magazine one of the "ablest and timeliest" periodicals in its class, and it thought that Page, the succeeding editor, should continue to follow the policy and general line of thought that made the Forum so successful. In following this same emphasis, Walter Hines Page's chief interest was also the enlistment of famous and expert writers to comment on significant affairs.

After Page's departure for the Atlantic Monthly, his assistant, Alfred Ernest Keet, carried on for several years, followed by Joseph Rice from 1897-1907. Dr. Rice lacked the originality and aggressiveness of his predecessors, but he continued the traditions of Forum with respect to specialist writers and symposiums.

In the same way, in regard to another literary magazine, the Nation, Frank Luther Mott, in his analysis of American Magazines, again stated that the list of the early contributors to Nation enrolled most of the famous scholars and writers of the sixties and seventies and kept its contributors in the eighties and nineties. Writers like Bryce and Dicey, English correspondents Higginson and Norton, such Harvard men as Channing, Hary, Kittredge, and Winson, became Nation contributors, with others such as Joel Chandler Harris, William Roscoe Thayer and James Ford Rhodes, as occasional writers for the magazine.

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8 Mott, III, p. 335, p. 346.
The influence of Nation far exceeded its circulation. Its subscribers have included libraries, universities and other educational centers in the country and its contributors, as have been listed, included the educated leaders who sway opinion. James Bryce observed that it was read by two classes of people, which in America have a strong influence in forming political and economic opinion, namely, editors and University professors.9

E. L. Godkin, founding Nation in 1865, showed at once a distinctive style, a refreshing penetration, and a skill in ironic analysis never before equalled in American journalism.

Allan Nevins in American Press Opinion asserted that the greatest role in the leadership of opinion in the generation preceding the Civil War had been played by Horace Greeley, and the "greatest single part in the next generation was with little doubt that of E. L. Godkin." From 1865 until 1899 Godkin was editor-in-chief of the Nation. Nevins felt that directly Godkin never addressed more than 35,000 subscribers to the two publications, Nation and Evening Post, but indirectly, as filtered "down through to the other journals, through pulpits, through college chairs, and by word of mouth," his opinions affected almost every corner of the land.10

These were the magazines then, that are recordings of a climate of opinion, and the historian cannot ignore them except at his peril.


CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND OF THE PATTERNS OF THOUGHT OR MOTIVES
UNDERLYING THE "NEW IMPERIALISM"

Underlying the whole problem of expansion, it would seem are the ideas that motivate it, give it direction, and furnish its semantics.

What, then, are the principal beliefs constituting the rationale of late nineteenth century American expansion? Basically the ideology fell into patterns derived from 1) science 2) humanitarianism 3) economics and 4) politics, and comprised, first of all, rationalizations of "inevitable destiny," making full use of Darwin's "survival of the fittest." They included, secondly, the altruistic motive of extending freedom, benevolence, and civilization to races less blessed. Thirdly, they elaborated on all the concomitant doctrines of self-defense, of naval power, and of necessity against foreign imperialism. The patterns then abetted the economists' glorification of the pecuniary motive as the driving force in "progress," and finally, they broadened their scope again, with the world leadership idea as the end result of the national prestige and political power themes. All of these ideas, these patterns of thought, are what will be considered in this paper, as providing the basis for the "new imperialism" of 1898.

The beginning of the 1890's marked roughly the incipience of the tendency which, though it was probably not consciously related to
philosophical imperialism, did prepare the foundation for and lead to this ideology of 1898. Lying in the popular mood in which ideology often germinates, the seed of imperialism was an inclination toward two emotions related to the elements of imperialist ideology; namely humanitarianism and a belligerent spirit of national self-assertion.

The new imperialism differed from the manifest destiny of the 1840's in that the latter had been largely a matter of emotion. Much of it had been simply an expression of a half-blind faith in the superior virility of the American race and the superior beneficence of American political institutions. In the intervening years since the 1840's, much had been done to provide this new emotional concept with a philosophic backing. It was not merely the emotion of the 1840's. The expansionists of the 1890's were able to cite the lessons of science and of history in support of their doctrine. And their reasoning and arguments carried conviction to some of the best minds of the period. It was this reasoning and these arguments that brought about a change in popular psychology that formed those intellectual currents or those patterns of thought underlying the "new imperialism."

Probably the idea that first had a great impact for the new expansionist philosophy was the Darwinian hypothesis of evolution through natural selection. Darwin's theory of the evolution of higher life-forms through natural selection, the "survival of the fittest" in the "struggle for existence," was easily adaptable to sociological theorizing, and his American interpreters

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1 Julius Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (Baltimore, 1936), p. 8.
made the most of it. If a ruthless struggle for existence among individuals resulted in the survival and predominance of the "fittest" or biologically "best," a similar struggle among races or nations might be expected to produce similar results. Thus Pratt concludes: "... ruthless international competition was justified in the name of 'progress.'"² And Darwin himself referred specifically to the United States when he wrote:

There is apparently much truth in the belief that the wonderful progress of the United States, as well as the character of the people, are the results of natural selection; the more energetic, restless, and courageous men from all parts of Europe having emigrated during the last ten or twelve generations to that great country, and having their succeeded best. Looking to the distant future, I do not think that the Rev. Zincke takes an exaggerated view when he says: "All other series of events -- as that which resulted in the culture of mind of Greece, and that which resulted in the empire of Rome -- only appear to have purpose and value when viewed in connection with, or rather as subsidiary to, ... the great stream of Anglo-Saxon emigration to the west."³

Prominent Americans who applied Darwinian theory to practical conclusions were two popular writers, John Fiske, the historian, and Josiah Strong, a Congregational clergyman.

As a devout disciple of Herbert Spencer, interested in propagating the theories of historical evolution and the survival of the fittest among nations, John Fiske was determined to show that the Anglo-Saxons in the United States had evolved the "fittest of all political principles --


federalism -- upon which all the world would at some future time be organized. Anglo-Saxons, he felt, excelled not only in institution but in growth of numbers and in economic power, and he firmly believed that because of the superiority of their institutions and the growth of their power, the Anglo-Saxons were bound to lead the world. Theirs was an inevitable destiny.

Having already spread out over two hemispheres, he felt they could not fail to keep that sovereignty of the sea and that commercial supremacy first acquired in the settlement of America. As he said:

It is enough to point to the general conclusion that the work which the English race began when it colonized North America is destined to go on until every land on the earth's surface that is not already the seat of an old civilization shall become English in its language, in its religion, in its political habits and traditions, and to a predominant extent in the blood of its people. The day is at hand when four-fifths of the human race will trace its pedigree to English fore-fathers, as four-fifths of the white people of the United States trace their pedigree today. The race thus spread over both hemispheres, and from the rising to the setting sun, will not fail to keep that sovereignty of the sea and that commercial supremacy which it began to acquire when England first stretched its arm across the Atlantic to the shores of Virginia and Massachusetts.4

Theories of race superiority lent themselves exceedingly well to a justification of imperialism. Foster Rhea Dulles implied that the premise of racial superiority was generally assumed "in support of each successive step toward American overseas expansion." He believed that publicists repeatedly pictured the United States as standing guard over western civilization. They urged the annexation of new territory in the Caribbean, in the Pacific, and off the coasts of Asia, not only in the national interest, but in behalf of

the welfare of the world. Thus Foster Rhea Dulles linked this racial superiority with the responsibility it carried with it. The theme of destiny, inevitable destiny, was a corollary of the theme of duty. Repeatedly it was declared, says Richard Hofstadter, "that expansion was the result of a 'cosmic tendency,' that destiny always arrives, that it was in the inexorable logic of events." The doctrine that expansion was inevitable had, of course, long been familiar to Americans. Manifest Destiny had often been invoked throughout the nineteenth century. Albert Weinberg had pointed out that this expression took on a new meaning in the nineties. Previously, destiny had meant primarily that American expansion, when we willed it, could not be resisted by others who might wish to stand in our way. During the nineties it came to mean that expansion "could not be resisted by Americans themselves, caught, willing or unwilling," in the coils of fate. Again, theirs was an inevitable destiny -- to empire -- with its concomitant idea of duty.

Even more assertive in the development of such ideas was Josiah Strong. Strong's widely read and widely quoted *Our Country* had a persuasive influence. The Anglo-Saxon, Strong wrote, held in his hands the destinies of mankind, and the United States was to become the home of this race, the principal seat of his power, the great center of his influence. He maintained that:

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7 Weinberg, p. 254.
... this race of unequaled energy, with all the majesty of numbers and the might of wealth behind it -- the representative, let us hope, of the largest liberty, the purest Christianity, the highest civilization -- having developed peculiarly aggressive traits calculated to impress its institutions upon mankind, will spread itself over the earth. If I read not amiss, this powerful race will move down upon Mexico, down upon Central and South America, out upon the islands of the sea, over upon Africa and beyond. And can anyone doubt that the result of this competition of races will be the "survival of the fittest"?

This was the "white man's burden."

Strong's starting point was his concern with world evangelization, reflecting the powerful missionary impulses of this generation in American life. He was convinced that such evangelization was the duty of the Anglo-Saxon people. With their two great ideals of spiritual Christianity and civil liberty, they had risen by a process of natural selection to world pre-eminence.

It was the unique task of the United States, Strong further believed, to make certain that this expansion spread abroad American national ideals. He felt that as custodian of the two greatest developments in human history -- civil liberty and pure spiritual Christianity -- the Anglo-Saxon was divinely commissioned to be, in a peculiar sense, his brother's keeper. Strong questioned whether there was room for reasonable doubt that the race, "unless devitalized by alcohol and tobacco" was destined to "dispossess many weaker races, assimilate others, and mold the remaining," until, in a very true and important sense, it had Anglo-Saxonized mankind.


9 Ibid., p. 225.
Religious groups throughout the nation gradually united in support of the imperialism of righteousness, of duty and destiny, of the "white man's burden."

The third and fourth background patterns of thought underlying the new imperialism included not only the concept of a superior race and a moral mission, but the traditional realistic arguments laid down by the early Hamiltonians in their program for overseas power. They outlined a philosophy of self-interest, force, and power politics. They included the ideas of security and of paramount interest.

No writer had more influence in shaping this expansionism than Captain Alfred T. Mahan. He not only influenced public thinking by means of his books, innumerable articles and letters to newspapers, but also by close personal association with men in a position to put his ideas into effect.

Mahan's historical studies on the influence of sea power, with the realization that new forces were invading "that little corner" which had previously made up the world of the United States, convinced him that "no nation, certainly no great nation, should henceforth maintain the policy of isolation." And once persuaded that the United States could not live unto itself, Mahan preached this broader point of view unceasingly — "whether they will or no, Americans must now begin to look outward."

And in The Interest of America in Sea Power, in which he urged that the country pursue a stronger policy that the present one of "passive self-

10 William Livezey, Mahan On Sea Power (Oklahoma, 1947), pp. 77-78.
defense," Mahan pointed out:

All around us now is strife; the struggle of life, the race of life, are phrases so familiar that we do not feel their significance till we stop to think about them. Everywhere nation is arrayed against nation; our own no less than others.11

Mahan was primarily concerned with naval power and had analyzed the concept of this power, using England as a model. He concluded that the basic elements of power were trade -- including open markets and protected markets like colonies -- the ships to carry trade, and military and naval strength to protect shipping and trade in time of war. His was an ambitious program of mercantile imperialism. Accepting the thesis that a growing volume of industrial production demanded new foreign markets to maintain a healthy economy, Mahan insisted that in the face of existing imperialistic rivalries the United States had to be prepared to safeguard its commercial interests throughout the entire world. This meant a strong and powerful navy, for only that nation which commanded the seas was in a position of real power, and such a navy in turn had to have overseas bases to operate effectively away from its home ports. This implied colonies, and on this subject Mahan maintained:

Such colonies the United States has not and is not likely to have. . . . Having therefore no foreign establishments, either colonial or military, the ships of war of the United States, in war, will be like land birds, unable to fly far from their

11Alfred Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power (Boston, 1897), p. 18.
own shores. To provide resting places for them, where they can coal and repair, would be one of the first duties of a government proposing to itself the development of the power of the nation at sea. 12

At this time, Mahan's ideas had special significance and meaning to those businessmen pushing aggressively into foreign markets. The growing productivity of farms and factories would compel a search for foreign markets, as we shall see later. The competition for markets and colonies being carried on by the seaboard powers of Europe, especially the aggressiveness shown in the Pacific, in Africa, in South America, might bring these powers into collision with the United States. The prospective piercing of the Isthmus of Panama, which could create havoc for the United States in her present state of military and naval preparation; the very unsettled political conditions rampant in Haiti, Central America, and the Hawaiian Islands, places of great military and commercial importance, whose control also had international implications -- all these things could perhaps force the United States to abandon her usual complacency and could lead her to "look outward" and to build up her sea power.

America must be ready in attitude and in actual preparation; hence Mahan sketched the outlines of his program. In addition to constructing a modern navy and adequate coast defenses, the United States must be ready to take, when opportunity offered, such outlying positions as would confer mastery of the essential and necessary water routes. Of special importance, 12

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12 Alfred Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston, 1890), p. 83.
when the isthmian canal should have been opened, would be the control of the Caribbean. Mahan again insisted:

Control of a maritime region is insured primarily by a navy; secondarily, by positions, suitably chosen and spaced one from the other, upon which as bases the navy rests, and from which it can exert strength. At present the positions of the Caribbean are occupied by foreign powers, nor may we, however disposed to acquisition, obtain them by means other than righteous; but a distinct advance will have been made when public opinion is convinced that we need them, and should not exert our utmost ingenuity to dodge them when flung at our head.13

Mahan was also concerned with the Pacific. The United States would need not only the unobstructed use of the isthmian canal, but outposts in the Pacific as well, and the most logical outpost was in the Hawaiian Islands. Already in 1890 Mahan had written that for the defense of the west coast it was necessary that no foreign power acquire a lodgment in those islands.14

The fear or concern for foreign imperialism was constantly pushed to the fore.

It follows then that imperialism of this kind appealed to members of both business and political elites as an enlargement of the sphere of American power or honor and profits. Many of the underdog elements also responded to this new note of national self assertion. This became the "paramount interest" pattern, with its national honor theme and emphasis on economic necessity.

A directive motive in the expansion policy was demand for markets and for profitable investment by the exporting and financial classes within each imperial regime. The rising productivity of industry required larger imports


14Ibid.
of some forms of raw materials, more imported foods for larger urban populations, and a great variety of imported consumption goods for a rising standard of living. These imports could be purchased only by a corresponding expansion of exports, or else by the incomes derived from foreign investments which implied earlier exports of capital goods. As J. A. Hoblson declared:

It was this sudden demand for foreign markets for manufactures and for investments which was avowedly responsible for the adoption of Imperialism as a political policy and practice by the Republican party to which the great industrial and financial chiefs belonged, and which belonged to them. The adventurous enthusiasm of President Theodore Roosevelt and his "manifest destiny" and "mission of civilization" party must not deceive us. It was Messrs. Rockefeller, Pierpont Morgan, and their associates who needed Imperialism and who fastened it upon the shoulders of the great Republic of the West. 15

One aspect of American imperialism can then be seen as the natural product of economic pressure of a sudden advance of capitalism which could not find occupation at home and needed foreign markets for goods and for investments.

National interest was only one point in the arguments for expansion. This interest was also identified with the concern for the welfare of the world at large, and thus it developed into the world leadership pattern of thought. With her frontage on the Pacific, the United States stood guard over the preservation of Western civilization. But it was her role not only to defend but to extend the blessings of that civilization. Again Mahan's arguments were used, as he brought together, logically and persuasively, the several factors supporting an emergent imperialism. Dulles explains these factors as:

... the aggressive restlessness underlying the struggle for survival among the great powers, the consequent necessity for the United States to build up predominant economic and political strength, and the moral responsibility of the nation to maintain a position which would enable it to uphold law and justice in international society.16

The forces then, leading toward the move of expansionism, were very powerful, representing as they did what seemed to be the demands of duty and destiny, national security, commercial advantage, and an obligation of leadership, and obligation of spreading abroad American principles. Nevertheless they might not have carried the day had it not been for the insistent propaganda of the expansionists themselves. Their skillful appeal to logic and emotions was of decisive importance in creating public support for imperialism.

