Demosthenes and the Theoric

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DEMOSTHENES AND THE THEORIC FUND

by

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**INTRODUCTION** ....................................................... (1)

Chapter  
I.  **SCHOLARLY OPINION ON THE NATURE OF THE THEORIC FUND**  ........................................... 1  
   Early Public Distributions of Money  
   The Early Theoric Fund  
   The Theoric Fund in the Fourth Century  
   The Theoric Fund as a Means of Public Welfare  
   Estimation of the Amount Given Through the Theoric Fund Each Year  
   Amount of Money Given to Individuals Through the Theoric Fund  
   The Theoric Board and Its Association with Public Works  
   Laws Affecting the Theoric Fund  

II.  **THE NATURE OF THE THEORIC FUND**  ............................ 15  

III.  **THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE THEORIC FUND**  ....................... 62  
   Wages and Prices in Athens  
   Goals of the Athenian state in the Fourth Century  
   Political Groupings in Fourth-Century Athens  
   Relationship of the Theoric Fund to These Political Groupings  

IV.  **DEMOSTHENES AND THE THEORIC FUND**  ......................... 81  
   General Position of Demosthenes  
   Survey of His Speeches  

V.  **THE RELATIONSHIP OF DEMOSTHENES AND EUBULUS RE-EXAMINED**  .......................... 113  

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** .......................................................... 134
INTRODUCTION

It is a commonplace among students of Athenian history that the fourth century is not like the fifth century. Where the fifth century tends to the heroic, the fourth century appears matter-of-fact; where the fifth century Athenians produced exciting creative work on an unprecedented scale, fourth-century Athenians often appear to have spent their whole lives in market place or in the law courts; and where fifth-century Athenians appear charged with the vision of destiny, the Athenians of the fourth century often appear rather work-a-day. Such interpretations distort the true differences between the two centuries, of course. But it is quite true that if one wishes to learn more of everyday life in ancient Athens, if one wants a knowledge of the bread-and-butter facts of Athenian existence, the fourth century provides much more definite information. And because the Greeks of the whole classical period were men of flesh and blood and were not made of bronze or marble, the study of Athenian banking, finance, grain prices, wages, trade policies, laws, population, and all the other factors which make up the socio-economic complexus of this polis has its own interest.

The period of Demosthenes has become the center for such studies because of the abundance of records dating from this time. Fifty-nine
speeches attributed to Demosthenes are extant as well as speeches by Aeschines, Dinarchus, and Hyperides; pamphlets by Isocrates, writings attributed to Xenophon, treatises from Aristotle's pen, fragments of historians, and inscriptions by the score.

Because of the central importance of this period, much work has been going on in recent years to interpret it more adequately. But perhaps it would be more correct to say that this new work in large measure represents a re-interpretation of the period. Demosthenes himself remains the central figure of this era; but where before he was pictured as a demi-god, a man of unbounded genius thwarted only by the crassness of the multitude and the perversity of his political opponents, these new scholars--G. L. Cawkwell, Raphael Sealey, and, of a somewhat earlier period, Sir Arthur Pickard-Cambridge, to mention a few--are making an honest effort to discover Demosthenes as he really was. And they have determined in some instances that Demosthenes, had feet of clay. True, some of the new work is of a 'de-bunking' nature, an effort to destroy not only the myth surrounding Demosthenes but the very worth of the man himself. But most of it represents diligent and careful research to find out the true nature and character of the policies of Demosthenes and his opponents.
This paper will follow this newer pattern. It represents an effort to unravel and to clarify one of the more tangled policies of this era, the Theoric Fund. This Fund, sometimes known incorrectly as the Theater Fund, is continually mentioned in many documents of the period. From this it appears that it was one of the more important Athenian fiscal measures. Writes J. van Ooteghem, "Le théoricon est un des pivots de la politique athénienne au IVe siècle av. J.-C., et un des thèmes les plus fréquemment traités par les orateurs de l'époque."1

Our modern age has been called the age of the anti-hero. This is reflected in our drama, our literature, and even in the attitudes of the man on the street. Perhaps that is why modern man has little patience for the romantic portraits of the life of Demosthenes (or of the Gracchi or of George Washington or of Lincoln) which sometimes characterize the scholarship of the last century. And so Demosthenes and the others have been forced to vacate their lofty pedestals and rub shoulders with Common Man. This is just insofar as all men "are from the dust and all return to the dust." Nonetheless, some men in the short course of their lives step out before the mass of humanity and guide them forward whether to good or to evil. Some men lead, others are led.

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And so the hero cannot and must not altogether die. It will be the effort of
the writer in interpreting Demosthenes and his milieu to avoid romantic
soarings on the one hand and pessimistic nihilism on the other. It is hoped
that the real worth and renown of Demosthenes may emerge more clearly
through this study.
CHAPTER I

SCHOLARLY OPINION ON THE NATURE OF THE THEORIC FUND

It is of considerable importance in this discussion of the Theoric Fund to begin by a consideration of the basic opinions and theories which modern scholarship has developed.

Several scholars are of the opinion that the Theoric Fund was very small and that, consequently, Demosthenes allowed himself to become greatly disturbed over a rather minor matter. They hold that this is a representative instance of Demosthenes' failure to grasp political realities. Such, for example, is the position of Ulrich Kahrstedt.\(^1\) In his eyes this fund existed solely to enable the people to obtain seats for performances at the theater. The state established an entrance fee of two obols and, Kahrstedt informs us, this money was paid back to the city, which gave one of the two obols to the theater manager while retaining the other. Originally the money was given

only at the three-day City Dionysia. But later the Theoric Fund was distributed 'on the festival days.' Kahrstedt suggests that the monetary distribution took place not only on the City Dionysia but also on the Panathenaia, the Lenaia, the Hephaistia, and on whatever other festivals had theater presentations. Kahrstedt refers to two texts, Dinarchus 1. 56 and Hyperides 1. 26, and concludes that the total payment to any one person in the course of a year was about five drachmas. Multiplying this figure by the number of citizens (about 20,000) and making deductions for those who lived in the country, the rich, and others who wouldn't bother to collect, Kahrstedt arrives at a figure of 60,000 drachmas a year as the total sum the state would pay out, of which it would receive back again (making allowance for those who would spend their two obols in taverns instead of attending the theater) 20,000 drachmas. Since only this small sum of 40,000 drachmas (less than 7 talents) is involved Kahrstedt writes aiming a shaft at Demosthenes: "Aber man versteht jetzt schlechterdings nicht, warum sich jemand über die Theorika--als für die athenische Finanzen ruinös--aufregen kann. Sie verschlingen allenfalls 40,000 Drachmen, das Reiterkorps aber gegen 240,000 (Xen. Hipp. i. 19.)."
Such a position, frequently is held by those who are critical of Demosthenes. But in this lies its very weakness. Passing over for the moment the question of Demosthenes' ability as a statesman, one may ask whether a position which leaves him pictured as incompetent and inept is truly acceptable. It must be remembered that Demosthenes led the Athenian people (as far as anyone in the fourth century ever did this) from about 343 until after 330. There is here a question as to whether Demosthenes, who in several of his major speeches discussed the Theoric Fund, and stressed its importance in the total financial arrangements for the state, spoke as an intelligent man or as a fool to be laughed off the bema for making so much out of something absurdly small. Simple probability seems to work against such a small figure being assigned to the Theoric Fund. Further, there is also the problem of explaining Eubulus' importance in the state. He apparently was not an orator; rather his name is constantly associated with financial matters in general and with the Theoric Fund in particular. If the Theoric Fund was truly "small beer" as A.H.M. Jones, a follower of Kahrstedt in this matter, would have it, explaining Eubulus' importance becomes an intensely difficult proposition.  

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If the Kahrstedt position were true, then, indeed, Jones must be correct when he writes that "Demosthenes was rather foolish to make himself and his policy unpopular by trying to transfer it (the Theoric Fund) to the war fund even in peace time."6 An inescapable problem exists with such a position.

G. L. Cawkwell also holds to this low figure for distributions, but is aware of the problems outlined above and formulates his position with regard to the Theoric Board and the functions of this administrative body accordingly, as shall be seen.7

Quite at the opposite end of the spectrum is the opinion that the Theoric Fund was, in reality, very large, a question of distributing several hundred talents each year. The major proponent of such a position is Henri Francotte.8 It is his contention that the Theoric Fund distributions were not simply used to help defray the cost of attending the theater but were principally doles. All citizens were equal—equal even before the budget. Those who

6Ibid.


performed various tasks for the state received pay; those who did not received Theoric distributions. Such distributions thus arose out of the democratic instincts of the Athenian people: all citizens by right share in all privileges. The Theoric Fund for Francotte is a fourth-century version of the fifth-century diobelia, a measure instituted by Cleophon to give relief to the poor through daily (apparently) welfare payments of two obols. In the less affluent times of the fourth century the resources of the state in day-to-day practice permitted such a daily distribution only irregularly, though the operative principle remained: two obols a day for everyone not engaged in the Courts, the Council, the magistracies, or in military service. These distributions would have been financed by using all the unallocated funds from the revenues (the surpluses); and Francotte feels that there would be constant pressure to put more and more money in this Fund. The Theoric Fund becomes in this interpretation a basic social welfare measure of the radical democrats. While Francotte himself is quite critical of the Theoric Fund, he is a principal witness to its egalitarian character.

Since Francotte suggests that the Theoric Fund would be given (under ideal circumstances) in a two-obol daily distribution to all those not
directly working for the state, James Buchanan\(^9\) proposes that Francotte had in mind a Fund in which up to 400 talents a year would be spent. It does seem clear enough that Francotte felt that the annual figure for these welfare distribution ran rather high, for he recognized that only by assigning a generally high figure to the Theoric Fund could the fact that Demosthenes wanted to finance expeditions by using this money be explained. But it is not quite so evident that Francotte was talking in terms of 300 to 400 talents a year, for he assigned the dole only to those not engaged in the performance of civic duties and also recognized that the two-obol daily distribution was an ideal of the democrats, not a reality achieved in daily practice.

With the general outlines of Francotte's position both A. M. Andreades\(^10\) and W. Schwahn\(^11\) seem to concur, though neither gives precise data on the amount of the Fund.

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This position is important in that it clearly recognizes that while the Theoric Fund may have originally been concerned with furnishing money to the citizens for their theater seats, it was something more than this in the time of Eubulus and Demosthenes. Assuredly it is only in such terms that the importance of the Fund in the second half of the fourth century can be recognized.

But problems remain. Any theory which would assign 300-400 talents a year to Theoric Fund payments (if Francotte may be interpreted in this manner) runs up against the plain fact that in a good year no more than 400-450 talents were collected as revenue by the state.\textsuperscript{12} It is impossible to believe that even as much as half this amount was used for public distributions. And the 400-talent revenue represents a peak sum in the fourth century, certainly not an average. Aristotle also records the great care which the Council took in checking on those who applied to receive a daily two-obol welfare payment given to those who were disabled (\textit{adunatoi}).\textsuperscript{13} It may rightly be asked if the Council would show so much concern over the claims of the disabled if a regular payment was given virtually daily in any case. The Theoric Fund cannot have been an actual two-obol daily dole. Money for such payments was just not available. While some authors delight in picturing the perversity of the

\textsuperscript{12} Demosthenes x. 38.

\textsuperscript{13} Aristotle \textit{Ath. Pol.} 49. 4.
fourth-century Athenians, the fact of the matter is that most citizens felt a great responsibility toward the welfare of their *polis* and were not willing to lavish huge sums of money on themselves while the administration of the government and military defense measures went to ruin.

Perhaps the most generally accepted position as regards the Theoric Fund is that of Boeckh. Augustus Boeckh in his great work *The Public Economy of the Athenians* (*Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener*) held that though the Theoric Fund began in a very limited fashion, in Demosthenes' time the state was making distributions to about 18,000 people of two obols per citizen on about 25–30 festivals a year. For Boeckh the Theoric Fund was a festival fund, and the continual pressure was to extend this distribution to more and more festivals. The Fund was a "gratification" of the masses, a promotion of the "private interest of the citizens," a "filling [of] the purse of each individual at the common cost." Since in the time of Demosthenes the Fund

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15 ibid., 302.

16 ibid., 250.

17 ibid.
was supported by the surpluses from the revenues received by the state. Boeckh held that in a good year distributions of a drachma or more per man at each festival might be made. Thus the cost of the fund ranged from 25 to as high as 90 talents a year. Boeckh assumed that the distributions would always be made on determined festivals and that therefore the people would try to increase this number of festival days.

James Buchanan in his dissertation on monetary distributions to the Athenians specifically opts for the Boeckh interpretation. For him as for Boeckh the Theoric Fund underwent a change from "theater-money" to "festival-money." J. van Ooteghem also takes this same view and calls the Theoric Fund "essentiellement une manière de satisfaire les instincts égoïstes du peuple." Such is also the judgment of Gustave Glotz. And it seems that Arthur Pickard-Cambridge, George Grote, and J. B. Bury take roughly the same position with roughly similar judgments.

18 Buchanan, 141.

19 Ibid., 85.


The important point about the Boeckh position is that it recognizes that the Theoric Fund had an essential connection with Athenian festivals, while at the same time it avoids the pitfall of making the fund solely connected with theatrical presentations. Several problems occur, however. There is a certain rigidity in the estimates of the total yearly distribution, an assumption, seemingly, that even in more difficult times the people could still count on their distributions. But in the period after the Social War Athens had little revenue and did not use that for such distributions. Secondly, there is no reference made to the public works program which was in the hands of the board controlling the Theoric Fund. The Fund and this program, as shall be seen, are closely related. Finally, the view offered of the Theoric Fund is that it was a measure wanted only by the irresponsible elements in the state, who clamored for bread and circus and ignored any real needs of the polis. Such a view recognizes neither the true position of Demosthenes as regards the Fund nor the statesmanship of Eubulus.

Various scholars, particularly certain critics of Athenian drama, delineate the Boeckh position somewhat further and explain the distributions as enabling the citizens to buy food with which to celebrate their festivals and to join in the festal entertainment. In the words of Octave Navarre, "elles
distributions avaient alors pour but de permettre aux indigents de s'accorder, à l'occasion de la fête, une journée de chômage et un meilleur repas.\textsuperscript{22} A. E. Haigh\textsuperscript{23} and Arnold Schaefer\textsuperscript{24} also adopt this explanation. Again, of course, this position recognizes the festal character of the Theoric Fund, but the evidence for this being the purpose of the fourth-century Fund is not adequate and the explanation itself limits radically the purpose, scope, and consequent importance of the Fund.

The final position to be considered is that evolved by G. L.


\textsuperscript{24}Arnold Schaefer, \textit{Demosthenes und Seine Zeit} (2d ed. rev.; Leipzig: B. G. Teubner Verlag, 1886-87), II, 150.
Cawkwell. His basic insight is that a distinction is necessary between the
Theoric Fund distributions (which he reserves for the purpose of providing
funds for the citizenry wishing to attend the public theater) and the totality of
functions of the Theoric Board. Thus he rejects any link of the Theoric Fund
with the diobelia-type daily dole and limits the size of annual distributions to
fifteen talents or less. But since this was only one function of the Theoric

25Since his first article in 1960, G. L. Cawkwell, an English
scholar, has produced a series of carefully worked articles which provide a
sweeping re-interpretation of the period of Demosthenes. Cawkwell reacts
vigorously against the strongly pro-Demosthenes scholarship which charac-
terized much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. For Cawkwell
Demosthenes is not a lone patriot proclaiming a way of salvation which his
fellow citizens, mired in pleasure and ennui, refused to hear, but a political
leader (who happened also to be a very good speaker) who sometimes offered
good programs for the people to follow but who often tended not to see the ac-
tual realities which Athens had to deal with. His first article, "Aeschines and
the Peace of Philocrates" (Revue des Etudes Grecques, LXXIII (1960), 416-38)
was an effort to prove that the policy of Aeschines in 346 was neither short-
sighted nor pacifist. A brief article "Demosthenes and the Stratiotic Fund"
(Mnemosyne, Series 4, XV (1962), 377-83) was an effort to show that
Demosthenes could not have been the founder of such a fund. His "The De-
fense of Olynthus" (Classical Quarterly, LVI, No. 1 (May, 1962), 122-40.)
reassessed the history of that period. A two-part article, "Demosthenes' Policy After the Peace of Philocrates" (Classical Quarterly, XIII N.S. (May
and Nov., 1963), 120-38 ; 200-13.) discuss Athenian history from 346-40.
Most important with regard to the Theoric Fund is his article "Eubulus"
(Journal of Hellenic Studies, LXXXIII (1963), 47-67.), which attempts to better
explain and to vindicate the policy of Eubulus.

Board, it is necessary to look elsewhere to discover what made this Board so important. Since the surpluses of the revenues were assigned to the Theoric Fund, the Board had a relatively large sum of money at its disposal, part of which it used for the regular theater distributions, while the remaining part, the lion's share in a good year, was devoted, he argues, to public works such as the development of the navy, the building of ship sheds, the repair of roads, and other military and non-military projects. It is this fact which gave the Theoric Board and, consequently, Eubulus their prominence in the administration of affairs. Strangely enough, Buchanan appears to have had the same insight, but mentions it only in passing without stopping to explore its significance.

This position, based as it is on several important but heretofore inadequately explained texts is most important for explaining the significance of the Theoric Fund in the thinking of Demosthenes. But it does seem that Cawkwell, intent on making his point as regards public works and diminishing, consequently, the importance of the theoric distributions, has neglected other key texts. Basically he ignores the use of the Theoric Fund as a means of direct public welfare and of redistribution of wealth as, it shall later be main-

\[27\] Buchanan, 90.
tained, the *Fourth Philippic* in particular indicates that it was.

Such are the basic positions. And, with the possible exception of the first, all contribute basic knowledge of the nature of the Theoric Fund. But at the same time each appears to have within itself certain basic inadequacies. These have been pointed out in only sketchy fashion at this point. For it is clear that the real task at hand is not really the business of refutation but of putting forward what it is hoped are positions solidly founded on all the available evidence. But such an operation can only proceed in a dialectic with the work done by these scholars and much be carried out in constant explicit and implicit reference to it.
CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF THE THEORIC FUND

The Theoric Fund has received much disparagement and condemnation from various students of Greek history. We have, for example, this remark of Gustave Glotz: "Always inadequate and always being increased, the funds for public grants the Theoric Fund corrupted the regime, dissipated in alms the resources necessary for essential services and dragged to the abyss the treasury and the city." \(^1\) And the modern Greek economist A. M. Andreades called the Fund the "cancer that caused Athens' death." \(^2\) Before we can challenge such judgments, we must have a clear idea of the nature of this Fund. Our task is not to produce a brand-new theory unrelated to previous scholarship, but to bring some order into the welter of existing scholarly work and to develop certain points neglected thus far. Our goal in this chapter, then, is to present a comprehensive view of the Theoric Fund as a public institution.

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in Athens.

We begin with the basic position that the Theoric Fund is, a distribution of public money to the citizens of the Athenian state. Such a sharing by members of a Greek community in the public assets was not a new thing in Greek life. As far back as the Heroic Period such distributions seem to have taken place. It was then a question of cattle being used for money and taxation. To pay such taxes as there were, men brought cattle to a temple or shrine and would then join in public meals, feasting, naturally enough, on the cattle. This sharing was an expected part of the proceedings. 3 In the sixth century there is record in Herodotus of the Siphnians having the custom of distributing extraordinary public revenues, such as those from mining, among themselves. 4 In early fifth century Athens we find a somewhat similar case: "In the archonship of Nicodemus, when the mines in Maroneia came to light and the state had a surplus of one hundred talents from their exploitation, some men proposed to distribute the money among the people." 5 Themistocles stepped in, however, and induced the people to spend the money on their fleet for the war against Aegina. James Buchanan, referring to Plutarch, is of

3 Ibid., 210.
4 Herodotus History iii. 57.
5 Aristotle Ath. Pol. 22. 7.
the opinion that the Athenians did have public distributions of one sort or another prior to this, but that the amount of money involved was not as significant. 6 It seems that there were also distributions in the later part of the century, a distribution involving the surplus of the revenues. 7

Such practices may seem strange to us. Capital must be accumulated, not dispersed in wasteful distributions. We may be quite right in our judgment, but then we remind ourselves that we are formed in the patterns of nineteenth and twentieth century capitalism, not in the patterns of life found in the Greek polis. The Greeks, along with many other ancient and primitive peoples, believed that the income of the community belonged to the multitude of individual citizens. 8 The state was not looked upon as a separately functioning set of institutions but as the sum of individuals within a certain geographical area. A polis is not a national state.

Another distribution in the Athenian state, a distribution out of which the fourth century Theoric Fund seems to have come, was the distribu-


7Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum4, 91, 49-52.

bution giving all citizens money with which to attend the theater festivals
(τὸ θεωρίκον). Libanius tells the story of the beginning of this fund:

Since among the Athenians in ancient times the theater was not made of
stone, but the seats were constructed of wood, everyone struggled to get
a place and fights took place and people were hurt. Wishing to stop this,
the leaders of the Athenians charged a price for the theater seats. Each
then had to pay two obols and had to have a reserved seat. So that the
poor might not appear to be harmed by the expense, it was arranged that
each get the two obols from public funds (ἐκ τοῦ δημοσίου).

The Scholiast to Demosthenes also indicates that before the reserved seat plan
was adopted rich individuals would scalp blocks of seats, while the
Scholiast for Lucian's Timon speaks of fights taking place and of people getting
theater places the night before the spectacle.

Scholars, ancient and modern, in discussing this Theater Fund are
in unanimous agreement that the sum involved was two obols per day. Octave
Navarre says on this point: "C'était une subvention fournie par l'État
athénien à tous les citoyens pauvres pour leur permettre de payer le prix

9Libanius, Argumenta Orationum Demosthenicarum: Hypoth. 01.
I. 8-9.

10Schol. Demosthenes i. 9. 1.

11Schol. Lucian Timon 49. Confer also Etymologicum Magnum
s.v. θεωρίκον δρυπίον and Photius Lexicon s.v. θεωρία.
d'entrée au théâtre, c'est-à-dire deux oboles par jour de fête." This is only to record the words of Libanius and the later lexicographers, Suidas, Photius, and the writers of the Etymologicon Magnum on the point. There is some talk of a drachma being involved, but this plainly refers to the three-day City Dionysia. There is also a fair amount of agreement that these distributions began around the time of Cleophon.

Thus the Athenian state around the end of the fifth century was spending about 3 1/3 talents annually to assure order in the theater and that all could share in these religious events. This was the early Theoricon.

Note that we say "early Theoricon." This word, ἑῳρίκον, has been a source of massive ambiguity. It is not surprising to discover that such a fund was in its inception linked with the theater—the word in its etymology hints strongly at that (ἑῳρία-----ἑῳρίκον). But it is certain that the nature of this fund change with the passage of time in some way. Even Ulrich


13 Libanius Argumenta Orationum Demosthenicarum: Hypoth. 01. I. 8-9., Suidas Lexicon s.v. ἑῳρίκον καὶ ἑῳρίη, Photius Lexicon s.v. ἑῳρία, and Etymologicon Magnum s.v. ἑῳρίκον ὄργυριον.

14 Schol. Lucian Timon 49 is the chief source for this position.

15 Plutarch Aristides 24 says "after the death of Pericles."
Kahrstedt admits that. However, the name does not change. So, while the fund is a different thing in the time of Demosthenes (how very different will be shown shortly), the name remains the same.

A problem also arises regarding the founder of the Theoric Fund. But, we may ask, the founder of which fund? The early Fund? That is one thing. The Fund as in the time of Demosthenes? That is quite another. It would seem that those discussing the question of the Theoric Fund have rather continually stumbled upon this point of ambiguity without truly recognizing it.

But there is a partial reason for this failure. There was another form of distribution of public money at the end of the fifth century—the diobelia. Many scholars have wished to link the two funds; some have even wished to assume that θεωρίκων and διωβελία were two names for the same thing.\(^\text{16}\)

The reason is not difficult to find: both seem to have appeared about the same time in Greek history and both involve two obols. However, such a link-up of the two distributions must be rejected.

The diobelia is defined in the *Anecdota Graeca* (to use the reading of the Codex Marcianus 530, which scholars prefer) as "δ' θεωρίκων δύο, οὗς μαθ' ημέραν ὁ δῆμος ενισθοθερέτο ορέμ."\(^\text{17}\) The founder of this fund is de-

\(^\text{16}\) E. G., Navarre, 247.

\(^\text{17}\) *Anecdota Graeca* s.\(v\). Διωβελία.
declared by the writer of the *Constitution of the Athenians* to have been Cleophon. 18 Expenditures from this fund are mentioned in the reports of the treasures of Athena Polias and Athena Nike for the years 410/9 and 407/6. 19 In 407/6, according to these inscriptions, the payments were sharply reduced. Xenophon reports that in 406 Archedemus, a leader of the *popular* party, had charge of this fund. 20 This indicates that the fund itself was a democratic measure. After 405, when Aristophanes alluded to the *diobelia* in the *Frogs*, 21 we do not hear of this fund.

Should this fund be connected with the *Theorikon*? No, says Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, whose position is not most commonly accepted. He considers this fund to have been a sort of state-pension, a public relief measure. He recalls the fact that many in the besieged city of Athens had left their possessions behind them and had a right to some help from the state. Cleophon therefore set up this fund and also began again the public works pro-

18 *Aristotle Ath. Pol.* 28. 3.


20 Xenophon *Hellenica* i. 7. 2.

21 Aristophanes *Frogs* 140.
gram of Pericles so that work could be given to the people. This is an instance, writes Wilamowitz, of the state acting as a corporation which divides its dividends with all the share-holders.\textsuperscript{22} Wilhelm Schwahn holds a similar view,\textsuperscript{23} as does James Buchanan, who stresses that this fund would be for those who remained unemployed.\textsuperscript{24} Two obols would be given daily under this fund to those in need.

There are then, only superficial similarities between the early Theoric Fund and the diobelia. In the time of Demosthenes, however, the Theoric Fund, as shall be proved shortly, took on many characteristics of the diobelia of the fifth century. This no doubt led a number of scholars to link the early Theoric Fund and the diobelia.

And so the problem as to who was the founder of the Theoric Fund once more presents itself. It seems likely that the early Theoric Fund or Theater Fund was instituted during the Periclean period or shortly thereafter. Plutarch states this unequivocally (though his authority is by no means abso-

\textsuperscript{22}Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Aristoteles und Athen (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1893), pp. 212-15.


\textsuperscript{24}Buchanan, 71-74.
Plutarch's theory is that Pericles, not having the private wealth which Cimon, his rival, possessed and which he used to influence the poor, had recourse to the distribution of the people's own wealth in festival grants (θεωρικοῖς), jurors' wages, and other modes of largesse. The Demosthenes Scholiasm says, "Pericles was the first to make these public funds theoric-money (τὰ κρήματα ταύτα τὰ δημόσια θεωρικὰ ἐποίησεν ἐξ ἀρχής δὲ θεωρικῆς .. .). Further, we have the statement of Zenobius: ἐπὶ διοράντω τὸ θεωρικὸν ἔγενε τὸ δραχμή ... The Diophantus mentioned seems to refer to the archon in 395/4. If the distribution was indeed increased to a drachma (though in the period of the Corinthian War this is somewhat hard to understand), it may be argued that such a distribution originated earlier. The historian Philochorus is also cited by Harpocrates as referring to the Theoric Fund in the third book of his Atthis (Ὅ τὸς θεωρικός Αἴτησις), a book

25 Plutarch Pericles 9. 1-3. Confer also 7. 2. and 34. 1.

26 Schol. Demosthenes i. 9. 1. The Scholiast to Aeschines also says this (Schol. Aeschines iii. 24.).

27 Zenobius iii. 27. Cited in Hesychius Lexicon s.v. δραχμή.
which is believed to end with events in 449.\textsuperscript{28} But some suggest that the Gamma should read Zeta (Book Six, consequently). But much more telling is the fact that the Theoric Fund was introduced at a time when the theater seats were constructed of wood ($\kappa\rho\iota\alpha\varepsilon\upsilon\lambda\iota\nu\alpha\varsigma\alpha\varsigma\iota\lambda\iota\alpha\varsigma\varsigma$). We know that this was so during the whole fifth century and on into the fourth until the "Theater of Lycurgus" was finished. Pausanias tells us that Lycurgus completed the theater which others had begun ($\epsilon\pi\epsilon\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\sigma\varepsilon\varepsilon\eta\nu\tau\omega\tau\rho\omicron\nu\varepsilon\tau\varepsilon\rho\alpha\nu\upsilon\varphi\alpha\rho\zeta\alpha\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha\varsigma\varsigma\nu$).\textsuperscript{29} This points to a founding of the Theoric Fund no later than the early part of the fourth century, for during the turbulent times of the mid-part of the century little work would have been done on a project of this nature. Coupled with the previous evidence presented, this factor is an additional indication that the early Theoric Fund dates to the last half of the fifth century. That Pericles was the originator seems quite possible, even likely.

But not all has been said on this point. The historian Justin (second century A.D.) says: "Tunc [at the time of Epaminondas--c. 360] vectigal publicum, quo antea milites et remiges alebantur, cum urbano populo

\textsuperscript{28}Harpocration Lexicon in Decem Oratores Atticos s.v. \\ \\ \textsuperscript{29}Pausanias Description of Greece i. 29. 6.
dividi coeptum."\textsuperscript{30} But this is not a clear reference to the Theoricon as a Theater Fund. Some further evidence may be provided by the argument from silence. Van Ooteghem\textsuperscript{31} and G. L. Cawkwell\textsuperscript{32} point out that neither Aristotle (in the \textit{Constitution of the Athenians} or elsewhere) nor Aristophanes--two writers from whom we would certainly expect a reaction--nor any fifth-century writer makes mention of the Theoric Fund in any clear fashion. However, it may be said that the 3 1/3 talents cost would hardly cause a ripple in the fifth-century Athenian economy. It was indeed at this period "very small beer." James Buchanan wishes to make something of a case for the popular leader Agyrrhius (c.390) being the founder. But to make this assertion he is forced to brush aside the testimony of the Scholiasts and of Zenobius. Our cautious conclusion is therefore that the Theoric Fund as a Theater Fund began in the middle or late fifth century.

The subsequent history of the Theoric Fund up until the middle of the fourth century is most obscure. We shall not attempt to trace it, for evidence to guide the researcher is simply absent.

\textsuperscript{30}Justin \textit{History of Trogus Pompeius} vi. 9.

\textsuperscript{31}J. van Ooteghem, SJ, "Démosthène et la théorique," \textit{Les Études Classiques}, I (1932), 391; 397.

We therefore come to the end product of this process of development, the Theoric Fund as it appeared in the time of Demosthenes. This is the central problem; the previous considerations provide necessary background information.

First of all, there is an association of the Theoric Fund with not only drama festivals but with festival days in general. Scholars generally agree that there was a change "aus Schaugeldern zu Festgeldern." Much ancient evidence exists for this. In the *Etymologiaeum Magnus* it is stated that Theoric money was distributed by the city on communal festival days (ταῖς κοιναῖς ἔορταῖς). Pollux tells us that Theoric money refers to "τὰ ἐν τὰς ἔορτας καὶ θεῶν τιμᾶς τῇ πλήθει νεμόμενα." Suidas also says that Theoric money was given out on festival days (ταῖς ἔορταῖς). That this represents an actual change, an enlarging of the Fund, is accepted by


34 *Etymologiaeum Magnus* s.v. θεωρικὸν ἄργυριον

35 Pollux *Onomasticon* viii. 113.

36 Suidas *Lexicon* s.v. θεωρικὸν καὶ θεωρίη
van Ooteghem, Kahrstedt, and Busolt to name a few. Demosthenes himself gives excellent testimony that this was the case in his time. He mentions a distribution on the Panathenaea, while in the Speech on Organization he says that the people will seize upon a festival or some other pretext for a public distribution. In the First Olynthiac Demosthenes hints broadly that the people must stop using their surplus revenue for festivals but appropriate it for military purposes.

This association with festivals is rather important. The Theoric Fund started in conjunction with the drama festivals—truly religious actions. This religious orientation the Fund retains even in its new character. "No doubt," Pickard-Cambridge admits, "the distribution had a certain religious color. The festivals were all in honor of the gods, and there was at least a

37 van Ooteghem, Les Études Classiques, I, 398.
40 Demosthenes xliiv. 37.
41 Demosthenes xiii. 2.
feeling that their hearty celebration was likely to bring good luck."43 The festivals, insists George Grote, were intimately bound up with the national spirit. 44

But the subsequent idea that the Theoric Fund was simply intended by its proponents as a gratification for the people must be avoided. It is our firm contention that such was not the case. Perhaps the first scholar to break from the "gratification" pattern was Henri Francotte. His views are worth putting forth in some detail. For the Greeks the state, he says, "rassemble à une vaste société anonyme dont on se partage les bénéfices . . . ."45 The social order in Athens amounted to a primitive form of socialism and must be understood in these terms. Everyone has a right to an equal share in the revenues of the state--so the theory ran. 46 "Quant le citoyen tend le main, l'État n'a pas devant lui un mendiant, qu'il peut jeter à la porte, mais un


45Henri Francotte, L'Industrie dans la Grèce Ancienne (Brussels: Société Belge de Libraire, 1900-01), p. 49.

46Henri Francotte, "Études sur Démosthène: Démosthène et la théorique," Musée Belge, XVII (1913), 77.
créancier qu'il doit recevoir avec les plus grands égards.  

And so the place of the Theoric Fund becomes clear:

Les distributions complétaient le système des soldes: celui-ci assurait la rémunération des services rendus par les citoyens à l'État, comme jurés, bouleutes, etc.; le théorique fournissait des ressources aux citoyens qui n'avaient pas rendu de services à l'État. Les soldes étaient le traitement de ceux qui avaient fait quelque chose; le théorique procurait un traitement à ceux qui n'avaient rien fait. Ainsi était maintenue l'égalité la plus complète des citoyens devant le budget.

The principle of this Fund: "deux oboles par tête pour chaque jour non occupé à la Héliée ou au Conseil ou à l'armée ou aux tribunaux."  

Francotte, as an economic historian at the turn of the twentieth century, is highly critical of such distributions, but he makes an important point:

A la distance où nous sommes, l'appréciation de semblables institutions est difficile. L'État n'est ni une providence, ni un gendarme, il ne nous doit pas le vivre et le couvert; il nous doit plus que le simple protection de nos droits et de nos biens. Il n'est pas chargé de faire le bonheur des individus; il ne peut pas se désinteresser de leur malheur. Où est le juste milieu? En bien des cas, il faut abandonner aux circonstances, aux traditions de la nation le soin de marquer. Rien de plus dangereux donc pour juger le système des Athéniens que de commencer par le replacer dans notre époque. 

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47 Ibid. 78.
48 Ibid. 70-71.
49 Francotte, L'Industrie . . ., 41.
50 Ibid. 43-44.
We must, however, test this theory with great care, for upon it depends our entire understanding of the Theoric Fund in Athenian life. The works of Demosthenes are above all an important source in this regard. There is, for example, the extremely compelling text in the Fourth Philippic:\(^{51}\):

If we could banish from our midst both the obloquy which some heap on the Theoric Fund, and also the fear that the Fund will not be maintained without doing a great deal of harm, we could not perform a greater service nor one more likely to strengthen the whole body politic (διαν τὴν πόλιν).

Follow my argument while I state first the case of those who are regarded as the poorer classes. There was a time not long ago when the revenue of your state did not exceed a hundred and thirty talents, and yet of those competent to undertake the trierarchy or pay the property-tax there is not one that declined the duty that devolved on him in the absence of a surplus; but the war-galleys sailed out, and the money came in, and we did all that was required. Since then fortune has smiled on us and increased our revenues, and the exchequer now receives four hundred instead of one hundred talents, though no property-owner suffers any loss but is rather the gainer, for all the rich citizens come up to receive their share of this increase, as indeed they have a perfect right to do. What then do we mean by reproaching one another for this and making it an excuse for doing

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\(^{51}\) That the Fourth Philippic is genuinely Demosthenic can no longer be reasonably questioned. Alfred Koerte ("Zu Didymos Demosthenes-Commentar," Rheinisches Museum für Philologie, Neue Foge, LX (1905), 388-416), Stephen Daitz ("The Relationship of the De Chersoneso and the Philippica Quarta of Demosthenes," Classical Philology, LII, No. 3 (July, 1957), 145-62), Werner Jaeger (Demosthenes: The Origin and Growth of His Policy, trans. Edward Robinson (Berkley: University of California Press, 1938), p. 183), and James Buchanan (Theorika ..., p. 105) join in asserting its authentic character, while Charles D. Adams ("Speeches VIII and X of the Demosthenic Corpus," Classical Philology, XXIII, No. 2 (Apr., 1938), 129-44) has made an important effort further to ground these statements.
nothing, unless it is that we grudge the relief which the poor have received at the hands of fortune? I for one shall not blame them, nor do I think it fair to do so.

... just as each one of us has a parent, so ought we to regard the collective citizens as the common parents of the whole State, and so far from depriving them of anything that the State bestows, we ought, if there were no such grant, to look elsewhere for means to save any of their wants from being overlooked. So then, if the wealthy would accept this principle, I think they would be doing not only what is fair, but also what is expedient; for to deprive one citizen of necessaries is to make many of them unite in disaffection towards the government.