Yet it was by no means clear that the American government and public were really interested in foreign affairs. Press reports, editors, and politicians argued these controversial issues at length. In the nation could be heard eloquent voices attempting to stir up a crusading spirit, or an imperialist movement, or a revival of aggressive Anglophobia. Others appealed for the maintenance of isolationism. And the American literary magazine carried these diverse ideas and these diverse patterns of thought in varying degrees and with varying interpretations. The importance of their influence cannot be directly measured, but it seems only reasonable to admit that they were an important contribution in the formation of the American policy of supporting or reacting to the new imperialism of 1898.

CHAPTER III

"INEVITABLE DESTINY" REFLECTED IN LITERARY MAGAZINES

The idea of a destiny which presides over and guides American expansion has rarely, if ever, been absent from the national consciousness. The precise character of that destiny, however, as well as the ultimate goal to which it points, has varied with changing ideas and circumstances. At the close of the nineteenth century, natural destiny lay beyond continental U.S.A. and the triumph of this idea whether on the ground of alleged national interest or moral obligation, can be explained only in terms of the new conditions prevailing in the country at the end of the nineteenth century.¹

Specifically American expansion centered about the disposition of the Philippine Islands at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War of 1898. To better understand the issues of the treaty debates of 1898 and 1899, the historian may examine the articles of Nation and Forum.

The American belief in Manifest Destiny that gained acceptance in the 1840's arose from an emotional sense of mission. It was the duty of America to furnish democratic ideals and their successful application to a world emerging from absolute monarchy. Thus Alexis de Tocqueville, the French

observer, noted when he wrote (in 1830's) that everything concerning democracy showed us as a "seminal font" and elaborate laboratory.²

In 1899 the American people broke with their traditions of idealism as they approved acquisition of the Philippines. Expansionism carried them across the Pacific away from continental U.S.A. and to a major strategic commitment in the Far East. The acquisition of the Philippines was recognized by contemporaries on both sides of the debate to be a turning point in our history.

Background events that shed much light on this final situation of the Philippines began on January 28, 1893, when Americans read a bulletin from Honolulu, Hawaii. Two weeks earlier, this news report stated, a group of American residents had overthrown a young native queen and formed a provisional government. A Committee of Public Safety, largely composed of Americans, and having the support of the American Minister, Mr. Stevens, seized control of the government in Honolulu. Marines from the U.S.S. Boston had landed at the request of the American minister in order to protect lives and property. Violence had ended quickly. The rebels were in full control and were said to have enthusiastic support from the populace. Most noteworthy of all, they had announced the intention of asking the United States to annex the islands.

The proposition seemed to come unexpectedly, and neither politicians nor journalists knew quite what to make of it. The molders of public opinion seemed to be waiting to learn what mold the public wanted.

²Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (London, 1946), Forward, xiv.
The press focused attention on "inevitable destiny." Magazine articles, congressional debates, and public speeches, in sharp contrast with the apathy of the previous decade, vigorously expounded the new overseas expansionism.

The argument for overseas expansion was the myth of racial superiority, derived from the evolutionary theories set forth by Charles Darwin and popularized by John Fiske and John Burgess.

Fiske firmly believed that because of the superiority of their institutions and the growth of their power, the Anglo-Saxons were bound to lead the world by keeping that sovereignty of the sea and that commercial supremacy first acquired in the settlement of America. It was inevitable. Burgess was convinced that Anglo-Saxons were uniquely endowed with the capacity for establishing national states, were forordained to carry political institutions to all parts of the world, and consequently "must have a colonial policy."

Editorially Nation opposed inevitable destiny. It pointed out in the issue of February 9, 1893, that destiny may or could also mean that the United States continue its past role in Hawaii because "the situation heretofore has been exactly to our liking and we may well ask why it should be changed."

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4 John W. Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, I (Boston, 1891), p. 45.

5 Nation, LVI (February 2, 1893), p. 75.
A week later the editor questioned the validity of racial destiny of the Social Darwinists. He implied that different races would not necessarily live in peace simply because the Anglo-Saxon race was exercising dominant control. *Nation* stated:

And those who desire for the republic greater variety of races, and especially more color in our population, would do well, if they have the stomach for it, to read the account on Thursday last, of the burning and torture of a negro in Texas. That shocking story is a sufficiently awful illustration of the power of race hatred to convert Anglo-Saxons, at least, into devils incarnate. Do you want more material to feed this apparently unextinguishable passion?

There were others writing in the periodicals though who saw in the Anglo-Saxon race specific qualities that made it expansive. In March, 1893, John R. Procter, soon to be head of the Civil Service Commission, contributed to *The American Journal of Politics* an article which contained some particularly pertinent observations concerning the expansive qualities of the race. Procter believed that the Anglo-Saxons who came from Britain were "the most adventurous, the most restless descendants of that hardy rover race." Discussing the "restless" march of Anglo-Saxondom he asked:

Will not the same spirit that brought the Norse sea rovers to that beautiful Britain and sent their descendants worldward from that island home, carry the aggressive Anglo-Saxons of the Greater Britain, inheriting the same Teutonic greed for land, with the aggressive colonization instincts and assimilating forces intensified; with a love of adventure and of gain, and an adaptability of commerce -- will not these forces, more potent than written laws, force American enterprise to look more and more, as we grow stronger and richer, beyond the limits of our own territorial restriction.

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And The Review of Reviews, in June, 1893, commenting editorially upon the frequency of revolutions and wars in the Latin American countries, observed that it seemed as though these countries with their large mixture of Indian blood "were determined to kill themselves off in order that their land might become the heritage of the Anglo-Saxon or some other stable race with capacity for industrial development and social order."\(^8\)

Nation did not concur with the policy of "inevitable" annexation on any grounds but pointed out the effect this "general readiness to subjugate and dominate or control outside this continent would have on our domestic institutions."\(^9\)

As the Hawaiian issue approached the time of decision, Mahan entered the propaganda campaign. He looked upon the Hawaiian question as important both in itself and in the precedent it would create. He prepared for the Forum an article which appeared late in February, 1893. Mahan took for his postulate the concept that growth is a vital necessity to a nation. Cessation of growth amounts to stagnation and decay. He asserted the "inevitable destiny" of the United States to expansion when he wrote:

In our infancy we bordered upon the Atlantic only; our youth carried our boundary to the Gulf of Mexico; today maturity sees us upon the Pacific. Have we no right or no call to progress farther in any direction? . . . This is the question that has long been looming upon the brow of a future now rapidly passing into the present. Of it the Hawaiian incident is a part -- intrinsically, perhaps, a small part, -- but in its relations to the whole, so vital that, as has been said, a wrong decision does not stand by itself, but involves, not only in principle, but in fact, recession along the whole line.

\(^8\) The Review of Reviews, VII (June, 1893), p. 523.
\(^9\) Nation (March 9, 1893), pp. 173-174.
And then Mahan very pointedly continued:

In our natural, necessary, irrepressible expansion, we are here come into contact with the progress of another great people, the law of whose being has impressed upon it a principle of growth which has wrought mightily in the past and in the present is visible by recurring manifestations.\textsuperscript{10}

Later in the same article, Mahan again reiterated his plea for understanding that this annexation of Hawaii was part of the natural destiny of the United States. He asserted:

This is no mere question of a particular act, for which, possible, just occasion may not have offered yet; but of a principle, a policy, fruitful of many future acts, to enter upon which, in the fulness of our national progress, the time has now arrived. The principle being accepted, to be conditioned only by a just and candid regard for the rights and reasonable susceptibilities of other nations... the annexation even of Hawaii, would be no mere sporadic effort, irrational because disconnected from an adequate motive, but a first fruit and a token that the nation in its evolution has aroused itself to the necessity of carrying its life -- that has been the happiness of those under its influence -- beyond the borders that have heretofore sufficed for its activities.\textsuperscript{11}

The article opened a series,\textsuperscript{12} all directed to the theme of growth and the inevitability of decay if the growth is retarded. The article was on the stands by February, though it was in the March number.

Mahan's position was promptly challenged by Cooley. Was there even a constitutional warrant for the acquisition of such outlying possessions? Judge T. M. Cooley, formerly a member of the Michigan Supreme Court and of the Interstate Commerce Commission wrote in Forum also, and argued that


\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., p. 7

\textsuperscript{12}The articles were later issued in his book, \textit{The Interest of America In Sea Power} (Cambridge, 1897).
there was not this constitutional warrant, and he did not consider this acquisition either destiny or duty. While the constitution itself imposed no limit upon the treaty-making power, that power, he reasoned, was in reality limited by the conditions under which the Constitution was made and the purpose of its makers; and the founding fathers, he was sure, had in mind neither states nor territories of non-homogeneous people, nor the erection of a colonial system. As he said:

Now outlying colonies are not within the contemplation of the United States at all. The structure of government created under it never had in view such colonies and the people of the United States would never have consented to provide for our holding them. . . . This proposed treaty is not only one that will constitute a precedent for uniting ourselves to any country on the globe, but it is one that will justify our annexing other countries regardless of the differences of race and of the discordant elements that might be brought into the Union by the act. . . . The Constitution was made for the government of the United States of America, and not of countries in different parts of the world. It was not made and shaped for the establishment of any colonial system.13

An important point, however, is that those who used the argument of "inevitable destiny" sought to create the impression that certain events were fated to take place, that whether good or evil they were bound to occur. Actually the argument was usually employed to take all cases, good or evil, out of the realm of human volition. That this argument had its effect is demonstrated by the observation made in another periodical, the Atlantic Monthly, by an opponent of the absorption by the United States of the countries of Latin America, that "if destiny condemns us to absorb

them... the longer the day is postponed the better for us."\textsuperscript{14} Such absorption was felt to be wrong, but it was also feared that the United States might be compelled by destiny to carry it out.

There were other references to the idea of inevitability in the periodicals during this period. Henry Pratt Judson, at the time, Dean of the Colleges at the University of Chicago and later its president, in the \textit{Review of Reviews}, March, 1893, argued that the United States could no longer remain isolated and that it "cannot help being one of the foremost states even if it would."\textsuperscript{15} Similarly, a writer in the \textbf{Political Science Quarterly} observed that after the Hawaiian revolution of 1893 the United States "awoke to the fact that perhaps in spite of ourselves and our national prejudices the logic of events had extended our zone of political influence far beyond our supposed definitive boundaries."\textsuperscript{16}

Congressmen, Senators, and reporters spoke of many diverse reasons either in support of or opposing expansion, or more specifically annexation of Hawaii. There was talk that Grover Cleveland, the incoming President, wanted Hawaii and also wanted Canada and the West Indies. Thomas F. Bayard, Secretary of State in Cleveland's first term, said Hawaii should become America's. Some members of the party remained suspicious, but as the administration prepared to send a treaty to the Senate, reporters judged that it

\textsuperscript{14} Browne, "Latin and Saxon America," \textit{Atlantic Monthly}, LXIV, p. 840.


would be ratified by more than the necessary two-thirds vote.

Cleveland personally intervened with a request that the Senate defer action and give him time to study the matter. Since the President-elect did not even intimate that he would oppose annexation, both Democrats and Republicans acquiesced.

The new President decided that scrutiny of the question would require some time. He withdrew the treaty and sent a commissioner to Hawaii to gather data and to survey opinion among the native population. Eventually, with the report of James H. Blount, the agent whom he had sent to Hawaii, and with Walter Gresham, his new Secretary of State, he drafted a Presidential statement declaring not only that annexation should be renounced, but that justice called for redressing the wrong by at least an apology to the Queen, together with a quick effort to persuade the revolutionaries that they should restore her.

This caused a great deal of speculation and conflict on the part of annexationists and anti-annexationists. The blossoming imperialist movements probably lost their force for a time. As Ernest May wrote: "From the beginning, it had been moralistic as well as imperialist. While leaders like Lodge, Frye, and Morgan spoke of security, advantage, and gain, many editors, and most clergymen used words like 'duty,' 'destiny,' and 'mission.'"17

Albert Shaw, the youthful editor of the popular American Review of Reviews, wrote in 1893 of America's past failure to seek colonies as a "policy more selfish and timid than it was broad and enlightened." After annexation had come to seem unlikely, he described the great powers as "watching... with a somewhat puzzled and bewildered but also a very alert and fixed attention" and urged Congress to exhibit a "sense of the national dignity and the national destiny."18

Meanwhile, Nation had been praising President Cleveland for his cautious policy, complimenting Mr. Blount for his carefully prepared legal case, and maintaining that annexation was not the inevitable destiny of the United States, but only an unreasonable act being forced by a few individuals and groups.

In an editorial of December, 1893, Nation angrily retorted that there was much discussion in the Senate about the President not keeping it informed about matters in Hawaii, and then continued:

But not one word was said in the debate as to what a President should do when an unauthorized act of war has been committed in a foreign country by a representative of the United States, and a legitimate representative government thereby overthrown. ... This is exactly what has happened in Hawaii. ... Has the President under the Constitution no power to undo wrongs committed in foreign countries without authority by his officers or agents? Somebody ought to answer this question.19

19Nation, LVII (December 14, 1893), p. 439.
Some weeks later Nation denounced the annexation of Hawaii, which, is maintained, may come about eventually, not because of inevitable destiny, but simply as a result of force and maneuverings. Nation very strongly stated:

The Hawaiian annexationists have scored a great point in getting the 'Portuguese colony' to come out strongly for annexation to the United States. This was accomplished in a mass meeting of that colony held on February 19, when stirring resolutions were passed to that effect. As there are 8,602 Portuguese in the islands, 6,276 of whom cannot read and write, the importance of this accession to the annexation cause will be apparent. 20

In May, 1894, Forum, at one point, praised the handling by the administration of the Hawaiian case, while in another article, S. M. Cullom, taking inventory of the administration's policy and finding it lacking, felt it inevitable to extend the sovereignty and jurisdiction of this nation.

He said:

The entire country had cheerfully and patriotically concurred in the wisdom and Americanism of the foreign policy of the retiring administration, and from Cape Cod to the Seal Islands not a dissentient syllable was heard in regard to the cherished proposition of President Harrison's administration peacefully to extend the sovereignty and jurisdiction of this Republic over the waiting population of the beautiful islands of the western sea. 21

Henry Cabot Lodge, in the March issue of the Forum, strongly supported and maintained the inevitable destiny of the United States. "There is a very definite policy for American statesmen to pursue in this respect if they would prove themselves worthy inheritors of the principles of Washington

20 Nation, LVIII (March 22, 1894), p. 204.
and Adams." He further asserted that there may be no extension to the South, but from the Rio Grande to the Arctic Ocean, there should be one flag and one country, that the United States should build the Nicaragua canal, should control the Hawaiian Islands, Samoa, and Cuba -- all this for the interests and destiny of the United States. 22

In a following issue of Forum, George Bourinot challenged Lodge's "inevitable destiny" including Canada. He answered that Canadians did not favor annexation and that a change in the system and method of their government would not be conducive to the liberty and happiness of the Canadian people. He then showed how the Canadian government, politics, and economic system, were very effective and even more so than the United States. 23

Nation had also disagreed with Lodge's article in Forum. It was cynical of his reasoning, and of his "kindergarten methods of instruction," and it laughed at his "Americanism" and national duty idea. 24

In early 1895, the headlines had proclaimed the new revolution in Cuba, a war for independence, and throughout the island small armed bands struck at Spanish garrisons and roads and railroad lines. The United States reacted instinctively against Spain.

24 Nation, LX (March 14, 1895), p. 191.
In most American eyes, the rebels were fighting for an independent republic and for such American-patent blessings as free enterprise, free schools, and free churches. Even the most isolationist American newspapers, such as the New York Evening Post, the Springfield Republican, and the Boston Transcript, expressed hope that the Cubans would succeed. It was at this time that many newspapers became voluntary propaganda organs for the Cubans. Sensation-mongering papers like William Randolph Hearst's and Joseph Pulitzer's later dispatched special correspondents to vie with shocking accounts of Spanish atrocities.

In an editorial, Nation severely criticized the United States policy of "manifest destiny" in Cuba by referring to the illiterate population. It stated:

How easy it is for Spain -- how easy it would be for the United States if Lodge and Frye had their piratical way -- to make Cuba a model of self-government and political purity, may be seen by a glance at the nature of the population . . . . Illiteracy mounts up to alarming proportions: 76 percent of the population can neither read nor write. . . . From all this it can be inferred how ripe Cuba is for independence and republican institutions, especially how ready to become a state in our Union. What delightful colleagues for Lodge and Morgan in the Senate would Cuba furnish. . . . With hearts beating true to sugar and tobacco and all other 'good things' in sight, they would seem to be fore-ordained to seats in the Senate; and Senator Proctor's objections to receiving them must be set down to advancing age, the pharisaic spirit, and blindness to manifest destiny. 25

Nation, in October, 1895, commenting upon Captain Mahan's article, "The Future in Relation to American Naval Power," 26 again struck a blow

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at the idea of inevitability. It refused to accept the determinism or the inevitability implied, and was sharply critical of Mahan for speaking "again and again of the development of the nation and of national sentiment as a 'natural force,' moving on to its desired end, unconscious and unmoral."\(^{27}\)

In a comment on Murat Halstead's book, *The Story of Cuba*, as having value as the report of a newspaper correspondent who has recently visited Cuba, *Nation* again referred to the "destiny" idea.

To our mind, Mr. Halstead's facts destroy the arguments suggested by political fancy. The argument from "destiny," however, is unanswerable, and always has been to those who believe in it. Cuba belongs by destiny to the United States, just as Canada and Mexico do, to say nothing of South America; it is also part of destiny that the present owners of these countries should vigorously resist parting with them, so that it will probably be centuries before destiny is accomplished satisfactorily to all parties. Newspaper correspondents, however, occupy themselves much with the future, and we are glad to know from Mr. Halstead that it will all turn out all right in the end.\(^{28}\)

*Forum* also presented an article on the "inevitable destiny" theme. W. G. Sumner, Professor of Social and Political Science at Yale University wrote on the fallacy of territorial expansion in the June *Forum*. He explained that the traditional belief is that a state aggrandizes itself by territorial extension, so that winning new land is gaining in wealth and prosperity. He maintained that there is such a thing, though, as an expedient size for a state and that the notion that gain of territory is gain of wealth and strength for the state, after the expedient size has

\(^{27}\) *Nation*, LXI (October 3, 1895), p. 235.

\(^{28}\) *Nation*, LXII (June 25, 1896), p. 496.
been won, is a delusion. He continued his explanation, that if the United States should admit Hawaii to the Union, the Fiscus of the former state would collect more taxes and incur more expenses. The circumstances are such that the latter would probably be the greater. But, with Cuba, he said, if we were compelled to take the jurisdiction and establish order and security there, it would be a great burden and possibly a fatal calamity to us. Sumner then concluded:

This confederated state of ours was never planned for indefinite expansion, or for an imperial policy. . . . The Fathers of the Republic planned a confederation of free and peaceful industrial commonwealths, shielded by their geographical position from the jealousies, rivalries, and traditional policies of the Old World. . . . Any extension will not make us more secure where we are, but will force us to take new measures to secure our new acquisitions. The preservation of acquisitions will force us to reorganize our internal resources, so as to make it possible to prepare them in advance and to mobilize them with promptitude. This will lessen liberty and require discipline. It will increase taxation and all the pressure of government. . . . All this will be disastrous to republican institutions and to democracy.29

This expansionism and imperialism then, according to Professor Sumner, is not necessarily "inevitable destiny" or duty for the United States, but could actually do more harm than good.

There was much controversy over annexing lands with peoples of varied nationalities, customs, and language. Could this really be "manifest destiny"?

Hon. John R. Proctor, President of the United States Civil Service Commission believed this was perfectly natural and inevitable when he said:

Having annexed possessions of France, Spain, Mexico, and Russia -- with their alien peoples, customs, and laws -- and with ease incorporated them into our system, we care little whether there are a few thousand more or less Orientals now in Hawaii. If this be an evil, with annexation, it will prove a diminishing one: without annexation it may become incurable.

Proctor then went on to declare more forcefully the logic and inevitableness of this manifest destiny, when he continued in Forum:

The founders of our government understood that it was devised to facilitate annexation of territory; and our past history has settled that question. . . . Every acquisition of territory since the formation of our government has been opposed by men who seem to have had little appreciation of the manifest destiny of our race: others shrink with fear, lest we have not the ability to administer properly the government of countries seeking admission into our system.30

Murat Halstead, in an article in the same issue of Forum, returned to the natural destiny of the United States when he spoke of Cuba and said:

It has been the plain common sense of history that, as Spain lost by her colonial system of regarding outlying possessions crown property, and ruling them by martial law so she must lose Cuba in the same way. There is no escaping the law and logic of history. If she has not lost the island already it is only a question of time when she will do so. And then the United States must accept the duties of destiny.31

Later in the article, Murat again implied the inevitability of the destiny of the United States to expand and change, when he said that we be everlasting examples. Thomas Jefferson saw that if the Constitution was not equal to the occasion of the absorption of the Louisiana purchase, there was a higher and a more fundamental law -- "our inheritance -- written over


the continent, in rivers and ranges of mountains, in plains and valleys, and
that therefore, the Constitution would have to be accommodating. No parch­
ment can forbid the march of mankind."

In an editorial of December, 1897, Nation referred to Mr. Bryce's
article in the December Forum. Nation approved of the objection of Mr. Bryce
to annexing Hawaii because of the difficulty of governing such a country and
especially such a population. Mr. Bryce had also said: "The policy of
creating great armaments and of annexing territories beyond the sea would
be... an un-American policy, and a complete departure from the maxims —
approved by long experience — of the illustrious founders of the Republic."33

And Nation tried to strengthen the argument by commenting:

Now the first thing that confronts us when we done to this 'mere
matter of detail'... is the fact that the Hawaiian Government
confesses that the inhabitants of the islands are not capable of
governing themselves. If this is true... it is, or ought to be,
a fatal bar to annexation. The theory of our government, from the
Ordinance of 1787 down, has been that the expansion of the United
States was to be solely by the addition of self-governing communities
to self-governing communities.34

This annexation then again, is not inevitable but contrary to American
principles and ideals.

Both Forum and Nation in March, 1898, referred to the duty of the
United States in regard to its relations with Cuba and Spain. Talk of

32Ibid., p. 65.
Forum, XXIV (December, 1897), p. 395.
34Nation, LXV (December 2, 1897), p. 432.
war and the growing bellicosity of many caused one last effort to be made in a plea to consider the real consequences of duty.

Senator H. D. Money in Forum, commenting on the impossible conditions that were demanded as necessary precedents to the recognition of Cuban belligerency, felt that the whole character of the war precluded the fulfillment of any of those conditions. He concluded by again appealing to our destiny and duty when he wrote: "But a recognition of belligerency would not accomplish our measure of duty in this matter. . . . If we look to our duty, we cannot be indifferent to her fate. The example of insurrection against oppression was set by us."35

And Nation, in its one final plea stated:

He [the President] should bear in mind, too, that a war which the conscience of the nation does not heartily support, a war which leaves a doubt in the mind of Christian men and women whether it is right for us to engage in it, is particularly unwise and dangerous. The enthusiasm which the first smell of gunpowder creates will be a very feeble reliance unless it is sustained by the conviction of substantial citizens that we are following an imperative call to duty; that we have weighed the consequences, and that we have well considered what we are to do after we shall have successfully intervened in Cuba and assumed the responsibility of governing it.36

This would not seem to be "inevitable destiny" by Nation. But imperialists believed that every expansion of our territory was in accordance with the irresistible law of growth, with its "inevitable destiny."

36Nation, LXVI (March 17, 1898), p. 199.
CHAPTER IV

IDEA OF "WHITE MAN'S BURDEN"
AS SEEN IN LITERARY MAGAZINES

Along with the ideas of racism and destiny that appeared in the writings of the philosophers of expansion was the idea of mission. "The doctrine of mission," says Ralph Henry Gabriel, "is a rationalization which provides a philosophical justification for national and racial pride."¹ Frederick Merk wrote: "A truer expression of the national spirit was Mission. This was present from the beginning of American history and is present, clearly, today... Its language was that of dedication -- dedication to the enduring values of American civilization."²

Burgess, too, felt that altruistic thought -- that the abilities of the Anglo-Saxons were too valuable to be kept at home. Burgess felt that by far the large part of the surface of the globe was inhabited by populations which had not succeeded in establishing civilized states, and since there is no human right or barbarism, the Teutonic nations were called to carry the political civilizations of the modern world into those parts of

¹The Course of American Democratic Thought: An Intellectual History Since 1815 (New York; 1940), p. 344.
the world inhabited by unpolitical and barbaric races. They must have a colonial policy, and this, Burgess felt, was a matter not only of right but of duty.3

Thus the expansion of the United States into backward and misgoverned areas, which Fiske and Strong had seen as destiny, took on, in Burgess's teaching, the character of an obligation to civilization, an altruistic characteristic and motive.

Another spokesman for this idea of mission was Josiah Strong, who adopted the ideas of the Social Darwinists and elaborated them in a notable chapter in Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis. The idealism of his message, which emphasized the historic mission of the Anglo-Saxon people, to implant in all the remote areas of the earth, the great values of civil liberty and spiritual Christianity, was bound to appeal to the moral sentiments of many Americans. Religious groups throughout the nation gradually united behind the "imperialism of righteousness."

As Strong said: "It is time to dismiss 'the craven fear of being great,' to recognize the place in the world which God has given us and to accept the responsibilities which it devolves upon us in behalf of Christian civilization."4

One of the dominant themes of the doctrine of mission as it appeared in the periodicals was the viewpoint that this country had a mission to

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further the cause of peace. This argument was, of course, also often used in connection with the ideas of race and destiny, and the frequency of its appearance in the literature of expansionism is evidence of the need that was felt to clothe expansionism in the raiment of moral respectability. Perhaps because of the powerful strain of Puritanism that was, and to a considerable degree still is, part of the American character, the American felt it necessary to find moral justification for his actions and the actions of his country. Thus the idea of an American mission to preserve or promote peace had a strong appeal.

The Review of Reviews, May, 1894, declared that the United States had a duty in the Pacific and in the Orient to open these areas to the Occident and also to protect the weak against the strong. Furthermore, the whole world would approve this step and "would welcome the Stars and Stripes as the emblem of peace and good will toward all mankind in the North Pacific."\(^5\)

Even though the idea of mission, "white man's burden," was probably the most benevolent of the expansionist concepts, it was at times expressed in connection with theories far removed from peace and justice. Writing in the American Journal of Politics, Ethan Allen, grandson of the Revolutionary War leader, advocated what he called the "right of political domain." Under this right, said Allen, the United States could appropriate any territory it needed. The United States would pay a fair price but refusal to sell would mean confiscation. This rule, claimed Allen, would be enforced "for the benefit of all mankind, since this nation is today the

\(^5\)Review of Reviews, IX (May, 1894), p. 515.
world's almoner of the liberties our fathers gained." It was, of course, an expression of mission similar in its immorality to the utterances of Burgess and Mahan. The arrogance of such statements prompted the Nation, in October, 1895, to refer sarcastically to those who "in fine Hegelian phrases" claim that the United States has international duties as well as international rights, and who declare that the nation is "preparing to go forth with lofty benevolence, like a Knight of the Round Table, to redress wrongs and establish justice the world over."7

In regard to the public, readiness to react to the Hawaiian and Cuban situations can be understood in part through the displacement of feelings of sympathy or social protest generated in domestic affairs; these impulses found a safe and satisfying release in foreign conflict. Hawaii needed the help of the United States, and it was from this altruistic motive that the United States wanted to come to her aid. Spain was waging a heartless and inhuman war, the Cubans were portrayed as noble victims of Spanish tyranny, and again it was the United States that must unselfishly come to the aid of the Cuban people. This was the "white man's burden."

Both Nation and Forum alluded to this altruistic motive. In an editorial in the February 9, 1893 issue, Nation did not consider it altruistic when one realized the inferior type of person that would come into the governing body of the United States if Hawaii were annexed. Nation stated:


7Nation, LXI (October 3, 1895), p. 234.
The population now consists of natives recently emerged from savagery, speaking foreign tongues, Japanese, Chinese, and Portuguese. . . . The State Government would almost inevitably fall into the hands of a Sugar Boss or of some other great speculator, who would fill the Legislature with its own creature, and cause his own election to the Senate in company with the kind of subordinate known as a "Me-too." The best mode undoubtedly seems to be the mode now in operation—that is, a simple protectorate. 8

The United States then, had no obligation to "take care" of, or evangelize these poor inhabitants of Hawaii, and Thomas Cooley, in an article in Forum, felt it would be more altruistic of the United States to remain out of the affairs of Hawaii. He did not feel that the United States manifested true interest in the people of Hawaii when they made no attempt to ascertain the wishes of the native population about the subject of annexation, nor of any one else, except those who participated in the revolution. 9

Nation agreed with Cooley in his view. In an editorial commenting on the filibustering message and treaty submitted to the Senate by the President in the Hawaiian matter, Nation said that the recommendation about the islands had been made by the "plenipotentiaries" who represented the "merest fraction of the inhabitants, whose wishes had not been manifested by a plebiscite or even consulted. Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, will for them, be wholly at the mercy of despots seated either at Washington or at Honolulu." 10

8 Nation, LVI (February 9, 1893), p. 96.
10 Nation, LVI (February 23, 1893), p. 136.
Nation followed this same theme in another editorial, when it stated:

As a friend of the Indian, therefore, as one who does not contemn the Chinese and who does have an honest respect for solemn treaty obligations even with an "inferior" civilization, and who could not personally do a mean act to the humblest of the Hawaiian aborigines, we hope President Cleveland will study the proposal in the light of American republican principles and of the nature of peace and war. Is it consistent to incorporate another people without a plebiscite; or having taken a plebiscite, straightway to disinfranchise the majority of those who participate in it? Is it lawful to go to war for this purpose?

Or is it altruistic to force one's policies on another people? Nation very pointedly and cleverly commented on Mr. Blount being sent for the investigation. It continued: "He actually plans to visit all the islands and employ several weeks in finding out the real sentiment of the people."

Nation then concluded:

It was evidently a great mistake to send a man of such plodding methods, when there were available as commissioners men of lightning-like minds, such as that of the ex-officer of the navy who told a reporter that the "nine hours" he spent in Honolulu thoroughly convinced him that the Hawaiians to a man were in favor of annexation.11

There was no altruistic motive, it would seem, according to Nation, for Minister Steven's work, as early as November, 1889, to get ready to haul up the flag and to force annexation. "His dispatches, from his earliest arrival on the islands, show that he was true to the Blaine tradition of diplomacy, for he set to work at once interesting himself in the material resources and possibilities of the country, looking for chances to get in on the ground floor, for channels of usefulness and for good things

generally." And Nation implied that his meant "good things" for the United States, not the people of Hawaii.

Nation considered universal suffrage an important condition in the altruistic motive, when in its editorial, it referred to the Tribune's allusion to a certain "free and intelligent people" in Hawaii, whom this wicked administration is forcing to submit to "a corrupt, idolatrous, and barbarous despotism." Nation regretted that the Tribune did not say of what this "free and intelligent" people consisted. It hoped it was not possible that it consisted of the 637 white Americans resident in the capital in a total registered vote of 13,593, and that the term excluded the bulk of the population simply because they were native-born and colored.