For we are bound, Athenians, to share equitably with one another the privileges of citizenship, the wealthy feeling secure to lead their own lives and haunted by no fears on that account, but in the face of dangers making over their property to the commonwealth for its defence; while the rest must realize that State-property is common property, duly receiving their share of it, but recognizing that private wealth belongs to the possessor. In this way, a small state grows great, and a great one is kept great.52

The text is clear: Demosthenes explains both the nature of the Theoric Fund and its foundations in prevalent political theory. The Theoric Fund, which all share in, is a public relief measure for the poor (ῥωθεία τοῖς ἀνόροις) which the poor have a right to receive. There is also the somewhat earlier

52 Demosthenes x. 36-39; 41-42; 45.
The testimony of the *Speech on Organization*. The Theorikon is not mentioned by name in this speech, but the whole context of the speech seems to point only to this institution. There are allusions to "the officials who assign and distribute the public funds", to "doles", to festivals being a pretext for doles, etc., etc. 54 The speech concerns itself with a discussion taking place in the Assembly over the allotment of a certain sum of money. The normal destiny of this money would be the Theorikon Fund, but Demosthenes' purpose in speaking is to suggest an alternative and to use the occasion to discuss Athens' general military preparedness. He begins by indicating possible modes of treating this problem of the sum of money:

I may attack the officials who assign and distribute the public funds and may thus gain credit with those who regard this system as detrimental to the State, or I may approve and commend the right to receive these doles and so gratify those who are especially in need of them (. . . οὔτε συνειπὼντα καὶ παραγενέσανθος δὲ δεῖ λαμβάνειν χαρίσασθαι τοῖς σφόδρ᾽ ἐν χρείᾳ, τοῦ λαβεῖν οὐδίν) 55

53 The genuine character of the *Speech on Organization* (xiii) has been called into question at various times in the history of Demosthenic scholarship. This question cannot be explored in all its detail here. It is enough to say that it is attested as being Demosthenic by Gustave Glotz ("Démosthène et les Finances Athéniennes de 346 à 339," Révue Historique, CLXX (1932), 390.) and G. L. Cawkwell ("Demosthenes and the Stratiotic Fund," Mnemosyne, Series 4, XV (1962), 377.), while Werner Jaeger, though having a few lingering doubts himself, attests that the modern verdict is in favor of its genuineness. Confer Jaeger, *Demosthenes: The Origin and Growth of His Policy*, 135.

54 Demosthenes xiii. 1-3; 10.

55 Ibid. 1.
Mentioned in this text are the basic elements indicated in the Fourth Philippic: a distribution of public funds as a particular aid to the poor. Later Demosthenes indicates that the money distributed was not a return for service rendered, but a dole in the strict sense. In the Third Olynthiac, mentioning the Theoric Fund by name, Demosthenes speaks of public distributions, though he expresses his opinion that these distributions do not, as they were intended, cure the public ills: "Like the diet prescribed by doctors, which neither restores the strength of the patient nor allows him to succomb, so these doles that you are now distributing neither suffice to ensure your safety nor allow you to renounce them and try something else . . . ." Therefore, from Demosthenes we have clear evidence that the Theoric Fund was a means of public assistance to the poor through distributions of public funds.

Aristotle also talks about the "two-obol dole." Speaking from an aristocratic point of view, Aristotle presents his theoretical position on this practice:

56 Ibid. 2.
57 Demosthenes iii. 31.
58 Ibid. 33. See also a similar passage in Demosthenes Proem.
53. 4.
Now equality of property among the citizens is certainly one of the factors that contributes to the avoidance of party faction; it is not however a particularly important one. For the upper classes may resent it on the ground that their merits are not equal, owing to which we actually see them often attacking the government and rebelling; and also the baseness of human beings is a thing insatiable, and though at first a dole of only two obols is enough (τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἵκανον διαφορία [sic] μόνον), yet when this has now become an established custom, they always want more, until they get to an unlimited amount; for appetite is in its nature unlimited, and the majority of mankind lives for the satisfaction of appetite. 59

Following upon this, in Book Six of the Politics he puts forth concrete proposals:

... while where there are revenues men must not do what the popular leaders do now (for they use the surplus for doles, and people no sooner get them than they want the same doles again, because this way of helping the poor is the legendary jar with a hole in it), but the truly democratic statesman must study how the multitude may be saved from extreme poverty; for this is what causes democracy to be corrupt. ... the proper course is to collect all the proceeds of the revenues into a fund and distribute this in lump sums to the needy, best of all, if one can, in sums large enough for acquiring a small estate, or, failing this, to serve as capital for trade or husbandry, and if this is not possible for all, at all events to distribute the money by tribes or some other division of the population in turn ... 60

It is clear enough that Aristotle is not condemning the wantonness of the Athenian rabble which has its desires for bread and circus ever filled by demagogues lusting for power (so often this is the interpretation of his remarks!)

59 Aristotle, Politics ii. 4. 1267a38-b5, 11.

60 Ibid. vi. 3. 1320a29-b2. 4.
but clearly looks upon these distributions as just relief for the poor. His only
point is that the system then in vogue (the Theoric Fund) does not do very well
the job for which it is intended. 61

A fair number of scholars have recognized that the Theoric Fund in
the time of Demosthenes is clearly not simply a matter of providing the poor
with theater seats, that it was of particular assistance to the poor in a more
substantial way. However, they seem unable to grant it any other role than
providing the poor with money for festal entertainment, a "little something" for
the poor to forget their troubles for a day. Glotz, for example, while
stressing the rise of poverty in fourth-century Athens and the misery of the
poor, 62 and admitting that the Theoric Fund was an aid to the poor, nonetheless
classes the Theoricon as the means whereby the people could be assured of
"bread and circus" and the egotistical impulses of the mob could be fulfilled.63

61 There is also a possible reference in a similar vein in the
Antidosis of Isocrates: "And if I have refrained from accepting the bounties
(λπμμάτων) which are distributed by the city it was because I thought it outrageus if I, who am able to maintain myself from my private resources, should stand in the way of any of those who have been compelled to get their livelihood from the city . . . ." (Isocrates Antidosis 152). There may be here reference to the money paid for jury duty, another means of livelihood for the unemployed poor.


63 Ibid. 338-41.
Grote, though trying to be understanding, classes the Theoric Fund as "almsgiving." Wilamowitz wishes to link the fourth century Theoricon with the idea embodied in the fifth century diobelia, but is critical of such a measure as an instrument for normal domestic policy. Speaking of the Theoric Fund, Arnold Schaefer rather bitterly states, "So weit also war das Übel mit dem athenischen Wesen verwachsen, dass selbst Demosthenes darauf verzichtete es mit der Wurzel auszureissen: ein grosser Teil der Bürgerschaft konnte ohne Züschusse aus Staatsmitteln nicht mehr bestehen." Most scholars have grasped, at least in some embryonic fashion, that the Theoric Fund was a measure for poor relief, though they have not, apparently, grasped the conclusions that follow from this. Further, various forms of "anti-welfarism" value judgements present in these scholars tend to distort the very concept itself.

We are dealing here, of course, with a distribution of public money. There was always the temptation for the people to distribute money confiscated from private individuals among themselves. The Scholiast to

64 Grote, ix, 492-99.
65 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 212-16.
Aeschines makes reference to such propensities in the time of Cleophon.\footnote{Schol. Aeschines ii. 76.}

And Demosthenes warns the people of his own time not to debase the Theoric distributions by supplementing them by distributions of the wealth of private persons, for all classes of citizens must be treated justly. Clearly, for Demosthenes the Theoric Fund was a distribution of public money.\footnote{Demosthenes x. 44-45.}

This public money was not one of the allotments in the budget, but was made up of the surplus of revenues after the regular operating expenses of government has been met. In the \textit{Speech Against Neaera}, dating probably from 339 and definitely from the period of Demosthenes,\footnote{For a discussion on the chronology and authenticity of the \textit{Speech Against Neaera} see A. T. Murray (ed. and trans.), \textit{Demosthenes: Private Orations L-LVIII; in Neaeram} ("Loeb Classical Library"; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), 347-49 and the reference given there.} the speaker tells how that lover of legal battles, Apollodorus, brought forward a bill "proposing that the people should decide whether the funds remaining over from the state's expenditure (τὰ περιόντα χρήματα τῆς διοικήσεως) should be used for military purposes or for theoric money (θεωρικά).\footnote{(Demosthenes) lix. 4.}" Pickard-Cambridge explains:
... it would appear that at the beginning of each year, the Assembly passed a Budget, allocating to special purposes and to particular funds as much as was required by each; and that the surplus or unallocated revenues passed in time of war into the military chest, in time of peace into the Theoric Fund, and that from the latter they were distributed to the citizens.\textsuperscript{71}

Later, the government financial expert, Eubulus, would have a law passed making it mandatory that all the surpluses from the revenue go to the Theoric Fund (c. 350). This law will be considered later in this chapter. It must be held in mind that the Athenian state was unsophisticated in its financial arrangements. There does not seem to have been any general policy regarding national finance. The system was to vote a tax for a specific purpose and for none other. If after there was a surplus in any of the treasuries, then it would go, throughout most of the Demosthenic period, automatically to the

\textsuperscript{71}A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, 96-97.
Theoricon Fund treasury to be returned to the people. 72

How much would the surpluses from the revenues amount to?

Here only conjecture can be offered. It is known from Demosthenes' Fourth Philippic (x. 37-38) that when the revenues were 130 talents (after the Social War in 356/55) there was no surplus and the state had difficulty making ends meet, while when 400 talents was the annual revenue (by 341 at the latest), there was a significant surplus. But how much is not known. Frank Egleston Robbins, in a study on the cost to Athens of her Second Empire, took up the question of surpluses and offered the estimate that the amount would be from between 50 to 100 talents annually. He says, however, that there is not

72 That the Theoricon in the time of Demosthenes involved a distribution of the surpluses of the revenues is supported by scholarly opinion. Busolt condemns it for swallowing up "alle Überschüsse der Staatsverwaltung" (Busolt, 427). Schwahn ("Theorikon," Pauly-Wissowa) likewise holds this view as does Gustave Gilbert (The Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens, trans. E. J. Brooks and T. Nicklin from the 2d German ed. (London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co., 1895), pp. 342-43.). While ancient sources do not often talk of the surpluses (τὰ περιοντα) by name—though Demosthenes x. 37-38 does seem to link the surpluses specifically with the Theoricon Fund—there are very many references to a dividing of the public money. Confer Justin vi. 9., Harpocratio s.v. Θεορικά, Libanius Argumenta Orationum Demosthenicarum: Hypoth. 01, I. 7-11., Schol. Demosthenes I. 9. 1., etc. There is no room for a view such as Kahrstedt's (Nachrichten ..., 1929, 160-61.) that the Theoricon in the time of Demosthenes was still the very small matter of providing money for the theater.
enough data to do anything more than offer conjecture. But during the Demosthenic period the loss of territories particularly in the northern Aegean area would have lowered the contributions of the allies and thus would have reduced in all probability the average minimum surplus and quite possibly the average maximum. On this basis it seems better to accept an annual average of between 20 and 90 talents, realizing that in any given year the amount could be less (even nothing) or more.

Much is learned about the mode of distribution of the Thoeric Fund from one section of the Speech Against Leochares:

He got together some of the Otrynians with the demarch, and persuaded them at the opening of the adult register to inscribe his name.

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74 The argument will often be levelled that distributing the surpluses harmed Athens' military preparedness. Certainly it can be admitted that the surpluses represented an additional possible source of money for state projects, including defense. But that such distributions really hurt Athenian defense is less sure. The mass of people did not feel so, obviously. There is also an interesting passage found in the speech by Demosthenes *On the False Legation* (xix. 89-91). Demosthenes suggests that Aeschines will say in his defense that during the Peace of Philocrates (which Aeschines promoted) Athens has a strong fleet of three hundred warships with money for them. Demosthenes does not answer that this is a lie because there is no money but rather that this would have been the case, peace or no peace. Both Aeschines and Demosthenes in effect indicate that peace does not mean the end of funds for defense.
And after that on the occasion of the great Panathenaea at the time of the distribution, he came to get his Theoric money (πρὸς τὸ θεωρικὸν), and when the other demesmen were receiving it, he demanded that it be given him also, and that he should be entered on the register under the name of Archiades. But when we entered a solemn protest, and all the others declared that what he was doing was an outrage, he went away without either having his name inscribed or receiving the Theoric money (τὸ θεωρικὸν λαβὼν). 75

From this it is clear that to get the Theoric money a citizen had to appear before an official of his deme and receive his money. 76 A man had to be a full citizen to receive his money. Besides the evidence of the above text on this point, Lucian in his Timon seems to make the same point: "When recently he had the assignment of distributing the Theoricon to the tribe of the Erechtheidae, I came to ask for what was mine, but he said he did not recognize me as being a citizen." 77 And a citizen had to appear in person, Conon

75 Demosthenes xliv. 37.

76 This is also in the opinion of several scholars, attested in a text from Plautus:

(Euclio, a gentleman of Athens, apparently has a pot of gold in his house. But he will have to go out to get his money or others will think he has a stock of his own.)

nam noster nostrae qui est magister curiae
dividere argentī dixit numinos in viros;
id si reliquo ac non peto, omnes ilico
me suspicentur, credo, habere aurum domi.

(Aulularia, 107-10)

77 Lucian Timon 49.
of Paeania on one occasion was prosecuted for having taken Theoric money for his son who was abroad.\textsuperscript{78}

There is now the problem of determining the amount paid out in this Fund. The Fund seems to have been associated in the minds of people with the term "two obols." Demosthenes, for example, in the \textit{Speech on Organization} says: "It is that though the many reforms proposed were all of them important and honourable, no one remembers any of them, but everyone remembers the two obols."\textsuperscript{79} In the context, which, as has been indicated, is only explainable in terms of the public distributions of the Theoric Fund, "two obols" seems to be a synonym for the Fund. However, in none of the later speeches of Demosthenes nor in any speech of Aeschines do we find the Theoric Fund referred to in this manner. In a text already cited from Aristotle, we have the term \textit{διωβολία} (not \textit{διωβελία} ).\textsuperscript{80} Again, given the general context, the reference seems to be another synonym for the Theoric Fund. It must be recalled that the early Theoric Fund was always a matter of two obols (a thing made clear in innumerable texts). It is likely that the late Theoric Fund

\textsuperscript{78} Hypereides \textit{Against Demosthenes} Frag. 6 (7).

\textsuperscript{79} Demosthenes xiii. 10.

\textsuperscript{80} Aristotle \textit{Politics} ii. 4. 1267b2. 11.
remained associated for a time with this term, but because it became considerably more than a Theater Fund under the management of Eubulus, the "two obol" appellation was less and less suitable. The Speech on Organization was delivered c.352-50 when the revenues were still somewhat low, and a large surplus did not exist. Two obols per festival may have been the regular payment. But the usage in Aristotle may well point to a traditional term, despite the absence of this term in the orators.

In the time of Demosthenes evidence exists for large sums being distributed. Conon of Paeania attempted to get five drachmas for his son, and this seems to have been a single allowance if the reference in Dinarchus is to the same incident. And Plutarch associates Demades with a 50 drachma distribution for the Anthesteria c. 330. But the amount mentioned is so large that either Plutarch exaggerates or this was a most untypical distribution. To make such a distribution on this one occasion 150 talents would have been required (based on 18,000 potential recipients). The figure of a drachma is sometimes given (e.g. in the Scholion to Lucian's Timon, 49), but this may

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81 Hypereides Against Demosthenes Frag. 6 (7).
82 Dinarchus Against Demosthenes 56.
83 Plutarch Praecepta Gerendae Reipublicae 25. 1. 818 E-F.
refer to the total sum given under the early Theoricon for the three-day City Dionysia. However, the reference in Hesychius to a drachma may be for a single allowance. 84 We find better help on this question in a statement in the Aeschines Scholion:

The Athenians distributed as Theoric money a drachma at first to each citizen, a practice introduced by Pericles. Later, under the pretext of the Theoric Fund, much money was distributed at the same time. This took place at the time of Diophantus and also at the time of Eubulus. 85

The important words here are "much money at the same time" (πολλά δραχμα χρήματα) -- additional evidence for larger distributions in the time of Demosthenes. 86 Clearly, though, to determine the amount given out on any single occasion is impossible simply on the basis of this data.

It will prove helpful to tackle this problem in a different manner. We have seen that the Theoric Fund was distributed on the festivals. It is further known that Athens had from between twenty-two and thirty festivals a

84 Hesychius Lexicon s.v. δραχμη χαλατωσα.
85 Schol. Aeschines iii. 24.
86 References to three obols, four obols, and one drachma are also found (Lucian Eucomium Demosthenis 36, (Demosthenes) Proemium 53. 4.) but it is by no means certain that these are actually references to the Theoric Fund.
year, some of which ran for several days. A lump sum would be distributed on at least a number of these festival days. Now it is certain that this lump sum did not represent an amount given for each day of the year. For if two obols were given on each day of the year, the cost of the program would be about 400 talents per year—an impossibly high amount. Besides, it is known from the Constitution of the Athenians that there was a daily two obol payment by the state to invalids:

The Council also examines the invalids. For there is a law which orders that those whose property is less than three minae and who are so completely disabled physically that they cannot do any work shall, after having been examined by the Council, receive two obols daily for their support from the public funds.

If there were a daily welfare payment of two obols to everyone, the invalids would certainly not be required to undergo a special examination by the Council. But on the other hand, it is impossible to accept the position that

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87 The chief Athenian festivals beginning with those in the first month of the Athenian year (late July/Aug.) were the following: Cronia, Synoikia, Panathenaea, Boedromia, Pyanopsia, Oschophoria, Thesmophoria, Apaturia, Chalkia, Halae, Rural Dionysia, Gamelia, Lenaia, Anthestheria, Chloia, City Dionysia, Munychia, Thargelia, Plynteria, Skiophoria, Dipholia, and Arretophoria. There was also the festival of the Eleusinian Mysteries as well as a number of smaller festal days. Of all these festivals, the Panathenaea and the City Dionysia were by far the most important.

88 Aristotle Ath. Pol. 49. 4.
the distribution was a mere matter of two obols being given out perhaps fifteen times a year, as Kahrstedt\(^89\) and A. H. M. Jones\(^90\) hold. For no one would propose to finance military expeditions with only fifteen or sixteen talents. This would make not only Demosthenes look quite foolish for having made such proposals but also the Athenian people for letting Eubulus sway them so easily at the time of the Peace of Philocrates.

But the main problem with both such proposals is that they ignore the flexible character of the surpluses. After the Social War when Athens had paid out 1000 talents for mercenary soldiers alone,\(^91\) Athens was forced to scrimp and save to make ends meet. There was nothing like a surplus then. But by 345 or so the revenue had risen to 400 talents a year and there was a significant surplus. This change in surpluses, says G. L. Cawkwell, "can also be seen from Demosthenes' financial proposals in 351 and 349—in 351 he did not talk about the Theoric Fund because it no doubt was insignificant; in 349 it was considered large enough to finance a military expedition.\(^92\) In a

\(^{89}\)Kahrstedt, \textit{Nachrichten} . . ., 1929, 159-60.


\(^{91}\)Isocrates \textit{Areopagiticus} 9.

good year a hundred or more talents would be available to distribute; in a very bad year nothing. The average range of the surpluses, as has been said, probably ran from 20-90 talents. Let us assume, with Boeckh, that 18,000 citizens would receive payments. If the average payment during the year was a drachma on each distribution day, payment might be made on twenty-five festival days, costing the state 75 talents for the year. If the average payment equalled 5 dr. per festival day, only six distributions could be made if 90 talents were available for the Fund. If two obols were paid out, each distribution day would cost the state one talent. If paid out on all the 25-30 festivals during the year, the Fund would expend 25 to 30 talents, an amount which would be doubled or tripled during a period of prosperity. Such seems to be the most reasonable estimates that can be offered. It may have been that there was a certain minimum amount allotted, as earlier, for the theater seats, but evidence for or against this possibility is absent.

This distribution of the surpluses was administered by a special Thoric Board. That there was such a board is clear from Ath. Pol. 43. 1.

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93Augustus Boeckh, The Public Economy of the Athenians, trans. Anthony Lamb from the 2d German ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1857), pp. 310-11. This range of figures is also accepted by Buchanan (Theorika..., 141), who himself cites Boeckh, by van Ootechem (Les Etudes Classiques, 1, 405) and by Andreades (History of Greek Public Finance, 262).
The usual term used to designate this Board, ἐπὶ τὸ θεωρίν, indicates that there were more than one man on this Board. How many members cannot be ascertained. As for the manner of selecting these officials, the following appears in the Constitution of the Athenians:

All the officials for the ordinary administration are chosen by lot, with the exception of the Treasurer of the military funds, the Treasurers of the Theoric Fund, and the Superintendent of the water supply. These latter officials are elected by vote and hold their office from one Panathenaic festival to the next (ἐν παναθηναίαις ἐν παναθηναίαις). Does this refer to the Greater Panathenaea? Schwahn, for one, seems to think that it does and that, therefore, the Board members held four-year terms. But Busolt holds that a man held office only from one year to the next (from one lesser Panathenaea, that is, to the next), as does Ferguson. The Greek, which leaves out the adjective μεγάλων, bears out the latter interpretation. But though a man only held office for a year at a time, it seems pro-

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94 Aristotle Ath. Pol. 43. 1.

95 Schwahn, "Theorika," Pauly-Wissowa.

96 Busolt, 1143-44.

bale that men like Eubulus and Lycurgus either were repeatedly elected or that they controlled the policies of the Board through their political friends. Probably the very fact that the Theoric Board officials were elected instead of chosen by lot meant that they could be re-elected—designated by lot was used to insure new people being chosen each year.

The authority of the Theoric Board was not simply a matter of supervising the distribution of money several times a year. Aeschines tells us:

In earlier times, fellow citizens, the city used to elect a Comptroller of the Treasury, who every prytany made to the people a report of the revenues. But because of the trust which you placed in Eubulus, those who were elected Superintendents of the Theoric Fund held (until the law of Hegemon was passed) the office of Comptroller of the Treasury and the office of Receiver of Moneys; they also controlled the dockyards, had charge of the naval arsenal that was building, and were superintendents of streets; almost the whole administration of the state was in their hands.

On this passage the Scholiast makes a noteworthy comment. He suggests that Aeschines says this to destroy in advance a possible argument of Demosthenes:

Lest Demosthenes might say that 'thus we were well-minded toward the city; it entrusted many offices to me', he [Aeschines] destroys this ar-

98 Aeschines iii. 25. is strong proof for the power of Eubulus.

99 The law of Hegemon, passed after 338 as an anti-Demosthenes measure—Hegemon was a supporter of Eubulus, Aeschines, etc. (cf. Demosthenes xviii. 285)—restored the independent office of Comptroller (_aspectou).

100 Aeschines iii. 25.
argument saying that this was done not on account of Demosthenes' good will, but because this was the custom from the time of Eubulus. From that time forth this custom held even for the unworthy. 101

So from the time of Eubulus these different functions seem to have been bound up with the office of the Theoric Board. Pollux also links the Theoric Board with the selling of possessions of those exiled by the Court of the Areopagus and with the selling of booty. 102 These functions are, of course, easy to link with the basic task of distributing the surpluses.

But what of the overseeing of civic construction projects which the Board did? G. L. Cawkwell made an effort to deal with this problem. "There is no reason," he says, "to suppose that the Commission controlled no more than it distributed." 103 Besides citing the passage from Aeschines given above, he points out that Harpocration, s.v. θεωρικά, says: Ταύτα ... ὑστερον ... κατετίθετο εἰς τὰς δημοσίας κατασκευὰς καὶ διανομὰς τῶν πολιτῶν [Italics mine] 104 There is also the fact,

101 Schol. Aeschines iii. 25.
102 Pollux Onomasticon viii. 99.
104 Harpocration Lexicon in Decem Oratores Atticos s.v. θεωρικά
recorded in Philochorus, that when the Athenians voted that the Theoric money be made available for military purposes (τὰ χρηματα ἡμισαντο πάντες τὰ ναυστατικά), work was also suspended on the ship sheds and the naval arsenal. 105 It is known, further, from an inscription that Eubulus purchased wood for naval work:

EN THI ARXAIAI ΣΚ(Ε)ΥΘΗΚΕΙ
NEIΑ KAINΟ: ΔΔ(Γ)
ON EYBOYLOΣ ΕΜΡ(ΙΑ)ΤΟ

Dinarchus tells us that Eubulus had many ships and new dockyards built, 107 and his statement is supported by the fact that the number of ships in the Athenian navy increased from 288 in 357/6 to 341 in 353/2 to 392 in 330/29. 108 Demosthenes also gives evidence for this linkage of public works with the Theoric Fund:

'But,' says an objector, 'if our foreign policy has failed, there is great improvement in domestic affairs.' And to what can you point in proof?

105 Philochorus, frag. 135.
106 IG II² 1627. 352-54.
107 Dinarchus Against Demosthenes 96.
108 IG II² 1611. 9.; 1613. 302.; 1627. 269.
To the walls we are whitewashing, the streets we are paving, the water works, and the balderdash?

Now, on the contrary, the politicians hold the purse-strings and manage everything (καὶ διὰ τούτων ἀπαντα πράττεται), while you, the people, . . . have sunk to the level of lackeys and hangers-on, content if the politicians gratify you with a dole from the Theoric Fund (ὑπαδίδωσι θεωρικῶν) or a procession at the Boedromia . . .

Indeed Eubulus seems to have attempted to achieve this financial goal of the writer of the Treatise on the Revenues:

. . . if with a large surplus in hand we shall celebrate our festivals with even more splendour than at present, shall restore the temples, and repair the walls and docks . . . surely, I say, our proper course is to proceed with this scheme forthwith . . .

All points to this combining of function by the Theoric Board from the time of Eubulus on.

109 Demosthenes iii. 29, 31. This passage is a virtual repetition of that found in Demosthenes xiii. 30.

110 (Xenophon) Treatise on the Revenues 6. 1. The Greek of this passage indicates the relationship of the surpluses, the festivals, and the construction programs: "... περιουσίας δὲ πολλῆς γενομένης μεγαλοπρεπέστερον μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐορτάς ἔξομεν, ἰερὰ δὲ ἐπισκευάσομεν, τείχη δὲ καὶ νεάρια ἄνωρθωσομεν . . ." The Treatise on the Revenues, produced, it is believed, shortly after 355, is often held to be the guiding theoretical position of the party of Eubulus. For the basic program of the writer is to make Athens secure by placing her on a sound financial basis—something much needed in the period immediately after the Social War.
It has been said that the Theoric Board attained this power simply because of the prestige of Eubulus. But, while this no doubt had its effect on the minds of the people, it is also true that public works projects, which certainly would provide work for the poor, on this basis complement well the public-welfare-distribution function of the Board.

Cawkwell himself does not agree that there were distributions of money on any scale, but wants to make public works the chief reason for the importance of the Board. But, not to mention again all the previous evidence for distributions which has been given, in one of the very sources he cites, we find that Harpocration links the Theoricon with distributions for the people (διανομᾶς τῶν πολιτῶν). His evidence, though, for linking public works with the Theoric Board seems sound, and it can be assumed that because public works were a means of giving employment to the poor, the Theoric Board was a logical agency to oversee them. In this case, "Theoric Fund" would have analogous meanings: one referring to the Theoric Fund proper, the distribution of money; another referring to all the money given to the Theoric Board for its


expenses. It may be that money was actually budgeted for the public works projects (probably so, in some cases), though perhaps part of the surplus went for public works, part for distributions.

The distributions of Theoric money was governed during the period of Demosthenes by a series of laws. These laws (at least those known to us) revolve around the relationship of the Theoric Fund to the military fund (στρατιωτικά). There is no clear mention of a War Fund as such in the existing documents before 348 in the Olynthiacs of Demosthenes. The existence, however, of some such fund may be indicated in texts ten years earlier or more. In the Speech Against Timotheus (362) the phrase ἐκ τῶν στρατιωτικῶν χρημάτων occurs twice.\(^{113}\) The adjectival use of στρατιωτικῶν does not, however, in itself point to a specific Fund. There is also a reference in the Speech Against Polycles (359) to persons who collect the military funds (or supplies?); the Greek reads τῶν τὰ στρατιωτικὰ εἰσπραττόντων.\(^{114}\) There is also the later evidence in the Scholiast to Demosthenes for a War Fund prior to the Theoric Fund but the chronology in the passage is

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\(^{113}\) Demosthenes xlix. 12, 16.

\(^{114}\) Demosthenes 1. 10.
Harpocration's statement is clearer, but it may mean only that there were funds for military purposes (as Libanius puts it). Such a Fund, if it did exist, would administer the eisphorae levied for war purposes and the surpluses of the revenue if, indeed, they were assigned to this purpose.

In the *Speech Against Neaera*, there is the statement that

"... the laws prescribed that, when there was war, the funds remaining over from state expenditures should be devoted to οἵτινες ...". This of course would mean that the money would not be given to the Theoric Fund.

The speaker refers to the period before the Olynthus crisis (i.e. before 349/8). If there was such a Fund, there may well have been such a law. Of course, from the period of the Social War until about 353 there would have been no sur-

115 "Seeing that they had a military fund, the Athenians a little before had made this money Theoric money, so that each of the citizens got two obols on the day of the theatrical presentation that they might use the one for their own sustenance and might have the other to give to the director-in-chief of the theater." Schol. Demosthenes 1. 9. 1. This passage probably confuses the early Theoricon with the late fund.

116 "This money formerly was kept for the necessities of war and was called the Military Fund (ὁποιαδήποτε), but later it was turned over for public projects and distributions ..." Harpocration *Lexicon in Decem Oratores Atticos* s.v. θεατρικά.

117 Libanius *Argumenta Orationum Demosthenicarum: Hypoth.* 01. I. 7-11.

118 (Demosthenes) lix. 4.
pluses. The people would not debate whether non-existent funds should be assigned to the War Fund or the Theoric Fund.

But the speaker in the *Speech Against Neaera* is not entirely truthful. There may well have been such a law, but at the time in question it had been superseded by a new law, sponsored by Eubulus apparently, which assigned all the surplus money to the Theoric Fund. When was this new law brought into effect? If, suggests Francotte, there was a law which assigned the surplus in time of war to the War Fund, it does not seem to have been operative in 352, the approximate date of the *Speech on Organization*, for Demosthenes does not appeal to the people to follow this law in connection with the "small sum of money" under discussion. Likewise, if the new law of Eubulus were in effect, there would not have been this discussion.119 However, shortly thereafter Eubulus must have put in his law for by 349 Demosthenes was hesitating to move that the surpluses be used for military purposes,120 and in the *Third Olynthiac* he calls upon the people to appoint nomothetes to repeal the laws for the administration of the Theoric Fund which, in his words, "distribute the military funds as Theoric money among those who

119 Francotte, *Musée Belge*, XVII, 75.
120 Demosthenes i. 19-20.
remain in the city." 121

What did these laws provide? Pickard-Cambridge suggests the following:

It is most likely that the law put an end to the assignment of unallocated funds (whether for military or other purposes) by means of decrees of the People, and that it did so simply by enacting that all funds not allocated in the annual Budget should become theoric money; for no decree might contravene a law, on pain of penalties which might be very heavy, and in order to pass any special vote of money out of the surplus it would be necessary to repeal the law of Eubulus. 122

There is the belief that these laws required the death penalty for whoever would attempt to have the surpluses made over to military usage. Busolt, for example, says, "... bald darauf (zwischen 343 und 339) durch ein Zusatzgesetz derjenige, der beantragen sollte die \( \Theta \epsilon \alpha \rho \iota \kappa \alpha \) zu \( \sigma \tau \rho \alpha \tau \iota \iota \kappa \alpha \) zu machen, mit der Todesstrafe bedroht." 123 This is held also by Arnold Schaefer 124 and Jaeger, 125 The only ancient testimony for this law,

121 Demosthenes iii. 10-11.
122 Pickard-Cambridge, 127.
123 Busolt, 1143.
124 Schaefer, II, 145.
125 Jaeger, 244.
however, is found in Libanius\textsuperscript{126} and the Scholia to Demosthenes,\textsuperscript{127} both of whom simply state the fact that there was such a law. But it is not likely that there was such a penalty. The simple law of Eubulus worked very well to deter those who would make such a change; Apollodorus, after all, was convicted and fined, and no other attempt to make this change is known of until 339 when, presumably, the legal obstacles were cleared away. The testimony of the Scholiast and of Libanius, both from the third and fourth centuries A.D., by itself is not compelling. Cawkwell in this connection points out that the Scholiast was not free from error, for he says that the war with Philip began in 349/8 and that the motion of Apollodorus preceded the \textit{Olynthiacs}, both of which, Cawkwell states, are demonstrably false.\textsuperscript{128} Along with Cawkwell in opposition to the existence of this law stand Pickard-Cambridge,\textsuperscript{129} Holm,\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{126}Libanius \textit{Argumenta Orationum Demosthenicarum}: Hypoth. 01. I. 7-11.

\textsuperscript{127}\textit{Schol. Demosthenes} I. 9. 1.


\textsuperscript{129}Pickard-Cambridge, 127.

and Navarre, 131 all of whom believe that these writers exaggerate the meaning of ἔφε βουλεύειν in Demosthenes Third Olynthiac, 12, taking it literally instead of figuratively.

In early 348 occurred the only case known when anyone tried to circumvent the law of Eubulus. Apollodorus, when the city was "on the point of sending out its entire force to Euboea and Olynthus" (Phocion was sent out to quell the rebellion in Euboea early in 348 and soon after called for all the help he could get from Athens), seeing, perhaps, that Demosthenes had achieved nothing with regard to finances by his Olynthiacs (all of which date from 349) and also by the fact that Phocion's expedition to Euboea was taking much longer than expected and therefore cost a good deal, moved "that the people ought to have power to do what they pleased" with the surpluses. At the time, because of the pinched financial situation, the people approved. But later Stephanus, a personal enemy whom Apollodorus previously had indicted for perjury, indicted the decree as illegal and won his case, so the author of the Speech Against Neaera would have us believe, by making the people believe that Apollodorus was a state debtor. Apollodorus was fined a talent for

making an illegal motion.\footnote{Demosthenes} It is unlikely that Apollodorus was convicted on this technicality, for no one else subsequently made a similar motion. Cawkwell suggests that the motion was at first well received because Phocion’s army was in Euboea for so long.\footnote{Cawkwell, Journal of Hellenic Studies, LXXXIII, 62-63.} But because the implications for the Theoric Fund were no clear, the people subsequently rejected the motion. Obviously, there was solid legal protection for the Theoric Fund.

In 339/8, Philochorus reports, "... the public money was all voted for the war fund, Demosthenes making the motion."\footnote{Philochorus, frag. 135.} Clearly Demosthenes did this in a legal fashion by first removing the old law of Eubulus. For if he had not, Aeschines and the other foes of Demosthenes would certainly have mentioned this as another instance of Demosthenes’ depravity. In the period 340-39, the Athenian state was in great turmoil because of the renewed conflict with Philip. The people were ready for any measure to insure their safety. The Fund, however, was restored shortly after 338.

Such is the general picture of the Theoric Fund. It was a distribution of the surpluses from the revenues distributed on festival days to citizens

\footnote{Demosthenes} lix. 3-8.

\footnote{Cawkwell, Journal of Hellenic Studies, LXXXIII, 62-63.}

\footnote{Philochorus, frag. 135.}
through their demes. It provided for some of the needs of the poor, though all were eligible to receive it. The wealthy, however, paid the greater part of the taxes from which the revenues were derived while the poor, because of their numbers, collected most of the Theoric money. This distributions were governed by a Theoric Board, which also had control over another important measure of relief for the poor, public works. Eubulus considered the Theoric Fund of such importance for his policies that he had special laws enacted to preserve its existence. But the strongest preservative force for the Fund was the tradition built up in the Greek world that the wealth of the state belongs to all the members of the state.
CHAPTER III

THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE THEORIC FUND

To say simply that the Theoric Fund was a relief payment of such-and-such an amount given out to all the people on the festival days is not enough. The Theoric distributions existed in a very definite milieu and themselves helped to form and reform this milieu. It is essential, therefore, to grasp this larger context.

Changes in the cost of living which took place over the course of the fourth century are instructive and give one indication why the Theoric Fund assumed a greater importance. In the fifth century the usual daily wage for the workman was one drachma. Agricultural workers also received about one dr. In the fourth century wages by the day tended to rise and to vary. Unskilled laborers averaged about 1 1/2 dr. per day, while, according to the Eleusinian accounts, skilled craftsmen received about 2 or 2 1/2 dr. Workers,

of course, did not work every day, for there were many festivals and holidays and there were also slack periods and lay-offs. There was, however, a tendency to base wage scales more and more on the piece rather than by the day. We may estimate on the basis of these figures that in the fourth century the average annual wage for the unskilled worker was about 450 dr. whereas the skilled workman drew from 600-750 dr. Thus from the fifth to the fourth century wages virtually doubled.

What of prices? The price on wheat (per medimnus) rose from an average of 2 dr. in the fifth century to 3 and then 5 dr. in the fourth century. It must, of course, be remembered that in times of scarcity the price would go to four or even six times that amount. Oxen for sacrifice cost 51 dr. a head as an average in 410 and 77 1/4 dr. about 375 with the price being presumably higher later in the century. The price of copper at least doubled over the hundred year period. There was, however, only a slow rise in the price of raw iron until about 330. The himation (outer garment), plain quality, cost 16 dr. in 392, but in 329 the wholesale price for the commonest quality garment was 18 1/2 dr. This would indicate a fairly serious rise on the retail market. Between 380 and c. 340 ox hides for making shoes appear to have doubled in price. Clothing in general appears to have been expensive. From this it would appear that prices generally doubled during the course of the fourth
It is now apparent who was caught in the wage-price squeeze. The unskilled worker, who had averaged about a drachma per day in the fifth century, now was earning only 50% better than that in the fourth (though he may have been able to improve his situation by working more often, at least in some cases). The skilled worker, however, could meet the rising prices because his wages were 100-150% higher than in the fifth century.

The result of this was that the number of poor in the Athenian state was very high. The number of citizens in Athens during the Demosthenic period was no greater than 25,000 and perhaps closer to the 21,000 indicated in the census of Demetrius of Phalerum of 322.² Out of this number only 1200, Demosthenes tells us, had estates large enough to bear a trierarchy (which would cost between 40 minae and a talent).³ In 322 only 9,000 citizens possessed an estate even of the low value of 20 minae (2,000 dr.).⁴ A. H. M. Jones believes that of the 12,000 citizens below this figure (which might re-


³Demosthenes xiv. 16.

⁴Pickard-Cambridge, 71.
present, say, a holding of five acres with house and livestock). 5,000 probably owned no land at all. Some of these might be fairly well off, but very many of the unskilled laborers probably were in this lower echelon on the economic scale. 5 It may be assumed that perhaps one-fifth of the citizens in the state lived in a more or less significant state of poverty. Indeed, said Isocrates (no doubt exaggerating somewhat), "... today those who are destitute of means outnumber those who possess them." 6 There would be in such a situation a need for state assistance. It seems likely that the Theoricon was chosen as one of the means to give this assistance—a limited means, no doubt, but an aid.

Certain of these economic facts have definite consequences in the political order. Having seen several of the basic features of the economic order, we may understand the central principles of the socio-political order. Here snare awaits the unwary investigator—prejudice. This is operative on two levels. First, it is quite easy to make value judgments in terms of modern practice, rather than in terms of what Athenian life and thought was

5Jones, 79-81.