Nation continued:

If this should prove true, we should all die of shame. . . . We take it for granted that the Tribune means the native born citizens of Hawaii, without distinction of race or color, and that it is under the impression, formed through misleading reports, that they are furiously opposed to the Queen's government and would overthrow it but for Secretary Gresham and Mr. Blount. When it learns the true state of the case, it will come round, and will denounce the prejudice against color just as we do, and demand an equal voice in the government for the colored Hawaiians as it does for the colored Americans.13

This alone would be the "white man's burden" toward the Hawaiian people, according to Nation. A truly altruistic act on Congress's part in dealing with the Hawaiian problem would be the taking of a popular vote. Altruism does not allow, Nation stated:


... the policy of allowing a handful of white traders to set up a government without consulting the main body of the people. ... [It] would be strongly condemned by both parties, and especially by the republican party arrayed against a popular vote on account of the color of the bulk of the voters, seeing that it was it which embodied in our Constitution that famous clause which says that the right to vote "shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State, on account of race, color, or any previous condition of servitude."14

Nation continued this line of thought in an editorial in a later issue. It again referred to the illiteracy of the people of Cuba and then implied how Cuba was thus not ready for independence, republican institutions, or for becoming a State in the Union. Nation continued: "What delightful colleagues for Lodge and Morgan in the Senate would Cuba furnish! With heart beating true to sugar and tobacco and all other good things in sight, they would seem to be foreordained to seats in the Senate; and Senator Proctor's objections to receiving them must be set down to advancing age, the pharisaic spirit, and blindness to manifest destiny."15 Nation thus linked its reaction against the imperialists' ideas of "manifest destiny" with its reaction against their understanding of "White man's burden."

The anti-imperialist, like the imperialist, was interested less in international humanitarianism than in his own nation. The concern was always in regard to what effect this imperial policy would have upon the country, this joining of peoples so unlike those of the United States, this racial disqualification for self-government.

14 Ibid., (December 14, 1893), p. 443.
15 Ibid., LX (April 25, 1895), p. 320.
The Hawaiian "failure" was not, according to Nation, that the President's plan of undoing the wrong committed in the name of the Government had failed, or that the provisional government of Hawaii was still in power, and that the queen was still deprived of the throne from which she had been pushed by an illegal use of United States forces. But the plan that really failed, stated Nation, was that we did not:

... express our national love of justice and regard for the weak and wronged. ... If anything has failed, it has been the simple purpose of the President to carry out a fundamental principle of Christianity. But it is of the nature of a fine and just action that its merit and real success reside in the intention, not in the execution. ... When the history of this Hawaiian affair comes to be written, after the partisan clamor has died out, it will be seen that Mr. Cleveland struck a fine note of patriotism and justice.16

Nation praised Senator Proctor as a man for good Americans to keep their eyes on, as he did not agree with Lodge, Frye, and Cullom in hoping for a war with Spain so that "we may have an opportunity to annex Cuba."

Nation then very cleverly and with heavy sarcasm explained:

The character of the population, he [Senator Proctor] adds, is not such as he would consider desirable in a State of the Union, and a State Cuba would necessarily become, he thinks, if annexed. Now it is hard to sit down with a United States Senator and point out to him what Lodge says every intelligent schoolboy knows. ... Does not Mr. Proctor know that intense Americans never ask how we are to govern distant islands and mongrel races after we get them? ... Besides, does not Mr. Proctor know what the instantaneous effect of American institutions upon alien peoples is certain to be? Can he not see them becoming, at first contact with our politics, industrious and sober students of the constitution, enemies of corruption, good Republicans?17

16 Ibid., LVIII (February 8, 1894), p. 97.
17 Ibid., LX (March 28, 1895), p. 229.
Nation thus ridiculed the so-called "white man's burden" taken on by Lodge and Frye and Cullom and President Harrison. Nation considered proper government of the islands part of the "white man's burden."

In regard to the uprising in Cuba, Clarence King, in an article in Forum, held that it was the duty of the United States to make a decision to help either Spain or Cuba, and then concluded that it was our "burden" to decide only one way.

Our record toward Spain is clear. . . . Is it difficult for us to decide between free Cuba and tyrant Spain? Why not fling overboard Spain and give Cuba the aid which she needs, and which our treaty with Spain cannot prevent? Which cause is morally right? -- Which is manly? -- Which is American?18

Nation also referred to the Spanish tyranny in Cuba, but it did not agree with King's conclusion. Nation cited some of the oppression and tyranny in taxes, customs, and duties, but then explained that the administration of Cuba had distinctly improved in the last thirty years; and that the men responsible for the idea that Spain was a cruel monster were simply outsiders with no real interest in the people of Cuba. Nation felt it was not the "burden" of the United States to interfere in Cuban affairs because "the great mass of property owners and business men see their truest interest in the continuance of Spanish control."19

Henry Cabot Lodge's conception of the "sacred trust" apparently resolved itself into the moral principle that the welfare of the heathen

18 Clarence King, "Shall Cuba Be Free?" Forum, XX (September, 1895), p. 319.

is sacred. The crowning element in Lodge's moral philosophy was a doctrine of the "burden." In speaking of the duty of the United States to Cuba, in an article in *Forum*, Lodge stated his viewpoint when he wrote:

That which makes action imperative on the part of the United States in regard to Cuba, rests on a higher ground than any of these. Such a war as is now being waged in Cuba -- unrestrained by any of the laws of civilized warfare and marked by massacre and ferocious reprisals at every step -- is a disgrace to civilization. . . . The interests of humanity are the controlling reasons which demand the beneficent interposition of the United States to bring to an end this savage war and give to the island peace and independence. . . . We have a responsibility with regard to Cuba. We cannot evade it. . . . If one Administration declines to meet our national responsibilities as they should be met, there will be put in power another Administration which will neither neglect nor shun its plain duty to the United States and to the cause of freedom and humanity.20

John Bassett Moore, Professor of International Law at Columbia University, did not agree with Lodge in his plea for the Cubans, as to the duty and burden of the United States to the cause of humanity. He did not approve recognizing Cuban belligerency, did not feel it would benefit the Cuban insurgents. He also pictured the illiterate population, the undeveloped political capacity, and the tendency of the people for constant wars and revolutions. It was not the burden of the United States to aid them, because, as he said:

These facts . . . furnish matter for serious reflection as to our future relations to Cuba, when it is proposed to intervene for the purpose of expelling the government of Spain. And if Spain should be expelled by our aid, and, at the close of the war, the island should remain, as probably would be the case, in our possession,

it is doubtful whether the confidence of the world in the benevo-
ience of our motives would be strong enough to save us from the
imputation of having committed a wilful act of spoliation.21

Another who felt that the majority of the people were not capable of
self-government and who felt also that it was not part of our burden to
extend our American institutions was James Bryce. In the December Forum
he wrote: "One sometimes hears it said that her mission is to spread
democratic principles. Polynesians and Asiatics, Creole Spaniards and
mulattoes are not fit to receive those principles. Neither are negroes
fit, as the history of Haiti and of most of the South American so-called
'republics' proves."22

Altruism was again pointed out by Henri Rochefort, editor of
L'Intransigeant, when he wrote in Forum of the sympathy of the French
people for the Cubans and then concluded:

How much more actively ought these sympathies to manifest themselves
in the great American republic, which, but its proximity, as well as
by economic interests, is bound to Cuba, and which certainly has not
forgotten in a century the history of its struggles for its own in-
dependence . . . Who is the adversary? . . . It is the power, at
once imbecile and tyrannous, that disseminates everywhere anger and
revolt - - in the Philippine Islands as well as in Cuba - - after
having caused the whole of Latin America to rise up against it.
Between republican Cuba and monarchical Spain can those hesitate to
believe in the meaning of the words "progress," "liberty," and
"humanity?"23

21 John Bassett Moore, "The Question of Cuban Belligerency," Forum,
XXI (May, 1896), pp. 298-299.

22 Rt. Hon. James Bryce, "The Policy of Annexation for America," Forum,
XXIV (December, 1897), p. 394.

23 Henri Rochefort, "The United States and Cuba," Forum, XXIII
(April, 1897), pp. 156-157.
And later in the same article, he even more pointedly stated the meaning of the "white man's burden." He wrote: "The great American republic holds in its hands the destiny of an oppressed people, whose heroism and patriotic sacrifices have rendered it a hundred times worthy of liberty. Will the United States decline to speed the hour of justice? The cause of the Cuban insurgents is that of Humanity." 24

In reaction against the imperialist idea of the great civilizing and protecting mission of the United States, Nation referred to those people who talk about not shrinking selfishly and timidly within the narrow bonds of the United States, but feel that the country should go forth and redress the wrongs of other countries and rescue the oppressed. But Nation felt that the mission was, as it stated:

... a grandiose conception, but there is nothing grandiose about the missionaries who are to execute it. What they have in their minds is a remorseless trampling upon native rights, opportunities for personal enrichment, readiness to pick a quarrel with every nation that gets in their way, and an era of general national extravagance and waste and oppressive taxation. That ... is what the benevolent mission of the United States will come to an execution -- its tender mercies proving cruel -- and that is the end to which the Hawaiian beginning will surely conduct us. 25

Furthermore, in the talk again of Hawaiian annexation, Nation did not feel that the economic interest for the Islands should enter, but that only a high moral plane should be the basis in discussing annexation. Then with a "tongue in the cheek" remark, it stated: "It is well if all this

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24 Ibid., pp. 160-161.

25 Nation, LXIV (June 17, 1897), p. 448.
is now removed from the debate and if it can again dwell upon the lofty morality of 3,000 aliens giving away the territory and sovereignty of 97,000 natives and residents. ²⁶

Again, just as earlier, Nation felt that it was a misunderstood "white man's burden" that would force institutions and governments on a people, not allowing them the freedom of choice by voting. As it said in an editorial:

... many well-meaning people have been deceived with the idea that we are delivering a people from monarchical tyranny and substituting republican government instead, thereof, whereas we are doing the very opposite thing, if the first words of our Declaration of Independence are a true definition of republican institutions ... If we were disposed to do equal and exact justice, we should allow the Hawaiians to vote on the question of having a Queen, if they want one, but that, we acknowledge, is now impracticable. It is not impracticable to allow them to vote on the question of annexation. ²⁷

Murat Halstead appealed to the altruistic feeling in the September Forum, in writing about American annexation and armament, when he wrote:

"We have assumed a protectorate of Hawaii, and for the second time, urge a treaty of annexation of those islands. We have claimed rights as a humane Power, with faith in self-government, and a consciousness of the manifest destiny, to do the things counting for freedom and peace and the extension of our just influence in Cuba." ²⁸

In two issues in March, Nation criticized the enlightened self-interest

²⁶Ibid., LXV (October 7, 1897), pp. 270-271.
²⁷Ibid., (November 25, 1897), p. 410.
of the imperialists and appealed to the moral point of view. In its editorial, Nation asked: "Are we morally ready for war with Spain? Have we a cause of war so clear, so loftily imperative that all the hideousness of carnage and the fearful blow to civic progress must be hazarded in order to vindicate humanity and righteousness." 29

And in the next issue, Nation sadly admitted: "In fact, these open avowals of readiness to kill people and destroy property for purposes of private gain were probably the most grotesque outcome of Christianity and civilization that the Western world has ever had, and it has had many." 30

Later in the same article, Nation admitted and acknowledged the necessity of war under certain circumstances, "if there is no other reason, in order that the higher civilization, which in our day is apt to find its expression in superior strength, shall have its due influence in the ordering of human affairs." 31

But Forum again took a different position. In the March issue, Senator Money regretted that two administrations had given but slight recognition to the public sentiment of the people to come to the succor of the Cubans. He explained that thirteen consuls of the United States in Cuba had truthfully portrayed the dreadful conditions of the island; yet the official representations had not affected the policy of the Presidents

\[\text{Nation, LXVI (March 24, 1898), p. 218.}\]
\[\text{Ibid., (March 31, 1898), p. 238.}\]
\[\text{Ibid.}\]
and Cabinets. He appealed to the responsibility of Americans to humanity when he concluded: "The truth is, that the bond and stock market is today the most potent factor in the government of nations; and the men who compose it care but little for the general business of the mass of the people, for liberty, for religion, or for humanity."32

This spirit of the heavily emotional "White man's burden" was used by imperialists and anti-imperialists alike. It was used for Hawaii, Samoa, Cuba, and the Philippines. It was used up to the very climax itself, when McKinley found his answer -- that "there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died."33 It was used thus as a motive or pattern forming the basis for this new imperialism of 1898 -- this motive or pattern of the "white man's burden."


CHAPTER V

PORTRAYAL OF "SELF-DEFENSE" IDEA

IN LITERARY MAGAZINES

There can be little doubt, in light of the analysis thus far presented, that ideological and religious considerations stand in the front rank among those factors that composed the pattern of American expansionism during the years 1893-1898. However, these considerations present a pattern that is by no means complete; hardly less significant is the large body of expansionist sentiment which centered around the revival of interest in the United States Navy, in self-defense and security. The new imperialists of 1898 used the principle of national defense as an important motive in their expansionist undertakings.

The naval revival of the eighties and nineties did not result entirely from economic and political considerations, nor from the influence of a few individuals. Important also were the psychological elements underlying these other factors. The expansion of the navy resulted partly from a growing national consciousness and national pride, from natural combative-ness, assertiveness, and greed, from a feeling of inferiority made acute by the wide gap which separated American naval progress from that of the great world powers.

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It is also likely that a feeling of fear dictated an expansion of the navy during these years. Naval expansion was to a large degree based upon strategic considerations, upon a desire to strengthen the nation's defenses. This emphasis upon defense stemmed to some extent from a feeling of insecurity, anxiety, and fear. This emotion was partly natural and sincere, arising out of the realities of this country's naval weakness, and partly sympathetic, resulting from the propaganda of the expansionists, who, if they did not create this feeling, certainly fostered it and played upon it for their own purposes. Whatever the explanation, this emotion was a basic part of the psychological background of naval expansion.

The United States needed Hawaii, according to the imperialists, either as annexed territory or a protectorate, and of the two, annexation was much to be preferred. The American press urged the self-defense argument because of alleged or real British intrigue in Honolulu.

Self-defense or national security gained great support through Alfred Mahan. He immediately manifested concern over Hawaii and our sea power in the March issue of *Forum*. He spoke of the value of any naval position, and then referred all this to the Hawaiian group. He concluded:

From the foregoing considerations may be inferred the importance of the Hawaiian Islands as a position powerfully influencing the commercial and military control of the Pacific, and especially of the northern Pacific, in which the United States, geographically, has the strongest right to assert herself. These are the main advantages, which can be termed positive: those, namely, which directly advance commercial security and naval control.¹

In addition, Mahan discussed acquisition by a foreign power:

To the negative advantages of possession, by removing conditions, which, if the islands were in the hands of any other power, would constitute to us disadvantages and threats, allusion only will be made. The serious menace to our Pacific coast and our Pacific trade, if so important a position were held by a possible enemy, has been frequently mentioned in the press and dwelt upon in the diplomatic papers which are from time to time given to the public. Upon one particular, too much stress cannot be laid ... the immense disadvantage to us of any maritime enemy having a coaling station well within twenty-five miles.²

Mahan's views were debated by the Nation. It refused to accept Mahan's reasoning and used counter-arguments rejecting his premises. Nation felt that Mahan wrote almost purely as a naval tactician and that he made out the Hawaiian Islands to be of great strategic importance, if a naval war of tremendous proportions were to break out. But, Nation insisted: "All this may be freely admitted without allowing it to be a reason of any force whatever in favor of annexation." It went on to argue that in the first place, it would be a departure from all that is traditional and all that is best or necessary in the policy of this country, to make any plans whatever for such a contingency as Captain Mahan contemplated. The editorial maintained that the people of the United States would reject this idea that one's country must embark upon these warlike adventures in order to become a naval Power of the first rank. So, Nation felt, any privileges in the way of a coaling station or naval stores, the United States either

²Ibid.
had at their disposal or could be had for the asking. No change is necessary for self-defense or in the name of "vital interest," according to Nation's conclusions.