6Isocrates Areopagiticus 83.
Francotte's warning with regard to the Theoric Fund has already been presented. But current historical practice and a certain cosmopolitanism of twentieth century living minimizes this problem. More likely, the Greeks themselves can fool us. A. H. M. Jones makes this interesting point:

It is curious that in the abundant literature produced in the greatest democracy of Greece there survives no statement of democratic political theory. All the Athenian political philosophers and publicists whose works we possess were in various degrees oligarchic in sympathy. The author of the pamphlet on the 'Constitution of the Athenians' preserved among Xenophon's works is bitterly hostile to democracy. Socrates so far as we can trace his views from the works of Xenophon and Plato, was at least highly critical of democracy. Plato's views on the subject are too well known to need stating. Isocrates in his earlier years wrote panegyrics of Athens but in his old age, when he wrote his more philosophical works, became increasingly embittered against the political regime of his native city. Aristotle is the most judicial in his attitude, and states the pros and cons, but his ideal was a widely based oligarchy. With the historians of Athens, the same bias is evident. Only Herodotus is a democrat, but his views have not carried much weight, partly because of his reputation for naivete, and partly because his explicit evidence refers to a period before the full democracy had evolved. Thucydides is hostile: in one of the very few passages in which he reveals his personal views he expresses approval of a regime which dis-

7This is not to rule out comparisons, however. We can say that Athens in the fourth century has much in common with Great Britain in second part of the twentieth century A.D. For Britain after World War II there was a constant conflict between her vision of herself as Mistress of the Seas ("The sun never sets on British soil") and the simple reality that she was no longer a first-line Power. This conflict produced the ragged roar of the British lion in the Suez crisis. But to say that Athens is like this does not carry with it the privilege of judging Athenian practices in terms of, say, modern British ideals and practices.
franchised about two-thirds of the citizens, those who manned the fleet on which the survival of Athens depended. Xenophon was an ardent admirer of the Spartan regime. Aristotle, in the historical part of his monograph on the Constitution of Athens followed—rather uncritically—a source with a marked oligarchic bias. Only the fourth century orators were democrats; and their speeches, being concerned with practical political issues—mostly of foreign policy—or with private litigation, have little to say on the basic principles of democracy, which they take for granted. ⁸

The democracy of Athens, which the whole world has held in admiration, was not so admired by some of its citizens—particularly not so by some of her leading intellectuals. Care must be taken not to accept their testimony uncritically.

In analyzing the activity of the radical democracy which was the Athens of the fourth century, two underlying principles in particular functioned as mainsprings for her conduct: equality and autonomia (the desire for preserving the life of the polis). Aristotle in the Politics, in his discussion of the characteristics of radical democracy has an extended explanation of equality. For the radical democrat, says Aristotle, society is based on liberty for all to govern in turn and for all to live as they like. And so officials of government are elected by all from all, most of the magistracies are chosen by lot, there is little or no property qualification for holding office, there is short

tenure for office-holding, judicial functions are exercised by all the citizens, the assembly of the citizens is sovereign over all matters, there is payment for public duties so that all may perform them, and, says Aristotle, "low birth, poverty, and vulgarity" are the qualifications which recommend a man.9

Gustave Glotz explains this emphasis on equality: "Equality was for them [the Athenians] the condition of liberty; it was, indeed, because they were all brothers, born of a common mother, that they could neither be the slaves nor the masters of one another."10 This equality cannot be interpreted merely as an equality before the law, such as the French Revolution provided for every Frenchman. It meant nothing less than the extension of privilege from the domain of the few to every citizen.11 Every citizen, just because he was a citizen, shared equally with every other citizen in the toils and the benefits of the state. Such is the foundation for the idea already presented that the citizens have a right to share in the income of the state.

On the political level this equality was achieved in virtually per-

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9 Aristotle Politics vi. 1. 1317b1-1318a2. 6-9.


fect fashion. Some of the leaders of the state, such as Demosthenes, came from very wealthy backgrounds, but some, such Demosthenes' nemesis, Aeschines, came from the relatively poor strata of society. But in a fuller sense, the attainment of equality was blocked by the overwhelming reality of the gap between rich and poor. And this, it was well realized, had its own effect on political equality. Athens was faced with this fact:

Political equality would disappear if social equality were too glaring; liberty without a minimum of property or easy means of access to it would be nothing more than an abstract principle. It was the duty of the State, therefore, since it was possessed of the power, to remedy an evil dangerous to the whole community and fatal to democracy. It had to safeguard the rights and interests of one group without at the same time disregarding and over-riding the rights and interests of another group.12

In some Greek states failure to recognize this led to bloody strife. Athens was spared from this except for the abortive revolutions in 411 and 403. For Athens' response was to make the rights of all equal but the obligations of the citizens proportionate to their degree of wealth. The rich were expected to contribute generously out of their wealth for the upbuilding of the city. Many of these contributions, such as the liturgies and the trierarchies, were a source of pride for those who had the means to be able to make such contributions, but there were also naked taxations such as the eisphorae. If the exactions became

12 Glotz, The Greek City, 315.
too great, the rich would complain that the poor were trying to bleed them. There was also the temptation felt by the poor at times to confiscate the wealth of the well-to-do. In general, however, a balance was maintained, but the problem of wealth vs. poverty always lurked below the surface as a threat to the equality sought by the democrats. In the fourth century this problem tended to be accentuated, for Rostovtzeff marks out as one of the salient features of this century "the lapse of the mass of the population into proletariat and ... the growth of unemployment." There was also in the public mentality a very great sensitivity on this point. Glotz cites two examples:

Deinarchus reproached Demosthenes for having been carried to the Piraeus in a litter and insulting in this way ordinary pedestrians; and a law of Lycurgus forbade women to go to the feast of Eleusis in carriages, in order that the poor women should not be offended by the great ladies.

The State adopted many different methods in an effort to alleviate this imbalance. Pay was given to military personnel and to those serving in civic offices. Cleruchies provided a new life for the poor. Public works were instituted, assistance was given to the handicapped, distributions were made of


14 Glotz, The Greek City ..., 315.
gifts to the state or of booty, efforts were made to keep the price of grain down (how often Athens' activities in the northern Aegean are related to this!), and finally, theoretic distributions were made. Thus the state sought to assure equality among all the citizens.

The second operative principle was that of autonomia. Werner Jaeger explains this:

Throughout the centuries from Homer to Alexander, the fundamental fact in Greek history was the city state, the form of political and spiritual life which was fixed very early, and never wholly abandoned. . . . In other words: the Greeks were not able to think of giving up the independence of their city-states any more than today we have been able to think in practice of giving up our own national states in favour of any more comprehensive form of state.15

While it is true that some Greek thinkers, such as Isocrates, urged that the Greeks unite in political union under a single leader, by and large the Greek city-states could not be induced, except by naked force, to give up their autonomia for anything more than the briefest period. In time of common danger—the Persian Wars provide an instance—these cities will join together. But when the danger passes, they withdraw apart, ridding themselves of anything which smacks of limitation upon their individual sovereignty. Autonomy

was a principle to which the Greek city-states held to with deep passion and "que l'on défendait farouchement."\textsuperscript{16}

In Athens this common principle manifested itself particularly in the drive for attaining and holding the empire (\(d\rho\chi\delta\)). It was a case of Athens having to rule others or she herself would be ruled. For a while all Greek cities were heavily dependent upon imports for their economic life,\textsuperscript{17} Athens in particular was in this state. Attica was very poor and was not well suited to the growing of grain, the basic foodcrop. It became simply essential for Athens to maintain the grain route to Thrace and the Black Sea. Should this route in particular be closed, Athens' national life would be imperiled. And so Athens sought to protect this route by her possessions in the northern Aegean and sought also to keep other states in this area weak. As a minimum Athens felt that she had to hold Euboea, Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros. She also felt it most desirable to hold or else have allied to herself the territories around the Hellespont and the Bosporus. One glance at the map makes clear the relationship of these territories to Athens and the Black Sea area and also makes clear


\textsuperscript{17}Rostovtzeff, I, 91.
that "the foreign policy of the Athenians was largely a grain policy." In the fourth century Athens had much more difficulty preserving her "rights," as she considered them to be, in this area. Besides the purely economic motivation, Athens in this century was also motivated by memories of "the good old days" of the fifth century when she was Ruler of the Islands.

In the time of Demosthenes men generally took one of two positions on equality and autonomy. One group, dominated by the trading interests and the wealthy, was generally in favor of peace, for in time of peace trade proceeds in an orderly fashion and there is little danger of special taxes (eisphorae). But peace they called for only as long as the main trade routes were protected. If the great routes to the Bosphorus and the Black Sea were threatened, they expected the city to take necessary defense measures. Their program: peace with strength and honor, security from exploitation by the poor. The poor, however, were generally in favor of an imperialistic policy even if it meant war, for this was an obvious way both to assure the food prices remaining at a reasonable level and to obtain work in the army or the fleet. At home they wanted wealth enough to assure them a decent existence and to give

them respect among all their fellow citizens.

These principles were applied to practical realities through the activity of what may be called political parties. These "parties" do not seem to have been tightly organized in the Continental European fashion or as we find to a lesser degree in the United States. Demosthenes gives in rhetorical fashion some idea how these party groupings were organized:

Once, men of Athens, you paid the eisphora by tax-boards. Now you conduct political affairs by similar groupings. An orator is the leader of each group with a general and three hundred [an indefinite number] to do the shouting under him. The rest of you ascribe yourselves, some to one group, some to another.19

But it does seem that party lines in general divided along the lines of rich and poor.

In the fifth century three general political groupings could be found. The oligarchs formed a secret party which sought radical change in the Athenian constitution. They were supported by certain of the wealthy, intellectuals who admired the constitution of Sparta, and other dissident elements; and they attained power only for brief periods in 411 and 403. Totally opposed to the oligarchs were the radical democrats. This party supported the war with

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19 Demosthenes ii. 29.
Sparta. Their goals: to defend the democracy (protect the power of the people in law court and assembly) and to retain the empire. Between these two groups were the moderate democrats. These accepted the democratic constitution but "wished to limit the absolute power of the people, either by restricting the franchise, or by defining the powers of the assembly, and to abolish pay for state services except in the army." They sought peace but did not want to lose honor or the empire. During the Peloponnesian War this party tended to become amorphous, leaving the real struggle for power in the state to the more extreme groups. But with the destruction of the oligarchical coup in 403, the oligarchs were reduced to powerless political clubs (εταιρεία), and only the moderate and radical democrats remained. Though Theramenes, a moderate democrat, had been a major anti-oligarchical figure, his compromise desire for rule "by the Five Thousand" was not fulfilled. In the fourth century, consequently, though certain thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates continued to press for a moderate democracy or an aristocracy, in the political arena the two major political groupings tended to drop their basic ideological differences. This was practical politics: "The masses had . . . a large


21 Ibid., 95-96.
majority in the Assembly and could at any time outvote those who represented the agricultural, commercial, and financial interests. "22 Pickard-Cambridge expresses a strong indication of this new rapprochement:

It is remarkable that of the leaders in politics, the generals, the ambassadors, and the financial and administrative officials, a very large proportion were men of wealth. This not only implies the absence of strong class-feeling, but it also shows that the masses were not unready to entrust their affairs to those who felt themselves called upon to lead, and able to do so, whoever they might be. 23

Raphael Sealey strongly accepts this view of the non-ideological character of Athenian political parties in the fourth century:

Many modern writers have assumed that Athenian parties constantly differed on very general questions of principle, and the supposed parties have sometimes been given such names as 'conservative', 'moderate', 'radical', 'oligarchic'. There is no reason to doubt that parties sometimes disagreed on immediate issues of policy; but it has been shown that sometimes they agreed on such matters. Therefore it was not taken for granted that politicians of different parties would disagree on immediate problems . . . . A fortiori, it was not taken for granted that political groups would disagree on very general questions. 24

And so Demosthenes and Eubulus, the leading politicians of the period under consideration, had their followers but relied chiefly upon convincing the Assembly of the people by argument and rhetoric that their program or their plan

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22 Pickard-Cambridge, 77.

23 Ibid., 79.

was most suited to the interests of the citizens. Political life was not the
clash of warring ideologies, none wishing to yield to the other, but a constant
effort to unite various interest groups, particularly the rich and the poor, in
achieving a common policy. One political group did not support equality and
autonomy while the other opposed it, but both general groups supported these
principles, differing only in the practical sphere of implementation and in the
degree that these objectives should be stressed. The battle was fought not
over the validity of these principles but over their interpretation in daily life.25

In such a situation the Theoric Fund became an important weapon of
policy, a lever which might be used to promote or possibly to diminish both
equality and autonomy. It was not for nothing that Demades called the Theoric
Fund "the cement of the democracy."26 The Theoric payments served, first of
all, as a levelling force. The greater part of the taxes came from the rich, for
taxes were generally based on property owned. When there was a surplus all,
of course, collected the Theoric payments if they wished. But the greater part

25 It is interesting how this non-ideological alignment resembles
the politics of the United States. While in the 1930s Popular Front Socialism
and currently in the 60s Goldwater Republicanism represent definite ideological
groupings, the general struggle between Democrats and Republicans has not
been up to this time a struggle of ideologies but over the right means to achieve
the American ideal.

26 Plutarch "Quaestiones Platonicae," Moralia 1011 B.
of the citizens, as has been seen, owned small estates or even no estates and could be classed as lower middle-class or poor. The many, therefore, would receive the money which largely came from the wealthy few. The Theoric Fund was an important addition to the income of many poorer families. In this way, as in the system of state pay and public works, the wealth of the state was slowly redistributed and social equality was increased. Any reduction in the Theoric Fund would slow this process as well as reduce the cash income of the poor.

It seems at first examination that when the Theoric Fund promoted equality, it functioned at the same time to impinge on autonomy, while if the Theoric money were to be used for military purposes autonomy would be strengthened but equality weakened. From several recorded instances it seems that the Theoric Fund did indeed provide a check on war for those who wanted to limit war. Cawkwell suggests that when Eubulus came to power c. 355 that he realized that if peace was to succeed it must prove to be tangibly profitable. "Hence the ill-famed distributions of $\tau\delta\theta\epsilon\omicron\omicron\iota\kappa\nu\delta$ which were probably indispensable if the Athenian People was to be saved from its own folly." 27 It has been suggested that the Theoric Fund gave Eubulus the freedom to turn Athens

to a defensive viewpoint in foreign relations, building up her fleet and fortifications but avoiding outright war unless necessary. Demosthenes himself reports that in 346 Eubulus pushed the Peace of Philocrates through by telling the people that it was either that or turning the Theoric fund over to military purposes. Plutarch reports that as late as 330 Demades managed to dissuade the people from joining in a revolt against Alexander by promising them a large distribution of money (which looks suspiciously, despite its outrageous size, like a possible Theoric distribution (though the amount, fifty drachmas, is probably exaggerated). But to say that the Fund did provide such a check does not of itself condemn the Fund as a corruption of the people or some such thing. But a more serious charge is that the Theoric Fund seriously limited military preparedness because it channeled all the surplus funds back to the people. Waging war was an expensive business in the fourth century because, chiefly, the techniques of warfare were beyond the capability of a hastily called-out citizen army. More and more there was reliance placed on professional soldiers to do the fighting for the city. The very fact that war was now fought year around meant that fewer and fewer citizens could afford such ex-

28Pickard-Cambridge, 128-29.
29Demosthenes xix. 291.
30Plutarch "Praecepta Gerendae Reipublicae," Moralia 818 E-F.
tended tours of duty as often resulted. Much money had to be on hand in order to wage an extended campaign. It has been estimated, for example, that the Social War cost Athens one thousand talents for mercenary troops alone.

It will be necessary, therefore, to examine whether the Theoricon really did promote equality only, while at the same time reducing autonomy. Was the politician who dealt with the Theoric Fund put in the position where he had to choose between supporting equality or autonomy, or was there some third possibility? It will be the contention of this paper that neither the policy of Eubulus nor that of Demosthenes accepted this dilemma.
CHAPTER IV

DEMOSTHENES AND THE THEORIC FUND

It is clear that the Theoric Fund potentially could play a significant role in the political decisions which governed the Athenian state. It dealt annually with an important sum of money, at least under normal circumstances; it was of interest to the poor as a means of increasing their income; it was a potential source of funds for other projects within the polis; and it provided a possible lever for the individual politician or political group to influence policy. It must now be asked how one such politician, one Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes of the deme Paeania, dealt with the reality which this Fund presented.

In considering Demosthenes the politician it must be remembered that he was a man of wealth and substance. He says candidly in the Speech Against Meidias that he was for ten years a chairman of one of the tax boards and that he paid the same share of the taxes as some of the very richest men in Athens.¹ When he first entered the political arena he seems to have been a

¹Demosthenes xxi. 157.
follower of Eubulus, spokesman for the interests of the wealthier members of the polis. However, this association did not last long; and for most of his political career Demosthenes supported and later led the radical democrat group. His sympathies were thus with the many.

The classic opinion of Demosthenes is that his policy remained inflexible from the early speeches of the state trials through to the Speech on the Crown, a span of over twenty-five years. He is pictured as a passionate patriot or fanatic ever struggling against the danger from the North, concerned only with this one reality. But such is not the case, nor will the speeches of Demosthenes permit such an interpretation without violence. Demosthenes began political life as a partisan of Eubulus against the group supporting Aristophon. Werner Jaeger, generally a strong proponent of the flexibility of Demosthenes' policies, makes the point that the early speeches of Demosthenes were all concerned with measures important to the financial policy of the state, a viewpoint dear to the party of Eubulus. With the rise of Philip Demosthenes turned his energy to mobilizing Athens against this threat from the North, but he was enough of a realist to support the Peace of Philocrates when Athens no

longer had the resources to carry on the war with Philip. For Demosthenes' resistance should only be carried on at (what seemed to him at least) a favorable time.\(^3\) Without going into the development of his policy in detail, the point to be made now is that Demosthenes' policy must not be looked upon as rigid and unchanging. Rather Demosthenes approached the problems of state in a somewhat flexible and pragmatic fashion. He was not simply an opportunist, but by no stretch of the imagination can he be called a dogmatist.\(^4\)

How then did Demosthenes regard the Thoric Fund? Commonly it is held that Demosthenes was dead set against this Fund, which he felt debilitated the people. However, it shall be contended in this chapter that Demosthenes, as a radical democrat staunchly in favor of promoting the equality of all the citizens, was a supporter of the Thoric Fund. Such was his principle continuously during the whole period of the struggle with Philip of Macedon. But Demosthenes was also fervently dedicated to maintaining the

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\(^3\)cf. Demosthenes v (On the Peace).