In another editorial, Nation similarly rejected any change being necessary in the management of the islands. To Nation, there was no question of self-defense or of vital interest as seen by the imperialists. Americans had governed the islands during most of the time since they had possessions on the Pacific Coast. And, as Nation stated: "We have been spared the trouble of fortifying them and keeping a large naval force in those waters and settling their private quarrels . . . As other nations have respected our wishes in the matter in the past, they would respect them in the future all the more as our power to command respect increases with revolving years."4

Nation repeated this argument and plea for status quo further in the February 16th issue. In it, Nation, like Forum, linked foreign imperialism or intrusion with the islands. It explained that the treaty of 1875, and extended in 1887, gave the United States "everything we want — free trade with the islands, a coaling station, and complete protection against every description of foreign intrusion . . . There is therefore, not the slightest occasion for any kind of precipitate action."5 There would seem to be no real basis then for the self-defense idea, according to Nation, at this time.

3 Nation, LVI (March 2, 1893), p. 154.
4 Ibid. (February 2, 1893), p. 75.
5 Ibid. (March 9, 1893), pp. 173-174.
Mahan's contention that a large navy was necessary for the growth of the United States was again questioned by several editorials and articles in Nation. In the March 9th editorial, Nation was aware of the truth of Mahan's thought as presented in the March Forum -- that Hawaii had value as a coaling station, in case the United States were at war with another great naval Power in the Pacific Ocean. It also realized the difficulty which possession of it would be to a rival or enemy. But -- it pointed out, that Mahan's whole argument was based on the assumption that the United States was to have a navy as large and as powerful as the navies of France and England put together. As Nation said:

... to make Hawaii of use to us as a coaling station in a war with Great Britain ... we must have a navy large enough not only to protect our coasting trade and our cities on the Atlantic and the Pacific from the assaults of British cruisers, but to make British cruisers afraid to go near the Sandwich Islands. 6

This was Naval politics that Nation viewed warily. Again, in the March 16th issue, in an item called "Armed Evangelists," Nation spoke out against the need of a navy. It again conceded that it would be well to have a respectable navy for the defense of the coasts and the patrol of the seas, and the protection of United States citizens in "semi-civilized countries," but it would not be well to have such a navy made the nucleus of an enormous sea force, to be "played for all its worth" at every Presidential election. 7

6 Ibid., (February 16, 1893), p. 115.
7 Ibid., (March 16, 1893), p. 191.
Forum, in June, 1893, presented the views of Thomas Cooley, President of the American Bar Association, against Hawaiian annexation. Cooley rejected not only the self-defense argument, but also the foreign imperialism -- the fear that if we did not take them Great Britain would. Nation pointed out the false impression given or spread by the imperialists that England wanted the islands, the "English scare" that the United States had to prevent foreign imperialism with concern for her own security and vital interest. James Schouler, lawyer and historian, in Forum, also brushed aside the fear of British or other foreign interference to seize the islands if the United States did not.

The security and vital interest theme were again criticized by Nation in 1894. In the first section of one of its articles, Nation struck out against the "well-known Jingoism" of Chairman Morgan of the Senate Committee, reporting in relation to the Hawaiian Islands. Nation irritably stated:

Incidentally he [Senator Morgan] tried to please everybody concerned in the Hawaiian affair, with the natural result of pleasing nobody; but his main intent was to make his report a powerful argument for a big navy, and the Nicaragua Canal, and coaling stations thick as blackberries, and general bumptiousness and insolence in foreign affairs.

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Nearly all of the officers who were examined by Senator Morgan agreed with that terror of the world's navies, that the United States cannot be too quick about preparing for a naval war in the Pacific and fortifying Pearl Harbor, as the true way of bringing to naught the craft and power on an enemy's ships -- "say British ships," as the Alabama Senator innocently remarked, and Nation ridiculed.\(^{12}\)

But later in the same article, Nation referred to the most "luminous and cogent" views of Commander Houston, who held that:

\(\ldots\) in time of war and without a navy equal or nearly equal to that of the greatest naval power, the possession of the Hawaiian Islands would be a source of weakness rather than strength \(\ldots\). We should ultimately have to let them go \(\ldots\) after having wasted a lot of money.\(^{13}\)

As to the likelihood that the United States would authorize the creation of a great naval force, Houston thought that a calm inquiry as to the attitude of Congress and the country on that question would show the thing to be so improbable that one need seek no further for reasons for not acquiring the islands. Nation approved of his rejection of the naval theme.

Nation respected Captain Mahan as an authority, but it rejected his constant demand for naval power. It criticized Mahan who had evaluated the naval programme of Earl Spencer of England. Nation commented on this:

\(^{12}\text{Ibid., p. 285.}\)
\(^{13}\text{Ibid., p. 286.}\)
he did say that a strong naval force was important, more now than ever, for Britain ... because of her foreign possessions. Then this author Mahan comments how it may be good for national pride, but it is also very inconvenient and that many Englishmen would not enter into the "British Empire" as a programme now today. ... Nevertheless, if our naval officers had their way, Capt. Mahan included, they would load us with similar responsibilities, in the shape of outlying dependencies, posts, garrisons, and coaling stations, without a particle of the excuse which England had for her expansion.14

Later, Nation again alluded to Captain Mahan and stated: "In short, the new school of naval experts, with their great learning and scientific attainments, tends distinctly to throw an unreal glamour about war, and to make it little else than a beautiful demonstration of mathematical theses or problems in mechanics or ballistics." In proof, it concluded: "If anyone is yet in doubt about the way the growth of the navy itself has fostered a warlike spirit among us, and made it seem a light thing to go to war, he need only look at the effect of the new navy on the last two secretaries of the department."15 Nation cited Secretary Tracy and Secretary Herbert as being changed persons, thinking only of war and destruction.16 Security and vital interest were excuses in this constant naval power theme, all rejected by Nation.

Nation was by no means convinced of the danger of foreign imperialism either. It criticized those agencies and individuals who were twisting

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14 Nation, LVIII (May 17, 1894), p. 357.
15 Ibid., LIX (November 8, 1894), p. 337.
16 Ibid., LX (April 18, 1895), p. 292.
the truth. It spoke of the latest news in this regard, that "if Great Britain neglected her opportunity to grasp the islands, the danger of Japan's seizing them increases," Jingoism, it seemed, had taken possession of certain Japanese politicians, hence Nation concluded that they had their Morgans and Lodges and Fryes, a stern rebuke to the supporters of the "security and vital interest" theme of the expansionists. 17

Lodge proved his support of this theme by his article in the March Forum. He very strongly insisted:

With England reaching out for every island in the Pacific, and with British sympathy strongly manifested for the royalist government, this administration has done everything in its power to break down our well-settled policy in regard to these islands, which are so essential to us, both commercially and from a military point of view. 18

The danger of foreign imperialism was a basis for expansionism declared necessary by Lodge.

Nation again in 1896, in its editorial, questioned the need for a large navy. As it insisted: "The navies of the great naval Powers are meant to carry on wars with each other, which their past history and experience lead them to exist." But Nation maintained, there did not exist in the case of the United States a single one of the reasons which excused the large navies in Europe. As it proved: "We have no foreign possessions. We have no interest in European quarrels." 19 And in the

following editorial, it re-iterated this lack of the danger of foreign imperialism and this lack of a need for a great navy, when it stated:

The stories and news agencies invent every now and then of a determination of Great Britain to assume a bellicose attitude toward us, by purchasing Cuba from Spain, or seizing Hawaii from the missionaries, are childishly silly. There is nothing which practical men in Europe view with more wonderment than our naval preparations and our apparent desire to fight somebody.20

The Commander of the first Naval Battalion, J. W. Miller wrote an article for Forum. He stated his case for preparing for the security and vital interest of the United States when he said that the only necessary thing was to face the fact that the country was earnestly convinced of the vital importance of a policy, called "Monroe" or "jingo," it did not matter -- the policy that no European power shall enlarge its territory on the continent without the consent of the United States.21 Commander Miller then went on to suggest that Congress begin a system of coast defenses and the construction of more battleships, the formation of a General Staff, more ships and troops -- in other words, anything necessary for the self-defense and security of the United States.22

Henry Cabot Lodge once more made his views known in Forum, this time on the duty of the United States to Cuba. He appealed to the motive of vital interest specifically, and he upbraided the present administration

20 Ibid., (February 20, 1896), p. 152.
22 Ibid., p. 240.
when he wrote: "Every Administration, until we reach the one now in power, has declared in the plainest terms to the government of Spain and to the world that the condition of Cuba was a matter in which the United States had a vital interest." Then appealing to the danger of foreign imperialism he continued: "Every reasonable man who gives any thought to this subject will admit that the fate of Cuba is of great importance to the United States; that under no circumstances should we permit Spain to transfer the island to any other European power."

"Vital interest" was again appealed to in Forum by Senator Cullom. He pointedly stated: "If ever it happens that the era of oppression and bloodshed shall cease in Cuba, and that the United States shall possess that rich gem of the West Indies . . . it will be because we are bound to protect the interests of the United States by Ocean and Gulf wherever those interests develop themselves."

Nation was again attacking the foreign imperialism scare in December, 1896. It commented on the fact that Ex-Secretary Foster was back from Hawaii with his arguments again, and that he had one conclusive argument in reserve: "If the islands are not annexed by the United States they will be by some other of the great Powers." But Nation tried to assure itself, "this appeal to self interest is not clear, was so overworked four


years ago, and has become so ludicrous by lapse of time, that we do not look to see it have much effect on a country and a Congress that show signs of being decidedly weary of Hawaii."\(^{25}\)

The islands were seen by various newspapers and periodicals, such as *Washington Post*, *San Francisco Evening Bulletin*, and *Review of Reviews*,\(^{26}\) as a "key to the Pacific" in this theme of self-defense and vital interest. But this enthusiasm was, however, not unanimous. Some papers and periodicals assumed a cautious or hostile attitude from the beginning.

*Nation*, as was seen, was one of these periodicals. By May, 1897, it was writing sharply and pointedly against this argument of "key to the Pacific," of vital interest and defense. Commenting on a lecture for Hawaiian annexation by Mr. John Foster it upbraided Mr. Foster

... who pins his faith mainly to the theory which has such a peculiar fascination for certain minds, that the islands constitute the "key to the Pacific," and therefore we must have them anyhow. As he tells us himself, that they stand at the center of an otherwise unoccupied circle of water having a radius of about two thousand miles, one may be pardoned for suggesting that the key does not seem to fit the hole, and that after going to the trouble of securing it we might find it incapable of turning the lock.

It then went on to criticize the key idea as a palpable absurdity, insulting to the intelligence of the people of the United States, pointing out that "if the island stood in the middle of a passageway of only moderate width so that their occupation could be made effective for the purpose of blocking the way against the vessels of other nations, then they might be called

\(^{25}\) *Nation*, LXIII (December 3, 1896), p. 413.

the "key to the Pacific." But, it reasoned, even in that case the duty of the United States to acquire them would have been far from clear because an international guarantee of the freedom of such a passage would have been of greater value than the exclusive ownership, with the ensuing necessity of expensive fortifications and the increased danger of bloody complications with other Powers.  

Passing on from the key idea, Nation brought in the foreign imperialism and self-defense theme again in 1897, and accused Foster of wanting the islands for the purpose of securing this outpost of the Pacific frontier, and thus protecting the future mighty commerce and rapidly growing interests on that coast from the encroachments of the great Powers striving for ascendancy in that quarter of the globe. Again Nation rejected this logic when it argued:

When one remembers that it takes a fast steamer about five days to reach any point of our coast from Honolulu, the idea of the islands as a defense is on a par in absurdity with the key idea. . . . As a matter of course a little group of islands, incapable of supporting from its own resources a population large enough to furnish more than a mere handful of fighting men, could never add anything to the defensive strength of the nation owning it, unless its position commanded some necessary avenue of approach.  

And, Nation concluded, in the present case the United States would be merely adding another point to be defended, and very difficult of defense at that, if the United States ever engaged in a war in the Pacific.

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27 Nation, LXIV (May 6, 1897), p. 332.

28 Ibid., p. 333.
The myth of foreign imperialism was again the focal point of Nation's remarks, when it very sarcastically stated some arguments in favor of annexation. As it said: "If the United States does not 'grab' the islands, the Japanese will. They already outnumber the Americans greatly, they are increasing rapidly, they are fitted for the climate and for its industries, and their destiny is so much more manifest than ours that it will prevail if we delay any longer. The presentation of these reasons should appeal forcibly to the sense of justice which distinguishes the American people."29

One of Forum's writers agreed with the views of Nation. Senator White used some of the same arguments that Nation had used in its May 6th editorial. He first denied the contention that the United States had to have the islands for purposes of protection or self-defense. He felt that the United States could make a better contest without than with Hawaii. If the United States accomplished annexation for defensive purposes it would have to fortify the new domain and build a navy capable of sustaining it. Senator White, pointed out that the naval strength of the United States was increasing very slowly, while leading European competitors were acting with more alacrity.

Senator White also reviewed the desire of other countries to acquire Hawaii and in this he stated:

29Ibid., LXV (July 15, 1897), p. 39.
But it is urged that England, in case of trouble, may seize Honolulu, and that the Japanese may do so. England clearly will not operate against us from Honolulu. She has a veritable Gibraltar at Esquimalt on the Washington boundary. Why should she divert and divide her strength by permitting her guns to rust two thousand miles from her enemy, especially when she is splendidly equipped at a point within sight of the smoke of our civilization? For more than forty years England has denied any hostility to Hawaii.30

Senator White continued point by point to reject all the demands and reasonings of the annexationists. He insisted that we did not need the Islands to defend the Nicaraguan Canal, as the western terminus would not have been better protected by guns mounted at Hawaii than by those which guard the Golden Gate. Also, the battleships of the United States could be dispatched from California to Nicaragua more speedily than from Honolulu. So, to annex the Hawaiian Islands, Senator White maintained would weaken, not strengthen our military position or self-defense.

Nation was happy to cite the President of the Hawaiian Republic, Mr. Dole, on the theme of foreign imperialism. Mr. Dole had denied the Bureau's idea that if the United States refused to annex the islands, then the Republic would offer itself to any of the Powers which stood waiting to see what the United States did about the matter. Mr. Dole contended that the Republic would simply go on as before. And Nation willingly added: "This admission was hard for Hatch, the Hawaiian Minister in Washington to bear."31

Annexationists brought forward the testimony of military and naval

31 Nation, LXVI (January 27, 1898), p. 52.
experts. In his plea for Hawaii as a coaling station and port, Hon. John Proctor referred to Mahan who had likened a modern warship without coal "to a wingless bird." Proctor then went on to say:

In the possession of a hostile power, Hawaii would give an additional base for coaling and repair from which to attack our extended coastline. With Hawaii in our possession, and Pearl Harbor fortified and stored with coal -- furnishing a safe harbor for our merchantmen -- we need fear no attack from a cross the Pacific. We should require fewer war ships in the Pacific, and fewer fortifications on our Western and Alaskan coasts, than would be required if Hawaii should remain in its present condition or pass to the possession of a foreign Power.32

In competition with this ambitious program of aggressive foreign policy and territorial expansion, was James Bryce's article in the December issue of the Forum. He wrote, he stated, from an American point of view, and maintained very strongly that Great Britain had no direct interest in the fortunes of either Cuba or Hawaii. Going on to the argument most frequently used in the United States for the annexation of Cuba and Hawaii, that insisting on the strategic strength gained to American by their annexation, Bryce immediately brushed it aside. It had been said that the Island would give the United States two points of naval vantage -- one commanding the Caribbean Sea and the other the Eastern Pacific, thus protecting her southern and western coasts. Bryce argued that the United States was exceptionally strong in this position already. He then questioned if it would be worth while for the United States to build and maintain a navy that would be necessary if the United States wanted to defend the islands. He

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admitted disagreement with the views of Captain Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt in their plea for a strong navy. He concluded by observation that if there were any force in these considerations, it followed that the annexation of either Cuba or Hawaii would be a source not of strength but of weakness. America did not want to see either island fall into the hands of any possible naval enemy, but, Bryce concluded, neither is threatened with any such danger, and the expression of the feelings of the United States would be sufficient at any time to avert it. 33

Senator Morgan, in the March issue of the Forum, answered Mr. Bryce's questioning attitude on the wisdom of the United States in desiring to annex the Hawaiian Islands. Mr. Morgan proved its wisdom especially in pointed out the necessity of the Islands as held by the opinions and reports of skilled and experienced officers of the Army and Navy "who declare that Hawaii is indispensable to the protection of our western coast." He held that self-defense was a basis for the annexation of the islands. 34

Daniel Agnew, ex-Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Forum, gave a legalist's view against an aggressive foreign policy and territorial expansion. He disregarded the argument that precedents were cited to justify annexation, and concluded that precedents did not amend the Constitution. His advice was: "If we fear foreign nations, arm our coasts and defend our ports! If we need a harbor or coaling station,


secure it by treaty! If these be assailed, defend them by force of arms, as we do other rights!" 35 Neither security nor vital interest then required this policy of imperialism, according to Mr. Agnew.