\(^4\)Jaeger's Demosthenes: The Origin and Growth of His Policy in its entirety is a witness to this point. Pickard-Cambridge [Demosthenes and the Last Days of Greek Freedom--384-322 B.C. (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1914)] likewise approaches Demosthenes in this fashion, while Gustave Glotz ["Démosthène et les Finances Athéniennes de 346 à 339," Revue Historique, CLXX (1932), 386] is willing to solve critical problems in Demosthenes by appealing to this viewpoint.
autonomy of Athens. When circumstances demanded, Demosthenes attempted to weigh these different aspects to attain his goals most effectively. If the state could not afford while locked in combat with Philip to use its surpluses for Theoric distributions, it could give this money as wages for those who served either in the armed forces or in a civic capacity at home. Instead of by direct distributions, the aim of equality must be promoted by wages. But when Athens no longer needed these armies and home forces, when there was peace, then the Fund should be restored. And so after Chaeroneia the Fund reappears again with none other than Demosthenes himself as one of the members of the Board. This view of Demosthenes' policy regarding the Theoric Fund would roughly represent Henri Francotte's opinion on the matter.5 This position is quite different from the traditional viewpoint that Demosthenes was always against the Theoric Fund, which with its inflexible black-and-white character verges at times upon wish-fulfillment. The proponents of the traditional position are themselves violently opposed to the Fund; therefore they want Demosthenes likewise to be opposed. Thus Boeckh, coming upon the Fourth Philippic's defense of the Theoric Fund can say only that it is a forgery made of patching from other Demosthenic speeches, for this Theoric Fund senti-

ment as expressed in the speech is contrary to Demosthenes' usual position and therefore cannot be his. So also Kahrstedt cynically remarks regarding the lack of shouting by Demosthenes against the Theoric Fund in the late 340s and Demosthenes' taking part in the administration of the Fund that things often look a bit different from the ruler's throne than they looked from the opposition benches. But this is to try to force Demosthenes' thought into an abstract formula and then to be bewildered (or amused) by any deviation. But such, as shall now be our effort to prove regarding Demosthenes, is not the nature of living political thought, which strives to deal with changing conditions while moving to attain its goals.

To provide effective proof for this theory it is necessary to examine those speeches which deal with the Theoric Fund and see how Demosthenes approaches the Fund in the different political circumstances he met. The pertinent speeches will be considered in chronological order.

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8 Determining the exact chronology of the speeches of Demosthenes is no easy matter. A great deal of scholarly effort has been expended on this problem. While some speeches have been calculated down to the month in which they were given, others, particularly many of the judicial speeches, can only be hypothetically situated in the chronological sequence. An effort to deal
with this problem of chronology in detail would be beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, we will appeal largely to a relatively recent study of this question: Raphael Sealey, "Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Some Demosthenic Dates," *Révue des Études Grecques*, LXVIII (1955), 77-120. His conclusions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>355/4</td>
<td>Against Leptines (xx)</td>
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<tr>
<td>354/3</td>
<td>On the Navy-Boards (xiv)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>353/2</td>
<td>For the People of Megalopolis (xvi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>353/2</td>
<td># On Organization (xiii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>352/1</td>
<td>* First Philippic (iv)</td>
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<tr>
<td>351/0</td>
<td>For the Liberty of the Rhodians (xv)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>349/8</td>
<td>* First Olynthiac (i)</td>
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<tr>
<td>349/8</td>
<td>* Second Olynthiac (ii)</td>
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<tr>
<td>349/8</td>
<td>* Third Olynthiac (iii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>347/6</td>
<td>Against Meidias (xxi) -- though part of the speech dates from an earlier period.</td>
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<tr>
<td>346/5</td>
<td>On the Peace (v)</td>
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<tr>
<td>344/3</td>
<td>Second Philippic (vi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>343/2</td>
<td># On the False Legation (xix)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>342/1</td>
<td>* Fourth Philippic (ix)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>342/1</td>
<td>* On the Chersonese (viii)</td>
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<tr>
<td>342/1</td>
<td>* Third Philippic (ix) -- longer version</td>
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<tr>
<td>330/29</td>
<td>On the Crown (xviii)</td>
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</tbody>
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* = speeches particularly pertinent to the discussion of the Theoric Fund
# = not assigned a date by Sealey. Francotte ("Études sur Démosthène: Démosthène et la théorique," *Musée Belge*, XVII (1913), 74) assigns speech to this date.

For the placing of the Fourth Philippic, On the Chersonese, and Third Philippic in the (sequential) order given, the following article was consulted: Charles D. Adams, "Speeches VIII and X of the Demosthenic Corpus," *Classical Philology*, XXXIII, No. 2 (Apr. 1938), 129-44. Briefly, he indicates that there was first a short version of the speech On the Chersonese. This address was not published. A few months later the Fourth Philippic was delivered; this was never published by Demosthenes himself. The Third Philippic followed upon the Fourth. Some years after this Demosthenes published the extant form of the speech On the Chersonese. This published version included the earlier version of the same name plus many portions of the (unpublished) Fourth Philippic. After the death of Demosthenes the unpublished Fourth Philippic was found among Demosthenes' papers and, like the speech(es) against Meidias, was published by Demosthenes' literary executor.
The first apparent policy statement on the Theoric Fund is found in the *Speech on Organization*, which was delivered in 353/2. At this time Philip had seized a number of Athenian colonies in the northwestern Aegean, was active in Thrace, and had involved himself in the internal affairs of Thessaly and Phocis. In 352 Athens sent an expedition to protect Thermopylae from seizure by Philip's forces. In these threatening circumstances Demosthenes used the opportunity afforded by the discussion of the allotment of a sum of money to urge that Athens give pay for service rendered to the state rather than welfare payments. Demosthenes does not oppose the right of the citizens to receive these payments. But, he says:

... if you so organize the receipt of money that it is associated with the performance of duties, so far from injuring, you will actually confer on the state and on yourselves the greatest benefit; but if a festival or any other pretext is good enough to justify a dole, and yet you refuse even to listen to the suggestion that there is any obligation attached to it, beware lest you end by acknowledging that what you now consider a proper practice was a grievous error.

Demosthenes therefore urges that the total revenues of the state be shared by each citizen equally (λαμβάνειν ύμᾶς . . . τὸ ἰσον ἐκαστῶν) but as pay for those of military age and as overseer's fees "or whatever you like to call it."

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9 Demosthenes xiii. 2.

10 Ibid.
for those beyond the age limit. Thus, Demosthenes urges the formation of a paid citizen army rather than that the revenues of the state be given to mercenary troops. Demosthenes here as always reveals his deep feeling for the spirit of the fifth century when any function in the state could be performed by any citizen, when government was not left to professional politicians nor warfare to the generals but all took part. He wishes to restore this pattern of living, but does not seem to realize in all its implications that life in the fourth century is a different matter, that fighting, for example, has become much too scientific for citizen armies, called out on short notice, to master effectively. But as for the Theoric Fund, he wishes to attain the goals the Fund attempts to gain, but in these circumstances when, as it seemed to Demosthenes, the autonomy of the city was threatened, by a different route.

In 351 Demosthenes felt himself politically powerful enough to open the discussion in the popular Assembly. Athens at this point felt herself to be in grave danger from Philip. Philip had attacked in the area of the Chersonese and had given up there only because of illness. Olynthus had made overtures to Athens for peace and assistance, and there were parties in that city as well as in Euboea more or less working in sympathy with Philip. Athens herself had

11 Demosthenes xiii. 4.

12 Demosthenes xiii. 21-31.
had her own territory raided by Philip's fleet. It was at this point that Demosthenes rose to make his proposal. His plan:—Athens, instead of maintaining a defensive stance, should take the offensive against Philip by means of a standing strike force. Ideally this force should consist of fifty warships with transports and a large citizen army. But for the moment it was necessary to settle for a more modest force; and since his pleas in the Speech on Organization had had no effect, this army would have to be largely mercenary:

So I propose that the whole force should consist of two thousand men, but of these five hundred must be Athenians, chosen from any suitable age and serving in relays for a specified period—not a long one, but just so long as seems advisable; the rest should be mercenaries. Attached to them will be two hundred cavalry, fifty at least of them being Athenians, serving on the same terms as the infantry. There will also be cavalry transports provided. So far, so good; and what besides? Ten fast-sailing wargalleys. 13

Demosthenes put a price tag of 92 talents on this force. 14 But to obtain this bargain Demosthenes offered to pay the soldiers only half the usual wage, for he assumed that the force would live off the land. 15 A table in which he listed the sources from which the ninety-two talents might be obtained is lost; but since Demosthenes did not make an issue of it, it is likely that he did not in-

13 Demosthenes iv. 21-22.
14 Demosthenes iv. 28.
15 Demosthenes iv. 29.
tend to rely on the Theoric Fund. 16 However, the plan does not seem to have been accepted, for no records of actions against Philip are mentioned for the year following this speech.

There is a certain naiveté evident in this proposal of Demosthenes. While he hoped obviously that this expeditionary force would just be a start to Athenian efforts, the force itself promised to be so small and so poorly financed that it could not hope to have been very successful. The fact of the matter is that Athens did not have money available to spend on a strong expedition. The city was recovering from the cost of the Social War and, on top of that, had just sent an expedition to protect Thermopylae from Philip in the previous year, an expedition which cost "more than two hundred talents." 17 Demosthenes admitted that the city could not afford the pay and maintenance of a force larger than he proposed. 18 The question is whether his force would have been large enough to accomplish anything—a question which remains without an answer, for there is no evidence that the people adopted the plan. It is probable that the fact of limited revenues coupled with doubtful expectations regarding such

16Jaeger (Demosthenes: The Origin and Growth of His Policy, 120-21) holds that Demosthenes did not propose turning the Theoric Fund over to military purposes at this time.

17Demosthenes xix. 84.

18Demosthenes iv. 23.
an expedition joined to convince the Assembly that the measure was not opportune.

In any case there was a lull in the conflict with Philip. Athens was occupied only with quarrels with Corinth and Megara in 350. But in very late 350 or early 349 Olynthus, the key city on the Chalcidicean Peninsula in the North, began again to make overtures to Athens for protection from Philip. In 349/8 the situation for Athens was this:

In the war against Philip there were two strategic necessities for Athens. First, she had to keep Philip from breaking into Greece and co-operating with Thebes in an attack on Attica itself, and the second matter, of equal or even greater importance, was to protect her lifeline through the Hellespont and the Bosphorus, clearly in constant danger through Macedonian expansion eastward. The war in the north was in itself far less important and it acquired interest for serious Athenian statesmen in so far as it became a possible means of preventing Philip from ruining Athens by attack or by starvation.¹⁹

It is in this context that Demosthenes urges the Athenians to send military assistance to the Olynthians to protect them from Philip. For, he says, "... if we leave these men, too, in the lurch, Athenians, and then Olynthus is crushed by Philip, tell me what is to prevent him from marching henceforward just where he pleases";²⁰ and "... is anyone here so foolish as not to see that our neg-

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²⁰ Demosthenes 1. 12.
ligence will transfer the war from Chalcidice to Attica?" 21 Demosthenes thus wanted to keep Philip as far at bay as possible. He therefore urges that one expeditionary force be sent to aid the Olynthians and a second to raid Philip's territory. He does not spell out in detail how these forces should be financed but he does say the following:

With regard to the supply of money, you have money, men of Athens; you have more than any other nation has for military purposes. But you appropriate it yourselves (ινετκ...λαμβανετε), in such a form as you please. Now if you will spend it on the campaign, you have no need of a further supply; if not, you have—or rather, you have no supply at all. 'What!' someone will cry, 'do you actually move to use this money for military purposes?' Of course I do not. Only it is my opinion that we must provide soldiers and that there must be one uniform system of pay in return for service. Your opinion, however, is that you should, without any trouble, just appropriate the money for your festivals. Then the only alternative is a war-tax, heavy or light, as circumstances demand. 22

By this date, then, the surpluses must have been large enough to finance military expeditions. It seems from this text that Demosthenes strongly preferred that the people choose to use the Theoric Fund money to support the expedition rather than that they place the great burden of an eisphora upon (chiefly) the rich. It would seem at first that Demosthenes is supporting the interests of the rich in proposing this alternate to eisphorae. He may have threatened the

Theoric Fund as a ploy to insure that at least some money would be forthcoming

21 Demosthenes i. 15.
22 Demosthenes i. 19-20.
even if only by means of the *eisphorae*. If this is the reason, then Demosthenes did not so much side with the wealthy as simply use every avenue of approach to get money for the Olynthus struggle. But his position is subsequently clarified, as shall be seen.

In the *Second Olynthiac* Demosthenes again urges that help be sent to Olynthus. This duty he proposes for the people:

To sum up, I propose that all should contribute (εἴσφοροι) equitably, each according to his means, that all should serve in turn until all have taken part in the campaign, that all who wish to address you should have a fair hearing, and that you should adopt the best advice offered, not just what this man or that man is pleased to suggest. 23

In this speech Demosthenes says not a word about using the surpluses; in the two other places in which he mentions the duty of the citizens, the verb *eispherein*, meaning "to pay a special tax," appears. 24 It seems that at this point Demosthenes felt that the people were just not ready to give up the Theoric Fund. Demosthenes notwithstanding, the people apparently believed the fall of Olynthus was not something which would immediately affect Athens. If the expedition proposed in the *First Philippic* cost ninety-two talents, such an expedition as Demosthenes now proposed might well cost much more than that. If the people did not feel the immediacy of the problem which Demos-

23 Demosthenes ii. 31.

24 Demosthenes ii. 13; 24.
thenes set before them, this might well be part of the reason that Demosthenes' plan for all-out measures did not receive popular approbation.

Demosthenes returned to his efforts to send effective aid to Olynthus in the Third Olynthiac. He must have felt that the greatest obstacle to action was the financial question, for most of this speech is spent on his proposed solution to this problem. Demosthenes felt that if some other solution could be found for this problem of financing an expedition, there would be no need to use the Theoric money. But he is not of the belief that at this point there is any other solution but to use the surpluses. Therefore nomothetes must be appointed and the legal blocks to the turning over of the Theoric Fund to military purposes be removed. But Demosthenes does not wish to take this money which helps to bring equality to the city away from the people. He wishes rather to show the Athenians how they can both serve their city and have their money:

You will ask me if I mean pay for military service. Not only that, men of Athens, but also the immediate adoption of a uniform system, so that each citizen, receiving his share from the public funds, may fill his proper place in the service of the state. If peace can be preserved, he is better off at home, safe from temptations into which want might lead him. If some such contingency as the present arises, then it is better for him to serve his country in person, as indeed he ought, supported by these

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25 Demosthenes iii. 19.

26 Demosthenes iii. 10-11.
same funds. If anyone is too old to fight, then as overseer or manager of
some indispensable work, let him be paid on an equitable system the
wages that he now receives without benefit to the state. [emphasis
mine]27

Demosthenes does not deny that the citizens need the money; he wants service
to be rendered in this present contingency to the state for the money. While
Demosthenes—good debater that he is—is critical of the Theoric Fund in this
speech in an effort to make his point clear to his audience, he is not at all
critical of the basic goals of the Theoric Fund. Rather, he proposes an alter-
nate route to the attainment of these goals—and this route to be used only in a
time of crisis! Demosthenes does not urge the abolition of the Theoric Fund but
only the use of the Fund in this crisis to provide pay for those serving the state.
It is in this light that his proposals regarding the Theoric Fund given in the
First Olynthiac must be understood.

Demosthenes' concern with financial matters is not difficult to un-
derstand. Perhaps no other item drained more revenue from the state than a
military campaign. The cost of the Social War has already been mentioned--
1000 talents spent for mercenary soldiers alone.28 The short expedition by
Athens to Thermopylae in 352 cost over 200 talents, though this figure included

27Demosthenes iii. 34.

28Isocrates Areopagiticus 9.
the private expenses of the troops. 29 The siege of a fortified city could cost several thousand talents. But just to ready a single trireme cost two talents, while its crew of 200 men would be paid 4 obols each a day. A soldier would also expect to be paid 4 obols a day, while a cavalryman would expect three times as much. Demosthenes once estimated that Athens would need 1000 cavalry, 300 ships, and a multitude of infantry if she wished to retain her power. 30 Clearly such preparedness would not be had cheaply. Hence the continual concern that can be noted in Demosthenes' speeches for financial backing for military affairs.

In the Speech Against Neaera, listed as LIX in the Demosthenic Corpus, is found recorded the account of Apollodorus' motion, made in 348, to turn the Theoric money over to the military fund. The account is given by one Theomnестus, brother-in-law to Apollodorus, as a part of the introduction of Apollodorus, who was to be the main speaker in the accusation against the courtesan Neaera. This speech is usually dated to the year 339. 31 The sym-

29 Demosthenes xix. 84.

30 Demosthenes xiv. 13.

31 This is the customary date given. But Schaefer (Demosthenes und Seine Zeit (2d ed. rev.; Leipzig: B.G. Teubner Verlag, 1886-7), III, 399) dates it to 343 and Blass places it between 343 and 340. See his argumentation: Friedrich Blass, Die Attische Beredsamkeit (2d ed.; Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1893), III, Pt. 1, 535-36. In any case the speech is relatively distant in time from the events related in LIX. 3-8.
pathetic account of Apollodorus' action becomes important if it can be shown that the speech was actually written by Demosthenes. But it was not according to the opinion--almost unanimous--of the scholars who have considered the question. There are seven speeches preserved in the works attributed to Demosthenes which involve Apollodorus as prosecutor. It is the opinion of Werner Jaeger that because one of these, Apollodorus vs. Stephanus (xlv), is genuine, the other speeches also were preserved. But Jaeger states definitely that the Speech Against Neaera is spurious. The opinions, therefore, expressed in the speech cannot be attributed to Demosthenes with any sort of necessity.

But the account also becomes important if a definite political link between Demosthenes and Apollodorus can be discovered. In other words, did Apollodorus make his motion at the behest of Demosthenes? Then certain conclusions about Demosthenes' own feelings might be drawn. Some have concluded that there was such a close working arrangement between the two men.

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32Jaeger, Demosthenes: The Origin and Growth of His Policy, 39.

33Ibid., 216. Neither Blass nor Schaefer nor Pickard-Cambridge nor Jaeger accept the speech as Demosthenic. Blass points out that even the ancient critics such as Harpocration, Athenaeus, Phrynichus, and the "so wenig kritischen" Libanius doubt the Demosthenic character of the speech. Cf. Friedrich Blass, Die Attische Beredsamkeit (2d ed.; Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1893), III, Pt. 1, 535.
About the year 352 Apollodorus laid a claim against a certain Phormio for twenty talents owed ostensibly by Phormio to Apollodorus because of certain business transactions ten years earlier. But Phormio countered with a *paragraphe* motion, charging that Apollodorus' suit was illegal because Phormio had been given a discharge from all claims by Apollodorus and because the suit was made beyond the time prescribed by the statute of limitations. Phormio's speech was written by Demosthenes, and in the course of the speech there were vitriolic attacks on Apollodorus and a colorful contrasting of the noble Phormio with the base Apollodorus. Apollodorus was defeated and did not receive even a fifth part of the votes. But Apollodorus, angered by the decision offered suit against one of the minor witnesses who had testified on behalf of Phormio and accused him of perjury. Two speeches survive in the Demosthenic Corpus from this second action. And both of them are written for *Apolloiodorus against the witness, Stephanus*. Of these the second (xlvI) does not appear to be genuine. But the first is very often assigned to Demosthenes both on the basis of internal evidence and also on the basis of evidence found in

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34 *Demosthenes xxxvi. 44-45; 53; 55-61.*
For that matter, Plutarch also testifies that Demosthenes did write speeches for both Apollodorus and Phormio in their quarrel. While Pickard-Cambridge is hopeful that Demosthenes did not actually author the First Speech Against Stephanus (xlv), Jaeger and Blass assign the speech unequivocally to Demosthenes. Demosthenes looks particularly bad to modern eyes because the Speech Against Stephanus assigned to him is such a violent attack not only on Stephanus but also on Phormio. The testimony of the previous trial is called perjurous, and in the general melee of name-calling Apollodorus is made to attack even his own brother. By modern standards of legal forensics this is a thoroughly disreputable speech, and it would be considered particularly base for Demosthenes to have been responsible for this at-

35 "You, Demosthenes, wrote a speech for the banker Phormio and were paid for it: this speech you communicated to Apollodorus, who was bringing a capital charge against Phormio"—Aeschines On the Embassy 165. Aeschines thus distorts the original incident to put Demosthenes in an even worse light.