_Nation_ made its final efforts to undo all of the arguments of the imperialists in regard to security, vital interest, and foreign imperialism. It accused Senator Frye of "suppressing the fact that we have a perpetual right to the use of Pearl Harbor as a coaling station," when he asked where the United States would get its coal. 36 It argued that "without Hawaii, all our naval force in the Pacific may be employed in attacks upon the enemy or in defending our own coast. With it, we must expend some part, and probably a large part, in defending the islands." 37

_Nation_ viewed the security and vital interest of the United States, the defense of its shores, and its freedom from foreign imperialism, all part of the future of the United States, without this imperialist or expansionist policy. At the same time, expansionists relied on the self-defense and vital interest pattern of thought, the fear of foreign imperialism theme, as part of their ideology in support of the "new imperialism" of 1898.


36 _Nation_, LXVI (February 3, 1898), p. 80.

CHAPTER VI

LITERARY MAGAZINES REFLECTION OF "PARAMOUNT INTEREST"

The thesis that islands and new lands were essential to the defense of the coasts of the United States appears to have derived its appeal at least partly from the notion of their necessity to the defense of an interest of quite a different character. This paramount interest was for the "national honor" of the United States and, implied in this, for commercial expansion or economic necessity. Thus Pacific islands were desired for their provision of markets and raw materials. In other words, the islands were the outposts not only of coastal defense, but also of the protection of a new paramount interest, overseas commerce, contributing to the greater national honor of the United States.

It was not really until the Hawaiian issue of 1893 that expansion of commerce began to seem an imperative reason for expansion of territory. Thus the national honor of the country and economic necessity became a paramount interest.

Captain Alfred Mahan himself was an influential monitor in his article of 1893 on the bearing of the annexation of Hawaii upon the "commercial and military control of the Pacific." As he stated: These are the main advantages, which can be termed positive: those, namely,
which directly advance commercial security and naval control."¹

It was suggested at the very beginning of the controversy that the revolution and the movement for annexation were simply outgrowths of a conspiracy of the sugar interests to get the bounty of two cents a pound paid to domestic sugar growers. Nation called attention to the contract between the Hawaiian planters and the Western Sugar Refining Company -- the Spreckels concern in San Francisco, a branch of the Sugar Trust -- whereby the corporation would receive one-half of any bounty that might be paid to the planters. "Even if Congress should retain the bounty on domestic sugar, and should annex the islands, it was realized that the islands might be denied enjoyment of the bounty in whole or in part." Thus was expressed the opinion that the revolution was "of sugar, by sugar, and for sugar."²

When the "snap" annexation of the islands and the assured failure of the precipitate treaty appeared certain, Nation rejoiced and again criticized Senator Morgan's view that the annexation "would have helped our trade."³

Rejecting the paramount interest in the Islands as contributing to our national honor, Nation likewise rejected Mahan's entreaty to follow England's

²Nation, LVI (March 2, 1893), p. 151.
³Ibid., p. 154.
example by such annexation of foreign territory and foreign population as
it said simply "to promote certain undefined things which he calls national
'influence' and national greatness."4

But John Proctor in the November issue of Forum, was concerned with
the national honor of the United States in regard to its battle for
commercial supremacy. He wrote:

We are fast building a Navy large enough to render all necessary
protection to our merchants in foreign ports. Let us hope that the
reform in our Civil Service will be carried forward... and that
all our consular representatives abroad shall be regarded as the
business agents of our people, and selected with regard to their
business qualifications, and promoted for efficient service. When
all these things have been done and the fetters of our restrictive
laws removed, we shall enter the contest for industrial and commer­
cial supremacy with the conditions greatly in our favor.5

Nation too, commented on this type of commercial supremacy as sought
for by Captain Mahan, and linked it with the national honor theme, when
it stated: "Could the fathers of the republic have foreseen in 1789 what
the views of a great many of us as to the conditions of national greatness
would be today, how sad it would have made them."6 And it laughed at
Lodge's "Americanism," his trite appeal to national honor, in his analysis
of the foreign policy of the United States.7

4Nation, LVI (March 9, 1898), p. 174.
5John R. Proctor, "America's Battle for Commercial Supremacy," Forum,
XVI (November, 1893), p. 323.
6Nation, LVIII (May 31, 1894), p. 401.
7Ibid., (March 14, 1895), p. 191.
Lodge had criticized the blundering foreign policy of the United States, in not strengthening the national honor of the country. Lodge had reiterated Mahan's theme that "this Administration has done everything in its power to break down our well-settled policy in regard to those islands Hawaii which are so essential to us, both commercially and from a military point of view." Lodge brought up the problem of economic necessity when he regretted the fact that it had become the fashion to neglect foreign relations of the United States and this unfortunate tendency had been greatly stimulated in recent years by the tariff reform or free trade agitation.

He pointed to ideas borrowed from England, but he believed that the United States used them entirely different, in that England never allowed adherence to theory or foolish love of consistency to interfere with her interests. He insisted that the free trade ideas of the United States only harmed her, that the United States did not use them to get privileges in return. He concluded that these paramount interests should no longer be neglected.  

To support Lodge's view, Mahan, in writing on the navy as a career, pointed to the lack of concern of the people of the United States. Only toward foreign affairs, toward the national honor of the United States. Only those who either reside or have business interests in foreign lands where political conditions are unsettled, and justice at times hard to obtain show concern for national paramount interests.  

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But *Nation* criticized Mahan for his emphasis on constant development of the nation and of national sentiment, without consideration for any other thought or force.\(^\text{10}\) *Nation* considered national honor from a different viewpoint. In an editorial it struck out: "We need more men in public life, in the press, who seek national greatness in the sphere of mind and law, and resist the popular longing for more bloody corpses, desolated towns, and the general 'hell of death and destruction' called war."\(^\text{11}\)

*Nation* again aired its views on this subject in a specific editorial entitled "National Honor." In questioning the appropriateness of a new and large navy it stated:

... the reason which a Jingo always falls back on, when hard pressed, for wishing to live in complete armor, is that somebody may assail our "honor" -- that is, say something offensive, or refuse to submit to some demand of ours, or resent some of our language. It is impossible beforehand to describe or define injuries to honor, because honor is an impalpable thing. . .

In short, when we get our navy and send it around the world in search of imputations on our honor, we shall have launched the United States on that old sea of sin and sorrow and ruffianism on which mankind has tossed since the dawn of history.\(^\text{12}\)

Reverting again to the economic necessity theme, *Forum* published two articles. The first was written by Edward Atkinson, author of *The Collection of Revenue* and *The Distribution of Profits*. In it, he spoke of trade, the purchasing power of countries, imports and exports, and then concluded: "It follows that the self-interest as well as the moral and political welfare of the people of the United States are bound up in

\(^{10}\text{Nation, LXI (October 3, 1895), p. 234.}\)

\(^{11}\text{Ibid., (October 31, 1895), pp. 304-305.}\)

\(^{12}\text{Nation, LXII (January 16, 1896), p. 47.}\)
a close commercial union with the other English-speaking peoples." With land, islands, etc. there must be union "for the protection of commerce and for the assurance of peace and plenty wherever the dominion of the English speaking people and its influence extend."\(^{13}\)

In the second article, Henry Cabot Lodge referred to the duty of the United States in Cuba, in regard to her economic interests there. In speaking of the recurring revolutions and disorders in Cuba, he contended that "American property on the island is being destroyed and the commerce with Cuba is being ruined." Later in the article, Lodge referred to Mr. Sumner's words that Cuba must be saved, and wrote:

> Mr. Sumner's words state the larger aspect of the question exactly as it is today. The danger to American property in Cuba, the ruin of American commerce, the immense field which would be opened to American enterprise, and the market which would be secured for American products by Cuban independence... are all weighty reasons for decisive action on our part.\(^{14}\)

Lodge here admitted that these reasons were pecuniary, material, and interested, and though he also admitted to higher moral reasons, yet he deemed these others as important and necessary, for our national honor and for our economic necessity.

In this same way Senator Frye found all of this a necessity and he would have been ready to seize, fortify, and hold against the world all the islands on the map, and would have reached out to take whatever was or

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might be necessary to the future commercial supremacy of the United States and for these ideas Nation criticized him.15

Economic betterment for the United States was the result of Forum’s article called "The Wanton Destruction of the American Property in Cuba." Yznoga was writing about the return of order and prosperity to Cuba as a result of its annexation by the United States, but feeling this impossible for the present, he argued that "could Cuba be purchased, the advantages of this country would be enormous. A vast field for American enterprise and capital would be opened up . . . . The cession of Cuba would also remove the large balance of trade against us . . . for it would open a market for at least a hundred millions of our products."16

On this same Cuban problem, Fidel Pierra, the Chairman of the Cuban Press Delegation, wrote in Forum: "But if from a political point of view, it is to the interest of the United States that Spain should withdraw from Cuba, from an economic standpoint it is still more so." Pierra then referred to the fate of the American property under Spanish rule, the confiscation of whatever capital remained in Cuba, and the fact that commerce with the United States would fluctuate, and all of this pointed to his conclusion that the United States had to adopt a policy that would bring about the immediate withdrawal of Spain from Cuba.17 Economic necessity proved an important motive to the expansionists.

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The national honor motive was also again appealed to in reference to the Anglo-American arbitration treaty. Different views of "national honor" were presented. As Coudert wrote in the March issue of Forum:

Tradition had ordained that a national honor required to be lubricated with blood in order to be kept in good working condition. . . . When a sufficient number of men had been slaughtered, and a proper number of towns had been burned and plundered, . . . Honor smiled once more with restored cheerfulness. . . . Honor, national honor, has been a priceless possession, but a very expensive one to keep.

And later the author viewed honor as two great nations who were willing to abide by reason and to forego violence. As he said:

. . . let us not be misled by high-sounding declamations about national honor. The only danger which our honor may run is in an exaggerated tendency to make readiness to strike, the test of its delicacy and the proof of its existence. . . . A Republic with a united nation of seventy millions behind it may stop to discuss without being taxed with timidity, and will not care if the effervescent mob that clamors for blood on all available occasions shall feel outraged in its honor because of a generous forbearance to draw the nation's sword.18

So Coudert would imply, national honor should not be used as an excuse or motive by the aggressive imperialists. Theirs is a misunderstanding of the demands of the term "national honor."

Business sentiment seemed still strongly anti-war and Nation was quick to point out any new reaction. In April, 1897, it criticized the new appointment of a Jingo and annexationist as United States Minister to Hawaii, who might also try to rush the islands into the Union with the United States, but then Nation pointed to "new complications. . . . regarding the sugar question, which involve the pending tariff bill, the

beet-sugar people in this country being now opposed to annexation as they are to reciprocity with Hawaii," and Nation concluded that these "new influences may thus enter into the decision of the problem now." Economic concern by business may cause the imperialists to question their arguments on economic necessity, Nation hoped.

The magazine again referred to American business interests in an editorial entitled "Fostering the Beet Sugar Industry." In its strike against the United States for its concern only for the "sixty millionaires" in Hawaii, who are Europeans and Americans and not for the 25,000 Japanese and others, Nation stated:

Under the new tariff, it is computed that the duties on Hawaiian sugar, if it should be made to pay duties, would amount to from $8,000,000 to $12,000,000 a year. In other words, the present Administration with its eyes open or shut -- probably with them shut -- is binding the Government to pay bounties, amounting to at least $8,000,000 a year, upon Hawaiian sugar, to these sixty Hawaiian millionaires. Can the American sugar industry stand up against such favoritism as that? Can the Secretary of Agriculture fight successfully for home-grown sugar against such odds as these?

The "jingo" in Congress or the press, was an object of intense dislike to the editors of business and financial journals, who sought to counteract his influence by anti-war editorials in their columns. Boards of trade and chambers of commerce added their pleas for the maintenance of peace to those of the business newspapers and magazines. And Nation added its voice to both of these groups. On September 16, 1897, it happily reported that the annexationists in Hawaii were in a great deal

19 Nation, LXIV (April 29, 1897), p. 312.
20 Nation, LXV (August 5, 1897), p. 103.
of flutter over the arrival of the United States Senators and Representatives who were to take a near view of their "republic for annexation only." It further reported that the "ungrateful natives" were preparing for the occasion a "monster petition," to assert that their country was stolen from them by a handful of rich and powerful whites, and that they did not want to be annexed. Nation concluded:

The worst of it is that most of the visiting statesmen are beet sugar men. Now a beet sugar American is almost certain to be pessimistic about the institutions of cane-sugar Hawaii. He will take very high ground on liberty and constitutional guarantees and the right of suffrage; and unless the Hawaiians are able to satisfy him on all these points, he will never consent to let the beet sugar grown by free men suffer competition from the cane sugar of men who are not enjoying self-government. This is what makes the annexationists so nervous. Jingo congestion can satisfy, big-money men they can easily persuade that they are ripe for annexation; but they tremble under inspection by statesmen thoroughly grounded in the doctrines of representative government and beet sugar. 21

Becoming more desperate and determined to prove the falseness of the "economic necessity" theme of the imperialists, Nation invoked again the understanding of the people for what was actually happening in regard to Hawaiian annexation. Advocates of Hawaiian annexation had been relieved to hear that the Sugar Trust had withdrawn its opposition to the treaty. As it stated: "... somehow Spreckels has been 'squared,' the island planters have been let into the 'deal,' and now all is clear sailing." And now, Nation cuttingly referred to the fact that the Senate could return to its high moral plane in discussing annexation. There had been for a time, Nation reported, a "mercenary tinge" to the debate, which "must have

21 Ibid., (September 16, 1897), p. 215.
pained Senators" -- there was much talk of selfish opposition of beet-sugar growers and sugar refiners, and hints that there would be something substantial "in it" for certain Western Senators if they could beat the treaty. Now Nation stated: "... it could again dwell upon the lofty morality of 3,000 aliens giving away the territory of 97,000 natives and residents." 22

And in its editorial in the same issue, Nation again linked this "economic necessity" with the unreasonable treatment of the Hawaiian people when it declared that less than 3,000 of the "recent Anglo-Saxons" are pretending to have a right, and are brutally exercising it, to dispose of the lives and fortunes of 25,000 Japanese, 24,000 Chinese, 15,000 Portuguese, 40,000 Hawaiians. And they are exercising it, Nation maintained, under the proud device, "Good Business Chances Here." 23

Then in March, 1898, Nation referred very strongly for the last time to the idea that the war with Spain had become simply a business enterprise. The sufferings of the Cubans were wholly lost sight of in the concern for economic necessity, the hope of making some money out of a conflict in their behalf. Nation believed that when the present crisis arose, the business view of war was what was chiefly present to the Jingo mind. Among the more rampant Jingoes, such as Senator Thurston of Nebraska, this view seemed to prevail. Nation reported that Thurston, just the previous week, said to the Senate that war with Spain would increase the business and the earnings of every American railroad, it would increase the output of every

22 Ibid., (October 7, 1897), p. 271.
23 Ibid., p. 272.
American factory, it would stimulate every branch of industry and every domestic commerce, it would greatly increase the demand for American labor, and in the end every certificate that represented a share in American business enterprise would be worth more money than it was today. There seemed to be no "national honor" theme in this. According to Nation, it was the opposite, a reversal of "national honor." As it stated:

In fact, these open avowals of readiness to kill people and destroy property for purposes of private gain were probably the most grotesque outcome of Christianity and civilization that the Western world has ever had. . . . The savage fights under the influence of inherited passions and devilish instincts and an animal view of the ends of life; but even he is not so degraded as to fight in order to make money in trade.24

Forum also included articles on the paramount interest of "economic necessity theme." Senator White, though, referred to the argument that the commerce of the United States with Hawaii was so important that the United States could not afford to risk outside interference. Senator White conceded that the United States had valuable trade there, but felt that "common business sense dictates that a properly framed treaty. . . will bring all desirable Hawaiian commerce to the United States. The Hawaiian Islands will deal with us because their interests make such a course necessary."25

24Nation, LXVI (March 31, 1898), p. 238.
But the Honorable John Proctor in Forum argued that our interests as well as our national honor demanded the annexation of the Hawaiian group. And our interests appeared to have been the large seaborne commerce on the Pacific that it would be necessary to protect.26

Daniel Agnew, a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania wrote in Forum and maintained that according to the Constitution the United States could not annex Hawaii. He stated that there had always been a clear necessity for previous annexation, as Louisiana, Florida, Alaska, and Texas, and he felt no paramount necessity or interest in the case of Hawaii. "Not a single benefit to be derived from its incorporation into the Union is an absolute or vital necessity. All its advantages are simply commercial, and they do not justify a power to purchase not found in the Constitution."27 Hence the economic necessity of the imperialists did not satisfy the anti-imperialists.

But in March, 1898, Senator Morgan in Forum, felt that commercial supremacy for the United States was basically important. He stated that the commercial reasons for the annexation of Hawaii were not under-valued by any merchants, or marines, who have any acquaintance with the trade of the Pacific Ocean. And he concluded: "Annex Hawaii, and we will rapidly build up at Honolulu, in sight of Pearl Harbor, a commercial mart, like


Hong Kong, protected by a fortress, easy of construction, far stronger than Gibraltar that will stand sentinel over the surrounding ocean for thousands of miles."  

All of this contributed in one way or another, either according to the views of the imperialists or the anti-imperialists, to the idea and the reality of the "national honor" of the United States, to her "economic security" and thus in the long-range plan, to her paramount interest.

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CHAPTER VII

"WORLD LEADERSHIP" PATTERN OF THOUGHT

In the year 1898, America was prepared to reach the height of her expansionist glory. Another motive or pattern of thought had arisen during the nineties to help lead her to this height. As Weinberg stated: "It was, in brief, the doctrine that imperialist expansion was a means to America's assumption of a role of thorough-going collaboration in pursuing the interests and duties of world politics."¹

This doctrine was, of course, repudiated by the anti-expansionists, who constantly emphasized the fact that this idea conflicted sharply with the dominant American policy and attitude of the past, the principle of independent political action known as isolationism.

Yet, throughout the course of the nineties, the restraining power of isolationism over American foreign policy visibly lost its strength. Having noted in 1890 the commercial and strategic needs which were enforcing upon this countrymen the beginning of an "outward view," Captain Mahan had written during the discussion of the Hawaiian issue in 1893, that "we also shall be entangled in the affairs of the great family of nations and shall have to accept the attendant burdens."²

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¹Weinberg, Manifest Destiny, p. 453.
²Alfred Mahan, Interest of America in Sea Power, p. 104.
A foreshadowing of the transition to a larger political outlook also came in the Venezuelan issue of 1895. A spark of national pride led to the feeling that the United States was destined to affect the future of the world. And one realized that extent of this feeling when John R. Proctor stressed in his article in Forum, 1898, "that the retention of the Philippines was demanded by 'the interests of peace' -- that is, the necessity of preventing a war of the powers to decide the proper depository of this white man's burden."

So America's conception of the territorial expansion essential to the international activities of a world power also had its foundation in the 1890's, and Forum and Nation either supported this growing concept of world leadership as part of the "national prestige" and "political power" due to the new role of the United States, or reacted against it adversely as being contrary to any necessity for the well-being of the United States or of the world.

Formerly, Hawaii's membership in America's economic system made it seem the one proper exception to the continental policy. In the expansion movement of 1893, Hawaii seemed to Mahan, in an article in Forum, only the first fruit of a policy entangling us in the commercial even if not the political rivalries of the outside world.

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Nation did not feel that the United States had to be entangled in such political and commercial rivalries as that, but, as it stated in an article on Hawaii: "As other nations have respected our wishes in the matter in the past, they would respect them in the future all the more as our power to command respect increases with revolving years." It further disagreed with Mahan's thesis to secure world leadership or more specifically national prestige and power by "following England's example by such annexations of foreign territory and foreign populations as seem likely to promote such undefined things which he calls national 'influence' and national greatness, by securing naval predominance on the Pacific, or 'the control of the Pacific,' as he calls it." Nation followed this type of reasoning to its logical conclusion -- that this type of "national prestige" would require a navy equal to the largest now existing, in order to secure and protect such outlying dependencies, and Nation did not vision this as world leadership, but a "war of giants."

In its review of Rev. Josiah Strong's book, The New Era, Nation ridiculed his ideas that the civilization of all peoples is inversely as their isolation and that it is one of the signs of being on the verge of the millennium, or new era, that steam and electricity render isolation and therefore barbarism, impossible. So to save civilization, Strong would

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5 Nation, LVI (February 2, 1893), p. 75.
imply, the United States must take its position as a world leader, but Nation disagreed with these generalizations. 7

In reviewing the foreign policy of the United States from 1893 to 1895, Henry Cabot Lodge, in his article in Forum, regretted the Administration's policy of retreat and surrender. Lodge firmly believed that the United States must show its concern for national prestige and political power in a practical way, by its leadership in controlling Hawaii, Samoa, and Cuba. He believed that the United States had not become the leader of the world she should have become, because of the neglect of foreign relations. As he said: "For more than thirty years we have been so much absorbed with grave domestic questions that we have lost sight of these vast interests which are just outside our borders. They ought to be neglected no longer." 8

Nation did not agree with Lodge or Mahan in their ideas of how the United States should acquire national prestige and political power. It regretfully commented: "Could the fathers of the republic have foreseen in 1789 what the views of a great many of us as to the conditions of national greatness would be today, how sad it would have made them." 9

But Nation did agree with and applaud Mr. Gresham in his report on the Samoan matters to the President. Nation quoted Mr. Gresham's report:

7Nation, LVII (July 20, 1893), p. 52.
9Nation, LVIII (May 31, 1894), p. 401.
It is in our relations to Samoa that we have made the first departure from our traditional and well-established policy of avoiding entangling alliances with foreign powers in relations remote from this hemisphere. . . . Every nation, and especially every strong nation, must sometimes be conscious of an impulse to rush into difficulties that do not concern it, except in a highly imaginary way. To restrain the indulgence of such a propensity is not only the part of wisdom, but a duty we owe to the world as an example of the strength, the moderation, and the beneficence of popular government.10

**Nation** agreed with Mr. Gresham's conclusion that the experiences of the United States have shown it to be a wise policy to avoid such entangling alliances that have not only failed to correct, but have aggravated the very evils which they were designed to prevent. World Leadership then, did not require that the United States be involved in such issues with foreign nations.

Just as **Nation** approved of Mr. Gresham's views, so it condemned Senator Frye's ideas. **Nation** commented on Frye's illogical tenacity to "seize, fortify, and hold against the world all the islands on the map." His desire for the United States to lead as a world power was not accepted by **Nation**.11

**Both Nation** and **Forum** presented views on the Monroe Doctrine and its application in these world affairs.

**Nation** began its series of articles on this problem, in an editorial entitled, "Some Monroe Myths." It pointed out the fact that Seward's

10Ibid., (June 28, 1894), p. 481.

ordering of the French out of Mexico was entirely different from sending
the British out of Nicaragua. That was not a matter of showing the national
prestige of the United States by enforcing the Monroe Doctrine, because the
Monroe Doctrine was not involved in this case.\footnote{12} And later that year, in
an editorial speaking of the Venezuelan difficulty, \textit{Nation} commented:

\begin{quote}
Whether Great Britain or Venezuela has the better historical
and legal title to the territory so long in dispute between those
two countries, no one without the easy omniscience of a Lodge, a
Campbell, a Blaine, or a \textit{Tribune} editor would venture to decide
offhand. . . . When Venezuela finds out that Salisbury and Chamber-
lain mean what they say, and that our Government means what it
says -- that there is no possibility of a bloody-Monroe doctrine
war, in which we should get all the hard knocks and the Venezuelans
all the glory -- negotiations with England will probably be re-
opened and the prolonged dispute amicably settled.\footnote{13}
\end{quote}

In an editorial the following week, \textit{Nation} re-iterated its conviction that
the United States had no duty or right by the Monroe Doctrine to protect
the South American states "against the natural consequences of their own
insolence and folly" -- that the United States did not have to become
involved in every entanglement and war to show its leadership to the world.\footnote{14}

\begin{quote}
It again rejected this involvement in another editorial in which it concluded:

\begin{quote}
It is a remarkable example of the power of words to take the
place of ideas that our Government should now revert to the Monroe
Doctrine and call upon us to stand by Venezuela, as a republic,
against Great Britain -- our ally in the previous controversy --
\end{quote}
\end{quote}

\footnote{12}{\textit{Ibid.}, (May 9, 1895), p. 356.}
\footnote{13}{\textit{Nation}, LXI (October 24, 1895), p. 286.}
\footnote{14}{\textit{Ibid.}, (October 31, 1895), p. 305.}
as a monarchy. . . . In a word, the American Secretary of State's Olney references to Venezuelan republicanism and friendship and English monarchy and hostility have no more to do with the facts than with the planet Jupiter. 15

The following month, Nation showed her regret that the United States had to show her political power and her right as a leader in the world, by "insolence, abusiveness, and brutality," and that, in short, in international affairs, "the ruffianly way is the more excellent way." Nothing, Nation felt, was more of a discredit to our civilization and actually to our national prestige. 16

Oscar Straus, in his article in Forum, upheld the Monroe Doctrine as a preserver of peace, and maintained that every assertion of it "has had the effect of averting the calamities of war." Later he stated that: "Mr. Cleveland has responded to this grave duty in order to avert a hostile collision between the two great English speaking peoples, who should ever remain strenuous and worthy rivals in all the acts of peace." 17

Forum also presented the views of J. W. Miller, Commander of the First Naval Battalion. Mr. Miller, in writing about the rumors of war, stated:

Therefore, facing the situation fairly and squarely, convinced that the people demand the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, we must at once put ourselves in a position to enforce with measurable

15 Nation, LXII (January 2, 1896), p. 5.  
16 Ibid., (February 20, 1896), p. 152.  
dignity, a recognition of the American continental policy. The situation, the times, are ripe for quick action: the question is, What shall we do?18

And Mr. Miller then concluded that the national prestige of the United States demanded that Congress begin the system of coast defenses and the construction of more battle-ships. The United States must take its position as a world leader.

The Chairman of the Cuban Press Delegation also wrote in *Forum* of the "perpetual source of annoyance, of irritation, and of danger to the United States" of Spanish domination in Cuba. "Of danger," he stated, "in so far as it may, at any time, give rise to international complications of a nature which it is not possible to foresee. . . . Cuba will be a running sore in the side of the United States." And the only way for the United States to show her "political power" concluded Mr. Pierra, was "by complete cauterization," which meant the "utter separation of Spain from the country."19 The United States must then retain her national prestige to be a world leader.

And if the other powers of the world are looking to the Pacific area, then the United States must do the same, according to Mr. Proctor, in his article in *Forum*. As he said:

The presence of Russia in the Far East, and the possibility of a combination between Russia and China, followed by the awakening of China from her sleep of centuries, the extension of French dominion

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in Indo-China, Siam, and Madagascar, the partitioning of Africa and the islands of the Pacific among European Powers; the industrial growth of Japan... all tend to change the front of the world, and to transfer to the placid Pacific the national activities which, for three centuries past, have rendered the Atlantic the theatre of stirring event.20

So the United States must accept her role as a leader in the world of nations, and as a leader must retain her power through expansion in the Pacific area. It would follow then, that she must also protect this national prestige of hers, by being prepared and ready to fight for her political power. And it is this preparedness against the nations of the world that Murat Halstead pleaded for in his article in Forum, "American Annexation and Armament."21

*The Nation* quite clearly stated its over-all stand on this issue of national prestige and political power in its editorial, "Jingo Morality."

*The Nation* explained:

But there is a Jingoism which comes to us in quite another guise. It is clad in the soft raiment of an attractive literary style and wears an appearance of high philosophy. In fine Hegelian phrases it talks about a nation coming to self-consciousness, suddenly awaking to the fact that it has international duties as well as international rights and preparing to go forth with lofty benevolence, like a knight of the Round Table, to redress wrongs and establish justice the world over.22

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22 *The Nation*, LXI (October 3, 1895), pp. 234-235.
Nation accused Captain Mahan of being the leading exponent of this refined Jingoism, and believed that Mahan would logically accede to the fact that this "American domination over any inferior power would have nothing more to do with morality than an earthquake." But, Nation strongly maintained that this "earthquake and physical power doctrine is a most dangerous one for any time or people." In other words, it believed that this political power theme that would lead to world leadership, was simply a means used as justification for an ignorant and brutal proposal of foreign aggression and conquest. And this was not considered real power, nor would it lead to true world leadership.\textsuperscript{23}

Yet the argument that the United States must accept and if necessary fight to maintain her role as a world leader, was also strongly endorsed by the imperialists of 1898. This was all linked to the duty of the United States, to her natural right, to her national honor, to her vital necessity -- all of this implied in her world leadership role or pattern.

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid.
It has been the purpose of this study to analyze expansionist feeling in the United States for the years 1893-1898, as it was reflected especially in two of the nation's periodical press, and to treat the evidences of this feeling in such a way as to shed light on the origins of American imperialism. Many years before the United States, at the close of the last century, embarked on a career of overseas expansion and took its place as one of the world's great powers, signs and portents of a rising interest in external affairs made their appearance in the periodical literature. No claim is made that the expansionist sentiment in the periodicals was in itself responsible for the imperialist outburst of 1898. But it is firmly believed that the evidence presented demonstrates that the periodicals were an important agency for creating an atmosphere favorable to expansion.

An important part of this atmosphere was the ideology of expansion. The basic concepts that composed the framework of this ideology -- inevitable destiny, mission or "white man's burden," ideas of self-defense, paramount interest, and world leadership -- made their appearance in the writings of such men as Fiske, Strong, Burgess, and Mahan. Placing emphasis upon these central ideas, these men furnished the American people with a
philosophical justification for expansion. However, the work of providing the nation with an expansionist ideology was by no means limited to a few individuals. These fundamental concepts were also being offered to the nation through an important segment of the popular press -- the periodical literature.

In the periodicals studied, as in the writings of the theorists, racism appears to have been a dominant abstraction used to justify expansion. Here were emphasized the expansion qualities of the Anglo-Saxon, his mission to give to others the benefits of his superior institutions, and the need for racial unity as a means of extending his power and influence throughout the world.