36 Plutarch Demosthenes 15.

37 Pickard-Cambridge, 220-25.

38 Jaeger, Demosthenes: The Origin and Growth of His Policy, 40-41 216. Blass (III, Pt. 1, 33-34) says: Sie [die erste Rede gegen Stephanos] hat ganz und gar Demosthenische Form, ungleich der zweiten, an deren Unehlichkeit kein Zweifel ist . . . ." He goes on to say that modern authors question the genuinity of the First Speech Against Stephanus because they feel that it does not fit in with Demosthenes' "ehrenhaftem Charakter." Blass himself appeals to political reasons to explain Demosthenes' motivation.
tack on his former client. But by ancient standards the logographer was simply the mouth-piece of the one who employed his services. The speech writer was not bound by the opinions he expressed for others. And Athenian courtroom practice was as much dependent on acid-tongued invective as on anything else.

What was Demosthenes' motivation for this change of clients? It has been suggested that Demosthenes gave his support to Apollodorus in return for the motion which Apollodorus promised to make against the Theoric Fund. But such does not seem to be the case. In the first place, the motion was not made before 348 while the Phormio-Apollodorus quarrel dates to 352 and the First Speech Against Stephanus is dated by Schaefer (as well as by most other authorities) to 351. A four-year gap between the political deal and the pay-off is a bit hard to put credence in. Secondly, Demosthenes' strategy called for a fully legal attempt to change the Theoric Fund temporarily over to war purposes. He asked the people to appoint nomothetes to "repeal those laws which

39 Blass, III, Pt. 1, 33-34.

40 This matter was previously discussed in Ch. 3. Among others Cawkwell ("The Defense of Olynthus," *Classical Quarterly*, LVI, No. 1 (May 1962), 128-30; "Eubulus," *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, LXXIII (1963), 60) and Blass (III, Pt. 1, 315-17) hold the 348 date. The motion, says Blass, "muss später fallen als die dritte olynthische Rede . . . ."

41 Schaefer, III, 399.
hamper us in the present crisis"—the Theoric Laws. His was a sane, rational approach, for he knew well what happened to the man who acted outside the law. But the approach of Apollodorus was rash; even if it had succeeded the people might later have had a change of heart and indicted Apollodorus for making an illegal motion and for deceiving the people. The move lacked finesse. It is possible that this man acted in alliance with Demosthenes or even by special pre-arrangement, for Demosthenes, at least at this juncture, did want the end that this motion aimed at. But it is not likely. Demosthenes would have been hesitant to compromise his own political position by being linked with such a move. The best that can be said is that Apollodorus may have been a follower of Demosthenes' party acting impetuously on his own. The sentiments expressed in the Speech Against Neaera give no particular clue to Demosthenes' own policy regarding the Theoric Fund. Rather, the account given is a flattering portrayal of what seems to have been a rather ill-conceived act by Apollodorus.

The next time that a mention of the Theoric Fund appears in the writings of Demosthenes is in the Speech on the False Legation. But the Fund is mentioned here only in passing and it is difficult to learn much regarding Demosthenes' policy. Demosthenes addresses Eubulus and indicates his sur-

42Demosthenes iii. 10-11.
prise that this man who had cursed Philip was now a supporting witness for Aeschines:

After terrifying the people, and telling them that they must go down to the Peiraeus at once, pay the war-tax and turn the Theoric Fund into a war-chest, or else vote for the resolution that was supported by Aeschines and moved by that abominable Philocrates, with the result that we got a discreditable instead of an equitable peace, and after all the ruin that has been wrought by their subsequent misdeeds, are you reconciled with them after that?  

It is apparent from this that Eubulus took a hand in the critical peace negotiations in 346 and presented the people with a clear either-or proposition in order to influence them to vote for the peace. For he threatened the rich with war-taxes, the poor with the loss of the Theoric Fund, and everyone with military service. What is clear from this is that Demosthenes recognized the lever which the Theoric Fund presented as a means for influencing the people. Demosthenes does not criticize the people for yielding to this persuasion—a forensic speech would be a dangerous place in which to do that—nor Eubulus for using this persuasion, but only the fact that he used this persuasion to get this peace, the Peace of Philocrates (which Demosthenes before had strenuously supported). Demosthenes knew that the Theoric Fund was a significant feature of Athenian life.

In 342/1 Philip was again on the move. Thrace was now under his

43 Demosthenes xix. 291-92.
dominion (a fact which galled the Athenians since they were accustomed to consider Thrace as their private preserve), and Athens had begun once again to be gravely concerned for the Chersonese, that long tongue of land guarding the entrance to the Propontis and the Black Sea. To guard this passage Athens sent cleruchs to Cardia, the chief city on the peninsula, and also sent a force under the general Diopeithes, a rather indiscreet man who soon had committed several open acts of war against Philip. Philip protested to Athens on the conduct of Diopeithes and called for his removal. Athens was faced with the decision to hold to the peace or else to declare war on Philip. At this juncture Demosthenes rose to urge the people to support Diopeithes, for as far as he was concerned the peace had long since ended. The precise text of this speech has not come down to us, but much of it appears in the *Speech on the Chersonese*, a speech combining this address with portions of the *Fourth Philippic* (which speech Demosthenes appears never to have published himself in its full form). In the published version of the *Speech on the Chersonese* Demosthenes urges the Athenians not to recall Diopeithes but to give his expedition proper support so that he will not have to make illegal raids. Again Demosthenes' aim is to make Philip fight there so that Athens will not later have to fight him in Attica.

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Demosthenes' main request in the speech is for financial support. Direct organized action is needed:

We refuse to pay war-taxes (χρηματα εἰςφερεῖν) or to serve in person; we cannot keep our hands off the public funds (ταυ κοιναν δεχεσθαι); we will not pay Diopeithes the allowances agreed upon, nor sanction the sums that he raises for himself; but we grumble and criticize his methods... if you are not going to pay your contributions, nor serve in person, nor keep your hands off the public funds, nor grant Diopeithes his allowances, nor sanction the sums that he raises for himself, nor consent to perform your own tasks, I have nothing to say.45

This is the state in which Demosthenes finds the people—refusing to accept any alternative. Note that one of the alternatives is for the people to keep their hands off the public money, i.e., to give up the Theoric Fund distributions. Then money would be available for Diopeithes. But if the people do not want to do this they can pay war-tax and serve in person or grant the money promised to Diopeithes (which apparently was not appropriated) or give Diopeithes a free hand to make his own arrangements. Demosthenes gives his own preferred solution:

What, then, is the task of sound patriots? To know and realize all this, to shake off our outrageous and incurable, slothfulness, to contribute funds (χρηματα δε εἰςφερεῖν), to call upon our allies, and to provide and arrange for the permanent upkeep of our existing army, so that just as

45 Demosthenes viii. 21-23.
Philip has a force ready to attack and enslave all the Greek states, so you may have one ready to protect and assist them all. 46

Financial problems should be solved, therefore, by levying one or more special taxes for the war effort; there is no mention of using the Theoric money. So also in the closing portion of the speech Demosthenes uses the same terminology when recalling to the people their duty regarding Diopeithes' financial condition. 47

In the Fourth Philippic, delivered shortly after the (unpublished) Speech on the Chersonese, Demosthenes again makes a plea for money for the fight against Philip: "There is nothing that the state needs so much for the coming struggle as money." 48 But there is a ray of hope—the King of Persia. He is aware of Philip's designs and may perhaps be quite ready to support the enemies of Philip out of his vast wealth. 49 But Demosthenes is most concerned about a psychological barrier to action which has arisen. Some speakers have been telling the people that "certain persons want to plunder your [their] wealth", using this charge to blind the people from seeing the real danger which

46 Demosthenes viii. 46.

47 Demosthenes viii. 76.

48 Demosthenes x. 31.

49 Demosthenes x. 31-34.
Philip presents. 50 It is with this veiled charge in mind that Demosthenes feels it necessary to devote a significant part of his speech to explaining his own attitude toward the Theoric Fund. He feels that his position has been misrepresented and that this misrepresentation "is affording a pretext for those who are unwilling to perform any of their duties as citizens; indeed, you will find [he says] that in every case where a man has failed to do his duty, this has been given as the excuse." 51 The question of the Theoric Fund was apparently a very hot issue in Athens at that time, for Demosthenes indicates his hesitancy to discuss the matter. 52 We must, he says, banish from our midst "the fear that the Fund will not be maintained without doing a great deal of harm . . ." 53 He goes on to explain how the Theoric Fund aids the poor (as was discussed in Ch. 2). He concludes this explanation by saying, "What do we then mean by reproaching one another for this and making it an excuse for doing nothing, unless it is that we grudge the relief which the poor have received at the hands of fortune? I for one shall not blame them, nor do I think it fair to do so" 

50 Demosthenes x. 55.

51 Demosthenes x. 35.

52 Ibid.

53 Demosthenes x. 36.
[italics mine]. 54 So the wealthy ought to accept their obligation toward the poor and not use this as a pretense for complaining that they cannot afford to contribute to the war effort. But at the same time the rich have a just grievance, Demosthenes feels, when they see "certain persons transferring this usage from public moneys to private property . . . ." 55 Rather, says Demosthenes:

... we are bound, Athenians, to share equitably with one another the privileges of citizenship, the wealthy feeling secure to lead their own lives and haunted by no fears on that account, but in the face of dangers making over their property to the commonwealth for its defense; while the rest must realize that state property is common property, duly receiving their share of it, but recognizing that private wealth belongs to the possessor. 56

And so Demosthenes still looks to the people as the prime suppliers of money for the fight against Philip; Persian gold was only a possibility. Though some of his remarks in this speech are no doubt motivated by expediency, considering that he did at least one other time propose that in an acute crisis the

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54 Demosthenes x. 39.
55 Demosthenes x. 44.
56 Demosthenes x. 45.
Theoric Fund should be used for military purposes, he wants the people to use the war-tax as the main means of raising this money. Demosthenes' real concern continues to be motivating the people to use their own resources to fight Philip.

It has often been said that Demosthenes' over-riding concern was foreign policy. And he himself admitted as much in one place at least:

"... out of many spheres of public activity I chose the affairs of the Hellenes as my province ..." But the Fourth Philippic, while still concerned with foreign affairs, nonetheless shows Demosthenes' concern for the domestic welfare of Athens. Says Werner Jaeger, "The program for domestic politics in the Fourth Philippic bears witness to the new spirit of social sacrifice that found its expression in the financial policies at the beginning of the war period."

57 James J. Buchanan, "Theorika: A Study of Monetary Distributions to the Athenian Citizenry during the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C." (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Classics, Princeton University, 1954), p.105. He accepts the Fourth Philippic as genuine and explains the Theoric Fund statements in the speech purely on the basis of expediency. While this motive must have been present, it would leave the texture of Demosthenes' other actions and utterances regarding the Theoric Fund in part quite unexplainable as has been and will be shown. Rather, Demosthenes is a proponent of the Theoric Fund. Though he might have wished in this crisis to convert the Fund to military purposes, he realized that such a proposal was not well suited to practical reality.

58 Demosthenes x. 19.

59 Demosthenes xviii. 59.

60 Jaeger, Demosthenes: The Origin and Growth of His Policy, 183.
Demosthenes asks both rich and poor to see the needs and problems of one another so that all may enjoy the great blessing of equality.

In the Third Philippic, given a short time later, Demosthenes again calls for all the Athenians to join in making provision for their defense by providing warships, funds, and men.  He does not again discuss in detail how money should be obtained, but he does recall to mind that patriots in other cities called upon the people to pay a war-tax (εἰσφέρειν), that others said it was not necessary, and that these cities fell finally into Philip’s hands.  The moral of the story for the Athenians: pay the tax.

Finally, Philochorus recounts, in 339 Demosthenes made a motion which was carried that all the public money should be for the war fund:

\[ \ldots \tau \delta \chiρήματα \psi ρίσαντο πάντ' \varepsilon \iota \nu \iota \sigma τρατιωτικά, \Delta \mu \omega σ\θένους \gamma ρά\ψαντος. \]  

This is clarified further by the Aeschines Scholiast, who relates that Demosthenes was the first to persuade that the Theoric money be changed over to the military fund.  This was a clear moment of crisis.  

War with Philip had been formally renewed in 340.  Philip had besieged

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61 Demosthenes ix. 70.
62 Demosthenes ix. 63-64.
63 Philochorus frag. 135.
64 Schol. Aeschines iii. 24.
Byzantium and Perinthus. But more threatening than this was the fact that Philip was named general by the Amphictyonic Council in its war against the Amphisseans. Already having physical access to Hellas by way of Thermopylae, which he now held, Philip now possessed legal access. He promptly came down with his army and occupied Elateia, within striking distance of Thebes and Athens itself. At this point Demosthenes worked furiously to line up allies for Athens, shepherding even Thebes into the fold. The very life of the city was threatened. It would have been unreasonable at such a point to spare the Theoric Fund, and so the people no doubt readily took the measure to convert legally the Theoric Fund to military purposes. That Demosthenes did this legally is certain from the fact that he was never accused of acting outside the law in this matter by any of his many opponents, who surely would have seized at the added opportunity to attack him had he not made this change-over in a strictly legal fashion.

But in 337/6 there is positive evidence that the Theoric Fund had been restored, for Demosthenes appears as a member of the Theoric Board. He testifies to this himself. 65 And Aeschines gives a long explanation as to how Demosthenes, as Head of the Theoric Board held almost all the offices in

65Demosthenes xviii. 113.
Athens and was therefore subject to public audit. If Demosthenes had been a fierce opponent of the Theoric Fund as has been alleged, it is impossible to believe that he would then turn around and accept the leadership of the Theoric Board. Schaefer says that the Fund was restored on a very restricted basis lest it get out of hand again, implying that Demosthenes was a watchdog over the Fund. But he offers no proof whatsoever, and it can be concluded that this was the only way he could explain the situation while still preserving his view of the noble patriot and lover of freedom, Demosthenes. Pickard-Cambridge is to the point when he says that Demosthenes "had never in fact condemned the distribution as bad in itself, but only as bad when it was treated as more important than the vital needs of the State; and he had admitted that if those needs could be met without suspending the distributions, they ought to be so met." It may be justifiably concluded that Demosthenes, though he focused on preserving the autonomy of Athens, was also very much concerned about equality. And so we would expect a radical democrat to be. Only in a moment of dire straits was he willing to give up the 'glue of the democracy.'

66 Aeschines Against Ctesiphon 24.
67 Schaefer, III, 82-83.
68 Pickard-Cambridge, 403-04.
the Theoric Fund. And in the one speech preserved in which he openly urges that the Theoric Fund be temporarily put to military purposes, he presents a carefully worked out plan that the ends envisioned by the Theoric Fund might still be attained.
CHAPTER V

THE RELATIONSHIP OF DEMOSTHENES AND EUBULUS RE-EXAMINED

During much of the so-called Demosthenic period, not Demosthenes but Eubulus was the leading politician in the Athenian state. Eubulus' period of leadership dates from about 353 until the trial of Aeschines in 343, and he probably remained an important figure for several years afterwards. The fact of his power is clear from the speeches of Demosthenes himself, in which the name of Eubulus occurs often. But though his name appears often it was not because he and Demosthenes were political allies. Rather, the fall of Eubulus saw the rise to power of Demosthenes.

The traditional view holds that the policies of Eubulus and Demosthenes were totally opposed. Croiset, for example, names Eubulus as the head of the "peace party", which had for its aim "to put to sleep the watchfulness of the people."¹ Demosthenes, of course, is pictured as the noble leader of the "war party", the party of action, true to the ideals of Athens. For Jaeger

¹Alfred Croiset, "L'état des partis à Athènes au temps de Démosthène," Revue des Cours et Conferences, XIV (1905-06), 700-02.
"Demosthenes and his political opponents had diametrically opposite views", \(^2\) views which were "irreconcilable." \(^3\) But Jaeger wishes, at least, to make it clear that Demosthenes started political life as a supporter of Eubulus, an idea which is anathema to the more traditional supporters of Demosthenes. \(^4\) Such is Jean Luccioni. For him Demosthenes from the very beginning saw Macedon as the great danger. \(^5\) Demosthenes always acts as an Athenian patriot. \(^6\) He says:

Demosthène se proposait non pas de restituer le passé dans sa vérité, mais de lutter contre une sorte de décadence intellectuelle et morale qui affligeait, selon lui, la Grèce de son temps, parce qu'il jugeait que cette décadence compromettait et rendait difficile la politique de résistance énergique, dans l'union de tous les Grecs, qui devait s'opposer aux empiétements de l'ennemi commun, le Macédonien. \(^7\)

Such also is the position of Arnold Schaefer and many other nineteenth-century students of the period of Demosthenes.

Of course, such thinking is quite understandable, for this is cer-


\(^3\)Ibid., 57.

\(^4\)Ibid.


\(^6\)Ibid., 50.

\(^7\)Ibid., 36.
tainly the view that Demosthenes wishes posterity to have of him. His *Speech on the Crown* (xviii) is an uncompromising black-and-white portrayal of himself against the party of Eubulus and Aeschines. 8 Such is also the tenor of his other great attack on Aeschines, the *Speech on the False Legation* (xix).

As for Eubulus, Theopompus, who held him in great distaste, helps to set the tone of the traditional view of modern scholarship. Theopompus called Eubulus a profligate demagogue who led the city to indolence and cowardliness by the distributions of the Theoric Fund. 9 The view of Plutarch is often neglected:

> And Eubulus the Anaphlystian also is commended because, although few men enjoyed so much confidence and power as he, yet he administered none of the Hellenic affairs and did not take the post of general, but applied himself to the finances, increased the revenues, and did the state much good thereby. 10

But even this, while sincere, is a left-handed compliment, for it implies that Eubulus had no direct concern for foreign policy but only for stacking up drachmas. And so men like Schaefer picture Eubulus thus:

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8 The link between Eubulus and Aeschines is indicated by Demosthenes xviii. 21; 162; xix. 290-91; 304; Aeschines *On the Embassy* 184.

9 Cited in Harpocrat1on *Lexicon in Decem Oratores Atticos* s.v. *Εὐβούλος* and Athenaeus *The Deipkosofists* iv. 166 D-E.

10 Plutarch *Moralia*: *Præcepta gerendæ reipublicæ* 15. 3. 812 F.
Bei ihnen handelt es sich nicht um Hingebung an einen höheren Zweck, dem nach festen Grundsätzen auch unter Opfern und Gefahren nachgestrebt wird, sondern um behaglichen Genuss, überall nicht um hellenische Politik, sondern die ganze Staatskunst läuft hinaus auf das Geschick zu augenblicklicher Aushilfe ...  

George Grote is of the same opinion:

... Eubulus is the ministerial spokesman, whom the majority, both rich and poor, followed; a man not at all corrupt (so far as we know), but of simple conservative routine, evading all painful necessities and extraordinary precautions; conciliating the rich by resisting a property tax, and the general body of citizens by refusing to meddle with the Theoric expenditure.  

Demosthenes in such a picture is the dauntless hero with sword upraised to lead the people forth to destroy the enemies of Athens and restore the city to her true greatness. Eubulus is only concerned with money; Demosthenes with true ideals.