An examination of Forum indicates that racism was most commonly revealed in the allusions the periodical made to the need for understanding, cooperation, and even unity among the English speaking peoples. In these allusions there is implied or expressed the belief that such a relationship would involve the increasing participation of the United States in matters lying beyond her own borders. They are, then, not only expressions of racism but are also expressions of racial expansionism.

There were, of course, critics of racism, and Nation was one such critic. It was particularly adverse to Burgess' brand of Teutonic racism, and it deplored the tendency on the part of many Americans to assume that it was the destiny of the Saxon not merely to predominate in North America, but to monopolize it.
Present also in the periodicals were allusions to other basic expansionist concepts. As it had many times before in American history, the idea of destiny made its appearance. Editors and writers felt it necessary to support the idea of destiny. Others, with more regard for semantics, argued simply that it was senseless to resist an expansion that was inevitable or predetermined, and some placed expansion still farther beyond the will of the American people and claimed that it was the destiny of others that was driving them into the arms of the United States. These ideas were seen frequently in the writings and articles of Forum. On the other hand, as seen in its articles, Nation deplored the search for glory and aggrandizement abroad and refused to accept the idea that this destiny was inevitable. It was critical in its writings of Mahan for speaking of the development of the nation and of national sentiment as a natural force.

The record of Forum indicates also the prevalence of a sense of mission during this period, of a belief that expansion was necessary in order that the nation might do its duty in the spreading of civilization and democracy. The assertion of such claims brought from the anti-expansionist Nation a particularly sharp rebuttal, and it severely criticized the hiding of this imperialistic tendency toward expansion behind the cloak of moral respectability.

The literature studied also includes evidence of a growing feeling that expansion was dictated by certain vital national interests. Strategic interests were among the basic national interests driving the nation toward expansion. The United States was in the midst of a period of naval revival. Much of the discussion in Forum relative to this revival stressed
the need for naval strength to secure the nation's defenses. But this was also the period of Mahan. Mahan's writings focused attention not upon narrow defensive needs but upon offensive action, upon the strategic importance of the Caribbean, the isthmian canal, and Hawaii. Even more important, by establishing the inter-relationship of industry, markets, bases, merchant marine, and navy, he set forth a theory of sea power that was essentially a theory of mercantile expansion. While Forum, on the whole, supported these ideas of Mahan, ideas of self-defense and thus naval necessity for security, Nation found reason to criticize both the general ideas of security and vital interest and the specific ideas of Mahan.

Among the most important of the national or paramount interests impelling this country toward expansion was the economic interest. Although the pitfall of attributing the whole movement toward expansion to economic motives should be avoided, the evidence of the material in Forum and Nation makes it impossible to shove economic considerations into the background. Although there are only scattered evidences of a desire to expand politically in order to assure the nation's economic prosperity, there was a large body of sentiment favoring external economic expansion.

No evidence can really be found to prove or disprove the contention that external economic expansion was required to relieve industrial surpluses. But whether this need was real or imagined, Forum reflected a feeling that foreign markets were becoming essential to the nation's
economic welfare. Its articles showed the widespread feeling that the country must or should extend its economic activity beyond its borders and develop and acquire markets abroad for its products. Nation, on the other hand, rejected these ideas.

It may, of course, be argued that during the early period there is little evidence that such expansion had become a vital necessity and that those who in editorials and articles advocated such a course were engaged in agitating a myth. There is no proof that during these years the country was faced with the problem of disposing of a surplus of industrial products and capital or that the extension of its economic activity abroad was in fact important to its welfare and security. However, the period which closely followed was a period of tremendous external economic expansion, a period which saw the erection of a political and financial empire and the emergence of the United States as the world's dominant power. The advocates of economic expansion during the years 1893-1898 may have been anticipating the future; they helped prepare the way for the period that followed.

The United States was also impelled toward expansion by the interaction of ideas and interests with events. The public discussion reflected in Forum stimulated the feeling that the United States should assume a larger role in world affairs, while Nation held that expansionism was not necessary for national prestige and political power. The public debate over the Hawaiian issue, 1893-1895, contained all the elements needed for a debate on the whole problem of foreign acquisitions. Revealed in the periodical literature, especially Forum, is a body of opinion
which favored annexation for a wide variety of reasons -- strategic, economic, and humanitarian. But what is more important, this literature indicates that many believed Hawaiian annexation to be not a "sporadic effort," as Mahan phrased it, but rather as the first fruit of a comprehensive program of external expansion.

Nation reflected evidences of anti-expansionist feeling. The very existence of an opposition viewpoint is noteworthy, for it indicates that during these years expansionist sentiment was prevalent enough and strong enough to evoke a rebuttal.

The assumption may be made that since the origins of the new imperialism are to be detected in the periodical literature, so too, may the beginnings of the anti-imperialist movement of 1898-1900, embark permanently upon a career of imperialist aggrandizement. That the nation stopped short of such a career after 1900 was due in part to the influence of the anti-imperialists, and it is likely also that hostile critics of expansion during the period 1895-1898 shared in determining the course this nation was later to take. These early critics could not prevent the expansion of the United States, but by holding expansionist sentiment among their contemporaries up to the light of critical inquiry, they helped insure that the nation in its twentieth century expansion would follow a path consistent with its better traditions, rather than the path of imperialism.

The expansionist sentiment that appeared in the periodicals during the years 1893-1898 provides no definitive explanation for the expansion of the United States during the years that followed. The outburst of 1898,
the arrival of the United States as a world power at the turn of the century, and the continued expansion of the nation's power and influence since that time are developments far too complex to be explained solely from the early signs of expansionist feeling in the periodicals. But these signs are important; that the United States was later to travel the road of external expansion was determined partly by the urgings of those who, during these germinal years, used the periodical press as a vehicle for their expansionist views.
CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. PRIMARY SOURCES

American Journal of Politics

Atlantic Monthly


This book contains addresses of the Presidents from 1789 to 1929 on the occasion of their inaugurations. It is helpful in determining possible major issues of the era.


This is a standard work on the legal aspects of Burgess. An important section is his reasoning and logic in regard to racial superiority.


This book contains a clear statement on Fiske's ideas of Manifest Destiny, and presents his entire reasonings leading to his imperialistic conclusions.

Forum.


This book criticizes the American press for its false presentation of the facts in regard to the aspects of the War with Spain. It especially pointed out the inflammatory public opinion that was fed by falsehoods in regard to conditions in Cuba and conditions supposedly leading to a war.

*Harper's New Monthly Magazine.*

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This book contains the essential ideas of Mahan on naval importance. Mahan here places it against the broader background of progress, of the need to "look outward."

Mahan, Alfred T. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*. Boston, 1890.

This book presents Mahan's views on the importance of the navy and naval power in the growth of any great nation, and then he applies these ideas to the United States.

Mahan, Alfred T. *The Interest of America in Sea Power*. Boston, 1897.

This book presents Mahan's arguments for the United States to pursue a stronger policy than the one of "passive self-defense." He links naval importance with markets, self-defense, coaling stations, and power.


Mr. Nevins has here collected nearly four hundred specimens of the best editorials written. These include a galaxy of famous names and present a record of public opinion on successive incidents and crises in American history down to the present.

Political Science Quarterly.

Review of Reviews.


Some of the papers and messages of this book show the attitudes of the president to the various aspects of the war, such as the debate over recognition of Cuban belligerency.


The writings in this book are significant in portraying the attitudes of Roosevelt and Lodge in regard to the "new imperialism" and support and add strength to the writings of *Forum.*

Carl Schurz spoke at the University of Chicago and for the Anti-Imperialist League. These speeches contain his arguments against imperialism and manifest destiny.


Strong, in this book, underlines the mission idea, the duty of the United States to Christianize the peoples of the world.


Strong presents his thesis that it is the destiny of the Anglo-Saxon to spread his civilization to the world.


This is a pictorial presentation of the events and background of the Spanish-American War.

II. SECONDARY SOURCES


This book presented ideas of various writers that supported and expanded on the themes of race superiority, destiny, and paramount interest, also found in the magazines studied.


Rejecting isolationism, this book maintains that economic exigencies constrain Englishmen and Americans to combine forces, in their pursuit of growth.


This book blended diplomatic and intellectual history in such a way as to throw light on pendulum-like swings of public opinion between isolationism and internationalism. It proved useful in presenting the impact of certain ideas and attitudes on contemporary American foreign policy.

This is an important book, as no previous analysis has penetrated deeper to the heart of an immensely important problem, the problem of public opinion and the conduct of foreign affairs.


This book provided background information for the political and diplomatic activities accompanying the relations of the United States with Spain.


This book takes a broad view of public opinion. This is a pioneer work analyzing the influence of public opinion on foreign policy. According to his interpretation, public opinion is the most powerful force in American foreign policy, but it is also ignorant and fickle.


The author probes into the ideological background of American imperialism and into the motives of American statesmen. His thesis is that a few men in powerful positions were able to plunge the nation into an imperialist career that it never explicitly decided to follow.


This book contains a chapter specifically on the imperialism of the United States in the 1890's, presenting its intellectual background and especially the influence and impact of Captain Alfred T. Mahan.


This is an analytical study of the meaning and use of the term "national interest" in foreign policy, the growth of this doctrine in America, and its application to problems of territorial and commercial expansion. At times the author has not made a detailed analysis of the facts which justify the generalizations contained in the book.

A general background book for a study of the diplomatic relations of the United States.


The author here presents the growing role of the United States in international relations. It is important in its emphasis on the role of the United States in the 1890's.


The author contends that most grandiose expressions of the divine mission were products of the second half of the nineteenth century. He emphasizes the ideas of Josiah Strong, John Fiske, and Alfred Mahan.


The author addressed himself valiantly to the greatest subject which can challenge a historian -- the mind and character of a people. The chapters on the nineteenth and the twentieth century, which begin and end the book, provide profound insight, are keenly critical, yet always fair.

Chamberlin, Fred C. *The Blow From Behind*. Boston, 1903.

The book presents some features of the anti-imperialist movement attending the War with Spain. It criticized the anti-imperialists for causing the war to last longer, for costing the lives of American soldiers, and encouraging them to desert, but the author gives no documentation or concrete evidence for his statements and conclusions.


One section of this book was helpful, in that it presented the rationale behind the new imperialism.


The book contains several chapters dealing with the Spanish-American War and the problems relating to Hawaii and Samoa. The author rejected the hasty "imperialism" of the American settlers in Hawaii, yet approved the annexation of Hawaii because it was considered as a necessary naval base in order to retain the Philippines.

The author describes the processes and influences involved in reporting the news of the world. It is documented and clearly written.


This book provided a general historical background for the interests of the United States in the Pacific, covering the western expansion on the continent, early relations with China and Japan, and the acquisition of Samoa, Hawaii, and the Philippines. He shows the genesis and formation of our imperialism.


The author presents a very interesting analysis of the rise of the United States to a world power position. His intellectual background proved useful and was well documented.


This is a study of the development of American imperialism during the years 1885 to 1909. While there seems to be a real note of cynicism now and then, this is offset by a real conviction that over the years we have redeemed our pledges in a far-sighted colonial policy and a granting of political freedom.


A small section of the book treated of the Darwinian background of the war and of the influence of Alfred T. Mahan.


This is a first-rate pictorial history for the general reader. It is the words, drawings, and photographs of the correspondents, artists, and photographers of the time of the Spanish-American War, presenting the story of Mr. Freidel.


One part of this book was significant in presenting the philosophy of progress behind this era, the idea of the mission of the United States.

Greene has gathered some interesting articles significant to the various aspects of the imperialism of 1898, such as the manifest destiny idea, the economic necessity, and the territorial expansion themes.


This is a rather involved account of a political philosopher ending with an indictment against imperialism.


This is a classic account of the background and influence of social Darwinism in the United States.


This book is divided into three parts: a history of the daily newspaper and a description of its organization and technique, the propaganda of the various governments during the Great War, and the political and commercial propaganda of the 1930's. It provided some general ideas on propaganda and its influence.


This book is a well documented exhaustive study of monographs and memoirs. The author gives considerable attention to individual motives and records in detail the whims and fancies of particular persons in seats of authority. One does not always receive the impression that he fully appreciates the impact of economic and social forces upon statesmen. He also gives little attention to international law and international organization as factors in determining the policies of diplomats.


This book is a comprehensive and authoritative history of American journalism.

The author attempts a thorough investigation of the forces which go into the making of public opinion and the obstacles to access to facts upon which public opinion should rest. He also turns to the effect which prejudice and self interest have upon our meagre information and shows how opinions become crystallized into public opinion and how a common will or herd mind is formed.


The author strongly criticized the imperialism of 1898 and was significant in his refutation of many of the ideas of the imperialists, as the ideas of missionary necessity, duty, and national interest.


Interestingly written, this book proved good background material for the new imperialism. It was well documented.


This book proved a study in public opinion. It appraised American opinion regarding expansionist projects in the United States in the nineteenth century. Its analysis of the idea of mission proved significant.


This is a study of the Spanish-American War which covers the years from the breaking out of the second insurrection in Cuba in 1895 to the ratification of the Peace of Paris by the United States senate in 1899. But Mr. Miller has written in a satirical, scornful tone as an anti-imperialist. It is interesting to note that in the 1931 issues, Forum reviewed the book rather critically, and Nation praised it highly.

Moon, Parker T. Imperialism and World Politics. New York, 1930.

Discussing the dynamics of imperialism, the author upheld the thesis that ideas and principles activate the public at large.

Mott, Frank Luther. American Journalism. New York, 1941.

This is a standard work on the history of newspapers in the United States from 1690 to 1940.

The work is primarily a reference book containing a study of the complete history of American magazines.


This book proved significant in its information about the Nation, its editors and contributors.


In this book, Pratt analyzed the economic factors in Manifest Destiny. In regard to the cause of the Spanish American War, he refuted the idea that the United States fought for markets and fields for investment. His interpretation is that American business had consistently opposed action that would lead to war with Spain and had endorsed expansion only after the war began.


Presenting a good over-all picture of United States foreign policy, the author also presents the background for the change in American public opinion during the 1890's.


A good standard biography on Alfred T. Mahan.


This book explains the significance of Hanna, of Cleveland in regard to Cuba, and then of McKinley and Cuba and Spain. It pointed out the influence of the "yellow press" and the importance of public sentiment in acting effectually upon Congress, a dominant majority of which wanted war with Spain.


The author presents a bitter attack upon the proprietors and the practices of American newspapers. It is a competent and sincere criticism, yet at the same time, it is a partisan work.

This book is a fierce arraignment of the journalism of that time.


In the section on the 1890's, Sears is realistic in his analysis of the political happenings of that time. He emphasizes the political events, but he also points out background influences.

Sixto Lopes to the American People. *Philippine Politics,* No. 3.

A Filipino writes letters for the Filipino cause. The few collected here do not furnish statistical facts, but are important as the opinion of one Filipino in regard to the problem.


This book is a study of the origins and the emergence of the United States as a national state and of its subsequent growth pattern. Much of it is simply general background material.


A managing editor of the New York *Evening Post* and then editor of the *Nation,* Villard has written these studies of the most widely read metropolitan dailies. A chapter is also devoted to Edward Godkin.


A classic study of imperialism. It was most significant in emphasizing the ideological factors in expansionism. The patterns of thought of Weinberg were used in part in the analysis here.


This book was important in throwing light on the "new journalism," the events of the war reflecting public opinion, and the misrepresentations of the "yellow press."

The object of this study was to survey the policies and activities of the Press of New York City in connection with the many incidents in Hispano-Cuban-American relations from 1895 to April, 1898, when the Spanish American War began. But the book also presented an absorbing general picture of the marshaling of public opinion by the press during this period.

Wright, Quincy, ed. *Public Opinion and World Politics.* Chicago, 1933.

The various lectures of this book are devoted to public opinion and to propaganda. They include public opinion as a factor in government, the molders of public opinion, and the methods of political propaganda.
APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Norma Stoeffler has been read and approved by three members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

May 30, 1966
Date

John D. Mentag, Jr.
Signature of Advisor