And so in the traditional pattern Eubulus and Demosthenes are contrasted as black to white. Some, such as Ulrich Kahrstedt, wish to award Eubulus the white banner, but retain the uncompromising contrast.

More recently, however, this contrast of black and white has been toned to a pattern of grays. Demosthenes, it is clear, spent his whole political

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life in an effort to maintain Athens as an independent and strong polis. His prime concern, as has been seen, was with foreign policy. Demosthenes' apologia is his Speech on the Crown. In it he outlines the vision he has of Athens' position and destiny. A sample statement:

Was it the duty of our city, Aeschines, to abase her pride, to lower her dignity, to rank herself with Thessalians and Dolopians, to help Philip to establish his supremacy over Greece, to annihilate the glories and the prerogatives of our forefathers? Or, if she rejected that truly shameful policy, was she to stand by and permit aggressions which she long foresaw, and knew would succeed if none should intervene?  

It was Athens' destiny and clear duty to resist all the unjust designs of Philip. This policy, Demosthenes tells us, he forwarded in all his proposals.  

Demosthenes outlined in detail what his foreign policy was:

What course of action was proper for a patriotic citizen who was trying to serve his country with all possible prudence and energy and loyalty? Surely it was to protect Attica on the sea-board by Euboea, on the inland frontier by Boeotia, and on the side towards Peloponnesus by our neighbors in that direction; to make provision for the passage of our grain supply along friendly coasts all the way to Peiraeus; to preserve places already at our disposal, such as Proconnesus, Chersonesus, Tenedos, by sending succour to them and by suitable speeches and resolutions; to secure the friendship and alliance of such places as Byzantium, Abydos, and Euboea; to destroy the most important of the existing resources of the enemy, and to make good the defenses of our own city. All these purposes were accomplished by my decrees and my administrative acts.  

13 Demosthenes xviii. 63.
14 Demosthenes xviii. 69.
15 Demosthenes xviii. 301-02.
All these things were not accomplished by Demosthenes, but at least this is a reasonable statement of his goals in concrete terms: protecting the territorial integrity of Attica, guarding the grain route, gaining strong allies, and carrying the war against Philip wherever it would hurt him. Such a policy assumes that Athens' sphere of influence included the entire Aegean area. It follows then that any activity by another power in that area would be considered as a hostile act against Athens herself. Thus as early as 354 Demosthenes began to look upon Philip as an enemy of Athens because of his activities in the northern Aegean. This area had been traditionally under the dominance of Athens, but this dominance had been seriously weakened in the changing conditions of the mid-fourth century. Demosthenes was also identified with a policy of hot war—Philip, he felt, must be attacked now! Aeschines' accusation that Demosthenes was a war-monger was not without some foundation in fact.\[^{16}\]

But though this was the guiding fact of his political life, it is to do Demosthenes a rank injustice as a statesman to say that this was his only concern. For while most of his surviving speeches are concerned with the struggle against Philip, there is recorded his struggle to reform the tax system (Speech on the Tax Boards) and his concern for the welfare of the poor and for equality in the state (Fourth Philippic). And he was also head of the Theoric Fund for a

\[^{16}\text{Aeschines On the Embassy 177.}\]
time. Domestic affairs were also of concern to Demosthenes; he was not just a foreign minister.

Demosthenes sought above all to revive the greatness Athens once possessed and to rejuvenate the present by the ideals of the past. George Kennedy recently put it this way:

A splendid passage of On the Crown (190 ff.) betrays the instinct of the martyr. It must be read with recognition of Demosthenes' assumption that no fundamental change could be admitted into the Athenian constitution and traditional way of life, an assumption which others did not accept and which could not be permanently maintained. In his lonely radicalism, Demosthenes was a pure conservative. 17

What of Eubulus? He was much concerned, contrary to the opinion of many of his critics, with preserving the autonomy of Athens. Basically he wanted peace, for he felt that peace brought many benefits. But this was to be peace with honor. Eubulus did not call for peace at any price. The peace he envisioned was a peace which left Athens strong and well able to defend herself against aggression.

It seems that Eubulus largely set out to follow the policies advocated by the author of the Treatise on the Revenues. This is suggested because so many policies that can be assigned to Eubulus correspond with those set down in the Treatise. Indeed, the Treatise appeared just after the end of the

Social War when Eubulus and his party were struggling to gain control of the state. It has been reasonably supposed that the Treatise is a public expression of the "platform" of Eubulus' political group. Though the author's proposals for the Laureian mines—never, seemingly, implemented by Eubulus—may indicate a looser relationship of the document to Eubulus' policy, the Treatise still seems to be in its general tone and presentation a theoretical expression of the views of the Eubulus group.

The Treatise is a clarion call for peace. For with peace comes full revenue to the state. And peace will bring every sort of blessing, particularly in the economic order, to Athens:

For if the state is tranquil, what class of men will not need her? Shipowners and merchants will head the list. Then there will be those rich in corn and wine and oil and cattle; men possessed of brains and money to invest; craftsmen and professors and philosophers; poets and the people who make use of their works; those to whom anything sacred or secular appeals that is worth seeing or hearing. Besides, where will those who want to buy and sell many things quickly meet with better success in their

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19 (Xenophon) Treatise on the Revenues 5. 11-12.
efforts than at Athens? 20

And so the author calls for a common peace in Greece. He wishes Athens to take the lead in establishing such a peace. 21 But if Athens is wronged, she must protect her rights:

But someone may ask me, 'Do you mean to say that, even if she is wronged, the state should remain at peace with the offenders?' No, certainly not (οὐ δὲ φαίην); but I do say that our vengeance would follow far more swiftly on our enemies if we provoked nobody by wrong-doing; for then our enemies would look in vain for an ally. 22

In this way all classes within the state will benefit, many civic improvements will be possible, and Athens shall enjoy both security and the respect of the other Greek states. 23 Such is a good statement of Eubulus' policy in foreign affairs.

Demosthenes gives witness that such was actually the policy of the Eubulus group by his burlesque of the views of 'certain politicians' in the Speech on the Chersonese:

... whenever any question arises that concerns Philip, instantly up jumps someone and tells you how good a thing it is to preserve peace, and what a bother it is to keep up a large army, and how certain persons want

20 Ibid., 5. 3-4.
21 Ibid., 5. 8-10.
22 Ibid., 5. 13.
23 Ibid., 6. 1.
to plunder your wealth, and all that sort of thing; and by these speeches they put you off and afford leisure for Philip to do whatever he wishes.²⁴

It is clear that there was a group actively opposed to the policies of Demosthenes and which the people normally followed. Stripping this statement of its invective-laden tone, it seems evident that this group urged preserving the peace which had been agreed upon with Philip, was against a large standing army (particularly a standing army of citizens), and supported the retention of the Theoric Fund. The reference to plundering the people's wealth appears in the Fourth Philippic, and in that speech Demosthenes, as has been seen, is at great pains to prove that he, too, supports the Theoric Fund.²⁵ Putting this statement in the context of the views expressed by the Treatise-author, it is easy to imagine that this opposing group was against offensive military action unless Athens' interests were clearly threatened. And so Demosthenes' policy of fighting Philip wherever and whenever possible was not acceptable to them.

Eubulus wanted peace. But at the same time Eubulus deemed it essential to maintain the key positions of Athens: the sea-ways to Pontus, the points which governed this route--Imbros, Lemnos, and the Chersonesus, Thermopylae, and Euboea. For these he would use the necessary means to af-

²⁴Demosthenes viii. 52.

²⁵Demosthenes x. 55.
ford them reasonable protection. 26 When Philip appeared on the scene, this doctrine had to be applied to a new set of practical realities. While Demosthenes chose the path of all-out war with Philip and urged that a full military effort should be made near Macedon itself, Eubulus urged that Athenian resources be used in a defense of Greece. In accordance with this policy Eubulus promoted the expedition which prevented Philip from attaining control of Thermopylae in 352. 27 He seems to have been the chief supporter of the expedition to Euboea in 349/8, for the general allied to him, Phocion, was put in charge of the expedition and Meidias, another supporter of Eubulus, seems to have promoted the expedition. 28 In 346 Eubulus and Aeschines tried to form a league against Philip but without success. 29 And Eubulus, as has been previously shown, built up a very strong Athenian fleet. Indeed, it is the opinion of G.L.


27 The decree was proposed by Diophantus of Sphettus, a political ally of Eubulus—Demosthenes xix. 86.

28 On Phocion and Eubulus see Aeschines *On the Embassy* 184. The trial of Aeschines was a political trial and test. When Phocion and Eubulus appear in support of Aeschines it may be assumed that all three are political friends. For Meidias' support of Plutarchus of Eretria, the Euboean leader supported in 348, see Demosthenes xxi. 110; 200. For Meidias as an ally of Eubulus see Demosthenes xxi. 205-07.

29 Demosthenes xix. 10-11; Aeschines *On the Embassy* 57-60.
Cawkwell that "Eubulus' policy of abandoning mere war of conquest and seeking collective security was the only chance of success and it failed not because it was ill-judged but because the new national state was led by a great general." At the same time Eubulus opposed any war to liberate Amphipolis and reassert Athenian domination in the northwestern Aegean. This opposition would explain why the people did not give approval to the plans Demosthenes proposed for offensive military action in that area. In short, Eubulus was not prepared to have what he considered the basic defense positions of Athens jeopardized, nor was he prepared to commit Athens in force to areas where the vital needs of the city were not at stake.

It appears that Eubulus had several basic reasons for such a policy. First of all, as Beloch cogently points out, Athens had struggled without success for three years with second-rate powers in the Social War and indeed had come to the edge of financial and military disaster. Eubulus realized that Athens could not carry on "eine Politik im grossen Stil" as she did in the fifth century. Secondly, if Aeschines' personal opinion may be accepted as re-


fleeting that of Eubulus, Eubulus did not feel the fanatical hatred and mistrust of Philip which gripped Demosthenes. Where Demosthenes can only hurl epithets of hatred and abuse at Philip, Aeschines will admit that Philip has a good memory and great eloquence, appears to put more trust in oaths and treaties made with Philip, and in general avoids violent invective with regard to Philip. He even strongly implied in his Speech Against Ctesiphon that the Hellenes should have made peace with Philip and not have gone to Chaeroneia. Thirdly, Eubulus wanted to avoid war so that Athens might enjoy financial and economic strength—a fact which needs no further proof, so strongly did it characterize the thinking of Eubulus.

Eubulus was also concerned about equality within the state. He was long head of the Theoric Fund and was trusted by the people in this post. And he also supported the public works program, as is clear from Aeschines and

32Aeschines On the Embassy 42-43.

33Aeschines On the Embassy 137-38.

34Aeschines Against Ctesiphon 148-51.

Dinarchus as well as from Demosthenes. Unfortunately, not one word uttered by Eubulus has come down to us (his oratorical ability was probably not outstanding, and Aeschines may well have been his spokesman before the popular Assembly), and as a result his views on this question of equality must be determined from the activities he supported. But since the Theoric Fund and the public works program played such an important part in promoting full equality, Eubulus' own views on equality may be conjectured safely enough.

Demosthenes' firm promotion of the ends aimed at by the Theoric Fund and his basic sympathy for the Fund itself as a means of giving assistance to the poor has been discussed at some length. What of Eubulus' views and policies? Not a great deal is known for, again, no speech of Eubulus is extant. It is quite clear, however, that he was connected closely with the Theoric Fund. Theopompus' caustic criticism of Eubulus for his distributions of the revenues of the state has already been recorded. There is, of course, Aeschines' explicit statement linking Eubulus with the direction of the Theoric Board. Philinus also associated Eubulus in particular with the Theoric Fund.

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36 Aeschines *Against Ctesiphon* 25-26; Dinarchus *Against Demosthenes* 96; Demosthenes iii. 28-32.

37 Aeschines *Against Ctesiphon* 25.
Indeed, Eubulus' association with the Fund was probably the factor which supported his power in the state. Aeschines relates:

... because of the trust which you placed in Eubulus, those who were elected Superintendents of the Theoric Fund held ... the office of Controller of the Treasury and the office of Receiver of Money; they also controlled the dockyards, had charge of the naval arsenal that was building, and were Superintendents of Streets; almost the whole administration of the state was in their hands.

These centralizations of power, Aeschines indicates, occurred at the time when Eubulus was in Charge of the Theoric Fund. And so, as Beloch puts it, Eubulus found in the Theoric Fund an apt instrument to give him control of the policies of the state without having to seek the office of general. It is also plain that Eubulus was a protector of the Theoric Fund, for though Demosthenes called for the Theoric money to be used to support an Athenian effort at Olynthus his plan was not approved, and the motion of Apollodorus, made a few months later, was ultimately quashed. As Eubulus was in the ascendancy at this time, it is clear that he withheld his support from these measures. And in 346 Eubulus used the Theoric Fund as a lever to secure the Peace of

38 Harpocrate Lexicon in Decem Oratores Atticos s.v. θεωρία contains a citation of this historian.

39 Aeschines Against Ctesiphon 25.

40 Beloch, 179.
Philocrates. But while it has already been demonstrated that the Theoric Fund in the time of Demosthenes and Eubulus was a matter of distributing the surpluses of the revenue, it is not clear when this change from the early Fund was instigated. Eubulus is often named as the promoter of this change, but there is no ancient evidence to this effect. Eubulus did, however, insure the continuity of the distributions by the laws regarding the assignment of the surpluses to the Theoric Fund. It has been shown that such a law was put into effect during the early period of Eubulus' political dominance. This fact is perhaps the strongest proof of Eubulus' strong support for the Fund. But aside from this information not much is really known in a direct fashion about Eubulus' activity in connection with the Fund. A great many judgements have been made about his popularity being due to the doles, his greed for power, his myopic vision of Athenian foreign policy, but these are conclusions drawn from this evidence by modern authors rather than attested fact. And, as has been indicated, it is difficult to square such judgements with the totality of facts known of Eubulus' activity.

And so Demosthenes and Eubulus both struggled, each in the way that seemed best to himself and to his party, to preserve the autonomy and equality of the Athenian democracy. While Demosthenes opted for total war and

41 Demosthenes xix. 291.
thus was more ready to sacrifice the "glue of the democracy", the Theoricon, to reach what he felt to be more important goals, Eubulus opted for a more limited defense perimeter and within this defined but well-defended area to maintain civic equality particularly by means of the Theoricon and the work of the Theoricon Board and to promote the economic growth of the city. Demosthenes' pattern was the more active, a striving for quick, decisive results; Eubulus chose a slow but steady strengthening of the city.

It might be thought that Chaeroneia definitively proved the weakness of Demosthenes' analysis of the problems Athens had to deal with. For though Athens had the support of troops from Euboea, Achaea, Megara,

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42 It may be profitable to examine in schematic form the comparative actions of Demosthenes and Eubulus in three difference instances which are well documented enough to provide a contrasting view:

Demosthenes

352 Supported action of Eubulus—Demosthenes xix. 86.

Felt expedition should have been sent to wage offensive war—Demosthenes iii. 5. Urged offensive war—Demosthenes iv. 17-18.

Urged pay be given for service instead of having Theoric distributions—Demosthenes xiii.

Eubulus

Sent strong force to Thermopylae to protect it from Philip—Demosthenes xix. 86.

Planned expedition to protect Chersonese; expedition not sent because of lessening of danger—Demosthenes iii. 4-5.

Plan not accepted—(Theoric distributions continued).
349/8 Urged support for Olynthus; offensive action against Philip—Demosthenes i; iii.

Urged Theoric money be used for military purposes—Demosthenes i; iii.

Against diverting military forces to Euboea—Demosthenes v. 5.

Limited expeditions sent to Olynthus; no offensive action taken.

Plan not accepted—(Demosthenes) lix. 3-8.

Promoted expedition to protect Euboea—Demosthenes v. 5; Aeschines ii. 184.


Promoted Pan-Hellenic Confederation against Philip—Aeschines ii. 57-60; Demosthenes xix. 304.

Sent expedition to hold Thermopylae against Philip. Expedition rejected by Phocians—Aeschines ii. 133.

Then sought peace with Philip; used Theoric Fund as lever to promote peace—Demosthenes xix. 291; Aeschines ii. 79.

Wanted peace only as a breathing space—Demosthenes v. 13; 24-25.

Wanted to make peace into a general peace—Demosthenes xix. 14; Aeschines iii. 69-71.

Peace of Philocrates obtained.

Peace of Philocrates obtained.

This peace originally supported by both men.
Acarnania, Leucas, Corcyra, and, most important, Thebes, and though she herself was totally mobilized and was well-financed and though the Theoric Fund had been converted for the moment to military purposes, the Hellenic forces, out-generated, were decisively defeated. And thus real autonomy for the Greek cities came to an end, despite an effort on Philip's part to maintain appearances. But Demosthenes' own defense deserves a hearing:

You must not accuse me of crime, because Philip happened to win the battle; for the event was in God's hands, not mine. Show me that I did not adopt, as far as human calculation could go, all the measures that were practicable, or that I did not carry them out with honesty and diligence, and with an industry that overtaxed my strength; or else show me that the enterprises I initiated were not honorable, worthy of Athens, and inevitable. Prove that, and then denounce me; but not till then. 43

Athens had been defeated under the leadership of Demosthenes, but in a valiant cause, the defense of Athenian autonomy and arete. But though Demosthenes served the city well once war with Philip became inevitable, it is fair to ask whether such war was indeed inevitable. Eubulus' group had not wanted Athens to provoke Philip once the Peace had been made. They believed that Athens could enjoy both autonomy and a good life for all her citizens. But Demosthenes ever looked upon Philip as "the enemy" and was willing to make sacrifices in the struggle for equality so that autonomy might be maintained.

However, the powerful national state of Macedon under Philip, a truly excel-
lent general, prevailed; and Athens lost her autonomy. While the Theoric Fund was soon restored and life within the city went on again, Athens could never be the same. The bothersome question remains whether under the more cautious policy of peace with honor, strong defense, and civic equality of Eubulus, such a fate might have been postponed, perhaps for quite a time. Perhaps, realistically-speaking, the expanding nation of Macedon would not and could not have been long delayed by Athens, whatever action she took. For the days of the city-state were numbered; the empire was about to appear as the dominant ruling force in the Mediterranean basin. Politicians such as Eubulus and Demosthenes cannot foretell the future nor do they often perceive the underlying trend of events. They are too close to their own times. Rather, they must deal with the realities they encounter in terms of their own experience and the collective experience of their people. Philip of Macedon was something new. Eubulus might look to the encounter with the Persians for a clue and decide that a common peace was the answer. Demosthenes might look to the Atens of the First Confederation which ruled by its own power the cities and islands of the Aegean for a clue and determine that a strong citizen army was the real answer. But Macedon was not Persia and it certainly was not Sparta; it was nothing like a city-state and it was not yet an empire of disparate peoples bound together only by military force. The Macedon of Philip
was a nation, and under him it became a nation in arms. In the long run the many Greek cities with their varied loyalties could never resist a determined effort by such a nation. Chaeroneia was only the proof of this fact and not really a proof for the adequacies or inadequacies of the policies of Eubulus and Demosthenes.
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The thesis submitted by Robert A. Wild, S.J. has been read and approved by the director of the thesis. Furthermore, the final copies have been examined by the director and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content and form.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

May 29, 1967  
Date  
Signature of Adviser